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# Community Crime Prevention

Seattle, Washington

 Office of Technology Transfer  
National Institute of Law Enforcement and  
Criminal Justice  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
U.S. Department of Justice

**NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT  
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**AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT**

**Community Crime Prevention Program  
Seattle, Washington**

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Office of Technology Transfer  
National Institute of Law Enforcement  
and Criminal Justice  
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration  
U.S. Department of Justice

September 1977

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## ABSTRACT

In 1975, a burglary occurred every ten seconds. Many of the residential burglaries are crimes of opportunity, committed by juveniles who gain entry through unlocked doors or windows during the day when residents are away. The sheer volume of burglaries, lack of witnesses and ease of performance, make detection and apprehension of burglars difficult.

In Seattle, the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) has tapped a powerful resource for controlling burglary: citizens. The program marshalls citizen action to prevent burglaries by making homes more secure. If a crime is committed, prompt and complete citizen reporting increases the chance of apprehension.

By encouraging citizens to join cooperative efforts on their own behalf, CCPP has helped to reduce burglaries. Equally important, it has diminished the fear and "fortress mentality" that can come from feelings of isolation and helplessness.

Developed by Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been named an Exemplary Project by the National Institute. For those who wish to consider a similar approach, this manual gives a basic overview of the program.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
1.1 The Case for Community Crime Prevention	1
1.2 The Community Crime Prevention Program in Seattle	4
1.3 Special Features	6
1.4 Results	7
1.5 Content Guide	9
Chapter 2: CCPP Development and Organization	11
2.1 Background	11
2.2 Burglary in Seattle	12
2.3 Strategy Development	13
2.4 Start-Up and Site Selection	15
2.5 Organization and Staffing	17
2.6 Staff Training	19
2.7 Institutionalization	20
Chapter 3: Operations	21
3.1 Neighborhood Organization	21
3.1.1 Community Contact	21
3.1.2 Resident Contact	22
3.2 Primary Services	24
3.2.1 The Block Watch	25
3.2.2 Property Marking	28
3.2.3 Home Security Inspection	29
3.3 Maintenance Services	30
3.4 Advisory Service	32
3.5 Summary	33
Chapter 4: Replication	35
4.1 Needs Assessment	35
4.1.1 Demographic Factors in Replicability	35
4.1.2 Alternative Strategy Development	38
4.1.3 Start-Up Considerations	39

4.2	Key Program Factors	39
4.2.1	Target Selection and Saturation	40
4.2.2	Primary Service Delivery	40
4.2.3	Staffing	42
4.2.4	The Civilian Nature of the Program	42
4.2.5	Police Relations	43
4.3	Legal Considerations and Policy Recommendations	44
4.3.1	Precaution Against Fraud	45
4.3.2	Staff Felony Check	45
4.3.3	Work Neighborhoods in Teams	45
Chapter 5: Results and Costs		47
5.1	Reduction of Burglary	47
5.2	Burglary-in-Progress Calls	55
5.3	Service Goals	55
5.4	Costs	57
Chapter 6: Evaluation Guidelines		63
6.1	Evaluating Crime Reduction	63
6.2	Evaluating Crime Reporting	70
6.3	Evaluating Program Operations	72
APPENDICES		
Appendix A:	Executive Summary to the <i>Policy Development Report on the Community Crime Prevention Program</i> , prepared by the City of Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office, October 1976.	73
Appendix B:	CCPP Staff Job Descriptions	83
Appendix C:	Home Security Checklist	87
Appendix D:	Contents of Training Program for New CCPP Staff	97
Appendix E:	Letter of Introduction	101
Appendix F:	Block Watch Packet	105
Appendix G:	Sample Block Watch Map	115
Appendix H:	Excerpt from CCPP <i>Third Year Evaluation</i> , Increase of Burglary-In-Progress Calls	119
Appendix I:	Victimization Survey Instrument	131
Appendix J:	Sample Size Considerations for a Victimization Survey	159
Appendix K:	Estimated Professional Survey Costs	163



## Chapter 1: Introduction

"The first thing to understand is that the public peace...is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves ...No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down."\*

### 1.1 The Case for Community Crime Prevention

A study of index crimes in Seattle, conducted by the Law and Justice Planning Office in 1972, found that more citizens were concerned about becoming victims of burglary than of any other crime. Their concern was realistic. According to FBI reports, in the five years after 1970, the rate of burglary in the United States rose 47 percent. In 1975, a burglary was committed somewhere in this country every ten seconds.

Many communities have responded to the problem of increased crime by calling for increased police manpower. The assumptions are that law enforcement agencies are most qualified to combat crime, and their effectiveness is directly related to the level of manpower available for patrol and investigation. Yet, the prevalence of residential burglary in particular makes it mathematically improbable that even greatly increased police patrol would

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\* Jane Jacobs, Death and Life of Great American Cities, Random House, 1961, p. 33.

deter many crimes, or that an investigations unit could follow up each report properly.

Moreover, the nature of residential burglary makes it particularly elusive to traditional police methods. The crime requires only stealth and opportunity. Because the police patrol officers are, after all, non-residents in a patrol neighborhood and outnumbered by households, they are greatly hampered in their ability to recognize either stealth or opportunity.

Many urban police departments have responded to the situation by instituting anti-burglary units and exploring non-traditional methods to control the wave of burglary. They have undertaken tactical planning to forecast vulnerable houses and neighborhoods based on previous crime data. They have adopted team policing, in which police officers and investigators are assigned as teams to provide comprehensive services to a single neighborhood. In addition, they have applied innovations in forensics and equipment. Yet without citizen assistance, the potential impact of improved police procedures may never be fully realized.

Recent LEAA-funded research has underscored the importance of involving citizens in anti-crime efforts:

- A 1975 Rand study of criminal investigation procedures found that without the assistance of victims or witnesses in identifying a suspect, the chances of a successful investigation were slim.\*
- Several studies examining police response time have suggested only a moderate correlation between lower response time and higher arrest rate. The time lapse between a criminal incident and the call to police appears to be more critical than the time it takes police to respond to that call. When the incident and the call are concurrent, as in a burglary-in-progress call, there is a strong correlation between low response time and high arrest rate (i.e., burglary-

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\* Peter W. Greenwood and Joan Petersilia, The Criminal Investigation Process; Volume I: Summary and Policy Implications. October 1975.

in-progress calls greatly increase the likelihood of apprehension).\*

- A recent Institute-supported study conducted by the Kansas City Police Department using civilian observers found that prompt citizen reporting is critical to realizing positive outcomes to criminal incidents in terms of arrest and witness availability. The study found that delays in citizen reporting tended to nullify the potential impact of rapid police response.\*\*

Clearly, to make an impact on the burglary rate, the citizenry must be mobilized.

Criminal justice professionals readily and repeatedly admit that, in the absence of citizen assistance, neither more manpower, nor improved technology, nor additional money will enable law enforcement to shoulder the monumental burden of combating crime in America.\*\*\*

Fortunately, the very facts about burglary that can confound police methods make it particularly amenable to citizen prevention. Obviously, only a resident can make certain that his household is secure. Only alert neighbors can recognize suspicious activity at the back door, even when the police cruiser is at the front door. Two other facts about residential burglary suggest that citizen action is an appropriate response. Most victims are unable to provide identifying numbers on stolen property; and most household burglaries occur in daylight hours when it is

\* Police Response Time: Its Determinants and Effects. Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1977. Data from the 1972-73 Kansas City patrol experiment were recycled to shed light on the determinants and effects of response time. Weak positive correlations between response time and arrest rate have been found in a 1966 study of the Los Angeles Police Department (Hubert Hoover Isaacs, for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice) and a limited study in Seattle in 1975.

\*\* Response Time Analysis Study, Kansas City Police Department, 1977, available through the NCJRS loan program.

\*\*\* National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, A Call for Citizen Action: Crime Prevention and the Citizen, April 1974, pp. 1-2.


possible to witness them.\*

The basic notion of citizen crime prevention is that potential victims are in the best position to diminish criminal opportunity, recognize stealth, and minimize their own vulnerability.

## 1.2 The Community Crime Prevention Program in Seattle

In 1972, the City of Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO) surveyed its citizens and found that the national statistics had reached home: the citizens of Seattle were more concerned about burglary than any other crime.

At about the same time, LJPO studies of the incidence and patterns of burglary in Seattle found that:



- In well over one-third of Seattle's reported burglaries, thieves entered through unlocked doors and windows;
- Most victims had not identified their lost property by any means that would discourage burglars from fencing stolen goods and assist in recovering the property;

\* Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, Uniform Crime Reports (1975).

- Most burglaries occurred during waking hours when they could be witnessed by citizens; and
- Traditional police patrol cannot possibly saturate a neighborhood to the extent required to prevent many burglaries.

The Community Crime Prevention Program was initiated as one of two components of a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to the LJPO aimed at developing a comprehensive burglary reduction plan.\*

CCPP concentrates on four principal tactics, each confronting one of the problems identified in the study of burglary patterns:

- 1) To encourage citizens to protect their homes against relatively easy entry by burglars, CCPP provides residential security inspection services. Using a home security checklist, a home service technician accompanies the occupant through his home, checking doors and windows and offering advice for making them more secure. The technician gives the resident a copy of the checklist with his recommendations noted.
- 2) To deter burglars, discourage fencing of property, and assist in returning property to its owners, CCPP provides assistance and equipment for marking personal property. Property identification is usually done during the home security inspection visit. An electric engraving tool is used to mark up to ten items with the owner's driver's license number. Residents are encouraged to continue engraving their property and to display decals warning potential burglars that property has been marked.
- 3) To augment the "range of vision" of traditional police preventive patrol, CCPP organizes neighborhood burglary prevention groups, familiarly known as Block Watches. A Block Watch typically consists of 10 to 15 families

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\* The other component was a demonstration program for the Police Department, using several advances in the collection and storage of physical evidence (fingerprints) and expanding the Department's burglary field investigation capacity.

on a block who are willing to exchange information about their schedules and habits, watch each others' homes, and report suspicious activities to each other and to the police. CCPP considers the Block Watch the citizen's most important weapon against burglary.

- 4) To promote citizen awareness of their role in reducing burglary rates, the program supplies informative materials about burglary and its prevention.

In addition, advisory services are provided on request to communities not targeted for CCPP intensive services. The advisory program makes extensive use of the media, mailers, speaking engagements and other public events and gatherings to encourage homeowners to mark their property, inspect their home security measures, or to organize community block watches under their own initiative.

### 1.3 Special Features

Several features of the Community Crime Prevention Program increase its effectiveness and make it appealing to replicators:

- The principal costs of the program are for personnel. There is no necessity for high overhead, costly equipment, or a long start-up period (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4).
- The techniques of the program are not complicated. They can be easily and inexpensively taught to project personnel (see Chapter 3, Operations).
- CCPP is designed to be flexible, adapting if necessary from neighborhood to neighborhood within one program or from city to city, according to specific needs (see Chapters 3 and 4).
- There are no institutional obstacles to establishing or running the program. With precaution, no legal, political or civic problems are likely (see Chapter 4, section 4.5). The worst a CCPP program can encounter is citizen apathy, while it more than likely

generates a spirit of mutual concern and enthusiasm that may carry over into other citizen initiative projects as well.

- No large investments of either time or money are demanded of citizens, while the possible saving to them in terms of fear and anguish, as well as property loss, are easily understood. Enlisting citizen cooperation is the only absolute requisite to success.

#### 1.4 Results

When CCPP was designed, planners hoped to accomplish two goals: first, to halt or at least slow the increase in residential burglary, and second, to increase the incidence of citizens' reports of burglary in progress. To achieve these objectives, the project set an instrumental goal of enlisting 30 percent of all target households in the selected neighborhoods for each of the three services.

The Seattle program is unique in the degree of rigor with which its accomplishments have been evaluated. Recent surveys have controlled for factors confounding earlier studies and collected victimization data that are considered highly reliable.

In personal interviews, a survey in 1975 collected "pre-project" data on crime for 1974, followed the next year by a wave of interviews that collected "post-project" data for 1975. In addition, LJPO conducted a telephone survey in 1976. Each of these included both project and non-project households. As a result, the impact of CCPP has been carefully measured. Here are the highlights (see Chapter 5 for detailed discussion):

- CCPP is successful in reducing the burglary victimization of the program participants. The victimization surveys reveal a 48 to 61 percent reduction in burglaries of households which have used CCPP services, or approximately four fewer burglaries per 100 households per year.

- The two surveys found no evidence of displacement. The decrease in burglaries of households receiving CCPP services apparently did not produce an increase in burglaries of their non-participating neighbors or in adjacent census tracts not serviced by CCPP.
- Reporting rates for both CCPP members and non-members who reside in CCPP target areas have increased from 51 percent to 76 percent of actual burglaries committed.
- A higher proportion of the calls made to police are burglary-in-progress calls than was the case before the program began. Burglary-in-progress calls as a proportion of all burglary calls to the police from CCPP target neighborhoods increased 27 percent after those neighborhoods received program services.
- The program met or exceeded its original goal of involving at least 30 percent of the households in target areas with each of the three services. In comparison, a national survey of Operation Identification projects reported that only 10 of 65 projects responding had enrolled more than 10 percent of their target area households.\*
- A survey conducted by program staff in late 1975 indicates that an impressive percentage of households acted upon the recommendations of home service technicians. Of residents responding, 39 percent said they had actually made one or more of the suggested improvements to their home security and another 11 percent said they intended to make improvements.

The Community Crime Prevention Program in Seattle is clearly successful in attaining its own standards and in comparison with other burglary prevention projects across the nation. Most of this manual will be devoted to a detailed discussion of factors underlying this success.

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\* National Evaluation Program, Operation Identification Projects, Phase One Report, LEAA. August 1976, p. ix.



## 1.5 Content Guide

To assist other communities in adapting the Seattle approach, the succeeding chapters in this manual discuss the development, operations, and results of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

Chapter 2, Development and Organization. The 1972 analysis of index crimes that was conducted by Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO) is discussed as the basis of criminal justice planning efforts and the concentration on burglary reduction. The need for developing alternative strategies is cited. The chapter also covers project staffing and organization and prospects for future funding.

Chapter 3, Operations. This chapter describes the methodology for service delivery to Seattle residents, the services offered by the program, and a typical block watch organizing meeting.

Chapter 4, Replication. This chapter discusses program features which should be adopted to insure maintaining program effectiveness, demographic factors that affect the applicability of the program to a locale, and alternatives for adopting the Seattle model to another community. Finally, legal considerations and police recommendations are presented.

Chapter 5, Results and Costs. This chapter presents the findings of various evaluations of the Seattle program relating to program impact on burglary rate and the incidence of burglary-in-progress calls as well as the achievements of service goals for block watch organization, property marking, security inspections, and information delivery. A detailed discussion of program costs and efficiency measures is also included.

Chapter 6, Evaluation Guidelines. The final chapter discusses the relative merit of various sources of data and methods for conducting victimization surveys. Techniques for evaluating crime reporting and program operations are also discussed.

Attached as appendices to this manual are various documents used by the Community Crime Prevention Program. Of special interest is Appendix A, the Executive Summary to the project's October, 1976 Policy Development Report.

## Chapter 2: CCPP Development and Organization

### 2.1 Background

Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office (LJPO) is a division of the Office of Policy Planning (OPP) in the Executive Department of Seattle's City Government. (OPP's other responsibilities include physical planning and human resources.) Consistent with its mandate to identify problem areas in the administration of criminal justice and to develop corrective strategies, in 1972 the LJPO undertook a program to prioritize certain index crimes. The method of identifying the priority crimes was not limited to the usual single measure of frequency. Rather a total of three variables were considered:\*

- Frequency of occurrence. Data were taken from the Seattle Police Department's reports of crime incidents.
- Severity and level of public fear and tolerance. This element was added to allow the prioritization plan to weigh an aggravated assault more heavily than a shoplifting incident. Data were collected through interviews with city residents.
- Potential for crime reduction. Priority crimes must also be amenable to prevention strategies. For example, homicide is not a priority crime. Despite the fact that it scores high on other

\* Future prioritization studies will incorporate an assessment of relative threat to the community of offender groups, as measured by recidivism rates.

measures, research indicated that the bulk of homicides occurred between acquaintances and is not particularly amenable to reduction strategies.

The three crimes that emerged from the 1972 study as deserving priority attention were burglary, rape and robbery.

