# The National Evaluation of the Standards and Goals Project

Volume i An Assessment of the Program

Prepared for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA, Washington, DC

December 1978

Staff of the National Standards and Goals Evaluation

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AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH / 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Washington, DC 20007

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Volume I An Assessment of the Program

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# Preface

The report that follows is the product of two years of work, involving at one point or another as many as 11 people full-time. The writing of the report was the least of the work that had to be accomplished. Behind such innocuous statements as (for example) "...we identified 136 key elements for further study..." lay many weeks, often months, of work. The written report is the tip of the iceberg.

Above all, we had to conduct field work in 27 states, meaning that we had to rely upon the cooperation and candor of hundreds of people in literally every part of the country. We would like to take this opportunity to thank them. Whatever other problems may have burdened the Standards and Goals Program, a lack of good people was not one of them.

We would also like to express our thanks to our technical monitor from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, who worked with us throughout the evaluation. We knew from the outset that the evaluation would not be a cut-and-dried matter of bean counting, but that foreknowledge did not make the obstacles and detours along the way any easier. Paul Lineberry's assistance and patience has been appreciated.

A note on authorship. Although the report is properly read as a team effort, specific people did have specific writing responsibilities. Paul Radtke was primarily responsible for Chapters 2, 6 (with William Trencher), and 8 (with Shirley Hines and Ingrid Heinsohn). Melissa Holland wrote most of Chapters 3 (with William Trencher) and 4. Blair Bourque, Rigney Hill, and Shirley Hines compiled the material for Chapter 7 (as one small part of the work that appears as Volume III of the evaluation). Chapter 5 was lifted, with minor editorial changes, from the trip summaries that were prepared after every field visit. Charles Murray took the lead on Chapters 1 and 9, and, with Ingrid Heinsohn and Joan Flood, edited the report as a whole.

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# 1. Introduction

What follows is the evaluation of the Standards and Goals Program, sponsored during the period 1974 to 1977, by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

The Standards and Goals Program--"S&G" for convenience-was an unusual program from the outset. On paper, at least, it was LEAA's highest priority project for 1974. It was allocated more money than any other Discretionary Fund (DF) program to that time--so much money that one state, California, received more than a national commission had gotten a few years earlier to do the same job for the entire country. And yet this program, unlike the others that LEAA typically sponsors, had no direct connection with the administration of law enforcement or of justice. It promised no new ways of preventing crime. It bought no new hardware for catching criminals. It tested no new theories for rehabilitating prisoners. Rather, it financed a process, with a few, general stipulations about what that process was to produce. S&G paid for the states to think about what they wanted their law enforcement/criminal justice (LE/CJ) systems to be. It asked them to set standards of operation, goals for the future, and to write them down and publicize them so that they would be known to all.

The motivation for the program grew from problems with which LEAA had been wrestling since its inception in the late 1960s. In particular, the motivation for S&G went back to the problem of trying to deal with law enforcement and criminal justice on a national scale. For, despite the proliferation of centralized information systems, there are only a few generalizations that the Federal government can make with assurance about the LE/CJ system in this country.

It is important: that much is undisputed. From almost any perspective, enforcement of the law and administration of justice is a central concern.

It is sprawling and uncoordinated. Only education rivals LE/CJ as a conglomerate social institution that has remained largely under local and state control throughout a period of increasing centralization at the Federal level.

It is heterogeneous, in all sectors. Police practices, court procedures, correctional systems work very differently in different states.

It is changing -- to an unknown extent.

After these assertions, the state of knowledge of the practices and directions of the system as a whole is fragmented. Professionals within a specific area--prosecution or probation or policing--have a good feel for the dimensions of practice and change within their special fields of expertise. Literature is available that ties the pieces together retrospectively. But despite the propensity to speak of a "system" of law enforcement and criminal justice, systemic goals and systemic descriptors have been hard to come by at the level of operations and policy decisions.

For LEAA, this state of affairs has been of more than academic interest. In broad strokes, LEAA has been tasked by Congress with upgrading the quality of law enforcement and criminal justice across the sectoral boundaries of police and courts and corrections, and on a national scale. The problem has been to determine a plausible strategy for accomplishing the mission. How to do it, with a budget that is a miniscule part of the national expenditures on LE/CJ? How to do it, given that the notion of a centralized criminal justice system appeals to virtually no one?

One strategy has been to use the leverage that money buys, through LEAA grant programs. Seen benignly (from the Federal standpoint), the objective has been to finance experiments and practices that states and localities would not institute otherwise and, once their merits were established, to rely on the willingness of the locality to institutionalize them in the local budget. Seen less benignly (from the standpoint of a locality wary of Washington), leverage could take the form of insidious loss of local control--"comply with the following stipulations, or lose your Federal support."

The wisdom and impact of these grant programs have been and still are the subject of dozens of scholarly and congressional inquiries. But whatever the final assessment may be, the approach intrinsically has been a piecemeal one.

In the early 1970s, LEAA's senior officials began to examine the potential of "standards" as a way of transcending the bit-by-bit, project-by-project approach to change. Instead of using leverage, the "standards" approach would try to generate multipliers. Put in its most elementary form, LEAA would establish accepted yardsticks for comparing law enforcement and criminal justice systems, starting with a national set of standards and goals (see Chapter 3). But resistance to national standards for local systems was strong, and it soon became obvious that volumes would sit unused on library shelves. Rather than try to sell an entire nation on one set of standards, LEAA argued, why not let the states each develop their own? Three benefits were plausible.

First, if it were possible to get explicit, objective statements on where a state wanted to go, there would at at least be a framework on which to hand out the Federal resources that LEAA could provide. Second, with luck, the existence of a well-crafted, consensus set of standards at the state level would in itself be a catalytic element in prompting widespread change within that state. And, making an equally problematic assumption, that the standards of the separate states would tend to be "good" standards, LEAA hoped to set in motion events that would raise the overall quality of the system and decrease the inequities among localities.

We have stated these intended benefits cautiously. LEAA's rhetoric was less so. "The development of the standards and goals through a well-planned process," wrote LEAA, "represents an historic milestone for criminal justice planning. It is singularly important to each local and state unit of government." (National Program Strategy: iv). LEAA went on:

The concept of using standards and goals as the driving force for planning and operating the criminal justice system is not new. What is new is commitment to the institutionalization of the process of setting standards and goals as a major tool in planning, budgeting, and evaluating the effectiveness of crime fighting efforts. The underlying premise of the standards and goals program is that if SPAs, criminal justice agencies, and the general public together reach consensus on the purposes, responsibilities, and goals of the system, adopt standards, goals, and priorities,

and commit their energies and financial resources to their fulfillment, crime rates can be significantly reduced, and the existing inequities of the criminal justice system can be eliminated or diminished.

The chapters that follow describe what happened. The first volume is an account of how the idea worked in practice and what was accomplished with the roughly 16 million dollars that LEAA eventually spent on it. The second volume takes on the much broader question of standards and goals in the lower case: what is the profile of LE/CJ standards and practice nationwide? The third volume is a concordance of the standards on a state-by-state basis, for use as a reference document.

Volume I is organized in nine chapters, of which this is the first. Chapter 2 presents the design of the study. Chapter 3 describes the background and objectives of the S&G Program. Chapter 4 describes the mechanics of the program, and the extent to which the immediate outcomes of the program were achieved. Chapter 5 presents six brief outlines of programs in specific states, to convey a sense of the various forms an S&G process might take. Chapter 6 then puts these process characteristics in the form of generalized themes. Chapter 7 discusses the nature of the intermediate outcome of the program: the standards themselves. Chapter 8 then analyzes the extent to which the program had impact on LE/CJ planning and practice. Volume I closes with conclusions and recommendations, in Chapter 9.

# 2. Design of the Study

The Standards and Goals Program began in January, 1974. The evaluation of the program was conducted between November, 1976 and July, 1978, by the Washington Office of the American Institutes for Research (AIR).

#### **STAFF**

The project director and principal investigator was Dr. Charles A. Murray. Mr. William M. Trencher and Mr. Paul H. Radtke served as associate project directors, with the assistance of Dr. Gary Brumback in the early phases of the project. Data collection, data analysis and preparation of the final report were jointly conducted by the persons named above and Ms. D. Rigney Hill, Ms. Blair B. Bourque, Ms. Melissa Holland, Ms. Ingrid Heinsohn, Ms. Shirley Hines, and Ms. Cindy B. Israel. Additional data collection support at points during the project was provided by Mr. Louis O. Richardson and Mr. Garmon West. Administrative support was provided by Ms. Joan M. Flood. Graphics were prepared by Ms. Virginia Sheard.

The evaluation of the Standards and Goals Program involved four analytic tasks. The first was (1) examination of the process and the impact of the S&G Program through an analysis of 27 state S&G projects. The second task was (2) comparative analysis of the standards adopted by the states in certain, selected topic areas.

The other pair of tasks provided a context against which the program could be assessed. An examination was made of (3) the general process by which change takes place in each of the state's criminal justice systems. And we conducted a survey of (4) current policies and practices of operating criminal justice agencies in a variety of areas addressed by the state standards. While these latter tasks were carried out as a part of the overall evaluation of the

TABLE 2.1 Standards and Goals Field Data Collection

State	Dates	Staff
ALABAMA	11/15-11/17/77	Richardson, Heinsohn, Hines
CALIFORNIA	6/20-6/28/77	Hill, Israel
COLORADO	12/7-12/9/76	Brumback, Trencher
	10/31-11/3/77	Radtke, Heinsohn, Hines
DELAWARE	3/28-3/31/77	Trencher, Heinsohn, West
	12/14-12/15/77	Hill
FLORIDA	12/19-12/21/76	Murray
	11/29-12/2/77	Radtke, Hines, Holland
GEORGIA	12/1-12/3/76	Murray, Trencher
	11/28-12/2/77	Trencher, Israel
IDAHO	6/6-6/9/77	Murray, Heinsohn, Radtke
ILLINOIS	4/26-4/29/77	Murray, Hines, Israel
INDIANA	7/11-7/13/77	Brumback, West
IOWA	5/9-5/13/77	Murray, Hill, Israel
KANSAS	4/25-4/28/77	Trencher, Heinsohn, West
LOUISIANA	3/20-3/24/77 7/25-7/28/77	Murray, Heinsohn, Hill Hill
MAINE	11/29-12/3/77	Richardson, Heinsohn, Hill
MICHIGAN	5/21-5/25/77	Brumback, Hill, Hines
MINNESOTA	11/15-11/18/77	Radtke, Hines, Israel
MISSISSIPPI	11/1-11/4/77	Hill, Holland, Israel
NEBRASKA	9/26-9/29/77	Richardson, Hines, Radtke
NEW MEXICO	10/18-10/21/77	Hill, Heinsohn, Israel
NORTH CAROLINA	12/12-12/14/77	Trencher, Holland, Israel
NORTH DAKOTA	5/30-6/3/77	Murray, Heinsohn, West
OHIO	10/18-10/20/77	Radtke, Hines Richardson
OREGON	8/16-8/19/77	Brumback, Israel, Radtke
PENNSYLVANIA	3/21-3/25/77	Brumback, Hines, West
	4/13-4/15/77	Brumback, West
TEXAS	12/13-12/16/77	Richardson, Heinsohn, Hines
UTAH	6/21-6/24/77	Trencher, Hines, Radtke
WASHINGTON	9/11-9/15/77	Murray, Heinsohn, Hill
WISCONSIN	5/9-5/13/77	Brumback, Heinsohn, West

Standards and Goals Program, they were also regarded as distinct, separate research topics. They are treated extensively in the second volume of this report.

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS PROCESS AND IMPACT

#### **Data Collection**

Information about the process and impact of the Standards and Goals Program came from two main sources: interviews of persons involved in the process, and archival materials collected from each of the 27 projects examined. Data collection took place during field visits by a team of staff from the AIR Washington office. Field visits normally lasted for three to four days, by a team of three persons. The overall schedule and staffing of the data collection is shown in Table 2.1 below.

Interview Data. Overall, 507 individual interviews were conducted from December, 1976 through December, 1977. Because many of the S&G efforts had terminated well before the evaluation began, and because the persons who had been involved in S&G were not always available by the time that the field visits occurred, the number of interviews conducted and the positions of the persons interviewed varied from state to state. The situation was further complicated by the many different structures of state-level LE/CJ systems—a position that was of central importance in one state's system might not even exist in anothers. But while we could not standardize the samples, we could pursue a standardized procedure for locating and choosing among the persons who were available. The procedures were as follow.

In each state, we conducted interviews with a core group consisting of the head of the S&G Commission, the director of the S&G staff and the director of each staff subdivision (e.g., for courts, police, etc.), and director (or senior assistant) of all state-level LE/CJ related agencies. These typically included representatives of the State Planning Agency, the Attorney General's office, the Department of Corrections (adult and juvenile division), Court Administrator's Office of the State Supreme Court, Parole Office, Department of Public Safety (if any), State Police, and departments of child and family services. We further attempted to interview senior representatives of the police, prosecution, defense, and correctional services in at least one major city in each state. Representatives of LE/CJ professional associations were also routinely interviewed.

We then inquired of the S&G staff and the director for information about the key members of the Commission (either in positive or obstructive roles), and interviewed a representative sample of them. Typically this group was comprised of the heads of the Task Forces on the Commission. Additional interviews were developed on the basis of the specifics of the situation. In some states, where the legislature had been involved in S&G, we interviewed legislators and their staffs. In other cases, prominent lay persons had been active, and we sought them out. In still other cases, certain SPA staff or a regional planning office, or some other unit had played a role; the key persons were interviewed.

The general rule was that if a person was in the capital city (where the field team typically went first), then any person who fell in the above groups would be interviewed. This included, of course, all of the state-level officials. We would travel to another city to locate the director of the S&G staff, the director of the S&G commission, or a person who by consensus of other respondents was a primary figure in the S&G experience. When such a person existed, consensus appeared to emerge quickly.

In all we interviewed 507 people. The characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.2 The Interview Sample

	Role in the Standards and Goals Program				Total	
Professional Background	Commission member	Staff member	Other 1	No S&G role	Number	Percent
State-level LE/CJ official	41	2	28	74	145	(29)
Local LE/CJ official	30	9	15	45	99	(20)
SPA staff	3	<b>74</b> <sup>2</sup>	10	8	95	(19)
Other LE/CJ-related job	12	3	6	12	33	(7)
Legislator	3	4	0	23	30	(6)
Other governmental position	20	3	20	27	70	(14)
Other	23	10	1	1	35	(7)
TOTAL	132	105	80	190	507	
Percent of total	(26)	(21)	(16)	(37)		

NOTES: 1. Examples include participation in public hearings, as a consultant, or as a reviewer of the draft.

Many of the S&G staff were hired by the SPA specifically for S&G. This figure does not necessarily denote long-term SPA employees who were shifted to S&G.

Archival Data in the States. The second major source of information regarding the process and the impact of the Standards and Goals Program was the records maintained by the SPA's and the program staff. These records were used primarily to supplement and clarify the information provided through personal interviews. They were especially useful in those states where the process had been begun some time before the visit of the evaluation team.

The use of the state archives was limited by their accessibility, the volume of the material to be searched, and the completeness of the records. In most states it was possible to construct an accurate documentary record of the S&G process, independently of the recollection of the individuals involved.

Archival Data at LEAA. A final source of information was the body of reports, records, and materials at the national office of LEAA. Records of financial and technical assistance, and of implementation grants, were retrived from the Grants Management Information System (GMIS) maintained by LEAA. Other materials, including monitoring reports, state project profiles, and a series of project case studies prepared by the Stanford Research Institute complemented the information gathered in the states. Files of internal LEAA memoranda and correspondence relating to S&G were also examined.

#### Content

A concerted effort was made to standardize the quality of the information through the use of detailed interview schedules and an archival search checklist. Both the interview schedule and the checklist were structured around a presumed sequence of project phases, beginning with the initial planning and organization of the project, and ending with the implementation of the adopted standards. Copies of the interview schedules and archival search checklist are to be found in Appendix A of this volume.

The nature of the information varied according to the role the interviewee had played in S&G. Project directors, staff, and other persons involved in the day-to-day management of the project were asked about the technical aspects of the project. Information in the category included:

- Initial planning and organizational decisions
- Staff selection
- The recruitment of participants
- Public hearings
- Standards adoption procedures
- Priority setting procedures
- Implementation planning and activities

Staff were also asked to describe the general environment within which the project operated. Topics in this area included:

- Initial perceptions of the purpose of the program
- Unanticipated changes in plans or processes
- Sources of support or opposition to the project
- The relationship of the project to the SPA
  The relationship of the project to the Governor
- Facilitators and barriers to implementation

Finally, staff were asked to give an appraisal of the process. Topics in this area included:

- Assessment of the overall organization of the
- An assessement of the performance of project decision-makers
- The value and usefulness of the public hearings
- The utility of the priorities set by decision-
- An assessement of the implementation effort
- Future strategies for standards and goals in the
- An overall assessement of the success of the project.

Persons who participated in the process, but who were primarily involved in the actual development of the states' standards were asked about broader aspects of the project, and about topics where the perception of the staff might be biased. Topics in this area included:

- Appraisal of the organization of the process
- The value and quality of staff input
- The political environment in the state
- Future expectations for the project in the state
- An appraisal of the success or failure of the project.

Information about S&G in the states was obtained from the Standards and Goals staffs, from persons in operating

criminal justice agencies and from the staff in the SPA's. Standards and Goals staff were asked about specific implementation efforts undertaken as a part of the project, and about implementation efforts being made by other agencies. Agency personnel were asked for their assessment of the project and for any changes in the operation of the agency that resulted from the project. They were also asked to assess the future impact of the project on their agency and to express any major disagreements they might have had with the standards adopted by the state. SPA staff were asked about the integration of the standards that had been adopted into the agencies' planning and funding processes.

The information sought in the interviews was primarily factual in nature. Mininal emphasis was placed on gathering attitudinal data. To the extent such data were obtained, they were clarified by soliciting concrete examples that illustrate the opinions expressed. Relatively few quantitative scales were used and the questions asked were largely open-ended in nature.

# Data Analysis

The analysis of the S&G Program was predominately qualitative rather than quantitative. Conclusions were drawn about the program as a whole rather than the individual state projects. Although a great deal of specific information was gathered about each state project the evaluation was designed to assess the utility and impact of S&G as a national program, not to produce 27 project case studies.

Very few a priori delimitations about what was or was not important were carried into the data collection, and as the effort progressed it became increasingly clear that the open-ended approach was the most appropriate. Often, the variations found among states in process, outcome and eventual impact became significant only after a number of states had been visited. The quantitative measures reported in this study were derived out of the qualitative data and are used primarily for summarization of the most common relationships uncovered, not as an analytic device.

# **COMPARISON OF STANDARDS ACROSS STATES**

Initially, it was intended to compare all elements of all standards on all topics in all of the states. Familiarity with the data base changed this objective. It was huge. Further, we found that the bulk of the standards were what the staff came to call "motherhood and apple pie standards," with which no one could reasonably disagree but with no mandate to take action—for example, "Every police agency should ensure its operational effectiveness in dealing with other elements in the criminal justice system." To compare states on standards like these clearly would be meaningless—an omission by a state could more easily be a sound thriftiness of effort than rejection of the sense of the standard.

Instead we established an entity we have labeled the "key element." A key element is a standard, or section of a standard, that meets two criteria:

- (1) it specifies a concrete action on policy, and
- (2) it deals with a nontrivial topic.

Not surprisingly, the first criterion had fuzzy edges; some standards were more than platitudes but less than truly specific and actionable. We tended to be inclusive. The second criterion was not a problem; only a handful of elements were discarded because they dealt with a minor detail of equipment or procedure.

Because virtually all of the states used the NAC standards as an initial guide (even though a few subsequently rewrote them from scratch), we drew our list of key elements from the NAC volumes. In all, 136 key elements were isolated (Chapter 7). We continued to compile information on all states that published volumes of standards, rather than limit the effort to the 27 we visited. The sample eventually reached 41, or all states with published standards and goals as of 1 March 1978.

#### **Data Collection and Coding**

The data source was the published volume. For each key element, a given volume of standards was first searched to determine whether that state had developed a standard related to the topic. If so, the following characteristics of the state's version were abstracted:

- The degree to which the standard agreed with the National Advisory Commission standard
- The strength of the mandate to implement the standard
- When the standard was to be fully implemented
- How specific the standard was regarding what was to be done, and who was to do it.

In addition to these factors substantial differences between the state standard and the National Advisory Commission standards were noted. Changes noted included:

- Changes in the person or agency responsible for implementing the standard
- Changes in the target or scope of the standard
- Omissions, changes, or additions to the conditions specified in the standard.

Other variations in content were noted. Then, for a given element, the results from all 41 states were reviewed, and basic categories of content were developed  $ex\ post$  facto.

### Data Analysis

The purpose of reviewing the substantive content of the standards produced by the states was three-fold in nature.

First, the standards reveal additional information about the S&G process in the states. Did a state simply mimic the NAC standards? Were these conspicious discrepancies in tone and philosophy in the standards for different LE/CJ sections? Were the standards prepared as a mandate for action, or did they stay with softer, less specific exhortations to be good?

Second, the analysis assesses where the states stood on a large number of important issues in criminal justice. On a related topic, we examined the degree to which the NAC volumes--which were, after all, supposed to stand as guides for the entire nation--were in accord with national sentiment as expressed in the state standards.

Third, analysis was undertaken to compare standards with the actual practices of operating criminal justice agencies. We now turn to a review of the data base for that comparison.

# **SURVEY OF CURRENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTICES**

#### **Data Collection**

Information about current practice in criminal justice was obtained through a national mail survey of criminal justice agencies in all sectors of the system: police, sheriffs, courts, prosecution, defense, and corrections. All state level criminal justice agencies were surveyed as well as all agencies in cities with a population of 50,000 or more. The surveys were also sent to a random sample of agencies in cities of less than 50,000 population: 30 percent of cities with a population of between 25,000 and 50,000, and 15 percent of cities with a population of between 10,000 and 25,000 were surveyed. Altogether, 1,598 individual agencies were contacted in 760 cities and all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Table 2.3 presents the breakdown of the sample by sector and the response rate to the survey.\*

TABLE 2.3
Survey of Criminal Justice Practice: The Survey Sample

1,071 435 214	Number 636 <i>325</i>	Percentage 59.4
435	325	
435	325	
		74 7
214		74.7
	114	<i>53.3</i>
422	197	46.7
345	202	58.6
249	137	55.0
1,665	975	58.6
51	46	90.2
51	46	90.2
102	92	90.2
	1,665 51 51	1,665 975 51 46 51 46

<sup>\*</sup> A shorter version of the law enforcement instrument was sent to smaller police agencies (agencies in cities with less than 25,000 population). The large police agencies and all sheriff agencies were sent the longer form. See Appendix B.

A pre-test of the survey instruments was conducted approximately 3 months before the full mailing. The pre-test sample of 5 states and 60 cities was again contacted for the full survey.

#### **Data Content**

The questions asked of criminal justice agency personnel dealt primarily with the topics examined in the comparison of state standards described previously. Additional questions about issues other than those raised by the National Advisory Commission were also included on the recommendation of consultants. The questions were structured to capture the degree of compliance with the practices recommended in the National Advisory Commission standards and to solicit details of the practices, including the dates when the practices were first adopted, and the use of Federal funds to implement the practice.

The questions ranged over a variety of topics. They dealt with agency policies, programs, administrative and planning procedures, personnel and training policies, statutory requirements, physical facilities, and operational practices. Copies of the survey instruments can be found in Appendix A.

# **Data Analysis**

The survey of criminal justice practices was conducted to supplement the analysis of the Standards and Goals Program, and to provide a basis to assess the continuing process of system improvement contemplated in the original design of that program. A second major reason for conducting the survey was to provide criminal justice planners a national perspective of the actual practices of agencies in the system. As described in the comparison of state standards, the survey served as a basis for comparing the standards adopted by the state with the actual practices of Operating on the assumption that agencies in the states. the S&G was intended to encourage improvements in the system the survey also provides a basis for assessing the impact of the program by comparing changes in agency practices prior to, and following the standards and goals project in each state--although, for reasons discussed in Chapter 8, we became very reluctant to infer causality.

Perhaps the most valuable information provided by the survey is the data relating to the dates when specific policies were adopted. This information provides a basis for assessing the pace at which changes in the system take place, both on a national and a state level.

## ANALYSIS OF CHANGE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Initially, it had been intended to collect detailed accounts of changes in LECJ practice that were said to have been stimulated by S&G. It soon became apparent that (1) there were few incidents of this type and (2) there were many major contemporaneous changes that had nothing to do with S&G. We therefore broadened our inquiry to include reconstruction of LE/CJ changes regardless of their direct connection, or lack of it, with S&G. A detailed account of the sample and procedures is given in Chapter 15 (Volume II).

#### **Data Collection**

Information about the process of change in criminal justice came predominantly from interviews with persons in operating criminal justice agencies. When changes involved legislative actions, members and staff of the state legislature were interviewed. Most of the information about specific changes was gathered during direct interviews as a part of the field visit schedule. Supplemental information was obtained by telephone to ensure a uniform level of information about each change.

For interviews at the agencies, respondents were asked to describe the three most important changes to have taken place in the last five years. In the case of legislative changes, we attempted to obtain a roster of major legislative actions in the area of criminal justice prior to the field visits. This information was typically available from the published records of the state legislature. In the interview, respondents were asked to comment on each of these changes and to provide additional examples of change involving the legislature.

For legislative and non-legislative changes alike, we sought more than one source to complete or verify the information. In some cases it was also possible to collect documentary materials that described the nature of the change in some detail.

#### **Data Content**

Specific information about these changes was sought in the following areas:

The exact nature of the change

- A description of the former policy, program or procedure
- Jurisdictions, offices or other persons affected by the change
- The time frame within which the change had or would occur
- The formal process through which the change was adopted
- Details of the events leading up to the changes
- Key actors
- The role that Standards and Goals may have played in the process
- Effects of the change on agency operations
- Critical incidents of the impact of the change
- The amount and source of any funds involved in the change.

The information was obtained for each change of a significant nature. A copy of the forms used to compile this information can be found in Appendix A of this volume.

## Data Analysis

The analysis of how change takes place in the criminal justice system was undertaken both as a part of the overall analysis of the Standards and Goals Program, and as a separate, intrinsically interesting research topic. For the evaluation of S&G, two questions were to be addressed:

- What was the magnitude of the changes created by the program in comparison with other changes taking place in the system? and
- How well did the strategy for creating change, suggested by the standards and goals concept, fit with the general pattern of change in the system?

Answering the first question entailed a relatively simple comparison of changes stimulated by S&G with changes arising from other causes. Answering the second question required, however, a general understanding of how change takes place in criminal justice. The approach used was to treat the individual changes as small-scale case studies, each of which illustrated some fact or pattern of the change process. Changes of a similar nature or pattern were then grouped and a typology of change patterns was developed. By identifying the key factors involved in these changes, we sought to assess how well or how poorly the standards and goals concept met the requirements for creating change. Qualitative analysis was employed throughout, as described in Chapter 15.

# 3. Structure of the Program

This chapter describes the basics of the Standards and Goals Program: its antecedents, the meaning of "standards" and "goals," the purposes that the program was intended to serve, and how the program was supposed to operate. We conclude the chapter by translating the rhetoric and documentation of S&G into a formal program rationale that will frame the rest of the report.

#### ANTECEDENTS

The Standards and Goals Program had its beginnings in the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in the mid-1960s. One of President Johnson's many big-name, high-prestige panels, the Commission issued a report asserting that improvements in criminal administration by state and local governments must begin with the construction of formal machinery for planning. This, combined with a surging crime rate, led to the major piece of legislation called "The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968." The Act created LEAA. Included in the new agency's responsibilities was a mandate to develop comprehensive law enforcement and criminal justice "plans."

The planning mandate eventually led to the Standards and Goals Program. For, as LEAA administrators quickly discovered, "comprehensive plans" were being prepared and published, but without an anchor. The plans were not going to lead to some version of a "good" LE/CJ system--because the definition of what constituted "good enough" had not been set.

#### The National Approach: NAC

In late 1971, following discussions among senior officials at LEAA and the Attorney General, it was agreed that a clear statement of objectives and priorities was needed, "...to help set a rational strategy to reduce crime

through the timely and equitable administration of justice; the protection of life, liberty, and property; and the efficient mobilization of resources." Jerris Leonard, the LEAA Administrator at that time, created a national commission to direct this effort. Its purpose, he said, would be "...to establish for the first time, national goals, performance standards, and priorities to help every criminal justice planner in the nation chart where he is, where he wants to go, and how to get there."4

The National Advisory Commission (hereafter called NAC), received an appropriation of \$1.8 million from LEAA. During 15 months of effort, it developed five volumes containing over 500 standards and recommendations for the nation's criminal justice systems. When the Commission's work was completed in late 1972, its chairman stated that while some state and local governments might have already met or surpassed standards recommended in the report, most in the nation had not. The report's authors urged each state and local government "...to evaluate its present status and to implement those standards and recommendations that are appropriate."

In January 1973, LEAA tried to give that process some momentum, through a three-day national conference in Washington, D.C., to introduce the standards. Criminal justice planners, practitioners, public officials, and legislators from throughout the country were invited to participate. The purpose of the conference was to give the commission's work a forum and showcase for the first time among those who were in a position to encourage the development and implementation of state standards.

It made no visible progress. In some respects, it backfired. Many conferees thought they had come to Washington to critique the draft standards, only to find out on arrival that the draft was a final one. Others feared the imposition of inappropriate standards on them by the Federal government. Still others were skeptical about the future of standards and goals efforts, especially in light of rumors that Jerris Leonard was on his way out. There was no rush by the states, then or afterwards, to embrace NAC's standards as their own.

The State Approach: S&G

During the early months of 1973, lengthy discussions were held within LEAA regarding the future of the standard-setting effort. LEAA's General Counsel (and former Executive Director of the NAC Commission) was one of the leading

advocates of establishing an ongoing standards and goals mechanism within the agency, an enthusiasm shared by LEAA Administrator Leonard, the initiator of NAC.

Divisions arose within LEAA about how to proceed with the S&G followup--through the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), LEAA's research arm, or under a special advisory committee directly under the Administrator.

NILECJ saw itself as the logical place to put the S&G program. 7 Among the tasks the Institute proposed for itself were the periodic determination of what standards had been implemented, evaluations of the success of that implementation, development of materials to support standards development, and technology transfer to support implementation. handle matters related to the implementation, evaluation, and updating of standards, the Institute suggested that contractors be utilized. Regional offices and the SPAs would assume responsibility for implementation of standards within their respective regions, and a permanent National Advisory Commission would be created to keep the standards current. The General Counsel led the other point of view, that a small permanent staff within LEAA should be established to pursue S&G developments under the direction of an advisory committee appointed by the Administrator. Both strategies were based on expounding and selling the NAC standards to the states.

At this point, in April 1973, decisions within the White House took a hand. Leonard was replaced as the Administrator of LEAA by Donald Santerelli, the Agency's fourth administrator in its six years of existence. And Santerelli, following the practice of his predecessor, immediately created a management committee to examine the Agency's goals and objectives and to identify areas for organizational improvement. Among the findings of the committee was "...a need for standards against which to measure progress in the criminal justice system," but at the state level, building on the work of the National Advisory Commission.

The shift of emphasis toward the state level was reinforced by the actions of the House Judiciary Subcommittee during this period. In the spring of 1973, the Nixon Administration, in preparation for the LEAA reappropriation hearings, introduced a special revenue-sharing bill. The legislation (HR 5613) provided that funds be made available to state and local governments on a more direct, no-strings basis than LEAA was using. The House Committee rejected the proposal, but it did adopt some of the language in HR 5613.

Among the suggested changes accepted in the bill that passed the 1973 Crime Control Act was this definition of comprehensive planning: 10

The term "comprehensive" means that the plan must be a total and integrated analysis of the problems regarding the law enforcement and criminal justice system within the state; goals, priorities, and standards must be established in the plan.

This language, which had been drafted by LEAA's General Counsel, was quickly interpreted by LEAA as a congressional mandate for the state-by-state development of standards and goals. LEAA's 1974 State Planning Agency Guidelines passed the Act's definition of "comprehensive" on to the states, and added requirements that the next state comprehensive plan include (1) a general statement describing any existing or proposed goals, priorities, and standards; and (2) time-tables for the development of a comprehensive set of standards and goals for inclusion in the 1976 fiscal year plans. 11

When the new guidelines were presented, a number of state planning agency executive directors expressed concern about meeting the 1976 deadline. Further, many of them questioned LEAA's priorities. As they saw it, LEAA wanted to push the production of standards to counteract the criticism the Agency was receiving, ignoring the more important task of integrating the developed standards into the planning process. But the requirement was retained, and the states set about trying to meet it.

To assist them, LEAA's administration took advantage of the 1973 amendments that returned control of 15 percent of the funds to LEAA's central office. The money was allocated among four major initiatives within the newly formed office of National Priority Programs, one of which was standards and goals. Approximately \$20 million was earmarked to support the initiative. Before ONPP's director had even taken office, these funds were allocated to the regional offices (ROs) for distribution to the states at their discretion. The ROs were given the responsibility for setting guidelines, making funding decisions, and monitoring stateby-state progress. States were informed of the availability of discretionary funds for standards and goals in January 1974. The Standards and Goals Program was underway.

# "STANDARDS" AND "GOALS": THE CONCEPTS

The foregoing description still leaves hanging the question of what the words "standard" and "goal" were supposed to mean. It is a question that persisted throughout the project.

The Congress had been no help. The legislation that mandated the states to peg their criminal justice planning to "standards" and "goals" omitted to specify what the words meant. To fill in the gap, ONPP published guidelines for states that defined the concepts and suggested processes for developing and using them.

In the early versions (there were several), 12 "goals" and "standards" were presented as distinct concepts. Thus, a goal was "an ultimate state...within the criminal justice system...to be achieved or maintained by a specific time in the future" (Handbook, p. 12), whereas a standard was "a criterion describing, either qualitatively or quantatively, desired characteristics of the criminal justice system..." (Op. cit., p. 12)

The distinction was semantically obscure. Operationally, it was defined in attached descriptions of procedures for developing standards and goals:

Formulating a goal...is to be preceded by the identification and analysis of a [criminal justice system] problem...; the goal...if attained will alleviate or remove the problem. Standards describe conditions... which must exist in order that a specific goal be attained. (Op. cit., p. 19)

Or to put it more loosely, goals were broad, unquantified ends for which standards served as sideline yard markers (as it was later analogized) to measure progress toward those ends. ONPP regarded this conceptual distinction as arbitrary but straightforward and useful for program purposes. 13

In practice, the distinction was less clear. As the program evolved, it became apparent that "standards" and "goals" were not absolute reference points but overlapped on the continua of general/specific, qualitative/quantitative, and long-term/short-term that supposedly distinguished a goal from a standard. This built-in ambiguity, originally unforeseen, became apparent to ONPP in monitoring the states'

S&G programs and was officially recognized in later guidelines. 14 The 1975 Suggestions for... S&G acknowledged the "controversy and lack of consensus" over the terms and observed that states' treatment of them fell into three different categories (p. 41): (1) standards and goals are the same thing; (2) goals are long-term, standards are shortterm; and (3) goals tell what is needed, standards how much is needed (conceptually, probably closest to LEAA's original view of the distinction).

ONPP still maintained the importance of separating the concepts (e.g., p. 42, p. 14, op. cit.) but chose not to treat the problem of state discrepancies in the Suggestions manual. Departing from its own original perspective, ONPP chose the second category of definition for use in that manual, describing goals as long-range in contrast to standards as short-range.

In terms of policy prescriptions, the matter rested there. The standard-goal distinction dropped into the background. ONPP eventually accepted a range of formats for the final versions of the standards that were incorporated in state comprehensive plans. Not only was the standard-goal distinction blurred in practice, but the terms were also variously replaced by or used interchangeably with others--"recommendations," "missions," "objectives," and "comments"--all variations with very little effect on the substance of the proposals. 15

It all seemed to make very little difference. We were unable to determine that the substance of final proposals, implementation strategies, or level of program impact bore any consistent relation to the choice and interpretation of terms. The standard-goal distinction had little, if any, operational utility for the program.

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS: THE PROGRAM

# The Objectives

LEAA's first-level objective for the Standards and Goals Program was to get the states to set standards, any standards, that would tend to integrate and make coherent a criminal justice system that LEAA saw as being "fragmented, divided, and isolated"—an expression echoed throughout NAC's reports and subsequently quoted by LEAA in introducing the S&G program to the states. LEAA repeatedly emphasized in its mandate to the states (e.g., Policy Statement, 1/74) that it

was the standard-setting process that was endorsed and not the adoption of any particular standards. In particular, LEAA tried to avoid charges that it was fronting for the NAC standards. The NAC volumes were "strictly advisory."

LEAA's stated intention was that standards and goals should improve the system by becoming "integral parts of... planning and implementation activities" (Suggestions, p. 2) and in this role make planning both more comprehensive and more rational. 16

The first improvement envisioned by LEAA--more comprehensive planning--was to come about through a holistic view that (LEAA hoped) would be engendered by standard-setting, in contrast with the piecemeal approach to change that characterized previous planning. As the National Program Strategy (5/74) expressed it, the program would "encourage states to analyze the problems of the system as a whole rather than look at isolated problems or needs."

The second improvement was the "rationalized planning" called for so often in LEAA statements. It would spring from the precision and operational specificity that standards would lend to plans. Thus standards and goals were to provide "a precise and quantifiable structure on which to base plans." The specific force by which standards and goals would drive system improvements was anticipated to be funding decisions (see, for example, the early purpose outlined in the Policy Statement of January 1974).

A third expectation of the program—a benefit not of the product but of the process itself—was awakened awareness and active involvement of a range of criminal justice officials, legislators, and the public at large in analyzing system needs and recommending changes. The commitment to change fostered by such participation was supposed to lead to improvements, and to ensure "that the standards developed be meaningful, have a chance for successful implementation..." (Policy Statement, January 1974)

The ultimate outcome--the final purpose of planning--was to be crime reduction and improved quality of justice. 17 As expressed in the S&G Handbook (p. 2), "The underlying premise of the Standards and Goals Program is that...crime rates can be significantly reduced, and the existing inequities and inefficiencies of the CJS can be ameloriated."

These various points—the hierarchy of means and outcomes—were brought together in the S&G Handbook:

In summary, a nationwide process of establishing standards and goals should provide a closer relationship between planning and budgeting and between budgeting and crime reduction and should improve the system of justice in the nation (p. 3).

#### The Planned Process

LEAA's expectations of how the standards and goals program was supposed to work is simply stated. Each state was to bring together a range of criminal justice professionals and lay people who, with the support of a research staff, would analyze the needs of the state's existing criminal justice system. They were to develop specific standards to meet those needs. The standards were then to be adopted and put to use in planning by the SPA and by the state's LE/CJ community.

In detail, LEAA saw the process divided into separate, functionally defined steps, intended to be roughly sequential. Early guidelines for how to go about the process described five steps, ending with integration of adopted standards in the state's comprehensive plan, a statutory and agency requirement to be met by 1976. 18 Later guidelines described seven steps. 19 The seven components that formed LEAA's revised version of the S&G process were discussed and illustrated with selected alternative approaches, emphasizing each state's freedom to tailor the process to its own requirements and desires. Below, the steps are summarized from the detailed presentation in the 1975 Suggestions manual.

1. Organizing for S&G. In the beginning a state is faced with hard organizational questions. How should the project be staffed--with State Planning Agency personnel, specially hired employees, consultants under contract, or some combination of these? Who should be the responsible body--members of the existing SPA Supervisory Board or a new separate commission? What geographic and functional mix would be effective on the commission? What timetable is reasonable?<sup>20</sup>

- 2. Developing the standards and goals: the core task. The commission must end up with an analysis of the key problems of the state's criminal justice system, and with a set of goals and standards needed to meet them. Choices of method include whether to use the NAC or other sets of standards as models or to start from scratch.<sup>21</sup>
- 3. Establishing priorities among standards. At this stage the main choice is how and by what criteria to determine the most important among the selected standards and goals—to decide the most pressing needs of the state's criminal justice system.
- 4. Citizen and agency input. This component calls for the S&G Program to determine how to make the program responsive to the people—how to get opinion and participation from the state and local criminal justice agencies, special interest groups, community leaders, and the public at large. A project might choose to have citizen representatives on the S&G commission, or to hold public hearings, or to disseminate brochures containing response forms, or to use some combination of these and other methods. Scheduling the input is another decision—whether to have continuing and regular review by citizen and agency groups during the development work, or to provide a single review after the commission's work is completed.
- 5. Adoption of standards, goals, and priorities. At this point, procedures must be set up for formal approval of the developed, reviewed, and revised standards; for recommendation of these to the governor and legislature; and for distributing the adopted standards in a published document to jurisdictions across the state.
- 6. Implementation. Questions arise next as to what must be done to achieve the goals and standards adopted, who shall be responsible, and what resources are required. More specifically, it must be decided which vehicles are most appropriate for implementing which standards—legislation, administrative policy change, or selective allocations of LEAA funds. The commission and staff must build detailed implementation strategies.
- 7. Progress assessment and refinement. A final step faces the standards and goals developers: how to continue the process. They must consider two functions. "Refinement" involves monitoring the progress of implementation, following changing conditions within the state, and updating standards and implementation strategy accordingly. Evaluation involves measuring the program's impact—assessing the amount of awareness and commitment the public, state, and

local agencies have to standards and goals; the degree to which the SPA's comprehensive plan is linked to standards; and the existence of a shift in non-LEAA funding according to standards, goals, and priorities. And evaluation is also to assess the adequacy of the process, on such points as how well the commission meetings were attended, how much citizen/agency input was solicited, and how much attained. 22

Individuality in approaches to the process as a whole was expected and encouraged in the procedural guidelines published in 1974 and 1975. One version (Handbook, 1975) presented a number of alternative scenarios for the states to consider at each step in the process, on the grounds that "[LEAA] has realized the necessity for permitting, indeed encouraging, the use of alternative methods...to suit best the existing situation and the prevailing attitudes and resources" (p. 18). Further, these guidelines and the revised version of Suggestions specified that states were free "to modify [the scenarios] in any way necessary" (Handbook, p. 35) and that, in fact, their options were not limited to the methods described since "no particular approach will meet all of the requirements of a particular state because of the differences among the states" (Suggestions, p. 1.

#### LEAA's Role in the State's Process

Overall Stance. As the preceding discussion indicates, LEAA went to some length to present its role in S&G as one of support, not control. The guidelines explicitly built in state and local option—in the structure of the process set up for developing S&G's, in the substance and priority of the standards developed, and even in the definitions of "standard" and "goal."

The restricted role taken by the central office was specified in early statements (National Program Strategy for S&G's, 5/74), and attributed to the concept of "New Federalism," which "aimed at returning power to the people..., at creating a true partnership among states, localities, and the Federal government" (p. 17). It was the intent of LEAA that "standards and goals development be the product of [such] a partnership" (p. 17). For states this partnership was intended to mean that LEAA relied on state initiative or choice in the program's process and product: "It is up to you....[LEAA] is there to help you, not dictate to you" (p. 17).<sup>23</sup>

The support that LEAA was prepared to offer took two forms: funding and technical assistance, both "to be

initiated at the request or perceived need of state and and local governments."<sup>24</sup> By early 1974, responsibility for this support was decentralized. The regional offices were delegated funding responsibility and 20 staff, and outside contractors provided technical assistance. Within the central office, the Standards and Goals Division of ONPP provided national leadership by setting policy, providing orientation and technical assistance to the regional offices, and by developing technical guidelines for the states to use in the procurement of services and evaluation.

Funding. In the fall of 1973, LEAA allotted approximately \$20 million in discretionary funds to its ten regional offices for subsequent distribution to states to finance S&G development programs.

The LEAA State Planning Agencies were notified of the availability of this money both through the general LEAA Policy Statement on S&G in January 1974, and through individual Regional Office correspondence containing skeleton guidelines on the minimum requirements, funding ranges, and durations for state awards.

After the initial notification, the later process guidelines spelled out in detail the minimum requirements for applications, the priorities of the ONPP, and, based on those, the criteria that the Regional Offices would use to judge the relative merits of applications. 25 Briefly, the requirements for the 1974 applicants specified that the format for S&G development include adequate representation (agency- and citizen-wide), adequate public exposure, adequate process planning, formal S&G adoption, system balancing (accommodating inter-component impacts of standards), and FY 75 and 76 comprehensive plan requirements for incorporation of S&G's.<sup>26</sup> ONPP priorities for use of S&G resources put the formulation of strategy for the state process in first place; then, the development and adoption process itself; third, comprehensive plan integration; and last, implementation and evaluation. It was explained that the last two functions should be funded chiefly by block grants and other non-S&G, non-discretionary sources.

The priorities only nominally guided grant allocations. In practice, "a state has a high probability of obtaining these funds in the amounts needed if it meets the criteria...," as one manual clarified. And indeed no state was denied the funding requested. LEAA intended to and did show its commitment to S&G by its ready allocation of grants.

In addition to discretionary funds, S&G programs were financed by Part B planning funds, Part C action funds and Part E correctional funds. All of these funds were dispersed through the individual states' block grant programs; the lump sums given directly to the State Planning Agency to be allocated more or less as it deemed fit. Five states used only part B planning funds to develop and implement their standards and goals: Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, Vermont, and West Virginia.

Table 3.1 depicts the total amount of grants awarded to each state and their source. The range of funding was from \$19,000 to over 1.5 million dollars. Most fell between \$175,000 and \$400,000. Discretionary fund expenditures for S&G totalled \$16.2 million and reached 48 states and territories.

In the guidelines explaining how to set up an S&G program and apply for funding, implementation was assigned a low priority. Guidelines declared that for a given program, this phase will not be funded until the process is designed and work is underway, and that among programs, those "which can be classified under categories [planning, developmentadoption, and comprehensive plan integration] will be considered before those within the categories [implementation and institutionalization]."28 States were informed of implementation fund availability by followup correspondence from the ROs. Discretionary funds not used for addressing S&G's would be diverted to implementation; these funds would be contingent on completing the development program; and implementation priority would go to continuation of current projects implementing specific standards. 29 The ONPP anticipated, and relayed its expectation to the states, that implementation projects initiated through discretionary funds would gradually be assumed by states' block funds and general criminal justice budget.

Technical Assistance and Oversight by LEAA. After the initial grants were awarded, it was made clear that the "major responsibility [for the S&G process] rests with the states." DEAA's continuing role in the process was restricted to providing technical assistance, monitoring, and evaluation. Technical assistance tasks were primarily assigned to outside consultants, but the ONPP and the RO branches undertook some forms of assistance directly.

The role of the ONPP was intended to include broad oversight functions of national overview, coordination, and evaluation. In addition, ONPP was to be responsible for the development and distribution of policy and procedural

TABLE 3.1
Standards and Goals Discretionary Funding By State 1

State	S/G Grants through 7/78 (\$000's)	Rank	State	S/G Grants 2 through 7/78 (\$000's)	Rank	
ALABAMA	302.6	20	NEW HAMPSHIRE	276.7	25	
ALASKA	276.1	26	NEW JERSEY	224.4	39	
ARIZONA	308.9	19	NEW MEXICO	355.1	15	
ARKANSAS	270.0	29	NEW YORK	262.5	31	
CALIFORNIA	1,575.1	1	NORTH CAROLINA	174.9	40	
COLORADO	709.9	3	NORTH DAKOTA	229.5	38	
DELAWARE	300.8	21	ОНЮ	270.7	28	
FLORIDA	460.8	6	OKLAHOMA	154.3	42	
GEORGIA	369.5	14	OREGON	90.9	44	
HAWAII	263.4	30	PENNSYLVANIA	393.7	13	
IDAHO	241.6	36	RHODE ISLAND	171.7	41	
ILLINOIS	685.6	4	SOUTH CAROLINA	243.9	34	
INDIANA	225.4	37	SOUTH DAKOTA	268.0	27	
IOWA	290.2	23	TENNESSEE	452.2	8	
KANSAS	242.3	35	TEXAS	19.3 <sup>3</sup>	48	
KENTUCKY	327.8	16	UTAH	<b>250</b> .0 <sup>3</sup>	32	
LOUISIANA	327.8	17	VIRGINIA	443.8	9	
MAINE	285.5	24	WASHINGTON	455.9	7	
MASSACHUSETTS	977.3	2	WISCONSIN	418.9	10	
MICHIGAN	245.2	33	WYOMING	. <b>151.9</b> 3	43	
MINNESOTA	417.9	11				
MISSISSIPPI	300.0	22	D.C.	317.8	18	
MISSOURI	78.1	46	PUERTO RICO	95.7	45	
MONTANA	400.7	12	VIRGIN ISLANDS	48.9	47	
NEVADA	576.4	5	V	70.0	•••	

Total all states: 16,229.6

Source: LEAA Grants Management Information System.

Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming developed standards using only block funding.

<sup>2.</sup> Includes all grants for development of standards and goals or coordinated implementation projects.

<sup>3.</sup> DF for implementation. S/G development was paid out of block funds.

handbooks, of technical and process guidelines, and of synopses of the previously developed NAC standards. 31 ONPP was to present orientation and training programs to RO and SPA personnel; procure contracts for states requesting technical assistance; and prepare annual national progress reviews. 32

Not all of the planned functions ever materialized. Formal training programs were not developed nor were guidelines published and distributed before most states began their programs.

Direct technical assistance first took form in late 1973 and early 1974 with orientation visits by staff from ONPP's S&G Division to each of the ROs. Equipped with what one participant called very sketchy guidelines," this Federal cadre briefed Regional Administrators, their designates, and the state representatives at the Regional Offices about the purpose and requirements of the S&G Program, the availability of TA, and the roles of the RO. The Administrators were then instructed to encourage SPAs to apply for funds as soon as possible to begin state programs. 33 In this orientation mission the central office staff was backed by materials and personnel from the contractors hired for technical assistance. One of the contractors, the Stanford Research Institute (SRI), developed a slide presentation with accompanying script and helped conduct the orientations in six regions. The same materials were used by the other contractors and the central office staff in the remaining regions. 34

A second ONPP function -- development of guidelines and synoptic material -- was completed under contract. SRI worked out the policy handbook, National Program Strategy, published in May 1974, as well as the program guidebook, Suggestions for Developing and Implementing CJ S&G's, in March 1975. Suggestions was the revised version of an earlier, internally developed draft, Handbook for Developing S&G's, in May 1974.35 Once developed, the contracted documents were delivered to ONPP and then distributed to the SPAs and the RPUs, where they served to inform and clarify. The Strategy outlined purposes and policies of the ONPP for the S&G process--requirements of the state program, suggestions for and priorities on use of discretionary funds and technical assistance, and roles and responsibilities of national, regional, and state components. The Handbook and Suggestions guides outlined the steps inherent in the S&G process and illustrated alternative methods for achieving them. All three manuals appended instructions for applying for financial and technical

assistance. Synopses of the 427 NAC S&Gs were also published and distributed to the states in five volumes.

