


COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PLANNING:

A PROGRAM FOR

ARTHUR CAPPER DWELLINGS

WASHINGTON, D.C.



55825

Prepared for
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Policy Development and Research

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A PROGRAM FOR
ARTHUR CAPPER DWELLINGS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FINAL DRAFT

Prepared for
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Office of Policy Development and Research

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INTRODUCTION

This report presents a comprehensive security plan for Capper Dwellings, an 1,100-unit public housing project in Washington, D.C. (see Figure 1). The plan and the supporting analysis were prepared by William Brill Associates, Inc. (WBA) under contract to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

WBA's contract with HUD called for the firm to field test, in two public housing projects, an approach to security planning and analysis developed by WBA under previous HUD funding.¹ One of these projects was Capper Dwellings, the subject of this report. A plan for the other project, Nickerson Gardens, Los Angeles, California, is presented in a separate report.²

Approach

The approach used to develop the comprehensive security plan for Capper Dwellings was based on several operating principles, discussed below:

The need to understand the vulnerabilities of the site

This component of the planning approach involves identifying the characteristics of the project's physical and social environment that (1) contribute to the criminal victimization of residents, (2) contribute to their fear of crime, or (3) cause them to alter their behavior to such an extent that they limit their opportunities for interaction with their environment and fail to construct the social defenses against crime commonly found in strong, cohesive neighborhoods.

Projects may be vulnerable on several levels. There may be physical characteristics of the site that contribute to crime or fear of crime, or cause people to avoid interaction with each other and their environment. There may also be patterns of interaction among residents that limit their ability to work together or look after one another with the result that residents, because they are isolated, are more likely to be victimized by crime or afraid of

¹For an example of some of WBA's earlier work in security planning, see: Comprehensive Security Planning: A Program for Scott/Carver Homes, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976), and Housing Management Technical Memorandum no. 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September, 1975).

²See Victimization, Fear of Crime and Altered Behavior: A Profile of the Crime Problem in William Nickerson Jr. Gardens, Los Angeles, California, Draft Report, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1976).




Figure 1: Location Map

the possibility.

Projects may also be vulnerable because of the manner and extent to which they receive police and other security-related services. If these services are not provided, or are provided in an insensitive or inefficient manner, residents' vulnerability may increase.

To analyze the vulnerabilities of Capper Dwellings along these dimensions, WBA applied its Residential Vulnerability Analysis, a refinement of a research and planning tool developed under previous HUD funding.

This analysis consists of three parts. The first part is the Household Safety and Security Survey that is administered to a sample of the resident population. The survey provides data on actual victimization, resident fear of crime, and resident modification of behavior due to concern about crime. The survey is an important planning tool because it tells exactly where victimizations are taking place and which areas are viewed most fearfully. This information allows improvements to be targeted to the most vulnerable areas.

The second element of the Residential Vulnerability Analysis is the Site Security Analysis. This identifies features of the site that contribute to residents' vulnerability to crime. Criteria used include: (1) the amount and location of unassigned space--space that no one protects and which can easily be claimed by intruders; (2) the penetrability of the site, that is, how it can be entered and how these entry points are structured and controlled; (3) the presence of design conflicts, where user groups are forced to compete over the use of the same facility or space; (4) the presence of features (such as poorly defined front and rear yards) that discourage the exercise of territoriality on the part of the residents; and (5) the extent to which the site provides opportunities for formal surveillance, such as that of the police, or opportunities for informal surveillance where neighbors can casually and easily view common areas.

The third part of the Residential Vulnerability Analysis examines the cohesiveness and organizational strength of a project's social structure. This analysis determines the extent to which residents have formed supporting relationships useful in resisting criminal intrusion or in controlling anti-social behavior of other residents. This part of the Analysis also examines how effectively police and other security-related services are delivered to the project.

The need for evaluation

The second operating principle that guided the preparation of the security plan was that the plan should be able to be evaluated. This requirement can be met by a reapplication of the Residential

Vulnerability Analysis or any of its dimensions after improvements have been made. The success of the plan can thus be judged on explicit and relevant criteria. A resurvey of the population, for example, can determine, in precise terms, what shifts have occurred in resident victimization, resident fear of crime, and in the extent to which residents are limiting their use of their environment because of their concern about crime. The characteristics of the site and the social structure of the residents can also be analyzed on a before-and-after basis.

The need for a mutually reinforcing mix of improvements

The third operating principle of this plan is that any effective security program must present a mutually reinforcing mix of improvements. Experience has shown that many efforts to improve security in housing have failed at least partly because they are one-dimensional approaches to a multi-dimensional problem. It is not enough to install any one improvement, be it improved lighting, site improvements, resident organizations, or even guards. A coordinated program that involves a mix of reinforcing improvements is necessary.

Scope of This Report

This report applies the principles discussed above. The findings of the Residential Vulnerability Analysis are first presented, followed by the Comprehensive Security Plan for Capper Dwellings based on this analysis.

The security plan for Capper Dwellings includes a range of improvements. Physical site improvements are specified as well as measures to increase resident organization and the delivery of police and security-related social services. The plan structures these improvements so they will be reinforcing. For example, one of the major recommendations is that Capper Dwellings be broken up into smaller social units. This will deinstitutionalize the project and provide social units of a size and scale that residents can identify with. To accomplish this objective, the plan calls, first, for architectural elements, such as fences, hedging and activity areas, to define these social units; and second, for measures that would actively organize the residents within these smaller units. The plan also recommends a social service delivery system that recognizes these units as a primary element with which to work.

The report presents a systematic, comprehensive approach to security planning. The approach is systematic because it applies precise research instruments to measure factors relevant to the crime problem. It is comprehensive in that it recommends a broad range of improvements that, because they are mutually reinforcing, can be expected to substantially impact on the crime problem in residential environments.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNING AREA: CAPPER DWELLINGS

The Neighborhood Setting

Capper Dwellings is a 1,100-unit project made up of three geographically distinct areas managed by a single office. These areas are Ellen Wilson, Arthur Capper (highrises and low-rises), and Carrollsburg. As seen in Figure 2, the planning area for the recommendations presented in this report includes all of the above except the Arthur Capper low-rises.

The development is a ten-minute walk from the Capitol Building and, as represented in Figure 3, is bounded by expensive brick townhouses on its north border; marginal wood frame housing and industry on its east and west borders; and the Washington Navy Yard on its south border, which separates the development from the Anacostia River. A major arterial highway, the Southwest Freeway, runs directly through the development and physically separates the Ellen Wilson area from Arthur Capper and Carrollsburg with a high stone wall many residents call "the China Wall." The highway subdivides the project, and also accentuates the contrasting development on either side of the freeway--expensive townhouses in the Capitol Hill area north of the freeway, and industrial and Navy Yard development to the south.

Besides the Capitol Hill renovations, plans to improve the South Capitol Street/Buzzard Point areas immediately west of the development are under review (Figure 3).

Several schools, public playgrounds, and parks surround the development (Figure 4). The closest commercial street is Eighth Street, connecting the Pennsylvania Avenue commercial strip southward to the Navy Yard entrance. The closest supermarket is at Seventh and E Streets, three blocks from the development.

As shown in Figure 5, the buildings range in size from the six-story elevator buildings in the Arthur Capper area to the three-story walk-up apartments and two-story townhouses of Ellen Wilson and Carrollsburg. The most visibly dilapidated area is Ellen Wilson, which is surrounded by high priced renovated townhouses. Ellen Wilson's low two and three story brick buildings are marked by graffiti, broken windows, and broken doors; the courtyards between

Figure 2:
The Capper Dwellings Site
Washington DC








Figure 4: Schools, Parks and Commercial Activity



**Figure 5:
Building Types**

-  townhouse
-  walk up apartments
- ABC,D elevator buildings



**Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC**

buildings are bare dirt. One of the largest open spaces in the area is a garbage-strewn lot adjacent to the freeway (Figure 6), where several Ellen Wilson buildings were demolished to accomodate the right-of-way.

As Figure 7 shows, Arthur Capper's six-story elevator buildings are also bleak and sterile examples of public housing architectural design. The open spaces in this area of the development accentuate the anonymous character of the buildings, in which small, poorly lit entranceways are gauntlets through which one passes to stench-filled hallways.

Several parking lots and playgrounds with dilapidated play equipment and small, undernourished plants complete the landscape. The playground closing K Street to vehicular traffic between Sixth and Seventh Streets, shown in Figure 8, is of particular interest because it helps connect several buildings around the large, flat, central playfield. The east end of the field is lit by ten stadium-type lights used for nighttime semi-pro football games and city league baseball. Otherwise, the field is infrequently used by Capper Dwellings residents. At present, the west end is being excavated for a new multi-purpose center, scheduled for completion summer, 1977. It is planned as a day-care center for 64 children, a food stamp office, a credit union, a correction office, a juvenile probation office, a legal aid office, and a Roving Leader representative's office.

The 1101 highrise building across L Street from the field on I Street is also of special interest. It is being renovated to provide housing exclusively for the elderly. Two hundred and ninety units are planned, eighty percent as efficiencies, twenty percent as one bedroom units.

The Residents

The residents of Capper Dwellings are typical of those found in most big city public housing projects. They are almost entirely black and an overwhelming majority of the households (85%) are headed by females, most of whom are unemployed. There are many young people and few adult males.



Figure 6: Photo: Vacant Lot Between Freeway and Ellen Wilson




Figure 7: Photo: Arthur Capper Elevator Building 'B'
View looking across Lincoln Playground



Figure 8: Photo: K Street Playground

RESIDENTIAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The Residential Vulnerability Analysis consists of three related parts: The Household Safety and Security Survey, the Site Security Analysis, and an analysis of the project's social structure and the delivery of police and other security-related social services.

Part I: Household Safety and Security Survey

This survey provides an important perspective on security issues in a housing environment. It measures resident victimization, resident fear of crime, and the extent residents are limiting their use of the environment due to concern about crime.

The survey has two important uses. First, it provides baseline data about the crime problem that can be used as a basis for measuring change over time. A resurvey of the population after improvements has been made would provide an accurate assessment of their effect on reducing victimization, fear and altered behavior. The second use of the survey is as a planning tool. An analysis of the data tells where on the site victimizations are occurring, and which areas and situations are viewed most fearfully by residents. This means that improvements can be directed at the areas and units on the site with the greatest problems.

THE SAMPLE

The survey instrument was administered to a sample of 168 households (22% of the population) living in the project one year or more. The sample of 266 adults and 208 children under the age of 18 was stratified by apartment size to assure a representative distribution of family size.

Interviews with the head of each household³ took place in November and December of 1975 and concerned events of the previous 12 months, November 1974 to November 1975. Respondents ranged in age from 19 to 75. More than 90% were female.

GENERAL FINDINGS

General findings of the Household Safety and Security Analysis are given here. A more detailed discussion is found in Appendix A.

³In 13 cases, another resident adult was substituted due to the continued unavailability of the head of the household.

VICTIMIZATION

Overview

Victimization was very high in Capper Dwellings (Table 3, Appendix A); more than 29% of the sampled households were victimized during the survey period. Repeated victimization was also high; 75% of these households were victimized more than once.

Comparison with Washington, D.C. and U.S.

The findings for Capper Dwellings were compared to Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) findings for Washington, D.C. and for the nation as a whole. The comparison, as indicated in Table 1, revealed that victimization in Capper Dwellings is substantially higher in most categories than for the nation as a whole and for that of similar (less than \$7,500/year) income groups. Robbery, for instance, was five times the national rate for low-income persons. Findings also revealed that victimization in Capper Dwellings is higher in most categories than that of similar income groups elsewhere in Washington, and higher than that of Washington as a whole. Residents of Capper Dwellings experienced twice as many successful burglaries.

The rate of attempted burglary was also extremely high compared to either Washington or national figures; it was almost 20 times the national rate.

The assault rate was the only category in which Capper Dwellings had a lower rate than that of low-income persons nationally. However, the rate was about the same as for the Washington low-income population.

Comparison with Other Public Housing Projects

Victimization in Capper Dwellings was also compared with that of several other public housing projects where the same survey was administered. These projects were located in Dade County, Florida, Baltimore, Maryland, Los Angeles, California, and Boston, Massachusetts.

As indicated in Table 27, Appendix A, only slight differences were found among the projects. The assault rate, the vandalism rate, and the rate of successful burglary were somewhat lower in Capper Dwellings, indicating that it has features making it resistant to successful burglaries but not to attempts.

FEAR

The survey measures fear on three levels: expectation of victimization, sense of danger associated with features of the environment, and fear for children.

Table 1.--Comparison of crime rate

Rate per 1,000 population 12 and older	LEAA				WBA Capper Dwellings
	National ^a		Washington ^b		
	All incomes	Income less than \$7,500/yr.	All incomes	Income less than \$7,500/yr.	
Robbery	6.9	8.9	17.0	21.3	48.0
Purse snatching	3.2	...	12.0	16.7	10.6
Assault	26.0	31.6	13.0	17.7	16.0
Sexual assault	1.0	1.6	1.0	2.7	8.0
Rate per 1,000 households					
Burglary	92.7	101.9 ^c	74.9	78.7 ^d	500.0
Successful burglary	72.0	78.5 ^c	51.7	51.7 ^d	95.2
Attempted burglary	20.7	23.4 ^c	23.2	27.0 ^d	404.8
Larceny	109.3	102.4	51.0	37.9	101.2

^aLaw Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973 Advance Report, Vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

^bLaw Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization Surveys in 13 American Cities, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

^cData obtained in advance of publication. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1976).

^dData obtained in advance of publication. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization Surveys in Washington, D.C.--Survey Data Tables and Selected Analytical Findings, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1976).

Expectation of Victimization

While the crime rate is high in Capper Dwellings, the residents' fear of being victimized is very high. As shown in Figure 9, more than 83% of the respondents felt that there was a 50/50 chance or better of being the victim of a burglary in the year ahead, though the actual chance of a successful burglary is 9.5%. Seventy-four percent felt the chances of being robbed in the year ahead were 50/50 or better, while the actual probability is 7.1%.

Fear for Children

Residents were also asked how worried they were (not worried, worried, very worried) about their children being beaten, robbed or forced to pay money for protection in three situations--in the project, at school, and going to and from school. More than half, as indicated in Table 20 of Appendix A, reported they were either "worried" or "very worried" about these events occurring in each of the settings. For the most part, the project was viewed as being more dangerous for children than the other situations.

Perceived Dangerousness of the Environment

Respondents were also asked to rate 20 settings and locations on a 6-point scale, ranging from very safe to very dangerous. These locations and social settings included everyday events and places, such as waiting for a bus, talking to a neighbor, or walking across the project. Many of the questions asked how the residents felt about doing these things during the day versus at night, or alone versus with other people.

As Table 21, Appendix A indicates, the respondents find a number of social settings highly dangerous, especially at night. In general, the residents seemed to find situations in which they were visible or protected (in daylight, with another person, in their own home) much less dangerous than those situations in which they were isolated or not easily visible.

The mean dangerousness rating (last column of Table 21, Appendix A) shows that no nighttime activity was considered safer than any daytime activity. Being on the streets away from one's home at night is the most dangerous circumstance. The lowest mean dangerousness scores were assigned to situations close to one's home, in open view, or in daylight.


ALTERED BEHAVIOR

Respondents were also queried as to how they modified their behavior

Figure 9:

PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS VICTIMIZED COMPARED WITH RESPONDENTS' FEAR OF VICTIMIZATION

Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC



PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS VICTIMIZED BY CRIME



PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO FEEL THEY HAVE A 50/50 CHANCE OR MORE OF BEING A VICTIM

^a Asked on women only.

^b Asked of car owners only.

because of concern about crime.

As indicated in Table 23, Appendix A, more than 80% kept their doors locked while they were home. More than half would not go out alone, nor go shopping at night, because they were afraid of becoming victims of crime.

Table 23 also shows that over two-thirds of the respondents kept their children inside during the evening; nearly 10% even tried to keep their children in during the day.

Concerns about crime have caused many respondents to install new security items such as locks, bolts, or window grills. Even more have recently obtained some personal protection device--a gun, knife, club, or tear gas--to improve their security.

LOCATIONAL ANALYSIS OF VICTIMIZATION

The survey data was analyzed to determine the relationship, if any existed, between the physical design characteristics of Capper Dwellings and the incidence of crime. As shown in Figures 10, 11, and 12, the location of each reported victimization was plotted on a site map. Incidents of robbery, assault, sexual assault, purse snatching and auto damage are shown for the last reported incident only, while every reported incident of burglary (attempted and successful), larceny, vandalism, and mailbox theft is shown. Figure 10 shows the reported victimizations in the Arthur Capper highrises, Figure 11 shows those of Carrollsburg and the Arthur Capper low-rises, Figure 12 those of Ellen Wilson.

The patterns of victimization related to building type were as follows:

1. Townhouses reported more vandalism than other building types. This may be related to territorial feelings of townhouse dwellers who more often report vandalism.
2. Townhouses suffered more larcenies than other building types, perhaps because their attached yards encouraged residents to leave articles about that could be stolen.
3. Townhouses showed a very low proportion of successful burglary compared to total burglary attempts.
4. Townhouses experienced more burglary attempts in proportion to their total number than other types of units.
5. Walk-up apartments experienced far more mailbox break-ins in proportion to their total number than other types of units.

Figure 10:




Figure 11:

PATTERNS OF VICTIMIZATION


- Burglary B
- Assault A
- Rape RA
- Larceny L
- Auto Damage AD
- Vandalism V
- Robbery RB
- Attempted Burglary AB
- Purse Snatching PS
- Mail Box Theft M

number indicates floor level of victimized unit

BB households surveyed

38 victimizations

victimizations occurred between November 1974 & November 1975



6. Burglary attempts in walk-up buildings concentrated on the first and third floor units. Attempts on first floors were more successful than those on the third.
7. Highrises experienced significantly fewer burglary attempts than the other building types.
8. Crimes against the person, especially robbery and purse snatchings, occurred more frequently in and around highrise buildings.
9. Areas subject to casual pedestrian surveillance appeared to have less crime than other areas.
10. More robberies and purse snatchings appeared to occur in areas where criminals could easily escape from view into public areas.

GEOGRAPHICAL PATTERNS

To examine the locations of personal victimization more accurately, the blocks of the three sections of Capper Dwellings were classified according to the type of buildings in the block, as shown in Figure 13. Also, each crime for which a location could be fixed was plotted block by block and the resulting distribution examined.

In Ellen Wilson, the majority of crimes, principally burglary and attempted burglary, took place in two clusters of three-story walk-up buildings. These buildings are set back and separated from the street and, in each case, surround three sides of a courtyard. Along the sidewalk small groups, mostly men, cluster to talk and to watch traffic. No one appears to frequent the courtyard between the walk-ups and, apparently, few people pay attention to what goes on in it.

South of the freeway, three blocks showed unusually high rates of burglary attempts. These are the two bounded by K and L between Second and Fourth Streets and the one bounded by L and M between Fourth and Fifth Streets. A factor contributing to this might be the relatively heavy traffic to and from schools moving through these blocks. The local junior high school, for example, lies to the west of the project on I Street.


The possible effect of Ellen Wilson's being separated from the rest of the project was also examined but no significant differences emerged. Apparently the freeway separating the sections has no effect on the distribution of crime.

Figure 13:
Victimization by Building Type

T TOWNHOUSES REPORTING HIGH RATES OF VANDALISM, LARCENY AND ATTEMPTED BURGLARY; LOW SUCCESSFUL BURGLARY

E ELEVATOR BUILDINGS REPORTING MORE CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON; ROBBERIES & PURSE SNATCHING

W WALK-UPS REPORTING HIGH MAILBOX BREAK INS AND BURGLARY ATTEMPTS ON 1ST AND 3RD FLOOR



Capper Dwellings,
 Washington DC

Part II: Site Security Analysis

The Site Security Analysis identifies the physical characteristics of a site's layout that contribute to crime problems--characteristics that create fearful conditions, expose residents to risk, and inhibit development of the supportive neighborhood relationships that are necessary for residential communities to develop social defenses against crime.

METHODOLOGY

To apply the Site Security Analysis to Capper Dwellings, WBA staff made a series of walking and observation tours. Photographs were taken and studied, and an aerial photograph of the site obtained. Numerous interviews concerning space use were held with housing authority staff, management personnel, police, and residents. These findings were translated into a site security map which presents the findings of the analysis (see Figure 14). The findings provided the basis for identifying site improvement objectives and making corresponding recommendations.

CRITERIA

The following criteria comprise the Site Vulnerability Analysis.

UNASSIGNED OPEN SPACE

Unassigned spaces are those which individuals or groups of residents have not claimed for their own use. They lack environmental cues suggesting how the space is to be used and who should control it. There is generally no formal or informal supervision or control. These spaces may vary in size, location and character; they may be front or rear yards that are unclaimed by tenants for their own use, or larger open spaces.


Large amounts of unassigned space can be a major vulnerability. Because these spaces are unprotected and uncared for, they provide opportunities for residents and outsiders to engage in mischievous and anti-social activities; activities that would not be tolerated where residents control and maintain their own territory. Such activities threaten residents and discourage them from developing those spaces as their own.

Good design usually has little unassigned space; it is defined, in a hierarchy of need, as public space, semi-private space, or private space. Space organization clearly indicates who is to use the space and for what purpose. Such design provides a format for organization and control, encouraging residents to lay claim to their

Figure 14:

Site Security Analysis

- UNASSIGNED SPACE 
- PENETRABILITY 
- LIMITED SURVEILLANCE OPPORTUNITIES 
- DESIGN CONFLICTS 



Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC

WBA WILLIAM BRILL ASSOCIATES, INC.



environment, and inhibiting intruders from taking control.

The site analysis examines the site from this perspective. The site is carefully observed at various times of the day and night, over a period of weeks. The uses of space are recorded and studied. Areas whose design and placement do not provide cues as to use and those which residents clearly do not control are noted and mapped.

PENETRABILITY

This component of the analysis examines how access to the site is structured and controlled. In many public housing projects a security problem is created because access is uncontrolled. That is, there are no environmental suggestions as to how the site should be entered or how traffic should move through it: people enter and move through the site without crossing any barriers suggesting that they are entering someone's environment.

EASE OF SURVEILLANCE

Good site design usually provides numerous opportunities for casual and informal surveillance of activities and space. Space should be arranged for example, so children can be watched by mothers from inside their houses; walkways and bus stops should be located so people waiting can be seen by others. Such features have important security implications because they provide "eyes and ears" that can hear or see if help is needed; they reassure people that they are not alone and isolated. These features also deter criminal or anti-social behavior, because, in many instances, people will not commit such acts where they can be observed by others.

It is also important that more formal surveillance--such as that of the police--also be possible. Police should have a clear view of the site when they patrol and should have quick access to all parts of the site.

The site analysis examines the extent to which these kinds of surveillance opportunities exist.

DESIGN CONFLICTS

Design conflicts occur when two incompatible areas of activity (such as a tot-lot and a basketball court) are located next to one another or when two groups are forced to compete for the same space or facility.

Such design frequently results in conflict between residents, or in one group's needs not being met because they are forced to withdraw.

Good site design minimizes such conflicts and encourages an orderly and harmonious use of space and facilities.

ENCOURAGEMENT OF TERRITORIALITY

This element examines the extent to which the site encourages residents to express territoriality. In a site that does not offer such encouragement residents do not reach out to take control of their immediate environment. The line of defense then becomes the front door rather than the front or rear yard. Good design, in contrast, has cues (often plants or small fences) that define private areas and yards and encourage residents to take control of such space.

Without such definition residents are on the defensive and limited in the area they can control. It allows outsiders to penetrate space close to the dwelling unit without barrier or challenge.

The Site Security Analysis includes an assessment of how well the layout and design of the site encourages such territorial control.

ANALYSIS FINDINGS

UNASSIGNED OPEN SPACE

With few exceptions, the development's open spaces are unassigned (see Figure 14). They are unclaimed by residents for their own use, offer few environmental cues to residents or strangers as to their proper and accepted uses, and thus are vulnerable to criminal intrusions and mischievous behavior. Among the exceptions are the townhouse front yards along Third and Fourth Streets between I and L (see Figure 15). Many of these yards have wire fencing that defines the limits of the yard area each resident claims for his or her own use and control. Some yards have flowers or gardens; these are positive actions by residents to establish a "buffer zone" between their homes and the public street. The emphasis on front yard activity is also reflected in the amount of street life in this area: men work on cars at curb side, residents sit on small porches watching the sidewalk activity, and neighbors talk easily to one another.

Parking areas in Carrollsburg flow into or overlap with deteriorating recreation areas, and semi-private townhouse rear yards are often indistinguishable from debris-filled semi-public areas (see Figure 16). The lack of assigned space in Carrollsburg is most readily observed around the three-story walk-up buildings. Here, most residents have an indirect relationship with the ground level, that is, they must, in most cases, walk out of their front door and around the building to reach the back yard. Unlike residents




Figure 15: Photo: Typical Carrollsburg Townhouses and Front Yards



Figure 16: Photo: Carrollsburg Rear Yard Area
Rear yard areas in Carrollsburg are undifferentiated and poorly used

living in townhouses (who have their own, semi-private front and rear yards), a walk-up resident must relate to his open space as part of a group of residents, all of whom share the open spaces around any one building.