## 2.2 Burglary in Seattle

In 1972 there were 11,339 burglaries (defined as the illegal entrance into a structure for the purpose of committing a theft or other felony) reported in Seattle. While this marked a decrease from 1971, demographic and economic factors led planners to anticipate an increase in 1973 (which in fact occurred). LJPO staff identified the following facts concerning burglary in Seattle (in addition to those discussed in Chapter 1):

- Approximately 75% of all burglaries were residential (rather than commercial) in nature, resulting in property losses exceeding 4 million dollars.
- The majority occurred in single-family dwellings.
- Arrests for 70% of daylight burglaries and 30% of burglaries committed in darkness were of persons under the age of 19.
- Of those entries into dwellings that were locked, the vast majority were accomplished by brute force, not skilled lock-picking.
- The bulk of stolen property was disposed of by direct sale (not through a "fence") to the public.
- Over 90% of burglaries were not witnessed.
- Arrest and/or return of property occurred in fewer than 10% of all cases; but
- In those cases in which there was an arrest and/or return of property, the vast majority were witnessed.

## 2.3 Strategy Development

The results of this analysis convinced planners that strategies limited to typical police department functions would not alone affect the problem. Accordingly, LJPO's grant application to LEAA described a two-part anti-burglary effort, including a police component and CCPF--a project designed to attack the problem through preventive education and citizen action.

The law enforcement component focused on two primary strategies: 1) increased development and use of a single fingerprint system, and 2) expanded burglary detective investigation capability. The third strategy for burglary reduction called for utilization of civilian organizers for "target hardening" residential burglary targets. This third component soon evolved into the Community Crime Prevention Program. Only eight months elapsed between the designation of burglary as a priority crime and the initiation of CCPF operations.

Ensuing CCPF grants were not joint submissions with the police, but their early affiliation was significant because police endorsement is critical for any CCPF-type effort. Unless police assistance is sought from the start, it is possible that the department will perceive the project as a competitive effort--one that inappropriately involves civilians in police work. The best way to avoid the conflict is to heed the advice offered in CCPF's second year grant application: "Define what the police do, and do something else."

Public receptivity to a community crime prevention effort is also highly dependent on active police endorsement. Citizens may view any type of enforcement or anti-crime activity as the exclusive province of law enforcement agencies. Thus, any program that engages in such activity without police support may be viewed with distrust by citizens who fear that it is an anti-police, illegal, or commercial venture. As the Project Director has stated, "not even a neutral stance by the police is sufficient for project survival."

The utility of police collaboration and support is best demonstrated by the diversity and scope of services provided by the Seattle Police to the CCPP:

- The police provide much of the initial training and orientation of new staff and in-service training.
- The police provide equipment and access to sources of equipment such as movie projectors and security hardware.
- The police collect, store, and retrieve data needed by the program to evaluate performance and to educate citizens about local burglary risk; and provide access without charge to card punch and card sort equipment for program use.
- The police respond to citizen inquiries about the authenticity of CCPP field workers (often while the staff member waits at the citizen's front door) and have assisted the program in legal actions against the occasional private burglar alarm or security patrol firm whose salesmen have posed as staff members in order to enter homes to make a sale.
- The police have taken all staff members and many block watch members with them in patrol cars to acquaint them closely with patrol methods.
- The police have assisted CCPP by officially requesting the media to withhold victims' names and addresses; and most importantly,
- The police frequently attend meetings in citizens' homes to organize block watch groups, thus providing not only a great deal of credibility to CCPP staff, but also motivation to participate in CCPP.

Quite clearly, the support of the Seattle Police Department has been a vital factor in CCPP's success. An orientation lecture conducted by a CCPP staff member about the program has become part of the Seattle Police Academy training program. Furthermore, CCPP staff address the police roll calls regularly to keep line officers informed of the project's direction.

## 2.4 Start-Up and Site Selection


Initially, intensive delivery of CCPP services was planned to occur in two of Seattle's eleven police patrol sectors, with selective testing in a third sector of the effects of mass media exposure. The two sectors selected as target areas comprised approximately 27 percent of the city's population. Both sectors had areas with a high incidence of burglary and residents included many lower income families.

After several months of operation, it became obvious that the original goal of delivering services to residents of two sectors in one year was unrealistic in relation to the actual implementation time available and the relatively small project staff. Hence, revisions in delivery goals were made.

Essentially, CCPP decided to provide a systematic, block-by-block service delivery sweep, targeting on single-family and duplex dwellings in neighborhoods with significant levels of burglary. Multiple dwellings were generally excluded since the staff research had indicated that a much higher proportion of burglaries occurred in single-family dwellings. Additional factors were the difficulty of organizing a potentially more transient population in the multiple dwellings and the burden of involving landlords in any security improvements.

The decision to concentrate activities in high risk burglary areas was made not only to provide target hardening where it was most obviously appropriate but also to test and evaluate project methods more effectively.

The process of site selection provided occasion for early contact between the staff and the police and helped to lay the groundwork for the mutual respect and cooperation so necessary to program success. Throughout the project's history, project staff have accompanied police in patrol vehicles through the target area to become familiar with the neighborhoods and police patrol patterns. In this early phase of the program their escorts were the two sector patrol sergeants, both of whom were seasoned patrol veterans, who were somewhat skeptical of civilian involvement in any enforcement-related endeavors.



After surveying the two sectors, staff indicated their census tract preference for program start-up. Their choice was the "toughest" census tract in the sector, the one with the highest burglary and overall crime rate.

Fully expecting their opinions to fall on deaf ears, the patrol sergeants offered their impressions of the selection: "You're crazy." In short, they suggested that as "rookies" project staff should get their "feet wet" in safer, quieter neighborhoods before tackling the tough ones. Not only would they need as much experience and expertise as possible in order to



make an impact on the tougher neighborhoods, but meeting that problem head-on without experience and prior success would be demoralizing to staff and might start the entire effort off on the wrong foot. Somewhat to the sergeants' surprise, the staff accepted their suggestion.

Again, this anecdote illustrates the nature of the project's relationship with the police: Patrol officers of each tract are among the first contacted and their impressions are highly valued. The police and CCPP staff are fully aware that it is not an exercise in courtesy and public relations but rather an expert consultation.


While no hard and fast formula was applied, considerations in selecting sites for service delivery included absolute burglary rates for the past year, a graph of that rate across an eight-year period, the ratio of burglaries to occupied dwelling units, the percentage of single and two-family dwellings and the population turnover rate. Census tracts with relatively and steadily high burglary rates were targeted for CCPP services and, where possible, those areas were matched with control census tracts having comparably high burglary trends.

Now in the fourth operational year, three sectors have been completed, representing roughly 20% of the city.

## 2.5 Organization and Staffing

Currently, CCPP staff consists of the Project Director, six community organizers, four home service technicians, one office manager/data coordinator, one full-time secretary, one half-time secretary and one data collection aide. Five of the community organizers are primarily responsible for organizing new block watches. The sixth has recently become responsible for maintaining existing block watches. The home service technicians provide property marking and home security inspection services. The project's overall organization is illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1  
CCPP Organization



The Project Director, who supervises all project activities and is responsible directly to the LJPO, has been with the project since its inception. Although he was recruited by the LJPO planning staff responsible for the grant application and award, his employment was contingent on the approval of the Seattle Police Department.

In the first year of project operation, there were no home service technicians. Community organizers were responsible for all aspects of service delivery. C.E.T.A. funds, acquired midway through the second year, have allowed CCPP to establish the technician position. Since the two positions involve substantially different roles (service delivery versus community planning and organizing), it was felt important to differentiate responsibilities. Job descriptions for both positions are presented in Appendix B.

No specific academic or vocational background is considered pertinent for CCPP positions. Rather, staff are selected for relevant personal characteristics such as motivation, resourcefulness, flexibility and personal presence. Obviously, personality is a critical factor in a job that requires extensive public interaction. Flexibility in work hours is also important since experience has shown that certain time periods (especially 5-7 p.m. on weekdays) are most productive for contacting residents.

## 2.6 Staff Training

It is not enough to recruit staffers with the requisite personality traits. They then must be trained. All new hires, regardless of staff position, receive the same initial three-day training. This program consists primarily of classroom lectures. Instruction includes an overview of the CCPP's philosophy and ideology, and a discussion of the importance of formal evaluation in the design and operation of the CCPP. Guest speakers from related community agencies, such as Seattle's Rape Reduction Program and the Police Department's Burglary Unit and Community Service Officer Program, also address new employees. Training in the conduct of home security inspections

includes a detailed presentation by the Police Department's Security Unit and the Northwest Locksmith Association. The Home Security Checklist (Appendix C) used by technicians in inspecting participants' households (see section 3.2.3) also serves as an excellent training aid.

A training packet of materials on burglary, the criminal justice system, and project forms and policies is provided in looseleaf form. (A description of the training materials appears as Appendix D.) Finally, orientation includes an all-day retreat, half of which is devoted to simulated field operations (role playing) and half consisting of recreational group activity to build comradeship between old and new staff. At the end of the training program, new staff members must pass a written examination.

In addition to the initial training, all staff members spend at least one day per month in in-service training, which normally consists of familiarization with other related agencies. Guest speakers at in-service training sessions have included representatives from the Washington State Council on Crime and Delinquency, the State Board of Prison Terms and Parole, and the King County Prosecutor's Office. In-service training tailored to specific staff positions continues as on-the-job training.

## 2.7 Institutionalization

Figure 2.1 indicates that CCPP is currently operated through the city's Law and Justice Planning Office. However, 30 July 1977 marks the close of CCPP's federal funding (Chapter 5, Results and Cost, will present a detailed account of funding to date) and the city of Seattle is therefore faced with the question of continuation. With the support of the Mayor's Office, the City Council and the Police Department, there seems little doubt that the program will continue. Furthermore, the City Council, in providing monies for the 1977 General Fund, set aside \$117,653 for Neighborhood Crime Prevention. The actual allocation of these funds will take place in April/May budgetary hearings, and the decision on CCPP's future will be made at that time.

## **Chapter 3: Operations**

Citizens must share the responsibility for prevention of crime--law enforcement agencies, the courts and corrections cannot and should not handle it alone.

--Seattle 2000 Commission Report,  
September 4, 1973

The key to the operations of the Seattle CCPP is saturation. Focusing on the single crime of residential burglary, CCPP staff select a city sector and then methodically cover that area, street by street, neighborhood by neighborhood, until it has been saturated. The result is a continuum of organized and secured households rather than haphazard or isolated pockets of serviced homes.

This chapter discusses the project's methods of neighborhood organization and describes in detail the three primary services offered by the Community Crime Prevention Program--home security checks, property identification, and block watch--and also discusses the program's advisory and maintenance services.

### **3.1 Neighborhood Organization**

#### **3.1.1 Community Contact**

After an area has been targeted to receive CCPP services, the first step in delivering those services involves making contact

with the police and the local civic organizations. Police contact, as noted above, includes riding a few evenings with the police patrol in order to get their impressions of the neighborhood's crime problem and particularly vulnerable areas, as well as suggestions regarding issues that might be of particular concern to the residents. It also provides the staff with an opportunity to become familiar with the general geography of the neighborhood, thus allowing them to discuss problems related to location with the residents.

Local civic groups and church organizations are also contacted. This step enables the staff to take advantage of any strong community ties (when they exist) and channel their energies toward burglary reduction activities. The support lent by such groups can also go a long way toward gaining entry into the homes of their membership. Generally, this support merely leads to an announcement either at meetings or in mailings that the area has been targeted for CCPP involvement and that residents can expect a visit; a very simple but enormously helpful aid. At times, more active involvement may take place. Typically, this would include coordinating speakers and programs of a law enforcement and public involvement nature with CCPP activities, in order to heighten awareness and concern. However, under no circumstances are block watches held at or organized around such meetings. Staff feel that it is critical that block watch meetings focus solely on the CCPP mandate and that they be held on the block.

At the same time that the community is being contacted, the CCPP senior clerk is developing a "community profile" which includes crime data and demographic information about its residents.

### 3.1.2 Resident Contact

The first actual citizen contact occurs by mail. This contact may be made at the same time the community is being "prepped" (as described above), or immediately afterward. Thus, contact occurs either by phone or mailing, and more typically, by both. In either instance it is important to indicate the municipal aegis of the program (by now, most Seattle citizens are aware of its existence) and the fact that it is without charge or commercial

affiliation. The letterhead and envelope logo used in the mailing is conspicuously marked with the City of Seattle's official seal and helps to dispel any doubts regarding the authenticity of its contents.

After being informed that in 1975 one out of every twenty-four homes in Seattle was burglarized, the receiver of the letter is also informed that the city is now providing "three free burglary prevention services" of which he may soon avail himself. The letter describes the three primary services of property identification, home security checks, and neighborhood block watch organizations. Finally, the letter states that CCPP staff will be appearing at their doors in about a week in order to register their participation and answer any questions they may have. The letter bears the signature of each CCPP staff member. (A copy of the letter appears as Appendix E of this manual.) Each resident of the targeted neighborhood receives such a letter.

The next contact phase is the "doorbelling" program. The community organizers canvass the neighborhood as a team. Usually, their work is done in the early evening when most residents are at home. As they progress through the streets, they fill in a log with the house addresses and degree of interest indicated by the residents. That information is later transferred to a master log at headquarters. The log also notes those not at home, and follow-up visits or calls are made to them after the block watch meeting if they do not attend. The initial doorbelling contact lasts about three minutes and reminds, reviews or presents the resident with the mailing. Residents are encouraged to participate in all program services but most importantly a block watch (see Section 3.2.1). As neighbors become interested in a watch, this positive support is mentioned to the next contact.

All field work, starting with the contact phase, is coordinated on a rotating basis by one of the community organizers who serves as Team Coordinator. No group of nine or ten individuals can perform effectively without a coordinator. Normally, the Team Coordinator serves throughout the delivery of service to one or more complete census tracts and then another community organizer rotates into that duty, which demands additional work and planning beyond that required of the other team members. This rotational team leadership is an important factor in the smooth field implementation of the CCPP.

In short, the operating assumption of the CCPP is that a systematic, block-by-block, "sweep" of a target neighborhood is more likely to yield a high quantity and quality of participating citizens. This assumption relies heavily on the professionalism of the project field staff. It must be remembered that while the ultimate acts of crime prevention are borne by the citizen, the organizing responsibility rests with the professional field staff who bear the approval and support of both the city government and police. In addition to the official posture lent by the project's municipal affiliation and the resulting willingness on the part of citizens to allow city organizers into their homes, a professional staff guarantees the full-time commitment necessary to the saturation methods of the project's operations.

It is, of course, unrealistic to expect 100 percent participation in any block or neighborhood. For a variety of reasons including wariness, lack of concern and unavailability, many citizens are unable or unwilling to participate. The project at inception sought to achieve a level of 30 percent participation for each service of all single and two-family households per target area, participation being defined as any household's partaking of at least one of the three primary services. In fact, the program has achieved a minimum of 40 percent participation in target areas and has therefore raised its minimum participation objective to the 40 percent level.

The remainder of this chapter will discuss just what it is that over 40 percent of the contacted households of Seattle are opening their doors to, and how the CCPP staff deliver services.

### 3.2 Primary Services

By far, the most important function of CCPP is to perform the primary services. These include the three main tactics (block watch organizing, household security inspections and property marking) that CCPP uses to help citizens reduce their vulnerability to burglary. These services are delivered in a deliberate way only to target neighborhoods.



Staff time charts for the third year of operations indicate that 90 percent of the staff's time was devoted to primary service delivery. A description of each of the three tactics that comprise the primary services follows.

### 3.2.1 The Block Watch

This is the single most important feature of the Community Crime Prevention Program. All other services are delivered only as a complement to this one indispensable service. The block watch is an organization of a group of neighbors, usually at least ten and no more than 15 neighbors, who are interested in mutual protection against burglary. As the community organizer canvasses a neighborhood, each individual expressing interest in the block watch is asked to host an initial meeting in his or her home. If no host is found but interest exists, the residents are invited to a meeting held in the project's mobile unit. Once a host is found, he or she is asked to invite all the neighbors and is supplied with printed invitations.

