


MINNESOTA


GOVERNOR'S
COMMISSION
ON CRIME
PREVENTION
AND CONTROL

EVALUATION
UNIT



EVALUATION
REPORT

42824



prepared by:

Evaluation Unit
Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control

STATE OF MINNESOTA

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MINNESOTA CRIME WATCH

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SECTION 1:

INTRODUCTION

In August of 1975, Minnesota Crime Watch (hereafter referred to as MCW) completed its second year of operation. MCW was first sponsored in 1973 by the Governor's office and was known as the "Law Enforcement Crime Prevention Program." Year-two sponsorship and all funding has come from the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control employing federal and state funds.

During its first year of operation, MCW received \$282,012 in federal funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and \$22,589 in state funds from the Legislative Advisory Committee (LAC), for a total of \$304,601. Year-two funding amounted to \$261,598 (LEAA) plus a state match of \$26,400 (LAC), for a total of \$287,998. Thus, MCW received a grand total of \$592,599 to operate its crime prevention program for the first two years.

A. BACKGROUND

The long-range goal of MCW is to reduce the incidence of crime in Minnesota through crime prevention activities. Crime prevention is defined as "the anticipation, the recognition, and the appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it."

The crimes MCW has chosen to address are crimes against property -- in particular, residential burglary. Emphasis was placed on burglary because of its widespread occurrence and its resistance to standard crime-solving methods.

Although coordinated at the state level, the major implementation of the program is at the local agency level. MCW is designed to supply participating law enforcement agencies with materials to help them establish crime prevention programs in their communities. MCW attempts to increase citizen concern about crime and then channel it into citizen crime prevention activity. A basic assumption of MCW is that victims of crimes often contribute to their own misfortune through ignorance of the appropriate preventive measures that would protect their persons or property.

MCW's emphasis during years one and two was on burglary prevention, of which Operation Identification was a major component. MCW is unique in its attempt to coordinate Operation Identification in every community in the state, using a uniform identification sticker design and numbering system.

B. YEAR-TWO GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF MINNESOTA CRIME WATCH

The long-range goals of Minnesota Crime Watch are:

- 1) To effect a reduction in the incidence of specific crimes with major emphasis on crimes against property in Minnesota; more specifically, to effect a reduction by 1979 in the rate of property crime statewide in Minnesota from the 1972 rate of 2,081.5;
 - sub-goal a) to enlist 20% of all households and businesses in Operation Identification by the end of the second-year funding.
 - sub-goal b) to enlist 40% of all households and businesses in Operation Identification by 1976.
- 2) To bring about a reorientation within police departments toward crime prevention activities and to provide training for law enforcement agencies as to what they can do before crimes occur, as opposed to simply responding after the crime has occurred.
 - sub-goal a) by 1979, every Minnesota law enforcement agency larger than 20 officers shall have established a minimum commitment of 40 hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities.

sub-goal b) to provide 40 hours of crime prevention training for 90-130 law enforcement officers in Minnesota during second-year funding.

- 3) To improve the relationship and the cooperation between the police and the community.

The major objectives of Minnesota Crime Watch are:

- 1) To provide Minnesota law enforcement agencies with the training and materials necessary to educate citizens in the specific measures they can undertake to prevent specific crimes from occurring to their property or their person.
- 2) To increase the citizens' awareness of the problems of crime in their community.
- 3) To educate and train citizens . . . in the specific measures they can undertake to help prevent such crimes as residential and commercial burglary, shoplifting, theft from person and auto theft, and person-to-person street crimes. (The first phase of the program focuses on the prevention of residential burglary.)
- 4) To involve organized citizen and youth groups in crime prevention activities as well as using them to inform and involve others in the community.
- 5) To secure long-range changes through legislation and community planning for security designed to improve the crime prevention capabilities of Minnesota citizens.

C. EVALUATION OUTLINES

This year-two evaluation of MCW contains five major sections: Direct Public Information (Section 2 of this report), Local Agency Implementation (Section 3), Crime Prevention Training (Section 4), Crime Prevention Re-orientation (Section 5), and Premise Security (Section 6).

DIRECT PUBLIC INFORMATION (Section 2)

The evaluation of MCW's direct public information campaign begins with a discussion of overall activity in the production and distribution of mass-media advertisements, billboards, bus posters, and other forms of publicity.

Following a discussion of mass-media message content, the evaluation centers on the Quayle survey results. MCW hired Oliver Quayle and Company, a New York-based subsidiary of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, to conduct "before" and "after" surveys in an attempt to assess the effects of MCW's mass-media campaign.

The final component of this evaluation is a unit cost analysis of the direct information effort.

LOCAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION (Section 3)

Essential to MCW's success are the efforts of local law enforcement agencies throughout the state. Analysis of MCW's execution at the local level focuses on four major factors:

1. the enlistment of agencies into MCW,
2. the distribution of materials to member agencies for further dissemination,
3. the nature and extent of member agency crime prevention activities, and
4. a "cost analysis" involving the materials distributed by MCW and the manpower costs borne by member agencies for crime prevention activities.

CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING (Section 4)

During years one and two, crime prevention training was offered to all member agencies. The evaluation of crime prevention training is organized around a series of questions regarding efficiency, effectiveness, and cost.

1. In evaluating the efficiency with which the training was provided, two areas are investigated:
 - a) the use of resources in crime prevention training, and
 - b) the attainment of training objectives as defined in the grant applications.

2. The effectiveness of training focuses on:
 - a) the impact of training on crime rates,
 - b) the relationship between crime rates and the receipt of crime prevention training,
 - c) the relationship between population served and training, and
 - d) the extent to which MCW training has been directed at specific crime prevention measures.
3. The cost analysis section attempts to determine the unit cost of MCW crime prevention training and compares these costs to those of one other law enforcement training program in Minnesota.

CRIME PREVENTION REORIENTATION (Section 5)

A major goal of MCW is to reorient law enforcement agencies throughout Minnesota toward crime prevention. Analysis of reorientation examines data used by MCW to document its progress and data gathered through a statewide survey to measure current reorientation levels. Results of this survey are presented in the following sections:

1. the effects of MCW membership on reorientation,
2. a comparison of the reorientation of MCW-trained member agencies with non-trained agencies,
3. the effects of agency characteristics on reorientation, including
 - a) the impact of force size, and
 - b) the impact of agency type,
4. the effects of reorientation on the organizational structures of law enforcement agencies, and
5. the reorientation of individual member and non-member personnel.

PREMISE SECURITY (Section 6)

MCW also attempted to increase residential and commercial security.

The evaluation of security programs focuses on two programs: Operation Identification and premise surveys. The evaluation of Operation Identification considers the following:

1. Accomplishments of Operation Identification
 - a) Origin
 - b) Basic Features
 - c) Implementation Options
 - d) The PIN Number
 - e) Engraving Procedures
 - f) Promotional Effort
 - g) Enrollment
 - h) Public Perceptions of Operation Identification
 - i) Profile of an Operation Identification Participant
 - j) Public Perceptions of Premise Surveys
2. Analysis of Goals
 - a) Appropriateness of Goals
 - b) Adequacy of the Goals and Sub-Goals
 - c) Efficiency in Meeting Goals
3. Effectiveness of Enrollment
4. The Impact of Operation Identification on Crime
 - a) Incidence Data
 - b) Clearance Data
 - c) Crime Rates Data
 - d) Basic Questions
 - 1) probability of being burglarized
 - 2) reduction in dollar loss upon being burglarized
 - 3) increase in dollar value recovered
 - 4) burglary as a precipitant to joining Operation Identification
 - 5) impact on burglary clearance rates
5. Unit Cost Analysis of Enrollment in Operation Identification
 - a) Acceptability of the Unit Cost
 - b) Unit Cost Analysis in the Three-Community Study
6. Operation Identification in Comparative Perspective

Since the premise survey program has comprised a much smaller part of MCW's security endeavors than Operation Identification, its evaluation is considerably abbreviated compared to that of Operation Identification:

1. Background
2. Activities
 - a) Materials
 - b) Promotion
 - c) Training
3. Data Collection and Evaluation
4. Constraints on the Program
5. Conclusions about Premise Surveys

D. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

DIRECT PUBLIC INFORMATION (Section 2)

Conclusions

1. MCW has implemented a rather massive direct information campaign designed to:

- a) increase the public's awareness of crime in the community, most specifically the problem of residential burglary, and
- b) educate the public in specific measures designed to prevent residential burglary, with emphasis on the Operation Identification program.

2. In terms of promotion, the magnitude of MCW's information effort has unquestionably resulted in an economy that could not have been achieved by independent, local promotional efforts. The content of the promotion is also a strength.

3. The success of this promotion has been measured in part by the Quayle surveys which indicated:

- a) substantial success in "increasing the citizens' awareness of crime in the community,"
- b) some success in creating an increased perception of burglary as a problem,
- c) a significant increase in the number of people receiving information pertaining to home security, and

- d) a slight increase in the number of steps citizens take to secure their premises.

4. Through its second year, MCW expended approximately \$214,872.44 on promotional activities, or about 5.6¢ per citizen.

Recommendations

As a result of observations from this section and the analyses in the "Premise Security" section later in this report, it is recommended that MCW develop promotional materials for use by local agencies that wish to publicize specific programs such as premise surveys which encourage citizens to actually implement target-hardening techniques.

LOCAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION (Section 3)

Conclusions

Enlistment

1. As of June, 1975, MCW had enlisted 183 police departments in Minnesota and 69 sheriff's offices, for a total of 252 of Minnesota's law enforcement agencies.

2. MCW has an informal goal of enlisting enough agencies to serve all of the citizens in Minnesota. Enlistment data as of June, 1975, show that the 252 member agencies serve 94.7% of the population based on MCW's definition of population served. (When based on the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension [BCA] definition, the percentage is 83.8%.)

Materials

3. MCW has been extremely efficient in supplying its member agencies with most crime prevention materials.

4. The provision of printed and other support material to participant

agencies is certainly a major strength of the program. In light of the number of agencies participating in the program and the amount of material that must be printed and distributed to each participating agency, the project has confronted and surpassed a major logistical problem.

Local Agency Activities

Results of the March, 1975, survey indicate:

5. Forty-five (22.4%) of the 201 member agencies for whom data were available had established crime prevention units. However, 75 agencies had three or more officers engaged in crime prevention activities, and 23 agencies had official crime prevention budgets.

6. Only 42% of the member agencies for whom complete data were available had met MCW's request that agencies spend at least 8 hours per week on crime prevention activities. Twenty agencies, however, had the equivalent of one full-time person (40 hours per week) in crime prevention.

7. Of the 215 member agencies for whom complete data were available, 143 (66.5%) had recruited assistance within their communities. Recruitment of community assistance in small communities has been nearly as successful as in larger ones.

Cost Analysis

8. Based on actual expenditures to the contracted advertising agency and estimates of MCW staff salary, the average cost of supplying a member agency with crime prevention materials was \$931.70. This yields a figure of 6.5¢ per person served, when based on the MCW definition of population served; the BCA definition yields a 7.4¢ figure. Estimates of the combined per capita cost of promotion, materials, and manpower expended in the

year-two implementation of crime prevention programs are 21.3¢ (MCW) and 24.1¢ (BCA).

Recommendations

Although MCW has reached a high population served, it is recommended that active enlistment of new member agencies be resumed, and that present members be encouraged to increase their commitment to crime prevention activities.

The Quayle results indicate that in the case of one MCW program, Operation Identification, the communities with strong local agency involvement (the suburbs) have had the best results in increasing the public's awareness of the program and citizen participation. Since police departments are perhaps better able to increase community involvement than are sheriff's offices, it seems that citizen response would be improved by a closer contact with the police. Thus, it may be advantageous for MCW to concentrate on enlisting local police departments even where the county sheriff's office is already a member.

The success of local agencies with strong crime prevention efforts in getting people to participate in Operation Identification suggests that other programs would have best results if encouraged by the local agency. Therefore, MCW should continue to encourage active crime prevention activity (including non-Operation Identification activity) within departments and, in turn, within the community.

CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING (Section 4)

Conclusions

1. MCW has presented six training sessions which resulted in 9,728 person-hours of training.

2. There were 198 MCW-trained officers as of the end of year two. These trained officers represented 103 MCW member agencies or 43% of all member agencies.

3. In comparison to BCA training costs, MCW training has been implemented at a favorable cost level, despite MCW's relative newness in the area of training.

Recommendations

Three recommendations have been identified which may increase the value of MCW training by giving member agencies information which could increase the effectiveness of their crime prevention programs.

1. Inform agencies of methods to optimize resources available for crime prevention activities. Such information might be included in training sessions devoted to methods of applying for state and federal grants, information on clearinghouses for criminal justice information, and ways of adapting programs from other areas to suit local needs.

2. Educate agencies in methods of evaluation so that existing programs might be structured for more effective performance, and agencies might have a better basis for accurate and realistic requests for funds.

3. Given the importance of the material covered in the advanced sessions and the time constraints in terms of how much can be covered in a one-week session, it is appropriate to recommend that MCW consider the possibility of instituting a third training session devoted primarily to the areas of research, planning, and evaluation.

CRIME PREVENTION REORIENTATION (Section 5)

Conclusions

1. The comparison of agencies that are members of MCW with agencies that are not shows that member agencies are more active in areas of crime prevention than non-members. When controlling for force size, member agencies maintained a higher level of participation across the force size ranges. This also held true when controlling for agency type -- member sheriff's offices and police departments were more active in crime prevention than their non-member counterparts.

2. The comparison of agencies trained by MCW with non-trained agencies shows that trained agencies participate to a greater extent than non-trained agencies. However, this may be a reflection of the fact that larger agencies were more likely to have received training in crime prevention than smaller ones.

3. In an analysis of agency type, it was found that among member agencies, police departments were more active in crime prevention activities than sheriff's offices. Police departments maintained a higher level of participation regardless of force size.

4. The analysis of changes that occurred in the organizational structure of an agency because of crime prevention activities showed these changes to be a function of available manpower. Agencies with large forces have the ability to assign individuals to specialized crime prevention functions, whereas agencies with smaller forces employ alternative methods of crime prevention that are amenable to available resources.

5. The attitude section of the questionnaire showed that individuals

within member agencies maintained a higher level of crime prevention orientation than individuals from non-member agencies. The results of the comparison held true when controlling for force size and agency type. It was also found that individuals within member agencies perceived that a shift toward crime prevention had occurred within their departments.

Recommendations

From the conclusions above, it seems appropriate to recommend the following:

1. Because of apparent differences in orientation between trained and non-trained agencies, it is recommended that MCW continue its crime prevention training program.
2. Because crime prevention activity is significantly greater for police departments than for sheriff's offices even when controlling for force size, it is recommended that MCW continue to enlist police departments of all sizes.

PREMISE SECURITY (Section 6)

Conclusions

Goals and Objectives

1. Although the crime problems addressed by MCW were incorrectly documented in the first-year grant application, statistics show that residential burglary, total burglary, Part I property crime, and total Part I crime pose significant problems in Minnesota.

Quayle Survey

2. In general, Minnesotans are becoming more aware of Operation Identification. As awareness and knowledge about the program increase, it is

expected that enrollment will increase accordingly. Public apathy remains as a major obstacle to increased participation.

The most interesting and consistent findings of the Quayle survey are the results of the suburban sample. This sample a) had heard about Operation Identification from non mass-media sources at a higher rate than had the other samples, b) was significantly more aware of Operation Identification, c) had a higher level of sophistication concerning its function, and d) showed a higher level of claimed enrollment in Operation Identification.

Enrollment in Operation Identification

3. The 236 agencies, as of March, 1975, had enrolled 116,713 of the 1,363,185 targets in Minnesota, for an enrollment penetration of 8.6%. The total enrollment increased 153.2% from March, 1974, to March, 1975.

The MCW goal was to reach 20% enrollment, but this goal was not reached. However, compared to other programs around the country, MCW did achieve more absolute enrollment than any other program examined. Moreover, several Minnesota communities have penetrations of 20% or more.

Effects of Operation Identification

4. Total burglary statistics show promising trends in both clearance and incidence, but the burglary rate itself increased more in MCW's first full year of operation (1974) than the average rate of increase during 1965-1973. However, this increase was considerably less than the national increase in 1974.

5. Based on statewide estimates, non-participants have a residential burglary rate 3.84 times higher than that of participants. Non-residential targets display a non-participant burglary rate 1.69 times higher than that

of participants.

6. Deterrence seems to be operative only in terms of the specific targets enrolled in Operation Identification. The increasing burglary rates would indicate that some displacement is taking place either to non-member targets, to other types of crime, or perhaps to non-criminal activity (the increase in burglary rates might have been higher without Operation Identification).

The Three-Community Study

7. Residential units participating in Operation Identification are more likely than non-participants to avoid suffering a dollar value loss after a burglar has gained entrance to the structure and are likely to lose less in dollar value than non-participants if a loss is incurred.

8. The fact that a participant has been burglarized prior to the time of joining Operation Identification clearly has an influence on how quickly the participant joins the program.

Cost Analysis

9. A cost analysis of direct expenditures by MCW on Operation Identification-related activities yielded a statewide unit cost of \$1.47 per enrollee.

10. As indicated by the amount of training directed at premise surveys, MCW has given some emphasis to this program. However, this emphasis has resulted in only a minimal number of premise surveys being conducted. MCW promotion of the premise survey has evidently been insufficient to generate citizen demand for premise surveys. Also, informational materials specific to premise surveys have been lacking.

Recommendations

1. The first major recommendation is that rather than focusing on property crime, MCW should explicitly focus its goal statements on residential burglary. MCW's goal should be either to decrease residential burglary rates by a specific target date or to slow down the increase in these rates by a specific amount by a specific date.

2. The second major recommendation is that significant efforts be undertaken to increase enrollment in Operation Identification.

To this end, the following are recommended:

- a) that MCW undertake controlled experiments to determine methods of enrollment which most reduce the time and effort costs of the enrollee, yet, at the same time, maximize the amount of property actually marked with traceable PIN numbers.
- b) that copies of the findings of this report be made available to the actuarial departments of insurance companies operating in the state for the purpose of determining whether more companies than at present might be willing to offer discounts on renter's and homeowner's policies to participants in Operation Identification. This would create incentives to join the program.
- c) that MCW pursue the possibility of increasing the actual marking of participant property by providing marking tools to purveyors of items most commonly stolen in residential burglary. Signs stating that purchases of participants can be engraved with their PIN numbers should also be provided. This service might encourage participants to mark new property at the time of purchase. The availability of brochures in such retail outlets might also encourage non-members making purchases to join the program.
- d) that MCW encourage its member agencies to make special efforts to reach those over 60 years of age and those with lower educational levels through special enrollment campaigns.

- e) that MCW attempt to go beyond its original goal of enlisting agencies to cover a maximum proportion of the population of the state and attempt to actively recruit new member agencies. Increased enlistment of agencies should lead to increased crime prevention activity and community involvement at the local level and increased enrollment in Operation Identification outside the metropolitan area. Present members should also be encouraged to increase their commitment to crime prevention activities.

3. The third major recommendation is that a major focus of MCW activity be directed at programs designed to physically deter burglary.

To this end, the following are recommended:

- a) that MCW actively undertake a program to dramatically increase the number of premise surveys conducted by its member agencies as a means of encouraging the taking of physical deterrence measures by the citizens of Minnesota.
- b) that MCW explore the possibility of using environmental design programs to increase the level of both physical and psychological deterrence to burglary on a larger scale than individual structures, especially in high burglary areas.

E. DATA SOURCES USED IN THIS REPORT

The data used in this evaluation came from a variety of sources and were comprised of survey, aggregate, budgetary, and project-related data and materials. The principal data sources were:

- 1. crime statistics from the FBI, Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), and individual law enforcement agencies in Minnesota,
- 2. two public opinion surveys of citizens in the state of Minnesota conducted by Oliver Quayle and Company,
- 3. a telephone survey of MCW member agencies conducted in March, 1975,
- 4. U.S. Census Bureau data on population characteristics,

5. U.S. Postal Service estimates of residential and business addresses in Minnesota,
6. an in-depth study of residential and commercial burglary in three communities from 1970-1974,
7. financial reports and invoices for unit cost analyses,
8. the agenda of MCW training sessions,
9. MCW grant applications,
10. BCA data on police force size and composition,
11. materials distributed by MCW to member agencies and the public through its promotional campaigns,
12. evaluations of similar projects in other states and communities, and
13. a survey of selected personnel from 72 law enforcement agencies in the state of Minnesota.

SECTION 2:

DIRECT PUBLIC INFORMATION

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Goals and Objectives

Education of the public has been an integral component of Minnesota Crime Watch since the project's inception. The philosophy supporting this aspect of MCW holds that the people of Minnesota need to be alerted to the problems of crime and informed of methods by which to protect themselves. MCW's informational effort is based on Objectives 2) and 3) of the MCW project outline. In the first-year grant application, the objectives specifically addressed residential burglary:

- 2) To increase the citizen's awareness of the problems of residential burglary;
- 3) To educate and train citizens in the specific measures they can undertake to prevent residential burglary;

In the year-two grant application, MCW broadened its scope to encompass community crime in general and focused on specific measures that citizens can employ to prevent such crimes. The crimes mentioned were residential and commercial burglary, shoplifting, theft from person, auto theft, and person-to-person street crimes. The second-year plans emphasized the education of children as well as adults.

2. Background

During both years of operation, MCW has carried on an extensive informational campaign using both an indirect and a direct approach. The

attainment of Objectives 2) and 3) relies most heavily on the indirect approach, which is carried out by law enforcement agencies at the local level. MCW has distributed various informational materials to its member agencies, who, in turn, deliver the MCW materials to citizens in their jurisdictions. MCW's local level informational effort is discussed in detail within the "Local Agency Implementation" section of this report.

As a supplement to the local information effort, MCW has used a direct informational approach, which centers around a mass-media campaign using newspapers, television, radio, and outdoor advertising throughout Minnesota. According to the project management, these advertisements have been designed to alert citizens to the problems of crime, but some also attempt to educate citizens about specific crime prevention techniques. For the most part, the supplemental advertising campaign has been used to direct citizens to their local law enforcement agencies for further information.

The mass-media informational campaign has been carried out on a statewide basis, which offers three main advantages. First, the statewide delivery has the potential of reaching more citizens than would local delivery (unless each community had identical and extensive advertising campaigns). Second, the statewide delivery is less expensive than comparable advertising at the local level. Third, the statewide delivery uses the electronic media and other advertising forms that cut across community boundaries. If individual communities or law enforcement agencies were to use such advertising, they would undoubtedly find their efforts to be very costly because a significant proportion of the advertising costs would be spent in reaching people outside the target area.

3. Plans for Direct Public Information

Included in the first-year plans for MCW's direct public information effort were the following:

- 10 different newspaper ads
- 1 60-second T.V. commercial
- 3 30-second T.V. commercials
- 5 10-second T.V. commercials
- 3 60-second radio commercials
- 4 30-second radio commercials
- 4 10-second radio commercials
- 3 outdoor billboard designs

Year-two plans included:

- 8 newspaper ads
- 2 outdoor billboards
- 2 bus poster designs
- (unspecified quantity) T.V. advertisements
- (unspecified quantity) radio advertisements

The year-two plans also called for production of materials for a special Crime Prevention Week. The proposed materials, including T.V. salutes, newspaper and radio ads, and main street banners, were unspecified in the grant as to amount and distribution.

4. Evaluation Outline

The evaluation of MCW's direct public information campaign begins with a discussion of overall accomplishment in the production and distribution of mass-media advertisements, billboards, bus posters, and other forms of publicity. There is no specific evaluation of the year-one and year-two efforts because MCW's records in most cases do not break down year-one and year-two accomplishments.

Following a discussion of mass-media message content, the evaluation will center on the Quayle Survey results. MCW hired Oliver Quayle and Company,

a New York-based subsidiary of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune, to conduct "before" and "after" surveys for purposes of measuring the effects of MCW's mass-media campaign.

The final component of this evaluation will be a unit cost analysis of MCW's direct information effort.

B. EVALUATION

1. Accomplishments

A major feature of the direct information campaign has been MCW's ability to rely exclusively on a public service approach in disseminating its crime prevention messages statewide. MCW has purchased no air-time or advertising space. The following list provides an indication of the scope and success of MCW's public service promotional effort.

According to the project management, the media have made widespread use of the various informational materials, which include: 13 television commercials (7 distributed in year one, 6 distributed in year two; an additional 8 spots were produced in year two for distribution in year three); 17 radio commercials (7 distributed to all Minnesota radio stations in year one, 10 during year two); 21 newspaper ads (appearing 857 times in 240 Minnesota newspapers -- through January 12, 1975); 50-60 outdoor boards (of four different designs) at any time, with at least one enhancing each major state highway; four different bus poster designs in a large enough quantity to equip 750 MTC buses on the inside and another 240 on the outside; and a 30-second movie cartoon distributed to 225 theaters statewide.

Also a message was flashed between periods onto the ice at all Minnesota North Star home hockey games as well as shown on the scoreboard at

several Minnesota Vikings football games.

An additional major source of MCW information has been newspaper articles. As of January 12, 1975, 650 articles had appeared in 228 Minnesota newspapers, according to MCW.

The content of these materials has varied among general MCW information, specific Operation Identification messages, and general burglary prevention advice. The Operation Identification messages have constituted a significant portion of total advertising. According to the project management, of the 857 newspaper advertisements appearing through January 12, 1975, 376 (43.9%) specifically mentioned Operation Identification. Most of the other newspaper ads were geared to burglary problems and prevention. Also, the project management estimated that approximately one-half of the bus signs and billboards specified Operation Identification as did most of the television spots distributed in year two.

Although most of the materials have dealt with the problems of burglary and its prevention (mainly through the use of Operation Identification), the data indicate that the prevention technique of premise surveys has been conspicuously absent from MCW advertising. Because of this lack of exposure, citizens desiring premise survey information must contact their local law enforcement agencies, provided that the agencies are MCW members and are willing and able to conduct such surveys. Despite MCW's intensive informational campaign, the premise survey has not received a great deal of attention, perhaps contributing to the survey's low profile in security activity (see "Premise Security" section).

The success of the informational campaign is measured by the Quayle

surveys and by enrollment in Operation Identification. The Quayle results are presented in the following section, and enrollment is discussed within the "Premise Security" section of this report.

2. The Quayle Survey

The public education activities of MCW are predicated on the assumption that increased citizen exposure to crime prevention messages will lead to:

- a) an increased awareness of the problem of crime,
- b) increased contact with local law enforcement agencies for crime prevention information, and
- c) an increased understanding of crime prevention measures that citizens can take, which should lead to
- d) an increase in crime prevention measures actually taken.

The success of these educational efforts is indicated by the results of surveys conducted by Oliver Quayle and Company. The data came from a modified area probability sample of the population 18 years of age and older and followed a "before and after" design. The "before" survey was conducted in August of 1973. It was designed to measure citizens' awareness of crime and crime prevention practices before MCW's mass-media campaign. A survey in October-November, 1974, measured the same citizen response after approximately one year of MCW's operation.

The Quayle surveys involved the drawing of three separate samples:

- a) 405 respondents in a statewide sample (in each survey);
- b) 158 respondents in a suburban sample drawn from the communities of Burnsville, Eden Prairie, Golden Valley and New Hope (160 in the "post" survey); and
- c) 160 each in the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul (155 and 150, respectively, in the "post" survey).

For purposes of analysis, Minneapolis and St. Paul (the Twin Cities) have been combined into one sample.

It is important to note that since the "post" survey measured changes only over the first year of MCW operation, it is likely that the results may tend to underestimate the current level of citizen awareness and information on crime prevention practices.

a) Public Awareness of Crime in the Community:

In order to evaluate MCW's progress in increasing the level of citizen awareness of crime, the "pre" and "post" Quayle results were compared. Respondents were asked, "Do you think crime is a serious problem here in your community?" The data in TABLE 2.1 indicate an increase from "pre" to "post" in levels of citizen awareness.

TABLE 2.1						
"DO YOU THINK CRIME IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM HERE IN YOUR COMMUNITY?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	130 (40.6%)	166 (54.4%)	37 (23.4%)	66 (41.2%)	140 (34.6%)	174 (43.0%)
No	161 (50.3%)	121 (39.7%)	110 (69.6%)	77 (48.1%)	232 (57.3%)	207 (51.1%)
Other	29 (9.0%)	18 (5.9%)	11 (6.9%)	17 (10.6%)	33 (8.1%)	24 (5.9%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

The highest levels of citizen awareness in the "pre" sample were in the Twin Cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul), followed by the suburban and state samples. The most significant increases, however, occurred in the suburbs, where responses rose from 23.4% to 41.2% (17.8%), and in the Twin Cities where the responses rose from 40.6% to 54.4% (13.8%).

The increases in citizen awareness from the "pre" to the "post" period may, of course, be attributed to a number of causes including a general

awareness of crime obtained through media exposure and personal communication and experience. The fact is that a true experimental design was not possible with a statewide promotional program such as MCW's (no control group not receiving information). Nevertheless, given the short time period involved, a case can be made for attributing a significant proportion of the increase to the MCW program.

A second indicator of public awareness is responses to the question, "What do you think is the most common sort of crime committed here in your community?"¹ (see TABLE 2.2).

RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Burglary/Break-ins	105 (32.8%)	105 (34.4%)	50 (31.7%)	79 (49.4%)	98 (24.2%)	109 (26.9%)
Robbery/Hold-ups	20 (6.3%)	33 (10.8%)	8 (5.1%)	15 (9.4%)	31 (7.7%)	36 (8.9%)
Assault/Mugging	8 (2.5%)	3 (1.0%)	---	1 (0.6%)	2 (0.5%)	2 (0.5%)
Stealing/Theft	39 (12.2%)	27 (8.9%)	18 (11.4%)	21 (13.1%)	82 (20.2%)	64 (15.8%)
Car Theft	11 (3.4%)	5 (1.6%)	4 (2.5%)	---	8 (2.0%)	6 (1.5%)
Bicycle Theft	10 (3.1%)	2 (0.7%)	12 (7.6%)	1 (0.6%)	10 (2.5%)	1 (0.2%)
Petty Theft	23 (7.2%)	13 (4.3%)	15 (9.5%)	5 (3.1%)	30 (7.4%)	25 (6.2%)
Shoplifting	3 (0.9%)	5 (1.6%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.2%)	10 (2.5%)	12 (3.0%)
Vandalism/Juvenile Delinquency/Teen Gangs/Disorderly	30 (9.4%)	60 (20.3%)	20 (12.7%)	20 (12.5%)	50 (12.3%)	71 (17.5%)
Traffic Violations	10 (3.1%)	7 (2.3%)	11 (7.0%)	2 (1.2%)	23 (5.7%)	13 (3.2%)
Kidnapping	---	---	---	---	1 (0.2%)	---
Murder	2 (0.6%)	2 (0.7%)	---	1 (0.6%)	---	---
Drug Abuse	5 (1.6%)	5 (1.6%)	6 (3.8%)	2 (1.2%)	15 (3.7%)	21 (5.2%)
Rape/Sex Crimes	7 (2.2%)	7 (2.3%)	1 (0.6%)	3 (1.9%)	3 (0.7%)	5 (1.2%)
Pickpocketing/Purse Snatching	6 (1.9%)	4 (1.3%)	1 (0.6%)	---	---	2 (0.5%)
Drinking	3 (0.9%)	1 (0.3%)	2 (1.3%)	---	6 (1.5%)	9 (2.2%)
N/A, Other	40 (12.5%)	24 (7.9%)	9 (7.6%)	8 (5.0%)	42 (10.4%)	29 (7.2%)
TOTAL RESPONSES:	342 (100.0%)	305 (100.0%)	159 (100.0%)	160 (100.0%)	411 (100.0%)	405 (100.0%)
N:	320	305	158	160	405	405

Analysis of "pre" and "post" responses indicates little change in most

¹As a measure of increased awareness of crime, this question is deficient in that it asks for "the most common crime." The fact that a crime is not most common does not necessarily mean that people are not aware of it. A decrease in responses from "pre" to "post" may indicate nothing more than the fact that respondents realize that a crime mentioned in the "pre" survey is not "most common." It is possible that respondents became more aware of a certain crime problem, but if that crime were not most common, they might not answer; thus, the increased awareness would be unmeasured.

of the crimes mentioned. In the statewide sample, responses of burglary/break-ins, robbery/hold-ups, shoplifting, vandalism, drug abuse, rape/sex crimes, pickpocketing/purse snatching, and intoxication increased, although no single increase was particularly significant.

Since the main thrust of MCW has been aimed at residential burglary, especially during the first year of operation, it might be expected that the responses of burglary/break-ins would show large increases. A review of responses shows only the suburban sample revealing a large increase in this category. The statewide and Twin Cities samples showed only a moderate increase.

Conclusion

The MCW public education campaign appears to have achieved some success in "increasing the citizen's awareness of crime in the community." The most significant increases have occurred in those communities with the most active crime prevention programs (the suburbs and Twin Cities). It is difficult, however, to ascribe the observed changes solely to MCW, due to the lack of a control group not exposed to MCW. Therefore, the possibility that the increases noted are due to some combination of other factors in addition to MCW's public education effort cannot be rejected.

b) Citizen Awareness of Crime Prevention Techniques:

The second public education objective also is measured by the data gathered from the Quayle surveys.²

In this section, responses to a variety of questions that concern the

²Although the MCW originally intended to offer a large-scale crime prevention education program to both "citizens and young people," the actual first-year program effort was directed toward adults in regard to residential burglary, and the available data reflect this concentration.

public's awareness of MCW messages are examined, as well as the public's knowledge of what measures might be taken to prevent crime, especially burglary. The final group of questions to be examined concerns what precautions people actually take to prevent crime.

It is assumed that before MCW can educate the public, the mass-media campaign must first catch the public's eye. A comparison of "pre" and "post" responses regarding exposure provides an indicator of changes in the public's familiarity with residential burglary prevention messages (see TABLE 2.3).

TABLE 2.3						
"HAVE YOU EVER SEEN OR RECEIVED ANY INFORMATION ABOUT PROTECTING YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT) FROM BURGLARY?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	243 (75.9%)	277 (90.8%)	118 (74.7%)	151 (94.4%)	288 (71.1%)	359 (88.6%)
No	61 (19.1%)	26 (8.5%)	33 (20.9%)	9 (5.6%)	106 (26.2%)	42 (10.4%)
Other	16 (5.0%)	2 (0.7%)	7 (4.4%)	---	11 (2.7%)	4 (1.0%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

Initially, it is important to note the high percentage of positive responses to the question across the sample. None of the samples is below seventy percent in terms of the number of respondents who had seen or received information about protecting their homes or apartments. From the "pre" to the "post" period, each sample had a significant increase in positive responses to the question, with the largest increase occurring in the suburban sample. Indeed, in the "post" period every section of the sample exceeded eighty-eight percent in positive responses to the question.

It is expected that if education of the public were taking place, not only would more people have been exposed to the MCW messages, but more people would remember what they had seen or heard.

TABLE 2.4 shows the extent to which citizens have come in contact with burglary prevention messages. While it is possible that some of the messages cited were from a source other than MCW, the intensity of the MCW campaign during this time period should make tenable the assumption that most of these messages were from MCW. As might be expected, MCW seems to have been most successful in reaching the television audience where approximately three-quarters of the respondents in each sample recall having seen some message. Newspaper and magazine advertisements were the second most frequently cited source with about 60% of the respondents in each sample indicating they had seen some burglary prevention message there. The two categories least often mentioned were bus posters and public lectures.

TABLE 2.4 RESPONDENTS HAVING RECEIVED BURGLARY PROTECTION MESSAGES FROM VARIOUS SOURCES and RESPONDENTS REMEMBERING CONTENT OF MESSAGE TO BE THE MARKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY (Multiple responses possible)						
SOURCE/ CONTENT:	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	SOURCE	CONTENT	SOURCE	CONTENT	SOURCE	CONTENT
Billboard	77 (25.2%)		44 (27.5%)		74 (18.3%)	
Property I.D.		38 (12.5%)		26 (16.2%)		33 (8.1%)
Magazine/Newspaper	184 (60.3%)		107 (66.9%)		246 (60.7%)	
Property I.D.		50 (16.4%)		33 (20.6%)		72 (17.8%)
Bus Poster	45 (14.8%)		15 (9.4%)		30 (7.4%)	
Property I.D.		19 (6.2%)		5 (3.1%)		11 (2.7%)
T.V.	229 (75.1%)		118 (73.7%)		307 (75.8%)	
Property I.D.		92 (30.2%)		59 (36.9%)		126 (31.1%)
Radio	58 (19.0%)		34 (21.2%)		106 (26.2%)	
Property I.D.		22 (7.2%)		10 (6.3%)		30 (7.4%)
Brochure/Pamphlet	125 (41.0%)		87 (54.4%)		147 (36.3%)	
Property I.D.		49 (16.1%)		38 (23.7%)		61 (15.1%)
Public Lecture	28 (9.2%)		10 (6.3%)		42 (10.4%)	
Property I.D.		5 (1.6%)		2 (1.2%)		8 (2.0%)

Although there seems to be a fair amount of consistency across the three samples, as might be expected, minor variations do appear in those message sources which are more heavily concentrated in some areas, i.e., bus posters.

In addition to determining the sources of burglary protection messages, it is important to examine the extent to which people remember the content of

those messages. Television, newspaper/magazine advertisements, and pamphlets/brochures were the most frequently cited sources in all three samples in regard to the message that people ought to mark their personal property. Indeed, it can be stated from these data that a minimum of 31.1% of the respondents statewide remember having been exposed to the message that they ought to mark their personal property. (This minimum is due to the fact that multiple responses to this question were possible; in fact, the percent exposed from all sources combined is probably much higher.) In general, about one-third to one-half of those who have received a message from one of these sources indicate that the content of that message involved personal property identification. The only exception to this pattern was the public lecture where only one-fifth indicated the subject matter to have been property identification. Indeed, marking personal property was the most frequently cited message content across all message sources and across all samples.

The data in TABLES 2.3 and 2.4 indicate that a vast majority of the population has been exposed to some burglary prevention message and that a significant proportion has specific recollections as to the content.

The public's knowledge of precautionary measures is indicated by responses to the question, "Do you think there are any steps you personally could take to prevent or deter the burglary of your home?" Responses to the "pre" survey indicate a high positive response to the question ranging from 78.7% in the Twin Cities sample, to 89.2% in the suburbs (see TABLE 2.5).

Responses to the "post" survey show increases in the Twin Cities and state samples and a minor decrease in the suburban sample. Across the state, 85.4% of the respondents indicated a knowledge of steps to take in order to avoid burglary.

TABLE 2.5						
"DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ANY STEPS YOU PERSONALLY COULD TAKE TO PREVENT OR DETER THE BURGLARY OF YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT)?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	252 (78.7%)	271 (88.9%)	141 (89.2%)	140 (87.5%)	332 (82.0%)	346 (85.4%)
No	46 (14.4%)	26 (8.5%)	12 (7.6%)	18 (11.2%)	46 (11.4%)	45 (11.1%)
Other	22 (6.8%)	8 (2.6%)	5 (3.1%)	2 (1.2%)	27 (6.7%)	14 (3.5%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

Crucial to the evaluation of whether or not learning is taking place is the question of changed behavior. Do people actually take action based upon the information contained in the crime prevention messages to which they have been exposed?

When respondents were asked whether they take any steps to secure their homes or apartments when going out for awhile, a vast majority of the "pre" respondents indicated that they take steps to secure their residences (see TABLE 2.6).

TABLE 2.6						
"DO YOU IN FACT TAKE ANY STEPS TO SECURE YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT) IF YOU ARE GOING TO BE OUT FOR AWHILE AND NO ONE WILL BE HOME?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	294 (91.9%)	285 (93.4%)	141 (89.2%)	147 (91.9%)	346 (85.4%)	361 (89.1%)
No	19 (5.9%)	19 (6.2%)	14 (8.9%)	10 (6.3%)	52 (12.8%)	42 (10.4%)
Other	7 (2.2%)	1 (0.3%)	3 (1.9%)	3 (1.8%)	7 (1.8%)	2 (0.5%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

Of the respondents, 85.4% statewide, 91.9% in the Twin Cities and 89.2% in the suburbs claimed to take preventive steps when going out for awhile. Results of the "post" survey show increases in all samples from an already very high level.

A second behavioral question asked, "Do you take any steps to secure

your home or apartment when you go to bed at night?" Results indicate that a larger majority of Minnesotans take precautions in this situation. Before MCW, 89.1% (state sample) and 93.8% (Twin Cities sample) of the respondents claimed to secure their residences at night (see TABLE 2.7).

TABLE 2.7						
"DO YOU TAKE ANY STEPS TO SECURE YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT) WHEN YOU GO TO BED AT NIGHT?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	300 (93.8%)	294 (96.4%)	145 (91.8%)	153 (95.6%)	361 (89.1%)	373 (92.1%)
No	12 (3.7%)	8 (2.6%)	11 (7.0%)	4 (2.5%)	40 (9.9%)	29 (7.2%)
Other	8 (2.5%)	3 (1.0%)	2 (1.2%)	3 (1.9%)	4 (1.0%)	3 (0.7%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

The "post" results show an increase in each sample, with 92.1% of the respondents statewide and 96.4% of those in the Twin Cities taking precautions.

The third and final situation presented in the surveys dealt with security steps taken when leaving the house or apartment for a weekend or longer vacation. Again, nearly 90% of those questioned indicated that before MCW they took security steps (see TABLE 2.8).

TABLE 2.8						
"DO YOU TAKE ANY STEPS TO SECURE YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT) IF YOU GO AWAY FOR A WEEKEND OR A LONGER VACATION?"						
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Yes	283 (88.4%)	281 (92.1%)	141 (89.2%)	143 (89.4%)	364 (89.9%)	358 (88.4%)
No	22 (6.9%)	5 (1.6%)	5 (3.2%)	4 (2.5%)	26 (6.4%)	23 (5.7%)
Other	15 (4.7%)	19 (6.3%)	12 (7.6%)	13 (8.1%)	15 (3.7%)	24 (6.0%)
TOTALS:	320	305	158	160	405	405

The results of the "post" survey were not as consistent as the responses to the preceding questions. The Twin Cities and suburban samples increased and the state sample decreased slightly.

