


# THE SPECIALIZED DRUG ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT FINAL TARGET AREA EVALUATION OF THE NEW ORLEANS EXPERIMENT

PREPARED BY  
THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
COORDINATING COUNCIL


FRANK R. SERPAS, JR., Executive Director  
ROBERT STERNHELL, Director of Evaluation  
MARCIA SLOTNICK, Evaluator  
ELLEN McKINNON, Evaluator

THE TARGET AREA CRIME SPECIFICS PROGRAM,  
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT'S DRUG  
ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT, was funded by  
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,  
Grant Number 72-DF-06-0042-TA-3



THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
COORDINATING COUNCIL  
MAYOR MOON LANDRIEU  
Chairman  
ANTHONY GAGLIANO  
Vice-Chairman

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MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT

Project: Drug Enforcement Component

Project Number: 72-DF-06-0042-TA-3

Subgrantee: New Orleans Police Department

Date of Report: September, 1977

Director of Evaluation: Robert Sternhell

Prepared By: Marcia Slotnick,  
Projects Evaluation Specialist II

Ellen McKinnon,  
Projects Evaluation Specialist II

Evaluation Assistance: Stuart Carroll,  
Projects Evaluation Specialist III

Ruth de la Gueronniere,  
Grants Administrator

Cheryl Lyle,  
Clerical and Graphics

Elaine Greene,  
Student Intern

Subhash V. Kulkarni,  
Student Intern

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Project Staff: Clarence B. Giarrusso,  
Superintendent of Police

Sgt. Henry Spako,  
Project Director

Sgt. James Kirkpatrick

Police Officer Laura Hendry

Authorized Official: Moon Landrieu, Mayor  
City of New Orleans

NCJRS

APR 10 1978

ACQUISITIONS

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## PREFACE

The Drug Enforcement Component was one of eleven projects funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1973. Each of those eleven projects was intended to impact some aspect of New Orleans' crime rate and crime problem. The New Orleans Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) has evaluated all those programs that became operational, and copies of the evaluations are available upon request.

The evaluation of the Drug Enforcement Component has been accomplished as a joint product of two CJCC evaluators. The original draft of the evaluation was written by Marcia Slotnick in May, 1977. She had succeeded Roger Jones, who had left the agency to take a position in Fort Worth. Ms. Slotnick, in turn, left in June, 1977 to accept a job in Columbus, Ohio. In the course of reviewing the Slotnick evaluation, several points of contention were raised. The most important of these questions related to (1) the rate of arrest of heroin peddlers, (2) the number of hours of police overtime, and (3) the rate of convictions for heroin arrests. With respect to the heroin peddler arrest, the Narcotics Unit questioned the validity of the sample taken by Ms. Slotnick. The issue on overtime was the accuracy of the total hours. The contention on convictions was that it was outside the scope of the program.

In order to resolve these questions, Ellen McKinnon worked through the data previously collected and reached the

following conclusion. First, if the sample was inaccurate, it would be necessary to collect a universe of data for the four year period, 1971-1975. The decision was made to accept the results of the sample for all but the heroin arrests. These arrests, numbering over 3,000, were collected from the Narcotics Unit arrest ledger book. Ms. McKinnon was assisted in this task by Elaine Green of the University of New Orleans (a student interning with the agency for the summer) and Cheryl Lyle of the Evaluation Unit. The findings, obtained by comparing the sample distributions to the universe of heroin arrests, showed the sample to be valid.

In contrast, it was quickly discovered that the overtime figures used originally were not accurate, and these new totals are indicated in the report.


On the issue of convictions, the reporting decision has been satisfactory to no one. The figures are included in an appendix because the evaluators feel it is an issue that needs greater discussion. Unfortunately, the present data is not conclusive, merely suggestive, of lower rates of conviction on heroin cases outside the conduct of special operations.

As a result of the repeated analyses of the Drug Enforcement Program, our confidence in the results of the evaluation is high. The program clearly delivered what it said it would do in its grant application submitted in 1973. The unit managed its money well and administered the program professionally. Substantial progress was made toward the project's

goals, and the program should be seen as one of the more successful of the Target Area programs.

Robert Sternhell  
Director of Evaluation

September 1, 1977



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Drug Enforcement Component of the New Orleans Police Department was one of eleven Target Area programs funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1973. This program was intended to impact the crime rates in the city by reducing the "major" drug trafficking problems in the city. This was to be accomplished by compensating for manpower shortages by providing overtime funds for narcotics officers, by providing sophisticated investigative equipment, and by making it possible for district officers to handle all aspects of marijuana arrests.

### Evaluation Design

The original research design emphasized the creation of a depository for marijuana evidence to be used by district officers. It was anticipated that through the depository, responsibility for marijuana arrests would be shifted to district officers. Because of administrative problems, the depository was deleted, but project personnel stated that the original goals could be achieved despite this change.

Measures of efficiency, such as vehicle acquisition, overtime hours and so forth were used to assess the program's ability to become operational in accordance with the planning document.

Data collection for the impact section of the report was gathered primarily from the New Orleans Police Department's

Drug Arrest Register. A 10% sample of all drug arrests was used and because of the emphasis on major drug trafficking, a 100% sample (universe) of heroin arrests was used. Baseline data which was gathered for two years prior to the grant (August, 1971 to July, 1973) and experimental data which covered the grant period (August, 1973 to July, 1975) were compiled and subsequently compared.

#### Programmatic Activity and Fiscal Responsibility

Vehicles and equipment to be used for undercover investigations and evidence gathering were purchased. A considerable amount of "buy money" to be used to purchase drugs was withheld by the CJCC because of delays in establishing the depository. This money was returned unspent at the grant's conclusion. Grant funds were also allocated to pay for overtime investigative work. Overtime was intended to increase the number of available officers, thus improving the efficiency of drug investigations.

#### Project Effectiveness

Two major undercover operations took place during the grant period. Operation "Checkmate" occurred in July of 1974. Seventy-four arrests for the sale of heroin resulted from the operation with 72% of those being convicted. Operation "Top Cat" occurred in October of 1975. Fifty-five or 81% of those individuals arrested were convicted. In addition, 80% of those persons convicted received life sentences. Both of

the operations were considered to be highly successful by project personnel.

One of the goals of the project was for district officers to handle a majority of low level and user oriented arrests. An examination of statistics for the baseline and experimental periods indicate some progress has been made toward the shifting of responsibility. An examination of the arrest statistics for both periods indicates that the unit has also made progress in shifting the bulk of their activities to the apprehension of higher level offenders.

It was suggested in the report that with enhanced investigative capabilities, the conviction rate should go up and the refusal and nolle pros rates should concurrently go down. Many other factors, particularly acceptance rates by the District Attorney's Office, influence the disposition pattern to a significant degree. The District Attorney's Office stresses that because of its high refusal rates, it is prosecuting only the best cases. A 10% sample of cases was gathered and followed through to dispositional status. This, however, raised more questions than it answered. The statistics did not confirm a high refusal rate, and indicated that the "nolle pros" rate was increasing. It is speculated that these findings are the result of the sample containing a mix of persons arrested in undercover operations and persons picked up on routine unit duty, and that the latter group exhibits much lower prosecution and conviction outcomes. The number of legal and investigative issues involved make it impossible to adequately explain the findings in this report.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The unit appears to have shifted the arrests of marijuana offenders to district officers despite the fact that the depository was deleted. This goal, however, should have been deleted from the planning document. In addition, the D.E.C. made considerable progress in concentrating on the apprehension of major large scale drug peddlers in New Orleans. Further study is needed of the conviction process because the apprehension of major peddlers will mean nothing if they are not convicted and sent to prison.

The greatest success was found in the undercover operations both in terms of convictions and sentencing. Sales cases made during the unit's day-to-day operations do not have as high a conviction rate as the undercover operations because they are often not made by D.E.C. personnel and according to personnel, the intent to distribute cases instead of sales cases constituted their best routine cases. Thus, the unit was able to utilize the grant monies to obtain the more comprehensive evidence necessary for a sales case to be accepted and a conviction gained.

It was recommended that any further grants should apply specifically to undercover operations and that overtime should be allotted for these investigative activities. Finally, it is suggested that when a project rejects one of its goals, like the depository, a change should be made in the planning document.





## INTRODUCTION

The Problem

The drug problem in New Orleans, as measured by arrest statistics, rose drastically in the late 1960's and early 1970's. In the period from 1968 through 1971, significant increases in the rates of drug arrests occurred. Total drug arrests increased by 300%. More specifically, heroin arrests increased by 128%, hallucinogen arrests (primarily marijuana arrests) increased by 750%, and dangerous drugs (i.e., amphetamines and barbiturates) increased by approximately 55%. (See Figure 1.)