Each community organizer averages two block watch meetings per week involving about 10 households each. To prepare for the meeting, the organizer composes packets of handouts for the participants. These packets (an example of which is reproduced in Appendix F of this manual) include the most recent monthly newsletter which contains the following information:

- census tract description and definitions by street boundaries;
- number of burglaries within the tract, during the last month and the same time period the year before; the type of residence burglarized and time of day and week;
- inventory of items stolen;
- entry description, including place and method; and
- a map of the tract with the burglary locations identified.


Also included is a household inventory list for engraving identification, instructions for using the engraving tool, and the home

security checklist (Appendix C). Most important, each member of the block watch is asked to write his or her name, address, and phone number on a blank map of the block prepared in advance by the community organizer. Later, at CCPP headquarters, all members' names, addresses, and telephone numbers are entered onto a consolidated map. Copies are then sent to the block captain for distribution to all block watch members.

The organizing meeting usually begins between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. The organizer introduces himself or herself, reviews the nature of CCPP, and briefly indicates a few facts about burglary in Seattle that are particularly relevant to citizen action--specifically, that the majority of burglaries occur during daylight hours when it is possible for citizens to witness them, and that in 40 percent of Seattle's burglaries entry is gained through open doors and windows. It is obvious, the community organizer explains, that increased police patrol--the traditional response--cannot be expected to make more than a minimal impact on such a situation. The organizer will recount that the chances of a patrol officer detecting a burglary in progress are mathematically slim, and even if so blessed by coincidence, there is little guarantee that it will be recognized as a burglary. How can a patrol officer be expected to know that the person entering the unlocked front door doesn't live there, or isn't a friend or relative? The answer is simple: he can't.

However, neighbors not only stand a better chance of knowing who belongs in the neighborhood, but more important, they are there to see or question those who might not. Thus, properly organized and informed neighbors can effectively combat crime.

It is important to note that the intent of a block watch is to work in cooperation with the police. Under no circumstances is vigilantism or self-help encouraged. Rather, the community organizer discusses in detail the uses of "911," the proper protocol and the need for that protocol. Many times the patrol officers are able to drop in on the block watch meeting and reinforce remarks made concerning law enforcement cooperation. Above all, residents are informed to call the police when suspicious incidents occur. Anyone with a legitimate reason for being in the area will quickly be identified as such and will not be hassled by the police. Of course, the beauty of block



watch is that one alert resident can mean one alert neighborhood in a matter of minutes by means of pyramiding phone calls, easily facilitated by consulting the block watch map (see Appendix G).

Residents are then counseled in some of the methods that burglars might employ--has anyone ever rung your doorbell and then appeared surprised to find you home? Of particular importance, the community organizer discusses some of the measures that are provided in the materials to combat burglaries. The phone, of

course, is a primary method. After calling the police, neighbors should be informed of suspicious activity. Furthermore, unusual activity in a neighbor's house can easily be checked by phone. Other suggestions include exchanging vacation schedules and performing certain safeguards for those neighbors on vacation, such as rotating the lights that are on, mowing the lawn, collecting the mail and papers, using the driveway and filling the trash cans.

The other component of the block watch is the demonstration of security measures by the technician. First, the technician briefly describes the contents of the safety checklist and the use of the engraving tool. The technician then schedules times for its use and encourages the block watch to purchase one of its own for future use. The demonstration then includes types and uses of various locks, reinforcement techniques and the particular security weaknesses of certain kinds of doors and windows.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the participants elect a block watch captain who becomes the neighborhood's liaison between the watch participants and CCPP.

### **3.2.2 Property Marking**

Available to each block watch is an engraving instrument for marking property and a supply of window decals to warn intruders that property is marked. Indelibly marked property has a significantly diminished value in the stolen goods market, and provides a method for identification and reclamation should the house be burglarized. Although staff technicians performed the marking tasks in the first three years of operations, they now encourage the participants to mark their own. This arrangement not only allows the technicians to be available for more inspections and demonstrations but also bolsters participation by immediately involving the neighborhood in a positive anti-burglary activity that combines individual initiative--the actual engraving--with group activity. The latter is encouraged by leaving each block watch with an engraving tool for a two-week period. The tool is accompanied with a sign-up sheet and neighbors are asked to use the tool during their chosen time and then pass it on to the next household on the list. However, staff are quick

to point out that during the start-up phase it was important that technicians do the engraving in order to build up project goodwill and to develop an expertise in problems encountered in the "how's" and "where to's" of engraving. Of course, for those who are unable, the technicians continue to perform the engraving, and samples of all engraving are inspected during the home inspection visit.

The suggested identifying mark for engraving property in Seattle is a Washington State driver's license number. This is far superior (as would be any state driver's license number) to other identifiers because of the ease by which police can trace the number through the Department of Motor Vehicles. (Through the computerized system, police in Seattle can identify the owner within two minutes, compared to three months for Social Security numbers.)

It should also be noted that the engraving tool is available to neighborhood residents who do not participate in the block watch but who do desire the engraving service. In such instances, the staff encourages that household to borrow the engraver from one of the block watch participants in hopes that whatever reservation existed to prevent initial involvement might disappear when acquainted with a watch member. However, households may subscribe to any or all of the primary services. In fact, some families have already engraved their own property without project impetus (although unfortunately most such instances involve the use of Social Security numbers) and desire to have only the security inspection, which is detailed below.

### 3.2.3 Home Security Inspection

During the weeks following the block watch meeting, and after sufficient time has elapsed for residents to use the engraver and implement any other security measures that were discussed, the technician visits the participant's home. The technician and the homeowner spend about 10 minutes walking methodically through and around the outside of the home, discussing weaknesses observed and options for correcting those weaknesses. To insure that items are not overlooked during the inspection, the technician uses a Home Security Checklist (Appendix C), which lists the

most common burglary vulnerabilities along with recommendations (usually including illustrations) for specific remedial actions.

A copy of the Checklist with recommendations noted is left with the resident. The list familiarizes the homeowner with basic terminology of security hardware and can be carried to the locksmith's shop to help the homeowner describe precisely what he needs to secure his home. As was the case with the property marking, the technicians will assist those unable to implement changes themselves.

Finally, after inspection and engraving, decals such as the one shown on the next page are placed on windowed entries.\* It is important to note that the decals are not available without inspection, in order to avoid the practice of using only decals which may cease to act as a deterrent to potential burglars if property is not, in fact, marked.


### 3.3 Maintenance Services

Originally, the primary technique for maintaining block watch activities and interest during the first two and one-half years of project operation was through the distribution of the project's newsletter. Block watch captains were expected to deliver the newsletters personally to each member of the block watch and during that contact, keep interest in the block watch alive. Distribution of the newsletter was generally not sufficient to keep the block watches alive, however, and many block captains neglected to deliver the newsletters or had their children drop them off on the neighbors' porches.

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\* The decals such as the one shown on the next page were developed by the Minnesota Crime Watch Program, and were reproduced by the Washington State Attorney General's Office with their consent. Inquiries concerning the Minnesota program and/or the decals should be directed to Judge Ose, Minnesota Crime Watch, 444 Lafayette Road, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101.

# WARNING



## OPERATION I.D.

All items of value on these premises have been marked for ready identification by Law Enforcement Agencies.

In response to this problem, the program developed a maintenance component. Currently 4 of the 6 project organizers devote approximately 25 percent of their time to the maintenance service while one other organizer spends 80 percent of his or her time on maintenance activities.

The maintenance service is a specialized extension of the initial neighborhood anti-burglary campaign (the "primary service") and is designed to sustain and rejuvenate the burglary awareness and countermeasures that were brought about by the primary service. The purpose of the maintenance service is to prolong the impact of block watch groups in reducing residential burglary.

Operationally, maintenance service is principally a reapplication of the earlier primary service sweep at a fixed time interval. It provides periodic opportunities for staff and block watch members to (1) reinforce the anti-burglary focus of the block watch, (2) recognize the contributions of block watch members toward reducing residential burglary, and (3) replace block watch captains who, for whatever reason, have ceased to serve effectively as neighborhood coordinators. The service consists of four sustenance operations:

- (1) Continuously identifying block captains who are no longer effective and finding replacements for them;
- (2) Conducting meetings for up to 60 adjacent block captains within six months after their community has been first organized into block watches;
- (3) Thereafter, conducting a meeting for all residents of those same captains' areas annually; and
- (4) Conducting a continuing series of newsletter features, public events, awards presentations, and news media coverage city-wide to promote the block watch concept.

### 3.4 Advisory Service

In order for the project to respond to a heavy demand for CCPP services in non-target neighborhoods when the program began, advisory services were offered. This was necessary to insulate and sustain the project's systematic operation. At that time, one community organizer was assigned to this function, which consisted primarily of training community volunteers to introduce and establish CCPP-type activities among their neighbors.

Now that CCPP is being institutionalized in the City of Seattle, however, project planners anticipate that intensive CCPP services will be offered to all areas of the city on a schedule. Accordingly, the advisory services have been curtailed to primarily a series of speaking engagements at local clubs and gatherings.



### 3.5 Summary

In sum, the Community Crime Prevention Program benefits from a clear and relatively singular focus. The scope is limited to the prevention of one crime, residential burglary. The strategy relies on three tactics, two of which (the household security inspection and property marking services), are secondary to the block watch. The method of primary service delivery is to select a target neighborhood and saturate it. Finally, project staff have developed two other program components, maintenance and advisory services. The former is designed to insure the maintenance of the block watch organizations developed by project staff, and the latter to encourage community residents to organize CCPP-type activities under their own initiative.

## Chapter 4: Replication

### 4.1 Needs Assessment

Any community considering adopting this program should have already identified one major need: a solution to a high or increasing rate of residential burglary. There are no easy formulae for determining which community will find the CCPP solution most effective, or whether, and how, to adapt the Seattle model to local conditions. Two facts support the value of CCPP for nearly every community: the universality of the problem and the simplicity of the response.

The following discussions cite demographic factors which should be considered by planners in assessing the applicability of CCPP to their community, and possibilities for alternative strategies based on the CCPP experience in Seattle.

#### 4.1.1 Demographic Factors in Replicability

- Type of Burglar. Victimization data revealed that reduced burglary rates in treated neighborhoods in Seattle are not accompanied by higher rates in surrounding areas, in other words, that there is no displacement of crime (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). These findings indicate that the thief deterred by CCPP is the relatively amateur, local burglar who capitalizes on, rather than creates, criminal opportunity. It stands to reason, then, that the program would be most effective in reducing the crime rate where there is a high proportion of residential burglary of this type. This feature, among others which make the crime susceptible to citizen action (see Section 2.2), describes

the great proportion of residential burglary in nearly all urban residential centers.


- Type of Housing. It has been Seattle's experience that the model of primary service delivery through neighborhood saturation is best limited to single-family or duplex houses. Previous attempts at block watch organization had not proven effective among residents of multiple family dwellings. In addition, home security inspections are neither practical nor meaningful to a tenant on any but the ground floor of most apartment buildings, and even then, security improvements must be approved in advance by the landlord.

- Population Density. In areas where houses are isolated or set apart, the value of block watch in producing witnesses or watching property is diminished.

- Residential Turnover is an additional demographic factor bearing on program effectiveness. To the extent that program success depends on maintenance of block watches and personal property marking, program effects would be undermined by high residency turnover. Moreover, neighborhoods characterized by high transiency may be expected also to have weak indications of local organization and resident interaction, making them less amenable to community organization.

- Homogeneity/Heterogeneity. A neighborhood with existing lines of communication and interaction will be easier to organize for block watch activity and will be more receptive to saturation. It will require more effort, but can still be worthwhile, to pursue saturation methods in a target area which is heterogeneous and where residents have previously been socially isolated.

- Competition. Obviously, the program will be less effective if it duplicates the efforts of an already operating program. Where a more limited program, such as Operation ID, or more fragmented programs already exist, planners should investigate the possibility of cooperative effort. Often, however, competition takes the form of neighborhood tradition (as in Boston's North End, a tightly knit ethnic neighborhood with a low crime



rate) or in other self-protective measures, such as the security equipment used in wealthy neighborhoods.

Considering these factors, there are two types of residential areas which are unlikely to benefit from CCPP:

- High Income Neighborhoods. In a suburban setting, low population density and social norms may make block watch organization impractical as well as uncongenial. In addition, residents tend to rely on their own household security equipment for target hardening. Moreover, burglars are much more likely to be skilled rather than local youthful amateurs, and are undeterred by locked doors.

In an urban setting, high income populations may be more dense but residents tend still to take their own measures of self protection, described by Jane Jacobs. "In some rich city neighborhoods, where there is little do-it-yourself surveillance. . . street watchers are hired. . . . A network of doormen and superintendents, of delivery boys and nursemaids, a form of hired neighborhood, keeps the street supplied with eyes."\*

The only facet of CCPP that would lend itself to high income neighborhoods is property identification, and there are at least 100 such programs in operation nationally, limited to this tactic. In making such a program available to high income populations, an advisory model may suffice, enlisting interest through localized advertising, for example, and supplying equipment on request.

- Rural Areas. Rural populations would be less likely to benefit from CCPP. Block watch activities cannot be as fruitful where there is lower population density and houses are isolated.

#### 4.1.2 Alternative Strategy Development

Because CCPP is an experimental, demonstration program, evaluators have investigated alternative strategies and modifications to the model being implemented in Seattle. These studies are well documented (see discussion in Appendix A) and will be of interest to planners considering replication. Alternatives explored included moderate to massive expansion of effort through additional staff (either hired or volunteer), other deployment of present staff, accelerating the time for serving a given geographic area, and changing tactics from saturation to mass media recruitment. For Seattle, alternatives to their current level and focus of activity appear to be less cost-beneficial than present methods.

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\* Op. cit., pp. 39-40.

However, the fact that Seattle has found one formula effective should not discourage adaptation of the program by other communities. CCPP is designed to have considerable flexibility and other communities can tailor the program to their own circumstances.

#### **4.1.3 Start-Up Considerations**

The impetus for initiating a Community Crime Prevention Program can come from anywhere in a community--citizen groups or governmental agency. The program might be started or operated by ongoing citizens' groups such as the League of Women Voters, the Chamber of Commerce, or Rotary Club. However, while any group can start or run the program, it is advisable to make the project an independent operation and not part of a broader organization. The Seattle staff has even rejected invitations to have orientation meetings held in conjunction with church or school affairs, to avoid diluting the impact of their message by allowing participants' attention to be divided.

Similarly, CCPP advises avoiding political alignments. Local politicians may cast longing glances at the grassroots community organization being assembled and the growing list of names of active residents. A program director may be tempted to use these political assets to launch his or her own electoral career. But if the program becomes aligned with any political organization or candidate, its effectiveness will be reduced, being vulnerable at the outset to political prejudice and losing the advantages of police and municipal endorsement. (It should be noted that once CCPP is fully institutionalized in Seattle, a steering committee will be created to diversify any political leanings and to maintain programmatic oversight.)

#### **4.2 Key Program Factors**

Although adaptation is to be encouraged, the special features which define the Seattle program warrant careful consideration in evaluating the available alternatives to meet local needs.

#### 4.2.1 Target Selection and Saturation

The program's basic approach is to select a target area on which to focus and then to provide a battery of program services. The tactics and efficacy of the saturation approach have been discussed in Chapter 3. Again, this tactic relies on implementing a program very systematically, block-by-block whenever possible, with a maximum of staff contact with residents.


While there are cheaper and faster ways to cover a city with antiburglary information and services, none can stimulate the necessary interaction or participation achieved through personal contact with a competent staff person. Other programs operating nationally that have attempted tasks similar to CCPP are able to cover a larger area more quickly but cannot claim the high levels of participation attained by CCPP.

#### 4.2.2 Primary Service Delivery

Primary Service includes block watch organization, home security inspections and property marking. A basic principle of CCPP is to focus only on residential burglary, and to limit activities to the three primary services in target areas. In the third year, nine of the ten field staff spent 90 percent of their time rendering primary services.

The Block Watch is the most fundamental feature of Community Crime Prevention, and all other services are secondary to organization of block watches. They must have a very localized focus to engender and sustain daily mutual protective concern among households; therefore, in Seattle the number of households in a given block watch averages about fifteen. This limit also promotes a sense of unity and group norm-setting which is considered basic.

Maintenance Service is essential to sustain participation in block watch. Follow-up activities are considered so important that CCPP assigns the equivalent of at least one full-time staff



member to this task. Obviously, specific maintenance activities such as newsletters would be adapted to the program setting.

