


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DATE FILMED

7/27/81

UNIFICATION OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS:

PROGRAM MODELS

by

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71091

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PREFACE

Local corrections agencies nationwide are struggling to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations and to streamline organizational arrangements for the delivery of varied correctional services. The study on which this document is based was conducted by the American Justice Institute (AJI) to synthesize the best research, operational experience, and expert opinion concerning correctional reorganization, with an emphasis on consolidation and unification of related functions. The purpose is to provide criminal justice administrators, planners, and policy-makers, elected officials, and citizens with information to help them make informed choices in planning and implementing organizational reforms to improve delivery of correctional services at the local level.

AJI project staff began by conducting a literature search and field survey. Letters were sent to all criminal justice state planning agencies and each LEAA regional office, asking for their help in identifying sites where successful consolidation efforts had been undertaken or were underway. Contacts with colleagues in the field also were made to obtain advice concerning promising examples. In a "second wave" mailing, 60 additional letters were sent to professional associations, private nonprofit agencies and institutions, colleges and universities, and LEAA-funded projects. Responses were followed up on an individual basis, generating numerous study reports, copies of legislation, and other documentation as well as suggestions for site visits.

These materials were read and catalogued. Follow-up was done by telephone and promising sites were selected for in-depth study. In all, 45 locations were recommended as promising examples of successful attempts to reorganize and consolidate local corrections. Through correspondence, telephone contacts, and preliminary site visits, the range of sites was narrowed to 17. These were located in eight different states.

Primary criteria for final site selection included: (1) comprehensiveness (sites in which the many pieces of the corrections operation were being pulled together into a single organizational network); (2) local service delivery (sites in which local responsibility for community corrections was emphasized); (3) adult corrections orientation (where consolidation of adult corrections was the primary focus); (4) representativeness (sites with widely applicable organizational approaches); and (5) strength of recommendation (a less quantifiable criterion that took into account the sources and strengths of the recommendation and the amount of substantiating material).

Secondary criteria for site selection included: (1) diversity of geographic location; (2) urban/rural representativeness; and (3) logistics (considering the economy and efficiency of travel arrangements). Applying these primary and secondary criteria to the 45 promising locations, the following sites were selected for study:

California: Ventura County; San Diego County; Shasta County; Napa County

Connecticut: State Corrections Department

Florida: State Corrections Department; Orange County

Iowa: State Corrections Department; Des Moines (Polk County)

Maryland: State Corrections Department; Montgomery County

Minnesota: State Corrections Department; Arrowhead Regional Community Corrections System; Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System

Oregon: State Corrections Department; Multnomah County

Washington: Kings County

The next major phase of the project involved on-site examination of the 17 primary sites, bolstered by information received through mail and telephone contacts with representatives of secondary sites. The final phases of the project involved AJI staff and consultants in the analysis and synthesis of materials, drafting of chapters for the report, and review of drafts by consultants and site representatives to insure that accurate and up-to-date information had been captured. Members of the project advisory group also read and commented on the various drafts.

Numerous individuals and organizations contributed to the production of this document. Members of the project advisory group, who provided helpful advice and encouragement and contributed substantively throughout the process, included: Lenore Johnson, Commissioner, Lake County (Minn.) Board of Commissioners; Harry Allen, professor and director of the Program for the Study of Crime and Delinquency at the start of the project and recently relocated to San Jose University; Daniel Glaser, professor of sociology, University of Southern California; and Norm F. Chamberlain, executive director of the Pioneer Cooperative Affiliation, Seattle, Washington.

Louis Biondi and Frank Shults served successively as project monitors for the LEAA grant (77-NI-99-0065) supporting this work. They both provided sound advice, showed genuine interest in the success of the project, and provided capable management support.

Individuals interviewed at each of the sites; and our many correspondents, unfortunately, are too many to list here. To all of these people, and to our many other colleagues, advisors, consultants, friends, and family members who gave in measures large and small, we express our appreciation for their varied contributions to this effort.

Some Major Themes

As the study of organizational alternatives proceeded, certain major themes emerged to help us to find our way through an enormously complex territory of theory and practice. These became points of orientation, and eventually provided a framework for the report. These guiding ideas are implicit throughout the text, but it may be helpful to state them explicitly here.

First, the problem of fragmentation of correctional services is real and it acts to frustrate and defeat well-designed programmatic reforms. Very little attention has been given to developing the organizational arrangements required to implement community-based correctional programs. The present system is characterized by gaps, duplications, and cross-purposes among the different services and levels of government, yet reorganization to correct these problems often produces only cosmetic change. Sometimes it diminishes the effectiveness of existing services.

To be effective, reorganization must be oriented to well-defined substantive goals. There must be a shared understanding of the problems to which community corrections will be addressed, the program strategies to be used, and the resources to be committed to the task. "Unification" and "consolidation" are needed to overcome service fragmentation, but these goals should not be sought at the expense of flexibility and discretion in fitting particular programs to particular needs. Bureaucratic solutions should be avoided; instead, plans should provide for selective centralization of some functions and decentralization of others.

There is no "school solution" to the organization of community correctional services. Jurisdictions vary dramatically, not only in such obvious features as geographic size and population density, but in a diversity of more subtle factors -- attitudes toward government, the role played by private agencies, the nature of crime and community tolerance for it, and so on. The "right" organizational blueprint is the one that fits the situation.

Nevertheless, there are consequences associated with moving toward, for example, a regional configuration instead of administration by a single unit of government. Such basic choices require a relinquishment of other options, and they involve advantages and disadvantages, hazards and opportunities, which are to some degree predictable. Three "pure-type" models are presented in this report to aid in assessing such factors on the basis of experience gained elsewhere.

Solutions to organizational problems in community corrections today must be fashioned in an intergovernmental context. Even under arrangements that emphasize strong, unified control by a single jurisdiction, there must be linkages and a dynamic exchange with other units of government. Distinctive, but complementary roles are emerging for different entities, some as direct providers of service, others as facilitators and regulators. This reverses the historic pattern of uncoordinated growth in which almost all correctional functions are assumed to some extent by almost all units of government in our federated system.

"Organization" is understood to mean "structure" much of the time, and the organization chart captures the attention of everyone. But ultimate effectiveness may depend more on the way in which the change process is managed than on the eventual arrangement of departments and divisions and the lines connecting them. Success depends on a keen understanding of the "field of forces" within which reorganization is attempted. The ability to discern forces that support and those that oppose proposed changes, a sense of timing, and the ability to turn adversity to advantage are examples of the kind of leadership required to bring about more reasonable and cost-effective organizations for delivering community correctional services.

Organization of the Report

This report consists of seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the topic of correctional consolidation, outlining the evolution of the problem of service fragmentation and the beginnings of organizational reform. The major "conceptual tools" used for the analysis of current community correctional systems and the ways in which change can be induced also are introduced.

Chapter II describes three "pure-type" organizational models for the delivery of local correctional services and identifies the seven analytic dimensions or issues in terms of which each model is described in subsequent chapters.

Chapters III through V present and discuss operating examples of each of the three models. Chapter III is concerned with the county-administered unified corrections model; Chapter IV with the regional or multi-jurisdiction local government model; and Chapter V with the state-administered decentralized model. Each of these chapters uses the seven analytic dimensions identified in Chapter II to analyze and report the data collected in site visits. These dimensions include: source of initiative for change; values and goals of reorganization; scope of the new corrections system; intergovernmental relations; financing; linkages with other criminal justice and human service agencies; and impact on service delivery.

Chapter VI focuses on the change process, using some elements of "force field" theory to analyze the various "driving" and "restraining" forces that served to facilitate or impede reform in each of the three model situations. Change strategies and tactics and some general guidelines for nurturing the reorganization process also are offered.

Chapter VII attempts to develop some "action charges" for the various participants in and supporters of the reorganization effort. The roles of different actors differ in significant ways and there are unique contributions that each type of individual or group can make. Rather than summarizing what is presented in earlier chapters, this final chapter goes a step further to suggest how what has been learned might be applied.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Efforts to improve American correctional systems have long been preoccupied with facilities and programs -- the operation of jails, prisons, and youth institutions; the supervision of offenders on probation and parole; and, more recently, the creation of diverse "alternative" services such as community correctional centers, youth service bureaus, and drug or alcohol treatment programs. Relatively little attention has been directed to the organization and management of these programs. Yet problems of correctional administration seem omnipresent. There are gaps in service and costly duplications. There is an overall pattern of fragmentation engendered by the fact that correctional programs are administered by all levels of government (and many private agencies) with little concern for coordination or rational divisions of labor.

The development of orderly and cost-effective organizations for the delivery of correctional services thus is one of the most urgent needs in the field today. Until administrative arrangements have been clarified, and in many instances redesigned, efforts to test and refine programs will be frustrated and their results obscured. This seems especially true for community corrections, where a bewildering array of programs, budgets, and jurisdictional mandates converge. The most difficult organizational and management problems, as well as the greatest opportunities for resocializing offenders, are found in the community.

A major obstacle to successful reorganization has been the insularity of local corrections. Program operators, immersed in their own milieus, typically have little opportunity to compare organizational alternatives or to study the successes and failures of their counterparts in other systems. Yet "snapshots" taken in key locations reveal some exciting new developments that appear to offer the promise of a more manageable, and ultimately more effective, system.

So beleaguered is the field of corrections that even such qualified optimism seems strangely out of place. Site visits and a review of current trends, however, uncovered many examples of constructive change. Paradoxically, forces defined as "unfriendly" to correctional programs at times seemed to supply the energy for their improvement. The fiscal stringency generated by local tax reductions, for example, has necessitated the development of more efficient organizational formats. The partial withdrawal of state governments from institutional programs, under the combined impact of economy moves and the "justice model," has

stimulated state-local partnerships in the expansion of community alternatives. Questioning of the efficacy of large public bureaucracies in the administration of local corrections has led, in some locations, to service agreements with private agencies and a few highly creative improvisations. For example:

- Connecticut: The Field Services Division of the State Department of Corrections has withdrawn from the direct provision of parole services in favor of service contracts with public and private agencies at the local level. Variety and flexibility in meeting the needs of different geographic areas are stressed. An imaginative public education program has been developed, primarily through T.V., resulting in coalitions of interested citizens working for improved community corrections programs, independent of state agencies and their policy positions.
- Orange County (Orlando) Florida: Correctional reorganization has relieved jail overcrowding and court congestion. Construction of a new jail has been postponed indefinitely, saving millions of dollars for construction, plus \$15. per prisoner per day in county costs.
- Minnesota: With assistance from a new state subsidy, six sparsely populated counties in northeast Minnesota have joined together to provide a comprehensive, high-quality correctional service (that none could have provided individually) at a reasonable cost to each county.
- Multnomah County (Portland) Oregon: Criminal justice departments have been brought together under a single department of justice services. Formerly fragmented administrative functions have been consolidated and the entire criminal justice system is comprehensively planned, operated, and assessed.

How have these communities achieved such results? Is there anything to be learned from their experiences? What guidance can they provide to other local governments considering the reorganization of correctional services? This report has been prepared to answer questions such as these. Recommendations and observations are based on a study of more than a dozen successful community corrections consolidation efforts -- stretching from Florida to Washington State and involving various urban, suburban, and rural governments. The focus was on emerging solutions and on organizational "models" that appear capable of meeting, with some adaptations, the varying needs of many different jurisdictions. To set the current situation in perspective, the study began with an examination of the evolution of the problem and the

beginnings of organizational reform. This was followed by an attempt to develop, from observations of operating systems, several organizational models for the delivery of correctional services at the local level.

Evolution of the Problem

Over the last 200 years, American corrections has undergone an evolutionary expansion and diversification that has left the field richer by far but disorganized, fragmented, and confused. Criticism of the uncoordinated and haphazard nature of correctional organization and administration has come from numerous scholars and practitioners within and outside the corrections field. The fragmentation of correctional services also has been highlighted by all of the major study commissions of the past decade. In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice focused attention on the lack of coordination among the various components of the correctional and criminal justice systems.¹ This theme was echoed four years later by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which observed:

Very little is 'systematic' about the state-local corrections system.... In most situations, administrative responsibility is divided among the state, its counties and localities; split between agencies at each level that handle adults and those that deal with juveniles; and sliced up within jurisdictions among various functions. Many functions are not even handled by the corrections system but are performed by the courts.²

Both the fragmentation of correctional services and the movement toward unification are comprehensible within the context of their own historical periods. That correctional administration in most jurisdictions is disjointed and uncoordinated reflects the way in which the various service components developed over time. As a series of reforms, each designed as an alternative to existing means of dealing with offenders, the separate components of what today is perceived as the correctional "system" emerged piecemeal and in conceptual and organizational opposition to one another. The episodic development of correctional services at different levels and for different reasons is described by the Council of State Governments:

The steady expansion of corrections services is the result of a series of reform efforts, each one aimed at a perceived deficiency in its predecessor. For example, incarceration was introduced out of a distaste for the practice of physical punishment; probation was in turn an effort to mitigate the inhumaneness of incarceration. As each reform was introduced, it became institutionalized with its own bureaucratic structure, distinct from its predecessors....³

Today, the various service components are, in many jurisdictions, organizationally so distinct that they share little but the focus on offender populations. Functional divisions exist between adult and juvenile programs, institutional and field services, and local and state institutions. The rapid rise of diversion programs has added yet another major service area, distinct from but administratively overlapping other correctional services. Fragmentation is both horizontal and vertical, with different functions in the same geographic area assigned to separate agencies at one level of government or to various agencies at different levels of government. Long-term institutions for adults and juveniles and parole systems in most cases are state-operated, often by different agencies. Jails and juvenile detention facilities generally are administered by local governments, usually counties, again by separate agencies. Probation is a state-local function in most jurisdictions; for adults it is predominately state-operated, for juveniles it is more often local.⁴

Functional divisions among the various correctional services are reflected in deep-seated ideological differences that both arise from and serve to perpetuate the organizational schisms. During the early stages of their evolution, such divisions were not only natural, considering the reformist character of most correctional services, but probably necessary. Independence, and even antagonism, permitted each reform to develop, organize, and expand without contamination from the service or program it was designed to supersede. Currently, however, fragmentation and the duplications and gaps in service that tend to accompany it are viewed by many as a serious impediment to correctional effectiveness.

The Beginnings of Organizational Reform

The move to unify correctional services is as much a product of its time as was the divisiveness that characterized their early development. Both the rhetoric and the reality of correctional consolidation derive from a number of recent developments in the absence of which fragmentation of correctional services could hardly be viewed as problematic. Most important, perhaps, has been the emergence of the correctional services as a functional grouping and popularization of the concept of the criminal justice "system."

The term "corrections," at least as applied to the entire spectrum of programs and services for the convicted offender, was not in common usage before about 1950. Until that time, prisons, jails, probation, and parole were viewed as independent services or systems in themselves rather than as parts of an overall correctional system. Corrections, when the term was used at all, generally referred to prison administration.⁵ The concept of the "criminal justice system," comprised of law enforcement, courts, and corrections, is of even more recent vintage.

Beginning in the 1960's and gaining momentum throughout the early 1970's, a broad-based effort to reconceptualize (and ultimately to remodel) the criminal justice process emerged and took shape. A wide variety of recommendations for reform -- some structural, others operational or philosophic -- were set forth in the reports of a series of national study commissions. Many of these recommendations were based on the assumption of a need for coherence in criminal justice and corrections, both of which had come to be viewed in systemic terms.

Catchwords of reform included offender "reintegration," community-based treatment, alternatives to incarceration, "diversion" from criminal justice processing, and "minimizing penetration" of the justice system. Most analyses also stressed the need for a "continuum of service" to provide for the logical progression of offenders from one agency or program to the next and a smooth transition to the community upon release. The climate for change was created by the wealth of new ideas, new program models, and new approaches to offender management. The context was provided by the now widely accepted "total systems" view of both corrections and criminal justice. Within this context the fragmentation of services, so long taken for granted, began to appear conspicuously in need of remedy.

Other Stimuli for Reform

Interestingly, a second major impetus for reorganization to reduce or eliminate fragmentation in service delivery has come largely from outside corrections and criminal justice. Most state reorganizations of corrections agencies during the past decade have occurred as part of a more general reorganization of state government.⁶ Since the turn of this century, reorganization of state government has focused on the lack of coordination or organizational coherence among public agencies. As had already occurred in the corrections field, the rapid expansion of government services in the 1930's and 1940's resulted in an overly complex administrative structure with numerous independent agencies and considerable overlap in jurisdictions and duplications in services. Streamlining the government bureaucracy, by consolidating agencies and standardizing operating procedures, was viewed as a means of increasing efficiency and accountability of government operations and insuring more effective control by the executive.⁷ In the process of redesigning the overall structure of state government, corrections agencies also have been subjected to organizational realignment. In almost every case, such reorganization -- for both corrections and state government in general -- has resulted in administrative consolidation into fewer agencies.⁸

A third major impetus for correctional reorganization derives from the perception that existing organizational structures are obsolete, neither reflecting nor promoting the philosophies, functions, or inter-agency relationships of the modern correctional service. The reason

for the perceived incongruence between form and function is that, in most states and localities, correctional operations and their conceptual underpinnings have changed. The general trend has been toward the expansion and upgrading of services for offenders in the community and a shift in responsibility for offender management from the state to the localities. In addition, the number and variety of correctional services has expanded tremendously, producing a chaotic assemblage of related programs under the auspices of administratively unrelated agencies. Among the most significant developments of the past decade with implications for the reorganization of correctional services are:

- Expansion of corrections into areas traditionally within the province of law enforcement or the courts (e.g., pretrial screening and classification, pretrial detention and field services, postconviction/presentencing services, etc.).
- A philosophical, and often operational, shift from an institution-oriented corrections program to one that places greater emphasis on community-based alternatives to incarceration and diversion.
- An "outreach" orientation, including strategies for service brokerage, offender advocacy, public education, resource development, use of volunteers and paraprofessionals, and contracting for services from private and public agencies in the community.
- Growing involvement of courts in defining and upholding offenders' rights; and of state governments in setting standards for correctional operations and subsidizing or otherwise creating incentives for adherence to state standards and policy objectives for local corrections.
- A tendency for juvenile and adult programming to converge, in both theory and practice, as juvenile services become more concerned with due process and adult services become more service-oriented.
- Increasing concern for the continuity of services from point of arrest to discharge from the correctional system, for equity in offender management, and for standardization of bureaucratic procedures to enhance equity and to permit sharing of information needed at each stage of correctional processing.

States and counties vary widely in the extent to which these general trends are manifested in their correctional operations or in the stated objectives of correctional agencies and the commitments of agency management. Many, however, have moved far enough from traditional modes of operation so that some administrative reorganization

of community corrections is seen as necessary. Armed with a new philosophy of community-based and community-oriented corrections and spurred by the more general trend toward reorganization of the public services, these jurisdictions have been seeking or experimenting with new organizational structures that allow for more cost-effective delivery of services at the local level.

Reorganization to Upgrade Local Service Delivery

The varied success of America's states and counties in managing their offender populations suggests that there is no "best" way to organize and administer correctional services that can be assumed applicable to all jurisdictions. Direct state administration of local corrections makes sense in some situations -- for example, in smaller, more compact states or in sparsely populated ones. In others (e.g., where there is a history of strong and effective local government), state participation may consist primarily of technical and financial assistance, while counties retain administrative control of programs and services. Consolidation, where considered desirable, may be achieved by unification of services at the county level, by multi-county arrangements for sharing workloads and resources, or by regionalization within a statewide system. Correctional services thus may operate effectively under a variety of organizational arrangements -- tailored to the specific conditions and correctional objectives of particular states and counties.

There are, however, some commonalities among the organizational models adopted or espoused for modern community corrections systems. They are, increasingly, oriented toward the provision of services that are comprehensive, unified, and community-based. Correctional services to local communities are comprehensive in that a full range of needed services and resources are offered or arrangements are made for their provision by referral of correctional clients to other community agencies and programs. Comprehensiveness may be gauged by the extent to which a jurisdiction is equipped to meet identified client needs in such areas as health, education, job training, and employment development. Program activities designed to identify and fill service gaps are one indication of movement toward a more comprehensive community corrections service.

Correctional services are unified to the extent that the various components of the correctional apparatus are brought together organizationally and that responsibility for correctional programs is lodged with a single administrative agency. One simple measure of movement toward unification is the degree to which the number of organizations with corrections responsibility is shrinking. Reorganization to consolidate correctional services indicates movement toward unification.

Community-based corrections implies not only that offenders are retained in their communities, but that other community agencies, citizens, elected officials, and corrections staff all have some stake in the operation. Local people feel responsible for the correctional apparatus and participate in the corrections process. The emphasis is on supervising offenders in the community as opposed to state institutional placement. Corrections also is integrated with other local human service programs and makes optimum use of these resources in meeting the needs of correctional clients. Some measures of the degree to which a corrections system is community-based include: the number and proportion of state institution commitments; the extent to which the corrections organization relies on other community services; and the degree to which local groups and individuals are involved in the corrections process.

There are a number of ways in which the comprehensive, unified, integrated, community-based corrections service can be implemented. At this point at least, there simply is not enough documented information to justify promulgation of any single organizational model for corrections systems in all of the nation's culturally, geographically, and socioeconomically disparate states. The organizational structure appropriate for any given jurisdiction will depend on such factors as the size and distribution of the state's population; geographic circumstances; policy objectives for corrections and for other public services; and traditions in the operation of state and local governments in general and in the way in which correctional functions historically have been handled. There is almost endless variation in the extent of consolidation or integration and in the nature of the state-local relationship that will facilitate the delivery of correctional services at the local level.

The particular configurations reflected in an organizational chart, of course, do not insure effective or efficient service delivery and reorganization is not always the answer to service-related problems. If organizational reform is undertaken, however, it should be geared to the conditions and objectives or "mission" that characterize a state's correctional system. Some consolidation of agency functions and some degree of state involvement in local corrections probably are desirable in most jurisdictions in order to provide for greater coherence in the correctional process and a full array of services at the local level.

Since logic is rarely the paramount concern in organizational change, the organizational response that is both appropriate and feasible will be determined as well by what are essentially "political" considerations -- how entrenched are existing arrangements, how costly and how difficult is reform, and what kinds of change will be supported or allowed by local sources of power and influence. Notions of the ideal organizational configuration must be tempered by considerations of what can be accomplished within existing constraints.

Bringing About Change

The key to successful reorganization is skillful management of the change process. To move from one organizational structure, and one operational mode, to another is no simple task. Robert Biller has suggested that organizational change can be thought of in two contrasting situations.⁹ The first, which he describes as "bedrock," occurs in relatively stable bureaucratic systems in which change can be induced in a planned, rational, and long-range fashion. The second situation, which Biller labels "swampy," occurs under conditions of high uncertainty and rapid change. This is the situation in which corrections finds itself today -- a swampy condition by all tests and one in which the management of contingencies may be the most crucial requirement.

In such a situation organizational change is particularly difficult to orchestrate. Change is a turbulent process involving diverse individuals and interest groups, values and traditions, and various imperatives and constraints within and outside the jurisdiction. Organizational change occurs over time as the system moves through cycles of "unfreezing" (during which change may occur) and "re-freezing" (during which crystallization takes place and further change is discouraged).¹⁰ During a period of unfreezing, various forces may join together to modify existing organizational arrangements while others will arise to resist change.

Kurt Lewin pioneered in the development of a topographical approach to the study of human behavior.¹¹ His approach, which came to be called field theory, stressed analysis of the forces that operate within and among human actors who are linked to one another by social bonds. The basic idea of field theory has been used extensively in the applied behavioral sciences and has proved especially helpful in researching organizational change. It thus seemed suited to the present effort to identify different models for the reorganization of community-based corrections.

The technique is methodologically simple, although far from easy to apply to real-world situations. The first task is to define the goals of change (in this case the reorganization or corrections and related services). This is followed by an effort to inventory those forces that support and facilitate the changes required to attain these goals ("driving forces"), as well as those that operate to resist or impede change ("restraining forces"). The behavior of those who seek to bring about change can be appraised in terms of their capacity to stimulate and coordinate driving forces and to neutralize or counteract restraining ones.

Such an approach is, of course, much easier to describe than to implement. Sometimes latent forces (such as the perceived attitude of

a powerful decision-maker) are highly influential, despite the fact that they are never expressed overtly. At other times, what appear to be driving forces turn out to be restraining ones (as when an outside expert who supports reorganization is rejected by influential "insiders"). Defining the goals of change also may be difficult because they seldom are consensual and they tend to be modified as the change process unfolds. Nevertheless, force field analysis does provide a useful conceptual tool in an exploratory study such as this.

A second conceptual lens through which information collected for this study has been interpreted is "the law of the situation." This term was introduced many years ago by Mary Parker Follett in her perceptive essays on organizational conflict.¹² In attempting to conceptualize ways in which conflict might be resolved constructively, Follett developed the notion of "integration." Integration is achieved when the crucial and legitimate goals of contesting parties are optimized, rather than scaled down through compromise or overridden through domination. Integrative solutions often require redefinition of the problem, since it is common for any party with a stake in a contested issue to define the problem in such a way that others must lose if they are to win.

Follett described the combined dynamics of the integration process as "the law of the situation." The premise on which this idea rests is that the elements necessary to reach "optimal" solutions to most problems lie in the context in which they arise. Domination and compromise commonly occur because of insufficient time, patience, or motivation to tease out and fit together the pieces of a better solution. Those who enter the problem-solving arena with inflexible notions of the "right" answer, and little inclination to consider the view of others, are likely to impede the development of lasting solutions.

Both force field analysis and the techniques of integration seem highly appropriate to the attempt to develop and apply models for the consolidation and unification of community corrections. This is true for two reasons. First, our knowledge about what works and does not work in correctional programs (and in organizational formats designed to deliver them) is rudimentary. And second, the situations within which such reorganization efforts are considered or attempted differ strikingly along many dimensions. An awareness of the opportunities for and constraints on organizational change, and a willingness to work with and within them, will do much to insure the success of any such venture.

Outline of the Report

Chapter II describes three "pure-type" models developed from site

visit data for the purpose of clarifying the types of organizational change currently being undertaken by local corrections agencies across the United States. Seven dimensions along which variations are found to occur also are described. Subsequent chapters present information and observations gleaned from the study of local corrections systems representative of the three models. The three model chapters are followed by a discussion of the change process and an outline of "action charges" for various individuals and groups with an interest in effective local corrections and the organizational framework for its achievement.

Neither the models nor the action charges are intended as "blue-prints" for action. They are, instead, generalized prototypes designed to assist those seeking organizational change in making decisions and implementing plans optimally suited to their particular jurisdictions.

FOOTNOTES

1. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). Other advocates of correctional consolidation have included: Committee for Economic Development, Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice (New York: 1972); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Recommendations of the Corrections Task Force (Wash., D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).
2. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Relations in the Criminal Justice System (Wash. D.C.: August 1971).
3. Council of State Governments, Reorganization of State Corrections Agencies: a Decade of Experience (Lexington, Ky.: 1977).
4. Robert Carter, Richard A. McGee, and E. K. Nelson, Corrections in America (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975), p. 170.
5. Daniel L. Skoler, Governmental Structuring of Criminal Justice Services, Chapter VIII, "Correctional Services." For more on responses to correctional fragmentation, see: Daniel L. Skoler, "State Criminal Justice Superagencies: Antidote for the Nonsystem?" State Government, Winter 1976, pp. 2-8; and "Correctional Unification: Rhetoric, Reality, and Potential," Federal Probation, (March 1976): 14-20.
6. Supra note 3. The Council of State Governments reports that, between 1965 and 1975, 42 states reorganized their corrections agencies and 29 did so twice. Other trends included a dramatic increase in the number of states with a single agency (from 12 in 1965 to 23 a decade later) and a shift in responsibility for some services (especially probation) from the judiciary and local government to the state.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid. Defining reorganization as a change in the bureaucratic location of corrections administration (combining program responsibility into fewer agencies, shifting administrative jurisdictions, or moving services into or out of an "umbrella" agency), the Council of State Governments reports that 42 states changed their corrections administrative structure at least once during the decade 1965-1975. The trend toward consolidation is clear from their data: the Council notes that in 1965 there were 119 independent state agencies with corrections responsibility, while ten years later there were only 92.

9. Robert P. Biller, "On Tolerating Policy and Organizational Termination: Some Design Considerations," Policy Sciences, Vol. 7 (1976): 133-149.
10. Kurt Lewin, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology: Concepts and Methods," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44 (1939): 868-896.
11. Ibid.
12. Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (eds.), Dynamic Administration: the Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett (New York: Harper and Bros., 1940), pp. 30-49.

CHAPTER II

THE MODELS: AN OVERVIEW

No single organizational model can be expected to meet the needs of local corrections in all jurisdictions of the United States. The demographic, geographic, and political circumstances are enormously varied: from dense to sparse distributions of population; from small to very large service areas; from jurisdictions in which counties are strong governmental entities to those in which there are no counties at all. Behind such prominent features lie a multitude of other more subtle differences in customs, traditions, attitudes, and practices that characterize the public services generally and the workings of the justice system in particular.

This report presents three basic models for the organization and administration of community corrections. It is not anticipated that any of these models will be exactly right for a given situation. In fact, it is likely that none of the models offered here as "pure types," will be found to exist in reality exactly as described. Those who develop organizational designs for community corrections generally will adopt some combination of models that meets the specific needs of their situation. For purposes of analysis, however, it may be useful to consider the attributes of each pure type independently--its strengths and weaknesses, the problems that must be surmounted in its implementation, and some strategies and tactics for dealing with those problems.

The first model assumes that a unit of local government (almost always a county) will directly administer a wide range of community-based correctional services. The second assumes that two or more local governments will jointly provide and administer such services. The third model assumes that a state government will administer community correctional services, with some decentralization to the local level. The "field of forces" that must be dealt with changes radically under these different assumptions. In the first two models, the role of state government is facilitative and regulatory, while local governments are the primary administrative actors. In the third model, the state negotiates for the use of many local resources but retains administrative control over programs. The first and second models, which share the feature of local government administration, differ considerably in implementation: one involves only a single bureaucratic and legislative system, while the other requires sometimes formidable negotiations between or among local units to work out financial and operational arrangements. The "driving forces" that favor development of a unified and comprehensive system, and the "restraining forces" that arise to oppose it, are apt to vary with the model adopted.

FIGURE 1

THREE PROGRAM MODELS

Major Organizational Options and Dimensions

	Model #1:	Model #2:	Model #3:
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS:	Unified County-Admin- istered Program Model	Multi-Jurisdiction Local Government Program Model	State-Administered Program Model

THE DIMENSIONS:

Source Of Initiative For Change -- Where does the impetus for unification originate?
Values and Goals -- What values and goals mold its character?
Organizational Scope -- What will be included in the new organizational structure?
Intergovernmental Relationships -- What intergovernmental relationships help to
shape the unification effort?
Financing -- Where is the money to come from? Who pays for what?
Linkages to Related Services -- What linkages are sought between the corrections
organization and resource systems in the surrounding community?
Service Impact -- What is the impact of reorganization on service delivery?

Dimensions of the Models

The three models presented here, however distinct, represent efforts to accomplish the same underlying purpose: that of knitting together the disparate resources needed for cost-effective delivery of community-based correctional services. This purpose is supported in part by the belief that most offenders can be managed more effectively in the community than in remote facilities. It is supported as well by a generic movement in public administration toward functional consolidation of similar services and decentralization of service delivery. The goal is to develop comprehensive, unified programs that are integrated with local resources in ways that minimize reliance on costly, layered, and unresponsive organizational machinery.

No single set of doctrines, of course, even those as appealing as "unification" and "decentralization," will be sufficient to guide the reorganization of community corrections in any jurisdiction. Regardless of the model or combination of models adopted, certain analytic questions must be addressed by all who seek to bring about organizational change. Which functions should be centralized and which decentralized? How should the required services be financed? Which officials are in the best position to manage them? How will local resources be leveraged? What distinctive roles emerge for local, state, and federal governments? Such questions can be thought of as representing dimensions in terms of which the models can be explicated, differentiated, and assessed. The questions posed under each dimension listed below are deceptively simple: Their answers, which will differ from one situation to another, seldom if ever are absolute.

Source of Initiative for Change

Where does the impetus for reorganization originate? Is it generated by a ground swell of citizen dissatisfaction? Initiated by legislators intent on reducing the costs of government? Advocated by an especially strong, capable, and interested administrator? Does a county board of commissioners seek organizational change to make local government more efficient? Or is the issue of concern primarily to corrections professionals and criminal justice planners? The answer to these questions will illuminate both the goals of reorganization and the forces that are likely to emerge to support or resist any proposed change.

Sources of initiative for change may be internal, coming from within the jurisdiction for which reorganization is contemplated. Such initiatives may occur as part of an effort to restructure government in general or they may be focused more narrowly on reform of the correctional apparatus. Initiatives also may be external to the jurisdiction, as, for example, when a state attempts to influence

counties by introducing voluntary or mandatory standards or incentives. A third locus of initiatives may be described as pervasive or diffused. These are slow, often unnoticed social changes that gradually permeate correctional operations, modifying attitudes and philosophies and thereby outdated existing organizational arrangements and creating a climate for change.

In most cases, a variety of events, people, and circumstances--some fortuitous, others carefully planned--interact in a combination of factors unique to the particular situation. The interests and concerns of the various participants, as well as the bargaining, negotiation, and compromises that occur in the process of change, will help to determine the nature of the resulting organizational structure.

Values and Goals

What are the objectives of the reorganization effort? What type of organizational outcome is desired and what benefits are expected? What values underlie the definition of goals and the setting of priorities? Answers to these questions will help to place in perspective both the change process and the organizational structure likely to result.

Reorganization generally is initiated by people who sense an imbalance, an inconsistency, between the way corrections currently is organized and the way it should be organized. Objectives or purposes of the reorganization, and the values that underlie them, thus flow from and differ with the source of the initiative. In general, however, the objectives of reorganization fall into one of four categories. Local values underlying these objectives often are patently clear; at other times they are masked by rhetoric or disguised for "political" reasons.

1. To realign state-local relationships

The "new federalism" and much contemporary thinking in the human service professions advocate the transfer of more power from state to local governments. Government administrators promote decentralization and a return of authority and responsibility to local government. Motivations for doing so are mixed. In some cases it is a conservative reaction to "big government;" in others it is the state's way of reducing its own workload and costs by shifting a larger portion to the local level. Many state subvention programs also are initiated in an attempt to divert an expanding and increasingly expensive state corrections workload. To local governments, the phantom of shifting costs thus may lurk behind any state-initiated attempt to reorganize corrections.

