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VIOLENCE

A STAFF REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

PREPARED BY

Donald J. Mulvihill & Melvin M. Tumin

With Lynn A. Curtis



A STAFF REPORT
NOT A REPORT
OF THE
COMMISSION

The White House

June 10, 1968

EXECUTIVE ORDER #11412

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Establishment of the Commission.* (a) There is hereby established a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission").

(b) The Commission shall be composed of:

Dr. Milton Eisenhower, *Chairman*
Congressman Hale Boggs
Archbishop Terence J. Cooke
Ambassador Patricia Harris
Senator Philip A. Hart
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham
Eric Hoffer
Senator Roman Hruska
Albert E. Jenner, Jr.
Congressman William M. McCulloch
*Dr. W. Walter Menninger
*Judge Ernest William McFarland
*Leon Jaworski

SECTION 2. *Functions of the Commission.* The Commission shall investigate and make recommendations with respect to:

(a) The causes and prevention of lawless acts of violence in our society, including assassination, murder and assault;

(b) The causes and prevention of disrespect for law and order, of disrespect for public officials, and of violent disruptions of public order by individuals and groups; and

(c) Such other matters as the President may place before the Commission.

SECTION 4. *Staff of the Commission.*

SECTION 5. *Cooperation by Executive Departments and Agencies.*

(a) The Commission, acting through its Chairman, is authorized to request from any executive department or agency any information and assistance deemed necessary to carry out its functions under this Order. Each department or agency is directed, to the extent permitted by law and within the limits of available funds, to furnish information and assistance to the Commission.

SECTION 6. *Report and Termination.* The Commission shall present its report and recommendations as soon as practicable, but not later than one year from the date of this Order. The Commission shall terminate thirty days following the submission of its final report or one year from the date of this Order, whichever is earlier.

S/Lyndon B. Johnson

*Added by an Executive Order June 21, 1968

The White House

May 23, 1969

EXECUTIVE ORDER #11469

EXTENDING THE LIFE OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, Executive Order No. 11412 of June 10, 1968, entitled "Establishing a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence," is hereby amended by substituting for the last sentence thereof the following: "The Commission shall terminate thrity days following the submission of its final report or on December 10, 1969, whichever is earlier."

S/Richard Nixon

Cover: *Close fight.* Lithography by Willy Jaecfel. Ferdinand Roten Gallery, Baltimore.

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

Vol. 11

A STAFF REPORT
SUBMITTED TO THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES & PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

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December 1969

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STATEMENT ON THE STAFF STUDIES

The Commission was directed to "go as far as man's knowledge takes" it in searching for the causes of violence and means of prevention. These studies are reports to the Commission by independent scholars and lawyers who have served as directors of our staff task forces and study teams; they are not reports by the Commission itself. Publication of any of the reports should not be taken to imply endorsement of their contents by the Commission, or by any member of the Commission's staff, including the Executive Director and other staff officers, not directly responsible for the preparation of the particular report. Both the credit and the responsibility for the reports lie in each case with the directors of the task forces and study teams. The Commission is making the reports available at this time as works of scholarship to be judged on their merits, so that the Commission as well as the public may have the benefit of both the reports and informed criticism and comment on their contents.

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ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are deeply indebted to many persons. By far the greatest debts are to Dr. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Dr. James J. Short, Jr., upon whom we relied in all phases of our work and from whose previously published works we drew heavily.

William G. McDonald, the Commission's Administrative Officer, has provided assistance far beyond what his title suggests. Without him the report could not have been written and published.

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We also thank Jerome J. Daunt and Robert F. Haynes of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Walter J. Kenney of the Staff of the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Subcommittee; Frederick S. York of the Department of State; George E. Young of the U.S. Military Academy; Peter J. Ognibene and Richard Bucher of the Air Force Academy; Jerome Garvey of Princeton University, and Colonel Robert Saltzman, U.S.A.F. (Ret.).

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Frances Blevins made our work much easier by rendering outstanding assistance on a variety of administrative and technical problems, and Irene R. Kenlan gave freely of her time for valuable secretarial work, as did Judith A. White. In addition, many members of the Commission staff aided the Task Force in connection with administrative and secretarial problems, including Lois Brooks, Mildred F. Dolan, Jean Peterson, Cecelia Roots, R. Christine McKenzie and Margaret S. Enright.

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PREFACE

From the earliest days of organization, the Chairman, Commissioners, and Executive Director of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence recognized the importance of research in accomplishing the task of analyzing the many facets of violence in America. As a result of this recognition, the Commission has enjoyed the receptivity, encouragement, and cooperation of a large part of the scientific community in this country. Because of the assistance given in varying degrees by scores of scholars here and abroad, these Task Force reports represent some of the most elaborate work ever done on the major topics they cover.

The Commission was formed on June 10, 1968. By the end of the month, the Executive Director had gathered together a small cadre of capable young lawyers from various Federal agencies and law firms around the country. That group was later augmented by partners borrowed from some of the Nation's major law firms who served without compensation. Such a professional group can be assembled more quickly than university faculty because the latter are not accustomed to quick institutional shifts after making firm commitments of teaching or research at a particular locus. Moreover, the legal profession has long had a major and traditional role in Federal agencies and commissions.

In early July a group of 50 persons from the academic disciplines of sociology, psychology, psychiatry, political science, history, law, and biology were called together on short notice to discuss for 2 days how best the Commission and its staff might proceed to analyze violence. The enthusiastic response of these scientists came at a moment when our Nation was still suffering from the tragedy of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

It was clear from that meeting that the scholars were prepared to join research analysis and action, interpretation, and policy. They were eager to present to the American people the best available data, to bring reason to bear where myth had prevailed. They cautioned against simplistic solutions, but urged application of what is known in the service of sane policies for the benefit of the entire society.

Shortly thereafter the position of Director of Research was created. We assumed the role as a joint undertaking, with common responsibilities. Our function was to enlist social and other scientists to join the staff, to write papers, act as advisers of consultants, and engage in new research. The

decentralized structure of the staff, which at its peak numbered 100, required research coordination to reduce duplication and to fill in gaps among the original seven separate Task Forces. In general, the plan was for each Task Force to have a pair of directors: one a social scientist, one a lawyer. In a number of instances, this formal structure bent before the necessities of available personnel but in almost every case the Task Force work program relied on both social scientists and lawyers for its successful completion. In addition to our work with the seven original Task Forces, we provided consultation for the work of the eighth "Investigative" Task Force, formed originally to investigate the disorders at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the civil strife in Cleveland during the summer of 1968 and eventually expanded to study campus disorders at several colleges and universities.

Throughout September and October and in December of 1968 the Commission held about 30 days of public hearings related expressly to each of the Task Force areas. About 100 witnesses testified, including many scholars, Government officials, corporate executives as well as militants and activists of various persuasions. In addition to the hearings, the Commission and the staff met privately with scores of persons, including college presidents, religious and youth leaders, and experts in such areas as the media, victim compensation, and firearms. The staff participated actively in structuring and conducting those hearings and conferences and in the questioning of witnesses.

As Research Directors, we participated in structuring the strategy of design for each Task Force, but we listened more than directed. We have known the delicate details of some of the statistical problems and computer runs. We have argued over philosophy and syntax; we have offered bibliographical and other resource materials, we have written portions of reports and copy edited others. In short, we know the enormous energy and devotion, the long hours and accelerated study that members of each Task Force have invested in their labors. In retrospect we are amazed at the high caliber and quantity of the material produced, much of which truly represents, the best in research and scholarship. About 150 separate papers and projects were involved in the work culminating in the Task Force reports. We feel less that we have orchestrated than that we have been members of the orchestra, and that together with the entire staff we have helped compose a repertoire of current knowledge about the enormously complex subject of this Commission.

That scholarly research is predominant in the work here presented is evident in the product. But we should like to emphasize that the roles which we occupied were not limited to scholarly inquiry. The Directors of Research were afforded an opportunity to participate in all Commission meetings. We engaged in discussions at the highest levels of decisionmaking, and had great freedom in the selection of scholars, in the control of research budgets, and in the direction and design of research. If this was not unique, it is at least an uncommon degree of prominence accorded research by a national commission.

There were three major levels to our research pursuit: (1) summarizing the state of our present knowledge and clarifying the lacunae where more or new

research should be encouraged; (2) accelerating known ongoing research so as to make it available to the Task Forces; (3) undertaking new research projects within the limits of time and funds available. Coming from a university setting where the pace of research is more conducive to reflection and quiet hours analyzing data, we at first thought that completing much meaningful new research within a matter of months was most unlikely. But the need was matched by the talent and enthusiasm of the staff, and the Task Forces very early had begun enough new projects to launch a small university with a score of doctoral theses. It is well to remember also that in each volume here presented, the research reported is on full public display and thereby makes the staff more than usually accountable for their products.

One of the very rewarding aspects of these research undertakings has been the experience of minds trained in the law mingling and meshing, sometimes fiercely arguing, with other minds trained in behavioral science. The organizational structure and the substantive issues of each Task Force required members from both groups. Intuitive judgment and the logic of argument and organization blended, not always smoothly, with the methodology of science and statistical reasoning. Critical and analytical faculties were sharpened as theories confronted facts. The arrogance-neither of ignorance nor of certainty could long endure the doubts and questions of interdisciplinary debate. Any sign of approaching the priestly pontification of scientism was quickly dispelled in the matrix of mutual criticism. Years required for the normal accumulation of experience were compressed into months of sharing ideas with others who had equally valid but differing perspectives. Because of this process, these volumes are much richer than they otherwise might have been.

Partly because of the freedom which the Commission gave to the Directors of Research and the Directors of each Task Force, and partly to retain the full integrity of the research work in publication, these reports of the Task Forces are in the posture of being submitted to and received by the Commission. These are volumes published under the authority of the Commission, but they do not necessarily represent the views or the conclusions of the Commission. The Commission is presently at work producing its own report, based in part on the materials presented to it by the Task Forces. Commission members have, of course, commented on earlier drafts of each Task Force, and have caused alterations by reason of the cogency of their remarks and insights. But the final responsibility for what is contained in these volumes rests fully and properly on the research staffs who labored on them.

In this connection, we should like to acknowledge the special leadership of the Chairman, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, in formulating and suppoting the principle of research freedom and autonomy under which this work has been conducted.

We note, finally, that these volumes are in many respects incomplete and tentative. The urgency with which papers were prepared and then integrated into Task Force Reports rendered impossible the successive siftings of data and argument to which the typical academic article or volume is subjected. The reports have benefited greatly from the counsel of our colleagues on the

Advisory Panel, and from much debate and revision from within the staff. It is our hope, that the total work effort of the Commission staff will be the source and subject of continued research by scholars in the several disciplines, as well as a useful resource for policymakers. We feel certain that public policy and the disciplines will benefit greatly from such further work.

* * *

To the Commission, and especially to its Chairman, for the opportunity they provided for complete research freedom, and to the staff for its prodigious and prolific work, we, who were intermediaries and servants to both, are most grateful.

James F. Short, Jr. Marvin E. Wolfgang

Directors of Research

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SUMMARY

To millions of Americans few things are more pervasive, more frightening, more real today than violent crime and the fear of being assaulted, mugged, robbed, or raped. The fear of being victimized by criminal attack has touched us all in some way. People are fleeing their residences in cities to the expected safety of suburban living. Residents of many areas will not go out on the street at night. Others have added bars and extra locks to windows and doors in their homes. Bus drivers in major cities do not carry cash because incidents of robbery have been so frequent. In some areas local citizens patrol the streets at night to attain the safety they feel has not been provided.

The private market is responding to the inadequacies of our public response. Safety has become a commodity that is explicitly sold or rented with real estate. One new high-cost subdivision under construction outside Washington, D. C., will be guarded by electronic alarms. The entire development will be surrounded by two fences, broken for entry at only two points, both with guardhouses. Residents will be telephoned to approve visitors. The two miles of fencing will be surveyed by a closed-circuit television system and fortified by hidden electronic sensors. All residents will carry special credentials for identification.

If present trends are not positively redirected by creative new action, we can expect further social fragmentation of the urban environment, formation of excessively parochial communities, greater segregation of different racial groups and economic classes, imposition of presumptive definitions of criminality on the poor and on racial minorities, a possible resurgence of communal vigilantism and polarization of attitudes on a variety of issues. It is logical to expect the establishment of the "defensive city," the modern counterpart of the fortified medieval city, consisting of an economically declining central business district in the inner city protected by people shopping or working in buildings during daytime hours and "sealed off" by police during nighttime hours. High-rise apartment buildings and residential "compounds" will be fortified "cells" for upper-, middle-, and high-income populations living at prime locations in the inner city. Suburban neighborhoods, geographically removed from the central city, will be "safe areas," protected mainly by racial and economic homogenity and by distance from population groups with the highest propensities to commit crimes. Many parts of central cities will witness frequent and widespread crime, perhaps out of police control.

The fragile sense of community that enables us to live and work peaceably together in common institutions is in danger. Unchecked criminal violence can conceivably lead even to a collapse of the nation and society as we know

them, or to a dictatorship to restore order by repression. Short of this extreme, the legacy of bitterness, distrust, and consequent violence among hostile groups will produce an increasingly weakened society.

We must act now if the trend is to be reversed.

THE DIMENSIONS OF VIOLENT CRIME

How much violent crime exists in the United States? Who commits these acts? Who are the victims? Are we more violent now than we have been historically? Are we more violent than other countries?

Available figures from the FBI *Uniform Crime Reports*, such as those in the table below, indicate that the amount and rate of violent crime over the last 10 years have been substantial.

	Total Number 1968	Rate Per 100,000	Percent Increase 1958–1968
Criminal homicide	13,960	6.8	52
Forcible rape	31,700	15.5	71
Robbery	266,700	131.0	143
Aggravated assault	286,300	141.3	82

But history does not allow simple conclusions to be drawn. National information on crimes of violence has been available in this country only since the 1930's. Scattered accounts prior to then give no unequivocal proof that the rates of criminal violence today are significantly greater than in the more distant past. "Alarming" increases in robbery and other violent crimes are on record before the Revolution, and the first century after independence saw years of considerable violence.

The F.B.I.'s *Uniform Crime Reports* are the only national crime data available and consist of voluntary submissions by most local police jurisdictions in the country on offenses known to the police and arrests made. The FBI states that such data must be read with great caution. Based on voluntary disclosures by local police, these statistics are imperfect measures of the actual levels and trends of violent crimes in the United States.

The greatest problem in counting crime is the considerable gap between the *reported* figures and the *true* figures. It has been estimated by the Crime Commission that the true rate of major violent crime as well as serious property crime may be nearly twice as high as the reported rate. Reasons for the gap include failure of citizens to report because they believe police cannot be effective in solving crime, do not want to take the time to report, do not know how to report, or fear reprisal.

Many other problems exist. For example, arrest data have numerous inherent biases: Compared to whites, Negroes may be disproportionately arrested on suspicion. The resulting arrest statistics, therefore, may indicate a relatively higher Negro involvement in crime than is valid. Of equal concern is the fact that many police departments are upgrading their reporting

procedures, so recent reported crime increases in some cities may well reflect more complete disclosure of the violence that was always present, rather than any real increase in crime.

Balancing the numerous reporting problems against the dramatic reported increases in major violence, we nonetheless conclude that there have been significant increases in the true rates of homicides, assaults, and robberies during the last 10 years. Although there has been a large reported increase in the forcible rape rate, the associated reporting difficulties are too great to allow firm conclusions about a true increase.

From numerous sources, including the *Uniform Crime Reports*, independent studies, and the Task Force seventeen city victim-offender survey, we have sketched a rough profile of violent crime as follows:

Violent crime is primarily a phenomenon of large cities. The 26 cities with populations of 500,000 or more contribute about half of the total reported major violent crimes, but comprise only about one-fifth of the total reporting population. Violent crime in the city is primarily committed by youths between the ages of 18 and 24, followed by youths in the 15-17-year age group. The continued increase of the youthful age groups portends a parallel increase in future violence.

Unsurprisingly, a significant proportion of the recent increase in major violence is attributable to migration of the population from rural to urban areas and to an increase of the proportion of people aged 15 to 24 relative to the rest of the population. Thus, part of the real increase in violent crime is due to basic demographic shifts, rather than to pathogenic forces.

Violent urban crime is overwhelmingly committed by males. The reported male homicide arrest rate in large cities is five times the female rate, and the robbery rate is 20 times higher. Similarly, poor, uneducated persons with little or no employment skills are much more likely to commit a serious act of criminal violence than persons higher on the socioeconomic ladder.

In spite of the numerous deficiencies in arrest data, true rates of violent crime by Negroes appear to be considerably higher than rates for whites. Reported urban arrest rates are much higher for Negroes in all four major violent crime categories, ranging up to 16 times as high for robbery and 17 times as high for homicide. Correlations of data by race do not, of course, reflect differential social, economic, job, educational, and opportunity status between black and white groupings. The urgent need to reduce violent crimes among urban Negro youth is obvious, requiring a total effort toward changing the demoralizing conditions and life patterns of Negroes, the unequal opportunity and discrimination they confront in this country, and the overcrowding and decay of the urban ghettoes in which most of them must live.

Although it is difficult to make comparisons among nations with their different histories, cultures, levels of development, criminal statutes, and statistical reporting procedures, the United States probably has true rates of serious violence noticeably higher than other industrial countries, or among the highest. Our rate for criminal homicide is virtually unsurpassed by rates in other industrialized societies. The prevalence of guns offers a partial explanation—the United States with 200 million people averages 6,500 gun

murders a year, while England, Germany, and Japan with a combined population of 214 million together average only 135 gun murders a year. Rates for robbery and aggravated assault may also be noticeably higher than in other industrialized countries. Our rates for suicide, violent auto fatalities, and burglary, although high, do not stand out as much. We are often not alone in incidents of criminal violence, especially when recent trends are compared to England and Wales, but we are constantly a leader in comparison to other countries.

The statistics indicate a seriously high level of violent crime in America today, but they do not reveal the underlying cultural and historical tattitude toward violence. Exploring this theme, a survey done for the Violence Commission shows that the incidence of "legitimate" violence and "normal" deviance is diffused throughout American habits: most of us have been spanked as children (93 percent); more importantly, the frequency of people being slapped and kicked (55 percent), or beaten (31 percent) is also high. Many more have witnessed acts of violence ranging from schoolyard fights to much more serious incidents.

Our statistics show that a young man is particularly liable to become delinquent if he lives in wretched housing near the center of a large metropolitan area, without a father in the house, with low income, unstable employment, little education, and in a subculture that has a grievance against society and the police. These features describe the conditions and prospects of Negro youth in the urban ghettoes. Many become violent offenders.

Homicide, assault, and rape are predominantly *intra*racial, the majority involving Negroes attacking Negroes. Robbery is the one major violent crime with a high *inter*-racial component: although a large proportion of robberies involve Negro offenders and victims, an ever larger percentage appears to involve Negroes robbing whites.

Contrary to common fears of "violence in the street" committed by strangers, there is a strong likelihood that when homicide and assault occur they will be between relatives, friends, or acquaintances in the home or other indoor locations. Forcible rape is considerably more likely to be perpetrated by a stranger who may pick a woman up on the street but will most probably commit the act indoors. Robbery usually occurs outside among strangers, and so may be the only serious violent crime consistent with many popular conceptions.

Alcohol, narcotics, and dangerous drugs are deeply intertwined with crime in both fact and popular belief. Their actual role in violent incidents is, however, difficult to determine. Sensational press reports of "drug-crazed" criminals create misconceptions about the relationship. Although an addict's need to support his habit often leads him to burglary or robbery, there is little evidence that narcotics and drugs cause violent behavior directly. However, use of both alcohol and drugs can weaken inhibiting controls, thereby making potential violence more possible. In addition, alcohol is involved in more than 25,000 (over one-half) of all auto fatalities and in many lesser accidents.

Marihuana has relatively mild effects on the user, and there is no evidence

that it leads to the use of more dangerous drugs or that it causes aggressive behavior. Quite to the contrary, it makes many users more relaxed. On the other hand, hallucinogens such as LSD have often caused extreme reactions and even psychosis.

In analyzing the interaction between the victim and the offender, we find that the victim, the offender, or both were often drinking prior to homicide, assault, and rape, and there is good reason to believe that the victim sometimes provokes or helps precipitate homicide, assault, and, to a lesser extent, robbery. The ostensible motives in homicide and assault are often relatively trivial, usually involving altercations, family quarrels, jealous rages, and the like. The two crimes are very similar, and there is no reason to believe that the assaulter sets out with any less intention to harm than the killer. Except for the seriousness of their final outcomes, the important distinction is that homicides most often involve handguns while knives are most common in assault.

We have intensively studied the criminal histories of many offenders and conclude that by far the greatest proportion of all serious violence is committed by repeaters, not by one-time offenders. When all offenders are compared, the number of hard-core repeaters is small relative to the number of one-time offenders, yet the former group has a much higher rate of violence and inflicts considerably more serious injury. A violent offender released from an institution, if he recidivates, appears most likely to commit crime roughly 2 to 3 years after release, and the length of sentence seems to bear no regular relationship to the chance of recidivating among violent offenders. If anything, there may be a tendency for violent offenders who have served longer sentences to recidivate more often than those who have served shorter sentences.

Such are the dimensions of violent crime in America. The costs of such violence are enormously high, both in dollars and in psychic and social damage. Millions are spent to maintain the law enforcement and criminal justice system, but the real costs are paid by those whose lives and spirits are crippled by it. We can readily conceive the psychological damage to individuals and their families when victimized by rape, murder, and physcial harm. However, the impact on the community may be less readily grasped. In our society, we hold a delicate balance between values such as individualism and conformity, liberty and security, progress and stability. Pervasive violence creates a climate of fear and mistrust of others, which seriously degrades the normal social and political interaction that holds a society together. Under the fear of violence, the use of public facilities such as parks declines; racial conflict and segregation into subcultures increases; communities and neighborhoods break up as people withdraw inward or flee the area; and civil liberties are threatened with a cry to "do something" to "put a stop" to violence. New undesirable social groups and practices, such as political demagoguery and vigilante action, increase. The possibility of compromise and rational communication among differing groups breaks down, while polarization and conflict are hieghtened by escalating violence. In short, violence weakens the cohesion of a society and the authority of its

government. Instead of calling attention to trouble areas, it may give rise to vicious spiral of new conflict, violence, and social disintegration.

EXPLANATIONS OF VIOLENT CRIME

Is there something in an individual's biological and genetic makeup that can explain his violent behavior? Although we find differences among age, sex, and racial groups in the tendency to violent behavior, there is no evidence to link these variations to genetic or biological difference. Social and cultural experiences appear more important in molding behavior. For example, although data show that women are clearly much less criminal than men, the explanation appears to lie far less in their biological differences than in their social upbringing and differing cultural roles. The female child is usually more supervised than the male; she is taught to be soft, gentle, and compliant, while, especially in the ghetto subculture, the male is encouraged to be tough. The woman's role as wife, mother, and homemaker tends to involve her in far fewer situations that can lead to criminal or violent behavior. Even if a woman is caught up in the meshes of the law, the social attitude toward her tends to be sympathetic and protective, rather than harsh and punitive. Importantly, however, when the cultural roles of women and men come to resemble each other, their rates of crime and violence also become more similar.

Man has the *capacity* for aggression, but evidence that he is *innately* aggressive has not been persuasive. Whatever the capabilities of an individual—whether he is intelligent or feebleminded, suffers brain damage or chromosomal abnormalities—the likelihood that he will turn to either normal or criminal behavior depends not so much on these characteristics, but upon his environment and the kinds of social interaction he has with the people around him.

What of personality factors? Psychologically, potential aggressiveness and violence are lodged in all individuals, but success or failure in controlling them are dependent on the interaction between the individual and his environment. A psychoanalytic understanding of the dynamics of personal behavior is important for the treatment of a violent person but such treatment is usually only successful when violence is a symptom of some mental illness and not a "normal" or functional reaction to outside forces.

In sum, although the biological, psychological, and psychiatric factors underlying violent behavior have a role, we must more carefully consider the external influences that help create personalities with different capacities for violence and different abilities for diverting aggression into socially acceptable channels.

Much can be learned about aggression and violence by examining the dynamics of socialization of the young child. The newborn child is a "natural" deviant so far as he has to be socialized into conformity. Until he learns otherwise, he seizes and takes what he can, screams for his own way, and demands attention. It is through the process of socialization that he learns approved or "normative" behavior and is able to postpone his immediate needs for gratification. If gratifications, material and otherwise,

are perceived as low in quality, quantity, and general attractiveness, the child will be less likely to learn approved behavior and may well learn to lie, cheat, and be dishonorable to gratify his impulses as directly and as immediately as he can.

The learning pattern into deviant behavior contains the following elements: no firm and continuing inducement to conform to the norms of peaceful, legal behavior; an unattractive payoff for conformity in relation to the prospective costs; relatively few models of successful normative behavior; more impressive models of successful deviant behavior; the perception that deviant behavior is easier, less costly, and more rewarding than conforming behavior; and the presence of an established group of individuals who are involved in and may be actively recruiting others into deviant behavior. Under these conditions, there is a high probability that deviant behavior will be engaged in, particularly if it is reinforced by success and gratification, including acceptance by one's already deviant peers. In order to outweigh the attractiveness of deviant behavior and its promises, it is necessary to build a superstructure of restraints and rewards that will have value for the child. Meaningful and rewarding relationships are needed with others—friends and family, peers and community. With these relationships, the child gains feelings of comfort, security, approval, and self-esteem. And it is the normative behavior of these groups that he uses as the model of his own behavior. Gratifying rewards of love and security, power, and prestige must be present if the child is to be persuaded to accept the general normative life. By this means, the individual acquires a "stake" he does not wish to risk, one that he values enough to put aside recurring impulses to deviant behavior. He learns that his stake will be in danger if he either uses violence or encourages it, outside the general normative or legitimate framework.

The concept of "stake" is very important in learning to control one's impulses to criminal and violent activity. It is an investment in society that makes it possible to build habits of deferring gratification, for without something to bargain with, there is no attraction in bargaining. A stake can be a reputation valued; a certain esteem or prestige enjoyed with people about whom one cares; a level of material comfort; a future for oneself or for one's children; acceptance as a member of various groups; community, family, neighborhood, occupation, nationality, whatever. It is obvious that the more stake one has, the more one stands to lose and the more likely he is to exercise restraint in their defense.

That large segments of our population lack a "stake" and have all too numerous models for deviant behavior, can be seen from an understanding of life in the urban ghetto, where the most severe of criminogenic forces are constantly at work.

If the slums in the United States were defined strictly on the basis of dilapidated housing, inadequate sanitary facilities, and overcrowding, more than five million families, or one-sixth of the urban population, could be classified as slum inhabitants. Many of the deteriorated houses in the slums have been the primary targets of clearance and renewal projects, yet only a small percentage of new buildings constructed on the razed sites have been open to former inhabitants. Urban renewal programs, therefore, seem to be

limiting rather than expanding the number of housing units in the sections to which the poor and nonwhite have most access. The result is more intensive overcrowding. Even when new housing becomes available, it is often too expensive.

The ghetto child grows up in these circumstances, on streets littered with trash, discarded liquor bottles, sleeping drunks, narcotic addicts, and prostitutes. Home life is characterized by crowded sleeping arrangements, inadequate plumbing and sanitary facilities, falling plaster, rats, roaches, and a shifting group of relatives housed in incredibly few rooms. Personal possessions are few and minimal respect exists for the property of others. There is little to hold a child close to this kind of home, and his parents often lose control of his activities.

Employment problems, particularly as they affect the young and untrained, add to the negative influences in deteriorating urban areas. Seventy-one percent of all Negro workers are concentrated in the lowest paying and lowest skilled occupations. They are the last to be hired and the first to be laid off. The unemployment rate for nonwhites is twice as high as that for whites, although there has been some improvement in recent years.

The realities of employment are clearly reflected in the figures on income. Although Negro family income in the cities has recently increased to a median of $5,623 at present, this figure represents only 68 percent of the average white family income. While one-third of the Negro families in cities lived on $4,000 a year or less, only 16 percent of the whites did.

The urban school system often fails to counteract those influences that draw individuals toward crime and violence. The link between school failure and delinquency is not completely known, but there is evidence that youths who fail within the school system contribute disproportionately to delinquency. One estimate is that the incidence of delinquency among dropouts is 10 times higher than among youths who stay in school.

The public school should be a major institution for the transmission of legitimate values and goals of society. Recent commissions and studies, however, have pointed out that the school system is failing to reach all youth equally and is thus contributing to low achievement and school dropouts. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted from its survey of 75 major central cities that 75 percent of all Negro elementary school students were attending institutions that were 90 percent or more Negro, while 83 percent of the white elementary school students in those same cities were attending schools that were 90 percent to entirely white. It has been estimated that by 1975, 80 percent of all Negro pupils in the 20 largest cities, or half the nation's Negro population, will be attending schools that are 90 to 100 percent Negro.

School segregation is particularly unfortunate in light of the finding of the Coleman Report that minority group pupil achievement appears more affected by the school environment than is the case for majority groups. When a white pupil from a home strongly supportive of education was placed in a school were most pupils did not come from such homes, his achievement was little different than if he were in a school with students of similar home backgrounds. Yet when a minority pupil from a home with little stress on education was put in with students from backgrounds strongly encouraging education, his achievement was likely to increase.

The environment in which these basic institutions fail is also highly anonymous, releasing the individual from community restraints more easily than in less urban environments and providing greater opportunity for deviance. The police are often strangers carrying out their duties in, at worst, an alien subcommunity and, at best, among an anonymous set of subjects. Metropolitan areas with mass population, many commercial establishments, and highly visible wealth provide more frequent opportunities for theft than other places. Property is insured, and consumer goods in more abundance are vividly displayed and more portable.

Combine poverty, deteriorated and inadequate housing, lack of good employment opportunities, economic dependency, poor education, and anonymous living with population density, social and spatial mobility, ethnic and class heterogeneity, reduced family functions, and broken homes—and an interrelated complex of powerful criminogenic forces is produced by the ghetto environment.

The impact of these forces is more clear when they are set against the normative behavior American society encourages, the pervasive beliefs that help us determine who is good and who is bad, who is successful and who is a failure, who is worthy and who is not.

In American culture, the belief that the well-being of others should be safeguarded is balanced against belief in the individualistic pursuit of success. The competitive road to success is accorded great emphasis in American life, and achievement is often measured in material terms. Failure to achieve, especially when aspirations are increased, can cause deep frustration.

There are different ways to cope with this frustration. One can conform to the system, take solace in the fact that others are even further behind, and perhaps make false claims of success and associate with those of higher status. Or one may withdraw: alcohol, drugs, mental illness, and suicide are possible avenues of escape. One can reject the dominant values of the system, or accept them ritualistically without conviction, often living a life of quiet desperation. One can reject the values and substitute others. Hippies and many students are but contemporary examples of alternative value sources that in the past have ranged from church congregations to artist colonies and revolutionary movements.

Finally, one can accept the competitive system but not the socially approved rules for running it, choosing instead illegitimate means for enhancing one's position. Having little stake in the system, those in this last category see little to gain by playing according to the rules and little to lose by not. The leap to violence is not far, for in an effort to secure material goods and services beyond those available from legitimate sources, lower class members without work skills and education are pulled into crimes for which force or threat of force has a functional utility. Being the less skilled and educated members of a professed open society, these people are more responsive to opportunities for illegal gain and less constrained to seek that gain by violent methods.

The role of frustration suggests that violent aggressive crimes, such as homicide, assault and rape, might partially be viewed as expressive of pent-up rage over not having sufficient opportunities to gain. Yet this perspective

seems more satisfactory in explaining acquisitive crimes, such as robbery or burglary, whether or not they are violent.

More useful in explaining aggressive violence is the notion that the urban ghetto produces a subculture within the dominant American middle class culture in which aggressive violence is accepted as normative and natural in everyday life, not necessarily illicit. A subculture of violence is not the product of cities alone. The thugs of India, the *vedetta barbaricina* in Sardina, and the *mafioso* in Sicily have existed for many years. But the contemporary American city has the accouterments not only for the birth but also for the highly accelerated development of violent subcultures, and it is in these cultural settings that most violent aggressive crimes in fact occur.

Violence, of course, is not absent from the established middle class culture of the majority in our society. It is simply the greater frequency and approval of illegitimate violence that distinguishes the subculture of violence from the dominant culture pattern.

Not everyone in the ghetto accepts an ethos of violence. Even among those who do, primarily young males, violence is not the only or predominant mode of expression. When it is used, the context often involves the desire to prove one's masculinity and to become a successful member of ghetto society. Male adolescence requires rehearsal of the toughness, heavy drinking, and quick aggressive responses that are characteristic of the lower class adult male.

From the perspective of dominant middle class standards, the motives in criminal homicide and aggravated assault—mainly altercations, family quarrels, and jealousy—are cheap issues for which people trade their lives or become seriously injured. Yet they are much more reasonable if we accept the existence of a ghetto subculture of violence in which a much wider range of situations are perceived by many as justifying an aggressive response. An altercation with overtones threatening a young man's masculinity, a drunken misunderstanding between husband and wife on Saturday night, a competition for the same woman—these can be more than trivial events in an environment that accepts violence as a norm, allows easy access to weapons, is physically deteriorated and segregated from the rest of the community, and has reduced social controls.

The suggestion that the conflict situations in which aggressive crimes are generated occur within the ghetto slum is consistent with the facts that homicide, assault, and rape are predominantly intraracial, involving Negro offenders victimizing other Negroes in a majority of cases. Those who subscribe to subcultural violence, therefore, are often not burdened by conscious guilt, because their victims are likely to belong to the same subculture. Even law-abiding members of the neighborhood may not view various illegal expressions of violence as menacing or immoral. Thus, when the victims see their assaulters as agents of the same kind of aggression that they themselves represent, violent retaliation is readily legitimized.

To be young, poor, male, and Negro; to want what the open society claims is available, but mostly to others; to see illegitimate and often violent methods of obtaining material success; and to observe others using these means successfully and with impunity—is to be burdened with an enormous

set of influences that pull many toward crime and delinquency. The current political and social posture of minority groups reinforces the pressure, creating an awareness and expectation that unfortunately far outdistance any real progress toward equality that has been made.

If the poor, young, black male with little stake in society is socialized into the ways of violence by his immediate subculture, he is also under the influence of many forces from the general, dominant culture. Violence is a pervasive theme today in the mass media. The sheer frequency of screened violence, its intensity as well as its context, and the myriad forms it takes, cannot claim to instill firm notions of nonviolence in the viewers. Unless the assertion that such violence encourages violent behavior (or strips us of our sensitivity to it) is countered by scientifically acceptable evidence, we are playing a dangerous game with the influence it may have on the young of today and adults of tommorrow.

Much of the same can be said about guns in American society. The ease with which anyone over 18 can obtain firearms is well documented. During the past decade, about 29 million new guns have been added by domestic production and importion. Weak or unenforced statutes on possession or use of firearms and the stimulus of advertising increase the availability. Today, half of our population could be armed if guns in this country were evenly distributed.

Mail-order and other firearm advertisements, the highest gun-to-population ratio in the world, the glorification of guns in our history, and the daily television displays of guns in the hands of heroes surely play no positive role in minimizing violence. These and many other socializing forces colored with violence further shape the values and form the mentality of many American youth.

THE RISE IN VIOLENT CRIME

If, as we believe, the conditions of life for inner-city populations are largely responsible for the sharp difference in violent crime rates between these populations and other groups in our society, there remains a puzzling paradox to be considered: Why, we must ask, have urban violent crime rates increased substantially during the past decade when the conditions that are supposed to cause violent crime have not worsened—have, indeed, generally improved?

The Bureau of the Census, in its latest report on trends in social and economic conditions in metropolitan areas, states that most "indicators of well-being point toward progress in the cities since 1960." Thus, for example, the proportion of blacks in cities who completed high school rose from 43 percent in 1960 to 61 percent in 1968; unemployment rates dropped significantly between 1959 and 1967 (from $6,720 to $7,813), and the median family income of blacks in cities increased from 61 percent to 68 percent of the median white family income during the same period. Also during the same period the number of persons living below the legally-defined poverty level in cities declined from 11.3 million to 8.3 million.

There are some important counter-trends. The unemployment rate for blacks, though lower, continued to be about twice that for whites. Unemployment among black teenagers in cities increased by a third between 1960 and 1968 (to 30 percent, two and one-half times the urban white teenager rate). Moreover, figures indicating a closing of the family income gap between blacks and whites in the 1960's do not reflect a number of critical details, such as the fact that in cities black men who worked the year round in 1967 earned about seven-tenths as much as white workers and that this fraction was unchanged since 1959, or the fact that the "dependency ratio"—the number of children per thousand adult males—for blacks is nearly twice that for whites, and the gap widened sharply in the 1960's. The degree of poverty among the Negro poor in metropolitan areas remained severe, half the families reporting incomes $1,000 or more below the Social Security Administration's poverty budget of $3,335 for a family of four. We also find a significant increase in the number of children growing up in broken homes, especially among Negroes and lower income families in the cities. Among Negroes in the cities in 1968 with incomes below $4,000, only one-fourth of all children were living with both parents, as compared to one-half for white families of the same income level. Significantly, for families with incomes of $10,000 per year, this difference between white and black families disappears.

Whatever may be the correct over-all judgment on the change in inner-city living conditions over the past ten years, it is clear, however, that the change has been less dramatic than the change in violent crime rates during this period. How is this discrepancy to be explained? Why, if a high percentage of the crime in our cities is caused by factors such as poverty and racial discrimination, has it increased in a period of unprecedented prosperity for most Americans and in a time of painfully slow and uneven but genuine progress toward racial equality? These questions are not susceptible to precise scientific answers, but it is possible to offer informed judgments about them. In our considered opinion, the following factors have been significantly operative in the increasing levels of violent crime in the inner cities:

• The United States has been changing with bewildering rapidity—scientifically, technologically, socially, and politically. Americans literally are changing how we work, how we live, how we think, how we manage our vast enterprise. Sociologists and anthropologists have long observed that rapid social change leads to a breakdown of traditional social roles and institutional controls over the behavior of young and old alike—but particularly the young, who, because of the social change, are less likely to be socialized into traditional ways of doing things (and not doing them) and, hence, ineffectively constrained by these traditional ways. This process includes the breakdown in traditional notions of civility, respect for elders and the institutions and patterns of conduct they represent, property rights, ways of settling disputes, relations between the sexes and many other matters.

With economic and technical progress in the United States has come increased affluence for most—but not all—of the members of our society. This combination of rapid social change and unevenly distributed affluence is devastating. At a time when established ways of doing things, traditions of

morality, and attitudes about personal and property rights are changing, rising levels of affluence, interacting with public promises of a better life and television displays of still more affluence, have created expectations that have outstripped reality, particularly among the poor and especially the poor black. Rising income statistics look reassuring until one focuses on the continuing gap between black and white incomes.

We have in this country what has been referred to as a "revolution of rising expectations" born of unprecedented prosperity, changes in the law, wars on poverty, space spectaculars, and a host of other features of contemporary life. But a rapid increase in human expectations followed by obvious failure to meet those expectations has been and continues to be a prescription for violence. Disappointed has manifested itself not only in riots and violent demonstrations—but may also be reflected in the increasing levels of violent crime.

• Our agencies of law enforcement have not been strengthened sufficiently to contain the violence that normally accompanies rapid social change and the failure to fulfill human expectations. The criminal justice process, suffering from an insufficiency of resources and a lack of management, has become less effective as a deterrent to crime and as an instrument for rehabilitating those who are apprehended and convicted.

• Public order in a free society does not and cannot rest solely on applications or threats of force by the authorities: It must also rest on the people's acceptance of the legitimacy of the rule-making institutions of the political and social order and of the rules these institutions make. Persons obey the rules of society when the groups with which they identify approve those who abide by the rules and disapprove those who violate them. Such expressions of approval and disapproval are forthcoming only if the group believes that the rule-making institutions are in fact entitled to rule—that is, are "legitimate." What weakens the legitimacy of social and political institutions contributes to law-breaking, including violent crime.

In recent years a number of forces have converged to weaken the legitimacy of our institutions. The spectacle of governors defying court orders, police unlawfully beating demonstrators, looters and rioters going unapprehended and unpunished, and college youth attacking society's rules and values, makes it easier, even more "logical," for disadvantaged young people, whose attachment to law-abiding behavior already is tenuous, to slip into law-breaking behavior when the opportunity presents itself. In addition, pervasive suspicion that personal greed and corruption are prevalent among even the highest public officials has fed the idea among the poor that nearly everyone is "on the take," and that the real crime is in getting caught.

The beliefs that some claim to be widely held among poor young ghetto males—that the "system" in the United States is collectively guilty of "white racism" and of prosecuting an "immoral" war in Vietnam—have also tended to impair the moral impact upon them of our restrained the commission of violent crimes against society.

These three factors—disappointments of minorities in the revolution of rising expectations, the weakening of law enforcement, and the loss of institutional legitimacy in the view of many—have had their effects on crime

rates throughout our society. It is not surprising, however, that their greatest impact has been in the inner-cities, among the young, the poor, the male, the black. It is there that reality most frustrates expectations, that law enforcement provides the least protection, and that the social and political institutions of society serve the needs of the individual least effectively. It is in the inner-city that a subculture of violence, already flourishing, is further strengthened by the blockage of aspirations whose fulfillment would lead out of the subculture, by the failure of criminal justice system that would deter adherence to undesirable subcultural values, and by the weakness of institutions which would inculcate a competing set of values and attitudes.

GUIDELINES FOR ACTION AND RESEARCH

Social Reconstruction

If we are to alleviate the root causes of violence, as well as other mounting problems in a complex, changing, interdependent society, the problems that change brings to the society must be anticipated. Our institutions of government can no longer wait for crises to become obvious before examining them and implementing a response. Piecemeal reactions to inequalities and problems after they have reached crisis proportions are inadequate, wasteful, and ineffective. The United States can continue to flourish only if political leaders and government officials, businessmen, university scholars, church leaders, opinion molders of media, and the general public, all anticipate developing problems and together solve them with sufficient speed, resources, and will.

Changing job technologies, agricultural overproduction, vast migrations of rural blacks and whites to cities, urban sprawl, and decay of central cities with festering ghettos are not individual problems with separate solutions. They are one problem. To a large extent, our current high levels of crime and violence are symptoms and a part of a single American social problem. We therefore call for deliberate social reconstruction to solve our problems of race and poverty, of inequality and violence.

A comprehensive range of policies are necessary that in the short run will help contain and control violence and in the longer run will resolve the underlying inequalities and attitudes that are its root causes.

Our philosophy is that safety and justice are intertwined. Those changes in the lives of the deprived population that will involve more justice for them, we believe, will provide more safety for the rest of the population.

The first essential in a program to lessen violence in America is continued national economic progress and prosperity. This requires government policies to maintain a high general level of income and employment as the best overall means for ending poverty and deprivation. But general macroeconomic policies will not alone suffice to insure that all deprived individuals and groups are brought into our growing population, especially for young jobseekers. To end unemployment, we must assist the black, the young, and

the hard-core unemployed through private and public job-training programs, through vigorous government and private action to end job discrimination, and through programs to develop more business activity in the ghettoes with increased minority participation in management and ownership.

Those who cannot work—the old, the disabled, the family without a wage earner—still have a right to decent living without fear and degradation. But their burden is too great for state and local governments, whose welfare programs vary widely and inconsistently in their adequacy. Thus, a national minimum welfare policy is needed—perhaps along the lines of the negative income tax—that will insure the right of all citizens, especially children and the elderly, to a decent standard of living.

More than a minimum income level is required to end the culture of poverty and deprivation that traps many Americans. The decaying slums in the center of our major cities remain the setting and breeding ground for much of the nation's poverty and violence. Extensive reconstruction of our urban environment in all its facets will be required. The Model Cities program offers considerable promise in its concepts of experimentation and demonstration of what concentrated efforts by all levels of government working with local citizens can do to rebuild their urban environment. In the mass society of our growing urban areas, the individual's sense of alienation and lack of responsibility for his environment are partly a product of feeling powerless and dependent on anonymous forces of government that he cannot control or influence. Measures are needed to organize community involvement and participation, not only by the ghetto dweller, but by all urban groups, in the public decisions which affect their lives, thereby building community pride, cohesion, and responsibility. Gaining services and influencing government through the normal political process will give the urban resident a "stake" in his community, while reducing the alienation and frustration that breed violence.

Improvement of citizen access to the diverse government service agencies is badly needed. Community Service Centers are one answer. They would coordinate and dispense services rendered by traditional city, state and federal agencies, including such functions are job counseling and training, family counseling, adult education, and the like. Centers should be scattered close to the population in various sections of the city and should make maximum use of local people as workers. Other means for citizens to overcome government red tape include local offices to handle grievances against public officials and private business. We urge that the federal government fund experimental projects designed to serve these purposes.

The most serious general problem is the concentration in urban ghettoes of Negroes and other minorities caught in a vicious subculture of poverty and violence. Their chances for full integration into the larger American culture mostly depend on breaking through the walls of discriminatory housing practices. Direct federal housing programs and those that seek to aid private construction of dwellings should be closely controlled to insure that minorities have full access to housing throughout our cities and suburbs. Evidence indicates that Negro families in integrated communities readily adopt middle class behavior and norms. We recommend experiments in

subsidized scattered relocation and redistribution of poor ghetto families into middle class white communities where integration with its accompanying opportunities would break those cultural patterns that sustain poverty and violence.

For the barriers of housing discrimination to fall as well as for the urban environment to be rebuilt, a new level of housing programs must be developed. We must have programs to build adequate, inexpensive homes for urban dwellers, while maintaining and rehabilitating old units. There will be 100 million more Americans to house by the turn of the century. The task of housing them offers an opportunity to build new urban centers ("New Towns"), fully integrated in race and class, yet planned and governed to furnish the best in environment, education, and community involvement and participation.

Hope for significant social reconstruction with diminished violence lies in the future generations, the cohorts of children and youth growing up each year. The solutions that will break the cycle of violence lie in their upbringing and socialization into the society—from preschool days through formal education to adult jobs and marriage. From the earliest preschool age, children must learn the costs and dangers of violent behavior, and how to work and play cooperatively without violence. We recommend that the President convene a White House Conference on Family Life and Child Development to discover problem areas in American child rearing and youth and to discuss needed changes and the governmental action necessary to support them.

Although further research is required to understand the psychological and social contributions of early childhood to later violent behavior, we do know that many children in our society are deprived of adequate affection, attention, and stimulation in the curcial preschool years. As a result, they are handicapped, both socially and educationally. The Head Start experience offers much useful information and advice for developing preschool programs, both formally and informally in the home, that would stimulate the young child's mind and teach him to develop normal relationships with adults and other children in which violent habits would be minimized. A program of preschool training, accompanied by considerable parent participation and indoctrination into easily practicable methods of stimulating, disciplining, and otherwise rearing children, could go far to minimize frustration and violence in poor children, while at the same time helping to equalize their future opportunities in life. Because the attitudes and practices of parents and community are vital to the efficiency and long-term success of such a program, a strategy for preschool training should be designed to popularize it and meet obvious needs of the community.

Wrapped up with preschool training and the child's early learning of behavior is the problem of child abuse. Those who abuse their children tend to feel inadequate and overwhelmed by the problems and stresses of family life and child care. Child abuse might be minimized by expanding day-care centers for children of working mothers, Head Start programs and parental education in child rearing. Community Service Centers or other local facilities should provide needed family services such as counseling and health services.

More study is also needed on the role of primary and secondary schools and their capabilities in integrating children, especially those from deprived subcultures, into the norms and values of the larger society, thereby decreasing tendencies toward violent behavior. We do know that our public educational system, overburdened and inadequate as it may be for the tasks, remains the major single instrument for opening opportunities for success, influencing patterns of future behavior, and recognizing and answering specific individual problems and needs before they become dangerous. Teacher training, school-community relations, programs for dropouts and educationally handicapped adults, and many other areas of education deserve more research and national support for the roles they can play in diminishing violence in America.

Criminal violence is only one aspect of the protest of youth, but it is a significant one: in 1966, men under the age of 25 accounted for over 70 percent of arrests for robberies, burglaries, and rapes. Policy responses based on the broadest possible perspectives are required. We recommend the creation of new roles for youth, so that young people can lend their energies, visions, and skills to the decision making processes of this country and learn through their participation that peaceful change can be affected within the framework of democratic institutions. Innovations in youth self-help programs are needed with particular emphasis on the involvement of indigeneous youth in planning and operation.

In an effort to restore the respect of youth for our laws, we should legalize marihuana use, or possession for use by persons over 18 years of age. There is no reliable scientific evidence of harmful effects, nor is there evidence of marihuana's being a steppingstone to hard narcotics. Through our harsh criminal statutes on marihuana use and in light of evidence that alcohol abuse accounts for far more destruction than any known psychoactive substance today, we have caused large numbers of our youth to lose respect for our laws generally. We have also criminalized untold numbers of young people. The scientific data do not support harsh treatment. Although we do not intend to encourage use, because as with any psychoactive substance, abuse can be harmful, we leave the restraining effort to educational campaigns, family influences, and the like.

SAFETY FOR THE NON-CRIMINAL POPULATION

We do not suggest that broad social reconstruction will eliminate all criminal violence and recognize tha the short run the risk and difficulty of committing crime and violence mus[illegible] increased.

The key to safety lies in the criminal justice system—police, courts, and corrections. Yet the system has been shockingly ineffective. Personnel at all levels are severely understaffed, training is inadequate, equipment and facilities are archaic, and funding is minimal. In spite of efforts at prevention, the largest percentage of all crimes known to the police do not result in imprisonment or probation. In 1968, only 86 percent of homicides, 55 percent of forcible rapes, 27 percent of robberies and 66 percent of

aggravated assaults resulted in arrest. Of all arrests, only some result in prosecution; of all prosecutions, only some result in determination of guilt; of all those found guilty, only some end up incarcerated. The attrition between commission and institutionalization varies by crime—in some categories more than 90 percent of all crimes known to police do not result in institutionalization or probationary treatment outside the walls. And the crimes known to police are only a fraction of all crimes committed, so it is quite clear that the "preventive" aspect of the system of criminal justice is far form effective.

One response is expanded use of new police techniques, equipment, and strategies for deterring crime. Control by deterrence is primarily effective against rational and impersonal crime, such as burglaries, street robberies, and some assaults. It is here that experiments will intense police patrolling, street lighting, surveillance, and alarm systems should be encouraged. Ways of "target hardening"—making victims and property less susceptible to attack—need to be imaginatively explored by all levels of police and government, as well as by urban designers and private manufacturers. Residential buildings, including parking and routes of access, should be designed for maximum feasible security and deterrence of crime. Perhaps teams with expertise in both security and design could evaluate residential areas, schools, parks, and other facilities in order to develop more secure patterns of use. The areas of police equipment and organization—communications, police car, nonlethal weapons, command centers—offer considerable prospect of improvement. Computers and statistical methods have already proved their immense value in understanding and predicting criminal patterns.

The ready availability of firearms to almost anyone increases the problems of control and the likelihood of violence. Tighter federal and local laws regulating the sale, licensing, and ownership of deadly firearms are therefore necessary throughout the nation. The passage and diligent enforcement of effective laws for licensing and control of sales of firearms could materially lower the level of and damage from violence in America.

Because of organized crime's impact in weakening local government and law enforcement as well as public respect for law, we recommend a more vigorous and aggressive attack on organized crime and its activities by all agencies and levels of government. The dimensions of the problem demand that national leadership and law enforcement agencies play the major role in an all-out coordinated campaign against organized crime. We recommend the continuation of the strategies and recommendations proposed by the President's Crime Commission, with the further investment of national attention, will and resources necessary for success. The task will require use of all available tools and techniques to obtain proof of criminal violation, greater punishment for acts that constitute part of organized criminal enterprise, suppression of illegal organized gambling, and reduction in the movement of illegally acquired funds into legitimate commercial activities.

A strategy to reduce and control crime and violence can only be as effective as the personnel and organization implementing it and the citizens supporting it. Planning and resources must be directed at upgrading

professional personnel and developing the appropriate understanding and mutual support in the common problem among the diverse public officials and the general public. Improved training, professional standards, and career opportunities for police are needed, but equally important are broader recruitment and careful screening of police, as well as better community relations, especially with deprived minorities. Perhaps more than any other representative, the policeman directly demonstrates the attitudes and interest of the larger society to the poor and deprived communities of our cities.

About half the calls to which policemen respond are incidents growing out of quarrels among intimates, and certainly a great amount of criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and forcible rape involve families and acquaintances. Because both the outcome of these incidents and the general state of police-community relations depend on the policeman's attitudes and skills as a conflict resolver, we recommend that all police be specially prepared and sensitized for these functions in their training and operations. Imaginative innovations such as "domestic quarrel teams" are needed, as well as closer police cooperation with such purely social agencies as suicide prevention and mental health services.

Courts and correctional institutions have the difficult task of controlling criminal offenders after arrest while attempting to alter their inclinations toward violent and illicit behavior into habits more acceptable and legitimate in our society. Both systems are woefully overburdened and inadequate in relation to their swelling caseload of offenders.

A 1964 study estimated that 1 in every 9 youths (1 in 6 for boys only) would be referred to a juvenile court before his 18th birthday. The juvenile justice system is therefore especially critical in diminishing recidivism, yet it has generally operated with low prestige and inadequate resources in the overall justice system. The Supreme Court's *Gault* decision has imposed stricter procedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, for young offenders in juvenile courts. In light of *Gault* and of the Crime Commission's findings, we reiterate their recommendations for increased pre-judicial disposition of all juvenile cases not requiring adjudication. State legal codes covering juvenile offenses should be narrowed to encompass only those offenses considered crimes when committed by an adult. At the same time, more non-judicial supervision and assistance should be furnished young offenders, in contrast to currently inadequate probation practices that frequently stigmatize a youth without constructively influencing his behavior.

There are many, often conflicting, correctional goals, including punishing the offender and restraining him from doing more harm to the community; deterring him and other potential offenders from future offenses; rehabilitating him into accepted patterns of behavior; and reintegrating him into full citizenship in the community. Unfortunately, public opinion and resulting institutional actions usually emphasize immediate restraint, punishment and deterrence over the more long-run goals of rehabilitation and reintegration. The former approach has failed. No satisfactory data exist to show that length of sentence bears any real relationship to recidivism among violent offenders. In fact, there may be a higher recidivism rate for violent offenders who have served longer sentences.

Most major violence as well as the most serious injury is committed by a relatively small core of recidivists. It would therefore appear that the corrections system has done little for the offenders with whom we are most concerned. Yet high recidivism rates come as no surprise to persons experienced in the facts of prison life. Most prisons are schools for crime. Prison experience normally degrades and demoralizes men detaching them even further from any integrative ties with the normal and legitimate community, As a result, an average term in prison today probably does as much to create crime as it does to deter or prevent it. We can expect little else from an environment that is perhaps more criminogenic than even the urban ghetto environment from which most prisoners originally come.

The entire correctional system must be reconstructed in light of this evidence. The goal of rehabilitation must be given first priority. The offender must acquire the attitudes, habits, and work skills necessary to play a respectable, satisfying role in society. Programs such as pretrial releases without bail, supervised rehabilitation of offenders in their community with minimal or no confinement, smaller specialized institutions with more educational, job-training, counseling, and therapy services are needed.

Each offender has a particular background and personality, and so the correctional treatment of court and correctional institutions should involve to mix of strategies best tailored to turning the individual offender toward a more normal law-biding way of life. This requirement is especially important for juveniles and first offenders. Very few first offenders are hardened into patterns of violent, criminal behavior and can be readily returned to legitimate patterns. But all too often they imprisoned in local jails or large "total institutions" of correction and restraint.

As the offender is reintegrated into society, he must find a decent job and accepted position in the community. He requires not only the supervision of parole but continued assistance and access to financial and other services to help give him a "stake" in his community. The priority of effort should again be on youth and new offenders, especially during the 2 or 3 years after release, before they become habituated chronic offenders.

These recommendations for improving the adult and juvenile corrections systems will require not only increased funds but also much more professional talent and effort. Upgraded and expanded correctional staffs could be supplemented by recruiting part-time assistance from the professions of the community. Young lawyers or law students employed in programs such as a Youth Justice Corps could ensure that young offenders receive the legal and counseling services they need. Local Youth Service Centers and even existing private organizations could serve to make professional help more readily available to juvenile offenders.

In considering society's response to violence, we do not limit ourselves to the perpetrators of violence. We also have a responsibility to the innocent victims of violence, who often are left impoverished during long expensive recoveries. Because it is impractical for victims to obtain compensation from their attackers, we strongly endorse victim compensation by the government

to victims of major violent crimes and call on federal and state legislatures to adopt such plans.

The policies and programs needed to alleviate and control the problem of crime and violence will require coordinated support and numerous specialized services from all levels of government. Most urgently needed is better information on crime, criminals, and our criminal justice system as it actually operates. The Crime Commission report and the recent report on National Needs for Criminal Justice Statistics by the Bureau of the Census both offered recommendations for a better system of crime statistics, by improving coordination and integration of numerous federal, state, and local agencies now collecting data on crime and violence. The Statistics Center, authorized as an arm of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, together with the FBI's National Crime Information Center, the National Center for Health Statistics of the National Institute of Mental Health, the Children's Bureau, and the National Safety Council, all have roles to play in collecting and evaluating statistical data on individual violence.

CONCLUSION

We emphasize that there can be no genuine safety without real justice. Stability and security come only when the citizens of a society accept its rules of conduct as legitimate and reasonable; this acceptance can be expected to prevail generally only among those who find they can enjoy the normal benefits and pleasures of life in law-abiding ways. It is those groups most deprived of respect, opportunity, and the sense of responsible participation in our society who contribute most to its violence. And it is those programs leading to social justice for all our citizens that in the long run will reduce the causes of violence in America.

The various rising trends of violence in America today constitute a national problem requiring a national response. Our public officials, the leaders of governments and our people, must press that public response with the necessary programs, resources, energy, and persuasive leadership. Perhaps even more critical than the governmental response is the collective response of the American people. Only a fuller commitment to the task can insure justice and safety for all.

TABLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I

FACTUAL PERSPECTIVES

Part I of this report is a profile of the facts presently known about individual or criminal violence. After defining in Chapter 1 those actions considered as criminal violence, we will examine and appraise in Chapter 2 the statistical systems that report on their incidence. With these reporting systems in mind, we present in Chapter 3 the levels and trends of criminal violence. Chapter 4 has a more specific inquiry: how much of reported individual violence is explicable as the result of organized crime activities? The characteristics of victims and offenders and the relationships between them in the most serious kinds of violent crimes are examined in Chapter 5 from the results of our 17 city survey. Chapter 6 provides an outline of the social and economic costs resulting from criminal violence—costs that can only be minimized through success in the social research and action policies that will be presented later in the report.

Cain and Abel. Lithograph by Marc Chagall. Ferdinand Roten Gallery, Baltimore.

CHAPTER 1

THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE: WHAT ARE CRIMINAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE?

At 3:15 p.m., the reporting officer arrived on the scene and found a circular 5-inch hole in the screen made by a shot gun blast. The victim was found lying on his back on the bedroom floor. The pattern made by the shot on the living-room wall indicated that the subject was hit in the hallway approximately 12-1/2 feet from the screen. A witness said the victim had complained to the suspect about talking too loud in front of his apartment. The victim then drew a gun, pointed it at the suspect's head and pulled the trigger three times, without the gun going off. The suspect ran toward the project across the street, and the victim fired one shot at him. The suspect then came back with a shot gun, fired through the victim's door, and fled the scene.

* * * * *

The victim left her apartment at approximately 7 p.m. She arrived at the cafe between 8:30 and 9, decided that she was not hungry, and left without ordering anything. She had started walking westbound on Third Street when the suspects came by in a car. Suspect 1 got out of the car and took her by the arm, asked her where she was going, and then told her that she was to accompany them. At this time, suspect 2 also got out and both suspects walked the victim to the car. The victim made no outcry and did not resist their efforts to force her into the vehicle. They drove up and down side streets and at an unknown location, stopped and picked up suspects 3 and 4. The driver then proceeded to an apartment. The victim recalled that there was a front room, a bedroom, and a small room like a den that had no furniture in it. It was in this small room that suspect 1 took her, forced her to the floor and removed her panties. Suspect 1 then had an act of intercourse with the victim. As each suspect completed an act of intercourse, the next suspect in turn entered the room and sexually assaulted the victim. Each suspect had intercourse with the victim twice. The suspects then left the apartment with the victim, drove her to the corner of Eighth and Main, and told her to get out.

* * * * *

Upon arrival the officers were informed by the victim that he had been on the street corner waiting for a public service bus. He was approached by six Negro males who were walking north on Center Street. The youths surrounded him—four of the boys stood behind him, one to his right and one directly in front of him. The youth directly in front ordered him to remove his black leather coat. Prior to this action, the boy standing in front asked one of the boys standing behind, "Is that him?" Someone behind said "Yes." The boy in front then pretended that the coat rightfully was his property. The boy on his right took a pocket knife from his clothing and pointed it at the victim's stomach. The victim's coat and wrist watch were removed, with the knife still pointed at his stomach. As the boys started to walk south on Center Street, one of them asked, "Do you have any money?" The victim answered in the negative and the youths continued walking south.

* * * * *

The victim was interviewed at the hospital. She related that she had been cut by her husband, who had picked a fight with her and then slashed her on the left side of the stomach without reason or provocation. She had just come home from work and found her husband in an intoxicated condition. Following the quarrel, the husband allegedly picked up a kitchen butcher-type knife and slashed her. The offender was also interviewed. After advising him of his constitutional rights, the reporting officer decided that the offender was under the influence of alcohol to the point where interviewing him would be useless. The offender did admit cutting his wife, however. His version was that both he and his wife had been drinking and that he had cut his wife with the aforementioned pocketknife, following the argument that she had instigated.

* * * * *

These are not excerpts from paperback novels. They are not notes from film or television scripts. They are descriptions of crimes recently committed in four major American cities, as reported by the investigating police officers.[1] Such accounts are not unique—hundreds of thousands are made out each year—and anyone who reads them has more than an intuitive idea of what is meant by criminal or individual acts of violence.

There are numerous conflicting definitions of criminal violence as a class of behavior. Police, prosecutors, jurists, federal agents, local detention officials, and behavioral scientists all hold somewhat different viewpoints as to what constitute acts of violence. All would probably agree, however, as the police reports make abundantly clear, that criminal violence involves the use of or the threat of force on a victim by an offender.

We have defined criminal violence for purposes of this report as "the use or threatened use of force to secure one's own end against the will of another that results or can result in the destruction or harm of person or property or in the deprivation of individual freedom."

This general definition is purposely broad enough to encompass conflicting descriptions of violence so that space need not be wasted on justifying a more narrow, debatable position.

The breadth of the definition includes both forceful acts against persons and those against property. Acts of force directly against persons greater

emphasis throughout, because force and the threat of force demand the greatest attention in the minds of citizens. As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice emphasized, "The crimes that concern Americans the most are those that affect their personal safety—at home, at work or in the street."[2]

Yet the simultaneous inclusion of forceful acts against property—even though these acts are usually thought to be less serious than those involving force against the person—suggests that property harm often cannot be separated from the inconvenience, discomfort, or suffering of the individual who owns it. In this sense, the small shopowner whose windows are broken in the middle of winter experiences inconvenience in the operation of his business; the elderly lady whose apartment is burglarized, severely damaged, and left in a state of disarray may experience psychological trauma and considerable physical discomfort before her personal property is repaired and replaced; and a family experiences great suffering, even though its members may not themselves be injured, when an arsonist's fire destroys the home. The point is that while forceful destruction may be directed at property, the secondary effects on individuals can be considerable.

The definition of violence encompasses the threat of force, as well as its actual use. This acknowledges, for example, that the imminence of harm perceived by a woman on whom forcible rape is attempted can have deep psychological impact, even if she escapes. It also suggests that, even if an armed robber does not actually use his weapon, he can create fear and may successfully complete his act with no resistance on the victim's part. The threat of force, then, will be considered so intertwined with the actual use of force that it cannot reasonably be separated as a nonviolent experience in the perception of the victim.

In spite of the wide range encompassed by the definition, there are definite areas where it is not meant to apply. There are many crimes, for example, in which the element of force usually is not present or is present only in a minor way. Larceny, automobile theft, forgery, embezzlement, and receiving stolen property are good examples. Other crimes—such as gambling, drunkenness, and abortion—are non-violent because no victim or object of attack is apparent, regardless of whether or not force is used by the offender. Although they are not excluded from the definition, the violent events of political assassination and mass social protest are not treated here because of their consideration in other Commission Task Force reports.

What specific acts qualify as being violent according to the definition we have given? The following would qualify:[3]

- Criminal homicide
- Forcible rape
- Robbery
- Aggravated assault
- Suicide
- Violent auto fatalities
- Child abuse
- Other sex offenses
- Other assaults
- Disorderly conduct
- Burglary
- Arson
- Vandalism
- Individual violent acts related to gangs
- Individual violent acts related to organized crime

All the acts save suicide, auto accidents, and child abuse[4] are unequivocally defined as criminal offenses. All of them except suicide, violent auto fatalities, child abuse, criminal violent acts related to gangs, and criminal violent acts related to organized crime are official separate classifications in the only national system of criminal reporting presently available in the United States, the *Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)* published by the FBI.[5]

Criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault are the violent acts described in the preceding police reports. They clearly involve the use or threat of force on personal victims and have been considered the most serious violent crimes. The Task Force will follow this precedent, referring to them as the "major violent crimes" and focusing much more attention on them than on other individual violent acts.

Criminal homicide involves murder (commonly in the first and second degree), nonnegligent or voluntary manslaughter, and negligent or involuntary manslaughter. Throughout this report, however, "criminal homicide" includes only murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. Most negligent manslaughters involve use of automobiles and are thus considerably different from murder and nonnegligent manslaughter.[6]

Forcible rape is composed of rape by force, assault to rape, and attempted rape, but excludes statutory offenses (those where no force is used and the victim is under the age of consent).

Robbery includes stealing or taking anything of value from a person, either by force or by creating fear. Strong-arm robbery, stickups, armed robbery, assault to rob, and attempt to rob are all acts included as "robbery" in the *UCR*.

Aggravated assault is considered assault with intent to kill or for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury — by shooting, cutting, stabbing, maiming, poisoning, scalding, the use of acids, the use of explosives, or by other means. The category excludes the less serious forms of assault, assault and battery, and fighting.[7]

Beyond the major violent offenses, the most serious violent acts of concern to the Task Force are those in which the victim dies. The other general causes of death besides homicide are natural, disease, suicide, and accidents. The first two causes clearly do not fall within the scope of violence-related death. Suicide, on the other hand, definitely does. The act of voluntarily and intentionally taking one's own life involves a victim and the use of force. Whether or not fatal accidents, defined by the National Safety Council as occurrences in a sequence of events which produce unintended death,[8] should be included within the scope of individual acts of violence requires more careful thought.

What rationale is there for considering accident fatalities as violence related acts? The justification depends on whether or not the accident involves some unconscious[9] attempt to injure or be injured, whether or not the activities in which accidents occur partially involve an element of recklessness brought on by a desire to be aggressive,[10] and the extent to which any propensity exists for homicide or suicide.

These questions are most relevant to the principal kinds of accidental deaths—those due to motor vehicles, falls, fires, drowning, firearms, machinery, and poison.[11] Each mode should be examined for the extent to which violent behavior or aggressive desires of the persons involved are related

to the accident. Only accidental deaths involving motor vehicles will be considered in the report. This is the leading category of accidental deaths—with 53,100 fatalities in 1967 (next is falls [19,800] and then burns [7,700]). Death involving motor vehicles has more often been linked to conscious or unconscious aggression than any other accident type.[12]

This is not to imply that a conclusive body of literature has proven a relation between fatal auto accidents and violence. Information is, in fact, only fragmentary and limited to isolated case studies. One survey, for example, showed that communities with high auto fatality rates also have high rates of crime in general and violence in particular, whereas those with low auto fatality rates had low crime and violence rates. It was concluded that:

> whatever factors play a part in the positive correlation of suicide, homicide, other crimes and accident death rates, there is no reason to doubt that aggressive, hazardous driving is likely to be characteristic of persons similar to those who have suicidal or homicidal tendencies, or both— and vice versa.[13]

A related hypothesis, that motor vehicles provide a glamorous, albeit a none-too-safe, outlet for aggression, is likewise not proven, though there is reason to believe that automobile manufacturers have long felt its presence. In 1965, for example, the Federal Trade Commission said this in its report on automobile advertisements:

> Many of the words and phrases used in this advertising appeared calculated to evoke connotations of the glamour and thrills associated with speed and power:
>
> *Phrases:* "just pull the trigger," "start billing yourself as the human cannon ball," "want action?," "fire the second stage," "aim it at the road."
>
> *Verbs:* runs away, takes off, scat, roars, growls.
>
> *Adjectives*: dynamic, powerful, hot, lively, exciting, inviting, swinging, spirited, wild, ferocious, high flying.
>
> *Nouns*: missile, rocket, tiger, big cat, stinger.[14]

Similarly, the 1968 *Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Traffic Safety* states that:

> for many persons some of the time, and for some persons most of the time, driving is a form of aggression. It is a socially approved, or at least provided, outlet for violent behavior . . . .Certainly automobile manufacturers, especially in their advertising directed to young consumers, have unabashedly associated their products with various forms of violent or aggressive behavior, and continue to do so.[15]

The following advertisements are cited as illustrative:

> There's a tiger loose in the streets. The moan [of the engine] gets drowned out in its turn by a booming exhaust note that someone ought to bottle and seal as pure essence of car.

> So now we have a new kind of car: A brute—but a very smooth brute. A 97-pound girl can herd this seven litre (engine) and never know it has 345 horses and 462 pound/feet of torque—unless she gets mad and stomps her foot, then she'll know.
>
> Bring on the Mustangs, Wildcats, Impalas . . . we'll even squash a few Spiders while we're at it. Dodge has made it a little harder to survive in the asphalt jungle. They just uncaged the Coronet.[16]

None of this is to say that *all* auto fatalities involve a conscious or unconscious desire to be injured or aggressive, or that drivers have personal characteristics similar to those of murderers or suicides. Surely many—perhaps most—auto accidents are in fact unintended and involve either carelessness or chance occurrences that have no relation to aggressive or violent behavior. What is being suggested, however, is that some drivers may have used the motor vehicle as an instrument of force or threatened force against themselves or others. These are the events which the Task Force will consider to be "violent auto fatalities" in the report.

Child abuse, which can be generally defined as the physical injury of minors by adults, involves the use or threat of force and a personal victim more clearly than motor vehicle accidents. Physical abuse of children has received much attention in recent years, not only in professional literature but also in the daily press and in popular magazines. A nationwide survey of the press and of popular magazines from July 1, 1965, through December 31, 1965, for example, yielded 257 items concerning the general phenomenon of child abuse, exclusive of reports on specific incidents.[17]

The *UCR* categories of "other sex offenses" and "other assaults" are meant to cover the less serious forms of the forcible rape and aggravated assault crime categories. In both of these lesser classifications, the presence of a personal victim is clear, although, especially in "other sex offenses," the role of force or its threat may be much less relevant than in major violent offenses. Included in the "other sex offenses" category are statutory rape and offenses against chastity, common decency, morals, and the like. Attempts are included, although "forcible rape" and "prostitution and commercialized vice," which are separate categories, are excluded. "Other assaults" are merely described as assaults and attempted assaults not of an aggravated nature.

Disorderly conduct, defined by the *UCR* simply as "breach of peace", is probably the least serious and most marginal violence-related act to be included. There is reason to question the relevancy of a personal victim or a property object of violence here. Yet the threat of force is likely to be present, even if in a mild form, and a clear possibility exists that the individual freedom of others is at least partially limited by the offender.

Burglary, arson, and vandalism are violent acts in which the primary object of used or threatened force is property; but a personal victim nonetheless can and usually does experience secondary physical inconvenience, discomfort, or suffering from these crimes.[18] Burglary is officially defined by the *UCR* as housebreaking, safecracking, or any unlawful entry to commit a felony or a theft. Although force is usually present to some extent, so that the act remains consistent with the Task Force's overall concept of violence, the official definition stipulates that no force need be used to gain entrance.

Burglary attempts are classified along with completions by the FBI. Arson also includes attempts and is defined as willful or malicious burning with or without the intent to defraud. In a similar way, vandalism refers to willful or malicious destruction, injury, disfigurement, or defacement of property without consent of the owner or the person having custody or control.

Not only will we study individual criminal violence as perpetrated by isolated offenders, but the violence of certain groups--gangs and professional criminal organizations is also considered.[19] Gang activities, essentially those of youthful street gangs, tend to be related to group values and processes. The goal of organized crime is rarely violence, per se, but rather illegal business activity in which violence is more of a side product, a means of enforcement, or a mode of implementation.

While the scope of the report is largely limited to these specific individual acts of criminal violence, recognition will also be given to the broader diffusion of violence-related behavior in the fabric of everyday life. The population at large cannot dissociate itself from this inquiry on the grounds that only fiends and archvillains commit violent crimes. In a very real sense, rather, there is a certain "legitimacy" of violence and "normalcy" of deviant behavior, in this and other societies. Certain modes of noncriminal violence are legitimized in our everyday life, while, in a similar vein, certain kinds of technically criminal and violence-related acts are often accepted as normal weaknesses or deviations from common standards.

The legitimacy of noncriminal violence in our daily lives covers situations ranging from the affairs of state to the activities of the family man. In the conduct of war—whether the people overwhelmingly accept the need to fight, as they did for the World Wars, or whether there is great controversy, such as that concerning the Vietnam war – the government legitimizes the use of force to destroy the property, person, and freedom of "the enemy." Even when war is not in progress, national governments have agents who, rightly or wrongly, are in effect licensed to kill. On a local level, the enforcers of our laws are authorized to use violence to maintain order and restrain other violence—although at present there is wide disagreement about when this is appropriate and when it is not. On an even more personal level, every child quickly learns that the superior force of his parents can and does result in the deprivation of desired goods, services, and freedom of movement.

There is also a degree of normalcy accorded many acts that are technically criminal and often involve violence. Many studies have revealed the widespread nature of such behavior among the officially noncriminal population. Reporting on this phenomenon, the Crime Commission said:

> There is a common belief that the general population consists of a large group of law-abiding people and a small body of criminals. However, studies have shown that most people, when they are asked, remember having committed offenses for which they might have been sentenced if they had been apprehended. These studies of "self-reported" crime have generally been of juveniles or young adults, mostly college and high school students. They uniformly show that delinquent or criminal acts are committed by people at all levels of society. Most people admit to relatively petty delinquent acts, but

many report larcenies, auto thefts, burglaries, and assaults of a more serious nature.

One of the few studies of this type dealing with criminal behavior by adults was of a sample of almost 1,700 persons, most of them from the State of New York. In this study, 1,020 males and 670 females were asked which of 49 offenses they had committed. The list included felonies and misdemeanors, other than traffic offense, for which they might have been sentenced under the adult criminal code.

Ninety-one percent of the respondents admitted they had committed one or more offenses for which they might have received jail or prison sentences. Thirteen percent of the males admitted to grand larceny, 26 percent to auto theft, and 17 percent to burglary. Sixty-four percent of the males and 27 percent of the females committed at least one felony for which they had not been apprehended. Although some of these offenses may have been reported to the police by the victims and would thus appear in official statistics as "crimes known to the police," these offenders would not show up in official arrest statistics.[20]

These illustrations imply that "normal" people occasionally resort to violence and crime. The occasions in which these acts are undertaken, the reasons for their justification, and the gratifications associated with them are in this sense quite within the range of things we understand and approve. In short, we are no strangers to crime and violence.

Yet, however strong the commonly accepted weave of violence and crime in our everyday life, its degree of seriousness is relatively minor. However great the temptation is, most people do not cross over from "legitimate" violence and "normal" deviance into the sphere of blatantly violent acts uniformly condemned by the populace and defined as serious crimes by law.

It remains now to articulate more precisely what is presently known about the individual acts of violence included within the scope of Task Force coverage.

REFERENCES

1. The reports are a few of the many thousands submitted to the Task Force as part of its survey of victim and offender characteristics and relationships discussed in Ch. 5. All identifying elements have been changed in the four reports used, although the substance of the narratives has been left intact.
2. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Crime Commission) *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment,* (Washington, D.C.: Gov. Print. Off., 1967) p. 14.
3. Missing from the list is kidnaping which, while a very serious act involving force and a victim, is of such low incidence that it will not be considered.
   Narcotics offenses, while not themselves acts of violence according to the Task Force definition, will be relevant insofar as drug use is related to the violent acts listed. This possibility is raised in Ch. 15.
   Similarly, gambling, narcotic offenses, and fraud are relevant in the context of organized crime as illegal, nonviolent business activities which may require violence in a supplementary way to assure continuance of operations.
4. Suicide is presently defined as criminal in some state statutes, unlawful in others, and neither criminal nor unlawful in still others. Only those auto accidents judged to be manslaughter are criminal. There are statutes in all states on child abuse, but they vary greatly in comprehensiveness and legal import.

5. FBI, U.S. Department of Justice. *Uniform Crime Reports–1967* (Washington D.C.: Gov. Print. Off., 1967), pp. 57-58. (Hereinafter cited as *UCR.)*
6. The *UCR* classify and report "willful murder and non-negligent manslaughter" together and separate out "negligent manslaughter." Thus, when we refer to FBI "criminal homicide" figures throughout the report, they are from the "willful murder and nonnegligent manslaughter" category of the *UCR.*
   Excluded from criminal homicides are also noncriminal homicides, composed of exusable homicide (killing in self-defense) and justifiable homicide (killing done as a legal duty by a peace officer or executioner).
   All the other violent acts explained in Ch. 1 which are classified and reported in the *UCR* follow the exact definition used by the FBI.
7. With regard to aggravated assault and criminal homicide, it should be emphasized that the line between the acts is very uncertain, other than in terms of the final outcome. The speed of the ambulance, the competence of the surgeon, and the area of the body where a projectile or weapon strikes are probably more important factors distinguishing the two crimes than the offender's motive or state of mind. See Ch. 5.
8. *Accident Facts, 1968* (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1968).
9. See Ch. 9 for a consideration of violence and the unconscious.
10. It will be shown in Part II of the report that the word "aggressive" is not necessarily synonymous with the word "violent." In particular, an aggressive act may or may not be violent. In the present context, however, the Task Force is referring to aggression which manifests itself in violent behavior. See Part II for a detailed consideration of the meaning of "aggression" and its relation to "violence."
11. *Accident Facts, 1968, op. cit.*
12. It can be reasonably argued that gun accidents are at least as related to aggression and violence as motor vehicle "accidents." Because, however, the incidence of fatal gun accidents is much lower than the incidence of fatal motor vehicle accidents–2800 vs. 33,100 (*Accident Facts,* 1968, op. cit.)–and because the Commission's Task Force on Firearms is discussing violence and gun accidents, this Task Force is not pursuing the topic.
13. Austin L. Porterfield, "Traffic Fatalities, Suicide and Homicide," *American Sociological Review,* Dec., 1960, pp. 897-901.
14. "Automobile Safety, Speed and Racing Advertising," Joint memo to the Federal Trade Commission from the Directors of the FTC's Bureaus of Industry Guidance and Deceptive Practices, Nov. 15, 1966, pp. 4-5.
15. U.S. Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Report of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Traffic Safety* (Washington, D.C.: Gov. Print. Off., Feb. 1968), pp. 82-84.
16. *Ibid.*
17. The survey was done by Brandeis University. See David G. Gil, "Physical Abuse of Children–One Manifestation of Violence in American Society," unpublished Consultant paper submitted to this Task Force, p. 29.
18. Arson can, of course, also claim a personal victim.
19. It should be reiterated that the Task Force leaves to another Task Force Report the kind of group violence that is a product of social protest, unrest and change. See *The Politics of Protest,* by Jerome Skolnick, Task Force Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.
20. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment,* p. 77.

Pad No. 4. Oil painting by Stuart Davis. Collection of Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Lowenthal, New York.

CHAPTER 2

AMERICAN CRIMINAL STATISTICS: AN EXPLANATION AND APPRAISAL

The Crime Commission concluded that "What is known about the trend of crime . . . is almost wholly a product of statistics."[1] As a prelude to the discussion of levels and trends of criminal violence in the next two chapters, it is accordingly imperative to explain the development of the statistical reporting systems which profile those levels and trends and to critically appraise the validity of the systems.[2]

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL STATISTICS

Because the criminal justice system is composed of three parts—police, courts, and corrections—it is reasonable to look to each as an important source of statistics on the levels and trends of voilent crime. In reality, neither the court system nor the corrections system at present produces meaningful statistics on the amount of violence in America.

There are, in fact, no national criminal judicial statistics today. The series begun in 1932 by the Bureau of the Census was discontinued in 1946. Although the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has collected and published data since 1940 on "Juvenile Court Statistics" (delinquency, dependency, and neglect cases are covered),[3] there are several reasons why the series is not an appropriate indicator of the levels and trends of youth crime. Many cases of delinquency are simply not referred to court, while variations in intake procedures make it difficult to estimate the number of children who are referred to juvenile courts but rejected at intake. Moreover, the juvenile court estimates which are available present the number of children referred without specifying the offenses which brought them into contact with the court.[4]

The present state of prison statistics, collected by the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice and published as "National Prisoner Statistics," shows little improvement over the court situation. The series, begun in 1926, was handled by the Bureau of the Census until 1950. It is a voluntary

reporting program which has achieved complete coverage. Information now covered includes the number of persons handled by state and federal prisons and correctional institutions, although there are no data on jails, other short-term penal institutions, probation, or parole.[5]

These statistics, then, lack scope and depth. As the Crime Commission emphasized, the series could be greatly improved by an increase in staff and funds. Even with the data that are included, much is not compatible. Because some states send misdemeanants to prison while others send only felons, the types of prisoners included vary from state to state.[6] A method of uniform classification is needed.

