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ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER

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## ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER

### I INTRODUCTION

#### A. GOALS OF THE STUDY

The goal of this study was to explore and illuminate patterns of response of various public organizations in Indiana to the threat or realization of civil disorder with respect to organizational planning, training and personnel procedures, operational decision-making, and inter-organizational behavior. Research upon change in these complex dimensions is virtually nonexistent.<sup>1</sup>

A related goal of this study was to contribute to the identification of some systematic connections between certain expectations or experiences with civil disorder and organizational or interorganizational change processes. This would not only suggest certain antecedents of change but also highlight sources of organizational maladaptation to civil disorder.

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<sup>1</sup>The only large social research effort which has been established to date to inquire into civil disorder behavior is that conducted by the Disaster Research Center at The Ohio State University. That project, "Organizational Responses to Major Community Crises," is under the leadership of Dr. Enrico L. Quarantelli and is supported during the period June 1968 through May 1973 with a \$466,364 grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. The Disaster Research Center has produced a number of important monographs, working papers, and scholarly articles on this and related subjects.

## B. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

This study was conducted during the summer months of 1969. It grew out of a graduate research seminar offered by the Department of Political Science which was conducted in the spring of 1969 by the author of this report. This seminar, entitled "Comparative Analysis of Public Organizations," involved four graduate students from the Department of Political Science and one from the Department of Psychology. The substantive focus of the seminar was on "The Politics of Law and Order in Indiana."

Toward the end of the Spring Semester three of the Political Science graduate students expressed an interest in continuing our research into the responses of public organizations to civil disorder through the summer. Thanks to the interest and cooperation of Mr. Henry S. Ruth, Jr., Director of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, and Mr. Adrian Jones, a collective violence researcher in the National Institute, we were able to do so with a grant for summer research.

The author wishes to give special acknowledgement to the important contributions of the three Political Science graduate students who served as research assistants for the duration of this study: Miss Joyce Smith, Mr. Charles Kuhlman, and Mr. Dennis Smith. The bulk of the field research was conducted by them and they had a central role in the design and analysis of the study. Whatever success we may have achieved in this exploration is due in large part to their efforts. The final report, with its limitations, is the responsibility of the principal investigator.

## C. METHODOLOGY

### 1. RESEARCH DESIGN

#### a. Exploration

This study is interested in enlarging our understanding of organizational responses to civil disorder. It was not our purpose to evaluate the adequacy of civil disorder responses by various public organizations in Indiana, for that reason, this report will deal with the generalized roles of various actors in the state rather than identifying named personalities or specific cities. The only exception to this policy of nonattribution is the historical account of civil disorder experiences in four Indiana cities which is found in Part II of this report.

Exploratory studies are usually contrasted with hypothesis-testing studies. Exploration is concerned with the development of insights and the generation of new ideas about a phenomenon. Exploration involves the researcher in a quest for something that is difficult to define and uncertain as to what kinds of data are to be selected or rejected. Hypothesis-testing, on the other hand, is concerned with the confirmation or rejection of specific hypotheses. Data are collected in a purposeful and essentially systematic effort to test the hypotheses which are advanced.

It should be noted that the distinctions between exploratory studies and hypothesis-testing studies are not nearly as clear as some would prefer to believe. Rather, we are concerned with a thrust in one of these two directions of inquiry. No scholar initiates exploratory field research without some sense of analytical priorities, without some sense of what are the

more important aspects of the behavior he wishes to understand. The analytical priorities which gave direction to our exploration were rooted in the goals of this study and are reflected in the conceptual scheme which developed during the graduate seminar.

b. Conceptual Scheme

Civil disorder has many meanings. The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) classified disorders into three categories: major disorders, serious disorders, and minor disorders.<sup>2</sup> These categories are based on the degree and duration of violence, the number of active participants, and the level of law enforcement response. The category of "minor disorders" is defined by the Kerner Commission in the following language:

These would not have been classified as "riots" or received wide press attention without national conditioning to a "riot" climate. They were characterized generally by: (1) a few fires and broken windows; (2) violence lasting generally less than one day; (3) participation by only small numbers of people; and (4) use, in most cases, only of local police or police from a neighboring community.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968), p. 113.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

The experience in Indiana cities with actual civil disturbances would fit approximately into this category of minor disorders. The fit is not perfect. Some 3,000 National Guardsmen were placed on active alert for three days outside of Gary in anticipation of violence during the mayoral election that was won by Richard Hatcher. Other disorder experiences in Indiana resemble certain characteristics of "serious" disorders.

The important point is that this research was interested in exploring the responses of public organizations to expected as well as actual disorders. Many officials expect major disorders. For this reason, our definition of civil disorder encompasses a range of characteristics which run from those associated with a minor disorder to those which the Kerner Commission has used to characterize a major disorder: many fires, intensive looting, reports of sniping, violence lasting more than two days, sizable crowds, and the use of National Guard or Federal forces as well as other control forces.<sup>4</sup>

The organizational responses that were of interest in this research were the reinforcement or change in the goals, leadership strategies, structure, and tasks of those public organizations that tend to act in the event of a civil disorder. We were especially concerned with organizational responses-- at local and state levels--which bear on planning, personnel procedures and training programs, operational decision-making in the field, and which effect the interorganizational relationships among these organizations.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

c. Research Plan

This research was conducted during the period 30 June 1969 through 30 September 1969. During that period the three research assistants worked full-time on the project; the principal investigator spent one-third of his time on this research. Although the final analysis and report were not completed until April 1970, there was virtually no field work conducted after 30 September 1969. Little new data were gathered after September. Therefore, the research report does not deal with events in Indiana that may have occurred subsequent to September 1969.

The decisions concerning our sample choices were based on several factors. First, the decision to look at several cities was considered appropriate because the primary locus of response to civil disorder is at the local level. Second, the four Indiana cities that were selected -- Evansville, Gary, Indianapolis, and South Bend -- were chosen because each had experienced one or more civil disorders in the past half decade and each reflected a range of socio-economic, structural, and population characteristics which are shared by a large number of communities across the country. Third, the decision to explore the state level of responses was made because of the increasing role of state agencies in civil disorders and because of our interest in illuminating patterns of local-state interaction during a disorder. Finally, we decided to look at events within the State of Indiana due to their physical proximity to Indiana University at Bloomington and due to the improved access potential that we assumed we would enjoy by operating in our home state.

Data were drawn from three sources: documentary materials from public organizations in Indiana and from the Federal Government, newspaper articles, and field interviews.

Events in the state and the selected cities were monitored in the following newspapers on a regular basis during the period of field research: The Evansville Press, The Gary Post-Tribune, The Indianapolis Star, The South Bend Tribune, and The Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal.

Over 110 public officials and other persons -- from the Federal and state government and the four cities -- were interviewed during the course of the field work by the project staff. The positions of these people are identified in Appendix A of this report. They were selected on the basis of their presumed relevance to our research goals in terms of their formal position or upon the recommendation of another interviewee who identified them as an important resource person for our project.

The data were evaluated by means of ongoing consultation among the project staff. The research assistants drafted preliminary findings for each city and the state level as a means for facilitating tentative closure of their work at the end of the field portion of the study when they left the project staff in September 1969. The Washington, D.C. interviews were conducted by the principal investigator in September and November 1969. These preliminary findings, together with the documentary materials and newspaper reports, were integrated into the final analysis by the principal investigator.

## 2. FIELD WORK

The field interviews were conducted with the use of a semi-structured interview schedule (See Appendix B). This interview schedule was pretested in interviews in the Bloomington area and in South Bend.

At the outset of the field work, we expected to have problems in gaining access to certain officials and documentary materials due to the controversial nature of our research goals. Our expectations were correct.

Upon the arrival of the research assistants for the first time in one city, they were advised by the chief of police that the stance of his department was one of "maximum security." As the chief put it: "Does Macy's tell Gimble's?" He said that until they obtained complete clearance every aspect of the police department operation except the formal table of organization would be "classified for security reasons." By clearance, he meant that they must get the study approved by the mayor and that the chief would check their references by calling persons interviewed elsewhere in the state. During this encounter with the chief, the research assistants were quizzed to see if they knew the names of various law enforcement officials in the state. He told them that for all he knew they were "members of S.D.S.!"

The mayor of one city refused to let the project staff conduct any interviews in his city until the summer was over. The reason given was that he was concerned that the activities of the staff -- asking questions of public officials and people in the community -- might itself precipitate a civil disorder. The mayor -- true to his word -- did extend his full cooperation to the principal investigator in October 1969 but by that time the research assistants had left the project for other academic duties so it was impossible to gather more data. This city was kept in the study because the

staff judged that there were sufficient useful data collected in the initial interviews, from sources outside of the city, and from newspaper articles.

One of the first officials contacted in the Indiana State Police (ISP) reflected a comparable degree of security consciousness. This officer was relectant to let the staff examine ISP training manuals concerned with disorder training. He also denied flatly that the ISP had a separate intelligence division, pointing out that each trooper has some intelligence training but that the ISP is too small an organization to justify a separate intelligence unit. Several weeks later we learned of a newspaper article, published months before, in which the ISP Intelligence Division was described.

The reaction of this State Police officer was not characteristic of the ISP leadership or that of the Indiana National Guard. The Superintendent of the Indiana State Police offered to let us tape our interview with him (he initiated this offer). He generally gave the project staff carte blanche access to his organization. The same was true of the Adjutant General of Indiana and other ranking National Guard officers.

With the exception of one city, local government officials made a genuine attempt to cooperate with the study, especially after their initial anxiety about the purposes of our research wore off (for some, of course, it never did).

Other than some access problems, there were two ubiquitous difficulties we confronted during the field research: the reluctance of interviewees to discuss the problems in their own organizations and their tendency to talk about the way their programs should operate when we raised questions about the way they actually operate. These impediments lowered the payoffs of a number of interviews until we began to acquire a more sophisticated sense of their operational situation.

## II CIVIL DISORDER EXPERIENCES IN INDIANA

In the past half decade the United States has experienced a rash of violent civil disorders across the land which have stressed the social and institutional fabric of the country. These disorders have levied a heavy cost on human life and property. Using the state militia as one indicator of the intensity and scope of this national problem, it is to be noted that since 1965 there have been some 200 disturbances which have been responded to by public authorities with the callup of a quarter-million National Guardsmen for temporary duty. In the two-week period between 5-20 April 1968 alone, following the murder of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., over 120,000 National Guardsmen in 25 states were ordered to duty in response to civil disorder incidents or potential incidents.

The State of Indiana has been relatively fortunate during this period of time. It did not suffer the agonies visited upon Detroit, Newark, Chicago and other cities in its sister states. But it had its share. The following pages provide a brief sketch of the recent experiences with civil disorder of four Indiana cities -- Evansville, Gary, Indianapolis, and South Bend -- and thereby provide a setting for the analysis in the following two sections of this study of the responses of public organizations to civil disorder.

## A. EVANSVILLE

Evansville has a relatively small black population; a special U.S. census in 1966 estimated 9,889 blacks or 6.9% of the city's population. Almost half of Evansville's black population is under the age of 21. There have been two disturbances involving the black community in recent years, one in August, 1968, and the other in July, 1969. In neither instance was recourse made to state level police or military services.

The 1968 disturbance began with an incident involving a car loaded with white passengers which led to the stoning of several police cars. The disturbance area is near downtown Evansville in the vicinity of Lincoln and Governor streets. The Police Department described the affair as "hooliganism." On the second night, light scuffles and minor stoning became more serious after a black girl was struck with a bullet fired by an unknown assailant. A market was broken into and later in the night a lumberyard was burned; total damage was later estimated at about \$275,000. The police response was to barricade the area but no mass arrests were made. Mayor Frank McDonald returned from the Democratic National Convention in Chicago but was hospitalized by a serious ailment. The Chairman of the City Council, Mr. Brooks, directed operations in his stead. Black leaders including the staff of the city's Human Relations Commission took to the streets and succeeded in cooling tempers. By the third day, a combination of relatively light police action, curfews, and meetings between city officials and black leaders brought the disorders to an end.