Due to the high percentages of respondents who claimed to take precautionary measures prior to MCW, it is probably unreasonable to expect the MCW public education campaign to increase substantially such positive responses. However, the public education effort encouraged, and possibly increased, the use of specific measures that have proven to be the most effective deterrents. For example, although 90% of Minnesotans take preventive steps, some may be taking steps that are insufficient (such as turning on the lights or telling a neighbor they will not be at home, but not locking all doors). The MCW public education effort should present the most effective deterrent measures and encourage the public to take notice and to make use of all these steps.

In the three situations presented, the same general actions were specified by respondents as being precautions they take to secure their residences.

In each sample, the majority of response categories showed increases in the percentage of respondents citing each measure. In the state sample, eleven categories out of sixteen increased; in the Twin Cities, twelve; and in the suburbs, nine.

In regard to precautions taken when going out for awhile, the most frequent response was "locking the doors" (see TABLE 2.9).

In each sample, the percentage who mentioned locking doors increased from "pre" to "post." The response of locking windows decreased in all samples. The response of telling a neighbor also decreased, except in the Twin Cities sample.

TABLE 2.9

"DO YOU IN FACT TAKE ANY STEPS TO SECURE YOUR (HOME, APARTMENT)
IF YOU ARE GOING TO BE GONE FOR AWHILE AND NO ONE WILL BE HOME?"

Specific steps mentioned as being taken.

TYPES OF SECURITY	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL		SUBURBS		STATE	
	PRE	POST	PRE	POST	PRE	POST
Lock doors	237 (74.1%)	232 (76.1%)	106 (67.1%)	126 (78.6%)	287 (70.9%)	295 (72.8%)
Lock windows	113 (35.3%)	84 (27.5%)	46 (29.1%)	46 (28.7%)	119 (29.4%)	92 (22.7%)
Tell a neighbor I'm going out	74 (23.1%)	77 (25.2%)	34 (21.5%)	27 (16.9%)	96 (23.7%)	84 (20.7%)
Turn on an alarm system	7 (2.2%)	5 (1.6%)	4 (2.5%)	4 (2.5%)	7 (1.7%)	4 (1.0%)
Leave outside lights on	10 (3.1%)	20 (6.6%)	9 (5.7%)	28 (17.5%)	8 (2.0%)	30 (7.4%)
Leave inside lights on	86 (26.9%)	109 (35.7%)	42 (26.6%)	77 (48.1%)	68 (16.8%)	113 (27.9%)
Leave drapes and shades open	8 (2.5%)	20 (6.6%)	3 (1.9%)	19 (11.9%)	3 (0.7%)	20 (4.9%)
Have deadbolt doors, special locks	13 (4.1%)	21 (6.9%)	4 (2.5%)	15 (9.4%)	6 (1.5%)	18 (4.4%)
Have through-frame pins on rods on sliding doors	---	1 (0.3%)	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	2 (0.5%)	4 (1.0%)
Set automatic timers for lights	15 (4.7%)	21 (6.9%)	16 (10.1%)	16 (10.0%)	9 (2.2%)	18 (4.4%)
Have a guard dog	18 (5.6%)	22 (7.2%)	17 (10.8%)	26 (16.2%)	18 (4.4%)	31 (7.7%)
Operation Identification	5 (1.6%)	12 (3.9%)	5 (3.2%)	6 (3.7%)	8 (2.0%)	6 (1.5%)
Tell police	12 (3.7%)	11 (3.6%)	11 (7.0%)	1 (0.6%)	25 (6.2%)	17 (4.2%)
Lock garage	5 (1.6%)	6 (2.0%)	3 (1.9%)	6 (3.7%)	4 (1.0%)	12 (3.0%)
Stop deliveries	13 (4.1%)	26 (8.5%)	12 (7.6%)	6 (3.7%)	10 (2.5%)	25 (6.2%)
All others	9 (2.8%)	8 (2.6%)	1 (0.6%)	3 (1.9%)	9 (2.2%)	19 (4.7%)
TOTAL RESPONSES:	625	675	314	407	678	788
N:	320	305	158	160	405	405
AVERAGE NUMBER OF STEPS PER RESPONDENT:	1.95	2.21	1.99	2.54	1.67	1.95

Another response that showed a consistent increase from "pre" to "post" was leaving an inside light on. In the suburban sample, this response increased 11.8%, with an 11.1% increase in the state sample. Less frequently mentioned precautions that increased consistently were: leaving an outside light on, leaving the drapes and shades open, using automatic timer for lights, having a guard dog, having deadbolt locks, and locking the garage. TABLE 2.9 also shows the average number of steps taken per respondent. In each of the three samples, there was a significant increase from the "pre" to the "post" surveys. Not only did the largest increase occur in the suburban sample, but these respondents also took the largest number of steps per person.

Respondents indicated similar steps taken when going to bed at night. Most frequent responses again were locking doors, locking windows, and leaving inside lights on.

"Pre" survey results suggest that a large percentage of Minnesotans (85.2% in the state sample and 90.9% in the Twin Cities sample) lock their doors at night. Each sample increased slightly in the "post" survey, so that nearly 90% of all respondents specified that they locked their doors at night. Locking the windows was the second most popular precaution. Again there was a consistent increase from "pre" to "post." The most noticeable increase occurred in the response of leaving the drapes and shades open.

Steps taken when going away for the weekend or longer were again similar, with one major exception. The most frequent response was telling a neighbor of the departure. Although the "post" response decreased in every sample, nearly 60% of all respondents indicated that they take this precaution. As might be expected, locking doors and locking windows were the next most frequent responses (although they, too, decreased consistently in the "post" results). Visual precautions, such as making arrangements for mail, newspapers, and deliveries, using an automatic timer to turn on lights, leaving inside lights on, and having the lawn mowed were next most frequent, with most samples showing "pre" to "post" increases.

The situation of going on vacation evoked certain responses not mentioned in the two previous situations. As with the responses of stopping newspaper and mail deliveries (mentioned above), nearly as many respondents stated that they inform the police of their departure. Unlike the visual precaution increases, the "post" results for "telling the police" decreased in each sample. Apparently, Minnesotans are nearly six times as likely to tell their

neighbors of a vacation than to tell the police.

In all three situations suggested by the Quayle survey and discussed above, there are many increases in the "post" responses concerning use of preventive measures to secure residences. However, responses to many of the available precautions are low, and the increases in most cases are small. Perhaps more crime prevention exposure is necessary before significant MCW impact on people's actions to secure their homes and apartments can be shown.

Conclusions

As measured by the "pre" and "post" Quayle surveys, there has been an increased public awareness of the problem of crime in the community. The data also indicate that, when compared to the "pre" survey, a significantly larger number of people in the "post" survey had been exposed to information concerning home security. This suggests that MCW has been effective in reaching the people with its message. However, this increase in awareness and exposure has not led to dramatic increases in the use of home security precautions. This is due in part to the high percentage of people who prior to the implementation of the MCW public education campaign took some steps to prevent burglary. Also, it is perhaps too soon to determine the extent to which MCW has been able to influence people to take either a larger number of steps or more effective ones in regard to home security.

c) Summary of Awareness and Education:

1) Awareness of crime in the community is up. This awareness seems to have increased most significantly in communities with active crime prevention programs (the Twin Cities and the suburbs).

2) There is an increase in the number of people who have been exposed to burglary prevention messages.

3) Since approximately 90% of Minnesotans claimed to take some preventive measures prior to MCW, it would be difficult for MCW to increase this figure substantially. There is some evidence, however, that Minnesotans are taking more steps per person now than prior to MCW. Given the short time between the "pre" and "post" surveys, it is remarkable that any increases in behavior were noted.

3. Cost Analysis for Promotion

During year one, MCW spent a total of \$86,939.75 for materials in its statewide promotion of crime prevention. This figure breaks down as follows: television (\$50,261.57), radio (\$4,932.89), T.V. and radio (\$1,695.90), billboards (\$2,146.81), newspaper and magazine advertising (\$15,628.32), bus and outdoor posters (\$4,429.59), movie trailer (\$6,000.00), slide for Met Center (\$144.67), and Bus-O-Rama (\$1,700.00).

This sum represents 41.32% of the contract with the advertising firm of Chuck Ruhr Associates during year one; thus, 41.32% of the agency fee paid to Ruhr (\$18,776.13) and 5.0% (project director's estimate) of the materials produced by Ruhr for MCW office use (\$169.59) must be added to the total. This amounts to an additional \$18,945.77.

The MCW project director estimates that 15% of her time was spent on the development and dissemination of promotional materials during year one. Thus, it is appropriate to add 15% of the project director's salary and fringe benefits (\$1,866.55) to the above figures.

Therefore, the total direct cost of promotional activities during year one is \$107,751.33.

In year two, the MCW contract with Chuck Ruhr Associates entailed

expenditures for the following items: television (\$74,879.55), radio (\$254.59), billboards (\$2,743.14), newspaper and magazine advertising (\$2,853.73), posters (\$3,433.56), movie trailers, etc. (\$3,134.30), and corridor display for Met Center (\$1,163.02).

In year two, promotional materials accounted for 54.31% of the Ruhr expenditures. Thus, this percentage of the agency fee paid to Ruhr (\$14,935.25) and 5% of the materials produced by Ruhr for MCW office use (\$145.13) has been added to the above items.

In addition, the project director has estimated that 15% of her time and 5% of the administrative assistant's time was spent on promotional activities during year two. These proportions of their respective salaries and fringe benefits (a total of \$3,723.97) have been added to the direct cost estimate for promotional activities in year two, bringing the total expended in this area to \$107,121.11, a sum almost identical to the year-one total.

Through year two then, MCW spent \$214,872.44 on promotional activities. The direct cost of spreading the MCW message across the state came to 5.6¢ per citizen (based on a statewide population of 3,805,069).

It should be noted that this cost figure represents direct expenditures only. If one were to attempt to determine the systemic cost of time and space contributed by the media as a public service and the proportional cost spent on office supplies and equipment, plus secretarial time for promotion, the cost per citizen figure would undoubtedly be considerably higher.

C. CONCLUSIONS

1. Minnesota Crime Watch has implemented a rather massive direct information campaign designed to:

- a) increase the public's awareness of crime in the community, most specifically the problem of residential burglary, and
- b) educate the public in specific measures designed to prevent residential burglary, with emphasis on the Operation Identification program.

2. In terms of promotion, the magnitude of Minnesota Crime Watch's information effort has unquestionably resulted in an economy that could not have been achieved by independent, local promotional efforts. The content of the promotion is also a strength.

3. The success of this promotion has been measured in part by the Quayle surveys which indicated:

- a) substantial success in "increasing the citizens' awareness of crime in the community,"
- b) some success in creating an increased perception of burglary as a problem,
- c) a significant increase in the number of people receiving information pertaining to home security, and
- d) a slight increase in the number of steps citizens take to secure their premises.

4. Through its second year, Minnesota Crime Watch expended approximately \$214,872.44 on promotional activities, or about 5.6¢ per citizen.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of observations from this section and the analyses in the "Premise Security" section later in this report, it is recommended that

Minnesota Crime Watch develop promotional materials for use by local agencies who wish to publicize specific programs such as premise surveys which encourage citizens to actually implement measures to make their premises more secure.

SECTION 3:

LOCAL AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Goals and Objectives

Although Minnesota Crime Watch is a statewide crime prevention program, the project management repeatedly has stressed the importance of local law enforcement efforts. As discussed in the previous section of this report, MCW's direct public informational campaign (using television, radio, newspapers, and outdoor advertising) is supplemental to the local agency (indirect public information) effort. Also, the MCW organizational manual states that "it is vital to recognize . . . that [MCW] is a local program in its execution and implementation. For MCW to succeed, each participating agency must put its wholehearted support and effort into the job."

Local agency effort is directed toward all of the long-range goals and the five program objectives, with specific emphasis on the following:

GOALS: 2) To bring about a reorientation within police departments toward crime prevention activities

sub-goal a) by 1979, every Minnesota law enforcement agency larger than 20 officers shall have established a minimum commitment of 40 hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities.

3) To improve the relationship and cooperation between the police and the community.

OBJECTIVES: 3) To educate and train citizens . . . in the specific measures they can undertake to help prevent such crimes as residential and commercial burglary, shoplifting, theft from person and auto theft, and person-to-person street crimes.

- 4) To involve organized citizen and youth groups in crime prevention activities as well as using them to inform and involve others in the community.

2. Background

Local agency activity in MCW begins with the enlistment of local police and sheriff's offices as members. Upon enlistment, MCW coordinates various activities with the local agencies. MCW gives its most widespread assistance in supplying local agencies with crime prevention materials intended for local distribution. These materials are sent to each agency according to formulae based on the agencies' populations served. (Another major project-directed activity is the training of local agencies in crime prevention. This activity is the focus of the "Crime Prevention Training" section of this report.)

Specific local agency activities include duties within the department (such as in-service training and the functions of crime prevention officers and units) and activities within the community (such as securing the aid of local citizens and groups to assist in the distribution of crime prevention materials). The main objective of local agency activity is to educate citizens about the problems of crime and the preventive steps available to them. MCW does offer guidelines and supporting materials to each agency for use in educating the public, but the project encourages each participating agency to develop its own ideas to meet individual community needs. These ideas are then shared with other agencies through a MCW-coordinated agency information exchange in the form of a newsletter.

3. Evaluation Outline

The following evaluation will focus on four areas:

- a) the enlistment of agencies into MCW,
- b) the distribution of materials to member agencies for further dissemination,
- c) the nature and extent of member agency crime prevention activities, and
- d) a cost analysis involving the materials distributed by MCW and the manpower costs borne by member agencies for crime prevention activities.

B. EVALUATION

1. Enlistment of Law Enforcement Agencies

During the first year of funding, Minnesota Crime Watch contacted all Minnesota law enforcement agencies as part of the project's active recruitment. In July of 1973, Minnesota Crime Watch sent the 66 largest agencies an introductory letter which explained the program and invited them to join the program and attend the first training session. Agencies selected were all police departments serving populations of 10,000 or more and all sheriff's offices serving 25,000 or more. Fifty-seven police departments and eight sheriff's offices responded favorably to the invitation. These sixty-five agencies formed the original Minnesota Crime Watch membership.

In addition to the July session, MCW held five orientation sessions at different locations throughout the state in September, 1973. All agencies not invited to the July training session were invited to attend one of the orientation sessions and to join MCW.

It should be noted that MCW has specified no goals or quotas in regard to agency enlistment. MCW has never emphasized a high enlistment percentage. Instead, the project has aimed at enlisting enough agencies to offer crime prevention programs to all Minnesotans. MCW's progress in this regard is

examined later in this section.

Since the July, 1973, letter of invitation, Minnesota Crime Watch has had no sustained recruitment effort to enlist agencies. In order to increase its membership, the project has depended on the initiative of non-member agencies, which has been inspired by:

- 1) Minnesota Crime Watch's public information campaign,
- 2) word-of-mouth from member agencies,
- 3) encouragement from citizens who desire to join Operation Identification,
- 4) the motivation provided by Minnesota Crime Watch's distribution of crime prevention materials at no charge to the participant,
- 5) delayed reaction to the first-year recruitment effort, and
- 6) perceived success of the Minnesota Crime Watch program.

The current process of becoming a participant is described below. Upon receiving an indication from the department that it is interested in joining, Minnesota Crime Watch sends a letter outlining the goals and aims of the project. Included is a form that asks for some basic information such as the size of the department and population served. MCW requests agreement from the agency to devote at least eight hours per week to crime prevention activity. Upon receipt of the information, MCW lists the agency as a participant and sends materials with which to start local crime prevention programs. Agencies are encouraged to submit monthly reports on the progress of their crime prevention activities. These reports, as outlined in the first-year grant, ask for information on: 1) community group participation, 2) number of people taking part in distribution of materials, 3) numbers of speakers and presentations given, and number of people reached, 4) press coverage, 5) number of brochures and other literature distributed, 6) citizen

participation, and 7) law enforcement agency statistics which include the number of residential burglaries, Operation Identification versus non-Operation Identification burglaries, and number of burglaries cleared by arrest.

Although MCW no longer actively recruits agencies, the number of participants has increased sharply since the enlistment of the original 65 members.

As of March, 1975, the regional participant figures were (see APPENDIX F for a map of the criminal justice regions in Minnesota):

- Region A -- 8 police departments, 11 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 19 agencies.
- Region B -- 12 police departments, 6 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 18 agencies.
- Region C -- 11 police departments, 8 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 19 agencies.
- Region D -- 23 police departments, 12 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 35 agencies.
- Region E -- 27 police departments, 12 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 39 agencies.
- Region F -- 35 police departments, 13 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 48 agencies.
- Region G -- 67 police departments, 7 sheriff's offices,
for a total of 74 agencies.

State totals as of June, 1975, show enlistment of 183 police departments and 69 sheriff's offices. Of a total of 633 law enforcement agencies in the state, 252 were participating in Minnesota Crime Watch.

There are various methods of examining the effectiveness of Minnesota Crime Watch's agency enlistment. First, regional comparisons of enlistment penetration, burglary statistics, and population will indicate whether or not Minnesota Crime Watch enlistment is effective in reaching the regions having burglary problems and population concentrations. Second, regional

comparison of burglary rates of participant versus non-participant agencies (based on their rates prior to joining Minnesota Crime Watch) will indicate if agencies with serious burglary problems have been enlisted within each region. Third, an analysis of population served by participant agencies will determine the extent to which Minnesota Crime Watch's members can reach the citizens of Minnesota.

Enlistment as of March, 1975, burglary rates of 1974, regional percentage of 1974 burglary in Minnesota, population (based on 1970 census data), and population served by Minnesota Crime Watch participant agencies are presented in TABLE 3.1. The table ranks each region from highest to lowest based on these variables.

TABLE 3.1					
REGIONAL RANKING OF AGENCY ENLISTMENT, BURGLARY AND POPULATION ^a					
<u>RANK</u>	<u>Regions Ranked by % of Agency Enlistment^b</u>	<u>Re- gion</u> <u>% of Minn. Popu- lation</u>	<u>Re- gion</u> <u>Burglary Rate (Per 100,000)</u>	<u>Re- gion</u> <u>% of Minn. Bur- glary</u>	
1 hi	G	G - 49.3%	G - 1,609.1	G - 69.6%	
2	B	F - 15.8	B - 1,080.4	B - 8.2	
3	D	D - 9.6	C - 826.4	F - 8.2	
4	E	B - 8.7	D - 803.3	D - 6.7	
5	F	E - 7.9	F - 592.1	C - 3.5	
6	C	C - 4.9	A - 443.8	E - 2.1	
7 lo	A	A - 3.9	E - 306.8	A - 1.5	
^a Based on 1974 Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) data and 1970 census figures.					
^b Based on agency participation through February, 1975.					

As shown, Region G has the highest burglary rate (1,609.1), the highest regional percentage of burglary (69.6%), and the highest regional percentage

of population (49.3%). Region G also has the highest number of member agencies among the regions. The member agencies in Region G served 100% of the Region G population. The data for Region G seem to indicate that Minnesota Crime Watch's enlistment has been effective in securing its highest percentage of enlistment in this region of highest population, burglary percentage, and burglary rate.

Figures for Region B offer further support for Minnesota Crime Watch's enlistment effectiveness. Region B has the second highest regional percentage of 1974 Minnesota burglary (8.2%), and it has the second highest regional burglary rate (1,080.4). Region B also has the second highest regional enlistment percentage.

The pattern established in Regions G and B is not clearly followed in viewing data from Regions C, D, E, and F. Comparisons of Regions D, E, F, and C based on their respective enlistment rankings (from third to sixth) are less clear than those of Regions G and B because of the small differences between the third and sixth ranks.

The pattern set by Regions G and B reappears in the data from Region A. The data from Regions G and B indicated that Minnesota Crime Watch's highest enlistment has occurred in the regions of highest burglary and population. Region A statistics follow this pattern at the other extreme. Region A has the lowest regional population, the lowest regional percentage of 1974 Minnesota burglary, and the lowest percentage of agencies enlisted in Minnesota Crime Watch.

In conclusion, TABLE 3.1 shows significant regional relationships that can be viewed as a measure of Minnesota Crime Watch's enlistment effectiveness.

Although the data of the middle-ranked regions are inconclusive, the table as a whole indicates a correlation among enlistment, burglary statistics, and population.

The second measure of Minnesota Crime Watch's enlistment effectiveness concerns the burglary rates of participant agencies prior to the inception of Minnesota Crime Watch. In 6 of 7 regions (according to 1970 figures), the mean burglary rates of agencies who became Minnesota Crime Watch participants were greater than the rates of agencies who are non-members. This comparison suggests that in six of the seven regions, the agencies with the most significant burglary problems enlisted in the program.

The third measure of effectiveness is the population that is served by Minnesota Crime Watch participant agencies. A regional breakdown of "population served" is presented in TABLE 3.2. Based on 1970 census figures for Minnesota, the 252 Minnesota Crime Watch participant agencies serve 83.8% of all Minnesota residents. The 83.8% figure is based on the BCA definition of "population served" by a county sheriff. The BCA defines the population under a sheriff's jurisdiction as those county residents who are not served by a local police department.

Since Minnesota Crime Watch includes the entire county population as being served if the sheriff's office is a Minnesota Crime Watch participant (because the county sheriff is expected to provide crime prevention services to those communities being served by non-participant agencies), the population served using this method indicates 94.7% of the state's population is served by participant agencies.

TABLE 3.2
POPULATION SERVED BY
AGENCIES PARTICIPATING IN MCW, BY REGION^a

Region	Total Population	POPULATION SERVED BY MCW AGENCIES		% OF POPULA- TION SERVED	
		BCA Definition	MCW Definition	BCA	MCW
A	149,173	118,112	134,783	79.2%	90.4%
B	329,603	286,761	319,756	87.0	97.0
C	185,376	175,010	176,435	94.4	95.2
D	363,493	308,547	331,567	84.9	91.2
E	301,598	231,827	237,383	76.9	78.7
F	601,446	362,302	530,168	60.2	88.1
G	1,874,380	1,707,462	1,874,380	91.1	100.0
STATE	3,805,069	3,190,021	3,604,472	83.8	94.7

^aAgency data complete through March 1, 1975.

In summary, the number of agencies in Minnesota Crime Watch has shown a steady increase since Minnesota Crime Watch's statewide invitation of July, 1973; 65 of the state's law enforcement agencies joined immediately, another 115 joined before April, 1974, and 72 have joined since then for a June, 1975, total of 252.

Although 252 of Minnesota's law enforcement agencies are Minnesota Crime Watch members, the participants include 75.0% of the county sheriffs with 100% of Region G sheriffs. The participant agencies serve 83.8% (94.7% according to the MCW definition) of the people in Minnesota. Finally, the enlistment of agencies in Minnesota Crime Watch seems to be highest in regions that also show high population and burglary.

2. Distribution of Materials to Member Agencies

Once enlisted as MCW participants, the local law enforcement agencies depend on the project headquarters to supply MCW materials necessary to conduct crime prevention programs within the communities. Distribution of materials is contingent upon enlistment of agencies. Materials are given to all participant agencies; an agency cannot receive materials

without joining the Minnesota Crime Watch program.

Materials supplied by Minnesota Crime Watch often complement the training provided by the project. The materials which are sent to new members -- that are also covered in training -- include information on the aims and objectives of Minnesota Crime Watch, instructions for instituting a crime prevention program, and directions for implementing a crime prevention unit within the law enforcement agency. Other materials include press information, speech outlines, monthly reporting forms, property engravers, and a variety of brochures, booklets, and stickers. These materials are distributed at no cost to the agency, although it is requested that the agency agree to devote at least eight hours per week to crime prevention activity.

Certain materials, such as three slide presentations and the "Crime Watch" manual, are issued to each participating agency. Other materials, such as posters, bumper stickers, and yard/construction site signs, are distributed on the basis of agency need. The remaining stickers, brochures, engravers, and pamphlets are intended for public distribution, and they are supplied to each participant agency according to formulae based on the population served.

The formula for distribution of Operation Identification stickers, which are displayed on potential burglary targets in order to signify membership in the burglary prevention program, entitles each participating agency to a total number of stickers (large and small sizes combined) equal to 25% of the population served. The number of Operation Identification brochures, which along with Operation Identification stickers are distributed to the public by each agency, is based on 45% of the total stickers. Personal

Protection Brochures, which are intended to educate and sensitize the public to crime prevention, are sent to the agencies at the rate of 33% of the number of Operation Identification brochures distributed to the agencies. Commercial Security Booklets, designed for businesses interested in burglary prevention, are dispensed at the rate of 1% of the population served by the agency. Departments are able to reorder any of these materials as they are needed at no charge. MCW developed these formulae in an attempt to determine "minimum need" for each type of material.

In order to analyze MCW's efficiency in distribution of materials, "proposed" totals are compared with "actual" totals. The proposed totals were generated from MCW's distribution formulae, and these totals serve as indicators of the demand for such materials and MCW's ability to meet that demand.

Minnesota Crime Watch proposed a statewide total of 873,380 Operation Identification stickers for distribution to participant agencies. According to MCW, a total of 2,362,230 stickers were sent out to agencies, or 270.5% of what the project expected the need to be.

Statistics for brochures indicate even higher percentages of "actual" to "proposed" materials. A statewide total of 393,022 was proposed. Based on Minnesota Crime Watch records; 1,437,280 (365.7%) were dispensed.

The actual distribution totals of Operation Identification stickers and brochures are significantly higher than the proposed totals, indicating that MCW has been extremely efficient in the distribution of these materials.

Distribution of engravers is the only exception to MCW's high efficiency in providing materials to participant agencies. Engravers are considered to

be the property of the individual agencies, and they are given to the public for temporary use. The engravers are dispensed to the individual agencies according to the proposed number of stickers divided by 500. The proposed statewide total of engravers was 1,747, and there was a shortage of engravers during part of year two.

In the spring of 1975, MCW sent all member agencies the same number of engravers sent to them originally to replace all that were no longer operating properly and to alleviate the shortage of engravers which had existed previously.

3. Member Agency Activities

In addition to the distribution of materials to member agencies, other important indicators of MCW's success are:

- a) the number of crime prevention officers and units in the state,
- b) the extent of activities carried out by these officers and units, and
- c) the extent to which member agencies have been able to enlist community support for crime prevention.

The data collected in the March, 1975, survey of member agencies make it possible to examine these crime prevention activities at the local level.

a) Crime Prevention Officers and Units:

The March, 1975, telephone survey asked member agencies to specify "the total number of officers in crime prevention activity (through February 28, 1975)." Data were not available for 35 agencies, and of the remaining 201, 191 had at least one officer engaged in crime prevention activity (see TABLE 3.3).

Since all MCW member agencies have a contact person for Minnesota Crime Watch, the 10 agencies who reported no officers in crime prevention activity probably interpreted this question as implying more than just receiving materials from MCW.

TABLE 3.3		
<u>OFFICERS IN CRIME PREVENTION</u>		
<u>Number of Officers in Crime Prevention</u>	<u>Number of Agencies</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	10	5.0%
1	79	39.3
2	37	18.4
3 - 4	38	18.9
5 - 9	25	12.4
10 +	12	6.0
TOTALS:	201	100.0%
Not Available	35	

Seventy-nine agencies had only one officer involved, 37 had two, and 75 had three or more. Forty-five (22.4%) of the member agencies for whom data were available indicated that they had formally designated crime prevention units.

An additional measure of agency commitment to crime prevention is whether local funds are allocated to these activities. Only 23 member agencies reported formal allocation of funds to crime prevention activities. Of these 23, six spent less than \$1,000.00, six spent between \$1,000.00 - \$4,500.00, and ten spent over \$4,500.00.

b) Activities Related to Crime Prevention:

Two questions in the telephone survey relate to the crime prevention activity level of member agencies -- the average number of hours devoted

to crime prevention by the agency, and the average number of crime prevention presentations given by the agency each month.

Hours Devoted to Crime Prevention Activity

Minnesota Crime Watch has sought to obtain a minimum commitment of eight hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities from each of its member agencies. As can be seen in TABLE 3.4, they do not seem to have achieved this goal with the majority of their members.

Of the 201 member agencies for whom complete data were available, only 42% have met or surpassed the goal of eight hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities.

On the other hand, 93.6% of these agencies surveyed are committing some hours each week to crime prevention, and twenty agencies (10%) are providing the equivalent of one full-time person (40 hours) in crime prevention activities each week.

TABLE 3.4		
<u>HOURS DEVOTED TO CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES</u>		
<u>Hours Devoted to Crime Prevention per Week</u>	<u>Number of Agencies</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	13	6.5%
1 - 7	103	51.2
8	14	7.0
9 - 24	45	22.4
25 - 39	6	3.0
40 +	20	10.0
TOTALS:	201	100.1%
Not Available	35	

While one might suppose that it would be the smaller agencies around the state who might not have the manpower to meet this goal, there is some

evidence to indicate that size of department may not be the most important variable. Of the fifty agencies surveyed in March who had over 20 officers, 18 (36%) were providing less than eight hours per week of crime prevention activities.

Crime Prevention Presentations

A second indication of crime prevention activity in the community is the average number of crime prevention presentations made by the agency each month. Only 26% of the agencies for whom data were available responded that they did not make such presentations, and twelve agencies (5.9%) responded that they made four or more a month (see TABLE 3.5).

TABLE 3.5		
<u>NUMBER OF PRESENTATIONS PER MONTH</u>		
<u>Number of Presentations per Month</u>	<u>Number of Agencies</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	53	26.0%
1	72	35.3
2	38	18.6
3	29	14.2
4 +	12	5.9
TOTALS:	204	100.0%
Not Available	32	

c) Community Support:

The third indication of MCW's success at the local level is the extent to which member agencies have been able to enlist the support of local groups in their crime prevention efforts.

TABLE 3.6 shows that 66.5% of the member agencies for whom data were available have been successful in recruiting at least one local group to help them, and 16 agencies (7.4%) have four or more groups which aid them in their

crime prevention activities.

TABLE 3.6		
<u>ENLISTMENT OF ASSISTANCE FROM LOCAL GROUPS</u>		
<u>Number of Groups Assisting</u>	<u>Number of Agencies</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
0	72	33.5%
1	64	29.8
2	41	19.1
3	22	10.2
4 +	16	7.4
TOTALS:	215	100.0%
Not Available	21	

TABLE 3.7 indicates the types of groups most often recruited by member agencies. Commercial and local service organizations comprise almost two-thirds of those assisting the agencies.

TABLE 3.7		
<u>TYPES OF GROUPS ASSISTING</u>		
<u>Types of Groups Recruited (Multiple Responses Possible)</u>	<u>Number of Times Mentioned</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Commercial/Business	105	38.0%
Local Service Organizations	67	24.3
Youth Groups	34	12.3
Other	70	25.4
TOTALS:	276	100.0%

The services most often provided by these groups are aiding the agency in the distribution of materials and encouraging citizens to enroll in Operation Identification (see TABLE 3.8).

TABLE 3.8		
<u>TYPES OF ASSISTANCE RECEIVED</u>		
<u>Types of Assistance</u> <u>(Multiple Responses Possible)</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Times</u> <u>Mentioned</u>	<u>Percent</u> <u>of Total</u>
Enrollment in Operation I.D.	43	16.2%
Distribution of Materials	91	34.2
Engravers Supplied	15	5.6
Publicity	37	13.9
Other	80	30.1
TOTALS:	266	100.0%

In addition, 79 (33.5%) agencies reported that they have been successful in getting groups to provide more than one type of assistance, and 59 (25%) reported receiving financial assistance from local groups for their crime prevention activities. This financial assistance ranged from less than \$50.00 in the case of 15 agencies to over \$250.00 for 16 agencies.

As one might suspect, larger departments with larger budgets allocated to crime prevention, a larger population served, and more hours devoted to crime prevention activities tend to have more local groups aiding them and obtain more types of assistance from these groups. But as can be seen in TABLE 3.9, many of the departments serving small communities in the state have also been able to obtain a variety of types of assistance from a variety of groups. It would appear from these findings that a strong departmental initiative and commitment to crime prevention may produce the same degree of local commitment in smaller communities as one finds in larger ones.

TABLE 3.9				
NUMBER OF LOCAL GROUPS HELPING AGENCY				
by				
POPULATION SERVED (1970)				
(only agencies receiving assistance are included)				
Number of Groups	P O P U L A T I O N			
	260 - 2,950	2,951 - 13,450	13,451 - 50,000	Over 50,000
1	22 (66.7%)	18 (38.3%)	11 (26.8%)	1 (16.7%)
2	7 (21.2%)	18 (38.3%)	13 (31.7%)	1 (16.7%)
3	2 (6.1%)	7 (14.9%)	10 (24.4%)	1 (16.7%)
4 +	2 (6.1%)	4 (8.5%)	7 (17.1%)	3 (50.0%)
TOTALS:	33	47	41	6

Additional assistance to the Operation Identification program has come from two insurance companies. The Mutual Services Insurance Company and the Saint Paul Companies each offer 5% discounts on homeowners insurance rates to policy holders who are members of Operation Identification. These rate reductions provide an additional stimulus for citizens to join the program.

Also, the "Vandalism and Theft" committee of the Associated General Contractors of Minnesota has offered unique help to the Operation Identification effort. This group has produced a three-foot square construction site sign similar in function and design to the MCW-issued yard/construction site sign. Copies of this sign have been made available to members of the Associated General Contractors of Minnesota who also are participants of Operation Identification.

Finally, use of specific media by MCW member agency personnel deserves mention. Although complete data is unavailable, it should be noted that many officers have used television, radio, and newspaper columns to spread the crime prevention message. In addition, newspaper articles written by reporters across the state have given MCW and local crime prevention activities extensive exposure.

4. Cost Analysis for Local Agency Implementation

The unit cost analysis is comprised of two sections: 1) the direct cost of materials produced by MCW for distribution by local agencies, and 2) an estimate of the manpower costs of crime prevention activities carried out by member agencies.

In year one, the contract with Chuck Ruhr Associates involved expenditures for the following items: engravers (\$7,664.91), police manuals (\$3,043.70), brochures (\$36,484.55), presentation materials (\$26,879.87), posters (\$6,817.28), Operation Identification stickers (\$34,605.63), and bumper stickers (\$6,899.62), for a total of \$122,395.65. Since 58.17% of the Ruhr contract was for the production of these materials, that proportion of the agency fee and project materials (\$28,405.98) has been added to the above total.

In addition, the project director estimated that 25% of her time was spent on the development and distribution of these materials during year one. Thus 25% of her salary and fringe benefits (\$3,110.97) has been added to the cost figures above for a year-one total expenditure in this area of \$153,912.60.

In year two, the expenditures for materials distributed to local member agencies breaks down as follows: engravers (\$908.20), films (\$242.01), brochures (\$36,319.87), presentation materials (\$3,894.44), posters and premise signs (\$3,419.08), Operation Identification stickers (\$16,017.85), buttons (\$368.74), and cover letters (\$253.36), for a total of \$61,423.55. These materials comprised 37.71% of the Ruhr contract, thus an additional \$11,464.81 has been added to the above total representing that percentage of the agency fee and project materials in the contract.

In year two, the project director estimated that 25% of her time and 25% of the administrative assistant's time were devoted to the provision of these materials and other services to member agencies. Thus an additional \$7,986.51 has been added to the above totals which reflects these percentages of their respective salaries and fringe benefits. The total expended in year two for the provision of materials to member agencies is \$80,874.87. This amount is slightly over half (52.5%) of the amount spent in year one.

During the first two years of MCW, a total of \$234,787.47 was spent on the provision of materials to member agencies. This comes to an average of \$931.70 per agency (N = 252 as of June 30, 1975). Using population served by MCW agencies as a basis for analysis yields a per capita cost for these materials. As noted earlier, MCW and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension use slightly different definitions of population served. MCW claims that 3,604,472 citizens (94.7%) are served by MCW member agencies. This figure indicates a per capita cost of 6.5¢ for materials. The BCA definition of population served indicates that 3,190,021 citizens (83.8%) are served by MCW agencies. Using the BCA figures produces a per capita cost of 7.4¢ for materials distributed during the first two years of MCW.

In the preceding section of this evaluation, the cost for promotional activities was calculated on the basis of the population of the state. If those figures are recomputed on the basis of population served by MCW agencies, it is possible to calculate the combined per capita cost for MCW's statewide promotional activities and for the materials provided local member agencies for distribution. The results of this analysis are summarized in TABLE 3.10.

TABLE 3.10 PER CAPITA COSTS OF PROMOTIONAL ACTIVITIES BY MCW and <u>MATERIALS PROVIDED MEMBER AGENCIES FOR DISTRIBUTION</u> (first two years of MCW)			
<u>Population Served</u>	<u>Promotional Activities by MCW</u>	<u>Materials for Local Agency Distribution</u>	<u>Total Cost per Capita</u>
MCW	6.0¢	6.5¢	12.5¢
BCA	6.7¢	7.4¢	14.1¢

Thus far, the cost analysis has been limited to direct expenditures by MCW for promotion and materials. The total cost of local agency implementation involves additional expenditures of manpower and other resources. The data collected in the March, 1975, telephone survey make it possible to estimate at least one of these costs -- the hours spent by member agencies on crime prevention activities.

It should be noted that the following analysis is an estimate of only one of the costs borne by MCW member agencies. In addition to manpower costs for the time spent on crime prevention activity, one could include budgeting costs for Crime Prevention Officers and Crime Prevention Units as well as the overhead costs for each agency. These cost factors were not included due to the lack of reliable data.

The telephone survey in March asked each member agency how many hours per week they devoted to crime prevention activities. The mean number of hours reported was 14.12 per agency per week. This figure is skewed by the fact that there are a few large agencies in the state who have full-time crime prevention units. The median number of hours spent was 5.90 per week, which

is probably a better description of the distribution than the mean.

The 198 agencies responding to this question indicated that they spent a total of 2,795 hours per week on crime prevention activities. If one were to assume a conservative \$4.00 per hour wage for those engaged in these activities, this would indicate that, on the average, MCW member agencies combined are spending \$11,181.00 per week on the manpower costs of implementing crime prevention programs. This comes to a statewide total of \$581,412.00 per year or an average of \$2,219.13 per agency per year.

During year two, the total MCW costs for promotional activities and materials distributed to local agencies was \$187,995.98. If one were to add the estimated dollar value for manpower derived above (\$581,412.00) to this figure, a more accurate unit cost estimate could be calculated. This yields an estimated cost to MCW and member agencies of \$769,407.98 during year two for promotional activities, materials, and manpower expended in crime prevention activities. This works out to an average of \$3,053.21 per agency during year two.

TABLE 3.11 summarizes the per capita costs of promotion, materials and manpower expended during year two.

TABLE 3.11 UNIT COST PER CAPITA for PROMOTION, MATERIALS, AND MANPOWER (year two only)				
<u>Population Served</u>	<u>Promotional Activities by MCW</u>	<u>Materials for Local Agency Distribution</u>	<u>Manpower Costs to Agencies</u>	<u>Total Cost per Capita</u>
MCW	3.0¢	2.2¢	16.1¢	21.3¢
BCA	3.4¢	2.5¢	18.2¢	24.1¢

At this point it would be appropriate to compare these per capita costs of MCW with costs from similar programs. However, MCW is a pioneering effort, and comparative costs are not available. Perhaps future evaluations of such programs will find the MCW cost estimates valuable for purposes of comparison.

G. CONCLUSIONS

Enlistment

1. As of June, 1975, MCW had enlisted 183 of the police departments in Minnesota and 69 of the sheriff's offices, for a total of 252 of Minnesota's law enforcement agencies.
2. MCW has an informal goal of enlisting enough agencies to serve all of the citizens in Minnesota. Enlistment data as of June, 1975, show that the 252 member agencies serve 94.7% of the population based on MCW's definition of population served. (When based on the BCA definition, the percentage is 83.8%.)
3. Regional comparisons show that the highest MCW enlistment has been in Region G, the region of greatest population and burglary. Also, Region B, with the second highest burglary rate, has the second highest enlistment percentage.

Materials

4. MCW has been extremely efficient in supplying its member agencies with most crime prevention materials. In the distribution of stickers and brochures, MCW has issued approximately 2 1/2 times its proposed totals in satisfying agencies' reorders. The only exception to MCW's success in distributing materials has been their distribution of engravers, of which there

was a definite year-two shortage.

5. The provision of printed and other support material to participant agencies is certainly a major strength of the program. In light of the number of agencies participating in the program and the amount of material that must be printed and distributed to each participating agency, the project has confronted and surpassed a major logistical problem.

Local Agency Activities

Results of the March, 1975, survey indicate:

6. Forty-five (22.4%) of the 201 member agencies for whom data were available had established crime prevention units. However, 75 agencies had three or more officers engaged in crime prevention activities, and 23 agencies had official crime prevention budgets.

7. Only 42% of the member agencies for whom complete data were available had met MCW's request that agencies spend at least 8 hours per week on crime prevention activities. This is true for large and small agencies alike; 36% of agencies over 20 officers indicated that they had not met this request. Twenty agencies, however, had the equivalent of one full-time person (40 hours per week) in crime prevention.

8. Most agencies had been making crime prevention presentations to their publics, and twelve agencies indicated a schedule of four or more presentations per month.

9. Of the 215 member agencies for whom complete data were available, 143 (66.5%) had recruited assistance within their communities. Seventy-nine agencies secured help from two or more groups, and one-fourth of the agencies had received financial assistance from their communities. Recruitment

of community assistance in small communities has been nearly as successful as in larger ones.

10. Special assistance from outside the program has come from two insurance companies who offer homeowners insurance discounts to participants in Operation Identification.

Cost Analysis

11. Based on actual expenditures to the contracted advertising agency and estimates of MCW staff salary, the average cost of supplying a member agency with crime prevention materials was \$931.70. This yields a figure of 6.5¢ per person served, when based on the MCW definition of population served; the BCA definition yields a 7.4¢ figure. Estimates of the combined per capita cost of promotion, materials, and manpower expended in the year-two implementation of crime prevention programs are 21.3¢ (MCW) and 24.1¢ (BCA).

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although MCW has reached a high population served, it is recommended that active enlistment of new member agencies be resumed, and that present members be encouraged to increase their commitment to crime prevention activities.

The Quayle results indicate that in the case of one MCW program, Operation Identification, the communities with strong local agency involvement (the suburbs) have had the best results in increasing the public's awareness of the program and citizen participation. Since police departments are perhaps better able to increase community involvement than are sheriff's offices, it seems that citizen response would be improved by a closer

contact with the police. Thus, it may be advantageous for MCW to concentrate on enlisting local police departments even where the county sheriff's office is already a member.

