


National Criminal Justice Reference Service



This microfiche was produced from documents received for inclusion in the NCJRS data base. Since NCJRS cannot exercise control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, the individual frame quality will vary. The resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the document quality.



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A


Microfilming procedures used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101-11.504.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author(s) and do not represent the official position or policies of the U. S. Department of Justice.

National Institute of Justice
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

Date Filmed

4/9/81



California Youth Authority

1980

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.,
Governor

YOUTH AND ADULT CORRECTIONAL AGENCY

HOWARD WAY,
Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY

PEARL S. WEST,
Director

CHARLES A. KUHL,
Chief Deputy Director

JAMES C. BARNETT,
Deputy Director
Prevention and Community
Corrections Branch

CHON GUTIERREZ,
Deputy Director
Management Services Branch

RUTH E. KRANOVICH,
Deputy Director
Parole Services Branch

AL OWYOUNG,
Acting Deputy Director
Planning, Research, Evaluation
and Development Branch

GEORGE R. ROBERTS,
Deputy Director
Institutions and Camps Branch

DIVISION OF RESEARCH

KEITH S. GRIFFITHS,
Chief

ELAINE DUXBURY,
Research Manager III

DOROTHY M. TORRES,
Principal Investigator
and Author

JOEL M. MURILLO,
Graduate Student Assistant

Alfredo V. Ortiz,
Student Assistant

	<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
SUMMARY	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. EVALUATION DESIGN	5
Overview	5
Process: Design and Methodology	6
Outside Influences: Design and Methodology	9
Outcome: Design and Methodology	10
III. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: THE COMMUNITY AND THE GANGS	15
The Community	15
Gangs	16
IV. PROJECT PROCESSES	20
Staff Organization	20
Conflict Resolution: Third Period	23
Conflict Resolution: Strategies	25
Barrio Associations	28
Federation	30
Recreational Activities	30
Jobs	32
Staff Issues	34
Staff Training	39
V. OUTSIDE INFLUENCES	40
Community	40
Law Enforcement	42
School	43
Media	43
Intradepartmental Contacts	44
Outside Groups	45
VI. PROJECT OUTCOMES	47
Homicides	48
Federation	66
Incidents	69
Summary	81
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS	87
Project Outcome: Statistical	87
Project Processes	89
Federation	91
Outside Influences	92
Other Project Outcomes	93
Conclusions	93

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure Number</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	EVALUATION DESIGN	6
2	HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM) BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	50
3	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED COMPARED TO OTHERS - BY YEAR	54
4	HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: PROJECT-TARGETED COMPARED TO NON-TARGETED - BY YEAR	57
5	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS BY YEAR	60
6	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	62
7	HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM - BY YEAR	65
8	LOS ANGELES COUNTY GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: GVRP BARRIOS AND OTHER GANGS - BY YEAR	68
9	VIOLENT INCIDENTS: PROJECT TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	71
10	TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS: GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	74
11	TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	77
12	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS: SUSPECT-BARRIOS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	80
13	VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: ROBBERY AND NON-ROBBERY RELATED BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	83
14	ROBBERY-RELATED INCIDENTS: BY SUSPECT BARRIOS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	85

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table Number</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM) BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	49
2	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED SUSPECTS COMPARED TO OTHERS	53

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table Number</u>		<u>Page</u>
3	HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: PROJECT-TARGETED COMPARED TO NON-TARGETED BY YEAR	56
4	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS BY YEAR	59
5	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	61
6	HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM BY YEAR	64
7	LOS ANGELES COUNTY GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: GVRP BARRIOS AND OTHER GANGS	67
8	VIOLENT INCIDENTS: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM) BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	70
9	TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS: GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	73
10	TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM	76
11	EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS: SUSPECT-BARRIOS BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	79
12	VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: ROBBERY AND NON-ROBBERY RELATED BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS	82
13	ROBBERY-RELATED INCIDENTS: BY SUSPECT BARRIOS	84

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart I.	GANG VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROJECT ORGANIZATION CHART	21
----------	----------------------------------------------------------	----

APPENDICES

Appendix A	CODE FOR CRIMES	94
Appendix B	GANG CONSULTANT DUTIES AS STATED IN THE CONTRACT	95

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge those who have worked on the Gang Violence Reduction Project during the third funding period and who have contributed toward its accomplishments.

Gang Consultant Staff

Cruz Valadez	Augustine Soto	David Valenzuela
Ernie Garcia	Arthur Quesada	Peter Chavez
Miguel Garcia	Manuel Barron	Larry Barron
Thomas Garcia	Vincent Delgado	Steve Delgado
Augustine Villa	John Herron	Eddie Venegas
Thomas Morales	Gilbert Delgado	Rudy Rivera
Louis Saenz	David Almanza	Herman Aviles
Miguel Alvarez	Mark Delgado	Robert Gomez
Charles Harrison	Mark Amaya	
John Herron	Manuel Escobar	

Youth Authority Staff

Manuel Carbajal	Richard Novoa	Henry Toscano
Fred Martinez	Hilda Castro	Dwayne Wyatt
Tana Gonzales	Peter De La Pena	William Saldana
Teresa Anguiano	Linda Koltes	

Charles Pineda, Director

County of Los Angeles

Leo Cortez, Youth Coordinator

SUMMARY

This evaluation report is for the Gang Violence Reduction Project's third funding period, June 1, 1978 to June 31, 1979. The project was funded by a grant from the Office of Criminal Justice Planning and was administered by the California Youth Authority.

The Gang Violence Reduction Project worked with seven of the approximately 18 feuding gangs or barrios in the target area of the unincorporated part of East Los Angeles.

The project's objectives were: 1) to reduce homicides to six or less and 2) to reduce violent incidents to 163 or less in the target area during a 12-month period. This included homicides or violent incidents where the suspect was from a gang with which the project was working and the victim was either from a gang with which the project was working or was a non-gang member. These objectives were developed from a baseline period of the 12 months before the project was in operation. During this period there were 11 homicides and 181 violent incidents which fit the definitions.

The project's basic strategies were: 1) the promoting of peace through the negotiation of antagonisms in order to mitigate or resolve gang feuds, and 2) the providing of positive activities in which gang members could become involved. Gang consultants, who were generally influential members of the gangs with which the project was working, worked with project staff in implementing the strategies. Meetings of the gang consultants along with other gang members compromised a forum for conflict mediation. Other activities included sports and other recreational activities as well as the development of job opportunities. Barrio association meetings were used in most barrios to help plan activities.

The statistical findings show that the project reached its stated objectives

for the third funding period. Gang-related homicides which were targeted by the project were reduced to two whereas the objectives stated that there would be no more than six. Gang-related violent incidents which were targeted by the project were reduced to 133, whereas the objectives stated that there would be no more than 163. Trends for the data were examined for the period prior to the project's operation and through the first, second, and third periods in order to determine whether or not they showed evidence of project effect. The trend for homicides with project barrios as suspects had been rising but dropped after the project began. This compared with a continued rising trend for gang-related homicides throughout the part of the Los Angeles County under the Sheriff Department's jurisdiction.

The trends for gang-related violent incidents also show evidence of project effect, but the evidence is not as clear. The overall trend had been rising sharply prior to the project's intervention. It became variable after the project began, then dropped, and leveled off at the lower level.

Between-gang violent incidents showed the strongest evidence of project effect. They began dropping after the project began and reached the lowest level since January-June 1975. It is not clear that project effect was responsible for the drop in the trend for violent incidents with project barrios as suspects and non-gang members as victims. This is because the trend did not start downward immediately after the project began. Rather, it dropped somewhat a year later.

Violent incidents with suspects from barrios with which the project was not working were used as a comparison. These incidents did not drop. Rather, they remained somewhat variable with an overall increase evident.

Interpretating violent incident statistics was complicated by an increasing trend for violent incidents with unidentified gangs as suspects. Unidentified gangs as suspects began to increase in the second six months after the project began. This trend peaked and then dropped somewhat the last six months of the third funding period.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Gang Violence Reduction Project is a project developed with the goal of reducing gang-related crimes in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area. It has been funded by the Office of Criminal Justice Planning for three periods beginning in November 1976 and has been operating under the auspices of the California Youth Authority.¹ This paper is the evaluation report for the third period, June 1, 1978 to June 30, 1979.

The East Los Angeles unincorporated area which is the target area for the project has approximately 18 youth street gangs called barrios.² These gangs feud with one another and commit crimes which are a major problem for the community. Their activities often result in deaths. For example, in the two years prior to the project's full operation (1975-76) there were 30 gang-related homicides involving the gangs in the area.

The project's objectives during the first two funding periods were the reduction of gang-related violent and nonviolent incidents in the target area by 10 percent per year. However, after the project began, it was found that the project's resources were sufficient only to work with seven of the major gangs in the area. Therefore, the objectives for the third funding period were modified to include only incidents involving the seven gangs with which the project was working. Moreover, it was found that nonviolent crimes could not be reliably measured; so these objectives were modified to exclude nonviolent crimes.

¹The first two funding periods were November 1976-September 1977 and October 1977-May 1978.

²Any count of the gangs or barrios in the area is problematic because they are always in a state of flux. Some die out as they cease to be active. Others are in the early stages of development and only occasionally engage in illegal activities. The number 18 is used here because 18 gangs have been consistently contributed to the Sheriff Department's incident statistics in the period since the project began.

Also, the experiences during the first two funding periods indicated that while the project was able to reduce violence among gangs with which it was working, it could not be expected to reduce violence between gangs with which it was working and those with which it was not working. Therefore, the third-period objectives were stated to include the former and exclude the latter. Incidents in which a member of a gang with which the project was working was a suspect and nongang member was a victim were included in the objectives as incidents which the project could be expected to reduce.

The project's third-period objectives which are stated below were based on reductions from the 12-month baseline period prior to the project's operation--January 1 to December 31, 1976.

1. The first objective was to reduce homicides in which the suspect was a gang member with whom the project was working and the victim was either a gang member with whom the project was working or a nongang member to 6 or less during the 12 months of the third period.³ These compare with the 11 homicides of the same type during the baseline period.

2. The second objective was to reduce violent incidents in which the suspect was a gang member with whom the project was working and the victim was either a gang member with whom the project was working or a nongang member to 163 or less during the 12 months of the third period. These compare with the 181 violent incidents of the same type during the baseline period.

The approach which the Gang Violence Reduction Project is using to achieve its objectives is unique in that its emphasis is on working with gangs as social groups rather than on working with individuals. Instead of the gangs being broken up, the attempt is being made to change their nature so that they will work to accomplish positive goals rather than engage in negative activities. Feuding is to be reduced through the increasing of communication and positive interactions among the gangs which are fighting.

³Because the third period was extended from 12 to 13 months while the objectives were stated in terms of a 12-month period, the evaluation of the period will be based on the last 12 months of the grant period.

The project was modeled after the Federación de Barrios Unidos (Federation) which came into existence around June 1972 and ended about September 1973.⁴ It began with several barrios deciding to form formal associations. Representatives from these associations along with representatives from other barrios in the area, held meetings at which feuds were discussed and mitigated. A number of interbarrio activities were planned and successfully carried out. At the time, those involved felt that the Federation had been successful in mitigating gang feuds and reducing homicides.

Therefore, following the same general model, the overall plan of the Gang Violence Reduction Project is to hire gang leaders as consultants from seven gangs to work with project staff in community organizing, crisis intervention, and conflict resolution. Their function is to promote the project's goal of peace in their barrios (gangs) and to organize barrio associations to work for positive goals in the community. The plan is, through the consultants, to bring together leaders from each gang neighborhood as representatives to a forum where feuds can be discussed and mitigated. And, the project is to provide recreational activities which involve members from one or several gangs at a time. Community involvement projects are to be started as part of the project to provide learning experiences and activities in which the gang members can be involved.

Because the seven gangs are the target group of the project, it works through its various activities toward directing all members away from committing violent acts. Therefore, it does not differentiate between gang members who are either on Youth Authority parole or county probation and those who are not.

This report will summarize the project processes during the first and second funding periods and analyze in more detail the processes during the third funding period.⁵ In addition, all three periods will be examined as

⁴Information about the Federation was acquired from several people who were involved in forming the Federation.

⁵The summary of previous events will be based on the reports for the first two periods: Dorothy M. Torres, Gang Violence Reduction Project First Evaluation Report, State of California, Department of the Youth Authority, August 1978 and Dorothy M. Torres, Gang Violence Reduction Project Second Evaluation Report, State of California, Department of the Youth Authority, November 1978.

a whole in order to arrive at some generalizations regarding the effectiveness of strategies used and the nature of problems faced by the project.

The statistical analysis will not only evaluate the project's success in reaching its objectives for the third funding period. It will also examine the trends for different types of gang-related violent incidents in the target area in the period prior to the project's implementation as compared to trends during the first, second, and third periods of its implementation.

The overall influence of the project as an intervention technique within its environment will be explored on the basis of the evaluation design.

II. EVALUATION DESIGN

Overview

The evaluation design for the third funding period of the Gang Violence Reduction Project will continue to be the same one used for the evaluations of the first and second funding periods.⁶ Both "hard" and "soft" data have been gathered and analyzed. The major objectives of the evaluation are: 1) to document and analyze the process by which the project is implemented, and 2) to measure the outcome of the project in order to determine whether or not it has succeeded in reaching its stated objectives of reducing gang-related homicides and violent incidents. A secondary objective is to explain what has occurred.