Formal management of the evaluation, assessment, and monitoring functions was assigned to the Office of Evaluation and the Office of Program Management, neighbors of the Office of National Priority Programs within LEAA, and task assistance came from the regional offices and consulting firms. <sup>36</sup> Contracted tasks used in evaluation included a nationwide survey in FY 76 of States' S&G development progress; oral and written status reports submitted by consultants in FY 75 and FY 76 on each state receiving TA from them; and detailed case studies on the programs of a sample of states selected by ONPP. <sup>37</sup>

At the level of specific S&G grants to the states, the primary responsibility for assistance was originally to devolve on the Regional Offices. They were felt to be "in the most favorable position for effectively assisting the SPAs" because they "generally have a good understanding of conditions in the states," such as the organization, structure, and politics of state government as well as state technical and financial capabilities. 38 The role of the Regional Offices was to include the following: Assess state needs; suggest uses of TA and help prepare requests for it; send out information on the progress of other states; help prepare discretionary fund grant applications; develop and sponsor demonstration programs; assess TA effectiveness; assess the process results, including integration of S&Gs in comprehensive plans; and finally--as cited earlier--allocate discretionary funds and assess and monitor the process itself. The state representatives located in each RO were to be the primary agents for these functions.

But ONPP eventually assumed many of these responsibilities as well. The ROs had total control of DF grants--award decisions and monitoring--only in FY 74. Because of "a general lack of compliance with agency S&G policy," ONPP approval of awards became mandatory in FY 76.38 Further, onsite monitoring of state programs shifted back to the central office after a hiatus in FY 74 and 75, during which that responsibility had been given to the Regions. After realizing that the "provision to all ROs of a one-day S&G program orientation seminar was actually not sufficient" to prepare them for this function, and after being forced to cancel planned multi-state information seminars for ROs and SPAs in 1975 because of budget cutbacks, the ONPP itself took over on-site monitoring. Correcting what it termed "a major shortcoming of the national-level S&G program in 1974 and 1975," the ONPP set up site visits in 1976 to all states requesting continuation discretionary funding.<sup>39</sup>

As an additional monitoring and evaluation task, the ONPP in 1976 let a contract to examine all state comprehensive plans for inclusion of standards. The objective was to determine compliance with LEAA policy, which in turn was based on the requirements of the Safe Streets Act.

Contracted TA. The remaining state-specific technical assistance came from contractors. After surveying states which had begun S&G development by 1974, the ONPP concluded: "Almost all of the states will require TA in one or more areas" (Strategy, p. 18). To fill this need, three two-year contracts of \$150,000 each were awarded in March, 1974-- intended to "provide program expertise" to SPA's upon request through FY 76. Recipients were Stanford Research Institute, Midwestern Research Institute, and Planning Research Corporation.

States were officially informed of this provision in the National Program Strategy in May, 1974:40 The Strategy listed possible uses for TA, ONPP priorities for these uses, and application procedures.

Areas designated for TA use were the following (synopsized from p.39):

- formulating plans for the state S&G process;
- organizing the developmenal stage--setting up task forces or commissions, advising on staff requirements, conducting training and orientation for the developers;
- organizing public hearings and providing materials;
- incorporating standards into the comprehensive plan;
- analyzing the state's existing criminal justice system and comparing thatto NAC or other systems of standards, with resulting determinations of necessary implementation measures;
- developing agendas, arranging speakers, and choosing sites for conferences.

Priorities described for these areas were the same as set for use of discretionary funds--process planning was ranked first and implementation and evaluation projects were ranked last (Strategy, p. 36). The application procedure, which promised at best three to five weeks between the request for and the provision of TA, was explained as having seven steps (pp. 41-43):

- 1. RO helps SPA assess need and formulate request;
- 2. SPA issues request to RO with copy to Office of S&G in Washington, D.C.;
- 3. RO evaluates request and forwards comments to OSG;
- OSG (and ONPP) evaluates request;
- 5. ONPP negotiates with contractors for specific TA time period, and amount of ONPP-provided funds;
- Contractors contact SPA and RO to arrange a beginning date;
- 7. Contractors begin as scheduled.

Instructions and a sample request form were shown in the Strategy (pp. 44-46).

States quickly took up the offer of on-site TA. In 1975, 22 states received contracted assistance. By the program's end in 1976, the total was 32. In the course of the program, two of the three original national contracts were supplemented with funds totalling over \$400,000. In all, the TA contracts totalled more than \$850,000.


Contractors recorded the following accomplishments for both the national- and state-level programs in their 1976 final reports: 41 development of handbooks and guidebooks on S&G for LEAA; assistance with the early training and orientation sessions given by the control office staff; procurement of speakers for multi-state conferences and workshops; planning and conducting regional and national conferences; and--the largest effort in time and money--providing TA to states and regions. In the last category the bulk of the assistance was reported to be strategic -- helping a state plan the overall process or a particular part of it. Other types of state assistance were reported to be the following: conducting staff orientation and training, planning and conducting public hearings and conferences, designing research studies of the existing CJ system, designing comparative analyses of the existing system and ideal S&G systems, developing priority-setting mechanisms, integrating S&Gs into the state comprehensive plan, and planning implementation strategies.

#### THE PROGRAM RATIONALE FOR S&G

The preceding pages have recounted the rhetoric of the S&G program and, in broad strokes, the process that was intended to make good on the rhetoric. But to get at the

dynamics of the S&G process, it is necessary to unfold the public logic into a much more elaborate set of statements about what-leads-to-what in S&G. We call this elaboration a program rationale, and it forms the framework of the evaluation.

Any program, including the S&G Program, can be conceived as a set of programmed inputs designed to produce a sequence of steps leading to some definable ultimate impact. In simplest form, this general program model is as follows.



In these terms, the functions of any evaluation can be reduced to:

- assessing the nature and extent of the impact achieved,
- verifying that the inputs were made as planned, and
- 3. demonstrating a linkage between input and ultimate impact.

# Phases for Investigation

The task is to convert the empty boxes into a specification of the intervening processes that were intended.

The overview of the S&G process which was used most widely (see pp. 25 to 27) identified seven phases:

- Organizing for Standards and Goals.
- Developing the Standards and Goals.
- Priority setting.
- Citizen and agency review.
- Standards and Goals adoption.
- Implementation.
- Progress assessment and refinement.

For purposes of analysis, we divided these seven into 15 subphases that, based on the literature and on three preliminary field trips, appeared to be critical nodes intervening between the decision to undertake an S&G Program in a given state, and the eventual impact that LEAA wanted to achieve. The 15 subphases were as follows (keyed to the 7-phase model used by LEAA):

#### PHASE

#### SUBPHASE

- 1. Organizing for S&G
- Assimilating the Federal charge (The state's understanding of what the proprogram was supposed to accomplish, and where it stood on the state's agenda).
- 2. Organizational decisions.
- 3. Gearing up. (First steps in implementing the approach that had been decided upon).
- 2. Developing the Standards 4. The first approach. and Goals.
- - Regrouping. (Often, the first approach had to be changed in midstream, either because the first one did not work as intended, or because of policy changes. This subphase refers to this process of redirection).
  - 6. Finishing the paper product (i.e., the written standards and goals volumes).
  - Implementation planning.
- Priority-setting among the goals.
- 8. Priority-setting among the goals.
- 4. Citizen and agency review.

Activities in this "phase" were subsumed under subphases 2. (the first approach, when citizen input was typically solicited for development of the standards), and in the implementation steps under phase 6.

- 5. Standards and Goals adoption
- 9. We retitle it "Legitimization of the Standards and Goals," to suggest the broader function of this phase.
- 6. Implementation
- 10. Action to legislate standards.
- 11. Actions to implement standards through administrative fiat.
- 12. Actions to implement standards in localities.
- 13. Integration of standards into the SPA funding cycle.
- 7. Progress assessment
- 14. Development of SG-II procedures (if a follow-on were found appropriate).
- 15. Establishment of an institutional patron for S&G (to maintain the implementation process).

Within each subphase, we then identified measures of "success"--intermediate accomplishments that might appear unimportant to themselves, but which were facilitators or even prerequisites for eventual impact. Below we list the outcome indicators that were chosen for each subphase.

Assimilation of the Federal Charge. "Success" in this subphase is defined as...

- 1. Evidence that S&G was initially perceived by key state personnel as a potentially valuable planning tool.
- Evidence that key program planners obtained and absorbed the available knowledge about how to develop and implement standards and goals.
- Evidence that the ultimate purposes of S&G--changes in practice through legislative, procedural, and funding changes--were understood by key program planners.

Organizational Decisions. In terms of data collection, it is important to examine how the organizational decisions were reached. But in terms of outcomes, the proof of the success was sought in the outcomes of the next subphase.

Gearing up. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 4. Key LE/CJ actors are brought into the process.
- 5. Options are researched and presented for decision by the Commission.
- 6. Qualified staff in the appropriate numbers are hired.
- 7. Appropriate office space and resources are provided.

Development of the Standards. "Success" in this phase (combining subphases 2.1-2.3) is defined as...

- 8. Commission adapts NAC standards, or expands on them, in light of information about local conditions.
- 9. Political/bureaucratic ramifications of the standards are recognized, and efforts to deal with them are undertaken.
- 10. The draft results are disseminated to localities and agencies for review.
- 11. A draft report is completed and released.
- 12. Local and agency review of the draft standards is received and taken into account.
- 13. A final version accepted by the Commission is completed.

Setting of Priorities. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 14. A rational and feasible ordering procedure.
- 15. The results of the ordering process satisfy the two criteria of "major problem" and "plausibly implementable."

Implementation Planning. "Success in this phase is defined as...

- 16. The priorities are integrated into the content and scheduling of implementation options.
- 17. The cost implications of implementation options are analyzed.

- 18. The crime-related impacts of implementation options are projected.
- 19. The political feasibility of implementation options are analyzed.
- 20. Implementation options are internally consistent.

Legitimization of the Standards and Goals. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 21. A visible, formal act of adoption is completed.
- 22. The standards and goals are formally endorsed by other influential actors (e.g., legislators, officials in major metropolitan areas, state officials).
- 23. The facts of the adoption and endorsements are widely known.

Action to Implement Standards through Administrative Fiat. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 24. An analysis of the feasible administrative actions is prepared and reaches the desks of the officials who could implement the actions.
- 25. Directives and other procedural changes are undertaken.
- 26. Practice changes as a result of the directives.

Action to Legislate Standards. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 27. Bills to implement standards and goals are introduced and debated.
- Bills to implement standards and goals are passed.
- 29. Standards and goals are cited as desirable guidelines in hearings to determine budgets of state LE/CJ agencies.

Action to Implement Standards in Localities. "Success in this phase is defined as...

- 30. Prescriptive packages or comparable how-to-do-it materials are prepared and their availability is made known.
- 31. Technical assistance resources for local implementation are made available, and their availability is made known.

- 32. The how-to-do-it materials are requested by local authorities.
- 33. Technical assistance is requested by local authorities.
- 34. Local ordinances and administrative changes to implement standards and goals occur.

Integration of Standards into the SPA Funding Cycle. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 35. The comprehensive state plan is built around the priorities and content of the standards and goals.
- 36. Decisions on grant applications are based on S&G considerations.
- 37. Potential applicants for grants are made aware of these guidelines.

Development of an Institutional Patron for Standards and Goals. "Success" in this phase is defined as...

- 38. The continued pursuit of S&G is part of the institutional charter of an appropriate state office.
- 39. Institutional incentives to perform this function are developed.
- 40. Provisions are made for long-term stability for this aspect of the office.

Development of S&G-II Goals and Procedures. Assessment of outcomes for this final subphase lies beyond the scope of the evaluation. And, as a practical matter, the utility of a follow-on to the original Standards and Goals Program is not apparent.

#### **Process Variables and Disposing Conditions**

The purpose of defining the subphases and the outcomes of success within subphases was to provide an orderly, systematic method of tracking "the reasons why"--or why not--in the analysis of the ultimate achievements of the program. As a further elaboration, we added to the rationale some of the principal process variables and disposing conditions that were expected to play a major role.

Process variables refer to the program administrators' degrees of freedom. General objectives and general procedures were specified within the S&G program, as in any

program, but the specifications left wide latitude on how to go about a number of processes that could be critically important. Many of the process variables always turn out to be site-specific, and must be identified on the spot. But nine seemed to be of more generic importance, and were included in the program rationale:

- 1. LEAA's initial presentation of S&G's process and purpose to the officials who were to plan the program in that state.
- Competence of the S&G staff that was assembled (or, appropriateness of and follow-through on selection procedures).
- 3. Strategic emphases of the state-level program (e.g., concentration on standards that could be legislated, or emphasis on public participation).
- 4. The nature of LEAA's technical assistance in the course of the project.
- 5. LEAA's use of incentives and disincentives to promote achievement of S&G objectives.
- 6. The choice of an institutional placement for S&G development (e.g., as part of the SPA, as an ad hoc office, etc.).
- 7. Debate-generating mechanisms in the development process. (e.g., "hearings" on standards, presentation of alternatives, etc.).
- 8. Format of the implementation materials.
- 9. Stance in local implementation efforts (e.g., hard-sell versus passive offer of TA if asked).

Disposing conditions play the same role as process variables insofar as they too are intervening variables. But disposing conditions differ in that they are not within the control of the program's personnel. They may account for much of a program's success or failure, but nothing could have been done by the program to promote or to dampen them. All that the program could do was take them into account.

Like process variables, disposing conditions also tend to be idiosyncratic, with each site exhibiting a few peculiar conditions that affected outcomes. We list four of the generic conditions that we investigated during each field visit:

- Predisposition of senior state officials to be advocates of the S&G program or the concept.
- 2. Salience of LE/CJ issues in state politics.
- 3. Centralization of LE/CJ functions (hypothesis: the greater the centralization, the easier implementation was likely to be, if a few key people could be persuaded).
- 4. Social, economic, and cultural heterogeneity within the state (that presumably would tend to militate against widely acceptable standards).


# The Completed Map

Each of the subphases, the indicators of intermediate outcomes, the process variables, and the disposing conditions were chosen because of explicit expectations about how they would affect the overall progress and accomplishments of the program. Rather than try to state all of the interconnections one-by-one, we assembled them in the form of a "map," in which the arrows represent hypothesized causal tendencies.


Certain simplifications are apparent. In particular, we did not try to represent the myriad feedback loops that could be postulated to exist. But even with the simplifications, the interconnections among the nodes would defeat communication if we tried to combine them into one figure. We have therefore broken the overall map into several pieces, as shown in the diagrams within Figure 3.1 on the following pages.

Taken as a whole, the map represents the logic of the program, as expressed to us by the participants at the national and state levels and as inferred from the preconditions that perforce had to exist if the program were to get where it wanted to go from the resources and procedures with which it started. The research into the process and impact of the Standards and Goals Program that is reported in this volume can be seen as an investigation into the degree to which the logic was realized in practice.

#### A. ASSIMILATING THE FEDERAL CHARGE



#### B. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS AND GEARING UP



### C. THE FIRST APPROACH






Figure 3.1 Summary of the Rationale for the Standards and Goals Program





#### E. FINISHING THE PAPER PRODUCT



# F. IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING AND SETTING OF PRIORITIES






Figure 3.1 (continued)

# G. LEGITIMIZATION OF THE STANDARDS AND GOALS



#### H. ACTION TO LEGISLATE STANDARDS



#### I. ACTION TO IMPLEMENT STANDARDS IN LOCALITIES





Figure 3.1 (continued)

# J. INTEGRATION OF STANDARDS INTO THE SPA FUNDING CYCLE



# K. ACTION TO IMPLEMENT STANDARDS THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT




Figure 3.1 (continued)

#### 3. FOOTNOTES

- President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967.
- <sup>2</sup>The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 PL 90-351, Sect. 201.
- <sup>3</sup>Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, News Release of October 21, 1971, on the Creation of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
  - 4 Ibid.
- <sup>5</sup>National Advisory Commision on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Report on the Police. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967, p. v.
  - 6<sub>Ibid</sub>.
- <sup>7</sup>Internal Memorandum, Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Subject: Position Paper on the Implementation and Update of National Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, prepared by John A. Gardiner, for Jerris Leonard, Administrator. January 2, 1973.
- <sup>8</sup>Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Safe Streets Reconsidered: The Block Grant Experience 1968-1975. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977, pp. 40-41.
  - 9<sub>Ibid</sub>.
- $^{10}$ The Crime Control Act of 1973 (PL 93-83).
- <sup>11</sup>The Crime Control Act of 1976 (PL 94-503, Sect. 601(m)).
- 12 Some of these follow: "LEAA Policy Statement Regarding Criminal Justice Standards and Goals," 1/74; Handbook for State and Local Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 5/74; National Program Strategy, 5/74.

13 The first point is conceded early in the 1974 S&G Handbook (p. 12) in introducing key term definitions:

...these [definitions] will represent a departure from usages familiar to some users. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to fix arbitrary definitions...to provide consistency throughout this manual.

The second point--the clarity and "fixedness" of the definitions as presented--is implied throughout the process guidelines later in the Handbook (especially Part V, "Overview," pp. 18-28), where problem, goal, and standard formulation are described as separate steps--sequentially set and logically interlocked.

- 14 These include, e.g., Suggestions for Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, 3/75; Standards & Goals Progress Report, 1/76.
- <sup>15</sup>To indicate how far afield the states were permitted to wander, Minnesota adopted a set of proposed changes consisting solely of "recommendations and commentary"; and these terms were in an introductory explanation explicity equated with NAC's "standards."
- <sup>16</sup>This integration into comprehensive planning is what LEAA frequently refers to as "the institutionalization of standards and goals."
- 17 Crime reduction received more emphasis in LEAA's S&G's literature.
- 18 See National Program Strategy, 5/74; Handbook for State and Local Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 5/74, for a description. The integrative process was mandated by the CC & SS Act, 1973, and prescribed by LEAA.
- 19 Suggestions for Criminal Justice Standards & Goals, 3/75.
- <sup>20</sup>Also, nomenclature had to be decided. It varied widely. We use "commission" as a generic label for the body of persons who passed judgment on the candidate standards.
- Latter approach called "blank sheet" method (Handbook, p. 54; Sugg., p. 46).

The process as delineated here had evolved from significantly different earlier conceptions. Besides the substantive differences between the seven-step (1975) and five-step (1974) descriptions noted previously, a greater change is represented between these and the earliest, pre-program sketches of the process, around 1973. Those are roughly outlined in LEAA inter-office correspondence and in state notices distributed` by the regional offices. They conceive a more restricted direction for development, in which a state would take the NAC standards, determine which were and which were not being met, and set up programs to implement the latter. No stateoriginated standards were envisioned. Essentially, the state standards and goals program stood for NAC implementation. LEAA memo, "Plan for Future Efforts of LEAA to Implement Standards and Goals," dated May 21, 1973, refers to the state S&G programs planned or underway at that point as "state implementation efforts" (p. 5 and Exhibit 6) and classifies them as one among several "plans for implementing the report of the NAC on Criminal justice system of your state with a resulting adoption or rejection of selected S&G's." first guideline presented in this correspondence in an attachment on grant application requirements states, "Applicants...must provide a commitment to consider the Standards and Goals developed by the NAC...."

The latter emphasis on state option in developing S&G's is apparently LEAA's response to an undercurrent of feeling that NAC was being forced on states. It is made clear in 1974 that "These guidelines do not, of course mandate the substance of standards and goals but rather the format for their development;\* that the position of NAC is one among other sets of standards suggested as models; and that the modeling process itself is one among alternative approaches including starting from scratch. \*Handbook, 5/74, p. B-7, [Appendices]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>"Quote from Santerelli on topic of New Federalism, presented in *Strategy*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>From LEAA memo "Plan for Future Efforts in S&G," 5/73. LEAA intended role in S&G was succinctly presented to the states in Strategy (5/74); "LEAA will serve as catalyst by providing appropriate technical and financial assistance when and where needed" (p. 2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Handbook, 5/74; National Program Strategy, 5/74; Suggestions, 3/75.

But note differences described earlier between the '74 (HBK; NPS) and '75 versions (Suggestions).

- 27<sub>Handbook</sub>, 5/74, p. 12.
- 28 Suggestions, p. 148.
- <sup>29</sup>Atlanta RO correspondence, 2/74.
- 30 Source temporarily out of production.
- Published as the multivolume Reports of the NAC on CJ S&G's, 1973.
- $^{32}$  Summarized from "Roles and Responsibilities," p. 22, and "Major Activities," pp. 24-26.
- This information is from interviews with former staff of ONPP's S&G Division.
- 34 Source: SRI final report on S&G contract work.
- $^{35} \mbox{Supposedly, the revision was based partly on state feedback on the <math display="inline">{\it Handbook}$  draft.
- <sup>36</sup>Policy Statement, LEAA.
- $^{37}$  Information on management and assistance from ONPP's "Program Plan for FY 76" (internal memo, 5/2/75).
- 38 Five case studies were produced: Florida, Michigan, Oregon, Texas, and Utah.
- 39 National Program Strategy, pp. 22-23.
- <sup>40</sup>Op. cit. pp. 23-24.
- 41 Source: ONPP's Program Plan for FY 76."

# 4. Immediate Outcomes: The Commissions

The bulk of the money for S&G was spent on the commissions that made up the program in each state. This chapter describes who those people were and how they were organized. The question of interest is whether the states assembled commissions of the structure, make-up, and staff support that would enable them to produce credible standards and subsequently to promote their implementation.

The commission was called by different names in different states--"Governor's Council on Criminal Justice,"
"Criminal Justice Standards Commission," "The Governor's
Crime Reduction Task Force," are examples--but every state
in the S&G program had one. We shall use "commission" as a
generic term for the body of men and women who were appointed
to develop and pass upon the draft standards and goals.

We compare the commissions of the 27 states we studied on two factors—structure and make-up—and the dimensions of each factor that could be expected to affect the nature of the program's product and impact. Specifically, we examine the following commission variables. For structure, we consider how the commission was linked to the SPA, the commission's size and organization, and the structure and extent of staff support. Under make-up we consider the overall representativeness of the panels, their expertise, and their prestige.

#### **STRUCTURE**

#### Links to the SPA

The State Planning Agency and the S&G Program were irrevocably wedded by LEAA's demand that the completed standards eventually be incorporated into the comprehensive

state plan. The question was: how deeply should the SPA involve itself in the standards development process?

Two options were available. At one extreme, the SPA could keep a hands-off stance. The commission and staff could be chosen, housed, and supported without any participation of the SPA. The SPA would deal with the resulting standards only when it came time to incorporate them into the comprehensive state plan. At the other extreme, the SPA could make itself the institutional home for the entire process. It had a readymade counterpart of the S&G structure. By Federal statute, the SPA had a commission—the Supervisory Board will be our generic label for it—of prominent citizens. And the SPA had a standing staff to support the Supervisory Board. S&G development could simply be added to the SPA's existing functions.

There was no decisive a priori argument in favor of either alternative. Each had potential advantages. Here, we limit the discussion to what choice the states made. The consequences of these choices will be discussed in Chapter 6.

The distribution in the 27-state sample was as follows:

Creation of a separate ad hoc commission:	18
Use of the Supervisory Board without change:	5
Use of the Supervisory Board expecially	
augmented for S&G:	3
Other (Illinois)	1

The ad hoc commission was the most popular choice by a wide margin. The five states that used the Supervisory Board without change were Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Washington (in phase 1). The three states that used an augmented Supervisory Board were Florida, Oregon, and Utah. Two states (Kansas and Pennsylvania) explicitly noted links with the SPA board through common members—four in Pennsylvania and 15 in Kansas. Other states apparently had some overlap, but exact figures were not available.

#### Internal Structure

Size of Commission. The sizes of the 27 commissions we studied ranged from 12 to 450 persons, as shown in Table 4.1. The median was  $50.^2$  The main cluster consisted of 17 states with memberships of 25 to 100 persons.

TABLE 4.1 Size of the Commission

State	Number of Persons	State	Number of Persons	State	Number of Persons
Alabama	40	Iowa	$\sim$ 350	North Carolina	27
California	447	Kansas	44	North Dakota	50
Colorado	96	Louisiana	64	Ohio*	36
Delaware	19	Maine	$\sim$ 700	Oregon	44
Florida	43	Michigan	75	Pennsylvania	12
Georgia*	28	Minnesota	36	Texas	20
Idaho	33	Mississippi	111	Utah	87
Illinois	NÁ	Nebraska	23	Washington*	69
Indiana	56	New Mexico	125	Wisconsin	54

<sup>\*</sup> Denotes phase 1 membership,

Ten states fell outside the main cluster. At one extreme were four small, committee-like groups of less than 25 members. They were Pennsylvania (12 members), Delaware (19), Texas (20), 3 and Nebraska (23).

At the other extreme was the convention-like commission. California was clearly the archetype, with nearly 450 members of its "Safer California" commission. Other unusually large commissions were New Mexico (125) and Mississippi (111).

Three of the 27 states departed from the normal commission setup and therefore are given no precise total in the table. Maine used regional citizen study groups that involved an estimated 600 to 800 citizens; Iowa shifted commission members every few meetings and involved about 350 persons in all. In Illinois, responsibility for standards and goals development was subcontracted to three professional organizations, each responsible for a different criminal justice area and each functioning independently from the others.<sup>4</sup>

Task Force Organization. Size alone tells relatively little about how a commission worked. More relevant is the internal organization set up to distribute the tasks of the development phase.

A commission was typically divided into subcommittees or task forces which were to develop standards and goals in separate topic areas. To compare internal organizations, we will look at the number and type of commission divisions and the distribution of members in them.

The most common division among the 27 commissions we studied was five task forces, based on the five sectors of criminal justice practice observed by the NAC--law enforcement, corrections, courts, community crime prevention, and information systems. Usually task forces were both nearly equivalent in size and mutually exclusive. Each task force had an appointed chairman and sometimes a vice-chairman.

Variations from this norm were slight. All commissions but one had a small number of task forces—six or less—and of these, all but two had from four to six task forces. Endictably, the high extreme was California's large commission, with 17 task forces; and the low extreme, Pennsylvania, whose 12-person commission was not partitioned. Iowa's changing membership was assigned to three fixed task forces. Two states—Maine and Illinois—are excluded from this distribution because of their unique programs, described earlier, which do not fit the normal commission model.

Seven commissions were identical to the NAC five-component model. Four eliminated the community crime prevention or the information systems component or both. Four others kept the basic five and added more. Seven others both added and deleted task forces.

The most popular addition to the NAC's example was a task force on juvenile justice (10 states). Other additions were unique. Florida created a task force on organized crime, Georgia one on personnel development, and Nebraska one on education and research. Ohio had a two-phase program with two commissions, each addressing a different set of topics, of which the total included the basic five.

Five states added a non-substantive "executive committee" to their commissions. Instead of addressing a specific criminal justice area, the committee was assigned responsibility to coordinate and make final decisions on the work of the task forces. In four cases the executive committee consisted of the chairmen and vice-chairmen of the other task forces. In the case of Texas, this committee had a separate membership.

Task forces within a given commission tended to be of roughly equal size, with eight exceptions. In this cluster, the systems task force tended to be the smallest (four states) and corrections the largest (three states), but otherwise variations formed no obvious pattern. Only six states had membership overlap among topical task forces. Nebraska was the most extreme case with each commission

member serving on two or three task forces. Ohio had moderate overlap (about half the members served dual functions), and North Carolina and Washington had occasional overlapping. Michigan's juvenile justice task force, formed after the commission work was underway, consisted entirely of the members of other task forces. Florida's systems task force doubled as the executive committee and was made up of other task force chairmen, as noted earlier. Florida and the three other commissions with executive committees composed of task force chairmen thus form another variety of membership overlap.9

Another structural variation was the use of persons or groups with advisory rather than participant status in the These advisors in some cases served for the commission as a whole and in others were assigned to specific task forces. Eight commissions had advisory components. Assigned to each task force in four commissions were one or a small set of advisors--called study team leaders in Georgia, special consultants in Florida, special attendees in Pennsylvania, and consultants and technical advisors in Indiana. Assisting the law enforcement task force in Nebraska was a small police standards advisory panel. The whole commission in Wisconsin worked with a 38member advisory group. North Dakota's commission included three small adjunct groups -- a legislative liaison council, an advisory committee which included the governor, and a plans committee of law professors. Idaho brought in five research consultants after the project was underway.

Finally, a few states had commissions of a more complex structure than characterized by any of the patterns described above. We have already noted the cases of Illinois, Maine, and Iowa, in which no single or fixed commission was created. Four states--Delaware, Kansas, Idaho and Texas--set up a hierarchy of two or more distinct S&G bodies (excluding the SPA Supervisory Board).

# The Staff

Each commission had a staff to support its work, much in the same way that a congressional committee is supported by staff. We expected that the staff's competence and structure might have a crucial effect on the outcomes of the project for a number of reasons. First, the staff members were almost the only project participants who could be expected to have maintained a direct, continuous, and long-term involvement in the process. The commission members themselves participated only on a periodic, part-time basis.

Consequently, the staff had high potential for affecting both the process and the outcomes of the program merely by virtue of the intensity of their participation. Second, it was expected that much of the actual work involved in the planning, development, and implementation of the states' standards would inevitably fall on the shoulders of the staff. Scheduling meetings, setting agendas, preparing and distributing materials, and coordinating the efforts of an often large and diverse group of participants would all require a substantial amount of staff work. How well the staff performed these tasks, requiring the considerable technical and political skills that they did, could be expected to have an impact on the success or failure of the states' programs.

We therefore obtained detailed information on the backgrounds, duties, and performance of the staff members and found that very little of it is worth reporting. Based on the information collected in 27 state programs, it is apparent that the personal characteristics and the organizational structure of the staff did not vary as widely as anticipated and that the variance which did exist lay more in purely idiosyncratic features than in structural or functional ones.

Our assessment of the personal characteristics of the staff focused on their personal competence, expertise or background in criminal justice, and ability to maintain a workable and credible relationship with the people they served. "Personal competence" denoted the general ability and willingness of the staff to perform the tasks asked of them, ability to meet appropriate deadlines, level of effort, and general quality of work they performed. "Expertise and background" of the staff referred to their training in criminal justice topics and familiarity with the criminal justice system. "Ability of the staff to work constructively with other participants" related primarily to the degree of confidence the staff maintained during the process and their sensitivity to the issues that concern criminal justice practitioners.

Personal Competence of the Staff was seldom criticized in the programs we examined. Although we periodically heard horror stories about a specific staff member, the assessment of project directors and other participants was almost always that the staff performed adequately, and sometimes admirably. Staff members were typically described as interested, enthusiastic, and willing to perform whatever tasks were set out for them. Moreover, the quality of the work performed was generally judged to be satisfactory or better. In many states, materials prepared by the staff

were adopted by the participants as final products without revision. There were few complaints about the ability of staff to meet deadlines. And, although several projects experienced major delays, these were not attributed to failures of the staff.

The one exception we found was the experience of a state in which the staff distributed a preliminary draft of standards only a short time before they were to be formally adopted, which was said to have contributed to local and professional resistance to the standards. As a result, the attempt to adopt state standards was abandoned and the nature of the state's program was revised. Aside from this instance, staff blunders had only minor impacts on the process or the outcomes.

Background and expertise in criminal justice was not judged as favorably as overall competence. The most common complaint about staff members was that they were young, inexperienced, and often naive about the details of the system. Relatively few of the staff possessed practical experience in an operating criminal justice agency. In several instances, S&G had been a staff member's first direct contact with criminal justice problems or issues. Typically, however, the staff possessed at least a theoretical understanding of criminal justice. Several held degrees in criminal justice or in related fields such as political science or sociology. There were also a number of attorneys on the staffs, most of whom were fresh from law school.

Those states that used existing state planning agency personnel as standards and goals staff had a slightly better range of experienced people at their disposal. SPA-based personnel more frequently tended to have had direct experience with operating agencies as police officers, probation or parole officers, or correctional workers. This background, in addition to direct involvement as criminal justice planners, monitors, or researchers, provided a substantial overall level of expertise. But the difference between the SPA and non-SPA staffs with respect to expertise did not always appear to have a payoff for the S&G effort. individual SPA staff members might have had relevant criminal justice experience, the people assigned as S&G staff as a whole often displayed the same general characteristics as the staff hired from the outside--youth, inexperience, and, because of the somewhat peculiar nature of the SPA's role in the criminal justice system, lack of operational knowledge of the system as well.

A few states enjoyed conspicuously experienced staff. In Michigan and Georgia, the program was staffed partially

by criminal justice employees who were "loaned" to the project on a part-time basis. One other state, California, recruited its senior staff primarily from the ranks of former criminal justice employees. In Washington and Illinois, some part of the standard-setting function was delegated to professional associations, and the "S&G staff" was actually the existing association staff.

Again, we have only one example in which lack of LE/CJ expertise (perhaps combined with generalized lack of competence) produced a significant outcome. In this case, the LE/CJ inexperience of the staff, which was hired exclusively from outside the state, was blamed for an unnecessary delay in completing a comparison of state practice with the National Advisory Commission standards. The delay forced the participants to rush the remaining development process to completion within five months.

Ability to work with the other participants, the last characteristic we will consider, was perhaps the single most important personal trait of the staff. Their ability to maintain the confidence of the criminal justice practitioners and the sensitivity they displayed to the issues important to practitioners, were often reputed to have been an important factor in the project.

The first characteristic--the ability of the staff to work constructively with the commission--was in most cases said to have been adequate. The staff's youth or inexperience or naivete were typically said to have been offset by their enthusiasm and willingness to work.

Occasional problems did exist. In a few instances, the staff was accused of ignoring the wishes of commission members when translating their revisions of specific standards into final drafts. Staff members were also occasionally accused of being arrogant toward or ignoring the views of practitioners. Finally, staff were sometimes said to place greater importance on the process than on the quality of the product. That is, they did not permit enough time for discussion of important issues, pursued issues which lacked intrinsic importance to the state, and pressured participants to accept the NAC standards as written regardless of substantive differences of opinion.

Relations between project participants and staff tended to deteriorate over time, particularly in those states where the standard development process was protracted or when project participants changed. Several states extended the development process over a period of two years or more. Toward the later stages of these programs, commission members started to lose interest. As a result, the process became what one participant called "a distasteful grind," and staff was seen as placing too much emphasis on reviewing all of the standards in detail.

A more significant problem arose in a few states where the membership of the SPA Supervisory Board was originally the commission and then changed during the process. The new Board scrapped the work completed by the staff under the previous Board, and told the staff to start over with a new set of procedures. This situation damaged staff morale and discredited the process for many participants. In these states the second effort was marked by considerable staff-participant antagonism, as the commission members urged completion of the process and staff grew cynical about the commission's real motives for S&G.

We must emphasize that these were occasional incidents and events that were more often symptomatic of other problems than causal. Overall, what we can say about the staff is that every commission had one, they were very similar, and they explain very little about what happened to the S&G Program.

#### MAKE-UP OF THE COMMISSIONS

Three characteristics of commission membership were examined: representativeness, LE/CJ professionalism, and "influence." The first of these was stressed by LEAA as part of the push for public participation in the S&G process. The latter two were chosen for examination because of their hypothesized relevance to the nature of the standards and to the forces working in favor of implementation.

# Representativeness

Racial/Ethnic. Proposals and reports from the state programs typically mentioned the importance of minority representation in the standards-setting process. Most states characterized the commission as representive of "a cross-section" or a "broad spectrum" of state racial, ethnic, and religious groups. But the data are scanty. Few of the volumes reveal the relevant breakdowns of commission membership. Respondents could seldom do more than estimate the minority composition of defunct commissions.

The states that published ethnic composition of the commission tended to be ones with a good record. For instance, the Kansas S&G volumes described the percentages of blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians on the commission and showed these to be within tenths of a point of the corresponding population percentages.

Even where no compositional breakdown or other information appears, representation of certain minorities can sometimes be inferred. In North Dakota, for example, three of the 50 commissioners were listed as tribal judges and nominees of the Indian Affairs Commission. Texas included three Spanish surnames among the 20 listed for the upperlevel, executive task force. Of all the states, New Mexico has by far the greatest proportion of Indian and Spanish surnames—one—third of the 125 members.

Occasionally, ethnic minority representation took strange forms. Indiana specified the ethnic origins of immigrant commissioners, including Latvians. And in Idaho, the most salient issue of ethnic minority representation concerned the sizeable Basque population.

The white-black mix is yet more difficult to analyze. Our impression is that, at the least, blacks were certainly not overrepresented. Every commission for which we could obtain data had some black members. Sometimes these persons held key positions or played an especially active role. And in many cases it may be that the proportion of blacks on the commission fairly represented the proportion in the population of professionals from which the commission was chosen. Relative to overall population of the state, it appears that blacks were underrepresented on many if not most commissions.

The low representation of minority organizations is perhaps more significant than underrepresentation in raw numbers. About a fifth of the commissions included one member from the ACLU (Colorado, Wisconsin, Mississippi), the state Civil Rights Commission (Michigan), the Urban League (Wisconsin, Michigan), the Office of Minority Affairs (Washington), or the State Commission on Human Rights (Mississippi). And more generally, most commissions included a public defender or legal aid representative. But apart from these exceptions, we found no evidence that the commissions systematically included representation for black local community groups, moderate or radical. Given the degree to which minority grievances have involved the LE/CJ system, this lack of organizational representation is at odds with the intentions of the program.11

Women. No state commission was more than 25 percent female. Of the 23 states for which we had data, the break-down of female representation by states was:

0 percent two states
1-5 percent six states
6-10 percent four states
11-20 percent eight states
21-25 percent three states

The median was 9 percent.

The best records on female representation were posted by Minnesota (25 percent), and Indiana and New Mexico (22 percent). The worst records were Delaware's and North Carolina's which had no women on their commissions. In general, the female membership among southern commissioners was especially meager—six of the seven southern states among the 23 had no more than 5 percent women.

The women who were part of the commissions tended to represent non-LE/CJ groups, especially ones involved in social work, youth organizations, and education. Virtually no states chose representatives of women's organizations, except for the League of Women Voters (represented on about a third of the commissions).

Geographic Dispersion. "Regional mix" was universally cited by the states as a characteristic of their commissions. In few states, region is named as an explicit criterion for member selection. Kansas, for example, presented the geographic distribution of the commissioners, using state economic development regions as units, and showed that the distributions were usually within a percentage point of that of the general population. California used the region, as delineated by the SPA, as a basis for member selection.

A small cluster of states--Florida, Pennsylvania and Ohio--had a distinctive structural feature to insure balanced regional representation: review and modification of draft standards by regionally based task forces subordinate to the central commission. The regions were the SPA's Regional Planning Units. In Iowa and Maine, these regional units constituted the main standards-setting body.

Even when geographic dispersion was not explicity built into the process, it appears to have occurred. Random checks of members' hometowns revealed state-wide scattering without exception.

Urban/Rural. Two competing factors must be remembered as we examine this important demographic factor. "Representativeness" was presumably good, in terms of the need to include all the important groups. But when a state had a highly heterogeneous urban/rural mix, the situation itself was bound to be a complicating one. For, given sizeable groups living in very different urban/rural settings, major disparities in LE/CJ needs, resources, and values could be expected which no amount of representativeness on the commission could dispel.

We categorized the urban/rural characteristic on two variables. First, we specified "big-city urban" as being a distinctive quality, and identified whether a commissioner came from a city of at least 100,000 persons. The second variable attempted to get at the "dominant city" syndrome that seemed common. It asked whether a commissioner came from one of the three largest cities in the state, regardless of their population (in North Dakota, for example, the largest city is 53,000 people). The results are shown in Table 4.2 below. Note that we produced an overall "urban/rural ratio," by combining the percentages on the two variables and divided this total by the combined figures on the same two parameters for the state as a whole.

The following observations seem warranted.

First, the states did not aim for absolute representativeness on this dimension. The mean urban/rural ratio was
2.3:1. Only one state (Nebraska) had a ratio as low as 1:1.
Only two other states (Colorado and Oregon) had ratios as
low as 3:2. Nor, for that matter, does absolute representativeness seem appropriate. Insofar as a state wished to
include people with credentials in LE/CJ, with influence, or
with other desired characteristics, those persons were
likely to be concentrated in the major population centers.
The most disproportionate urban domination of the commissions was found in Delaware and Georgia (3.9:1), Pennsylvania
(3.3:1) and Indiana and Ohio (3.0:1).

The role of the capital city in this computation should be noted. In almost all of the states the capital city contributed a disproportionate share, for obvious reasons. New Mexico and Utah, respectively, drew a third and half of their commission membership from the capital city. In Alabama and North Carolina, where the capital city was greater than 100,000 in population but not one of the three largest cities, this factor accounts for the strange discrepancy between the two measures of urban/rural representativeness.

TABLE 4.2
Urban Characteristics of the Commissions

	Standards and Goals Commission		State as a Whole % of pop-			Commis-	
	% from cities > 100,000	% from top 3 cities	No. of cities > 100,000	ulation living in cities > 100,000	% living in top 3 cities	sion/State Ratio	
Alabama	45	18	4	22	18	1.6	
Colorado	40	41*	2	29	34	1.3	
Delaware	0	89*	0	0	23	3.9	
Florida	58	44	8	25	17	2.4	
Georgia	71	68*	4	19	17	3.9	
Idaho	0	61*	0	0	21	2.9	
Indiana	77*	71*	6	28	21	3.0	
Kansas	73*	73*	3	25	25	2.9	
Louisiana	42	42*	3	26	26	1.6	
Michigan	61	28*	8	26	21	1.9	
Minnesota	53	53*	3	22	22	2.4	
Nebraska	22	26*	2	34	36	.7	
New Mexico	35	66*	1	24	32	1.8	
North Carolina	50	11	4	13	10	2.7	
North Dakota	0	42*	0	0	· 20	2.1	
Ohio	78	53	9	28	16	3.0	
Oregon	18	41	1	25	18	1.4	
Pennsylvania	75	75	5	24	22	3.3	
Texas	70	30	10	38	24	1.6	
Utah	48	56 <sup>*</sup>	1	28	17	2.3	
Washington	51	51	3	25	25	2.0	
Wisconsin	44	44	2	20	22	2.1	

Data could not be obtained or were not applicable to the commissions in California, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, and Mississippi.

The commission/state ratio is the ratio of the simple sums of the two variables.

In terms of percentages, the "most urban" commissions were in Indiana, Kansas, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas—in all of them, at least 70 percent of the commissioners came from cities of 100,000 or more persons. The "least urban" inevitably were in the states that had no city of 100,000 or more persons—Delaware, Idaho, and North Dakota. Among the states that did have a city of that size, the least urban were Oregon (18 percent of the commissioners), Nebraska (22 percent) and New Mexico (35 percent).

The "most concentrated" commissions—with members from the state's three largest population centers—were Delaware (89 percent), Pennsylvania (75 percent), Kansas (73 percent)

<sup>\*</sup> Indicates that the capital city is included in this group.

and Indiana (71 percent). The states least dominated by the big three were North Carolina (11 percent), Alabama (18 percent), Nebraska (26 percent), Michigan (28 percent), and Texas (30 percent). In all of the others, the top three cities accounted for at least a third of the commissioners, even though in none of them did these cities hold a third of the state's population. 12

# LE/CI Professionalism

One of the central issues that S&G planners were supposed to confront was the role of the LE/CJ professional in the development of standards. LEAA's interest in broad public participation was unmistakeable. But the guidelines were broad, and a state could more or less go its own way. Each could decide for itself the questions: To what extent should the standards reflect the voice of the public at large? To what extent should the standards reflect professional judgments?

Table 4.3 summarizes the composition of the commissions on the professional dimension.

As the Table indicates, we first categorized a commission member as "LE/CJ professional," "other governmental," or "lay." The first category, "LE/CJ professional" included law enforcement, courts, prosecution/defense, corrections and systems. Under law enforcement we included state and local police, sheriffs, and officers of such agencies as state bureaus of investigation, intelligence divisions, crime labs, police officer training schools, state and local public safety departments, and private (campus or business) security services. Under courts we included judges at all levels and courts' personnel such as administrators, clerks, and reporters. We distinguished this category from that of attorney, which we define as district attorneys and prosecutors, public defenders, and lawyers in private practice, as well as representatives of the Attorney General's office, of Legal Aid, and of Community Legal Services. Corrections cover both adult and youth functions and include representatives of state corrections departments, probation and parole boards, institutions, and rehabilitation services such as prison industries, work release, and halfway houses. 13 Finally, one category of criminal justice function fit no single division but was system-wide. The systems category included state and local criminal justice planning or coordinating councils, city crime commissions, and centers for general criminal justice education and training.

TABLE 4.3 Professional Composition of the Commissions

		Professional Background				LE/CJ Sector (percontage of total membership)				
	Total mem- bership			qe ot ership)	Law En forcement	Prosecution/ Defense	Courts	Corrections	Systems	
Alabama	40	80	13	7	33	8	12	27	c	
California	447	63 <sup>3</sup>	27 <sup>3</sup>	10 <sup>3</sup>	MD	MD	MD	MD	MC	
Colorado	96	48	21	31	17	12	9	10	(	
Delaware	19	69	26	5	21	16	16	16	0	
Florida	43	65	21	14	26	12	16	12	C	
Georgia <sup>2</sup>	28	82	14	4	14	46	11	7	4	
ldaho	33	61	15	24	15	9	12	24	C	
Illinois	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
Indiana	56	71	9	20	21	23	13	13	2	
lowa	$\sim$ 350	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	MD	ΜĒ	
Kansas	44	70	16	14	21	14	18	18	(	
Louisiana	64	80	12	8	39	23	9	8	0	
Maine	~ 700	MD	MD	85 <sup>3</sup>	MD	MD	MD	MD	MC	
Michigan	75	43	44	13	19	11	7	7	(	
Minnesota	36	58	22	20	17	8	19	14	(	
Mississippi	111	52	20	28	11	17	12	11	2	
Nebraska	23	52	22	26	17	13	13	9	(	
North Carolina	27	56	37	7	22	11	4	7	(	
North Dakota	50	42	20	44	10	12	10	10	C	
New Mexico	125	MD	MD	MD	143		MD	MD	ME	
Ohio <sup>2</sup>	36	44	42	14	22	8	8	6	(	
Oregon	44	59	27	14	18	18	11	9	2	
Pennsylvania	12	75	25	0	8	8	25	33	9	
Texas	20	75	15	10	25	20	5	20	5	
Utah	87	52	16	32	16	14	14	9	0	
Washington <sup>2</sup>	69	71	16	13	29	9	15 9	17 4	1	
Wisconsin	54	61	15	24	22	19	y	4	7	
Median	50	61	21	14	19	12.5	12	10.5	c	

For Florida and North Dakota, cross-classification in the membership roster produced percentages totalling more than 100.

The "other governmental" category included appointed officials and elected office holders whose functions were not directly or predominantly concerned with law enforcement or criminal justice. Examples are state departments of administration, human resources, education, mental health, and social welfare, as well as regional and city planning offices, welfare agencies, services to the aging, youth service bureaus, and other community services. Occupations falling in this category included state medical examiner, adjutant general, and public information officer as well as township supervisor and county administrator. It also embraced state and local officials—legislators, mayors, city councilmen, and county commissioners.

<sup>2.</sup> Denotes Phase I only

<sup>3.</sup> Figures represent reported percentages, not computations from raw data,

The third category--"lay"--turned out to be a grab-bag of persons who seldom qualified as unadulterated citizens. In one way or another, almost all of them carried some additional credential. They came from a variety of professions--most commonly education, religion, business, agriculture, labor, industry, media, and public at large (the last referred to as "public" or "citizen" in commission rosters listing titles or positions). Also frequently included were private or voluntary special interest and people's rights groups, such as Citizens Against Crime, the Farmer's Union, the State Consumer Council, the ACLU and various child rights organizations--some of which were mentioned in the sections on minorities and women. Community improvement and welcoming committees (e.g. New Detroit, Inc.) appeared occasionally. 14

Predictably, the classification procedure entailed a number of borderline decisions, when a commission member fell into more than one class according to the office, occupation, or affiliation given for him in the membership roster. For example, a member might be described as a practicing attorney and state legislator, or as a businessman and former sheriff, or as youth services coordinator and president of the League of Women Voters. When possible we based our classification on what the member was chosen to represent -- as indicated by the title (e.g. "citizen") shown on the membership roster. We assumed that a dual listing reflected dual representation, and classified a member in two Other cases were less clear-cut. A single title such as law professor, for example, represented both a lay perspective and professional expertise. Similarly, a single affiliation like Volunteers in Probation filled both the private and the criminal justice categories. In such cases, we assigned a single category on a case-by-case basis.

LE/CJ Versus Non-LE/CJ. As Table 4.3 indicates, the typical S&G Program used LE/CJ professionals for more than half of its members (median = 61 percent). In five states (Alabama, Georgia in Phase I, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and the Texas executive council), the proportion was at least three LE/CJ professionals for every one "other." In only five states did the LE/CJ professional constitute a minority: Colorado (48 percent), Ohio (44 percent), Michigan (43 percent), North Dakota (42 percent), and Maine, which reported only that 85 percent of the 77-plus people who participated were lay citizens.

Turning to the divisions within the non-criminal justice sector--lay and other governmental--we find 13 states with skewed distributions of members. Mississippi, Indiana, Colorado, North Dakota, Nebraska, Utah and Wisconsin have at least twice as many purely lay representatives as either agency appointees or elected community/state leaders. Idaho, Washington, and Ohio have substantial proportions of each of both categories, but (within the "other governmental category") almost no elected officials.

Skewed in the other direction, Michigan and North Carolina had relatively large majorities of politicians within the non-LE/CJ group. North Carolina and Georgia had only one lay representative each.