The success of local agencies with strong crime prevention efforts in getting people to participate in Operation Identification suggests that other programs would have best results if encouraged by the local agency. Therefore, MCW should continue to encourage crime prevention activity (including non-Operation Identification activity) within departments and, in turn, within the community.

SECTION 4:

CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Goals and Objectives

In year one, the Minnesota Crime Watch grant stated as one of its goals:

- Goal 2) To bring about a reorientation within police departments toward crime prevention activities and to provide training for law enforcement agencies as to what they can do before crimes occur, as opposed to simply responding after the crime has occurred.

This goal has remained essentially the same in thrust over both years of the grant. However, the project management of Minnesota Crime Watch specified the year-two goal into two operational parts:

sub-goal a) by 1979, every Minnesota law enforcement agency larger than 20 officers shall have established a minimum commitment of 40 hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities.

sub-goal b) to provide 40 hours of crime prevention training for 90-130 law enforcement officers in Minnesota during second-year funding.

Goal 2) refers both to reorientation and to training. Although training in crime prevention is a characteristic of reorientation, it is isolated for discussion in this section because it is more tangible than is reorientation. A specific amount of training was offered in year two [as prescribed in sub-goal b)], whereas the process of reorientation involves training, crime prevention budget allocation, and hours of agency time spent in crime prevention activity, which has a target date of 1979 [as stated in sub-goal a)].

The sub-goal of providing 40 hours of crime prevention training for 90-130 law enforcement officers in Minnesota during year-two funding is supported by Objective 1) a) of the second-year grant application:

Objective 1) a) During the second year, funds are requested to conduct four one-week training sessions (two will be advanced sessions open to officers who received the introductory training at Alexandria, July 9-12, 1973; the remaining two sessions will be similar in content and orientation to the Alexandria program and will be open to officers from the smaller law enforcement agencies unable to attend the Alexandria meeting). Printed and audio-visual materials will be produced for showing and/or distribution at the training sessions.

To reiterate, Goal 2) (reorientation) is comprised of two sub-goals: a) crime prevention activities, and b) crime prevention training. The training component is supported mainly by Objective 1) a) as stated in the year-two grant application and is the focus of this section of the Minnesota Crime Watch evaluation.

2. Background

Most indicators of crime show that crime in Minnesota (as in the United States as a whole) is increasing. Annual crime rates indicate consistent increases in reported crime. Victimization surveys also reveal a general rise in crime, but such surveys show the problem to be even more ominous by suggesting that crime is occurring far more often than is indicated by standard crime rates.

Judging from the increasing crime threat to citizens and from the inability of the present approach of the criminal justice system to slow or stop the rise in crime, it is apparent that new strategies and concepts are needed. Crime prevention is a relatively new approach, and if it is accepted

as a necessary strategy in Minnesota's fight against crime, then MCW's attempt to train law enforcement personnel in crime prevention techniques is clearly appropriate.

Ideally, the crime prevention training provided by MCW would go beyond an introduction to crime prevention and would inspire law enforcement agencies to establish intensive crime prevention methods which would eventually contribute to a reduction in crime rates. However, it has not been shown that crime prevention training is adequate to accomplish these feats. Pending longer operation of MCW which will lead to accumulation of more complete data for evaluation, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the adequacy of MCW training in generating crime prevention activity so as to reduce crime rates.

Also, it is reasonable to assume that a reduction in crime rates will result not from training alone, but from a combination of training, public education programs, community crime prevention programs, and intensive local agency effort.

The only conclusion which can be drawn at this time is that the training system that MCW has implemented is adequate to reach the stipulation of Goal 2)'s sub-goal b). However, even if MCW trains the planned number of law enforcement personnel, there can be only a superficial assessment of the training's quality. Measures of quality at this point are intuitive and rely mainly on logical deductions about the appropriateness of training content. Without enough data on the effects and quality of training, evaluation of MCW crime prevention training remains difficult.

3. Evaluation Outline

The evaluation of MCW crime prevention training which follows is organized around a series of questions regarding efficiency, effectiveness, and cost.

In evaluating the efficiency with which the training was provided, two areas are investigated:

- a) the use of resources in crime prevention training, and
- b) the attainment of training objectives as defined in the grant applications.

The effectiveness of training focuses on:

- a) the impact of training on crime rates,
- b) the relationship between crime rates and the receipt of crime prevention training,
- c) the relationship between population served and training, and
- d) the extent to which MCW training has been directed at specific crime prevention measures.

The cost analysis section attempts to determine the unit cost of MCW crime prevention training and compares these costs to those of one other law enforcement training program in the state.

B. EVALUATION

1. Efficiency of Crime Prevention Training

Two questions are asked concerning the efficiency of crime prevention training:

- a) Did the use of resources as planned result in the performance of planned activities in crime prevention training?
- b) Did each crime prevention training program activity systematically attain program objectives which led to the achievement of program goals in the crime prevention training?

In the year-two grant application, Minnesota Crime Watch stated:

Training of law enforcement officers in crime prevention methods and techniques --

Four one-week training sessions will be held. Two of the sessions will be advanced courses covering in greater detail and depth the technical areas covered at the Alexandria session, July, 1973. Enrollment in these two sessions will be limited to those officers who attended the Alexandria training session and will be limited to 20-25 students.

The second two training sessions will be basic, introductory and similar in content to the Alexandria training session. The two basic sessions will be open to all law enforcement officers not in attendance at our first training, seminar. Attendance will be limited to 35-40 students at each session. Approximately 16-18 speakers will be required for each session (the same speakers will, in all likelihood, be used for more than one session). Local experts will be used where possible - particularly for such topics as locks and keys, safes, alarms, retail and commercial security, etc. It is anticipated, however, that 2 to 3 of the topics at each session will require expertise from outside Minnesota (in particular, architectural and building design, long-range planning, development and implementation of a crime prevention unit).

As of the end of year two, this planned activity has resulted in basic and advanced seminars presented at the Rodeway Inn in Bloomington between November 4 and November 15, 1974; the basic seminar held at Alexandria between April 14 and April 18, 1975; and finally, basic and advanced seminars held at the Thunderbird Motel in Bloomington, between May 27 and June 6, 1975. The resources expended by Crime Watch did lead, as planned, to the performance of the specified activities.

The goal of these sessions was to train 90-130 officers during year-two funding. Since the goal provides no criteria for measuring the quality of training, the evaluation of the project's progress toward goal attainment is restricted to an examination of the final "product" -- trained officers.

The provision of crime prevention training has been predicated on the assumption that before local police and sheriff's departments can be expected

to educate their citizens in the specific steps that could be taken to prevent property crimes, the participating officers themselves have to be trained.

Upon inspection, an even broader assumption is evident -- that training will lead to three sub-goals: (1) the officer will be able to do his job more proficiently, (2) the officer will be able to aid in educating the public, and (3) the officer will be able to reorient his peer group and others with whom he works to the concept of crime prevention as seen by Minnesota Crime Watch. To achieve these sub-goals, MCW began its training program in July, 1973.

Year-One Training

The first orientation and training session was held from July 9 to July 12, 1973, at Alexandria, Minnesota. This session was limited to all police departments serving populations over 10,000 and all sheriff's departments serving populations of 25,000 or more. Sixty-five (98.5%) of the sixty-six invited departments attended the 32-hour session. The instructional personnel included the director of the National Crime Prevention Institute, law enforcement officials from cities that already had established crime prevention programs, and experts on hardware systems such as locks and alarms, as well as experts in areas such as lighting systems and home and business construction. Region G was well-represented at Alexandria I. Nearly two-thirds of the agencies in attendance were from Region G, which has 49.3% of the state's population. At first analysis, the Region G attendance might seem to be an overrepresentation (and an underrepresentation by law enforcement agencies from other regions). However, if the regional percentages of Minnesota burglary incidence are used as criteria of representation, it appears that Region G was slightly underrepresented. Although 63.1% of those

attending Alexandria I were from Region G, 69.6% of the 1974 reported burglary occurred there.

The only other training activity of year one was five three-hour orientation sessions held in September, 1973, in Grand Rapids, Bemidji, Fergus Falls, Marshall, and Shakopee. These five sessions were designed to provide information on crime prevention methods and techniques, to explain the MCW program, and to invite the departments to join MCW. All of the departments not invited to Alexandria I were invited to these "mini-sessions." Those attending received the printed information given participants at the Alexandria session and heard abbreviated oral presentations.

The orientation sessions' exposure of the MCW program more than doubled agency participation in MCW. Total membership increased from the 65 agencies attending Alexandria I to 135 at the time of the "public launching" of MCW in October, 1973. At the end of year one, MCW membership totaled approximately 200 members, of which roughly one-third had in-depth training.

Year-Two Training

During year-two funding, training sessions were held in Bloomington, Minnesota, at the Rodeway Inn; in Alexandria, Minnesota, at the Arrowwood Lodge; and at the Thunderbird Motel in Bloomington. The Rodeway training session was broken down into sections of one week each in duration. The first week offered "basic training" and was similar in content to the first-year Alexandria I session. The second week offered "advanced training," and the curriculum served as a general model for the subsequent advanced sessions. The training offered in the second year at Alexandria (Alexandria II) was limited to a one-week course in "basic crime prevention." Training given at the Thunderbird Motel included one-week basic and one-week

advanced sessions.

According to the data, 47 officers received training in the basic training session held at the Rodeway Inn, and 56 received advanced training during the next week. Another 36 officers received basic training at Alexandria. Finally, 39 officers participated in basic and 21 participated in advanced training at the Thunderbird Motel; a total of 199 officers received training during year two. Since some officers went through both basic and advanced training during year two, the total number of individuals receiving some training during year two was 155. It is obvious that the goal of training 90-130 law enforcement officers during year two has been satisfied in terms of numbers of trained officers. Minnesota Crime Watch has exceeded the upper limit of its goal (130 officers) by 25 officers; in other words, the project has exceeded its goal by 19%.

While 32 hours of training were offered at the first-year session in Alexandria, all but one of the second-year sessions offered 40 hours of training. The lone exception, basic training at Thunderbird, offered only 32 hours of training because it was not possible to schedule around the Memorial Day holiday. TABLE 4.1 summarizes participation in year-one and year-two crime prevention training sessions by criminal justice region (see APPENDIX F for a map of the criminal justice regions in Minnesota).

TABLE 4.1												
DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINED AGENCIES BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGION												
REGION	YEAR ONE		YEAR TWO									
	ALEXANDRIA		RODEWAY		RODEWAY		ALEXANDRIA		THUNDERBIRD		THUNDERBIRD	
	I		BASIC		ADVANCED		II		BASIC		ADVANCED	
	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending	# Agencies Present	% of Agencies Attending
A	1	1.5%	--	--	--	--	2	6.1%	--	--	--	--
B	4	6.2	--	--	--	--	3	9.1	--	--	--	--
C	4	6.2	--	--	2	5.1%	3	9.1	4	16.0%	1	5.6%
D	4	6.2	--	--	--	--	4	12.1	--	--	--	--
E	3	4.6	1	3.4%	--	--	5	15.2	1	4.0	--	--
F	8	12.3	2	6.9	3	7.7	9	27.3	2	8.0	--	--
G	41	63.1	26	89.7	34	87.2	7	21.2	18	72.0	17	94.4
TOTALS :	65	100.1%	29	100.0%	39	100.0%	33	100.1%	25	100.0%	18	100.0%

2. Effectiveness of Crime Prevention Training

Probably the most significant indicator of an increasing level of commitment to training is the mean (average) hours of training received by law enforcement agencies that were represented at the various sessions. The mean number of hours of training received by agencies attending Alexandria I was 32 hours. In other words, each agency was represented by one officer. The mean hours of training per agency at the (year two) Rodeway Basic was 64 hours -- precisely double the mean figure at Alexandria I.

The trend toward increasing the average number of officers present at training sessions from individual departments has, however, fluctuated from session to session. Nevertheless, throughout the year-two sessions, the mean number of officers from individual agencies was consistently above the "bench mark" of 1.0 set in year-one training. The "average" agency sent 1.6 officers to Rodeway Basic. On the average, 1.4 officers represented each agency at Rodeway Advanced, 1.1 at Alexandria II, 1.6 at Thunderbird Basic, and 1.2 at Thunderbird Advanced.

Agency attendance at year-two training sessions is even more significant in light of different funding policies of MCW during the two years of training. During year one, MCW "picked up the tab" for room and board expenses (at Alexandria I). At the year-two Alexandria II session, six agencies funded their own expenses, and at the year-two Rodeway and Thunderbird sessions, the individual agencies paid for the expenses of all officers trained.

Having determined that MCW has succeeded in engendering a commitment among participant agencies to crime prevention training, at least four crucial questions can be raised. First, has the crime prevention training received by agencies had any measurable impact on the crime rate in the areas served by trained agencies?

Although the crime rate would be the best single indicator of the effectiveness of training, unfortunately the existing data base does not lend itself to this type of analysis. Moreover, it is unreasonable to expect crime prevention training by itself to have significant impact on measures as crude as the various crime rates.

The second question is: are those areas with the greatest property crime problems receiving a corresponding level of crime prevention training? The data base currently available allows only tentative conclusions to be drawn. This can be done by comparing the percent of the state's burglary incidence within each region with the percent of the total person-hours of training received within the region. TABLE 4.2 presents these data.

A tentative conclusion to be drawn from the table is that, by and large, the crime prevention training provided by MCW has gone to regions in an amount roughly proportional to the regional burglary problem. Obviously, the

training received by agencies within the seven criminal justice planning regions has not been uniformly proportional to the burglary incidence. That is, when ranked on both variables, only three regions appear in the same position, (Regions G, F, and A; positions 1, 2, and 7, respectively). However, these three regions alone account for 79.4% of the burglary incidence in Minnesota. The remaining four regions, where the rank ordering breaks down, account for but 20.6% of the burglary incidence. Thus, MCW appears to have been effective in training agencies from the areas most in need of crime prevention training.

TABLE 4.2												
MINNESOTA CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGIONS RANKED ON PERCENTAGE OF 1974 BURGLARY INCIDENCE AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MCW TRAINING RECEIVED												
	HIGHEST	-	-	-	-	RANK ORDERING	-	-	-	-	-	LOWEST
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7					
Regional % of Burglary Incidence	G (69.6%)	F (8.3%)	B (8.2%)	D (6.7%)	C (3.5%)	E (2.1%)	A (1.5%)					
Regional % of Person-Hours of Training	G (74.6%)	F (9.5%)	C (5.1%)	E (3.8%)	D (3.4%)	B (2.5%)	A (1.2%)					

The fact that MCW has provided a proportional amount of training (in terms of the incidence of burglary) to three of the criminal justice regions is surprising in itself. This is so because the project has no real authority over participant agencies. MCW cannot require agencies to send officers to be trained. One impact the project can have on those receiving training lies in the fact that MCW determines the location and content of the training sessions.

The third question is: what is the distribution of MCW training relative to the state's population distribution? TABLE 4.3 indicates the

distribution of training relative to population. There is a broad range in penetration of trained law enforcement agencies relative to the population of the various regions. At one extreme lies Region G, where 91.9% (approximately 1,723,000) of the regional population is served by agencies that have received MCW crime prevention training. At the other end of the scale (in terms of percent of population served) is Region E, where 23.7% (approximately 71,400) of the regional population has the benefit of MCW trained crime prevention officers serving their locality. The total figure indicates that some 2,599,000 (68.3%) of Minnesota's 3,805,069 residents are served by agencies which have received crime prevention training.

TABLE 4.3					
CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING BY POPULATION DISTRIBUTION					
<u>Region</u>	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>Percent of Population Served by Agencies with MCW Training</u>	<u>Mean Hours of Training per Trained Agency</u>	<u>Number of Trained Officers</u>	<u>Number of Trained Officers Per 100,000 Population</u>
A	149,173	24.5%	37.3	3	2.01
B	329,603	65.5	41.3	7	2.12
C	185,376	64.4	55.1	11	5.93
D	363,493	48.4	46.9	9	2.48
E	301,598	23.7	40.9	10	3.32
F	601,446	42.6	61.3	22	3.66
G	1,874,380	91.9	134.4	136	7.26
STATE	3,805,069	68.3	94.4	198	5.20

At least as important as the percent of population served by trained agencies is the amount of training in crime prevention received per region. An indicator of this is the mean hours of training that agencies have received (see TABLE 4.3). Here again a wide range is encountered. At one extreme, 91.9% of Region G's population is served by trained agencies that,

on the average, have 134.4 hours of crime prevention training. At the other extreme is Region A wherein trained agencies have received an average of 37.3 hours of crime prevention training. The statewide figure indicates that the average trained agency has received 94.4 hours of crime prevention training. However, this state figure is clearly skewed by Region G. When Region G is excluded from the computation, the mean hours of training received by trained agencies is 50.4 hours.

The final two columns of TABLE 4.3 indicate that a wide disparity exists among regions in terms of the number of officers who have attended MCW training sessions. However, when the number of trained officers is standardized per 100,000 population, the differences become less dramatic than raw numbers indicate. For example, 136 (68.7%) of Minnesota's 198 officers trained in crime prevention work in Region G. However, since Region G contains approximately 50% of the state's population, the ratio of trained crime prevention officers per 100,000 population is 7.26, or 5.25 greater than the 2.01 ratio evidenced in Region A which contains only three (1.5%) officers trained in crime prevention.

The fourth question is: what subject areas are addressed by MCW training? As noted earlier, officers must be trained before they can educate citizens in the specific steps that can be taken to prevent property crimes. However, before agencies can effectively implement crime prevention programs and activities, information pertaining to the organization and content of these programs and activities must also be included. In order to examine the extent to which training offered by MCW has addressed these topics, the actual agenda of the six training sessions have been examined.

MCW training may be broken down into four major subject areas: 1)

technical information, 2) crime prevention organization, implementation, and administration, 3) planning and evaluation, and 4) other activities.

TABLE 4.4 PERCENT OF HOURS DEVOTED TO SUBJECT AREAS BY TRAINING SESSION								
TOPICS	BASIC					ADVANCED		
	Alexan- dria I	Rodeway	Alexan- dria II	Thunder- bird	TOTAL BASIC	Rodeway	Thunder- bird	TOTAL ADVANCED
Technical Information	65.0%	65.0%	69.5%	69.2%	67.2%	61.0%	61.0%	61.0%
Organization, Implementation, Administration	6.7	11.9	9.8	12.3	10.3	9.8	6.1	8.0
Planning, Evaluation	13.3	6.2	9.8	12.3	10.1	19.5	18.3	19.0
Other	15.0	16.9	11.0	6.2	12.4	9.8	14.6	12.0
TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%

The first subject area, "technical information," received the bulk of training time (see TABLE 4.4). This subject area consisted of such topics as: a) commercial and residential security (locks, keys, safes, alarms, Operation Identification, and premise surveys); b) personal security (prevention of kidnapping, assault, rape, and extortion); c) property security (automobiles and bicycles); and d) security through environmental design. Basic training devoted 67.2% of its time to these topics while 61.0% of the advanced training was devoted to these aspects of crime prevention.

The second subject area, "organization, implementation, and administration," focused on the crime prevention unit and its implementation, function and operation. Also included in this subject area were topics addressed at news media relations and getting the crime prevention message to the public. Time devoted to this subject area was 10.3% in basic training and 8.0% in advanced.

"Planning and evaluation" was the third subject area. Topics in this section included: a) long-range planning for crime control; b) resources in Minnesota for crime prevention; c) goal setting, data collection, and evaluation; d) the planning function of a crime prevention unit; and e) crime prevention programming in Minnesota. This subject area displayed the largest change in time devoted from basic to advanced training subject areas. Although the basic training utilized 10.1% of its time for these topics, the advanced training increased their exposure to 19.0% devoted to planning and evaluation.

The fourth subject area focused on "other" activities. This segment of training consisted of a) check-in and registration; b) welcome and orientation; c) evaluation and summary of the training sessions; d) group problems and discussions; and e) exams. This subject comprised 12.4% of basic and 12.0% of advanced training time.

In sum, a total of 198 officers representing 103 law enforcement agencies received training dealing with crime prevention. Analysis indicates that agencies with officers trained in crime prevention serve more than 68% of Minnesota's population.

As indicated by the above discussion, there are some differences in focus between basic and advanced training. Although the majority of training time was focused on technical information in both basic and advanced, there is less emphasis during advanced training. Also, slightly less time was expended during advanced training on the subject area of "organization, implementation, and administration." The largest shift in emphasis was more time devoted to "planning and evaluation" during advanced training.

3. Cost Analysis for Training

In year one, MCW spent a total of \$22,826.89 for crime prevention training of law enforcement officers, and \$1,313.46 was spent for the production of training materials. This includes \$1,064.41 for actual training materials plus 0.5% of the agency fee paid to Chuck Ruhr Associates which represents the proportion of the total Ruhr contract expended on training-related materials. An additional \$859.98 was spent on travel and fees for speakers at the Alexandria I training session and \$10,466.87 for lodging of participants and rental of facilities.

The project director estimates that 15% of her time was devoted to training activities during year one; thus, this percentage of her salary and fringe benefits (\$1,866.58) has been added to the above expenditures as part of the total direct cost.

Since the officers trained were paid their salaries while attending the training sessions, it is appropriate to include some estimate of their earnings as part of the overall cost of training to the criminal justice system. Assuming a conservative wage of \$4.00 per hour, an additional \$8,320.00 is included in the overall system cost of the training program.

In year two, training expenditures totaled \$66,849.63. Of this, \$15,426.09 was spent on the production of training materials, \$1,806.10 on speakers' travel and fees and \$10,502.37 for lodging and the rental of training facilities. An additional \$8,523.07 is added to the above to represent the amount of time spent by the project director (25%) and the administrative assistant (30%) on training activities during year two. The final item to be included in the systemic cost analysis is the estimated salaries of the participants. For year two, this figure is \$30,592.00.

In the first two years of MCW, an estimated total of \$89,676.52 was spent by MCW and member agencies on crime prevention training. This amount does not include other direct costs such as office supplies, equipment and staff travel which might have been added were reliable data available. It also does not include indirect costs such as having 198 law enforcement officers not on duty for the period of the training. Thus the training cost estimates here are low compared to the actual total systemic cost. They do, however, reflect those costs for which reasonable data were available.

TABLE 4.5 summarizes the unit cost figures for the first two years of MCW training.

TABLE 4.5 UNIT COST OF TRAINING BASED ON DIRECT COSTS TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM				
Year	Dollars per Individual	Dollars per Hour	Dollars per Individual per Hour	Total Expended
Year One	\$351.18	\$713.34	\$10.97	\$22,826.89
Year Two	335.93	348.18	8.74	66,849.63
% Change, Year One to Year Two	- 4.34%	- 51.19%	- 20.33%	+ 192.86%

Comparing year one to year two, the apparent dollar cost per individual per hour of training declined by 20.33%, from \$10.97 in year one to \$8.74 in year two. The primary reasons for this decrease are: (1) the increase in hours of training offered per session, (2) the economy of scale gained through the increased number of participating individuals, and (3) the decrease in money spent for lodging in year two. The first factor was discussed in the previous paragraph; the other factors mean that MCW offered more hours of training to more individuals for a dollar cost considerably

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lower than in year one.

While it is not possible to separate out the relative impact of each of these factors, the decrease in the hourly cost per officer trained is a very positive indicator. Of course, the existence and strength of this trend will not be apparent until Minnesota Crime Watch has achieved at least another year of run time.

Unit Cost Comparison

A logical alternative delivery system for police training in the state of Minnesota is that of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA). In addition to the duties of providing investigative assistance to local police agencies and serving as the central repository for crime data, the BCA conducts three types of police training.

The fiscal 1976 BCA budget for police training included \$143,213.00 for "Basic Training" and additional funds for "Special Training." Though "Special Training" may be conceptualized as akin to crime prevention training in terms of specialized subject matter, the time frame for this training is subject to extreme variation. Because of this constraint, only the BCA basic training will be analyzed for comparison with MCW crime prevention training.

In FY 1976, 380 individuals received the 280 hours of instruction that comprise basic training. Basic training, with a duration of 280 hours, is much longer than any single course given in year one or year two by Minnesota Crime Watch.

It must be noted, then, that while the BCA training is a "logical" choice for comparison with MCW training, it is far from the "ideal" choice. The factors mitigating the validity of comparing the two types of training are more fully discussed in the following section. For now, suffice it to say that the comparison of an institutionalized training delivery system (BCA) with a training system implemented by a non-institutionalized project (MCW) is somewhat misleading. Essentially, this is so since the costs incurred by the BCA are internalized, while MCW is incurring typically greater start-up costs.

The BCA budget for basic training includes the following categories which were also used in determining the cost of Minnesota Crime Watch training: (1) rents and leases, (2) printing and binding, (3) contractual services for staff and other items, (4) travel and subsistence, (5) vehicle rental from motor pool, (6) out-of-state subsistence and travel for staff, (7) supplies and materials, and (8) equipment.

Above it was noted that owing to the non-institutionalized nature of MCW training and the start-up costs being incurred, the comparison of MCW and BCA training is not an ideal one. These factors could lead to an expectation that analysis would show MCW training to be initially greater in unit cost than BCA training. And indeed, TABLE 4.6 indicates that the unit cost of MCW training per trained individual is greater than the BCA unit cost. However, the difference in cost is less than might be expected.

TABLE 4.6		
UNIT COST COMPARISON OF MCW TRAINING IN YEAR TWO WITH BCA TRAINING		
<u>COST</u>	<u>BCA BASIC</u>	<u>MCW</u>
Dollars per Individual	\$376.87	\$335.93
Dollars per Individual per Hour	\$ 1.34	\$ 8.74

Cost Acceptability in View of Alternatives

Acceptability cannot be assessed simply on the basis of whether or not the raw dollar figure of one type of training is comparable to that of the other type of training. This is the case for several reasons: (1) MCW has not previously incurred sunk costs as has the BCA, (2) no discount factor is included in the BCA dollar cost for fixed expenditures, (3) the short duration of MCW training in terms of total years and the "part-time" nature of police training as a component of MCW, and (4) the BCA is an established organization operating the basic police training system of the state of Minnesota, as mandated by the legislature, whereas MCW is incurring the usual higher dollar costs of start-up. Additionally, MCW deals with a body of knowledge still in the research and development stage.

If the provision of crime prevention training is deemed to be worthwhile, at the present time Minnesota Crime Watch is providing that training at an "acceptable" unit cost. This must be the case, given that MCW is the only source of such training in Minnesota. Therefore, given the previously enumerated reasons for a higher unit cost, the startling fact

is that MCW has provided specialized training for a relatively slight difference in unit cost when compared with the BCA.

C. CONCLUSIONS

1. MCW has presented six training sessions which resulted in 9,728 person-hours of training.

2. There were 198 MCW-trained officers as of the end of year two. These trained officers represented 103 MCW member agencies or 43% of all member agencies.

3. In comparison to BCA training costs, MCW training has been implemented at a favorable cost level, despite MCW's relative newness in the area of training.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

Three recommendations have been identified which may increase the value of MCW training by giving member agencies information which could increase the effectiveness of their crime prevention programs.

1. Inform agencies of methods to optimize resources available for crime prevention activities. Such information might be included in training sessions devoted to methods of applying for state and federal grants, information on clearinghouses for criminal justice information, and ways of adapting programs from other areas to suit local needs.
2. Educate agencies in methods of evaluation so that existing programs might be structured for more effective performance, and agencies might have a better basis for accurate and realistic requests for funds.
3. Given the importance of the material covered in the advanced sessions and the time constraints in terms of how much can be covered in a one-week session, it is appropriate to recommend that MCW consider the possibility of instituting a third training session devoted primarily to the areas of research, planning, and evaluation.

SECTION 5:

CRIME PREVENTION REORIENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

To the man on the street as well as to the policeman himself the apprehension of criminals is usually stressed as a major goal. This means responding to crime-related calls and carrying through on such activities as criminal investigation, collection of evidence, interrogating and arresting suspects.³

This statement exemplifies the traditional orientation of law enforcement agencies which has focused on crime incidence and the apprehension of criminals. But, as the following statement from a study of residential burglary shows, an emphasis on apprehension does not necessarily lead to success.

... The traditional law enforcement approach, which emphasizes the deterrence of crime through the apprehension and punishment of offenders, has had only limited success in dealing with residential crime, and especially residential burglary. Police manpower and resources are often inadequate to deter residential crime by preventive patrol, and the response capability of the police is frequently too limited and slow to permit the apprehension of most residential burglars on the scene, even when the police receive an immediate alert.⁴

Although this statement is addressed to the area of residential burglary, similar conditions exist in dealing with other crimes. It was in response to this realization that innovative law enforcement agencies have developed

³ Leonard Ruchelman, "Police Policy," Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (August, 1974), p. 48.

⁴ U. S., Department of Justice, LEAA, Monograph on Residential Security, (December, 1973).

crime prevention programs. In Minnesota, many crime prevention programs have been encouraged and developed by Minnesota Crime Watch (MCW), a state-wide project now in its third year of funding by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control. In MCW's definition, crime prevention " . . . is the anticipation, the recognition, and the appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or reduce it."⁵

A major part of the MCW program is to reorient law enforcement agencies from a predominantly apprehension-oriented stance to a crime prevention position. The project's position on the importance of the change needed in the orientation of law enforcement agencies is found in a quotation from the project's first-year grant application: "It is of highest priority in Minnesota that Law Enforcement agencies focus on what they, in cooperation with the citizens of their community, can do before crimes occur, rather than simply responding after the crime has occurred." Thus, the reorientation focus desired by MCW is to persuade previously apprehension-oriented or crime-focused agencies to devote time and resources in areas of crime pre-vention.

The definition of crime prevention used by MCW introduces the concept of crime risk, which is the probability of a crime occurring to a person or property during a specific time period. The problem with the measurement of crime prevention is the difficulty in measuring the number of crimes that "could have occurred" but did not because they were prevented. On the other hand, apprehension activities are easily measured by such indicators as the number of arrests, the number of crimes cleared by arrest, and the conviction of individuals for crimes.

⁵Minnesota Crime Watch Training Manual, p.15.

This difficulty in measurement of crime prevention may have several consequences. A police agency may be hesitant to engage in activities which do not produce visible results or benefits, where results and benefits include arrests or convictions. Or, in the case of an agency which does participate in preventive activities, apprehension activities may have a higher priority since the results are more visible.

The focus of this section of the MCW evaluation will be on the amount and type of reorientation which has taken place within Minnesota law enforcement agencies. This analysis is, by nature, after the fact, since no concise documentation is available to establish the level of orientation toward crime prevention activities prior to the establishment of Minnesota Crime Watch in September of 1973.⁶ The only available data, gathered from several secondary sources and individuals involved with the project, show that crime prevention activities existing prior to the formation of MCW were centered in urbanized areas, with little, if any, orientation toward crime prevention existing in rural or outstate areas.⁷ In short, only a limited amount of crime prevention activity existed prior to the formation of MCW, and this activity was confined to the Twin Cities metropolitan area.

B. REORIENTATION GOALS

The goal developed by MCW in response to the apprehension orientation

⁶The fact that no form of "pre-post" study was used to establish a prior measurement poses a methodological problem.

⁷Records of grant proposals and grants funded by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control before July, 1973, show that most of the funding for crime prevention programs of any sort was to agencies other than law enforcement agencies; for example, funds for crime prevention education programs were granted to the Minnesota Education Administration, the Corrections Service of Minnesota, and the Minnesota Attorney General's Office.

of law enforcement agencies states:

- Goal 2) To bring about a reorientation within police departments toward crime prevention activities and to provide training for law enforcement agencies as to what they can do before crimes occur, as opposed to simply responding after the crime has occurred.

The objective of this goal is to introduce law enforcement agencies to the concept of crime prevention and assist them in the institution of this concept within their agencies. Thus, reorientation toward crime prevention entails the shifting of attitudes and resources of a law enforcement agency from "after-the-fact," apprehension-oriented activities to prevention- or crime risk-oriented activities.

In Goal 2), which is a long-range goal of MCW, the training of individuals from law enforcement agencies in crime prevention concepts and activities is seen as a major force in the implementation of reorientation within these agencies. However, factors other than training could have effects on reorientation. One of the major factors is simply agency membership in MCW.

Although no specific goal was set for enlisting agencies, membership is seen as the initial step in reorientation toward crime prevention. Once an agency is a member, it is provided with materials to start a crime prevention program in its community. These materials consist of stickers, posters, engravers, brochures to be distributed to the public, and a manual of instructions for setting up a crime prevention program.

MCW encourages increased commitment of agencies by supplying both resources and advice. Agencies, however, are free to determine their own levels of participation in crime prevention activities. Agency commitment would increase with the designation of a full-time crime prevention officer,

the addition of manpower, allocation of crime prevention funds, and participation in the MCW basic and advanced training seminars. The formation of a permanent crime prevention unit or bureau within the department is an indicator of an even higher level of commitment.

1. MCW's Measures of Reorientation

Before second-year funding in 1974, MCW provided documentation of its reorientation efforts which centered on the following indicators:

- a) Membership in Minnesota Crime Watch,
- b) The amount of MCW crime prevention training received,
- c) The formation of a crime prevention unit in the department,
- d) The amount of time devoted to crime prevention activities, and
- e) The formation of and membership in the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association (MCPOA).

2. Documentation of MCW's Measures

Though most of the crime prevention programs directed by MCW in some way affect the reorientation of agencies, the above criteria were used by MCW as measures of progress toward its reorientation goal. The following data were gathered to determine the status of the above indicators:

- a) Membership in MCW was 252 agencies as of July 1, 1975. This figure indicated an increase of 187 agencies from the initial enlistment of 65.
- b) At the end of MCW's second year, 198 individuals from 103 agencies (43.6% of member agencies) had received training at Minnesota Crime Watch crime prevention training seminars. This was an increase from the original 65 individuals from 65 agencies trained in the first year.
- c) The number of crime prevention units in the state was reported at 45.
- d) MCW reported that the average number of hours spent by member agencies per week in crime prevention activities is greater than eight.

- e) At the end of second-year funding the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association (MCPOA) had been in operation for a year and a half, with 99 officers from 85 law enforcement agencies participating.

Enlistment of agencies increased, the number of individuals receiving training increased, the average hours spent by departments on crime prevention activities was above the eight hours originally requested, and a statewide organization of crime prevention officers independent of MCW was formed. The above information shows, according to MCW, that the process of reorientation toward crime prevention activities was taking place in Minnesota law enforcement agencies.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY TO EVALUATE REORIENTATION

The data gathered from MCW and Evaluation Unit records provide indications of a certain level and type of reorientation toward crime prevention, but it is not in itself enough information on which to base an evaluation. In order to evaluate the effects of MCW's reorientation efforts, it was felt that other factors, such as the size of member departments, their extent of participation in crime prevention activities, and the amount of departmental resources allocated to these activities should be examined. In July and August of 1975, a survey of a sample of Minnesota law enforcement agencies was conducted to obtain information on additional factors necessary for an evaluation of MCW's progress toward Goal 2) of its grant application. See APPENDIX A for the questionnaire used to conduct this survey.

1. Methodology

a) The Sample:

The sample for this study consisted of both police departments and sheriff's offices throughout the state. For the most part, agencies

selected had a population served of 2,500 or above. For ease of administration and because the Twin Cities metropolitan area contains a high density of population and resources, the sample consisted of two divisions: an outstate section and a metropolitan section (Region G).

The outstate sample consisted of MCW member and non-member agencies matched in terms of population served and size of force. The agencies in the outstate sample ranged from Duluth, with a population served of 100,578 and a force size of 163, to Long Prairie, with a population served of 2,416 and a force size of 6. The member agencies were also matched for amount of crime prevention training received.

The metropolitan sample was chosen in a slightly different manner. Because of Region G's concentration of heavily populated communities and large law enforcement agencies, coupled with its shortage of non-member agencies, it was not possible to match member and non-member agencies by force size or population as was done in the outstate sample. The metropolitan sample included a wide range of populations and force sizes among member agencies and included all of the non-member agencies.⁸

In the outstate sample 30 agencies were members and 16 were non-members, for a total of 46. In the metropolitan sample 21 were members and 5 were non-members, for a total of 26 agencies. A grand total of 72 agencies were selected; 51 were member agencies and 21 were non-member agencies (see APPENDIX B).

⁸ Except in the case of non-member police agencies contracting to a member sheriff's office.

b) The Instrument:

The survey questionnaire used to measure the reorientation efforts of MCW was designed to obtain both factual and attitudinal data. For the most part, the questionnaires for member and non-member agencies were identical, with the exception of three questions used to isolate information that was unique to the respective samples.

Interviews were conducted with agency personnel throughout the state with attempts made to interview more than one individual from each department. In member agencies, heads of departments and the crime prevention officer were sought for interviewing; within non-member departments, the target personnel were heads of departments and patrol officers.⁹

Overall, 79 individuals were interviewed in member agencies and 29 in non-member agencies, for a total of 108 in the 72 agencies in the sample.

c) Evaluation Outline:

The structure of this evaluation used five indicators of reorientation. The evaluation contains the following: 1) the effects of membership in MCW on reorientation, 2) a comparison of the reorientation of MCW-trained member agencies with non-trained agencies, 3) the effects of agency characteristics of (a) force size and (b) agency type, 4) how reorientation affects the organizational structures of law enforcement agencies, including the formation of crime prevention units and the more subtle changes that have occurred in the roles of agency personnel, and 5) an attempt to determine the reorientation of individuals within departments by comparing

⁹Precautions were taken to structure the answers to some questions while allowing some freedom of response via the mixture of structured questions with open-ended questions.

personal crime prevention attitudes of member and non-member personnel.

The effects of membership, training, force size, and agency type are analyzed in terms of their influence on agency participation in crime prevention activities. Although the indicators above suggest that participation in crime prevention activities should be measured by the amount of time spent per agency on various crime prevention activities, unfortunately the data gathered during the survey provide only more general measures of agency participation.¹⁰

2. Evaluation

The concept of crime prevention will be approached from two perspectives. The first is a general view of the various general categories of crime prevention as pursued by state law enforcement agencies. The second is an investigation of specific activities within those categories. The general categories of crime prevention studied are: 1) Commercial Security, 2) Residential Security, 3) Rural Security, 4) Personal Security, 5) Property Identification Program, 6) Education of the Public, and 7) Education of Fellow

¹⁰ As part of the investigation into the extent of participation in crime prevention activities, agencies were asked how many hours per week the department, as a whole, was devoting to each particular activity. The responses, however, are difficult to interpret or analyze. The responses for any one activity varied from 0 to 90 hours per week, giving some agencies a total of 1,260 hours per week devoted to crime prevention activities. This would seem plausible coming from a department with a substantial force size, but it seems less dependable from an agency with a force size of 18. The response received from a majority of member agencies interviewed was that it was difficult to separate crime prevention activities from police duties. Thus, information received from this question is uninterpretable for two reasons: 1) misunderstanding of the question, and 2) the difficulty of separating time devoted to crime prevention activities from routine police duties. As a result, this analysis permits only a rough estimate of crime prevention activity. Since it was not possible to obtain reliable data on the amount of time spent on specific crime prevention activities, the results shown here only indicate whether an agency is involved in an activity rather than the extent of that involvement.

Officers.¹¹ These categories represent possible areas of focus or concentration within an agency's crime prevention program. The categories were developed in order to ascertain whether differences in focus existed in the crime prevention programs of different agency types and sizes. These categories are not mutually exclusive.

a) Member vs. Non-Member Agencies:

The possibility exists that any agency in the sample could have any or all of the significant factors needed to indicate a prevention-oriented agency, regardless of membership in Minnesota Crime Watch. Non-member agencies utilizing their own resources might be committed to crime prevention activities to the same extent as member agencies. However, a key factor in the level of participation in crime prevention activities by member agencies may be the fact that MCW provides materials, some of the resources, and training for those activities. Therefore, member agencies may have a greater potential for crime prevention activity, and comparisons of the two groups should show the effects of MCW's reorientation efforts. The following analysis will examine the hypothesis that agencies which are members of MCW engage in more crime prevention activities than non-member agencies.

The analysis begins with a comparison of member and non-member participation in the general categories of crime prevention activity. TABLE 5.1 presents data on agencies' participation in the seven general crime prevention categories.

¹¹ For definitions of these categories, see APPENDIX C.

TABLE 5.1
MEMBER/NON-MEMBER COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION IN
GENERAL CRIME PREVENTION CATEGORIES
ALL AGENCIES

VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Non-		Non-		Non-		Non-		Non-		Non-		Non-	
	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21	Member N = 51	Member N = 21
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	82.2%	76.2%	90.2%	66.7%	35.3%	28.6%	54.9%	33.3%	98.0%	71.4%	88.2%	66.7%	76.5%	33.3%

Member responses are consistently higher than non-member responses in all areas. The differences between members and non-members range from a 6% difference in the area of Commercial Security to a 43.2% difference in the area of Education of Fellow Officers. According to the data, the highest member participation is found in the areas of Property Identification Program, Residential Security and Education of the Public. Nearly all (98%) of member agencies offered the Operation Identification program to citizens within their jurisdictions. The data further suggest that non-member participation was highest in the areas of Commercial Security and Property Identification Program.¹²

The large difference in responses between members and non-members in the area of Education of Fellow Officers may be due partially to the force size differences between the two groups. The median force size for member agencies is 25 and the median force size for non-members is 8. Because of their force size and/or other resources, member agencies seem better able to maintain in-service training programs. Agencies with in-service training programs are the agencies best able to dispense crime prevention information received from MCW within the agency. The dissemination of crime prevention information within an agency provides for a better knowledge and awareness of crime prevention ideas and procedures by officers and can assist greatly in the provision of crime prevention services to the public. The activity of Education of Fellow Officers in crime prevention forms a crucial link in

¹² Although identification programs form an integral part of residential and commercial security, for purposes of this study the three categories were developed separately so that high responses in the Property Identification Program category would not contaminate other aspects of residential and commercial security efforts. As a result, the figures shown in the categories of Commercial and Residential Security reflect only additional efforts in these programs, such as premise surveys, distribution of literature, and instructions in security methods.

