


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National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20531

DATE FILMED

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Chairman ICHORD. Dr. Hacker, you are recognized to proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK J. HACKER

Dr. HACKER. Thank you. I am very grateful for the opportunity. I apologize that due to the shortness of time it was not possible to prepare some written statement, which I will do later on.

[The written statement later supplied by Dr. Hacker follows:]

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. HACKER, M.D.

In our days, modern society has become more vulnerable to the danger of terrorism than ever before. Due to the exponential growth of modern society in specialization, differentiation and size, the dependence on and sensitivity of highly placed individuals, crucial institutions and industries, communication centers, etc., has tremendously increased, thus making these individuals and industries attractive and often easily accessible targets for terroristic attack. Rapid advances in technology, psychology, and mass communication have made explosive, highly dangerous weapons generally available; brain-washing and other coarse, or subtle coercive influence techniques can now be used effectively and profusely, and it was "discovered" recently that violent acts can serve as mass entertainment. These factors have multiplied the chances and dangers of terrorism.

The Chairman of this Committee has correctly predicted the rise (and the import) of terrorism years ago, and called for legislative and administrative measures to combat this mounting social danger. Admittedly most terrorism is criminal, but represents a criminal activity of a special sort calling for special and innovative counter-measures that are not confined to conventional law enforcement approaches. Terrorism having yielded maximal results in public attention and effective promotion of terrorist causes on comparatively minor investments of money and life, has proved itself a veritable growth industry, which can be expected to further expand and proliferate, possibly in a mushroom-like fashion.

Terrorists deliberately creating extreme fear and in its wake, indignation or helplessness and even paralysis, forcibly draw attention to themselves and the causes they presumably represent, and in whose name violence is perpetrated. Terrorism mainly serves to signal, to alarm, to frighten and prove the powerlessness of power, to advertise and to propagandize. Victims chosen at random, or for their publicity value, are used and abused ruthlessly to produce the desired effects of intimidation on the objects of terrorism (not to be confused with the victims), which are a small (family) or a large (nation) community or even the whole world, by extortion, blackmail and spectacular cruelty.

The terrorist personality profile roughly falls within three main categories:

1. Criminal; motivation mainly or exclusively personal gain.
 2. Mentally deranged; motivation personal, idiosyncratic conflicts, dramatic self-display and self-cure, delusions or hallucinations, often incomprehensible to observers.
 3. Political; motivation directed toward a realistic or imagined strategic goal, directly or indirectly, rationally or irrationally, serving either a clear, but often also a vague political, pseudo-political or pseudo-religious ideology.
- These three categories, criminal, deranged, political, often overlap, frequently it is difficult to distinguish in a given instance (for instance, Symbionese Army) which of these motivations are present or predominant. Yet it appears clear that for effective counter-measures, the distinction between these categories must not be blurred; what is effective in one category, is totally ineffective for another (for instance, the expected deterrence of death penalty, or the lure of money, to favorably influence the political or mentally deranged offenders).

Violent conflict solution attempts become all the more likely, the more the participants in a conflict on either side are or become fanatically indoctrinated, imbued with feelings of righteousness and convinced of the sacredness of their cause. The evident connection between violence and its justification (in the minds of the perpetrators) deserves particularly careful study; the "rational" terrorists who use more "strategic" than "symptomatic" violence, may be subjectively sincere, intelligent, unselfishly motivated, incorruptible, well trained and well

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organized, which makes them no less but more dangerous. Modern political terrorism represents an explosive threat in its inhuman ruthlessness and disregard of innocent life, because the terrorists also consider their own lives as expendable.

Terrorism is attracted by big names, (megacrimes) and big occasions (holiday and anniversary events), very often terroristic acts represent episodes of a series and are followed, copycat, or imitation crimes. Some forms of terrorism (sky-jacking, kidnapping, etc.) occur in waves, follow definite fashion patterns, influenced and even produced by spectacular dramatized mass media communication. After the stimulating "sensational" entertainment effect has worn off, righteous indignation sets in on the part of the objects of terrorism (community), that for obvious psychological reasons, then considers the terrorists as "nothing but" common criminals. But righteous indignation is no substitute for genuine understanding on which effective countermeasures can be based.