The disturbance in 1969 began with the July 10 shooting of a 14 year old black youth on the front porch of his home. It was widely supposed, on the basis of information supplied by a friend sitting with him, that the youth was killed by a white passerby in an automobile. A week later, police discovered

that the friend was responsible for what was an accidental shooting. Fire-bombing and minor looting continued for several days. The principal instrument of the city administration, this time actively directed by Mayor McDonald, was the curfew, under the terms of which over a hundred persons were arrested. In this disturbance, black leaders refused the request of the Mayor to engage in street conciliation, saying that past pledges made by them on behalf of the city government had not been redeemed and that in facing truly hostile crowds they would simply lose their credibility. A rumor control center which had operated effectively during the 1968 disorder was never put into action in 1969 due to lack of preparedness. By Sunday night the disorder had ended.

#### B. GARY

Gary is an ethnically and racially mixed city. The black population is rising rapidly. In 1957, Philips Cutright estimated on the basis of a sample survey that blacks comprised 33.1% of the population. By 1973, the Kerner Commission projected a 50% black population. This rapid demographic change has been accompanied by tension, but relatively little racial violence.

In 1967, Richard Hatcher, opposing the regular Democratic organization represented by John G. Krupa, the Lake County Democratic Chairman, defeated the incumbent Mayor, Joseph Radigan in the May primary. Rumors of potential disorder began to circulate shortly thereafter. Krupa is willing to acknowledge that he himself expressed fears of Hatcher and Hatcher's followers. The Gary election was bound to be one of national importance, since it was one of the first in recent years where a Negro was likely to finish with a good electoral showing.

Governor Branigan ordered the Indiana State Police to conduct an undercover intelligence exploration of the potential for and the sources of violence. This was a new function for the State Police. A unit of ten men infiltrated into Gary. The Gary Police Department was aware of the ISP operation, but was not fully privy to the information they gathered. This effort of the ISP led to the formation of a permanent intelligence unit which persists today. Governor Branigan, on the basis of information available to him, sent David Allen, one of his administrative assistants, along with the leadership of the Indiana State Police and Indiana National Guard to Gary during the election to coordinate action should a disorder arise.

Over 3,000 National Guardsmen were organized as a task force under the command of the commanding officer of the 2nd Brigade, 38th Infantry Division, and moved into seven billeting areas near Gary. Other Army and Air National Guard units were called to their armories or duty stations to stand alert pending an outbreak of disorder in Gary. In the end, disorder did not occur. Aside from the civility of the citizens of Gary, this perhaps is attributable to the actions of the FBI, U.S. Marshalls--acting first under Justice Department orders and then court orders--who prevented or, at least discouraged, large-scale vote fraud on either side.

The only recent instance prior to the summer of 1969 which could reasonably be classified as a riot occurred in July of 1968. The disturbance began on July 29 when two police officers attempted the arrest of a gang member over an issue which involved several gangs. It should be noted that in Gary, as on the south side of Chicago, gangs are a prominent phenomenon. They have clear identities and organization, and appear to persist through time. At least one

of the Gary gangs, the Sin City Disciples, has received Office of Economic Opportunity funds to operate semi-commercial recreational facilities. When the arrest was made by two officers of the Gary Police Department, gang members came to the assistance of the arrested man. Members of other gangs became involved and soon windows were being smashed on the south end of Broadway Street.

The disorder continued through Saturday night and early Sunday morning. Fighting and property destruction continued Sunday afternoon. The Mayor, Richard Hatcher, and the Chief of Police, Mr. Hilton, called upon the Governor for assistance in controlling the outbreak. The Governor promised the assistance of the State Police riot control units by nightfall Sunday and the use of the National Guard on the following morning. The Mayor and the Chief felt that the time lags indicated by the Governor's commitment would lead to further loss of control.

Therefore, they engaged in an unorthodox procedure--they called for the assistance of Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff Joseph Woods. Within forty-five minutes, Sheriff Woods had arrived with 50 deputies. By that time, late Sunday afternoon, the Gary Police Department had cleared the streets, but the Sheriff's men were useful because, in Chief Hilton's words, their presence enabled the city to "negotiate from a position of strength." By Sunday night the total force mobilized by the city amounted to 50 Cook County Sheriff's officers, 30 Lake County Sheriff's officers, 80 Indiana State Police officers and 170 Gary Police Department officers.

At 9 pm the Mayor attempted to forestall further outbreaks by declaring a curfew and ban on the sale of gasoline and weapons. He later discovered that he had no authority to impose a curfew, but on the basis of his order some 70 persons were arrested. The disturbance came to an end Sunday night with no loss of life and negligible injuries. There was some property damage, but it was not widespread.

### C. INDIANAPOLIS

The City of Indianapolis was an urban community of almost 500,000 people at the time of this study. Under the UNIGOV arrangement, effective January 1970, that population figure jumped with the creation of one consolidated city out of what was the City of Indianapolis and the County of Marion. Consequently, Indianapolis has been elevated in national population ranking from 26th to 12th, subsequent to the completion of field work for this study. The Kerner Commission Report predicted that Indianapolis would have a black school majority by 1985.

Indianapolis had begun planning for the contingency of a riot early in the spring of 1969. The Public Safety Board, the Human Relations Commission and the Indiana National Guard were the main stimulants to pre-planning. They were encouraged by the newly elected mayor, Richard Lugar. A series of meetings and simulations involving all of the potentially relevant agencies led to the development of detailed plans designed to cope with a riot.

A disturbance began Thursday, June 5, on a warm night in the crowded playgrounds near the Lockefield Gardens housing development. Two officers sent to investigate a fight found themselves facing an unruly crowd. They fired

several shots at a young man who was running away after striking one of the officers. The shots attracted a larger crowd. Additional policemen arrived. Black leaders with reputations as "radicals" in the highest echelons of the police department, cooperated with a black Deputy Chief of Police, Mr. Davenport, in attempting to reduce tensions. They were largely successful, except for the burning of a supermarket. No major police action took place and members of the local community assisted the Fire Department in extinguishing the store blaze.

On Friday night, rock throwing and store-breaking began around 5 pm. A small department store was broken into and looted. By Friday, Chief Winston Churchill had returned from a hunting vacation and was in command from police headquarters. On the scene, Deputy Chief Stratton was in charge. He rejected offers by black leaders to contain the disorder in their own fashion as well as turning down their request for emphasis on the use of black officers wherever the police did take action. Stratton ordered the streets cleared and then advanced his policemen in riot formations. This resulted in the mass arrest of 74 black citizens. Most were charged with Disorderly Person or Disorderly Conduct. The Defense Panel Committee of the Indianapolis Bar Association, in cooperation with the Legal Services Organization, arranged for the release of all but four or five of those charged either on recognizance or \$125 cash bonds.

On Saturday, the leadership of a black community center, called Our Place, invited the top leadership of the Police Department and the Mayor to a meeting. The Mayor and the Chief did not attend. But the officers who represented the Department agreed to the withdrawal of intensified police patrols, increased

use of black officers, community leaders to patrol the area without police interference and future police-community meetings to avert further incidents. That night there were only a few isolated incidents, none of large scale. The June disturbances had come to an end.

#### D. SOUTH BEND

Prior to 1967, there was little racial violence in South Bend, Indiana. (Although during the summer of 1966 there were several interracial gang fights.) However, on July 25 and 26, 1967, the city experienced serious racial violence. Twenty persons were injured and 91 arrested. Property damage from arson and malicious trespass amounted to \$50,000. The entire 150 man South Bend Police Department was mobilized; they were augmented by 25 St. Joseph County Sheriff's deputies and 33 officers from the neighboring town of Mishawaka. In addition, 150 Indiana State Police officers and 1107 Indiana National Guardsmen were placed on alert.

The disturbance broke out on the evening of July 25 with the breaking of windows by groups of juveniles on Western Avenue. The outbreak was related to the provocative actions of whites driving through the black neighborhood. In addition, the previous day, a black youth had been arrested in connection with an interracial incident at a gas station; this was cited by black leaders as the catalyst for black discontent. By 11 pm, buildings were burning in the vicinity of Washington and Walnut Avenues. The Police Department moved into the area equipped with riot gear: crowd control batons, helmets, tear gas and canine units. The crowd was dispersed and many arrests made.

Despite attempts at conciliation on the following day, several cars were overturned and set afire. Police units sent to disperse the gathering crowd were stoned by the crowd. Four police canine units were used to disperse part of the crowd and force the remainder into a nearby youth center building. Someone in the center threw a chair which broke the front window. Thinking they were being attacked, the police fired several times with shotguns through the window. Two officers, a captain and a lieutenant, entered the building with other policemen and police dogs. The crowd inside the building appeared to threaten the policemen, thereupon the captain opened fire with his Thompson sub-machine gun at the ceiling while the lieutenant did the same with his .38 calibre revolver. Several persons were injured by the shotgun blasts and all inside the center were arrested. One man attempted to escape but was felled by a shotgun blast which injured him severely in the groin. Aside from a relatively minor incident outside a liquor store later in the evening, the disturbance had ended by 11 pm.

Several firebombings and arrests occurred during the next three days. Local authorities were successful in containing violence in South Bend so it was not necessary to use the Guard troops operationally. The National Guardsmen were taken off alert and began their recall on 29 July.

## III ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER

## A. RESPONSES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

## 1. PLANNING

a. Premises of Planning

A set of working premises appear to serve as the foundation upon which Gary, South Bend, Indianapolis and Evansville plan their future courses of action to cope with civil disorder. Although there is some variation in these four cities with respect to the premises of planning, a pattern does emerge in their planning behavior.

One premise is that the key to successful civil disorder response is "preparedness." In one city, preparedness means that the city must take preventative steps to defuse hostility in the community by building police morale and enlarging the capacity of community and neighborhood organizations to cope with their problems. The rationale is that it is necessary to "buy time" for the city until planning is improved and the police department can recruit and properly train more personnel. In the other cities, preparedness means deterrence: demonstrate sufficient force in being to deter those who would create a disorder because of their fear of the consequences of starting a disorder.

A second premise is that disorders are planned by what some interviewees identify as an "enemy." In some cases the enemy is seen as a somewhat diffuse criminal element. Some view civil rights organizations and church groups as part of the problem. In other cases, the enemy consists of militant students or dedicated revolutionists, organized on a national basis. Some claim the

threat comes from criminal gangs, generally Black. Still others argue that disturbances are the work of an international Communist conspiracy to destroy the police and other authoritative institutions in the United States. A number of police officials mentioned their basic agreement with The Communist Attack on U.S. Police, a book by W. Cleon Skousen which argues the conspiracy thesis.

A third premise of planning is that improved intelligence activities are essential to preparing adequate responses to what are assumed to be largely planned disturbances. Several police departments have established special investigative units or enlarged their criminal intelligence function to accommodate this perceived need for better clandestine information. Secrecy in civil disorder planning is implicit here.

The need to establish the physical capacity to demonstrate a formidable "show of force" when a disturbance threatens appears to be another working premise of civil disorder planning. Efforts to plan for and procure a variety of kinds of hardware -- riot regalia and protective gear, more powerful and varied weapons, sophisticated communications equipment, and crowd control agents -- are manifestations of this underlying premise.

A fifth premise is that, when civil disorder occurs, the response must be swift in restoring order. The restoration of order acquired a military flavor in the minds of several interviewees. When asked how the police department of one city defines the successful handling of a civil disorder, the assistant chief of police of that city replied: "Winning!"

b. Plans and Nonplans

Those who associate civil disorder planning with the detailed work of industrial or city planning, or war planning with its specification of strategic and tactical assumptions and explicit contingency responses, will be disappointed. Very few civil disorder plans for cities are written in any detail beyond statements of guidelines; broad expectations about the locus and sources of disorder; and modifications in standard operating procedures, unit structures, or equipment utilization.