Although there appeared to be adequate treatment services available to drug users (most services were handling fewer than capacity), the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department was not equipped to deal with the skyrocketing drug problem. The section had a staff of 25 officers primarily responsible for the investigation of all narcotics violations in the city. Additionally, the unit was responsible for "1) the arrest of street pushers; 2) disruption of internal distribution systems; 3) disruption of smuggling activities prevalent in a port city; 4) arrest and detention of drug users; and, 5) detection and arrest of non-street middle level drug pushers."<sup>1</sup> These responsibilities

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<sup>1</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, MCJCC, City of New Orleans, 1973, p. 224.

Figure 1

DRUG ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS  
(1964-1972)



- Hallucinogens and Marijuana
- + Dangerous Drugs - Amphetamines, Barbiturates
- Narcotics - Heroin and Derivatives

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section

Prepared by: CJCC

became more intense as the drug problem became more serious, thus increasing the workload of the Narcotics Section. The number of personnel in the unit, however, remained the same as it had been in 1968. These increases in the drug arrest rates had a significant impact on the work of the Narcotics Unit. Apparently, the increase in follow-up investigations (by the Narcotics Unit) initiated by other sections of the Police Department was accompanied by a decline in the number of investigations of high level drug traffickers. The follow-up investigations primarily involved the channeling of evidence (generally marijuana) from the arresting officer to the Crime Lab. As indicated by arrest data, this responsibility increased concurrently with rising arrest figures, thus limiting the unit's ability to deal with the high level drug traffickers.<sup>2</sup>

Three needs were evident from the existing conditions of the Narcotics Division:

1. A system should be set up whereby it would be possible for the arresting officer (i.e., district officer) to process his own marijuana evidence without using the Narcotics Division as a conduit to the Crime Lab. The system would save many hours for the Narcotics Unit.
2. District plain clothes officers should be equipped and trained to "conduct routine narcotic investigations within their respective districts."<sup>3</sup> The officers would handle only marijuana evidence.

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<sup>2</sup>For definitions of drug trafficking levels, see Appendix A.

<sup>3</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, p. 227.

The satisfaction of these two needs would allow the Narcotics Division to dedicate more hours to identify and apprehend the higher level drug traffickers. These activities would be further enhanced by the satisfaction of a third need:

3. The Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section did not have adequate equipment to deal efficiently with major narcotics dealers. The equipment needed to increase efficiency included:
  - a. "Buy money" with which narcotics could be purchased from offenders
  - b. Automobiles not clearly identifiable as police vehicles for undercover work
  - c. Electronic surveillance equipment
  - d. Photographic surveillance equipment

It was thought the satisfaction of these needs would improve the capacity of the Narcotics Unit to deal with the high level drug dealers in the city.

### The Project

The spiraling drug arrests coupled with the lack of manpower and equipment in the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department were the impetus for a project designed with the intention of attacking the "serious" drug trafficking problems in the city. Therefore, on August 1, 1973, the New Orleans Police Department was awarded a discretionary grant by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The project was part of the Target Area Crime Specifics Program planned by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, p. 224.

The grant award amounted to \$661,081; \$204,020 of which was LEAA cash, the remainder of which was subgrantee in-kind and cash match. The commander of the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department was designated as the project director and an administrative officer was assigned to manage the grant operations. The funds were spent over a 31-month period beginning in August, 1973, and ending in March, 1976.

The major thrust of the project was to enhance the ability of the Narcotics Section to concentrate its activities on the detection and apprehension of major drug traffickers. This was to be accomplished by adjusting for manpower shortages by providing overtime funds for narcotics officers, by providing sophisticated investigative equipment, and by making it possible for district officers to handle all aspects of marijuana arrests. The project was expected to operate in a manner indicated by the following goals and objectives.

### Original Goals and Objectives

#### Goals:

- "1. The primary goal of the project is to enable the Narcotics Unit to concentrate its efforts on the detection and apprehension of major large scale drug peddlers in the New Orleans area.
2. A 5% increase in the arrest of major narcotic dealers over a two-year period.
3. A third goal is to make it possible for district officers to handle all aspects of marijuana arrests, including processing and storing evidence, making reports, conducting routine investigations, and attending court, thereby freeing Narcotic Unit time by 25%.

Objectives:

1. The institution of a depository system for marijuana evidence obtained by district officers.
2. The equipping and training of district plainclothes officers to enable them to handle all aspects of marijuana investigations.
3. The purchase of ten intermediate automobiles of different kinds as to insure (sic) the narcotic violators will not be able to identify them as law enforcement agency vehicles.
4. The installation of 12 channel UHF mobile radios, one way glass, periscope devices, and other visual aids, and noiseless heating and cooling devices in the vehicles.
5. The purchase of 8 UHF 8 channel walkie-talkie (sic) for foot surveillance to increase both the mobile and foot surveillance capabilities of the Narcotics Section.
6. The purchase of a bird dog tailing device and transmitter, two body transmitters, and receiving units and recording devices to insure (sic) the safety of undercover agents and informats (sic).
7. The purchase of certain camera equipment necessary to photograph narcotic transactions.
8. The purchase of a telescope zoom spotting scope for use in surveillance from fixed locations where a man or vehicle cannot operate with the unaided eye (sic).
9. 'Buy money' to be used by the Narcotic Section in the detection and apprehension of major large scale narcotic dealers.
10. Funds to be utilized for overtime work by members of the Narcotic and Drug Abuse Section."<sup>5</sup>

The Project as Modified

During the planning process, the operational director had designated the head of the Criminalistics Laboratory to

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<sup>5</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, pp. 232-233.

be responsible for the depository more than six months after the project began implementation (March, 1974). However, the depository had not yet been located in the NOPD complex. Because the depository was an important element of the project,<sup>6</sup> the CJCC began urging the NOPD to implement the depository and train the district officers as outlined in the grant application. By June, 1974, the administrative and organizational problems had not yet been resolved, and the CJCC began withholding funds for "buy money" until a decision about future project funding had been made.<sup>7</sup> Through discussions with the Chief of Police, CJCC, and LEAA, it was determined the project could apply for a scope change. In October, 1974, a grant adjustment request was submitted deleting the central evidence depository as an objective of Drug Enforcement Component. No other related goals or objectives were changed because it was thought project personnel could achieve the goals without the depository.

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<sup>6</sup>If a central evidence depository could not be located, it would dilute the potential effectiveness of the project, assuming the implementation of the depository was a method of freeing time for narcotics officers to concentrate on more serious drug offenders.

<sup>7</sup>A more detailed account of these problems appears in Target Area Evaluation: A Six Month Report on the Development of Target Area Projects and the Evaluation System, R. Sternhell and S. Carroll, MCJCC, July, 1974, pp. 18-20.



## II

### EVALUATION DESIGN

The Drug Enforcement Component was funded to enable the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department to concentrate its efforts on serious drug traffickers by providing the N.A.D.S. with expanded manpower and investigative capabilities and by providing district officers with improved apprehension and processing techniques.

The original research design for the evaluation of this document emphasized the anticipated shift of responsibility of marijuana arrests from the Narcotics Division to the districts. This shift was to be accomplished in part by the development of a depository system for evidence to be used by district officers, thus freeing time for narcotics officers to concentrate on activities other than the processing and storing of marijuana evidence. With the deletion of depository as an objective, it would seem the logic of the project would be diluted; however, it was believed project goals could be achieved regardless of the scope change. The analysis will proceed, then, in the context of this change, assessing the impact of the remaining nine objectives, thus requiring some revision of the original research design.

The evaluation will discuss the project from two perspectives: efficiency and effectiveness. Measures of efficiency will be used to assess the extent to which the project was implemented as described in the planning document.

Generally, the discussion will focus on the length of time between grant award and implementation, project activities and expenditures, and manpower and equipment allocations. Specifically, the measures to be used to assess the efficiency of the Drug Enforcement Component include the following:

1. The number of vehicles purchased and in operation; the length of time between the grant award and the completion of this activity.
2. The number of fully equipped vehicles and the length of time between the grant award and the equipping of the vehicles.
3. The amount of "buy money" available to the police and when available.
4. The amount of "buy money" returned at the project's conclusion.
5. The equipment purchases during the grant--did they coincide with the proposed purchases?
6. The number of overtime hours reported by the Narcotics Division.
7. The number of training sessions for district officers.

