

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

95TH CONGRESS }  
2d Session }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

X STUDY MISSION ON INTERNATIONAL  
CONTROLS OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING  
AND PRODUCTION  
JANUARY 2-22, 1978

A REPORT  
OF THE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS  
ABUSE AND CONTROL  
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION  
SCNAC-95-2-3



JULY 1978

Printed for the use of the  
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON: 1978

60051

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL**

**LESTER L. WOLFF, New York, *Chairman***

**PETER W. RODINO, Jr., New Jersey**  
**PAUL G. ROGERS, Florida**  
**E (EIKI) DE LA GARZA, Texas**  
**JAMES R. MANN, South Carolina**  
**MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois**  
**CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York**  
**FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, California**  
**GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma**  
**BILLY L. EVANS, Georgia**  
**LEO C. ZEFERETTI, New York**  
**DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii**

**J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida**  
**TOM RAILSBACK, Illinois**  
**LOUIS-FREY, Jr., Florida**  
**ROBIN L. BEARD, Tennessee**  
**BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York**  
**TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio**

*Et Officio*

**MARIO BIAGGI, New York**  
**CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois**  
**STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina**  
**JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas**

**COMMITTEE STAFF**

**JOSEPH L. NELLIS, *Chief Counsel***  
**THOMAS H. VOGEL, *Professional Staff Member***  
**LAURIE GENEVRO, *Research Intern***

---

**SELECT COMMITTEE STUDY MISSION TASK FORCE**

**LESTER L. WOLFF, New York, *Chairman***

**JAMES R. MANN, South Carolina**  
**CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York**

**TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio**  
**JOE SKUBITZ, Kansas**

# NCJRS

JUL 19 1979

## CONTENTS ACQUISITIONS

	Page
Foreword.....	v
Introduction.....	1
I. Japan.....	2
a. Drug abuse among American military personnel in Japan.....	2
b. International traffic.....	3
II. Philippines.....	4
a. Drug abuse among U.S. military personnel.....	5
b. International traffic.....	7
III. Papua New Guinea.....	7
IV. Australia.....	8
V. Singapore.....	10
a. International traffic.....	13
b. International Narcotics Conference in Singapore.....	13
c. Burma.....	13
VI. Malaysia.....	15
a. International traffic.....	18
VII. Thailand.....	20
VIII. India.....	22
IX. Iran.....	25
X. United Kingdom.....	26
Conclusion.....	29
I. Press conference statement of Chairman Lester L. Wolff.....	31
II. Statement by Chairman Lester L. Wolff for the Congressional Record with comments by Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman.....	35
III. Intelligence information.....	39
IV. Continuing reaction in Thai narcotics community to Congressman Lester Wolff's statement identifying major narcotics traffickers in Thailand.....	42
V. Letter to Chairman Lester Wolff from Khun Sa.....	45
VI. Keynote address by Robert B. Oakley at the East Asian Regional Narcotics Conference.....	46
VII. Correction to Report on South American Study Mission, issued November 1977.....	52

## FOREWORD

The following is a report on the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control special mission to 10 countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe between January 2-22, 1978. The delegation consisted of five members of the Select Committee and six other Members of Congress from all parts of the United States and both sides of the aisle and included representation from eight major committees of the Congress.

The mission was complemented by the participation of the Honorable Adolph Dubs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Mr. James Free, Special Assistant to President Carter. The participation of these representatives from the executive branch substantially enhanced the value of the trip and furthered the Select Committee goal of increasing cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of Government on narcotics control matters.

Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics who participated in the mission were Chairman Lester L. Wolff of New York, Congressman James R. Mann of South Carolina, Congressman Charles Rangel of New York, Congressman Tennyson Guyer of Ohio, and ex officio member Congressman Joseph Skubitz of Kansas. In addition, members of the committees who were present at some of the narcotics meetings were Congressman George Danielson of California, Congressman John Myers of Indiana, Congressman Donald Mitchell of New York, Congressman Robert Badham of California and Delegate Antonio Won Pat of Guam.

Lt. Col. Ted Dolloff, U.S. Army, Congressional Relations, who served as escort officer provided invaluable services to the delegation in his handling of all transportation and logistics matters. All members of the delegation would like to commend him for his assistance in planning, coordinating, and facilitating the entire study mission. Mr. Robert Stutman, Director, Congressional Affairs, Drug Enforcement Administration, provided assistance in coordinating liaison between the delegation and DEA personnel in each country visited. Ms. Ann Swift, Congressional Relations, Department of State, assisted in coordinating mission activities. The Select Committee Chief Counsel, Mr. Joseph Nellis and Professional Staff Member Thomas H. Vogel performed valuable staff support services for the delegation. Without the assistance of these individuals, the study mission would not have been possible and we thank each of you for your outstanding assistance.

In each country, the Members of Congress and staff met both formally and informally with a wide range of individuals including presidents, prime ministers, cabinet officers, agency heads, military officials, narcotics officers, U.S. Embassy personnel and numerous private citizens. We want to thank every individual who took time to exchange views and experiences on international narcotics control

matters. It is only through increased international cooperation that we will be able to make progress in the continuing struggle against the abuse of narcotics.

During the mission, the task force participated in the State Department Southeast Asia Regional Narcotics Coordinators Conference in Singapore and exchanged information with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the State Department personnel who are responsible for implementing U.S. policy in the critical Southeast Asia region. We want to thank the Honorable Mathea Falco, Senior Narcotics Adviser, State Department, for her assistance in facilitating our participation in the conference.

The members of the Select Committee and the staff take this opportunity to express deep appreciation for all the useful assistance provided by personnel from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Embassies in the countries visited.

LESTER L. WOLFF, *Chairman.*  
JAMES R. MANN.  
CHARLES B. RANGEL.  
TENNYSON GUYER.  
JOSEPH SKUBITZ.

APRIL 11, 1978.

## INTRODUCTION

During the past 5 years, the United States has been the recipient of a rapidly increasing share of heroin produced in Southeast Asia. Five years ago, the best estimates from the U.S. intelligence community was that 2 percent of the heroin in the United States came from Southeast Asia. We have observed this figure as it has crept from 2 percent to 5 percent to 15 percent and finally, in 1977, to 25 to 35 percent. While the U.S. Government reports that the total amount of heroin being smuggled into the United States has decreased in 1976-77 from 7 tons to 6 tons, the amount from Southeast Asia has doubled from 1 ton to 2 tons in the same period of time. Southeast Asian opium and heroin are no longer restricted to the dark alleys of Southeast Asia, but now are available on the streets of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and the United States.

The Select Committee's 10 nation, 20-day mission focused on a study of narcotics abuse and the impact of heroin trafficking from the Golden Triangle on those countries in close proximity to the source area. In addition, the mission focused upon impressing foreign governments and U.S. personnel overseas, with the depth of the commitment which the U.S. Congress has toward the reduction of the international traffic in drugs. In a series of prior Select Committee reports, the committee has underscored its adherence to the ultimate necessity for the reduction in trafficking—the cutting off of supplies at their source and in transshipment areas.

The task force undertook to examine the extent of drug abuse in each of the countries and to determine if U.S. Government assistance can aid in effectively combating the spread of trafficking and drug abuse. The countries we visited are experiencing all of the advancing stages of drug abuse which have been seen in the United States and more importantly, are examples of areas through which the major drug trafficking pipelines traverse. Our mission took us from Papua New Guinea (with almost no drug abuse problem) to Malaysia (with a rampant problem); from Thailand (the transit site for tons of illicit heroin going into the international market) to India (the largest producer of licit opium in the world). We were able to discuss nationwide prevention programs in Singapore and the Philippines and innovative treatment approaches in Singapore and England. We discussed reducing cultivation at the source, border control, law enforcement, prevention, training, treatment, and regional cooperation in each of the countries visited.

It is almost a cliché to repeat that drug abuse is an international problem. All nations are victim nations, for wherever the drug traffic touches, the people in that country are irreparably harmed and corrupted. We tried to encourage bilateral, multilateral, and regional cooperation on drug abuse issues. We were encouraged by the positive reception we received in each of the countries visited. It is almost axiomatic that a congressional delegation draws close attention from the leaders of other nations, particularly where a Narcotics Committee directs the attention of these leaders to their joint responsibility with other countries for the suppression of this great common evil.

LESTER L. WOLFF, *Chairman.*

## I. JAPAN

There has been a substantial increase in the abuse of drugs in Japan in the last 2 years. As an indication, more drugs were seized during the first 5 months of 1977 than in all of 1976. As a result, the Japanese have upgraded their emphasis on drug law enforcement and maintained the prevention programs at previous levels. In 1975, the prevention programs were the primary focus of the Japanese Government's drug abuse strategy. At the present time, the Japanese recognize the serious nature of their drug abuse problem and are extending greater cooperation to U.S. authorities on international cases.

The biggest part of the Japanese drug problem is the abuse of stimulants smuggled in from Korea, Hong Kong, and Europe. The problem is spreading from cities to rural areas. There are an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 amphetamine abusers in Japan. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that a gram of amphetamines may be purchased in Korea for \$10 and sold on the streets of Japan for \$1,000.

Accompanying the abuse of stimulants is an increase in the abuse of heroin. Amphetamine abusers often rely on heroin to counteract the side effects of the stimulant and use the two drugs simultaneously. The heroin used in Japan is largely from the Golden Triangle area—Burma, Laos and Thailand.

Authorities are very concerned with a major presence of organized crime in narcotics traffic. The National Police Agency estimates that 60 percent of organized crime's income is derived from drug trafficking. There have been reports of numerous fights between rival gangs for control of the trade. This follows the pattern of violence taking place in major trafficking cities around the globe.

## A. DRUG ABUSE AMONG AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN JAPAN

Among the 45,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, the primary drug of abuse is marihuana. The drug abuse problem in the military there merits attention, but it is certainly not as serious as the situation the armed services face in Western Europe. Officials have reported the following number of drug abuse incidents:<sup>1</sup>

1975-----	601
1976-----	485
1977-----	371

Last year, 57 cases were referred to the Japanese authorities, and 22 Americans are in jail, mostly for marihuana offenses.

Command-directed urinalyses are part of the drug detection program of U.S. Forces in Japan. The following statistics were provided to the Select Committee by Captain J. W. Howay, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1975:		
Number-----	3,075	
Test positive-----	22	
1976:		
Number-----	4,761	
Test positive-----	140	
1977:		
Number-----	3,562	
Test positive-----	83	

<sup>1</sup> An incident is defined as any time that the military begins an investigation concerning drug use, drug trafficking or activities which occurred in relation to drug use.

No breakdown of the positive results was available by drug of abuse or followup action taken.

[NOTE: Statistics were not available for Misawa Air Base, Japan; for years 1975 and 1976. U.S. Army, Japan, statistics were not available for 1975.]

The most serious problem among U.S. Armed Services dependents in Japan is alcohol. In 1976, three dependents were treated for alcohol abuse, while in 1977 there were 95. Drug abuse referrals for 1976 and 1977 were 10 and 2, respectively. There is a wide variety of treatment facilities, including hospitals or clinics (at Yokota/Yokosuka, Okinawa, and Clark), Alcohol Rehabilitation Drydock (at Yokosuka and Okinawa) and social action AA groups and counselors at local units.

U.S. military officials in Japan are very concerned about the future. They see the increasing use of drugs among the civilian population as a threat to American service personnel stationed in Japan, since drugs more easily obtained by civilians become more available to the armed forces.

#### B. INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC

On an international level, Japan is presenting some new problems. While DEA's efforts previously were aimed at the methamphetamine problem (which was Japan's primary concern), our agents now spend 90 percent of their time on heroin cases which involve Japan as a transshipment site. Cases have indicated that Thai and Chinese traffickers are using Japan as a transshipment point for heroin going to the United States. Japan is becoming a more likely transit point for smugglers as Hong Kong tightens its port controls. The situation is becoming more serious, as Japan plans to open a new airport in March 1978. The airport is located 1½ hours from downtown Tokyo. Surveillance will be much more difficult than it has been in the past. DEA is also concerned with trafficking connections and tourism from Japan through and to Guam. The problem is not specific to the military personnel stationed there, but involves the massive corruption of the local authorities. The military is restricted from assisting DEA officials because of *posse comitatus* provisions.

Some cases uncovered in Japan indicate that retired U.S. military personnel have been involved in smuggling Southeast Asian heroin to the United States. This is being investigated, along with the extent of the connection between Japanese criminal organizations and Japanese-American community contacts in the United States.

Japan is significant on an international level not only in its position as a transshipment site, but also in its role as the major Asian producer of acetic anhydride. Acetic anhydride is a chemical with many industrial uses, among them the refining of heroin. Japan legally exports acetic anhydride to such non-industrial countries as Thailand, Burma, and Malaysia, where it is illegally diverted to illicit refineries. Only 1 kg. of acetic anhydride is required to produce 1 kg. of heroin. Japanese production of the chemical has steadily increased in recent years, and is currently around half a million tons, annually. Despite recommendations from the United States, Japan continued to have no production or export restrictions on acetic anhydride to non-industrial countries.



### *Recommendations*

. Based on its findings, the Select Committee task force believes that it would be in the interest of the United States to continue to urge Japan to place monitoring controls on the exportation of acetic anhydride. The United States should also work with Burma, Thailand, and Malaysia to closely monitor the importation and distribution of acetic anhydride. The Select Committee also believes that the Internal Revenue Service should become involved in the monitoring of retired U.S. military personnel suspected of involvement in narcotics trafficking.

With the potential which Japan shows for becoming an important operating base for U.S. drug enforcement efforts in the future, the United States should re-examine its present extradition treaty with Japan. At present, this treaty does not cover narcotics offenses. The Select Committee recommends that it be amended, giving the United States a firmer base from which to direct its international narcotics efforts in Japan.

## II. PHILIPPINES

A major reason for study of this area is the large U.S. military contingent in the area. As well, the Philippines is a potentially dangerous transit area. The imposition of martial law in the Philippines in 1972 has limited the use, production, and trafficking of dangerous drugs, as it has limited travel and the flow of goods in general.

The Philippines is not a drug producing nation. The last seizure of an opium refining laboratory was in 1972. Some cannabis is grown, but it is for local use. The government is working to eradicate the cultivation but reports show that it is continuing to spread. Drugs coming into the Philippines are largely heroin and marijuana from Thailand, cannabis resin from Pakistan, methaqualone from Hong Kong, and LSD from the United States.

The major domestic enforcement agency is CANU, the Philippines Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit, which was established in 1972. It is responsible for narcotics law enforcement, education, training, and rehabilitation. CANU recently established a Special Action Team consisting of CANU officers, a U.S. CIID Customs Coordinator, and a U.S. DEA representative. The purpose of the Special Action Team is to increase overall coordination of domestic and international agencies in investigation and intelligence.

CANU's efforts in officer training have been done in conjunction with DEA. So far, 1,200 Filipino personnel have been trained either by DEA or DEA trained instructors. Through its public education work, CANU has established information centers at 10 universities, and has trained 8,000 youth leaders in metropolitan Manila. Treatment and rehabilitation are provided by the government and seven private treatment and rehabilitation facilities in the Philippines. The facilities do not use methadone, but focus on "religious awakening" and family solidarity. Some 3,295 persons have been admitted, and 991 have been rehabilitated but still undergo followup care.

## A. DRUG ABUSE AMONG U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

There are two major U.S. military installations in the Philippines, Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station. There are some drug problems here, but as in Japan, nothing as serious as the situation among U.S. troops stationed in Europe.

*Clark Air Force Base*

At Clark Air Force Base, drug abuse problems are handled by the Social Actions Office. After alcohol, marijuana is the most common drug of abuse. It is grown locally (in the mountainous region of Luzon), available at \$10 to \$20 per ounce. Officials do not feel that the current level of marijuana use affects combat readiness. Hard drugs do not have a significant presence. This is due in part to the limited availability, the high cost of heroin, and the massive abuse prevention and control efforts including severe local penalties directed toward it.