Prior to an experience with a disturbance in the late Sixties, one of the cities studied had developed no written plan response to civil disorder. In 1964, the Mayor had delegated the task of emergency planning to the Chief of Police who, in turn, appointed a police inspector to develop a plan. The inspector acknowledged that his concept of planning was oriented toward nuclear attack rather than civil disorder. Therefore, the plan he developed followed guidelines suggested by the local civil defense office. It specified broad responsibilities for each local governmental unit, listed the names and telephone numbers of emergency personnel, and enumerated the trucks and other types of equipment in the local region that might be made available by private industry and public agencies. It was not until the tense events of Summer 1967 emerged around the nation that the need was articulated in that city to develop plans that were directed specifically toward civil disorder response. The result, after several more years of effort involving considerable interagency consultation, was a written plan consisting of broad guidelines with statements of general operational responses in terms of geographic trouble areas or zones, loci of authority, and communications procedures to be used in mobilizing response forces.

Not all of the cities achieved even this level of relative comprehensiveness of planning scope. In another city the planning that was done was based upon FBI training received by the police officer responsible for development of a plan. He appeared to rely rather heavily upon the notions developed in the FBI manual entitled Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots, published in 1967 as supplemental to a booklet on the subject distributed by the FBI to law enforcement agencies in 1965. The concrete result of his planning efforts did not appear to go much beyond the development and training of a tactical squad in the police department.

Our impression is that little detailed planning for civil disorder response has been done in the cities studied. This is especially the case when one examines local agencies other than police departments. The local courts have done little to prepare themselves for the demands that a civil disorder would likely impose upon them. This appears to be predicated on the assumption by some court officials that a major disturbance would not overtax their capacity to respond. Clearly, if problems are not anticipated, serious planning is unlikely to occur. Other officials in the legal system reflect similar minimal concern with the need for planning. An assistant to one of the city attorneys indicated that they were not planning to cope with the legal contingencies that might arise from disorders because they feel that riots in their city are unlikely, they have confidence in existing laws and legal structures, and because of the conservative nature of the local bar which seemed unwilling to engage in extensive planning schemes for defense of mass arrestees. Nor does there appear to be active ad hoc groups of lawyers working on this problem in the cities studied. The city council in these cities also has tended to be somewhat aloof from concern with the need to plan their responses in civil disorder.

The apparent lack of planning on the part of sheriff's departments came as a surprise. Other than the police, the sheriff's department represents the most important law enforcement agency at the local level. Generally, sheriff's departments have been irregular participants in interagency planning sessions and have done little to prepare for their main task in a disorder: incarceration of mass arrestees. In one locale, the only initiative the Sheriff had taken in anticipation of a disorder was to prepare a packet of arrest forms for use by his deputies in a disorder. Several reasons may be suggested to account for this lack of attention to disorder planning by some sheriffs. First, there may be reluctance on the part of sheriffs as elected officials to involve themselves in the controversial judgments that must be made during a disorder. Second, relationships between city and county governmental units are not known for a tradition of enthusiastic cooperation. A sheriff may be unwilling to make himself interdependent with the planning needs of a city government. A third factor is that a sheriff may be preoccupied with a somewhat different set of law enforcement problems than those which demand the priorities of city police.

A sense of optimism about the ability to respond to future disorders also characterizes the approach to planning in these cities. This may reduce the sense of urgency to develop detailed plans. The design and refinement of plans can be a loathsome chore, especially when all of these agencies are confronted with the need to respond continuously to the daily operating problems of their agencies. The addition of some hardware and some riot-trained personnel reduces the apparent need to plan. Several of these cities have added multi-channel communications equipment, portable radios and scramblers in some cases.

They have experienced disorders and have engaged in some degree of disorder training -- particularly in police departments. Thus, they have some of the confidence that comes to a military unit that is at least partially battle-tested. They are increasingly confident of their ability to cope with the "next" disorder. One mayor mentioned that it would be a good idea to establish a field communications center to communicate with his city's command "if there is a disturbance in the future." But there was no concerted effort to plan for such a field communications center.

Another factor which may reduce the perceptions of local officials of the need to plan is their awareness that the possibilities for external assistance are growing. Federal, National Guard, and State Police formations offer an image of an almost inexhaustible supply of highly mobile, well-trained and well-equipped response forces. Augmenting this perception are the very evident political commitments of state and Federal political leaders to return "law and order" to their respective jurisdictions. These perceptions may predispose local officials to rely on external resources and not engage in careful planning for civil disorder.

c. Planning Dynamics

While there is little doubt that the visibility of riots in other communities is a necessary condition to stimulate planning at the local level, such threatening events alone probably are not a sufficient condition. Important catalysts in the promotion of planning come from external governmental entities, primarily in state government. The Indiana National Guard appears to have a key role here. This role is implemented by the Military Support

Plans Officer (MSPO), who heads the Military Support to Civil Authorities Section in the Office of the Adjutant General of Indiana. The MSPO, in cooperation with representatives of the Indiana State Police, often conducts a series of planning conferences for local officials around Indiana. In addition to promoting planning conferences and maintaining close contact with local officials, the MSPO proposes model civil disorder plans to cities. In 1965 and 1966, personnel from the Indiana State Police and the Indiana National Guard joined FBI instructors in riot and mob control seminars which were held around the state. In 1967, officials from the ISP and ING traveled to 12 cities -- including the four under consideration here -- in which disturbances were expected in order to assess local planning and training efforts and to promote the need for planning.

Another external stimulus to local planning is the civil defense program. This appears to play a minor role, however, as evidenced by the failure to heed the efforts of local civil defense units which attempt to act as the planning agency for cities. Civil defense agencies attempt to elaborate model disorder plans and to inventory available disaster resources. The civil defense education program which is based at Indiana University in Bloomington probably comes as close as any facet of the overall civil defense structure to stimulating disorder planning. This program, among other projects, runs a series of problem-solving simulation exercises which deal with natural disaster and civil disorder situations.

A different kind of planning stimulus is generated by the Governor's office. Over the decade the Governors have sent policy letters to local

officials which specify the steps to be taken to acquire state aid in connection with a disorder. These position papers are rather general in tone and it is unlikely that they induce much planning in the cities.

Another result of the operations of these external agencies is to foster interagency planning. Their efforts to bring various local public organizations together for planning have met with limited success. This tends to occur where there is receptivity to interorganizational planning already present at the local level.

The focus of planning has shifted over the past several years. Until about five years ago, the focus of planning was on the small-scale disorder involving several square blocks of activity that could be handled with a tactical unit. Watts caused a shift in concern to large-scale riots calling for response personnel in the many hundreds, if not thousands. A further shift has been made in response to the possibilities of having to engage in guerrilla warfare. This last situation is much harder to cope with than the others. If planners are correct about the presence of urban guerrillas, then the planning process has to plan for a high level of unpredictable hit-and-run attacks, as well as the use of snipers, arson, and bombing.

Another shift in planning is due to widespread disorder on university campuses. In the judgment of a number of the law enforcement personnel who were interviewed, the main sources of disruption in our society have moved from the urban ghetto to the campus. White radicals, black militants, and anti-war protesters are presumed to operate within and from what seems to some interviewees to be the privileged sanctuary of the university. In some respects, the college and university have enjoyed the status of an enclave over the years,

using their own security personnel for the maintenance of good order on campus. Events in the past half decade have ended the traditional sanctuary concept. Although there are still some inhibitions on the part of law enforcement agencies about moving uniformed personnel onto a campus without a specific request from the university administration, there is little self-restraint on the part of Federal, state, and local agencies about sending in personnel in mufti, especially in an intelligence collections role.

The shifting focus of planning -- as well as other civil disorder responses by local agencies -- does not always lead to planned responses consistent with the new focus. Various agencies may verbalize their awareness of the university, for example, as a source of disturbances. But the details of planned responses tend to be based upon each organization's experiences with the last disorder in which they were involved. This may create a "Last-War Syndrome" in which the actual response capabilities are based on procedures that were found to be successful during a prior disturbance. A fire department official in one city explained that his organization had no formal response plan: "We would employ the same procedures we used in 1967 if it happened again. It worked well then." This tendency to rely upon direct experiences with a disorder rather than calculating on the basis of new data or modified perceptions may account for the general failure to evaluate and revise existing plans which we observed in the field.

Decisions about the need actually to engage in planning at the local level seem to rest with the mayor. The setting of basic policy also appears to rest in the mayor's office; the city council formally may ratify these policies and give them a legal existence. If one looks at the entire collection

of local agencies which engage in planning, there is no clear structure of authority or control. Agencies, even those operating under the formal hierarchy of a city government, tend to retain a measure of autonomy in their planning and operations. But if one looks at the distribution of influence, there is little doubt that the mayor is dominant, especially if he has a strong political base. The extent to which the mayor is able to facilitate cooperative planning within his government, as well as in interaction with other local agencies, is another matter. The typical strategy of mayors is to vest primary responsibility for disorder planning in the police department and to use his political influence to bring other local agencies into harmony with the initiatives taken by the police leadership.

d. Scope of Cooperative Planning

Cooperative planning activities among local public agencies are limited in scope and irregular in frequency. Joint meetings among people from local agencies and the local representatives of state and Federal agencies have occurred in the four cities. These meetings have explored issues of basic policy, the need for cooperation and the forms that cooperation should take, and specific questions about technical and structural matters. But these efforts have been irregular and do not constitute a stable and systematic program of cooperative planning at the local level.

One goal that takes high priority in joint planning meetings has been to clarify the relationships among the participant agencies. Although this is a more prominent issue at the early stages of joint planning, it reasserts itself whenever a participant agency acquires new equipment or establishes a

new program which implies some adjustment in prior arrangements of the division of labor among the several agencies. For example, the National Guard developed an organizational innovation which would make a searchlight unit available to local police during a disorder without having to deploy an entire Guard company which is normally associated with equipment of this type. Under this new arrangement, the Guard would provide a jeep with searchlight, a searchlight operator, and a driver. The police department would provide a policeman to ride "shotgun." It was necessary for the Guard to arrange with the police how and when these new units would be used.

There were indications that campus disorder planning was not well articulated with the planning efforts of the local governmental units surrounding these campuses. Relationships between the university communities -- especially faculty and students -- and police departments are not positive. The past use of city police in campus disturbances has left a residue of hostility on both sides. The joint planning that does occur between campus and local governmental agencies -- primarily police and sheriff's departments -- tends to be done on an informal and nonsystematic basis.

Cooperative planning sessions tend to reflect two different needs on the part of participants. One is the need to prepare for interdependent action in the future. An example of this is the arrangements that local police develop with State Police and National Guard representatives to prepare for the contingency of calling up forces to support police resources in a large scale disorder. A second type of planning situation occurs when dependence is one-sided. For example, military intelligence units solicit the cooperation of local police authorities in the collection of intelligence information about the activities

of the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panther Party. Some police departments view this intelligence-sharing as somewhat burdensome with only limited payoff for their own operations.

A primary inhibitor of cooperative planning is the preoccupation of each agency with its autonomy. This factor is at work in state and Federal agencies, as well as those operating at the local level. Efforts to work on a cooperative basis with other agencies is perceived by most agencies as increasing their budget costs and reaction time, as well as allowing "outsiders" to intrude into their decision processes. This is particularly evident in the reaction of agencies which have heavy responsibilities for the conduct of operating programs. Local civil defense offices, which have the strongest commitment -- if not capability -- to emergency planning are largely ignored by agencies like police departments which are constantly enmeshed in the demands of daily operations. Police departments, in which mayors have invested the major responsibility for civil disorder planning, have possibly the least commitment to careful planning among local agencies. This facet of police organizational behavior is not as much a matter of their perversity about the planning function as it is a problem of the structural constraints which immerse police departments in an intensely routine set of tasks every day. Their relative success in past disorders have led many police officials to conclude that they can succeed in the future by operating on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, some police officials have the almost naive expectation that detailed planning for cooperative interagency responses is unnecessary because they expect that willing cooperation will be forthcoming in the event of a future disorder. This hopeful expectation has not squared with past realities during a civil disorder.

e. Prevention vs Control

The behavior of the local agencies involved in planning a response to civil disorder reflects a priority on the control of a disturbance once it has erupted rather than its successful prevention. City mayors and spokesmen for public agencies enunciate great concern with getting to the root causes of disorder so that the possibilities of disorder can be minimized. The actual behavior seems to emphasize control at the expense of prevention.