This analysis of project operations will include the entire grant period, from August, 1973, through March, 1976.

Measures of effectiveness address the ability of the project to impact the target problem. In this case, the report assesses the degree to which the project has been able to apprehend the higher-level peddlers of dangerous drugs. The following measures will be used to assess project effectiveness:

1. The number of arrests of major peddlers of dangerous drugs (heroin and opium derivatives).  
Project Goal: 10% increase

2. The number of arrests of middle level peddlers of dangerous drugs.  
Project Goal: 25% increase
3. The number of arrests of street level dealers of dangerous drugs.  
Project Goal: 25% increase
4. The number of arrests of major peddlers of amphetamines and barbiturates.  
Project Goal: 10% increase
5. The number of arrests of middle level peddlers of amphetamines and barbiturates.  
Project Goal: 25% increase
6. The number of arrests of street level peddlers of amphetamines and barbiturates.  
Project Goal: 25% increase
7. The number of arrests of major peddlers of hallucinogenics and marijuana.  
Project Goal: 10% increase
8. The number of arrests of middle level peddlers of hallucinogenics and marijuana.  
Project Goal: 25% increase
9. The number of arrests of street level dealers of hallucinogenics and marijuana.  
Project Goal: 25% increase

Measures one, two, and three are the primary direct measures of project success. Increases in arrest rates for all three measures are anticipated, although greatest weight will be put on the major and middle level peddlers. Additionally, it is expected that there will also be increases in arrest rates for users of various drugs, based upon the improved capacity of district level officers.

10. The number of marijuana arrests handled by district officers.  
Project Goal: 75% increase

The raison d'etre of the project is the shifting of responsibility for marijuana related investigations and

arrests to district officers in order to free the Narcotics Division to pursue other narcotics violations. After the deletion of the depository from the project, it was believed that training sessions for the district officers could help to effect this goal.

11. The number of convictions of narcotics dealers and users.  
Project Goal: 20% increase

All things being equal, the conviction rate, by narcotic and by level of involvement (major dealer, middle level dealer, low level dealer), should significantly increase as a result of the more intensive and complete investigations undertaken by the division.<sup>8</sup>

#### Data Requirements

Data for the evaluation of this project comes from several sources including the following:

1. Application for Grant (SLEPA 1)
2. Statement of Subgrant Award (SLEPA 2)
3. Narrative Progress Reports (SLEPA 5) - this is a monthly report in which the project documents its activities.
4. Subgrantee Fiscal Report (SLEPA 4) - documentation of monthly fiscal activities.
5. Grant Adjustment Requests - the documentation provided by the subgrantee noting scope and budget changes.
6. Monthly Statistical Reports - prepared by project personnel to the evaluator showing monthly drug arrests and personnel status.

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<sup>8</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, pp. 234-235.

7. Drug Arrest Register - a volume maintained by the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section listing drug arrests for all police divisions and non-drug arrests made by narcotics officers.
8. Records of the Clerk of Court and the Criminal District Court

### Data Collection

The evaluator was responsible for the collection, processing, and storage of all data used in this analysis. Data used for the impact section of this report was obtained primarily from the Drug Arrest Register and the records of the Clerk of Court. It was collected in manual form by the following procedures. Early in the preparation of this report, it became evident that arrest and disposition data were not readily available on magnetic tape. It also became evident that it would be impossible to manually collect data on all drug arrests. Therefore, it was determined a 10% sample of all arrests noted in the Drug Arrest Register would be appropriate for evaluation purposes. Using a random number table, the evaluator generated both the baseline and experimental arrest data from the files of the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section and dispositional data from the files of the Clerk of Court. The baseline data covers the two-year period prior to the grant implementation (August, 1971, through July, 1973); the experimental data includes two years of project operation (August, 1973, through July, 1975). Dispositional data was collected for the sample of cases.

Due to the fact that the arrest of major peddlers of serious drugs was a primary goal, emphasis has been placed on the apprehension of heroin offenders. Additional data was collected from the Drug Arrest Register in order to have a 100% sample or universe of heroin arrests. Thus, two sets of heroin data will be referenced: a 10% sample to be compared to the other drug types and the entire group to be examined separately. The baseline and experimental time periods remained the same. The characterization of the offender made at the time of arrest was noted. This characterization, if present, reflected police experience with that particular individual. This designation was either that of user or that of seller.

#### Data Problems

The evaluator encountered two problems in the data collection phase of the project. First, from the manner in which the project plan and the research design are written, it appears the intent of the project was to affect total arrests for the various types of drugs, ignoring those cases which had multiple charges and drug types. In those cases, the evaluator has coded only the most serious drug charge placed against the individual, based upon quality and quantity of the drug. This procedure is further supported by existing arrest procedures; because police officers have some discretion in the way they record charges and drug types, it can be assumed that they vary to some extent (i.e., one officer

might charge an individual with possessing heroin while another officer might only find paraphenalia.

The second problem encountered was in ascertaining the arrest credit for the case. There was no absolute method of determining whether an arrest credit belonged to the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section or district unit. Names of arresting and investigating officers were listed in the arrest register with each arrest. In some cases, the credit was quite simply determined because the names were either all those of the N.A.D.S. or all those of district officers. In other cases, however, it was difficult to determine credit because names from both units appeared. Although a district officer may have made an arrest, the narcotics officer might have processed the evidence for the arresting officer. On the other hand, the two units might have cooperated on the arrests. Based upon discussion with project staff, the evaluator credited the unit with the most names listed as the arresting unit. The same procedure was used for both the baseline and experimental periods, thus minimizing any error.

#### Data Storage

The evaluator was responsible for data storage, maintaining manual data in a secure location and coding machine readable data so as to protect confidentiality.

### III

#### PROGRAMMATIC ACTIVITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY

Early in August, 1973, the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department was officially awarded a discretionary grant to fund the previously described project (#72-DF-06-0042-TA-3). This section will discuss the ability of the unit to implement the project as described in the planning document. Additionally, a discussion of fiscal activity and responsibility is included. Of primary concern in this section are the measures of efficiency discussed elsewhere in this report.

##### Equipment Acquisition

1. The number of vehicles purchased and in operation at the project's conclusion
2. The number of fully equipped vehicles

In an effort to improve investigative and apprehension capabilities, the N.A.D.S. included in its grant application equipment more sophisticated than was currently available. Project personnel indicated, first, that the purchase of non-police vehicles (i.e., unmarked and models other than those normally used in police work) would improve investigative capabilities because of the "highly secretive nature of narcotics work." Two of the vehicles were to be vans which were to be equipped with special surveillance equipment. All vehicles were to be equipped with portable radios.



During the period between the grant award and the draw down of funds for project operation (August 10, 1973 - September 30, 1973) bid procedures, requisitions, and equipment specifications were finalized. By the end of October, 1973, six vehicles had been ordered. Delivery of these vehicles began five months later. By June, 1974, eight vehicles had been delivered to the N.A.D.S. The project originally planned to purchase 12 vehicles, which were to be equipped with UHF mobile radios. A more sophisticated communications system using hand-held portable radios had been implemented at the N.O.P.D., however, and the mobile radios were deleted from the project.<sup>9</sup> The hand-held radios were substituted. The remaining vehicles were not requisitioned until the project had been in operation for more than a year. By that time automobile costs had increased sufficiently to necessitate the deletion of one of the four unordered vehicles.<sup>10</sup> The three vehicles were delivered in March, 1975, twenty months after the project began operating. According to project staff, this last delay was due in part to the administrative problems the project was experiencing during earlier months of operation.

#### Other Equipment Purchases

Early in the grant period, it appeared to project personnel that equipment could not be purchased for the prices in the original grant application. Additionally, allowances for

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<sup>9</sup>Grant Adjustment #1, approved December 3, 1973.

<sup>10</sup>Grant Adjustment #2, approved November 7, 1974.

taxes had not been included in the original budget. Finally, more sophisticated investigative devices had become available since the original application had been submitted. In October, 1973, therefore, a grant adjustment was submitted reflecting the desired changes. Much of the equipment unchanged by the grant adjustment was ordered upon draw down of initial operating funds. The remaining equipment was ordered upon approval of the grant adjustment (December, 1973). The equipment included in these purchases included electronic tailing devices, tape recorders, radios, and photographic equipment. All equipment purchased was included in the grant or grant adjustments. The project ordered the equipment through City bid procedures. Some delays in the delivery of the equipment were experienced, as long as six months or more, thus delaying the implementation of the project.