As part of its prevention effort, all personnel within 60 days of arrival at Clark are provided with a 4-hour drug education seminar. The treatment and rehabilitation program at Clark is diverse, and includes counseling and hospitalization and detoxification, if necessary.

Military officials at Clark work with local authorities in controlling the drug situation. Most drug identification is done by the local law enforcement agencies who have apprehended individuals with drugs in their possession. Random urinalysis has been discontinued, and a program of command directed screening has been implemented. Out of 274 persons tested in 1977, 5 showed positive results. In the Unit Sweep urinalysis program, there were 1,345 tests in 1977, with 1 positive screen. Officials have also developed a program designed to eliminate the smuggling of contraband (including narcotics) out of the Philippines. "Commando Plug" is operated in conjunction with Customs officials. The areas of interest to the program are personal property (household goods, unaccompanied baggage, vehicles), passengers and accompanied baggage, military and military contract aircraft, and cargo. All personal property shipments are inspected by military personnel who have been trained and accredited by the U.S. Customs Service. A military customs inspector is present during the entire time household goods and unaccompanied baggage are packed for shipment. All departing passengers and their accompanied baggage are inspected prior to boarding the aircraft. Accompanied baggage is screened by detection dogs prior to stowing in the aircraft.

The deterrent effect of the DOD customs inspection and Commando Plug programs is evident (see chart below). In the past year, only two confirmed narcotic finds were made involving personnel and cargoes departing Clark Air Force Base (both were marijuana). The task force from the Select Committee was surprised that not a single military person was picked up upon entry into the U.S. on a narcotics smuggling charge even though there are known cases involving smuggling by military in SEA. This either indicates that the en-route or pre-clearance customs is missing something, the stateside receivers are missing something or the servicemen are no longer smuggling narcotics.

## DOD MILITARY CUSTOMS/COMMANDO PLUG PROGRAM—RESULTS

Activity	Jan- uary	Feb- ruary	March	April	May	June	July	Aug- ust	Sep- tem- ber	Oct- ober	No- vem- ber	De- cem- ber
Household goods inspections.....				1								
Aircraft inspections.....												
Baggage inspections.....											1	
Postal inspections.....												
Total.....				1							1	

*Subic Bay Naval Station*

Navy officials here believe that the Subic Bay installation may be the cleanest naval installation in Southeast Asia in terms of drug presence. Possible explanations for this are that the Republic of the Philippines is not a source country for drugs, and the close cooperation between the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and CANU since 1972. Marihuana is the most widely used drug. It is easily obtained, but expensive (\$1.50 to \$2 per gram). Officials also report a problem with the tranquilizer Serax. A prescription is required to procure it legally, but it is very easy to get on the black market.

The main line of attack on the drug problem at Subic is enforcement. The NISO works on base, off base, and out-country to control narcotics traffic. Officials feel that they have a handle on the problem on base. Subic runs a random urinalysis program; of the 607 personnel tested in 1977, 20 came up with positive screens, indicating them as "possible users."

Operation Stableboy is a NISO program which works off base and out-country with foreign law enforcement agencies in source areas. Its purposes are to neutralize illegal drug activity and curtail drug abuse in the Navy. There have been some difficulties with the cooperation of foreign police because of a conflict of goals. The Navy wants to stop pushers at the street level because they pose a threat to sailors, while foreign authorities are trying to apprehend the higher-ups in narcotics traffic. These differences hamper but do not halt the cooperative efforts. Stableboy has staged operations in all ports prior to the docking of naval vessels when sailors will be on leave in the area.

In 1977, Stableboy apprehended 173 servicemen and 316 Filipinos, and seized 172 grams of heroin, 14,000 grams of marihuana, and 443 cannabis plants. Close contacts with the Filipino authorities secured the release of all but five servicemen. Operation Stableboy has conducted successful operations in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Manila, Thailand, and Jakarta.

The Counseling and Assistance Center at Subic Bay offers a program of therapeutic evaluation, whose objective is to generate knowledgeable recommendations to commanding officers regarding the disposition of drug abusers. The program also offers a client an opportunity to become more aware of himself, and any preparatory counseling necessary for individuals awaiting transfer to a Navy drug rehabilitation center. Dependents of military personnel are offered similar services.

## B. INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC

The presence of foreign heroin in the Philippines indicates that there is trafficking activity. Also, all heroin seized since 1974 has belonged to non-Philippine residents. During 1976, DEA documented the passage through the Philippines of nine Guamanian traffickers and aided CANU in seizing 3 kilograms of No. 4 heroin destined for a foreign country. There are three primary factors which contribute to the use of the Philippines as a transshipment site for narcotics. One factor is the geography of the country. The 7,083 islands which make up the Philippines are difficult to patrol. There is constant sea traffic of all kinds. The southern islands are especially difficult to monitor, and there are rumors of drug connections with Indonesia.

Another contributing factor is the Philippines' desire to promote tourism. As a part of this promotion, it does not pursue a strong customs policy.

The third factor is the political situation in the Philippines. There is the chance that future easing of the state of martial law in the Philippines will make drug trafficking easier. This could coincide with a crackdown on drug smuggling in other Southeast Asian ports, which would make the Philippines a prime transit area.

In efforts to prevent this from happening and to control the existing narcotics trafficking problem, Filipino officials have worked closely with DEA, Thais, and Australians on narcotics cases. They show a great willingness to work on an international level against narcotics. The Philippines is a member of ASEAN, participates in international programs, conferences, and treaties, and cooperates with other nations on matters of mutual concern.

The Select Committee believes that the willingness of the Filipinos to aid in international efforts could be directed toward training efforts. The Philippines has been so successful in its antinarcotics efforts that it would be useful if the United States could facilitate in any manner the training of foreign narcotics officials by the Filipino authorities. They have already trained several Malaysians and Guamanians. Often, the practice of Asians training Asians is more effective than training by U.S. authorities.

The Philippines has agreed to provide slots in each of its 10-week advanced narcotics training programs for several Indonesians, Malaysians, and Thais, if the United States can fund their participation.

## III. PAPUA NEW GUINEA

At the time of the delegation's visit, there was no major problem with domestic drug abuse in New Guinea. Papua New Guinea's only connection with international narcotics traffic is as a potential transshipment point from Southeast Asia to Hong Kong, Australia, or the United States. There are some areas in New Guinea where the climate and land are suitable for cultivating poppies or coca plants but the only illegal crop which has been found is cannabis. This is important, for the remote inaccessible areas provide a dangerous potential.

The drug enforcement emphasis in New Guinea now is on preventive law enforcement. Officials are trying to anticipate any possible problem. The PNG government has recently established a 6-man drug squad. So far, there has been no request that the U.S. Embassy aid PNG in the training of the squad. DEA and State were requested by us to provide training assistance, which is pending in DEA.

Papua New Guinea officials have participated in regional narcotics conferences including the South Pacific Basin Intra-Regional Drug Abuse Conference held in New Zealand during October 1977. The task force feels that the U.S. Government should offer to assist in the training of Papua New Guinea's narcotics squad, either in a foreign program or in the United States.

#### IV. AUSTRALIA

Drug abuse in Australia has been steadily rising since the beginning of the decade, especially in the last 2 to 3 years. The common age of abuse is between 18 and 25, but it is becoming lower. While a wide variety of substances are used, cannabis is the major drug of abuse. It is usually imported as Thai sticks (from Bangkok) or hashish (from the India subcontinent or the Middle East). There is also substantial local production. In 1976, police and Narcotics Bureau officers seized approximately 2 tons of marihuana and over 5,000 plants. There is no evidence of a lessening of the demand—officials believe that the large scale local cultivation points to the opposite. There are an estimated 500,000 weekly users of marihuana.

Opium has been used in the past, but the latest information suggests that it is increasingly being processed into heroin or morphine. Heroin seizures have been increasing and heroin now presents a major problem for Australia. In 1970, 1.4 kilograms were seized; in 1976, 20 kilograms. The heroin is predominantly from Hong Kong and Thailand, but there have been five seizures of heroin laboratories in Australia in the last 2 years.

There are an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 heroin addicts, though definite figures are difficult to obtain. Use is as common in upper class youths as in poorer, and there are no geographic boundaries to heroin use. Heroin addicts looking for a more available substitute often turn to Palfium, a narcotic pain killer. A prescription is required to obtain the drug, and officials report a flood of forged prescriptions for it.

Hallucinogens are not as widely used as either cannabis or opium, but they still have a significant presence. The popularity of LSD has been declining since 1973, after a 3-year vogue. Officials credit this decline to a period of limited supply and poor quality LSD, which discouraged users. Other hallucinogens, such as certain mushrooms, aerosols, and glue, are used, especially among the young. Officials see a potential for the increased use of DMA, DMT and STP.

Recently, extensive use of amphetamines, barbiturates, and other psychotropic substances have been reported. One particular drug, methaqualone (trade name Mandrax), has been a major part of this increase. Mandrax is widely—and, in the opinion of some authorities, overly—prescribed for nervous anxiety. Abusers often combine its use with alcohol.

Cocaine is not a widely used drug at the present time. The first major seizure of cocaine was in 1976.

There are increasing efforts to control the drug situation through enforcement. However, the authority for drug law enforcement is divided between the Commonwealth government and six State governments. This makes coordinated efforts difficult, and has hampered the collection of meaningful statistics. Four major areas of drug law enforcement are the responsibility of four different types of agencies. The effort is broken down to the Commonwealth, the State governments, the Department of Business and Consumer Affairs, and the National Standing Committee on Drugs of Dependence.

The Commonwealth has responsibility for the control of import and export of narcotics and psychotropic substances, and the manufacture of narcotics. State governments control the manufacture of psychotropics, cultivation of drug producing plants, and distribution of drugs of dependence within their boundaries. The Department of Business and Consumer Affairs enforces legislation regarding illegal import and export of drugs. It coordinates compliance with international convention requirements. Its antismuggling efforts include detector dogs, air/sea surveillance, and a computerized information system which monitors the production, distribution, and destruction of drugs covered by the Single Convention of 1961 and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The National Standing Control Committee on Drugs of Dependence was established in 1969. Its goals are to consider the future of the drug problem in Australia, and make recommendations to the government on action which should be taken.

The Australian National Drug Education Program is supported by Federal funds, and is designed to "ensure an integrated and coordinated approach to drug education as a preventive measure." The program emphasizes the integration of drug education into general health education. The program considers the broader picture of "inter-personal relationships, life-styles, and adjustments in a complex modern society" as it relates to drug abuse. Health and drug education programs try to avoid scare tactics. Treatment programs in Australia use methadone only for those persons with a physical dependence on heroin. Not more than 500 to 600 persons are on methadone at this time—down from approximately 1,200. Australian officials had found that they were too liberal in the dispensing of methadone to heroin users who were not addicts. To prevent the dispensing of methadone to non-addicts, they are now using naloxone (NARCAN), which is a positive test for dependence. At the present time, there are approximately 1,500 people in treatment of some form. The rapid growth of the drug problem has overloaded centers, such as WHO (We Help Ourselves). This center has detoxified 700 addicts over the last 3 years, and is now turning away persons at a rate of four per day. Australia has a growing domestic problem with drug abuse.

The use of drugs is widespread, with especially serious situations in the seaports and major cities. Australian officials are also concerned with the increased presence of organized crime in narcotics dealing. The kidnaping and apparent murder of an anti-drug campaigner in New South Wales prompted the establishment in October 1977 of a National Royal Commission to inquire into all aspects of the drug problem. Presently, the Commission is being slowed by the lack of reliable statistics. Enforcement efforts are also hampered by the division of responsibility and lack of coordination between Federal and state agencies.

Of concern to the United States as well as to Australia is Australia's position as a prime transshipment point for narcotics smugglers, but officials have no information that any heroin has ever come to Australia only for the purpose of transshipment. They acknowledge that there is a possibility of such traffic in the future. Australia has over 12,000 miles of coastline, largely uninhabited, and an abundance of abandoned airstrips from World War II. Private yachts and small aircraft are used to land the goods, which are then transferred to campervans and trailers for overland transportation. It was discussed during the visit that the Australians are unable to monitor their borders effectively because of the size of the coastline, and there was talk of building up their Coast Guard or using the Navy to better patrol the coast.

In the past, Australian authorities believe most of the trafficking was carried on by ethnic Chinese, but they now find a substantial number of Caucasian traffickers. Smugglers have also changed from individuals carrying small loads for personal gain, to highly professional organizations directing major shipments of drugs. Australia is aware of its international responsibilities for curbing this smuggling problem. Although there are no DEA representatives in Australia, officials there work closely with the U.S. Embassy in Canberra on cases of mutual interest, and with DEA representatives in Manila. Australia actively participates in regional and worldwide conferences. Australia and the United States have a bilateral extradition treaty which includes drug offenses.

#### *Recommendations*

The task force from the Select Committee recommends that NIDA offer to share the findings from their research on determining the scope of the drug abuse problem in Australia as the Royal Commission is having some difficulty in ascertaining the answer to this fundamental question. NIDA should make whatever reports or experts available, as requested by the Australians.

The task force is very concerned with the lack of control the Australians have over their coastline. They should be encouraged to strengthen their coastal surveillance. The United States should offer to assist either through the Coast Guard or Customs in removing this loophole in Australian enforcement efforts. The United States should also extend NIDA and DEA training opportunities to Australian officials to bring their efforts to optimum capacity.

#### V. SINGAPORE

Singapore is a city-State which gained its independence from Malaysia in 1965. Prior to 1963, it was a British Crown Colony. Singapore is the fourth busiest port in the world, the fourth largest financial center in the world, and the third largest refining center for petroleum products. It has the second highest per capita income in Asia, the first being Japan. Singapore has a long history of opium abuse. Some authorities believe the city to be in a third "historical stage" of drug abuse; the first phase being from the origin of modern Singapore in 1819 to the outbreak of the Pacific War and the occupation of the island by Japan when the major drug of abuse was opium; the second phase from restoration of British rule in 1945 to

1970 with the British concentrating on the suppression of trafficking; and the third phase beginning in 1971 with the dramatic change in patterns of drug abuse. Prior to 1971, there were very few drug addicts under the age of 20; in the change that took place more and more young people in their teens and twenties were taking drugs. Currently, the predominant drugs of abuse are ganja (cannabis) and No. 3 heroin. Authorities believe the city to be in the throes of a heroin "epidemic" and place a high priority on controlling it. Half of the population of Singapore is under the age of 21. The government of Singapore estimates that there are 18,500 drug addicts, 87 percent of which are between 16 and 29.

In an attempt to combat this situation, the drug laws in Singapore are very strict. The Misuse of Drugs Act, passed in 1973, streamlined the old drug laws, and was amended in 1975 to stiffen the penalties for drug offenses. Any person caught in possession of over 15 grams of pure heroin is considered a trafficker. Trafficking in dangerous drugs is a capital offense. There is no indication yet that these penalties have had any serious impact on slowing the drug traffic. At present, 42 of the 223 persons who have been arrested as traffickers are subject to the death penalty; of these 42, 13 have exhausted all their legal alternatives and face execution. The Misuse of Drugs Act has been criticized because of its severe penalties and presumptions of guilt until innocence is proven. Under the law, everyone is subject to urinalysis. If a positive screen turns up, a person can be detained and confined for 6 months of treatment. The recent sharp increase in arrests (figures included in the chart on p. 15) reflects the detention of users rather than traffickers.

To enforce these laws, the Central Narcotics Bureau was established in 1971. (At approximately the same time the DEA office—then the BNDD—reopened in Singapore). Presently, there are 108 persons in the CNB and 80 persons in each of the 8 police divisions. The CNB is staffed by experienced people and cooperation between the Bureau and DEA is good.