Police departments are the primary agencies of planning and response at the local level. Mayors have delegated planning responsibilities to their top police officials. Police-community relations units in police departments have too frequently been compromised in their efforts to improve their relationships with underprivileged parts of the community due to the demands made on them by the law enforcement activities of the police. Police units established to perform constructive work with youth gangs too often become coopted by the criminal intelligence functions of their department. The extent of the problem varies from city-to-city and there are, of course, exceptions. But the thrust is in the direction of control behavior.

Another indicator of the propensity to control disorders rather than prevent them or mitigate their causes is found in the role of municipal human relations commissions. Typically, these commissions are not brought into an active planning role. Some public officials view these commissions as serving to exacerbate rather than reduce tensions in the community. Whatever their relative effectiveness may be in given communities, human relations commissions have a clear organizational mission to interface between public authorities and citizens with grievances and to try to resolve community

conflict. In one Indiana city this mission has found expression in the establishment of a rumor control center which sought to establish better communications and "...hopefully keep potential untruths from spreading." The commission in the same city also established a task force to prevent trouble from occurring at high school football games by keeping an eye on the crowd and attempting to cool off any trouble that might flare up. The commission in another city helped to prevent further polarization in its ghetto community during a recent disorder by convincing police officials to minimize their show of weapons when enforcing a curfew.

The apparent emphasis given to control objectives in the preparations of cities for civil disorder continues to be reflected in the lack of concern with planning and, where planning is done, to orient preparations toward squelching a disturbance once it has started. Police agencies dominate the planning process and large Federal grants for hardware and riot equipment characterize the nature of external assistance to cities' efforts to innovate new responses to the problems of civil disorder.

## 2. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

### a. Scope of Training

Police and some civil defense personnel receive training for civil disorder in the cities studied. The meaning of civil disorder training is elusive. It is necessary to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" disorder training.

Direct training involves the study of crowd control techniques, the use of weapons in a riot situation, the use of special weapons and chemical

agents, training in the disciplined use of communications gear in a riot, and special arrest and identification techniques. The trend in the cities studied was to provide at least some exposure to direct training for civil disorder to all new police recruits. Direct training tends to be only a few hours of study and field training in a recruit training program of about ten weeks. Tactical squads in the several departments receive more intensive riot training. Direct training was virtually nonexistent in agencies other than the police.

Indirect training covers a much wider range of topics. Indirect disorder training includes those skills that are learned in connection with the routine duties of a position but which may be used in the event of a disorder. These skills encompass first aid, marksmanship, community relations, traffic control, vehicle operation and field maintenance, communication codes, the use of standard equipment, etc. Presumably, every local agency has a number of training activities that have some utility in the event of a civil disorder. Such indirect training is standard in all agencies.

The frequency and magnitude of disturbances at American universities would cause one to expect that campus security units have thorough civil disorder training. This is not the case. On the contrary, personnel in these units have little or no training of this kind. The security director of one university indicated that, with the exception of ex-policemen, or city policemen who "moonlight" on the campus, none of his men have training for campus disorder response. He had sent one of his men for disorder training to the program offered by the city police department. But the man resigned shortly after completion of this training to take a better job. According to the director, "the risk of training my men is too great."

Cooperative training is made available by the city police departments to police agencies in nearby communities and other appropriate public agencies, such as civil defense auxiliary police and university security units. These facilities do not appear to be exploited very heavily by potential users, evidently due to the problem of giving men release time from their primary sources of employment. There also appears to be rather limited interest among eligible agencies in taking advantage of these opportunities. Furthermore, there may be little effort expended by some city police departments to attract outsiders into their programs. According to the civil defense director in one city, the police department of that city has not conducted training for the civil defense police unit due to either lack of interest or time.

b. Recruitment and Promotions

One of the cities studied, which has a substantial black population, recently has made an extraordinary effort to recruit blacks into the police department. The current trend in rookie class ratios is about seven blacks to ten whites. Previously, the ratio was roughly one black to ten whites. At the time of our field research, the overall ratio was one black for every four-and-one-half whites. All of the police departments studied had made some effort to recruit black policemen but not at this level of emphasis.

The human relations commission is another area where recruitment strategy is becoming sensitive to the needs of the black community in order to facilitate the reduction of tensions that could lead to disorder. For example, in one city, the community task force personnel and the people who work in the rumor control center are recruited primarily from the black community.

These examples of efforts to recruit blacks should not be interpreted as indicating a profound movement in recruitment strategy. Rather, they suggest isolated responses that may become a trend. The typical pattern is still very much white.

It is the view of some that police-community relations units represent the wing of the police department that is most strongly oriented toward the prevention of civil disorder. One city police department made it a point to "hand-pick" the six men in its community relations unit in terms of their positive experience and attitudes toward the black community. It was decided that these men, apart from their regular prevention duties, would be exempted from participation in any direct civil disorder response conducted by the police department. The reason for this decision was that use of these men for riot control would jeopardize their access to the black community which was essential to their primary mission in the community relations unit.

The recruit training programs in all of the police departments studied included a block of instruction on police-community relations. Some resistance to this aspect of training was found in one city. The resistance was not from the police trainers but from some of the recruits who objected to this material on the grounds that it was propaganda. There was also resistance to police-community relations training among some of the older men in the police department. Indeed, the younger men who had more recent contacts with members of the black community in high school were more receptive to these training materials than the older officers.

There may be an expectation that riot training or participation in a tactical unit provides improved opportunities for promotion. This may indeed be the case but we were unable to find any evidence to support this thesis. It may be that disorder training has become sufficiently widespread -- at least in urban police departments -- that it offers no distinctive credentials to the individual officer at promotion time.

c. Special Units

Each of the cities studied had developed some type of special unit for deployment in the event of a serious civil disorder, typically a tactical squad, sniper unit, or a K-9 unit. Tactical squads are small units of about a half-dozen men who are selected ideally on the basis of their intelligence, flexibility, and emotional stability. One city established two of these squads, each consisting of a sergeant and three patrolmen who are specially trained to respond to snipers and firebombing. According to the director of police training of that city, these squads would be used only as a last resort. "If they were used too soon, it could create panic and more disorder."

The tactical squads developed in another city were trained originally to handle mob problems. Their training emphasized riot control formations and special use of the riot baton. The officer who first trained these units six years ago is now critical of his approach. He felt the training was inappropriate because it was based upon military practices which were oriented to an "enemy," not citizens.

K-9 units are used for controlling crowds, specialized patrol, and arrest of rioters. These dogs have also been trained to search buildings and can be used to apprehend a sniper. A chief deputy sheriff in one community said he was reluctant to use dogs in a disorder because of the resentment they might cause.

### 3. OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

#### a. Command Leadership

Once a civil disorder has begun, the mayor tends to draw the reins of authority into his own hands and, usually with the blessings of the city council, makes critical decisions in close consultation with the chief of police. In one city, the mayor and chief delegated authority for decision-making in the field to a ranking police captain, who served as field commander of the city's response forces for the duration of the disorder. The city police were the primary action forces in the disorder and it appears that the police hierarchy at each level -- from city command post to the field -- served as the point of coordination for all other agencies involved in the city's response. This may mean that other agencies play no active role. During a disorder in another city, the civil defense unit was not alerted or placed on standby. In the same disorder, the human relations commission was maintained in contact with the mayor at the command post but was not sent into the area of the disturbance. The mayor's reason for excluding the participation of agencies other than the police may have been his concern that they would interfere with his attempts to restore control in minimum time. This rather direct emphasis on ending a disorder was reflected in the remark of a policeman from another city who

was asked if he was given any special instructions by his superiors during the riot. He replied: "To maintain law and order and to shoot if shot at."

The need to cope with civil disorder is one of the central political challenges which confronted the mayors in the cities we observed. One mayor pointed out that this problem probably was his most critical responsibility and that he devoted "much time and emotion and commitment to the civil disorder question in order to act both effectively and compassionately." The profound political implications of a disorder account for the strong responses made by mayors when they assume what can only be described as "command" of their cities during a disturbance. This political quality is suggested by the response of one mayor when he was reminded that the established procedure for requesting state assistance during a disorder was first to contact the local post of the Indiana State Police. The mayor commented: "I don't care what the procedure is. If I need help in a hurry, I'll get the Governor on the phone!"

The leadership style of the mayor during a disturbance appears to be consultative and oriented toward building confidence in his leadership out in the community. A disorder, especially if it is the first of any size to face the current political leadership of a city, is generally viewed by the mayor as being filled with uncertainties. In working out these uncertainties, the mayor draws on the suggestions, proposals, and reactions of human relations commission people, representatives of public utility companies and other city services, his legal advisors, city councilmen, and the heads of fire and police departments. Because the police are his primary response forces, he tends to rely heavily on the advice of the leadership of that department.

A typical mayor will also see the need to reduce the anxiety of citizens and to restore lost confidence in the ability of the city leadership to handle the situation. This means that he will endeavor to establish contacts with community leaders in the neighborhoods where the disorder is developing. During one recent disorder in an Indiana city, the deputy chief of police went into the disrupted area to establish field alliances with groups of blacks with the help of policemen and citizens on the scene who were willing to cooperate. During the tense period following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the mayor of the same city used what he called "personal diplomacy" with various church groups, social clubs, and neighborhood organizations in the black community to cool down the situation. One problem that has emerged during several disorders was that some of the community "leaders" to whom the mayor had access are leaders of factions which are not well regarded in the troubled areas of the city.

b. Command Limitations

Several kinds of problems have faced mayors and other city officials who have a command responsibility to stop a civil disorder. One I would call the "Fail-Safe Problem." This concerns the problem of insuring that the force and violence employed by police and other response forces does not exceed what the responsible official had in mind. It is far too easy for a group of young and inexperienced policemen who have orders "to maintain law and order and to shoot if shot at" to start firing into a menacing crowd that is closing around them at the first sounds of what they conclude in the heat of the moment to be gunfire directed against them. Positive command discipline over the operation of response forces is essential to prevent over-reaction and unnecessary official violence against citizens.

One city came close to experiencing this Fail-Safe Problem when the National Guard was on alert outside of the city for possible riot duty. One Guard troop commander began to move his unit into the troubled city on his own initiative. He was stopped only after the chief of police learned about his unilateral action and got the Adjutant General of Indiana to relay down a countermanding order.

One mayor attempted to improve command discipline by enhancing the loyalty and support for his administration among the men in the police department. He has attempted to give "individual attention to specific officers" by monthly award ceremonies which he attends, a Policeman of the Month Award, and other symbolic gestures. This mayor felt that the support of the police department could be maintained "in the same way one maintains the support of any constituency."

Another command problem is official action which aggravates a civil disorder. One mayor complained that his human relations commission was undercutting his approach to solving community tensions by leading agitation within city government agencies rather than reacting to governmental and black community demands. In another city, the rapport which had been developed by a police unit which worked with youth gangs was undermined and tensions increased when the police began to use the gang contacts for criminal investigations. Also, the practice of some police agencies which detain gang leaders during a disorder with the objective of depriving the disorder of its alleged leaders can have an opposite effect. It may very well deprive the city authorities of access to leaders who can assist the city in stopping the disturbance with a minimum of violence on either side.

Time lag is another leadership problem. Characteristically, a disorder grows with little design or pattern. The capacity of city leaders to respond

to a disorder with reasonable and effective measures appears to be limited by the delay of accurate information about the locus and nature of problems in the street. A county prosecutor commented after his experience with a disorder that "by the time we heard about it, it was just about over." The typical responses to this problem have been to improve the efficiency of the communications network, employ field command posts, and upgrade the intelligence function--within the city police and in cooperation with state and Federal intelligence organizations.

c. Coordination Processes

To borrow a contemporary expression, there is a tendency for public organizations to "do their own thing" during a civil disorder. This occurs even though the police are the primary action forces during a disorder and are available for use as an anchor for the coordination of other agencies. During one crisis in the state in which there would have been time to work out details of relative functions among National Guard, Federal Marshalls, State Police, and city police, there was almost no evidence of active coordination. In another situation, police had been assigned to ride with fire trucks for protective purposes. Yet there was no determination of whether the policeman had authority over the firemen or the firemen over the police officer riding with the fire unit.

This absence of operational coordination has resulted in agencies working at cross-purposes during a disorder. According to one mayor, the city council members took it upon themselves to meet with a group of black leaders the second night of the disorder, which he felt undercut his ability to lead an effective city-wide response.