2. To reduce total costs of government and eliminate duplicative services

Realignment may be proposed where duplication and fragmentation clearly present serious problems. Such reorganizations often are directed toward local government in general, not corrections alone. Reducing costs and eliminating duplication also may be espoused by persons who use reorganization as a way to acquire power by challenging the status quo. Many unification efforts represent significant shifts in "turf" and power.

3. To improve service delivery

More efficient service delivery may be the objective of efforts to coordinate corrections resources and integrate them with other human services. Unification is seen as a way to combine scattered correctional programs and resources in a cost-effective manner. This purpose is a major plank in the platform of many corrections reformers.

4. To shake up a recalcitrant, inefficient, incompetent bureaucracy

This purpose is most likely to arise from within the particular jurisdiction. Grand juries, citizen and professional groups, and reform politicians provide the needed leadership. The retirement of a key official, a riot, a strike, or evidence of poor administrative practices may serve to trigger reform.

Values and goals importantly determine an organization's "character" and provide a context for organizational change. If corrections is viewed primarily as a component of crime control, its location within a law enforcement and public safety organization may seem most appropriate. Alternatively, if the focus is on provision of rehabilitative or social services, the correctional operation instead may be lodged within a multi-function human services agency. Organizational structure also is likely to influence goals and values, especially over time. For example, where reorganization is undertaken to accommodate a community corrections philosophy, the new structure in turn may create pressures for even more rapid movement toward a program with a community corrections emphasis. Values and goals thus must be made explicit at the outset if the change is to be more than cosmetic and if it is to produce results that are desired and broadly supported.

Organizational Scope

What is the scope of the reorganization effort? What will be included within the proposed organizational structure and what will be left out? The terms "unified," "comprehensive," and "integrated" mean different things to different people. So does the notion of "community corrections." Definitions of the appropriate scope of the reorganized corrections system will depend on the way in which three key questions are answered:

1. How is "community corrections" to be defined and what are its functional boundaries?
2. What specific corrections activities are to be performed and which organizational component will be responsible for each activity?
3. How will the corrections agency fit within the overall government structure? Is it to be a separate department or part of a "super-agency?"

The first step in determining the scope of the new unified corrections department will involve defining the corrections task and delimiting its boundaries. Should corrections deal only with sentenced offenders? Or are convicted but still unsentenced offenders also its responsibility? What about persons awaiting trial? Answers to these fundamental questions will help to define the proper relationships of the new organization to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government.

Another determinant of the scope of the reorganized corrections department will be the range of activities to be performed. Local correctional agencies today perform functions and offer services to offenders at all points from initial police contact to the serving of sentence: screening for diversion at point of arrest, pretrial classification, pretrial field services, pretrial detention, post-conviction/presentencing services, and post-sentence institutional and field services. Many local corrections agencies also recruit, train, and deploy volunteers; recruit and monitor private and public services under contract; develop housing, treatment, employment, and other opportunities for offenders in the community; and provide training resources for client-serving staff and volunteers. Which activities will be carried out by the new organization and which organizational components will be primarily responsible for each? Which functions could be contracted out to private or other public agencies?

A major decision to be made in determining the scope of the reorganized community corrections department is whether or not juvenile and adult correctional services will be contained within the same department. There are strong arguments on both sides of the questions and little empirical evidence to suggest that one or the other solution is generally superior. The way this issue is decided will depend on the values and objectives of those who initiate and carry out the reorganization.

Another major decision, the organizational placement of the new corrections department, also will be made on the basis of dominant values and goals. Placement of the corrections function within the general government structure is likely to follow one of four patterns: a separate department of corrections; corrections as one division of a department of court services; corrections as one department within a human services agency; and corrections as one department within a public safety agency. These different arrangements reflect diverse philosophies and tend to result in important operational differences. The horizontal placement of the department, like other questions of scope, must be given considerable thought in planning for reorganization.

Intergovernmental Relationships

What intergovernmental relationships help to shape the reorganization effort? What distinctive roles will be devised for state, local, and federal government entities? Is the result a coherent whole or are there gaps, duplications, and cross-purposes? Do the tensions generated by intergovernmental efforts lead to constructive or even creative solutions or is conflict between and among levels of government an impediment to effective service delivery? Other questions to be considered include: If the state plays a major role, how can county participation and support be insured? What special legislation may be required to implement the proposed model? What state-local traditions and existing laws may facilitate or hamper operations of the new organization? How can counties put pressure on the state to move? What incentives for full local participation might be offered?

This dimension is of critical importance in implementing any of the models presented here. Interesting developments, representing efforts to resolve problems that arise in this complex area, are taking place in various parts of the country. Success in community corrections probably cannot be achieved in the absence of a well orchestrated set of intergovernmental arrangements, if for no other reason than because the necessary funding generally must come from all levels of government.

Financing

What revenue sources will be tapped to support the reorganized system and what relationships between financing of services and control over service content are desirable? Efforts to reorganize and integrate community corrections generally occur in a highly inter-governmental context. Complex partnerships between state and local governments have emerged in some jurisdictions, with the federal level omnipresent in funding of various kinds through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Control and accountability inevitably follow financing, but specific outcomes vary in interesting ways. In any case, financing patterns and the resulting interdependencies and tensions are crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of any effort to unify community corrections through organizational change.

Linkages to Related Services

What linkages exist (or are being sought) between the corrections organization and resource systems in the surrounding community? The answer to this question reveals the operating premises of the organization. For example, a direct treatment mode of intervention leads to unilateral strategies, with the agency attempting to provide all offender services; a "brokerage" mode, on the other hand, results in varied approaches to resource mobilization (e.g., use of existing employment, mental health, social welfare, and other services in the community).

The ability of the corrections agency to work out effective and durable arrangements with other providers of service seems a critical determinant of success in community-oriented corrections. This ability is related to the policies, priorities, and management techniques of the organization. Especially important is a commitment to non-traditional organizational structures and outward-looking, "cosmopolitan" leadership styles. The ability of the corrections organization to generate reciprocal arrangements and share tasks and resources with other human service and law enforcement agencies will be a critical test of its credibility within the larger environment in which it operates.

Service Impact

What is the impact of reorganization on service delivery? How does it affect the quality of efforts to prevent recidivism and reduce crime? The "bottom-line" question of effectiveness tends to be lost in considerations of process and the details of the organization

chart. Yet the question is one that must be asked since, presumably, the ultimate purpose of organizational change is to improve correctional services.

The focus of this report is on the reorganization of local correctional services. Nonetheless, the findings of a recent study of state-level reorganizations may be revealing. The Council of State Governments examined the experiences of nine state jurisdictions with realignment of their corrections structures.² This research indicated that consolidation of state correctional services during the past decade has confirmed some of the expectations of both its advocates and its opponents. Certainly it appears to be an effective means of increasing high-level accountability and of laying the foundation for a coherent statewide corrections program. Overall managerial control and system-wide planning also have been facilitated. If the primary objectives of reorganization are political or managerial, state-level unification apparently offers a number of important benefits. Programmatic objectives, on the other hand, appear less likely to be achieved: there was little evidence that such reorganization efforts reduced costs or improved service delivery.³

Whether or not the findings of the Council of State Governments' study apply as well to local corrections, a measure of skepticism must be maintained with regard to the impact of reorganization on service delivery. The long history of governmental reform reveals wide disparities between the expectations of those who reorganize and the results they achieve. Also, since research data on effectiveness tends to be ambiguous, the question of service impact generally must be answered in terms of more impressionistic evidence.

The Models

With these seven dimensions in mind, we now turn to the three "pure-type" models of community corrections organization. The intention here is to place them in perspective, briefly commenting on their distinctive characteristics to provide a frame of reference for more detailed discussions of each model in Chapters III, IV, and V of this text.

The Unified County-Administered Model

The county-administered corrections agency is, perhaps, the organizational option that best fits the theory and philosophy of community-based corrections. Under this model, correctional services are comprehensive, integrated, community-located, and locally controlled and financed. Although the legislative framework may be

provided largely by the state, correctional services are administered by officials at the local level--where staff and clients live, where crime is generated, and where, many authorities believe, it must be prevented or controlled. Under this arrangement also, the electorate to which program administrators are responsible is in a position to observe program successes and failures. Consolidation of programs within a single unit of government tends to avoid the clash of purposes that often frustrates multi-government efforts. Finally, the strategy is consistent with the more general goal of simplifying the operations of local government and enhancing their cost-effectiveness. This model thus represents a confluence of two strong movements whose time may have come: unified community corrections service delivery and broad-based reform of local government operations.

In recent years, the unified local corrections model has appeared throughout the country in two quite different contexts. Initially, this model appeared as a result of efforts to upgrade local services for offenders. Often such reforms occurred as part of an overall reorganization of county and/or municipal governments and the initiative for change clearly came from within the local jurisdiction. More recently, efforts to reshape local corrections have occurred under the stimulus of state policies or laws that seek to shift a portion of the correctional workload to the local level (often with financial and other forms of assistance from the state). During the past decade, most states have felt the pressures of increasing inmate populations. Many have begun to look to local governments to assume some of this additional workload, devising increasingly sophisticated strategies to encourage them to do so. The pilot for such efforts consisted of a subsidy through which counties could obtain specified amounts of earmarked money by retaining in local programs offenders who otherwise would be committed to state institutions. The controversy that came to surround such subsidy arrangements led to attempts to design new correctional roles for both levels of government and to re-think their interrelationships.

Through this process a general pattern has begun to emerge, reflecting many of the recommendations of the various study groups and national commissions over the past fifteen years. While still somewhat nebulous, this pattern has some distinctive characteristics which are guiding intergovernmental divisions of responsibility for correctional services in many jurisdictions today. Most states, it seems clear, will retain control over the operation of long-term institutions for adult and serious juvenile offenders--essentially the correctional options of "last resort." These programs apparently will operate within a philosophic context that is increasingly "justice-oriented" rather than rehabilitative, although many rehabilitative services still are offered. A major change in the traditional state role, however, is evident in the movement away from direct state operation of noninstitutional correctional services (typically probation and parole) and toward providing an array of indirect services to local governments. Financial subsidies are now elaborately "fine-tuned" in response to numerous criticisms. In

addition, many states are involved in planning, standard-setting, technical assistance, staff training and manpower development, and research and information dissemination. This development is providing steadily increasing support for the assumption by local governments of new and expanded activities in the corrections arena.

Most innovations in state-local relations have come in the form of state incentives to the localities. A more recent development has been the creation of a regulative role for the state. Subsidy funds are coming to be tied more closely to performance measures (typically defined in terms of commitment practices rather than program effectiveness); and some new laws include provisions for the state to assume direct administration of correctional programs if localities fail to respond to the lure of state aid. One top state corrections official has a simple technique to remind his local government counterparts of the state's authority, under new legislation, to take over programs in their jurisdiction if they do not act within a specified period of time. This whimsical administrator merely telephones to say: "Tick, tick, tick."

In general, however, a participative strategy is used to work out the state-local relationship, especially with respect to developing new laws and working through the operational problems involved in their implementation. Local corrections officials and their varied constituencies are given ample opportunity to critique preliminary formulations of state efforts to strengthen local government involvement in corrections. The wisdom of such an approach is obvious. Local officials often are guarded, if not outright suspicious, concerning state efforts to draw them into a larger commitment. County boards of commissioners and administrative officers have learned the hard way that corrections is an area in which problems abound and successes are few. They are understandably reluctant to have those problems transferred from the state to the local level, even if incentives and assistance from the state are proffered.

Nevertheless, although almost everyone agrees that there are difficult problems to be faced, the consensus at both state and local levels seems to be that local assumption of increased responsibility for corrections is appropriate. As Frank C. Woodson of Ventura County, Calif., has suggested (borrowing a phrase from Donald Schon's book, Beyond the Stable State), unified local corrections is an "idea in good currency."⁴ Agreement about goals and common rhetoric, of course, will not be sufficient to insure success. Great importance must be attached to the process through which such shifts in corrections responsibility will take place. Still inadequately analyzed, understood, and communicated are the issues, problems, and strategies of the change process by means of which abstract ideas are translated into working systems. It is hoped that this report, especially Chapters VI and VII will make some contributions in that area.

The Multi-Jurisdiction Local Government Model

The concept of cooperation and reciprocity among units of government in providing correctional services has been present since the early days of corrections in this country. Although plagued by gaps and duplications in service, the crude division of labor that emerged at least recognized that the task must be shared. Offenders present themselves to the criminal justice system in ways that confound jurisdictional boundaries and the niceties of bureaucratic territory. The uncrowded city jail across the street from an overflowing county jail makes the public justifiably uneasy, particularly in a time of growing taxpayer resentment of the costs of government. Programming for small segments of the offender population (e.g., incarcerated females and mentally ill offenders) has produced a variety of contractual arrangements between states and, occasionally, between or among local governments. However, the comprehensive, integrated community corrections system, financed by and serving two or more local governments, is only now beginning to appear in a few parts of the country. This is the pattern which is here defined as the multi-jurisdiction local government model.

The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice strongly recommended this general approach, emphasizing the advantages of community-based corrections while acknowledging the inability of most local governments to implement such programs without assistance. In its 1967 report, the Commission's Corrections Task Force recommended:

"Reciprocal arrangements between governments should be developed to permit flexible use of resources. Regional sharing of institutional facilities and community programs should be greatly increased."⁵

Regional cooperation also appeared as a major theme of the 1973 report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, but the emphasis here was on state-level cooperation with little attention to operating agreements among local governments. In fact, while conventional wisdom suggests that such arrangements are highly desirable and needed, there has been little effort on the part of national study groups to address the formidable problems of implementation.

How is it possible that such a good idea, which has been around for such a long time, is so rarely put into operation? Students of public administration could supply ready answers. County governments (the primary candidates for this role) tend to be insular and inward-oriented. Their revenues are generated within county lines and decisions concerning expenditures are made by boards responsible to a county electorate. Unless there are unequivocal economic advantages associated with cooperative services, the idea of sharing programs and costs with other jurisdictions arouses doubt and suspicion. It

runs against the grain of the dominant political-administrative power structure, involves risks, and raises awkward questions. The incentive system of local government is structured in a way that discourages multi-unit efforts. This may be illustrated by quoting a few lines from a letter received during the field study portion of this project:

"Our first efforts at facility consolidation occurred in 1972-73 when we attempted to build a regional facility for this area. The metropolitan . . . area encompasses a five-county area, with . . . County by far the largest. Our attempts to include these other counties at that time failed due to opposition by the local county sheriffs.

"Our second efforts were in 1975-76 when we planned to consolidate the detention functions of the . . . City Police Department with our unit. This met with a roadblock when the police chief who supported the idea resigned and was replaced by an individual who was not receptive to consolidation.

". . . County does not give up easily, though, and we are once again pursuing the idea. The smaller surrounding counties are under extreme pressure to build new facilities and we are hopeful that they will now see the logic and reasoning behind a regional facility."⁶

Yet logic and reasoning, it seems clear, will not be sufficient to bring the multi-jurisdiction model into widespread use. Where it is beginning to be implemented, the stimulus appears to come from a skillfully devised system of state incentives to a set of contiguous local governments that provides convincing financial reasons to set aside parochial patterns in favor of a cooperative approach. Where an outside, higher-level government is willing to help with financing and offer technical assistance, some exciting new organizational roles are beginning to emerge.

The multi-government model actually may become the dominant pattern for the future in many parts of the country. This is the model that fits the increasingly intergovernmental image of public business. As it becomes more prevalent, the insularity of local governments will be reduced. New interdependencies and alliances will cut across county lines, creating networks for planning and operating unified programs to meet regional needs. As economies of scale are achieved, the public is likely to support such sensible ways of doing business. Optimism in this area derives in part from experience in fields analogous to corrections (such as mental health) and in other countries (such as Sweden) where regionalized organization is the norm. In American criminal justice, under one of the oldest intergovernmental arrangements in the field (sometimes referred to as the Lakewood Plan), county sheriffs contract to provide police services to municipal governments. An interesting feature of such efforts is the tendency of the sheriff and

city government officials to support one another when confronting county boards on budget issues. In the corrections arena, we may begin to see coalitions of state, county, and city officials join together to present regional proposals for unified service delivery.

This model remains somewhat speculative and future-oriented, yet some solid experience with it has appeared in a few jurisdictions. Some of the advantages of regional cooperation and consolidation are documented in Chapter IV. Perhaps more important at this early stage of development, the problems that tend to arise and provisional strategies for their resolution also are presented.

The State-Administered Decentralized Model

Although a state-controlled community-based corrections organization might seem a contradiction in terms, there are situations in which state administration is most appropriate. Some local governments have neither the mandate nor the resources to provide a full range of modern correctional services. Some states are so compact that the state government seems close and "in touch" with local problems and needs. Traditional relationships among the different levels of government sometimes suggest a primary role for the state because county governments are weak or nonexistent. And some would argue that a certain amount of distance between local problems and ultimate authority is desirable in order to avoid the pettiness, parochialism, and neglect that sometimes has characterized local government.

Under the state-administered decentralized model the state performs not only its traditional function of operating prisons and long-term youth institutions, but seeks to deliver comprehensive correctional services within local communities. This model goes much further than state administration of probation and parole. It requires that the state initiate and carry out a broad range of services for offender reintegration in a unified and cost-effective manner. Such an arrangement might be considered more "unified" than any other since, as the responsibility of a single authority, institutional and community services can be better coordinated. The model calls for an ideal mix of coordination and dispersed "grass-roots" organization as many state services, and the power to influence the manner in which services are delivered, are decentralized to the local level.

The most straightforward approach to implementation of this model is the delegation strategy often employed in both public and private business. Under this arrangement, authority and responsibility for a broad range of planning, budgeting, and personnel decisions typically are delegated to officials much "closer to the action" than those in the central office. Headquarters surrenders control over daily activities in favor of determining general policy guidelines and monitoring results to insure accountability. In the private sector

such delegation often is functionally based, especially when the product permits an integrated effort. General Motors, for example, at times has allowed its separate divisions considerable autonomy, even encouraging them to compete with one another within limits.

More typical of the human services that are primarily a governmental responsibility, however, is a strategy of geographic regionalization rather than functional division. Prescribed territories are assigned to regional administrators, who are charged with meeting the needs of the populations they contain. Sometimes these geographic entities are defined in terms of the human problems addressed and how they are generated and manifested. The notion of the "catchment area," which has appeared in the field of health services administration, captures this idea well. Such arrangements have been complicated by the fact that different problems and agencies define different regions, while the human beings involved, and the problems they exhibit, present themselves in ubiquitous, untidy forms that ignore such bureaucratic boundaries.

Confusion over territory, mission, and jurisdiction has plagued efforts to decentralize governmental activities in the human services in general. This is conspicuously the case with respect to corrections, since the problems that underlie crime and delinquency also appear in other arenas--mental health, substance abuse, social welfare, unemployment, and so on. One of the most appealing aspects of the state decentralized model, theoretically at least, is the opportunity it seems to offer to coordinate correctional services with other state services directed to the same or similar populations. The discouraging side of this argument is that examples of effective coordination are extremely difficult to find.

The delegation of authority and responsibility to regional administrators charged with developing grass-roots participation would seem to depend for its success upon the use of sound public administration techniques. In fact, such terms as "delegation" and "decentralization" come from the field of management. Reflecting a rational view of organizational life, they rest on the assumption that it is possible to define and allocate specific tasks and the power to carry them out. If such a strategy is to work, it must be thought through carefully and implemented with determination. The respective roles of the regions and headquarters must be constantly reassessed and creative ways developed to handle the tensions that inevitably arise. Regional actors must have sufficient power, discretion, and flexibility to perform their tasks in a way that is responsive to local needs. At the same time, accountability for results, in terms of both service impact and fiscal performance, must be maintained. The current climate of economic stringency accentuates this need, for no public program can long survive if its reputation for responsible behavior is seriously questioned.

The public administration approach to decentralization of state-administered correctional services does have many advantages. There

are, however, numerous unresolved problems and potential difficulties. The regionalization strategy has been employed thousands of times by state agencies over the last several decades, but it has produced relatively few examples of community-oriented, unified, comprehensive programming. The result too often has been a bureaucratically ponderous and expensive set of organizational relationships. Flexibility and discretion at the operating level, sensitivity to local needs, and successful co-optation of local sources of power and the resources they command have become lost in a tangle of bureaucratic procedures and competition for control. The history of decentralization efforts leads one to ask whether there might be approaches to decentralization of state-administered community corrections that avoid the familiar problems of hierarchical delegation.

Some promising examples of state activity in this area do exist. The more imaginative efforts seem to involve a blending of the state-administered model with one or both of the other two models described above. In such situations the state government adopts the role of facilitator and regulator, while local governments are primarily responsible for service delivery. Such developments are described in Chapters III and IV in connection with the unified local and multi-jurisdiction models. There are other intriguing developments, based on entirely new alliances between state government and local interests, which follow the pattern of the state-administered model. The state, under such arrangements, relinquishes the role of service provider and develops alternative delivery methods (e.g., contracts with private and public agencies, brokerage techniques, and public education programs) or even attempts to create a strong political constituency supportive of community-based corrections but independent of government control. These and similar approaches are described in Chapter V.

Concluding Comments

Corrections today is buffeted by varied forces and undergoing changes that cannot be anticipated with precision. James Thompson, who describes contemporary organizations as "streams of action in time and space," has suggested that those seeking organizational change are shooting at a moving target.⁷ The aptness of this metaphor for American corrections is underscored by the fact that most states either recently have reorganized their correctional services or currently are undertaking such changes. Perhaps the most durable aspect of the situation is the residue of unsolved problems that are distinguished today largely by their greater scale, complexity, and urgency.

Organization and reorganization, it must be stressed, often are illusory solutions to complex problems. Changes in form may be merely cosmetic, having no demonstrable impact on the problems they are designed to address. The goals and values that provide impetus for change, while giving it purpose and integrity, can make the critical difference. Reconceptualization of the whole problem of crime and delinquency, and

of societal policies for their prevention and control, is needed before "process"-oriented activities such as organizational change can be truly useful. It is a major premise of this report that the reintegrative goal of community-based corrections, and the values that underlie it, furnish a foundation for undertaking this task.

FOOTNOTES

1. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), p. 38.
2. Council of State Governments, Reorganization of State Corrections Agencies: a Decade of Experience (Lexington, Ky.: Council of State Governments, 1977).
3. Ibid.
4. Frank C. Woodson, "A Corrections Strategy," undated statement, Ventura County, Calif.
5. U.S. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 183.
6. Letter to project staff, dated November 3, 1977, from the director of a metropolitan county department of corrections.
7. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

CHAPTER III
THE UNIFIED COUNTY-ADMINISTERED MODEL

State laws generally provide the framework for corrections activities, but most corrections services are delivered at the county level.¹ It is both proper and logical, therefore, to propose a unified county-administered model for the organization of local corrections, especially in larger, more metropolitan counties.²

At the time of the 1970 census there were 15 counties in the nation with populations of over 1,300,000. These counties contained 20 percent of the nation's population. With larger populations than a number of our smallest states, some of these counties also spend more on corrections.² Indeed, Los Angeles County, the nation's most populous, administers one of the largest jail systems in the world.³ As shown in Table 1, there also are 195 other counties with 1970 populations of between 172,106 and 1,267,792.⁴ These, plus the 15 largest, constitute the nation's metropolitan counties.⁵ Although they represent a small number of jurisdictions, (less than 7 percent of the 3101 counties in the nation), they contain 60 percent of the population.⁶

Innovations in these populous and influential counties are noticed. Important emerging trends in public administration often appear first here because such jurisdictions represent some of the more progressive examples of "good" government and management. Recent studies have revealed the beginnings of a new trend in community-based corrections in some metropolitan counties⁷--the emergence of the unified county-administered corrections department. There still are very few examples of the comprehensive, unified county corrections system, yet in some counties evolution toward such an organizational format is surprisingly far along.⁸ In others, although the beginnings are modest, a metamorphosis is taking place that may result in a relatively complete panoply of services unified within a single county corrections department.

This chapter describes a prototype county-administered corrections organization--its attributes, strengths, and weaknesses and some of the major problems that may be encountered in its implementation.⁹ As are the other two organizational models set forth in this volume, this model is comprehensive, unified, and community-based. The county-administered model, however, also is locally controlled and community financed. Local control implies that the county government, among other things, sets policy, initiates and evaluates program performance, controls expenditures, and is responsible for hiring and firing personnel. The county must have at least these prerogatives for the corrections program to be described as county-administered. Community financing means that the county budgets and allocates resources for the

TABLE 1
 QUINTILE GROUPING OF COUNTIES ACCORDING TO POPULATION, 1970*

GROUP	RANGE IN POPULATION OF COUNTIES IN EACH GROUP		TOTAL POPULATION OF EACH GROUP	POPULATION OF EACH GROUP PLUS ALL PRECEDING GROUPS	% OF TOTAL U.S. POPULATION CONTAINED IN EACH GROUP	% OF TOTAL U.S. POPULATION CONTAINED IN EACH GROUP PLUS ALL PRECEDING GROUPS	NUMBER OF COUNTIES IN EACH GROUP	% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF COUNTIES IN EACH GROUP	NUMBER OF COUNTIES IN EACH GROUP PLUS ALL PRECEDING GROUPS	% OF THE NUMBER OF COUNTIES IN EACH GROUP PLUS ALL PRECEDING GROUPS
	LARGEST	SMALLEST								
1	7,867,760	1,327,321	40,101,951	40,101,951	20.0	20.0	15	0.5	15	0.5
2	1,267,792	522,809	40,916,703	81,018,654	20.0	40.0	55	1.9	70	2.4
3	522,329	172,106	40,870,143	121,888,797	20.0	60.0	140	4.5	210	6.9
4	170,838	49,587	40,621,717	162,510,514	20.0	80.0	471	15.1	681	22.0
5	49,554	64	40,655,059	203,165,573	20.0	100.0	2,420	78.0	3,101	100.0

* SOURCE: RAND McNALLY 1978 COMMERCIAL ATLAS AND MARKETING GUIDE, 109TH EDITION

correctional services it administers. Some or all of these resources may be in the form of state or federal subsidies or other funds, but allocation of resources by the county within state or federal guidelines can produce a sense of local control over financing (as long as the guidelines are not too confining).

Correctional administration at the local level is surprisingly complex. At the state level, in contrast, the formulation of policy, definition of objectives, and development of programs may be concentrated in the hands of relatively few individuals. A state corrections plan may appear as a strategy designed in a rational step-by-step fashion by a few persons free from the "interference" of politicians, judges, citizens, and other interest groups. Administered at the local level, corrections is in many ways more political:

"It is the essence of politics, and the mass sum of private choice... Especially when the public interest is high from sensed peril or has been stirred to new heights... the process of securing goal consensus and translation to agreed objectives will be at its most diffuse, vigorously political peak."¹⁰

Each level of government, of course, has its biases and each tends to believe that it can "do the job better" than the next level. Federal, state, and local jurisdictions, however, may agree that community corrections is best administered by local governments. The philosophy of community-based corrections supports this notion. Offenders, it is suggested, should be retained in their own communities whenever possible and the community should have substantial control over its own correctional apparatus. Although only one of several organizational options, the county-administered model thus has considerable appeal.

The county-administered prototype is discussed here in terms of seven issues or dimensions along which variations are likely to occur: source of initiative for change; the goals of reorganization and underlying values; organizational scope; intergovernmental relations; financing; linkages to related services; and service impact.

Source of Initiative for Change

This study identified three general sources of initiative: external, internal, and pervasive. External initiatives come from outside the county. They often appear in the form of a state mandate, usually through legislation. A state, for example, can influence its counties by shifting some of its corrections workload to the local level, providing subsidies and subventions, introducing and enforcing minimum standards, and so forth. Such state actions, which work to "unfreeze" a settled county corrections organization, may involve mandatory requirements, voluntary inducements, or some combination of both.

Minnesota and Oregon present perhaps the best examples of state corrections strategies, expressed through state legislation, to stimulate the development of community corrections systems at the county level. In Hennepin County, Minnesota, and in Multnomah County, Oregon, state legislation has been an important initiating factor. Many other states have stimulated change at the local level in somewhat less comprehensive ways. Some provide incentives for the development of residential and field services to help counties meet minimum corrections standards. Others, notably California and Washington State, have instituted probation subsidy programs to encourage counties to retain offenders at the local level.

External initiatives also may come from the federal level. In Ventura County, California, a federal grant provided funds for a "unified corrections project" to minimize duplication of correctional services among local, state, and federal agencies operating within the county. Elsewhere, federal LEAA funds have supported corrections planning activities of state planning agencies and, in some cases (e.g. Minnesota and Iowa) have partially supported efforts to develop state corrections master plans that eventually affected county government operations.

Internal initiatives come from within the county jurisdiction. They may occur as part of a larger move to modernize county government structure (as in Ventura and San Diego Counties in California), in which case corrections reorganization may be carried along on a wave of more general government reform. Alternatively, reorganization may be focused more narrowly, or more exclusively, on corrections alone (as occurred in Orange County, Florida). The individuals involved, the strategies employed, and even the goals of reorganization are likely to be different in each case.

Internal forces for change are, in some instances, tied quite simply to the fact that a county is growing rapidly. (Orange County, for example, is one of the fastest growing counties in the United States, while Ventura and San Diego have growth rates that are much higher than average.) Such counties change because they must: population growth impels change. The picture is one of expanding metropolitan counties that are revising charters, passing bond issues, and modernizing city and county administrative structures. It is characteristic of such counties to have a noticeable sense of community pride that itself may serve to promote change. Officials in such counties may be engaged in an effort to prove they are more progressive, more advanced, or better managers than their state counterparts. There is something special about these counties and they seem to delight in projecting this image.¹¹

In the jurisdictions studied the sense of competitiveness and local pride often provided dynamic energy to fuel the change process, combining in complex and sometimes unexpected ways with other community norms and values. It was not uncommon, for example, to find "conservative" supporters of home rule (to keep government close to

the people) aligned with more "liberal" proponents of community-based corrections.¹² Corrections, it was believed, should be integrated into the community, with both authority and responsibility tied tightly to the local power structure. The implication was that local corrections might avoid the bureaucratic indifference and unresponsiveness that sometimes characterize state corrections services.

Not surprisingly, internal initiatives for reorganization often derive from an expanding workload that strains system resources beyond reasonable limits. All of the sites visited (with the exception, perhaps, of Hennepin County, Minnesota), reported that their corrections systems were "out of balance," with overcrowding or burgeoning case-loads constant companions. The physical plant, which is most inflexible, generally experiences the greatest difficulty in adapting to increased workloads. The county jail often is at center stage. Symptoms (overcrowding, increasing altercations, lawsuits over substandard conditions) tend to be viewed as the problem, at least initially. Eventually, the county is forced to respond by working toward one of three objectives: reduce admissions to jail; decrease average length of stay in jail; or create more jail bed space. Each, or any combination, of these alternatives in turn will aggravate organizational fragmentation unless the corrections apparatus is dealt with as a whole.¹³ (The basic question, of course, is why the workload is increasing and whether such growth is reasonable. Unless this issue is addressed, the expanding system may generate premature or unnecessary reorganization in the name of efficiency and economy--without considering the causes of the increase in workload.)

Another internal factor behind many county reorganizations is the force of outstanding leadership--unusual individuals with the energy, drive, and competence to get the reorganization off the ground. Consolidation, it seems, often takes place in well-managed counties, with strong and able administrators, generally backed by a management staff of consistently high caliber. In some situations, key judges, the sheriff, or county commissioners have provided the momentum for organizational change. State corrections leadership and the judiciary also have provided important second-level support. Although such individuals may not participate directly, their endorsements can significantly aid the reorganization effort.

In the counties studied, groups such as the League of Women Voters, the Junior League, the American Association of University Women, local bar associations, and other leadership forces outside government also were instrumental in promoting change. These groups can be useful in another respect. County commissioners sometimes have insufficient background to understand corrections issues and options, but they generally take with a grain of salt the advice of persons with vested interests in the correctional system. In such cases, more "objective" public interest groups, if well-informed and tactful, have been both helpful to local officials and influential in pushing for reform.

Planning studies often have been important in initiating correctional reorganization. These may be internal or external sources of initiative since funding may come from within or outside the local jurisdiction. (The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been one of the most important external sources of support for such studies, giving local governments an opportunity to assess the need for reorganization and to develop alternatives.) As a stimulus to organizational change, such studies often have been productive.¹⁴ Good analysis, it seems, can make a difference if it spells out the problem, outlines a range of possible solutions, and identifies major obstacles to reform. Local officials and policy-makers are not insensitive to measures of effectiveness, responsiveness, and costs; and they generally are interested in alternative arrangements for the cost-efficient delivery of correctional services.¹⁵

Another source of initiative that is both internal and external appears in those instances in which developments in a progressive county motivate the state to undertake an important new corrections program applicable to other counties. Although the original initiative is internal or county-based, other counties subsequently are spurred by external state interests in promoting change. For example, a particularly successful pilot test, funded in one locality with federal funds, may produce an exemplary project that the state feels obligated to replicate elsewhere under state auspices. Pretrial diversion was initiated in Florida in this manner, as were community corrections centers in Maryland. In each case, the state simply moved to protect its corrections interests.

A third general category of initiative for change, pervasive (or diffuse) initiatives, are gradual, broad-based, and sometimes dramatic shifts in attitude, philosophy, or operations that render old organizational arrangements obsolete. Widely held perceptions of the need for reorganization to promote new ways of doing things may create a favorable climate for change. The bail reform movement and the nationwide proliferation of work-release programs are examples of new concepts (often accompanied by new organizational forms) that came about through pervasive or broad-based initiatives. These innovations materialized as correctional philosophies changed and, over time, produced shifts in organization to accommodate them. The availability of federal funds served to disturb the old organizational equilibrium and stimulate reorganization to achieve a new one.

The philosophy of community corrections, itself a pervasive source of initiative, may create internal pressures for reorganization. As a county becomes more involved in community-based alternatives, many new programs may be introduced and old distinctions between programs (e.g., jail and probation) tend to become blurred. For example, a work-release program, which requires an offender to spend some time in custody and some time in the community, may encourage local control of probation services and closer coordination between jail and field services. As programs are developed that do not "fit" the jail/probation dichotomy, organizational consolidation may appear a logical solution.

The study suggested that, of the three models discussed in this volume, the county-administered model is likely to be characterized by the largest number and variety of initiatives for change. More opportunities for consolidation of corrections thus may arise at the county level. Often it is only a matter of deciding how to exploit them. Site visits suggested that successful change agents continually scan the environment for opportunities of three types: (1) external initiatives that might be supported, strengthened, or somehow facilitated to foster change at the county level; (2) internal initiatives that can serve to trigger the change process; and (3) more pervasive emerging trends that, if anticipated correctly, may result in a more receptive environment for change. This will produce a sense of the opportunities for unification, the initial sources of initiative for change, and the "right" time for all the pieces to fall into place.