Advisory Service includes efforts to supply information to non-target areas or to service such areas on request. Its significance is that it enables CCPP to disseminate general anti-burglary information as a separate function, without diluting its saturation efforts in target neighborhoods.



It should be noted, however, that advisory services are strictly peripheral to the Community Crime Prevention Program. Although this component of CCPP has not been evaluated to the same extent as the primary services, project planners point out that similar, solely advisory programs have been attempted in Seattle and elsewhere with little success. In contrast, rigorous research design and methodology have shown that communities participating in CCPP's primary service sweep do experience fewer residential burglaries.

#### 4.2.3 Staffing

Actual staffing and responsibilities are discussed in Chapter Two. The effectiveness of staff is not based on prior experience or education but on personal characteristics and acquired skill. The success of the program depends on the staff members' ability to win the confidence of residents and motivate them to participate in the program. Personal presence, motivation, resourcefulness and dedication are invaluable. Tolerance of frustration is crucial. The community organizers should be flexible in work schedules since residents are most receptive to contact between 10:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. and Saturdays. They must also be able to work well together, since experience indicates that teams are most productive in working a neighborhood, and the team members are of equal rank.

#### 4.2.4 The Civilian Nature of the Program

Planners rejected the idea of administering CCPP under the Seattle Police Department. There are advantages to having the program staffed by civilians. They are much less costly than sworn police personnel. Police departments, where rules are necessarily strict and structured, may lack the flexibility essential to running CCPP. Citizens probably feel more comfortable speaking with other civilians in discussing crime and home security improvements, and in supplying information for community profiles.

Evidence suggests the civilian nature of the program increases the likelihood of citizen participation and compliance. A survey

of a random sample of inspected neighborhoods explored whether citizen compliance with recommendations for improved security was as low in Seattle as the five percent compliance reported in Alameda, California, where law enforcement personnel had conducted security inspections. Of the sample, 40 percent had complied with or implemented recommendations made at the time of the inspections--despite obstacles to change like expense and aesthetic damage. (See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3.)

It is a tenet of CAPP that equipment (for example, electric property engravers) is used by citizens in direct relation to their own investment in time or money. While many other projects purchase large quantities of equipment which is then made available to the public, the CAPP purchases the minimum amount of equipment needed to loan to block watch groups directly, and strongly encourages each member household to donate approximately 50 cents toward the purchase of an engraver. Evidence from the city's prior programs and other cities suggests that mass, free availability of such equipment does not necessarily draw much interest in the use of that equipment.

#### 4.2.5 Police Relations

A police department may react to the program with the feeling that crime prevention is properly part of the police function, particularly if the department has a burglary prevention unit. Police may feel that civilian program workers are in effect reducing the number of jobs for sworn officers. Alternately, some police may resent having to answer more calls for service from areas where block watches have heightened citizen sensitivity.

In Seattle, however, the police have become an advocate for, and ally of, the program. Their assistance in preliminary planning stages, block watch organization, input into community profiles and attendance at block watch meetings have been indispensable. Their support has given the program credibility and stature in the community, promoting citizen trust and interest. Clearly, a high priority must be given to enlisting the assistance and support of local law enforcement agencies.



*CCPP staff and police officers work together – a key to success.*

#### 4.3 Legal Considerations

The following policies are recommended to safeguard the program legally and protect the staff and the citizenry.

### 4.3.1 Precaution Against Fraud

The Seattle experience reveals that both legitimate business and criminal interests may attempt to capitalize on the program's success. Businesses selling security equipment can try to identify with the project in advertising campaigns. Other "organizations" may try to enlist neighborhoods in imitation "block watches," or simply offer protection for a fee. Of course, criminals may try to pose as CCPP staff to gain entry. Citizens should be told not to admit "inspectors" without a police-supplied photo ID. They should be warned of potential fraud at every opportunity and kept abreast of any recent fraudulent activities. Media campaigns should emphasize that participation costs nothing and that CCPP endorses no products.

### 4.3.2 Staff Felony Check


With such great numbers of households being entered by CCPP staff in the course of the program, it is statistically probable that burglaries will occur in a few of them within a short time of the visit of project personnel. The Seattle program has made the policy decision that all staff except those limited to office work would have to consent to having a felony records check done by the Seattle Police Department. This practice protects the project from real or contrived disaster and increases police support by avoiding charges that burglars could be using the project to gain information.

### 4.3.3 Work Neighborhoods in Teams

Another policy developed to protect the project is that, whenever possible, staff members should move through the neighborhood as a team in order to maintain visual contact every few minutes, particularly when first doorbelling a new target area. Also, staff members do not usually enter homes alone at the time of the first contact, especially if the circumstances would increase the chance of a civil suit or criminal charge for alleged misconduct on the part of the staff member. This policy

also serves to protect staff who may be exposed to physical risks by working in high crime areas and who, in covering a large number of households, might encounter difficult residents on occasion.

In short, with the precautions and methodical approach taken by the Seattle project, the CCPP model can be an effective means of reducing residential burglary in a variety of settings.



## Chapter 5: Results and Costs

The Seattle program is unique in the degree of rigor with which its accomplishments have been evaluated. The Law and Justice Planning Office of the City of Seattle has conducted an intensive series of studies to explore both the operations and impact of the CCPP. This chapter draws from these studies to report on the program's successes in reducing burglaries, increasing burglary-in-progress calls, and meeting service objectives. The costs of operating the Community Crime Prevention Program are discussed at the end of this chapter.

### 5.1 Reduction of Burglary

On the surface, it would appear to be simple to assess the impact of the Community Crime Prevention Program upon burglary. A researcher would simply need to check police records of burglaries before and after the program delivered services to an area and see if the number of burglaries was reduced. This approach is severely flawed, however, because in addition to reducing burglaries the program has a second goal of increasing citizen reporting of burglaries to the police. Victimization surveys show that only about half of the burglaries committed are actually reported to the police, due to citizen apathy or belief that the police cannot help anyway. Program success in increasing citizen reporting of burglaries could mask its crime reduction impact and might even produce an increase rather than decrease in burglary reports in neighborhoods receiving the services of the CCPP. Since the program goals have opposite effects on police burglary data, an independent source of data is needed to assess the program's impact on burglary. Victimization surveys provide that source, and both telephone and door-to-door surveys of citizens have been conducted to evaluate CCPP. In these surveys, which included both program

participants and non-participants, respondents were asked whether they have been burglarized, and if so, whether they reported the burglary to the police.

### The SEA-KING Victimization Survey

This survey was carefully designed as a rigorous measurement of the impact of the CCPP. The survey was conducted in five Seattle census tracts (four in West Seattle and one in the Green Lake area of Seattle). The first survey was conducted in mid-1975 and dealt with crime victimization during 1974. To collect these pre-project data 1,474 residences were surveyed. The second survey was conducted in mid-1976 and dealt with crime occurring in 1975. Included in this "post-project" survey were 1,216 residences. Drawing from all census tracts, it included residences randomly selected from among those known to have received CCPP services, and an approximately equal number of residences that had not received project services. This survey has a number of features which make it a rigorous evaluation of the CCPP program:

- Project tracts were selected randomly rather than for high crime rates. The statistical phenomenon of regression toward the mean which is typically expected when extremes (here, unusually high crime rate areas) are the focus of study is avoided since project tracts had relatively low pre-project burglary rates. A "spontaneous" reduction in burglary in any one of these tracts independent of the project's impact is not to be expected.
- Data were collected for both program and non-program participants on a comparable pre-post basis, allowing an assessment of pre-treatment burglary rates of the two groups and an estimate of general decreases in the burglary rate.
- Data were collected by researchers independent of the project, reducing the likelihood of unintentional biases.
- The use of adjacent census tracts as comparison groups enabled an assessment of displacement of burglary to adjoining census tracts. Many studies of community crime prevention programs have failed to attempt to

study displacement of burglaries. These particular comparison tracts are especially well suited for studying displacement because they are also bordered by Puget Sound, reducing the possibilities for displacement to be distributed to other (non-comparison) adjacent census tracts.

- Artifacts due to highly victimized individuals moving out of the target area between pre- and post-surveys were controlled by inclusion of both treated and untreated residences.
- Additional police activities did not occur in project tracts. Often evaluations of the impact of community crime prevention programs are confounded because cities develop coordinated programs for crime reduction providing both increased police services and other community crime program services to an area simultaneously. The problems in disentangling the individual effects of the police and the community crime prevention program are obvious and usually insurmountable.
- Victimization data rather than the less reliable police reporting data were used, as was noted earlier.

Table 5.1 presents a summary of the results of the SEA-KING victimization survey. Highlights of the findings are the following:

#### Burglary Rates

- Within experimental tracts pre-treatment burglary rates of the CCPP-treated homes and non-treated homes were virtually identical (6.18 percent vs. 6.45 percent, [ $x^2 = .03$ ,  $df = 1$ ],  $p = .86$ ).
- A comparison of the post-treatment data for CCPP and non-CCPP residences within experimental tracts shows a statistically significant lower burglary rate for CCPP participants (2.43 percent vs. 5.65 percent, [ $z = 1.818$ ],  $p = .03$ , one tailed test). The reduction in burglary in CCPP residences was 61 percent (from 6.18 to 2.43).
- A marginally significant overall reduction in burglary rate occurred within the experimental tracts when CCPP



Table 5.1--SEA-KING Victimization Data

Area	Burglary Victimization per 12 Months				
	Pre-Treatment (Jan.-Dec., 1974)				
	Total	Not Burglarized	Burglarized <sup>1</sup>	Reported	
Yes				No	
<u>Control</u> (federal tract 96 and 105)	575	515	60 (10.43%)	28 (47%)	32
<u>Experimental</u> (federal tract 97 and 98)					
--CCPP:	356	334	22 ( 6.18%)	15 (68%)	7
--Non-CCPP:	543	508	35 ( 6.45%)	14 (40%)	21
Total	899	842	57 ( 6.34%)	29 (51%)	28
	Post-Treatment (Jan.-Dec., 1975)				
<u>Control</u> (federal tract 96 and 105)	442	400	42 ( 9.95%)	24 (57%)	18
<u>Experimental</u> (federal tract 97 and 98)					
--CCPP:	247	241	6 ( 2.43%)	6(100%)	0 <sup>2</sup>
--Non-CCPP:	248	234	14 ( 5.65%)	7 (64%)	4 <sup>2</sup>
Total	495	475	20 ( 4.04%)	13 (76%)	4 <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Burglarized one or more times.

<sup>2</sup> Does not include three cases where reporting data were unknown.

residences and non-CCPP residences were combined (6.34 percent in 1974 vs. 4.04 percent in 1975, [ $x^2 = 3.24$ ,  $df = 1$ ],  $p = .07$ ).

- Within adjacent control tracts pre-treatment burglary rates were higher than those in experimental tracts (10.43 percent vs. 6.34 percent, [ $x^2 = 8.04$ ,  $df = 1$ ],  $p = .01$ ).
- Control tract burglary rates were not significantly different between 1974 and 1975 (10.43 percent vs. 9.95 percent,  $p = .85$ ).

#### Reporting Rates

- Reporting rates did not differ significantly between experimental and control tracts in the pre-treatment period, or between 1974 and 1975 for control tracts. Reporting rates between 1974 and 1975 increased at a marginally significant level for experimental tracts (50.9 percent vs. 76.5 percent,  $p = .06$ ).
- Within experimental tracts pre-treatment reporting rates differed significantly between CCPP participants and non-participants (68 percent vs. 40 percent,  $p < .05$ ). A statistically valid comparison of post-treatment reporting rates for the CCPP and non-CCPP groups was not possible due to the small number of burglary cases. All of the six burglaries to CCPP residences were reported, however.

#### Burglary Displacement

- Data from the Sea-King survey do not support the hypothesis that deterred burglaries are displaced to non-CCPP residences. It might be expected that non-CCPP residences in the same census tract as CCPP residences would become the most likely target of displaced burglaries. These census tracts showed a 12 percent decline in burglary, however (from 6.45 percent to 5.65 percent). Burglary rates in the adjacent census tracts also declined by 5 percent (from 10.43 percent to 9.95 percent). These data are not conclusive, but suggest that displacement is not occurring. These

decreases compare to a 61 percent decline in burglary in treated residences.

### The LJPO Telephone Survey

A telephone survey was conducted by the Law and Justice Planning Office to supplement the SEA-KING study. This survey was conducted in August and September, 1976 and included victimization data for the preceding six months from both project and non-project residents in five census tracts plus an additional 790 households city-wide.\* A total of 1,970 CCPP members and 1,322 non-CCPP members responded to the survey. The five tracts were chosen on the basis of being recently treated (having been completed no more than 18 months, nor less than six months prior to August, 1976) and having met CCPP criteria for successful treatment (i.e., 30 percent or more of the single and duplex residences received burglary reduction services).

Table 5.2 presents a summary of the results of the LJPO telephone survey. This survey provided valuable supplementary information to that of the SEA-KING survey because the latter survey included only 247 CCPP participants, and 248 CCPP "refusers" in experimental tracts in the post survey. The telephone survey covered the two SEA-KING experimental tracts plus three additional census tracts. As was noted above, data in the LJPO telephone survey were collected for a six month period. Highlights of the LJPO survey findings follow:

#### Burglary Rates

- LJPO survey data indicated a lower level of burglary for CCPP members (5 percent for six months) compared to non-CCPP members (6.1 percent), but this difference is not statistically significant.
- When LJPO data were combined with SEA-KING post-

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\* Data on the city-wide survey are not presented in the LJPO report.

Table 5.2--LJPO Telephone Survey

Census Tract	Date Completed	Residential Burglary Rate for Preceding 6 Months at Time of Call									
		CCPP Members					Non-CCPP Members				
		No Burglary	Burglary	Reported <sup>2</sup>	Not Reported	No Burglary	Burglary	Reported <sup>2</sup>	Not Reported		
87	5/75	177	12 6.4%	8 67%	4	143	9 5.9%	5 56%	4		
89	7/75	335	23 6.4%	15 65%	8	176	20 10.2%	19 95%	1		
95	12/75	424	29 6.4%	22 76%	7	370	36 8.9%	28 76%	9		
97	9/75	445	13 2.8%	8 67%	4	251	9 3.5%	7 100%	0		
98	4/75	490	22 4.3%	16 76%	5	302	6 2.0%	4 67%	2		
Total		1871	99 5.0%	69 71%	28	1242	30 6.1%	63 80%	16		

<sup>1</sup> Federal census tracts.

<sup>2</sup> Totals of "reported" and "not reported" may not add up to total "burglary" because, in some cases, respondents were not sure. [Tract 95 may contain a numerical error of one or two cases.]

53

Combined SEA-KING Post- and LJPO Telephone  
Victimization Survey Data

	Total Interviewed	No Burglary	Burglary	Reported	Not Reported
CCPP	2,217	2,013	204 9.2%	144 72%	56 28%
Non-CCPP	1,570	1,396	174 11.1%	140 83%	29 17%
Total	3,787	3,409	378 10.0%	284 77%	85 23%

treatment data,\* a significantly lower burglary rate was found for CCPP participants compared to non-CCPP residences (9.2 percent vs. 11.1 percent,  $p < .05$ , one-tailed test).

- Unexpectedly non-CCPP participants had a significantly higher reporting rate than CCPP members for the combined LJPO and SEA-KING survey data (83 percent vs. 72 percent,  $x^2 = 6.07$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .01$ ). These non-CCPP participants lived in CCPP treated census tracts and may have increased their burglary reporting due to their awareness of the project's activities. As was seen in the SEA-KING data, individuals in control census tracts have particularly low reporting rates (47 percent).

#### Length of Time of Project Impact

- LJPO survey data allow for an estimation of the duration of project effects, since various tracts surveyed had received services at different periods in time. Tracts served at periods of 14, 12, and 9 months prior to the survey showed significant differences between CCPP and non-CCPP residences with CCPP residences having lower burglary rates. Tracts served 17 and 18 months prior to the survey did not show a significant difference between CCPP and non-CCPP residences, and CCPP members were burglarized at a slightly higher rate than non-CCPP members (4.9 percent vs. 3.3 percent). Thus, the LJPO researcher concluded that project effects last from 12 to 18 months and stated that "while not significant, (data) could possibly suggest that with the passage of time, CCPP members begin to become burglary-prone and that some sort of retreatment may be necessary." The researcher stresses that this is only a tentative suggestion.