Minnesota Crime Watch's reorientation efforts.¹³

An additional concern of this study was to establish whether or not agencies had discontinued any of the MCW-inspired crime prevention activities they had once adopted. Out of all member agencies in the sample, only two had discontinued any of the activities in which they had been involved. In each case these agencies made up only 2% of the total number of member agencies in the sample. From this fact it would seem that if an agency implements a crime prevention program, it will generally maintain that program.

Further indication of the fact that member agencies tend to be more crime prevention oriented than non-member agencies is seen in specific crime prevention activities (see TABLE 5.2).

TABLE 5.2		
MEMBER/NON-MEMBER COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES		
ALL AGENCIES		
VARIABLE	MEMBER	NON-MEMBER
	N = 51 Percent YES	N = 21 Percent YES
Premise Survey	52.9%	23.8%
Use Warning Tags	25.5	19.0
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	49.0	19.0
Departmental Literature	33.3	9.5
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	5.8	4.7
Departmental Property Engraved	70.5	14.2
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	92.0	42.8
In-Service Training	60.7	14.2

¹³ A discussion of the effects of Minnesota Crime Watch training can be found in the next section.

Again, the results show that for each activity member agencies display a higher level of participation than non-member agencies. Participation in Premise Surveys, a technique of crime prevention used in both residential and commercial security programs, ranged from 23.8% for non-members to 52.9% for members. Member agencies indicated that they performed a total of 195 commercial surveys (an average of 9.75 per agency per month) and 277 residential surveys (an average of 13.1 per agency per month). Non-member agencies, in contrast, performed 11 commercial surveys (an average of 5.5) and 0 residential surveys per month. Even more pronounced differences are visible in the member/non-member comparison of the Development of Departmental Literature and New Crime Prevention Techniques.

Agency orientation may also be seen in the response to questions concerning the department's own involvement in crime prevention programs. For instance, when asked if the agency had Engraved Departmental Property with its identification number, 70.5% of the members indicated they had, as compared to 14.2% of non-members. In response to the question of Personal Membership of the person interviewed in the Identification Program, 92% of those interviewed from member agencies were involved, while only 42.8% from non-member agencies were involved. Also, the response of member agencies that claimed to have In-Service Training programs was nearly four times as great as the non-member response. The two activities in which there was no great difference in participation were Warning Tags, a system of residential and commercial notification of premise security problems in which 25.5% of the members and 19.0% of the non-members participate; and Citizen Crime Prevention Committee with 5.8% of members and 4.7% of non-members responding

that they have such committees.¹⁴

From this comparison of member and non-member agencies, one can conclude that member agencies apparently have better-developed crime prevention programs than non-members. Members show greater participation in all of the general categories and in each specific crime prevention activity chosen for evaluation.

b) Trained vs. Non-Trained Member Agencies:

The following analysis attempts to determine whether or not the receipt of MCW training leads to increased crime prevention activity. As mentioned in the second-year grant, it was MCW's intention to bring about reorientation within law enforcement agencies via training of agency personnel in crime prevention. Of the sample utilized in this study, 20 member agencies had officers who had received MCW training by the end of the project's second year. These agencies were compared to the 30 member agencies in the sample who had not received MCW training (see TABLE 5.3).

A comparison of trained and non-trained member agencies shows that in the categories of Residential Security, Commercial Security and Property Identification Program, MCW-trained agencies are only slightly more likely than non-trained member agencies to engage in these activities. This could be the result of the structure of the programs involved. These three areas

¹⁴ The low participation level for these two activities can be explained by several factors. The Warning Tags technique was often mentioned as being disliked by both the public and officers. This technique requires leaving Warning Tags at the point of the security problem, thus leaving a visible sign on such things as unlocked doors or windows. In the case of Citizen Crime Prevention Committee, one of the reasons for lack of success in this area seems to be that local organizations already present in the community, such as Lions or Rotary Clubs, often fulfilled the function of these committees.

TABLE 5.3
 TRAINED/NON-TRAINED MEMBER AGENCY COMPARISON OF
PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL CRIME PREVENTION CATEGORIES

VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-	Trained	Non-
	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30	N = 20	N = 30
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	90.0%	83.3%	90.0%	90.0%	15.0%	46.7%	70.0%	43.3%	100.0%	96.7%	95.0%	83.3%	90.0%	70.0%

form the core activities of the crime prevention program focused on by MCW. In addition, these three activities are closely linked in application, since the Property Identification Program is a segment of both Commercial Security and Residential Security. In the area of Personal Security, Education of Fellow Officers, and Education of the Public, however, trained agencies indicated significantly higher participation than non-trained agencies. A major exception to this trend is the Rural Security category, in which non-trained agencies indicated a participation level three times as high as trained agencies. This fact could be the result of the construction of the sample. Agencies who received training were generally urban police agencies, which because of their jurisdiction have little need for a Rural Security program. Thus, the majority of non-trained agencies was drawn from the outstate sample, which tended to be smaller, more rural agencies.

Although the review of the general crime prevention areas shows some differences between trained and non-trained agencies, a better distinction is found by looking at the involvement of agencies in specific crime activities (see TABLE 5.4). In each specific activity, trained agencies showed a higher level of involvement than those without training. The three most significant differences were participation in the MCPOA, Development of Departmental Crime Prevention Techniques, and Premise Surveys. As an indication of the extent to which trained agencies are participating in specific activities, trained agencies performed 2.3 times as many residential surveys and 4.1 times more commercial surveys than agencies without training, for an average of 2.9 times as many total surveys per month.

TABLE 5.4		
TRAINED/NON-TRAINED MEMBER AGENCY COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES		
VARIABLE	TRAINED	NON-TRAINED
	N = 20 Percent YES	N = 30 Percent YES
Premise Survey	75.0%	36.7%
Use Warning Tags	30.0	23.3
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	85.0	26.7
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	70.0	33.3
Departmental Literature	55.0	20.0
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	10.0	3.3
Departmental Property Engraved	85.0	63.3
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	100.0	86.7

Further indicators of the trained agencies' commitment to crime prevention is suggested by their 70% response to having Developed Crime Prevention Techniques on their own, compared with the 33.3% response of non-trained agencies. Also, 55% of trained agencies claimed to have Developed Crime Prevention Literature on their own (spending an average of \$730.45 in the process) as opposed to 20% of the non-trained agencies (spending an average of \$183.33).

In addition to the MCW seminars, training in crime prevention is offered through the in-service training programs of individual agencies. As noted earlier, 60.7% of the member agencies sampled responded that they operated an in-service training program. A comparison of trained to non-trained agencies showed that 80% of trained agencies had in-service programs in contrast to 50% of the non-trained. A further comparison of trained to non-trained agencies showed that 75% of trained agencies included crime prevention topics

in their programs as compared to 36.7% of the non-trained agencies. It is interesting to note that both trained and non-trained agencies who offered crime prevention training in their in-service programs are devoting, on the average, approximately 10% of that time to crime prevention topics. Another point of interest is the number of agencies which responded that they were intending to send individuals to future Minnesota Crime Watch training seminars (85% of the trained agencies and 66.7% of the non-trained said they intended to do so).¹⁵

In conclusion, the analysis of trained vs. non-trained MCW member agencies shows that although there is some evidence that trained agencies have a higher level of involvement in general crime prevention categories, the full impact of MCW training is shown by the use of special techniques by trained agencies. Trained member agencies consistently made greater use of specific crime prevention techniques than did non-trained members. It is possible, however, that the difference may be in part a function of factors other than the training received by agencies, e.g., department size, department type and crime prevention attitude. These factors will be examined in the following sections.

c) Force Size:

If force size affects the level of participation in crime

¹⁵As part of the survey, member agencies were asked if they had any intentions of sending individuals from their agency to future MCW crime prevention training seminars. Of the 51 member agencies interviewed, 74.5% indicated that they intended to send people to future MCW training sessions (63.2% of member sheriff's offices and 84.1% of member police departments). When the agencies were divided by force size, it was found that 79.3% of the large force size agencies, 73.3% of medium size agencies, and 57.1% of small size agencies indicated they intend to attend future training sessions. These data would indicate that agencies feel that training in crime prevention is an asset to the agency and that the ability to send individuals to training sessions may be affected by the size of the agency.

prevention activities, participation should increase as force size increases, irrespective of membership in Minnesota Crime Watch.

In order to determine the effects of force size on crime prevention re-orientation, agencies in the sample were divided into three force size categories: 1-5 officers, 6-10 officers, and 11 or above. These categories were suggested by an organizational study of law enforcement agencies conducted by the Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control.¹⁶ The study determined that in order to provide 24-hour police patrol, it was necessary to have a force size of 6 or more full-time officers. The next organizational division came at 11, the number necessary for an agency to continue providing 24-hour police coverage and begin to add members with specialized functions within the agency, such as full-time administration or detective/investigative personnel.

The analysis of force size provides further support for the earlier conclusion that MCW members show more orientation to crime prevention than non-members. Among the agencies with force sizes of 1-5, members indicate greater participation than non-members in all but two of the activity categories: Rural Security and Personal Security. The most significant difference was found in Property Identification Program, in which all members, but only 57.1% of the non-members, responded that they had such a program (see TABLE 5.5).

Among the sample with force sizes 6-10, members show more involvement than non-members in all categories. In this group the largest difference is

¹⁶Stefan J. Kapsch, Minnesota Police Organization and Community Resource Allocation (St. Paul, Minn.: Governor's Commission on Crime Prevention and Control, 1970).

TABLE 5.5
MEMBER/NON-MEMBER COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION IN
GENERAL CRIME PREVENTION CATEGORIES
by FORCE SIZE

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 1-5														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7	N = 7
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	71.4%	57.1%	85.7%	57.1%	42.9%	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%	57.1%	85.7%	71.4%	28.6%	14.3%
AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 6-10														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10	N = 15	N = 10
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	93.3%	90.0%	93.3%	70.0%	33.3%	10.0%	35.7%	30.0%	100.0%	80.0%	85.7%	60.0%	86.7%	30.0%
AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 11 OR ABOVE														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member	Member	Non-Member
	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4	N = 29	N = 4
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	86.2%	75.0%	89.7%	75.0%	34.5%	25.0%	75.9%	50.0%	96.6%	75.0%	93.1%	75.0%	82.8%	75.0%

in the Education of Fellow Officers, in which members are nearly three times as likely to be involved as non-members.

Among agencies with force sizes of 11+, members consistently indicate higher participation than non-members. However, the information available on the force size of 11+ does not permit valid comparison, for there is not a sufficient number of non-member agencies available with force sizes above 10.

When the data were analyzed across force size, several trends were found. Member agencies of all sizes indicated high levels of participation in Residential and Commercial Security, Education of the Public, and in the category of having a Property Identification Program. Involvement in two areas, Personal Security and Education of Fellow Officers, increased as force sizes increased, although Rural Security decreased in the larger agencies. This decrease is due to the fact that the larger agencies in the sample were mainly from urban areas.

These findings show that certain crime prevention activities can be implemented by any agency regardless of force size, while other activities appear to be more dependent upon the resources found within agencies and the crime complexion of the community.

With four exceptions, member agencies had higher levels of participation in specific crime prevention activities than non-members across the force size groupings (see TABLE 5.6).

In addition, member participation in specific crime prevention activities shows that in four instances the percentage of participation increased as force size increased. These activities were Premise Surveys, Use of Warning

TABLE 5.6		
MEMBER/NON-MEMBER COMPARISON OF PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES		
by FORCE SIZE		
AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 1-5		
VARIABLE	MEMBER	NON-MEMBER
	N = 7 Percent YES	N = 7 Percent YES
Premise Survey	14.3%	-0-
Use Warning Tags	14.3	42.9%
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	14.3	-0-
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	57.1	-0-
Departmental Literature	14.3	-0-
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	-0-	-0-
Departmental Property Engraved	57.1	14.3
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	100.0	33.3

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 6-10		
VARIABLE	MEMBER	NON-MEMBER
	N = 15 Percent YES	N = 10 Percent YES
Premise Survey	46.7%	40.0%
Use Warning Tags	20.0	10.0
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	40.0	-0-
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	26.7	30.0
Departmental Literature	6.7	10.0
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	-0-	-0-
Departmental Property Engraved	53.3	10.0
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	80.0	44.4

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 11 OR ABOVE		
VARIABLE	MEMBER	NON-MEMBER
	N = 29 Percent YES	N = 4 Percent YES
Premise Survey	65.5%	25.0%
Use Warning Tags	31.0	-0-
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	62.1	-0-
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	58.6	25.0
Departmental Literature	51.7	25.0
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	10.3	25.0
Departmental Property Engraved	82.8	25.0
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	96.6	75.0

Tags, participation in the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association, and the establishment of a Citizens Crime Prevention Committee. In two activities participation levels remained consistently high across the force sizes. These were the Engraving of Departmental Property with an identification number and the response of being Personally a Member of a Property Identification Program. In two additional cases no consistent increase with increasing force size was found. These activities were Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques and Development of Departmental Crime Prevention Literature.

When the data for non-member participation in specific activities were analyzed, no consistent relationship between percentage of participation and force size was found. Generally, participation in specific activities increased as force size increased for member agencies, with the most dramatic increase found in Premise Survey activity. No relationship between force size and participation in specific activities was found among non-member agencies, although their levels of participation in all but four instances were lower than those of member agencies.

From the analysis of force size, the following conclusions can be drawn. There are basic crime prevention activities that agencies engage in regardless of force size. Other areas, however, are dependent upon the availability of resources found only in larger forces. For the most part, member agencies indicate greater participation in crime prevention activities than non-member agencies. This includes all activities, across all force size ranges, with the exception of Rural and Personal Security activities of smaller agencies.

d) Agency Type:

In the next section of analysis the samples were divided into two categories according to agency type, either sheriff's offices or police departments. Differences in organizational structure and jurisdiction of the two agency types may affect the agencies' participation in crime prevention activities. One example of the differences between sheriff's offices and police departments is their divergent responsibilities in jurisdiction. Sheriff's offices' jurisdictions generally encompass a large area, contain several municipalities, and are more rural in nature. Police departments' jurisdictions are more concentrated in area, encompass only one municipality, and are more urban in nature. It was thought that the differences of responsibilities and jurisdictions between sheriff's offices and police departments might have an effect on the crime prevention activities engaged in by these agencies. A greater percentage of police departments than sheriff's offices responded that they were presently involved in crime prevention activity in all categories except Rural Security (see TABLE 5.7).

The difference between agency types in percentage of participation ranged from 5% in the category of Property Identification Program to 35.3% in Education of Fellow Officers.

The data in TABLE 5.7 tend to support the premise that different types of jurisdiction lead to different rates of participation in crime prevention activities. Responses from sheriff's offices showed that they concentrated on Rural Security more than police agencies, which is in accordance with the rural nature of a sheriff's jurisdiction.

Since both police departments and sheriff's offices were low in crime prevention activity before the creation of MCW, and since at present police

TABLE 5.7
COMPARISON OF MEMBER POLICE DEPARTMENTS/SHERIFF'S OFFICES
PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL CRIME PREVENTION CATEGORIES

VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20	Police Dept. N = 31	Sheriff's Office N = 20
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	96.8%	40.0%	100.0%	75.0%	12.9%	70.0%	61.3%	45.0%	100.0%	95.0%	93.5%	80.0%	90.3%	55.0%

agencies maintain a higher level of participation, it appears that more re-orientation has taken place in police departments than in sheriff's offices. It is also the case that sheriff's offices were the only agency type to respond that they had ceased to participate in some crime prevention programs.

Comparison of police departments with sheriff's offices in the specific crime prevention activities shows that police agencies participate at a higher level than sheriff's offices overall.

TABLE 5.8		
COMPARISON OF MEMBER POLICE DEPARTMENTS/SHERIFF'S OFFICES PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES		
VARIABLE	POLICE DEPARTMENT	SHERIFF'S OFFICE
	N = 31 Percent YES	N = 20 Percent YES
Premise Survey	64.5%	35.0%
Use Warning Tags	32.3	15.0
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	64.5	25.0
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	54.8	40.0
Departmental Literature	38.7	25.0
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	6.5	5.0
Departmental Property Engraved	74.2	65.0
Personally Member of a Prop- erty Identification Program	96.8	85.0

The data in TABLE 5.8 show that police departments maintained higher levels of participation than sheriff's offices in all specific activities. The greatest differences in the percentage of participation was found in the activities of Premise Survey and membership in the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association. The smallest difference in levels of participation was found in having a Citizen Crime Prevention Committee.

When the two agency types were broken down according to force size, it was found that MCW member police agencies still tend to participate to a greater degree than MCW member sheriff's offices in all force size groups (see TABLE 5.9). Despite the small population involved in the analysis of agencies with small force sizes (1-5), the data indicate that police departments do tend to participate to a greater degree than sheriff's offices in the four activities of Commercial Security, Residential Security, Personal Security, and Education of Fellow Officers; less in Rural Security and Education of the Public; and the same in one category, having a Property Identification Program, where both groups had 100% participation.

In the sample of force sizes 6-10, a similar situation is present. Police departments are more active in four categories, less active in two, and the same in one (Property Identification Program, again 100%).

In the case of agencies with force sizes of 11+, police agencies again indicate higher participation than sheriff's offices, with higher levels of participation in all categories but Rural Security. The lower participation in this category again may be entirely dependent on the differences in jurisdiction; larger police departments are more likely to have little concern with Rural Security.

These findings show that within the general crime prevention categories, police agencies participate to a greater degree than sheriff's offices across the force size ranges.

Study of the responses to participation in specific crime prevention activities displays similar results (see TABLE 5.10).

TABLE 5.9
COMPARISON OF MEMBER POLICE DEPARTMENTS/SHERIFF'S OFFICES
PARTICIPATION IN GENERAL CRIME PREVENTION CATEGORIES
by FORCE SIZE

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 1-5														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office
	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3	N = 4	N = 3
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	100.0%	33.3%	100.0%	66.7%	25.0%	66.7%	25.0%	-0-	100.0%	100.0%	75.0%	100.0%	50.0%	-0-
AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 6-10														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office
	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5	N = 10	N = 5
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	90.0%	100.0%	100.0%	80.0%	20.0%	60.0%	40.0%	20.0%	100.0%	100.0%	90.0%	60.0%	90.0%	80.0%
AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 11 OR ABOVE														
VARIABLE	COMMERCIAL SECURITY		RESIDENTIAL SECURITY		RURAL SECURITY		PERSONAL SECURITY		PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM		EDUCATION OF PUBLIC		EDUCATION OF FELLOW OFFICERS	
	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office	Police Dept.	Sheriff's Office
	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12	N = 16	N = 12
Percent of Agencies Presently Involved in Activity	100.0%	66.7%	100.0%	75.0%	5.9%	75.0%	82.4%	66.7%	100.0%	91.7%	100.0%	83.3%	100.0%	58.3%

TABLE 5.10
COMPARISON OF MEMBER POLICE DEPARTMENTS/SHERIFF'S OFFICES
PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES
by FORCE SIZE

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 1-5		
VARIABLE	POLICE DEPARTMENT	SHERIFF'S OFFICE
	N = 4 Percent YES	N = 3 Percent YES
Premise Survey	25.0%	-0-
Use Warning Tags	25.0	-0-
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	25.0	-0-
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	100.0	-0-
Departmental Literature	25.0	-0-
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	-0-	-0-
Departmental Property Engraved	75.0	33.3%
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	100.0	100.0

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 6-10		
VARIABLE	POLICE DEPARTMENT	SHERIFF'S OFFICE
	N = 10 Percent YES	N = 5 Percent YES
Premise Survey	60.0%	20.0%
Use Warning Tags	30.0	-0-
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	50.0	20.0
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	30.0	20.0
Departmental Literature	10.0	-0-
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	-0-	-0-
Departmental Property Engraved	50.0	60.0
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	90.0	60.0

AGENCIES WITH FORCE SIZE of 11 OR ABOVE		
VARIABLE	POLICE DEPARTMENT	SHERIFF'S OFFICE
	N = 17 Percent YES	N = 12 Percent YES
Premise Survey	76.5%	50.0%
Use Warning Tags	35.3	25.0
Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Assn. (MCPOA)	82.4	33.3
Development of New Crime Prevention Techniques	58.8	58.3
Departmental Literature	58.8	41.7
Citizen Crime Prevention Committee	11.8	8.3
Departmental Property Engraved	88.2	75.0
Personally Member of a Property Identification Program	100.0	91.7

The data in TABLE 5.10 indicate that, with one exception, police agencies maintained a higher level of participation in every specific crime prevention activity at all force size levels than did sheriff's offices.

The fact that in most cases police from small agencies engage in as many activities as those from larger ones challenges the notion that extensive prevention activity (which leads to reorientation) can take place only in large agencies.

e) Organization:

Crime prevention reorientation can, in part, be measured by studying the effects and degree of reorganization within agencies. Questions were developed to measure the amount of organizational change that may have been caused in an agency by the adoption of crime prevention activities. All of the individuals interviewed in the study (a total of 79 member officers were interviewed) were asked whether or not any changes had occurred in their positions because of crime prevention activities. They also were asked what kinds of changes occurred and how these changes affected their positions.

A review of the data showed that in the case of non-member agencies there was virtually no reorganization of agencies because of crime prevention activity. Thus, the focus of this section will be solely on member agencies.

The highest level of organizational reorientation toward crime prevention activities by a law enforcement agency is the formation of a crime prevention unit. Such a unit is a formal designation of the crime prevention function within the agency. A crime prevention unit places certain functional demands upon an agency such as commitment of monetary and manpower

resources. The commitment of these resources to crime prevention diverts resources from other primary functions of the agency, such as the apprehension of criminals. In this way it also displays the greatest shift from an apprehension or reaction attitude toward a crime prevention attitude.

As of February 1, 1975, 45 member agencies indicated that they had formally designated crime prevention units. This was a dramatic increase from the conditions found in the state prior to the formation of Minnesota Crime Watch.

Of the personnel interviewed from member agencies, 59.5% responded that change did occur in their positions or responsibilities because of the institution of crime prevention activities in their respective agencies. When the member subsample was divided according to force size, it was found that the larger agencies (11+ officers) showed 71.0% of the personnel responding that their positions or responsibilities had changed. In the mid-range force size (6-10), 16.5% responded that change had taken place, and in the lower range forces (1-5), 8.9% indicated change. When the member respondents were divided according to agency type, it was found that 62% of the 29 individuals from sheriff's offices and 55% of the 50 individuals from police departments responded that their positions or responsibilities changed because of the institution of crime prevention activities.

Respondents were then asked what type of change had taken place. Responses to this question were divided into three categories:

- 1) Position change refers to a movement within the organization, changes of title or rank, new civil service classification, or raise in pay.

- 2) Job duties change refers to the individual's role and function within the organization, what tasks the individual performs as part of his/her job. Indicators of a change in job duties include such things as additional or modified job duties because of crime prevention activities.
- 3) Responsibilities change refers to situations in which neither an individual's position nor job duties changed, but his/her responsibilities did. For example, a secretary might be assigned the additional responsibilities of filing Operation Identification registration forms. In this case, filing is a job duty of the secretary, but the filing of Operation Identification forms is an additional responsibility.

Of the 47 individuals who said that they experienced changes in position or responsibilities, 6.4% responded that they had been placed in a new position because of crime prevention activities. These individuals were all from law enforcement agencies with force sizes of 11 or above. In the next two categories, 42.6% indicated that their job duties had changed, and 51.1% responded that theirs was a change of responsibility.

When the sample was divided according to agency type, it was found that the three individuals who had a change in formal position because of crime prevention activities were from police departments. These people made up 6% of the police respondents. In the category of job duties, 27.6% of the respondents from sheriff's offices and 24% of respondents from police departments replied that their job duties changed because of crime prevention activities. Responsibilities change evoked a 34.4% response from those in sheriff's offices and 28% from police department personnel. When asked how these changes had affected their positions, the most common response in all cases was that the change increased their workload.

In conclusion, it can be said that the reorganization of law enforcement agencies because of crime prevention activities is in part a function

of available manpower. Larger forces have the ability to assign personnel to the specialized task of crime prevention, whereas smaller departments employ methods of implementing crime prevention activities that can be accomplished with available resources. Smaller agencies, which because of manpower constraints are unable to develop separate crime prevention units or to assign individuals solely to crime prevention duties, apparently incorporate crime prevention activities into the duties which are already a function of an individual's position. Many of the activities developed by MCW are readily compatible with routine police functions. For instance, residential and commercial security can be explained or "plugged" during everyday police-public encounters. This observation leads to the concept, borne out with responses from agencies, that small-sized agencies with comparatively high workloads tend to adopt those crime prevention activities which constitute a "minimal cost" to the agency's manpower and resources. For example, a property identification program can be conducted at any of several levels. The materials are available free of charge from MCW, and to have a functioning program, the agency need only have these materials available on demand, which constitutes a minimal cost in time and resources. A full-scale program of "canvassing" neighborhoods to increase enrollment and offering to assist in the marking of property introduces a substantially greater cost to the agency.

f) Attitudes of Agency Personnel:

The second section of the reorientation questionnaire consisted of an attitude survey designed to obtain the respondents' personal opinions on several aspects of crime prevention. This section was composed of a series of statements concerning various topics within the area of crime prevention, topics such as their attitudes toward crime prevention, their perceptions of

their department's orientation toward crime prevention activities, and their views on the state management of the crime prevention program. Individuals were asked to respond to each statement on a five point scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. Responses were then scored and given values according to their crime prevention orientation. A middle, or neutral, position was included in the scale; these answers were set at zero to prevent the answers of unsure or unknowledgeable individuals from influencing results. Member/non-member comparisons were generated from both individual questions and an aggregate scale which combined responses to those questions (see APPENDIX D).

Each respondent was asked thirteen questions. The aggregate scale for orientation is based upon responses to eleven of these questions. For each of these eleven questions, the scores were coded from -2 to +2, with the positive score representing the highest level of orientation toward crime prevention. The aggregate scale was formed by the summed score of the eleven questions; thus, the scores will range from -22 to +22. The higher the number on the orientation scale, the greater the orientation toward crime prevention.

Questions 2 and 3 were omitted from the aggregate scale due to the difficulty of establishing scale direction for these questions. These two questions were also coded from -2 to +2 and will be discussed and compared independently. The variance found in the population sizes from question to question reported below is the result of the elimination of missing responses.

Analysis of the data indicates a difference in attitude toward crime prevention between respondents in member and non-member agencies. For the eleven attitude questions in the aggregate scale, the member mean score (\bar{X})

was 10.26, and the non-member mean score was 2.82. This difference was highly significant ($t = 7.01$, $\text{Sig.} = .01$, one-tailed test), indicating that individuals interviewed from member agencies have a greater crime prevention orientation than do those from non-member agencies.

Three questions (8, 9, and 10) were of the self-centering type and were designed to look at shifts in orientation over time as seen by the respondent.

8. Two years ago, this department was Crime Prevention oriented.
9. At present, this department is Crime Prevention oriented.
10. Two years from now this department will be more Crime Prevention oriented.

Question 8 referred to the perceived crime prevention orientation of the agency before Minnesota Crime Watch was instituted and the others pertained to the present and perceived future levels of orientation.

When member and non-member responses to Question 8 were tested, no significant difference was found. Members and non-members perceived their departments' orientation toward crime prevention prior to the institution of Minnesota Crime Watch in the same way (member $\bar{X} = -.42$; non-member $\bar{X} = -.31$). When Questions 9 and 10 were compared in the same manner, significant differences were found -- present: member $\bar{X} = 1.19$, non-member $\bar{X} = .75$; future: member $\bar{X} = 1.40$, non-member $\bar{X} = .68$. From this it could be said that members perceived their agencies as crime prevention oriented at present and that they will be more so in the future. Although non-members' attitude scores increased from past to present, they did not display the level of increase found in member agencies. Member scores reflect a shift in attitudes

toward crime prevention which is not found in non-member scores.

Questions 5, 6, and 12 were directed at the respondents' attitudes toward crime prevention activities and the effect these activities have upon their departments.

5. The amount of time spent on Crime Prevention activities by this department overextends the department's resources.
6. In the long run, Crime Prevention activities will pay for themselves.
12. The manpower used in Crime Prevention activities by this department would be better spent on the apprehension of lawbreakers.

A member/non-member comparison showed that in each case respondents from member agencies had a significantly greater level of orientation toward crime prevention than non-members. These responses indicate that individuals within member agencies felt that the crime prevention activities engaged in by their departments were worth pursuing.

Questions 7, 11, and 13 asked for the individual's opinion on Minnesota Crime Watch and the project's efforts as a state program.

7. In general, state Crime Prevention programs tend to be more effective than those initiated by individual departments.
11. State Crime Prevention programs tend to be too general to apply in specific communities.
13. For this department, the methods and techniques developed by Minnesota Crime Watch have been an effective means to deter burglaries.

The above questions were asked to determine whether there was a difference in orientation between agencies toward the operation of the crime prevention

program at the state level, and if the individual felt that the state program was working. This would seem to show that the individuals in member agencies are more in agreement that a state program is an effective means of operating crime prevention activities than are those in non-member agencies.

In order to determine whether or not there was a difference in perspective toward crime prevention as a concept, Questions 1 and 4 were asked.

1. The victim of a burglary contributes to his/her own misfortune by not taking sufficient precautions.
4. Crime Prevention is not law enforcement's problem; it is the community's problem.

These questions were developed from statements found in the MCW Training Manual and are basic premises of the concept of crime prevention. Again those from member agencies were significantly more likely to agree with these statements than were non-members.

Questions 2 and 3 were developed to probe how the respondents perceived their agency's control of the crime situation within the agency's jurisdiction.

2. At present this agency is able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.
3. In the future this agency will be able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.

These questions, because they lack direct reference to crime prevention, were not included in the crime prevention orientation scale. The responses to these questions indicate that respondents perceived their agencies as being

only moderately able to control crime within their jurisdiction. There was no significant difference in responses of those from member and non-member agencies.

In summary, analysis of data indicates that individuals within member agencies have a higher level of orientation toward crime prevention than individuals from non-member agencies. However, there was found to be no significant difference in their perceptions of the ability to control crime in their respective jurisdictions.

D. CONCLUSIONS

One of the goals of Minnesota Crime Watch was to reorient Minnesota law enforcement agencies toward crime prevention. It was the purpose of this study to evaluate the crime prevention reorientation which has taken place during the first two years of Minnesota Crime Watch's operation. This study has reached the following conclusions:

1. Information provided by Minnesota Crime Watch to demonstrate the effects of reorientation shows that membership of agencies increased, that 43.6% of member agencies received crime prevention training, that there was an increase in the number of crime prevention units in operation, and that the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association (MCPOA) was formed. According to Minnesota Crime Watch, this increase in crime prevention activity demonstrates that reorientation has taken place.

2. The comparison of agencies that are members of MCW with agencies that are not shows that member agencies are more active in areas of crime prevention than non-members. When controlling for force size, member agencies maintained a higher level of participation across the force size ranges.

This also held true when controlling for agency types -- member sheriff's offices and police departments were more active in crime prevention than their non-member counterparts.

3. The comparison of agencies trained by MCW with non-trained agencies shows that trained agencies participate to a greater extent than non-trained agencies. However, this may be a reflection of the fact that larger agencies were more likely to have received training in crime prevention than smaller ones.

4. The analysis of participation in crime prevention activities by member agencies shows that force size has an effect on participation. It was found that as force size increased, the number of activities participated in and the use of specific techniques increased. This was found to hold true for both sheriff's offices and police departments. It is possible that this would hold true for non-member agencies, but because of a lack of large non-member agencies, sufficient data were not available.

5. In an analysis of agency type, it was found that among member agencies, police departments were more active in crime prevention activities than sheriff's offices. Police departments maintained a higher level of participation regardless of force size.

6. The analysis of changes that occurred in the organizational structure of an agency because of crime prevention activities showed these changes to be a function of available manpower. Agencies with large forces have the ability to assign individuals to specialized crime prevention functions, whereas agencies with smaller forces employ alternative methods of crime prevention that are amenable to available resources.

7. The attitude section of the questionnaire showed that individuals within member agencies maintained a higher level of crime prevention orientation than individuals from non-member agencies. The results of the comparison held true when controlling for force size and agency type. It was also found that individuals within member agencies perceived that a shift toward crime prevention had occurred within their departments.

In conclusion, despite a lack of a longitudinal form of measurement, the findings of this study show that reorientation toward crime prevention activities is occurring within law enforcement agencies who are members of the Minnesota Crime Watch project. The results of the reorientation survey support most of the MCW project reports on its progress toward Goal 2). It can be seen that member agencies perform crime prevention activities to a greater extent than non-members. Moreover, member agency personnel tend to display a higher level of personal awareness and orientation toward crime prevention.

Within these member agencies, other major influences on reorientation include force size, agency type, and training in crime prevention. In general, member agencies, police departments, agencies with large force sizes, and those who receive MCW training in crime prevention show greater levels of crime prevention orientation than non-member agencies, sheriff's offices, smaller force sizes, and agencies that have not received training.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

From the conclusions above, it seems appropriate to recommend the following:

1. Because of apparent differences in orientation between trained and

non-trained agencies, it is recommended that Minnesota Crime Watch continue its crime prevention training program.

2. Because crime prevention activity is significantly greater for police departments than for sheriff's offices even when controlling for force size, it is recommended that MCW continue to enlist police departments of all sizes.

SECTION 6:

PREMISE SECURITY

A. INTRODUCTION

Security is a key concept in the MCW program. It is an important part of MCW's public information effort ("the media devices assist in educating the public in basic security measures...") and is a central theme of the training curriculum ("...nationally renowned experts on crime prevention and security present information on physical security devices, such as locks, keys, safes, alarm systems...").¹⁷ Moreover, the education of the public in security measures is the focus of the law enforcement-community relationship.

The crime prevention advocated by MCW and the local agencies hinges on citizen action in taking steps to protect themselves and their property. The first phase of MCW centered on residential security, and the second on commercial security. While continuing in these areas, the MCW plan calls for a third-year shift to personal security and an attempt at "securing long-range changes through legislation and community planning for security designed to improve the crime prevention capabilities of Minnesota residents." MCW states in its manual:

Citizen concern about crime must be translated into action. In a significant number of cases, the victim of a crime contributes to his own misfortune, largely out of ignorance, by not taking basic security measures that would protect his person or property. This approach to crime prevention is based upon the idea of reducing the self-imposed opportunities for crimes to occur. "Mechanical" crime prevention -- placing obstacles in the path of the would-be offender to make committing the crime more difficult -- is a simple, but basic idea.

¹⁷ Quotes taken from Minnesota Crime Watch Manual.

1. Goals and Objectives

As mentioned, security is a broad concept which touches on most MCW activities and objectives. MCW's long-range goals also are security-oriented. The education of the public regarding security techniques affects Goal 3)'s focus on "the relationship and cooperation between the police and the community." Also, security is a component of Goal 2)'s training and reorientation provisions. Goal 1), however, is the goal most directly influenced by the concept of security. It is mainly through the use of security measures that MCW hopes "to effect a reduction in the incidence of specific crimes with major emphasis on crimes against property in Minnesota"

Goal 1) of the first-year grant application made specific reference to residential burglary. In the year-two application, MCW dropped Goal 1)'s specific reference to residential burglary in favor of a concentration on Part I property crime.¹⁸ However, the grant application later states that "the selected target crime was and continues to be residential burglary."

This focus on residential burglary led to the initiation of the Operation Identification program:

Because of the enormous rise in residential burglaries, and the intense public concern about the threat that this crime represents to each citizen in his own home, the first subject selected for concentrated effort is the prevention of residential burglary.

A major part of the campaign to reduce residential burglary in Minnesota will be the Property Identification Project. This project is based on the assumption that burglars will be deterred from stealing property that has been marked with a personal identification number. Such an identification number will make the stolen goods more difficult to get rid of, and easier to recover and return to the owner.

¹⁸Part I property crimes are burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

The law enforcement crime prevention project will seek to assist law enforcement agencies in Minnesota in implementing this project in their communities. It will provide participating agencies with training in the implementation of the project, with individual materials they can use in explaining the project in their communities, with individualized window stickers that will indicate a citizen's participation in the program, and with some engravers for use in identifying the property. (from year-one grant application)

2. Operation Identification

Operation Identification is one of the most important components of MCW, and it was a major element in MCW's program to reduce residential burglary. The specific objectives of the first phase were "to tell the citizen how to make his home less inviting as a target for burglars; how to make his home less accessible should it be chosen as a target; and how to participate in Operation Identification, making his personal property less desirable to burglars and, in fact, making his property a threat to burglars."

A project publication titled Minnesota Crime Watch: A brief description and summary of Minnesota's crime prevention program described Operation Identification as follows:

Operation Identification is the program in which citizens mark their valuable possessions with a Permanent Identification Number, register this number with the police, and then post window stickers to their homes warning would-be burglars of the risk in entering those homes.

A burglar is discouraged in two ways. First, he knows he cannot sell the belongings to a dealer of stolen goods. No dealer wants to be apprehended with stolen merchandise; particularly merchandise easy to trace and identify.

Secondly, the burglar knows that if he is apprehended with someone's marked property in his possession, it is evidence that will convict him in court.

3. Premise Surveys

Another major MCW-encouraged security procedure geared to the prevention of burglary is the premise survey program. A premise survey is an inspection by law enforcement officers of the existing security of residences and businesses. This inspection is designed to uncover security weaknesses in the buildings and to educate the people in more effective security measures.

During the inspections, officers write down recommendations which are then given to the home or business owner as a reminder and guide to the steps needed to make the premise more secure.¹⁹ Although participant agencies have been supplied with a checklist from which citizens can do their own surveys if necessary, MCW encourages agency personnel to conduct in-person surveys. In-person surveys are more thorough and are better able to meet particular needs of individual homes and businesses than are "checklist" inspections.

4. The Problem as Documented by MCW

The second-year grant application concentrates on three specific crime problems in Minnesota. These problems are Part I property crime, burglary, and residential burglary.

Experts in the field of criminal investigation consider Part I crimes²⁰ to be the most serious crimes, and the fact that all three problems addressed by MCW are classified as Part I indicates that they are important. The importance of each problem can be assessed statistically by the use of a

¹⁹ Some departments mail this sheet of recommendations after it has been neatly prepared at headquarters.

²⁰ Part I property crime includes burglary, larceny and auto theft. Other Part I crimes are manslaughter, robbery, rape and aggravated assault.

hierarchical crime structure showing property crime, burglary, and residential burglary as components of Part I crime. Such a hierarchical structure would compare residential burglary to total burglary, total burglary to Part I property crime, and Part I property crime to total Part I crime.

A modified hierarchical arrangement showing these relationships of Part I components was developed for the problem statement of the first-year grant application. Although it omits residential burglary statistics, TABLE I of the problem statement (see APPENDIX E for problem statement and tables) displays the statistical relationships of Part I property crime to Part I crime, burglary to Part I property crime, and burglary to Part I crime. The state totals of TABLE I suggest that burglary composed 41.0% of total 1972 Part I crime. In 1972, burglary made up 44.5% of Part I property crime, which was 92.2% of total Part I crime.

The problem statement further emphasized the problem of burglary in TABLE II (see APPENDIX E) by comparing incidence and clearance data for burglary to that of Part I crime. This table shows that burglary, which TABLE I suggests to be 41.0% of all Part I crime, had a greater rate of increase in incidence and a lower rate of increase in clearance during the years from 1962-1972 than total Part I crime. According to TABLE II, the average annual rate of increase in the incidence of burglary was 19.3%, while the average annual rate of increase in Part I incidence was 15.1%. Clearance figures in TABLE II show that burglary's average annual rate increase was 4.2% from 1962-1972, while the Part I average rate of increase was 10.5% per year. The changes in incidence and clearance of burglary and Part I crime resulted in decreased clearance rates for both groups, but the clearance rate for burglary dropped more than twice as much as the Part I clearance rate -- 23.2% to

11.2% for burglary and 25.1% to 20.6% for Part I crime.

The problem statement seems to document the 1972 problem of Part I property crime and, in particular, burglary. However, after an attempt to add statistics for 1973 and 1974 to the tables for the purposes of this evaluation, it became apparent that the first-year application's problem statement is an inaccurate statistical documentation of the problems that Minnesota Crime Watch addresses.²¹

²¹ There are three main concerns of the problem statement's inaccuracy:

- a) The inconsistency in definition of Part I crime and resultant faulty comparison of tables.
- b) The lack of strict hierarchical structure.
- c) The FBI change in its definition of property crime.

a) In attempting to validate these tables, it was found that TABLES I and II are based on different definitions of Part I crime. There are no explicit definitions in TABLE I; TABLE II footnotes its definition of Part I crime to include larceny under \$50 in the Part I total. The TABLE I percentages are based on a Part I total that excludes larceny under \$50. The problem statement uses TABLE II to "further illustrate" the problem of burglary documented in TABLE I. Since the definitions are different, however, comparison of the tables and conclusions drawn about the importance of burglary are misleading.

b) The illustration of the problem of Part I property crime would be more accurate if TABLE II included statistics for Part I property crime. This omission results in a break of the hierarchical structure established in TABLE I. As a result, TABLE II forces a comparison of burglary to total Part I crime, instead of offering a comparison of burglary to Part I property crime.

c) The FBI in 1973 changed its Uniform Crime Report (UCR) definition of property crime. Prior to 1973, property crime excluded larceny under \$50, but UCRs for the following years consider property crime to include all larceny. TABLE I is based on the obsolete definition of property crime, and therefore it is an inaccurate representation of the problems of property crime and burglary as currently defined.

5. Importance of the Problem Addressed by MCW

The inaccuracy of the problem statement does not mean that the problems challenged by MCW are unimportant. It must be remembered that the inclusion of these problems in the Part I classification indicates importance. Also, when TABLES I and II are corrected, they document that residential burglary, burglary, and Part I property crime are problems in Minnesota.

Corrected tables with 1973 and 1974 data are presented in TABLE 6.1. The corrected tables illustrate the magnitudes of these problems based on consistent definitions and hierarchical structure. The adjusted tables indicate property crime to be a problem in that 94.7%, 94.9%, and 94.6% of Part I crime in 1972, 1973, and 1974, respectively, were property crimes.

Corrected TABLE 6.1 shows that 1972 burglary constituted 29.1% of Part I property crime (not 44.5% as given in the original TABLE I), and that burglary was 30.3% of 1973 and 30.1% of 1974 Part I property crime. Residential burglary comprised 61.3%, 66.0%, and 65.4% of total burglary during these same years.