The underlying research question is: What is the effect of the Gang Violence Reduction Project as an intervention technique? The research design which was developed used the project proposal as its basis but was not limited to it. The intention was to leave the design open enough so that unanticipated findings would be possible.

The basic design is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure shows the three aspects which are seen as relevant to the evaluation of the project's intervention effort. In the center are the "Project Processes", or the types of activities in which the project engages. On the left are the possible "Outside Influences" upon the project. These are groups or individuals who can have an effect upon the project processes. On the right are the "Project Outcomes", or its presumed effects. The evaluation analysis is primarily concerned with one direction of influence: influence from those outside the project on the project and the influence of the project on the changes labeled "Outcomes." This direction of influence is represented by the dark arrows in Figure 1.

⁶This chapter is based on Gang Violence Reduction Project Second Evaluation Report, op. cit., Chapter II.

The other possible directions of influence, which are of secondary concern, are shown by the light arrows. One of these is the influence the project outcomes may have on the project processes as they feed back into it. Another is the influence the project may have on groups or individuals outside the project as they become aware of it or as they are directly affected by it. Also, the project's outcomes may independently influence those outside the project, and those outside the project may independently influence what is labeled "Project Outcomes."

FIGURE 1. EVALUATION DESIGN



Process: Design and Methodology

The activities of the project are seen as a process--ongoing, developing occurrences in which certain steps or major events can be discerned.

The analysis of the process was structured beforehand by defining the major activities as stated in the project's proposal. A number of questions were asked about each of the project's activities:

1. What happened?
(This question refers primarily to the history of each activity.)
2. Which techniques worked; which ones did not; and why or why not?
(By techniques is meant the consciously applied strategies used by the project staff as well as those inferred by the researcher.)
3. Which influences, other than specific techniques, contributed to the success or failure of the various project activities?
(The influences referred to here could include outside influences as well as anything which happens within the project itself.)
4. In what way do the project activities appear to relate the outcomes attributed to them?
(This question is necessary because it cannot be assumed that project processes are automatically responsible for particular outcomes. Therefore, it will be necessary to provide evidence which shows that the project processes are related to the outcomes and/or evidence which shows that the outcomes were the result of some influences not related to the project.)
5. What generalizations can be made from the specific occurrences?
(These generalizations can be used for planning similar projects or can be considered hypotheses for future studies.)
6. What other issues are of significance?
(Any other issue which emerges during the project's implementation and which seems important for the analysis will be considered.)

In order to answer the questions listed above, detailed, dated notes of events relevant to the project were kept. They included descriptions of activities, problems which arose, and solutions which were used.⁷ This information was taken from the researcher's experiences and from reports of others who were involved.⁸ The following information was collected for each major aspect of the project processes:

1. Making initial contacts and establishing rapport: a record was kept of the techniques used and their relative degree of success or failure.

⁷The most detailed notes were made during the first funding period when the project processes and the barrios were new to the researcher. After that the notes emphasized basic facts and the unique aspects of events.

⁸The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of the first project director, Charles Pineda, Jr., to the process analysis. He shared his knowledge of the community and the barrios and helped provide his access to the project's ongoing activities. However, the interpretations and conclusions are the author's.

2. Gang meetings: A record was kept of the meetings, including the reasons for meeting, issues discussed, and resolutions.
3. Forum or federation of gangs: Historical records of its development were kept, including how it came about, when and where meetings took place, which gangs were present at each meeting and an approximation of the number present from each gang; and a description of the conflict resolution processes which occurred at the meetings was made.
4. Community involvement projects: The history of each project was recorded, including a description of the project, the planning that was involved, and its degree of success or failure.
5. Recreational and team building activities: A record was kept of the gangs and the number of members participating in each activity; and a record was kept of its planning and problems which arose.
6. Staff and training meetings: A record was kept of the meetings, including discussions of project activities, strategies, and gang related events.

The methods used to gather data on the process were primarily those which are used for qualitative research. This type of research has been developed and employed by many social scientists, with the approach described by Schatzman and Strauss similar to the one being used here.⁹ This approach is one in which the perspective of the participants is used as a way of understanding a social situation. A specific method by which this understanding can be achieved is that of the participant observer. The participant observer learns through taking part in the process activities and reflecting upon them. Among the problems he or she faces are those of establishing rapport and explaining his/her role. The techniques he or she uses are generally field notes, unstructured interviews, and to some extent semistructured interviews.

As a participant observer in the Gang Violence Reduction Project, the researcher was often involved in dealing with very delicate situations which

⁹Schatzman, Leonard and Anselm L. Strauss, Field Research, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1973. Similar methodologies are described in John Loftland, Analyzing Social Settings, Belmont, Calif., Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971, and in Robert Gobdan and Steven J. Taylor, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1975.

initially were unfamiliar to her. Therefore, it was necessary to be sensitive to situations in order not to do anything which might be unacceptable.

No notes have been taken in the field. Rather, events were recorded as soon as possible after an activity. Reflections on the events were recorded as a preliminary type of analysis. Note taking was begun at rather formal project meetings during which no sensitive issues were being discussed. It was discontinued any time someone seemed uncomfortable because of it. After several months, it seemed possible to take notes at all except emotionally charged project meetings.

The researcher was present at most of the project activities which took place during the first 11-month period and at a representative sample of activities after that.¹⁰ Reports were solicited from project staff attending activities which the researcher missed. Weekly semi-structured interviews were begun with project supervisory staff in January 1979 to help insure that their activities were being communicated to the researcher. Also, loosely structured interviews were conducted throughout with gang consultants about their work for the project.

Outside Influences: Design and Methodology

The aspect labeled "Outside Influences" in the evaluation design is defined very broadly. It includes any social entity or individual which can affect or be affected by the Gang Violence Reduction Project's activities. Although several are listed in Figure 1, consideration is not limited to them.

Information about outside influences has been obtained in the same manner as information on the project processes. The researcher has made records of

¹⁰Other research activities such as writing reports and analyzing statistics and process data made it impossible for the researcher to attend all events. It is possible that the researcher did not become aware of some project-related events or of some aspects of others during the second and third funding periods because she was not always able to take part in the day-by-day activities of the project. However, efforts were made to compensate for this by seeking information from many different individuals.

events of which she has become aware through being present as a participant observer or through reports from others who were present.

The research was structured by the following questions:

1. What contacts has the project made with outside groups or individuals? What has been the nature of the contacts? And, what, if any, outcomes are discernible?
2. What type of media coverage has there been on gangs and on the project? And what direct or indirect effect, if any, has this coverage had on the project processes, on the project outcomes, or on those outside the project?

Outcome: Design and Methodology

Analysis. The third-period outcome analysis in this report is primarily concerned with the effect the Gang Violence Reduction Project has had on gang-related violent incidents among the gangs with which it is working, and between them and non-gang members. Other outcomes that become evident are also noted.

The seven gangs with which the project is working will be the focus of the analysis of project effect in this report, rather than all the gangs in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area as was the case in the previous reports. This modification is being made because the objectives for the third period are specific to those gangs and because this focus will provide a truer picture of the effect of the project.

As has been stated, there are two primary objectives to the outcome analysis. One is to determine whether or not the project met its specific objectives for the third funding period and the other is to determine whether or not there is evidence of project effect on particular types of violent incidents across time.

In order to achieve the second objectives, trends will be examined. Comparisons will be made between the trends prior to the project's implementation and those since it has been in operation. Also, comparisons will be made among different types of incidents, as well as between gangs with which the project has been working and those with which it has not worked directly.

The criteria used as evidence of project effect will be: 1) a change in trend which occurred at the time the project's intervention began or shortly thereafter; 2) a change which is maintained or which becomes more pronounced; and 3) whether or not a similar change occurred among groups which the project did not work. This way of analyzing trends is consistent with the types of analysis described by Campbell and Glass, et. al."

Time Periods. For the purpose of analyzing trends, the project implementation will be seen as beginning in January 1977. This is justifiable because the first two months, November and December 1976, were used primarily for hiring personnel and setting up an office with only limited intervention in the barrios. The trends will be drawn using both six-month and one-year time periods on the horizontal axis. The one-year period tends to provide a smoother trend line for the homicides, which are few in number, but tends to hide immediate project effect. Because the project objectives are based on a 12-month (rather than 13-month) period, the third period will be analyzed as a 12-month period beginning July 1, 1978 and ending June 30, 1979.

Data. The data used for the analysis of gang-related violent incidents have been taken from records kept by the East Los Angeles Sheriff's gang unit.¹² These data have been used because they are the most reliable source of data

¹¹ Campbell, Donald T., "Reforms as Experiments: in Elmer L. Struening and Marcia Guttentag (Eds.), Handbook of Evaluation Research, Vol. 1, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1975; Campbell, Donald T., "From Description to Experimentation: Interpreting Trends as Quasi-Experiments," in Hester W. Harris, Problems in Measuring Change, Madison, Wisc., The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963; and Glass, Gene V., Victor L. Willson, and John M. Gottman, Design and Analysis of Time-Series Experiments, Boulder, Colo., Colorado Associated University Press, 1975, pp. 15 and 44.

The design being used here is one with a continuous intervention on one group and with non-equivalent groups used as comparisons. It can be illustrated as follows:

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc}
 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & X & X & X & & \\
 \hline
 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 & 2 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
 \hline
 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 & 3 \\
 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0
 \end{array}$$

¹² Personnel of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Substation in East Los Angeles, and Deputy Wes McBride in particular, have been very generous in allowing the researcher to use their data. Without it, this part of the analysis would not have been possible.

available on gang-related crimes in the project target area. They are kept in the form of incident reports, which include a brief description of each incident.

Because the same deputy has been in charge of the records since 1975, there has been continuity in the records since then. However, there is evidence that some changes in reporting have occurred. Separate records are kept for homicides, and these are available from 1971 through the present. Although homicides are almost always reported, there may have been an increase through the years in the homicides being reported as gang-related. And the data for recent years contain more complete information than that kept in the past.

Data on all types of gang-related incidents are available from 1975, but there have been some changes in reporting procedures. In 1975, only the most significant events were reported by the deputies in the field, and, as a result, many incidents were not included in the data. In 1976, the procedure was changed so that all incidents involving gangs were reported to the deputy in charge of statistics. But, since others were still responsible for making the reports, no doubt some gang incidents were missed. Since 1977, he has reviewed all incident reports and has separately identified the gang-related reports. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that some of the increase in gang incidents between 1975 and 1976 and between 1976 and 1977 may be due to the changes in reporting procedures.

The information given in the incident reports is based on the field deputies' reports and may have been updated with information acquired later. However, some types of information are not uniformly included in all incident reports. For example, in one incident report the degree of injury may be specified while in another no mention may be made about whether or not injuries occurred.

Also, there were many incidents in which the suspect was thought to be a gang member but the identity of the gang was not known. These incidents can present a problem for the analysis because there can be included among them suspects who are not gang members, members of gangs from outside the target area, members of Gang Violence Reduction Project (GVRP) barrios and members of other barrios in the target area. If the number or the rate of incidents with suspects from the unidentified barrios remains relatively stable, they can be interpreted as a constant in analyzing the rest of the data. But if there is a

drastic change in their number or rate across time, it is difficult to adequately interpret the rest of the data.

The definition of a gang incident which is used in the analysis is partially based on the Sheriff's Department operating definition: One or more illegal activities occurring at about the same time and place involving gang members as suspects. However, for purposes of the analysis each death is counted as one incident. In addition, occasionally a long, complicated incident report was separated into several simpler incidents involving distinct illegal activities.

As indicated earlier, only incidents involving violent crimes have been selected for the analysis. These were defined as crimes in which physical force was used against persons or property or in which there was a threat of injury to a person. Incidents in which the only violence reported occurred during the arrest procedure were not included.

Only incidents involving crimes by or between gangs in the unincorporated part of East Los Angeles were chosen for the analysis. Therefore, incidents in which either the suspects or victims were from gangs outside the area were excluded. However, incidents with suspects classified as being from unidentified barrios were counted if the victim was from a barrio in the area, another unidentified barrio, or a nongang member. And fewer than one percent of the reported gang incidents were dropped from the analysis because of lack of information regarding the crime committed or which gang, if any, was involved. For example, if there was a report that someone had heard shooting and when the Sheriff's deputies arrived, they could find no evidence of who did the shooting or who or what was being shot at, the incident was excluded from this analysis.

The likelihood of a crime being reported as well as its being investigated in detail increases with the seriousness of the crime. Many incidents are not reported. For example, Sheriff's personnel estimate that only one in four or five of the instances of shooting at houses is reported. The assumption that is made here is that the rate of reporting for the various crimes being analyzed has not changed over time.

The researcher and, later, student assistants coded information from each reported gang incident which fit the criteria given above. A maximum of two suspect gangs and two victim gangs could be coded for each incident. If several crimes were reported in an incident, the most serious one was coded. The crimes were subdivided into general categories relevant to gang activities rather than into those used by law enforcement. For example, all types of beatings were coded into one category except those in which a stabbing also took place; then coding the stabbing took precedence over coding the beating. (See Appendix A.) In addition, every incident was coded as either robbery-related or not robbery-related. These coded incidents are the basis for the analysis in this and the previous reports.

III. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: THE COMMUNITY AND THE GANGS

A brief summary of the nature of the community and the gangs of the East Los Angeles unincorporated area follows. More detailed versions of this chapter can be found elsewhere.¹³

The Community

The setting in which the Gang Violence Reduction Project operates consists of the community in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area and the gangs within the community. The unincorporated area which is the target area for the project is approximately eight square miles and is surrounded by the City of Los Angeles and four smaller municipalities. Its population, based on the 1970 census, was 104,648, of which 88% were Spanish-surnamed.

The socio-economic characteristics of the area are no doubt related to its problems. The average years of school completed by those 25 years of age and older is 8.8 as compared to the Los Angeles County average of 12.4 (1970 census). In a survey done in the area, it was found that 23% of the households had incomes below the poverty level¹⁴ and that the unemployment rate in the area was 17%.¹⁵ According to the 1970 census, less than 15% of the workers were in professional, technical, managerial, and sales categories. On the other hand, over 65% of the workers in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area

¹³ Torres, Dorothy M., Gang Violence Reduction Project First Evaluation Report, op. cit., Chapter III; and Torres, Dorothy M., "Chicano Gangs in the East L. A. Barrio", Youth Authority Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3, Fall 1979, pp. 5-13.

¹⁴ The East Los Angeles Community Union (TELACU) and Community Planning and Development Corporation (CPDC). Unincorporated East Los Angeles Social and Community Environment Assessment Program, Volume II Preferences and Issues Sub-Program, October 1976, p. 56.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 51. The same method as used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was used for analyzing employment and unemployment.

were in the clerical, craftsmen, foremen, and operations--non-transport categories. Thus, it can be seen that the socio-economic level of the area is low. The relationship between gangs and areas with low socio-economic status have been noted by many social scientists.¹⁶ It may be that the environment in such areas generates conditions favorable for the development of gangs and gang delinquency.

Whatever the cause, it is true that in the East Los Angeles community gangs are of major concern. When asked to rate several problems or issues, 45% of a representative sample of residents chose juvenile delinquency as the most urgent problem.¹⁷ Thirty-one percent of the residents felt that there was a serious youth problem in their own neighborhood.¹⁸ However, informal discussions with community residents indicate that there is a large gap between the average resident and gang members. The residents expressed a lack of understanding of the gang phenomenon. Their usual interactions with gang members were negative ones.

Gangs

The gang phenomenon has a long tradition in East Los Angeles. Not very much is known about their origins, but people in the community state that they began in the 1920's. Some of the gangs in existence today began in the 1920's or 1930's. Others are relatively recent, beginning within the last ten years. And according to reports from the Sheriff's office, a number of new gangs are emerging at the present.

The word "gang", which has negative connotations, is never used by the members. They speak of themselves as a barrio¹⁹ and speak of the territory which

¹⁶For example, see Thrasher, Frederic M., The Gang (Abridged and with an Introduction by James F. Short, Jr.), Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1963; Cohen, Albert, Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1955; and Miller, Walter B., "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency", Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 14, Summer 1958, pp. 5-19.

¹⁷TELAC and CPDC, Vol. II, po. cit., p. 14.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁹This use of the term, barrio is different from its general use which refers to an entire Mexican-American community or neighborhood. The gang members use barrio to refer to the membership and territory of each gang.

they claim as their barrio or neighborhood. Both words, barrio and gang, will be used in this report depending upon the perspective taken.

The size of the barrio territories in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area vary considerably. They range from a few square blocks to about one square mile. It is difficult to get accurate estimates of memberships but they seem to range from about 30 to about 200 with one barrio that may have as many as 500 members. The larger ones average about 80 to 100 members. These estimates include all members--those who are active as well as those who are not very active. Although barrios in the area are primarily male in membership and orientation, many have female members.

The median age of barrio members is estimated to be 17 to 18. Youngsters generally begin to join when they are about 14 and begin disassociating themselves from barrio activities by the time they reach 21 or 22. There are a few members as young as 12 and some continue to be active into their late 20's.

Although the barrio or gang members are part of the East Los Angeles community, their relation to the community has typically been one of a high degree of alienation. Gang members often tend to be disliked by the community and are often prevented from using parks or other recreational facilities. Service agencies have generally not worked with what are called "hard core" gang members. However, some have worked with marginal youngsters, attempting to keep them out of gangs.

As might be expected, gang members' relations which law enforcement are not good. In general, officers see gang members as being very bad and incapable of reform. In turn, gang members see law enforcement as constraining them in all their normal activities. They complain of being harassed and physically assaulted by officers.

Schools also have difficulty with gang members. Many members do not go to school because they have dropped out or have been suspended due to their tendency to get into fights with rivals. Those who are most active are less likely to continue attending school than those who are less active. However, it seems that the members of the gang which claims a school as its territory

or who are not feuding with other gangs in the school are often able to attend with few problems.

The internal perspective on the gangs or barrios which is held by the members is quite different from the view held by those on the outside.

Barrio members are very proud of their neighborhood, which they see as good. The barrio is made up of friends and acquaintances called homeboys who are bound together with a strong sense of loyalty. The activities in which they engage are primarily social in nature. They get together and talk, drink, and take drugs. While under the influence of the intoxicants, they often act "crazy", or locos. Since activities such as loitering, drinking under age, the taking of or the possession of drugs, and disturbing the peace are illegal activities, they are subject to arrest. Although some members work, the most active usually do not have any apparent means of support. Therefore, they may engage in illegal and sometimes violent activities to acquire money. However, these illegal activities are not the reason for the existence of the barrio or gang.

Within any barrio, members do not engage equally in all activities. Most are involved in the relatively minor illegal activities and only a minority are engaged in the most serious crimes. In any barrio, there is a central core which is highly active in all activities.

The 18 barrios in the target area themselves also vary in their involvement in crime. The violent incident reports analyzed for this report can be used as an indication of their criminal activity. During the 18 months between January 1978 and June 1979, each of the six most active barrios was involved as suspects in an average of 2 to 3 reported violent incidents per month. Each of the three least active barrios for whom data are reported were involved in only 1 or 2 of these incidents during the entire 18-month period. There are numerous smaller barrios, not considered in the analysis, which have not been involved as suspects in any reported incidents.

One of the most serious activities of the barrios is feuding. The feuds are equivalent to wars between countries. Relations between barrios are such that some are feuding, others are neutral, and others are friendly. Some barrios have a long tradition of feuding while others have only recently begun to fight.

Feuding takes on a uniform character as it is carried out through distinct types of activities. True gang fights have been rare the past few years because of the increase in the use of guns. Typical attacks between barrios are: fist fights; assaults with knives or other weapons; and shooting at homes, cars, or people. When a feud is hot, members will seek out the enemy barrio to attack. However, members of feuding barrios will generally engage in violent confrontation any time they encounter one another. When a barrio is involved in a hot feud, it provides the primary focus for the members' activities. At such a time the members are very much concerned with preserving their barrio and protecting its honor.

In summary, it can be said that the descriptions of the feuds and the other aspects of the barrio life which have emerged from the research present a picture of a life with various contradictions. It is a life in which there is much enjoyment and warmth arising from being in the company of friends, and a life in which there is the excitement of being involved in daring and dangerous activities. But there is also much sadness and anger arising from the instances in which a beloved "home boy" has been killed by another barrio. This life, which members call the vida loca, meaning the "crazy life", contains many frustrations. Among the causes of frustration are the lack of money and the unavailability of jobs, not having much to do, and not being accepted nor helped by others. These frustrations help feed the anger and hatred that is characteristic of the barrio. It takes anger and hatred to keep the feuds going, and these feelings make it easier for individuals to commit robberies and assaults. Frustrations also cause psychological pain and it may be that drugs are used to help alleviate this pain.

IV. PROJECT PROCESSES

The Gang Violence Reduction Project's processes, or the on-going activities, will be discussed in this chapter. Events occurring during the third funding period (June 1, 1978-June 31, 1979) will be described and those occurring during the first and second periods (November 1976-May 1978) will be summarized. An analysis of all the periods will be made in order to generalize about these processes.

Staff Organization

When the project started, there were five staff members: a director (Parole Agent II), two field workers (a Parole Agent I and a Parole Aid), one secretary (Office Assistant II), and one research evaluator (Research Assistant III). There were 10 gang consultant slots filled during the first six months. By the end of the first year, two additional Parole Agent I's, a Parole Aid Trainee, and a student assistant for the research evaluator had been added to the staff. By the end of the second year, two additional gang consultant slots and a Parole Aid had been added.

Figure 2 shows an organization chart representing the relationships among project staff as they were during most of the third period. The roles of the project staff will be summarized here with further elaboration in the sections below.

The role of the project director was that of providing direction and inspiration, of overseeing activities, and of serving as an intermediary between the project and Youth Authority administration. During the third project period he spent no more than 20% of his time in the field although when the project began, he had spent most of his time in the field. The section supervisors' role was primarily that of working with the gang consultants. They encouraged mediation when necessary, helped plan activities, and kept track of the consultants' hours.




CHART I. GANG VIOLENCE REDUCTION PROJECT ORGANIZATION CHART

*Signifies barrios (gangs).

The gang consultants' role was that of intermediary between the project and the gang members.²⁰ The consultants met as a forum during regularly scheduled project meetings and occasionally at specially called meetings. They worked daily with their barrio's members, helping stop incidents or becoming involved in mediation efforts when necessary. They helped organize association meetings and recreational activities. They also provided other services to their barrio members, such as informing them of job openings and helping them with the application procedures and on occasion assisting them with the steps involved in solving personal problems.

The role of the individual called the "Field Services Coordinator" was that of helping staff in coordinating activities and helping with some aspects of the paper work required of the project. The individual labeled "Resource Developer" in the figure had several roles. He researched job opportunities and contacted community agencies about their services and then either presented the information he acquired at project meetings or brought speakers to the meetings. He assisted with other project activities and helped the consultants work in the barrio of which he was a member.

The role of the Youth Services Coordinator who was hired by Los Angeles County continued to be that of working along with the project in its various aspects. He spent less time in project-related activities than he had in the past--about 20 to 30% of full time. The Youth Worker hired under a Los Angeles City recreational program spent about 50% of his time working along with the gang consultants, particularly those in one barrio.

The roles of the secretary and of those filling the temporary, assistant secretary position were those of receptionists, typists, file clerks, and coordinators of office paper work.

The role of the research evaluator was that of documentor of activities and analysis. From the perspective of an observer, she often provided input

²⁰ See Appendix B for a copy of the gang consultant duties as stated in their contracts.

into the project's day-to-day decisions. Two individuals filled the position of part-time student assistant at different times, working from about 25-50% of full time. Their main role was that of assisting with the coding and displaying of violent incident data. One also made some voluntary contributions to project activities.

As can be seen in Figure 2, the staff was larger than it would otherwise have been because it was able to utilize CETA²¹ positions. These CETA positions provided additional gang consultants for several months, an assistant to the secretary for most of the period, and two parole aid trainees throughout.

Conflict Resolution: Third Period

Although conflict resolution was not required as often during the third funding period as it had been when the Gang Violence Reduction Project began, it continued to be extremely important in controlling the feuds.

When the project started in November 1976, there were five active feuds among the project's seven barrios and two inactive feuds. At the end of the second funding period (May 1978), peace prevailed among the seven barrios.²² One major peace treaty and two peace agreements had been reached. Two other feuds were in what can be called a "cold war" state.

At the beginning of the third period one of the cold war feuds became reactivated. A car which was thought to contain members of one barrio drove by and shot at a group from another barrio, hitting and killing one of the project's gang consultants. No clear evidence regarding the reason for the shooting has become known to the researcher. At the same time that the hot feud broke out between the two project barrios, the injured barrio began attacking other enemy barrios not participating in the project. This invited counterattacks and renewed other feuds. The best explanation for this behavior

²¹ These positions are funded by the federal government under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act.

²² See Gang Violence Reduction Project Second Evaluation Report, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

is that the members felt angry, hurt, and frustrated, and therefore felt the need to lash out at everyone.

Project staff began talking to members of the two barrios in the project in an attempt to cool the feud, but it was difficult to get them to consider peace. The next strategy employed was that of taking the most active members of each barrio away from the area on separate camping trips. Each group went knowing the other group was also going away at the same time to talk about the possibility of peace. Although no resolution was reached, the trip seemed to have brought about a decrease in the number of incidents between the barrios.

During the six months after the initial killing, four individuals who were members or associates of either of the two feuding barrios were killed. Neither the suspects in these homicides nor their barrio memberships were known to the Sheriff's Department. Because each of the barrios was also feuding with barrios which were not part of the project, it is not possible to make a reliable guess as to which barrios were responsible for the killings. Because of the circumstances which were known about the homicides, it seems to the researcher that one or two of the homicides might have been attributable to the feud. This speculation is taken into consideration in the analysis of the data below.²³

After about eight months, the feud cooled down considerably with incidents occurring only occasionally. Professional staff and gang consultants investigated each of these incidents to mediate them in order to help prevent flareups in the feud and to help reestablish a more permanent peace. There were instances in which gang consultants were known to have prevented incidents between the two barrios.

Another of the cold war feuds became activated with outbreaks of incidents occurring from time to time during the third period. Although the project's efforts at negotiating did not achieve a total cessation of activity,

²³ See page 51.

the indications are that these efforts helped keep the feud from becoming hot and, thus, may have prevented some deaths.

A third feud between two of the barrios which had a peace agreement also required some mediation. A few minor-to-moderate incidents occurred. In one of these, a member of one of the barrios apparently crossed out the name, or placa, of the other barrio which was written on a wall. This and the other incidents were successfully negotiated so that the feud did not become reactivated.

