EXECUTIVE TRAINING PROGRAM
IN ADVANCED CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTICES

# MANAGING PATROL OPERATIONS



OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Office of Development, Testing, and Dissemination
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
United States Department of Justice



# MANAGING PATROL OPERATIONS

## MANUAL

Prepared by:

Donald F. Cawley
and
H. Jerome Miron

Contributors:

Robert MacFarlane
and
Terrence Richard

This manual was prepared pursuant to Contract J-LEAA-022-76 with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The points of view or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent official policy or positions of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

# INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR MANAGING PATROL OPERATIONS

The Committee for Economic Development, a group of leading business executives throughout the nation, has expressed the conviction that:

> Crime running rampant is certainly not the mark of a healthy society. Large-scale criminal activity, whether organized or spontaneous, undermines an economy based upon opportunity and enterprise, while it fosters a sense of injustice among the poor and the minorities. No citizen can justify indifference, least of all members of the business community with their special concern for public safety. Complacency will prove suicidal.
>
> . . . .
>
> Events of the past decade have intensified the challenge to order and justice. Drug abuse is rising rapidly, terroristic violence is now a fact of life, and crime syndicates flourish. More and more Americans hesitate to venture upon the streets, especially at night; they feel insecure even within their own homes. Almost two-thirds of all women and nearly half of all men say they were "more afraid and uneasy" on the streets in 1971 than in 1970. Crime has long been much more common in the United States than in other industrialized countries, but it has now passed the limits of tolerance.[1]

The Committee further asserts:

> The need for strong professional police management is obvious in view of technological developments, organizational complexities, obstacles to optimal utilization of available manpower, and difficulties arising from animosities between police and the populations served. The qualities of leadership and the management skills required are of high order. Resistance to change is deeply imbedded, but reorganizations already achieved or in progress show that obstacles are not insuperable.
>
> . . . .
>
> The nation has been well advised of its needs. A series of Presidential Commissions composed of distinguished and knowledgeable citizens has studied these problems and analyzed and reported upon them at length. Their recommendations over a period of 40 years display a remarkable

---

[1] Reducing Crime and Assuring Justice. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1972, pp. 9-10.

degree of consistency and similarity. But beginning with the renowned Wickersham Commission (1929-1931) few of these recommendations have been adopted--even in part--although repeated, reinforced, and expanded in the past decade by thoroughly competent groups that have explored every aspect of criminal administration. A suitable agenda for action has thus been available for 40 years. Most of the detailed proposals made in this statement conform in summary fashion with these prior studies, although we also urge new governmental changes and courses of action to produce the desired results. It is now time to take effective action.[2]

A call for action would be equally appropriate today. The regrettable fact is that little progress has been made in upgrading the criminal justice system. Indeed, similar calls for action have been issued frequently over the last 60 years, and the degree of progress can only be described as disheartening.

As an example, in 1920 Raymond Fosdick made the following observations concerning police patrol methods: "...It is not at all uncommon to find the boundaries of posts remaining unaltered for years...[while] there are many districts in which the night problem...is entirely different from the day problem...the posts in such districts are often policed in exactly the same way during all hours of the day and night."[3]

And again in 1929, Bruce Smith in his Police Systems in the United States said, "...city police forces waste a part, and sometimes a considerable part, of their available manpower on...distribution of uniformed patrols...without regard to established need...It is a matter of general observation that [patrols] are usually distributed on an equal, or nearly equal, basis throughout the twenty-four hours of the day, despite the fact that the crime curve shows a marked peak between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m...."[4]

More than decades later, consider the words of Chief of Police Roy McLaren in his 1972 text, Police Administration:

> Until recent years, the practice in organizing the work in almost all police departments has been to distribute the patrol force evenly among three eight-hour shifts and to assign the officers to beats of equal area. This method of distribution was evidence either of a lack of knowledge concerning the hourly and geographical fluctuations of the police load, or of indifference to the possible increase in efficiency resulting from a distribution of the force on the basis of need throughout the day over the area to be served. When beats of equal area are

---

[2]Ibid., p. 33.

[3]Quoted from Walton, Frank, "Selective Distribution of Police Patrol Force," in Chapman, Samuel G.(ed.), Police Patrol Readings (2nd ed.). Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970, p. 297.

[4]Ibid.

established without regard for variations in need for police service, some will have several times the amount of police work required by others...Patrolmen should be distributed in proportion to the need for police service. The essence of the distribution problem lies in measuring the proportionate need.[5]

A Prescriptive Package soon to be published by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice entitled Improving Patrol Productivity brings us up to date on the current state of affairs. It describes a survey of 321 police agencies showing that almost 50 percent of the agencies still employ "equal staffing" on the three basic shifts of duty. The agencies that still hold to equal staffing, however, are for the most part agencies with fewer than 100 sworn officers.

The reasons for continuing to use this less efficient distribution system are many. The authors of the Prescriptive Package, Improving Patrol Productivity, state:

Some police administrators have felt and assumed a need to provide a given level of coverage on each shift. Some departments have simply failed to keep workload records or analyze these records to identify patterns of activity. Some departments have simply taken the easy scheduling option: they have eliminated the complex scheduling and rotation problems that occur when watches are differently staffed. Some departments have caved in to the pressure of patrol personnel who want as many day tours as possible. Finally, some departments have unwittingly locked themselves into union agreements that specify equal shift staffing while a few states have enacted equal shift staffing laws. Whatever the reasons--tradition, union agreements, or state laws--equal shift staffing has a major and detrimental impact on both the efficiency and effectiveness of patrol operations.

In 1967 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice noted:

Many departments resist change, fail to determine shortcomings of existing practices and procedures through research and analysis, and are reluctant to experiment with alternative methods of solving problems. The police service must encourage, indeed put a premium on, innovation, research and analysis, self-criticism and experimentation.[7]

A recent article entitled "Police Service Today" states:

---

[5]McLaren, Roy C., Wilson, O.W., Police Administration. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972, pp. 364-365.

[6]National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Improving Patrol Productivity (in process).

[7]Task Force Report: The Police. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 44.

> The police service of the United States, is a picture of contrast. Some of the world's finest police forces are in cities of this country, as well as some of the most progressive police executives. At the same time, many police agencies have made no discernible moves toward seeking excellence by reorganizing, modernizing procedures, stepping up standards of training programs, or improving management or field operations. They seem to cling to tradition and oppose any change even in the face of the increasingly complex problems posed by a rapidly changing society.[8]

And in 1973 the National Commission on Productivity commented on the reluctance to chart new courses in this way:

> Most police chiefs are understandably cautious when it comes to doing something out of the ordinary. "Innovation" is a luxury many police departments feel they cannot afford. However, neither can they afford to hold to the status quo while conditions around them change.
>
> Clearly a prescription for a balanced approach to risk-taking is needed. It is important to recognize that useful information often comes from the idea that did not work as expected. Managers must also learn how to take reasonable and controlled risks, that is, to try things out, and establish a consistent approach to risk-taking.[9]

The facts appear to be reasonably clear. If progress is to be made, police administrators must get beyond the kind of position adopted by a chief in one large city who said, "You need to smell if something is going to be a winner before you get behind it."[10] History has shown that progress is not made by followers but by leaders. The risks for leaders are obviously greater than for followers, but so are the satisfaction and the benefits that come to both the department and the community.

What is needed are creativity and the willingness to assume the risks associated with being an innovator. There may be, furthermore, little security in continually supporting the status quo. In an unpublished masters thesis, O'Neill and Bloom described creativity:

> Creativity can be defined as a deliberate pursuit of change and innovation. All creativity inherently involves experimenting on a trial and error basis. There is always the possibility that some attempts may fail....Moreover, uncertain activities introduce risk and therefore anxiety into the operation of organizations...[and] creativity within a bureau inevitably generates tensions and inconsistencies with other organization characteristics.

---

[8]Municipal Police Administration, International City Management Association, 1969, p. 1.

[9]National Commission on Productivity, Opportunities for Improving Productivity in Police Services, 1973, p. 5.

[10]Ibid., p. 66.

> Moreover, these other characteristics--tendencies toward inertia, routinization, and inflexibility--are natural and inevitable attributes of all bureaus. Creativity is not.[11]

The Managing Patrol Operations topic of the Executive Training Program seeks to encourage the idea that a critical review of existing practices can lead to creative ways of conducting patrol operations. In the face of the fiscal constraints confronting most municipalities today, there is an urgent need to improve the efficiency of police patrol. The hard realities of the fiscal situation were expressed in these terms by the National Commission on Productivity:

> State and local governments are challenged to provide more effective police services at a time when the growing desire for public safety is surpassed only by the increase in police costs. For a police department to create one more round-the-clock post actually requires adding five officers to the force at a cost that may exceed $80,000 a year. To place an officer in a police car with a partner 24 hours a day may exceed $175,000 in annual costs to the community....
>
> These fiscal facts of life have forced many communities to recognize that the demand for more police services cannot be met simply by expanding the police force. Rather, police departments must learn to use more effectively the personnel and other resources currently available to them. That means increasing their productivity.[12]

The costs of funding the nation's criminal justice and law enforcement system amounted to a staggering $17.2 billion in 1975. Of that amount, $9.8 billion, or 57 percent of the total amount, was spent on police efforts.[13] As the total law enforcement costs increase, so will the demands of the tax-paying community for increased productivity.

Since most police agencies assign almost 60 percent of their total personnel resources to patrol service, it seems reasonable to assume that the effectiveness and efficiency of this service must be closely scrutinized in any attempt to increase productivity. The luxury once enjoyed by the police administrator of requesting and receiving additional personnel to combat the rising crime rate and put more personnel on "preventive" patrol appears to be a thing of the past.

Now the administrator must seek and develop better ways of assigning and using resources so that higher levels of productivity are achieved. The police organization must be critically evaluated, and the performance of the patrol

---

[11]O'Neill, M. Edward, and Bloom, Carlton James, A Comparative Study of the Field of Patrolmen's Workload. Master's thesis. California State College at Long Beach, 1971.

[12]National Commission on Productivity, op. cit., p. 1.

[13]U.S. Bureau of the Census, Expenditures and Employment Data for the Criminal Justice System, 1975.

services division especially so. The degree of specialization in the organization will also have to be carefully examined and justified, since such units are staffed by drawing personnel from the patrol services division.

As a beginning, the police administrator should consider the following:

> Police textbooks refer to the patrol officer as "the backbone of the police department," yet the policies of many police departments seem to deny this. The patrolman is usually the lowest paid, least consulted, most taken for granted member of the force. His duty is looked on as routine and [it] consists of "the inexperienced and the mediocre." This situation, where it exists, must be changed.[14]

The importance of police patrol cannot be overestimated. The patrol officer in any city is the most visible representative of government. He/she responds to calls for services, enforces the law, and maintains order in the community.

In addition to establishing standards which emphatically stated that the patrol officer is the most important person in police work and stressed the need to attract and retain competent people in patrol, the Commission suggested further that:

> Information must be gathered that indicates where and when police are most needed; each agency must analyze its own personnel resources and establish realistic goals based on these resources; the agency then must field a patrol force based on need, its resources, and its goals, and finally, each agency should have a plan to revise and update its patrol operations continually.... It is also important that priorities for calls are established in advance and all personnel, especially radio dispatch personnel, are aware of these priorities.... Patrol work is too often taken for granted. It is not a random function haphazardly applied. It requires the best men and careful planning to make it successful.[15]

In short, the need for a broad and searching review of present patrol practices is a critical one. This review should challenge long-standing policing philosophies and beliefs and should result in an examination of the patrol structure, policies, priorities, methods, and procedures. There are many compelling arguments for undertaking this introspective analysis. The overriding one is that the "way we have always done it" has not reduced the level of crime or quelled community dissatisfaction with the quality of police service. There is a clear need to establish sound and effective programs designed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of patrol operations.

To accomplish this purpose, police administrators must, at the very least:

---

[14]NACCJSC, p. 189

[15]Ibid., p. 190.

- Know the actual functions and roles of an effective manager
- Understand the basic principles of organizational development so that lasting change can be initiated and managed
- Understand the need to involve first-line supervisors at an early point in the planning process
- Assign and distribute resources to match actual workload demands
- Conduct policy reviews of current workload demands to determine both their validity and their reasonableness
- Know the importance of systematic crime analysis to the development of effective and responsive patrol strategies and tactics
- Be aware of the innovative programs being tried by other police agencies so that the wheel is not reinvented over and over
- Know the roles of the citizen in the law enforcement system and understand the impact the community has on departmental policy and operations.

The Managing Patrol Operations topic of the Executive Training Program will look at and discuss these needs.

In summary, the public will not wait another 50 years before police administrators take the obvious actions necessary to assign resources in accordance with workload demands. The fiscal realities alone will force action on this basic issue. The public will demand professional police managers who are lead. And inherent in leadership is the willingness to assume risk. We must recognize that calculated risk is the means by which progress is made at the necessary pace. The time to take effective action is now.

# CHAPTER 1. THE ROLES OF A MANAGER

This chapter seeks to answer the deceptively simple question, "What do managers do?" This question is posed to managers by their families, by their staff members, by line personnel who aspire to become managers, and even by most managers themselves.

Ask this question of people who have attended a management training course and you are likely to be told that managers plan, organize, coordinate, and control. This answer has been the classic one since it was first prescribed in 1916 in the work of Henri Fayol, the founder of modern administration and management theory.

"Fine," you may respond, "but what do managers really do?" If you choose to probe further for a more specific answer, you may be interested in reviewing an article in the 1969 issue of the Harvard Business Review entitled, "The Management Process in 3-D," which is described as providing "a way to fit together all generally accepted activities of management."[1] Coming one-half century after Fayol, this article ends up telling the reader that managers plan, organize, staff, direct, and control.

In the past 60 years an enormous literature has developed on management. In American public and private organizations, there may be at least four million managers at the second level of supervision alone who aspire to become chief executives. In any month, countless courses, training programs, seminars, workshops, and in-house management development programs are going on. In any day, a manager may be surrounded and supported by a host of staff specialists whose jobs are simply to make their managers more efficient in carrying out their work.

All this and still we do not really know what managers do.

In this chapter we seek to summarize answers to this and other questions about the job of the manager. The text relies heavily on the work of one school of management--the "work-activity" school--and, particularly, one person, Dr. Henry Mintzberg. Mintzberg's[2] work is based on evidence from empirical studies of managers' work, in sharp contrast to the great majority of books and articles on the manager's job that make little reference to systematic evidence. By the use of a methodology that includes extended observations of managers and leaders of organizations, analysis of the working records of presidents of public and private organizations, analysis of the daily work of managers, and structured

---

[1]MacKenzie, R. A., "The Management Process in 3-D," Harvard Business Review, 47, November-December, 1969, pp. 80-87.

[2]Mintzberg, Henry, The Nature of Managerial Work. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

observations and interviews of chief executives, Mintzberg was able to bring the results of empirical research together for the first time. The convergence of these research findings enabled him and others to develop a new view of the work of the manager and will enable us to answer that fundamental question, "What do managers do?"

The manager's work is analyzed in several dimensions. Section I of this chapter summarizes the findings of the studies of Mintzberg and others about the nature and characteristics of the job of the manager. Section II discusses some of the issues regarding the job of the manager in the public sector compared to the job of the manager in private organizations. Section III summarizes the findings and implications of the roles of a manager in public organizations. Finally, an appendix to this chapter presents a checklist for self-study of your job as a manager.

## I. THE MANAGER'S JOB: ROLES AND CHARACTERISTICS

What do managers do? An answer has been developed by the "work-activity" school of thought. The organizing concept of the work-activity theory is the notion of the role. A role is defined as an organized set of behaviors belonging to an identifiable office or position. While individual personality may affect how a role is performed, it will not affect the fact that the role is performed. Thus, managers and others play roles that are predetermined, although individuals may interpret them in different ways.

Identification and description of the roles of managers on the job is derived from actual observations by Mintzberg and the documented performance of several hundred managers of both public and private organizations. There is considerable empirical evidence to support the contention that the various identified roles of the job of the manager are common to the work of all managers. The differences that may exist in some managers' work--for example, the managers of public sector organizations--can be described largely as certain roles being highlighted or de-emphasized by these managers. In reviewing the following detailed descriptions of these roles, three points should be borne in mind.

First, each role is observable and can be witnessed. It should also be noted that some activities of a manager may fit into more than one of the identified and described roles.

Second, all of the observed work or activities of managers are accounted for in the role description. There has been a tendency in the literature to exclude certain work that a manager does as inherently nonmanagerial. But if a manager must do certain things, such as preside at a retirement dinner, then we should assume that this is part of the managerial job and seek to understand why the manager does it.

Third, while the roles are described individually, they cannot be isolated; these roles form a gestalt--an integrated whole. One cannot arbitrarily remove one role and expect the other roles to remain intact. For example, a manager who ceases to perform a liaison role may lose access to external information; this loss will lessen his/her performance in the disseminator role, which, in turn, will affect the quality of the decisionmaking role of the manager.

## A. The Roles of the Manager

The position of manager provides the starting point for this analysis. The manager is defined as that person formally in charge of an organizational unit. This formal authority leads to a special position of status in the organization. From this formal authority and status comes what Mintzberg has determined as ten established roles of the manager. Figure I-1 shows the relationship between the authority of the manager and the ten roles of a manager.

### 1. The Interpersonal Roles

#### a. The Manager as Figurehead

The most basic and most simple of the managerial roles is that of figurehead. Because of his/her formal authority, the manager is a symbol and is obliged to perform a number of symbolic duties. Some are trite; some are inspirational; all involve some form of interpersonal activity; and none require significant information processing or decisionmaking.

#### b. The Manager as Leader

The leader role is clearly among the most significant of all the manager's roles and has received more attention than any other. It has several outstanding characteristics:

- It permeates all management activities. Thus, it would be unwise to isolate certain activities as specifically being leadership activities. For example, each time a manager encourages or criticizes a subordinate, he/she is acting in the capacity of leader, in spite of the fact that such activities may have other purposes, such as transmitting information or making strategic decisions. Virtually everything the manager does is screened by subordinates searching for leadership clues. Anxious subordinates may infer leadership messages (perhaps nonexistent ones) even from the manager's form of greeting.

- Some activities may be concerned primarily with leadership. A special class are those associated with staffing--hiring, training, judging, promoting, rewarding, and dismissing subordinates. Some other leadership activities may be primarily motivational in nature, in which a subordinate may turn to the manager--for advice on a personal problem or for reassurances that his/her work is adequate.

Figure 1-1. The Ten Managerial Roles[3]




[3]Ibid.

- In another set of activities, the manager, as leader, probes (one might even say "meddles") into the actions of subordinates. Empirical evidence shows clear indication of this type of activity, even though most of the management literature ignores this activity or does not recognize it as leadership. In "touring" the organization, in reading company magazines, in much of what he/she does on a daily basis, the manager seeks information on his/her organization. When exposed to something he/she doesn't like, the manager often may act--as the leader.

Two additional points should be noted about the leadership role. First, the key purpose of this role is to integrate individual needs and organizational goals. Second, it is in the leader role that managerial power most clearly manifests itself. Formal authority vests the manager with great potential power; leadership activity determines how much of it will be realized.

c. The Manager as Liaison

While the leader role stresses vertical relationships or authority and power within the organization, the liaison role stresses the significance of horizontal relationships between the manager and numerous individuals and groups outside the organization. The liaison role involves the significant web of external relationships that the manager builds and maintains in a variety of formal and informal ways. These relationships or contacts have been called "exchange" relationships, in which the manager gives something in order to get something in return. For example, managers may join outside boards or organizations, or attend conferences, conventions, seminars, or serve on external committees--all of which provide contacts that will produce information and favors to the manager in return for the manager's investment of time and expertise. The liaison role represents the beginning of a key part of the manager's job--the linking of the environment with the organization.

2. The Informational Roles

Mintzberg's second set of managerial activities concern receiving and transmitting information. Much evidence indicates that to his/her subordinates, to the observer, and to the manager himself/herself, the manager clearly occupies the central position in the movement of a certain kind of information within the organization. In effect, the manager occupies a position that can be described as the "densest part of a network" of information flow. He/she is the organization's "nerve center" through which the flow of nonroutine information is transmitted and used. These roles reflect two features of the manager's job--his/her unique access to external information (derived from the liaison role) and his/her all-embracing access to internal information (derived from the leader role). Though the manager may not know everything about a given subordinate activity performed by staff or line employees, he/she is the only one to know a significant amount about every activity, whether staff or line. As a result, many outsiders will turn to the manager when the information they need from his/her organization involves more than one function or when they do not know which specialist in the organization can answer their questions.

Three roles characterize the manager in his/her informational function. In the monitor role, he/she informs himself/herself about the organization and its environment; in the disseminator and spokesperson roles, he/she transmits this information to others.

a. The Manager as Monitor

The manager as monitor is continuously seeking, and being bombarded with, information that enables him/her to understand what is taking place in the organization and its environment. Observations clearly indicate that the manager receives a wide variety of information from a wide variety of sources both inside and outside the organization. Usually, such information falls into five categories:

- Internal Operations--Information on the progress of operations in the organization that comes in many forms: standard reports, touring the organization, etc.

- External Events--Information about clients, personal contacts, associates, political events and moves, and developments in new technology. Sources may be as diverse as personal contacts who keep him/her informed on events and gossip of the business; subordinates who act as filters for information; and periodicals and newsletters.

- Analyses--Analyses and reports on various issues, solicited and unsolicited, from subordinates, trade organizations, consultants, news clippings, studies. Some are requested and initiated by the manager; others derive from the basic flow of nonroutine information that crosses the manager's desk by mail or by memo.

- Ideas and Trends--A number of means are used by the manager to maintain and increase understanding of the technical and conceptual aspects of the job. Conferences, letters from associates, professional organization reports, phone conversations with colleagues in other organizations, and contacts with subordinates or specialists within the organization form the conceptual reference base from which new understanding is developed.

- Pressures--The manager's channels of information also bring him/her data in the form of pressures of various kinds. Subordinates attempt to influence decisions by providing information. Outsiders may make a variety of demands based on their access to and use of information.

It is clear that the manager's advantage lies not in the vast amount of documented information available to him/her, but in the current, nondocumented information transmitted largely by informal means. As Richard Neustadt pointed out in his study of presidential leadership, "...It is not information of a general sort that helps a President see personal stakes.... Rather, it is the odds and ends of tangible detail that, pieced together in his mind, illuminate the underside of issues put before him.... To help himself, he must reach out as

widely as he can for every scrap of fact, opinion, gossip, bearing on his interests and relationships as President...."[4]

What does the manager do with his/her information? Clearly, he/she simply transfers a good part of it. The means of transferring information inside the organization are discussed in the disseminator role of the manager, while the means of transferring information outside the organization are discussed in the spokesperson role. Figure I-2 shows the manager's role in the processing of information and makes clear that it is the informational roles that tie all managerial work together--linking status and the interpersonal roles with the decisional roles.

b. The Manager as Disseminator

His/her special access to information allows the manager to play the role of disseminator, sending external information into the organization and internal information from one subordinate to another. The information is usually of two distinguishable types: factual and value.

Factual information can be tested as to its validity; on some recognized scale it is either correct or incorrect. The manager receives much factual information simply because of his/her formal authority. A good part of this information is quickly forwarded to the appropriate subordinates.