Terrorism never takes place in a vacuum, but has to be seen against the background of social conditions (or their image) and emotional reactions to these conditions or their images. Terrorism thrives on feelings of remediable injustice; neither actual deprivation nor oppression as such are root causes of terrorism, but the perception and experience of injustice, simultaneously with the belief that such injustice can be remedied by social action (and is *not* considered nature, inevitable, fated, etc.) are basic reasons for terrorism.

In fact it can be argued that the full weight of counter-measures against terrorism is morally justified only if conditions of governmental terror are not tolerated (like in some countries that permit or encourage oppression, deny due process of law, condone torture, etc.). Terrorists are characteristically recruited from the ranks of the disaffected and alienated; the origin of terrorism is in direct relationship to conditions that do not permit meaningful social change, except by violence. Due to modern communication, terrorism is an international problem; terroristic techniques are easily exported and quickly imitated all over the globe. Empirical research has shown beyond any reasonable doubt that imitation and repetition of terroristic acts occur more readily when spectacular violence is used, regardless of whether this violence is performed by the law breakers or by the law enforcers.

The following steps are suggested for more effective counter-measures to be devised and for new preventive and protective insights to be gained:

I. Research and remedial social (legislative, administrative, technical, law enforcement, etc.) action should be initiated immediately and be carried out simultaneously with mutual reference to each other. The formulation of research should take into account that terrorism is not a definite and static, but rather a fast changing, chameleon-like, shifting and ongoing phenomena, characteristically unpredictable in its future manifestations, because terrorism incorporates not only social and political developments all over the globe, but also the reflection of effective or ineffective counter-measures. Therefore, the systematic combination of research and action, of theoretical and practical considerations, of teaching, training, instruction and field work, experience and participation is mandatory to meet terroristic threats and to optimally anticipate and prevent terroristic dangers. The coordination of legislative and administrative, and even of national and international measures (interpol-like international agency for exchange of information and mutual assistance, help in preparation and advice for conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements) should be visualized from the very start.

II. Due to the varied and varying, multifaceted and changing manifestations of terrorism that are differently motivated (criminal, mentally deranged, political), no single magic formula will "explain", or "solve", all or even most terroristic offenses; yet terroristic activities follow essentially the same few models. Hence, general principles and guidelines of counter-strategies can be developed. Therefore:

1. Action teams or task forces, consisting of highly trained, professionalized experts from various fields, including, but not confined to law enforcement officers, should be organized and permitted to participate in action right away. These teams could be under central control or be organized on a local level under the umbrella of a federal institution; their function should be advisory, but their advice should have to be sought by the decision makers (duly elected or appointed officials) in an obligatory fashion; just as there should be an obligation to inform them of all the details of relevant events. In special cases these task forces could be used for actual participation in negotiations, bargaining, etc.

2. The organization of action teams or task forces should have computerized data banks and similar resources at their disposal, which quickly inform about successes or failure of previous similar events and the countermeasures taken.

The data collecting center, or centers could be empowered to conduct ongoing research into:

(a) Personality profiles and personality development of various types of terrorists (criminal, mentally deranged, political).

(b) Victimology: The reasons for victims to be chosen as victims, behavior of victims, for instance in terms of indignation, endurance, hysteria or hidden and overt sympathy for captors, erotic ties, identification with aggressors, etc., effects of "brain-washing" and other forms of coercion creating conversion or increased resistance.

(c) Behavior of terror objects, i.e., families, communities, nations, etc. Studies in group, mass and crowd psychology of behavior under stress (man on the ledge phenomenon, when out of impatience, crowd demands jumping, to terminate intolerable tension), combined with studies about deterrent effect of higher penalties, particularly death penalty specifically in regard to terrorism, possibly the threat of high penalty only increases illusion of security, rather than security). Special attention to psychology of law enforcement officers and their sensitivity to lose face and to ridicule (see scientific findings that saving face, means losing life), habituation to resolving emergent or actual conflict by quick confrontation, rather than by negotiations.