TABLE 6.1
REPORTED PART I CRIME,^a PROPERTY CRIME,^a AND BURGLARY INCIDENCE
IN MINNESOTA (Regional and Statewide -- 1972 through 1974)

1 9 7 2								
Region	Part I Crime	PROPERTY CRIME		BURGLARY INCIDENCE			RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY ^b	
		Inci- dence	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Property	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Burglary
A	2,381	2,333	98.0%	623	26.7%	26.2%		
B	8,565	8,328	97.2	2,901	34.8	33.9		
C	3,288	3,238	98.5	831	25.7	25.3		
D	7,079	6,959	98.3	2,031	29.2	28.7		
E	2,899	2,847	98.2	648	22.8	22.4		
F	10,500	10,289	98.0	2,358	22.9	22.5		
G	95,911	89,738	93.6	26,638	29.7	27.8		
State	130,621	123,722	94.7	36,030	29.1	27.6	22,078 ^c	61.3%
1 9 7 3								
Region	Part I Crime	PROPERTY CRIME		BURGLARY INCIDENCE			RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY ^b	
		Inci- dence	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Property	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Burglary
A	2,469	2,418	97.9%	667	27.6%	27.0%		
B	9,500	9,201	96.9	3,277	35.6	34.5		
C	4,137	4,084	98.7	1,190	29.1	28.8		
D	7,685	7,548	98.2	2,044	27.1	26.6		
E	2,905	2,858	98.4	640	22.4	22.0		
F	12,458	12,197	97.9	2,895	23.7	23.2		
G	98,559	92,398	93.7	28,868	31.2	29.3		
State	137,713	130,704	94.9	39,581	30.3	28.4	26,127	66.0%
1 9 7 4								
Region	Part I Crime	PROPERTY CRIME		BURGLARY INCIDENCE			RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY ^b	
		Inci- dence	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Property	% of Part I	Inci- dence	% of Burglary
A	2,863	2,799	97.8%	662	23.7%	23.1%		
B	10,431	10,167	97.5	3,561	35.0	34.1		
C	4,704	4,604	98.0	1,532	33.3	32.6		
D	9,394	9,201	97.9	2,920	31.7	31.1		
E	3,785	3,715	98.2	925	24.9	24.4		
F	14,625	14,277	97.6	3,561	24.9	24.3		
G	106,491	99,325	93.3	30,161	30.4	28.3		
State	152,293	144,088	94.6	43,322	30.1	28.4	28,349	65.4%

^aPart I Crime and Property Crime include total larceny.

^bRegional breakdown of Residential Burglary not available.

^cExcludes residential/non-residential breakdown on 453 burglaries.

Adjusted TABLE 6.2 illustrates the importance of burglary in comparison to Part I property crime and in comparison to total Part I crime. During the years 1962 thru 1972, the average annual rate of increase for burglary incidence (19.3%) was greater than comparable rates for either Part I property crime (14.5%) or total Part I crime (15.1%). During these same years, the average annual rate of increase for clearance of burglary (4.2%) was less than the average annual rates of increase for clearance of either Part I property crime or total Part I crime. As a result, the 1962-1972 drop in the clearance rate of burglary is more significant than the clearance rate decreases of either Part I property crime or total Part I crime. Burglary's clearance rate decreased twice as much as the other two -- from 23.2% to 11.2% for burglary, from 24.2% to 18.8% for Part I property crime, and from 25.1% to 20.6% for total Part I crime.

Statistics in TABLE 6.2 suggest that burglary's rate of increase in incidence during 1973 was greater than the rates of increase for the other categories. In 1974, the rate of increase in incidence of burglary reversed the 1962-1973 trend, and at 9.5% was lower than the 10.2% rate of increase for Part I property crime incidence and the 10.6% rate of increase for total Part I incidence. Burglary's clearance rates increased from the 1972 low point of 11.2% to 11.4% in 1973 and 12.7% in 1974. At the same time, clearance rates for property crime decreased slightly from 18.8% in 1972 to 18.6% in 1974, and the Part I clearance rate dropped from 20.6% in 1972 to 20.4% in 1974.

The sparse data for residential burglary indicates that its incidence has constituted over 60% of total burglary during the last three years,

increased 18.3% in 1973, but this increase dropped to 8.5% in 1974.

The above discussion offers documentation of the importance of the problems addressed by Minnesota Crime Watch. One other source of information related to this problem is the data from the Quayle surveys, which measured the responses of the citizens of Minnesota -- the potential victims of these crimes.

Responses to two survey questions are of importance.

- 1) Do you think that crime is a serious problem in your community?
- 2) What is the most common sort of crime committed here in your community?

It must be noted that these survey questions present problems when used to measure attitudes about the importance of crime. As discussed in the "Direct Public Information" section of this report, the wording of the questions is ambiguous; thus, the Quayle results provide estimates of the public's perception of the importance of crime. Responses to the "pre" survey show that 34.6% believed crime to be a serious problem, and that one in four respondents believed burglary/break-ins to be the most common crime (see TABLES 2.1 and 2.2).

Given the importance of the problems addressed by MCW in terms of both crime statistics and popular perception, this evaluation will examine two of MCW's major programs designed to combat these problems.

6. Evaluation Outline

The evaluation of security programs undertaken by MCW focuses on two programs: Operation Identification and premise surveys.

The evaluation of Operation Identification follows the following outline:

1. Accomplishments of Operation Identification
 - a) Origin
 - b) Basic Features
 - c) Implementation Options
 - d) The PIN Number
 - e) Engraving Procedures
 - f) Promotional Effort
 - g) Enrollment
 - h) Public Perceptions of Operation Identification
 - i) Profile of an Operation Identification Participant
 - j) Public Perceptions of Premise Surveys
2. Analysis of Goals
 - a) Appropriateness of Goals
 - b) Adequacy of the Goals and Sub-Goals
 - c) Efficiency in Meeting Goals
3. Effectiveness of Enrollment
4. The Impact of Operation Identification on Crime
 - a) Incidence Data
 - b) Clearance Data
 - c) Crime Rates Data
 - d) Basic Questions
 - 1) probability of being burglarized
 - 2) reduction in dollar loss upon being burglarized
 - 3) increase in dollar value recovered
 - 4) burglary as a precipitant to joining Operation Identification
 - 5) impact on burglary clearance rates
5. Unit Cost Analysis of Enrollment in Operation Identification
 - a) Acceptability of the Unit Cost
 - b) Unit Cost Analysis in the Three-Community Study
6. Operation Identification in Comparative Perspective

Since the premise survey program has comprised a much smaller part of MCW's security endeavors than Operation Identification, its evaluation is considerably abbreviated compared to that of Operation Identification:

1. Background
2. Activities
 - a) Materials
 - b) Promotion
 - c) Training
3. Data Collection and Evaluation
4. Constraints on the Program
5. Conclusions About Premise Surveys

B. EVALUATION OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION

1. Accomplishments of Operation Identification

Minnesota Crime Watch's most widespread activity is Operation Identification, which has become the major crime prevention bond between citizens and local law enforcement agencies. So well-known is this activity that many people think of MCW and Operation Identification as being synonymous. The following section details the progress of the Operation Identification concept -- from its origin to the present.

a) Origin:

Though archaeological evidence indicates that mankind has been engraving distinctive symbols on his possessions for at least 25,000 years,²² most sources credit Everett F. Holladay as the originator of Operation Identification. Holladay, then a member of the Monterey Park (California) Police Department, instituted a program he called "Operation Identification" in that southern California city in 1963.

The effectiveness of the Monterey Park program in reducing the burglary rate among participants was widely hailed by those supporting implementation of the program in other areas. Unfortunately, the actual effect of the program is virtually impossible to determine since no systematic evaluation of that program exists. In fact, despite the wide dispersion of such programs across the country, it is generally conceded that hard evidence of Operation Identification's effectiveness as a burglary deterrent is lacking.

²²For an excellent summary of property marking practices from the Paleolithic Period through cattle branding in the Old West, see: Hans W. Mattick, et al., An Evaluation of Operation Identification as Implemented in Illinois, (Chicago: University of Illinois Center for Research in Criminal Justice, 1974), ch. 1.

b) Basic Features:

Operation Identification programs seek to deter burglary in several ways. The primary goal of such programs is the prevention of the occurrence of a burglary at a participant location. The second goal is to reduce the economic loss sustained by a participant in the event of a burglary. This second goal is to be achieved by increasing the efficiency of the process for identifying and returning stolen property. Marked property found in the possession of a suspect can increase the likelihood of establishing that the item was, in fact, stolen, thereby increasing the conviction and clearance rates for possession of stolen property. The program is also frequently seen as a mechanism to improve police-community relations.

Two relatively simple activities are undertaken by (or for) each participant in the Operation Identification program: (1) items likely to be stolen are engraved with a symbol that can be linked to the owner, and (2) notification (usually in the form of decals) is posted in conspicuous places to inform potential burglars that valuables on the premises have been so marked.

The deterrent aspect of the program is based on the hypothesis that marked items are harder to fence than unmarked items. This factor, combined with the risk to the burglar in transporting incriminating evidence, is designed to make the potential cost of capture outweigh the potential benefit of burglarizing an Operation Identification location.

The objective of reducing property loss is based on two suppositions. First, if a participant is burglarized, marked property is less likely to be taken (for the above reasons). Second, if marked property is stolen and

later recovered, the owner can be found and the property returned.

c) Implementation Options:

Operation Identification has been implemented in a great number of communities since its inception in California. Although the number of communities which have undertaken this program is unknown, estimates range from an unlikely low figure of 400,²³ through a mid-range figure of nearly 1,000,²⁴ to an estimated 80% of all the communities in the United States.²⁵

The widespread utilization of Operation Identification also has resulted in varied methods of implementation. The major variations stem from a number of operational decisions:

- 1) What number will be engraved?
(Driver's license, social security, phone, other.)
- 2) Who will engrave?
(Prospective participant, police, other volunteers, private organizations, other.)
- 3) What type of engraving tool and who provides the tool?
(Electric engraver, scribe; purchased by participant, borrowed from police agency, other.)
- 4) What type of promotional effort?
(Door-to-door, mass-media, posters and handouts, service only on request, other.)
- 5) What help is obtained? Funding sources?
(Insurance organizations, business groups, service clubs, volunteers, school; federal/state grants, charge for service, other.)

²³"Police Offer Free Advice on Preventing Burglary," New York Times, 22 July, 1973. Today this figure would be low in view of the fact that well over 200 communities in Minnesota alone have implemented MCW's Operation Identification program.

²⁴"Operation Identification," Law and Order, May, 1973.

²⁵Thomas White, et al., "Burglary Prevention: Police Expectations and Experiences" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute), p. 14.

6) What records are maintained?²⁶

These categories and the various alternative operational methods are discussed in the following section, which presents the methods MCW chose to implement Operation Identification in Minnesota.


d) The Permanent Identification Number (PIN):

Most police departments in the country have utilized drivers' license numbers for their Operation Identification programs. A minority of departments use Social Security numbers. Neither system was selected for use in Minnesota because of several limitations. The use of drivers' license numbers excludes unlicensed drivers and organizations (churches, schools, businesses, units of government, etc.).

Use of Social Security numbers provides other difficulties. As is the case with drivers' license numbers, not every individual and no organizations have Social Security numbers. Moreover, federal regulations prohibit the tracing of Social Security numbers.

With these limitations in mind, Minnesota Crime Watch succeeded in persuading all participant departments in the state to adopt a standard numbering system known as PIN (Permanent Identification Number). The PIN number consists of a 9-character identifier which is assigned by the FBI to each reporting agency, a 2-character personal identifier (the initials of the individual or organization), and a number assigned sequentially on the basis of participation. The PIN numbering system is illustrated in Figure 6.1.

²⁶White, et al., "Burglary Prevention: Police Expectations and Experiences," pp. 14-15.



Aside from overcoming the disadvantages of other numbering systems, the PIN system has the advantage of being recognizable across jurisdictional lines in Minnesota, and, in fact, across the nation. The one apparent disadvantage of the PIN number is its length.²⁷

e) Engraving Procedures:

Basically, there are two major options for engraving. Either the implementing agency provides the personnel who engrave the participant's valuables, or the participant does the engraving himself.

These options have provoked controversy. Note the following observation: "Strong conflicting opinions exist about who should engrave the items. Costs to the police are highest when uniformed officers engrave items, can be lower if civilian employees engrave, and lowest if volunteers

²⁷At a recent meeting of the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association (MCPOA), several officers stated that some participants had complained that the number they had to engrave was too long. One officer stated that, he too, had heard such complaints, and that each time he did, he took off his wedding band to show the complaining participant. On the inside surface of the ring was engraved, quite clearly, the officer's 15-character PIN number!

or owners engrave. However, the highest response rates are achieved by using police personnel."²⁸

Owing to cost considerations and concerns about prospective participants' reluctance to having police systematically examine their possessions, Operation Identification in Minnesota encourages participants to do their own engraving.

However, since the owners are expected to do the engraving, one cannot be sure that all objects are engraved. In fact, there is no way to be sure that any items are engraved. Various procedures are used to increase the likelihood that items will be engraved: 1) stressing the importance of engraving all valuables to each participant, 2) giving each participant an information sheet which notes the items most frequently stolen in burglaries and which suggests that they be marked, and 3) withholding the Operation Identification decals until the engraver has been returned.²⁹

A majority of the departments in Minnesota use electric engravers for marking property. Through year two, Minnesota Crime Watch had purchased and shipped approximately 3,100 of these engravers to participating departments. The engravers were allocated on the basis of the number of Operation Identification stickers ordered, with 1 engraver accompanying each 500 stickers.

²⁸White, et al., "Burglary Prevention: Police Expectations and Experiences."

²⁹Several Minnesota Police Departments offer a non-electric pen-like engraver, which participants may purchase for a minimum replacement charge of approximately \$2.00. Most of these departments give the participant the decals at the time they sign up.

Departments utilizing electric engravers loan them to prospective participants for varying amounts of time -- usually dependent on demand. Most of the police and sheriff's departments indicated that local civic groups have donated additional engravers for use in the program. Despite this cooperation, many departments report long waiting lists for engravers.

Because of these waiting lists and the expense involved in purchasing additional engravers, some departments have begun to utilize non-electric engravers. These engravers look very much like a ball-point pen, but they have a point capable of inscribing a PIN number on any surface. Typically, a community organization buys the first lot of engraver pens. Participants are then charged the replacement price for the engraver.

The engraving pen has two primary advantages. First, it eliminates the problem of people waiting to borrow the electric engravers. Second, the participants own the engravers, thus making it easier for them to engrave new articles they might purchase. The primary disadvantage of using the pen engraver is its cost to the participant. Possible reluctance on the part of participants to purchase the pen engravers has been alleviated by making electric engravers available for loan.

f) Promotional Effort:

One of the primary benefits accrued by implementing Operation Identification on a statewide basis is the economy achieved in the production and dissemination of promotional material. As an indicator of the scale involved, MCW records indicate that through September of 1975, the following materials have been distributed to police departments:

740,776 Operation Identification Brochures,
2,456,432 Operation Identification Participant Stickers,
64,341 Operation Identification Bumper Stickers, and
3,579 Operation Identification Yard/Construction Site Signs.

In addition to the statewide promotional effort, Minnesota Crime Watch encourages the individual participating agencies to actively promote the program at the local level. This encouragement has led to coverage of the local program in community newspapers. Numerous departments have also organized, with the aid of volunteer organizations, their own promotional campaigns which have included door-to-door drives.

g) Enrollment:

The Preliminary Evaluation Report indicated that through February 28, 1974, the agencies responding to an MCW survey had enrolled 46,092 targets in Operation Identification: 44,506 residential units and 1,586 businesses. Of these totals, 20,236 residences and 300 businesses had participated in "property identification" programs prior to their enrollment into Minnesota Crime Watch's Operation Identification. Therefore, the enrollment directly attributable to Minnesota Crime Watch consisted of 24,270 residences and 1,286 businesses. The total state enrollment of 46,092 yielded an enrollment penetration of 3.4%.³⁰

Enrollment as of March, 1975,³¹ increased to 113,352 residential units

³⁰Based on post office total targets for 1974 (1,363,185). Enrollment penetration is calculated as follows: $\left(\frac{\text{targets enrolled}}{\text{total targets}} \right)$.

³¹Enrollment based on results of the March, 1975, survey to which 87% of member agencies responded.

and 3,070 businesses.³² The adjusted totals (those that exclude targets enrolled in previous programs) are 93,116 residences and 2,614 businesses. Also included in the 1975 total are 291 "others."³³ A breakdown of the number of targets enrolled as of March, 1975, follows:

- Region A) 1,561 residential, 129 business, 24 others -- total of 1,714. Residential penetration was 3.3%.
- Region B) 5,150 residential, 138 business, 4 others -- total of 5,292. Residential penetration was 4.9%.
- Region C) 2,932 residential, 124 business, 2 others -- total of 3,058. Residential penetration was 5.0%.
- Region D) 5,131 residential, 122 business, 5 others -- total of 5,258. Residential penetration was 4.7%.
- Region E) 2,280 residential, 245 business, 17 others -- total of 2,542. Residential penetration was 2.4%.
- Region F) 7,392 residential, 745 business, 43 others -- total of 8,180. Residential penetration was 3.9%.
- Region G) 88,906 residential, 1,567 business, 196 others -- total of 90,669. Residential penetration was 16.8%.

The 236 agencies, as of March, 1975, had enrolled 116,713 of the 1,363,185 targets in Minnesota,³⁴ for an enrollment penetration of 8.6%. The total enrollment increased 153.2% from March, 1974, to March, 1975.

h) Public Perceptions of Operation Identification:

In addition to statistics on enrollment, other aspects of

³² Residential totals are inflated since they include totals of agencies that don't separate enrollment figures; therefore, business and others are deflated.

³³ Non-residential, non-business, such as government buildings, churches, schools, etc.

³⁴ Based on residential and business address totals supplied by the post office.

Operation Identification are of interest. The Quayle survey results provide measures of:

- 1) The public's awareness of Operation Identification.
- 2) The public's understanding of Operation Identification.
- 3) Enrollment in Operation Identification.
- 4) Constraints upon public participation in crime prevention programs.

1) The Public's Awareness of Operation Identification

A review of the Quayle results indicates similarities between awareness of crime in the community and awareness of Operation Identification. As mentioned earlier, the largest increases in community awareness of crime from "pre" to "post" surveys were found in the suburban and Twin Cities samples. The awareness of Operation Identification is greatest in the same samples. Approximately 92% of the suburban sample and 84% of the Twin Cities sample have heard of Operation Identification, compared to 78% of the state sample (see TABLE 6.3). Once again these results may reflect the impact of the active crime prevention programs in the suburbs and Twin Cities.

TABLE 6.3			
<u>"HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION?"</u>			
<u>(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)</u>			
<u>RESPONSE</u>	<u>MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL</u>	<u>SUBURBS</u>	<u>STATE</u>
Yes	83.9%	91.9%	78.3%
No	14.1	7.5	19.0
Other	1.9	0.6	2.7
TOTALS:	99.9%	100.0%	100.0%
N:	305	160	405

Respondents learned of Operation Identification in various ways. Television was the mode most often mentioned by respondents as the way they first learned of Operation Identification. Word-of-mouth from relatives or neighbors was the second most frequent method, followed by newspapers and magazines, and the police department (see TABLE 6.4).

TABLE 6.4			
"HOW DID YOU FIRST LEARN ABOUT OPERATION IDENTIFICATION?"			
(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
(multiple responses possible)			
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL	SUBURBS	STATE
Television	42.2%	34.0%	48.9%
Neighbors/friends/ relatives	18.4	18.4	11.4
Police	9.0	15.0	8.8
Town/village associations	2.3	1.4	1.6
Newspapers/magazines	13.3	12.9	12.9
Radio	3.1	1.4	6.6
Brochures/pamphlets	4.7	6.8	4.1
Advertisements	0.8	1.4	0.9
All others	6.3	8.8	4.7
TOTALS:	100.1%	100.0%	99.9%
N: ^a	256	147	317
^a N refers to number of <u>responses</u> given.			

The suburban sample had the greatest awareness of Operation Identification, but the lowest percentage hearing about the program from television messages. Education about Operation Identification in the suburbs may have come from local effort such as the police department and distribution of brochures and pamphlets. Since the suburban sample reported significantly larger responses in these categories than did the other samples, these figures also suggest that one means of increasing awareness is to have an active local effort to complement the mass-media campaign.

2) The Public's Understanding of Operation Identification

Awareness of Operation Identification is not sufficient. A better measure of MCW's success in reaching people is the public's understanding of the Operation Identification concept. The Quayle survey found that the suburbs again provided the model. When respondents were shown facsimiles of the Operation Identification and MCW symbols, the suburbanites displayed a greater sophistication concerning the meaning of the symbols than did the other samples. Nearly 73% of the suburban respondents recognized the Crime Watch facsimile and described its meaning with a fairly sophisticated level of understanding, as compared with only 44.9% in the state sample, and 53.8% in the Twin Cities (see TABLE 6.5).

TABLE 6.5			
'DO YOU HAPPEN TO RECOGNIZE THIS SYMBOL (facsimile of the CRIME WATCH SYMBOL)?'			
(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL	SUBURBS	STATE
Recognize with some sophistication	53.8%	72.5%	44.9%
Do not recognize	30.8	17.5	40.3
Have seen it but don't know what it is	13.1	10.0	14.1
Other	2.3	-0-	0.7
TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N:	305	160	405

The presentation of the Operation Identification facsimile revealed similar responses. The differences between highest and lowest samples were not as great as with the Crime Watch facsimile. Again, the suburbs led the others in sophistication (see TABLE 6.6).

TABLE 6.6			
"HERE IS ANOTHER SYMBOL (facsimile of the OPERATION IDENTIFICATION SYMBOL). WHAT DOES THIS SYMBOL MEAN TO YOU?" (Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974) (multiple responses possible)			
<u>RESPONSE</u>	<u>MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL</u>	<u>SUBURBS</u>	<u>STATE</u>
Recognize with some sophistication	69.6%	76.2%	66.8%
Do not recognize	30.4	23.8	33.2
TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N:	332	168	443

3) Enrollment in Operation Identification

A final measure of MCW public education achievement is the number of people who have been motivated to join Operation Identification. Again the suburbs are the model. Of the suburban respondents, 18.8% claimed that they had joined (as of October-November, 1974), compared to 15.7% for the Twin Cities and 10.6% statewide (see TABLE 6.7).

TABLE 6.7			
"HAVE YOU JOINED OPERATION IDENTIFICATION?" (Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
<u>RESPONSE</u>	<u>MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL</u>	<u>SUBURBS</u>	<u>STATE</u>
Yes	15.7%	18.8%	10.6%
N:	48	30	43

Again it should be noted that the communities with active crime prevention programs have the outstanding results.

4) Constraints Upon Public Participation in Crime Prevention Programs

Apparently the people of Minnesota are becoming aware of Operation

Identification. Survey results suggest that a majority of citizens has a fairly sophisticated understanding of the program and that many people have joined. However, there appear to be major obstacles to actual participation in Operation Identification.

According to the Quayle responses, 80%-90% of Minnesotans have heard of Operation Identification, but only 10%-20% have joined. Survey results suggest that the major reason for not participating is public apathy (see TABLE 6.8).

TABLE 6.8			
"WHAT ARE TWO OR THREE MAIN REASONS WHY YOU HAVE <u>NOT</u> JOINED OPERATION IDENTIFICATION?"			
(Asked of those who <u>had heard</u> of the program but had NOT joined)			
(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
(multiple responses possible)			
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL	SUBURBS	STATE
Just never got around to it	43.8%	44.4%	40.1%
Not practical for my possessions	1.8	3.2	1.3
Do not have the time	8.9	8.7	7.6
Do not believe it will work	2.7	4.8	3.3
Do not have sufficient information about Operation Identifica- tion	7.1	7.9	12.9
Our town does not have Operation Identifica- tion	-0-	-0-	2.3
Do not have anything worth stealing	12.9	13.5	11.9
Feel it unnecessary	7.1	7.1	4.6
Live in a safe place	1.8	2.4	5.6
All other	7.6	3.2	5.3
Don't know, no answer	6.3	4.8	5.0
TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%
N:	224	126	302

When respondents who indicated that they had not joined Operation Identification were asked their reasons, a significant number of respondents said they do not have anything worth stealing, but the largest response in all samples was that they "never got around to it." A very small percentage answered that they "do not believe it will work." Apathy, not aversion to the concept, appears to be the major barrier to participation.

Summary

The most consistent findings of the Quayle data are the conspicuous results of the suburban sample. This sample 1) had heard about Operation Identification from non mass-media sources at a higher rate than had the other samples, 2) was significantly more aware of Operation Identification, 3) had a higher level of sophistication concerning its function, and 4) rendered a higher estimate of Operation Identification enrollment.

In general, Minnesotans are becoming aware of Operation Identification. As awareness and knowledge about the program increase, it is expected that enrollment will increase. Public apathy, however, is a major obstacle to increased participation. It appears then that the motivation of the public is the crucial aspect of Operation Identification. As was mentioned in the discussion of the citizens' awareness of crime in the community, it would seem that active crime prevention programs similar to those in the suburbs would enhance the MCW public education effort.

i) Profile of an Operation Identification Participant:

The Quayle results provide additional information about those who have joined Operation Identification. This information contributes to a profile of members, with implications about the audiences of MCW's public education effort, past and future.

According to survey results, Operation Identification participation rates vary considerably by family income (see TABLE 6.9).

TABLE 6.9					
PARTICIPATION RATES BY FAMILY INCOME					
SAMPLE	UNDER \$5,000	\$5,000- \$7,500	\$ 7,501- \$10,000	\$10,001- \$15,000	OVER \$15,000
Minneapolis and St. Paul N: ^a	10.8% 37	10.3% 29	17.1% 41	18.6% 86	18.6% 86
Suburban N: ^a	6.7% 15	9.1% 11	16.7% 12	17.1% 35	27.9% 68
State N: ^a	1.6% 61	2.3% 43	7.5% 67	13.0% 123	21.3% 89
^a N refers to the base figure upon which percentages were calculated. This table, <u>and the six that follow</u> , should be read, for example, "10.8% of the 37 respondents in the Minneapolis and St. Paul sample with incomes under \$5,000 were participants, whereas 18.6% of the 86 in the same sample with incomes over \$15,000 were participants."					

In the statewide sample, participation rates range from 1.6% in the lowest income category to 21.3% among those with a family income of over \$15,000.00 per year. The same consistent rise in participation rates by income can be noted in the Twin Cities and suburban samples.

The socio-economic status of respondents (as determined by the interviewers) provides an additional component to the profile of Operation Identification members. Quayle results indicate that the highest participation rates were among the "middle classes" (see TABLE 6.10). In the statewide sample, participation ranged from 1.4% among those classified as being "lower" class (N = 9) to 44.4% (N = 9) among those in the "upper" class. In the Twin Cities sample, the highest participation rate (18.5%) was among those

in the "upper middle" class, while in the suburban sample the highest rate (25.7%) was among those in the "lower middle" class category.

TABLE 6.10				
<u>PARTICIPATION RATES BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS</u> (as <u>recorded</u> , not asked, by interviewer)				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>LOWER</u>	<u>LOWER MIDDLE</u>	<u>UPPER MIDDLE</u>	<u>UPPER</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	6.9%	16.5%	18.5%	-0-
N:	29	218	54	4
Suburban	11.1%	25.7%	13.2%	11.1%
N:	9	19	68	9
State	1.4%	10.7%	14.6%	44.4%
N:	70	244	82	9

In the statewide sample, the highest participation rates were among those in single family dwellings. In both the Twin Cities sample and the suburban sample, the highest rates were among those living in duplexes. Given the small numbers in this category, however, there is a considerable likelihood that these findings may be due to chance. In any case, the vast majority of those participating in Operation Identification live in single family dwellings (97.7% in the state sample, 90.0% in the suburban sample, and 85.4% in the Twin Cities) (see TABLE 6.11).

TABLE 6.11				
<u>PARTICIPATION RATES BY TYPE OF DWELLING</u>				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING</u>	<u>DUPLEX</u>	<u>HIGH-RISE/ MULTIPLE UNIT</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	16.4%	20.0%	8.7%	-0-
N:	250	25	23	0
Suburban	21.4%	50.0%	-0-	11.1%
N:	126	2	0	18
State	11.8%	-0-	5.3%	-0-
N:	356	0	19	0

Educational achievement of members also displays consistent results in all samples (see TABLE 6.12).

TABLE 6.12				
<u>PARTICIPATION RATES BY EDUCATION</u>				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL</u>	<u>HIGH SCHOOL</u>	<u>SOME COLLEGE</u>	<u>COLLEGE DEGREE</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	9.8%	18.8%	16.0%	15.4%
N:	61	117	61	65
Suburban	-0-	17.7%	26.2%	20.0%
N:	16	62	42	40
State	-0-	11.2%	11.5%	19.2%
N:	82	169	78	73

In general, the likelihood of joining Operation Identification increases with education. In the statewide sample, none of those with less than a high-school diploma were participants, compared to 19.2% of those with a college degree. In the Twin Cities sample, the highest participation rate was among those who completed high school, while in the suburbs the rate was highest among those with some college education.

Education is also associated with having heard of the Operation Identification program. The highest proportions of those who have not heard of Operation Identification are to be found among those who have not completed high school (see TABLE 6.13).

TABLE 6.13				
EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF THOSE WHO HAVE <u>NOT</u> <u>HEARD OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION</u>				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>LESS THAN</u> <u>HIGH SCHOOL</u>	<u>HIGH SCHOOL</u>	<u>SOME</u> <u>COLLEGE</u>	<u>COLLEGE</u> <u>DEGREE</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	31.1%	14.5%	9.8%	10.8%
N:	61	117	61	65
Suburban	37.5%	4.8%	2.4%	7.5%
N:	16	63	42	40
State	45.1%	16.6%	21.8%	8.2%
N:	82	169	78	73

In addition to the above variables, the Quayle data also indicated that participation in Operation Identification is more likely among those who have lived in Minnesota over 10 years and among those who are middle-aged.

These findings would indicate that those with higher incomes, socio-economic status levels, and education are more likely to be familiar with the program and more likely to actually join Operation Identification.

When respondents were asked if they had ever been the victim of a crime, the proportion who answered "Yes" was consistently higher for participants in Operation Identification than for non-participants. Approximately 70% of the participants in each of the three samples had been victims of some crime, compared to 45% of the non-participants in the statewide sample, 58.2% in the Twin Cities sample and 48.8% in the suburban sample (see

TABLE 6.14).

TABLE 6.14				
<u>"HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE VICTIM OF A CRIME?"</u>				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>		<u>NON-PARTICIPANTS</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	70.8%	29.2%	58.2%	41.8%
N:	48	48	256	256
Suburban	70.0%	30.0%	48.8%	51.2%
N:	30	30	129	129
State	69.8%	30.2%	45.0%	55.0%
N:	43	43	360	360

Operation Identification participants were also more likely to have been victims of a burglary than non-participants. In the statewide sample, 32.5% of the participants had been burglarized at some time compared to only 15.7% of the non-participants (see TABLE 6.15).

TABLE 6.15				
<u>"HAS YOUR (HOME/APARTMENT) EVER BEEN BURGLARIZED?"</u>				
<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>PARTICIPANTS</u>		<u>NON-PARTICIPANTS</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Minneapolis and St. Paul	31.3%	68.7%	21.3%	78.7%
N:	48	48	254	254
Suburban	33.3%	66.7%	20.5%	79.5%
N:	30	30	127	127
State	32.5%	67.5%	15.7%	84.2%
N:	40	40	356	356

It should be noted here that these findings do not indicate that the Operation Identification program is not working. Since the question was phrased to determine whether the respondents had ever been burglarized, it

is quite likely that having been burglarized led to joining Operation Identification rather than the other way around.

Summary

In general, the results of the profile were as expected. It is widely theorized that people of lower income, socio-economic status, and educational attainment often choose not to become involved with law enforcement agencies. As a result, the majority of Operation Identification members may fit into the following, perhaps oversimplified, profile:

A typical Operation Identification member in Minnesota appears to be a long-term state resident who is middle-aged, middle-class, married, has at least a high-school education, and is living in a single family dwelling.

According to the Quayle data, certain groups may have had insufficient exposure to the Operation Identification program. These groups are people over age 60, and people with less than a high-school education. The current MCW public education campaign, although providing widespread exposure throughout the state, has apparently been unable to reach these groups. Barriers may be citizens' geographic isolation, lack of concern, lack of acceptance of police programs, or inability to understand or enroll in the program without special assistance. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a definite need to at least attempt to reach these citizens. Perhaps future MCW public education efforts should place a special emphasis on reaching these particular groups.

j) Public Perceptions of Premise Surveys:

Another important aspect of the MCW burglary prevention program is the security check conducted by local law enforcement agencies. The Quayle survey asked two questions about this program.

The first question was designed to measure citizens' awareness of the security check program (see TABLE 6.16); the second, to measure citizens' willingness to participate in such a program (see TABLE 6.17).

At the time of the second Quayle survey, only 13.3% of the statewide sample, 11.8% of the Twin Cities sample, and 16.2% of the suburban sample knew that their local police departments had a security check program (see TABLE 6.16).

TABLE 6.16			
"DO YOU KNOW IF A SECURITY CHECK PROGRAM IS AVAILABLE IN THIS COMMUNITY?"			
(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL	SUBURBS	STATE
Yes	11.8%	16.2%	13.3%
No	63.0	36.9	59.5
Not sure	25.2	46.9	27.2
TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N:	305	160	405

However, responses to the second Quayle question indicate that approximately 60% of Minnesotans (even a higher percentage in the Twin Cities) would participate in a program of security checks by law enforcement officers, if such a program were available (see TABLE 6.17).

Apparently, most people see security checks as desirable. But although all MCW agencies have received information on home security check procedures, many departments have not actively begun security check programs because of budget, manpower, or time considerations.

TABLE 6.17			
"IF SUCH A PROGRAM WERE AVAILABLE, DO YOU THINK YOU WOULD BE LIKELY TO REQUEST A SECURITY CHECK BY THE POLICE?"			
(Responses to "post" survey of Oct.-Nov., 1974)			
RESPONSE	MINNEAPOLIS and ST. PAUL	SUBURBS	STATE
Yes	65.6%	58.7%	60.2%
No	23.6	32.5	33.1
Not sure	10.8	8.7	6.7
TOTALS:	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%
N:	305	160	405

Due to the above constraints and the lack of MCW publicity about this preventive measure, security checks have had a low profile. It would seem from the Quayle data that more active efforts by MCW and by local law enforcement agencies would lead to great success. But, as documented by the Golden Valley Police Department in August-September, 1974, actual inspection of a citizen's home does not necessarily lead to security improvements on the part of the homeowner.³⁵

2. Analysis of Goals

a) Appropriateness of Goals:

In choosing 1972's property crime rate of 2,081.5 as a target for Goal 1), Minnesota Crime Watch may have jeopardized its chances of goal attainment. A review of state and national property crime rates (see TABLE 6.18) shows that 1972 was the first year since 1965 that these rates dropped. This suggests that the goal was based on the rate from an uncharacteristically

³⁵ According to the Golden Valley Police Department, follow-ups were made on 160 residences from 8 months to 1 year after they were inspected. Results showed that owners of 65% of those inspected did nothing to improve their home security. "The only people who followed suggestions at all were those that experienced a burglary or theft," said the report.

low year.

TABLE 6.18		
UNITED STATES VS. MINNESOTA		
PROPERTY CRIME RATES ^a		
(1965 - 1974)		
<u>YEAR</u>	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>MINNESOTA</u>
1965	2,224.3	1,924.9
1966	2,427.7	2,110.8
1967	2,705.5	2,461.2
1968	3,036.2	2,823.1
1969	3,311.3	2,934.7
1970	3,588.2	3,048.9
1971	3,732.8	3,382.5
1972	3,527.4	3,179.6
1973	3,702.1	3,355.4
1974	4,362.6	3,696.8
^a Property crime rates (per 100,000 population) computed using new method which includes total larceny combined with burglary and auto theft.		

Minnesota Crime Watch's decision to attempt reduction of a flat crime rate seems to indicate that the unrepresentativeness of 1972 rates was not considered. In order to attain Goal 1), the property crime rate by 1979 would have to be lower than that of seven years earlier (1972). Only twice in the last fifteen years (1960-1974) did the property crime rates decrease, and when they did, the rates dropped below those of the previous year only, never below the rates of seven years previous.

The use of the 1979 target date presents a problem for this evaluation because assessments of the project's progress toward attaining the goal must be based on projections of crime rates and incidence. Though such projections are subject to error, there is no other way to gauge the progress of the project.

Goal 1), as quantified in the year-two grant, faces one other problem, this dealing with a recent change in FBI Uniform Crime Reporting. Since 1973, the FBI definition of property crime includes total larceny. The target 2,081.5 property crime rate of Goal 1) is an FBI figure based on the old definition which does not include larceny under \$50. The permanent addition of larceny under \$50 to the property crime definition automatically raises the property crime rate significantly -- from 2,081.5 per 100,000 to an adjusted 1972 property crime rate of 3,179.6. Since all future FBI and Minnesota BCA Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs) will adhere to the new definition, it would seem appropriate to restate the target rate using the new definition of property crime.

Appropriateness of Sub-Goal a)

A review of sub-goal a) suggests that enrollment in Operation Identification is appropriate to the reduction of property crime. Assuming that Operation Identification deters burglary, enrollment in the program may have an impact on property crime reduction since burglary is a component of property crime. Thus, the sub-goal's 20% enrollment target is appropriate in that it might reduce burglary, and, in doing so, could have an effect on the property crime problem addressed by Goal 1).

b) Adequacy of the Goals and Sub-Goals:

A close examination of sub-goal a) leads one to question the adequacy of the sub-goal and Minnesota Crime Watch's focus on burglary in an effort to reduce property crime as a whole, for the following reason.

According to the statement of the problem, burglary constitutes 44.5% of property crime statewide. With the FBI's new method of classification, which includes total larceny in the property crime total, this figure is

adjusted to 29.1% (see TABLE 6.1). It seems that there are two ways a reduction of burglary's 29.1% could effect a reduction in property crime:

- 1) the remaining 70.9% (larceny and auto theft) would have to be reduced or held constant, or
- 2) the reduction of burglary would have to be sufficiently large to offset any increases in larceny and auto theft.

It appears unlikely that the former will occur, since the combined larceny and auto theft rate has risen from 1,394.4 in 1965 to 2,585.4 in 1974.³⁶ Given the improbability of larceny and auto theft suddenly decreasing, the reduction of burglary in order to effect a reduction in the property crime rate would have to be very significant.

Rate projections for 1979 indicate the inadequacy of Minnesota Crime Watch's focus on burglary as a means for reducing property crime. According to projections based on rate increases from 1965 through 1972 and projected through 1979, the 1979 property crime rate, using the new FBI definition of property crime, will be 4,231.7 per 100,000 for Minnesota.

In order to reduce this rate to less than 3,179.6 (which is the adjusted figure for the 1972 target rate given in the grant application) by concentrating on burglary reduction, 85.4% of the projected 1979 burglary incidence would have to be eliminated.

It is questionable that by 1979 Minnesota Crime Watch's security activities could effect such a reduction of burglary. Such a reduction would leave an incidence of 14.6% of the 1979 burglary projection, with a

³⁶ Larceny/auto theft rate is derived from FBI larceny and auto theft crime rates.

corresponding burglary rate of 179.8. Minnesota's burglary rate has not been that low since the early 1950's -- the 1950 rate was 150.6 (BCA). Thus, sub-goal a) seems inadequate to effect a reduction in property crime equal to the proportion demanded by Goal 1).

c) Efficiency in Meeting Goals:

MCW hoped to enroll 20% of all Minnesota households and businesses by the end of year two. Telephone survey results of March, 1975, show an enrollment penetration of 8.6%. At that time it became apparent that the 20% figure would not be reached. However, the data presented in TABLE 6.19 indicate that the goal itself (20%) was probably unrealistic. The efforts made to attain the goal did result in a highly successful outcome in comparison with other nationally reported programs.

TABLE 6.19
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND RANKED PERCENT
OF STANDARD SUCCESS ACHIEVED FOR ELEVEN
OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PROGRAMS NATIONWIDE^a

COMMUNITY	1970 POPULATION	NUMBER OF PARTICI- PANTS	(YEAR REPORT)	RANKED % OF SUCCESS ^b
1. Marshall County, Oklahoma	7,682	760	(1973)	121.0%
2. Monterey Park, California	49,166	4,000	(1971)	100 = Standard
3. Wichita, Kansas	276,544	10,000	(1973)	44.0
4. Cincinnati, Ohio	452,524	15,000	(1973)	40.7
5. MINNESOTA	3,805,069	116,713	(March, 1975)	37.7
6. St. Louis, Mo.	622,236	16,000	(1974)	31.0
7. MINNESOTA	3,805,069	46,092	(March, 1974)	14.9
8. New Orleans, La.	593,471	2,500	(1972)	5.0
9. Detroit, Mich.	1,511,482	6,500	(1973)	5.0
10. Illinois	11,113,976	23,227	(Sept., 1974)	2.6
11. New York City	7,894,862	4,500	(1973)	1.0
12. Dallas, Texas	844,401	900	(1972)	1.0

^aTABLE 6.19 adapted from AN EVALUATION OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION, Mattick, et al., University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Center for Research in Criminal Justice, (September, 1974), Appendix I.

^b% Success = $\frac{\text{ENROLLMENT REPORTED IN COMMUNITY}}{\text{Enrollment in Monterey Park} \times \frac{\text{Population of Community}}{\text{Population of Monterey Park}}} \times 100$

TABLE 6.19 indicates that in comparison to similar programs, Minnesota has, within a short period of time, enrolled a great number of participants in Operation Identification. At least three facts indicated in TABLE 6.19 deserve special emphasis:

- 1) In terms of raw number enrolled, Minnesota had exceeded all other reported enrollment by March, 1974. One year later, the MCW enrollment was more than five times greater than the next largest enrollment, and larger than all other listed enrollment combined.
- 2) When enrollment figures are standardized utilizing Monterey Park, California, (the community which has had the longest running Operation Identification program in the U.S.) as a base, only three communities are ahead of Minnesota's 1975 ranking. It should be noted that MCW's Operation Identification programs in several communities have enrollments that, if ranked, would rival the highest figures in the table. This once again indicates that while Operation Identification is a program coordinated at the state level, its implementation is based on local agency activity and initiative.
- 3) An indicator of increased efficiency in enrollment is indicated by the jump in ranking from year one's #7 ranking to the year-two ranking of #4.