Value information deals with preferences--someone's arbitrary belief of what ought to be. A statement of values is neither correct nor incorrect; it often reflects the needs of those who wish to exercise power over a decisionmaking situation. A significant function of the disseminator role is to transmit value statements into the organization to guide subordinates in making decisions.

c. The Manager as Spokesperson

The spokesperson role is performed when the manager transmits information of his/her organization's environment. As the formal authority, the manager is called upon by the employees of the organization to speak on behalf of the organization; as nerve center, he/she has the information to do so effectively.

The spokesperson role requires that the manager keep two groups informed. The first is the organization's set of key influencers--the board of directors, the policymaking body, or, in the case of a middle manager, the boss. A second group to be informed is the organization's public, which may include clients, peers, consumers, professional organizations, government agencies, the press, citizens, and interest groups.

The manager must keep both groups informed about the organization's plans, policies, and results. The manager may maintain and even enhance his/her liaison network by sharing information with his/her contacts. To perform these spokesperson activites effectively, the manager must transmit

---

[4]Neustadt, Richard, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: Wiley, 1960, p. 157.

Figure 1-2. The Manager as an Information Processing "System"



information that is current, accurate, and expert. In effect, because of his/her authority position and the resulting "nerve center" information the manager has developed, he/she is vested with considerable "expert power"--special knowledge about the profession, industry, or interest group of which the organization is a part--and is called on to give expert advice both to outsiders and to those within the organization.

### 3. The Decisional Roles

A most crucial part of a manager's work, and the part that justifies his/her authority and his/her access to information, is the decisional roles. These roles involve the manager in the strategy-making process in the organization, the process by which significant organizational decisions are made and interrelated.

One fact is unquestionably clear from the empirical studies of managers: the manager must take full charge of the organization's strategy-making system and is substantially involved in every significant decision made by the organization. This is so because: (1) The manager, as formal authority, is the only one allowed to commit the organization to new or important courses of action; (2) the manager, as nerve center, is the only person in the organization who can best ensure that significant decisions reflect current knowledge and organizational values; and (3) strategic decisions can most easily be integrated into the complex organization by having one person control all of them.

In strategic decisionmaking, there are generally three kinds of activities--an intelligence phase, a design phase, and a choice phase. The intelligence phase is the initiating activity--looking for and selecting situations that require decisions. The design phase is the heart of the decisionmaking analysis--seeking alternatives and evaluating them. The choice phase is the process of choosing or accepting one alternative from among those available.

Four decisional roles are described as part of the job of the manager: the change agent role, in which the manager acts at the proactive, innovative end of the continuum of strategic decisionmaking (includes both intelligence and design phases); the disturbance handler role, which includes the same phases at the reactive end of the continuum of strategic decisionmaking; the resource-allocator role, which deals primarily with choice-making activities; and the negotiator role, in which the manager engages in a distinct type of decisionmaking activity--negotiations with other organizations or groups.

#### a. The Manager as Change Agent

In the change agent role, the manager acts as the initiator and designer of much of the controlled change in his/her organization. Controlled change implies all those activities where the manager makes changes of his/her own will by exploiting opportunities and solving nonpressing problems. The change agent work begins with "scanning" activities. As part of the monitor role, the manager spends much time scanning the organization, looking for opportunities and situations that may be considered problems or areas for possible improvement.

In such a search for opportunities and problems, the manager depends on tangible information in the form of specific events and ad hoc data, rather than on the gradual trends displayed in routine reports. Having discovered either an opportunity or problem, the manager may decide that the organization should take action to improve the situation. At this point the design phase of decisionmaking begins and the intelligence or scanning phase diminishes. What is noteworthy about this type of "improvement decision" is that it is not usually an immediate, discrete act of deciding. Rather, as a decision, it emerges as the consequence of smaller decisions and activities happening over a period of time. The key features of most "improvement decisions" are the sequencing of steps leading to the actual decision to act and the prolongation of these steps over time.

Assuming that over a period of time the manager has finally decided, "We've gone as far as we can go in our discussions on the problem (or opportunity)," subsequent activities are then designed to improve a particular organizational situation. The manager may choose to involve himself/herself in the design phase and the choice phase of this improvement project on one of three levels of decisionmaking:

- Delegation--For the least important improvement projects, the manager may choose to delegate all responsibility for the design and choice phases of the project. He/she may become involved only to the extent of choosing the subordinate who will deal with it, while retaining the right to replace the subordinate.

- Authorization--Because some improvement projects may require closer control, the manager may choose to delegate responsibility for the design phase, while retaining responsibility for the choice-making phase. By operating this way, the manager retains ultimate control over choice implementation actions without having his/her time consumed in design work.

- Supervision--Because the improvement project may involve major organizational resource commitments or sensitive value issues, or because powerful organizational groups are to be affected, the manager may choose to retain responsibility for and supervision of the design phase and, of course, the choice phase.

Most managers who were studied seem to maintain supervision at any given time of a large number of "improvement projects" in widely differing stages of development.

In summary, in the change agent role the manager functions as an initiator and as a designer of important controlled change in the organization. These changes take place--over time--in the form of "improvement projects," many of which are supervised directly by the manager and all of which come under his/her control in one way or another.

b. The Manager as Disturbance Handler

The change agent role of the manager emphasizes voluntary action by the manager to bring about controlled organizational change. In the disturbance handler role, the manager deals with involuntary situations and changes that

are partially beyond his/her control. Here, the manager acts out of necessity, because the pressures brought to bear on the organization are too great to ignore. Types of disturbances are many.

Studies of managers acting in this role suggest that the nature and characteristics of disturbances can be described as follows:

1) Nature:

- Conflicts between subordinates over resource demands, personality clashes, or overlap of specialties
- Conflicts or difficulties between one organization and another
- Losses (or the threat of losses) of resources to the organization.

2) Characteristics:

- Disturbances often come up suddenly and are most frequently unpredictable.
- Generally, disturbances are seldom indicated in the routine flow of information--in reports and so on. Rather, they are defined by ad hoc oral reports, usually in the form of "instant communication."
- Disturbance handling usually takes priority over most other kinds of managerial activity.
- Managers have more influence during periods of disturbance than at other times.

It seems evident that every manager must spend a good part of his/her time reacting very quickly to disturbance situations. These arise not only because poor managers ignore situations until they reach crisis proportions, but also because good managers cannot anticipate the consequences of all actions taken by their organizations.

c. The Manager as Resource Allocator

Resource allocation is the heart of the organization's strategy-making system. It is making choices involving significant organizational resources that determines the success of the strategy. Among these resources, in the broadest context, are manpower, money, time, material, equipment, and reputation. Each of these can be allocated positively or negatively--that is, decisions can be taken to use or to preserve these resources.

How should the manager allocate resources? In the studies of managers' work, there was evidence that resource allocation comprises three essential elements--scheduling time, programming work, and authorizing decisions made by others in the organization.

- Scheduling of the manager's time--While it may seem strange to begin a discussion of the resource allocator role with a review of how the manager decides to schedule his/her own time, it should be obvious that throughout each working day, the manager is faced with decisions that have an effect well beyond the manager and his/her own schedule. In scheduling his/her own time, the manager is in fact determining the interests of the organization and setting its priorities for action. In announcing his/her own schedule, the manager determines that certain issues are important to the organization and that others are inconsequential, because they receive little or none of his/her time. Those issues that receive low priority in the schedule of the manager's time do not reach the formal authority centers of the organization and are, in effect, blocked for want of resources. It is little wonder, then, that subordinates react strongly to the priorities set implicitly by the manager's scheduling and use of his/her time. The results of personal scheduling decisions by the manager indicate how powerful the manager of an organization really is and how much influence he/she can exert in simple ways over the diverse affairs of the organization. They also indicate the enormous "opportunity costs" (positive or negative) of the manager's time to the organization.

- Programming work-- The manager's role is to establish the work system of the organization: what is to be done, who will do it, what structure will be operative. Such decisions are basic resource allocation choices; many of them are made when the organization is new or when a new part or process is added to the existing organization. However, the work system also requires continual readjustments as the organization continues to operate. In the informational roles of monitor and disseminator as well as in the change agent role, the manager acquires the needed information to design and construct such adjustment or improvement programs. In his/her programming work as a resource allocator, the manager, by deciding what is to be done, in effect programs the work of his/her subordinates.

- Authorizing actions--The manager retains continuing control over the allocation of resources--particularly in the programming of work--by insisting that he/she authorize all significant decisions before they are implemented. By retaining--and not delegating--such power, the manager ensures that he/she can interrelate decisions. To fragment this power is to invite discontinuous decisionmaking and a disjointed strategy.

Given the fact that much of the resource allocation role of the manager is involved with many such informal, ad-hoc, ill-defined, and relatively unspecified or unknown authorizing requests, which are usually presented individually (rather than in "batches," as in a formal budget review session), what are the factors that enter into the manager's choice-making behavior?

- The manager must believe that the organization's resources will not be overextended.

- The manager must consider whether a decision on one request is consistent with other decisions.

- The manager must somehow be able to test the feasibility of the request.

- By authorizing too quickly, the manager may be denying himself/herself important information.

- By delaying the request, the manager may be losing an opportunity or confusing subordinates, who may not know whether to try again or forget the request.

- By approving, rather than supervising, these requests--as discussed in the change agent role--the manager suggests with these types of decisions that he/she is not prepared to spend much time on them; by making a decision "with the stroke of a pen," he/she may be discouraging a subordinate who may have taken months to develop such a proposal and request.

d. The Manager as Negotiator

The final role of the manager is that of participant in negotiations. From time to time, the organization finds itself in major, nonroutine negotiations with other organizations or individuals. Some management theorists have argued that the manager's participation in negotiations--even with labor unions--is nonmanagerial and unnecessary. However, an examination of the work of managers and, particularly, an analysis of this work in terms of the roles of the manager argue convincingly that the negotiator role is a vital part of the manager's job. He/she participates because as figurehead his/her presence adds credibility and authority to the proceedings; as spokesperson he/she presents the organization's information and value system to outsiders. But, most important, as resource allocator, the manager has the authority to commit organizational resources. Negotiation is resource trading in real time. Whether the resource to be negotiated is money, time, manpower, materials, or reputation, such negotiation or trading requires the presence of someone with authority to commit the quantity of resources at stake, and to do it quickly. Who but the manager has this authority and knowledge and these decisionmaking capabilities?

In summary, the decisional roles of the manager are those in which the real power of the manager is exercised: power over strategy-making in the organization, power expressed by his/her ability to initiate and supervise improvement projects, power through his/her control over the allocation of organizational resources, and power through his/her supervision of all major negotiations.

Figure I-3 summarizes the answer of Mintzberg and others to the question: What do managers do? These summary findings identify and describe the roles and present identifiable activities performed by managers in their jobs.

Figure 1-3.

SUMMARY OF TEN MANAGERIAL ROLES

| Role | Description | Identifiable Activities from Study of Chief Executives |
|---|---|---|
| **Interpersonal** | | |
| Figurehead | Symbolic head; obliged to perform a number of routine duties of a legal or social nature | Ceremonies, status requests, solicitations |
| Leader | Responsible for the motivation and activation of subordinates; responsible for staffing, training, and associated duties | Virtually all managerial activities involving subordinates |
| Liaison | Maintains self-developed network of outside contacts and informers who provide favors and information | Acknowledgments of mail and phone calls; external board work; other activities involving outsiders |
| **Informational** | | |
| Monitor | Seeks and receives wide variety of special information (much of it current) to develop thorough understanding of organization and environment; emerges as nerve center of internal and external information of the organization | Handling all mail and contacts categorized as concerned primarily with receiving information (for example, periodical news, observational tours) |
| Disseminator | Transmits information received from outsiders or from other subordinates to members of the organization--some information factual, some involving interpretation and integration of diverse value positions of organizational influencers | Forwarding mail into organization for informational purposes, making oral contacts involving information flow to subordinates (such as review sessions, instant communication flows) |
| Spokesperson | Transmits information to outsiders on organization's plans, policies, actions, results, etc.; serves as expert on organization's industry | Board meetings; handling mail and contacts involving transmission of information to outsiders |

Figure 1-3, continued...

| Role | Description | Identifiable Activities from Study of Chief Executives |
|---|---|---|
| Decisional | | |
| Change Agent | Searches organization and its environment for opportunities and initiates "improvement projects" to bring about change; supervises design of certain projects as well | Strategy and review sessions involving initiation or design of improvement projects |
| Disturbance Handler | Responsible for corrective action when organization faces important, unexpected disturbances | Strategy and review sessions involving disturbances and crises |
| Resource Allocator | Responsible for the allocation of organizational resources of all kinds--in effect, the making or approval of all significant organizational decisions | Scheduling; requests for authorization; any activity involving budgeting and the programming of subordinates' work |
| Negotiator | Responsible for representing the organization at major negotiations | Negotiation |

## II. PUBLIC ORGANIZATION MANAGERS

In general, the public and private manager perform similar roles, but there are a few important aspects of the job of the public manager that set it apart from management in the private sector. Though these differences do not directly change any of the roles of the manager, they do affect these roles and make the job of the public manager relatively more complex.

Generally, these unique characteristics of public management fall into three principal categories: external factors that affect the entire nature and life of the public organization; internal factors that affect the managerial procedures of the public organization; and internal-external transaction factors that affect the regular daily operations of the public organization.

Each of these factors is analyzed below and statements are offered describing the various impacts on the organization of the factors. Finally, a series of implications for the manager's role in public organizations is listed.

When one matches these implications to the ten managerial roles described in Section I, one discovers that the differences between managers' jobs in public and private organizations are usually a matter of the greater degree or intensity with which some of these roles are exercised by public organization managers. Fundamentally, however, there is very little natural difference in managers' jobs between the public and private sectors.

A. External Factors that Affect the Nature of Public Organizations

1. Public organizations rely on annual guaranteed appropriations of funds.

There is no marketplace in which the public organization can test its effectiveness and efficiency on the basis of how the "market" responds. The market for public organizations is noncompetitive and is not based on supply and demand. Thus, incentives to the organizations derived from relatively automatic penalties or rewards imposed by a market do not occur in public organizations.

The result is that compared to private organizations, public organizations have:

- Less knowledge of client or consumer preferences;
- Less knowledge of performance indicators and information about how well they are doing;
- Less knowledge about how to match their "supplies" to "demands;" and
- Fewer incentives toward cost reduction, operating efficiency, and effective performance.

2. Public organizations are more formally constrained by laws, courts, legislatures, and hierarchy.

The impact of external formal forces on these organizations is such that there are:

- More constraints on spheres of operations (jurisdictions) and procedures, with the result that there is less autonomy for the manager in making choices about these matters;
- More external sources of formal influence; and
- More and greater fragmentation of these sources and influence.

3. External political influences impose informal constraints or challenges on public organizations.

The impact of informal political influence is such that, compared to private organizations:

- There is greater diversity and intensity of external influences on decisions;

- Greater attention is given to public opinion and interest group reactions, and more organizational energy is spent on bargaining and negotiations; and

- There is a greater need on the part of the public organization to seek support from "constituents"--citizens, client groups, sympathetic formal authorities, etc.

B. Internal Factors that Affect the Procedures of Public Organizations

1. Public organizations are characterized by more complex goals and objectives, which make their decision criteria and evaluation processes more complex.

The manager must deal with a greater number and diversity of objectives and criteria. The vagueness and intangibility of most objectives and criteria create conflict for the organization. The greater tendency is for the public manager to "trade off" between conflicting goals, objectives, and performance criteria.

2. The authority of the public manager may be more constrained than that of the private manager.

- Authority over subordinates and lower staff levels is more fragmented due to merit or civil service system constraints and because subordinates can bypass the manager and appeal to alternative authorities.

- Managers have a greater reluctance to delegate more levels of review; they make greater use of formal regulations, due to difficulties in supervision resulting from the vagueness of objectives or the intangibility of criteria discussed in No. 1 above.

3. Incentives and incentive structures are different.

- Managers have greater difficulty in devising incentives for effective and efficient performance.

- Some studies indicate that many public employees place a lower value on monetary incentives and, where there are unions, emphasize bargaining for nonmonetary incentives, such as fringe benefits, access to policymaking, job security, etc.

4. Personal characteristics of public employees seem to be different.

- Individual empirical studies indicate that public organization employees manifest lower work satisfaction and lower organizational commitment.

- Most managers in public organizations show a higher need for achievement and dominance, though these findings may be questionable since most managers of any organization manifest these traits.

5. Organizational performance is relatively less "activist" in most public organizations.

- Because of both external and internal factors, public organizations show greater caution and rigidity and less innovation. Moreover, frequent turnover of top management due to elections and political appointments results in greater disruption of implementation of plans.

C. External-Internal Transactions that Affect the Operations of Public Organizations

1. Many public "government" activities are monopolistic and coercive or regulatory in nature.

- Participation in financing of public services is unavoidable or mandatory for the "consumer," thus creating both interest and resentment. Consumers of public services must pay taxes.

- Participation in the consumption of services will be unavoidable, since there will usually be no other service agency available.

- Regulation of individuals or institutions may be perceived as a common good--so long as it is done to someone else.

2. Public organization activities have broad impact.

- "Consumers" or "politicians" who finance, use, and influence activities express concern about "the public interest," "law and order," and "the public good"--all of which are undefined, of wide scope, and highly symbolic. The result is that the actions of public administrators are often invested with great symbolic significance.

3. Scrutiny and public integrity are more highly valued in public organizations and reflect unique public expectations, compared to private organizations.

- Public officials are under greater scrutiny by citizens, groups, the media, and higher authorities.

- There is a greater public expectation that officials act with fairness, responsiveness, accountability, and honesty.

If one were to characterize the relative importance of public organization managerial roles in terms of the intensity of effort or energy required, one could conclude that the interpersonal roles of figurehead, leader, and liaison seem to be predominant. However, the public manager cannot lessen his/her efforts in the other roles. All ten roles form a basic, integrated whole or gestalt; no one role can be isolated from the others because all are interdependent. Even where the interpersonal roles of the public manager seem to be predominant, many of the activities performed in these interpersonal roles require the exercise of the other informational and decisional roles.

The net effect of the heightened emphasis on some of the roles of the public manager may be that extra pressures are placed on him/her to share information and, if information can be shared, to share the job. This may explain the proliferation of various deputies, assistant or associate directors, or managers in many public organizations. Yet even in these instances, the unique authority and access to information that the manager has invests him/her alone with the ability and responsibility to control the strategic decisionmaking roles of the job.

## III. SUMMARY

The "work-activity" school of management analysis represented by Mintzberg and others has been able to develop a detailed view of the work of the manager for the first time and has reached some major conclusions and implications about the job of manager.

### A. Conclusions

1. Managers' jobs are remarkably alike. Most of the work of managers can be described in terms of ten basic roles and six sets of characteristics.

2. Differences can be described largely in terms of these roles and characteristics. Some types of managerial work or a specific manager's job may give more attention to certain roles or highlight or de-emphasize various characteristics of the job.

3. As commonly thought, much of the manager's work is challenging and unprogrammed. But every manager has his/her share of regular, ordinary duties to perform, especially in moving information and maintaining a status system. Almost all of the activities managers engage in ultimately relate back to their roles as managers.

4. The manager is both a generalist and a specialist. In his/her own organization he/she is a generalist--as the focal point or nerve center for moving information and in handling disturbances. But as a manager, he/she is a specialist, and the job involves specific roles and skills. Unfortunately, to date we know little about these skills or how to teach or transmit them systematically.

5. Much of the manager's power derives from information. Unfortunately, he/she receives much information orally, often lacks effective means to disseminate it to others, has difficulty in delegating responsibility for decisionmaking, and must therefore take full charge of the organization's strategy-making.

6. The principal hazard of the job is superficiality. The job is open-ended, and because he/she has responsibility for information processing and strategy-making, the manager is induced by the job itself to take on a heavy load of work and to do much of it superficially. The work pace is unrelenting and characterized by brevity, variety, and fragmentation.

7. Managers work with oral information and intuitive processes. The management "scientist" has had almost no influence on how the manager works.

8. The manager is in a kind of vicious circle. The job pressures force him/her to adopt work characteristics that make it difficult for him/her to receive help from the management scientist, which leads to aggravation of the negative characteristics and increased work pressures.

9. The management scientist can help break this circle by providing some help for the manager in information processing and strategy-making. However, to do so, the management scientist must devise a way of getting access to the manager's oral data base and must understand the real work and activities of the manager.

10. Managerial work is far more complex than a reading of the literature or attendance at management development seminars would suggest. There are no simple prescriptions, and there is a need to study it further if improvements are to occur.

B. Implications

Managing is an art, not a science. Since most of the methods managers use are not properly understood, they have not been analyzed in any formal sense and are thus not yet capable of being taught. Management training has done little to supplement the set of innate skills that managers are required to exercise.

Managers can partly overcome this lack of learning opportunities through self-study and by making changes in the way they manage. By self-study, we mean that managers should study their own particular jobs. To stimulate managers to analyze their own work, the Appendix to this chapter presents a checklist of 15 groups of guideline questions developed by Dr. Mintzberg. The checklist is derived from empirical observations of managers and is keyed to the roles and characteristics of the manager's job.

The following list of 10 ideas may be used as concepts around which the results of the use of the checklist may be organized in the formation of a "plan" to modify some aspects of your job as a manager.

1. Share information--By status and roles, the manager is exposed to a significant amount of "privileged" information. Much of this information is oral and memory-based. Conscious attention should be given to disseminating this information.

2. Deal consciously with superficiality--The manager's work and time are disjointed and fragmented; activities are varied and brief, with most decisions being taken incrementally. A balance must be found between concentration on issues and marginal involvement. There will be dilemmas of delegation.

3. If information can be shared, share the job also--A way to overcome heavy managerial workload is to share the job. A dyad or triad can be formed called the "management team" or "chief executive office." A disadvantage is that information-sharing by the manager with this team will require considerable time. However, when job-sharing works, it is probably the best answer to the pressures of work.

4. Make the most of obligations--Fulfilling obligations, such as by meeting callers, attending to ceremonial duties, and handling some crises, may be an opportunity to accomplish many of the other roles of the manager.

5. Free oneself from obligations--Free time is made, not found, and the manager must force it into his/her schedule. However, the manager is not a reflective "planner" in the classic sense. His/her milieu is stimulus-response. Still, he/she can make some choices that could relieve him/her of long-term obligations, or he/she can authorize others to meet some of these obligations.

6. Emphasize the managerial role that fits the situation--Most managers must give special attention to certain roles in certain situations. It is almost as if the manager must subscribe to a "contingency" style of management. There cannot be one style or role that fits all situations that arise in any given day.

7. See a comprehensive picture in terms of its details--The manager puts together a jigsaw puzzle, and though he/she is always working with small pieces, he/she cannot forget the whole picture. Thus, effective managing often means building channels of information that bring to him/her tangible, specific information. He/she must often step back and take advantage of those mental models that can assist in determining decisions to be made.

8. Recognize one's own influence in the organization--While obvious, this idea is often actually overlooked during daily work. Subordinates are always sensitive to and on the lookout for clues to what the manager is thinking, needing, wanting. Often such clues are misinterpreted.