#### Buy Money

1. The amount of "buy money" available to the police and when available
2. The amount of "buy money" returned at the project's conclusion

As indicated previously in this report, the project was intended to focus on the high level drug traffickers in New Orleans. The planning document indicated large sums of money with which to purchase drugs would enhance the ability of the N.A.D.S. to "make sales category cases against major peddlers."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, p. 231.

For this reason \$20,000 was budgeted for confidential use by narcotics officers. The Project Director was responsible for administration of those funds. At the conclusion of the project in March, 1976 more than one third of the "buy money" remained (\$7,393.18 was unspent).

Some delay in the use of the "buy money" was experienced because the CJCC withheld its allocation until the organizational problems regarding the implementation of the depository were resolved. Project personnel indicate the delay in the allocation of "buy money" to the N.A.D.S. accounts for the substantial remaining funds at the conclusion of the grant.

#### Manpower Shortages

1. The number of overtime hours reported by the Narcotics Division.

Manpower shortages were a problem in many units of the New Orleans Police Department during the planning stage of this project. These were particularly acute within the staff of the N.A.D.S. Narcotics officers stress the fact that due to the nature of narcotics investigations, a 40-hour work week would not allow the unit to function as efficiently as possible. Surveillance activities, in particular, often necessitate overtime work. Grant funds were allocated, therefore, to pay for overtime investigative work. The overtime was intended to increase the number of available personnel and to improve the efficiency of drug investigations. Overtime is particularly needed because of the fact that project personnel have stated that it takes at least two years to adequately

train an officer in narcotics work.

Expenditures of funds for overtime activities began in March, 1974 and continued through March, 1976. During the 25 month period, a total of 17,676 overtime hours were logged for an average of 17.7 officers. In terms of LEAA cash, this was an expenditure of \$116,038. To determine the average number of overtime hours per week, the total number of hours is divided by the number of weeks:

$$\frac{17,676}{108.5} = 162.9$$

This amounts to approximately 9.2 hours per week per officer. The number of additional personnel that could be hired can be derived by dividing the average number of hours per week by the regular 40-hour work week:

$$\frac{162.9}{40} = 4.07^{12}$$

Thus, four additional officers could have been hired in lieu of the overtime expenditures. Considering mandatory court overtime and surveillance time, the additional four officers would not significantly add to the manpower of the unit. Skilled personnel would be required to assist in training thus reducing their effectiveness. Project personnel have stated that the end of the training period would closely parallel that of the grant's termination.

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<sup>12</sup>This derivation was originally done by Subhash V. Kulkarni in his report The Study of Functional Aspects of the New Orleans Narcotic and Drug Abuse Section Considering Expenditures Incurred Due to Overtime Payments During the Grant Period, unpublished, July 28, 1977, p. 10-11.

## Training of District Officers

1. The number of training sessions for district personnel

According to the planning documents, the training of district personnel in the performance of simple narcotics investigations (i.e., marijuana) was to be accomplished through this grant. This was to be achieved by (a) providing a central depository system for marijuana evidence and (b) "training personnel in the methods of narcotics investigations."<sup>13</sup> With the deletion of the central evidence depository as an objective of the project, one of the remaining methods by which narcotics officers' time could be freed to focus on the more serious drug offenders was to train district personnel in narcotics investigations. Prior to implementation of the project, the N.A.D.S. had begun training sessions for district officers who had gone through the police academy prior to the inclusion of substantial narcotics training as part of the academy's curriculum. By the time the project was implemented, most of these special training sessions had taken place, with evidence of four additional sessions at the onset of project operation. Apparently, all recruits going through the police academy since late 1973 have been trained in methods of low level narcotics investigations. Officers from the N.A.D.S. provide the training for each class.

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<sup>13</sup>Operational manual for the Drug Enforcement Component, Section 2.1.

## Fiscal Responsibility

The total grant award for the Drug Enforcement Component was for a two-year period beginning August 1, 1973. Total grant funds budgeted amounted to \$661,081 of which \$204,020 was LEAA cash. Due to excess funds at the end of the original grant period, the project was granted an extension through March 31, 1976. Table 1 is a summary of grant funds and expenditures during the entire grant period.

There were three grant adjustments during the discretionary funding period.

1. The first, approved December 3, 1973, accounted for the changes in equipment noted previously in this report.
2. The second grant adjustment, approved November 7, 1974, reflected both a scope change and a budget change.
  - a. The depository system was deleted as an objective of the project because of the inability of the N.O.P.D. to locate appropriate space.
  - b. One vehicle was deleted from the project because of increased costs of other vehicles.
3. The final grant adjustment, approved November 18, 1975, established the budget as indicated in Table 1 and extended the project through March, 1976.

Scheduled reports were submitted in a timely and efficient manner. Project records indicate fiscal management was appropriate for most budget matters. At the conclusion of the funding period, \$8,547 remained in the project's accounts. The remaining funds were returned to LEAA. Final fiscal and narrative reports were also submitted.

Table 1

DRUG ENFORCEMENT COMPONENT FINANCIAL SUMMARY  
 Period: 8/1/73 - 3/31/76

ITEM	TOTAL GRANT FUNDS			LEAA CASH ONLY		
	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance
Personnel	\$451,598	\$451,598	-0-	\$116,066	\$116,038	\$ 28
Fringe	\$ 55,568	\$ 55,540	\$ 28	-0-	-0-	-0-
Travel	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Equipment	\$ 73,350	\$ 73,152	\$ 198	\$ 64,475	\$ 64,277	\$ 198
Supplies	\$ 70,364	\$ 62,021	\$8,343	\$ 23,479	\$ 15,158	\$8,321
Contractual	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Construction	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Other Direct	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Indirect	\$ 10,201	\$ 10,201	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	\$661,081	\$652,512	\$8,569	\$204,020	\$195,473	\$8,547

Note: Total grant funds includes both LEAA cash and City in-kind match.

Financial Summary prepared by: Ruth de la Gueronniere, Grants Administrator

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#### IV

#### PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS

The impact of a project is the effect project activities have on its primary goals. This section will be concerned with measuring the impact the Drug Enforcement Component had on narcotics arrests in New Orleans from August, 1973 through July, 1975. The major intent of the project was to improve the ability of the N.A.D.S. to apprehend major peddlers of dangerous drugs (i.e., heroin and opium derivatives) in the New Orleans area. The assessment of the project's ability to achieve this goal will be the primary focus of this section. Subsidiary goals to be measured include the number of arrests of major peddlers of other types of drugs including amphetamines and barbiturates, hallucinogens, and marijuana. Other measures of programmatic impact include the number of marijuana arrests (user and low level) handled by district officers and the number of convictions of narcotics dealers.

Using a random 10% sample of marijuana, amphetamine and barbiturate and 100% of the heroin arrests noted in the Arrest Register of the N.A.D.S. of the New Orleans Police Department, the following analysis should give indications of the ability of the Drug Enforcement Component to achieve its goals. The period on which this analysis focuses is compared to a baseline period of two years prior to grant inception. The comparisons give indications of change from the first time period to the second. This analysis will address the following hypotheses:

1. If the investigative capabilities of the N.A.D.S. were improved by implementation of this project, increases in rates of arrests and convictions of major and middle level drug peddlers are to be expected.
2. If district officers are sufficiently trained in marijuana related investigations, they should be able to handle a significantly greater number of those arrests.

In the analyses concerning levels of drug trafficking, the assignment of a level for a particular case is based upon criteria established by narcotics officers in the NOPD. These criteria appear in Appendix A of this report. Project staff indicate these criteria are not valid in all cases since the assignment of level is based only upon the drugs in possession at the time of arrest. For example, a high level dealer may be arrested with just a few pills in his/her possession. On the other hand, a street level peddler may be arrested with a large quantity of marijuana.

Analyses concerning the type of drug the individual is charged with possessing, intending to sell, or distributing are based upon "apparent" drug types at the time of arrest. In some cases when drugs are tested, they are found not to be what they appeared to be at the time of arrest and charges are dropped.

Hallucinogens have been excluded from the analysis. During the study period of the Drug Enforcement Component, fewer than 5% of all drug arrests were identified as for the possession of hallucinogens. When a 10% sample is taken of such a small number of cases, it is quite difficult to obtain

a representative sampling. Also, the inclusion of the hallucinogenic arrests would have little or no effect on the findings of this report.