Much unassigned space also surrounds the elevator buildings. The spaces at the base of these buildings are poorly differentiated, no zones of transition clearly distinguish between the public street and the semi-public areas of the highrises (see Figure 17). There are only some sparse shrubs and trees, open grass-and-dirt areas, and low (often broken) chain link fencing bordering some sidewalks.

Of the three site areas, Ellen Wilson is the most critical with regard to unassigned space. The overrun shrubbery, rain-rutted, bare-dirt courtyards, and general dishevelment suggest an environment that is emotionally and intellectually abandoned. In this area, even townhouse residents have abandoned their individual yards. No attractive planting subdivides the open spaces, no fencing, sitting areas, plant material, or changes in paving texture define entranceways. There are no communal recreation areas where residents can meet and establish better neighboring relationships.

PENETRABILITY

Besides the vast amount of unassigned open space, the site's pedestrian circulation system of sidewalks and walkways makes it highly penetrable.

Figure 14 graphically presents the site's penetrability. It shows that both pedestrian and vehicular circulation are best organized in the Carrollsburg area because there the public street grid is the principle structure. Primary traffic and parking emphasis is on the public street, thus the blocks in between the streets and behind the buildings are left for semi-public and semi-private activities. This is a convenient system for organizing a rational site plan, and in most cases it limits the number of undefined entrances into semi-private rear yards.

Arthur Capper and Ellen Wilson, on the other hand, are organized into "super block" plans in which the buildings do not define the perimeter of each block, as in Carrollsburg, rather they are placed on the site without real or symbolic barriers defining the building's relation to the surrounding neighborhood.

Entranceways

In most of the walk-up buildings there is no control over access.



Figure 17: Photo: Arthur Capper Elevator Building 'B'
The area between the door and the street is undifferentiated and public.

Many doors leading to stairways are broken. In most cases, access to mailboxes and the upper floors can be achieved without crossing any real or symbolic barriers.

The Arthur Capper elevator buildings are even more vulnerable to unwanted intrusions, because each building has two operating entrances (see Figure 18). Doors on these entrances, however, cannot be locked, since locks were broken some time ago; in some cases doors are so bent out of shape they cannot close (Figure 19).

To further complicate matters, the two entrances are out of sight of each other, so a guard at one entrance cannot also control the other. The halls and common areas of the buildings are dark, narrow and menacing; so much so that the housing authority has had trouble employing guards for these areas.

LIGHTING

At night, the importance of defining major and secondary pedestrian pathways is extremely important. Street and project lighting can establish, by the intensity and quality of lighting, nighttime walking zones through the project site that will increase security, and lengthen the time the site is used by residents for recreation and leisure activities.


Two types of lighting are presently used. One system lights the public streets in a regular and even fashion with high intensity lighting. This system lights most front yard areas facing the street. The other system lights the rear yards and interior courtyards within the project. This second system is ineffective in most cases, as it provides only intermittent lighting, leaving many dark and shadowy areas. Many of the rear yards and courtyards in Carrollsburg and Ellen Wilson for example, have only one light in each major open space, and many secondary areas have no light at all. This pattern of lighting makes these highly fearful areas to venture into after nightfall. The situation is the same for areas between the Arthur Capper elevator buildings, which are also lit in a disjointed fashion. The low lighting level in rear yards and interior courtyards is clearly one of the factors that accounts for residents' overwhelming fear of nighttime activities as determined by the Household Safety and Security Survey.

SURVEILLANCE



Opportunities for informal or casual surveillance of resident activities are minimal. Most of the play areas and spaces adjacent to housing units cannot be easily observed. This is especially true of the large rear areas enclosed by the walk-up units. There is little activity in this area to begin with for it is barren, and

Figure 18:

Lobby Security Analysis: Typical Elevator Buildings



Capper Dwellings,
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


Figure 19: Photo: Arthur Capper Elevator Building
Many doors are broken and impossible to lock

most units have no direct access to it. Even if these areas were used, high levels of informal surveillance could not occur, because rooms facing the area are bedrooms and bathrooms, which are not so often used as kitchens and living rooms.

The playground on K and Fifth Streets, which is actively used by young children, is also somewhat isolated from casual view. It is out of the line of sight of most apartment windows and away from building entrances, where people might naturally congregate.

The entranceways to the highrise buildings also offer severe problems of visual control. The interiors as noted previously, are dark and sinister. It is impossible to see inside the building as one enters it, or to see down the hallway to the elevator. Hidden corners, dark narrow hallways and uninviting, unattractive opaque doors and translucent windows make the entranceways appear menacing and fearful, rather than inviting and safe (see Figure 18 for a graphic analysis of lobby vulnerabilities).

DESIGN CONFLICTS

Capper Dwellings suffers from several significant design conflicts that contribute to the vulnerability of the site.

Recreation Facilities

The most significant conflict is created by the lack of an adequate recreation facilities plan. At present, only one small playground and one basketball court serve Carrollsburg; one active playground serves Arthur Capper, and residents of Ellen Wilson must use surrounding park or school-ground equipment. As a result, no single block or group of buildings can claim any particular area for its own use because of the general lack of facilities throughout the site. There are conflicts between teenagers and younger children over control of the playgrounds that do exist. This was reported to be the case in the playground located between two of the high-rises (buildings B and C, as seen in Figure 14). Here, the area has been taken over by loitering men and teenagers.

Community Space

A second design conflict involves the lack of usable community spaces for residents to meet and conduct business; nor is there provision for indoor activities at the building or individual block level. A community meeting space exists (next to the management offices in a lowrise building in Arthur Capper), and a multi-purpose room is planned for the new center. However, the 70 to 80 households in each elevator building and about the same number in

each block of Carrollsburg and Ellen Wilson have no focal point for community-oriented organizational activities or services.

Entranceways

Another major design conflict involves the use of building entrances. These have often been surrendered to teenagers, who frequently obstruct entrance use and discourage the control of these areas by responsible residents. As discussed earlier, this problem is particularly difficult in elevator buildings, where teenagers and younger children run in and out of two separate entrances. Closing one of the two doors is illegal under fire code regulations, and visually controlling both outside and inside activities at both door locations is physically impossible. Redesign of these lobbies and entranceways is an important factor in improving building security, as will be discussed shortly.

The Elderly Building

The conversion of the 1101 L Street building for use by elderly residents could result in an additional design conflict. This would occur between the elderly and teenagers when the former make their way from the 1101 building to the new multi-purpose building. This will require them to walk along the vacant central playfield, out of sight of other buildings, and close to a teenage activity area. The route could be a fearful one for the elderly as they may feel isolated and be thrown into conflict with the teenagers over the use of the route and its nearness to teenage activity areas.

Part III: Social Vulnerability Analysis

Part III of the Residential Vulnerability Analysis identifies features of the social environment that impact on the project's vulnerability to crime. It analyzes the extent to which residents are able to work together and look after one another. This is a key element in a community's resistance to crime and its capacity to control the anti-social behavior of its members. For, as noted earlier, security is not just a result of site design. Indeed, the most important line of defense against crime is development of the traditional sense of neighborhood, where people care about and protect one another.

CRITERIA

To measure this capability, the Social Vulnerability Analysis employed

the following criteria.

SOCIAL COHESION

This is the tendency of residents to stick together and to feel part of the community. When residents are socially cohesive, there is a natural, almost unconscious, surveillance of surroundings. Residents are likely to report suspicious activities, and intruders are quick to sense this. There is also an easier and more natural supervision of children.

When interviewing residents to measure the level of social cohesion, WBA attempted to identify the values, attitudes, and interests that divide or unite residents.

SOCIAL WITHDRAWAL

Social withdrawal is characterized by the quality of residents' social interactions, the extent to which residents restrict their activities, and the extent to which residents resist participation in organizations. Social withdrawal is accompanied by feelings of anomie, isolation, and detachment from the environment. It is one of the most serious symptoms of an abandoned and deteriorating environment indicating vulnerability to abuse by residents as well as outsiders.

Findings on this issue are based on responses to relevant questions in the Household Safety and Security Survey, observations of how residents use their environment, and on interviews with residents.

SOCIAL AND POLICE SERVICES

The extent to which residents are receiving adequate police and social services can impact substantially on the project's vulnerability to crime. If police protection is not being provided, or is being provided in an ineffective manner, the probabilities of victimization, fear, and altered behavior may increase. If services related to such stressful issues as alcoholism and drug abuse are not available, then the community's ability to work together can be seriously impaired. Negative effects may also result if services relating to health needs and child care are not provided.

In assessing Capper Dwellings from this standpoint, WBA tried to determine the availability and effectiveness of these kinds of services. The extent to which the crime problem affects the delivery of social services to Capper Dwellings was also studied.

RESIDENT ORGANIZATION

The extent to which residents are organized is an important indicator of the community's capacity to resist criminal penetration and to control deviant behavior of its own members. Resident organization expresses the group's social cohesion and is a measure of its capacity to deal with common problems. Highly organized communities or projects are usually better able to cope with stress than unorganized ones. Further, they are usually more successful at getting their fair share of society's resources. In analyzing a community's vulnerability to crime, it is therefore important to know the extent to which residents are organized, the character of their organization, and the issues to which residents address themselves.

METHODOLOGY

This analysis of Capper Dwellings relied on data gathered from interviews and discussions with residents, talks with management personnel, and talks with the staffs of organizations providing social and police services. Relevant literature and data from the Household Safety and Security Survey were also considered.

ANALYSIS FINDINGS

SOCIAL COHESION

The social environment at Capper Dwellings is characterized by much distrust, hostility, and divisiveness. Social cohesion does not exist in terms of strongly shared values and supporting relationships. Respondents, for example, were embarrassed to be identified as Capper Dwellings residents. Many presented themselves as exceptions to the community, rationalizing or considering other residents inferior. It was always "others" who made Capper Dwellings an undesirable place to live.

Distrust of neighbors was high, and may be based on real dangers. Many residents believe that sharing information with neighbors will make them more vulnerable to crime. They are afraid that friends of neighbors (usually "boyfriends") will burglarize their apartment if the neighbor knows they are away or have acquired something of value.

There are also value and attitude conflicts between groups, related to the care of the home and supervision of children. Families, in the most simple terms, divide along three lines: (1) those who care about themselves and their environment and still see possibilities of liberating themselves or their children from public housing and the welfare system; (2) those who care about themselves and their

environment but see little possibility of leaving the situation, and intend therefore, to make the best of their environment; and (3) those who do not care and take no action to improve their lives and environment.

Parents of the first two groups care for their home and are attentive to its decoration. They also attempt to discipline their children and to provide them with the resources their means allow. The third group of parents, however, often resolves its bitterness by engaging or even encouraging their children to destroy housing property by writing on walls, dumping trash, urinating in the halls, and breaking windows. This group often views the project as "government property" and questions why it should care about the site or the buildings.

Some value and attitude differences appear strongly related to age differences. Many elderly residents wanted to be separated from the younger residents; the major complaint being that children are unsupervised and undisciplined. Some senior citizens reported that their efforts to correct children's destructive behavior have been thwarted by parents who protect and support their children. Elderly residents also expressed fear of being robbed by young adults and teenagers when going to the bank or shopping. As a group, however, the elderly are highly cohesive. In the "410" building, which is all elderly, there is a clear, shared, value system and a great deal of mutual support.

SOCIAL WITHDRAWAL

Reluctance to associate with neighbors increases the already fearful environment at Capper Dwellings. As noted in the Household Safety and Security Survey, residents restrict their behavior due to fear of crime, especially at night, when 68.5% keep their children in; 56.0% do not go out alone; and 54.2% do not go shopping. This conclusion is validated by informal interviews with residents and community program directors, many of whom reported that residents do not leave the Capper Dwellings environs. This habit may be related to residents' fear of their unit being burglarized if they are not there to protect it. However, this withdrawal increases the cultural deprivation of both adults and children by limiting their exposure to the outside environment, which may over time become alien to them.

POLICE AND SOCIAL SERVICES

This section discusses the police and social services provided or available to residents. The discussion includes a general description of the service, and, where feasible, includes comment on the adequacy of the service and on factors relating to its effectiveness.

Problems and issues that seem to cut across a number of services are also identified.

Police Services

One of the most important deterrents to crime in any community is the presence of law enforcement officials. Capper Dwellings is presently patrolled by three types of police: The District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), the Property Management Administration (PMA) Housing Police, and contract guards. A special guard, provided by the D.C. government, is stationed at the health clinic at 1011 Seventh Street.

The housing police, who are responsible for law enforcement on PMA property at Capper Dwellings, also patrol Sheridan Terrace and Barry Farms, several miles away.

As of March 1977, the force consisted of 22 commissioned officers and four non-commissioned officers, as well as several dispatchers, clerks and aides. The housing police command center is on M Street N.W.; however, a field operations office to coordinate patrols of the three developments has been set up in the basement of 1011 Seventh Street at Capper Dwellings.

In addition to patrolling the Capper Dwellings site, the housing police also monitor and coordinate patrol activities of the two contract guards, who are assigned to the four highrise buildings on the development.

The following is a typical daily tour of duty for housing police and contract guards.

8 a.m.-4 p.m.

1 captain
1 sergeant
7 officers (2 are non-commissioned)
3 aides
2 dispatchers
1 station clerk
2 contract guards

4 p.m.-12 midnight

1 lieutenant
2 sergeants
5 officers (1 non-commissioned)
1 aide
2 dispatchers

1 station clerk

Midnight-8 a.m.

2 sergeants
3 officers
2 dispatchers
1 station clerk
2 contract guards (weekends only)

The Housing Police Security Program supplements the MPD. Housing police patrol the entire site in radio-equipped cars and on foot. Officers are armed and have the power to arrest suspects on housing authority property, but suspects must be turned over to MPD officers for booking. MPD assumes jurisdiction over homicide, suicide, and suspicious cases; they must be notified at once if a death occurs.

The housing police dispatcher at the command center is the link, first, between incoming resident calls and housing police in the field and, also, between housing police and the MPD. Should a housing police officer require the assistance of the MPD, he must notify the dispatcher at the command center who in turn calls the MPD. This relay system is time-consuming and could mean serious delay in emergencies. When a MPD officer arrives on the scene he is considered the officer in charge.

Patrol functions of the PMA housing police are not coordinated with the MPD, which has two scout cars and several foot patrolmen regularly assigned to the area. The MPD does, however, furnish the PMA police with information on all criminal activities in the Capper Dwellings area each day.

Besides the police services described above, the D.C. government has stationed a special guard at the public health clinic on the second floor of the 1011 Seventh Street building; he is there only during working hours (8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m.). This guard has authority to enforce laws and keep the peace only at the health clinic. His activities are not coordinated with the PMA or MPD.

Tenant-MPD Relations

Despite some efforts by the MPD to establish ties with residents, tenant-police relations at Capper Dwellings are not close, and residents appear doubtful about the effectiveness of the police and the current criminal justice system. The Household Safety and Security Survey collected detailed data on 80 crimes, yet only 37 (46%) were reported to police. Robbery, assault, and burglary were the crimes most frequently reported; mailbox break-ins and larcenies

were the least. Thirteen of the 18 crimes against persons (72%) were reported to police, while only 24 of the 62 crimes involving property loss were reported (39%).

Table 13, Appendix A, breaks down reporting frequency for all categories and Table 14, Appendix A, presents the reasons given for not reporting crimes to police.

Residents who did not report a crime said they felt that nothing could be done, that there was no evidence available. This may indicate a feeling of helplessness, perhaps related to fear of retaliation by the perpetrator.

Another oft-stated reason was that the incident was reported to someone else, perhaps the management office. This may reflect a feeling that police action would not be effective, again suggesting feelings of helplessness. Four of the six "other" responses were related to failure to report mailbox break-ins. Two said they fixed the box themselves, implying that getting the boxes repaired would be the only reason to report the crime. One thought the office would report it. One robbery victim was afraid the police would not respond.

The issue of police protection was raised when residents suggested measures they thought would improve their security. Almost 31% said there was a need for improved police protection.

In an effort to improve the relationship between police and residents, the MPD established a community relations center on the site several years ago. This center, at 400 L Street, S.E., is open Tuesday through Saturday. According to the MPD Community Relations Department, the center was established to make it easy for residents to file complaints and to obtain information on police programs and crime.

One MPD program, Operation I.D., has had a good response from residents of Capper Dwellings. On request, the community relations officer will engrave an identification number on personal property and provide warning stickers for doors and windows free of charge.

The Security Inspection Program is also available to residents. In this case, the community relations officer inspects one's home, checking doors, windows, locks, lighting, landscaping and security devices, and suggests ways to improve and safeguard one's person and property.

The community relations officer will also, when requested, meet with tenants, church groups, youth groups, and other organizations to discuss the role of police in the community,

crime prevention, and related topics.

Besides these services, the community relations officer dispenses free tickets to sporting and other events, through the Community Relations Center, the Capper Recreation Center and local neighborhood groups. Coloring books are available for children. Each year the MPD's First District sponsors a Christmas party for needy children in the area.

The Community Relations Center also encourages boys to join the MPD Boys' Club. This organization tries to teach respect, restraint and responsibility, and sponsors programs in athletics, art, music, electronics, and other areas.

The MPD also sponsors the Officer Friendly Program in which officers visit public schools--kindergarten through ninth grade--three times a year giving talks on traffic safety, drugs, vandalism, fire, extortion, and dangerous "toys" such as blasting caps, matches, and guns. The aim of the Officer Friendly Program is to stress the child's responsibility as a citizen in the community.

One of the first major community police programs in Capper Dwellings and the entire District was the Neighborhood Scout Car Program, intended to familiarize citizens with the officers who patrol their neighborhoods. Police distributed flyers to each home in the neighborhood asking residents to participate in informal meetings to get to know one another, and to discuss crime and other related problems. The program lasted for two years (1973-1974) and was discontinued due to the public's lack of interest.

The Property Management Administration Housing Police do not have a formal community relations program.

Conclusions

With the establishment of the PMA police force this past year, residents of Capper Dwellings are receiving better police protection than in the past, but it is difficult to measure the full impact of the PMA police as yet. One very obvious limitation of the PMA force is its size in relation to the areas it is expected to patrol. For instance, during the weekly midnight to 8 a.m. shift, three officers and one sergeant (the other sergeant is in the security station) must patrol Capper Dwellings as well as two other developments several miles away. PMA expects to hire five additional officers under the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) program; this will ease the shortage. Additional guards need to be

stationed at the controlled entranceways in the highrises recommended in this report.

Patrol functions of the MPD are not coordinated with the PMA police. This may occasionally result in overlapping patrols, an inefficient use of police.

Housing Management and Maintenance

Providing adequate management and maintenance services to a project like Capper Dwellings is an extremely difficult task. The residents have many needs. The project itself was built many years ago and has a great deal of deferred maintenance. The staff size is limited, and the environment, as is discussed below, is a stressful one, just as it is for the residents.

The staff of Capper Dwellings is hard working, dedicated, and does its best under difficult circumstances. Its efforts, however, appear to be hampered by two factors. First, tenant-management relations are not particularly close. Residents who were informally interviewed reported negative feelings about the maintenance staff. They also complained that management had not been strict enough with many residents and had failed to follow through on complaints some residents had made against others.

These responses, it should be stressed, were those of a few residents who were interviewed on a casual, informal basis. No structured survey was made of residents' attitudes toward management and no evaluation was made of the effectiveness of Capper Dwellings management and maintenance services.

The Safety and Security Survey, which was administered to a sample population did, however, query residents on the extent to which they thought management of the project was a problem. Fifty-three percent felt it was either a serious or a very serious problem. These feelings of residents, as well as the performance of the management and maintenance staff, may be affected by the image each has of the other. Some residents may see the staff as unconcerned and casual, and some of the staff, in turn, see the residents as uncooperative, unappreciative, and even destructive.

These conflicts, given the complexities of running a public housing project and the difficulties of living in one, are natural enough. The problem is that there is no mechanism by which complaints can be comfortably aired, discussed, and reviewed with the facts of the case. Residents, for example, seem to have very little understanding of the pressures the staff is under to provide services, nor do residents understand how they could make the maintenance staff's job easier. The management staff, in turn, probably needs to know more about the perceptions of the residents and what their

priorities are.

The second factor affecting management services that this research indicated is the problem of security. As discussed in detail in Appendix D, which analyzes the extent to which services are being affected by the security problem, many maintenance employees are afraid of being victimized on the job. Most feel that their fear of crime affects their work, and that they need or should be allowed to carry a weapon.

The two factors, tenant-management relations and security, are linked. If, for example, tenant-management relations were closer, the management and maintenance staff might feel that residents would look after them when they are on the site. They would feel safer then, and their productivity would increase.

Improved coordination between the police, the management, and others who deliver services to the site would also improve the delivery of services to residents. If the police knew the schedules and security needs of people delivering services, they could better provide protection for them.

Food Services

There is a food co-op on the site at the 1011 Seventh Street building and a food stamp certification office sponsored by Friendship House at 619 D Street, S.E. A Safeway Grocery Store at Seventh and E Streets and several small community grocery stores are available. Residents generally use the Safeway instead of their own food co-op. They claim that prices at the co-op are higher, and that they do not carry brand names or have much variety.

The experience of the food co-op is particularly unfortunate because it is one of the organizations that could have brought people together and demonstrated the value of cooperation. Instead, because residents do not support it, the co-op has had to raise prices and eliminate perishables, and this in turn makes the co-op less likely to be used.

This experience highlights the lack of resident cohesiveness and indicates the impact that lack of resident participation can have on the delivery of needed services. It demonstrates, also, the difficulty in getting residents to work together on a site-wide basis.

Health and Mental Health Services

Two health clinics are located at Capper Dwellings, a general

health clinic, and a mental health clinic.

The first provides general health and medical care to Capper Dwellings and the surrounding neighborhood. Its staff of 17 employees includes three physicians.

The mental health clinic, which also has a permanent staff, provides counseling and therapy to individuals and groups. Most clients are referred by other social service agencies, schools, families, and friends. A former community organizer noted an inordinate reluctance to enter counseling among Capper Dwellings residents; apparently some people were afraid they would be labeled "crazy" if they used this kind of service. While resistance to counseling or therapy is not at all unusual, it seems to be particularly pronounced among Capper Dwellings residents, indicating a possible need for outreach and education activities.

Transportation

Security impacts on the use and availability of transportation for the residents of Capper Dwellings. Resident use of the bus system is undoubtedly influenced by their anxiety about waiting at bus stops. This was one of the situations that respondents to the Household Safety and Security Survey labeled among the most dangerous settings.

Because of this concern, 16.1% of the residents use taxis. The availability of taxis, however, is also affected by the crime problem. Three of the five taxi drivers interviewed who frequently made runs into the general area reported that if possible, they often refused to pick up Capper Dwellings residents. Residents, on their side, complained that once downtown, they were concerned that taxi drivers would refuse to bring them home.

These findings, plus the fact that only 11% of the residents own cars, means that the crime problem has contributed to the isolation of Capper Dwellings residents.

Recreation

The D.C. Department of Recreation has two programs in effect at Capper Dwellings. One is the indoor community recreation center adjacent to the 501 Virginia Avenue highrise building. A permanent staff manages the small gym and basketball court, which appear to be used intensively.

Outside the center is a large field for baseball or football. Before building on the community center started, there were also outdoor basketball courts and play equipment.

The Roving Leader program is second of the two. Under this program a leader moves through neighborhoods in the city, including Capper Dwellings, and tries to engage youth in constructive activities. The leader also counsels young people and acts as a liaison with the schools, courts, and community agencies.

WBA's analysis indicates a considerable demand for recreation among youth at Capper Dwellings. Existing facilities are intensively used, and additional activity areas are needed.

Drug Abuse

Of those interviewed in the Household Safety and Security Survey, 77.3% felt that drugs were a serious or very serious problem at Capper Dwellings. Although drug dealing and related criminal activity has been reduced since the sealing off of the 1101 L Street highrise, it remains a problem. The extent, however, cannot be quantified.

The Department of Human Resources has three different kinds of narcotic treatment programs available and relatively accessible to Capper Dwellings residents. A narcotics treatment clinic, "The Shack," is located at 123 K Street, S.E., a comfortable walking distance from Capper Dwellings. Although the clinic provides abstinence, vocational and recreational counseling, its emphasis is on methadone maintenance. It has a 300 client capacity and is a little more than half full.

Although the clinic is close to Capper Dwellings, residents are a relatively low percentage of the clientele. Many residents and some housing management staff did not even know of its existence.

Two other facilities at D.C. General Hospital are a fifteen minute bus ride from Capper Dwellings. These serve all the residents of the District of Columbia but receive many clients from Southeast. The Directors of the programs could not estimate, however, how many of their clients, if any, came from Capper Dwellings.

One of the programs is Emerge House, a residential treatment facility for all five narcotic treatment clinics in the district. It has a 35 person capacity, yet usually has only 20 clients. It is a co-ed residential facility and has three female counselors. The Director reported having a higher than usual success rate with female clients.

The other clinic is the prenatal clinic, which provides outpatient counseling to pregnant mothers on drugs. The services are of particular concern to Capper Dwellings, given its large population of females and young mothers. This clinic is also not filled to capacity.