In addition to the information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Children's Bureau publishes annual statistics on juvenile institutions and occasionally produces special reports.[7] A new classification system needs to be developed for these statistics. In general, the correctional statistics from both of these sources are of little or no use in measuring the levels and trends of violence.

Regardless of how rigorous the court and correctional data are intended to be, they are inherently less useful than police data in profiling the levels and trends of crime. The police system has first contact with the original criminal events upon which the statistics are based, and there is considerable "mortality of information" from the time the offenses are recorded by police to the incarceration of those convicted. The conclusion by criminal statistical experts has consequently been that, if data generated from criminal justice operations is to be used at all, only offenses known to the police can validly hope to approximate the trends and levels of violent crimes.

What therefore needs to be explained and appraised is the American system of police criminal statistics. The Uniform Crime Reports, published every year since 1930 by the FBI from data submitted voluntarily by police departments throughout the country, are the major source of police data in the United States. Although incomparably better than American court and corrections statistics, the *UCR* police statistics have been late to evolve and mature in comparison to those of some European countries (such as England), which have had national police data for over 125 years.

The number of police agencies cooperating in the voluntary *UCR* reporting system has increased regularly through the years, from 400 in 1930 to approximately 8,500 in 1968, representing 92 percent of the national population.[8]

Since 1958, when important revisions were made in the presentation of data, crimes have been reported by geographical areas, following as closely as is practical definitions used by the Bureau of the Budget and the Bureau of the Census. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (generally made up of an entire county or counties having certain metropolitan characteristics and at least one core city of 50,000 or more inhabitants) have the largest absolute population and coverage as reported in the latest *UCR* (1968). In that year, SMSA's represented 136,385,000 people, with 97 percent of the areas actually reporting to the FBI. "Other cities" are urban areas outside Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, most of which are incorporated communities of 2,500 or more inhabitants. In the 1968 *UCR*, 89 percent of "other cities," with a combined population of 25,730,000, actually reported to Washington. "Rural areas," composed of unincorporated portions of counties outside

urban places, had a population of 37,746,000 in 1968, of which 75 percent reported to the FBI.[9]

The offenses that are reported represent violations of criminal law in the separate states. No violations of federal law *per se* are tabulated or included in the *UCR*, although crimes overlapping between federal and state jurisdictions are counted.

The crime classification system used by the FBI is based on legal categories of offenses and is derived from an analysis performed originally by the Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in 1929.[10] The Committee's survey clearly showed great statewide variation in statutory definitions of crime. Consequently, offenses such as robbery, burglary, and larceny were broadly defined so that crimes committed under each of the varying state statutes could, for statistical purposes, be embraced by the uniform classification system. Crimes were divided into two categories, originally known as Part I offenses and Part II offenses.

Part I offenses included criminal homicide,[11] forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and automobile theft. They have been traditionally referred to as the "more serious" or "major" offenses. In recent years, criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault have been reported as "major violent crimes," while burglary, larceny, and automobile theft have been reported as "major property crimes."[12]

The incidence of each of these crimes taken separately, as well as the total, gradually came to be used as a "Crime Index," much like a price or cost-of-living index. In 1958, the term "Crime Index" was first used officially in the *UCR*, replacing the term "Part I Offenses" in describing the seven major crimes. The initial rationale for using the seven offenses as the Index appeared in the original work of the Committee on Uniform Crime Records, and is still currently offered in the *UCR*:

> The total number of criminal acts that occur is unknown, but those that are reported to the police provide the first means of a count. Not all crimes come readily to the attention of the police; not all crimes are of sufficient importance to be significant in an index; and not all important crimes occur with enough regularity to be meaningful in an index. With these considerations in mind, the above crimes were selected as a group to furnish an abbreviated and convenient measure of the crime problem.[13]

All other crimes were originally classified as Part II offenses and today remain as non-Index offenses. In 1968, they included the following categories, already defined in Chapter 1 as violent acts: offenses against family and children (although only child-abuse offenses, reported as part of this category, are here being treated as violent acts), other sex offenses, other assaults, disorderly conduct, arson, and vandalism. The non-Index offenses also include the following categories that are not being considered as violent per se by the Task Force: forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property (buying, receiving, and possessing stolen goods), weapons (carrying, possessing, etc.), prostitution and commercialized vice, narcotic drug laws, gambling, driving under the influence of alcohol, liquor laws,

drunkenness, vagrancy, suspicion, curfew and loitering violations (juveniles), runaways (juveniles), and all other offenses.[14]

All law enforcement agencies in the United States receive from the FBI a series of forms requesting information to be submitted to the *UCR*. From completed forms returned by cooperating agencies, the Bureau tabulates crime rates and trends for presentation in the quarterly preliminary reports and in the annual *UCR*. The kinds of data requested may be found in the *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook*.[15] For Index crimes—formerly Part I offenses—the FBI requests the number of offenses reported to the police, complaints that were found to be false, actual offenses, and offenses "cleared by arrest."

"Cleared by arrest" means that the police have cleared a reported offense from their record by taking into custody one or more suspects and making them available for prosecution. This definition does not mean that the offender is exonerated, but merely that the police are satisfied that the person they have taken into custody is a good suspect, so that the records can be cleared of the particular offense.

Variations among the Index offenses are striking. In 1968, criminal homicide had a clearance rate of 86 percent, forcible rape 55 percent, robbery 27 percent, aggravated assault 66 percent, larceny 18 percent, and automobile theft 19 percent. Overall, this means that only 22 percent of all Index offenses known to the police were cleared by arrest in 1968. The national Index clearance rate has been on the decline since 1961. The 1965 rate was 26 percent, for example, while the 1966 figure was 24 percent, and the 1967 figure, 22 percent.[16]

The Index crimes are the ones with the most refined rate breakdowns (including the age, sex, and race of persons charged). For crimes other than those appearing in the Index, the cooperating agencies report on the number of persons charged (i.e., held for prosecution) but not on the number of offenses known to the police (as is the case with Index offenses). Thus, the statistical counting unit changes from number of offenses (Index crimes) to number of persons arrested (non-Index crimes).

APPRAISAL OF THE UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

The *Uniform Crime Reports* are probably adequate for their original purpose—police use. Individual police agencies are interested in the number of offenses processed, the relationship between crimes reported and offenses cleared by arrest, and comparative data for evaluating the efficiency of their own and other police departments. At the same time, the spatial-temporal variations of crime reported by the *UCR* are undoubtedly useful to law enforcement agencies for crime reduction and control programs.[17]

There has, however, been considerable criticism of the usefulness, reliability, and validity of the *UCR* Index as a measure of the nation's criminality. The Director of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge, England, an acknowledged authority on criminal statistics, appraised the *UCR* in his testimony to this Commission. After stating that the criminal statistics in Western Germany, England, and the Nordic countries are considerably better than in the United States, he concluded:

> I would say that [criminal] statistics are weak in the United States. There is an improvement in the federal statistics in the last fifty years, . . . but there is still a tremendous amount to be done to provide this country with a real barometer of criminal behavior.[18]

It is necessary to review in some detail criticism raised against the *UCR* in order to present a clear perspective on the accuracy of the levels and trends of violence that the statistics reveal. Two broad categories of problems are evident in the statistics. The first is due less to *UCR* procedures and presentations proper than to difficulties inherent in collecting any local data on a national basis in any country and to inadequacies in the processing of these data by the individual police forces. The second category relates more to practices followed by the *UCR*.

Inherent Collection Difficulties and Police Inadequacies

Variation in Legal Definitions

Each state has its own penal code and, therefore, its own definitions of crimes. Variations in these definitions throughout the 52 separate jurisdictions are considerable and have made it difficult to fit separate penal code violations into the uniform categories that are applied in the national statistics. Moreover, the collection of statistics is localized, and the law enforcement agencies participating in the *UCR* collection vary widely in their practices, administrative policies, and ratios of police to population.

The inherent conflict is between regionalism and centralization, and our national criminal statistics are not the first product that reflects the unsuccessful resolution of that conflict.

Incomparability of Data Over Time

Partly because of this problem of federalism, the statistical reporting system was originally made voluntary. As a result, many reporting agencies, especially in the nonurban areas, were slow in joining the *UCR* network; there were only 400 agencies reporting to the *UCR* in the 1930's, while today there are about 8,500. Thus, trends of both violent and nonviolent crimes during the early years of the *UCR* are highly questionable as representative of national figures. "Because of these problems," the Crime Commission stated, "figures prior to 1958, and particularly those prior to 1940, must be viewed as neither fully comparable with nor nearly as reliable as later figures."[19]

Definitions of certain crimes have also been changed as the *UCR* have sought greater sophistication. Among the changes made by the *UCR* in 1958, for example, was the exclusion of statutory offenses from the category of rape, so that only *forcible* rape was considered.

The "Dark Figure" of Crime

The *UCR* Index is composed of offenses reported by the police. There is a considerable gap, however, between the amount of crime reported by the

police and the true level. This gap has been called the "dark figure" of crime,[20] and its existence is without a doubt the greatest constraint on the validity of crime statistics in the United States or any other country.

The reasons for the gap are numerous. Many offenses—Index and non-Index, violent and nonviolent—have a low level of reportability because they are never discovered by the police or because they are concealed by the offender and/or the victim. High on the list are fornication, adultery, sodomy, seduction, rape, desertion, nonsupport, gambling, weapon law violations, tax evasion, embezzlement, and shoplifting. The Crime Commission found that citizens often felt that the police would not be effective in solving the crime, did not want to take the time to report, did not know how to report, or did not report for fear of reprisal.[21]

The exact reasons for poor reporting by the public vary from crime to crime. The violent act of child abuse is a good example. It is reported as part of the *UCR* non-Index category called "offenses against family and children,"[22] and the limitations to accurate reporting here are probably greater than with the other violent acts covered in the *UCR*. Parents inflicting physical harm on children may well be reluctant to bring them to doctors for medical care if there is a possibility that the abuse will be reported to the police. Even if injured children are brought in, however, it is often difficult for medical authorities to prove abuse if the parents deny it. The problem is compounded by the fact that there is no clear agreement on what professional groups should have the responsibility to report to police and social agencies. Legislation against child abuse was not instituted until the 1960's, and there has been debate over whether the responsibility for reporting lies with doctors or with other groups, such as school personnel, social workers and nurses. Other unsettled questions include whether reports should be submitted to police or to other official agencies, whether reporting should be mandatory or discretional, the age limit up to which injuries are reportable, the conditions which are to be reported, the responsibilities and rights of persons submitting and receiving official reports, the establishment of central registries and the penalties to be invoked for failure to report.[23]

Even if a complaint has been registered by an individual with law enforcement authorities, the police may not always transmit the information to the FBI. A member of the Crime Commission staff, for example, was informed of a "file 13" in one large city, where citizen complaints not forwarded to the central statistical office were filed for the purpose of answering insurance inquiries.[24] Perhaps more disturbing was this comment by a high police department official in a large city:

> The unwritten law was that you were supposed to make things look good. You weren't supposed to report all the crime that actually took place in your precinct—and, if you did, it could be your neck. I know captains who actually lost their commands because they turned in honest crime reports.[25]

In addition to such conscious efforts by departments "to advertise their freedom from crime as compared to other municipalities,"[26] certain cities simply do not have a rigorous system of information processing.

This is not to imply, of course, that all police departments

under-report—indeed, the efficiency of many of the departments cooperating in the Task Force victim-offender survey discussed in Chapter 5 has been impressive. Nonetheless, the reporting habits of a number of cities must remain suspect. The Crime Commission observed, for example, that the disparities between cities of the same size for Index offenses are so great that they seem most unlikely in the absence of some variation in reporting practices.[27]

Given the problems presented by the gap between the reported and the true level of crime, the Crime Commission undertook an invaluable piece of research in its victimization survey, the first of its kind. A sample of the population was interviewed and asked if, when, and how it had been victimized. The crime rates that resulted from this national sample of households were then compared to reported *UCR* Index rates.

There were actually three surveys done for the Commission. One was undertaken by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago.[28] A national sample of 10,000 households was asked if the person interviewed, or any member of his or her household, had been a victim of crime in 1965. If a victim was interviewed, he or she was asked whether the crime had been reported and, if not, why not. More detailed victim surveys were also taken in a number of medium-to-high-crime precincts in Washington, Chicago, and Boston by the Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR) in Washington[29] and the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan.[30] These studies were based on victimization of the person interviewed only.

As shown in Table 1, the NORC study indicated that the 1965 victim rate for the four violent Index crimes was almost double the comparable *UCR* rate for individuals, while the 1965 victim rate for the three Index property crimes combined was more than double the comparable *UCR* rate. A closer look at the violent crimes indicates a lower homicide rate for victim data than for police data. There was only one willful homicide reported to the NORC surveyors, however, and this was not enough to make the homicide rate statistically useful and directly comparable to the *UCR* rate.

On the other hand, there was a considerable difference between the victim and police rates for the other violent crimes. The NORC rate was 3½ times greater than the *UCR* rate for forcible rape, 1½ times the *UCR* robbery rate, and twice the aggravated assault rate.

The difference between victim data and police statistics was even greater in the BSSR and SRC studies. Figure 1 shows the results for three Washington, D.C., precincts studies. The estimated victim rate was more than four times as high as the police rate. The differentials in the property crimes were even greater. Because there are proportionately many more property crimes than violent crimes in the overall Index, the victim rate was almost seven times the police rate.

The victim studies were not without methodological problems[31] and had to assume the respondents interviewed were telling the truth. Nonetheless, we believe the NORC victim survey probably produced a better estimate of the true rates of violence than do UCR data.[32] We will assume in Chapter 3 that the NORC rates are valid approximations of the true rates and thus rough indicators of the gap between the true rates and police rates. Because of the

Table 1.–Comparison of NORC and UCR Rates[a]
[Per 100,000 population]

Index crimes	NORC survey, 1965-1966	UCR rate for individuals, 1965	UCR rate for individuals and organizations, 1965
Criminal homicide	3.0	5.1	5.1
Forcible rape	42.5	11.6	11.6
Robbery	94.0	61.4	61.4
Aggravated assault	218.3	106.6	
Burglary	917.1	296.6	605.3
Larceny ($50 and over)	606.5	267.4	393.3
Motor vehicle theft	206.2	226.0	251.0
Total violence	357.8	184.7	184.7
Total property	1,761.8	790.0	1,449.6

[a] "Uniform Crime Reports," 1965, p. 51.
Philip H. Ennis, "Criminal Victimization in the United States: a Report of a National Survey" (Field Surveys II, Crime Commission), p. 8; *UCR, 1965*. The UCR national totals do not distinguish crimes committed against individuals or households from those committed against business or other organizations. The *UCR* rate for individuals is the published national rate adjusted to eliminate burglaries, larcenies, and vehicle thefts not committed against individuals or households. No adjustment was made for robbery.

[d] Crime Commission, A Task Force Report: *Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 18.

Figure 1[a]

importance of such data, the Task Force will later recommend that new and refined victim studies be instituted on a periodic basis to supplement and put into better perspective the levels and trends of crime reported by the *UCR*.

In addition to indicating that the *levels* of violent and nonviolent crimes are greatly underestimated by *UCR* rates, the victim studies show that the *trends* implied by the police data are accurate only if we assume a constant relation between total and police-reported crime. The trends we perceive may simply be due to reporting smaller or greater proportions of the true amount of crime.

There is some reason to believe that a significant amount of the rise in *UCR* violent crimes during the last decade (an increase that will be graphically shown in the next chapter) is merely due to an increase in the reporting rate. This may be due to an increased tendency by citizens, especially minority groups, to report violent crimes and to an improvement in police processing of citizen complaints.

It is possible that Americans are reporting violent and nonviolent crimes more than they used to. This judgment cannot yet be stated with empirical certainty. However, the Crime Commission did find that the minority groups of this country, especially Negroes, have expressed a strong need for adequate police protection and implied that this feeling has been growing partly as a function of the civil rights movement.[33] It is also possible that positive results have been produced by the general educational efforts of the FBI, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and other law enforcement agencies that encourage people to report all types of offenses.[34] It has therefore been suggested that the new awareness of the need for–and right in

having—adequate police protection is being translated into higher crime-reporting rates by poor and minority groups.[35]

A more striking, and probably more important, explanation of higher reporting rates is improved police recording and transmission of complaints to the FBI. The suggestion that figures collected by the *UCR* may not always reflect the total number of incidents reported to the police has already been made. In recent years, however, there have been efforts to professionalize the reporting process in many urban police departments. As a result, reported levels of crime have increased so rapidly that a more thorough reporting of crime seems to be the only logical explanation.

Reported robbery trends in Chicago and New York present a good illustration.[36] Figure 2 shows noticeable increases in the number of robberies reported over a period of time. Each of the large jumps occurred during and after the institution of more rigorous reporting procedures.



[a]Crime Commission, Assessment Task Force, *Ibid.*, and p. 23; *U.C.R. 1935-1967, op. cit.*

Figure 2.—Variation in Reported Robbery Offenses, Volumes for New York and Chicago, 1935-1967[a] [Number of offenses reported in the respective standard metropolitan statistical areas]

In New York a central complaint system replaced a precinct reporting system in 1950. As a result, there was a fourfold increase in the volume of robberies reported between 1949 and 1959.[37] In 1966 controls were again tightened, resulting in an increase between 1965 and 1967 that is still climbing.

In Chicago a central complaint system was installed in 1960; the volume of reported robberies almost doubled between 1959 and 1961.

These examples indicate, then, that increased rigor on the part of the police may have reduced the gap between the reported and the true figure of

crime. As a consequence, a good deal of the recent crime rise may be perceived rather than real. Of the four violent crimes, experts have suggested that police professionalization has in particular expanded the reporting of aggravated assault and robbery, offenses which have shown the most dramatic statistical rise in recent years. Because those two categories are so broad, more rigorous police scrutiny has resulted in tabulations of robbery and aggravated assault offenses which previously would not have been classified as Index crimes.[38]

The FBI does a commendable job in attempting to eliminate the bias in national levels and trends of crime due to reporting changes in various cities. When a city is undergoing a significant reporting change, its data are removed from the national trend computations until it has 2 years of experience under the new reporting system. When the city's data are reentered, they inevitably reflect higher levels of crime. These levels are assumed to be the best estimate of the true amount of crime in the city. The levels of past years are changed accordingly. The revised rate estimates of past years are readjusted upward, so that the trend does not show the kind of radical jump apparent in the New York and Chicago statistics above. When the city's figures are then entered into the national computations, the bias of a sharp national jump is minimized.[39]

To illustrate the importance of such readjustments, the FBI has shown that, while the rate for the four combined Index violent crimes has increased by 36 percent between 1960 and 1965 (according to the figures officially published in the *UCR*), the readjusted increase is only 25 percent.[40]

In spite of these procedures, reliance on the national trend figures is hazardous because of the great weight the readjusted cities have on these statistics. It has been shown that the cities which significantly changed their reporting systems between 1959 and 1965 accounted for nearly 25 percent of the national reported major violent crimes during the same period.[41]

Police Misclassification

Another problem which may bias published statistics is police misclassification of crimes submitted to the *UCR*. Of the four major violent crimes, misclassification is least likely with criminal homicide. If it is not immediately apparent whether a homicide is willful or by negligence, a followup investigation usually can determine the proper grouping.

The classification problem is likewise minimal in the case of robbery. There is some reason to believe that a larceny may be classified as robbery. The *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook* says robbery is "like larceny but is aggravated by the element of force or threat of force."[42] If the exact details of an event are unclear, it is likely that larcenies and robberies can be misclassified. There is as yet, however, no conclusive proof on the extent of the problem.

The possibility of misclassification is greater in forcible rape and aggravated assault. In the former the difficulty arises primarily because of the 1958 *UCR* classification rule. Prior to 1958 the category was called "rape," and included both "forcible rape" (carnal knowledge of a female above or below the legal age of consent forcibly and against her will) and "statutory rape" (carnal knowledge of a female under the legal age of consent and

without force). Beginning in 1958, however, the statutory offenses were removed (and put into the non-Index category of "other sex offenses), so that the classification was changed from "rape" to "forcible rape" only. Despite this change, a 1966 survey by the D.C. Crime Commission indicated that one half of the cases reported in Washington, D.C., as "carnal knowledge" (statutory rape) were in fact forcible attacks, and therefore should have been classified as forcible rape.[43] This survey demonstrates that, at least in Washington, there was a considerable underreporting of forcible rapes in 1966.

Differences between the Index offense of aggravated assault and the non-Index offense labeled "other assault" (mainly "assault and battery" and "simple assault") create further difficulties. As the following excerpt from the *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook* shows, the main criteria for distinguishing between the two catagories are whether or not a weapon is used and the extent of injury.

> In most instances the initial facts will be sufficient to clearly establish the proper classification of an assault. Generally, any assault by shooting, stabbing, cutting, poisoning, scalding, or by the use of acids or explosives should be classified as aggravated assault under Uniform Crime Reporting regardless of severity of injury. This does not exclude other assaults by other means which could properly be classified as aggravated. Careful consideration of the following factors should clarify the classification of an aggravated assault.
>
> (1) The type of weapon used or the use made of an object as a weapon.
>
> (2) The seriousness of the injury, and
>
> (3) The intent of the assailant to cause serious injury.[44]

As an indication of the extent to which police misclassify on the basis of this definition, the Crime Commission noted that the *UCR* changed their reported national increase of aggravated assault offenses in 1963-64 from 10 percent to 5 percent.[45] Although the FBI is working with legal agencies to eliminate this problem, the adjustment suggests that there may be over-reporting of aggravated assaults by the police.

Of the non-major violent crimes, there is some evidence that the disorderly conduct category is especially subject to variable classification according to individual police departments. In particular, some departments are thought to have different rules of thumb for determining whether an act is called disorderly conduct, drunkenness, or vagrancy.

Criticisms of UCR Practices and Proceedures

Need for More Refined Classifications

Offenses covering a wide range of seriousness are sometimes included within the same *UCR* category. This makes refined analysis of the crimes extremely difficult. To the extent that the public image of these crimes is couched in terms of the more serious (and generally more publicized) variations under the same crime catagory, the result may be a somewhat distorted conception of what the rate for the particular crime means.

A prime example is robbery. There are many variations, ranging from an armed bank robbery in which several people are shot and injured to minor thefts such as purse snatching, where force or the threat of force is used. Dramatically profiling the lower end of the robbery spectrum was the report of an offense in which one of two 9-year-old boys twisted the arm of the other in the schoolyard in order to obtain 25 cents of the latter's lunch money. Because force was used, the police correctly recorded and counted the act as "highway robbery."[46]

While these less serious events should be recorded, it does not seem reasonable to include them in the same category as the more serious offenses. At the very least, it would be desirable for analytic purposes to publish *two* Index catagories of robbery—perhaps armed robbery and unarmed robbery (strongarmed robbery, muggings, purse snatchings with force or threat of force, etc.)—in order to give a clearer picture of which kind of theft with force is recorded.[47]

Aggravated assault is also a broad classification, although the limits are narrower for criminal homicide and forcible rape. During testimony before the Commission, the chief of the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics commented on the broad definition of aggravated assault. He described a police-reported incident in which two older boys decided to give another a hotfoot. The prospective victim, however, was barefoot:

> How can you give a barefooted boy a hotfoot? So instead of that they applied a match to his back, and they raised a blister. The outcome...was an aggravated assault reported to us.[48]

Although this was an isolated case and by no means a common reporting pattern, it does illustrate the relative lack of seriousness that can be associated with an offense correctly classified as an aggravated assault. When it is realized that the catagory also includes attempted murder, where the victim may be very seriously injured, the need for a more refined breakdown becomes as justifiable here as it did for robbery.

Another classification difficulty with the *UCR* is that the Index offenses are set apart from the non-Index offenses, as if the former were uniformly more serious. Yet, arson and assault and battery (both non-Index crimes) may in fact involve more physical injury than many Index offenses, such as forcible rape and even some aggravated assaults.[49] One study, for example, has revealed that nearly two-thirds of the injuries sustained by the victims of criminal activities occur in connection with non-Index offenses.[50] Because part of the officially stated rationale behind the seven Index crimes is to choose those of "sufficient importance" and because it is assumed that there is a strong relation between "importance" and "seriousness," the Task Force suggests that either the justification for the Index be redefined, or, its scope expanded to include more than the seven offenses presently used.

Lack of Weighting Within the Index

The question of relative seriousness has been raised with regard to offenses of different degree within the same crime category. The problem is much more critical, however, when the seven offenses composing the *UCR* Index as

a whole are considered. The difficulty does not arise when the level and trend of each Index crime is shown individually. However, the prime purpose of the Index is to give some overall estimate, and this is done by simply lumping the seven Index crimes together.

The fundamental criticism here is that there is no weighting by seriousness of offense when the Index is considered as a whole. There is no difference in seriousness, for example, between a $50 larceny and a premeditated murder. Each offense represents a unit of one in the Crime Index total volume (and the Crime Index rate computed from it and population totals). Because there are many more property crimes than violent crimes,[51] the Index is greatly overweighted toward property offenses. It is consequently possible, for example, that a marked decline in those violent crimes generally assumed most serious—criminal homicide and forcible rape—could be offset by minor increases in property crimes. "Under these circumstances, the total number of Index crimes, or the Crime Index, represents an invalid, inaccurate measure of the amount and quality of criminality in a community."[52]

Because of the severe weighting inaccuracy involved, the Task Force recommends that the UCR eliminate levels and trends of the Crime Index total and the Crime Index rate. If some unweighted total Index must still be used, it would be better to talk only of the "Property Index" (for the three major property crimes) and the "Violence Index," (for the four major violent crimes). Although there would still remain unequal weightings within each Index—for example, a robbery would be weighted the same as a criminal homicide—the conflict between violent and property crimes at least would be eliminated.[53]

Ideally, of course, an index of crime, or set of subindices, should accurately weight the relative seriousness of each crime included. This has already been done by Sellin and Wolfgang, using psychophysical scaling techniques.[54] A representative sample of people was asked to judge the relative seriousness of various crimes. The weighting system that resulted from the sample is shown in Table 2. Thus, for example, homicide has a score of 26 and forcible rape a score of 10. This means that those interviewed (who came from different backgrounds, ranging from police officers to students) on the average thought homicide to be about 2½ times more serious than rape.

The trends produced by counting the seriousness of crime with these weights can be dramatically different from the trends reported by the *UCR* system. Figure 3, for example, shows estimated robbery trends in Philadelphia between 1960 and 1966 based on a 10 percent sample of robberies known to the police. The *UCR* Index rate reflects the simple count of robberies per 100,000 population, but the rate for the Sellin-Wolfgang Index also incorporates seriousness scores computed from the facts of each case in the sample. The two trends lines are very dissimilar. Most noticeably, the *UCR* Index indicates that the frequency of reported robbery per 100,000 was about the same in 1962 as in 1966, yet the Sellin-Wolfgang Index reveals a clear increase in seriousness over the period.

It can be shown in utility theory[55] that the Sellin-Wolfgang weights are not "additive"—the scores for each of a number of crimes cannot technically be added together to give a total crime index. The Science and Technology Task Force of the Crime Commission, however, did attempt to interpolate

Table 2 – Sellin-Wolfgang Index of Crimes[a]

Element	Score value
Minor injury to victim	1
Victim treated and discharged	4
Victim hospitalized	7
Victim killed	26
Victim of forcible sex intercourse	10
Intimidated by weapon, add	2
Intimidation of persons in connection with theft, etc. (other than in connection with forcible sex acts):	
Physical or verbal only	2
By weapon	4
Forcible entry of premises	1
Value of property stolen and/or damaged:	
Under $10	1
$10-$250	2
$251-$2,000	3
$2,001-$9,000	4
$9,001-$30,000	5
$30,001-$80,000	6
Over $80,000	7
Theft of motor vehicle (recovered, undamaged)	2

[a]Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

the Sellin-Wolfgang scores onto an additive scale of utilities (or rather disutilities, because the score being considered is the relative amount *lost* by an individual if he is a victim of a certain crime). Table 3 shows the interpolated weights in comparison to the *UCR* ranking of the Index crimes.[56] The Science and Technology Task Force ranking, it is clear, does not follow the exact same order as the *UCR* ranking. The disutility scale, for example, suggests that aggravated assault is more serious than robbery, while the *UCR* ranking suggests the opposite.

We are not so much interested in explaining the technical details of weighting systems and disutility scales as in emphasizing that the groundwork has already been laid for the very rapid development of an additive index that accurately reflects the seriousness of the crimes it aggregates. Other countries are already performing initial experiments with a weighted national index, and the Council of Europe is considering using such a scaling system for international comparisons.[57] The Task Force believes the *UCR* should give top priority to this matter.

Inclusion of Both Attempts and Completions

Both attempts and completions are included in the levels and trends published for Index offenses. Of the Index violent crimes, the one exception is the category of criminal homicide. Only completed homicides are included, but attempted homicides are classified as aggravated assaults. This means that the general category of "aggravated assault" includes attempted homicides, completed aggravated assaults, and attempted aggravated assaults—and there is no way of differentiating among them in the *UCR* figures. Similarly, attempts and completions are combined together in the categories of forcible rape and robbery.



Source: Andre Normandeau, "Trends in Robbery as Reflected by Different Indexes," in Thursten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, *Delinquency: Selected Studies*, New York, Wiley, 1969, p. 151.

Figure 3.—Variation in Reported Robbery Offense Rates in Philadelphia, 1960-66. According to the Sellin-Wolfgang and UCR (Census Adjusted Rates per 100,000 total population based on a 10 percent samples)

Because personal injury and property damage or loss are usually much less extensive (if they are present at all) in attempted as opposed to completed violent and property Index crimes, a true picture of seriousness can be constructed only if the attempted acts are separated from the Index. "If there is any value in having a collection of criminal statistics based upon objective criteria indicating the amount of actual harm or loss to a community, than criminal attempts should definitely be omitted from the Crime Index.[58]

While we strongly recommend limiting Index crimes to completions, we believe attempts should still be tabulated separately and published in a supplement—showing a less serious dimension of criminal activity than that of completions, but a dimension that is necessary comprehensively to profile the levels and trends of crime. Such data, needed by police administrators in determining workload volumes, will be important for analytic comparisons of offenders who do and do not complete a criminal act and could be useful in research on strategies to reduce the number of completed crimes.

Table 3.[a]*—Disutilities of Index crimes*[b]

Type of crime ranked by seriousness (*UCR*)	Estimated average
1. Criminal homicide	400,000,000[c]
2. Forcible rape	10,000,000[c]
3. Robbery	10,000
4. Aggravated assault	20,000
5. Burglary	200
6. Larceny ($50 and over)	100
7. Auto theft	900
8. Larceny (under $50)	90

[a]Source: Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Science and Technology* p. 56.

[b]The table was computed in the following way. First, the Sellin-Wolfgang scores for larceny crimes were translated into a utility scale based on monetary loss in the larceny. The other crimes were then interpolated onto this scale, based on their Sellin-Wolfgang values. *Ibid*

[c]The disutilities for criminal homicide and forcible rape are very crude estimates based on an extrapolation extending far beyond the region for which data were available concerning the functional form of the relationship between scale value and utility.

Failure to Consider Multiple Events

Police reports are not limited to descriptions of crimes committed only once by one offender on one victim. Rather, a more complex or multiple "event" may occur in which more than a single offender and/or victim is involved. The FBI does consider offenses committed on each victim in an event. However, when more than one kind of crime is committed the FBI asks the police to count for the *UCR* only the "most serious" criminal act. If, for example, an offender commits forcible rape, burglarizes the house, physically assaults the victim, and steals the victim's automobile, only the forcible rape is to be reported by the police to the FBI. The amount of physical harm or the loss or damage to property is therefore not counted as such, and many acts are not recorded statistically.

Similarly, the commission of the same kind of crime more than once on the same victim presently is not counted. Thus, if a woman is forcibly raped by four offenders during the same event, the FBI asks the police to only report one rape.

The result is an under-reporting of Index crime in multiple events, with the chance of under-reporting being greater as the seriousness of the crime decreases and the commission of the crime increases. In the Sellin-Wolfgang system, this incompleteness is eliminated. For each criminal act that occurs during an event, the number of times it is committed is multiplied by the weight of the crime. A total score is then calculated.

The following hypothetical example can be used to illustrate how the *UCR* method and the Sellin-Wolfgang method contrast in recording a multiple event:

> A holdup man forces a husband and his wife to get out of their automobile. He shoots the husband, gunwhips and rapes the wife twice and leaves in the automobile [worth $2,000] after taking money [$100] from the husband. The husband dies as a result of the shooting.[59]

The police would report only the murder of the husband and the rape of the wife according to the present *UCR* system. The Sellin-Wolfgang method, however, would compute a total score, reflecting the number and weight of each crime in the event, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. – Illustration of Sellin-Wolfgang scoring[a]

Offense	Number of times committed	x	Weight	=	Total score
Husband killed	1	x	26	=	26
Wife raped	2	x	10	=	20
Wife threatened gun	1	x	2	=	2
Wife injured requiring hospitalization	1	x	7	=	7
Car stolen	1	x	2	=	2

[a]Sellin and Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

The *UCR* could well experiment with a weighting=scoring approach similar to the Sellin-Wolfgang system and the Science and Technology Task Force extensions of it–and thereby provide national statistics that would record the multiple contigencies of a criminal event.

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Greater Emphasis on Changes in the Total Volume of Crime Instead of Changes in Rates

Percentage changes can be measured in terms of the volume of crime or the rate of crime from year to year (the incidence per 100,000 population). The latter approach is much more accurate and meaningful because it relates the change in crime to the change in population.

Until recently, however, absolute changes have been reported in the *UCR*, with little reference to population changes. The 1956 *UCR*, for example, showed that in 353 cities with over 25,000 inhabitants, there was a crime increase of 11 percent from 1940 to 1950, with increases ranging from 2 percent for robbery to 59 percent for aggravated assault. Each Part I offense showed a percentage increase. However, when these same data are adjusted for population changes, they show a 5-percent *decrease* in the rate for 1950 (1,724 per 100,000) as compared to 1940 (1,814 per 100,000) instead of the 11-percent increase.[60]

In a later report (1960), the *UCR* stated that the "first year of the 1960's recorded a new all-time high with 98 percent more crime than in 1950."[61] The reader who did not also consider the substantial population increase between 1950 and 1960 could have been considerably misled. When crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants are calculated over the period, the actual increase is 22 percent.

In 1961 the *UCR* used a new format in which the large charts at the beginning of the volume–those most referred to in official statements and in the press–showed absolute volume and rates together. This dual presentation is a commendable improvement.

Nonetheless, the annual *UCR* publication still subordinates rate changes to volume changes in the introductory pages most used for public consumption.

The FBI also publishes quarterly figures comparing the incidence of crime to the corresponding quarter of the previous year; in these reports volumes are given with no reference to rates. Although both the absolute volume and the rate of reported crime have increased during the 1960's, the increase in volumes is noticeably more than the increase in rates. Thus, the public is given an exaggerated picture of the increase in reported crime.

Figure 4 reproduces the "Crime Clocks" which are presented in the opening pages of the 1968 *UCR*. The clocks refer only to the absolute volume of crime and do not adjust for population at all. This means that, regardless of whether population increases, remains the same, or decreases from year to year, a continued increase in the number of offenses committed will make the clocks "run faster." If crime increased as much as population from one year to another, the crime rate would remain the same–but the *UCR* clocks would still speed up. The FBI does not specifically compare the clocks to those of past years, but such a comparison proves interesting. The result is a great speedup–one considerably greater than the change that would be evident if the clocks were based on rates.



[a]*UCR*, 1968, p. 29.

Figure 4[a]

The Task Force recommends that the *UCR* discontinue the crime clocks and other presentations like them, which tend to misrepresent the changes in violent and nonviolent crime over time. Similarly, an attempt should be made to express the figures published quarterly in rate form as well as in volumes, even though the population totals needed for such figures are difficult to estimate on a quarterly basis.

While expressions of change in terms of rates are vastly preferable to change in terms of volumes, the rates expressed in the *UCR* are still not as refined as is desirable. *UCR* rates are computed per 100,000 of the *entire* population. The unstated assumption in this practice is that all persons are equally capable of committing crimes. By definition, however, criminal conduct generally cannot occur among children under 7 years of age, and is rare among children up to at least 12 years of age.[62] Generally speaking, the offender is much more likely to be a male than a female and much more likely to be younger than older.

We recommend, therefore, that rates be refined for age, sex, race, etc.[63] Such improvements are not easy, of course, because estimates of both crime volume and population volume for the more refined categories would be needed each year to produce the rates. The rates are necessary, however, if we are better to understand which particular population groups are most responsible for the levels and trends of crime. With the excellent cooperation and the assistance of the FBI, the Task Force has taken a step toward this goal by producing in the next chapter moderately refined rates by age, race and sex over a recent time span.

Inadequacies of Arrest Statistics

Most of what has been reviewed relates to *UCR* data on offenses known to police. In the preceding discussion of crime rate refinements by age, sex, race, etc., however, the focus shifted to *UCR* statistics on arrests by police. Arrest data have to be used for such breakdowns because the mere knowledge that an offense has been committed does not insure that the characteristics of the offender(s) are known.

In the *UCR*, data on the number of offenses known are presented for the seven Index crimes only, while data on arrests are presented for the Index crimes plus all 22 categories of non-Index offenses. Several basic comments on this procedure are necessary.

Because "offenses known" are not reported for non-Index crimes, it is even more difficult to generalize about their true incidence than about the true incidence of Index crimes. Not only is there a gap in the non-Index category between the true number of offenses and the reported number, but there is also a second gap between the reported number of offenses and the number of arrests made. An idea of the size of this gap is indicated in Figure 5.[64]

The point is that, for non-Index crimes, not only may the arrest rate levels and trends observed be due in part to variations in the number of offenses recorded, but they may also be due to the variation in the arrest clearance rates for those offenses. Thus, generalizations about the true levels and trends of non-Index crimes from *arrest* levels and trends are even more



[a] *UCR*, 1960-1967.

Figure 5.[a]*—Variation in reported offense rates and reported arrest rates for the Nation, 1960-1967*
[Four major violent crimes (rates per 100,000 national population)]

risky than generalizations about the true levels and trends of Index crimes from the *offense* levels and trends.

The publication of incomplete information for non-Index crimes on the grounds that they are less serious, and therefore of less interest, is not an acceptable defense. A more justifiable one is that the non-Index crimes are often not reported by the police as thoroughly as are Index crimes. However, this should not prevent the *UCR* from working with the police toward a system that reports both offenses and arrests for all crimes covered. If data for a crime category are to be published at all, every effort should be made to relate the reported incidence of crime as closely as possible to the true incidence.

The consistent publication of both offenses and arrest statistics will leave still another problem. At present, the basic *UCR* reporting unit for offense data is the *number of offenses,* but the basic unit for arrest data is the *number of persons arrested.* The shift in bases is significant. An offense may be "cleared by arrest" when one or more suspects are taken into custody. In addition, one suspect may be responsible for one or more offenses. Thus, one robbery may result in the arrest of three offenders; on the other hand, one arrested suspect may be responsible for three robberies. The relationship between number of persons arrested and number of offenses, therefore, is never entirely clear.[65]

Consistency between offense and arrest information requires that a common reporting unit be used. Reported offenses cannot always include information on the number and characteristics of offenders (especially for non-violent, property crimes), so the best reporting unit should refer to the crime—the number of offenses reported and the number of offenses for which arrests were made. The Task Force recommends that the FBI change to such a common base. If this were done, the number of persons arrested could still be reported, but in a separate section of the *UCR*, where the problem incurred in generalizing from arrest information could be properly reviewed.[66]

There are many people who object to the use of arrest figures for the

purpose of reporting who criminals are, and the *UCR* have never clearly articulated the problems involved.

In the first place, even if all persons arrested are guilty, the gaps between the reported arrest level and the true level of crime still exist. Any conclusions about the characteristics of all offenders derived from the characteristics of arrested offenders must be tempered by this fact.

Second, it cannot be assumed that all persons arrested are in fact guilty of the crimes with which they are charged. By the use of arrest data to describe the criminal or delinquent population, the police are permitted to decide those whom the community will treat as criminal. Such use of arrest data without verification of guilt (by either a government decision to prosecute or a court decision to correct) works to the detriment of minority groups, who are often viewed with suspicion by police but treated somewhat more circumspectly by both prosecutors and courts. Although it may be entirely justifiable in terms of standard police investigation procedure to "round up the usual suspects" whether or not they are clearly guilty, the individual characteristics that are recorded upon arrest may give a biased estimate of the true offenders.

A major conclusion of Chapter 3 is that arrest rates for the major violent crimes are much higher for the younger than for the older, for males than for females, and for Negroes than for whites. It can probably also be safely assumed that the police in most cities share this judgment. It is possible, however, that because the police relate violence more to the young, to males and to Negroes than to other groups, they disproportionately round up these individuals as the usual suspects, producing a higher proportion of youthful, male and Negro offenders in arrest statistics than is merited. In other words, there may be an unwarranted upward bias to the arrest rates for the young, males, and Negroes—even though they are in fact proportionately more guilty of violent crimes than the older people, females, and whites.

A systematic investigation to test this assertion has unfortunately not yet been made. It has been suggested, however, that "most police officers agree that it is easier to effect an arrest in cases involving juveniles than in cases involving adults."[67] Thus, the crime rate may in part be higher for the young than for older people simply because it is easier to arrest juveniles.

There is no such statement by police with regard to arrests and the sex of the offender, although at least one author has suggested that males are detected, and hence arrested, more often for criminal homicides than females because of the cruder methods males employ in killing.[68]

Similarly, there has been little exploration of the racial factor. One of the few studies with relevant conclusions examined shoplifting in Philadelphia. The author noted a distinct tendency for apprehended Negro offenders to be reported, while white offenders were more likely to be let go. This clearly affected the racial component of the Philadelphia larceny arrest statistics.[69]

Another author has offered this observation on the question of racial bias in arrest statistics, although no empirical proof is presented to back up the position:

> A belief, based on real or imagined information, that a particular minority group commits more crime than other groups will often lead to a greater saturation of this group's neighborhoods by police patrol. Such saturation will likely turn up more crime and produce a larger number of arrests of persons belonging to the group, though it will also often inhibit some kinds of criminal activity because of the increased likelihood of apprehension. But it is the police activity and not the behavior of the group itself which is conditioning the group's crime rates as they eventually appear in printed statistics.[70]

In sum, the possibility of an unwarranted upward bias in arrest rates for the young, males, and Negroes has been neither conclusively verified nor deeply explored. Yet the question remains, and the *UCR* should at least articulate the potential difficulties present in using arrest data for assessing the characteristics of offenders. The responsibility for any existing biases is as much a function of police practices and the basic inadequacies in the reporting of any nation's arrest data as it is of particular FBI procedures.

Subjective Interpretations of Published Data

There may be some justification for criticism that the *UCR* has not been entirely unbiased in the interpretation of the data published. The 1960 *UCR*, for example, made this statement:

> Increases were recorded in all crime categories except robbery, which was down one percent. This crime had the most significant rise in 1960 and the reversal of the trend indicates to some extent the success of police efforts to reduce its occurrence.[71]

Such a conclusion is rather questionable in light of the reporting errors that have been reviewed.

Considering the current public sensitivity about crime and violence, the following comparison to European countries is significant:

> The publication of criminal statistics [in England and Scandinavia] is not regarded as a dramatic act to mobilize public awareness against the danger of rape, murder and other kinds of crimes, but it is regarded as a regular kind of source of information, bringing to the knowledge of those who are interested—unfortunately very few—what is going on in this vast amount of crime.
>
> Our [England's] criminal statistics in comparison to your publications differ as much as—if I may bluntly say so—an old English cup of tea compares with a dry Martini on the rocks. They [British statistics] are very prosaic, very quiet. And this in some ways makes them less attractive to read. But it does produce them for the public.[72]

Incomplete Orientation of Data to the Needs of All Users

The *UCR* generally satisfy the needs of the users they were primarily designed for—the police. Many criticisms, however, suggest that the statistics are not sufficient for the needs of other users. Although the needs of social scientists, the press, and government officials originally may have been of

secondary importance, the justification for satisfying their needs has grown considerably since the *UCR* were first developed.

The FBI has been very helpful to scholars requesting unpublished data; yet the fact remains that the basic classification and reporting system was constructed with little attention paid to underlying explanations and theories of crime:

> Designed without theory, without testing of hypotheses in a research project, without establishment of operational definitions for empirical analysis that inductively could lead to significant conclusions, but instead, based upon assumed administrative utility and presumed uniformity in collection of statistics, the classification lacks adequate criteria for understanding the volume and quality of criminal activity.[73]

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

For the most part, comparisons with foreign statistics are extremely difficult to make. The existing limitations are primarily due to differing criminal statutes, reporting procedures, and cultural interdicts. Most experts—including criminologists,[74] the Crime Commission,[75] and the FBI[76]—decry the hopelessness of making international comparisons because of these factors. Their position was summarized in testimony to the Commission as follows:

> Since criminal statistics were for the first time established at the beginning of the nineteenth century . . . social scientists, moralists, criminal administrators have been tempted in one way or another to compare the state of the crime, its evolution and its trends between the various countries. But as knowledge of criminal statistics became more developed and more refined, and the differences in criminal law and practice, in police activities, and in communal attitudes have all been more clearly perceived, caution not to say skepticism—as to the reliability of comparisons—grew stronger and stronger. The basic factors which make comparisons difficult are, of course: variations in incidences of reporting, and methods of record in the proceeding of various organs of the machinery of justice, and in the scope and definition of criminal provisions.[77]

The myriad of criminal statutes and reporting procedures has been detailed in other works,[78] and there is no need to proceed beyond emphasizing the existence of these complexities. The way cultural differences reduce our ability to make international comparisons may not be immediately obvious, however. Other cultures judge violent behavior with differing standards.[79] These affect criminal definitions as well as ad hoc evaluations of particular acts of violence. In our own country, such variations exist among regions;[80] so it is not surprising that even greater variations exist among foreign countries. For example, consider the rule established in San Cristoval (Melanesia) governing battles:

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> People who are climbing trees or fishing on the sea are not attacked, even in the heaviest battles, which, for these people, may involve wholesale slaughter without notice of the inhabitants of a given village . . . . the reason being that such fighting was considered to be too cruel, and therefore it was held that fighting should be restricted to "people on the ground." There was also a rule that fighting at night was not allowed.[81]

The American Embassy in Turkey describes a cultural pattern that obscures international statistical comparisons to an even greater extent:

> It should also be noted that a large proportion of even the serious crimes committed in Turkey never come to the attention of the police. Frequently "settlements" are made among families involved in crimes with the village muhtar [head man] acting as arbitrator and meting out summary "justice." One local employee of the Embassy estimates that at least 50% of the crimes committed in Turkey are disposed of in this fashion. We would also suggest that the crimes committed in connection with rural "blood feuds" and by roving bandit gangs which are often noted in the Turkish press, never reach the Government's statistical machinery.[82]

In spite of these problems, the criminal statistics, reporting procedures, and cultural interdicts are comparable in some of the industrial and post-industrial countries such as England, Canada, Denmark, and Norway. Thus certain crude yet meaningful international comparisons can be made between the United States and these countries.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this chapter has been to place the next two chapters in proper perspective by critically appraising the statistical systems which report the levels and trends of violence to be considered.

Police statistics are presently incomparably better than court and corrections statistics for estimating the amount of violent crime and for profiling the levels and trends of violence because they more directly relate to the actual criminal event, whereas there is a "mortality of information" with court and corrections data.

For individual acts of violence covered by national police statistics, limitations on the accuracy of the data are apparent. These limitations are a result of inherent difficulties in data collection, inadequate police reporting, and improper *UCR* practices and procedures. Some of the constraints (such as the gap between the true and reported crime level or, in the case of non–Index crimes, the further gap between offenses and arrests) severely limit the validity of published trends and levels. Other constraints (such as the nonrecording of multiple events or the inclusion of attempts with completions) are less severe, but impose an additional level of uncertainty in interpreting the incidence and severity of crime. Still other constraints (such as the propensity to report volume changes instead of rate changes, or the possibility that nonobjective statements may accompany empirical data) do not pose a problem to the expert seeking to construct levels and trends, but

may tend to give the public a somewhat inaccurate picture of violent crime.

A discussion of what kind of integrated statistical system is most desirable and what steps should be taken to implement it will be one of the concerns of Chapter 17.

In comparison to other countries, the quality of American statistics has improved, although certain nations do have more refined information. Data on violence in various countries is usually difficult to compare, however, because of different criminal statutes, reporting procedures, and cultural interdicts.

REFERENCES

1. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Crime Commission), *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 21.
2. The focus of this chapter is on data reported by the criminal justice system, primarily from the FBI. (Comparisons with foreign countries are also made.) See App. 1 for a review and analysis of sources of national data for those individual violent acts defined in Ch. 1 whose incidence are not reported by the criminal justice system.
3. Delinquency cases are classified by sex and place of occurrence and to some degree by reason for referral, manner of handling, and disposition. Some traffic offense information is also included. The series is based in part on a national sample of juvenile courts (494 out of an estimated 2,700 having jurisdiction in juvenile matters in 1966) and in part on on special reports from selected localities.
   See Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Children's Bureau, "Juvenile Court Statistics–1965," Children's Bureau Statistical Series No. 85 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), as cited in Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment*, p. 130.
4. Marvin E. Wolfgang (with the collaboration of Bernard Cohen, John Conrad, Lenore Kupperstein, and Frederic Pryor), "Measuring the Volume and Character of Crime," submitted to the Panel on Social Indicators, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Apr. 1968, p. 57.
   These facts only point to a second basic problem: the reports lack the detail and completeness required for the serious study of delinquency: "There are no data at all regarding the age or race of the delinquents. Most of the detailed information in the report does not come from the national sample, apparently because country's 30 largest cities asked to submit data on reasons for referral and disposition, only nineteen responded in usable form in 1965. Missing were such cities as New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. The maximum age limits of the courts which did report varied." ("Juvenile Court Statistics–1965," *op. cit.*, p. 130).
5. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment*, p. 130.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. FBI, U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports, 1968* [hereinafter cited as *UCR*] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), pp. 53-54.
9. *UCR, 1968, op. cit.*, p. 58.
10. FBI, U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reporting: A Complete Manual for Police*, (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1966), p. 1. The original committee was composed of both police administrators and social scientists.
11. As discussed in Ch. 1, "criminal homicide" is composed of willful murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and negligent manslaughter. However, we are using criminal homicide to refer only to willful murder plus non-negligent manslaughter. The *UCR* combines these two categories (and reports negligent manslaughter separately). Thus, FBI data which we refer to as "criminal homicides" are found in the *UCR* as "willful murder and non-negligent manslaughter."

12. As discussed in Ch. 1, the Task Force is here considering burglary as an act of violence.
13. *UCR, 1968, op. cit.*, p. 57.
14. While the Task Force has made this differentation between violent and non-violent acts for the non-Index offenses, the *UCR* do not.
15. See generally, *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, op. cit.*
16. *UCR, 1965-68, op. cit.*
17. Wolfgang et al., *op. cit.*, p. 39.
18. Statement of Leon Radzinowicz before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Hearings, Sept. 26, 1968, p. 642.
19. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 20. The Commission here was reflecting the official judgment of the FBI. See *UCR, 1958*, Special Issue.
20. See, for example, Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," Consultant Paper to the Crime Commission, p. 32.
21. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 18.
22. As indicated in Ch. 1, this category also includes non-support, neglect, and desertion–acts which are not being considered as violent by the Task Force.
23. David G. Gil, "Physical Abuse of Children–One Manifestation of Violence in American Society," unpublished consultant paper submitted to this Task Force, pp. 31, 33.
24. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 24.
25. Fred J. Cook, "There's Always a Crime Wave–How Bad Is This One?" *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 6, 1968, p. 132.
26. "Wickersham Statistics Reports," p. 13, as cited in Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 24.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Philip H. Ennis, "Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey" (Field Surveys II, Crime Commission), hereinafter referred to as NORC.
29. Albert D. Biderman, Louise A. Johnson, Jennie McIntyre, and Adrianne W. Weir, 'Report on a Pilot Study in the District of Columbia on Victimization and Attitudes Toward Law Enforcement" (Field Surveys I, Crime Commission).
30. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Measurement of the Nature and Amount of Crime," sec. 1 of Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas" (Field Surveys III, Vol. 1, Crime Commission).
31. See Ch. VII of the NORC Survey for a review of the methodological problems encountered.
32. With certain exceptions, such as the case of criminal homicide discussed above.
33. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 22.
34. See Ronald H. Beattie and John P. Kenney, "Aggressive Crimes," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Mar. 1966, p. 78.
35. See the Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 22; *Task Force Report: The Police*, p. 148.
36. Assessment Task Force Report, *ibid.*, p. 22-23.
37. It should be noted on the chart that the FBI did not report New York data during these years because it refused to accept the information as valid until the changeover was completed.
38. Beattie and Kenney, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
39. For a more complete explanation of the trend adjustment process, see the Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 23. The Crime Commission, in turn, greatly relied on an explanation written for it by the FBI. That explanation was reproduced as App. E of the above report. It is also found in this Task Force report as App. 1.
40. *Ibid.* These adjusted figures are the ones used in the 1933-67 trend charts in the next chapter.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, op. cit.*, p. 20.

43. *Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1966), p. 49 (hereinafter referred to as the D.C. Crime Commission Report).
44. *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, op. cit.*, p. 21.
45. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment*, p. 24, based on information supplies to the Crime Commission by the FBI.
46. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," *op. cit.*, p. 50. See also Thorston Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency*, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964).
47. Recent *UCR* publications do show separate trend figures for different kinds of robberies. The 1968 *UCR*, for example, shows different charts for each of six kinds (p. 16). The point, however, is that there remains only one general class of Index robbery–and this broad class, not a more specific breakdown, is usually referred to in most official, professional, and public media discussions.
48. Statement of Ronald Beattie before the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Hearings, Sept. 25, 1968, p. 545.
49. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," *op. cit.*, p. 33-34.
50. See Sellin and Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency, op. cit.*, Ch. 2.
51. *UCR*, 1968 (p. 4) showed, for example, that the four major violent crimes composed only 13 percent of the Index total, while the three major property crimes composed 87 percent.
52. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, p. 721 (1963).
53. In the following chapter, the Task Force will use with caution a combined, unweighted "Violence Index" composed of the four major violent crimes. In effect this almost will be an aggravated assault-robbery index, because these violent crimes make up the overwhelming percentage of total major violent crimes (about 93 percent in *UCR*, 1968 p. 4). Nonetheless, this index does have some merit as a crude measure of aggregate violence, because the two predominant crimes–especially robbery–have often been viewed by experts as bellweathers of violence.
54. Sellin and Wolfgang, *op. cit.*
55. See, e.g., John Von Neuman and Oscar Morgansten, Princeton *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1948).
56. Although the FBI does arbitarily rank the Index crimes from greater to lesser seriousness, it does not, of course, give specific weights to each crime.
57. Since publication of Sellin and Wolfgang's *The Measurement of Delinquency*, several replicas of the scaling process have appeared that have used the scores derived from the original Philadelphia population. The most elaborate one has been made in Canada with support from the Canadian Research Council. This work is described in detail by Dogan Akman and Andre Normandeau, "Towards the Measurement of Criminality in Canada: A Replication Study," *Acta Criminologica* (Jan. 1968), 1: 35-260. See also by the same authors, *Manual for Constructing a Crime and Delinquency Index in Canada* (Montreal: University of Montreal, 1966); "The Measurement of Crime and Delinquency in Canada," 7 *British Journal of Criminology* 129-149 (Apr. 1967). Also D. Akman, A. Normandeau, Stanley Turner, "Replication of a Delinquency and Crime Index in French Canada," 8 *Canadian Journal of Correction*, 1-19; Aron Walker, "Replication of Philadelphia-Montreal Scaling of Seriousness of Offenses," Harvard University (typescript, n.d.). Akman and Normandeau have also executed a replication study among university students and blue-collar workers in England, and Guy Houchon and A. de Boeck plan the publication of a replication in the Congo.
Additional replication studies of the psychophysical scaling are in process in New Jersey by Robert Figlio, among inmates of correctional institutions; by Angel Velez-Diaz, under supervision by Edwin Megargee, at the University of Puerto Rico; by Dusan Cotic in Yugoslavia; by Menachim Amir in Israel; by Herman Roether with sex offenders on probation at the Philadelphia General Hospital; by the State of California in an announced research project, and by the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. Other studies in process that are known to have used the scale scores for judging success of demonstration or action programs have occurred in Boston, Kentucky, and New Jersey. In a further analysis of the Glueck Prediction Table relative to recidivism, the New York City Youth Board used the scale scores. See Maude M. Craig and Laila Budd, "The Juvenile Offenders: Recidivism and Companions," 13 *Crime and Delinquency*, 344-355 (April 1967). In a study of hidden delinquency, Martin Gold found utility in the scale scores; see Martin Gold, "Undetected Delinquent Behavior," *Journal of Research in Criminology and Delinquency*, January 1966. (Cited in Thorsten Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Delinquency: Collected Studies*, forthcoming publication of John Wiley & Sons.

58. Wolfgang, "Uniform Crime Reports; A Critical Appraisal," *op. cit.*, p. 720.
59. Taken from 1960 *Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook*, with minor modifications.
60. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," *op. cit.*, p. 35.
61. *UCR, 1960*, p. 1.
62. Wolfgang, "Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal," *op. cit.*, p. 733.
63. The *UCR* does produce arrest *volumes* for such breakdowns, but not arrest *rates*.
64. Although the offense-arrest gap for non-Index crimes is being discussed, the gap can be illustrated in Fig. 5 only for Index crimes: data for the top trend line in the figure are not available for non-Index crimes.
65. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," *op. cit.*, p. 26.
66. More generally, another dimension of criminal statics is needed–one that adequately traces the number of persons arrested to the courts and corrections stages of the criminal justice system. This dimension moves the discussion out of the range of police statistics for showing the levels and trends of crime–and into the realm of integrated reporting that traces individuals throughout the justice process. Such a unified system is recommended in Ch. 17.
67. Wolfgang, "Crimes of Violence," *op. cit.*, p. 49.
68. Otto Pollak, *The Criminality of Women* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1950), p. 82.
69. Thorsten Sellin, "Research Memorandum on Crime in the Depression" (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).
70. Gilbert Geis, "Statistics Concerning Race and Crime," *Journal of Crime and Delinquency*, 126 (1965).
71. *UCR Quarterly Report*, Mar. 1962, as cited in Wolfgang, "Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal," *op. cit.*, p. 737.
72. Statement of Leon Radzinowicz, Hearings, *op. cit.*, Sept. 26, 1968, pp. 641-642.
73. Wolfgang, *"Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal," op. cit.*, p. 724.
74. Professors Wolfgang and Ferracuti, in *The Subcultural of Violence* (London: Social Science Paperback, 1967), p. 273, have called international criminal statistics "woefully inadequate." Leslie T. Wilkins in *Social Deviance* (London: Tavistock, 1965), p. 86, cited in Thorsten Sellin, *Criminologica*, vol. V, No. 2, Aug. 1967, said, "International comparisons of criminal statistics are quite impossible at the present state of their development."
75. The Crime Commission said, "For most offenses it is difficult to compare directly the rates between countries because of great differences in the definitions of crime and in reporting practices." *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 39.
76. The *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* of Dec. 1966, p. 39, states: "In endeavoring to make comparisons between the United States and foreign crime statistics, the analyst is immediately confronted with the fact that direct comparisons are not possible. This is true because of the differences in crime definitions, methods of classification and reporting, and techniques of validation. Further, crime counts in various countries are influenced by such matters as ethnic and cultural background, economic and social structure, and a host of other factors."
77. Testimony of Leon Radzinowicz to the Commission, Sept. 26, 1968, p. 8.
78. See, for example, Karl O. Christiansen, "Report on the Post-War Trends of Crime in Selected European Countries," consultant paper submitted to the Crime Commission, 1967.
79. In a consultant paper to the Task Force entitled "Observations on Cross-Species and Cross Cultural Comparisons of Aggression and Violence," App. 25 Prof. Paul Bohannon explains how cultural values condition the way an individual evaluates all behavior, including violent action.
80. Professor Bohannon, discussing regional variations in our country, describes how violence is condoned, ignored and used by legitimate authorities. A rather dramatic

example of the legitimate use of violence occurred recently in Oklahoma City, Okla., where a judge meted out the punishment of 20 whiplashes in lieu of jail to a 17-year-old offender. (See *Hartford Times*, Dec. 13, 1968.) Professor Bohannon further cites examples of how violence is ignored in certain places in the United States. For example, he states that historically we have ignored violence in the ghetto, in the university, and in non-delinquent boys' gangs. *Ibid.*

81. C.H. Wedgewood, "Some Aspects of Warfare in Melanesia," *Oceania*, 5-33 (1930), as cited in Bohannon, *ibid.*, p. 98.
82. Information supplied by the Embassy in response to a Task Force request for statistical data.

APPENDIX 1

OTHER STATISTICS ON INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE

Chapter 2 evaluates statistical information reported by the criminal justice system, primarily police statistics of the FBI. Not all of the individual acts of violence defined in Chapter 1 are covered by criminal justice system data publications, however. This appendix reviews and analyzes the data on the remaining criminal acts available from alternate sources.

SUICIDE AND VIOLENT AUTO FATALITIES

Suicides, auto fatalities, and all other causes of death are published in the mortality data tables of *Vital Statistics of the United States*.[1] All death and fetal death statistics in this National Center for Health Statistics publication are based on information obtained from microfilm copies of original death certificates received from the registration offices of all states, certain cities, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. An attempt is made to obtain data on all deaths, not merely a proportion of them. The certificates of most states conform closely in content and arrangements to the standard national certificates issued by the public Health Services; thus a fairly uniform reporting format has been maintained.

Although every state has adopted a law requiring the registration of births, deaths, and fetal deaths, these laws are not uniformly observed. In most areas, almost all births and deaths are registered. For some isolated areas, however, there is probably enough under-registration to affect the use of the statistics. For example, a study made in a few selected counties of Tennessee, where the death rates for 1949 to 1951 were unusually low, uncovered a number of unregistered deaths.[2] A similar situation may exist in other states.

The death rates are computed on the basis of population statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Rates for 1940, 1950, and 1960 are based on the populations enumerated as of April 1 of each year. Rates for all other years are based on the estimated midyear (July 1) population. In addition to the national rates, the data include breakdowns by region, age, race, and sex, although detailed information on rates by city size is not available.

The general statistical inadequacies in the NCHS suicide and auto fatalities information seem to be in the form of classification, rather than reporting errors. A recent investigation of fatalities in single-vehicle crashes, for example, suggests that where complete autopsies are not routinely performed—a situation common in most states—as many as 10 percent or

more of fatalities in certain types of highway crashes may be erroneously attributed to accident.[3]

Another study reported that 13 out of 86 crash fatalities that were listed as accidents in Kansas City, Mo., should have been listed as suicide. It was noted that the individuals who died were immature and unstable, with past records of failure, marital and family disharmony, and poor work records. With one exception, the fatalities followed quarrels with wives, sweethearts, other family members, or employers. In general, it was observed that:

> "suicides in one area are often viewed as accidental deaths in another. Various public officials with training varying from extensive to none are charged with this responsibility, often superimposed upon which are various religious, social, and community pressures tending to influence the criteria . . . . It is the attitude of the certifying official, not the victim, upon which the statistics of suicide depend."[4]

Relatively little is known about the frequency with which homicides are misclassified as accidents, or vice versa, although individual case reports of such events appear periodically. However, it is thought that a good many child deaths listed as accidents are really closer to child-abuse homicides. As one investigator notes, "to some physicians the idea that the parents abused their child is so repugnant that they deny this possibility even in the face of clear-cut evidence."[5] In one state, only half of the cases of child abuse suspected by physicians were reported to the authorities.[6]

In sum, it is clear that NCHS death rate data on suicides and auto fatalities do suffer from definite classification problems.[7] There are several reasons, in addition, why the NCHS auto fatality data are less adequate than its suicide data. Violent auto fatality data need to focus on the "offenders" responsible for the action: the drivers. But the NCHS data consider only death rates for victims. Although some of the victims may also be responsible for the action—some drivers are themselves killed—many other nondrivers (e.g., passengers and pedestrians) are also killed. The statistics do not separately list this group.[8] Further, the statistics refer only to "auto fatalities"—not to "violent auto fatalities." There is no attempt to classify separately those drivers who is some way may have been using the motor vehicle as an instrument of force or threatened force against themselves or others.

These inadequacies point to the kind of data that are ideally required to make statistical inferences about those responsible for "violent auto fatalities." The data should (1) focus on the drivers in auto fatalities and not just on the victims and (2) make a judgment on which drivers were guilty of violence-related acts, rather than simply responsible for an "accident." Obviously, the required data are of a very sophisticated nature, can only be produced through considerable investigation, and demand a clearer definition of "violent auto fatalities." Not surprisingly, such information is currently unavailable from any official source. What still can be asked, nonetheless, is whether any present data source can at least be used to "proxy" the levels and trends of "violent auto fatalities"—to substitute, that is, as a rough statistical approximation for the data being sought.

The data presented by the National Safety Council in its annual publication, *Accident Facts*, are a step in the right direction. Empirical information on all accidents, including fatal auto accidents, is presented. Many of the auto fatality data are simply a re-publication of NCHS death

rates, broken down by various categories. Yet, the NSC goes beyond this by using other data sources—NSC's own estimates, and estimates from various state, federal, and international agencies.

In spite of the broader scope of the data, however, only a few tables can be used to approach the very specific topic of "violent auto fatalities." for example, one table in the 1968 edition of *Accident Facts* centers on the number of fatalities broken down by the kinds of improper driving responsible for the death:[9]

- Speed too fast
- Right of way:
  - Failed to yield
  - Passed stop sign
  - Disregarded signal
- Drove left of center
- Improper overtaking
- Made improper turn
- Followed to closely
- Other improper driving

Of these categories, "speed too fast" might be taken as the one under which most violent auto fatalities would fall. Other tables are unfortunately not broken down by these categories, but at least they focus on the drivers involved in fatal accidents and give both age and sex variations.

NSC data have thus been oriented in the right direction, and the Council could probably devise without much difficulty the kind of reporting format useful for analysis of violent auto deaths. The national statistical recommendations reviewed in Chapter 17 include this suggestion.

For the present, however, the best sources for proxy data on "violent auto fatalities" are the *UCR*. The FBI defines "negligent manslaughter" as any death which police investigation establishes as primarily attributable to gross negligence of some individual other than the victim.[10] Importantly, almost all negligent manslaughters today refer to motor fatalities. Ninety-eight percent of the reported 1967 negligent manslaughters, for example, involved motor vehicle deaths.[11] Thus *UCR* negligent manslaughter data present, roughly speaking, information on a certain kind of auto fatality—one where there is gross negligence by the driver.

In the *UCR* reporting scheme, negligent manslaughter is in a twilight zone between non-Index and Index offenses. It is given more consideration than a non-Index crime because, in addition to being categorized by the number of persons arrested and their age, sex, and race, the classification is reported in terms of the number of offenses committed, broken down by city size and regional variation. Yet it is not given the status of an Index crime—the *UCR* Index is composed only of the four major violent and three property offenses discussed in Chapter 2.

Regardless of the status of negligent manslaughter, it presents the usual kind of statistical problems. There is a gap between the reported and the true level of offenses. The NORC survey did not estimate victimization rates for negligent manslaughter, so the size of the gap cannot be estimated. Like criminal homicide, however, the gap may be fairly small because of the

seriousness of the offense. A more likely reason for underreporting might be the misclassification of negligent manslaughters as accidents. There is also a gap between offenses reported and arrests made. Yet this is also fairly minimal, because the negligent manslaughter clearance rate is high.[13] In sum, it would thus seem that the inadequacies of negligent manslaughter data are probably as small as or smaller than those of any other *UCR* category.

Given this background, why should *UCR* negligent manslaughter data be considered the best available proxy of violent auto fatalities? For one thing, more than any other current data source, they focus on the offending drivers in fatalities and classify only those drivers whose actions may be violence related. The *UCR* data do not consist of victim death rates, but rates per 100,000 of those persons who are responsible for an act of criminal negligence.[14] Secondly, negligent manslaughter is by legal definition more than an unintended, noncriminal incident—more than an "accident." The offending driver is guilty of "gross negligence." This is not necessarily equated with guilt in using the motor vehicle as an instrument of force or threatened force against oneself or another, but there does seem to be considerable similarity between the two notions. Negligent manslaughter data are accordingly used in Chapter 3 as the proxy for "violent auto fatality" data and compared to the empirical information on criminal homicide and suicide.

ARSON

The *UCR* have been reporting arson arrests only since 1964, and the data suffer from the same inadequacies as do all *UCR* non-Index categories.[15] Unlike most of the *UCR* classifications, however, there are other national sources for statistics on arson. The Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture maintains statistics on fires which occur on all federal, state, and private forest, brush, and grasslands under formal fire protection. Based on a state-by-state record of fires for the past decade, Forest Service figures reveal that about one-fourth of all forest fires were arsons.[16] Although interesting, the figures are of limited use to the Task Force because individual violence is primarily an urban problem.

More useful are statistics on incendiary building fires published by the National Fire Protection Association.[17] The data on both the number of fires and the total property loss due to fires is broken down by causes, with the category of "incendiary and suspicious" fires presumably including most reported arsons.

The data received by the NFPA represent only a part of all fires because not all areas submit information by causal breakdown. In 1967, for example, fire marshals in only 17 states submitted information by cause, though certain cities in other states also submitted usable data.[18] The areas reporting in that year represented 54,500,000 people, a sample of 27 percent of the United States population.

Like the FBI, the NFPA does not merely publish the reported data but also projects national estimates from the figures submitted. The estimates are based four-fifths on the reports of the state fire marshals and one-fifth on the city fire department reports. Estimates for areas not reporting, or not reporting completely, are made by assuming that the rates are similar to those in comparable areas. In addition, the estimates are adjusted for underreporting. Over the years it has been found that in the average state,

half the fires and one-quarter of the dollar losses are not reported to the state fire marshal. For cities, the ratios of reported to total losses are higher.

Many refinements are undoubtedly missing from these estimates. For example, a city undergoing civil disorders in recent years probably has a much higher arson rate than a city that has remained peaceful. Estimates for one based on the other might be very misleading.

While rate estimates may not be exact, they are probably a more valid gauge of arson levels than any other source, and are an accurate reflection of real trends. NFPA data are accordingly used in Chapter 3. We encourage the Association to improve and expand its reporting networks, and recommend in Chapter 17 that the system be incorporated into an overall state-federal reporting network which includes, among other data, information on all individual acts of violence.

INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE RELATED TO GANGS AND ORGANIZED CRIME

There are no national data which estimate the amount of individual violence for which street gangs and organized crime are responsible. The discussion in Chapters 4 and 14 of levels and trends in these categories is therefore limited to indirect estimates and individual case studies.

REFERENCES

1. The below explanation of the statistics is based on sec. 6 (Technical Appendix) of the 1966 edition.
2. Tennessee Department of Public Health: Results of Survey of Death Registration Completeness. *The Spotlight*, Jan. 1954.
3. I. West, G.L. Nielson, A.E. Gilmore, and J.R. Ryan: "Natural Death at the Wheel," 205 *J.A.M.A.*, 261-271 (July 29, 1968).
4. J.F. Edland: "Vehicular Suicide as a Manner of Death," presented at International Conference on Accident Pathology, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1968.
5. M. Nomura: "The Battered Child Syndrome," a review, 25 *Hawaii Med. J.* 392 (May-June 1966).
6. H. Patterson; & D. Char., "Child Abuse in Hawaii," 25 *Hawaii Med. J.*, 396 (May-June 1966).
7. NCHS data on the frequency of events that do not result in death are more inadequate. Nonfatal accidents—with the exception of highway crashes—work injuries, and some recreational injuries are not reportable. Even where reporting does occur, differences between States and communities make it difficult to arrive at meaningful comparative estimates. Furthermore, as a study from California showed, a substantial proportion of relatively minor events may not be reported even where reporting is required. (See N.R. Smith, Reporting Level of California State Highway Accidents, 36 *Traffic Eng.*, 20 (June 1966). The best estimate of nonfatal accidents resulting in injury is based on National Health Survey Interviews. Estimates of nonfatal suicide attempts are particularly unreliable because few people are willing to admit to unsuccessful attempts and because many of those that are described may purposely be called accidents.
   Although it would be meaningful in Ch. 3 to compare attempt suicides and nonfatal accidents with the willful murder equivalent of aggravated assaults, these reporting inadequacies are so great that the Task Force will be unable properly to analyze the data. We will, however, compare willful murders, suicides and "violent auto fatalities" proper.
8. It should be noted that the problem does not arise in NCHS suicide rates. For although these rates are really meant to be for victims, they are also for offenders,

by the nature of the offense. For willful murder, finally, it has been shown that the data source—the *UCR*—does focus on offenders.

9. National Safety Council, *Accident Facts*, p. 48.
10. As discussed in Ch. 1 and reiterated in Ch. 2, "criminal homicide" is composed of willful murder, nonnegligent manslaughter and negligent manslaughter. However, we are using "criminal homicide" to refer only to willful murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, which the *UCR* combine and report separately from negligent manslaughter.
11. Source: FBI unpublished data. Of the negligent manslaughters not involving motor vehicles, good illustrations are hunting accidents or "accidental" firings of weapons.
12. Criminal Homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
13. Nationally, it was 82 percent in 1967, exceeded only by the 88 percent clearance rate for criminal homicide.
14. The *UCR* negligent-manslaughter *arrest* data thus focuses on these individuals. However, the data on the number of manslaughter *offenses* only counts those people killed by the driver. Thus, for example, if a driver kills himself and two passengers, only two manslaughters are reported by the *UCR*.
15. See Ch. 2.
16. As reported in a letter from the Director of Fire Control in the Forest Service to the Task Force.
17. National Fire Protection Association, *Fire Journal*.
18. The States were Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. The cities that submitted usuable data from States not themselves reporting were: Oakland, Calif.; Indianapolis, Ind.; Louisville, Ky.; Haverhill, Mass.; Atlantic City, N.J.; Columbia, S.C.; Abilene, Austin, Dallas, and Fort Worth, Tex.; and Alexandria, Va.

Slapping. Polymer on canvas by Joseph Shannon. Corcoran Gallery, Washington.

CHAPTER 3

LEVELS AND TRENDS OF INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

We now examine the levels and trends of individual violence in this country. The following summary of major conclusions must be read with an awareness that only a more careful appraisal of how a particular point is developed within the context of the chapter will produce a full understanding of its meaning:

(1) Individual violence has spanned the breadth of American history, and there is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that recent levels and trends of violence per capita are significantly greater than in the more historical past.

(2) The true forcible rape rate has not necessarily risen significantly over the various timespans considered. However, at least since 1958, there has probably been a significant rise in the true rates of criminal homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault.

(3) To the extent that there has been an increase in major individual violence rates in recent years, there is justification for relating it both to street crime, involving strangers, and to personal crime, involving friends, acquaintances, and intimates.

(4) Major violence is primarily a phenomenon of our largest cities.

(5) The most observable regional variations show the South to have the highest rates of homicide and assault, but the lowest rates of robbery. The West experiences the highest rates of forcible rape.

(6) Conclusions on age, race, and sex variations are more difficult to make because they are based on arrest data, which are less complete and more biased than offense data. Those arrested are not necessarily proven guilty, and police are often more likely to arrest youth and members of minority groups. Nevertheless, balancing the reported figures with the reporting problems, we can infer with confidence that the true rates of major violence are higher for individuals in the 18-24 and 15-17 age ranges than for other ages; higher for males than females; higher for Negroes than whites; and higher for poor, uneducated individuals with few employment skills than persons higher up on the socioeconomic ladder.

(7) A significant proportion of the recent increase in major violence is attributable to migration of the population from rural to urban areas and to an increase of the proportion of people aged 15 to 24 relative to the rest of

the population. Thus, part of the real increase in violent crime is due to basic demographic shifts, rather than to more pathogenic forces.

(8) The true suicide rate appears to be considerably higher than the true criminal homicide offense rate, which seems about at the same level as the true negligent manslaughter rate, a "proxy" for violent automobile fatalities. All the levels appear to be much lower than the actual rates for such major violent crimes as robbery and aggravated assault.

(9) When city size, region, age, sex, and race are considered, negligent manslaughter and criminal homicide prove remarkably alike. Yet, only along the dimension of rate distribution by sex is suicide unequivocally similar. It is similar to the other two acts along the city-size and regional dimensions, although the correspondence is not complete. There is an inverse relation between suicide, on the one hand, and negligent manslaughter and criminal homicide, on the other, when age and race are considered. However, it may be that young urban Negro adults experience suicide rates as high or higher than their white counterparts.

(10) The true rate of child abuse is probably significantly higher than the rate for the four major violent crimes combined, although the seriousness of the offense seems to considerably less on the whole. Although injury to children is not uncommon, there is no proof behind the popularized conception of widespread "child battering" in this country. Inferences cannot be made about real trends in the incidence of child abuse over time until further information become available.

(11) There has probably been a significant rise in the true burglary rate over recent years.

(12) A definite uptrend in the true arson rate is evident, and a sharp increase in the real dollar cost of arson per 100,000 is even more striking. Part of this uptrend is probably reflected by arson in the broader context of urban disorders.

(13) The available data on other assaults, other sex offenses, disorderly conduct, and vandalism are so poor that few meaningful inferences can be made from them.

(14) The Violence Commission public opinion survey implies that the incidence of the "legitimate" violence and "normal" deviance diffused through the conventions of everyday life is impressively high, although more studies are needed to objectively take the pulse of violence in our life style and compare it with similar measurements in other countries.

(15) International comparisons suggest that, for the four major violent crimes, the United States has true rates either noticably higher than other industrial countries or among the highest. This holds for both levels and trends of major violence. We are often not alone—especially when recent trends are compared to England and Wales—but we are consistently a leader in comparison to other countries. If, as has been suggested, affluence and social progress are common to all modern countries with high and increasing major violence, this causal matrix would seem to apply even more to the United States than to other nations. Although real American rates are also high and increasing for suicide, violent auto fatalities, and burglary, they do not stand out as much in comparison to foreign countries.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Criminal violence is not new in American history. "Alarming" increases in robbery and other violent crimes are on record since before the Revolution.[1] In stronger language, it has been observed that, "We began, after all, as a people who killed red men and enslaved black men," even though we often did it "with a Bible and a prayer book."[2]

Although the American Revolution is only marginally relevant to a historical profile of criminal violence, the impact it had in defining a new country's freedom and in framing life styles should not be underestimated. The independence and opportunity offered by early America were gained only through violence and revolution.

The levels of violence that were present up to and through the Revolution did not seem to diminish after it:

> The first century after independence were years of incessant violence—wars, slave insurrections, Indian fighting, urban riots, murders, duels, beating. Members of Congress went armed to the Senate and House. In his first notable speech, in January 1838, before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, Abraham Lincoln named internal violence as the supreme threat to American political institutions. He spoke of "the increasing disregard for law which pervades the country; the growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober judgment of Courts; and the worse than savage mobs, for the executive ministers of justice."[3]

The violence Lincoln spoke of was not easily separated from the more massive upheaval he eventually confronted. During the three decades before the Civil War, there appears to have been a gradual increase in crimes of violence, as suggested by case studies of such cities as Buffalo, New York, and Chicago during this period.[4]

There is some evidence that, after the war, the level of serious criminal violence was on a downward trend, at least in certain areas of the nation. Careful study of 19th century criminal statistics in Massachusetts indicate a downward trend in serious, violent crimes and an upsurge of lesser crimes, such as simple assault.[5] Explanations tend to emphasize the influence of early urbanization, rather than any postwar letdown in the propensity to be violent:

> The factory system demands cooperation and regularity of behavior in a way that the older agrarian or commercial economy did not. As the inhabitants of Massachusetts grew used to the city, or "civilized," they learned to settle down.[6]

Although this pattern may have been present in the emerging urban areas during the late 19th century, it probably was not applicable to the rugged frontier regions of the country.

At any rate, the consensus from scattered local statistics and individual case studies of cities is that an upsurge of violent crime occurred after the turn of the century. In 1910, for example, one author declared that "crime,

especially [in] its more violent forms, and among the young is increasing steadily and is threatening to bankrupt the Nation."[7] Memphis reported a homicide rate of 90 per 100,000 in 1961, nearly 15 times as high as the national rate today,[8] while studies in Boston, Chicago, and New York during World War I and the 1920's showed violence rates considerably higher than those evident in the first published national criminal statistics, beginning in 1933.[9]

Between 1930 and 1932, the FBI produced figures on a sizable number of individual cities. The rates of violence suggested were lower than in the 1920's, but higher than the official national statistics of the 1930's.[10] The indication is that the early 20th century surge of reported violence had peaked out and was on a downswing by the time *UCR* figures became available.