Values and Goals

People who work in county government know that members of the board of commissioners, corrections officials, and county executives are likely to see the same issue in very different ways. County commissioners presumably are responsive to the public interest. They want to concentrate on problems that concern their constituents. Corrections officials, on the other hand, may focus on improvements in the quality of services to clients; while county executives are concerned with costs and with setting priorities for competing budget demands. Such differences in goals, and in the values associated with them, set the stage for potential conflict in the change process and importantly determine the character of the resulting organizational structure.

Ideally, the structure that emerges will reflect the values and goals of the community served--their priorities for corrections and their conceptions of its proper role. Organizational structure (or form) should follow from perceptions of organizational purpose (or function). Several of the counties studied had rather homogeneous populations with shared values that allowed them to find a philosophical basis for consensus and to act on it. More typically, however, a community's correctional policy is not rooted in any one set of beliefs. Rather, it is a synthesis of many competing ideas and values, expressed, often dialectically, through different personalities and organizations, and evolving over time. The corrections process in one county can be seen to differ from the corrections process in another--in organizational character, goals and philosophies, leadership style, and the way corrections is organized. The county-administered model, in other words, can accommodate a wide range of values, goals, and circumstances.

One of the unique strengths of the county-administered corrections organization is its proximity to the community it serves. Goals set by the state legislature or the governor do not have the same meaning as those defined by county representatives. The overall "mission" of the county-administered correctional organization and its specific or immediate objectives are, presumably, more consistent with local norms and more responsive to locally defined problems.

Examples of all four types of objectives noted in Chapter II are found in county corrections reorganizations: to realign state-local relationships; to reduce government expenditures and eliminate duplicative services; to improve service delivery; and to motivate reform of bureaucratic procedures. Similar values and goals are found in jurisdictions where other organizational models, such as the multi-jurisdiction or the state-administered model, have been implemented. But the county model seems to provide a natural forum for resolving local conflicts in values and goals, making it more likely that the corrections organization will evolve in a logical and cohesive way. Unfortunately, under the county-administered model disparities among counties in offender treatment may increase as each jurisdiction establishes and carries out its own corrections policies.

Many corrections functions, as well as many allied social services, are already administered by county governments in many states. This gives the county a major reason to assume responsibility for achieving the objectives of increased efficiency and effectiveness, reductions in costs, the elimination of duplicative services, and a general improvement in the quality of corrections administration. Change agents should look for and exploit these interests. The opportunity for reform often arises from local demands for not only a more humane and more fair system of criminal justice, but a better managed system as well.

Organizational Scope

Organizational scope refers to the range of activities that will be included within the unified corrections department. There are numerous possible variations. Definition of the appropriate scope will depend largely on local answers to the three questions outlined in Chapter II. What will be the functional boundaries of the community corrections task? Who will perform each of the corrections services identified as necessary? How will the corrections agency fit within the overall government structure?

Defining the term "community corrections" requires that the boundaries of the corrections apparatus be delimited. Who are its clients? Will it deal only with persons convicted and sentenced, or will services also be provided for those convicted but still unsentenced? Will pretrial services fall within its scope? There are no

right or wrong answers to these definitional questions; the way they are answered is a local prerogative. The question of combining juvenile and adult services also will be answered in ways that reflect local values, traditions, and correctional objectives. Some counties have responded by combining services for both age groups; others have resisted the inclusion of juveniles with adults because of long-standing philosophical differences between the two services and the belief that juveniles should not be treated as if they were adults.¹⁶

Specific corrections activities or functions to be performed by components of the unified department may include an enormous variety of services. Local corrections agencies today provide any or all of the following services:¹⁷

- Pre-arrest screening

In conjunction with police, mental health, welfare, and other correctional agencies, determine, at point of police contact, who shall be screened from the criminal justice system. May include referral to non-justice agencies.

- Pretrial classification

Determine arrested person's eligibility for citation release, ROR, supervised release, bail, bail reduction, pretrial work release, public defender services, medical, psychiatric, social, or other services. Determine qualifications for suspended prosecution.

- Pretrial services

Supervise pretrial releasees and persons approved for suspended prosecution. Conduct preliminary investigations for court.

- Pretrial detention

Operate detention facility for unsentenced prisoners, providing custody, case services, and special programs.

- Presentence services

Perform fact-finding and social diagnosis and develop recommendations for presentence reports.

- Post-sentence services

Supervise probationers and jail parolees, operate institutions (jails, halfway houses, honor farms, etc.) and administer programs for special prisoner groups (work release, weekend confinement, pre-release services, etc.).

- Resource development

Recruit, train, and supervise volunteers. Recruit, screen, and monitor agencies serving clients under contract. Develop community opportunities (housing, work, training, treatment) for clients. Develop community work placements for use in sentencing programs. Develop training for staff and volunteers.

Assigning responsibility for the various functions to be performed by the unified department often requires that traditional distinctions between institutional and field services be overcome. Generally, there are two major organizational barriers to the development of a close working relationship between the county jail and the probation function. First, in most counties an elected sheriff administers the jail, while the chief probation officer is appointed either by the courts or by the county board of commissioners. Second, in more than half (26) of the states, probation is administered not by the county, but by the state.¹⁸ Both of these facts inhibit the coordination of field and institutional services required for effective local corrections.

The county-administered model proposed here resolves the problem of state-local coordination by moving jail and probation services into a single unified county department. The proper role of the sheriff, however, has no widely applicable answer. The sheriff may or may not wish to retain or take on additional corrections responsibilities, but as the size and variety of corrections programs expand the need for a professional corrections manager will become increasingly evident. There are sheriffs with considerable interest and talent in the corrections area, but such individuals are the exception, not the rule (and they are not always re-elected).

Placement of the county-administered corrections agency, the third issue that must be decided in determining the scope of the re-organization, can take any of a variety of directions. Four major options, or variations of the county-administered model, are offered here as illustrations of the ways in which corrections might fit within the general structure of county government. These options include: (1) a county department of court services; (2) a separate county department of corrections; (3) a department of corrections as one department of a county justice services agency (the agency also

would contain the sheriff's office, criminal justice planning, and public safety departments); and (4) a county department of corrections as one department of a county human services agency (the agency also would contain departments of welfare, mental health, and allied social services).

• Option 1: The Department of Court Services


A major characteristic of the department of court services (see Figure 1) is the notion that it exists primarily to provide services to the judiciary. While this may be considered a virtue, it can entangle the courts in program administration, thus violating the principle of the separation of powers by involving the courts in the business of the executive branch.

Another problem associated with this organizational option is the absence of a chain of command. It makes little sense to have a court services department for each court level, so in a two-tier court system the lower level court should join forces with the court of higher jurisdiction. The different levels, however, may not work together well enough for this arrangement to be satisfactory. Additional barriers to reaching agreement and providing for continuity over time are presented by the fact that each judge is independent and their schedules are rotating--the latter serving to present, then take away, opportunities for such an organization to form. (There are ways to overcome this problem. Presiding judges of the respective courts may provide the necessary leadership or a judicial committee may be useful as a coordinating mechanism.) In any event, while the lack of direct authority over individual judges is desirable in terms of their judicial duties, it can pose problems related to their new administrative responsibilities.

Another variation of the court services agency is to have the director of the department of court services report to a court administrator. This has advantages and disadvantages. If the functions of the new department are narrow (if they do not extend beyond criminal justice into civil and other court matters), then the court administrator cannot be placed within the new department for he or she has broader responsibilities. If, as illustrated here, the new department has a broader scope, the court administrator may become one of its deputy directors. In designing around this option, the relationship of the department head to the position of court administrator must be established. The scope of the new department plays a part in deciding this issue.

One feature of this model may warrant emphasis. The sheriff may retain administrative responsibility for the jail, and particularly the detention facility, if the county has separate facilities for unsentenced and sentenced adult prisoners. The model assumes that the sheriff will retain responsibility for the pretrial jail, but that newly created facilities or program modules will be placed within the department of court services. It is assumed that the director of institutions and institution programming will provide corrections programming within the

FIGURE 2
THE DEPARTMENT OF COURT SERVICES



jail; the sheriff is responsible only for custody, feeding, and direct jail operations. The need for a high level of cooperation between the department of court services and the sheriff's office represents another vulnerable point in this particular organizational scheme.

A further variation--in fact, a step toward shifting responsibility for the jail to a professional corrections manager (as in Option 2, the County Department of Corrections), is to encourage the sheriff to hire a civilian corrections manager to operate the jail. Later, if it becomes desirable, administrative relationships can be realigned so that the corrections manager reports to the director of court services or to a county director of corrections. Resistance to the goal of moving corrections operations out of the province of the sheriff and into a county corrections department sometimes can be overcome if county board members emphasize the economic advantages of community corrections programs as compared to correctional operations within the jail.

Two examples of corrections organizations that appear to be evolving in the direction of the county department of court services are Orange County (Orlando), Florida, and Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota. In Orange County an Office of Court Alternatives was established in early 1975 by ordinance of the Board of County Commissioners. This office is under the court-appointed court administrator, but administered by a professional corrections manager and monitored by a Board of Directors (composed of the sheriff, the state attorney, the chief judge, the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, and the district supervisor of the State Department of Offender Rehabilitation).

The office provides a correctional "umbrella" linking four program components: a pretrial diversion unit, a county (misdemeanant) probation component, a supervised pretrial release section, and a community-based misdemeanor work-release center. The merger of these functions was stimulated by LEAA, as Orange County was selected as one of the replication sites of the Des Moines exemplary project.¹⁹ Significantly, some of the other replication sites (e.g., Vancouver, Washington) also have established court service departments. The jail continues under the jurisdiction of the elected sheriff, but a professional corrections manager supervises jail operations.

In Hennepin County, the Department of Court Services is the principal county corrections agency. It provides adult and juvenile probation services, temporary juvenile detention, juvenile residential treatment facilities, and domestic relations services. In 1976 the department employed 343 persons with an overall budget of almost \$8 million. Some 28 community-based corrections programs provide services to correctional clients under contract.

The sheriff's office operates the county adult detention facility, the primary facility for temporary detention of offenders in Hennepin County. The adult corrections facility, a local institution for commitments from county municipal district courts, was operated by the City of Minneapolis until 1975 when the county assumed this responsibility. The facility now is being used increasingly as a dispositional alternative for gross misdemeanants and felons.

• Option 2: The County Department of Corrections

This variation of the county-administered model will evolve in counties with strong county executives, in counties where probation is a local responsibility, and in counties where the sheriff, for whatever reason, divests himself of corrections responsibilities. The unification of formerly separate probation and jail operations represents the most important consolidation accomplishment (see Figure 2).


One criticism of this organizational option represents the other side of the coin with respect to the separation of powers since it serves the interests of the executive branch. To some, therefore, this model may threaten to deprive the courts of necessary control over the preparation of presentence reports and the means of insuring that court orders are carried out. The relative powers of the county executive and the courts, and the tensions and traditions that color their relationship, will have a bearing on the choice between the department of court services and the department of corrections as the proper organizational solution for a particular county.

The organization chart depicted in Figure 2 envisions a department of corrections for adults. If services for juveniles are added, the creation of a deputy director position to supervise the enlarged administrative organization is advisable. Note that, as in the other options, specialized staff assistants are placed at the disposal of the chief executive. The number of assistants will depend on the size of the organization, but among other functions that should be represented are: volunteer coordination, research and evaluation, training and staff development; community/client relations; and service contracts development and management.

Emerging examples of county departments of corrections were found in several jurisdictions. In Ventura County, California, after several years of study and debate, the Board of Supervisors requested that a corrections service agency be established as a new department of county government. The director of the new department, which includes services for youths as well as adults, is appointed by the county executive. Existing juvenile and adult probation department staff and programs were incorporated in this department, which also was assigned responsibility for planning, administering, and evaluating all adult and juvenile correctional programs in the county. In 1975, one year after its creation, the department was reorganized along functional lines, with separate units for court services, field services, and institutional services.

Ventura County absorbed the operation of the Oxnard City Jail into the county jail system in 1971. The sheriff continues to operate the medium-security honor farm and the maximum-security jail. The separate administration of jail facilities by the sheriff may suggest that the Ventura operation is closer to a court services department than a county department of corrections, but all new corrections programs now are placed automatically under the jurisdiction of the corrections service agency. Since the agency also is responsible for correctional services within the jail, there has been significant movement toward a county department of corrections structure.

FIGURE 3
THE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS



* DEPUTY DIRECTOR IF JUVENILES INCLUDED
** - VOLUNTEER COORDINATOR
- RESEARCH/STATISTICS
- TRAINING, ETC.

King County (Seattle), Washington, established its Department of Rehabilitation Services in January 1974. The new department absorbed functions formerly carried out by the Bureau of Corrections within the Department of Public Safety. Six months later, with the merger of the city and county jails, jail programs plus others related to the involuntary treatment of the mentally ill were added. (The latter are provided under contract to the State Department of Social and Health Services.)

The department is functionally organized into two divisions, one serving involuntary treatment, the other serving correctional clients. By ordinance, a 13-member Board of Rehabilitation Services plays a strong advisory role in departmental operations. The centerpiece of the county department is its consolidated jail operations. The county jail currently handles male felons (pre- and post-trial and in the new work-release program), while the former city jail accommodates all misdemeanants and juveniles. However, since county probation services still are paralleled by separate city and state probation agencies, consolidation is not yet complete.


• Option 3: The County Justice Services Agency

The first two variations of the county-administered model include the position of law and justice coordinator, essentially a staff specialist in the county executive's office. This individual oversees the preparation of county justice department budgets and coordinates developments in the fragmented justice system so as to serve the interests of the county executive. In this third organizational option, the law and justice coordinator position is no longer needed since this function is performed by the department head.

The organization chart (Figure 3) suggests that the director still must rely heavily on coordination because many of the departments in the justice services agency are run by elected officials not directly responsible to the director. (The director does have budget authority and, in some cases, administrative authority). Administrative control over the various justice departments nevertheless is strengthened considerably by this organizational configuration.

The county justice services agency is analogous to the public safety option at the state level in that it allies corrections with law enforcement rather than human services. The decision to form such an agency suggests the logic of, and implies support for, the inclusion of all corrections functions (as illustrated in the organization chart). Retaining juvenile corrections as a separate department is, of course, still an option under this approach. The chart also divides corrections into pre- and post-disposition court services. An alternate approach would be to separate juvenile and adult services and then to subdivide these further into field and institutional units. Because this will be a large department, and because the organizational distance from the courts may be sizable, special units may be needed to work directly with the courts.

FIGURE 4
THE COUNTY JUSTICE SERVICES AGENCY



The justice services agency option is exemplified by Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon. The Multnomah County Department of Justice Services includes nine divisions: courts, civil process, public safety, district attorney, public defender (a private agency under contract to the county), juvenile court and home, adult felony and misdemeanor corrections, medical examiner, and law library. Many of these offices are headed by elected officials over whom the director of the department has no direct administrative authority. There is no sheriff; instead, there is a director of public safety who administers a county police department. Jail services are administered by the division of adult misdemeanor corrections.

Juvenile and adult services are administered separately. Since the former are under the juvenile court, technically they are part of the justice services agency. Previously, juvenile corrections was part of a county department of human services. The juvenile court judges brought juvenile services into the justice services agency when they re-established direct supervision of juvenile services, along with the power to appoint key juvenile services personnel.


Until July 1978, when Multnomah County opted to participate in Oregon's Community Corrections Act, the Department of Justice Services dealt only with misdemeanants. The state handled felony institution commitments and probation and parole services for felons. Thus, it was in this area that the Multnomah County example lacked comprehensiveness. Under legislation modeled after the Minnesota plan, passed in Oregon in 1977,²⁰ Multnomah County had the option of taking over all corrections services administered within it or contracting with the state to continue providing parole and probation services. The county opted to provide these services within the county structure.

● Option 4: The County Human Services Agency

A fourth possibility (see Figure 4) for the placement of corrections in the county government structure envisions a department of corrections within a county human services agency. (The exact nature of the other departments is not of major concern here, as this will vary from one county to another). This approach has considerable potential for consolidating the many services offenders are likely to need. One possible criticism of this variation of the county-administered model is that it may be too large and thus may become overly bureaucratic. At the state level, however, such human services "umbrella" agencies have been initiated successfully in many states.

A department of corrections located within a human services agency, at either the county or the state level, will operate quite differently from one that exists as an independent department (as in Option 1 or 2) or one that is included within a public safety agency (Option 3). Again, the decision to include youth corrections within the county human services agency is a local prerogative. But this study found that where juvenile and adult services were combined, corrections was more likely to be located in a human services agency than a public safety agency.

FIGURE 5
THE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY



The corrections organization of San Diego County, California, includes some of the features of the county human services agency model. This county has adopted an agency structure that reduces the number of department heads reporting directly to the county executive. Four large agencies were created and most corrections activities were placed in the agency containing welfare and other human service departments. Other criminal justice functions were grouped together in a fiscal and justice services agency.

The four agencies are: (1) a county health agency, which contains public health, mental health services, and allied departments; (2) a community services agency, which contains many of the traditional county government functions, such as zoning, agriculture, etc.; (3) a human resources agency, which includes welfare, human services, contracting agreements with private agencies, and the probation department; and (4) a fiscal and justice services agency, which includes the department of finance and criminal justice departments.

This agency structure splits criminal justice departments by placing the probation department in one agency and all other criminal justice departments in another. But, the probation department operates all corrections services, except the jail, which continues to be operated by the sheriff. In effect, the probation department is a youth and adult corrections department.

Intergovernmental Relationships

Three dimensions of the county-administered model and its implementation have been outlined so far: sources of initiative for change, values and goals, and organizational scope. Although discussed separately, in practice these elements interact with one another. Once the initiative for change has been mobilized and values and goals have provided a sense of purpose and direction, then the proper scope of the new organization will become more obvious. Designers of the unification effort will want to select from among the wide array of possible corrections activities and set them within an organizational framework that best fits their particular situation. Whatever option or options are selected, however, the new organization will operate within an intergovernmental context.

The relationships among local, state, and federal governments often are described as if the different levels were arranged as a layer cake, with local governments at the bottom and the federal government at the top, just under the icing. This analogy is somewhat of an oversimplification. It seems more accurate to think of intergovernmental relationships as a marble cake, since they generally involve an interweaving of responsibilities and substantial sharing of powers.

Intergovernmental relationships can produce very complex organizational arrangements. Even in states characterized as state-administered in their corrections organization, there may be some county-administered

corrections functions and certain multi-county arrangements as well. In fact, all three models may be found in operation within the boundaries of a single state. This is most clearly illustrated in Minnesota, but Maryland and Florida also contain examples of each model type.

In the latter, some urban counties had decided earlier to move toward a more unified county corrections system with or without state support; in other areas multi-county sharing of at least some corrections functions was taking place; and still other counties were contracting with the state to provide some corrections services. In such states, therefore, the result is a complex blend of state, local, and multi-jurisdiction arrangements that, if well integrated and competently administered, can be quite effective.

Where initiation of county-administered corrections has come from within the county (and the state is neither interested nor involved in the change process or its outcome)²¹ intergovernmental relationships are greatly simplified. Even in this situation, however, site visits suggested that counties must negotiate with state agencies to obtain those social, educational, and vocational services that are provided by state agencies. Intergovernmental relationships become more complicated where state subvention and incentives are used to encourage counties to modify their corrections system or its organizational structure.²² The way in which state-local tensions are managed then becomes an important factor in the success of the overall enterprise.

In each jurisdiction studied, intergovernmental traditions played an important part in determining how governments got along together. For example, it is not surprising that in Florida, with virtually no experience with state subsidies for any local government purpose, state incentives were not made a part of the state corrections legislative package. In Minnesota, traditional rivalries between counties and the state served to keep one county from joining the state program until special concessions were made.

In each case studied also, the county government was strong, well-established politically, and capably administered. Pay scales at the county level often were higher than those of the state. The state or federal government sought to "pilot test" new ideas in these counties. It is important to note that these counties are not necessarily exceptions; rather, they seem to be representative of a growing number of well-managed counties that are beginning to restructure their corrections operations.

Site visits indicated that local legislators generally had access to lawmakers in the state capitol and to the governor's office. In at least two instances, state corrections administrators spoke candidly of being intimidated by the inclination and ability of local people to go "straight to the governor" or "straight to the legislature." These state corrections administrators saw their own power bases as relatively weaker and felt that they were forced to assume the role of well-behaved bureaucrat rather than advocate of correctional reform. These were what might be called "caretaker" states--that is, states that never really "let go" of corrections responsibilities, despite the fact that they describe

corrections as primarily a local function. An alternate approach is demonstrated by states in which local forces are deliberately mobilized to achieve state objectives. In one jurisdiction, for example, the state created an indigenous service delivery system in the localities by purchasing services from private service providers. These local agencies then became important allies in the legislative arena, lobbying for appropriations to state corrections, which then could be passed on to local governments.

The county-administered model thus appears to have, at least potentially, the best of both worlds. It can barter with state corrections, lending or withholding political support for state-initiated proposals. It can go directly to the legislature or the governor to get special legislation passed (or, in unusual cases, obtain special appropriations). Or it can "go it alone," choosing to form its own local department of corrections. With such a range of alternatives, and the power to effect them, these counties tend to be rather independent governmental entities.

Intergovernmental relationships, of course, are by no means restricted to county relationships with state and federal governments. The relationship between the county and its cities also is important, for it is the city police who provide the majority of admissions to the county justice system. Their policies determine, to a large extent, the workload of the county justice system. Also, in a number of situations, cities have decided to go out of the jail business.²³ Having to take over this responsibility serves as an initiating force to push the county toward organizational change. Cities thus are an important part of the intergovernmental context.

In each local jurisdiction studied, there was some concern that state-mandated corrections programs would force added costs on the county. Different mechanisms to deal with this concern were evident. In some states, such as Maryland, local legislators attempted to insure that legislation was worded so that counties could exercise maximum discretion in implementation. In California, on the other hand, state legislation requires the state to assess the fiscal impact of any new state legislation; if it is likely to cause an increase in local expenditures, the state must appropriate funds to reimburse the counties.²⁴ Over a period of time, this has created a number of state-local subvention programs, in corrections as well as in other areas of government service.

State standards and inspection/enforcement provisions often create tensions between state and local governments. For example, all of the states visited have legislation requiring the state to inspect jail facilities, yet the intricacies of managing the state-local relationship for this purpose vary considerably. Two fundamentally different approaches are evident, reflecting two different administrative styles on the part of state government. In some "caretaker" states, if county jails do not meet minimum state standards, the state responds by withholding or reducing subsidies or other funds or initiating court actions

to force compliance. (In at least two states, subsidies were contingent upon approval of a more comprehensive set of conditions, including the development of a master plan). In contrast, in states where the inter-governmental relationship is more participatory, standards are viewed as strictly for the purpose of identifying substandard conditions. Rectifying such conditions then is the responsibility of both the state and the county. The state is obligated to assist the county in upgrading its corrections operations by providing financial or technical assistance. The "carrot and stick" approach replaces reliance on enforcement alone.

Site visits revealed great variation in the ability of states to enforce standards. Even in states where standards could be enforced by the freezing of subsidy payments, this generally is viewed as politically unacceptable except as a last resort. While often used as leverage, the threat is rarely implemented as issues seem to be negotiated before such provisions are used. In some states with overcrowded prisons, the state was so beholden to its counties for holding state prisoners in local jails that it was politically impossible to implement enforcement mechanisms. The state, in effect, was condoning the incarceration of state prisoners in local jails that the state itself had found to be substandard.

Financing

Financing, of course, is integrally linked to intergovernmental relationships. And it is financing that fuels the change process. Organizational change often is initiated with funds designated for planning and study purposes. Normally, a task force or an "action project," often assisted by LEAA funds, provides the initial momentum for reorganization--or at least hastens the evolution of a more unified county corrections department.²⁵

Funding to continue operations once pilot projects have been completed, or to implement the recommendations of a task force study, is another matter. The counties studied were financially healthy and funds were available to take over the costs of federally-initiated efforts. The willingness of these counties to provide a better than average level of public services, and to pay more for better service, also contributed to the tendency to follow through on studies and projects initiated with federal funds. In many other jurisdictions, maintaining the momentum for change may be very difficult.

Rarely have federal or county funds alone provided the financial base for correctional consolidation. State subsidies have played an important role in many jurisdictions. In Minnesota, passage of the 1973 Community Corrections Act provided substantial state subventions to any county or group of contiguous counties of at least 30,000 population for the establishment of local corrections systems.²⁶ The subsidy is administered by the state Department of Corrections through a block grant arrangement. The amount of the state subsidy is based on

a formula that reflects the population characteristics, correctional needs, and financial base of each county. Four factors are included in the formula: (1) per capita income; (2) per capita taxable property value; (3) percentage of population between the ages of six and 30 years; and (4) per capita population for correctional purposes.

The Minnesota plan includes a funding disincentive. State costs incurred through commitments of adults sentenced to five years or less, and all juvenile commitments to state institutions, are subtracted from the county subsidy. For 1977 this "charge-back" amounted to \$27.50 for adults and \$49.50 for juveniles for each day they spend in state institutions. In 1978, nearly \$7.6 million will be provided to the 25 counties (about 70 percent of Minnesota's nearly four million residents participating in the Act). Hennepin County, which contains the City of Minneapolis and is the largest county in the state, will receive \$2.2 million. Smaller counties receive much smaller amounts.

The Minnesota plan probably is the most comprehensive state corrections subvention package, but other states also have relied on subsidies to stimulate corrections activity at the local level. Oregon recently initiated legislation similar to Minnesota's.²⁷ Maryland²⁸ and Iowa²⁹ have significant, although less comprehensive, state subvention programs. And many states with legislation of limited scope may be on the road to more comprehensive arrangements. Ohio, for example, is building three regional institutions following passage of state legislation enabling regionalization. Two conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of those jurisdictions visited: First, most states with significant state subsidy programs for community corrections have a history of state-local subventions in other areas of government (i.e., it is an established tradition). And second, smaller, more specific or particularized subsidies are likely to precede more comprehensive ones.

There are alternatives to state subventions in the funding of local corrections reorganization. These are especially evident in jurisdictions that rely heavily on private nonprofit agencies to provide services to correctional clients. While publicly operated programs are financed primarily from local property taxes or through state subsidies of some kind, some private organizations have demonstrated a creative ability to obtain funding from a variety of sources. The Mahoning County Residential Treatment Center of Youngstown, Ohio, is an example. Money to operate the Center is obtained from several federal and state sources.³⁰ No part of the operation is dependent on the county for direct financing, a fact that should be encouraging to correctional administrators in jurisdictions where the property tax base is declining.

Where state monies provide a significant portion of the funds for local corrections, the calculation of an equitable subsidy formula may be a source of some state-local conflict.³¹ Determining per diem costs for persons housed in county jails and residential treatment centers also is difficult. For example, since no residential facility operates continuously at full capacity, should the state pay only for the beds it uses or should it contract for a specific number of beds (thus providing

a constant flow of funding to the agency)? The procedures, formulas, and mechanisms established in some state and federal systems can be of assistance to counties in developing similar arrangements,³² but the details must be ironed out by responsible parties in each locality.

Linkages to Related Services

A consolidated county corrections agency will need to develop linkages to health, educational, vocational, and social services from public and private agencies in the community. In some county-administered operations (notably, Ventura and San Diego Counties in California), nearly all services are provided by government agencies. In others, (such as Hennepin County, Minnesota), private agencies are relied on heavily to provide residential, treatment, educational, and vocational services to correctional clients. The proper mix, individual roles, and mutual relationships must be negotiated. Interestingly, in a few instances, county corrections leadership has strongly resisted passing funds to private agencies, reflecting a "we can do it better" attitude for which the state so often has been criticized.

Certain patterns can be observed in the way corrections agencies generally secure services from other public agencies. The typical, and perhaps traditional, situation is for county corrections to attempt to include a line item in its budget so it can purchase services from other public agencies (mostly within the county, but perhaps at other levels of government) and from private agencies as well. Portions of the jailer's budget, for example, may be designated for the purchase of hospital services from the county health department and educational services from the local school district.

This arrangement is theoretically unnecessary. County health and other public services are intended for use by all county residents--offenders and non-offenders alike. The jailer, however, may believe he needs a line item for their purchase for two reasons. First, consensual agreements with other agencies rarely work. Services promised, for one reason or another, simply do not materialize on a regular basis. Under a contractual arrangement the jailer has more control over services and is assured of more regular service delivery. The second reason stems from the fact that the jail typically is not considered part of the community. While a county-wide mental health department is charged with providing services to anyone within the county, funds may not be available to provide services to jail inmates. Curiously, if a person is free in the community, he or she has ready access to these services; once confined, access often is restricted or denied.

Several different approaches are used to overcome this problem. In one California county, the sheriff was frustrated because the state employment department could provide only one person for four hours a week to assist inmates about to be released to the community. One-half day per week simply was not enough to serve all the men and women who needed

employment assistance. The sheriff solved this problem by placing men and women on "work furlough," loading them on a bus, and driving them the few miles to the state employment offices where they entered through the front door and received the same services provided any other citizen. Labelled "offenders," they could be served only by the department's ex-offender specialist. Entering through the front door, they suddenly gained access to a variety of services previously unavailable to them because of their offender status.

Clearly, the problem of linkages to needed services is most troublesome for the incarcerated population. Offenders in residential placement or on parole or probation have greater access to services because they can enter "through the front door" of any public agency. The offender label represents less of a handicap to those in the community. By its very nature, then, community-based corrections expands linkages to services since most offenders are supervised in the community, rather than held in secure settings.

An alternative to developing linkages with other community agencies is to provide needed services within the correctional agency. The correctional agency can operate its own school program, hire its own staff psychologists and psychiatrists, and employ its own doctors and dentists.³³ One problem with such arrangements is that corrections-operated services may be of lower quality than those provided by other public or private agencies. The extent of reliance on private or public service providers will help to define the character and philosophy of the local corrections system. Avoidance of their use suggests a direct service model, while heavy reliance characterizes a service brokerage operation. Most jurisdictions visited during this study had somehow developed collaborative relationships with local human service agencies. Somehow, also, public and private agency officials in these jurisdictions did not demonstrate the parochial attitudes that might be expected of agencies differentiated along functional lines. They often were able to rise above agency self-interest when it was important to do so. Judges, county commissioners, citizens, and corrections officials were surprisingly cosmopolitan in attitude and this favored cooperation among agency personnel at all levels of government.

The county-administered model, it seems, has much appeal in terms of its ability to provide linkages to services. In several states, many of the non-correctional services offenders need also are operated by county government. This puts the responsibility for coordination squarely at the county's doorstep. In those states in which most allied social services are administered by the state (Florida is an example), coordination of the delivery of social services will be more difficult for a county to achieve. The county-administered organization also may be more successful in working with local private agencies, since the correctional client referred to private resources is a local resident. Private agencies may not view clients of a state corrections agency in quite the same way.

Linkages to services often are strengthened by placing important service providers on community corrections policy and advisory bodies. This is a particular strength of Minnesota's county corrections operations.


Members of the public, the media, and other segments of the community also are involved, either on such advisory boards or in volunteer programs. Once involved, such individuals and groups serve as advocates and brokers to help offenders gain entrance to allied social service agencies.

Service Impact

The jurisdictions visited during the course of this study could provide little empirical evidence to suggest that the unified, comprehensive county corrections organization has any distinct advantages, in terms of impact on service delivery, over other modes of organization. Where evaluation is required as a condition of receiving state subsidies, more definitive conclusions may be forthcoming. At present, however, it is difficult to determine whether new organizational forms provide for more "effective" service delivery than those they replace.


Despite the lack of evaluative data on service impact, this model represents the most appealing organizational solution to many correctional problems. Locally administered and controlled, the county corrections system seems ideally suited to the community corrections philosophy and its operationalization--at least in those jurisdictions with the inclination, population base, and resources to support it. Also, impressionistic data obtained during site visits to county-administered systems suggest a variety of important benefits. Where such systems have been implemented, many people report that not only does correctional effectiveness seem to have increased, but services have become more humane, more fair, better organized, more uniform, and generally better administered. The underlying theme was that a logically organized and competently administered corrections system will result in greater respect for the law. The changes made were regarded as an indication of good government. They were accomplished to protect the integrity of the law and the justice system--an important accomplishment in its own right.

FIGURE 6
SUMMARY OF THE UNIFIED COUNTY-ADMINISTERED PROGRAM MODEL



UNIFICATION OPTIONS:

- DEPARTMENT OF COURT SERVICES
- COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
- COUNTY JUSTICE SERVICES AGENCY
- COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY



FOOTNOTES

1. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Expenditure and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1976).
2. Ibid.
3. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and U.S. Census Bureau, Local Jails (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). See also: National Association of Counties and International City Manager's Association, 1977 County Year Book (Washington, D.C.: NACO, 1978).
4. Table is from 1978 Commercial Atlas and Marketing Guide, 109th ed. (New York: Rand McNally 1978), p. 39, as derived from the U.S. Bureau of Census, 1970 census population for counties.
5. The National Association of Counties takes the position that counties of 100,000 population or more have the capability to establish single-county programs. Duane Baltz, Associate Director, Criminal Justice Programs, of NACO reports: "We have used 100,000 as the cut-off point between rural and urban. This is still arbitrary but it has some utility. The Bureau of the Census uses it in some studies and we have used it for a corrections management training program, etc. Our list shows about 360 counties over 100,000 (according to revised census data)...counties of that size should have the resources, staff, etc., to develop their own criminal justice planning board or coordinating council, and by implication, should also have the capability to operate single-county programs. Roughly 75 percent or more of the counties over 100,000 have at least 100 inmates in their jails."
6. Supra, Note 4.
7. National Association of Counties, Criminal Justice Program Fact Sheet (Washington, D.C.: NACO Research Foundation, 1977).
8. Ibid. Counties identified include: Ventura County, Calif., Orange County, Fla., Hennepin County, Minn., King County, Wash., Multnomah County, Ore., among others. Several multi-jurisdiction examples also were studied.
9. The main data base for the chapter on the county-administered unified model consists of Orange County (Orlando), Florida, Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota, Clark County (Vancouver), Washington, Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon, and San Diego County, California. The authors also have drawn on the literature, on their own experiences, and on site visit data concerning multi-county examples presented in Chapter IV and state-administered examples presented in Chapter V. Other sources include the Des Moines exemplary project and the five replications of that program in various cities and counties throughout the nation.