Alcoholism

Although the prevalence of alcoholism at Capper Dwellings cannot be quantified, it is reported to be high among all age groups. Intoxicated individuals can frequently be seen in the early morning hours. Residents and community personnel verify the presence of extensive alcoholism at Capper Dwellings.

There is, it seems, a need for a prevention and treatment program aimed at communities like Capper Dwellings, where many residents are young people and females. The latter have a particularly difficult time seeking help because most alcoholic treatment programs (like drug abuse programs) are male-oriented. They are not geared to the special problems of the female, particularly the low-income female head of household residing in a project like Capper Dwellings.

Conclusions

The preceding discussion covered a wide range of services. Its purpose was to assess the services that might impact on residents' ability to function effectively as a community and thus become more crime-resistant.

Generalizations are difficult, even after extensive field research, but some tentative conclusions can be offered about police and social services. First, there seems to be a need for better linkage between the residents and the services. It appears that some services, such as drug and alcohol abuse programs, are underutilized, and many residents are not even aware of them. Secondly, better coordination among services, such as maintenance and police is needed, and residents clearly need to organize so they can relate to available services and help shape their content. Third, new initiatives are needed. Outreach activities on the part of social service providers could be usefully expanded and a program should be designed that addresses the problems of being a woman in Capper Dwellings.

Given these and related limitations, there are several measures that can be taken, which will be discussed below. These include increased outreach activities by the social services, and the formation of tenant organizations that will help residents learn about services and shape their content.

RESIDENT ORGANIZATIONS

There is no operating or formal tenant council at Capper Dwellings. There are, however, influential residents with whom management

consults, although they never were formally elected to this role. For the most part, these individuals are older residents and ones who have lived in the project many years. They are generally responsible and caring about the project and have tried to do something, year after year, in spite of repeated promises and disappointments. They are, in a sense, the true heroines of the project, having raised children, held families together under difficult circumstances, and seen many of their children move away. The problem is that these individuals, even if they were organized into a formal council (as they are in other projects) have no political base or structure. Because they have no structure, they cannot substantially affect the management of the project, and because they can show few results, they exercise little influence over families that do not share their basic set of values. They cannot be expected, for example, to exercise much control over the families whose children are vandalizing the project. Given the absence of grass roots support, the leadership is not strong enough to reward or punish these families, and, as individuals, they are no closer to the families or to the youth than is the housing management staff.

The weakness of tenant organizations in a project like Capper Dwellings is thus considerable. There is no structure through which tenants can relate to each other or to outside organizations, or exercise social control over troublesome families in the community.

The plan presented in the next section of this report presents a series of recommendations that are designed to correct these deficiencies and to develop strong, effective, tenant organizations at Capper Dwellings.

PLANNING AND DESIGN OBJECTIVES

The Capper Dwellings' environment has been analyzed for its vulnerability to crime by three sets of criteria:

- o The Household Safety and Security Survey measured:

- Actual Victimization
- Fear of Crime
- Altered Behavior

- o The Site Vulnerability Analysis measured:

- Unassigned Space
- Site Penetrability
- Opportunities for Surveillance
- Design Conflicts

- o The Social Vulnerability Analysis measured:

- Social Cohesion
- Social Withdrawal
- Police and Security-related Services
- Resident Organization

The application of these criteria generated the improvements listed below, which include (1) physical improvements, (2) measures designed to strengthen the community, and (3) measures designed to improve the delivery of services. As developed in the Comprehensive Security Plan that follows, these improvements will be mutually reinforcing.

WBA recommends the following improvements:

- o Subdivide Capper Dwellings into 12 neighborhoods.
- o Reinforce neighborhoods by organizing the residents in each.
- o Architecturally reinforce the definition of the 12 neighborhoods.
- o Establish a crisis intervention program that links each neighborhood with social services.
- o Provide site-wide recreational facilities and improve lighting across the site.
- o Establish a Security Planning Board.

THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY PLAN

Part I: Overview

This section presents a comprehensive security plan for Capper Dwellings designed to counteract the vulnerabilities of the environment identified above. This plan is for the site area shown in Figure 2. The Arthur Capper low-rises were not included.

The key element of the plan is the division of Capper Dwellings into 12 neighborhoods, so as to reduce the project to a more human scale. These neighborhoods would consist of from 40 to 90 families. Their definition would be reinforced two ways: first, tenants would be organized in each of the neighborhoods and leadership selected; secondly, they would be defined architecturally. Site improvements would establish boundaries and help control access; activities would be internalized within each neighborhood, and space would be assigned to individual families when feasible. Site improvements would be structured to encourage residents' control of both neighborhood and private space.

These neighborhoods form the key element of the plan in that they are intended to bring residents closer together, and provide them with a social unit to identify with. Their purpose is to provide residents with the traditional strengths of the neighborhood, making them less vulnerable to criminal intrusion and better able to control the anti-social and mischievous behavior of other residents. WBA recommends that the leadership of these neighborhoods comprise the tenant council; thus giving such a council an organizational base, something it does not now have. It is also recommended that these neighborhood organizations be linked to the social service delivery system by participating in a crisis intervention program in which representatives of social services come to neighborhood meetings, provide guidance in crisis management, and explain the services offered by their particular agency.

The plan also calls for establishment of a security planning board made up of neighborhood leaders, housing management staff, metropolitan police, and project security guards. The purpose of the board would be to assure an open flow of information and perspectives among the participants, and provide a framework for planning and coordinating security programs.

The plan also proposes site improvements to improve circulation through the site, increase lighting, and establish structured

recreational areas.

Part II: Recommendations

SUBDIVISION OF CAPPER DWELLINGS INTO 12 NEIGHBORHOODS

One of the problems identified by the Residential Vulnerability Analysis is the lack of community or neighborhood feeling among residents. People are fearful of one another; they have not formed close, supportive relationships. The vastness of the project, the large amounts of unassigned space, and the general, anonymous, institutional character of the site undoubtedly contribute to these attitudes. Residents of Capper Dwellings thus lack one of the best defenses against crime and fear of crime-- a sense of identification, and belonging, the knowledge that one is part of a group.

To create this necessary identification, WBA proposes dividing the project into 12 neighborhoods, as outlined in Figure 20. The neighborhoods are geographically distinct: six are located in Carrollsburg, two in Ellen Wilson, while each highrise is seen as a neighborhood.

These neighborhoods are one of the cornerstones of the safety and security plan; they will be the organizational unit for residents and for site improvements.


SOCIAL REINFORCEMENT OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

It is not enough to define neighborhoods in the abstract. They must be reinforced both socially and physically. The social reinforcement consists of organizing residents in each neighborhood and establishing leadership.

Such efforts will help define the neighborhood, and help create a grass roots social organization that can act as an intermediate structure between the residents and the tenant council as well. As pointed out earlier, tenant councils in public housing frequently have no organizational structure; they may be no more than a group of well-meaning and untiring residents. But if a council is elected or formed by neighborhood groups, it may have more influence on the agencies it deals with as well as with other residents.

Organizing on a neighborhood level, moreover, would be much more manageable than trying to organize site-wide, as is so frequently attempted. It does not diffuse or overwhelm potential leadership with too large a jurisdiction, and allows different neighborhoods

Figure 20:
Block and Building Cluster Areas



Capper Dwellings,
 Washington DC

0 30 60 120 200
 scale in feet

M ST.
 N

their different organizational styles and rates of progress.

ARCHITECTURAL REINFORCEMENT OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS

The site improvements discussed here are intended to reinforce the definition of each neighborhood by internalizing site activities and controlling access. They are also intended to correct the vulnerabilities identified by the Residential Vulnerability Analysis.

They are designed to encourage expressions of territoriality by residents, decrease the amount of unassigned and unclaimed space, reduce design conflicts, and increase opportunities for casual surveillance of the site by residents, as well as formal surveillance by police.

If design deficiencies are corrected, victimizations on the site should be reduced, as well as resident fear of crime and resident social withdrawal. The Household Safety and Security Survey, it will be recalled, found a high victimization rate among residents. It also revealed a high level of fear: there was a 50/50 chance or better, said 60% of the respondents, that they would be beaten up in the project in the next year; the figure for robbery was 74%, that for burglary 83% (see Table 19, Appendix A).


Site improvements intended to reduce victimizations on the site, as well as resident fear of crime and resident social withdrawal are as follows:

Improvements Recommended for Carrollsburg Neighborhoods 1-6 and Ellen Wilson Neighborhoods 11 and 12 (Townhouse and Walk-up Buildings)


- o Reinforce the character of each of these neighborhoods by turning the interior courtyards into activity centers, including various combinations of children's play areas, teenage areas, shaded sitting areas, clothes drying areas, parking areas, and garbage pick-up locations. Figure 21 shows the layout of each neighborhood activity center.
- o Further reinforce the definition of each neighborhood by reducing the number of uncontrolled entrance points leading to interior courtyards. This will be done with fencing and gates (which symbolically close alleyway entranceways between buildings), and wide planting strips which limit access to courtyards that open onto public streets (see Figures 21, 22, and 23).

Figure 21:
Recommended Site Improvements

- TOWNHOUSES WITH FRONT YARDS
DEFINED BY WALLS OR PLANTING
- CHILDREN'S PLAY AREA
- BASKETBALL COURT AND TEENAGE
ACTIVITY AREA
- SITTING AREA WITH TRELIS
- CLOTHES DRYING AREA
- GARBAGE PICK-UP LOCATION
- PLANTING STRIP, LOW SHRUBS
- GATE



Capper Dwellings,
 Washington DC



Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC





Figure 22:
NEIGHBORHOOD 4: Typical rear yard development
for Carrollsburg and Ellen Wilson

Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC

Figure 23:
NEIGHBORHOOD 5: Perspective view of
typical rear yard development
for Carrollsburg and Ellen Wilson



- o Reduce burglar access to first floor apartment windows by planting low maintenance shrubs at the base of each building facing a public street (see Figures 21 and 22).
- o Improve walk-up building entrance control by installing small sitting areas directly outside entranceways as shown in Figure 24. These should act as transition zones symbolically separating the building entranceway from public street activities, thus helping residents to take territorial control over entranceway activities.
- o Define townhouse front and rear yards (Figures 21 and 22) by separating each yard with low brick walls or shrubbery, and defining the ends of rear yards with hedges or planting strips. This will provide residents with a framework for using their front and rear yard spaces, thus increasing territorial claims and open space control.

Improvements for Arthur Capper Elevator Buildings



- o Create vertical neighborhoods in each of the four elevator buildings by installing formal controlled entranceways. This organizes each lobby into an inner lobby with a new elevator and an outer lobby, separated from each other by a formal guard station. These lobbies are designed to control activities within each building as well as access to the buildings. Figure 25 presents recommended floor plans for these lobbies in Neighborhoods 8 and 9, and Figure 26, a perspective sketch of the exterior of Neighborhood 8, Building B, shows the new additions, including controlled entranceway and upper level elevator lobbies.

In operating these entranceways, WBA recommends that the guidelines presented in Appendix C be followed. These stress the need to involve residents in entranceway operation and present detailed guidance regarding their operation, staffing, and design.



- o Reinforce the effectiveness of the controlled entranceways by installing panic locks on all fire doors. This will discourage residents from using the fire passageways to go from floor to floor and channel pedestrian traffic through the lobby and past the formal guard station. The planting strip behind Neighborhoods 7 and 8 along Virginia Avenue should work in conjunction with the fire doors; it clearly turns the Virginia Avenue side of the buildings into rear yard areas. Thus, traffic is forced onto the K Street side of the buildings, where it can be viewed by guards at the entranceways.

Figure 24:

Typical walk-up building entrance plans



Carrollsborg



Ellen Wilson

Figure 25:

**Typical Controlled Entranceways
for Arthur Capper Elevator Buildings**

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




Figure 26:
Neighborhood 8; Building B
showing new additions



Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC

- o Further reinforce the controlled entranceways by locating tot lots and shaded sitting areas immediately outside guard stations as shown in Figures 21, 25, and 26. These outdoor activity centers will extend the area under control of each guard station, and will act as transition zones, separating entranceways from public sidewalk activities.
- o Install a new parking lot in the yard between vertical Neighborhood 10 and Seventh Street, as shown in Figure 21. This parking lot will provide residents of the neighborhood with parking directly adjacent to the new lobby entranceway.
- o Demolish the existing tot-lot in the courtyard between Neighborhoods 9 and 10 and replace it with a decorative landscape of trees, shrubs, and low grass mounds. This will eliminate the old deteriorated play area and replace it with a new tot-lot on the corner of K and Seventh Streets as shown in Figure 21.

Rationale

These improvements, along with the social and organizational recommendations presented earlier, should counteract the vulnerabilities of the environment because they:

- o Internalize site activities within neighborhoods by placing them in interior courtyards or adjacent to elevator building entrances, or setting them clearly within a small, well-defined, project area to which small groups of residents can easily relate. These activities increase opportunities for small groups to meet together, develop neighboring relationships, and develop social sanctions that control outdoor space. Thus fear for children should decrease, use of outdoor space should increase and (as discussed in the Social Vulnerability Analysis) resident social withdrawal from the environment should be minimized.
- o Increase the number of recreation activities, and distribute them within the individual neighborhoods. This will increase the legitimate casual, as well as direct, surveillance and visual control of neighborhood open spaces. This should reduce the incidence of anti-social and mischievous behaviors now occurring in these previously unassigned, unwatched areas. Vandalism and larceny in and about townhouse rear yards should also be reduced with the increase in surveillance.

- o Separate competing needs by assigning teenage areas, adult sitting areas, and tot-lot playgrounds to different locations within each neighborhood.

This will reduce the conflicts occurring when different groups compete for the same space. By separating different age groups, for example, conflicts between teenagers and children can be minimized.

- o Define townhouse yards with low walls and shrubs, thus inviting residents to use these spaces themselves. The increased territorial awareness will help establish yard areas as buffer zones separating townhouses from the public streets. Greater control of front and rear yard areas by residents will then be possible, which should help decrease larceny and vandalism. Planting strips at the base of walk-up buildings will reduce access to ground floor windows and perhaps also reduce the number of successful burglaries reported in first floor apartments.
- o Reduce the number of entrances to the individual neighborhoods, (both actually and symbolically) thus channelling pedestrian traffic past building entrances or outdoor sitting areas, where a guard or resident can notice and control movement. This will help residents define the boundaries of their neighborhoods and improve security by limiting access to interior courtyards. The result is a rational pedestrian circulation pattern that assists residents, guards, and management personnel in formally and informally surveying and controlling traffic through the site.
- o Install formal controlled lobby areas in elevator buildings to increase visibility and control of lobby area activities (Figure 25). This will decrease residents' fear of entry space and elevator waiting areas, and improve the general image of the elevator building environment. By establishing control over access, use of building space can be limited to legitimate users. Closing fire doors with panic locks will help channel traffic away from secondary exits and through the controlled lobbies. Channelling everyday traffic past a guard station converts unmanageable, open access buildings into manageable limited access ones. As discussed in Appendix C, obtaining the controlled entranceways that will improve security will require a joint effort of residents, guards, and management which should improve resident organization. Finally, crime in and around the elevator buildings should decrease.

PROVISION OF RECREATIONAL FACILITIES; IMPROVEMENT OF LIGHTING

The following improvements help structure activities relating to the overall site. Designed to connect the site and the various neighborhood sections together, they deal with semi-public and public spaces not part of any one neighborhood but part of the site as a whole. For these spaces, WBA recommends:

- o Providing additional teenage basketball areas and an elementary school-age playground (similar to the one at Fifth and K Streets) on the vacant land next to Virginia Avenue in Ellen Wilson. As shown in Figure 21, this recommendation will help make available recreational facilities to elementary school children in each of the 12 neighborhoods.
- o Upgrading of the Fifth and K Streets playground by adding shade trees and shaded sitting areas and connecting it with the playground area proposed for the rear of the new multi-service building (Figure 21).
- o Locating a new, wide sidewalk through the east end of the central playfield (Lincoln Park) to be incorporated with a new teenage basketball area and a shaded sitting area (Figure 21).
- o Improving nighttime use of the site and neighborhood areas by installing a high and low intensity lighting system as shown in Figure 27.


RATIONALE

Some of the site's open spaces do not "belong" to any one specific neighborhood but rather to several. These require special attention.

Improvements to the Fifth and K Streets playground, the new Ellen Wilson facilities (including two basketball courts and playground) and the central playfield basketball facilities should be made as they improve the overall site design. First, these locations offer pre-teenagers and teenagers (who are highly mobile, active, and gregarious) with alternative, on-site, locations to the individual neighborhood recreation centers. Second, these areas are, for the most part, larger than the neighborhood recreation areas and can provide older children with larger scale play equipment and activities (basketball areas, baseball and football fields). Third, these areas allow residents to apply the security concepts developed for the neighborhood open spaces to the more public areas, improving territorial control of these semi-public areas, and casual surveillance of on-site activities.

Figure 27:

Conceptual Lighting Plan



Capper Dwellings,
Washington DC

Thus, WBA recommends upgrading the existing playground at Fifth and K Streets, and connecting it with the one proposed for the rear of the multi-service building (now under construction). This encourages several different neighborhoods to use the larger play equipment unavailable in the tot-lots proposed for each neighborhood.

The lighting improvements shown in Figure 27 will brighten the shadowy, poorly lit areas identified in the Site Vulnerability Analysis. This should help overcome residents' fears of using the site's open spaces in the evening. In many cases, residents said they were more afraid of walking across their own space than they were of walking down a well-lit public street, where they could at least be seen.

Proper lighting of the site should increase its use for legitimate activities, and aid resident and police surveillance.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CRISIS INTERVENTION PROGRAM

The Residential Vulnerability Analysis identified several issues relating to the delivery of social services to Capper Dwellings. It showed that services, in some cases, were under-utilized, despite the clear need, as in the case of alcohol and drug abuse. It showed also, that residents tended to voice their needs in a crisis-oriented fashion rather than in a preventive framework.

There was no indication that residents were helping to shape the programs available to them, and no programs seemed specifically designed for the resident population. For example, though over 85% of the households are headed by females, no program addressed the special needs of women in such situations. Nor was there a structure through which women could discuss common problems or seek mutual support.

The crisis intervention program proposed here would overcome some of these deficiencies. It would assist residents in coping with crises, and at the same time, improve their awareness of available social services. It would also provide a mechanism which would allow residents to help shape some of these programs and because it operated on the neighborhood level, it could be expected to strengthen that structure.

The crisis intervention program recommended here would require a member of the housing authority staff to enlist representatives of social service agencies to come to neighborhood meetings and

offer crisis management information and training to residents. The representative would lecture and run a workshop on a crisis situation the person represents. For example, someone from an alcoholic treatment program could talk on how to handle a drunk safely, someone for drug abuse could talk about how to handle a suspected overdose case, or how to tell whether someone is on "uppers" or "downers," so they can be handled accordingly, and someone from a child care agency could talk about how to recognize various symptoms in children.

Presentations like these would include information on the services offered by each agency. Thus a family that might begin by learning how to handle a drunk might end up seeking counseling and long-term treatment for the alcoholic.

This program would require careful planning. Agencies must be contacted, programs prepared, and crisis issues identified. Residents should play a key role in each of these steps.

The program should increase linkage between residents and the social service agencies. The outreach format and crisis orientation assures contact and relevancy. The services themselves should benefit also, since the program encourages them to develop crisis management approaches and, because of resident involvement, might suggest ways they can improve their service and relevancy to public housing residents.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY PLANNING BOARD

One of the findings of the Residential Vulnerability Analysis was that there is no mechanism available to assure that police services to Capper Dwellings are coordinated either with each other or with other elements of the community, such as residents and housing authority staff. There also is no mechanism to assure that residents are involved in or informed about security issues.

To meet these needs, it is proposed that a security planning board be established at the project. The board would consist of representatives of the tenant council, each of the police services, and the housing authority staff. Its purpose would be to review, on a monthly basis, the security situation at the project and to determine ways it could be improved.

This format would provide an opportunity for these groups to meet and get to know each other in a non-crisis environment. This would be particularly important in terms of police-community relations, as usually the two groups meet only in situations such as when someone needs help, is being arrested, or is making a complaint. Often the crisis situation means misimpressions are made on both sides. The structured, non-crisis setting of these meetings would

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

have no such pressures. They would provide an opportunity for checking rumors and discussing complaints in a calm, supportive setting. This kind of contact should correct misimpressions and stereotyping on both sides.

The board should also deal with such solid issues as how well guards are doing their job, where crimes occur and how to prevent future occurrences, how security services can be coordinated to protect people delivering services, and how residents and housing staff can improve security at Capper Dwellings.

Part III: Implementation — Preliminary Cost Estimate

This estimate presents the costs involved in the construction of the recommended site improvements shown in Figure 21. The estimate is organized by neighborhood areas and general site improvement areas (as shown in Figure 28) to allow a phased improvement program. Should funds be limited, neighborhoods can be improved one at a time.

The PMA has already arranged for the preparation of the contracts for work to be done on the lobbies and controlled entranceways in the four elevator buildings.

Costs for the various items and areas are estimated figures as of May 1977. These estimates are for budget purposes only and are subject to slight adjustment when more detailed estimates are completed during final design.


PRELIMINARY COST ESTIMATE FOR CAPPER DWELLINGS

Neighborhood 1


Clothes poles (8)	\$ 400
Court paving	4,800
Fence w/ gate section	2,500
Seeding	700
Shrub plantings	20,850
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000
Trash enclosures (2)	<u>4,000</u>

41,250

Figure 28:
Cost Estimate by Neighborhood



Capper Dwellings,
 Washington DC



Neighborhood 2

1/2 basketball court w/ fencing	\$ 3,800	
Parking area	8,500	
Seeding	800	
Shrub plantings	16,000	
Sitting areas w/ trellis (2)	16,000	
Tot play areas	3,000	
Trash enclosures (1)	<u>2,000</u>	
		50,100

Neighborhood 3

Clothes poles (6)	300	
Court paving	12,400	
Seeding	550	
Shrub plantings	8,250	
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000	
Tot play area	4,000	
Trash enclosure	<u>4,000</u>	
		37,500

Neighborhood 4

Basketball court w/ fencing	7,600	
Clothes poles (8)	400	
Parking area	10,000	
Seeding	800	
Shrub plantings	10,000	
Sitting area and trellis	8,000	
Tot play area	3,000	
Trash enclosures (2)	<u>4,000</u>	
		43,800

Neighborhood 5

Basketball court w/ fence	7,600	
Clothes poles (8)	400	
Court paving	15,000	
Fence w/ gate (2 sections)	5,000	
Parking area	6,000	
Seeding	700	
Shrub plantings	14,000	
Sitting areas w/ trellis	16,000	
Tot play area	3,000	
Trash enclosures	<u>4,000</u>	
		71,700

Neighborhood 6

Clothes poles (10)	\$ 500
Court paving	7,200
Seeding	700
Shrub plantings	7,250
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000
Tot play area	3,000
Trash enclosure	<u>2,000</u>

28,650

Neighborhood 7

Entrance area development at highrise building	4,500
Seeding	800
Shrub plantings	9,550
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000
Tot play area	<u>4,000</u>
	26,850
Controlled entranceway, lobby and elevator	<u>150,000</u>

176,850

Neighborhood 8

Entrance area development at highrise building	4,500
New section of sidewalk	2,600
Seeding	800
Shrub plantings	8,850
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000
Tot play area	<u>4,000</u>
	28,750
Controlled entranceway, lobby and elevator	<u>150,000</u>

178,750

Neighborhood 9

Bermed and planted court	9,000
Court paving	19,150
Seeding	200
Shrub planting	4,400
Sitting area w/ trellis	8,000
Tot play area	<u>4,000</u>
	44,750
Controlled entranceway, lobby and elevator	<u>150,000</u>

194,750

Neighborhood 10

Bermed and planted court	\$ 9,000	
New parking area development	6,000	
Seeding	200	
Shrub plantings	<u>3,350</u>	
	18,550	
Controlled entranceway, lobby and elevator	<u>150,000</u>	
		168,550

Neighborhood 11

Court paving	8,200	
Fence w/ gate (3 locations)	7,500	
Planted court development	15,000	
Seeding	650	
Shrub plantings	13,950	
Sitting areas w/ trellis (2)	16,000	
Tot play areas (2 locations)	6,000	
Trash enclosures	<u>4,000</u>	
		71,300

Neighborhood 12

Court paving	12,200	
Fence w/ gate (2)	5,000	
Seeding	600	
Shrub plantings	23,400	
Sitting areas w/ trellis	16,000	
Tot play areas (2)	7,000	
Trash enclosures (4)	<u>8,000</u>	
		72,200

General Site Improvement Area I

Elementary school age playground	15,000	
Seeding	300	
Shrub plantings	3,400	
2 basketball courts w/ fence	<u>15,200</u>	
		33,900

General Site Improvement Area II

Renovate existing area development	12,000	
Shrub plantings	<u>2,150</u>	
		14,150

General Site Improvement Area III

Basketball courts (2)	\$ 15,000	
Sidewalk paving	8,350	
Sitting area w/ trellis	18,000	
Shrub plantings	<u>1,900</u>	
		43,250
Site lighting for all areas		<u>90,000</u>
SUB TOTAL		1,316,700
Contingencies		71,700
Contractors overhead and profit		<u>157,700</u>
TOTAL		1,546,100

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

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SUMMARY

This report presents a profile of the crime problem at Capper Dwellings, a public housing project in Washington, D.C. The profile is based upon a survey of 168 households concerning their members' criminal victimization experience during the last year. The survey also questioned residents concerning their fear of crime and the extent to which they were altering their behavior as a result of their concern about crime.