3. Confrontation of various negotiation techniques and strategies in terms of effectiveness and morality:

(a) Which means are best suited to bring about certain stated or agreed upon ends. Who should negotiate, when and how, up to what limit, etc.

(b) Providing empirical research data for the decision about ultimate ends; for instance, preservation of individual life (considered highest hierarchical aim in peacetime democratic society) vs. prestige or propaganda gains, or gains in status or territory, (considered high goal by authoritarian societies or in times of war). "Hard" empirical data to supplement or to guide emotional intuition.

III. Due to the undeniable fact that the mass media perform willingly or unwittingly the propaganda job for terrorism by providing national or international audiences with sensational mass entertainment; possibilities for reasonable mass media presentation, appropriate controls must be studied and experimented with under strict observation of First Amendment protection and other guarantees for free speech and free expression. Various voluntary and compulsory control schemes, avoiding crude censorship can be suggested by reducing or eliminating spectacular advertisement and excitement effects, to minimize the multiplying contagion effect, leading to imitation and escalation of terroristic violence. All scapegoating of the media, who, after all, only do their job as presently defined and seemingly demanded by the public, should be avoided; media experts (and investigations about media effects) could be used as team members and particular emphasis placed on experimental attempts to employ the media positively and productively through genuine information and education, that nevertheless can be exciting and entertaining.

IV. Modern terrorism is a criminal activity of a novel and special sort, therefore novel methods for its control, reduction and elimination must be developed, which should try to avoid public indifference as much as public hysteria. Since the security measures of conventional law enforcement are clearly not sufficient for effective protection, new cooperation patterns with law enforcement agencies and new information patterns to further the understanding of the public must be worked out:

1. Training of law enforcement officers in the various fields of the experts and vice versa training of experts in strategy and tactics of law enforcement, with particular attention to communicability of their joint activities to the public.

2. Research based suggestions to legislative and administrative bodies regarding availability and manufacture of hand firearms and explosives (gun laws), etc.

3. Terror from above (governmental or police state, totalitarian, vigilante terror) certainly is and is believed to be a possible and potentially quite popular countermeasure against terrorism. Hence even the "benign" beginnings of such terror (emergency measures continued over a long period of time, inroads in the protection of individual freedom, etc.) must be spotted and avoided by weighing the inherent potential effects of measures against their costs in liberty and freedom (see, for instance, search and seizure, free movement, free expression, etc.).

V. Insofar as terrorism must be seen in the general context of its origin and justification (for the terrorists and actual or potential objects) novel action research and research action may serve to single out and point to particularly sensitive areas nationally and internationally, in which the feeling of remediable injustice runs high. Attention can be drawn to these areas and problems without

waiting for the terrorists to do so by their spectacularly violent actions. The task forces or research teams could be social action initiators and fulfill a preventive function (for instance, the explosiveness of the situation in Palestinian refugee camp could have been and was foreseen. Officially tolerated arbitrary arrest and torture of the political prisoners by totalitarian and South American countries possess a high terroristic potential, or the situation in some ghettos and certain jails as breeding ground for terrorism, can easily be spotted).

Legitimate moral authority can be conferred on strong, firm and decisive countermeasures against terrorism only, if at the same time social action is demanded and carried out by the very same authority, that does not just demand loyalty and obedience to law, but endeavors to bring about conditions which justly and legitimately can command loyalty and compel obedience to law. The reality principle of the future to which a free democratic nation is irrevocably committed, demands the development and availability of free and institutionalized alternatives to violence for peaceful and reasonable evolution. To this high purpose, all research and action endeavors should be dedicated.