10. Lewis, Joseph H., "Policy Sciences and the Market," in Grace M. Taher (ed.), University Urban Research Centers 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1971-72).
11. Sometimes these are "charter" counties, which establishes their special status from the outset. In other cases, a general law county may succeed in getting special legislation passed, permitting the county to conduct its business in ways otherwise not possible. In Orange County, Fla., new facilities and programs, superior salaries, and innovations in practice are talked about with considerable pride, especially in comparison with other counties and with state government generally. This sense of being "special" also is noticeable in Montgomery County, Md., which has successfully pressed for legislation specific to the county; and in Hennepin County, Minn., where the state was persuaded to make special concessions before the County would participate in the state Community Corrections Act.
12. Orange County, Fla., for example, is a politically conservative climate, yet a truly community-based network of corrections services has been developed.
13. In Ventura County, Calif., the county-wide criminal justice planning board requires any new applicant for LEAA funds to complete a "systems impact" statement, similar to the more familiar "environmental impact" statement, which forces the applicant to forecast the probable effects of the project on the workloads of police, the courts, corrections, and the public sector.
14. See, for example: Frederic D. Moyer and Joseph W. Maxey, Hennepin County, Minnesota, Corrections Plan (Urbana, Ill.: National Clearinghouse for Criminal Justice Planning and Architecture, 1977); and Governor's Task Force on Corrections, Oregon Corrections Master Plan (Salem, Ore.: 1976).
15. In Ventura County, Calif., the grant-funded Unified Corrections Project helped to produce a corrections strategy and the political and organizational base for unification of corrections. See: Corrections Division, Department of the Sheriff, "Ventura County Community Correctional Program," undated; and County of Ventura, "A Corrections Strategy," May 1974.
16. Minnesota counties (Hennepin, for example) typically combine juvenile and adult services. California is an example of a state in which they are dutifully kept separate.
17. The range of services performed by local corrections agencies today were identified by Walter Busher in the course of the Alternatives to Jail Project of the American Justice Institute (LEAA Grant No. 75-NI-99-0006).
18. Nancy Levinson and Rod O'Conner, "Regionalization of County Corrections Programs," National Association of Counties Research Foundation Fact Sheet, March 1978.

19. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Community-Based Corrections in Des Moines (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). This volume also summarizes the effort to replicate the Des Moines Community Corrections Program in five other locations: Clark County (Vancouver), Wash.; San Mateo County, Calif.; Salt Lake County, Utah; St. Louis County (Duluth), Minn.; and Orange County (Orlando), Fla.
20. The Community Corrections Act of 1977, Oregon Legislative Assembly, 1977 Regular Session, Senate Bill 354.
21. As in Ventura County, Calif.
22. As in Hennepin County, Minn., which receives a substantial portion of its corrections budget in the form of a state subsidy. But this is true also in Florida where Orange County, among others in the state, has elected to develop misdemeanor probation services because the state has ceased to provide this service for the counties.
23. In King County (Seattle), Wash., this event served to solidify the unification process. In Ventura County, Calif., on the other hand, County absorption of the Oxnard City Jail occurred early in the evolutionary process, and appears as a relatively insignificant event in the overall evolution of that program.
24. Senate Bill 90, Chapter 1135, of the 1977-78 California Legislative Session, amending certain sections of the Education and the Revenue and Taxation Codes.
25. See, for example: Ventura County, Calif., "Corrections Strategy," May 1974.
26. Minnesota Community Corrections Act, M.S. 401.01-401.16, 1973.
27. Supra, Note 21.
28. Maryland, Annotated Code, Article 27, 706, 729, 19.
29. Iowa, Senate File 112, 67th General Assembly, 1977.
30. Harry Allen, et al., Halfway Houses, forthcoming Program Models publication prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
31. Minnesota has pioneered in this area. Maryland, Ohio, and other states also have had considerable experience.
32. Federal probation and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons probably have the most experience in this area; but several states (e.g., Florida, Ohio, and Minnesota) also have wrestled with these issues and have come to agreement with county units of government. Oregon has done a lot of work in fine-tuning the state subsidy formula.

33. This was probably most pronounced in the Orange County operation, but community corrections systems typically provide less in the way of direct services than more traditional corrections systems with which the authors are familiar.

CHAPTER IV

THE MULTI-JURISDICTION LOCAL GOVERNMENT MODEL

Chapter III presented various organizational options for a unified county-administered corrections system. The county-administered model is an excellent organizational solution for many metropolitan counties--those with population bases large enough to justify and support a comprehensive corrections system. Most counties, however, are small. Although our 210 largest counties (those with populations of more than 172,000) contain about 60 percent of the nation's population, there are 2,891 smaller counties, many of which contain substantially fewer residents. The unified county-administered model, therefore, is a viable organizational solution only in relatively few instances. Other models are needed to meet the special needs of smaller and less populous counties."

Small and medium-sized counties are faced with especially difficult corrections problems.¹ Generally they have neither the funds nor the workload to support a comprehensive array of correctional services. Caseloads are small and per capita costs are higher than in larger jurisdictions. The workload also may fluctuate widely, requiring continuous adaptation and "crisis management." Since few programs and services are available, offenders tend to receive the same treatment, regardless of age, sex, or need, or they are referred to the state corrections system. Local facilities frequently are old and inadequate, while recruitment of qualified staff is impeded by low pay scales and the lack of an attractive career ladder. Adding to such problems is the fact that, because of high public visibility, substandard conditions are readily noticed and may result in legal or political pressures for change. Further, the state may set standards that the county is incapable of meeting, then send in inspection teams with the "muscle" to close facilities or enforce compliance. Small counties clearly must develop creative ways of providing services that both meet contemporary correctional standards and fit within their limited budgets.

The Multi-Jurisdiction Local Government Model

The multi-jurisdiction model is presented here as one solution to many of the corrections problems faced by small and medium-sized counties.² This model is one in which two or more local governments join together to provide and administer community corrections programs and services. Like the other organizational models described in this volume, this model is comprehensive, unified, and community based. Like the unified county-administered model (Chapter III), it also is locally controlled and financed. Local control and financing, however, is accomplished through a multi-jurisdiction (or regional) administrative apparatus.

The concept of the multi-jurisdiction local corrections organization was introduced in Chapter II, where it was noted that, while such a model is greatly needed, few examples currently are to be found on the American corrections scene. Site visits identified many instances of inter-county arrangements of rather limited scope, the most common being one in which two or more counties collaborate in the construction and operation of a regional corrections facility or jail.³ Such cooperative ventures may represent steps along an evolutionary path toward a more comprehensive multi-jurisdiction arrangement.

Material in this chapter draws heavily from information gained during site visits to three multi-county corrections systems in two states (Minnesota and Iowa). Collateral evidence gleaned from other less comprehensive multi-jurisdiction arrangements provides important additional support for conclusions and observations offered here.⁴ Three major options for inter-county collaboration have been identified. Others, of course, are possible; but these three are sufficiently distinct to permit the application of one or another in a wide range of situations throughout the United States. The first, exemplified here by the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board in northeastern Minnesota, represents an excellent model for large, sparsely populated rural counties. Responsibility and authority are dispersed relatively equally among the various parties to the agreement. The second option, represented by the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted County Corrections Board, is a model for satellite counties clustered around a medium-sized county. In this case authority is vested more heavily in the more populous county. The third option, exemplified by Iowa's Fifth Judicial District, represents a model for states in which there are numerous small counties.

The Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board operates through a joint powers agreement among six large and sparsely populated counties.⁵ The principal city in the region is Duluth. The governing unit functions much like a port authority, except that it delivers corrections services throughout the six-county area. The operation provides an example of successful corrections consolidation in a predominantly rural area with large distances between population centers. The Board provides comprehensive services to both youth and adults, with the exception of jail services, which are the responsibility of local sheriffs. Services provided by the Board include probation, parole, residential treatment, juvenile detention, and a number of alternative direct service programs.

A somewhat different multi-county arrangement is represented by the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted County Corrections Board, which operates out of southeastern Minnesota in an area about 80 miles south of Minneapolis/St. Paul. Here, two smaller counties (Dodge has a population of just over 13,000; Fillmore, about 21,000) cluster around a more populous county (Olmsted's population is just over 83,000). The latter contains the principal city in the area (Rochester) and provides the bulk of the corrections workload. In contrast to the two other counties, which are mostly rural, Olmsted has a high per capita income, many professional residents, and a suburban character. The Corrections Board provides

comprehensive corrections services for both juveniles and adults, although, as in the Arrowhead region, local sheriffs retain control of the jails.⁶ A major difference between this three-county operation and that of the Arrowhead region is found in the greater administrative powers of the metropolitan county in the former (Olmsted serves as administrative agent for the three-county corrections system, while in the Arrowhead system a new multi-county government entity was created). This tends to make the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted arrangement especially appropriate for suburban satellite counties, while the Arrowhead model may be more effective in rural areas.

A third approach to multi-county consolidation is found in Iowa's Fifth Judicial District,⁷ in which 16 counties collaborate to provide services in four state-mandated areas: pretrial release, supervised pretrial release, probation, and residential treatment. Such an arrangement seems particularly appropriate for states in which there are many small counties (Iowa, for example, has 99). While in the case of the Fifth Judicial District one county (Polk) does contain a large share of the region's total population, the model may be applicable to areas in which no single population center exists.⁸

Regardless of the particular route followed in setting up a multi-county corrections operation, a host of related matters make this model more complex than its single-county counterpart. The obstacles to be negotiated in creating a county department of corrections or court services are formidable enough. They may increase geometrically when an effort is made to bring under one umbrella agency the corrections operations of two or more counties. Instead of a single sheriff, for example, there may be several; the number of judges also increases proportionately; and commissioners from all participating counties must become involved. Differences among counties in population, size, geography, values, and traditions may present difficult problems to be painstakingly worked out, especially in determining equitable cost-sharing arrangements and fair representation for each county within the governing body.

Some of the characteristics of small counties further complicate the multi-county consolidation effort. Most of the less populous counties visited for this study are not characterized by a strong county executive or by established bureaucracies. A part-time board of county commissioners generally manages the domain, assisted by a few staff aides. In the general structure of government, staffs are small and few persons have specialized knowledge of corrections. In contrast to many of the single-county systems studied, pay scales tend to be lower than those of the state and local officials generally exert relatively little influence in the state capitol, especially where representation depends heavily on population count.

In some ways, such qualities make it easier to get things done on the local level. There is no ponderous, unresponsive bureaucracy to oppose organizational change. Communications are simpler: personal

contacts (by telephone or face-to-face) serve as the primary method of communication and there is less written documentation. With fewer persons playing more roles, coordination is more manageable. There is a feeling that it is possible to accomplish much in the public arena --if key actors can be energized around common goals.

As with the other organizational models presented in this volume, caution must be used in applying the multi-jurisdiction model in any particular locale. The observations and recommendations offered here are general, requiring careful adaptation to the particular requirements of specific settings. Drawn from varied experience with multi-jurisdiction correctional services, these general observations and guidelines are intended to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the model and suggest some of the problems that may arise in its implementation. As in the previous chapter, the model is described in terms of the seven dimensions identified in Chapter II.

Source of Initiative for Change

Many internal, external and pervasive sources of initiative for change can be teased out of the case studies developed during site visits. Some have included:

- Embarrassing publicity or a grand jury investigation of substandard corrections practices;
- Legislative appropriations of funds for a timely state-wide survey that provides supportive recommendations;
- Willingness of several neighboring counties to collaborate in developing a multi-county facility, leading perhaps to an agreement to administer other correctional services on a regional basis;
- LEAA funding, used as "seed money" or "risk capital" to test and evaluate a new concept;
- A significant change in leadership, fortuitously timed;
- Broad-based citizen, professional, and legislative support for organizational change;
- A successful pilot test of a new program or service;
- A willing "front-runner" jurisdiction to serve as an experimental location for a new concept in correctional organization.

A combination of these factors was evident in northeastern Minnesota, where, for example, in 1969, there were 20 city lock-ups, seven county

jails, and a county work farm. No professional treatment staff were assigned to any of these facilities and there were no separate facilities for juveniles, who were detained in adult jails. Funds for the maintenance of buildings and equipment were inadequate; and the courts handling misdemeanor cases had no professional staff to help in the preparation of presentence reports or to develop programs for sentenced offenders.

A grand jury investigation of the St. Louis County work farm in that year concluded that conditions there were "comparable to a dog kennel." Adverse publicity was focused on the work farm by some of the local media. Concurrently, the state legislature appropriated funds for a survey of state correctional problems and the development of a comprehensive plan for regional corrections facilities. Backed by state recommendations deriving from this study, St. Louis County moved to form a regional corrections facility (the Northeast Regional Corrections Center) in cooperation with Carlton, Lake, and Cook Counties. LEAA funds were used to remodel the St. Louis work farm. Planning for a regional detention home for juveniles was initiated through the efforts of local officials and with the determined and dedicated assistance of a group of citizens who felt strongly that children should not be housed in jails with adults. With assistance from LEAA and the Minnesota legislature, the Arrowhead Juvenile Center was developed as a regional detention facility serving five counties.

In 1971, under another LEAA grant, diagnostic and treatment services were provided to the Duluth municipal court and the first treatment staff person was assigned to the work farm. This allowed a small education and treatment program to be begun by the new director. Meanwhile, as was occurring elsewhere in the nation, the population of the work farm was changing. Public drunkenness statutes were removed from the books in Minnesota in 1971 and the work farm was used increasingly to confine younger felony offenders with longer sentences.

A focus for state legislative action was provided by the growing movement within Minnesota toward community-based residential facilities and programs and both formal and informal court diversion programs.⁹ In the fall of 1972, a task force was charged with developing a subsidy program to support more comprehensive county corrections. The task force, with broad representation from all elements of the criminal justice system as well as county commissioners, split into committees to consider specific aspects of a subsidy program. Key members of the state corrections department served as chairmen of each committee.¹⁰ Their final product was the Minnesota Community Corrections Act of 1973.

In June 1974, Dodge and Olmsted counties became one of the first regions to participate in the subsidy program provided for by the Community Corrections Act. During the period 1973-1975, participation was limited to pilot tests in this and two other areas in the state. In July 1976, Carlton, Lake, Cook, and St. Louis Counties joined with Aitkin and Koochiching Counties to form the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board under the Act.

Developments in Iowa were quite different. They began in Des Moines in 1964 with a newspaper editor's visit to the Vera Foundation in New York City, where successful initiation of the Manhattan Bail Project had reduced rates of detention of suspects awaiting trial. This Des Moines citizen returned to Iowa and, with financial assistance provided by a local foundation (the Hawley Foundation), initiated a pretrial release program. The normative reason for change in this case was citizen concern about the quality of justice for the poor. Government interests also were served by the release of selected persons pending trial because the jail at the time was overcrowded and reduction in the jail population made economic sense. After an initial test period, the city and county appropriated funds to continue the pretrial release program, which continued to be operated by the Hawley Foundation under a contractual arrangement.

In 1970 a supervised pretrial release program was instituted. Called "release with service," it focused on those individuals who could not qualify for the regular release on recognizance (ROR or OR) program. Participants were released on recognizance if they consented to close supervision and other special release conditions. This second project component was made possible by a grant from LEAA, with additional funds from Model Cities.¹¹ In 1971 the Model Cities' crime and delinquency specialist proposed that the county board of supervisors combine the pretrial programs and expand services and funding.

In January 1971 the board created the Polk County Department of Court Services. A large LEAA grant provided funds to establish misdemeanor probation and presentence investigation services and to open the Ft. Des Moines residential facility. This filled out the original complement of four programs: pretrial release; supervised pretrial release; misdemeanor probation and presentence investigation services; and a residential facility to serve as an alternative to jail. In 1972, with funds from the Iowa Crime Commission, the Polk County operation was extended throughout the 16-county Judicial District (regional offices were opened in Creston and Chariton) and the department was renamed the Fifth Judicial District Department of Court Services.¹²

Over time the operation continued to evolve and expand. A women's residential facility was opened in 1973; an alcohol safety action program was added; there is now a strong volunteer program; and a Community Resource Management Team¹³ provides specialized probation services to both misdemeanants and felons. Outlying counties are served by a network of regional offices, but the center of the action is Des Moines in Polk County. By 1977 the department had changed its name again, this time to conform to new legislation mandating the provision of the four principal corrections components in each judicial district of the state. The new department became known as the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services.

There are both similarities and interesting contrasts to be found in the initial experiences of the three jurisdictions studied. While in northeastern Minnesota the initiative came from a county investigation

of substandard conditions and a state-funded survey and plan, in both Iowa and in the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted area it was citizen interest and concern that sparked the change effort. In Minnesota, citizens initiated the PORT program as a residential alternative to prison.¹⁴ In Des Moines, a group of citizens led by a newspaper editor initiated a series of reforms that resulted in the Des Moines community corrections program. Here, as elsewhere, local citizens, bar associations, women's groups, and representatives of the media served as important initiators of change.

Both PORT and the Des Moines program served as good examples or models for other counties and provided key concepts for state legislation. There is evidence that a "good program" developed in one county will be copied by others. Further, neighboring counties seem willing, in many instances, to join forces with a county that is already providing a service that is seen as valuable. The PORT program in Olmsted County, for example, was already there and working; it thus seemed logical for neighboring counties to use it.¹⁵

There seems to be something especially significant about the residential facility as an element of the initiation process in the development of the multi-jurisdiction model. Perhaps because the residential facility is more tangible than other programmatic elements, a regional jail or community correctional center often is the initial focus of cooperative arrangements among neighboring counties. It seems to be the programmatic "trigger" that allows or encourages the creation of a more comprehensive multi-jurisdiction corrections operation. While the evolutionary development of a more comprehensive structure may be temporarily frozen at that point, or further development halted entirely, other components of the corrections system often are added to the regional structure at a later date.

It also seems to help if contiguous counties are experiencing similar problems, such as overcrowded jails, at the same time, since this sets the stage for consideration of regional alternatives. The state at this point may play an important supportive role. If a state corrections subsidy, for example, is geared toward reducing commitments to state institutions, then construction or expansion of local facilities is forced.¹⁶ For small counties to respond economically to this stimulus, however, they must join together. Thus, any state subsidy that is targeted on reducing commitments to state institutions is likely to encourage both local corrections expansion and joint ventures among counties.

Despite the importance of state support and facilitation as a stimulus to multi-jurisdiction cooperation, local actors tend to provide the primary source of initiative for change. The state role is primarily in the legislative arena -- providing funds and statesman-like leadership, but these generally appear after other important initiatives at the local level and often because of such local initiatives. Ideally, the state role is, at least initially, more supportive than forceful. For example, the concepts introduced by Iowa's Fifth Judicial District were at first "encouraged" and "permitted" in other districts

by state statutes. Only later did "mandates" appear in state laws. As has been observed in other cases, the inclination to suggest rather than require seemed to pay off. It also served as a useful test of the willingness of the various actors to become involved, as well as a demonstration of intention -- a means of assessing resistance before taking a firmer stand.

Two additional observations regarding the successful initiation of multi-jurisdictional corrections arrangements may be helpful to those seeking such organizational solutions to local corrections problems. The first has to do with the importance of local leadership in effecting change, the second with its goals. In the early stages of development, formidable negotiations are required to work out financial and operational agreements satisfactory to all participants. The state role, at least initially, is to help in setting up the legislative framework and then to stand aside to allow "locals" to fight it out. (Where state officials step into the fray prematurely, the results have been uniformly disappointing).

Interestingly, in two of the cases studied, the careers of the principal local actors have followed nearly identical paths. The original director of the Ft. Des Moines residential facility joined the Iowa Department of Corrections as bureau chief in charge of community corrections, later moving on to become Director of the Department. His counterpart in Minnesota, the first director of the PORT program in Olmsted County, later became Deputy Director for Community Corrections of the state Department of Corrections and, finally, Commissioner of Corrections. The career paths of these two men, and the roles they played in initiating and sustaining the change process, are strikingly similar.¹⁷ Both men, it may be important to note, were charged with a sense of mission. They sometimes led, at other times rode the crest of the wave that brought community corrections to its current position. Both also did much to shape the legislative programs that picked up and advanced the change process that each had done so much to initiate.

The second observation has to do with the purposes of reform. Unlike the unified county-administered model (Chapter III), or the state decentralized model (Chapter V), the multi-jurisdiction model generally is initiated not as a part of a larger overhaul of government structure, but as a specific response to recognized corrections problems. Quite often, as well, multi-jurisdiction efforts build on the simplicity of existing arrangements. In the cases studied, an existing corrections bureaucracy did not have to be dismantled and restructured because little in the way of corrections programs or staff existed. They were starting almost "from scratch." Where local corrections agencies did exist, a breakthrough occurred when it became clear that joining together would leave each county with "something of its own" in addition to something new that was shared and otherwise unavailable.

Values and Goals

In implementing the unified county-administered model (Chapter III), major reasons for correctional reorganization were: to realign state-local relationships; to reduce total costs of government and eliminate duplicative services; to improve service delivery; and/or to shake up a recalcitrant and inefficient bureaucracy. These same four purposes seem relevant in the case of the state-decentralized model (Chapter V). For the multi-jurisdiction model, however, a slightly different focus is evident. The goals of reorganization and the values that underlie them often reflect a dominant concern with the improvement of service delivery. As reported by the National Association of Counties:

"A multi-county approach often enables counties to pool their resources to provide more effective services, attract more qualified personnel, and institute better rehabilitation programs for inmates at the local level."¹⁸

Different counties naturally have different goals and values. While the concerns of urban counties will differ from those of suburban ones, both will differ strikingly from rural counties where strong agrarian values may conflict with urban versions of the community corrections philosophy. The Northeast Correctional Center of the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board in Minnesota, for example, is one of few correctional farming operations in the nation today (and certainly one of very few that still makes money). Its urban counterpart would be a community correctional center located in a downtown metropolitan area, close to transportation and linked to education and social services and employment opportunities of the urban setting.

There are other ways in which counties will differ that affect their values and goals. Local history and tradition color inter-jurisdictional relationships. Longstanding feuds or intercounty conflicts suggest fundamental differences in values that may run deep. Such conditions serve as restraining forces to impede or prohibit collaboration among contiguous counties. A tradition of working cooperatively, however, often is instrumental in initiating and sustaining change, as well as defining intergovernmental relationships.

Even counties with fairly amiable relationships will differ in their conceptions of the goals of consolidation, depending upon local circumstances. If one county has recently built a new jail and has plenty of space available, its perspective will differ from that of a county that needs more jail bed space. Counties that need to move immediately may not be willing to wait and gamble that intercounty agreements can be hammered out in time to allow them to deal effectively with their own pressing corrections problems. Thus, having similar traditions and compatible values may not be enough -- counties must not only be "in the same boat;" they must be facing similar problems at

virtually the same time.¹⁹

The key seems to be to find mechanisms that allow counties both to select their own partners and to design their own administrative arrangements; that is, to do all that is possible to allow counties with shared values and goals to join together in natural geographic and normative clusters. Where this is done, consolidation is less likely to threaten county interests in maintaining local control.

Finally, for jurisdictions that are too small to develop comprehensive corrections systems by themselves, and who fear a loss of local control to larger governments or an intergovernmental consortium, a small multi-county corrections structure represents a good compromise. Such an arrangement helps to keep government close to the people and provides some measure of local control. The county retains some of its own identity and is allowed its share of control of the joint enterprise.


Organizational Scope

Definition of the appropriate range of activities to be included within the multi-jurisdiction corrections system will depend upon local answers to the three questions identified in Chapters II and III: (1) How is the corrections system to be defined and what are its functional boundaries? (Unless the scope of services is set forth in state legislation, this becomes a local prerogative). (2) What specific corrections activities are to be performed and which organizational component will be responsible for each? (The new multi-jurisdiction corrections organization most likely will build on existing arrangements. To some extent the size of the operation will determine the scope of services that can be planned. Generally, the larger the population base, the more varied the corrections services can become. The larger the geographic area to be served, the greater the need for regional service centers). (3) How will the corrections agency be related to the county governments it is to serve? How can several counties simultaneously administer a comprehensive, unified, locally governed corrections organization?

The fragmented bureaucratic machinery and small resource base of each participating county must be pulled together in ways that serve and protect local interests in the joint enterprise. The subject of organizational scope thus includes administrative structure; i.e., the way in which counties are joined together to administer corrections services. A prototype organizational framework for a multi-jurisdiction community corrections system appears in Figure 5.

Some of the organizational components of this model may need further explanation. For example, each county board of commissioners would ask one of its members to serve on an executive board governing the cooperative venture. According to the provisions of a joint

FIGURE 7
MULTI-JURISDICTION LOCAL GOVERNMENT CORRECTIONS SYSTEMS



powers agreement, there may be weighted votes for each jurisdiction based on an agreed-upon formula. The executive board, and ultimately each board of commissioners, would be responsible for final approval of the annual budget and for approving all major policy decisions. This board, however, would meet infrequently and primary guidance for the program would be provided by the community corrections board and its executive committee. Some good examples²⁰ of the possible composition of the executive board are contained in the Minnesota and Iowa statutes.

The organization of services reporting to the corrections director will depend on the size and scope of the multi-jurisdiction arrangement. The prototype depicted in Figure 5 assumes that the sheriff remains in charge of jail operations but that the new corrections agency will provide programs and services within the jail.²¹

The general organizational framework depicted here, of course, must be adapted to fit specific multi-county situations. There are a number of effective approaches to multi-county consolidation or regionalization of corrections services. Each of the three jurisdictions studied was arranged somewhat differently, although their general organizational structures tended to follow similar lines. Organizational variations reflect the unique circumstances of the counties involved. Thus, the organization chart of the basic multi-county corrections model must be modified to take into account specific needs and situations. From site visits, three multi-county variations have been identified. These illustrate common circumstances in which the multi-jurisdiction model may be useful.

- Option 1: A Model for Rural Counties

A first organizational option joins together several large, sparsely populated counties with small population centers. This arrangement involves from three to ten geographically large counties with about equal populations. All counties are equal partners in a shared corrections enterprise.

Under such an arrangement, multi-county operations would be governed by a joint powers agreement similar to that of the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board. This board exemplifies a multi-jurisdiction, local government corrections organization that is successfully operating in such an environment. The Arrowhead board has pulled together into a multi-jurisdiction corrections organization nearly all corrections services. While jails continue to be operated by local sheriffs, residential facilities for juveniles and adults are provided by the board. Even probation and parole, formerly state-operated, have been turned back to local governments.²²

Services are organized into four major departments: court and field services; juvenile institutional services; adult institutional services; and support services. Court and field services provide pretrial, probation, and parole services to the county and district courts throughout the region. Juvenile institutional services include the Arrowhead Juvenile Center and community-based programs. Adult institutional services include the operation of the Northeast Regional Corrections Center, its educational program, and several outreach programs such as Volunteers in Corrections and the Two Harbors Positive Peer Culture program. The support services department is responsible for planning, research, staff development, and educational outreach programs in four smaller counties.

- Option 2: A Model for Suburban Clusters

In the second option, a multi-county organization could be developed where a number of small counties nestle against a much larger one, and where the more populous county can serve as the center of a multi-county corrections service area. The counties should be joined together by a joint powers agreement that pools the corrections resources of the area. This multi-jurisdiction arrangement will be most useful in medium and small population centers. As a practical matter, two or three counties will be included in any such multi-county corrections organization. Although a state legislative framework would be an added inducement to forming a multi-jurisdiction corrections organization, such an arrangement could be developed in many states without state legislation or leadership. This fact makes the multi-jurisdiction option a particularly useful one.

Equitable cost-sharing arrangements seem to be the key requirement for success in implementing this option. If the fear of being absorbed or overwhelmed by the larger county can be overcome, small counties stand to gain considerably from pooling their resources with a more heavily populated neighbor county. The Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted operation is a good example of a successful suburban cluster corrections organization. The system is comprehensive in that it includes corrections services for both juveniles and adults, provides residential services, and has extensive field operations based not only in the central county (Olmsted) but in out-county offices as well. Eleven program areas, each with a separate budget, are melded together; administration, evaluation, and training serve the entire operation. A court services program provides probation and parole supervision, as well as investigative reports for the courts, voluntary referral and "courtesy" supervision, and diversion services. The PORT corrections center provides a residential setting for the treatment of older youths and adults, while other PORT facilities provide group homes for younger persons. An extensive volunteer program provides services throughout the three-county area. Programs are offered within the jail, although jail administration remains under the control of the sheriff. A youth services community program, a "rape-line"

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program, and a learning disabilities program have moved the multi-county agency into prevention and victim/witness services areas.

The purchase-of-service agreement under which the system operates represents a contractual arrangement between the advisory board and the public and private agencies that provide corrections services. Each year the advisory board develops system-wide goals and objectives and allocates a specific amount of money for each area of corrections needs. The board then advertises what they want done, and how much money they are prepared to spend to achieve each objective, and local public and private agencies are encouraged to participate. A purchase-of-services agreement is the instrument that binds the contractual relationship. The agreement can be changed at quarterly review periods by consent of the parties. Inadequate performance in meeting objectives may result in a program's being placed on "probation" by the steering committee. In the event that performance does not meet the conditions of the probationary period, the agreement may be terminated by the county boards, on the recommendation of the advisory board at the end of the quarter.

• Option 3: A Model for Small Counties

In a third organizational variation of the multi-jurisdiction model, a large number of small counties are joined together to provide local corrections services. This option is particularly applicable to those states with large numbers of counties that are small both geographically and in population. Iowa's Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services serves as a good example here, for it involves 16 counties surrounding Des Moines. In the Des Moines operation, Polk County is the principal population center, but the counties could just as well be of similar size and character. Although organized along judicial district lines, the multi-county organization reports directly to a board made up primarily of elected county commissioners, rather than representatives of the judicial branch. State legislation sets the administrative framework and it clearly functions as an agency of the executive branch.

Of the three operations considered here, the Iowa program is the most limited in scope. Juveniles are not included within the multi-jurisdiction corrections network.²³ The sheriffs continue to operate the jails and the state corrections department continues to administer parole and certain halfway houses for state parolees. Pretrial services, however, receive great emphasis in the Iowa program. Upgrading the quality of presentence reports for prisoners who have been convicted and are awaiting sentence has been emphasized as well, so the scope of the Iowa effort includes a wide spectrum of services at both pre- and post-trial stages. Many additional service opportunities exist within the broad range of this corrections framework and one gets the impression that in Iowa change and growth are not yet "complete."

Intergovernmental Relationships

The multi-county corrections model is by nature intergovernmental. The concept of tension between and among various county interests and the notion of driving and restraining forces are highly applicable here, for they do much to explain the workings of the multi-jurisdiction model, as well as the process by which it is created and installed. Resolution of conflict is the key to the successful formation and continued operation of the enterprise.

The primary forum for negotiation is the executive board which, in the prototype organization, consists of one member from each participating board of commissioners. The Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board, for example, includes nine members: one county commissioner from each of the five smaller counties, two commissioners from St. Louis County, one representative of the Minnesota Chippewa tribe, and one citizen member. This body sets overall policy and approves appropriations.

It is this representative board that links the multi-jurisdiction organization to the county politic and to the budget resources each county is expected to contribute to the joint effort. In Minnesota, each county is eligible for a subsidy and the subsidy is actually sent to the receiving county. Thus, once a year, as the county board makes the decision to transfer these funds to the multi-jurisdiction corrections system, the latter is reminded that it is a creature of, and responsible to, the county boards participating in the joint venture.

There is a second important forum for negotiation. Minnesota's Community Corrections Act mandates the formation of an advisory board to develop the annual corrections plan and recommend programs and priorities to the regional corrections executive board. The Arrowhead Regional Corrections Advisory Board has 25 members, nine of whom are members of the Arrowhead Regional Corrections Board. (Other members include the corrections administrator, welfare director, educational administrator, probation/parole officer, ex-offender, health representative, social services agency representative, public defender, county attorney, judges, chief of police, sheriff, and several citizens). The Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System and the Fifth Judicial District Department of Correctional Services have advisory boards that are similarly constituted. Such boards are one way to bring together all those elements on which corrections must depend for its success and to focus the energy and enthusiasm of local citizens.

Most of the intergovernmental negotiation is horizontal; that is, between and among county governments. Different branches of government may become involved; for example, the judiciary may be concerned about losing control over certain probation matters such as presentence report services. State legislation that encourages or permits multi-jurisdiction corrections organization adds a vertical dimension to the negotiation process. The state legislative framework sets the boundaries

within which negotiations will take place. In fact, it is difficult to envision widespread development of the multi-jurisdiction model unless states pass enabling legislation with at least some of the features of the Iowa or Minnesota statutes. State subsidies and the contingencies associated with their disbursement, standard-setting, and inspection and enforcement are important sources of state-local tensions.

A somewhat unusual intergovernmental arrangement exists in Shasta County, California, where the State Division of Forestry has turned over one of its forestry camps to the regional corrections program administered by the County. Ten smaller counties contract with Shasta for services and use of the regional facility. The Forestry Division operates the camp and supervises inmate work crews, while the Shasta County Sheriff's Office provides custodial and supervisory services and some rehabilitation programming. This type of state-local co-operation seems to be widely applicable, but few such arrangements are known to exist. It may be particularly useful in states where the state corrections department provides inmate labor to do forestry work and where new state community corrections centers are absorbing the population formerly sent to the forestry camps, forcing closure or significant reduction of the state camp system.

Two other observations may be worth noting here. First, local traditions and history strongly affect intergovernmental developments, providing many different rationales for the geographical boundaries of multi-jurisdiction corrections systems. Those studied were not compatible with other "regional" bodies (e.g., LEAA criminal justice planning units, state economic planning regions, or state human service catchment areas).²⁴ Such overlapping of service areas may affect the attempt to integrate corrections with other social services or any other planning effort in an intergovernmental context.

Site visits also indicated that despite strong regional organization, individual counties still operate with considerable independence. This is reflected in distinct differences among participating counties in arrest, prosecution, sentencing, and corrections policies and practices. (For example, while the crime rate in Olmsted County is nearly six times that of Fillmore County, the commitment rate in Fillmore is substantially higher than that of Olmsted).²⁵ The multi-county arrangements studied clearly did not force each county into a common mold.

Financing

In each case studied, the multi-jurisdiction local government corrections system was financed by funds from three sources: (1) state subsidies; (2) county property taxes; and (3) grants and contracts.

Iowa's legislative framework is fairly straightforward, promising \$650,000 initially (in 1973) in state subventions as an incentive to counties to create multi-jurisdiction corrections systems along judicial district lines. (This amount subsequently was increased to \$8,175,000). The state social services department must approve judicial district plans and budgets; then it enters into what is essentially a purchase-of-service agreement with each district corrections department. One county in each district serves as administrative agent for the district.