There can be no doubt that before, during, and after the turn of the century Americans matched official condemnation of the violent and nonviolent outlaw with a certain sense of social adulation:[11]

> Jessie and Frank James gained a strong and popular following in mid-America after the Civil War. To the many Southern sympathizers in Missouri the James Brothers, who were former Confederate guerrillas, could do no wrong, and to many Grange-minded farmers the James' repeated robberies of banks and railroads were no more than these unpopular economic institutions deserved. Other social bandits have been Billy the Kid, idolized by the poor Mexican herdsmen and villagers of the Southwest, Pretty Boy Floyd, onetime Public Enemy No. 1 of the 1930's who retained the admiration of the sharecroppers of eastern Oklahoma from which stock he sprang, and John Dillinger, the premier bank robber of the Depression Era. Modeling himself on . . . Jesse James, John Dillinger by free-handed generosity cultivated the Robin Hood image while robbing a series of Midwestern banks.[12]

Historical commentary thus indicates the presence of high levels of violence in America before systematic attempts at measurement began nationally in the 1930's. If any general reported trend can be hypothesized, the available evidence suggests an initial high level of violence slowly rising in the late 19th century, perhaps leveling off for a period, rising to a new peak shortly after the turn of the 20th century, and then declining somewhat thereafter. The question of whether or not Americans have historically shown a propensity or impulse to acts of violence remains difficult to answer. Nor is there unequivocal historical evidence to suggest that the period from the 1930's to the present has produced levels and trends of criminal violence significantly greater than in the more distant past.[13]

RECENT LEVELS AND TRENDS OF VIOLENCE

The existence of national criminal statistics from 1933 on allows a more precise discussion of recent levels and trends of violence. Because the statistics have the extensive limitations discussed in Chapter 2, these observation are in large part an exercise in statistical inference. Available reported empirical information is valid only to a certain point,

beyond which we must infer conclusions about true levels and trends of crime. There are four parts to our investigation.

The first considers the four major violent Index crimes of the *UCR*–criminal homicide,[14] forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault–focusing on national rates as well as on variations according to city size, region, age, sex, race, and socioeconomic status. On the whole, Americans probably think of these crimes more than any others when "criminal violence" is discussed, and so there is justification for the detail with which they will be examined.[15]

The second section considers all the other specific acts which Chapter 1 concluded ought to be incorporated into the scope of criminal violence, although the available information is even less complete and accurate than the data on the four major violent crimes.

The third part seeks to shed at least some empirical light on the broader diffusion of "legitimate" violence and "normal" deviance in the American society by disclosing relevant information from the Commission's National Public Opinion Survey on Violence.

We conclude by comparing recent levels and trends of serious violent acts in the United States to those in other countries.

The Major Acts of Individual Violence

National Data

What can be said about recent levels and trends of major violence for the nation as a whole, without consideration of specific groups of regions? The best information available is reproduced in Table 1, which shows national rates for each of the seven major Index crimes, plus combined rates for the four violent crimes and the three property crimes. In all cases, the rates refer to offenses known to the police.[16]

We are presenting rates, not volumes, for the reason discussed in Chapter 2. Yet an initial reference to the gross amount of violence in this country is appropriate because the volume in America is probably greater than in any other nation. For the year 1968, the rates in Table 1 are based on 13,650 reported homicides, 31,060 reported forcible rapes, 261,730 reported robberies, and 282,400 reported aggravated assaults, yielding a total of 588,800 reported major violent crimes for the year.[17]

Notice in Figure 1 that the levels of major violent crime are dwarfed by the levels of major property crime. Over time, the levels for the four major violent crime rates *combined* have been lower than those of auto theft, which, in turn, has generally been the property offense with the lowest rates. These are reported rates, of course, but the NORC survey also indicated a large differential between the incidence of nonviolent (property) crimes and violent crimes. Although violent crimes are generally thought to be much more serious than property crimes, the latter have a much higher rate of incidence.

In recent years, however, there has been a striking similarity between the reported upward trend of violence and property crimes rates. Since 1965 the reported combined violence rate has increased 40 percent, while the reported combined property rate has increased 48 percent. Whatever else

Table 1.—Variation in reported UCR Index offense rates, 1933-68 [rates per 100,000 national population] [a]

Year	Combined rate 4 major violent crimes	Criminal homicide	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Combined rate, 3 major property crimes	Burglary	Larceny $50 and over	Auto theft
1933	153.6	7.6	3.7	93.9	48.4	631.3	328.3	57.9	245.1
1934	131.3	6.1	4.0	74.3	46.9	564.7	288.0	58.3	218.4
1935	116.7	7.0	4.4	61.1	44.2	487.6	242.3	58.6	186.7
1936	106.5	7.1	5.1	49.9	44.4	453.4	236.6	56.5	160.3
1937	107.9	7.0	5.3	53.3	42.3	463.2	247.0	55.4	160.8
1938	104.6	6.6	4.5	52.4	41.1	444.4	248.9	56.1	139.4
1939	103.0	6.6	5.3	48.5	42.6	443.4	258.6	54.1	130.7
1940	100.3	6.5	5.2	46.4	42.2	440.4	260.4	51.0	129.0
1941	98.0	6.5	5.3	42.8	43.4	440.0	246.1	57.4	136.5
1942	113.0	6.4	6.1	46.6	53.9	432.0	235.6	74.1	122.3
1943	108.8	5.5	7.4	44.6	51.3	463.5	239.8	87.2	136.5
1944	114.2	5.6	7.9	43.6	57.1	488.8	244.0	96.0	148.8
1945	131.5	5.9	8.9	54.2	62.5	580.9	287.2	116.2	177.5
1946	142.0	6.9	8.7	59.4	67.0	593.6	303.2	130.0	160.4
1947	139.8	6.2	8.5	55.8	69.3	559.6	297.6	135.8	126.2
1948	135.9	5.9	7.6	51.9	70.5	550.9	295.4	141.6	113.9
1949	138.0	5.3	7.2	54.8	70.7	554.3	314.8	131.8	107.7
1950	132.9	5.3	7.3	48.7	71.6	559.6	312.4	135.0	111.2
1951	127.7	5.1	7.5	46.8	68.3	582.3	303.2	153.0	126.1
1952	139.1	5.3	7.1	51.5	75.2	652.5	324.8	192.1	135.6
1953	145.2	5.1	7.3	54.9	77.9	680.6	345.7	194.5	140.4
1954	146.5	4.8	6.8	57.6	77.3	695.8	367.9	196.5	131.4
1955	136.6	4.7	8.0	48.2	75.1	670.2	342.5	192.2	135.5
1956	136.0	4.7	8.5	46.7	76.7	723.0	358.9	209.7	154.4
1957	140.7	4.6	8.4	49.6	78.1	791.2	395.4	229.1	166.7
1958	147.6	4.6	9.3	54.9	78.8	853.6	437.7	248.4	167.5
1959	146.8	4.8	9.3	51.2	81.5	849.5	431.1	250.3	168.1
1960	159.0	5.0	9.4	59.9	84.7	964.4	500.5	282.3	181.6
1961	156.4	4.7	9.2	58.1	84.4	981.8	510.6	288.9	182.3
1962	160.5	4.5	9.3	59.4	87.3	1030.8	526.4	308.4	196.0
1963	166.2	4.5	9.2	61.5	91.0	1125.8	566.9	344.0	214.9
1964	188.2	4.8	11.0	67.9	104.5	1251.7	623.8	382.6	245.3
1965	197.8	5.1	11.9	71.3	109.5	1314.2	651.0	408.8	254.4
1966	217.2	5.6	12.9	80.3	118.4	1449.5	708.3	456.8	284.4
1967	249.9	6.1	13.7	102.1	128.0	1671.7	811.5	529.2	331.0
1968	294.6	6.8	15.5	131.0	141.3	1940.2	915.1	636.0	389.1

[a] The levels and trends up to 1967 are readjusted by FBI according to the methods in app. 1.

Source: FBI unpublished readjusted data

Note.—The levels and trends up to 1967 are readjusted by FBI according to the methods of app. 1. (FBI unpublished data. See table 1.)

Figure 1.—Rates per 100,000 national population.

may be said about the levels and trends of violent crimes over recent years, their proportion out of the total number of Index offenses reported has remained constant.

What is implied about the proportion of Americans out of the total population who are responsible for serious individual violence? Table 1 shows that in 1968, 295 major violent crimes were reported for every 100,000 people in the country. This refers to offenses and not offenders. Multiple offenders in the same crime event are common. A conservative approximation would be that there are more than twice as many offenders as offenses in major violent crimes. Some are repeaters during the same year, but we are safe in estimating about 600 violent offenders reported per 100,000 population in 1968. If the NORC survey was correct, the true rate was about twice as great, so that roughly 1 out of every 100 Americans may have committed a major violent crime in 1968.

These figures are based on crime during a one year period and include only those offenders who happened to commit deviant acts within that short interval. When we inquire into the cumulative proportion of the population committing at least one act of crime over a number of years, the conclusions are even more striking. A study for the Crime Commission suggested that about 40 percent of all male children now living in the United States will be arrested for a nontraffic offense during their lives.[18] Of the nearly 10,000 boys followed in the Philadelphia birth cohort study discussed below, 35 percent of the boys between the ages of 10 and 17 were responsible for delinquent acts. And, significantly for our purposes, fully 22 percent of the boys were arrested for one or more of the major violent crimes over the 10-year study period.[19] These findings, much more than the yearly figures, should be taken into account when a profile is drawn of how many Americans may be responsible for serious acts of violence.

Whether violence is observed for any one year or over a number of years, rates are considerably higher for certain subgroups out of the total national population than for others.[20]

While the rates in Table 1 focus on offenders, they also show the probability of any individual being a victim.[21] Victimization probabilities specify the likelihood of any citizen's being an object of individual violence in any one year and give an idea of whether or not the current widespread public fear of being victimized is justified.

In fact, the 1968 victimization probabilities computed from Table 1 show roughly one chance in 14,706 of a citizen being killed, one chance in 3,226 of a woman being raped,[22] one chance in 763 of an individual being robbed, and one chance in 709 of a person being assaulted seriously.

Although the current national victimization probabilities may not engender great personal fear in the average citizen, the likelihood of victimization has risen at an alarming pace in recent years. Compare the preceding probabilities with those of 1958 (the chance of a citizen being killed was roughly 1 in 21,739, the chance of a woman being raped was 1 in 5,376, the chance of an individual being robbed was 1 in 1,822, and the chance of a person being seriously assaulted was 1 in 1,270). In addition, the likelihood of being victimized increased greatly when the entire lifespan of an individual is considered.[23] Finally, whether victimization is considered latitudinally and longitudinally, the probabilities are much higher for certain subgroups than for others.[24]

Considering the levels of each of the major violent crimes, Figure 2 shows that the reported homicide level has been the lowest, the reported forcible rape level slightly above it, the reported robbery level greatly above the rape level, and the reported aggravated assault level on top, slightly above robbery.



Note.—The levels and trends up to 1967 are readjusted by FBI according to the methods of app. I. (FBI unpublished data. See table 1.)

Figure 2.—Variation in reported UCR Index offense rates for the four major violent crimes, 1933-68 [rates per 100,000 national population].

Care must be given to specifying the exact timespan used in statements about percentage increases. Different time periods can give very dissimilar percentage changes which, if not stated within the context of other changes over other periods, can often be used to defend greatly divergent interpretations.[25] We will accordingly show trends for various time spans in a systematic way. For each offense type, the 1933-68 period gives the widest perspective, the 1940-68 period begins on a year near which the trend for several crimes reached a low point, the 1958-68 period encompasses the span since the last major changes in *UCR* reporting, and the 1965-68 period marks the time since the Crime Commission and has generally been one of especially dramatic rate increases. Percentage changes of the major violent crime rates over these timespans are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.– Percent change of reported major violent crime offense rates over time[a]

Timespan over which percentage change in rate has been computed

	Percent for 1938-68	Percent for 1940-68	Percent for 1958-68	Percent for 1965-58
Major violent crime type	- 10.5	+ 4.6	+47.8	+33.3
Criminal homicide	+318.9	+198.1	+ 66.7	+30.3
Forcible rape	+ 39.5	+182.3	+138.6	+83.7
Robbery	+191.9	+234.8	+ 79.3	+29.0
Aggravated assault	+ 91.8	+193.7	+ 99.6	+48.9
4 major violent crimes combined				

[a] Computations by Task Force from the rates in Table 1.

The criminal homicide trend actually shows a decrease of 10 percent from 1933 to 1968. When 1940 is used as a base year, there is a slight increase of 5 percent. The 1958-68 period registers an increase of 48 percent. The 1965-68 increase alone is 33 percent.

Because of the extreme seriousness of homicide, it is likely that these reported trends accurately reflect real trends over time. In addition, the argument can be made that, without improved medical and surgical treatment over the 1933-68 span, the homicide increase would be more noticeable. This is because the *UCR* includes only *completed* homicides and classifies attempts as aggravated assaults. Thus, it is possible that advances in medicine, surgery, and transportation to hospitals have resulted in fewer deaths today than in 1933, so that proportionally more "attempts" than "completions" are now reported. There are unfortunately no precise estimates of the effect of technology. Nonetheless, upon balancing all the available evidence, we are persuaded that least since 1958 there has been a significant increase in the true rate of criminal homicide.

There is a pronounced upward trend in the reported forcible rape offense rate (a 319 percent increase since 1933. Because the trend is fairly continuous, the 1940-68 increase is a smaller 198 percent. Much of this rise was in the 1958-68 period, during which the rate increased 68 percent. The rise from 1965 to 1968 alone was 30 percent.

Do these increases represent a true picture, rather than a statistical illusion? Because the category became more limited in scope in 1958 (it was changed from "rape" to "forcible rape," which excludes all statutory offenses) while the reported increase continued to be great, it could be argued that there has been a significant increase in the forcible rape rate, at least over the 1958-68 period.

On the other hand, the NORC survey indicated the true forcible rape rate might be as much as 3½ times greater than the reported one in 1965. This potential gap between true and reported offenses is considerably greater in forcible rape than in any other major violent crime. The possibility that reported increases are a result of digging deeper into the well of unreported offenses is consequently greatest for forcible rape. Another fact blurring the significance of the 1958-68 increase is that many of the cases reported by the police, and hence the *UCR*, may actually be unfounded.[26] These problems are great enough to prevent us from unequivocally inferring that the reported increase in forcible rape offenses necessarily implies a significant uptrend in the true rate.

The overall reported robbery trend shows a sharp decline from the early 1930's to the early 1940's, a leveling off until 1958, and an increase thereafter that began gradually but has become unprecedented. It was not until 1967 that the robbery rate passed the earliest reported rate in 1933. The increase between 1933 and 1968 is accordingly only 40 percent, while the increase from 1940 to the present is fully 182 percent. The recency of this increase is reflected in a rise of 139 percent since 1958 and an 84 percent since 1965 alone.

The possibility that part of the increase is due to more careful police classification as robberies of offenses previously classified as larcenies has been suggested. The NORC study, further, estimated the true robbery rate to be about 1½ times the reported rate. There is consequently reason to conclude that the recent reported increase has been partly statistical. Nonetheless, the 1958-68 rise has been so great and the reporting problems small enough that it is reasonable to assume a significant rise in the true rate in recent years.

Figure 2 shows that the long-term reported trend for aggravated assault is similar to the forcible rape trend—steadily rising, except for a slight downward trend over the first decade. During recent years, however, the increase has been so sharp that it resembles the 1958-68 surge in reported robberies. Rate increases over the various timespans are 192 percent (1933-68), 235 percent (1940-68), 79 percent (1958-68), and 29 percent (1965-68). Part of the reported increase may be due to more careful police classification; and because the NORC survey suggests the true rate may be twice the reported one, the well of unreported offenses is probably substantial. Yet the upswing has been so dramatic and the statistical problems small enough so we can fairly confidently assume a significant rise in the true rate in recent years.[27]

In sum:

- There is reason to conclude that a meaningful rise in the true rates of homicide, robbery and assault has occurred over the last 10 years, although conclusions on rape are difficult to make.

The Influence of Urbanization and Age Redistribution of the Population

Violent crime is centered to a considerable extent in our largest cities. It is well known that the United States is becoming an urbanized society at a rapid rate. The 1960 census, for example, shows that in the last 30 years the rural population of this country has decreased by more than half. From 1960 to 1967 alone the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area population climbed from 112,885,000 to 134,748,000, an increase of 19 percent.[28] It would seem reasonable, therefore, that a significant amount of the reported rise in violent crime could be explained by urbanization alone—by the fact that more people are agglomerating into those environments which, for whatever reasons, produce the most violence.

Table 3.—Reported Index offense increases, 1950-65, and the effects of urbanization[a]

	Increase in volume of reported UCR Index offenses, 1950-65[b]	Percentage of increase attributable to "urbanization" alone (migration from rural to urban areas).
Criminal homicide (willful murder and nonnegligent manslaughter)	2,294	8.5
Negligent manslaughter	1,523	(45.8)[c]
Forcible rape	5,123	12.8
Robbery	65,226	25.1
Aggravated assault	102,180	13.2
Subtotal: 4 major violent crimes[d]	174,823	17.5
Burglary	637,882	14.1
Larceny	1,427,554	20.1
Auto theft	299,723	25.7
Total: all major crimes	2,541,501	19.0

[a]A work of Theodore Ferdinand. (see app. 3)

[b]For each category, the figure represents the number of 1965 offenses reported by the UCR, less than number of 1950 offenses reported by UCR.

[c]Although the volume of negligent manslaughters has increased by the left-handed column figure between 1950 and 1965, the effect of urban-rural population shifts have actually worked to supress the volume of manslaughters. The figure in parenthesis can thus be interpreted as showing the degree of suppression—the proportion of potential increase that urbanization has prevented.

[d]Criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

In a similar manner, it will be shown below that the young generally commit more crime than individuals in other age groups. It is also well known that, because of the high birth rate in the postwar years, the youthful age

group has become an increasingly large proportion of the total population. Since 1961, for example, nearly 1 million more people have entered the 10-to-24 age range each year.[29] It would seem reasonable, therefore, that a significant amount of the reported rise in violent crime could be explained by the age redistribution of the population alone. There are proportionately more people in the high violence-prone age group each year.

These hypotheses have, in fact, proved quite valid. Table 3 shows the increase in volume of reported *UCR* Index offenses, 1950-65, and the percentage of the increase for each crime attributable only to urbanization.

The volume of all major Index offenses (except manslaughter)[30] has increased appreciably as a result of urbanization. For the four major violent crimes, 8 percent of the reported increase in criminal homicide offenses, 13 percent of forcible rape offenses, 25 percent of robbery offenses, and 13 percent of aggravated assault offenses between 1950 and 1965 are attributable to urbanization alone. Overall, 18 percent of the increase in the four major violent crime offenses between 1950 and 1965 is attributable to

Table 4.—Reported Index arrest increases, 1950-65, and the effects of expansion[a]

	Increase in volume of reported UCR Index arrests, 1950-65[b]	Percentage of increase attributable to expansion of proportion of population aged 10-24
Criminal homicide[c] (willful murder, nonnegligent manslaughter and negligent manslaughter)	3,827	5.5
Forcible rape	1,411	47.1
Robbery	26,093	13.4
Aggravated assault	24,915	9.2
Subtotal: 4 major violent crimes[d]	56,246	11.8
Burglary	153,954	12.3
Larceny	317,695	10.7
Auto theft	83,365	13.8
Total: all major crimes	611,260	11.6

[a]Work of Theodore Ferdinand.

[b]For each category, the figure represents the reported number of individuals arrested in the 1950 UCR.

[c]Willful murder and non-negligent manslaughter" was not differentiated from "negligent manslaughter" in 1950 UCR arrest reporting. While "criminal homicide" refers to the first two alone throughout the rest of the Report (see the explanation in chapter 1), the term therefore must here incorporate negligent manslaughter.

[d]Criminal homicide (including negligent manslaughter) forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

urbanization alone. The figure for both violent and property offenses is 19 percent.

Table 4 shows the increase in volume of reported *UCR* Index arrests, 1950-1965, and the percentage of those increases for each crime attributable to expansion of the proportion of the population aged 10 to 24.[31] For the four major violent crimes, 6 percent of the reported increase in criminal homicide arrests, fully 47 percent of the reported increase in forcible rape arrests, 13 percent of the reported increase in robbery arrests, and 9 percent of the reported increase in aggravated assault arrests between 1950 and 1965 are attributable to expansion in the 10- to 24-age cohort. Overall, 12 percent of the increase in the four major violent crime arrests between 1950 and 1965 is attributable to age redistribution alone. The figure for all reported arrests, violent and property, is 12 percent.

The reason for emphasizing the urbanization and age redistribution effects (the calculations for which are fully explained in App.3) is not to play down any increase in violent crime.[32] It is, rather, to show that a significant proportion of the recent reported increase in violent crime is attributable to basic demographic shifts in our society, not to more pathogenic factors.

City Size Variation

What exactly have violent crime rates been in urban areas and for the young? We will answer this question as part of a broader inquiry into how recent major violence has varied according to city size, region, age, sex, race and socioeconomic status.

There is substantial information to prove the relationship between big cities and high levels of major violent crimes rates in 1967. The reported combined rate for major violent offenses in cities with over 1 million inhabitants is close to nine times greater than in rural areas and about eight times greater than in cities with over 10,000 population. From all the agencies reporting to the *UCR* in 1967, six cities with populations over 1 million (composing approximately 12 percent of the total population) contributed about one-third of the total reported major violent crimes. Similarly, 26 cities with populations over 500,000 or more contributed 49 percent of the total reported major violent crimes, though they claimed as residents only about 19 percent of the total population.[33] The high 1967 major violent crime levels in urban areas are broken down in Appendix 4 for each city with a population over 25,000.[34]

The validity of each city's reporting system varies, of course, so that the data might be considerably different if all cities were uniformly rigorous. For criminal homicide, Atlanta reported the highest 1967 rate (28 per 100,000, as compared with 24 for second-place St. Louis). Los Angeles reported the highest forcible rape rate (50), with Newark and Baltimore close behind at 48 and 47, respectively. The reported robbery rate was highest in Detroit (730). Baltimore and Washington, D.C. were not far behind (at 713 and 712). For aggravated assault, Baltimore was first by a considerable margin (at 710 versus 571 for second-place Miami). When the four rates are combined, Baltimore clearly has the highest reported incidence, at 1,492 per 100,000. Below

Baltimore, the following cities are fairly close together:

Newark (1,170)
Washington, D.C. (1,144)
Detroit (1,074)
Miami (1,067)

When levels and trends over a period of time are considered, similar conclusions can be made about the disproportionate incidence of major violent crimes in large cities.

Figures 3 through 7 show major violent crime offense rates, plus the combined rate, by city size since 1960.[35] With the exception of rural and suburban cases, it can be seen that rate levels in each figure and for each year (with only the exception of criminal homicide in 1960) are ranked according to city size. The great cities uniformly have the highest reported major violent offense levels and the smaller cities have lower levels. In each figure, for each city size, there is an upward trend. However, especially since 1965, the reported big-city offense rate increase has been much more dramatic than that for any other city size. The smaller city sizes generally show more moderate rate increases that are very similar to one another.[36]

In recent years, the suburbs have generally reported lower offense rate levels than all but the smallest cities. The only exception has been for forcible rape. By 1967, and in comparison to the other trend levels, the suburban rate was sixth highest for homicide, third for forcible rape, fifth for robbery, sixth for aggravated assault, and fifth for the rates combined. Although the reported increases have not been dramatic, suburban rates appear to be going up as business and industry increase, with shopping centers frequently cited by local police as targets for suburban crime.[37]

Reported rural area rates for homicide have consistently been in third place relative to cities of various sizes and suburbs. By 1967, however, the rural rate was only fifth highest for forcible rape; it was lowest of all for robbery, aggravated assault and the combined rate. The rural rate increase generally has been mild.

The NORC study tends to confirm these *UCR*-based observations. The NORC true-rate estimates were broken down into three categories: center metropolitan, suburban metropolitan, and nonmetropolitan. It was found that rates for the four major violent crimes declined with movement away from the center metropolitan area, and did so more rapidly than was the case for the three Index property crimes.[38]

Part of the reason for higher urban crime rates seems to be that central-city high crime areas—in most part the ghettos—have enlarged in terms of physical space as a consequence of large migrations to the suburbs.[39] Because of such changes, the Crime Commission concluded that "comparing city crime rates of today with those of earlier years is to some extent like comparing the rates for a high crime district with those for the whole city."[40]

Thus:

- In spite of the statistical reporting inadequacies, there appears to be a strong, direct relationship between the size of a city and the real level



Source: UCR, 1960-67, See app. 5.

Figure 3.—Variation in reported criminal homicide offense rates by size of city, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1960-67, See app. 5.

Figure 4.—Variation in reported forcible rape offense rates by size of city, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1960-67. See app. 5.

Figure 5.—Variation in reported robbery offense rates by size of city, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1960-67. See app. 5.

Figure 6.—Variation in reported aggravated assault offense rates by size of city, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1960-67. See app. 5.

Figure 7.—Variation in reported offense rates, four major violent crimes combined; offense rates by size of city, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

of major violent crime. The problem of major individual acts of violence is foremost a problem of the big cities. In the context of major violent crimes, the much popularized phrase "urban crisis" is a preeminent reality. There are alternative approaches to solving the interrelated urban problems that confront us. At this point, we cannot emphasize strongly enough that the available empirical evidence presses for immediate and wide ranging action in our great cities.

Regional Variation

It has been traditional to complement discussions of city-size variations with considerations of regional variations. However, there are important limitations to regional analyses. Of foremost concern is the possibility of oversimplification: regional generalizations often imply that similar conclusions are necessarily applicable to all subareas in the common region. In fact, regions are often more heterogeneous. This is especially so in the United States, where a major region like the West covers over a million square miles.

The most violent crime-related islands in any region are the cities. If there are environmental influences encouraging individual acts of violence, it is likely that they are more derivative of specific city or general urban factors, rather than of broad regional characteristics. In a very large sense, then, the following is a discussion of whether cities in one geographic area have significantly higher violent crime rates than cities in other geographic areas.[41]

Variations in reported rates for the major violent crimes, plus the combined rate, are considered for four broad regions: Northeast, North Central, South, and West. For each crime, 1967 reported rates and recent levels and trends are considered over the 1958-67 period.[42] To contrast reported police rates with victimization estimates of the true rates, we compared the FBI and NORC figures for regional variation.

Figure 8 and Table 5 show that the South clearly had the highest reported homicide offense rates in 1967. The overall rate for the South was 9 per 100,000 compared with 5 in the North Central States, the West and the Northeast. The high Southern rates were spread rather evenly through its subregions, and the South Atlantic rate (10) was only slightly higher than the rate in both the East South Central and West South Central States (9).

Figure 9 shows that reported Southern homicide offense rate levels have consistently been about twice as high as any other region over the last 10 years. For all regions, there has been a slight upward trend over the 1958-67 period.[43] It is probably valid to conclude that the reported homicide offense rate differences between the South and the other regions also hold for the true rates. This is clear in Table 6, which shows agreement as to the region with the highest levels between the *UCR* offense rate data and the NORC victimization estimates of the true rate.

Figure 10 and Table 5 show that reported forcible rape offense rates in the West were nearly twice as high as those in each of the other regions in 1967. The high overall Western rate was especially due to California.

Figure 11 shows that the reported level in the West has remained about twice as high as that in other regions over the last 10 years. For all regions,

Table 5.—Variation in UCR reported major violent crimes by region, 1967 [a]
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Major violent crime	Region: Northeast	(New England)	(Mid-Atlantic)	North Central	(East North Central)	(West North Central)
Criminal homicide	4.1	(2.4)	(4.6)	4.9	(5.5)	(3.7)
Forcible rape	10.6	(6.3)	(11.9)	13.5	(14.6)	(10.6)
Robbery	117.0	(37.0)	(141.5)	115.7	(135.7)	(66.6)
Aggravated assault	105.3	(58.1)	(119.8)	102.2	(113.7)	(74.0)
4 Major violent crimes combined	237.0	(103.8)	(277.8)	236.3	(269.5)	(154.9)

Major violent crime	South	(South Atlantic)	(East South Central)	(West South Central)	West	(Mountain)	(Pacific)
Criminal homicide	9.4	(9.6)	(9.2)	(9.2)	4.9	(4.8)	(4.9)
Forcible rape	12.9	(13.5)	(9.9)	(14.0)	20.1	(14.5)	(21.8)
Robbery	74.7	(97.2)	(39.4)	(63.6)	108.9	(53.8)	(125.9)
Aggravated assault	163.5	(191.1)	(124.3)	(147.4)	138.3	(100.9)	(149.9)
4 Major violent crimes combined	260.5	(311.4)	(182.8)	(234.2)	272.2	(174.0)	(302.5)

[a] *UCR, 1967*, table 3. For each breakdown, the component sub-regions are shown in parentheses.

The crime breakdown is for each of the 4 major violent crimes and for these crimes combined. The circled rate in each row shows which region had the highest rate for the indicated crime in 1967.



Source: UCR, 1958-67. See app. 6.

Figure 9.—Variation in reported criminal homicide and nonnegligent manslaughter offense rates, by region, 1958-67, [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1967.

Figure 8.—Variation in reported criminal homicide and nonnegligent manslaughter offense rates, by state, 1967, [rates per 100,000 population].

Table 6.—Variation in UCR 1965 and 1967 major violent crime rates vs. NORC 1965 major violent crime rates[a]
[rates per 100,000 population]

Major violent crime	Region											
	Northeast			North Central			South			West		
	UCR '67	UCR '65	NORC '65	UCR '67	UCR '65	NORC '65	UCR '67	UCR '65	NORC '65	UCR '67	UCR '65	NORC '65
Criminal homicide	4.1	3.6	0	4.9	3.7	0	9.4	8.0	10	4.9	4.2	
Forcible rape	10.6	8.5	25	13.5	11.8	42	12.9	10.8	48	20.1	17.2	5
Robbery[b]	117.0	49.9	139	115.7	76.6	85	74.7	45.6	48	108.9	81.9	13
Aggravated assault	105.3	84.7	164	102.2	84.1	233	163.5	140.6	173	183.3	113.5	36
4 major violent crimes combined	237.0	146.7	328	236.3	176.2	360	260.5	205.0	279	272.2	216.8	55

[a]UCR, 1965 and 1967; NORC Survey, p. 21. For each UCR year, the region with the highest rate for a particular type of violent crime is circled. For the one NORC year, the highest rate for a particular type of violent crime has a square around it.

[b]NORC figures are for individuals only; UCR figures are not adjusted and reflect all offenses known to the police, not just those for individuals.



Source: UCR, 1958-67. See app. 6.

Figure 10.—Variation reported in forcible rape offense rates, by region, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1967.

Figure 11.—Variation in reported forcible rape offense rates, by state, 1967 [rates per 100,000 population].

however, there has been a definite upward trend in reported forcible rape offenses, especially since about 1963. The sharpest overall reported increase has been in the North Central States, where the rate has more than doubled over the last 10 years.

Table 6 makes it reasonable to conclude from the reported police offense rates that the West did in fact have the highest true forcible rape rate. The *UCR* reported figures for 1965 and 1967 and the NORC victimization estimate for 1965 agree that the West is the region with the highest rates.

Reported 1967 robbery offense rates were highest in the Northeast according to Figure 12 and Table 5, although the North Central and Western rates were insignificantly lower. The Northeast rate was 117, while the North Central and Western rates were 116 and 109, respectively. The Southern level was a distant fourth at 75. The Middle Atlantic area was largely responsible for the high reported Northeast rates, the East North Central area disproportionately responsible for the high reported North Central rates, and the Pacific area greatly influenced the high reported Western rates.

According to Figure 13, robbery trends in all regions noticeably upsurged over the 10-year period, with sharp spurts between 1965 and 1967. During this short period, the Northeast rate increased 134 percent, the North Central rate 51 percent, the Western rate 33 percent, and the Southern rate 33 percent. Before 1965, the reported Northeast level was relatively low. It is likely that the sharp Northeast rise thereafter was in large part due to the 1964-66 reporting changes in New York City, discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, it is probable that the true Northeast robbery levels were in fact high throughout the entire 10-year span.[44] The reported 1959-61 North Central spurt can be similarly explained by the reporting changes Chicago underwent at that time.

Table 6 shows that the 1965 NORC estimate of true robbery rates disagreed with the 1965 *UCR* reported rates in regard to which region had the highest levels of incidence. The NORC survey showed the Northeast highest, while the *UCR* showed the Northeast only third. By 1967, however, the *UCR* also showed the Northeast first, probably reflecting more rigorous New York City reporting. In general, there is closer agreement between the 1965 NORC ranking of robbery levels by region and the 1967 *UCR* ranking, than between the 1965 NORC and the 1965 *UCR* rankings. If it can be assumed that regional rankings of the true rates have not changed since 1967, it thus seems likely that the 1967 *UCR* figures more reliably reflected the true rates than did the 1965 *UCR* figures.

Figure 14 and Table 5 show the 1967 reported Southern aggravated assault offense rates above those in other regions. This fact is not surprising, considering that the South is also highest in reported criminal homicide and that there is a close relation between homicide and aggravated assault.[45] The Southern rate was 164. The West had the second highest reported rate (138), while the Northeast and the North Central regions reported noticeably lower rates (105 and 102, respectively).

Levels and trends over the 10-year period maintained the 1967 reported aggravated assault relationships among regions. The South is consistently first, the West is consistently second, and the other two regions are consistently close together in third place, according to Figure 15.

Part of the higher Southern levels may be explained by the Southern



Source: UCR, 1967.

Figure 12.—Variation in reported robbery offense rates, by state, 1967 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1958-67. See app. 6.

Figure 13.—Variation in reported robbery offense rates, by region, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1967.

Figure 14.—Variation in reported aggravated assault offense rates by state, 1967 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1958-67. See app. 6.

Figure 15.—Variation in reported aggravated assault offense rates by region, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

tradition of resorting to violence in settling family arguments and personal disputes. This thesis is explored in the Commission's Task Force on the History of Violence. We caution, however, against relating the historically high Southern aggravated assault and homicide rates to Negro offenders only:

> Study after study over a number of years has failed to correlate race with the rate of crime against persons for the [Southern] area. . . . While a great deal of the violence in the South was committed by Negroes, largely against other Negroes, rates of offenses for Southern whites have also been high compared with those in other parts of the country.[46]

The disparity between reported aggravated assault offense rates in the South and those in other regions is not as great as it used to be. This was true for homicide, too,[47] so the similarity between that offense and aggravated assault is again evident. During the 1935–1965 period, for example, the reported aggravated assault rate tripled in most regions outside the South, while the West South Central increase was 60 percent, the South Atlantic increase was 20 percent, and there was a decline in the East South Central rate.[48]

Although the 1965 and 1967 *UCR* continued to show the South as the region with the highest reported aggravated assault rate, the 1965 NORC victimization estimate of the true rate found the *West* to be on top, with the South only third (Table 6). It is therefore impossible to infer from recent reported offense rates that the South is the region with the highest true aggravated assault offense rate, and it is possible that, at least currently, the rate is higher in the West.

Figures 16 and 17 and Table 5 show that, especially in recent years, the reported rate levels for the four major violent crimes combined have been very similar in all regions, with the West slightly on top. In 1967, for example, the West had the highest combined rate, 282, with the South at 260, the Northeast at 237, and the North Central region at 236. Mainly reflecting robbery and aggravated assault offenses, the combined violent crime rate in each region has experienced a sharp increase, especially since 1963.

The *UCR* reported police rates and the NORC victimization estimates seem to concur in Table 6 that the West has had the highest combined rate in recent years.[49]

Whether police or victimization figures are used, the high combined major violent crime rate in the West appears especially due to the high rate in California.[50] Part of the reason for the high ranking of California may be that its statistical reporting system is the most rigorous in the country: only in this state are local agencies required by law to report all statistical data to a central statistical bureau. As a result, it may be that the higher California figures are simply more accurate and truthful than in most other states.

Another partial explanation is the effect of urbanization and migration. We have related urbanization to violent crime, and California is one of the three most heavily urbanized states in the nation. The 1960 census showed 86 percent of the California population to be urbanized, while the national average is only 70 percent. It is significant that



Source: UCR, 1967.

Figure 16.—Variation in reported offense rates for four major violent crimes combined, by state, 1967 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1958-67. See app. 6.

Figure 17.—Variation in reported offense rates for four major violent crimes combined, by region, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

California has been the recipient of one of the greatest migrations in Western history. "And whether migration is itself as important a cause of crime, as is sometimes asserted, or not, in larger quantities it is clearly unsettling and disruptive of the social order."[51]

On the other hand, it will be shown below that age and race are demographic factors which clearly affect the incidence of crime, yet there is nothing in the California age/race population to make it significantly different from the distribution in the rest of the country.[52] Age and race do not seem to be factors explaining the high incidence of violence in California.

In sum:

- The true criminal homicide rate level is highest in the South, with the other three regions grouped fairly close together below. The reported uptrends in each region do not always reflect true increases, although there is some reason to believe that the real gap between Southern rates and those of other regions is diminishing.
- We infer that the true forcible rape rate is higher in the West (especially California) than in the other three regions, which vary insignificantly from one another. As with the national figures, it is difficult to unequivocally conclude that there has been an uptrend in the true rate; nor can it be said with certainty that the real rates of one region have changed proportionately to other regions over the time periods covered.
- For robbery, the West, the North Central and the Northeast regional levels seem grouped close together and significantly above the Southern level. The sharp reported uptrends in every region probably do not reflect the rise in the real rate.
- The *UCR* and NORC data are more conflicting for aggravated assaults than for the other violent crime types. The safest inference that can be made is that the true Western levels appear higher than those of the Northeast and the North Central regions. There probably has been a significant real uptrend in all regions over the period observed, however. There is also reason to conclude that, since 1935, any gap between higher real rates in the South and lower real rates in other regions may have diminished.
- When the four rates are combined, it can be concluded that the West probably has the highest real rate level. It cannot be said with any assurance, however, that the real combined rate for any one region has significantly changed in relation to the rates of other regions over the last 10 years.

Age Variation

The conclusions on major violent crime variation according to city size and region were based on reported offense rate data. For the factor of age (as well as for sex, race, and socioeconomic status), only arrest rates can be computed, as explained in Chapter 2. Conclusions about the true incidence of violence are even more risky when using arrest data than when using offense data. Not only is there the gap between the true violence rate and the offenses reported rate, but a second gap exists between offenses reported and arrests made.

In general, arrest statistics are less complete and accurate than offense statistics. Critics assert that by the use of arrest data to describe the criminal or delinquent population, the police are permitted to decide those whom the community will treat as criminal. They say that such use of arrest data, without verification of guilt by either a government decision to prosecute or the courts' decision to correct, works to the detriment of minority groups, who are often viewed with suspicion by police but are treated somewhat more circumspectly by both prosecutors and courts.[53]

In spite of these problems, arrest figures remain the most reliable source of information about the personal characteristics of offenders. In drawing conclusions and inferences about variation in true rates of violence according to age, sex, race, and socioeconomic status, we will be careful to balance the reported arrest figures against the reporting problems.

For each of the major violent crimes, plus the combined reported arrest per 100,000, Figures 18-22 show variations by the following age breakdowns; 10-14, 15-17, 18-24, 25 and over, and all ages (10 and over).[54] While references to "youth" usually refer to the 10-14, 15-17 and 18-24 groups, references to "juveniles" traditionally relate to the 10-14, and 15-17 groups only.[55] The rates have been computed by the staff from *UCR* arrest and U.S.



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 7.

Figure 18.—Variation in reported urban criminal homicide arrest rates, by age, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 7.

Figure 19.—Variation in reported urban forcible rape arrest rates, by age, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Census population data. The timespan is 1958-67. Because violent crime is so much an urban phenomenon, the arrest rates are for urban areas only;[56] suburban and rural areas are not included.[57]

Figure 18 indicates that the levels of reported criminal homicide arrests have been consistently highest (18 in 1967) for the 18-24 group and consistently lowest (1 in 1967) for the 10-14 cohort. The other age ranges have remained at levels somewhere between.

The reported homicide rate trend is upward over the period. There is a much sharper increase in juvenile arrest rates relative to rates for other groups, however. While the rate of increase over the period was 76 percent for the 18-24 group, for example, the 10-14 cohort rate jumped 150 percent and the 15-17 rate increased by 112 percent.

The 18-24 group is shown in Figure 19 to have consistently maintained the highest reported rate level for forcible rape (35 in 1967). The 15-17 cohort is consistently second (29 in 1967), the 25-plus group consistently third (6 in 1967), and the 10-14 cohort consistently fourth (4 in 1967).

Reported arrest rates for forcible rape broken down by age of offender have remained relatively constant over the trend period. The overall rate of



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 7.

Figure 20.—Variation in reported urban robbery arrest rates, by age, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

increase is a relatively small 28 percent. The second place 15-17 cohort, however, has been closing the gap somewhat between it and the first place 18-24 cohort. Reported arrests of persons in the former group have increased 20 percent, while the increase is only 2 percent in the latter group.

In the case of robbery—the offense that refers to anonymous attacks in the street more than any other major violent crime—the reported arrest rates for the 18-24 cohort (181 in 1967) and for the 15-17 group (192 in 1967) have been highest by far over the period, according to Figure 20. The 10-14 and 25-plus groups have had much lower arrest rate levels (62 and 25, respectively, in 1967).

The overall upward trend in arrest rates has been greater in robbery than in any other of the four major violent crimes. The 10-14 reported arrest rate increased a dramatic 193 percent over the period. The 15-17 cohort increased by 87 percent, enough to surpass the 18-25 arrest rate level in 1965. The rate of the latter group increased by 38 percent over the period. However, when only the span 1965-1967 is observed, an especially dramatic upsurge in the 18-24, as well as the 15-17, arrest rate becomes apparent.

The 18-24-age group has consistantly shown the highest reported aggravated assualt arrest rate (202 in 1967) over the 10-year period (Figure



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 7.

Figure 21.—Variation in reported urban aggravated assault arrest rates, by age, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

21). The reported 15-17 rate level has consistently been second (118 in 1967), and the 25-plus level consistently third (88 in 1967).

The reported aggravated assault upward trend by age is somewhat less than, but very much parallel to, the robbery increase over the period. Again, the two juvenile cohorts experienced the sharpest rises. The 10-14 group arrest rate increased by 290 percent and the 15-17 group arrest rate by 153 percent over the period, closing the gap between it and the 18-24 cohort rate, which increased by only 62 percent. For none of the groups, however, is there the kind of dramatic upsurge during 1965-1967 that characterized the 15-17 and 1824 cohorts for robbery.

In summary:

- A significant relationship exists between the true rate for each of the major violent crimes and the 18-24 and 15-17 cohorts. That this does not apply to the 10-14 cohort strongly suggests it is misleading to generalize about "juveniles" and "youth" without specifying definite and rather narrow age ranges. With regard to trends, the conclusions acknowledge a disproportionate increase in the true rates of the 10-14 and 15-17 cohorts for robbery and aggravated assault. Because census



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 7.

Figure 22.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates, 4 major violent crimes combined, by age, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

projections indicate a continued increase in the aged 10-14, 15-17 and 18-24 populations relative to other population groups, the need to focus a large part of violence reduction policy on these groups seems of paramount importance from the data available.

Sex Variation

Figures 23 through 27 show for each of the major violent crimes, plus the combined crimes, reported arrest rate breakdowns between males and females. The figures were computed by the Task Force from *UCR* arrest



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 8.

Figure 23.—Variation in reported urban criminal homicide arrest rates by sex, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

volumes and U.S. Census population volumes in exactly the same way as Figures 18 through 22.[58] The time period is 1958-67, and only urban data are used for the same reason as in the age computations.[59]

An examination of the figures shows that reported male arrest rate levels have been overwhelmingly greater than reported female arrest rate levels. In 1967, for example, the reported male homicide rate was about 5 times higher than the female rate, the robbery rate about 20 times greater, and the aggravated assault rate approximately 6½ times higher. As far as trends over time are concerned, the homicide arrest rate increases were 61 percent for males and 27 percent for females, the robbery increases were 72 percent for males and 97 percent for females, and the aggravated assault increases were 74 percent for males and 45 percent for females.[60]

Thus:

- In spite of the statistical problems, it is safe to infer that the true level of violent crime is still disproportionately weighted toward male offenders. To the extent that females are offenders, they appear more likely to commit "intimate" violent crimes such as murder than "street crimes" such as robbery.
- No conclusions, however, can be drawn about whether the upward trend of violent crime involves a greater male or female percentage rate increase. In particular, the female increases may be unreliable because the reported female levels are so low that minor reporting changes could be greatly responsible for the observed variations



Source: UCR,1958-1967, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 8.

Figure 24.—Variation in reported urban forcible rape arrest rates, by sex, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Racial Variation

Figures 28-32 show for each of the violent crimes, plus the combined crimes, reported arrest rate breakdowns for Negroes versus whites. The figures were computed by the FBI for the Task Force and are based on *UCR* arrest volumes and U.S. Census population volumes.[61] To further refine the figures, the rates were computed for all ages (10 and above) and also for the 10-17-year-old group for each race.[62] They show urban reported arrest rates only, for the same reasons as did the age and sex figures.[63] The trend



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 8.

Figure 25.—Variation in reported urban robbery arrest rates, by sex, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

period covers 1964 through 1967, because it has been only during these years that the *UCR* have made race-age breakdowns.

The reported arrest rate levels are markedly higher for Negroes than for whites in all four major violent crimes. The year 1967, presenting the most accurate UCR data, is illustrative. In criminal homicide, the Negro 10-17 cohort experienced a reported arrest rate (22) about 17 times above the white 10-17 cohort rate (1.3), while the Negro rate for all ages (54) was 18 times greater than the corresponding white rate (3). In forcible rape, the black reported arrest rate for ages 10-17 (60) was approxiamtely 12 times higher than the corresponding white rate (5), and the rate for blacks of all ages (60) was also 12 times above the rate for whites of all ages (5). In robbery, the Negro 10-17 reported arrest rate (550) was approximately 20 times higher than the white 10-17 rate (27), while the rate for Negroes of all ages (369) was about 16 times higher than that for the complete spectrum of white ages (23). In aggravated assault, the black reported arrest rate for 10-17-year-olds (336) was eight times as large as the corresponding white rate (41), and the black rate over all ages (477) was around 10 times as high as for all white ages (46).



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 8.

Figure 26.—Variation in reported urban aggravated assault rates, by sex, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

The trends show that increases in reported black urban arrest rates over the 1964-67 period are greater than increases in white rates for three of the four major violent crimes. In criminal homicide, the Negro 10-17 reported arrest rate increased by 82 percent, while the corresponding white rate remained unchanged; the Negro rate for all ages rose by 39 percent, and the white rate for all ages rose by 11 percent. In forcible rape, the black reported arrest rate for the 10-17 cohort increased 31 percent versus 20 percent for the corresponding white rate; the rises for blacks and whites of all ages were 27 percent and 10 percent respectively. In robbery, the Negro reported arrest rate increase was 73 percent for the 10-17 group versus 15 percent for the corresponding white group; the Negro increase for all ages was 52 percent, and the white increase for all ages was 10 percent.

The aggravated assault reported arrest rate increase was 22 percent for blacks in the 10-17 cohort and 26 percent for whites in the corresponding cohort; the rate of increase for blacks for all ages was only 6 percent versus a 19 percent increase for whites of all ages. Aggravated assault was thus the only major violent crime in which the white increase in reported urban arrest rates was greater than the black increase.



Source: UCR, 1958-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates by Task Force. See app. 8.

Figure 27.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates, 4 major violent crimes combined, by sex, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1964-1967, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates done for the Task Force by the FBI. See app. 9.

Figure 28.—Variation in reported urban criminal homicide arrest rates, by race and age, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1964-67, and U.S. Census. Computation of rates done for the Task Force by the FBI. See app. 9.

Figure 29.—Variation in reported urban forcible rape arrest rates, by race and age, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR, 1964-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates done for the Task Force by the FBI. See app. 9.

Figure 30.—Variation in reported urban robbery arrest rates, by race and age, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Figure 32 shows that the levels and trends resulting from combining the rates for the four major violent crimes are the usual basic reflection of robbery and aggravated assault levels and trends.

The large national arrest differentials between Negroes and whites evident in the figures are essentially borne out in a forthcoming cohort study of delinquents in Philadelphia.[64] The analysis is limited to boys born in 1945 who lived in Philadelphia from at least ages 10 to 18 and focuses on arrests during the juvenile period (ages 7 to 17). The study is not completely comparable to the preceding figures, because "nonwhites" instead of "Negroes" are referred to and only males and those arrested under the age of



Source: UCR, 1964-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates done for the Task Force by the FBI. See app. 9.

Figure 31.—Variation in reported urban aggravated assault rates, by race and age, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

18 are considered. These problems are not great, however, because most nonwhites in Philadelphia are Negroes, because most offenders are males, and because the racial differentials between the groups aged 10-17 in the above figures were basically the same as the racial differentials for all ages combined. Although the study is only for one city, its method is more rigorous than any previous comparable survey, so that the arrest rates computed are reliable. It therefore is an ideal source against which to compare our findings on racial differentials.

The cohort involved 2,902 nonwhite and 7,043 white youths. Of this group, about 85 percent were born in Philadelphia and about 95 percent went all the way through the Philadelphia school system (including both public and parochial schools). Delinquency was defined as at least one official contact with the police in which the subject was taken into custody and a report recording his offense prepared and retained in police files. Of the 9,945 subjects, 35 percent proved to be delinquents by this definition.

For the nonwhites, 1,458, or 50 percent, were delinquent while 2,017, or 29 percent, of the whites were delinquent:

> The higher proportion of nonwhite delinquents constitutes one of the major statistical dichotomies running throughout the analysis of the



Source: UCR, 1964-67, and U.S. Census. Computations of rates done for the Task Force by the FBI. See app. 9.

Figure 32.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates, four major violent crimes combined, by race and age, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

> cohort and particularly of the delinquent subset. No other variable emerges quite so clearly and significantly.

While *UCR* arrest statistics are based on rates per 100,000 in a given year, the delinquency arrest rates in the cohort study represented the number of juveniles per 1,000 who were arrested for a delinquent act sometime during the 11-year period covered. With the longer time period, the cohort study rates are thus obviously higher than *UCR* rates. It is not, however, so much the rates themselves which interest us, but rather the differentials between the rates when they are broken down by race.

The rates for nonwhites proved to be higher than white rates for each of the four major violent crimes, and the racial differentials were more pronounced here than for all other kinds of delinquent acts. In the case of criminal homicide, for example, 14 acts were recorded in the entire cohort, and all were committed by nonwhite boys, giving them a rate of 5/1,000.

There were 44 forcible rapes recorded for the cohort, 38 commited by nonwhites and 6 by whites. This produced a nonwhite rate of 13/1,000 and a white rate of 1/1,000 for the cohort. The racial differential here corresponds closely to the differential in the national arrest rates reported above, where

the Negro 10-17 rate in 1967 was 12 times greater than the white rate for the same age group.

One hundred and ninety-three cases of robbery were recorded as perpetrated by members of the cohort, 173 by nonwhites and 20 by whites. The resulting rates were 60/1,000 for nonwhites and 3/1,000 for whites, producing a nonwhite rate 20 times the white rate. Again this ratio is strikingly similar to the racial differential found in the national arrest statistics: for the year 1967 the Negro arrest rate for the 10 to 17 group was 20 times that of the white juvenile group.

The cohort was responsible, finally, for 220 aggravated assaults, 181 involving nonwhites and 39 involving whites. These represented rates of 62/1,000 and 6/1,000, respectively, or an incidence about 10 times greater amount nonwhites than whites. This maintained the close correspondence between the cohort racial differential and the computed national arrest rate differential, above, which showed the 1967 Negro aggravated assault arrest rate for the 10-17 age group to be eight times greater than for the white juvenile group.

The implications of the cohort data, as well as of the earlier national rate computations, must be kept in proper perspective. Simple causal references about race and violence must be avoided. Although much more research is needed, the information presently available indicates that violence rate differentials between blacks and whites would become noticeably smaller if conditions of equal opportunity prevailed. In a classic delinquency study in Chicago, for example, it was concluded:

> The important fact about rates of delinquency for Negro boys is that they, too, vary by type of area. They are higher than the rates for white boys, but *it cannot be said that they are higher than rates for white boys in comparable areas, since it is impossible to reproduce in white communities the circumstances under which Negro children live.* Even if it were possible to parallel the low economic status and the inadequacy of institutions in the white community, it would not be possible to reproduce the effects of segregation and the barriers to upward mobility. These combine to create for the Negro child a type of social world in which the higher rates of delinquency are not unintelligible.[65]

Aware of these qualifications, we have made the following inferences about the *true* levels and trends of major violence by race from the reported arrest figures:[66]

- In spite of the weakness of the data, it is difficult to believe that the much higher arrest levels of Negroes are due only to reporting errors and biases.
- With regard to trends over the period of 1964-67, the true rate for criminal homicide has probably been increasing faster for blacks than for whites. It is probable that the true increase in rates of robbery by blacks is greater than for whites, although reporting problems make this conclusion less certain. For forcible rape and aggravated assault, it is impossible to say whether the true rate of increase is significantly greater for one race than for the other.

Socioeconomic Status Variation

By the offender's socioeconomic status, we essentially refer to his income, occupation, and education. There is no regular national data on the socioeconomic status of violent offenders from the *UCR* or any other source, so our conclusions are based on independent studies.

The forthcoming Philadelphia cohort study of youthful male offenders [67] defines socioeconomic status in terms of the mean income in the census tract where each individual resided. There are two statistically important categories, upper and lower socioeconomic status. For assaultive crimes[68] the lower SES rate per 1,000 cohort boys was 142, while the rate for upper SES boys was only 30. Similarly, the lower SES rate in robbery was 35 and the upper SES rate was 6.

The most frequently explored aspect of socioeconomic status in other studies has been the offender's occupation.[69] Each of the investigations at our disposal consistently relates major violence to offenders at the lower end of the occupation scale. Police data from a succession of studies in Philadelphia indicate that roughly 90-95 percent of criminal homicide offenders from both races,[70] 90 percent of forcible rape offenders,[71] and 92-97 percent of robbery offenders[72] are at the low end of the occupational scale, ranging generally from skilled workers to the unemployed. A St. Louis study of aggravated assault concluded that blue-collar workers predominate as offenders.[73] The D.C. Crime Commission found that 44 percent of Negro offenders in major violent crimes and 40 percent of white offenders were unemployed. Whether or not the violent offender was employed, his occupational history generally involved unskilled work.[74] A Florida study using prison data observed that offenders committing criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and theft with violence were most frequently in the semiskilled or unskilled occupational categories.[75]

We found similar evidence in our victim-offender survey of 17 major American cities.[76] Table 7 shows separate occupation breakdowns for offenders arrested for criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and unarmed robbery. Occupations were unavailable in a large number of cases, reflecting the low priority often given by police to recording such information. Nonetheless, for the offenders whose occupation was known, these national data from big cities clearly show violent offenders were most likely to be at the lower end of the occupational scale (skilled laborers, laborers, or unemployed).[77]

Other studies might be cited, but the basic conclusion remains:

- In spite of reporting problems, the true rates of major violence appear to be much greater for those of lower socioeconomic status than for those of higher status. The poor, uneducated individual with minimal or no employment skills is more likely to commit serious violence than the person higher up on the socioeconomic ladder. Here, then, is another important target group for policy action.

Other Individual Acts of Violence

The four major violent crimes are the most important indicators of the levels and trends of violence, yet a complete profile must include the other

Table 7.—The occupations of offenders arrested for major violent crimes in selected cities, 1967[a]

Offender occupation	Major violent crime type (percentage) Criminal homicide	Forcible rape	Aggravated assault	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Executive	1.1	1.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
Manager	1.4	1.5	0.6	0.0	0.0
Secretary-clerical	1.8	2.9	2.8	0.3	1.7
Sales	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.0
Other services	2.1	4.3	6.4	1.4	2.0
Craftsman	0.0	1.6	0.8	0.0	0.0
Skilled laborer	5.3	5.4	5.1	5.3	1.5
Laborer	9.0	26.9	14.1	10.6	12.6
Farmer	0.0	0.4	0.0	1.0	0.0
Student	2.1	10.8	10.1	15.0	34.2
Housewife	5.8	0.0	3.0	0.5	0.6
Dependent	0.0	0.4	1.7	0.8	2.5
Other	1.6	1.2	2.8	0.5	1.5
Unemployed	5.4	7.9	6.4	13.5	7.1
Unknown	63.1	34.3	45.3	51.4	36.2
Total Percentage	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(Number of Interactions)	(668)	(617)	(1493)	(509)	(502)

Total number of offenders (statistical weights applied) 3,790. Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.

[a]Task Force Victim-Offender Survey; see ch. 5.

individual acts. The empirical data available on the violence-related acts of suicide, fatal auto accidents, child abuse, other sex offenses (besides forcible rape), other assaults (besides those that are aggravated), disorderly conduct, burglary, arson, and vandalisms will therefore be briefly considered.

With varying degrees of adequacy, information on such "nonmajor" violent crimes is supplied by the *UCR*, official data from other publications, or independent surveys. Although there were considerable constraints on the inferences that could be made from the data on the four major violent offenses, the limitations are generally even more severe for these other acts of violence.

Suicide and Violent Auto Fatalities

Suicide and violent auto fatalities (as defined in Chapter 1) are undoubtedly the most serious of the nonmajor individual acts of violence.

The Task Force will devote more space to these than to other nonmajor acts, profiling their national incidence, considering rate breakdowns by city size, region, age, sex, and race, and comparing them to criminal homicide.[78] Although no publication specifically reports violent auto fatalities, we are using as a proxy the negligent manslaughters reported in the UCR.[79]

Figure 33 compares national levels and trends for suicide, negligent manslaughter, and criminal homicide offenses per 100,000 population.[80] The reported suicide rate level has been consistently highest (10 in 1967), homicide consistently second (6 in 1967) and negligent manslaughter consistently third (4 in 1967). In this figure, a rate is also shown for all auto fatalities. It is really the auto fatality death rate from National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) data, but, to make it comparable with the other rates, it might be interpreted as the total number of accident fatality "offenses committed" per 100,000—both those that are really accidents and those that are violent auto fatalities, as defined in Chapter 1 and 2. The rate level for all auto fatalities is obviously much higher (27 in 1967) than for the three fatality categories of primary interest.

If the negligent manslaughter rate is a reasonable proxy of the violent auto fatality offense rate, comparison with the total auto fatality offense rate gives a crude estimate of what proportion of all auto fatality offenses are violent. The figures very roughly indicate that about one of every seven motor fatalities may be a product of violence-related actions by drivers instead of being purely accidental.



[1]*UCR, Vital Statistics of the U.S.* See app. 10.

Note: In 1963 the *UCR* expanded their negligent manslaughter reporting from urban areas to all reporting agencies.

Figure 33.—Variation in reported offense rates for selected non-accidental causes of death, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 total population].

There is a slight uptrend in the negligent manslaughter and homicide rates, while the suicide rate has stayed almost constant across the last 10 years.

Unfortunately, data are not published annually for suicide rates by city size. However the NCHS did compute broad rate breakdowns for 1966, the last available year. Two general categories were used, metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.[81] The offense rate is 12 per 100,000 for metropolitan and 11 per 100,000 for nonmetropolitan suicides, so there is no great disparity between urban and nonurban areas. On the basis of isolated studies in the past, the NCHS believes that these levels have not changed greatly in recent years.[82]

Refined breakdowns by city size, however, are available for *UCR* negligent manslaughter offense rates, as shown in Figure 34.[83] The levels appear consistently higher for the rural areas, the largest sized cities, and the second largest sized cities. Rates for other city-size areas become lower with smaller populations. The rate for suburban areas is just beneath that for cities with populations between 50,000 and 100,000.

In comparison to the suicide and negligent manslaughter levels, Figure 3 showed homicide rates to be highest in the two largest city-size categories, with the national rural area rates in third place. All three violence-related fatality types, then, seem to be distributed rather similarly according to city sizes; in each case, there does not appear to be a great difference between big city and rural rates.

Figure 35 shows the reported suicide level in the West to be distinctly higher than in other regions. There is no dramatic change in or uniformity between the regional rate trends over the period shown. The high Western rates are especially due to California and Alaska in the Pacific subregion, and Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nevada in the Mountain subregion. Generally, these states have had higher rates than other states in the past.[84]

It is not clear why these particular states should have the highest rates. The suggestion might be made that the high California rates are related to a relatively more permissive, noninterdictive pattern of life, but hypotheses are more difficult to generate for the other five states. One clue might be gained by asking whether the overall rate in each state is due more to the influence of the urban areas within it or is more spread out between the urban and nonurban areas. Although suicide breakdowns for states by city size are not available on a yearly basis, the most recent special study done by the NCHS produced the figures shown in Table 8. These are 3-year averages over the 1959-61 period for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan rates in the two subregions where the states in question are located.

It would seem from these data that, like the national metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan evidence mentioned earlier, there is relatively little variation between urban and nonurban areas in the states with the country's highest suicide rates. Whatever the reason for the higher rates in these states, then, it is not due to some unique phenomenon along the city-size dimension.[85]

In Figure 36, the ranking of negligent manslaughter rates is consistently in this order: the South, the West, the North Central States, and the Northeast. Interestingly, this exact same ranking of regions was present for criminal homicide in Figure 9, above, although the rate level in the South was relatively higher and the rate levels for the other regions were closer to one another.



Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census. Computations by the Task Force. See app. 10.

Figure 34. Variation in reported negligent manslaughter offense rates by city size, 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

Thus, it seems that there are close relationships among suicide, negligent manslaughter, and homicide along the regional variation dimension. The regional ranking is exactly the same for the latter two violent fatality types, while the Western and Southern rates are relatively higher and the North Central and Northeastern rates relatively lower for each of the three categories.

The suicide rate (for all races combined) essentially rises with advancing age, as Figure 37 makes clear.[86] Figure 38, on the other hand, shows a relationship between the offender's age and the manslaughter rate that is almost the exact reverse. The 15- to 24-year-old group has the highest rates,



Source: Vital Statistics of the U.S. See app. 10.

Figure 35.–Variation in reported suicide rates by region, 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

Table 8.–Reported suicide rates in the Mountain and Pacific subregions, by metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area, 1959-61 average[a]

Mountain:	
Metropolitan	13.9
Nonmetropolitan	12.6
Total	13.3
Pacific:	
Metropolitan	15.1
Nonmetropolitan	13.8
Total	14.9

[a]Suicide in the United States, 1950-64, NCHS Series 20, No. 5, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., p. 18.



Source: UCR and U.S. Census. Computations by the Task Force. See app. 10.

Figure 36.–Variation in reported negligent manslaughter offense rates by region 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

with lower levels for each successive age grouping. The lowest rate level is, as might be expected, for the group generally below the legal driving age—those 15 and under. There is considerable similarity between the distributions by age group for both negligent manslaughter and homicide (Figure 19); in both sets, the rate is highest in the 15-24 group, lower in the over-25 group, and lowest in the 10-14 grouping.

Figure 39 shows that suicide rates are considerably higher for males than for females and whites than nonwhites.[87] In 1966, the respective rates were 17 per 100,000 for white males, 8 for nonwhite males, 7 for white females, and 2 for nonwhite females.[88]

National data on suicides according to race and age are not available. This is unfortunate, for, unlike what has been traditionally assumed, there is now reason to believe that the higher suicide rates for whites compared to nonwhites do not hold for all ages. Figures 40 and 41 show breakdowns by age, race, and sex in 1960 from a forthcoming study of suicide among



Source: Vital Statistics of the U.S. See app. 10.

Figure 37.–Variation in reported suicide rates by age, 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

Negroes in New York City. They suggest that suicide may be a serious problem among young urban Negroes–and even higher in frequency than among young urban whites:

> Most important, a breakdown of the New York City figures reveals the surprising information that, among blacks of both sexes between the ages of twenty and thirty-five, suicide is decidedly more of a problem than it is in the white population of the same age. . . .It is only after the age of forty-five that suicide among whites rises to heights so much greater than that of blacks of the same age that it causes the white suicide rate to rise to a total level higher than that for the Negro.[89]

According to Figure 42, the distribution of reported negligent manslaughter rates by sex shows a large gap between reported male and



Source: UCR and U.S. Census. Computations by the Task Force. See app. 10.
Note: Data not broken down by the 45-54, 55-64 and 65+ age groups over the 1963-64 period.

Figure 38.–Variation in reported negligent manslaughter arrest rates by age of offender 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

female offense rates. In 1966 the male rate was 4 per 100,000, and the female rate less than 1. However, the distribution by race shows the Negro rate to be considerably higher than the white rate, while the opposite was true in suicide. In 1966 the reported Negro negligent manslaughter rate was 4 per 100,000 and the reported white rate 2.[90]

Figures 23 and 28, above showed that males and Negroes also predominate as offenders in criminal homicide, although the Negro-white reported rate differentials are much greater than for negligent manslaughter. In 1966 the homicide rates were 14 for males, 3 for females, 48 for Negroes, and 3 for whites. Thus, the 1966 male-female differential was 5-1 in criminal homicide and 5-1 in negligent manslaughter, while the Negro-white differential was 16-1 in criminal homicide and 2-1 in negligent manslaughter.

We reach the following conclusions about the three violent acts ending in death:



Source: Vital Statistics of the U.S. See app. 10.

Figure 39.—Variation in reported suicide rates by sex and race, 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

• While the usual kinds of reporting problems exist for the data, the difficulties are small enough so that the rough rankings and comparisons made for the reported rates are assumed to hold for the true rates.[91]

• The national levels indicate that the true suicide offense rate is considerably higher than the true criminal homicide offense rate, which appears to be at about the same level as the true negligent manslaughter rate. All of the levels are in turn much lower than the true rates for such major violent crimes as robbery and aggravated assault.

• A closer look at suicide rates shows little variation of offender rates when urban and nonurban areas are compared, a considerably higher rate in the West than in other regions, higher rates with advancing age, much higher rates for males than for females, and much higher rates for whites than for nonwhites. It is possible, however, that young adult Negroes, especially urban males, experience higher suicide rates than their white counterparts.



Source: Herbert Hendin, *Black Suicide,* (New York: Basic Books, Forthcoming), p. 152.

Figure 40.—Variation in reported male suicide rates by age and race, New York City, 1960 [Age-specific rate per 100,000 population].



Source: Herbert Hendin, *Black Suicide,* (New York:Basic Books, Forthcoming), p. 152.

Figure 41.—Variation in reported female suicide rates by age and race, New York City, 1960 [Age-specific rate per 100,000 population].

• A closer look at negligent manslaughter shows offense rates to be higher in large cities (population 100,000 and above) and rural areas than in other city-size areas, offense rates higher in the South and West than in the North Central States and Northeast, arrest rates generally higher for lower ages, arrest rates much higher for males than for females, and arrest rates much higher for Negroes than for whites.

• Along each of five demographic dimensions (city-size, region, age, sex, race) considered, then, negligent manslaughters (by assumption, violent auto fatalities) and criminal homicides prove remarkably alike. Thus, the causes and explanations for negligent manslaughter may be similar to those for criminal homicide. Conversely, the causes and explanations behind suicide appear different, for the most part. Only



Source: UCR and U.S. Census. Computations by the Task Force. See app. 10.

Figure 42.—Variation in reported negligent manslaughter arrest rates by sex and race of offender, 1963-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

along the dimension of rate distribution by sex is suicide unequivocally like the other two acts. It appears generally similar to them along the city-size and regional dimensions, although the correspondence is not so clear-cut. And, importantly, there is an *inverse* relation between suicide on the one hand and negligent manslaughter and criminal homicide on the other, along the age and race dimensions.[92]

Child Abuse

Figure 43 shows recent reported arrest rate levels and trends for the *UCR* category of "offenses against family and children," covering nonsupport, neglect, desertion, and abuse of family and children. Because this classification covers more than abuse and because of the reporting inadequacies connected with it, any inferences about true levels and trends are difficult to make.

The NORC 1965 victimization estimate of the true national level for offenses against family and children was 206 per 100,000[93] (versus the *UCR* 1965 arrest rate in Figure 43 of 45 per 100,000). Like the *UCR*, however, the



Source: UCR.

Figure 43.—Variation in reported arrest rates for offenses against family and children, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

NORC survey does not attempt to separate child abuse from the overall category. It is also likely that considerable underreporting existed in the NORC household interviews. The study was directed primarily at adults—in each household contacted, the first interview was made with someone 18 years or older.[94]

A better estimate of the national incidence of child abuse in 1965 can be ascertained from a special study done by Brandeis University and the NORC.[95] The survey obtained an indirect estimate of the incidence of child abuse and investigated the attitudes held by adults about such acts. Only incidents of child abuse which resulted in physical injury of some kind—from minor to fatal—were included. Abusive physical attacks not resulting in injury were excluded. Fifteen hundred and twenty adults (21 years or older), representing a population of approximately 110 million, were interviewed. A standard, multistage, area probability sample with quotas based on sex, age, race, and employment status was used. The final estimate of the level of child abuse was based on a question in which respondents were asked if they personally know families involved in incidents of child abuse during the 12 months preceding the interview. Three percent of the 1,520 respondents reported such personal knowledge. When this was extrapolated to the general population and sampling error was considered, the resulting national rate estimate was that 1,330 to 2,140 adults per 100,000 total population knew of child-abuse incidents.[96] This is only a rough estimate, of course. It was likely that some adults interviewed were referring to the same incident of child abuse known to them. Thus, the estimated rate of adults who knew of such incidents was probably an upper limit to the true rate.[97]

Even when extensive overreporting is taken into account, however, the child-abuse rate estimate is high in comparison to the rates of the four major violent crimes. If it were assumed, for example, that the survey overreported by 50 percent, the child-abuse rate estimate for 1965 would still be in the

range of 665 to 1,070 per 100,000, as compared to a rate of 198 for the four major violent crimes combined in 1965. In spite of its higher incidence, the child abuse offenses are on the whole probably less serious than the major violent offenses.

As indicated in Table 9, the same survey showed that well over half of the respondents thought that anybody could at some time injure a child in his or her care. This large proportion implies that the infliction of physical injury upon children is viewed as an "almost normal occurrence" by many adults.[98]

Table 9.—Respondents' opinion on the propensity to child abuse in the population at large[a]

Opinion	Number	Percentage
"Almost anybody could at some time injure a child in his care"	884	58.3
"Not everybody is capable of injuring a child in his care"	592	39.1
Did not know	40	2.6
Total	1,516[b]	100.0

[a]David G. Gill, unpublished consultant paper submitted to the Task Force.

[b]Excluding 4 respondents who did not answer.

A later Brandeis survey limited itself only to cases of child abuse legally reported through the available state channels.[99] Although the second survey did not give a profile estimate of the true level of child abuse in the country, it did analyze the seriousness of cases more closely than the earlier study. The later survey also expanded the definition of child abuse to a focus on the complete act of violence rather than only on the results of the act. All events were included which revealed "the use of physical force on the part of a caretaker in interaction with a child in his care, in order to hurt, injure, and perhaps destroy him."[100]

The survey was originally scheduled to be conducted for 1 year, starting on January 1, 1967.[101] All the states, as well as Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, participated in the survey by submitting standardized information on every incident of child abuse reported under their respective legislation. Forty cities and counties were selected from the official listing of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The core cities of the 10 largest SMSA's were included in the sample by arbitrary decision, while 30 cities and counties were selected at random from strata based on population size and geographic region.[102]

About 6,000 cases of child abuse were reported from these units for 1967. In this sample, there was an overrepresentation of the lower socioeconomic groups, a high proportion of female heads of households, a high proportion of biological fathers absent, and a higher-than-average birth rate.[103] These conclusions were made on the seriousness—as well as the true incidence—of child abuse in the United States:

> Physical abuse of children is not a "major killer and maimer" of children as it was claimed to be in sensational publicity in the mass media and also in professional literature. These exaggerated claims seem to be due to an emotional response to this destructive phenomenon that touches sensitive spots with nearly every adult, because many adults may themselves be subject to aggressive impulses toward children in their care. Yet, in spite of its strong emotional quality, the phenomenon of child abuse must be put into a balanced perspective. While no claim can be made that the true incidence rate of physical abuse of children has been uncovered by the nationwide survey, it seems clear, nevertheless, that the scope of the phenomenon as a serious social probelm has been exaggerated. Six thousand reported cases of physical abuse per year in a nation of 200 million, in spite of underreporting, do not constitute a major social problem, at least in relative terms, tragic as every single incident may be.[104]

Other Sex Offenses and Other Assaults

Figures 44 and 45 show recent reported levels and trends for these two non-Index *UCR* offense categories which were designed to cover the less serious forms of the Index sex offense category (forcible rape) and the Index assault category (aggravated assault).

The *UCR* are the sole data source for these categories, and therefore only arrest rates are available. From 1963 the reported "other sex" arrest rate has been on a downswing, while it was shown earlier that the reported forcible rape offense rate has been on an upsurge. It is impossible to say whether or not this can be partially explained by recent classification as forcible rape of acts which previously had been classified as "other sex offenses." When the "other assaults" category is compared with the Index classification of aggravated assaults, however, the trends are more similar. The "other assault" category shows a slow reported arrest uptrend and, in particular, a sharp spurt between 1966 and 1967 that is parallel to the reported aggravated assault offense rate rise over the interval.

As might be expected, the gaps between the reported arrest rates in Figures 44 and 45 and the true rates seem to be great. The 1965 *UCR* level for reported "other sex" arrests was 43 per 100,000, while the NORC victimization rate was 142. In the "other assaults" category, the 1965 *UCR* and NORC rates were 145 and 394, respectively.

- From this scanty data, the Task Force can make no inferences about the true trend of these offenses over recent years, though we assume the rate levels are closer to the NORC victimization estimates than to the *UCR* arrest figures.

Disorderly Conduct

Figure 46 shows recent reported arrest levels and trends for disorderly conduct from the *UCR*, the only available data source. In 1967, as in past years, the rate for reported disorderly conduct arrests was second highest out of all 29 *UCR* crime categories. The rate per 100,000 was 377 (drunkenness arrests were in first place with a 1,040 rate and larcenies were third with a 306 rate.)



Source: UCR.

Figure 44.—Variation in reported arrest rates for other sex offenses, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

The usual large gap between reported arrests and the true incidence of the offense can here be assumed, though no estimate of their size is available.[105] The fact that disorderly conduct is not uniformly differentiated from vagrancy and drunkennes by all police departments further blurs the validity of the reported arrest figures.

• The Task Force therefore can infer little about the real trend of disorderly conduct rates, though it is probable that the true level of this, the least serious personal violence-related act, is higher than the other personal violent offenses.



Source: UCR.

Figure 45.—Variation in reported arrest rates for other assaults, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: UCR.

Figure 46.—Variation in reported arrest rates for disorderly conduct, 1960-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Burglary

Burglary is an Index crime, so that offense rates instead of merely arrest rates are available. Of all the *UCR* Index crimes, burglary consistently has had the highest offense rates.[106] In 1968, for example, the burglary offense rate was 915, versus 295 for the four major violent crimes combined.

The NORC survey estimated the true level of burglary incidence to be about 1½ times as high as the reported offense level in 1965. The NORC level was 949 versus 605 for the *UCR*. The victimization study results confirmed the *UCR* figures which showed the burglary level to be considerably above the levels of each of the other Index crimes.[107]

The reported burglary trend over time greatly resembles the shape of the reported robbery trend—declining until the early 1940's, then rising sharply thereafter, especially over the 1958-68 period. The increases for reported burglary offenses are 179 percent between 1933 and 1968, 251 percent between 1940 and 1968, 109 percent between 1958 and 1968, and 41 percent between 1965 and 1968.[108]

- On the basis of this information, the Task Force concludes that the reporting error is small enough and the rise in reported rates dramatic enough for there to have been a significant rise in the true burglary rate over recent years. It also seems likely that the true incidence level for burglary is higher than for any other Index offense.

Arson

The *UCR* have been reporting arson arrest rates only since 1964. Figure 47 shows a definite reported uptrend over the period, with a 1967 rate of 6 per 100,000.



Source: UCR.

Figure 47.—Variation in reported arrest rates for arson, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Unfortunately, the NORC study did not make victimization estimates for arson. The only relevant NORC category is "malicious mischief or arson"—essentially a combination of both vandalism and arson. The 1965 NORC rate for this classification was 1061 incidents per 100,000. The 1965 *UCR* arson arrest rate was 5, while the *UCR* vandalism rate was 70 that year, giving a comparable combined arrest rate of 75 for the two violent acts.

The National Fire Protection Association estimates of incendiary and suspicious fires are probably better approximations of the true arson rates

than *UCR* data.[109] Figure 48 shows the NFPA's esimates of the rate of incidence per 100,000 in suspicious and incendiary fires from 1958 to 1967.[110] The estimate for the 1967 rate is 22 fires per 100,000, and the cost estimate of damage incurred is $712 per 100,000 people in the country. The rate uptrends are distinct—an increase of 85 percent between 1958 and 1967 in the estimated number of arsons per 100,000 and a huge increase of 293 percent in the dollar cost. It is likely that much of the real increase in arson rates over the last few years is related to the civil disorders occurring in the nation's largest cities.



Source: National Fire Protection Association.

Figure 48.—Variation in estimated true incidence and true dollar cost rates for incendiary and suspicious fires, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

If the NFPA data are considered reasonably good replacements for NORC true arson rate estimates, a comparison of Figures 47 and 48 implies that the true level has been about four times above the *UCR* arrest rate level. Since 1964, however, the NFPA and *UCR* uptrends appear very similar. When the 1965 NFPA arson incidence rate estimate of 17 is compared to the 1965 NORC incidence rate estimate of 1061 for "malicious mischief or arson," it seems safe to assume that the NORC composite mainly reflects the "malicious mischief," or vandalism, component.

Not only do incendiary and suspicious fires appear to be on the rise

generally, but they also seem to be increasing relative to other kinds of fires. Referring to its own classifications, the NFPA states in its most recent appraisal:

> The leading "fire causes," or sources of ignition, continue to be smoking and matches, electrical equipment, and heating and cooking equipment; but the two categories of children and matches and incendiary or suspicious fires are rapidly growing in importance, and, combined, they exceed, for the first time, the number of heating and cooking fires.[111]

Commenting on the 1966-67 rise in fires according to their location, the Association observes that the increase in public assembly, educational, institutional, and store fires are the most disturbing.[112] "In all those occupancies, and in schools and stores particularly, the intentional fire has become of marked importance."[113]

- Relying mainly on the NFPA figures, the Task Force believes they are reliable enough to infer that there has been a definite rise in the true incidence of arson and, more strikingly, a sharp rise in the dollar cost per 100,000. We assume that part of this uptrend is due to urban disorders.

Vandalism

Figure 49 shows reported vandalism arrest rates, since the *UCR* began to publish them in 1964. We assumed above that the 1965 NORC victimization estimate of 1061 for "malicious mischief or arson" mostly refers to vandalism offenses. If this is correct, the true incidence level may be at least 10 times as high as the reported police arrest level.

Additional NORC estimates gave the 1965 dollar loss at $210 million, with an average loss of $120 for each person whose property was vandalized. At least for vandalism against business, it is generally thought that damage is much higher in the center-city high crime districts than in any other geographic area.[114]

Because vandalism seems to be such an underreported offense, it is difficult to place much meaning in the trends revealed in Figure 49. The sharp 1964-65 rise, in particular, may reflect the elimination of inconsistencies by police between the first and second years of reporting vandalism.

One of the few independent sources of information that seems to have some degree of nationwide reliability was a study of public school vandalism in selected major cities between 1966 and 1967.[115] Thirty-six major cities known to record public school vandalism data were contacted. For the 32 cities which sent enough data for reasonably accurate aggregates,[116] the total number of known school vandalism offenses (window breaking, larceny, arson, and miscellaneous offenses) was 543,064 and the total estimated destroyed school property came to $6,224,648. This worked out to 0.12 acts of vandalism per student (or 11,687 per 100,000 students), a cost of $1.35 per student (or $135,346 per 100,000 students) and a cost of $11.46 per offense (or $1,146,209 per 100,000 offenses).[117]

- From the meager information available, the Task Force can only infer that the level of vandalism appears much higher than *UCR* arrest data indicate. No conclusions can be reached on trends over time, and there is obviously room for much improvement in the official statistical reporting of vandalism.



Source: UCR.

Figure 49.—Variation in reported vandalism arrest rates, 1964-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

The Broader Diffusion of Individual Violence in American Society

We turn to information on the broader diffusion of less serious individual violence in our everyday life. As discussed in Chapter 1, the Crime Commission reported that 91 percent of the respondents in their survey admitted committing acts which, had they been detected, could have resulted in sentencing under the adult criminal code. Most of the crimes committed—violent and nonviolent—were of a petty nature, although there were some more serious acts.[118]

The national public opinion survey done for the Violence Commission[119] further pursued the question of everyday violence. Respondents in the national sample were asked if they had ever been recipients, observers, or instigators of individual violent acts. Tables 10, 11, and 12 show the results.

Of the six categories of violent acts shown in the tables,[120] the first ("spanked as a child") and, for the most part, the second ("slapped or kicked") can be considered as everyday acts of violence that usually are not criminal events. The last four categories ("punched or beaten," "choked," "threatened or cut with knife," and "threatened with gun or shot at") are generally reportable as more serious and criminal events.[121] The implied levels of incidence for the first two categories are in general extraordinarily high, especially considering that the figures include females as well as males.

Table 10.–Respondent as recipient of violent acts[a]

Have been:	Percent of respondents: Total	Male Veteran	Male Nonveteran	Female
Spanked as a child	93	97	92	92
Slapped or kicked	55	72	62	44
Punched or beaten	31	62	43	10
Choked	8	15	9	5
Threatened or cut with knife	14	29	16	4
Threatened with gun or shot at	12	28	15	3

[a]Louis Harris and Associates, "The American Public Looks at Violence," Nov. 1968: Study No. 1887, for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Table 11.–Respondent as observer of violent acts[a]

Have ever seen another person:	Percent of respondents: Total	Male Veteran	Male Nonveteran	Female
Slapped or kicked	60	79	69	47
Punched or beaten	48	72	60	30
Choked	15	27	17	7
Threatened or cut with knife	18	32	25	8
Threatened with gun or shot at	17	36	20	7

[a]Louis Harris and Associates, "The American Public Looks at Violence," Nov. 1968: Study No. 1887, for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

Table 12.–Respondent as instigator of violent acts[a]

Have ever:	Percent of respondents: Total	Male Veteran	Male Nonveteran	Female
Spanked a child	84	84	72	90
Slapped or kicked	31	45	33	23
Punched or beaten	27	57	34	8
Defended self with knife	6	16	4	2
Defended self with gun	9	28	3	1

[a]Louis Harris and Associates, "The American Public Looks at Violence;" Nov. 1968: Study No. 1887, for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.