9. Deal with growing coalitions--Any organization exists because certain "influencers" created it and are prepared to support it. In the past, it was easy for managers to handle simple coalitions of "influencers" and organizations. Today, there are no simple coalitions, but many complex ones composed of people inside and outside the organization. The trend is that these new types of coalitions will continue and grow larger and more influential.

10. Learn to use the management scientist--As organizations become more complex, they turn to the use of outside experts and consultants. Each has to learn to use the other effectively. Managers have information and authority; consultants may have the time, technology, and analytic skills. A marriage between these two can benefit the organization--but remember that marriages are usually preceded by a period of courtship in which each partner gets to know the other.

A CHECKLIST FOR SELF-STUDY
OF THE JOB OF THE MANAGER

1. Where do I get my information and how? Can I make greater use of my contacts to get information? Can other people do some of my scanning for me? In what areas is my knowledge weakest, and how can I get others to provide me with the information I need? Do I have powerful enough mental models of those things in the organization and its environment that I must understand? How can I develop more effective models?

2. What information do I disseminate into my organization? How important is it that my subordinates get my information? Do I keep too much information to myself because dissemination of it is time-consuming or inconvenient? How can I get more information to others so they can make better decisions?

3. Do I balance information-collecting with action-taking? Do I tend to act prematurely--before enough information is in? Or do I wait so long for all the information that opportunities pass me by and I become a bottleneck in my organization?

4. What rate of change am I asking my organization to tolerate? Is this change balanced so that our operations are neither excessively static nor overly disrupted? Have we sufficiently analyzed the impact of this change on the future of our organization?

5. Am I sufficiently well informed to pass judgment on the proposals made by my subordinates? Is it possible to leave final authorization for some of them with subordinates? Do we have problems of coordination because subordinates in fact now make too many of these decisions independently?

6. What is my vision of the proper direction of this organization? Are these "plans" primarily in my own mind in loose form? Should they be made explicit in order to better guide the decisions of others in the organization? Or do I need flexibility to change them at will?

7. Are we experiencing too many disturbances in this organization? Would there be fewer if we slowed down the rate of change? Do disturbances reflect a delayed reaction to problems? Do we experience infrequent disturbances because we are stagnant? How do I deal with disturbances? Can we anticipate some and develop contingency plans for them?

8. What kind of a leader am I? How do subordinates react to my managerial style? How well do I understand their work? Am I sufficiently sensitive to their reactions to my actions? Do I find an appropriate balance between encouragement and pressure? Do I stifle their initiative?

9. What kinds of external relationships do I maintain and how? Are there certain types of people that I should get to know better? Do I spend too much of my time maintaining these relationships?

10. Is there any system to my time scheduling, or am I just reacting to the pressures of the moment? Do I find the appropriate mix of activities, or do I tend to concentrate on one particular function or one type of problem just because I find it interesting? Am I more efficient with particular kinds of work at special times of the day or week, and does my schedule reflect this? Can someone else (in addition to my secretary) take responsibility for much of my scheduling and do it more systematically?

11. Do I overwork? What effect does my workload have on my efficiency? Should I force myself to take breaks or to reduce the pace of my activity?

12. Am I too superficial in what I do? Can I really shift moods as quickly and frequently as my work patterns require? Should I attempt to decrease the amount of fragmentation and interruption in my work?

13. Do I orient myself too much toward current, tangible activities? Am I a slave to the action and excitement of my work, so that I am no longer able to concentrate on issues? Do key problems receive the attention they deserve? Should I spend more time reading and probing deeply into certain issues? Could I be more reflective?

14. Do I use the different media appropriately? Do I know how to make the most of written communication? Do I rely excessively on face-to-face communication, thereby putting all but a few of my subordinates at an informational disadvantage? Do I schedule enough of my meetings on a regular basis? Do I spend enough time touring my organization to observe activity at firsthand? Am I too detached from the heart of our activities, seeing things only in an abstract way?

15. How do I blend my rights and duties? Do my obligations consume all my time? How can I free myself sufficiently from obligations to ensure that I am taking this organization where I want it to go? How can I turn my obligations to my advantage?

Some of these questions may sound rhetorical. None are meant to be. There are no simple solutions to the complex problems of managerial work. If the manager is to improve his/her work, he/she must provide his/her own answers. For this reason it is crucial that the manager develop a better understanding of his/her own work.

## REFERENCES

Most of the data and analysis of the work of Mintzberg can be found in The Nature of Managerial Work, by Henry Mintzberg (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

Further readings in the Mintzberg model may be found in:

"The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact"
Henry Mintzberg
Harvard Business Review
July-August, 1975, pp. 49, ff.

"Planning on the Left Side and
Managing on the Right Side"
Henry Mintzberg
Harvard Business Review
July-August, 1976, pp. 49, ff.

"Strategy Making in Three Modes"
Henry Mintzberg
California Management Review
Winger, 1973, pp. 44, ff.

The analysis of the differences between public and private organizations can be found in: "Comparing Public and Private Organizations," H. G. Rainey, et al., Public Administration Review, March-April, 1976, pp. 233, ff.

# CHAPTER 1--APPENDIX A

# ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

# AND

# POLICE MANAGERS

## I. DEFINITION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Organizational Development (OD) first appeared in the literature of management less than two decades ago, and the term has more recently become one of the most widely used to describe a cluster of activities undertaken to help an organization meet the challenges of pervasive change.

The great watershed concept that OD relies on to deal with these challenges is the idea of a social system. The idea has roots in sociology and anthropology stretching well back into the nineteenth century, but the first and still perhaps the most exhaustive statement of the manifestation of the social system in industry was made in the Hawthorne studies.[1] People do not exist as single units, nor are they related to one another only as some external authority, such as management, says they should be related--for example, through formal organizations. Nor does the nature of the relations they develop with one another derive only from the activities required for survival in the particular environment in which they are located.

The idea of a social system presumes that people develop stable relationships with one another that have deep psychological meaning for the members of the organization and that are observable by those outside the system. Thus, says OD, in changing an organization one is not merely making some mechanical rearrangements of the activities people will perform. The context and texture of people's lives are being changed, and the internalized rules they have adopted for governing their own behavior and that of other members are being fundamentally altered.

Since the original social system ideas were stated, an enormous amount of research and theory has been brought to bear on how social systems operate. Concepts of norms and roles have received great attention. The idea of interaction--what members of an organization say and do, to and with one another--has come to be a central one. Hitherto unguessed-at energies and creative potentials have been discovered in all kinds of social systems. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the whole movement known as "participative management" relies on the idea that a kind and quality of organization and wisdom exist in the social system that far transcend anything that can be arbitrarily put there by outsiders.

OD does not say that some human collectivities are social systems and some are not. Rather, it says that any group that one would consider altering significantly is usefully conceived as an ongoing social system with the properties that social systems have been found to possess. And the hallmarks of such systems are the feelings members have developed for one another and the interactions through which these feelings are expressed.

---

[1]The Hawthorne studies were a series of research findings conducted in 1927 at the Hawthorne works of the Western Electric Company in Chicago by the late Elton Mayo and his colleagues at Harvard University. The researchers discovered that when workers are treated as human beings rather than as units, and when they have feelings of pride and personal worth in their jobs, as well as the opportunity to get things off their chests, morale and productivity tend to rise.

However, Organizational Development is anything but precise. It connotes a wide variety of approaches and functions and is applied by different individuals to describe divergent, and sometimes opposing, strategies for organizational improvement. Yet most definitions currently in use agree in substance that OD is a planned, managed, systematic process to change the culture, systems, and behavior of an organization in order to improve its effectiveness in solving its problems and achieving its objectives.

The activities grouped under OD focus on interaction and behaviors. Further, the OD change process usually seeks to modify behavioral patterns that relate to the organization's operation at the various hierarchical levels and the multiple functions performed by people in the organization. But the systematic nature of OD also includes changes in the systems, or in the material and supporting factors in the organization, if such systems hinder full use of the organization's human resources.

It is not an exaggeration to say that OD exists as an organized concept today because of two broad answers to issues that have been evolving over the past 30 or so years. These two answers interlock and are mutually supportive:

1. Given the nature of social systems in the modern organization world, the command/obedience style of management is less and less appropriate to changing an organization, since research shows that this style has a high probability of producing unintended consequences that are often inimical to the goals of the change.

2. It has been found that people whose whole cultural experience has been an education in the rightness of the command/obedience style can rarely make significant changes in their behavior to find new adaptive relations with their organization without the help of third parties who are professionally trained to give this kind of help.

In other words, we have a field of OD today because a centuries-old leadership style, command/obedience, seems to have become obsolete. But we have not yet institutionalized the new cultural and educational patterns needed to produce leaders in large numbers who are naturally adapted to the organizations they must lead. Adaptations must therefore be ad hoc and personal, and we have discovered that consultants are effective adjuncts to managers who find that they are going to have to make some of these adaptations themselves.

OD is thus at present a repository of new ideas about organizational leadership and of new ideas about how managers can be helped by consultants to change their styles. At the present time both sets of new ideas--about leadership and about consultancy--are extremely tentative and fragile and are undergoing constant change. Because of this, it is incorrect to say that one can learn a new managerial style or learn about consultancy and then simply perform the new techniques. What is equally important is to evolve a personal learning style that will sustain one through the continuous changes in ideas that will mark the next 30 years.

The decline of command/obedience as a dominant management style traces from research about how effective leaders behave. Beginning in the early 1960s, a "situational" view of leadership emerged that said that effective leaders are those whose behavior is attuned to the needs and opportunities inherent in the situation in which they are immersed. Their own feelings, ideas, and impulses are defined as part of the situation, and therefore situational leadership is not

merely doing what others want. Rather, it is the ability to negotiate and mediate among different and often conflicting demands--of which the leader's own needs are one set. It is the ability to find and articulate consensus and to lead in translating consensus into action. As noted above, however, situational leadership is a fragile idea compared with the massive weight in our culture of the command/obedience style of behavior. Few good case studies exist of what good situational leadership looks like. We have practically no criteria that people can use to tell them when they are behaving situationally.

## II. EVOLUTION OF OD

The earliest identifiable OD efforts relied heavily on laboratory training and face-to-face interaction of people in small groups. Much of the current technology of OD still carries strong influences from group process and stresses teamwork and collaboration among and between groups within the larger organization, although the focus of OD has evolved from development of the individual to development of the group and the total organization. The activities commonly associated with organizational development are approached on a group problem-solving basis--real problems, existing or potential, within the organization. The individual may be developed within the context of the group or within the context of the organization. These activities frequently include:

- Attitude measurement
- Diagnostic interviewing
- Problem solving
- Goal setting
- Communication improvement
- Conflict resolution
- Task force use
- Job design
- Evaluation and measurement of effectiveness.

## III. ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES IN OD

OD is still a relatively young management science--or art--and an understanding of several unresolved and controversial issues lies at the heart of any discussion of the field. Among theorists and practitioners there are differing opinions about what factors are necessary for systematic OD. Some of the principal issues and points of controversy are:

- Content versus process--What degree of emphasis is placed on how a group interacts? What degree on the outcome of their interaction?

- Role of top management in OD--Must top management be actively involved in OD activities, or passively committed to them, or leading them?

- Use of third parties--What are the role and function of people who are not members of a group engaged in an OD activity, but who analyze the process? Should the third party be internal to the organization or external? Is a third party needed at all?

- Individual, team, or total organizational development--Do activities aimed at individual and team development legitimately constitute organizational development? Must the whole organization be involved if the effort is to have sufficient impact on the culture?

- Management development versus organizational development--What are the relative differences in focus and methodology between management development and organizational development? What importance is there in making a distinction between the two functions?

- The role of measurement and evaluation--What degree of importance is placed on objective evaluation of the effectiveness of OD efforts? Can the real issues undertaken in OD be measured?

- OD: fad or institutionalized process?--Is real OD a matter of practicing new developmental activities, or a fundamental, long-range plan for strategic change?

A great deal of theory exists today about how OD consultants can be of help to managers and organizations. The growth of theory has accelerated dramatically in the past five years and is no longer merely a collection of do's and don'ts and rules of thumb. In the early and middle 1960s it became clear that: (1) OD consulting is something quite different from technical advice-giving; (2) the creation and maintenance of a genuine helping relationship with the client is the primary task; and (3) the client's needs--not the consultant's--are of greatest importance. These insights developed hand in hand with the realization that in most situations, the client (a manager) was involved in changing both his/her own behavior and that of others--a process that could not be aided by a consultant who simply offered pat formulas.

Another key development was the role of the internal consultant, someone who was on the payroll and who knew the organization from within. External, independent consultants can be crucial to getting a change process started and can offer valuable suggestions at strategic choice points, but the day-to-day support the manager and others need often can be supplied by an in-house consultant more effectively and cheaply.

## A. Coping with Resistance to Change

In the 1940s and 1950s, resistance to change was treated as a genuine force to be reckoned with and overcome. OD has made major contributions to understanding what is really going on when something we loosely call resistance to change arises. OD now sees an organization as a field of interacting forces and processes, rather than as a two-dimensional battleground where forces for change oppose forces for resistance. Social system ideas helped clarify this concept. So, too, has increasing understanding of the culture of a group or organization: patterns of behavior observed in the organization are functional for certain needs of members and of the system as a whole. Norms arise to buttress these patterns. To label these behavior patterns "resistances" is to risk overlooking their value and functionality for individual members of an organization.

Perhaps the most useful body of theory for understanding resistance is motivation theory. Beginning in the middle 1950s, managers and human relations specialists began to realize that people behave as they do for reasons that have deep importance for them, even if these reasons are not sanctioned or recognized by the organization. Douglas McGregor crystallized this notion in his statement of Theory Y, which summarizes the person's own reasons for acting as he/she does, in contrast to reasons projected on him/her by another who is trying to get the person to conform and obey. What is important about McGregor today is not so much the

accuracy of Theory Y as the base his original insights provided for further research and theory about the needs, goals, and intentions of people in organizations.[2]

When one grants that each individual's behavior makes sense to that person, it is clear that the negative label "resistance" may be missing the point. OD acknowledges this, and it has evolved a variety of approaches that have a common tenet: No change should be installed that does not make sense to those who are affected by it.

B. A View of the Processes of Change

For many years, in all management theory as well as in OD in particular, a search has been going on for a useful way of thinking about the process of change through time in an organization. The operative questions are: How do initiatives for change cascade through the system? At what rate can we expect change to proceed? When can we expect to notice results? How long will the system be in a state of flux before it stabilizes in some new pattern of behavior? How are we to regard apparent lapses and reversions to previous "outmoded modes" of functioning?

Kurt Lewin's original change model[3] of "unfreezing-moving-refreezing" was an early statement about the process of change. OD has subsequently placed most of its emphasis on the "unfreezing" portion of the Lewin model. What is meant by "moving" an organization and "refreezing" it in a more effective mode has received less attention. Some would even argue that the "refreezing" metaphor is misleading in today's turbulent world--that what is needed is to prepare the organization for a life of "organic flux" and for the possibility that truly stable patterns are a will-o'-the-wisp.

Comments made earlier about the nature of the system being changed, about the role of initiators, and about the meaning of resistance are germane to this problem of the process of change. OD has come around to the understanding of the process of change as something that is not a simple linear sequence. Change initiatives occur on several fronts at once. Resistances and sticking points occur on all these fronts. Some thrusts occur quickly and easily, while others seem to occur with glacial slowness. Unexpectedly, the system may appear to revert to "tried-and-true" methods even though everyone agrees that these are bankrupt and discredited ways of doing things.

In OD thinking, the overall change process is increasingly being seen as a somewhat disjointed political and opportunistic process in which a multiyear time horizon must be anticipated and in which periodic reversions are not only inevitable but also possibly beneficial in that they help the system reaffirm its commitment to change--once new ways are glimpsed, it is often helpful to fall back to old ways to rediscover their inadequacy.

It is important to say that no universal and comprehensive theory of the process of change now exists. There is at the present time a good deal of theorizing about the stages and process of growth, but the major theoretical advances are

---

[2] The Human Side of Enterprise. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.

[3] These ideas are nicely summarized in Bennis, Warren G., et al., (eds.), Holt, Rinehart and Winston, The Planning of Change. New York: 1961, p. 237, ff.

yet to be made, and the wisest course of action is for an individual organization to develop its own model of the process of change.

The main contributions that OD theory can make at present are the ideas that (1) the change process is not a linear sequence, (2) it will almost always take longer to bring about significant change than one might assume at the outset, and (3) it seems useful to think of the change process in terms of broad phases that overlap and are interdependent but that nonetheless have a cumulative effect.

The practice of OD is based on several key values. These include acceptance of the organization's need to fulfill its responsibility to its various communities for interdependency and continuity, for increasing effectiveness in performance, and for development of an internal climate in which personal growth is supported.

To realize these values, OD employs its knowledge of behavioral science in planned interventions in the processes of the organization. These interventions may be concerned with the technical problems of the business, its administrative problems, and the human problems of its social system, although we customarily think of OD as being concerned with the latter.

OD must be a long-range, continuous effort enduring three to five years to be maximally effective, because it must eventually come to grips with changing the norms and values in an organization, which are relatively impervious parts of the culture. Changing an administrative practice or procedure may be accomplished in a short time and may have some effect on organizational behavior, but fundamental cultural change takes longer and should begin by unblocking individuals from their set attitudes and releasing their energy, a difficult but important prelude to team building and other typical OD facilitative-tactical modes.

OD is necessarily innovative because the problems it deals with are seldom identical; each must be solved in its own special way, consonant with a specific organization's culture. Moreover, the stream of new findings from research in the behavioral sciences provides a continuing opportunity as time goes by for more cogent interventions within and between all levels--individual, group, and organizational. The current theory and results of research should be evaluated and absorbed into the strategy of OD as a matter of accepted practice. The usefulness of these new ideas should be subjected to constant scrutiny; inappropriate ones should be discarded, and potentially effective ones should be tried out.

Concerning the specific OD techniques (in the sense of facilitative and tactical modes) presently used with some frequency, we suggested earlier that all these were discussed at least 15 years ago by Douglas McGregor but have been elaborated upon and polished by numerous practitioners since then. For example, team building, management by objectives (MBO), job enrichment (JE), and internal consulting were described in characteristic terms by McGregor, and his descriptions bear repeating here because conceptually they appear to be as valid today as they were then. It should also be understood that we use the terms "team building," "management by objectives," "job enrichment," and "internal consulting" generically, recognizing that organizations may have their unique names or designations for their own in-house versions of these modes. For example, MBO is called "goal setting" in many organizations.

C. Team Building

Team building is an OD facilitative-tactical mode that is intended to make a group effective and achieve unity of purpose. Most managerial teams are not teams at all but are collections of individual relationships with the boss in which each person is vying with every other one for greater power, prestige, recognition, and personal autonomy. Under these conditions, unity of purpose is a myth, and the managerial team is inept at accomplishing objectives through group efforts.

A good group is one in which the atmosphere tends to be informative, comfortable, and relaxed. There is considerable discussion, in which virtually everyone participates. The tasks or objectives of the group are well understood and accepted by the members. The group members actively listen to one another. There is disagreement, but it is worked through to a consensus (with no formal voting as a cop-out). There is frequent, frank, and relatively comfortable criticism. People freely express their feelings as well as their ideas and have no hidden agendas. Clear work assignments are made and accepted. Leadership in the group shifts as needed to draw forth and use all the human resources in the group. There is little or no struggle for power and control because the main concern is to get the job done, consistent with cultural values in the organization. And, finally, the group self-consciously stops periodically to examine how well it is doing as a group in accomplishing its tasks and how the feelings and behaviors of members are contributing to the group and its work.

In a word, team building as an OD technique attempts to move a group forward in all the aforementioned directions. It is based on the clear realization that the highest commitment to organizational objectives and the most successful collaboration in achieving them require unique kinds of interaction that can occur only in a highly effective group setting.

D. Management by Objectives

Management by objectives is a way of managing people that emphasizes the integration of personal objectives and organizational objectives and is built upon self-control. The purpose of MBO is to encourage goal integration, to create a situation in which a subordinate can achieve his/her own goals best by directing his/her efforts and energies toward the objectives of the enterprise or overall organization. MBO is, in concept, a calculated attempt to link improvement in managerial competence with the satisfaction of the manager's higher-level ego and self-actualization needs. MBO does not tack a new set of duties on top of the existing managerial job. It is, rather, a different way of fulfilling one's existing responsibilities--of "running the job." Put another way, MBO is a flexible, rational, participative way for the manager to plan and control the accomplishment of the work of the organization.

In practice, MBO is usually translated into a closed-loop system designed for managing managers and professional employees, in which a superior and his/her subordinates sit down and jointly set specific objectives that are to be accomplished within a set time frame and for which the subordinate is then held accountable. But practice varies widely as to the degree of formalization and the quality of superior-subordinate goal negotiation, commitment, and participation. Our belief is that MBO works best after the groups that intend to use it have been developed into a team whose members openly encounter one another.

E. Job Enrichment

Job enrichment started out as a limited tactical change in managing employees in which several well-known companies undertook to increase the duties and responsibilities in certain routine jobs as a way of offsetting some of their unpleasant and repetitive features. The idea of redesigning jobs to include meaningful tasks rather than highly specialized repetitive operations appeared to offer vast possibilities for motivating employees with incentives in the jobs themselves. A number of leading contemporary behavioral scientists have taken the position (based on research and theory) that the factors that motivate are growth factors, or those that give the worker a sense of personal accomplishment through the challenge of the job itself. In other words, motivation is in the content of the work, the internal dynamics that the employee experiences in completing his/her task.

In JE the emphasis changes from rigid management direction and control to more participative modes, where much of the planning and controlling associated with doing the work are bestowed on the employee. To this extent JE is akin to MBO for higher-level employees, because lower-level employees are asked to make greater input into the conduct of their work and to link their goals and satisfactions to the attainment of organizational objectives. Both JE and MBO are fundamentally grounded on self-control and humanistic notions. Both can become important cornerstones of OD and bases for entirely new styles of organizational management.

F. Internal Consulting

Internal consulting as a facilitative-tactical OD mode is important for carrying out team building, for installing MBO and JE, and, in general, for redefining the role of the training specialist or manager or whoever has the assigned role of bringing OD to the client organization. The proper role of the OD facilitator is that of internal consultant, and organizations are increasingly creating such positions or redefining traditional training positions so that the incumbents of them become internal consultants, or change agents.

Internal consultants take a professional stance vis-a-vis their managers and consider them as clients. They recognize that help is always defined by the recipient and that they can neither fulfill their responsibilities to the organization nor maintain proper ethical standards of conduct if they are placed in a position that involves conflicting obligations to their managerial clients.

Internal consultants play an organizational role in which they provide three important kinds of help. First, they help in strategic planning by being sensitive to managers' needs and by contributing their knowledge. Second, they help in solving problems. They concern themselves with immediate and specific problems and provide help to managers on all organizational levels. Third, they help with managerial controls, but not as technicians running rigid systems. Rather, they act as diagnosticians who find practical ways to capitalize on self-control and build it into the way work is planned, assigned, conducted, and evaluated in the organization.