The Minnesota plan is more comprehensive. In this state subsidies initially were for specific purposes (e.g., probation, jail modernization, construction of regional jails, etc.). The Community Corrections Act consolidated these subsidies and provided a more comprehensive state funding mechanism. Progression from "particularized" subsidies for narrow purposes to a more comprehensive mechanism seems a logical, evolutionary approach that can be expected to be repeated in other states.

The Minnesota financing strategy is set forth in a 1974 publication of the Association of Minnesota Counties as follows:

"...the expected level of (state) funding for counties is one based on the anticipation that over the next few years the state corrections budget will grow from 22 million to 30 million plus annually and that at least one-half will be directed into community corrections subsidies as the need for state institutions lessens. The legislature could also speed up the process of bringing more counties under the Community Corrections Act by additional appropriations."

"...the expectation that the corrections department would begin to divert money from the institutions to community corrections programs was one of the selling points to the legislature. Initial start-up funding will still be needed for new community correctional systems for several years before stability and savings begin to occur."²⁶

In Minnesota corrections subsidies are arrived at in the form of legislative appropriation bills. So far, the legislature has expanded the amount of money for county subsidies each year. Expenditures for state-administered corrections, however, have not diminished as expected; in fact, a \$35 million state institution building program now is being planned. (This is being used primarily for the construction of replacement beds; the total state prison population is not expanding). The state thus finds itself squeezed by the need to increase appropriations for local subsidies, while at the same time financing a slower but significant expansion of state corrections expenditures. The potential for stabilizing or reducing state corrections (perhaps overstated originally) clearly has not been realized. If state corrections costs continue to spiral and the legislature begins to resist increasing county subsidy appropriations, local corrections systems --especially those most heavily dependent on state subsidies-- undoubtedly will be affected.²⁷

The exact amount of money available to each county is determined by a formula, the primary factor of which is the population of the county. An equalization approach is used to reflect correctional needs and the financial resources available to meet the corrections workload.²⁸ The Community Corrections Act requires that counties be charged for use of state institutions for adult commitments of less than five years and for all juvenile commitments to the state.²⁹ This serves as an incentive to counties to rely on community alternatives wherever possible and to use state facilities only as a last resort. The multi-county state subsidy budget is arrived at by adding together the subsidies expected to flow to each county board, then subtracting "charge-back" costs from each county's allotment (i.e., the amount the state will charge each county for its use of state institutions). In evaluating reasonable multi-county alliances, the potential subsidy as well as the commitment rates of each county are important factors in the minds of county commissioners.

The Minnesota legislation also requires an amount equivalent to five percent of the subsidy to be spent on the development of an adequate information system and on program evaluation. Another five percent must be set aside for the training of personnel. These requirements are designed to assure that the progress of local corrections systems will be monitored and that staff development will occur.

Since the Minnesota Community Corrections Act requires each county to expend at least the annual amount for correctional services spent at the time of its entry into the Act, significant county dollars are added to the state subsidy funds in the multi-jurisdiction budget. Grants and contracts contribute relatively small amounts. LEAA grants in particular, while they may appear significant in the comprehensive plans of LEAA regional planning units, seem small when compared with total county and state expenditures for corrections. The impact often expected from LEAA dollars thus may be unrealistic. One productive strategy is to use the relatively limited LEAA money as "risk capital" or "seed money" to initiate and test new corrections concepts.

The Arrowhead Regional Corrections system's proposed (1978) sources of income budget is presented here (see Table 2) as an example of how state, county, and other funds serve to finance a multi-jurisdiction corrections system.

Linkages to Related Services

The multi-jurisdiction local corrections model presents unique problems and opportunities for developing necessary linkages to the health, education, vocational, and social services of public and private agencies in the community. A comprehensive community-based corrections system will make these services readily available to offenders who need them. In fact, the extent to which linkages to services have been developed is a key measure of the degree to which

TABLE 2
ARROWHEAD REGIONAL CORRECTIONS SYSTEM SOURCES OF INCOME (1979)

BEGINNING BALANCE (1978 CARRYOVER)	\$	0.00
AITKIN COUNTY		50,284.00
CARLTON COUNTY		125,076.00
COOK COUNTY		16,424.00
LAKE COUNTY		66,309.00
KOOCHICHING COUNTY		79,745.00
ST. LOUIS COUNTY		1,614,047.00
STATE OF MINNESOTA -- SUBSIDY		1,698,259.00
OTHER FUNDING:		
FARM INCOME & PER DIEMS	\$	150,000
LEAA GRANTS		48,812
HEW GRANTS		35,000
EDUCATION PROGRAMS		517,278
		<u>751,090.00</u>
TOTAL	\$	4,400,975.00

community corrections exists.

One problem in developing service linkages is that multi-jurisdictional corrections boundaries are unlikely to be contiguous with any one school district or any one mental health agency. These and other social service agencies may not have multi-jurisdiction agreements and probably will not share the regional perspective of the unified correctional organization. In this situation, the corrections administrator can work at two levels: independently with each service agency in the region; and at a level that unites their efforts and highlights any disparities among them in terms of services and procedures.

Another problem likely to surface in the multi-jurisdiction setting is the absence of allied social services. Needed services simply may not be available. The choice then is either to urge each county to develop such services and see that offenders receive their share (a key role of volunteers and citizen members of the corrections advisory board); or to create needed services within the corrections service delivery system. Examples of both these approaches were found in site visits. In the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted region the necessary services are of good quality and in adequate supply. Service providers are linked closely to the corrections organization through their participation on the corrections advisory board. Such linkages also exist in the Arrowhead region, and to a lesser extent in Iowa's Fifth Judicial District, but in these two settings many needed services are not available in amounts that meet offender needs. In the latter two cases, therefore, some services are provided directly by the corrections organization. The Arrowhead system also relies on an outreach approach to supply specific services to particularly needy areas of the region.

Some multi-jurisdiction operations rely on regional offices to increase community participation, promote local control, and facilitate the creation of an effective social service network. A good volunteer program also helps. In each case studied volunteers were used extensively, consistent with the community participation each program was able to generate. A volunteer program not only helps to fill service gaps by provision of direct services; it results in a cadre of advocates and service "brokers" who are able to convince responsible agencies to meet offender needs. It also encourages citizens to feel that they are involved in local problem-solving and government.

Service Impact

With respect to service impact, more can be said about the multi-jurisdiction model than about either the unified county-administered model (Chapter III) or the state decentralized model (Chapter V). This is largely because the multi-county operations studied have taken considerable care to provide for evaluation of their programs. The


preliminary results seem encouraging, especially when buttressed by more qualitative assessments of what has been accomplished.

A Minnesota Department of Corrections research project, called the "Impact Study," makes before-and-after comparisons of counties as they enter the Community Corrections Act with those of counties that do not. According to the research reports, the Act has decreased state commitments significantly.³⁰

At the local level, each Minnesota community corrections system also is required to evaluate the impact of its corrections services. Four measures are used to assess each program: (1) control measures (the number and percent arrested and/or convicted while in a community corrections program); (2) follow-up measures (recidivism in terms of most serious difficulty six and 12 months after release); (3) rehabilitation (e.g., percentage of offender "contracts" successfully completed); and (4) program utilization (number of persons using the program, etc.). Both the Arrowhead and the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted regions have taken seriously the evaluation requirement and have produced numerous reports.³¹ The community corrections advisory boards are preoccupied with modifying programs to improve services and officials there are convinced that service impact has been enhanced.


The success of the Fifth Judicial District program in Iowa is less well documented, but its predecessor in Polk County, with headquarters in Des Moines, has been the subject of much study.³² LEAA considered its results impressive enough to award the Des Moines program "exemplary project" status. All of the multi-jurisdiction systems studied thus seem to have achieved the objectives articulated by the National Association of Counties: "...a pooling of resources to provide more effective services, attract more qualified personnel, and institute better rehabilitation programs for inmates at the local level."³³

FIGURE 8
SUMMARY OF MULTI-JURISDICTION LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAM MODEL



UNIFICATION OPTIONS:

- MODEL FOR RURAL COUNTIES
- MODEL FOR SUBURBAN CLUSTERS
- MODEL FOR SMALL COUNTIES



FOOTNOTES

1. Special problems of criminal justice in less populous areas are discussed in: Shanler D. Cronk (ed.), A Beginning Assessment of the Justice System in Rural Areas, report of the Conference on Justice and Legal Assistance in Rural America, Austin, Texas, Oct. 31 - Nov. 1, 1977, Sponsored by the National Rural Center and the American Bar Association (No publication data).
2. One variation of the multi-jurisdiction model involves city-county consolidation of corrections functions. Indeed, there are some examples of such cooperative endeavors (e.g., in New Mexico, the City of Albuquerque and Bernalillo County operate a jail facility in common). The multi-county organization, however, is more widely applicable and thus receives primary emphasis in this chapter.
3. E.g., the Southeast Kansas Regional Corrections Center at Fort Scott and the Box Butte Regional Jail in Alliance, Neb.
4. For example, ten counties contract with Shasta County, Calif., for use of the Northern California Regional Rehabilitation Center in Redding. The State Division of Forestry has turned over one of its forestry camps to Shasta County and supervises the camp's work crews. The County Sheriff's Office provides custody and rehabilitation services.
5. The six counties cover almost 18,000 square miles, an area larger than any of the smaller New England states and nearly as large as New Hampshire and Vermont combined. With the exception of St. Louis County, the population of which is slightly over 220,000, county populations in this area range from about 3500 to 36,000. The five other counties in this consolidated corrections system include: Aitkin, Carlton, Cook, Koochiching, and Lake.
6. Retention of responsibility for the jails by sheriffs in these two multi-county arrangements makes them analogous to the Department of Court Services model introduced in Chapter III.
7. Multi-county corrections districts have been established throughout Iowa as regions contiguous with judicial district boundaries.
8. The total population of the 16-county area is about 505,000. Polk County, which includes Des Moines, contains about two-thirds of this total.
9. The most visible such project was the PORT (Probationed Offenders Rehabilitation and Training) project in Rochester. PORT was developed in 1969 as an alternative to state institution confinement. Its first director was Ken Schoen, who in 1971 joined the state corrections department as Assistant Commissioner for Community Corrections Programs.

10. It was during this period that David Fogel resigned to take a comparable position in Illinois as Corrections Commissioner. In January, 1973, before the work of the committees was finished, Ken Schoen had been appointed Commissioner and was able to direct the final design of the Community Corrections Act. The Act is described in: Association of Minnesota Counties, "The Minnesota Community Corrections Act," 1974.
11. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency administered the program for one year. This early period was a critical one and much of the project's success can be attributed to the charisma and personal style of Bernie Vogelgesang, who was a central figure in this project for many years.
12. In 1973, the state legislature passed enabling legislation and appropriated \$650,000 to encourage the formation of multi-county corrections departments along judicial district boundaries in other areas of the state.
13. Described in E.K. Nelson, Jr., Howard Ohmart, and Nora Harlow, Promising Strategies in Probation and Parole, (Washington, D.C. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978).
14. See footnote 9.
15. Picking "front-runner" counties to initiate pilot tests of new corrections programs seems an effective strategy for implementation on a broader scale. Beginning with such jurisdictions allows the development of a more comprehensive corrections organization to start "downhill" --that is, after some initial successes. This approach was urged by OSTI in its report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice over ten years ago. See: Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Implementation, consultant paper prepared for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).
16. Many states now have legislation that encourages regional jails and some provide subvention for initiating them. State guidelines and standards also serve to pressure local governments to improve sub-standard jails and corrections practices.
17. There is evidence that some local actors who are important in the initiation of reform at the local level can and do move on to the state level as the focus of reform shifts to the state (as suggested by the careers of Harry Woods in Iowa and Ken Schoen in Minnesota). But this is not always the case: the late Bernie Vogelgesang, who had many attractive offers to move, remained the central figure in the Des Moines operation.

18. National Association of Counties Research Foundation, County Resources Department, Human Services Center, "Criminal Justice Program Fact Sheet," May 1977. An additional purpose emerged from the three multi-jurisdiction operations visited: that of improving the quality of justice, especially for the disadvantaged. This goal has strong conceptual links to one goal of the unified county model which speaks to the need to improve corrections in order to protect the integrity of the law.
19. Outside influences can unwittingly create just such a situation. For example, a state revision of its criminal code may shift sentencing practices sufficiently to cause simultaneous overcrowding of jails in many counties. Such unintentional effects create opportunities for multi-county consolidation or regional cooperation.
20. Minnesota Statutes, 401.1 - 401.16, Community Corrections Act; Chapter 154, Acts of the 67th General Assembly, State of Iowa (also referred to as Senate File 112). There should be plenty of room for local variation, but boards should include representatives of criminal justice agencies, associations of corrections professionals, allied human service agencies, and citizen groups. A small executive committee should serve as a steering committee.
21. Significantly, in each of the three sites visited, a community corrections center was developed to serve as an alternative to jail. This represents an important choice since it colors all subsequent steps in the emergence of a comprehensive multi-county corrections network. Each jurisdiction instead might have opted to build more jail bed space.
22. This was accomplished through the Minnesota Community Corrections Act, supra note 20. Some corrections field services have been regionalized or "out-stationed" to more remote areas of this large and widely dispersed operation. Services for pretrial prisoners represent a small portion of the total effort. Minnesota, it should be noted, has very low detention rates for both juveniles and adults, which may indicate that other mechanisms have been developed to screen out cases that otherwise might be detained pending trial.
23. Although parallel efforts appear to be underway to consolidate juvenile operations, this development is still too new to permit speculation.
24. Experience with these regional bodies may somehow prepare counties to enter into multi-county corrections ventures. The memberships of county advisory boards are quite similar to that of an LEAA criminal justice planning supervisory board in a multi-county region. Such regional planning efforts seem to provide important experience in inter-county cooperative networks.
25. Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Counties, 1978 Comprehensive Plan, p. 10.

26. Association of Minnesota Counties, "Community Corrections Act," July 1974, p. 2. Minnesota's "crime-prone" age group will peak during the early 1980's. The big gamble thus is to postpone new prison construction until this occurs. Other states are likely to keep building, then be faced with maintaining expensive physical plants that are no longer needed.
27. Interestingly, dependence on state subsidies varies considerably from one county to another. For example, state subsidies represent less than one-third of the budget of the Arrowhead regional corrections system, while more than 70 percent of the Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted operation is financed by the state. Each county has other corrections costs buried in county budgets and not reflected in the multi-jurisdiction corrections budget, so the accuracy of these figures may be questionable; but the observation that some local community corrections systems are more dependent on state subsidies than are others remains valid.
28. Minnesota Statutes, 401.10.
29. Minnesota Statutes, 401.09 and 401.13.
30. Minnesota Department of Corrections, "Impact of Community Corrections Act on Sentencing Patterns," Rochester, Minn., January 1977.
31. For example, see: Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System, "Semi-Annual Report, July 1 through December 31, 1977" and "1977 Year End Report," Olmsted County, January 1978; Olmsted County, "PORT Eighth Annual Report," Rochester, Minn., 1978; Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System, "The Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Counties Community Corrections Advisory Board: An Evaluation of the Advisory Board and its Subcommittees," Rochester, Minn., February 1978; Dodge-Fillmore-Olmsted Community Corrections System, "Court Services Program Clients Survey," Rochester, Minn., January 1978; Tyce, Francis A., "PORT of Olmsted County, Minn.: Community Rehabilitation for Legal Offenders," Hospital and Community Psychiatry, March 1971; Minnesota Department of Corrections, "Impact of the Community Corrections Act on Sentencing Patterns," Minneapolis, Minn., 1977. The Minnesota experience is summarized in John Blackmore, "Minnesota's Community Corrections Act Takes Hold," Corrections Magazine, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1978, pp. 45-56 and "The Minnesota Experience: State Subsidy Shifts Corrections to Counties," State and County Administrator, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1977.
32. Roger O. Steggerda and Peter S. Venezia, "Community-Based Alternatives to Traditional Correction," National Council on Crime and Delinquency, February 1974; and Bookman, Fazio, Day, and Weinstein, "Community-Based Corrections in Des Moines," National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, December 1976.
33. Supra note 18.

CHAPTER V

THE STATE-ADMINISTERED DECENTRALIZED MODEL

It is tempting to begin this discussion of the state-administered model for organizing local corrections with an appraisal of the functions of state government today. Certainly there are strong advocates of an expanded state role in various arenas of public administration. There also are, of course, those who argue for reduced state participation, pointing to deficiencies in service delivery, escalating costs, and alleged unresponsiveness to citizen needs. But, although these generalized debates provide a context for the present analysis, they offer little practical guidance for the selection of organizational modes for community corrections. Such guidance instead must come from a nexus of indigenous forces and conditions, including: terrain and demography; existing configurations of state and local agencies and the traditions behind them; the revenue picture; the political climate; the quality and modus operandi of the legislature and the executive branch; and so on.

In fact, the variety of factors at work, and the dramatically different ways in which they are manifested in different states, makes any discussion of a state-administered "model" highly problematic. One state may have a rich tradition of private agency efforts on behalf of offenders, while another has virtually no examples of such services. In one jurisdiction legislators may be strongly committed to community programs for offenders, while in another the opposite point of view may be predominant. A major purpose of this chapter is to identify those factors that appear to support the concept of a state-administered decentralized approach and those that militate against it. This will be done through a consideration of the seven analytic dimensions and an attempt to convey some sense of the problems, tensions, and problem-solving strategies encountered during site visits.

First, however, it may be useful to discuss several factors that help to determine the character of corrections programs in any given state: the way in which state-level corrections is organized; the size of the state; and the posture of state government with respect to the delegation of authority and responsibility to the localities.

State-Level Organization of Corrections

Most state-level reorganization efforts have been driven by a desire to simplify, streamline, and control the costs of burgeoning governmental programs. Drawing similar functions together on the organization chart reduces the governor's span of control, which typically is unmanageable, and promises increased coordination,

accountability, and economy. Although these purposes may not be achieved in any demonstrable fashion, public concerns are at least temporarily alleviated. Often programmatic goals are secondary in such reorganization efforts, but the concept of achieving more effective correctional services becomes an added justification for changes that seem compelling on other grounds.

State-level reorganizations of corrections in recent years have tended to result in one of three organizational patterns: (1) state corrections as a part of a human services "umbrella" agency; (2) state corrections as a part of a public safety conglomeration; or (3) state corrections as a separate agency with reporting lines directly to the governor. The movement to place state corrections in a human services "super-agency" appeals to those who hope to develop alliances between offender rehabilitation programs and such services as social welfare, mental health, and employment development. This concept, especially appealing for youth corrections, often has resulted in the placement of state correctional services for all age groups in a large, multi-function agency presided over by a cabinet-level official.

The trend toward placement of state corrections in a human services umbrella organization peaked in the 1960's and some reversal now seems apparent.¹ Although some linkages were developed between corrections and other services, reorganization proved to be no panacea for the insularity of prison and parole programs. Corrections has tended to remain a separate enclave within state government, even when formally provided with such organizational allies, and it often has had to sacrifice the visibility required to compete successfully for fiscal resources to maintain or expand correctional programs. Also, departments with more "positive" missions have not been eager to identify themselves with the management of criminals, even though they share with corrections the same agency boundaries. Administrators of such umbrella organizations, especially in large states, have been forced to allow constituent departments and divisions considerable autonomy because of the size, variety, and complexity of their various functions.

The placement of state corrections in a public safety agency setting is less common, but nevertheless an interesting and significant development. The rationale for this form of reorganization typically includes some of the same as that of the human-services model: simplicity, accountability, and economy through the integration of similar functions. However, the philosophic basis for this mode of reorganization is different from, if not antithetical to, the human-services approach. The public safety super-agency typically combines corrections with state police organizations as well as criminal identification, prosecution, and planning functions. Sometimes disaster-preparedness programs and the state militia also are included.

The public safety umbrella agency is advocated partly on the basis of the various national commission recommendations that our balkanized system of criminal justice be better integrated. A more

recent development in support of the public safety model is the questioning of the effectiveness of offender rehabilitation programs that has appeared in recent years² and the advocacy of the "justice model" as an alternative.³

Daniel L. Skoler has offered persuasive arguments in support of the creation of state criminal justice super-agencies.⁴ Referring to six states that have grouped together more than one major criminal justice component (Maryland, Kentucky, Montana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina), Skoler acknowledges that the record has not been one of instant success. He argues, however, that such an approach to reorganization may be more feasible and more effective in avoiding new bureaucracies than the human-service umbrella. He also asserts that the criminal justice super-agency is peculiarly suited to decentralization and the development of community-based correctional components:

Fortunately, the establishment of an integrated state department of criminal justice would provide an orderly and rational structure for regionalizing and decentralizing services . . . Moreover, it can recognize legitimate desires for community control and participation with its grant-in-aid and technical assistance leverages, recognizing that if minimum criminal justice standards and priorities are met, diversity in local approaches and innovations are desirable and worth fostering.⁵

The state public safety super-agency may move to the forefront as the pendulum swings away from human-service groupings. It is difficult to predict how corrections, and especially community-based corrections, might fare under such circumstances. Membership in any super-agency, whether human service or public safety, potentially diminishes the power base of state corrections and restricts its ability to communicate its needs to key resource allocators and the general public. And, although corrections has rarely enjoyed bureaucratic camaraderie with its human service associates, neither could it be said to have had a history of rapport with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies. It could be argued that the potential for resolving that problem is the most salient reason for merging corrections with other criminal justice agencies; but, one must ask, at what cost? Prisons and youth institutions might become cohesive parts of a law enforcement operation (perhaps too much so if the history of sheriff-administered jails is considered); but what support and leadership would emerge for reintegrative community programs?

The third organizational pattern for state corrections is as an autonomous cabinet-level department. This model has been most often recommended by corrections professionals over the years and it now seems to be reasserting itself in the midst of doubts about the efficacy of the super-agency approach. Corrections is less likely to stand apart organizationally in states of small population (although there

are notable exceptions --Utah, Idaho, and New Mexico, for example) and it is equally difficult to rationalize cabinet status for corrections in heavily populated states where so many constituencies clamor for a direct relationship with the governor. Nevertheless, when compared with alternative solutions, the departmental model seems to have great merit. Linkages with human service and criminal justice agencies clearly are essential to the success of rehabilitation-oriented corrections programs, but such arrangements are best negotiated from a position of strength. The mission of corrections, in the final analysis, is distinctly different from that of health or welfare; and it is not the same as policing or prosecution.

Whatever the particular organizational form adopted, there are advantages associated with state-administered correctional services-- e.g., fiscal and programmatic autonomy and continuous visibility of needs and problems (rather than periodic visibility during crises). A clear differentiation, of course, must be made between the administration of services that are the direct responsibility of state government and the administration of services designed to facilitate and regulate local delivery of correctional services. It is unlikely that officials concerned with direct operation of programs can be equally effective in facilitating operation by local government counterparts. Similarly, those concerned with such functions as subventions, standards, and technical assistance seldom are equally effective in line management roles.

Perhaps an ideal organization for an autonomous state department of corrections would include a division of (directly administered) correctional services and a division of (indirectly administered) community correctional services. Whether or not such a unit should embrace both juvenile and adult correctional functions is a controversial question and each state must find its own answer. There are, however, advantages to a combined operation. Although youth corrections may have a greater affinity for health and welfare services and adult corrections with criminal justice, the two nevertheless share both functions and problems. Some differentiation between them within a departmental structure seems desirable, but their combined strength should help to justify needed autonomy within the increasingly complex web of state government.

State Size and "Posture"

Two additional factors strongly influence the manner in which a state might develop and operate community-based corrections services. The first is the size of the state, in terms of both population density and geographic area. The second factor, which does not lend itself to such precise definition, is the stance or posture of state government, and especially state corrections, with respect to decentralization or the delegation of authority and responsibility to the localities.

The first point is obvious. Any state's approach to community corrections will depend greatly on its size. Heavily populated states have the option of establishing regions within each of which a comprehensive range of community correctional services can be developed. There is a sufficient population base to support such a strategy. Sparsely populated states do not have that opportunity to the same degree (although again there are exceptions --New Mexico, for example, has regionalized its probation and parole services). Correctional operations, even those intended to be community-based, are likely to be administered from the state capitol, and quite different methods must be employed to encourage "grass roots" involvement. The geographic size of the state seems less significant than its population, but it is clear that this factor is not inconsequential. One has only to imagine the contrasting situations of correctional administrators in Alaska and Rhode Island (both have state-administered systems) to grasp this reality, and it appears throughout the country, if in less dramatic forms.

Stance with regard to decentralization is somewhat more difficult to describe. The posture of one state, and particularly of its corrections department, may be traditionally bureaucratic regarding both internal organization and the structure of field operations. Such a stance tends to produce rather predictable outcomes. Organization is likely to be hierarchical, communications vertical, and control a function of headquarters. With its attendant management styles and reward structures, this type of system will be strong in accountability but may be relatively inflexible and allow for little discretion at the operating level.

A contrasting hypothetical situation is a state whose posture, especially toward corrections, is relatively non-traditional and non-bureaucratic. In this case there is likely to be less concern with the formal anatomy of the organization (as symbolized by the organization chart) and more concern with the delivery of services at the local level and the involvement of varied interest groups outside the organization. Flexibility, discretion, and innovation may be encouraged, but problems of accountability may emerge.

The State-Administered Decentralized Model

The remainder of this chapter deals with the analytic dimensions used in previous chapters, applying them to situations in which state government assumes primary responsibility for the administration of community correctional services. Although information is drawn from site visits to a number of states, three examples are emphasized here. Florida serves as an example of a large, populous jurisdiction in which the effort to decentralize corrections has followed more or less traditional lines of regionalization and delegation. Wyoming illustrates the situation of a geographically large but sparsely populated state.

And Connecticut represents a non-traditional effort to develop community correctional programs in a geographically small but densely populated state where county governments do not exist.

Source of Initiative for Change

Study of the sources of initiative for the unification and decentralization of corrections may help to explicate the values underlying the change, as well as the forces that may arise to support or resist it. Case studies, however, make clear the complexity of the initiation process and the impossibility of comprehending it fully. Nevertheless, we did discern some interesting features of initiation, noting both commonalities and striking differences among the jurisdictions studied. One factor that seems to characterize the initiation of decentralized correctional services is a ferment of problems that arouse great concern. More "rational" arguments for changing the status quo tend to become influential only after the situation is energized by perceptions of serious dysfunction or crisis. The ability to use adversity in the interest of constructive reform seems a key to successful initiation.

In Florida, the context of reorganization, for example, was unprecedented population growth and all of the urgent problems that accompany urbanization and industrialization. A large population in migration and a rapidly increasing crime rate quickly inundated existing correctional services, especially the institutions. Something had to be done. Inadequacies in state services extended beyond corrections into many other areas and a ponderous and fragmented bureaucracy was struggling to cope simultaneously with innumerable new problems.

Florida's ability to mount a vigorous campaign to overcome these conditions seemed closely related to legislative leadership that emerged through reapportionment. The legislature, which rapidly became less "rural" and much younger, set a course toward broad reform of its outmoded agency structure. Because of the high visibility and critical nature of its problems, corrections became a prime target for reorganization. The governor put his weight behind reform and those who were administratively responsible for state corrections sought to take advantage of the circumstances. The directions for change recommended by national crime commission, and the more specific prescriptions of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, were used to rationalize and justify the concept of a comprehensive, regionalized, and upgraded correctional service. With the assistance of the American Justice Institute, a master plan for change was developed.

The background of change in Connecticut was different in its specific dynamics, but not without similarity to the broad picture in

Florida. Problems of government that demanded solution were one common denominator; the skillful seizing of opportunities thus fortuitously presented was another. Perhaps the initial precondition for change in Connecticut was the demise of county government. Fought determinedly by local sheriffs (who lost control of jail operations as a result), the elimination of this level of bureaucracy placed the state in a clear position to exercise leadership in the corrections field. For a time, however, little happened in the corrections sphere. The position of Director of Jails, reporting directly to the governor, was created, but the move toward community-based alternatives took time to materialize. In 1968, in a move to unify disparate units, a Department of Corrections was inaugurated. The jails (soon to be called community correctional centers) were placed within the new agency, as were state penal institutions and parole services. Probation remained separate from the new department.

Another major factor in the initiation of reorganization in Connecticut was a succession of administrators who, at quite different points in time, exercised leadership in achieving incremental change. In the early days of the new department, an experienced correctional manager from outside the state was able to deal effectively with urgent problems of inmate unrest. His successor, a long-time figure in state affairs, helped to develop strong linkages between corrections and both the executive and the legislative branches. Another experienced outsider then introduced many of the concepts of progressive corrections and modern management. At the time of our site visit the incumbent department head, who had apprenticed as deputy director, was thoroughly familiar with his environment and able to move skillfully when opportunities arose. Undoubtedly, the major catalyst for the initiation of a community-oriented program in Connecticut was the LEAA grant under which P/PREP (Public/Private Resources Expansion Project) was created to encourage community agencies to provide services to parolees and probationers. However, it was the combination of inside leadership and outside facilitation that enabled operationalization of the concept.

The Wyoming situation presents some unique elements. In this large, sparsely populated state, the driving force behind recent reforms in corrections has been concern about conditions in the penitentiary, an old and outmoded facility. The sensitivity of the governor, the politically elected supervisory board, and the legislature to the possibility of criticism has strongly influenced the development of a set of goals for change involving both facility construction and program enhancement.

While the focus is on the improvement of institutional facilities, considerable attention has been given to strategies for developing community-based alternatives (which to date have been relatively retarded) and for unifying existing programs (particularly integrating probation and parole with institutional services). The presence of

a staff person close to the board and highly knowledgeable about corrections and human services has been especially important in the initiation of new ideas. And, as in the other states visited the use of outsiders to suggest and legitimize initiatives for change also was significant in Wyoming.

Values and Goals

The capacity of state government to generate local corrections programs that are unified, comprehensive, and authentically rooted in the community depends heavily upon the goals set by the legislature, the governor, and agency administrators. They must place a high value on each of these ingredients and communicate a sense of purpose or "mission" constructed around them. It is not enough that goals and values be stated rhetorically; they must be translated into operational objectives that have meaning for those charged with implementation. Finally, a system of rewards and penalties of various kinds must be devised to support officially prescribed goals. Lofty statements of purpose will have little impact unless tied to the allocation of resources, the upward mobility of staff, and the distribution of status and influence. Such criteria ask a great deal of state government when the task of goal-setting requires the dispersion of decisional power and finite resources to the localities. It is much easier to augment state functions and resources than to share them with local actors. If a state correctional program is to assume the character of a dispersed, community-oriented operation, unconventional leadership and management strategies seem to be required.

Florida furnishes an example of a state that is making a determined effort to develop a comprehensive and unified correctional system while decentralizing its operations into five geographic regions. The Correctional Reform Act of 1975, which established this regional approach, began with a statement of purpose that included all of the elements mentioned above and stressed the development of community alternatives to traditional incarceration. Site visits to Florida made clear the obstacles that must be overcome if such goals are to be implemented through traditional methods of bureaucratic management. With most of the official actors and the available revenues at the state level, it is difficult to develop local participation, although Florida certainly is making progress in this area.

The regions and their sizable administrative and operating staffs are physically close to local problems and resources, but the lines of accountability run back to the state capitol. Also, career rewards are determined within the state structure, not on the basis of local evaluations of effectiveness. Regions do not have separate budgets, but rather must negotiate line items within the overall departmental budget. The Florida effort to both decentralize and unify its correctional services is impressive for the boldness of the concept and the

strong legislative mandate behind it, although there still are many problems to be worked out.

Connecticut presents a somewhat different picture with respect to both goal-setting and implementation. Beginning five years ago, with the assistance of LEAA funding, the Department of Corrections launched an experimental effort to bring non-state (including private) agencies into the local correctional service delivery system. The goals of this initially tentative strategy were unorthodox: to move the locus of responsibility for reintegrative programs to the community; to draw a wide spectrum of resources and interest groups into the process of offender reintegration; and to develop a political constituency independent of state government in the arena of legislative and administrative policy-making.

Initially called the Public/Private Resources Expansion Project, this unusual program was able to demonstrate its efficacy on a limited scale before its adoption as the primary strategy of the field services division of adult corrections in the state. General goals were reinforced by increasingly refined implementation techniques. For example, participating agencies with which the state negotiated contracts for service were required to contribute some of their own resources (the amount increasing over time). In early 1978, two-thirds of all costs were being paid by state or local units; and within a year all federal funding was to have been phased out.

In a jurisdiction without counties, and with a tradition of localizing privately operated human services, Connecticut has devised a most unusual role for the state. The fact that it rests on clearly formulated goals and concepts seems central to its success. Certain management problems, however, are apparent in Connecticut as a result of the highly dispersed, diversified, and flexible programs that have been developed. Now that the initial work has been done, departmental administrators are concerning themselves with monitoring to insure accountability in service-purchase agreements and with building management information systems to permit system-wide planning and evaluation. Despite its problems, Connecticut provides an example of state leadership in local corrections in a manner that is strikingly different from the hierarchical, regionalized format that is characteristic of most attempts to decentralize.

The situation of Wyoming again presents some unique elements. Many of the concepts associated with "progressive" corrections or "modern" management would have little credibility in Wyoming --or, for that matter, in a number of other states of large area, small population, and some residual aspects of a frontier culture. Experience in such jurisdictions encourages some reticence in recommending the array of reforms that have been tried (and frequently abandoned) in more populous and "sophisticated" states. Paradoxically, some of the features of human service administration in Wyoming, which seem almost antiquated by current standards, might meet the needs of such states quite well, if creatively applied.

Corrections in Wyoming is administered through the Board of Charities and Reforms, composed of five elected officials (the Governor, the Secretary of State, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Treasurer, and the State Auditor). The Board functions like a politically controlled department of institutions with responsibility for management and fiscal supervision of both correctional and eleemosynary facilities. The correctional system is dominated by the institutions with a primary focus on the penitentiary at Rawlins. Probation and parole, combined as a state function, are only tenuously connected with the institutions. There is a minimum of professional central-office staff and the concept of a unified department of corrections is viewed as an expensive and unnecessary "bureaucracy." Members of the board, as well as some members of the legislature, take a personal interest in corrections (especially in the controversies surrounding institution management) and pay close attention to the public, since all are elected to office.

Terms such as "a unified correctional service" and "community-based reintegration programs" evoke unusual reactions in states like Wyoming. The goal of dealing with human problems (including crime and delinquency) in the community enjoys considerable support, for localism is strong and people tend to be doubtful of governmental solutions to human problems. However, the norm of helpfulness goes only so far when socially destructive behavior is involved. Vigilante activities are still in the memories of some of the older residents. The values, goals, and missions of corrections in Wyoming thus must be worked out in a context wholly different from that in more urbanized states. Unification of services is a viable goal if the implementation strategy is built around the multi-purpose, political board; but not in the usual departmental sense. The development of community-based, "grass-roots" correctional services is a goal for which there is some potential support in Wyoming, but again the methods of implementation must be adapted to local attitudes and imperatives (the extensive use of volunteers for example, would appear more palatable than a large cadre of professional staff).