William Brill Associates, Inc. (WBA) conducted the survey under contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as a first step in developing a comprehensive plan for Capper Dwellings. The results of the survey provide baseline indicators against which to measure the success of the plan. The findings also assist in the preparation of the plan because they indicate such important planning information as where the crime is taking place and what areas on the site are viewed with the greatest fear on the part of residents. This information in concert with other data presently being gathered by WBA forms the vulnerability analysis--a research and planning methodology that identifies the vulnerability of housing environments to crime.

Repeated victimization was very high in Capper Dwellings. Of the 50 households (29.7 percent of the sample) that experienced a crime during the preceding year, 75 percent had been victimized more than once.

The survey findings reveal a victimization rate substantially higher in most categories than the nation as a whole and higher, on a national basis, than that of similar income groups. Robbery, for instance, took place more than five times as often in Capper Dwellings than among low-income persons nationally. Findings also reveal that victimization in the Washington projects is higher in most categories than that of similar income groups elsewhere in Washington and higher than that of Washington as a whole. Residents of Capper Dwellings experienced twice the robberies that other low-income Washingtonians did and nearly twice the successful burglaries.

The findings also show an extraordinarily high fear rate--one that is even out of proportion to the threat as determined by the actual victimization experience of the residents. Seventy-four percent of the respondents felt their chances of being robbed during the coming year were 50/50 or better. The actual incidence was less than 5 in 100.

The survey also showed that residents constrained their use of the environment and their participation in social activities because of their concern about crime. They did not,

for example, move as freely throughout the site as they would prefer. Many residents were so concerned about crime that they had purchased means of self-protection.

Subsequent reports to be prepared on Capper Dwellings will present related analyses of the crime problem as well as the components of a comprehensive security plan for the project. The plan will represent a demonstration of the planning and research concepts developed by WBA under HUD funding. For the most part, these concepts hold that any successful security plan must be based upon a thorough understanding of the problem, utilizing such data as contained in this report and must contain a reinforcing mix of social as well as physical improvements.

The following report reviews the purpose and general findings of the survey, describes the method employed, and presents detailed information on victimization and its location, as well as data on resident fear of crime and altered behavior. It also details tenants' proposals to improve security. The analysis compares Capper Dwellings with other public housing projects surveyed by WBA.

INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

This report presents the findings of a household survey administered to a sample of residents of Capper Dwellings, a public housing project in Washington, D.C., operated by the Property Management Administration of the D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development.

The survey was administered by William Brill Associates, Inc. (WBA), under contract with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The survey measured residents' criminal victimization experience, their fear of crime, and their behavior alterations because of their concern about crime.

The findings of the survey are meant to provide a profile of the crime problem in Capper Dwellings that can be used as a basis for planning and evaluating improvements designed to increase security.

The findings are a part of a larger effort being undertaken by WBA. Under a contract with HUD, the firm is preparing comprehensive security plans for housing projects in three cities. These plans will provide a full field test of approaches to security planning developed under earlier HUD contracts.¹

The survey is designed to meet the need for a clear understanding of the crime problem. Findings generated by the survey, such as where victimizations occur and which areas of the site the residents regard fearfully, are now being used by WBA in the planning of a comprehensive security program for Capper Dwellings. This plan, nearing completion, will include recommendations concerning site improvements and improvements in police and related social services.

The survey findings will also provide a basis for evaluating the success of the reconstruction plan. If, for example, a resurvey of Capper Dwellings (scheduled to take place after the improvements have been implemented) indicates a drop in victimization, fear, and/or altered behavior--the factors covered by the survey--then the plan can reliably be judged successful.

¹The WBA approach, which stresses a mix of social and physical improvements is discussed in some detail in the Housing Management Technical Memorandum no. 1, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 1975).

The remainder of this report consists of six sections. The first describes the methodology followed in conducting the study. The next three present data on victimization and its location, data on resident fear of crime, and data on the extent to which residents are altering their behavior because of their fear of crime. The fifth section covers related issues such as the problems tenants perceive as existing in the projects and their proposals on how to make Capper Dwellings more secure. The final section compares the data from this survey with findings from WBA's research in housing developments in Dade County, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; Baltimore, Maryland; and Los Angeles, California.

CAPPER DWELLINGS

Capper Dwellings is a large public housing project in Southeast Washington. Although under a single management, it is composed of three geographically distinct projects: Ellen Wilson, Carrollsburg, and Arthur Capper. Figure 1 shows the location of the three projects.

Wilson, a small project composed of mixed two-story townhouses and two- and three-story walk-up apartment buildings is separated from the other two projects by an elevated freeway. Carrollsburg, composed principally of three-story walk-ups with some rows of townhouses, is flanked east, west, and north by Arthur Capper. The eastern portion of Arthur Capper consists of four six-story elevator buildings and a nine-story double building that is vacant in preparation for conversion to housing for the elderly. The western portion of Capper is composed of two-story townhouses, one block of which is north of Carrollsburg.




GENERAL FINDINGS

Table 1 compares the findings on victimization with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) findings for the nation as a whole and for Washington, D.C. Comparisons are made for both low-income levels and all-income levels.

While robbery is more common among low-income persons generally, the robbery rate in the three Washington projects was more than double that of the Washington low-income population as a whole, more than five times the national rate for low-income persons and more than six and a half times the national rate for all incomes. The high rate in Capper Dwellings is part of a pattern in which robbery rates are higher in public housing than elsewhere.

The three projects also experienced burglary far more frequently than either Washington as a whole or low-income Washingtonians, although the Washington projects showed the

Figure 1.--Arther Capper Dwellings

-  Carrollsburg
-  Arthur Capper
-  Ellen Wilson




Table 1.--Comparison of crime rate

Rate per 1,000 population 12 and older	LEAA				WBA Capper Dwellings
	National ^a		Washington ^b		
	All incomes	Income less than \$7,500	All incomes	Income less than \$7,500	
Robbery	6.9	8.9	17.0	21.3	48.0
Purse snatching	3.2	...	12.0	16.7	10.6
Assault	26.0	31.6	13.0	17.7	16.0
Sexual assault	1.0	1.6	1.0	2.7	8.0
Rate per 1,000 households					
Burglary	92.7	101.9 ^c	74.9	78.7 ^d	500.0
Successful burglary	72.0	78.5 ^c	51.7	51.7 ^d	95.2
Attempted burglary	20.7	23.4 ^c	23.2	27.0 ^d	404.8
Larceny	109.3	102.4	51.0	37.9	101.2

^aLaw Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization In the United States: 1973 Advance Report, vol. 1, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

^bLaw Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization Surveys In 13 American Cities, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

^cData obtained in advance of publication. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization in the United States: 1973, (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, July 1976).

^dData obtained in advance of publication. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization Surveys In Washington, D.C.--Survey Data Tables and Selected Analytical Findings, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1976).

.... Not available.

lowest rate of successful burglary of all the public housing projects surveyed. The Capper Dwellings rate was also higher than the rate for low-income households nationally or for households of all incomes sampled by LEAA.

The rate of attempted burglary in the three projects was extremely high compared to either the Washington or the national figures. It was almost 20 times the national rate and was the highest of all the public housing projects surveyed. The high attempted burglary rate coupled with the relatively low successful burglary rate experienced by Capper Dwellings in comparison with other public housing projects surveyed, may indicate that units in Capper Dwellings are more resistant to forcible entry even though they are attacked at a higher rate than other projects.

Households in the three projects experienced larceny at a rate considerably higher than for Washington as a whole and much higher than for other low-income households in the city. These rates are comparable to national rates, perhaps as a result of the separation of mailbox break-ins from larcenies in the data. Such incidents would generally be included as household larcenies by LEAA. Such inclusion would make the Washington larceny rate more than triple the national low-income rate.

Taken together, these figures suggest that the residents of these three projects are more subject to robbery, burglary (successful or attempted), and larceny than Washingtonians overall or even low-income Washingtonians.

The assault rate was the only category in which the Washington project had a lower rate than that for low-income persons nationally. The rate was also somewhat lower than that in the public housing projects surveyed in other cities. The Capper Dwellings rate is about the same as for the Washington low-income population and considerably lower than for the nation as a whole.

While the crime rate is high in Capper Dwellings, the residents' fear of these crimes is far higher. More than 83 percent of the Washington respondents felt that there was a 50/50 chance or better of being the victim of a burglary in the year ahead. Seventy-four percent felt the chances of being robbed in the year ahead were 50/50 or better. The actual chances of robbery are 5 in 100, far less.

Fears such as these lead residents to attempt to reduce their risk of victimization. Such attempts are likely to take the form of physical and/or social withdrawal. In the Washington projects, more than half the respondents refuse to shop at night or to go out alone at night because they are afraid of becoming a crime victim.

Almost three-fourths of those with children, moreover, try to keep them in at night lest something happen to them. Such behaviors constitute withdrawal from the physical environment, leaving the public spaces to be occupied by others without legitimate claim to the space and who may engage in illicit activities. More than one in five respondents restrict visits to friends and relatives in the project because they are afraid of crime. This constitutes a form of social withdrawal. Such withdrawal and related fears of the other residents reduce mutual recognition among residents, weaken the mechanisms of social control, and reduce the chances of mutual support in time of trouble.

Reduced social cohesion and surrendering the environment leave the way open to intruders, illicit activities, and victimization, and reduce the legitimate residents' ability to protect and support one another. Thus, a cycle develops in which fear of crime contributes to both social and physical withdrawal, which leaves the way open to further victimization and increased fear.

METHODOLOGY

DIMENSIONS OF THE SURVEY

Residents were surveyed along three dimensions: victimization, fear of crime, and altered behavior.

Victimization

This dimension measured three kinds of victimization:

1. Personal victimization--robbery, purse snatching, assault, and sexual assault suffered by residents.
2. Victimization against the housing unit--burglary (attempted or successful), and vandalism suffered by residents.
3. Victimization involving personal property loss--larceny, deliberate car damage, and mailbox break-ins suffered by residents.

In contrast to police data, this dimension measured what the sampled residents actually experienced as victims of criminal acts, not simply those incidents that were reported to the police.

Fear of crime

This dimension measured the degree respondents feared for themselves and their children and regarded their environment as dangerous and threatening. Respondents were asked to assess the probability that they might be the victims of various crimes in the year ahead and about their concern for the safety of their children in various areas and situations, such as being in the project or on the way to school. They were also asked to rate the dangerousness of a variety of areas and activities. A projective question was asked about whether they thought "people" should get something to protect themselves and, if so, what they should get.

Altered behavior

This dimension concerned the extent to which people were altering their behavior in an effort to improve their security. Indicators of altered behavior included the extent to which respondents were constraining the use of their environment by not visiting friends, going out, or shopping at night. Also identi-

fied were other measures respondents took to limit their vulnerability to attack, such as how often they used taxis, or if they had installed extra locks at their own expense, or acquired weapons.

RELATED ISSUES

The survey also explored a number of additional items related to the crime problem, such as whether the police came when notified of a crime, the problems the residents thought most serious throughout the project, and the improvements the residents thought would make their complex a safer place to live.

RATIONALE FOR SURVEY DIMENSIONS

Victimization, fear, and altered behavior were selected because these dimensions effectively comprise an operational definition of the crime problem. They are both relevant and precise. Victimization measures what has happened to people. Fear measures one of the most powerful and most anxiety-producing reactions to the problem. Altered behavior measures how people are changing their behavior because of the problem--making changes that usually involve constraining their use of the environment and limiting their social relationships.

These dimensions thus comprise appropriate baseline indicators against which to measure change over time. If, for example, a resurvey of the population indicates a drop in victimization, fear, or altered behavior, then the new security program can fairly be judged to be a success. In any case, evaluative judgements on the crime problem, because of the survey related in this report, will be based on hard, factual data, not on hearsay or impression.

THE SAMPLE

Table 2 shows the selected sample of 168 households, 22 percent of the households who had lived in the project one year or more, stratified by the number of bedrooms per unit. An interview with the head of each sample household was obtained in all but 13 cases.² Interviews took place during November and December 1975 and concerned events that took place during the previous 12 months (November 1974 to November 1975).

²In these 13 cases, another resident adult was substituted due to the continued unavailability of the head of the household.

Respondents ranged in age from 19 to 75. More than 90 percent of the respondents were female. Most respondents (78.4 percent) had not worked during the previous 12 months. Of those that had jobs, most had full-time jobs.

The sampled households included 266 adults and 280 children. Of the children, 109 were 12 years of age or older. Personal victimization rates relate to those 375 persons over the age of 12, a population base similar to that used by LEAA.

Table 2.--Households sampled

Size of unit	Arthur Capper	Ellen Wilson	Carrollsburg	Total
1 Bedroom	8	13	21	42
2 Bedroom	45	8	41	94
3 Bedroom	16	6	5	27
4 Bedroom	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>
Total units sampled	74	27	67	168
Total units in project	336	123	303	762

THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

The survey instrument, developed and used to construct the profile presented in this report was previously applied in Dade County, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; and West Palm Beach, Florida. Concurrent with its application in Washington, the instrument was also applied in projects in Los Angeles and Baltimore. The instrument was modified to make it sensitive to the specific design and layout characteristics of each of the housing projects.

In administering the survey instrument public housing residents were recruited and trained as interviewers and validators. Previous experience found that public housing residents can be reliable, insightful, and disciplined interviewers and validators.

VICTIMIZATIONS

The categories of victimization used here are a refinement of the system used by the Uniform Crime Reporting System of the FBI. Personal crimes are those against the individual. Property crimes are divided into crimes against the housing unit itself and crimes involving personal property loss but not involving the housing unit directly. The categories used in this survey are defined as follows:

- . Personal victimization--crimes against the individual. These include robbery, purse snatching, sexual assault, and assault.
- . Victimization against the housing unit--crimes directed against the household. They include burglary (attempted or successful) and vandalism.
- . Victimizations involving personal property loss--crimes that occur outside the household unit but normally on project property. These include larceny, deliberate car damage, and mailbox break-in.

DEFINITIONS OF CRIMES

The following definitions describe the crimes covered in the survey:

Assault--an unlawful physical attack by one person upon another

Burglary--unlawful or forcible entry of the home usually, but not necessarily, attended by theft; may be successful or merely attempted

Deliberate car damage--apparent willful damage done to an automobile by someone other than the owner

Larceny--the theft or attempted theft of property or cash from the immediate vicinity of a unit, involving neither forcible nor unlawful entry

Mailbox break-in--the theft or attempted theft of the contents of a locked mailbox

Purse snatching--the theft of purse, wallet, or cash directly from the person of the victim but without force or threat of force (corresponding to personal larceny with contact)

Robbery--the theft or attempted theft of property or cash directly from an individual by force or threat, with or without a weapon

Sexual assault--carnal knowledge through the use of force or the threat of force, including attempts

Vandalism--apparently deliberate damage done to the unit by someone not living in it.

SCOPE OF INQUIRY

For each of the crime categories, respondents were asked whether they or any member of their household had been a victim of that particular crime between November 1974 and November 1975 and, if so, the number of occurrences.

A series of specific questions was then asked about the last victimization, including:

1. The time of the incident
2. The location of the incident
3. The value of property stolen or damaged
4. The number of victims and the extent of their injuries
5. Whether the police came to the project to investigate.

VICTIMIZATION SUMMARY

As shown in table 3, of the 168 households surveyed, 50 households (29.7) percent) experienced one or more criminal incidents during the previous year.

Table 3.--Households victimized

Frequency of victimization	Number of households victimized	Percentage of sample households (N=168)
Units victimized once	13	7.7
Units victimized more than once	<u>37</u>	<u>22.0</u>
Total units victimized	50	29.7

Thirteen households were victimized once during the previous year. Thirty-seven households were the victims of repeated incidents of the same type or of one or more incidents of different types during the previous year.

Table 4 presents a summary of victimization by type of crime for the three projects combined. Attempted burglary was, by far, the most common crime, affecting 21 percent of the households and accounting for nearly 35 percent of the total incidents. Mailbox break-ins, a form of household larceny, were also very frequent, affecting nearly 18 percent of the households sampled and accounting for 19 percent of the total incidents. In table 4 the column "Number of households victimized" does not sum to the total units victimized shown in table 3 because many units were the victims of diverse crimes and therefore appear more than once.

Table 4.--Summary of victimization

Crime	Number households victimized	Percentage of sample households (N=168)	Total number of incidents	Percentage of total incidents
Robbery	12	7.1	18	9.2
Purse snatching ^a	4	2.4	4	2.0
Assault	4	2.4	6	3.1
Sexual assault	3	1.8	3	1.5
Successful burglary	10	6.0	16	8.1
Attempted burglary	36	21.4	68	34.7
Larceny	10	6.0	17	8.7
Vandalism	9	5.4	20	10.2
Mailbox break-in	30	17.9	38	19.4
Deliberate car damage	3	1.8	6	3.1

^aNo data were collected on separate incidents.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

PERSONAL VICTIMIZATIONS

Victimizations in this category are crimes against the person, including robbery, purse snatching, assault, and sexual assault. This type of crime accounted for 15.8 percent of the total incidents reported to the interviewers. Except for the number of occurrences, all detailed data that follow refer to the last-reported incident only.

Robbery

Of all personal victimizations, robbery was the most frequent, as table 4 shows, constituting 58 percent of the 31 crimes against individuals.

Twelve households experienced a total of 18 robberies during the preceding year (three households experienced more than one robbery). Note that only the last robbery in each of the 12 households is described below.

There were 14 victims in the 12 most recent cases (two were double robberies). Nine victims were male and five were female. Their ages ranged from 15 to 73. Twelve victims received no injury while two were treated for injuries and released.

Losses ranged from nothing to \$105. Ten of the 12 robberies took place in the project, with two near it. The highest concentrations of robberies were on Wednesdays and Fridays. All but one robbery took place in the afternoon or evening. No robberies occurred between the hours of 11 p.m. and 11 a.m.

Ten of the 12 robbers were estimated by the victims to be younger than 21 years of age. Two of the 10 robbers were female.

Nine robberies were reported to the police. In each case the police responded, taking an average of 14 minutes to arrive, according to the victims. One victim went to the police station the next day to report the robbery (this incident is not counted in the arrival time).

Purse snatching

In addition to the foregoing robberies, four households experienced purse snatchings. Half of the most recent incidents took place within the project and the others occurred nearby. The rate, standardized per thousand persons 12 years of age and older, was 10.6. This, however, is a minimum since respondents were asked only if an incident had occurred, not how often the crime took place.

Table 5.--Robbery

Households victimized once	9
Households victimized more than once	<u>3</u>
Total households victimized	12
Total incidents	18
Rate per 1,000 population, 12 and older	48

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Victims (N=14)		
Incidents		
One victim	10	83
Multiple victims	2	17
Sex		
Male	9	64
Female	5	36
Age		
Mean	37	
Range	15-73	
Injuries		
None	11	79
Treated and released	2	14
No answer	1	7
Losses		
Mean	\$32	
Range	\$0-105	
Time and place of robbery		
Hours		
1-6 a.m.	0	0
7-noon	1	8
1-6 p.m.	6	50
7-midnight	5	42
Day		
Monday	1	8
Tuesday	1	8
Wednesday	4	34
Friday	4	34
Saturday	1	8
No answer	1	8

Table 5.--Robbery (contd.)

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Time and place of robbery (contd.)		
Month		
January-March	2	17
April-June	2	17
July-September	4	33
October-December	3	25
No answer	1	8
Location		
In the project	10	83
Near the project	2	17
Robbers		
Age		
15-17	3	25
18-30	6	50
21+	1	8
Unsure	2	17
Sex		
Male	10	83
Female	2	17
Police		
Notified		
Yes ^a	9	75
No	3	25
Came if notified		
Yes	8	100
Time to arrive		
Mean	14 minutes	
Range	4-45 minutes	

^aOne victim went to the precinct the next day and is not included in the remaining figures.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Assault

Six assaults took place against the members of four households. The four most recent incidents included a total of six victims. Half the victims were male and half were female. Victims were generally young, averaging 23 years of age, but ranged up to 41 years of age. Although most victims received little or no injury, one victim was killed.

All four assaults occurred in the late afternoon and early evening. Two occurred in the summer (June and July) and two in the late fall (November and December). Two assaults took place on Thursdays and two on Saturdays.

The victims reported that three of the four assailants were male; one assailant was between 18 and 20 and the other three were older than 21. All used weapons.

Of the four most recent incidents, three were reported to police. Police responded in less than 10 minutes, averaging five minutes.

One "assault" involved a conflict with a police officer. Not wishing to prejudge the incident, the information is included in table 6.

Sexual assault

Three incidents were reported. One victim refused to discuss any details. The remaining victims were 18-year-old females. The two assaults occurred at night, one on Sunday and the other on Wednesday. Only one of the two incidents described was reported to the police. The victim estimated the response time at 15 minutes.

One victim reported the assailant to be 21 or older, while the other victim was uncertain of the age of the assailant. Table 7 gives more information.

VICTIMIZATIONS AGAINST THE HOUSING UNIT

The second category of victimizations included in the survey consisted of crimes committed against the household. These were vandalism and burglary. Except for the number of occurrences, all data that follow refer to the most recent incident only.

Table 6.--Assault

Households victimized once	2
Households victimized more than once	<u>2</u>
Total households victimized	4
Total incidents	6
Rate per 1,000 population, 12 and older	16

	<u>Number</u>
Victims (N=6)	
Incidents	
One victim	2
Multiple victims	2
Sex	
Male	3
Female	3
Age	
Mean	23
Range	16-41
Injuries	
None	1
Minor	3
Treated and released	1
Killed	1
Time and place of assault	
Hours	
4 p.m.	1
5 p.m.	1
7 p.m.	1
8 p.m.	1
Day	
Thursday	2
Saturday	2
Month	
June	1
July	1
November	1
December	1

Table 6.--Assault (contd.)

	<u>Number</u>
Time and place of assault (contd.)	
Location	
In the project	3
Near the project	1
Assailants ^a	
Age	
18-20	1
21+	3
Sex	
Male	3
Female	1
Weapon used	
Yes	4
No	0
Police	
Notified	
Yes	3
No	1
Came if notified	
Yes	3
No	0
Time to arrive	
Mean 5 minutes	
Range 0-10 minutes	

^aOne alleged "assailant" was a uniformed police officer, male and over 21.

Table 7.--Sexual assault

Households victimized once	3
Households victimized more than once	<u>0</u>
Total households victimized ^a	3
Total incidents	3
Rate per 1,000 population, 12 and older	8
	<u>Number</u>
Victims (N=2) ^a	
Incidents	
One victim	2
Sex	
Female	2
Age	
Mean	18
Range	18
Injuries	
None	1
Treated and released	1
Time and place of sexual assault	
Hour	
9 p.m.	1
1 a.m.	1
Day	
Sunday	1
Wednesday	1
Month	
February	1
May	1
Location	
In the project	1
Near the project	1
Assailant	
Age	
21 +	1
Unknown	1
Police	
Notified	
Yes	1
No	1
Came if notified	
Yes	1
Time to arrive: 15 minutes	

^aOne victim refused to give any further information.

Burglary: successful and attempted

These were the most frequent crimes occurring within the scope and time frame of this study, accounting for 43 percent of the total number of incidents. Ten households experienced 16 successful burglaries, and 36 households had 68 attempted burglaries.

As table 8 shows, of the 10 victimized households, 4 were successfully burglarized once and 6 more than once. The following data refer to the 10 most recent successful burglaries.

Six of the incidents occurred during the day and four at night. No clear pattern of day or month emerged.

Losses ranged from none to \$350, averaging \$138.

Of the 10 households, 4 were entered through the front door, 2 through front windows, and 4 through back windows. Three of the four entries through doors resulted in damage. One entry through a door took such little force as to indicate the door may have been unlocked. One of the window entries required cutting a screen.

Seven households sustained damage. Damage to three households was completely repaired by the management. In two other households, management made some repairs, and no repairs were made in the remaining two.

Repairs to two households took more than 3 weeks; one repair was completed in 6 to 10 days; two were repaired in 1 to 2 days.

The police were informed in 7 of the 10 cases and investigated in each case. Their time to arrive, when called, ranged from 5 to 60 minutes, averaging 27 minutes.

Vandalism

Nine households suffered a total of 20 incidents of vandalism. Seven of the nine victimized households were vandalized more than once. The majority of incidents (eight) occurred between June and September. Five households reported losses, ranging from nothing to \$123, with a mean loss of \$46.20. The police were notified in six incidents and responded in each case. The response times reported by victims ranged from 5 to 90 minutes, with a mean of 20 minutes. Table 9 gives further details.