"That spanking is a nearly universal experience is not surprising, but the percent who report incidents of slapping or kicking is indeed alarming."[122]

In commenting on the veteran-nonveteran and male-female differences in the tables, the survey notes:

> Predictably, the percentages representing female involvement drop sharply on all aspects of violence but spanking, which reinforces the thesis that women have taken over the role as family disciplinarians. The different rates for veterans and nonveterans strongly suggest the presence of war-related violence, but another factor–age–has its influence, too, especially as regards child spanking. Veterans are heavily concentrated in the 31-50 age group (*59%* vs. *19%* nonveterans), and thus have more children of "spankable" age.[123]

We conclude:

- Although there is no national reporting system to profile the levels and trends of "legitimate" violence and "normal deviance," the Violence Commission survey, at least, implies such incidence is impressively high–to say nothing of the widespread existence of the more serious violence forms revealed. More studies of this kind are needed to objectively analyze violence and compare it with similar measurements in other countries.

International Comparisons

What can be said about the levels and trends of American violence in comparison to those of foreign countries? We warned in Chapter 2 that international comparisons are exceedingly difficult to make–because of different criminal statutes, reporting procedures and cultural interdicts. Yet these problems are minimal for England and Wales, as well as for Canada. In addition to comparing American levels and trends to corresponding information from these countries, we have been able to include a number of other countries. The additions that are possible, however, vary from crime to crime. Homicide, suicide, violent auto fatalities, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and burglary are considered.

Criminal Homicide

Unquestionably, waves of killing far more vicious and extensive than any in the United States have at times overtaken other countries–particularly in less developed regions of the world. For example, there have been reports of widespread violent homicidal outbursts in Mexico[124] and in the Philippines.[125] In Colombia it is estimated that as many as 200,000 people have been killed since 1930 in a pattern of senseless brutality growing out of an old political struggle. Guerrilla groups, originally politically motivated but later purely antisocial, have terrorized rural areas in Colombia for years, killing in the most sadistic ways. Indoctrination of children in methods of killing is widely practiced throughout the country today.[126]

These examples are interesting, but they so involve cultural phenomena in the individual countries that we must limit ourselves to homicide in more stable industrialized nations to obtain meaningful comparisons. Figures 50a and 50b show criminal homicide rates per 100,000 for a number of countries, as published in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*.

The reported homicide rate in the United States has remained well above all the other reported rates during the 11-year period. The extent to which the American murder rate exceeds that in other industrialized countries has been dramatized in this way:

> No doubt industrial society generates awful tensions. No doubt the ever-quickening pace of social change depletes and destroys the



Source: United Nations *Demographic Yearbooks*, 1955-67.

Figure 50a.—Variation in reported criminal homicide offense rates for selected countries, 1955-66 [rates per 100,000 population].



Source: United Nations *Demographic Yearbooks*, 1955-67.

Figure 50b.—Variations in reported criminal homicide offense rates for selected countries, 1955-66 [rates per 100,000 population].

institutions which make for social stability. But this does not explain why Americans shoot and kill so many more Americans than Englishmen kill Englishmen or Japanese kill Japanese. England, Japan, and West Germany are, next to the United States, the most heavily industrialized countries in the world. Together they have a population of 214 million people. Among these 214 million people there are 135 gun murders a year. Among the 200 million people in the United States there are 6,500 gun murders a year—about 48 times as many. Philadelphia alone has about the same number of criminal homicides as

England, Scotland, and Wales combined—as many in a city of two million (and a city of brotherly love, at that) as in a nation of 45 million.[127]

Table 13 shows that the American experience does not stand out quite as much when continuous trends are considered for the countries in Figures 50a and 50b. The American increase in criminal homicide (30 percent) is greater that of any other country except Norway, although the reported increases in Germany and Denmark are roughly comparable. On the other hand, six of the 13 countries reported *decreases* in homicide rates over the trend period.

Table 13.–Percent change in reported criminal homicide rates over the last 10 years (countries shown in Fig. 50)[a]

Country	Years covered[b]	Percent change
Norway	1955-65	+66.6
United States	1956-66	+30.4
Germany	1955-65	+30.0
Denmark	1955-65	+20.0
England and Wales	1956-66	+16.6
Canada	1956-66	+ 8.3
Australia	1956-66	+ 7.1
Belgium	1966-65	-11.1
France	1955-65	-11.1
Finland	1956-66	-14.8
Austria	1956-66	-26.6
Japan	1955-65	-37.5
Switzerland	1955-65	-45.4

[a]Computed by Task Force from U.N. *Demographic Yearbooks*, 1955-67 editions.
[b]Percentage changes for each country computed by the Task Force from latest available data reported in *Demographic Yearbook* in comparison to data from 10 years earlier.

Suicide and Violent Auto Fatalities

Foreign data on suicide and violent auto fatalities generally reflect reporting and collection problems similar to those discussed for the American data. Foreign reporting systems often encounter difficulty in distinguishing suicide from homicide and, especially, accidental deaths. Figure 51 must be read with such qualifications in mind. These suicide statistics, compiled from the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*, show that the United States

ranks 11th in suicide among the selected countries, with a reported 1966 annual rate less than half that of Austria and much lower than numerous other countries.[128] Thus, while the United States leads the entire industrialized world in reported criminal homicide, our reported suicide rate is significantly lower than that of many other industrialized nations.

Table 14 reveals for the countries of Figure 51 that the reported American suicide uptrend over the 10-year interval covered was fifth highest. Interestingly, 10 countries reported declines in suicide rates and two countries reported no change over the trend period. Yet the American uptrend, like the American level of suicide, does not stand out in comparison to several other industrialized nations.

In the case of violent auto fatalities, almost all countries have the same problem with data collection. While not singling out auto accidents



[a] Data are presented for last year available.
Source: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1967, 19th edition.

Figure 51.–Reported suicide rates for selected countries, 1965 or 1966.[a] *[rates per 100,000 population].*

Table 14.–Percent change in reported suicide rates over a recent 11-year period (countries shown in Figure 51)[a]

Country	Years covered[b]	Percent change
Australia	1956-66	+30.5
Netherlands	1956-66	+18.3
Canada	1956-66	+13.1
Belgium	1955-65	+10.3
United States	1956-66	+ 9.0
Norway	1955-65	+ 4.0
Germany	1955-65	+ 3.6
Austria	1956-66	+ 1.3
Mexico	1956-66	0
Sweden	1956-66	0
France	1955-65	- 5.6
Portugal	1956-66	- 6.0
Ireland	1956-66	- 7.7
Spain	1955-65	-10.9
England and Wales	1956-66	-11.8
Finland	1956-66	-14.2
Switzerland	1955-65	-16.2
Denmark	1955-65	-17.1
Italy	1955-65	-19.4
Japan	1955-65	-41.8

[a]Computed by Task Force from *Demographic Yearbooks*, 1955-67 editions.

[b]Percentage changes for each country computed from latest available data reported in *Demographic Yearbook* in comparison to data from 10 years earlier.

specifically related to *violence*, Figure 52 shows that the general rate of traffic deaths is high in the United States in comparison with other industrialized countries. Traffic death rates are higher only in Australia and Austria, but a number of other countries have similar rates.

England and Wales provide the only refined data that seem to approximate what we have defined as violent auto fatalities. The classification is called "death by dangerous driving." Figure 53 shows the reported offense rates along with the reported offense rates for the American proxy, negligent manslaughter, over a 10-year trend period. If these proxies are at all reliable,



[a]Data are presented for last year vailable.
Source: United Nations, *Demographic Yearbook*, 1967, 19th edition.

Figure 52.–Reported suicide rates for selected countries, 1965 or 1966.[a] [rates per 100,000 population].

they imply that the American rate of violent auto fatalities may have been roughly three times that of England and Wales. The implication for trends is that the countries have experienced fairly similar increases over the last 10 years. The rate increase in England and Wales was 70 percent, compared to 58 percent in the United States.

Forcible Rape, Robbery, and Aggravated Assault

Figures 54, 55, and 56 reveal that the large differentials in levels of violence between the United States and other countries reappear when we turn to



Note: In 1963 the *UCR* expanded their negligent manslaughter reporting from urban areas to all reporting agencies.
Source: UCR, 1958-67; *Criminal Statistics (England and Wales)*, 1958-67. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) hereafter referred to as *Criminal Statistics (England and Wales)*.

Figure 53.—Variation in reported offense rates for manslaughter by negligence (United States) and deaths by dangerous driving England and Wales, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Averages computed over 1963-67[129] from the figures produce forcible rape rates of 12 (United States), 2 (England and Wales), 4 (Canada) and 4 (Denmark); robbery rates of 77 (United States), 9 (England and Wales), 37 (Canada) and 4 (Denmark); and aggravated assault[130] rates of 110 (United States), 56 (England and Wales), 6[131] (Canada) and 37 (Denmark). Thus, for each major violent act, the reported American average rate is greater than the reported average rate for the other three countries *combined*.[132]

When the figures are examined for trends over a period of time, however, the picture changes somewhat. The reported U.S. increases for forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault are considerably greater than those in Canada and Denmark.[133] Yet the reported increase over recent years in England and Wales are all noticeably above the reported U.S. increases. For the 1958-67 period, the reported rape increase was 80 percent in England and Wales and 47 percent in the United States; the reported robbery increase was 161 percent in England and Wales and 86 percent in the United States; and the reported aggravated assault increase was 144 percent in England and Wales and 62 percent in the United States.



Note: Rates for Canada and Denmark available only for years indicated.
Sources: UCR 1958-67; Criminal Statistics (England and Wales) 1958-67; Dominion Bureau Statistics, Crime Statistics, 1963-67 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationery), hereinafter referred to as Canadian Crime Statistics; the data from Denmark were prepared for the Task Force by Professor Karl O. Christiansen, Director of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Copenhagen (hereinafter referred to as Christiansen).

Figure 54.—Variation in reported forcible rape offense rates in the U.S., Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

Burglary

Figure 57 compares burglary in the United States, Canada, England and Wales. The rates are not greatly dissimilar. The American and English 10-year increases are also very much alike (85 and 91 percent, respectively), though the British increase is again greater than ours. The Canadian uptrend is less pronounced, except over 1966-67, when it rises sharply. Generally speaking, the reported levels and trends in the three countries are considerably more alike for burglary than for the major violent crimes.



Note: Rates for Canada and Denmark available only for years indicated.
Sources: *UCR* 1958-67; Criminal Statistics (England and Wales) 1958-67; Canadian Crime Statistics, 1963-67 and Christiansen.

Figure 55.—Variation in reported robbery offense rates in the U.S., Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

It is difficult to on burglary alone form other countries. However, the International Criminal Police Organization (interpol) does provide data on "serious theft" for many nations. "Serious theft" basically refers to major forms of burglary and robbery in the Interpol classification.[134]

There are too many problems to compare American *rate* levels with the Interpol data, although categories like "serious theft" are accepted by experts as validly reflecting reported *trends* over time.[135] Figure 58 shows such trends for a number of countries reporting to Interpol. There are sharp increases in "serious theft" for many nations over the periods covered. For example, the Australian increase (1952-62) was 25 percent; the Swedish increase (1950-64), 96 percent; the West German increase (1950-64), 220 percent: the Dutch increase (1950-64), 169 percent; and the Finnish increase (1955-64), 149 percent. The data in Table 1 of this chapter show the increase in reported American robberies and burglaries over the same period of time to be 91 percent. Although the American categories are not directly comparable to the Interpol categories,[136] the suggestion is clear that, over recent years, the reported increases in in major forms of thefts in many industrialized countries may well have been as great as or greater than increases in the United States.[137]



Note: In England and Wales, as well as Canada, the classification equivalent of aggravated assault is "wounding." Also, rates for Canada and Denmark available only for the years indicated on the figure.
Sources: UCR 1958-67; Criminal Statistics (England and Wales) 1958-67; Canadian Crime Statistics, 1963-67 and Christiansen.

Figure 56.—Variations in reported aggravated assault ("wounding") offense rates in the U.S., Canada, Denmark, England and Wales, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].



PERCENT CHANGES

	1958-1967	1963-1967
U.S.	+85	+43
CANADA	–	+15
ENGLAND & WALES	+91	+23

Note: Rates in Canada available only for the years indicated.
Sources: *UCR* 1958-67; Criminal Statistics (England and Wales) 1958-67; Canadian Crime Statistics, 1963-67.

Figure 57.–Variation in reported burglary offense rates in the U.S., Canada, and England and Wales, 1958-67 [rates per 100,000 population].

• In conclusion, the general picture of the four major violent crimes is that the United States probably has true rates either noticeably higher than other industrial countries or among the highest. This holds for both levels and trends of major violence. We are often not alone–especially when recent trends are compared to England and Wales–but we are consistently a leader in comparison to other countries. If, as has been suggested, affluence and social progress are common to all modern countries with high and increasing major violence,[138] this causal matrix would seem to apply even more to the United States than to other nations. Although real American rates are also high and increasing for suicide, violent auto fatalities, and burglary, they do not stand out as much in comparison to foreign countries, according to the evidence available.



Source: INTERPOL, International Crime Statistics 1950-64 (Paris: General Secretariat of the International Criminal Police Organization, hereinafter referred to as International Crime Statistics.

Figure 58.–Variation in reported "serious theft" offense rates, selected countries, 1950-64 [rates per 100,000 population].

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1. Carl Bridenbaugh, *Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1955), p. 10, as cited in The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (hereinafter referred to as the Crime Commission), *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, p. 19.*
2. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Violence: America in the Sixties,* Signet Paperback (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968), p. 31.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
4. Clarence Schrag, "Anatomy of Violence," consultant paper submitted to the Task Force, App. 25, p. 33.
5. See Roger Lane, "Urbanization and Criminal Violence in the Nineteenth Century: Massachusetts as a Test Case," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (eds.) *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives,* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), pp 360-361.

6. Roger Lane, "Urbanization and Violence in the Nineteenth Century: Massachusetts as a Test Case," consultant paper submitted to the National Comission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Abstract, p. 1. *Task Force Report: Violence in America–Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1969).
7. Al Wasserman, "NBC White Paper: Terror in the Streets," unpublished script for NBC television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1965, p. 24, as cited in the Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 19.
8. Schrag, *op. cit.*
9. Marvin E. Wolfgang (with the collaboration of Bernard Cohen, John Conrad, Lenore Kupperstein, Frederic Pryor), "Measuring the Volume and Character of Crime,' submitted to the Panel on Social Indicators, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Apr. 1968, p. 56.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Not that this is not a uniquely American phenomenon. Eric Hobsbawn, for example, has shown the existence of the "social bandit in European history." See his *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).
12. Richard Maxwell Brown, "Historical Patterns of Violence in America", in *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, op. cit.*, p. 36.
13. For a comprehensive appraisal of violence in historical perspective, see *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, op. cit.*
14. As explained in Ch. 1, by "criminal homicide" we refer to the *UCR* category "willful murder and non-negligent manslaughter" and omit "negligent manslaughter."
15. The rates of the four crimes will also be summed up to provide a combined rate. This is in effect a violent crime "Index," but in light of earlier *UCR* Index criticisms, the Task Force does not claim that this aggregation is anything more than a rough profile of total criminal violence. The combined rate disproportionately reflects robbery and aggravated assault (because the incidence per 100,000 is much higher for these crimes than for homicide and rape) and therefore does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the crime. As a rationale for retaining this rather crude combined rate, however, we note that aggravated assault and, especially, robbery are the kind of anonymous street crimes (as opposed to more personalized crimes among intimates) with which Americans seem especially concerned.
16. The rates through 1967 have been recomputed backward by the FBI according to the method described in App. 2. The 1968 figures have just been published and readjustments for earlier years have not yet been made available.
17. From *Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports–1968* [hereinafter cited as *UCR*] (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968), p. 5.
18. Crime Commission, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1967), p.v.
19. Thorsten Seelin and Marvin Wolfgang, *Delinquency in a Birth Cohort*, forthcoming. See the more extensive discussion in the section on race below.
20. It will be be shown below that offense and arrest rates are much higher than the national average for city dwellers, the young, males, blacks, and the poor.
21. The victimization probability is found by simply dividing the incidence of an offense per 100,000 into 100,000. Thus, an offense rate of, say, 200 per 100,000 means that the probability of being victimized is 1 in 500.
22. While the Table 1 rape rates are per 100,000 *total* population, the computed victimization probability is per 100,000 of the *female* population.
23. Unfortunately, there have not been any longitudinal studies of victimization.
24. For example, a recent survey in Chicago indicated that the risk of physical assault for the black ghetto dweller is 1 in 77; for the white middle-class citizen, the odds are 1 in 2,000; and for the upper middle class suburbanite, the odds are 1 in 10,000. (Gordon Hawkins and Norval Morris, *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control*, forthcoming publication of University of Chicago Press.)

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In General, the NORC Crime Commission survey showed the probability of being a victim is much greater for people in urban areas than in nonurban areas, for the young (ages 20-29) than for the older, for males than for females (except, of course, for forcible rape), for blacks than for whites, for the poor than for the more wealthy. (Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–an Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 80.) Thus, as Ch. 5 will more clearly show, the same subgroups that are likely to be offenders are more often than not likely to be victims.

25. The *UCR*, for example, have been criticized for only publishing and graphically illustrating trends over recent years, when the increases have been most dramatic. Such criticism is justified to a certain extent. On the other hand, there is truth in the reason suggested by the FBI for this practice–that the statistics since 1958 are much more reliable than earlier ones. If earlier trends are not to be given emphasis, the Task Force believes the *UCR* should more clearly state the reasons for using the time periods that are published.
26. See Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 40.
27. Because the combined rate trends mainly reflect robbery and aggravated assault, the inferences here are the same as for those offenses.
28. The former figure is from *"1960 Census of Population, Volume I–Characteristics of the Population,* Part A–"Number of Inhabitants," U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1961), p. XXV. The latter is an estimate obtained directly from the Census Bureau by the Task Force.
29. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 25.
30. See App. 3.
31. Arrests are used because, as discussed in Ch. 2, completely accurate knowledge about the characteristics of offenders is not possessed until arrest has been made. The extent to which generalizations about offenses reported can be made from knowledge of arrests reported is limited by the factors discussed in Ch. 2. The most important limiting factors are the clearance rate gaps between arrests and offenses and the fact that "reported arrests" refer to the number of *persons* arrested, while "reported offenses" refer to the number of *offenses*.
32. Considering the emphasis the Task Force is placing on rate changes, rather than volume changes, it would have been more desirable to couch the increases in terms of rates. However the author of the analysis summarized in Tables 2 and 3 used volume increases.
33. Computed from *UCR, 1967*, Table 9, p. 100.
34. See App. 4 for complete lists of all cities with populations of 250,000 and above.
35. The basic data for the figures and the respective percentage increases are found in App. 5.
36. The relation between city size and violence is noticeably less in the South than in other regions, however. The NORC study showed, for example, that Southern metropolitan center city rates for the seven major Index crimes are less than one-third of the suburban rates. See Philip H. Ennis, *Criminal Victimization in the United States,* National Opinion Research Center (May 1967); a report submitted to the Crime Commission (NORC Survey), pp. 21-30.
37. Wolfgang (with the collaboration of Conrad, Pryor et al.), "Measuring the Volume and Character of Crime," *op. cit.*, p. 73.
38. NORC Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
39. The extent of the suburban population growth vis-a-vis central cities is evident in these census figures. The center city population was 45,473,000 in 1940 and 39,418,000 in 1966. The suburban population was 27,103,000 in 1940 and 65,815,000 in 1966.
40. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 37.
41. Again, the region that may be somewhat an exception to these comments is the South. As discussed in note 36, *supra.*, the NORC study showed that metropolitan

center-city Index rates for all seven major crimes were less than one-third as high as suburban rates.

42. Levels and trends by region are harder to analyze before 1958 because the *UCR* did not include rural areas in state and regional rates before that year. The basic data for the regional levels and trends over the 1958-67 period and the respective percentage increases are found in Appendix 6.
43. When longer time spans are considered, there is evidence to indicate that the differential between Southern reported rates and those from the other regions is getting smaller. The Crime Commission noted that, at least in urban areas (because, as has been noted, the pre-1958 UCR state and regional rates did not include rural areas), reported Southern homicide rates have declined by one-third to one-half from 1935 to 1965. Although the decline was about the same in the Mountain states, the fall was only 15 percent or less elsewhere (with *increases* in the New England area of the Northeast and the Pacific area of the West). See Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 31.
44. The regional trend figures have not been adjusted backward by the FBI, as is the case with the national trend figures, so that reporting changes are more noticeable on the regional figures than on the earlier national figures, as shown in Table 1.
45. As noted in Ch. 2 and discussed in Ch. 5, the difference between the two offenses is very often not so much one of motive and intent but of where a projectile struck a person and whether adequate treatment was given rapidly enough.
46. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 31.
47. See note 43, *supra.*
48. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 31.
49. The NORC study does not show, however, that the other regions are close behind the West, as do the *UCR* data. These discrepancies deserve futher analysis. However, possible explanations are too long and complex for the Task Force to pursue here. The inadequacies of the NORC survey as well as the inadequacies of the *UCR* would have to be considered. Such complexities explain why the Task Force has mainly concentrated on merely asking whether there is agreement between the *UCR* and the NORC survey on which region has the highest rate within each violent crime category.
50. The state probably does not, however, have the highest real combined rate in the country. The *UCR* statistics in Fig. 16, for example, show that California's 1967 combined rate was 351.1. There were five states with higher rates: Maryland (474.1), New York (403.4), Illinois (394.4), Florida (390.2), and Michigan (374.0). See *UCR 1967*, pp. 68 ff.
51. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 34.
52. *Ibid.* The Crime Commission Assessment Task Force stated that the ratio of males to females is only slightly higher than the nation as a whole: 99.2 to 97.2. In addition, the state has a lower percentage of Negroes than the nation as a whole (5.6 percent as compared with 10.5), but a higher percentage of other nonwhite population (2.4 percent as compared with 0.9 percent for the nation as a whole).
53. See Ch. 2 for a more complete discussion of the biases inherent in arrest data. It is suggested there that the existence of unjustifiably high statistical reporting of youth, male, and Negro arrests is probable, although not yet proven empirically.
54. The actual data, the method and assumptions for computing the rates, and additional computations of percentage increases of rates over time are found in App. 7.
55. This reflects the fact that the majority of state juvenile court statutes limit juvenile court jurisdiction to youngsters alleged to have committed a crime who have not reached their 18th birthday. Persons 18 and older who are charged with a criminal offense are within the jurisdiction of the regular court.
56. Cities over 2,500 population.
57. If they were, the rates would be somewhat lower.

58. An explanation of the method and assumptions used and a presentation of both actual computed rates and percentage changes over time is found in App. 8.
59. So, again, the rates would be somewhat lower if the rural and suburban categories were added to the urban category.

    Although Figure 24, on forcible rape, was included for completeness, it shows only male arrest rates because the offense is by definition committed by males on females. The case of forcible rape will therefore not be referred to in our analysis, although the male rape levels and trends are included in Figure 27, which shows rates by sex for the four major violent crimes combined.
60. Fig. 27, as expected, reflects primarily the levels and trends of robbery and aggravated assault; the fact that the included forcible rape figures are only for males adds to the male-female discrepancy in the summation.
61. An explanation of the method and assumptions used and a presentation of both the actual computed rates and percentage changes over time is found in App. 9.
62. These broad age breakdowns are not adequate when age only is being analyzed, but do suffice in this context, where the focus is on race.
63. So, as before, combining the urban with suburban and rural data would somewhat lower the rates in all categories.
64. Sellin and Wolfgang, *op. cit.*
65. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Rejoinder" (to Christen T. Jonassen, "A Re-evaluation and Critique of Some of the Logic and Some Methods of Shaw and McKay," *American Sociological Review*, 608-614 (Oct. 1949), *American Sociological Review*, 617 (Oct. 1949); reproduced in James F. Short, Jr., "Introduction," in Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, revised ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. xxi

    Short also reports that recent Chicago data "provide evidence that, over time, Negro communities increase their ability to control delinquency. In new chapters (XIV and XVI) prepared especially for this edition of *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, McKay presents data concerning trends of officially recorded delinquency in 74 Chicago communities (marked off by physical and social characteristics and for historical reasons) over a 35-year period, 1927-61. McKay finds that four of the five communities with the most pronounced upward trends, and four of the five communities with the most pronounced *downward trends*, are Negro communities. The most significant difference between these communities appears to be the fact that the upward-trending communities have begun and completed the familiar cycle of Negro invasion, disruption of institutional life, and succession of the population to a Negro majority most *recently* in the series, while the downward-trending communities have constituted the heart of the Negro community in Chicago (the 'Black Belt' south of the Loop) for more than 30 years. Thus Lawndale on the west side, and Kenwood, Woodlawn, and [more recently] Englewood on the south side have undergone virtually complete changes in population, from middle-class white to middle- and lower-class Negro, during the late 1940's and the 1950's. Their delinquency rates have changed 'from well below the mean for the city to among the highest in the city.' Thirty-five years ago, rates in the areas of greatest decrease were the highest in the city. They still are high, as is evidence of other social ills, such as truancy and mental illness, but they 'have decreased significantly and consistently over the past thirty years'." (Introduction to Revised Edition of Shaw and McKay, 1969, *Ibid.*, pp. xxix and xxx.)

    For other discussions of the difficulties in comparing blacks and whites living in equal circumstances, see: Henry D. McKay and Solomon Kobrin, "Nationality and Delinquency: A Study of Variation in Rates of Delinquency for Nativity, Nationality and Racial Groups Among Types of Areas in Chicago." (Unpublished manuscript, Institute for Juvenile Research, Department of Mental Health, State of Illinois, pp. 101-194), and Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Crime and Race: Conceptions and Misconceptions" (Pamphlet No. 6, Institute of Human Relations Press, The American Jewish Committee, 1964.)
66. In presenting the above statistics and reaching our conclusions we have been sensitive to positions such as the following: "The elimination of racial classifications from public criminal statistical reports would probably do much

good and little harm. It might allow issues between law enforcement agencies and minority groups to be resolved on grounds more substantial than those provided by rather spacious statistics." (Gilbert Geis, "Statistics Concerning Race and Crime," *Crime and Delinquency* Vol. 11 (2) (1965), p. 149.) We more strongly believe, however, that the true profile of violent crime must be sketched to the best of available knowledge.

67. Sellin and Wolfgang, *op. cit.*
68. An aggregate category composed of criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and assault and battery.
69. It would, of course, be optimal to have an SES index including education as well as occupation and income. While there is no rigorous analysis of violent crime available that does this, occupation alone or, as above, income alone, is a very good proxy because the three variables are so closely correlated.
70. Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1958), p. 37.
71. Menachem Amir, *Patterns in Forcible Rape,* unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Penn., 1965, p. 153.
72. Andre Normandeau, *Patterns and Trends in Robbery,* unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Penn., 1968, p. 186.

Both Amir (see p. 156) and Normandeau (see pp. 186-188) roughly controlled for occupation and asked whether the large rate differentials between blacks and whites disappeared. Each author computed arrest rates broken down by race for only the most violence-prone groups—the skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled and unemployed. The overall black rate was four times the overall white rate for forcible rape offenders and remained four times as great within the violence-prone occupational groups when occupation was controlled. In the case of robbery, the overall black male rate was 16 times the over white male rate and was only reduced to about 10 times the white rate within the violence-prone occupational group when occupation was controlled.

How do these results affect our earlier conclusion that violence rate differentials between blacks and whites would become noticeably smaller if equal opportunity prevailed? They qualify the statement, but only to a degree. As both Amir and Normandeau emphasize, their calculations were crude because of unrefined data. More important, to say a black is at the same occupation level as a white is not necessarily to say that he has been given equal opportunity for advancement, income, education, housing, etc. We repeat that much more research needs to be done on the incidence of violence in comparable cohorts of blacks and whites. In fact, a systematic investigation with a research design specifically oriented to comparing black and white crime while controlling for all other variables has yet to be undertaken.

73. David J. Pittman and William Handy, "Patterns in Criminal Aggravated Assault," 55 *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science,* 462-470 (Dec. 1964).
74. *Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1966), pp. 131-132.
75. Stephen Schafer, "Criminal-Victim Relationships in Violent Crimes," Vol.I, Unpublished research report, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, July 1, 1965, under research grant MH—07058-01, pp. 85 ff.
76. See Ch. 5 for a description of the survey.
77. The proportionately large percentages in the "student" category mainly reflect arrests of juvenile offenders.
78. The data for the figures in this section are found in App. 10. Although the Task Force has supplied data appendices for all the figures up to and including this section, no more supplementary tables will be included in Ch. 3 because the remaining backup data is easily found in the indicated reference sources and is generally less important and/or of more questionable validity.
79. See App. 1 for a discussion of the available data on auto violence and our reasons for using negligent manslaughter as a proxy. The data on suicide on this chapter come from the annual publication of the National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics of the U.S.* See App. 1 for an appraisal of these data.

80. As stated in note 14, *supra,* we are using "criminal homicide" to mean willful murder plus nonnegligent manslaughter and are treating negligent manslaughter separately.
81. In NCHS publications, "metropolitan areas" include all counties in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (or in New England, Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas), while "nonmetropolitan areas" include all other counties.
82. See, for example, *Suicide in the United States, 1950-1964,* National Center for Health Statistics, Series 20, No. 5 (Aug. 1967), for the most recent case study of suicide, which reaches these conclusions about urban variation and suicide.
83. Figs. 34 to 39 and Fig. 42 break down negligent manslaughter and suicide rates by city size (manslaughter only), region, age, sex, and race over the 1963—66 period. The span was chosen because it is the most recent period for which both comparable *UCR* negligent manslaughter and NCHS suicide data are available. Although this does not give a very-long-trend period, it is sufficient for the main purpose of the figure: the graphic illustration of suicide and negligent manslaughter levels broken down by the indicated demographic variables.
84. See past issues of *Vital Statistics for the United States,* NCHS, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.
85. One other partial explanation to the higher Western suicide rates may be related to the fact that there are high populations of American Indians living on or still having ties with reservations in several areas of the West. This is important because Indians are one of the few ethnic groups in this country presently known to have a significantly higher suicide rate than the general population. In some tribes, the rate of suicide is at least 100 per 100,000, or roughly 10 times the average rate for the United States as a whole.

Given this information, it can be asked in which Western states where the general suicide rate is high are there enough American Indians living on or still having ties with reservations for the general state suicide rate to be pulled up significantly by the very high Indian suicide rate. Of the six states with the highest suicide rates, only Montana qualifies according to this criterion. In 1962, the last year for which official population figures for Indians are available, the ratio of Indians to the total population was roughly 1 to 35 in Montana. (The U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs estimate of Montana Indians in 1962 was 20,566 and the U.S. Census Bureau estimate of the total Montana population in 1962 was 696,000.)

However, the suicide rates in Arizona and New Mexico are almost as great as for the six highest states; and the Arizona and New Mexico Indian populations are very large. In 1962, roughly 1 of 18 people in Arizona was an Indian with ties to a reservation. The New Mexico ratio was about 1 to 19. (The U. S. Bureau of Indian Affairs 1962 Indian population estimates were 81,924 in Arizona and 52,180 in New Mexico. The U. S. Census 1962 total population estimates were 1,466,000 and 978,000, respectively.)

In at least Montana, Arizona, and New Mexico, then, it is likely that high Indian suicide rates were one partial statistical explanation for the higher overall state rates. These rates, in turn, contributed to the high overall rates for the West, although the quantitative impact was still rather small. (See Larry H. Dizmang and Claudia F. Matthews, "Suicide," unpublished consultant paper submitted to the Task Force.)

86. While the suicide rate is lowest for children and adolescents in comparison to rates for other age groups, it is interesting to note that, within the cohort of children and adolescents, suicide ranks as the third leading cause of death behind only accidents and cancer, according to NCHS figures.
87. Although the NCHS statistics refer to the general category of "nonwhites," most of these are, of course, Negroes, so that Fig. 39 is comparable to the race figures for manslaughter and homicide, which refer to "Negroes."
88. The high male suicide rate is also related to marital status. In 1966, the suicide rate for divorced males was 69.4 compared to 18.4 for divorced females. Divorce is in general more related to suicides than is any other marital status. The 1966 suicide rate for divorced people of both sexes was 39.9. For single persons, the rate was 20.9, for married persons 11.9, and for the widowed 23.8. See Dizmang, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

89. Herbert Hendin, *Black Suicide* (forthcoming publication by Basic Books, New York), p. 5.

The author concludes:

> In the young adult Negro group described it is clear that there is a relation, and not an inverse one, between suicide and homicide. This is based in the particular black experience in our culture, an experience that generates violence within the Negro and presents him with the problem of controlling it.
>
> The alternation among these young blacks between conscious, overt violence and self-desrructive behavior is a far cry from "the unconscious hostility toward the lost loved object" described by Freud. Patients fitting the picture Freud described are usually anything but openly destructive. The statistics . . . showing that the high peaks of Negro homicide and suicide occur during the same age period (twenty to thirty-five) take on more meaning when it is seen that underlying suicide as well as homicide is the central common factor of the attempt by the young black population to deal with its rage and violence. (Pp. 47 and 48.)

For another important recent study of race and suicide, see Michael Lalli and Stanley H. Turner, "Suicide and Homicide: A Comparative Analysis by Race and Occupational levels," 59 *Journal of Criminology, Criminal Law and Police Science,* 191-200.

90. These data, as well as the homicide data, are from the *UCR*. Unlike the NCHS suicide figures, these FBI figures are not broken down by sex and race separately.
91. In the case of violent auto fatalities, however, it will take further work to show how good the data proxy of negligent manslaughter is. Conclusions here can therefore refer only to negligent manslaughter with the underlying but yet unproven assumption that the same in fact holds true for violent auto fatalities.
92. Again, however, it may be that young urban Negro adults experience suicide rates as high or higher than their white counterparts.
93. NORC Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
94. This person was asked if anyone in the household had been victimized in the past 12 months, and the surveyors then attempted to interview all victims. While this theoretically provided for the interviewing of everyone in the family, including children, the first adult contact could obviously have held back information on the abuse of household children by himself (herself) or by other adults. See NORC Survey, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-5.
95. David G. Gil and John H. Noble, "Public Knowledge, Attitudes and Opinions About Physical Child Abuse in the United States, "Brandeis University Papers in Social Welfare, No. 14 (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis Univ. 1968).
96. See David G. Gil, "Physical Abuse of Children–One Manifestation of Violence in American Society," unpublished consultant paper submitted to the Task Force.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.*
99. David G. Gil, "Nationwide Survey of Legally Reported Physical Abuse of Children," Brandeis University, Papers in Social Welfare, No. 15 (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis Univ., 1968).
100. Gil, unpublished consultant paper submitted to the Task Force, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 3.
101. Although halfway through the year, the study was extended to Dec. 31, 1968.
102. Of the 10 largest cities, Philadelphia was not able to participate in the 1967 study at all, and Washington, D.C., was not able to participate in the comprehensive level of the study. Thus the sample for comprehensive study was reduced to 38 units.
103. Gil, "Nationwide Survey of Legally Reported Physical Abuse of Children," *op. cit.*, p. 51.
104. In an unpublished consultant paper submitted to the Commission, "The Neglect, the Abuse, and the Battering of Children," Dr. Vincent J. Fontana (Director of Pediatrics at St. Vincent's Hospital and Medical Center of New York, and Medical Director of New York Foundling Hospital) differs with Prof. Gil (see footnote 96 above) on this point. While acknowledging that accurate statistics concerning the incidence of child abuse are unobtainable, Dr. Fontana maintains that:

> we are probably seeing only the upper portion of a submerged iceberg . . . In 1967, a total of 706 suspected child abuse cases were reported to the State Department of Social Services of New York City; a 70 percent increase over the 1966 total of 416 . . . . [Furthermore] although the U.S. National Vital Statistics Division lists cancer as a major cause of pediatric deaths in 1959, accidental deaths among children during the same year actually ranked 175 percent higher. The question arises as to how many of these so-called accidental deaths were not actually "accidental" but due to the unsuspected maltreatment of children . . . . Only a fractional number of neglected and abused children are taken to physicians or hospitals for medical attention. Many of these children, who are seen by the physician, go unrecognized, undiagnosed, and hence, not reported.

105. The NORC Survey did not include disorderly conduct.
106. Cf. Table 1 and Fig. 1, above.
107. NORC Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
108. Computations by Task Force from data in Table 1.
109. They were calculated by the NFPA for the Task Force according to the method outlined in App. 1 and are based upon these sample states: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vemont, and Wyoming.
110. Arson data are appraised and this conclusion is reached in App. 1.
111. National Fire Protection Association, "Fires and Fire Losses Classified, 1967, 62 *Fire Journal*, 18 (Sept. 1968).
112. The percentage increases by location, or "occupancy grouping," are based on fire volumes, not rates, by the NFPA. For the 1966-67 period, the percent changes in the frequency of fires for all the location categories were:

Location or occupancy grouping	1966 volume	1967 volume	Percent increase
Public assembly	28,600	30,800	7.7
Education and institution . . .	17,000	17,700	4.1
Residence	669,400	665,100	-.6
Store	47,800	51,800	8.4
Office	8,200	9,900	20.7
Industry	67,300	57,500	-14.6
Storage	98,300	106,100	7.9
Other building	34,200	22,000	-35.7
Brush, rubbish, grass	832,000	865,500	4.0
Forest	123,900	125,000	.9
Other outdoor	23,700	27,900	17.7
Transportation equipment . .	446,150	413,700	-7.3
Total	2,396,550	2,393,000	-.2

Source: NFPA, *ibid.*, pp. 19-21.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
114. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 46.
115. "Vandalism Study of Selected Great Cities for 1966-1967," prepared by the Baltimore City Public Schools Division of Research and Development, Bureau of Records and Statistics, June 1968.
116. Ranked in order of public school enrollment, the cities were: New York, Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, Washington, D.C., Milwaukee, Memphis, New Orleans, Denver, Tampa, Boston, Cincinnati, Jefferson County, Tulsa, Portland, Pittsburgh, Newark, Kansas City, Mo., Oakland, Minneapolis, Wichita, Birmingham, Dayton, El Paso, Norfolk, Louisville, St. Paul, Richmond, Syracuse, and Beaumont.

117. Rate calculations from the survey data were made by the Task Force.
118. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 77.
119. Louis Harris and Associates, "The American Public Looks at Violence," Nov. 1968: Study No. 1887, for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Hereinafter cited as Harris Survey).

The total sample in the survey comprised 1,176 interviews with persons 18 years of age and older. Respondents were selected by means of an area probability sampling procedure which involved 100 sampling points, or "clusters," of approximately 12 interviews each. Instructions from the Harris home office directed interviewers to specific blocks or other geographical units and then designated systematic procedures for determining which individual within the household should be interviewed. No callbacks were employed; if no interview was obtained at an address, the interviewer attempted an interview at the next residence, following a prescribed route.

Coincident with the interview among adults, interviewers talked with teenage boys and girls (14-18) residing in the same localities. The interview with youngsters was considerably shorter, dealing only with media use, expressions of dissention, experience with violence, and approval of physical violence. There were 195 of these interviews (no more than one teenage interview per household was permitted). An additional 301 interviews were conducted 1 week later through the use of an identical sampling procedure, thus yielding a total of 496 interviews with teenagers.

Interviewing among adults took place Oct. 1-8, 1968. The additional teenager interviews were made on Oct. 10-12, 1968.

120. Table 10 has all six categories. Table 11 eliminates "spanked as a child." Table 12 eliminates "choked."
121. The survey was not interested, however, in whether or not the acts were in fact reported to the police.
122. Harris Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
123. *Jbid.*, p. 120.
124. Mexico has experienced a high homicide rate for many years. Social analysts suggest that in areas of Mexico where rates are high, physically aggressive forms of behavior constitute positive values. Observers describe a kind of fatalistic expectation of violence and death. See Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, *The Subculture of Violence* (London: Social Science Paperbacks, 1967).
125. In 1965 the Philippines had 8,750 murders, or 27.0 per 100,000 population. "For comparison, the FBI *Uniform Crime Reports* for 1965 show a total of 9,850 murders in the entire U.S. for 1965 and a rate per 100,000 population of 5.1. Thus the actual *number* of murders committed by the 32 million people in the Philippines is about as high as that for the 190 million people in the U.S." See the *Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement*, prepared by the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, Dept. of State, Washington, D.C., Dec. 15, 1966, p. 36.
126. Wolfgang and Ferracuti, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-279.
127. Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.
128. From data appearing in the Report of the Firearms Task Force of the Violence Commission, the United States ranked eighth in general suicide rates but *first* in percent of suicides by firearms in a 16-country survey. See George D. Newton, Jr., and Franklin E. Zimring, *Firearms and Violence in American Life* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 35.
129. In the case of Denmark the period is 1962-66.
130. Called "wounding" in England and Wales as well as in Canada.
131. Canada also has a very large number of minor assaults. In 1967 Canadian Crime Statistics reports the following figures for that offense:

Year	*Number*	*Rate per 100,000*
1965	44,551	271.6
1966	53,533	318.6
1967	59,149	340.9

The comparable *UCR* category is "other assaults." In 1967 a total of 4,566 agencies, representing a total population of 146 million, reported 229,928 arrests, or 157.6 per 100,000.

132. American violent crime rates are also great in comparison to another country with reliable data, Norway. Rates for separate major violent acts are not available, but Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie computed rates for the equivalent of the four major violent crimes combined (which in Norway are given the labels: offenses against life, body and health; assaults against public servants; and robbery). He produced these rates per 100,000 population over the age of 14 (with American rates for the four major violent crimes combined in parentheses):

Year	*Rate per 100,000*	*Year*	*Rate per 100,000*
1957	58 (140)	1962	57 (160)
1958	59 (148)	1963	58 (166)
1959	59 (147)	1964	54 (188)
1960	56 (159)	1965	59 (198)
1961	59 (156)	1966	65 (217)

133. For the Norwegian equivalent of the four major violent crimes combined, Professor Nils Christie (see preceding note) computed an uptrend of only about 8 percent between 1957 and 1966, so the reported American increase is considerably greater than in Norway as well. Professor Christie informed the Task Force that he found no firm evidence as to the permanency or magnitude of the recent Norwegian increases. He stated that he preferred to regard the possible rises in the crime rate as a fluctuation in the long-term trend, which has been fairly level.

In addition, in the case of forcible rape trends, the Task Force could find few significant uptrends from *International Criminal Statistics* (Interpol) data on most of the other European countries. Interpol data are explained in more detail below.

134. See the Interpol publication, *International Criminal Statistics*, for complete explanations.
135. Discussing Interpol data in "Report on the Post-War Trends of Crime In Selected European Countries," Consultant Paper to the Crime Commission, p. 4, Prof. Karl Christiansen says:

> Comparisons of the trends may be feasible provided that: (1) No important changes in legislation have occurred in any of the countries during the period of investigation. (2) No important changes in the administration of the law of any of the countries have occurred during the period of investigation. (3) No important changes in the system of recording, statistical preparation and tabulation of the data have occurred in any of the countries during the period of investigation.

136. It is likely, for example, that the summation of American robberies plus burglaries includes more crimes of a minor nature than the Interpol "serious theft" classifications.
137. Unfortunately the years since 1965, when the American increases have been the sharpest, are not included in these comparisons because complete foreign data are not yet available.
138. Prof. Leon Radzinowicz, for example, addressed this common tie when he testified before the Commission that:

> . . . to find crime decreasing it is necessary to leave the affluent societies altogether and go where there is less property and less opportunity, less competition, less chance, less mobility, less of all the things usually associated with the very idea of social progress. (Testimony of Sept. 26, 1968, transcript, p. 626.)

APPENDIX 2

UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING TRENDS–FBI PROCEDURES

This explanation of FBI procedures was originally provided by the Uniform Crime Reporting Section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the benefit of the President's Crime Commission. Because of its importance in articulating exactly how crime trends are computed by the FBI, it has been reproduced for this Task Force Report of the Violence Commission:

> Reference is made to page 46 of "Uniform Crime Reports–1965" which briefly sets forth an explanation of crime trends as prepared for Uniform Crime Reports publication.
>
> Historically, the FBI applies verification and quality review procedures over individual agency reports giving special attention to trends in volume of crime, as well as crime rates. In all trend tabulations only those reporting units are used that have provided comparable data for the period involved. National, geographic and area trends are always established on the basis of 2 consecutive years. Whenever it is determined that an agency has provided noncomparable data during this period the reports of that agency are not used in trend tabulations.
>
> The FBI conducts a special review of crime reports from police agencies five times a year for the purpose of identifying any significant changes in crime levels which are due in part to a change in reporting procedures or record systems. For example, in 1966 over 2,000 trend letters[1] were sent by the FBI staff to the police administrator of a contributing agency to inquire as to the reason for a significant increase or decrease in pertinent crime classifications. This letter specifically directs attention to a possible change in records or reporting procedures. As a result, in 1966, 147 reporting agencies have been eliminated from trend tabulations because the change in crime counts are in part due to a change in reporting or records in all or one offense classification.
>
> "Uniform Crime Reports–1965" reported that 92 percent of the U.S. population was represented in offenses known to the police volume and rate tabulations. (Rates in Uniform Crime Reports always refer to the number of crimes per unit of population.) However, since national trends or percent change tabulations are restricted to those agencies

which have had comparable records and reporting practices, the departments actually used for national trends in 1965 represented 82 percent of our U.S. population. Year-to-year trends in Uniform Crime Reports are valid and can be used to reasonably establish long-term trends, as well as reestimate crime volumes and reconstruct rates for past years. We logically assume that the current year is the most complete in terms of volume. The trend or percent change as established by comparable units for each 2-year period is then applied as the basis for reestimating the volume for prior years.

An example of the procedure used will be that applied to the crime counts from New York City. This is an atypical situation. New York City Police Department is providing a more complete count of criminal incidence through an improvement in reporting and records procedures.

In 1965 the New York City Police Department reported 187,795 index offenses and will report over 300,000 index offenses in 1966. These figures obviously are not used in uniform crime reporting trends, but the 1965 volume figures for the city of New York, State of New York and for the United States must be revised. Normally we would apply to noncomparable reporting places the average trend experience of similar comparable reporting units within the same State. However large cities, and particularly New York, are unique. In such situations we will revise the 1965 New York City volume figure using the average trend experience for cities over 500,000 inhabitants nationally against the actual reporting volume by New York City in 1966.

$$\frac{\text{(1966 volume reported)}}{\text{(Trend comparable places, 1966 over 1965)}} = \text{Estimated crime for previous year.}$$

If we assume a New York city base of 300,000 index offenses this will increase the New York State 1965 volume of index offenses by 92,000. The total crime rate for the State of New York will then be adjusted upward from the 1,608 offenses per 100,000 reported in 1965 to 2,117. The national rate will be similarly revised from 1,434 offenses per 100,000 as reported in 1965 to 1,482.

There is set forth below the published estimated number of index offenses in 1960 to 1965 and the revised estimates which we used in establishing the trend from 1960 to 1965. The center column contains the national percent change which was established by comparable reporting units for each 2-year period and which remains constant in reestimating for past years.

Year	Revised estimate	Published national trend over previous year (percent)	Published estimate
1960	1,908,679	–	1,861,261
1961	1,973,151	3	1,926,119
1962	2,098,432	6	2,048,341
1963	2,310,359	10	2,259,081
1964	2,614,223	13	2,604,428
1965	2,780,015	6	2,780,015

REFERENCES

1. The text of the letter reads as follows:

We appreciate your continued interest in crime reporting. We note a sharp change in your crime figures, identified by period and classification as follows:

Was the change due to any adjustment in your scoring procedures or record system? We ask this to be sure that the same method was used in both periods.

Your response in the enclosed envelope will be appreciated.

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, *Director*

APPENDIX 3

REPORTED INDEX CRIME INCREASES BETWEEN 1950 AND 1965 DUE TO URBANIZATION AND CHANGES IN THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION ALONE

This appendix shows the method and calculations behind the conclusions in Chapter 3 on the percentage increases of reported Index crimes between 1950 and 1965 due to urbanization and changes in the age structure of the population alone. The work has been done by Theodore Ferdinand in an article forthcoming in the *British Journal of Criminology* and is included here with his consent and review. The method and calculations are entirely the work of Professor Ferdinand. The Task Force has edited his technical commentary somewhat to integrate it with the overall Task Force report and has omitted the author's brief Introduction and Summary-Conclusion.

REPORTED INDEX CRIME OFFENSE INCREASES BETWEEN 1950 AND 1965 DUE TO URBANIZATION ALONE

Table 1 shows the distribution of the population in urban and rural places in 1950 and 1965. It is apparent that the major effects of redistributing the 1965 population in terms of 1950 proportions are (1) a large increase in the number of people in rural areas, (2) only a minor decrease in Group II cities, and (3) substantial decreases in the remaining groups.[1]

In Table 2, the revised volume of Index crimes is calculated from the revised population figures for 1965 from Table 1 and the *actual* rates of these crimes in 1965. The revised volumes of Table 2, therefore, represent the Index crimes that would have occurred if the population had been distributed in urban and rural places in 1965 as it was in 1950.

Table 3 shows the percent increase in Index crimes attributable to urban redistribution alone. The speical case of manslaughter should be pointed out. In Table 3 we see that the volume of manslaughters has actually been suppressed by the degree of urbanization that has occurred since 1950. This finding is entirely reasonable because those groups that have declined in size relative to the rest of the population since 1950 (the rural areas and Group II cities) have relatively higher rates of manslaughter (see Table 2), while those groups that have gained rapidly in population (Group III, IV and V cities) have rather low rates of the crime.

Table 1.—The distribution of the population in urban and rural places, 1950 and 1965

Cities by population size	1950[1]	1965[2]	Revised 1965[3]
Group I, cities greater than 250,000	25,936,568	42,573,000	34,870,000
Group II, cities of 100,000 to 250,000	9,882,796	13,704,000	13,280,000
Group III, cities of 50,000 to 100,000	8,697,121	15,788,000	11,640,000
Group IV, cities of 25,000 to 50,000	8,360,623	16,200,000	11,230,000
Group V, cities of 10,000 to 25,000	9,935,178	17,003,000	13,300,000
Group VI, cities of less than 10,000	6,831,320	11,626,000	9,172,000
Rural area	37,676,816	27,118,000	50,600,000
Total	107,320,430	144,092,000	144,092,000

1. From UCR, Table 31, p. 89.
2. From UCR, 1965, Table 6, p. 94.
3. Calculated by increasing the size of each population category by 34,270, the percentage represented in the total increase of the total population in 1965 over 1950.

The volume of all the other major offenses, however, has increased appreciably as a result of urbanization. For the four major violent crimes, 8.5 percent of the reported increases in criminal homicide[2] offenses, 12.8 percent of the reported increases in forcible rape offenses, 25.1 percent of the reported increases in robbery offenses, and 13.2 percent of the reported increases in aggravated assault offenses between 1950 and 1965 are attributable to urbanization alone. Overall, 17.5 percent of the increase in the four major offenses between 1950 and 1965 is attributable to urbanization alone. The figure for all reported offenses, violent (including manslaughter) and property, is 19 percent.

REPORTED INDEX CRIME ARREST INCREASES BETWEEN 1950 AND 1965 DUE TO CHANGES IN THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION ALONE

An analysis similar to the above can be perfomed on the changes in the age structure of the population. The analysis proceeds by first calculating the volume of arrests that would have occurred in the absense of changes in the age structure under examination. These figures are then used to determine the portion of the increases in Index crime arrests since 1950 that are a direct result of the changes in the age structure of the United States.

There are two differences between these calculations and those for urbanization. First, the basic counting unit is now *arrests reported by the*

Table 2.—The actual rate and revised volume of Index crimes for 1965[1]

	Group I		Group II		Group III		Group IV		Group V		Group VI		Rural	
	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume	Rate	Revised volume
Criminal homicide (murder and nonnegligent manslaughter)	9.2	3,207	6.4	852	3.5	407	3.1	348	2.3	306	2.0	184	4.2	2,127
Negligent manslaughter	4.9	1,708	4.7	624	3.3	384	2.5	281	1.4	186	1.1	101	6.2	3,137
Forcible rape	21.4	7,461	11.2	1,488	8.3	966	6.3	708	5.6	746	5.0	459	8.7	4,402
Robbery	178.8	62,370	73.1	9,718	48.5	5,644	32.9	3,693	18.6	2,475	11.8	1,083	9.9	5,007
Aggravated Assault	200.2	69,810	151.0	20,060	85.1	9,903	70.7	7,940	66.7	8,876	62.0	5,690	58.3	29,500
Burglary	982.6	342,500	871.2	115,700	674.6	78,500	561.7	63,002	461.8	61,410	368.9	33,850	308.4	156,100
Larceny, $50 and over	633.3	220,800	555.7	73,800	491.6	57,200	442.5	49,680	309.2	41,150	236.4	21,700	176.2	89,200
Larceny, under $50	1,325.2	461,900	1,509.0	200,400	1,277.7	148,600	1,190.1	133,700	1,005.1	133,750	717.4	65,820	231.0	127,100
Auto theft	537.0	187,200	353.1	46,910	297.1	34,580	212.4	23,860	140.5	18,680	98.6	9,050	51.1	25,860

1. The actual rates of Index crimes were taken from *Uniform Crime Reports*, Table 6, pp. 94-95. The revised volumes were revised population figure for 1965 from Table 1 and the actual rates of this table.

Table 3.–The percent of the increases in Index crimes Attributable to urban and rural population distribution alone

	A[1] Total offenses, 1965	B[2] Revised total offenses, 1965	C Difference between A and B	D[3] Total offenses, 1950	E Difference between A and D of E	F C as percent
Criminal homicide (murder and nonnegligent manslaughter)	7,626	7,431	195	5,332	2,294	8.5
Negligent manslaughter	5,724	6,421	-697	4,201	1,523	(45.8)
Forcible rape	16,884	16,230	654	11,761	5,123	12.8
Robbery	106,350	89,990	16,360	41,124	65,226	25.1
Aggravated Assault	165,241	151,779	13,462	63,061	102,180	13.2
Total 4 major violent crimes	296,101	265,430	30,671	121,278	174,823	17.5
Burglary	940,713	851,062	89,651	302,831	637,882	14.1
Larceny	2,112,089	1,824,800	287,289	684,535	1,427,554	20.1
Auto theft	423,034	346,140	76,894	123,311	299,723	25.7
Total all offenses	3,777,661	3,293,853	483,808	1,236,160	2,541,501	19.0

[1]These figures were taken from *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1965, Table 6, pp. 94-95.
[2]These figures represent the totals of the rows in Table 2, 1950, Table 31, p. 89.
[3]These figures were taken from *Uniform Crime Reports*, [illegible]

police, instead of *offenses reported by the police*. This is so because, as discussed in Chapter 2, completely accurate knowledge about the characteristics of offenders is not possessed until arrest has been made. The extent to which generalizations about offenses reported can be made from knowledge of arrests reported is limited by the factors discussed in Chapter 2. The most important limitations are the gap between arrests and offenses and the fact that "reported arrests" refer to the number of *persons* arrested, while "reported offenses" refer to the number of *offenses*. We do not attempt to generalize from arrests to offenses in this analysis.

Second, the *UCR* category of "willful murder and nonnegligent manslaughter" cannot be separated from the *UCR* category of "negligent manslaughter."[3] No differention was made by the *UCR* for the base year of the analysis, 1950. Consequently, "criminal homicide" here means willful murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, and negligent manslaughter.

Table 4 shows the number of those aged 10 through 24 years and the number in the remaining portion of the population.[4] This age cohort was selected because it is very criminally inclined[5] and because in recent years it has increased in size much faster than the rest of the population.

Table 4.–The age structure of the United States in 1965 if no change in distribution since 1950

Age cohorts	1950[1]	1965[2]	Revised[3] 1965
10-24	33,387,000	49,243,000	42,760,000
0-9 and 25 or older	117,939,000	144,575,000	151,058,000
Total	151,326,000	193,818,000	193,818,000

[1]From U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1966, (87th ed.), Washington, D.C., 1966, No. 21, p. 24.

[2]From U.S. Census, "Estimates of the Population of the United States, by Age, Color, and Sex: July 1, 1960 to 1965," *Population Estimates*, Series P–25, No. 321, Nov. 30 1965, Table 2, p. 15.

[3]Calculated by increasing age cohorts of 1950 by the same percentage of increase exhibited by the total population.

In Table 5, the volume of arrests that would have occurred in 1965 if the age structure had remained unchanged from 1950 has been calculated. In Table 6, the percentages of the increases in Index arrests that have resulted from changes in the age structure alone are shown.

Table 6 concludes that, for the four major violent crimes, 5.5 percent of the reported increase in criminal homicide arrests, 47.1 percent of the reported increase in forcible rape arrests, 13.4 percent of the reported increase in robbery arrests, and 9.2 percent of the reported increase in aggravated assault arrests between 1950 and 1965 are attributable to expansion of the proportion of the age 10-24 cohort in the total population. Overall, 11.8 percent of the increase in the four major violent crime arrests between 1950 and 1965 is attributable just to the greater proportion of those aged 10-24 in 1965 than in 1950. The figure for all the reported arrests, violent and property, is 11.6 percent.

Table 5.—The volume of arrests in 1965, revised to reflect age structure of 1950 U.S. population

Crime arrests, 1965	A[1] Actual volume of 1965	B[2] Rate arrests of arrests, 1965	C[3] Revised volume
Criminal homicide (willful murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, negligent manslaughter):			
Under 25	3,798	7.721	3,300
25 and over	6,365	4.401	6,652
Forcible rape:			
Under 25	6,897	14.02	5,990
25 and over	3,837	2.652	4,080
Robbery:			
Under 25	31,600	64.23	27,460
25 and over	14,272	9.87	14,910
Aggravated assault			
Under 25	35,011	71.20	30,430
25 and over	49,400	34.2	51,690
Burglary:			
Under 25	158,140	321.4	137,490
25 and over	39,487	27.3	41,270
Larceny:			
Under 25	291,363	592.5	253,300
25 and over	92,363	63.8	96,400
Auto theft:			
Under 25	89,957	182.8	78,200
25 and over	11,806	8.16	12,330
Total:			
Under 25	616,766	1254.0	536,170
25 and over	217,530	150.4	227,322

[1]From *Uniform Crime Reports*, 1965, Table 22, p. 114.

[2]Calculated by dividing the col. A "Under 25" entries by 492.43 (the number of people per 100,000, 10-24 years of age) and the col. A "25 and Over" entries by 1445.75 (the number of people per 100,000, 0-9 and 25 or older.)

[3]Calculated by multiplying the col. B "Under 25" entries by 42,760,000 and the column B "25 and Over" entries by 151,058,000. See Table 4.

Table 6.—The percentage of the increases in volume of Index arrests since 1950 due to changes in the age structure

Crime	A Volume of arrests 1950	B Volume of arrests 1965	C B-A	D Revised Volume of arrests 1965	E B-D	F E as percent of C
Criminal homicide (willful murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, and negligent manslaughter)	6,336	10,163	3,827	9,952	211	5.5
Forcible rape	9,323	10,734	1,411	10,070	664	47.1
Robbery	19,779	45,872	26,093	42,370	3,502	13.4
Aggravated assault	59,496	84,411	24,915	82,120	2,291	9.2
Subtotal, 4 major violent crimes	94,934	151,180	56,246	144,512	6,668	11.8
Burglary	43,673	197,627	153,954	178,760	18,867	12.3
Larceny	66,031	383,726	317,695	349,700	34,026	10.7
Auto theft	18,398	101,763	83,365	90,530	11,233	13.8
Total	223,036	834,296	611,260	763,502	70,794	11.6

REFERENCES

1. To some extent these changes represent improvements in the thoroughness with which the FBI gathers data from police departments throughout the Nation. But because the 1950 UCR underestimate the size of rural and small town populations (relative to the 1965 UCR), the effect of these improvements has been to understimate the actual extent to which the American population has left the countryside for the cities. Thus, the effects of population redistribution upon the criminal patterns of America described below are probably conservative estimates of the influence of this factor.
2. As discussed in chap. 1, by "criminal homicide" we mean "willful murder," plus "nonnegloget manslaughter."
3. As has been done throughout most of the Task Force report.
4. Unfortunately the FBI reports the volume of arrests for age categories different from those used by the U.S. Bureau of Census. The FBI uses the age group 24 years and under, while the Census Bureau reports its data that those who committed crimes while under the age of 10 years were not taken into account when computing the rates of the various crimes. This number is so small, however, that it could not have had any appreciable effect upon the results.
5. See chap. 3.

APPENDIX 4

OFFENSE RATE DATA FOR THE FOUR MAJOR VIOLENT CRIMES, 1967 CITIES OVER 250,000 POPULATION-RANKED BY RATE OF OFFENSE

[All rates per 100,000 population in the relevant city]

[Source: FBI, Unpublished data]

These rates are referred to in Chapter 3 and are for central cities only. Rates for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas are included in the *UCR*, 1967, pp. 80-93. The order of ranking for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas is in some instances different from the central city rankings. Rates of offenses for individual cities under 250,000 are higher in some instances than for individual cities over 250,000.

Identical tables for criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault (as well as for the other major *UCR* Index offenses) covering the year 1965 are found in the Assessment Task Force Report of the Crime Commission, pp. 212-215.

Table 1.—Criminal homicide
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Rank	City	State	Rate
1	Atlanta	Ga.	28.3
2	St. Louis	Mo.	24.5
3	Fort Worth	Tex.	22.6
4	Washington	D.C.	22.0
5	Dayton	Ohio	21.7
6	Baltimore	Md.	21.4
7	Newark	N.J.	21.3
8	Houston	Tex.	20.6
9	Cleveland	Ohio	18.4
10	Charlotte	N.C.	17.4
11	Detroit	Mich.	17.1
12	New Orleans	La.	17.0
13	Dallas	Tex.	15.7
14	Chicago	Ill.	15.6
15	Birmingham	Ala.	14.5
16	Louisville	Ky.	13.3

Table 1 (cont)

Rank	City	State	Rate
17	Memphis	Tenn.	12.7
18	Nashville	Tenn.	12.6
19	Cincinnati	Ohio	12.5
20	Miami	Fla.	12.4
21	Oakland	Calif.	12.4
22	Kansas City	Mo.	11.7
23	Boston	Mass.	11.5
24	Tampa	Fla.	11.5
25	Philadelphia	Pa.	11.3
26	San Antonio	Tex.	11.3
27	Tulsa	Okla.	11.2
28	Indianapolis	Ind.	10.9
29	Sacramento	Calif.	10.1
30	Los Angeles	Calif.	9.9
31	Rochester	N.Y.	9.8
32	Oklahoma City	Okla.	9.5
33	Norfolk	Va.	9.4
34	New York	N.Y.	9.1
35	San Francisco	Calif.	8.8
36	Jersey City	N.J.	8.6
37	Toledo	Ohio	8.6
38	Seattle	Wash.	8.3
39	Omaha	Nebr.	8.0
40	Phoenix	Ariz.	7.7
41	Pittsburgh	Pa.	6.7
42	Denver	Colo.	6.5
43	Columbus	Ohio	6.4
44	Akron	Ohio	6.3
45	Milwaukee	Wis.	5.5
46	Buffalo	N.Y.	5.2
47	Albuquerque	N. Mex.	4.7
48	Wichita	Kans.	4.6
49	Long Beach	Calif.	4.3
50	Minneapolis	Minn.	4.0
51	El Paso	Tex.	3.9
52	Portland	Oreg.	3.7
53	Honolulu	Hawaii	3.6
54	St. Paul	Minn.	2.8
55	San Jose	Calif.	2.6
56	San Diego	Calif.	2.5

Table 2.–Forcible rape
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Rank	City	State	Rate
1	Los Angeles	Calif.	50.3
2	Newark	N.J.	47.7
3	Baltimore	Md.	47.2
4	Detroit	Mich.	44.7
5	Kansas City	Mo.	43.6
6	St. Louis	Mo.	43.5
7	Denver	Colo.	42.7
8	Chicago	Ill.	39.6
9	Pittsburgh	Pa.	31.7
10	Minneapolis	Minn.	30.9
11	Dayton	Ohio	30.5

Table 2 (cont)

Rank	City	State	Rate
12	New Orleans	La.	30.1
13	Oklahoma City	Okla.	30.0
14	Long Beach	Calif.	29.9
15	Buffalo	N.Y.	29.7
16	Oakland	Calif.	28.3
17	Atlanta	Ga.	25.9
18	Norfolk	Va.	25.8
19	San Francisco	Calif.	24.9
20	Wichita	Kans.	24.6
21	Miami	Fla.	24.2
22	Columbus	Ohio	23.9
23	Cincinnati	Ohio	23.5
24	Indianapolis	Ind.	23.4
25	New York	N.Y.	23.3
26	Albuquerque	N. Mex.	23.1
27	Memphis	Tenn.	22.9
28	Rochester	N.Y.	22.6
29	Nashville	Tenn.	22.3
30	Philadelphia	Pa.	22.2
31	Phoenix	Ariz.	21.9
32	Washington	D.C.	21.3
33	Boston	Mass.	20.5
34	Louisville	Ky.	20.3
35	Fort Worth	Tex.	20.1
36	Seattle	Wash.	20.0
37	Toledo	Ohio	19.5
38	Charlotte	N.C.	19.0
39	St. Paul	Minn.	18.5
40	Houston	Tex.	18.3
41	Omaha	Nebr.	18.2
42	Tulsa	Okla.	18.2
43	Cleveland	Ohio	17.4
45	Tampa	Fla.	17.1
46	Dallas	Tex.	15.8
47	Portland	Oreg.	15.4
48	Sacramento	Calif.	15.3
49	Birmingham	Ala.	15.1
50	Akron	Ohio	14.3
51	El Paso	Tex.	12.7
52	San Jose	Calif.	11.7
53	Jersey City	N.J.	10.1
54	San Diego	Calif.	9.7
55	Milwaukee	Wis.	7.0
56	Honolulu	Hawaii	5.5

Table 3.–Robbery
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Rank	City	State	Rate
1	Detroit	Mich.	730.1
2	Baltimore	Md.	712.6
3	Washington	D.C.	711.9
4	Newark	N.J.	578.3
5	San Francisco	Calif.	542.6
6	Chicago	Ill.	520.9
7	Miami	Fla.	459.0

Table 3 (cont)

Rank	City	State	Rate
8	St. Louis	Mo.	456.8
9	New York	N.Y.	439.7
10	Cleveland	Ohio	433.0
11	Kansas City	Mo.	400.3
12	Oakland	Calif.	368.4
13	Los Angeles	Calif.	352.5
14	Pittsburgh	Pa.	333.4
15	Dayton	Ohio	309.5
16	Minneapolis	Minn.	303.4
17	New Orleans	La.	293.9
18	Houston	Tex.	273.9
19	Toledo	Ohio	269.3
20	Portland	Oreg.	252.0
21	Tampa	Fla.	248.7
22	Boston	Mass.	237.7
23	Long Beach	Calif.	236.6
24	Indianapolis	Ind.	226.2
25	Louisville	Ky.	219.2
26	Akron	Ohio	201.6
27	St. Paul	Minn.	201.0
28	Denver	Colo.	183.4
29	Norfolk	Va.	183.0
30	Seattle	Wash.	181.0
31	Buffalo	N.Y.	174.7
32	Sacramento	Calif.	157.1
33	Rochester	N.Y.	156.9
34	Columbus	Ohio	156.1
35	Phoenix	Ariz.	153.3
36	Memphis	Tenn.	148.9
37	Philadelphia	Pa.	141.5
38	Omaha	Nebr.	140.2
39	Nashville	Tenn.	137.3
40	Fort Worth	Tex.	129.2
41	Cincinnati	Ohio	128.7
42	Atlanta	Ga.	123.0
43	Dallas	Tex.	113.6
44	Charlotte	N.C.	105.8
45	Jersey City	N.J.	101.6
46	Albuquerque	N. Mex.	99.1
47	Birmingham	Ala.	97.0
48	Oklahoma City	Okla.	93.1
49	Tulsa	Okla.	91.1
50	Milwaukee	Wis.	90.9
51	San Antonio	Tex.	63.4
52	San Diego	Calif.	62.9
53	El Paso	Tex.	62.8
54	San Jose	Calif.	57.0
55	Wichita	Kans.	56.1
56	Honolulu	Hawaii	33.0

Table 4.–Aggravated assault
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Rank	City	State	Rate
1	Baltimore	Md.	710.1
2	Miami	Fla.	571.1
3	Newark	N.J.	522.7

Table 4 (cont)

Rank	City	State	Rate
4	Charlotte	N.C.	421.7
5	Los Angeles	Calif.	398.0
6	Washington	D.C.	388.5
7	Chicago	Ill.	350.5
8	St. Louis	Mo.	336.5
9	Nashville	Tenn.	331.7
10	San Francisco	Calif.	326.0
11	New York	N.Y.	303.8
12	Tampa	Fla.	294.5
13	Detroit	Mich.	282.6
14	Dallas	Tex.	268.5
15	Norfolk	Va.	265.3
16	Kansas City	Mo.	259.2
17	Birmingham	Ala.	258.5
18	Albuquerque	N. Mex.	253.0
19	New Orleans	La.	239.7
20	Dayton	Ohio	238.2
21	Minneapolis	Minn.	232.2
22	Houston	Tex.	224.0
23	San Antonio	Tex.	212.4
24	Phoenix	Ariz.	195.4
25	Boston	Mass.	194.7
26	Rochester	N.Y.	186.4
27	Atlanta	Ga.	175.0
28	Pittsburgh	Pa.	171.6
29	Philadelphia	Pa.	163.8
30	Omaha	Nebr.	161.4
31	Louisville	Ky.	160.5
32	Cleveland	Ohio	159.1
33	Oakland	Calif.	158.7
34	Cincinnati	Ohio	158.4
35	Denver	Colo.	152.2
36	Long Beach	Calif.	146.8
37	Wichita	Kans.	142.1
38	Oklahoma City	Okla.	131.2
39	St. Paul	Minn.	126.0
40	Seattle	Wash.	123.1
41	Fort Worth	Tex.	116.2
42	Tulsa	Okla.	116.2
43	El Paso	Tex.	112.4
44	Buffalo	N.Y.	110.5
45	Columbus	Ohio	107.3
46	Toledo	Ohio	101.6
47	San Diego	Calif.	93.2
48	Portland	Oreg.	92.4
49	Indianapolis	Ind.	92.1
50	Memphis	Tenn.	92.1
51	Akron	Ohio	90.1
52	Sacramento	Calif.	83.2
53	Jersey City	N.J.	81.8
54	Milwaukee	Wis.	79.5
55	San Jose	Calif.	62.2
56	Honolulu	Hawaii	56.1

Table 5.–Total for the 4 major violent crimes combined
[Rates per 100,000 population]

Rank	City	State	Rate
1	Baltimore	Md.	1,492.3
2	Newark	N.J.	1,170.0
3	Washington	D.C.	1,143.7
4	Detroit	Mich.	1,074.5
5	Miami	Fla.	1,066.7
6	Chicago	Ill.	926.6
7	San Francisco	Calif.	902.3
8	St. Louis	Mo.	861.3
9	Los Angeles	Calif.	810.7
10	New York	N.Y.	775.9
11	Kansas City	Mo.	714.8
12	Cleveland	Ohio	627.9
13	Dayton	Ohio	599.9
14	New Orleans	La.	580.7
15	Tampa	Fla.	571.8
16	Minneapolis	Minn.	570.5
17	Oakland	Calif.	567.8
18	Charlotte	N.C.	563.9
19	Pittsburgh	Pa.	543.4
20	Houston	Tex.	536.8
21	Nashville	Tenn.	503.9
22	Norfolk	Va.	483.5
23	Boston	Mass.	464.4
24	Long Beach	Calif.	417.6
25	Dallas	Tex.	413.6
26	Louisville	Ky.	413.3
27	Toledo	Ohio	399.0
28	Birmingham	Ala.	385.1
29	Denver	Colo.	384.8
30	Albuquerque	N. Mex.	379.9
31	Phoenix	Ariz.	378.1
32	Rochester	N.Y.	375.7
33	Portland	Ore.	363.5
34	Atlanta	Ga.	359.2
35	Indianapolis	Ind.	352.6
36	St. Paul	Minn.	348.3
37	Philadelphia	Pa.	338.8
38	Seattle	Wash.	332.4
39	Omaha	Nebr.	327.9
40	Cincinnati	Ohio	323.1
41	Buffalo	N.Y.	320.1
42	Akron	Ohio	312.3
43	San Antonio	Tex.	304.2
44	Columbus	Ohio	293.7
45	Fort Worth	Tex.	288.1
46	Memphis	Tenn.	276.6
47	Sacramento	Calif.	265.7
48	Oklahoma City	Okla.	263.8
49	Tulsa	Okla.	236.7
50	Wichita	Kans.	227.4
51	Jersey City	N.J.	201.4
52	El Paso	Tex.	191.2
53	Milwaukee	Wis.	182.9
54	San Diego	Calif.	168.3
55	San Jose	Calif.	133.5
56	Honolulu	Hawaii	98.2

APPENDIX 5

OFFENSE RATE DATA FOR THE FOUR MAJOR CRIMES, BY CITY SIZE, 1960-67

Table 1 lists the data used to construct Figures 3 through 7 in Chapter 3. The information is for reported offenses and is already in rate form in the *UCR* so Table 1 is merely a summary of published offense rates between 1960 and 1967. All the areas–both urban and rural–with agencies reporting offenses to the *UCR* are included in the rates. Table 2 shows the percentage change over the 1960-67 period for the data in Table 1.

Table 1A.–Variation in reported criminal homicide
Offense rates, by size of city, 1960-67
[Rates per 100,000 population]
[Data for Fig. 3, Ch. 3]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Cities:								
Over 250,000	6.8	7.2	7.6	7.9	8.9	9.2	9.9	11.9
100,000-250,000	5.6	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.6	6.4	6.9	7.4
50,000-100,000	3.3	3.8	3.4	3.2	3.7	3.5	3.6	4.0
25,000-50,000	2.9	3.2	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.5
10,000-25,000	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.8	2.9
Under 10,000	2.7	2.0	1.7	1.7	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.5
Suburban	NA	NA	NA	2.3	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.3
Rural	NA	4.7	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.7	5.0

Note:–Suburban rates include: suburban, city, and county police agencies within metropolitan areas. Exclude: core cities. Suburban cities are also included in other city groups. Suburban and rural data only available for years indicated.

Source: *UCR*.

Table 1B.—Variation in reported forcible rape offense rates, by size of city, 1960-67
[Rates per 100,000 population]
[Data for Fig. 4, Ch. 3]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Cities:								
Over 250,000	15.2	17.8	18.3	17.1	19.2	21.4	24.6	27.3
100,000-250,000	7.6	7.4	7.9	8.9	11.4	11.2	14.2	13.8
50,000-100,000	5.5	5.3	5.7	6.5	8.0	8.3	9.3	10.3
25,000-50,000	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.6	6.0	6.3	7.2	7.8
10,000-25,000	4.0	4.3	4.2	4.0	5.4	5.6	5.7	7.0
Under 10,000	3.3	3.8	3.1	3.3	5.3	5.0	4.6	5.1
Suburban	NA	NA	NA	6.7	8.6	9.8	10.4	10.9
Rural	NA	6.7	6.7	6.0	9.5	8.7	8.9	9.2

Note:—Suburban rates include: suburban, city, and county police agencies within metropolitan areas. Exclude: core cities. Suburban cities are also included in other city groups. Suburban and rural rates only available for years indicated.

Source: *UCR*.

Table 1C.—Variation in Reported Robbery Offense Rates, by size of city, 1960-67
[Rates per 100,000 population]
[Data for Fig. 5, Ch. 3]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Cities:								
Over 250,000	117.6	112.8	157.7	159.5	173.4	178.8	242.5	330.2
100,000-250,000	57.5	55.9	55.9	61.2	69.1	73.1	83.5	107.8
50,000-100,000	36.6	38.5	37.1	42.8	47.3	48.5	55.1	69.0
25,000-50,000	22.6	24.1	23.4	24.5	29.4	32.9	36.4	44.5
10,000-25,000	15.7	16.2	15.4	16.3	16.9	18.6	20.6	26.2
Under 10,000	12.8	12.9	11.0	11.1	11.7	11.8	11.9	14.8
Suburban	NA	NA	NA	21.9	25.2	28.1	31.0	38.4
Rural	NA	10.6	10.7	10.7	10.8	9.9	10.0	11.5

Note:—Suburban rates include: suburban, city, and county police agencies within metropolitan areas. Exclude: core cities. Suburban cities are also included in other city groups. Suburban and rural data only available for years indicated.

Source: *UCR*.

Table 1D.—Variation in reported aggravated assault offense rates, by size of city, 1960-67
[Rates per 100,000 population]
[Data for Fig. 6, Ch. 3]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Cities:								
Over 250,000	154.1	168.9	178.3	175.4	192.2	200.2	228.1	257.0
100,000-250,000	83.3	84.8	93.3	103.8	137.2	151.0	157.3	158.8
50,000-100,000	58.9	63.8	56.5	61.1	70.9	85.1	92.3	101.4
25,000-50,000	39.9	41.5	38.8	43.0	53.2	70.7	81.1	85.3
10,000-25,000	35.2	34.1	34.4	36.4	45.7	66.7	72.4	79.2
Under 10,000	28.9	29.4	26.4	30.3	37.7	62.0	68.2	76.0
Suburban	NA	NA	NA	38.6	47.6	65.9	73.4	78.9
Rural	NA	34.4	33.7	38.6	58.7	58.3	60.9	67.2

Note:—Suburban rates include: suburban, city, and county police agencies within metropolitan areas. Exclude: core cities. Suburban cities are also included in other city groups. Suburban and rural data only available for years indicated.

Source: *UCR*.

Table 1E.—Variation in reported offense rates, 4 major violent crimes combined, by size of city, 1960-67
[Rates per 100,000 population]
[Data for Fig. 7, Ch. 3]

	1960	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Cities:								
Over 250,000	293.7	346.7	361.9	359.9	393.7	409.6	505.1	1001.5
100,000-250,000	154.0	153.3	162.6	179.5	223.3	241.7	261.9	287.8
50,000-100,000	104.3	110.4	102.7	113.6	129.9	145.4	160.3	184.7
25,000-50,000	70.1	73.3	69.5	75.6	91.5	113.0	126.1	141.1
10,000-25,000	57.3	57.1	56.4	58.9	70.4	93.2	101.5	115.3
Under 10,000	47.7	48.1	42.2	48.4	56.7	80.8	86.8	98.4
Suburban	NA	NA	NA	69.5	83.9	106.5	117.8	131.5
Rural	NA	56.4	55.2	59.4	83.0	81.1	84.5	92.9

Note:—Suburban rates include: suburban, city, and county police agencies within metropolitan areas. Exclude: core cities. Suburban cities are also included in other city groups. Suburban and rural data only available for years indicated.

Source: *UCR*.

Table 2.–Percentage change in reported offense rates for the 4 major violent crimes, by city size, 1960-67

Criminal homicide:	+ 75.0
Cities over 250,000	+ 32.1
100,000-250,000	+ 21.2
50,000-100,000	+ 20.7
25,000-50,000	+ 20.8
10,000-25,000	- 7.4
Under 10,000	+ 43.5
Suburban[1]	+ 6.4
Rural[2]	
Forcible rape:	+ 79.6
Cities over 250,000	+ 81.6
100,000-250,000	+ 87.3
50,000-100,000	+ 66.0
25,000-50,000	+ 75.0
10,000-25,000	+ 54.5
Under 10,000	+ 62.7
Suburban[1]	+ 37.3
Rural[2]	
Robbery:	+180.8
Cities over 250,000	+ 87.5
100,000-250,000	+ 88.6
50,000-100,000	+ 96.9
25,000-50,000	+ 66.9
10,000-25,000	+ 15.6
Under 10,000	+ 75.3
Suburban[1]	+ 8.5
Rural[2]	
Aggravated assault:	+ 66.8
Cities over 250,000	+ 90.6
100,000-250,000	+ 72.2
50,000-100,000	+113.8
25,000-50,000	+125.0
10,000-25,000	+163.0
Under 10,000	+104.4
Suburban[1]	+ 95.3
Rural[2]	
4 major violent crimes combined:	+241.0
Cities over 250,000	+ 86.9
100,000-250,000	+ 77.1
50,000-100,000	+101.3
25,000-50,000	+101.2
10,000-25,000	+106.3
Under 10,000	+ 89.2
Suburban[1]	+ 64.7
Rural[2]	

[1]Suburban percentage changes are for the years 1963-67.
[2]Rural percentage changes are for the years 1961-67.
Source: *Computations by Task Force Staff from Table 1.*

APPENDIX 6

OFFENSE RATE DATA FOR FOUR MAJOR VIOLENT CRIMES BY REGION, 1958-67

Figures 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16 in Chapter 3 show variation by state for the major violent crime rates in 1967. The actual data, in rate form, were taken directly from the 1967 *UCR* and are not reproduced here.

Figures 9, 11, 13, 15, and 17 in Chapter 3 show variation by region for the major violent crime rates between 1958 and 1967. The data are also in rate form in the *UCR*. The extracted rates over the trend period are reproduced in Table 1. The data are for offenses committed and are from all agencies–urban and rural–reporting to the *UCR*. In addition, the *UCR* have incorporated into the figures estimates for all those areas not reporting.

Table 2 shows the percentage change over the 1958-67 period for the data in Table 1.