Organizational Scope

Theoretically at least, the state model appears to offer the greatest promise for bringing together a wide spectrum of services required for the community treatment of offenders. State institutions can be linked with community programs to avoid discontinuities between the two, if both are state-administered; and the varied state programs whose cooperation is needed, such as mental health, social welfare, and employment development, also should be accessible as part of a single overarching authority. Unfortunately, reality does not always fit the theory.

Florida seems to have made much progress toward the unification of a broad array of programs. Under the present Department of Corrections, probation and parole supervision has been combined with institutional services. Misdemeanant probation was terminated at the time the new department was established. However, juvenile corrections remained in the health and welfare super-agency. The five regions of the department are struggling to develop connections with resources in their localities, but with mixed success. The department is autonomous, however, and does include a diversity of programs.

Connecticut's venturesome effort to mobilize the community is occurring largely within the Field Services Division of the Department of Corrections. Probation is separately administered, as are juvenile corrections programs. Thus, although innovative in relating itself to the localities, the state can hardly be said to have unified its own correctional services.

Since Wyoming has placed all correctional services (and all other human services) under a single board, in a sense all policy-making and fiscal planning converges at that point. However, there are wide gaps at the operating level, so the criteria of comprehensiveness and integration are largely unmet. The limited number of professional staff who might help to tie together the pieces of the system exacerbates this problem.

It seems, then, that there are difficult obstacles in the path of broadening the scope and variety of programs under the state model. These difficulties appear in very different state systems and they are present on both the horizontal plane (where corrections seeks to utilize other state resources) and the vertical plane (where state corrections seeks to mobilize community support and involvement). It is difficult to generalize from site visit data because of its limited and impressionistic nature. Florida's success in building a large and diversified system seems related to the traditional dominance of state government in the corrections sphere ("It's the only game in town," said one observer) and to the emergence of a department reporting directly to the governor, which provides a strong power base for expansion. The regional format is promising, but subject to bureaucratic overload and as yet largely untested.

In Connecticut, where a rather narrow segment of state government has engaged a surprisingly wide range of local and private resource networks, the scope of unified state-level corrections programs seems limited.

Wyoming, which is just launching a major effort to coordinate and diversify its correctional programs shows much progress in penal reform but is extremely limited in the scope and integration of community alternatives to incarceration. The most intriguing aspect of the Wyoming picture, and perhaps its greatest potential strength, is the close connection of corrections to the powerful Board of Charities

and Reforms and to some members of the legislature. In this situation, political actors may be able to move rapidly toward a rich mix of community programs if reasons for doing so become compelling. Those reasons could be economic.

Intergovernmental Relationships

Within the state-administered decentralized model, corrections is primarily the responsibility of the state. This represents both the greatest strength and the most significant weakness of the model. Its strength lies in the apparent directness and simplicity of the administrative process as responsibility and authority come together, unequivocally, in one governmental entity. Its weakness is the opposite side of the coin. With the state as the primary actor, there may be little incentive for other governmental units or private interests to enter the arena of community corrections. These observations, it must be acknowledged, arise from an understanding of the state model as a "pure type." Nothing is ever so simple and unambiguous in the real world. Even when the state directly administers corrections, it must do so in a context of funding and influence that impinge upon it from both federal and local sources. And the fact that state officials must be sensitive to local imperatives is central to our political system.

The state model for organizing community corrections need not fail because its intergovernmental relationships are limited. It is more apt to fail because the conduct of intergovernmental business has become so confounded by procedural mazes that many feel a sense of despair about delivering cost-effective programs. (An interesting if little known consequence of this concern was the Joint Funding Simplification Act of 1975 through which Congress offered state and local governments an opportunity to apply for and administer multiple federal assistance programs through a single application and accounting process. The number of successful applications processed, however, is limited). Nonetheless, it is entirely possible for a state government committed to mobilizing resources for community corrections to do so in a strongly intergovernmental fashion. Needed is leadership knowledgeable about the complex interrelationships between and among governments in our federated system and great determination in their use.

Financing

The development of revenue sources for community corrections seems a more straightforward function in the state model than in the multi-level and highly interdependent situations represented by the

regional and county-administered models. The usual expectation for state-operated programs is that they will be funded through tax monies appropriated by the legislature for that purpose. However, the subject of financing even at the state level is quite complex.

In Florida, the use of state funds to support regionalized correctional services is, in fact, the dominant mode. There are no separate regional budgets and few private agencies participate on a service-purchase basis. While encouraging centralized accountability, such an approach may discourage local participation in reintegration efforts.

The sharing of fiscal responsibility with local public and private agencies may be a much more effective way of obtaining grass-roots involvement and local "investment" in successful outcomes. States like Florida, which use a regional strategy to decentralize correctional activities, may need to work out formulas for allocating funds to regions that differ drastically from each other. Such an approach opens the door to local advocacy and political influence over differing funding patterns, a process that is much more complex but also much more "local" in character. One of the criticisms of state-administered and vertically integrated systems most often voiced by those with a local perspective is that the economies typically promised as a consequence of central management are negated by the elaboration of a layered superstructure running back to the state capitol. The regional bureaucracy, and intervening levels of administration, may come to cost more than the service duplications they were designed to eliminate.

The funding of community-based programs under the Connecticut system is dramatically different. The P/PREP experiment started with the idea of using state funds to induce increasingly larger commitments of local funds for the varied programs around which service contracts were developed. Participating agencies were asked to commit themselves to a politically active role with respect to the advocacy of community corrections, as well as to contribute part of their own resources to the new venture. In the beginning, a standard expectation of one-third financing from the participating agency prevailed; five years later (with LEAA "starter" funds nearing termination), the overall pattern was two-thirds funding from participating agencies and one-third from state and federal sources. This contracting strategy has not been without problems, of course, and those involved at the state level now speak of efforts to be more rigorous both in negotiating agreements and in monitoring them once they are in operation. This will lead to greater standardization and possibly some loss of flexibility. The tension between accountability and discretion seems unavoidable in such an approach and management of that process certainly is a major challenge to administrators. Connecticut officials believe that their unusual relationship with local agencies and private organizations provides an effective vehicle for attracting funds from outside the state as well as at the local level (they cite examples that include both private foundation and federal government sources).

Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of financing under the state model must be considered in the context of trends in the revenue picture, seen from an intergovernmental perspective. There have been massive shifts in the allocation of tax monies by level of government. The share of state and local governments in total public spending rose from 36.5 percent in 1960 to nearly 50 percent in 1974.⁶ In dollars, the increase was from \$61 billion in fiscal 1960 to \$200 billion in fiscal 1974. State and local payrolls have grown accordingly. Federal aid to state and local governments has grown at an especially rapid rate in the areas of health, education, employment development, and the social services--functions central to the implementation of community correctional programs.⁷

Given this overall pattern, there would seem to be a substantial financial basis for major state efforts to unify and augment local corrections services. Even states like Wyoming, which view federal and other "outside" funds with more than a little suspicion, may discover sound economic reasons to move in this direction. The state role, under such circumstances, may be one of either direct administration or indirect facilitation of local efforts.

Linkages to Related Services

A corrections system in which the state government plays a dominant service delivery role would appear to possess a strong potential for building relationships with other agencies and resource networks. State governments are powerful. They have the power to tax, to shape public policy through legislation, and to define the roles and determine the resources of local entities. Where the mission of corrections is the resocialization of the offender within a context of needed services, great advantage would seem to go to the state-administered model. The fact that most of the remedial and developmental programs needed by people in trouble are a state responsibility supports this rationale. If state officials cannot orchestrate these varied services to yield a synergistic effect, who can?

Yet the potential for linking community corrections to needed resources by means of state administrative operations seems much greater than actual accomplishments. Many kinds of linkage are required. They must be both vertical (state-to-local) and horizontal (state agency-to-state agency) and they must involve the building of reciprocal understandings at both policy and operational levels. Such forms of cooperation and augmentation (one service supporting and extending that of another) are easy to talk about, but apparently quite difficult to achieve.

The reasons for this disparity become clear when state efforts to build reintegrative programs for offenders in different jurisdictions are examined. Many issues and problems present themselves.

Those concerned with organizational design must consider, for example, whether the boundaries of a regionalized correctional system should be coterminous with those of other human service agencies and if they differ from each other, which one to follow. (Another option would be to conform the regions of a decentralized corrections service with those of state judicial districts.)

Numerous questions arise around the general problem of determining which functions should be centralized and which decentralized. Relationships with other human services must be affected by the decisions made. Should each region have a reception and diagnostic center for its own offender population? Should specialized institutions, (e.g., for the mentally ill or sexually aberrant) be state-wide or regionalized? Questions of economy and of programmatic effectiveness necessarily enter into the analysis of such questions.

Another important factor in the linkage of corrections to other systems is that of administrative and leadership style. Those in charge of regions would seem to require generalist managerial skills. Their experience and outlook cannot simply be that of an institution administrator or a parole administrator, or even that of a corrections specialist in a broad sense. They must see and be able to deal with the "gestalt" of services required by offenders. They must look outward toward the complex world of public and private entities in their environment, avoiding a preoccupation with internal operations. Where are such generalists to come from? How can brokerage and advocacy skills be infused into the corrections organization? Similar questions can be raised with regard to those who operate at the level of departmental administration and the various staff specialists around them. Community treatment, localization of service delivery, reintegration in place of clinical treatment--all may run against the grain of those whose experience has been gained in a traditional state correctional system.

The relatively simple (some might say primitive) corrections service of Wyoming seemed to have fewer obstacles in the path of linkage development than did larger and more bureaucratic jurisdictions. Placement of all human services under the direct control of the Board of Charities and Reforms appears unwieldy; yet it places policy-making in the hands of a small number of individuals, all of whom are elected to office. The potential for linking these services, however, has been realized only to a small extent. There is a tendency to deal with parts rather than the whole, even though those parts have not been divided by strong bureaucratic boundaries. In a state like Wyoming, the opportunity to move toward more unified and decentralized service delivery would seem to depend upon the political leadership of key figures in the executive and legislative branches, coupled with creative staff work.

In such jurisdictions organizational design should build on the simplicity of existing arrangements, rather than attempting to follow the path (and perhaps repeat the disappointments) of larger systems.

A small management group could be built around the political administrative board in Wyoming. Initial emphasis could be placed upon development of information to help decision-makers understand the changing character of the crime problem and the effectiveness of existing programs. Such data would encourage linkages among services that should contribute to both economy and effectiveness. That those in policy-shaping roles, as political figures, are attuned to local interests and viewpoints is a fact that should be capitalized upon by staff. In place of a large central-office bureaucracy, one might envision a flexible, catalytic management group oriented toward the analysis of existing programs and the identification of opportunities for their improvement. Authority for the purchase of services, coupled with the necessary funds, could lead to an impressive community-based system in Wyoming.

Connecticut has built an unusual set of linkages between the state corrections service and a diversified set of local entities. A system of drug abuse treatment centers has been instituted throughout the state. Some traditional programs (such as the Hartford Catholic Family Service Agency) have been involved and other completely new programs have been created (e.g., Project MORE, which supplies a range of services in a deteriorated and high-crime neighborhood of New Haven). The Junior Chamber of Commerce has been engaged on a state-wide basis in job-finding and other community corrections tasks; and a public education program using the mass media has been mounted.

Horizontal linkage-building has been less successful in Connecticut. State human services, including those in the corrections area, remain somewhat segmented. Efforts are being made to address this problem through information development and exchange --an interesting strategy, for it suggests that what reorganization cannot accomplish may be partially achieved through a unified "offender-tracking" management information system. Connecticut has an unusual opportunity to pioneer in this area because of the integration of misdemeanor and felony programs; and the corrections research director is aware of the power of routine information to improve administration and link together a fragmented system. The familiar problems of defining common data elements and working out agreements for sharing information among different units must still be worked out. But, as one informant put it, "the charm of the resulting system will be the ability to mix and blend program options flexibly at both the felon and the misdemeanor level." The problems that must be resolved to accomplish this are typical of those in other states. Programs often do not include a built-in information acquisition capability. What is needed, we were informed, is a "zero-based mindset" on the part of all concerned with program expansion. Interestingly, in Connecticut a regional criminal justice research association has been formed, perhaps to serve as a vehicle for some unifying activities that cannot be accomplished through official state channels.

Service Impact



Seen from a national perspective, it is clear that the major thrust for consolidation and organizational redesign of community corrections is taking place within the county and regional models. Nevertheless, interesting developments are occurring under the auspices of state-administered systems in a surprising variety of ways. The differing initiatives, problems, and forces at work in Florida, Connecticut, and Wyoming illustrate this situation.

There is little empirical information on the effectiveness of the state model and certainly no valid data base that could be used to compare it with the other models discussed in this report. Wyoming is now just beginning the construction of record-keeping routines to provide data on program and organizational effectiveness. In Connecticut, although a systematic effort is underway to develop an information system that will provide such data, at the time of our last site visit there was little "hard" information on the effectiveness of programs undertaken with state participation. In Florida, the latest information suggests that both crime rates and commitment rates currently are decreasing, but no direct correlation with reorganization or regionalization is posited. Most observers interviewed, however, believed that programs have become more effective since consolidation and regionalization. Given the established tradition of state administration of human services in Florida, and the drive for reform now reflected in both the legislature and the executive branch, the state model clearly seems "right" for them. As it has an opportunity to be refined, and as those in key leadership roles become more experienced with the new arrangements, it is reasonable to believe that increased effectiveness (or perceptions of increased effectiveness) will result.

In sum, none of the three jurisdictions used here to illustrate the state model offer a scientific basis for judging the impact of a state-administered system on programs. Conclusions derived from site visits and information gathered from observers leads to a general conclusion. The state model has much potential, but it does face formidable obstacles. It has its greatest opportunity to succeed when implemented in relatively non-bureaucratic, innovative ways that avoid the familiar devices through which large bureaucracies defeat their own substantive purposes. Examples of such unusual features include: having regions "compete" with each other for resources in a state like Florida; making wide use of volunteers recruited directly by political leaders in a state like Wyoming; or furthering the intriguing development of an independent political coalition favoring community corrections, as Connecticut has done. Other jurisdictions for which state administration seems the appropriate strategy will forge their own concepts in bringing about unification and decentralization of the corrections function.

FIGURE 9

SUMMARY OF THE STATE ADMINISTERED DECENTRALIZED MODEL



UNIFICATION

FOOTNOTES

1. Disillusionment with the human services umbrella agency has led to its disaggregation in some states. Such a process is currently underway in California.
2. James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
3. David Fogel, We Are the Living Proof (Cincinnati: W.H. Anderson, 1975).
4. Daniel L. Skoler, "State Criminal Justice Superagencies: Antidote for the Nonsystem?" State Government, Winter 1976, pp. 2-8.
5. Id., pp. 7-8.
6. Barry M. Blackmant, et al., Setting National Priorities: the 1976 Budget (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 7.
7. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI
BRINGING ABOUT CHANGE

Preceding chapters have discussed three organizational models for the delivery of community-based correctional services. All of these approaches involve sometimes substantial changes in the status quo. All require an understanding of the dynamics, problems, and strategies implicit in modifying complex organizations and the environments in which they operate. Change, the common denominator of all three models, presents many challenges to those interested in improving the organizational machinery for the delivery of community corrections services.

This chapter addresses the problems associated with and techniques for bringing about change. Focusing upon administrative dynamics rather than organizational structure, it acknowledges the perspective described by Alexander Pope in his *Essay on Man* (1733): "For forms of government let fools contest, whatever is best administered is best."¹

The way in which people go about attempting to change organizations reflects their definition of the term "organization." Certain common metaphors enter into the process of organizational change and affect the results. Many people think of organizations as machines, a perspective sometimes referred to as "scientific management."² This view encourages a preoccupation with form or structure, as portrayed in an organization chart, and a mechanistic approach to reorganization. Change is undertaken by revising the organization chart. Small units may be merged into large ones or large partitioned into small. Headquarters may be strengthened at the expense of field offices, or vice versa. Distinctions between "line" and "staff" functions tend to be maintained rigidly. Changes typically are made in the line of command, the span of control, and other structural features. This view of organizations and their reform is most common in bureaucratic systems with relatively traditional conceptions of organizational process and leadership roles.

There are, of course, many other theories or models of the complex organization. Implicit or explicit commitment to any of these tends to direct organizational change along fairly predictable lines. A second fairly common metaphor for understanding organizations is based on the extended family. Those who hold this view perceive their organizations as informal networks of relationship and influence. Emphasis is placed upon function rather than structure. The metaphor of the family encourages change to achieve greater openness and authenticity in communications and shared understanding of goals. Such techniques as sensitivity training and organization development might be used in reorganization efforts by those who view the organization as an extended family.³

A more eclectic point of view, however, has emerged in recent years. Sometimes called "contingency theory," the cornerstone of this perspective is the belief that organizations differ greatly from each other and, therefore, the conceptual lenses through which the change process should be viewed also may differ from one situation to another. This point of view takes into account the particular mission of the organization, its history and traditions, and especially the values that underlie reorganization. Contingency theory allows us to examine, for example, the relative merits of incremental and radical change in a particular situation.⁴ It encourages diagnosis of surrounding forces to discern what Follett would call "the law of the situation."⁵ It helps to avoid dogmatic prescriptions that may seem eminently right to outside "experts," but transparently inappropriate to those familiar with local imperatives and constraints. Many contemporary theorists see much merit in the contingency perspective because it recognizes the complexity of the forces at work and the need for flexible and adaptive change strategies. From this point of view, the analogues of the machine and the family appear as too simplistic, distorting rather than illuminating reality.

Modern studies of organizational change focus as much upon the environment as upon the organization itself, concluding that most large bureaucracies find themselves in increasingly turbulent situations that they must learn to cope with and, hopefully, to influence. This generalization is an understatement with respect to community corrections today. Myriad constituencies, often with strong sanctioning powers, are determined to make their voices heard: advocates of offender rights, unions representing correctional staff members, groups demanding rejection of the rehabilitation concept and others demanding its extension. Those seeking to re-design local correctional services find themselves in the midst of volatile and contradictory forces over which they exert very limited control.

It is clear that in such a situation the change agent must be adept in working with conflict. He must understand how conflict is generated, maintained, and resolved; how its negative and pathological effects may be muted to avoid immobilizing the change effort; and most of all, how to seize upon any unfreezing of existing relationships to move decisively toward desired goals. The constructive use of adversity is at the heart of any successful organizational change, especially in corrections today. Knowledge of the informal side of the organization and the "sociometry" of power and influence is required, as is sensitivity to events and interests operating outside the organization's boundaries, but capable of impinging upon it. A keen sense of timing thus seems indispensable.

The strategic aspects of reorganization should not obscure the importance of coherent values and goals. Many reorganizations, however glowing the rhetoric on the basis of which they are "sold," lead only to cosmetic changes, not to a more cost-effective service delivery system. Those concerned with reorganization should be skeptical of change for the sake of change. This is especially

important with respect to community corrections. Rehabilitation of offenders has lost credibility in recent years and a "justice model" has been proposed as an alternative.⁶ However, much of the controversy about the efficacy of rehabilitation has focused on penal programs and sentencing techniques. There still appears to be a willingness to support community services aimed at reintegration of offenders into employment and socialization networks. The case for doing so, however, must be demonstrated in clear and convincing terms. Reorganization of local corrections at times may be carried on a larger wave of governmental reform and cost reduction, but, in the long run, it must be justified through understanding and support of its own mission. As Philip Selznick has suggested, the organization must be "infused with values" that are understood and accorded legitimacy in the environment in which it operates.⁷

The County Model as a Field of Forces

Local government in some way retains a feeling of smallness and intimacy even when it becomes relatively large and bureaucratized. Those in key administrative positions are well known to each other and to the public. Representatives of the mass media pay close, if selective, attention to both issues and personalities. Alliances are formed and enmities develop. County commissioners experience the tensions of reconciling the demands of district constituents with county-wide interests and needs. With local functions, staffing, and budgets increasing rapidly in recent years as a result of revenue-sharing, incessant pressures to do more are accompanied by strident demands to economize. Local officials bear the brunt of public indignation about perceived failures and extravagances of government. The process through which decisions are made regarding new programs, reorganization, and funding levels is open, contentious, and volatile. Clear-eyed, statesmanlike leadership sometimes appears; but so does pettiness, parochialism, and empire-building. Community corrections, in the county organization model, finds itself in a fascinating, if sometimes chaotic, arena.

Most local government functions are performed within a fairly constant field of forces. Local officials quickly come to know their major opponents and supporters, as well as the prevailing arguments for and against their programs. Whether the task is maintaining roads, operating schools, or controlling fires, its purpose and place in the overall scheme of things tends to be relatively enduring. Change typically takes place when there is scandal, malfeasance, or some system-wide event such as a major increase or decrease in revenue. Competition for resources and influence nonetheless occurs within widely accepted parameters. There are challenges and contests, of course, but these occur within a larger context of reciprocity and respect for established "turf."

The first thing that should be understood about community corrections in the local-government model is that it is not a well established and recognized system in the sense described above. Some pieces of the proposed comprehensive and unified system, however, do have a place in the established order, with varying degrees of security and potency. The jail, although typically funded at a low level, is an accepted part of the sheriff's domain. County-administered probation has a place in the local budget and it may have a variety of ancillary programs temporarily supported by "outside" monies; but its mandate often is precarious. The judiciary and the prosecutor, and whatever special services surround them, have independent bases of support and credibility problems of their own. Criminal justice planning units initiated with LEAA funding seek to encourage system-wide behavior, but have discovered no cosmic glue for that purpose.

Given this general situation, what is the potential "force field" for a unified service? Which are the driving, and which the restraining, forces? Generalized answers to such questions are risky. Support for a unified community corrections service may derive from various sources --the county executive, the presiding judge, the sheriff, the board of commissioners, the press, and so on. On the other hand, one or more of these same interests may represent a major source of resistance. Unlike many local government functions, the community corrections program does not have predictable friends or enemies; or, at least, predictions about them are subject to many more contingencies than those imposed on more regularized local functions. Some observations about major actors and their predispositions for support or resistance nonetheless can be made.

Driving Forces

The major driving force behind change of the kind considered here is the nagging presence of unresolved problems. Chronic failures tend to appear and reappear over the years; they are often avoided and ignored, but through their very persistence they insinuate themselves into the consciousness of community leaders. The intimacy and repetitiveness of contacts with the immediate environment makes such problems ultimately inescapable. Skid row, with its dreary parade of derelicts; the less visible but periodically publicized jail, with its revolving door; shocking crimes that hit the front page when least expected and are documented in succeeding editions with explanations of personal, familial, and community pathology--all of these generate a pent-up need for lasting solutions.

The presence of pervasive problems in itself cannot galvanize action or focus it effectively upon a prioritized agenda of needs and objectives. Most communities, in fact, experience long periods of inaction in which a "wringing of hands" and journalistic rhetoric about a patently inadequate criminal justice system lead largely to

more of the same. Conditions need to be "right" for problem awareness to be translated into action. This readiness to move undoubtedly has many elements, but its essential core appears to be leadership. Strategically positioned persons must be willing to commit themselves to determined effort. The more diverse and broadly based the leadership group, the better the chances for success.

Even with problem awareness and responsive leadership, a crisis often is needed to draw attention away from business-as-usual and catalyze potential supporters into action. There are innumerable examples of such incidents: the suicide of a young person in jail; a particularly tragic and apparently senseless crime; revelations of corruption on the part of criminal justice officials; outrage by minority persons concerning their victimization by the justice system. Usually such incidents do not reflect a new problem, but they may precipitate a climate of willingness to find solutions. Needed are leaders who represent the "conscience" of the community in collaboration with those who have their hands on the levers of action and know how to use them.

The next step typically involves a study, a task force, or a survey of some kind to provide the analytic basis for reorganization and reallocation of resources. While necessary as an antidote to ill-conceived action, this stage is perilous. Initial momentum and commitment may be dissipated and an initially promising thrust for reform lost in "data" and in debate about alternatives. While the initiating problem, and indignation about it, made the front page of the local press, the task force report may have to fight for publicity. Those who are unenthusiastic about reorganization may find the study phase perfectly suited to tactics of resistance and obfuscation. Vested interests in a parochial criminal justice system, latent or unvoiced during the early period, now may assert themselves. The seemingly clear path to a better system may be strewn with obstacles.

What forces can be harnessed to successfully negotiate this necessary but difficult stage? Legitimation of the goal of unification from outside sources may be of great assistance. Local leaders, struggling to maintain a sense of proportion about problems of implementation, can be helped by reinforcement from neutral and prestigious outsiders. For example, the general direction provided by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice seemed to help to keep change efforts on track in many localities visited during this study. Local task forces were able to relate their recommendations and priorities to the findings of that group and those of subsequent study groups that focused national attention on widespread problems in criminal justice. Reliance on outside authority, of course, has risks of its own, since the intrusion of "foreign" experts may arouse local resentment. The key to success seems to be the ability of local leaders to use such outsiders skillfully, at the right time and place, and with respect to the right issues. The function of brokering and mediating between "inside" and "outside" forces deserves more attention than it has received, for it often seems critical to success.

Many local government consolidation efforts have depended heavily upon state initiation and facilitation. Although clearly not a substitute for strong local leadership, it seems clear that a state role in encouraging local reforms can be a powerful force for unification and enhancement of community corrections. The underlying reason for the salience of state intervention may lie in the fiscal pressures now facing local government. Many problems remain unsolved because of a lack of resources. The prospect of some previously unavailable funds earmarked for community treatment can generate reforms that were "in the works" for a long time. The trend is toward a state role that combines assistance with standard-setting (thus raising all of the tensions that accompany any intergovernmental relationship).

In many jurisdictions, the success or failure of unification efforts may depend upon how well these forces are managed. A broad and diversified local corrections system may emerge from the state-local partnership; or a fall-back to earlier arrangements may occur if there is feuding and negative stereotyping across governmental boundaries. It appears that versatile people --who understand both state and local worlds and can mediate effectively between them-- are needed to work out these new relationships. The ability to perform this function goes beyond the elements of a job description. Needed is sensitivity to bureaucratic history, political power distributions, ego needs of key figures, and other "informal" variables.

As already indicated, it is difficult to generalize about the figures and force field elements within the community that may appear to support a unified corrections program. In more than one site visit location it was evident that the county executive was the primary driving force in the early stages. Concerns for economy and efficiency were paramount, with correctional effectiveness cited as an important secondary goal. In one county, the judiciary played a key role; and in another the sheriff was a leader of early change efforts. A fascinating variety of peripheral groups entered the arena at different stages of reorganization and in different locations. University faculty contributed expertise and respectability to reorganization proposals in one location. In another, the League of Women Voters performed an important legitimating role. Local criminal justice planning boards at times were important, as were earlier coordinating groups such as the Citizen Councils of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and special task forces appointed to report to the county board or city council. All of the examples of relatively successful unification efforts seemed to involve both bureaucratic and political leadership and, in fact, a close partnership between the two.

Once the idea of unification was "in the air" and the backing of key opinion leaders had been obtained, something of a bandwagon effect often was apparent. Such a dynamic, indeed, seemed necessary to avoid the loss of momentum during periods of study and analysis. If those with power and prestige were unambiguous in their support, many others found reason to put aside their own reservations. Interestingly, competition sometimes played a role. In one county, the

major city government became active in unification and reform only after county government leaders had obtained recognition for their efforts in that area.

What forces can be used to enhance local corrections once the comprehensive unified organization has been achieved? There exist little data on which to base an answer to this question. The movement toward consolidation is new and most of the systems now in place face the arduous task of making the idea work. The most promising efforts observed were heavily dependent on good management techniques. Management-by-objectives, now a somewhat hackneyed term, seemed critical. Previously separate units required some common orientation, some shared understanding of their collective enterprise. The budget, and the fiscal planning essential to its construction, often served as a unifying force, offering the opportunity to operationalize the rhetoric of cooperation in common programs, shared staff and facilities, and standardization of operations in the context of the total system.

Portrayal of the driving forces for change in the local government model obviously provides no blueprint for the would-be change agent. The forces are so numerous and so varied in their manifestation as to be quite bewildering. They "make sense" only when viewed through the eyes of a perceptive insider. In successful change efforts, leadership comes from various (some quite improbable) places. When the initiative to solve problems falters at one point, it is picked up at another. Site visits confirmed this. Strong leaders faded or lost their credibility, only to be replaced or augmented by fresh support. The difference between driving and restraining forces often was startlingly small. Conversion of resistance to support, or support to resistance, at times required only a small increment of influence. This may reflect the basic dilemma of community corrections--the uncertain, even fickle, nature of commitment to its goals.

Restraining Forces

The dialectical nature of attitudes toward community corrections can best be captured by reviewing restraining as well as driving forces. Examples can be found of both thesis and antithesis, and sometimes of synthesis, forming around either support or resistance.

Chronic problems of crime and delinquency, and the inability of a fragmented justice system to deliver lasting solutions, may be a driving force for change. This same condition all too often manifests itself as a kind of malaise, a grudging tolerance for problems everyone regards as insoluble. Cynicism about the failure or the superficiality of past reform efforts leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy that nothing significant ever will be done about the blighted section of town, the grotesque jail, the disorganization of family life, or the denial of opportunities for generations of deprived persons.

The conversion of problem awareness to solution-oriented action is in no way an automatic event.

Again, the antidote to apathy about system failures is leadership --coupled with a crisis or visible incident to galvanize constructive action. But even quality leadership may select targets of greater opportunity and the crisis may serve only to deepen pessimism about the difficulties of change. Those wishing to capture opportunity in the interests of reorganization and enhancement must strategize well and act decisively, for there are no easy answers or guarantees of success.

Studies, surveys, and task forces to analyze complex problems and present recommendations for reform may impede as well as stimulate action. Those who would scoff at such "rational" solutions to criminal justice problems find a ready audience, quick to be skeptical of yet another expensive report that may simply gather dust on some shelf. Their concerns are well-founded. If studies are to be undertaken, they should be done expeditiously, taking advantage of usually voluminous existing data and addressing themselves to a range of problems, some of which can be acted on quickly with reasonable hope of success. Studies should focus upon not only the nature of the problem, but the specifics of implementing solutions. A climate of action should be built in from the beginning to avoid the loss of momentum and leadership commitment.

The use of outside "experts" is a two-edged sword. Skillfully applied to the right issues at the right time and in the right way, many doubts can be resolved and local problems can be put in a national perspective. But this process can just as easily go awry. An outsider who seems arrogant about his experience or jurisdiction, uninformed or disrespectful of local traditions, or the tool of some local faction can lose credibility instantly. A potential driving force then begins to operate in reverse.

Similar problems arise around the state role in facilitating unification and improvement of local corrections. Performed well, state functions of subsidization, standard-setting, technical assistance, and staff development can be of immeasurable aid to local change agents. But state functionaries may be seen as intruders. Residual suspicions may make any assistance appear as an effort to "take over" local prerogatives, or to foist on the localities problems and expenditures that state officials and politicians do not want. Here the motivations behind state aid become critical. If the underlying purpose is to reduce state expenditures (especially in terms of capital outlay for construction of penal institutions), all inducements for local government participation may be seen as a smoke screen. Site visits suggested that local officials are looking at new state-aid laws with some caution. Much negotiation and "testing" of intent and commitment are required to make state intervention a driving rather than restraining force.

Beyond these potential restraining elements, which seem to be opposite sides of the driving forces, it is possible to identify some additional negative elements. Perhaps the most formidable is the centrifugal force operating to pull apart those units that must be integrated to form a unified and comprehensive community correctional system. This problem is familiar to those who work in the local government arena. The sheriff, usually elected and independent of mind, may find many reasons not to associate himself with probation. Probation may be no more inclined to identify itself with the harsh realities of police and jail operations. When the effort to unify is within a public service context, those seeking to supply the necessary "glue" also must deal with elected district attorneys and judges, who typically have their own lines of communication with the county board and the electorate. The existence of baronies and feifdoms in local government is more the rule than the exception, and some very powerful sanctions are required to change that traditional sociometry.

Another restraining reality, especially in populous jurisdictions where consolidation is most needed, is the ponderous and unresponsive nature of government bureaucracy. There are exceptions --localities in which capable "generalist" managers have learned to stress results and demand performance. But reorganization typically faces more entrenched structures. Middle management may find many reasons to defeat even those policies backed by top management. If reorganization is in a human service context, the large ancillary systems of health, welfare, and employment development may respond very slowly to efforts to divert their energies toward offenders. These discouraging facts must be faced early if ambitious reorganization schemes are to make any real headway. Ways must be found to set new priorities, earmark funds, commit key staff, and set new policy directions. If this is not done, the reintegration concept of community treatment, which depends upon developing a wide network of resources, may never be operationalized.

Those seeking change also must recognize that there is no ready constituency in the community to support them or to provide help at critical decision points when their agenda is in competition with other public programs. This is a sobering thought. Most new initiatives in government today are backed by cohesive and skillful groups of advocates. "Senior citizens" lobby effectively for programs for their age group. Business and labor are notably well organized; but these days so are conservationists, ethnic minorities, government workers and innumerable other groups. This competitive milieu is further agitated by what is coming to be called the "taxpayer revolt." Fiscal stringency is an omnipresent reality. If a revitalized community corrections service is to be justified in such an environment, it must identify itself with economy and efficiency; but it still must work out viable services and ways of delivering them. Budget realities dictate innovative ways of piecing together existing resources, focusing them on urgent needs, and making them more cost-effective. Insensitivity to this fact can release more restraining forces than any would-be change agent can hope to surmount.

Still another potential restraint on the development of a more coherent system is the prevailing public suspicion of offender "re-integration" programs. Most citizens are frightened of and angry about crime and criminals. They tend to doubt the validity of past reform efforts and easily are polarized by those who indict a new idea as "soft" on crime or uncaring about its victims. Those who define operational values and missions for community corrections must concern themselves with these difficult problems. It helps to admit that, despite great effort and idealistic conviction, past efforts to rehabilitate have not proved successful. Emphasis can be placed on program goals that combine assistance in practical modes, such as job-finding, with realistic control and surveillance. The costs of an antiquated and cumbersome system can be compared with one that is tightly conceived and sensibly managed. But rhetoric is dangerous. Familiar promises never made good beget anger and rejection. Better, it seems is an approach that emphasizes the pragmatic. Improve the system organizationally. Reduce costs. Try the best known methods, but be willing to pull back if results are not encouraging. The image, and the reality, suggests a mode not of broad social engineering but of persistent, coordinated efforts to develop and implement effective programs.