VICTIMIZATIONS INVOLVING PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSS

The third category of crimes surveyed was crimes involving the loss of personal property. These crimes included larceny,

Table 8.--Successful burglary

Households victimized once	4
Households victimized more than once	<u>6</u>
Total households victimized	10
Total incidents	16
Rate per 1,000 households	95.2

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Time of burglary		
Day	6	60
Night	4	40
Day		
Sunday	1	10
Monday	1	10
Tuesday	1	10
Wednesday	2	20
Thursday	2	20
Friday	2	20
No answer	1	10
Month		
January	1	10
April	1	10
May	1	10
June	2	20
July	1	10
August	1	10
September	1	10
October	1	10
November	1	10

Burglary losses
 Mean \$138
 Range \$0-350

Method of entry		
Front door	4	40
Front window	2	20
Back window	4	40

Table 8.--Successful burglary (contd.)

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Damage		
Items damaged ^a		
None	3	
Doors	3	
Windows	3	
Screens	1	
Paint	1	
Damage repaired by management		
None	2	20
Some	2	20
All	3	30
No damage	3	30
Time for repairs		
2 weeks +	2	40
6-10 days	1	20
1-2 days	2	40
Police		
Notified		
Yes	7	70
No	3	30
Came if notified		
Yes	7	100
Time to arrive		
Mean 27 minutes		
Range 5-60 minutes		

^aSome had mutiple damage.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

deliberate car damage, and mailbox break-ins. Except for the number of occurrences, all detailed data that follow refer to the last-reported incident only.

Larceny

Table 10 details the 17 larcenies suffered by 10 households during the year. Three households experienced more than one larceny. Eleven of the larcenies took place in the townhouses. The small, territorial yards in these units may lead people to leave property outside temporarily, during which time it can be stolen.

Some losses were quite high, ranging up to \$420 in value and averaging \$151. Only 30 percent of the larcenies were reported to the police. The time for police to respond ranged from 6 to 30 minutes, with a mean of 18 minutes.

Deliberate car damage

Only 17 households reported owning cars. Parked cars belonging to three separate households were reported as being deliberately damaged in six incidents during the year covered by the survey. The damage was generally done at night (67 percent) and in the early part of the week. One incident resulted in no dollar loss and another in damage totaling \$25. The third respondent did not know but estimated the damage at more than \$100. The police were notified in two of the three most recent cases: in one case, the victim went to the police station to report the crime; in the other, the police responded in 8 minutes

Mailbox break-ins

Thirty households experienced 38 mailbox break-ins, according to table 12. Seven were victimized more than once.

The greatest single number of incidents (six) occurred in November. Most incidents took place on Wednesdays, none on Sundays when there are no mail deliveries. Seven incidents were reported to postal authorities and six to police. Although seven incidents were reported, only two were known to have been investigated by the Post Office. Mailbox damage was repaired by the management in 18 cases.

POLICE NOTIFICATION

Of a total of 80 crimes for which detailed data were collected, 37 incidents (46 percent) were reported to the police. Robbery, assault, and burglary were the crimes most frequently

Table 10.--Larceny

Households victimized once	7
Households victimized more than once	<u>3</u>
Total households victimized	10
Total incidents	17
Rate per 1,000 households	101.2

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Time of larceny		
Day	5	50
Night	5	50
Day		
Monday	1	10
Tuesday	2	20
Wednesday	4	40
Thursday	1	10
Friday	1	10
Saturday	1	10
Month ^a		
January	1	11
June	2	22
July	2	22
September	1	11
November	3	33
Losses		
Mean	\$151	
Range	\$10-420	
Police		
Notified		
Yes	3	30
No	7	70
Came if notified		
Yes	3	100
Time to arrive		
Mean	18 minutes	
Range	6-30 minutes	

^aOne could not specify month.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 11.--Deliberate car damage

Households victimized once	1
Households victimized more than once	<u>2</u>
Total households victimized	3
Total incidents	6
Rate per 1,000 households	35.7
Rate per 1,000 car owners	352.9

	<u>Number</u>
Time	
Day	1
Night	2
Day	
Sunday	2
Wednesday	1
Month	
September	2
November	1

Losses: \$0, \$25 and \$100+(guess)

Police	
Notified	
Yes	2
No	1
Time to arrive: ^a 8 minutes	

^aOne went to get the police.

Table 12.--Mailbox break-ins

Households victimized once	23
Households victimized more than once	<u>7</u>
Total households victimized	30
Total incidents	38
Rate per 1,000 households	226.2

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Time of mailbox break-ins ^a		
Day		
Monday	3	10
Tuesday	3	10
Wednesday	7	23
Thursday	1	3
Friday	4	13
Saturday	3	10
Month		
January	2	7
February	1	3
March	3	10
April	2	7
June	3	10
July	3	10
August	2	7
September	2	7
October	1	3
November	6	20
December	4	13
Repairs completed		
All	17	57
Some	1	3
None	12	40
Still using box		
Yes	23	77
No	7	23

Table 12.--Mailbox break-ins (contd.)

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Police		
Notified		
Yes	6	20
No	24	80
Came if notified		
Yes	6	100
Time to arrive		
Mean 48 minutes		
Range 5-120 minutes		
Post Office		
Notified		
Yes	7	
No	23	
Investigation		
Yes	2	29
No	5	71

^aMany could not remember details.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

reported. Mailbox break-ins and larcenies were the least frequently reported. Thirteen of the 18 crimes against persons (72 percent) were reported to police, while only 39 percent of the 60 crimes involving property loss was reported.

Table 13 breaks down reporting frequency for all categories and table 14 presents the reasons given for not reporting crimes to police.

The most common reason for not reporting a crime was the feeling that nothing could be done, that there was no evidence to use. This may indicate a feeling of helplessness, perhaps related to the high fear levels.

Another often-stated reason was that the incident was reported to someone else, perhaps the management office. This may reflect a feeling that police action would not be effective, further indicating feelings of helplessness. Four of the six "other" responses were related to failure to report mailbox break-ins. Two said they fixed the box themselves, implying that getting the boxes repaired would be the only reason to report the crime. One thought the office would report it. One robbery victim was afraid the police would not respond.

Table 13.--Police notification

By type of crime; last incidents only

Crime	Police not told	Police told	Total (last incidents)	Percentage of incidents reported to police
Robbery	3	9	12	75
Assault	1	3	4	75
Sexual assault	1	1	2	50
Burglary	3	7	10	70
Larceny	7	3	10	30
Mailbox break-in	24	6	30	20
Vandalism	3	6	9	66
Deliberate car damage	1	2	3	66
	—	—	—	—
Total	43	37	80	46

Table 14.--Reasons given for not informing police of crime^a

Reason	Number	Percent
Nothing could be done; lack of proof	20	35.1
Not important enough	6	10.5
Police would not want to be bothered	4	7.0
Did not want to take the time; inconvenient	1	1.8
Private or personal	1	1.8
Did not want to get involved	1	1.8
Fear of reprisal	1	1.8
Reported to someone else	17	29.7
Other	<u>6</u>	<u>10.5</u>
Total	57	100.0


^aSome gave more than one reason, so number of reasons is greater than number of crimes not reported to police.

LOCATIONAL ANALYSIS OF VICTIMIZATION

The survey instrument is environmentally specific--it indicates the specific location of the criminal act. Such data is potentially rich to the planner because of the possibility that a relationship can be established between the physical design features of the site, e.g. highrise-low-rise, end unit-interior unit, etc., and the probability of victimization. Should such a relationship be found to exist, resources can be targeted toward those units that have the highest probability of being victimized and toward those areas on the site that have the highest probability of being the scene of a criminal act.

To determine if there was a relationship between the physical and design characteristics of Arthur Capper Dwellings and the incidence of crime, the survey data was extensively analyzed. As shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4, the location of each reported victimization was plotted on maps of the various sections of Arthur Capper. Every reported incident of burglary (attempted and successful), larceny, vandalism, and mailbox theft is shown on these maps. The location of reported incidents of robbery, assault, rape, purse snatching and auto damage are shown for the last reported incident only. Figure 2 shows the victimizations

Figure 2.--Patterns of Victimization
Arthur Capper Dwellings (Highrises)



PATTERNS OF VICTIMIZATION

- | | |
|--------------------|----|
| Burglary | B |
| Assault | A |
| Rape | RA |
| Larceny | L |
| Auto Damage | AD |
| Vandalism | V |
| Robbery | RB |
| Attempted Burglary | AB |
| Purse Snatching | PS |
| Mail Box Theft | MB |

number indicates floor level of victimized unit
53 households surveyed
24 victimizations
victimizations occurred between November 1974
& November 1975


ARTHUR CAPPER DWELLINGS (Highrise)

D.C. Department of Housing
and Community Development
Property Management Administration

WILLIAM BRILL ASSOCIATES, INC

0 20 40 60 80ft NORTH

Figure 3.--Patterns of Victimization
 Carrollsburg Dwellings and
 Arthur Capper Dwellings
 (Lowrisers)



reported by respondents in the Arthur Capper highrises; figure 3 shows the victimizations reported in Carrollsburg and the Arthur Capper lowrises; and figure 4 shows the reported victimizations in Ellen Wilson.

Building design

Forty-five interviews were conducted in townhouse units, 70 in walk-up buildings and 53 in highrises. This segment discusses differences in victimization among these three types of buildings. Figure 5 shows the distribution of these building types in Capper Dwellings.

Townhouses

The townhouse units are all two-story units with front and rear windows and doors. The townhouses of Arthur Capper form hollow squares³ around interior courts. The courts contain small yards, clothes lines, parking lots, and garbage bins. The arrangement of the townhouses in Wilson and Carrollsburg is varied.

As table 15 shows, vandalism occurs at a much higher rate in the townhouses than in the other building types. This, however, may be an artifact of the respondent's perception of his space. The townhouse has a large surface area which can only be viewed as part of the unit. If an obscenity is painted on the wall, it is painted on the resident's wall. In a walk-up or highrise, it is painted in the hallway.

Likewise, townhouses have yards which are inherent to the individual unit. If a rosebush in this non-public space is ripped up, it is the resident's rosebush that is destroyed. If this were to happen in the yard around a walk-up unit or by a highrise building, it would be the management's problem, not affecting the individual resident directly. Thus, the higher reported rates of vandalism in the townhouses may result from the townhouse dweller's different perception of what is his "own" rather than from an actual difference in intentional injury to property.




Table 15.--Vandalism by building type


	Townhouse		Walk-up		Highrise		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Number of incidents	14	70.0	1	5.0	5	25.0	20	100.0
Distribution of interviews	45	26.8	70	41.7	53	31.5	168	100.0

Note.--Chi²=20.6553; $\alpha < .001$

³One block is triangular.

Figure 2.--Building types in
Capper Dwellings

-  Townhouses
-  Walk-ups
-  Highrises



The townhouses experienced significantly more total burglary attempts than would be expected by chance. (See table 16.) Apparently, these units appear vulnerable to attack, perhaps because of their greater window and door area compared to that of walk-ups and highrises. These attempts, however, were far less successful in the townhouses than in the other types of buildings. The success rate for burglary against townhouses (3.0 percent) was far lower than for either highrises (27.0 percent) or for walk-ups (27.8 percent)⁴

According to the property manager, there is no difference in hardware that might make the townhouses less vulnerable.

Apparently, residents of the townhouse define the area immediately surrounding their unit as "theirs" as was discussed in reference to vandalism above. This creates a "zone of transition" between the private space inside the residents' home and the more public spaces of the street. Here residents may linger and observe the activities of others, improving casual surveillance of the areas surrounding the townhouses. In addition, the semi-public nature of this space means that an occupant of the space must be recognized as legitimate or else attract the attention of other residents. This greater susceptibility to challenge may make burglars more shy and more likely to terminate a break-in attempt for fear of discovery.

This suggests that privatization of units in the walk-up and highrise buildings may reduce the rate of successful burglaries.

Table 16.--Burglary attempts^a by building type

	Townhouse		Walk-up		Highrise		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Number of burglary attempts ^a	29	34.5	37	44.1	18	21.4	84	100.
Distribution of interviews	45	26.8	70	71.7	53	31.5	168	100.

^aThis is the sum of successful and attempted burglaries.

Note.--Chi²=20.6553; $\alpha < .001$

⁴A one-tailed difference-of-proportions test of townhouses vs. all others yielded an alpha of less than .0005.

The townhouses in the three projects report more frequent larcenies than the other building types. The semi-public nature of the yards attached to these units may lead residents to temporarily leave items, e.g., a bicycle or lawnchair, in these yards, creating an opportunity for quick thievery. The highrises and walk-ups, with less semi-public or semi-private space, do not present such opportunities.

Table 17.--Larceny by building type

	Townhouse		Walk-up		Highrise		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Number of larcenies	11	64.7	4	23.5	2	11.8	17	100.0
Distribution of interviews	45	26.8	70	41.7	53	31.5	168	100.0

Note.--Chi²=12.5481; $\alpha < .01$

The townhouses experienced no mailbox break-ins for the simple reason that they do not have mailboxes, only mail slots through the door.

No crimes against persons were recorded as taking place inside the townhouse units.

Walk-ups

The walk-up apartment buildings generally consist of three floors connected by flights of narrow, dark stairs. The first floor entries are generally undistinguished openings in the brick wall. A full-sized window admits light to the second floor halls and also exposes much of the hallway to view from the street. The third floor has a window but the angle from the sidewalk prohibits casual observation of activities in the hallway. No door opens to the roof, a scuttle providing the only access. The mailboxes for these units are located in a cluster on the first floor. In some buildings they are built into a brick extension of the exterior wall of the building, while in others they are built flush to the wall of the narrow entry way and are difficult to see from outside.

As table 16 shows, units in walk-up buildings experienced 44.1 percent of the total burglary attempts recorded in Capper Dwellings. The two-story walk-ups in Ellen Wilson had no recorded crimes.

As table 18 shows, burglary attempts in walk-up buildings were concentrated on the first and third floors. First floor apartments had a majority of the 37 burglary attempts (51.4 percent). Eight of these first floor attempts (42 percent) were successful. Only three burglary attempts (8.1 percent) of the total were directed against second floor units and none was successful. Fifteen of the walk-up burglary attempts (40.5 percent) were against third-story units. Fewer of these were successful than on the first floor but the difference was not statistically significant.

The accessible windows of the first floor units may make them attractive targets and greater ease of escape may compensate the burglar for the higher risk of discovery from those frequenting the building.

The second-story provides a poor target, having neither accessible windows nor easy escape, and the chances of detection are relatively high, since the window in the hallway makes activity in the hall partially visible from the street. In addition, those travelling to the third floor might discover the burglar at work.

Activity in the third floor hall cannot be seen from the street, despite the window in the hall. The chance of detection is less. A secondary escape may be provided by loosening the scuttle blocking access to the roof.

Table 18.--Burglary in walk-up buildings

Floor Number	Successful Burglaries		Attempted burglaries		Total burglary attempts	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Third Floor	2	20.0	13	48.2	15	40.5
Second Floor	0	0.0	3	11.1	3	8.1
First Floor	8	80.0	11	40.7	19	51.4
Total burglary attempts for all floors	10	100.0	27	100.0	37	100.0

Note.--Chi²=4.73; $\alpha < .10$

The three-story walk-up units experienced a far higher rate of mailbox break-ins than the highrise units. Their mailboxes are highly exposed to attack.

One purse snatching took place at the door of the respondent's apartment, but no other crimes against persons were recorded within the walk-ups.

Highrises

Four six-story elevator buildings lie on the path between the rest of Capper Dwellings south of the freeway and the shopping areas of 7th and 8th streets, mostly north of the freeway. One building contains the management office, where the mailboxes for the highrise residents are located.

Each building has two or three entrances on opposite sides of the structure. Solid brick surrounds the opaque entry doors. No one approaching these doors has any idea of what lies beyond them.

Behind these buildings is a large open playground and to the south stands the empty shell of the nine-story double building being converted to housing for the elderly.

The highrise buildings show a lower frequency of burglary attempts than do the other buildings. This may be due to the higher proportion of inaccessible windows in these buildings, compared to the other building types. The success rate of these attempts (27.8 percent) was virtually the same as that in the walk-up apartments. No floor-by-floor pattern of burglaries, either attempted or successful, appeared. All the vandalism took place on the first and second floors.

Crimes against the person took place more frequently in highrises than in either the walk-up buildings or the townhouses. Six robberies and two assaults, one fatal, took place inside these structures (lobbies, stairs, hall, elevators) may account for this. All these spaces are partially or totally screened from public view and there is no way to screen intruders out of these spaces.

Geographical patterns

The location of each crime was plotted on maps of the site in an effort to identify any geographic distribution that might be present.

The possible effect of the separation of the Ellen Wilson section from the rest was examined but no significant differences emerged. Apparently, the freeway separating the sections has no effect on the distribution of crime.

In order to examine the location of personal victimization more accurately, the blocks of the three projects were classified according to the type of buildings in the block. It was found that two-thirds of the most recent crimes against persons, principally robberies and purse snatchings, took place in or around the highrise buildings while only 32 percent of the interviews were conducted there. A number of locational factors may, in part, account for this. The highrise buildings lie between the rest of Arthur Capper-Carrollsborg and the shopping area north of the freeway on 7th and 8th streets. These buildings are, in addition, adjacent to the bus stops along Virginia Avenue.

People with money or laden with packages are very likely to be found in this area, providing good targets. Further, the highrise buildings may provide an easy escape for a robber. Opportunities to "disappear" are limited in other areas of the project.

Finally, each crime for which a location could be fixed was plotted block by block and the resulting distribution examined. It was found that in Ellen Wilson, the majority of crime, principally burglary and attempted burglary, took place in two clusters of three-story walk-up buildings. These buildings are set back and separated from the street and, in each case, surround three sides of a court. One group faces south toward Virginia Avenue across a barren expanse of dirt upon which is occasionally parked a car. The other group faces toward 7th Street but is separated from it by two short rows of walk-ups perpendicular to the street. Between these rows is a glass-sprinkled yard. Along the sidewalk small groups, mostly men, cluster to talk and watch the traffic. No one appears to frequent the court between the set-back walk-ups and apparently, few pay any attention to what goes on there.

South of the freeway, three blocks showed unusually high rates of burglary attempts. These are the two bounded by K and L streets between 2nd and 4th streets and the one bounded by L and M between 4th and 5th streets.

A distinctive characteristic shared by these blocks is the relatively heavy traffic to and from schools. The local junior high school lies to the west of the project on I Street. I Street does not go through to the junior high school, and K Street has become a common route to school. The block by M Street, bordered east and west by schools, also lies on a heavily travelled project-to-school route. While this suggests that some of the students are the source of these crimes, it may be that the high traffic flow masks the presence of others engaged in burglary.

Summary findings

WBA identified the following locational factors related to crime at Capper Dwellings:

1. Townhouses reported more vandalism than other building types. This may result from territorial feelings by townhouse dwellers.
2. Townhouses suffered more larcenies than other building types, perhaps because of their attached yards.
3. Townhouses showed a very low proportion of successful burglary compared to the total burglary attempts.
4. Townhouses experienced more burglary attempts than would be expected by chance.
5. Walk-up apartments experienced far more mailbox break-ins than would be expected by chance. They have exposed mailboxes.
6. Burglary attempts in walk-up buildings concentrated on the first and third floor units. Attempts on the first floors were more successful than those of the third.
7. Highrises experienced significantly fewer burglary attempts than the other building types.
8. Crimes against the person, especially robbery and purse snatching occurred more frequently in and around the highrise buildings.
9. Areas subject to casual pedestrian surveillance seemed to incur less crime than other areas.
10. More robberies and purse snatchings seemed to occur in areas where criminals could escape through and into public space with a visual obstruction between the victim and the thief.

FEAR OF CRIME

Four different sets of questions were used to gauge the type and extent of residents' fear of crime. Respondents were asked:

1. What they thought the probability was (greater than 50/50, 50/50, less than 50/50, or almost no chance at all) of their being the victim of any of eight specific crimes during the coming year
2. How much they were worried (very worried, worried, or not worried) about their children being beaten up, robbed, or extorted at school, in the project, or on the way to and from school
3. How they would rate the dangerousness of 16 specific situations on a 6-point scale ("0" signifying very safe and "5" signifying very dangerous)
4. Whether they felt people should carry something to protect themselves and, if so, what they should carry.

PROBABILITY OF FUTURE VICTIMIZATION

Respondents were asked what they thought their chances were of being a victim of eight specific crimes within the next year. Table 19 indicates that crimes involving personal property loss rank as the most likely. More than 83 percent estimated that the chances of having their homes broken into while they were away were 50/50 or better and more than 74 percent felt that the chances of being robbed in the project were 50/50 or better. Vandalism and deliberate car damage were felt to be of higher probability than assault or sexual assault.

FEAR FOR CHILDREN

Another indicant of fear was the worry respondents felt for the children in their household. Respondents were asked how worried they were (not worried, worried, very worried) about their children being assaulted, beaten up, or subject to extortion in three locales: (1) in the project; (2) at school; and (3) going to and from school.

No strong patterns of worry related to particular threats or places emerged in the three projects, except that slightly

Table 19.-- Victimization probability

How respondents rated probability of future victimization

Type of victimization	Greater than		Less than	Almost
	50/50	50/50	50/50	No chance
Percent				
Having your home broken into while you are away	20.8	62.5	11.3	5.4
Having your home broken into while you are at home	7.7	31.5	33.9	26.8
Being robbed in the project	19.8	54.5	13.8	12.0
Being beaten up in the project	13.2	47.3	25.1	14.4
Being sexually assaulted or molested ^a	16.6	23.8	44.4	15.2
Having your car deliberately damaged ^b	17.6	52.9	11.8	17.6
Having your home vandalized	15.5	53.6	18.5	12.5
Having your mailbox broken into	22.8	39.6	17.4	20.1

^aPercentage of women only.

^bHouseholds without cars were not asked this question (N=17).

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

more parents are less worried about extortion than about robbery or assault. This must not be obscure, however, as table 20 shows, that one-fourth of these respondents are very worried about their children's safety, no matter where they are.

DANGEROUSNESS

The measure of dangerousness was found by asking respondents to rate 20 settings and locations on a 6-point scale, ranging from very safe to very dangerous. These locations and social settings included everyday events and everyday places, such as waiting for a bus, talking to a neighbor, or walking across the project. Many of the questions asked how the residents felt about doing these things during the day or at night and alone or with other people.

As table 21 indicates, the respondents find a number of everyday social settings highly dangerous, especially at night. In general, the residents seemed to find situations in which they were visible or protected (in daylight, with another person, within the walls of their own home) much less dangerous than those situations in which they saw themselves as isolated or not easily visible.

The mean dangerousness rating (last column of table 21) shows that no nighttime activity was considered safer than any daytime activity. Being on the streets away from one's home at night is the most dangerous circumstance. The lowest mean dangerousness scores were assigned to situations close to one's home, in open view, or in daylight.

PERSONAL PROTECTION

To measure anxiety further, respondents were asked the projective screening question, "Do you think people should carry something to protect themselves?" Those who said yes were asked what they thought people should carry.

The overwhelming majority (76 percent) felt that people should carry some sort of personal protection. More than half of these (42 percent of all the respondents) mentioned a handgun as appropriate protection. One person suggested a shotgun.

The suggestions listed as "other" included: a dog (suggested by five respondents), hat pin or file, portable alarm, black pepper, or ice pick (one respondent for each suggestion). In addition, two refused to specify but indicated something that would kill. Five said "anything."

Of the respondents, 103 (61.3 percent) felt that people

Table 20.--Fear for children

How worried are you about your children	Not worried	Worried	Very worried
	Percent		
Being beaten			
In the project	33.0	39.8	27.2
Going to and from school	41.7	34.0	24.3
At school	38.8	34.0	27.2
Being robbed			
In the project	40.8	35.9	23.3
Going to and from school	38.8	34.0	27.2
At school	40.8	36.9	22.3
Being forced to pay money for protection			
In the project	47.6	27.2	25.2
Going to and from school	46.6	28.2	25.2
At school	45.6	31.1	23.3

Mean percent very worried, for each area

In the project	25.2
Going to and from school	25.6
At school	24.7

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Table 21.--Dangerousness ladder

Activity	Very safe (0 rating)	Safe (1 rating)	Fairly safe (2 rating)	Fairly dangerous (3 rating)	Dangerous (4 rating)	Very dangerous (5 rating)	Mean rating
At night							
Riding a bus alone	0.0	8.7	15.5	18.6	37.9	19.3	3.4
Waiting for a bus alone	1.2	4.3	22.6	17.1	29.9	25.0	3.5
On your way to shopping	0.0	6.8	18.0	16.8	36.6	21.7	3.5
Walking along the street	0.0	4.8	11.4	15.7	41.0	27.1	3.7
Walking across the project	0.6	7.8	17.5	21.7	31.3	21.1	3.4
Near home and hidden from view ^a	0.6	11.0	19.4	14.8	27.7	26.5	3.4
Near home and in view ^a	0.6	14.4	34.1	15.0	20.4	15.6	2.9
Walking from a bus stop to your house	0.0	5.5	9.8	22.0	36.6	26.2	3.7
Walking from a car to your house	1.2	21.3	39.6	17.1	12.2	8.5	2.4
Alone in your home	3.0	28.7	41.3	10.8	7.8	8.4	2.2
During the day							
Waiting for a bus alone	1.2	23.0	56.4	6.7	9.1	3.6	2.1
On your way to shopping	4.8	31.9	47.0	7.2	6.6	2.4	1.9
Walking along the street	3.1	23.3	52.1	10.4	6.1	4.9	2.1

Table 21.--Dangerousness ladder (contd.)