In conclusion, the CCPP is apparently successful in reducing the burglary victimization of its participants. The two surveys discussed, plus an earlier, more limited survey conducted by the project support this conclusion. As has been noted, alternative explanations for the results can never be totally ruled out, but the present data are strongly supportive of the program.

\* Data were adjusted to be comparable for a one-year at risk period.

## 5.2 Burglary-in-Progress Calls

As was discussed above, the Community Crime Prevention Program was expected to result in increased numbers of burglary-in-progress calls. In order to assess this impact, the Law and Justice Planning Office collected data on burglary-in-progress calls using the police department's computerized dispatch records. Areas treated by the CCPP were compared to non-CCPP areas. A number of problems occurred with these comparisons because the dispatch system uses car beats rather than census tracts to record location and the two units are not comparable. Appendix H provides a summary of the burglary-in-progress call data. Highlights of the data include the following:

- A significant increase in the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls to all burglary calls in treated car beats was observed (9.1 percent pre- vs. 11.6 percent post-program,  $p < .05$ ). No significant difference in non-treated car beats was observed (8.5 percent pre- vs. 8.8 percent post-program).
- Data support the assertion that the calls are of high quality, since arrests resulting from the calls increased slightly (from 17.5 percent to 19.2 percent), and the amount of suspect descriptive information also increased non-significantly from 60.5 percent to 65.6 percent.

## 5.3 Service Goals

The Community Crime Prevention Program set the following goals for its operations:

- form neighborhood block watch groups in 30 percent of all occupied single family and duplex dwellings in test communities;
- complete the marking of property for identification in 30 percent of all target households;
- complete security inspections in 30 percent of all target households;

- provide at least 70 percent of all target households with information about burglary and ways to reduce it;
- outside the test communities, on request, provide all possible aid regarding burglary reduction.

### Summary

The Law and Justice Planning Office has collected a great deal of additional data regarding the Community Crime Prevention Program. A number of general conclusions regarding the program can be drawn:

- The CCPP is apparently successful in reducing the burglary victimization of its participants. All three victimization surveys support this conclusion. The SEA-KING survey helps to rule out alternative explanations associated with the earlier survey including regression to the mean, atypical burglary levels of participants in the pre-treatment period, covarying increases in police activity, displacement, general trends toward burglary reduction, and potential biases in data collection due to project control of the survey. As was noted above and is also mentioned in Appendix A, alternative explanations can never be totally ruled out. The present data are strongly supportive of the program, however.
- The CCPP influence apparently lasts from 12-18 months.
- Reporting rates for both CCPP members and non-members have tended to increase in treated areas.
- Burglary-in-progress calls as a proportion of all burglary calls to police have increased significantly in treated areas and their quality is relatively high as measured by presentation of suspect information and the occurrence of subsequent arrests.
- Police report data are difficult to interpret due to variations in reporting rates.

## Aid to Non-Target Communities

This objective differs from the others in that a specific quantitative goal is not specified but rather "all possible aid" is prescribed. Project literature cites the program's numerous activities to assist non-test communities early in the program's development. One of the community organizers on the staff had the full time responsibility of assisting communities on request. He was involved in a range of activities, helping citizens to establish block watches, mark property, and learn about strategies of burglary prevention. The community organizer used a variety of techniques to encourage burglary prevention, including talks to civic organizations and schools. Project literature provides a detailed account of collateral contacts of the program, miscellaneous speaking engagements and community organization activities.

### 5.4 Costs

The Community Crime Prevention Program began operations in 1973 with a staff of eight, five of whom were field representatives. In mid-1975, the federal Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) went into effect, distributing block funds to cities across the country to be used to provide jobs for the previously unemployed. In Seattle, nine CETA employees were hired by CCPP, with a supplemental LEAA grant obtained to cover related costs of the additional personnel. After three months, as of November 1975, the city discovered that it had overcommitted its CETA allocation, and CCPP had to reduce its CETA positions to seven. As of April 1976, the program had one director, ten field staff, and two-and-a-half full time equivalent office staff. In addition, one person is retained on a consultant basis to aid in data collection for evaluation purposes, and thus is probably best excluded from the program budget for cost-benefit calculation purposes. As Table 5.3 shows, the total program budget is currently about \$250,000 annually.

There are at least two ways to try to assess the "efficiency" of the program in dollar terms. One is to calculate the unit costs of services provided; the other, to try to relate the program's costs to its crime reduction impact. Both methods are somewhat imprecise.



Table 5.3

	<u>8/73-7/74</u> <u>FIRST YEAR</u>	<u>8/74-7/75</u> <u>SECOND YEAR</u>	<u>8/75-7/76</u> <u>THIRD YEAR<sup>2</sup></u>
<u>PERSONNEL</u>			
Project Director	\$ 18,000	\$ 18,000	\$ 20,909
Community Organizers	54,000(5)	59,500(5)	72,704(6)
Home Service Technicians	--	--	38,592(4)
Data Coordinator	8,000	9,501	10,986
Secretary (full-time)	6,740	--	8,000
Clerk (half-time)	--	3,739	4,244
Fringe Benefits	<u>11,228</u>	<u>11,796</u>	<u>31,087</u>
Subtotal	97,968	102,536	186,522
<u>OTHER SERVICES</u>			
Community Organizing Assistance	1,844	3,000	--
<u>NON-PERSONNEL</u>			
Auto Use	2,880	5,000	17,422
Rent	4,000		
Telephone	2,100		
Printing	9,000	28,059	44,637
Administrative	6,380		
All Other	<u>3,450</u>		
Subtotal	27,810	33,059	67,059
<u>EQUIPMENT</u>			
Office Equipment	<u>1,970</u>	<u>1,260</u>	<u>2,540</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$129,592</u> (127,000)	<u>\$139,855</u> (173,032)	<u>\$256,121</u> (222,944)

Notes:

1. Some totals are approximations due to e.g., different staffing levels during a single year or because of incomplete or compounded information.
2. Includes CETA funding for 7 positions. Does not include one person retained since 9/75 on consultant basis to aid in data collection for evaluation.
3. Items not included are: costs of police manpower in responding to calls, coming to meetings, etc; free media coverage; in-kind contributions such as the window decals provided by an insurance company; or volunteer time.

To examine unit costs requires a figure for total services provided. Unfortunately, the four services to households listed below in Table 5.4 do not exhaust the activities of the CCP. As the program ages, more and more block watch maintenance work is required in neighborhoods the field group has already covered and organized. At present, one community organizer devotes full time simply to maintenance activity--reviving moribund block watches, answering inquiries, providing speakers for block watch meetings, and so forth. Other staff also have been involved in this activity. Most of the time of the half-time clerical person, for example, is spent producing the monthly block watch newsletters. Another unaccounted program activity is consultation with residents of non-target areas requesting assistance with their own crime problems. In addition to these activities, there have also been occasional "false starts," such as an attempt to organize one sector by a media campaign, which was abandoned as a failure.

Table 5.4  
Community Crime Prevention Program  
Services Provided

	<u>Information</u>	<u>Inspection</u>	<u>Marketing</u>	<u>Blockwatch</u>
First Year (10/73-7/74)	2,684	1,067	1,345	1,404
Second Year (8/74-7/75)	11,517	3,788	3,728	3,209
Third Year (8/75-7/76) estimated from first 5 months	13,860	3,403	4,126	4,620
Estimated three- year totals	28,461	8,258	9,199	9,273

Nevertheless, the bulk of the program's effort is still directed at its effort to organize residents of particular target sectors, and thus the basic data in the table are reliable measures of

program activity. Comparing these indices with program costs, we can calculate the following:

- in the first year, the program reached about 2,700 homes at an average cost of about \$48 per home. A total of 1,900 homes joined block watches; assigning program costs just to this group gives a unit cost of \$92.
- in the second year, the comparable unit cost figures are \$12 and \$44, indicating increased program efficiency after the first-year startup period.
- for the first five months of the third year, unit costs rose somewhat to \$18 and \$55. About 15 percent of the program's salaries are now devoted to maintenance and consultation functions, as described above, however; thus we might want to discount these unit costs to \$15 and \$47 to show only the costs of the current target area effort.

In addition to these measures, CCPP has calculated the cost per "unit of service," meaning an informational contact, an inspection, a property marking visit, or a block watch enlistment, all considered for evaluation purposes as equally costly units. For the first two years, this figure was reported as \$17 and \$6, respectively.

Clearly, these cost figures must be compared to some sort of assessment of program benefits. The benefits accruing from a deterred burglary, however, are hard to quantify. Personal losses reported from the average residential burglary in Seattle are \$457.78 according to 1976 data from the Seattle Police Department. Since CCPP services are estimated to result in roughly four fewer burglaries per 100 households per year, the savings in losses of property to victims would be \$1,831.12 per 100 households. This cost saving alone would make up 39.7 percent of the program cost expended. The average cost of criminal justice system resources devoted per burglary is over \$1000.\* But both of these figures

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\* This figure is an estimate, inflated to current value, from Institute for Defense Analyses, Task Force Report: Science and Technology, a report of the 1968 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (GPO, 1967), pp. 56-65.

have problems of interpretation. As to the first, it should be noted that, in an economic sense, property stolen (not destroyed) is a "cost" only to the victim. To the general economy, it is merely a transfer, a neutral economic event. The second figure, the average system cost, is not a "savings" either. The police, courts and prison systems will exist and consume funds regardless of any slight reduction in burglary. Only if the crime or crimes prevented directly reduce some real item of expenditure--in other words, if there is a marginal cost savings--has the program investment really been offset by a hard-dollar savings. With 10,000 or more homes involved in block watches, implying a possible burglary reduction of 350 or so city-wide, the CCPP may in fact be producing a marginal cost savings. An additional police detective, or an additional prosecutor, or another courtroom might have been paid for had this number of additional burglaries in fact occurred. We cannot be certain. But we can be fairly confident that, whatever the marginal benefit in criminal justice system costs as a result of the program, it is much, much smaller than \$1000 per prevented offense.

None of the preceding disproves the worth of this program. In the first place, there are many real costs of crime which we have not attempted to assay--the property destroyed; the distress of the victims; the time lost to citizens devoted to reporting, repairing, replacing and making court appearances; the honest income lost to offenders and their families as they make appearances and serve sentences; the locks and security services that crime makes necessary; the effect of increased crime on otherwise healthy residential and business areas; etc. Moreover, as anti-crime efforts have bigger and bigger impacts, marginal cost benefits do rise and sometimes even reach or exceed average costs. Finally, even though the transfers of stolen property are economically neutral, they are hardly just transactions and are clearly worth preventing, if possible, at some costs for that reason alone.

## Chapter 6: Evaluation Guidelines

Community crime prevention programs can pursue a wide range of strategies which can have many different effects upon a community. As a program evolves, evaluation research can play an important role in guiding the selection of the most effective techniques. This chapter will discuss three major aspects of evaluating community crime prevention programs: (1) measuring crime reduction; (2) measuring impact on citizen reporting of crime to the police; and (3) monitoring the program's attainment of its operational goals.

Many programs, particularly those that rely heavily on volunteer support, will not have the staff or financial resources for a sophisticated evaluation of impact. Moreover, demonstrating the crime reductive impact of community crime prevention efforts raises sufficiently difficult measurement issues that such an effort should be carefully considered. Certainly, even in the absence of rigorous evidence of crime reduction, the merits of involving citizens in preventive activities are indisputable. Thus, a low cost program may choose to confine its goals to those which will ensure adequate community coverage and engender a sustained individual interest in actively improving the safety of the community. Measurement of these process objectives can be easily integrated with any program design and can prove invaluable to the task of delivering services in the most systematic fashion possible.

### 6.1 Evaluating Crime Reduction

The evaluation of the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program discussed in the preceding chapter indicates the value of assessing crime reduction impact by means of a victimization survey.

As was noted, the program's impact on crime rates and rates of citizen reporting have opposite effects upon police crime reporting data. If crime decreases but reporting increases the two effects will appear to cancel themselves, or the police data may even show an increase in crime in the communities receiving program services.

Victimization surveys can vary widely in terms of cost, rigor of research design, and need for professional staff. The choice of a specific research strategy will depend upon the funds available, access to research staff, and interests of the project and its funding agency. Two research strategies differing widely in cost and rigor will be presented to illustrate the range of available options. The first study employs the systematic techniques associated with "professionally conducted" surveys while the second employs more informal techniques recommended by the researchers at the LJPO for projects not requiring highly sophisticated victimization surveys.

#### Professional Victimization Survey Model

The research design and techniques employed by the Law and Justice Planning Office which were discussed in the preceding chapter typify those used in professional surveys. The LJPO researchers (1) selected test tracts which were not extreme in prior crime rates to avoid the likelihood of a regression artifact, (2) collected data for both the pre- and post-program period for both residences receiving services and those not receiving services in experimental census tracts, (3) employed control census tracts to assess the possibility of displacement effects and spontaneous variations in crime rates, (4) made sure that additional police services were not added on a differential basis across experimental and control census tracts, (5) employed researchers who were independent of the project to reduce the possibilities of bias in data collection, and (6) used quality control checks by phoning a sample of all residences contacted by researchers to verify both the interviewers' and respondents' reliability. Appendix I presents a copy of the survey instrument used by the LJPO in its survey.

The Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office conducted a number of victimization surveys and used both door-to-door and telephone

interviews of citizens. Research by Tuchfarber and Klecka\* has recently demonstrated the comparability of data gathered by door-to-door and telephone surveys. The researchers concluded that, "The omission of citizens without telephone service does not appear to bias the sample demographically; nor does it adversely affect the substantive information being collected--in this case, crime victimization data and attitudes toward crime-related matters." The LJPO researchers concur with the findings of Tuchfarber and Klecka based upon the observations in their own studies and recommend telephone surveys over personal interviews due to their lower cost and apparently equal reliability.

Tuchfarber and Klecka recommend that telephone respondents be selected by the use of the technique termed "random digit dialing." This technique was used in their comparative research and is characterized by them as follows:

A researcher who wants to obtain an RDD (random digit dialing) sample must first determine all the operating exchanges in the desired geographic area and then select at random one of the exchanges with its corresponding area code, if necessary. The number is completed by randomly selecting the last four digits. This two-step sequence is repeated until the desired quantity of telephone numbers has been generated. The random numbers can be selected by computer or by hand using a random number table.

Tuchfarber and Klecka's recent book titled Random Digit Dialing: Lowering the Cost of Victimization Surveys provides a detailed discussion of the sampling procedure, the recruitment and training of interviewers and supervisors, the questionnaire design, the controls for screening out ineligible respondents, suggested call-back procedures, and recommended techniques for processing and analyzing the data gathered.

Appendix J provides a summary of considerations in determining an appropriate sample size for a victimization survey. The Appendix indicates the number of units to be selected and associated confidence in conclusions.

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\* Tuchfarber, A. and Klecka, W. Random Digit Dialing: Lowering the Cost of Victimization Surveys Police Foundation, 1976.

Based upon the experience of other victimization surveys, the costs of a professionally operated survey are likely to be relatively high. Appendix K discusses a sample budget for a centrally managed, independent victimization survey. Projects should carefully consider their needs and financial capabilities in selecting a specific research design. If a highly sophisticated survey is not possible, alternative less comprehensive methods are available which can still provide valuable data regarding a project's crime impact.

#### Project Conducted Victimization Survey Model

The researchers at the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office have stressed that many projects may be able to conduct adequate and relatively inexpensive surveys by using regular project staff as researchers. The recommended approach is to have program staff conduct phone victimization surveys as described by Tuchfarber and Klecka as part of their normal tasks. Program staff could select control census tracts adjacent to the experimental tracts to assess displacement as well as comparative changes in victimization. Each community organizer could then have the responsibility to phone randomly selected households in the control area and inquire about burglary victimization in those households both at the time of initial contact with the new target census tracts and then after six months had passed. The LJPO researchers stress that the techniques used by the CCPP staff in their original victimization survey are likely to suffice, and respondents could simply be asked two questions, "Have you been burglarized in the past six months?" (with the interviewer carefully defining burglary for the respondent), and if so, "Did you report the burglary to the police?" An alternative strategy would be to assign one member of the project staff to conduct the victimization survey, perhaps devoting half to three-quarter time to the task. This individual would do all victimization interviewing by phone for both experimental and control census tracts. This approach has the benefit of holding any biases of the interviewer constant over all interviews, and if the phone exchange numbers did not vary systematically between control and experimental census tracts, the added advantage of not revealing to the interviewer the experimental status of the respondent. Nevertheless, the practice of assigning community organizers to conduct the interviews may be preferred by those projects without sufficient funds to support an evaluation staff member. Maintaining a balance between the number of control and experimental households interviewed by each community organizer would help in part to control for biases in the



individual community organizer's style of interviewing. The LJPO estimates that single phone interviews may take approximately five minutes to conduct on the average.