Internal consultants in an OD effort possess the knowledge to make interventions in the organization and help management manage better. To be effective, they need to have a nontraditional role and the skill to carve out the type of role briefly described above. Obviously, no single proper OD internal consultative role can be set forth in infinite detail here or anywhere else because of the vast differences in organizational cultures, environments, and situations. The essential

point is that it is difficult, if not impossible, for an organization to undertake OD without redefining or establishing anew the role of the agent of change. Effective OD is not a program grafted onto an existing organization as an ornament but, rather, a movement toward a new way of organizational life. Consequently, installation of an OD internal consultancy has been widely recognized as an OD facilitative-tactical device at the macro level which is a prelude for all other organizational interventions.

## IV. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES FOR PATROL MANAGERS

Organizational development theory and practices focus especially on the role of the manager as a change agent in the organization. In the major interpersonal roles of the manager (figurehead, leader, liaison) and in the informational roles (monitor, spokesperson, and disseminator) the manager acquires both external and internal access to information and ideas that no one else in the organization possesses. To use this information to initiate or facilitate improvements in the organization requires that the manager make decisions about changes in policies, procedures, or personnel.

The emphasis placed by OD theory on the notion that business or service organizations are fundamentally social systems implies that the manager as change agent should be careful in diagnosing, assessing, and subsequently managing planned changes in the social systems that operate within the organization. This is no easy task, and the role of change agent is a relatively new and critical job in managing police agencies. The notion expressed by OD theory that traditional "command/response" behavior by employees in organizations has eroded in favor of a more fluid "participative-management response" seems to be borne out by recent operational experiences in many police departments. For example, many police executives and departments have recently accepted, at least in concept if not in operations, team policing (however defined), and there have been organized attempts to install and use MBO processes in departments. These developments are partially in response to the emerging patterns of police employee behavior as much as they are in response to new organizational strategies to cope with increasing crime rates or service demands.

There is as yet no prescriptive handbook or set of formulas the police manager can use to develop techniques or approaches to the design and implementation of planned changes in the police organization. The four OD facilitative approaches of team building, MBO, job enrichment, and the use of internal consultants have all been tried with varying successes in many departments. A critical issue in the application of OD principles and practices to police departments is that the normal complexity of change is heightened by the fact that the command/obedience style of organizational management is generally still the norm in police departments. While OD argues that such a style is becoming obsolete, many police managers are highly sensitive to altering this style given the special organizational responsibilities of police agencies for the protection of life and the public order. Such responsibilities may, at critical times, require a rather rigid command and control management system.

On the other hand, some police managers have seen the benefits to the organization of modifying this system through the use of OD processes. Individual self-control based on subordinates' knowing why and how they contribute to the accomplishment of police responsibilities--even in crisis situations--has resulted in organizational change. Co-responsibility and individual accountability for agreed-upon objectives, procedures, tactics, and operations have emerged as new norms and

new incentives for improving employee work performance and organizational effectiveness.

Several general sets of principles have been followed by progressive police managers in either planning for change or diagnosing the need for change. They can be used as guidelines or as a checklist for the performance of the police manager as change agent.

A. Planning for Change

- Planning changes in one part of a police organization will eventually require consideration of changes in overlapping parts of the system.

  Example: Changing the role of a patrol officer in a directed patrol strategy will require changes in the role of supervisors. Sergeants will have to become more like managers and planners; lieutenants will have to act as coordinators with other units as well as senior managers who provide guidance and direction in resolving conflicts between various units. Evaluations of various types of changes in patrol operations state again and again that changes from traditional to directed patrol were ineffective because plans were not made from the beginning to provide re-training and support for the new roles of supervisors.

- To change behavior on any one level of a hierarchical organization, it is often necessary to plan for complementary and reinforcing changes at higher and lower levels.

  Example: It is not enough to retrain supervisors. Dissemination of information about the new roles and responsibilities of such supervisors, as well as installation of support services to reinforce these new roles, will be required both at the patrol level and at the senior management level so that those who are supervised know why and how this new role operates and those who supervise the supervisors know how and why their subordinates are to act in a different way. Again, various evaluation studies have pointed out that the failures of experiments in team policing or directed patrol (however defined) were traced to the lack of planning for new roles of supervisors in such experiments and in the lack of organizational support of these new roles.

- Managers can begin to plan for introducing changes at points in the police organization or system where some stress or strain may exist. These "squeaky wheel" complaints or stresses may be due to dissatisfaction with the status quo, and such dissatisfaction may be a motivating factor for individuals or groups to become involved in planning for change.

  Example: Complaints by patrol units about overwork or too much time spent on responding to calls may be an indication of a variety of organizational or management deficiencies as much as a normal human reaction to work. They might reflect a lack of management studies of workload demands or inappropriate policies providing for indiscriminately responding to all

calls for service. The use of patrol officer task forces to identify some of the reasons for complaints may be a productive tool for diagnosing and planning for alternative policies or procedures.

- If thorough changes in an organization are desirable or necessary, change must ordinarily start with the chief policymaking officials.

  Example: Most if not all changes introduced into police agencies occur where the chief of the agency first agreed to the change. The chief's subsequent policy statements supporting the change and refusal to panic at opposition have been crucial factors in acceptance of the change throughout the system.

- Both formal and informal organizations in a system should be considered in planning most processes of change.

  Example: Every system has a network of cliques and informal groupings that often exert strong restraining forces and influences that will affect changes initiated by formal authority. The use of task forces composed of staff and line personnel (formal organization) and individuals representing nonformal organizations (such as union representatives) may have the effect of harnessing support for the change and guaranteeing some level of "buy-in" to the change.

- The ultimate effectiveness of a change is often directly related to the degree to which members of all levels of an institutional hierarchy took part in fact-finding and diagnosing of the planned change as well as in formulating it and reality-testing it.

  Example: Successful changes in patrol operations, which have been documented and evaluated, have been due to the carefully planned involvement of police personnel from major subsystems in the organization--those who are planning the change and those who are to implement the change. These two groups are not composed simply of staff and line personnel. It is incorrect to assume that staff personnel can plan adequately for OD changes or that line personnel can implement the changes proposed. Rather, the use of ad hoc planning task forces composed of <u>implementers</u>, <u>planners</u>, and those <u>managers</u> who must supervise and maintain the change is critical to the effective continuation of the change.

## V. SUMMARY

This Appendix has focused on ideas and practices that may be useful for the manager performing the role of change agent. In this role the manager acts as an initiator and designer of much of the planned and controlled changes that need to occur in the organization. In the performance of other roles--for example, monitoring the organization--the manager receives information that may suggest opportunities or needs for improvements. As a change-agent decisionmaker, the manager may decide to begin planning for these improvements.

Diagnosing the need for improvements may be aided by the use and analysis of various negative or positive organizational or personnel measurements. Planning for changes in policies, procedures, and personnel may be facilitated by the use of much of the recent theory and practices derived from that area of management studies termed Organizational Development.

Whatever theories, practices, or operational experiences are used in other police agencies to plan and manage controlled change, planning for such changes will remain part of the job of the police manager and will increasingly become the most complex part of this job.

CHAPTER 1--APPENDIX B

A GUIDE FOR PROGRAM

IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

The attached Guide for Program Implementation was prepared as an internal working document for use by the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department in its planning and development of its major Directed Patrol Program. It has been included in this Manual with the permission of the KCPD.

# A GUIDE FOR PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PLANNING

## I. PROGRAM POLICY AND SPECIFICATION

### A. Operational Definitions and Objectives

1. What is the operational definition of this program activity?
2. What is(are) the objective(s) of this program activity?

### B. Boundary Conditions

1. In what area of the Northeast Patrol Division will the proposed program be implemented?
2. What specific segments of the area population will be involved?
3. How will each population segment be involved?
4. When will the involvement of each population segment begin and end?
5. Who will be responsible for involving each segment?
6. What specific area individuals will be involved?
7. How will each individual be involved?
8. When will the involvement of each individual begin and end?
9. Who will be responsible for involving each individual?
10. What groups will be involved?
11. How will each group be involved?
12. When will the involvement of each group begin and end?
13. Who will be responsible for the involvement of each group?
14. What difficulties with boundary conditions may develop?
15. How will each difficulty develop?
16. When will each difficulty develop?
17. Who will be responsible for resolution of each difficulty?
18. What resources will be necessary to aid resolution of each difficulty?
19. How will each resource aid resolution of each difficulty?
20. When will each resource be implemented to aid resolution of each difficulty?
21. Who will be responsible for implementing each resource to aid resolution of each difficulty?

### C. Division of Functions

1. What distinct activities or functions are involved in program implementation?
2. What pairing of elements and functions are appropriate for implementation of the program?
3. How will each element accomplish each program activity/function?
4. When will each element accomplish each program activity/function?
5. Who within each element will be responsible for accomplishing each program activity/function?
6. What division of functions changes will occur within the various phases of the program?
7. How will the changes be accomplished within each phase?
8. When will the changes be accomplished for each phase?
9. Who will be responsible for insuring the accomplishment of each change?

D. Administrative Functions

Policy

1. What existing policy decisions affect program implementation?
2. What policy decisions are necessary for program implementation?
3. How will each policy decision be implemented?
4. When will each policy decision be implemented?
5. Who will be responsible for creation and implementation of each policy decision necessary?

Procedures

1. What existing procedures affect program implementation?
2. What procedures are necessary for program implementation?
3. How will each procedure be implemented?
4. When will each procedure be implemented?
5. Who will be responsible for establishing, implementing and assessing the operational appropriateness of the procedures?

Guidelines

1. What existing guidelines affect program implementation?
2. What guidelines are necessary for program implementation?
3. How will each guideline be implemented?
4. When will each guideline be implemented?
5. Who will be responsible for establishing, implementing and assessing the operational appropriateness of the guidelines?

E. Law

1. What existing laws affect program implementation?
2. What legal restrictions currently exist with respect to project implementation?
3. How will each legal restriction affect the program?
4. When will each legal restriction affect the program?
5. What legal restrictions can be resolved?
6. How will each legal restriction be resolved?
7. When will each legal restriction be resolved?
8. Who will be responsible for resolution of each legal restriction?
9. What additional authority will be necessary for program implementation.
10. How will the additional authority be acquired?
11. When will the additional authority be required?
12. Who will be responsible for obtaining the additional authority?

II. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

A. Decision Making

1. What elements make decisions that will affect program implementation?
2. What decisions are made by each element that will affect program implementation?
3. How does each element make each decision?
4. When does each element make each decision?
5. Who in each element is responsible for making each decision?

6. What sources of information are used by each element to make each decision?
7. What decisions are necessary for program implementation?
8. What elements make the decisions necessary for program implementation?
9. How will each element make each necessary decision?
10. When will each element make each necessary decision?
11. Who within each element will be responsible for making each decision?
12. What sources of information are necessary for making each decision?
13. What decisions will be communicated to interested elements?
14. What interested elements will receive each decision?
15. How will each decision be communicated to each element?
16. When will each element receive each decision?
17. Who will be responsible for communicating each decision to each element?

B. Management Styles

1. What management style is necessary for program implementation?
2. What difficulties will be encountered during program implementation that are due to the present management style?
3. How will each difficulty be resolved?
4. When will each difficulty be resolved?
5. Who will be responsible for resolution of each difficulty?

C. Delegation of Authority

1. What delegation of authority will be necessary for program implementation?
2. How will each delegation of authority be implemented?
3. When will each delegation of authority occur?
4. Who will be responsible for insuring each delegation of authority is authorized and implemented appropriately?

D. Informal Organization

1. What existing informal groups will affect program implementation?
2. How can each group facilitate the program?
3. How can each group adversely affect the program?
4. How should each group be dealt with?
5. Who will be responsible for dealing with each group?
6. What new groups may be formed as a result of program implementation?
7. How will each new group facilitate the program?
8. How will each new group adversely affect the program?
9. How will each new group be dealt with?
10. When will each new group be dealt with?
11. Who will be responsible for dealing with each group?

E. Communication

1. What informational items need to be communicated for program implementation?
2. What items will each element need for program implementation?
3. How will each informational item be communicated to each element?
4. When will each informational item be communicated for each element?
5. Who will be responsible for communicating and receiving each informational item for each element?

6. What restrictions to communication will be necessary for program implementation?
7. How will each restriction be implemented?
8. When will each restriction be implemented?
9. Who will be responsible for insuring that restrictions on communications are achieved?
10. What "spin-off" impacts will be experienced due to program communication?
11. How will each spin-off result occur?
12. When will each spin-off result occur?
13. Who will be responsible, if necessary, for taking appropriate action?

F. Operational Relationships

1. What non-department, non-patrol, or intra-patrol projects will affect program implementation? (ongoing, planned)
2. How will each project affect program implementation? (program context, program inputs, program process, program products)
3. When will each project affect program implementation?
4. What projects with potentially favorable impacts can be used to an advantage in program implementation?
5. How will each favorable project be used in program implementation?
6. When will each favorable project be used in program implementation?
7. Who will be responsible for insuring appropriate interface?
8. What costs will be incurred as a result of program-project interface?
9. What projects with potentially unfavorable impacts will be circumvented in program implementation?
10. How will each unfavorable project be circumvented?
11. When will each unfavorable project be circumvented?
12. Who will be responsible for insuring appropriate circumvention?
13. What impacts will program implementation have on each project identified?
14. How will each program-to-project impact occur?
15. When will each program-to-project impact occur?
16. Who will be responsible for insuring non-detrimental program-to-project interface?

III. PROGRAM EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT

A. Areas of Data Needs

1. What are the program inputs to be monitored?
2. How well are each program's activities operating?
3. What types of performance accountability are needed?
4. What impact data about the accomplishment of program objectives are needed?

B. Measurement

1. What measures are relevant to each data need?
2. How should the measurements be taken?
3. What are the procedures for assuring reliability and accuracy of the data?
4. What record-keeping procedures will be required?
5. When and how frequently will data be required?
6. Who will be responsible for collecting and organizing the data?

C. Data Feedback

1. Who needs to receive data feedback?
2. What format should be used?
3. How often should feedback occur and when should it start and stop?
4. What coordination of data is required?
5. Who is responsible for that coordination?
6. What potential constraints to an efficient, effective feedback system can be identified?
7. What can be done to overcome such constraints?
8. What costs will be involved in establishing a feedback system?
9. Who will monitor data for evidence of unanticipated problems?
10. What action might the monitor take upon discovering such problems?
11. How do we identify defects in program design?

D. Accountability of Performance

1. How will accountability be determined?
2. What shall each element be accountable for?
3. Who shall each element be accountable to?
4. What procedures should be used in the event of accountability failure?

E. Impact Evaluation Design

1. What evaluation design(s) is(are) most appropriate?
2. What statistical analyses are suggested by both the research questions and the data?
3. What overlap between program objectives exists?
4. How can such overlap be dealt with best?
5. Who is responsible for the design and implementation of the impact evaluation?

F. Unanticipated Outcomes

1. How can we identify unanticipated outcomes?
2. How can we deal with these?
3. When should we check for unanticipated outcomes?
4. Who should be responsible for identifying and dealing with them?

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS

1. What information is needed for program implementation and maintenance?
2. What information systems need to be developed for program implementation and maintenance?
3. How will each information system be developed?
4. When will each information system be developed?
5. Who will be responsible for developing and maintaining each information system?
6. What elements will use each information system?
7. How will each element use each information system?
8. When will each element use each information system?
9. Who within each element will be responsible for insuring the appropriate utilization of each information system?
10. What are the information sources for each information system?
11. What will be the information format for each information system?

12. How will each format be developed?
13. When will each format be developed?
14. Who will be responsible for the development of each format?
15. What are the areas of overlap between information systems?
16. How will each area overlap?
17. When will each area overlap?

V. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

A. Human Resource Allocation

1. What tasks will be required for program implementation?
2. What types of personnel qualifications will be required to perform each task?
3. How many personnel with each type of qualifications will be needed?
4. When will personnel with each type of qualifications be necessary?
5. Are sufficient personnel currently available with each type of qualifications?
6. What selection criteria will be used to assign personnel to tasks required for program implementation?
7. How will selection procedures for qualified personnel by task be accomplished?
8. When will each selection procedure be accomplished?
9. Who will be responsible for accomplishing each selection procedure?
10. What types of personnel training will be required?
11. How will each type of training be accomplished?
12. When will each type of training be accomplished?
13. Who will be responsible for insuring that each type of training is accomplished?
14. How will the effects of each type of training be assessed?
15. What effects will selection and training have on present personnel assignments?

B. Program Staff Relationships and Coordination

1. What activities/functions will the program staff perform?
2. How will each activity/function be performed?
3. When will each activity/function be performed?
4. Who will be responsible for accomplishing each activity/function?
5. What types of coordination between program staff will be necessary for program implementation?
6. What types of staff relationships will be necessary to implement the program?
7. How will rank structure affect staff relationships and coordination?
8. Who will be responsible for development and supervision of program staff?

C. Equipment and Facilities Allocation

1. What equipment/facilities will be necessary for program implementation?
2. How will the equipment/facilities be acquired?
3. When will the equipment/facilities be necessary?
4. What costs will be incurred by acquiring equipment/facilities necessary for program implementation?
5. Who will be responsible for acquiring and allocating equipment/facilities necessary for program implementation?

## VI. PROGRAM CONFLICTS

### A. Special Events

1. What types of difficulties created by special events may affect program implementation?
2. How can each type of difficulty be resolved?
3. When can each type of difficulty be resolved?
4. Who will be responsible for resolution of each type of difficulty?

### B. Conflicts

1. What types of conflicts might arise?
2. How can each type of conflict adversely affect the program?
3. How can each type of conflict be dealt with?
4. Who will be responsible for resolution of each type of conflict?

## CHAPTER 2. RESOURCE ALLOCATION--CONSIDERATIONS

> Every police agency immediately should develop a patrol deployment system that is responsive to the demands for police services and consistent with the effective use of the agency's patrol personnel. The deployment system should include collecting and analyzing required data, conducting a workload study, and allocating personnel to patrol assignments within the agency.[1]

The call for deployment of patrol resources that meet identified workload demands can be traced back to 1920, when Raymond Fosdick first observed that:

> ...there are many (police) districts in which the night problem, from a police point of view, is entirely different from the day problem; yet the posts in such districts are often policed in exactly the same way during all hours of the day and night.[2]

Ten years later, the same criticism was made by Bruce Smith:

> City police forces waste a part, and sometimes a considerable part, of their available manpower on distribution of uniformed patrols--without regard to established need.... It is a matter of general observation that (patrols) are usually distributed on an equal, or nearly equal, basis throughout the twenty-four hours of the day, despite the fact that the crime curve shows a marked peak between 6:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m.....[3]

It appears that some basic changes are long overdue and bear considerable promise of improved efficiency.

### I. EQUAL SHIFT STAFFING

A 1975 research study, conducted by the University City Science Center, revealed that 29 percent of 321 police agencies sampled still employ an "equal manning" formula in which equal numbers of officers are assigned to each of the

---

[1] National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, 1973, p. 199.

[2] Quoted from Walton, Frank E., "Selective Distribution of Police Patrol Force," in Chapman, Samuel G., (ed.), Police Patrol Readings, 2nd ed., Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1970, p. 297.

[3] Smith, Bruce, Police Systems in the United States, New York: Harper & Row, 1940, pp. 151-154.

three basic duty shifts. The table below shows that this tendency is disproportionately high in agencies with 100 or fewer sworn personnel.

Table 2-1. Shift Staffing Patterns of 321 Police Agencies[4]

| Department Size (Number of Patrol Officers) | Percent Departments with Equal Shift Staffing | Percent Departments with Less Than 29 Percent of Patrol on Night-Watch (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 - 24 | 54 | 11 |
| 75 - 99 | 53 | 36 |
| | 10 | 80 |
| ALL DEPARTMENTS | 49 | 30 |

This finding brings into question the accuracy of the assertion (or assumption) made in 1973 by the National Advisory Commission that:

> Existing patrol allocation systems distribute available manpower in proportion to predetermined criteria. Most of these systems are based on hazard or workload formulas. Certain factors which present a greater police problem, or are more time consuming, usually are weighted accordingly.
>
> No better total patrol allocation system is available. The only existing alternatives to proportional distribution systems are systems which attempt to optimize specific aspects of patrol activities such as response to requests for services; these, however, are not total patrol allocation systems.[5]

In fact, it would appear that for many police agencies one of the major issues still facing the chief is the equitable, efficient, and economical deployment of patrol resources.

## A. Focus of This Chapter

The policy implications of decisions concerning the distribution of patrol resources are the subject of this chapter. It is not our intention, however, to explain the mechanics of how a workload demands analysis is conducted. A number

---

[4] Gay, William G., et al., Improving Patrol Productivity, Volume I, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977, p. 24.

[5] Police, p. 200.

of source materials are available that discuss the need for efficient deployment of patrol resources and some also describe methodologies for conducting workload demands analyses.[6]

Workload demands analyses are critical because they serve as the foundation for decisions about the deployment of patrol resources on a "proportionate" need basis. Appropriate deployment can then be achieved by developing an allocation plan that follows two basic objectives. First, since demands for police service fluctuate markedly by time of day, day of the week, and season of the year, as well as by geographic area, manpower must be allocated in proportion to these variations in service needs. Furthermore, since the patrol operation is generally charged with providing maximum protection to persons and property, it seems only logical that resources should be assigned to areas where and when services are required.

Secondly, patrol units should have approximately equal workloads, for it has been shown that equitable assignment of workloads has led invariably to higher levels of officer productivity and better morale. The allocation system chosen should also be designed to provide sufficient time to accomplish expected patrol activities, ranging from responses to emergencies to the traditional random, preventive patrol activities.

B. Methods Available to Identify Workload Demands

In the past decade many techniques and methods have been developed to identify the workload demands placed upon the patrol service. They range from manual (hand tally) systems to sophisticated computerized systems. Computer capability, in addition to its superior speed and capacity, allows greater opportunities for experimentation with different designs and applications.

Despite the availability of various methods and models, many agencies have held steadfastly to traditional ways of assigning resources--ways which are, we believe, both inefficient and uneconomical. In general, the greatest inefficiency is the assignment of equal numbers of personnel to the three basic shifts and to all geographic areas without regard to the actual workload needs.

C. Temporal Distribution of Workloads

The authors of the Prescriptive Package on Improving Patrol Productivity depicted a "typical" distribution of calls for service over the three basic duty shifts as follows:

---

[6] See Chapter 2, "Efficient Deployment of Patrol Personnel," Improving Patrol Productivity, Volume I, NILECJ; NACCJSG, Police, pp. 199-205, the third edition of Police Administration, by O. W. Wilson and Roy C. McLaren discusses the distribution and allocation of patrol resources in appendices J and K.

Figure 2-1. Calls for Service[7]




Figure 2-2 shows the actual distribution of service calls and reported crimes over a typical 24-hour period in one midwestern city. The authors of the Prescriptive Package note that: "the general workload patterns of this city are similar to workload fluctuations charted in cities of various size located throughout the county."[8]

Even a cursory examination of these charts points up the wide fluctuation in the workload during the 24-hour period. The crimes and the calls for service both increase steadily in almost identical patterns throughout the afternoon and evening hours and decrease drastically in the early hours of the morning.

As a consequence of this imbalance in the workload, officers assigned to the evening shift (four p.m. to midnight) have a much heavier workload than the officers assigned to the other two basic shifts. Also, the amount of "noncommitted" time on the evening shift may be very small or nonexistent at precisely the time of day when it is most needed. On the other hand, there will be a surplus of this valuable time "batched" during the early morning hours when it can be used least productively.