While in Singapore, the delegation visited the Jalan Awan Center, a narcotics treatment facility. The Center is next door to the Jalan Awan prison. While there, the delegation was briefed on the background of addiction treatment methods in Singapore.

In 1976, there were 600 persons in treatment facilities—filling the centers to capacity. The recidivism rate at the time was approximately 90 percent. With the beginning of Operation Ferret (discussed below), expanded facilities were needed. It was decided to renovate an area just outside the Jalan Awan prison. There are 6¼ blocks completed at the present time, with 1,120 persons in custody. There are currently four completed rehabilitation workshops, and four more are planned.

The treatment program at Jalan Awan is broken down into five stages: Stage I is a 1-week "cold turkey" detoxification program. There is a doctor connected with the program, but it is basically a total withdrawal by the addict on his own in a cell. Stage II is a recuperation period. Stage III is an "indoctrination" or counseling period, with briefings on the dangers of drug abuse. Stage IV is a 3-month physical recuperation period with exercise and nutrition programs to help build up the individual's physical condition. Stage V focuses on discipline and work skills for the remainder of the detention with the participants assigned to workshops sponsored by private companies.



The participants are paid from \$0.25 to \$0.65 per hour, which goes into an account which the workers' family can draw upon. During the entire program, none of the addicts are allowed to smoke, as this is considered a similar form of addiction. There are regular visits by the addict's family every 2 weeks.

There is no variation in the program for women. If a woman is pregnant when taken into custody, she will probably have an abortion, rather than run the risk of having an addicted baby. If an addict is under 16 or over 55, he or she would be sent to a different facility with a modified program. Most of the persons in Jalan Awan are from 19 to 27 years old.

If an individual is released from the program and convicted a second time, there is a mandatory 3-year prison sentence. This does not involve any treatment—it is a cold turkey detoxification inside the prison.

Although the program has been underway for only 8 months, the officials believe that the recidivism rate has been cut down to 45 percent. Aftercare supervisors are SANA (Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association) volunteers; the supervision is done on a private basis, not through the government. The aftercare supervision includes visits to the individual's house, a report on his ability to keep a job, and weekly and random urinalyses.

It is difficult to evaluate the program at the present time, as it is a 2½-year process and the first cycle is not yet complete. However, we can comment that many Asian countries adopt the "cold turkey" method of detoxification, a method not suitable to the United States with our constitutional restrictions.

The major antinarcotics effort in Singapore is Operation Ferret, a coordinated supply/demand reduction effort aimed at halting the drug epidemic. The operation involves the CNB, Singapore Police, the Vigilante Corps, Customs, and Singapore's Armed Forces. The operation's mission is to identify, apprehend, and detoxify all addicts, to gather evidence from those captured and to catch and try traffickers. CNB concentrates on traffickers, while the other agencies focus on domestic users. The entire narcotics program is under the direction of the Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs who chairs a committee which is responsible for both demand and supply reduction and control. Operation Ferret began on April 1, 1977. It unexpectedly rounded up too many addicts—more than the detoxification centers could handle. In 1977, arrests were approximately 2,000 persons per month for drug offenses through Operation Ferret. In March 1977, there were an estimated 11,200 heroin addicts on the loose; by September, the figure was down to 7,300. The steady price of heroin indicates that supply and demand reduction have been progressing at a balanced rate. The future plans of Operation Ferret are to "ferret out" the more elusive heroin abuser and to prevent recidivism.

SANA, The Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association, is the head of the treatment effort. It is a private organization and is financed by corporations and public funds. SANA is similar to the private organization PEMADAM in Malaysia, which works to get public involvement in solving the drug problem.

## A. INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC

Singapore does not produce or refine opium, but there is a considerable narcotics presence in the city. Singapore's position as a major world port makes it a prime transshipment site. In the past 18 months, two instances have been noted where Singapore was the transshipment point for heroin coming to the United States. One case revealed a Singapore-London-Nassau-Miami smuggling route. Singaporeans make up one of the two controlling syndicates in the Netherlands which supply a portion of the European market.

## B. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONFERENCE IN SINGAPORE

While in Singapore the delegation (Mr. Wolff, Mr. Guyer, Mr. Rangel, and Mr. Danielson) attended the East Asian Regional Narcotics Conference. Mr. Wolff addressed the conference. He pointed out that there is little that Congress can do by itself, but what it can do is pave the way for better cooperation between U.S. agencies and foreign governments. He stated that he is encouraged by the State Department's increased international narcotics efforts, but that there is still room for improvement in relations with key countries to halt the narcotics traffic. Mr. Wolff decried the lack of meetings and the failure to cooperate between the drug professionals represented by DEA and the State Department, and made a plea for cooperation between narcotics coordinators in DEA and the embassies. He also mentioned the need for the division of responsibilities in narcotics efforts and adequate alternate sources of replacement income for opium growers.

Mr. Rangel stated that the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and the Congress are trying to be more supportive of the State Department and the DEA. He pointed out the interest the new administration has shown in dealing with the narcotics problem on an international level, and expressed his hope that this problem would be given even more attention, which it deserves. Mr. Rangel stressed that narcotics threatens society—all societies—and it is in the international interest to do everything possible to combat this threat.

Mr. Danielson mentioned the impact that the Vietnam conflict had on the American consciousness, bringing the reality of the overseas drug problem home to us.

Mr. Robert B. Oakley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was the keynote speaker at the conference. (The text of this speech is included in the appendix.)

## C. BURMA

While in Singapore, the delegation attended a briefing on the narcotics situation in Thailand and Burma, held by DEA. It was stated that in the long term a key to the narcotics problem in the Golden Triangle, from an enforcement point of view, is the regulation of acetic anhydride (a chemical necessary in the refining of heroin) and knocking out the refineries, both of which involve action that must be taken by the Burmese. The Burmese Government

is not in control of the area where 35 percent of the opium is produced—this area is in the hands of insurgents. While the government of Burma has done a good job of attempting to control the traffic in narcotics and at the same time fight out their political differences, this effort cannot be considered as being sufficient. The United States must enlist the aid of European nations in pressuring the Government of Burma into more action against the narcotics problem. At present, a U.N. crop substitution project has plans to go into Burma, but Mr. Wolff cautioned them not to expect too much. The key is to bring political stability to the area.

The political situation is the core of the opium problem in Burma. The North of Burma is largely in the hands of insurgents—many different groups of insurgents with different goals. Not all are seen by Burmese officials as having political goals, but instead are just after the money in the narcotics trade. The Burmese Government has two separate commands in the north: the eastern one goes after narcotics and the northern one fights the Burmese Communist Party. The antinarcotics effort has a higher priority than that against the BCP; 95 percent of the resources of the U.S. Embassy in Burma are targeted toward narcotics. The staff was informed at a briefing with the State Department Narcotics Coordinator from Burma that the Embassy has not raised the idea of the central Burmese Government sitting down with the insurgents, though the Congress has stressed that it would be a constructive thing to do. The helicopters provided the Burmese by the United States, we are told, have been carefully kept out of the combat areas; the Burmese are very protective of them. This means that soldiers usually hike to the refining areas, giving the traffickers enough warning to get out. However, the Embassy officials believe that the U.S. program in Burma is a success, and that the amount of opium reaching the borders has been halved (from 400 to 200 tons). It is interesting that the Burmese and the Thais both point their finger at each other as the real cause of the problem.

The briefing also touched upon the problem of Guam as a major transshipment site which needs Federal help badly. The committee has plans to look into this problem. The People's Republic of China has made no public statements on possible seizures from their waters. It is clear that the United States is going to have to make some overtures to the Chinese to gain their assistance both in stopping smuggling into Hong Kong and, more importantly, the activities of the Burmese Communist Party. The briefing included the recommendation that we continue to look into the possibility of increased enforcement training in Indonesia to anticipate the problem there. We need to supplement our intelligence in Indonesia before the problem comes to a head, should our efforts in the Golden Triangle succeed.

#### *Recommendations*

The United States should continue to cooperate as much as is possible with the Singapore authorities in halting the drug problem, and averting any future that Singapore might have as a transshipment site for heroin into the United States. We should continue to observe the progress of treatment efforts in Singapore. Singapore has been very cooperative in the past, working closely with DEA and with people out of Operation Stableboy when naval ships are basing in

Singapore. Singapore also works closely with other nations in ASEAN, as well as Australia and New Zealand. The task force urges that the United States encourage other nations to participate in eradicating the drug traffic coming through Singapore. We should also consider taking a human rights evaluation of the Shan States in Burma, and proceed in the diplomatic arena from there.

The task force urges that the United States encourage the Central Government of Burma to work toward bringing about a political settlement in the opium producing areas in North Burma including sitting down with the insurgents to discuss means of reducing opium cultivation.

The task force urges that the State Department contact the Government of the People's Republic of China to ask for their cooperation on curbing the flow of narcotics from areas controlled by the Burmese Communist Party.

SINGAPORE—DRUG ARRESTS AND SEIZURES<sup>1</sup>

Drug	1976	Quantity (kilograms), January-March 1977
<b>Drug seizures:</b>		
Heroin.....	24	4
Morphine.....	3	1
Raw opium.....	32	2
Prepared opium.....	16	1
Hashish.....		1
Cannabis.....	10	1
Methaqualone (tablets).....	1,025	60
	1976	Number of arrests January-March 1977
<b>Drug arrests:</b>		
Opium.....	327	42
Morphine.....	245	20
Heroin.....	5,682	1,993
Cannabis.....	269	71
Methaqualone.....	33	4
Total.....	6,556	2,130

<sup>1</sup> Figures provided by Singapore authorities.

## VI. MALAYSIA

Opium addiction in Malaysia has been a problem since the turn of the century. In the early part of the 20th century, the government gained control of the sale and distribution of opium. In 1910, it took over the import and distribution of opium in government shops. In 1934, opium was made available only to those recommended by medical practitioners. This system prevailed until World War II. At that time, there were 75,000 registered opium addicts, and about twice that many illegal ones. In 1945, opium was completely banned. In 1952, the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance was enacted, prohibiting the possession, manufacture, sale and importation of all types of drugs.

The population of Malaysia is about 70 percent Malay-Muslim and 30 percent Chinese. For years, the majority of drug abusers were elderly Chinese opium smokers. The government thought that the drug problem would die off with them, but this has not been the case. There has been an obvious change in abuse patterns in the last 7 years. Drug abuse is on the increase in all ages and racial groups, especially among the young. The common age range of abuse is from 15

to 30. There is a variety of drugs being abused: cannabis is popular, but a large number of people abuse heroin or morphine. Some abusers also use psychotropics (such as Mandrax), amphetamines, and barbiturates. Heroin abuse is a predominantly urban phenomenon, but there is evidence that it is spreading to rural areas. Authorities estimate that there are 150,000 heroin addicts in Malaysia, a country with a population of 38 million. Most of the heroin which supplies these addicts comes from the Golden Triangle area; Malaysia is not a source country for opium but the northern border of Malaysia adjoins the southern border of Thailand. Some cannabis is grown, largely for domestic use. There are some refining activities in Malaysia (authorities estimate 5 to 10 laboratories on the northern border). Malaysian officials have seized several laboratories in recent years.

The enforcement of internal drug laws in Malaysia is the responsibility of three agencies: The Royal Customs and Excise, the Royal Malaysia Police, and the Pharmacy Division of the Ministry of Health. Customs is responsible for monitoring the international movement of drugs; the police are responsible for enforcing the laws applying to internal abuse and trafficking; and the Pharmacy Division oversees the manufacture, information, sale and use of drugs. In 1972, the government authorized the formation of a Central Narcotics Bureau, to supplement the other agencies. The Bureau was also given the responsibility to investigate international trafficking cases which also falls within the jurisdiction of the police and customs. CNB became operational in January 1973, and since then has been concentrating its efforts on major traffickers, but with little success. The CNB has 18 officers and 13 detectives assigned to narcotics enforcement, but most are assigned to administrative positions. DEA has been working very closely with the Malaysians, yet they have not been able to even identify all of the major traffickers. (Statistics for arrests and seizures are included at the end of this section.) The Malaysian police enforcement record is improving, but not as quickly as the drug problem is growing.

The drug laws which the police are assigned to enforce are severe. In the early 1970's trafficking in dangerous drugs became a capital offense. Prosecution of cases for the death penalty is only undertaken with the consent of the public prosecutor, and the law is intended to apply only to major traffickers. Malaysia has very weak conspiracy laws, which have never been used in a narcotics case. In early 1977, an additional section was added to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, providing that no agent provocateur shall be unworthy of credit which will greatly enhance the use of undercover agents in narcotics investigations.

Emergency Ordinance 5, enacted in 1969, allows for the detention of an offender who threatens the national security without a trial for up to 2 years on Pulau Jerjak, a penal island; 160 people have been detained for narcotics offenses. Under the Restricted Residence Enactment, such persons may be restricted to a certain place under police supervision for 2 more years.

After the CNB was established the National Advisory Committee on Drug Abuse Prevention was formed. It is headed by the Ministry of Law; CNB is its secretariat. It has a subcommittee on education

and publicity. The committee emphasizes prevention over correction, and believes that making the public more aware of the dangers of drug abuse will prevent them from experimenting with dangerous drugs. They promote a positive approach in the schools, and avoid "don'ts." They stress incorporating drug education with other subjects. We saw a number of billboards in Kuala Lumpur warning people to avoid drug use. This is a noteworthy campaign.

On October 1, 1975, the Minister of Health designated 24 hospitals as detection and detoxification centers (7 detoxification, 17 detection). Three centers for treatment and rehabilitation were also established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Welfare Services. The government rehabilitation centers have a maximum capacity of 380 residents and they hope to double their capacity by 1979. Sixty percent of the people in for treatment are 21 to 30 years old, and 80 percent of the treatment given is for heroin problems. The centers take a multidisciplinary approach to rehabilitation. After being detoxified (with the use of medication, but not methadone), the addict remains in a psychosocial rehabilitation program for a maximum of 6 months. A senior welfare officer is responsible for overall administration, direction, and coordination of all staff at each center. The government realizes that enforcement alone will not solve the drug problem; it must be coordinated with demand reduction. Recently, legislation was passed making treatment of drug dependents compulsory, but the Welfare Ministry has a severe shortage of qualified treatment personnel. Until this year, the U.S. Government involvement in demand reduction has been limited to training a few social workers. There has been a very successful involvement of U.S. Peace Corps workers and other volunteers in treating addicts. More direct assistance projects will begin in 1978.

A research committee, run by the Department of Policy Research, University of Science, Malaysia, has been established to provide the CNB with quantitative data about the extent of drug addiction, its incidence relative to sex and age, and the determinable effectiveness of different methods of rehabilitation.

As part of the citizens' efforts against drug abuse the National Association Against Drug Abuse (PEMADAM) was formed in March of 1976. It strives to encourage every citizen to participate in anti-drug abuse activities. PEMADAM's objectives are: (1) To cooperate with State and Federal Governments in eliminating the unlawful production of and dealing in drugs and drug abuse; (2) to conduct research into drug abuse, and rehabilitate drug dependents; and (3) to foster public consciousness of the drug problem.

PEMADAM's functions are: (1) To educate the Public on the perils of drug abuse; (2) to provide counseling (24 hours a day) and assistance service to persons seeking such service as a result of abuse or dependence on drugs; (3) to cooperate with related government departments and other voluntary organizations in eradicating the evils of drugs; (4) to establish, maintain, and expand rehabilitation facilities; (5) to collect and distribute expert opinions on the dangers of drug abuse, to hold seminars, and forums; and (6) to raise funds for the use of the Association in the furtherance of its activities. PEMADAM's area of operation is in the States of Malaysia, and the Federal Territory.