Specific area representation within these sectors was generally evenly distributed. Drawing from the raw data, few exceptions are of interest. For example, political membership was high on the Colorado, Florida, Delaware, Indiana, and New Mexico commissions (New Mexico also had an unusually large number of state legislators—nearly one-tenth of the entire commission of 125 persons. Also, a few states had clusters of lay people representing selected areas. Kansas drew about half its private sector solely from business and industry. Thousand included military personnel. Education and business dominated the non-LE/CJ areas in Mississippi. Agriculture—ranchers and farmers—predominated in North Dakota. In Wisconsin, Texas and Alabama the majority of lay people were university professors. 18

Within-LE/CJ Balance. Table 4.3 also presented the number of members representing each of the five categories of criminal justice function. We note initially that system-wide representation was sporadic--seven states--and slight-usually a fraction the size of other components. Wisconsin was the sole exception, with four regional criminal justice planning council representatives. We omit the "systems" category in considering the patterns of sector balance below. We also collapse attorneys and court personnel into a single group, to more clearly delineate the balance among the three main sectors of law enforcement, adjudication and corrections.

The overall pattern for the LE/CJ contingent was roughly 35:45:20 among law enforcement/courts/corrections respectively. The low corrections representation presumably reflects the relatively lower number of officials in that sector (sheriffs were classified as law enforcement). Only a few states broke sharply with the pattern. Ohio and Louisiana were heavy on law enforcement representation (about 50

percent of the LE/CJ representation). Georgia had a remarkable proportion of court-related commissioners (70 percent), and Pennsylvania (with its very small commission, it must be remembered) showed more than double the corrections proportion (44 percent). Otherwise, the patterns of balance were unremarkable.

# Influence

The final dimension on which we compare the make-up of commissions is the professional prestige and influence of members from the criminal justice sector. This variable is intended to capture the commission's clout within the criminal justice system as well as with state government generally.

It was expected to affect the credibility, acceptance, and impact of the program and products in three ways. First, the participation of senior officials was expected to push their adoption by legislation or other external implementation processes. The commission members' testimony at hearings, their political leverage, and their access to the governor were all expected to be assets. Second, senior LE/CJ officials were often in a position to implement standards independently, by administrative directive. And third, it was hypothesized that the visible endorsement of the standards by senior LE/CJ officials in the state would lend some impetus by example to officials contemplating adoption of locally-implemented standards.

To estimate the level of LE/CJ influence within the commission, we defined a set of key LE/CJ positions, and established a raw count of the number of members holding one of the small set of top criminal justice positions within the state. These positions we have limited to: attorney general, supreme court chief justice or judge (maximum of one), state court administrator, prosecutor (or public defender, but not both) from any of the three largest counties, and the chief executive officer of adult corrections, juvenile corrections, public safety or highway patrol (but not both), the state bureau of investigation, probation and parole boards, state public defenders office (if any), and the criminal justice planning agency.

These offices and departments are present in some form in most states, though often under different names or with organizational variations—e.g., corrections may be called rehabilitation; highway patrol, state police; probation and parole may be split into separate boards (in which case only

one could be counted); juvenile corrections may be a division of the adult system or an independent department.

To count only these people has obvious limitations on a representation of influence. The influence of a given office or agency varies widely among states, or a particular subordinate may wield more power than a supervisor. Moderate levels of prestige are not captured by this procedure. We did not count office or agency representatives who were second in command. Nor did we count heads of minor departments or of lower level divisions within departments—e.g., the bureau of narcotics, the police officers standards and training board, and divisions such as vocational rehabilitation under corrections.

But to include these additional categories creates as many problems as it solves, especially with regard to a confound with commission size. After considering the alternatives, we found that a straightforward count of the chief executives of the major LE/CJ institutions seemed to do as well as the more complex variations.

A state could conceivably have a maximum of 19 persons on the "influence index." The actual numbers are shown in Table 4.4, for the 21 states that are applicable or for which data were available. The range is 0 to 12 with a median of 6. Pennsylvania is the low extreme, Florida the high. We have insufficient data to establish indices for three states—California, New Mexico, and Mississippi—and we have purposely omitted three other states—Iowa, Maine, and Illinois—with atypical commission structures.

Table 4.4 also includes the ratio of senior officials to the total membership. We hypothesize that the time and commitment of a senior official tended to vary inversely with the degree to which s/he was one of a crowd. Finally, primarily for illustrative purposes, we have combined the standardized scores of the number of senior officials and the ratio to form an "LE/CJ prestige index." A high score signifies high levels of both senior representation and a concentration of such representation within the commission. Delaware, Florida, Kansas, and Nebraska lead the list; Pennsylvania, Alabama, Michigan, Georgia are at the bottom.

We may combine the prestige index with the data on proportion of LE/CJ professionals on the commission, as a means of examining the issue of domination of the commissions by LE/CJ considerations as opposed to those of general representation.

TABLE 4.4
Senior LE/CJ Officials on the Commissions


State	No. of Size of Senior Commis- Officials sion		Ratio	"LE/CJ Prestige Index"	State	No. of Size of Senior Commis- Officials sion		Ratio	"LE/C. Prestige Index"
Alabama	3	40	1/13	11	Nebraska	7	23	1/3	86
Colorado	8	96	1/12	48	North Carolina	6	27	1/5	63
Delaware	8	19	1/2	98	North Dakota	6	50	1/8	39
Florida	12	43	1/4	98	Ohio	6	36	1/6	50
Georgia	3	28	1/9	15	Oregon	7	44	1/6	57
Idaho	5	33	1/7	37	Pennsylvania	0	12		1
Indiana	9	56	1/6	74	Texas	5	20	1/4	61
Kansas	9	44	1/5	82	Utah	8	87	1/11	50
Louisiana	8	64	1/8	58	Washington	6	69	1/12	32
Michigan	4	75	1/19	13	Wisconsin	6	54	1/9	37
Minnesota	5	36	1/7	35					

Figure 4.1 below shows the placement of the commissions on the two dimensions. The four labels are self-explanatory, and should be read as the illustrative characterizations they are meant to be; not as precise diagnostic statements.

In terms of LEAA's objectives for S&G, something can be said for a commission in any of the quadrants. The convention of LE/CJ practitioners should bring a wealth of practical knowledge to the standards-setting process; the conclave of LE/CJ policy-makers should have high implementation potential; the citizens' commission meets LEAA's ambitions for lay participation; and the citizen/policy-maker amalgam sounds like a proper middle-of-the-road balance.

Note that the unusually large commissions (California, Maine, Iowa, New Mexico) were classified as citizens' commissions, even though we lacked data, for the LE/CJ professionals did participate in each of those states, but the commissions were intended to be, and were widely perceived as, citizen-oriented organizations.

FIGURE 4.1 Characterization of LE/CJ Dominance within the Commission



NOTE: Italics indicate a small commission of 30 or fewer persons; underlines indicate a commission of 75 or more persons.

 Denotes the Executive Committee Missing data: Mississippi, Illinois

#### IV. FOOTNOTES

False starts and changes: Iowa started with a commission internal to the SPA but created an outside, regionally based structure before any standards were developed; we represent the latter body. Washington developed some standards by an internal commission, then subcontracted to external bodies; we represented the former in the Table.

<sup>2</sup>By commission size we refer to (1) the accepting and appointed rather than the planned and invited membership, (2) the original rather than later membership (whether changed by resignation and/or reappointment of certain members or by creation of a new commission in a second phase or in a project reorganization, (3) the size of the decision-making body rather than of an overseeing body or a set of ad hoc subcommittees (as in the case of Idaho and Delaware, respectively). Our data source is in some cases the states' formal publication of final Standards & Goals, in some cases SPA archives, and the latter when the two sources conflict.

<sup>3</sup>Texas could be considered unusually small or unusually large. It appointed an additional 150 members to develop separate areas of standards, but the 20-member executive body retained the final decision on the content of standards.

Only one of these organizations used a set commission in the development process—the Greater Egypt Regional Planning Agency, responsible for non-metropolitan standards, with a commission of 128 persons. The other organizations were the Illinois Bar Association, responsible for courts standards, and the IACP, for police standards.

The commission divisions we refer to as task forces were labeled differently in different states: "task forces," "committees," and "subcommittees" were the most frequent names.

<sup>6</sup>Kansas had three divisions in its 500-member advisory panel; four divisions in its smaller overseeing body.

7 Illinois' non-metropolitan standards commission consisted of eight task forces.

- <sup>8</sup>Some states not addressing juvenile justice as a distinct project topic later instituted a separate juvenile justice standards project with its own commission--e.g., Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin. Michigan added a juvenile justice task force after the project was underway.
- <sup>9</sup>An executive structure did not always guarantee an executive function. In Florida, for example, the executive committee was reported to play a vanishingly small role.
- <sup>10</sup>A horror story is, for example, when a staff member is leading a regional public meeting and announces to the press upon arrival that the S&G Program will counteract the incompetence of the local police chief.
- <sup>11</sup>Given a small commission, the inclusion or exclusion of the state capital in either the "100,000+" or the "three largest" category tended to skew the results. But this appeared to be a significant factor in only Kansas and Delaware.
- <sup>12</sup>Two anomalies should be noted: in both Alabama and North Carolina, the *fourth* largest city was both (a) over 100,000 and (b) the state capital, where many of the commissioners lived. Hence the strange discrepancy between their percentages in the first two columns of Table 4.2.
- <sup>13</sup>We placed youth service bureau personnel, youth counselors, and other professionals dealing with general youth problems in the non-LE/CJ sector.
- <sup>14</sup>The organizations and agencies we classify as lay include the following: the state Civil Rights Commission, the Urban League, foundations and endowments (Lilly, America), Office of Minority Affairs, Life Underwriters, utility companies, state auto club, Dairy Association, Stutman's Association, United Fund, Boy Scouts, Association of Counties, the Chamber of Commerce, and many others.
- Michigan listed the governor and lieutenant governor as members in the final but not preliminary reports.
- 16 Referring to the 2nd-level, 450-member commission of Kansas.
- 17 Referring to the 2nd-level, 150-member task forces in Texas.

<sup>18</sup>The index score is expressed on a normally distributed 0-100 scale. Specifically, the procedure was to (1) convert each variable to a set of standardized scores, z=(x-m)/s, (2) add the two "urban" variables scored for each state, (3) standardize the resulting set of summed scores z(I), and (4) express the resulting index (I), as I=1+Fz(I), for negative z(I) and I=Fz(I) for positive z(I), using a table of cumulative normal probabilities to obtain the value of  $Fz\{I\}$ .

# 5. The Process: Cases

The structure and personnel of S&G have been described. In Chapters 6 to 8 we shall pull together the themes that appeared to dominate the process and to be most relevant to LEAA's planning needs. But there is a gap between the structural outline and the synthesis of process namely, what did the program look and feel like, in specific states? The summaries in this chapter are intended to fill that gap. Each briefly tells the story of a specific state, from inception of the S&G process through implementation of the adopted standards (if the state ever got that far). The examples were chosen to represent a variety of approaches, but otherwise their selection from among the 27 possibles was arbitrary.

#### **ALABAMA**

# Planning/Organization

The Alabama Law Enforcement Planning Agency (ALEPA) spearheaded the S&G effort in Alabama. It began shortly after the National Advisory Commission Standards and Goals Conference held in Washington, D.C., during January, 1973, prior to the eventual S&G Program. ALEPA initially thought that costs of developing and implementing the standards process would have to be absorbed by ALEPA planning funds and proceeded on that assumption. ALEPA planning staff members were directed to incorporate standards into their planning efforts within each criminal justice system component (police, courts, corrections, and juvenile delinquency). There was no formal process during this initial attempt to incorporate standards into the state's overall criminal justice planning scheme.

The availability of LEAA money to support the S&G development process led to a formalized effort in Alabama. Two grants totaling \$285,000 were awarded in February, 1974. A full-time project director was hired and a Standards and Goals Advisory Board appointed. Members of the S&G Advisory Board were appointed by the ALEPA director in collaboration with the S&G Project Director. Members of the Advisory Board represented operating criminal justice system agencies. Most were selected from the membership of ALEPA's State Supervisory Board, which is appointed by the Governor. There were no citizen representatives on the S&G Advisory Board.

The S&G Advisory Board was divided into four task forces, each representing one criminal justice system component: police, courts, corrections, and juvenile delinquency. These task forces were each supported by one full-time S&G staff person.

An initial orientation meeting of the S&G Advisory Board was held in September, 1974. Task forces were organized and staff presentations regarding S&G project activities made at this initial meeting. The S&G process in Alabama was thereby formally launched with task forces in each criminal justice system component area given the mandate to develop standards and goals applicable to their area.

# Development

Initial task force meetings began shortly after the S&G Advisory Board orientation meeting. S&G staff members made recommendations to the task forces regarding standards applicable to each component area. Staff based these recommendations on the review of existing standards promulgated by NAC, the American Bar Association, and the American Correctional Association. Each task force reviewed recommendations made by staff members and modified or rejected them to fit what they saw as the needs of the criminal justice system in Alabama. The developmental process concluded in May, 1975 when each task force presented its recommendations to the Standards and Goals Advisory Board.

The Alabama S&G task forces accepted 94% of the National Advisory Commission standards, but not without some revision in wording. Standards in Alabama were seen as something for agencies in the state to strive for, not as mandates. Words such as "shall," "will," and "must" were consequently replaced with less directive phrasing. Dates of compliance were extended to make them more realistic (or palatable).

The developmental process in Alabama provided for little public involvement. Public hearings were held in each of ALEPA's seven planning regions in June, 1975--only after the task force recommendation had already been submitted to the full Advisory Board. Representatives of all criminal justice operating agencies in each region were invited as were a select group of public officials (Mayors, County Commissioners, etc.) and citizens. Members of ALEPA Regional Planning Boards were also invited to participate. Input from these meetings were reportedly incorporated into the task force recommendations prior to adoption by the S&G Advisory Board in July, 1975. But it appears that the impact of these hearings on the S&G process was little at Invitees were carefully selected and most of them represented the criminal justice community. The connection between persons at these hearings and the public at large was too thin to plausibly argue that citizens were represented in the development of the Alabama standards.

#### Adoption/Priorities

The ALEPA Standards and Goals Advisory Board met in July, 1975 to review the draft recommendations submitted by the task forces. The recommendations were approved at the meeting. Draft reports of each task force were subsequently printed and sent to each member of the ALEPA State Supervisory Board for review and comment. Members of the Supervisory Board were asked to review the recommendations and submit comments in writing prior to a meeting of the Supervisory Board scheduled for August, 1975. At this meeting, the police, courts, juvenile, CJ planning, and CJ information reports were adopted by the State Supervisory Board. The corrections report was tabled after heated debate among members of the Supervisory Board and critical comment by various special interest groups. A Review and Revision Committee was formed, consisting of the chairman and selected members of the S&G Advisory Board, to further review the adult corrections portion of the final report. The adult corrections portion was subsequently revised and adopted by the Supervisory Board.

The Alabama S&G process did not provide for the establishment of priorities. It was said that the intent in Alabama was not to focus on specific problems; hence S&G did not include a definition of "problems" from which priorities might have been set. The Alabama effort was characterized as a "broad brush" approach to setting standards, with compliance left wholly to the discretion of criminal justice operating agencies in the state.

# Implementation

Alabama's S&G process did little to spur implementation directly. Agencies seeking ALEPA funds are not formally required to address S&Gs in their grant requests. Potential grantees were informally advised that their requests would be "more favorably looked upon" if S&Gs were tied in but they were not required to address them. It was reported that some grants were denied because they did not fit with Alabama's standards; other sources said that these projects would not have been funded regardless of the standards S&G was said to have been used as ALEPA's excuse for rejecting such requests. Agencies with grant writing capability often did say that they addressed relevant standards in their requests, as a means of smoothing out the funding process, but not because they were intent on implementing standards.

An intermediate step toward implementation was undertaken by the Alabama S&G project: the preparation and dissemination of S&G workbooks statewide. When the original S&G grants to ALEPA ended in August, 1975, two supplemental grants totalling \$50,000 were approved to cover the cost of preparing and distributing these workbooks, designed to assist state and local agencies in planning for S&G integration and implementation. The S&G process was thereby extended to the end of March, 1976. During this time, workbooks were distributed to 473 sheriff and police departments, 417 courts, 375 adult correctional facilities, and 23 juvenile correctional facilities. Each workbook contained a listing of the standards adopted by Alabama. It provided the recipient with a means of assessing his agency's level of compliance, and as a procedure for mapping out a program to achieve compliance in the future. Recipients were asked to complete the workbooks and return their compliance program outlines to ALEPA.

The response rate was extremely low. Those that did respond indicated that the standards adopted by Alabama were acceptable, and ALEPA concluded on the basis of their response that the standards enjoyed general acceptance. The S&G workbook effort was also credited with increasing awareness of standards at the agency level by "putting on the desk of every state and local agency head a record of uniform standards of operation." No direct connection between this effort and an implementation action was found.

It was also reported that the Alabama S&G process influenced criminal justice system legislative reforms. Again, hard evidence for the connection is skimpy. clear, however, that the standards were cited by the proponents of reform. Moreover, they were presented as accepted standards, embraced in theory by agencies in As such, they were said to have been persuasive in the legislative process. For example, standards reportedly "wielded considerable influence" in the passage of the Judicial Article of 1975, a broadscale reworking of the Alabama courts system. Standards were also being used by persons attempting to pass mandatory training requirements for law enforcement officers in the state. seems justified to conclude that S&G had some influence in criminal justice system legislative reform in Alabama, at least insofar as they gave another source of ammunition to persons/organizations who already had taken the lead in certain LE/CJ reforms.

# State and Local Agencies

The operation of state and local CJ agencies in Alabama has not been noticeably influenced by the S&G, apart from the effects of the recent legislative reforms cited above. The intent of the S&G process in Alabama was said to have been to make operating agencies aware of the standards as goals to strive for. It was assumed that standards developed by the representatives of operating agencies would be accepted by their colleagues throughout the state, and serve thereby as a stimulus for improvement in operations. Whether even this awareness (let alone acceptance) has been accomplished could not be ascertained. It appears unlikely.

#### **CALIFORNIA**

# Planning/Organization

The California standards and goals effort, known as Project Safer California (PSC) seems to have been conceived, orchestrated, and supervised by a former director of the Office of Criminal Justice Planning (OCJP). The Director had worked for LEAA/Washington for one year, maintained close ties with Santarelli and Velde, and was familiar with the S&G program from its inception. The OCJP designed its own S&G program, feeling that none of the alternatives presented by LEAA were relevant to California. OCJP applied to the Region IX office of LEAA for a S&G grant. It was quickly approved.

In April, 1974, the Director informed OCJP staff that the S&G grant had been awarded. Planning for the organizational structure, staff functions, and job classification was, according to one staff member, accomplished in one day. The existing Standards and Evaluation division at OCJP expanded to make room for the Project Safer California project. PSC became the primary concern not only of the Standards and Evaluation division but of the entire OCJP office.

In June and July 1974, OCJP hired between 50 and 60 staff persons, 17 of whom were to serve as technical consultants for the 17 task forces which would develop California's standards. Although the Director reported that the positions were widely advertised, consensus of the staff is that notice of the openings was by word of mouth and that a Reagan contact was helpful. The majority of the staff was said to have been conservative, with a few notable exceptions. The competency of the staff was never seriously questioned by any respondent; there was, however, some feeling that relevant experience was not given enough consideration. All staff members were screened by Reagan's Legislative Affairs Secretary, and Reagan's Executive Assistant. Final approval was by the Director. Staff were hired on TAV status, a temporary civil service rating, with a promise that after five months they would be allowed to take the state personnel test and thereafter be given a two-year appointment.

The grant application called for 450 individuals to participate as Commission members. A list of 3,000 recommended persons was drawn up and then gradually whittled

down. Again, the selection of Commission members was closely scrutinized by the Governor's Office. The Director had responsibility for final approval of the Commission. The resulting Commission appears to have been a broad mix of regions, LE/CJ professionals, elected officials, and citizenry. Some criticized the Commission for what was said to be a tilt in liberal circles toward law and order issues.

# **Development**

The 450 members of the Commission were assigned to 17 task force committees. Each committee was to meet four times in four different sites between late August and the Governor's Conference, schedule for December, 1974. In effect, standards were to be developed in three months. It had the earmarks of a crash operation.

Initially, staff attempted to bring in other sources of standards, and relate options to current research findings, but the press of time eventually prompted the Director to request that only NAC standards be closely examined.

Attendance at the meetings was high and participants were reportedly enthusiastic. Discussion of standards often was vigorous, but changes were principally one of deletion rather than substance. One unusual note: Many of the participants felt that it was retrogressive for California to use the NAC standards as a base since California already had implemented and surpassed many of NAC's specifications.

During the development phase, the Director continued to keep close tabs on the daily operations of Project Safer California, to such an extent that many staffers complained that his presence prevented free discussion of issues critical to the project. Then, toward the end of the development phase, the morale of the staff and Commission apparently plummeted because of growing doubts that the work of PSC would ever be adopted as California's Standards and Goals by the Council on Criminal Justice.

#### Adoption/Priorities

It is generally conceded that by the time the Governor's Conference was held in December, 1974, Project Safer California was in shambles. One disgrunted respondent

described the Conference as an elaborate "coming of Christ" operation that cost \$73,000. The original grant had proposed that the California Council on Criminal Justice adopt the standards at the Conference and that Governor Reagan "proclaim" the work of PSC as the standards for the State of California. Following the Conference, the regions were to begin holding meetings to establish priorities and develop plans for implementation.

But adoption never occurred. There are several versions of the failure, all of which were bound up in some degree with the politics of the respondent. The truth lies among a combination of factors, the relative importance of which could not be disentangled.

Jerry Brown had just been elected as Governor of California. Even among the most objective observers, Project Safer California had been seen as closely tied with the Reagan administration. Some Brown people described PSC as an attempt to cement Reagan's law and order philosophy into California's criminal justice system. More moderate opponents thought that it was not appropriate to hand over such a major policy statement to a new administration. In any case, the Council on Criminal Justice reportedly wanted to wait and see what Brown wanted to do when he entered office in January.

At the same time, a letter-writing campaign had been initiated by several right-wing extremist groups who saw S&G as an attempt to nationalize the police force and take away the guns of the citizenry. Leaflets to this effect had been distributed at the Conference by some adamant members of the Commission. Their efforts were not taken seriously by most PSC participants, but they were said to have at least dampened the attractiveness of linking Reagan with S&G.

Internal politics were also in turmoil. State regional offices were reported to be very strong in California, traditionally opposed to OCJP dictates. The regions had been represented by individual participants in PSC, but they now raised objections that they had not been given sufficient opportunity to participate in the S&G development process. Some CCCJ members themselves also felt they had not been given adequate opportunity to review the massive report.

Whatever the combination of forces at work, the upshot was that CCCJ decided to stall the adoption of the standards. It issued a statement recommending that the work of PSC should be circulated to the regions for further "massage" (the universal verb for this exercise).

#### The Aftermath

Despite the failure of CCCJ to adopt the standards, the regions began preparing for their local conferences. The focus of their meetings switched from implementation planning to the said "massage" of the standards. Some of the regions intended to go as far as to imitate the structure of PSC, complete with 17 committees. OCJP asked for another \$1,000,000 to fund the regional effort.

Meanwhile, Brown had launched an attack on OCJP. Its staff was cut from 220 to about 50, to demonstrate Brown's ability to gain control over bureaucratic waste. OCJP had no constituency to defend it, and Brown characterized it as a "pretzel palace" that did nothing but funnel Federal funds to projects that did not contribute to the control of crime. In January, 1975, a directive came from the Executive Office that work on Project Safer California was temporarily to cease.

Between January and April 1975, PSC staff sat in OCJP office waiting for word about the fate of the S&G program. No word came and the project died away. No one was fired, their TAV status was simply allowed to elapse.

Several of the remaining OCJP were assigned to "clean up the PSC mess" by editing the unadopted S&G document into a manual called Suggested Practices and Procedures (SP&P). The change in title was intended to dissociate its contents from Project Safer California. SP&P was envisioned as a managerial checklist for planning and evaluating compliance with the suggested practices. The format of the manual was to allow a column for agency self-assessment. But this document was still in limbo at the time of the California field visit. It was awaiting LEAA funding to assist with publication and distribution.

Suggested Practices and Procedures was seen by the new OCJP deputy director as an "administrative remedy to a serious dilemma." The dilemma arose when LEAA's Region IX office informed OCJP that they intended to hold OCJP to its contracted responsibility to produce a document appropriate to the expenditure of dollars (3.8 million). A new grant

proposal had thus been written requesting \$711,000 deobligated funds for two purposes. About \$200,000 would be available in \$40,000 chunks to the agencies who are statutorily responsible for standard-setting and who wish to revise the parts of Suggested Practices and Procedures relevant to them. The other \$500,000 would be awarded to Officers Standards and Training Commission to expand its existing efforts on Job-Related Employee Selection Standards. The fate of this proposal is not known.

#### IDAHO

# Planning/Organization

Idaho was one of the first states to develop a Standards and Goals Program. Enthused by the LEAA Washington conference, the director of the SPA and the chairman of the SPA Supervisory Board returned to Idaho and began organizing the effort. The Governor's support was recruited, lists of participants were compiled, a program director selected, and the most prominent businessman of the state was enlisted to serve as chairperson. A few of the intended participants refused to serve but there was relatively little resistance to the program. What resistance there was came from the law enforcement community, which was said to be a highly vocal and influential part of the system.

In June, 1973 the executive body of the Standards and Goals Program was established, and called the Governor's Council on Criminal Justice. The commission was an independent body completely separate from the SPA. The SPA director was closely involved in the process, however, and maintained close liaison with the program throughout its early phases. The staff of the S&G Program were isolated from the SPA both physically and in terms of direct contact with SPA planners. It was not until the second phase of the program that such contact was achieved.

The Council members included (there were a few replacements) two state legislators, three state and one Federal judge, six state-level agency officials, two police chiefs, a sheriff, a university president, a businessman, and a practicing attorney. In addition to the Council, five subcommittees were formed, each chaired by a Council member, and each responsible for reviewing standards in a topical area: police, courts, corrections, juvenile justice, and community crime prevention. The subcommittees were comprised of six to seven members from various areas of the criminal justice system. The representation of private citizens was scant. The staff made an effort to provide a "mix" of persons on the committees, with emphasis on persons from the area they were to consider. Full-time staff consisted at this time of the program director and a secretary.

The planners of S&G were conscious that Idaho was one of the first states to go through the S&G process. As a result, considerable time was spent deciding on an approach.

An initial public meeting of the Governor's Council was held in July, 1973, to organize the program and explain the purpose and objectives of the program. The Governor attended and spoke at this meeting as well as at a subsequent conference in July at which the National Standards and Goals Program was explained. However, between July and November, there was no real S&G activity in the state because of lack of access to the NAC reports and materials. At the end of November, a second meeting of the Council was held at which it was determined that there would be more work involved than could be reasonably handled by the committee chairpersons. It was decided to hire five research consultants to assist In December, a proposal was subeach of the committees. mitted to LEAA for a discretionary grant to support the S&G Program. The discretionary grant was approved in April, 1974, providing support in the amount of \$146,000 for the period of 1 July 1973 to 31 December 1974.

#### Development

Starting in January 1974, the subcommittees began to review the NAC standards as well as other related standards of the ABA, ACA, and Idaho Police Officers Standards and Training Commission (POST). Their mandate, as they saw it, was to examine these standards and decide which were appropriate for Idaho and which were not.

There was general agreement that crime was not, as yet, a major problem in Idaho. The Governor indicated as much in his official letter recognizing the S&G Program. However, inasmuch as the State was growing at a rapid rate, it was expected that it would be a problem in the future. The S&G Program therefore was officially oriented toward the development of standards and goals for the year 1995.

The NAC standards formed the basis for the review. The staff indicated that they generally favored the standards as set out by NAC. Often, their view was adopted by the Council. Many of the standards were verbatim copies of the NAC version. Certain standards relating to local law enforcement, police training, and local detention were substantially revised. The most common changes were to delay the date of implementation or to eliminate the offending standard.

The committees met with varying frequency. The corrections committee, for example, met at least ten times between January, 1974 and January, 1975. In contrast, the police committee completed its review in the course of three meetings. Most of the committees' work was completed by the middle of 1974, and, in September, the Governor's Council convened to begin review of the committees' recommendations.

Public hearings were held during the autumn of 1974. Hearings were held in five of the larger cities in the state. Program staff served as advance publicists of the hearings, appearing at local civic groups and arranging facilities and advertising. Public attendance was good at the hearings, averaging over 100 attendees. Whether anything was accomplished is doubtful. One subcomittee member suggested that many of the citizens were college students and that local criminal justice officials were not actively involved. Almost everyone, including the Director, agreed that the hearings had no effect on the substance of the standards eventually developed. The last public hearing was held in December, 1974.

In January 1975, the Governor's Council resumed its review of the committees' recommendations. Subcommittee chairpersons presented the recommendations to the Council for discussion, approval, rejection, or reworking by the committee. One Council member suggested that the Council tended to be a bit more cautious than the committees in adopting innovative or controversial standards. greatest resistance to controversial recommendations apparently came from the law enforcement representatives on the Council, and several standards were modified or rejected to meet these objections. These compromises appear to have been successful in maintaining Council unity; only a handful of recommendations (6 to 10) passed with less than a unanimous The dissenting opinions were recorded and reproduced vote. in the Council's final report. The Council completed the final review of the standards in March, 1975, at which point the Council was dissolved and the preparation of the final report left to the staff. The report was sent to the printer in May, and in June it was available for distribution around the state.

#### **Implementation**

In January, 1975, a proposal to carry out the implementation of the Standards and Goals Program was submitted to LEAA. It set forth a vigorous program of implementation, including the preparation of a Standards and Goals manual for local officials, training workshops to be held around the state, and various efforts (unspecified) to encourage legislative and administrative adoption of the standards. Somewhere after this point, however, it became clear that S&G had been operating virtually independently of the SPA and that there were no plans to coordinate S&G with the SPA's planning process. When LEAA approved the implementation grant in May, 1975, it specified two special conditions

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to bring this integration about. It required the submission of a plan showing how S&G was to be used in the SPA's process, and a plan showing how the S&G Program was to be evaluated. But the following months slowly led to a conflict between the tasks set out in the implementation proposal and the eventual integration of S&G into the SPA process.

The lack of clear role definition for the S&G staff in the SPA after the Council dissolved appears to have been largely to blame. First, the Council had not assigned implementation priorities to the standards. Why this failed to occur is not clear. One respondent suggested that there was a feeling that no consensus could have been reached by the Council. Most persons interviewed suggested that no real consideration was given to priorities or implementation of the standards by the Council. In any event, the task of assigning implementation priorities to the standards fell to the S&G staff. But because of the previous failure to coordinate S&G with the SPA, two distinct planning processes would be going on at the same time if S&G remained a separate entity under the SPA. This problem was resolved by absorbing the S&G staff into the ongoing planning and research units of the SPA. Priorities would be the responsibility of the SPA.

By July 1975, the original S&G effort had been almost completely reduced to a personnel support project for the SPA. The program director had resigned and his role had been taken over (for purposes of implementation grant monitoring) by the SPA director. Three of the five original staff had also resigned, of which only one was replaced. Two of the remaining staff were assigned to the research unit, and the new person was assigned to the planning/grant review unit. The preparation of the S&G manual disappeared as a task, as did any discussion of local S&G workshops, and setting priorities among standards became a matter of selecting those standards that related to the SPA's planning/funding priorities. In short, the S&G effort consisted of three additional staff members performing tasks indistinguishable from those of other SPA personnel.

Between July and December 1975, the S&G performed a variety of research and planning tasks in conjunction with the other SPA staff. In November, a general survey of public attitudes and opinions regarding criminal justice was conducted under the auspices of S&G. Standards and Goals staff also attended two conferences at which Standards and Goals were discussed. Between January and March 1976, the staff was involved in developing the 1976-77 Comprehensive

Plan. In March, the SPA director requested that the special conditions relating to the implementation grant be retired. A three-page letter explaining that the S&G process had been absorbed into the SPA planning process and that reorganization needs had forced the abandonment of the original implementation goals. Would LEAA mind revising the project objectives to match these realities? On April 13, he sent a second letter requesting a permanent reduction in staff on S&G from five to three (no one had been hired to fill the two vacancies), and an extension of the project to March 1977. On April 27, LEAA agreed to the retirement of the special conditions, and on May 3, agreed to the permanent staff reduction and the time extension.

Between January 1976 and the field visit in June 1977, the S&G staff worked on the Comprehensive Plans and other research projects for the SPA. In September, the SPA Board approved seven of the Governor's Councils' recommendations in conjunction with the 1977 State Plan. These standards were revised to fit into the SPA's funding categories and priorities and are used in an uncertain fashion as "sources" for problem identification, planning, and grant review. They are considered as advisory materials for the SPA to reject or accept as desired. Apart from a few police agencies that used the standards to justify proposals for more personnel, there has been no noticeable change in either SPA or agency behavior, practices, or policies.

# Planning/Organization

In November 1973, the Iowa Crime Commission organized a three-day Governor's Conference on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals--even before the S&G program had been planned. The purpose of the conference was to review the standards of the National Advisory Commission (NAC) and adopt those that were applicable to Iowa. The conference participants--criminal justice professionals, government officials and public citizens--reviewed and adopted 127 standards that were published in a Conference Report in April 1974.

In July 1974, after the national S&G effort had been announced, the SPA received a grant to develop standards and goals for the State of Iowa. The grant application was written by a woman who left for another job soon after the grant was awarded. Also, the climate of the office during this time was described as chaotic. The SPA reportedly lacked credibility with state and local criminal justice professionals.

The three full-time S&G staff were hired during September 1974. All three staff members had B.A. degrees related to criminal justice, but all were new graduates and the standards and goals project was their first exposure to the real world. This lack of experience was compounded by lack of direction from the SPA director, causing the project to spin wheels throughout the fall.

#### Development

The original grant application called for the Governor to appoint task forces of professionals and citizens that would work on developing Iowa's standards and goals. reasons unknown to the S&G staff, the task forces were never appointed. Instead, the S&G staff began its work with a complex comparison of NAC standards with current LE/CJ practice in Iowa. This exercise took nearly nine months, too long by the S&G staff's own estimates, and was attributable (according to the staff) to lack of direction from the SPA director. Later in the project, parts of the comparative analysis had to be redone because of the S&G staff's initial unfamiliarity with the Iowa criminal justice system. This loss of time preparing the comparative analysis, coupled with the Governor's failure to appoint the task forces, caused the project to drift until the S&G staff

finally took stock and devised an alternative method for developing Iowa's standards and goals. This coincided with the appointment of a new SPA director who took more interest in the project.

The new plan called for each of the seven regional planning units to organize committees that would review NAC standards around selected topic areas once a month. The S&G staff collected worksheets filled out by the regional representatives and synthesized them for use at the monthly ad hoc meetings held in Des Moines on the same topic areas. Each RPU was to send three representatives—one in police, one in courts, and one in corrections. Invitations were also sent to 30 to 35 other criminal justice "functionaries" and special interest group members. Attendance varied by function area. Participation in the corrections committee was enthusiastic, while the court committee's attendance and level of interest were low, especially among the judicial representatives.

The ad hoc structure was designed to provide maximum diversity, with an eye toward building grassroots support for the implementation phase. But the transiency of the committee membership worked against this, and, in retrospect, S&G staff believe that stable committees of ten people, plus ad hoc invitees, would have preserved the broad base of representation and developed more lasting support. One critic of the Commission's work noted that the "balance" created by inviting two of each agency type was artificial, and tended to stultify change rather than stimulate it. He stated that true balance could have been introduced by including people who were not on a criminal justice payroll.

At the monthly ad hoc meetings the input from the regional meetings was reviewed and discussed. The staff estimates that only about 10 percent of the standards provoked heated debate among the participants. When conflicts arose, compromises were sought. Sometimes these were not forthcoming and standards simply were scrapped. The S&G volume was still unavailable for examination in mid-1977. One key commission member argued that most of the clout was removed from the more controversial standards. He felt that the standards are bland to the point of worthlessness.

#### Adoption/Priorities

After discussion of the standards, motions were entertained for amendments or adoption, voting by simple majority. The S&G volume was adopted in December 1976 by a vote of the

Iowa Crime Commission. At no point were public hearings held, since the S&G director felt that their contribution in other states had not been significant enough to warrant the trouble. One critic saw this as a real failing of the S/G program. Notification of the "open" meetings was sent to local newspapers in accordance with Iowa law, but this was really a token procedure. Media coverage of the Des Moines meetings was reportedly good.

The volume remained unpublished for so long partially because of problems with the printer, but also because of the time it took the three staff members to complete the commentary in the S&G volumes. The delay in publication caused problems in implementation, discussed below.

Priorities for implementation had not been established, although this was described as "in process." No formal analyses are being performed. The S&G staff planned to choose two or three of the legislature's recommendations as priorities after making an informal analysis of their political feasibility.

#### Implementation

The S&G staff expected implementation of the standards to be neither easy nor immediate. As mentioned earlier, the program had attempted to promote implementation by building a broad base of political support during the development meeting in Des Moines, but the transiency of the development committees seemed to preclude any real commitment to the standards by agency heads. Many standards in courts and corrections required legislation before implementation could occur, and the S&G director intended legislation to be the primary thrust for implementation. It was noted that the attorney general prohibited legislators from serving on the Iowa Crime Commission—an obvious obstacle to at least one route for building support for legislative implementation.

Despite the fact that the S&G staff was currently operating on an implementation grant, very little implementation planning had begun at the time of the field work. Activities were blocked in part by the delay in publishing and distributing the S&G volume. Local grant applicants were supposed to submit proposals in compliance with standards and goals, and RPUs were supposed to notify potential grantees about the importance of S&Gs to funding decisions—both guidelines were very difficult to follow without the published volume.

# State and Local Agencies

The few state agency heads who anticipated that the S&G program would affect their agencies saw standards and goals as a set of guidelines and as a way of substantiating a need for change. One person remarked that S&G will be a "tail wagging the dog"—the agency executive would decide what he wants and then find a standard to support it. Several of these agency interviewees also felt that the delay in publication had already seriously undermined the potential usefulness and acceptance of the standards. LE/CJ professionals needed something immediately. In the absence of an Iowa version, agencies relied on other national sources for guidance.

It should be noted that a new criminal code was completed and an influential legislative study group for corrections was established, both without any relationship to the Standards and Goals program. Some of their key actors did participate in S&G development.

Some respondents expected that the local officials' desire to maintain autonomy will present a problem to implementation at the local level. This is especially likely in the corrections system, which will be decentralized shortly. In short, the three S&G staff members were working hard, but Iowa's S&G implementation phase had shown few accomplishments when we last observed it.

# LOUISIANA

# Planning/Organization

The Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), the supervisory board of the SPA, received its grant to develop standards and goals in the spring of 1974. The 65 members of the commission are appointed by the Governor and include the attorney general, the Superintendent of Public Safety, the director of the state police, the court administrator, the director of the Department of Corrections, and the former director of the Louisiana Youth Commission, as well as other local LE/CJ professionals. Most of the people interviewed commented that using the LCLE for S&G was an ideal arrangement: the Commission members had already established a good working relationships among themselves, the mix on the Commission could build grassroots support for the acceptance of the adopted standards, and the membership was a who's-who of Louisiana LE/CJ and politics.

The staff hired for the S&G project were young and inexperienced. This was seldom perceived as a defect. Many respondents remarked that their enthusiasm and hard work was the key to a successful project. Three of the staff were recent law school graduates, which seems to have influenced the strategy for implementation that was later developed.

#### Development

The LCLE was divided into five committees--Community Crime Prevention, Juvenile Delinquency, Law Enforcement, Courts, and Adult Corrections. The first task of each committee was to plan a series of seven meetings to be held throughout Louisiana, where the public would be encouraged to contribute to the state's S&G development.

Hundreds of invitations were sent out to public and staff, and Committee members appeared on local television and radio talk shows. The hearings were time-consuming, and some of the Committee chairmen and S&G staff questioned their value. Staff argued that they did produce standards for prevention of child abuse and the development of rape crisis centers--standards that had not been covered by NAC, and which would otherwise have been omitted. It was one of the few concrete examples of a result from public hearings that we heard from any of the 27 states. An opinion survey of LE/CJ professionals, conducted by LSU, provided a second source of public input to the development of Louisiana's S&G.

Following the public hearings, the committees began drafting standards using contributions from the public hearings, NAC and ABA standards, and state-of-practice reports prepared by S&G staff. One committee chairman characterized discussion as being divided along urban/rural lines, with the representatives of rural agencies fighting the adoption of standards that were already being met in the urban counties. The corrections committee was particularly volatile. Respondents provided vivid descriptions of battles between two individuals at opposite ends of the liberal/conservative spectrum.

# Adoption/Priorities

In June 1975, Louisiana's standards and goals, with the notable exception of the corrections standards, were adopted at a two-day conference of LCLE. Corrections standards were not adopted until the next month, and the label "standards" was changed to "objectives," to discourage judicial pressure and litigation. After adoption, 3,000 draft volumes were distributed to law libraries, legislators, and LE/CJ professionals.

Each committee was asked to set priorities among their goals. A separately appointed Priority Committee then ordered the goals among the sectors. The priorities that were set were intended to direct LCLE's funding for the next three years. The goal statements were formulated and quantifiably defined by the SPA staff according to statewide needs, success of existing programs, and the ability to suggest a measurable course of action.

#### **Implementation**

In accordance with Federal guidelines, Louisiana's standards and goals have been integrated into the state comprehensive plan. General areas of standards related to specific short— and long—range goals are cross—referenced beneath goal statements. Many of the goals involve the attainment of specific standards in a prescribed period of time. Each year, one person from each section of the SPA goes out to major cities to explain the relationship between the goals and the SPA funding process. Technically, a project may not be funded unless it is in compliance with a stated goal. This contingency had not occurred, however, according to sources at the SPA.

The S&G staff focused its implementation efforts on legislative activities. This was partially a result of the legal training of key staff. It also derived from their sense that this strategy would have the greatest impact. The staff monitored criminal justice legislation, especially those bills related to standards and goals, using an elaborately designed tracking system. S&G staff were frequently called to give testimony before the legislature as well as to provide technical assistance in drafting certain bills and proposals. Serendipitously, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee was also the S&G director's brother, providing a natural handoff for the introduction of criminal justice legislation. The Louisiana S&G provided several examples of legislative action which were at least partially caused by S&G efforts.

While legislative efforts had been intensive, the impact of S&G upon state and local agencies were much less effective despite the early attempt to build agency heads into the development process. The state police praised the S&G project, especially its efforts for Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) legislation, but the agency was not using the standards to guide policy or operational planning. In corrections, the director of DOC admitted he had never read the S&G report. The director of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) characterized the standards as obsolete. Most agencies had developed their own SOP manuals and updated them periodically. Changes were usually made reactively rather than proactively. Several respondents proposed that the biggest factor in Louisiana LE/CJ was the court order.

A final note. The S&G program officially ended in 1977, but two staff members were retained to begin the POST project, passed by vote of the legislature. Using state block funds, the ex-S&G will set up the curriculum for the academy, certify academy instructors, and hold conferences for academy directors. This will be a permanent vehicle for the implementation and enforcement of training standards for law enforcement personnel.

#### MAINE

Compared to other states visited as part of the national assessment, Maine's Standards and Goals Program has been unique in its attempt and apparent success in involving lay citizens in developing long-range objectives for their state's criminal justice system. While some jurisdictions have tried to stimulate public participation, most of those efforts were pro forma appointment of community members of S&G commissions, poorly attended public meetings for reviewing already established standards and goals in most states. In Maine, citizen participation was the foundation of the S&G effort.

#### **Process**

In March 1976, three area directors joined the S&G project director in recruiting citizens from throughout the state to participate in the "Community Alliance," Maine's Standards and Goals Program. Each area director was responsible for coordinating the efforts of a total of 11 study groups around the state. The original organizational task was to recruit approximately 600 individuals to serve on the study groups. Each of these groups was then to be broken down into subgroups or committees for the actual development of the recommended objectives.

Some 10,000 invitations were sent to members of public and private organizations to urge their participation. The real recruitment, however, took place during a door-to-door campaign. While suspicion was expressed by some, area directors reported a generally supportive response. By the end of the recruitment drive, over 800 citizens had agreed to participate in the Alliance.

It was understood from the beginning by all involved that there would be no simple "honorary involvement." Each committee was required to meet twice a month, and substantial preparation was necessary for each meeting. Because 85 percent of the Community Alliance membership had no previous criminal justice experience, the first six months proved to be an intensive learning and educational process for most participants. Speakers, slide presentations, and films were presented to most groups, and these were supplemented with status reports of current laws and activities of the criminal justice system in the state. Also provided were informational materials prepared by the project staff in response to specific citizens' requests.

By April 1977, the 11 study groups were ready to begin the task of developing their recommendations. With each subcommittee meeting twice a month, the staff indicated that they were attending an average of 90 meetings over a regular 30-day period.

Using the NAC standards as a guide, the committees reviewed, revised, and amended the standards to meet their perception of need for Maine's criminal justice system. Certain topics often produced heated debate among members; standards were not rubber-stamped in Maine. Of major importance was the constant level of feedback maintained by staff and participants through regular circulation of meeting minutes.

During the summer of 1977, the recommendations of all the ll study groups were collected and the staff began the task of synthesizing these separate reports into one document. Staff found the recommendations were remarkably similar. Where conflicts did exist, steering committees composed of members from each study group were charged to reach a final resolution.

In September, the work of the Community Alliance was compiled into a preliminary report that was presented for adoption during a town meeting held in Augusta on December 8 to 10, 1977.

## Impact

By the end of 1977, there had been a number of outcomes apparently attributable to the Community Alliance effort. During the 1977 emergency session of the Maine legislature, 38 bills were introduced to implement many of the project's recommendations. Because it was a short session, legislators indicated that it is their intent to use the report and prefiled bills as a basis for legislative action in the following term. One legislator commented that the Alliance was extremely helpful in keeping the House informed of public sentiment on a number of criminal justice issues.

A noticeable element of Maine's Standards and Goals Program was the receptiveness of criminal justice professionals to the notion that citizens can develop meaningful objectives for the system. No professional interviewed complained of being left out of the S&G process and most seemed optimistic that the report would have some value.

Many respondents argued that the most valuable outcome of the Community Alliance will be that a significant number of Maine citizens have taken the time to become educated about their state's criminal justice system. Community Alliance, it was said, has created a core of informed citizens who can act as spokespersons and perhaps become change agents in their own communities.

As of the end of 1977, the project director intended to continue the work of Community Alliance. He announced the incorporation of Community Alliance at the town meeting. Community Alliance, Inc., is to have its own Board of Directors and be funded by private industry and service groups. Objectives of this organization were to be to continue lobbying for legislative implementation of their recommendations and to promote voluntarism in criminal justice agencies. A beginning membership of approximately 300 was expected.

## 6. The Process

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The process whereby the standards were developed was supposed to be of fundamental importance to the program and to this evaluation of it. LEAA planned to determine which strategies were most successful in producing legislative and administrative implementation; which strategies were most effective in mobilizing voluntary compliance with standards; and which strategies tended to produce long-term, institutionalized use of S&G as a planning tool.

These ambitions turned out to be unrealistic. The main point of interest about the S&G process in the 27 states is that it exhibited so much variance while the measures of impact exhibited so little. It seemed that every approach was tried in an extreme form in at least one state--from apathy to enthusiasm in motivation; from tightly restricted conclaves of the LE/CJ elite to wide-open solicitation of public participation; from highly theoretical objectives to bread-and-butter practicality; from political to apolitical; from consensual to confronting. On these and other dimensions, the S&G spanned the range.

There is some anecdotal interest in simply describing the range, and that, at bottom, is the function of the following pages. For we are unable to compare the variations in process to corresponding variations in the degree to which the standards produced LE/CJ change, or were likely to. Such variations, discussed in Chapter 8, were small. We discuss instead some of the basic elements of the process which were expected by LEAA to be keys, and attempt to illuminate some of the problems that persisted across strategies.

## SOURCES OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

A primary obstacle to the success of the Standards and Goals Program was the fragmented structure of the criminal justice systems in the states. Criminal justice comprises a "system" only in the loosest sense of that term. In any

given state, several systems exist, each responsible for a unique set of functions and each responding to its own set of priorities and constituencies. In the absence of an authority that could speak for the system as a whole, it was necessary that the S&G Program attract at the outset the support of a broad range of persons and institutions. How well they succeed in this effort varied among states. And, as might be expected, success in attracting one set of supporters sometimes created opposition in another.

## Sources of Support Within the LE/CJ Community

As an idea, the Standards and Goals Program had a sizeable "natural" constituency from which it could draw support. The SPA supervisory board, which typically included many of the state's leading actors in criminal justice, was an important potential source, particularly because the SPA was one of the most obvious beneficiaries of the program.

In addition, key persons in virtually every state had participated in the National Advisory Commission's deliberations, both as members of the Commission and as attendees at the Washington Conference (see Chapter 3). These individuals formed a potential core of supporters who were both familiar with the standards and committed to their implementation. Thus, in several states, the initial idea for the S&G Program came from persons who attended the Washington Conference.\* In other states, persons with previous involvement with the NAC were among the staunchest supporters of the state program.

In addition to support from persons attracted to the idea of S&G, support came from persons who saw S&G as a useful vehicle for implementing a specific change. One state Department of Corrections supported the S&G Program because it wanted to focus attention on the problems and conditions in local jails. In another state, a corrections department was under court order to improve conditions in its prisons, and supported the S&G Program in hopes that it would provide

<sup>\*</sup>In the most dramatic instance, the attorney general and the director of the SPA drew up plans for the S&G Program on the flight back from Washington. They approached the governor with the idea, drew up the list of participants, and were largely instrumental in organizing and running the program to its conclusion.

leverage for additional appropriations. In a third state, the attorney general assigned staff to work with the S&G Commission because he wanted the Commission to endorse the idea of a state-wide grand jury system. Support was also generated among individuals interested in creating an independent youth services department; by a state insurance commission interested in extending coverage to state prisoners; by an attorney general's office interested in enlarging its organized crime program; and by local judges interested in the creation of local judicial councils.

Translating evidence about these pockets of support into statements about overall level of support within the LE/CJ community is complicated by the independence of the subsystems That the Attorney General was an ardent advocate of the prospective S&G program might not mean anything to a local District Attorney, and was highly unlikely to mean anything to a local police official. In part, this situation pointed to the importance of enlisting the support of prominent persons in each LE/CJ subsystem. The range of success in that regard was detailed in Chapter 4. But equally, the situation pointed to intrinsic limitations in the built-in reliance of S&G on widespread voluntary acceptance of the The capacity of the LE/CJ community to mobilize or S&G idea. to enforce support by hierarchical bureaucratic means was limited, both by the segmentation of the system horizontally across functions and by segmentation vertically among jurisdictions.