#### Drug Arrest Statistics During the Study Period

During the planning stages of the Drug Enforcement Component, drug arrests in New Orleans were rising at a rapid rate, particularly for marijuana and hallucinogens (see Figure 1). During 1972 a total of 4,240 individuals were arrested for drug violations, with marijuana and hallucinogens accounting for 72% of those arrests. The steady increase of the prior five years seemed to peak in 1972 and began to level off during the latter part of that year. By August, 1973, when the Drug Enforcement Component was implemented, a downward trend of drug arrests began and continued throughout the remainder of the study period (August, 1973, through July, 1975). During the two-year period prior to project implementation, there were 7,753 individuals arrested (an average of 323 arrests per month) for drug violations according to N.O.P.D. statistics. Using the same statistics for the project period under study, there was a 17% decrease (to 6,397 arrests in the two-year period) in the number of individuals arrested for drug violations. Throughout the experimental period, then, the average number of arrests per month was 266 (Figure 2).

Generally, prior to project implementation there were significant increases in the numbers of individuals arrested for drug violations. This project was planned, in part, in

DRUG ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS BY MONTH  
(6/71 through 7/75)

Figure 2



Source: New Orleans Police Department Drug Arrest Summaries  
Prepared by: CRCC



an effort to cope with the increasing drug problem. By the time the project was implemented, however, the rising drug arrests had leveled off and had even begun a downward trend. During the peak period of arrests through the end of the study period, the types of drugs in the possession of individuals arrested was proportionately similar with marijuana accounting for the majority of drug arrests.

Given the sharp decreases in drug arrests and other things being equal, it can be inferred the Drug Enforcement Component, with its additional manpower and investigative resources provided by the LEAA grant, should have been more able than previously to concentrate its activities on the primary goals of the project. Apparently no longer constrained by a skyrocketing drug problem (in terms of drug arrests), the improved investigative capabilities were expected to have broad implications for the most serious drug traffickers. The remainder of this report will focus on those activities.

### Undercover Operations

Two major undercover operations occurred during the period in which the project was being funded by LEAA. Project personnel indicate the funds enabled narcotics officers to focus on the higher level heroin peddlers in the community. Although the quantity of heroin found in the possession of the individuals arrested during the operations would qualify most of them as low and middle level dealers (as defined by the scheme presented elsewhere in this report), project

personnel indicate some of those arrested were of the higher level traffickers. Apparently, with limited amounts of "buy money", narcotics officers attempt to use it to the greatest extent possible by focusing on as many traffickers as can be reached. In other words, it is only possible to purchase small quantities of drugs from a number of traffickers.

The first undercover operation, "Operation Checkmate", occurred in July, 1974 in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.), the federal drug enforcement agency. The D.E.A. provided the "buy money" in addition to personnel for the operation because project "buy money" was unavailable for use as the administrative problems had not yet been resolved. Seventy-four arrests for the sale of heroin resulted from the operation, with 72% of those being convicted. Sentences ranged from two years to life, with 40% of those convicted receiving life sentences. Table 2 summarizes the dispositions of those individuals prosecuted.

"Operation Top Cat" was the second undercover operation completed during the project. Sixty-eight individuals were arrested during "Operation Top Cat" in October, 1975. Fifty-five or 81% of those individuals arrested were convicted. In addition, 80% of those persons convicted received life sentences (Table 3).

On a comparative basis, "Top Cat" seems to have been the more productive of the operations. Whereas 40% of those convicted as a result of "Checkmate" received life sentences, 80% of those convicted during "Top Cat" received the same

Table 2

DISPOSITION AND ARREST DATA FOR TWO  
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS "CHECKMATE" AND "TOP CAT"

	Checkmate	Top Cat
Accepted Cases	70	41
Suspects Arrested	74	68
Defendants Charged	73	65
Defendants At-Large	4	3
Defendants Dismissed	7	4
Defendants Nolle Pros*	11	0
Defendants Not Guilty	9	2
Defendants Convicted	53	55
Number of Life Sentences	21	44

\*Seven of these defendants were either re-indicted or were already convicted on another charge.

Source: District Attorney's Office  
Prepared by: CJCC



Table 3

SENTENCES OF INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED  
FROM UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS "CHECKMATE" AND "TOP CAT"

Sentences	Operation "Checkmate"		Operation "Top Cat"	
	N	%	N	%
1-5 Years	9	(17%)	0	(0%)
6-10 Years	7	(13%)	1	(2%)
11-15 Years	4	( 8%)	1	(2%)
16-20 Years	5	( 9%)	1	(2%)
21-30 Years	1	( 2%)	0	(0%)
Life	21	(40%)	44	(80%)
Other	3	( 6%)	0	(0%)
Unknown	3	( 6%)	8	(15%)
Total	53		55	

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section, and District Attorney's Office

Prepared by: CJCC

sentence. Acceptance rates for "Checkmate" and "Top Cat" were 99% and 96% respectively. It should also be noted that 4% of those convicted from "Top Cat" were found not guilty and 17% of those from "Checkmate" were found not guilty.

Narcotics officers considered their two major undercover operations to be highly successful, particularly with regard to the high conviction rate of those arrested. As will be shown in the remainder of this report, conviction rates for other drug arrests are substantially lower than those indicated here.

#### Patterns of Drug Arrests

Turning to the sample of arrests noted elsewhere in this report, the analysis will now be primarily concerned with the direct measures of project impact. The assessment considers arrest activities in two time periods in an attempt to measure the ability of the project to make the anticipated changes in drug arrest patterns. The time periods referenced above are the baseline period (August, 1971 through July, 1973) and the project study period (August, 1973 through July, 1975), to be referred to as Time 1 and Time 2 respectively. Totals to be used will be for each of the 24 month periods.

As part of the major emphasis of the Drug Enforcement Component, there was to be a shift in the types of arrests made by the N.A.D.S. to the arrest of more serious types of drug traffickers. One of the methods to achieve this was by shifting the major responsibility for drug arrests to

district officers. It is unclear from the planning documents whether or not this was to include all levels of marijuana arrests or simply the lower levels. Additionally, there is no indication of any other drug arrest responsibilities that should shift to district officers (e.g., was the utilization of "marijuana arrests" intended to indicate responsibilities for all "user" and low level arrests; such a conclusion could be made since the courts have traditionally treated users of several types of drugs in similar ways). All of these possibilities are discussed here.

If the grant is to be taken in its most literal terms, then the district officers were expected to take responsibility for 75% of all marijuana arrests, whatever the level. By examining the characteristics of the sample, an indication of the ability of the project to accomplish this goal can be obtained. During Time 2, district officers handled 292 of the 441 marijuana arrests or 66.2% (Table 4). Clearly, district officers were not handling 75% of all marijuana arrests. If the arrests are compared with Time 1, however, there are indications of progress made toward the goal (Table 5). During Time 1, district officers handled 268 of the 493 marijuana arrests or 54.4%. District officers handled a substantially larger proportion of marijuana arrests in Time 2. This change represents a 22% increase in the proportion of marijuana arrests being handled by district officers. At the same time, the Drug Enforcement Component reduced the proportion of drug arrests it was handling from 44.6% during Time 1 to

Table 4

ARREST CREDIT BY DRUG TYPE  
(Time 2)

	D.E.C.		District Officers		Other/ Unknown	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Drugs*	96	(98.0%)	1	(1.0%)	1	(1.0%)
Marijuana	143	(32.4%)	292	(66.2%)	6	(1.3%)
Cocaine	5	(62.5%)	3	(37.5%)	0	(0.0%)
Amphetamines/ Barbiturates	45	(44.1%)	57	(55.9%)	0	(0.0%)
Heroin	41	(43.6%)	52	(55.3%)	1	(1.1%)
Drug Paraphenalia	9	(33.3%)	18	(66.7%)	0	(0.0%)
Unknown	1	(33.3%)	2	(66.7%)	0	(0.0%)
Total	340		425		8	

\*All arrests handled by the D.E.C. are noted in the Arrest Register; therefore, some non-drug arrests appear.

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section

Prepared by: CJCC

Table 5

ARREST CREDIT BY DRUG TYPE  
(Time 1)

	D.E.C.		District Officers		Other/ Unknown	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
No Drugs*	108	(96.4%)	3	(2.7%)	1	(.9%)
Marijuana	220	(44.6%)	268	(54.4%)	5	(1.0%)
Cocaine	5	(71.4%)	2	(28.6%)	0	(0.0%)
Amphetamines/ Barbiturates	65	(46.8%)	72	(51.8%)	2	(1.4%)
Heroin	46	(50.0%)	43	(46.7%)	3	(3.3%)
Drug Paraphenalia	11	(35.5%)	20	(64.5%)	0	(0.0%)
Unknown	0	(00.0%)	3	(75.0%)	1	(25%)
Total	459		412		12	

\*All arrests handled by the D.E.C. are noted in the Arrest Register; therefore, some non-drug arrests appear.