## A. INTERNAL TRAFFIC

Malaysia is in a critical position in international narcotics traffic, as it is one of the major transshipment points for heroin from the Golden Triangle en route to Europe. It could have the same position in relation to the United States in the future, especially if the supply of Mexican heroin is sharply curtailed. The cost of this illegal trade is staggering—in Malaysia, the heroin costs \$1,500 (U.S.) per pound; in Europe it goes up to \$17,000 (U.S.) per pound; arriving in the United States it is worth \$40,000 per pound and its street sale price is astronomical. Opium is not grown in Malaysia, but it is imported and sometimes refined here.

The vastness of the jungle area bordering Thailand and Malaysia, and the insurgencies in those areas, allows smugglers ample opportunity to carry on their trade. The large amount of coastline promotes the use of seagoing vessels in smuggling, and the size of the area makes it difficult to patrol. Organizers of smuggling activities are well-financed, and operations generally have legitimate businesses as covers for their activities. The organizers of the operations stay in the background and do not participate in the smuggling, making it difficult to make cases against them. In 1976, 58 Malaysian nationals were arrested abroad for narcotics offenses; in 9 months of 1977 there were 49. Many secret societies connected with drugs in Western Europe are based in Malaysia.

Enforcement efforts are marked by a lack of international cooperation and coordination. Thailand and Malaysia do not work closely together and rarely pass strategic intelligence. The Western European Nations which are on the receiving end of the heroin traffic through Malaysia have not stationed any permanent enforcement personnel in either Penang or Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysians have worked most closely with the United States and DEA in international efforts. The Malaysians are very willing to use the intelligence capabilities of DEA, even instead of those of Interpol. They regularly make use of DEA resources, for both undercover work and providing support, such as a flash roll. The Malaysians are very cooperative with U.S. agents, and will even drop other cases to work on a U.S. priority.

The Malaysian domestic enforcement effort is marked by a similar lack of organization. While there are regular and formal interagency meetings, the separation of responsibility among the three major drug enforcement agencies makes coordination difficult and effective enforcement nearly impossible. The agency responsible for monitoring international traffic, Customs, is primarily a revenue gathering agency, and is only beginning to become actively involved with its enforcement duties. Two detector dogs have been given to Customs (they were still in quarantine at the time of the delegation's visit), and it is hoped that their use will encourage more Customs involvement in airport security. This will soon be an even more serious concern, as the Malaysians have plans to open a new international airport in

Penang early this year where the customs and police contingent is not large enough to effectively combat the large volume of trafficking.

There is also a conflict within the customs mandate in that the emphasis of the customs bureau is to facilitate the easy flow of people and goods across the border, rather than to regularly search passengers and packages for contraband, including narcotics. However, the mission was impressed that Mr. Yatim took this opportunity to stress that both the police and customs would be intensifying their activity to control narcotics trafficking.

The transfer of Rais Yatim to the Ministry of Home Affairs will hopefully result in a step-up in the efforts to coordinate drug enforcement. As Congressman Rangel stated at the press conference held in Kuala Lumpur, "We are confident that your government is aware of the serious problems, the gaps that exist, and that you are taking a very progressive program in order to tackle these problems."

Currently, Malaysian enforcement is organized as it was in the United States pre-1973. The United States should aid the Malaysians in reorganizing their efforts, to avoid the problems which we encountered. We should encourage them to strengthen the enforcement of their laws on the street level, where they are presently fairly weak. The Malaysians need United States and DEA input and encouragement in coping with their drug problem. Malaysian enforcement officials have benefited greatly from DEA instruction in narcotics investigation processes. The impact of the detector dogs cannot yet be determined, but there are high hopes for their success. This aid and support should continue, in all areas that are appropriate.

The United States cannot bear the entire burden for aiding the Malaysians in controlling international heroin traffic. The Western European nations receiving Southeast Asian heroin through Malaysia and the United Nations need to be reminded of their responsibilities in aiding in the eradication of the international narcotics problem.

#### *Recommendations*

1. With the opening of a new international airport in Penang this year, the difficulty in curbing the flow of heroin from Malaysia to Western Europe and the United States will greatly increase. The United States should offer both Customs and DEA training to the Malaysians to increase the quality of their enforcement effort.

2. The U.S. must encourage other Western European nations to provide assistance in both personnel and equipment to the Malaysians as the United States has for several years.

3. The United States must encourage the Malaysians to take strong action to design a program to prevent the free flow of illegal drugs through Penang including stationing of agents in Penang.

4. The United States should provide the Malaysians with guidance as a means for centralizing their enforcement bureaucracy which at the present time is extremely fragmented.



MALAYSIA  
ARRESTS AND SEIZURES

Year	Arrests	Seizures						Psycho- tropic sub- stances (tablets)
		Raw opium (kilo- grams)	Prepared opium (kilo- grams)	Morphine (kilo- grams)	Heroin (kilo- grams)	Cannabis		
						Dry (kilo- grams)	Plants	
1970.....	711	2,248.415	39.575	64.921	0.208	1,446.738	4,418	2,349
1971.....	908	1,360.964	40.070	7.542	.928	3,819.167	10,191	15,236
1972.....	1,155	1,340.818	29.995	78.775	2.664	1,282.248	5,621	11,419
1973.....	1,613	2,391.348	57.982	77.589	19.023	1,004.689	47,401	45,253
1974.....	1,819	1,127.782	24.644	9.632	26.470	396.073	5,141	28,941
1975.....	3,202	826.253	87.729	28.546	85.9	415.43	88,081	52,112
1976.....	5,128	603.63	34.68	27.31	70.63	298.14	10,770	3,882
1977 (January- September).....	4,487	538.4	80.22	91.42	70.27	93.50	2,733	1,787
Total.....	19,033	10,437.61	396.895	385.735	276.093	8,755.915	174,356	159,979

<sup>1</sup> Other pills.

Note: Clandestine laboratories destroyed: 1973, 1; 1976, 2; and 1977, 2.

## VII. THAILAND

While most of the Asian opiates entering the world's illicit market originate in Burma, Thailand remains the key transit nation in the Asian heroin traffic. A handful of major traffickers (primarily ethnic Chinese residents in Thailand) control the movement of thousands of kilograms of opiates from the Golden Triangle all the way to the local and international markets in Asia, Europe, and North America, often with the collaboration of mid- and lower-echelon Thai police, military and customs officials. Most of the major traffickers named by Chairman Wolff in the May 17, 1977, Congressional Record have gone into hiding or fled the country. The lesser known subordinates of the big traffickers carry on the trade, but according to DEA's knowledge no large drug sales are being made to Westerners. Opium is a major cash crop in Thailand, and to discontinue it could cause an economic crisis in the northern area where opium trading is linked to a major black market dealing in most economic commodities. Prime Minister Kriangsak has been very pleased with the progress being made in crop substitution efforts so far in northern Thailand. The prior programs have included crops such as coffee, gladiolus seeds, and kidney beans. Utilizing new marketing approaches, these crops have brought a higher cash return for the farmers than opium did in previous years. However, the crop substitution program still operates on a very limited scale.

A military coup in October 1977, has changed the political situation in Thailand. The new Prime Minister, Kriangsak Chamanan, has stressed the importance of narcotics control. The Prime Minister met with the delegation in Thailand, and reaffirmed his country's commitment to halting the flow of narcotics. The Thais staged a crackdown on narcotics in 1977, which has caused a stockpiling of opium on the Thai-Burmese border, and in Laos. There is concern that the Laotians could sell their opium supply to get money for their insurgent troops.

As in most other Southeast Asian nations, penalties for narcotics offenses in Thailand are severe. Possession of more than 10 kilos of heroin is a capital offense. Last year three persons were executed for this crime. The Thais have begun to make better transit cases this year, and as a result, a larger percentage of seizures have been made at the airport in 1977 than in 1976.

Corruption is a serious problem within the Thai enforcement agencies. Within the field force of the Thai National Police Department it is evident in varying degrees. DEA believes that corruption has been overcome in the units with which it works, and that they are under the guidance of hardworking, non-corrupt leaders.

Prime Minister Kriangsak requested that the United States provide additional helicopters to stem the flow of narcotics through Thailand. Appropriations for this are not presently in the budget. All of our intelligence efforts and equipment support have been unable to curb the flow of narcotics to any appreciable extent. It is essential that some political solution be arranged for the producing areas in Burma in the form of an agreement between the insurgent hill tribes in the north and the Ne Win government. As long as political anarchy in Burma reigns, the opium traffic will continue.

Thailand is the major transit point for Burmese heroin. There are no means of accurately monitoring traffic across the border between the checkpoints. Smugglers use short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft and mule caravans and body packs to transport the opium. In August 1977, the Thai Government conducted a destruction of seized opiates for the first time in several years. In addition to DEA's contingent, there are now narcotics representatives accredited to the Thai Government from six countries: France, the Netherlands, Canada, Hong Kong, Sweden and Australia. DEA fears that the Chinese syndicates running the opium traffic through Thailand will increasingly turn to the most lucrative market—the United States.

They are especially concerned about the east coast U.S. distributing groups, who are actively seeking heroin sources. DEA officials on both coasts believe that it is only a matter of time before the connection is made. Intelligence sources say that decreased amounts of refined and semi-refined opiates are coming to the Thailand-Burma border. However, the amount and percentage of heroin coming into the United States from Southeast Asia is steadily increasing. In 1976, DEA estimates indicated that 10 to 14 percent of the heroin in the United States was from Southeast Asia, which translated to approximately 1 ton of pure heroin. In 1977, it was estimated that 2 tons, or 33 to 35 percent of the heroin which came into the United States was from Southeast Asia. This represents an increase of approximately 100 percent. This increase appears to be growing steadily.

The political situation in Thailand is tenuous, making narcotics enforcement difficult. Before the government can concentrate its efforts on the narcotics problem it must first ensure its own stability. As in Burma, the key to the narcotics problem is stabilizing the political situation. At our recent meeting, Prime Minister Kriangsak discussed the security problems on the northeast frontier. He indicated that the Cambodian insurgency is under control, and that he is more concerned with the large influx of refugees from Cambodia. This problem is further complicated by the fact that some of them are carrying "Laotian" heroin with them across the border.

### *Recommendations*

1. The United States should work with General Kriangsak on keeping acetic anhydride out of northern Thailand. Mr. Rangel has proposed increased monitoring of the substance once it is in less developed Countries.

2. Worldwide attention should be focused on Thailand, along with Burma and Laos, and its position and importance in international narcotics traffic. Nations, especially those Western European nations who receive Golden Triangle heroin, should be urged to aid Thailand in its efforts to halt the flow of illegal narcotics from Thailand. The United States alone cannot bear the entire responsibility of the international community.

3. All of our intelligence efforts and equipment support have been unable to curb the flow of narcotics to any appreciable extent. It is essential that some political solution be arranged for the producing areas in Burma.

We must encourage all parties involved—the Thais, the Burmese, and the Burmese insurgents—to sit and talk about their differences. The area of control and dominance of the opium trade by the BCP is expanding. We should explore the possibility of the PRC assisting the international community in discouraging the BCP from permitting trafficking of opium in their areas. Chairman Wolff has received numerous letters from Khun Sa, leader of the Shans. The most recent letter reconfirms his interest in solving the problems of the Shan State, including the continued production of opium. Mr. Wolff has also received recent letters toward a solution of political problems in Thailand. These matters should be a focal point for State Department interest and action.

4. The Thais' request for additional helicopters should be referred and acted upon by the individuals responsible for program assistance.

5. The Thais have extended an open invitation to President Carter to visit Thailand and Prime Minister Kriangsak.

### VIII. INDIA

India is the world's largest producer of licit opium. Opium is produced for: (1) The manufacture of opium alkaloids, such as morphine, codeine, and their salts, in Indian factories; (2) export for scientific and medicinal uses; and (3) medicinal opium for India's maintenance program. Indian opium is in great demand for use by U.S. pharmaceutical companies (Mallinckrodt, Penick and Merck). Some 22 percent of the Indian opium available for export is bought by these U.S. companies, making them almost totally dependent on Indian opium.

The number of hectares licensed by the Indian Government for opium cultivation has been increasing since the 1974-75 crop year (see chart at the end of this section). Not only is the opium sold, but also the poppy straw, which is left after the plant has been incised. The straw has a low morphine content, but it is still profitable. The government has been reluctant to increase production for fear of straining its control capabilities.

The Indian Government has strict controls on opium production. Poppy cultivation is confined to traditional tracts that have the highest opiate yields, and are located contiguously to ensure more

effective supervision. Cultivators are issued licenses only after their applications are thoroughly screened. Efforts are made annually to raise the minimum qualifying yield. Other control measures include the following practices: measuring the fields during planting and during the growing periods; weighing opium yields daily during harvest, and within 2 weeks after harvest (as a check for withholding opium); and inspecting the opium for adulteration. In addition, a price incentive scale and a system of bonus payments are used to encourage high yields and the sale of the crop to the government—thereby discouraging diversion.

India is also a source and transit country for hashish and hash oil. Marihuana grows wild in the entire north of India. This marihuana is widely used in many ways, including as a tea and in the production of hashish.

India focuses on preventive narcotics enforcement, but has no centralized narcotics enforcement bureau. State police and the excise departments at the state level are the main agencies responsible for narcotics enforcement. The Commissioner of Narcotics controls the cultivation and disposal of licit narcotics from the national level. He is also responsible for taking action according to international conventions, and coordinating the activities of the various agencies dealing with enforcement. The narcotics unit of customs and central excise deal with narcotics smuggling. There is a Central Bureau of Investigation which operates directly under the Prime Minister as the central police agency. DEA does not view India as a critical heroin exporting country.

Indian Government sources have put the number of drug addicts in India at anywhere from 300,000 to 600,000 persons, but no exact figures are available. Opium appears to be the primary drug of abuse, and there are currently more than 66,000 registered opium users (according to the Commissioner of Narcotics). These registered users consume 1.5 metric tons of opium yearly, while it is estimated that unregistered users consumer 125 metric tons in the same amount of time. There have been no new registrations of opium users, which has led to the possibly erroneous conclusion that opium use is declining.

The major concern of Indian authorities over the abuse of drugs is the presence of marihuana and hashish, which is spreading rapidly. Heroin is not widely used; its only significant presence is in the Naga Province. The use of psychotropics is limited also, but is slowly increasing, especially in educational institutions. The Naga Province presents a political problem not unlike that of the hill tribe states in northeastern Burma. Opium is grown and traded in Nagaland, which is an Indian province seeking self-determination. The state of insurgency is 30 years old, and shows no signs of abatement.

A broader concern of Indian officials is the oversupply of licit opium. India is facing a crisis in the world opium market. According to the "Report of the International Control Board for 1977, 'Data made available in 1977 show that there is an overproduction of opium.' " Turkey's production of licit opium has been increasing along with India's, thereby increasing the strain on the market. Turkey's large production of poppy straw concerns India as a possible factor in depressing the price to American manufacturers, India's largest customer.

A problem which accompanies India's licit production of opium is the diversion of this opium to illegal channels. However, all diversion is absorbed by domestic users and thus no significant amount of Indian opium has showed up in the international pipeline. India has licensed 66,000 hectares to one quarter million farms for the production of opium. Usually there are four people working each farm, which means there are 1 million opium farmers for the government to supervise. This is not an easy task, but the Indian government has developed an impressively effective control program. Surveillance of the crops is strictest during the 1-month "lancing period." At this time the yield from numerous area farms is monitored to try to detect possible diversion. The real problem in diversion is with the farmers holding back small amounts for their own use from government purchases. Chairman Wolff has commended the Indians on their ability to control the production of opium, keeping it out of the wrong hands to the degree which they have.

The Indians are having a harder time controlling the international flow of narcotics. Recently, a case involving 980 grams of Burmese heroin, seized in Nepal, was uncovered. This case indicates that there may be a new smuggling route out through the west of Burma rather than the south. A larger smuggling problem, from the Indian's perspective, is the flow of cannabis products from Nepal and Pakistan into the world market. This is an especially serious situation, as once hashish enters the international market its point of origin is difficult to determine. This situation underlies the need to halt hashish production at the source.