Activity	Very safe (0 rating)	Safe (1 rating)	Fairly safe (2 rating)	Fairly dangerous (3 rating)	Dangerous (4 rating)	Very dangerous (5 rating)	Mean rating
During the day (contd.)							
Walking across the project	4.8	38.9	52.1	2.4	1.8	0.0	1.6
Near home and hidden from view ^a	4.4	30.0	51.9	4.4	6.3	3.1	1.9
Near home and in view ^a	1.8	38.6	52.4	4.2	2.4	0.6	1.7
Walking from a bus stop to your house	4.8	36.7	51.2	3.0	3.0	1.2	1.7
Walking from a car to your house	5.5	48.2	40.2	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.5
Alone in your home	4.8	48.2	42.3	3.0	0.6	0.6	1.5
Day or night not specified							
Talking with a friend in front of your house	3.0	32.9	52.7	5.4	3.6	2.4	1.8

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^aPhrased differently for different building types.

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

should carry something lethal to protect themselves. A desire for such a counterthreat may be a strong indicator of the respondents' feelings of being threatened.

Table 22.-- What respondents felt people should carry to protect themselves

Type of protection	Number ^a	Percentage of respondents (N=168)
Handgun	71	42.3
Shotgun/rifle	1	0.6
Knife	30	17.9
Cane/club	16	9.5
Tear gas/mace	28	16.7
Other	17	11.3
Total responding positively to carrying some type of protection	127	76.0

^aSome respondents gave more than one response.

ALTERED BEHAVIOR

The third dimension of the crime situation surveyed in these projects was the extent to which residents were altering or changing their behavior because of their perception of the crime problem.

More than 80 percent of the respondents kept their doors locked while they were home for fear of crime. More than half the respondents would not go out alone nor go shopping at night because they were afraid they would become victims of crime.


Table 23 shows that over two-thirds of the respondents kept their children inside during the evening because they were afraid of criminal activity. Nearly 10 percent even tried to keep their children in during the day.

Concerns about crime caused many respondents to install new security items such as locks, bolts, or window grills in their homes. Even more have recently obtained some personal protective device, such as a gun, knife, club, or tear gas, to improve their security. As table 24 shows, knives were the favored weapon, with clubs and tear gas ranking next. This contrasts with the respondents' evident belief, shown in table 22, that people should have handguns for protection.

Most of those responding "other" refused to state what they had obtained, possibly indicating the possession of unregistered firearms.

Table 23.--Behavior alterations due to fear of crime

Percentage who:



^aBase=103 households.

Table 24.--Personal protection

Respondents who have "recently" obtained something for self-protection (N=168)

Type of Protection	Number ^a	Percentage of respondents (N=168)
Handgun	2	1.2
Shotgun/rifle	0	0.0
Knife	11	6.5
Cane/club	7	4.2
Tear gas/mace	5	3.0
Other	8	4.8
Total who "recently" obtained something	28	16.7

^aSome respondents had obtained more than one type of protection.

RELATED ISSUES

Other matters were also explored in an effort to identify respondents' perceptions of the problems in the project and improvements they felt would make them feel more secure.

PERCEPTIONS OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS

A further measure used to determine how residents felt about their environment was a series of questions that asked respondents to rate, on a five-point scale, how serious they thought five problems were in the project. As indicated in table 25, drugs was perceived to be one of the most serious problems in the combined projects, with 39.9 percent of the respondents giving it a "very serious" ranking. This seemed most pronounced in the townhouses, where 43.2 percent considered drugs to be a very serious problem. The problem of next greatest concern was gangs. More than 25 percent ranked this a very serious problem, while 28.8 percent of the respondents in the highrises felt this was very serious.

Table 25.--Problems in the project

Respondents assigning given seriousness to potential problems in the project (N=168)

Potential problem	No problem	Not serious	Serious	Fairly serious	Very serious
	Percent				
Drugs	15.3	7.4	28.2	9.2	39.9
Gangs	22.2	10.8	27.5	14.4	25.1
Kids fighting	18.6	24.6	23.4	16.8	16.8
Poor management	34.7	12.0	16.2	19.8	17.4
Tenant selection policies	55.8	11.0	17.2	8.0	8.0

Note.--Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Feelings about management activity were relatively positive, with 34.7 percent of the total respondents indicating poor management was not a problem. In each project, more than half the respondents felt tenant selection policies were no problem.

TENANT PROPOSALS

Table 26 shows the tenants' security proposals mentioned during the interviews.

Improved locks, doors, and so forth were mentioned by 44.6 percent of the respondents. Next in importance were other suggestions (mostly dealing with security guards) and better lighting. Thirty percent thought better police protection would solve their problems. These facts seem to indicate a reliance on institutions to aid them. Few respondents mentioned measures involving the people themselves in the reduction of the crime problem.

Table 26.--Tenants' security proposals

Security proposals	Percentage of respondents (N=168)
Better lighting	36.3
Improved recreational facilities for young people	11.3
Better police protection	30.4
People pulling together more	19.0
Better locks, doors, etc.	44.6
Environmental improvements (e.g., pathways, walls, parking)	7.1
Tenant patrol	14.9
Other suggestions ^a	38.1

^aThese included more and better security guards.

Note.--Totals exceed 100 percent because some tenants had more than one proposal.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS

Table 27 compares the WBA data from the three Washington projects with that from four other public housing projects.

Examination of the number of criminal acts, standardized to rates per 1,000 persons 12 years of age and older or per 1,000 households, reveals the victimization patterns in Capper Dwellings to be roughly similar to other public housing environments.

Robbery in the Washington projects occurred at a rate similar to most of the other public housing project surveyed. As discussed in the section on locational analysis, the existence of easy escape routes seems to increase the incidence of robbery in an area. Most public housing has an abundance of escape routes and hiding places.

The purse snatching figures from WBA are minimal since respondents were asked only if an incident had taken place, not how frequently. Washington had the lowest rate of all the projects surveyed.

Assault in the Washington projects was somewhat less common than in the other projects. The lower purse snatching and assault rates coincide with an overall tendency for the Washington low-income population to have lower crime rates than comparable populations in the other cities surveyed.

Meaningful comparisons of the Washington rate for sexual assault are difficult to make because of the rather small number of incidents.

The Capper Dwellings rate was the lowest among the public housing projects surveyed for successful burglary and was the highest for attempted burglary. This apparently indicates that successful burglary is more difficult in the Washington projects than in the Baltimore or Los Angeles projects.

Theft from mailboxes seems to vary directly with the accessibility of the mailboxes to intruders. The walk-up apartments in the Carrollsburg project have exposed mailboxes and were the principal source of the high rate in the Washington projects compared to Dade County, Baltimore and Los Angeles. This rate, however, does not approach the high rate of break-ins for Boston.

The vandalism rate in the Washington projects was far lower than those found in the Boston and Dade County public housing projects. Some of the Boston and Dade County rates may include damage resulting from attempted burglaries, accounted for separately

Table 27.--Crime rates compared

The three D.C. projects and other public housing projects

Incidents per 1,000 population 12 and older	<u>Boston</u>	<u>Dade</u>	<u>D.C.</u>	<u>Baltimore</u>	<u>Los Angeles</u> ^a
	Four projects	Scott/Carver Homes	Capper Dwellings	Murphy Homes	Nickerson Gardens
Robbery	55.7	47.0	48.0	114.1	49.8
Purse snatching	10.6 ^b	36.0 ^b	28.0 ^b
Assault	23.1	35.4	16.0	33.0	49.8
Sexual assault	5.1	5.2	8.0	18.0	3.1
<u>Incidents per 1,000 households</u>					
Successful burglary	196.1	308.7	95.2	255.2	283.7
Attempted burglary	404.8	337.9	326.2
Larceny	159.2	278.1 ^b	101.2	6.9	524.8
Mailbox break-in	12183.3	161.1	226.2	20.7	0.0
Vandalism	1673.6	1241.6	119.0	103.4	241.1
Deliberate car damage ^c	50.3 ^b 100.0	35.7 352.9	20.7 428.6	127.7 450.0

^aFigures relate only to households resident one year or more, to provide comparability to other projects.

^bData relates only to households victimized, not frequency of victimization.

^cUpper figure: base = all sampled households; lower figure: base = households owning a car.

....Data unavailable.

in the Washington survey. One factor affecting the vandalism rate may be the proportion of townhouse-type units in the project. Damage to the exterior of such buildings is done to a particular household, whereas damage to the exterior of walk-ups or high-rises is not done to a particular household.

The significance of deliberate car damage is difficult to assess because of the low rate of car ownership (only 10.1 percent of households had cars in the Washington projects) and the low number of incidents. Among car owners, three (17 percent) had their vehicles damaged in the preceding year, in a total of six incidents. Some of this may result from careless play or malicious mischief; some may be due to attempts to rifle the contents of the car or steal auto parts or accessories.

The population of these projects seems less subject to purse snatching and assault than the other public housing projects surveyed. Their households suffered fewer successful burglaries than the other projects, and fewer larcenies than all but the Baltimore projects.

While the crime rates in public housing overall are terribly high, it appears that Capper Dwellings is certainly not the worst by any means.

It is proposed to reduce these rates through a coordinated program of improved architectural design and social defense and thereby reduce fear of crime and the degree residents feel forced to alter their behavior to cope with their anxiety about crime. These plans will be detailed in subsequent reports.

APPENDIX B:

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS SERVING
CAPPER DWELLINGS RESIDENTS

APPENDIX B: COMMUNITY PROGRAMS SERVING
CAPPER DWELLINGS RESIDENTS

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APPENDIX B: COMMUNITY PROGRAMS SERVING CAPPER DWELLINGS RESIDENTS

ALCOHOLISM

1. No clinics in service area.

2. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA)
619 D Street, S.E.
547-8880 Ext. 46

Contact: James Beale

Services provided: Self-help counseling among problem drinkers.

Hours: Thursdays only. Group meets from 8 p.m. on.

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: Adults

Geographic area served: From East and South Capitol Streets to the Anacostia River.

Travel time from Capper: 20 minute walk

Sponsoring agency: Friendship House and AA

CHILD CARE

1. Child Development Center
619 D. Street, S.E.
547-8880 Ext. 65

Contact: Jean Alexander

Services provided: Educational program for children. Priority given to children of mothers working or in job training.

Hours: 7:30 a.m. - 6 p.m.
Monday through Friday

- Cost: Sliding scale
- Prevalent age group served: 3 to 10 year olds
- Geographic area served: From East and South Capitol Streets to the Anacostia River
- Travel time from Capper: 20 minute walk
- Sponsoring agency: Friendship House
2. D.C. Day Care Center
1011 Seventh Street, on site
547-3711
- Contact: Joyce Fletcher
- Services provided: Day care for children of working mothers.
- Hours: 7 a.m. - 6 p.m.
- Cost: Sliding scale
- Prevalent age group served: 2½ to 5 year olds
- Geographic area served: Whole city, but main area is Capper neighborhood
- Travel time from Capper: None - on site
- Sponsoring agency: National Capitol Day Care under contract to D.C. Department of Human Resources
3. Planned: The Neighborhood Multi-Purpose Center to be completed by August, 1977, at Fifth and K Streets will have a day care center for 64 children.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND HOUSING

1. Community Organization Unit
1001 Fifth Street, S.E.
547-8880 Ext. 26, 28, 29
- Contact: Vivian Williams

Services provided: Help in forming and working with tenant councils. Help in dealing with housing problems, including rent increases and evictions.

Hours: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Monday through Friday

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: Adults

Geographic area served: From East and South Capitol Streets to the Anacostia River

Travel time from Capper: None - on site

Sponsoring agency: Friendship House

DRUG ABUSE

1. Emerge House
D.C. General Hospital
1905 E Street, S.E.
626-7267

Contact: Murry Haton

Services provided: "Open" residential treatment with phased rehabilitation

Hours: 24 hours a day

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: Mid-twenties, but any adult 16 years or older

Geographic area served: Whole city

Travel time from Capper: 15 minute bus ride

Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Resources

2. Prenatal Clinic
D.C. General Hospital
1905 E Street, S.E.
626-7034

Contact: Linda Stahlman

Service provided: Outpatient counseling and methadone maintenance for expectant mothers on drugs

- Hours: 9 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Monday through Friday
- Cost: Free
- Prevalent age group served: 17 years old and older. 18 and under with parental consent.
- Geographic area served: Whole city
- Travel time from Capper: 15 minute bus ride
- Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Human Resources
3. The Shack, Narcotics Treatment Clinic
123 K Street, S.E.
629-4926
- Contact: John Vaughn
- Services provided: Methadone maintenance and other outpatient counseling. Some vocational and avocational counseling.
- Hours: 10 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.
Monday through Friday
9 a.m. - Noon
Saturday and Sunday
- Cost: Free
- Prevalent age group served: 20 - 35 year olds, adults. Has client capacity of 300, is little more than half full.
- Geographic area served: 12th Street, S.W. to Independence Avenue to the Anacostia River.
- Travel time from Capper: 20 minute walk to most parts of the project
- Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Human Resources

ELDERLY SERVICES

1. Nutrition Program for Senior Citizens
Office: 619 D Street, S.E.
Meal site: 400 L Street, S.E., at Capper
547-8880 Ext. 37, 38

Contact: Doris Hicks
Services provided: Balanced lunches at meal site every weekday
Hours: Lunchtime
Cost: Voluntary contributions
Prevalent age group served: Senior citizens
Geographic area served: Friendship House service area (most of Southeast and Southwest)
Travel time from Capper: None - on site
Sponsoring agency: Friendship House

2. Project Link
1418 Pennsylvania Avenue
and on site at Ellen Wilson and
the "410" building, M Street
547-8880 Ext. 62, 63, 75

Contact: Edith Beckwith - central office
Elizabeth Parker - Ellen Wilson
Anna Chapman - Ellen Wilson
Services provided: Escort services for senior citizens. Transportation assistance, informal recreational programs, counseling on services available.
Hours: 9 a.m. - 5 p.m. Monday through Friday
Cost: Free
Prevalent age group served: Senior citizens
Geographic area served: On site and Friendship House service area.
Travel time from Capper: None - on site
Sponsoring agency: Friendship House

3. Senior Citizen Recreational Program
7th Floor "410" building, M Street
547-2915

Contact: Willa Smith
Services provided: Arts and crafts, cards, trips, and movies
Hours: 10 a.m. - 8 p.m.
Monday through Friday

Cost: Free
Prevalent age group served: 60 and older
Geographical area served: Capper residents.
Travel time from Capper: None - on site
Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Recreation

FOOD SERVICES

1. Food Stamp Office
619 D Street, S.E.
547-8880 Ext. 20, 54

Contact: Terry Szall
Thelma Pringle
Hanna Richardson

Services provided: Food stamp certification for
330 clients each month

Hours: 8:15 a.m. - 4:45 P.M.
Monday through Friday

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: None - any person eligible for
food stamps

Geographic area served: Friendship House service area.

Travel time from Capper: 20 minute walk

Sponsoring agency: Friendship House

2. Martin Luther King Food Co-op Store
1011 Seventh Street, S.E.
547-8880

Contact: Beatrice Gray

Services provided: Groceries, by cooperative arrange-
ment

Hours: 9 a.m. - 7:30 p.m.
Monday through Saturday
9 a.m. - Noon
Sunday

Cost: Varies with product. No cost to
join.

Prevalent age group served: All ages

Geographic area served: Friendship House service area.
Travel time from Capper: None - on site
Sponsoring agency: Friendship House

HEALTH SERVICES

1. Mental Health Center
1101 Seventh Street, S.E.
544-0213

Contact: Dr. William Reed
Services provided: Adult and child therapy in a variety of settings, for groups, couples, families, and individuals.
Hours: 8:15 - 4:45 p.m.
Monday through Friday
Cost: Medicaid or free
Prevalent age group served: All ages
Geographic area served: Ward 5-S: Capitol Building to 15th Street, N.E., M Street to Penna. Ave., S.E.
Travel time from Capper: None - on site
Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Human Resources

2. Neighborhood Health Clinic
1107 Seventh Street, S.E.
629-2786

Contact: Muaida Patterson
Services provided: General medical clinic, plus:
Maternal care
Pediatrics
Obstetrics/Gynecology
Nutrition counseling
Social worker twice a week

JOB TRAINING

1. Washington Youth Conservation Corp
D.C. Department of Recreation
3149 16th Street, N.W.
673-7449

Contact: Anyone in office
Services provided: Summer employment only

- Hours: 8:30 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Monday through Friday
- Cost: Free
- Prevalent age group served: 15 - 18 year olds
- Geographical area served: Whole city.
- Travel time from Capper: Contact above number for nearest enrollment center
- Sponsoring agencies: U.S. Department of the Interior,
U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Forest Service
D.C. Department of Recreation
2. Women's Job Corps
1751 N Hampshire, N.W.
265-2822
- Contact: Mrs. Wattenbert
- Services provided: Screening and placement of young women in Federal Job training programs. Requires leaving home for two years while in training. Placed 225 women last year.
- Hours: 9 a.m. - 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, by appointment only
- Cost: Free
- Prevalent age group served: 16 to 21 year olds
- Geographical area served: Whole city
- Travel time from Capper: 30 minutes by bus
- Sponsoring agency: National Women's Corps under contract with U.S. Department of Labor
3. Work Incentive Program (WIN)
921 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
724-2273
- Contact: Brenda Bingham
- Services provided: Employment training, referrals, placement.

Hours: 8:30 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Monday through Friday

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: Young adults and adults

Geographic area served: 15 minute walk

Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Manpower

POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

1. Police-Community Relations Center
400 L Street, S.E.
626-2335

Contact: Officer James Freeman

Services provided: Operation I.D., Security Inspection Program, Neighborhood Scout Car Program, recreational activities with youth, consumer education

Hours: 2 p.m. - 10 p.m. Tuesday through Saturday
10 a.m. - 6 p.m. Tuesday through Saturday, alternating weekly

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: All ages

Geographical area served: S.E. section of the MPD'S First District

Travel time from Capper: None - on site

Sponsoring agency: D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

RECREATION

1. Capper-Lincoln Community Center
Fifth and K Streets, S.E.
LI 3-5588

Contact: Anne Cooke

Services provided: Indoor and outdoor recreational programs for children, teenagers and adults. Programs include arts and crafts, basketball, volleyball, table games, gymnastics, majorettes, and cheerleading. Team competitions for certain sports have been organized. Special events and trips are also organized.

Hours: Winter: November - March
Monday through Thursday: 9 a.m. - 10 p.m.
Friday: 9 a.m. - 11 p.m.
Saturday: 1:30 p.m. - 10 p.m.
Summer: April - October
Monday through Friday: 9 a.m. - 10 p.m.
Saturday: 9 a.m. - 6 p.m.

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: Youth and adults

Geographic area served: Service Area 5 within Ward 2, approximating the area between South Capitol Street and the Anacostia River.

Travel time from Capper: None - on site

Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Recreation

YOUTH SERVICES

1. After Care Service Division
122 C Street, N.W. Room 701
629-2026

Contact: Sidney L Parker

Services provided: Youth counseling to juvenile offenders

Hours: 8:15 a.m. - 4:45 p.m.
Monday through Friday

Cost: Free

Prevalent age group served: 17 years and younger

Geographical area served: Whole city
Travel time from Capper: 20 minute bus ride; will make home visits
Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Human Resources, Bureau of Youth Services

2. Community Care Services Division
Langston Terrace, Housing Development
2146 H Street, N.E.
398-3100

Contact: John Bryant
Services provided: Pre-delinquency counseling
Hours: 8:15 - 4:45 p.m.
Monday through Friday
Cost: Free
Prevalent age group served: 6 - 17 year olds
Geographical area served: Whole city, Bryant is assigned to Capper
Travel time from Capper: 30 to 40 minute bus ride; workers will usually make home visits
Sponsoring agency: D.C. Department of Human Services, Bureau of Youth Services

3. Roving Leader Program
Will have office space in
Neighborhood Multi-Purpose
Center
829-3276

Contact: Carver Leach, Director
Amos Thorton, Supervisor, Ward 2
Services provided: Guidance to delinquent or delinquent-prone youth. Engages youth in constructive recreational activities, helps adolescents use community resources, encourages drop-outs to return to school, and intervenes on their behalf with school and court authorities.

Hours:	Counselors available on 24 hour basis, often work at night, meeting with youth on streets.
Cost:	Free
Prevalent age group served:	11 - 17 year olds
Geographic area served:	Whole city, Capper served by Ward 2 office.
Travel time from Capper:	Will meet with youth on site.
Sponsoring agency:	D.C. Department of Recreation

CITY-WIDE HOTLINES, SWITCHBOARDS
AND INFORMATION SERVICES
FOR RESIDENTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

1. Andromeda Hotline
(Spanish speaking)
Number: 667-6766
Hours: Seven days a week, 24 hours
2. Crisis Intervention Hotline
Number: 462-6690
Hours: Seven days a week:
Workers on duty from 1 p.m. to midnight; recorded
referrals all other times
3. Diabetic Hotline
Number: 588-7755
Hours: Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. - 4 p.m.
24 hour recording of emergency referrals
4. Families and Children in Trouble
(FACT Hotline)
Number: 628-3228
Hours: Monday through Friday; Worker on duty from
5:30 to 8:30 p.m.
Recorded referrals all other times
5. Food Stamp Information and Referral
Number: 629-5863
Hours: Monday through Friday, 8:15 a.m. - 4:45 p.m.
6. Gamblers Anonymous Hotline
Number: 585-2151
Hours: Seven days a week, 24 hours
7. Gay Switchboard
Number: 638-4611
Hours: Seven days a week, 7:30 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.
8. Narcotics Treatment Administration
Drug Abuse Hotline
Number: 347-9593, 347-9594, 347-9595
Hours: Monday through Friday, 5 p.m. - 8:15 p.m.
9. Neurotics Anonymous Hotline
Number: 628-4379
Hours: Seven days a week, 24 hours

10. Rape Hotline
Number: 333-RAPE
Hours: Monday through Friday, 9 a.m. - 5 p.m.; recorded
messages 24 hours
Saturday, 10 a.m. - 1 p.m.
Sunday, Noon - 4 p.m.
11. Suicide Prevention Hotline
Number: 629-5222
Hours: Seven days a week, 24 hours
12. Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse
(WACADA)
Number: 466-2323
Hours: Monday through Friday, 9 a.m. - 5 p.m.
Applications for funds for seven days a week, 24 hours.

APPENDIX C:
CONTROLLED
ENTRANCEWAYS

APPENDIX C: CONTROLLED ENTRANCEWAYS

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APPENDIX C: CONTROLLED ENTRANCEWAYS

The success of controlled entranceways depends on three elements: good physical design, well trained guards, and cooperative residents. All three must be organized to operate in a mutually supporting manner if entry by intruders is to be prevented.

GUARDS: MANAGEMENT TRAINING

The guard, who has the responsibility of controlling access, is under pressure from intruders and residents alike. Since his conduct will determine who is challenged and under what circumstances, he must have a clear understanding of the operational guidelines that will be enforced. These guidelines must be realistic; if they cannot be implemented, all will lose. The guard's morale will suffer as he realizes that his job cannot be done, the support of tenants will diminish with their confidence in the system. Further, tenants see the system not doing the job they expected of it, and may become resentful of the inconvenience associated with its operation. In short, defects, however small, must be avoided, or problems more serious than the original result. Training must make guards aware of the pressures they will face. They will need, first, to become familiar and comfortable with the monitoring control equipment. Second, and much more difficult, they must expect continuing pressure as they deal with and challenge residents, visitors, and intruders. People frequently will not show identification, and attempt to bypass screening. Guards can expect to be criticized or even threatened when they insist on asking for identification. They must be prepared to check the identification of children; many will wander in and some are capable of destructive acts. They must also be prepared to check the identification of those who look familiar. Social relationships terminate; a boyfriend a resident long welcomed may no longer be.

Given these pressures, guards must have a professional orientation, some emotional distance from residents. To achieve this, guards probably should not be regularly assigned to the same buildings. Work shifts can be rotated among buildings and among times of the day. This will prevent guards from becoming too familiar with residents or frequent visitors, providing a greater incentive for them to ask for identification.

Obviously, training and orientation must be thorough. An ideal program should stress police techniques, human relations, self

defense, tenant and building security, and first aid. It could be sponsored by the District of Columbia Police Department and designed so that guards will qualify for a Special Police Commission. Besides the training at the Police Academy, a special program should introduce them to the electronic equipment they will operate in the guard station. A video tape or similar program should be developed to allow simulated use of the equipment, sensitizing guards to the actual operation of the entranceways before they are assigned to the guard stations.

Once the guards begin duty, on-going training could be provided by the Security Director of the Property Management Administration. A follow-up program of this kind would assist guards in dealing with problems and allow sharing of work experiences.

RESIDENT INVOLVEMENT

Resident involvement is important to the overall planning of the controlled entranceways. Tenants should know not just the potential benefits, but also the inconveniences that will be imposed on them. The entranceways will not work unless the residents demand that the guards do their job and support them when they do. Early planning should establish mechanisms to assure residents' involvement and support in planning and implementing the entranceways, to insure their support after completion.