## D. Implications of Unbalanced Workloads

The batching of noncommitted time in the hours when it is least needed holds serious implications for the police manager. This potentially productive time must be evaluated critically, since it directly affects an agency's ability to "control" criminal activity and deliver a high quality of service to the community. For example, the responses to calls for service on the evening shift are likely to be slower than at other times because of the likelihood that patrol resources will be in use on prior calls.

---

[7] Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. I, p. 25.

[8] Ibid., p. 34.

Figure 2-2. Distribution of Service Calls and Reported Crimes




[9] Ibid., p. 35.

Furthermore, because little, if any, noncommitted time is available during the evening hours, it is virtually impossible for the department to have the patrol service plan for any prevention and apprehension-oriented tactics.

It is also likely that the lack of noncommitted time will prevent uniformed officers from conducting complete, initial investigations on reported crimes during the peak hours. This problem could prove to be doubly counterproductive if the officer's hasty initial investigation results in poor collection of required information and, subsequently, requires the investigator assigned to the case to repeat the initial process.

Clearly, the inefficiencies inherent in the "equal manning" policy of most agencies are so great that police administrators should conduct critical examinations of the practice. The potential for gains in productivity, by shifting to a policy of assigning resources in proportion to workload demands, are substantial.

## II. EQUAL GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE

The way the workload is distributed geographically is another important consideration. As is the case with temporal distribution, there are typically wide variations in the amount of the workload in each geographic area.

Once the percentage of the total workload in a geographical subdivision is known, the administrator can begin to consider what share of the total resources should be assigned to that area. An even more precise distribution of the workload would involve temporal analysis by geographic area. For example, in the business district, the heaviest workload will probably be concentrated between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on weekdays, while in a heavily populated, high-crime area, the workload may be spread over the entire week and longer periods of time each day.

The assignment of sufficient resources to specific geographic areas (districts, precincts, beats, etc.) to meet the identified workload demands will require that more of the total available resources be assigned to some specific areas. Typically, the larger percentage of the resources will have to be assigned to the more congested areas where the crimes and calls for service are greater. Since the areas which receive more of the available resources are frequently those situated in the "inner city," the administrator must be prepared to deal with the complaints from the "residential" communities that may believe that they are entitled to a larger share of the resources.

### A. Policy Implications

Assigning equal numbers of patrol resources to each geographical area, regardless of actual workload, can have several serious policy implications for the administrator; among them an inability to cope with actual crime occurrences; an uneven level of response to calls for service; an increase in cross-beat dispatches for calls for service (with the consequent loss of accountability for policing that area); and morale problems that are bound to arise when some employees are overworked while other are underutilized.

B. Proportional Need Coverage

Many agencies have found that imbalances and inefficiencies can be avoided by developing a competent workload demands analysis capability. In fact, where a comprehensive workload analysis has been conducted and carefully considered by an agency, it has often led to the development of a personnel distribution policy that assigns resources when and where the needs exist.

There are many advantages to shifting to a "proportional need" policy. Agencies that have abandoned equal manning and introduced the proportional need model have found that basic patrol productivity levels have increased, service to the public has been improved, morale has improved, and a more equitable distribution of noncommitted time has led to better and more useful management of the available time.

Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show the amounts and distribution of critical, noncommitted time in a representative agency that has 45 patrol units for assignment over a 24-hour period. The first chart shows the availability of noncommitted time on an "equal manning" basis (15 units per shift), and the second shows the availability (and better distribution) of the time when resources are assigned on a workload basis.

C. "Available" Patrol Time

A critical output of the workload demands analysis process is the identification of the amount of patrol time that is classified as noncommitted or available, i.e., time not obligated to meet required activities. The existence of this time is not in question since all police administrators have traditionally used it for random preventive patrol. We have already discussed how the existing amount of this time might be better distributed. Now, let us consider how much of this time is available based on the experiences of various agencies.

Agencies that have attempted to identify the amount of noncommitted (available) time, have, naturally, arrived at different percentages of the total patrol time. A recent study conducted in East Hartford, Conn., concluded that 28 percent of the total patrol time was spent in processing calls for service. A 1975 study in Kansas City, Mo., indicated that 65 percent of the patrol time was "committed." Other studies have found that between 50 and 60 percent of patrol time was in the committed category.

These figures indicate that 30 to 50 percent of the total patrol time may fall into the noncommitted, or available time classification. However, before such a conclusion can be drawn, it is essential to define what actually constitutes committed time.

Committed activities can be grouped into six general categories: general calls for service, crime reports, arrest and court processing, statutory requirements, administrative demands, and personal relief times. Essentially, committed time includes all required or mandated activities.

As the studies have indicated, agencies in which the amount of noncommitted time was determined using the six criteria stated above, the amount of available time was actually found to amount to between 30 and 50 percent of the total patrol time. Obviously, the amount of this noncommitted time will vary by agency

Figure 2-3. Equal Shift Deployment and Time Available for Preventive Patrol




[10]Ibid., p. 37.

Figure 2-4. Deployment According to Workload Demands and Time Available for Preventive Patrol




[11] Ibid., p. 41

and depend upon the staffing level of the patrol service division, the definition of committed time, and the administrative practices of the agency, not to mention the level of efficiency of the patrol services personnel. However, a fair figure to assume for available time appears to be 40 percent.

It is essential that each agency identify its actual amount of noncommitted time since it represents the existing block of available time that can be used by the administrator to initiate innovative programs or achieve operational economies. The administrator can affect the amount of this critical time through a policy review process.

## III. BASIC CALLS FOR SERVICE DISTRIBUTION MODEL

In conducting the patrol workload analysis, many police agencies count the number of calls for service received in identified categories and distribute them on a temporal and geographic basis within the jurisdiction. Beats are then designed to equalize the workload among units on patrol.

Several assumptions are made in using this model: that an "average" time is required to dispose of all service incidents, that personal relief time will be the same in each beat (or district), that administrative demands on patrol will be equitably distributed, and that arrest and subsequent count processing time will be the same for each geographic subdivision in the jurisdiction.

For agencies using this model, the output of the basic calls for service count becomes the basis upon which the patrol resources are distributed. Clearly, this system is preferable to one where the number and distribution of calls for service are not considered.

However, there are other police agencies that believe that the basic count of the number of calls for service is but one input to a range of managerial considerations that have a bearing on the efficient and effective distribution of patrol personnel. Some of the additional managerial considerations are identified in Figure 2-5.

## IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of other very important managerial considerations that must be examined before resources can be distributed appropriately. They are discussed in the next five sections.

### A. Time Consumed Completing Incidents

Many police administrators believe it is important to know how much time is actually spent in completing a call for service in a particular category of the workload. For the number count alone will not necessarily provide the detail needed to prevent an inappropriate or inequitable distribution of workload and personnel.

One of the concerns raised about not getting actual "time consumed" information was expressed by the National Advisory Commission on Standards and Goals in 1973:

Figure 2-5. Use of Basic Calls for Service Model as Input to Further Analysis

| INPUT | MANAGERIAL CONSIDERATIONS | OUTPUT |
|---|---|---|
| Calls for Service Model<br>• Identify number of calls for service<br>• Geographic distribution<br>• Temporal variations<br>Assumptions:<br>• Assign "average" time spent on all calls<br>• Personal relief time is same in all districts<br>• Administrative demands are equal<br>• Arrest/court time is equal | • "Time consumed" per service incident<br>• Response time<br>• Weighting of incidents and categories<br>• Arrest and court time<br>• Computerized applications, e.g., PCAM, Hypercube<br>• Others | Distribution of Patrol Personnel |

ANALYSIS AND DECISION STEPS BEYOND CALLS FOR SERVICE MODEL

> Experience shows that using the number of calls for service and the number of arrests without regard for time expended is of little or no value in determining workload. For example, the same number of service calls and arrests may occur on two different shifts. All the activities on one shift, however, may take twice as long as on the other shift. Therefore, using only the number of incidents would indicate falsely that the workload was the same on both watches.[12]

By tracking a call for service from time of receipt to the time of incident completion, the manager acquires some much needed information. A typical "time-consumed" continuum is illustrated below:

Figure 2-6. "Time Consumed" Continuum




Filling in the information on such a continuum provides managers with opportunities to examine the dispatch delay at the communications center, the amount of time spent in response to the assignment, and the time actually spent in completing the assignment. Such an examination can promote the streamlining of existing systems and practices and reduce the time spent and, thus, create more "available" time for other planned and managed activities.

Some police experts are convinced that knowing how much time is spent in completing all police patrol activities (not just calls for service) is essential if the police manager is, in fact, to be in full control of this vital function. For instance, the California Commission on Peace Officers' Standards and Training expressed the following view in a recent patrol workload study:

> There are numerous methods of calculating patrol workload, but the most accurate and direct approach is to determine the actual time expended on all activity by members of the patrol division. The primary factor is the amount of time expended, not the number of events or incidents.[13]

---

[12] Police, p. 302.

[13] California Commission on Peace Officers' Standards and Training, Patrol Workload Study: A Procedure for the Allocation and Distribution of Patrol Manpower, 1977, (Working Draft), p.2.

The authors of the report urge police administrators to become more knowledgeable about how the police officer spends his or her time when not engaged in calls for service or administrative activities. They identify the need in these terms:

> It has become apparent in our study of this problem that consideration must be given to the nature and quality of activities being generated by patrol officers. To base additional manpower needs on the measurement of questionable work activities would not be a sound approach. The police administrator must analyze officer generated activities, as he does citizen demands for service, to determine by categories what work is generated, in what volume, and at what level of quality.[14]

The category of officer generated activity should be evaluated in the light of agency goals and objectives.

While there are costs involved in accumulating time-consumed data required, many police administrators believe that the information acquired permits a fuller analysis and evaluation of what is being done so that alternate methods and procedures, which can make the patrol operation more effective and productive, can be developed.

B. Response Time

Providing rapid responses to calls for service from the public is another issue many police agencies consider in deciding how to distribute their patrol resources. In the past, many agencies had a policy that required an immediate response to each call for service from a citizen. An immediate response was one that brought the police to the scene of the incident in two to five minutes after a call was received. The reality, however, was that very few police agencies were able to fulfill such a commitment because of increased demands for service coupled with a shrinking patrol resource level.

Consequently, police administrators began to ask basic questions concerning their policies on response to calls for service. Among the questions they raised are the following: Must all calls for service be responded to rapidly, or at all? Are there alternative ways of handling citizen requests for service? Is it possible to separate the response to reported crimes from those on miscellaneous calls for service? Are there priorities in each of these two basic categories? Can several levels of response be developed based upon the seriousness of the incident? The answers to these questions will have a direct bearing on the distribution of patrol resources in any agency.

There have been several studies conducted in the past several years that have looked at response time to calls for service. They raise some questions concerning response time as a significant factor in deterring crime, increasing criminal apprehensions, and improving citizen confidence. A recent study conducted by William Bieck in the Kansas City, Mo., Police Department, considered the response time to 949 Part I crimes.

---

[14] Ibid., p. v.

The study considered both discovery (after the fact) crimes and involvement crimes in both the violent and nonviolent categories. A significant finding expressed in an early draft of the study was that the victim or witness to the crime accounted for 48 percent of the reporting delay between the time the crime was committed or discovered and the arrival of the police, as the figure below illustrates:

Figure 2-7. The Reporting Time Continuum




The delay in reporting the crime was longer in the case of nonviolent crimes (e.g., motor vehicle theft) than in the case of violent, involvement crimes (e.g., robbery).

The implication of such a large reporting delay is that there appears to be a pressing need for a citizen education program that promotes prompt reporting of crimes. Many of the reasons cited for delay that Bieck describes in his study lend themselves to correction; for example, citizens may wait to observe the situation before reporting, telephone another person first, or investigate the scene themselves. Clearly administrators will have to review response-time issues carefully in considering how to distribute personnel.

C. Weighted Incidents

Some police administrators believe it is necessary to assign "weights" to incident categories to rank the seriousness of the incidents. This approach reflects the administrator's priorities about jurisdictional needs. Selecting the incident categories to be weighted is a decision that must be made by the individual agency based upon experience and current needs. Some examples are described below.

Using the experiences of a large number of departments throughout the country, the International Association of Chiefs of Police constructed the following "weighted formula:"[15]

[15] McLaren, Roy C., and Wilson, O.W., Police Administration. New York: McGraw Hill, 1972, p. 695.

Table 2-2. IACP Weighted Formula

| Type of Incident | Relative Weighting |
|---|---|
| Part I Crimes | 4 |
| Criminal Homicide | |
| Forcible Rape | |
| Robbery | |
| Aggravated Assault | |
| Burglary | |
| Auto Theft | |
| All Other Offenses | 3 |
| Arrests for Part I Crimes | 2 |
| Arrests for All Other Offenses | 2 |
| Arrests for Drunkenness | 1 |
| Arrests for Disorderly Conduct | 2 |
| Arrests for Vagrancy | 2 |
| All Other Arrests (including those for outside departments) | 2 |
| Traffic Accidents | 2 |
| Miscellaneous Police Services | 1 |

Another example of a "weighted" formula is one designed by a large city that was experiencing a substantial rise in crime, particularly violent street crime. The police chief decided upon a formula that assigned percentages to six major categories of incidents. These reflected the priorities of the agency at that time.

Table 2-3. Weighted Formula for Six Categories

| Type of Incident | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Outside Crimes (murder, manslaughter, robbery, etc.) | 25 |
| Other Part I Crimes | 15 |
| Other Crimes | 10 |
| Uniformed Officer Arrests | 20 |
| Calls for Service (miscellaneous) | 25 |
| Traffic Accidents | 5 |

Although the response time to routine calls for service may have suffered under the second formula, the police administrator believed he was assigning the agency's resources to best meet the perceived and assessed needs--crime in general and violent street crime in particular.

There are numerous variations possible in the construction of allocation formulas. The important point, however, is that many administrators believe it is necessary to weight the importance of the categories of the total workload. It is in the selection of categories and the weighting of each that the administrator puts his sense of priorities into operation, deciding how patrol resources can best respond to the needs of the agency.

D. Arrest and Court Processing Time

Some agencies have identified the amount of patrol person hours spent in the arrest and processing of an arrest through the criminal justice system. They studied this because a large number of arrests can have a depleting effect on the actual availability of "assigned" resources to a geographic subdivision of the total jurisdiction.

For example, in one large city on the East coast, the time lost from actual patrol duty for each felony arrest amounted to 65 working hours. That is one-and-a-half weeks of patrol time for the particular subdivision to which the officer was assigned. Compare geographic subdivision with heavy arrest activity in terms of actual patrol time (as compared to "paper" assignment figures) with another subdivision that has relatively light arrest activity and the effect can be seen to be substantial. In fact, the inequity caused by this situation can be so great that the validity of some distribution policies can be totally negated.

To examine this problem it is necessary to scrutinize the amount of time that is spent on the internal processing of an arrest, the difference between misdemeanor and felony arrest activities, the arraignment practices of both the prosecutor and the court itself, and the average number of court appearances required to dispose of the particular arrest incident.

In many jurisdictions, this examination has led to the development of arrest diversion programs, the issuance of a summons in lieu of an arrest, and the development of "court alert" programs--programs that call the officer into court only when he is actually needed. Without exception, the adoption of these types of programs has saved considerable amounts of valuable and costly patrol hours.

E. Computerized Applications - Mathematical Models

In addition to the four considerations we have just discussed, some agencies have also looked into the capability of mathematical models to bring even more sophisticated information to decisions concerning the distribution of patrol resources.

Two of the better known computer or mathematical models are the patrol car allocation model (PCAM) developed by the Rand Corporation and the Hypercube Queing Model.

Essentially, PCAM is designed to deploy patrol units so that dispatch delays and response times can be optimized. The information provided by the model

includes the average number of units available, preventive patrol frequency, average travel time to incidents, fraction of calls that will be queued, and average waiting time. Some of the implementation needs and the drawbacks of such a system are outlined in Figure 2-8.

The Hypercube Queueing program is used especially for designing beat configurations. This system provides information for balancing the workload among beats, getting more equalized response times among district units, minimizing average response times, and reducing cross-beat dispatching.[16]

We have been illustrating just some of the considerations that many police administrators take into account (beyond the basic numerical count of calls for service) before deciding how to distribute patrol resources. In addition, there are many other concerns that must be taken into consideration, such as, community and political pressures, union reactions, collective bargaining agreements, management styles, and so forth.

## V. PATROL DISTRIBUTION MODELS

The matrix of Patrol Distribution Models (Figure 2-8) describes the specific distribution models in use in different agencies throughout the nation. The matrix is designed to reflect a progression in the sophistication of models used in making decisions concerning the distribution of patrol resources. We hasten to add that there is no single best model and, further, some agencies use a combination of the different models to arrive at the distribution system they consider to be most efficient and appropriate.

The matrix outlines the assumptions, advantages, drawbacks, and implementation needs that we have been able to identify.

Starting with the traditional "equal staffing" model, we then move to the four proportionate need models--basic calls for service, weighted calls for service, time-consumed calls for service, and mathematical models.

Unfortunately, with the exception of the equal staffing model, there is no clear picture of how extensively used any one model is. In the case of the equal staffing model, it has been estimated that 49 percent of the police agencies in the nation use this model. The estimate is based on a study described in the Prescriptive Package on Improving Patrol Productivity.

It might be fair to assume that the number of agencies using the various models described in the matrix decrease in number as one progresses through the higher levels of sophistication. Although there is no comprehensive evidence for this assumption, it does reflect information received from a number of police agencies throughout the country that have participated in our training program.

The matrix is provided here simply for your information, review, and consideration and may help you in arriving at a decision concerning the best method or model for distributing the patrol personnel assigned to your particular agency.

---

[16] For more detailed information concerning both of these mathematical models, see "Criminal Justice Models-An Overview," National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1976.

Figure 2-8. Patrol Distribution Models

| MODEL | ASSUMPTION | ADVANTAGES | DRAWBACKS | IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. EQUAL STAFFING | • Three basic shifts require the same number of personnel | • Easy to schedule<br>• No patrol workload study is needed<br>• Less employee and union pressure | • Inability to handle actual workload<br>• Poor response to C.F.S.*<br>• Batching of available time<br>• Lessened ability to deal with crime<br>• Morale problems<br>• Citizen dissatisfaction | |
| B. PROPORTIONATE NEED-BASIC C.F.S. | • Resources should be assigned to meet geographic and temporal demands | • Identifies C.F.S. workload<br>• Distributes C.F.S. on geographic and temporal basis<br>• Handles workload on timely basis<br>• Improves productivity<br>• Improves morale<br>• Improves citizen satisfaction<br>• Smooths out the available time | • Fails to account for the actual time spent on servicing an incident<br>• Averages used<br>• Does not "weight" incidents on basis of importance to police mission | • Develop a manual (or computerized) collection system<br>• Planning and analysis capability<br>• Conduct a patrol workload study |

Continued...

*Calls for service.

Figure 2-8. Patrol Distribution Models (Continued...)

| MODEL | ASSUMPTION | ADVANTAGES | DRAWBACKS | IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C. PROPORTIONATE NEED-WEIGHTED C.F.S. | • Resources should be assigned to meet geographic and temporal demands | • Assigns "weights" to categories of C.F.S. to reflect:<br>- Seriousness<br>- Duration<br>- Priorities<br>• Hazard factors may also be included in some agencies | • Does not account for the actual time spent on servicing an incident | • Collection system<br>• Planning capability<br>• Patrol workload study<br>• Managerial inputs re: priorities required |
| D. PROPORTIONATE NEED-TIME CONSUMED | • Resources should be assigned to meet workload requirements both C.F.S. and non/C.F.S. | • Identifies the actual time spent on C.F.S. as well as all other activities performed | • Accumulation of data costly<br>• Additional personnel investment<br>• May not adequately consider computer/mathematical model potentials | • Refined collection system-broader base of data<br>• Planning capability<br>• Refined and comprehensive workload analysis<br>• Managerial inputs re: priorities required<br>• Computer assistance may be required |

Continued...

Figure 2-8. Patrol Distribution Models (Continued...)

| MODEL | ASSUMPTION | ADVANTAGES | DRAWBACKS | IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E. PROPORTIONATE NEED-MATHEMATICAL MODELS | • Resources should be assigned to meet geographic and temporal demands/refinements | • Adds into the distribution of information<br>- Call rates per hour<br>- Travel distances<br>- Travel speeds<br>- Patrol frequency<br>- Cross beat dispatch<br>- Other | • May be costly in terms of gathering, analyzing, and implementing<br>• May be too refined for actual needs<br>• Requires both time and computer hardware<br>• Few existing evaluated computer models | • Computer capability<br>• Consultant interaction<br>• Management inputs<br>• Time<br>• Major training of staff and line personnel |

# CONTINUED

# 1 OF 3

3. Activation of these patrol directions at specific times determined by crime analysis.

The directed deterrent runs are performed during times that were formerly devoted to random patrol and have been assigned the same priority as radio dispatched calls for service. When officers are assigned to a D-run, the run can only be cancelled under extraordinary circumstances. As a result of these directed activities, patrol managers have been able to more effectively use patrol time and, in many instances, have achieved saturation levels of patrol in problem areas without increasing patrol personnel or costs.

Directed Apprehension Patrol

Wilmington, Delaware, has developed a split patrol to more effectively utilize time that was committed to random preventive patrol. By abandoning equal shift staffing, scheduling officers according to services demands, and prioritizing calls, Wilmington has been able to adequately answer calls for service and enable approximately one-third of its patrol division to engage in directed patrol activities. The assignment of officers to the directed or structured unit on a rotating basis ensures that every patrol person will have a chance to engage in a wide variety of activities designed to increase criminal apprehension. The driving force of the Wilmington program is the application of crime analysis to day-to-day operation of the directed patrol force. Directed officers work high crime areas and use both visible patrol tactics designed to deter crime and plain clothes decoy and surveillance tactics designed to apprehend criminals. The close coordination of crime analysis and operations has resulted in marked increases in the effectiveness of the patrol unit without increasing program personnel or costs.

The authors made the following comments concerning the above programs:

Although the programs described above use different methods and have attacked different police problems, each displays a similar view of patrol. All grew out of dissatisfaction with patrol operations and a feeling that patrol productivity could be improved without increasing expenditures or personnel. The first step in the process was the identification of problems the department was experiencing in carrying out its mission. San Diego focused upon community relations, while New Haven and Wilmington directed their attention to rising crime. After these problems had been identified, patrol officers were encouraged or directed to carry out specific activities designed to ameliorate the problems. In the case of New Haven and Wilmington, these directed activities were given the same

> priority as dispatched calls for service. The result of these three approaches to patrol was a substantial change in the way preventive patrol is carried out. Patrol is no longer a random activity that fills the gaps between calls for service, but has become a carefully thought out process that links police and community concerns through careful problem analysis to what the officer does while on patrol. As a result, these departments are realizing improved patrol effectiveness and efficiency....[10]

It should be noted that the three programs just described have some basic differences: New Haven's system programmed the patrol service response to identified crime problems and the dispatch of personnel to directed "D" runs to receive equal status with the random call for service by citizens. San Diego focused much of the noncommitted time on a community-oriented approach and placed a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the patrol officer. Wilmington actually "split" their force into a "basic" car force that answered calls for service and also performed a restricted "directed" patrol activity, and a "structured" force that was dedicated to specific activities that did not include answering calls for service, as in Model II in Figure 5-1. The authors of the Prescriptive Package, Improving Patrol Productivity, have devoted several chapters to the development of, variations in, and implementation of directed patrol programs.[11]

In developing a "directed" (managed, responsive, etc.) program, many agencies have involved patrol officers to a greater extent in so-called "crime prevention" activities, which have more traditionally been handled by a crime prevention specialist. Such a broadening of the activity seems most appropriate, especially since the citizen and community also have a role to play--they have an impact on many of the mutual problems they "share" with their police. This subject is covered further in the next chapter.