3. Effectiveness of Enrollment

Various factors influence enrollment in Operation Identification. Greater agency enlistment, which enables Operation Identification to be offered to more people, could result in greater enrollment in Operation Identification. Also, most Minnesota Crime Watch materials distributed to enlisted agencies are tied to enrollment either indirectly, as a means of promotion (posters, bumper stickers, certain brochures), or directly, as a part of enrollment (engravers, stickers). The materials with indirect relationship to enrollment have promotional impact on Operation Identification. Together with promotion in the mass-media, the materials with direct relationship to enrollment will possibly increase Operation Identification enrollment. Crime Prevention training also might have an effect on enrollment,

since the training content includes methods for increasing enrollment.

The enlistment of agencies into Minnesota Crime Watch makes it possible for citizens to enroll in Operation Identification. As enlistment of agencies increased 181.3% from April, 1974, to March, 1975, the enrollment in Operation Identification also increased significantly -- 153.2% (the percent differences are calculated as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Enrollment in 1975} - \text{Enrollment in 1974}}{\text{Enrollment in 1974}} \text{).}$$

It might be expected that the regions of highest enlistment would be the regions of highest enrollment, but to calculate enrollment penetration it is first necessary to determine the number of residential targets within each region (see APPENDIX F for a map of Minnesota's criminal justice regions).

A census bureau publication provides formulae for determining the number of residences (households) in each region. Therefore, in the following tables, "residential" enrollment totals are used as one method of computing enrollment penetration. Using this method, the number of total targets is equal to the total population divided by the average number of persons in each residence.³⁷

While it would be convenient to use only total targets in measuring Operation Identification enrollment penetration, it might be considered unfair to measure enrollment in this manner, for the number of total targets in Minnesota includes some which are in the jurisdictions of law enforcement agencies not participating in MCW. These targets do not have the opportunity

³⁷ Regional formulae for targets (based on census figures) are as follows: Region and Persons Per Target -- A-3.19; B-3.14; C-3.18; D-3.32; E-3.15; F-3.19; and G-3.54.

to enroll in Operation Identification, and the resultant enrollment penetration would be expected to be lower.

In order to remove this bias, enrollment penetration is based on "population served" targets, which exclude those targets having no opportunity for enrollment. This measurement, however, presents another problem in that "population served" has two definitions. The Minnesota Crime Watch project management assumes that each county sheriff serves all citizens in his particular county. Therefore, if a county sheriff's office is a participant in MCW, all people in that county have Operation Identification available to them, and the total county population is included in the measure of population served. By this definition, if all county sheriffs were MCW members, the population served would be equal to the state's population.

According to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, however, a county sheriff serves only those citizens not served by a local police department. Therefore, a large population served depends on both the sheriff's office and the police departments' joining MCW. Unless all police departments and the sheriff's office are members, the BCA definition of population served renders a lower total than does the MCW definition. For example, in Region G, all county sheriffs are MCW members, but only 59% of the police departments have joined Minnesota Crime Watch (see the discussion of Enlistment in Section 3). The MCW population served is therefore 100%, but the BCA figure is lower because of the non-member police departments.

When computed on the basis of these "targets served" figures, the enrollment penetration levels are higher than when based on total targets. The MCW-defined penetration is lower than the BCA-defined penetration because the MCW definition creates a larger base target figure.

In discussion of the following tables, all three estimates of enrollment penetration are considered.

TABLE 6.20 ranks both enrollment and enlistment by region, but a distinct pattern is not evident.

TABLE 6.20								
REGIONAL RANKING OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION ENROLLMENT PENETRATION and AGENCY ENLISTMENT IN MCW								
RANK	ENROLLMENT PENETRATION ^a						% of Agency Enlistment in MCW ^c	
	Re- gion	"Total" Targets	"Targets Served" ^b					
			Re- gion	MCW	Re- gion	BCA		
1 hi	G -	16.8%	G -	16.8%	G -	18.5%	G -	62.0%
2	G -	5.0	D -	5.8	F -	6.6	B -	39.0
3	B -	4.9	C -	5.3	D -	6.3	E -	33.0
4	D -	4.7	B -	5.1	B -	5.6	F -	32.0
5	F -	3.9	F -	4.9	C -	5.4	C -	31.0
6	A -	3.3	A -	3.9	A -	4.5	D -	30.0
7 lo	E -	2.4	E -	3.3	E -	3.4	A -	28.0

^aResidential enrollment as reported by agencies during the March, 1975, survey. Percentages based on census formulae for "targets."

^bBased on population served as of March, 1975, as defined by MCW and BCA.

^cAs of March 1, 1975.

Region G has the highest "total target" enrollment and the highest enlistment of agencies, but the second highest enrollment occurs in the region of third lowest enlistment (Region C). Furthermore, Region E, which has the third highest enlistment, has the lowest enrollment penetration. If enrollment based on "targets served" is used for comparison, similar results appear. Again Region G has the highest enlistment and the highest enrollment. Also, Region E again has the third highest enlistment, but the lowest enrollment. Although enlistment of agencies has a logical influence on enrollment, there is no strong regional ranking correlation between

enrollment penetration and agency enlistment levels.

Distribution of Minnesota Crime Watch materials is based on the "population served" by participant agencies, and it might be expected that the regions of highest population served (those receiving most materials) would have the highest enrollment. However, except for Region G, which received the largest share of materials (based on the largest population served) and has the highest "total target" enrollment penetration, there are no consistent relationships (see TABLE 6.21).

TABLE 6.21
REGIONAL RANKING OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION ENROLLMENT PENETRATION
and
POPULATION SERVED BY MCW PARTICIPANT AGENCIES

RANK	ENROLLMENT PENETRATION ^a					POPULATION SERVED ^c		
	Re- gion	"Total" Targets	"Targets Served" ^b			Re- gion	MCW ^d	BCA ^e
			Re- gion	MCW	Re- gion	BCA		
1 hi	G -	16.8%	G -	16.8%	G -	18.5%	G - 1,874,380	1,698,002
2	C -	5.0	D -	5.8	F -	6.6	F - 481,407	357,941
3	B -	4.9	C -	5.3	D -	6.3	B - 319,756	286,761
4	D -	4.7	B -	5.1	B -	5.6	D - 292,461	270,816
5	F -	3.9	F -	4.9	C -	5.4	E - 219,824	209,825
6	A -	3.3	A -	3.9	A -	4.5	C - 176,435	173,704
7 lo	E -	2.4	E -	3.3	E -	3.4	A - 129,260	109,782

^aResidential enrollment as reported by agencies during the March, 1975, survey. Percentages based on census formulae for "targets."

^bBased on population served as of March, 1975, as defined by MCW and BCA.

^cBased on 1970 census data.

^dMCW definition -- Minnesota Crime Watch defines population served to include all citizens in a given county if that county sheriff is a MCW member. This definition renders a higher "population served" than does the BCA definition.

^eBCA definition -- According to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, a county sheriff serves only those citizens who are not served by a local police department. A participating sheriff, then, will have a relatively low population to serve (in comparison to the MCW-defined population served).

As seen in TABLE 6.21, while Region F has the second highest population served, it is fifth in enrollment penetration. Also, Region C, which has the second highest "total target" enrollment penetration, has the second lowest population served.

If enrollment penetration based on the BCA definition of "population served" is used for comparison, a stronger correlation is evident. Regions G and F, the first- and second-ranked regions of population served, are first- and second-ranked in BCA-defined enrollment penetration. Regions B and D, which are ranked third and fourth in population served, are ranked fourth and third in penetration.

In addition to agency enlistment and "population served," there is also a programmatic link between Minnesota Crime Watch training and Operation Identification enrollment because the training content includes a discussion of methods for increasing enrollment. Presumably, with more training, agencies will enroll more citizens into the program. However, the influence of training on enrollment is not strong enough to create consistent regional ranking between training and enrollment (see TABLE 6.22).

Region G, which has the highest "total targets" enrollment penetration, has received the largest percentages of total MCW training and has the highest percentage of participant agencies trained. Region C, the region of second highest penetration, has the second highest regional percentage of agencies trained and claims the third largest regional accumulation of MCW training. Beyond Region G and C, however, the rankings are not as consistent. Comparisons made using enrollment penetration based on "targets served" show some improvement, but on the whole, strong correlations are not present.

TABLE 6.22
REGIONAL RANKING OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION ENROLLMENT PENETRATION
and
CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING RECEIVED

RANK	ENROLLMENT PENETRATION ^a						Re- gion	% of Total Training ^c	Re- gion	% of Own MCW Agencies Trained ^c
	Re- gion	"Total" Targets	"Targets Served" ^b			Re- gion				
			Re- gion	MCW	Re- gion					
1 hi	G -	16.8%	G -	16.8%	G -	18.5%	G -	82.8%	G -	63.9%
2	C -	5.0	D -	5.8	F -	6.6	F -	7.4	C -	22.2
3	B -	4.9	C -	5.3	D -	6.3	C -	3.4	F -	17.8
4	D -	4.7	B -	5.1	B -	5.6	E -	2.2	B -	16.7
5	F -	3.9	F -	4.9	C -	5.4	D -	2.1	D -	13.8
6	A -	3.3	A -	3.9	A -	4.5	B -	1.6	E -	10.8
7 lo	E -	2.4	E -	3.3	E -	3.4	A -	0.3	A -	5.9

^aResidential enrollment as reported by agencies during the March, 1975, survey. Percentages based on census formulae for "targets."

^bBased on population served as of March, 1975, as defined by MCW and BCA.

^cTraining received through year two.

Promotion, resulting from either certain materials distributed to Minnesota Crime Watch agencies or the statewide campaigns through the media, has been geared to augment enrollment. Regional comparisons are not feasible because of the statewide effort, but an indirect, statewide measure of promotional effect on enrollment is found in the Quayle survey. Quayle queried members of Operation Identification, "How did you first learn about Operation Identification?" Responses indicate that 49.8% of those surveyed learned about the program through promotion in the media (television, radio, newspapers, magazines, advertising). Television was cited by 38.3%.

Promotion can affect enrollment in either of two ways. First, promotion might directly influence citizens to join Operation Identification. Second, promotion might convince agencies not participating in Minnesota Crime Watch to join and thereby offer Operation Identification to more citizens. Enrollment of citizens in this manner is an indirect result of promotion.

In sum, enlistment, materials, training, and promotion are all related to enrollment; yet, it is difficult to isolate their individual impact. Besides overlapping among these factors, other influences are present. These include degrees of agency commitment, sizes of agencies, community group support and citizen commitment. This combination of factors makes measurement of specific influences difficult.

Enrollment in Operation Identification is also potentially influenced by such factors as regional population differences and the extent of the burglary problem within each region. When ranked by region, burglary rates could be a measure of the regional "need" for Operation Identification, and comparison with regional enrollment penetration rankings could provide an indication of MCW's effectiveness in reaching the regions of greatest need.

Regional comparison of enrollment penetration and burglary provides a measure of enrollment's effectiveness in reaching the regions with the greatest burglary problems. Two indicators of the burglary problem -- the burglary rate³⁸ and the regional percentage of 1974 burglary -- are presented in TABLE 6.23. Regional ranking illustrates the regions of greater burglary. Comparison to regional ranking of enrollment penetration shows whether or not penetration is higher in the regions with the greatest burglary problems.

The rankings in TABLE 6.23 show that enrollment penetration based on total population (converted to targets) is highest in Region G, which is the

³⁸ An indicator more appropriate than the standard burglary rate would be a burglary rate computed on the basis of targets, not population. However, the data for such rates are difficult to obtain because most police departments do not gather data on targets, and the burglary rate based on population is used here in their absence.

region of most burglary and the highest burglary rate. Other regions provide no distinct pattern. For example, Region A, with a relatively low burglary problem, has as high an enrollment penetration as has Region F, which along with Region B has the second largest regional percentage of Minnesota burglary.

TABLE 6.23
REGIONAL RANKING OF OPERATION IDENTIFICATION ENROLLMENT PENETRATION,
BURGLARY INCIDENCE, and BURGLARY RATES

RANK	ENROLLMENT PENETRATION ^a						1974 Burglary Rate (Per 100,000) ^c	1974 % of Minn. Burglary ^c		
	Re- gion	"Total" Targets	"Targets Served" ^b							
			Re- gion	MCW	Re- gion	BCA				
1 hi	G -	16.8%	G -	16.8%	G -	18.5%	G -	1,609.1	G -	69.6%
2	C -	5.0	D -	5.8	F -	6.6	B -	1,080.4	B -	8.2
3	B -	4.9	C -	5.3	D -	6.3	C -	826.4	F -	8.2
4	D -	4.7	B -	5.1	B -	5.6	D -	803.3	D -	6.7
5	F -	3.9	F -	4.9	C -	5.4	F -	592.1	C -	3.5
6	A -	3.3	A -	3.9	A -	4.5	A -	443.8	E -	2.1
7 lo	E -	2.4	E -	3.3	E -	3.4	E -	306.8	A -	1.5

^aResidential enrollment as reported by agencies during the March, 1975, survey. Percentages based on census formulae for "targets."

^bBased on population served as of March, 1975, as defined by MCW and BCA.

^cComputed from BCA data.

The regional rankings offered above provide only rough estimates of the effectiveness of enrollment. In each of the "ranking" tables, it is evident that Region G ranks first, far above the other regions. The other regions are fairly tightly grouped. In some cases, the differences among Regions A through F are so insignificant that rankings are nearly meaningless. Even when they are clear-cut, rankings are deceptive; they show only order, not proportions between ranks, and the ranking order does not indicate whether this position is due to an outstanding regional enrollment effort, or to a poor one.

The fact that Region G has the largest regional population, the largest burglary problem, and the largest enrollment penetration is a strong measure of overall enrollment effectiveness. Region G has nearly 50% of the state's population, and it has twice as much burglary as the other regions combined. The residential enrollment penetration in Region G (16.8%) is rapidly approaching Minnesota Crime Watch's goal of 20% by the end of year-two funding [see sub-goal a) of the grant application].³⁹ Region G's penetration is nearly twice that of the statewide residential penetration (based on post office data, statewide penetration is 9.2%; census figures indicate an 8.7% penetration).

With nearly half of the state's population and targets, Region G has 79.7% (88,906 of 111,593) of the state's residential enrollment in Operation Identification. The statistics for Region G indicate that enrollment is effective in reaching the regions with greatest population and burglary problems.

The statistics for the other regions seem to indicate that less of a burglary problem exists outside the metro region, but they also indicate significantly lower enrollments of citizens in Operation Identification. The non-metro regions are served by 69.5% (164) of the Minnesota Crime Watch agencies. Even though nearly half of the state's "population served" (45.3% BCA definition, 46.3% MCW definition) is served by the non-metro agencies, these agencies have enrolled only 20.3% of the total residential enrollment in Operation Identification in Minnesota, despite having nearly one-third

³⁹ Enrollment figures complete through the first half of year-two funding. Region G penetration increased from 5.8% at the end of year one to 16.8% one-half year later. It is quite possible that the 20% goal was reached in Region G by the end of year two.

(30.4%) of Minnesota burglary. Furthermore, the non-metro agencies have a composite 3.5% residential enrollment penetration (21,408 of 603,765 targets). This low penetration offsets the near-quota performance of Region G, and has resulted in a state enrollment (as of March, 1975) of less than one-half of the second-year goal of 20%.

4. The Impact of Operation Identification on Crime

As was noted earlier, the goal of MCW's security programs is to reduce crimes against property by making individual premises less attractive to criminals. To this end, citizens and commercial establishments have been encouraged to mark their property, have premise surveys conducted by local law enforcement agencies, and take steps to make physical entrance of their premises more difficult, that is, "target hardening." Operation Identification has been an important part of MCW's program to make premises in Minnesota more secure from crimes.

However, it also has been noted that MCW's quantification of Goal 1) makes unrealistic demands for the reduction of property crimes [see the section on appropriateness of Goal 1)]. It cannot be expected that MCW, with its heavy reliance on Operation Identification, can reduce property crime to the extent called for by Goal 1). Indeed, it remains to be seen if MCW can reduce property crime at all.

Perhaps other measures of success based on crime statistics are more appropriate. Such measures include: a) changes in burglary incidence, b) changes in clearance and clearance rates, and c) changes in the reported crime rates of Part I property crime, burglary, and residential burglary.

Data on these factors are presented in TABLES 6.24 and 6.25, and these

CONTINUED

2 OF 3

statistics provide an indication of how well MCW is controlling the crime problems it has chosen to address. Unfortunately, complete information on residential burglary is unavailable, although data have been inserted when possible.

a) Incidence Data:

Figures for residential burglary show that the average annual rate of increase in incidence from 1970 to 1972 was 10.1% (see TABLE 6.24). In 1973, the rate of increase was 18.3%, but in 1974, the first full operational year of Minnesota Crime Watch, the rate of increase of residential burglary fell to 8.5%. These rates of increase in incidence indicate that in 1974, some factor, although not necessarily MCW, slowed the increase in residential burglary which had been rising steadily from 1970-1973.

The incidence of total burglary as compared to residential burglary rose 19.3% per year from 1962-1972. In 1973 the rate dropped to 9.8%, and in 1974 (Minnesota Crime Watch's first full year) the rate dropped still further to 9.5%. This steady drop in rates of increase in burglary incidence might be a result of MCW's activities.

The Part I property crime data show that the average annual rate of increase in property crime incidence for 1962-1972 was 14.5%. In 1973, this increase dropped to 5.6%, despite the fact that MCW was not operational until the second half of the year. In MCW's first full year (1974), the rate increase (unlike that of residential burglary and total burglary) did not drop; instead it increased to 10.2%. This figure suggests that Minnesota Crime Watch is not yet having an impact on Part I property crime. The property crime data in TABLE 6.24 perhaps reflect the difficulty of having a goal which focuses on a reduction in property crime while the program itself

CHANGES IN THE INCIDENCE AND CLEARANCE OF PART I CRIME, PROPERTY CRIME, AND BURGLARY
IN MINNESOTA (1962 through 1972, 1973, 1974)

^dExcludes residential/non-residential breakdown on 453 burglaries.

concentrates on burglary.

b) Clearance Data:

Clearance figures may be appropriate indicators of MCW's control of the problem of burglary in that Operation Identification makes stolen property conspicuous, which is, theoretically, an aid in apprehending burglars. The average annual rate of increase in burglary clearance from 1962-1972 was 4.2%, but rose to 11.5% in 1973 and to 22.3% in 1974.

The sudden turnabout in burglary is not sufficient to affect the total property crime figures, as can be seen by comparing the burglary and property crime clearance rates. Burglary's clearance rate dropped from 23.2% in 1962 to 11.2% in 1972, but since then has risen slightly each year -- to 11.4% in 1973 and to 12.7% in 1974. Despite this improvement, the total property crime clearance rate dropped slightly from 18.8% in 1972 to 18.6% in 1974. Thus, it seems unlikely that a programmatic focus on burglary would affect the clearance rates for property crime.

c) Crime Rates Data:

TABLE 6.25 presents data on reported crime rates and their rates of increase in Minnesota, and TABLE 6.26 compares Minnesota crime rates in 1973-1974 with the national rates in 1973-1974.

In 1974, total Part I crime rose by 17.1% nationally, but only 10.6% in Minnesota (see TABLE 6.26).

The Part I property crime rate in Minnesota, which MCW seeks to reduce, rose 7.4% per year from 1965-1973 (see TABLE 6.25). In 1974 the rate of increase rose to 10.2%, although the national increase in Part I property crime was 17.8% in 1974.

TABLE 6.25
CRIME RATES^a AND RATES OF INCREASE FOR RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY,
BURGLARY, AND PROPERTY CRIME IN MINNESOTA -- 1965 through 1974

		1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Average % Change 1965-1973 (70-73)	1974
RESI- DENTIAL BURGLARY	Rate	d	d	d	d	d	483.0	511.9	566.7	670.4		727.3
	% Increase	e	e	e	e	e	e	6.0%	10.7%	18.3%	11.7%	8.5%
BURGLARY (Total)	Rate	530.5	579.2	704.4	801.8	779.4	801.7	881.7	927.2	1,016.4		1,116.3
	% Increase	e	9.2%	21.6%	13.8%	- 2.8%	2.9%	10.0%	5.2%	9.6%	8.7%	9.8%
PROPERTY CRIME (New) ^b	Rate	1,924.9	2,110.8	2,461.2	2,823.1	2,934.7	3,048.9	3,382.5	3,179.6	3,355.4		3,696.8
	% Increase	e	9.7%	16.6%	14.7%	4.0%	3.9%	10.9%	- 6.0%	5.5%	7.4%	10.2%
PROPERTY CRIME (Old) ^c	Rate	1,063.8	1,214.1	1,456.1	1,728.9	1,880.8	1,951.4	2,136.8	2,081.5	2,149.3		2,604.1
	% Increase	e	14.1%	19.9%	18.7%	8.8%	3.8%	9.5%	- 2.6%	3.3%	9.4%	21.2%

^aFBI rates 1965-1973 for Burglary and Property Crime; Residential Burglary rate computed from Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) statistics. All 1974 figures based on BCA data. All rates based on incidence per 100,000 population.

^bProperty Crime (New) -- property crime defined as auto theft, burglary, and total larceny.

^cProperty Crime (Old) -- property crime defined as auto theft, burglary, and larceny \$50 and over.

^dRates not available.

^eIncreases not computable.

TABLE 6.26						
CRIME RATES (per 100,000) AND PERCENT CHANGE FOR UNITED STATES AND MINNESOTA (1973 - 1974)						
TYPE OF CRIME	UNITED STATES			MINNESOTA		
	1973 Rate	1974 Rate	Percent Change '73-'74	1973 Rate	1974 Rate	Percent Change '73-'74
Total						
Part I	4,116.4	4,821.4	+ 17.1%	3,535.6	3,910.9	+ 10.6%
Part I						
Property	3,702.1	4,362.6	+ 17.8	3,355.4	3,696.8	+ 10.2
Total						
Burglary	1,215.1	1,429.0	+ 17.6	1,016.4	1,116.3	+ 9.8
Residential						
Burglary	750.7	886.0	+ 18.2	670.4	727.3	+ 8.5

The total burglary rate in Minnesota has increased each year since 1969, with no decrease during the years following Minnesota Crime Watch's inception. In fact, the average rate of increase of burglary rates from 1965-1973 was 8.7% per year. In Minnesota Crime Watch's first full year the rate of increase in the burglary rate reached 9.8%, but this was considerably less than the national increase of 17.6% in 1974.

Minnesota residential burglary rates have increased each year, with an increase of 50.6% from 1970 to 1974. During 1970-1973, the residential burglary rate rose an average of 11.7% per year. However, the residential burglary rate increase dropped to 8.5% during the first full Minnesota Crime Watch year of 1974, while the national increase was 18.2%. One might conclude that Minnesota Crime Watch has had little effect on reducing crime rates, and with the exception of residential burglary, MCW has not demonstrably slowed the rates of increase of these crimes, although it is possible

that these rates might have been even higher without the MCW program.

In conclusion, it is not yet apparent that Minnesota Crime Watch's approach to crime prevention has significantly affected residential burglary, burglary, and property crime, although the 1974 increases in the rates for these crimes were substantially lower than the national increases. Residential burglary data show that the rate of increase in incidence dropped from 1973 to 1974. Despite a rising residential burglary rate, the 1974 rate of increase in the residential burglary rate dropped from that of 1973.

Total burglary statistics show promising trends in the number of clearances, incidence of burglary, and in the clearance rate, but the total burglary rate itself increased more in Minnesota Crime Watch's first full year (1974) than the average rate of increase during 1965-1973.

These improvements in the burglary situation cannot be seen in the overall property crime statistics. It has been suggested that Goal 1)'s stress on property crime is inappropriate for a program which to date has focused on burglary. The data support this conclusion. Apparently a focus on burglary, while allowing the other component property crimes (larceny and auto theft) to go relatively unchallenged, is not effective in controlling property crime. The attempt to control property crime by focusing on burglary, therefore, may not merely be inappropriate, but impossible.

d) Basic Questions:

Given these findings, the question to be addressed here is what the impact of Operation Identification has been if it has not been successful in lowering the property crime rate or the overall burglary rate.

In an attempt to evaluate the impact of Operation Identification, a

series of analytical questions have been developed. The data analysis used in providing at least some tentative answers to these questions is based on the results of the statewide telephone survey of MCW member agencies in March, 1975, and an in-depth analysis of target-specific data collected in three Twin Cities suburbs -- New Hope, Brooklyn Park, and Golden Valley.

1) Does participation in Operation Identification lower one's probability of being burglarized?

One of the consistent findings of evaluations of property marking programs such as Operation Identification has been that premises belonging to such programs are much less likely to be burglarized than those which do not. Studies in St. Louis, Denver, Seattle, and Phoenix have all found lower burglary rates among Operation Identification participants. The same is true for Minnesota.

The data collected in the March, 1975, telephone survey of MCW member agencies included information on burglary rates for Operation Identification participants and non-participants.⁴⁰

TABLE 6.27 shows the residential burglary statistics reported by member agencies for the month of February, 1975.

⁴⁰ Some of the responding agencies could not provide complete breakdowns of either residential/non-residential Operation Identification membership or burglaries in enrolled targets versus non-enrolled targets. For these agencies, estimates were made using the figures from the agencies for whom complete data were available.

TABLE 6.27			
<u>RES IDENTIAL BURGLARY IN FEBRUARY, 1975</u>			
	<u>OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>NON-PARTICIPANTS</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Burglarized	49	1,866	1,915
Not Burglarized	<u>111,544</u>	<u>1,104,666</u>	<u>1,216,210</u>
TOTALS:	111,593	1,106,532	1,218,125

Based on census bureau estimates of the number of total residential targets for the state (population ÷ 3.2 persons per target), it can be seen that the burglary rate for Operation Identification participants was 43.91 per 100,000 targets during the month of February, compared to 168.63 per 100,000 targets for non-participants. Thus, the burglary rate for non-participants was 3.84 times higher than for participants.

Based on post office estimates of the total number of city residential and rural family deliveries at 1,283,152, the burglary rate for non-participants dropped slightly to 159.28 per 100,000 targets and was 3.67 times higher than for participants.

In terms of non-residential burglary, Operation Identification participants are also less likely to be burglarized than non-participants, although not as much so as with residential burglary (see TABLE 6.28).

TABLE 6.28			
NON-RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN FEBRUARY, 1975			
	OPERATION IDENTIFICATION PARTICIPANTS	NON-PARTICIPANTS	TOTAL
Burglarized	39	988	1,027
Not Burglarized	4,965	74,041	79,006
TOTALS:	5,004	75,029	80,033 ^a
^a Post office estimate of business addresses.			

Based on post office estimates of business addresses in the state, the burglary rate for Operation Identification participants was 779.38 per 100,000 targets compared to 1,316.82 per 100,000 for non-participants. The rate for non-participants was 1.69 times higher in non-residential burglaries as compared with 3.67 times higher in the residential case. The lower success rate among non-residential targets is not completely unexpected since many businesses (i.e., retail establishments) have much property worth stealing that cannot be marked with the owner's PIN number. Also, the value of the property may be worth the risk involved. In sum, the deterrent effect of Operation Identification does seem to vary by target type.

Deterrence, however, seems to be operative only in terms of the specific targets enrolled in Operation Identification. One plausible inference is that increasing burglary rates indicate the overall impact of the program to have been a displacement of burglary to non-participants, to other types of crime, or to non-criminal activity, rather than an overall reduction in burglary rates.

Even though targets enrolled in Operation Identification are burglarized

at a lower rate than those not enrolled, it does not automatically follow that all of this reduced likelihood is due to Operation Identification. It is quite possible that program participants also tend to be more security conscious than non-participants and thus take target-hardening measures to secure their premises. At this time it can only be said that being in Operation Identification is related to lower probability of being burglarized, not that the two are causally related.

In addition to the statewide data collected in the telephone survey, burglary statistics were collected on the three communities of Brooklyn Park, Golden Valley and New Hope for the year of 1974. The burglary rates and enrollment penetration levels in each community are shown in TABLE 6.29.

TABLE 6.29 RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RATES AND PENETRATION in THREE MINNESOTA COMMUNITIES			
COMMUNITY	BURGLARY RATE for PARTICIPANTS (per 100,000 targets)	BURGLARY RATE for NON-PARTICIPANTS (per 100,000 targets)	Enrollment Penetration Level
New Hope	586	1,398 (2.39 times higher)	16.4%
Brooklyn Park	1,671	3,475 (2.08 times higher)	9.9
Golden Valley	1,761	3,744 (2.13 times higher)	29.9

These three suburban communities all show that the burglary rate for non-participants in Operation Identification is substantially higher than for participants, although not as much higher as in the statewide results.

One possible explanation of this lower "success rate" is that as these communities all have higher enrollment penetration levels than the statewide figure, the incremental benefits to be gained by increasing enrollment may diminish once enrollment reaches some "critical" level. This possibility would require considerably more testing before it could be accepted, however,

and is stressed here as a potential candidate for further investigation.

- 2) Does participation in Operation Identification reduce the dollar value loss sustained when a participant's premise is burglarized?

Because of the relatively small number of Operation Identification participants who were burglarized in the three communities from which detailed data were gathered, no firm conclusions may be drawn in reference to this question. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the small sample size, there are some indicators that will permit at least some tentative conclusions.

For purposes of this dollar analysis, attempted burglaries (Uniform Offense Code numbers 2250 and 2251) were excluded. This allows a direct analysis of occasions when a burglar successfully gained admission to a premise but no dollar loss was reported by the owner. This, combined with an analysis of the average dollar value reported stolen, is designed to test the assumption that "marked property is a threat to the burglar," and additionally may be viewed as indicating the extent to which participants in Operation Identification mark property that is a likely target of a burglar.

Brooklyn Park

In Brooklyn Park in 1973, 4 residential participants in Operation Identification were burglarized while a total of 266 residential structures were participants in the program. These 266 participants comprised 2.6% of the residential structures. Of the participating structures then, 1.5% were burglarized, while 3.7% of residential structures not participating in Operation Identification were burglarized in 1973 (see TABLE 6.30).

TABLE 6.30
BURGLARY DATA FOR BROOKLYN PARK
(1973 - 1974)

TARGET TYPE		1 9 7 3		1 9 7 4	
		Participants	Non- Participants	Participants	Non- Participants
RESI-	Total Targets	266	10,082	1,077	9,841
DEN-	Enrollment				
TIAL	Penetration	2.6%	---	9.9%	---
	Burglarized	4 (1.5%)	376 (3.7%)	18 (1.7%)	322 (3.3%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	4	316	11	252
	Average Value Stolen	\$307.25	\$431.68	\$240.45	\$356.61
	Average Value Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 47.96	\$ 23.18	\$ 27.21
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.11	\$ 0.10	\$ 0.08
<hr/>					
NON-	Total Targets	6	197	9	207
RESI-	Enrollment				
DEN-	Penetration	3.0%	---	4.2%	---
TIAL	Burglarized	1 (16.7%)	123 (59.4%)	1 (11.1%)	132 (63.8%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	1	99	1	86
	Average Value Stolen	\$ 10.00	\$591.48	\$660.00	\$344.79
	Average Value Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 53.30	\$ 0.00	\$ 16.94
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.05

Of the 4 participants burglarized, all 4 reported a dollar value loss while 316 of the 376 non-participants burglarized (84.0%) reported some dollar loss. Bearing in mind the caveat regarding the small number of participant burglaries, it does not appear that participation in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park in 1973 deterred burglars from taking property.

The average dollar loss reported by the 4 participants burglarized was \$307.25. In the 316 non-participant burglaries where loss was sustained, the mean loss was \$431.68. In other words, residential participants

sustained only 71.2% of the loss compared to those not participating in Operation Identification. It appears, then, that participation in Operation Identification had some effect on the dollar value of property stolen.

In 1973, only 1 non-residential participant in Operation Identification was burglarized in Brooklyn Park. Since only 6 non-residential targets (3.0%) were enrolled in Operation Identification in 1973, this corresponds to 16% of the participants being burglarized. The single non-residential participant burglarized did sustain a loss. Of the 207 non-participants, 123 (59.4%) were burglarized. Of these burglaries, 99 (80.5%) resulted in a dollar value loss. Once again, it does not appear that participation in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park in 1973 reduced the likelihood of sustaining dollar value loss.

The lone non-residential participant that was burglarized reported a loss of \$10.00. The mean loss reported by non-participants who sustained a loss was \$591.48. The participant who was burglarized suffered only 1.7% of the loss of the non-participants.

In 1974, 1,077 residential units were participating in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park. This corresponds to 9.9% of all the residential units in the community that year. Of the participants, 18 (1.7%) were burglarized. Of these 18 burglaries, 11 (61.1%) were "successful" from a burglar's point of view. Of the 9,841 residential units not participating in Operation Identification, 322 (3.3%) were burglarized. Of the 322 non-participant residential burglaries, 252 (78.3%) resulted in a reported dollar value loss. Compared to non-participants, 17.2% fewer participants in Operation Identification sustained a loss when they were burglarized. Given the somewhat larger numbers to work with in 1974, one can tentatively

conclude that residential units participating in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park are less likely to sustain a dollar value loss when they are burglarized than are non-participants.

The mean loss sustained by participants in the 11 successful burglaries was \$240.45. The comparable loss suffered by non-participants was \$356.61. Residential participants in Operation Identification sustained only 67.4% the loss suffered by non-participants. All in all, it appears that residential participants in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park are less likely to sustain any loss than are non-participants. Additionally, when they do sustain a loss, it is likely to be less than that suffered by non-participants.

In 1974, 9 non-residential units were participating in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park. Of all the non-residential structures, 4.2% were members of Operation Identification, while 207 (95.8%) of the non-residential targets were not in the program. One (11%) non-residential participant was burglarized and reported a dollar value loss. Of the non-participants, 132 (63.8%) were burglarized, of which 86 (65.2%) resulted in dollar loss.

The loss sustained by the participant that was burglarized was \$660.00. The mean loss sustained by non-participants was \$344.79. Since only 1 non-residential Operation Identification participant was burglarized in 1973, and only 1 in 1974, no major conclusions, however tentative, may be drawn.

New Hope

The second community to be analyzed is New Hope. Whereas Brooklyn Park had a total of 9.8% of its structures enrolled in Operation Identification

by the end of 1974, New Hope had 16.7% enrolled overall (see TABLE 6.31).

TABLE 6.31					
<u>BURGLARY DATA FOR NEW HOPE</u>					
(1973 - 1974)					
TARGET TYPE		1 9 7 3		1 9 7 4	
		Participants	Non- Participants	Participants	Non- Participants
RESI-	Total Targets	593	6,656	1,195	6,078
DEN-	Enrollment				
TIAL	Penetration	8.2%	---	16.4%	---
	Burglarized	3 (0.5%)	109 (1.6%)	7 (0.6%)	75 (1.2%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	2	68	3	52
	Average Value Stolen	\$325.00	\$399.32	\$481.33	\$219.23
	Average Value Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 13.28	\$ 0.00	\$ 4.63
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.03	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.02

NON-	Total Targets	41	146	51	146
RESI-	Enrollment				
DEN-	Penetration	21.9%	---	25.9%	---
TIAL	Burglarized	6 (14.6%)	52 (35.6%)	8 (15.7%)	29 (19.9%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	2	31	2	16
	Average Value Stolen	\$602.50	\$143.03	\$ 11.00	\$146.94
	Average Value Returned	\$600.00	\$ 12.29	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 1.00	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00

In 1973, 593 (8.2%) of the residential targets in New Hope were participating in Operation Identification. Three of the 593 (0.5%) participants were burglarized. Of the 6,656 residential units not participating in Operation Identification, 109 (1.6%) were burglarized. Of the 3 participant burglaries, 2 resulted in a dollar value loss. Of the 109 non-participants burglarized, 68 (62.4%) sustained a dollar value loss.

The average dollar value loss reported by participants in 1973 was \$325.00. The corresponding average loss sustained by non-participants was

\$399.32. Residential participants in Operation Identification, then, sustained 81.4% of the loss suffered by non-participants in 1973.

Of the non-residential targets in New Hope in 1973, 41 (21.5%) were participants in Operation Identification. Of the 41, 6 (14.6%) were burglarized. Of the 146 non-residential non-participants, 52 (35.6%) were burglarized. Of the participant burglaries, 33.3% resulted in a loss compared to 59.6% of the non-participant burglaries.

In the 2 participant burglaries where a loss was sustained, the average loss was \$602.50. The mean loss suffered by non-participants was \$143.03. Participant non-residential burglaries, then, resulted in 421.2% of the loss sustained by non-participants.

In 1974, 1,195 (16.4%) residential units were participating in Operation Identification. Of these 1,195, 7 (0.6%) were burglarized. Three (42.9%) of these 7 burglaries resulted in a dollar value loss. Of the 6,078 residential units not belonging to Operation Identification, 75 (1.2%) were burglarized in 1974. Of these 75 non-participant burglaries, 52 (69.3%) resulted in a reported loss. In other words, 26.4% fewer participant than non-participant burglaries resulted in dollar value losses.

The mean dollar value reported stolen in the 3 "successful" participant burglaries was \$481.33. The corresponding average for non-participants was \$219.23. Participants in Operation Identification, in other words, sustained 219.5% of the loss suffered by non-participants.

Looking at both 1973 and 1974, it seems there is a trend toward residential Operation Identification participants being burglarized "successfully" less often than non-participants in New Hope. However, there also appears

to be a trend toward greater loss to participants who do sustain a loss.

Of the 51 (25.9%) non-residential structures belonging to Operation Identification in New Hope in 1974, 8 (15.7%) were burglarized. Of the 146 non-participants, 29 (19.9%) were burglarized. Of the 8 participant burglaries, only 2 resulted in a reported dollar value loss. Of the 29 non-participants burglarized, 16 (55.2%) reported a loss.

The average dollar value loss sustained in the 2 participant burglaries was \$11.00. The comparable loss sustained by non-participants was \$146.94, or 1,336% that of participants.

As was the case for residential participants, non-residential participants in Operation Identification in New Hope seem to be burglarized "successfully" less often than non-participants. The figures for non-participants also seem to indicate that the trend toward fewer burglaries where a loss is sustained is increasing slightly (i.e., 33% of non-residential participant burglaries were "successful" in 1973, compared to 59.6% in non-participant; 25% of participant burglaries were "successful" in 1974, compared to 55.2% among non-residential non-participants). In terms of actual loss sustained by participants, conclusions are much more tentative. However, one might interpret the figures as indicating a trend toward less dollar value loss for participant non-residential units in New Hope.

Golden Valley

Data from Golden Valley, the community with the highest enrollment penetration of the three studied (29.1% of all structures were enrolled in 1974), are the last to be analyzed.

In 1973, 967 (14.3%) of all residential units in the community were

participants in Operation Identification. Seventeen residential participants (1.8%) were burglarized in 1973. Of the 5,797 non-participating residential units, 245 (4.2%) were burglarized. Of the 17 participant burglaries, 13 resulted in dollar value loss, while 158 (64.5%) of the 245 non-participant burglaries resulted in reported loss (see TABLE 6.32).

TABLE 6.32					
BURGLARY DATA FOR GOLDEN VALLEY					
(1973 - 1974)					
		1 9 7 3		1 9 7 4	
TARGET TYPE		Participants	Non- Participants	Participants	Non- Participants
PESI-	Total Targets	967	5,797	2,044	4,781
DEN-	Enrollment				
TIAL	Penetration	14.3%	---	30.0%	---
	Burglarized	17 (1.8%)	245 (4.2%)	34 (1.7%)	171 (3.6%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	13	158	19	123
	Average Value Stolen	\$426.46	\$590.30	\$236.68	\$383.52
	Average Value Returned	\$ 3.85	\$ 52.54	\$ 21.05	\$ 50.98
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 0.01	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.09	\$ 0.13

NON-	Total Targets	61	340	64	347
RESI-	Enrollment				
DEN-	Penetration	15.2%	---	15.6%	---
TIAL	Burglarized	6 (9.8%)	97 (28.5%)	5 (7.8%)	57 (16.4%)
	Number Reporting Something Stolen	3	43	3	25
	Average Value Stolen	\$175.00	\$430.28	\$2,614.00	\$504.72
	Average Value Returned	\$ 0.00	\$164.12	\$2,516.67	\$ 14.84
	Ratio of Stolen to Returned	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.38	\$ 0.96	\$ 0.03

The average dollar value loss reported by the 13 participants who sustained loss was \$426.46. The corresponding loss among the non-participants was \$590.30. Participants, in other words, suffered 72.2% of the loss sustained by non-participants.

Of the non-residential units in Golden Valley, 15.2% had enrolled in Operation Identification through 1973. Six of these 61 participants (9.8%) were burglarized in 1973. Of the 340 non-participant, non-residential units in the community, 97 (28.5%) were burglarized. While 3 of the participant burglaries resulted in reported loss, 43 (44.3%) of the non-participants burglarized reported dollar value loss.

The mean dollar value reported stolen by the 3 participants was \$175.00. The non-participants who reported a loss averaged \$430.28. Loss to participants was only 40.7% that sustained by non-participants.

In 1974, 30% of the residential units in Golden Valley were participating in Operation Identification. Of the 2,044 participants, 34 (1.7%) were burglarized. Of the 4,781 non-participants, 171 (3.6%) were burglarized. Of the 34 participants, 19 (55.9%) who reported being burglarized also reported dollar value loss, while 123 (71.9%) of the 171 non-participants burglarized reported dollar value loss.

The average loss reported by the 19 Operation Identification participants was \$236.68. The corresponding loss to non-participants was \$383.52. Residential participants in 1974 sustained 61.7% of the loss suffered by non-participants.

Data on residential participant burglaries in Golden Valley in both 1973 and 1974 can be interpreted as indicating that dollar value loss to those belonging to Operation Identification is likely to be lower than loss to non-participants. The data indicate that the average participant lost \$66.95 for each \$100.00 lost by non-participants through burglary in 1973 and 1974.