## Sources of Support from Outside the LE/CJ Community

The Governor. The most prominent source of "outside" support for the S&G Program was expected to be the Governor's Office. In practice, support of some sort was identified in 23 of the 27 states, ranging from direct, active involvement to a passive, pro forma endorsement of the process. In tour states, we found no involvement whatsoever. Twice the governor formally refused to participate in response to a direct request, and twice the governor adopted a hands-off attitude toward the program, remaining explicity neutral.

In the remaining states, the governor's role varied widely.

In six cases, the governor's only role was the formal appointment of members of the S&G Commission or task force. This usually involved no more than signing on a letter drawn up by the SPA director or PSA staff.

In six states, the governor made at least one public appearance in connection with the S&G Program in addition to appointing members. In four of these cases, this meant an introductory speech at the first meeting of the Commission, or a message of congratulations at the meeting at which the developed standards were formally adopted. In a fifth state, the governor appeared on television to promote the program. In the other one, he held a press conference to publicize the release of the adopted standards.

Examples of more intensive involvement usually entailed some direct or indirect participation in the actual development process. In seven of the states, the governor appointed an aide or the lieutenant governor to represent kim at the meetings of the Commission. In one state, we were told that the governor kept in close touch with both the chairman and director of the S&G Program, and made his personal views known on a variety of issues. In a second state the governor made the decision to assign responsibility for the S&G Program to an independent advisory group rather than to the SPA, and appointed his lieutenant governor to chair the process.

In three states the S&G Program became closely associated with the individual holding the governor's office. The governors or their immediate aides were directly involved in the selection of Commission members and staff and monitored the day-to-day operations of the S&G Programs. In two cases, the governor's personal involvement extended to the implementation of specific standards, principally via legislation.

Association of the governor with the S&G Program was not an unmixed blessing. In two cases, the governor's public support generated opposition and criticism of the program from extremist groups and the governor's political opponents. Political favoritism was charged in selection of the Commission. It was also suggested that the adopted standards were shaped to reflect the philosophy of the governor and that the program was used to promote the governor's political fortunes. In one of these states, the close association of the governor with the program was cited as a reason why the S&G Program eventually failed. The election of a new governor

of the opposing party signalled a major retreat on the part of the SPA, and it was reported that the standards were scrapped at least partially for political reasons.\*

Except for the three states where the program became closely identified with the governor, the overall impact of the governor's S&G involvement was minor. The governor's involvement was usually ceremonial rather than substantive, with negligible effects on the program. And, as respondents frequently emphasized, the governors exercise relatively little control or authority over criminal justice matters in most states.

Other External Support. Instances of support for the S&G Program from outside the criminal justice system were relatively rare. In one case, the state's most prominent businessman lent prestige and support to the program by agreeing to serve as the Chairman of the S&G Commission. A state legislator in a second state was also actively involved in promoting the program, reportedly because of his hope that the program would help to pass a bill deinstitutionalizing status offenders. Individual citizens involved in reform efforts were periodically cited as providing support to the program. However, as a rule, direct citizen involvement was usually limited to program participants. The exception was in Maine, where the entire S&G Program was organized around citizen participation. In that state, the nonprofessional element not only supported but dominated the program.

#### Sources of Opposition Within the LE/CJ Community

There was very little opposition to the idea of a standards and goals program. The notion that there should be benchmarks against which to measure performance was not argued. However, the implications of setting standards, particularly in a system as visible and politicized as the criminal justice system, guaranteed that opposition to the S&G Program would arise. Despite major efforts to recruit key persons into the process and to draw input from all relevant sectors of the system, virtually every program we

<sup>\*</sup>The opposite situation also occurred. In another state, the initial S&G Program was carried out with virtually no support from the governor. However, when a new governor was elected, the program was made the centerpiece of the governor's effort to reform the state's criminal justice system.

examined experienced criticism and opposition. Of the 27 state programs we visited, only four reported no major opposition at some point in the process. In three of these states, the reason given for the lack of opposition was that the program had such a very low profile, involved so few people, and so openly promised that the process would not change anything, that there was nothing to oppose. The fourth state was again Maine, where the program was very heavily oriented toward citizen involvement and public participation.

Support had tended to be scattered and unemotional. Opposition tended to be broad-based and "felt." Whereas the accounts of support were put in terms of a handful of examples, accounts of opposition run into the dozens. Whereas support was often expressed in qualified, theoretical terms, opposition was often expressed with sarcasm, condescension, or hostility.

Opposition to the program struck a number of common themes: state vs. local prerogatives, individual agency "turf," lack of representation, and opposition to specific standards.

The clash of state and local prerogatives is endemic to the criminal justice system, and S&G was not exempt. Local resistance to the S&G Program was prompted by the notion that the state should dictate standards. The efforts to encourage local participation in the process did not forestall criticism or complaints that the state was encroaching on local prerogatives. City and county sheriffs, police chiefs, judges, and prosecutors typically led the opposition to the program; but local and regional planning agencies also were found to be in opposition to the state standards. In several states this was said to have resulted in secession from the process by local and regional agencies.

A second source of opposition to the S&G Program was the issue of proprietorship. It was widely questioned whether the S&G Program was the proper vehicle for establishing standards, and whether the standards it produced could be legitimate ones.

Part of the opposition was based on residual suspicions that Federal standards were being foisted on the states. This suspicion was common throughout the 27 states, and most pronounced in the southern states. It was spurious, in a technical sense--LEAA had given the states authority to write whatever standards they wished. But the points were frequently made that (1) NAC standards were in fact being used as the basis for the standards, and (2) LEAA had a

track record of promoting programs with a quasi-voluntary front-end and a quasi-compulsory rear-end (the most commonly cited example being the use of threats to revoke grant programs if Federal guidelines were not met). LEAA often repeated its assertion that it endorsed only the process, not specific standards. But, fairly or not, many observers interpreted it as self-deception or cant. There was pervasive fear that the adoption of standards would make it more difficult for agencies to qualify for Federal funds, or would drastically alter the kinds of projects that would be funded.

Questions of proprietorship also arose in states or agencies where previous standard-setting or implementation efforts had been undertaken. Several states had adopted the ABA standards; a few had taken extensive steps to implement them. The judiciary saw no good reason for uninformed citizens to review standards on topics that had been essentially settled among the members of the bar. In other states, the Departments of Corrections had publically endorsed the standards developed by the ACA.

State agencies with statutory powers to set standards often objected to the S&G Program as an invasion of their authority. In one state we were told that the SPA quietly shelved a number of proposals to fund ACA standard-setting projects, while waiting for the S&G standards. The subsequently adopted standards were regarded by the corrections community as inferior to those that the agencies themselves could have produced. A similar criticism was made of the SPA in another state when the S&G staff undertook a study of police training despite the fact that a proposal to fund the same study had been submitted by the state Law Enforcement Training Commission.

#### Sources of Opposition from Outside the LE/CJ Community

General public opposition was nowhere a problem. Only in Maine and possibly New Mexico was there enough public interest to make such opposition even a possibility. External opposition was usually confined to groups or individuals with specific interests responding to specific standards. For example, one State Insurance Commission supported the S&G Program because of its interest in extending coverage to state prisoners. The insurance industry became involved in S&G because it did not want to be compelled to whiterwrite this type of liability. Similarly, standards developed in the area of juvenile justice in one state were opposed as being too "hard-line" by a coalition of women's clubs who

had been active in the juvenile delinquency field. In still another state, we were told that a large number of ministers organized opposition to certain proposed changes in the state's drug and sex codes, and were able to quash adoption of standards endorsing those changes.

Opposition from noncriminal justice government agencies usually arose whenever the standards under consideration related to non-LE/CJ functions. In one state, health and education officials questioned the propriety of criminal justice representatives discussing topics affecting their area of responsibility. Proposals to restrict or change the authority or prerogatives of an agency raised immediate issues of "turf."

We noted only one instance in which opposition came from outside the LE/CJ system because of a fundamental disagreement with the overall program. The state budget analyst declared opposition to the adoption of any standard without a detailed examination of its cost implications. His opposition forced the S&G Program to delay adoption of any costrelated standards. The dispute was resolved only after the intervention of the governor in favor of the program.

## **PUBLIC HEARINGS**

The public's participation in the Standards & Goals Program was perceived by LEAA as a major component of the process. One of the progenitors of the program characterized S&G's primary goal as achievement of a public awareness of the importance of "standards" in criminal justice, analogous to public awareness of the importance of "ecology."

Maine was the archtypical example of a public-oriented program, and carried it off with enough success to exempt it from most of the generalizations that follow. With that exception, the public-participation component of the process produced few results.

Of the 27 states we visited, 20 held at least one formal public hearing as part of the S&G Program. The seven other states did not hold a formal public per se, but did permit interested persons to attend the regular working sessions of the Commission or task forces. Thus, every program in our sample had access to the comments and opinions of persons outside the process as it went about its work. Table 6.1 summarizes some basic points state-by-state. The following discussion elaborates on some of the general findings.

TABLE 6.1 Public Hearings in the 27 States

State	Special Hearings Held?	Lay Wit- nesses?	Self-appraisal of Attendance	Self-characteriza- tion of Purpose	Comments
Alabama	Yes	Yes	Good	Refinement of standards	Well-publicized. Two hearings at each site: LE/CJ practitioners first, then citizens on the second round.
California	Yes	DK	Good	Determining content of standards	68 hearings held by task forces, regional hearings cancelled due to adoption failure.
Colorado	Yes	Yes	Variable	For reference mater- ial during develop- ment	140 hearings in 19 locations, Trivial use during standards development.
Delaware	Yes	Intended	Low	None	Meetings were scheduled but no one came.
Florida	Yes	Minor	Low/variable	To determine content of standards	Wanted "grass-roots opinion" to apply to final document, Used surveys of local attitudes at regular LPU meetings.
Georgia	Yes	Minor	None	Public relations	Negligible effect.
Idaho	Yes	Yes	Widely variable	Public relations	No substantive contributions,
Illinois	Yes	No	Good	Obtain professional consensus	Tried to obtain participation by elite of LE/CJ professionals.
Indiana	Yes	Yes	Low/variable	Public relations	Regional hearings only.
Iowa	No	NA	NA	NA .	Meetings to develop standards were open to the public.
Kansas	No	Yes	Low	Public relations	Held after adoption was completed.
Louisiana	Yes	No	Low	Determine content of standards	Citizens participated in the general discussion. A few standards were added as a result.
Maine	Yes	Yes	Variable	Public relations and to determine content	Heavy public involvement/publicity.
Michigan	Yes	Minor	Low	To determine content	Time constraints limited use of public input.
Minnesota	Yes	Some	Good	Encourage pub. awareness of S&G program	No substantive use.
Mississippi	Yes	Yes	Good	To determine content	Scheduled 9, held 5. Negligible effects.
Nebraska	No	No	Low	NA	Public could attend meetings of the commission, No publicity.
New Mexico	Yes	Yes	Good	Determine public opinion	Besides 23 meetings, a Sunday newspaper supplement was used to solicit public reactions to standards.
North Carolina	a Yes	Yes	Poor	None	Conducted only to comply with the grant stipulation.
North Dakota	No	NA	NA	NA	Working sessions of the commission open to the publi
Ohio	Yes	Yes	Variable	Public relations	Prompted by compliance needs. No substantive effect
Oregon	Yes	Yes	Good	Public relations, refinement of standards	Three public hearings plus open commission meetings
Pennsylvania	Yes	Yes	Good	Public relations	Four hearings.
Texas	No	NA	NA	NA	Working sessions open to the public.
Utah	No	NA	NA	NA	Open meetings plus one big conference, Public input not used.
Washington	No-	NA	NA	NA	Working sessions open to the public.
Wisconsin	Yes	Yes	Not reported	Not reported	Ten hearings.

## The Purpose of the Hearings

The way that each state approached the public hearing phase of the program tended to reflect the overall philosophy of the program planners. In some states, the hearings were regarded as a major aspect of the standard development process and pains were taken to make participation widespread and useful. At the other end of the spectrum were those programs that did as little as possible. In some instances we were told that the hearings were held only to comply with the requirements of the LEAA grant. In several states, program officials openly regarded the hearings as an unnecessary nuisance. The most extreme example of this was the law enforcement task force chairman who opposed holding hearings, and, when convinced of his obligation to do so, tried to limit participation by delaying the release of invitations and public notices.

The seven states that did not hold formal hearings but merely permitted public attendance at their regular meetings, placed least importance on the hearings. The reasons for not holding hearings varied—because of the unfavorable experiences of other states; or because public hearings were regarded as inappropriate given the technical nature of the material to be developed; or because it was felt that public input was better obtained through the careful selection of citizen representatives on forces and Commissions.

The states that did hold hearings professed a variety of purposes. Compliance with the LEAA grant requirement was sometimes mentioned by respondents as the principal reason. But the majority of respondents felt that there were substantive benefits to be gained from the hearings. Two major benefits were most frequently mentioned: direct input into the content of the standards, and an increase in public and professional support of the program and the standards.

The programs that used the public hearings to gather input on the state standards emphasized the participation of criminal justice practitioners and other informed persons over the participation of the general public. Conversely, programs that used the hearings to educate the public placed more emphasis on drawing out public opinion and comment, and relied less on the hearings to assist the standards-development process. But there were no pure types. Very few of the programs made a conscious effort to exclude the general public from the hearings, and none tried to exclude the professional community. What usually emerged was a mixed strategy in which both citizens and professionals provided input, and, in some instances, educated each other.

The participation of practitioners was sought in every state--those that held formal hearings, and those that merely opened their regular meetings to outsiders. Participation by local practitioners was usually facilitated by holding the hearings or meetings at various locations around Only three states did not follow this approach. the state. In two cases, the SPA supervisory board was the body responsible for developing and adopting the standards, and chose to hold all of its regular meetings in the state capi-No formal hearings were held and participation was reportedly very poor. In a third state, the supervisory board only reluctantly agreed to hold public hearings to comply with grant requirements. Participation was also reported as low.

Practitioner participation was usually sought through direct invitation. If hearings were to be held at several locations, either the S&G staff or local planning agency staff were responsible for contacting local officials. In most instances, all criminal justice personnel and officials were invited to the hearings. Only in a few states was there an effort made to limit participation to key criminal justice officials, and then only because of a specific need for testimony of those officials. In general, the programs sought practitioner input, both to obtain factual guidance or opinions about specific standards and to assure that local practitioners had an opportunity to give their views. In this sense, their participation was needed to help build consensus and to make local officials feel that they had a stake in the final products.

Citizen participation was usually solicited through the mass media. The states varied greatly in the intensity of their efforts to draw in the general public. In one state the entire S&G Program was run like a political campaign, and direct citizen involvement was eagerly sought. In another state, citizen participation was discouraged by limiting testimony to criminal justice professionals. The majority of states adopted a strategy somehwere between these two extremes. Local meetings or hearings would be advertised in local newspapers, or on local radio stations. In a few states, S&G staff served as advancemen and attempted to drum up local enthusiasm through press releases and public appearances. In three states, these task were delegated to local and regional planning agencies with the state providing funding and guidance.

The success of the program in generating participation in the public hearings is difficult to evaluate on an absolute scale. Turnout, as measured by the number of citizens or

practitioners attending a given hearing, went from zero to several hundred. Variation existed among states and within states. Attendance also fluctuated according to the topics being discussed. Subjects such as gun control or changes in drug or sex laws sometimes attracted the attention of the media and the public. Court reform or prison regulations, generated less response. The attendance of local practitioners was typically described as good to excellent regardless of the topic under discussion. The reported comments of these attending practitioners were not uniformly favorable, either about the standards or about the S&G Program.

Attempts to evaluate the relative success of the states in generating participation were frustrated by a number of obvious factors. First, S&G staff and participants disagreed widely on the number of persons attending meetings. Second, hearings described as having been well attended by program staff ranged from an average of 30 attendees in one state to over 800 attendees in a second state. The context of the hearings and the expectations of the staff drastically altered the definition of "good attendance" from one instance to the next. Third, the states varied greatly in the number of hearings held and the scale of the program's effort. One state held over 145 public hearings at 19 cities around the state. Attendance was reported as "highly variable." A second state held only four hearings, but with an average attendance of over 150 attendees.

It does seem clear that the public hearings did not materially affect the standards. Sometimes respondents nominated scapegoats. Program staff complained about the apathy and lack of awareness on the part of the public. Local officials complained that the staff failed to provide structure or direction to the hearings. Everyone agreed that much time was lost dealing with purely local problems rather than general principles. The sheer number of standards under consideration also obstructed effective discussion.

There was the occasional exception—one state, for example, reported that a standard on child abuse was developed as a direct result of a citizen's comment at a public hearing. But the image of popular LE/CJ standards popularly arrived at was not remotely related to what happened.

There is no evidence from the testimony of the respondents or from the records of the new media that S&G produced even residual public awareness of the meaning or importance of "criminal justice standards." One program director reflected a common attitude. "We expected a lot from the hearings," he said. "Looking back, we probably should have known better."

#### IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

Implemention planning rarely occurred apart from efforts to implement specific standards, and the bulk of the discussion relating to this topic is therefore deferred to Chapter 8. Briefly, however, it may be noted that only 11 of the 27 visited states were reported to have engaged in any systematic implementation planning. These efforts ranged from task forces to plan strategies for implementation to a decision to restrict the choice of standards to those which could be implemented quickly. This latter effort entailed a 12-month project. Legislators were briefed on the S&G work, and one of the governor's legislative assistants was assigned to monitor standards and goals development, so that he might serve as chief lobbist when the time came for implementation.\*

The most typical form of implementation planning involved preparation of written documents. Five states of the 27--fewer than one in five--developed reports and handbooks to assist in the implementation of standards, ranging from brochures to (in two cases) systematic compendia of the requirements for implementing each standard.

The reasons for the discontinuation of these efforts are not illuminating. Like so many other aspects of the S&G Program, activity ceased when the grant ran out.

The 16 states that conducted no implementation planning gave reasons that were variations on a common theme: The program had been preoccupied with standards development. Implementation had not come to the forefront until the funding was nearly exhausted, or had never been considered at all.

#### PRIORITY-SETTING

S&G was intended to improve planning. To do so, it was thought essential that the goals for implementing standards be ordered in importance ("prioritized"). The responsibility for the ordering process was assigned to the S&G Program.

The logic was clear: Standards in themselves might specify where the criminal justice system ought to go, but

The plans subsequently lost vitality when the governor moved on to higher office.

said nothing about how to get there. Implementation strategies should be based on rational assessment of relative priorities. It was an important part of the process, and the data collection in the 27 states focused closely on it. Apart from efforts to implement specific standards, this process had the greatest potential for long-term impact, both in the SPAs and operating agencies. Our assessment sought information on:

- how the developed standards were ordered,
- who did it,
- what criteria were used, and
- what the priorities actually meant.

Of the 27 states we examined, only 15 states had performed some form of priority-setting. Four states were either in the process of setting priorities or planned to do so. Eight states had not set priorities and had no plans to indicate that it would eventually be done.

Failure to adopt priorities was usually a result of a conscious decision on the part of the S&G participants. In two states, the omission was part of a broader failure to adopt standards. In the remaining six states, the omission resulted from a conscious decision that to set priorities among the standards was unnecessary, inappropriate, or impossible. Respondents said that it had been concluded that a consensus could never be reached about what was of greater or lesser importance for the system. Other considerations were reported to be a staff's decision that each operating agency was in the best position to interpret the adopted standards; timidity; abandonment of the adopted standards by a newly appointed SPA supervisory board; and lack of time and money under the LEAA grant.

The four state programs that were in the process of setting priorities included the two states where the standards were being developed by professional associations, and two states where the process had been stalled in the development stage. These states will be discussed along with the states that had already adopted priorities.

#### The Priority Setting Process

Each state viewed the priority-setting process differently. In some cases it was the S&G staff, in others the Commission, and in still others the SPA that made the decision. In a few instances, priorities were set by more than one of these bodies. In one state, the S&G Commission

identified a number of high priority standards which were then reviewed by the SPA staff or the SPA supervisory board for final approval. In a second state, local S&G task forces made their priorities known to the SPA and a set of state-level priorities were developed out of them.

The decision about who would set priorities usually matched the understanding about who would use them. The SPA was one candidate target of the priorities, insofar as it wished to shape its funding and planning to fit the priorities. The operating agencies were another target, insofar as the standards were intended for statewide implementation. Priority-setting was viewed sometimes as a way to guide the specific functions carried out by the SPA, sometimes as a statement of goals for the system as a whole. Of the two views, it appears the former more frequently applied. In 14 of the 19 states that set or were going to set priorities, the SPA was responsible for the final order of standards.

The methods were not sophisticated. Nor is it clear that they could have been. To have devised a consistent and empirical ordering system to over 400 individual standards, covering a bewildering array of topics and issues, would have been a major achievement. Very few states even tried. Of the 19 states with a priority-setting process, only two attempted to apply empirical considerations to the task. The remainder used a variety of techniques, all based essentially on the individual preferences of the participants.

The two states that tried to base their priorities on hard data used several criteria. In one state, the standards were arranged according to the degree of impact their implementation would have on the crime rate, the cost of implementation, the number of agencies that would be affected, and the presence or absence of legal or constitutional constraints. Notably, this program made priority setting a major and separate phase of the S&G process—unlike the majority of states, where priority-setting was treated as almost an afterthought.

The second state was only planning its priority-setting process at the time of our visit. The intention was to use two criteria--cost and time--as a basis for assigning priority to different standards. Only standards that could be implemented in the immediate future at relatively low cost were to be given a high priority.

States using individual preference as the basis for assigning priorities to their adopted standards had often used elaborate methods to establish consensus among participants and nonparticipants. In two states the S&G staff had developed a "delphi"-type survey to tap the opinions of state and local officials. The results of these surveys were then compiled and presented to the SPA board for a final decision.

A more common approach was to poll the S&G Commission members or the SPA supervisory board about their personal priorities. In some instances the preferences of persons that would be most affected by the standards were tacitly accepted. In other instances, priorities were based on a simple majority vote, with standards receiving the most votes being adopted as high priority standards regardless of who cast the votes.

In the ten states where priority-setting was left to the SPA, it was common practice for the SPA to order priorities on the basis of existing policies. In five states, we were told that there had been no meaningful effort to examine the standards' intrinsic importance. The adopted standards had been fitted into existing funding and planning categories. In five other states, we were told that the priorities were never even reviewed by the SPA board, but were wholly the product of the SPA's staff. In one case, the priorities were essentially set by one individual. In all of these instances the priorities were based on the professional judgment of the staff rather than an explicit set of ordering criteria.

To put it directly, S&G's record on priority-setting was dismal. Only about half of the 27 states we visited even tried to set priorities. Of the 15 that did, only four had used (or were planning to use) a systematic process. And among the remaining 11, the process was tantamount to business-as-usual. If the question is whether the priority setting-assignment was completed as intended, the answer is obviously negative. This leaves open the issue of whether the priority-setting assignment was a realistic one. Some speculative thoughts on that topic are offered in the conclusions to the report, in Chapter 9.

## THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE STANDARDS

The final process issue we address is the question of legitimization: what steps were taken to make the finished standards into the widely accepted and respected statement

that LEAA sought? Three aspects of legitimization were investigated: (1) the formal adoption process; (2) the degree to which the standards were visibly endorsed by leading figures; and (3) the extent to which adoption and endorsements were made generally known to public and practitioners.

#### Adoption

To have maximum impact, the act of adoption should have certain characteristics. It should be public. It should be formal. And it should be relatively final. In its plans for S&G, LEAA envisioned all of these as part of the adoption process, with good reason. Lacking the force of law, the standards needed all the moral and political force that could be mustered. But as it turned out, adoption was only rarely a formal affair.

The act of adoption had been carried out in 17 of the 27 field states when the research was conducted. The adoption process was pending in four states, with every expectation that it would take place on schedule. In three states the standards had not been adopted and there was reason to believe they would never be adopted in their existing form. In two states, the likelihood of adoption was problematic. And one state had decided after some reflection to forego any formal adoption and leave the standards in "draft" form, subject to periodic revision and refinement.

The three states where the adoption step had not been taken and was not anticipated deserve further comment.

In two of them, the process appeared to have broken down altogether--once, because of the election of a new governor who arranged the disintegration of the process, and once, because disputes between representatives of the several criminal justice sectors effectively blocked formal adoption. The process fizzled out as staff and participants lost interest. An impending gubernatorial election further complicated matters, making the SPA hesitant to raise politically controversial issues.

The failure of the third state to adopt the developed standards was not caused by a breakdown in the process, but by a growing sense that the standards added nothing to what already existed. Criminal justice practitioners felt they they already met or exceeded the developed standards. The SPA already had a comprehensive set of guidelines on funding and planning based on its own standards. The final step of adoption was considered to be beside the point.

In the 17 states where the adoption of standards had been completed we identified two primary methods: adoption by the State Planning Agency Advisory Board, and adoption by the Standards and Goals Commission. Adoption by the SPA board was the most common method, by a margin of twelve to five.

When the commission was used, a second adoption by the SPA board was necessary before the standards could be integrated into the SPA's planning and funding decisions. This was successfully completed in three of the five states, although not without qualifications on the part of the SPAs. In a fourth state the SPA ratified only 12 out of over 400 standards adopted by the special commission. In the fifth state, the SPA did not adopt any of the standards as agency policy.

In all 17 cases of a formal adoption, the procedure involved an initial period of review and debate followed by a vote. A majority vote was necessary for passage, but in almost every state almost every standard passed without a dissenting vote. Disagreements, when they arose, were commonly resolved before the vote was taken--usually by revising the language of the standard or by deleting the offending clause. In a few cases, standards were passed over strong objections. But these were clear exceptions. Compromise rather than confrontation was the rule.

This is not to suggest that the road to adoption was always smooth. Both the procedures used to develop and adopt the standards and the content of the standards themselves often raised controversy. This is reflected in the number of times (instances occurred in virtually every state) that initial attempts to adopt standards were frustrated and abandoned. Topics such as the consolidation of small police departments, the abolition of plea bargaining, and the removal of status offenders from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts typically provoked controversy and prompted the deletion of the topic or drastic rewording. In several states entire blocks of standards were returned to the committees.

The conflicts generated over specific standards seldom threatened the process as a whole, and were regarded instead as a normal part of the development process. Only once, in Mississippi, did controversy over the substance of the standards result in a collapse of the standard-setting process and eventual failure to adopt the standards it developed.

In 12 states, the standards were formally adopted at a single meeting or special conference called for that purpose. In the other five states where adoption took place, adoption was carried out in a piecemeal fashion. The latter strategy was employed after an attempt to use the "event" approach failed or produced unexpected resistance.

Those states where the adoption of standards was given the greatest amount of public visibility produced a disproportionate number of major failures. Once, the failure of the adoption conference to produce a final volume of standards resulted in the resignation of the project director and a complete overhaul of the program. In other states, the conference became a forum for persons previously left out of the process. In at least six states these objections resulted in the rejection or drastic editing (some called it emasculation) of controversial standards. In each of these cases, the legitimacy of much of the previous work was seriously shaken in the minds of outsiders, the project staff, and the S&G Commission.

Once a set of standards had been adopted the content of the final document was usually fixed. Usually, but not always. In three states, all previous work was wiped out when a newly appointed advisory board decided that it did not like the standards produced and adopted by its predecessors. In several other states, the passage of standards by a formal vote was followed by extensive editing of both the style and substance of the standards by the staff. In one state, changes were made to accommodate the comments of persons asked to review the adopted standards. In other states, where adoption by the SPA Supervisory Board followed adoption by a special commission, SPA staff often reviewed standards to agree with the agency's own priorities and perceptions.

#### **Endorsements by Other Actors or Authorities**

If the standards adopted by the S&G Commission or by the SPA were to achieve legitimacy, it was necessary that they receive the general approval of practitioners affected by them. In part, this was sought in the development process, through the recruitment of prominent and influential actors. Chapter 4 described the outcomes of the programs in this regard. But when the standards had been developed,

it was also essential to make it known that the product was a good thing. We therefore looked for evidence that the standards were endorsed by leading figures on and off the S&G Commission, and inquired into the reaction of professional organizations.

The search produced negative results. With very rare exceptions, adoption by the Commission or SPA constituted the only formal endorsement the standards received. In addition, we identified a number of instances in which the adopted standards were formally rejected by prominent actors and organizations in the system.

The number of times that organizations not directly involved in the program formally endorsed the adopted standards was very small. We identified only seven states where this occurred. In one state, two of the larger cities had "accepted" the state's standards and were actively using them. In a second state, the state police chiefs' association formally endorsed a number (not all) of the standards relating to law enforcement, and the state law enforcement training academy had endorsed the training standards. In a third instance, the police chiefs' association reviewed the adopted standards and endorsed a number of them after a series of revisions were made. In the other four states, endorsements were received from individual police agencies; the states' prosecutors association; some, but not all of the state's local and regional planning agencies; and the state's League of Cities.

A few additional fragments of evidence can be cited. In the states where the standards were developed by professional associations, it probably can be assumed that the associations "endorse" at least the standards they developed. Similarly, in those states where the governor was closely associated with the S&G Program, his or her endorsement may be usually assumed. Finally, in one state, the director of the S&G Program was cited as the "change-maker" of the year by the League of Woman Voters. However, it was not clear whether this constituted an endorsement of the program he headed or his activities on behalf of the program.

On the negative side of the ledger, the adopted standards were more commonly ignored or explicitly rejected by major institutions in law enforcement and criminal justice.

Rejection of the standards frequently arose when an association or agency had formally committed itself to some other set of standards prior to the S&G Program. For example, in more than half of the states the State Bar

Association had developed or was developing its own standards. The Bar Association invariably rejected the S&G standards that were in conflict with its "own." Similarly, in states where the state courts had adopted ABA standards, and had made specific changes to implement them, the courts formally rejected or refused to endorse the standards developed under S&G. Thus, for example, the courts in one state had gone through a long legislative battle to establish the principle of merit selection of judges; then standards developed under S&G took the contrary position. Not surprisingly, the courts refused to change their stance.

The courts area in general posed the greatest problems in this regard, although American Correctional Association standards also superceded the S&G Program on occasion. Not only were several state systems committed to the ABA standards, but in other cases the status of the standards developed under S&G raised constitutional issues. Representatives of the courts asserted that it was a violation of the concept of the separation of powers to have an agency or vehicle of the executive branch develop and endorse standards for the judicial branch. This issue led to a failure or reluctance of members of the judicial branch to participate in the program, as well as to a noticeably lesser level of overt commitment on the part of the courts to the standards.

#### **SUMMARY: FOUR MODELS**

If the objective is to characterize the overall stance of any given S&G Program, four models were suggested by the data. Few of the states fit neatly into just one of the slots, but tendencies were apparent.

Eight of the 27 states could be characterized as approaching the model most consistent with LEAA's rhetoric, the public participation model. This model denotes an effort to get the public involved, draw up fresh, tailor-made standards, and publicize them. Structurally, the public participation model consists of an independent S&G Commission especially created for S&G, inclusion of non-LE/CJ persons, multiple committees and task forces, lots of public hearings, emphasis on legislative initiatives to implement standards, and as much publicity as possible. States that fit (sometimes precariously) into this category were Maine, Kansas, Minnesota, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Idaho (with considerable overlap into the political model), and Florida and Delaware (with considerable overlap into the bureaucratic model).

Three states -- Georgia, California, and Colorado -- can be classified as most representative of the political model. The political model, perhaps more properly seen as a subtype of the public participation approach, occurred when a powerful official or group decided to become S&G's patron. The key structural features distinguishing it from the public participation model tended to be closer outside control over (or guidance of) the activities of the program, and some quite specific political points that the patron intended to make-whether in the form of an active legislative program (Georgia) or in the form of "law and order" credentials (as was said by Reagan's political opponents to have been the case in California). Note that all three of the states categorized as "political" had a second phase, when the political activity died and the program reverted to a bureaucratic or compliance mode--or, in California's case, became moribund.

Ten states—the largest group—are examples of what may be called the bureaucratic model. The bureaucratic model represents states that saw the S&G Program as a primarily technical task, with implications for LE/CJ professionals in general and the SPA in particular. The SPA Director had chief responsibility; the staff was typically integrated into that of the SPA, the Commissioners usually were members of the SPA supervisory board, and SPA funding decisions were the ostensible purpose. Little publicity attended the process. We classified Utah, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin, Washington, Mississippi, Michigan, Illinois (with a very strong professional orientation) and Iowa (with some peculiarities in the early stages) in this category.

The fourth model is labelled strict compliance. In its pure form, this model denotes the process of going through the motions. It shares the structural characteristics of the bureaucratic model, with these variations: few if any new hires for the S&G staff (use existing SPA staff), few if any commission members from outside the SPA board, pro forma adoption of the standards (if any), and few attempts at publicity. We put North Carolina, Nebraska, Indiana, and North Dakota in this category, along with Ohio and Oregon during their latter phases. But it should be noted that we could have added several of the "bureaucratic" states to this category with very slight adjustments in the criteria we employed.

# 7. Intermediate Outcomes: The Adopted Standards

The only tangible product of the S&G Program in any given state was to be the actual written compendium of standards. In this chapter we describe how the standards looked, for the 4l states that had completed and published their volumes as of March, 1978. First, we deal with a "report card" on the degree to which the work got done. Then, we turn to the more interesting topic: Given a free hand to go their own ways, what would the states put on paper as their preferences? How would they differ—among them—selves, and with the NAC's national standards?

#### STATUS OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT

The characteristics of the S&G product are given for each state in Table 7.1 on the following page. They may be summarized as follows.

## Stage of Completion

As of March, 1978, 49 states had engaged in an S&G process (Vermont was the lone exception). We obtained volumes of standards from 41 of them. Of the remaining 8, 4 were still in uncirculated draft (those of Hawaii, New York, Rhode Island and Wyoming), two (Illinois' and Kentucky's) were completed too late for inclusion, and two (West Virginia's and Massachusetts') were said to be complete, but we were unsuccessful in obtaining a copy.

TABLE 7.1. Profile of the Standards and Goals Volumes, by State

				SE	CTOR BY	S COV	/EREC	) F	ORM	IATC			E	
								1			iority rankings imparative analysis of S/Gs	satus a	l	
	me	SPA?	date	Ĕ			crime	به	9	g.	ngs nalvsi	ation s1 practic		
	of volu	d by S	tion di ne	огсел	ğ		>.	justic	ntary	31.10	rankıngs ətive ana	menta state ;	ē	
STATE	Status of volume	Adopted by	Publication of volume	Law enfor	Courts	Systems	Communit prevention	Juvenile justice	Commentary	strategies	Compara	to imple Current	describt	COMMENTS
ALÁBAMA ALÁSKA	Final Final	Yes Yes	2/76 6/76			1 -		:		•			T	
ARIZONA ARKANSAS	Final Final	Yes Yes	2/77 6/76	•		1				•	-			ABA S/Gs were adopted, no separate volume published
CALIFORNIA	Draft	No	12/74	•	•   •		•	•						
COLOBADO CONNECTICUT	Final Final	Yes Yes	6/77 5/76				•	•			•	Ì	ŀ	The state of the s
DELAWARI FLORIDA	Oraft Final <b>2</b>	Yes Yes3	12/76 7/76				•		- 1					2. Insurable matters \$10% we live to the same \$100 keV.
GEORGIA	Final	Yes	3/76	•			.	•	•	٦,	<b>~</b>   '			2. Juvenile justice S/Gs are in draft form. 3.3 Adopted as an advisory document to the Governor
Hawan * IDAHO	S/Gs are Final	being revi No	sed -no do 6/75	•   •	)   <b>•</b>		•	•	•	İ	- 1	•   •		
Illinois •	Final Final	No4 Yes	4/77 <sup>6</sup> 5/78		•   •		$  \bullet  $	•	•		-   1	•		4 SPA will use as a working document no formal adoption 5 Hepresents only the S/Gs for the nonmetropolition areas, two additional S/G programs, but no volumes were published at time of this report.
INDIANA IOWA	Final Final	Yes Yes	1/77 5/77		:   :		•	l		•		•	1	· · ·
KANSAS	Emal	Yes	9/75				•	•	- 1	•			'	
Kentucky* ŁOUISIANA	S/Gs inc Final	uded in t Yes	ile 1978 Pi 10/75	in; dòc	ament •   •		CHIVIXI		e of r ●	eport	'	١.		
MAINE MARYLAND	Fin.Draft NA 7	No Yes	12/77 1976	•   •	•   •	·	•		•					6 Final volume will be published in July 1978
Massachusetts*	Draft	Yes	1976	s/G	. 1 ~	1	receive	ed by t	nne a	of this	Writ	- J		7 S/Gs included in the 1977 State Plan and Court Standards adopted 10/76
MICHIGAN MINNESOTA	Final Final	Yes Yes	4/75 10/75							•	1.		1	
MISSISSIPPI MISSOURI	NA <b>8</b> Final	No Yes	NA 2/76				•			l l	•			8 S/Gs included in the 1976 Comprehensive State Plan
MONTANA	Final	Yes	7/76	- 7   1			•	- 1	•	•	- 1	.   1	1	the state of the s
NEBRASKA NEVADA	Hinal ; Draft	Yes Accept	NA9 2/77	- 1							• ,		: [ :	9. S/Gs from NAC were approved one by one; volume of collected standards will not be published
NEW HAMPSHIRE NEW JERSEY	Fin.Draft Final	Yes Yes11	9/76 <sup>10</sup> 6/77			1 -	•				•	12		0 Courts volume published 1/77
NEW MEXICO	Final	Yes	1/77	•	•						-   '		Ί,	12 S/Gs adopted by Governor, never formally adopted by SPA
New York* NORTH CAROLINA	S/G prog Final	am starte Yes	d as of 4/7	7, no de ● [ (			tished 	us of 9	9/78.		•			
NORTH DAKOTA OHIO	Final Final	Endorsed Yes	12/75 1/77			•	•			•			1	
OKI AHOMA	Final	Yes	4/77	•	•   •	•	•	•			•			and the second of the second o
OREGON PENNSYLVÄNIA	Draft <sup>13</sup> Final	Yes Yes	1975 3/76		_   -		•		•	•   '	- 1		<u>'</u>	3 Volume will always be in draft form to permit flexibility and revision
Rhode Island* SOUTH CAHOLINA	S/Gs are Final	still in dra Yes	ft form n	ubotu • I •	neńtp	roduce	d yet   1			- [ ,	•		1	
SOUTH DAKOTA	Final	Yes	12/76			ě	•			•	İ	1.		A STATE OF THE STA
TUNNESSEL TEXAS	Final <sup>Fa</sup>	Nο	1976 7/76		•	•	•	ě	•		•	•	'	14 S/Gs revised in 1977
UTAH Vermont*	Final No S/G p	Yes rogram	8/74	•	•	•	•		•	•	- [ •	•	<u>'</u>	
VIBGINIA	Final	Endorsed	15 3/77	•	•		•		•	_   ,	•   •	•		15. Not all standards were adopted
West Andwer.	Oraft S/Os are		NA <sup>16</sup> 6 Compret					ent not		●   ved b	y tim	e of t	l hiş v	
Wist orisin Wyomiot	Final S/Gs are	Yes till in dra	1/77 t forme no	•   • docum				•17	•		•			17. Juvenile Justice S/Gs were published 12/75 as a separate volume.
• States not include t in							,			-1				

<sup>\*</sup> States not included in concordance study.

The status of the most recent version was as follows:

Final version completed as a separate volume Final version incorporated within the comprehensive	35
state plan	4
Draft completed as a separate	
volume	6
Incomplete draft	4
No known S&G Program	_1_
TOTAL	50

#### Sectors Covered

Six sectors were commonly used to break the LE/CJ domain into components: law enforcement, courts, corrections systems, community crime prevention, and juvenile justice. Of the 41 states in the analysis, the number of states addressing each of these was as follows:

Law enforcement	41	(100%)
Courts	41	(100%)
Corrections	40	( 98%)
Juvenile justice	33	(80%)
Community crime		
prevention	32	( 78%)
Systems	31	( 76%)

#### Format of the Volumes

The S&G volumes were organized in widely varying formats, with widely varying levels of detail and complexity. Besides the actual text of the standards they might include any or all of the following:

Commentary: A discussion of the rationale for the standards, caveats, or other background material.

Implementation strategies: how the state proposed that the ideals expressed in the standards were to be translated into reality.

Priority rankings: statement of which standards should be implemented first.

Comparative analysis of comparisons of the standard with the status of practice, or with comparable standards developed by the ABA, ACA, etc.

General description of current state practice, without specific reference to the standards.

The use of these supplementary materials lagged substantially behind the production of the standards themselves. The breakdown among the 41 states was:

General description of		
practice	23	(56%)
Commentary	22	(54%)
Comparative analysis	17	(41%)
Priority rankings	15	(37%)
Implementation strate-		
gies	14	(34%)

## Summary

As discussed at length in Chapter 3, the process envisioned by LEAA should have produced standards with three key characteristics.

First, they were to be comprehensive. The standards were to set the course for the system as a whole. For our purposes, we shall define comprehensive as including standards on at least law enforcement, courts, and corrections.

Second, they were to include priorities. One of LEAA's chief motivations for the S&G Program was its perception that LE/CJ planning was devoid of a sense of what should come first in the allocation of scarce resources.

Third, they were to include explicit strategies for implementation. LEAA did not expect full implementation to occur within the life of the program, but at least the route to implementation was to be developed.

How consistently did the states' S&G products meet these basic specifications? Not consistently at all. The breakdown as of the end of 1977 was:

Four states met all three criteria.

Ten states had published comprehensive standards and implementation strategies, but no priorities.

Eleven states had published comprehensive standards and priorities, but without an implementation strategy.

Sixteen states had published comprehensive standards, without either priorities or an implementation strategy.

Eight states had not published comprehensive standards, nor anything else.

One state did not undertake an S&G Program.

Or to put it another way, only four states out of 50 had produced documents that met the basic expectations of LEAA as described in its guidelines at the outset of the program. We hasten to add, however, that only modest emphasis should be put on that outcome. The four states in question--Florida, Indiana, Mississippi and South Carolina--were not otherwise noteworthy. Many other states did more real work on implementation, or specified priorities informally. Failures of the program as a whole should not be ascribed to mechanical breakdowns in producing certain elements. It is simply noted that the product LEAA ordered when it started the S&G Program was seldom the product it got.

### COMPARING THE STATES' STANDARDS

The Basis of Comparison: The Key Elements

In all, the 41 volumes that we are about to compare filled more than 19,000 pages, usually of closely typed text. A wholesale comparison of all the standards in all the states was out of the question--both as a practical matter of data preparation and for communicating the results to an audience with limited time and patience. We will therefore focus on a subset of standards that are most illuminating of where the states went--or refused to go--in their formulation of standards and goals. The components of this subset are called "key elements." The procedure for selecting them is described in Chapter 2 (pp. 12-13). Briefly, a key element is a topic (e.g. "approval of arrest warrants" or "use of pretrial conferences") that lent itself to a standard with specific, identifiable action implications. By using key elements, we winnowed out the mass of material that addressed self-evident or inarguable principles (e.g., "police should develop good relations with minorities") and

sweeping, vague instructions (e.g., "every police agency should insure its operational effectiveness in dealing with other elements in the criminal justice system").

In all, 136 key elements were identified and analyzed for each of the 41 eligible states. The complete state-by-state breakdown of the results forms a companion volume to the evaluation (B. Bourque and R. Hill. Concordance of Criminal Justice Standards Adopted by the States and the National Advisory Commission. Washington, D. C.: AIR, 1978). Here, we summarize the patterns that emerged.

## Congruence with the NAC Standards

How different in fact were the states' standards from NAC's? To what extent did the states copy NAC's version and thereby get the S&G process out of the way? To what extent did the states adopt the sense of NAC's standards, even though the wording and some of the specifics might have been altered?

Some states openly cribbed from NAC. These were primarily the "strict compliance" states discussed in Chapter 6. In some cases, the commissions even passed language straight from the NAC version that gave away the game (e.g., "The states should..."). More often, the language was at least made appropriate to the state. More often yet, the commission appeared to have been acting as the S&G Program planners had intended, using NAC as a guideline and applying modifications as the commissions saw fit. It is this type of congruence—adoption of the \*sense\* of the NAC standards—that we attempted to capture. A "sense of the standard" was defined for the NAC version of each key element topic, and the state S&G's were classified as falling within or not within that sense. When no standard existed on the topic, it was classified as "not within" the sense rather than as missing data.\*

Generally, the definition embraced minor variations in the time specified for implementation, definitions of relevant size (e.g., substituting "30-35 hours" for "40 hours" of annual inservice training), or other minor variations in

<sup>\*</sup>Because, as noted elsewhere, virtually all states had used NAC as a template. If a standard was not included, it was seldom because the state had failed to consider it, but because it had been rejected.

specification. The line was held, however, at discrepancies with what we interpreted (from NAC's wording and associated commentary) as the core concept of the element in question. For example: NAC urged that the maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders be set at five years. The "sense" was interpreted to consist of two characteristics: relatively short terms for such offenders, and the notion of a clearcut, no-exceptions cap on the permitted length. Thus states which set a general maximum of "5 to 10 years" were excluded for falling outside the first characteristic (a ten-year sentence is not short). States that set a general maximum of five years but permitted increases or decreases based on the offender's adjustment fell outside the second characteristic. It did not close the cap.

The codings used for each of the 136 key elements are shown in Appendix B, and the reader is invited to examine the judgments employed. This description has been intended to convey the sense of the "sense" variable.

The key elements were broken into five sectors: law enforcement, prosecution, defense services, courts, and corrections. For the key elements in each sector, we asked what percentage matched the sense of the NAC standard.

The overall results showed the impressive leverage of NAC: averaging cross sectors, 45.0 percent of the key elements matched the sense of the corresponding NAC standard.

The breakdown by sector was:

Law enforcement	49 p	percent
Prosecution	55 g	percent
Defense services	41 F	percent
Courts	40 g	percent
Corrections	40 F	percent

The variation among states was large. Idaho (87 percent), Nevada (82 percent), and Ohio (79 percent) were at the top of the list, with S&G's that shared the great bulk of NAC's sentiments. Alaska and South Carolina, with only five percent, were by far the lowest states in the ranking. In large part, however, this occurred because they failed to write standards on many of the key elements, not because they contradicted NAC. The state-by-state figures are shown in Table 7.2.

The states were internally consistent. A state that adopted the sense of NAC's standards in, say, law enforcement, also usually adopted the NAC position in prosecution

TABLE 7.2 Degree of Congruence with NAC, by State and LE/CJ Sector

	Perc t	entage of he Sense o	Key Element	ents Match Position	ing	"Cong	ruence lex"
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Law En- forcement	Prosecu-	Public Defense	Courts	Correc- tions	Mean %	Rank
Idaho	81	100	93	81	82	87	1
Nevada	90	82	100	57	82 `	82	2
New Mexico	88	100	93	48	68	79	3
North Dakota	90	91	73	43	70	74	4
Florida	76	91	73	57	68	73	5
Alabama	86	64	80	62	66	71	6
Mississippi	45	82	80	67	77	70	7
lowa .	74	73	67	52	75	68	8
Kansas	60	91	73	52	57	67	9
Utah	71	82	67	52	59	66	10
South Dakota	64	64	87	67	43	65	11
Louisiana	64	91	33	62	52	61	12
Delaware	38	64	73	71	55	60	13
Michigan	48	45	67	76	61	59	14
Indiana	88	54	40	52	NA	59	15
California	88	45	40	57	61	58	16
Texas	79	91	27	52	18	53	17
Maryland	38	73	40	57	43	50	18
North Carolina	50	64	40	48	39	48	19
Arkansas	26	55	53	43	41	44	20
Tennessee	62	55	40	. 24	36	43	21
Nebraska	33	55	67	48	14	43	22
Oregon	19	82	13	48	34	39	23
Oklahoma	60	45	33	24	32	39	24
Montana	21	55	33	57	25	38	25
New Jersey	36	55	33	24	39	37	26
Maine	36	64	7	43	30	36	27
Virginia	48	18	13	19	52	30	28
West Virginia	26	45	13	19	45	30	29
Pennsylvania	62	18	33	10	25	30	30
Connecticut	33	55	20	10	14	26	31
Georgia	29	27	27	33	9	25	32
Minnesota	17	45	7	19	30	23	33
New Hampshire	19	36	13	33	9	22	34
Washington	36	36	7	10	11	20	35
Ohio	10	27	13	29	7	17	36
Colorado	26	27	0	0	14	13	37
Missouri	10	9	27	14	7	13	38
South Carolina	10	Ö	0	5	9	5	39
Alaska	2	0	ő	5	16	5	40

NOTE: Arizona adopted ABA standards for prosecution, defense, and courts topics, and are omitted from the index.

or courts or corrections. The lowest inter-sector correlation was .51 (between law enforcement and courts), and the

average inter-sector correlation was .65.\* The overall "Congruence Index" (the summed sector scores), had a very

TABLE 7.3
NAC "Sense of the Standard" Accepted by at Least Two-Thirds of the Commissions

	Commissions Accepting	Percentage
LAW ENFORCEMENT (states = 41, key elements - 42)		
Establish minimum training requirements for sworn officers	35	(85%)
Develop joint task forces/encourage exchange programs with other agencies	34	(83%)
Ensure access to a crime laboratory	33	(80%)
Utilize citations and/or summons in lieu of arrest	31	(76%)
Ensure access to a criminal justice training center	30	(73%)
Provide at least 30-40 hours of annual in-service training	28	(68%)
Establish multiple grades within the patrol rank	28	(68%)
PROSECUTION (states = 40, key elements = 11)		
Use diversion when benefits outweigh risk to society	30	(75%)
Develop guidelines governing diversion decisions	29	(73%)
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES (states = 40, key elements = 16)		`
Provide for state financing of public defender services	27	(68%)
COURTS (states = 40, key elements = 21)		
Provide comprehensive programs of continuing judicial education for judges	33	(83%)
CORRECTIONS (states = 40, key elements = 46)		
Provide residential or other partial release alternatives	32	(80%)
Provide work-release programs for institutions	31	(78%)
Maximize release on own recognizance	30	(75%)
Provide vocational education programs within each institution	29	(73%)
Develop a wide variety of community-based correctional progra	ms 28	(70%)

<sup>\*</sup>Mean correlation was obtained via the r to z transformation. The correlations were of sector scores with state. A sector score was the percentage of the key elements for that sector which were rated as sharing the sense of the NAC standard.

high reliability for a five-item index: .899, using Cronbach's coefficient alpha.\*

But if the states borrowed widely from NAC, they did not borrow the same items. Only a few, scattered key elements showed widespread agreement with NAC's position. The most popular elements are shown in Table 7.3 above, using adoption by two-thirds or more of the states as the cutoff point of "popular."