The Law and Justice Planning Office experienced considerable difficulties with the falsification of data by their interviewers who conducted the CCPP victimization survey. It should be noted that these interviewers had no relationship with the project but simply falsified data to avoid the effort in contacting citizens. Falsification was particularly prevalent in data from the door-to-door survey (which can typically involve considerable effort). The LJPO instituted phone followup surveys of respondents to verify whether the original interviews were conducted and whether the data reported in the interviews were correct. Corrections were made where falsification was found, and all original respondents were recontacted. Generally data from interviews which had been conducted were accurate, and the principal problem was with interviewers failing to conduct interviews and, in some cases, then reporting totally fabricated data.

The LJPO experience highlights the need for systematic checks on the reliability of victimization survey data regardless of whether they are collected by individuals related to the project or by an independent agency. A fixed proportion of all respondents chosen randomly should be recontacted by a reliable interviewer to determine whether the data collected from the respondents are accurate. All interviewers should be made aware of the fact that verification of the data is being conducted and that falsification of data will be uncovered and treated appropriately. To avoid projecting too negative an impression of interviewer integrity, the major purpose of reinterviewing can be attributed to the need to determine reliability of the respondents' replies rather than those of the interviewers. In Seattle the researchers had originally planned to recontact 20 percent of the respondents to determine the reliability of reported facts regarding their victimization.

The LJPO researchers stress that training of interviewers is critical. Interviewers should be informed of the need to avoid biases in interviewing, to avoid pressuring respondents, and to take care to define "burglary" to them. The LJPO researchers feel from their experience that the interviews should be as brief as possible to avoid irritating citizens and to permit clearly standardized procedures for interviewers. Short interviews also

increase interviewer productivity and the likelihood that a program will be able to include administering the victimization survey into the program's operations.

In addition to asking citizens whether they have been victimized, the victimization survey also provides the program with the opportunity to gain information about related matters. For example, program participants could be asked questions regarding their fear of crime or fear of burglary in pre- and post-treatment interviews. Data from these questions might be difficult to interpret, however. At first glance one might think that a successful community crime prevention program would have the effect of reducing citizen fear since the burglary rate would be decreasing and citizens would have the perception of taking active steps to protect themselves against burglary. Just the opposite effect might be observed, however, if the program is modeled closely after the Seattle CCPP, because as part of the program citizens receive newsletters noting the occurrence of burglaries in their immediate census tract. It is possible that citizens are aware of increasing crime rates in their city and yet think that the crimes are not occurring in their immediate community. This is particularly true of burglary which is not likely to come to the attention of a citizen except by word-of-mouth. Few newspapers consider small scale burglaries sufficiently important to report. Since citizens are likely to be in personal communication with relatively few members of their immediate census tract, the newsletter accounts of burglaries two to four blocks away may actually increase rather than decrease the citizen's fear of crime in the immediate community. This initial sensitization, or increase in fear, may be a necessary ingredient of the community crime prevention program's efforts, paradoxically, because Seattle CCPP data show that citizens who have participated in the program for a long time have a non-significant but substantial tendency to be burglarized more than non-program participants. It is possible that these individuals have become careless in some way perhaps due to complacency or decreased concern regarding the threat of burglary. It should be stressed that the finding of increased vulnerability was not statistically significant and remains only a hypothesis. This discussion does point out the difficulties in interpreting data on citizen fear, however, and the Seattle LJPO researchers have decided not to include in their interviews any questions regarding citizen fear of victimization in their immediate community. Similarly, questions regarding the degree to which citizens "like" the Community Crime Prevention Program have to be treated very carefully. It may be necessary to include a description of the program's services in the question

to be sure the citizen knows which program is being discussed, and yet once this is done the question may become the equivalent of asking, "Do you like the program which provides you all of these free services?" The citizen is placed in the position of sounding like an ingrate if he does not reply in the affirmative.

In summary, a number of aspects of the experimental design of victimization surveys should be stressed:

- *Select target communities for experimental purposes which do not have particularly high pre-program victimization rates. If communities are selected on the basis of currently high crime rates, regression toward the mean will be an inevitable alternative hypothesis to the evaluation's findings due to the spontaneous tendency of extreme high crime rate areas to return somewhat toward the average crime rate levels. This does not mean that a program should not offer services to those communities with the highest crime rates, and in many cases it will be absolutely essential to offer services particularly to these communities. For the purposes of experimental evaluation, however, some communities with more typical crime rates should also be assessed. The Seattle program selected its experimental target communities randomly to have a rigorous test of the impact of the program.*
- *Collect data both prior to program service delivery and also at a fixed period following service delivery. The Seattle CCPP was evaluated typically six months after the program provided services.*
- *Collect data from control census tracts to compare to the experimental tracts. If possible, have some of the control tracts adjacent to the experimental tract(s) to allow for a test of the displacement of burglary to nearby areas. The most adequate design would probably include both nearby and also distant control tracts to assess displacement and general decreases in burglary in the city. Distant tracts should be comparable to the experimental tract in terms of demographic and crime incidence factors if possible.*

- *Avoid situations in which the police or other agencies are providing crime reduction services to the experimental community but not to the control communities.* In many cities crime programs are coordinated and a single area may receive a battery of services from different agencies. This may be a useful technique of crime reduction, but rigorous conclusions based upon studies of any single program's impact will be sacrificed. If agencies provide services to both experimental and control areas simultaneously, differential effects between the areas may still be attributed to the community crime prevention program even though the overall levels of crime in the two areas may be influenced by the additional programs. If the community crime prevention program interacts in some way with the new program of the additional agency, it will be difficult to determine whether the program is successful only in conjunction with other programs.
- *If possible have an independent evaluator conduct the victimization survey to avoid potential unintentional biases of program personnel.* If program personnel conduct the survey, instruct them thoroughly in the need to avoid biases. In either case, recontact a fixed proportion of the survey respondents to check on the accuracy of the data collected, and inform interviewers that these checks are being performed.
- *Keep the survey as simple as possible within the scope of your research needs.* This approach increases interviewer efficiency, reduces citizen irritation, and makes control of bias easier. Carefully define the term "burglary" to the respondents to be certain that responses are comparable across all respondents.

## 6.2 Evaluating Crime Reporting

A secondary goal of the Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program is to assess the impact of the program on crime reporting rates and proportion of burglary-in-progress calls to the police. As was discussed in Chapter Five, overall burglary crime reporting rates were expected to increase in areas served by the CCPP. Furthermore, the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls was expected

to increase. Burglary-in-progress calls are critical because previous studies had shown that the probability of apprehension of a burglar decreases markedly if the police officers are not able to arrive at the burglary close to the time of its occurrence.

The Seattle researchers benefitted greatly from Seattle's computerized system of recording citizen calls to the police. The computerized dispatch system (SELECT) includes a record of all police calls and categorizes them by the offense reported (e.g., residential burglary), crime, location, location of the caller, whether the crime is in progress, and whether a suspect or vehicle description is provided. These data were analyzed by the LJPO researchers to determine whether changes occurred in the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls to general burglary calls, to determine the location of the caller (since the CCPP should increase calls from block watchers), and to determine whether suspect information was provided by the caller. The researchers also determined the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls resulting in arrests.

The degree to which a similarly thorough analysis of citizens' burglary reports to the police is possible in other cities will depend in large part on the type of system used by the police to record citizen crime reports. Many systems require elaborate manual analyses of log sheets and may be considered too laborious to be worthwhile for researchers. If possible, analyses comparable to those conducted by the Seattle researchers are recommended to determine the impact of the community crime prevention program upon citizen reporting of crime. The study could be further broadened to investigate whether increases in burglary calls are accompanied by a generalized increase in calls regarding all crimes.

In addition, an evaluation may include a comparison of victimization data regarding crimes citizens claim they reported to the police to actual reports received by police. This comparison would provide a further check on the accuracy of both the police and citizens' reports, and enable researchers to adjust victimization data accordingly.

### 6.3 Evaluating Program Operations

In addition to the various measures of program impact cited above, comprehensive data systems for the assessment of the program's operational goals are also recommended. The Seattle CCPP assigned one staff clerical worker to maintain a detailed record of the project's performance in service delivery. Project staff maintained records of the homes contacted and services delivered, and the staff person tabulated the results. Similarly, services to non-target communities and maintenance activities have been carefully monitored and recorded. Other programs will need to develop monitoring forms appropriate to their particular array of services and method of service implementation.

Again, this aspect of the evaluation process is both simple to execute and important to assure that the fundamental message of community crime prevention is reaching the widest possible audience and stimulating the kind of protective attitudes and physical improvements that are essential to the security of a community.

**Appendix A**

**Executive Summary to the *Policy Development Report on the Community  
Crime Prevention Program*, prepared by the City of Seattle Law and  
Justice Planning Office, October 1976**

APPENDIX A  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY\*

Introduction

The Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) is a City of Seattle response to the priority crime of burglary. The program is designed to reduce burglary through delivery of crime protection services directly to Seattle's citizens. As such, it is a direct response to the Seattle 2000 law and justice goals and objectives which have been approved by the Mayor and City Council. It provides an opportunity for citizens to become involved in direct service roles to reduce crime (Goal C) and represents the City's principal opportunity to expand citizen crime prevention programs (Objective 2). Specifically, the Seattle 2000 Commission report stated: "Citizens must share the responsibility for prevention of crime--law enforcement agencies, the courts and corrections cannot and should not handle it alone."

The Seattle 2000 theme that we must involve citizens in the reduction of crime has little meaning unless we know what works to reduce crime. If the City encourages citizens to participate and spend their time and money on a cooperative burglary reduction program, it is especially important to know that the program, in fact, has the desired effect of crime reduction.

This necessity to inform ourselves is the driving force behind this presentation. In the arena of crime reduction efforts, failures have consistently outnumbered successes and scholars with national reputations are claiming that "nothing works." Crime reduction programs which offer an honest promise of success

\* To the Policy Development Report on the Community Crime Prevention Program, prepared by the City of Seattle Law & Justice Planning Office, October, 1976.



are extremely rare. The current fiscal environment accommodates program failure much more gracefully than success. Here we are faced with a problem of large magnitude, where a program which responds to adopted City goals and objectives has demonstrated success.

The purpose of this paper is to make recommendations for the Community Crime Prevention Program's future based on information generated in its demonstration phase.

The discussion which follows is consistent with the legislative intent of the Seattle City Council, which resolved in Resolution 24975 to reaffirm the intent of the City Council and the Mayor "to proceed with the development of a comprehensive policy plan for the City," and which approved "a schedule of initial priority components of the comprehensive policy plan to be developed by the Office of Policy Planning." A principal policy element in the comprehensive policy plan work for 1976 was "community participation in crime reduction." The responsibility for this work was assigned to the Law and Justice Planning Office.

The description of this element, included as an attachment to Resolution 24975, reads:

"There are substantial opportunities to encourage and facilitate citizen actions in crime reduction. Possibilities range from broad educational efforts to intensive house-to-house crime prevention services. Having accumulated experience with citizen action programs, both successful and unsuccessful, Law and Justice will undertake a synthesis to develop City policy which considers citizens as public safety resources and which can guide City resource allocation decisions for facilitating and encouraging citizen actions to reduce crime."

This paper responds to that work element.

## Community Crime Prevention Program Background

In late 1972 and early 1973, the Seattle Law and Justice Planning Office conducted an extensive analysis of the crime of burglary. That analysis revealed the following:

1. that the majority of residential burglaries occur during daylight hours when it is possible for citizens to witness them;
2. that in about 40 percent of Seattle's burglaries, entry is gained through open doors and windows;
3. that police patrols cannot be reasonably expected to prevent many burglaries; and
4. that the majority of victims were not able to provide identifying numbers of their lost property which would aid police in apprehending offenders and returning recovered property.

These findings became the basis for the Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) design. The program employs Community Organizers and Home Service Technicians who, on a block-by-block basis, perform the following tasks:

1. Organize Block Watch groups. These block watch groups are made up of eight to twelve neighboring families who mutually agree to watch their neighbors' homes and report unusual occurrences to police.
2. Conduct Home Security Inspections. CCPP staff go through the residence and point out security weaknesses and offer advice on how the weakness could be remedied.
3. Perform Property Marking. CCPP staff engrave an identifying number, usually the driver's license number, on frequently stolen property items and post a decal that so informs would-be burglars.

The program's goal has been to involve at least 30 percent of the single-family and duplex residences in a neighborhood in at least one of the above activities or "Primary Services."

A "Maintenance Service" is also provided. It is designed to sustain block watches which have been established. Block watch captains are recontacted at six month intervals, and a monthly newsletter is published, in order to rejuvenate anti-burglary interest in a community.

On a City-wide basis, the program provides "Educational and Informational" materials advising residents on how to protect themselves from burglary. This activity or "Advisory Service" makes extensive use of the media, mailers, speaking engagements and other public events and gatherings.

The Community Crime Prevention Program has been supported by a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant since September, 1973. Its purpose has been to test the strategy outlined above to see if it would reduce residential burglary.

Between September, 1973, when the program began, and June, 1976, approximately 20 census tracts (20 percent of all residential tracts in Seattle) have received the program's Primary Service (block watch, home inspection and property marking). An additional 24 tracts have received the program's Advisory Service (education and information).

By June 1976, the program had involved 8,708 households in block watch, conducted 8,047 home security inspections, performed 8,765 property markings and provided educational and informational services and materials to an additional 2,000 citizens.

The areas of the City covered by Primary Service include the Central Area and most of West Seattle. Advisory Services have been provided to all of South Seattle, Queen Anne, Magnolia, Laurelhurst and parts of Lake City and Broadview.

The Advisory Service is the weaker component of the program, in terms of its impact on burglary and is provided essentially due to citizens' demand for services.

The cost of the program since its beginning (approximately three years) has been \$562,813.

## Community Crime Prevention Program Impact on Burglary

The overall goal of the Community Crime Prevention Program is to reduce residential burglary. The specific, technically stated objectives of the program are as follows:

Objective One: To produce a statistically significant decrease in the number of residential burglaries in the program's target areas.

Objective Two: To demonstrate a statistically significant increase in the number (or percentage) of burglary-in-progress calls received by the Seattle Police Department.

To determine whether the objectives were achieved, data from three separate and independent sources were analyzed. The sources were official Seattle Police Department records on reported residential burglaries, three separate victimization surveys and official Seattle Police Department dispatch records. Analysis of these data allow the following conclusions:

1. Participation in the Community Crime Prevention Program significantly reduces the risk of residential burglary victimization, by between 48 percent and 61 percent.
2. The proportion of actual residential burglaries that are reported to the police increases from about 50 percent to 76 percent following CCPP activities. This also holds for the proportion of burglary-in-progress calls, which increased 27 percent in areas of the City treated by the Community Crime Prevention Program.
3. No evidence of residential burglary displacement to either adjacent non-CCPP households or non-CCPP treated census tract was found.
4. The Community Crime Prevention Program achieved its objectives.

## Analysis of Alternatives

Alternatives for the Community Crime Prevention Program's future range from cancellation of the program to massive expansion. Using productivity quotas of the existing program and a goal of 40 percent acceptance of offered CCPP services, the following projections can be made:

1. Maintenance of current CCPP resource commitment (ten field staff) will allow Primary Service to be offered City-wide in eight and one-half years.
2. With a 50 percent expansion to 15 field staff, the entire City would be serviced in five and two-thirds years.
3. To complete the entire City in three years would require an expansion to a level of 28 field staff.

Relatively little is known about methodologies which depend upon the use of volunteers, recruitment via media campaigns and how these compete with Seattle's systematic door-to-door provision of services by civilian paid staff. The national experience suggests, however, that participation would be substantially less (2 percent to 17 percent).

The crime impact evaluation shows the greatest advantage of the program accrues to households which accept property marking, home security inspections and become part of a block watch. This suggests that high rates of participation are desirable.