A final potential restraining force might be termed the "boom-erang" effect of outside funding and program initiation. In many situations, progress is made toward a better and more unified system through projects funded by grants from federal or other sources. Initiated with high hopes and expectations, these efforts all too often collapse when outside financing no longer is available. Effective use can be made of such "starter" monies, but it seems important to anticipate and prepare for their termination. Unless this is done, bold new ventures may fall under an aura of failure. From the outset, planning should prepare for and gain local support, perhaps incrementally, as special funding is scaled down. Funded by outside monies and started in haste without careful preparation for effective implementation, initial reorganization efforts may fail, with the result that more substantial change may be even more difficult to bring about later on.

The Regional Model as a Field of Forces

Organizational change within the environment of a single unit of local government is largely applicable to the situation presented by a multi-jurisdictional or regional consolidation. Again, local government, particularly county government, is the primary political/administrative target of change. The involvement of two or more governmental entities, however, geometrically increases the number and complexity of the forces at work. Unfortunately, the addition of one or more units of government often contributes more restraining than driving forces, although some successes in multi-jurisdiction

unification of community correctional services do seem to be emerging.

The traditional sociometry of local government in America has been one of provincialism --of valuing what is different or special about "our" county and maintaining strong cultural, political, and bureaucratic boundaries between and among units. The residents of a county seat may feel more affinity for a "sister"city in Latin America or overseas than for the locality fifty miles away with which hotly contested high school football games are held yearly. The very grass-roots character that permits offender reintegration programs paradoxically subverts the ability to work out cooperative relationships.

This traditional pattern has been undergoing rapid change in recent years; and the rate of change is accelerating. Urbanization and the increasingly technological nature of our economic system are making parochial forms of organization less viable. Problems arise within areas defined by population distribution rather than by city or county lines and pressures to discover better answers are relentless. The county supervisor, for a time, may be able to ignore the regional picture, but professional and economic sectors of his community are likely to have long since gone about working out the communication links and resource exchanges necessary to keep them up to date.

Government, too, is changing reluctantly in many locations, as a result of these needs and pressures. If the inward-looking tendencies of local government in the United States represent restraining forces for region-wide solutions, the modernizing trends can be thought of as driving forces. There are many of these, and they operate variously across the country. Ironically, these "pro-change" forces seem to be less evident where the need for change is greatest. Those localities that are most insular and least capable of participating in cooperative ventures with other local units also appear to be the most in need of such cooperation to resolve their own corrections problems. Local governments that have the capability to look outward and relate their problems and opportunities to the larger scene also are seen to be the most successful in mounting strong indigenous efforts to prevent and correct crime. Although admittedly impressionistic, this pattern was apparent from site visit data.

The driving forces for reorganization in the regional model are numerous and interrelated. One such force is the presence of "professional" management; that is, county executives and correctional administrators who are committed to precepts of good management rather than loyalty to local interests and political factions. The broader movement to develop intergovernmental programs in other areas also encourages multi-jurisdiction solutions to correctional problems. Revenue-sharing, with specially mandated programs for local initiatives in the human service area, have great influence. When such actions are tied to standards that a smaller unit of government cannot meet alone (e.g., a requirement that the population base eligibility for

state aid is 30,000 or above), cross-jurisdictional efforts obviously are greatly encouraged. Perhaps the most powerful force for regional corrections is the combined effect of state subsidies, standards, and technical assistance to the localities.

Many other forces are at work, some of which are difficult to define and perhaps impossible to measure. Chapter IV pointed out the need for a combination of opportunity and competence if regional organizations are to be achieved. Competence may be equated with strong, professional management, and statesmanlike political leadership in determining policy directions. Difficult though such ideas might be to evaluate, the presence or absence of "opportunity" is even more nebulous. More often than one might wish, opportunity for significant change seems associated with the emergence of highly visible problems that goad otherwise indifferent decision-makers into action. Competence, then, is closely related to the ability to sense the presence or imminence of such problems and to channel the energy they generate into constructive activities. The relationship between adversity and advantage seems especially pertinent to the regional model of community corrections. A long-standing reluctance to form boundary-spanning partnerships may be dissolved when harsh economic factors make it clear that in no other way can common problems be solved. The degree to which the solution approaches the ideal model of a comprehensive and unified system then tends to be a function of the vision and abilities of those who wield power and authority. A sense of timing and negotiating skills seem critical under such circumstances.

Other driving forces favoring the regional model are more institutionalized. Organizations that cut across local government lines, such as the National Association of Counties and associations of county supervisors, provide a broad perspective and offer examples of concrete action that have worked well in selected jurisdictions. Inter-jurisdictional local government planning organizations (for example, the Association of Bay Area Governments in California) also provide guidance in cooperative efforts. Regional criminal justice planning units have carried this concept into the functional area of community corrections with mixed but sometimes gratifying success. There is no clear-cut constituency for the regionalization of community corrections, but there are myriad interests and forces that can be mobilized for that purpose, given the convergence of favorable circumstances and effective leadership. The demand for economy in government may do more than any other contextual factor to set the stage for such developments in the immediate future.

The State Model as a Field of Forces

The setting for both single-county and regional models is primarily local in character. In these models the driving and restraining forces, complex as they are, arise and are expressed mainly in the community.

The force field in which the state model operates is fundamentally different. The state capitol lies at the center, for it is here that funding priorities are determined, program policies are enunciated, and personnel decisions are made. Efforts to counteract this strong centripetal tendency, as required for a decentralized community corrections service, must take cognizance of the centralist sociometry of state government if they are to be realistic in design and execution.

It is fascinating to observe the common features of politics and administration that appear in the state capitols of demographically quite different jurisdictions. Of course, the effects of geographic size or urbanization appear throughout any state's governance system. But conversations in the corridors of the capitol building are remarkably similar from one state to another. They tend to be concerned with the movement of bills through the intricate machinery of the legislature and the pendants of key legislative committee members; the budget and the competitive political process through which fiscal priorities are set; contests between the governor and the legislature; the press, and the effort to gain or avoid its attention; or the likely reactions of the judiciary to current initiatives and controversies. Division of powers is a dominant reality of state government. As such, it is a pluralistic and quite unpredictable milieu, with alliances forming and dissolving on the basis of a never-ending series of issues.

Party politics provide a degree of cohesion, but by far the greatest force for continuity is the state bureaucracy. Governors come and go and the turnover among legislators is increasingly rapid, but the agencies responsible for carrying out executive and legislative mandates evince enormous staying power. To the consternation of those who believe in the separation of politics from administration, the state bureaucracy also typically possesses a strong capability for initiating public policies and programs. State agencies hold critical information; they have staff resources to devote to analysis and to advocacy, and, significantly, they maintain their own lines of contact with key constituencies in the electorate. Even the most powerful political executives and legislators find reason to seek the advice and support of agency personnel strategically positioned to assist them.

The force field of state government today lends special prominence to representatives of the mass media. Increasing refinement of investigative reporting has opened up governmental activities to public inspection and the workings of the criminal justice system have been of particular interest to journalists. News services retain specialists on state government in almost all jurisdictions today; their lines of communication back to the hometown press provide a major force for bringing together local and state perspectives or dramatically announcing their divergence. Journalists, too, work in a highly competitive environment, with tensions especially evident between print media and TV. Reporters seasoned in the inner world of state government tend to be highly knowledgeable and are often irreverent of status and protocol.

Driving Forces

It would be difficult to argue that, in itself, the achievement of a unified, integrated, and comprehensive system of community-based corrections has been a major priority of state government. States generally have been preoccupied with the operation of penal institutions and facilities for seriously delinquent youthful offenders. While all states have some parole services, and many administer probation programs as well, these activities seldom have been the focus for positive new initiatives. In fact, a prevailing posture of state government has been to do what it must in the corrections area and to hope that serious problems will not arise, especially near election time. Corrections has been viewed as a potential source of embarrassment or criticism rather than an opportunity to better serve the public interest. Professionals in state corrections sometimes exercise impressive leadership, despite this generally unfavorable environment, but more often than not they have had to rely on the leverage of some distressing problem to obtain the attention of the legislature and the governor's office.

Given this context, it is apparent that the major driving forces for the state-administered model will appear in the general environment of state government rather than in the state corrections apparatus. Correctional administrators favoring a community-based approach, together with interest groups sharing that purpose, have been most effective when they have focused on their particular problem area the energy generated by larger concerns. Public uneasiness about crime, and doubts about the effectiveness of existing correctional programs, offer the opportunity to advocate major reorganization. But the chances of doing so successfully increase substantially if such a movement can be integrated with some larger agenda of the governor, the legislature, or both.

In many cases, this "larger" purpose has been the reduction of state expenditures, especially for the construction and operation of institutional facilities. Even a casual look into the economics of correctional services reveals the enormous cost of building, maintaining, and operating custodial institutions. Alternatives are attractive to the degree that they reduce those costs. Forestry camps and part-way facilities in the community can be shown to be less expensive than conventional institutions, and probation and parole cost even less. But there are dilemmas and disappointments that arise from deeper analysis. Custodial institutions represent the major societal instrument for crime deterrence, and the public has been asking its representatives to increase rather than decrease deterrence. Moreover, what seem to be inexpensive community programs can become very expensive indeed if the resources required for offender reintegration actually are provided. Such difficult issues often are avoided or obscured in state initiatives to expand community corrections, especially when the economic imperative is at work.

Some surprising alliances have supported state efforts to expand community corrections. Opponents of big government have aligned themselves with correctional leaders of more liberal persuasion in the effort to promote community-based alternatives to prison. Such strategic partnerships rest on shaky foundations when those involved hold dissonant values and have diverse objectives. Corrections might look to the field of mental health for examples of the massive problems that can emerge from ambiguous policies. Nonetheless, the lack of institutional space eventually demands community-based solutions, especially as the courts begin to require that overcrowding be reduced. Under such circumstances heavy responsibility falls upon those at the service-delivery level for ingenuity and productivity in dealing with correctional problems.

Community corrections has been impacted by other forces in state government within recent years. The revenue-sharing strategies of the federal government have provided new opportunities for financing local services, although the so-called "tax revolt" clearly offsets this development. Reapportionment of state legislatures has brought to many state capitols political representatives of the inner city, and of urbanized areas generally, who know the meaning of hard-core crime and are aware of the need for programs that respond to more than its symptoms. The state is coming to be seen as a provider of indirect rather than direct services in many fields, especially the human services. This movement has aided the decentralization of corrections in states such as Minnesota and Oregon, where an elaborate set of new state roles reflects both assistance and regulation of local efforts. The forces behind such fresh designs are impressive in their diversity, representing what appears to be a solid coalition of supporters of this new "partnership" approach.

Restraining Forces

Chapter V, which drew illustrations from three quite different states, called attention to some of the obstacles to the development of a community-based correctional service administered by the state. The psychological and organizational distance between the state capitol and the communities in which services are delivered typically is great. "Central-office" mentality may cause those who make decisions at the center of the system to be insensitive to the local situation, simply because they are a part of a different network and have a different world view. This social configuration is not immutable, but it is persistent and efforts to counteract it must be both substantial and imaginative. Conventional techniques of decentralization and delegation are unlikely to be sufficient to bring to local service delivery the "inside" perspective that seems so essential to genuine offender reintegration.

There is a formidable restraining force on the other side of the state-local relationship. Even when state officials are prepared to be flexible and receptive to local needs, the "gatekeepers" of local agency systems and resources may respond with suspicion and mistrust. A state-administered community-based program may be defined as "theirs" and thus not receive full commitment of scarce local resources. Even if the state seeks to facilitate assumption by local authorities of responsibility for an enhanced correctional service, its motives may be suspect -- state officials may be viewed as intruders with "take-over" in mind or as strategists who wish local government to accept responsibilities unattractive to the state without adequate fiscal assistance. Such doubts, experience suggests, cannot be dealt with quickly or altogether rationally. There must be a long process of patient consultation and modification of proposals. All concerned must be given an opportunity to be heard. This process of extensive participation must continue after the initial design of the program into its implementation phase, where unanticipated problems are certain to surface.

One highly visible restraining force is the scarcity of strong, generalist administrative leadership. Managers of comprehensive, decentralized correctional services need a broad understanding of offender problems and the community services required to deal with them. There is no obvious training ground for such administrators, since prior experience is likely to have been gained in some particular component of the system at the state or local level. Probation and parole managers, especially those with experience in programs committed to brokering, advocacy, and the use of resource teams, may constitute the best source of administrative talent for the new unified system. But since these fields suffer from their own kind of parochialism, what is needed is training in public administration as a generic field, coupled with experience in integrated service delivery systems. This problem can be solved only gradually as such programs increasingly emerge.

Still another prominent restraining force in the state model is the competition among power centers within state government for influence and control of the community-based system. In one sense, this constraint can be understood simply as a product of the division of powers among the executive, the legislature, and the courts. However necessary and legitimate such a system of checks and balances may be, there is no doubt that it can make organizational change a long and tortuous process. Agencies in the executive branch tend to have quite definitive ideas about how such services should be mandated and carried out, although different state agencies frequently have quite different perspectives on the issues. The legislature, tuned to the electorate and the meshing of state policies with local realities, may enter the arena with still different priorities and problems in mind. And the courts have moved with increasing frequency to set standards and determine criteria for services directed toward offenders.

Great skill, patience, and political sensitivity are required on the part of state officials who set out to create unified and decentralized corrections services. They must be prepared to negotiate flexibly with many different actors and understand the forces to which each responds. Successful state efforts seem to depend heavily on the ability to work with a complex, pluralistic system and to avoid those impasses in which great energy is expended with little or no forward progress. In several jurisdictions reviewed for this study, there were individuals in boundary-spanning roles, capable of moving back and forth between the world of the legislature and that of state agencies, understanding the forces at work in both situations. At times these individuals were able to mediate between the state and the local level, smoothing out difficulties and defining common ground on which all involved could negotiate their differences and work to develop mutually beneficial solutions to fiscal and programmatic problems.


A final restraining force within the state model is the presence of severe fiscal constraints that inhibit implementation of a unified program. Since the context of unification and decentralization often is one of economy and financial stringency, there is a serious danger that the new and much touted system will be only an assemblage of existing underfunded elements with failure a built-in product of insufficient revenues. This problem may be masked in the early design stages by program enhancement money temporarily made available by the relinquishment of state responsibilities or by the decision not to construct state facilities. Unrealistic expectations may be generated around the belief that unifying disparate services will somehow create economies of scale and substantially reduce administrative costs. Experience with state subsidies to local corrections, as well as with direct state administration of local services, indicates that such hopes generally are unrealistic. If, for example, the new unified service expects to draw heavily upon the resources of related systems (such as mental health and employment development) service-purchase funds must be obtained. In the words of those now urging fiscal realism, "there is no free lunch."

Strategies for Change: Radical and Incremental

Change, it has been suggested, results more from accommodation to tensions than from a planned and orderly process of setting goals and working toward them. Would-be agents of change must make use of rational tools such as planning and management-by-objectives, but they also must be adroit in working with conflict and adversity and in timing their actions to mesh with a constantly changing field of forces. The effective change agent thus not only must be a good strategist; he also must orient strategies to values and purposes that make sense to key constituencies.

Figure 10

Example Elements in the Field of Forces



The limited literature on moving American corrections toward a community-based model offers a basic choice between "incremental" and "radical" modes of change. All of the jurisdictions reviewed for this study were involved in an incremental process, but there are those who argue that such rational approaches cannot effect a transition from the institution-centered model of the past to the reintegrative, resocializing pattern envisioned for the future. Some of those who argue for radical strategies of change point to the Massachusetts experience with restructuring youth corrections in the early 1970's. Radical changes in the youth corrections system of Massachusetts were introduced by Dr. Jerome Miller upon his appointment in 1969 as the first Commissioner of a newly established Department of Youth Services. The events that followed were surrounded with controversy, which continues to this day, but there is no doubt that change was effected:

"Within three years, the entire institution-based system had been almost completely dismantled. Driven by a moral certainty about the inhumanity of traditional punitive approaches to youth corrections, Miller set about to transform the mission of DYS from punishment to therapy. He began by actively trying to reform the institutions, by issuing directives ordering the elimination of various repressive practices and by establishing controversial educational and therapeutic experiments. Although Miller had not initially intended to close down the training schools, two years of ascending frustration, marked by employee sabotage, increased brutality, and inmate violence, convinced him that the institutions could not be reformed. Within a few frantic months at the end of 1971 and the beginning of 1972, he systematically emptied every one of the training schools."⁸

Miller then moved aggressively to secure new funding sources to support a network of alternative community programs. Sizeable federal funds were committed; seven regional offices were created; and a supplementary state budget was authorized to finance service-purchase contracts. The system had been revamped by the time Miller left for Illinois in 1973, but at costs that some considered too high.⁹

Lloyd Ohlin has described the concept of change underlying Miller's activities as reflecting "crisis theory," in contrast to the "policy model," which implies dependence on rational planning and gradual change.¹⁰ This point of view is consistent with the observation that reform grows out of conflict and that perhaps Miller caught and rode a wave of change that had arisen prior to his arrival in Massachusetts. The ability of a change-oriented administrator such as Miller to make major changes in a short period of time is strongly related to the structural arrangements in which he finds himself. For example, the fact that the new Department of Youth Services in Massachusetts had control over the dispositions of the offenders in its charge made radical change possible. Had there been judicial control over placement of offenders and the length of their commitments, the results could hardly have been the same.

The timely appearance of federal funds to implement the community-based system in Massachusetts, when state funds became unavailable for some purposes, also was a significant driving force. Ohlin believes that the service-purchase strategy was a powerful aid to change, since it permitted new delivery modes during the time of transition without the impeding effects of the surrounding state bureaucracy. Regionalization, too, is seen as an important administrative move (though hardly in the conventional bureaucratic format) since it pushed decision-making away from central office and into the hands of those dealing directly with offenders and the community.

Finally, the speed of the change process in Massachusetts bears examination as an important variable. Indeed, this may be the central issue in weighing incremental change strategies against radical ones. Opponents of "incrementalism" might argue that in such a massive shift as occurred in Massachusetts, it is not feasible to drag along the old system, with its built-in inertia, since this would compromise and ultimately defeat the major goals of change. Others might note, however, that such rapid change stands in danger of reversing itself because a solid foundation for the new system has not been prepared. Radical change agents, aware of this possibility, may build in strategies to make a return to the old system virtually impossible. In Massachusetts, in fact, elimination of youth institutions and the decision not to construct new ones did have this effect.

The Massachusetts experience provides a fascinating set of facts from which those interested in correctional change can learn a great deal. This is not negated by the fact that different observers will interpret these events in drastically different ways. Obviously there are differing values involved and different conceptions of what organizations are and how they should be changed. Nonetheless, it should be clear that radical change, however beneficial in the long run, is never a smooth and painless process.

Incremental approaches to change may seem somewhat stodgy when compared with such adventuresome efforts as those undertaken in Massachusetts. Nevertheless, observations made during site visits suggested that many individuals in various roles are committed to change in the incremental mode. If radical change can be likened to a contact sport, incremental change seems more like a chess game. Effective incremental change agents do a great deal of scanning and strategizing, attempting to move forward when the situation is fluid and to consolidate gains when it is not.

A study of correctional administrators as change agents¹¹ identified certain strategies as particularly important in bringing about significant organizational and programmatic changes in the correctional field. One of these was the involvement of a wide range of actors, in both external and internal force fields, in order to gain their commitment to change goals. A strategy called "dilemma management" emphasized the use of the energy and attention generated by problems to induce solutions that otherwise would be impossible to achieve. In a

sense, dilemma management brings radical and incremental modes of change closer together, for it asks the administrator to work with forces that typically are unruly, while at the same time attempting to reach rational goals and hold the organization together. Use of outside expertise was seen as helpful, although a boomerang effect can occur if outsiders and their ideas are rejected by inside decision-makers. Timing of change efforts, and delay when conditions are not auspicious, was found to be critical to success in incremental change efforts. A summary profile of the "change-capable" correctional administrator divided the attributes required into "readiness" skills (e.g., scanning the environment, maintaining credibility, and conceptualizing problems and solutions) and "action" skills (e.g., seizing opportunities, keeping conflict within limits, and institutionalizing changes so that they become an ongoing part of the life of the organization).

Tactics of Reorganization

The broad strategies selected by those who wish to bring about change, and the values and goals toward which such efforts are oriented, obviously are of great importance. But pragmatic or "operational" tactics of reorganization enter in as well. Ernest G. Reimer, an experienced correctional administrator, has provided some perceptive comments in this area, pointing out that the methods by which government reorganization is achieved may have more to do with the success and duration of the change effort than the particulars of the organizational design.¹² Relatively little attention has been paid to the process of changing governmental structures. An evolutionary step-by-step procedure has much to commend it. Such an approach must be capable of adjusting to new influences that may surface -- such as a change in available resources, the emergence of new political leaders, or a shift in public attitudes.

It is impossible to predict which organizational structure will work best for each of the myriad local governments in the United States. As a particular jurisdiction begins to mobilize its correctional resources more effectively, it will have an opportunity to experiment with different structures and to assess which works best. The evolutionary process also permits those directly involved to contribute more meaningfully to the design.

In some situations, circumstances may dictate a rapid and dramatic reorganization (for example, following a crisis in which the corrections service is revealed to be badly flawed or ineffective). Usually, however, there is time to plan and implement a more orderly process of change. Certain suggestions can be made concerning that process:

Identify and State Common Goals. Unless the various interests involved reach agreement regarding the objectives of a reorganized

system, it cannot be expected to succeed. The sheriff, probation officials, the judiciary, the county administrator, and other key figures must reach genuine consensus and reconcile differences early in the process. As implementation proceeds, the focus should be on shared goals rather than on methods. In most situations, there are a variety of ways in which objectives may be achieved and these alternatives can be a matter of discussion and negotiation.

Avoid Stepping on Toes Unnecessarily. In most governmental reorganizations, it is necessary to alter spheres of authority and responsibility. The effectiveness of the new system will depend upon how this is accomplished. The first concern of those involved in the reorganization probably will be its potential effect on their personal situation. Such concerns tend to loom larger from the individual standpoint than the general effectiveness of the proposed new system. When shifting zones and levels of responsibility, therefore, and especially when shifting them downward, careful evaluations should be made before any action is taken. There may be a variety of ways of making such changes, some less obtrusive than others. These are most likely to appear if those involved are consulted early and their ideas and reactions considered carefully. In the long run, the new system will need all the supporters it can get.

Look for Trade-offs. A loss of status or resources for an individual or a unit involved in the reorganization at times may be offset by some kind of gain. If so, the possibilities of overt or covert opposition can be reduced. For example, judges may be less resistive to some loss of control over probation if it can be demonstrated that they will receive an improved presentence investigation service; and a sheriff may be more inclined to relinquish administrative power over the jail if in turn he obtains additional resources to enhance law enforcement operations.

Accomplish Change in Phases. In some situations it may be advantageous to combine or coordinate some services prior to total reorganization. Such an approach may allow early identification of problem areas, an ironing-out of procedural difficulties, and an opportunity for those who must implement the new system to learn how to do so. If the reorganization requires additional funding, phasing-in may allow the costs to be spread over two or three fiscal years rather than concentrated in a single budget period.

Find the "Right" Administrator. The head of the reorganized corrections system should be selected for essential attributes, and not placed in that position as a succession from some prior role or as a way of satisfying political considerations. Those who direct the change process may not be the best candidates for top administrative posts, especially if conflict and trauma have accompanied the unification effort. An outsider with outstanding credentials may be in a better position to gain wide support and make the right decisions as the new system comes off the drawing board and begins operation. In any case, the administrator should be able to exercise strong leadership and

should be committed to the goals that have guided the reorganization effort. His background should be broad and diversified to avoid parochial attachments to any part of the system for which he is responsible. It is equally imperative that the director have strong support from the political authority that appoints him and will oversee his work.

Set Objectives and Deadlines. As the new system is launched, there will be numerous competing priorities. It is essential that those in charge go about the implementation in a systematic fashion, setting goals and monitoring performance to assess the progress that is made. It is impossible to do everything at once. System-wide priorities must be set and all units must understand the process by which this is done. Team management may be a useful tool; and the budget process can be used to unify and coordinate disparate functions.

Conclusion

The guidelines offered here may be helpful to those engaged in reorganization efforts, but it is important to emphasize that there are no text-book solutions for problems of this kind. The focus of this study has been on jurisdictions that have enjoyed some measure of success in unifying local correctional services. There is much merit in correctional unification efforts for they address long-standing problems in sensible ways; but no reorganization should be undertaken without careful consideration of its need and purpose. Arguments against unification should be reviewed¹³ and much can be learned from both successful and unsuccessful reorganization experiences. For example, while one of the counties site-visited for this report was successfully consolidating a wide range of programs, an adjacent county was experiencing a discouraging reversal of similar and equally ambitious efforts. We need much more systematic research to understand the reasons for such different outcomes. In the meantime, local and state officials considering such moves must diagnose their own situations to determine the best course of action available to them.

At the present time, fiscal considerations are receiving major attention in many jurisdictions throughout the country. Almost everyone concerned with the conduct of public business is engaged in a re-examination of traditional beliefs and dogmas. In this volatile context, Professor John J. Kirilin has offered some thoughts that are highly pertinent to the subject of this study and consistent with the "contingency" perspective introduced earlier. Kirilin suggests that the categorical nature of public programs and agencies may be leading us into a sort of "colonial" administration in which members of the public are treated "as objects, as natives." "Public administration," he observes, "will become the administration of publics, providing services to categorized citizens, manipulating citizen participation,

seeking forever the symbiosis that assures clientele dependency and agency survival."¹⁴

As an antidote to this trend, Kirilin offers a tentative list of "maxims" for the organization and management of public services. They are offered here as appropriate guidelines for the reorganization of community corrections systems:

- Seek alternatives to the creation of bureaucracies; use the administrative strategy only as a last resort.
- Distrust universal solutions and formula allocations of funds; they must often be used, but expect anomalous cases.
- "Errors" will occur; they are often not the result of venality, stupidity or corruption, but the consequence of the inadequacy of the policy being implemented to fit the particular circumstances.
- Cherish, protect and nurture complexity and differences.
- Create "decision situations" in which affected parties (from individuals to governments) are led to adjust their behaviors to achieve the public policy objective, without being directed to the particular method.
- Pay conscious attention to "values management," to the creation of a shared vision of the future, and to expectations of the roles various individuals and organizations are to play in creating that future.
- Each government must take full accountability for the consequences of its policies upon other governments; in particular, the Federal and State governments should not capriciously mandate local government actions."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle III, 1733.
2. For a classic presentation of the ideology of this movement, see Frederick Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper and Row, 1947).
3. For a review and critique of some of the methods that flow from this position, see: Andrew Malcolm, The Tyranny of the Group (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1975).
4. See section, this chapter, on Strategies for Change.
5. Henry C. Metcalf and L. Urwick (eds), Dynamic Administration: the Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett (New York: Harper and Bros., 1940).
6. David Fogel, We Are the Living Proof (Cincinnati, Ohio: W.H. Anderson, 1975).
7. Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
8. Colin S. Diver, "Department of Youth Services," a case developed by the School of Management, Boston University (John R. Russell, Principal Investigator) under contract with the Urban Management Curriculum Development Project, National Training and Development Service, 5028 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016, 1978, p. 5.
9. Id., p. 1.
10. Commentary on the Massachusetts experience is drawn from a presentation by Dr. Lloyd Ohlin at the annual meeting of the American Justice Institute in Sacramento, Calif., May 5, 1978, in which a summary of major research themes was provided.
11. E.K. Nelson, Jr. and Catherine H. Lovell, "Developing Correctional Administrators," research report to the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training, Washington, D.C., November 1969.
12. Ernest G. Reimer, letter to project staff following review of draft chapters.
13. The case against consolidation is reviewed by Daniel L. Skoler, Organizing the Non-System (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).

14. John J. Kirilin, "Intergovernmental Implications of the Passage of Proposition 13 by California voters," paper presented at Claremont Hotel Symposium, July 14, 1978, p. 5.

15. Id., pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION CHARGES

This final chapter is not intended to summarize or recapitulate the various elements of the report. Rather, the purpose is to focus the information developed upon the question of implementation. Chapters II through V dealt with the alternative models that might be used as frameworks in the design of improved community correctional organizations. Chapter VI addressed the forces that impinge upon the process of organizational change, either facilitating or restraining it. The present chapter identifies the major actors, the tasks they might undertake, and the difficulties they may encounter in attempting to implement comprehensive and unified organizational models. The assumption underlying this discussion is that the roles of the major participants in the change process differ both in the opportunities they are likely to be presented with and in the problems they may have to solve. In concluding this report with a discussion of the responsibilities of individual actors we hope to emphasize that, in the final analysis, change is a function of individual effort, commitment and, inevitably, risk-taking. "Models" and "forces" are abstract ideas --latent and impotent until seized upon by real people to solve the problems of real situations.

Any attempt to implement the ideas put forward in this study is certain to be difficult. At the present state of knowledge, there is no assurance of success. The only certainty would seem to be that there will be outcomes unanticipated, and perhaps unwanted by those who initiate change. Why, then, should reorganization efforts be made? One answer may be that the price of inaction is inordinately high. Many existing systems are not cost-effective and investments in them are constantly growing. There are those who believe that the past determines the future in a kind of unavoidable linear progression. Others (including the writers of this report) believe that many different potential futures exist at any moment and that what emerges can be shaped by human effort. Our concern here is with attempting to define the kinds of effort required.

This brief outline of "action charges" for each of the major actors on the correctional scene is organized around the force field concept used throughout this report. The chapter begins by addressing the actors in the "internal" field (i.e., those closest to the point at which community correctional services are delivered). Then those in the "external" field will be considered --individuals whose participation may be critical even though they may be only peripherally involved. It is not implied that any one actor or group of actors is generally more significant than any other, for this will vary from one situation to another. If some very important groups are missed entirely it is because the present discussion is limited to actors whose roles have been illuminated by the data collected.

The Internal Force Field

The internal field within which the reorganization of local correctional services is taking place includes, among others: corrections professionals, local government administrators, county and city commissioners, criminal justice planners, judges, prosecutors, and local law enforcement administrators. The manner in which these individuals and groups approach the tasks of change, and especially the way in which they orchestrate their efforts, determines not only the success or failure of unification but the character of the resulting organization.

Professionals in Corrections

Perhaps no group has such a large stake in reorganization efforts as those whose programs and jobs are directly affected by the merging and redefining process of unification. Jailers, probation officers, operators of community correctional centers, court administrators, specialized treatment personnel dealing with offenders (e.g., in drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs), and those concerned with diversion services illustrate but do not exhaust this category. Those who hold administrative authority, whether as top executives or in middle-management roles, are especially critical during the initiation and implementation of reorganization, as are certain key staff persons and consultants who develop information and define options for decision-makers.

The single most important function that corrections professionals can perform in the reorganization process is to articulate and manifest the values and goals that will give the new organization a sense of purpose and mission. Many of the other actors involved will tend to concentrate upon economy and structural coherence. It will usually fall to corrections professionals to define the problems of current programs (the reasons for reorganization) and the goals of change. This is a difficult task because in most communities correctional services are far from monolithic. The jail may be operated according to one philosophy, probation programs according to quite another. The ability of those who speak for corrections to reach a pragmatic reconciliation of such differences seems to be a major test of their power to influence the shape of events to come.

The reintegration concept of community corrections appeared to be the rallying point for cooperation and consensus among corrections officials in the present study. Many agreed that the community is the optimal point around which to organize because it is the place where the offender must come to terms with his future and the repository of resources needed to turn him toward a legitimate way of life. Historically divisive (and usually rhetorical) questions, such as the validity of punishment versus treatment, tended to give way under such circumstances to a sensible emphasis on the need for access to

employment opportunities and membership in noncriminal social groups. Nevertheless, a great deal of strategic leadership seemed to be required to dull the edges of polarizing conflict and open up mutually beneficial opportunities for those directly affected by reorganization.

Practical steps taken by correctional professionals in this study to facilitate unification included: working out internal differences before "going public"; demanding that the economic resources needed for viable community corrections not be ignored in the euphoria surrounding economy drives; developing linkages with state and federal corrections officials whose experience and roles made them effective allies in designing laws and standards; acknowledging that past corrections efforts have not always been successful and that solutions are too new and insufficiently tested for fine-tuning; and serving as catalysts for the integration of diverse concerns in the interest of cost-effective services.

Actions that should be avoided by professionals in corrections, according to the information developed in this study, included: abdicating the implementation role to actors more familiar with the "public" arena; alienating potential supporters by resorting to the jargon of corrections; giving allegiance to a particular enclave of the corrections field when the overriding need is for a less parochial stance; failing to have available the fiscal, manpower, and programmatic information needed for the construction of realistic budgets, formulas for state-local partnerships, and staffing requirements; adopting a doctrinaire and "locked-in" position regarding the resource requirements of corrections programs when more flexible approaches would open up better negotiating opportunities.

Generalist Administrators in Local Government

Metropolitan counties and large cities in which significant reorganization of correctional services is taking place frequently have strong "generalist" administrators who manage the day-to-day affairs of local government and are responsible to elected boards or councils. These individuals and their staffs play important roles in unification efforts. Typically they view organizational reform in the corrections area (and in fact the entire sphere of local criminal justice) as a part of a larger problem of simplifying the administration of local government and making it more cost-effective. They are interested in the normative beliefs of particular programs, but tend to avoid strong commitments in the interest of developing solutions that "make sense" in a larger context. This perspective generates tensions that tend to take the same form in different jurisdictions. For example, some local government administrators favor consolidation of public safety functions (to the point of merging corrections with police and fire protection agencies), while those directly in charge of constituent units tend to resist any moves that might restrict

their autonomy. In current efforts to consolidate local correctional services, however, generalist administrators often find common cause with the corrections professionals discussed in the preceding section.

The single most important function that generalist administrators can perform in reorganization aimed at developing more effective local corrections is to introduce the concepts and tools of modern public administration. Those directly involved in the management of correctional services often do not have a background in administration, having risen to their posts through the line operations they now oversee. County and city administrators often can supply skills in organizational design, budget analysis, manpower surveys, and policy study to supplement the programmatic knowledge of corrections professionals. Such approaches as management-by-objectives, program and performance budgeting, accountability through program evaluation, and planning and forecasting techniques are greatly needed in unification efforts. These methods and perspectives, which tend to be the special province of generalist administrators, can be extremely useful when appropriately employed.