Table 1A.–Variation in reported criminal homicide offense rates, by region, 1958-67
[Rates per 100,000 regional population]
[Data for Fig. 9, Ch. 3]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Northeast	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.6	3.6	4.1
North Central	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.5	3.7	4.4	4.9
South	8.9	8.9	9.2	8.2	7.8	7.4	7.7	8.0	8.9	9.4
West	3.5	3.4	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.9

Source: *UCR*, 1958-67.

Table 1B.—Variation in reported forcible rape offense rates, by region, 1958-67
[Rates per 100,000 regional population]
[Data for Fig. 11, Ch. 3]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Northeast	6.2	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.6	6.7	7.9	8.5	10.2	10.6
North Central	6.6	7.0	9.0	8.7	9.1	8.7	10.5	11.8	12.8	13.5
South	8.4	8.2	8.0	8.1	7.8	7.6	10.2	10.8	12.0	12.9
West	15.3	14.3	14.4	14.3	14.1	14.1	16.3	17.2	19.0	20.1

Source: *UCR*, 1958-67.

Table 1C.—Variation in reported robbery offense rates, by region, 1958-67
[rates per 100,000 regional population]
[Data for Fig. 13, Ch. 3]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Northeast	35.4	32.4	34.1	38.7	36.5	39.5	44.5	49.9	90.5	117.0
North Central	48.9	48.6	74.5	72.0	72.0	73.1	76.2	76.6	95.1	115.7
South	32.8	30.2	34.3	33.9	34.1	37.2	44.0	45.6	56.1	74.7
West	67.5	57.2	71.8	69.2	70.0	69.7	76.2	81.9	85.8	108.9

Source: *UCR*, 1958-67.

Table 1D.—Variation in reported aggravated assault offense rates, by region, 1958-67
[Rates per 100,000 regional population]
[Data for Fig. 15, Ch. 3]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Northeast	50.2	53.3	51.6	53.2	57.0	61.5	76.9	84.7	98.4	105.3
North Central	40.7	44.9	57.9	58.3	65.4	60.2	82.3	84.1	91.7	102.2
South	95.3	96.1	98.8	96.8	93.8	102.6	134.9	140.6	153.4	163.5
West	76.2	74.6	84.1	81.8	90.2	90.2	109.6	113.5	126.6	136.3

Source: *UCR*, 1958-67.

Table 1E.—Variation in reported offense rates for 4 major violent crimes combined, by region, 1958-67
[Rates per 100,000 regional population]
[Data for Fig. 17, Ch. 3]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Northeast	94.2	94.6	94.6	100.5	102.9	110.6	132.7	146.7	202.7	237.0
North Central	99.2	103.8	144.8	142.3	149.8	145.2	172.5	176.2	204.0	236.3
South	145.4	143.4	150.3	147.0	143.5	154.8	196.8	205.0	230.4	260.5
West	162.5	149.5	174.1	168.3	178.1	177.8	206.0	216.8	235.7	272.2

Source: *UCR*, 1958-67.

Table 2.—Percentage change in reported offense rates for 4 major violent crimes, by region, 1958-67

Criminal homicide:	
Northeast	+ 70.8
North Central	+ 63.3
South	+ 5.6
West	+ 40.0
Forcible rape:	
Northeast	+ 71.0
North central	+104.5
South	+ 53.7
West	+ 31.4
Robbery:	
Northeast	+230.5
North central	+136.7
South	+127.7
West	+ 61.3
Aggravated assault:	
Northeast	+109.8
North central	+151.1
South	+ 71.7
West	+ 81.5
4 major violent crimes combined:	
Northeast	+151.7
North central	+138.2
South	+ 79.2
West	+ 67.5

Source: Computations by Task Force Staff from Table 1.

APPENDIX 7

URBAN ARREST DATA: COMPUTATIONAL METHOD AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FOUR MAJOR VIOLENT CRIMES, BY AGE, 1958-67

Table 1 lists the data used to construct Figures 18 through 22 in Chapter 3. Table 2 shows the percentage change over the 1958-67 period for the data in Table 1. A discussion of the methods of computing the rates and the assumptions behind them follows the tables.

Table 1A.—Variation in reported urban criminal homicide arrest rates, by age, 1958-67

[Data for Fig. 18, Ch. 3]
[Rates per 100,000 age specific population]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Ages 10-14	0.4	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0
Ages 15-17	4.8	5.3	7.8	8.0	6.7	7.0	6.9	8.0	9.7	10.2
Ages 18-24	10.1	11.1	14.4	14.4	13.3	14.0	13.4	15.8	16.1	17.8
Ages 25 +	5.8	6.0	6.9	6.7	6.5	6.4	6.6	7.2	7.4	8.0
Ages 10-17	1.9	2.2	3.0	3.2	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.6	4.1	4.2
All ages (10 and over)	5.6	5.9	7.0	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.8	7.7	8.0	8.7

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 1B.—Variation in reported urban forcible rapes arrest rates by age, 1958-67
[Data for Fig. 19, Ch. 3]
[Rates per 100,000 age specific population]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Ages 10-14	2.3	2.1	3.3	2.9	3.5	3.0	3.4	4.6	3.8	3.9
Ages 15-17	24.2	24.6	25.9	29.3	25.6	23.6	21.5	27.0	26.9	29.0
Ages 18-24	34.2	34.0	33.5	38.4	34.8	36.3	32.0	33.9	35.6	34.8
Ages 25 +	4.9	5.0	5.3	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.3	5.7	6.1	6.2
Ages 10-17	9.7	9.7	10.9	11.3	11.0	10.3	10.0	12.6	11.9	12.7
All ages (10 and over)	9.0	9.1	9.5	10.7	10.2	10.3	9.5	10.8	11.3	11.5

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 1C.—Variation in reported urban robbery arrest rates by age, 1958-67
[Data for Fig. 20, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 age specific population)]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Ages 10-14	21.1	25.6	41.0	35.4	39.9	39.9	38.1	52.3	51.0	61.8
Ages 15-17	102.5	103.7	131.2	126.7	123.9	119.5	120.1	146.1	154.4	191.6
Ages 18-24	131.4	121.0	153.4	170.2	156.3	147.0	146.1	151.4	150.0	181.5
Ages 25 +	18.8	17.1	22.1	25.8	23.8	23.0	21.5	23.9	22.4	24.8
Ages 10-17	48.3	52.0	71.3	64.3	68.5	67.9	67.9	85.7	86.7	106.9
All ages (10 and over)	36.5	34.9	45.9	49.8	48.0	46.7	46.0	52.5	52.3	62.7

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 1D.—Variation in reported urban aggravated assault arrest rates, by age, 1958-67
[Data for Fig. 21, Ch. 3]
[Rates per 100,000 age specific population]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Ages 10-14	14.4	14.1	25.4	29.8	32.1	30.2	36.8	41.4	55.0	56.2
Ages 15-17	70.3	76.5	108.1	123.5	116.2	122.8	131.4	141.9	171.4	177.5
Ages 18-24	124.0	132.7	156.3	163.5	156.5	159.6	177.0	178.8	198.8	202.0
Ages 25 +	60.6	65.6	77.0	75.7	73.6	72.9	78.4	78.9	87.8	88.3
Ages 10-17	33.1	35.3	53.1	59.5	60.8	63.0	71.2	77.0	95.2	98.3
All ages (10 and over)	63.0	67.9	81.7	83.1	79.1	81.7	89.3	91.8	104.6	106.3

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 1E.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates, 4 major violent crimes combined, by age, 1958-67
[Data for Fig. 22, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 age specific population)]

	1958	*1959*	*1960*	*1961*	*1962*	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*	*1967*
Ages 10-14	38.2	42.4	71.5	69.0	76.3	73.7	79.2	99.0	110.9	123.0
Ages 15-17	201.6	210.0	273.0	287.5	272.4	273.0	279.8	323.0	362.3	408.2
Ages 18-24	299.8	298.8	357.6	386.4	360.9	356.7	368.5	379.8	400.4	436.1
Ages 25 +	90.2	93.7	111.3	114.0	106.5	107.9	111.8	115.7	123.7	127.3
Ages 10-17	93.0	99.2	138.3	138.3	143.1	144.0	152.1	178.8	197.7	222.1
All ages (10 and over)	114.1	117.9	144.2	150.6	144.0	145.3	151.6	162.7	176.2	189.1

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 2.—Percentage change in reported urban arrest rates for the 4 major violent crimes, by age, 1958-67

Criminal homicide:	
10-14	+150.0
15-17	+112.5
18-24	+ 76.2
25+	+ 37.9
10-17	+121.1
All ages (10+)	+ 55.4
Forcible rape:	
10-14	+ 69.6
15-17	+ 19.8
18-24	+ 1.8
25+	+ 26.5
10-17	+ 30.9
All ages (10+)	+ 27.8
Robbery:	
10-14	+192.9
15-17	+ 86.9
18-24	+ 38.1
25+	+ 31.9
10-17	+121.3
All ages (10+)	+ 71.8
Aggravated assault:	
10-14	+290.3
15-17	+152.5
18-24	+ 62.0
25+	+ 45.7
10-17	+197.0
All ages (10+)	+ 68.7
4 major violent crimes combined:	
10-14	+222.0
15-17	+102.5
18-24	+ 45.5
25+	+ 41.1
10-17	+138.8
All ages (10+)	+ 65.7

Source: Computations by Task Force Staff from Table 1.

The arrest *rates* per 100,000 of each age group were computed by the Task Force because the *UCR* only publish arrest *volumes* broken down by age. To find the rates, U.S. Census population volumes were used with the *UCR* arrest volumes.

There were two versions of age specific arrest volumes to choose from in the *UCR*. The number of arrests by age is given both for agencies in urban areas reporting to the *UCR* (SMSA's and other cities with populations of 2,500 or more) and for all agencies reporting (those in the urban areas plus those in rural areas—with population less than 2,500). The former volumes were chosen because, on balance, the four major violent crimes have been shown to be urban phenomena (though the rural area is the third highest city size for criminal homicide); because the proportion of rural agencies reporting is much smaller than for the cities;[1] and because, even for the rural agencies that did report, the validity of the reporting is generally more suspect than that of the cities.

METHOD OF COMPUTATION

The U.S. population for each age group (1) and the total U.S. population (2) were taken from U.S. Census projections. The urban population (3) was extracted from *UCR* arrest volumes obtained from cities with populations over 2,500. The computations were based on the assumed equality $(1)/(2) = x/(3)$. The computed x gave the estimated number of people in each age group covered by the *UCR* agencies.

Given x, and taking the volume of arrests (4) for the age group from the *UCR* for the relevant year, the estimated arrest rate per 100,000 (R) of the age group is easily computed.

The actual calculations proceeded as follows:

I. $\frac{(3)}{(2)}$ = percent U.S. population in UCR urban areas

II. percent urban $(1) = x$

III. $\frac{(4)(100{,}000)}{x} = R$

The following data were used in the computations:

(1)

The U.S. population for each of the age groups 1958-67:[2]

10-14 Years

1958	15,546,000	1963	18,037,000
1959	16,220,000	1964	18,435,000
1960	16,910,000	1965	18,959,000
1961	17,742,000	1966	19,416,000
1962	17,709,000	1967	19,885,000

15-17 Years

1958	7,949,000	1963	10,002,000
1959	8,311,000	1964	10,763,000
1960	8,462,000	1965	10,527,000
1961	8,294,000	1966	10,614,000
1962	9,261,000	1967	10,795,000

18-24 Years

1958	15,308,000	1963	18,188,000
1959	15,677,000	1964	18,718,000
1960	16,121,000	1965	20,203,000
1961	16,961,000	1966	21,346,000
1962	17,609,000	1967	22,270,000

25 Years and Over

1958	98,250,000	1963	102,366,000
1959	99,103,000	1964	103,165,000
1960	100,000,000	1965	103,983,000
1961	100,830,000	1966	104,921,000
1962	101,596,000	1967	106,068,000

All Ages (10 Years and Over)

1958	137,053,000	1963	148,593,000
1959	139,311,000	1964	151,081,000
1960	141,493,000	1965	153,672,000
1961	143,827,000	1966	156,296,000
1962	146,175,000	1967	159,017,000

(2)

Total U.S. population, 1958-67:[3]

1958	174,882,000	1963	189,417,000
1959	177,830,000	1964	192,120,000
1960	180,684,000	1965	194,592,000
1961	183,756,000	1966	196,920,000
1962	186,650,000	1967	199,118,000

(3)

Population of cities of 2500 and more inhabitants reporting arrest volumes broken down by age to the *UCR*, 1958-67:[4]

1958	52,329,497	1963	94,085,000
1959	56,187,181	1964	99,326,000
1960	81,660,735	1965	101,652,000
1961	85,158,360	1966	102,736,000
1962	94,014,000	1967	107,899,000

$\frac{(3)}{(2)}$

Computed percentages which the *UCR* urban population (3) represented of the total U.S. population (2), 1958-67:

1958	29.9	1963	49.7
1959	31.6	1964	51.7
1960	45.2	1965	52.2
1961	46.3	1966	52.2
1962	50.4	1967	54.2

X

Computed number of people for each age group out of the population of cities of 2,500 or more inhabitants with agencies reporting to the *UCR*, 1958-67:

10-14 Years

1958	4,648,254	1963	8,964,389
1959	5,125,520	1964	9,530,895
1960	7,643,320	1965	9,896,598
1961	8,214,546	1966	10,135,152
1962	8,925,336	1967	10,777,670

15-17 Years

1958	2,376,751	1963	4,970,994
1959	2,626,276	1964	5,564,471
1960	3,824,824	1965	5,518,584
1961	3,840,122	1966	5,540,508
1962	4,667,544	1967	5,850,890

18-24 Years

1958	4,577,092	1963	9,039,436
1959	4,953,932	1964	9,677,206
1960	7,286,692	1965	10,545,966
1961	7,852,943	1966	11,142,612
1962	8,874,936	1967	12,070,340

25 Years and Over

1958	29,376,750	1963	50,875,902
1959	31,316,548	1964	53,336,305
1960	45,200,000	1965	54,279,126
1961	46,684,290	1966	54,768,762
1962	51,204,384	1967	57,488,856

All Ages (10 Years and Over)

1958	40,978,847	1963	73,850,721
1959	44,022,276	1964	78,108,877
1960	63,954,836	1965	80,216,784
1961	66,591,901	1966	81,586,512
1962	73,672,200	1967	86,187,214

X

The number of arrests by age groups for each of the four offenses over each of the 10 years, 1958-1967, are found in *UCR* in the tables cited in the above footnotes.

There were several important assumptions essential to the computational method.

(1) Arrests for people below age 10 were not included because it was assumed that the bulk of arrests of juveniles under 18 involved arrestees no one younger than 10. Little bias is entered into the computations by this assumption because most juvenile court statutes with a lower age limit do not go below ages 6 or 7, and very few of these offenses are ever recorded for ages below 10. Moreover, computing a rate based on the entire population under 18 years would continue the unsatisfactory practice of including preschool and infant children in the denominator.

(2) It was assumed that the arrest volume and population distributions in the city areas failing to report to the *UCR* could not have changed the estimates significantly because the number of these areas is relatively small (as above, in 1967 2.5 percent of the SMSA areas and 11.0 percent of the other

city areas failed to report) and because there is no reason to even assume the figures to be different from those in the reporting areas.

(3) Most importantly, the equality (1)/(2) = (x)/(3) by definition assumes that the proportion of a certain age group out of the total U.S. population [(1)/(2)] is the same as the proportion of the age group out of the *UCR* urban population for the areas reporting [(x)/(3)]. Thus, for example, in 1967 when those aged 10-14 made up 10 percent of the total population, it was assumed that they also made up 10 percent of the population living in cities of 2,500 and over, included in the *UCR* .

The validity of this assumption can be checked by comparing for each age group the proportion of that group out of the total U.S. population, out of the urban population, and out of the rural population. If the proportions are not the same, the assumption is not completely valid, meaning that its use has entered a certain bias into the computations. If the rural proportion differs from the urban proportion, then the urban proportion will differ from the proportion out of the total U.S. population. For any urban-rural difference, the urban-total U.S. population difference will be smaller because the urban population makes up a larger share of the total U.S. population than does the rural population.

Population data for the kinds of detailed breakdowns required to compute such proportions are only available for the last census year, 1960. Table 3 gives the proportions for the under 18, 18-24, and 25-plus age group out of the total U.S. population, the urban population, and the rural population.

Table 3.–Proportion of specific age group populations out of total U.S. population, urban population, and rural population, 1960

Age group	Proportion out of total U.S. population	Proportion out of urban population	Proportion out of rural population
Under 18	.3580	.3443	.3897
18-24	.0870	.0881	.0844
25 and older	.5549	.5675	.5237

In commenting on the computational biases implied by these proportions, we will assume that they have not changed greatly for each year in the 1958-67 period.

For the under-18 group, the rural proportion (.3897) is higher than the urban proportion (.3443), so the proportion out of the total population (.3580) is also somewhat higher. Instead of the equality (1)/(2) = (x)/(3) holding, there is in reality the inquality (1)/(2) > (x)/(3). Thus X is in fact smaller that that value computed assuming the equality. In turn, R = (4)/(x) (100,000) must be somewhat higher than estimated. In other words, all the under-18 rates are somewhat higher than estimated–there is a downward bias to the under-18 rates estimated for Figures 18 through 22.

For the 18-24 group, the proportion out of the U.S. total population (.0870) is somewhat lower than the urban proportion (.0881), so that the cohort rates are in fact somewhat lower than estimated–there is a slight upward bias to the 18-24 rate estimates in Figures 18 through 22.

For the 25-plus group, the proportion out of the U.S. total population (.5549) is somewhat lower than the urban proportion (.5675), so that the cohort rates are in fact somewhat lower than estimated—there is an upward bias to the 25-plus rate estimates in Figures 18 through 22.

For each age group, however, the variation from the assumed equality is relatively slight, so that the resulting small biases do not affect the general conclusions on age and major violence in Chapter 3.

REFERENCES

1. In 1967, the reporting from SMSA agencies to the *UCR* was such that 97.5 percent of the 134,748,000 population was covered; the reporting from other city agencies such that 89.0 percent such that 89.0 percent of the 24,829,000 population was covered; while the reporting from rural areas was such that only 75.2 percent of the 38,293,000 population was covered.
2. Source: *Population Estimates*, Bureau of Census, Dept. of Commerce, Series P–25, Nos. 311 (July 1965), 314 (Aug. 1965), and 385 (Feb. 1968).
3. *Source: Ibid.*
4. *Source. UCR*, Tables 17,16,17,20,20,26,25,27,31,33, for the respective years.

APPENDIX 8
URBAN ARREST RATE DATA, COMPUTATIONAL METHOD AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FOUR MAJOR VIOLENT CRIMES, BY SEX, 1958-67

Table 1 lists the data used to construct Figures 23 through 27 in Chapter 3. Table 2 shows the percentage change over the 1958-67 period for the data in Table 1. A brief discussion of the methods of computing the rates and the assumptions behind them follows the tables.

Table 1.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates for the 4 major violent crimes, by sex, 1958-67
[Data for Figs. 23 through 27, Ch. 3]
[Rates per 100,000 sex specific population]

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Criminal homicide:										
Male	9.2	9.6	11.8	11.6	11.0	11.1	11.3	12.8	13.6	14.8
Female	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.8
Forcible rape:										
Male	18.3	18.5	19.3	21.9	20.8	21.0	19.5	22.0	23.1	23.5
Female										
Robbery:										
Male	71.0	67.9	89.2	96.7	93.0	90.8	89.1	101.8	101.7	121.9
Female	3.2	3.2	4.1	4.7	4.8	4.5	4.8	5.5	5.3	6.3
Aggravated assault:										
Male	108.1	115.5	141.2	143.8	137.8	142.1	156.4	160.9	184.4	188.3
Female	19.5	21.8	24.5	24.8	22.9	23.8	25.2	25.8	28.5	28.3
4 major violent crimes combined:										
Male	206.5	211.5	261.5	274.0	262.6	265.0	276.3	297.6	322.9	348.6
Female	24.9	27.4	31.2	31.9	30.2	30.6	32.4	33.9	36.4	37.4

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 2.—Percentage change in reported urban arrest rates for the 4 major violent crimes, by sex, 1958-67

Criminal homicide:	+60.9
Male	+27.3
Female	
Forcible rape:	+28.4
Male	
Female	
Robbery:	+71.7
Male	+96.9
Female	
Aggravated assault:	+74.2
Male	+45.1
Female	
4 major violent crimes combined:	+68.8
Male	+50.2
Female	

Source: Computations by Task Force Staff from Table 1.

The arrest *rates* per 100,000 males and per 100,000 females were computed because the *UCR* only publish arrest *volumes* broken down by sex. To find the rates, U.S. Census population volumes were used with the *UCR* arrest volumes. In general, the computational method and the assumptions made are the same as in Appendix 7, so the comments here are briefer, in deference to the more detailed parallel comments in that appendix.

Only individuals aged 10 and above were included in the computations and *UCR* urban arrest data was used, for the reasons discussed in Appendix 7. Similarly, the computational method involved these relations:

$$\text{equation} \quad \frac{(1)}{(2)} = \frac{(x)}{(3)}$$

and then

$$\text{equation} \quad r = \frac{(4)}{(x)}$$

where R is the computed urban arrest rate for a particular sex. The identity of the other variables in the relationships and the data for their values in different years are as follows:

(1)

The U.S. population, males and females, 10 years of age and older, 1958-67:[1]

Males 10 years of age and older:

1958	67,362,000
1959	68,406,000
1960	69,408,000
1961	70,497,000
1962	71,591,000
1963	72,696,000
1964	73,841,000
1965	75,044,000
1966	76,254,000
1967	77,508,000

Females, 10 years of age and older:

1958	69,692,000
1959	70,903,000
1960	72,085,000
1961	73,329,000
1962	74,585,000
1963	75,895,000
1964	77,240,000
1965	78,629,000
1966	80,042,000
1967	81,508,000

(2)

Total U.S. population for the years 1958-67:[2]

1958	174,882,000
1959	177,830,000
1960	180,684,000
1961	183,756,000
1962	186,656,000
1963	189,417,000
1964	192,120,000
1965	194,592,000
1966	196,920,000
1967	199,118,000

(3)

Population of cities of 2,500 and more inhabitants with agencies reporting arrest volumes broken down by sex to the *UCR*, 1958-67:[3]

1958	52,329,497
1959	56,187,181
1960	81,660,735
1961	85,158,360
1962	94,014,000
1963	94,085,000
1964	99,326,000
1965	101,652,000
1966	102,736,000
1967	107,899,000

$\frac{(3)}{(2)}$

Computed percentages which the *UCR* urban population (3) represented out of the total U.S. population (2), 1958-67:

1958	29.9
1959	31.6
1960	45.2
1961	46.3
1962	50.4
1963	49.7
1964	51.7
1965	52.2
1966	52.2
1967	54.2

(x)

Computed number of people of each sex out of the population of cities of 2,500 and more inhabitants with agencies reporting to the *UCR*, 1958-67:

Male *UCR* population, 10 years of age and older:

1958	20,141,238
1959	21,616,296
1960	31,372,416
1961	32,640,111
1962	36,081,864
1963	36,129,912
1964	38,175,797
1965	39,172,968
1966	39,804,588
1967	42,009,336

Female *UCR* population, 10 years of age and older:

1958	20,837,908
1959	22,405,348
1960	32,582,420
1961	33,951,327
1962	37,590,840
1963	37,719,815
1964	39,933,080
1965	41,044,338
1966	41,781,924
1967	44,177,336

(4)

The number of males and females arrested for each of the four offenses over each of the 10 years, 1968-67, are found in the *UCR* in the tables cited in the above footnotes.

The same assumptions as in Appendix 7 were requisites for this method. Most importantly, the equality (1)/(2) = (x)/(3) by definition assumes that the proportion of males or females out of the total U. S. population ((1)/(2)) is the same as the proportion of males or females out of the UCR urban population for the areas reporting (x)/(3). Thus, for example, in 1967, where males made up 49 percent of the total population, it was assumed that they made up 49 percent of the total population, it was assumed that they made up 49 percent of the population living in cities of 2,500 and over included in the *UCR*.

As in Appendix 7, the validity of this assumption can be checked by comparing for each sex the proportion of that group out of the total U. S. population, out of the urban population, and out of the rural population for the last census year, 1960. If the proportions are not the same, the assumption is not completely valid, meaning that its use has entered a certain bias into the calculations. The computed proportions are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.—Proportion of sex group populations out of total U.S. population, urban population, rural population, 1960

Sex group	Proportion out of total U.S. population	Proportion out of urban population	Proportion out of rural population
Male	.4925	.4848	.5105
Female	.5074	.5151	.4894

If it is again assumed that these proportions have not changed greatly for each year over the 1958-67 period, Table 3 implies the following:

For males, the proportion out of the U. S. population (.4925) is somewhat larger than the urban proportion (.4848), so the male rates are in fact somewhat higher than estimated—there is a slight downward bias to the male rate estimates in Figures 23 through 27.

Conversely, for females, the proportion out of the U. S. population (.5074) is somewhat smaller than the urban proportion (.5151), so the female rates are in fact somewhat lower than estimated—there is a slight upward bias to the female rate estimates in Figures 23 through 27.

For both groups, however, the variation from the assumed equality is relatively slight, so that the resulting small biases do not affect the general conclusions on sex and major violence in Chapter 3.

REFERENCES

1. Source: Estimates of Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce, Population Reports, Series P-25, Nos. 311 (July 1965), 314 (Aug. 1965), and 385 (Feb. 1968).
2. *Ibid.*
3. Source: UCR,—tables 20, 19, 19, 22, 22, 29, 28, 29, 33, 25 for the respective years.

APPENDIX 9

URBAN ARREST RATE DATA, COMPUTATIONAL METHOD, AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FOUR MAJOR VIOLENT CRIMES, BY RACE AND AGE, 1964-67

Table 1 lists the data used to construct Figure 28 through 32 in Chapter 3. Rates were calculated for the 1964-67 period instead of the 1958-67 period because the *UCR* have only produced the race-age breakdown for arrest volumes over the last 4 years. Table 2 shows the percentage change over the 1964-67 period for the data in Table 1. A brief discussion of the methods of computing the rates and the assumptions behind them follows the tables.

Table 1.—Variation in reported urban arrest rates for the 4 major violent crimes, by race and age, 1964-1967

[Data for Figs. 28-32 in Ch. 3. (Rates per 100,000 race and age specific population)]

	1964	1965	1966	1967
Criminal homicide:				
Negro:				
10-17 years	12.2	15.6	19.6	22.2
All ages (10 years and over)	38.6	45.6	48.1	53.8
White:				
10-17 years	1.3	1.1	1.5	1.3
All ages (10 years and over)	2.8	3.0	3.2	3.1
Forcible rape:				
Negro:				
10-17 years	45.8	64.3	56.5	60.0
All ages (10 years and over)	47.2	57.2	57.0	59.9
White:				
10-17 years	4.1	4.1	4.3	4.9
All ages (10 years and over)	4.9	5.0	5.4	5.4
Robbery:				
Negro				
10-17 years	318.4	441.2	434.8	549.5
All ages (10 years and over)	243.1	295.0	294.0	368.7
White				
10-17 years	23.5	24.1	24.5	27.0
All ages (10 years and over)	20.7	21.8	20.6	22.8

Aggravated assault:				
Negro:				
10-17 years	274.8	308.3	302.1	335.6
All ages (10 years and over)	451.5	456.8	441.5	477.1
White:				
10-17 years	32.3	33.7	38.3	40.6
All ages (10 years and over)	38.4	39.8	43.0	45.7
4 major violent crimes combined:				
Negro:				
10-17 years	651.2	829.4	813.1	967.3
All ages (10 years and over)	780.3	854.6	840.5	959.6
White				
10-17 years	61.2	63.0	68.7	73.8
All ages (10 years and over)	66.7	69.7	72.1	77.0

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census.

Table 2.—Percentage change in reported urban arrest rates for 4 major violent crimes, by race and age, 1964-67

Criminal homicide:	
White:	
10-17 years	0
All ages (10 and over)	+10.7
Negro:	
10-17 years	+82.0
All ages (10 and over	+39.4
Forcible rape:	
White:	
10-17 years	+19.5
All ages (10 and over)	+10.2
Negro:	
10-17 years	+31.0
All ages (10 and over)	+26.9
Robbery:	
White:	
10-17 years	+14.9
All ages (10 and over)	+10.1
Negro:	
10-17 years	+72.6
All ages (10 and over)	+51.7
Aggravated assault:	
White:	
10-17 years	+25.7
All ages (10 and over)	+19.0
Negro:	
10-17 years	+22.1
All ages (10 and over)	+ 5.7
4 major violent crimes combined:	
White:	
10-17 years	+20.6
All ages (10 and over)	+15.4
Negro:	
10-17 years	+48.5
All ages (10 and over)	+23.0

Source: Computations by Task Force Staff from Table 1.

The arrest *rates* per 100,000 whites of specific age groups and per 100,000 Negroes of specific age groups were computed because the *UCR* only publish arrest *volumes* broken down by race and age. To find the rates, U.S. Census population volumes were used with the *UCR* arrest volumes. The calculations in Appendix 9 were performed by the FBI and the Task Force. In general, the computational method and assumptions were the same as in Appendix 7, so the comments here are briefer, in deference to the more detailed parallel comments in that appendix.

Only individuals aged 10 and above were included in the computations and UCR urban arrest data was used, for reasons discussed in Appendix 7. Similarly, the computational method involved these relations:

$$\frac{(1)}{(2)} = \frac{(x)}{(3)}$$

and then

$$r = \frac{(4)}{(x)} \quad (100{,}000)$$

where R is the computed urban arrest rate for a particular race/age group. The identity of the other variables in the relationships and the data for their values in different years are as follows:

(1)

The U.S. population for each of the age-race groups, 1964-67:[1]

Negro, 10-17-year-olds:			
1964	3,586,000	1966	3,837,000
1965	3,714,000	1967	3,949,000
Negro, 10 years and over:			
1964	15,130,000	1966	15,849,000
1965	15,489,000	1967	16,210,000
White, 10-17-year-olds:			
1964	25,323,000	1966	25,874,000
1965	25,465,000	1967	26,396,000
White, 10 years and over:			
1964	134,604,000	1966	138,975,000
1965	136,771,000	1967	141,267,000

(2)

Total U.S. population for the years 1964-67:[2] 192,120,000; 194,592,000; 196,920,000; 199,118,000.

(3)

Population of cities of 2,500 and more inhabitants with agencies reporting arrest volumes broken down by race and age to the *UCR*, 1964-67:[3] 1964, 90,768,000; 1965, 92,880,000; 1966, 94,017,000; 1967, 98,330,000

$$\frac{(3)}{(2)}$$

Computed percentages which the *UCR* urban population (3) represented out of the total U.S. population (2), 1964-67: 1964: 47.2; 1965: 47.7; 1966: 47.7; 1967: 49.4.

(x)

Computed number of people for each race-age group out of the population of cities of 2,500 and more inhabitants with agencies reporting to the *UCR*, 1964-67:

Negro, 10-17-year olds: 1964, 1,692,592; 1965, 1,771,578; 1966, 1,830,249; 1967, 1,950,806.

Negro, 10 years and over: 1964, 7,141,360; 1965, 7,338,253; 1966, 7,553,973; 1967, 8,007,740.

White, 10-17-year-olds: 1964, 11,952,456; 1965, 12,146,805; 1966, 12,341,896; 1967, 13,039,624.

White, 10 years and over: 1964, 63,533,088; 1965, 65,239,767; 1966, 66,291,075; 1967, 69,785,898.

(4)

The number of Negroes and whites, broken down by age, arrested for each of the four offenses over each of the 4 years, 1964-67, are found in the *UCR* in the tables cited in the above footnotes.

The same assumptions as in Appendix 7 govern this approach. Most importantly, the equality (1)/(2) = (*X*)/(3) assumes that the proportion of specific age group whites or Negroes out of the total U.S. population ((1)/(2)) is the same as the proportion of specific age group whites or Negroes out of the *UCR* urban population for the areas reporting ((*X*)/(3)). Thus, for example, in 1967, where Negro 10-17 year-olds made up 2 percent of the total population, it was assumed that they also made up 2 percent of the population living in cities of 2,500 and over included in the *UCR*.

As in Appendix 7, the validity of this assumption can be checked by comparing for each race the proportion of that group out of the total U.S. population, out of the urban population and out of the rural population for the last census year, 1960.[4] If the proportions are not the same, the assumption is not completely valid, meaning that its use has entered a certain bias into the calculation. The computed proportions are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.–Proportion of race group populations out of total U.S. population, urban population, rural population, 1960

Population Proportion	Proportion out of total U.S. population	Proportion out of urban population	Proportion out of rural population
Race group:			
White	.8857	.8815	.8954
Nonwhite	.1142	.1184	.1045

Table 3 implies the following:

For whites, the proportion out of the U.S. population (0.8857) is somewhat larger than the urban proportion (0.8815), so that the white rates are in fact somewhat higher than estimated–there is a slight downward bias to the white rate estimates in Figures 28 through 32.

For Negroes, the proportion out of the U.S. population (0.1142) is somewhat lower than the urban proportion (0.1184), so that the Negro rates are in fact somewhat lower than estimated–there is a slight upward bias to the Negro rate in Figures 28 through 32.

These proportions are for 1960. Although the U.S. Census does not produce the data breakdowns with which proportions can be calculated for noncensus years–here 1964 through 1967–separate studies have indicated a continuing Negro migration from the rural to urban areas since 1960. If this is so, the biases are greater in the 1964-67 period than in 1960.

Even considering this probability, however, the variation for both groups from the assumed equality is still relatively slight, so that the resulting biases do not affect the general conclusions on race, age, and major violence in Chapter 3.

REFERENCES

1. *Source*: Estimates of Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce, Population Reports, Series P–25, No. 385 (Feb. 1968).
2. *Ibid*.
3. *Source*: *UCR*, Tables 30,31, 35, 37 for the respective years.
4. The check is only made for whites and Negroes of all ages, under the assumption, based on App. 7, that the 10-17 group breakdown by race would not vary enough from the results for all ages to add a significant extra bias.

APPENDIX 10

SUICIDE AND VIOLENT AUTO FATALITY DATA AND COMPUTATIONAL METHOD

The below tables list the data used to construct Figures 33 through 39 and Figure 42 in Chapter 3.

Table 1.—Variation in reported offense rates for selected nonnatural causes of death, 1958-1967

[Data for Fig. 34, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 population)]

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Motor vehicle accidents	21.3	21.5	21.2	20.8	22.0	23.1	24.9	25.4	27.1	26.8
Suicide	10.7	10.6	10.6	10.4	10.9	11.0	10.8	11.1	10.9	10.5
Criminal homicide[1]	4.6	4.8	5.0	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.8	5.1	5.6	6.1
Manslaughter by negligence[2]	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.9	3.1	3.6	3.9	4.1	4.4	4.4

[1]By "Criminal homicide," we refer to "willful murder" and "non-negligent manslaughter," for the reasons discussed in Ch. 1.

[2]In 1963 the *UCR* expanded their negligent manslaughter reporting from urban areas to all reporting agencies.

Source: *UCR; Vital statistics of the U.S.* Rates already computed in these publications.

Table 2.—Variation in reported negligent manslaughter offense rates, by city size, 1963-66

[Data for Fig. 34, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 population)]

City size	1963	1964	1965	1966
250,000+	4.3	4.4	4.6	6.5
100,000-250,000	4.0	4.5	4.8	4.8
50,000-100,000	3.2	3.7	3.2	3.8
25,000-50,000	2.6	3.1	2.6	3.2
10,000-25,000	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.8
Under 10,000	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.6
Suburban	2.8	3.0	2.9	3.5
Rural	7.1	5.3	4.7	7.1

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census. Rate computations by Task Force as explained below.

Table 3.—Variation in reported suicide rates, by region, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 35, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 population)]

Region	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
New England	9.7	9.9	9.3	9.5
Middle Atlantic	9.3	8.7	9.2	8.6
East North Central	10.5	9.8	10.5	10.0
West North Central	11.1	11.2	11.0	10.8
South Atlantic	11.0	11.0	11.4	11.3
East South Central	8.9	9.6	9.4	9.5
West South Central	9.1	9.2	9.0	8.5
Mountain	14.2	13.5	14.3	14.0
Pacific	16.7	16.1	16.6	17.1

Source: *Vital statistics of the U.S.* Rates already computed in the publication.

Table 4.—Variation in reported negligent manslaughter offense rates, by region, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 36, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 population)]

Region	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Northeast	2.4	2.7	2.7	3.3
North Central	2.8	3.0	3.3	4.1
South	4.6	4.9	4.7	5.4
West	4.3	3.9	3.6	4.8

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census. Rate computations by Task Force as explained below.

Table 5.—Variation in reported suicide rates, by age, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 37, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 age specific population)]

Age	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
5-14	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
15-24	6.0	6.0	6.2	6.4
25-34	11.8	11.8	12.3	12.3
35-44	16.0	15.5	16.7	15.8
45-54	21.1	20.5	20.7	20.0
55-64	23.6	22.6	23.8	22.9
65-74	22.4	22.1	22.0	21.6
75-84	25.4	24.0	24.2	24.3
85+	24.6	25.3	24.4	23.8

Source: *Vital Statistic of the U.S.* Rates already computed in the publication.

Table 6.—Variation in reported negligent manslaughter arrest rates, by age, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 38, Ch. 3 (Rates (rounded) per 100,000 age specific population)]

Age	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
14 and under	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.04
15-24	5.7	5.0	5.6	5.5
25-34	4.6	4.3	4.4	4.4
35-44	2.9	2.9	2.6	2.9
45-54	N.A.	2.3	1.9	1.7
55-64	N.A.	.9	1.0	1.1
65+	N.A.	.5	.5	.6

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census. Rate computations by Task Force as explained below.

Table 7.—Variation in reported suicide rates, by sex and race, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 39, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 sex and race specific population)]

Sex and race	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
White:				
Male	17.8	17.2	17.4	17.2
Female	6.3	6.1	6.6	6.3
Nonwhite:				
Male	7.9	7.2	7.7	7.8
Female	2.2	2.2	2.5	2.4

Source: *Vital Statistics of the U.S.* Rates already computed in the publication.

Table 8.—Variation in reported negligent manslaughter arrest rates, by sex and race of offender, 1963-66
[Data for Fig. 42, Ch. 3 (Rates per 100,000 sex and race specific population)]

Sex and race	*1963*	*1964*	*1965*	*1966*
Male	4.0	3.7	3.9	3.8
Female	.4	.4	.4	.5
White	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.9
Negro	4.1	3.7	4.0	4.1

Source: *UCR* and U.S. Census. Computations by Task Force as explained below.

The rates for the violent auto fatality proxy, negligent manslaughter, were computed by the Task Force, so an explanation will be given of exactly how this was done.

In the case of Table 2, variation in reported offense rates by city size, both the number of offenses and U.S. Census population estimates for the relevant city-size areas are given in each *UCR* over the years covered. The Task Force simply computed the rates from these offense and population volumes. The *UCR* offense totals came from all the agencies reporting; the U.S. Census estimates are based on the populations in the areas covered by those agencies.

In the case of Table 4, variations in reported offense rates by region, both the number of offenses and U.S. Census population estimates for the relevant regions are given in each *UCR* over the years covered. The Task Force simply computed the rates from these offense and population volumes. However, the *UCR* regional breakdowns are only for cities of 2,500 or more, so that the rural areas in the regions are not represented. The U.S. Census population volumes used are correspondingly for cities of 2,500 or more in each region.

The rate computations in Tables 6 and 8, showing variation in reported arrest rates by age, sex and race, were more complicated. The *UCR* publishes negligent manslaughter arrest *volumes* broken down by age, sex, and race, but not *rates*, so again the U.S. Census population volumes were used with the *UCR* arrest volumes to produce the arrest rates. The negligent manslaughter age, sex, and race arrest volumes are given both for agencies in cities with 2,500 or more people and for all agencies reporting (i.e., including rural areas).

This same situation was present in Appendices 7, 8, and 9 for the arrest volumes of the four major violent crimes broken down by age, sex, and race. In those cases, the arrest volumes for cities with a population of 2,500 or

more were used in the rate computations, rather than the volumes for all agencies reporting. This was because, on balance, the four major violent crimes were found to be city phenomena; because the proportion of rural agencies reporting out of the total number of rural agencies is much smaller than for the cities;[1] and because, even for the rural agencies that do report, the validity of the reporting is generally more suspect than that of the cities.

The arrest volumes for cities with 2,500 or more people cannot be used in the case of negligent manslaughter, however, because Table 2 of this appendix shows such high negligent manslaughter rates in rural areas. The rural rates are in fact even higher than the urban rates over the 1963-66 period. It was therefore decided that the importance of rural areas in negligent manslaughter outweighted the above inadequacies of rural area data, so that *UCR* volumes for all agencies reporting (cities 2,500 and over, plus rural areas) were chosen for the rate computations, along with U.S. Census population volumes for the areas covered by those agencies.

The computations in this appendix were made under the same assumptions used in Appendices 7, 8, and 9. For example, with regard to the age breakdown, if a certain age group made up a percentage of the total population, it was assumed to compose the same percentage of the smaller *UCR* reporting population. This was also done for sex and race in negligent manslaughter rate computations.

The assumption of equal proportionality was not completely valid in Appendices 7, 8, and 9 because the proportions of age, sex, and race groups were not quite the same in the missing rural areas as in the city areas. The biases resulting from this fact were discussed in those appendices. However, in the negligent manslaughter case, the rural areas are included in the computations. The biases here still remain to some extent, because the percentage of agencies reporting to the *UCR* from the rural areas is still relatively low compared to the percentage of agencies reporting from the city areas. Yet about three-quarters of the rural population is now covered—whereas none of the rural population was covered in Appendices 7, 8, 9—so that the biases are much smaller in the negligent manslaughter case.

The bias that the rural agencies are generally less reliable than the city areas reporting remains, of course; but overall, the biases present do not appear serious enough to invalidate any of the conclusions reached from the tables and their corresponding figures in Chapter 3.

The exact mechanical steps taken in computing the negligent manslaughter age, sex, and race arrest rates parallel the steps taken in Appendices 7, 8, and 9

In the case of age, computations were made in the following manner: The U.S. population for each age group (1) and the total U.S. population (2) were taken from U.S. Census projections for each year. The total U.S. population covered by the *UCR* arrest volumes (3) was taken from the *UCR* for each year. From the equality (1)/(2) = (x)/(3), x was found. The computed x gave the estimated number of people in the relevant age group out of the U.S. population covered by the *UCR* for the particular year.

Given x, and taking the volume of arrests for the age group (4) from the *UCR* for the relevant year, the estimated age group arrest rate (*R*) for the year was computed as: $R = (4)/(x)\ (100{,}000)$.

The following data were used in the computations:

Age Computations

(1)

U.S. population for each age group, 1963-66:[2]

14 and under: 59,461,000, 59,454,000, 59,878,000, 60,040,000
15-24: 28,190,000, 29,483,000, 30,730,000, 31,960,000
25-34: 22,339,000, 22,317,000, 22,369,000, 22,606,000
35-44: 24,594,000, 24,563,000, 24,438,000, 24,249,000
45-54: N.A., 21,760,000, 22,047,000, 22,336,000
55-64: N.A., 16,678,000, 16,968,000, 17,265,000
65 and over: N.A., 17,863,000, 18,162,000, 18,464,000

(2)

U.S. total population, 1963-66:[3] 1963, 189,417,000; 1964, 192,120,000; 1965, 194,592,000; 1966, 196,920,000

$\frac{(1)}{(2)}$

Computed percentage that each age group represents of the total U.S. population, 1963-66:

14 and under: 1963, 31.4; 1964, 30.9; 1965, 30.8; 1966, 30.5.
15-24: 1963, 14.4; 1964, 15.3; 1965, 15.8; 1966, 16.2.
25-34: 1963, 11.8; 1964, 11.6; 1965, 11.5; 1966, 11.5.
35-44: 1963, 13.0; 1964, 12.8; 1965, 12.6; 1966, 12.3.
45-54: 1963, no data; 1964, 11.3; 1965, 11.3; 1966, 11.3.
55-64: 1963, no data; 1964, 8.7; 1965, 8.7; 1966, 8.8.
65 and over: 1963, no data; 1964, 9.3; 1965, 9.3; 1966, 9.4.

(3)

Total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting arrest volumes by age groupings to the *UCR* 1963-66:[4] 1963, 125,760,000; 1964, 132,439,000; 1965, 134,095,000; 1966, 137,986,000.

(*x*)

Computed number of people for each age group out of the total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting to the *UCR*, 1963-66:

14 and under: 1963, 39,488,640; 1964, 40,923,651; 1965, 41,301,260; 1966, 42,085,730
15-24: 1963, 18,109,440; 1964, 20,263,167; 1965, 21,187,010; 1966, 22,353,732
25-34: 1963, 14,839,680; 1964, 15,362,924; 1965, 15,420,925; 1966, 15,868,390
35-44: 1963, 16,348,800; 1964, 16,952,192; 1965, 16,895,970; 1966, 16,972,278
45-54: 1963, no data; 1964, 14,965,607; 1965, 15,152,735; 1966, 15,592,418
55-64: 1963, no data; 1964, 11,522,193; 1965, 11,666,265; 1966, 12,142,768

(4)

Volume of arrests for each age group, 1963-66, can be found in the *UCR*.

Sex Computations

In the case of the breakdown by sex, the same method was used. The corresponding data are as follows:

(1)

U.S. population for each sex, 1963-66:[5]
Male: 1963, 93,471,000; 1964, 94,738,000;
1965, 95,884,000; 1966, 96,949,000
Female: 1963, 95,945,000; 1964, 97,381,000;
1965, 98,708,000; 1966, 99,971,000

(2)

U.S. total population, 1963-66:[6] 1963, 189,417,000; 1964, 192,120,000; 1965, 194,592,000; 1966, 196,920,000.

$$\frac{(1)}{(2)}$$

Computed percentage for each sex, 1963-66:
Male: 1963, 49.3; 1964, 49.3; 1965, 49.3; 1966, 49.2.
Female: 1963, 50.7; 1964, 50.7; 1965, 50.7; 1966, 50.8.

(3)

Total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting arrest volumes by sex to the *UCR*, 1963-66:[7] 1963, 125,760,000; 1964, 132,439,000; 1965, 134,095,000; 1966, 137,986,000.

(*X*)

Computed number of people for each sex out of the total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting to the *UCR*, 1963-66:

Male: 1963, 61,999,680; 1964, 65,292,427;
1965, 66,108,835; 1966, 67,889,112.
Female: 1963, 63,760,320; 1964, 67,146,573;
1965, 67,986,165; 1966, 70,096,888.

(4)

Volume of arrests for each age group, 1963-66, can be found in the *UCR*.

Race Computations

Finally, in the case of the breakdown by race, the same method was used. The corresponding data are as follows:

(1)

U.S. population for each race, 1963-66:[8]
White: 167,248,000, 169,447,000, 171,443,000, 173,302,000.
Negro: NA, 20,791,000, 21,211,000, 21,608,000.

(2)

U.S. total population, 1963-66:[9] 189,417,000, 192,120,000, 195,592,000, 196,920,000.

$$\frac{(1)}{(2)}$$

Computed percentages for each race, 1963-1966:
white: 88.3, 88.2, 87.7, 88.0.
Negro: 10.8, 10.8, 10.8, 11.0.

(3)

Total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting arrest volumes by race to the *UCR*, 1963-66:[10] 1963, 116,952,000; 1964, 117,874,000; 1965, 125,139,000; 1966, 128,163,000.

(*X*)

Computed number of people for each race out of the total U.S. population covered by all agencies (city and rural) reporting to the *UCR*, 1963-66:
white: 1963, 103,268,616; 1964, 103,964,868;
1965, 110,372,598; 1966, 112,762,320.
Negro: 1963, 12,630,816; 1964, 12,730,392;
1965, 13,515,012; 1966, 14,097,930.

(4)

Volume of arrests for each race, 1963-66, can be found in the *UCR*

REFERENCES

1. In 1967, the reporting from SMSA agencies to the *UCR* was such that 97.5 percent of the 134,748,000 population was covered; the reporting from other city agencies (not in SMSA's but having more than 2,500 people) was such that 89.0 percent of the 24,823,000 population was covered; while the reporting from rural agencies (in areas with populations under 2,500) was such that only 75 percent of the 38,293,000 population was covered.
2. *Source:* Estimates of Bureau of Census, Department of Commerce, Population Reports, Series P-25, Nos. 311 (July 16, 1965), 314 (Aug. 1965), and 385 (Feb. 1968).
3. Source: *Ibid.*
4. Source: *UCR.*
5. Source: Estimates of Bureau of Census, Dept. of Commerce, Population Reports, Series P-25, Nos. 311 (July 1965), 314 (Aug. 1965), and 385 (Feb. 1968).
6. Source: *Ibid.*
7. Source: *UCR.*
8. Source: Estimates of Bureau of Census, Dept. or Commerce, Population Reports, Series P-25, Nos. 311 (July 1965), 314 (Aug. 1965), and 385 (Feb. 1968).
9. Source: *Ibid.*
10. Source: *UCR.*



St. Valentines's Day Massacre. Intaglio by Warrington Colescott. Library of Congress.

CHAPTER 4

VIOLENCE AND ORGANIZED CRIME

There is presently no information from the *UCR* or any other source that profiles the levels and trends of violent crime which result from organized criminal activities. It is possible, however, to reach some nonempirical conclusions about such violence by examining the nature, evolution, and structure of organized crime.

In 1951, the Kefauver Committee declared that a nationwide crime syndicate known as the Mafia operated and controlled the most lucrative rackets in many large American cities.[1] The syndicate has since changed its name to La Cosa Nostra (LCN: "this thing of ours") and has steadily increased its power and control. In earlier years, the organization was looser, oriented toward rural life, and received its greatest income from bootlegging in the Prohibition era. Evolution from a rural to an urban society and the end of Prohibition brought alternative fields of activity—especially narcotics, gambling, loansharking and extortion, labor racketeering, and the infiltration of legitimate businesses.[2] Concomitant with this expansion, a more sophisticated, efficient, and businesslike crime syndicate developed.

Today, the syndicate consists of 24 groups, or "families," operating as criminal cartels in large cities throughout the nation. Members are exclusively of Italian descent and maintain communciation with one another through a national body of overseers.[3] Members of the core families reside and are active in the states shown in Figure 1. Groups in New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, Michigan, and Rhode Island are especially wealthy and influential.[4] The overall structure has been described as "a state within a state"—"a second government."[5]

The structure of each family is geared to the maximization of profits. The hierarchy resembles that of the Mafia groups that have operated for almost a century on the island of Sicily. A "boss" heads the family, and his authority is absolute; the only possible exception is an overruling by the national advisory group. Next in the social structure is the "underboss," the liaison officer and administrative assistant who is in control during the boss's absence. On the same level is the *consigliere,* who is the counselor-adviser and often a family elder. Below the underboss are the *caporegine*, or lieutenants, and finally the *soldàte,* the "soldiers" or "buttonmen" who report to the *caporegine.*[6]



Figure 1.–States in which organized crime core group members both reside and operate.

This structure does not focus on violence per se, but only uses it as means to maximize profits. If we cannot speak of violence and organized crime with empirical exactitude, there is enough descriptive and anecdotal material from law enforcement officials that at least shows *how* violence is involved–and even gives a few suggestions about how much.

There are two general categories of violence related to organized crime: external and internal. External violence refers to the use and threat of force by the syndicate against the outside community or public at large, while internal violence centers on the use or threat of force among different groups within the sphere of organized crime.[7] External violence may be the most relevant for the Task Force in the sense that our implicit concern has been with violence and the general public. However, violence is manifest in both categories, regardless of the victims.

LEVELS OF EXTERNAL VIOLENCE

The most important use of external violence is as a means of enforcing business practices. Violence is held to a minimum in the gambling and narcotics business because transactions are almost entirely in cash, not in credit. There is little default in the gambling business, because the customer wants the relationship to be a continuing one. When money must be borrowed, the customer usually obtains it from a loanshark, not from the gambler. Similarly, credit is extended only very rarely to narcotics customers. Retailers may obtain credit from wholesalers, but they almost always make good the return payment. Although an addict may commit violent acts to support his habit, there is little credit and little violence between merchant and customer due to payment disputes. However there have been reported recently incidents of dealer-customer violence in the drug trade due to the sale of impure or unsatisfactory products (See Chapter 15).

Loan-shark violence, on the other hand, is common. The transaction is in credit rather than cash, and the payment must be compelled outside the law. The threat and use of violence by the syndicate can be applied and expanded in many ways. As an illustration, the Executive Director of the Illinois State

Crime Commission cited in testimony to the Senate the case of a woman whose husband was loaned $300 for medical bills. He frequently had difficulty meeting the 10-percent weekly interest payments. One night he was dropped at their doorstep badly beaten. In May 1964, the shark to whom they were in debt tried to kidnap their 5-year-old son, and the wife begged $30 from her employer after a threatening telephone call. On another occasion she was told that, if they continued to have difficulty meeting the payments, enough male customers would be found to enable her to earn $100 a day as a prostitute. Eventually, the husband, having paid $1,000 in interest without ever having reduced the principal, despaired and committed suicide.[8]

Violence and labor racketeering go hand in hand. Control of a union with jurisdiction over coin machines, for example, carries with it the ability to parcel out territories and gain a complete monopoly in the industry–a monopoly enforced by union contracts, picketlines, and, if necessary, "labor violence." Control over the bartenders' union can mean the ability to force taverns to buy food, liquor, and supplies only from certain wholesalers.[9]

A final form of business violence occurs when the syndicate decides to move into an industry. It does so both for investment purposes and to find new bases for illegal activities. It is usually able to gain control of one firm through its loan-sharking operations or extortion. The organization then uses a powerful combination of economic weapons, extortion, and judiciously applied violence to drive competitors from the industry. As one authority has remarked, "When organized crime embarks on a venture in legitimate business, it ordinarily brings to that venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation which are employed in its illegal enterprises."[10] The economic power of La Cosa Nostra insures that a monopoly, once secured, can be maintained.

Although no yearly estimate of the violence related to such external business activities is available, there are estimates on the magnitude of the activities themselves. The Crime Commission, approximating the value of illegal goods and services sold, put the level of gambling at $7 billion, narcotics at $350 million, and loan sharking at $350 million, for a yearly total of $7.7 billion. One author has put it another way: "If La Cosa Nostra's illegal profits were reported," the United States could afford "a 10-percent tax reduction instead of a 10-percent surcharge."[11]

The other empirical approach to the level of organized criminal business is via *UCR* arrest rates for the non-Index categories of gambling, fraud, and narcotics, which relate to the main underworld interests more than any other FBI classifications. Reported arrest rates over recent years for the three categories combined are shown in Figure 2. The usual gaps between arrest data and the true incidence can be assumed. The arrest variations are as likely to be due to reporting changes and FBI policy as to variations in the real rate of organized crime offenses. Despite this inadequacy, and even assuming that organized crime is not completely responsible for the business activity behind the arrests, the rate levels are relatively high in Figure 2. In 1967, for example, the combined arrest rate for gambling, narcotics, and fraud was 167, compared to a rate of 130 for the four major violent crimes.

Before reliable statistical inferences can be made from such arrest and cost estimates (proxying the amount of organized criminal business activity), more empirical sophistication is required. Better estimates of business activity are



Figure 2.—Variation in reported arrests for gambling, narcotics and fraud combined, United States, 1961-67.

needed, and a standard estimate of the amount of violence created by each extra increment of activity could be worked out.

In addition to violence that is a function of business activities, there is another dimension of external violence related to organized crime. This might be called "secondary professional violence." It is "secondary" in the sense that the violence is not committed by the organized network itself, but by local professional criminals who are in some way responsive to directives of organized crime. A "professional criminal" can be thought of in this context as someone who is regularly involved in criminal activities, but is not a member of an organized family.

Why can professional criminals in local neighborhoods be tied to organized crime? In part, the answer is simply one of operational necessity. The rank and file of organized crime is recruited from this population, and the steady influx of soldiers creates a wide variety of working relations between professional criminals and organization members, as well as bases for personal friendships.[12]

In part, the answer is also that organized crime "hires" professional criminals without necessarily accepting them as members of families. Professional criminals often deal with fences and loan sharks who are part of a family. Just as organized crime may need the services of professional criminal employees, so professional criminals may require the specialized services that the syndicate can provide. LCN has been occasionally employed, for example, to arbitrate disputes between Chicago professionals outside the family.[13]

There is one more very important reason for tying professional criminals in local neighborhoods to organized crime: support of the relationship by the community itself. There is evidence in certain cohesive ethnic communities

that the people accept and encourage ties between local professional criminals (often their friends and relatives) and organized crime. The linkup, while promoting crime, is seen by the community residents as a source of protection—an assurance that the syndicate will act as a kind of ombudsman of the poor. LCN is thus regarded in certain areas as the benevolent protector of the people from the police and violent crime. As one law enforcement expert said, "You want to talk about safe streets? A woman can walk through the neighborhood and not worry about being attacked. They [syndicate members or professional criminals working with them] keep the streets a lot safer than the cops do."[14] Some neighborhoods are so tightly controlled that the street crime rates are actually *lower* than the citywide averages.[15]

On the other hand, "secondary professional violence" by locals operating in other areas or against strangers is encouraged. In one highly controlled neighborhood, for example, two professional baseball players parked their car on the street one evening. Because the vehicle had out-of-state license plates, it was immediately identified as not "belonging to the neighborhood." When the men returned, two sets of golf clubs had been stolen from the car. However, intelligence officers from the city police department then spread the word that they wanted the golf clubs returned, letting it be known that they belonged to two sports heros. Within 2 days they were returned, with one set treated to new club covers as an apology.[16]

Robbery and burglary, then, are especially important expressions of "secondary professional violence." There is again no measure at present which indicates the degree to which this organized-crime-related phenomenon is responsible for the overall reported levels of violence-related acts.

LEVELS OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE

While the incidence of external violence seems to be divided between forms of assault and murder (especially in the course of business operations) and less serious forceful acts such as robbery and burglary (especially as part of professional secondary violence), the force that LCN directs within the organization appears to more uniformly manifest itself in killings.

The need for security, the outbreak of rebellion, and the growth of competing criminal organizations are all linked as the main rationales for internal gangland killings, according to available evidence.

The integrity of the organization depends on its security. If a member does not meet his obligations, he is punished both as a warning to others and to preserve prior agreements. If potential informants pose enough of a threat, they are killed in the cruelest and most vicious ways. For example, the body of Albert Anueci, an organized crime figure who had threatened the organization with exposure, was found several years ago outside Rochester. Some 20 pounds of flesh had been cut from his body, and he had been shot, strangled, and set afire.[17]

Closely related to security violence, and sometimes part of it, is use of force in quelling internal rebellion within the organization. It appears, for example, that a major LCN internal war has recently been ended by a realignment of the New York rackets. The feud began in October 1964, when Joseph Bonnano, who had been plotting against two other families, was

kidnaped, apparently with LCN approval. Bonnano managed to escape death by promising to surrender all his New York activities and move away. But the attempted murder of Salvatore Bonnano on January 28, 1966 by Gaspara DiGregorio was apparently a warning against the rebuilding of his father's organization. Sometime later, LCN decided that DiGregorio was incompetent and appointed Paul Sciacca to succeed him. Then the war with Bonnano began in earnest. Law enforcement authorities say that the war has been successfully arbitrated by *consilgli ri* and bosses of other families through a "subcommittee" appointed by the syndicate and is coming to an end. Paul Sciacca has won; Joseph Bonnano has moved to Arizona and his son to California. No one knows exactly how many have been killed, but seven Bonnano henchmen and four Sciacci loyalists are known to have died.[18]

Although this kind of rebellion is the most spectacular, there is usually internal tension below the top levels. One important soldier, for example, indicates that his boss was constantly having men killed because they were getting too powerful and could have threatened him. The soldier spoke from personal experience. An attempt was made on his life after he had become valuable,[19] although he apparently never had violated the rules. Such conflict seems reasonable in the sense that, while the older bosses need daring and aggressive young men, the proven young men may eventually begin to wonder why they need their bosses. If this is commonly the case—and again exact data are not available—then there may be a good deal more insecurity and instability within LCN than is presently thought.

Violence to eliminate competition from the criminal marketplace is the other important rationale behind gangland killings. Competitive violence occurs only when LCN's relative position in the community of organized criminals is weak enough to be challenged. In 1962, the activities of the Massachusetts branch of La Cosa Nostra were inhibited by three strong, independent Irish criminal organizations which maintained such tight control over gambling and loansharking that the LCN could not have moved in without an enormously costly war.[20] So, typically, it waited.

Eventually, a member of one of the Irish gangs felt intolerably insulted by a rival; all three gangs prepared for war. A series of ferocious beatings quickly escalated to murders which weakened each of the organizations. Seizing the opportunity, LCN moved in with vastly greater force and far more effective terror. To the public, it seemed that Boston's gangland slayings were continuing. But a fundamental change had occurred. Whereas the earlier killings had been by Irish gangs, now LCN was performing the murder—to discourage competition, teach lessons, make the Irish gangs more responsive to the "new boss," and even to satisfy personal grudges. There were 40 murders in all; apparently, the New England Cosa Nostra felt secure enough—and perhaps understood the Boston population well enough—to know that it could get away with such public violence.[21]

In general, this kind of violence has been at a relatively low level during the past few decades.[22] It is possible to speculate, however, that the incidence of competitive violence may well increase in the future. The potential opponents of LCN are Negro and Puerto Rican organizations working in the most risky street-level operations.

In nearly every large city, the numbers rackets and the narcotics trade have been turned over by LCN to Puerto Rican and, especially, Negro

organizations, which have demanded a share of the business, will not tolerate being left out, and can operate more effectively in the ghettos than can the syndicate. In some cities, the Italian-dominated organizations are moving out of hard narcotics. It is too risky, penalties are too high, and racketeers have been heard to say that they "want no part of it."[23]

It has always been the tough and ambitious first-generation criminals who have had the stomach for street-level operations. As they move up in the hierarchy, their stake increases, they become divorced from street operations, and they do not want to kill any more. There are few first-generation Italians to populate the lower levels of organized crime today. Just as the Jews moved out to make room for the tougher and hungrier Italians, the Italians may now have to move out of street-level operations to make room for the Negroes and Puerto Ricans.[24]

Competitive violence due to such a changing of the guard has already been evident. On April 24, 1967, Michael Luongo, a New York mobster, was kidnaped, apparently by Negro racketeers. The kidnapers demanded a $45,000 ransom, showed a thorough familiarity with the operations of Luongo and his boss, Manfredi, and mentioned that they were settling "old scores" with Manfredi. On April 25, the ransom was paid by Manfredi and, after Luongo had been released, permission was received from the LCN hierarchy to kill the kidnapers, who have since disappeared and are presumed dead.[25]

The enormous power and sophistication of LCN would seem to preclude a real challenge to its supremacy, but as Negro and Puerto Rican organizations become more sophisticated and better trained,[26] they will certainly demand more. Sometime in the future, LCN may have to choose between making way for the new syndicates or fighting the competition with unprecedented terror which would almost certainly evoke a strong public outcry for increased law enforcement.

An empirical estimate of the proportion of the total violence level accounted for by the use of internal force within organized crime is difficult to make. The categories of external and internal organized violence, however, provide a conceptual scheme defining what should be measured.

TRENDS IN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL VIOLENCE

With no objective yearly estimates of the violence due to organized crime, there can obviously be no rigorous national approximations of trends. Nonetheless, there is nearly unanimous agreement by law enforcement officials and other experts on the basis of case experience that there has been a distinct decline in the most serious forms of organized violence—gangland beatings and killings. In Chicago, where organized crime is probably more violent than in many other places, there were 765 "gang murders" between 1919 and 1934, an average of 38 per year. From 1935 to 1967, a period twice as long, there were 229 such murders, an average of seven per year.[27]

The reason for the decline is not that LCN is reducing its activities—on the contrary, the above observations have indicated that its bases have broadened and strengthened—but simply that it has changed to more sophisticated management techniques. Its leaders have learned that violence only exposes

them to public attention and law enforcement pressure. A continuing effort has been made to avoid violence, and much of the actual force has been replaced by a system of rational alternatives, which apply to both external and internal organized violence.

The most effective alternative to wholesale force is the constant threat and occasional use of force as a lesson for everyone to see. Such inducement of fear has gained the syndicate its ends just as effectively as widespread force. As one former supervisor of detectives for the Central Intelligence Bureau of the New York City Police Department wrote, "The use of violence by syndicated criminal groups has been careful, calculated, and controlled . . . [it] has been so successful that the fear instilled by it has actually reduced the need to use force."[28]

It should be remembered, however, that we have defined violence not only as the use of force, but also as the threat of force and the deprivation of freedom. In this sense, the infliction of fear is not so much an alternative to widespread physical force as a different, perhaps less serious, manifestation of violence.

Another alternative to violence has been bribery and corruption. Through the organization's tremendous financial resources and skill at blackmail and extortion, corruption enables the syndicate to operate with relative impunity and little need for violence. The practice is a conventional operating technique; all available data indicate that organized crime flourishes only where it has corrupted local officials.[29] An underworld figure insists, for example, that half the police department in one New England city receives regular payments from the regional branch of the LCN. Each month the "bluebook" of raids planned for the month is delivered by members of the force, so that LCN is forewarned of any planned policy activity which might interfer with business.[30]

A last important alternative is the use of people who would otherwise be killed. Few individuals are now considered so useless that they need be wasted by murder. The owner of a prosperous New York restaurant who needed money and found legitimate credit unavailable can be cited as an illustration. He received a loan from a shark, agreeing to pay interest of 5 percent a week. Although unable to meet payments, he was permitted by the shark to default in exchange for certain agreements. He was required to buy meat from a new distributor and became an outlet for stolen, hijacked, and diseased meat unfit for human consumption. He agreed to but liquor from another distributor, who stole it or in some other way avoided paying taxes on it. Soon the son of one of his "investors" was put on the payroll as headwaiter, and the restaurant became a favorite hangout for bookmakers. All the while, the owner was attempting to pay off his loan, never able to make a dent in the principal because of the high interest rate.[31]

When internal, as opposed to external, alternatives to violence are considered, the focus is on the man assigned to be the "enforcer" in every family. The "enforcer" is an impersonal technician whose role is to assure that the boss' judgments are carried out. Internally, the members of LCN have given the organization a virtual monopoly on deadly force. They have given up their discretionary right to use force against each other and have granted unlimited force to their ultimate superior. It is therefore of crucial importance that the boss, in turn, has an "enforcer" who carries out the

superior's orders, but has no independent authority. The need for a "just" enforcer was explained by one expert:

> . . . force is not physical control; it is *ex post facto* infliction of pain for deviation. If such intentional infliction of suffering is to be accepted by the recipients and by citizens generally, it must be made "justly," in measures suitable to correcting deviation without stimulating rebellion. Maintaining "consent of the governed" then, requires that punishments for deviation be accepted as legitimate by those being governed.[32]

The mere presence of this enforcement mechanism has generally succeeded in minimizing actual force, although rebellion may still break out, as previously mentioned. The imposition of fear, then, works internally as well as externally to reduce the need for actual violence.

CONCLUSION

From this profile of violence and organized crime, the following summary conclusions can be made:

(1) Violence is not the primary end of organized crime, but a means to the goal of profit maximization.

(2) The individual acts most related to organized crime are criminal homicides and assaults required to implement external business activities and to assure internal stability as well as the robbery and burglary that are especially important components of secondary professional violence.

(3) It is difficult to estimate what part of the true level of individual violence that organized crime is responsible for. Data are not easy to come by, in particular because of the secrecy of organized operations. New methods of information reporting and analysis to empirically approximate the incidence of syndicate related violence are therefore urgently needed and will be recommended in Chapter 17.

(4) The Task Force accepts the position that the trend of murders and assaults has diminished as the sophistication of organized crime has increased. However, the threat of force, the creation of fear, and the deprivation of individual liberty may well have also increased as the power base of LCN has strengthened and its mode of operations has changed. There is no evidence that the robbery and burglary that is a function of secondary professional activities have been on a downtrend, to say nothing of the possibility of increased competitive violence between LCN and emerging Negro and Puerto Rican organizations. No strong rationale therefore really exists for deemphasizing the contribution over time of organized crime to individual violence.

(5) This judgment, plus the facts that the syndicate's primary business operations have obviously expanded and the autonomous, illicit power to do its will—whether violent or nonviolent—has grown, provide the basis upon which the strong organized crime policy recommendations of Chapter 17 will be made.

REFERENCES

1. Kefauver Committee, 3d Interim Rept., S. Rept. No. 307, vol. 6, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 150 (1951).
2. See Robert T. Anderson, "From Mafia to Cosa Nostra," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71:3 (1965), p. 302; Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," *Antioch Review*, 13:2 (1953), p. 131; Andrew Sinclair, *Prohibition: The Era of Excess* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962); William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity: 1914-32* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
3. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Organized Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), P. 6. Hereinafter cited as "Organized Crime Task Force." The Task Force also reported that most cities in which LCN is present only have one family, with the exception of New York, which has five.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
5. Joseph Valachi, quoted in *Time*, Jan. 17, 1969, p. 75.
6. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Organized Crime, op. cit.*
7. In Ch. 3, one way of breaking down the four major violent crimes was according to whether they were autonomous street offenses or crimes against intimates. If the members of organized crime are treated as composing a social unit, "internal violence" is more conceptually related to the "crimes against intimates" category and "external violence" to the "autonomous street crimes" category.
8. Testimony of Charles Siragusa, Executive Director of Illinois Crime Commission before Senate Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong. 2d sess., p. 107. In an interview of an organized crime loan shark conducted by a Task Force representative, the use of violence and the threat of violence to collect the debts was vividly described. Among the "tools" of the ordinary loan shark are lead pipes, knives, and baseball bats. The informant described "clients" as ordinary people, seasonal workers, small businessmen in need of quick cash, and the like, all paying 5 percent interest per week. He said his only weapon to enforce collection was violence and often borrowers had to be brutally beaten to set an example for other borrowers.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Donald R. Cressey, "The Functions and Structure of Criminal Syndicates," Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Organized Crime, op. cit.*, app. A, pp. 25-60.
11. Peter Maas, *The Valachi Papers* (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1968).
12. Mark Furstenberg, "Violence and Organized Crime," consultant paper submitted to this Task Force, (see App. 18).
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
18. See Charles Grutzner, "Mafia Leaders Settle 'Banana War'," *New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1968, pp. 1, 79.
19. Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
22. In large part for the reasons to be discussed in the section on trends, below.
23. Although these organizations continue to buy narcotics abroad, import it, and sell it to local agents. Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
24. An interesting study of the ethnic composition of organized crime has been done by Mark H. Haller. Titled "Urban Crime and Criminal Justice; The Chicago Case" and read on April 18, 1968, to the convention of the Organization of American Historians, the paper showed that of the 108 top crime figures in Chicago in 1930, 30 percent were Italian, 29 percent were Irish, 20 percent were Jewish, and 12 percent were Negro. Not one was of native-born American stock. Similar studies of ethnic composition in recent years would prove invaluable for verifying the suggested emergence of Negro and Puerto Rican organizations at the street level of operations.

25. Indictments of the *People of the State of New York* v. *Rocco Mazzie a.k.a. Roggie Mazzie* (Indictment No. 929-68) and *People of the State of New York* v. *Michael Luongo* (Indictment No. 928-68), Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York (Feb. 29, 1968).
26. La Cosa Nostra has developed a highly sophisticated training process. A young man is watched for years to evalute his development, intelligence, and courage. He is tested under a variety of conditions, even set up for arrest. Gradually, the importance of the jobs given to him increases; and if, over a period of 6 to 10 years, he shows that he has the "character" for the work and has learned well, he is accepted.

    There is no objective reason why Negro and Puerto Rican gangs could not develop similar systems. There is a hypothesis that Italians are just better at this sort of work because of Sicilian traditions and their family structure. But no one is certain about this. Narcotics are now being sold on the streets by Negroes and Puerto Ricans; numbers are passed by them. There is no reason why, eventually, as they increase their power, these new gangs will not develop their own training systems and gang structures. Gambling would come first, then numbers and sports betting, followed by loan sharking and international narcotics business. Just as Italians have controlled the traffic from processing plants in Marseille, Puerto Ricans could bring narcotics in from Latin America, and Negroes from the Middle East. See Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, footnote 46.
27. Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
28. Ralph Salerno, "Organized Crime and Violence," unpublished paper prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.
29. Crime Commission, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 191.
30. Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
31. Testimony of Michael H. Metzger, Assistant District Attorney, Queens County, N.Y., before Senate Select Committee on Small Business, 90th Cong., 2d sess., as cited by Furstenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
32. Cressey, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

No Quiren. Etching from the "Disasters of War" by Francisco Goya. Ferdinand Roten Gallery, Baltimore.

CHAPTER 5

THE OFFENDER AND HIS VICTIM

INTRODUCTION

The politics of violence and the rhetoric of "law and order" during recent years have given rise to vague and often inarticulate notions about what happens when the offender meets his victim and the circumstances surrounding the encounter. Racial overtones are common. Widespread beliefs have been established about strangers—thugs, hoodlums, rapists, and worse—seizing control of city streets, pouncing on passive victims, and entering houses through unfortified living-room windows.

Such emotional misrepresentations often cloud important policy questions which require precise statements of fact. Criminal violence committed mainly by strangers on the street might seem amenable to reduction through reinforced police operations. But is this really the pattern? Should we believe that individual violence is racial warfare at a slow burn? Do ghetto blacks usually attack suburban whites? There is a common assumption that the offender is aggressive and the victim weak. But is this always true? Can the act be more of a duet, with the victim often as responsible as the attacker? If so, can we change our behavior to lessen this possibility? Are violent criminals psychopaths, or are their motives more common to everyone? How does ghetto life influence these motivations? To what extent are victims injured? Does it make sense to think about policy that reduces the availability of certain weapons?

Unfortunately, information on interracial violence, the location of criminal encounters, prior relationships between victim and offender, victim provocation, motives, extent of injury, weapons used, etc., is for the most part limited to studies of one kind of crime in a single city. In response to the Crime Commission's plea for more investigation,[1] we have undertaken the first survey of national dimensions on victim and offender patterns in the four major violent crimes: criminal homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, and robbery. We sought representation from all regions in the country and have collected a 10-percent random sample of 1967 offense and arrest reports from 17 large U.S. cities: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. Only

the largest cities were chosen because major violence with high incidence is clearly a phenomenon of urben complexes.[2]

Central to any such inquiry is the "event" during which the violence is committed. At the time the offender attacks the victim, for example, we are interested in the race of each, whether they know one another, what the motive was, whether the victim helped bring on the attack himself, etc. All of these elements derive from the "interaction" between one victim and one offender. We have adopted the "victim-offender interaction" as the basic unit of measurement in the study.[3] Unless otherwise indicated, the tables presented are based on the total number of interactions recorded. Only interactions in which the offender was arrested are included, because these reports give the most complete information.[4]

In a broad study of this type, designed and implemented in a very short time, certain problems are inevitably experienced.[5] However, we believe that the survey validly describes general patterns and represents the only current source of extensive data which can be compared to the previous, more intensive local studies.[6] Not all of our new information can be presented here, and only some of the best-known earlier work is used for comparison.[7]

SEX, RACE, AND AGE

Chapter 3 showed that the arrest rates for major violent crimes are much higher for Negroes (per 100,000 persons) than for whites (per 100,000) and, similarly, that rates are much higher for males than females, for the young than for the old, and for low-income persons than for those of a higher socio-economic status. The Crime Commission's study by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) showed that victims are also much more likely to be black, male, young, and poor.[8]

This information is "static": it treats victims and offenders separately and does not permit more than inferences to be made about interrelationships. Our survey data now make it possible to suggest a national urban profile of the interrelationships between victims and offenders according to their sex, race, and age.[9]

Racial fears underlie much of the public concern over violence, so one of our most striking and relevant general conclusions is that serious "assaultive" violence—criminal homicide, aggravated asssault and forcible rape—is predominantly *intra*racial in nature. The tables below show that the majority of these crimes involve Negroes assaulting Negroes; most of the rest involve whites victimizing other whites. Robbery, on the other hand, has a high interracial component, mainly composed of younger black males robbing older white males.

These findings are consistent with the notion that much of this country's assaultive criminal violence can be explained through the "subcultural" values[10] that often influence behavior in our urban ghettos:

> Negroes are a minority group that still suffer from residential and general cultural isolation from the rest of the community, despite recent advances in integration. So long as this ethnic group is socially isolated and required to live in restricted residential areas, they will continue to constitute a "subcultural" area. This subculture is characterized by poor housing, high density of population, overcrowded home conditions, and by a system of values that often condones violence and physical agression from childrearing processes to adult interpersonal relationships that sometimes end in criminal slayings. To a lesser degree, whites in the lower socio-economic classes as well as Negroes become part of this subculture of violence.[11]

Robbery appears to go beyond spontaneous patterns within the ghetto, often reflecting a more rational victimization pattern.[12]

Criminal Homicide

Table 1[13] reveals that criminal homicide is mostly intrasexual and even more strongly intraracial. Of the interactions in our survey in which the sex of the participants was known, 63 percent were male/male,[14] only 4 percent were female/female, 16 percent were male/female, and 18 percent female/male. When race was known, 24 percent of all killings were between whites and 66 percent between Negroes. Six percent involved Negroes killing whites and 4 percent whites killing Negroes. The dominant age pattern was for individuals over 25 to kill persons in the same age category (47 percent of all interactions).[15] Earlier studies of criminal homicides in specific locations have produced similar results.[16]

Aggravated Assault

Similar sex, race, and age patterns occur in the aggravated assault category, suggesting that assault and homicide may differ only in the seriousness of the injury. Table 2[17] shows that, when sex was known, 57 percent of all interactions were male/male, 7 percent female/female, 9 percent male/female, and 27 percent female/male. The main exception to the general similarity to homicide was a female/male assault frequency much higher than the male/female frequency.

About one-quarter of all assaults were between whites, sixty-six percent between Negroes, eight percent involved Negroes attacking whites, and two percent whites attacking Negroes.

As with homicide, the dominant age pattern was for individuals over 25 to assault others in the same category (43 percent of all interactions). The next largest group consisted of juveniles assaulting individuals in the same age range (14 percent).[18]

Our sex, race, and age figures closely parallel the assault infromation from previous investigations in individual cities.[19]

Forcible Rape

Ninety percent of the rapes where race was determined were intraracial (Table 3).[20] Thirty percent were white/white, 60 percent Negro/Negro, 10 percent white/Negro, and a neglibible percent Negro/white.[21]

No clear age pattern emerges. Rapes occurred with almost equal frequency in the age groups: men between 18 and 25 on women of the same age (19 percent of all interactions), men 18 to 25 on girls 17 and under (17 percent), boys and under on girls in the same age range (16 percent), men over 25 on girls 17 and under (15 percent), and men 18 to 25 on women over 25 (12 percent.)[22]

Table 1. – Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, criminal homocide 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Sex of offender \ Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	62.3	17.5	79.8 (455)
Female	16.4	3.8	20.2 (115)
Total	78.7 (449)	21.3 (121)	100.0 (570)

Race of offender \ Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	24.0	3.8	27.8 (159)
Negro	6.5	65.7	72.2 (412)
Total	30.5 (174)	69.5 (397)	100.0 (571)

Age of offender \ Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	3.3	1.6	4.2	9.1 (49)
18-25	3.6	10.3	19.8	33.5 (182)
26 and over	3.5	6.7	47.0	57.4 (311)
Total	10.4 (56)	18.6 (101)	71.0 (385)	100.0 (542)

Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by sex-570.
Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by race=571.
Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by age=542.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 2.–Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, aggravated assult, 17 cities, 1967
(Percent of total)

Sex of offender \ Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	56.6	27.0	83.6 (727)
Female	9.3	7.1	16.4 (142)
Total	65.9 (573)	34.1 (296)	100.0 (869)

Race of offender \ Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	23.9	1.8	25.7 (223)
Negro	8.4	65.9	74.3 (648)
Total	32.3 (281)	67.7 (590)	100.0 (871)

Age of offender \ Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	13.5	1.4	2.8	17.7 (138)
18-25	3.4	10.1	11.1	24.6 (191)
26 and over	3.1	11.7	42.9	57.7 (451)
Total	20.0 (156)	23.2 (181)	56.8 (443)	100.0 (780)

Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by sex-869.
Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by race-871.
Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by age-780.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 3.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Sex of victim / Sex of offender	Male	Female	Total	
Male	–	100.0	100.0	(465)
Female	–	–	–	
Total	–	100.0 (465)	100.0 (465)	

Race of victim / Race of offender	White	Negro	Total	
White	29.6	0.3	29.9	(139)
Negro	10.5	59.6	70.1	(326)
Total	40.1 (187)	59.9 (278)	100.0 (465)	

Age of victim / Age of offender	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total	
0-17	15.7	2.7	2.5	20.9	(93)
18-25	17.1	18.8	12.1	48.0	(214)
26 and over	14.6	7.4	9.1	31.1	(138)
Total	47.4 (211)	28.9 (129)	23.7 (105)	100.0 (445)	

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by sex=465.
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by race=465.
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by age=445.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Although there is some variation between our national results and those from at least one earlier city study, no radical differences are apparent.[23]

Armed Robbery

Table 4 [24] shows that male/male interactions are the most frequent in armed robbery (84 percent). Females rarely robbed other females (1 percent) or males (4 percent), but males occasionally robbed females (10 percent). Unlike criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and rape, robbery is more interracial (49 percent), with Negroes robbing whites as the typical pattern (47 percent). Only 13 percent of the robberies were white/white, but 38 percent were between Negroes.