Conflict Resolution: Strategies

The Gang Violence Reduction Project's experiences in conflict resolution during its three years of operation make it possible to draw some generalizations about strategies which tend to be successful and those which tend to be unsuccessful.

Intervention strategies. When an incident occurs between two barrios which are not fighting or which are involved in a relatively cool feud, it seems that the intervention strategies employed must have particular characteristics to be successful. These are stated below as propositions.

1. Immediate intervention is essential. The more quickly after an incident occurs that intervention begins, the more likely it is that it will be successful. As time passes after an incident, the possibility of retaliation increases as does the possibility that many people who were not directly involved will become aware of it and become angry.
2. It is necessary to investigate the exact details of an incident from the perspectives of all those involved. The details often reveal a different reality than that of the rumors which are being circulated.
3. An important, but often difficult, step is bringing together all those involved in an incident, all others specifically affected by it, and a neutral third party who is interested in negotiating the differences. It is less likely that an incident will be successfully resolved if individuals who were not present negotiate in behalf of those that were involved in an incident than if both sides in the negotiations have first-hand knowledge.
4. Delaying tactics are sometimes necessary immediately after an incident

occurs when all the details are not known. Those who feel harmed and who wish to retaliate need to be asked to hold back on any action with the understanding that the incident will be investigated by responsible individuals.

Role of mediators. When the two (or more) sides involved in an incident are brought together, it is important to have one or more individuals present who can serve as mediators. This is because those involved are often quite emotionally charged. The required characteristics of the mediators are that they must be respected by both sides. If they are not barrio members, they must have a very good understanding of the way of thinking of the barrio members. Their role is to encourage interaction between the two sides and help them resolve the conflict in such a way that peace will be the result rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Negotiations. Successful negotiations require that everyone tell exactly how they feel without holding back. If someone holds back some essential facts or does not express his true feelings, apparently successful negotiations will later be revealed as failures. If an agreement is reached, all those present as well as others who are affected by the incident need to concur for the negotiations to be successful. This generally requires asking each person whether or not he agrees. Silence often means disagreement in the barrios.

Resolution of incidents. A number of different types of agreements or resolutions of incidents have occurred.

1. In some cases when all the facts were aired, the consensus has been that, while individuals were blameless, others misinterpreted their motives. An example of this type of case was an instance in which a member of one barrio went to visit his girlfriend who lived in an enemy barrio. While he had not gone there to do anyone any harm, the members of the second barrio felt that he had bad intentions. An agreement was possible because the two barrios were no longer engaged in an active feud. It was agreed that he could visit the girlfriend's home as long as he went directly there and left without causing any problems. The agreement was reciprocal so that the second barrio would also be allowed to visit friends or relatives that lived in the first barrio.
2. Another type of resolution has been guilt with an explanation. In

such a case an individual might claim he was under the influence of drugs and did not know what he was doing. His behavior could then be seen, not as a challenge to another barrio, but as an irrational act.

3. An incident can be resolved if all agree that what occurred was a mistake. For example, an attack might have been intended to hit at an enemy barrio, but someone from a neutral barrio might have been the victim instead. Therefore, the neutral barrios do not have to go to war.

4. An agreement not to retaliate has occurred when no one was hurt as the result of an attack and when the exact nature of the events could not be determined. The consensus in this case was that, as from all appearances each side was sincere in trying to negotiate and since no one wanted a feud to break out, no further action would be taken.

5. Another type of resolution was that in which a barrio either "disowned" a barrio member or his actions. For example, a barrio might agree that an individual had indeed committed the act in question, but that he was not acting in behalf of the entire barrio. Therefore, his behavior was interpreted as being individualistic and it was not necessary that the two barrios go to war because of it. Such a resolution seems to work only for minor incidents and holds only as long as the behavior is not repeated. Essentially, the agreement is stated in terms such as: "We'll forget it, as long as it doesn't happen again."

6. A partial resolution has occurred in a few cases. In these cases it was decided that for the injured party to be satisfied and justice be done, a fair fight was necessary. Although the researcher was not always able to find out whether or not a fight did occur, it seems that in general the fights have not take place. Apparently the fact that the other was willing to take part was sufficient to end the conflict. It is believed by many experienced in negotiations that the "fair-fight" solution is not a good one because in many instances, the loser gets mad and wants to retaliate.

Feuds. The strategies stated above apply only to incidents occurring between barrios which have not been fighting for some time or who are neutral or friendly. The steps in the resolution of an active feud were outlined in the First Evaluation Report.²⁴ The basic strategy is that, once both sides are

²⁴ Op. cit., Torres, p. 50-58.

ready to consider peace, all the major figures from each side are brought together with neutral parties to negotiate. Experience has shown that more than one meeting is often required.

Failures. There are some strategies on the part of third parties which have failed to bring about peace agreements. Some of these are stated below.

1. Apply pressure on individuals so as to force them into saying that they will go along with a peace agreement rather than trying to convince them of the rationale behind peace and waiting until they truly come to agree.

2. Being presumptuous about the feelings of those who have been hurt by the enemy barrio rather than respecting them. This relates to failing to appreciate the depth of the injury which has been suffered not only by those who were personally hurt, but by those who were related to them.

3. Singling out individuals from feuding barrios and suggesting that they cease to attack the enemy barrio. This only makes matters worse. (This must be distinguished from selling someone on the need for working toward peace.)

4. Working with members of one barrio involved in a feud and trying to get them to cease attacks without simultaneously working with the other barrio.

5. Using a barrio member who is not very influential (or who does not have very much palabra) to try to convince others that they should work toward peace.

Barrio Associations

One aspect of the project's plan for achieving its objectives was the development of barrio associations. The development of associations would involve transforming barrio meetings, which barrios have always had and which they have used to socialize and to make plans, into more formal-type meetings which would be used to plan positive activities and promote the project's goals.

Although barrio association meetings have been held since the first funding period, there have continued to be problems in organizing and maintaining them. During the third funding period, five of the seven barrios each had several meetings. The barrio which met most often had been having semi-regular

meetings since the project began and continued to do so. One barrio met only once and another had no association-type meetings. Attendance at the meetings has averaged from about 12 to 30 members.

The barrio meetings have been useful in keeping the barrio members aware of the project and the goals it represents as well as its activities. They have also been used for announcing job opportunities and planning sports and other recreational activities.

One of the initial problems encountered in setting up the meetings is that of getting the members accustomed to going to the meetings regularly. It has been found that, in order to accomplish this, it is important that the meetings always be at the same time and place and that the gang consultants continually encourage the members to come.

A second problem is the need for an overriding purpose for meeting which appeals to the barrio members. When meetings have been called for a specific purpose, such as planning an outing, the turn-out has generally been good. Younger members may be attracted if they know that there will be a movie or a game after the meeting; however, the meetings must accomplish something for them to continue to attend.

During the second and third funding period, stipends of \$5 have been paid to each of the three persons in charge of conducting the meeting as a way of encouraging weekly meetings. It is evidence of the extremely social nature of the barrios that the money has been used for activities rather than by the individuals for their own needs. Some of the barrio associations have also had car washes as a means of making money for recreational activities or for helping with the burial costs of members.

There have been problems in getting satisfactory places to meet. When the project started, it was difficult for it to get permission to use recreation and other community facilities for the meetings of the barrio associations. This was no longer a serious problem during the third period in most of the barrios. Those in charge of the facilities usually required assurances that there would be no writing on the walls and that the supervisor from the project be present. However, three of the barrios had not been able to find a public place where they could meet on a regular basis.

Association meetings seem to function best when a barrio is basically at peace and having no problems. Any serious problem which affects a barrio interferes with association meetings. The problems can include an incident with another barrio or within the barrio as well as problems with law enforcement. The latter can include the fact that several members have been arrested or the fact that law enforcement increasing its patrol and the members are afraid to assemble for fear of getting arrested as they arrive or leave.

Federation

The concept of a Federation of United Neighborhoods (or Barrios Unidos) was not a significant concept during the third period. It had been promoted when the project began. When the development of a business was being considered, the plan had been to incorporate the Federation to run the business. When the Youth Authority decided that a business was not a feasible idea for the project to pursue, the concept of the Federation was gradually dropped from active consideration.

Recreational Activities

Recreational activities sponsored by the project seem to be an important supplement to the conflict resolution strategies. As members are steered away from feuding activities, it is important to have more positive directions in which to steer them.

Some of the activities during the third funding period were sports activities (including softball) among all the seven barrios on the first of July, softball games between six of the barrios during August and September, and several handball games involving three barrios. There were also various types of outings such as picnics and beach trips involving one barrio at a time. Twelve to 25 individuals attended each of these activities. There were several larger trips. One barrio went to Disneyland. There were four two-day trips to a private camp ground which had cabins around a lake. A different barrio attended each one. All the barrios attended the theatrical show, Zoot Suit, on either of two days, with a total of 70 attending.

Activities with all seven barrios present at once were not possible after July because of the conflicts discussed above. The sports activities allowed inter-barrios interactions, but most of the other activities involved only one barrio at a time.

The recreational activities were beneficial to the project's goals, primarily as diversions, and were enjoyable to those who went, giving many a chance to have experiences that they might not have had otherwise. For example, those going to the cabins by a lake in a beautiful mountainous area near Santa Barbara expressed feelings of exhilaration and a sense of freedom that they apparently had never felt before.

However, some problems arose which show that there are inherent difficulties associated in working with barrio members. Some of the difficulties included those of organizing activities; based on what individuals said, it was often assumed that more were going to attend an activity than actually showed up. There were usually difficulties in getting started on time. Quite often, at the time everyone was supposed to assemble, it would be found that some had not arrived because they needed rides, necessitating their being picked up, and that others had failed to bring the necessary items so that they would have to return to get them.

Another difficulty is the ever-present potential of conflict arising. Considering the large number of activities which the project has organized, the fact that there have been few incidents is quite extraordinary. It seems that the reason for this success has been that precautions have been taken. Situations which could have posed a potential for conflict have been avoided quite often based on the advice of the consultants. However, several minor incidents occurred which could have become serious had it not been for the intervention of staff and consultants. Therefore, the staff became more cautious during the last part of the third period, avoiding activities with large members of participants particularly if more than one barrio would be present.

The difficulties which were stated in the First Evaluation Report²⁵ are also always present. These relate to the life style of barrio members and the fact that they are accustomed to drinking and taking drugs as part of their ordinary recreation. This made it necessary that the project arrange events in such a manner as to discourage indulgence. However, the exercise of rigid

²⁵ op. cit., p. 65.

standards can result in barrio members refusing to take part in activities, defeating the purpose of the activities. Therefore, discretion has been required in the setting of standards.

Jobs

The fact that the need for jobs is a major concern for many barrio members has been evidenced since the project began by the need being brought up at association meetings and by members often coming to the project office to ask for information about job openings.

It seems that barrio members have difficulties in getting and keeping jobs for numerous reasons: 1) There are not very many jobs available for which they are qualified; 2) they often do not find out about openings in time to apply; 3) many do not have cars to go to jobs outside the area and some are initially uncomfortable going to work in distant and unfamiliar areas; 4) extremely menial jobs, such as being box boys, do not appeal to most members; 5) some local companies and job placement offices will not consider individuals for jobs whom they feel are gang members (as evidenced by dress and tatoos); 6) some members are not accustomed to working and to abiding by the rigid and precise schedules required by most jobs; 7) most members who have developed barrio pride are not accustomed to allowing themselves to be treated with what they consider to be disrespect or to allowing themselves to be "bossed around" as is sometimes required for keeping certain jobs.

The Gang Violence Reduction Project has become involved in providing job opportunities for barrio (gang) members in various ways. Gang consultants and other staff have occasionally informed members about openings and often have helped them in applying for jobs through activities such as providing transportation to job sites.

During the second funding period, the gang consultants spoke to personnel from a local agency in charge of allocating jobs under the "Summer Youth Employment Program" (SYEP).²⁶ The consultants asked that some slots be allocated to

²⁶ These were made available by federal monies under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, Title IV.

the project for the summer of 1978. After meeting with project staff, the agency allowed the project to have 21 slots. This meant that each barrio could get 3 slots. The jobs were for 20 hours per week for a period of 10 weeks. Those eligible were low income youth between the ages of 14 and 21.

The following summer (1979), the project was once again made eligible for 21 slots since it had received them the year before. In addition, some barrios received slots from other agencies located in their areas. These slots were coordinated by the gang consultants in these areas. Therefore, because of the cooperation of the local agencies and the project, it was possible for numerous barrio members to receive some income during the two summers. According to barrio members, in the past they had been excluded from any special job slots that had become available in the community.

The SYEP workers had just begun working at the end of the third funding period. The evidence thus far is that the coordination of the job slots provided useful learning experiences for the consultants and some of the staff but also posed some problems. The gang consultants helped the applicants fill out the employment forms and helped them acquire the necessary paperwork. They also had to find job sites and had to help define the jobs the workers would be doing. There were three different types of job definitions: Some youth were assigned to well-structured settings such as offices at which they assisted with secretarial work; others served as assistants to the gang consultants, learning about barrio work; and others did what was called "beautification work", consisting primarily of painting structures or cleaning out empty lots.

Some of the difficulties which have arisen in relation to the SYEP job slots have related to organizing the activities and seem to have been due to the inexperience of the individuals in doing job development. Problems also arose in finding enough work for the youth to do.