It should be understood that the problems of coordination tend to be operational problems that occur in the field. These coordination problems

have emerged within agencies as well as among agencies operating in the field during a disorder. Back in the command post there may have been clear gestures of cooperation and willingness to engage in mutual consultation. A mayor working in a crisis enjoys a bounty of helpful advice and support from other officials. The problems emerge in the field when a number of agencies must interact in response to a mercurial situation of disorder. This operational problem is difficult even in situations such as a natural disaster which lacks the hostile crowds and rolling violence of a civil disorder. Two of the project staff were on the scene of a gas explosion which occurred in an Indiana city in 1969. They were impressed by the difficulties of getting a large number of response organizations to coordinate their relief efforts at the same time that each agency was attempting to protect its own autonomy.

d. Use of Force

Once a disorder appears to be getting out of hand, the priorities of control seem to become compelling to city officials. To reiterate a point made earlier, the goal tends to become a matter of "winning" by the application of more force than the opposition groups can muster. A mayor and the chief deputy sheriff from the surrounding county argued that a massive show of force was the most effective means of controlling a disorder and had been successful in their city's experience.

Several officials acknowledged that a massive show of force may lead to the actual use of that force. This contingency underscored their need to combine maximum deterrence with minimum application of force. In other words, how can the level of violence be minimized? One device that has been used with success is the curfew. The establishment of a curfew in cities has tended to reduce the extent and frequency of confrontations among opposing militant groups or between police authorities and such groups. This has reduced considerably the potential for violent exchanges. Another peacekeeping mechanism

was developed cooperatively by the police, mayor's office, and news media in one city. This was a police communications procedure known as "News Code 30." When a Code 30 is issued in the event of a disturbance, all news media in the city will hold information concerning the incident for at least 30 minutes unless the Code 30 is cancelled by the city. The purpose of the Code 30 agreement was to avoid advertising an impending disturbance or an actual one in its initial stages which might stimulate it or perhaps tip the balance between a situation which can be controlled and one which gets out of hand.

The type of public organization which uses force in an attempt to quell a disorder also appears to be a matter for the exercise of some judgment. Police units are used until they become exhausted or the scope of the disorder grows too large for their response capacity. Yet one police chief disagreed with the role of police as the first-line response agency. He felt that police are not the appropriate response force because they are not--most of the time--a military organization. The Chief argued that the police have to go back into the community after a disturbance has ended in order to continue their primary peace-keeping functions; their employment in disorder control makes their peace-keeping efforts much more difficult.

## B. RESPONSES OF STATE GOVERNMENT

### 1. PLANNING

#### a. Premises of Planning

Planning at the state level in Indiana seems to reflect the same working premises that undergird disorder planning at the local level: emphasis on preparedness and deterrence, the concept of an organized hostile force or "enemy" which plans disorders, the need for improved intelligence, the ability

to mobilize the hardware needed for a persuasive "show of force," and the need to insure that any confrontation in which state forces are involved will lead to a decisive victory over the disorderly citizens -- "victory" in the sense of ending the disorder, not destruction of the citizens.

The basic differences between local and state premises lie in the role of the state as the de facto disorder response force of last resort. If the combined efforts of the Indiana State Police and Indiana National Guard -- the primary response forces available to the Governor -- are incapable of stopping a disorder, the Governor would be required to call for Federal troops. This would levy a heavy cost in political terms upon the Governor and leadership of the state. (This has happened only twice in contemporary history, both times in Michigan in connection with a Detroit riot.) Therefore, the state leadership is forced to move in two directions simultaneously in planning for civil disorder: develop a maximumly effective state response force at the same time that they endeavor to strengthen the capacity of local government to cope with disorder so that the state forces will not have to be used. State planning in Indiana reflects this dualism.

b. Nature of State Plans

The principal agencies of state government which engage in disorder planning are the Indiana State Police, the Indiana National Guard, the Indiana Department of Civil Defense, and the Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Agency.

The Indiana Department of Civil Defense, an instrument of state government, implements civil defense preparations in support of Federal Office of Civil Defense programs which are the responsibility of the Department of Defense. The civil defense function is primarily concerned with reducing casualties and facilitating recovery from a nuclear attack. The efforts of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense to prepare for a nuclear war, in cooperation with county and city civil defense agencies, represent preparations that would also help communities in the state to cope with fires, floods, industrial accidents, and civil disorder. Civil defense programs emphasize emergency preparedness and encourage the development of community plans to identify and utilize medical, transportation, fire and police services, communications, food, and shelter resources to cope with emergencies. A major state-wide program is to assist local communities in the development and operation of emergency plans by conducting the simulation of operations in a city emergency operations center (EOC). The EOC simulations provide local officials from several agencies with an opportunity to use group problem-solving techniques in response to a simulated community emergency. This program is operated around the state by the Indiana University-Civil Defense University Extension Program with the cooperation of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense. It is funded under a contract with the Department of Defense.

The objectives of the civil defense program could have useful payoffs in a civil disorder. Its encouragement of emergency planning at the state and local level, its efforts to identify resources that could be used to recover from a disaster, and its programs to improve the quality of operational

coordination among public agencies have obvious implications for civil disorder responses. But civil defense inputs or potential inputs seem virtually to be ignored in Indiana in terms of the planning, training and operational decision-making responses that concern civil disorder.

Several persons in state government argued that many civil defense personnel were too committed to the traditional notion that civil defense will take over local government when civil authority has been destroyed or temporarily suspended due to a domestic emergency. Rather, one interviewee stated, civil defense should become essentially a staff planning function. Although the EOC simulation exercise and other civil defense programs appear to be moving in that direction, there seems to be little enthusiasm (especially at the local level) for a major civil defense role in civil disorder response activities.

The activities of the Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Agency (ICJPA) represent another area where implicit contributions to civil disorder response have not been important.

The ICJPA and its Commission and Advisory Council were created by the Indiana General Assembly in 1969 with funds from state resources and Federal matching funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S. Justice Department. Its general purpose is to plan and develop programs to improve the quality of law enforcement at the state and local level in Indiana. According to the ICJPA guidelines, the concept of law enforcement comprehends "the needs of the police, prosecution, defense attorneys, the courts, correctional agencies, and the offender himself."

The Executive Director of ICJPA was appointed and on the job in March, 1969. However, his tenure was brief with his resignation six months later amid allegations that certain of his budgetary and personnel recommendations were being blocked in the executive office of the Governor on partisan grounds or on the grounds that ICJPA salaries approved for Federal grants were higher than the state wished to pay. The early months of ICJPA activity were also marred by a report prepared by The Urban Coalition and Urban America, Inc. which charged bias in representation on ICJPA decision-making bodies:

Indiana's 11-member Criminal Justice Planning Commission, which has ultimate responsibility in making final decisions on the state's plans and programs under the (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets) Act, includes only criminal justice officials and local government representatives. The state does have, in addition, an advisory group of 12-non-voting members which is broader in representation but powerless. An Indiana Urban League official described the agency in his state as "insensitive to the problems we face in the urban or inner-city areas" -- the areas with the highest crime rate. The agency has contracted out the development of the state plan to private consultants, thereby further reducing the already limited scope of participation.<sup>5</sup>

The report argues further that,

In Indiana, for example, delegates from Lake County sit on the state planning agency, but there is no representative of the administration of Mayor Richard Hatcher in Gary, the county seat. Thus one of the state's largest concentrations of low-income, minority people is deprived of a policy-making voice on the agency. The city's administration was omitted despite the fact that Gary has one of the state's highest over-all crime rates.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Law and Disorder: State Planning Under the Safe Streets Act (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Coalition and Urban America, Inc., June 1969), p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Op. cit., p. 18.

Some interviewees commented that the National Guard and police agencies were measures of last resort; successful civil disorder prevention in their judgment rested in the long-term citizen attitudes toward law enforcement and justice. The ICJPA took a step in that grass-roots direction with the establishment in September 1969 of a Subcommittee for Voluntary Law Observance. The ICJPA Commission appointed as chairman of the Subcommittee the former law school dean of a prominent private university in the state. The chairman proposed to ask Indiana citizens to pledge "obedience to the Ten Commandments" to reduce the state's crime rate. "If everyone in Indiana observed the Ten Commandments, there would be no violation of Indiana laws ...We ask you to pray for our success."

Despite the latent possibilities of reform and modernization of the Indiana criminal justice system, the locus of civil disorder response at the state level rests with the Governor, the Indiana National Guard (ING), and the Indiana State Police (ISP).

The Governor's role is primarily that of ultimate executive authority and judge of the scope and magnitude of appropriate state forces response in a disorder. The Governor, with the advice of principal aides (Attorney General, Adjutant General, Superintendent of State Police), has established the procedures whereby state forces may be employed to assist local authorities. Very simply, this procedure specifies that local authorities should contact the nearest State Police Post and relay the nature of the disorder or "imminent danger" which faces the community. The basic policy articulated by the Governor, upon which state planning appears to rest, was as follows:

The assistance of the Indiana State Police and/or the Indiana National Guard will be authorized when sufficient facts have been presented to me clearly indicating that the situation is, or is in imminent danger of being, beyond the control of local authorities operating at their maximum capabilities. State forces, if authorized, will supplement, and not replace, local authorities -- in the absence of the declaration of martial law -- and the direction and control of the state forces will remain at all times with the Governor.<sup>7</sup>

Although the basic state policy reflected in this letter from the Governor has not changed, it does reflect a change in the procedures for calling out state forces. According to Official Opinion No. 66 issued by the Attorney General of Indiana in 1967, the sheriff of the county involved in a disorder -- or other civil officer acting in his stead -- is to take the initiative in contacting the Governor or Adjutant General, rather than channeling a request for aid through the nearest State Police post.

Three official opinions of the state attorney general appear to form the basis for civil disorder responses at the state level.

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<sup>7</sup>Letter dated June 2, 1969, from Edgar D. Whitcomb, Governor, State of Indiana to All Mayors, Chiefs of Police, Sheriffs, and Civil Defense Directors; Subject: State Assistance in Cases of Public Disaster, Serious Domestic Violence, or Imminent Danger Thereof.

Official Opinion No. 66 (1967) concerns the authority of the Governor to call out the National Guard in the event of a civil disorder and the authority of the Guard while performing in a disorder. The Constitution of Indiana provides that the Governor, as commander-in-chief of the military forces of the state, may call out those forces on his own initiative to suppress insurrection.<sup>8</sup> According to Official Opinion No. 66, Guardsmen may make arrests under the direct order of a superior officer for statutorily defined felonies and misdemeanors; they have the authority to arrest commensurate with that given to local peace officers. The National Guard also may detain rioters in jail until the riot is suppressed without an actual arrest which would necessitate a turning over to civil authorities and

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<sup>8</sup>Indiana state law concerning the militia provides the following authority for quelling disorder, as quoted from Burns' Indiana Statutes Annotated, Section 45-2110: "After any person or persons composing or taking part, or about to take part, in any riot, mob, rout, tumult, or unlawful combination or assembly mentioned in this article (Sections 45-2101 - 45-2123) shall have been duly commanded to disperse, or when the circumstances are such that no such command is requisite under the provisions of this article, and the civil officer to whom such military force is ordered to report, or if there be no civil officer present, then such military officer (or if such command is acting under the direct order of the governor, then such officer within the limits provided in his instructions) shall take such steps for the arrest dispersion, or quelling of the persons composing or taking part in any such mob, riot, tumult, outbreak, or unlawful combination or assembly mentioned in this article, as may be required, and if, in doing so, any person is killed, wounded, or otherwise injured, or any property injured or destroyed by the civil officer, or officer or member of the national guard, or other persons lawfully aiding them, such officer, member of person shall be held blameless. (Acts of 1953, Ch. 187, Section 410, p. 660.)

setting of bond. The rationale here is that the setting of bond would frustrate the attempt of the Guard to suppress the riot since the person could rejoin the riot upon being released on bail. Such detention is subject to judicial review in a habeas corpus proceeding -- therefore the attorney general argued that detention "cannot rest on mere fiat." Regarding martial law, this Opinion stated that it "will take very dire circumstances to substantiate the supplanting of civil laws and to substitute military for judicial trials resulting in the denial of constitutional guarantees which have developed over the years and are of primary concern today." The attorney general argued that unless there is a complete breakdown of civil control and a closing of the courts, there is no need to resort to any form of martial law. "The Governor can handle the situation adequately by calling out the National Guard for assistance and if that is unsuccessful, by requesting Federal Troops." This Opinion also pointed out that Guard units will not be rendered subordinate to the local civil authorities during a disorder nor will they receive their orders from them.