India has been an active participant in international antinarcotics efforts, especially through the United Nations, and works with the INCB on licit cultivation issues. Chairman Wolff expressed his appreciation of the support the Indian Government has shown on the international narcotics resolution which he sponsored at the United Nations in February 1977.

#### *Recommendations*

Based on its findings and observations, the task force firmly believes that the international oversupply of opium must be controlled. Should the legal market become depressed, opium farmers might turn to illegal buyers to earn money from their crops. The United States should urge the United Nations to take steps to ensure that this will not happen. Also, efforts must be made to stem the flow of hashish from and through India, and to cut off the supply at its source. The United States should use its good offices in the Nagaland dispute. This opium route is becoming more and more significant.

INDIA.—*Production and end uses of opium April 1975 through March 1976*

	Metric tons
Total opium production:	
Licit used in-country and exported.....	1, 180
Illicit used in-country and exported.....	130
Grand total.....	<u>1, 310</u>
Opium used in-country:	
Licit use:	
(a) Codeine factories.....	148. 5
(b) Registered addicts.....	1. 5
Illicit use.....	<sup>1</sup> 150. 0
Subtotal.....	<u>125. 0</u>
Opium exported:	
Licit.....	980
Licit bartered with U.S. pharmaceutical companies for codeine.....	<sup>1</sup> 50
Illicit.....	1, 030
Subtotal.....	<u>5</u>
	1, 035

<sup>1</sup> About 200 metric tons of opium are used for production/acquisition of codeine for consumption within India. Of this amount, India processed about 150 metric tons of opium and bartered 50 tons with U.S. pharmaceutical companies for codeine.

## IX. IRAN

The delegation had a 4-hour stopover in Tehran, Iran, for a working lunch with Prime Minister Amouzegar on January 17, 1978.

The major narcotics topics discussed at the luncheon were the ineffectiveness of UNFDAC and the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan. The Prime Minister is extremely concerned with the inability of the Afghans and Pakistanis to control the cultivation and smuggling of opium. He stated that Iran would be very willing to increase its support to UNFDAC if a credible program could be designed for narcotics control and/or rural development. As an indication of Iranian commitment, the Prime Minister promised to send a higher ranking official to the February meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in Geneva. He also pledged to work closely with the United States and United Nations on Afghanistan narcotics control matters.

Iran is aware of the possible damage to United States-Iranian relations, should Iran become a major transshipment point for narcotics flowing to Europe and the United States. Already there is a serious problem with opium transiting through Iran to Turkey and other parts of the illicit pipeline. In addition to efforts aimed at halting the international movement of narcotics, attempts must be made

to attack narcotics at their source. Prime Minister Amouzegar supports the task force on this issue, especially as it relates to Afghanistan. Most of the opiates which supply Iran's addict population of approximately 400,000 persons comes from Afghanistan. In that country the areas where opium is cultivated are not under direct government control. A special emphasis needs to be placed on primary interdiction there.

#### *Recommendations*

The United States delegation should continue to work closely with the Iranian delegation in Geneva on UNFDAC matters and make a special effort to keep the Prime Minister informed on UNFDAC programs and issues.

From its observations, the task force has concluded that an important part of resolving the narcotics situation in that area is increased international communication. Channels should be opened with the Soviet Union so that a multinational effort can be made to control the flow of narcotics across the Iranian border. Turkey and Iran should be encouraged to work together to stem the flow of opiates through Iran. Also, we should strengthen the Afghanistan Government's effort to try to devise a more effective means of reducing opium cultivation in the rural areas.

#### X. UNITED KINGDOM

The Committee was in London, England, for approximately 36 hours. On Saturday, January 21, 1978, the delegation was briefed by the DEA SAIC and two representatives of the Home Office who have responsibility for drug matters. The primary issues of concern were the role of England as a transshipment point and the approach of the British Government to the treatment of heroin addiction.

In a broader view, the domestic drug situation in Great Britain gives cause for concern. The best information DEA has indicates a drug crisis similar to that which was evident in the United States in the early 1960's. That is, "growing use of barbiturates, amphetamines, cocaine, heroin, hashish, psilocybin; drug store burglaries, burgeoning street crimes, mass acceptance of cannabis, all adding to concern over drug abuse in Great Britain." (DEA briefing book)

The United Kingdom poses a serious problem on an international level, also. The United Kingdom is a natural transshipment center for world-wide drug smuggling. Cannabis and cannabis products from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Morocco arrive at the major British ports and air terminals and are shipped on to the United States, Canada, and Europe. There is also traffic in heroin on an unknown scale from Amsterdam to either the United States or Canada through the United Kingdom.

Most of the heroin in the United Kingdom comes from Southeast Asia, either directly or through Europe. In 1976, 46 pounds of heroin were seized, all from Southeast Asia. The heroin traffic is believed to be controlled by syndicates of ethnic Chinese operating behind legitimate business fronts, such as travel agencies or import-export firms. Officials do not have much information on activities within ethnic Chinese communities; however, they believe that the syndicates raise most of their illegal revenue from gambling and other vices, rather than narcotics.

Beyond such syndicate activities, the British do not feel that they have a severe problem with drug-related crime. For the most part, they feel that addicts who are involved with street crime were involved before they became addicted. In addition, although violent crime is rising in Britain, there is little violent crime related to narcotics trafficking.

The British have had few problems with violence or expansion of the black market when a narcotics shortage occurs. They believe that several factors prevent these reactions to a shortage: (1) Private doctors, (2) clinics, and (3) the burglary of pharmacies, which have been linked to temporary shortages. Also, most addicts are polydrug abusers and thus switch drugs when there is a shortage of desired items.

The two services involved with narcotics control in Great Britain are customs and police. The major thrust of customs is the raising of revenue through value added taxation; narcotics is the primary emphasis in law enforcement for the customs branch when compared with other law enforcement issues. The police narcotics work is done by New Scotland Yard's drug squad and by other metropolitan and regional crime squads, supported by central drugs intelligence and illegal immigration units. The overall policy is controlled by the Home Office Drugs Branch which has responsibility for advising customs, police, the British pharmaceutical industry and the agencies involved with drug maintenance and rehabilitation.

The British laws controlling drugs are similar to those in the United States. However, police are prohibited from committing a crime to establish that someone else is committing a crime (the agent provocateur statute). In Britain, a buy must be immediately followed by a bust which restricts rising through a distribution ring through repeatedly purchasing larger amounts. The British police are also restricted from using controlled deliveries.

The British are making the most of the methods which they are free to use. For the first time, they are using their conspiracy statutes in narcotics cases in the prosecution of ethnic Chinese syndicates. Additionally, the British recently concluded a joint operation with DEA resulting in the destruction of a major LSD syndicate. This operation underlined the problems the British have on international cases because of their lack of a coordinated national narcotics enforcement force. The fragmented police network makes it difficult for the British to accurately assess the extent of drug abuse in Britain. The British police are assisted in this work by less restrictive legal constraints on issues like search and entry, presumption of complicity and detention, and also by overwhelming public support.

Despite the recent joint operation, DEA in England is not operational. There are no DEA unilateral investigations including no unilateral handling of narcotics intelligence assets in the United Kingdom. However, sources are handled jointly if they are helpful in probes with which DEA is concerned. The overall goals of DEA in England are to "develop and encourage a rapid two-way exchange of criminal information."

The focus of DEA work is with Customs because of the international aspects of their work. However, DEA also works with the police on investigation of ethnic syndicates in light of their connections with organizations in drug-producing areas.



At this time, DEA has no plans for future formal training sessions and will provide less formal briefings frequently upon request. However, it should be kept in mind the British are very sophisticated in their approach to law enforcement, including narcotics.

An integral part of the British approach to narcotics, in the international mind, has been the impression of a "British system" of treatment. This is a shibboleth. During the delegation's visit, however, the primary point made by the representatives of the Home Office was that there is no such thing as a "British system." They emphasized that this phrase was created by Americans, perhaps as a result of the different way the British narcotics problem developed. The British became increasingly aware of narcotics addiction in the 1950's, primarily as a result of therapeutic treatment rather than strict addiction. Therefore, the initial response was to consider addiction as a medical problem and thus leave the treatment of addiction to a doctor's discretion. Unfortunately, overprescription of heroin to addicts spurred the growth of the heroin black market. In 1976, there were 2,932 registered heroin addicts compared to 1,549 in 1971. However, drug officials estimate that the actual number of heroin addicts was more like 8,000 (overall figures for known addicts and for known addicts receiving treatment are included in the appendix).

There are several critical facets of the British approach which clarify the differences with American treatment practices. Any physician may prescribe heroin, methadone or other regulated substances for the treatment of pain or illness. However, to prescribe heroin for addicts, a physician must apply for a special license. Approximately 300 doctors have a license of this type, but of the 1,200 patients under treatment, only 200 are receiving heroin at this time. Most of the others are being treated with methadone.

The determination of whether to accept an individual for treatment and then what modality to follow is left to the discretion of physicians either responsible for a private practice or as directors of treatment centers. There is no overall government policy on treatment modalities; rather, it is handled on a case-by-case basis by individual physicians. The move away from the use of heroin in the treatment of addicts was made by doctors themselves and not because of a change in any policy.

A problem which is experienced by the British is the overprescription of heroin by licensed physicians. A doctor must report all addicts who are being treated to the Home Office to prevent multiple enrollments. The police can obtain the records from pharmacies concerning how much heroin is being dispensed by each doctor. However, the only punishment which is levied when a doctor is found to be overprescribing is the removal of his license to prescribe heroin for the treatment of addiction.

Under the national system of health insurance in Britain, a patient has numerous options if he is seeking treatment for addiction. First, the patient may go to a public health center and have the treatment paid for by his insurance. If a patient goes to a private doctor, the only report which has to be made is to the pharmacy concerning the drug which is being prescribed. One must keep in mind that any doctor can prescribe morphine or methadone if they feel it is warranted.

NARCOTIC DRUG ADDICTS KNOWN TO THE HOME OFFICE AS AT DEC. 31, BY TYPE OF DRUG BEING  
PRESCRIBED IN TREATMENT (UNITED KINGDOM)

Type of drug	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Methadone alone.....	1,056	1,201	1,300	1,314	1,292
Methadone and heroin.....	194	219	238	207	161
Methadone, heroin and other drugs.....	7	4	5	5	5
Methadone and other drugs but not heroin.....	21	15	8	16	19
Heroin alone.....	102	112	109	87	78
Heroin and other drugs but not methadone.....	35	43	40	17	9
Morphine alone.....	72	69	72	54	41
Pethidine alone.....	52	45	52	50	49
Dextromoramide alone.....	29	47	56	62	62
Dipipanone alone.....	33	45	68	121	147
Cocaine alone.....	3	3	3	3	2
Other drugs alone <sup>1</sup> .....	6	7	6	3	4
Other drug combinations.....	5	5	14	14	12
Total.....	1,615	1,815	1,971	1,953	1,881

<sup>1</sup> Including levorphanol and phenazocine in 1972-76, and medicinal opium in 1973-74.

UNITED KINGDOM

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Addicts known to be receiving drugs at Jan. 1.....	1,549	1,615	1,815	1,971	1,953
Added during the year—Persons notified as addicts by medical practitioners:					
Not previously known.....	799	807	875	923	991
Known in earlier years.....	586	599	566	534	539
Total.....	1,385	1,406	1,441	1,457	1,530
Taken off during the year—Persons no longer re- corded as addicts at Dec. 31:					
Removed by reason of death.....	65	61	77	69	63
Admitted to penal or other institution.....	1,254	437	387	484	514
No longer seeking treatment.....		708	821	922	1,025
Total.....	1,319	1,206	1,285	1,475	1,602
Addicts known to be receiving drugs at Dec. 31.....	1,615	1,815	1,971	1,953	1,881

## CONCLUSION

The social, moral and physical effects of drug abuse affect the entire population of the world, even those places where there is relatively little present drug abuse.

The nations of the world may not agree on many policies or ideologies, but the necessity to combat the spread of narcotics and to control its evil effects is one area where there is no real disagreement.

In the countries visited, we found a unanimity of opinion coupled with a desire for leadership. Leadership is the quality the United States can and must offer.

## APPENDIX

### I. PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LESTER L. WOLFF, FEBRUARY 16, 1978

On January 2, 1978, I, as Chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, led a study mission to Asia and the South Pacific with ten of my colleagues from the Select Committee, the International Relations Committee and four other committees of the Congress. The delegation was bipartisan in nature and had representatives from all geographic regions of the United States.

This 10-nation, 20-day mission focused on a study of narcotics abuse and the impact of heroin trafficking from the Golden Triangle on those countries in close proximity to the source area and on a discussion of the prospects of establishing international cooperative efforts to stem the flow of narcotics. The bottom line of each of our discussions with the prime ministers, foreign ministers and narcotics officials was finding the ways and means of preventing an increased flow of 90-percent pure Southeast Asian heroin from reaching the international markets in Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.

There has been a startling increase in the percentage of heroin from Southeast Asia reaching the veins of the addicts in this country. Eighteen months ago, when the Select Committee was formed, 85 to 90 percent of the heroin in the United States came from the poppy fields in Mexico, with only 5 to 10 percent coming from Southeast Asia. Now, although the U.S. narcotics agencies claim that the amount of heroin being imported into the United States has decreased from seven tons to six tons, 30 to 35 percent of the heroin entering the United States and nearly 80 percent of the heroin entering many areas of Europe originates from the Golden Triangle of Burma, Thailand and Laos. In spite of all the seizures, all the narcotics assistance and all our international cooperation, the floodgates have been opened and the people of Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States are being drowned by a torrent of pure white heroin.

Having this in mind, we were determined to measure the nature and extent of their narcotics trafficking activities and narcotics abuse in Japan, the Philippines, New Guinea, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Iran and England during our recent mission.

The following are highlights of our findings in each country:

Japan is a major international producer of more than half a million tons of the chemical acetic anhydride. While this chemical is used in numerous industrial processes, it is also a critical ingredient in the refining of heroin from opium gum. We are currently working with the Japanese on preventing the diversion of acetic anhydride to the illicit heroin refining organizations in Malaysia, Thailand and Burma. However, at the present time, there are no controls on the export of this chemical.

We will continue to work with the Japanese to set up a system to monitor the use of acetic anhydride in these countries which do not require major amounts of the chemical for industrial purposes.

It was also disturbing to find that Japan is in the throes of an amphetamine epidemic, with approximately 100,000 to 200,000 addicts. This narcotic traffic provides 60 percent of the income for the 150,000 individuals involved in organized crime.

The Philippines has been able to reduce the heroin problem during the last 5 years from an estimated 10,000 addicts to zero, through the imposition of martial law, a program of strict enforcement, harsh penalties and massive public education. We examined the question of drug abuse in the U.S. military at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base as part of our ongoing study of drug abuse in the military. We found that there is widespread abuse of marihuana and alcohol among U.S. military but the problem is not as severe among our troops stationed in the Philippines as it is in Europe. However, there is continuing concern over U.S. military personnel who have retired in the Philippines and elsewhere becoming involved with heroin trafficking organizations.

Papua New Guinea, as yet does not have a narcotics problem. There is a strong possibility, however, that because of its proximity to Australia it may be used as a future transshipment point. To prepare for this possibility, the Select Committee is working to secure narcotics training slots for the six members of the police force assigned to narcotics. In addition, it should be noted that the climate and topography in Papua New Guinea are suitable for the cultivation of marihuana, coca, and opium.

Australia, from an international standpoint, is a potentially serious transshipment point for narcotics coming from Southeast Asia enroute to Europe and the United States. However, the primary concern of the Australian authorities is their rapidly expanding domestic heroin problem. The Australians have two major problems with controlling the narcotics problem: First, they are unable to effectively patrol their 12,000 mile coastline, making the smuggling of narcotics aboard yachts possible. Secondly, there is a lack of cooperation between the states and the Federal Government, making law enforcement difficult. We are presently working with the Australians on improving the monitoring of their coastal waters.