The residents must also cooperate to assure prompt and thorough screening; if they resist showing identification or otherwise abuse the guard, he may soon withdraw and fail to perform the critical screening function.

It is important, therefore, to develop a program that not only informs residents on use of the entranceways, but also consults with them on how entranceways should operate. The resident organizations (previously recommended in this report) for each highrise building, and housing management would be the proper organization to establish such a program.

The program should have several stages. First residents should be consulted in the selection of electronic hardware to be used. This is important because if the PMA chose to install monitoring and locking equipment that offended residents, they may feel their privacy was being invaded, or that their building resembled a prison. During this first phase, residents and management would also decide on methods of identifying residents and visitors, methods of controlling ingress and egress, and other operational aspects.

After construction of the entranceway begins, an education program should inform residents as to the use of and issues involved in

the operation of the entranceway.

Flyers and brochures could encourage all residents to attend informal meetings. These meetings could also include information on how residents can maximize their personal safety; the Community Relations Officer of the MPD could, at such a meeting, solicit tenant participation in the Operation I.D. and Household Security Inspection programs. Safety precautions for women could be discussed. As the entranceways begin operation, additional meetings and literature distributed could insure proper tenant understanding and support of the security program.

EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Ultimately, decisions regarding the selection of electronic hardware and actual operation of the entranceways should be made by the housing management and residents. WBA, however, has outlined several recommendations which may be helpful to those involved in the process.

ELECTRONIC SECURITY HARDWARE

DOOR SENSING DEVICES

All secondary entrances to the building must be restricted. Fire doors leading outside must then be able to be opened only from inside the building, and only in emergency situations. In non-emergencies, they should be kept closed. To accomplish this, panic-lock hardware, which requires a strong push to open the door, could be installed on the inside of the fire doors at every floor. Electronic sensing devices, wired to the guard booth could also be installed on doors, to alert guards if someone is tampering with them in a non-emergency.

Fire doors on every floor should permit entrance onto the stairs, but the only exit should be into the controlled inner lobby or outside, not to another residential floor.

AUDIO MONITORING EQUIPMENT

The guard station should be equipped with a two-way radio system enabling the guard to monitor and talk with persons at other strategic locations in the buildings, such as the ground floor fire door areas and elevators. The monitor should activate at the sound of a loud noise; this

means the guard will not have to constantly spot-check monitor locations or leave the monitor on continuously. When the security guard monitors conversation from these areas, he can let offenders know he is listening, challenge them and summon assistance to the location. A two-way intercom should be installed between the guard station and the outer lobby so the guard can question visitors and check identification.

ELEVATOR CONTROLS

Access to and from different floors of the building should be made only by elevators, because activities in them can easily be monitored. Where feasible, elevators could be equipped with help buttons, which activate an alarm in the guard station. The elevators could also be equipped with an override system enabling the guard to bring the elevator to lobby level in an emergency. With such a system residents can alert guards if they are in danger, while guards can monitor and speak to offenders in the elevator cab, and bring the car to the lobby level where police can take charge.

CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION SYSTEM

The decision to install a closed circuit television system should be evaluated against the high cost of such equipment. In vertical Neighborhoods 7, 9 and 10, ground floor fire doors are in partial view of the guard station; this may negate the need for costly television equipment. On the ground floor of Building 8, however, the need for a television camera is greater, since the outside fire door cannot be seen from the guard station.

If television equipment is installed, it places an additional responsibility on a guard who is already burdened with identifying residents, challenging visitors and intruders, controlling the doors, maintaining the audio system (if one is installed) and maintaining order in the lobby. Given these responsibilities and the amount of traffic through the building, a single guard might not find time to view the monitor frequently.

LOBBY DOORS

Electronic locks operated from the guard station should be placed on the inner and outer lobby doors to control entrance and exit to the building. Doors should be controlled separately; however, the guard should be able to lock both doors so he can

trap an offender in the outer lobby fleeing from the scene of a crime.

TELEPHONE INTERCOM SYSTEM

An outside telephone line could be installed in the guard station to provide communication with the Housing Police, Housing Management, Metropolitan Police, and Fire Department.

An intercom system should also connect to tenants' telephones. This can be used to clear visitors with residents.

OPERATION OF THE ENTRANCEWAYS

There are three basic operational requirements of a controlled entranceway. First, there must be physical control over the points of ingress and egress; second, there must be a way to identify residents; and third, the guard must use the physical controls he has to enforce the identification system, assuring that those entering the building have a legitimate reason for being there.

In some cases, planners may discover that it is impossible to completely control access. One might then opt for an "interventionist" model--where guards do not routinely screen everyone, but do so randomly or if someone looks suspicious. The entranceway thus houses a central guard post that responds to emergencies throughout the project and screens some individuals.

Ideally, the decision on the kind of system--be it interventionist or controlled--is made during the planning process. It should be a deliberate decision. An interventionist system should be chosen if consideration shows a controlled system could not operate; it should not occur by default. When this happens, residents and guards both feel defeated and there is a drop in morale and support.

The most feasible way of identifying residents would be to use cards with a photograph. A guard could check this against a tenant list. Or, a master photograph file of residents could be kept in the guard booth; in this case residents would not be required to carry cards, since a guard would simply match the photograph with the face.

Visitors could gain access to the building after guards cleared them with residents. Guards may also want to record the visitor's name and destination.

As an additional safety precaution, guards should note names

of persons who move valuable goods in and out of the building, (television sets, stereos, furniture), as well as the serial number of the goods.

Besides the tasks described above, the guard should operate electronic control and monitoring equipment, survey and maintain order in the lobby and elevator areas, report incidents, and work with police, fire and other support services.

APPENDIX D:

**A REPORT ON
CRIME AND THE DELIVERY
OF SERVICES IN
CAPPER DWELLINGS
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

FINAL DRAFT

PREPARED FOR
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

PREPARED BY

WBA William Brill Associates, Inc.
Annapolis, Maryland

June 1977

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INTRODUCTION

Public housing residents are tremendously dependent upon a wide range of public services that relate to their housing, their health and their participation in the broader community. If these services are not provided it can have a devastating effect on their lives. If a visiting nurse does not keep an appointment, a homebound patient's condition can worsen. If elevators go unrepaired it can mean a long, hard and dangerous climb up a dark stairway; and if taxis do not come, it can mean that important appointments are missed or that one is stranded in an uncomfortable place.

For some time there has been a growing concern among housing officials that one of the factors that may be affecting the delivery of needed services in public housing is the crime problem. Specifically, there is the concern that the staff of organizations delivering services are being victimized to such an extent that they are unable to deliver the intended services to residents or can only do so at an increased cost.

To provide insight into this issue, William Brill Associates, Inc. (WBA) was asked by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to examine the relationship between crime and the delivery of services in one public housing project: Arthur Capper Dwellings, in Washington, D.C. This study examines the victimization experiences of persons who deliver services to Capper Dwellings; the patterns and types of victimizations; and the secondary effects crime and fear of crime have on the availability, cost and quality of services rendered to the residents and management of the development. The report includes recommendations which housing authorities and other organizations may find useful to reduce the victimization of service personnel and to thereby contribute to the delivery of housing and social services to those who need them.

This study was undertaken as part of a larger project involving the development and testing of approaches to comprehensive security planning underway with funding from HUD.

SCOPE

The analysis of the victimization of service delivery personnel examined:

- o victimization rates among those who deliver services to the site
- o patterns of vulnerability
- o fear of crime

- o altered behavior patterns from fear of crime

METHODOLOGY

Over 60 interviews with the management and field employees of service organizations that care for the site were conducted. Organizations were selected from the following categories:

Housing Management

Capper Dwellings Maintenance Department

Social Services

On-Site Health Clinic
On-Site Mental Health Clinic
Social Rehabilitation Administration (SRA)
 Community Care Program
 Aftercare Program
 Bureau of Family Services
 Up John Homemakers
 Recreation Facility
On-Site Food Co-op
Friendship House Community Organization Office

Contractors

Westinghouse Elevator Company
Capitol Boiler Works, Inc.
M & M Welding and Fabricating Company

Utilities

District of Columbia Water Resources Department
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company
Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO)

Other Services

District of Columbia Vector Control Division (exterminating service)
Yellow Cab Company

Eighteen residents were also interviewed to learn their perceptions about the effect of crime on the cost, quality, and availability of services they needed.

In addition to the data collected from these interviews, victimization data from the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) was analyzed to determine the number of crimes that occurred in the Capper

area involving service delivery personnel.

The report has three parts: The first part contains a summary of findings which includes (1) data on the victimization, fear, and altered behavior of service personnel, and (2) a section on the patterns of vulnerability, as well as a section on related issues and conclusions. The second part discusses recommendations based on these findings, and the third part is an appendix which gives a detailed accounting of the data collected from each of the organizations and groups interviewed.

PART I

Victimization analysis

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

VICTIMIZATION

Based on a sampling of service personnel in each category, it was found that victimization of service delivery personnel appeared high. Of the 49 field personnel interviewed, five (10.2%) had been victimized over the past year. Four of the victims were members of the Capper Dwellings' maintenance staff and one was an employee of Capitol Boiler Works, a contractor.

The victimizations of Capper Dwellings' maintenance personnel occurred on paydays and inside buildings which provided good cover for the perpetrators. In one instance, four maintenance men were robbed and one was shot in the carpentry shop of a highrise at 601 Virginia Avenue. The other victimization involved a contractor working in a boiler room.

Since it was not feasible to interview all service delivery agencies who work in the Capper area to determine the victimization rate of their personnel, the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) was contacted to see if additional crimes were reported. The MPD was given a list of street names and block numbers and was asked to identify all crime-related incidents in the Capper area.

From the list of 119 crimes, a number of incidents were identified as crimes committed against service delivery personnel. Thirteen crimes occurring in the Capper area were identified as being associated with or related to service delivery personnel. This represents 11% of all incidents reported to the MPD for the Capper area from January 1976 to January 1977. The largest number of crimes occurred at Carrollsburg (eight incidents), followed by Ellen Wilson (three), and the Capper highrise area (two). Thirty-nine percent of the crimes committed in the total Capper area were larcenies, 30% were robberies, and 15% assaults and burglaries.

The larceny incidents involved vehicles from a TV/radio shop, a construction company, a sewage company, an office equipment company, and the Housing Authority Maintenance Department. Two U.S. Postal workers, an adult education field employee, and a deliveryman were the victims of robbery incidents. The burglaries took place at a recreation center and a private office within the Capper area. The D.C. Sanitation Department and the U.S. Postal Departments' employees were victims in the assault incidents. Whether a robbery attempt was the primary objective of these assaults is not known.

During interviews of management-level employees, three other victimizations involving field personnel not interviewed were learned of. Two of these victimizations involved members of the Capper Dwellings' maintenance department and one involved a subcontractor to Capitol Boiler Works.

FEAR

Fear among service personnel was high. Twenty of the 49 respondents, or 41%, said they did not feel safe while working at the site. Thirty-five percent of those interviewed, one woman and 16 men, felt the need to carry a weapon for protection. Seventy-one percent of those who said they should be allowed to carry a weapon were members of the Capper maintenance staff, a group which has experienced a high victimization rate.

Fear among different service organizations and among females and males varied. Thirty-six persons were interviewed in the maintenance function categories (i.e., utilities, housing maintenance, building contractors, etc.) and 13 were interviewed in the social service category.

In the maintenance function categories, 36 persons were interviewed. Sixteen of those interviewed (55.6%) said they did not feel safe on the job while nine out of 13 (69%) of those interviewed from the social service category did feel safe while working at Capper.

In the social service category, 10 of the 13 persons interviewed, (77%) were females. Workers in all other categories were male with the exception of one woman who worked in the Capper maintenance office.

Ninety percent of the females in the social service category felt safe working at the site while none of the males in that category felt safe.

It appears from the above data that those who felt safest while working on the site were females in the social service category.

ALTERED BEHAVIOR

Crime and fear of crime among service personnel at Capper have an adverse effect on the way they behave on the job. Forty-five percent of those interviewed (22 persons) reported that the crime problem at the site affected the quality of their work. Twenty-seven percent, or three out of 11 women, felt their work quality was affected, while 50% (19 of 38) of the males felt so. Those interviewed often reported that their work suffered because they were concentrating more on looking out for their safety than on

the work assignment. This behavior pattern was reported mostly by maintenance and utility personnel as opposed to social service workers.

Harassment of service personnel was another significant factor related to poor work quality. Of the 49 persons interviewed, 18 (37%) said they were harassed while performing their duties. Of those harassed, 15 persons (83%) said the quality of their work suffered. This strongly indicates a relation between harassment of service personnel and the way they do their work. Of those who did not feel safe working on the site (41% of all persons interviewed), 75%, or 15 persons, said their work quality was affected. Ten percent of all those interviewed (four persons) said they carried a weapon for protection.

Crime and fear of crime at the site have prompted some service organizations to take special precautions to protect their employees. The most common of these is to assign two persons per job. This practice is followed regularly by Westinghouse Elevator, Capitol Boiler Works, M & M Welding, and C & P Telephone, even though many of their work assignments can be completed by one person.

Other organizations try to schedule two or more persons, but often do not have the manpower or the funds to do so. These include the Capper maintenance department and the on-site community organization group. Field representatives for the Social Rehabilitation Administration and PEPCO meter readers can request accompaniment by a co-worker if they feel one is needed for security.

The housing police force which patrols the site does provide some protection for service delivery personnel. However, according to the housing security coordinator, the force is understaffed by 22 persons. One precautionary measure taken by the housing police force is to provide an escort for maintenance men and contractors who service the boiler rooms after dark.

PATTERNS OF VULNERABILITY

Thus far this report has presented data on service delivery personnel as a single group. However, it is important to note that some service personnel may be more vulnerable to crime or more fearful of being victimized than others. Variations depend to a large degree on the workers' service relationship to the site and residents, where they work, and the precautions their organization takes to ensure safety.

For example, those who work in the health clinic under the protection of an armed guard were less vulnerable to crime. As a consequence they felt less fearful of being victimized than the members of the Capper maintenance department, whose duties require them to work

in highly vulnerable areas.

Employees of the Water Department felt safer than those who repaired elevators because they worked on open-street areas in full view of residents and passersby. The work of elevator repairmen, on the other hand, takes them into areas such as lobbies, basements, and hallways which provide good cover for perpetrators.

Working with others

The difference in the level of fear between those who worked alone and those who worked with others was dramatic. Of the 24 persons interviewed who worked with others, 17, or 71%, said they felt safe while working on the site. Of the 25 persons interviewed who worked alone at the site, 15, or 60%, said they did not feel safe.

Other factors

Sixty-two percent (16 of 26 persons) of those service personnel whose organizations were located off the site and who visited there occasionally felt safe from crime. These persons reportedly felt safe because they worked in open areas, knew the residents, or worked with others. Thirty-nine percent, or 10 persons, did not feel safe; most of them worked in vulnerable places such as highrise buildings, basements, elevators, vacant units, etc., which provide ideal places for robberies, assaults and other crimes.

Fifty-seven percent (13 of 23 persons) of those service personnel whose organizations were located on the site felt safe from crime. These were primarily persons in a social service capacity. On-site social service personnel reportedly felt safe because they were residents, or had worked in the area for many years, and knew residents they could depend on for help. Others, as in the case of the health clinic workers, were under the protection of a guard. The only two on-site social service personnel who did not feel safe were two men at the mental health clinic; they were fearful of making home visits in the development. Since many of their clients were women, these visits were occasionally construed as social visits by the client's boyfriend or husband.

Forty-four percent, or 10 on-site service personnel, did not feel safe. Eight were members of the maintenance staff who worked in the areas considered highly vulnerable to crime. The other two were the mental health workers mentioned above.

RELATED ISSUES

Victimization, fear of crime, and altered behavior among service

personnel have a direct impact on the cost and availability of services to the Housing Authority and residents.

COST

Although precise figures on the additional financial burdens placed on the Housing Authority and residents because of crime would be difficult to estimate, WBA learned that several contractors passed on additional costs to the Housing Authority. Figures quoted by these organizations ranged from 10% to 40% over and above what the cost would be for the same work done in a safer environment. These figures include the cost for such additional expenses as assigning two men to a job that could be handled by one person, vandalism and theft of equipment, overtime hours spent rechecking and redoing work hastily completed by fearful service personnel, and additional insurance costs.

Housing Authority officials stated that contractors generally add 6% to the overall cost of a job to compensate for vandalism and late payment.

Other service organizations, such as utilities and social services provided by government and private organizations, cannot pass on crime-related costs to the Housing Authority. Any expenses they incur because of crime are usually passed on to the consumer or taxpayer. Additional costs incurred by specific organizations include:

- o PEPCO--if an employee reports that he refused to read a meter because he thought it was dangerous, PEPCO must send a supervisor to escort him on a return trip. This costs doubly, since PEPCO must provide additional manpower and loses billing if the meter is not read. This practice is followed for the entire city.
- o C & P Telephone--two men are sent out on any job during certain hours of the day and months of the year, whether or not the second man is needed. This extra man costs C & P \$28.00 per hour. C & P follows this practice at Capper Dwellings, as well as other areas of the city it regards as dangerous.
- o Social Rehabilitation Administration--at each of the divisions visited, a field worker can request the company of a fellow worker if he feels the area to be visited is dangerous. This duplicate effort results in a loss of manpower and additional costs. The practice is followed city-wide.
- o On-Site Mental Health Clinic--an electronic burglary system

was installed at the cost of approximately \$2,000, plus a monthly service charge.

- o On-Site Food Co-op--an electronic burglary system was installed at the cost of approximately \$2,000 plus a \$130.00 monthly service charge.
- o On-Site Health Clinic--a special District of Columbia guard is stationed there at a salary cost of approximately \$12,000 a year, plus related expenses.

CURTAILMENT OF SERVICES

Some organizations simply refuse to provide services to the site because of the crime problem, and others curtail their services to certain hours or days. Several cab drivers interviewed said they do not make runs to the site or pick up passengers there because they are afraid of being victimized. Westinghouse Elevator will not service elevators in the highrise buildings after dark or on the weekends. The supervisor at Westinghouse said he would send service persons to the site during those hours only in an extreme emergency and only if an armed guard was available for protection. C & P Telephone will not service the site on Saturdays or after 5 p.m. during the week. Social services field representatives do not generally visit homes after dark except in an extreme emergency.

RESIDENTS' VIEWS OF SERVICE DELIVERY

Eighteen interviews were conducted with a cross-section of Capper Dwellings residents to get their opinions on service delivery at Capper dwellings. Information collected during these interviews was based on these issues:

- o the extent to which crime, or the fear of crime, is the basis for service denial or cost increases
- o how crime, or the fear of crime, in their judgment, affects the quality of maintenance service, and whether the maintenance staff does its job well

SERVICE CURTAILMENT AND COST INCREASES

Residents were asked if they felt that they had ever been denied services because of the crime problem. Seven of 18 respondents felt they had, and even more had heard of others who had requested services and been denied.

Eight of 18 respondents (44%) felt that certain services cost more for them because of crime in the development. The costs of taxis and insurance policies were specifically mentioned by five respondents. Three respondents reported applying for home insurance covering theft, fire, etc., and being denied because Capper is considered a high-risk area, or were quoted what they felt were excessively high costs. Other residents reported denial of taxi service during the early evening or at night; this was attributed to the crime problem. Residents also reported having had taxi drivers deny them a ride after being told the destination. Some respondents felt that taxi drivers charge more than the standard rate per zone because of the risk involved in coming to the Capper area. One respondent felt that taxi dispatchers sometimes tell them that there are no taxis available once they know that the destination is Capper Dwellings.

One resident reported having called a lock company on a Friday afternoon to replace a broken lock and being told that service would not be available until Monday, a time the area was considered less dangerous than a weekend.

MAINTENANCE SERVICES

Fifty percent of the residents (nine of 18) interviewed felt that the maintenance staff does not do its job well. Three of the nine linked maintenance problems to crime or fear of crime. By contrast, 67% of all maintenance personnel interviewed (10 of 15) felt the crime problem at the site affected the quality of their work. Other reasons given were laziness and too much socializing by maintenance personnel.

The three respondents who felt that crime affects the performance of the maintenance staff particularly mentioned dangers they felt were encountered by night workers, especially those going from building to building. Although only three respondents felt that crime affected maintenance performance, 13 of 18 respondents (72%) had heard of Capper maintenance employees who had been victimized. The most frequently mentioned incident was the robbery/assault involving maintenance employees in the carpentry shop at 601 Virginia Avenue. One respondent had heard of an insurance agent who was robbed.

Most respondents felt that maintenance employees were careless about letting it be known when they are to be paid (the incident in the carpentry shop occurred on a payday), so that most residents know when payday is.

Perhaps because they are unaware of the policy of sending out two-man teams, residents complained that maintenance personnel are always together. Five respondents mentioned socializing as

a reason for poor maintenance service.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the findings discussed above, the following conclusions can be made:

- o The victimization rate over the past year from January 1976 to January 1977 among persons who deliver services to Capper Dwellings is high. Of those interviewed, 10.2% were victimized. There were also the three unconfirmed victimizations reported by service delivery management staff. It is estimated that 13 of 19 incident reports filed with the MPD for the Capper area were related to victimization of service delivery personnel.
- o There is a high level of fear among service delivery personnel. This is particularly evident among those personnel who work in areas vulnerable to crime, i.e., high-rise buildings, boiler rooms, vacant units, and other places out of view and easily accessible by perpetrators of crime.
- o Females who work at the site in a social service capacity and who are either residents, know residents well, or have worked at the site for a number of years feel safest from crime.
- o The quality of services provided to the site and its residents is poor. Fear of crime and harassment of service personnel affects the quality of their work.
- o The victimization of service personnel and fear of crime pushes up the cost of services to the Housing Authority and residents. Several service organizations, particularly contractors, pass on the cost of financial losses and safety measures to the Housing Authority. Several residents have complained that they were overcharged by taxis and insurance companies when requesting their services.
- o According to police data and estimates made by service organizations contacted, over \$4,900 in cash and equipment was either stolen or vandalized at Capper in the last year.
- o Several service organizations refuse or curtail their services to the site and its residents because of their fear of being victimized.
- o Forty percent of the residents interviewed felt crime

at Capper was responsible for increased cost of services.

- o The relationship between tenants and the Capper maintenance staff is poor. Fifty percent of residents feel that the maintenance staff is not doing an adequate job while 47% of the maintenance staff said they had been harassed by residents while doing their work.
- o With the exception of providing Housing Police escorts to the boiler room, little is being done by the Housing Authority to provide adequate security for service personnel.

PART II

Recommendations

In order to (1) eliminate poor work quality, (2) eliminate additional costs, (3) eliminate curtailment of services to the residents and management of Capper Dwellings, and (4) improve the security of those who deliver services to the site, the following recommendations are made.

IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH HOUSING POLICE

Interaction between the Housing Authority police and service personnel is minimal. Aside from escorting service personnel to boiler rooms around the site, no other coordinated effort exists on the part of the Housing Authority police to provide security for service delivery personnel. This is understandable given the present manpower limitations of the staff. Once the housing police program is staffed to its full level, procedures to provide greater security for service personnel could be put into effect.

The procedure of providing escorts to boiler rooms could be expanded to make police escorts available on request to service personnel who work in other vulnerable locations on the site, i.e., highrise buildings and vacant units. Housing police should also be provided with a list, prepared daily, indicating what service personnel are working at the site and the location in which they are working. Routine checks should be made to ensure the safety of those working; should work location change, the housing police should be notified. Extra housing police should be stationed at the site on days when members of the Capper maintenance staff are paid. This will ensure greater protection for staff who have been victimized on paydays over the past year.

RESIDENT/SERVICE PERSONNEL INTERACTION

Supportive interaction between the residents at Capper Dwellings and persons who deliver services to the site is an important ingredient in reducing fear among service delivery personnel. The findings in this report indicate that many service personnel who have long worked at the site and who know and respect residents are less fearful of being victimized.

When the relationship between a service group and the residents is poor, as in the case of the Capper maintenance staff, work quality among service personnel suffers, and their fear of being victimized is high. To alleviate such stress and promote understanding and awareness between residents and service groups, a public information

program could be established. Such a program would sensitize residents to the important role service delivery personnel play in providing social and maintenance services to the site. The program could also include an orientation program for service delivery personnel that would sensitize them to the needs and concerns of the residents and inform them of security issues and precautions related to their work. The program could be initiated by the Housing Authority and implemented with the assistance of the Capper Tenant Council and those service organizations willing to participate. The idea of creating such a program was suggested by WBA and received warmly by several of the service organizations interviewed.

A comprehensive program of this nature could reduce tension between residents and service personnel, and foster mutual respect and understanding between groups. This in turn could reduce fear and victimizations among service delivery personnel and contribute to improving the quality, availability, and cost of service at the site.

PART III: APPENDIX

Findings from interviews with service organizations

CAPPER DWELLINGS MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT

The Capper maintenance department is unique among service organizations on the site in that it is under the control of the housing manager, its work is highly visible to residents, and it plays a vital role in the day-to-day operation of the site. For these reasons, it has been placed in a separate category and examined more closely than the other service organizations discussed.

In attempting to chart specific patterns of victimization and to understand how they affect maintenance personnel at Capper Dwellings, data on the victimization experience, level of fear, and attitudes of workers concerning the crime problem were compiled.