As the table indicates, broad agreement occurred infrequently. Only 16 of the 136 key elements reached a two-thirds majority in even modified support of the NAC position. When the issue involved concrete action implications—the criterion for being a key element—the commissions seldom revealed a consensus across the states.

Did the broadly acceptable key elements have anything in common? Not insofar as we could determine. There were a few mild surprises. Given the overall results, it is hard to explain the high ranking of the elements advocating joint task forces among law enforcement agencies or state financing of public defender services (the tendency to protect local options usually inhibited passage of standards such as those). Taken together, the only common thread we find is innocuousness.

The unpopular standards—ones accepted by only a third or fewer of the commissions—were more plentiful. Of the 136, 37 (27 percent) fell into this category, as shown in Table 7.4.

Again, we found no obvious connection among the "rejected" NAC positions. There is generally conservative cast to them--many involved issues with a strong link to long-standing practices within the LE/CJ profession--but by and large they are heterogeneous.

#### The Nature of the Stance Taken Toward LE/CJ Issues

The relationship of the states' choices to NAC's raises the broader issue of the stance they represent toward law enforcement and criminal justice. Did the states endorse a

<sup>\*</sup>The coefficient represents the average correlation between split-half subsets of the sector scores. See L. J. Cronbach, "Coefficient Alpha & the Internal Structure of Tests," Psychometrika 16 (1951), pp. 297-334.

TABLE 7.4
NAC "Sense of the Standard" Rejected by at Least Two-Thirds of the Commissions

		Cammissions Accepting	Percentage
	NFORCEMENT 41, key elements = 42)		
	Establish criminal justice coordinating councils in jurisdictions >30,000	1	(2%)
	Require a B.A. for entry-level police officers	5	(12%)
	Consolidate police agencies with fewer than 10 employees	. 7	(17%)
	Assign a full-time officer to each secondary school for	_	
	counseling and teaching	8	(20%)
	Adopt geographic policing wherever feasible	12	(29%)
	Employ a full-time planner in large police agencies	12	(29%)
	Allow collective bargaining	12	(29%)
	Consider collection of misdemeanor incidents by telephone	12	(29%)
	Provide physical fitness facilities for officers	13	(32%)
	Maintain full-time vice investigation capability for agencies with more than 75 personnel	13	(32%)
	CUTION 40, key elements = 11)		
	None were accepted by fewer than one-third of the commissions		
	DEFENSE SERVICES 40, key elements = 16)		
	Limit felony caseloads to 150 per year	7	(18%)
	Develop plans for defense services during a mass disorder	8	(20%)
	Locate offices where most of the clients live	10	(25%)
	Select public defenders through a state-based merit system	11	(28%)
	40, key elements = 21)	0	(0%)
		0	(0%)
	40, key elements = 21) Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest	4	(10%)
	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices  Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest  Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence	4 s 5	(10%) (13%)
	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices  Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest  Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence  Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge	4 s 5 7	(10%) (13%) (18%)
	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices  Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest  Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence  Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge  Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court)	4 5 7 8	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%)
COURT (states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices  Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest  Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence  Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge	4 7 8 12	(10%) (13%) (18%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)	4 s 5 7 8 12 s 13	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time)	4 s 5 7 8 12 s 13	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years	4 4 7 8 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 5	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate	4 4 7 8 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 5 5 5	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46) Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders	4 4 7 8 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 5 6	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible	4 4 5 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 6 7	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder	4 4 5 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 6 7 8	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%) (20%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder Discontinue use of reception/diagnostic centers for inmate classification	4 4 5 5 7 8 12 5 13 5 5 6 7	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46) Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder Discontinue use of reception/diagnostic centers for inmate classification Limit court jurisdiction over juveniles to charges involving non-status offenses	4 ss 5 7 8 12 ss 13 5 5 6 7 8 8 8 8	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%) (20%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46) Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder Discontinue use of reception/diagnostic centers for inmate classification Limit court jurisdiction over juveniles to charges involving non-status offenses Use sentencing councils in courts with more than one judge	4 ss 5 7 8 12 ss 13 5 5 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 9	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%) (20%) (20%)
states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence. Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46) Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder Discontinue use of reception/diagnostic centers for inmate classification Limit court jurisdiction over juveniles to charges involving non-status offenses Use sentencing councils in courts with more than one judge Prohibit expansion of juvenile institutional capacity	4 ss 5 7 8 12 ss 13 5 5 5 6 7 8 8 8 9 10	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (18%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (20%)
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states =	40, key elements = 21)  Eliminate plea negotiation practices Bring defendants before a judicial officer within 12 hours of arrest Use juries of less than 12 persons in cases not punishable by life sentence Allow questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge Establish a family court (incorporating former juvenile court) Separate dispositional and adjudicatory hearings in juvenile cases Eliminate requirement for grand jury indictment in criminal prosecution  CTIONS 40, key elements = 46)  Close facilities without individual cells (within a reasonable time) Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at 5 years Compensate inmates at the prevailing market rate Authorize continuing court jurisdiction of sentenced offenders Convert institutions to coeducational facilities where feasible Set maximum sentence at 25 years for felonies other than murder Discontinue use of reception/diagnostic centers for inmate classification Limit court jurisdiction over juveniles to charges involving non-status offenses Use sentencing councils in courts with more than one judge Prohibit expansion of juvenile institutional capacity Provide counsel for inmates during major disciplinary hearings Authorize courts to specify a minimum sentence before becoming eligible for parole	4	(10%) (13%) (18%) (20%) (30%) (33%)  (13%) (13%) (13%) (15%) (20%) (20%) (20%) (25%) (28%)

get-tough, law and order approach? Did they emphasize protection of civil liberties? Did the standards reflect the latest trends in LE/CJ practice, or did they stick with familiar, traditional approaches?

Categorization of the Alternatives. All of these and many more questions about "stance" would be asked of the standards. At the same time, they pose substantial problems of aggregation: what is the scale for comparing (say), a standard on preparation of police budgets with one on sentencing practices? We employed the following procedure.

As a review of the key elements in Appendix B will demonstrate, the alternatives under almost all of the key elements lend themselves to a clustering in three ordered classes. At one extreme is (1) the NAC stance--none of the states outdid NAC in anchoring one end of the continuum.\*

Note that we do not use NAC as one end of the continuum because we use NAC as a model, but because it so happens that NAC represented one end of the continuum we seek to analyze. A listing of the common themes among the key elements should give the flavor of the continuum in question.

Law Enforcement. Make the system systematic; put more formal boundaries on the officer's discretion. Increase activities in nontraditional roles (e.g., crime prevention, schools). Constrain use of physical custody and other traditional enforcement behaviors. De-emphasize strict vertical hierarchies and status distinctions within the police force, but increase horizontal specialization of functions. Make the selection and training requirements more stringent.

Prosecution/Defense/Courts. Make the system more systematic. Specify guidelines, lessen discretion. Increase consolidation and centralization of financing and control at the state level. Streamline procedures. Protect rights of the accused. Use merit selection; make training requirements more stringent.

<sup>\*</sup>A code of "1" on the "stance" variable was equivalent to a code of "yes" on the "sense of the standard" variable discussed above.

Corrections. Minimize use of incarceration, increase the alternatives (the dominant theme). Maximize use of vocational and educational rehabilitation programs. Protect and/or restore defendant rights. Reduce sentences, and increase their consistency and definition. Consolidate functions (e.g., jails) under state control. Make selection and training requirements more stringent.

An examination of these themes reveals an internal consistency of stance. For want of a better term, we will label the NAC extreme the "progressive alternative," but keep quotation marks around the label to remind the reader that no affective meaning need be associated with it.

In the middle were a variety of stances that tended toward the NAC position without sharing its sense--(2) watered-down versions of the NAC stance, in other words. Sometimes they endorsed the principle but omitted the specifics that would put the principle into practice. Sometimes they qualified the principle itself. The label for this alternative will be the "compromise alternative."

The third category denotes (3) either an explicit contradiction of the NAC stance (e.g., advocacy of election of public defenders rather than merit selection) or no standard at all. The label will be "traditional," again without intending that the word imply approval or criticism.

We categorized each state's response to each key element as falling in one of these three categories, as shown in Appendix B.

Explaining the Variance. There is relatively little explainable variance—that is perhaps the most striking feature of the states' stances. As we noted in discussing simple congruence with the NAC formulation, NAC was used widely, but not consistently across states—very few (16) of the 136 key elements reached acceptance by even two-thirds of the states. For all but a few of the key elements, we begin with the reality that most states rejected the NAC formulation. Too few exceptions are available to get much leverage on an explanation of the variance that did exist. (In most cases, the variation is thus between "many states rejected" to "almost all states rejected.")

We do propose three inhibiting factors that were expressed by many respondents.

First, a commission might reject NAC's approach or water it down because of scientific uncertainty about whether it was objectively a good idea. What are the real impacts of diversion? Team policing? Abolition of plea bargaining? Work release programs? For many of the key elements, the "progressive alternative" is based on hopes and hypotheses as much as on evidence.

Second, a commission might reject NAC's approach because of high dollar costs of implementation. Even when impact is known, it may be that the tradeoffs in budget resources make the "progressive alternative" unattractive.

Third, a commission might reject the "progressive alternative" because of subjective controversies of values that are beyond scientific resolution. LE/CJ abounds in them. Examples are the validity of punishment as a purpose of corrections, the importance that should be attached to local control of LE/CJ functions, the proper role of popular selection versus merit appointment in selecting LE/CJ officials, and, pervasively, the rights of the accused versus the rights of the community. The Constitution and associated Supreme Court rulings have resolved only limited corners of these issues. The rest remain very much matters of value predictions, not objective right or wrong.

We assigned the "progressive alternative" for each of the key elements a simple rating on each of these three dimensions, as follows:

#### Scientific uncertainty

- 1. Little scientific controversy about effectiveness.\*
- 2. Some scientific controversy about the effectiveness.
- 3. High level of scientific controversy about effectiveness.

<sup>\*&</sup>quot;Effectiveness" was defined in terms of crime reduction, lowered recidivism, efficiency, and other outcomes that are universally accepted as positive impact per se. Note also that a key element could be coded "l" on this dimension if effectiveness were self-evident (e.g., as in taking time-of-day into account when scheduling patrol resources).

#### Cost implications

- 1. Implementation entails no cost or trivial costs.
- Implementation entails moderate costs.
- Implementation entails major costs.

#### Value valence\*

- 1. No significant issues of values are involved.
- 2 . Significant issues of values are involved.

Codings of the three dimensions for each key element are given in Appendix B; the reader is invited to compare judgments. The "science" and "value" weights were positively correlated (+.58) with each other but not with "cost" (-.17 with science, -.23 with value).

The first finding of note is the degree to which the "progressive alternative" could reasonably have been rejected because it was too uncertain in its effects, too costly to implement, or too subjective in desirability. Tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7 show the breakdowns by sector. Overall, it could be argued that about half (45 percent) of the "progressive alternatives" taken by NAC had a major degree of controversy associated with their objective effects (or lack of them); about half (51 percent) had major dollar costs associated with them, and about a third (37 percent) involved a choice among values on which reasonable people might disagree. More discouraging yet to the prospective standards-setter, more than a third (36 percent) of the "progressive alternatives" faced more than one of these obstacles. Overall the ratings for the 133 scored key elements were:

Major rating	on all three inhibiting		
factors	_	18	(14%)
	on two of the three		
inhibiting		31	(24%)
	on one of the three	- 7	(430)
inhibiting	on none of the three	5 /	(43%)
inhibiting		26	(20%)
***************************************	1406013		(200)
	TOTAL	132	

Only two categories. The ratings fell naturally into a binary yes/no scheme.

TABLE 7.5
Ratings of the "Progressive Alternatives" on Scientific Uncertainty

Sector	Sc	Number		
	Low	Moderate	High	Rated
LAW ENFORCEMENT	27%	51%	22%	41
PROSECUTION/DEFENSE	12%	46%	42%	26
COURTS	24%	29%	48%	21
CORRECTIONS	5%	30%	66%	44
OVERALL	16%	39%	45%	
Number rated	21	52	59	132

TABLE 7.6
Ratings of the "Progressive Alternatives" on Cost Implications

Sector	( Minor	Cost Implication Moderate	ns Major	Number Rated
LAW ENFORCEMENT	29%	19%	52%	42
PROSECUTION/DEFENSE	38%	8%	54%	26
COURTS	38%	14%	48%	21
CORRECTIONS	51%	2%	47%	45
OVERALL	40%	10%	51%	
Number rated	53	14	67	134

TABLE 7.7
Ratings of the "Progressive Alternatives" on Value-Loading

Sector	Value•	Number	
	Low	High	Rated
LAW ENFORCEMENT	83%	17%	42
PROSECUTION/DEFENSE	81%	19%	26
COURTS	71%	29%	21
CORRECTIONS	31%	69%	45
OVERALL	63%	37%	
Number rated	85	49	134

Our point is a simple one: very few of the "progressive alternatives" were necessarily attractive to right-thinking people, regardless of their expertise in LE/CJ or their desire to improve the system. To read a state's response to the NAC stance as an indication of the state's energy or commitment to a better LE/CJ system is a fundamental misinterpretation of the situation. Repeatedly, the people associated with the S&G process and observers of it pointed to the irrationality and-or at least questionable wisdom-of adopting a standard on a topic, given the variations in need, in appropriateness, and in predilections among the jurisdictions that would have to live with it.

In one sense, these observations are consistent with LEAA's motives for starting the S&G Program in the first place. National standards imposed ex cathedra were seen as both unrealistic (substantively) and unfeasible (politically). But in another sense, these barriers to adoption at the state level call into question the very role of "standards" in LE/CJ, and the feasibility of making them work at even the state level. In the following section we turn to one set of implied questions—were the standards implemented in fact. In the final section, we take up some of the more interpretive implications.

### 8. The Impact of the Standards and Goals Program

This chapter takes up the question of program impact. We distinguish program impact from the other measures of success that were discussed in earlier chapters. At this point, the question is not whether a volume of standards was published. We examine instead the extent to which that volume of standards, and the process that produced it, made any difference in the way that the LE/CJ system functions.

Impact was expected to occur in two ways: through the integration of the standards into the existing comprehensive planning process carried out by the SPA, and through the acceptance and application of the standards by individual criminal justice agencies and other decision-makers.

The first route to change was a recognized part of the program design from the outset, both in Washington and in the states we visited. The mandate to integrate the developed standards into the states comprehensive plan by 1976 was explicit and unambiguous. Indeed, as we have indicated elsewhere, in certain states this mandate was regarded as the only purpose of the program.

Most states did not take such a narrow view of the S&G Program, nor did S&G's advocates at LEAA. Except in the "strict compliance" states, the standards were intended to represent an affirmative statement of what criminal justice practice should be, with or without the Federal carrot as a motivation. Several states went to some lengths to avoid identification of S&G as a Federal program, emphasizing instead the need for the state to have some formal standards against which to measure their practices. few states implementation was as important as developing the standards themselves. Particularly in states with a strong citizen-based program, implementation efforts went hand-inhand with the development process, in some instances overshadowing the developmental aspects of the program.

To assess impact on the LE/CJ system we divide the discussion into the following topics:

- Actual implementation of the standards
- Integration of the standards into the SPA comprehensive planning process
- Long-term plans or prospects for the institutionalization of the S&G Program or the continuing implementation of standards.

Under the first topic we examine changes that actually occurred in LE/CJ practice through administrative and legislative processes, assistance provided to individual agencies, and other forms of direct action carried out under the S&G Program.

Under the second topic we examine how the standards adopted under S&G are used in the comprehensive planning process, how they are used in decisions regarding the funding of specific programs, and the requirements that the SPAs have placed on grant applicants with regard to compliance with standards.

Under the third topic we examine plans for the establishment of permanent agencies or entities responsible for implementing the standards developed under the S&G Program, and the long-term prospects for future impact by the program.

#### **IMPLEMENTATION**

Of the three topics, the first is the closest to the heart of the program's aspirations. Recall the rhetoric quoted in the Introduction: the S&G Program was a "commitment to the institutionalization of the process of setting standards and goals as a major tool in planning, budgeting, and evaluating the effectiveness of crime fighting efforts." It was hypothesized that, through a successful S&G Program, "crime rates can be significantly reduced, and the existing inequities of the criminal justice system can be eliminated or diminished." (National Program Strategy: iv). After discounting the hyperbole, the sense of those objectives was appropriate. If it were to be worthwhile to spend 16 million dollars on a project, LEAA was arguably right to hope for some eventual impact on the bottom line measures of LE/CJ impact. It might have been overly optimistic to expect direct evidence of reduced crime and more equitable administration of justice because of S&G, but not to expect evidence of concrete changes in practice.

Further, it was reasonable to expect some portion of this type of impact to emerge soon, if it were to happen at all. The impetus and the resources for implementing standards were highest during and immediately following the life of the S&G Program.

Because of these considerations, a major portion of the evaluation's resources was given over to an examination of how much change had occurred because of S&G by the end of 1977. This chapter details the results.

The procedure was to assemble an inventory of any LE/CJ change that might reflect impact of S&G, then to winnow out the false-positives. In each of the 27 states visited during the evaluation, each respondent in an LE/CJ position was asked to name any agency change in practice or policy, however minor, related in any way, however tenuous, to the Standards & Goals Program. S&G staff and commissioners were asked to name any implementation efforts with which they were familiar, and to refer us to any persons who might give us more information. Members and staff of state legislature were asked to name any bill (proposed, under consideration, or passed) that was related to S&G. In all, this effort resulted in a roster of 112 specific changes said to have been associated with the S&G effort.

#### The Sample of Changes

The sample is believed to be comprehensive for all state-level changes directly inspired by S&G. Presumably some direct local-level changes were missed, because of the limited scope of data collection at the local level. Presumably some indirectly related state-level changes were missed, because the link had gone unnoticed or because the agency was reluctant to give S&G credit for a change it preferred to see as its own initiative. But in neither case does it appear that the number was large.

For local changes, it might appear that the chances were great that large numbers of significant changes could have been missed. After all, the evaluation visited only a tiny number of local agencies. But two factors discussed elsewhere at more length cast doubt on this supposition. First, the local implementation efforts of the states were rare and feeble. Few states were even trying to encourage local implementation. When such deliberate efforts were successful, S&G staff knew about them, and could tell the evaluation team. Those changes are included. Aside from

these calculated local implementation efforts, any local impact would have had to rely on spontaneous local initiative. But (the second factor), we know enough about the range of potential impact to be confident that spontaneous local initiative was unlikely. Few local officials in few states even received the S&G volumes. Those that did, we were repeatedly told, seldom even read them. The image of local LE/CJ officials thumbing through the standards and figuring out ways to meet them does not square with reality. By all accounts—those of S&G staff, commissioners, and the local officials we did interview—local—level indifference toward the S&G volumes was massive.

The likelihood that the state-level agencies were effectively "hiding" S&G's role is also low. We included a change in the sample if it bore any connection at all with S&G. Thus, on occasion we did hear agency officials claim "no connection" for a given change but we included it anyway, for further investigation. As it became apparent that the number of S&G-related changes was extremely small, we deliberately adopted the view that they were being hidden, and took special measures to be inclusive.

The only changes that we know are omitted from the 112 consist of internal S&G efforts, especially research efforts, that might have been used by others without either the S&G staff or the user being aware that a form of "S&G impact" might be occurring.

With these caveats, it is our belief that the sample is inclusive. The problem is to determine how many of the 112 represented authentic impact of the S&G Program.

The 112 changes occurred in 21 of the 27 states we visited. In six states we were unable to associate any changes directly or indirectly with the S&G Program. The largest number of changes in any single state was 31 (in Georgia, because of the large number of legislative actions produced by S&G). The breakdown is as follows:

Thirty-one changes	1
Ten changes	1
Eight changes	1
Six changes	3
Five changes	2
Four changes	3
Three changes	7
Two changes	1
One change	3
No change	5

Siere.

Table 8.1 displays some basic characteristics of the sample. Note that almost all of the changes were made at the state level, and most of these were made through legislative action rather than administrative fiat. Although

TABLE 8.1 Characteristics of Changes Associated with the Standards and Goals Program

	Number	Percentage
LEVEL		
State	99	89
Local	13	12
MODE OF CHANGE		
Legislative	71	63
Administrative	39	35
Other	2	2
SECTOR		
Law Enforcement	32	29
Corrections	21	19
Courts	.14	13
Juvenile Justice	10	9
Prosecution	8	7
Defense	6	5
Community Crime Prevention	3	3
System Wide	18	16

changes in the areas of law enforcement and corrections make up slightly over half the sample, all of the sectors are represented, including 16 changes affecting the system as a whole.

Having identified the sample of (in effect) "conceivably significant changes" caused by S&G, the process now becomes one of examining the degree to which S&G played a role, and thereby eventually affected LE/CJ practice.

#### The Successful Completion of the Change

The first cut at the reality of the 112 concerns the issue of completion: the extent to which the changes that

S&G may have helped set in motion had actually taken place when our observations ended.

Each change was classified as falling within one of three categories on this dimension:

Successful: The legislation, or administrative action or other action had been implemented by the time observation ended, or awaited only a pro forma final step.

Pending: Still to be decided. The details of the
 "pending" suggest that this category includes a
 substantial number of low-probability prospects, and
 some outright unified thinking (particularly about
 tabled legislation).

Failed: The effort had explicitly been rejected or withdrawn from consideration when observation ended.

Using these definitions, the breakdown among the sample of 112 was:

Completed	63	(56%)
Pending	37	(33%)
Failed	12	(11%)

The "failed" cases represent no impact or negative impact. The "pending" cases are problematic. For those "pending" that represent legislation (30 out of the 37), the path to eventual implementation is especially difficult. But we have no estimate of what proportion of the pending changes will occur. It can only be said that the number of potential impact-producing changes will eventually exceed the 63 "completed" but fall short of 100 (the combined "completed" and "pending").

#### S&G's Causal Role

The remaining changes had varying relationships to S&G, and this factor forms the next cut. To be included, a change need only have *some* relationship to S&G. When the specifics were examined, S&G's causal role was found to be highly restricted.

To operationalize the causal role of the S&G Program, we first examined six factors:

- Degree to which S&G engendered the original idea and/or intent for the change
- Degree to which the standards or the information gathered by the S&G staff provided guidelines for the change
- Degree to which S&G provided financial assistance for the change
- Degree to which S&G staff provided time and effort to implement the change (e.g., technical assistance, planning, proposal writing)
- Degree to which the program contributed political support to the change (e.g., mobilized citizen support, lobbied for the change)
- Degree to which the standards provided a justification for the change (e.g., lent authority or legitimacy to change efforts).

Using a simple yes-no categorization, the role of S&G in the 100 broke out as shown in Table 8.2.

TABLE 8.2
Types of Implementation Support

	Status of the Change							
		pleted =63)		ding 35)		iiled =14)		otal 112)
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	. %	No	. %
Standards and Goals provided								
the idea and intent	7	(11)	4	(11)	0	(0)	11	(10)
guidelines	28	(44)	26	(74)	7	(50)	61	(54)
financial support	11	(17)	2	(6)	2	(14)	15	(13)
technical assistance	21	(33)	22	(63)	7	(50)	50	(45)
political support	27	(43)	25	(71)	6	(43)	58	(52)
added legitimization of existing intentions	41	(65)	32	(91)	13	(93)	86	(77)

Origin of the Idea and Intent. The most salient type of contribution was providing the idea and intent: stimulating a change in the system that had not been seriously contemplated before the standards were developed. Only 11 changes in the 27 states could be classified in this category. These changes were:

 Revision and up-date of a state policy department's written policies and procedures manual (completed)

- Establishment of a staff and field inspection system in a state police department (pending)
- Establishment of an inspection system in a local police department (completed)
- Partial consolidation of two local police agencies' service delivery systems (completed)
- Establishment of a state-wide community crime prevention program (completed)
- Revision of a state's correctional code, including the addition of a provision permitting the adult authority to establish and operate community-based correctional programs (completed)
- Establishment of county-level judicial councils (pending)
- Introduction of legislation setting minimum training and educational requirements for police chiefs (pending)
- Legislation permitting judges to impose restitution to the victim as a condition of probation (completed)
- Introduction of legislation setting uniform police salaries on a state-wide basis (pending)
- Revision of the juvenile parole board's revocation procedures (completed).

Thirty-five additional changes were borderline. S&G Program clearly played a major role in pushing them to the forefront, but, just as clearly, they had been live topics for implementation prior to the program. eight of these 35 were the legislative bills that came out of the Georgia S&G Program. The remaining seven included an effort to implement a court order that preceded S&G, implementation of the favorite program of an LE/CJ professional association, and a major study of jail conditions with which S&G joined forces. S&G's role in each of these cases was in the nature of providing a handy, well-balanced vehicle for making or introducing changes that apparently would have been attempted anyway. Indeed, this was the most common theme whenever S&G was involved in a change. The program served as one additional factor in a well-established, longstanding battle.

Source of Guidelines and Information. Given that very little in the way of new ideas and intentions emerged from the program, the standards themselves could still provide guidelines on how to proceed. In addition, the information gathered by S&G staff could serve as a basic reference to the parties engaged in promoting a change.

An assessment of the 112 changes indicates that S&G provided information and guidelines to potential change-makers in about half the cases. Sixty-one of the 112 changes, or 54 percent revealed this pattern. It must again be noted, however, that 28 of these cases came from Georgia where legislative implementation was heavily emphasized. Apart from Georgia, the number of changes in which S&G played an information and guideline role was 33, or 39 percent of the remaining 84 changes.

Some examples will serve to clarify how this information and guideline role took focus. In one state a survey conducted by the S&G staff was used, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate public sentiment in favor of a controversial bill. another state, the S&G staff compiled a detailed description of the materials that should be available in a prison law library, and a court order subsequently incorporated that description to guide prison officials. The revision of a state's rules of criminal procedures was said to have been partially based on the S&G standards (although other sources, such as the ABA standards were also used, and may in fact have been more important). Often, it was asserted that standards had been used as a reference material in drawing up specific pieces of legislation. These included a failed attempt to establish a jail standards system, the development of a state master plan, the establishment of a uniform defense attorney appointment system, and an unsuccessful attempt to establish a recreational program in a county jail.

The most clearcut cases provide evidence of the "template" function that LEAA intended for S&G. The most clearcut cases were often associated, however, with failed changes. The less clearcut instances were sufficiently ambiguous to question whether meaningful impact occurred at all. Even assuming the best, the aggregate number of cases was extremely small.

Source of Financial Assistance. In a very small number of changes, the S&G Program provided direct financial support to implement a specific standard or set of standards. We identified 13 examples among the successful or pending cases. Typically, the assistance was in the form of a direct grant to an agency or organization, out of implementation money set aside for that purpose. In one state, the state planning agency gave a grant to a local prosecutor's office to implement a set of standards. In another state, a grant was released to support a feasibility study on the problem of regional consolidation of police services. The establishment of a state-wide community crime prevention program, referred

to earlier, was also financed largely through SPA revenues. Seed money was provided to help establish a state-wide probation coordinating office.

The relationship between the S&G Program and the changes actually implemented was sometimes remote. In at least two states, it could be determined that money allocated to the SPA for the purpose of implementing standards was turned over in lump sums to one or two agencies to spend as they wished. In one of these, it was openly said that how and where the money was spent was determined only after the grant was received, and without reference to the standards. In the second state, a very large implementation grant was given to an agency under circumstances suggesting that no real relationship existed with the S&G Program. The decision to award the grant was made in the governor's office, apparently without any reference to the standards.

Provision of Technical Assistance. In 43 cases of the successful or pending changes, and 50 overall, the S&G staff had supplied TA of one form or another. The most common form of staff involvement concerned legislation (31 out of the 50 examples--23 changes in Georgia alone). Legislation was drafted in areas involving.

- The establishment of an independent juvenile parole board
- The establishment of a state-wide probation coordinating commission
- The use of outside medical facilities for prisoners
- The revision of a state's correctional code
- The consolidation of adult and juvenile corrections systems, and
- The selection of judges.

It must be noted that only seven of these legislative actions had been passed when observation ended. Six had failed and 18 were pending at the time of our visits, with a "pending" often a euphemism for "permanently tabled."

Besides drafting legislation, TA took ad hoc forms of several types. S&G staff sponsored a conference of legislators, the attorney general, the governor, correctional officials, judges and other criminal justice practitioners. Out of that conference came a new sentencing bill. S&G staff assisted local citizens in drafting a proposal to fund the construction of a group home. And, most notably, the S&G coordination, in one state, drafted the state's correctional

master plan as part of an overall effort to comply with a court order against the correctional system. The remaining instances of TA included compilation of information to support changes in the regulation of police officer accreditation, the abolition of bail bonding, and the release policies of the juvenile parole board.

Source of Political Support. The activities of the S&G staff sometimes placed them in positions of advocacy. In its extreme form, this led to direct involvement in political controversies and legislative battles. In several states, the S&G staff not only drafted legislation, but actively lobbied among the legislators to beat back opposition. In other states, the program staff organized citizen support to influence the legislature. Overall, we found that S&G lent political support to changes in 51 of the successful or pending cases and 58 overall.

In some instances, the political aspects of the S&G implementation effort extended to the standard-setting process. In one state, a standard relating to a long-standing controversy in the state was said to have been tailored to support the position of change advocates. In another state, where a long battle had been fought to create an independent correctional authority, all standards relating to the correctional area referred to a then nonexistent department of corrections. Conversely, the standards were sometimes shaped to support existing practices and to defuse criticism, as in the case of standards relating to affirmative action policies. In all cases in which a standard in the S&G staff became part of an ongoing political battle, the S&G role was said to be peripheral relative to the well-established political and institutional forces involved.

Source of Moral Support and Justification. Beyond the concrete types of support discussed above, the S&G Program also provided a form of moral support. Our analysis indicates that this "moral" authority was the most commonly cited contribution made by the program to the changes we identified. Seventy-three of the 112 successful or pending changes were said to have been influenced in this matter.

In the great majority of the cases, it appeared that the standards provided a rationale for something the persons trying to make a change were doing already. The most common story we heard in response to the question, "What changes has S&G helped bring about?" was that it added momentum. Thus, for example, a standard relating to the appeal of excessive

sentences was used to legitimize a practice that had been carried out informally for many years. In several instances, criminal justice officials reported that they had used the standards to persuade legislators or county commissioners of the need for certain changes. The standards were not claimed to have been the sole or even dominant authority used in this context.

#### The Extent of S&G Impact

The findings we have presented leave unanswered the question, How important was the S&G Program to the achievement of the changes? Evidence has been presented that the program provided little in the way of new ideas or initiatives for the system. Most of the changes associated with the program had been underway before the program was begun. But it has also been asserted that, in certain states, the staff of the S&G Program contributed substantially to the implementation of specific changes, providing time, money, information, and political skills. We have also indicated that the standards themselves provided guidelines for action as well as a certain moral authority for the changes attempted.

Assessing the importance of the S&G Program to the changes is finally judgmental, and we present the following in that light. Briefly, we combined the accounts we obtained from various respondents and rated each successful change on the following rating scale:

- If a change arose directly from the Standards and Goals effort, if the support provided through the program was plausibly the major reason why it succeeded, and if the balance of evidence suggested that the change was unlikely to have occurred without the program, S&G was rated as the decisive factor.
- If the change had identifiable sources of impetus besides S&G, but the program made a major contribution to the content of the change or it is arguable that the change would not have been accomplished otherwise, the program was rated as a substantial factor.
- If the S&G Program made an identifiable contribution to the implementation of a change, but it was only one of a number of factors of equal or greater importance, the program was rated as a marginal factor.

• If the S&G Program was associated with a change, but the balance of evidence suggests the change would have occurred in the same form without the program, S&G was rated as an inconsequential factor.

Among the 63 successful changes (the only population that could be meaningfully rated), the assessment produced the following results: 6 changes were rated as having been decisively affected by the S&G Program; 22 were rated as having been substantially affected by the program; 23 were rated as having been only marginally affected by the program; and 12 changes were rated as having been inconsequentially affected by S&G. Table 8.3 breaks down the ratings by type of support.

TABLE 8.3 Estimated Role of S&G in the Completed Changes

	Estimated S&G Role Relative to Non-S&G Forces				
Type of Support	Deci- sive	Substan- tia!	Mar- ginal	Inconse- quential	Total
Contributed intention and guidelines, plus other support	1	1	0	0	2
Contributed intention and guidelines, no other support	0	3	1	0	4
Contributed intention and support, but standard's guidelines were not used	1	0	0	0	1
Contributed guidelines and support to existing intention	2	9	0	1	12
Contributed guidelines to an existing intention (no other support)	0	2	9	0	11
Contributed support only to an existing intention (guidelines not used)	2	3	6	3	14
Contributed general legitimization only to an existing intention	0	4	7	8	19
Total	6	22	23	12	63

The assessment of the implementation goals of S&G is a bleak one, from whatever perspective it is viewed. An extensive and expensive field research effort yielded a sample of only 112 implementation changes from 27 states. Only 63 of these had been successful, and only 37 others were even

remotely likely to ever succeed. Of the 63, only 6 can confidently be ascribed to the existence of the S&G Program. Only 22 others were plausibly substantially affected by S&G--a total of 28 changes in 27 states. And, if the program had turned out otherwise, it must be noted that these aggregate figures would not be the focus of interest. Rather, the analysis would be centering on the four cells in the top left-hand corner of Table 8.3: implementation changes that occurred because S&G provided the stimulus and the benchmarks for change. And the entries total only five. It is however, unnecessary to dwell on specific numbers. Even if they were wrong by several factors, the implementation accomplishments of S&G would be meager, on an absolute scale, or relative to the money expended on the program, or relative to the hopes of its progenitors.

# INTEGRATION OF STANDARDS AND GOALS INTO THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING PROCESS

LEAA's control over general implementation was restricted. Whether a state and localities decided to act on the standards was largely up to them. But LEAA did have substantial direct and indirect control over the use of standards by the SPAs. The integration of the standards into the planning process was accordingly stressed in the planning of S&G, and in our subsequent evaluation of the program.

The practical meaning of the term "integration" was never spelled out. The S&G process and the standards it produced could be and were used by the SPAs in a variety of ways. The dialogue between practitioners, citizens, and public officials that the S&G Program generated was a potential source of new ideas for the SPA. The priorities developed under the S&G process could be used by the SPA to order its research, planning, and funding activities. The information generated and gathered under S&G could be a resource for identifying problems and needs in the system. The standards themselves could be used as benchmarks against which to measure agency practices and performance, and to identify areas of need.

Integration could also mean that the SPA was to become the vehicle for implementing the standards, encouraging agency compliance, or facilitating changes to meet the standards. This could be done through technical assistance, direct action by the SPA with the legislature and governor, and through the SPA's own funding decisions. In short, "integration" could take a variety of forms as a logical extension of the S&G concept.

#### SPA Acceptance of the Standards

The first step in the integration of standards and goals into the planning process was that the SPA had somehow to make them their own. In those states where the S&G Program had been carried out within the SPA this was not a problem. It was a problem, however, in those states where S&G was carried out by a separate commission.

In 12 of the 27 states we visited, the transfer of standards from the S&G body to the SPA was described as difficult, incomplete, or a failure.

The least serious example was a state where the SPA staff resisted the inclusion of the developed standards into the SPA's planning process because they doubted the adequacy of the standards and the competence of the S&G staff. In time, however, this difficulty was resolved by the promotion of the S&G director to the directorship of the SPA. In a second state, the S&G program produced a set of "recommendations" rather than standards, which were presented to the SPA for consideration. The recommendations were never adopted—not because of inadequacies, but because they were regarded as adding nothing to the SPA's existing priorities and standards.

In two states, the SPA formally adopted the standards developed under S&G but later withdrew its endorsement. In one of these states, where "integration" had never gone beyond listing the standards in the comprehensive plan, the SPA eliminated standards in subsequent annual plans. In the other state, a new supervisory board was appointed after the S&G standards had been adopted and the entire subject of standards was quietly dropped. An SPA staffer who headed the S&G effort in that state indicated that the new board knew nothing about the program and that he had no intention of educating them.

In four states, the SPA adopted only some of the developed standards, or adopted a set of high priority standards that "coincided" with those developed under S&G. In two of these states the SPA had adopted only those standards that it felt could be implemented in the immediate future. The remaining standards were retained as reference material. In the other two states, the SPA board felt that the standards developed under S&G were too numerous and detailed to be adopted en masse. Consequently, the board adopted only selected, high priority standards as long-term agency "objectives." The bulk of the S&G program's work was ignored.

The four remaining states of the 12 each exhibited unique characteristics. In one state, the SPA adopted a set of standards despite the failure of the S&G commission to do so. In a second state, the SPA board refused to adopt the standards it helped to develop. In a third state, the SPA chose to adopt the National Advisory Commission standards rather than those adopted by the S&G commission it helped to fund. Finally, in the fourth state, the entire S&G effort came to a halt after the election of a new governor. The standards adopted by the SPA were radically revised.

#### "Integration" in Practice: Examples

The foregoing described the SPA's "acceptance" of standards in a technical sense: did the SPA even claim to be ready to use the standards in the planning process? Now, we turn to the more relevant question: did anything really happen to the planning process?

There was reason to hope that something would happen. The S&G process offered a unique opportunity for the SPA and practitioners to review the problems and needs of the system within which they operated. It was not implausible to anticipate that the process would uncover areas where fresh effort and attention were required, or where resources should be increased. At the very least, the materials and information reviewed by the participants formed a body of knowledge that was of potential use to SPA planners.

The expectations were plausible, but they were not borne out in practice. The results in the 27 state S&G programs led to highly negative conclusions. First, with the most isolated exceptions, the program added nothing to what was already known about the LE/CJ systems served by the SPAs. Further, the S&G experience or its products had no apparent substantive impact on the planning activities of the SPAs in the states we visited. Finally, the S&G Program had no appreciable impact on the way SPAs allocate their action grant funds or technical assistance services.

We introduce the reasons for these conclusions with some examples.

In State A, the SPA board formally adopted the standards developed under S&G as its official statement of preferred practice. Every program funded by the SPA, it was said, must somehow be related to at least one of the standards adopted by the state. But grant applicants were not required

to address or even to meet the standards themselves. Rather, after a grant application had been approved, a member of the SPA staff would search through standards and find one related to the program in question. In the annual action plan, each program would then be listed along with the appropriate standard. As the SPA respondents in that state universally reported, the standards were sufficiently broad that some "related" standard could be found for any project.

In State B, the SPA formally adopted the standards developed under S&G and listed them each year in its action plan. Grant applications were still reviewed on an ad hoc basis, without any reference to the adopted standards.

In State C, the SPA formally adopted the S&G standards and required all grant applicants to address standards in their grant application. But, SPA respondents told us, nobody paid any attention to that section, except to see if it was there. Whether a program was funded was based on the perceived worth of the proposed program, the predilections of the SPA supervisory board, and the inevitable political factors.

In State D, decisions on which programs to fund were being made at the local and regional level, subject to state review. Local planning agencies were not required to address the state's standards. The state plan was essentially a summary of the plans submitted by the local and regional agencies. The SPA did not review local plans based on the state's adopted standards. The relationship between the standards and the programs funded was rationalized ex post facto, as in State A.

In State E, the SPA adopted only a few of the standards developed under S&G. In the "problem analysis" section of the annual plan, each major point was cross-referenced with one or more of the adopted standards. Funding decisions were based on a set of criteria "derived" from the adopted standards (i.e., the criteria were consistent with the general sentiment of the standards). The criteria may even have been developed independently of S&G--there was controversy on this point. In any event, the SPA has not required grant applicants to address any standards; they need address only the funding criteria.

In State F, the SPA also adopted only some of the developed standards—those that fit into the SPA's existing funding and planning criteria. The SPA staff unilaterally

revised the adopted standards to reflect the SPA's own priorities. These revised, rejected standards were otensibly used as one criterion in funding and grant review decisions-but, the SPA staff reported, the SPA would revise the standards again rather than reject a program it wanted to fund.

#### Barriers to Integration

The examples above represent common approaches to the integration of standards and goals into the comprehensive planning process. Of the 27 state SPAs we visited, 16 had adopted all of the standards developed under S&G, three states had adopted some of them, and five were in the process of doing so. Of the 19 states that had adopted at least some of the standards, eight states used the standards to justify the funding of projects after the fact, as in State A. states virtually ignore the standards as in State B; they are listed in the plan but play no role in decision-making. Three states require applicants to relate proposed projects to a standard, but adherence to standards is not an important criteria of funding, as in State C. In two states, funding decisions are made at the local level, as in State D, thus bypassing the states' adopted standards. Four states have abstracted the standards, using some of the standards as high priority topics as in State E, or revising the standards to match existing priorities, as in State F.

Note that these characterizations are not based on the testimony of a few dissident SPA staffers. Respondents in a given state's SPA almost always told the same story. And the overall picture was that S&G was regarded as a paper exercise, both as a program and a component of the comprehensive planning process. The reasons we heard were remarkedly consistent.

Prior constraints on funding decisions were universally severe. LEAA's funding formula compartmentalizes the block grants into pots for each of the major LE/CJ sectors. Other constraints were typically imposed by the SPA supervisory board and by the legislature. SPA personnel widely disagreed with-openly mocked, on occasion-the notion that they were genuinely "planning" the allocation of resources. They perceived themselves to have very few degrees of freedom in their decisions.

Limited funding was also a frequently mentioned problem. Action grant funds were often tied up in existing projects, with very little left for new initiatives. Recent cut-backs in LEAA funding aggravated these problems. States that had

been able to fund S&G-related projects had been able to do so primarily because of S&G funds.

Political considerations also played a role. Few SPAs thought they had the political clout to reject applications or to revise funding policies on the basis of the standards. The typical SPA was already considered suspect by several key criminal justice leaders, and was not eager to provoke criticism by rejecting a favored project because it failed to meet the "standards."

The bulk of the standards themselves was also frequently cited as a barrier to integration. SPA staff commonly noted that the standards were too numerous to be digested at once. For an SPA to base its decisions on such a large body of material, we were told, was practically impossible given time constraints. The failure of most states to establish priorities among the standards aggravated the difficulties of using the standards in a meaningful way.

In several states, SPA staff regarded the standards themselves as inadequate for planning purposes. They were described as being too general in content, too open to conflicting interpretation or, in several cases, too oriented toward the status quo. Controversial standards were usually dropped or revised to meet objections, leaving a residue that was too bland or even retrogressive to serve as a basis for improving the system.

Overshadowing these factors was the perceived uncertain status of S&G in the overall LEAA policy framework, and the uncertain status of LEAA itself. One SPA director told us that he regarded S&G as merely another passing fancy with LEAA, and that, in time, LEAA would move on to some other initiative or emphasis. A second director indicated a belief that LEAA had initiated the S&G program only to meet Congressional pressure—"Congress pushes them and they push us," was the expression used. A third director indicated that LEAA had virtually forced the S&G concept on the states, without regard to the need or desires of the states themselves. The director contrasted the intensity with which LEAA pushed the states to accept money for the program with the benign neglect that followed once the program was underway.

An additional factor at the time of our field visits was the uncertain status of LEAA itself. Cutbacks in LEAA block grant funding, the closing of the regional offices, the absence of an appointed administrator, and the on-going debate in Congress and within the administration were all

perceived as indications of an impending change in LEAA policies. Under these circumstances, there was little sentiment behind a vigorous implementation of the S&G concept at the state level.

In all 27 states, the accounts were consistent and negative. The overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that S&G had no significant effect on the subsequent work of the SPAs.

#### INSTITUTIONALIZATION

LEAA knew from the beginning that to be fully successful the S&G Program would have to outlive Federal support. Even if the standards and goals were developed as planned, some sort of institutional patron would have to take over responsibility for seeing that implementation continued, that the standards were updated, and that S&G's initial momentum toward more rational LE/CJ planning was not lost. Progress toward long-term institutionalized status of the S&G approach constitutes the third measure of program impact.

The basic conclusion is that in no state does evidence exist that significant institutionalization had occurred by the end of 1977. We shall begin instead with the few cases of possible future success.

Two of the 27 states reported that the SPA was soon to be converted to a department of criminal justice: a full-fledged state agency with authority over all state-level criminal justice policies and resources. If this actually were to come about, we were told, S&G would become an integral part of the agency's planning and policy-setting process. We were not able to evaluate either of these two predictions, except to note that in one state the SPA enjoyed a very close relationship with the governor, who appeared to support the idea; and in the other state the SPA's budget had just been cut by the legislature, forcing a reduction in personnel.

A third state told us of ambitious plans to present an adopted body of standards to the governor and legislature. It was hoped that these standards would be adopted by resolution by the legislature with the governor's endorsement, thus becoming the officially endorsed policy of the state on criminal justice practice. Less optimistically, we must note that the current use of the standards by the SPA is negligible. In addition, the original S&G Program in this state almost foundered because of local opposition to statedictated standards.

The most promising example of long-term impact of the S&G Program was found in Maine, where the program had been dominated by a citizen-based organization. The SPA in this state had remained detached from the program and, when our observations ended, the standards had not been completed. We were told by the SPA director that integration of the standards would not occur until 1981 at the earliest, because of the timing of the program with the SPA's planning cycle.

The promising aspect of the Maine program is that the group had already been incorporated into a permanent citizens' interest group. The organization had attracted long-term outside funding and had established cadre throughout the state. The leadership intended to lobby in the legislature for reforms in the criminal justice system. It also intended to encourage local decision-makers to implement the state standards, and had already participated in a number of legislative and local actions (with mixed results). Of all the states we visited, Maine was the most plausible candidate for successfully institutionalizing some variant of the S&G approach.

With these tenuous exceptions, institutionalization is a dead issue.

#### OTHER IMPACT-RELATED ACTIVITIES

We have not dwelt on other, subsidiary activities undertaken by some S&G programs in some states. There was a variety, none of which was intensive or widespread. The paragraphs that follow virtually exhaust the cases.

Much of this activity can be described as "informational" in nature. Several program staffs prepared workbooks and handouts that were distributed around the states to citizens, practitioners, and legislators. In some instances, the materials dealt with the standards developed under S&G. In other instances, specific changes (e.g., pending legislation) were endorsed or described. Other materials dealt with specific technical issues and were directed only at practitioners. Topics covered include management information systems, police specialization, and current jail populations.

In a few instances, S&G staff conducted or supported basic research on current problems or issues in criminal justice. In one state, the S&G staff produced reports on violent juvenile offenders and police training. In another state, the S&G Program directed funds to support research

to validate police officer selection tests. In a third state, a local planning agency was encouraged by the S&G Program to develop a technical assistance package on areas of misdemeanant training. In a fourth state the S&G Program directed funds to a state family services agency to develop legislation for deinstitutionalizing juvenile offenders.

Promotional activities were undertaken in a number of states. S&G staff and resources were used to conduct workshops and special conferences dealing with the states' standards or specific topics. Once the SPA law enforcement specialists held meetings with individual police chiefs and sheriffs to discuss specific problems and standards. In a second state the S&G staff designated four sites as "key cities" and conducted a needs assessment in each. Using recommendations derived from those assessments, the staff attempted to assist local citizens and practitioners to implement specific changes in their communities. At the time of the research, these efforts had been unsuccessful because of a lack of local support.

Finally, several states made use of newspapers, mailouts, and other media to raise interest in both the standards and the problems of the LE/CJ system.

To our knowledge, none of these activities had produced second-order effects on practice. That possibility cannot be discounted altogether.

### 9. Conclusions and Recommendations

To a point, the Standards and Goals Program was implemented as intended. Commissions were chosen, staffs were assembled, standards were considered and adopted by the designated bodies. Volumes of standards and goals were produced—41 of them, as of March, 1978.

Further, there is a large, unknown quantity of "good things" that inevitably followed from the program. More than \$16,000,000 was spent, almost entirely on people. They were typically hard-working, bright, competent people. Most of them look back on their experience with S&G as a constructive part of their careers, and are proud of the job they did. Aside from the positive contributions they made to the program, they often were doing work that directly facilitated the operation of the SPA. Another nontrivial outcome is surely the education that the program provided for the S&G staffs. For most, S&G was a cram course of practical training about how the LE/CJ system works and who pulls the levers, and the future work of these persons in the system must benefit from the experience.

Finally, there are the imponderable consequences of continuing interactions among LE/CJ officials who were brought together by the Standards & Goals Program. Respondents often mentioned the role of S&G in getting people to talk to each other who before had not talked to each other. We were able to document that these interactions did not result in continuing systematic contact, but informal networks may have been strengthened.

So the S&G Program was not a scandal. It was a good-faith effort. But, it was also a failure:

The impact of the Standards and Goals Program was insignificant. Nowhere did the program achieve the ultimate objectives intended for it.

The following pages detail the evidence for this gloomy assessment. We work backwards, from a review of the impact accomplishments to the process outcomes to what we believe to be the real sources of failure in the program's conception.

#### ACCOMPLISHMENTS: IMPACT

Stimulation of Change in the LE/CJ System in General

As detailed in Chapter 8, the number of instances in which S&G caused change appears to have been miniscule. This conclusion can be viewed from two perspectives.

First, and in many respects intuitively most convincing, the people who had reason to make a case for S&G did not claim substantial accomplishments for the program. Even if every account of S&G accomplishments in stimulating change is taken at face value, the achievements of the program would still look fragile and scattered.

But this general statement can be converted into numbers.

Systematic questioning on this topic of more than 500 people who were in the best position to know produced a total of only 112 changes in the 27 states that were associated in any way whatsoever with the Standards & Goals Program. When examined, this relatively small number attrited rapidly.

- Of the 112 changes or potential changes, 12 had already failed to reach fruition and 37 were still "pending." Sixty-three were accomplished facts.
- Of the 63, 35 were judged have been only marginally affected by the S&G Program.
- Of the 28 that remained, only 6 could be judged as having been decisively affected by the program.

Nor were our rating criteria severe. Given so few instances of plausible accomplishment, we gave the benefit of the doubt to S&G in borderline cases. It is simply a fact to be accepted:

Neither the development of the standards nor the efforts of the staffs led to the stimulation of change that had been a basic goal of the program. And there is no evidence that we observed the program before these outcomes could be expected to become visible. On the contrary, in most of the states we visited, the standards had already been forgotten.