The role of the Indiana State Police in disorders is indicated in Official Opinion No. 43 (1968). According to the attorney general, when a civil disorder occurs in a city the ISP may be deployed directly by the Governor or he may approve the request by the mayor of the city for state police assistance. State Police officers, in such a city, would have the same authority with respect to the enforcement of criminal law as the city police would have within their respective jurisdictions; ISP officers are peace officers and have the same authority with respect to criminal law enforcement as sheriffs, constables, and police officers have in their local jurisdictions.

State Police would not have the authority of detention as do National Guardsmen but would merely perform their normal police functions regarding arrest procedures. The Governor may direct the ISP, acting under his orders in a city during a disorder, to assume the additional police duties of enforcing city ordinances, such as a curfew imposed by the mayor.

A third important legal interpretation provided by the attorney general is Official Opinion No. 5 (1969), dealing with disorders at state universities in Indiana. This Opinion, which reflects actions by the 1969 session of the Indiana General Assembly, specifies that the board of trustees of the state universities have the "power and duty" to govern use of university property "including the governance of travel over and the assembly upon such property;" to govern the conduct of students, faculty and employees to the end of preventing "unlawful or objectionable acts which seriously threaten the ability of the institution to maintain its facilities available for performance of its educational activities or which are in violation of the reasonable rules and standards of the institution designed to protect the academic community from unlawful conduct or conduct which presents a serious threat to person or property of the academic community." Boards of trustees are also empowered to "dismiss, suspend or otherwise punish any student, faculty member or employee of the institution who violates the institution's rules or standards of conduct, after determination of guilt by lawful proceedings ... Conduct which constitutes a violation of the rules of the institution may be punished, after determination of guilt by lawful procedures, without regard to whether such conduct also constitutes an offense under the criminal laws of any state or of the United States or whether it might result in civil

liability of the violator to other persons." Opinion No. 5 sets forth the statutory penalties enacted in 1969 by the Indiana General Assembly "for trespassing upon and damaging any real or personal property of public educational institutions." In this Opinion the attorney general also states that every student, upon his admission to a state university, implicitly contracts to conform to and be governed by the proper rules and regulations of the university. If the students perform their part of this contract, "yet are prevented from receiving the quid pro quo, which is the opportunity to further their education in an atmosphere and environment devoid of rebellion and anarchy," they may "seek redress by civil actions in a court of law." The attorney general concludes this opinion by stating:

And it is clear that the State of Indiana has the right to institute civil law suits against officials at any level to collect claims for damages against state property.

If any state university official abdicates his responsibility, he should resign or face legal process for removal.<sup>9</sup>

Guided by these legal opinions and statutory authority, the Governor and his key advisors and response forces (ISP and ING) plan the state's civil disorder responses. Since at least the early 1960's, Indiana Governors have relied on an administrative assistant in the Governor's office for advice -- together with the Adjutant General and the Superintendent of State Police -- on appropriate disorder responses. The advisory roles of these three aides

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<sup>9</sup>Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Official Opinion No. 5 Office of the Attorney General, State of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana, May 13, 1969, pp. 8-9.

to the Governor tend to be more important in the period of operational decision-making during an actual disorder than in the planning for a disorder. What planning that does occur at the state level is located primarily in the efforts of the Indiana State Police and the Indiana National Guard.

The planning activities of the Indiana State Police are limited in scope and embedded largely in tactical considerations. One aspect of planning has already been identified with respect to the procedures to be used by local officials in calling for state assistance by first contacting the local State Police post. The post transmits the request to the communications center at ISP headquarters along with evidence to confirm or disconfirm the character of the local situation. Further information may be collected by State Police personnel in the locale. If the situation is confirmed as a disorder or impending disorder that requires state assistance then the ISP Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent will contact the Governor's office and broadcast a "Signal 49" to the ISP riot response units. A Signal 49 is intended to get the ISP ready for a riot response. The section heads at ISP headquarters are alerted along with the operations center; one of two mobile command buses will likely move into proximity of the problem area to act as a field command post and establish communications links with the operations center at ISP headquarters and with local authorities. The State Police response units will fuel their vehicles, and check the riot equipment which they carry at all times. All command personnel will go to their duty posts. The ISP business administration commander will identify the housing and restaurant facilities and predetermined access routes and assembly areas.

Another aspect of ISP planning is the response unit. This is the riot platoon. The ISP has eight platoons located over the state. Each platoon is commanded typically by an ISP district commander and consists of about 60 men. In addition to the commander, each platoon has an assistant commander, a medical officer, a sniper, and a radio man. The remainder of the platoon consists of four squads of about 14 men each, including squad commander and assistant commander, a gas-chemical agent specialist, and an automatic weapons specialist. The ISP tactical doctrine calls for deployment of at least a full platoon in any disorder response.

Once the riot platoon has been brought to a ready status by Signal 49, the force may be committed by the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent -- with the Governor's authorization -- by broadcasting a "Signal 50." This signal tells the ISP personnel to go into action and implement their predetermined assignments. Riot platoons move on identified access routes to their assembly areas, the mobile command post begins to coordinate the field operations with the ISP operations center, and the business administration commander makes final arrangements for shelter, meals, and other aspects of logistical support.

The intelligence function is another type of planning response of the ISP. All State Police units maintain routine observation of events in their districts. But the Intelligence Division -- created in 1968 -- has special responsibility for maintaining careful reporting on conditions in Indiana cities and universities. The personnel of this small unit are clandestine operators working on the collection of information in the two areas of criminal investigations and civil disorder. Intelligence Division officers are purely

investigative and have no responsibility for law enforcement. The Division reports directly to the Superintendent and the Governor. It attempts to operate independent of the District ISP structure. It is the primary intelligence organization of state government. As such, an important part of its function is to maintain close liaison with other local, state, and Federal intelligence organizations.

One other facet of the ISP planning response is the reorientation of its Public Relations Division. The Division was established in 1935 to create lines of contact with the people of the state but its role was primarily in the area of safety education. Recently, a shift of priorities occurred in the Division which gave it a new emphasis toward improving the quality of ISP relations with the mass media and in the minds of the public. One of the major reasons given for this shift in Division function was the reporting of riot news. It was felt that there was a need to minimize the "irresponsibility" of some newspapermen in reporting the events of a civil disturbance. One step being taken by ISP on behalf of this new orientation is to have video cameras available for recording a disorder; this would provide an alternative to total reliance on the television network coverage of a disorder.

These procedural and organizational preparations constitute the disorder planning activities of the Indiana State Police. The response plans of the ISP are built around highly mobile response units tied together with an efficient communications network. Its plans are not built around detailed planning documents prepared with the elaboration found in the National Guard plans.

The Indiana National Guard, with over 10,000 men, has more than ten times the personnel of the State Police and -- not surprising for a military organization -- engages in extensive planning for civil disorder response.

The Office of the Adjutant General of Indiana has a Military Support to Civil Authorities Section, consisting of five full-time staff, headed by the Military Support Plans Officer (MSPO) who is a full colonel in the Indiana National Guard. The main responsibility of the Section is to provide general liaison and planning for the supporting functions that the National Guard provides for civil authorities, both at the state level and in local communities in Indiana.

The MSPO is responsible for the preparation and updating of the Indiana Military Domestic Emergency Plan, which grew out of the state's National Guard planning for natural disasters and nuclear attack, and is based upon a model state plan to handle civil disorder and other domestic emergencies which was formulated by the Office of Military Support to Civil Authorities of the National Guard Bureau in The Pentagon.

The Indiana Military Domestic Emergency Plan, because it provides the guidelines for employment of the state's disorder forces of last resort, represents the most comprehensive degree of disorder planning at the state level. The Plan is a rather large document of over 100 pages which detail the procedures for alerting Guard units, the organization of the Guard into three Sub-Area Commands (North, Central, and South) and 11 Sectors (most of which correspond to the State Police Districts) and provide for the formation of response Task Forces. The Plan also specifies riot control tactics and the operational

guidelines for all major functions in a disorder or other emergency: intelligence, handling of refugees, communications, logistics, personnel, engineering, public information, and liaison with other jurisdictions.

c. Planning Dynamics

As mentioned previously, ISP and ING personnel began to conduct seminars on riot control in several Indiana communities in 1965. In 1967, representatives from these two state agencies went to 12 Indiana cities to assess local disorder planning and training activities and to encourage local authorities to engage in planning. In August 1967, the Indiana Legislative Council created a Committee to Study Civil Disorders consisting of state legislators, local officials, and the Attorney General of Indiana. The charge to the Committee was to

Investigate in depth the current situations in the urban communities of Indiana with regard to civil disorders. To evaluate the capacity of local and state law enforcement agencies to deal with these disorders. To make recommendations concerning local and state programs aimed at alleviating the predisposing conditions, increasing the ability of citizens and governmental units to deal with these disorders when they occur and with their consequences.<sup>10</sup>

This Committee made a number of recommendations concerning emergency procedures, education, housing, welfare, and employment. Its report included detailed proposals for legislative action.

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<sup>10</sup>Report of the Committee to Study Civil Disorders, Indiana Legislative Council, 1967-1968.

The Military Support Plans Officer in the ING developed a model city response plan which outlined guidelines and programs for disorder planning for Indiana's cities. The model plan -- which can be adapted to the specific needs of each city -- was presented to each Indiana mayor at a meeting of the Indiana Association of Towns and Cities on May 21, 1969. The MSPO, as part of his planning mission for the Indiana National Guard, maintains a planning "packet" for each city in the state. Each packet contains a map of the city identifying major access routes, assembly and billeting points, strategic utilities, and telephone numbers of key officials. The packets also identify the equipment available in the area to assist in supporting response forces and include after-action reports which have been filed by National Guard unit commanders following the periods of alert or commitment of National Guard units during a civil disturbance. Presumably, these packets serve as a basis for planning state responses during a disorder.

## 2. TRAINING AND PERSONNEL PROCEDURES

Training of state response forces is essentially military training. The basic training doctrine and techniques used in the ISP and ING were developed by the U.S. Army civil disturbances training program at Fort Gordon, Georgia. For example, the disorder training program of the ISP was developed by a State Police official who attended the Fort Gordon program in 1963 and brought the training materials back to Indiana for adaptation to ISP needs. These materials are used in the annual recruit school and experienced ISP officers are recalled from duty periodically to receive this training. At this time, most State Police have had some civil disorder training although the State

Police officers with the highest level of riot training are assigned to the eight riot platoons. National Guard officials have also participated in the Fort Gordon program.

Traditional civil disorder training has emphasized infantry maneuvers, riot control formations (line, wedge, diamond, etc.), the use of the riot "baton," and applications of chemical agents for crowd control. There have been some modifications in training during the past several years because of the perceptions of public authorities that civil disorder is shifting from a riot situation to one which the label "guerrilla warfare" has been applied by them with increasing frequency. This seems to mean that disorders are now less characterized by unruly mobs than by organized revolutionaries who use snipers and arson and make attacks directly on law enforcement and fire prevention personnel. Consequently, the training programs have tended to place more emphasis on the mobility of response units and the addition of anti-sniper techniques and equipment.

The personnel who receive this training do not appear to enjoy privileged status insofar as promotional opportunities in their organization are concerned. An exception may be the personnel in the State Police Intelligence Division. When the Division was first created, over 150 State Police officers applied for assignment to the Division. After extensive screening the Division selected only 19 plus some alternates. Those who were selected and held the rank of trooper, were promoted to sergeant. The sergeants selected were promoted to first sergeant.

Considerable initiative appears to be taken at the state level to educate local officials to the need for planning. In addition to the ISP-ING local planning seminars, the MSPO in the Indiana National Guard has spent considerable time encouraging local officials to examine the quality of disorder planning and to develop greater interagency coordination of planning and response activities. Training of police officials in riot control is a part of this effort.