Another source of jobs for barrio members was developed through contact with the manager of a temporary employment agency. This agency was able to provide various types of unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled jobs on a temporary basis to individuals without much experience who might not otherwise have been hired for those kinds of jobs. However, as temporary workers, they were paid at a lower rate than permanent workers doing the same job.

These temporary jobs seemed to have enabled over 40 barrio members who needed jobs to make some money and enabled several individuals to get permanent jobs with the companies which had hired them temporarily.

One barrio was able to get some jobs in a youth conservation camp in the mountains because of a joint effort between the Employment Development Department (EDD) and the project. The jobs became available through the EDD. An employee of the department notified the project supervisor in the area who along with the gang consultants found youth to fill the job openings. The work required that the youth be away at the camp during the week but allowed them to return on weekends. Between 30 and 40 were hired during a period of several months but most did not keep their jobs for more than one or two months.

Because these jobs became available shortly after the barrio had become involved in feuding, the jobs may have been partly responsible for the feuds having cooled down somewhat, as they took some of the members out of the area and enabled them to become preoccupied with other activities.

Although there is only indirect evidence, it seems likely that more barrio members were employed during the third period than might have been the case without the efforts of project staff. The fact that more were working may have contributed to a reduction in violence by members. This conclusion is based on the assumption that jobs provide a different type of orientation which is not easily reconcilable with being active in a barrio and that jobs help remove some of the frustrations and the temptations associated with not having an income. One such temptation which has often been voiced by barrio members is that of engaging in illegal activities to acquire money.

Staff Issues

This section will examine some issues relevant to the work of the staff in the Gang Violence Reduction Project. The staff will be broken down into two parts: supervisory staff, including parole agents and parole aids, and the gang consultants. The generalizations which are given below were drawn by the researcher with input from some of the staff members. They are based on experiences during the project's three funding periods.

The supervisory staff will be considered first. There are a number of qualities which seem to lead to the greatest degree of effectiveness in the staff. One set of qualities relates to having particular cultural understandings. It is desirable that the staff understand the barrio subculture, understand Spanish and the barrio dialect, and be familiar with the area. It is easier for them to function if they are of Mexican-American background, because they are more likely to have the necessary understandings and because it is easier for them to be accepted in the barrios. Those without the understanding of the barrio subculture found that they had to make a major effort to acquire some knowledge about it. The one staff member who was not Mexican-American was Black. He felt that he had to be more open, always aware, and more ready to learn than others. He felt that he had to be extra careful because his color was an additional factor by which he could be isolated in a crisis.

The attitudes of staff were important. All the evidence points to the fact that the staff that were the most effective were those who were most highly committed to working in the barrios and to working toward bringing about peace. Commitment makes it less likely that someone will get discouraged. Also, the most effective staff members were those who felt the most comfortable in interacting with barrio (gang) members and who had the most positive attitudes towards them. At the same time it was important that staff members be able to maintain an objective point of view. This was to avoid being pulled into the barrio subculture and adopting the perspective often held within it that it is hopeless to try to do anything about the feuds.

Another attitude associated with effectiveness is that of believing in the methods used by the project. Methods are most likely to be carried out successfully by a person if he or she is someone who can be called a believer.

There are some personality qualities which seem associated with high levels of staff effectiveness. One of these is leadership. A person with leadership qualities can rally others behind him and increase the enthusiasm for project activities, thus making them more successful. Ideally, staff members need to have a high tolerance for stress and for frustrations. This fact is related to another issue in staff work for the project. This issue is that of the many sources of stress and frustration which were present in the project's day-to-day activities.

An initial source of stress for most new staff members was that they had to come to know the barrio ways and ways of thinking. They had to become acquainted with the barrio members with whom they would be dealing personally and they had to become accepted by them. Often new staff have been coolly received until they have been tested. According to one staff member, "They need to know where they stand with you and where you stand." Barrio members state the same concept when they say: "We need to know where he is coming from."

The organizing of activities can be a frustrating experience because they never turn out quite as expected and there are almost invariably some problems associated with them. This has caused some of the staff to lose some of their enthusiasm for planning activities. Some of the frustration may have been related to the fact that some of the staff had not been sufficiently trained in the organizing of activities. However, the skills required for organizing activities for the barrios seem to have unique aspects including having an understanding of barrio ways and a great deal of flexibility.

Some exhaustion may have resulted from some staff putting energies into areas which were not likely to pay off. For example, although the project's thrust has been in working with the barrios as social groups, occasionally some staff members have become interested in "reforming" particular individuals. When they have not succeeded, they have felt discouraged. On the other hand, in working with a group, it is possible to measure success in terms of overall changes in the group. For example, a barrio may be showing more of an interest in planning recreational activities than in starting new feuds. And it is possible to enlist the help of the group in assisting an individual with his special problems, making it more likely that he will make positive changes.

Another source of stress is the fact that crisis situations are constantly occurring and the fact that there is always danger associated with project work. In some aspects it seems not unlike a war zone. Several staff members have found themselves in potentially dangerous situations but were fortunate not to get hurt. One was present with members of a barrio when an enemy barrio drove by, shooting.

Supervisors have found that they often have to work nights and weekends either because of crisis or because of project-sponsored activities. This type of time schedule has been found to create or exacerbate family problems for staff.

The many frustrations and constant stress experienced by many of the staff who have worked for the project have apparently lead to what has been called

"Burn-out." Burn-out seems to be a type of exhaustion. It has become more of a serious issue during the third funding period than it had prior to that. The director who had been with the project since its inception left at the end of the third period expressing feelings similar to battle fatigue.

Also, the stressful and frustrating aspects of the job seemed to be contributing factors in the transfer of two Parole Agent I's. Five individuals filled the project's three available positions during the first three periods of the project's operation (November 1, 1977-June 30, 1979).

Gang consultants were members of the barrios they were representing. Various qualities appeared to be related to their effectiveness. The gang consultants who were highly respected members (palabras) in their barrios were better able to help resolve feuds or specific incidents between barrios than those with less palabra. They were also more capable of getting members to take part in recreational activities and association meetings. Some gang consultants have had specific qualities which have made them effective in particular areas. For example, some have had the ability to talk well and therefore have helped put across ideas and help promote interactions when others were reticent, some have been able to joke and reduce tensions in difficult situations, and some have been able to plan activities well.

As with the supervisory staff, gang consultants with the highest degree of commitment to the project's goal of peace were the most effective. They were the most likely to initiate successful activities on their own.

Gang consultants, like other project staff, experienced stress and frustrations in relation to their work in the Gang Violence Reduction Project. The organizing of activities was often frustrating because fellow members (home-boys) did not always attend activities as anticipated. The fact that the consultants sometimes found themselves in opposition to their own barrio's members as they tried to discourage them from engaging in activities related to feuding and the fact that they were often involved in dangerous situations were sources of stress. The latter may have been a greater problem for consultants who were in the process of pulling themselves away from barrio activities as they got older and who might not have been in dangerous situations had they not been working for the project.

Some of the difficulties in the project's work with consultants have continued to be those discussed in the First Evaluation Report. These included problems in hiring individuals who would be effective. When the project began, the director who lived in the target area and who knew many barrio members contacted, screened, and hired them. During the third period, most of the contacting and screening was done by the supervisors and the consultants although the actual hiring was done by the director. Entire barrios became involved on occasion in recommending individuals for hiring.

Because the consultants are barrio members, they have had similar problems to other barrio members. The project has had to deal with individuals who had drinking or drug problems, either attempting to help them overcome their problems or having to make the decision to terminate them. Also, some consultants have been terminated after being arrested or after receiving jail sentences.

On some occasions consultants have become quite angry when they felt some matter such as their pay checks has not been handled adequately, and some have resorted to the typical barrio way of dealing with such situations--confrontation. On one occasion minor physical contact with a staff member resulted from such a confrontation.

The turnover among consultants has been rather high. Some have been terminated or have resigned because of problems such as the ones given above. Others have resigned to take better paying or less dangerous jobs. From the time the project began hiring in February 1977 to the end of the third funding period in June 1979, 36 individuals were hired under contract for 12 positions. (Others worked under CETA positions.) Eleven remained for periods of over one year and two of the original group which was hired were still working at the end of the third period.

As was stated above, one gang consultant was killed at the beginning of the third period, apparently by a member of another barrio, causing a hot feud to flare up between two project barrios. The effect of his death on the project was profound. At first, everyone seemed to be in a state of shock. That was followed by a sense of disorientation. The disorientation seems to have been due to the fact that prior to the death there had been what in retrospect appears as complacency about the project barrios being at peace with one another.

The project did not seem to recover from the disorientation until the end of the third period. In addition, two other consultants received minor to moderate injuries during the third period.

Staff Training

During the three funding periods of the Gang Violence Reduction Project, various individuals have been invited to come to staff meetings to provide training, such as explaining the work of agencies or sharing knowledge. During the third period, those providing training included a college professor who presented the history of Chicanos, a state employee who explained personnel procedures, and personnel from a health clinic who explained their services.

During the period of the project's operation, there have also been several team building sessions for all staff conducted by outside consultants. All except one have had limited success, demonstrating that few individuals are able to understand barrio members sufficiently to conduct effective training for them. During the third period, a three-day team building session was held on a site by the beach. Training was conducted on one day by one psychologist and on the following two days by two psychologists working as a team. Staff tensions had been high prior to the session, and they seemed to peak during the three days in spite of efforts by the psychologists to provide tools for improving relationships. The session may have been useful in getting some feelings out into the open, making it possible for relationships to begin to improve. However, several months were required for morale to be improved to the point that the staff could work effectively as a team.

V. OUTSIDE INFLUENCES

There are many groups or individuals who were not an integral part of the Gang Violence Reduction Project who could have been influenced by the project or could have influenced it. Some of these will be considered below.

Community

Project staff have interacted with individuals or agencies in the East Los Angeles community since it began. The initial interactions seemed to have revolved around the project establishing its place within the community. Later interactions were concerned with the project trying to get cooperation from those in the community in carrying out its activities with gang members and in turn, trying to help the community in dealing with its difficulties with gang members. Cooperative efforts often developed. These interactions seem to have had a positive effect on the project's objective of reducing gang violence.

Handball Courts. Contact with Los Angeles County developed early in the project's operation. The need for handball courts arose at a barrio association meeting during the first funding period. Project staff and barrio members met with the county supervisor from the district. During the meeting, barrio members volunteered to do the labor if the county would provide the materials. The supervisor was impressed and agreed to procure some funds for the courts.

The building of the handball courts began during the second funding period with the county providing materials and skilled labor and the barrio members helping with various tasks. The courts were completed during the third funding period and a dedication was held at the park. The county supervisor, community people, barrio members, and project staff were present.

Community Agencies. As stated in the first report²⁷ there was no evidence of any change in the number or type of agencies which might interact with gang members in the period before the project began and during its first funding period. Although the agencies remained essentially the same during the second period, there were some changes during the third period. One agency which had included gang members among its clients closed down. It had provided some classes for dropouts as well as job counseling and placement. Several new programs were funded during the third period. Only two seemed to have had effects significant to the project goals during the third period. Both of these programs chose the same project barrio as their focus. One hired several individuals to work with gang members and senior citizens in an attempt to increase communications between them and to help improve the physical condition of the community. This program which began in the summer of 1978 often worked in conjunction with the project staff (consultants and supervisors). Cooperative activities often resulted. Thus, it would seem that this program expanded the positive efforts which were being made in the one barrio.

The other program, funded through the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, began setting up in December 1978. It increased staff to investigate gang-related incidents and to coordinate efforts with other aspects of the judicial process. Its objective was that, through an increase in investigations, more gang members would be prosecuted, sentenced, and serve time in institutions. Based on statements by staff and gang consultants it seemed successful in achieving that end by the latter part of the third period. This program may have prevented some gang incidents but its effect would not have been noticeable until the last part of the third period. However, this program's philosophical approach was very different from the approach of the project which has been to attempt to keep barrio members out of the criminal justice system by preventing violent incidents.

Since it began, the project has worked along with a community agency which had been providing recreational activities primarily in one barrio for many years. The effect of the cooperation seemed to be an increase in the effectiveness of both the agency and the project in the promoting of positive activities among the barrios. For example, in the Christmas of 1978 the agency

²⁷Op. cit., p. 71.

was able to acquire many free Christmas trees. The gang consultants from each of the project's seven barrios helped distribute the trees to needy families within their neighborhoods.

Jobs. The possible effect of gang members getting jobs has been noted above.²⁸ The project, working in conjunction with community agencies, was able to help gang members get jobs who otherwise might not have been employed.

Parents Groups. Mothers from community parents' groups concerned with gang violence have interacted with the project on numerous occasions since it began. They have helped with some project activities and have brought violent incidents to the attention of staff. Their meetings with the gang consultants have served to clarify incidents, to prevent further incidents, and may have prevented new feuds from starting.

During the third period, mothers visited the project several times regarding incidents. Their meetings with the staff seem to have been helpful in resolving most of them. However, some of the mothers were concerned because the project was not working with barrios in the area other than the seven which have been part of the project.

Law Enforcement

Since the project began, there have been a number of occasions when law enforcement personnel have come to confer with the staff regarding gang-related problems. During the third period, several individuals overseeing specially-funded law enforcement programs in the area made a presentation at a staff training meeting explaining their operation.

In addition, officers have on occasion contacted the project office to make it aware of gang incidents. There, the researcher became aware of several instances in which communications between law enforcement officers and the project may have helped prevent gang incidents. There were some instances in which project staff have contacted law enforcement regarding

²⁸See page 34.

allegations of police abuse. Generally, the contacts have helped clarify issues and may have improved relations between officers and gang members.