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section

Prepared by: CJCC

32.4% during Time 2, representing a 28% decrease in the proportion of cases it was handling. This evidence indicates there was a major shift in the handling of marijuana arrests during Time 2.

If the intention of the project was for district officers to handle a majority (i.e., 75%) of the low level and user level arrests, regardless of drug type, so time would be freed for narcotics officers to concentrate on the more serious offenders, then this analysis should focus on changes in the levels of those arrested. Table 6 summarizes those changes. The data shows the district officers handled a greater proportion of all levels of arrest in Time 2 than they handled in Time 1. The change is particularly striking for the user and low level arrests.<sup>14</sup> Combining the user level and low level arrests for each of the periods, the 65% of those cases handled by district officers represents a 14% change. The 35% of those arrests handled by narcotics officers decreased by 19%. These findings indicate some progress was made toward the shifting of user level and low level drug arrests to district officers during the project.

Finally, if it is to be assumed that district officers were intended to handle 75% of user level and low level arrests, then the following assessment should be made. Using the same sample as described previously, the district

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<sup>14</sup> Although it appears the change in high level is just as striking, it is impossible to make a similar inference because the sample size is extremely small.


Table 6

TOTAL DRUG ARRESTS BY LEVEL, TIME, AND CREDIT

Level	Time 1						Time 2					
	District Officers		D.E.C.		Total		District Officers		D.E.C.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
User	300	(57%)	224	(42%)	524	(100%)	293	(66%)	150	(34%)	443	(100%)
Low	68	(56%)	56	(46%)	121	(100%)	80	(61%)	51	(39%)	131	(100%)
Mid	20	(48%)	22	(52%)	42	(100%)	23	(51%)	22	(49%)	45	(100%)
High	2	(20%)	8	(80%)	10	(100%)	7	(35%)	13	(65%)	20	(100%)
Not Applicable	2	( 2%)	108	(98%)	110	(100%)	1	( 1%)	92	(99%)	93	(100%)
Unknown	20	(33%)	41	(67%)	61	(100%)	21	(64%)	12	(36%)	33	(100%)

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Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section  
 Prepared by: CJCC





officers handled a substantially larger proportion of user and low level marijuana arrests in Time 2 than they did in Time 1. Narcotics officers demonstrated the reverse trend (Table 7). The change represented an 18% increase in the proportion of user and low level arrests handled by district officers and a 23% decrease in the proportion of those arrests handled by narcotics officers.

### Summary

Thus far, the analysis has focused on the proportion of marijuana arrests handled by district officers. The project goal was for district officers to handle 75% of those arrests. The ability to achieve this goal was measured from three perspectives. In no case was it found that district officers were handling 75% of the arrests; however, in all cases significant shifts in the proportions of arrests handled by the two divisions took place.

### Seriousness of Arrests

Even though the evidence thus far indicates all levels of drug arrests by narcotics officers were proportionately smaller during Time 2 than Time 1 and numerically fewer than drug arrests by district officers, it is possible the arrests by the D.E.C. were more serious than during Time 1. This section will first address the ability of the D.E.C. to handle more serious drug traffickers; second, it will assess changes in the arrest patterns of both district and narcotics officers.


Table 7

SAMPLE OF USER AND LOW LEVEL ARRESTS  
FOR MARIJUANA BY DISTRICT AND D.E.C. OFFICERS

Level	Time 1						Time 2					
	District Officers		D.E.C.		Total		District Officers		D.E.C.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
User	236	(57%)	177	(43%)	413	(100%)	249	(67%)	123	(33%)	372	(100%)
Low	21	(60%)	14	(40%)	35	(100%)	21	(72%)	8	(28%)	29	(100%)
User and Low	257	(57%)	191	(43%)	448	(100%)	270	(67%)	131	(33%)	401	(100%)

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Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section  
Prepared by: CJCC



If it is assumed the project goals were intended to apply to both the D.E.C. and the entire drug arrest picture, then it would be expected that drug arrests would increase at all levels during Time 2. Total drug arrests decreased during Time 2, however, both for the D.E.C. independently and the D.E.C. and districts combined. Therefore, proportionate increases can be expected at some levels but equivalent decreases must be reflected at other levels to account for the total reduction in drug arrests. The only exception to this is if the user level and unknown level arrests decrease sufficiently, it is possible for goals relative to levels to be achieved.

- Using the Sample Drug Arrests

The seriousness of drug arrests by the D.E.C. changed substantially with regard to heroin and amphetamine/barbiturates (Tables 8A and 8B). User level arrests were down by 100% for heroin; at the same time, high level arrests for the same drug were up by 325%, middle level arrests were up by 54%, and low level arrests were up by 8% (Table 8A). In addition to the sharp reduction in user level arrests, the proportion of unknown levels were also down during Time 2.

When the universe of heroin arrests is examined according to specific arrest charges, similar trends emerge (Table 8D). In terms of simple possession, arrests by the narcotics unit decreased by only 28%, and intent to distribute cases increased by only 29%. However, sales arrests increased by 320%. This figure is somewhat inflated by the two undercover operations but as was stated by Sergeant Kirkpatrick of the

Table 8A  
HEROIN ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	7 (15%)	24 (52%)	6 (13%)	2 ( 4%)	7 (15%)	46
Time 2	0 ( 0%)	23 (56%)	8 (20%)	7 (17%)	3 ( 7%)	41
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-100%	+8%	+54%	+325%	-54%	

Table 8B  
AMPHETAMINE AND BARBITURATE ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	26 (40%)	16 (25%)	9 (14%)	6 ( 9%)	8 (12%)	65
Time 2	13 (29%)	19 (42%)	6 (13%)	5 (11%)	2 ( 4%)	45
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-28%	+68%	-7%	+22%	-66%	

Table 8C  
MARIJUANA ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	177 (80%)	14 ( 6%)	6 ( 3%)	0 ( 0%)	22 (10%)	219
Time 2	123 (86%)	8 ( 6%)	5 ( 4%)	1 ( 1%)	6 ( 4%)	143
% Change <sup>a</sup>	+8%	0%	+33%	b	-60%	

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

<sup>b</sup>Cannot be computed

Table 8D

HEROIN ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS (BY CHARGE)  
 "TOP CAT" AND "CHECKMATE" INCLUDED

	Charge Level				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Possession</u>	<u>WITD</u>	<u>Sales</u>	<u>Unknown*</u>	
Time 1	1,050 (72%)	305 (21%)	73 (5%)	28 (2%)	1,456
Time 2	634 (52%)	333 (27%)	259 (21%)	1 (.08%)	1,227
% Change*	-28%	+29%	+320%		

Top Cat - Sales: 68  
 Checkmate - Sales: 74

Narcotics Unit, sales cases made outside of these special operations do not constitute their best effort. In addition, the Sergeant stated that often these were Jefferson Parish or federal arrests.

Despite this opinion, the D.E.C. made a substantial number of arrests in Time 2 even when sales cases for both "Checkmate" and "Top Cat" are omitted (Table 8E). Intent to distribute cases increased 48% and sales cases rose 120% between the two time periods. Thus, it would appear that the unit has made progress in shifting the bulk of their activities to the apprehension of higher level offenders.

For amphetamines and barbiturates (Table 8B), substantial reductions in the proportions of user level and unknown level of arrests by the D.E.C. were also experienced during Time 2 with increases in low level and high level arrests (68% and 22% respectively).

Marijuana arrests by the D.E.C. (Table 8C) remained proportionately similar during Time 2 and Time 1, with an average of 83% of those arrests being of user level.

Although the above changes in arrest behavior by the D.E.C. appear to be significant, they have tenuous reliability at best. While a sample can often provide useful indications of the characteristics of an entire population, it is difficult to make inferences when the sample is so refined that the cells of a table are of such low numerical values as Tables 8A, 8B, and 8C. By combining some of the categories, it is possible to make a somewhat more rigorous analysis.






Table 8E

HEROIN ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS (CHARGE)  
 "TOP CAT" AND "CHECKMATE" ARE EXCLUDED

	Charge Level				<u>Total</u>
	<u>Possession</u>	<u>WITD</u>	<u>Sales</u>	<u>Unknown</u>	
Time 1	1,050 (72%)	305 (21%)	73 (5%)	28 (2%)	1,456
Time 2	615 (58%)	327 (31%)	117 (11%)	1 (.09%)	1,060
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-19%	+48%	+120%		

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

Top Cat - Sales: 68  
 Checkmate - Sales: 74

Source: New Orleans Police Department, Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section  
 Prepared by: CJCC

Because the major emphasis of the project was the middle and high level drug traffickers, those two categories of offender will be combined. The user and low level traffickers were generally de-emphasized in this project. Unknown levels of offenders will be excluded from the analysis. The first category will be considered the "trafficker" level, the second the "street" level.