The most common age grouping for armed robbery was 18 to 25 for offenders and 26 and over for victims (37 percent), followed by victims and offenders in the 26 and over category (18 percent), then by both aged 18 to 25 (13 percent). The leading combination of sex, race, and age was clearly Negro males 18 to 25 robbing white males 26 and over.[25]

Unarmed Robbery

About 70 percent of unarmed robbery interactions were male/male, while only 3 percent were female/female. Twenty-five percent were males robbing females, and only 2 percent females robbing males (Table 5).[26] In comparison to armed robbery, therefore, the male/male pattern retained its dominance, although a noticeably higher frequency of males robbed women.

Racial characteristics are almost identical for both forms of robbery. Eighteen percent of all unarmed interactions were between whites, 37 percent between Negroes, 44 percent Negroes robbing whites, and only 1 percent whites robbing Negroes. The national sample thus indicated that Negroes rob whites in almost half of all known urban robberies where an arrest has been made.

The leading age combinations in unarmed robbery are shown in Table 5.

When sex, race, and age were combined, the highest combination involved juvenile Negro males (17 and under) robbing other juvenile Negro males. The ranks of the other important combinations were: Negro juvenile males robbing white females 26 and over, Negro males 18 to 25 robbing white males 26 and over, Negro male juveniles robbing white juvenile males, and Negro juvenile males robbing white males 26 and over.[27]

In spite of the considerable degree of interracial unarmed robbery, the leading sex-race-age pattern thus remains *intra*racial. The fact that older white females appear to compete with older white males as an important target group suggests that unarmed robbers must choose between higher potential payoffs by robbing males and greater safety by attacking females.

Although our results on interracial robbery are similar to those in at least one previous investigation of robbery in a local community, the main difference between the survey and most other studies is that our national study shows a relatively higher percentage of Negroes robbing whites.[28]

Table 4.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender, by sex, race, and age, armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of the total]

Sex of the victim / Sex of the offender	Male	Female	Total
Male	84.5	10.2	94.7 (255)
Female	4.4	0.9	5.3 (14)
Total	88.9 (240)	11.1 (29)	100.0 (269)

Race of the victim / Race of the offender	White	Negro	Total
White	13.2	1.7	14.9 (40)
Negro	46.7	38.4	85.1 (229)
Total	59.9 (161)	40.1 (108)	100.0 (269)

Age of the victim / Age of the offender	0-17	18.25	26 and over	Total
0-17	6.8	8.5	8.1	23.4 (59)
18-25	2.1	13.1	36.8	52.0 (133)
26 and over	0.8	5.4	18.4	24.6 (63)
Total	9.7 (24)	27.0 (69)	63.3 (162)	100.0 (255)

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by sex=269
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by race=269
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by age=255.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 5.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender, by sex, race, and age, unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of the total]

Sex of the victim / Sex of the offender	Male	Female	Total
Male	68.9	26.2	95.1 (239)
Female	2.0	2.9	4.9 (912)
Total	70.9 (178)	29.1 (73)	100. (251)

Race of the victim / Race of the offender	White	Negro	Total
White	17.9	1.1	19.0 (47)
Negro	43.9	37.1	81.0 (204)
Total	61.8 (155)	38.2 (96)	100.0 (251)

Age of the victim / Age of the offender	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	31.2	4.9	21.0	57.1 (135)
15-25	1.7	6.4	23.2	31.3 (75)
26 and over	0	2.0	9.6	11.6 (27)
Total	32.9 (78)	13.3 (31)	53.8 (128)	100.0 (237)

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by sex=251.
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by race=251.
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by age=237.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

THE INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICTIM AND OFFENDER

Criminal violence has produced a

"fear of strangers [that] is improverishing the lives of many Americans. People stay behind the locked doors of their homes rather than walk in the street at night. Poor people take taxis because they are afraid to walk or use public transportation. Sociable people are afraid to talk to those they do not know. Society is suffering from what the economist would label opportunity costs. When people would stay home, they are not enjoying the pleasurable and cultural opportunities in their communities; they are not visiting their friends as frequently as they might. The general level of sociability is diminished."[29]

Just how great is the stranger's role in major violence? Table 6 [30] shows most of the possible relationships between victim and offender prior to the criminal act, from the most intimate and personal to those which are more distant and formal, and finally to meetings between strangers. The broad categories are "husband-wife relationships," "other family relationships," "other primary group relationships" (close friend,[31] paramour,[32] homosexual partner), "nonprimary group relationships" (prostitute, acquaintance,[33] neighbor, business relation, sex rival or enemy,[34] stranger,[35] police officer or felon[36]) and "miscellaneous or unknown relationships."[37]

A considerable proportion of interactions do in fact involve strangers. The proportion is relatively low in homicide (16 percent), but rises in aggravated assault (21 percent), becomes a majority in forcible rape (53 percent) and dominates in armed (79 percent) and unarmed robbery (86 percent). More generally, the percentage of nonprimary group relationships steadily rises from homicide to robbery, while the percentage of family and other primary group relationships uniformly declines. The popularly conceptualized fear that an attacker will be a stranger is therefore strongly justified for robbery and relevant for rape, but is much less valid for aggravated assault and generally inappropriate for homicide.

Criminal Homicide

One in four homicides was between family members, and 9 percent involved other primary group contacts. Thus, one-third involved primary group relationships, while 46 percent involved non-primary relationships. About a fifth were miscellaneous or unknown. The proportion of family members in 1967 homicides, according to our sample survey, coincides with a complete tabulation made that year by the FBI, which found slightly under 30 percent within the family.[38] Previous local city studies have reported roughly the same findings.[39] However, they suggested relatively higher percentages in the "other primary group" category and relatively lower percentages within the "nonprimary group."[40] When all the available investigations are compared, the percentage of primary group relationships ranges from about one-third in our national sample up to about two-thirds in some of the previous more intensive but local surveys.[41]

Table 6.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

More Violent Criminal Type /	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Husband (v) Wife (legal)	6.3	1.9	0	0	0
Wife (v) Husband (O) (legal)	6.0	5.3	0	.6	0
Husband (v) Wife (O) (common)	1.5	.5	0	0	0
Wife (v) Husband (O) (common)	2.0	1.7	0	0	0
HUSBAND-WIFE	15.8	9.4	0	0.6	0
Parent (v) Child (O)	2.0	0.9	0.2	0	0
Child (v) Parent (O)	3.9	1.2	2.0	0	0.1
Brother-Sister (V or O)	1.4	1.4	0.3	0	0
Other family	1.6	1.0	4.4	0	0.4
OTHER FAMILY	8.9	4.5	6.9	0	0.5
Close friend	5.6	3.6	1.6	0.1	0
Paramour	3.2	2.9	1.7	0.3	0.1
Homosexual partner	0.2	0.2	0	0	0
OTHER PRIMARY	9.0	6.7	3.3	0.4	0.1
Prostitute (V or O)	0.9	0.2	0	0.6	0.1
Acquaintance	15.4	16.0	28.5	8.8	8.0
Neighbor	3.1	3.8	3.3	0.5	2.6
Business Relation	1.9	1.3	0.1	0.9	0
Sex rival or enemy	6.8	3.0	0.7	1.4	0.2
Stranger	15.6	20.6	52.8	78.6	85.7
Felon or police officer (V or O)	1.7	10.1	0.3	0	0.2
NONPRIMARY	45.4	55.0	85.7	90.8	96.8
Any other and unknown	20.9	24.3	4.1	8.2	2.6
UNKNOWN	20.9	24.3	4.1	8.2	2.6
GRAND TOTAL	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789

Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Regardless of the variation, the importance of friends and intimates in criminal homicide cannot be denied. Homicide often appears to reflect the dynamic interplay between two persons caught up in a life drama where their relationship plays a role in explaining why such a flagrant violation of conduct norms has occurred. This should really not be very surprising. Everyone is within easy striking distance of intimates for a large part of the time. Although friends, lovers, spouses, and the like, are a main source of pleasure in one's life, they are equally a main source of frustration and hurt. Few others can anger one so much.[42]

Within the family classification, most of the slayings were between husbands and wives in legal marriages (12 percent of all interactions in Table 6).[43] Killings involving other primary group relationships were most likely to be between close friends (6 percent), and the non-primary group category was dominated by strangers (16 percent) and acquaintances (15 percent).[44]

A number of important distinctions become evident when the sex and race[45] of the actors in the various relationships are considered. Regardless of race, when a female was killed, the probability that the victim-offender relationship involved husband and wife was much greater than when a male was killed.[46] The percentage of females killed in which some other family relationship was involved also proved noticeably higher than for males. Generally, then, the data showed a higher proportion of family relationships for female[47] and of nonpromary relationships for male victims[48] The pattern was the same and more clear for offenders.[49]

In the mate killings half of the offenders were husbands and half were wives.[50] When the races were considered separately, however, proportionately more Negro than white wives, and more white than black husbands were offenders.[51]

Whether within or outside of marriage, heterosexual relationships are exceptionally fraught with potential violence. Love and hate in psychoanalytic theory are juxtaposed and often intertwined, so that an individual can both love and kill the object of his desire if the normal expression of his feelings is denied or perceived as such:

> Be thus when thou art dead, and I will
> kill thee
> And love thee after . . . . I must
> weep,
> But they are cruel tears. This
> sorrow's heavenly;
> It strikes where it doth love.

Had Desdemona not been loved by Othello, she might have lived.[52]

Aggravated Assault

Fourteen percent of all aggravated assaults were between family members, and 7 percent involved other primary group contracts; 55 percent occured in nonprimary group relationships.[53] In comparison to criminal homicide, primary group involvement was lower and nonprimary group involvement somewhat higher.

The percentage of mate assaults is similar to comparable single-city studies, but the percentage of primary group relationships appears to range from about one-fourth in our national sample to slightly over half in other studies.[54] Thus, friends and intimates appear to play an important role in aggravated assault, most probably for the same reasons as in criminal homicide, although the extent to which strangers and other nonprimary group relationships are involved clearly increases with aggravated assault.

Husband-wife assaults dominated the general family relationship catebory (7 percent of all interactions). Assaults between close friends were highest among other primary group relationships (4 percent), while assaults between strangers (21 percent) and acquaintances (16 percent) were most prevalent in nonprimary group relationships. These rankings are the same as for criminal homicide.[55]

Although the similarity is not complete, the general patterns that emerged when aggravated assault relationships were broken down by sex and race very much followed those for homicide. When the victim was a female, the relationship was more likely to be between husband and wife than when a male was a victim.[56] As victims, males appeared more involved in nonprimary group relations than females, and white males more than Negro males. Regardless of race, when a female was the offender, she was more likely to assault individuals having primary group relationships than when the offender was a male,[57] while the opposite was true for nonprimary group relationships.[58] When a mate was assaulted, the husband was the offender in about three-quarters of the cases.[59] In homicides, we noted that husbands and wives were about equally likely to be offenders.[60]

Forcible Rape.

From a legal perspective, the kind of personal relationship between victim and offender is probably more important in forcible rape than in any of the other major violent acts. The law and informal ethical codes recognize degrees of moral weakness and culpability which partly depend on the relationship. A young girl is considered an innocent victim in an incest relationship, for example. But the victim is thought to be less innocent if mutual drinking was involved or a close relationship existed prior to the offense.[61]

Only 10 percent of all forcible rape interactions in the survey involved primary group relationships, while 86 percent were nonprimary group relationships; the rest were unknown or miscellaneous. Other family relationships besides those involving mates or children were most frequent in the primary group category (4 percent). Strangers (53 percent) and acquaintances (29 percent) dominated the non-primary group classification. These national results generally coincide with the earlier findings in specific communities.[62]

Although there appeared to be some previous knowledge of the offender or some prior relationship between him and the victim in almost half the rapes, the stranger category dominated all other specific types of relationships. If a woman is attacked, then, considerable justification does appear to exist for the fear that the offender will be a stranger.

The forcible rapes by males who are known to their victims may involve situations in which someone not yet established as a boyfriend or paramour presses for sexual favors. Although the woman can initially encourage the advance, she may then resist. If the male is not dissuaded and forcefully succeeds in his physical quest, the result may be a report of rape to the police in which the offender is an aquaintance. This pattern may be especially true to life experience among the lower classes, where a disproportionate amount of forcible rape and other major violence occurs. The attitude that women are objects of exploitation is common among lower-class male society. A related principle is that intercourse is expected if dating continues.[63] With each successive meeting, the male will often try to go as far as he can, judging the dating series a failure if there is no progression toward intercourse. When added to the relative dearth of articulate verbal communication and techniques for deflating aggression among lower class individuals, these behavior patterns and attitudes describe how the male may often attempt to elevate an acquaintanceship physically to a more intimate relationship, despite the protests of the woman.[64]

Our results differed little between blacks and whites, except that Negro victims, more than white victims, were involved in a primary group association other than within the family. White, more often than black, offenders committed incest.[65]

Armed and Unarmed Robbery.

Seventy-nine percent of all armed robberies and 86 percent of the unarmed robberies were by strangers. The only other relationship of interest was a past acquaintanceship (8 and 9 percent, respectively). Little variation occurred by sex and race of victim or offender, except that Negroes were almost exclusively involved in the very few primary group relationships. These results confirm the findings in previous single-city studies.[66]

SPATIAL PATTERNS

Certain places are part of our immediate environment. We commonly eat in a kitchen, dining room, or restaurant; meet companions in a bar; go to a third-floor apartment by a stairway; walk along a public street; etc. The particular place where a major violent crime occurs does not "cause" the offense, and the offender may not "choose" one place in preference to another, but the location, just as the weapon and the motive, varies in frequency and may play an important role in the circumstances associated with the crime.[67]

Related to the fear of strangers in the minds of many Americans is the assumption that criminal violence will most likely occur on the street. Half of the women, and about one-fifth of the men in the United States, are afraid to use the streets at night, according to a recent Gallup Poll.[68] How justified is this concern when each of the major violent crimes is considered?

Table 7[69] shows that, although criminal homicide occurs out-of-doors more than any place else, there is a fairly even distribution among outside (37 percent), home (34 percent), and other inside locations (26 percent). Even

Table 7.—The place of occurrence by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Major violent crime type	Willful Murder	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Bedroom	10.0	2.6	33.2	0.5	2.3
Kitchen	2.9	2.2	0.1	0.3	0
Living room, den, study	11.8	15.9	9.1	2.0	2.4
Hall, stair, elevator	7.0	5.4	3.9	3.4	10.1
Basement, garage	2.6	0.2	5.2	0	1.6
TOTAL, home	34.3	26.3	51.5	6.2	16.4
Service station	0.6	0.9	0	3.0	0.5
Chain Store	0	0.4	0	1.7	0
Bank	0	0	0	3.0	0
Other commercial establishment	2.8	3.1	1.4	20.4	3.5
Bar, tavern, taproom, lounge	7.6	2.8	0.6	2.4	0.1
Place of entertainment other than bar, tavern, etc.	0.9	0.9	0.6	0	0
Any other inside location	14.2	11.2	11.3	3.5	5.1
TOTAL OTHER INSIDE LOCATION	26.2	19.3	13.9	34.0	9.2
Immediate area around residence	4.2	4.9	2.2	4.6	6.0
Street	24.9	39.1	4.8	37.6	48.8
Alley	1.0	1.2	6.1	2.1	1.9
Park	0.4	1.9	2.3	0.5	7.4
Lot	2.3	0.9	3.2	1.8	3.7
Private transport vehicle	2.1	1.1	11.0	3.5	3.6
Public transport vehicle	0.7	1.0	0	3.8	1.8
Any other outside location	1.3	2.0	4.3	5.4	1.1
TOTAL OUTSIDE LOCATION	36.9	52.1	33.9	59.3	74.3
Unknown	2.5 2.5	2.2 2.2	0.7 0.7	0.4 0.4	0 0
GRAND TOTAL	100.0 100.0 (668)	100.0 100.0 (1493)	100.0 100.0 (617)	100.0 100.0 (509)	100.0 100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

more aggravated assaults occur outside (52 percent) than in the home (26 percent) and other inside locations (19 percent). Outside places (34 percent) are less frequently the scene of forcible rape than for any of the other violent crime; over half occur in the home (52 percent) or other inside locations (14 percent). Armed robbery is mostly outside (59 percent) and less in the home (6 percent) than any other major violent crime. Encounters occurring in other inside locations (34 percent) are higher for armed robbery than for other crimes, reflecting the many commerical establishments involved. Relative to violent offenders, citizens have most justification for fearing unarmed robbers when out on the street or in some other external location (74 percent of all unarmed interactions occur outside). The frequency of unarmed robberies happening in the home (16 percent) is lower than for any other crime.[70]

Criminal violence, then, varies considerably according to location. If a person is victimized, he is likely to meet a robber on the street or be assaulted outside, yet the chances are considerably lower in rape and homicide.

Criminal Homicide

The nearly equal locale distributions for homicide are generally substantiated in previous studies of particular communities.[71]

Within the home, as Table 7 shows, the three major locations were the living room (12 percent), where family members and friends probably come into contact with one another more than in any other single place; the bedroom (15 percent), where the close proximity of intimates may encourage unresolved conflicts to flare up; and halls, stairways, and elevators (7 percent), which are places of transition where the victim may be caught by his adversary after moving from a scene of conflict.[72]

Homicides in inside places other than the home were mainly distributed between miscellaneous indoor locations (14 percent) and bars or taverns (8 percent), while most outside killings occurred in the street (25 percent).[73]

When the sex and race of victim and offender were considered, higher percentages of female than male victims as well as offenders were found in the home, regardless of race. This finding undoubtedly reflects the large amount of time women spend in the home.[74]

There was little important sex-race variation for homicides occurring in other indoor locations,[75] but a uniformly higher proportion of males than females, regardless of race, were victims and offenders in outside homicides.[76] This is so because of the greater number of men on the streets at night—particularly during the hours and on the days of the week when homicide reaches a peak.[77] Groups of young males often move from one place of amusement to another late at night. When the female is out, she more likely has a male companion, who escorts her home but then makes his way alone. If a woman is married, she is likely to stay home to care for the children while her husband is out.[78]

Our national data show that husband-wife slayings are much more likely to occur in the home than elsewhere. Among mate slayings, husbands (15 percent) were killed in the kitchen about twice as often as wives (7 percent.[79] As a frequent family meeting place, especially among the lower classes, where frustrations accumulated during the day may be released,

where questions about the family budget are raised, where women spend much of their time, and as a place where deadly weapons are handy,[80] the kitchen is not an unexpected setting for wives who kill their husbands.[81]

The home was also the most common place for homicides between other family members or those with other primary group relationships. while outside locations predominated in non-primary group relationships. Reasonably, a clear overall tendency emerged for primary group murders to occur inside and non-primary group killings outside.[82]

Aggravated Assault

There are some variations, but the results from earlier studies are similar to the national survey, which shows half of all assault interactions as split between the home and other inside locations; the rest occur outside.[83] Aggravated assaults in the home were most likely to occur in the living room (16 percent). Assaults in other indoor locations were found in the miscellaneous category (11 percent), and outside attacks occurred mostly on the street (39 percent).[84]

The more refined aggravated assault breakdowns for locational patterns continued to parallel the results for criminal homicide. Similar explanations seem to apply, and the suggestion that the two crimes may differ mainly in the seriousness of their outcomes again appears valid. For both races, women were more likely to be assault victims or offenders in the home, but men were more likely to be victims or offenders in outside locations.[85] Primary group interactions occurred mostly in the home or other indoor locations, while combatants whose relationships were not of a primary group nature tended to fight outside.[86]

Forcible Rape

Previous local studies confirm the suggestion that about half or more of all forcible rape interactions occur in the home.[87] Considerably more of the remaining rapes in the survey occurred in outside than other inside locations.

Not surprisingly, the bedroom dominated the home locations (33 percent). Most of the rapes committed in other indoor locations were in miscellaneous places (11 percent). "Private transportation vehicles"—undoubtedly cars—stood out as the predominant outdoor setting (11 percent), with the alley (6 percent) and the street (5 percent) ranking lower. Regardless of where and how a man or a group of males may firstapproach a woman who is subsequently raped, the discernable pattern is toward finding a more intimate, nonpublic place, even if it is only the back seat of an automobile.

There was little variation from our general findings when blacks and whites were observed separately.[88] Moreover, regardless of whether the victim and offender were related through family bonds or other primary group ties, or whether a nonprimary relationship existed, about 50 percent or more of the rapes in the national survey occurred in the home. Nonprimary rape relationships, however, had higher frequencies in outside locations.[89]

Immediate family members usually share the same house, so it is reasonable to expect that if a forcible rape situation evolves between family-related individuals, incest will occur there. Similarly, in the course of

their daily activities, women often come in contact with relatives, good friends, paramours, and the like, in private indoor places. Without undue hesitation, women often accompany these same people to such places for social functions. In each case, the eventual offender is more able and the eventual victim more willing to interact in a private indoor location before the sequence leading to a rape. On the other hand, while acquaintances, neighbors, co-workers, strangers, and the like, may seek and often gain an intimate indoor location for the rape, the general reluctance of women to interact with less well-known men in this setting increases the likelihood of attack in automobiles or on the street.

Armed and Unarmed Robbery

Our findings support earlier investigations that businesses and outside places dominate as scenes of armed robbery.[90]

Table 7 shows that victims were rarely robbed in their homes by armed offenders. About one-third of the armed robbery interactions in the survey occurred in other inside locations, however, pointing to theft from commercial establishments (20 percent) and other institutions. All other armed robberies occurred outside, especially on the street (38 percent).

The pattern of more female victimization inside and male victimization outside, regardless of race, held true for armed robbery as well as for homicide and aggravated assault, probably for the same reasons.[91] No really decisive sex-race armed robbery patterns appeared from the point of view of offenders, however.[92] Almost all the armed robberies involved non-primary group relationships,[93] so the association we found for the other crimes between fewer previous contacts and more outside locations was maintained.

A more noticeable portion (about one-sixth) of unarmed than armed robberies occurred inside (see Table 7), although the most likely spot—the hall, stairway, or elevator—was the same for each category of theft (with 10 percent of all unarmed robbery interactions occurring in these places). However, while armed robbers often chose commercial establishments, the proportion of unarmed robberies in these places was very low. Fully three-quarters of all unarmed robberies were outside, primarily on the street (49 percent), in parks (7 percent), or in the immediate area around a victim's residence (6 percent).

The sex-race patterns of armed and unarmed robbery differed,[94] although both types mainly involved nonprimary group relationships.[95]

VICTIM PRECIPITATION

> No villain need be! Passions spin the plot:
> We are betrayed by what is false within.[96]

Just as the commission of a crime is often the culmination of a process in which many factors are at work, so there are few genuinely random victims:

> The householder who is the victim of burglary has, as often as not, paid no heed to the state of his locks, left windows unfastened, or has gone away and advertised his absence by omitting to cancel the milk.

> The motorist who leaves a camera or briefcase on the seat in full view is asking to have them stolen. But victims may go beyond carelessness. The man who had had more liquor than he can take lies in the arms of a prostitute and may lose his wallet if it has not already been emptied by paying exorbitant sums for drinks in the shady "club" where he picked her up. Victims may suffer as a consequence of their own cupidity and foolishly entrust money to "confidence men" who assure them that some financial venture is about to produce a fantastic profit. And some women approaching middle age and anxious about their sexual attractiveness are not infrequently the victims of unscrupulous Don Juans who fleece them of their money as well as their modesty. People who are careless about their goods, who are prepared to penetrate the Rialto of the half-world of prostitutes, "club" owners and criminal lay-abouts, whose greed or whose vanity craves satisfaction, may all fall victim to crimes of one sort or another.[97]

In violent crimes, too, the victim at times contributes to the commission of the offense. We might expect the victim to contribute to major violent offenses and facilitate their execution by provoking or initiating a hostile reaction to the offender (e.g., during an altercation, one party hands the other a gun and, knowing full well the other's hostile mood, accuses him of not having the "guts to shoot"), by unconsciously inviting the offense through an emotional pathology (e.g., a wife has masochistic needs that are satisfied by her assaultive husband), by direct invitation or incitation (e.g., a female engages in heavy petting and, at the last moment, begins to resist the man's advances), or by omission of normal preventive measures (e.g., a robbery victim flashes a great deal of money at a bar and then walks home alone along a dark street late at night).[98]

The law of homicide has in fact formally recognized provocation by mitigation of the offense from murder to manslaughter or from criminal to excusable homicide,[99] although such recognition is almost negligible in the statutes covering aggravated assault, forcible rape, and robbery.[100]

Table 8 [101] suggests that victim precipitation is often involved in criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and, to a lesser extent, armed robbery.[102]

Criminal Homicide

Victim precipitation was defined in the survey as occurring in criminal homicide whenever the victim was the first to use physical force against his subsequent slayer.[103] Typical cases of precipitation defined in this way are as follows:

- A husband accused his wife of giving money to another man, and while she was making breakfast, he attacked her with a milk bottle, then a brick, and finally a piece of concrete block. Having had a butcher knife in hand, she stabbed him during the fight.
- A husband threatened to kill his wife on several occasions. In this instance, he attacked her with a pair of scissors, dropped them, and grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen. In the ensuing struggle that ended on their bed, he fell on the knife.

Table 8.—Victim-precipitation by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim-precipitation \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Victim Precipitation	22.0	14.4	4.4	10.7	6.1
No victim precipitation	33.8	34.6	82.9	81.4	83.8
Unknown	44.2	51.0	12.6	7.9	10.1
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

• During a lover's quarrel, the male hit his mistress and threw a can of kerosene at her. She retaliated by throwing the liquid on him, and then tossed a lighted match in his direction. He died from the burns.

• A drunken husband, beating his wife in their kitchen, gave her a butcher knife and dared her to use it on him. She claimed that if he should strike her once more, she would use the knife, whereupon he slapped her in the face and she fatally stabbed him.

• During an argument in which a male called a female many vile names, she tried to telephone the police. But he grabbed the phone from her hands, knocked her down, kicked her, and hit her with a tire gauge. She ran to the kitchen, grabbed a butcher knife, and stabbed him in the stomach.[104]

In spite of the high percentage of cases with inadequate or unknown data, the findings in Table 8 that homicide is precipitated in a large proportion o interactions (22 percent) is supported by the only other source available.[105] Thus, the conventional assumption that the homicide victim is a weak an passive individual attempting to avoid an assault by an offender who is brutal strong, and overly aggressive would not always appear to be correct.[106]

Is it reasonable to assume that some of the victims who precipitate the deaths are often bent, consciously or unconsciously, on suicide, so that t offender is really used as a means to carry out this desire? There is parti evidence:

Table 8.—Victim-precipitation by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

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In spite of the high percentage of cases with inadequate or unknown data, the findings in Table 8 that homicide is precipitated in a large proportion of interactions (22 percent) is supported by the only other source available.[105] Thus, the conventional assumption that the homicide victim is a weak and passive individual attempting to avoid an assault by an offender who is brutal, strong, and overly aggressive would not always appear to be correct.[106]

Is it reasonable to assume that some of the victims who precipitate their deaths are often bent, consciously or unconsciously, on suicide, so that the offender is really used as a means to carry out this desire? There is partial evidence:

> Although it is impossible to verify an assumption of subconscious suicide wishes among these victims, empirical data from broad social factors combine with psychological and sociological data suggesting that victims in many cases present themselves as willing targets for violent aggression leading to homicide.[107]

Our figures imply that, regardless of race, males are considerably more likely to precipitate homicide than females.[108] This finding suggests that the police should

> . . . thoroughly investigate every possibility of strong provocation by the male victim when he is slain by a female. It is, of course, the further responsibility of defense counsel, prosecuting attorney, and subsequently the court, to determine whether such provocation was sufficient either to reduce or to eliminate culpability altogether.[109]

Age, victim-offender relationships, and locations did not appear to be important considerations for victim-precipitated homicide.[110] Stabbing and shooting were the most common methods of killing where precipitation did occur.[111]

Aggravated Assault

Victim-precipitated aggravated assault was somewhat more broadly defined in the national survey as occurring when the victim was first to use either physical force or insinuating language, gestures, etc. against his attacker. The proportion of victim precipitated assaults (14 percent) in Table 8 is less than for criminal homicide (22 percent), but we believe it large enough, in spite of the many unknowns, to once again suggest a similarity between the two acts.

Certain clinical observations have reinforced this position. The personalities of assault and homicide victims who provoke attack can often be classified in the same way:

> The victims of many assaults and homicides have what may be called an aggressive-tyrannical personality and engage in acts with the offender which invite or excite assaultive response. The victim is usually emotionally involved with the offender—a spouse, parent, or lover. The assaulters and killers can be described as submissive and passive, desiring to avoid conflict whenever possible, particularly if playing the masochistic role results in gaining them affection. The victim sadistically exploits these traits in the offender, becomes demanding, critical, and unmerciful, or threatens to withhold love and affection. In short, the victim oversteps the offender's previously overcontrolled hostility threshold.[112]

For assault, as for homicide, there was little variation in the chance of precipitation according to the victim's age, and white males appeared to invite attack considerably more than white females. Unlike homicide, the same differential was not clearly present between Negro males and females. Black females were more likely to precipitate an assault than white females,

however. Other slight departures from homicide were that attacks between primary group relations (other than family) appeared somewhat more associated with victim precipitation than interactions characterized by other relationships and that provocation was more likely to occur in home assaults than in attacks at other locations. Given the number of unknowns, we could not say with assurance that victims who precipitated attack were noticeably more likely to be injured. Nor was there great variation in the means of injury when victim precipitated and non-victim-precipitated interactions were compared.[113]

Forcible Rape

When the victim agreed to sexual relations but retracted before the actual act or when she clearly invited sexual relations through language, gestures, etc., we defined the interaction as victim precipitated forcible rape.[114] Table 8 shows relatively few unknowns here. Unlike the only other investigation on the subject, the frequency of victim precipitation (4 percent) was quite low. Although it sounds very reasonable intuitively, we therefore cannot add proof to the suggestion that "If the victim is not solely responsible for what becomes the unfortunate event, at least she is often a complementary partner."[115]

White females were not much more likely to precipitate rape than Negro females,[116] though females between the ages of 15 and 17 were most likely to behave in a way that encouraged the attack.[117] Precipitation was more likely to occur when a nonfamily primary group relationship (close friends, paramours, etc.) existed between the victim and offender than when there were family ties or when a nonprimary group relationship was involved.[118] Home locations had a somewhat higher chance of precipitation than other places.[119] We did not find a noticeably higher degree of victim precipitation when the victim was injured than when she was not. Bodily means were used by the offender in the few instances where the victim precipitating the event was injured.[120]

Armed and Unarmed Robbery

Victim precipitation in armed and unarmed robbery was related in the survey to "temptation-opportunity" situations in which the victim clearly had not acted with reasonable self-protective behavior in handling money, jewelry, or other valuables.[121] In addition to showing a great deal of money, such circumstances might be created by a person walking late at night through a park or down a dimly lit street instead of along a possibly longer, but safer, main thoroughfare.

Detailed information on the actions of robbery victims is not often recorded by police, but Table 8 shows that our tabulators were certain enough to make a judgment in all but 8 percent of the armed robbery interactions. The resulting estimate that such careless precipitating behavior was present in 11 percent of the unarmed robbery interactions was exactly

the same as the estimate produced in the only comperable study (although the latter combined armed and unarmed robbery).[122]

We are not as confident here about the chance of precipitation as we were for homicide and assault. However, a small, yet meaningful proportion of all armed robberies may be partially brought on by the carelessness of victims. If this is true, the implications could be important. The high degree of emotion and irrationality in homicide and assault would seem to make warnings against precipitating attack rather futile. But it is much more reasonable to suggest that if people and establishments took some care to avoid obvious "temptation-opportunities," they might become considerably 'harder" targets against armed robbery.

Only male victims, regardless of race, appeared to precipitate armed robbery, and the Negro male was higher than the white male percentage. Such victims appeared more likely to be in the 18–20 and 26–30 age ranges than in any other group, and the interactions invariably took place between individuals having nonprimary group relationships. Precipitation was more probable in home and outside locations than in "other inside" locations.[123] Provocation was noticeably higher in interactions where the victim was not injured, but there were too few "temptation-opportunity" situations involving injury to make any meaningful statements about weapons used.[124]

Six percent of all unarmed robberies were precipitated (Table 8). It is difficult to explain why victims appeared to provoke crime more in armed than unarmed robbery. We can suggest, however, that once a victim presents a "temptation-opportunity," the potential offender might be more willing to respond if he is armed than if he is not. The figures suggest that if precipitation did occur in unarmed robbery, the victim was usually a white male between 21 and 40 or above 50 having a nonprimary group relationship with the offender. As with armed robbery, precipitation was more likely to occur in home or outside locations than "other inside" places, and it was higher in interactions where the victim was not injured than those in which injury occurred.[125]

MOTIVE

Any discussion of "motive" from data such as ours is rudimentary because it reflects only the factors recorded by police. The term is too imprecise to imply conscious design, planning, or underlying socio-psychological causes. Motive should not be confused with intent, which is essentially a legal term referring to the offender's ability to comprehend the nature of his act and his resolve to commit it. Motive is a much less formal term, often referring in police investigations to that which stimulates a person to commit a crime.[126]

Table 9[127] gives results of the national survey. The tabulators were asked to indicate, whenever possible, what appeared to be the original motive leading to the criminal event. Thus, for example, the initial motive in criminal homicide might be robbery or sexual attack. "Altercations" dominated in criminal homicide (36 percent) and aggravated assault (30 percent), while the simple desires for sexual gratification or money were maintained in almost all forcible rapes (99 percent), armed (98 percent), and unarmed robberies (96 percent).

Table 9.—The motive of the offender, by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Motive \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Family quarrel	7.7	5.8	0	0	0
Jealousy	4.4	3.0	0	0	0
Revenge	2.5	2.9	0	0.2	0.6
Altercation	35.7	29.6	0	0	0.2
Self-defense	5.5	1.7	0	0	0
Halting felon	0.3	0.2	0	0	0.5
Escaping arrest	0.5	7.9	0	0	0
Robbery	8.8	2.3	0	98.5	96.0
Sexual	2.1	1.0	99.3	0.5	1.0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0.9	1.0	0	0	0
Other	10.6	4.5	0	0.5	0.4
Unknown	21.0	40.1	0.7	0.2	1.3
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions = 3,789
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes, for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim=offender Survey, preliminary data.

Criminal Homicide

Altercations appeared to be the primary motivating forces both here and in previous studies.[128] Ostensible reasons for disagreements are usually trivial, indicating that many homicides are spontaneous acts of passion, not products of a single determination to kill. One newspaper analysis illustrated this well:

> Murders result from little ol' arguments over nothing at all," noted a veteran Dallas homicide detective. "Tempers flare. A fight starts, and somebody gets stabbed or shot. I've worked on cases where the principals had been arguing over a 10¢ record on a juke box, or over a one dollar gambling debt from a dice game."

> Detectives say a dialog that ends in homicide may begin;
>
> "You got a cigaret?"
> "Naw, I ain't got any."
>
> Or the fateful conversation may begin like this:
>
> "Hey, you're lookin' at me."
> "No I ain't."
> "Yes you are. Why you lookin' at me?"
>
> Here are some current cases:
>
> A man was shot in the back in front of a tavern because, police said, he had refused to lend his assailant a dollar.
>
> "Deceased and suspect had been arguing over a $5 bet and became involved in a scuffle," says the beef sheet concerning another shooting.
>
> Two men who worked together were drinking beer and became involved in an argument over a $1 pool bet. One wound up on a morgue slab.
>
> Believe it or not, here's the police summary of another killing: "The suspect was drunk and stabbed the victim because he would not move over in bed." It happened in Little Mexico, a case of a nephew murdering his uncle.[129]

Homicide or assault may be the easiest ways to terminate altercations for people of lower socioeconomic status who possess limited verbal skills:

> Here violence not only expresses frustration, but also represents a brusque and inadequate summary of the argument the person cannot verbalize. In addition, it constitutes an effort to suspend the offending level of interaction.
>
> Obviously, lack of social skill can be a two-edged sword; not only can it produce violence as a substitute for talk, but it can also inspire explosions directed at the inadequate person by other people who find themselves unable to reach him in more conventional ways.[130]

Regardless of race, male victims and offenders were more frequently involved in altercations than females.[131] This reflects the greater frequency of interactive relationships men are involved in, so that the opportunities for such situations to precipitate physical attack are commensurately increased.[132] The likelihood of an altercation was fairly constant for all ages of victims,[133] though the percentage of offenders whose motive grew out of an altercation roughly tended to increase with age.[134]

Although lower in frequency than altercation, the remaining motives indicated in Table 9 may have some importance in criminal homicide: miscellaneous reasons (11 percent), robbery (9 percent), family quarrels (8 percent), self-defense (6 percent), and jealousy (4 percent).[135]

When robbery was the motive, white males were much more likely to be victims than white females or blacks of either sex.[136] The

percentage of victims killed as a result of an interaction motivated by robbery generally increased with age. Older white males are prime robbery targets, presumably because offenders believe they have more money and possessions, and it now appears that they are more likely than any other group to be robbery victims who are slain. More males than females were motivated by robbery, but the tendency decreased with age.[137]

Female victims were much more likely than males to be in interactions motived by a family quarrel, and the same was true for offenders. Women tend to be more limited to family interactions in their daily lives than men, so the likelihood that physical attack will arise out of these situations is accordingly greater. Unsurprisingly, the percentage of interactions motivated by a family quarrel was generally highest for victims and offenders aged 21 to 60.[138]

Marital discord almost always has a long history, and it is likely that the persistent tensions arising from it encourage some to kill as an escape from the pressure:

> • Mrs. Riverton stated that "I shot him because he has been running around with some woman for the past 18 months." She further stated that they had been lying in bed arguing for the past hour and she made up her mind to do it.
>
> • Stanley Masterson, white male, 45, stated that his wife, Jane Masterson, white female, 40, quit him and sued him for divorce, and that she was running around with a truck driver. Masterson states that about 12:30 p.m. he went over to his house and that she was in the bedroom and he asked her about talking things over, and she told him that she already had her mind made up, and that no one could change it. Masterson states that she began cursing and fighting him, and that he went to the living room and got his pistol from a dresser drawer, and went back to the bedroom and shot her one time in the head.[139]

Criminal homicide motivated by self-defense was more common for male than for female victims and for female than for male offenders.[140]

For jealousy, the most observable sex and race pattern was for the percentage of Negro females (as victims or offenders) to be much higher than the percentage of white females.[141] The proportion of interactions motivated by jealousy peaked in the 20–40 age range for both victims and offenders.[142]

We have already suggested that heterosexual relationships, within and outside of marriage, have a high potential for violence when jealousy is present. It has been observed in another study that:

> conflicts born of a love triangle might be momentary or they might be more firmly entrenched as a result of a grudge of long standing. Those of a momentary nature tend to develop between two men over the question of who will have the privilege of taking some woman home from a party or a cafe. Those that result from differences of long standing usually involve disputes between individuals interested in the same mate. Although the persons involved meet during the moment of fatal conflict by chance, our cases lead us to believe that the assailant had been waiting for such an opportunity when the chance presented itself. Homicide, in this instance, is more deliberate.[143]

Two cases ilustrate these observations:

> • On investigation we found that the deceased, H. B. Mitson, Negro male, 30, had been to a beer joint at 2900 Sauer Street and became involved in an argument with Ed Yalsin over a woman known as "Boo-Boo." Information shows that the deceased was walking with this girl "Boo-Boo" when Ed Yalsin walked up to him and stabbed him two times in his chest because this girl had promised Yalsin that she would go with him after the cafe closed.
>
> • On investigation we find that the deceased was sitting on a car fender at 2500 Pease when Clara King walked past her on the street. The deceased is reported to have said something to Clara about fooling with her boy friend and then hit Clara with a stick. Both of them went to fighting and the deceased was using a stick and Clara was using her knife. The fighters were separated by Beverly Franks, 500 Allston, who was with Clara King, and she was also cut.[144]

From the perspective of general community standards, most of these motives, especially altercations, family quarrels, and jealousy, are "cheap issues for which people trade their lives."[145] Yet they are much more reasonable if we accept the concept of a subcultural ethos of violence within the urban ghettos in which a much wider range of situations are preceived by many as justifying an aggressive response. An altercation with overtones threatening a young man's masculinity, a drunken misunderstanding between husband and wife on Saturday night, a competition for the same woman—these can be more than trivial events in a ghetto environment which accepts violence as a norm, allows easy access to weapons, is physically deteriorated and segregated from the rest of the community, has reduced social controls, and experiences inadequate law enforcement:

> The persistence of conditions set in motion by the ecological process of segragating give these areas their own mores and thereby encourages a relaxed form of social control. The very nature of the contacts experienced by these people lowers inhibitions and encourages response to passion. Each homicide area is inhabited by people who carry on most of their daily routine, experiencing only symbiotic contacts between themselves and members of other racial or cultural groups. Opportunities for passionate conflict between them and other groups are limited. The process of segregation raises the probability of intragroup conflict not only by virtue of its power to generate proximity and intimacy, but also by virtue of its power to reduce respect for the areas that are segregated into deterioration. This is seen more clearly by those who, as inhabitants of these areas, experience the daily routine of such communal living. In Negro areas the relaxed pattern of social control is more obvious. It is reflected in the shuffle of unregulated traffic; the sharp odors of segregated theaters; or the sheer infrequency of uniformed police. In the downtown white area it is less

obvious—more underground. Bell-boys of the cheaper hotels feel it; janitors of rooming houses feel and see it too, but the majority of this relaxed social control is behind the closed doors of places of cheap entertainment. The essence of it is that there has developed among many of the people who inhabit these areas a psychology of excuse. They often feel justified in breaking the general community code, or at least they have little conscience against it. The define community expectations in terms of their own deprivations.[146]

Aggravated Assault

Like criminal homicide, "altercations" stand out as the primary recorded motive in aggravated assault; previous local studies reached the same conclusion.[147] It is unlikely that the subcultural influences which may explain this pattern are any different than for homicide. "Escaping arrest" (8 percent)[148] and "family quarrels" (6 percent) were the next most common motives, although the "unknown" figure was unfortunately very high (40 percent).

The chance of being a victim or offender in an altercation-motivated interaction did not vary greatly between black and whites.[149] This frequency also parallels homicide. Although more males (as victims and offenders) than females were involved in homicides motivated by altercations, this was not true for aggravated assault.[150]

Forcible Rape, Armed Robbery and Unarmed Robbery

No variations from the general pattern in Table 9 were recorded by race or age of victim or offender.[151]

MEANS OF INFLICTING INJURY AND WEAPONS USED

Many factors must converge before a violent crime but, especially for criminal homicide, aggravated assault, and armed robbery, access to and cultural traditions of weapons have important roles in the final outcomes. The world abounds in available weapons, yet our data and those from every other significant study show the instruments actually used are neither mysterious nor exotic. They are usually commonplace, quick, brutal, and direct.[152]

Table 10[153] shows whether victims were injured[154] and, when they were, the weapon used by the offender. Firearms are most common in homicide, but knives and sharp instruments most frequent in aggravated assaults. Forcible rape usually involves little physical injury beyond the rape, but physical restraint and bodily methods are generally used when harm is inflicted. Injury is also relatively infrequent in robbery. Weapons are fairly evenly distributed among all types in armed robbery interactions where injury occurs; bodily means (hands, fists, feet, etc.) are of course used by unarmed robbers who inflict injury.

Table 10.—Means of inflicting injury by type of crime, 17 Cities, 1967
[In percent]

Injury status and means of inflicting injury \ Major Violent Crime Type	Criminal Homicide	Aggravated Assault	Forcible Rape	Armed Robbery	Unarmed Robbery
Firearm	46.6	13.0	1.4	2.0	0
Knife or other sharp instrument	29.2	25.9	0.7	1.2	0
Blunt instrument	3.2	11.7	0.6	3.8	0
Poison	0.2	0.1	0	0	0
Body	10.8	22.4	17.7	3.7	26.7
Other	9.8	7.0	1.0	3.0	1.0
Total Injured	100.0	80.1	21.4	13.7	27.7
Total Not injured	0	18.0	76.0	82.5	66.1
Total unknown	0	1.9	2.6	3.8	6.2
Grand total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Criminal Homicide

About 47 percent of all homicides in our national sample involved the use of firearms by the offender, with knives or sharp instruments (29 percent) and bodily methods (11 percent) next most common. The FBI tabulation of all 12,090 homicides committed in 1967 concurs with our ranking, although it emphasizes the role of firearms even more: 63 percent of all cases involved firearms, 20 percent knives; or sharp instruments, 9 percent bodily methods, and 8 percent all other methods.[155] Firearms have also been the most popular weapon in the majority of the earlier city studies.[156]

With certain exceptions, we found firearms the most commonly used weapons regardless of the sex, race, or age of the victim.[157] The same was generally true for offenders.[158]

Aggravated Assault

Table 10 indicates that the victim was uninjured in 18 percent of all aggravated assaults. When harm was inflicted, the most likely weapons used were knives or sharp instruments (26 percent), bodily methods (22 percent), firearms (13 percent), and blunt instruments (12 percent). Our national sample is again very consistent with the FBI tabulation. In 1967, the FBI recorded the weapons used (regardless of whether injury was inflicted) in all of 253,300 aggravated assaults reported in the *UCR*. The FBI ranking was: knives or sharp instruments (33 percent), bodily methods (24 percent), blunt instruments (22 percent), and firearms (21 percent).[159] The results were similar in earlier city studies.[160]

Clearly, then, firearms lose their dominant position when the focus shifts from criminal homicide to aggravated assault. There are at least two alternative interpretations. Homicide and aggravated assault can be viewed as very similar crimes generated by similar circumstances, with the differential in their seriousness largely explained by the fact that homicide offenders happen to have more deadly weapons at hand. Or, it might be suggested that the homicide offender is more determined to kill, and therefore chooses the weapon most capable of achieving his end, while the aggravated assault offender does not have such a goal in mind.

Each interpretation undoubtedly has significance. Yet the consistent similarity between homicide and assault—considering the dynamics of sex, race and age as well as relationships, locations, and victim precipitation—persuades us that the truth lies more with the first position.[161] Only a small percentage of criminal homicides involve premeditation, so the second position must be further tempered. Perhaps most importantly, "altercations" dominate as the rationales behind both homicide and assault, suggesting that motives do not determine the weapon used. Additional evidence comes from a Chicago study which shows that a greater proportion of knife attacks (more common in assault) than gun attacks (more common in homicide) are to vital parts of the body, and that more multiple wounds are inflicted with knives than with guns.[162] This is not the kind of information with which one can argue that persons arrested for aggravated assault have a lesser desire to kill than people arrested for criminal homicide.

When the sex, race, and age of the assault victim were considered, shooting was never the most common method of injuring the victim. Knives and sharp instruments were the most commonly used means of inflicting harm against males of all races, with bodily methods close behind. Bodily means were most frequent against females of all races, followed by knives and sharp instruments in the case of Negro females. Generally, we found bodily means most commonly used against younger victims and knives against older victims.[163]

The dominance of knives and bodily methods over firearms was basically maintained when offender characteristics were studied. The general pattern, however, was for Negro offenders, regardless of sex, to use knives more than other weapons, while bodily means were highest for white male offenders, and blunt instruments for white females. Surprisingly, perhaps, we found for all races that the likelihood of female assault offenders injuring their victims

was consistently higher than for males. Although there are fewer female assaulters than males,[164] women would therefore appear somewhat more dangerous than men when they actually become offenders. Up to the age of 20, offenders were most likely to use bodily methods of inflicting injury[165] while older offenders were most likely to use knives. Thus, not only is there an apparent shift from bodily methods to knives as the age of the victim increases, but the pattern also holds true as the age of the offender increases.[166]

Forcible Rape

We defined "injury" in the course of forcible rape as any physical harm inflicted *in addition to* the sex act itself.[167] Using this definition, Table 10 suggests that no harm was inflicted in about three quarters of all interactions, while bodily means were almost always used if physical harm was incurred.[168] This was true regardless of the race and age of the victim or offender. However, white offenders appeared more likely to inflict harm than black offenders. The likelihood of being harmed increased with the victim's age and the likelihood of inflicting injury peaked for offenders between the ages of 21 and 30.[169] Perhaps because of different definitions of injury, our national results conflict with those from the only comparable study.[170]

Armed Robbery[171]

Table 10 shows that in most armed robberies (82 percent), the victim was uninjured. In the relatively few instances involving physical harm, weapons were evenly distributed among blunt instruments, bodily means, firearms, and knives or sharp instruments. With certain exceptions,[172] the low degree of harm generally held regardless of sex, race, and age of victim or offender, although the predominant weapon used when injury was inflicted often varied.[173] Our results are generally consistent with earlier single city studies.[174]

The importance of firearms reasserts itself, however, when we change the perspective slightly and ask only what weapons are used in armed robbery, *regardless of* injury to the victim. In 1967, the FBI conducted an investigation into the 117,000 nationally reported armed robberies and found that 63 percent of the cases surveyed involved firearms, 24 percent knives or other sharp instruments, and 13 percent blunt objects.[175] Other studies have registered similar results.[176] When all the major violent crimes are considered, then firearms predominate in the use of force by murderers and the threat or use of force by armed robbers.

Unarmed Robbery

The clearest difference between the two forms of robbery was the greater liklihood that the victim would escape physical injury when the offender was *armed*. The victim was injured in 28 percent of all unarmed robberies, but in only 14 percent of the armed robberies.[177] (See Table 10.) The victim is undoubtedly more likely to resist the offender when he is unarmed, so force may be resorted to and injury incurred. Armed robbers use a variety of

weapons when they injure victims; injuries in unarmed robbery are inflicted (by definition) through bodily methods.

Regardless of sex, white victims in unarmed robbery were more likely to be harmed than black victims[178] and older victims generally more likely to incur injury than younger ones.[179] The most observable offender patterns were much higher infliction of bodily injury by Negro females than Negro males[180] and by white males than white females,[181] as well as a tendency for those aged 18–25 to inflict bodily injury more than offenders of other ages.[182]

CONCLUSION

A number of policy implications[183] become apparent when we draw together the characteristics of and relationships between victims and offenders in serious criminal violence.

The intraracial nature of assaultive violence—homicide, assault, and rape—would discount suggestions that relatively high rates of individual crime by Negroes reflect a new stage of racial conflict. These findings warn against restrictive "law and order" controls based on the assumption that assaultive violence masks racial warfare. Stronger police protection *is* needed, but should particularly be directed toward the protection of Negroes from other Negroes in the subcultural ghettoes.

A great deal of interracial robbery does exist, however, especially by younger Negro males against older white males.[184] Although such violent theft cannot be ignored and controls are required, this fact underscores the social and economic inequalities in our country and indicates the need to carry the "quantitative" revolution to all minority groups through minimum incomes, adequate education, housing, jobs, and the like.

To the considerable extent that some forms of major violence—robbery in particular—are committed by strangers in outside or public locations, improved law enforcement patrol and surveillance techniques will continue to be required as instruments of deterrence. Yet we must recognize that violence among intimates, friends, and acquaintances, especially in criminal homicide and aggravated assault, often occurs in private and indoor locations. This requires a more imaginative preventive response than traditional law enforcement has provided. Techniques for discovery and intervention are needed to defuse conflict situations that might otherwise lead to serious violence. The "domestic quarrel team" concept, involving groups of police and behavioral experts on 24-hour call, is one promising approach.

Whether violence occurs among intimates or strangers and inside or outside, advances in deterrence and intervention must be viewed as short-term policies that require substantial reinforcement by long-term social programs for the reduction of the underlying causes of violent crime in our cities. Reconstruction is needed, for example, to eliminate the subcultural ghettoes which appear influential in producing homicides and assaults triggered by seemingly trivial motives, such as altercations.

Homicide and assault often involve victim precipitation. This suggests the need for police and the courts to investigate more carefully the role of the victim. Our criminal statutes, sentencing practices, and correctional treatment

should be adjusted to allow for the contingency of victim provocation.

The possibility that a small but noticeable number of robberies may be precipitated by the victim's carelessness indicates the utility of a campaign to reduce "temptation-opportunities." People should be made more aware that simple precautions—such as using only main thoroughfares at night—could significantly lower the probability of victimization. Other "target hardening" practices include credit cards which are difficult to use when stolen, sliding barriers between drivers and passengers in taxicabs, scrip for use on public transportation vehicles, and street-corner callboxes.

The data offer several arguments for stronger controls on the possession of handguns.[185] The first is supported by the findings that 1) criminal homicide and aggravated assault are very similar acts, varying primarily in the severity of their outcomes, 2) knives are most popular in assault, and 3) guns are most used in homicide. Guns, in addition, are the most versatile weapon in homicide:

> Firearms make some attacks possible that simply would not occur without firearms. They permit attacks at greater range and from positions of better concealment than other weapons. They also permit attacks by persons physically or psychologically unable to overpower their victim through violent physical contact.[186]

Perhaps most importantly, firearms are more deadly than any other weapon—the fatality rate for firearms attacks is approximately five times as high as that for knives. Thus, "a rough approximation would suggest that the use of knives instead of guns might cause four-fifths, or 80 percent, fewer fatalities."[187] Effective handgun control would not reduce the motivation or desire to kill, but it would necessitate the use of less efficient and more deadly weapons; thus, relatively fewer homicides and more aggravated assaults might be expected to occur.

Second, guns predominate as the weapon used in armed robbery. There is every reason to believe that the gun is often essential for the armed robber and that, without it, many would be unable to produce the threat of force needed to carry out such a crime.[188] In addition, the fatality rate for armed robberies involving firearms is approximately four times as great as that for other armed robberies.[189]

Third, consider the practice of keeping firearms in the home for purposes of self-defense.[190] There is an assumption here that a great deal of violence involves strangers intruding in the home and that firearms are an efficient defense. Yet criminal homicide, while often occurring at home, infrequently involves strangers. Aggravated assault involves more strangers, but it also occurs outside more often. Even for the relatively few homicides and assaults involving strangers intruding into a home, existing evidence indicates that the element of surprise substantially limits the effectiveness of home defense.[191]

Robbery occurs between strangers most of the time, yet it rarely occurs in the home; even when it does, the element of surprise exists. Burglary has a much higher incidence rate than the four major violent crimes,[192] is the most common type of intrusion by a stranger, and causes the greatest property loss. Yet burglary rarely threatens the homeowner's life.

The burglar typically seeks to commit his crime without being discovered, if possible by entering a home that is not occupied. Consequently, he is more likely to steal the home-defense firearm than be driven off by it. For example, over 18,000 home burglaries in the Detroit Metropolitan Area in 1967 resulted in the killing of only one burglary victim in the City of Detroit.[193]

Not only do the facts show the limits of firearms as protective devices, but they also suggest that guns are often hazardous in the home. A great deal of criminal homicide involving firearms, for example, occurs between intimates in the home. In the heat of an altercation, family quarrel, or jealous rage, guns stored for protection against strangers can be used on friends and loved ones. Nor does the shooting need to be criminal: a substantial number of the 23,000 annual firearms accidents in the country occur in the home.[194]

Providing a factual base for these policy implications, the national survey of victims and offenders has also helped to clarify the nature of homicide, assault, rape, and robbery. As we learn the extent to which the patterns of each violent act merge and the degree to which they are unique, a more comprehensive explanation of criminal violence as a general social phenomenon can be built.

REFERENCES

1. The Crime Commission concluded that lack of broad comprehensive data on characteristics and relationships "prohibits the development of more informative and useful statistical reconstructions of criminal events. This type of information must be secured more systematically if greater understanding of the different conditions under which crimes occur is to be achieved." (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice [hereinafter referred to as the Crime Commission], *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment* [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967], p. 77.
2. As shown in Ch. 3. The study should thus be viewed as a national sample of large cities, but not one "stratified" over less dense populated areas.

   A local contact in each city worked in cooperation with the Police Department to draw the 10-percent random sample of reports for each of the four acts of major violence. ("Criminal homicide" was defined as explained in Ch. 1). Cases involving both adults and juveniles and those cleared by arrest as well as uncleared were systematically included. The information was then photocopied and sent to the Commission for analysis.

   The work of our local contacts in each city was prodigious. Each man, already burdened with the responsibilities of a highly demanding position, contributed his time and supervisory effort without pay, except for expenses in some cases. The advisers were: *Atlanta*: Dr. John T. Doby, Chairman, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta; Mrs. Maryann Albrecht. *Boston*: Prof. Stephen Schafer, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Northeastern University, Boston. *Chicago*: Mr. Charles N. Cooper, Cook County Office of Economic Opportunity, Chicago. *Cleveland*: Dr. Charles McCaghy, Department of Sociology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland. *Dallas*: Dr. Sidney J. Miller, Department of Sociology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas. *Denver*: Prof. Gresham M. Sykes, Director, Administration of Justice Program, University of Denver College of Law, Denver. *Detroit*: Dr. Eliot Luby, Lafayette Clinic, Detroit. *Los Angeles*: Dr. Gilbert Geis, Department of Sociology, California State College at Los Angeles, Los Angeles. *Miami*: Mr. Victor H. Mealy, Director, Head Start Social Services, Dade County Public Schools, Miami. *Minneapolis*: Dr. John Clark, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis. *New Orleans*: Dr. Robert E. Tournier, Department of Sociology, Tulane University, New Orleans. *New York*: Dr. John Martin, Department of Sociology, Fordham University, New York. *Philadelphia*: Dr. Thorsten Sellin, Professor Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania and Co-Director Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Mr. Frank Cannavale, Department of Sociology and Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. *St. Louis:* Mr. Nelson Heller, Resource Allocation Unit, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, St. Louis. *San Francisco:* Mr. Thomas J. Sweeney, Assistant Executive Director, San Francisco Committee on Crime, San Francisco; Mr. William B. Smith. *Seattle:* Dr. Clarence Schrag, Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle; Mr. Jack Craig. (The Washington, D.C., sample was collected by the Task Force.)

   Just as important was the excellent cooperation we received from the police in each city for a task that was often troublesome and time-consuming. The Police Chiefs and Department staff members involved were: *Atlanta*.: Superintendent Fred Beerman, Assistant Superintendent Charles W. Blackwell, Assistant Superintendent Clinton Chaffin. *Boston*: Commissioner Edmund McNamara. *Chicago*: Superintendent James B. Conlisk, Chief Otto Kreuzer, Detective Division; Deputy Chief Michael Spiotto, Detective Division; Director Carl Miller, Records Division; Mr. Bart Ranier, Data Processing Division. *Cleveland*: Chief Patrick Gerity; Patrolman Charles L. Greiner, Systems Analyst; Detective Inspector James M. Limber, Lt. Howard A. Blackwell, Lt. Joseph F. Mongel. *Dallas*: Chief Carl Batchelor; Sgt. Charles Elwonger, directing the staff of the Research and Development Section. *Denver*: Chief G. L. Seaton. *Detroit*: Commissioner Johannes F. Spreen; Inspector Jack Shoemaker, Commanding Officer, Record Bureau. *Los Angeles*: Chief Thomas Reddin; Douglas McFadgen, Records and Identification Division. *Miami*: Chief Walter E. Headley; Capt. K. E. Fox. *Minneapolis*: Superintendent Calvin Hawkinson. *New Orleans*: Superintendent Joseph I. Giarrusso. *New York:* Commissioner Howard Leary; Chief Inspector Sanford D. Garelik, Capt. James Meehan. *Philadelphia*: Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo. *St. Louis*: Chief Curtis Brostron. *San Francisco*: Chief Thomas J. Cahill; Director Dennis Smith, Bureau of Identification. *Seattle*: Chief Frank Ramon; Lt. Roy Skagen. *Washington, D.C.*: Chief John B. Layton; Assistant Chief Charles L. Wright, Technical Services Division; Inspector William D. Foran, Criminal Investigation Division; Lt. Patrick L. Burke and Sgt. Bernard F. Kelly, Homicide Squad; Detective Sergeant Frank Rinaldo, Detective Sergeant Embrey Minor, and Detective Edward Guggenheim, Sex Squad; Capt. Ralph E. Stines, Robbery Squad; Capt. Clark W. Hamm and Detective Mathew J. Vinciguerra, C.I.D. East; Sgt. Louis A. Fantacci, C.I.D. West.

   Although 10-percent of all cases were requested, we also asked that no fewer than 50 nor more than 200 cases for any one major violent crime be sent from any one city. The lower bound ensured a statistically meaningful contribution from each city, and the upper bound was required mainly because of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Detroit, where the volumes for certain major violent crimes (especially aggravated assault and robbery) were so great that even a 10-percent sample would have been unmanageable.

   In all, we received and processed 781 homicides, 2,352 aggravated assaults, 1,064 forcible rapes, and 2,385 robberies.

   Tabulators were hired to transcribe information on the offense and arrest reports to special tabulation sheets, from which punchcards were automatically made through a data scanning machine. We are indebted to Frank Devolder, Chief, Automated Data Management Services Division, and John Perdue, Chief, Systems and Programming Section of the General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., for drawing up the tabulation sheets with us and supervising their translation into punch cards.

   Two percent of all cases were retabulated by others for a consistency check. When any systematic mistakes or judgmental errors were uncovered, all the work done by the tabulator was repeated. The data scanning machine rejected all tabulation sheets with mechanical mistakes (e.g., two marks in a column where only one should have appeared) and corrections were again made. After the data cards were punched, a great many logical consistency checks were made by computer.

Mistakes were rectified and new cards punched. These procedures are fully explained in the complete study report forthcoming as a special Field Survey to the Commission.

We were fortunate in having the excellent services of the Assist Corporation of Annandale, Va., and in particular, Richard G. Abbott, for the vast amount of computer work necessitated by the survey.

3. One "tabulation sheet," with the characteristics of and relationships between one offender and one victim, was made out for each offender who committed a violent crime upon each victim in the criminal event.

Thus, if two offenders attacked one victim in the same criminal event, we have recorded two interactions and two complete sets of information, each describing one offender's relation to his victim and the characteristics of both.

The procedure means we have tabulated a particular victim and all his characteristics every time we could determine that an offender in the criminal event interacted with him. This procedure might be interpreted as incorporating a "bias" in our figures towards victims attacked by more than one offender: for the characteristics of these victims are counted more than once. This "double counting" (or triple counting, etc.) is negligible for criminal homicide events, because they usually involve just one victim and one offender. The chance of more than one offender is considerably greater in aggravated assault, forcible rape and robbery.

However, we do not view this as a "bias" but as an intentional effort to give greater weight to victims attacked by more than one offender. Just as important, we have concluded that, on balance, using the interaction as the basic unit of analysis encounters fewer problems than other units of analysis and is the clearest, most comprehensive mode of expression. If, for example, we eliminated double counting by tabulating only one victim and one offender from each event, how could we decide whom to choose if a multiplicity of individuals were involved?

Or, we might eliminate the interaction altogether and use the case as the unit of analysis. We would then make statements about "x percent of all cases." The case is in fact best at times. Thus, Ch. 14 will produce survey data tabulated in terms of cases because all we are interested in there is the percentage of events in which groups or gangs of offenders are involved. However, when the interest is in relationships between specific victims and offenders, the case is obviously too general a measuring rod.

Finally, we might eliminate the interaction and speak only of "*x*% of all victims" and "*x*% of all offenders" separately. Here again we eliminate double-counting. But now only "static" conclusions can be reached. For example, we can relate that "*x*% percent of all victims are white" and "*x*% of all offenders are white," but we cannot make the very important statement that "in *x*% of all incidents, a white victimized a white." On the other hand, the best quality about the interaction as the unit of analysis is that it allows for such "dynamic" statements.

Although the earlier studies of victims and offenders reviewed in this chapter have generally relied on these alternative units of analysis we will therefore use the interaction, except in those isolated incidents where other modes are preferable.

4. Our tables are based on 668 homicide, 1,493 aggravated assault, 617 forcible rape, 509 armed robbery, and 502 unarmed robbery interactions cleared by arrest from the seventeen cities. (See App. II for a discussion of the possible "bias" that might result because uncleared cases were not included.)

These numbers are "statistical" in that they represent a weighting system applied to the real number of interactions cleared by arrest. The unweighted, or real numbers, were: 633 homicides, 1,353 aggravated assaults, 538 forcible rapes, and 649 robberies.

(See App. II for an explanation of the weighting system, the reasons for using it, and the method by which the real number of interactions was converted into the statistical number.)

It is also important to realize that the data refer to percentage or frequency distributions—not incidence or rates per population unit—within the sample survey. Incidence data was examined in Ch. 3 and here the focus is on the dynamic interplay between victims and offenders. We do not directly determine, for example, that a victim is more likely to be robbed by a stranger than by a friend. What can be directly asserted is that *when* a victim is robbed, the likelihood is greatest that the offender will be a stranger, etc.

5. The forthcoming Field Survey to the Commission, in which a complete analysis of the study is presented, will include a more complete and detailed review of all the problems involved, on a city-by-city basis.
(See App. II for a consideration of certain other problems)

6. In this chapter, we limit data comparisons to the following earlier studies: Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), has been used by most of the following:

Menachem Amir, "Patterns of Rape and the Female Victim" (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The University of Pennsylvania, 1965). Andre Normandeau, "Trends and Patterns in Robbery" (unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The University of Pennsylvania, 1968). David J. Pittman, and William Handy, "Patterns in Criminal Aggravated Assault," *Journal Criminal Law, Criminal and Police Science*, v. 55, p. 462, 1964. Alex D. Pokorny, "A Comparison of Homicides in Two Cities," *Journal Criminal Law, Criminal and Police Science*, vol. 56, no. 4, 1965. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas" (Field Surveys III, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), vol. 1. *Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia* (D.C. Crime Commission). St. Louis Police Department, *Annual Report*, 1965. Stephen Schafer, "Criminal-Victim Relationships in Violent Crimes" (unpublished research, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, July 1, 1965, MH–07058.

7. The topics considered here will be expanded in a forthcoming Special Field Survey.

This chapter includes new survey data and comparisons with other studies on age, race, sex, occupation, victim-offender relationships, location of the crime, victim precipitation, offender motives and means of inflicting injury. Our comparisons implicitly discount the possibility that the patterns observed in other studies might have changed since the time they were originally made.

The forthcoming Field Survey, which analyzes these factors more completely, includes a number of other factors (marital status, time of day, day of week, month, social context, among others) and makes comparisons between cities grouped by region as well as between data from cleared and uncleared cases.

All the supporting tables from the survey in this chapter are presented in App II. The most general of these tables are repeated in the chapter. The great bulk of data makes inclusion of more tables prohibitive. We have clearly noted the Appendix tables upon which all our statements are based.

8. Philip H. Ennis, "Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Report of a National Survey," Field Surveys II, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), Tables 14, 16, 17, pp. 31, 33, 34-35.

9. The percentage figures in this section are based only on those interactions in our survey where these characteristics were known.

For race, we only included whites and Negroes, eliminating the few interactions involving persons from other races. The supporting tables behind the other sections in this chapter, however, do include other races.

We also have "dynamic" data on socioeconomic status. The best indicator was occupation. Because occupation was commonly unreported, we have relatively few interactions where it was known for both victim and offender. Because of this, our findings here are tentative and discussed only in footnotes.

10. See Chs. 11, 14, and 16 for development of the concept of violent subcultures.

11. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide," in Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide* (New York: Harper & Row, Readers in Social Problems, 1967), p. 19.

12. Although, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, a great many Negroes also rob other Negroes.

13. Reproduced in App. 11 as Table 3.

14. The diagonal (/) means "killed by" (or, for the other crimes, "assaulted by," "raped by," "robbed by"). Thus, sixty-three percent of these interactions involved males killed by other males.

15. The other noticeably high combinations were 26+/18 to 25 (twenty percent) and 18-25/18-25 (ten percent).

The most important combined sex, race, and age patterns were, respectively, for Negro males over age 25 to kill Negro males of the same age group; Negro females to kill Negro males, both over 25; Negro males aged 18 to 25 to kill Negro males over 25, and white males to kill white males, both over 25. (See Table 4, App. 11.)

Ranked in order of importance, the most noticeable combinations among the seventy-one criminal homicide interactions where occupation was determined were: students killing students, housewives killing children or dependents, people of miscellaneous services killing people of the same classifications, laborers, and laborers killing housewives (most likely their wives).

As discussed in Ch. 3, the "student" category could include college students, although most individuals so classified were juveniles and young people still in vocational, night, and high schools.

It is highly probable that the importance of the student category is overemphasized in our figures. Unless there was evidence to the contrary, our tabulators usually assigned anyone 17 or under to the "student" category. Thus, while a specific occupation had to be stated in the police offense-arrest report of anyone 18 and older for us to tabulate it, all that was needed to determine the "occupation" of those 17 and under was age, and item much more commonly available. (See Table 5, App. 11.)

16. Wolfgang found that 94 percent of the 550 identified victim-offender relationships were of the same race. 72 percent of the total were Negro and 22 percent were white. Of the 6 percent or 34 cases in which an offender crossed the race line, 14 cases were Negro/white (Negro killed by white) and 20 cases were white/Negro.

Sixty-four percent of the 550 identified victim-offender relationships involved participants of the same sex: 61 percent were male/male, while only 3 percent were female/female. Of the 36 percent in which an offender did kill a person of the opposite sex, 16 percent were male/female and 20 percent were female/male.

Of the 550 indetified victim-offender relationships, 59 were of the same race and sex, 35 precent of the same race but opposite sex; 4 precent were of a different race but same sex; and 2 precent were of a different race and sex.

Of the 583 relationships having an age difference (not included were 26 victims and offenders of the same age and 11 infant victims), 59 percent had offenders younger than their respective victims. An age difference of no more than 5 years accounted for over a third of all victim-offender relationships and decreased consistently as the age difference between victim and offender increased. There were only three relationships where the victim-offender age difference was 50 years or more.

(Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), pp. 210, 222, 224, 225.)

The D.C. Crime Commission found that only 12 of 172 murders were interracial. (Report of the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia (hereinafter referred to as the D.C. Crime Commission), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 42.)

In Houston, Pokorny found that 97 percent of the Negro victims were killed by Negro offenders. This compared with 86 percent of Latin-American victims who were killed by other Latin Americans and 91 percent of whites who were killed by other whites. (Alex D. Pokorny, "A Comparison of Homicides in Two Cities," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, vol. 56, No. 4, 1965, p. 484.)*

17. Reproduced in App. 11 as Table 6.
18. The other important combinations were, respectively, 18 to 25/25+ (twelve percent), 26+/18 to 25 (eleven percent), and 18 to 25/18 to 25 (ten percent).

The most important sex, race, and age assault combinations ranked as follows: Negro males over 25 assaulting similarly aged Negro males, the same offenders assaulting Negro females over 25, Negro males aged 17 and under assaulting Negro males of the same age group; Negro males over 25 assaulting Negro males 18 to 25, and Negro females over 25 assaulting like Negro males. (See Table 7, App. 11.)

Among the 293 interactions for which occupations could be determined, the most important groups were, respectively, students assaulting students, laborers assaulting laborers, laborers assaulting housewives, and children or dependents assaulting invdividuals of the same status. (See Table 8, App. 11.) The same caution that was noted for criminal homicide overemphasizing the importance of student-student interactions is relevant here, however.

19. In St. Louis, Pittman and Handy found that 57 percent of the 238 cases were of the same sex and same race. 39 percent of the total cases were of the same race but different sex. About 17 percent were white/white. Nearly 80 percent were Negro/Negro.

In 61 percent of the cases the victim and offender were the same age category (under 20, 20-34, 35-49, and 50+). There were more cases in the 20-34 age group than any other age group whether considering victims alone, offenders alone, or victims and offenders together.

(David J. Pittman and William Handy, "Patterns in Criminal Aggravated Assault," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science*, vol. 55, 1964, pp. 467-468.)

In Washington, the D.C. Crime Commission found that only 9 percent of all assaults were interracial. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 76.)

In Chicago, Reiss found that about 90 percent of all aggravated assaults occurred within the same race group. When race crossing occurred, about 2 percent involved whites assaulting Negroes and 7 percent, Negroes assaulting whites. (Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Studies in Crime and Law Enforcement in Major Metropolitan Areas" (Field Surveys III, Crime Commission), p. 34.)

20. Reproduced as Table 9, App. 11.
21. Because white males have long had nearly institutionalized access to Negro women with relatively little fear of being reported, however, it is likely that the true proportion of Negroes raped by whites is larger. (See Marvin E. Wolfgang, *Crimes of Violence*, Report submitted to the Crime Commission, p. 64.)
22. As might be expected, the leading combinations when race and age were combined proved to be, respectively, attacks by Negroes 17 and under on Negroes the same age, Negroes 18-25 on Negroes the same age, Negroes 18-25 on Negroes 17 and under, Negroes 18-25 on Negroes over 25, and Negroes over 25 on Negroes 17 and under. (See Table 10, App. 11.)
23. In Philadelphia, Amir found that of the 646 cases of identified relationship, 77 percent were Negro-Negro and 16 percent were white-white. Thus, among the 44 cases in which the offender was of one race and the victim of another, 4 percent contained a white male offender and a Negro victim and 3 percent had a Negro male offender and a white victim. The amount of interracial rape was therefore small, and the danger to white women was as minimal as to Negro women—probably much less if reference is again made to the nearly institutionalized access white males have had to Negro women, from slavery to recent times, with little fear of reprisal or retribution. (Menachem Amir, "Patterns in Forcible Rape," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania 1965, p. 82.)

Thus, we found relatively more white/white rapes in our national sample than Amir did in Philadelphia (30 versus 16 percent), relatively fewer Negro/Negro rapes (60 versus 77 percent), relatively more white/Negro rapes (10 versus 3 percent) and relatively fewer Negro/white rapes (less than 1 percent versus 4 percent). Our overall percentages of intra and interracial rape, however, were similar to Amir's figures.

In general, Philadelphia victims and offenders came from the same age group (15-24), though victims tended to be younger than offenders. The median age for all offenders was 23.0 years compared to 19.6 years for victims. (Amir, p. 104.) Our results are in general agreement.

In Washington, the D.C. Crime Commission found that 88 percent of all rapes involved persons of the same race. (D.C. Crime Commission, op. cit., p. 54).

In Chicago, Reiss found that 90 percent of all rapes and attempted rapes involved victims and offenders of the same race. Only 3 to 5 percent of all forcible rapes involved a white woman and a Negro offender, and 1 to 2 percent involved a Negro female and a white male. (Reiss, pp. 34-3.) These findings are close to our national survey figures.

Among the 210 interactions for which occupation was determined, the leading combinations were, in order of importance: student/student, student/laborer, housewife/laborer, unemployed/laborer, student/skilled trades, student/unemployed, and housewife/unemployed. The same caution that was noted for criminal homicide against overemphasizing the importance of student-student interactions is again operative here, however. (See Table 11, App. 11.)

24. Reproduced as Table 12, App. 11.
25. The other important combinations were, respectively, Negro males 18-25 robbing Negro males 26 and over, Negro males 26 and over robbing like Negro males, and Negro males 18-25 robbing white males 18-25. (See Table 13, App. 11.)

    Only 58 armed robbery interactions allowed determination of occupation, but for these the most important combinations are ranked as follows: miscellaneous services/unemployed, laborer/laborer, housewife/unemployed and manager/student. (See Table 14, App. 11.)
26. Reproduced as Table 15 in App. 11.
27. See Table 16, App. 11.
28. In Philadelphia, Normandeau found 24 percent of all types of robberies were interracial and 76 percent were intraracial.

    Of the interracial robberies, 16 percent were committed by Negro males against white males and 7 percent by Negro males against white females. Less than 1 percent were committed by Negro females against white females, less than 1 percent by white males against Negro males, and less than 1 percent by white males against Negro females. Thus, of all interracial robberies, 17 percent were male/male, less than 1 percent were female/female, and 7 percent were intersexual.

    Of the 76 percent of intraracial robberies, 63 percent were by Negroes against other Negroes and 13 percent by whites against other whites. Negro males robbed other Negro males in 47 percent of all events and Negro females in 13 percent. Negro females robbed other Negro females in 2 percent of all events and robbed Negro males in less than 1 percent. Among white intraracial robberies, 9 percent were committed by males against males and 3 percent by males against females. White females robbed only a single white male and robbed white females in less than 1 percent of all events. Thus, of all intra-racial robberies, 56 percent were male/male robberies, 2 percent were female/female, and 17 were intersex.

    In all robberies, inter- or intraracial, 73 percent were male/male, 3 percent were female/female, and 24 percent were inter-sex.

    In general those who committed robbery were much younger than those who were robbed. (Andre Normandeau, "Trends and Patterns in Crimes of Robbery," an unpublished dissertation for the University of Pennsylvania, 1968, pp. 167-173.)

    In Chicago, Reiss found that, on the average, two-thirds of all armed robberies occurred within the same race group. Although Negroes were more likely to be victims than whites, it was not probable that whites robbed Negroes. In race crossing during robbery, the victim was generally white and the offender Negro; this form of victimization comprised 25 to 30 percent of all robberies.

    Reiss suggested that in robbery the Negro poor are victimized by other Negroes, but that the white victim who is robbed is most likely to be a businessman or of higher socioeconomic class. In Chicago, many of the white businessmen who were robbed were conducting business in Negro areas. (Reiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35).

    In St. Louis, the police found 35 percent of all 1965 robberies were Negro/Negro, 20 percent white/white, fully 44 percent white/Negro and 1 percent Negro/white. (St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, *Annual Report 1965*, p. 16.)

    In Washington, the D.C. Crime Commission found that between 1950 and 1965, 56 percent of all robbery victims were white and 86 percent of all robbery offenders were nonwhite. (D.C. Crime Commission, op. cit., pp. 56, 65.)

    For the 96 unarmed robbery interactions where we could determine occupations, the most important groupings are ranked: student/student, miscellaneous employment/child or dependent, sales personnel/student, secretary-clerk/student, and unemployed/student. (See Table 17 in App. 11.)
29. Jean McIntyne, quoted in Marvin E. Wolfgang (with the collaboration of Bernard Cohen, John Conrad, Lenore Kupperstein, and Frederic Pryor) a Report submitted to the Panel on Social Indicators, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, April 1968, p. 107.
30. Reproduced in App. 11 as Table 18.
31. A "close friend" was defined as a person with whom frequent direct and intimate (but not sexual) contact had been maintained.
32. A "paramour" was defined as any heterosexual love object or sex partner other than a spouse or a prostitute.
33. An "acquaintance" was defined as a relationship involving recognition, but no fellowship or friendship.
34. An "enemy" was defined as a traditional foe avoided in normal social relations.
35. A "stranger" was defined as a person with whom no previous contact had been made.
36. This relationship mainly refers to situations where felons escaping arrest attack police officers, though it is at least theoretically possible for an officer to attack a felon and be prosecuted for brutality.
37. It might be suggested that an attack by more than one offender is more likely to occur when the offenders are strangers or have other nonprimary group relationships, so that our use of the "interaction" as the unit of analysis yields significantly higher nonprimary percentages than if the "case" were used. We will investigate this possibility in the forthcoming Field Survey.
38. FBI, U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports* (hereinafter referred to as *UCR*) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 8.
39. For example, 25 percent of all Wolfgang's criminal homicides in which the relationship was determined involved family relationships. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 207.)
40. Our percentage of primary interactions would be even lower and nonprimary interactions higher if, as might be reasonably assumed, the unfortunately high percentage of miscellaneous and unknown relationships are in fact nonprimary.
41. Thus, while our "other primary group" category contained 9 percent of all interactions, Wolfgang found that roughly 38 percent of all determined Philadelphia victim-offender relationships were in the classification. And while our "non-primary group" category involved 45 percent of all interactions, Wolfgang found that 35 percent of all determined victim-offender relationships were within the classification. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 207.)

    It was noted in Washington, D.C., that only 21 percent of the homicide victims were unacquainted with their offenders. Twenty-seven percent of the criminal homicide occurred between spouses, and another 10 percent were between other relatives. The remaining homicides were between persons who at least casually knew their assailant. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 42.)

    Pokorny found very few criminal homicides in Houston occurring between strangers (about 1 percent). About 50 percent of the homicides occurred among family relatives and close friends. (Pokorny, *op. cit.*, p. 483.)
42. This paragraph is based on Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicides, op. cit.*, p. 203 and William Goode, "Violence Between Intimates," consultant paper to this Task Force, App. 19, p. 2.
43. The percentage is 16 when common-law marriages are added. Wolfgang found about 18 percent of all known Philadelphia relationships were between husbands and wives. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 207-213).

    The police reports we have used as our data source often have difficulty in determining marital status primarily due to the cultural prevalance of common-law marriages among Negroes. Our tabulators were instructed to register a marital relationship between victim and offender only when they could be reasonably sure it existed.
44. Wolfgang had similar results. (*Ibid.*, p. 207.)
45. All the remaining tables in App. 11 supporting this chapter include other races besides Negro and Caucasian. Because there were so few interactions here, however, our reference to race in the text are based only on blacks and whites, unless otherwise indicated.
46. The proportion of all Negro males killed in which the wife is the offender is also noticeably higher than the case for white males.

47. Negro, females, in addition, appear to be victimized in a higher proportion of other primary group relationships than white females.
48. Wolfgang found somewhat different patterns for victims. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 207.)
49. The relative frequency of Negro male offenders in nonprimary relationships also appears considerably higher than the proportion of white male offenders. (See Tables 19A and 20A in Appendix 11.)
50. Table 21 in App. 11 shows that, for all husband-wife homicides, 49.6 percent involved wives as offenders and 50.4 percent involved husbands as offenders. Here again, while our data reflect a 10 percent sample of all big-city murders in 1967, the FBI tabulated the same information for all the 1967 criminal homicides. The results were about the same. The FBI found 45 percent of all cases had wives as offenders and 55 percent had husbands (*UCR* 1967, p. 8) The data are consistent with those found by Wolfgang: in 53 percent of all Philadelphia husband-wife homicides, the husband was the offender and in 47 percent the wife was the offender. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 213.)
51. See Table 22A in App. 11.

    In addition, Table 23A in App. 11 considers husband-wife murders by weapon used. Almost all such homicides involved either shooting or stabbing. When firearms were used, we found the wife to be offender half the time and the husband the other half. When knives or sharp instruments were used, however, the wife was the offender in two-thirds of the interactions and the husband in only one-third. Wolfgang found roughly the same for Philadelphia homicides. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 213.)
52. This paragraph is based on Terence Morris and Louis Blom-Cooper, "The Victim's Contribution," in Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 67.