## Integration of Standards and Goals into SPA Planning and Resource Allocation

In theory, SPAs in 16 of the 27 states we visited had adopted all of the S&G standards and three had adopted at least some of them. But among these 19 SPAs, we found that, with regard to planning and funding decisions,

Two of the SPAs were ignoring the standards altogether;

Eight of the SPAs were using an after-the-fact approach, finding standards to fit the funded projects,

Three SPAs were requiring applicants to address standards in their applications, but ignored that section of the application in reaching funding decisions;

Four SPAs had abstracted or modified the standards so that they fit preexisting priorities, and

Two SPAs used local and regional funding processes that bypassed the state-level standards.

SPA accounts of attitudes about and practice toward the standards were consistent and negative. The overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that S&G had no significant real impact on the subsequent work of the SPAs. There may still remain, as during our field research, instances in which the standards are cited by SPAs in the comprehensive plans or funding decisions. In the states we visited, the SPA staff members asserted that these were paper exercises to comply with LEAA's demands. Perhaps they have more substantive content elsewhere.

#### Institutionalization of the S&G Approach

With the conceivable exception of four of the 27 states, institutionalization is a dead issue. No plans exist for continuations of any sort in 23 of the 27 states. The four exceptions involve possible outcomes, not accomplished ones.

\* \* \*

The conclusion on the impact topic is free of important qualifications. The Standards and Goals Program was a clear-cut failure, if success and failure are put in terms of effects on the criminal justice system. And those were the terms that justified its existence.

The question then becomes, Why? Broadly speaking, a program may fail either because it was a good idea poorly implemented or because the idea itself had some flaw. Below we examine the extent to which each of these sources of failure played a role.

#### **PROCESS OUTCOMES**

Standards & Goals had only one tangible product, the actual volumes of written standards and goals and the collateral materials that were to go with them. To put the issue in terms of producing the written product, we recapitulate from Chapter 7:

The process envisioned by LEAA should have produced standards with three key characteristics.

First, they were to be comprehensive. The standards were to set the course for the system as a whole. For our purposes, we shall define comprehensive as including standards on at least law enforcement, courts, and corrections.

Second, they were to include priorities. One of LEAA's chief motivations for the S&G Program was its perception that LE/CJ planning was devoid of a sense of what should come first in the allocation of scarce resources.

Third, they were to include explicit strategies for implementation. LEAA did not expect full implementation to occur within the life of the program, but at least the route to implementation was to be developed.

How consistently did the states' S&G products meet these basic specifications? Not consistently at all. The breakdown as of the end of 1977 was:

Four states met all three criteria.

Ten states had published comprehensive standards and implementation strategies, but no priorities.

Eleven states had published comprehensive standards and priorities, but without an implementation strategy.

Sixteen states had published comprehensive standards, without either priorities or an implementation strategy.

Eight states had not published comprehensive standards, nor anything else.

One state did not undertake an S&G Program.

Or to put it another way, only four states out of 50 had produced documents that met the basic expectations of LEAA as described in its guidelines at the outset of the program. We hasten to add, however, that only modest emphasis should be put on that outcome. The four states in question--Florida, Indiana, Mississippi and South Carolina--were not otherwise noteworthy. Many other states did more real work on implementation, or specified priorities informally. Failures of the program as a whole should not be ascribed to mechanical breakdowns in producing certain elements. It is simply noted that the product LEAA ordered when it started the S&G Program was seldom the product it got.

In terms of content of the standards the influence of the standards developed by the National Advisory Commission was pervasive. Averaging across LE/CJ sectors, 45.0 percent of the "key elements" that were analyzed matched the sense of the corresponding NAC standard.\*

But while the states borrowed widely from NAC, they did not borrow the same items. Only 16 of the 136 key elements reached a two-thirds majority in even modified support of the NAC position, and 37 of them were adopted by fewer than a third of the states.

This is not meant as either praise or blame--the NAC standards are by no means treated here as the model to be emulated. The point is rather that the S&G process suggests a continuing broad lack of consensus among the states on LE/CJ matters, insofar as the standards do in fact represent a state's sentiments.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$ For the meaning of "key elements," see page 12.

#### THE PROCESS ITSELF

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 described the composition and operation of the 27 S&G programs that were the subject of field research. Variations in process were great. Recapitulating from Chapter 6:

Eight of the 27 states could be characterized as approaching the model most consistent with LEAA's rhetoric, the public participation model. This model denotes an effort to get the public involved, draw up fresh, tailor-made standards, and publicize them. Structurally, the public participation model consists of an independent S&G Commission especially created for S&G, inclusion of non-LE/CJ persons, multiple committees and task forces, lots of public hearings, emphasis on legislative initiatives to implement standards, and as much publicity as possible. States that fit (sometimes precariously) into this category were Maine, Kansas, Minnesota, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Idaho (with considerable overlap into the political model), and Florida and Delaware (with considerable overlap into the bureaucratic model).

Three states -- Georgia, California, and Colorado -- can be classified as most representative of the political model. The political model, perhaps more properly seen as a subtype of the public participation approach, occurred when a powerful official or group decided to become S&G's patron. The key structural features distinguishing it from the public participation model tended to be closer outside control over (or guidance of) the activities of the program, and some quite specific political points that the patron intended to make-whether in the form of an active legislative program (Georgia) or in the form of "law and order" credentials (as was said by Reagan's political opponents to have been the case in California). Note that all three of the states categorized as "political" had a second phase, when the political activity died and the program reverted to a bureaucratic or compliance mode--or, in California's case, became moribund.

Ten states—the largest group—are examples of what may be called the bureaucratic model. The bureaucratic model represents states that saw the S&G Program as a primarily technical task, with implications for LE/CJ professionals in general and the SPA in particular. The SPA Director had chief responsibility; the staff was typically integrated into that of the SPA, the Commissioners usually were members of the SPA supervisory board, and SPA funding decisions were the ostensible purpose. Little publicity attended the process. We classified Utah, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Texas,

Wisconsin, Washington, Mississippi, Michigan, Illinois (with a very strong professional orientation) and Iowa (with some peculiarities in the early stages) in this category.

The fourth model is labelled strict compliance. In its pure form, this model denotes the process of going through the motions. It shares the structural characteristics of the bureaucratic model, with these variations: few if any new hires for the S&G staff (use existing SPA staff), few if any commission members from outside the SPA board, pro forma adoption of the standards (if any), and few attempts at publicity. We put North Carolina, Nebraska, Indiana, and North Dakota in this category, along with Ohio and Oregon during their latter phases. But it should be noted that we could have added several of the "bureaucratic" states to this category with very slight adjustments in the criteria we employed.

"Process" is interesting and important primarily insofar as it makes any difference to some sort of outcome. And in this respect the analysis of the S&G process was a washout:

The main point of interest about the S&G process in the 27 states is that it exhibited so much variance while the measures of impact exhibited so little.

The one possible exception to this statement is Maine. The program in Maine was still in progress when observations ended, and it was at that point premature to make statements about the impact or lack of it achieved by Maine. seem that Maine was generating more local participation, more genuine citizen interest in the standards than was observed in any other state. Maine is unusual in other respects as well--its small population, lack of major urban centers, racial homogeneity, and other features that may have facilitated the kind of community approach that was attempted. Generalizations from the Maine experience are risky. If the Maine S&G program does produce results, it may be a signal that the public participation model will work when a real social and political "community" is the setting. But, it must be emphasized, this presumes final results of the Maine program that had not had a chance to occur or fail to occur when observation ended.

#### THE CONCEPTS BEHIND STANDARDS AND GOALS

When the material in Chapters 4 through 7 on the program's structure and process is taken into account, it seems improbable that S&G's failure can be ascribed to breakdowns in program implementation. Many of the states brought ample energy and imagination to their part in S&G. Several of the states put together an effort that gave S&G a very good shot indeed. Among them, just about every plausible route to impact was explored. And none of them worked. The evidence is persuasive that

The central concepts of the program were at fault. A real problem had been perceived. Worthy objectives had been set. But the program they prompted failed to deal with a few key obstacles that would inherently frustrate its ambitions.

Given the luxury of hindsight, we have concluded that the Standards and Goals Program as designed could not have been made to work.

Below, we suggest two interlocking flaws in concept: the assumptions about the capacity to write valid standards, and the assumptions about the right political and professional aggregate for legitimizing those standards.

#### The Limits on the Possible in Standard-Setting

The attractiveness of S&G's central premise is hard to resist. The premise was that standards are important, even crucial, to long-term progress in criminal justice, and that they were inadequately specified and accepted. We shall not recapitulate the entire argument here. We simply wish to make clear that

The impulse that led to the creation of the Standards and Goals Program is not at issue. The need for LE/CJ standards was and remains real.

It was not the need for standards that was illusory, but the feasibility of producing the kind of standards that LEAA wanted. The S&G Program asked for a product that could not be produced.

That product, it will be remembered, was to have been a set of standards setting forth the minimums that would be tolerated in criminal justice practice. The standards were to guide policy. They were to be the foundation of planning. They were to have the tacit force of norms. They were to be such that a person could say of an LE/CJ agency that it was or was not operating "up to standard."

From an abstract point of view, preparing such standards is a matter of writing them down. Almost any topic in LE/CJ can be conceived in terms of "standards," from response-time for police to definitions of "speedy trial" for the courts to the availability of medical care in correctional institutions. But the key to the objectives set for S&G was that these standards eventually be usable. And this brings the issue from the abstract to the concrete. For, to have even a chance of being used, a standard must meet three preconditions.

First, the standard must have operational meaning, for self-evident reasons. General principles of justice (e.g., "Ensure a fair trial") are not directly implementable.

Second, the standard must have broad acceptance among the people with the power to translate the standard into policy or law. Also for self-evident reasons.

Third, the standard must possess objective validity. Except for the rare, universally acclaimed standards, implementation of standards ultimately entails some measure of compulsory compliance. It was not an aspect of S&G that LEAA liked to emphasize, but everyone, especially at the local level, was sensitive to the long-term enforcement implications of standards-setting.

Failing any one of the three criteria, a standard was unlikely to move beyond the printed page. Lacking operational content, it literally could not be implemented—a fact that received surprisingly little attention when S&G was in the planning phase at LEAA. Lacking broad support, it would be unlikely to obtain approval. Lacking a measure of objective validity—that is, to the extent that reasonable people could reasonably object to it—compulsory compliance would be difficult to justify.

Meeting these criteria turned out to be feasible for only a limited range of standards. Externalities—conditions over which S&G had no control—undermined LEAA's objectives for S&G. For convenience, we label them scientific uncertainty, cost tradeoffs, and subjective values, and deal with each in turn.

Scientific Uncertainty. The first externality is the state-of-the-art in law enforcement and criminal justice. The Standards and Goals Program mandated the states to produce comprehensive, enforceable standards and goals in a context of widespread ignorance:

The domain of concrete, objectively valid standards is narrow, far more so than the ambitions for S&G took into account.

This is not the place for a review of the LE/CJ research literature. We will leave it as an assertion that the state of LE/CJ knowledge in the late 1970s is still inexact at best, and riddled with gaps on some of the most important topics with which the states' standards were supposed to deal. Policing alternatives, sentencing alternatives, and correctional alternatives are typically just that: alternatives, with only educated guesses and tentative findings to guide decisions on the best way to proceed.

S&G's advocates did not expect matters to be otherwise. At no point in the development of the program did LEAA intimate that the final word on LE/CJ practice was about to be developed. On the contrary, the issue was finessed: only the standards-setting process was endorsed. LEAA carefully steered clear of appearing to sponsor any particular set of standards. The states were to decide what was most appropriate for their specific situations. The latent answer to the issue of scientific uncertainty was a commonsensical one: something is better than nothing. Educated guesses are preferable to plain, unadulterated guesses, and the S&G process would at least give the educated guess a chance.

But that logic broke down when it came to the standardssetting process. The people who sat on the S&G commissions
and the local officials who read the S&G volumes they produced were also aware of the flimsy or arguable basis for
many of the standards. And that a standard is known to be
based on an educated guess drastically increases the difficulty of encouraging its adoption in a reluctant community.
The rationale of the S&G Program depended heavily on the
dynamics of professional peer pressure, a community of
opinion, or even on the generalized urge to keep up with the
Joneses. But when a standard was based on admittedly
tentative knowledge, the doubts and differences within the
professional and lay communities alike were well-recognized.
Professional and public pressure had no hard core of confident knowledge around which to crystallize.

Thus the role of scientific uncertainty in justifying reasonable people in their reasonable objections to many of the standards that were set by the various commissions.

Many of the standards could not credibly be presented as "the right thing to do." They could only be presented as probably the right thing to do, in the context of the zigs and zags of fashion that have characterized the practice of LE/CJ. When commission members responded skeptically to the rhetoric of the Standards and Goals Program, they often reminded us that they were not necessarily cynical nor reactionary. They were, they said, just remembering a history that they did not care to repeat.

Cost Tradeoffs. The second externality that obstructed the achievement of the product LEAA sought was the issue of tradeoffs between the benefits that a standard might promise and the costs of bringing those benefits about.

As in the case of scientific uncertainty, the magnitude of the problem is hidden by omission. Standards with large price tags attached often never came under consideration. But even among the standards that survived, cost was often relevant. Among the 134 applicable key elements, for example, an even 50 percent involved large, continuing dollar costs. Being a good idea was not enough to make a standard acceptable:

Even when the virtues of a standard were clear, the costs of implementation could lead reasonable people to reject it, depending on local and often idiosyncratic conditions.

The tradeoff calculation was in part a function of the population of a jurisdiction, and the standards frequently tried to take this factor into account. Standards would sometimes provide alternative actions for agencies of different sizes, or exempt smaller agencies altogether.

But size was only one of the potential discriminating variables, and the easiest to handle. It happens that needs vary, even for jurisdictions of similar size and budget resources. A standard that was worth the money to implement in one city was of peripheral importance in another. And it put the standards-setters in a dilemma. If they tried to specify what constituted an objective "need" sufficient to make the standard applicable, they opened themselves to endless definitional disputes. But when they took the easier rcute (e.g., "Maintain at least a part-time tactical crime force, consistent with an analysis of needs...."),

they removed the teeth from the standard. Compliance with the standard became impossible even to determine, let alone enforce.

The cost tradeoffs could not have been resolved given more time, more money, or more methodological expertise. Even if the technical problems could have been resolved, the question of local preferences would have remained. Given a benefit of some importance, but not crucial; given costs of moderate size, but not trivial, local jurisdictions had a ready-made reason to decline to comply with many standards.

Subjective Values. The third externality is variations in values across localities, geographic areas, and especially across ethical and political stances. Many criminal justice issues transcend questions of effectiveness—for example, should convicted felons be released if the risk of recidivism is low (they are not a threat to society) or confined for an extended period anyway (a serious crime requires serious punishment)? Data cannot decide the issue, on this and on a wide range of other topics that the standards dealt with.

The problem of values was least a problem in law enforcement and prosecution/defense, where fewer than 20 percent of the key elements were rated as entailing high-valence value issues. It was more often a problem in the courts (29 percent), and it was a pervasive problem in corrections, where more than two-thirds (69 percent) of the key elements were ones that dealt in highly value-laden issues.

A few of the items entail constitutional issues that eventually could be resolved for all. Most of them do not:

Many of the issues for which LEAA sought standards have no "right" answer, even in constitutional law,

and to set standards assigned an objectivity to them that does not exist in fact. A prickly, highly political issue is raised: in this context, is standards-setting by the state a legitimate exercise of authority? Many commissioners thought not, accounting in part for their unwillingness to develop explicit operational standards.

Taking the effects of these three factors together-scientific uncertainty, cost tradeoffs, and process values==
LEAA's rhetoric about the scope of the S&G process led to a
trap. For the rhetoric raised expectations of both wideranging, course-setting standards and implementation of

those standards. But the characteristics of implementability--specificity, broad support, objective validity-were hard to come by. The mushiness and lack of comprehensiveness in the standards reflect this constraint.

#### Sources of Legitimacy

The other major defect with the concepts underpinning the Standards and Goals Program is argued to be one of legitimacy. If the standards were to be adopted and integrated into planning, they had to be accepted by several constituencies. Which constituencies, reached by what routes, could vary greatly depending on premises. LEAA's premises were that the "state" was an appropriate unit of aggregation, and that the legitimization process was essentially a political one. Again taking advantage of our access to hindsight, we question whether either premise made sense.

The State as a Unit of Aggregation. Even as the NAC was writing its national standards, the New Federalism was becoming a key part of the Nixon administration's program. At the same time, LEAA had become highly sensitized to state resistance of federal intervention in law enforcement and criminal justice. Financial assistance was generally welcome; direction was not. Thus the idea to use the state as the unit of standard-setting and implementation had natural impetus. It was hoped that the states would be able to accommodate differences in values, in aspirations, in financial resources; and at the same time serve as a convenient unit of implementation through state-wide legislation, state-wide agency policy, and state-wide disbursement of LEAA block funds through the SPA.

In terms of implementation, the state as a unit of aggregation may have been appropriate. But as a means of of reducing heterogeneity, the state as the unit of aggregation did not offer much leverage. It appeared that, as a rule,

The states did not form communities of opinion or common experience that facilitated agreement on standards.

The within-state variation in resources, needs, and values was very great, perhaps as great as the between-state variation.

This conclusion is based in part on qualitative accounts by the state officials we interviewed. They routinely described significant divisions within their state's demographic or ethnographic makeup. Typically, the differences were multi-dimensional, leading to characterizations of two (or more) cultures--rural Georgia versus the "state of Atlanta," the western versus the eastern slopes of Colorado, southern Louisiana versus northern Louisiana, downstate Illinois versus the urbanized Chicago area. Virtually every state had its tale to tell.

The nature of the heterogeneity can also be seen in the numbers--in measures of racial composition, economic disparity, voting records, religious affiliation, and the like. The simplest and most pervasively important number is perhaps the split between the metropolitan and small-town/rural environment. Among the 41 states that had completed their S&G volumes by March 1978, the split was a nearly even 52 to 48 percent. Only four of the states could be called homogeneously metropolitan (at least 80 percent of the population living in metropolitan areas) and only four could be called homogeneously small-town or rural (no more than 20 percent living in metropolitan areas). The standards had to be made applicable to widely varying circumstances, even within the state unit.

Beyond these demographic specifics or cultural patterns in particular states lay the suspicion that smaller jurisdictions hold toward the ambitions of larger ones. It is an American tradition. Many would argue it is a strength. The SPAs have to approach it as an obstacle. But whatever its virtues or lack of them, it exists. The same forces that prevented the National Advisory Commission from generating a consensus across states prevented S&G from generating a consensus within states.

Acceptance of the Standards: Who and Why. In LEAA's original rhetoric and in the ongoing S&G efforts, practice was commonly based on the assumption that acceptance of the standards was a political process. The standards would have behind them the force of public opinion, would be an official statement of policy, perhaps out of the governor's office, would be a topic for public position by state legislators and other political figures. And the standards would be translated into practice because they were in some sense legitimized as being the will of the people.

The problem was that the role envisioned for the public opened up this dilemma.

The issues that should properly be decided by the community, not by the professionals, were also the ones so controversial and so subjective that implementable state-wide standards could seldom be established.

The issues that did lend themselves to standard-setting-technically oriented, confined in scope-were the ones which the public was least qualified to devise or even to judge. Also, they were the ones on which the public could confer the least legitimacy. Correctional officials were not impressed by a lay panel's opinion about how to handle inmate grievances. Judges did not hurry to change court procedures because anyone but another judge (or perhaps lawyers) urged so. Police generally looked uncharitably on the nonprofessionals' pronouncements about how they should allocate their patrol resources.

The concept of public participation is not criticized here. On the contrary: for the product that LEAA sought from the Standards and Goals Program, the role assigned to the public was essential. But for the product that could actually be produced, the public's "ole was both less important and, often, a detriment:

The key constituency for adoption of the standards that could be produced was not the public, but the LE/CJ professionals.

For, regardless of the role that a state decided to give to the professionals in the <code>development</code> process, they automatically, unavoidably stood at the center of the <code>imple-mentation</code> process. Without their active support in legislative hearings, in issuing directives to subordinates, or in complying with directives from the higher-ups, the standards were bound to be stymied.

#### POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR LEAA

Partial successes are typically a rich source of ideas and improvements. The lessons of failures are mostly indirect, except for the central one (don't do it again). Thus our list of concrete suggestions is short, and the indirect lessons are in part speculative. The following pages should be read in that light.

The need for standards is real, once it is recognized that only certain limited areas in LE/CJ lend themselves to standard-setting. Those areas are almost exclusively

technical. Within these limited areas, measures of "good" and "bad," "adequate" and "inadequate" are defined by the craft, and are properly formulated by the craftsmen. In general,

LEAA should support continuing efforts by professional organizations to develop and disseminate standards.

In doing so, enthusiasm for standards, any standards, is inappropriate even when the topics are technical ones. We detect no virtue in institutionalizing fads, or in calling a predilection a standard. Above all,

LEAA should back off from the shotgun endorsement of standards-setting, and choose its targets more selectively.

LEAA is currently sponsoring efforts related to jail standards that come close to the approach that seems most attractive. A specific area of concern is chosen, about which there exists widely shared notions of what the standards should be, and LEAA provides specific incentives (via an accreditation process) for meeting those standards. Picking its targets, LEAA should make headway.

Another legitimate role for LEAA in the development of standards concerns the professional community and the state of knowledge. When the task is put as an injunction to "develop standards," the professional community will tend to act as the S&G commissions did--avoid the controversial topics or water down the "standard" to no real meaning all. task can be put another way: "Here is a topic of great importance on which there should be standards but are not. Why not?" The recommendation is not for a research program; rather, the professional community should take the lead in specifying needs. Is the desirability of any one course of action on topic X really so unclear? Is there a commonly agreed upon "best way," but one that is still politically unpalatable? If the best course-the proper "standard"is in fact still unclear, what outstanding questions must be answered before progress can be made in reaching a standard? Much can be done to pare away fake uncertainties from real ones--if the task put in those terms.

We should stress that the use of professional associations for the purposes we have suggested has practical advantages:

For those standards will rely on voluntary compliance, a well-publicized consensus among peers is probably the most promising approach for promoting wide-spread acceptance.

The S&G experience convincingly demonstrated the limitations of legislation and of administrative fiat in implementing standards. They are cumbersome routes, very seldom used. In the still highly decentralized field of LE/CJ, professional pride may well be the most effective (and often the only feasible) way of promoting implementation.

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The evaluation has focused on concrete indicators of success—changes in LE/CJ practice—and has been unrelievedly negative. The question is legitimate: Might other perspectives yield a different picture?

If the alternative perspective is long-range impact, the answer is surely no. Even when we conducted the field work, the memory of S&G in those states that had completed the process was already vague. Many LE/CJ officials we interviewed had forgotten the project altogether or, if they were new to their jobs, had never heard of it. The transfer of the standards from printing press to the shelf was typically immediate.

But another alternative perspective is more troublesome. It would reject the notion that S&G "had" to be a failure. On the contrary, it would portray the S&G Program as having successfully done its job in many states—until the State Planning Agencies dropped the ball. If the SPAs had put teeth into the standards via their funding and planning decisions, S&G would have worked.

It is an arguable position, especially if "planning linked to standards" is believed to be intrinsically good, a step in the right direction, independently of other considerations. And this is the point at which the S&G experience is potentially most pregnant with implications. For the alternative to blaming the SPA is the one we find more plausible: the SPAs were behaving reasonably by not using the standards as the basis for planning. But if that is the case, then the S&G experience calls into question many of the assumptions behind the LEAA planning process itself. It is a line of logic that we cannot pursue at length with the data at hand. We offer these thoughts.

The LEAA planning process is predicated on the notion that the LE/CJ system possesses the qualities of a genuine system. That it is susceptible to systemic analysis. That functions can be linked across the sectors. That suboptimization of components within the system is a reasonable goal. That issues of efficiency and effectiveness can usually be separated from issues of values. That a state-level funding agency can establish priorities and allocate scarce resources on a more rational basis than the one that would result from a pro-rata distribution of funds.

The S&G experience does not in any sense "refute" these It does provide striking evidence for some competing conditions and competing notions. They stem from this basic observation about the S&G: Given generous time, money, and opportunity, the states were unwilling to set down any but the most innocuous, general statements of how their criminal justice systems should function. With the rarest exceptions, they rejected flat assertions about what constitutes proper practice. They would not set priorities, or would set only very flexible ones. The states differed widely among themselves, reaching anything approaching a "national consensus" on only a handful of items. for local judgments and local options was almost universal. On all of these counts, the S&G experience can be interpreted as at odds with the philosophy behind the elaborate planning approaches for making "rational" use of LEAA funds.

Added to this is the pervasive cynicism about the planning process that existed in virtually every SPA we visited. It was not our job to assess that process. But it became a principal topic of conversation when we discussed integration of the standards into the state plan, and it would be disingenuous to ignore the many remarks heard among the SPAs we visited. The size of the comprehensive plans (sometimes over 1,000 pages) and the incommensurate review period (usually about 30 days) was one source of jokes and Another was the set of Federal requirements that, sarcasm. according to many SPAs, leave them with genuine authority over only 10 or 15 percent of the formula grant funds. "planning tool," the standards were typically seen by their staffs as one more contraption added to an already contrived procedure.

And finally, there were the thoughtful comments we heard about standards as a basis for use of Federal funds and innovation. As noted, the standards that can be enforced most confidently are generally the most prosaic as well--and are inherently likely to be so. Does LEAA really want to channel its money toward these kinds of improvements?

Or does it want the bulk of its money to finance more innovative improvements that local jurisdictions would not initiate on their own and that are not yet appropriately designated as standards? We do not try to make a case for either approach. Tension does exist between them.

Taken together, these considerations point to the possibility that S&G was not an aberration at all, or even a "mistake." Given the way that LEAA wants to go about its business, the Standards and Goals Program may very well have been a sound next step; the right thing to do; the indispensable adjunct to planning that S&G's progenitors said it was. In that light, perhaps there was nothing wrong with the concept behind S&G.

But at the beginning of the chain are the givens of the logic, the same givens that led to the creation of State Planning Agencies, Regional Planning Units, comprehensive state plans, prioritization, funding guidelines, and the rest of the elaborate process that has emerged. If these givens are all that LEAA has assumed, S&G should not have been the failure that it was.

## Appendix A

#### INSTRUMENTATION

The following pages contain copies of the principal instruments used in the course of the Standards and Goals evaluation. The first set represents the protocols taken on the field visits. In all cases, the interviewer filled out the forms. The second set of instruments consists of the mailed questionnaires on LE/CJ practice. Results from the survey are presented in Volume II of the evaluation. The third set of forms (actually, one form) is the internal protocol used for development of the key element analysis presented in Chapter 7 of Volume I, and also used as the basis for the concordance of standards that comprises Volume III.

Field Visit Instruments

## STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION Changes/Interview Notes/Subsequent Followin Information

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	AFAA's Pregrant Interaction with State: Perception of what LEAA				}	[			_ _	.							ļ				-									1
	has Trying to Accomplish								_ -	-																				
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11.	DEVELOPMENT	1				ı	- 1	- 1	- [	1	- 1	1	Ì																	
	Sources of Support and Opposition Inside/Outside the Commission , J.	-					-		-1																		Ll			
	Retrospective Assessment of Commission Organization 9	1-	<del> </del>					- :		-[-					•															
	Staff Selection: Overview	1	<b> </b>					-	_	- -																				
	Relationship with the Governor																													
	Public Hearings: Role, Description, Value	.	ļ			_	_	_ -	_ -	_ .	.															<b> </b>				ļ
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***	Adoption: Procedure used in the State	.,						-		}-																-				
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	Analyses Performed	-						1					1	1														. 1		ĺ
	Application of Priorities: Use of Priorities by State in		<b> </b>						-+					_			<b></b>											_		
	Funding/Planning Decisions in LE/CJ		ļ					- -																						<del></del>
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	Integration of Standards and Goals in the Comprehensive State Plan and Funding Process							$\bot$					l														$\sqcup$			
	Political Context: How does Innovation or Change Occur																					,,						_ _	]	
	Instrumentation Planning: Setting an Overall Strategy	•										[	[					er_												
	S/G or SPA Implementation Activities: Local, State Agencies,	4		-		7		T							}	_												$\perp$ l		L
	Legislative				-	7	7	1	7	_	_	$\neg$																		
	Efforts at local Implementation		1			7	1	丅	$\neg$	1	7				$\neg$													$\Box$		
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v.	STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES  General Assessment of S/G Program and its Impact on State and	<u> </u>	2	3	1	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	<u>16</u>	17	18	19	<u>20</u>	21	22	23_	24	25	_26_	.27_	_28
	General Assessment of S/G Program and its Impact of S/G on Your Agency Local Agencies																												
	State Agencies: Changes Independent of S/G	<u>~</u> 1							-																				
VI.	OTHER Tuture Strategies for State Standards and Coals							1																					

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KEY: C = copy or collect SRS = select representative sample Copied Not available abstract discretionary Abstracted In library Other collected I. PLANNING/ORGANIZATION D Correspondence relating to initial grant Statement of objectives, statement of work and budget summary in all applicable grant applications c C 3. Correspondence/materials relating to technical assistance Correspondence with Governor's office D c Executive orders re S/G Refusals to participate in S/G D 6. C Minutes/materials from meetings between LEAA and State officials SRS Minutes from planning sessions 9. 9. Organizational chart C C 10. Roster of Commission personnel 11. Staff roster and resumes C 12. Staff selection procedures II. DEVELOPMENT Minutes of Commission deliberations SRS Materials prepared by S/G staff for Commission's use C Memoranda/working papers relating to refinement of standards SRS Minutes from public hearings SRS Mailing list for publicity and invitations D 6. Resignations by Commission members D Correspondence with chiefs of state and local LE/CJ agencies re S/G SRS III. ADOPTION/PRIORITIES С Minutes from adoption proceedings 2. C Materials prepared for adoption proceedings C Minutes from priority setting meeting Materials used for priority setting process C List of priorities C IMPLEMENTATION . Minutes from meetings discussing implementation planning Memoranda relating to implementation planning or action C Ċ Memoranda relating to proposed changes in procedure or direction Implementation materials for distribution (if copies of brochures are available, obtain) C C Grants or other formal authorization for implementation efforts Correspondence, internal or with state agencies or localities regarding implementation plans С Reports on current status of standards C V. OTHER State S/G volume C 1977 Comprehensive Plan C Roster of state/local officials C **LEAA DF Progress Reports** С List of all LEAA/SPA grants in support of S/G С Evidence of financial or in-kind state support to S/G С Bibliography of S/G publications C Publicity/press releases SRS VI. PUBLICATIONS IN AIR LIBRARY

STANDARDS AND GOALS

Title Location Date AIR person Code<sup>a</sup> Respondent Phone Nature of contact Further action

<sup>\*</sup> Make sure codes are consistent among team members.

### FIELD VISIT INTERVIEWS

STATE:	

	TITLE	NAME	<b>1</b>	nc lude trea tode)	Vif involved in Standards and Goals Program
LAW ENFORCEMENT	Chief, State Police or Highway Patrol			12.1	
	Director, Police Officer Standards & Training				
	Director, State Bureau of Investigation	•.			
	President, State Sheriff's Association				
	President, State Police Chief's Association			•	
	Chief, Local Police Department Locality:				
	Sheriff Locality:	``			
CORRECTIONS	Director, Adult Corrections				

### FUELD VISIT INTERVIEWS

ST	ATE	
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	TTTLE	NAME	PHONE	(Include Area Code)	Vif involved in Standards and Goals Program
CORRECTIONS	Director, Juvenile Corrections	·			
	Director, Adult Probation				
	Director, Juvenile Probation	•			
	Director, Adult Parole				
	Director, Juvenile Parole			•	
	Director, Community Based Corrections	·			
	Chairman, Parole Board				·

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STATE: √ if involved in (Include Standards and Area Goals Program TITLE 1 NAME PHONE Code) COURTS Attorney General State Court Administrator State Public Defender Chief Justice, State Supreme Court President, District Attorneys Association President, State Bar Association Local District Attorney Locality: Representative, Judicial Council

STATE:				
	TTTLE '	NAME	(The Lude Area PHONE Code)	Vil involved in Standards and Goals Program
YOUTH SERVICES	Director, Youth Services Bureau			·
SOCIAL SERVICES	Director, Department of Social Services			
	Director, Drug/Alcohol Treatment and Prevention Program	•		
LECISLATIVE	Key staff, Senate Judiciary Committee	,	·	
	Key staff, House Judiciary Committee	<b>i</b> .		•
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#### THE REST VEG TO THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF

STATE:				
	TITLE	NAME	(Include Area PHONE Code)	Vif involved in Standards and Goals Program
STANDARDS AND GOALS	S/G Project Director	•		
	Key S/G Staff member(s)			
	S/G Commission Chairman	•		
		<u>'</u> .		
OTHER SUGGESTED INTERVIEWEES		,		,
				a
				·

PLEASE RETURN TO:

Cindy B. Israel
The American Institutes for Research
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW
Washington, D.C., 20007

TITLE	NAME.	ADDRESS	PHONE	APPT, TIME	COMMENTS OR DIRECTIONS
CORRECT IONS					
Director, DOC (Adult )				:	
Director, Juvenile Corrections					
Director, Probation (Adult)					
Director, Probation (Juvenile)		,			
Director, Parole (Adult)	,				
Director, Aftercare		·	•		,
Director, Community Based Corrections					
Parole Board					
madismis-representantis es equestro-do-spressos da 48-48-48-48-58-48-48-48			r <del>до доміна до во</del> го на надзеро фінанського на проводу вого на прободу вого на проводу вого на проводу вого		المراود والمراود و المراود و ا

TITLE	NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	APPT. TIME	COMMENTS OR DIRECTIONS
LAW ENFORCEMENT					
Chief, State Police or Highway Patrol					
Director, POST	- <del> </del>				
Director, State Bureau of Investi- gation	· ·	,			
President, State Sheriff's Assn.					
President, State Police Chief's Assn				,	
Chief, Local Police Department			•		
Sheriff		·.			
		, i			

TITLE	NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	APPT, TIME	COMMENTS OR DIRECTIONS
COURTS Attorney General				:	
Court Administrator	·		programa de relações de la relações de la relações de la relações de la relações de la relações de la relações	ork and an annual section of the sec	
State Public Def.					
Chief Justice			description of the second of t	en eranenankuarankuarankuarankuar	ganda ugung agun buga (Guda) di agun buga mili buga agun buga agun buga agun agun agun agun agun agun agun a
President, District Attorneys Assn.					. В населена видеовивна во в боле в в пово в населения на дошен д населе
President, State Bar Association					
District Attorney, Local	. :		•		
		,			

-		·			
TITLE	NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	APPT. TIME	COMMENTS OR DIRECTIO
YOUTH SERVICES					
Director, Youth Services Bureau				·	
SOCIAL SERVICES					and the second s
Director, Dept. of Social Services					
Director, Drug/ Alcohol Treatment and Prevention Prog.					
LEGISLATIVE		. On the state of			
Key staff, Senat Judiciary Committee					
Key Staff, House Judiciary Committee			•		
Principal sponsor of major leg. or staff					
Person testifying for/against given bill (rep. of state/local agencies or interest groups			•		

TITLE	NAME	ADDRESS	PHONE	APPT. TIME	COMMENTS OR DIRECTIONS
STANDARDS AND GOALS					
S/G Contact, Direc.					
S/G Staff member					
S/G Commission Chairman					
,					
		•			
OTHER	•				
And the second s					

Ar

# LEAA'S PRE-GRANT INTERACTION WITH STATE: Perception of what LEAA was trying to accomplish

1411-	as did VOII holique LEAA was service to askieve have be 5/0 services?
. wn	at did YOU believe LEAA was trying to achieve by the S/G program?
	Relationship to comprehensive planning:
	Relationship to improvement of the LE/CJ system:
	Other comments:
. We	re LEAA's proposed methods and resources for the S/G program in line with these objectives?
. We	re LEAA's proposed methods and resources for the S/G program in line with these objectives?
We	re LEAA's proposed methods and resources for the S/G program in line with these objectives?
. We	re LEAA's proposed methods and resources for the S/G program in line with these objectives?
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	ve had a 5-point scale about LEAA'S EXPLANATION OF WHAT S/G WAS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPL v would you rate it and why? ("1" meaning vague and misleading and "5" meaning a clear and thorough
	ve had a 5-point scale about LEAA'S EXPLANATION OF WHAT S/G WAS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPL v would you rate it and why? ("1" meaning vague and misleading and "5" meaning a clear and thorough
	ve had a 5-point scale about LEAA'S EXPLANATION OF WHAT S/G WAS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPL v would you rate it and why? ("1" meaning vague and misleading and "5" meaning a clear and thorough lanation)
	ve had a 5-point scale about LEAA'S EXPLANATION OF WHAT S/G WAS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPL v would you rate it and why? ("1" meaning vague and misleading and "5" meaning a clear and thorough lanation)
	ve had a 5-point scale about LEAA'S EXPLANATION OF WHAT S/G WAS SUPPOSED TO ACCOMPL v would you rate it and why? ("1" meaning vague and misleading and "5" meaning a clear and thorough lanation)



## DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLANS AND ACTUAL PROCESS: State's S/G Process

Respondent ID:		Interviewer:		
To what extent did actual process that	d vour state's S/G progr	ram as originally conceived d	iffer from the	
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If changes, wh	hy?			
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#### PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND PROCESS: Decisions on Organizational Structure, Rationale, Methods, and Division of Labor

R	espon	ndent ID: Interviewer:	
1.		w was the organizational structure of the project decided upon?  Who did it?	
		How was the decision made?	
		Other comments:	
2.		at was the rationale for the organizational structure? (probe for role of staff, role of Commission, etc.	
3.		v were the Commission members selected?  Procedure:	
		Who selected?	
4.	Out o	of those invited to become members, how many refused? (Note: Names are NOT to be obtained)	otained.
5.	Were	e there any important consequences—good or bad—from absenteeism or resignations?	

6. How	v was the work divided?  Procedure:
	Trocedure.
	People involved:
	Tasks:
	Internal review/development process used:
	Other comments:
about h	vant to discuss the basic planning decisions which were made early in the program ow the Standards and Goals would be developed.  t, the development process. Were the existing sets of Standards (NAC, ABA, etc.) used?
	If yes, how;
8. How	were the topics for standards in your state decided on?
	Who decided?
	Procedure:
	Was a comparative analysis ever done?

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION



# SOURCES OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION INSIDE/OUTSIDE THE COMMISSION

Respondent ID: Interviewer:
Did the Commission meet any resistance or find any support in the state agencies or in important municipal agencies?
(Note: Names of individuals or individual identifiers are NOT to be obtained.)
Critical incidents of resistance:
Critical incidents of support:

Ar

# RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF COMMISSION ORGANIZATION

Respondent ID: Interviewer:	
. How would you assess the Commission's performance?	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
. Suppose you were given the job of hiring and structuring a commission in a new state — what would you do differently and why?	
Organizational structure:	
Relationship to S/G staff:	-7
Functions:	
Qualifications and background of Commission:	

STAFF SELECTION: Overview



1.

Re	espondent ID:	Interviewer:
1.	. Suppose you were given the job of hiring What would you do differently and why?	and structuring a staff in a new state.
	what would you do differently and why	<i>(</i>
	Organizational structure:	
	Qualifications and background of st	taff:
	Functions:	

### S/G INTERFACE WITH THE SPA AND THE COMMISSION



espo	ndent ID: Interviewer:
	Note: Skip this form if Commission was identical with SPA supervisory board.
Fro	m an organizational perspective, how has the S/G project been linked to the SPA?
_	
Has	the S/G director had access to key SPA decisionmakers when necessary?
•	Describe instances where access to SPA helped solve a problem or where lack of access had negative results:
Has	(For the above, obtain one or two critical incidents regarding the nature of the contact or non-contact.) there ever been a need for the Commission to confer with the SPA? If so, how was that accomplished?
<b>a.</b>	Were regular channels between the Commission and the SPA established?
b.	Describe usual nature of interaction between the Commission and the SPA (did the S/G director act as a go-between or was he/she excluded from the picture most of the time?)

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION

### **RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNOR**



spondent ID;		<del>/</del>	Interview	/er:	<b>.</b>	
What role did the	governor play	in the S/G p	process?			
During the	initial phase:					
						<del></del>
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				***************************************	
During deve	elopment:					
•			•			·
·						
<del></del>			<del></del>			
During adop	ption:	-				
	-				·	
				<u> </u>		
				<u> </u>		
During impl	ementation:					
						, - The same and t
***************************************						
	sess the inters	est of the gov	ernor in the S	S/G program?		
Total I	ack	t	1	. I	Active	
of supp	port 1	2	3	4	5 support	
Reasons for	rating:					
<u></u>						
What advan	tages or disad	wantaga baa	this areated f	on the S/G ne		
venat duran	rages or disag	valitayes ilas	tins Greated i	or the ava but		
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·						



### PUBLIC HEARINGS: Role, Description, Value

ondent ID:		<b>-</b>	Interviewer:	<u> </u>		
d you have any pu <b>Why?</b>	ıblic hearings?	Yes	No			
			<u></u>			
	·	•				
Invitees:		rays	•			
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Other comments	:					

2.	2. Timing of public hearings in S/G	process:		
3.	.  3. How was the public feedback used			
				·
		···		
	477			
	William Committee Committe		and the second s	
				· ·
4.	How would you rate the value of 5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	How would you rate the value of 5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	How would you rate the value of 5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ele ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	How would you rate the value of 5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ele ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = ''extremely valuable''?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ele ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ole ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ele ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ale ranging from 1 = "tota	
4.	5 = "extremely valuable"?	the public input on a 1-5 sca	ele ranging from 1 = "tota	

### ADOPTION: Procedure Used in the State



Respo	ondent ID: Interviewer:	
He	nw were the Standards and Goals formally adopted?	
	Procedure used:	
	Who or what group had final authority?	
	When adoption of S/G took place:	
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Other comments:	
Δf	ter formal adoption, what was done with the approved version?	
· ^'	ter formal adoption, what was done with the approved version:	
	To whom were the approved drafts distributed?	
		ove

Legislature:					
·		·	<del></del>	····	
		<del></del>			
Cities and counties:					
		<u> </u>			
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		<del></del>			<del></del>
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Regional planning units	•				
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	Prince Pr		<u> </u>		
		·.			
	<u> </u>				
Professional association	s and special inte	rest groups:			
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·				<del></del>	



# PRIORITIES PROCESS: Priority Setting Method Used/Nature of Analyses Performed

por	ndent ID:			
Has	the S/G Commission set p	riorities among its goals?	Yes	No (describe status below)
1 103	the 370 Commission set p	. To rites among its goals:		
	Comments:			
			<u>.                                    </u>	
			<u>_</u>	
		•		
Cou	ld you describe the method		ual preference	Criteria-based
Cou	ld you describe the method  Description (timing of me	d used? Individu		
Cou		d used? Individu		
Cou		d used? Individu	voting process):	
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Cou		d used? Individu	voting process):	
Cou		d used? Individu	voting process):	

### STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION

PRIORITIES: Utility of the Priorities



Respon	dent ID: Interviewer:
1. Do	the state's priorities make sense to you in terms of:  Cost:
•	The consensus of CJ officials?
	·
	Public support/political acceptability?
	Impact on major crime/criminal justice problems:
	the implementation of the priorities, did you perform any analyses of
	Cost?
	Impact on crime?
•	
•	
	Political feasibility?
•	



## APPLICATIONS OF PRIORITIES: Use of Priorities by State in Funding/Planning Decisions in LE/CJ

Respondent ID: Interviewer:	
1. We are interested in finding out about how the S/G priorities were utilized.	·
Can you describe how they are utilized	
by the SPA?	
	***********
by state LE/CJ agencies?	
by local LE/CJ agencies?	
	~
	&\ <i>U</i>
by others (legislatures, etc.)?	
d)	
	<del>-,</del>



# INTEGRATION OF STANDARDS AND GOALS IN THE COMPREHENSIVE STATE PLAN AND FUNDING PROCESS

	(Obtain description and critical incidents for each positive response.)
Have	e the Standards and Coals been integrated into the comprehensive planning process? Yes No
	Analysis:
	<u> </u>
	Action plan:
	Multiyear plan:
	·
المارية	e grant applicants been made aware of the S/G program? Yes No
mavi	a grant applicants been made aware of the S/G program?
~	
	Have grant applicants requested funds to implement specific Standards and Goals
	within their agencies or programs? (If yes, go to Change Roster and Change Form)

3,	Has the SPA funding process used S/G to reach funding decisions?	Yes	No	•	
		·····			
				·	
				<del></del>	

over



### POLITICAL CONTEXT: How Does Innovation or Change Occur?

espondent ID: Interviewer:
he purpose of the next questions is to get a perspective on the environment surrounding ne S/G program in this state.
he general question is: Are there any special features of the politics and government of this state which we ought to know about?
·
Special characteristics relating to:
The executive branch:
The legislature:

Police/sheriff:	
Courts:	
Corrections:	
Urban/rural relationships:	
Perty politics:	
	•
Aspects of centralization or decentralization in the LE/CJ system:	



### IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING: Setting an Overall Strategy

and Pror char Pror (not state	noting change in city county agencies noting legislative ages requiring legislation) in agencies noting implementation ugh LEAA block funding	Very Low	Low	Moderate	High	Very hi
and Pror char Pror (not state	county agencies noting legislative nges noting procedural changes requiring legislation) in pagencies					
char Pror (not state	noting procedural changes requiring legislation) in pagencies					
Pron thro	noting implementation					
	ugh LEAA block funding					
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# S/G OR SPA IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES: Retrospective Assessment

on	dent ID: · Interviewer:
	•
hat	t is your overall assessment of implementation activities to date in your state?
1	Are you where you thought you would be?
9	Satisfaction with progress to date?
•	
•	
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•	
•	Changes if it were to be done over?
•	Changes if it were to be done over? .
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•	Other comments:
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### **EFFORTS AT LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION**



Respondent ID:		Interviewer:
1. What are the S/G	efforts at the local level?	
Localities wh	ere S/G is active:	
		·



### GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF S/G PROGRAM AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

(for use with state and local officials)

Responden	nt ID:	Interviewer:	
	u had any contact	with the Standards and Goals project in your state? Yes	No
If <u>n</u>		ondent is aware of its existence, ask sheard about it?	
	b. Nature of con		_
	Stage	Type of Interaction (meetings, conference, correspondence)	Frequency
	Initial planning		
	Development (i.e., input		
	to draft)		•
	imple- mentation		
	(i.e., input to draft)		

lave you ever commented on the S/G program either publicly or internally in your agency?	Yes	1NO
Where comment made (e.g., internal meeting, etc.):		
Content of comment:		
Stimulus for comment:		
	<del> </del>	
		*
/hat is your overall assessment of the S/G program? to you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		
o you think it accomplished what it was supposed to accomplish?		