Tables 9A , 9B , and 9C summarize the collapsing of categories described above. Only in the case of heroin (Table 9A ) does there appear to be significant changes in the proportion of higher level drug arrests, illustrated by the 90% increase in traffickers. The other drug types remained relatively stable.

Finally, the drug types can be combined and the ability of the project to achieve its goals from the perspective of levels can be assessed. By using this categorization (Table 10), the D.E.C. increased the proportion of drug arrests at all levels of trafficking but the user level, which decreased by 14%. These findings illustrate the de-emphasis on user level arrests by the N.A.D.S.

#### ● Arrests by Narcotics, District, and Other Officers

If the intention of the project was to increase the arrest of the higher level traffickers no matter who the arresting officer, then the following analysis is of concern. Once again, the findings are based upon the sample. Tables 11A, 11B, and 11C illustrate the city-wide totals for the

Table 9A  
HEROIN ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	31 (79%)	8 (21%)	39
Time 2	23 (60%)	15 (40%)	38
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-24%	+90%	

Table 9B  
AMPHETAMINE AND BARBITURATE ARRESTS  
BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	42 (74%)	15 (26%)	57
Time 2	32 (74%)	11 (26%)	43
% Change <sup>a</sup>	0	0	

Table 9C  
MARIJUANA ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	191 (97%)	6 ( 3%)	197
Time 2	131 (96%)	6 ( 4%)	137
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-1%	+33%	

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

Table 10

DRUG\* ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	Level				Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	
Time 1	210 (72%)	54 (18%)	21 (7%)	8 (3%)	293
Time 2	136 (62%)	50 (23%)	19 (9%)	13 (6%)	218
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-14%	+28%	+28%	+100%	

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

\*Marijuana, amphetamines and barbiturates, and heroin

Table 11A  
HEROIN ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	18 (20%)	48 (52%)	10 (11%)	3 (3%)	13 (14%)	92
Time 2	4 (4%)	55 (58%)	20 (21%)	10 (11%)	5 (5%)	94
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-80%	+12%	+91%	+266%	-64%	

Table 11B  
AMPHETAMINE AND BARBITURATE ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	57 (41%)	40 (29%)	22 (16%)	8 (6%)	12 (9%)	139
Time 2	33 (32%)	45 (44%)	11 (11%)	7 (7%)	6 (6%)	102
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-22%	+52%	-31%	+17%	-33%	

Table 11C  
MARIJUANA ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS

	Level					Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	Unknown	
Time 1	417 (85%)	35 (7%)	9 (2%)	0 (0%)	31 (6%)	493
Time 2	376 (85%)	30 (7%)	11 (2%)	4 (1%)	20 (4%)	441
% Change <sup>a</sup>	0	0	0	b	-33%	

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

<sup>b</sup>Cannot be computed

levels of drug trafficker. The data shows the same pattern as the D.E.C. arrests discussed previously (Tables 8A, 8B, and 8C) with more serious heroin arrests showing the sharpest increase, amphetamine and barbiturate arrests showing increases in low level and high level arrests, and virtually no change in the nature of marijuana arrests.

By collapsing the categories as previously described (Tables 12A, 12B, and 12C) the patterns are again similar, the only exception being the amphetamine and barbiturate category which shows a substantial decrease in the proportion of trafficker level arrests (Table 12B). Table 9B indicates there was no change in the proportion of trafficker level amphetamine and barbiturate arrests by narcotics officers, thus indicating the decrease is attributable to officers other than narcotics officers.

Finally, Table 13 considers drug trafficking at all levels and shows the same pattern as Table 10 (the D.E.C.). The increases do not appear to be as striking, however, once again indicating the D.E.C. accounted for the greater proportion of the increase. Available data on district drug arrests shows only slight changes in the directions indicated here.

Table 12A  
HEROIN ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	66 (84%)	13 (16%)	79
Time 2	59 (66%)	30 (34%)	89
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-21%	+112%	

Table 12B  
AMPHETAMINE AND BARBITURATE ARRESTS  
IN NEW ORLEANS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	97 (76%)	30 (24%)	127
Time 2	78 (81%)	18 (19%)	96
% Change <sup>a</sup>	+6%	-21%	

Table 12C  
MARIJUANA ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS  
(Two Levels)

	Level		Total
	Street	Trafficker	
Time 1	452 (98%)	9 (2%)	461
Time 2	406 (96%)	15 (4%)	421
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-2%	+100%	

<sup>a</sup> Computed on percents

Table 13

DRUG\* ARRESTS IN NEW ORLEANS


	Level				Total
	User	Low	Middle	High	
Time 1	492 (74%)	123 (18%)	41 (6%)	11 (2%)	667
Time 2	413 (68%)	130 (21%)	42 (7%)	21 (3%)	606
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-8%	+17%	+17%	+50%	

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<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

\*Marijuana, amphetamines and barbiturates, and heroin





## Dispositions of Drug Arrests

Following the logic of the Drug Enforcement Component, other things being equal, the conviction rate should increase significantly for drug traffickers. If the grant funds enabled the N.A.D.S. to conduct complete and intense investigations, it would seem logical that the investigations should lead to a higher conviction rate. Obviously, police officers have limited control, at best, over the cases accepted for prosecution. With enhanced investigative capabilities, the conviction rate should go up and the refusal and nolle pros rates should concurrently go down. Several other factors, however, must also be considered when an assessment is made of the disposition rates:

1. The individual Assistant District Attorney who may decide the severity of a charge.
2. The jury who may opt for a lesser count, whether for evidencary reasons or a reluctance to convict on a sales charge where life in prison is the mandatory sentence.
3. The reliability of a confidential informant.
4. The quantity of the drug confiscated.

Although these are pertinent factors, it is nevertheless the responsibility of the District Attorney's Office to decide if the evidence gathered by the officers is sufficient for prosecution and then to prepare the case for trial.

Generally, the District Attorney, who came into office in mid-1974, tended to refuse more cases than his predecessor. An Assistant District Attorney suggested that the high refusal rate (estimated 50%) was a result of a change of

emphasis by the office. Stress would be placed on cases where the charge was more serious and would result in a severe sentence. Thus, inherent in this philosophy is the belief that higher conviction rates should be the result.

In order to assess the disposition rates and their relevancy for this evaluation, data was collected based on a random 10% sample. This was the identical information that was used to discuss marijuana, barbiturate and amphetamine arrests earlier in this report. Questions were raised as to the affiliation of the arresting officer, i.e., whether or not he or she was a member of the Narcotics Unit. Time constraints prevent this evaluator from rechecking the sample or collecting the disposition data in its entirety. It would obviously be valuable were it to be done.

The data that was collected and placed in chart form can be found in Appendix B and C. It is not placed within the body of the report because it raises some questions that are relevant but beyond the scope of this evaluation to answer. For example, both the Narcotics Unit and the District Attorney's Office appear to agree that the refusal rate has increased under the present administration. Yet, both Appendix B, which shows the dispositions of total drug arrests by narcotics officers, and Appendix C, which shows these dispositions isolated by drug type, show a decreasing refusal rate. The District Attorney's Office stresses that it prosecutes only the best cases; yet, the "nolle pros" rate seems to be increasing. Other factors are obviously affecting the nature of the statistics.

It has been suggested that forces beyond the control of either of the two departments are at work within the system. The Narcotics Unit has stated that search and seizure laws often prevent them from obtaining all available evidence in a case. The question of quantity should be delved into in order to explore further the link between investigation and conviction.

One last element to be suggested for further research should be presented. Both Norman Robinson of the District Attorney's Office and James Kirkpatrick of the New Orleans Police Department have stated that considerably less heroin exists in the city. Many things or combination of things have produced this: (1) the two undercover operations were highly successful, (2) emphasis has changed to other drugs such as cocaine on the market, or (3) changes have occurred in trafficking on a national or international level. Whatever the reason, heroin seems to be increasingly expensive and hard to obtain in New Orleans. This might explain the decrease in overall heroin arrests, but it does not directly account for the increase in nolle pros cases or the decrease in refusals. In the near future, the emphasis of a grant of this sort would be somewhat different, with drugs such as cocaine being considered the most serious offense as heroin becomes the exception to the norm.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

During the discretionary period under study, the Drug Enforcement Component, through delayed but adequate grant management, made progress toward achieving its goals. The unit appears to have impacted the heroin and marijuana trafficking more significantly than the other types of drugs included in the evaluation. However, certain reservations should be noted and some unanswered questions remain to be studied.