    The quoted verse is from *Othello*, V, ii, 18-22.
53. Twenty-four percent were miscellaneous or unknown.
54. The most comparable study on aggravated assault relationships was in Washington, D.C. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 76.) The D.C. percentages were for all *known* relationships, while ours (in parenthesis) are for all interactions:

Husband-wife	11	(10)
Other family	10	(4)
Other primary	37	(7)
All primary groups	48	(21)
All nonprimary groups	42	(55)
Unknown or miscellaneous	--	(24)
Total	100	(100)

    It is likely our primary group percentages would be even lower and the nonprimary group percentages even higher if, as might be reasonably assumed, the unknown and miscellaneous percentages mostly refer to nonprimary interactionss.
55. The main difference is that assaults by escaping or resisting felons against police appear to have a relatively large role in aggravated assault (10 percent of all interactions). As indicated in our definitions, above, this category could theoretically include police assaults on felons that were prosecuted for brutality, but we assume these recorded instances are very few.
56. In addition, the chances of the relationship being between other family members are distinctly higher for white female victims than any of the other sex-race combinations. Female victims appeared more likely to be involved in other primary group relationships than male victims, and Negro victims than white victims.
57. The one exception to this statement was that Negro male offenders appeared to have proportionately a somewhat higher involvement in other family relations than Negro female offenders. The one addition was that Negro male offenders appeared to have proportionately a somewhat higher involvement in other primary group relationships than white males.
58. See Tables 19B-20B, App. 11.

    Our conclusions on offenders here are similar to those in the St. Louis study of aggravated assault. Pittman and Handy found that the female was more likely

(64 percent) than a male (36 percent) to assault someone with whom there had been some intimate relationship. A male was more likely (64 percent) than a female (36 percent) to attack a stranger. (Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*, p. 468.)

59. See Table 21, App. 11.
60. However, the proportion of white husbands assaulting wives was somewhat above three-quarters and the proportion of Negro husbands assaulting wives somewhat below three-quarters. This means the proportion of Negro wife offenders in all Negro husband-wife interactions became noticeably greater than the proportion of white wife offenders in all white husband-wife interactions. (See Table 22B, App. 11.)

    In addition, Table 23B in App. 11 considers husband-wife assaults by whether harm was inflicted and, if so, what weapon was used. The pattern was considerably different from the case of criminal homicide. (Shown in Table 23A, App. 11.) When no harm was inflicted, it was much more likely that the husband was offender than vice versa. Firearms, knives and sharp instruments, blunt instruments, and bodily means were the main methods of inflicting injury. When firearms or knives were used, the husband appeared somewhat more likely to be the offender than vice versa. When blunt instruments or bodily means were used, the husband was much more likely to be the offender.
61. Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 482.
62. The most comparable findings are those of Amir (*op. cit.*, p. 490) in Philadelphia and the D.C. Crime Commission (*op. cit.*, p. 53) in Washington. Their results, in comparison to ours, can be summarized as follows:

In Percent

	Amir	D.C. Crime Commission	Task Force Survey (Table 6)
Family	2	2	7
Other primary	11	12	4
All primary	13	14	11
All nonprimary (stranger in parentheses)	86 (42)	82 (36)	86 (53)
Unknown or other	1	4	3
Total	100	100	100

63. Although this is becoming increasingly prevalent today at all levels of American Society.
64. This paragraph builds upon Goode, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
65. Amir reported more detailed racial differences among victims in his Philadelphia study. Even though Negro victims were as likely to be raped by a stranger (53 percent) as white victims (50 percent), Negro victims were more likely to be raped by a close neighbor (21 percent) than white victims (13 percent). White victims were more likely to be raped by an acquaintance (22 percent) than Negro victims (12 percent) (See Amir, *op. cit.*, pp. 492-493.)

    See Tables 19C and 20C, App. 11, for the survey data supporting this paragraph.
66. In the most comparable earlier study, Normandeau found that 85 percent of his Philadelphia robbery cases in Philadelphia did not involve a previous relationship. (Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 119.)

    See Tables 19D, 19E, 20D, and 20E, App. 11, for the sex and race data supporting this paragraph.
67. See Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*, op. cit., p. 133.
68. Adults representing a cross section of the population were asked if they were afraid to walk out at night within a mile of where they live.

    The results:

	Yes	No	Can't Say
National	35	62	3
Men	19	79	2
Women	50	47	3
Whites	35	62	3
Negroes	40	59	1

Source: George Gallup, "Crime in Streets Real Fear of U.S. Voters," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 9, 1968.

69. Reproduced in App.11 as Table 24. Our data, as well as the data in the other studies cited, are based on the frequency distributions of total interactions (total victims or cases for the other studies) and do not actually measure the chances of being killed in one place versus another.
70. It might be hypothesized that an attack by more than one offender is more likely to occur outside than inside, so that our use of the "interaction" as the unit of analysis yields significatntly higher outside percentages than if the "case" were used. We will investigate this possibility in the forthcoming Field Survey.
71. In Philadelphia, Wolfgang also found slightly higher percentages in outside locations than in the home, with other inside locations slightly lower still. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 124.) In Washington, D.C., slightly less than two-thirds of the homicides occurred in the residence of the victim, of the offender, or of an acquaintance of either. Another 28 percent of the cases took place on the street. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 42.) In the study of Florida inmates, more homicides were committed in the home (44 percent) than any other location, while 35 percent of the cases occurred in outside locations. (Stephen Schafer, "Criminal-Victim Relationships in Violent Crimes, vol. I, a research study submitted to the Public Health Service, July 1, 1965, p. 159.) In Houston, while 42 percent of the homicides occurred in the home, 26 percent of the cases occurred on the highway. (Pokorny, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-482.
72. Wolfgang's ranking was bedroom, living room, and kitchen, with the stair-hall in fourth place. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 124.) The main difference between our data and his was the importance of the kitchen. Fully 11 percent of all Philadelphia murders Wolfgang analyzed occurred in the kitchen, while our national survey registered only 3 percent.
73. Wolfgang's Philadelphia figures are similar. (*Ibid.*, p. 123.)
74. Wolfgang's figures are generally the same. (*Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.) The survey data in this paragraph are found in Tables 25A and 26A of App. 11.
75. Wolfgang found somewhat higher percentages for males than females and whites than blacks. (*Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.)
76. Although Negro females appeared as likely as white males to kill in outside locations. Wolfgang generally found the same sex-race pattern. (*Ibid.*)
77. We will analyze such temporal patterns in the forthcoming Field Survey to the Commission, which more comprehensively reports our study.
78. The survey data in this paragraph are from Tables 25A and 26A in App. 11. See Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 125, for the interpretive commentary.
79. Although the number of interactions representing these percentages was small.
80. We will show the relationship between weapons and location in the forthcoming Field Survey.
81. From Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide op. cit.*, p. 127. see tables 27A and 28A of App. 11 for the data supporting this paragraph.

    Wolfgang, too, found that most husband-wife homicides occurred in the home. But, while 49 percent of all our husband-wife interactions occurred there, fully 85 percent of his Philadelphia cases occurred in the home. (*Ibid.* p. 215.)

    He concurred that the percentage of all husbands killed in the kitchen by their wives was about twice as high as the percentage of wives killed by their husbands in the kitchen, although the number of cases was similarly small.

Wolfgang also found that the percentage of all wife killings which occurred in the bedroom was about twice as high as the percent of all husband killings which occurred there. We, too, found the percentage of wives killed in the bedroom higher, but the difference was not as great.

Finally, we found the percentage of wives killed in inside locations other than the home was noticeably higher than the percentage of husbands killed in other inside locations.

82. See Tables 27A, App. 11, for supporting data.
83. In St. Louis, 46 percent of all cases occurred on public streets (versus 39 percent of our interactions) and 38 percent in residences (versus 26 percent in the survey). (See Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*, p. 464.) In Washington, D.C., slightly less than half of the aggravated assaults occurred in the home (versus 26 percent in the survey) while more than a third of the cases took place on the street (versus 39 percent of our interactions). (See D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 79). Of the Florida inmate population studied, nearly a third of the aggravated assaults occurred in the home (versus 26 percent in the survey) and another third in outside locations (versus 52 percent in the survey). (See Schafer, *op. cit.*, p. 159.)
84. The most important exceptions to this general parallelism between criminal homicide and aggravated assault were relatively lower aggravated assault percentages in the bedroom and in bars and taverns.

    The relatively low ranking our figures gave to bars and taverns—only seventh highest—also differs from results in Chicago, where bars and taverns were the third most common setting for assault and battery. (Reiss, *op. cit.*, p. 128.)
85. Again, there was no sex-race difference for other indoor locations worth mentioning. (See Tables 25B and 26B, App. 11, for supporting data.)

    Variation according to sex in the home and in outside locations was similarly observed for aggravated assault offenders in St. Louis. Pittman and Handy found that females commit aggravated assaults indoors (35 percent) more frequently than outdoors (14 percent), while the opposite was true for males (65 percent indoors compared to 86 percent outdoors). (Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*, p. 464.)
86. See Table 27B, App. 11, for supporting data.
    This was similar to the findings in the St. Louis study, where Pittman and Handy found more relatives (89 percent) were assaulted in the home than nonrelatives (25 percent). Logically, more nonrelatives (75 percent) were assaulted outside the home than relatives (11 percent). (Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*, p. 464.)
87. Fifty-six percent of the victims studied in Philadelphia were raped indoors at one of the participant's residence. Another 11 percent occurred at other indoor locations. (Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 300). Nearly half of the rape cases studied in Chicago occurred in a residence. (Reiss, *op. cit.*, p. 105.)
88. This remained generally true in the Philadelphia and Chicago studies as well. (See Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 300 and Reiss, *op. cit.*, p. 105.)
89. For the data substantiating this section, see Tables 25C, 26C, and 27C, App. 11.
90. In Philadelphia, more than half of all robbery cases occurred on the street. Twenty-one percent of the cases occurred in establishments, while only 7 percent occurred in a private residence. (Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 244.) By and large, armed and unarmed robberies in Philadelphia occurred more frequently in business places or public places (*Ibid.*, p. 235.)

    In Chicago, fewer than 14 percent of all robbery cases occurred in the home, while 56 percent occurred in the street and 12 percent occurred in establishments. (Reiss, *op. cit.*, p. 22.) In Washington, D.C., less than 4 percent of the robbery cases occurred in a private residence, while over 80 percent occurred on the street. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 66.) The data from Florida inmates showed that most thefts with violence occurred in shops or stores (45 percent), while 30 percent occurred in outside locations and less than 9 percent occurred in the home. (Schafer, *op. cit.*, p. 159.)
91. More specifically, in the few armed robberies occurring at home, females were more likely than males and blacks more likely than whites to be victims. Females were also more likely than males to be robbed in other indoor locations, while whites were more likely than blacks; these were mainly personnel—clerks, tellers, and the like—in commercial institutions. Males were victimized more outside, as were Negroes. (See Table 25D, App. 11.)

92. More specifically, no decisive sex-race variation appeared for the few armed robberies in the home. White offenders had somewhat higher percentages than Negroes in other inside locations. When the interactions was outside, black armed robbers had somewhat higher percentage involvements than whites. (See Table 26D, App. 11.)
93. See Table 27D, App. 11 Along the same line, Normandeau found in Philadelphia that white males were more like to commit armed robbery in a business setting, while Negro males were more likely to commit armed robbery in a street setting. (Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 237.)
94. More specifically, for unarmed robberies in the home, the clearest variation was that Negro females were more frequently robbed than white females. More males than females and blacks than whites were robbed in the few unarmed interactions occurring in other inside locations. The white percentages were generally higher than the black, regardless of sex, when the victim was robbed outside. The only variation that stood out clearly from the point of view of offenders was that males dominated the few unarmed robberies in other indoor locations.
95. See Tables 25E, 26E, and 27E, App. 11 for the data supporting this paragraph.
96. George Meredith, *Modern Love*, XLIII, quoted in Morris and Blom-Cooper, in Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 71.
97. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.
98. These suggestions are based on Leroy G. Schultz, "The Victim-Offender Relationship," *Crime and Delinquency*, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, vol. 14, No. 2, April 1968, p. 137.
99. There are four prerequisites for such reduction:
    1. There must have been adequate provocation.
    2. The killing must have been in the heat of passion.
    3. The killing must have followed the provocation before there had been a reasonable opportunity for the passion to subside. Such provocations, for example, are: adultery, seduction of the offender's juvenile daughter, rape of the offender's wife or close relative, etc.

    Finally (4), a causal connection must exist between provocation and the heat of passion, which must have been the cause of the act which resulted in death.

    (Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Victim-Precipitated Criminal Homicide," in Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 73.)
100. See Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 247, and Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

    Hans Von Hentig, the first to suggest the notion of victim precipitation, voiced dismay over the failure of our legal system to fully recognize provocation:

    > The law assumes that the perpetrator is always the directing agent at the back of any move. It takes for granted that the "doer" is always, and during the whole process which ends in the criminal outcome, active, the "sufferer" always inactive. It is characteristic of our legalistic thinking that the notion of provocation has been allowed to enter into our criminal codes, only in a very limited way. Individual variations are discounted. 'There must also be a reasonable proportion between the mode of resentment and the provocation.' This is the law—full of majesty but devoid of finesse.

    Hans Von Hentig, *The Criminal and His Victim* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 419.
101. Repeated in App. 11 as Table 29.
102. Different definitions of victim precipitation were formulated for each of the major violent crimes and are given in the sections below. Perhaps more than for any other topic in the investigation, reliance has been placed on the interpretive judgment of our tabulators, rather than on factual statements or objective measures. It might be assumed that decisions were easier to make in criminal homicide because of the legal recognition of provocation, but this is not apparent in Table 8, where the percentage of inadequate information for making a judgment is very high for criminal homicide and aggravated assault, but considerably lower for the other crimes.

    The wide variation in the unknown percentages is difficult to explain. Tabulators were instructed to record "unknown" unless they were reasonably certain from the information provided that an interaction definitely did or did not involve victim precipitation.

103. This follows the definition used by Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 252.
104. These are reproduced from Wolfgang, "Victim-Precipitated Criminal Homicide," in Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 74-75, and taken from the Philadelphia study.
105. Wolfgang judged that the victim precipitated 26 percent of the homicide cases he analyzed. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 254.)
106. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
107. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "A Sociological Analysis of Criminal Homicide," in Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 24.
108. Wolfgang found the same pattern in Philadelphia homicides. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.)
109. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Victim-Precipitated Criminal Homicide," in Wolfgang (ed.), *Studies in Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.
110. Wolfgang found the same pattern in Philadelphia homicides. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 256-257.)
111. Wolfgang found a roughly similar pattern in Philadelphia victim-precipitated homicides, although stabbing was somewhat more common than shooting. (Ibid.)

    For the survey data supporting this and the previous paragraph, see Tables 30A-35A, App. 11. In this section and the rest of the chapter, the tabulations of age variation are for males and females combined and for white, black, and "other races."
112. Schultz, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.
113. See Tables 30B-35B, App. 11, for the data supporting this section.
114. This generally follows the definition used by Amir, *op. cit.*, p. 545.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 533. In spite of using the same definition, Amir judged that fully 19 percent of all the Philadelphia forcible rape cases he analyzed were victim precipitated. (*Ibid.*, p. 553.) Because Amir may have had more complete information than we had, it might be suggested that his data are more reliable than ours. However, because our unknown factor was relatively small and the definition used was basically the same, we believe that our extensive data may qualify Amir's position. This would appear to be operative for the general question of how meaningful a percentage of forcible rapes are victim precipitated, as well as in consideration of the other points below where our conclusions do not coincide with his.

    It should be added, however, that our relatively low proportion of precipitated rapes may reflect the uncertainty of the police officers who wrote the reports we received.
116. This did not agree with Amir's finding (*Ibid.*, p. 546) that Negroes precipitated rape over twice as frequently as whites.
117. This generally agreed with Amir, who found a slightly higher involvement of the 15-19 age group in victim-precipitated rape than was true with any other age group. (*Ibid.*, p. 546.)
118. Amir's conclusions differed from these in that nonprimary group relationships (Strangers, acquaintances, and neighbors) comprised 79 percent of victim precipitated rapes, while 19 percent occurred in nonfamily primary group relationships (close friend or family friend), and 2 percent in a family situation. (*Ibid.*, p. 551.)
119. Amir found more cases of victim precipitation among those rapes occurring in places outside residences (but not in cars) than in rapes occurring in residences. (*Ibid.*, p. 550.)
120. We found (*a*) a general low level of injury (about 21 percent of all interactions and (*b*) only slightly higher percentages of precipitation when the victim was injured (5 percent) than when she was uninjured (4 percent) through bodily means.

    Amir found (*a*) a general high level of physical force (roughness, beating, etc.) in 85 percent of all cases and (*b*) more cases of victim precipitation among those rapes which involved the use of such force (21 percent) than in cases which did not involve the use of force (9 percent). (*Ibid.*, p. 550.)

    Thus, the greatest disagreement here is between our low level of injury and

Amir's high level of physical force used. We suggest below that these positions are not irreconcilable because physical force does not always result in injury. The discrepancy, in other words, may only reflect the different terms used ("injury" by us and "physical force" by Amir).

We are, of course, interested here in observing the likelihood of victim precipitation in our injured versus uninjured interactions and comparing this to the likelihood of victim precipitation in Amir's physical versus nonphysical force cases. The figures just cited indicate that the percent of victim precipitated interactions is insignificantly higher for our injuries than noninjuries (5 versus 4 percent), while the percent of victim precipitated cases is noticeably greater for Amir's instances of physical force than for no physical force (21 versus 9 percent).

The supporting data for the above comments in the text are in Tables 30C-35C, App. 11.

121. Our definition was based on suggestions made by Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 291.
122. Although he discovered the necessary information was often unknown, Normandeau found about 11 percent of his Philadelphia robberies were victim precipitated using the broad "temptation-opportunity" definition. He did not place enough faith in the definition or in the available information to attempt more refined breakdowns, but did alternatively suggest that if the presence of alcohol in the victim can be termed a case for victim-precipitation in that victims are less cautious, then 12 percent of the robbery victims were "responsible" for their own victimization. (*Ibid.*, pp. 291-292.)
123. Interestingly, however, the percent out of all armed robberies occurring in the home that were victim precipitated seemed to be roughly as high as the percent out of all armed robberies in outside locations that were victim precipitated.
124. For the data supporting this paragraph, See Tables 30D-35D, App. 11.
125. For the data supporting this paragraph, see Tables 30E-35E in App. 11.
126. See Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 187.
127. Reproduced in App. 11 as Table 36.
128. For example, altercation was the most frequent motive in Philadelphia criminal homicides: 35 percent of all cases (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 191) and in most of the Washington, D.C. homicide cases studies (72 percent, D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 79.)
129. *Dallas Morning News,* Oct. 27, 1968, p. 18A.
130. Hans Toch, "The Violence-Prone Person: A Typology," unpublished consultant paper to this Task Force, p. 18.
131. Wolfgang found the same to be true. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 191.)
132. *Ibid.*, p. 192.
133. With the exception of ages 0-14, where the percentage of victims killed in an interaction motivated by an altercation was noticeably lower (6 percent) than for the other ages.
134. See Table 37A-40A in App. 11 for the data supporting this paragraph.
135. Wolfgang found the ranking after trivial altercation to be family quarrels, jealousy, altercation over money and robbery. (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 191.)
136. This concurs with the findings of Wolfgang, *ibid.*
137. This concurs with the findings of Wolfgang, *ibid,* pp. 191. 377. The data supporting this paragraph are found in Tables 37A-40A of App. 11.
138. The only exception was a relatively high percentage (12 percent) of civtims aged 14 and under in interaction motivated by family quarrels. See Tables 37A-40A, App. 11, for the data supporting this paragraph. The pattern found above was also generally observed by Wolfgang, *ibid.*, pp. 191, 377.
139. These cases, from Houston, Tex., are cited by Henry Allen Bullock, "Urban Homicide in Theory and Fact," *Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science,* vol. 45, 1954-55, p. 574.
140. The differential between offender frequencies for white females versus white males is especially great. An interesting contrast occurred for the oldest age group, 61 and over. There were no victims in this range when the offender acted self-defensively, but there was a relatively large group (8 percent) of offenders who appeared to commit homicide because of this motive. See Tables 37A-40A, App. 11, for the data supporting the above paragraph.

Wolfgang found the same sex differentials regardless of race and the same patterns for offender age, although his results were not as marked and characterized by fewer cases (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 191, 377).

141. Wolfgang was able to find significantly higher percentages of female than male victims and Negro than white victims. *Ibid.*, pp. 191, 377.
142. See Table 37A-40A, App. 11, for the data supporting this paragraph.

Wolfgang found for offenders that the percent of cases where jealousy was the motive was highest and fairly constant over the 20-60 age range. *Ibid.*, p. 377.

143. Bullock, *op. cit.*, p. 574.
144. *Ibid.*
145. *Ibid.*, p. 575.
146. *Ibid.*
147. For example, altercation was the predominant motive in Washington aggravated assaults, being present in 63 percent of all cases. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 79.)
148. This figure refers mainly to assaults on police.
149. Although percentage involvement is somewhat higher for blacks.
150. Among victims, male percentages were measurably higher than females for whites, but the difference was almost imperceptible for blacks. Among offenders, female percentages were actually higher than male percentages for both races.

See Tables 37B-40B in App. 11 for data supporting this other paragraph and data on age.

When the offender committed a serious assault in the process of escaping arrest, he was usually male, regardless of race. (There were no white female offenders, while the percent for black female offenders was 6.) Percentage involvement was somewhat higher for offenders in the 15-30 age range. Victims were almost always males, regardless of race, and tended to be over 20, with relatively little percentage variation among specific groups in this range. (See Tables 37B-40B in App. 11.)

Aggravated assaults motivated by family quarrels proved identical to the situation in criminal homicide: there were higher female victim and offender percentages than male, regardless of race, and generally higher percentages for both victims and offenders between ages 20 and 60. (See Tables 37B-40B in App. 11.)

151. See Tables 37C-40C, 37D-40D, and 37E-40E, App. 11 for more detailed information. The only exception to the statement here is that in a very few instances the frequency of "sexual" as the original motive in robbery was more than negligible, although the number of interactions was still very small. This was so for white female armed robbery victims, probably reflecting an attack that began as rape but ended as robbery; for Negro female unarmed robbery offenders, probably reflecting the actions of prostitutes; and for victims of armed robbery aged 15-17, as well as victims of unarmed robbery aged 18-20.
152. These comments are based on Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, pp. 79-81.
153. Reproduced in App. 11 as Table 41.
154. For all crimes, we broadly defined "injury" as physical harm of more than a very minor nature (e.g., scratches or slight abrasions). All instances where the victim was hospitalized were assumed to involve "injury" although we did not require hospitalization as a sine qua non. The data was insufficiently precise to allow for psychological trauma. Injury was defined as physical harm inflicted in addition to the sex act itself in forcible rape and in addition to the loss of money of goods in robbery.
155. *UCR*-1967, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
156. For example, in Houston, about two thirds of the homicide cases involved shooting, and one-fourth involved stabbing. (Pokorny, *op. cit.*, 481.) In Washington, D.C. most murder victims were shot (41 percent), while 29 percent were stabbed. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 42.) While stabbing was the most frequently used method in Philadelphia homicide cases (38 percent), shooting closely followed (33 percent) (Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide, op. cit.*, p. 84.)

157. Table 42A of App. 11 shows that, when sex and race were considered, the only victims against whom firearms were not the most popular weapons were males of races other than white or Negro. Here knives or sharp instruments were most often used. Not surprisingly, more women than men, regardless of race, were victims of homicide through bodily methods.

Table 43A of App. 11 shows several exceptions when the victim's age was considered. Victims under the age of 14 were most likely killed by bodily means. Stabbing was most used against victims in the 15-17 and 18-20 age cohorts, although shooting was almost as high. Firearms predominated among all other victim ages, except 61 and over, where knives and bodily methods were both considerably more common than shooting.

Our general emphasis on the role of firearms differs from Wolfgang's results in Philadelphia. He found that white females were most often killed by firearms, yet the percentage of shooting victims (33 percent) barely exceeded the percentage of beating victims (30 percent). White males were most often the victims of beatings, and Negroes of both sexes were most often stabbed. (Wolfgang, *Ibid.*, p. 84.)

158. Tables 44A and 45A in App. 11 show the only exceptions to the predominance of firearms as weapons were Negro females, "other" males, and offenders between the ages of 18 and 20. In each case, the offender was most likely to use a knife.

The contrast between the survey and the Philadelphia results was not so great for offender characteristics. Wolfgang found shooting to predominate among male offenders of both races, although stabbing was primarily used by Negro females. (The white female category was too small to make percentage distribution.) Shooting and stabbing shifted back and forth as the first and second most used methods across the various ages, with firearms the most popular weapon used for the youngest and oldest Philadelphia offenders. (Wolfgang, *ibid.* p. 85.)

159. *UCR—1967, p. cit.*, p. 10.
160. For example, in St. Louis, the offender used a knife in 52 percent and a gun in 16 percent of the cases. (Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*, p. 465.)
161. This is also the suggestion of Pittman and Handy, *op. cit.*
162. Task Force Report on Firearms to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, George D. Newton, Jr., and Franklin E. Zimring, *Firearms and Violence in American Life* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 44.
163. See Tables 42B and 43B, App. 11 for the data supporting this paragraph.
164. See Table 2 in this chapter.
165. Or blunt instruments.
166. See Tables 44B and 45B. App. 11, for the data supporting this paragraph.
167. The data were insufficiently precise to determine psychological trauma.
168. Note, however, that we did not ask whether, *in spite of* any injury, the offender was carrying a dangerous weapon. It was found in the Washington, D.C., study that one-fourth of all rape victims were attacked by offenders armed with dangerous weapons. (D.C.Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 54.)
169. See Tables 42C-45C, App. 11, for the data supporting this paragraph.
170. While we asked if additional harm or injury was inflicted, Amir asked in his Philadelphia study whether some form of force (roughness, beating, or choking) was used. He judged this to be so in 85 percent of all cases and also found such "brutality" to be noticeably more common for Negro than white offenders as well as in cases where victims were as old or older than the offender. (Amir, *op. cit.*, pp. 322, 324, 325.)

The differing approaches are unfortunate but not necessarily inconsistent. The composite picture we suggest is that (*a*) force through bodily means is common but actual additional physical harm is not, and (*b*) that force is more likely to be used by Negro offenders than whites, but that injury is more likely to be inflicted by white offenders than Negroes.

171. In armed robbery, as well as unarmed robbery, the Task Force Survey defined injury as actual physical harm in addition to the loss of money or goods.
172. For example, instances in which the percentages were noticeably above the general figures in Table 10 included Negro female victims not harmed (91 percent), victims

14 and under not harmed (98 percent) and Negro females not inflicting harm (94 percent). However, these were based on relatively few interactions. See Tables 42D-45D in App. 11.

173. Most noticeably, in comparison to the rather even distribution among blunt instruments, bodily means, firearms and knives or sharp instruments in the general Table 10, the percentage of white female victims injured through bodily means (23 percent), victims aged 15-17 injured through bodily means (13 percent), victims aged 21-25 injured by guns (14 percent), victims 26-30 injured by blunt instruments (12 percent), victims 51-60 injured by blunt instruments (18 percent), "other" male offenders injuring with knives (16 percent) and offenders 41-50 injuring through bodily means (27 percent) were very high. For some of these percentages, however, the total number of interactions in the category was relatively few. (See Tables 42D-45D in App. 11.)
174. For example, it was found that victims were not injured in 89 percent of the armed robbery cases surveyed in Washington. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 64.) Normandeau found that, when weapons were present in any form of robbery, they were not used to inflict harm in 93 percent of the Philadelphia cases studied. (Normandeau, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.)
175. *UCR—1967, op. cit.*, p. 15.
176. For example, almost three-fourths of the armed robbery cases surveyed by the D.C. Crime Commission involved firearms. (D.C. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 64.)
177. It is likely, however, that although the incidence of injury is higher for unarmed robbery, the seriousness of injury is higher for armed robbery.
178. The results of Philadelphia robbery provide a contrast here. Normandeau showed the liklihood of physical injury for robbery of *all* kinds, but we can roughly compare his figures to our unarmed tabulation because much more injury occurs in unarmed interactions. Although we found that the percentage of white males suffering injury through bodily means (48 percent) was higher than the percent of Negro males (33 percent), Normandeau found that Negro males in Philadelphia suffered more from physical injury (68 percent) than white males (39 percent) (Normandeau, *op. cit.*, p. 202.)
179. See Tables 42E and 43E in App. 11 for the data supporting this statement.
180. The number of Negro female interactions was quite low, however.
181. We did not find any white female offenders in unarmed robberies in our sample.
182. See Tables 42E-45E, App. 11, for the data supporting this paragraph.
183. To be developed in Ch. 17.
184. Although our figures indicated that Negroes rob Negroes almost as frequently as they rob whites.
185. A recent study shows that handguns are the most commonly used firearms in criminal acts. See the Task Force on Firearms, *op. cit.*
186. Firearms Task Force, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
187. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
188. One psychiatric investigator stated:

> Robbery appears to be a crime made infinitely more possible by having a gun. To rob without one requires a degree of strength, size and confidence which was lacking in many of the men with whom I spoke . . . For the most part the men involved were not very large and not very strong. Some were not very aggressive. Some of these men could not possibly carry out a robbery without a gun. In short, there was a clear reality element in the need for a gun once a man made the decision to rob . . . Although the men needed a gun to rob, the converse was also true: they needed to rob in order to use a gun . . . it was the gun which provided the power and the opportunity for mastery.

Dr. Donald E. Newman, Director, Psychiatric Services, Peninsula Hospital and Medical Center, Burlingame, Calif. Portions of Dr. Newman's report are attached as App. E of the Task Force on Firearms, *op. cit.*

189. Firearms Task Force, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
190. A 1966 public opinion survey for the Crime Commission showed that about 66 percent of householders with guns list "protection" as one reason for having them. (Firearms Task Force, *op. cit.*, p. 61.)

191. *Ibid.*, p. 64. This is also probable in forcible rape (which, however, does occur more often in the home and by strangers) especially because women are generally less capable of self-defense.
192. See Ch. 3.
193. Firearms Task Force, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
194. *Ibid.*, p. 20. The Firearms Task Force, however, did find that guns may be of some utility in defending businesses (p. 68).

APPENDIX 11

SEVENTEEN CITY SURVEY WEIGHTING METHOD AND DATA

This is an appendix to Chapter 5. All tables presenting the data analyzed in that chapter are found below. The more general tables are also reproduced in Chapter 5. We begin by explaining the weighting system applied to these data.

In the introduction of Chapter 5, we noted that the cleared interactions used in our preliminary results represented a "statistical" number, which was the result of a weighting system applied to the real number. Here we explain the weighting system, the reasons for using it, and the method by which the real number of interactions was converted into the statistical number.

As stated in Chapter 5, we requested that the sample be drawn over cases cleared by arrest as well as those uncleared. Although the former reports naturally have more information, especially on offenders, than the latter, both kinds were collected to see if cleared cases produced statistically different patterns than uncleared cases.[1] It might be hypothesized, for example, that if an offender were a friend or relative of his victim, he could be more easily tracked down and arrested. If this were so, our percentages on victim-offender relationships would be "biased": the sample of cleared interactions would show a greater proportion of instances involving friends and relatives than actually happened in the total universe of all interactions. Other biases might also be present.

Given the need to collect both cleared and uncleared cases to investigate such possibilities, we could have asked for a separate, 10-percent sample of each variety. But this was not feasible because, among other reasons, some cities filed cleared and uncleared cases together and the resources were not available to sample separately. The sample was simply drawn across the total number of cleared and uncleared cases considered together.

The relative proportions of cleared and uncleared cases received from each police department were thus dependent upon the police clearance rate, which varies greatly among departments. This meant that, for example, even though 10 percent of city A's crime produced a much larger number of cases than 10 percent of city B's, we might receive more cleared cases from B, if it had a considerably higher clearance rate. In other words, when we came to discuss

only cleared interactions in Chapter 5, the sample size was a function of both the volume of crime in each city and the efficiency of the police (as reflected in the clearance rates).

The situation was clearly unsatisfactory from the perspective of what the relative influence of each city would be on the patterns produced (where we aggregated all cities into a national composite). Say, for example, the national sample was composed of only two cities. If the volume of a certain kind of crime in A were twice B, and if all the interactions in A had offenders using weapon 1, while all offenders in B used weapon 2, then we would want the national sample to produce a percentage distribution having twice as many interactions with weapon 1 than 2. But if the clearance rate in B were twice A, the national split between weapons would be 50–50. The percentages would be "biased" because they partially reflected police efficiency, which has absolutely nothing to do with the basic characteristics of and relationships between victims and offenders which we seek. It would, rather, be much closer to the truth if the relative influence of each city in the sample were only a function of its total volume of crime vis-a-vis the other cities.

The weights we developed statistically readjusted the relative volumes of cleared cases we received to achieve this effect. Table 1 shows how the weights were computed for each city and crime type. For example, read across the row showing Boston criminal homicides. According to column 1, the *UCR* reported that Boston experienced a total of 71 criminal homicides in 1967. Given the *UCR* reporting procedures discussed in Chapter 2, the figures in column 1 in effect represent total numbers of victims. Column 2 gives the sum of all homicide victims in all 17 cities–3,274 in 1967. Column 3 produces the computed ratio of column 1 to column 2, stating that the volume of homicide victims in Boston was 2.1 percent of all victims in the 17 cities. In column 4 we see that our sample has 43 Boston criminal homicide victims, considering only interactions where the offender was arrested. Column 5 says that the sum of all such homicide victims we received in the 17-city sample was 633. Column 5 produces the computed ratio of column 3 to column 4, stating that the sample volume of homicide victims in Boston was 6.7 percent of all victims sampled in the 17 cities, considering only instances where the offender was arrested. The weight in column 7 (0.319) is simply the value which readjusts the percent in column 6 back to the percent in column 3. It is found by dividing column 6 into column 3. The weight implies that we statistically diminished the importance of Boston in our criminal homicide sample by roughly two-thirds. If the weight were 1, the contribution of Boston would have been unchanged; if it were more than 1, we would have been increasing the relative influence the patterns in Boston had on the national patterns for our cleared interactions.

The same procedure was used for each city and crime type.[2] All the weights are summarized in Table 2. Each city crime-specific weight was multiplied by the real number of interactions we received in which the offender was arrested. This gave the statistical number of interactions we used for that city-crime type. For all the cities together, the real number of cleared interactions received was 633 for criminal homicide, 1353 for aggravated assault, 538 for forcible rape, and 649 for armed and unarmed robbery. After the weights were applied, the statistical interactions cleared totaled 668

Table 1.–The weighting factor determined for each crime type for the seventeen cities

17 cities in survey and crime type / Method determining weighting factor	Number of offenses (victims) for each crime type in each of the 17 cities as reported in 1967 UCR	÷	Total number of offenses for each crime type for the 17 cities combined as reported in 1967 UCR	=	Proportion of total crime committed in each city	Survey sample of cleared offenses (victims) for each crime in each of the 17 cities	÷	Total survey sample of cleared offenses (victims) for each crime for the 17 cities combined	=	Proportion of the total sample survey of crime committed in each city	Weighting factor
	1		2		3	4		5		6	3 ÷ 6
Atlanta: Criminal homicide	141		3,274		.043	47		633		.074	.580
Forcible rape	129		7,908		.016	38		538		.070	.230
Aggravated assault	872		75,198		.011	90		1,353		.066	.174
Robbery	613		106,197		.005	41		649		.063	.091
Boston: Criminal homicide	71		3,274		.021	43		633		.067	.319
Forcible rape	126		7,908		.015	20		538		.037	.428
Aggravated assault	1,198		75,198		.015	101		1,353		.074	.213
Robbery	1,403		106,197		.013	59		649		.090	.151
Chicago: Criminal homicide	552		3,274		.168	50		633		.078	2.134
Forcible rape	1,403		7,908		.177	99		538		.184	.964
Aggravated assault	12,417		75,198		.165	165		1,353		.121	1.354
Robbery	18,456		106,197		.173	91		649		.140	1.239
Cleveland: Criminal homicide	149		3,274		.045	32		633		.050	.900
Forcible rape	141		7,908		.017	22		538		.040	.436
Aggravated assault	1,290		75,198		.017	65		1,353		.048	.357
Robbery	3,511		106,197		.033	13		649		.020	1.650
Dallas: Criminal homicide	133		3,274		.040	49		633		.077	.524
Forcible rape	134		7,908		.016	15		538		.027	.607

(Continued)

Table 1.—The weighting factor determined for each crime type for the seventeen cities

17 cities in survey and crime type / Method determining weighting factor	Number of offenses (victims) for each crime type in each of the 17 cities as reported in 1967 UCR	Total number of offenses for each crime type for the 17 cities combined as reported in 1967 UCR	Proportion of total crime committed in each city	Survey sample of cleared offenses (victims) for each crime in each of the 17 cities	Total survey sample of cleared offenses (victims) for each crime for the 17 cities combined	Proportion of the total sample survey of crime committed in each city	Weighting factor
	1 ÷	2 =	3	4 ÷	5 =	6	3 ÷ 6
Aggravated assault	2,273	75,198	.030	40	1,353	.029	1.022
Robbery	962	106,197	.009	10	649	.015	.587
Denver: Criminal homicide	34	3,274	.010	9	633	.014	.730
Forcible rape	224	7,908	.023	4	538	.007	3.809
Aggravated assault	799	75,198	.010	33	1,353	.024	.435
Robbery	963	106,197	.009	6	649	.009	.980
Detroit: Criminal homicide	281	3,274	.085	36	633	.056	1.509
Forcible rape	733	7,908	.092	19	538	.035	2.624
Aggravated assault	4,635	75,198	.061	105	1,353	.077	.794
Robbery	11,973	106,197	.112	22	649	.033	3.325
Los Angeles: Criminal homicide	281	3,274	.085	38	633	.060	1.429
Forcible rape	1,421	7,908	.179	42	538	.078	2.301
Aggravated assault	11,253	75,198	.149	111	2,353	.082	1.824
Robbery	9,966	106,197	.093	44	649	.067	1.384
Miami: Criminal homicide	57	3,274	.017	29	633	.045	.380
Forcible rape	111	7,908	.014	23	538	.042	.328
Aggravated assault	2,617	75,198	.034	96	1,353	.070	.490
Robbery	2,103	106,197	.019	77	649	.178	.166
Minneapolis: Criminal homicide	19	3,274	.005	16	633	.025	.229
Forcible rape	146	7,908	.018	18	538	.033	.551
Aggravated assault	1,098	75,198	.014	33	1,353	.024	.598
Robbery	1,435	106,197	.013	33	649	.050	.265
New Orleans: Criminal homicide	117	3,274	.035	39	633	.061	.580
Forcible rape	207	7,908	.026	23	538	.042	.612
Aggravated assault	0	75,198	.000	0	1,353	.000	.000
Robbery	2,018	106,197	.019	16	649	.024	.770
New York: Criminal homicide	745	3,274	.227	47	633	.074	3.064
Forcible rape	1,905	7,908	.240	97	538	.180	1.336
Aggravated assault	24,828	75,198	.330	77	1,353	.056	5.801
Robbery	35,934	106,197	.338	54	649	.083	4.066
Philadelphia: Criminal homicide	234	3,274	.071	48	633	.075	.942
Forcible rape	458	7,908	.057	33	538	.061	.944
Aggravated assault	3,378	75,198	.044	116	1,353	.085	.523
Robbery	2,919	106,197	.027	85	649	.130	.209
St. Louis: Criminal homicide	171	3,274	.052	41	633	.064	.806
Forcible rape	304	7,908	.038	11	538	.020	1.880
Aggravated assault	2,352	75,198	.031	64	1,353	.047	.661
Robbery	3,193	106,197	.030	28	649	.043	.696
San Francisco: Criminal homicide	63	3,274	.019	32	633	.050	.380
Forcible rape	178	7,908	.022	19	538	.035	.637
Aggravated assault	2,331	75,198	.030	119	1,353	.087	.352
Robbery	3,879	106,197	.036	29	649	.044	.827
Seattle: Criminal homicide	48	3,274	.014	29	633	.045	.320
Forcible rape	116	7,908	.014	19	538	.035	.415
Aggravated assault	714	75,198	.009	26	1,353	.019	.494
Robbery	1,050	106,197	.009	24	649	.036	.267
Washington: Criminal homicide	178	3,274	.054	48	633	.075	.716
Forcible rape	172	7,908	.021	36	538	.066	.325
Aggravated assault	3,143	75,198	.041	112	1,353	.082	.504
Robbery	5,759	106,197	.054	17	649	.026	.070

Table 2.—Summary of the weighting factor for each crime type for the 17 cities

City \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Forcible rape	Aggravated assault	Robbery
Atlanta	.580	.230	.174	.091
Boston	.319	.428	.213	.151
Chicago	2.134	.964	1.354	1.239
Cleveland	.900	.436	.357	1.650
Dallas	.524	.607	1.022	.587
Denver	.730	3.809	.435	.980
Detroit	1.509	2.624	.794	3.325
Los Angeles	1.429	2.301	1.824	1.384
Miami	.380	.328	.490	.166
Minneapolis	.229	.551	.598	.265
New Orleans	.580	.612	.000	.770
New York	3.064	1.336	5.801	4.066
Philadelphia	.942	.944	.523	.209
St. Louis	.806	1.880	.661	.696
San Francisco	.380	.637	.352	.817
Seattle	.320	.415	.494	.267
Washington	.716	.325	.504	2.070

criminal homicides, 1,493 aggravated assaults, 617 forcible rapes, and 1,011 armed and unarmed robberies.

Note that we derived the weights using sample and total volumes and proportions of *victims* but then applied the weights to the sample of cleared *interactions*. The number of victims equals the number of interactions only if the ratio of victims to offenders is 1:1 in each crime event; this is often not the case, especially for aggravated assault, forcible rape, and robbery. And the victim-offender ratio need not be constant among cities; the average number of interactions in a typical violent crime event, therefore, can vary from city to city. The important point is this: by designing a victim-based weighting system, we made the volume of cleared interactions sampled reflect the total volume of victims in each city, while at the same time we maintained any differential victim-offender ratios that existed. Thus, our readjustment method in no way changes the average number of interactions in a typical crime event in any one city.[3] For any crime type, the readjustment merely allows the relative influence of any one city vis-a-vis the others to reflect the proportion of total victims that city produced relative to the others in 1967.

The weighting system adjusts for several other sampling problems as well. For example, while a 10-percent sample was requested, an upper bound of no more than 200 cases for any city-crime type was added so that our tabulators could reasonably handle samples of the large volumes of certain crimes in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Detroit. Thus, a 10-percent sample of all 1967 New York robberies would still have amounted to fully 3,593 cases, an unworkable volume. On the other hand, while the 200 New York robberies we settled for were manageable for the tabulators, they did not properly reflect the volume of New York robberies vis-a-vis other cities (for the sample actually represented less than 1 percent of the city' robberies). The weighting system, however, allowed us to statistically reinstate the high volume of New York robberies relative to the other cities, so that the city has a greater influence than any other on the national robbery patterns that emerged. The same kind of reinstatement was often necessary in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Detroit, producing the unsurprising fact that most of the weights for these cities in Table 2 are greater than 1.

We were able to similarly reweight in a few instances where too many clearances were sent (because, for example, the sample was drawn only from cleared cases) and in situations where too few clearances were on hand (because, for example, it could not be determined one way or another from the information received whether an arrest had been made).[4]

Finally, a key methodological concern with such a weighting system is that it might create significant biases if a very small sample is greatly magnified in influence by a very large weight. The best illustration of this possibility was Denver. Table 1 shows, for example, that we could account for only four cleared forcible rape cases in the Denver sample, but that this probably unrepresentative cross section of all cleared rapes was magnified by a factor of 3.8 in the process of weighting. Even with the weight applied, however, the relative influence of Denver was so small in the national picture that the potential overall bias was negligible. The same was true for other Denver crimes and for other city-crime types where the sample was small and the weight large.[5] In general, an inspection of Tables 1 and 2 shows most of the

weights to be less than one, anyway, so that the problem of magnifying a very small and therefore possibly biased sample is minimal.

Although it is always better to draw a sample that does not require reweighting, we believe the system here is defensible and sound, producing percentage distributions in the tables below that properly reflect the differential influences of all cities and valid general national patterns of how the offender relates to the victim and what characteristics each possess.
each possesses.

The remaining pages of Appendix 11 list the tables behind the analysis in Chapter 5.

Table 3.— Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, criminal homicide 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Sex of offender \ Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	62.3	17.5	79.8 (455)
Female	16.4	3.8	20.2 (115)
Total	78.7 (449)	21.3 (121)	100.0 (570)

Race of offender \ Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	24.0	3.8	27.8 (159)
Negro	6.5	65.7	72.2 (412)
Total	30.5 (174)	69.5 (397)	100.0 (571)

Age of offender \ Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	3.3	1.6	4.2	9.1 (49)
18-25	3.6	10.3	19.8	33.5 (182)
26 and over	3.5	6.7	47.0	57.4 (311)
Total	10.4 (56)	18.6 (101)	71.0 (385)	100.0 (542)

Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by sex=570.
Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by race=571.
Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by age=542.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 4.—Race, sex, and age of the victim by race, sex and age of the offender criminal homicide, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent of total)

Race, sex, and age of victim			White.						Negro						Total
			Male			Female			Male			Female			
			0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	1-17	18-25	26+	
WHITE	MALE	0-17	.3	.6	.1	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	.1	0	1.2 (6)
		18-25	.1	2.3	1.1	0	0	0	0	.2	.1	0	0	0	3.9 (21)
		26+	.3	3.1	7.8	0	.6	1.2	.8	2.2	1.4	.4	.1	.6	18.6 (100)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	.3	.8	0	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.2 (6)
		18-25	0	.4	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8 (9)
		26+	0	.3	2.2	0	.3	0	.3	.1	.3	0	.4	0	3.8 (20)
NEGRO	MALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.6	.7	1.3	0	.2	.2	5.0 (27)
		18-25	0	.3	1.0	0	0	.1	1.4	5.2	2.4	0	.3	.1	10.8 (58)
		26+	0	.4	.4	0	.1	.4	1.8	8.4	16.0	.4	1.1	10.4	39.5 (213)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	.3	0	.3	.3	.9	0	1.2	.1	3.0 (16)
		18-25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.6	.5	0	0	0	2.1 (11)
		26+	0	.6	.6	0	0	0	0	1.7	4.7	.1	.3	1.1	9.1 (49)
Total			.8 (4)	8.2 (44)	15.4 (84)	0	1.4 (7)	1.9 (10)	7.2 (39)	20.3 (110)	27.6 (149)	0.9 (5)	3.7 (20)	12.6 (68)	100.0 (541)

Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions, by race, sex, and age=541.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 5.—Occupation of the offender, by occupation of the victim, criminal homicide, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent of Total)

Occupation of victim / Occupation of offender	Executive, professional, technical	Manager, official, proprietor	Secretary, clerk	Sales	Other services	Craftsman, foreman	Skilled trades	Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	Farmer, farm labor	Student	Housewife, domestic	Child or dependent	Other employment	Unemployed	Total
Executive, professional, technical	.4	0	.)	0	2.0	0	.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0	4.4 (3)
Manager, official, proprietor	0	0	2.0	0	1.0	0	1.0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	4.5 (3)
Secretary, clerk	2.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	0	0	2.4 (1)
Sales	0	.4	0	.5	0	0	4	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	0	3.4 (2)
Other services	0	1.0	0	0	7.0	0	0	.5	0	0	.4	0	0	0	9.0 (6)
Craftsman or foreman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Skilled trades	0	0	0	0	4.3	0	0	1.0	0	0	3.3	0	0	0	8.6 (6)
Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	.4	2.0	1.8	0	1.0	0	.5	6.8	0	1.4	5.0	2.1	.4	.4	22.4 (16)
Farmer, farm labor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student	.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0	0	11.2	0	2.0	0	.3	16.4 (11)
Housewife, domestic	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	0	0	7.4	0	2.0	10.3 (7)
Child or dependent	0	'0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other employment	.5	.3	0	0	0	0	.4	.8	0	0	0	0	3.1	0	5.2 (3)
Unemployed	0	2.6	0	1.0	3.3	2.0	0	2.0	0	0	.9	0	.5	.5	12.7 (9)
Total	4.3 (3)	6.9 (5)	3.8 (3)	1.5 (1)	19.0 (14)	2.0 (1)	2.4 (2)	13.6 (10)	0	12.6 (9)	12.1 (9)	12.0 (9)	4.1 (3)	5.3 (4)	100.0 (71)

Total number of known criminal homicide victim-offender interactions by occupation=71.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 6.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, aggravated assult, 17 cities, 1967
(Percent of total)

Sex of offender \ Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	56.6	27.0	83.6 (727)
Female	9.3	7.1	16.4 (142)
Total	65.9 (573)	34.1 (296)	100.0 (869)

Race of offender \ Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	23.9	1.8	25.7 (223)
Negro	8.4	65.9	74.3 (648)
Total	32.3 (281)	67.7 (590)	100.0 (871)

Age of offender \ Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	13.5	1.4	2.8	17.7 (138)
18-25	3.4	10.1	11.1	24.6 (191)
26 and over	3.1	11.7	42.9	57.7 (451)
Total	20.0 (156)	23.2 (181)	56.8 (443)	100.0 (780)

Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by sex=869.
Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by race=871.
Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by age=780.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 7.—Race, sex and age of the victim by race, sex, and age of the offender, aggravated assault, 17 cities, 1967
(Percent of total)

Race, sex, and age of victim			White						Negro						Total
			Male			Female			Male			Female			
			0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	1-17	18-25	26+	
WHITE	MALE	0-17	.6	.4	0.4	0	0	.1	0.4	0	0	.4	0.3	0	3.5 (27)
		18-25	.4	3.1	1.7	0	.1	0	0	.7	.8	0	0	0	6.9 (53)
		26+	.2	2.5	5.1	0	.1	.8	.9	1.0	2.4	0	.2	.2	13.4 (104)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	.6	0	0	0	0	.2	0	.1	.1	0	0	1.1 (8)
		18-25	0	.6	.5	0	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.4 (11)
		26+	.1	.6	2.8	0	0	.4	.1	0	.1	0	0	0	4.1 (31)
NEGRO	MALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.2	1.1	1.2	.4	.2	.2	11.3 (87)
		18-25	.1	0	.1	0	0	0	.6	2.6	5.0	.1	.7	.1	9.4 (72)
		26+	0	.2	.5	0	0	0	.9	3.8	12.2	.1	1.4	4.2	23.2 (180)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	0	.1	0	0	0	1.1	.7	.7	1.2	.2	.3	4.1 (32)
		18-25	0	.3	.2	0	0	0	.1	1.6	2.7	0	.2	.3	5.6 (44)
		26+	0	0	.2	0	0	0	.5	1.0	10.4	.1	.3	3.7	16.1 (125)
Total			2.5 (19)	8.2 (64)	11.6 (91)	0	.2 (2)	1.4 (11)	12.9 (101)	12.7 (99)	35.6 (277)	2.3 (18)	3.4 (27)	9.0 (71)	100.0 (779)

Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by race, sex, and age=779.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 8.—Occupation of the defender by occupation of the victim, aggravated assault, 17 cities, 1967
(Percent of total)

Occupation of the offender \ Occupation of victim	Executive, professional, technical	Manager, official, proprietor	Secretary, clerk	Sales	Other services	Craftsman, foreman	Skilled trades	Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	Farmer, farm labor	Student	Housewife, domestic	Child or dependent	Other employment	Unemployed	Total
Executive, professional, technical	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	0	0.5 (1)
Manager, official, proprietor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	.7	2.1 (6)
Secretary, clerk	0	0	.9	0	0	.6	0	.6	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	2.4 (6)
Sales	0	0	0	.6	0	.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.2 (3)
Other services	0	.2	0	0	.4	0	0	0	0	.6	2.1	0	.5	1.1	4.8 (14)
Craftsman or foreman	0	0	.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	.6	.6	0	0	0	1.9 (5)
Skilled trades	.1	0	.2	0	.7	0	2.0	.6	0	.5	1.9	0	0	.2	6.2 (18)
Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	.2	0	.6	.6	.6	1.2	1.1	8.9	.3	.3	5.0	.1	.8	1.2	21.2 (62)
Farmer, farm labor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student	1.2	2.1	.7	.1	.7	0	0	0	0	23.3	.4	0	0	1.2	29.7 (86)
Housewife, domestic	.1	0	0	0	0	.6	0	3.1	0	0	1.2	.2	0	0	5.2 (15)
Child or dependent	0	0	0	0	.2	0	0	0.5	0	.2	0	5.0	0.5	0	6.4 (18)
Other employment	0	0	0	.4	0	0	0	0.5	0	0	.5	0	1.7	.5	3.5 (10)
Unemployed	0	0	0	.6	.3	0	1.7	3.0	0.3	2.0	1.3	0	1.6	4.1	15.0 (43)
Total	1.6 (5)	2.2 (7)	3.0 (9)	2.4 (7)	2.9 (9)	3.1 (9)	4.9 (14)	18.6 (54)	0.7 (2)	27.9 (82)	13.0 (38)	5.3 (16)	5.5 (16)	9.0 (26)	100.0 (293)

Total number of known aggravated assault victim-offender interactions, by occupation=2931.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 9.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of the total]

Sex of victim / Sex of offender	Male	Female	Total
Male	–	100.0	100.0 (465)
Female	–	–	–
Total	–	100.0 (465)	100.0 (465)

Race of victim / Race of offender	White	Negro	Total
White	29.6	0.3	29.9 (139)
Negro	10.5	59.6	70.1 (326)
Total	40.1 (187)	59.9 (278)	100.0 (465)

Age of victim / Age of offender	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0-17	15.7	2.7	2.5	20.9 (93)
18-25	17.1	18.8	12.1	48.0 (214)
26 and over	14.6	7.4	9.1	31.1 (138)
Total	47.4 (211)	28.9 (129)	23.7 (105)	100.0 (445)

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by sex=465.
Total number of known forible rape victim-offender interactions, by race=465.
Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by age=445.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 10.—Race, sex, and age of the victim by race, sex, and age of the offender, forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Race, sex, and age of victim			Race, sex, and age of offender: White						Negro						Total
			Male			Female			Male			Female			
			0-17	18-25	26 +	0-17	18-25	26 +	0-17	18-25	26 +	0-17	18-25	26 +	
WHITE	MALE	0-17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		18-25	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		26+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	FEMALE	0-17	1.4	5.6	6.5	–	–	–	2.0	0.9	0.4	–	–	–	16.7 (74)
		18-25	.4	5.4	2.8	–	–	–	.2	2.3	1.2	–	–	–	12.2 (54)
		26+	.7	2.9	2.9	–	–	–	.7	1.4	1.7	–	–	–	10.4 (46)
NEGRO	MALE	0-17	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		18-25	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
		26+	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	FEMALE	0-17	.1	0	.2	–	–	–	12.3	10.5	7.4	–	–	–	30.5 (135)
		18-25	0	.1	0	–	–	–	1.5	11.1	3.4	–	–	–	16.7 (74)
		26+	0	0	0	–	–	–	1.0	7.6	4.6	–	–	–	13.2 (58)
Total			2.6 (11)	14.1 (63)	12.3 (55)	–	–	–	17.7 (79)	33.9 (151)	18.8 (84)	–	–	–	100.0 (445)

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by race, sex, and age=445.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 11.–Occupation of the offender by occupation of the victim, forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967

Occupation of offender \ Occupation of Victim	Executive, professional, technical	Manager, official, proprietor	Secretary, clerk	Sales	Other services	Craftsman, foreman	Skilled trades	Laborer unskilled, semi-skilled	Farmer, farm labor	Student	Housewife, domestic	Child or dependent	Other employment	Unemployed	Total
Executive, professional, technical	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.6	0	0	0.8 (1)
Manager, official, proprietor	0	0	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	1.7	0	.3	2.7 (6)
Secretary, clerk	0	0	1.4	0	.5	0	0	0	0	.9	0	.6	0	0	3.4 (7)
Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other services	0	0	0	0	.2	0	0	0	0	1.4	0	1.9	.9	.4	4.8 (10)
Craftsman or foreman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.1	0	.7	0.2	0	0	.3	2.2 (4)
Skilled trades	1.5	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	.4	6.2	1.6	0	0	0.2	10.5 (22)
Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	0	0	1.6	0	.7	0	.9	.3	0	11.4	6.8	4.4	.4	6.6	33.2 (69)
Farmer, farm labor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	0	17.5	.9	2.3	.9	1.2	23.2 (48)
Housewife, domestic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child or dependent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.3	0	0	1.3 (2)
Other employment	0	0	1.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	.5	0	0.2	0	1.8 (3)
Unemployed	0	0	1.2	0	0	0	0.9	0	0	5.4	5.2	0	0	2.9	15.7 (33)
Total	1.7 (4)	0	5.6 (12)	0	1.4 (3)	0	2.7 (6)	1.4 (3)	0.4 (1)	44.4 (93)	15.1 (32)	12.9 (27)	2.4 (5)	12.0 (25)	100.0 (210)

Total number of known forcible rape victim-offender interactions, by occupation=210
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 12.–Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Sex of offender \ Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	84.5	10.2	94.7 (255)
Female	4.4	.9	5.3 (14)
Total	88.9 (240)	11.1 (29)	100.0 (269)

Race of offender \ Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	13.2	1.7	14.9 (40)
Negro	46.7	38.4	85.1 (229)
Total	59.9 (161)	40.1 (108)	100.0 (269)

Age of offender \ Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0–17	6.8	8.5	8.1	23.4 (59)
18–25	2.1	13.1	36.8	52.0 (133)
26 and over	.8	5.4	18.4	24.6 (63)
Total	9.7 (24)	27.0 (69)	63.3 (162)	100.0 (255)

Total number of known armed robbery victim-offender interactions, by sex=269.
Total number of known armed robbery victim-offender interactions, by race=269.
Total number of known armed robbery victim-offender interactions, by age=255.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 13.--Race, sex, and age of the victim by race, sex, and age of the offender, armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Race, sex, age of victim			White						Negro						Total
			Male			Female			Male			Female			
			0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	1-17	18-25	26+	
WHITE	MALE	0-17	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	2.1	2.1	0	0	0	0	4.2 (10)
		18-25	0	1.4	.7	0	.3	0	4.0	5.6	1.9	0	.1	0	14.0 (35)
		26+	.3	4.2	3.7	0	.1	.8	3.7	17.3	5.1	0	1.3	0	36.5 (93)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	.5	0	0	0	1.0 (2)
		18-25	0	0	.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.6 (1)
		26+	0	.6	.5	0	0	0	.1	1.0	.8	0	.6	.3	4.0 (10)
NEGRO	MALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.6	0	.3	0	0	0	3.8 (9)
		18-25	0	1.1	0	0	0	0	4.5	3.4	2.2	0	0	0	11.2 (28)
		26+	0	.5	0	0	.1	0	3.0	7.7	6.4	0	1.8	0	19.5 (49)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	.6	0	0	0	0	0	0.6 (1)
		18-25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.2	0	0	0	0	1.2 (3)
		26+	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0	1.6	.6	0	0	0	3.2 (8)
Total			0.4 (1)	7.9 (20)	5.6 (14)	0	0.5 (1)	0.8 (2)	23.0 (59)	39.8 (102)	18.0 (46)	0	3.8 (10)	0.3 (1)	100.0 (255)

Total number of known armed robbery victim-offender interactions, by race, sex, and age=228.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 14.—Occupation of the offender by occupation of the victim, armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of the total]

Occupation of victim / Occupation of offender	Executive, professional, technical	Manager, official, proprietor	Secretary, clerk	Sales	Other services	Craftsman, foreman	Skilled trades	Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	Farmer, farm labor	Student	Housewife, domestic	Child or dependent	Other employment	Unemployed	Total
Executive, professional, technical	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manager, official, proprietor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secretary, clerk	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.1	1.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.2 (1)
Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other services	0	0	0	0	2.2	0	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	0	0	3.3 (2)
Craftsman or foreman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Skilled trades	0	.2	2.2	.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.2 (2)
Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	1.4	3.2	.5	0	3.3	0	2.2	10.5	0	.2	0	0	4.3	0	25.6 (16)
Farmer, farm labor	0	1.9	0	0	5.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.8 (4)
Student	0	5.9	2.2	.3	2.2	0	0	.3	0	13.6	0	0	0.3	0	24.6 (15)
Housewife, domestic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child or dependent	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other employment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unemployed	0	4.8	0	1.5	10.6	0	.3	2.4	0	1.1	6.5	0	2.2	0	29.8 (18)
Total	1.4 (1)	16.3 (10)	4.9 (3)	3.6 (2)	24.6 (16)	0	3.8 (2)	14.3 (9)	0	16.0 (10)	6.5 (4)	0	7.2 (5)	0	100.0 (58)

Total number of known armed robbery victim-offender interactions, by occupation=58.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 15.—Characteristics of the victim and the offender by sex, race, and age, unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of the total]

Sex of offender / Sex of victim	Male	Female	Total
Male	68.9	26.2	95.1 (239)
Female	2.0	2.9	4.9 (12)
Total	70.9 (178)	29.1 (73)	100.0 (251)

Race of offender / Race of victim	White	Negro	Total
White	17.9	1.1	19.0 (47)
Negro	43.9	37.1	81.0 (204)
Total	61.8 (155)	38.2 (96)	100.0 (251)

Age of offender / Age of victim	0-17	18-25	26 and over	Total
0–17	31.2	4.9	21.0	57.1 (135)
18–25	1.7	6.4	23.2	31.3 (75)
26 and over	0	2.0	9.6	11.6 (27)
Total	32.9 (78)	13.3 (31)	53.8 (128)	100.0 (237)

Total number of known unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions, by sex=251.
Total number of known unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions, by race=251.
Total number of known unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions, by age=237.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type,

Table 16.—Race, sex, and age of the victim by race, sex, and age of the offender, unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Race, sex, age of victim			White						Negro						Total
			Male			Female			Male			Female			
			0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	0-17	18-25	26+	1-17	18-25	26+	
WHITE	MALE	0-17	4.7	0	0	0	0	0	6.8	0.1	0	0	0	0	11.5 (27)
		18-25	.1	1.7	0	0	0	0	3.2	2.3	.2	0	0	0	7.6 (18)
		26+	2.0	2.9	3.2	0	0	0	5.8	8.1	1.0	0	.1	.3	23.7 (56)
	FEMALE	0-17	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.0 (2)
		18-25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.9	1.4	0	0	2.5 (5)
		26+	.5	1.0	.9	0	0	0	9.2	5.0	1.2	0	0	0	17.9 (42)
NEGRO	MALE	0-17	0.3	0	0	0	0	0	18.4	1.5	0	.1	0	0	20.3 (48)
		18-25	0	.3	0	0	0	0	.2	0.3	.8	0	0	0	1.5 (3)
		26+	0	.7	0	0	0	0	.6	1.8	.7	0	1.3	0	5.1 (12)
	FEMALE	0-17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		18-25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.6	0	0	0	0	1.6 (3)
		26+	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.9	1.9	0.6	0	.3	1.5	7.1 (16)
Total			8.6 (20)	6.6 (16)	4.1 (10)	0	0	0	47.1 (112)	22.9 (54)	5.5 (13)	1.5 (4)	1.7 (4)	1.8 (4)	100.0 (237)

Total number of known unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions, by race, sex, and age=237.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 17.—Occupation of the offender by occupation of the victim, unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[Percent of total]

Occupation of offender \ Occupation of victim	Executive, professional, technical	Manager, official, proprietor	Secretary, clerk	Sales	Other services	Craftsman, foreman	Skilled trades	Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	Farmer, farm labor	Student	Housewife, domestic	Child or dependent	Other employment	Unemployed	Total
Executive, professional, technical	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Manager, official, proprietor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secretary, clerk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other services	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.4	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.7 (1)
Craftsman of foreman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Skilled trades	0	0	0	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.4	1.7 (1)
Laborer, unskilled, semi-skilled	1.4	0.2	1.8	4.5	.2	0	0	1.1	0	1.4	.2	0	0	1.4	12.2 (11)
Farmer, farm labor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Student	0	.7	6.5	7.2	1.4	0	.2	.5	0	38.7	0	0	.3	6.4	61.9 (59)
Housewife, domestic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.6	0	0	0	0	2.6 (2)
Child or dependent	0	0	0	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	.2	0	3.6	7.6	0	12.9 (12)
Other employment	0	0	0	0	1.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.4 (1)
Unemployed	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.0	0	0.2	2.9	0	.2	.3	5.6 (5)
Total	1.4	0.8	8.2	13.4	3.1	0	1.6	3.8	0	43.2	3.1	3.6	8.0	9.6	100.0 (96)

Total number of known unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions, by occupation=96.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Row and column figures may not exactly equal the indicated percentages or frequencies because of the weighting procedure and rounding
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 18.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Husband (v)–wife (o) (legal marriage)	6.3	1.9	0	0	0
Wife (v)–husband (o) (legal marriage)	6.0	5.3	0	0.6	0
Husband (v)–wife (o) (common law)	1.5	0.5	0	0	0
Wife (v)–husband (o) (common law)	2.0	1.7	0	0	0
Total: husband–wife	15.8	9.4	0	0.6	0
Parent (v)–child (o)	2.0	0.9	0.2	0	0
Child (v)–parent (o)	3.9	1.2	2.0	0	0.1
Brother–sister (v or o)	1.4	1.4	0.3	0	0
Other family	1.6	1.0	4.4	0	0.4
Total: other family	8.9	4.5	6.9	0	0.5
Close friend	5.6	3.6	1.6	0.1	0
Paramour	3.2	2.9	1.7	0.3	0.1
Homosexual partner	0.2	0.2	0	0	0
Total: other primary	9.0	6.7	3.3	0.4	0.1
Prostitute (v or o)	0.9	0.2	0	0.6	0.1
Acquaintance	15.4	16.0	28.5	8.8	8.0
Neighbor	3.1	3.8	3.3	0.5	2.6
Business relation	1.9	1.3	0.1	0.9	0
Sex rival or enemy	6.8	3.0	0.7	1.4	0.2
Stranger	15.6	20.6	52.8	78.6	85.7
Felon or police officer (v or o)	1.7	10.1	0.3	0	0.2
Total: nonprimary	45.4	55.0	85.7	90.8	96.8
Any other and unknown	20.9	24.3	4.1	8.2	2.6
Total: unknown	20.9	24.3	4.1	8.2	2.6
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 100.0 (1493)	100.0 100.0 (617)	100.0 100.0 (509)	100.0 100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3789
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Total row and column percentages may not exactly equal 100.0 percent because of the weighting procedure and rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 19a.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of victim for criminal homicide, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Husband-wife	4.7	33.9	13.6	31.7	11.1	60.1	0	17.4
Other family	5.9	23.6	6.4	19.8	12.8	24.2	0	0
Other primary group	9.1	6.5	9.0	15.9	14.2	6.4	0	0
Nonprimary group	47.7	31.2	55.0	28.4	61.9	9.3	0	17.6
Unknown	32.6	4.8	16.0	4.2	0	0	0	65.0
Total	100.0 (136)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (323)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (5)	0	100.0 (61)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to toal reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 19b.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of victim for aggravated assault, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Husband-wife	3.1	29.6	9.2	27.9	0	15.5	0	2.4
Other family	1.7	16.9	6.1	6.2	14.4	30.2	0	1.4
Other primary group	4.8	8.3	10.0	19.1	4.7	14.1	0	0.1
Nonprimary group	76.0	36.2	56.9	33.5	70.8	40.2	88.9	53.8
Unknown	14.4	9.0	17.8	13.2	10.1	0	11.1	42.3
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 19c.—The Interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the victim for forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Husband-wife	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Other family	–	9.7	–	7.7	–	5.5	0	0
Other primary group	–	1.8	–	4.2	–	13.4	0	1.2
Nonprimary group	–	86.8	–	85.3	–	81.1	0	86.4
Unknown	–	1.6	–	2.8	–	0	0	12.4
Total	–	100.0 (201)	– –	100.0 (280)	–	100.0 (17)	0	100.0 (119)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 19d.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of victim for armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Husband-wife	0.5	0	2.6	1.1	0	0	0	0
Other family	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other primary group	0	0	1.2	5.2	0	0	0	0
Nonprimary group	99.4	100.0	96.1	91.5	100.0	0	85.2	80.0
Unknown	0.1	0	0	2.2	0	0	14.8	20.0
Total	100.0 (156)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (93)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (67)	100.0 (158)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 19e.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of victim for unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Husband-wife	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other family	.2	0	3.0	0	0	0	0	0
Other primary group	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0	.1
Nonprimary group	99.6	99.5	91.1	84.2	100.0	100.0	100.0	97.9
Unknown	0.1	0	5.9	15.8	0	0	0	2.0
Total	100.0 (111)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 20a.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the offender for criminal homicide, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of offender / Victim-offender relationship	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Husband-wife	11.8	28.9	7.3	41.7	9.8	36.4	50.8
Other family	8.6	22.6	7.2	11.4	12.0	29.8	0
Other primary group	7.0	10.4	8.4	14.6	15.7	5.5	1.3
Nonprimary group	38.9	23.2	57.5	19.3	62.5	28.3	37.9
Unknown	33.7	14.9	19.5	12.8	0	0	10.0
Total	100.0 (158)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (344)	100.0 (102)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (22)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions = 668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 20b.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the offender for aggravated assault, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Unknown
Husband-wife	6.7	11.2	9.9	18.1	1.1	0	9.4
Other family	3.2	31.2	5.1	2.6	6.7	0	1.7
Other primary group	3.2	17.3	8.2	13.8	3.6	10.5	0
Nonprimary group	58.0	40.3	53.6	44.8	74.8	89.5	61.5
Unknown	28.8	0	23.2	20.7	13.8	0	27.4
Total	100.0 (442)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (727)	100.0 (155)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (94)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 20c.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the offender for forcible rape, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Race and Sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Unknown
Husband-wife	0	–	0	–	0	–	0
Other family	11.1	–	5.3	–	4.2	–	0
Other primary group	2.6	–	2.9	–	12.2	–	12.9
Nonprimary group	83.3	–	87.1	–	83.5	–	74.3
Unknown	3.0	–	4.6	–	0	–	12.8
Total	100.0 (176)	–	100.0 (403)	–	100.0 (22)	–	100.0 (16)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions = 617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 20d.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the offender for armed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Husband-wife	0	0	1.0	0	0	0	0
Other family	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other primary group	0	0	.3	5.1	0	0	0
Nonprimary group	84.8	100.0	92.3	94.9	100.0	0	100.0
Unknown	15.2	0	6.4	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (256)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (8)	0	100.0 (8)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 20e.—The interpersonal relationship between victim and offender by race and sex of the offender for unarmed robbery, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Husband-wife	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other family	.3	0	.6	0	0	0	0
Other primary group	.3	0	.1	0	0	0	0
Nonprimary group	99.3	0	95.9	100.0	100.0	0	100.0
Unknown	0.1	0	3.7	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (101)	0	100.0 (365)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)	0	100.0 (13)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 21.--Husband-wife relationship in criminal homicide and aggravated assault, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Husband-wife relationship \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault
Criminal Homicide	49.6	25.2
Aggravated assault	50.4	74.8
Total	100.00 (105)	100.0 (142)

Total number of husband-wife interactions in criminal homicide and aggravated assault=247.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 22a.--Husband-wife criminal homicide by race, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Husband-wife relationship \ Race	White	Negro	Other	Unknown
Husband-victim; wife-offender		56.5	43.1	33.3
Husband-offender; wife-victim	65.6	43.5		66.6
Total	100.0 (19)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (10)

Total number of husband-wife criminal homicide interactions=105.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 22b.--Husband-wife aggravated assault by race, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Husband-wife relationship \ Race	White	Negro	Other	Unknown
Husband-victim; wife-offender	14.9	31.9	0	0
Husband-offender; wife-victim	85.1	68.1	100.0	100.0
Total	100.0 (30)	100.0 (97)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (14)

Total number of husband-wife aggravated assault interactions=142.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 23a.—Husband-wife criminal homicide by means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury / Husband-wife relationship	Firearm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other	Unknown
Husband-victim; wife-offender	50.5	65.9	42.5	0	0	0	9.7	0
Husband-offender; wife-victim	49.5	34.1	57.5	0	100.0	0	90.3	0
Total	100.0 (57)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (2)	0	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (5)	0

Total number of husband-wife criminal homicide interactions=105.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 23b.—Husband-wife aggravated assault by means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury / Husband-wife relationship	Firearm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other	Unknown
Husband-victim; wife-offender	41.9	47.1	13.9	0	6.6	17.8	29.8	49.6
Husband-offender; wife-victim	58.1	52.1	86.1	0	93.3	82.2	70.2	50.4
Total	100.0 (18)	100.0 (33)	100.0 (23)	0	100.0 (39)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (6)

Total number of husband-wife aggravated assault interactions=142.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 24.—The place of occurrence by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Bedroom	10.0	2.6	33.2	0.5	2.3
Kitchen	2.9	2.2	0.1	.3	0
Living room, den, study	11.8	15.9	9.1	2.0	2.4
Hall, stair, elevator	7.0	5.4	3.9	3.4	10.1
Basement, garage	2.6	.2	5.2	0	1.6
Total: home	34.3	26.3	51.5	6.2	16.4
Service station	0.6	0.9	0	3.0	0.5
Chainstore	0	.4	0	1.7	0
Bank	0	0	0	3.0	0
Other commercial establishment	2.8	3.1	1.4	20.4	3.5
Bar, tavern, taproom, lounge	7.6	2.8	.6	2.4	.1
Place of entertainment other than bar, tavern, etc.	0.9	0.9	.6	0	0
Any other inside location	14.2	11.2	11.3	3.5	5.1
Total: other inside location	26.2	19.3	13.9	34.0	9.2
Immediate area around residence	4.2	4.9	2.2	4.6	6.0
Street	24.9	39.1	4.8	37.6	48.8
Alley	1.0	1.2	6.1	2.1	1.9
Park	.4	1.9	2.3	.5	7.4
Lot	2.3	.9	3.2	1.8	3.7
Private transport vehicle	2.1	1.1	11.0	3.5	3.6
Public transport vehicle	.7	1.0	0	3.8	1.8
Any other outside location	1.3	2.0	4.3	5.4	1.1
Total: outside location	36.9	52.1	33.9	59.3	74.3
Unknown	2.5 2.5	2.2 2.2	0.7 0.7	0.4 0.4	0 0
Total	100.0 100.0 (668)	100.0 100.0 (1493)	100.0 100.0 (617)	100.0 100.0 (509)	100.0 100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions-3789.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 25a.—The place of occurrence of criminal homicide by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Race and sex of victim	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Home	38.2	53.3	28.1	56.1	10.2	84.3	0	14.3
Other inside location	25.6	31.2	26.6	15.5	47.6	6.4	0	36.6
Outside location	35.4	10.1	42.1	24.5	42.2	9.3	0	49.1
Unknown	.8	5.4	3.2	3.9	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (136)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (323)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (5)	0	100.0 (61)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 25b.—The place of occurrence of aggravated assault by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Location	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Home	18.6	47.7	31.0	52.6	29.2	61.5	0	12.3
Other inside location	27.4	27.1	14.8	12.0	12.0	0	5.2	22.6
Outside location	52.6	24.2	50.9	33.7	58.8	38.5	94.8	62.6
Unknown	1.3	1.0	3.3	1.7	0	0	0	2.5
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 25c.—The place of occurrence of forcible rape by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Location	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Home	-	53.8	-	54.4	-	50.8	0	42.4
Other inside location	-	8.4	-	10.8	-	0	0	31.6
Outside location	-	35.8	-	34.7	-	49.2	0	26.0
Unknown	-	2.0	-	0.1	-	0	0	0
Total	-	100.0 (201)	-	100.0 (280)	-	100.0 (17)	0	100.0 (119)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 25d.—The place of occurrence of armed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Location	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Home	5.5	9.1	12.0	36.0	6.7	0	0	2.8
Other inside location	31.1	40.8	5.8	30.6	36.4	0	90.8	29.1
Outside location	63.4	50.1	80.9	33.4	56.9	0	8.6	68.0
Unknown	0	0	1.3	0	0	0	0.7	0.1
Total	100.0 (156)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (93)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (67)	100.0 (158)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 25e.—The place of occurrence of unarmed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Location	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Home	16.7	6.3	19.4	21.2	53.2	0	0	17.8
Other inside location	6.1	4.6	11.0	0	0	0	81.5	10.8
Outside location	77.2	89.1	69.6	78.8	46.8	100.0	18.5	71.4
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (111)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (233)

Total number unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 26a.–The place of occurrence of criminal homicide by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Home	41.7	54.6	29.4	42.3	22.6	59.7	0
Other inside location	26.2	32.6	25.7	23.3	33.8	36.4	33.9
Outside location	31.3	12.8	41.8	31.2	43.6	3.9	56.2
Unknown	.7	0	3.1	3.2	0	0	9.9
Total	100.0 (158)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (344)	100.0 (102)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (22)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 26b.–The place of occurrence of aggravated assault by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Home	19.6	37.0	27.2	43.5	20.8	10.5	22.7
Other inside location	20.9	32.8	17.4	16.4	18.7	0	29.6
Outside location	58.7	26.9	52.6	38.6	60.4	89.5	40.9
Unknown	.8	3.2	2.8	1.5	0	0	6.8
Total	100.0 (442)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (727)	100.0 (155)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (94)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 26c.—The place of occurrence of forcible rape by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Home	50.8	-	51.8	-	59.9	-	29.7
Other inside location	16.2	-	12.8	-	0	-	38.6
Outside location	30.6	-	35.3	-	40.1	-	31.7
Unknown	2.3	-	.1	-	0	-	0
Total	100.0 (176)	-	100.0 (403)	-	100.0 (22)	-	100.0 (16)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 26d.—The place of occurrence of armed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Home	4.8	22.7	6.6	6.5	3.8	0	0
Other inside location	43.3	61.2	31.7	8.7	40.6	0	12.7
Outside location	51.9	16.1	61.1	84.8	55.6	0	87.3
Unknown	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (356)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (8)	0	100.0 (8)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 26e.—The place of occurrence of unarmed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of offender / Location	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Home	19.3	0	16.7	3.3	17.4	0	0
Other inside location	7.8	0	10.3	0	13.8	0	0
Outside location	72.9	0	73.0	96.7	68.8	0	100.0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (101)	0	100.0 (365)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)	100.0	100.0 (13)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 27a.—The place of occurrence of criminal homicide by the interpersonal relationship between the victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Location	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Other nonprimary group	Unknown
Home	48.7	67.6	43.2	26.6	22.3
Other inside location	23.8	28.5	27.4	26.0	27.1
Outside location	24.9	3.9	23.0	45.3	48.0
Unknown	2.6	0	6.4	2.1	2.6
Total	100.0 (105)	100.0 (58)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (304)	100.0 (141)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 27b.—The place of occurrence of aggravated assault by the interpersonal relationship between the victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Location	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Other nonprimary group	Unknown
Home	76.1	51.5	66.7	16.8	12.3
Other inside location	9.3	9.8	12.5	21.1	23.1
Outside location	13.9	37.2	20.8	59.8	61.3
Unknown	.7	1.5	0	2.3	3.3
Total	100.0 (141)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (821)	100.0 (363)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 27c.—The place of occurrence of forcible rape by the interpersonal relationship between the victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Location	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Other nonprimary group	Unknown
Home	0	76.9	58.5	48.7	59.1
Other inside location	0	12.4	15.8	13.4	29.4
Outside location	0	8.4	25.7	37.3	11.5
Unknown	0	2.2	0	.6	0
Total	0	100.0 (42)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (529)	100.0 (26)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 27d.—The Place of occurrence of armed robbery by the interpersonal relationship between the victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Location	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Other nonprimary group	Unknown
Home	4.8	0	23.6	6.7	0
Other inside location	23.6	0	36.3	33.7	38.5
Outside location	71.6	0	40.1	59.2	61.5
Unknown	0	0	0	0.4	0
Total	100.0 (3)	0	100.0 (1)	100.0 (462)	100.0 (43)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 27e.—The place of occurrence of unarmed robbery by the interpersonal relationship between the victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Location	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Other nonprimary group	Unknown
Home	0	0	0	16.8	3.6
Other inside location	0	0	0	9.5	1.2
Outside location	0	100.0	0	73.7	95.2
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	100.2 (2)	0	100.0 (486)	100.0 (14)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interaction=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column Figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 28a.—The place of occurrence of criminal homicide by husband-wife relationship, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Husband-wife relationship	Husband-victim; wife—offender	Husband-offender; wife-victim
Bedroom	11.6	14.6
Kitchen	15.5	7.3
Living Room	21.4	15.0
Hall, stairway, elevator	7.5	4.7
Commercial establishment	0	0
Places of entertainment	2.2	0
Other inside location	17.7	27.6
Other outside location	23.5	26.3
Unknown	.7	4.5
Total	100.0 (52)	100.0 (53)

Total number of husband-wife criminal homicide interactions=105.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed. Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding. Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 28b.—The place of occurrence of aggravated assault by husband-wife relationship, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location \ Husband-wife relationship	Husband—offender; wife—victim	Husband—victim; wife—offender
Bedroom	17.3	6.5
Kitchen	10.4	3.5
Living room	44.3	62.5
Hall, stairway, elevator	5.2	3.2
Commercial establishments	1.4	1.3
Places of entertainment	2.0	0
Other inside location	5.6	8.0
Other outside location	11.4	14.8
Unknown	2.3	0.2
Total	100.0 (37)	100.0 (105)

Total number of husband-wife aggravated assault interactions=142.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 29.—Victim-Precipitation by Type of Crime, 17 Cities, 1967
[In percent]