One form that interagency training takes is the use of simulation exercises sponsored by the National Guard to improve the quality of responses in the cities. One simulation -- called a Command Post Exercise (CPX) -- was organized in September 1969 under the auspices of the National Guard Sub-Area Commander for the Central portion of the state (includes Indianapolis and six other Indiana cities). The CPX, the second in as many years, brought together the commanders and headquarters staffs of six battalion-level National Guard units along with ranking officials from the police department, fire department, sheriff's office, public utility, and merchants' association from a number of Central Indiana communities.

The State Police, as a 24-hour a day organization, is able to incorporate de facto training of personnel into its daily operational routines. The National Guard, on the other hand, is a periodic organization which engages in very little activity which is not considered "training." Up until the mid-1960's, there was a very small amount of Guard training devoted to riot control or civil disorder. The overwhelming focus was on being prepared to react on a mobilization (into Federal service) date with a minimum amount

of training necessary at the mobilization date to be available for combat duty. The object of training was to aim for tactical preparation -- all field-type of operations -- with none of the planning or training being directed toward civil disorder.

After the Detroit riot in 1967 the situation changed and 32 hours of riot control training was incorporated into Guard programs. The next year saw the addition of 24 hours of unit training plus a substantial amount of staff training. Presently, about 30 percent of Guard training at company and staff levels is on civil disorder, with the remaining 70 percent devoted to training for mobilization and administrative support (some of the latter is support which has applications in a civil disorder mission). Civil disorder training directives are issued by the Military Support Plans Officer based upon guidelines provided by his National Guard Bureau counterpart in the Pentagon. Unit commanders may alter these training directives to emphasize certain aspects that are of particular importance to the mission of their units.

### 3. OPERATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

#### a. Command Leadership

Other than the minor disorders which can be handled by three or four riot platoons of the Indiana State Police, the likely disorder response at the state level will involve the Indiana National Guard. The Adjutant General, the Governor's principal military advisor and agent, is at the center of the Guard's leadership structure. In past disorders, the Adjutant General has been on the scene of the disorders within several hours of the alert of state assistance. During a disorder and at other times, he acts as a minister of defense to the commander-in-chief, the Governor.

One decision-making response to disorder which has occurred at the state level has been to restructure the role of the Adjutant General. Since the early 1950's, there have been three major areal subdivisions or "sub-area commands" of the Indiana National Guard: North, Central and South. Civil disturbance preparations had a very low priority in those earlier days. The Guard was primarily organized for mobilization duties or for responding in the case of a natural disaster. It appears that other than training for mobilization missions, the Guard did little planning. The state had established an areal organization and had divided the Guard -- on somewhat arbitrary grounds -- into three areas. If a Veterans Day parade was called for, or a response to flood or labor strife was needed, this was the responsibility of the sub-area command leadership. This began to change in 1967 when the civil disorder mission of the Guard acquired sudden urgency.

The principal change that occurred to the sub-area commands in 1967 and 1968 was a redefinition of the role of these commands and the relationship between the three sub-area commanders and the Adjutant General. These three commanders became the personal representatives of the Adjutant General in civil disorder.

The purpose of this arrangement was to provide for decentralization, flexibility, command and control in the planning and operations in the event of Military Support to Civil Authorities is required.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Letter to Indiana National Guard command personnel from Major General John S. Anderson, The Adjutant General of Indiana, 3 April 1968, Subject: Military Support to Civil Authorities Planning.

The sub-area commanders represent the Adjutant General and are responsible in their respective sub-areas for coordination between civil authority and military units, the determination -- following conference with local authorities -- of specific missions for National Guard troops during periods of disorder, insure that command of troops is retained by military commanders at all times, supervise disorder planning and advise the Adjutant General of the status of this planning, and make preparations for establishing Guard forward command posts in the vicinity of disturbances.

The sub-area commanders -- who occupy general officer positions -- would not normally be used as troop commanders during a disorder. Their active role is primarily one of planning for disorders in their sub-area. But in the event of a disorder there is little doubt that they would have a key role as an extension of the Adjutant General's function to interface the state's military forces with the highest civil authority. The Adjutant General's practice of being on the scene of a disorder as the Governor's military agent becomes quite impossible if civil disturbances erupt simultaneously in several parts of the state. At least in concept, the sub-area commanders can extend the effective presence of the Adjutant General in the event of multiple disorders.

Except on occasions like the 1967 Hatcher election in Gary, the Governor generally responds to requests for local assistance rather than taking the initiative himself. An integral part of the state response to local requests for assistance has been to create impediments to the acquisition of state assistance, especially high cost assistance like the deployment of National Guard troops. The Federal government pays for the use of Guard troops when

they are called into Federal service. The state bears the full costs when the Guard is put onto state active duty.

The training of National Guard units is under the direction of a staff of regular U.S. Army personnel, under the command of the Senior Army Advisor who is a colonel in the U.S. Army. The primary mission of the Senior Army Advisor and his staff is to provide training and support and evaluate the programs of the Indiana National Guard as they relate to the needs of the U.S. Army should the Guard be called into Federal service. (A counterpart advisory unit of the U.S. Air Force supports the Indiana Air National Guard.) The U.S. Army advisors participate only as aloof observers, in the event of an outbreak of disorder which results in the deployment of National Guard units. That is, they have no official function in a state operation, even in an advisory capacity, and have no desire even to become visually identified as participants unless the Federal Government calls the Guard into Federal service. Their presence in the area of a disorder is as observers and they report their observations through U.S. Army channels via the Fifth Army to Continental Army Command headquarters to the Pentagon. The National Guard channels run from the state directly to the National Guard Bureau -- a different command line.

The state leadership appears to prefer an involvement-limiting posture that is similar to that of the Federal Government. There is, however, a qualitative difference in that the relationship between local and state government is constitutionally and traditionally more intimate than that which obtains between state and Federal government. Therefore, the cost-limiting

or involvement-limiting strategies of state government vis-a-vis local requests for assistance seem to require that state officials at the highest levels take a close look at the request for assistance and -- if that assistance is granted -- bring ranking state officials directly to the scene of the disorder to lead the state response. The result is a collapsing of the chain-of-command such that the behavior of several ISP riot platoons and a couple of Guard battalions will probably be monitored by the Adjutant General, the Superintendent of State Police, and a key aide of the Governor who are at the location of the disorder. It appears that these officials not only act as observers and liaison for the Governor but may even become involved in making tactical decisions in the field.

b. Command Limitations

The process of collapsing the chain-of-command during state involvement in a disorder probably improves the quality of operational decision-making. These ranking officials have greater command experience and are more likely to be sensitive to the priorities of the Governor and understand more fully the policy constraints of the state's political leadership. Of course, this assumes that unit commanders are well trained and are not prone to delay or abdicate some of their tactical responsibilities in order to await decisions by superior officers.

The problem of time lag also emerges at several other points in the command structure of state response. The procedures developed to determine whether state involvement is really necessary tend to slow response times.

At one time, the Governor's office required a written statement from the mayor of a city requesting aid which acknowledged that the local authorities could no longer cope with the situation and that the disorder was out of control or about to become uncontrollable. This apparently severe prerequisite for state assistance was necessary, according to several state officials, because local officials would request help before they had even begun to make maximum use of their own resources. For example, when the State Police arrived to help city authorities in a recent disorder, they found that the chief of police had not called back to duty his off-duty officers and was using only about 60 percent of his manpower.

The time lag becomes rather critical when it is necessary to call in the National Guard. Upon requesting Guard support to suppress a riot in his city, one mayor learned the Governor could not deploy the Guard until the following day. That may have been too late. Fortunately, this particular disturbance did not get out of control and the mayor was able to restore order with his own resources along with some help from surrounding communities and the State Police. It may be that, in the early hours of a disorder, that the exercise of conciliatory leadership by the mayor together with the rapid and restrained use of highly mobile State Police units may be more valuable in saving a city than the deployment of a Guard infantry brigade 24 hours later.

Another command limitation at the state level is what I called the "Fail-Safe Problem" in the discussion of operational decision-making in local communities. This is much less of a problem in the case of State Police units, due to their relatively small size and their high level of training. Of course, the State Police does not operate routinely in the military-type formations

that its riot platoons assume in a disorder. A state trooper, like most police officers, generally will operate with minimum supervision and limited demands for coordination in the course of his official duties. Although National Guard troops are trained to operate in disciplined military formations, the Guard represents a different situation with respect to the Fail-Safe Problem.

Unlike the State Police, the National Guard is a part-time force which means that many units are relatively unfamiliar to their members. Typically, unit personnel do not work together on a daily basis and lack the team cohesion that is more characteristic of full-time organizations. About 70 percent of Guard training is for conventional tactical operations against an enemy force; little of this training prepares the Guard troops for operations in cities and built-up areas (some of their communications equipment is ineffective in these situations). The operational implications of the distinctions between "enemies" and "citizens" are also not well developed in this training. Another contributor to the Fail-Safe Problem is that the Guard, especially in Indiana, is relatively untested in major civil disturbances. Related to this lack of experience is the fact that a large part of the Indiana Guard membership has not experienced hostile gunfire or other physical threats -- that such green troops might be "trigger-happy" (to borrow the expression used by General Throckmorton after the 1967 Detroit disorder) is a real possibility. Finally, the commitment of a large force of Guardsmen is itself a control problem. Size alone aggravates communication problems among units and this, together with the turbulent and often hostile circumstances in which units operate, compound the difficulties of maintaining tactical control and weapon discipline.

c. Coordination Processes

A coordination process which also suggests a command limitation revolves around the question of who is in charge during a disorder. One state official said there was considerable difficulty in determining who was in command of the city when its mayor left the command post. The situation he was discussing was a disorder in which state forces were brought in to aid local officials. He was in the city command post with local police and ISP and ING representatives. When the mayor went out of the command post there was no clear agreement on who would make command decisions until the mayor returned. The State Police may be authorized by the Governor to "assist" local authorities, which can include the enforcement of city ordinances. We can assume that local authority is dominant here so that the initiative to employ the ISP people remains with the mayor.

The National Guard is a more perplexing case. One of the tasks of the Guard sub-area commander is to "insure that command of troops is retained by military commanders at all times." That he must also confer with local authorities when determining specific missions for Guard troops during a disorder does not mean that city officials ultimately determine these missions.

One technique which is intended to minimize this coordination problem is the establishment of a mobile command post for the representatives of state agencies. This specially equipped bus will move to the area of the disorder and establish radio and telephone communication links with local authorities and with key state offices, including that of the Governor. In the past, the state command post has housed various ranking state officials during disorders,

including the Adjutant General, the Superintendent of State Police, an administrative assistant to the Governor, and a representative of the Excise Tax Division (which has the authority to close liquor stores in the event of a disturbance). It is not clear that a separate state command post solves the problem of who is in charge of the city during a disorder.

Coordination -- including the exchange of information and advice -- is not limited to state and local governmental agencies. The FBI, military intelligence units, power and gas companies, and a special intelligence unit in the U.S. Department of Justice are among the Federal and private organizations which attempt to coordinate their own programs and share information with the agencies which are involved locally in responding to disorders. The Directorate for Civil Disturbance Planning and Operations (DCDPO) has been established in the Pentagon to provide national decision-makers with a continuous assessment of the civil disorder situation nationwide. The DCDPO coordinates and interprets after-action reports and other data which are provided by the communication channels of various agencies -- such as the National Guard Bureau and state Military Support Plans Officers, military intelligence reports, and the evaluations of military advisors to Guard units.