Goals 1 and 2 were achieved to the extent that a larger proportion of the arrests handled by the D.E.C. were for drugs other than marijuana. Significant increases in the proportion of marijuana arrests handled by district officers occurred during the study period (Goal 3). According to project personnel, all district officers received specialized training in the handling of those arrests. The unit does appear to have shifted the arrests of marijuana offenders to district officers, but changes in goals and methodology should have been made in the planning document. Furthermore, the implementation of a central evidence depository, one of the original goals, was never deleted from the grant's goals.

Other deficiencies in the methodology of the program should be noted as it pertains to the arrest of heroin offenders. The unit was quite successful in its two undercover

operations both in terms of convictions and sentencing. The D.E.C. arrested proportionally more persons overall on sales charges during the grant period. Their conviction rate on cases outside of special operations was 10% to 20% lower; but according to Norman Robinson of the District Attorney's Office, the Narcotics Unit's conviction rate is one of the best of any departmental unit within the New Orleans Police Department.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the comparison is made strictly on a relative basis. Project personnel have stated that they understood that the bulk of the monies was to be invested in time and equipment to support major undercover operations. It should have been mentioned that the unit saw only one effective strategy for capturing major offenders. Sales cases made during the unit's day-to-day operations do not have as high a conviction rate as undercover operations because they are often not made by D.E.C. personnel, and Sgt. Kirkpatrick stated that intent cases constituted their best routine cases.<sup>16</sup> Thus, it appears that the D.E.C. could have been more specific in the planning document in describing its proposed strategies for impacting the goals.

The changes in levels of amphetamines and barbiturate arrests were not as significant as were heroin and marijuana

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<sup>15</sup>Robinson estimated that this rate was between 60% and 75%.

<sup>16</sup>Sales cases which necessitate an exchange between suspects and officers are almost always preplanned.

arrests during the study period. It would appear that project personnel proportionally de-emphasized these drugs in order to concentrate on higher level heroin offenders. Fewer people were arrested on all charges during the study period, although by percentage, higher level dealers were being apprehended.

When the Drug Enforcement Component was implemented in August of 1973, a downward trend of drug arrests had already begun, and the trend continued throughout the remainder of the grant period. Although the detection and apprehension of major drug peddlers increased during the grant period, the total number of drug arrests handled by the unit did not.

Overtime hours were funded through the grant for investigatory work. The hours were distributed fairly evenly among officers and during October of 1975 and July of 1974, overtime hours were utilized in conjunction with the two major operations, Checkmate and Top Cat. Outside of these special operations, however, some overtime has been spent doing administrative work.

The primary goal of the project was to enable narcotics officers to concentrate on apprehending major large scale drug peddlers in New Orleans. The D.E.C. appears to have made considerable progress in this area. The apprehension of major peddlers will be meaningless in terms of community impact if these individuals are not convicted and sentenced to prison. Project monies spent on "Checkmate" and "Top Cat"

showed definite progress in achieving the grant's primary goal. The same cannot be said of the daily routine of the department. Many significant factors exist that influence the conviction rates on routine as well as special operations. Plea bargaining often results in the offender being convicted on a lesser charge. Also, a variety of situations results in a nolle pros decision. During an undercover operation, the officers are able to control the situation to a significant degree resulting in the good cases that bring convictions. Routine activities, on the other hand, are influenced to such a substantial degree by other factors that little if anything definitive can be said about their conviction rate. Thus, research remains to be done on the relationship between investigative work and the legal proceedings necessary to obtain a conviction.

### Recommendations

Three recommendations surface from the evaluation of this project.

1. Due to the stabilizing trends in drug arrests, more personnel should not be added to the D.E.C. but rather, overtime should be funded. This overtime pay, however, should be confined to investigative work and undercover operations.
2. Any further grants with the intent of impacting the traffic in serious drugs should confine itself to funding of undercover operations.
3. If the internal logic of a project is disturbed by the deletion of a major element of that project, then the project should be redesigned to put it into a logical form once again.



APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

According to project personnel, the following criteria are used by the Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section of the New Orleans Police Department for establishing the level of trafficker of the various drug types. Project personnel also indicate that while these definitions are applied to the amount of drugs found on the individual at the time of arrest, they are not always a precise indicator of the actual level of trafficking in which the individual is involved. Any amount less than the lowest level indicated for each drug is considered to be the "user" level. The criteria are approximations:

### Marijuana

Low level: At least 10 lids or 50 cigarettes  
Medium level: 10-100 pounds  
High level: More than 100 pounds

### Cocaine

Low level: 3 papers (dosage units)  
Medium level: 5-15 papers  
High level: More than 20 papers

### Pills (including hallucinogens)

Low level: 5-10 dosage units  
Medium level: 50-100 dosage units  
High level: More than 300 dosage units

### Heroin


Low level: A street level dealer, one who deals in an amount of a single dosage unit (a "paper"), may purchase as much as a bundle (25 "papers") from a mid-level dealer and sell each paper individually to users.

Mid-level: One who deals in amounts of one "bundle" or more--usually one or more bundles at a time. This dealer obtains heroin from a high level dealer in loose or packaged ("paper") form, and then "cuts" it (dilutes the strength) using milk sugar, quinine, etc. The mid-level dealer's connection is usually a local supplier, although he may obtain his drugs from out of town.

High level: This dealer sells exclusively in large quantities, by the ounce, in loose form. He obtains his drugs from out of town, by the kilo or more, and then may "cut" it once or twice to sell to the mid-level dealer.

Source: Narcotics and Drug Abuse Section, New Orleans Police Department

APPENDIX B



**CONTINUED**


**1 OF 2**

DISPOSITIONS OF DRUG ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	Guilty	Not Guilty	Refused	Nolle Pros	Dismiss	Active	Other/ Unknown	Total
Time 1	83 (24%)	5 (1%)	136 (39%)	44 (12%)	9 (2%)	7 (2%)	6 (19%)	351
Time 2	60 (24%)	6 (2%)	82 (33%)	40 (16%)	1 (<1%)	13 (5%)	46 (19%)	248
% Change <sup>a</sup>	0%	+100%	-15%	+33%	-50%	+150%	0%	

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<sup>a</sup>Calculated on percents





APPENDIX C

DISPOSITIONS OF MARIJUANA ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	<u>Guilty</u>	<u>Not Guilty</u>	<u>Refused</u>	<u>Nolle Pros</u>	<u>Dismiss</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Other/Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>
Time 1	54 (24%)	3 (1%)	81 (37%)	22 (10%)	9 (4%)	3 (1%)	48 (22%)	220
Time 2	35 (24%)	6 (4%)	52 (36%)	18 (13%)	1 (1%)	5 (4%)	26 (18%)	143
% Change <sup>a</sup>	0%	+300%	-3%	+30%	-75%	+300%	-18%	

DISPOSITIONS OF AMPHETAMINE AND BARBITURATE ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	<u>Guilty</u>	<u>Not Guilty</u>	<u>Refused</u>	<u>Nolle Pros</u>	<u>Dismiss</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Other/Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>
Time 1	14 (22%)	1 (2%)	29 (45%)	13 (20%)	0 (0%)	2 (3%)	6 (9%)	65
Time 2	13 (29%)	0 (0%)	11 (24%)	12 (27%)	0 (0%)	2 (4%)	7 (16%)	45
% Change <sup>a</sup>	+32%	-100%	-47%	+35%	0%	+33%	+78%	

DISPOSITIONS OF HEROIN ARRESTS BY NARCOTICS OFFICERS

	<u>Guilty</u>	<u>Not Guilty</u>	<u>Refused</u>	<u>Nolle Pros</u>	<u>Dismiss</u>	<u>Active</u>	<u>Other/Unknown</u>	<u>Total</u>
Time 1	13 (28%)	1 (2%)	15 (33%)	7 (15%)	1 (2%)	0 (0%)	9 (20%)	46
Time 2	9 (22%)	0 (0%)	11 (27%)	9 (22%)	0 (0%)	6 (15%)	6 (15%)	41
% Change <sup>a</sup>	-21%	-100%	-18%	+46%	-100%	b	-25%	

<sup>a</sup>Computed on percents

<sup>b</sup>Cannot be computed



**END**