Major violent crime type / Presence of victim precipitation	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Victim precipitation	22.0	14.4	4.4	10.7	6.1
No victim precipitation	33.8	34.6	82.9	81.4	83.8
Unknown	44.2	51.0	12.6	7.9	10.1
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1,493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30a.—Victim-precipitated criminal homicide by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of the victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	20.3	6.0	29.8	10.3	56.0	15.7	0	0
No victim precipitation	35.3	55.5	32.4	43.9	25.5	36.0	0	12.4
Unknown	44.4	38.5	37.8	45.8	18.8	48.3	100.0	87.6
Total	100.0 (136)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (323)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (55)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30b.—Victim precipitated of aggravated assault by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of the victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	21.0	6.3	24.9	17.9	22.5	6.6	0.7	3.8
No victim precipitation	43.5	60.2	34.1	30.9	32.4	57.6	85.3	25.7
Unknown	35.5	33.5	41.0	51.3	45.1	35.8	14.0	70.5
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0)6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30b.—Victim precipitated of aggravated assault by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of the victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	21.0	6.3	24.9	17.9	22.5	6.6	0.7	3.8
No victim precipitation	43.5	60.2	34.1	30.9	32.4	57.6	85.3	25.7
Unknown	35.5	33.5	41.0	51.3	45.1	35.8	14.0	70.5
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0)6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of the victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	-	5.1	-	3.8	-	0	0	5.8
No victim precipitation	-	82.7	-	92.4	-	96.3	50.0	59.7
Unknown	-	12.2	-	3.9	-	3.7	50.0	34.5
Total	-	100.0 (201)	-	100.0 (280)	-	100.0 (17)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (117)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of the victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	4.5	0	10.2	0	0	0	1.5	23.8
No victim precipitation	84.8	94.8	80.3	96.6	97.8	0	93.6	69.7
Unknown	10.7	5.2	9.5	3.4	2.2	0	5.0	6.4
Total	100.0 (156)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (93)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (67)	100.0 (158)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 30e.—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Presence of victim precipitation	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Victim precipitation	7.2	0	1.7	1.0	53.2	0	0	8.9
No victim precipitation	86.4	79.6	77.4	83.2	16.6	100.0	97.8	85.3
Unknown	6.4	20.4	20.9	15.8	30.2	0	3.2	5.8
Total	100.0 (111)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (233)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 31a.—Victim-precipitated criminal homicide by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 or over	Institution or unknown
Victim precipitation	0	24.3	22.6	21.5	26.8	26.6	24.0	35.7	21.2	7.9
No victim precipitation	75.8	44.7	43.6	40.5	25.5	33.4	21.1	33.3	61.4	10.8
Unknown	24.2	31.0	33.8	38.0	47.6	40.0	54.9	31.0	17.4	81.3
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (160)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (83)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 31b.—Victim precipitated aggravated assault by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 or over	Institution or unknown
Victim precipitation	17.7	12.0	17.6	14.2	23.1	28.7	21.5	17.6	10.4	5.7
No victim precipitation	44.9	50.3	35.1	33.8	40.4	28.9	37.6	43.1	46.3	29.0
Unknown	37.3	37.7	47.3	52.0	36.5	42.4	40.9	39.3	43.2	65.3
Total	100.0 (75)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (145)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (581)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounded.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 31c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation / Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 or over	Institution or unknown
Victim Precipitation	3.6	10.7	2.6	1.8	2.1	0	0	0	0	6.5
No victim precipitation	86.6	73.8	90.8	87.9	94.6	95.1	91.0	93.3	100.0	64.9
Unknown	9.8	15.5	6.7	10.3	3.3	4.9	9.0	6.7	0	28.6
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (111)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (107)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 31d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation / Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 or over	Institution or unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	15.9	2.6	17.2	2.2	2.6	0.5	0	17.6
No victim precipitation	76.5	96.6	51.0	86.4	78.4	96.8	95.0	96.7	99.1	76.3
Unknown	23.5	3.4	33.1	11.0	4.4	1.0	2.4	2.8	.9	6.0
Total	100.0 (19)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (219)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 31e.—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 or over	Institution or unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	3.0	2.4	12.1	5.5	0	5.6	11.7	8.9
No victim precipitation	77.9	78.8	94.0	93.0	87.9	94.5	78.6	73.4	75.9	85.4
Unknown	22.1	21.2	3.0	4.6	0	0	21.4	20.9	12.4	5.7
Total	100.0 (72)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 32a.—Victim precipitated criminal homicide by the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Victim-offender relationship	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Nonprimary group	Unknown
Victim precipitation	27.6	15.2	24.7	23.5	16.0
No victim precipitation	17.9	41.5	50.8	42.9	15.0
Unknown	54.5	43.3	24.5	33.6	68.9
Total	100.0 (105)	100.0 (58)	100.0 (60)	100.0 (304)	100.0 (141)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 32b.—Victim-precipitaled aggravated assault by the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Victim-offender relationship	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Nonprimary group	Unknown
Victim precipitation	18.7	17.1	27.9	16.4	3.8
No victim precipitation	31.2	33.9	32.5		
Unknown	50.1	48.9	39.6	35.0	91.2
Total	100.0 (141)	100.0 (67)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (821)	100.0 (363)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 32c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Victim-offender relationship	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Nonprimary group	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	1.5	15.2	4.5	0
No victim precipitation	0	85.3	59.8	85.0	49.2
Unknown	0	13.1	24.9	10.5	50.8
Total	0	100.0 (42)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (529)	100.0 (26)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions-1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 32d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Presence of victim precipitation	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Nonprimary group	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	23.6	11.7	0
No victim precipitation	100.0	0	40.1	81.5	79.6
Unknown	0	0	36.3	6.7	20.4
Total.	100.0 (3)	0	100.0 (1)	100.01 (462)	100.0 (43)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 32e.—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by the interpersonal relationship between victim and offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Victim-offender relationship / Presence of victim precipitation	Husband-wife	Other family	Other primary group	Nonprimary group	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	44.1	6.2	0
No victim precipitation	0	100.0	0	84.3	65.0
Unknown	0	0	55.9	9.5	35.0
Total	0	100.0 (2)	100.0 (0)	100.0 (486)	100.0 (14)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 33a.—Victim-precipitated criminal homicide by place of occurrence, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location / Presence of victim precipitation	Home	Other inside location	Other outside location	Unknown
Victim precipitation	20.3	21.6	23.6	24.8
No victim precipitation	41.4	31.9	29.1	16.5
Unknown	38.3	46.5	47.2	58.7
Total	100.0 (229)	100.0 (175)	100.0 (246)	100.0 (18)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 33b.—Victim precipitated aggravated assault by place of occurrence, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location / Presence of victim precipitation	Home	Other inside location	Other outside location	Unknown
Victim precipitation	21.7	11.3	11.3	26.8
No victim precipitation	35.8	22.8	38.5	32.8
Unknown	42.5	65.8	50.2	40.4
Total	100.0 (392)	100.0 (289)	100.0 (778)	100.0 (34)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 33c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by place of occurrence, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location / Presence of victim precipitation	Home	Other inside location	Other outside location	Unknown
Victim precipitation	6.6	2.2	2.1	0
No victim precipitation	85.0	71.2	84.9	68.9
Unknown	8.4	26.6	13.0	31.1
Total	100.0 (317)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (208)	100.0 (6)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 33d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by place of occurrence, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location / Presence of victim precipitation	Home	Other inside location	Other outside location	Unknown
Victim precipitation	17.5	3.5	14.2	0
No victim precipitation	77.6	92.1	75.5	89.1
Unknown	4.9	4.4	10.2	10.9
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (173)	100.0 (302)	100.0 (3)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percnet because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 33e.—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by place of occurrence, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Location / Presence of victim precipitation	Home	Other inside location	Other outside location	Unknown
Victim precipitation	11.1	0.4	5.7	0
No victim precipitation	76.3	98.9	83.5	0
Unknown	12.6	.7	10.8	0
Total	100.0 (24)	100.0 (46)	100.0 (374)	0

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 34a.—Victim-precipitated criminal homicide by injury to the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Injury to victim / Presence of victim-precipitation	Victim injured	Victim not injured	Unknown
Victim precipitation	22.0	0	0
No victim precipitation	33.8	0	0
Unknown	44.2	0	0
Total	100.0 (668)	0	0

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 34b.—Victim-precipitated aggravated assault by injury to the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Injury to victim / Presence of victim precipitation	Victim injured	Victim not injured	Unknown
Victim precipitation	15.8	10.5	7.7
No victim precipitation	34.7	41.6	14.5
Unknown	49.5	47.9	77.8
Total	100.0 (1137)	100.0 (263)	100.0 (93)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 34c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by injury to the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim-precipitation \ Injury to victim	Victim injured	Victim not injured	Unknown
Victim precipitation	5.0	3.9	14.7
No victim precipitation	84.5	85.1	14.8
Unknown	10.5	11.0	70.5
Total	100.0 (132)	100.0 (466)	100.0 (19)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data

Table 34d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by injury to the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Injury to victim	Victim injured	Victim not injured	Unknown
Victim precipitation	2.5	12.6	0
No victim precipitation	91.3	78.8	99.0
Unknown	6.2	8.6	1.0
Total	100.0 (71)	100.0 (417)	100.0 (21)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 34e—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by injury to the victim, 17 cities, 1967 [In percent]

Presence of victim precipitation \ Injury to victim	Victim injured	Victim not injured	Unknown
Victim precipitation	3.5	6.5	13.9
No victim precipitation	92.5	82.5	56.1
Unknown	4.0	11.0	30.0
Total	100.0 (142)	100.0 (330)	100.0 (30)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 35a.—Victim-precipitated criminal homicide by the means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
In percent

Presence of vitim precipitation \ The Means of injury inflicting	Fire-arm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other means	Unknown
Victim precipitation	25.7	26.3	17.1	0	11.9	0	7.9	0
No victim precipitation	33.3	18.8	44.6	100.0	51.0	0	72.7	33.2
Unknown	41.3	54.9	38.3	0	37.1	0	19.4	66.8
Total	100.0 (311)	100.0 (195)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (72)	0	100.0 (40)	100.0 (28)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Freqencies weighted according to toal reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 35b.—Victim-precipitated aggravated assult by the means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Presence of victim precipitation \ Means of inflicting injury	Firearm	Sharp Instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other means	Unknown
Victim Precipitation	16.2	17.7	14.6	0	10.9	10.2	23.1	3.5
No victim precipitation	28.6	18.3	34.8	27.9	57.0	40.7	24.0	17.1
Unknown	55.2	64.0	50.6	72.1	32.1	49.1	52.9	79.4
Total	100.0 (193)	100.0 (387)	100.0 (174)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (334)	100.0 (269)	100.0 (103)	100.0 (32)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 35c.—Victim-precipitated forcible rape by the means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury / Presence of victim precipitation	Firearm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other means	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	0	0	6.1	4.4	0	0
No victim precipitation	100.0	100.0	100.0	0	82.9	84.6	67.1	22.0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	11.0	11.0	32.9	78.0
Total	100.0 (8)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (3)	0	100.0 (109)	100.0 (468)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (19)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 35d.—Victim-precipitated armed robbery by the means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury / Presence of Victim Precipitation	Fire-arm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other means	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	11.6	.5	0	3.7	12.6	0	1.4
No victim precipitation	83.4	85.6	96.0	0	91.0	78.9	96.5	95.7
Unknown	16.6	2.8	3.6	0	5.3	8.5	3.5	2.8
Total	100.0 (10)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (19)	0	100.0 (18)	100.0 (420)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (21)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 35e.—Victim-precipitated unarmed robbery by the means of inflicting injury, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury / Presence of victim precipitation	Firearm	Sharp instrument	Blunt instrument	Poison	Body	No harm	Other means	Unknown
Victim precipitation	0	0	0	0	3.6	6.5	3.1	13.0
No victim precipitation	0	0	0	0	92.2	82.5	96.9	58.5
Unknown	0	0	0	0	4.2	11.0	0	28.5
Total	0	0	0	0	100.0 (134)	100.0 (331)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (33)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted, according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 36.—The motive of the offender by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Major Violent Crime Type / Motive	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Family quarrel	7.7	5.8	0	0	0
Jealousy	4.4	3.0	0	0	0
Revenge	2.5	2.9	0	.2	.6
Altercation	35.7	29.6	0	0	.2
Self-defense	5.5	1.7	0	0	0
Halting felon	.3	.2	0	0	.5
Escaping arrest	.5	7.9	0	0	0
Robbery	8.8	2.3	0	98.5	96.0
Sexual	2.1	1.0	99.3	.5	1.0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	.9	1.0	0	0	0
Other	10.6	4.5	0	.5	.4
Unknown	21.0	40.1	.7	.2	1.3
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1,493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789.
Frequencies weighted according to toal reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 37a.—The motive of the offender in criminal homicide by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of victim / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Family quarrel	5.2	21.6	6.0	16.4	11.1	5.4	0	0
Jealousy	3.3	5.4	3.1	14.2	0	6.4	0	0
Revenge	1.8	0	3.6	1.8	3.7	6.4	0	0
Altercation	31.9	3.4	47.4	16.3	72.0	3.9	0	23.8
Self-defense	3.8	0	8.5	4.3	0	5.4	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	.6	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	1.7	0	0.3	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	21.8	5.4	4.5	4.4	7.8	0	0	13.1
Sexual	0	9.9	2.0	4.7	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	2.3	3.1	0	1.6	3.3	0	0	0
Other	7.9	16.8	11.7	13.8	0	24.2	0	4.5
Unknown	20.3	34.4	12.3	22.5	2.0	48.3	0	58.6
Total	100.0 (136)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (323)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (5)	0	100.0 (61)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 37b.—The motive of the offender in aggravated assault by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of victim / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Family quarrel	0.9	22.1	7.7	15.8	1.7	15.1	0	0.1
Jealousy	.8	7.0	3.0	10.5	0	9.1	0	.3
Revenge	3.6	3.9	5.2	3.4	6.4	0	1.8	.3
Altercation	35.3	21.7	34.0	38.9	67.0	34.5	64.7	13.2
Self-defense	3.1	1.3	3.9	.7	1.8	0	0	0
Halting felon	.1	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	7.3	0	1.5	.2	0	0	20.7	17.3
Robbery	3.0	1.2	1.5	.4	0	0	3.4	3.7
Sexual	0	4.4	0.1	4.7	0	7.5	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	3.6	2.9	0.4	0.8	0	24.0	0	0
Other	9.1	0	7.2	2.3	6.2	6.6	0	2.2
Unknown	33.1	35.5	30.0	22.2	17.0	3.3	9.3	62.9
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 37c.—The motive of the offender in forcible rape by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of victim / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Family quarrel	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Jealousy	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Revenge	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Altercation	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Self-defense	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Halting felon	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Robbery	–	99.8	–	99.1	–	100.0	0	98.8
Sexual	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Riot	–	0	–	.1	–	0	0	0
Psychopathic	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Other	–	.2	–	.8	–	0	0	1.2
Unknown		100.0 (201)		100.0 (280)	–	100.0 (17)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (119)
Total								

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions-617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 37d.—The motive of the offender in armed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of victim / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Family quarrel	0	0	0	1.1	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	99.2	90.9	95.7	98.9	100.0	0	98.5	100.0
Sexual	0	9.1	1.5	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	.8	0	1.5	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (156)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (93)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (67)	100.0 (158)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 37a.—The motive of the offender in unarmed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of victim / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	1.2	.5	1.8	0	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	4.0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	93.4	96.9	93.6	89.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	98.2
Sexual	.7	2.6	3.7	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	.8	6.6	0	0	0	0
Unknown	2.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8
Total	100.0 (111)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions-502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 38a.— The motive of the offender in criminal homicide By age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Age of victim / Motive	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	12.1	0	0.7	9.9	4.5	8.6	15.6	7.0	8.3	1.8
Jealousy	0	0	2.1	8.3	10.8	7.6	0.6	0	0	1.8
Revenge	0	8.9	5.2	0	5.4	3.2	1.3	2.1	.9	0
Altercation	6.5	29.4	39.0	42.1	34.2	41.4	41.1	40.0	31.2	25.4
Self-defense	0	2.4	4.9	3.5	1.0	11.6	7.8	5.3	0	2.6
Halting felon	0	0	0	2.0	0.4	0	0.3	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	1.6	1.9	0.4	0	0	0	0
Robbery	0	0	0	3.8	8.2	3.6	12.1	13.6	35.6	15.5
Sexual	0	1.7	4.9	.9	2.9	3.4	1.5	2.8	2.2	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	2.6	0	0	1.0	1.3	0.7	1.7	0.9	0.7	0.4
Other	49.8	33.9	26.7	12.8	7.5	3.7	1.5	15.2	6.4	3.4
Unknown	28.9	23.7	16.5	14.0	21.8	15.6	16.4	13.2	14.7	49.0
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (160)	100.0 (102)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (83)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 38b.—The motive of the offender in aggravated assault by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	2.5	3.5	7.2	13.8	6.2	11.5	11.2	5.0	3.4	1.8
Jealousy	0	.5	3.3	5.5	10.7	4.1	5.2	.3	0	.8
Revenge	3.9	10.6	9.9	2.2	4.5	1.7	1.7	4.3	0	.5
Altercation	28.3	23.8	38.1	36.0	43.4	43.6	44.6	37.5	46.0	16.0
Self-defense	2.5	4.8	2.5	1.7	2.9	2.9	1.2	3.3	5.2	0
Halting felon	0	.7	.4	.4	.2	0	0	0	1.8	0
Escaping arrest	0	1.7	0	2.2	4.1	2.5	2.4	.9	2.6	17.1
Robbery	2.5	.9	.6	1.2	.8	.8	1.2	8.1	4.1	3.5
Sexual	.5	3.4	1.5	1.1	.6	0	.7	0	0	1.1
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	8.6	.5	0	1.8	.3	.6	2.9	2.0	0	0
Other	9.4	6.5	6.6	6.8	2.0	4.5	5.5	14.0	3.4	2.3
Unknown	41.9	43.0	29.8	27.3	24.2	27.8	23.4	24.5	33.4	56.9
Total	100.0 (75)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (145)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (581)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighed according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 38c.—The motive of the offender in forcible rape by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual	100.0	99.2	98.9	99.6	99.2	99.0	100.0	97.7	100.0	98.7
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	.5	1.1	.4	.8	1.0	0	2.3	0	1.3
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (111)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (107)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 38d.—The motive of the offender in armed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of the victim	0-14	15–17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	100.0	90.5	100.0	85.7	99.5	100.0	98.1	100.0	100.0	99.5
Sexual	0	9.5	0	4.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	4.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (19)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (219)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 38e.—The motive of the offender in unarmed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of the victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.5	0
Revenge	1.9	0	0	0	0	3.6	0	0	0	.1
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.7	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	3.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.7	0	0
Robbery	91.2	100.0	92.6	97.6	80.0	92.8	95.9	95.6	99.5	98.1
Sexual	0	0	7.4	0	20.0	0	4.1	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	2.4	0	3.6	0	0	0	0
Unknown	3.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8
Total	100.0 (72)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 39a.—The motive of the offender in criminal homicide by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of offender / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Family quarrel	7.7	19.4	3.7	19.5	1.8	36.4	0
Jealousy	6.1	1.5	4.0	5.2	0	0	0
Revenge	1.3	1.5	3.8	0	7.2	0	0
Altercation	28.3	10.0	42.2	28.5	62.1	3.9	29.8
Self-defense	3.1	21.4	5.1	9.3	0	0	0
Halting felon	.9	0	.1	.3	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	.9	0	.3	0	0	0	5.0
Robbery	8.4	0	10.7	2.3	12.3	0	21.4
Sexual	1.7	0	2.5	2.1	5.3	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	2.0	2.5	.4	.7	0	10.9	0
Other	11.2	14.8	11.1	7.1	3.2	48.8	5.0
Unknown	28.4	28.7	16.1	25.0	8.0	0	38.9
Total	100.0 (158)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (344)	100.0 (102)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (22)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions-668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 39b.—The motive of the offender in aggravated assault by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of offender / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Family quarrel	3.9	8.9	5.8	14.2	3.7	0	1.0
Jealousy	1.7	0	3.6	5.4	1.2	0	1.7
Revenge	2.1	4.2	3.6	2.0	2.7	0	1.9
Altercation	26.5	41.6	29.4	36.8	53.7	100.0	17.1
Self-defense	1.8	2.7	1.6	3.1	0	0	.2
Halting felon	.2	0	0.2	0	0	0	.4
Escaping arrest	9.7	0	8.0	5.8	1.4	0	8.2
Robbery	2.4	0	3.1	0	0	0	.9
Sexual	.2	0	1.8	0	1.1	0	.6
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	.9	1.4	.6	3.3	3.2	0	0
Other	4.2	7.5	4.1	3.4	17.2	0	3.3
Unknown	46.4	34.3	38.2	26.0	15.8	0	64.5
Total	100.0 (442)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (727)	100.0 (155)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (94)

Total number of aggravated assualt victim-offender interactions = 1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up to exactly 100.0 percent because of rounding off
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 39c.—The motive of the offender in forcible rape by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of offender / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Family quarrel	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Jealousy	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Revenge	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Altercation	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Self defense	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Halting felon	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Escaping arrest	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Robbery	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Sexual	99.8	-	98.9	-	100.0	-	100.0
Riot	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Psychopathic	0	-	.1	-	0	-	0
Other	0	-	0	-	0	-	0
Unknown	.2	-	1.0	-	0	-	0
Total	100.0 (176)	- -	100.0 (403)	- -	100.00 (22)	- -	100.0 (16)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 39d.—The motive of the offender in armed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of offender / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	98.2	100.0	98.4	100.0	100.0	0	100.0
Sexual	0	0	0.8	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1.0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	0.3	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (356)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (8)	0	100.0 (8)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions-509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 39e.—The motive of the offender in unarmed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Race and sex of offender / Motive	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	.9	0	.6	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	5.1	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	2.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	88.2	0	98.7	78.0	100.0	0	100.0
Sexual	1.4	0	.2	16.9	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	.6	0	.4	0	0	0	0
Unknown	6.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (101)	0	100.0 (365)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)	0	100.0 (13)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions-502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 40a.—The motive of the offender in criminal homicide by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive / Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0.7	10.1	9.5	5.8	14.4	13.1	4.5	6.8
Jealousy	0	0	.9	4.9	9.8	6.6	3.1	0.8	0	0
Revenge	15.4	1.3	3.4	3.5	0	2.7	4.5	0	2.2	0
Altercation	0	20.9	32.4	34.4	25.7	40.5	40.4	61.8	41.9	35.0
Self-defense	0	7.7	.7	.2	5.2	6.5	13.3	5.1	8.4	17.7
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	.7	0.7	.4	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	1.0	.7	0	.3	0	0	4.0
Robbery	21.5	26.3	16.4	11.3	2.8	6.3	1.6	0	0	17.7
Sexual	0	4.6	.4	4.9	2.5	1.8	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	1.4	.9	.7	1.0	0.8	1.0	2.4	0	0
Other	63.1	25.1	12.4	10.6	11.5	6.6	8.6	5.5	7.4	5.0
Unknown	0	12.8	31.8	18.4	30.5	21.6	12.4	11.2	35.6	13.7
Total	100.0 (3)	100.0 (46)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (142)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (138)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (27)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 40b.—The motive of the offender in aggravated assault by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0.9	0.3	1.8	7.6	11.9	8.8	6.4	8.3	2.2	3.1
Jealousy	0	1.4	0.3	3.1	2.1	5.9	5.8	2.6	0	2.9
Revenge	.9	5.7	2.2	.6	3.1	4.4	3.3	0	1.7	1.5
Altercation	16.5	26.5	30.5	29.1	23.6	37.0	31.3	22.9	30.7	33.9
Self-defense	6.0	1.0	.6	.5	1.8	1.3	1.7	6.1	0	2.6
Halting felon	0	0	.2	.4	0	0	0.2	0.6	0	.3
Escaping arrest	.8	11.4	8.5	12.1	9.4	4.3	6.6	8.1	3.4	7.3
Robbery	2.2	2.7	4.1	1.8	4.1	.7	3.7	.6	1.2	.4
Sexual	.8	1.1	.2	1.1	1.1	.3	.2	8.0	0	.4
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	1.7	1.3	3.1	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.2	0	0	0
Other	8.5	6.3	8.3	4.9	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	8.7	.3
Unknown	61.7	42.2	40.3	38.6	39.4	33.1	37.0	39.7	52.1	47.2
Total	100.0 (60)	100.0 (190)	100.0 (200)	100.0 (193)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (288)	100.0 (154)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (116)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 40c.—The motive of the offender in forcible rape by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of the offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sexual	100.0	100.0	98.2	99.0	99.5	99.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	1.8	1.0	0.5	0.4	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (19)	100.0 (94)	100.0 (115)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (22)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 40d.—The motive of the offender in armed robbery by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10.6
Altercation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	100.0	98.7	100.0	98.6	92.6	99.6	100.0	100.0	100.0	89.4
Sexual	0	0	0	1.2	2.5	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	4.8	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	1.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (36)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (137)	100.0 (111)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (12)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighed according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 40e.—The motive of the offender in unarmed robbery by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Motive \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Family quarrel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jealousy	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revenge	.6	.4	0	0	2.8	1.2	0	0	0	0
Altercation	0	0	.3	.7	.4	0	0	0	0	0
Self-defense	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Halting felon	2.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Escaping arrest	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robbery	97.3	95.6	97.4	91.6	94.0	98.8	100.0	100.0	0	100.0
Sexual	0	0	1.3	4.9	2.8	0	0	0	0	0
Riot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Psychopathic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	.7	2.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	3.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (115)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (62)	100.0 (56)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (1)	0	100.0 (18)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 41.—Means of inflicting injury by type of crime, 17 cities, 1967
[In Percent]

Injury status and means of inflicting injury / Major violent crime type	Criminal homicide	Aggravated assault	Forcible rape	Armed robbery	Unarmed robbery
Firearm	46.6	13.0	1.4	2.0	0
Knife or other sharp instrument	29.2	25.9	.7	1.2	0
Blunt instrument	3.2	11.7	.6	3.8	0
Poison	.2	.1	0	0	0
Body	10.8	22.4	17.7	3.7	26.7
Other	9.9	7.0	1.0	3.0	1.0
Total injured	100.0	80.1	21.4	13.7	27.7
Total not injured	0	18.0	76.0	82.5	66.1
Total unknown	0	1.9	2.6	3.8	6.2
Total	100.0 (668)	100.0 (1493)	100.0 (617)	100.0 (509)	100.0 (502)

* Total number of victim-offender interactions=3,789.
** Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
*** Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 42a.—Means of inflicting injury in criminal homicide by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury / Race and sex of victim	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Firearm	42.7	31.3	54.3	36.2	20.9	66.6	0	44.5
Sharp instrument	34.7	6.9	33.5	24.3	48.4	5.4	0	6.4
Blunt instrument	2.8	9.8	2.2	1.8	12.7	0	0	5.8
Poison	.2	0	.2	.8	0	0	0	0
Body	13.2	24.0	5.9	24.2	2.0	28.0	0	5.8
No harm	0	.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other means	3.3	24.9	2.7	10.9	16.0	0	0	8.5
Unknown	3.2	2.4	1.2	1.8	0	0	0	29.0
Total	100.0 (136)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (323)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (5)	0	100.0 (61)

Total number criminal homicide victim-offender interaction=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percnet because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 42b.–Means of inflicting injury in aggravated assault by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of victim	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Firearm	10.6	4.7	25.6	12.9	8.3	27.8	14.0	6.2
Sharp instrument	24.1	10.4	33.1	24.4	39.2	6.6	0	25.6
Blunt instrument	11.3	13.4	10.0	12.7	14.4	0	0	13.1
Poison	0	0	.5	0	0	0	0	0
Body	22.6	33.6	11.9	24.5	5.3	39.0	20.0	28.1
No harm	19.9	20.2	12.8	15.8	26.7	23.3	66.0	18.5
Other means	11.4	16.4	4.9	8.4	4.7	3.3	0	4.8
Unknown	0	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.5	0	0	3.7
Total	100.0 (236)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (373)	100.0 (226)	100.0 (29)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (517)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interaction=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 42c.–Means of inflicting injury in forcible rape by race and sex of the victim, cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of victim	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Firearm	–	1.1	–	0	–	0	0	5.8
Sharp instrument	–	1.5	–	.5	–	0	0	0
Blunt instrument	–	1.2	–	0	–	5.6	0	0
Poison	–	0	–	0	–	0	0	0
Body	–	24.7	–	11.7	–	53.4	0	14.8
No harm	–	68.1	–	85.8	–	41.0	0	70.5
Other means	–	1.8	–	.4	–	0	0	1.2
Unknown	–	1.5	–	1.6	–	0	0	7.6
Total	–	100.0 (201)	–	100.0 (280)	–	100.0 (17)	0	100.0 (119)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column Figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 42d.—Means of inflicting injury in armed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Means of inflicting injury	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Firearm	3.3	0	4.8	1.1	6.7	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	2.2	0	2.2	0	0	0	.4	.1
Blunt instrument	6.9	0	7.1	8.3	0	0	0	.5
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	5.6	22.8	4.1	0	0	0	3.9	.2
No harm	79.1	75.8	81.5	90.6	56.8	0	95.7	81.7
Other means	1.2	1.4	.2	0	36.5	0	0	6.9
Unknown	1.6	0	.1	0	0	0	0	10.6
Total	100.0 (156)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (93)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	0	100.0 (67)	100.0 (158)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.00 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 42e.—Means of inflicting injury in unarmed robbery by race and sex of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Race and sex of victim / Means of inflicting injury	White		Negro		Other		Institution	Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
Firearm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blunt instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	48.3	58.6	32.9	38.7	0	0	15.6	6.8
No harm	48.6	31.1	64.5	61.3	100.0	100.0	84.4	82.2
Other means	1.0	3.9	1.8	0	0	0	0	.1
Unknown	2.1	6.3	.8	0	0	0	0	10.8
Total	100.0 (111)	100.0 (52)	100.0 (75)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (5)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 43a.—Means of inflicting injury in criminal homicide by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Institution or unknown
Firearm	6.4	44.2	37.1	68.4	52.3	53.1	43.5	51.7	15.6	49.3
Sharp instrument	0	45.7	45.1	20.6	34.4	31.6	40.7	18.7	31.3	12.3
Blunt instrument	8.4	0	.7	4.3	0	4.8	1.9	3.5	3.0	4.4
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	.7	.6	0	0	0
Body	47.0	1.7	5.4	0	8.3	5.8	13.0	20.1	28.9	8.3
No harm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.3	0	0	0
Other means	28.6	8.4	11.7	5.8	5.0	4.0	0	6.0	5.6	5.7
Unknown	9.6	0	0	0.8	0	0	0	0	15.5	19.9
Total	100.0 (31)	100.0 (30)	100.0 (43)	100.0 (71)	100.0 (73)	100.0 (160)	100.0 (101)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (83)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 43b.—Means of inflicting injury in aggravated assault by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Institution or unknown
Firearm	16.5	18.5	18.7	19.4	14.5	19.4	14.6	15.5	15.8	6.2
Sharp instrument	21.1	21.3	39.3	19.4	26.8	29.5	34.1	19.6	26.6	23.5
Blunt instrument	14.6	9.2	10.2	12.8	7.2	11.1	12.4	20.3	24.8	11.7
Poison	0	0	0	1.0	.4	0	0	0	0	0
Body	26.7	28.7	9.4	21.2	17.2	17.7	16.7	14.0	4.4	28.2
No harm	13.2	13.5	16.0	20.6	26.1	11.2	16.1	7.1	14.2	20.9
Other means	7.4	7.1	4.1	5.6	7.1	9.0	6.2	13.5	14.2	6.2
Unknown	.5	1.7	2.3	0	.7	2.1	0	0	0	3.3
Total	100.0 (75)	100.0 (108)	100.0 (85)	100.0 (128)	100.0 (145)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (125)	100.0 (51)	100.0 (19)	100.0 (581)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 43c—Means of inflicting injury in forcible rape by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967 [In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of the victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Institution or unknown
Firearm	0	2.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.5
Sharp Instrument	0	0	0	1.2	0.6	6.7	0	6.5	6.5	0
Blunt Instrument	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	12.9	0	0	0
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	11.5	11.1	21.6	29.2	12.5	21.6	34.9	47.1	51.6	11.7
No Harm	86.1	83.3	73.2	64.6	84.9	69.5	41.3	52.9	41.9	76.6
Other Means	.8	0	2.7	0.8	0.8	0	3.0	0	0	1.3
Unknown	1.6	3.5	2.5	2.2	1.2	2.1	7.9	0	0	3.9
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (111)	100.0 (86)	100.0 (78)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (42)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (107)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 43d.—Means of inflicting injury in armed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Institution or unknown
Firearm	0	0	0	14.3	4.0	1.4	6.4	0	0.9	0
Sharp instrument	2.4	1.1	2.7	0	3.5	4.8	1.5	.5	0	.1
Blunt instrument	0	2.9	4.4	.7	11.7	7.9	4.8	18.0	7.1	0
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	0	13.2	.7	11.3	11.8	0	1.4	17.9	.9	1.2
No Harm	97.6	82.8	88.5	72.4	68.9	85.4	70.0	63.1	85.7	89.1
Other means	0	0	.9	0	0	.5	15.9	.5	.9	1.9
Unknown	0	0	2.8	1.2	0	0	0	0	4.5	7.6
Total	100.0 (19)	100.0 (14)	100.0 (44)	100.0 (28)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (65)	100.0 (31)	100.0 (23)	100.0 (219)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes of 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 43e.—Means of inflicting injury in unarmed robbery by age of the victim, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of victim	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Institution or unknown
Firearm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blunt instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	28.5	24.1	4.9	50.8	29.0	75.8	48.8	48.1	51.6	6.9
No harm	66.7	75.9	83.9	46.9	69.9	21.7	38.9	49.9	35.8	84.1
Other means	4.8	0	0	0	1.1	2.5	0.9	0	0	0
Unknown	0	0	11.2	2.3	0	0	11.2	2.0	12.6	9.0
Total	100.0 (72)	100.0 (18)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (26)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (34)	100.0 (22)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (233)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 44a.—Means of inflicting injury in criminal homicide by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting unjury \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Firearm	43.1	54.1	52.5	35.4	24.1	47.3	52.8
Sharp instrument	25.5	30.0	25.8	47.3	35.7	0	25.3
Blunt instrument	5.3	0	2.8	1.8	9.6	0	0
Poison	.2	0	.4	0	0	0	0
Body	13.1	9.7	11.7	5.9	8.0	28.3	0
No harm	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other means	7.9	6.2	2.8	7.9	17.3	24.4	21.9
Unknown	4.7	0	4.0	3.7	5.3	0	0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offener interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 44b.—Means of inflicting injury in aggravated assault by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Firearm	8.1	10.8	16.2	12.1	13.8	0	13.1
Sharp instrument	17.8	14.4	27.5	48.4	31.0	0	15.7
Blunt instrument	13.5	19.6	11.8	6.7	9.1	89.6	7.9
Poison	0	0	.3	0	0	0	0
Body	27.2	1.4	20.7	15.3	23.3	0	29.8
No harm	24.4	9.7	16.8	8.3	22.3	0	14.8
Other means	5.9	44.0	6.0	7.0	.4	10.5	12.5
Unknown	3.1	0	.7	2.1	0	0	6.2
Total	100.0 (442)	100.0 (24)	100.0 (727)	100.0 (155)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (94)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 44c—Means of inflicting injury in forcible rape by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Firearm	3.8	–	0.6	–	0	–	0
Sharp instrument	1.5	–	.3	–	2.0	–	0
Blunt instrument	1.0	–	.4	–	0	–	0
Poison	0	–	0	–	0	–	0
Body	22.2	–	16.1	–	23.1	–	0
No harm	65.7	–	79.7	–	74.9	–	100.0
Other means	1.3	–	.9	–	0	–	0
Unknown	4.5	–	2.0	–	0	–	0
Total	100.0 (176)	–	100.0 (403)	–	100.0 (22)	–	100.0 (16)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 44d—Means of inflicting injury in armed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Firearm	2.3	0	1.9	6.3	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	1.6	0	.7	0	15.9	0	5.4
Blunt instrument	2.5	0	4.4	0	3.0	0	8.5
Poision	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	.7	0	4.9	0	6.1	0	0
No harm	86.2	97.3	80.8	93.7	75.0	0	86 .0
Other means	6.6	0	2.0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	.1	2.7	5.3	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (121)	100.0 (3)	100.0 (356)	100.0 (13)	100.0 (8)	0	100.0 (8)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 44e.—Means of inflicting injury in unarmed robbery by race and sex of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
(In percent)

Means of inflicting injury \ Race and sex of offender	White		Negro		Other		Unknown
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Firearm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	0	0		0	0	0
Blunt instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
poision	0	0	0	0		0	0
Body	31.8	0	24.5	51.3	52.3	0	2.0
No harm	57.6	0	68.9	47.7	34.0	0	98.0
Other means	2.2	0	.4	.9	13.7	0	0
Unknown	8.3	0	6.2	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (101)	0	100.0 (365)	100.0 (16)	100.0 (7)	0	100.0 (13)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 45a.—Means of inflicting injury in criminal homicide by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Firearm	0	48.8	33.3	41.6	45.6	51.6	54.9	47.2	62.8	49.6
Sharp instrument	0	24.8	42.0	32.3	20.6	30.2	18.0	37.4	24.1	33.1
Blunt instrument	0	3.9	1.0	2.8	3.9	3.2	1.6	11.2	0	3.6
Poison	0	1.2	0	.5	.3	0	0	0	0	0
Body	0	7.2	4.6	17.7	13.1	9.8	13.2	1.7	13.1	0
No harm	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	0	0
Other means	0	14.1	6.3	4.0	6.5	4.5	8.0	.8	0	13.7
Unknown	0	0	12.7	1.1	9.8	.7	3.9	1.7	0	0
Total	0	100.0 (49)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (142)	100.0 (96)	100.0 (138)	100.0 (79)	100.0 (41)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (27)

Total number of criminal homicide victim-offender interactions=668.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 45b.—Means of inflicting injury in aggravated assault by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-15	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Firearm	0	9.3	7.6	16.3	13.0	12.9	17.0	15.2	16.1	18.0
Sharp instrument	32.2	17.5	31.4	25.4	21.6	28.6	33.3	28.6	40.1	17.7
Blunt instrument	41.5	14.5	10.3	9.3	14.3	12.6	14.8	6.0	6.2	4.6
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.9	0	0	0
Body	0	24.7	34.5	22.6	19.6	20.4	13.1	20.7	3.4	27.8
No harm	8.2	23.6	12.8	15.6	17.4	21.4	17.8	23.0	24.0	7.9
Other means	18.1	10.3	.5	10.6	8.8	2.8	3.1	5.1	10.2	16.8
Unknown	0	.1	2.9	.2	5.3	1.1	0	1.3	0	7.3
Total	0	100.0 (241)	100.0 (200)	100.0 (193)	100.0 (176)	100.0 (288)	100.0 (154)	100.0 (77)	100.0 (39)	100.0 (115)

Total number of aggravated assault victim-offender interactions=1,493.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 45c.–Means of inflicting injury in forcible rape by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Firearm	0	5.7	0	0	2.1	1.5	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	0	0	2.3	0	.5	0	0	0	0
Blunt instrument	0	1.7	0	0.9	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	0	12.7	16.5	25.1	25.6	10.6	13.3	0	0	14.5
No harm	100.0	77.2	80.3	65.3	70.4	85.2	85.6	100.0	100.0	80.0
Other means	0	0	0	2.9	0	0	0	0	0	5.5
Unknown	0	2.7	3.2	3.4	1.9	2.2	1.1	0	0	0
Total	0	100.0 (110)	100.0 (115)	100.0 (170)	100.0 (63)	100.0 (88)	100.0 (38)	100.0 (6)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (22)

Total number of forcible rape victim-offender interactions=617.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 45d.–Means of inflicting injury in armed robbery by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Firearm	0	2.1	1.5	2.0	0	7.3	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	.9	.5	.8	2.6	1.8	0	0	0	10.4
Blunt instrument	0	4.5	6.7	2.4	2.8	.2	0	0	0	4.5
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	0	1.2	3.7	4.9	2.9	2.4	27.2	0	0	0
No harm	96.5	89.8	69.9	86.1	86.9	88.1	64.6	100.0	100.0	85.1
Other means	3.5	.4	7.9	0	4.6	0	8.2	0	0	0
Unknown	0	1.1	9.8	3.7	.2	0.2	0	0	0	0
Total	100.0 (5)	100.0 (126)	100.0 (137)	100.0 (111)	100.0 (54)	100.0 (45)	100.0 (15)	100.0 (2)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (13)

Total number of armed robbery victim-offender interactions=509.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

Table 45e.—Means of inflicting injury in unarmed robbery by age of the offender, 17 cities, 1967
[In percent]

Means of inflicting injury \ Age of offender	0-14	15-17	18-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	61 and over	Unknown
Firearm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharp instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blunt instrument	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Body	16.4	23.2	47.5	41.3	10.8	30.7	11.0	0	0	17.0
No harm	66.0	70.6	38.8	54.7	86.0	47.6	87.6	100.0	0	83.0
Other means	17.6	.5	.2	.5	2.0	0	0	0	0	0
Unknown	0	5.7	13.5	3.5	1.0	21.7	1.4	0	0	0
Total	0	100.0 (274)	100.0 (62)	100.0 (56)	100.0 (49)	100.0 (21)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (1)	0	100.0 (18)

Total number of unarmed robbery victim-offender interactions=502.
Frequencies weighted according to total reported violent crimes for 1967, by type, in the 17 cities surveyed.
Column figures may not add up exactly to 100.0 percent because of rounding.
Source: Task Force Victim-Offender Survey, preliminary data.

REFERENCES TO TEXT AT BEGINNING OF APPENDIX 11

1. This investigation will be undertaken in the forthcoming special Field Survey in which the study is competely presented, Ch. 5 included analysis of only cleared interactions.
2. We could not compute separate weights for armed and unarmed robbery in each city, however, because the *UCR* data which we used in col. 1 does not make the distinction. We had no choice but to compute one general weight for robbery in each city and apply it to both armed and unarmed interactions.
3. Thus, for example, let us consider two cities in our national sample of clearances for crime *x*. There are 50 victims in city A and 50 in city B, while the victim-offender ratio is 1:1 in A and 1:2 in B. Assume also that there are no events with multiple victims—that only the possibility of multiple offenders exists. This means we have 50 real interactions in A and 100 in B. If the weights are 1 in A and 1 in B, we get 50 statistical interactions in A and 100 in B; no change has occurred. If the weights are 2 in A and 1 in B, we would get 100 statistical interactions in A and 100 in B. But, importantly this is so only because the new weight in A has doubled the number of victims: it has not tampered with the victim-offender ratio in A.
4. A complete account of all the problems encountered will be presented on a city-by-city basis in the forthcoming Field Survey to the Commission.
5. This is why we did not bother to remove Denver forcible rape or other city-crime types in a similar situation from the preliminary data.

Killed in Action. Drawing by Kaethe Kollwitz. Baltimore Museum of Art.

CHAPTER 6

THE COSTS OF INDIVIDUAL CRIME AND VIOLENCE[1]

INTRODUCTION

Estimating the costs of crime and violence would seem, at first glance, to be relatively simple. The dollar value of goods stolen, services denied, and gainful time lost are calculated and estimates are made on the basis of these figures.

But the procedure is deceptively simple. It fails to take into account, for instance, that the loss sustained by a victim of property crime is accompanied by the offender's gain. While this "transfer" is admittedly illegal, strictly speaking, there has been no loss to the economy if the offender gains as much as the victim loses. Indeed, illegally secured goods and services may undergo a number of transfers, so that several people may achieve gains along the way that more than make up, from a dollar point of view, for the losses sustained by the victim.

The same considerations apply to the acts of rape, assault, and homicide. On the one side are the losses of freedom and life and the bodily damage and psychic injuries sustained by the victims. On the other, however, are the various gratifications achieved by the offenders: revenge, assuaged rage, sexual pleasure, etc.

Not to take into account the gains achieved by offenders is to implicitly assert that they are not "valuable," so that they should not enter into the cost accounting. This is surely a defensible position. But it must also be recognized as a special point of view, implying criteria of value that yield cost estimates of a very different sort from what would result if the gains made by offenders were not taken into account.

These difficulties are multiplied many times over when actions which cannot be measured in terms of dollars and cents are considered. How much value should be placed on the psychic injuries to rape victims or the psychic gains to rapists? Although it may be possible to calculate the dollar value of wages lost by a family whose breadwinner has been injured or killed, how does one estimate the value of the psychic losses sustained by the wife and children? What can be assigned to the gratifications of revenge or sexual pleasure?

Often costs are incurred in response to beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions generated in the population, rather than to real acts of crime or violence. If people believe that they are caught in the middle of a crime wave, they may demand added police protection. This has specific cost dimensions which are not due to actual deeds, but rather to the anticipation of such deeds.

Or suppose judges increase the severity of sentences because of public pressure and the average robber now begins to serve 10 to 20 years in prison instead of 5 to 10 years. The society thereby incurs very large costs (the additional years of prison is only one), not as a result of direct action but rather of attitudes.

Should these additional costs be included in the estimates of individual crime and violence costs? Should the additonal expenditures on Job Corps, Head Start, and other such crime-preventive measures be included?

These questions reveal the complexities hidden under the surface of the apparently simple concept of "costs of individual crime and violence."

Upon consideration of these difficulties, we have found it convenient to distinguish between the economic and the psychological and social costs of crime and violence. This does not separate two totally distinct areas. Rather, it indicates that it is possible to make dollar estimates on only a limited number of criminal and violent acts and that there are large areas of social and psychic damage for which it is presently impossible to place any dollar estimate.

In assessing economic costs, it is advisable to employ the traditional legal categories of criminal acts and to depart from them only where the consequences are specificable as following directly from the actions or public reaction to them.

By contrast, in dealing with social and psychic costs it is necessary to think in quite different terms. Such concepts as "negative effects on civil liberties" and "the formation of new and undesirable groups and practices" become central to the analysis of social costs.

The overall estimates of economic costs are biased in the direction of the criteria implied. By contrast, the overall estimates of social and psychic costs are seriously lacking in any precision and therefore devoid of any possibilities of comparative measurement. For in the absence of any common unit of value, there is no way of adding and subtracting the costs and gains and arriving at a net figure that has any significant meaning.

These seem to be the only available alternatives. Thus, whatever estimates are offered must be considered with full regard to the indicated inadequacies.

ECONOMIC COSTS

Many scholars have attempted to measure the economic costs of crime in American society. They have assigned price tags to various types of crime. Many have accepted a total figure of approximately $25 billion as a fair estimate of the economic loss to society from crime. We here review and compare the four most comprehensive attempts to analyze the economic costs of crime. Our concern is primarily with specifying the differing conceptualizations and understanding the reasons for differing estimates of various economic costs. The four studies are:

- "Some Costs and Losses Associated with Crime and Criminal Justice," R. James Woolsey, Sept. 9, 1966. Draft copy of unpublished work done for the Task Force on Science and Technology of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.

- "The Economic Impact of Crime," Chapter 3, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment,* The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967).

- "Measuring the Volume and Character of Crime," Marvin E. Wolfgang (with the collaboration of Bernard Cohen, John Conrad, Lenore Kupperstein, and Frederic Pryor) The paper was submitted to the Panel on Social Indicators, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, April 1968.

- "Cost-Benefit Evaluation of Welfare Demonstration Projects: A Test Application to Juvenile Rehabilitation," W. Michael Mahoney and Carl F. Blozan, prepared for the Resource Management Corporation under contract to the U.S. Dept. Of Health, Education, and Welfare, December 24, 1968.

The sequence and relationship of the four papers is important to an understanding of their respective contributions and positions. The Woolsey paper was written first. Very shortly thereafter, the Crime Commission chapter was prepared, relying very heavily on the Woolsey paper for its estimates and organization. They are quite similar in format and generally agree on the major areas of concern and the dimensions of the problem.

Wolfgang's paper is very closely related to these two and offers cost estimates for many of the same areas of criminal activity. Wolfgang includes the estimates from the Crime Commission and the Woolsey paper for what he calls "crimes leading to the destruction or damage of human or physical capital or property and illegal transfers." However, he disagrees with both authors on the inclusion of cost figures for what he calls "illicit production and other public order crimes."

The Mahoney study is not a continuation of the debate; it is, however, the paper most concerned with the underlying economic issues involved in the discussion.[2] It treats the economic costs of crime, the theory of human capital, and the utility of cost-benefit analysis.

All four analyses question the reliability of their figures. The most complete discussion of the problem is by Wolfgang. He makes suggestions for improving the estimates of costs of crime and the extent of crime. These suggestions are important because they explain later differences between the Wolfgang estimates and those of the Woolsey-Crime Commission papers. The two major differences are:

- That police jurisdictions deleted from the FBI *Uniform Crime Reports* because of a rapid increase or decrease be accounted for in the statistics.

• That the disparity between the two sample surveys done for the Crime Commission and the Retail Merchants Association estimating economic costs of shoplifting may indicate that other areas of crime surveyed might also be inaccurate, and that better survey techniques are required.

All four analyses discuss the near impossibility of estimating costs in some areas. Differing assessments of this impossibility are reflected, however, in the inclusion of dollar figures for some crimes in some papers and not in others. All agree that the task of computing a reliable total cost of crime is difficult, if not impossible, and hence probably not a very useful procedure.

The Concepts of "Costs"

Throughout the discussions by Woolsey, the Crime Commission, and Wolfgang[3], there is ambiguity about the term "economic costs." At the most general level they are divided between those associated with criminal acts and those required to maintain a system of law enforcement, criminal justice, and crime prevention. The Crime Commission divides the costs of criminal acts into crimes against the person, crimes against property, other crimes, and illegal goods and services. Among crimes included in the "other" category are traffic offenses, driving under the influence, and criminal tax fraud. The Woolsey paper differs slightly in categorizing the crimes as losses of productive capacity, involuntary transfers from victims to criminals, risks caused by traffic offenses and public welfare expenses, and purchases of illegal goods and services. By contrast, Wolfgang uses the following classification: crimes leading to the destruction or damage of human capital or property, illegal transfer, and illicit production or other public order crimes.

Crimes included in the various classifications are shown in Table 1.

The concept of economic costs to the society is obviously very complex. The studies under consideration define costs to society in terms of the total dollar volume of crime (or occasionally the net dollar volume where theft is concerned). This may, however, be a distortion of the actual cost. For the only costs which can legitimately be termed "costs of crime" in strict economic terms are those directly associated with illegal transfers and public order crimes. The only important economic effect is concerned with the redistribution of wealth, which generally has no effect on the Gross National Product (GNP). This is not to say that there are no benefits from knowing the volume of various crimes within the society and stating their volume in dollar terms. In many cases it provides a useful measure of the extent of the problem of redistribution. Also, the costs of maintaining a system of criminal justice and law enforcement to prevent such illegal transfers are real.

The major economic problem involved in the destruction of or damage to human and physical capital or property is the issue of foregone earnings. The Crime Commission states that "willful homicide results in an economic loss to the community, which loses a productive worker, and to the victim's family or dependents who lose a source of support."[4] The Crime Commission and the Woolsey Paper compute foregone earnings for all homicide victims by

Table 1
Crime Classifications

Woolsey

Losses to productive capacity:
1. Property destroyed
2. Murder
3. Nonnegligent Manslaughter
4. Assault
5. Homicide
6. Rape

Risks:
1. Traffic offenses
2. Welfare expenses

Purchase of illegal goods:
1. Gambling
2. Narcotics
3. Loansharking
4. Prostitution

Involuntary transfers:
1. Robbery
2. Extortion
3. Larceny
4. Burglary
5. Forgery
6. Fraud
7. Embezzlement
8. Counterfeiting
9. Blackmail
10. Auto theft
11. Tax Evasion
12. Insurance
13. "Inventory shrinkage"

Crime Commission

Crimes against the person:
1. Willful homicide
2. Assault

Other Crimes:
1. Traffic offenses
2. Drunken driving
3. Tax fraud
4. Other revenue crimes
5. Abortion

Illegal goods and services:
1. Gambling
2. Narcotic
3. Loansharking
4. Prostitution
5. Alcohol

Crimes against property:
1. Arson
2. Vandalism
3. Robbery
4. Extortion
5. Burglary
6. Larceny
7. Embezzlement
8. Business theft
9. Auto theft
10. Fraud
11. Forgery

Wolfgang

Damage to human capital or property:
1. Criminal homicide and manslaughter
2. Rape and assault
3. Arson and vandalism
4. Auto offenses

Illegal transfers:
1. Robbery
2. Burglary
3. Larceny
4. Auto theft
5. Shoplifting
6. Fraud
7. Counterfeiting
8. Embezzling
9. Forgery
10. Extortion
11. Antitrust and other business crimes

calculating their lifetime earnings on the basis of the average national wage for persons of the victim's age. This measure fails, however, to account for sex, race, unemployment, previous training, and other important indicators in

determining actual earning potential. Wolfgang introduces some of these considerations in computing a somewhat more realistic total figure for this cost.

A more important problem concerns the differential loss to the individual and to the society. Woolsey points out that the figure for foregone earnings represents both the loss of the net economic contribution to the society and the consumption accruing to the individual. It is questionable, however, whether one ought to speak of total earnings for dead people as a measurement of loss to society. An alternative mechanism for calculating cost to society could profitably assess the level of social investment of the individual prior to the time of death. This concept arises from the theory of human capital.

The most significant problem associated with illegal transfers has to do with the economic nature of transfers. Transfers can be viewed more profitably in terms of income redistribution and efficiency than in terms of loss to the society. Wolfgang stresses this point and says:

> Do the values represented in these illegal transfer payments indicate an overall cost to society in the sense of foregone production? Obviously not, except in so far as the criminal is not participating in the process of legal production. Rather, money or goods are being transferred in a socially disapproved manner from one person to another. It is certainly advisable to estimate the volume of such transfers, although the usefulness of considering such transfers as somehow equivalent to the value of destroyed or damaged human and physical capital is open to question.[5]

Neither the Crime Commission nor Woolsey discuss this matter. Woolsey attempts to deal instead with the related problem of net loss of value in theft. He states that his figures indicate both the gross and net value of property taken by criminals, as a measure of the initial magnitude of the problem. His final estimates, however, account for the recovery of stolen property by the police, and therefore represent net losses.

Another factor involved in transfer costs is the efficiency of the economic activity involved. Mahoney states that:

> Efficiency losses are those losses which are incurred because of inefficient operation at the marketplace. Whether the imposition of inefficiency derives from "respectable" businessmen fixing prices or whether it derives through the extortion of organized crime is of no consequence for this categorization. From a conceptual standpoint there are also inefficiencies associated with the connection of organized crime to the provision of certain kinds of illegal goods and services. The purchasers of such goods and services may well pay a higher cost than if the market for them were not controlled by organized crime. This, in classic economic theory, results in the economic cost of inefficiency.[6]

Another aspect of efficiency relates directly to the problem of redistribution. Shoplifting, for instance, redistributes goods from the business man to the employees and customers. The owner may calculate such thefts as

part of his wages to employees, or may list them under "cost of doing business." But redistribution through shoplifting is inefficient in the sense that it causes prices to increase because some retailers will suffer greater thefts than others.

These inefficiencies are probably not very significant in comparison to the total waste in the American economy. In addition, some of the transfers may be beneficial to the society in gross economic terms. If a watch is stolen, sold to a pawnbroker, and resold, this process represents an addition to the GNP through the "value added" principle. Tax evasion, for example, also has a generative effect on the GNP. Because decisions on government revenues and expenditures are made independently of one another, tax money withheld from the government actually increases the level of the consumption function of the evader. Although transfer costs associated with crime have a redistributive effect, they may also have a generally positive economic effect on the society. Certainly they represent no significant cost.
significant cost.

The most significant disagreement among the three papers concern Wolfgang's exclusion of cost figures for public order crimes. He argues that:

> Illegal production can occur only if people want to buy such illegal goods or services; hence, the criminal is fulfilling consumer demand, a practice that is usually considered laudatory in a capitalist economy. Behavioral crimes may be considered unaesthetic by many, and perhaps, even destructive of the person involved. But the offender is not directly harming others in the sense of damaging property or taking goods or money illegally. Similarly, political criminals may offend the social solidarity but they do not reduce enjoyment of goods and services.
>
> For various reasons, these crimes have not been placed in a cost index. The only way such crimes could be viewed as an economic cost is that such activities are not included as production in the official Gross National Product statistics, so that if criminals turned to legal activity, the GNP would rise.[7]

Woolsey and the Crime Commission calculated the costs of public order crimes in much the same way they did for other crimes. In their discussion of gambling, the Crime Commission states that "The cost to legitimate society is not the total of illegal bets placed but rather that amount of the total which is retained by the operators of the system."[8] The Commission is here discussing profits on capital investments and services. It may be argued that these profits are exorbitant and therefore cause inefficiency, but it is not possible to make a credible argument that all such profits are costly to society. One must realize the possible importance of gambling to the continued existence of organized crime or as a diversion from other kinds of consumption, but these are not costs to society. Wolfgang correctly points to the demand for such services in society and the willingness of gamblers to pay a high service charge for the benefits they can potentially receive.

Wolfgang's discussion of prostitution is instructive. Whereas Woolsey says that the cost of prostitution is $225 million annually, Wolfgang points out

that the only economic cost concerns the nonreporting of prostitution to the GNP calculation. Numerious other countries do include prostitution to their GNP.

An additional difference among the approaches concerns the omission of the costs of training, placing, and integrating criminals into the legal economy. These costs of unemployment, job training, and placement would be relevant if crime were eliminated.

Mahoney calls attention to a relevant general point about the economic costs of crime in relation to the cost of national defense. He states:

> We can estimate that part of our nation's resources that is devoted to the production of defense goods. If there were no need for defense, we know these resources could be devoted to other uses—perhaps hospitals, schools, and improved facilities and perhaps television sets, beer, and ball games. The actual composition of the new goods produced would be determined both in the marketplace and in the political arena. If the resources now devoted to defense were to be fully utilized in the nondefense sector, other things constant, there would be no change in national income, merely a change in the nature of goods produced.[9]

Aside from blurring the useful distinction between goods in the private and public sectors and the resulting influence on expenditure, this point is useful in discussing the diverse cost of crime.

Comparative Cost Calculations

With these major problems now in the open, we can summarize the actual economic costs of crime estimated by Woolsey, the Crime Commission, and Wolfgang.

Table 2.—Cost Estimates

[Wool=Woolsey; CC=Crime Commission; Wolf=Wolfgang]

1. Destruction or Damage of Human Capital	Dollar estimates (in millions)
A. *Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter.*—The major difference between the Crime Commission and Woolsey on the one hand and Wolfgang on the other concerns the already discussed calculation of forgone earnings. Wolfgang used the vital statistics estimates of the race, age, and sex of the homicide victim and the Rice estimates of lifetime earnings. Their projection was reduced by 20 percent to take into account that homicide victims earn less than the average. The Wolfgang method of calculation is on balance preferable.	Wool, $650–850 CC, $750 Wolf, $484
B. *Rape and assault.*—The very large figure presented by Woolsey includes a subjective cost of rape as a certain percentage of homicide. The Wolfgang estimates are admittedly arbitrary. They are based on cost of medical expenses and lost production for victims. The Crime Commission makes no dollar estimate because of inadequate data. The figures they use for speculation lead to 65 million and are lower than Wolfgang's because of slightly different calculations for medical expenses and a different calculation of the number of rapes and assaults committed. The techniques used by the Crime Commission and Wolfgang are preferable to Woolsey's.	Wool, $15, $568 CC, $65 Wolf, $142
2. Destruction or Damage of Property	
A. *Arson and Vandalism.*—All three agree that $100 million for arson is a reliable figure. Disagreement arises over the calculation for vandalism. The Crime Commission and Woolsey only included vandalism against individuals while the Wolfgang paper includes twice that amount for vandalism against establishments. There is insufficient information to determine which estimate is closer to the actual loss through arson and vandalism.	Wool, $300 CC, $300 Wolf, $730
B. *Auto offenses.*—The Crime Commission estimate for this category comes under the title of "driving under the influence." On the basis of various estimates of the percentage of drivers who are responsible for accidents under the influence of alcohol, the Commission allocates a percentage of all traffic accidents to this cause. In the Wolfgang estimate damages caused by hit-and-run drivers and reckless drivers are included. The Wolfgang estimate is prepared from National Opinion Research Corporation data collected for the Crime Commission. The inclusion of this category is highly dubious. The costs are not derived from committing the crime under consideration, but getting into a traffic accident. Even if the inclusion is accepted, the Crime Commission figures are inflated once again as the same standard of forgone earnings are included.	Wool, $0 CC, $1,816 Wolf, $139
3. Illegal Transfers	
A. *Robbery, Burglary, Larceny, and Auto Theft.*—Individual estimates for robbery and burglary are exactly the same for Woolsey and the Crime Commission. They disagree with Wolfgang because Woolsey and the Crime Commission used FBI data, while Wolfgang used NORC data plus estimates. The estimates on larceny are quite similar for all three. Variation occurs as a result of slightly differing estimates. Estimates of auto theft are virtually the same by Woolsey and Wolfgang with considerable difference in the Crime Commission estimate. The Crime Commission included a factor for; damage to cars recovered after being stolen. There do not seem to be any significant issues separating the various estimates of costs for these crimes.	Wool, $499 CC, $600 Wolf, $672
B. *Shoplifting*—The estimates for all three are virtually identical.	About $1,500
C. *Fraud.*—Woolsey included only mail frauds in his estimate. Wolfgang used NORC data for frauds against persons and combined these with a very low estimate of tax frauds originally used by the Crime Commission. The Crime Commission says that it is not possible to make a reliable estimate of the costs of fraud, but it does use the quoted	Wool, $89 CC, $1,450 Wolf, $491

figure in its summary presentation. The Commission includes brief discussions of frauds associated with salesmanship, mail fraud, fraud in the sale and promotion of securities, charity fraud, health frauds, and auto and home repair frauds. In the terms of economic cost used by the authors of the papers,the estimate of the Crime Commission is probably more accurate.

D. *Counterfeiting, forgery, and embezzling*,–Woolsey and the Crime Commission made their estimates on the basis of data from the American Bankers Association and the U. S. Treasury Department. These basic estimates were accepted by Wolfgang. However, he also adds the $54 million payout in surety bonds plus two times this amount for surety violations not covered by insurance. The inclusion of surety bonds by Wolfgang seems reasonable.

Wool, $80
CC, $82
Wolf, $242

E. *Extortion.*–Woolsey's data were taken from an estimate by the late Robert Kennedy. Both Wolfgang and the Crime Commission felt there were grossly insufficient data to make an estimate.

F. *Antitrust and other business crimes.*–No estimates were made by any of the three authors.

Wool, $1,000
CC, $0
Wolf, $0

4. Public Order Crimes

A. *Gambling*–The Crime Commission stated in text of the report that it was impossible to make a reliable estimate on this area of illegal activity. However, once again it includes a figure in its summary table and the estimate is generally supported by figures in the text of the report. The Woolsey figures were taken from preliminary estimates of illegal gambling profits made by the Crime Commission. Later the Commission revised its estimates and this is the source of the disparity. No explanation is given for the change in the figures.

Wool, $11,250
CC, $7,000
Wolf: no estimate

B. *Narcotics.*–Woolsey and the Crime Commission both use figures provided by the Bureau of Narcotics. The cost is calculated by multiplying the number of addicts times the average expenditure per year per addict.

Wool, $350
CC, $350
Wolf: No estimate

C. *Loansharking.*–No paper gives reliable estimates. The Crime Commission asserts, however, that it is generally believed that this is the second largest revenue source of organized crime. The Commission feels that it exceeds narcotics in annual cost.

D. *Prostitution.*–The method for calculating annual cost has no usefulness.

Wool, $225
CC: No estimate
Wolf: No estimate

E. *Alcohol.*–The calculation of economic cost is made on the basis of loss in tax revenue to the Federal and State governments. There is no reason to challenge the estimates of the amounts of illegal liquor activity. Tax evasion in this case as in many others may actually contribute positively to the gross national product.

Wool: No estimate
CC, $150
Wolf: No estimate

5. Other Miscellaneous Cost Figures

A. *Abortion.*–The Crime Commission calculates foregone earnings for women who die while having illegal abortions and adds this to the cost for performing the operations to produce the estimate.

Wool: No estimate
CC, $120
Wolf: No estimate

Public Expenditures for Law Enforcement and the Criminal Justice System

Only the Crime Commission and Woolsey give detailed treatment to the costs of maintaining the criminal justice system. An outline for each follows:

Table 3.–Criminal Justice System Costs

Woolsey

Public costs of the criminal justice system:

1. Crime suppression
2. Apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration

A. Police
B. Prosecution and defense
C. Courts
D. Incarceration
E. Rehabilitation
F. Other–including welfare payments

Crime Commission

Public expenditures for law enforcement and the criminal justice system:

1. Police
2. Prosecution and defense counsel
3. Courts
4. Corrections

If the Crime Commission outline is used for comparative purposes, the exact expenditure estimates from each of the two sources are:

Table 4–Criminal Justice System Costs, Crime Commission Categories

1. *Police.*–The estimate of the Crime Commission includes the total cost of maintaining Federal, State, and local law enforcement services. The Woolsey estimate is slightly lower because he calculates a percentage of police time for traffic control and regulation. Wolgang criticizes the Crime Commission report for including traffic control costs.

Wool, $2,000
CC, $2,792

2. *Prosecution and defense counsel.*–The figures are expected to increase rapidly due to the increased protection of the rights of criminals by the courts.

Wool, $129
CC, $135

3. *Courts.*—The figures were derived from exactly the same sources. They are the total expenditure on court costs, civil and criminal, throughout the country. — Wool, $261 CC, $261

4. *Corrections.*—The description of corrections in the Woolsey paper is divided between incarceration and rehabilitation but the method of calculation is exactly similar. It includes the total cost of correctional institutions plus the cost of parole, probation, and other rehabilitation. — Wool, $1,000 CC, $1,034

Rehabilitation

In both the Crime Commission report and the Woolsey paper there are brief discussions of the benefits of crime prevention. The two items cited are the potential earnings for incarcerated criminals and the potential legitimate earnings of those who are currently making a living from crime. There were over 300,000 prisoners on an average day in 1965. Both papers speculate about the earnings of these individuals at the national average wage. The estimates are probably inflated, but there can be no doubt that the prisoners would be contributing more to the economy if they were out of prison.

Mahoney discusses in considerable detail the costs and benefits of criminal rehabilitation and stresses the contribution of rehabilitation programs to the increased return on human capital. The major costs and benefits are shown in Table 5.

Conclusion

From the foregoing summary of the varying estimates of the costs of crime, it is clear that the problem of establishing a valid estimate is very complex indeed. It is hard to argue strongly with the contention of numerous scholars that the problems are so great that it probably is not very useful to attempt any such estimates.

Table 5—The Costs and Benefits of Criminal Rehabilitation

Category	Costs	Benefits
Effects on government revenue flows	Increased budgetary cost of parole program	Decreases in costs of— 1. Penal Institutions 2. Welfare payments 3. Police agencies 4. Courts plus Increases in tax revenues
Effects on Society's economic resources	Increased budgetary cost of parole program plus Increased risk of crime and other external costs	Increases in Productivity of rehabilitants plus Decreases in productivity losses due to incidence of crime freed resources
Effects on individual economic welfare	Income forgone during participation in project	Increases in lifetime earnings

This judgment is likely to be reinforced by the considerations raised in the following section on the social and psychological costs of crime. We have not been able to even estimate these costs because there is no sensible procedure for doing so. Nonetheless, we can at least begin to define their dimensions.

SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS

Of the many social and psychological costs that might be considered, we limit ourselves to illustrating more obvious ones that specifically result from violent behavior:

- Loss of public facilities: cultural, recreational and economic.
- Increased racial conflict and segregation.
- The breakup of neighborhoods, communities, and urban subcultures.
- Negative effects on civil liberties.
- The formation of new and undesirable groups and practices.

The effects of real as against perceived violence are not generally distinguished. Hopefully, this suggestive discussion will stimulate further work that categorizes the entire matrix of possible social and psychological costs and makes progress toward estimating their magnitude.

Loss of Use of Public Facilities: Cultural, Recreational, and Economic

Many have listed crime and fear for personal safety as important factors in the unwillingness of white suburbia to support urban institutions. These factors also apply to many urban residents. The recent controversy at Columbia University highlighted this situation through the confrontation over the construction of the new gymnasium in Morningside Park. One spokesman argued that the debate over Morningside Park was irrelevant because, in her words, "everyone in the community knows that unless one wished to be mugged or knifed, no sane person would go near the park—night or day."[10]

This park and many others like it which are either in or near an inner city area could provide urgently needed recreational facilities for urban youth. Parks and other facilities in many cities are greatly under-utilized due to their undesirable location.

Other community facilities, particularly entertainment centers, also suffer because of location. Attendance at sports arenas in Chicago and Newark, for example, are adversely affected by fear of attack. It has become increasingly difficult for theaters and orchestras to sustain adequate support because of their central city locations. Retail outlets complain of high insurance costs and increased theft in downtown locations. Central city violence has greatly increased overall property insurance rates in most areas. These costs are, in turn, charged to the people least able to pay—the ghetto residents. The results are increased hostility and racial discord.

The measurement of underutilization would not be too difficult. An inventory of recreational and cultural facilities and retail, amusement, and outlets in a given city would be taken. By using standard calculations for the market demand for various kinds of facilities, percent utilization could be calculated and adjusted for different times of the day and night. The population could be surveyed to evaluate their reasons for use or nonuse of a given facility. Conclusions could be drawn about demand patterns and the inhibiting factors associated with problems of safety and violence. It would not be difficult to develop controlled experiments to assess the influence of various corrective actions designed to make the areas safe for maximum use.

Few will deny the immediate importance of adequate recreational and cultural facilities. But this problem relates to a fundamental question of urban development: will the conditions of life in the central city further encourage the shrinkage of the urban tax-base, the out-migration of middle-class whites, the increasing demands for urban services, and the exit of industry and consequently of employment opportunities? If violence makes use of these facilities too costly, it will be impossible to alter the prevailing patterns of urban growth and development. This would be an overwhelming cost.[11]

Racial Conflict and Segregation

Chapter 3 presented striking differentials in the rates of major violence for blacks in comparison to whites. Although the causes of these differentials are frequency ignored,[12] it is undeniable that the association of blacks with violence has conditioned the behavior and attitudes of white society.

Widespread residential segregation has been partially caused by the white community's concern with violence. The lower crime rates in high-income areas lead people to be attracted to the suburbs. A recent survey found that 30 percent of high crime area residents wished to mo move from that area as soon as possible.[13] However, whites could move more easily than Negroes due to income differentials and the racial discrimination existing in many areas of the city.

Racial discrimination has played a key role in the emergence of residential patterns in cities. Among the most persistent pattern is the keeping a residential area integrated for more than a few years.[14] The Kerner Commission Report discussed the process:

> Another form of discrimination just as significant is white withdrawal from, or refusal to enter, neighborhoods where large numbers of Negroes are moving or already residing. Normal population turnover causes about 20 percent of the residents of average U. S. neighborhoods to move out every year because of income changes, job transfers, shifts in life cycle position or deaths. The refusal of whites to move into changing areas when vacancies occur there from normal turnover means that most of these vacancies are eventually occupied by Negroes. An inexorable shift toward heavy Negro occupancy results.[15]

Higher crime rates among blacks are reflected in the differential fear that residents of various neighborhoods have of crime. The Crime Commission

noted that Negro women have the greatest fear of violence, with the second highest rate among Negro men.[16] The Gallup Poll in April of 1965 asked a national sample the following question: "Is there any area right around here—that is, within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" "Yes" was indicated by 34 percent, 63 percent answered no, and 3 percent couldn't say.[17] In 1968 the question was asked again by the Gallup Poll.[18] The results were as follows: 35 percent said yes, 62 percent said no, and 3 percent could not say. This poll gave a more extensive breakdown of the individuals polled. The figures (percent) for men and women are shown in Table 6.

Table 6
1965 Gallup Poll

Response to the question: "Is there any area right around here—this is within a mile—where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?"

	Yes	*No*	*Can't say*
Men	19	79	2
Woman	50	47	3
	Yes	*No*	*Can't Say*
White	35	62	3
Negro	40	59	1
	Yes	*No*	*Can't Say*
1 million and over	42	56	2
½ million to 1 million	40	57	3
50,000-500,000	42	53	5
2,500-50,000	33	65	2
Under 2,500	24	74	2
	Yes	*No*	*Can't Say*
Central city	49	46	5
Suburban	31	66	3

The conclusion seems to be clear: to feel safer, it is better to live in high income areas, suburbs, or areas which are predominantly white. America has a segregated society. A number of circumstances and attitudes have favored its continuation, and inasmuch as the presence of violence has contributed, it may be considered a social cost.

In all analyses of the relationships between the races, it is very difficult to separate the various causes of distrust and the lack of progress toward integration. Residential segregation and the association of blacks with

violence result in an almost total elimination of opportunities for informal personal or small group contact. In most cities, residential segregation is virtually total. The creation of a climate favoring contact and understanding is extremely difficult. The result is a heightening of prejudice and mutual distrust which, in turn, militates against gradual integration of the races.

Evaluation of the lack of contact and understanding is strongly influenced by one's own values. Yet some measurements of the seriousness of the malady have been developed. One recent study, for example, presents an index for the extent of residential segregation.[19] It would be relatively easy to do more extensive research and quantification of the perceived causes of residential mobility and neighborhood safety. The importance of safety and violence could be assessed through sampling techniques and observation of mobility patterns. The ability of blacks to move from high crime and violence areas could also be quantified. Generally, the contribution of violence to the Negro stereotype and its influence on various forms of segregation could be assessed.

The Breakup of Neighborhoods, Communities, and Urban Subcultures

Many forces within American cities militate toward the elimination of traditional neighborhoods or relatively confined community units within the city. Perhaps most notable is the breakup of traditional ethnic neighborhoods and the dispersion of third-generation ethnic groups into the suburbs and culturally integrated neighborhoods.[20] This dispersion is partially related to the general inmigration of Negroes to the central city and the outmigration of whites to the suburbs. It is also encouraged by the increase of crime in the central city and the difficulty of maintaining the quality of contact which in the past inspired a remarkable commitment to the maintenance of these neighborhoods.

Various scholars[21] have stressed the importance of face-to-face contacts and the sharing of common institutions and assumptions about neighbors. As insecurity increases in an area, the possibility of contact and "neighboring" (which includes, among other things, sharing smalltalk, borrowing small items, and living in the same environment) become inoperative. If, as the Gallup poll indicates, a large number of Americans feel unsafe in their neighborhoods, then urban existence becomes more and more atomic. Gallup states that, "The situation is thought to be so bad in many communities that persons interviewed offered such comments as 'I wouldn't even go out on my own porch after dark.' "[22]

The total cost of the breakdown of neighborhoods and urban communities because of violence is difficult to determine authoritatively and virtually impossible to measure precisely. However, many believe that a sense of community is essential to productive living and that group norms are important means of regulating antisocial behavior. These observations, although often elusive to quantification, may be very central to understanding urban life and the phenomenon of violence.

Negative Effects on Civil Liberties

The pressure to "do something" about the more conspicuous forms of violence is very strong and seems to be increasing. Talk of outright repression is common among many groups. Much of the pressure to "crackdown" on lawbreakers is voiced in terms of strengthening police departments. Various means are suggested to achieve this objective, and the most prominent is to give greater power to the individual policeman. Seldom before has there been such general dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court of the United States as there was after the series of decisions protecting the rights of the accused and regulating the actions of police.[23]

According to the Gallup poll of March 3, 1968, the majority of Americans said the courts were too "soft" on criminals. The results (percentages) were as shown in Table 7.

Table 7
1968 Gallup Poll

Response to the question: "In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?"

About right	19
Too harshly	2
No opinion	16

The same poll showed that large numbers of Americans felt that making penalties more severe, giving the police a freer hand, and increasing the size of the police force were the most relevant steps toward reduction of crime.[24] It should not be presumed that those who support these proposals are necessarily against the protection of civil liberties and constitutional rights. However, many spokesman for this position seem to express little concern for the rights of individuals and the importance of due process.

An index of constitutional liberties and equal protection under the law could be developed that would measure changes in the extent and type of protection given to lawbreakers of various categories. The legal protection given citizens involved specifically in civil disorders could also be studied. The court reaction to such police actions as shooting looters and arsonists would be a good indication of local trends of protection of civil liberties. Finally, Supreme Court decisions affecting issues of civil liberties may suggest an approach to a national resolution of the conflict between constitutional guarantees of basic liberties and the widespread demand for protection against violence.

The Formation of New and Undesirable Social Groups and Practices

Various social groups have responded to the increasing fear of violence and crime by forming their own institutions to protect citizens and property and return "law and order" to certain neighborhoods and urban communities. Some of these groups have been of genuine assistance to the police and the area concerned. Others, both black and white, have developed independent law enforcement units that have taken on the characteristics of vigilante

groups. Most of the groups, desirable or undesirable, will probably diminish in importance if greater confidence is restored in the ability of local law enforcement officers to protect property and lives.

Closely related to the formation of these groups is the development and proliferation of practices, particularly in the suburbs, designed to offer self-protection for the average person in situations of uncontrolled crime. Classes held to train housewives in suburban Detroit to shoot pistols have received considerable publicity. Other cities have noted a marked increase in pistol sales, training, and participation in various programs to assure self-defense and safeguard property. Given the current magnitude of concern about the problems of crime and violence, such developments are understandable. Yet these groups and practices probably have a negative effect on American society. The constant concern of individuals to protect themselves and their property is conducive to an atmosphere of suspicion and fear which may be particulary damaging to children.

Local politicians and demagogues can effectively increase these fears when they argue for simultaneous reliance on the police and distrust of the political system.

Within the black community, the objects of fear are different. The Harris Poll found that a much higher proportion of Negroes than whites considered police brutality as a major cause of rioting.[25] Black communities have also witnessed the formation of private groups for the self-defense and restoration of law and order. In addition, they seek to protect themselves from the police and other "instruments of white society." The first Black Panthers saw protection as one of the major functions of black community groups. It is impossible to say whether these groups will disappear if the threat of violence diminishes. Nevertheless, the institutionalization of law enforcement groups by private citizens signifies a serious lack of confidence in their law enforcement officials. It is certainly possible that these groups will adopt an independent character unrelated to the fear of violence and crime. These groups may become permanent social institutions which sow distrust and disharmony.

It would be interesting and useful to survey the various groups which have emerged in response to the perceived threat of a breakdown in law and order. Generalizations about composition and goals are likely, however, to be complicated by the diversity of forms and programs. An evaluation of their costs to society would be extremely difficult. Again, a judgment of the importance of the negative or positive consequences of existence is necessarily subjective.

REFERENCES

1. This is an edited and expanded version of two papers submitted by James Johnson to this Task Force. All references to the papers throughout this discussion will be as follows: The Woolsey paper, the Wolfgang paper, the Crime Commission paper, and the Mahoney paper.
2. All references to the papers throughout this discussion will be as follows: the Woolsey paper, the Wolfgang paper, the Crime Commission paper, and the Mahoney paper.
3. Our attention to actual cost estimates is confined largely to Woolsey, the Crime Commission, and Wolfgang, since the Mahoney paper does not attempt comparable estimates.
4. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
5. Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

6. Mahoney and Blozan, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.
7. Wolfgang, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
8. Crime Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
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10. Quoted in James A. Johnson, "The Social Costs of Violence," unpublished paper submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, p. 6.
11. Several authors have attempted to explain the cycle of growth and development which is currently affecting most American cities. Interesting accounts of the process can be found in the following books: Scott Greer, *Governing the Metropolis* (New York: Free Press, 1962), and *The Emerging City* (New York: Wiley, 1962); York Willbern, *The Whittling Away of the American City* (University of Alabama: Univ. of Ala. Press, 1964); Leo F. Schnore, *The Urban Scene* (New York: Free Press, 1965); Raymond Vernon, *The Myth and Reality of our Urban Problems* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), and *Metropolis 1985* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960); Benjamin Chinitz, ed., *City and Suburb* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); E. Hoover and R. Vernon, *Anatomy of a Metropolis* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959); Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia, Its People and Their Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959); Michael Danielson, ed., *Metropolitan Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
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16. Crime Commission, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact–An Assessment, op. cit.*, p. 87
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18. George Gallup, "Crime in Streets Real Fear of U.S. Voters," *The Gallup Report*, Oct. 9, 1968.
19. Karl E. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 32-34.
20. Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 229-280.
21. Suzanne Keller, *The Urban Neighborhood* (New York: Random House, 1968). Numerous studies have been done of neighborhoods in large American cities. Subcultures and ethnic groups have received considerable attention. The following books provide an interesting introduction to the field: N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1963); Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); William F. Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1943); Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Denneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper Row, 1965); Bernard J. Frieden, *The Future of Old Neighborhoods* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964).
22. George Gallup, "Crime in Streets . . .," *op. cit.*
23. The *Miranda* and *Escobedo* Supreme Court decisions which law and order advocates claim have "tied the hands of the police" have probably not had much effect on crime rates. This is because most criminals are not students of the law or even newspaper readers who would be aware of what the Court has decided. By the same reasoning, "untying the hands of the police" by congressional rejection of these two Supreme Court decisions would probably not be a deterrent to crime.
24. George Gallup, "Majority Say Courts 'Too Soft' on Criminals," *The Gallup Report*, Mar. 3, 1968.
25. Louis Harris, "Most Think Law and Order Has Broken Down," *The Washington Post*, Sept. 9, 1968.

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