Projections using evaluation data show that if program effects can be maintained, the contribution of single-family and duplex households to the City's burglary problem can be reduced substantially. The proportion of victimizations reported to police will increase, but reported residential burglary will also decline.

Maintenance of program effects is the most questionable assumption of the CCPP strategy. Citizens change their places of residence at a surprisingly high rate (about 50 percent in a five-

year period), and evaluation results suggest a decay of program effect between six to eighteen months after services are provided. Future program planning and evaluation should focus upon remedies for this weakness.

### Recommendations

The Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office offers the following recommendations based on its analysis of the Community Crime Prevention Program.

1. The Community Crime Prevention Program should continue. The Community Crime Prevention Program has been shown to be an effective means of reducing the priority crime of burglary. It makes extensive use of citizen initiative, as envisioned by Seattle 2000 Commission.
2. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded with City general fund resources when its present grant funding expires in August 1977. The project will have been supported by LEAA grant funds for approximately four years at the expiration of the present grant. Enough experience has been gained to determine if the project is worthy of City support. By seeking other grant support, the day of reckoning would only be delayed.
3. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be institutionalized into the Department of Community Development as of January 1, 1977. During its demonstration phase, the Community Crime Prevention Program has been managed by the Law and Justice Planning Office, and the project's personnel positions are created in the Office of Policy Planning/Law and Justice Planning Office. OPP/LJPO is not the proper organization to manage a fully operating project.

Of the possible departments, including the Department of Human Resources, the Seattle Police Department, the Department of Licenses and Consumer Affairs and the Department of Community Development, it is recommended that the Department of Community Development be chosen to house and manage the Community Crime

Prevention Program. DCD's management style, characterized by strong neighborhood improvement orientation, strict adherence to achievement of goals, objectives and schedules, and flexibility of staff working hours, can best accommodate the Community Crime Prevention Program, which has similar characteristics.

4. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be funded and maintained at its present level. The program operating at its present level will achieve full City coverage at the 40 percent level of participation in eight and one-half years. The 40 percent level represents an increase from the present goal of 30 percent participation. This increased goal is due, in part, to the increased experience and skills of project staff and due, in part, to the addition of the Mobile Citizen Involvement Unit which is designed to aid in delivery of the Primary Service and increase the acceptance level of citizens.
5. The Community Crime Prevention Program should be continually monitored and evaluated. The Community Crime Prevention Program remains an experimental program, although it has a history spanning more than three years. To insure continued success along with further controlled experimentation, the Community Crime Prevention Program should continue to be monitored and evaluated.

The Office of Management and Budget should require a strict program budget, the Law and Justice Planning Office should continue its crime impact evaluation and a project steering committee should be formed made up of representatives of the Seattle Police Department, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Community Development and the Law and Justice Planning Office, to provide oversight of the project.

**Appendix B**  
**CCPP Staff Job Descriptions**



## APPENDIX B

### CCPP STAFF JOB DESCRIPTIONS

Positions descriptions: The activities of field staff are described as follows:

#### CCPP Community Organizers

1. Conducts pre-implementation contacts with local groups two or three weeks in advance of entering a new community, including setting up police car rides to establish police relationships and getting press releases to community newspapers.
2. Before entering the new community, complete the "master log" of the area and a grid map (see Chapter 3).
3. Plan and execute mass mailings.
4. Doorbell and telephone after the mailing to determine which households desire what services.
5. Post all doorbelled or telephoned households in the master log, and send standard "dud" letters to households that could not be contacted.
6. Conduct block watch meetings for an average of no less than 20 new households per week.
7. Pass to the Home Service Technicians any new services requested at block watch meetings.

#### CCPP Home Service Technicians

1. Schedule service appointments in households shown on the Citizen Interest Forms (already completed by the Community Organizers) that desire home inspections and property markings.

2. While conducting home inspections and marking property, seek and recruit block watch meeting hosts as needed by the Community Organizers.
3. Announce any already scheduled block watch meetings while in each nearby home in order to increase interest and attendance.
4. Provide home inspection and property markings in an average of no less than 25 homes per week.

**Appendix C**  
**Home Security Checklist**

# Your City, Seattle

## Community Crime Prevention Program

Edward L. Good, Director  
Wes Uhlman, Mayor



### HOME SECURITY CHECKLIST \*\*

This is a list of ways to protect your home from burglars. Carry this with you as you examine your home and see where your weak spots are and how to remedy the problem. Please note that even the best equipment will not provide adequate security if broken, worn, or badly attached. Also, one window in each room should open easily for escape from fire or other emergency.

Caution: When using door or window locks which lock and unlock from inside the house with a key, be sure you can get out fast in case of a fire or other emergency. For example, when you are home always either keep a key in the lock or no more than five feet from the lock and be sure all family members know where it is or put an additional lock on the door or window which can easily be opened from the inside (such as a flip lock or snib lock). Remember, the first example lessens the effectiveness of the lock when you are home.

#### Ways a Door or Window May Be Opened by a Burglar

1. Slip the latch
2. Jimmy (pry) open
3. Pipe wrench or hammer the doorknob
4. Split the frame
5. Break glass and unlatch
6. Kick in plywood and unlatch


\*\*Approved by: Seattle Police Department, Community Service Officers, and Northwest Locksmith Association

608 Alaska Building, 618 2nd Avenue, Seattle, Washington (206) 583-6090

Weaknesses to Look for in Doors and Windows  
and  
Remedies for Those Weaknesses

1. Door and frame<sup>1</sup> do not fit tightly:

Strike Plate




This provides a gap to insert a tool to pry the door away from its frame or slip the latch. The door is held less effectively because the strength of the bolt which holds the door is dependent on how deeply it penetrates into the frame.

- a. Add an additional strike plate over the original one using as a minimum 2½ inch screws, if possible sheet metal screws.
- b. Or, attach a piece of heavy gauge sheet metal to the door frame for about 16 inches. This will shield the lock area to prevent the lock from being slipped.
- c. Or, add interlocking weather stripping.

2. Hinge pins located on exterior of door or window:

Hinge Pin



The pins, unless they are non-removable, can simply be taken out and the door removed.


Remove a corresponding screw from each hinge leaf. Insert a new screw halfway into one hole and cut off the head. (The new screw should be ¼-inch longer than the original screw.) The remaining screws should be removed and replaced with longer screws. Now when the door or window closes, the headless screw will go into the hole in the other hinge leaf to hold the door or window to the frame.

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
<sup>1</sup>Frame--The wooden border between the door itself and the wall panels.

<sup>2</sup>Strike plate--The metal plate into which the bolt extends. secured to the door frame by heavy screws.

Key-in-knob lock



Horizontal Deadbolt Lock



3. Key-in-knob lock<sup>3</sup> with spring latch<sup>4</sup> or dead latch<sup>5</sup>:

This kind of lock is weak because the locking mechanism is within the knob and can easily be broken.

- a. Add a separate deadbolt lock<sup>6</sup>. (See illustration.)
- b. Or, add a flip lock or snib lock<sup>7</sup>. (This lock can only be locked and unlocked from within the home.)


The spring latch is also a problem because it can be slipped with a credit card.

- a. Add a separate deadbolt lock which cannot be pushed back. The bolt can only be thrown with either a key or thumb turn.
- b. Or, add a flip lock or snib lock.

(Note: a one-inch throw is your best protection)

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<sup>3</sup>Key-in-knob lock--When you set it in a locked position, the outside knob can't be turned. The device that keeps the door locked is either a spring latch or dead latch. See below for their effectiveness in keeping burglars out.




<sup>4</sup>Spring latch--Latch which springs into place when door is closed. It can be opened by inserting a credit card or plastic between the door and frame.

<sup>5</sup>Dead Latch--Lock which springs into place when the door is closed. Once closed, it cannot be pushed back with a credit card as long as the door and frame fit tightly. (See page 2, item 1)

<sup>6</sup>(Horizontal) deadbolt lock--A heavy bolt that extends within the door and can be drawn back only with a key or thumb turn. (We emphasize again: a one-inch throw gives the best protection.)

<sup>7</sup>Flip lock or snib lock--Inexpensive pieces of hardware used to lock doors from the inside. The leverage created by these items is so strong that they are nearly impossible to break through. These locks should be used instead of the typical slide bolts. Slide bolts are secured to the surface of the door. Most surface locks are not strong enough to withstand a solid blow from the outside.

Double Cylinder Deadbolt Lock




4. Hollow core door<sup>8</sup> or thin plywood panels<sup>9</sup>:


Both types of doors may be kicked in enabling the burglar to reach in and unlatch the lock.

- a. Replace the door with a solid door or reinforce the thin panels with heavier wood or grillwork.
- b. Or, add a double cylinder deadbolt lock<sup>10</sup>. This lock can only be unlocked with a key both from the inside and the outside.

Flip Lock



Snib Lock



→ Add flip lock or snib lock here

5. Door with glass in it or beside it:


- a. Add a double cylinder deadbolt lock, or
- b. Add grillwork, or
- c. Replace the door with a solid door, or
- d. Replace the glass with non-breakable glass or a lexon plate, or
- e. Add a flip lock or snib lock six inches from the floor so it will be out of reach if the glass is broken, or
- f. Add a keyed slide bolt well-secured to the door with at least 2- $\frac{1}{4}$  inch screws.

<sup>8</sup>Hollow core door--There are airspaces between the outer frames of the door which are made of thin plywood. If you knock on the door from side to side, you can hear a change in sound.


<sup>9</sup>Thin plywood panels--These are inserted into an otherwise solid door.

<sup>10</sup>Double cylinder deadbolt lock--A deadbolt which requires a key to be opened from both the inside or outside. (Remember, a bolt with a one-inch throw gives the best security. See "Caution" on first page.)

### Single Cylinder Vertical Deadbolt Lock



### Single Cylinder Horizontal Deadbolt Lock



### 6. Double doors:

This type of door has three points where the door may have a gap giving a burglar more space to pry the door open.

- a. Add a "jimmy proof" vertical deadbolt lock<sup>11</sup> single cylinder<sup>12</sup> or double cylinder, depending on whether or not there is glass in or beside the door.
- b. Or, add a horizontal deadbolt lock with a one-inch throw. (See illustration and footnote #6.)

Double doors can easily be pushed apart. (Double windows also.)

One door should be inactivated by bolting the door at the top and the bottom with slide bolts. If there is glass, use a keyed slide bolt. (Be sure to use screws at least 2 $\frac{1}{4}$  inches long.)

### 7. Dutch doors:

The top of the door must be adequately secured to the bottom section.

- a. If it is a solid door, secure the door with a slide bolt, well-secured to the door with long screws. Also, have the bolt go deep into the bottom portion of the door to hold the door securely.
- b. Or, use a flip lock or snib lock.
- c. If there is glass in the door or beside it, use a keyed slide bolt.


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<sup>11</sup>Jimmy proof, vertical deadbolt lock--Two-piece interlocking mechanism in which the deadbolt slides down between the two locksets preventing the use of a crowbar to widen an opening between them. Care should be taken to purchase a strong lock which cannot be broken easily.

<sup>12</sup>Single cylinder deadbolt lock--A deadbolt which can be opened or locked from the outside with a key and by a thumb turn on the inside.



Keyed Slide Bolt




8. Sliding glass doors or windows:

There are two basic weaknesses. One is the flimsy lock usually attached to the original door or window which can be pried or jiggled open.

- a. Place a metal rod in the inside track behind the sliding door.
- b. If the door slides on the outside track, secure with a keyed slide bolt.

The second problem is that there is excess space in the upper track where the door slides. This enables the burglar to simply lift the door out of the track.


- a. Put staggered screws in the upper track leaving them protruding so that the door just clears the screws when the door slides shut.
- b. And, add a keyed slide bolt.



9. Overhead garage door:

The locks sold with the door normally can easily be jimmed open.


- a. Drill a hole in the middle of the track behind the last roller and insert a padlock.
- b. Or, put a padlock on both sides of the door.




10. Double hung windows:

The latches are usually old and not well-secured to the frame and can therefore be pried off. Also, a burglar may break out enough glass to reach in and unlatch the window. If painted shut, try a crow bar outside to be sure they are really painted shut.

Pins in Frame



Keyed Latch



- a. Drill a hole, angling slightly downward, for a pin to be placed through upper corners of inside frame and halfway through lower corners of the outside frame. Additional holes can be made above the first holes to allow the window to remain slightly open for ventilation.
- b. Or, cut lengths of wood to fit above inside frame. Attach Velcro (hook and loop material) to one side of wooden bar and to window frame. Nail wooden bar to frame if you do not need to open window.
- c. Or, replace the unkeyed latch with a keyed latch. (See "Caution" on first page.)
- d. Or, screw or nail the window shut.
- e. Or, add grillwork or bars.

11. Casement windows (windows that swing on hinges):

The window can either be pried open by breaking the latch or enough glass can be broken to reach in and unlatch the window.

- a. Change the regular keyless latch to a keyed latch or keyed slide bolt. (See "Caution" on first page.)
- b. Or, with the latch in a closed position drill a hole above the latch and insert a screw. The latch now cannot be opened because the latch cannot pass by the screw.
- c. Or, add grillwork or bars.

Other Weaknesses  
and  
Possible Remedies

1. Poor visibility for neighbors or people on the street to see a potential burglar.

This allows the burglar more time to spend attempting to get into your home.

- a. Cut back shrubbery which may hamper view.
  - b. Secure the entrances (door and windows) covered by shrubbery or at the sides and back of the home with the strongest locks.
2. Poor lighting hinders a person on the street or a neighbor from seeing a burglar attempting to enter your home and allows the burglar more time to spend getting into your home.
    - a. Keep a light on over the entrances of your home when you are not home as well as when you are. Remember you do not want to tell people you aren't at home by turning the lights on only when you are gone.
    - b. Put strong locks especially on doors and windows with poor lighting.
  3. Your home looks unoccupied when:

- a. Lights are not on within the home.

1. Have a neighbor keep a key to your home and turn lights on and off for you.
2. Buy a timer and set your lights to come on and go off as if you were home.
3. Get a housesitter.

- b. Newspapers, throw-ons and mail clutter the porch.

1. Have a neighbor remove the items.
2. Get a housesitter.

- c. Your lawn is overgrown, which is not normal.

1. Mow your lawn before you leave.
2. Have a neighbor mow your lawn while you are away.
3. Get a housesitter.

**Appendix D**  
**Contents of Training Program for New CCPP Staff**

APPENDIX D

CONTENTS OF TRAINING PACKET  
FOR NEW CCPP STAFF

1. A training schedule
2. Copies of Year-End or Quarterly Reports of this Program.
3. "Perspectives on Burglary", a position paper by this Program's Director.
4. The formal Personnel Policies of this Program as well as the Personnel Manual of the City of Seattle.
5. Relevant goals of the Seattle "Year 2000" Law and Justice Task Force.
6. The City of Seattle Lock Ordinance.
7. "What You Can Expect--An Explanation of the Criminal Justice System for Victims of Crime", by King County's Prosecuting Attorney.
8. Staff memorandum to guide citizen action on vacant house problems.
9. Samples of the Community Crime Prevention Program's Newsletter.
10. The Revised Code of Washington's definitions of burglary, larceny, robbery, etc.
11. Policy paper on guest riders in police patrol cars.
12. Maslow's Human Needs Hierarchy.
13. Copies of all administrative and operational forms used in Program implementation.
14. "Crime Prevention Tips for Citizens".
15. Information about emergency telephone number "911"
16. Information about truancy.

17. Information sheets outlining policies or procedures on diverse other Program matters.
18. Recent news media accounts of this Program.

The initial three-day classroom training includes the following:

1. An overview of the Program's philosophy and ideology, including forms and data, by this Program's Director.
2. Residential security in technical detail, by the Seattle Police Department's Security Unit and the Northwest Locksmith Association.
3. The use of this Program's "Home Security Checklist", by Charlene Kornblum, staff Community Organizer.
4. The relationship of this Program to the role of the police burglary investigator, by detectives of the Police Department's Burglary Unit.
5. On-site orientation at the Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit, the Patrol Division, the Communication Center, the Community Relations Division, etc., by police personnel.
6. The relationship of this Program to Seattle's Rape Reduction Program, by that Program's Director.
7. The relationship of this Program to the Seattle Police Department's Community Service Officer Program, by that Program's Director.
8. The importance of formal evaluation in the design and operation of this Program, by Dr. Kenneth Matthews, Ph.D., of Seattle's Law and Justice Planning Office.
9. An all-day retreat to Providence Heights Conference Center, half of which is devoted to simulated field operations (role playing) and half of which consists of building comradeship between old and new staff through recreational group activity.