As to the likelihood of sustaining no loss in a burglary, the figures

are inconsistent. More residential participants (12%) than non-participants reported some loss in 1973. In 1974, however, 16% fewer participants than non-participants reported a loss. Averaging the figures for 1973 and 1974 indicates the Operation Identification participants sustained a loss in 2% fewer burglaries than did non-participants.

In 1974, 64 (15.6%) of the non-residential targets in Golden Valley were participating in Operation Identification. Five (7.8%) of the participants were burglarized. Among the 347 non-participants, 57 (16.4%) burglaries occurred. Three of the 5 participant burglaries resulted in loss. Of the 57 non-participant burglaries, 25 (43.9%) resulted in a dollar value loss.

The average loss reported by participants was \$2,614.00, while non-participants reported a mean loss of \$504.72. The average loss to participants was 517.9% that of non-participants.

Examining 1973 and 1974 together indicates that the average non-residential participant in Operation Identification in Golden Valley lost \$238.60 for every \$100.00 reported lost by non-participants. The data tend to show, in other words, that participation in Operation Identification did not reduce the dollar value stolen from non-residential units in Golden Valley.

Additionally, the figures indicate that 10.9% more participants than non-participants suffered some loss once a burglar had gained entrance to the structure.

Some Tentative Conclusions

Aggregating the data from all three communities allows the following tentative conclusions to be drawn. First, a trend seems to be emerging

indicating that residential units participating in Operation Identification are more likely than non-participants to avoid suffering a dollar value loss after a burglar has gained entrance to the structure (7.1% fewer participants than non-participants reported a loss). Second, residential Operation Identification participants are likely to lose less in dollar value than non-participants. (On the average, participants report \$84.73 stolen for every \$100.00 reported stolen by non-participants.) Third, non-residential units participating in Operation Identification are more likely than non-participants to avoid sustaining any dollar value loss after a burglar has entered the premise (16.4% fewer participants than non-participants reported dollar value loss caused by a burglary). Finally, non-residential participants in Operation Identification are likely to lose more to burglars than non-participants when they do sustain a loss. (On the average, a participant loses \$196.73 for every \$100.00 lost by a non-participant.) Again, owing to the relatively small number of Operation Identification participants who were burglarized, assessing the significance of comparisons is, for the most part, extremely difficult.

3) Does participation in Operation Identification increase the dollar value recovered from burglaries?

As was the case with Question 2), the small number of cases with which one must deal presents difficulty in terms of making hard and fast conclusions. However, the data are presented in an effort to discern indicators of emerging trends.

As an aid in interpreting the data, two different measures will be utilized, the mean dollar value recovered from both participants and non-participants, and the ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen.

If recovery were 100% effective, the ratio would be \$1.00; that is, \$1.00 recovered for each \$1.00 stolen. An additional factor which will be considered is the percentage of burglaries where no dollar loss was reported.

Brooklyn Park

In Brooklyn Park, 4 residential Operation Identification participants were burglarized and all reported some dollar value loss in 1973. No property reported stolen in these burglaries was recovered (see TABLE 6.30).

Of 376 participants burglarized, 316 (84%) reported dollar value loss. The average recovered in these 316 burglaries was \$47.96. In essence, for every \$1.00 stolen from non-participating residential units, \$0.11 was recovered.

The single non-residential Operation Identification participant that was burglarized reported a loss and no property was recovered.

Of the non-participant, non-residential units, 19.5% reported nothing stolen. The mean recovery in the 99 burglaries where property was taken was \$55.30. The ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen for non-participants was \$0.09.

In 1974, 38.9% of the 18 residential participants burglarized sustained no loss. The average dollar value recovered in the 11 burglaries where property was taken was \$23.18. The ratio of recovered to stolen was \$0.10.

Of the residential non-participants, 21.7% reported nothing stolen. Of the 252 burglaries where dollar value was stolen, the average recovery was \$27.21. Put another way, Operation Identification participants' average recovery was 85.2% that of non-participants. However, since participants had

initially lost only 67.4% of the loss suffered by non-participants, the participant recovery ratio of \$0.10 is 20% greater than the \$0.08 ratio for non-participants.

Combining recovery figures on residential burglaries in Brooklyn Park for 1973 and 1974 yields the following: The average dollar value recovered for participants was \$11.59. The average recovery for non-participants was \$37.59. Participants recovered only 30.8% as much as non-participants. Since the participants lost 69.3% as much as non-participants, the ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen for participants is nearly 50% lower than that of non-participants (\$0.05 and \$0.10 average in 1973 and 1974 for participants and non-participants, respectively). In sum, participation by residential units in Operation Identification has not increased the amount of property recovered in Brooklyn Park.

In 1974, 1 non-residential participant in Operation Identification was burglarized and sustained a loss. Since no property from this burglary was recovered, the average recovered and the ratio of recovered to stolen were \$0.00.

Of the 132 non-participant, non-residential burglaries, 34.8% reported no loss. The average recovered in the 86 burglaries where a loss was reported was \$16.94. The ratio of recovered to stolen was \$0.05.

With only 2 non-residential Operation Identification participants burglarized in Brooklyn Park in two years, the data base is simply too small to enable comparison with non-participants at this time. Future evaluation of recovery data on non-residential participants, however, can be made against the non-participant combined 1973-1974 average of \$36.12 recovered and a ratio

of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen of \$0.07.

New Hope

Residential participants in Operation Identification in New Hope in 1973 reported no dollar value lost in 1 of the 3 burglaries. No property was recovered from the "successful" burglaries, so the average recovery and the ratio of recovered to stolen were \$0.00 (see TABLE 6.31).

Non-participant residential units sustained no reported loss in 37.6% of the cases. The average value recovered in the 68 burglaries where property was taken was \$13.28. This corresponds to a ratio of \$0.03 recovered for every dollar stolen.

Data from 1973 on non-residential participants in New Hope tell quite a different story. Of 6 participants burglarized, 4 reported nothing stolen. In the 2 burglaries where property was stolen, the average dollar value recovered was \$600.00. Since the average stolen in these 2 burglaries was \$602.50, the ratio of recovered to stolen is \$1.00.

Non-residential units not participating in Operation Identification reported no loss in 40.4% of the burglaries. The average dollar value recovered in the 31 burglaries where property was taken was \$12.29. In this instance, non-participants recovered only 2% as much as did participating non-residential units. The ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen for non-participants was \$0.09, or only 9% that of participants.

Non-residential participants reported no loss in 6 of the 8 1974 burglaries. No dollar value was recovered. Non-participants, on the other hand, reported no loss in 44.8% of the burglaries they sustained. No dollar value was recovered.

Averaging the New Hope data from 1973 and 1974 indicates that Operation Identification participation may have a greater impact on recovery for non-residential units than for residential units. The average dollar value recovered for participant non-residential units was \$300.00, with a ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen of \$0.50. Non-participant, non-residential units averaged a recovery of \$6.15, for a recovered to stolen ratio of \$0.05. While the average recovery for non-participant residential burglaries was \$9.53, for a recovered to stolen ratio of \$0.03, participating residential units had no dollar value recovered, and hence, a ratio of \$0.00.

Golden Valley

Residential units participating in Operation Identification in Golden Valley in 1973 reported no dollar value loss in 4 of 17 burglaries. The average recovery for the 13 burglaries where loss was reported was \$3.85, for a recovered to stolen ratio of \$0.01 (see TABLE 6.32).

Non-participating residential units escaped dollar value loss in 35.5% of the burglaries. The average recovery was \$52.54, for a recovered to stolen ratio of \$0.09.

Non-residential participants reported dollar value loss in 3 of the 6 burglaries they sustained in 1973. No dollar value was recovered. Non-participants, on the other hand, reported no loss in 55.7% of the 97 burglaries they experienced. The mean dollar value recovered was \$164.12 for a recovery ratio of \$0.38.

In 1974, participant residential units escaped loss in 44.1% of the 34 burglaries they experienced. The average dollar value recovered was \$21.05. The ratio of recovered to stolen value was \$0.09. During the same period,

non-participants reported no loss in 28.1% of the 171 burglaries they sustained. The average value recovered was \$50.98. The ratio of recovered to stolen was \$0.13.

In 1974, then, residential units participating in Operation Identification in Golden Valley recovered only 41.3% as much in dollar value as did non-participants. However, since they lost less to begin with, the disparity in the ratio of recovered to stolen is not nearly as great -- with the participant ratio of \$0.09 or 69.2% that of the non-participant ratio of \$0.13.

Non-residential participants fared much better in 1974 than they had in 1973 in terms of recovered property. Participants avoided loss in only 2 of 5 burglaries, compared to 56.1% for non-participants. The participants had an average recovered of \$2,516.67 compared to the non-participant average of \$14.84. The ratio of value recovered to value stolen is \$0.96 for participants, and \$0.03 for non-participants.

Some Tentative Conclusions

If the recovery data are aggregated across all three communities for both 1973 and 1974, some tentative indications of Operation Identification's impact on the recovery of property can be identified. Participation in Operation Identification seems to have a more favorable effect in recovering property in non-residential targets than in residential units. This is indicated by the average property value recovered for participating non-residential units of \$519.45. This figure is far greater than the comparable figures for non-participating, non-residential units. Residential participants, on the other hand, had an average recovery of \$8.01, or only 24.3% of the recovery average of \$32.96 evidenced by non-participants.

Additional indications supporting the above conclusion are the ratios of dollar value recovery to dollar value stolen. The average ratio for non-residential participants is \$0.33, while the corresponding average for non-participants is \$0.11. Residential participants, however, average \$0.03 compared to the average of \$0.08 found for residential non-participants.

Thus, Operation Identification seems to be having a greater impact on non-residential targets than on residential units in terms of dollars stolen and recovered. For example, the data indicate that residential participants tend to lose somewhat less when they are burglarized than do non-participants, averaging a loss of \$84.73 for every \$100.00 lost by non-participants. Despite the fact that residential participants lose 85% as much as non-participants, the participants recover on the average only 24.3% as much as non-participants. When the fact that the residential participants do seem to lose less is controlled for, as it is in the ratio of dollar value recovered to dollar value stolen, residential participants still recover only 37.5% as much as non-participants.

Non-residential Operation Identification participants typically lose nearly twice as much as their non-participant counterparts, but they recover, on the average, more than 11 times the amount of non-participants. Utilizing the recovered to stolen ratio, participants recover 3 times as much dollar value per dollar stolen as non-participants.

4) Is being burglarized associated with enrolling in Operation Identification?

This particular question has been the subject of a great deal of discussion in virtually every examination of programs similar to Operation Identification.

The fact that a participant has been burglarized prior to the time of joining Operation Identification clearly has an influence on how quickly the participant joins the program. Data generated from burglary reports and enrollment information in the three-community study generally show that individuals whose premises were first burglarized after the program was initiated in their community were the quickest to join the program, averaging approximately 90.2 days from the date of the burglary to the date of enrollment (N = 109). Individuals who had been burglarized prior to the time the program was initiated in their community were the second fastest to enroll, averaging 247.9 days from the date the program was available to the date of enrollment (N = 128). Slowest to join Operation Identification were those participants who had never been burglarized, averaging 261.6 days from program availability to date of enrollment (N = 2,408).

In other words, participants burglarized prior to program start-up took twice as long to join the program as those who were burglarized after program start-up. Participants who were never burglarized took three times as long to join Operation Identification as did those burglarized after start-up.

5) What is the impact of Operation Identification on burglary clearance rates?

For purposes of this analysis, burglary data for the three communities for the years 1973 and 1974 were aggregated and stratified on the basis of target type, clearance status, and participation in Operation Identification (see TABLE 6.33). Clearance status categories utilized are "pending" (case is yet unsolved), "cleared by arrest" (combines categories: adult arrested and juvenile arrested), and "exceptionally cleared" (for example, the burglar

is charged with a crime more serious than burglary).

TABLE 6.33							
PERCENT OF BURGLARIES CLEARED BY TARGET TYPE, CLEARANCE STATUS, AND PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION IDENTIFICATION							
TARGET TYPE	CLEARANCE STATUS	BROOKLYN PARK		GOLDEN VALLEY		NEW HOPE	
		Participants	Non- Participants	Participants	Non- Participants	Participants	Non- Participants
		Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
RESI- DEN- TIAL	Pending	81.8%	87.6%	90.9%	90.7%	100.0%	89.3%
	Cleared by Arrest	9.1	5.2	5.5	5.7	-0-	4.9
	Exceptionally Cleared	9.1	7.2	3.6	3.6	-0-	5.8
	TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N:		22	864	55	473	12	224
=====							
NON- RESI- DEN- TIAL	Pending	100.0%	83.6%	90.9%	84.3%	66.7%	73.6%
	Cleared by Arrest	-0-	9.2	9.1	10.7	27.8	20.9
	Exceptionally Cleared	-0-	7.2	-0-	5.6	5.5	5.5
	TOTALS:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
N:		2	304	11	198	18	91

As can be seen in TABLE 6.33, burglaries of residential participants demonstrate a higher proportion of cleared cases than non-participant burglaries in only two instances. Residential burglaries of Operation Identification premises in Brooklyn Park show 9.1% cleared by arrest, and 9.1% exceptionally cleared. Compared to clearance data on non-participant burglaries, participant burglaries were cleared by arrest 3.9% more frequently (non-participant burglaries were cleared by arrest in 5.2% of the cases). Of non-participant burglaries, 7.2% were exceptionally cleared, compared with 9.1% of the participant burglaries. Once again, because of the small sample of participant burglaries, a great deal of caution must be urged in interpreting the results in Brooklyn Park as indicative of a trend toward higher clearance rates among participant burglaries.

Examination of the data on non-residential burglaries again indicates only one community where the clearance distribution of participant burglaries

differs from non-participant burglaries. In the community of New Hope, 6.9% more non-residential participant burglaries were cleared by arrest than were non-participant burglaries (27.8% of participant burglaries were cleared by arrest, with 20.9% of non-participant burglaries similarly cleared).

Though the sample size of participant burglaries is again small (18), the data may be viewed with somewhat more assurance than was the case in the analysis of residential burglaries. since New Hope has a greater penetration of Operation Identification among non-residential units, and since more non-residential participants were burglarized in New Hope. This being the case, a tentative conclusion to be drawn from the data is that Operation Identification may have a positive impact on the clearance rate of non-residential burglaries. Evaluation efforts in the future should be sensitized to this fact and should look closely for any evidence of an emerging trend in this direction.

5. Unit Cost Analysis of Enrollment in Operation Identification

As of March 1, 1975, a total of \$110,169.62 was spent for materials related to Operation Identification in the first two years of MCW. This figure can be broken down as follows: television (\$24,602.99), engravers (\$8,118.81), brochures (\$15,204.10), posters (\$5,233.18), Operation Identification stickers (\$44,211.92), a bulletin "Burglar Repellant Sticker" (\$158.14), Met Center slide and corridor displays (\$1,307.69), bumper stickers (\$6,899.62), newspaper and magazine advertisements (\$3,197.37), and premise signs (\$1,235.80).

An additional \$25,028.22 must be added to this total to represent the proportion of the agency fees and project materials in the Ruhr contract

that were expended on Operation Identification-related materials.

The project director estimates that she spent 25% of her time on Operation Identification-related activities during year one and 10% during year two. She also estimates that 20% of the administrative assistant's time was spent on these activities during year two. Using these percentages, an additional \$5,953.72 must be added to the above costs to represent the proportion of salaries and fringe benefits attributable to Operation Identification.

The two-year total of direct expenditures was \$141,151.56. This total does not include direct costs for which an accurate attribution to Operation Identification was not feasible (such as equipment, office supplies, and staff travel). Nor does it include such indirect costs as wages and travel for enrollees for which accurate estimates were not available. Data on costs to member agencies, such as manpower, local enlistment materials, and promotion, have also not been included in the statewide cost estimate. Estimates of some of these factors have been included in the cost analysis of Operation Identification in the three-community survey which follows. The total systems and unit costs reported here are thus somewhat lower than their actual levels, but they do reflect those costs for which the most reliable data could be obtained.

Given an adjusted enrollment figure of 96,177 through February, 1975, and a total dollar expenditure of \$141,151.56, the unit cost per participant enrolled was \$1.47.

a) Acceptability of the Unit Cost:

The foremost difficulty encountered in evaluating the

acceptability of the unit cost stems from lack of comparable cost data.

A recent national survey of projects similar to Operation Identification revealed a median cost of \$4.00 to enroll a household (not counting donated promotional resources and manpower). The major factor contributing to the variation in enrollment costs for these projects has been whether door-to-door recruitment efforts have been undertaken. MCW's relatively low cost of \$1.47 reflects the fact that MCW has relied on its promotional campaign to steer citizens to their local law enforcement agencies rather than having the agencies actively recruit enlistees through door-to-door surveys.

The advantage of the door-to-door canvass lies in the thoroughness with which property is engraved. The overwhelming disadvantages, however, are the costs to the police department in terms of salaries, and ill will engendered in those citizens who perceive the activity as constituting an invasion of privacy. An alternative method of enrollment might entail mailing an engraving pen to all households and businesses with instructions and an identification number. Such an alternative would reduce the cost incurred in enrolling, although one might have to return a post card after engraving items in order to get the decals signifying participation. Though the alternative would reduce cost, it would virtually eliminate the already low degree of assurance that valuables are actually engraved.

The second major component of Operation Identification enrollment cost is the cost of the materials and media promotion campaign. Two general alternatives to MCW's method of operation are identifiable. The first alternative would entail foregoing the statewide promotional effort in favor of promotional efforts focused in smaller geo-political units (regions, counties, communities). As discussed in another section, this alternative would negate

the economy achieved by a statewide promotional effort, and therefore does not appear cost effective. The second alternative would focus the promotional effort at a higher level (five-state region, mid-western region, federal level). The disadvantages inherent in this scale of implementation stem primarily from the difficulty in attaining a close rapport with police officials at the community level.

The unit cost of enrollment in Operation Identification seems acceptable in light of the possible alternatives and the degree of success which MCW has had in obtaining 93,116 new residential and 2,905 new non-residential enrollments in Operation Identification.

b) Unit Cost Analysis in the Three-Community Study:

The following analysis attempts to supplement the statewide estimates of enrollment costs per Operation Identification participant by examining estimates of local expenditures on crime prevention, specifically Operation Identification, in the three communities where an in-depth analysis of crime prevention activity was made.

Brooklyn Park

In 1973, the Brooklyn Park Police Department (B.P.P.D.) budget totaled \$459,751.00, of which \$15,910.00 (3.5%) was devoted to crime prevention activity. This figure was supplemented by LEAA crime prevention grants totaling \$31,144.00, for a total crime prevention budget of \$47,054.00. Of the crime prevention budget, \$6,000.00 (12.8%) was devoted to burglary prevention, specifically, Operation Identification. Of the \$6,000.00 Operation Identification expenditure, \$2,000.00 was from the department's funds, the remaining \$4,000.00 was made up of LEAA monies. In other words, 0.4% of the Brooklyn Park Police Department's entire budget was devoted to Operation

Identification, and 12.6% of the department's contribution to the crime prevention budget was expended on Operation Identification.

By the end of 1973, the enrollment in Operation Identification in Brooklyn Park was 272, or 2.6% of the structures in the community. The direct cost to the B.P.P.D. (based on the \$2,000.00 expended) was \$7.35 per participant. The portion of the unit cost absorbed by LEAA monies was \$14.71 per enrollee. The combined unit cost per participant was \$22.06.

In 1974, the B.P.P.D. budget was \$535,677.00, an increase of 16.5% over 1973. Of the budget, \$10,360.00 (1.9%) was devoted to crime prevention, a decrease of 34.8% from 1973. LEAA crime prevention grants added \$32,572.00 to the B.P.P.D.'s crime prevention budget, for a total of \$42,932.00, or \$4,122.00 less than 1973. Of the department's budget, \$1,375.00 (0.3%) was devoted to Operation Identification. Of LEAA monies, \$7,125.00 (16.6%) was spent on Operation Identification enrollment. The total spent on enrollment in Operation Identification in 1974 was \$8,500.00, or 41.7% more than that spent in 1973 (\$6,000.00).

During 1974, 814 additional participants were enrolled in Operation Identification, for a total enrollment of 1,086, or 9.8% of the targets. The cost to the B.P.P.D. per enrollee in 1974 was \$1.69, a decrease of \$5.66 (77%) compared to 1973. The cost to LEAA also decreased to \$8.75, \$5.96 (40.5%) less than in 1973. The total unit cost in 1974 was \$10.44, or 52.7% less than in 1973.

Aggregating cost and enrollment data indicates the following: A total of \$14,500.00 was expended and resulted in a total enrollment of 1,086. The cost to the B.P.P.D. was \$3.10, while the unit cost from LEAA funds was

\$10.24 per participant. The aggregate unit cost was \$13.34 per individual enrollment.

Golden Valley

In 1973, the Golden Valley Police Department (G.V.P.D.) budget was \$503,824.00. Of the total, \$23,000.00 (4.6%) was spent for crime prevention. With LEAA funds totaling \$12,000.00, the total crime prevention expenditure was \$35,000.00. Of the department's budget, \$5,000.00 (1%) was spent on Operation Identification enrollment efforts. Of the LEAA funds, \$2,500.00 (20.8%) was spent for Operation Identification-related purposes. All told, \$7,500.00 (21.4%) of the crime prevention budget was spent on Operation Identification-related activities.

Enrollees in Operation Identification through 1973 comprised 14.4% of all potential targets. Given an expenditure of \$5,000.00 from the department's budget, the 1,028 participants were enrolled for a unit cost of \$4.86. Of the \$2,500.00 in LEAA funds spent for this purpose, the unit cost per participant was \$2.43. The total unit cost, then, was \$7.29.

The total G.V.P.D. budget in 1974 was \$554,662.00, an increase of 10.1% over the 1973 budget. Of the department's budget, \$4,700.00 (8.5%) was spent on crime prevention activity. The department received \$25,000.00 (an increase over 1973 of 108.3%) in LEAA crime prevention funds, for a total crime prevention budget of \$72,000.00 (an increase of 105.7% over 1973). Of the \$72,000.00, 20.8% (\$15,000.00) was spent on Operation Identification: \$10,000.00 from department funds (a 100% increase over 1973) and \$5,000.00 from LEAA monies (a 100% increase over 1973).

During 1974, 1,178 more participants enrolled (this figure was projected

from a total through November of 1,080). This amounts to a 14.6% increase over the 1973 enrollment. The cost to the G.V.P.D. for each participant enrolled in 1974 was \$8.49 (a 74.7% increase over 1973). The unit cost in LEAA funds was \$4.24 (an increase of 74.5% over 1973). The total unit cost per participant in 1974 was \$12.73 (a 74.6% increase over 1973).

The aggregate unit cost through 1974, based on an enrollment of 2,206 and expenditures totaling \$22,500.00 (\$15,000.00 from department budget, \$7,500.00 from LEAA grants), was \$10.20. The unit cost in G.V.P.D. funds was \$6.80, while the unit cost in LEAA funds was \$3.40.

New Hope

Turning to the community of New Hope for a similar analysis, the 1973 New Hope Police Department (N.H.P.D.) budget was \$416,253.00. From this budget, \$200.00 was allocated for crime prevention activity. The entire \$200.00 was expended on Operation Identification. LEAA crime prevention funds to New Hope totaled \$5,599.00 in 1973, of which \$3,000.00 (53.6%) was expended on Operation Identification. The total spent on crime prevention was \$5,799.00, of which a total of \$3,200.00 (55.2%) was expended on Operation Identification.

Given an enrollment through 1973 of 634 units (8.5% of potential enrollees), the unit cost to the N.H.P.D. was \$0.32 per participant. The unit cost in LEAA funds was \$4.73, for a total unit cost of \$5.05.

Of the 1974 N.H.P.D. total budget of \$464,457.00 (an increase of 11.6% over 1973), \$14,000.00 (3.0%) was expended on crime prevention activity. Supplementing the department funds was \$12,564.00 in LEAA monies (based on a projection of \$8,376.00 through August 31), or an increase of 124.4% over

1973 LEAA monies. The total expended on crime prevention in New Hope in 1974 was \$26,564.00, a 358.1% increase from the 1973 expenditure. In 1974, \$7,500.00 was expended on Operation Identification (28.2% of 1974's crime prevention allocation), a 134.4% increase over the 1973 expenditure. Of the money spent on Operation Identification, \$4,500.00 (60%) came from LEAA funds, and the remaining \$3,000.00 (40%) came from department funds.

An additional 612 targets were enrolled in 1974 (8.2% of the potential targets). The unit cost in departmental funds was \$4.90, while the LEAA unit cost was \$7.35, for a total unit cost per enrollee of \$12.25. In other words, the total unit cost increased by 142.6%.

The aggregate unit cost through 1974 was based on a total enrollment of 1,246 targets (16.7% of the total targets), LEAA expenditures of \$7,500.00, and expenditures from the N.H.P.D. of \$3,200.00. The unit cost in LEAA funds was \$6.02, in departmental funds was \$2.57, for a total unit cost of \$8.59 per enrollee.

The previous analysis assessed the unit cost of enrollment in terms of the dollars expended directly at the local level. Before the impact of MCW on the unit cost can be ascertained, an additional step must be taken. The proportion of MCW's direct operating costs for Operation Identification enrollment in each community must be determined. For the sake of brevity, the unit cost will be determined in the aggregate, through year-two funding.

MCW's direct expenditure on materials in the three communities was as follows:

Brooklyn Park -- \$3,456.20 (43,600 stickers @ \$0.007, 24,100 brochures @ \$0.015, 2,500 posters @ \$5.00, 2,000 bumper stickers @ \$0.03, 51 engravers @ \$4.50);

Golden Valley -- \$792.00 (30,800 stickers @ \$0.007, 14,360 brochures @ \$0.015, 50 posters @ \$5.00, 1,000 bumper stickers @ \$0.03, 18 engravers @ \$4.50); and

New Hope -- \$655.50 (18,000 stickers @ \$0.007, 8,300 brochures @ \$0.015, 60 posters @ \$5.00, 800 bumper stickers @ \$0.03, 18 engravers @ \$4.50).

Given the enrollment in the three communities, the unit cost per enrollment for materials was \$3.18 in Brooklyn Park, \$0.36 in Golden Valley, and \$0.53 in New Hope. The addition of these figures to the previously determined unit cost to the individual communities yields a total direct unit cost of \$16.53 in Brooklyn Park, \$10.56 in Golden Valley, and \$9.11 in New Hope.

As might have been expected, the addition of local agency costs to the direct MCW statewide cost estimate has dramatically increased the unit cost per enrollee.

It should be noted, however, that these three communities all have operating crime prevention units supported by both local and LEAA funds. Thus, the cost estimates derived here are probably higher than the typical agency cost around the state. These data have been included to show that the cost of enrolling a premise in Operation Identification is a reflection of both MCW and local expenditures.

6. Operation Identification in Comparative Perspective

In 1974, the Institute for Public Program Analysis (IPPA) undertook a nationwide survey of programs (such as Operation Identification) for marking personal property. From their analysis, the authors of this survey derived seven general propositions about existing Operation Identification programs. Each of these general findings will be compared to the results

of this evaluation of the program in Minnesota.

- a) Operation Identification projects have been unable to recruit more than a minimal number of participants in their target areas (the telephone survey conducted for this study indicated that only 10 of 65 responding projects had enrolled more than 10 percent of their target area households).

As of March, 1975, Minnesota had a penetration rate of 9.2% of the total residential targets in the state using census bureau estimates and 8.7% using the post office estimates. Of the total residential and non-residential targets (based on post office estimates), 8.6% were enrolled in Operation Identification.

Since the IPPA study included no statewide Operation Identification programs, the comparison of Minnesota to citywide projects may be misleading. Within Region G of Minnesota, which includes the Twin Cities, the enrollment penetration was 16.8% and several of the suburban communities had enrollment penetration rates of over 20%.

- b) The recruitment cost per participant for an Operation Identification project is quite high (median project cost is \$4 per household) not counting donated promotional resources and manpower.

The direct cost analysis of expenditures by MCW for materials related to Operation Identification produced an enrollment cost of \$1.47 per enrollee. This relatively low cost figure reflects the use of a media-based promotional effort to direct citizens to their law enforcement agencies for information, rather than a door-to-door canvass by officers.

An analysis of costs borne by agencies in three Minnesota communities indicated that the addition of local costs to the MCW figures would certainly

bring about a substantial increase in the unit cost of enrollment.

- c) Operation Identification participants have significantly lower burglary rates after joining as compared to before joining (O-I projects in Seattle and St. Louis have documented burglary reductions of 32.8 percent and 24.9 percent, respectively, for O-I participants).

This evaluation did not directly examine the question of whether participants who had been burglarized prior to joining were less likely to be burglarized after marking their property, although the three-community study did show that having been burglarized appeared to be a stimulus to enrolling in Operation Identification. Instead, the data collected for this evaluation focused on the comparison of burglary rates for participants and non-participants.

Depending on the estimates of targets used for analysis, residential participants are either 3.67 or 3.84 times less likely to be burglarized than non-participants. That is, the burglary rates for participants are between 26% and 28% of the rates for non-participants.

For non-residential participants, the burglary rate is 59% that of non-participants. That is, non-participants are 1.69 times more likely to be burglarized than participants.

- d) Cities with Operation Identification projects have not experienced reduction in citywide burglary rates (analysis of burglary rates for 255 cities with O-I projects in Illinois revealed no reductions when compared to 389 Illinois cities without O-I projects).

The burglary statistics for the state of Minnesota tend to confirm the results reported by IPPA. There has been no decline in either the incidence of burglaries or in the burglary rate since Operation Identification began.

The only indication that Operation Identification may have had some effect on burglary was that in 1974 the rates of increase in both incidence and residential burglary rates declined slightly and were considerably less than the national increases. It would be possible to argue, of course, that the increases in burglary would have been even greater had there been no Operation Identification program; however, there are no data available which could verify this argument.

In general, it appears that the primary effect of Operation Identification has not been one of reducing burglary rates but rather of making participant structures less susceptible to being burglarized.

- e) No evidence exists to indicate that Operation Identification produces any increase in either the apprehension or conviction of burglars (not one of the 18 O-I projects visited for this study could document increases in either the apprehension or conviction of burglars).

The data collected in the three-community study provide only very tentative information about clearance rates for participant and non-participant burglaries. In general, these findings tend to support the conclusion that Operation Identification has, at best, a minimal impact on clearance rates for either residential or non-residential burglary.

- f) The presence of Operation Identification markings does not significantly reduce the opportunities to dispose of stolen property (only 12 of 69 convicted burglars interviewed in Illinois indicated they would avoid stealing marked property).

The Minnesota evaluation of Operation Identification did not include information collected from convicted burglars, although the following should be noted about the data collected in the Illinois study:

— Of the 69 convicted burglars, 15 were arrested for crimes committed in areas which were not participating in the Operation Identification program. The remaining 54 burglars were arrested in member areas, although 10 of these were arrested before project implementation. Of the 44 burglars arrested in member areas after project implementation, it is not known how long the interval was between project implementation and arrest.

— Of the 54 burglaries occurring in member areas, 42 were committed in the Chicago area. An inspection of member dwellings in the Chicago area revealed that 77.8% of these member structures displayed no warning sticker.

— Only 3 of the 69 burglars interviewed spontaneously mentioned previous knowledge of the Operation Identification program.

— Only 1 person said that he would be more likely to enter a premise with an Operation Identification sticker, and 23.2% said they would be less likely to enter.

— Responses from 44.9% of the burglars indicated that engraved property would be more difficult to market, and 44.9% said that such markings would decrease the market value of such property in at least some cases.

- g) There is no indication that Operation Identification markings appreciably increase either the recovery or return of stolen property (not 1 of the 18 projects visited could document increases in either property recovery or return due to O-I markings).

Data from the three-community study led to the tentative conclusion that residential participants tend to lose somewhat less when they are burglarized than do non-participants. There was no indication, however, that participants recover a larger proportion of stolen property than do non-participants.

C. EVALUATION OF PREMISE SURVEYS

1. Background

The premise survey program, as designed by MCW, endeavors to implement many of the ideas of crime prevention in an effort to make a premise physically more secure. The premise survey program is differentiated from the Operation Identification program in that premise surveys are designed specifically to initiate target-hardening procedures. Operation Identification tends to be a "psychological" deterrent to the burglar if it causes him to choose a non-participant target. However, if a person receives a premise survey and implements the suggested improvements, a potential burglar is physically as well as psychologically deterred from the target. Thus, lowered target desirability and accessibility are the projected outcomes of Operation Identification and premise surveys, respectively.

Unlike Operation Identification, no specific project goals or objectives were delineated in the grant applications for the premise survey program. However, the premise survey program has direct relationship to the three MCW goals. Premise surveys may contribute to a reduction in crime; the performance of premise surveys is an indication of an agency's reorientation to crime prevention; and the police-community interaction that results from a premise survey may improve that relationship. Also, premise surveys help to satisfy program objectives by contributing to the crime prevention education of the public, and requests for premise surveys indicate that the public is aware that a problem exists.

Premise surveys are isolated for evaluation for three major reasons. First, as discussed above, premise survey activity touches on many aspects of the MCW program. Second, a significant proportion of MCW crime prevention

training has focused on premise surveys. Third, premise surveys complement Operation Identification in that they both are geared to the reduction of burglary. Moreover, premise surveys carry the concept of burglary prevention one step further by inspiring the implementation of specific physical deterrence measures, as opposed to the psychological deterrence offered by Operation Identification.

This evaluation of the premise survey program consists of three sections: a description of project activities related to premise surveys (materials, promotion, and training), data collection and evaluation, and constraints under which the program operates.

2. Activities

a) Materials:

Materials designed by MCW pertaining to premise surveys consist primarily of a Home Security Checklist. A suggested premise survey format was drawn up and included as a portion of the MCW manual, which was sent to each member agency. The premise survey format is of two types -- a residential security inspection form and a business security survey form. The format for the residential security inspection consists of 36 items pertaining to the physical security and description of the premise, with corresponding spaces for correction of problem areas. The business security form consists of two pages for physical security items and business procedure questions with accompanying spaces for recommended improvements. A third page of the business survey form is provided for a physical security diagram. Space is also provided for follow-up compliance information. These two survey formats comprise the only material specifically pertaining to premise surveys provided by MCW (other than training materials) and are

the premise survey models suggested to MCW agencies.

All member agencies receive the MCW manual; therefore, all agencies should be aware of the premise survey program's existence, despite the fact that not all member agencies have MCW-trained personnel. However, since the premise survey material only consists of pages within the manual, the implication is that the member agency has the resources necessary to produce, refine, and edit its own materials and to implement the premise survey program. The lack of premise survey implementation on the part of some agencies is evidence of the fact that this assumption may be erroneous.

b) Promotion:

The direct information effort of MCW was aimed at informing the public of MCW activities, yet this campaign made no provisions for promoting the premise survey program. It may be assumed, then, that the only method whereby the public could learn of the premise survey program would be through direct contact with a law enforcement agency (assuming it was a member agency of MCW).

Since there is no statewide promotion of the program and only minimal materials in the MCW manual, the only agencies heavily exposed to the premise survey program are those who have attended MCW training. Thus, for the community served by a non-trained agency, it is likely that there will be promotion neither from MCW nor by the local agency. This lack of promotion probably accounts for a great deal of the inactivity in regard to the premise survey program. Unfortunately, complete data are not available to assess the extent to which local agencies have promoted the premise survey program on their own.

c) Training:

Training data indicate that 15% of all training and 23.6% of basic crime prevention training has been directed at premise surveys.

The training directed at premise surveys may be considered as appropriate for two major reasons. The first is that only through training can consistency be produced. The methodology used in conducting a premise survey might be more effective if it is consistent within and among agencies. Without proper training, it is improbable that any two surveys would be conducted in the same manner, even in situations calling for identical recommendations.

Premise survey training might also be considered appropriate if the emphasis given in training were reflected in agency activities. However, if the local agency is to place emphasis on premise surveys, then a certain resource level must be present. If the local agency does not have sufficient manpower and other resources to place high emphasis on premise surveys, then the training in this area may not be put into practice.

3. Data Collection and Evaluation

MCW member agencies are requested to submit monthly reports to the project management. It is from these monthly reports that data were gathered pertaining to the extent of premise surveys conducted by member agencies. During 1974, approximately 102 member agencies submitted at least three monthly reports. This represents 43% of all MCW agencies. Of these 102 reporting agencies, only 25 reported nine times or more during the year. These 25 agencies comprise only 11% of all MCW agencies. There are probably several factors leading to this low reporting rate, such as manpower and other resource shortages. In addition, the project management has no sanctions

over member agencies to ensure uniform and consistent reporting. The low reporting rate would tend to understate any data gathered from the reports pertaining to the extent of premise survey activity. However, it might be assumed that those agencies having resources sufficient to report consistently might be those agencies most likely to implement the premise survey program.

Of the 102 reporting agencies, approximately 63% reported conducting premise surveys. The 1974 figures indicate that approximately 3,096 premise surveys were performed by these agencies. The majority of these surveys (69%) were checks of residential units. A large proportion of all surveys (64%) were performed within Region G. This distribution is probably skewed for two reasons other than the concentration of targets in this region (Region G contains 44.5% of all residential targets). Region G had the highest percentage of member agencies sending monthly reports (71% as compared to 50% from Region B, the second highest). Also, Region G had a high percentage of agencies conducting premise surveys (69%).

The 3,096 reported premise surveys conducted in 1974 represent only 0.23% of the post office estimate of 1,363,185 total targets in the state. The 2,132 residential surveys represent only 0.17% of the total 1,283,152 residences. Of the 80,033 business establishments in the state, only 964 (1.2%) received premise surveys during 1974.

With 102 reporting agencies as a base figure, an average of 30.4 security checks were performed during 1974 by each agency. As seen in TABLE 6.34, there is a great deal of regional variation in the categories of "member agencies sending monthly reports" and "reporting agencies conducting premise surveys." The variation in these categories accounts for a good

deal of the variation in the number of premise surveys per reporting agency.

TABLE 6.34							
SECURITY CHECKS BY REGION (1974)							
REGION	Residen- tial Premise Surveys	Business Premise Surveys	TOTAL Premise Surveys	Member Agencies Sending Monthly Reports ^a	Reporting Agencies Conducting Premise Surveys	Premise Surveys Per Reporting Agency	Person-Hours of Training (Premise Surveys)
A	1	27	28	6 (35%)	3 (50%)	4.7	7
B	13	17	30	9 (50%)	4 (44%)	3.3	21
C	87 ^b	22	109	4 (22%)	2 (50%)	27.3	28
D	324 ^b	27	351	5 (17%)	4 (80%)	70.2	28
E	49	16	65	16 (43%)	7 (44%)	4.1	29
F	369	171	540	11 (24%)	9 (82%)	49.1	72
G	1,289	684	1,973	51 (71%)	35 (69%)	38.7	647
TOTALS:	2,132	964	3,096	102 (43%)	64 (63%)	30.4	832

^aMore than 2 monthly reports.

^bReflects 300 security checks by Todd County Sheriff's Department as of February, 1974.

4. Constraints on the Program

As indicated in the "Crime Prevention Training" section of this report, 198 officers have been trained by MCW to implement premise surveys. However, the low penetration of the premise survey program indicates that some constraints have diluted the effectiveness of this program. Constraints to be discussed are: a) public inactivity to proposed security improvements, b) cost of security improvements, c) lack of good will toward law enforcement officers or agencies, d) lack of resources on the part of some law enforcement agencies, and e) lack of problem perception on the part of the public.

a) A very real constraint upon law enforcement agencies was emphasized in the 1974 Golden Valley study of home security checks, where it was found that the public often did not make suggested security improvements. In a follow-up conducted 8 months to 1 year after the premise surveys, 65%

of those people contacted had failed to implement any of the suggested improvements.

If security improvements are not made, there can be little or no impact upon burglary, and the very purpose of the survey is, in effect, negated. A logical reaction on the part of the police to this public non-responsiveness might be to de-emphasize or deactivate premise surveys completely.

b) One of the possible reasons for this lack of corrective action is that when a suggestion is made, the implementation thereof may be costly in terms of time or money. The citizen is then faced with the decision of whether the additional security is worth the cost. If the citizen feels the cost is too great, then the suggestion, as well as the time of the officer involved, is of minimum utility.

c) A third constraint concerns the relationship between the law enforcement agencies and the public. It is known that there exists between the police and certain segments of the public a feeling which may be characterized as less than good will. For instance, studies have repeatedly shown that police-community relations tend to be worst in high crime rate areas. Since a premise survey must be requested by the citizen and requires interaction between the public and police, some citizens will not be likely to contact the police even if they perceive a problem to be present. Unfortunately, it is often precisely these people who are most susceptible to being a target for burglary. Even among those people who harbor no ill will toward the police, it is possible that some may regard the survey as an intrusion upon their privacy.

d) Fourth, a member agency's response to the premise survey program

is often a function of available resources. Limited resources constrain manpower, time, material production, and program promotion. They may limit the training necessary for effective and consistent implementation or the manpower necessary for implementation. Thus, since training, material production, and program promotion depend almost entirely upon agency resources, those agencies without sufficient resource levels cannot be expected to perform on an equal basis with agencies having more resources.

The Golden Valley report provides some estimated direct costs which an agency incurs in the actualization of a premise survey, and it provides evidence as to the impact of these budgetary constraints. Each survey in Golden Valley was comprised of the following direct costs: a) \$3.00 for the Community Service Officer's time (actual survey time), b) \$0.80 for typing the report, and c) \$0.40 for transportation. This represents a \$4.20 total cost per survey and is considered an "absolute minimum per check."

Since 64% of the 3,096 security checks reported during 1974 were executed in Region G, the Golden Valley figures are used to project an estimated direct cost to reporting agencies on a statewide basis. This yields a figure of \$13,003.20 expended in 1974 by reporting agencies for premise surveys. This is a suggestive estimate and may be limited in two respects: 1) the disparity of report rates between agencies, and 2) the projection of a Golden Valley estimated cost to represent all reporting agencies. Agency size, operating costs, and location would all create a premise survey direct cost differential.

e) A final constraint not related to MCW's implementation of the premise survey program is public perception of the burglary problem and what can be done about it.

If citizens fail to perceive burglary as a problem in their community, or if they feel that there is little they personally can do to deter the burglary of their premises, then it is unlikely that they would take advantage of a premise survey program, even if they knew it were available.