# BASIC STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY FORM: Effect of S/G on your Agency

hat effect will the	s S/G progran	m have on you	ır own agenc	y in the future?			
	0	1	2	3	4	5	
"N	one at all"	i		cale	<u> </u>	"major char in the way v operate"	nges ve
	•			_			
Agency change	s aš a result c	of S/G (if yes,					
							****
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
					<del></del>		
			<del></del>				
it illore runctio	nai for state (	or local officia	als?				
	nai for state (	or local officia	nis? 				
- Thore relieve	nai for state (	or local officia					
	nai for state (	or local οπισιε					
	nai for state (			-			
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	nai for state (			-			
Other comment				-			
				-			
				-			
				-			
				-			
				-			

Ar

### STATE AND LOCAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

(for use with state and local officials)

ndent ID:	Interviewer:
at is your strategy	to implement Standards and Goals on a local level?
at is your strategy	to implement Standards and Goals on a local level:
Did you draw up	any formal plans?
Do you receive (c	or provide) any TA from the state level (S/G office)?
-	
<del></del>	
Who is responsib	le for the implementation?
<del></del>	
<del></del>	
Is there a liaison	person between the locality and the S/G office?
Funding for impl	ementation:

### IMPLEMENTATION: Standards Unacceptable to Users



Respondent ID: Inte	viewer:
. Are there any standards which you do not want to in which you have chosen not to pursue?	mplement or Yes No
COMMENTS AND CRITICAL INCIDENTS: Be were considered by the respondent but NOT imp	as specific as possible about changes which lemented.
. To what extent are these a factor in NOT adopting s	andards:
	Not a factor A minor factor An important factor
The standards themselves are no improvement on existing practice	
We did not hear enough about them	

Political or budget obstacles

Lack of public support

Lack of support within the agency

## STATE AGENCIES: Changes independent of S/G



spondent (C	D: Interviewer:
If you think changes in a	k back over this agency's history during the last five years, what do you see as the most important policies or procedures?
Labels !	(GO TO CHANGE FORM TO RECORD DETAILS)
i	Most important:
1	Next most important:
•	Third most important:
Genera	I comments on the rate and scope of change in the agency:
····	
-	
<del></del>	
-	
Genera	I comments on the way change occurs in the agency:
•	
	,
<del></del> >	



ent ID:			Interviewer:	<del></del>				
there system	any cha that ha	nges which	h should	have	occurred	in	your	agenc
					·			
you th	nink of ge?	anything :	specific	which	n acted as	s a	barr	ier to
Support/lac	ck of support							•
Political sup	port or oppo						· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
		and the second s	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
	port/restraint	<b>s:</b>						
Support or	opposition fr	om LE/CJ profes	sional associat	es:				
Support or	opposition fr	om the general p	ublic:					
Other:				,·				<del></del>
t could	d have d	one to fac	cilitate	the o	change?		-	
			,					
	you the change of the change o	you think of the change? Support/lack of support Political support or opposition from Support Opposition from Support Opposition	you think of anything to change? Support/lack of support from LEAA: Political support or opposition from the leading support or opposition from LE/CJ professupport or opposition from the general pother:	there any changes which should system that have not?  you think of anything specific t change? Support/lack of support from LEAA:  Political support or opposition from the legislature or the support or opposition from LE/CJ professional associate support or opposition from the general public:  Description of the general public:	there any changes which should have system that have not?  you think of anything specific which change? Support/lack of support from LEAA:  Political support or opposition from the legislature or the governor support or opposition from LE/CJ professional associates:  Support or opposition from the general public:	there any changes which should have occurred system that have not?  you think of anything specific which acted as change? Support/lack of support from LEAA:  Political support or opposition from the legislature or the governor:  Budget support/restraints:  Support or opposition from LE/CJ professional associates:  Support or opposition from the general public:	there any changes which should have occurred in system that have not?  you think of anything specific which acted as a t change? Support/lack of support from LEAA:  Political support or opposition from the legislature or the governor:  Support or opposition from LE/CJ professional associates:  Support or opposition from the general public:	there any changes which should have occurred in your system that have not?  you think of anything specific which acted as a barr: change?  Support/lack of support from LEAA:  Political support or opposition from the legislature or the governor:  Budget support/restraints:  Support or opposition from LE/CJ professional associates:  Dipport or opposition from the general public:

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION

**STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES: Priorities** 



ndent ID:	Interviewer:	
your agency.	and Goals for the time being, describe what YOU consider to be the k	key prioritie
		<del></del>
		<del></del>
Priority policy changes high priority):	or objectives (obtain details on why these have	
		<del> </del>
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Priority needs for addit	ional resources:	
		w <del></del>

#### STANDARDS AND GOALS EVALUATION

### **FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR STATE S/G**



tesponden	it ID: Interviewer:
. What ar	e the logical next steps for the S/G program in this state?
Sho	ort-range:
e-makes	
-	
	•
Ins	titutionalization of Standards and Goals:
********	
_	
What she	ould LEAA do to support these next steps?
	·
	·
<del></del>	



### EXPECTATIONS/PERCEPTIONS REGARDING S/G PROGRAM

(for use with S/G staff and Commission)

Re	espondent ID: *Interviewer:
1,	When S/G was initially presented to you, what were your perceptions of what S/G should accomplish and some of the desired outcomes?
2.	To what extent had S/G not accomplished what you initially perceived it should and why?
	Lack of support from staff/state agencies:
	Unrealistic expectations:
	Not enough time, people or resources:
	Lack of experience:
	Other:

### OTHER OUTCOMES



Respondent ID:	Interviewer:	
Most of our discussion of the important which have occurred. Are there and account?	pact of S/G deals with specific changes in criminal justice practice any other effects of the S/G program which should be taken	
	•	
		<del></del>
		<del></del>
	•	
		_

Mail Survey Instruments



## LAW ENFORCEMENT

Respondent		Title	
Agency		Telephone	
Add	dress		
Jur	isdiction(s) served by this agency	Municipality	
Por	oulation of jurisdiction served		
Nu	inber of full time sworn personnel (on payroll)		
Nu	mber of full time non-sworn personnel (on payroll)		
OP	ERATIONS		
1,	Does your agency have written operational policies and procedures regathe following? (check all that apply)	arding	
	Exercise of discretion		
	Arrest procedures/alternatives		
	Emergency response time		
	Conduct and appearance		
	Conducting investigations		
	None of the above		
	Agency policies and procedures are not written		
2.	Do patrol officers conduct followup beyond preliminary investigation	of crimes which occur in their assigned area?	
	□ No		
	Yes, since approximately 19		
3.	Does the number of police officers assigned to a shift very by time of d	lay and by location?	
	□ No		
	Yes, since approximately 19		
	<ul> <li>a. have you ever conducted workload studies to assist y</li> </ul>	rou in allocation of resources?	
	□ No		
	Yes, last study conducted in 19		
4.	Does your agency take reports of some misdemeanors and miscellaneo by telephone without the immediate dispatch of a police officer?	us incidents	
	□ No		
	Yes, when no investigation appears necessary, permitted since	e 19	
	Yes, when higher priority calls for service occur; permitted si	nce 19	
	Yes, (specify other criteria)	; permitted since 19	
	Yes, (specify other criteria)	; permitted since 19	

Omit information on dates when it is not readily available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

5.	Upon apprehension or filing of charges for certain offenses (other than traffic offenses) does your agency ever issue citations or summonses in lieu of taking the suspect into custody?
	□ No
	No, enabling legislation has not yet been enacted
	Yes, for certain less serious felonies, since approximately 19
	Yes, for certain misdemeanors, since approximately 19
6.	Does this agency participate in any formal diversion programs? (check all that apply)
	□ No
	Yes, for certain classes of youthful offenders, since approximately 19
	Yes, for certain classes of drug and/or alcohol abuse, since approximately 19
	Yes, for certain mentally ill offenders, since approximately 19
	Yes, for some misdemeanants, since approximately 19
7.	Has your agency established any of the following programs to encourage members of the public to take an active role in dealing with crime prevention?
	Mark valuables with traceable numbers to discourage theft and fencing. Program established in 19
	Target-hardening of homes. Program established in 19
	Target-hardening of commercial establishments. Program established in 19
	Police auxiliary/reserves. Program established in 19
	Crime prevention among elderly. Program established in 19
	Provide general crime prevention information to the community. Program established in 19
	Other citizen involvement programs (i.e., block-watching, hotline)
	(specify) Program established in 19
	(specify) Program established in 19
	None of the above
8.	Does this agency utilize a crime laboratory?
	No No
	Yes, operated by this agency, since approximately 19
	Yes, operated by another area law enforcement agency, since approximately 19
	Yes, a regional laboratory, since approximately 19
	Yes, a state laboratory, since approximately 19
	• If yes, have federal monies been used to support this effort? No Yes
9.	in your jurisdiction, have criminal justice coordinating councils been established?
	□ No
	Yes, at the state level in 19
	Yes, at the regional level in 19
	Yes, at the county level in 19
	Yes, at the municipal level in 19
	Omit information on dates when it is not readily available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

10.	Was this agency formed or has it been reorganized as a result of const	elidation or re	egionalization?	
	□ No			
	Yes, took place in 19			
	<ul> <li>Have federal funds been used in order to facilitate or initiate the above change?</li> </ul>	☐ No	☐Yes	
11.	Whether or not you have been reorganized with other police agencies and other neighboring agencies combined any of the following services.		l that apply)	
	No services combined			
	communications, combined in 19			
	records, combined in 19			
	staff, combined in 19			
	crime laboratory, combined in 19			
	purchasing, combined in 19			
	metro investigation squads, combined in 19			
	organized crime units, combined in 19			
	training facilities, combined in 19			
	other (specify)		combined in 19	
	other (specify)		combined in 19	
12.	Has your state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowe		<del></del>	
	state minimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?			
	□ No			
	Yes, enacted in 19			
	If yes, does the commission inspect local ager compliance on selection standards?	ncies for		
	☐ No			
	Yes, since 19			
13.	Please check all activities included in your employee recruitment and	selection pro	cess:	
	written test of mental ability or aptitude, since approximat	tely 19		
	oral interview, since approximately 19			
	physical examination, since approximately 19			
	physical audity test, since approximately 19			
	psychological examination, since approximately 19			
	polygraph examination, since approximately 19	_		
	in-depth background investigation, since approximately 19			
	other (specify)		since approximately 19	
	other (specify)			
	other (specify)			
	other (specify)			
	None of the above		The second secon	

Omit information on dates when it is not readily available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

14.	Does your adency reduits usw bours officers to usas some conside educations		
	☐ No		
	Yes, some college credit, required since 19		
	Yes, at least an associate degree, required since 19		
	Yes, at least a bachelor's degree, required since 19		
15.	Is there a minimum requirement for basic entry level training of sworn personnel?		
	☐ No		
	Yes; check all that apply:		
	recommended state minimum ofhours		
	mandatory agency requirement ofhours		
	mandatory state requirement of hours		
16.	Do you have access to regional or state training centers?		
	□ No .		
	Yes, have had access since approximately 19		
	<ul> <li>If yes, have Federal funds been used in order to facilitate or initiate t</li> </ul>	his activity? No	Yes
17.	Does your agency provide incentives for officers to achieve a college education?		
	☐ No		
	Yes (check all responses below that apply) Use	d Federal funds? No Yes	
	Provides adjustment of work hours to facilitate attending classes. A practice since 19		
	Provides financial assistance to defray expenses (e.g., books, tuition, etc.) A practice since 19		
	Provides incentive pay. A practice since 19		
	Uses college credit as a criterion for promotion.  A practice since 19		
	Other (specify)		
	A practice since 19		
	Other (specify)		
	A practice since 19		
18.	Has your agency civilianized positions within the organization? (By civilianization, staffing positions formerly occupied by sworn personnel with nonsworn personnel.)	we mean )	
	□ No		
	Yes, since approximately 19		
	a. type of position civilianized (check all that apply)		
	clerical support		
	traffic control		
	dispatch/communication		
	iail/security		
	motor transport		
	other (specify)		
	other (specify)		
	b total number of positions dividianted in the past 5 years		

Omit information on dates when it is not readily available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.



## **PROSECUTION**

Respondent	Title '	
Agency	Telephone	
Address		
Jurisdiction(s) served by this agency: State County	Municipality	
Population of jurisdiction served:		
Number of full-time prosecutors (on payroll):		
Number of full-time support personnel (on payroll):		
	- 	
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION		
1. Does your office employ any of the following types of personnel?	(check all that apply)	
	ral funds used? No Yes	
3. Do you have staff primarily assigned to screen cases?		
☐ No		
No, but the police department does, since 19		
Yes, we have a formal screening unit, since 19		
Yes, we assign an assistant to perform this function, since	19	
4. Does your state have a formal ethics code for police officials and e	employees?	
☐ No		
Yes , since 19		

5.	or calendaring cases?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19 The system is: manual computerized combination of both
6.	In your jurisdiction, have criminal justice coordinating councils been established?
	☐ No
	Yes, at the state level in 19
	Yes, at the regional level in 19
	Yes, at the county level in 19
	Yes, at the municipal level in 19
• 1	PROSECUTION POLICIES AND JUDICIAL PRACTICES
7.	Has your office aided the police in developing written guidelines for taking persons into custody?
	Yes, since 19
8.	Upon apprehension or filing of charges for certain offenses, does this jurisdiction ever issue citations or summonses in lieu of taking persons into custody?
	□ No
	Yes, for certain misdemeanors, since 19
	Yes, for certain less serious felonies, since 19
9.	May complaints be filed or arrest warrants be issued without formal approval of your office?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
10.	Are judicial officers authorized by law to release on recognizance?
	□ No
	- Yes
11.	In your jurisdiction, how soon after arrest must a defendant be brought before a judicial officer if a citation has not been issued?
	● Within hours days, since 19
12.	Does your office participate with or make recommendations to the court regarding pre-trial release of defendants?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19

13.	Does your agency utilize diversion for some detendants in field of prosecutions
	☐ No
	Yes, for the following: (check all that apply)
	first offenders, since 19 certain youthful offenders, since 19
	certain classes of misdemeanor offenders, since 19
	certain classes of felony offenders, since 19
	certain offenders suffering from some mental disease or psychologica abnormality which was related to the crimes for which treatment is available, since 13
	irrespective of offense when circumstances dictate, since 19
14.	If your agency utilizes diversion, do you have written guidelines which govern your decision making?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
15.	Have preliminary hearings been eliminated in misdemeanor cases?
	No
	Yes, since 19
16.	In your jurisdiction, how are grand jury indictments utilized? (check all that apply)
	Not at all
	Not at all, but criminal informations are used
	In all criminal cases
	For serious offenses only
	For investigative purposes only
	In all cases unless waived
17.	Has your agency abolished plea negotiations?
	☐ No
	Yes, but only for certain classes of offenders and offenses, since 19
	Yes, since 19
18.	If your agency does engage in plea negotiation practices, do you have written guidelines governing this practice?
	☐ No
	Yes, since 19
	Not applicable

19.	If plea negotiation is practiced in your office, must the agreement be presented in open court and placed on the record?
	□ No
	Yes, agreements must be presented in open court but are not placed on the record, since 19
	Yes, since 19
	Not applicable
•	PROSECUTOR HIRING AND TRAINING
20.	Are all prosecutors in your jurisdiction required to serve full-time?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
21.	Are new assistant prosecutors required to participate in entry-level training and orientation programs?
	☐ No
	No, but participation is recommended, since 19
	Yes, prior to taking office, since 19
	Yes, in the first year, since 19
22.	Are assistants and prosecutors in your office required to participate in continuing legal education programs annually?
	□ No
	No, but participation is recommended, since 19
	Yes, since 19



## CORRECTIONAL ADMINISTRATOR

Res	pondent	Title			
	ncy				
Add	dress	Telep	hone		****
Nur	mber of full time personnel (on payroll):				
-					
GE	NERAL POLICIES				
1.	When was the last time the State Code governing the correc was comprehensively revised?	tional system			
	• 19 (give exact year if known)	•			
	<ul> <li>a. If the code was revised within the last 3 years, periodicate the principal changes it created:</li> </ul>	please briefly			
,					
2.	Is there a master plan for all aspects of the correctional syst				
	No	Used Fede	ral funds? Yes		
	No, but such a plan is now being developed				
	Yes, in approximately 19				
3.	Are any facilities for ADULTS being constructed, renovate	d, or planned in this sta	ite?		
	No (please indicate reason)				
	present facilities are adequate				
	lack of revenues				
	it is a matter of policy not to expand faci	ilities, since 19	•		
	other (specify)				····
		·			
		•			
	Yes (indicate types of facilities involved)	under renovation number capacity	being planned number capacity		nstructed capacity
	community based		1		1
	temporary quarters			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	minimum facility			<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	medium facility				<u> </u>
	maximum facility		!	í	!

	Are any facilities for JUVENILES being constructed,	renovated, o	or planned i	in this	state?				
	No (please indicate reason)								
	present facilities are adequate								
	!ack of revenues								
	it is a matter of policy not to expar	nd facilities.	since appro	ximate	lv 19				
	other (specify)								
	Other (specify)				·				
	Yes (indicate types of facilities involved)								
	Tos (maissate types of facilities invertes)	under re	enovation	bei	ng planr	ned	being co	onstruc	ted
		number	capacity	numb	er ca	pacity	number	cap	city
	community based		<u> </u>	ļ	<u> </u>			-	
	temporary quarters		1 						
	secure detention		<u>i</u>		i			<u> </u>	
	non-secure detention		1					<u>i</u>	
	maximum security				i			<u> </u>	
	training schools		!						
	camps/ranches							i 	
5.	Which of the following actions (if any) have been tak the operation of local correctional facilities?	en with resp	ect to						
	are operation or rotal correctional resultation.			Δ	pproxi		npliance ,		ederal
	☐ Na assign			-	ipp. cm.		s'	-	us!
	No action			m	ate year		s · volun-	Jsed Fr Fun No	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the	e operation o	of these fac	m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
			of these fac	m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the	cilities	of these fac	m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local face	cilities	of these fac	m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local fac Transfer of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
6	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities  Other (please specify)	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
6.	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes
6.	Establishment of state-wide standards for the Establishment of state inspection of local facilities to direct state con State subsidy of local facilities Other (please specify)  Has this state enacted legislation limiting the jurisdict	cilities		m ac F	ate year	mand	s · volun-	Fun	Yes

### • SENTENCING

7.	which of the following best characterizes the most prevalent method of sentencing adult offenders under current state law?
	Indeterminate sentencing, since approximately 19
	Presumptive or "flat-time" sentencing, since approximately 19
	Mandatory sentencing, since approximately 19
	Other (describe briefly)
8.	Are the courts in this state authorized by law to specify a minimum sentence that must be served before parole eligibility if a minimum sentence is not specified in the statute?
	No .
	Yes, authorized since approximately 19
	what limits are set on the length of such a sentence?
9.	Does the state penal code stipulate maximum sentences for felonies?
	□ No
	Yes
	<ul> <li>a. what is the maximum sentence that can be imposed on offenders not specifically found to represent a substantial danger to others</li> </ul>
	for felonies other than murder? years
	b. what is the maximum sentence that can be imposed on any offender for felonies other than murder?  years
10.	Are pre-sentence reports usually made available to convicted defendants and to the prosecutors prior to sentencing?
	□ No
	Yes, to defendants only, since approximately 19
	Yes, to prosecutors only, since approximately 19
	Yes, to both, since approximately 19
11.	Are courts in this state required by law to grant all offenders full credit for time served in custody while awaiting trial or appeal?
	□ No
	Yes, required since approximately 19
12.	Are the courts prohibited by law from imposing concurrent sentences on both offenders already under sentence for prior crimes and those convicted of multiple offenses?
	No, since approximately 19
	Yes, prohibited for offenders already under sentence, since approximately 19
	Yes, prohibited for offenders convicted of multiple offenses, since approximately 19
	Yes, prohibited for both of the above, since approximately 19

13.	Are the courts in this state required by law to specify in the official court record the reasons for imposing a specific sentence?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
14.	In courts with more than one judge, do the judges meet regularly in sentencing councils to discuss individuals awaiting sentencing?
	□ No
	Yes, sentencing councils have been established since approximately 19
15.	Does state law provide for the appeal of a sentence to a state court or other body on the grounds that the sentence is excessive, inappropriate, or unjustifiably disparate when compared with cases of a similar nature?
	☐ No
	Yes, appeal permitted to a higher court, since approximately 19
	Yes, appeal permitted to another court at the same level as the sentencing court, since approximately 19
	Yes, appeal permitted to an independent body, since approximately 19
	Yes, other(specify)
	, since approximately 19
16.	Do the courts in this state retain jurisdiction over sentenced adult offenders?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
	Yes, since 19  a. for what period is jurisdiction retained?
	a. for what period is jurisdiction retained?
	a. for what period is jurisdiction retained? continuous jurisdiction
	a. for what period is jurisdiction retained?
	a. for what period is jurisdiction retained?  continuous jurisdiction  other (specify)  b. are the courts authorized to reduce or modify sentences? (check all that apply)
	a. for what period is jurisdiction retained?  continuous jurisdiction  other (specify)  b. are the courts authorized to reduce or modify sentences? (check all that apply)

### • PROGRAMS

17.	Has there been any effort to deinstitutionalize the juvenile corrections system in this state?
	□ No
	No, but such a program is being considered
	Yes, now in process, to be completed in
	Yes, completed
	<ul> <li>a. which of the following approaches have been attempted (check more than one if appropriate)</li> </ul>
	use of facilities in other states uncler contract agreement, since approximately 19
	use of federal facilities under contract agreement, since approximately 19
	use of local facilities under contract agreement, since approximately 19
	use of private facilities under contract agreement, since approximately 19
	closing of state institutions, since approximately 19
	accelerated release of persons from custody, since approximately 19
	subsidy incentives to local agencies to encourage use of local rather than state facilities, since approximately 19
	other (please specify)
	, since approximately 19
	b. please indicate current effect of the program
	<ul> <li>number of juveniles in custody decreased by%</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>number of adjudicated status offenders institutionalized decreased by%</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>number of adjudicated delinquents institutionalized decreased by%</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>number of pre-adjudicated juveniles institutionalized decreased by%</li> </ul>
	• other effects (specify)
18.	Does this agency have STATUTORY AUTHORITY to operate a post-commitment reception and diagnostic center for new inmates?
	No, authority withheld by specific provision, since approximately 19
	Statute neither grants nor withholds such authority
	Yes, authority granted by specific provision, since approximately 19
	does this agency operate a reception and diagnostic center?
	□ No
	Yes, established in approximately 19

Omit information on dates when it is not readily available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

19.	Is participa	ation of inmates in programs of treatment or rehabilitation mandatory?	
	☐ No	No, participation is strictly on a voluntary basis, since approximately 19	_
		es, most programs are mandatory	
20.		f the following <u>EXPLICITLY</u> or <u>FORMALLY</u> affected by the ion of inmates in treatment or rehabilitation programs? (check all that apply)	
		The probability that an inmate will be granted parole	
		The eligibility of inmates to receive special privileges	
		The rate at which the inmate is awarded "good time"	
		Other (please specify)	
		None of the above	
21.	Are the foi	.  bllowing programs for inmates available in your agency? (check all that apply)	
		Educational programs	
		Vocational programs	
		Job placement programs	
		Physical and recreational programs	
<b>22</b> .	Does this ag	gency offer or make available drug prevention and drug treatment o inmates?	
	<b>-</b>	No programs are offered or available	
		Yes (check all that apply) Used F	ederal funds? o Yes
		we have our own program, since approximately 19	
		we contract with government social service agencies, since approximately 19	
		we contract for services with private social services agencies, since approximately 19	
		<ul> <li>have the institutional drug treatment programs developed relationships with community programs so that inmates receive continuing treatment upon release?</li> </ul>	
		No	
		Yes, since approximately 19	

23.	Are there any institutions in the state that operate co-correctional programs (a program that permits daily contact between men and women inmates)?
	□ No
	No, but such programs are being planned
	No, such programs were tried and abandoned
	Yes (check all characteristics that apply)
	share common building, since approximately 19
	share eating facilities, since approximately 19
	share recreation facilities, since approximately 19
	other (specify) since approximately 19
	other (specify)since approximately 19
24.	Approximately what proportion of the persons now in custody are housed by themselves in an individual cell or room?
	Adults %
	Juveniles %
25.	Are private industries utilized in the agency's vocational training program?
	No, agency does not operate a vocational training program
	☐ No
	Yes, private industry provides: (check all that apply)
	machinery and other equipment
	plant space  committed job slots for released offenders
	other (specify)
26.	Are adult inmate wages set according to the prevailing wage paid for comparable work in private industry?
	☐ No
	No, was attempted but was abandoned  Used Federal funds?  No Yes
	Yes, but only on an experimental basis
	Yes, since approximately 19
27.	What is the wage paid to inmates employed in prison industries?
	A flat rate of \$ per hour Since 19
	A flat rate of \$ per day Since 19
	Other

	Does your agency operate a work-release program?	
	No, have no authority to do so	
	No, but do have the authority	
	No, did so in the past, but discontinued operations	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
	<ul> <li>a. if you have a work release program curn approximately what percentage of your participates in this program at any one t</li> </ul>	population
	b. has this proportion increased, decreased about the same in the past 3 years?	, or remained
	no change	
	increased % (approximate)	ate)
	decreased % (approxim	ate)
	c. what is the primary reason for the chan-	ge in participation?
	general economic conditions char	nged
	eligibility requirements were revis	
	other (specify)	
	Other (specify)	
29.	Does your agency operate an educational release program	_
		7
		7
	No, have no authority to do so	
		Used Federal funds? No Yes
	No, have no authority to do so	Used Federal funds?
	No, have no authority to do so No, but do have the authority	Used Federal funds?
30.	No, have no authority to do so No, but do have the authority No, did so in the past but discontinued it	Used Federal funds? No Yes
30.	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19	Used Federal funds? No Yes
30.	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially questions.	Used Federal funds? No Yes
30.	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially query no, have no authority to do so	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?
80.	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially query no, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?
30.	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially question.  No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?  No Yes  following be
	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially quality not not authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does state law or other authority require that any of the	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?  No Yes  following be tok all that apply)
	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially quality in the no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does state law or other authority require that any of the physically separated in local correctional facilities? (check	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?  No Yes  following be k all that apply) enders, since approximately 19
	No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does your agency allow home furloughs for custodially quantum No, have no authority to do so  No, but do have the authority  No, did so in the past but discontinued it  Yes, since approximately 19  Does state law or other authority require that any of the physically separated in local correctional facilities? (check adjudicated and non-adjudicated juvenile status offer	Used Federal funds?  No Yes  ualified inmates?  Used Federal funds?  No Yes  following be k all that apply) enders, since approximately 19  approximately 19  approximately 19

32.	Does this agency utilize halfway houses or other types of c pre-release centers for inmates?	ommunity-based
	No, have no authority to do so	
	No, but do have the authority	Used Federal funds? No Yes
	No, did so in the past but discontinued it	165
	Yes, since approximately 19	
33.	What is the maximum period an inmate can be held in:	Number of days Number of days can be held between review
	a. administrative segregation confinement	
	b. disciplinary detention or punitive segregation	
	an independent agency or body outside to agency, since approximately 19	edure, since approximately 19  vorks, since approximately 19  al department or agency, since approximately 19  the correctional department
35.	Does this agency give prisoners the right to legal counsel de hearings (hearings that may result in penalties or deprivation).	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
	is counsel provided at major disciplinary he prisoners unable to afford a private attorney.	earings for ey?
	□ No	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
36.	Does this agency have statutory authority to permit a person	on to examine his or her criminal record?
	☐ No	
	Yes, since approximately 19	

37.	those pardoned) restore civil rights of offenders?
	□ No
	Yes, for some but not all civil rights
	Yes, for all civil rights
	Yes, but only if fully discharged
38.	Is an ex-offender in this state barred from any specific occupations? (check more than one if applicable)
	□ No
	Yes, for certain occupations requiring a state license
	Yes, for certain occupations that bar those convicted of specific offenses

	Does this agency operate an information system that transaction statistics (OBTS) and/or computerized cri	maintains offende minal history reco	ords (CCH)?		
	No, neither		ral funds used? lo Yes		
	Yes, both, since approximately 19				
	OBTS only, since approximately 19				
	CCH only, since approximately 19	_			
10.	Does this agency periodically analyze its performance recidivism data or some other performance measure?	on the basis of			
	☐ No				
	Yes, recidivism data, since approximately 19		·		
	Yes, other (specify)	····			
	• How frequently is performance examined?	Monthly	Quarterly	Yearly	
		Other (speci	fy)		
41.	Does your agency require a minimum period of training	ng for			
		No minimum	Entry level minimum hours	In-service minimum hours	Since approxi- mately what ye
	a. correctional officers				
	b. classification counselors				
	c. probation and parole agents				
	d. caseworkers				
	<ul> <li>e. other employees who will have daily contact with inmates</li> </ul>				
					•
42.	Do you have a minimum education requirement for el correctional officers?	ntry level			
	No				
	Yes, at least				
	junior high school diploma				
	🛄 high school diploma				
	some college credit, since approxim	ately 19			
	college degree, since approximately	19			
	other alternative requirements relate	ed to education			
	<del></del>				
	Express of the Control of the Contro		And the second s		

Does your agency provide incentives for employees to continue their education?
☐ No
Yes (check all responses below that apply)
provides adjustment of work hours to facilitate attending classes
provides financial assistance to defray expenses (e.g., books, tuition, etc.)
provides incentive pay
uses college credit as a criterion for promotion
other (specify)
other (specify)
Does this agency recognize the right of correctional employees to negotiate collectively?
□ No
Yes, by statute, since approximately 19
Yes, as a matter of agency policy, since approximately 19
Are correctional employees prohibited by law from engaging in work stoppages or other job actions?
□ No ·
Yes, since 19
• what penalties are imposed in the event of a work stoppage or other job action?
termination of employment
suspension
loss of seniority
demotion
loss of pay
legal prosecution
other (specify)



## COURT ADMINISTRATOR

Respondent	Title	
Agency	Telephone	
Address		
Jurisdiction(s)	served by this agency: State County Municipality	
Population of	jurisdiction served:	
Number of ful	II-time judicial personnel (on payroll):	
Number of fu	ill-time non-judicial personnel (on payroll):	
• ORGANI	ZATION AND ADMINISTRATION	
1. Are any	of the following characteristics of a unified court system in your state? (check all that apply)	
	fully state-financed system, since 19	
	partially state-financed system, since 19	
	central administration by a state court administrator (this would include	
	states where regional or district administrators provide services to individual courts),	since 19
	complete administrative rule-making authority vested in the chief justice, the court of last resort, or a judicial council, since 19	
	one personnel system for the state judicial officers (judges) not including special magistrates, justices of the peace, etc., since 19	
	one personnel system for all non-judicial personnel, since 19	
	one state general trial court system, since 19	
	one state limited jurisdiction or lower court system, since 19	
	other (specify)	, since 19
	our state have a statewide or local/regional judicial coordinating council to monitor vide advice on the administration of your court system? (check all that apply)	
	No	
	Yes, a statewide council, since 19	
	Yes, local or regional coordinating councils, since 19	
	ur state judicial system utilize local court administrators? nore than one response, if appropriate)	
	Νο	
	No, but local court clerks perform functions similar to that of a court administrator, since 19	
	Yes, for general jurisdiction trial courts, since 19	
	Yes, for limited jurisdiction courts, since 19	
	Yes, for juvenile courts, since 19	
	Yes, for trial courts with five or more judges or a high caseload, since 19	
	Other (specify)	, since 19

₹.	for the court system?
	□ No
	No, these functions are performed by the judicial coordinating councils, since 19
	Yes, one person provides this service part-time, since 19
	Yes, one person provides this service full-time, since 19
	Yes, part of the duties of an existing unit, since 19
	Yes, a unit is assigned to these functions full-time, since 19
5.	Do the courts of general jurisdiction in your state utilize computerized or manual information systems for any of the following functions: (check all that apply)
	case docketing and calendaring , since 19
	notice to parties and/or counsel, since 19
	notice to prospective or panelled jurors, since 19
	other (specify)
	other (specify) , since 19
6.	In your state, have criminal justice coordinating councils (that cut across courts, corrections, and law enforcement) been established?  No
	Yes, at the state level in 19
	Yes, at the regional level in 19
	Yes, at the county level in 19
	Yes, at the municipal level in 19
•	POLICY, PROCESS, AND PROCEDURE
7.	Is it a statewide policy that citations or summonses may be issued in lieu of taking suspects into custody?
	☐ No
	Yes, since 19
	If yes, for what types of offenses is this a policy?
	for certain misdemeanors, since 19
	for certain less serious felonies, since 19
	other (specify) since 19
8.	Is commercial bailbonding permitted in your state?
	□ No
	Yes, but it has been severely restricted, since 19
	Yes, without substantial restrictions, since 19

5.	processing of a criminal case? (check all that apply)	
	☐ No	
	Yes, defendants must be brought before a magistrate or judicial officer within hours days, since 19	
	Yes, misdemeanor cases must come to trial withindays, since 19	
	Yes, felony cases must come to trial within days, since 1.9	
	If yes, how was this standard established?	
	court rule	
	statute	
	other (specify)	
10.	In your state, how are grand jury indictments utilized? (check all that apply)	
	Not at all	
	Not at all, but criminal informations are , since 19	
	Yes, in all criminal cases, since 19	
	Yes, for serious offenses only, since 19	
	Yes, for investigative purposes only, since 19	
11.	Are pre-trial conferences or omnibus hearings commonly utilized	
	in criminal proceedings in your state?	
	No	
	Yes, since 19	
4.5		
12.	How is pretrial discovery in criminal cases utilized in your court system?	
	Unlimited discovery for prosecution and defense, since 19	
	Unlimited, if defendant agrees, since 19	
	Only the defendant is entitled to full discovery, since 19	
	Other (specify)	, since 19
13.	Has your state abolished plea negotiations?	
	☐ No	
	Yes, since 19	
	Yes, but only for certain classes of offenders and offenses, since 19	

14.	In your state, who questions potential jurors for criminal trials? (check all that apply)
	Jury commissioner or clerk
	Trial court judge only
	Counsel for both sides and trial judge
	Counsel for both sides only
	Other (specify)
15.	Are juries of fewer than 12 persons ever utilized in criminal proceedings in your state?
	No, all juries must have 12 persons, since 19
	Yes, but only for certain classes of offenses, since 19
	Yes, for all classes of offenses, since 19
16.	Are presentence reports made available to counsel and/or defendants prior to sentencing in your trial courts?
	□ No
	Yes, but only counsel may see reports, since 19
	Yes, but only defendants may see reports, since 19
	Yes, both defendants and counsel may see reports, since 19
17.	In your state has jury sentencing been abolished?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
• J	UDICIAL PERSONNEL POLICY AND PRACTICE
18.	How do the general jurisdiction judges in your state come to the bench?
	Elected on partisan ballot by the public, since 19
	Elected on non-partisan ballot by the public , since 19
	Elected by the state legislature , since 19
	Appointed by the governor acting alone , since 19
	Appointed by the governor with the assistance of a judicial nominating commission, bar, or legislature, since 19
	Other (specify)

19.	Does your state maintain a comprehensive judicial education program?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
	<ul><li>If yes, does the program offer the following services: (check all that apply)</li></ul>
	orientation for new judges
	annual judicial college
	regular program for sitting judges special programs (seminars, etc.)
	benchbooks, manuals, etc.
	newsletters
	sabbatical leave for research/educational purposes
20.	Does your state have a judicial conduct commission or other body that may remove or discipline judges?
	□ No
	No, but action by the legislature is available, since 19
	Yes, since 19
	Yes, but for discipline only, since 19
	Yes, but for removal only, since 19
• J	UVENILE JUSTICE
21.	In your trial court system, has a separate family court or division been established
	(to handle domestic disputes, welfare matters, delinquency cases, etc.)?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
22.	Are juvenile status offenders (those accused of actions which would not be criminal if committed by an adult) under the jurisdiction of your juvenile courts?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19
23.	Are juvenile dispositional hearings separate from adjudicatory hearings in your court system?
	□ No
	Yes, since 19





## PUBLIC DEFENDER

Resp	Respondent Title	
Agen	Agency	<u></u>
Addr	Address Telephone	
Juris	Jurisdiction(s) served by this agency: State County Municipality	
Popu	Population of jurisdiction served:	
Num	Number of full-time defenders:	
Num	Number of full-time support personnel:	
1.	<u> </u>	
	Exclusively funded by the state, since 19	
	Partially funded by the local jurisdiction and partially by the state, since 19	
	Financed totally by local funds, since 19	
	Financed by funds other than above, since 19	
2.	2. Does your agency maintain its main office or satellite offices in those neighborhoods where the majority of your clients reside?	
	□ No	
	Yes, main office only, since approximately 19	
	Yes, main office and satellite offices, since approximately 19	
	Yes, satellite offices only, since approximately 19	
3.	3. Does your agency manage or coordinate a panel of private attorneys who may serve indigent defendants in your jurisdiction?	
	□ No	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
	a. do you provide these attorneys with any of the following services: (check	all that apply)
	training	
	investigative services	
	other support services	• .
4.	4. Is your agency:	
	part of a statewide system, since 19	
	part of a locally based system, since 19	
	locally-based independent office, since 19	
	Other (specify)	since 19

5.	Have caseload standards been established for your detender office?
	☐ No
	. Yes, since approximately 19
	a. please indicate caseload per attorney by category
	misdemeanors per year
	• felonies per year
	• appeals per year
	• juvenile proceedings per year
	b. were officially recognized standards utilized in establishing these caseloads?
	□ No
	Yes: NAC ABA NLDA State Standards
	Other (specify)
6.	Does your agency have an information system for the weighting, tracking, or calendaring of cases?
	□ No
	No, but we hope to institute a system soon
	Yes, we have had a manual system, since approximately 19
	Yes, we have had a computerized system, since approximately 19
7.	In your jurisdiction, have criminal justice coordinating councils been established?
	□No
	Yes, at the state level, in 19
	Yes, at the regional level in 19
	Yes, at the county level in 19
	<u> </u>
	Yes, at the municipal level in 19
8.	When is the earliest time public representation is available to eligible defendents in criminal cases?
	during investigatory stages in which client is a likely suspect, since 19
	immediately upon arrest, since 19
	at the first court appearance, since 19
	other (specify) since 19
9.	Do you represent inmates at detention facilities in any proceeding affecting detention or early release?
	□ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
10.	Does your agency have a formal written policy to guide staff attorneys for plea negotiation practices?
	□ No
	Yes since approximately 19

11.	Do you represent indigent probationers at any proceeding affecting probationary status?
	□ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
12.	Does your agency provide legal services to inmates who desire to appeal or collatorally attack convictions?
	□ No ·
	Yes, since approximately 19
13.	Do you provide representation to indigent parcless at any parole revocation hearings?
	☐ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
14.	Who determines whether an individual may qualify for public representation?
	Public defender
	The court
	the prosecutor
	other (specify)
15.	Are individuals who are provided public representation required to pay any portion of the cost of that representation?
	□ No
	Yes, costs assessed based on ability to pay, since approximately 19
	The second to the terms of the
	Yes, costs assessed in full, since approximately 19
	Yes, costs assessed in full, since approximately 19
16.	
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19  Does your agency utilize diversion?
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19  Does your agency utilize diversion? (check more than one response, if appropriate)
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19  Does your agency utilize diversion? (check more than one response, if appropriate)  No  Yes, when appropriate for certain
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19  Does your agency utilize diversion? (check more than one response, if appropriate)  No  Yes, when appropriate for certain classes of drug offenders. Policy since 19
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19  Does your agency utilize diversion? (check more than one response, if appropriate)  No  Yes, when appropriate for certain classes of drug offenders. Policy since 19  Yes, when appropriate for certain classes of of youthful offenders. Policy since 19  Yes, when it is likely that the offender is suffering from some mental illness or psychological abnormality which was related to the crime and for which treatment is
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19
16.	Yes, other (specify), since approximately 19
	Poes your agency utilize diversion? (check more than one response, if appropriate)  No  Yes, when appropriate for certain classes of drug offenders. Policy since 19  Yes, when appropriate for certain classes of of youthful offenders. Policy since 19  Yes, when it is likely that the offender is suffering from some mental illness or psychological abnormality which was related to the crime and for which treatment is available. Policy since 19  Yes, when appropriate for first offenders for certain offenses. Policy since 19  Yes, other (specify)  Has your agency formulated plans for the provision of defense services

18.	How is the public defender selected in your jurisdiction?
	elected, since approximately 19
	appointed by the court, since approximately 19
	appointed by a commission, since approximately 19
	appointed by a state public defender, since approximately 19
	other (specify)
19.	is the public defender in this jurisdiction employed on a full time basis?
	No
	Yes, since 19
20.	Do chief public defenders serve for a fixed term?
	☐ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
	<ul><li>If yes, length of term is years</li></ul>
21.	Is compensation for the chief public defender in your jurisdiction
	equivalent to the chief prosecutor
	equivalent to the presiding judge of the trial court of general jurisdication
	a salary determined independent of above described options
22.	Are assistant public defenders civil service employees?
	☐ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
23.	Are new public defenders required to participate in an entry level training or orientation program?
	No
	Yes, since approximately 19
24.	Are assistant public defenders required to participate in a program of continuing legal education?
	☐ No
	Yes, since approximately 19





## LAW ENFORCEMENT

Res	spondent	Title
Age	ency	Telephone
Add	dress	
Jur	isdiction(s) served by this agency	Municipality
Pop	pulation of jurisdiction served	
Nu	mber of full time sworn personnel (on payroll)	
Nu	mber of full time non-sworn personnel (on payroll)	
-		
UP	ERATIONS	
1.	Does your agency have written operational policies and procedures re the following? (check all that apply)	garding
	Exercise of discretion	
	Arrest procedures/alternatives	
	Emergency response time	
	Conduct and appearance	
	Conducting investigations	
	None of the above	
	Agency policies and procedures are not written	
2.	Do patrol officers conduct followup beyond preliminary investigation	n of crimes which occur in their assigned area?
	□ No	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
3.	Does the number of police officers assigned to a shift vary by time of	day and by location?
	□ No	
	Yes, since approximately 19	
	<ul> <li>a. have you ever conducted workload studies to assist</li> </ul>	you in allocation of resources?
	No	
	Yes, last study conducted in 19	
4.	Does your agency take reports of some misdemeanors and miscellane by telephone without the immediate dispatch of a police officer?	ous incidents
	□ No	
	Yes, when no investigation appears necessary; permitted sine	ce 19
	Yes, when higher priority calls for service occur; permitted s	since 19
	Yes, (specify other criteria)	; permitted since 19
	Yes, (specify other criteria)	; permitted since 19

# CONTINUED

3 OF 4

					deral funds?
	Traffic	full-time	part-time	No.	Yes
	Communications	<b></b>	<u> </u>		
	Criminal investigations	<u> </u>			
	Canine	<del> </del>		<u> </u>	<del>                                     </del>
	Tactical				
	Juvenile				<del> </del>
	Crime prevention			<u> </u>	
	Family crisis intervention			<del> </del>	
	SWAT		<u></u>		
	Bomb disposal				
	Helicopter				
	Internal affairs	ļ			
	Youth service bureau				
	Legal advisor				
	Evidence technician				
	Public relations				
	Bilingual services				
	☐ Vice				
	Narcotics/drugs				
	Intelligence				
6.	Upon apprehension or filing of charges for does your agency ever issue citations or sure.  No No, enabling legislation has not your year, for certain less serious felonity yes, for certain misdemeanors, since the sure of t	<b>mmonses i</b> et been ena es, since ap	n lieu of ta acted oproximate	ely 19	e suspect into custody?
7.	Does this agency participate in any formal (check all that apply)	diversion (	programs?		
	No				
	Yes, for certain classes of youthful	ıl offender	s since an	proxima	ately 19
					-
	Yes, for certain classes of drug an	d/or alcoho	of abuse, s	ince app	proximately 19
	Yes, for certain mentally ill offen	ders, since	approxim	ately 19	9
	Yes, for some misdemeanants, sin	ice approxi	imately 19		
		• •	,		

Check those areas which are staffed by specialists in your agency. Also indicate whether federal funds were used to help establish the specialty.

5.

8.	Has your agency established any of the following programs to encourage members of the public to take an active role in dealing with crime prevention?	
	Mark valuables with traceable numbers to discourage theft and fencing. Progra	am established in 19
	Target-hardening of homes. Program established in 19	
	Target-hardening of commercial establishments. Program established in 19	
	Police auxiliary/reserves. Program established in 19	
	Crime prevention among elderly. Program established in 19	
	Provide general crime prevention information to the community. Program e	established in 19
	Other citizen involvement programs (i.e., block-watching, hotline):	·
	(specify)	Program established in 19
	(specify)	<u> </u>
	None of the above	
9.	Does this agency utilize a crime laboratory?	
	□No	
	Yes, operated by this agency, since approximately 19	a*
	Yes, operated by another area law enforcement agency, since approximately 1	9 .
	Yes, a regional laboratory, since approximately 19	
	Yes, a state laboratory, since approximately 19	
•	• If yes, have federal monies been used to support this effort? No Yes	
10.	Does a uniformed officer give a classroom presentation at every public and private elementary school within your jurisdiction at least annually?	
	No presentations given	
	No, presentations given only at some schools	
	No, presentations given less frequently	
	Yes, since 19	
	<ul> <li>a. Is a full-time officer from this agency assigned to each junior and high school in your jurisdiction?</li> </ul>	senior
	No	
	No, officers assigned only at some schools	
	Yes, since 19	
11.	Has this agency adopted a geographic policing program which insures stable assign for individual officers?	ments
	No, do not use geographic policing	
	No, assignments are not stable	
	Yes, since 19	

r · · · · · · h n t i not readil available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

### • ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING

12.	Does your agency annually develop written goals in conjunction with budget preparation	n?	
	No		
	Yes, this has been a policy since approximately 19		
	• If yes, what has been the dissimination of this document?		
	to agency personnel		
	to the general public		
	used primarily by senior agency managers		
13.	We are interested in finding out about some of your agency's planning and research capabilities. Please check all that apply and indicate whether federal monies supported or support this position or activity within your agency.		
	No research and planning capability	Used Fed No	eral funds? Yes
	We have had a least one part-time planner, since 19		
	We have had a least one full-time planner, since 19		
	We have had a separate research and planning unit, since 19		
	We have had a system for the collection and analysis of patrol data according to time and/or geographic area, since approximately 19		
	We have had a locally based computer system, since approximately 19		
	We have had a computerized information system that interfaces with state and national systems, since 19		
14.	In your jurisdiction, have criminal justice coordinating councils been established?	<b>-</b>	<del></del>
	· No		
	Yes, at the state level in 19		
	Yes, at the regional level in 19		
	Yes, at the county level in 19		
	Yes, at the municipal level in 19	•	
15.	Was this agency formed or has it been reorganized as a result of consolidation or regionalization?		
	☐ No	•	
	Yes, took place in 19		
	<ul> <li>Have federal funds been used in order to facilitate or initiate the above change?</li> </ul>	Yes	

16.	and other	or not you have been reorganized with other police agencies, have you ir neighboring agencies combined any of the following services? Il that apply)						
		No services combined						
	communications, combined in 19							
	records, combined in 19							
		staff, combined in 19						
		crime laboratory, combined in 19						
		ourchasing, combined in 19						
		netro investigation squads, combined in 19						
		organized crime units, combined in 19	•					
		raining facilities, combined in 19						
		other (specify)	combined in 19					
	other (specify) combined in 19							
				_				
• 1	Has you	OFFICER SELECTION  It state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?	relop and enforce					
	Has you	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to dev	relop and enforce					
	Has you	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to dev nimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?	relop and enforce					
	Has you	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to dev nimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?	relop and enforce					
	Has you	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  If yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for	relop and enforce					
	Has you	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  Olf yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?	relop and enforce					
	Has you state mi	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  Olf yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?	relop and enforce					
17.	Has you state mi	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  • If yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?  No  Yes, since 19	relop and enforce					
17.	Has you state mi	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  Olf yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?  No  Yes, since 19  ur agency require new police officers to have some college education?	relop and enforce					
17.	Has you state mi	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  If yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?  No  Yes, since 19  ur agency require new police officers to have some college education?	elop and enforce					
17.	Has you state mi	r state enacted legislation establishing a commission empowered to devinimum standards for the selection of sworn personnel?  No  Yes, enacted in 19  If yes, does the commission inspect local agencies for compliance on selection standards?  No  Yes, since 19  ur agency require new police officers to have some college education?  No  Yes, some college credit, required since 19	relop and enforce					

r il available. If more than 10 years ago, put "+" in the blank.

19.	Please check all activities included in your employee recruitment and sele	ction process:				
	written test of mental ability or aptitude, since approximately 19					
	oral interview, since approximately 19	,				
	physical examination, since approximately 19					
	physical agility test, since approximately 19					
	psychological examination, since approximately 19					
	polygraph examination, since approximately 19					
	in-depth background investigation, since approximately 19	-				
	other (specify)	since approximately 19				
	other (specify)	since approximately 19				
	other (specify)					
	other (specify)	since approximately 19				
	None of the above					
20.	Is there a minimum requirement for basic entry level training of sworn pe	rsonnel?				
	☐ No	•				
	Yes; check all that apply:					
	recommended state minimum ofhours					
	mandatory agency requirement ofhours					
	mandatory state requirement of hours					

### • PERSONNEL POLICIES

21.	Does your agency provide formal in-service training to sworn personnel? (check more than one response, if appropriate)
	□ No
	Yes, training program initiated in 19
	average hours provided to each in-service training participant: hours per year
	a. Has your state adopted minimum requirements for formal in-service training of sworn personnel?
	No Yes, state minimum requirement ishours per year Minimum requirements are mandatory Minimum requirements are recommended but NOT mandatory
22.	Do you have access to regional or state training centers?
	□ No
	Yes, have had access since approximately 19
	• If yes, have Federal funds been used in order to facilitate or initiate this activity?
23.	Does your agency provide incentives for officers to achieve a college education?  No  Yes (check all responses below that apply)  Used Federal funds?  No Yes  Provides adjustment of work hours to facilitate attending classes. A practice since 19
	Provides financial assistance to defray expenses (e.g., books, tuition, etc.) A practice since 19
	Provides incentive pay. A practice since 19
	Uses college credit as a criterion for promotion. A practice since 19
	Other (specify)
	A practice since 19
	Other (specify)
	A practice since 19
24.	Does this agency monitor the physical condition of officers at least every 2 years to determine if they meet predetermined physical standards?
	☐ No
	Yes, since approximately 19

25.	Does this agency make available or provide service facilities and programs for officer physical conditioning?
	□ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
26.	Has your agency civilianized positions within the organization? (By civilianization, we mean
	staffing positions formerly occupied by sworn personnel with nonsworn personnel.)
	No No
	Yes, since approximately 19
	a. type of position civilianized (check all that apply)
	clerical support
	traffic control
	dispatch/communication jail/security
	motor transport
	other (specify)
	other (specify)
	b. total number of positions civilianized in the past 5 years:
27.	Has your agency expanded its job classification system to provide advancement
	opportunities within patrol officer ranks (i.e., senior patrol officer)?
	□ No
	Yes, expanded in 19
28.	Does this agency enter into formal collective negotiations with employee representatives regarding terms and conditions of employment?
	No, not authorized to do so by law
	No, authorized to, but do not
	Yes, with representatives of sworn officers, since approximately 19
	Yes, with representatives of nonsworn employees, since approximately 19
	Yes, with representatives of both sworn and nonsworn employees, since approximately 19
29.	Does your state or local jurisdication have laws prohibiting
	work stoppages or job actions by law enforcement employees?
	□ No
	Yes, since approximately 19
30.	Does your agency have a reserve officer program?
	☐ No
	No, do not need to augment force of sworn officers
	Yes, since 19

Key Element Analysis Coding Instrument





<b>)</b>						
State No.		NAC No		•		
Key Element No.			·			
• CONGRUENCE TO KEY ELEM	ENT (circl	e appropriate r	esponse)		•	
<ol> <li>State does not have a compare</li> </ol>	able standa	ird				
2. State standard is identical to I						
<ol><li>State has a comparable, but n</li></ol>	ot identica	i, standard				
8. NA						
• STRENGTH OF MANDATE (cit	rcie approp	riate response)				
1. Must				hould with qua		
2. Should give the highest priori	ty to			lo mandate to	do anythi	ng
3. Should			8. N	IA		
IMMEDIACY (circle appropriate	response)					
1. Immediately	75.	-,	79.	•	83.	By 1983
2. As soon as possible		By 1976,	80.	- •	84.	-,
3. No time specification		By 1977	81.	. ,	85.	By 1985
74. By 1974	78.		82.	•	8.	NA
• PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF SPE		· ·		ctors present)		
1. Identifies person/agency for			ard			
2. Requires an action: admir						
3. Requires an action: plann						
4. Delineates specific steps to						nd bad baan and
5. Provides a numerical or other	•	•			ner standa	rd has been met.
☐ 6. ———————————————————————————————————		····	<del></del>			
<ul> <li>SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES or language, unless the meaning of</li> <li>Change in person responsible for</li> </ul>	of the stan	dard is altered.				
Change in target group of standa	ard	<u></u>			<del></del>	
1						
Omission of conditions specified						
1	•					
2						
3			<del></del>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
<ul> <li>Changes or additions to condition</li> </ul>						
1						
2.				~ <del>-</del> -	- <del></del>	
3			-/			
Change in frequency.						
1.	- <del></del>					
● Other						
•						

### Appendix B

#### THE KEY ELEMENTS

The following pages show the 136 key elements used in the analysis in Chapter 7, and each category under each key element. As described in more detail in Chapters 2 and 7, the categories represent an ex post facto breakdown of the alternatives chosen by the 41 states.

The first column ("No. of states") shows the frequency distribution for each key element. The second column ("Stance") shows the rating on the trichotomous scale described in Chapter 7. A rating of 1 represents the "progressive alternative;" 2 represents the "compromise alternative;" and 3 indicates either a "traditional" alternative or omission of the topic altogether—which typically meant rejection, not disinterest.