Singapore poses a serious narcotics trafficking concern to the international market because of its active seaport, international airport, and the presence of numerous secret societies which are active in supplying heroin to the Southeast Asian and European markets. Because of its major involvement in international trade, it is very possible that Singapore will become a major transshipment center for heroin bound for the United States and Europe if curtailment of narcotics trafficking activities becomes more effective in Thailand and Burma.

While in Singapore, I addressed the State Department's Regional Narcotics Conference and had a frank interchange with our State Department and DEA representatives from the Far East. U.S. cooperation with foreign governments is at its best level ever, but I do not feel that we are receiving the cooperation that is required from the critical countries to effectively combat the international flow of narcotics.

We were also able to study the Singapore treatment program during our visit. The program, which has been in operation only 8 months, involves the mandatory incarceration of individuals who show a positive reaction to urinalysis tests. It is too early to tell if they will be able to break the pattern of 90 percent recidivism rate they are currently experiencing.

Malaysia is a major transshipment point for Far Eastern heroin entering Western Europe and the United States and is the primary country for the purchase of pure Southeast Asian heroin by Westerners. Our foremost concern is that Penang, the major narcotics trafficking center, is planning to open a new international airport later this year with direct service to Hong Kong and Europe. The Malaysians have been unable to effectively curb the flow of heroin from Malaysia in the past and this new airport will further complicate the problem as most of the enforcement officials are stationed 3 hours away in Kuala Lumpur. Unfortunately, the narcotics enforcement bureaucracy is modeled on U.S. policy prior to 1973 and there is a severe lack of cooperation between the police, Customs and Central Narcotics Bureau. We held discussions with the high ranking Malaysians to help them avoid the same problems the United States experienced prior to the implementation of Reorganization No. 2 in 1973, and the creation of DEA.

Thailand.—During our 4-hour stopover in Thailand, we were able to meet with Prime Minister Kriangsak who reaffirmed the Thai commitment to narcotics control and requested that the United States provide more helicopters to be used in their suppression effort. We have received evidence that while the flow of heroin to the Thai-Burmese border is down from previous years and the price is deflated, significant stockpiling is taking place at the border. The amount of heroin from Southeast Asia has gone from an estimated 0.7 ton in 1976 to 2 tons in 1977. It is my feeling that, until a political solution is found in the producing areas, we will never be able to interdict a significant amount of opium. At the time of our visit, the four fixed-wing aircraft which we had agreed to supply to Burma were just being delivered and it is too early to judge what impact they will have. However, I am still concerned that we are willing to provide helicopters and planes for narcotics control purposes to a country which is fighting an insurgency without requiring that they allow a single DEA agent to work in Burma on a permanent basis. It is distressing that our State Department feels that our relations with Burma are so sensitive that they have not asked the government of Burma to sit down with the leaders in the opium growing areas and discuss possible means of ending the cultivation of opium.

India is the largest legal producer of opium gum in the world, producing approximately 1,500 tons for the production of medical supplies. There are no examples of diversion of Indian opium into the illicit market. The primary domestic drug problem is the use of hashish and hash oil which enters their country from other Southeast Asian countries. Their major fear is that, with continued overproduction of poppy straw in Turkey and with the government subsidies to the farmers, the price of opium gum will be depressed. We will be contracting the International Narcotics Control Board in Geneva to discuss the apparent continued overproduction of poppy straw.

Iran has a large addict population, approximately 400,000 heroin and opium addicts. During our 4-hour meeting, the Prime Minister agreed to appoint a special representative to the United Nations to work with the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) on stopping the flow of opiates abused in Iran from the sources, Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the present time, over 80 percent of the heroin in Europe comes from Southeast Asia but in 1977, 80 percent of the heroin in West Germany originated from the poppy fields of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, Southeast Asian heroin is beginning to show up in other parts of Europe in increasing quantities.

England.—While in England, we focused on the British treatment efforts. For years, we have heard the "British system" touted as the solution to the problem of heroin addiction. The British officials told us that the so-called "British system" is a figment of the American imagination. Under British law, all doctors are allowed to prescribe heroin or other opiates for the treatment of any medical problem. However, only 300 doctors are licensed to prescribe heroin for the treatment of drug addiction. Of the 1,300 addicts presently under treatment, only 200 are receiving heroin as the drug of maintenance. The majority of the others are receiving methadone in programs similar to those in the United States. British officials did express great concern, however, over the rapidly increasing problem of heroin and methadone abuse.

It is important to point out that the Prime Ministers, Presidents and heads of the narcotics information agencies of each host country agreed that the war on narcotics trafficking cannot be fought by individual armies. Only through a unified response can we hope to stop the increasing flow of heroin to the United States and other parts of the world. It is a sad fact that an increase in the level of domestic abuse of drugs usually is the only means of guaranteeing an increased level of commitment to international narcotics control efforts. We must lend more support to these nations and to every nation in the world that is dedicated to combating the spread of heroin addiction.

## II. STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN LESTER L. WOLFF FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD WITH COMMENTS BY CONGRESSMAN BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, MAY 17, 1977

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, one of the major by-products of a factfinding mission is the opportunity afforded to Members to obtain information not available to us here in Washington. Such a significant instance occurred in connection with a joint factfinding mission undertaken by some members of the House International Relations Committee and the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. I have the honor and privilege of being chairman of the International Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The work of these committees necessarily dovetails to a large extent since issues involving control of narcotics, and political, military and economic assistance are often but two branches of the same tree. Recently, I led a delegation on a visit to Thailand, which, as most of my colleagues know, is the central source for massive heroin transshipments to Europe and the United States, manufactured from opium originating in what has become known as the "Golden Triangle." The Golden Triangle is that northernmost portions of Burma, Thailand and Laos which rests on the southern borders of the Yunnan Province of the People's Republic of China. This area grows between 400 and 500 tons of opium annually. The opium is transported across the border into Thailand, where it is refined into heroin and then smuggled in increasing and perilous amounts to the principal capitals of Western Europe, to the United States and other countries. Only a small percentage of the total crop is retained for local consumption, an activity that has been indigenous to this area of the world for hundreds of years. The Select Committee studies indicate there is cause for real concern with respect to the appearance of large amounts of Southeast Asian heroin in the United States, as our joint eradication programs with Mexico begin to produce substantive results in eliminating poppy fields and thus reducing the availability of Mexican heroin. Intelligence sources in foreign countries which are either bulk heroin producers or heroin transshipment points are much more likely to have current information on the activities of those nefarious persons who supply the blood money which is the genesis of any narcotics transaction. From just such intelligence sources, I have learned the names and identities of some major ethnic Chinese residing in Thailand who are primarily responsible for the purchase, shipment and support of the large volume of heroin that is distributed from Thailand into the western countries of Europe and the United States.

Before describing the activities of one major group of these individuals and naming them, which I intend to do in a few moments, I would like to present my colleagues with some background on what appears to be one of the recent developments in international heroin trafficking.

I want to pay a special tribute to the present splendid cooperation of the Thai Government. Prime Minister Thanin has made narcotics control one of the primary priorities of the Government. The substantial and cooperative work being done by the Royal Thai Police under General Sarasin and the intensive support given by General Chavalit along with the primary attention of General Kriangsak has been of great value in the results obtained so far. While there is much work yet to be done we are finding that the Thai Government understands its international responsibilities and is doing something about them in the area of drug control.

The Chinese Triad Societies which began their existence centuries ago as self-help organizations, have largely become criminal syndicates in recent years. Because of loose banking regulations and practices in the Far East and the close connection these ethnic Chinese have with relatives and friends scattered all over the globe, they have been able to assume a major role in the distribution, receipt, and dissemination of heroin. They work in mysterious ways, their business transactions clothed in coded language. Much business is transacted by

word of mouth and the trust that is extended by one Triad member to a blood brother is inviolate. They have their own code of silence not unfamiliar to law enforcement officers around the world who once dealt with organized gangs of criminals that transported Turkish heroin to the United States.

The secret societies known as the Triad were formed in Mainland China during the 18th century. Their original purpose was self-protection and opposition to the various Chinese dynasties. The names of the various secret societies are taken from the areas in China from which the original members emigrated. The headquarters of the secret societies are in Hong Kong. As members of the secret societies scattered throughout Southeast Asia and Europe, smaller branches were formed. Right up through the 1960's the secret societies were importing No. 3 heroin and opium for use in the countries where they were located. In the early 1970's the secret societies began to import No. 4 heroin along with No. 3 heroin which is used for smoking purposes. These groups, located in the various European countries are connected with the base operation, and families of Hong Kong. It is believed that they are largely responsible for the upsurge in heroin trafficking coming from Southeast Asia to Western Europe. The increase in level of heroin smuggling is reflected in the increase of heroin seizures in Western Europe from a level of 15 to 20 kilograms in the 1960's to over 600 kilograms last year. The primary secret society in Western Europe as far as heroin trafficking is concerned was the 14K group which has recently been pushed out by a rival based in Malaysia and Singapore. In most countries, including Hong Kong, it is illegal to belong to a secret society. However, because of the ethnic ties which all members of secret societies have, it is very hard to infiltrate these organizations. The Triads use the trafficking in narcotics to support their other legitimate and illegitimate activities.

Many of these individuals reside in Bangkok, living in baronial splendor, adopting Thai names, and represent the primary reason why Southeast Asian heroin has become an overwhelming threat to the national security of our country. For example, Chang Kai-Cheng—also known as Chang P'u-Ching, also known as Hu Chin-Te, also known as Thawee Sakulthanapanish—left Yunnan Province in China in 1949 and took refuge in Burma to escape the Communist takeover. He then married Liu-Chao-Ting and has eight children, some of whom study in Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States. He moved to Chiang Mai, Thailand, in 1965 and began his narcotics operation. Within 5 years, he had become and remains a most prominent figure in the Thai narcotics community. Mr. Chang has residences in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Mae Sai, Thailand. He is the head of the largest heroin distribution ring in that country. His list of associates is a "Who's Who" of Chinese ethnics in the Bangkok narcotics market. He has investments and is the coowner of many businesses among them the Broadway Hotel, Bangkok; Bai Cha Hom Tea Co., Bangkok; Tung Hising-Chan Hardware and Trucking Co., Chiang Rai, Thailand; and the Refined Tea Manufacturing Co. of Bangkok. Mr. Chang's operations in northern Thailand are conducted by confederates who purchase most of his narcotics from the hill tribes with financial support provided by Mr. Chang. Originally, Mr. Chang's narcotics business was located on the northern frontier of Thailand and northern Burma where he produced "999" brand of morphine. After moving to Chiang Mai because of pressure from the Burmese Government, he went to Laos and set up a gold mining company which was a front for a heroin factory at Gold Delta, Laos. In 1976, the heroin refinery was moved to Tachilek, Burma, at the edge of the northern border of Thailand, under protection from certain of the opium warlords in that area. Mr. Chang's confederate, Sha Ming, is the superintendent of the refinery and Mr. Chang remains in Bangkok distributing his poison to regular customers. Mr. Chang has excellent narcotics connections in Holland, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United States. His "bag man" is Mr. Chang Chen Shen, who lives in Bangkok and who has contacts with many government officials. Mr. Chang has Thai citizenship, resides at 132-5 Klong Papa Samsen, Bangkok; he also owns a house at 105 Market Street, Mae Sai, Thailand. As of this date, Mr. Chang roams about the globe frequently and can be said to be one of the most important figures in the spreading of Asian poison to the youth of the world.

There are more such persons. Mr. Chang Chen-Ch'eng—also known as A'Pung also known as Suthap Benjapokee—was born in Thailand with an ancestral home in Teachow, China. He lives in Bangkok in a beautiful modern home which has an underground room used for gambling and smoking opium. He is close to Mr. Chang, whom I have already described, and the various other ethnic Chinese who live in Bangkok who are in the narcotics business. He owns the Victory Hotel in Bangkok and a jewelry store at the rear of the hotel, called Beauty Thai Silk. About 10 years ago, he went to the Thai-Laotian border and stayed there for some



time before returning to Bangkok. He began to make considerable amounts of money in 1968 when Thailand's armed forces participated in the Vietnam war. This effort gave him the opportunity to smuggle large quantities of heroin to Saigon for sale to American soldiers, in collusion with some Thai Army officers. Intelligence sources reveal that between 1970 and 1971 A'Pung smuggled 100 kilograms of No. 4 heroin and several tons of processed opium to Saigon where fellow triad member Chang Ming distributed the narcotics. Mr. A'Pung has a knack for making friends in Thai Government circles. He has close connections with the Thai Army and the Thai police as well as officials of the former government. Mr. A'Pung also owns two export-import firms, Thai Gem and Lin Ho Trading Co's. in Bangkok. He has recently purchased a sumptuous villa in the area of Suthisan, Thailand, where Mr. Chang and his associates often visit to conduct business and to gamble.

Another significant piece of intelligence relates to a Mr. Sha Ming—alias Old Sua—a Yunnanese Chinese who resides in Thailand. Mr. Sha moved to Thailand from Burma in 1961 and now occupies the first important position of principal assistant to Mr. Chang. In 1966, when Mr. Chang established a heroin factory in the jungle area of Hui Hse, Laos, Mr. Sha was made superintendent of this factory. The chief pharmacist was a well-known heroin refiner named Hsiao Wang. At a later time this refinery was moved to Tachilek, Burma, under the protection of two Chinese opium warlord leaders named Yang Shiah Lee and Lo Hsin Han. Mr. Sha built a large laboratory at this site where he purchased raw opium while Mr. Chang supervised sales in Bangkok. In 1971, as the result of the loss of protection of the local armies and a change in Burmese Government policies, Mr. Sha's heroin refinery lost its armed protection and the result was the scattering of the refinery equipment to several mobile factories in the mountainous Golden Triangle area. At the present time, Mr. Sha is actively operating a comparatively large heroin refinery near Chiang Rai, Thailand.

Another associate of Mr. Chang Kai-Ching is Ma Hseuh-Fu, also a Yunnanese Chinese who came to Burma from China in 1949 and joined Mr. Chang as a partner in the opium business.

Mr. Ma is an extremely wealthy man, having made fortunes in the opium smuggling operation that he conducted from 1961 to the present time in Hong Lo, Burma. In 1964, Mr. Ma and his family moved to Bangkok. He and Mr. Chang, his partner and fellow Triad member, invested in the Cha Mon Tea Co. in Bangkok and used the company as a front for the transshipment of large quantities of heroin into international markets. He owns interests in the June Hotel and the Ming Tea Co., both of Bangkok, and is closely associated with General Li, a notorious opium exporter and Mr. Chang.

Mr. Wa Yao-Tung, another Yunnanese Chinese, who came to Thailand when he was very young, lives in a Western-style ranchhouse with a large garden adjacent to it. He also owns a house in Chaing Mai, Thailand. Between 1969 and 1971 he worked for a number of refinery operators, including the gentlemen I have already named. He is mainly responsible for supplying the precursors necessary for the manufacture of heroin. He is a major distributor of narcotics in Bangkok and has recently earned the equivalent of \$1 million with part of which he purchased two houses, one on Sukravait Road in Bangkok. Mr. Wa moves around from house to house in order to confuse law enforcement efforts and is known to be well connected in government circles. I wish also to call attention to the following three narcotics financiers and power brokers: Mr. Na Tsai-K'Uei, a Yunnanese Chinese, Mr. Ma Yao-Hua who is also Yunnanese, and Mr. Chu Hsueh-Pin. These three gentlemen reside in Thailand and are principal distributors of No. 3 heroin with connections in the Golden Triangle as solid as those they have in the United States. They own houses, hotels, export-import companies, and other fronts for their nefarious businesses.