Schools

There has been some interaction between the project and the area schools, but it has not been extensive. Staff met during the first and second funding periods with school personnel from a junior high and senior high school to inform them about the project. Some efforts were made by consultants and the staff to get some gang members reaccepted into the area's schools, but these were generally unsuccessful.

During the third period staff met with all the area's junior high and senior high vice principals as well as some administrators from the district to explain the project and to discuss possible cooperation. There were several instances in which school personnel called upon the project to ask for help with some problems related to gangs. As a result of these calls the project becoming involved in the mediation of some incidents between gangs.

The indications are that the interactions between the project and the schools had a positive effect upon the project's objectives, as the mediation of gang incidents taking place in the schools may have prevented further incidents from occurring or may have prevented new feuds from erupting. The schools' climate may have been improved. There is indirect evidence that once the project was able to subdue feuds among the seven barrios with which it was working, fewer incidents between them occurred in the junior and senior high schools.

Media

The media attention to gangs seem to have continued to increase from the time the Gang Violence Reduction Project began through its third period. There is no evidence of any direct effect of the communications media on project processes nor on project outcomes. However, since the media used the project on numerous occasions for their coverage of gangs or gang members, the existence of the project may have helped increase the extent of coverage. The two major media events during the third period were an article on the project in a major newspaper and a program on gangs in the East Los Angeles area by a national television network. Project staff, including some gang consultants, appeared

on local radio and television programs; and the project was covered by a national Latino magazine. Two movies were released dealing with gangs. One was filmed in the East Los Angeles area.

Gang members who expressed their feelings were not pleased with most media coverage. They felt that negative aspects of gangs and the community were overrepresented and positive aspects were deliberately excluded. By the end of the third period most gang members who had had any experience with media personnel were unwilling to talk to them.

Intradepartmental Contacts

Institutions. Since the project began, there have been visits by the staff of the project to the Youth Authority institutions where gang members from the East Los Angeles were incarcerated. At the beginning, these contacts were primarily for the purposes of getting to know the barrio members and making them aware of the existence of the project. Staff at the institutions were also informed about the project and its techniques.

During the third period, there were several visits made to institutions. Gang members were contacted either to keep them informed about the project or to discuss specific incidents which had occurred. Some contacts were also made with individuals about to be released, to remind them about the project's efforts to keep peace so that they would not initiate interbarrio incidents after they returned to the community.

Procedures. As noted in the First Evaluation Report²⁹ when the project began, new procedures had to be established within the department as it had never run a project of this type. Some problems arose but most of them became resolved as procedures became established.

However, it seems worthwhile to discuss one of the most serious problems which has arisen because of its effect on the project and because it needs to be considered in planning future projects. As they were not regular State employees, gang consultants did not get paid at a definite time. Pay vouchers had to be issued for each pay period.

²⁹Op. Cit., p. 78.

There were many bureaucratic levels through which the initial contracts and then the pay vouchers had to be processed before checks could be printed and mailed. Because the financial situation of the consultants was generally poor, they often lived from pay check to pay check. Therefore, when delays occurred and they had to wait for long periods for their checks, they suffered considerable hardships and often became angry.

When the pay procedures became regularized, and the consultant vouchers were given priority over other business, there were fewer problems. However, it seems that some improvements are still need both in the status of gang consultants and in the method by which they are paid.³⁰

Other situations which arose were improved through better communication between the project staff and personnel at higher bureaucratic levels. It was necessary for project staff to learn the proper procedures to making requests and for departmental administration to be aware that quite often relatively minor requests were very important in the project's work.

Outside Groups

Since the project began, it has had contacts with the groups outside the East Los Angeles area. These contacts increased during the third funding period.

Groups who have become aware of gang problems in their communities have contacted the project, requesting speakers from the staff to talk to them about gangs or about the project and/or to give them ideas about how to deal with their problems. During the third period, presentations were made to school personnel, high school and college classrooms, projects or agencies, and governmental personnel.

Contact with outside groups has also occurred in a different way. It is possible that the project influenced relations between project barrios and non-project barrios from outside the target area during the third funding period. There were several instances reported to the researcher in which either gang consultants or other gang members from project gangs helped establish peace agreements with other outside gangs or helped mediate incidents in such a way as to prevent feuds from developing.

³⁰ Different ways of employing gang consultants have been under study by the department.

The implications of the contacts with outside groups is that the effect of the project is expanding beyond its boundaries. However, excessive speaking engagements can be detrimental to the project if they occupy a significant part of staff time.

VI. PROJECT OUTCOMES

The general design and methodology for the outcome analysis is described in Chapter II above. As was stated there, the data source was the gang-related incident reports kept by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. All incidents used in the analysis are violent incidents³¹ occurring in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area in which the suspect was a member of a barrio in the area and the victim was either a member of a barrio in the area or a non-gang member. Incidents with suspects who were thought to be gang members but whose barrio membership could not be identified were also included in the analysis.

The analysis will consider whether or not the Gang Violence Reduction Project achieved its objectives as well as do a more detailed analysis of gang-related homicides and of gang-related violent incidents. Trends of different types of incidents will be examined in order to determine whether or not they provide evidence of project effect. Different time periods are used in this report than were used in the second report. Therefore, the trends will have somewhat different shapes. Both six-month (January-June and July-December) and one-year (July-June) periods are used. The final year (July 1978-June 1979) encompasses all of the third funding period except the first month (June 1978).

The Gang Violence Reduction Project has worked with seven of the most active barrios in the area. These are referred to as project or GVRP barrios below. There are about 11 other non-project barrios in the area.

The objectives stated that 1) homicides would be reduced to six or less and 2) violent incidents would be reduced to 163 or less in the target area

³¹ See Appendix A for the coding of violent incidents.

(the East Los Angeles unincorporated area) where the suspect was a gang being worked with and the victim was either a gang being worked with or a non-gang member. Incidents in which the victim was a gang not being worked with were excluded from the objectives. However, these incidents are also analyzed in this section for comparative purposes.

The objectives were based on a 12-month period. Even though the third grant period lasted 13 months, the final 12 months of this period will be used to determine whether or not the project achieved its objectives.

Homicides

Figure 2 and Table 1 show the trend for the homicides fitting the definitions given in the objectives. These are called "Project Targeted" because they are the homicides which the project's activities are expected to impact. As can be seen in Table 1, the total gang-related homicides for the last two six-month periods is 2 which is below the maximum of 6 stated as a third-period objective. Also, the graph in Figure 2 provides a strong indication of project effect on the reduction of homicides, as it shows a sharp change in trend, downward, after the project began and which then remains at a low level.

TABLE 1

HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND
GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM)
January 1971-June 1979
BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-Month Periods	Project Targeted Homicides
January-June 1971	2
July-December 1971	2
January-June 1972	1
July-December 1972	1
January-June 1973	0
July-December 1973	1
January-June 1974	2
July-December 1974	1
January-June 1975	3
July-December 1975	1
January-June 1976	5
July-December 1976	6
January-June 1977	4
July-December 1977	1
January-June 1978	1
July-December 1978	1
January-June 1979	1
TOTAL	33




FIGURE 2. HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM)
By Six-Month Periods

A qualification must be made regarding the confidence which can be placed on the number of "Project Targeted" homicides occurring during the July-December 1978 six-month period. A feud, which was discussed earlier in the "Project Processes" chapter, broke out between two project barrios.³² There were numerous incidents between the two barrios. During that period, two members of each of the barrios were killed in incidents in which the suspect barrio was unknown. Because each of the two barrios was also feuding with non-project barrios and because of the circumstances surrounding each homicide, it was not possible for the Sheriff's Department to arrive at a suspect barrio. Given the particular circumstances of the homicides, it is possible that one or two of them were attributable to the feud between the two project barrios. If 2 of these homicides whose suspect barrio was unidentified were recategorized as though the suspect barrio were a project barrio, the total for the last 12-month period would be 4 instead of 2. However, this would still be less than the maximum of 6 stated in the third-period objective. If the two were to be added to Figure 2 and Table 1, the trend would take on a different shape with a peak at 3 during July-December 1978 and then a drop back down to 1 in January-June 1979. However, this modification would not change the interpretation that the trend provides evidence that the Gang Violence Reduction Project was successful in reducing homicides.

Also, this graph and other graphs dealing with homicide data label the period during which the Federation (or Federación of Barrios Unidos) was in existence. Its possible effects are noted at the end of this section.

An examination of other breakdowns of the homicide data has been done in order to determine whether or not they provide evidence of project effect. Figure 3 and Table 2 show the trend by year for the total gang-related homicides occurring in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area (ELA) with barrios in the area as suspects. This trend is separated in the figure into three trends: the project-targeted homicides, other homicides with identified barrios as suspects, and homicides with unidentified barrios as suspects.

³²See Page 24.

Whereas the trend for the project-targeted homicides³³ shows a clear reduction followed by a leveling off after the project started, the other two trends do not show a change corresponding with the project's beginning. The comparison among the trends provides evidence that the project's intervention was responsible for reducing homicides among the barrios with which it was working and between the barrios with which it was working and non-gang members, rather than some other historical event which affected all gang homicides in the area. It is interesting to note that the trends for the other identified and the unidentified barrios had the same shape between July 1974 and June 1979, implying that the same forces were affecting both.

Total gang-related homicides in the area had fallen after the project began but rose sharply in the most recent year (July 1978-June 1979). This rise was primarily among homicides with other identified or unidentified barrios as suspects during the July-December 1978 six-month period. (See the discussion of Figure 5 below.)

³³

The qualification stated above, that one or two additional homicides whose suspect barrio is unidentified might be attributable to project barrios during the July to December 1978 six-month period, applies to this and all discussion of trends with project barrios as suspects in homicides. However, in none of the trends would the addition of one or two homicides to the six-month period change the interpretation of the overall trend.

TABLE 2
EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED SUSPECTS COMPARED TO OTHERS
July 1971-June 1979
BY YEAR

Year	Total ELA Barrios	Project Targeted ^a	Unidentified Barrios ^b	Others Identified ^c
July 1971-June 1972	10	3	0	7
July 1972-June 1973	4	1	0	3
July 1973-June 1974	8	3	0	5
July 1974-June 1975	8	4	0	4
July 1975-June 1976	17	6	3	8
July 1976-June 1977	15	10	0	5
July 1977-June 1978	7	2	0	5
July 1978-June 1979	20	2	9	9
TOTAL	89	31	12	46

^a Homicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and with a GVRP Barrio or a Non-Gang member as the victim.

^b All homicides with unidentified gangs as the suspects.

^c All other homicides in the target area not included in a or b. This includes homicides with other identified gangs in the area as the suspects as well as homicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and a non-GVRP barrio or an unidentified barrio as the victim.




FIGURE 3. EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: PROJECT-TARGETED COMPARED TO OTHERS - By Year

^aHomicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and with a GVRP Barrio or a non-gang member as the victim.

^bAll homicides with unidentified gangs as the suspects.

^cAll other homicides in the target area included in a. or b. This includes homicides with other identified gangs in the area as the suspects as well as homicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and a non-GVRP barrio or an unidentified barrio as the victim.

In order to fully understand the effect of the project on the barrios with which it was working, it is necessary to look not only at the project-targeted homicides but at all homicides with project barrios as suspects. As has been stated, the project-targeted homicides include only the homicides defined in the objectives. Thus, they exclude the homicides with project barrios as suspects and non-project barrios or unknown barrios as victims. When those which were excluded are added to the project-targeted, the total includes all homicides in which project barrios were suspects.

By looking at the total homicides with GVRP barrios as suspects it will be possible to test whether or not a compensation factor was operating. In other words, it might have been that while the project-targeted homicides had been reduced, the other homicides with project barrios as suspects might have increased so that the totals would not have shown a decrease.

Figure 4 and Table 3 compare the three trends in question by year: the total homicides with GVRP barrios as suspects, those which were project-targeted, and those which were not targeted but which had project barrios as suspects. As can be seen, the total for GVRP barrios as suspects, which had been rising, leveled off at 10 and then after the project began fell to 5 and then to 4. As has been noted, those which were targeted peaked at 10, fell after the project started to 2 and then remained at 2 during July 1978 to June 1979. The trend for the homicides which were not targeted show a rising and falling trend with no overall increase or decrease (from 4 to 0 to 3 to 2). There was no change in the trend apparent after the project started.

Therefore, not only did the trend for project-targeted homicides fall but the trend for all homicides with GVRP barrios as suspects fell as well. The non-targeted showed no apparent change. This finding would indicate that there was no compensation factor operating whereby as some homicides with project barrios as suspects were reduced within the East Los Angeles unincorporated area, other types of homicides increased to compensate for the reductions.

Figures 5 and 6 and Tables 4 and 5 compare the homicide trends for GVRP barrios as suspects with other identified barrios and unidentified

TABLE 3
HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: PROJECT-
TARGETED COMPARED TO NON-TARGETED
July 1971-June 1979
BY YEAR

Year	Total GVRP Barrios as Suspects	Project- Targeted ^a	Not- Targeted ^b
July 1971-June 1972	7	3	4
July 1972-June 1973	2	1	1
July 1973-June 1974	5	3	2
July 1974-June 1975	4	4	0
July 1975-June 1976	10	6	4
July 1976-June 1977	10	10	0
July 1977-June 1978	5	2	3
July 1978-June 1979	4	2	2
TOTAL	47	31	16

^a Homicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and with a GVRP Barrio or a non-gang member as the victim.