5. Conclusions About Premise Surveys

An overview of the premise survey program is based on information gathered from monthly reports of MCW participant agencies. Of the 102 reporting agencies, 63% reported conducting premise surveys. These agencies produced 3,096 surveys in 1974 (0.23% of total targets in the state).

Major program strengths include: a) the physical deterrence encouraged by premise surveys complements the psychological deterrence of Operation Identification, b) premise surveys may lead to an improved police-community relationship, c) requests for premise surveys reflect the public's recognition of the burglary program and its willingness to take preventive action, and d) premise surveys provide target-specific information on available burglary prevention measures.

Some constraints operate outside of the methods MCW has used to implement this program. Constraints working on the public include the lack of perception of burglary as a problem and the costs of correcting security deficiencies. Constraints on law enforcement agencies include public inactivity to proposed security improvements, lack of good will toward law enforcement agencies, and limited resources for material production and program implementation.

A Possible Alternative

There are alternatives pertaining to the implementation of the premise

survey which could diminish costs to the agency by necessitating less time and resources. A self-administered "universal" home security checklist as suggested in the Golden Valley report could effect such a reduction in agency time. This checklist could cover a wide variety of problem areas within varying types of premises. Each potential weakness could enumerate possible standard corrections. If the list were competently prepared and the premise properly surveyed, no major problems should arise. Since the intention is to reduce member agency time consumption, the instructions might read to contact police for assistance only if inconsistencies or questions pertaining to the survey and the premise arose. Consistent with this methodology, then, the citizen who is not concerned, who is not likely to implement suggested improvements, or who is capable of effecting security corrections without police assistance would be systematically eliminated from unnecessarily consuming agency time and manpower.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Goals and Objectives

1. Although the crime problems addressed by MCW were incorrectly documented in the first-year grant application, statistics show that residential burglary, total burglary, Part I property crime, and total Part I crime pose significant problems in Minnesota. The significance of the burglary problem is shown by the fact that during the decade prior to MCW, the incidence of burglary had increased faster than that of property crime or total Part I crime, while the clearance rate for burglary had declined twice as much as the others.

2. In its attempt to stop these alarming crime trends, MCW proposed an ambitious year-two goal that appeared impossible to meet. Efforts

to reach the goal of reducing the Part I property crime rate by 1979 to a figure lower than the 1972 rate seem destined to fail. Most of the problem with this goal lies in the fact that MCW's main weapons against crime, Operation Identification and general target hardening, have focused on burglary. It now appears that this focus on burglary, which constitutes only 30% of the property crime problem and leaves the other 70% relatively unchecked, will not be successful.

Quayle Survey

3. The most interesting and consistent findings of the Quayle survey are the results of the suburban sample. This sample a) had heard about Operation Identification from non mass-media sources at a higher rate than had the other samples, b) was significantly more aware of Operation Identification, c) had a higher level of sophistication concerning its function, and d) showed a higher level of claimed enrollment in Operation Identification.

In general, Minnesotans are becoming more aware of Operation Identification. As awareness and knowledge about the program increase, it is expected that enrollment will increase accordingly. Public apathy remains as a major obstacle to increased participation.

The majority of Operation Identification members may fit into the following rough profile: long-term state residents who are middle-aged, middle-class, married, have at least a high-school education, and are living in a single family dwelling.

By contrast, according to the Quayle survey, certain groups may have had insufficient exposure to the Operation Identification program. These groups are people over age 60 and people with less than a high-school education.

Enrollment

4. The 236 agencies, as of March, 1975, had enrolled 116,713 of the 1,363,185 targets in Minnesota, for an enrollment penetration of 8.6%. The total enrollment increased 153.2% from March, 1974, to March, 1975.

The MCW goal was to reach 20% enrollment, but this goal was not reached. However, compared to other programs around the country, MCW did achieve more absolute enrollment than any other program examined. Moreover, several Minnesota communities have penetrations of 20% or more.

Effects of Operation Identification

5. a) Residential burglary rates have increased each year, with an increase of 50.6% from 1970 to 1974. During 1970-1973, the residential burglary rate rose 11.7% per year. The residential burglary rate increase dropped to 8.5% during the first full Minnesota Crime Watch year of 1974. Total burglary statistics show promising trends in both clearance and incidence, but the burglary rate itself increased more in Minnesota Crime Watch's first full year (1974) than the average rate of increase during 1965-1973. However, this increase was considerably less than the national increase in 1974.

b) Based on statewide estimates, non-participants have a residential burglary rate 3.84 times higher than that of participants. Non-residential targets display a non-participant burglary rate 1.69 times higher than that of participants.

c) The incremental benefits to be gained by increasing enrollment may diminish once enrollment reaches some "critical" level. This possibility would require considerably more testing before it could be

accepted, however, and is pointed out here as a potential candidate for further investigation.

Deterrence seems to be operative only in terms of the specific targets enrolled in Operation Identification. The increasing burglary rates would indicate that some displacement is taking place either to non-member targets, to other types of crime, or perhaps to non-criminal activity (the increase in burglary rates might have been higher without Operation Identification).

The Three-Community Study

6. Although based on a very preliminary analysis and a small sample of participant burglary victims in the three communities of Brooklyn Park, New Hope, and Golden Valley, the following tentative conclusions were reached:

a) Residential units participating in Operation Identification are more likely than non-participants to avoid suffering a dollar value loss after a burglar has gained entrance to the structure and are likely to lose less in dollar value than non-participants if a loss is incurred.

b) If the recovery data is aggregated across all three communities for both 1973 and 1974, some tentative indications of Operation Identification's impact on the recovery of property can be identified. Participation in Operation Identification seems to have a more favorable effect, in terms of recovered property, on non-residential targets than on residential units. This point is indicated by the higher average property value recovered for participating non-residential units.

c) The fact that a participant has been burglarized prior to

the time of joining Operation Identification clearly has an influence on how quickly the participant joins the program. The data generally show, for instance, that individuals whose premises were first burglarized after the program was initiated in their community were the quickest to join the program, while individuals who had been burglarized prior to the time the program was initiated in their community were the second fastest to enroll. Slowest to join Operation Identification were those participants who had never been burglarized.

Cost Analysis

7. A cost analysis of direct expenditures by MCW on Operation Identification-related activities yielded a unit cost of \$1.47 per enrollee, statewide.


In the three-community study, an attempt was made to estimate local agency costs. As might have been expected, the addition of local expenditures dramatically increased the unit cost per enrollee.

8. As indicated by the amount of training directed at premise surveys, MCW has given some emphasis to this program. However, this emphasis has resulted in only a minimal number of premise surveys being conducted. MCW promotion of the premise survey has evidently been insufficient to generate citizen demand for premise surveys. Also, informational materials specific to premise surveys have been lacking.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusions reached above lend themselves to a logical system of analysis which leads to a series of recommendations in the premise security area. This system of analysis is abbreviated in Figure 6.2, which also

serves as an outline for the discussion to follow.



1. Findings About MCW Goals as Stated

As noted above, it seems impossible for MCW to achieve its goal of reducing overall property crime by focusing on residential burglary. Given the documented importance of residential burglary as a major element of Part I crime in Minnesota, it seems appropriate to recommend:

- a) that rather than focusing on property crime, MCW should explicitly focus its goal statements on residential burglary. MCW's goal should be either to decrease residential burglary rates by a specific target date or to slow down the increase in these rates by a specific amount by a specific date.

2. Findings About Operation Identification and Burglary

Residential burglary has been the major focus of MCW activity. It is appropriate, therefore, to organize recommendations around the findings

of this study regarding this problem.

Summarizing the conclusions drawn above indicates that:

- Operation Identification has not lowered the overall burglary rate; yet,
- Operation Identification participants have lower burglary rates than non-members; therefore,
- Some displacement is taking place either to non-member targets, to other types of crime, or perhaps to non-criminal activity (the increase in burglary rates might have been higher without Operation Identification).

Operation Identification does seem to have some deterrent effect for those premises which are participants. This effect may be termed "psychological deterrence," since a target's being in Operation Identification does not physically keep the burglar from entering the premise, but rather may influence him to choose not to enter.

Given this effect, it seems appropriate to recommend:

- b) that significant efforts be undertaken to increase enrollment in Operation Identification.

But, since Operation Identification alone has not been able to reduce statewide burglary rates, it also seems appropriate to recommend:

- c) that a major focus of MCW activity be directed at developing additional programs designed to physically deter burglary by encouraging citizens to take more target-hardening steps.

The analyses performed in this evaluation provide several recommendations as to how these two overall recommendations can, perhaps, best be implemented. A review of the findings about enrollment in Operation Identification and findings about premise surveys will provide background to these recommendations.

3. Findings About Enrollment in Operation Identification

The data from the Quayle survey indicate that citizen apathy ("I just haven't gotten around to it") seems to be the major constraint which keeps people from enrolling in Operation Identification. To this end, MCW should attempt both to decrease the costs in effort and time to enroll, and encourage the development of positive incentives for citizens to enroll and mark their property. To this end, the following recommendations are made:

- d) that MCW undertake controlled experiments to determine methods of enrollment which most reduce the time and effort costs of the enrollee, yet, at the same time, maximize the amount of property actually marked with traceable PIN numbers.
- e) that copies of the findings of this report be made available to the actuarial departments of insurance companies operating in the state for the purpose of determining whether more companies than at present might be willing to offer discounts on renter's and homeowner's policies to participants in Operation Identification. This would create incentives to join the program.
- f) that MCW pursue the possibility of increasing the actual marking of participant property by providing marking tools to purveyors of items most commonly stolen in residential burglary. Signs stating that purchases of participants can be engraved with their PIN numbers should also be provided. This service might encourage participants to mark new property at the time of purchase. The availability of brochures in such retail outlets might also encourage non-members making purchases to join the program.

The Quayle survey also indicated that the groups with the least exposure to the Operation Identification program were those over 60 years of age and those with less than a high-school education. To attempt to remedy this situation, it is recommended:

- g) that MCW encourage its member agencies to make special efforts to reach those over 60 years of age and those with lower educational levels through special enrollment campaigns.

The analysis of penetration rates in Minnesota showed that the metropolitan area (Region G) was closest to reaching the goal of 20% enrollment. Region G has a penetration rate of 16.8% while the second highest region had achieved a penetration rate of only 5%.

The Quayle survey consistently showed that citizens living in those areas with the most active crime prevention programs (the suburbs) were most likely not only to have heard of and to have joined Operation Identification, but to have heard of the program through their local police. In addition, the telephone survey indicated that many of the smaller law enforcement agencies around the state have been quite successful in establishing crime prevention programs and in enlisting community support for such programs.

Collectively, these findings indicate that those agencies in closest contact with citizens tend to have the most active crime prevention programs. For this reason, it is recommended:

- h) that MCW attempt to go beyond its original goal of enlisting agencies to cover a maximum proportion of the population of the state and attempt to actively recruit new member agencies. Increased enlistment of agencies should lead to increased crime prevention activity and community involvement at the local level and increased enrollment in Operation Identification outside the metropolitan area. Present members should also be encouraged to increase their commitment to crime prevention activities.

4. Increasing Physical Deterrence

Premise Surveys

The finding above that psychological deterrents such as Operation Identification have not been sufficient to reduce residential burglary rates led to the recommendation that MCW place more emphasis on physical deterrence measures. One program already supported by MCW which could lead to

more target-hardening measures being taken is the premise survey program.

The Quayle survey indicated that only 33% of Minnesotans would not participate in a premise survey program if it were offered by their local police departments. Given the need for increased physical deterrence measures, and given the high level of popular acceptance of the premise survey notion, it seems appropriate to recommend:

- i) that MCW actively undertake a program to dramatically increase the number of premise surveys conducted by its member agencies as a means of encouraging the taking of physical deterrence measures by the citizens of Minnesota.

While recognizing the importance and magnitude of the constraints on both MCW and member agencies, it is felt that the further development of the premise survey program is of significant importance that major efforts should be undertaken to overcome these constraints.

Given the limited manpower resources of many law enforcement agencies, a statewide promotional effort encouraging citizens to contact their police for a premise survey may be neither appropriate nor feasible. Nonetheless, it would seem appropriate for MCW to develop promotional materials for those member agencies desiring them. These materials would include brochures, mats for newspaper advertisements, radio tapes, and other materials appropriate to a localized promotional campaign.

In addition, alternative premise survey formats and strategies should be examined for possible use by those agencies for whom manpower and other resource constraints may impinge on their ability to fully implement this program.

Some thought might also be given to providing an additional window

sticker to those who have had a premise survey and who have made the physical changes recommended by the police. The prospect of obtaining such a sticker might induce more people to make more of the suggested changes than would otherwise be the case.

If the goal is to reduce attempted and actual burglaries through making targets both psychologically less desirable and physically less penetrable, premise surveys should be an integral part of any burglary prevention program.

Environmental Design

The two major recommendations regarding increasing enrollment in Operation Identification and increasing the use of premise surveys are designed to deter potential burglars from particular structures. An additional area of concern for an effective burglary prevention program ought to be the consideration of steps which might limit burglary incidence on a neighborhood or community-wide basis.

While recognizing that residential burglary is one of the more difficult crimes to control through environmental design, it is the case that some of the side effects of environmental design projects such as better lighting, more people on the street, increased feelings of a sense of community, and a common concern with reducing crime may influence the decisions and behavior of potential burglars as well as those engaged in person-to-person crimes. For these reasons, it is recommended:

- j) that MCW explore the possibility of using environmental design programs to increase the level of both physical and psychological deterrence to burglary on a larger scale than individual structures, especially in high burglary areas.

5. Conclusion

The above conclusions and recommendations have been derived from an evaluation of two residential security programs sponsored and encouraged by Minnesota Crime Watch.

While a public policy evaluation of this sort often seems to be critical of an existing program, it should be so in a positive sense. That is, the analysis of the extent to which a program has or has not met its stated goals should be coupled with recommendations to policy makers both as to how they might more realistically state those goals and as to how their programs might be improved in terms of reaching those goals. It is in this spirit that the conclusions and recommendations in this report have been presented.

There is no guarantee, of course, that widespread acceptance and implementation of these recommendations would have a significant impact on overall residential burglary rates in Minnesota. Crime rates are influenced by a host of socio-economic variables in addition to those which the MCW program and these recommendations seek to control.

Psychological deterrence programs such as Operation Identification have been shown to have some deterrent effect for those premises enrolled, although it is not possible to state precisely how much of that effect is due to the program and how much might be due to other physical deterrence measures taken by participants.

Physical deterrence measures taken by citizens cannot help but provide an additional deterrent effect as it is made physically more difficult for burglars to enter a premise.

Yet the combined effect of psychological and physical deterrence measures may only serve to have a deterrent effect for individual participants in the programs supporting these steps. The impact on the overall burglary rate may be negligible.

If future evaluations were to find this to be the case, it would not necessarily mean that the program was a failure -- for this would certainly not be the case for participants who were not victimized. Rather, it would mean that program goals and content would again have to be altered, again on the basis of the best available information at that time.

A P P E N D I X A

T H E

R E O R I E N T A T I O N Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

B U D G E T I N F O R M A T I O N

A G E N C Y I N F O R M A T I O N

M E M B E R Q U E S T I O N N A I R E

BUDGET INFORMATION

Total 1975 Budget: \$ _____

of which \$ _____ is for salaries

\$ _____ is for equipment

\$ _____ is for all other

In 1975 this Department received \$ _____

in Federal (LEAA) Grants for the purpose(s) of:

AGENCY INFORMATION

NAME of Agency _____

NCIC # _____

Department:

Rural _____

Urban _____

Sheriff's Office _____

Police Department _____

Population Served _____

Member of M.C.W. Yes _____ No _____

(If yes, date joined _____)

Department size, officers _____

civilian _____

Federal Grants Yes _____ No _____

Person Being Interviewed:

Head of Department _____

Crime Prevention Officer _____

Patrol Person _____

Other _____

How long a Police Officer? _____

Trained (M.C.W.)? Yes _____ No _____

MEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE

1. We are interested in finding out what Crime Prevention activities your department has been involved in, in the past two years, and those which it is currently involved with. Has your department been involved in, or is presently involved in any of the following activities?

Past	Present
1. <u>_____</u>	1. <u>_____</u>
2. <u>_____</u>	2. <u>_____</u>
3. <u>_____</u>	3. <u>_____</u>
4. <u>_____</u>	4. <u>_____</u>
5. <u>_____</u>	5. <u>_____</u>
6. <u>_____</u>	6. <u>_____</u>
7. <u>_____</u>	7. <u>_____</u>
8. <u>_____</u>	8. <u>_____</u>
9. <u>_____</u>	9. <u>_____</u>
10. <u>_____</u>	10. <u>_____</u>
11. <u>_____</u>	11. <u>_____</u>
12. <u>_____</u>	12. <u>_____</u>
13. <u>_____</u>	13. <u>_____</u>
14. <u>_____</u>	14. <u>_____</u>
15. <u>_____</u>	15. <u>_____</u>
16. <u>_____</u>	16. <u>_____</u>
17. <u>_____</u>	17. <u>_____</u>
18. <u>_____</u>	18. <u>_____</u>
19. <u>_____</u>	19. <u>_____</u>
20. <u>_____</u>	20. <u>_____</u>
21. <u>_____</u>	21. <u>_____</u>
22. <u>_____</u>	22. <u>_____</u>
23. <u>_____</u>	23. <u>_____</u>
24. <u>_____</u>	24. <u>_____</u>
25. <u>_____</u>	25. <u>_____</u>
26. <u>_____</u>	26. <u>_____</u>
27. <u>_____</u>	27. <u>_____</u>
28. <u>_____</u>	28. <u>_____</u>
29. <u>_____</u>	29. <u>_____</u>
30. <u>_____</u>	30. <u>_____</u>
31. <u>_____</u>	31. <u>_____</u>
32. <u>_____</u>	32. <u>_____</u>
33. <u>_____</u>	33. <u>_____</u>
34. <u>_____</u>	34. <u>_____</u>
35. <u>_____</u>	35. <u>_____</u>
36. <u>_____</u>	36. <u>_____</u>
37. <u>_____</u>	37. <u>_____</u>
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39. <u>_____</u>	39. <u>_____</u>
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41. <u>_____</u>	41. <u>_____</u>
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44. <u>_____</u>	44. <u>_____</u>
45. <u>_____</u>	45. <u>_____</u>
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47. <u>_____</u>	47. <u>_____</u>
48. <u>_____</u>	48. <u>_____</u>
49. <u>_____</u>	49. <u>_____</u>
50. <u>_____</u>	50. <u>_____</u>
51. <u>_____</u>	51. <u>_____</u>
52. <u>_____</u>	52. <u>_____</u>
53. <u>_____</u>	53. <u>_____</u>
54. <u>_____</u>	54. <u>_____</u>
55. <u>_____</u>	55. <u>_____</u>
56. <u>_____</u>	56. <u>_____</u>
57. <u>_____</u>	57. <u>_____</u>
58. <u>_____</u>	58. <u>_____</u>
59. <u>_____</u>	59. <u>_____</u>
60. <u>_____</u>	60. <u>_____</u>
61. <u>_____</u>	61. <u>_____</u>
62. <u>_____</u>	62. <u>_____</u>
63. <u>_____</u>	63. <u>_____</u>
64. <u>_____</u>	64. <u>_____</u>
65. <u>_____</u>	65. <u>_____</u>
66. <u>_____</u>	66. <u>_____</u>
67. <u>_____</u>	67. <u>_____</u>
68. <u>_____</u>	68. <u>_____</u>
69. <u>_____</u>	69. <u>_____</u>
70. <u>_____</u>	70. <u>_____</u>
71. <u>_____</u>	71. <u>_____</u>
72. <u>_____</u>	72. <u>_____</u>
73. <u>_____</u>	73. <u>_____</u>
74. <u>_____</u>	74. <u>_____</u>
75. <u>_____</u>	75. <u>_____</u>
76. <u>_____</u>	76. <u>_____</u>
77. <u>_____</u>	77. <u>_____</u>
78. <u>_____</u>	78. <u>_____</u>
79. <u>_____</u>	79. <u>_____</u>
80. <u>_____</u>	80. <u>_____</u>
81. <u>_____</u>	81. <u>_____</u>
82. <u>_____</u>	82. <u>_____</u>
83. <u>_____</u>	83. <u>_____</u>
84. <u>_____</u>	84. <u>_____</u>
85. <u>_____</u>	85. <u>_____</u>
86. <u>_____</u>	86. <u>_____</u>
87. <u>_____</u>	87. <u>_____</u>
88. <u>_____</u>	88. <u>_____</u>
89. <u>_____</u>	89. <u>_____</u>
90. <u>_____</u>	90. <u>_____</u>
91. <u>_____</u>	91. <u>_____</u>
92. <u>_____</u>	92. <u>_____</u>
93. <u>_____</u>	93. <u>_____</u>
94. <u>_____</u>	94. <u>_____</u>
95. <u>_____</u>	95. <u>_____</u>
96. <u>_____</u>	96. <u>_____</u>
97. <u>_____</u>	97. <u>_____</u>
98. <u>_____</u>	98. <u>_____</u>
99. <u>_____</u>	99. <u>_____</u>
100. <u>_____</u>	100. <u>_____</u>

_____	_____	Commercial Security
_____	_____	Residential Security
_____	_____	Rural Security
_____	_____	Personal Security
_____	_____	Identification Program
_____	_____	Education (of Public)
_____	_____	Education (of Fellow Officers)

2. Has your position, job duties, or responsibilities changed because of your department's involvement in Crime Prevention activities?

Yes

Which of the following has changed?

_____ Position change (new rank/or status)

_____ Job duties change (new functions added to your present position)

_____ Responsibilities change (no change in job duties, but added responsibilities)

_____ Other

How?

No

Not Applicable _____

3. How many total hours per week (on the average) are spent on the following Crime Prevention activities by all the members of your department (including other than police officers)?

Commercial Security _____

Residential Security _____

Rural Security _____

Personal Security _____

Premise Surveys _____

Identification Program _____

Education (of the Public) _____

Education (of Fellow Officers) _____

4. Please give the following information for each/any individual currently involved in the Crime Prevention activities of your department (including other than police officers):

<u>Rank or Job Title</u>	<u>Yearly Salary</u>	<u>Date began Crime Prevention activities</u>	<u>Hours/week devoted to activities</u>

5. Has your department, at any time, implemented a premise survey program?

Yes

How many residential surveys per month (on the average)?

How many commercial surveys per month (on the average)?

No

6. Does your department issue "warning tags" calling attention to residential or business security problems?

Yes _____

No

If No, does your department use other methods to call attention to security problems?

Yes

If Yes, what are the methods used?

No

7. Is any member of your department a member of the Minnesota Crime Prevention Officers Association?

Yes

How many?

Rank(s) _____

No

8. Has any individual within your department developed any Crime Prevention techniques or activities on his/her own?

Yes _____

What were they?

No _____

9. Does your department distribute any Crime Prevention literature, posters, etc., designed and paid for by the department?

Yes _____

If Yes, in the last year how much money has been spent on this? _____

No _____

10. Has a citizen's Crime Prevention committee ever been formed in your community?

Yes _____

If Yes, is the committee still functioning?

Yes _____

No _____

How long have they been in existence? _____

No _____

11. Has your department established a Crime Prevention Unit (a unit or section formally designated by the Chief or Sheriff)?

Yes _____

If Yes, the date the Unit was established _____

The number of members on the Unit's staff (including other than police officers) _____

No _____

12. How many members of your department belong to Operation Identification? _____

13. Has the department's property been engraved with an Operation Identification number?

Yes _____

No _____

14. What numbering system do you use in your Operation Identification program?

Social Security Number _____

Drivers License Number _____

Permanent Identification Number (PIN) _____

Phone Number _____

Other _____

15. Are you personally a member of Operation Identification?

Yes _____

No _____

16. Prior to the advent of Minnesota Crime Watch Crime Prevention Training Seminars (September, 1973), had any member of your department attended or received other forms of Crime Prevention training?

Yes _____

How many? _____

By whom? _____

No _____

17. Has any member received any non-Minnesota Crime Watch Crime Prevention training since September, 1973?

Yes _____

How many? _____

By whom? _____

No _____

18. Does your department plan to provide personnel within your department with training at future M.C.W. Crime Prevention Training Seminars?

Yes _____

How many? _____

No _____

Could you tell us why not?

19. Does your department plan to provide personnel within your department with Crime Prevention training from other sources?

Yes _____

How many? _____

With whom? _____

No _____

20. Has the Crime Prevention training received by your department provided any new information (new principles, facts, or techniques) which have been of use to you?

Yes _____

Could you list them?

No _____

If No, why not?

Not applicable _____

21. Do you have any form of on-going, regularly scheduled, in-service training?

Yes _____

How often given? _____

Who in the department receives it? _____

How long are training sessions? _____

No _____

22. If you have an in-service training program, is Crime Prevention training a part of the program?

Yes _____

How much of the total training time is devoted to Crime Prevention topics? _____

No _____

23. Has your department received any comments from the public with respect to the department's efforts to prevent crime?

Yes _____

If Yes, please describe the comments:

No _____

The previous set of questions was aimed at obtaining information on the department's involvement in Crime Prevention activities. The remaining questions are designed to obtain your personal opinions on several aspects of Crime Prevention.

Read each statement carefully. Then on the scale below each statement, locate and circle the number which corresponds to the way you feel about the statement.

- 1 - Strongly Agree
- 2 - Agree
- 3 - Neutral
- 4 - Disagree
- 5 - Strongly Disagree

1. The victim of a burglary contributes to his/her own misfortune by not taking sufficient precautions.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

2. At present this agency is able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

3. In the future this agency will be able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

4. Crime Prevention is not law enforcement's problem; it is the community's problem.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

5. The amount of time spent on Crime Prevention activities by this department overextends the department's resources.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Not Applicable

6. In the long run, Crime Prevention activities will pay for themselves.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

7. In general, state Crime Prevention programs tend to be more effective than those initiated by individual departments.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

8. Two years ago, this department was Crime Prevention oriented.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Don't Know

9. At present, this department is Crime Prevention oriented.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

10. Two years from now this department will be more Crime Prevention oriented.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

11. State Crime Prevention programs tend to be too general to apply in specific communities.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

12. The manpower used in Crime Prevention activities by this department would be better spent on the apprehension of lawbreakers.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Not Applicable

13. For this department, the methods and techniques developed by Minnesota Crime Watch have been an effective means to deter burglaries.

Strongly Agree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree

APPENDIX B

CONSTRUCTION OF THE
REORIENTATION STUDY SAMPLE

OUTSTATE SAMPLE

METROPOLITAN SAMPLE

OUTSTATE SAMPLE

Re- gion	NAME	Popula- tion	Mem- ber	NON- Mem- ber	Crime Pre- ven- tion Unit	Po- lice Dept.	Sher- iff's Of- fice	Train- ing	Force Size
A	East Grand Forks	8,900	X		No	X		0	19
A	Thief River Falls	8,600		X	--	X			18
A	Beltrami County	15,158	X		No		X	0	15
A	Polk County	16,215	X		No		X	0	19
A	Clearwater County	8,013	X		No		X	0	11
B	Ely	4,904		X	--	X			7
B	Eveleth	4,754	X		No	X			9
B	Silver Bay	3,504	X		No	X		1	9
B	Two Harbors	4,437		X	--	X			10
B	Duluth	100,578	X		No	X		1	163
B	Hibbing	19,017	X		No	X		1	29
B	Cloquet	8,700		X	--	X			13
B	Aitkin County	11,403	X		No		X	1	9
C	Breckenridge	4,200		X		X			9
C	Detroit Lakes	5,797	X		Yes	X		1	10
C	Morris	5,366	X		No	X		1	8
C	Stevens County	5,852	X		No		X	1	6
C	Wilkin County	5,189		X	--		X		4
C	Moorhead	29,687	X		No	X		0	30
D	Isanti County	13,840		X	--		X		13
D	Mille Lacs County	13,172	X		No		X	0	11
D	Kanabec County	7,193	X		No		X	1	8
D	Chisago County	18,238	X		No		X	0	16
D	Crow Wing County	20,918	X		No		X	2	13
D	Long Prairie	2,416	X		No	X		0	6
D	Buffalo	3,275		X	--	X			6
D	Wadena	4,640		X		X		0	9
D	Sauk Centre	3,750	X		No	X		1	11

OUTSTATE SAMPLE

Re- gion	NAME	Popula- tion	Mem- ber	NON- Mem- ber	Crime Pre- ven- tion Unit	Po- lice Dept.	Sher- iff's Of- fice	Train- ing	Force Size
E	Cottonwood County	10,935		X	--		X		8
E	Swift County	9,700	X		No		X	1	10
E	Willmar	12,869	X		No	X		2	22
E	Worthington	9,916	X		No	X		0	17
E	Redwood Falls	4,774	X		No	X		1	5
E	Windom	3,952		X	--	X			4
E	Montevideo	5,661	X		No	X		0	8
F	Lake City	3,594	X		No	X		0	7
F	Sleepy Eye	3,461		X	--	X			6
F	Goodhue County	24,322	X		Yes		X	0	27
F	Olmsted County	27,536	X		Yes		X	2	12
F	Faribault	16,595	X		Yes	X		2	28
F	Owatonna	15,341		X		X			23
F	Houston County	11,641		X	--		X		10
F	Martin County	13,565	X		No		X	0	7
F	Rice County	14,752	X		No		X	0	15
F	Steele County	11,590		X	--		X		21
F	North Mankato	7,347		X	--	X			8
F	Blue Earth County	21,427	X		No		X	0	27
F	Fillmore County	19,344	X		No		X	2	12

METROPOLITAN SAMPLE

Re- gion	NAME	Popula- tion	Mem- ber	NON- Mem- ber	Crime Pre- ven- tion Unit	Po- lice Dept.	Sher- iff's Of- fice	Train- ing	Force Size
G	Chaska	5,664		X	--	X			9
G	Medina	2,583		X	--	X			4
G	Wayzata	3,993		X	--	X			6
G	Bayport	3,001		X	--	X			4
G	Forest Lake	3,678		X	--	X			6
G	Blaine	24,964	X		No	X		5	21
G	Fridley	30,240	X		Yes	X		8	30
G	Lino Lakes	3,692	X		No	X		0	5
G	Carver County	23,492	X		No		X	0	33
G	Hennepin County	913,211	X		Yes		X	1	280
G	Ramsey County	438,010	X		No		X	0	159
G	Brooklyn Center	36,370	X		No	X		1	27
G	Brooklyn Park	32,370	X		Yes	X		4	28.
G	Eden Prairie	6,938	X		Yes	X		6	12
G	Minneapolis	436,425	X		Yes	X		8	883
G	St. Louis Park	49,772	X		Yes	X		8	48
G	Osseo	3,101	X		No	X		0	7
G	Maplewood	27,827	X		No	X		1	56
G	St. Paul	313,206	X		Yes	X		4	683
G	New Prague	2,680	X		No	X		0	19
G	Prior Lake	1,114	X		Yes	X		1	N/A
G	Savage	4,033	X		No	X		0	16
G	Washington County	100,842	X		Yes		X	1	57

APPENDIX C

DEFINITIONS FOR THE
REORIENTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

DEFINITIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE

Definitions for terms and words used in Reorientation Questionnaire conducted August, 1975.

CRIME PREVENTION ACTIVITIES: Any activity which eliminates the element of crime risk.

COMMERCIAL SECURITY: Instruction of businessmen, tips on how to prevent crimes in commercial areas. Prevention of burglary, robbery, shoplifting and employee theft.

RESIDENTIAL SECURITY: Instruction of house owners and others in methods of preventing property crimes. Controlling access of strangers, controlling forced entry, increase the chance of being seen during a forced entry and decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of crime.

RURAL SECURITY: Instructing rural residents in methods which will prevent crimes particular to their situation. Cattle brandings, checking livestock and checking fences frequently.

PREMISE SURVEYS: The program of looking at the physical security (i.e., doors, windows, lighting) of residences and making recommendations for the improvement of residential security.

PERSONAL SECURITY: Instruction in self-protection, methods of protecting oneself in and out of the house.

IDENTIFICATION PROGRAM: A program involving the marking of personal property which identifies that property with an individual or establishment.

EDUCATION OF PUBLIC: Making presentations and lectures, distributing pamphlets and other crime prevention information.

EDUCATION OF FELLOW POLICE OFFICERS: Making presentations, giving training and distributing crime prevention information to other members of the department.

CITIZEN'S COMMITTEE: A group of respected and influential citizens that assist the police in crime prevention activities.

CRIME PREVENTION TECHNIQUES: Methods of implementing those ideas and programs involved in crime prevention activities. For example, enlisting the assistance of local organizations in enrolling citizens in Operation Identification (OP. I.D.).

CRIME PREVENTION OFFICER: Any full-time, sworn member of a law enforcement agency who is designated to participate in and implement crime prevention activities.

CRIME PREVENTION UNIT: A unit or section formally designated by an agency, holding a position within the department's organizational structure, and responsible for crime prevention activities.

WARNING TAGS: Notices or "tickets" issued by patrolmen after observing a security deficiency in a business or place of residence. Examples of problems receiving notice include open windows, open doors, lawn unmowed (while on vacation), etc.

OPERATION IDENTIFICATION MEMBER: A person is a member of OP. I.D. only if they have marked their property with an identification number and display the membership sticker in their windows and/or doors.

A P P E N D I X D

I N D I V I D U A L

C R I M E P R E V E N T I O N A T T I T U D E

Q U E S T I O N S

INDIVIDUAL CRIME PREVENTION ATTITUDE QUESTIONS

Statistical tests were employed to establish the survey instrument's reliability coefficient (r_{tt}). These tests (Cronbach's alpha and standardized item alpha) establish a scales reliability and reproducibility. The r_{tt} of the instrument used was found to be satisfactory. Further statistical tests (t tests) were done on the means (\bar{X}) of the responses to establish the level of significance between member (M) and non-member (NM) responses.

TOTAL RESPONSES

Member:	N = 79	$\bar{X} = 10.266$	SD = 5.012
Non-Member:	N = 29	$\bar{X} = 2.828$	SD = 4.335
	t = 7.0128		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

1. The victim of a burglary contributes to his/her own misfortune by not taking sufficient precautions.

M:	N = 76	$\bar{X} = 1.31579$	SD = 0.8360
NM:	N = 29	$\bar{X} = 0.65517$	SD = 1.04457
	t = 3.3365		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

2. At present this agency is able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.

M:	N = 79	$\bar{X} = -0.228$	SD = 1.165
NM:	N = 29	$\bar{X} = -0.241$	SD = 1.023
	t = 0.0525		

DECISION: Do NOT reject at .01 level.

3. In the future this agency will be able to satisfactorily control the crime that occurs within its jurisdiction.

M:	N = 79	$\bar{X} = -0.468$	SD = 1.023
NM:	N = 29	$\bar{X} = -0.138$	SD = 1.217
	t = -1.3961		

DECISION: Do NOT reject at .01 level.

4. Crime Prevention is not law enforcement's problem; it is the community's problem.

M:	N = 76	$\bar{X} = 0.080263$	SD = 1.20022
NM:	N = 29	$\bar{X} = 0.03448$	SD = 1.08505
	t = 2.9803		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

5. The amount of time spent on Crime Prevention activities by this department overextends the department's resources.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 0.28947	SD = 1.09320
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.06897	SD = 0.99753
	t = 0.9372		

DECISION: Reject at .05 level.

6. In the long run, Crime Prevention activities will pay for themselves.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 1.35526	SD = 0.76077
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.79310	SD = 0.67503
	t = 3.4561		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

7. In general, state Crime Prevention programs tend to be more effective than those initiated by individual departments.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 0.78947	SD = 1.03686
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = -0.17241	SD = 0.88918
	t = 4.3723		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

8. Two years ago, this department was Crime Prevention oriented.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = -0.42105	SD = 1.19178
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = -0.31034	SD = 0.84951
	t = -0.4329		

DECISION: Do NOT reject at .01 level.

9. At present, this department is Crime Prevention oriented.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 1.19737	SD = 0.73066
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.75862	SD = 0.73946
	t = 2.7157		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

10. Two years from now this department will be more Crime Prevention oriented.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 1.40789	SD = 0.65681
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.68966	SD = 0.96745
	t = 4.3139		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

11. State Crime Prevention programs tend to be too general to apply in specific communities.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 0.55263	SD = 1.08805
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = -0.06897	SD = 0.92316
	t = 2.6989		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

12. The manpower used in Crime Prevention activities by this department would be better spent on the apprehension of lawbreakers.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 0.77632	SD = 1.02760
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.17241	SD = 1.10418
	t = 2.6116		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

13. For this department, the methods and techniques developed by Minnesota Crime Watch have been an effective means to deter burglaries.

M:	N = 76	\bar{X} = 1.05263	SD = 0.89286
NM:	N = 29	\bar{X} = 0.20690	SD = 1.20651
	t = 3.8785		

DECISION: Reject at .01 level.

A P P E N D I X E

S T A T E M E N T O F T H E P R O B L E M

TABLE I
REPORTED 1972 PART I CRIMES BY REGION

TABLE II
CHANGE IN THE INCIDENCE AND CLEARANCE OF PART I CRIMES IN MINNESOTA
(1962-1972)

- - - - -

(taken from Minnesota Crime Watch's first-year grant application)

PROJECT NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION:

16. Statement of the Problem

Crimes against property constitute the overwhelming percentage of reported Part I crimes in Minnesota. In 1972, these crimes accounted for 92.2% of all Part I crimes reported. Further, the crime is fairly uniform in its distribution across the state. At least 90% of all Part I crimes reported in the seven regional criminal justice planning regions in 1972 were crimes against property.

Of these crimes against property, burglary accounts for the largest share of the problem. In 1972, 41% of all reported Part I crimes fell in this category. Again, the distribution is fairly uniform across the state. Burglary accounts for 37.4 to 50.2% of all Part I reported crimes in each of the seven criminal justice planning regions in Minnesota.

Table I provides a regional breakdown of the 1972 reported Part I crime, illustrating the percent of the total which are crimes against property, as well as the percent which are burglaries.

TABLE I

Reported 1972 Part I Crimes by Region

Region	CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS		CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY		BURGLARY		Percentage of 1972 Part I Crimes Against Property
	No. of Crimes	Percentage of 1972 Total Part I Crimes	No. of Crimes	Percentage of 1972 Total Part I Crimes	No. of Crimes	Percentage of 1972 Total Part I Crimes	
A	46	3.1	1,423	96.9	623	42.4	43.8
B	235	4.1	5,518	95.9	2,901	50.4	52.6
C	47	2.3	2,011	97.7	831	40.4	41.3
D	115	2.7	4,184	97.3	2,031	47.2	48.5
E	50	2.9	1,684	97.1	648	37.4	38.5
F	198	3.2	6,022	96.8	2,358	37.9	39.2
G	<u>6,114</u>	<u>9.2</u>	<u>60,142</u>	<u>90.8</u>	<u>26,638</u>	<u>40.2</u>	<u>44.3</u>
State Total	6,805	7.8	80,984	92.2	36,030	41.0	44.5

In sheer volume, then, the problem of crime in Minnesota is one of crimes against property, and particularly of burglary.

The seriousness of the problem is further illustrated by Table II, which shows the change from 1962 to 1972 in the incidence and clearance of total reported Part I crime, with burglaries broken out separately.

This table indicates that the incidence of the crime of burglary is increasing at a higher rate than all other crimes (an average of 19.3% per year, compared to 15.1 for all Part I crimes, including burglary). At the same time, the clearance rate on

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all crimes has dropped from 25.1% in 1962 to 20.6% in 1972, while the clearance rate on burglaries has dropped at a much more dramatic rate, from 23.2% in 1962 to 11.2% in 1972.

The Law Enforcement Crime Prevention Program is designed to address this problem by involving all citizens in the community.

TABLE II

Change in the Incidence and Clearance of Part I Crimes in Minnesota
1962-1972

Reported Incidence of Crimes, 1962		1972	Percent Change 1962-1972
Total Part I Crime*	52,125	130,623	+151%
Burglaries	12,295	36,063	+193
Clearance of Crimes			
Total Part I Crime*	13,105	26,862	+105
Burglaries	2,853	4,038	+ 42
Percent of Clearances			
All Part I Crimes	25.1%	20.6%	
Burglaries	23.2	11.2	
Average Increase in Incidence of Crime			
All Part I Crimes*	15.1% per year		
Burglaries	19.3% per year		

*Includes negligent manslaughter, larceny under \$50, but excludes simple assaults.

The importance of community involvement in crime prevention and control has long been recognized by professionals in the criminal justice field. Widespread application of this concept in local communities, however, represents a new thrust and direction. Citizen concern about crime must be translated into action to prevent it. In a significant number of cases the victim of a crime contributes to his own misfortune, largely out of ignorance, by not taking basic security measures that would protect his person or property. This project is designed to alleviate this problem.

A P P E N D I X F

C R I M I N A L J U S T I C E R E G I O N S I N

M I N N E S O T A

MINNESOTA COUNTIES, BY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGION

MAP OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGIONS IN MINNESOTA

MINNESOTA COUNTIES

by Criminal Justice Region

REGION A

Beltrami	Lake of the Woods	Pennington
Clearwater	Mahnomen	Polk
Hubbard	Marshall	Red Lake
Kittson	Norman	Roseau

REGION B

Aitkin	Itasca	Lake
Carlton	Koochiching	St. Louis
Cook		

REGION C

Becker	Grant	Stevens
Clay	Otter Tail	Traverse
Douglas	Pope	Wilkin

REGION D

Benton	Kanabec	Stearns
Cass	Mille Lacs	Todd
Chisago	Morrison	Wadena
Crow Wing	Pine	Wright
Isanti	Sherburne	

REGION E

Big Stone	Lincoln	Pipestone
Chippewa	Lyon	Redwood
Cottonwood	McLeod	Renville
Jackson	Meeker	Rock
Kandiyohi	Murray	Swift
Lac Qui Parle	Nobles	Yellow Medicine


REGION F

Blue Earth	Houston	Sibley
Brown	Le Sueur	Steele
Dodge	Martin	Wabasha
Faribault	Mower	Waseca
Fillmore	Nicollet	Watsonwan
Freeborn	Olmsted	Winona
Goodhue	Rice	

REGION G

Anoka	Hennepin	Scott
Carver	Ramsey	Washington
Dakota		

MAP of CRIMINAL JUSTICE REGIONS
in MINNESOTA



END