It must be realized that these individuals supply the vast amounts of money necessary to guarantee a continuous large flow of opium. They finance the refineries which produce No. 3 and No. 4 heroin. They provide support for the smuggling operations after the merchandise arrives in Bangkok, and also the front money for the costs of distribution. Fortunes are collected in exchange for a nod, a handshake or an understood password from their Triad brethren all over the world. Their wealth is reminiscent of the legendary rulers of ancient days.

Mr. Speaker, to my knowledge, this burgeoning and extremely dangerous situation has never been made public before. I am doing so because it is necessary for the American people to identify their enemies. Together with the corrupt officials without whose connivance this traffic would be impossible, they are princely purveyors of universal misery.

I trust that all appropriate Federal agencies will take note of what has been said here today and will lend more support to the governments of every civilized nation in the world that is dedicated to combating the spread of heroin.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLFF. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

[Mr. Gilman asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.]

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my colleague, the distinguished chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control for focusing attention on this Thai problem.

There have been recent reports that the production of opium emanating from the Golden Triangle—from Burma, Thailand and Laos—has been increasing and that this area of Southeast Asia now accounts for an estimated 25 percent of the world's production of opium.

Mr. Speaker, it is imperative that these names of the members of organized crime be made known to the public here and abroad. Narcotics trafficking is an insidious business with its corruptive tentacles reaching into every facet of a nation's society, thereby undermining the very roots of that society.

Mr. Speaker, it is essential that the consciousness of the global public be awakened to recognize the devastating effects of narcotics trafficking. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman from New York (Mr. Wolff) for focusing attention on this worldwide problem and for putting the limelight on the traffickers who are trading on the minds and bodies of our American youth, and of the young people throughout the world.

I thank the gentleman from New York for his comments and also for the major contribution he has made in the fight against drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. He has done an outstanding job.

### III. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The eight major narcotics traffickers identified in Congressman Lester Wolff's May 17, 1977, statement on narcotics have gone into hiding. Four have taken refuge in the 5th Chinese irregular forces camp at Mai Salong, one is hiding out in Bangkok, two are attempting to obtain Burmese identification cards in order to enter Burma, and one apparently already left the country. Many narcotics traffickers not named by Congressman Wolff have also gone underground. An additional reaction to the Congressman's statement and the Thai Government's use of Article 21 is that many of the large-scale Chao Chou narcotics financiers say they will quit the trade. Small-time dealers are expected to fill the gap left by the fleeing major traffickers. The formation of new trafficking groups that plan to smuggle narcotics to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Hong Kong/Macau is already in the planning stages.

The May 17, 1977, statement on narcotics in Thailand by Congressman Lester Wolff has created considerable anxiety in the Thai narcotics community and placed additional pressure on traffickers already concerned. In addition to the major traffickers cited in the Congressman's statement, several additional traffickers and others involved in various degrees in the narcotics business have gone into hiding. Those who have fled appear to be reacting to the assumption that because of pressure from the U.S. Government, they will be arrested so as to placate the United States and thus ensure Thailand's continued receipt of the U.S. narcotics suppression funds and other aid monies. Their departure has created a temporary vacuum in the Thai narcotics community. The smaller narcotics dealers are expected to take advantage of the absence of the major traffickers to garner larger profits.

On June 13, a Bangkok-based known Yunnanese narcotics trafficker commented that as a result of Congressman Lester Wolff's May 17 statement identifying major Yunnanese narcotics traffickers in Thailand, most of the Yunnanese traffickers in Bangkok and Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces have gone into hiding. Not only had the well-known traffickers fled but also a number of the not-so-well-known. Many Chiang Mai traffickers went to Ban Yang, a Chinese refugee village in Fang District, Chiang Mai Province.

In early June, Chang K'ai-Ch'eng, one of the major Yunnanese narcotics traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, took refuge in the 5th Chinese Irregular Force (CIF) camp at Mae Salong Mountain in Thailand near the Chiang Rai Province/Burma border. Chang fled Bangkok, fearing arrest, and stayed with relatives upcountry.

On June 10, another Yunnanese narcotics trafficker identified by Congressman Wolff said that he planned to soon go up-country into hiding. Ma Yao-Tung has recently complained of being under considerable mental strain, and has said that this condition has been accentuated by Congressman Wolff's statement. Following a publication of his name as a major trafficker, Ma did not immediately leave

Bangkok but stayed behind to take care of closing out Chang K'ai-Ch'eng's Bangkok account and other business. Following Congressman Wolff's comments, Ma Yao-tung was noted as being unusually abrupt and curt in his dealing with narcotics buyers, often observing that he had quit the narcotics business because of the deteriorating local security conditions. Ma Yao-tung informed many of the narcotics purchasers that several of their friends had already gone to northern Thailand seeking sanctuary. As of June 15, Ma Yao-tung had vacated his residence and was living in a hotel in downtown Bangkok. Ma Yao-tung arranged for the destruction of his personal papers before abandoning his residence.

Ma Hsueh-fu, a Yunnanese narcotics trafficker who was also identified by Congressman Wolff, and a close associate/partner of Chang K'ai-Ch'eng, left Bangkok for North Thailand on May 28 and as of early June had reportedly gone into hiding at the 5th CIF camp in Mae Salong.

On June 5, two other Yunnanese traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, N A Ts'ai-K'uei, a major refinery investor of Mae Sai, Chiang Rai Province, and Sha Ming, also known as Sa U, a partner of Chang K'ai-Ch'eng in narcotics trafficking, were accepted at the 5th CIF camp for an indefinite stay. The two spread the news among friends that they had been called there by General Tuan, but in fact they entered the camp because they feared arrest.

As of June 5, Ma Yaq-Hua, a Chiang Mai-based trafficker named by Congressman Wolff, was in Chiang Mai. In late May, Ma Yao-Hua, along with Chu Hsueh-pin, another of the Yunnanese narcotics traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, had asked Huang to apply to Burmese authorities for identification cards. These additional traffickers who were not on Wolff's list, Ma Ju-ch'I, Yang En-Chao and Chao Shih-Chia made similar requests of Huang. The five traffickers asked Huang to obtain the cards as soon as possible and said they were willing to pay "thousands of Kyaï" for each card.

A major trafficker identified by Congressman Wolff, Chang Chin-Ch'eng, also known as Suthep Benchaphoki, who was a prominent narcotics dealer in southern Thailand, said that he was making plans to leave Thailand. Chang Chin-Ch'eng's present whereabouts are unknown but it is believed he left the country.

Another result of Congressman Wolff's disclosure was that as of late May and early June, narcotics traffickers in Chiang Mai City and locations farther north such as Fang, though they had not been named in the Wolff report, were going "underground" and dared not sleep in their homes. This publicity surrounding Wolff's statement was compounded by a high-ranking police conference held in Lampang in late May which spawned the rumor that government authorities had decided to detain from 200 to 300 Yunnanese Chinese suspected of trafficking and, regardless of whether or not they were currently implicated in narcotics activities, put them to work in special camps.

In another development, on June 8, the China Association in Bangkok, said that as a reaction to Congressman Wolff's report and the Thai Government's use of Article 21 against narcotics traffickers, many of the large-scale Chao Chou narcotics financiers have stated that they will quit the trade. The Yunnanese narcotics community are the suppliers by virtue of their numerous contacts in Northern Thailand. Most of those financiers who have expressed the desire to get out of the narcotics business are the already rich gold shop-owner types.

The combined effect of Congressman Wolff's statement and Article 21 would persuade the "wealthy" traffickers to quit the narcotics business.

#### IV. CONTINUING REACTION IN THAI NARCOTICS COMMUNITY TO CONGRESSMAN LESTER WOLFF'S STATEMENT IDENTIFYING MAJOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN THAILAND

##### *Summary*

The eight major narcotics traffickers identified in Congressman Lester Wolff's May 17 statement on narcotics have gone into hiding. Four have taken refuge in the 5th Chinese Irregular Forces camp at Mai Salong, one is hiding out in Bangkok, two are attempting to obtain Burmese identification cards in order to enter Burma and one apparently already left the country. Many narcotics traffickers not named by Congressman Wolff have also gone underground. An additional reaction to the Congressman's statement and the Thai Government's use of Article 21 is that many of the large-scale Chao Chou narcotics financiers say they will quit the trade. Small-time dealers are expected to fill the gap left by the fleeing major traffickers. The formation of new trafficking groups that plan to smuggle narcotics to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Hong Kong/Macau is already in the planning stages.

1. The May 17, 1977, statement on narcotics in Thailand by Congressman Lester Wolff has created considerable anxiety in the Thai narcotics community and placed additional pressure on traffickers already concerned by the evident sincerity of the government of Prime Minister Thanin Kraiwichian in prosecuting and possibly executing narcotics traffickers under Article 21. In addition to the major traffickers cited in the Congressman's statement, several additional traffickers and others involved in various degrees in the narcotics business have gone into hiding. Those who have fled appear to be reacting to the assumption that the Thanin government will arrest them. Their departure has created a temporary vacuum in the Thai narcotics community. The smaller narcotics dealers are expected to take advantage of the absence of the major traffickers to garner larger profits. The probable result is that the flow of narcotics will continue under new sponsorship but at a reduced rate. In Congressman Wolff's statement, he identified eight major narcotics traffickers. Although press reports have referred to 9 to 12 traffickers being named, in fact only 8 current traffickers were included in the Wolff report, the confusion evidently stemming from the various renditions and transliterations of the Sino/Thai names.

2. As a result of Congressman Wolff's May 17 statement identifying major Yunnanese narcotics traffickers in Thailand, most of the Yunnanese traffickers in Bangkok and Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces have gone into hiding. Not only had the well-known traffickers fled but also a number of the not-so-well-known. Many Chiang Mai traffickers went to Ban Yang, a Chinese refugee village in Fang District, Chiang Mai Province. Following the departure of "the Yunnanese" traffickers there appeared to be an upsurge of small shipments (5 to 10 pounds) of pai lung-chu from north Thailand, either

destined for Bangkok or for transshipment to south Thailand. It was estimated that the amount of pai lung-chu entering Bangkok from northern Thailand was no less than 1,000 pounds per month. Due to the departure of "the Yunnanese," conditions are favorable for the small dealers, especially those who use tour buses from Mae Sai and Chiang Mai, to smuggle their narcotics into Bangkok.

3. In early June, Chang K'ai-ch'eng (1728/7030/6134), one of the major Yunnanese narcotics traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, fled Bangkok, fearing arrest. Chang K'ai-ch'eng asked the Shan United Army (SUA) leader Chang Ch'i-fu for protection and he was sent to a SUA camp in Mae Hong Son Province. Later, Chang K'ai-ch'eng then was taken by the SUA to request refuge with the 5th CIF Commander, General Tuan Hsi-wen (3008/1585/2429). General Tuan accepted Chang K'ai-ch'eng and, as of June 13, Chang was still at the CIF camp.

4. On June 10, Ma Yao-tung (7456/5069/2639), another Yunnanese narcotics trafficker identified by Congressman Wolff, was planning to go up-country into hiding. Ma Yao-tung has recently been under considerable mental strain, which was accentuated by Congressman Wolff's statement. Following Congressman Wolff's comments, Ma Yao-tung was unusually abrupt and curt in his dealing with narcotics buyers, often observing that he had quit the narcotics business because of the deteriorating local security conditions. As of June 15, Ma Yao-tung had vacated his residence and was living in a hotel in downtown Bangkok. Ma Yao-tung arranged for the destruction of his personal papers before abandoning his residence.

5. Ma Hsueh-fu (7456/1331/1381), a Yunnanese narcotics trafficker who was also identified by Congressman Wolff, and a close associate/partner of Chang K'ai-ch'eng, left Bangkok for north Thailand on May 28 and as of early June had reportedly gone into hiding. In his absence Yang Ta-chia (2799/1129/3946) has taken over Ma Hsueh-fu's "refined tea company" business, and is also handling whatever narcotics transactions are currently pending. Ma Hsueh-fu, who never directly handled narcotics and was only a financial partner of Chang K'ai-ch'eng, did not react to Congressman Wolff's statement with the same degree of concern as did Ma Yao-tung and attempted to maintain a business-as-usual facade.

6. Two other Yunnanese traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, Na Ts'ai-k'uei (4780/1752/1145), a major refinery investor of Mae Sai (NC9260), Chiang Rai Province, and Sha Ming (3097/2494), also known as Sa U, a partner of Chang K'ai-ch'eng in narcotics trafficking, were accepted at the 5th CIF camp for an indefinite stay. The two spread the news among friends that they had been called there by General Tuan, but in fact they entered the camp, because they feared arrest by staff members of Prime Minister Thanin, whose arrival in Chiang Rai Province on a visit was imminent.

7. As of June 5, Ma Yao-hua (7456/5069/5478), a Chiang Mai-based trafficker named by Congressman Wolff, was in Chiang Mai. Ma Yao-hua met with Chang K'ai-ch'eng when Chang was en route to the 5th CIF camp. In late May, Ma Yao-hua, along with Chu Hsueh-pin (2612/1331/0756), another of the Yunnanese narcotics traffickers identified by Congressman Wolff, were seeking identification cards so they could enter Burma.

8. The other major trafficker identified by Congressman Wolff, Chang Chin-ch'eng (1728/6930/1004), also known as Suthep Benchaphoki, who was a prominent narcotics dealer in southern Thailand, was making plans to leave Thailand. Chang Chin-ch'eng's present whereabouts are unknown but it is believed he left the country.

9. Another result of Congressman Wolff's disclosure was that as of late May and early June, narcotics traffickers in Chiang Mai city and locations farther north, even though they had not been named in the Wolff report, were going "underground" and dared not sleep in their homes. The publicity surrounding Wolff's statement was compounded by a high-ranking police conference held in late May which spawned the rumor that government authorities had decided to detain from 200 to 300 Yunnanese Chinese suspected of trafficking and, regardless of whether or not they were currently implicated in narcotics activities, put them to work in special camps. Several well-known Chiang Mai narcotics traffickers were among those who stayed away from their homes following the adverse publicity and rumors.

10. Reacting to Congressman Wolff's report and the Thai Government's use of Article 21 against narcotics traffickers, many of the large-scale Chao Chou narcotics financiers have indicated that they will quit the trade. (Comment: The Bangkok Chao Chou narcotics trafficking community is primarily composed of narcotics movers and financiers. They rarely have any direct links to the source of supply, in contrast, the Yunnanese narcotics community are the suppliers by virtue of their numerous contacts in northern Thailand. Most of those financiers who have expressed the desire to get out of the narcotics business are the already rich gold shopowners.) It was reported that Hong Kong-based narcotics traffickers plan to organize those small-time dealers who are still interested in trafficking into an organization to ship narcotics to Hong Kong/Macau, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for transshipment to Vancouver and Montreal, Canada. Depending on the success of their Canadian route, they will further plan to expand their activities to include the United States and Europe.

11. When one Bangkok-based narcotics retailer felt that the combined effect of Congressman Wolff's statement and Article 21 would persuade the "wealthy" traffickers to quit the narcotics business. However, those small-time dealers who in the past had not earned significant profits working for their wealthy "bosses" would soon emerge as the new elite. As an example, two such dealers had recently been approached by some unknown investors to organize a trafficking group to smuggle narcotics to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Hong Kong/Macau. This group, while still in the formative phase, is planning to begin recruiting couriers in Bangkok after August and are busy with preliminary preparations.



V. LETTER TO CHAIRMAN LESTER WOLFF FROM KHUN SA

DECEMBER 30, 1977.

To: Dear Mr. Wolff.

May I take this good opportunity wishing you a very happy new year. Hope the year 1978 will bring you success whatever you aim for. I've written you a letter by the end of July and haven't received any reply from you yet. So, I wonder if it ever reached you.