Dr. HACKER. I want to congratulate whoever was responsible for drafting the set of questions because it shows some expertise and knowledge on the subject and for a moment it made me feel it was not necessary for me to testify because you had this information already.

I think, due to the tremendous technological developments and the accomplishments in perfecting weaponry and such and due to the specialization and differentiation of modern society, there is no doubt about it that modern society has become more vulnerable for this type of focused attack which now goes on under the name of terrorism and has become more vulnerable for both the criminal and political motivated attack.

I would like to make a statement on that, first of all. Even granting that most or all political acts of violence directed against an established government like the United States of America, it should be considered criminal and it is criminal. It is a special type of criminality that I believe cannot be handled with the conventional police methods.

In other words, terrorism is a crime, but a special sort of crime that demands certain special measures and certain special information to meet it successfully.

I am glad the chairman spoke about the suggestion of action teams. All over the country each local police force or law enforcement agency that has the responsibility of solving a case that happens in its jurisdiction, should be privileged to have the advice of such teams either on the spot or by telephone or whatnot, teams which have been properly trained. It should be obligatory that whoever makes the decision about these matters has to consult with that team. It does not necessarily have to take the advice of that team—that would be too much of an interference in the structure—but every police chief or whoever makes that type of decision should be obligated to consult with a team of that sort.

Great care should be taken in collecting and training the team members so they could be a functioning body, having all the material at its disposal. It could be computerized, right now, in order to determine the strategy of the matter and to be able to meet each individual case or incident at the moment.

Again, I want to say something as a matter of principle. I believe it is wrong to think we know nothing about terrorism. It is equally wrong to think we know all about it. There is no simple recipe. Now the motivations for terrorism are different. The first thing we have

to do is take account of the differentiations. I would distinguish between the criminal, the lunatic, and the political. To be sure, they are very frequently intermingled with each other. Maybe later I could give a few ideas on how one could handle that problem. But very clearly, the countermeasures of a society must take into account whether these acts are done by "crazies," inveterate criminals, or politically inspired people. This differentiation just implies that there are different things that ought to be done about a deed according to the suspected motivations of the perpetrator.

I agree with the chairman that at least in the very near future the method of using blackmail and extortion will become more popular because of the contagiousness of these methods, particularly when propagated by the mass media.

That is another area of very serious consideration, being fully aware of the first amendment protections and other necessary safeguards of freedom. But I believe nowadays one cannot afford to overlook the unhappy fact that willingly or unwittingly the mass media do the business of terrorism. They perform the dirty business of terrorism as its propaganda arm by spreading and dramatizing and making more spectacular acts of terrorism, thereby providing terrorist inducements.

In other words, my general idea is, although we cannot hope to devise a blueprint or even two or three blueprints, we can establish general guidelines that may be quite valid and will not miraculously handle every case to everybody's satisfaction, but will improve our batting average very significantly.

I would not be a scientist if I would not advocate a great deal more research. But I feel it should be very strictly focused, should not be a fishing expedition type of research, to just haphazardly go ahead and see what you can pick up. We already know a few areas, for instance, mass media, differentiation of various profiles; also by improvement of negotiation methods, by carefully going over past negotiations, that could improve society's reactions against what promises to be a dire threat, not only to the unfortunate victim but to the whole structure of society. Unfortunately, for better or worse, terrorism has been a very popular growth industry because there was relatively little at stake and spectacular things are accomplished.


The last thing I would like to say is what the representatives of law and order have to guard against is not to answer terrorism with terror. We have to be careful not to go overboard in our enthusiasm of fighting terrorism and not get into the area of terror.

I would feel the strongest and most focused activities are indicated right now. As everybody can see, terrorism is increasing and spreading like the cholera. The time to do something about it is right now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ICHORD. Thank you very much. We will proceed under the 5-minute rule. I will recognize the members for questioning. At this time, I will first avail myself of that.

It has been pointed out that probably the only nation in the world which has any set policy toward dealing with terrorism has been the nation of Israel. They work on the principle that terrorism feeds upon publicity and successes.



END