Sixteen of 40 maintenance department employees, including the department head, were interviewed. These 16 (40% of the total maintenance staff) represent a cross section of different types of maintenance functions at Capper.

All employees, with the exception of the boiler room engineers, work from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday through Friday. Some employees are occasionally required to work weekends. Boiler room engineers work on different shifts covering 24 hours.

INTERVIEW RESULTS - HEAD OF MAINTENANCE DEPARTMENT

The head of the maintenance department was interviewed to determine to what extent he feels the crime problem affects his employees and the quality of their work. According to him, maintenance personnel are very fearful on the job, especially those who work alone or in basement areas. He feels this results in low job morale and affects the quality of their work. Fear often induces employees to work too quickly, leaving a job inadequately done so that later it must be redone.

To alleviate employees' fears, the department head tries to send out two men on jobs whenever possible, but the cost of the additional man usually proves prohibitive. Extra costs are also incurred by vandalism and theft of tools. Vandalism costs are difficult to estimate, but \$600 worth of tools was lost over the past year.

Although he was not able to supply figures, the department head felt that many service companies increased the cost of service to Capper Dwellings to cover possible losses because of crime. He had not been refused service from any companies, but many limit their service to weekdays and will not come to the site after dark.

The department head reported that areas regarded with the greatest fear are Ellen Wilson Dwellings, the highrises--particularly those at K and Seventh Streets--and basement areas. Cleaning a vacant unit anywhere on the site is also regarded with apprehension.

He feels that residents do not cooperate in helping to maintain the buildings and grounds, and occasionally harass employees. He reported two incidents that occurred during the past year that he feels contributed to employees' fear, low morale, and poor work quality.

The most recent incident was a robbery and assault that involved five maintenance employees. During this incident, one employee was shot and the others robbed in the carpentry shop at 601 Virginia Avenue. Another employee was robbed while cleaning a vacant unit on L Street near Third Street. Both incidents occurred on payday.

INTERVIEW RESULTS - MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL

The employees interviewed were grouped as follows:

- o employees who had worked at the development two years or less
- o employees who had worked from two to five years
- o employees who had worked five years or more
- o employees who normally work alone
- o employees who work with at least one other person

Employees who had worked two years or less

Four persons had worked less than two years at Capper Dwellings. All four felt that employees need, and should be allowed to carry, some sort of protection. Three of four respondents reported having experienced harassment by residents while on the job; they felt this prevented them from doing their job well. Three respondents felt that the quality of their work suffers because of crime or fear of crime. All respondents reported having heard of other employees and service personnel who had been victimized. Table 1 presents these results.

Employees who had worked from two to five years

As seen in Table 2, seven of the eight respondents in this category felt that employees should be allowed to carry something for protection. Three respondents had experienced harassment which they felt kept them from doing their job well. Six of the eight respondents felt that crime in general prevents them from doing their job well. Six reported having some type of tool or equipment stolen from them while on the job. Seven of the respondents had heard of victimization of other employees or service personnel.

Employees who had worked five years or more

Three employees were interviewed in this category; two had worked nine years in the development and one 16. The employee who had worked 16 years was involved in the five-man robbery and assault incident described earlier. This employee felt that the quality of his work has suffered tremendously because of his victimization and fear of crime, while the others did not feel that the crime problem affected their work. The differences in the responses of the men in this category can be attributed to the victimization experience of one man. Table 3 summarizes these responses.

Employees who normally work alone

The eight employees who usually work alone in the development expressed great concern about the crime problem and most said they are fearful while on the job. Seven of the eight respondents felt that fear of crime prevents them from doing their job well; they mentioned having to keep constantly alert for potential assault or robbery. Seven respondents also felt that employees should be allowed to carry something for protection, and one actually does so. Three of the respondents actually had been victimized, and five respondents felt that harassment affected their work. Table 4 presents these results.

Employees who work with at least one other person

Seven persons were interviewed who usually work with another person. Two respondents felt that some sort of protection was necessary, and two reported actually carrying weapons. Harassment by residents was not as much of a problem according to this group, and only two felt that it prevented them from doing their job well. Three of the seven respondents felt that crime or the fear of crime affected the quality of their work. Tools and equipment had been stolen from four respondents, and six had heard of victimization of other employees or service personnel. Table 5 presents the responses in this category.

COMPARISON OF RESPONSES

As shown in Table 6, a comparison was made between those employees who worked alone and those who normally work with others to determine how their experiences and attitudes differ. The major difference appeared in the responses to questions about harassment. Harassment by residents was reported by 63% (five of eight respondents) of the employees who worked alone, while only 29% (two of seven) of those who worked with others felt that harassment was a problem that interfered with their work. Almost 100% of those respondents who work alone also felt that crime, or the fear of crime, prevents them from doing their job well, while the majority of those who worked with others felt that their work was not so affected.

CONCLUSIONS

The maintenance department is one of the most important and visible service groups by which the Housing Authority can provide residents with a clean, attractive environment. Yet the majority of maintenance employees are afraid of being victimized while on the job. Many feel the need to carry protection, and feel that fear of crime adversely affects their work. Many have had tools stolen, been the victim of harassment, robbery or assault, or heard of someone who has. The adverse conditions that maintenance employees encounter result in a circle of resentment and dissatisfaction among workers and residents alike. Residents resent workers who do not keep the buildings and grounds in order, and show their anger by harassing employees or thwarting their efforts. Employees respond by doing an inadequate maintenance job because they feel residents do not care about or appreciate their work. Nobody is happy and the circle continues.

Table 7, Composite Maintenance Personnel Results, presents data gathered from the whole group of interviewed employees. As seen in this table, the major problem facing maintenance staff is fear of crime. Sixty percent reported that they did not feel safe from crime while in the development. They considered the development dangerous and felt especially uneasy about highrise buildings, basement areas, and the Ellen Wilson site. According to those interviewed, their fear of crime lowers their work quality. Some expressed uneasiness about groups of teenagers standing around exits and entrances. Employees who had worked from two to five years or who worked alone were more fearful than other workers.

Sixty-seven percent of the respondents (10 of 15) felt that the quality of their work suffers because of crime or fear of crime. Respondents who felt that crime or fear of crime had no effect on their work had worked more than five years or worked with others.

Harassment by residents was experienced by 40% of maintenance

employees, who felt that their work suffered because of it. Most harassment was reported as verbal abuse, usually concerning the conditions of the buildings. Employees working two years or less felt that the inability to talk to residents was part of the problem. In general, newer employees reported harassment and its effects on their job more frequently than those who had worked longer in the development.

Sixty-seven percent of interviewed employees reported having had tools or equipment stolen from them. They were not able to give cost estimates, but management estimates the figure as exceeding \$1,300 for 1976. Eighty-seven percent of the employees had heard of robbery or assault incidents, three of which occurred during the past year.

Eighty-seven percent of employees reported that the Housing Authority does take precautionary measures to ensure their safety. These measures consist of sending two men on a job, assigning guards, and advising employees to lock all doors while working in the development.

Table 1.--Employees who had worked two years or less
(N=4)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	2
	No	2
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	1
	No	3
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	4
	No	0
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	Yes	3
	No	1
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	1
	No	3
Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	4
	No	0
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	3
	No	1
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	2
	No	2
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	4
	No	0

Table 2.--Employees who had worked from two to five years
(N=8)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	3
	No	5
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	1
	No	7
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	7
	No	1
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	Yes	6
	No	2
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	2
	No	6
Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	7
	No	1
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	3
	No	5
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	6
	No	2
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	6
	No	2

Table 3.--Employees who had worked five years or more
(N=3)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	1
	No	2
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	1
	No	2
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	1
	No	2
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	Yes	1
	No	2
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	1
	No	2
Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	1
	No	2
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	1
	No	2
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	1
	No	2
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	1
	No	2

Table 4.--Employees who normally work alone
(N=8)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	3
	No	5
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	1
	No	7
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	7
	No	1
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	Yes	7
	No	1
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	3
	No	5
Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	7
	No	1
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	5
	No	3
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	6
	No	2
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	3
	No	5

Table 5.--Employees who work with at least one other person
(N=7)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Number</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	3
	No	4
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	2
	No	5
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	2
	No	5
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	Yes	3
	No	4
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	1
	No	6
Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	6
	No	1
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	2
	No	5
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	4
	No	3
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	6
	No	1

Table 6.--Comparison of responses of employees who work alone
and those who work with others

<u>Question</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>Employees who work alone (N=8)</u>	<u>Employees who work with others (N=8)</u>
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	Yes	3	3
	No	5	4
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	Yes	1	2
	No	7	5
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves while working at this development?	Yes	7	2
	No	1	5
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your job well?	Yes	7	3
	No	1	4
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	Yes	3	1
	No	5	6
Have you heard of other employees at this develop- ment who have been victims of any crime?	Yes	7	6
	No	1	1
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	Yes	5	2
	No	3	5
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	Yes	6	4
	No	2	3
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	Yes	3	6
	No	5	1

Table 7.--Composite maintenance personnel
data results
(does not include head of Main-
tenance Department)

<u>Statistic or question</u>	<u>Data</u>
Number of years on the job	
Two years or less	4
Two to five years	8
Five years or more	3
Type of job	
Laborers	6
Technical workers	9
Working hours	
8 a.m. - 4 p.m.	13
Round the clock	2
Work patterns	
Work alone	8
Work with others	7
Do you feel safe from crime while walking around this development?	
Yes	6
No	9
While working in this development, do you usually carry something to protect yourself?	
Yes	3
No	12
Do you think employees should be allowed to carry something to protect themselves?	
Yes	12
No	3
Do you think the crime problem or fear of crime prevents you and other workers from doing your jobs well?	
Yes	10
No	5
Have you been a victim of any type of crime since working here?	
Yes	4
No	11

Table 7 (Cont)

Have you heard of other employees at this development who have been victims of any crime?	
Yes	13
No	2
Have you been harassed by residents while trying to perform your duties and, if so, has this prevented you from doing your job well?	
Yes	8
No	7
Have you had any equipment stolen from you while on the job?	
Yes	10
No	5
Does your organization take any special precautions to ensure your safety?	
Yes	13
No	2
	<hr/>
TOTAL	15

SOCIAL SERVICES

Public and private organizations provide a wide range of services to the residents of Capper Dwellings.

The D.C. Department of Human Resources (DHR) maintains a health clinic and mental health clinic at 1011 Seventh Street, S.E. In addition to these services, social workers for DHR's Social Rehabilitation Administration provide outreach services at the site at 500 K Street, S.E.

Friendship House, a non-profit service organization for residents of Southeast and Southwest Washington, maintains a food co-op and community organization office at the site.

Interviews were conducted with employees and/or management of each of these organizations.

HEALTH CLINIC

The health clinic, on the first floor of 1011 Seventh Street, S.E., has been in operation at the site for over eight years. It serves residents of Capper Dwellings as well as members of the surrounding community. About 30 patients visit the clinic daily. Two staff members who worked in the clinic and an outreach worker were interviewed.

The health clinic is probably the most secure service facility on the site. A special guard is stationed at the clinic every day during working hours to protect workers and patients who visit there. It was learned that no one at the clinic had ever been victimized; however, a theft of medical equipment estimated at a cost of \$400 occurred two years ago. The two staff persons who worked at the clinic daily said they felt safe and did their work well.

The outreach worker who visited households in and around Capper said she felt relatively safe while working in the site because she knew many of the residents and could count on them to protect her if she needed help. She had never been victimized, she said, and did not feel a need to carry a weapon while walking around the development. The crime problem at the site did not affect her work.

MENTAL HEALTH CLINIC

The mental health clinic is located at 1011 Seventh Street, S.E., directly above the health clinic. Although it does not have a guard formally stationed there, the guard from the health clinic downstairs makes routine checks of the facility. The clinic is

protected by a security lock and alarm system. No drugs are kept at the clinic.

Two male staff members, who worked both in the clinic and the surrounding neighborhood, were interviewed. It was learned that no one on the staff had been victimized over the past year. The interviewees said they felt safe once inside the clinic because they could, to some extent, control who enters through the locked door. They did say they were fearful when making visits to patients' homes and walking through the development to their office.

As a security precaution, neighborhood visits were restricted to daylight hours; night visits were made only in the most extreme emergency. One of the respondents felt his fear of being victimized occasionally made it difficult for him to concentrate on his work and, as a result, he could not give his best effort. He also said he should be allowed to carry a weapon for his protection. The staff has taken some basic courses in karate. This practice, however, is not a standard procedure followed by other mental health clinics in the city.

SOCIAL REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

The Social Rehabilitation Administration is responsible for delivering and providing social services under Federal and local programs to the residents of the District of Columbia. The SRA is comprised of three Bureaus; Youth, Family, and Rehabilitation. Interviewed were members of the management and field staff in the Youth and Family Bureaus who were responsible for providing social services to the residents of Capper Dwellings.

Bureau of Youth Services

Staff members of the Community Care Program and the Aftercare Program were interviewed. The Community Care Program provides comprehensive services for youths who are in danger of becoming delinquents. The Aftercare Program provides services for juveniles who have been judged delinquents or who are in need of supervision.

Community Care Program

The supervisor and two community care youth counselors for the Capper area were interviewed. The supervisor indicated that to his knowledge no one on his staff had been victimized or had complained of being harassed while at Capper, and that the quality of staff work was not hampered by the crime problem. He indicated that as a security precaution a female worker could request accompaniment by a male colleague on a field visit to a home if she felt it would

be dangerous. As an additional precaution, all community care counselors have taken self-defense courses sponsored by the Department of Recreation.

Two female community care counselors were interviewed. Both said they felt safe working in the Capper development and felt that the quality of their work was not affected by the crime problem. One said she had requested a male escort in the past and sometimes felt fearful while walking in the hallways and stairways of the highrise buildings. The other indicated she had been harassed on the site and curtailed her work to daylight hours because of the crime problem. Neither carried a weapon or felt the need to.

Aftercare Program

The supervisor and one youth counselor who worked in the Capper area said he did not feel safe working in the site. He said on several occasions he requested the company of a colleague because he was fearful of crime. The quality of his work was affected, he said, because he was afraid to visit some homes, and arranged for his clients to visit him in the central office. He felt having clients coming to his office rather than his visiting at their homes had a negative effect on counseling sessions. Although he had never been victimized or harassed, he was fearful when working at the site.

Bureau of Family Services

WBA interviewed the manager and field representative for Capper Dwellings in the Social Service Division of the Bureau of Family Services. The Social Service Division is responsible for meeting crisis needs, making problem assessments for families and adults, and for providing and coordinating family planning services, counseling, health related services, homemaker services, and chore services.

The supervisor did not know of anyone on her staff who had been victimized at the site. She said she felt the crime problem had a minimal effect on the morale of her field representatives, because they had become accustomed to working in the area. As a precautionary measure a field representative can request the company of a colleague if he is fearful of working in a particular area. In some instances the supervisor said she will assign a male worker to a high crime area rather than a female.

The field representative who works in the Capper area said she felt safe on the job and was not harassed by residents or others in the development. She felt the relationship she developed with clients and people on the site added to her security because she could

depend on them for help if she got into trouble.

She was particularly fearful of the hallways, entranceways, and elevators in the highrise buildings and felt the housing police were not visible enough to be an effective deterrent to crime. If "spurts" of crime occurred in a particular area, she said she would not have to visit it until the trouble cooled down.

Up John Homemakers

Up John Homemakers is a private organization which contracts with the SRA to provide homemaker services to clients.

The service coordinator and field supervisor for the Capper area were interviewed. The service coordinator said she did not know of any victimizations of homemakers at Capper. However, she did mention several homemakers complaining of being harassed on the site and being fearful of walking in the highrise buildings. She said most of the homemakers assigned to Capper lived in the neighborhood, knew many of the residents, and were familiar with the problems of the environment. Because of this she felt the morale of the homemakers and the quality of their work did not suffer.

She said she would refuse to send a homemaker into the area if she thought it was dangerous (two homemakers cannot work together for security because of a lack of funding).

The field supervisor said she was fearful of visiting the site, particularly the highrise buildings. When she first began working there she received an escort from housing management, but this practice was discontinued because, she said, management lost interest in providing it. She did not feel the quality of her work was affected, because once inside a client's home she felt safe. Although she had not been victimized or harassed at the development, she felt a need to carry a weapon for protection.

RECREATION FACILITY

The recreation facility is located at 500 K Street, S.E. The supervisor of the facility was interviewed and indicated that no one on the staff had been victimized over the past year. However, a movie projector was stolen from the center. The respondent mentioned that one staff member was assaulted and raped five years ago. According to the supervisor, the crime problem at the site did not affect the morale or quality of work of her staff. She attributed this to the fact that all employees had been working in the area for two or more years and had developed good relationships with the residents. She does keep the front door to the facility locked as a precautionary measure.

FOOD CO-OP

The food co-op, located at 1101 7th Street, S.E., has been operating on the site for four years, and serves residents of the development and the surrounding community. Like the mental health clinic, it has an electronic lock and alarm system. The manager of the co-op was interviewed and said that none of the employees there had been victimized, had complained of being harassed, or were fearful of crime. They are residents of the development and know many of the customers. Because of the lack of crime, she may recommend that the security alarm system service be discontinued.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION OFFICE

The community organization office is located at 1001 Fifth Street, S.E., and has been in operation for six years. The office acts as a liaison to solve problems between residents and housing management at Capper, and provides outreach information and referral services for tenants. The supervisor of the office, who is a tenant, was interviewed.

The office had been broken into over the past year and \$507 worth of equipment had been stolen. The supervisor said she and her staff were not fearful of being victimized, and that they felt safe. She reported that although none of the staff had been victimized, employees had complained of being harassed by residents. As a security precaution the supervisor curtailed working hours to daylight, kept the door to the office locked, and tried to keep two persons in the office together.

CONTRACTORS

Employees of three private companies which provided services to the Housing Authority were interviewed. They were Westinghouse Elevator Company, which maintains the elevators in the highrise buildings; Capitol Boiler Works, Inc., which does repair work to the boilers and heating systems; and M & M Welding and Fabricating Company, which does mechanical maintenance on the site. Each of these organizations has been servicing the site for several years.

WESTINGHOUSE ELEVATOR COMPANY

At Westinghouse, the field supervisor who was responsible for handling service at Capper, and three employees, were interviewed. It was learned that no one at Westinghouse had been victimized, but many of the servicemen who work there had been harassed and were fearful of being victimized. Two of the workers interviewed felt that the quality of their work suffered because their fear of being

victimized kept them from concentrating on it. The other respondent, who works alone and inspects the elevators, said he felt safe while working at the site and did his job satisfactorily. The respondent said he had been working alone at the site for over eight years and felt safe because he knew and respected the residents.

The elevator repairmen work and travel through areas of the highrise buildings which are regarded as dangerous by many residents and visitors. Those interviewed were particularly fearful of such places as entranceways, dark hallways and stairwells, and the elevator cages on the top floor of the buildings.

As a safety precaution, the supervisor always sends two men to repair the elevators at Capper, except for the inspector who works alone. The workers can demand that an extra man accompany them, or they can refuse to work at the site because, according to their union contract, they do not have to work in areas that are considered unsafe. Westinghouse will not service broken elevators during the night or on weekends unless there is an extreme emergency and an armed guard is available.

CAPITOL BOILER WORKS, INC.

The president of Capitol Boiler Works and three of his workers were interviewed. It was learned that two men working for Capitol (one of them a subcontractor) had been robbed at Capper over the past year. One victimization took place in a boiler room and the other next to a company truck outside a boiler room. As indicated from the interviews with the Capper maintenance personnel, the boiler rooms around the site were regarded with much fear because they are dark and their locks are often broken, making them accessible to perpetrators.

Two of the workers interviewed said they felt safe working at the site and did not experience any harassment by residents. The third respondent said he did not feel safe working at the site, and had been the target of a flying bottle and verbal abuse. He also reported that he had a tool box valued at \$130 stolen. All three men said they did not feel the crime problem affected the quality of their work. This was in contrast to the views of the company president, who said on the whole his men do not do as good a job at Capper as at other jobs because they are "running scared."

Two men are assigned to each job, due to the nature of their work, as well as security. The workers said their union contract did not stipulate that they could refuse to work in areas considered unsafe. When visiting the site they usually requested an escort from the Housing Authority police.

M & M WELDING AND FABRICATING COMPANY

At M & M, the manager was interviewed. He reported that an employee's car had been vandalized at the site and that his company had lost about \$1,900 in stolen and vandalized equipment at Capper over the past year. Although none of his workers had been victims of personal assault, he reported that they did not feel safe, and complained of being harassed on the job. Because of the crime problem, he said, his employees cannot give full concentration to their work.

Like Westinghouse, his employees are members of a union whose contract stipulates that they can refuse to work in areas that are regarded as dangerous. This requires him to send two men to the site as a security precaution.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER RESOURCES DEPARTMENT

The assistant administrator for Water Resources Management and two of his field employees who worked in the Capper area were interviewed. The administrator indicated that no Water Department employees had been victimized at Capper but that the area had an effect on their morale and quality of work. This statement was in contrast to the responses of the field workers interviewed. They reported that they felt safe working in the area, were not harassed, and worked well when visiting the site. It is important to note that, in contrast to other utility personnel and contractors, these men work outside and in full view of the residents and passersby. This may explain why they feel safe on the job.

The assistant administrator said two men work together as a safety measure, and added that they also work from trucks equipped with radios, which could be used to summon help in an emergency.

C & P TELEPHONE COMPANY

The C & P Telephone Company foreman and an installer/repairman who worked in the Capper area were interviewed.

The foreman said that, to his knowledge, none of his men had been victimized at Capper in recent years. He did indicate, however, that many of the personnel expressed fear of working in the area, and he felt this had an effect on the quality of their work. C & P has classified Capper as a dangerous area, and as a security precaution, two men must work together after noon during the school year and at all times during the summer months. As an additional precaution, C & P will not service the site on Saturdays or after 5 p.m. on weekdays. C & P has estimated the overall cost of keeping one man in the field at \$28 an hour. Thus, when two men are required to work on a job, the operating cost doubles to \$56 per hour.

The installer/repairman said he felt relatively safe while working at the site but would not work in the highrise buildings alone. Contrasting with the comments of the foreman, he said crime at the site did not affect the quality of his work. He said he had never been harassed at the site and felt no need to carry a weapon.

POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY

The field supervisor and two meter readers who are assigned to the Capper area were interviewed. The field supervisor did not know of any meter readers who had been victimized in the area, but felt the crime problem had a definite effect on work quality. Many workers refused to read meters because they had to enter basement areas which they felt were dangerous. As a precautionary measure, PEPCO policy states that, in instances where meter readers feel threatened or in danger, they can refuse to read the meter. When this occurs, a supervisor must accompany them on their next trip for a security check. These situations result in an additional manpower cost and, in some cases, loss of billing for one month. As an additional precaution, the dog repellent spray issued by PEPCO could be used to repel a human attacker. The supervisor also said he tried to schedule the same men to the area so they could become familiar with the residents and the environment. He felt this would cut down on security problems.

The two meter readers said they did not feel safe working in the area, particularly in the basement areas. Both said they had been harassed while working on the site and one felt he should be allowed to carry a weapon for protection. Fear of crime, they said, affected the quality of their work because they had to be careful and could not read the meters as fast as they would like to.

OTHER SERVICES

Under this category employees of two important service organizations were interviewed--the Vector Control Division of the D.C. Department of Environmental Services, which is responsible for administering extermination services to the site, and the Yellow Cab Company.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VECTOR CONTROL DIVISION

The lead foreman and four exterminators were interviewed at the Vector Control Division. The exterminators visit the site once every 45 days to spray the dwelling units. They arrive at the site in a group but work alone in the units.

There were no victimizations reported among this group. The exterminators said they felt safe working at the site and were not

harassed by residents. None of them carried weapons or felt the need to. One respondent said the spray can and the poison it contains can be an effective weapon, if needed. The exterminators were former members of Pride, Inc., a community organization, and, as the name of their organization indicates, they seemed proud of their work and their relationship with the community in which they worked.

According to the foreman, no precautions were taken to protect the exterminators from crime.

YELLOW CAB COMPANY

Yellow Cab Company is an association in which drivers operate independently. Although the drivers can use the dispatcher service provided by the association, they do not have to accept "runs" or pick up passengers.

At Yellow Cab, the fleet operations manager and five drivers were interviewed. The operations manager did not know of any drivers who had been victimized at Capper. He said he didn't know if the crime problem there affected the drivers' morale or the quality of their work, since each man operated independently.

None of the five drivers interviewed had been victimized at Capper. Three of them, however, said they often refused to pick up persons because they did not feel safe working in the area. One carried a weapon and another felt he should be allowed to carry a weapon.

As a precautionary measure, the association has instituted radio cabs whereby the name, address, and phone number of the caller requesting the cab are logged. When a cab arrives, the association will phone the caller to let him know the cab is outside. This means that the driver need not leave his car, and provides information on the caller should he attempt to assault the driver. In addition, drivers have radios in their cars which can be used to summon help in an emergency.

Unlike the service persons interviewed, drivers do not have to go to the site to earn a living, and two of them said they have refused to pick up or take passengers to the site because they are afraid of being victimized.

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