APPENDIX A

PERSONS INTERVIEWED IN STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISORDER

1. Federal Officials and Other Persons in Washington, D.C.

Military Support Plans Officer, Office of Military Support to  
Civil Authorities, National Guard Bureau, Department of Defense  
Former Military Support Plans Officer, Office of Military Support  
to Civil Authorities, National Guard Bureau, Department of Defense  
Chief, Information Unit, U.S. Department of Justice  
Editor, The National Guardsman Magazine  
Executive Assistant (Public Relations), National Guard Association  
of the United States

2. Federal Officials in Indiana

Chief, Indiana FBI Division Office  
FBI Resident Agent (Gary)  
FBI Resident Agent (Bloomington)  
Senior Regular Army Advisor to Indiana National Guard

3. State of Indiana Officials

State Senate Minority Leader  
Former Administrative Assistant to Governor Branigan on law  
enforcement matters  
Administrative Assistant to Governor Whitcomb on law enforcement  
matters  
Chairman, Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Commission and former  
administrative assistant to Governor Whitcomb on law enforcement  
Assistant Attorney General responsible for organized crime and  
civil disorder  
Superintendent, Indiana State Police (ISP)  
Assistant Superintendent, ISP  
Director of Traffic Division, Field Commander of Riot Control  
Platoons, ISP  
Director of Records and Communications, ISP  
Director of Intelligence Division, ISP  
Operations Center Commander, ISP  
Director of Training and Personnel, ISP  
Director of Public Information, ISP  
Assistant to Director of Business Administration, ISP  
Commanding General, 38th Infantry Division, National Guard  
Former Executive Director, Indiana Criminal Justice Planning Agency  
Adjutant General of Indiana  
Military Support Plans Officer, Indiana National Guard

Deputy Military Support Plans Officer, Indiana National Guard  
 Former Division Personnel Officer, 38th Infantry Division,  
 National Guard  
 Sub-Area Commander (Central), Indiana National Guard  
 Sub-Area Commander (South), Indiana National Guard

4. Evansville Officials

Mayor of Evansville  
 F/Sgt., Indiana State Police

5. Gary Officials

Mayor of Gary  
 Administrative Assistant to Mayor  
 City Comptroller  
 Chief of Police, Gary Police Department (GPD)  
 Assistant Chief, GPD  
 Director of Public Safety  
 Director of Training, GPD  
 Training Division, GPD (Officer)  
 Task Force Commander, GPD  
 Former Chief, GPD; Cmdr., Police-Community Relations Division, GPD  
 Task Force, GPD (Officer)  
 Police-Community Relations Division, GPD  
 Cmdr., Communications and Records, GPD  
 Assistant Fire Chief of Gary  
 Fire Department Dispatcher, Gary  
 Director, Human Relations Commission  
 Staff Member, Human Relations Commission  
 Director, Gary Civil Defense  
 Assistant City Attorney, Gary  
 Chief Deputy Prosecutor, Lake County  
 Cmdr., Schererville State Police Post, ISP  
 Cmdr., Gary Armory, Indiana National Guard  
 Chairman, Government Department, Indiana University at Gary  
 Public Affairs Director, Gary Chamber of Commerce  
 Executive Vice President, Gary Chamber of Commerce  
 Chief, Crown Point Bureau, Gary Post Tribune  
 Director, MARONA House  
 Officer, Detective Division, Gary Police Department  
 Officer, Detective Division, Gary Police Department  
 Chief Deputy Sheriff, Lake County

6. Indianapolis Officials

Mayor of Indianapolis  
 Deputy Mayor of Indianapolis  
 Chief of Police, Indianapolis Police Department (IPD)  
 Deputy Chief of Police (Training and Personnel), IPD  
 Deputy Chief of Police (Operations), IPD  
 Chief, Planning and Research, IPD  
 Sgt., Planning and Research, IPD  
 Fire Chief of Indianapolis  
 Deputy Fire Chief of Indianapolis  
 Chief, Special Investigations Branch, IPD  
 Deputy Fire Chief of Indianapolis  
 President, Indianapolis Board of Safety  
 Sheriff, Marion (Indianapolis) County  
 Director, City-County Civil Defense  
 Marion County Assistant Prosecutor  
 Chairman, Legal Defense Panel, Indianapolis Bar Association  
 Chairman, Lawyers' Commission, Indianapolis Bar Association  
 Executive Director, Lawyers' Commission, Indianapolis Bar Association  
 Director, Human Rights Commission  
 Director, Community Relations, Eli Lilly and Company  
 Director, Indiana Anti-Defamation League  
 Director, Support Your Local Police Committee  
 Police Reporter, Indianapolis Star  
 Police Reporter, Indianapolis News  
 Cmdr. District Nine, Indiana State Police

7. South Bend Officials

Mayor of South Bend  
 Police Chief-Designate, South Bend Police Department (SBPD)  
 Chief, Services Division, SBPD  
 Director, South Bend Police Academy  
 Chief, Community Relations Division, SBPD  
 Traffic Division Captain, PD-CD Liaison, SBPD  
 Sgt., SBPD-National Guard liaison, SBPD  
 Director of Training SBPD  
 Ex-Fire Chief of South Bend  
 Chairman, Human Relations Commission and FEPC  
 Executive Director, Human Relations Commission and FEPC  
 Former Executive Director, Human Relations Commission and FEPC  
 Chief Deputy Sheriff, St. Joseph County

7. South Bend Officials (continued)

Director of Security, Notre Dame University  
Attorney and Special Assistant to the President, Notre Dame University  
St. Joseph County Prosecutor  
Police Chief, Mishawaka Police Department  
Assistant Police Chief, Mishawaka Police Department  
Executive Director, Urban League of South Bend and St. Joseph County  
City Attorney, South Bend  
Acting Civil Defense Director, St. Joseph County  
Indiana State Police Post 1A  
City Editor, South Bend Tribune  
Representative, South Bend Panel of American Women  
Representative, South Bend Panel of American Women

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE USED IN FIELD RESEARCH

Indiana University  
Institute of Public Administration

Dr. Philip S. Kronenberg, Project Director  
Study of Organizational Response to Civil  
Disorder

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

- \*1. Introduction of interviewers and purposes.
  
- \*2. General background, including specific recollection of civil disorder(s):  
query of respondent.
  
- TP 3. How does the number of men on the force compare with the number desired?  
(How many additional men perceived as needed and why?)  
Who sets authorized level?
  
- SP 4. What is the authorized manpower strength of the force?  
How many men are on the force?  
How many supervisory to contact personnel?  
How many non-supervisory staff personnel under command of executive officer?
  
- SP 5. How many men left the force in the last three years and how many have  
been recruited in the same period?
  
- SP 6. What are the recruitment requirements for the \_\_\_\_\_ police?  
Background info: testing; waivers; areas for revision; mean scores on  
criteria?
  
- \*7. What traits would you look for ideally in a recruit?

\*8. Could you briefly describe the overall training program in your department?

Do you feel that recruit and inservice training is necessary?

What difference does it make?

Should there be more of it?

TP 9. What priority is given to training in budget allocations, in view of other demands?

SP 10. Recruit training: subjects and duration; different forms or types of training; cooperative training with other agencies?

Inservice training distinct from recruits: subject and duration; cooperative training?

Further education or training on individual basis: help in form of time or officially allocated money; present participation; where; how many?

SP 11. Who are the instructors in your training program?

From within or outside the department; credentials; qualifications; where trained and how long?

What is your present training budget as a proportion of total budget?

More funds needed for training?

\*12. Is there special training in your department for the control of civil disorder?

Is this individual or unit training?

Recipients of this training--recruits, inservice, both; subjects; forms of training--field, classroom; cooperative with other agencies;

how many have had or are receiving this training

plans for the future.

(patrolmen: what changes, if any, do you think ought to be made?)

\*13. Are those who receive training for civil disorder given special assignments by location, shift, or task?

(Are there special civil disorder units organized on a permanent or intermittent basis?)

\*14. Does your organization have a plan for coping with disorders?

Is it a single formal plan document?

When first drafted; original impetus; which organizations participated in drafting of the plan and in any revisions; when officially reviewed and why; presently anticipated changes in plan; reasons.

\*15. Does the plan specify what the duties and responsibilities of each member or unit of the organization are?

What are these duties and responsibilities?

Who invokes each part of the plan?

TP 16. How are the men mobilized?

Have any studies been made of the time required to mobilize fully?

\*17. According to the plan, if other governmental agencies become involved with you during a civil disorder, how do the specific duties and responsibilities change for each member or unit?

To what extent do your day-to-day operations involve working with these agencies?

\*18. What governmental agencies are included in your plan?

Other jurisdictions at the same level; other levels of government; nature of division of responsibility--geographical or functional.

TP 19. Does the plan provide for a communications network to link all elements of the responding agencies when a joint operation is underway?

Could you describe the system?

What arrangements are planned for communication with the field?

Any agencies excluded; implications?

\*20. In the \_\_\_\_\_ situation, did you experience any communication problems?

TP 21. What roles would each of the following have during a civil disorder:

- (A) prominent private citizens;
- (B) the mass media (press, TV, radio);
- (C) business and industry;
- (D) civic, community or service groups; and
- (E) the general public?

Are any of these roles provided for in the plan?

\*22. What role do police-community and human relations units have before, during; and after a disorder?

TP 23. What would you consider the goal or purpose of interorganizational planning for civil disorder response?

the goal of training for civil disorder?

What is a successful plan or training program?

\*24. In view of the public discussion about the potential for disorders here in Indiana, to what extent do you, as a member of the \_\_\_\_\_, feel that serious riots and disorders are threats to life and property in Indiana?

If there is no threat, why?

Define what constitutes disorder.

Is organization prepared for the situation just described?

Your experience?

(Probe for respondent's theory of cause of disorder--how they occur, why, and who is involved).

\*25. Do you think that new laws are needed to aid in controlling riots?

- \*26. Do you feel that police (or other) response to demonstrations on university campuses should differ from responses to those in so-called ghetto areas?

If so, why? If not, please explain why the two situations merit similar responses.

- \*27. Do you think that if persons committing minor crimes in potential riot situations are not immediately arrested, the situation will progress quickly into an uncontrolled riot?

- \*28. In a potential riot situation, do you feel that the tactic of a massive show of force acts as a deterrent to rioting?

Is a massive show of force very inadvisable?

In your opinion, what tactic would best prevent a disorder from becoming more severe?

- OP 29. In what situations do you operate most independently?

In what situations is teamwork most necessary?

- \*30. Turning to the operational aspects of control, when an officer on ordinary patrol duty encounters a situation he interprets as a disorder, how much assistance can he call in before a supervisory officer takes charge of deployment?

Kinds of units deployed?

Is this the way the police response is ordinarily initiated?

Is this the way it developed in \_\_\_\_\_ situation?

- TP 31. Who determines and how is it determined that a given situation merits the use of crowd/riot control tactics rather than apprehension and arrest techniques?

Reconnaissance and observation?

Containment and cordoning?

How often have control techniques been used in the last five years?

\*32. In the \_\_\_\_\_ incident, did commanding officers seek or get operational advice from civil officials?

Non-officials, community leaders, etc.; from designated representatives of the Governor?

TP 33. How much of your force needs to be committed before other law enforcement agencies are called in?

Which ones first:

at what point is (sheriff, S.P., Governor, National Guard) notified of the need for support;

role of regular army adviser?

\*34. Who decided that the \_\_\_\_\_ incident was over?

What are the steps in withdrawal?

Was there any disagreement among various organizations concerned?

Is it possible that there would be disagreement?

TP 35. What were the criteria for deciding that the \_\_\_\_\_ incident was over?

withdrawal guidelines for commanders.

\*36. In the \_\_\_\_\_ incident, how were the responsibilities of various control forces divided up?

Functional/sectional; if functional, which ones;

is criterion the appropriateness of means (training, numbers, equipment) to task or some other criterion?

\*37. What constitutes the successful handling of a disorder?

(Probe for value implications (e.g., life/property trade-off) limitations on force which should be employed, if any).

\*38. To what extent does the public generally appreciate and support your department?

Does the support given vary among different groups in the community?

Has the rise of civil disorder affected community or group attitudes toward your department?

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The symbols appearing in the margins of the schedule indicate to whom, within a given organization, each of the items applies. The abbreviations apply as follows:

- \* All personnel, or a sample thereof, within the organization.
- TP - "Top-level personnel", within the organization, i.e., those in executive, decision-making positions, such as a Chief of Police.
- SP - "Specialized personnel", such as training, personnel, or communications officer within an organization, who would have technical, substantive knowledge re a particular aspect of organizational response.
- OP - Law enforcement - type operational personnel, e.g., patrolmen.

**END**