Columns 3-5 apply only to the "progressive alternative" in each key element. "S" indicates the rating for degree of scientific uncertainty about its effectiveness; "C" indicates the rating of costs associated with implementing it; "V" indicates the rating of the degree to which the "progressive" alternative carries implications about values. In each case, a rating of 1 means "low" and a rating of 3 means "high."

No. of states	Stance	s c v	THE POLICE KEY ELEMENTS
		2 2 1	1.01 ESTABLISHMENT OF POLICE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
20	1		<ol> <li>Revise agency objectives and prioritiesannually in con- junction with budget preparation.</li> </ol>
8	2		2periodically (no budget tie-in).
3	2		3. Establish agency objectives and priorities (no mention of update or revision).
10	3		No standard.
		2 1 1	1.02 EXERCISE OF DISCRETION: ARRESTS
25	1		<ol> <li>Establish policy for the exercise of discretionin using arrest alternatives.</li> </ol>
3	2		2in general.
2	1		<ol> <li>Seek legislation or authority to permit discretion in selec- tion of arrest alternatives.</li> </ol>
11	3		No standard.
		2 1 1	1.03 EXERCISE OF DISCRETION: INVESTIGATIONS
24	1		<ol> <li>Establish policy for the exercise of discretionin the conduct of investigations.</li> </ol>
2	2		2in general.
1	1		3. Seek legislation or authority to permit discretion in the conduct of investigations.
14	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.04 PRESENTATIONS AT SCHOOLS BY POLICE OFFICERS
18	1		<ol> <li>Ensure that classroom presentations are conducted at speci- fied intervals by uniformed officers at all elementary schools in each jurisdiction.</li> </ol>
5	2		2. Same as #1, without specifying frequency or regularity of presentations.
18	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.05 ASSIGNMENT OF POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS
8	1		1. Assign afull-timeofficer to each secondary school, for counseling and teaching classes (when school cooperation can be obtained).
3	2		2part-time
2	2		3. Assign a part-time officer to each secondary school if agency resources permit or if the program is believed to be beneficial.
3	2		4. Establish liaison officers to improve police-school relations.
2	2		5. Initiate some other type of educational program for the secondary schools.
. 23	3		No standard.

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No. of states	Stance	S C V	
		2 3 1	1.06 POLICE LIAISON WITH THE MEDIA
19	1		<ol> <li>Establish regular liaison with the media through a full-time specialist officer (or unit, depending on agency size and media demands).</li> </ol>
1 7 14	2 2 · 3		<ol> <li>Assign at least a part-time officer to media liaison.</li> <li>Develop a policy or program with regard to the news media.</li> <li>No standard.</li> </ol>
1		3 2 1	1.07 GEOGRAPHIC POLICING
12	1		<ol> <li>Adopt geographic policing programs with stable officer assignments where feasible.</li> </ol>
7	2		2. Study the alternatives of neighborhood team policing, geographic policing, and other patrol methods, and implement those best suited to local needs.
1	2		3. Develop state-wide guidelines on the use of different types of patrol methods.
21	3		No standard.
		3 3 1	1.08 CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS
27	1		<ol> <li>Establish crime prevention programs that include (a) dis- semination of crime prevention information, (b) volunteer neighborhood security efforts, and (c) security programs for commercial establishments.</li> </ol>
1 2	2 2		<ol> <li>Same as #1, omitting volunteer neighborhood programs.</li> <li>Same as #1, omitting commercial programs.</li> </ol>
4	2		4. Increase community involvement in crime prevention.
6	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.09 FORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCILS
1	1		1. Establish criminal justice coordinating councils in juris-dictions of 30,000 or more persons.
27	2		2. Consider and where appropriate form a criminal justice
4	2		coordinating council.  3. Conduct joint planning and exchange information with other
9	3		criminal justice agencies. No standard.
_			

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	No. of states	Stance	s c v	
			3 1 3	1.10 DIVERSION POLICIES
	13	1		1. Divert some offenders pursuant to written policy, for some juvenile offenders, misdemeanants, and mentally ill persons.
	7	1		2. Same as #1, omitting misdemeanants.
_	7	2 2		<ol> <li>Same as #1, including only juvenile offenders.</li> </ol>
	4			4. Same as #1, without specifying a target group.
	10	3		No standard
			3 1 1	1.11 USE OF CITATIONS AND SUMMONS IN LIEU OF ARREST
	21	1		<ol> <li>Implement programs or utilize existing statutes permitting use of summons or citations in lieu of physical arrest or pre- arraignment confinement.</li> </ol>
	4	1		2. Same as #1, omitting summons.
_	2	1		3. Same as #1, omitting citations.
	4	1		4. Seek legislation allowing use of citations or summons in lieu
				of arrest.
	10	3		No standard.
			3 1 3	1.12 CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE AGENCIES
	5	1		1. Consolidate police agencies with fewer than 10 employees.
	2	1		2. Consolidate police agencies with fewer than 20 or 24 employees.
8	6	2		3. Consolidate police agencies if that is the most effective and
				efficient way to provide adequate (e.g., 24-hour) police service.
	, 9	2		4. Consider the feasibility of consolidation.
	19	3		No standard.
			2 3 1	1.13 PLANNING CAPABILITIES
	10	1		1. Employ at least one full-time planner in agencies with at least 75 personnel. In agencies with fewer than 75 personnel, assign responsibility for planning to a designated employee.
8	2	1		2. Have a full-time planner in large police agencies and have
_	3	2		some planning capability in small agencies.  3. Establish a planning capability consistent with agency size
	J	4		and planning tasks.
	10	2		4. Establish or improve planning capabilities.
_	16	3		No standard.
			2 2 1	1.14 ENHANCEMENT OF THE PATROL OFFICER'S ROLE
1	27	1		<ol> <li>Establish or expand multiple classification and pay grades within the patrol rank.</li> </ol>
	1	1		2. Establish multiple pay grades within the patrol rank.
	2	2		3. Consider establishing multiple classification and pay grades
	11	3		within the patrol rank. No standard.
	**	,		no standard.
			2 1 1	1.15 CLOSURE OF INVESTIGATIONS BY PATROL OFFICERS
	18	1		1. Allow patrol officers to close criminal investigations that
٨				do not require extensive followup.
	23	3		No standard.

o. of	Stance	S C V	
<b>,</b>		3 2 1	1.16 USE OF WORKLOAD STUDIES TO ALLOCATE PATROL RESOURCES
16	1		1. Conduct comprehensive workload studies at least annually, for establishing patrol activity priorities and operational objectives.
8	2 2		<ol> <li>Same as #1, without specifying annually.</li> <li>Maintain data drom the criminal justice information system,</li> </ol>
14	3		for use in making allocation decisions. No standard.
		1 1 1	1.17 CRITERIA FOR ALLOCATION OF PATROL RESOURCES
22	1		1. Allocate patrol personnel on the basis of explicit geographical and chronological criteria.
2	2	•	2. Study or consider patrol allocation alternatives.
1	2		3. Develop state-wide guidelines on the use of alternative patrol distribution plans.
16	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.18 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: JUVENILES
4	1		1. Utilize a specially trained juvenile officer or unit.
24	ī		2. Same as #1, for agencies with more than 15 officers.
1	2		3. Provide officers with specific training in juvenile delinquency topics.
12	3		No standard.
		1 3 1	1.19 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: TACTICAL CRIME FORCE
4	1		1. Maintain at least a part-time tactical crime force, consistent with an analysis of needs and available personnel.
2	1		2. Same as #1, for agencies with more than50 personnel.
8	1		375 personnel.
. 1	2		4200 personnel.
1	2		5. Establish county-wide or regional support services such as tactical units.
25	3		No standard.
		1 3 1	1.20 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: VICE
13	1		1. Maintain full-time vice investigation capability in police agencies with more than 75 personnel.
. 7	2		2depending on local needs and agency size.
1 20	2		3. Study the need for specialized capability in vice investigation.
▶20	3		No standard.
		1 3 1	1.21 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: DRUGS AND NARCOTICS
17	1		1. Maintain a full-time narcotic and drug investigation capabil-
_	۵.		ityin agencies with more than 75 personnel.
7	2		2depending on local needs and agency size.
1 2	2 2		3. Study the need for specialization in drugs and narcotics.
	4		4. Develop regional crime squads specializing in drug and narcotic investigation.
14	3		No standard.

• ,

1 3 1 1.22 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: INTELLIGENCE  13	No. of states	Stance	S	С	٧	
more than 75 personnel.  2. Maintain a part-time or fulltime intelligence capability depending on agency size and local needs.  3. Study the need for intelligence specialization.  No standard.  2 2 1 1.23 USE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE POSITIONS  24	3.42.63		1	3	1	1.22 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: INTELLIGENCE
7 1 2. Maintain a part-time or fulltime intelligence capability depending on agency size and local needs. 2 3. Study the need for intelligence specialization. No standard. 2 2 1 1.23 USE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE POSITIONS  24 1 1. Use civilians in positions not requiring peace officer status. 2 1 1 2. Same as #1, for agencies with at least 10 personnel. 3 2 3. Study or encourage use of civilians. 4 Use civilians for property system or technical positions only. No standard. 2 2 1 1.24 RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMS  16 1 1. Establish a reserve officer program when there is a need to augment the sworn officer force. 2 1 2. (Statements in the standards indicate that reserve officers are currently used.) 3 Consider establishing a reserve officer program.  1 3 1 1.25 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS  18 1 1. Ensure the availability of trained evidence technicianson a 24-hour basis. 3 2 2when they are needed. 3 2 3through a state or regional laboratory system. 4 4. Consider the use of trained evidence technicians. 1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  3 1 1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence. No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  8 1 1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council. 1 2 1through legislative action. 3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection. 4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	13	1				
1 2 3. Study the need for intelligence specialization.  2 2 1 1.23 USE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE POSITIONS  24 1 1. Use civilians in positions not requiring peace officer status. 1 1 2. Same as #1, for agencies with at least 10 personnel. 3 2 3. Study or encourage use of civilians. 4. Use civilians for property system or technical positions only. 10 No standard. 2 2 1 1.24 RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMS  11 1. Establish a reserve officer program when there is a need to augment the sworn officer force. 2 1 2. (Statements in the standards indicate that reserve officers are currently used.) 3. Consider establishing a reserve officer program. 10 3 No standard. 11 3 1 1.25 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS  11 1 1. Ensure the availability of trained evidence technicianson a 24-hour basis. 3 2 2when they are needed. 3 2 3through a state or regional laboratory system. 4 Consider the use of trained evidence technicians. 10 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  31 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  32 1 1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence. 3 No standard. 2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  4 1 Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council. 5 1 2through legislative action. 7 2 1 3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.	7	1				2. Maintain a part-time or fulltime intelligence capability
2 2 1 1.23 USE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE POSITIONS  24						3. Study the need for intelligence specialization.
1 2Same as #1, for agencies with at least 10 personnel. 3 2 3. Study or encourage use of civilians. 4. Use civilians for property system or technical positions only. 11 3 No standard. 2 2 1 1.24 RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMS  16 1		•	2	2	1	1.23 USE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE POSITIONS
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11 3 No standard.  2 2 1 1.24 RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMS  16 1						4. Use civilians for property system or technical positions
16 1	11	3				
augment the sworn officer force.  2			2	2	1	1.24 RESERVE OFFICER PROGRAMS
2 1 2. (Statements in the standards indicate that reserve officers are currently used.) 3. Consider establishing a reserve officer program. No standard.  1 3 1 1.25 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS  18 1 1. Ensure the availability of trained evidence technicianson a 24-hour basis. 2 2when they are needed. 3 2through a state or regional laboratory system. 4 Consider the use of trained evidence technicians. No standard.  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  3 1 1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence. No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  8 1 1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council. 2 1 2through legislative action. 3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection. 4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	16	1				
3. Consider establishing a reserve officer program. No standard.  1 3 1 1.25 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS  1. Ensure the availability of trained evidence technicianson a 24-hour basis. 2	2	1				2. (Statements in the standards indicate that reserve officers
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18 1 1. Ensure the availability of trained evidence technicianson a 24-hour basis.  2 2when they are needed.  3 2 3through a state or regional laboratory system.  4 Consider the use of trained evidence technicians.  No standard.  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  3 1 1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence.  No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  8 1 1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council.  1 2 1 3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	17					
a 24-hour basis.  2			1	3	1	1.25 SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES: EVIDENCE TECHNICIANS
2 2when they are needed. 2 2 3through a state or regional laboratory system. 3 2 4. Consider the use of trained evidence technicians. 15 3 No standard.  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  3 1 1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence. 8 3 No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  8 1 Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council. 15 1 2through legislative action. 2 1 3. Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection. 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	18	1				
4. Consider the use of trained evidence technicians. No standard.  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  1	3	2				
1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  1						
1 2 1 1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES  1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence.  No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council.  2 1 2through legislative action.  3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.						
1. Ensure access to at least one crime laboratory (state, regional, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence.  No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council.  2 1 2through legislative action.  3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	13	3				no standard.
al, or local) capable of efficient processing of physical evidence.  No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council.  2 1 2through legislative action.  3 Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  4 Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.			1	2	1	1.26 ACCESS TO CRIME LABORATORIES
8 3 No standard.  2 1 3 1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS  8 1 L. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council.  15 1 2through legislative action.  2 1 3. Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  1 3 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	33	1				
8 1 1. Develop state standards for police officer selectionthrough an existing commission or council. 15 1 2through legislative action. 2 1 3. Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection. 1 3 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	8	3				
an existing commission or council.  15 1 2through legislative action.  2 1 3. Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection.  1 3 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.			2	1	3	1.27 STANDARDS FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS
15 1 2through legislative action. 2 1 3. Develop state mandatory minimum standards for police officer selection. 1 3 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.	8	1				
selection. 1 3 4. Develop local selection standards for individual agencies.						2through legislative action.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2	_				selection.

No. of	Stance	s	С	v	
states		2	3	3	1.28 ENFORCEMENT OF SELECTION STANDARDS
17	1				1. Use a state commissionto inspect local agencies for compliance with selection standards.
5	1				2to enforce selection standards.
19	3				No standard.
		1	3	1	1.29 CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF POLICE OFFICERS
26	1				1. Use a formal process to select officers, including (a) a written aptitude test, (b) an oral interview, (c) a physical exam, (4) a psychological examination, and (5) an in-depth background investigation.
2	2				2. Same as #1, omitting the psychological examination.
2	2				3. Same as #1, omitting the oral interview.
3	2				4. Develop and use a comprehensive selection process.
1	2				5. Same as #1, omitting the oral interview and the psychological
_	4				exam.
7	3				No standard.
		3	3	1	1.30 EDUCATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR POLICE OFFICERS
3	2				1. Require1 yearof college for entry level officers.
8	2				22 years
2	2				33 years
5	ū				4a B.A. or its equivalent
3	2				5. Meet educational standards established by a state commission
,	2				or council.
	2				
5	2 3				6. Require a high school diploma for entry level officers.
2	3				7. Allow local discretion on educational requirements for entry
	_				level officers.
13	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	1.31 EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES FOR POLICE OFFICERS
19	1				1. Adopt the following educational incentives when they do not interfere with the delivery of police services: (a) duty or shift adjustments to facilitate college attendance, (b) financial assistance for books and tuition, and (c) pay incentives for college credits.
·· 3	2				2. Same as #1, omitting pay incentives.
2	2				3. Same as #1, except for duty and shift adjustments.
1	2				4. Same as #1, except for financial assistance.
ī	2				5. Pay incentives only.
2	2				6. Duty or shift adjustments only (or leave with pay).
5	2				7. Provide adequate educational incentives.
8	3				No standard.
_	_	1	. 3	1	1.32 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
20	1				1. Legislate minimum preservice training requirements for sworn
7	1				police officers.
,	1				2. (Statements in the standards indicate that legislation setting
0	•				minimum training requirements already exists.)
8	1				3. (Other standards indicate that authority for setting training
_	_				standards is vested in an existing board, commission, or council.)
6	3				No standard.

No. of states	Stance	S C V	
states		1 3 1	1.33 IN-SERVICE TRAINING
26	1		1. For sworn officers up to and including captainprovide at least 40 hours of inservice training annually.
2	1		2provide 30-35 hours of in-service training annually.
1	2		3provide 40 hours of in-service training every two years.
6	2		4. Provide in-service training (no other specifications).
2	2		5. Study, consider, or identify in-service training needs.
4	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.34 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRAINING CENTERS
24	1		1. Establish criminal justice training center(s) to provide
6	1		training for officers without access to local facilities. 2. (Other standards indicate that criminal justice training
J	_		centers are already in existence.)
11	3		No standard.
		3 3 3	1.35 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
12	1		1. Allow employees to engage in collective negotiations.
3	1		2. Continue existing practice of allowing collective negotiations
26	3		No standard.
		- 1 3	1.36 PROHIBITION OF WORK STOPPAGES AND JOB ACTIONS
17	1		1. Prohibit police work stoppages and job actionsthrough legislation.
1	1		2through formal written policy.
3	1		3. (Other standards indicate that legislation prohibiting such
			actions has already been enacted.)
20	3		No standard.
		2 1 1	1.37 RULES FOR CONDUCT AND APPEARANCE
20	1		1. Provide officers with written rules of conduct and appearance
			at the time of employment.
21	3		No standard.
		3 3 1	1.38 INTERNAL COMPLAINT UNIT
17	1		1. Use a specialized unit or individual to investigatecom-
2	1		plaints against officers. 2serious complaints against officers.
6	2		3. Investigate complaints according to written policy and
			procedures.
1.	2		4. Ensure that all complaints are investigated.
15	3		No standard.
		2 3 1	1.39 PHYSICAL FITNESS FACILITIES
13	1		1. Provide physical fitness facilities for officers.
5	2		2programs or standards for officers.
23	3		No standard.

No. of states	Stance	S	С	V	
		2	2	1	1.40 PHYSICAL EXAMINATION REQUIREMENT
14	1				1. Require physical examinations of officersat least annually.
6	1				2periodically.
21	3				No standard
		1	1	1	1.41 TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION OF MISDEMEANORS
12	1				1. Consider the collection of misdemeanor and miscellaneous incidents by telephone where appropriate.
	2				2. Provide a procedure for accepting reports of criminal incidents not requiring field investigation.
26	3				No standard.
		2	1	3	1.42 COMBINING POLICE SERVICES
30	1				1. Consider combining or contracting for police services with other agencies.
4	1				2. Develop joint task force efforts or personnel exchange programs among police agencies.
7	3				No standard.

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## THE PROSECUTION KEY ELEMENTS

No. of states	Stance	S	С	V	
states		2	1	1	5.01 GUIDELINES FOR TAKING PERSONS INTO CUSTODY
16	1				1. Aid the police in establishing guidelines for taking persons into custody
1	2				2. Aid the police in establishing guidelines for taking juveniles into custody.
2	2				3. Provide law enforcement agencies with legal advice regarding their functions and duties.
21	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	1	3.	5.02 DIVERSION CRITERIA
24	1				1. Use diversion programs for offenders when the likelihood of conviction is high but when the benefits of noncriminal diversion for the offender outweigh the potential danger to society.
6	1				2. Use diversion programs for offenders when the benefits of noncriminal diversion for the offender outweigh the potential danger to society.
5	2				3. Consider using diversion when appropriate.
2	2				4. Support the enactment of legislation allowing and legitimizing
3	3				diversion. NO STANDARD.
		2	1	1	5.03 GUIDELINES FOR DIVERSION
24	1				1. Publish guidelines governing diversion decisions.
5	1				2. Develop diversion guidelines (no stipulation that they be
11	3			٠	made public). NO STANDARD.
		1	1	1.	5.04 GUIDELINES FOR PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
25	1				1. Establish guidelines governing plea negotiation practices.
15	3				NO STANDARD
		3	1	1	5.05 PRESENTATION OF PLEA NEGOTIATION AGREEMENTS
19	1				1. Present all plea negotiation agreements in court, and place
2	2				in the record a full statement of the terms underlying the agreemen 2. Same as #1, for felony cases only.
4	2				3. Same as #1, but without requiring that the terms of the
•	-				agreement be place on the record.
15	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	1	1	5.06 PRELIMINARY HEARINGS IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
14	1				1. Discontinue preliminary hearings for misdemeanor prosecutions.
2	1				2. (Related statements supporting the limitation of preliminary
_	_				hearings to felony and serious misdemeanor cases).
1 23	2 3				3. Study the possibility of eliminating preliminary hearings. NO STANDARD

No. of states	Stance	S	С	V	
		2	3	1	5.07 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
12	1				1. Provide the prosecutor with access to a computer that performs administrative functions such as case scheduling, multiple indexing, etc., in high-volume systems or where economical.
11	1				2. Use an information system for the above functions (not necessarily computerized).
17	3				NO STANDARD.
		2	3	1	5.08 TIME COMMITMENT
26	1				1. Employ prosecutors on a full-time basis.
5	2				2. Ensure access to at least one full-time prosecutor in each jurisdiction or region, but assistant prosecutors may be part-time if the jurisdiction has a small caseload.
3	2				3. Have or encourage full-time prosecutors whenever it is necessary and feasible.
6	3				NO STANDARD
		2	3	1	5.09 PRE-SERVICE TRAINING
18	1				1. Require new prosecutors to attend a prosecutor's training course prior to taking office.
6	1				2. Require training for prosecutors (without stipulation that it be received prior to taking office).
5	2				3. Establish training programs for new prosecutors.
11	3				NO STANDARD.
		2	3	1	5.10 IN-SERVICE TRAINING
26	1				1. Require prosecutors and assistants to attend a formal training course annually.
6	2				2. Establish in-service training for prosecutors.
3	2				3. Encourage the establishment of continuing education programs
5	3				for prosecutors. NO STANDARD.
		3	1	1	5.11 APPROVAL OF ARREST WARRANTS
14	1				1. Obtain the formal approval of the prosecutor before issuing an arrest warrant or filing a complaint.
3	2				2. Same as #1, for arrest warrants only.
ì	2				3. Same as #1, for complaints only.
22	3				NO STANDARD.
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# THE PUBLIC DEFENSE KEY ELEMENTS

_	_		THE FORLIC DEPENSE RET ELEMENTS
No. of	Stance	s c v	
states			
J		2 3 1	6.01 USE OF COMPUTERS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
16	1		1. Provide the public defender with access to a computer that performs administrative functions such as case scheduling, multiple indexing, etc., in high-volume systems or where economical.
2	1		2. Use an information system for the above functions (not necessarily
22	3		computerized). NO STANDARD
ì		3 2 1	6.02 PROVISION OF DEFENSE SERVICES
21	1		<ol> <li>Provide defense services in each locality through an assigned counsel system drawing from the private bar and from a public defender organization.</li> </ol>
6	2		<ol> <li>Provide defense services, with local option on the type of system (assignment of counsel or public defender).</li> </ol>
6	2		3. Create or expand a full-time state-wide public defender organization.
1	2		4. Provide defense services through an assigned counsel system but experiment with a hypbrid system using both assigned counsel and public defenders.
6	3		NO STANDARD.
		2 3 1	6.03 USE OF FULL-TIME PUBLIC DEFENDERS
19	1		1. Employ public defenders on a full-time basis.
2	2		2. Same as #1, where justified by the caseload.
18	3		NO STANDARD.
_			
		2 1 3	6.04 SELECTION OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS
8	1		<ol> <li>Nominate candidates for public defender through a commission or similar bodywith final selection by the Governor.</li> </ol>
1	1		2with final selection by the Supreme Court.
2	1		3. Nominate through the appropriate district bar, with final
			selection by the Governor.
1	2		4. Nominate through local nonpartisan boards, with appointment by the county commissioners.
3	3		5. Select public defenders through public election.
2	2		6. Appoint public defenders through the board of directors or trustees of the public defender organization.
2	2		7. Ensure independence and competence of public defenders through an appropriate selection process (no process specified).
20	3		NO STANDARD.
		2 1	1 6.05 PUBLIC DEFENDER TERMS
13	1		1. Employ public defenders to serve terms of not less than four years.
2	3		2. Use a merit system in deciding whether to retain the public defender.
1	2		3. Employ public defenders for terms equivalent to those of the
			prosecutors.
23	3		NO STANDARD.

No. of states	Stance	S	C	V	
	•	3	3	1	6.06 FELONY CASELOAD LIMITS
7 8 25	1 2 3				<ol> <li>Limit public defender felony caseloadsto 150 per year.</li> <li>to assure proper representation (no figure specified).</li> <li>NO STANDARD</li> </ol>
		2	3	1	6.07 IN-SERVICE TRAINING
26	1				1. Establish continuing legal education programs for public defenders (and other lawyers).
2 12	2 3				2. Establish a commission to advice on local training needs. NO STANDARD
		1	3	1	6.08 ORIENTATION TRAINING
20 20	1				1. Require new public defenders to participate in an entry-level training program. NO STANDARD.
20	3	•	•	2	6.09 EARLIEST POINT OF REPRESENTATION
		3	3	3	
14	1				1. Provide counsel to eligible defendantsduring investigatory stages in which the individual is a likely suspect, or upon arrest.
7	2				2upon arrest (or at the first stage of criminal proceedings).
3 1	2 2				<ul><li>3no later than the first court appearance.</li><li>4. Provide prompt and reasonable defense representation that</li></ul>
15	3				includes pretrial activities.  NO STANDARD
	•	3	3	3	6.10 POST-DETENTION/CONVICTION DEFENSE SERVICES
16	1				1. Provide public representation to (a) inmates wishing to appeal, (b) indigent inmates of detention facilities, (c) indigent parolees at parole revocation hearings, and (d) indigent probationers at proceedings affecting probationary status.
1	2				2. Same as #1, omitting indigent probationers.
6	2				3. Provide public representation to inmates who wish to appeal, to indigent inmates of detention facilities, or in all criminal proceedings (usually limited to the first appeal).
17	3			,	NO STANDARD.
		1	3	1	6.11 COMPENSATION
12	1				1. Compensate public defenders at a ratecomparable to that of prosecutor counterparts.
8	1				2comparable to that paid by private law firms.
2	2				3in accordance with provisions established by a board or commission.
17	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	1	1	6.12 CIVIL SERVICE STATUS
14 26	1				1. Prohibit public defenders from holding civil service status. NO STANDARD.

No. of	Stance	S	С	V	
states		2	2	1	6.13 LOCATION OF OFFICES
10	1				1. Locate public defender offices inthe neighborhoods where most of the clients live.
4	2				2easily accessible locations.
1	2				3areas which will not cause the public defender to be identified excessively with the law enforcement and judicial systems.
25	3				NO STANDARD.
		2	1	1	6.14 DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REPRESENTATION
20	1				1. Require that defendants with public representation pay that portion of the cost that they are able to afford without substantial hardship to them or their families.
4	1				2. Develop a system whereby defendants pay some part of the costs of public representation.
16	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	3	3	6.15 FINANCING FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES
27	1				1. Provide for state financing of public defender services.
2	2				2. Provide for state contributions to financing of public defender services.
11	3				NO STANDARD.
•		3	3	1	6.16 PROVISION OF SERVICES DURING MASS DISORDERS
4	1				1. Ensure that the local public defender or bar association develops a plan for providing defense services during a mass disorder.
4	1				2. Ensure that the judicial council or the courts develop a plan for court processing during a mass disorder.
7 25	2 3				3. Develop a comprehensive criminal justice plan for mass disorders. NO STANDARD.

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#### THE COURT KEY ELEMENTS

No. of states	Stance	S G V	
		3 3 3	7.01 USE OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
0	1		1. Eliminate plea negotiation practices.
2	2		2. Aim for the elimination of plea negotiations, but conduct
	•		negotiations in accordance with written guidelines in the meantime.
25	3		3. Support or permit plea negotiations when they are in the public interest.
13	3		NO STANDARD.
ł		1 3 1	7.02 TIME LIMITS ON FELONY TRIALS
13	1		1. Set a time limit of 60 days between arrest or indictment and trial, in felony cases.
2	1		2. Same as #1, except that the time may be extended if pretrial
9	1		release occurs.  3. Same as #1, except the limit is 90 days.
4	2		4. Set a time limit of 180 days for all cases.
3	2		5. Mandate the development of time limits through court ruling
1	2		or statute.
1 8	2 3		6. Eliminate delays in bringing cases to court. NO STANDARD.
		1 3 Î	7.03 TIME LIMITS ON MISDEMEANOR TRIALS
16	1		1. Set a time limit of 30 days between arrest or indictment and
5	. •		trial, in misdemeanor cases.
5	1		<ol> <li>Same as #1, except that the time may be extended if pretrial release occurs.</li> </ol>
5	2		3. Set a time limit of 180 days for all cases.
3	2		4. Mandate the development of time limits through court ruling
_ ,	•		or statute.
8	2 3		5. Eliminate delays in bringing cases to trial. NO STANDARD.
	•		
		3 1 3	7.04 GRAND JURY INDICTMENTS
13	1		1. Eliminate the requirement for grand jury indictment in crim-
_ <del></del>	_		inal prosecutions.
3	2		2. Eliminate, except in capital cases.
2	2		3. Eliminate, except in controversial or exceptional cases.
6	2		4. Continue existing grand jury indictment practices.
16	3		NO STANDARD
		1 3 1	7.05 MAXIMUM DELAY ON APPEARANCE BEFORE A JUDICIAL OFFICER
1	1		1. Bring defendants before a judicial officer for an initial
•	•		appearance within 6 hours of the arrest.
3	1		2within 12 hours.
5 2	2		3within 24 hours.
- 2 1	2 2		4within 48 hours. 5within 72 hours.
9	2		
18	3		6without unreasonable delay. NO STANDARD.
	_		

	Stance	S	C	V	
states ,		3	3	1	7.06 USE OF PRIVATE BAIL BOND AGENCIES
15	1				1. Eliminate private bail bond agencies from the pretrial release
2	2				process.  2. Minimize participation of private bail bond agencies in the pretrial release process.
1 5	2 3				3. Study alternatives to the private bail bond system. 4. Retain private bail bonding with suitable reforms.
17	3				NO STANDARD.
		1	1	1	7.07 RULES OF PRETRIAL DISCOVERY
25	1				1. Require full reciprocal disclosure between the prosection and the defense, within the limits of constitutionally protected rights and witness safety.
3	2				2. Require disclosure by prosecutor only.
12	3	1	1	1	NO STANDARD 7.08 USE OF PRETRIAL CONFERENCES
12	1				1. Hold pretrial conferences for all cases unless the judge determines that such a conference would serve no useful purpose.
<b>3</b>	1				2. Hold pretrial conferences for complex or protracted cases, or as needed and requested.
3	. 2				3. (Other statements indicating that pretrial conferences are used, but without specifying types of eligible cases.)
22	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	1	1	7.09 QUESTIONING OF JURORS
7	1 2				1. All questioning of prospective jurors only by the trial judge. 2. Allow limited or supplementary questioning of jurors by the prosecu-
23	3				tion and defense. NO STANDARD.
		3	1	3	7.10 JURY SIZE
5	1				1. Use juries of fewer than 12 persons but more than 6 in criminal prosecutions for offenses not punishable by life sentences.
4	2				2. Use 12-member juries in felony cases unless the parties approve a jury composed of fewer than 12.
3	2				3. Use juries of fewer than 12 persons but more than 6 in non-felony cases; use 12-member juries for felonies.
1	2				4. Study the use of juries of fewer than 12 persons.
<b>4</b>	3				5. Use 12-member juries.
23	3				NO STANDARD
F.3		3	1	3	7.11 JURY SENTENCING
<b>1</b> 6	1				1. Abolish jury sentencing.
2	2				2. Abolish jury sentencing except in capital cases.
19	3				3. (Related statements indicating that jury sentencing is permitted). NO STANDARD

No. of states	Stance	S	С	V	
States		3	1	3	7.12 SELECTION OF JUDGES
17	1				1. Nominate judges through a judicial nominating commission, with final selection by the Governor.
2	1.				2. Same as #1, adding a requirement for election on a nonpartisan ballot after the initial term of service.
4.	2				3. Adopt a judicial merit selection system that includes members of the bench, bar, and public.
5 12	3 3				4. Elect judges by popular vote. NO STANDARD
		2	2	1	7.13 OVERSIGHT OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
18	1				1. Establish or maintain a commission authorized to investigate and take action on matters of judicial conduct.
3	2				2. Use existing provisions in the state code to discipline and remove judges.
5	2				3. Establish or maintain a commission to investigate judicial conduct and make recommendations to the Supreme Court (or Court of Appeals) for action.
14	3				NO STANDARD
		2.	3	1	7.14 CONTINUING JUDICIAL EDUCATION
33	1			:	1. Create or maintain a comprehensive program of continuing judicial education.
1	2				2. Establish a state judicial education committee to develop standards for training judges.
6	3				NO STANDARD.
		3	3	3	7.15 UNIFICATION OF THE COURT SYSTEM
21	1		***	, leev <b>e</b> ,	1. Unify all courts under a state-administered and financed system, supervised by the CHief Justrice of the Supreme Court.
1	2				2. Unify all state-level courts under a state-administered and financed system, maintaining local control of limited jurisdiction courts.
3	1				3. Organize all courts into a state-administered and financed system under the supervision of the state judicial council.
15	3				NO STANDARD
		2	3	1	7.16 CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCILS
19	1				1. Establish state, local, or regional coordinating councils to monitor and advice on the administration of the courts.
21	3	2	2	1	NO STANDARD.
10	•	2	J	1	7.17 MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
19	1				1. Establish court access to a computer for management functions such as case scheduling and jury selection in high-volume systems or where economical.
7	1				2. Establish a court management information system (not necessarily computerized).
14	3				NO STANDARD

	No. of states	Stance				
			3	1	1	7.18 FAMILY COURT
	8	1				1. Establish a family court as a division of the trial court of general jurisdiction.
	2	2				2. Establish a family court when feasible.
	4	3				3. Maintain a separate juvenile court.
	26	3				NO STANDARD.
			3	2	1	7.19 DISPOSITIONAL HEARINGS IN JUVENILE CASES
	12	1				1. Hold dispositional hearings that are separate from adjudicatory hearings in all juvenile cases.
•	28	3				NO STANDARD.
			2	3	1	7.20 ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL TRIAL COURTS
	17	1				1. Use full-time local court administrators in trial courts with five or more judges, or in courts where justified by the caseload.
	2	2				2. Use local trial court administrators as needed.
	4	2				3. Use court administrators in each judicial circuit or district.
	17	3				NO STANDARD.
			2	2	1	7.21 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS
	19	1				1. Assign responsibility for research, planning, and development to the local or regional administrator.
	3	1				2. Assign responsibility for research, planning, and development to the central administrative office.
	18	3				NO STANDARD.

## THE CORRECTIONS KEY ELEMENTS

No. of states	Stance	s c v	
2-3-50		3 3 3	8.01 INMATES' RIGHTS TO LEGAL COUNSEL DURING DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
14	1		1. Implement policies that satisfy a prisoner's right to legal counsel during disciplinary hearings.
7	2		2. Afford access to at least a counsel substitute (law student, correctional staff member, inmate paraprofessional, paralegal) during disciplinary hearings.
4	2		3. Afford access to legal counsel (disciplinary hearings not specified).
2	2		4. Afford access to counsel or a counsel substitute in preparation for disciplinary hearings.
13	3		No standard.
		3 3 3	8.02 PROVISION OF LEGAL COUNSEL FOR DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
11	1		1. Provide counsel for prisoners unable to afford a private attorney, for major disciplinary hearings.
3	2		2. Provide staff assistance for prisoners in proceedings related to disciplinary hearings.
3	2		3. Provide legal services to prisoners in accordance with existing legislation, court decisions, or administrative policies.
3	2		4. Facilitate prisoner access to legal services (no public funds to be used for attorneys' fees).
20	3		No standard.
		3 1 3	8.03 LIMITS ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
1 7	1 1		<ol> <li>Prohibit solitary confinement extending beyond7 days.</li> <li>10 days.</li> </ol>
4	2		3. Require administrative review of confinement after a specified time.
4	1		415 days.
2	2		5. Set policy limits and procedural safeguards for solitary confinement.
2	2		6. Prohibit solitary confinement except as a last resort.
20	3		No standard.
		3 3 3	8.04 CELL OCCUPANCY
5	1		1. Within a reasonable time, close all facilities in which prisoners are not provided with individual cells.
2	2		2. Require individual cells in new construction.
6	2		3. Provide prisoners with individual cells (no stipulation that
	_		substandard facilities be closed).
5	2		4. Provide prisoners with adequate space.
22	3		No standard.

No. of states	Stance	s	С	V	
SLALES		3	1	3	8.05 CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION IN REHABILITATION PROGRAMS
17	1				1. Assure that participation in rehabilitation or treatment programs be voluntary.
1	3				2. Require participation in rehabilitation programs for adults.
ī	3				3. Provide incentives for participation in rehabilitation programs
21	3				No standard.
		_		_	9 OC DEGEORATION OF STUTE PROVING BOLLOUING DELEASE
		3	Ţ	3	8.06 RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS FOLLOWING RELEASE
11	1				1. Assist inmates in the restoration of civil rights by providing
	-				related agency services.
8	1				2. Enact legislation providing for the restoration of all civil
					rights (no services).
5	2				3. (Other statements in the standards supporting the restoration
16	3				of civil rights of prisoners following release.) No standard.
10	3			•	No standard.
		3	3	3	8.07 GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN INSTITUTIONS
19	1				1. Establish a formal system to hear inmate grievances, using
					an ombudsman or other independent entity.
4	2				2. Establish formal, written grievance procedures.
17	3				No standard.
		3	1	3	8.08 PRETRIAL RELEASE
30	1				1. Release the accused on own recognizance when conditions permit.
2	2				2. Establish a state-wide pretrial release capability.
8	. 3				No standard.
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		3	1	3	8.12 MAXIMUM SENTENCES FOR NONDANGEROUS OFFENDERS
5	1				1. Set maximum sentence for nondangerous offenders at5 years.
1	2				25 years, but allow increases or decreases based on the
					offender's adjustment.
2	2				3greater than 5 but less than 10 years.
32	3				No standard.
		3	1	3	8.13 MAXIMUM SENTENCES FOR FELONIES
8	1				1. For felonies other than murder, set the maximum sentence
					at25 years.
2	2				225 years except when the prescribed penalty is life.
1	2				3. 25 years with extension permitted under certain circumstances
4	2				(e.g., dangerous or habitual felony offenders).
1	2				4. Permit life sentences without parole for repeat and violent offenders.
28	3				No standard.
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No. of	Stance	s c v	
states		3 1 3	8.14 DISCRETION IN SPECIFYING MINIMUM SENTENCES
11	1		1. Authorize courts to specify a minimum sentence to be served before becoming eligible for parole.
1	2		2. Authorize courts to specify a minimum sentence in cases of extended terms.
2	3		3. (Other statements indicating that authority to determine parole eligibility is vested in the Pardon and Parole Board.)
26	3		No standard.
		3 1 3	8.15 DISCRETION IN SPECIFYING MAXIMUM SENTENCES
6	2		1. Authorize courts to impose a maximum of one-third of the sentence or three years to be served before becoming eligible for parole.
1	2		2. Same as #1, for certain classes of felonies only.
2	3		3. (Other statements indicating that the parole authority is
2	. ,		
1	• 1		responsible for establishing these guidelines.)  4. Authorize courts to impose a maximum sentence to be served before becoming eligible for parole.
30	3		No standard.
		2 1 3	8.16 DISCRETION IN IMPOSITION OF CONCURRENT SENTENCES
11	1		1. Authorize courts to impose concurrent sentences on offenders already under sentence for prior crimes, and on those convicted of multiple offenses.
4	1		2. Authorize courts to impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences depending on the circumstances.
25	3		No standard.
. •		3 1 3	8.17 COURT JURISDICTION OVER SENTENCED OFFENDERS
6	1		1. Authorize sentencing courts to retain jurisdiction over sentenced offenders and to adjust sentences in accordance with new circumstances.
1	. 2		2. Limit sentencing courts to jurisdiction over offenders only during the period prior to incarceration.
4	2		3. Authorize sentencing courts to retain jurisdiction for a specified period.
29	3		No standard.
		111	8.18 UTILIZATION OF SENTENCING COUNCILS
9	1		1. Utilize sentencing councils in courts with more than one judge, as a means of assisting trial judges in arriving at appropriate sentences.
31	3		No standard.
	_	3 1 3	8.19 APPEALS OF SENTENCE
14	1		1. Make sentencing decisions subject to review on appeal to a court or other appeals body.
26	3	•	No standard.

No. of states	Stance	S	(	V	
		2	1	. 1	8.20 DISCLOSURE OF PRESENTENCE REPORTS
20	1				1. Make presentence reports routinely availableto convicted defendents and to the prosecution, prior to sentencing.
3	2				2to defendents only, except under special circumstances.
2 1	2 1				<ul><li>3to either the court or the prosecution.</li><li>4. (Related statements supporting full exchange of information</li></ul>
-	-				relative to sentencing.)
14	3				No standard.
		2	1	. 1	8.21 SPECIFICATION OF REASONS FOR SENTENCING DECISIONS
18	1				1. Specify in the record the reasons for imposing a given sentence.
1	2				2. Consider recording the reasons for sentences taht do not fall in the usual range for a given offense.
21	3				No standard.
		3	1	. 1	8.22 CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES IN RECEPTION-DIAGNOSTIC CENTERS
6	1				1. Do not use reception-diagnostic centers for inmate classification
5	3				2. Continue or expand the use of reception-diagnostic centers for inmate classification.
2	1				3. (Other statements indicating that inmate classification is
0.7	2				conducted at institutions rather than at separate reception-diagnostic centers.)
27	3				No standard.
		3	3	3 3	8.23 COMMUNITYBASED PARTIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS
31	1				1. Develop residental or other partial release alternatives.
1	2 1				<ol> <li>Study the need for community release programs.</li> <li>(Other statements indicating that partial release programs</li> </ol>
	_				are already being utilized.)
7	3				No standard.
		3	3	3 1	8.24 SIZE RESTRICTIONS ON JUVENILE DETENTION FACILITIES
3	1				1. Restrict the population of newly constructed juvenile detention facilities to20 persons.
8	1				230 persons.
1	2				3. Develop standards for juvenile detention facilities.
28	3				No standard.
		2	? 2	2 1	8.25 PLANNING FOR LOCAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
22	1				1. Develop local correctional facilities in accordance with a state-wide master plan.
18	3				No standard.

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	No. of	Stance	SCV	
	states			
_			3 3 3	8.26 STATE CONTROL OF LOCAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
	9,,	1		1. Incorporate jails into the state system (state control).
_	4	i	•	2. Study the feasibility of incorporating jails into a state or regional system; in the interim, develop and enforce jail standards.
	14	2	:	3. Develop and enforce state-wide jail standards, but retain local administrative control.
_	4	2		4. Develop state jail standards (no mention of control).
	1	3		5. Continue complete local control of jails.
	8	3		No standard.
			2 3 1	8.28 SEGREGATION OF PRETRIAL AND POST-TRIAL DETAINEES
	13	1		1. Segregate pretrial and post-trial detainees where possible, in local correctional facilities.
	7 20	2 3	:	2. Segregate diverse categories of inmates in local facilities.
	20	3		No standard.
			2 3 3	8.29 PROGRAMMING IN LOCAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
	20	1		1. Develop educational, vocational, job placement and recreational programs in local correctional facilities.
	3	2		2. Examine programming or develop standards to ensure that recreational,
_				educational, skills and social needs of offenders are being met in local
	17	3		correctional facilities. No standard.
9	1		3 1 3	8.30 CONSTRUCTION OF NEW JUVENILE INSTITUTIONS
ı	10	1		1. Prohibit construction of major new juvenile institutionsunder all
•		2		circumstances (replacement allowed).
	6	2 2		<ol> <li>2unless an analysis shows that no other alternative exists.</li> <li>3. Permit construction of new juvenile institutions provided that</li> </ol>
	-	_		projects are undertaken in accordance with a system-wide plan.
	21	3		No standard.
L	,		3 1 3	8.31 CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ADULT INSTITUTIONS
•			0 - 0	0.31 CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ADOLF INSTITUTIONS
Į	20	1		1. Prohibit construction of major new adult institutions unless an
	1	2		analysis indicates that no alternative exists (replacement allowed).  2. Postpone construction of new adult institutions until inmates are
1		-	,	classified and grouped into homogeneous populations as specified in a
•				master plan.
•	3	2		3. Permit construction of new adult facilities provided that construction
	2	3		conforms to total system needs or to state-wide policy. 4. Permit construction of new facilities.
	14	3		No standard.
			3 1 3	8.32 HOME FURLOUGH PROGRAMS
	18	1		1. Allow home furloughs to qualified inmates.
	22	3		No standard.
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No. of states	Stance	S	С	٧	
		3	3	3	8.33 WORK-RELEASE PROGRAMS
29	1				<ol> <li>Adopt, expand, or continue work-release programs in each institution.</li> </ol>
1	1				2. Establish transitional centers for selected work-release inmates rather than developing work-release programs in each institution.
1	1				3. (Other statements indicating the current use of work-release programs.
9	3				No standard.
		3	3	3	8.34 STUDY-RELEASE PROGRAMS
25 2	1	,			<ol> <li>Adopt or expand study-release programs in institutions.</li> <li>(Other statements indicating the current use of study-release programs.)</li> </ol>
13	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	8.35 EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS WITHIN STATE INSTITUTIONS
23	1				1. Develop or continue comprehensive educational programs within each institution.
2	2				<ol><li>Other statements indicating the existence of educational programs.)</li></ol>
25	2				3. Provide education to inmates either through institutional or community programs.
10	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	8.36 VOCATIONAL PROGRAMS WITHIN STATE INSTITUTIONS
<b>28</b> 8	1				<ol> <li>Develop or continue vocational training programs within each institution.</li> </ol>
1	1				2. (Other statements indicating the existence of vocational training programs.)
1	_				3. Develop and test in selected settings vocational training concepts related to state employment needs.
10	3				No standard.
		٠	1	3	8.37 PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
19	1				1. Encourage private industry to establish institutional training programs and to reserve jobs for graduates of these programs.
21	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	8.38 TREATMENT OF ADDICTED OFFENDERS
25	1				1. Develop drug treatment programs for incarcerated addicts who cannot be handled in community facilities.
2	2				2. Reexamine policies for handling addicted offenders and discourage their incarceration.
3	2				3. Divert addicted offenders from correctional facilities into community treatment programs, prior to incarceration.
10	3			i	No standard.

No. of states	Stance	S	С	V	
States		3	3	3	8.39 RATES OF COMPENSATION IN PRISON INDUSTRIES
5	1				<ol> <li>Compensate inmates at the rate prevailing outside the cor- rectional facility.</li> </ol>
6	2				2. Compensate inmates at a reasonable level, or as an incentive
_					to participate.
1	2				3. Compensate inmates at the Federal minimum wage.
1	2				4. Compensate inmates (no level specified).
6	3				5. Compensate inmates for their work, but require payment for
21	3				services provided by the state (food, clothing, medical). No standard.
		-	1	3	8.40 WORK STOPPAGES BY CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES
12	1				<ol> <li>Enact legislation prohibiting work stoppages by correctional employees.</li> </ol>
2	1				<ol> <li>Establish formal policy prohibiting work stoppages (legis- lation already exists).</li> </ol>
5	2				3. Discourage work stoppages and make plans to deal with them.
21	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	8.41 IN-SERVICE EDUCATION OF CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES
19	1				<ol> <li>Provide salary increases and new work assignments as incentives for correctional employees to improve their education.</li> </ol>
1	2				2. Provide salary increases as incentives (not new work assignments
5	2				3. Provide incentives to improve education (unspecified).
1	2				4. Provide incentives for participation in in-house training
					programs.
14	3				No standard.
		1	1	1	8.43 CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED BEFORE TRIAL
21	1				<ol> <li>Credit time served awaiting trial or appeal.</li> </ol>
19	3				No standard.
		3	1	3	8.44 JURISDICTION OVER JUVENILE STATUS OFFENDERS
8	1				<ol> <li>Limit the juristiction of the court to juveniles charged with nonstatus offenses.</li> </ol>
10	2				2. Maintain the court's jurisdiction over status offenders, but prevent their incarceration.
22	3				No standard.

No. of states	Stance	S	C	V	
States		3	1	3	8.45 EMPLOYMENT OF EX-OFFENDERS
12	-				1. Repeal all statutory provisions prohibiting the employment of ex-offenders in state and local government agencies.
4	-				2. Enact legislation protecting ex-offenders from unreasonable discrimination in employment (government agencies not specified).
5	-				3. Enact legislation protecting ex-offender's civil rights and other attributes of citizenship (employment barriers not specified)
1	-				4. Utilize existing laws to restore ex-offenders' rights (including right to employment) not directly related to the offense committed.
1	-				5. Legislate collateral consequences of a criminal conviction, including the denial or revocation of a license or governmental privilege.
18	-				No standard.
		3	3	3	8.46 ENCOURAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONAL PROGRAMS
12	1				1. Enact legislation authorizing the establishment of a wide variety of community-based correctional programs.
16	1				2. Develop community-based correctional programs through correctional agencies.
12	3				No standards.
		3	3	3	8.47 CONVERSION TO A COEDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
7	1				1. Convert adaptable institutions with comparable populations to coeducational facilities.
5 28	2				<ol> <li>Study the feasibility of converting institutions into coeducational facilities.</li> <li>No standard.</li> </ol>
		2	3	1	8.49 PROVISION OF IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES
1	1				1. Provide at least80 hoursof in-service training annually for all correctional staff.
20	1				240 hours
3	2				320 hours
8 3	2 2				4. Provide formal in-service training (no hours specified).  5. Create a commission to advise on correctional and other
3					criminal justice agency training needs, and to develop standards thereto.
5	3				No standard.
		2	3	1	8.50 PROGRAM EVALUATIONS
14	1				1. Evaluate correctional agency performance on the basis of recidivism rates reported at six-month intervals.
3	2				2. Conduct agency evaluations periodically.
4	2				3. Conduct overall reviews of the state corrrectional system on the basis of recidivism measures.
19	3				No standard.

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states

3 3 3 8.51 PLANNING FOR NONINSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES

1. Develop a systematic plan and timetable for implementing a full range of alternatives to incarceration.

7 2 2. Analyze the needs, resources, and gaps in service to develop a range of alternatives to incarceration.

9 3 No standard.