^b Homicides with a GVRP Barrio as the suspect and a non-GVRP Barrio or an unidentified barrio as the victim.




FIGURE 4. HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: PROJECT-TARGETED COMPARED TO NON-TARGETED
By Year

as suspects. Figure 5 is plotted for one-year periods and Figure 6 is plotted for six-month periods. The smoother trend lines of Figure 5 make it easier to see the long term trends. However, in Figure 6 it is easier to see the immediate changes occurring after the project's intervention.

Figure 6 and Table 5 show that there was downward change in trend for homicides with project barrios as suspects beginning the six months after the project started (from 6 to 4 to 3 to 2). This was followed by a slight rise (to 3) in July-December 1978 and then by a drop in January-June 1979 (to 1), reaching the lowest level for a six-month period since July-December 1974.

The trend for the other identified barrios showed no change corresponding to the project's beginning. The trend rose, fell, rose and then fell somewhat. The long term trend for other identified barrios in Figure 5 shows a rather sharp rise the last year (July 1978-June 1979).

Figure 6 and Table 5 show that the trend for unidentified barrios as suspects remained at 0 after the project began. During the July-December 1978 period it rose sharply to 8 and then dropped down to 1. This unusual increase during the one six-month period in the homicide cases for which there was not enough evidence to implicate particular barrios is inexplicable except in the one or two cases discussed above.

This increase in the unidentified barrios as suspects in homicides during the July-December 1978 period was largely responsible for the sharp peak which is evident in the trend for the total homicides during that period. This fact makes the peak difficult to interpret. As was stated above, those classified as unidentified barrios can include barrios from outside the East Los Angeles unincorporated area, non-gang members, and members of barrios with which the project was not working as well as barrios with which it was working.

TABLE 4

EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS
July 1971-June 1979
BY YEAR

Year	Total ELA	GVRP Barrios	Other Identified Barrios	Unidentified Barrios
July 1971-June 1972	10	7	3	0
July 1972-June 1973	4	2	2	0
July 1973-June 1974	8	5	3	0
July 1974-June 1975	8	4	4	0
July 1975-June 1976	17	10	4	3
July 1976-June 1977	15	10	5	0
July 1977-June 1978	7	5	2	0
July 1978-June 1979	20	4	7	9
TOTAL	89	47	30	12





FIGURE 5. EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS by Year

TABLE 5
EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: SUSPECT BARRIOS
January 1971-June 1979
BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-Month Period	Total ELA Barrios	GVRP Barrios	Other Identified Barrios	Unidentified Barrios
January-June 1971 ...	2	2	0	0
July-December 1971 ..	7	4	3	0
January-June 1972 ...	3	3	0	0
July-December 1972 ..	4	2	2	0
January-June 1973 ...	0	0	0	0
July-December 1973 ..	2	1	1	0
January-June 1974 ...	6	4	2	0
July-December 1974 ..	3	1	2	0
January-June 1975 ...	5	3	2	0
July-December 1975 ..	9	5	3	1
January-June 1976 ...	8	5	1	2
July-December 1976 ..	7	6	1	0
January-June 1977 ...	8	4	4	0
July-December 1977 ..	5	3	2	0
January-June 1978 ...	2	2	0	0
July-December 1978 ..	15	3	4	8
January-June 1979 ...	5	1	3	1
Total	91	49	30	12



The homicides with Gang Violence Reduction Project gangs as suspects are separated into types (by relationship of suspect and victim) for information purposes in Figure 7 and Table 6. Because the numbers are small, it is not possible to draw significant conclusions from comparisons of these trends. It does seem that the homicides against non-gang members as victims show the strongest evidence of reduction after the project began. There was a change of trend from 0 to 1 per year for within-a-gang homicides. The first one occurred in December 1976 when the project was being set up. Therefore, it seems that the change in trend occurred prior to the project's intervention.

In a separate analysis of data not shown in a figure, it was found that there have been only two robbery-related homicides in which project (GVRP) barrios were suspects. One occurred in the January-June 1975 period, and the other in the July-December 1976 period.

TABLE 6

HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS:
RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM

July 1971-June 1979

BY YEAR

Year	Total GVRP Barrios	Between Gangs	Within-a- Gang	Against Non-gang Members
July 1971-June 1972	7	5	0	2
July 1972-June 1973	2	2	0	0
July 1973-June 1974	5	4	0	1
July 1974-June 1975	4	2	0	2
July 1975-June 1976	10	7	0	3
July 1976-June 1977	10	5	1	4
July 1977-June 1978	5	3	1	1
July 1978-June 1979	4	3	1	0
Total	47	31	3	13




FIGURE 7. HOMICIDES WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS:
RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM
By Year

Figure 8 and Table 7 show the trend for total homicides in the part of Los Angeles County under the Sheriff Department's jurisdiction. This area excludes the City of Los Angeles and most other incorporated cities. Accidental deaths and killings by non-gang members have been excluded to be consistent with the definition of gang homicides used in this report. Chicano gangs have accounted for 87% of the gang homicides in 1975; 95% in 1976; and 91% in 1977 and 1978.

In addition to the trend for the total homicides in the county, Figure 8 and Table 7 show the trend for homicides with GVRP barrios as suspects and the trend with other gangs in the county as suspects.

A comparison of the county totals and the GVRP-barrio totals shows that the trends were very similar until the time when the project began. At that time the county totals remained level and then rose sharply while the totals for the GVRP barrios dropped and then leveled off. This comparison provides further evidence that the project's work with the barrios, rather than other events affecting all gangs in the county, was responsible for the drop in trend for the homicides.

Federation

The homicide trends which have been shown in the figures in this section also provide evidence for the possible effect of the Federación de Barrios Unidos. All the trends for the East Los Angeles unincorporated area show a drop at the time of the Federation's existence, 1972-1973. These would imply that the drop in homicides could have been due to the effect of the Federation. Further evidence for the Federation's effect can be found in Figure 8 which shows that the trends in homicides for GVRP barrios dropped during the 1972-1973 period, but the trend for other barrios in the county under the Sheriff Department's jurisdiction did not.

TABLE 7

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES:^a
GVRP BARRIOS AND OTHER GANGS

July 1971-June 1979

BY YEAR

Year	County Total ^a	GVRP Barrios	Others ^b
July 1971-June 1972	19	7	12
July 1972-June 1973	16	2	14
July 1973-June 1974	22	5	17
July 1974-June 1975	27	4	23
July 1975-June 1976	43	10	33
July 1976-June 1977	48	10	38
July 1977-June 1978	48	5	43
July 1978-June 1979	75	4	71
Total	298	47	251

^a These figures include all areas under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

^b Includes unknown.




FIGURE 8. LOS ANGELES COUNTY GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES: GVRP BARRIOS AND OTHER GANGS
By Year

^a These figures include all areas under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

^b Includes unknown gangs.

Incidents

The data for gang-related violent incidents in the East Los Angeles unincorporated area present a somewhat different picture than the data for the gang-related homicides. Figure 9 and Table 8 show the "project-targeted" violent incidents, which were the incidents that the project was expected to impact. The project-targeted violent incidents include those in which a GVRP (or project) barrio was a suspect and a GVRP barrio or non-gang member was a victim. Thus, violent incidents in which a GVRP barrio was a suspect and a non-GVRP barrio was a victim were excluded from those defined as "project targeted." The total number of gang-related violent incidents for the last two six-month periods (July 1978-June 1979) is 133. (See Table 8) This is below the 163 incidents which was stated as a third grant period objective of the project.

Three lines are plotted by six-month periods in Figure 9. The corresponding numbers are listed in Table 7. The trend line for GVRP barrios as suspects and victims was rising prior to the start of the project. It leveled off and then fell after the project began. This trend line provides strong evidence of project effect.

The trends for the total project-targeted incidents and for incidents with GVRP barrio suspects and non-gang member victims have the same shape: They were rising in the three periods prior to the project's implementation; they fell the following six months; they rose and fell again; and then they remained at the lower level for the last two periods. There is evidence of a positive project effect on these trends as they changed from a rising trend to a variable and then a dropping trend. However, the evidence is not as strong as a single clear-cut change downward in trend would provide.

TABLE 8
VIOLENT INCIDENTS: PROJECT-TARGETED (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT
AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM)
January 1975-June 1979
BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total	GVRP Barrio As Victim	Non-Gang .. Member As Victim
January-June 1975	27	10	17
July-December 1975	41	15	26
January-June 1976	75	23	52
July-December 1976	90	30	60
January-June 1977	74	29	45
July-December 1977	98	26	72
January-June 1978	71	11	60
July-December 1978	65	12	53
January-June 1979	68	17	51
Total	609	173	436

CONTINUED

1 OF 2




FIGURE 9 VIOLENT INCIDENTS: PROJECT TARGETED
 (GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT AND GVRP BARRIO OR NON-GANG MEMBER AS VICTIM)
 By Six-Month Periods

Figure 10 and Table 9 show the trend for the total of the incidents with project barrios as suspects. This trend is subdivided into trends for incidents which were project-targeted and incidents which were not targeted. The trends for the total and the project-targeted incidents are similar in shape because the project-targeted incidents were the major contributors to variation in the total. These two trends were rising prior to the beginning of the project. The trends varied after the project began by dropping and then peaking again during the July-December 1977 period. They dropped again and leveled off during the last three six-month periods (January 1978-June 1979). If this trend is smoothed out by plotting it by years ending in June 1979, it appears as rising prior to the project's beginning, and leveling off and then falling after the project began. The trend for the non-project targeted--those incidents with GVRP barrios as suspects but with barrios which were not in the project as victims--showed no consistent change, remaining at about the same level throughout.

This comparison provides a strong indication that there was no compensation taking place among the project-barrio incidents. The non-targeted incidents did not increase as the project-targeted incidents decreased. Also, this comparison provides further evidence that it was the project's efforts, rather than some other set of events, which were responsible for the change.

TABLE 9
 TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS: GVRP BARRIO AS SUSPECT
 January 1975-June 1979
 BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total GVRP	Project-Targeted	Non-Targeted
January-June 1975	41	27	14
July-December 1975	62	41	21
January-June 1976	86	75	11
July-December 1976	116	90	26
January-June 1977	92	74	18
July-December 1977	121	98	23
January-June 1978	91	71	20
July-December 1978	92	65	27
January-June 1979	82	68	14
Total	783	609	174




Figure 11 and Table 10 show the trend for the total violent incidents with GVRP barrios as suspects broken down into three other trends: between-gangs, within-a-gang, and against non-gang members. The between-gang incidents show a clear change in trend after the project began (beginning with the January-June 1977 period). It had been rising and began falling. The trends involving non-gang members as victims did not show a clear change downward until after the July-December 1977 period. Therefore, it is not possible to explain the latter change in terms of the project. The within-a-gang incidents, which are the least likely to be reported, are too few in number to draw reliable conclusions from them. The trend shows them staying at about the same level throughout.

TABLE 10

TOTAL VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS:
RELATIONSHIP OF SUSPECT AND VICTIM

January 1975 - June 1979

BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total GVRP Barrios	Between Gangs	Within-a- Gang	Against Non-gang Members
January-June 1975	41	23	1	17
July-December 1975	62	34	2	26
January-June 1976	86	35	2	49
July-December 1976	116	56	5	55
January-June 1977	92	41	4	47
July-December 1977	121	44	7	70
January-June 1978	91	29	5	57
July-December 1978	92	36	2	54
January-June 1979	82	27	4	51
Total	783	325	32	426



Figure 12 and Table 11 show the trend for GVRP barrios as suspects in incidents compared with trends for other identified barrios and unidentified barrios in the East Los Angeles area. The trend for the other identified (non-GVRP) barrios had been rising through the July-December 1977 period and, after then, there was a slight fall. The trend for the unidentified barrios, which had been rising, accelerated after the January-June 1977 period and peaked in the July-December 1978 period. It then fell somewhat in the January-June 1979 period. Neither of these trends changed at the time the project began as did the overall trend for the GVRP barrios.

The total incidents in the area (East Los Angeles) dropped immediately after the project began, then rose, leveled off, and then dropped somewhat in the latest six-month period reported. As can be seen in Figure 12, different suspect-barrio types were affecting the total trend for the area at different times. The drop in the January-June 1977 period was related to the drop among GVRP barrios; the subsequent steep rise was due to increases among all barrios. Total incidents remained at a high level because of the steep increase in incidents by unidentified barrios.

The very sharp increase in unidentified gangs as suspects in violent incidents presents a serious problem in the interpretation of all the data because no assumptions can be made about these incidents. The greatest part of this steep increase was due to incidents with the unidentified gangs as suspects and non-gang members as victims. They accounted for 30% of the violent incidents with unidentified gangs as suspects between January 1975 and June 1977 and for 70% of the incidents between July 1977 and June 1979. (Data not shown.)