Practical steps taken by generalist administrators in this study to facilitate the unification of correctional services included: placing a high priority on reducing fragmentation and duplication of programs; fostering a climate of fairness and objectivity in determining the reallocation of resources and status; listening to those with programmatic knowledge in defining the goals of a reconstituted service and supporting those goals in the face of potentially hostile outside interests such as the press and taxpayer organizations; reducing staff insecurity by introducing economies incrementally (e.g., by eliminating vacant positions rather than terminating existing personnel); serving as a catalyst and advocate in developing viable intergovernmental funding and work sharing arrangements (often acting as the major representative of local government interests in negotiations with state officials).

Actions that should be avoided by administrative generalists, according to information obtained in this study, included: exerting pressures for reorganization in a manner insensitive to accepted program standards (i.e., advocating changes of form over the requirements of substance); failing to obtain sufficient understanding and support for reorganization from county commissioners; allowing crises or highly visible corrections problems to subvert the unification effort rather than using such events to sanction its need; and granting excessive legitimacy and/or resources to one aspect of correctional activity at the expense of another (e.g., supporting jail costs financially while offering only rhetorical support of community treatment programs).

Elected Officials in Local Government

The most exciting and creative revisions in community corrections seem to have taken place in situations where elected officials and the private citizens close to them have taken a strong and knowledgeable interest in the initiation and implementation of change. Such individuals have been able to give political legitimacy to the aspirations of professional and administrative actors and to supply an essential linkage between them and the public. Many have developed a personal commitment to the concept of a broad and well-integrated community correctional system and have proved remarkably adroit in helping to work out new organizational designs at both local and regional levels. Standing some distance apart from the bureaucratic interests involved, they often have been able to avoid the "tunnel vision" of vested interests and the parochialism that often grows up around the different pieces of the local criminal justice service.

The most important function that elected officials and those serving on ancillary citizen boards can provide in unification efforts is that of interpreting the public interest to those in full-time government service and explaining the ideas behind reorganization in a form comprehensible to the public. That this rather obvious mediating role is essential (and all too often missing or inadequately performed) becomes clear through an examination of the misunderstandings that arise so often between corrections and the public. Sometimes professional jargon seems to be a part of the problem, while at other times communications appear to break down around apparent differences of general philosophy about crime, leading to stereotyped forms of attack and defense. Such unproductive interactions often can be avoided or turned toward constructive resolution of differences by skillful "political" mediators who have empathy for both inside (government) and outside (citizen) perspectives and the talent for discovering pragmatic solutions that both groups can endorse.

Practical steps taken by elected officials in this study to facilitate unification of correctional services included: engaging in extensive study of issues and recommendations in order to develop a clear understanding of the situation; making contact with others of similar interest at the state and national level to identify ideas and directions emerging in other locales and through commission and task force reports; acknowledging, in their official roles, the imperative need for changes in the status quo and for unification and upgrading of community corrections; dramatizing that issue and giving it priority over other concerns through contacts with the press and the electorate; and providing constant support for a unified service in the face of pressures from politically potent advocates of a fractionalized system.

Actions that should be avoided, according to our information, included: making philosophically polarizing public statements about punishment and treatment of offenders that encourage simplistic explanations of the problem; forming unilateral alignments with officials

responsible for one of the services to be consolidated and thus losing the power to sanction a comprehensive and integrated approach; assuming a provincial attitude toward reorganization that negates efforts to cooperate with the state or other local governments in developing the strongest possible program and making the best use of scarce resources; and allowing partisan political alliances to preempt decision-making about the optimal form of the reorganized service and the allocation of resources to its constituent parts.

Local Criminal Justice Officials Outside Corrections

While the inner circle of interests involved in the reorganization of community corrections can be variously defined, it almost certainly must include others directly involved in criminal justice activities. While highly balkanized and often operating at cross-purposes, the units of the justice system nevertheless are interdependent. Changes in the mode of operations in one segment quickly impact the others. Law enforcement agencies, the prosecutor, the judiciary, and criminal justice planners fall within this category. One might suppose that the common task of dealing with offenders might make these groups more receptive to unification efforts than those that are more peripheral to this function. However, our data suggest that, in many jurisdictions, the opposite may be true. Just as intimacy frequently lays a basis for conflict and divisiveness among individuals, it may also do so among organizational units. The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. Change, especially unification--which acts to blur bureaucratic boundaries and affects budgets, authority, and visibility--can be threatening indeed. The very interdependency that ties criminal justice agencies to each other also creates tensions in consolidation situations.

The way in which such differences can be worked out depends heavily upon the nature of the reorganization effort. If all criminal justice services are being reorganized into a public safety framework, there is likely to be great concern about autonomy on the part of the units and officials affected. Many contests concerning "turf" and resources can be expected. Officials with an independent line to the electorate, such as an elected judge or prosecutor, are unlikely to welcome a change that makes them equal partners with police and corrections units. Obviously, separation of powers enters into such decisions and solutions that seem correct by standards of administrative efficiency may not be viable when tested by the criterion of constitutional independence. At times the arguments surrounding such issues appear quite abstract. It is our impression that there is much room for coordination and integration of services (and of the fiscal and manpower planning related to them) without infringing upon the core values of the separation of powers doctrine. Participants need to be given good reasons, perhaps from some higher authority, to negotiate operational answers to such questions. However, there is a danger that this will not happen, given the considerable status and prestige and the independent power bases of those involved and that the dialogue will not get beyond the level of strategic rhetoric.

The problem of gaining coordination and acceptance of consolidation is quite different, and probably less formidable, if the focus of reorganization is on correctional services alone and if the expectation is that corrections will be linked with other criminal justice units rather than incorporated with them in a larger organizational framework. In such a situation, corrections may not have to compete directly for resources with other justice agencies (e.g., police) that can make their case in terms more immediate and apparently more urgent to the public. It also appears that if unification ties correctional units together without placing them within a larger public safety organization it may be easier to build reciprocal relationships between corrections and related health and welfare services. A delicate point to be considered in reorganization efforts is that the cementing of certain relationships through unification may weaken others. The advantages of placing corrections within the same organizational family as law enforcement must be weighed against the schism this may produce in alliances with public and private human service agencies. The informal sociometry of organizational life must be considered along with the formal aspects represented by the lines on organization charts. This is particularly true when the relationships among different parts of the local criminal justice system are being worked out.

Criminal justice planning units created by LEAA funding represent a unique element in the internal force field of justice agencies. The relatively neutral role of planning (as compared to provision of direct services) can facilitate integration, especially when outside funds are available to assist with preliminary studies and perhaps to finance pilot programs that bring together the various units in collaborative activities. Since beginning their work in the late 1960's, a major concept behind the LEAA planning units was that they would seek to redress the fragmentation of the justice system. Site visits for this project did reveal notable examples of such efforts (in one case a planning unit played the key role for a considerable period in integrating previously divided correctional services).

It was also apparent, however, that at other times and places the planning units were not influential in sanctioning consolidation. Some persons interviewed even suggested that their presence was counterproductive. The reasons for such outcomes are not entirely clear, but certain patterns did seem to appear in different locations. Sometimes the modus operandi of the planning unit tended to support and reward division rather than integration. Decision-making about federal funds that might be used to encourage unification resulted in "dividing the pie" among the different elements of the local justice system rather than bringing them together in collective endeavors. And the now well-known problem of massive costs and time requirements in the processing of planning grants was a chronic frustration to many officials in many jurisdictions. The fact that these problems are now widely acknowledged, and that much work is being done to simplify and reform the planning effort, offers hope that those with planning responsibilities can be more effective in facilitating consolidation in the future. This should be especially true for the regional model, since in many cases no other mechanism exists to span local government boundaries and bring the potential partners together in an effort to meet their collective needs.

Judges and prosecutors have played diverse roles in correctional consolidation efforts. Despite considerable criticism from some sources, the judiciary is perceived by the public as a source of knowledge and wisdom with respect to policy and organizational changes in the criminal justice system. In several sites visited during this study, judges assumed a leadership role in calling attention to the inadequacy of existing systems and to the human and financial consequences of failing to change them. They seemed especially effective in chairing or participating on planning committees and in bringing proposals for reform to the public and political decision-makers. While the majority of the judiciary probably do not seek to play such roles, some do so with great success. Their credibility as public advocates of reform seems to stem in part from their image of being "above" petty contests for power. At times they can act as the conscience of the community in demanding that needed actions be taken to deal with the problem of crime.

Some problems noted may have limited the capacity of the judiciary to perform such roles effectively. By training, and perhaps by temperament, judges tend to approach problems from a perspective that differs from those of managers and administrative analysts. The technology of administrative reorganization may be foreign to some members of the judiciary, for whom administration may not imply the development of policy and the organizational machinery to attain defined goals. Problems may arise if judges with such orientations become too deeply involved in the specifics of the design, financing, and structure of the new system. In some instances, we were informed, these problems have been exacerbated by judges who invest too heavily in the details of administrative implementation. The emergence of court administrators, who oversee supportive services for the judiciary (as hospital administrators do for physicians) seems a healthy antidote.

Prosecutors appear to be assuming new roles and expanding their influence in the area of community corrections. Some prosecutors have moved to develop diversion programs and even some treatment services as a part of, or an adjunct to, their offices. In this way they have become significant "actors" in the correctional system, at times contesting with probation agencies for the administration of such programs. A similar trend is apparent in situations in which a judge, with the assistance of his court administrator, moves to gain control of the presentence investigation function (and perhaps also the field supervision function) of probation. The interest and energy represented by such initiatives seems generally desirable, for disagreement over who should supply these services is better than disinterest on all sides. But conflict concerning the locus of services can be disruptive to reorganization efforts and such problems may become particularly severe if the question of who should do the task becomes a political issue at election time. Issues of cost-effectiveness and the public interest unfortunately may be lost in the heat of partisan debate.

Law enforcement and community corrections have had their differences in most jurisdictions, with the relationship fluctuating between an uneasy truce and episodes of overt conflict. Probation is equated with leniency in the minds of many police officials; and special rehabilitation programs such as community correctional centers, "outreach" work with delinquent gangs, and narcotic treatment projects frequently lead to public clashes between their correctional sponsors and law enforcement authorities. This is not, however, inevitably the case. In reviewing the initiation and development of some unified correctional systems, close cooperation between law enforcement and corrections was noted. This seems to occur most often when the two groups are gradually drawn into joint programs (for example, a work furlough project that combines jail and probation personnel or an alcohol treatment program in which police staff play nontraditional counseling roles). Collaboration appears most effective when negative stereotypes and attack and defense through the press are replaced with joint action, initially on a small scale. It helps if top administrators in both law enforcement and corrections publicly endorse the idea of cooperation. Certainly it is difficult to build a strong community-based corrections system when police authorities are highly critical of such activities.

An extremely important aspect of the relationship between community corrections and law enforcement is the administration of the jail and its ancillary programs, such as bail reform, diversion, and employment assistance for offenders. Typically under the administration of the county sheriff, the jail is at least potentially the hub of local correctional services. Problems arise when the sheriff is disinterested in correctional reform but reluctant to surrender control of jail operations. This can lead to an impasse that is extremely difficult to resolve, given the diffusion of political and administrative power in local government. Some sheriffs have shown active interest in correctional programs and have exercised leadership in developing more comprehensive and integrated systems. Others, believing that the jail presents never-ending management problems, as well as the risk of damaging publicity as a result of escapes or scandals, may be willing to relinquish the jail to correctional authorities (though often this is offset by the fact that sizeable budget and manpower elements are involved). There is no optimal answer to this dilemma and different jurisdictions will devise different solutions. The support of the sheriff and other members of the law enforcement community, however, often is a decisive factor in the success of an integrated local correctional system.

Taken as a group, local criminal justice officials outside of corrections--planners, judges, prosecutors, and police--are important to any effort to upgrade and consolidate local correctional services. While it may be possible to make progress in the absence of support from one or another, it is doubtful that much can be accomplished without leadership from some element of this network. Certainly the chances of developing a unified approach are unfavorable if strong restraining influence is exerted from one or more of these key bases. The attitudes of the public may determine the eventual outcome, but the process is circular since public opinion is influenced by these same officials. The action implications are clear: if any jurisdiction hopes to upgrade its system of community corrections, the support of local criminal justice officials is imperative.

The External Force Field

There is an almost endless list of groups and individuals involved in the development of community correctional services. The mix and relative importance of each will vary from one locale to another. The external field of forces includes, among others: state officials, legislators, human service agencies related to corrections, local citizen groups, and the media. Clearly, other interests sometimes exercise an important influence on correctional programs. The federal government, for example, through funding of planning and action projects is a critical "actor" in many situations. The focus of the present inquiry, however, is on the local situation and, to a lesser extent, those state-level activities that seek to facilitate local action.

State Officials

Improvements in community corrections, and particularly the unification of local or regional services, more often than not reflect a partnership between state and local levels. Undoubtedly, the need of state governments to economize, coupled with recent restrictions of the role of penal institutions and state corrections generally, has produced a willingness to encourage local authorities to assume greater responsibility for offender rehabilitation. But the growing consensus that rehabilitation and reintegration can best be accomplished at the local level also is involved in this movement.

State participation in this process has taken a variety of forms in different jurisdictions. In the county-administered and regional models outlined in previous chapters, state officials are called upon to perform facilitative and regulative roles. In the state-administered decentralized model, the role of state officials is one of developing and managing a dispersed community corrections system. The implementation skills required of state officials differ in these different situations.

All of the models call for sensitivity to local points of view and knowledge of the traditions, resources, and power arrangements that distinguish one locality from another. Perhaps the most difficult task for state officials, immersed as they are in the centralist milieu of their level of government, is to understand corrections as it operates at the community level. In part, this ability is a function of acquiring information. State officials gain in effectiveness by developing profiles of local governments and regional coalitions and updating that information periodically. In this way, they discover who must be dealt with on particular issues, what problems to expect, and what opportunities can be exploited. Without such information they appear to local actors as hopelessly uninformed outsiders--well-intentioned, perhaps, but unable to make appropriate connections between the resources they possess and the needs they attempt to fulfill.

Information, however, is only part of what is required for state officials to help implement unified local systems. What is done in the way of direct service and facilitation or regulation of local efforts may be less crucial than how it is done. The most effective state efforts observed in this study seemed to involve "art" as well as science. It is true that laws, policies, and standards had to be drafted to define and codify the division of labor between state and local levels. Many of these provisions were quite precise, dealing with funding formulas and stipulating conditions under which local compliance or initiative would be required to trigger state assistance or avoid state assumption of operating responsibility. But the process leading to such agreements depended heavily on involvement and participation, discussion and compromise, rather than punitive sanctions. Even when the state government was the primary administrative actor, there was a conspicuous need to draw local resource holders into offender-reintegration programs under conditions that made sense according to their particular objectives and constraints. This is no simple matter, since the power and career rewards of state officials revolve around the capitol rather than the localities in which services are delivered.

Examples of behaviors on the part of state officials that facilitated the development of comprehensive and unified local services included: drawing a broad spectrum of local actors into planning and monitoring of the state role; making use of state staff who had had an opportunity to develop relationships with local actors (e.g., jail inspection personnel) and who could interpret the local situation to headquarters decision-makers; allocating fiscal resources to the localities without "strings" or covert controls; defining general standards and goals that could be applied uniformly over time to guide local efforts and prevent distortion of purposes; providing research and program information and staff development opportunities to upgrade local efforts; and encouraging the development of citizen coalitions to play independent advocacy roles in future efforts to enhance community correctional programs.

Examples of ways in which state officials seem to impede the development of community-based correctional networks include: decentralizing activities through the state corrections hierarchy without creating linkages to local service systems; failing to take into consideration the local point of view (as revealed in hearings) in subsequent policy decisions; creating a feeling among local actors that state officials are "paternalistic" (i.e., that they really know best and listen to local views only because local participation is expected); promulgating standards that are unrealistically high (or fail to allow time for compliance to be achieved incrementally) and then neglecting to enforce them; and being overly responsive to highly vocal spokespersons who were strongly for or against particular correctional programs.

State Legislators

During the course of site visits a number of legislators interested in community-based corrections, as well as some county commissioners and supervisors, expressed views of reorganization and consolidation that differed significantly from those of officials directly involved in the correctional services. The ideas of state legislators were often quite refreshing since they usually were supportive of the concept of community treatment without being rigid in their thinking about ways it might be operationalized. Work in the pluralistic arena of legislative policy-making may bring with it a healthy skepticism and an ability to ask the right questions. In any case, legislators do have an essential role to play in the reconstitution of corrections and its movement to the local level.

Forging a new partnership between state and local governments for the delivery of correctional services usually requires legislation. The jurisdictions that have made the most impressive progress in this area have written major new laws. In doing so, they have thought through the complex issues of subsidies and block grants; standard-setting and the regulatory process required to implement standards; the nature of state organization required to mesh with an expanded local correctional service; the manpower development and training programs needed to achieve offender reintegration; the role of private agencies and citizen interest groups; and the interfacing of state-sanctioned correctional services with other state programs directed to the same or overlapping populations (e.g., employment, mental health and social welfare). Thinking about such issues seems to evolve as early and rather gross approaches are explicated and refined. Points neglected or only partially handled by pioneering jurisdictions have now surfaced so that more finely tuned solutions can be devised. Legislators have been deeply involved in this process, usually working closely with corrections professionals and helping to link them to the public.

Examples of tasks that legislators seem uniquely able to perform, according to our information, include: serving as catalysts for communication between state and local levels by virtue of their double role of statewide policy-makers and regional representatives; using legislative staff to develop empirical information on the nature and extent of the crime problem and the approaches taken in other jurisdictions to develop more effective correctional services; challenging correctional professionals to work and think in cross-governmental and cross-functional ways; exhibiting strong advocacy skills at crucial points in the passage of laws to counteract punitive attitudes among legislative peers and to discourage simplistic judgments of the value of community-based programs.

The study did not result in a dependable set of ideas about behaviors on the part of legislators that might prove dysfunctional in the development of community-based correctional organizations. However, a few clues were obtained from conversations with professionals at the

local level. Some legislators may have difficulty in reconciling the tension between their district role and their statewide role. In such situations they may become advocates for special interest groups antithetical to the concept of a diversified local correctional service. A few legislators apparently are so dogmatic in their personal beliefs about the nature of crime and its correction that they cannot be objective about operational improvements in correctional organization and management at the state or the local level. Highly stereotyped philosophies about crime, whether "conservative" or "liberal," may impede creative and incremental reform. It is difficult for anyone, legislator or citizen, to be objective about crime or its control because the subject evokes such emotional reactions. This very human tendency, however, is especially counterproductive when evinced by one charged with formulating public policy through the legislative process.

Allied Human Service Agency Representatives

The cornerstone of community-based corrections is the concept of offender reintegration. Central to that concept is the realization that correctional services alone are incapable of reversing criminal lifestyles. Community corrections, and particularly probation, has long operated around a "therapy" model. Officers carried caseloads, saw clients and considered their primary function to be intervention to alter the behavior and personality of the offender. Reintegration does not demand a relinquishment of that function, but it redefines it as a part of a process that works to change not only the offender but the social context in which he lives. The premise is that the offender has a realistic opportunity to change only if his life circumstances (job satisfaction, family relationships, friendship patterns, and so on) also change in positive ways. Community corrections, then, must seek to influence these diverse socializing networks if it is to attain its goals.

This process, of course, requires not only access to peripheral resource systems but commitment on the part of corrections personnel to a nontraditional conception of their role. Much progress has been made along these lines since the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice advanced this objective almost fifteen years ago. Probation officers and those in related community programs have learned advocacy and brokering skills. New concepts and styles of work have emerged--for example, the team supervision which replaces the caseload of the individual probation or parole officer with a "community resource management team." Nevertheless, in the context of building models for the reorganization of local corrections, it must be asked how well such ancillary services have responded to these efforts. Have employment placement agencies (and employers themselves) been sympathetic to the needs of ex-offenders for employment and for upward mobility in their jobs? Have recreation opportunities, social welfare services, family assistance programs, and innumerable other

community resources become more available to the offender population? And how might these networks become more responsive as a part of the implementation of a comprehensive, consolidated local correctional service? Who are the principal actors who should be advised regarding needed contributions in this area and what is the nature of their contributions?

The offender who is seeking to come to terms with the requirements of noncriminal life in the community faces a formidable array of "gatekeepers" or individuals who control access to the goods and services he needs to construct a new social identity. Some of these functionaries control routes toward a major resource (e.g., membership in a union, a driver's license or a work permit); others stand at the entrance of the resource system itself--the job, the educational institution, the hospital, or the family service agency. Dealing with persons in decision-making roles is difficult enough for ordinary citizens who have the requisite credentials, social skills, appearance, connections, and understanding of how the system works. For the typical offender, struggling to divest himself of multiple negative labels (offender, minority group member, economically disadvantaged, "different" in manner and appearance), the task is often impossible. Effective reversal of self-fulfilling patterns of failure seems most likely when those in decision-making roles have special reasons to change the decision criteria, to offer special opportunities, and to waive the usual requirements.

The study revealed interesting examples of such behavior. Employers (and organizations of employers such as the Junior Chamber of Commerce) sometimes participated in innovative employment programs for ex-offenders. Social agencies simplified access arrangements for the same group. Vocational training programs designated openings especially for ex-offenders. The list of creative linkages was quite long and diverse, yet it would be naive to believe that these special efforts are more than exceptions to the prevailing situation. For every access permitted, there are thousands of examples of access denied. Probably this is the case even with social welfare and mental health agencies, which might be expected to be more responsive than other community systems to the needs of offenders. The criminal (or one who has once been so defined by the legal process) is unattractive even to resource systems responsible for dealing with deviance and social pathology. Moreover, the present climate, which demands economies in government, has affected all human service programs and decision-makers are finding it difficult to provide their legally mandated services, much less open the gates to other difficult cases.

The penetration and co-optation of diverse resource systems outside community corrections may represent the greatest challenge of all for local correctional systems. If so, top priority should be assigned to this area. Limited funds might be better allocated to flexible service-purchase contracts than to expansion of existing correctional organizations. The concept of a broad and integrated community correctional system is consistent with the need for linkages to other systems. Current arrangements, through which local correctional programs are dispersed in

bits and pieces throughout the community and across several levels of government, seems to represent a major impediment to offender reintegration.

Community Interest Groups

The dominant theme of this report, that of designing organizational machinery for reintegrating offenders into the diverse tributaries of community life, presents a contradiction for those responsible for implementation. How can the notion of changing human behavior through the mobilization of community resources be operationalized through bureaucratic measures guided by concepts of unity and efficiency? The answer necessarily implies encouragement of diversity in the programs developed. While the overall goal may be unity in administration, flexibility and variety in the services provided must also be emphasized.

The problem, however, is that the dynamics of organizational life tend to take over. Means become ends with frightening speed, and ends (such as discretion, flexibility, and diversity of programs for different groups of offenders) become lost in the "group-think" of organizational norms. Berger and Neuhaus have addressed this problem in their study of the role of mediating structures in public policy.¹ Discussing the use of the family, church, neighborhood, and voluntary associations in the implementation of public goals, these authors stress the need to discover alternative mechanisms for providing public services in our complex urbanized society. The rationalism that undergirds modern planning movements, as well as the efficiency-oriented reorganizations that are ubiquitous in government, may prove to be a part of the problem rather than the solution. This type of rationalism tends to be instrumental rather than substantive, emphasizing means rather than ends and often subverting the latter in the interests of the former.² Berger and Neuhaus describe this problem well in its relationship to the implementation of public policy:

"As difficult as it may be for some to accept, all rational interests do not converge--or at least there is no universal agreement on what interests are rational. This means that public policy must come to terms with perduring contradictions.... The possibility to be explored is how a common purpose can be achieved through the enhancement of myriad particular interests."³

The actors best able to represent this point of view in the force field of community-based corrections are the highly varied interest groups that seek to facilitate the reintegration of offenders. A complete list of such groups would be difficult to compile. They come from the business community and from organized labor interests. They represent those interested in good government from a neutral

citizen perspective (as, for example, the League of Women Voters). They include neighborhood and minority group alliances, as well as organizations of ex-offenders. An important sector of this diversified category consists of those who have volunteered to serve community correctional agencies, such as non-paid probation counselors. Groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous, which have a primary focus outside of but related to offender rehabilitation, sometimes play an important part. Church groups occasionally are involved, but most of the interests that came to our attention were non-sectarian. Some of these groups appear to be traditional in philosophy and methods, while others are more radical--that is, highly critical of "establishment" programs for offenders.

This wide range of community interests groups can only be encouraged to follow the lead of their own chapters and associations which have extended their services to ex-offenders. Many barriers have been broken in recent years as restrictions on ex-offenders are removed and their reformation is defined as a legitimate and important goal. Such groups have learned some hard lessons in the process--lessons that need not be repeated by their counterparts elsewhere. Not all ex-offenders are capable of participating in voluntary association activities, since they sometimes manipulate and exploit those who seek to help them. But such negative experiences can lead to more effective and realistic programs. In fact, the most productive privately operated programs seem to be those that set high standards for participants and set clear limits on the eligibility of clients to receive services.

Interestingly, this study observed more instances of apparent success in programs for offenders on the part of community groups than in the relationship of those groups to the community corrections bureaucracy. Apparently, much remains to be learned about how a unified corrections service can enable community interest groups to become an effective part of a localized corrections system. Only rarely did we observe a broad strategy to enfranchise such groups and help them to collectively affect not only the lives of offenders but public policies concerning criminal justice operations. Needed are administrative techniques that encourage service-purchase contracts and effective monitoring of resulting activities. Also needed are open communications among professionals in the corrections agency and lay persons in volunteer associations and a modification of traditional values that place top priority on direct service by professional staff and denigrate the work of indigenous community groups. The drastic economies now facing local and state governments should result in new opportunities for private associations to enter the corrections arena. Those in leadership roles within such groups should be sensitive to this trend and move assertively to take advantage of it.

The News Media

The ultimate success or failure of community-based corrections will be determined by its credibility with the public. This, in turn, will be strongly influenced by the manner in which correctional activities are reported and interpreted by the news media. Our study involved few direct contacts with newspaper journalists or reporters from television or radio. Nevertheless, their presence was conspicuous. Most re-organization initiatives were formulated with the public (and, therefore, the press) firmly in mind and implementation strategies consistently showed sensitivity to the potential reactions of the media. Both questions of substance (e.g., whether a particular neighborhood would tolerate a halfway house for ex-offenders) and the tactics used in promoting change (e.g., whether the timing of an announcement was synchronized with the deadlines of the news source involved) typically were answered only after considering how the subject would be reported by journalists and the likely reactions of the public.

We cannot here offer prescriptions concerning the manner in which the news media should handle events connected with community corrections. The American press values its independence and guards it jealously. Journalists might agree, however, that reporting on crime and the criminal justice system ranges from poor to excellent even by their own criteria, and perhaps also that events connected with the crime problem typically have not brought forth examples of outstanding journalism. Sensational crimes tend to dominate the headlines, while long-term efforts to reduce crime seldom receive sustained and balanced attention. Failures of the corrections system (such as a riot in the jail or the crime of a parolee) are judged more newsworthy than complex efforts to "rehabilitate" the system that produces those outcomes. This pattern is unlikely to change drastically and certainly will not do so as a result of this publication.

There are, however, ways in which the news media can assist in the development of better corrections programs and more effective organizations to deliver them. Certainly the media can damage those efforts without achieving any legitimate journalistic goal. The media are oriented to the "news peg" on which a story can be hung or to the unusual human circumstances that attract interest. Sometimes such news is reported in a way that conveys the larger context of reform and re-organization; and sometimes it is not. It is a responsibility of the media to stay in touch with that context, to be knowledgeable about it, and to avoid coverage that is superficial or that distorts the underlying facts. It is the responsibility of those who furnish information and opinions to representatives of the news media to bring out the context and to help the public to grasp not only the immediate event but its larger significance. Both responsibilities--that of the journalist and that of the news source--are difficult to meet, given the pressures of time and the sometimes adversarial nature of the relationship. But it can be done, and we did come across impressive examples of incisive coverage that still was well-grounded in the facts of the situation.

Toward the end of the study, we received a telephone call from a journalist working for the major newspaper of a metropolitan area visited for this study several months earlier. The reporter's major interest centered on a clash between two political leaders, both of whom were running for re-election. They were said to be in disagreement on some key issues having to do with the consolidation of criminal justice services. The "news peg," however, was the disagreement between the two men, somewhat spiced by charge and counter-charge concerning responsibility for conditions in the local jail. The journalist was tenacious in probing to see if the information we had acquired was relevant to these issues. As the conversation proceeded, however, it became clear that she knew a great deal about the unification of services, the history behind that process, the personalities involved, and their "track records." No doubt we learned as much as the reporter, but more important, we concluded that she was prepared to write a story that would be informative as well as interesting. That is a goal about which almost everyone involved could agree and which all could participate in seeking to achieve.

The Research Community

The activities dealt with in this document are much too complex and amorphous to permit exact specification of a research agenda. However, it is patently clear that we need to know much more than we do about the phenomenon of organizational change in community corrections. Criminologists have been interested in the nature of correctional programs, but generally have ignored the bureaucratic machinery established to carry them out. Some research has been done on penal institutions as social and organizational systems, but the administration of community-based services has rarely been examined, despite the fact that far more offenders are supervised in the community.

In considering alternative administrative and organizational forms, the fundamental question must be: Which model is most cost-effective in reducing crime and delinquency? Unfortunately, at the present time research to answer this question is probably not feasible. The dynamics of organization and reorganization do not lend themselves to controlled experiments, and an almost infinite number of confounding variables (mostly unmeasurable) always intrude. It seems much wiser to design research around more manageable questions that arise in the planning and implementation of reorganization efforts. The number of such questions is extremely large, but some examples can be offered here to suggest their relative importance.

The question of how to finance local correctional programs is of great significance because the viability of organizational reform depends so heavily upon obtaining adequate financing. Funding patterns are intricate because of the intergovernmental nature of community corrections and because the present situation is one of diminished

revenues and shifting resource allocations. Research needs to examine the relative advantages of state versus local funding, the strengths and weaknesses of block grants, various different formulas for administering subsidies, and the delicate process of tying financial aid to performance standards.

An equally intriguing area for study is the process through which a mandate for comprehensive and coordinated community-based corrections is obtained. This ideal typically is frustrated by divisiveness, conflict, and vested interests, yet some jurisdictions, or even combinations of jurisdictions, have managed to forge a broad coalition of interests and service units. What sanctions help to bring this about? What kind of leadership behavior is apt to support or to work against that end? How may organizations with competing values (for example, probation and law enforcement) identify sufficient common ground to work together productively? The present report should provide some clues or even hypotheses relative to such questions, but much more intensive investigations obviously will be needed.

A final example of needed research is the study of truly innovative approaches to the organization of local corrections. There are fascinating examples of systems that have put aside traditional and defeating modes of organization in favor of alternatives based on qualitatively different conceptual premises. Connecticut abandons traditional parole in favor of a network of autonomous services. Minnesota puts into practice the concept of regional alliances in a number of differing ways. Multnomah County, Oregon, attempts organizational integration of all criminal justice services. Such departures from conventional practice receive a great deal of attention, at least initially, and even a modicum of objective appraisal from outsiders. But they are almost always placed in a position of propagandizing their accomplishments for instant imitation by others, while the serious, perplexing research questions remain inchoate. Needed is more sustained, in-depth examination of these and other organizational alternatives, based on the assumption that significant social inventions always contain latent forces, and ultimately produce unanticipated consequences.

Conclusion

The situation within which reorganization of community corrections is taking place is moving and changing very rapidly. Taxpayer anger at a government perceived as gargantuan and wasteful sparked property tax reductions in California and appears to be driving similar but much wider movements across the country. Will the effort to upgrade and reorganize community corrections be a beneficiary or a victim of such events? The question cannot yet be answered with any certainty. Crime rates continue at a high level and public concern about that problem has not abated. Striking statistics appeared in the LEAA Newsletter of June/July 1978,

which summarized the results of the first comprehensive survey of state and local probation and parole services across the United States. This study, conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, revealed that more than a million adults and almost 400,000 children were on probation or parole in the fall of 1976. When the clients of diversion programs are added, and it is realized that the families of offenders also are a part of the workload, the dimensions of the task become clear. The mandate for improving community corrections may or may not be widely accepted, but the problem of developing cost-effective organizations and programs will exist in either case.

It must be understood that the consolidation and reorganization of local correctional services is only a part of a larger problem. Over 70 percent of Americans today live in metropolitan settings. There are many problems to be solved in such areas--transportation, health, education, water and power, waste management, and so on through a long and familiar list. Dealing with crime and delinquency is only a part of this task. It must be fitted into the larger mosaic of urgent priorities in the urban setting and compete for the resources needed to achieve durable solutions. The machinery of government is ill-designed to address regional problems, which spill across governmental boundaries, ignoring the "neat" but artificial divisions of labor among federal, state, and local units, and a miscellany of special districts. Yet we have been generally reluctant to establish regional entities.

There are exceptions. Citizens in the Portland area recently voted to establish a popularly elected regional government, the first of its kind for a multi-county metropolitan area. Since there are only a few governmental entities embracing metropolitan areas with the authority both to plan and to administer governmental programs, the Oregon experiment will be watched with interest as it begins its operations in January 1979. Multnomah County, one of the sites visited for this study, had already launched an extensive consolidation of local criminal justice services; thus, it will be especially interesting to see how community corrections fares under the new regional arrangements. Those concerned with the upgrading of community corrections would do well to stay in touch with such broader consolidation efforts and, where possible, become a forceful and integral part of them.

Given the complex history and current organization of local corrections in America, it would be foolhardy to predict what lies ahead. Contemporary corrections has exorcised the inhumanities of earlier approaches through a reformist spirit, but solutions to today's problems cannot be discovered in indignation about the past or "true-believing" about the future. There are numerous reasons to put more resources into community-based programs, reasons that appeal both to what we understand about the restoration of offenders and to the economic sensibilities that must guide public policy under conditions of limited resources. But the case against community treatment, or more accurately against the excessive or inappropriate use of that approach, is a powerful latent factor.

Similarly, while there are cogent reasons to move toward comprehensive, unified organizational designs for community corrections, a strong case can be made against integration of services, for creative solutions often emerge through the autonomy of different units and the checks and balances of such a system serve many useful functions.

We are at a time in the history of correctional services when reform must be understood as a dialectical process. Thesis and antithesis will be expressed around key themes, with genuine progress made largely at times of rare synthesis. The analysis presented in this report rests on the premise that community-based corrections and consolidated organizations to deliver community programs represent an intersection of ideas whose time has come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, To Empower People: the Role of Mediating Structures in Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977).
2. Alberto G. Ramos, "Misplacement of Concepts and Administrative Theory," Public Administration Review, 38(6): 550-555, 1978.
3. Supra note 1, p. 43.
4. See, for example, Daniel L. Skoler, Organizing the Non-System (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 281.

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