We have submitted a detailed plan of our drug proposal of the true facts in regard to the Golden Triangle area when your representative Mr. Joe and committee arrived here and interviewed me in person on April 16, 1977.

Although our proposal was unfortunately turned down by your Government after the congressional hearing. But, you're still praised and appreciated by us of your great efforts and intellectual works in order to help world solve narcotic problems heartily.

I deeply understand that opium is a dangerous drug towards mankind all over the world. It is harmful to both health and spirit. Therefore, I myself want to take "Save People" as a starting point and honestly wish and willing to give my full cooperation in eliminating drugs entirely from this region.

Under the guidance of International Drug Enforcement Organization and on the "humanity" stand, I have no other demand rather willing to fulfill my duty as a "human being" should for his "same species" aim at improving human welfare.

May I again emphasize that I truly wish to take part in drug enforcement project. In order to achieve real result I sincerely welcome the International Drug Enforcement Organization to despatch its higher ranking officials to stay with us as to directly supervise the drug enforcement mission in accordance with drug enforcement plan. Further on several small teams from said project can be also despatched along with my troops to travel deep into different parts of Shanland as to observe personally on how farmers grow their opium as to be able to carry out drug control mission conveniently. In doing so I'm confident that the real outstanding result can be achieved within certain period.

Hope that the specialists will take our drug proposal as a memorandum and give a close study.

Respectfully yours,

KHUN SA.

VI. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY ROBERT B. OAKLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS AT THE EAST ASIAN REGIONAL NARCOTICS CONFERENCE, SINGAPORE, JANUARY 1978

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA AND INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

Mr. Ambassador and conference participants, it is a great pleasure to be here today in the major entrepot of Southeast Asia to discuss U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and our international narcotics control programs. Singapore is a particularly appropriate site for the 1978 East Asia Regional Narcotics Conference. We have all long been impressed with the economic progress and efficient government of this city-state and its remarkable people. In the area of narcotics control activities and rehabilitation programs for addicts, the record here has been equally good. We also greatly appreciate the cooperation of the Government of Singapore in making this conference possible.

To some it may seem that there is no direct connection between U.S. foreign policy interests in East Asia and our antinarcotics programs in the region. The truth is quite the contrary, however. This morning I would like to reiterate the importance of international narcotics control to the United States.

Present levels of peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific owe much to the advances East Asian countries have made in developing harmonious and cooperative relations among themselves. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia where ASEAN has served as a catalyst for increasingly close cooperation among its members over the past 2 years. This cooperation has not only enhanced prospects for regional harmony but has clearly contributed to peaceful, stable relations among them and to improving relations between the members of ASEAN and other states in Southeast Asia. Viewed in the historical perspective of seriously troubled relations between various Southeast Asian states, this is a notable accomplishment which must be protected and allowed to develop further. The United States is committed to do what it can to assist.

Yet, the activities of narcotics traffickers in border areas, the alliances they form with insurgent groups, the stimulus they provide for other forms of lawlessness across national borders can disturb the relations between otherwise friendly countries. We believe that the efforts in which we are engaged to join with other countries in controlling this traffic contributes to the health and prosperity of individual nations and to better relations between them. It thus furthers our broader objectives of promoting peace and stability in the region.

Our international narcotics program in East Asia is based squarely upon certain fundamental principles of U.S. policy toward Asia. These are: the principle that the United States will continue its key role in contributing to peace and stability in Asia and the Pacific; the principle that the United States seeks normal and friendly relations with the countries in the area on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect;

and the principle that we will use our influence to improve the human condition of the peoples of Asia. In addition, U.S. antinarcotics programs in East Asia are also consistent with the essential elements of our human needs agenda outlined by Secretary Vance in Paris last June, particularly the goal of developing the Third World's rural areas where the great majority of the poorest people live.

To tackle the international narcotics traffic we first need the utmost efforts of all those involved in drug control activities—individuals, groups, governments, and international organizations. The United States began with cooperation among our own Government agencies in Washington and with the Congress. Next we sought cooperation with other governments and international organizations. In short, international narcotics control in East Asia can be seen as an enterprise which requires far-ranging cooperation and coordination as our efforts proceed from the national to the regional and to the global arenas. This multifaceted problem demands hard work combined with adjustment to the local situation in each country with which we work together.

The origins of our international narcotics control programs can be traced to the late 1960's as the United States became greatly concerned about the debilitating effects of the drug culture on our own youth. Recognizing that no single country's internal laws and enforcement activities could result in a satisfactory reduction in the availability of illegal drugs, we began to emphasize the international aspects of the traffic in illicit narcotics in our foreign policy as well. Other nations at first lagged behind. Western Europe soon developed a serious drug problem, however, and governments there began to respond to domestic concern over the influx of illegal drugs. As Turkey phased out of opium production, Southeast Asia became the primary supplier of heroin to the cities of Europe. In recent years the nations of Southeast Asia also came to view the traffic in illicit narcotics as destructive to their own societies. Governments realized that in addition to the large amounts of heroin destined for Western Europe and North America considerable quantities of illegal drugs were feeding local addict populations.

Today many other governments accept the basic proposition that no nation can feel completely secure from the scourge of illegal drugs as long as the international traffic continues on its present scale and in its enormous profitability to the purveyors of this poison. The United States has responded to this increased interest in attacking the problem worldwide by increasing our cooperation with other governments and by providing appropriate forms of assistance to governments active in this area.

We have had friendly and mutually beneficial cooperation with many of our allies in narcotics control activities. In Thailand, one of our traditional friends in East Asia, there has developed a particularly close working relationship between our Embassy, including its component DEA regional office, and Thai Government organizations. With more than 30 DEA officers assigned to implementing this cooperation, we have seen the effectiveness and expertise of the Thai police and customs officers result in an increasingly aggressive approach to antinarcotics enforcement activities.

We have also developed a cooperative relationship with neutralist Burma. Because of our respect for the desire of the Burmese Government to maintain very strict nonalignment policies, we have not sought any closer relations with that country than Burma has desired.

Moreover, our different perspectives on world events have often put us on opposing sides of many international issues. Yet despite these differences, the two Governments have been able to cooperate effectively and with increasingly successful results in reducing the flow of raw and processed opium to the Burmese-Thai border for the international market. The primary impetus for this activity came from the Government of Burma.

Another country with territory within the infamous Golden Triangle area is Laos. Although in this case our political, economic and social systems are quite different, the United States has a strong interest in seeing an end to opium production in the Golden Triangle. Ultimately, effective reduction to a minimum of the trade in illicit narcotics will depend upon the actions and cooperation of all three Governments concerned—Burma, Thailand, and Laos. It is our hope that the Government of Laos will recognize this fact and take measures to combat this problem. In the spirit of seeking normal relations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect, the United States is willing to cooperate with any government in antinarcotics activities, whether bilaterally or through international organizations. At the present the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control appears to be the most likely entity which can develop cooperative programs for this purpose in Indochina.

I would be remiss if I did not at this point return to the subject of regional narcotics control efforts in East Asia. Two items included in the communique of the second ASEAN summit held in Kuala Lumpur in August of last year were of special interest to the United States. One of these was the campaign to limit and control production and spread of illicit narcotics and drugs, which create misery while sapping our most precious resource, human talent. This statement could serve equally well as a summary of U.S. domestic and international narcotics control activities. We also noted with much interest the second meeting of ASEAN drug experts in Chiang Mai last November. The United States has cooperative programs with all five of the member ASEAN states in antinarcotics activities, and is prepared to be of further assistance in ways that best suit the states concerned.

The United States is interested in facilitating or participating in any cooperative efforts to tackle this multifaceted program. For example, the United States has strongly supported the drug advisory program of the Colombo plan since 1973. It was upon our recommendation that the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee adopted such a program and appointed a drug adviser to the staff of the Colombo Plan Bureau. Over the past 5 years this program has built an impressive list of accomplishments and attracted extensive regional support. The Colombo plan drug advisory program is now a widely accepted element of the Asian drug control complex and one of the most active and productive regional narcotics programs in this part of the world. Because the trade in illicit narcotics in Southeast Asia has this important regional dimension, we must all be alert to the possibility that as illicit narcotics activities are reduced in one country they may reappear in other areas.

In reviewing the efforts and progress of recent years, however, we must not lose sight of the extreme difficulty of attacking the problems with which we are faced in international narcotics control. As you are all clearly aware, the network constructed to carry narcotics

from the remote opium fields of the Golden Triangle to the streets of major cities is incredibly complex and involves a plethora of disparate groups. At one end the system begins with the impoverished hill-tribes of Burma, Thailand, and Laos who are paid a pittance for their opium gum. At the other end are equally miserable human beings paying a high price for a few more hours or days of escape from the horrors of narcotics withdrawal. We can attempt to deal with these two terminals of the problem by crop or income substitution and by treatment or rehabilitation programs, respectively. Progress in these areas—to which the United States is dedicated—requires enormous efforts, great expense, and much time. The short-term disruptive effect of these efforts on the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals is an unpleasant, but necessary result.

In between the two terminals lie the only groups that truly benefit from this heinous traffic, the opium warlords of the Golden Triangle, the major refining and trafficking syndicates and the international courier and distributing organizations. Here our efforts can have more effect in a shorter period of time with negative effects for only a small number of individuals in the middle who profit from this unconscionable activity at the expense of the masses at either end of the system.

As you know, within the United States we place high priority on drug treatment programs. President Carter reaffirmed our commitment to this task in his August message to the Congress on Drug Abuse, setting an immediate objective of widening the scope of and improving the effectiveness of Federal drug treatment programs. Like the United States, East Asian nations are themselves experiencing social and economic problems brought on by drug addiction. It is estimated that in Thailand and Burma alone there are close to half a million drug addicts. This number is close to the usual estimates of American addicts, but represents a proportionately greater share of a combined Thai-Burmese population of about 80 million people. The United States has provided assistance in this area to Thailand for establishing 15 pilot drug detoxification centers in Bangkok, and has agreed to cooperate with the Government of Malaysia on improving treatment and rehabilitation programs there. We recognize that demand reduction of a worldwide scale is an important part of combatting the illicit drug trade. If pursued vigorously by the countries of the world, these efforts will eventually have an effect on the profitability of large-scale narcotics trafficking operations.

Perhaps the most effective long range method of attacking the illegal narcotics trade is to cut off the source at the roots. For large numbers of farmers living in the Golden Triangle area of Southeast Asia, however, poppy cultivation is their primary livelihood at the present time. Income and crop substitution are therefore a means for both reducing the production of opium and freeing these peoples from dependence on this illegal crop and from the economic stranglehold of the opium warlords. Once brought into a legal economic system, these members of the Third World's rural poor will have an opportunity to improve their lot along with their compatriots in nonopium producing agricultural areas.

In Thailand's northwest, for example, the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have been working in cooperation with the Royal Thai Government and the

U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control to identify suitable crops to substitute for opium production and to design the necessary infrastructure to make crop substitution economically viable. In Burma the Government has used its very limited resources to pursue a crop and income substitution program in opium growing areas. UNFDAC responded to this initiative and signed a 5-year agreement with the Burmese Government to provide \$6.5 million to build upon the existing program.

Recognizing that most of Europe's heroin now comes from the Golden Triangle, the Scandinavian countries have contributed approximately \$6 million to UNFDAC for its crop substitution programs in Burma and Thailand. We anticipate that a sound substitution program, coupled with strong enforcement activities will make opium growing increasingly less attractive to Burmese farmers, as well as having the important byproduct of assisting some of the poorest peoples in the world—upland farmers of the Golden Triangle—to make a respectable living.

The enforcement side of the narcotics control equation has been, and remains the key to short-term victories in the battle against illegal drugs. Many governments in the region have extremely effective drug control programs, largely as a result of steady, thorough enforcement activities against all those involved in the narcotics trade. Other governments with less experience in this area are nonetheless stepping up their activities and seeking training and technical support from international organizations and countries with expertise in enforcement such as the United States. Through our Embassies and their designated narcotics coordinators we maintain contacts on the diplomatic level for exchange of information and planning for the future. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration representatives at our Embassies in East Asia provide a point of working-level contact with enforcement entities within the governments of the region, as well as the professional and technical experience to permit a meaningful exchange of ideas and methods for disrupting the flow of illicit narcotics.

Two key countries for limiting the trade in illegal drugs are Burma and Thailand. That their enforcement efforts have paid off can be seen from the statistics. In Burma during the past year approximately 9,000 acres of poppies have been destroyed by Burma Army troops and civilian teams. Opium production is believed to have dropped below the 390 tons estimated for 1977 from over 400 tons in 1975. Although deliveries of morphine base to the Burma/Thailand border appeared to have increased in 1977, reported opium deliveries are expected to remain at approximately the 1976 level of 130 tons. This is a considerable reduction from well over 200 tons in 1975. In Thailand over 2 tons of opium, approximately 150 kilograms of morphine, and 469 kilograms of heroin were seized in 1977.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I expect the subjects outlined in this overview of the relationship between U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and our international narcotics control programs will be further discussed in greater detail during the panel presentations and the more than 20 workshop and small group sessions scheduled for the rest of the conference. It is my hope and that of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs that ideas and specific proposals for

improving our antinarcotics activities in East Asia will be generated in the course of these meetings. To date, largely as a result of the initiatives and positive cooperation of the governments of the area, our programs have been successful. Where human suffering is concerned, however, further improvements in our policies and programs are constant, we should keep foremost in our minds as we all pursue narcotics control activities in the coming year.

VII. CORRECTION TO REPORT ON SOUTH AMERICAN STUDY MISSION,  
ISSUED NOVEMBER 1977

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, D.C., April 4, 1978.*

Hon. LESTER L. WOLFF,  
*Chairman, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House  
of Representatives*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The report of the select committee's South American study mission, August 9 to 23, 1977, on page 17, states: "The delegation was informed that the son-in-law of Prime Minister (sic) de la Puente (of Peru) was indicted on narcotics charges with the knowledge and cooperation of the Prime Minister."

A copy of the report was brought to Foreign Minister de la Puente's attention and he has contacted our Ambassador in an effort to correct a mistake contained in that report. The Minister's only son-in-law has never been indicted, nor has he ever had anything to do with drugs. The Minister fears that the young man, who currently works for UNESCO in Paris, might somehow be harmed by this error.

It was the father-in-law of the Minister's son, one Luis Malpartida, who has been arrested twice as a drug trafficker. In fact, it was in this matter that the Minister cooperated with the police. DEA in Lima confirms that the person in question was Luis Malpartida.

In order to avoid any potential problems for the Minister's son-in-law and to allay his concerns, I would be grateful if you could put this correction in the record. Perhaps a rectification by the committee could also be sent to Foreign Minister de la Puente.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

MATHEA FALCO.

---

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,  
*Washington, D.C., April 17, 1978.*

Hon. MATHEA FALCO,  
*Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Director for International  
Narcotic Control Matters, Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR Ms. FALCO: Thank you for your recent correspondence indicating the error contained in the committee's report on our South American study mission respecting allegations that Foreign Minister de la Puente's son-in-law was indicted on narcotics charges. I certainly appreciate your taking the time and effort to advise me of this situation.

I too am very much concerned over an error of this nature and have taken this matter up with the committee staff members who prepared the report. It seems that during the committee's visit to Peru, representatives from the Drug Enforcement Administration, in indicating



the extent of commitment on the part of Peruvian officials, misinformed staff as to the exact identity of the relative of Minister de la Puente who was involved with the trafficking of cocaine.

I realize that errors of this nature can be most damaging and wish to convey my most sincere apologies to both Minister de la Puente and his son-in-law. I am also indicating for the record that the report is in error and that it was the father-in-law of the Minister's son, rather than the Minister's son-in-law who has been arrested on charges of drug trafficking.

Again, thank you for bringing this matter to my attention and be assured that the committee's record will reflect the error in the original report.

Sincerely,

LESTER L. WOLFF,  
*Chairman.*

○

**END**