TABLE 11

EAST LOS ANGELES GANG-RELATED VIOLENT INCIDENTS: SUSPECT-BARRIOS

January 1975 - June 1979

BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total ELA	GVRP Barrios	Other Identified Barrios	Unidentified Barrios
January-June 1975	73	41	25	7
July-December 1975	107	62	30	15
January-June 1976	161	86	50	25
July-December 1976	196	116	36	44
January-June 1977	185	92	52	41
July-December 1977	242	121	60	61
January-June 1978	239	91	55	93
July-December 1978	245	92	43	110
January-June 1979	212	82	52	78
Total	1,660	783	403	474



Figures 13 and 14 and Tables 12 and 13 are concerned with robbery-related incidents. As can be seen in Figure 13, both robbery and non-robbery related incidents with GVRP barrios as suspects had essentially the same shape trend, implying that these trends were responding to similar forces. The implication from this comparison is that to the extent that the project affected one trend, it also affected the other. As was noted above, there was a rising trend in gang-related violent incidents prior to the project starting, with a change in variability and a leveling off at a lower level after the project started.

Figure 14 and Table 13 show the trends for robbery-related incidents by suspect-barrio type. Other identified (non-GVRP) barrios show somewhat of a rising trend through the January-June 1978 period and then a slight drop after that. The trend for the unidentified barrios remained level until the July-December 1977 period when it began rising. It leveled off after January-June 1978. Neither of these two trends shows a change after the project started as did the trend for GVRP barrios.

Summary

In summary, it can be said that the Gang Violence Reduction Project met its stated objectives as the number of gang-related homicides and violent incidents remained well below the maximum set by the objectives.

An examination of homicide trends has shown strong evidence of project effect, because rising trends with project barrios as suspects began dropping after the project started and remained at a low level. A similar drop in homicides did not occur among homicides with other barrios as suspects. However, this finding must be qualified by the fact that there was an increase in homicides with suspects who were thought to be gang members but whose barrio membership could not be identified. This primarily occurred during one six-month period--June to December 1978. The available evidence indicates

TABLE 12

VIOLENT INCIDENTS WITH GVRP BARRIOS AS SUSPECTS: ROBBERY AND NON-ROBBERY RELATED
January 1975 - June 1979
BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total GVRP	Non-Robbery	Robbery
January-June 1975	41	31	10
July-December 1975	62	47	15
January-June 1976	86	70	16
July-December 1976	116	85	31
January-June 1977	92	75	17
July-December 1977	121	83	38
January-June 1978	91	68	23
July-December 1978	92	67	25
January-June 1979	82	59	23
Total	783	585	198





TABLE 13

ROBBERY-RELATED INCIDENTS: BY SUSPECT BARRIOS
BY SIX-MONTH PERIODS

Six-month Period	Total ELA	GVRP Barrios	Other Identified	Unidentified
January-June 1975	13	10	2	1
July-December 1975	23	15	4	4
January-June 1976	30	16	12	2
July-December 1976	40	31	2	7
January-June 1977	34	17	13	4
July-December 1977	68	38	14	16
January-June 1978	83	23	18	42
July-December 1978	79	25	10	44
January-June 1979	79	23	15	41
Total	449	198	90	161



that one or two of these might be the result of a feud between project barrios. The addition of these homicides to the figures for the GVRP barrios would not change the overall interpretation of the trend as decreasing after the project began.

There is also evidence from changes in the trends that the project had an effect in reducing the trend in violent incidents involving as suspects the barrios with which it was working. This evidence is strongest for incidents where the victim was in another with which the project was working (between-gang incidents) and not as strong for incidents involving non-gang members as victims, although the latter trend has fallen also.

As has been noted several times above, the fact that there was an unusual increase in the number of incidents in which the suspect was thought to be a gang member but whose gang membership could be identified presents problems for the interpretation. It is speculation on the part of the researcher that there may have been growing awareness of gang activity through time among deputies in the field. This might have lead them more often to suspect gang members when crimes are committed than they might have in the past. Earlier, the tendency might have been to attribute gang involvement only when there was direct evidence that a member of a particular gang was involved.

VII. Discussion and Conclusions

This section will discuss the findings of the evaluation research on the Gang Violence Reduction Project using the design shown in Figure 1 as its basis. Therefore, it will look at the three major subdivisions of the research and their interrelationships. The statistical findings (Project Outcomes) will be summarized first. Then the project's ongoing activities (Project Processes) and activities by other social entities (Outside Influences) will be examined. This will be done to determine how they might be related to changes in the violent incident statistics and how they might have affected one another.

Project outcome: statistical

The analysis of the project outcomes has focused on changes in gang-related homicide and violent incident statistics.³⁴ The findings relative to the project's stated objectives were that the objectives for the third funding period were achieved. Gang related homicides which were targeted by the project had been reduced to 2 whereas the objectives stated there would be no more than 6. Gang related violent incidents which were targeted by the project were reduced to 133, whereas the objective stated they would be reduced to 163 or less.

Trends were examined in order to determine whether or not they show evidence that the reductions in various types of incidents were due to the project's intervention throughout the period of its operation.

³⁴ Targeted incidents and homicides were those in which any of the seven barrios with which the project was working were suspects and either one of the project barrios or a nongang member was a victim. The objectives were based on reductions from the year prior to the project's intervention (1976). There were 11 homicides and 188 violent incidents which fit the definition above during this year. Other outcomes will be discussed below.

The evidence of project effect was particularly strong in the trend for project-targeted homicides. These had been rising at a steep rate but began dropping after the project started and leveled off at a low level by the third funding period. Also, the trend for all homicides with project barrios as suspects began dropping after the project began. These dropping trends compared with continued rising trends for gang-related homicides throughout the part of Los Angeles County under the Sheriff Department's jurisdiction. This comparison shows that the drop in homicides with project barrios as suspects could not have been due to some historical event or set of events which affected all parts of the county.

The trends for gang-related violent incidents also show evidence of project effect, but the evidence is not as clear cut as that provided by the trends for homicides. The trend for incidents with project barrios as suspects had been rising sharply prior to the project's intervention. It became variable after the project began, then dropped and leveled off at a lower level.

The evidence of project effect is strongest in the trend for between-gang violent incidents in which project barrios were suspects. It began dropping after the project began and was at the lowest level during the January-June 1979 period that it had been at since the January-June 1975 period. It is not clear that the project affected the decreasing trend for incidents with project barrios as suspects and non-gang members as victims, because it did not begin decreasing immediately after the project began. When the trend in violent incidents with other, non-project barrios as suspects is used as a comparison, it can be seen

that it did not drop when the project began, but remained somewhat variable with an overall increase evident. Therefore, the inference can be made that the trend did not drop because the other barrios were not subject to the same influence to which the project barrios were subject.

Interpretation of the violent incident statistics was complicated by an unusual change in the trend for incidents with suspects who were thought to be gang members but whose gang affiliation was unknown. This trend began to increase steeply in the July to December 1977 period and then leveled off at the higher level. Because nothing is known about the possible gang affiliation of the suspects in these violent incidents, less confidence can be placed in any interpretation of the rest of the data. However, based on the available evidence, the data indicate project effect in the reduction of gang-related violent incidents in which project barrios were suspects.

Project processes

The Gang Violence Reduction Project's processes were essentially those which were defined in its proposals. They were primarily directed toward resolving or preventing antagonisms between gangs and toward providing diversionary activities for gang members.

Because the researcher became aware of many instances in which successful conflict resolution took place and of other instances in which violent incidents were prevented through the intervention of project staff, it seems reasonable to assume that these activities were related to the reduction in homicides and violent incidents found in the statistical analysis.

In the conflict resolution techniques used by the project, the gang consultants who were hired served as the intermediaries between the project and the gang members. As representatives from their barrios, they, along with other staff, were able to bring together conflicting parties to discuss their antagonisms. In most cases, these efforts resulted in successful mediation. While gang consultants were working in their barrios, there were many instances in which they were able to intervene to prevent an incident from occurring. Weekly meetings at the project office enabled the gang consultants from the seven barrios (serving as a forum) to keep communications among the barrios open. Therefore, if an incident occurred, a consultant could bring it to the attention of the consultant from the other barrio involved. The project's success in conflict resolution was most clearly evident in its dealing with feuds. The feuds among project barrios which had been active when the project began were either completely stopped or were reduced in intensity by the second funding period. Only one feud became very active (hot) after having been completely cooled down. But, by the end of the third period, it had been considerably subdued (cooled).

Other project activities seemed to be useful as supplements to the conflict resolution strategies. Recreational and sports activities were an integral part of conflict resolution strategies if they were used for a specific purpose such as cooling a feud or if more than one barrio, including some that had been feuding in the past, took part. These activities permitted positive interactions among barrios which might have had only negative interactions prior to the activities.

When only one barrio was involved in an activity, it helped the barrio members continue to feel a part of the project, provided diversionary activities, and provided members with positive experiences which they might not otherwise have had.

The one major community involvement project which took place made it possible for gang members from one barrio to take pride in a concrete, positive accomplishment--the building and completion of handball courts in their neighborhood park.

Providing jobs for gang members and assisting them in finding out about and applying for jobs also seemed to be an important supplement to conflict resolution, as they provide alternative forms of activities which pay off.

Organizing association meetings also seemed to help supplement conflict resolution in some barrios by providing alternative activities. They seemed to have been learning experiences for those who took part--learning how to conduct or take part in somewhat formal meetings, learning how to plan activities, and learning about the project and its goals. However, in three of the barrios association meetings were not held often enough to indicate that they would have had any effect.

Federation

The decrease in homicides not only after the Gang Violence Reduction Project began (November 1976) but also during the period when the Federation was in existence (1972-1973) can be seen as evidence that the types of techniques used by both organizations can bring about a reduction in homicides. Both developed forums to encourage communications and to negotiate antagonisms, and both increased positive interbarrio interactions through recreational or sports activities.

Outside Influences

Two aspects to the relationship between the changes in violent incident statistics and the activities of other groups or individuals in the community of the East Los Angeles unincorporated area (Outside Influences) have been noted by the research. One is the possible independent effect each may have had on changes in the statistics. The other is the effect they may have had through interactions with the Gang Violence Reduction Project.

Community agencies, governmental organizations, and special programs in the area which might interact with gang members were examined. There was no evidence of any significant change in their number or type during the first and second funding periods as compared to the year before the project began. Therefore, their effect can be considered a constant. It would seem that they were not independently responsible for the changes in trends for homicides and violent incidents which occurred after the Gang Violence Reduction Project began. There were several new programs funded during the project's third funding period. It seemed that only two could have had any direct influence upon violent activities by project gangs. However, the gang-related homicides and incidents with project gangs as suspects did not show any significant change in trend during the third period. Rather, most trends had leveled off at a lower level than that at which they had peaked.

There is evidence that interactions between the project and community groups could have influenced the reduction in homicides and violent incidents. One type of interaction occurred when staff was made aware of gang-related incidents by members of some community group. As a result of their being

notified, the staff often became involved in investigating and mediating the incidents. In the other type of interaction, project staff worked with other agencies in such a way as to have an effect on barrio members. Some examples of this are: barrio members were able to take part in recreational activities which had been unavailable to them; they had previously closed facilities opened to them; they became informed of the services of agencies of which many were unaware; and more of them may have been able to acquire employment than would otherwise have been the case.

Other project outcomes

There is no doubt that the Gang Violence Reduction Project has had outcomes other than the statistical ones. Some have been noted above, such as the increase in communications between gang members and community groups. In many cases the increased communications seemed to have brought about improved relations between them.

Considered in the evaluation design were changes in the orientation of gang members. Based on indirect evidence, no major change in orientation has become evident other than that many gang members adopted peace as a desirable or at least possible concept. Other changes in orientation may have taken place, but the change may have been so gradual as to not be readily apparent.

Another effect of the project has been the spreading of its strategies for achieving peace to areas outside the target area.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be stated that the Gang Violence Reduction Project was involved in the types of activities outlined in its proposal. It achieved its objectives during the third funding period. The available evidence points in the direction that the project's activities were responsible for reductions in gang-related homicides and violent incidents with suspects from the gangs with which it was working.

Appendix A
CODE FOR CRIMES

1. Threatening with weapon or physical force.
2. Attacking car or building with no injuries.
3. Shooting at dwelling or car without hitting anyone.
4. Shooting at people without hitting anyone.
5. Forced robbery; attempted robbery. (Taken by force)
6. Shooting and wounding or killing.
7. Beating or otherwise assaulting.
8. Stabbing (can include assault).
9. Assault or attempted assault, done with vehicle.
10. Rape or attempted rape.
11. Other

If more than one crime per incident, code most serious crime based on injury done.

Appendix B
GANG CONSULTANT DUTIES AS
STATED IN THE CONTRACT

Services provided by Contactor (i.e., gang consultant) shall include but not be limited to:

1. Establish positive relationships with other gang members to gain their confidence and cooperation in order to involve them in setting up community neighborhood associations.
2. Assist GVRP staff in identifying power figures in gang groups in the project's target area and convince them to cease hostilities.
3. Contact and convince gang groups to get involved in Federation of United Neighborhoods in order to establish a communications vehicle to mitigate gang violence between antagonistic/feuding gangs in the project's target area.*
4. Assist GVRP staff in organizing gang groups into grass roots community neighborhood associations in their respective areas.
5. Assist GVRP staff in the implementation of self-help community project.
6. Assist in communicating the project's goals and activities to gang groups, gang members in the community, California Youth Authority institutions, CDC facilities and probation facilities in order to get them involved in the project.
7. Assist GVRP staff in the transportation of gang members to various sites in and out of target area.
8. Assist research assistant in collecting information about gang group behavior patterns.

* These duties were written when the project began. The actual duties have evolved during the 3 periods of the project's operation with some changes in emphasis taking place. For example, the concept of a Federation was not actively pursued during the third period, but job placement assistance which is not stated in the formal duties became a rather significant activity.

END