As mentioned earlier, many police administrators have opted to take some percentage of "preventive patrol" time and establish dedicated or specialized units that are responsible for handling a particular, perhaps recurring, problem or function, such as a pressing and persistent crime problem, crowd control, etc.). There are many examples of this approach, and we will refer to some in this chapter.

In 1973, a national commission expressed in strong terms the need to create special crime tactical forces and urged that:

> Every police agency employing more than 75 personnel should have immediately available, consistent with an analysis of its need, a flexible and highly mobile tactical force for rapid deployment against special crime problems.

---

[10] Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. I, p. 14.

[11] Ibid., pp. 89-154.

1. Every chief executive should establish written policies and procedures that govern deployment of the tactical force against any problem. These policies and procedures should stipulate at least:

a. That the tactical force will be deployed on the basis of current crime pattern analyses or validated current information on expected crime activity;

b. That the tactical force will be deployed against a problem only when the regularly assigned patrol force is not adequate to be effective against that problem; and

c. That tactical force deployment strategy will be based on an objective analysis of the problem: overt saturation as a highly visible preventive strategy, and covert saturation as a low visibility detection and apprehension operation.[12]

The Commission suggested that flexibility was the hallmark of the tactical operation, commenting that:

...the unit may work in plain clothes on a daylight burglary problem. Then, abruptly, they may be assigned to work in uniform on the night watch on a drunk driver problem, and the next night on a skylight burglar. If there is no specific problem, the unit members may be deployed over an extensive geographic area, then, if needed, quickly pulled together as a cohesive and coordinated unit to search for a particularly dangerous robbery suspect.

The tactical unit should be functionally responsible to the patrol commander under whom it is operating. The tactical force is present to augment the regular patrol force and to serve as a catalyst in making the line units effective in achieving their common ends. Tactical units who use greater force, or who show less respect for the public than the patrol units in the area, may achieve their immediate goal while alienating the community. Tactical unit personnel should be made aware of the problems, policies, and sensitive areas of the locations in which they work.[13]

More recently, Improving Patrol Productivity offered some new thoughts concerning the definition, purpose, and scope of specialized operations:

---

[12]National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, 1973, p. 238.

[13]Ibid., p. 239.

> Specialized patrol is defined as the activities of officers who are relieved of the responsibility for handling routine calls for service in order to concentrate on specific crime problems. Its primary purposes are the deterrence of suppressible crimes and the on-site apprehension of offenders. Specialized patrol operations commonly involve the use of decoys, saturation patrol of particular areas, aggressive patrol tactics, and surveillance of suspects and possible crime locations. These operations may be conducted by a specially organized unit or by regular patrol officers on an ad hoc basis as the need arises....
>
> . . . . . .
>
> In general, specialized patrol operations are designed to handle problems and situations which are believed to require more concentrated and coordinated attention than can normally be provided by the general patrol force, and/or which call for tactics such as covert surveillance and decoys, which cannot be used by patrol officers in uniform. Frequently, specialized units were assigned a wide variety of diverse responsibilities, including: hostage and sniper situations; V.I.P. protection; riot control; crowd control; and even mountain rescue. However, these special police problems are relatively infrequent occurrences in most jurisdictions. As a result, most specialized units concentrate their efforts on combatting more common types of criminal activity such as robbery, burglary, larceny, and rape--the crimes which constitute the most persistently intractable law enforcement problems in most localities....[14]

To clarify the latter observation, they explained that:

> Specialized patrol operations normally concentrate on what have been termed suppressible crimes. Suppressible crimes are generally considered to include: robbery, burglary, grand theft, petty theft, auto theft, assault and battery, and sex crimes. While the lists of crimes which are believed to be suppressible may vary somewhat from department to department, they will share the underlying concept that suppressible crimes are those which can be significantly impacted by police operations. That is, they commonly occur in locations, under circumstances and/or in patterns which provide the police with a reasonable opportunity for deterring them and, if deterrence fails, for apprehending the offenders. Estimates vary as to the percent of crimes which can be

---

[14] Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. II, p. 1.

considered to be potentially suppressible. One study suggested that about 40 percent of all known crimes occur in locations where they can be observed by non-participants and thus potentially suppressed by police activity, while another put the figure at approximately 60 percent for major crimes against persons. These are, however, very rudimentary, uncertain estimates. What is important to bear in mind is that the concept of suppressible crime provides only an orienting focus for considering possible target crimes for specialized patrol. Some crimes which are not normally considered to be suppressible may come to occupy the attention of specialized patrol units because of public demands for intensive police action and/or because they happen to be committed in a patterned way which lends itself to response by specialized units. On the other hand, some crimes which are generally felt to be suppressible may occur under conditions which render action by specialized units difficult if not impossible. As a general rule, specialized patrol should concentrate on the types of criminal activity upon which it has the greatest potential for positive impact. These target crimes need to be identified through careful and constant analysis of levels, types, frequency, and location of crime occurrences. They should not be selected merely on the basis of a predetermined list.[15]

Recruiting the staff for specialized units has not been a problem to police administrators in terms of the number of applicants. Experience throughout the nation has consistently shown that the number of applicants far exceeds the number of positions.

The reasons for the high level of interest in specialized patrol are several:

- Specialized units typically devote much of their time to crime-related activities. Specialized patrol is what may officers believe "real police work" should be all about. Officers often view assignment to specialized patrol duty as a means of relieving the frustrations involved in handling routine calls for service. They frequently believe that specialized patrol offers the opportunity to engage in the more exciting facets of police work which may have initially motivated them to join the force.

- Assignment to specialized patrol can represent a significant advancement in an officer's career. Members of specialized units are frequently promoted

---

[15] Ibid., pp. 2-3.

at a comparably high rate. For example, officers assigned to Miami's STOP Robbery/Burglary project receive a promotion to the rank of patrol investigator, which represents an important step toward making detective. And in New York City, specialized patrol provides officers with experience in high-crime, high-activity areas which is an important factor in the promotion process. In fact, the commanders of many specialized units report that promotion is the major cause of personnel turnover in their units.

- Specialized patrol units often provide a highly attractive and desirable working environment. Some units operate in a more relaxed, informal, and less militaristic fashion than the general patrol force. Others, especially those responsible for handling emergency situations, are frequently highly regimented and disciplined. This can foster a sense of esprit de corps similar to that found in elite military units like the Rangers and the Green Berets.

- Specialized units which work in civilian clothes provide their officers with the frequently desired opportunity to work out of uniform--to "get out of the bag." Some decoy and blending operations also allow, indeed encourage, participating officers to wear long hair, beards, and unconventional clothing.

- Specialized patrol officers are often extremely enthusiastic about their work and take great pride in it. They sometimes regard themselves as the elite of the patrol force, and this appraisal may be begrudgingly reciprocated by beat officers, if only in their jealous attitudes toward the specialized unit.

- Finally, specialized patrol can involve a variety of assignments, some of which may require a considerable amount of creativity and inventiveness. Decoy operations that involve the use of fairly elaborate disguises and extended surveillance of a moving suspect can require a great deal of ingenuity. For officers who enjoy a challenge, certain types of specialized patrol can be intrinsically enjoyable.[16]

The most critical aspect in the process of developing specialized patrols is the selection of personnel. This issue was addressed in a recent report in the following terms:

---

[16] Ibid., pp. 38-39.

> The single most significant aspect of a street crime unit is its personnel. Required to use their ingenuity and imagination, deployed in high crime areas, involved in dangerous situations, the officers assigned to the unit must be of uniformly high calibre.
>
> > By its very nature, civilian clothes police work requires men (and women) of initiative and imagination--who possess a high degree of integrity and can function effectively in an area of corruption potential with a minimum of supervision.
> >
> > These men (and women) spend their full time and energy actively engaged in outwitting the street criminal in his element--the street. They function, almost exclusively, in high hazard areas during the hours of peak crime incidence. They focus their attention on crimes of violence without the identification factor furnished by a uniform and/or marked auto, thereby finding themselves in a disproportionate number of situations in which they are face-to-face with armed felons. This requires, as well as personal courage, a high degree of resourcefulness and tenacity.
>
> Effective methods of recruitment, selection, training, supervision and evaluation are required for a street crime unit to assemble and maintain a high quality of personnel....[17]

In those cases where insufficient attention was given to selection and training, success has been limited, at best. On the other hand, careful attention to these critical issues have led to highly successful programs.

The range of those specialized units and programs is broad. In general, however, they can be grouped under four main headings: saturation patrol, decoy operations, stakeouts, and person or location surveillance.

Essentially, the specialized patrols are designed to have an impact upon the level of targetted crimes. Table 5-1 identifies those crimes and some tactical alternatives being used to reduce the levels of them.

---

[17] New York Street Crime Unit, An Exemplary Project, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975, p. 17.

Table 5-1. Specialized Patrol Tactics and Target Crimes[18]

| Target Crime | Tactical Alternatives |
|---|---|
| Street Robbery | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Decoy operations;<br>Suspect surveillance;<br>Area surveillance. |
| Commercial Robbery | Physical stakeouts;<br>Electronic stakeouts;<br>Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Area surveillance;<br>Suspect surveillance. |
| Residential Robbery | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Area surveillance;<br>Suspect surveillance. |
| Purse Snatches | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Area surveillance;<br>Suspect surveillance;<br>Decoys. |
| Residential Burglary | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Area surveillance;<br>Suspect surveillance. |
| Commercial Burglary | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Physical stakeouts;<br>Electronic stakeouts;<br>Suspect surveillance;<br>Area surveillance. |
| Vehicle Theft | Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Decoy operations;<br>Area surveillance. |
| Rape | Decoy operations;<br>Uniformed tactical patrol;<br>Suspect surveillance;<br>Area surveillance. |

[18] Improving Patrol Productivity, Vol. II, p. 81.

Saturation patrol, or uniformed tactical patrol as it is described in Table 5-1, has been described as follows:

> Uniformed tactical patrol is the most traditional and one of the most widely used forms of specialized patrol. It is a fairly simple, straightforward approach to specialized patrol which involves the same procedures and techniques used by general patrol officers when they are not handling calls for services. These include: constant visible movement throughout an area to generate a sense of police presence; careful observation of street activity; vehicle and pedestrian stops; citizen contacts, etc. The principal differences between these two types of patrol is that uniformed tactical patrol employs these tactics in an intense, concentrated fashion. Officers are relieved of the responsibility for responding to routine calls for services so that they can devote their full time and attention to patrol, thus intensifying its impact. In addition, uniformed tactical patrol operations typically deploy a number of officers in particular target areas, thereby greatly increasing the level of patrol in these areas.[19]

"Decoy" operations give the police agency another potential (and diversion). These operations have been described in this way:

> Decoy operations can be used effectively against crimes for which police officers can convincingly pose as likely "victims." Decoys are frequently used to combat street robberies, purse snatches, rapes, prostitution, and thefts from vehicles. The primary purpose of decoy operations is to make apprehensions for targeted crimes; however, by publicizing the use of decoys, they can also have a deterrent effect, since would-be offenders can never be certain whether or not prospective victims are police officers.
>
> The basic elements of this tactic are fairly straightforward. The fundamental idea is to attract an offender to a prepared "victim." To conduct a decoy operation, a specialized patrol unit simply disguises an officer to resemble a likely victim of a target crime and places him or her in a location where the crime is particularly prevalent. The decoy is watched closely by several back-up officers and, when a "hit" occurs, the officers move in to apprehend the suspect. However, while the basic concept is simple, considerable care should be taken in initiating and conducting decoy operations. Unless they are carefully planned and properly carried out,

---

[19] Ibid., pp. 80-82.

> decoy operations can have serious implications for citizen and officer safety, police/community relations and the productivity of specialized patrol....[20]

Decoy operations represent a significant conceptual change in police operations. In the past, the police agency has been expected to fulfill two basic roles--namely, prevention and deterrence as well as the apprehension role. These two roles could be described in terms of "before and after" activities as outlined in Table 5-2.

Table 5-2. Crime Occurrence Concept

| Concept | Activity |
|---|---|
| Before | Prevent and deter the crime from occurring through preventive patrol (i.e., reduce opportunity and increase fear of apprehension during the commission. |
| After | Conduct investigation of crime and arrest offender. |

The decoy operation introduces a new dimension into the overall concept. Simply stated, it is that there is a need to replace the victim or at least be near or on the scene during the commission of the crime. This approach is a "heady" active program that attempts to outwit the criminal. Obviously, if there is to be any reasonable expectation of success, it requires a solid crime analysis capability and sound personnel selection criteria that enable the "street" smart officer to compete with the criminal on "equal" terms.

The decoy operation restructures the more traditional view of police responsibilities. No longer is the "before and after" posture sufficient--there is a need to develop a "during" capacity and capability. Acceptance of this new dimension also changes the Crime Occurrence Concept Table:

Table 5-3. Crime Occurrence Concept

| Concept | Activity |
|---|---|
| Before | Prevent and deter the crime from occurring through managed patrol (i.e., reduce opportunity and increase fear of apprehension during the commission). |
| During | Victim replacement by a decoy or, at the very least, be at or near the scene during the commission of the crime. |
| After | Conduct investigation of crime and arrest offender. |

[20] Ibid., p. 88. This is also an excellent overview of decoy operations in the Exemplary Project on the New York City Street Crime Unit.

The "before" stage features prevention and deterrence, the "during" stage features replacement or direct observation, and the "after" stage features catching the criminal after the fact. Experiences in several agencies would support an argument that police should be spending considerable effort in the "during" stage.

However, we must add some words of caution. First, the careful selection of personnel for decoy operations is absolutely crucial. Second, care must be exercised so that legal issues such as the role of "entrapment" are carefully considered in the development of the tactics to be used. Legal advice should be sought before conflicts arise. In some cases, excessive enthusiasm on the part of law enforcement agencies has also endangered the success of decoy operations.

The next major area of specialized patrol is the use of "stakeouts." These can be either physical or electronic. Since most departments are somewhat familiar with these tactics, little needs to be said about them, except to raise the question as to whether they are cost-effective. For, both forms of stakeouts can prove to be expensive--the physical stakeout clearly being the more expensive of the two.

While some police administrators believe these operations are very effective, the question concerning cost-effectiveness may never have been examined. Shortly after implementing such an approach, the administrator should have it appraised. The results may be startling.

The final major "specialized" program involves area and suspect surveillance. Since area, or "location-oriented patrol," is really what takes place in a managed or directed patrol program, there is little reason to discuss this "concept" at length here.

Suspect surveillance programs (for example, "Career Criminal Programs") are somewhat different. The authors of the Prescriptive Package, Improving Patrol Productivity, expressed some concerns about this type of program:

> Suspect surveillance should be undertaken only when there are firm grounds for believing that the suspects are active criminals who commit offenses with sufficient frequency that closely monitoring their activity for a relatively short period of time is likely to be rewarding. Suspect surveillance is a particularly appropriate tactic when the identity of probable offenders is known but the targets and locations of their crimes do not form a coherent pattern.
>
> Suspect surveillance is not any easy tactic to use. An interim evaluation of the tactic by the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department noted that: "The strategy is much more difficult to work than was thought when designing the project, and it takes a special kind of police officer to use this strategy effectively. It was also learned that the active burglary and robbery suspects were extremely 'tail conscious' and surveilling these people for any length of time without being exposed is

> very difficult." Several steps can be taken by specialized patrol units to minimize the difficulties involved in suspect surveillance.[21]

It should also be noted that, in addition to operational constraints, the operation often flirts with the constitutional rights of the individual. An aggressive patrol program that focuses upon an individual for what he or she has possibly done or is suspected of doing, does not give sufficient grounds to allow the police to zero in on that individual without solid information concerning current activities. We offer this observation so that police administrators will not invest valuable resources in a losing cause. "Major offender" efforts, which assure the provision of full information to prosecutors and judges once the individual is arrested, are different and more worthwhile programs.

As was mentioned earlier, the number of programs and the tactics police agencies have initiated over the past several years have been impressive. Table 5-4 describes how some agencies have approached their local problems.

In summary, police administrators have responded to the need to improve the productivity levels of their employees. One of the prime areas identified as having the potential for significant upgrading has been the "preventive patrol" time of the uniformed service personnel.

As a consequence of critically examining the amount of this time and how it was being used, police agencies have instituted a large number of innovative and productive programs. This chapter has attempted to share with you the thinking which went into this examination as well as the outputs of that thinking.

In the next chapter we will examine the roles of the citizen and how the collective community has a continuing impact upon the police administrator's decisionmaking process.

---

[21] Ibid., p. 103.

Table 5-4. Selected Specialized Patrol Operations

| Department | Unit | Principal Target Crimes | Principal Tactics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atlanta, Georgia, Bureau of Police Services | Anti-Robbery Unit | Pedestrian Robbery<br>Commercial Robbery | Stakeouts<br>Decoys |
| | Anti-Burglary Unit | Residential Burglary<br>Commercial Burglary | Area Surveillance<br>Electronic Stakeouts<br>Uniformed Tactical Patrol |
| | High Crime Foot Patrol Project | Street Crimes | Uniformed Tactical Patrol |
| Denver, Colorado, Police Department | Special Crime Attack Team | Burglary<br>Robbery | Uniformed Tactical Patrol<br>Covert Area Surveillance<br>Stakeouts<br>Suspect Surveillance |
| | Escort (Eliminate Street Crime on Residential Thoroughfares) | Street Crimes | Uniformed Tactical Patrol on Motor Bikes |
| Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department | Special Enforcement Bureau | Target Crimes Vary, Selected by Sub-Station Commanders | Uniformed Tactical Patrol |
| Los Angeles Police Department | Metropolitan Division | Robbery<br>Burglary<br>Auto Theft<br>Auto Larceny | Uniformed Tactical Patrol<br>Area Surveillance<br>Stakeouts<br>Decoys<br>Suspect Surveillance |

| Department | Unit | Principal Target Crimes | Principal Tactics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Miami, Florida, Police Department | STOP Robbery/Burglary Unit | Robbery<br>Burglary | Decoys<br>Suspect Surveillance<br>Area Surveillance<br>Stakeouts |
| New York City Police Department | Street Crime Unit | Robbery<br>Grand Larceny From Person | Decoys<br>Area Surveillance |
| | Precinct Anti-Crime Units | Varies with Precinct | Varies with Precinct |
| | Tactical Patrol Unit | Street Crimes | Uniformed Tactical Patrol |
| Phoenix, Arizona, Police Department | Selective Enforcement Unit | Any Serious Suppressible Crime Problem | Suspect Surveillance |
| | District Crime Prevention Units | Varies with District | Varies with District |
| Pueblo, Colorado, Police Department | Special Operations Section | Burglary<br>Robbery | Area Surveillance<br>Mobile Alarm Stakeouts<br>Uniformed Tactical Patrol<br>Suspect Surveillance |
| Tucson, Arizona, Police Department | Tactical Operations | All Suppressible Felonies | Stakeouts<br>Area Surveillance<br>Suspect Surveillance<br>Uniformed Tactical Patrol |
| | Special Problems Detail | Multiple Offenders for Any Serious Crime | Suspect Surveillance |
| | Crime Prevention Unit | Commercial Robbery | Use of Covert Cameras |

| Department | Unit | Principal Target Crimes | Principal Tactics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wilmington, Delaware, Bureau of Police | Structured Patrol Force | Robbery<br>Burglary | Area Surveillance<br>Stakeouts<br>Suspect Surveillance<br>Decoys<br>Mobile Alarms and Cameras |

# APPENDIX A

The material in this Appendix is a synopsis of a Master Plan System developed and implemented by the New York City Police Department. It is used by permission of the author.

# A MANAGEMENT PLANNING SYSTEM FOR PATROL SERVICES

The current widespread concern with crime and the delivery of effective levels of service to the community has required a rethinking of the role of the police in our society. The total law enforcement role has become more complex. Greater responsibilities have been acquired which include a more diverse range of social and behavioral problems. Consequently, the management of police services has become that much more complex.

The increase in complexity has necessitated a reassessment of basic goals and objectives with a view toward improving the efficiency of the agency in delivering higher levels of service on a cost-effective basis. In planning to accomplish that aim the police administrator must cope with the realities of today and anticipate the needs of tomorrow. This is not an easy task. It will require the collective and coordinated efforts of the entire agency.

While the dedication and participation of the individual officer will always be needed, the critical ingredient is imaginative and bold management of the agency's programs and resources. The progressive manager must take the initiative in charting new courses of action rather than be passive where the reactive response may prove to be too little and too late.

What is needed is a system for planning and research. This system must assure planning and programming efforts on a continuing basis. Planning efforts are not one time undertakings but, rather, mosaics of activities which must fit together.

Consequently, there is a need to develop a programmed "master" plan which identifies the components which are incorporated, the priorities of the components, the expected times of completion, and the persons responsible for the component parts. In the absence of the "master" plan system the planning effort can be sporadic and uncoordinated and, thus, be counterproductive to the agency. Ideally, all oars should be in the water at the same time and pulling in the same direction.

Since the plan will impact upon the total police system, it is essential that the talents and experience of field managers and officers be utilized in the process. By involving the persons who are expected to implement the components of the plan at the front end of the process, the outcomes should be both realistic and achievable.

Additionally, the planning system should deal with the full range of administrative issues faced by the police executive. This, obviously, suggests that the overall program will extend over a period of years. It also requires a full commitment on the part of the police executive as well as the assignment of talented personnel who are capable of formulating a tough-minded and imaginative program.

The benefits to be realized from a systemized approach to the development of plans are substantial. Planning for the efforts before the programs are begun will permit consistent and coordinated progress.

It is clear that the police administrator can impact upon departmental workload and efficiency in a real way if the planning process (system) is well conceived and implemented.

Having established a "master" plan system for patrol services, the Chief of Patrol Services in a hypothetical city issued the following memorandum explaining the program to the members of his division:

> The Patrol Services "master" plan system is more than a plan for effecting needed changes. It is a system for planning and programming improvements on a continuing and comprehensive basis which capitalizes upon the talents and experience of patrol personnel as well as professional staff specialists.
>
> By scheduling programs, and by involving patrol services managers and officers as well as technical personnel at key stages, the required rate of change can be achieved and the impact of improvements magnified.
>
> By utilizing the "master" plan system, the patrol services division will identify programs which will be successively implemented during the succeeding 36-month period. The programs will be prioritized and the appropriate development implementation steps established. An updating process will be included to ensure a current review on a six month basis.
>
> Programs which are initiated will be either those which are of direct concern to patrol services or those which have an impact upon our services. All programs, designed to improve upon current levels of performance, will be an integral part of normal managerial concerns.
>
> It should also be noted that the total planning system will be flexible and, consequently, adjustments and modifications may be anticipated.
>
> The principal participants in the development of the plan's components will be patrol service commanders and officers who are responsible for the delivery of patrol services in our city. The plan calls for consultation with and inputs from you during the development and implementation phases. In short, you will be instrumental in examining the feasibility of proposals, developing the details of the plans, and carrying through the planned improvements.
>
> This system identifies programs intended to improve upon patrol services. The existence of such a plan should add a sense of purpose and a viable vehicle by which patrol services can be upgraded.

In all cases patrol commanders, and their teams, will be encouraged to develop their own plans which are consistent with the objectives and programs identified in the "master" plan; so that the approach is tailored to be responsive to local needs. Thus, the "master" plan system is a flexible tool for strengthening patrol services.

During the next 36 months our department will initiate a major effort to upgrade the patrol services delivered to the citizenry in ten major areas--the allocation of resources, field operations, management practices, organization, personnel, patrol functions, utilization of civilians, administrative procedures, equipment, and the area of other departmental programs impacting on the patrol service. Well conceived and meaningful programs in each of these areas are vital to shaping the character and level of improvement in services required to meet the needs of the community. There is a need to establish a set of priorities.

Therefore, the primary emphasis and the priorities during the initial 12 months will be in developing programs which are designed to achieve improvements in the allocation of resources and the quality of the services delivered to the community.

The goal to be realized in reviewing resource allocation practices and procedures will be to develop and implement improved allocation plans so that personnel are deployed more responsibly in accordance with actual need. Our city cannot afford the loss of effectiveness and productivity which results from a less than optimal deployment of police strength.

The objective in undertaking a basic overhaul of the current approaches and procedures governing field procedures and practices will be to strengthen patrol services substantially. A high priority will be given to a "managed patrol" program which highlights a proactive and imaginative crime control program. Rather than permitting the dissipation of energies and effort inherent in an unstructured "random" patrol program, the energies of the patrol service will be directed to the accomplishment of determined objectives.

The "master" plan system evolved from numerous discussions which were held with patrol service command and operating personnel who made suggestions for modifications, additions, and deletions to the overall program. The programs, then, represent the collective thinking of the patrol services bureau managers and officers. This same participatory approach will be utilized in further development of the programs and ultimate implementation of the finalized programs.

In summary, the plan which we have evolved is a comprehensive, and collectively developed, effort to upgrade the overall performance of the Patrol Services Division. The challenges in such an effort are enormous.

Nonetheless, my confidence in the managerial and operational levels of our agency leads me to the belief that the realization of these "impossible" goals will, in fact, become a reality.

Chief _____

Some questions which might be posed and which could be assigned to a planning team within the organization, for several of the ten critical areas in the overall plan, are suggested as follows:

Allocation of Resources

- Are the resources assigned to the geographic subdivisions on an equitable basis (i.e., workload demands)?
- Are the resources assigned within a geographic subdivision assigned equitably on a geographic and temporal basis?
- Is there a need for an "overlay" platoon to deal with the "heavy" demand hours?
- Are the officers "assigned" to an area actually available for assignment--or are they borrowed for other duties at other locations?
- How many officers are assigned to "fixed" demands (e.g., school crossings, "mission" duty, etc.) which in effect deplete the number available?

Field Operations

- Has the agency developed a program to maximize the time of police officers during their "uncommitted" time?
- Does the agency have a policy for two-person patrol--a doubling of costs?
- Are innovative programs initiated on a "model" basis in one of the geographic subdivisions?
- Has the agency attempted "specialized" patrol strategies to test new approaches to current problems?

- Does the field commander have an "intelligence" officer who attempts to piece together pieces of information into a pattern (crime analysis function)?

- Have special events (i.e., parades, fairs, etc.) been studied to determine optimal policing levels?

- Have efforts been made to develop "court alert" systems which would minimize the time officers spend in court waiting for trials, etc.?

- Has the use of scooters been evaluated?

- Are motorized officers required to leave cars and walk the community?

- Has the public participated in crime prevention programs?

Management Practices

- Has authority for decisionmaking been decentralized to the lowest acceptable level?

- Has the agency developed a timely and meaningful management information system?

- Have the issues of misconduct and corruption been dealt with in a forthright manner?

- Is there a clear channel of communication for issuance of orders as well as a corresponding feedback system for employee reactions or concerns?

- Has the community been activated in a real sense to participate/advise the agency?

- Must all calls for service be responded to? How quickly? Why?

Organization

- Is the organizational structure clear and understood by employees?

- Is there a "table of organization" which reflects the distribution of personnel by agency function?

- Are the responsibilities and duties of personnel at all levels clearly defined and articulated?

- Has the delegation of authority to subordinate command levels been clearly stated?

- Are the first-line supervisors given sufficient authority (and latitude) to make critical decisions?

- Is the span of control (at all levels) realistic and productive?

Personnel

- Are personnel assignments based upon the capabilities of the individuals? Can they be?

- Are potential promotees assigned to positions to prepare them for new duties?

- Are there "administrative" transfers which move "problems" from one commander to another?

- Are command "tenures" too long? Do they promote or stagnate initiative?

- Is the probationary period for recruits and managers (promotees) realistic?

- Is there an oral interview in the selection and promotion processes? Should there be?

- Is the separation process for incompleted and marginal performance (at all levels) adequate?

- Are the "Fast Burner" managers being given broad enough experience in the department?

The suggested questions deal with only several of the ten basic areas. Additionally, the questions and areas of inquiry are clearly not exhaustive. Each major area of agency concern should generate its own set of questions which test and challenge the present policies and practices.

In summary, the police administrator can have a substantial impact upon current workload demands and the efficiency and effectiveness of his/her agency resources. To achieve those outcomes, however, the administrator must develop a systematic (and systemic) planning process which results in a coordinated, consistent, and comprehensive approach to organizational needs and operational responses. A well conceived approach to the planning process is a must.

While it is true that each police jurisdiction must examine its needs and tailor its program and approaches to respond to those unique situations, it is equally true that a well conceived and responsive planning system will enable the agency to achieve the expected improvements--even if it takes several years.

# CHAPTER 6. THE POLICE MANAGER AND THE CITIZEN

In our discussion of managerial roles in Chapter 1, we identified three types of roles that demand that a manager contact individuals or organizations outside his/her agency. The interpersonal roles of figurehead and liaison require the manager personally to represent the organization and also to initiate, develop, and maintain regular outside contacts. The informational roles of monitor and spokesman require him/her to organize and then disseminate information both within the organization and outside of it. Finally, the decisional roles of disturbance handler and negotiator require him/her to react to crisis--normally originating from outside influences on the organization--and to make decisions with others from outside the organization about bargaining or negotiating.

In addition to the roles a manager plays, there are the significant special factors that affect the nature, procedures, and operations of public organizations. In general, the external influences upon public organization are such that, of necessity, the job of the public manager is affected heavily by external demands and influences--even pressures--being placed on the manager by those outside the formal, public organization. When we apply ideas and findings about the role of managers in the public sector to the job of the police executive, we discover that what may appear to be internal police discretion in making decisions about police matters, is often based on external influences, initiated by individual citizens or groups outside the direct supervision or control of the police manager.

In this chapter, we will attempt to summarize some research findings about the roles citizens play in influencing police activities. We will describe at least four roles that they take on. Then, various police-managed strategies and tactics will be considered as possible ways in which the police manager can view alternative approaches to the use of some of these citizen roles in accomplishing police goals and objectives. Finally, a generalized discussion will be presented, one which can point out some of the issues about ways police and citizens can interact in the future. At the outset, it should be stressed that both the literature as well as the documented experiences of police agencies concerning this topic are relatively weak and sketchy. This reflects the complexity and difficulty of providing clear guidance in spite of the significant amount of resources that have been expended studying this topic. Where successes have occurred, they have been due usually to the initiatives exercised by the police manager in the role of change agent.

## I. THE CITIZEN AND CRIME PREVENTION

Historically, crime prevention activities have been considered to be a major function of police departments. Over the past 20 years, however, there has been a growing belief that crime can be reduced through active citizen participation

in specific prevention programs. However, there is yet no definitive study or evaluation that demonstrates the validity of this emergent position regarding the impact of citizen related crime prevention activities on deterrence, apprehension, crime rates, arrest rates, or conviction rates. Most of the available studies or evaluations of citizen crime prevention programs show that these programs face an overriding critical problem--that is, that limited numbers of citizens choose to participate. Serious general questions must then be raised about citizen crime prevention programs: What mechanisms can be developed and maintained, particularly by police agencies, that will encourage and support a significant number of citizens to take steps to prevent crime? Should police departments take sole responsibility for the prevention of crime? If either police or citizen related efforts remain relatively unsuccessful, what alternatives are available to prevent crime?

There are no easy or documented answers to these questions. However, in reviewing many studies of specific types of citizen crime prevention programs, one can catalogue a set of police directed crime prevention program strategies which, in individual jurisdictions, have been helpful in accomplishing some prevention goals. Given the absence of an overall "model," which works, and relying on an acknowledged need for further efforts to specify the relationship between citizen crime prevention activities and the various outcomes by which police performance is measured (including crime rates, arrests, and clearances), several strategies that have been adopted can be outlined:

- Development of public education programs designed to teach citizens how to protect themselves and their property;
- Conduct of premise security surveys in commercial facilities and residences and recommendation of improvements, particularly in target-hardening tactics;
- Encouragement of property marking with unique identifiers;
- Organization of citizen groups into self-protection groups by the formation of block, neighborhood or crime watch/alert teams;
- Development and enforcement of local security ordinances through the use of building or zoning code changes in order to effect construction or major renovation changes to ensure a higher level of security.

Detailed analysis and evaluations of most of the existing types of prevention strategies are available from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in three reports: Police Burglary Prevention Programs, September, 1975; Crime Prevention Security Surveys, January, 1977; and Citizen Crime Reporting Projects, April, 1977.

An overview of selected prevention programs, representing the efforts of 10 police agencies, are displayed in Table 6-1. The basic concept of most of these prevention efforts is to expand community services, including intensified community education programs, property marking programs, and premise security surveys. In the 10 departments, these activities are coordinated in a variety of ways. In

Table 6-1. Overview of Selected Prevention Programs

| | Albuquerque, New Mexico | Chula Vista, California |
|---|---|---|
| CITY AND POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS | | |
| • Population (1970) | 243,751 | 67,901 |
| • UCR reported burglaries per 1,000 population (1973) | 28.47 | 16.88 |
| • Number of sworn officers in department | 447 | 81 |
| • Number of civilians in department | 59 | 25 |
| BURGLARY PREVENTION PROGRAM | | |
| • Concept of program | Expanded community services and special operations. | Expanded community services. |
| • Organization | Community Services Division and Special Operations Section engaged in specific burglary prevention activities. | Burglary prevention activities integrated throughout department. Supplement staff with interns. |
| • Funding sources | Department and grant. | Department and grant. |
| • Outside resources | Civic organizations and local businesses. | Civic organizations and local businesses. |
| PROGRAM COMPONENTS | | |
| • Property marking | Property marking. | Property marking. |
| • Premises surveys: | | |
| - Residential | | Residential surveys. |
| - Commercial | Commercial surveys. | |
| • Community education | Community education. | Community education. |
| • Alarms | | Alarms |
| • Special patrols | Special patrols. | Special patrols. |
| • Anti-Fencing | | Anti-Fencing |
| • Other | | Crime pattern and vulnerability analysis. |

[1]White, Thomas W., et al., Police Burglary Prevention Programs, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1975, pp. 10-11.

Table 6-1. (Continued...)

| | Denver, Colorado | Huntington, West Virginia | Indianapolis, Indiana |
|---|---|---|---|
| CITY AND POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS | | | |
| • Population (1970) | 515,000 | 74,315 | 622,000 |
| • UCR reported burglaries per 1,000 population (1973) | 29.25 | 9.04 | 12.34 |
| • Number of sworn officers in department | 1,365 | 116 | 1,110 |
| BURGLARY PREVENTION PROGRAM | | | |
| • Concept of program | Expanded community services and special operations. | Expanded community services. | Expanded community services. |
| • Organization | City civilian employees staff operation identification project; SCAT project separate unit in department. | Crime Prevention Unit responsible for burglary prevention activities. | Department and insurance industry maintain Crime T.R.A.P.; Specific Burglary Crime Attack Team; Burglary Specific Crime Impact Program. |
| • Funding sources | Grant. | Department and grant. | Department-Crime T.R.A.P., Grant-Other. |
| • Outside resources | -- | Civic organizations and local businesses. | Insurance Institute of Indiana, Women's Crusade Against Crime. |
| PROGRAM COMPONENTS | | | |
| • Property marking | Property marking. | Property marking. | Property marking. |
| • Premises surveys: | | | |
| - Residential | Residential | Residential | |
| - Commercial | Commercial | Commercial | |
| • Community Education | Community Education. | Community Education. | |
| • Alarms | | | |
| • Special patrols | Special patrols | | Special Patrols |
| • Anti-Fencing | | | Anti-Fencing |
| • Other | | Crime pattern and vulnerability analysis. | |

Table 6-1. (Continued...)

| | St. Louis, Missouri | St. Paul, Minnesota | San Bernardino, California |
|---|---|---|---|
| CITY AND POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS | | | |
| • Population (1970) | 622,000 | 309,980 | 104,000 |
| • UCR reported burglaries per 1,000 population (1973) | 30.59 | 23.64 | 28.56 |
| • Number of sworn officers in department | 2,218 | 543 | 205 |
| • Number of civilians in department | 653 | 134 | 50 |
| BURGLARY PREVENTION PROGRAM | | | |
| • Concept of program | Expanded community services and special operations. | Began as locally initiated expansion of community services. Now part of statewide crime prevention outside evaluation. | Short feasibility study of locally generated ideas with statewide outside evaluation. |
| • Organization | Burglary Prevention Unit. | Crime Prevention Unit responsible for burglary prevention. | Crime Specific Burglary Unit staff supplemented with reserve officers. |
| • Funding sources | Grant. | Department and grant. | Grant. |
| • Outside resources | Local businesses; Women's Crusade Against Crime. | Insurance industry; local businesses. | Local businesses. |
| PROGRAM COMPONENTS | | | |
| • Property marking | Property marking. | Property marking. | Property marking. |
| • Premises surveys: | | | |
| - Residential | | Residential | Residential |
| - Commercial | Commercial | Commercial | Commercial |
| • Community Education | Community Education. | Community Education. | |
| • Alarms | Alarms | | Alarms |
| • Special patrols | | | Special patrols |
| • Anti-Fencing | | | Anti-Fencing |

Table 6-1. (Continued...)

| | San Jose, California | Topeka, Kansas |
|---|---|---|
| CITY AND POLICE DEPARTMENT CHARACTERISTICS | | |
| • Population (1970) | 446,000 | 125,011 |
| • UCR reported burglaries per 1,000 population (1973) | 20.56 | 14.88 |
| • Number of sworn officers in department | 654 | 208 |
| • Number of civilians in department | 136 | 73 |
| BURGLARY PREVENTION PROGRAM | | |
| • Concept of program | Experiment in target area to determine effectiveness of techniques. | Expanded community services. |
| • Organization | Burglary prevention activities integrated within department; augmented with part-time civilian help. | Crime Prevention Bureau, Strike Force Against Street Crime including anti-fencing work. |
| • Funding sources | Department and grant. | Department and grant. |
| • Outside resources | | Civil organizations and local businesses; Topekans Against Crime. |
| PROGRAM COMPONENTS | | |
| • Property marking | Property marking. | Property marking. |
| • Premises surveys:<br>- Residential<br>- Commercial | <br>Residential<br>Commercial | <br>Residential<br>Commercial |
| • Community education | Community education. | Community education. |
| • Alarms | | |
| • Special patrols | | |
| • Anti-Fencing | Anti-Fencing | Anti-Fencing |
| • Other | Neighborhood Watch, Crime Pattern and Vulnerability Analysis. | |

many cases there are units devoted specifically to crime prevention efforts. In other cases, these activities are integrated throughout the entire department and become program activities for directed patrol efforts. Sometimes, these activities are augmented by paid or volunteer civilians or police reserve officers. Special tactical or anti-fencing work is usually done by a separate unit.

In reviewing the literature on prevention program components, one can sort out a "shopping list" of programs and identify the level of police activity and resources needed for each component. Table 6-2 lists a variety of prevention components, each of which has three levels of police activity: passive, active, and advocacy. On the passive level, activities generally are low profile, low cost, and require a very small police manpower commitment. As a rule, the passive level of activity does not achieve striking results. At the active level, police solicit opportunities to work with the public in attacking crime. They also are more aggressive in enforcing security ordinances and in undertaking surveillance. The cost and the results of prevention activites both go up at this level and decisions about specific methods must take into account both the size of the crime problem and local resources available to deal with it. Finally, at the advocacy level, police and citizen activities are aimed at large scale adoption of crime prevention ideals using groups, legal action such as security ordinances, building codes, and the regulation of the sale of second-hand items.

A. The Citizen Patrol

In January 1977, a national research and evaluation study entitled, Citizen Patrol Projects, was published by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The purpose of the study was to identify and assess available information regarding resident citizen patrols. Over 200 such patrols in 16 urban areas were identified and it is estimated that more than 800 such patrols are currently active in urban areas in the United States. Based on a preliminary assessment of existing information on such patrols, the following findings are presented for further discussion or use by police managers interested in this type of citizen role.

For purposes of this study, a resident patrol was defined in terms of four major characteristics:

1. There had to be a specific patrol or surveillance routine;

2. The routine had to be safety oriented, aimed at preventing criminal acts;

3. The patrol activity had to be administered by a citizen's or resident's organization or a public housing authority;

4. The activity had to be directed primarily at residential rather than commercial areas.

A list of the sites in which these resident patrols were identified, including a list of the number of patrol organizations that were further studied in terms of organizational profiles or detailed case studies, are displayed in Table 6-3.

Table 6-2. Shopping List for Prevention Program Components

| Level of Effort | Program Components | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Crime pattern and vulnerability analysis | Community education | Premises surveys | Property marking |
| Passive | Perform analysis of reported burglaries. Ascertain distribution of burglaries by MO and site characteristics. | Speak only on unsolicited request. Make printed material available to be picked up. | Conduct surveys only in response to unsolicited request. Rely on voluntary compliance with security ordinances. | Make engraving tools available for borrowing by citizens. Have citizens use their own engravers. |
| Active | Perform surveys of sites to ascertain degree of coverage by type of burglary prevention activities and levels of victimization. | Advertise availability of services and directly solicit opportunities for presentation. Distribute printed material door to door or by mail. Sponsor crime prevention programs in public areas. | Advertise availability of services. Directly solicit appointments to conduct surveys. Enforce existing security ordinances. | Advertise availability of engraving tools. Offer door-to-door engraving service. Maintain up-to-date records of participant identification numbers. |
| Advocacy | Propose or conduct demonstrations or experiments as indicated by above results. | Interact with private and government organizations to promote crime prevention through environmental design (e.g., structure, landscape, lighting). Address conflicts with fire and other safety requirements. | Promote or review legislation on commercial and residential security standards. | |

Table 6-2. (Continued...)

| Level of Effort | Program Components | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Anti-Fencing | Patrol | Alarms |
| Passive | Check on pawn shops and other places dealing in second-hand goods. | Conduct routine patrol. | Respond only to selected types of privately operated alarms. |
| Active | Conduct undercover operations. Coordinate activities and intelligence with other jurisdictions. | Conduct:<br>Burglary-specific patrol.<br>Truancy patrol.<br>Bicycle patrol.<br>Surveillance of suspects.<br>Saturation patrols of high-crime areas. | Conduct alarm installation and surveillance for high-incident targets. Levy fines on excessive false alarms. |
| Advocacy | Promote or review regulating the sale of second-hand goods. | | |

Table 6-3

| Name of Site | Universe of Patrols Identified | Number of Patrol Profiles | Number of Patrol Case Studies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baltimore | 29 | 13 | 4 |
| Boston | 18 | 11 | 4 |
| Brooklyn | 48 | 14 | 3 |
| Chicago | 27 | 15 | 2 |
| Dallas (suburb) | 1 | 1 | 0. |
| Detroit (suburb) | 22 | 14 | 4 |
| Houston | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles (suburb) | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| New Orleans | 11 | 11 | 4 |
| Newark | 11 | 3 | 1 |
| Norfolk | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| San Diego | 5 | 3 | 1 |
| San Jose | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| St. Louis | 16 | 12 | 2 |
| Washington, D.C. | 32 | 7 | 4 |
| Worcester | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 226 | 109 | 32 |

Some tentative conclusions about the operations and results of these resident patrols were developed from this study. Among them are:

- These patrols vary widely in cost, but most are operated on a small budget and a volunteer basis. Major expenditures are related to CB radios and other communications equipment, uniforms, gasoline, maintenance for cars, and administrative costs of maintaining records and files. Most of these patrols (other than those organized by public housing authorities) receive no public financial support.

- Such patrols may be divided into four types in order to consider their effectiveness:

  Building: Most of these patrols are sponsored formally by resident or tenant organizations. They tend to be highly visible and legitimized, which, in turn, contributed to their efficacy.

  Neighborhood: Though there is some limited evidence that neighborhood patrols perform valuable services, the broad and ambiguous areas they "protect" make any assessment of their impact difficult; furthermore, these patrols are subject to more residents' complaints than are building patrols.

Social Service and Community Protection: General lack of evidence about these two types precludes the making of conclusions about their crime prevention capability.

- Residential patrols appear to be susceptible only occasionally to vigilantism and not as frequently as the mass media would suggest. Neighborhood patrols seem to be more inclined to vigilantism than building patrols, usually when members are recruited from a "friendship" group (e.g., a CB radio club, etc.). Vigilantism may emerge when patrol and surveillance becomes especially dull and ventures such as chasing speeders or harassing teenagers becomes a dysfunctional substitute for patrol.

- Public housing patrols differ slightly to the extent that the crime problem may be partly attributable to perpetrators from among the residents themselves.

- Generally, the better organized the patrol is in terms of personnel, organization, affiliation and bureaucratization, the more effective they seem to be in achieving their goals.

Issues that affect the nature and operations of these citizen patrols and that require further analysis include the following:

- Little, if any, knowledge yet exists to explain the conditions under which resident patrols emerge.

- Little is known about the legal authority and potential liability accruing to patrol members. A related concern involves the legal position of those who employ patrols or support them with financial or in-kind contributions.

- Resident patrols are being set up by citizens and police across the country, but in some communities, these patrols operate independently of each other with little communication or coordination. Information as to what organizational arrangements optimize the effective operation of their crime prevention activities seems a major but unanswered question.

- Some patrols recruit or hire as members former delinquents or offenders among the neighborhood residents with the hope of rehabilitating them. The costs and benefits of this high-risk approach should be studied since this strategy may produce conflicting loyalties on the part of the newly recruited patrol member.

B. The Citizen as Crime Reporter

Since 1967, victimization studies and research on crime reporting by citizens have indicated that citizens are far from automatic or quick crime reporters. In fact, a majority of all crime goes unreported to the police although the percentages of unreported crime varies by its type. Despite variations, based largely on intercity differences, the pattern of reporting various types of crimes generally is as follows:

- Commercial establishments were most likely to report crimes committed on their premises;
- Crimes against households were more often reported than crimes against persons;
- Crimes of personal violence were more frequently reported than crimes of personal theft;
- Crimes against individuals were the least well reported; and
- With some notable exceptions, more serious crimes were more likely to be reported than those considered less serious; the exceptions were: approximately 50 percent of all rapes were unreported; and 30 percent of commercial burglaries as well as 30 percent of burglaries involving forceable entry were unreported.

In analyzing the reasons for failure to report, the three most common reasons given were: "nothing could be done"; "not important enough"; and "police would not want to be bothered." Clearly, a critical issue for the police to determine is whether the reasons cited for not reporting reflect the reality of the situation. This is particularly true in reference to the implied citizen judgment about either the ability or the interest of the police. But it must also be considered whether these judgments are based on other factors, such as citizen apathy, fear of retaliation, lack of information about how crimes are solved by the police, or even lack of knowledge about what to do.

A study in Kansas City (referred to earlier) soon to be released, sought to measure the actual amount of time spent by citizens in reporting crime, and the relationship of this expenditure of time to the police response time (dispatch and travel), arrest, citizen injury, witness availability, reasons for citizen choices to report or not report, and citizen expectations or satisfaction with the police response.

The highlights of some of the findings are summarized in this section along with findings from some other victimization studies. In the section that follows, we will pose a set of fundamental questions for consideration by police managers regarding the critical impact of this citizen role on the management of police operations.

In the crime data base used in the unpublished study, 949 Part I crimes were analyzed using rigorous statistical methods. The crimes were divided into three overlapping categories: type of crime--violent or nonviolent; discovery--those discovered by a citizen after the crime occurred unobserved or unreported; and involvement crimes--those in which a citizen saw, heard, or became involved at any point between the time a suspect began committing the crime and the time the citizen was free to report the crime to the police.

The total response time continuum (that is, the time from the moment of discovery or involvement ended until an officer began an on-scene investigation) was combined to form three main time intervals--reporting, dispatch, and travel. Each of these intervals was anlyzed and measures of time were determined from an analysis of each component time interval.

Assuming that the three components--reporting, dispatch and travel to the scene--can be displayed as a continuum representing the total time frame, then the following figure represents the median time spent on each continuum component for all 949 Part I crimes analyzed:

Figure 6-1.




Reporting time by the citizens of all 949 Part I Crimes analyzed comprised nearly half of the total continuum of time with a median time of a little more than six minutes. Dispatch represented one fifth of the continuum with a median time of almost three minutes. Travel represented almost one third of the continuum with a median time of five-and-one-half minutes.

The study will also report on the relationship of these time intervals to specific categories: type of crime--violent versus non-violent crimes--and discovery versus involvement crimes.

Analysis of citizen reporting problems or patterns, related to delays by the citizen, shows that the traditional assumption that crimes are reported without significant delay, often while they are occurring, is an untenable assumption. Almost one half of all Part I crimes were reported more than six minutes after the end of the citizen involvement or discovery and less than seven percent of the crimes analyzed could have been reported while they were in progress.

Studies also sought to locate the reasons for these significant citizen delays in reporting. Several patterns were found, ranging from delays due to the citizen talking to another person or investigating the crime scene, to citizen telephoning another person before calling the police. Other studies isolated problems of a more uncontrollable nature for citizen delay, such as, no telephone immediately available, citizen reporting crime had not been actually informed

from the beginning, there was an injury, or fear or emotional shock. When these patterns or problems were correlated in order to determine the most important variables for delay (that might be amenable to change), the rank order listing of these was found to be:

1. Apathy
2. Waiting or observing the situation
3. Telephoning another person or receiving a call
4. Not being sure of the police
5. Not being informed or being misinformed about the incident
6. Investigation by the citizen of the incident scene
7. Injury of citizen
8. Contacting security--usually in a commercial business and due to company policy

Variables not signficantly related to reporting delays were: delays due to talking to another person, chasing the suspect, fear or emotional shock, public communications delay, or police communication delays.

C. Some Issues for Police Management Considerations

1. Citizens take a significant amount of time to report crime.

Since major efforts have been made by police departments to reduce police response time by decreasing officer travel time and by improving patrol dispatch procedures, the question can be raised: What is the relative effectiveness of these efforts given citizen delays in crime reporting?

2. Citizen Reporting, Communications Dispatching, and Police Response After Dispatching are Three Separate and Independent Events.

The latter two events are directly controlled by the police, but these events are conditioned by the nature and characteristics of the citizen reporting event or process. Some improvements can enhance the short-term effectiveness of existing police practices in order to minimize the effects of citizen delays. For example:

- Procedures could be designed to screen calls in order to determine which type of rapid police response might prove productive in servicing the calls. A standardized decision checklist could be used by both the receiving clerk and the dispatcher by means of which immediate information could be collected about various aspects of the incident, particularly time lapses between discovery or involvement and reporting, injury, physical description, etc.

- Given effective screening procedures, calls could be "stacked" according to a priority. Research findings strongly suggest that, for some types of calls, citizen satisfaction can be controlled by the police by telling citizens when to expect the officer. Generally, setting appointments by the call screening clerk with the citizen for between 30 to 45 minutes after dispatch has proven to be an acceptable and satisfactory range. Then, when the officer arrives before the appointed time, satisfaction increases.

- The management of delayed response to nonemergency incidents could allow sufficient reserve strength to respond to emergency situations in which meaningful outcomes could be realized.

3. As much effort should be expended by the police on trying to change the patterns of delay by citizens as is now expended on improving dispatching and response procedures by police.

- Of the eight major variables affecting citizen delays only one, injury, is an uncontrollable hindrance to the citizen. One other variable, apathy, is so broad that it tells us little about why citizens delay and requires further research until clear answers are forthcoming. However, the remaining six variables seem to be amenable to change. These six seem to argue that citizens do not know what to do first.

  Well trained call screening officers can assist the citizen in reporting the crime and can lessen the delay. The research indicated that there was no relationship between citizen reporting times and police response times in involvement incidents; yet, when screening is coupled to stacking, prioritizing and discriminating between emergency and non-emergency calls with respect to choosing immediate police response, significant results can be obtained both in outcomes related to handling the incident and citizen satisfaction.

- The assumptions that rapid police response enhanced on-scene apprehension, reduced the incidence of citizen injury, and created the opportunity for locating witnesses quickly were found to be true in less than 40 percent of all crime incidents analyzed in this research. Moreover, in that 40 percent, these assumptions were usually found to be true only in involvement crimes. Until citizen reporting times improve, the bolstering of manpower and equipment to increase on-scene arrest and witness availability will produce negligible impact on crime clearance rates.

4. Additional research is needed, perhaps in each police jurisdiction, to explain why citizens delay reporting crime and to discover methods of minimizing delays.

5. The citizen reporting role is so critical to the efficient use of police capabilities that concentrated efforts must address methods to establish rapport between police agencies and citizens regarding mutual responsibilities. The citizen must be made aware of losses associated with delayed reports.

D. The Citizen as Source of Investigative Information

The criminal investigation process is described operationally as the total police effort to collect facts that lead to the identification, apprehension, and arrest of an offender, and the organization of those facts in a way that presents evidence of guilt so that successful prosecution of the case may occur. The deductive nature of this process--a probing from the known to the unknown backward in time--identifies it as one that essentially depends on others, apart from the police--complainants, victims, witnesses, suspects, and those arrested. While a significant amount of careful effort has been expended by the police in collecting facts from suspects or persons arrested because of court decisions such as those in the Miranda case or other criminal procedure requirements, only recently has attention been given to the role of the police in conjunction with the citizen who can provide information related to investigations.

Recent studies, conducted by RAND Corporation, Stanford Research Institute, and the Police Foundation, have shown that certain categories of investigative information, when obtained as early as possible from the citizen, can lead predictably to case solutions. These categories of information have been termed solvability factors. The most important determinants of whether or not a case will be solved are to be found in the quality and amount of information the citizen supplies immediately to responding patrol officer as well as the manner in which information about solvability factors is collected and used by both the patrol division and the detective division. Generally, these solvability factors, displayed in question form for incorporation into a crime reporting form to be used by the patrol, include the following:

1. Was there a witness to the crime?

2. Can a suspect be named?

3. Can a suspect be located?

4. Can a suspect be described?

5. Can a suspect be identified?

6. Can the suspect vehicle be identified?

7. Is the stolen property traceable?

8. Is there a significant M.O. present?

9. Is there significant physical evidence present?

10. Has an evidence technician been called? Is the evidence technician's report positive?

11. Is there a significant reason to believe that the crime may be solved with a reasonable amount of investigative effort?

12. Was there a definite and limited opportunity for anyone except the suspect to commit the crime?

In ranking these questions in terms of their relative weight in relation to the successful investigation of all Part I crimes, one finds that the first nine questions are the most important, and the first seven questions are those which can be answered most frequently only by the citizen, either as a complainant, a victim, or a witness.

The use by the police of these solvability factor questions has a significant relationship to the quality and the outcome of investigations. Some police agencies have redesigned crime reporting forms so that patrol officers follow an orderly, structured question and answer "hunt" for solvability when they conduct the initial investigation. Solvability factors have been used to screen cases for follow-up investigation, particularly where no information is derived. A screened case can then be forwarded to crime analysis for pattern and trend review and may possibly be reactivated if further information is developed. Solvability factors are also used by a call screening officer to determine the nature of the discovery or involvement crime so that decisions can be made about whether to respond on an immediate or a scheduled basis.

Another important aspect of the informational role in investigation is the citizen's willingness to share with their police knowledge and suspicions concerning crimes that have been committed in the community. The citizen frequently knows information about who is committing crime or where stolen property is being received and sold. The extent to which a police agency has established credibility with the community will affect how much of this information will be forthcoming.

Investigations of crime are basically and fundamentally a collaborative transaction between what the police need to know or discover and what the citizen might know. To increase the efficiency of this exchange, the police must recognize the informational role of the citizen. Many of the recent efforts at "directed" patrol tactics incorporate these ideas about the informational role of the citizen and use solvability factors to enhance investigative outcomes.

## E. The Citizen as Victim/Witness

Recently, attention has been focused on the specialized characteristics of the citizen as victim or witness in the criminal justice system. The critical roles of the victim or witness in reporting crime and in providing information to the investigative process are but the beginning phases of further involvement by the citizen in the police, prosecutor, and court components of the system.

Studies indicate that almost a fourth of criminal investigations are unnecessarily impeded by witness inaccuracies or purposeful use of false names or addresses by victims and witnesses. Almost 50 percent of criminal cases are not prosecuted because of witness failure to cooperate or witness unavailability. The reasons why citizens fail to cooperate, either in an investigation or during the late stages of prosecution, are many and varied--apathy, desire to avoid involvement, fear, poor police or prosecutor handling of citizen contacts, relationship between witnesses or victims and offenders, etc. Even in those instances were involvement does occur, success is dependent upon adequate communication between law enforcement and prosecutor staff and is often negatively affected by trial delays, inadequate support services for the victim or witness, loss of witness income, or intimidation by the offender or others.

Some jurisidictions have sought to provide basic information or have organized programs within their criminal justice agencies to improve the relationship between the citizen who is a witness or victim and the system itself. There are acknowledged, vested interests for both the police and the prosecutor who attempt to develop and maintain such programs, since the witness or victim input is a critical factor in increasing clearance and conviction rates and is also cost-effective.

A review of some of the "models" of victim/witness services programs throughout the country indicates that there are at least four definable sets of activities that have been offered:

1. On-Site Crisis Intervention

Activities may include having organized staff with trained volunteer support provided at the crime scene and short-term, follow-up counseling; transportation; emergency housing; emergency food or funds; protection from retaliation.

2. Information and Referral Services

Staff or volunteers provide access to social, medical, and mental health services or resources in the community.

3. Criminal Justice Services

Units provide:

a. Security surveys;

b. Crime scene clean up and repair, particularly for the poor and elderly;

c. Information about the results of case screening or the status of the follow-up investigation;

d. Information about court related activities; bail/bond; probation status; plea negotiations; dispositions; transportation to and from line-ups and interviews; instructions regarding subpoenas, trials, continuances;

baby-sitting; and companionship and reinforcement during stressful situations such as trials; protection from retaliation.

4. Research and Review

Units provide:

a. Identification, verification and analysis of why there are problems related to citizen roles (reporting, information, and victim/witness) in either the police or court relationships;

b. Cost/effectiveness, cost/benefit and impact studies of specific victim/witness service activities;

c. Analysis of various intervention points or contact points between the actors in the criminal justice system and the citizen;

d. Preparation and publication of reports, proposals, and analysis for distribution to the public, members of the criminal justice system, and the local or state legislative or executive branches in order to remedy problems.

The organization and location of these activities has varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Operationally, the advantages of locating such services in an organized unit within a police agency outweigh disadvantages since police agencies, in a 24-hour period, have an ease of access to victims due to the immediate contact with victims or witnesses at the scene. Some police agencies have organized units under the supervision of a sworn officer with a limited number of civilian or sworn staff that is supplemented by the use of volunteer citizens. Other experiments have located these units within the prosecutor's office, the court, or a third "contract" type agency, such as a community mental health center or a crisis intervention center. In general, the more successful programs have been those in which the police agency acts as the "lead agency" and establishes and runs the operation or, at least, collaborates with other criminal justice agencies (prosecutor and/or court) in jointly sponsoring and maintaining the unit.

## II. CITIZENS AND POLICE POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Many of the citizen roles we have been discussing focus on citizen involvement in either actuating the criminal justice process, by reporting a crime, providing investigative information, and so forth, or by ensuring the "successful" functioning of some of the goals of law enforcement, through crime prevention activities, or responding to victim/witness service units. Citizens also provide critical input into setting the operational policies or priorities of police departments. As James Q. Wilson has pointed out: "...the [police] administrator becomes attuned to complaints. What constitutes a 'significant' citizen demand will, of course, vary from city to city....Whatever the filtering mechanism, the police administrator ignores at his peril those demands that are passed through...."[2] The input an administrator should expect will generally come in

---

[2]Wilson, James Q., Varieties of Police Behavior, New York: Atheneum, 1974, p. 70.

two forms or styles--informal or ad hoc and formal or organized.

Examples of the first case may be reflected in departmental policies toward such offenses as prostitution, gambling, traffic, and public disorder. Usually, police policies in these areas respond, more or less accurately, to perceived community tolerances towards these behaviors. Police enforcement policies are usually based on police officials' perceptions and may be the product of varying pressures from individuals, organizations, or changing patterns of neighborhoods. Other examples can be found in reactions to police decisions to alter patrol vehicular modes (automobile, foot patrol, motorcycle, or scooter), to emphasize service versus regulatory or enforcement responsibilities, or to alter traditional priorities placed on the police response to various calls for service. It should be noted, however, that in some jurisdictions, police decisions to terminate the funding of such activities as escort services, or motorcycle tactical units patrolling in high crime areas, or to limit the provision of ambulance services or school crossing guards have all met with ad hoc, but organized and vociferous citizen reaction and response.

To minimize the crisis oriented nature of much of this type of citizen input into police decisionmaking, some agencies have made efforts to establish alternative mechanisms for policy input by citizens. These formal and organized mechanisms have been directed at developing a citizen-police policy development panel in which citizen members and police officials explore current policies in such areas as gambling, shoplifting, traffic enforcement, field interrogation, and public disorders with a view to developing alternative policies or procedures. In one such experiment in which a number of policies were developed and, to varying degrees, implemented, there were a number of serious problems that had to be faced, including:

- Limited participation by individual citizens, particularly the poor, and most citizen participants tended to be those with an organized stake in particular policies;
- Police officer and police union fears that this effort was the first step towards a civilian review board;
- Extensive study and time being expended on reviewing existing practices before policy changes or alternatives could be examined; and
- No formal evaluation of this project being undertaken, with the result that the impact of the effort remains conjectural.

Another experiment attempted to provide direct citizen policy-making input into a particular type of directed patrol program. Emphasis was placed on the interaction between patrol officers and the local citizens in the beat and sector areas of the patrol experiment. Although the community interaction council did succeed in reviewing some departmental policies, its impact was severely limited by a continuing lack of role definition of the citizen--were they advisors or co-equal policy makers with the police? Additionally, there was dissension between police and citizens as well as criticism that citizen members were handpicked by the police.

Other mechanisms for identifying and analyzing citizen input on a more formalized basis involve the use of public opinion surveys. A number of cities have conducted surveys of general citizen attitudes toward the police but very few have concentrated their efforts and surveyed public opinion on specific policy issues or identified citizen preferences about various police operational choices. However, whether such types of public opinion surveys can be developed and used by police and city administrators is still a major question, since the validity of using such techniques implies a prior level of citizen knowledge about police operations and decisionmaking.

Furthermore, studies of the possibilities and limitations of formalized citizen policy boards and public opinion polling are critical to the police administrator. For, without detailed understanding of what formal alternatives can work, the administrator will continue to "sample opinion" by receiving only the most organized, most vocal, most articulate, and most powerful public representations on issues, and they will generally be self-serving in nature.

## III. POLICE MANAGERS AND CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

The directions indicated by this brief survey of some of the research findings on the roles of citizens in policing show a consistent pattern. Police agencies are generally unprepared to deal with various types of citizen discretion or involvement. Few organized resources are being directly devoted to increasing citizen involvement in crime reporting, crime prevention, the handling of victims and witnesses, and the development of means for determining and channelling public opinion. And to a large extent, an agenda, which is established outside the department, is being reacted to through operational means that are often ill-suited to the task.

There are some basic, even philosophical, reasons why there is a universal problem with the issue of citizen-police interaction. Though the police are often described as servants to the public good, they are also, at the same time, responsible for the maintenance and regulation of public order. These two roles alone can create separate and conflicting objectives. And these conflicting objectives produce significant and real technical difficulties in getting things done.

It is not that as Americans we have lost confidence in ourselves or in the police to solve critical problems. It is not that there is an inherent inability of either the police or the citizen to plan ahead and provide an active, anticipatory response to common problems. It is not that the present mood of society is permissive, apathetic and nonresponsive. It is not that the "establishment," that is, either the government or the police are unwilling to solve problems of police-citizen interaction. And, finally, it is not that the "establishment" system frustrates or thwarts individual self-expression or creative solutions to problems. Rather, at the present time, given the current state of the "art" of social problem solving, we do not know yet how to do some things well or efficiently.

Conflicting objectives do create technical difficulties in getting things done. Nowhere is this clearer or more obvious that in the area of citizen involvement with most types of governmental services, from policing to health care to anti-poverty programs to welfare reform.

The problems are genuinely hard to solve. The difficulties do not involve primarily conflicts among different groups of people, such as the police and the citizen, or the poor and the rich, or the governed and the governing--although these types of conflicts exist and will continue to exist. Rather, most current social problems are difficult because they involve conflicts among objectives about which almost everyone holds some opinion. Everyone agrees that the police should maintain law and order and everyone agrees that the police should enforce the law in order to preserve order and everyone agrees that the police should involve the citizen as part of a process of accomplishing order maintenance or law enforcement goals. Yet, it is clear that each of these generally acceptable objectives create conflicts.

These conflicts, in turn, inevitably create technical or design difficulties for the police manager or planner--difficulties that often override the political difficulties. How to solve such problems--ones that have conflicting objectives--will always be a test and challenge to the police manager.

No prescriptive model of police management can be offered to offset these difficulties. Some of the literature suggests that to overcome these types of difficulties will require the police executive to encourage others to explain their objectives so that individuals and groups can then effectively bargain or negotiate in order to lessen the impact of these conflicts on useful programs or tactics. In general, it will usually be in the dual role of change agent and negotiator that the police manager can effect a workable solution and compromise between conflicting objectives. In exercising these roles, especially in planning for any level of citizen participation with policing, a few fundamental ideas may be useful to keep in mind.

For instance, community participation can be defined conceptually as citizen involvement in decisions affecting either individual behavior or community behavior. This concept of participation is very complex and difficult to use effectively as has been shown in our survey of the current literature on various types of citizen roles.

To be effective, community participation requires a two-way communication. Full information should be made available to the citizen so that he or she can understand and discriminate among the range of alternatives and their various implications for the citizen. Citizens should have access to the decisionmaking process so that choices to be made by the citizen or alternatives to be advocated can be known to the police.

In refining more carefully these two general requirements for citizen participation, several prerequisites should be met. There should be a way of identifying and documenting the overall objectives and values of the community. Effective two-way communication mechanisms should be structured. These communication mechanisms, in turn, must be structured with as much concern for the reception of information as for its transmission. Finally, the various publics or citizens should have equal access to ways to express their preferences in order to reach a public policy consensus.

Figure 6-2 provides a listing of various techniques for citizen or public participation in at least the two-way communication process required for some

level of effective police-citizen interaction. This listing is only an outline for comparing some techniques. A variety of these techniques may be used simultaneously by the police agency. Indeed, mechanisms for public participation cannot be investigated as single, isolated activities. They should be viewed as related sets of complementary and even linking processes.

Certain mechanisms, because of their emphasis and structure, are better suited primarily for an information dissemination function; others are designed solely to provide opportunities for public review of a relatively specific set of proposals; a third type is more appropriate for active police planner/citizen interchange for the collection of information, opinions, and ideas; finally, a fourth type may be appropriate for the resolution of issues or the settlement of conflicts. Each mechanism is displayed in the figure according to various types of communication characteristics and according to the objectives of the planning process for involving the citizen.

The listing may be used as a checklist for measuring plans to include citizen involvement or as a way of designing such plans.

Figure 6-2. Police Citizen Interaction

| Communication Characteristics | | | Public Participation Techniques | Citizen Participation Planning Objectives | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Level of Public Contact Achieved | Ability to Handle Specific Interest | Degree of 2-Way Communication | | Inform/Educate | Identify Problems/ Values | Get Ideas/Solve Problems | Feedback | Evaluate | Resolve Conflict/ Consensus |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | Public Hearings | | X | | X | | |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | Public Meetings | X | X | | X | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | Informal Small Group Meetings | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | General Public Information Meetings | X | | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 2 | Presentations to Community Org. | X | X | | X | | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Information Coordination Seminars | X | | | X | | |
| 1 | 2 | 1 | Operating Field Offices | | X | X | X | X | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Local Planning Visits | | X | | X | X | |
| 1 | 3 | 1 | Class Action Litigation | X | | X | X | | X |
| 2 | 2 | 1 | Information Brochures and Pamphlets | X | | | | | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Field Trips and Site Visits | X | X | | | | |
| 3 | 1 | 2 | Public Displays | X | | X | X | | |
| 2 | 1 | 2 | Model Demonstration Projects | X | | | X | X | X |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | Material for Mass Media | X | | | | | |
| 1 | 3 | 2 | Response to Public Inquiries | X | | | | | |
| 3 | 1 | 1 | Press Releases Inviting Comments | X | | | X | | |
| 1 | 3 | 1 | Letter Requests for Comments | | | X | X | | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Workshops | | X | X | X | X | X |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Charettes | | | X | | X | X |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Advisory Committees | | X | X | X | X | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Task Forces | | X | X | | X | |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Employment of Community Residents | | X | X | | | X |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Community Interest Advocates | | | X | | X | X |
| 1 | 3 | 3 | Ombudsman or Representative | | X | X | X | X | X |

1 = Low, 2 = Medium, 3 = High

END