**Appendix E**  
**Letter of Introduction**

# Your City, Seattle

## Community Crime Prevention Program

Edward L. Good, Director  
Wes Uhlman, Mayor



According to Seattle Police statistics for 1975,  
1 out of 18 homes in your community was burglarized.

The City of Seattle is attempting to reduce  
burglary in your neighborhood. Your federal  
tax dollars are coming back to you in the form of  
THREE FREE BURGLARY PREVENTION SERVICES.

The Crime Prevention Program, after three successful years in other parts  
of the city, is currently providing our services to you and your neighbors.

Our Home Service Technicians are available to provide:

1) FREE PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION

Marking your driver's license or other number, with an electric  
engraver, on small portable items most likely stolen by burglars.

2) FREE HOME SECURITY CHECK

Specific recommendations for your home about locks and latches for  
windows and doors, etc.

Our Community Organizer will help your neighborhood organize:

3) A NEIGHBORHOOD BLOCK WATCH

By conducting a neighborhood meeting at one of the homes on your  
block to introduce people living there to each other and to discuss  
the why's and how's of burglary prevention.

Beginning next week, representatives of the Community Crime Prevention Program  
will contact you and your neighbors about the free services. Since we are  
unable to contact you again by phone, we would like you to call us or send in  
the enclosed slip if interested.

*Betsy Lindsay*      *Patricia Moir*      *Mark Howard*      *Charlene Kornblum*  
Betsy Lindsay      Patricia Moir      Mark Howard      Charlene Kornblum

*Margaret Lyles*      *Martha Rubicam*      *Joan Sparling*      *Steve Tayer*      *Janice Olsen*  
Margaret Lyles      Martha Rubicam      Joan Sparling      Steve Tayer      Janice Olsen

NOTICE: City employees carry official identification and are registered with the  
Seattle Police Department. They will not ask for money or attempt to sell you  
anything. If in doubt about a person at your door, call us at 625-4724 or the  
Seattle Police Department at 625-2051.



**Appendix F**  
**Block Watch Packet**

YOUR CITY, SEATTLE

JANUARY NEWSLETTER

Community Crime Prevention Program

Edward L. Good, Director

Wes Uhlman, Mayor

TIP OF THE MONTH: A deadbolt is called "dead" because it can't lock itself, so please REMEMBER, before you walk away from what you think is a locked door, make sure it is a locked door--use the key to your deadbolt lock. Be secure.

\* \* \* YOUR EFFORTS RECEIVE NATIONAL AWARD \* \* \*

Be proud--

Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program has received the "Exemplary Project" award of the United States Department of Justice's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Only 21 of thousands of anti-crime projects have received the award during the four years that the awards have been made. Only three projects received the award when the Committee met in Washington, D.C. on January 7, 1977: (1) your Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program, (2) a program in Denver for youth offenders, and (3) Detroit's "One Day--One Trial" jurors' project. The Committee's vote was unanimous in favor of Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program.

Manuals and tens of thousands of brochures will be prepared now by the Federal Government to describe Seattle's Community Crime Prevention Program to anti-burglary workers in every part of the Nation.

Champagne flowed here when the news was received. We on the staff offer sincere thanks to the 10,000 citizens in the Block Watches and to the Seattle Police Department for unfailing support.

Ed Good

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THANK YOU TO

Mr. James Ruby for developing our new Household Inventory form, and Mr. Gorcester for an inspiring letter.

Burglary Data for December 1976

Census Tract 002

Boundaries:

North NW 85th Street East Eighth Avenue NW  
 South NW 70th Street West 20th Avenue NW

Number of burglaries this month: 7 Number for same month last  
 Single family or duplex homes 7 year: 10

Apartments \_\_\_\_\_  
 Weekday 2 Weekend 4 Unknown 1

Time of Day:

Morning (6am to 12 noon) \_\_\_\_\_ Afternoon (12 noon to 6pm) 3  
 Evening (6pm to 12 midnight) \_\_\_\_\_ Night (12am to 6am) \_\_\_\_\_  
 UNKNOWN: Victims gone over 24 hours 2 Day (6am to 6pm) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Night (6pm to 6am) 1 Other 1


Items stolen: Unknown 1 Nothing \_\_\_\_\_ Stereos and related equip-  
 ment 3 Televisions 2 Radios 1 Tape players/re-  
 corders 1 Photographic equipment \_\_\_\_\_ Sports equipment and  
 hobby equipment \_\_\_\_\_ Guns 1 Furniture 1 Kitchen accessories \_\_\_\_\_  
 Home tools \_\_\_\_\_ Clocks \_\_\_\_\_ Cash/checks ? \_\_\_\_\_ Purses or wallets with  
 contents (excluding cash) \_\_\_\_\_ Jewelry and watches 1 Clothing \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miscellaneous 1

Place of entry:

	1st Floor		2nd Floor		Basement		Garage	
	D	W	D	W	D	W	D	W
Front								
Rear					1			
Side								
Unknown		1		1	1	1	2	
Other								
Unknown								

Method of entry: Attempt only; no entry \_\_\_\_\_ No signs of forced  
 entry \_\_\_\_\_ Walk through open or unlocked door 3  
 Climb through open window \_\_\_\_\_ Force a locked door 1 Force a  
 locked window, then unlock door \_\_\_\_\_ or climb in window 1 ; Smash  
 a window, then unlock door \_\_\_\_\_ or climb in window 1 or unlock  
 and climb in window 1 Other \_\_\_\_\_

LOCATIONS OF BURGLARIES



Map Courtesy of Seattle Engineering Department

- 1--8000 blk. 10th Ave. NW
- 1--7500 blk. 19th Ave. NW
- 1--7700 blk. 14th Ave. NW
- 1--7500 blk. 18th Ave. NW
- 1--7700 blk. 19th Ave. NW
- 1--1800 blk. NW 77th
- 1--8300 blk. 18th Ave. NW

## NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME CLINIC

TAKE TIME. . . STOP CRIME. These are the words on the side of the "big blue van" used by our program to conduct block watch meetings on blocks where hosts cannot be found to hold the meeting in a home. The van is a classroom on wheels, serving as a vehicle to teach people about burglary and its prevention. We're happy to have it on board.

SHOW-ME-HOW-FAIR. Beginning Friday, January 21st and continuing through Sunday, January 23rd, Community Crime Prevention staff will be on hand as part of the many activities offered at this year's ERNST-MALMO GARDEN AND PATIO SHOW-ME-HOW FAIR to be held at the Seattle Center Coliseum. This year's presentation includes booth and classroom activities and presentations in the NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME CLINIC, the "big blue van". Crime prevention staffers will demonstrate property engraving, hand out Household Inventory sheets and Neighborhood Safety Group sheets and answer questions from interested citizens. In the booth, King County Police and Seattle Police will exhibit hardware displays, show a film entitled "Target for Terror", and answer questions. In the classroom, Detective Jim Fisk of the Seattle Police Department's Security Unit and Larry Roselle of the Northwest Locksmith Association will provide details on residential security and show a film entitled "Crime in the Home".

PART OF WATCHING FOR BURGLARY in your neighborhood is watching for suspicious cars. If you discover that a strange car has been abandoned in your area for 24 hours or more, call 911. Police department personnel will mark the car and leave it for an additional 24 hours. If it is not claimed within that time, it will be towed away. Persons calling 911 should make sure that the vehicle has been parked for 24 hours or more to insure police department action on the matter.

DO YOU WANT A GOOD ALARM FOR YOUR HOME? Mrs. T, a block watch captain in West Seattle suggests, "get a dog". A faithful dog is loyal to its master and quick to come to the defense of a master who is threatened in some way. Mrs. T. has found that a spayed female is the best type of "alarm" to have, and she has many fond memories of family pets which have doubly served as live-in protection.

NAME THE NEWSLETTER. Blockwatchers, we hereby invite you to participate in a contest to name the newsletter. If you have a good idea, write us or call us, but let us know by no later than February 3rd, 1977. The winner and the winning name will be announced in a future edition of the newsletter.

BLOCKWATCHERS, we hope you like our new maps. They are supplied by the Department of Community Development.

HOUSEHOLD INVENTORY LIST

Owner's Driver's License or other identifying number \_\_\_\_\_

	Serial Number	Model Number	Where Marked	<u>Visible</u> <u>Invisible</u>	Photo	Purchase Price or Appraisal	Location of Item
Television #1							
Television #2							
Radio #1							
Radio #2							
Stereo							
Speakers							
Tape Recorder							
Toaster Oven							
Blender							
Drill							
Sander							
Grinder							
Saw							
Typewriter							
Sewing Machine							
Camera							
Projector							
Binoculars							
Gun							
Bicycle							

Instructions: Make a copy of this to keep in a safe place away from home. A safe place in the home is in a secured plastic bag, placed in the refrigerator or freezer which functions as a vault in case of fire.

## USE OF THE ELECTRIC ENGRAVING PEN

Burglars don't want to be caught carrying property which has been marked, and so they are much less likely to steal it. Marking property increases the likelihood that burglars will be caught, prosecuted and convicted.

About 80% of the stolen property which is recovered by the police cannot be identified and returned to the owners and so it is sold at public auction.

To help the police, to protect your property, and to prevent burglary we recommend that you use the back of this form to list the serial numbers of your property and, further, that you use an electric engraver to mark your property following the directions given below:

1. Buy an electric engraver--available at most hardware stores at prices below \$10.00--to use and to share with your neighbors.

2. Engrave your complete driver's license number (all 12 digits, followed by "/WA" for Washington), or your Washington I.D. Card Number\* on all items which are likely to be stolen. The standard use of the Washington State Driver's License number or (for non-drivers) the Washington State Identification Card number is highly recommended because of the speed with which the property owner's name and address can be obtained through the police computer system. Otherwise, use birthdate and initials or social security number as a last resort.

3. To start the engraver, turn the button on the pen to the "on" position. To change the depth of the cut, just turn the adjustment knob at the tip of the pen or the rear of the pen depending on the model. Hold the engraver like a pen and write slowly with a light touch. It is somewhat noisy but is easy to use on metal, plastic and wood; metal is the best material to engrave. Engrave the identification number on the case rather than on the back or any other easily removed part.



4. Place decals on windows at the front and the back of the house. These decals are a proven deterrent to burglary. Urge your neighbors to mark their property, too. The more homes involved, the safer the neighborhood becomes.

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\*HOW TO OBTAIN AN I.D. CARD: A Washington state resident of any age who does not have a driver's license or driver's permit can obtain a Washington I.D. Card from the nearest office of the Washington State Motor Vehicle Department. Your picture is taken by the department and appears on the card when issued. (It is also excellent I.D. when shopping, cashing checks, etc.) Call the department to obtain information as to the current fee, identification you must provide, and the location of the nearest office. Find the telephone number by looking in the white pages of the telephone directory under "Washington, State of", then find the subheading, "Motor Vehicles, Dept. of", and then call any office listed under the subheading, "Driver's Licenses".

**Appendix G**  
**Sample Block Watch Map**

SAMPLE BLOCK WATCH MAP

N.W. 124th ST.

555-5868	12391
Sanford	+
555-4826	12381
Fonzerelli	+
	12371
	-
555-2246	12361
Morgenstern	+
	12351
	-
	12341
	-
555-2868	12331
Findley	+
	12321
	?
555-2695	12311
Haggars	+

MT. VIDEO DRIVE

12390	555-5263
+	Nelson
12380	555-3287
+	Cramden
12370	555-3673
+	Norton
12360	
?	
12350	555-4284
+	Bunker
12340	555-3275
+	Jefferson
12330	
-	
12320	
-	
12310	555-6279
+	Hartman

N.W. 123rd ST.

**Appendix H**  
**Excerpt from CCPP *Third Year Evaluation*,**  
**Increase of Burglary-In-Progress Calls**

## APPENDIX H

### EXCERPT FROM CCPP THIRD YEAR EVALUATION (July 1, 1973 to August 31, 1976)

#### Increase of Burglary-in-Progress Calls

Objective two, to increase significantly the number of Burglary-in-Progress (BIP) calls, was evaluated using SPD computerized dispatch records (SELECT system).

A non-equivalent control group design was used to examine BIP calls as a proportion of all burglary calls received by the SPD between September 30, 1974, and August 8, 1976. This time period was dictated by the availability of information at the time of data collection in August, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

As in the case of official SPD residential burglary data, an S-area and a treated area were identified, and pre- and post-data were separately determined. However, because of several differences in the manner in which data are maintained in the SELECT system, neither the areas nor the data are necessarily consistent with SPD data processing reports. The specific differences are as follows. First, SELECT data represent dispatch and patrol determination and classification of calls received, responded to and disposed of by patrol officers. As such, a call initially classified as a burglary by dispatch and patrol may subsequently be classified as some

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<sup>1</sup> Between April 13, 1974, and September 29, 1974, the SELECT system had averaged approximately 20 percent "down" time, or periods in which calls were not being entered into the computer data base. Following September 30, 1974, through the end of the year, down time averaged less than 8 percent. For 1975 and 1976, down time averaged less than 6 percent. Because of the more complete data beginning September 30, 1974, these data were chosen as the beginning phase.

other offense, or no offense at all, and not be included in SPD data processing reports as a residential burglary. In the same fashion, calls initially dispatched as other offenses may subsequently be classified as burglaries on data processing reports. (This difficulty results from (1) inconsistencies between the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), which is the basis of patrol actions, and the Uniform Crime Reporting system used by data processing; (2) "unfounding" of cases; that is, upon further investigation, it is determined that no crime occurred; and (3) in some cases, the difficulty of distinguishing other offenses closely related to residential burglary.) Second, SELECT data are recorded on a patrol car beat basis which does not correspond to census tracts, which are the bases for both SPD data processing reports and CCPP operation.


Since CCPP does operate within census tract boundaries, direct comparison of SELECT data for all of the treated tracts was not possible. For the 18 tracts previously identified (Table 5), each of the SPD car beats was examined to determine if the area of the car beat was made up of 50 percent or more of CCPP treated census tracts. This procedure identified 13 patrol car beats within police sectors Charlie, George and William (see Table 7 and Map 2). The remaining seven car beats were excluded from any analysis since they received partial treatment without reaching the criterion of 50 percent of their area. For each of the 50-percent-or-more treated carbeat areas, the period from September 30, 1974, to the month services began in that area was identified as a pre-period. The month following completion of services in that area up to August 8, 1976, was designated as a post-period. For the 13 car beats, there were a total of 98 pre-CCPP treatment carbeat months, 139 post-treatment carbeat months and 49 during-treatment carbeat months. Since pre-treatment time represented approximately 41 percent of the total pre- and post-carbeat months, S- data were split into a corresponding 40-60 percent split of a pre-period of September 30, 1974 to June 30, 1975, and a post-period of July 1, 1975 to August 8, 1976.

For each of the 13 treated car beats and the S- area, the following data were hand tabulated from computer printouts of SELECT data for pre- and post-periods: (1) the number of calls disposed of by patrol officers as "051" or residential burglary; as such, these would all generate a major offense report by officers that would initially be classified as a burglary case; (2) the number of these calls that were assigned to patrol as crimes in the act of being committed (BIP); (3) the number of

Table 7--SPD Car Beats Including 50 Percent or More of Census Tracts Treated by CCPF

Police Sector and % Treated		SPD Tracts Treated		Treatment Dates		
	Car Beat	% Treated	Tract	% in Car Beat	Begin	End
<u>Charlie</u>	1	56%	80	100%	8-76	9-76
			90	80%	7-76	8-76
	2	51%	92	70%	10-73	7-74
			110	20%	8-74	8-74
	3	86%	91	100%	10-73	7-74
			92	20%	10-73	7-74
			101	5%	9-74	11-74
	6	75%	92	10%	10-73	7-74
			100	67%	11-74	12-74
			111	40%	8-74	8-74
	7	100%	100	23%	11-74	12-74
			101	45%	9-74	11-74
	<u>George</u>	2	57%	114	100%	4-75
3		100%	102	100%	1-75	3-75
			101	50%	9-74	11-74
4		73%	160	100%	7-75	8-75
			161	33%	1-76	2-76
			170	33%	6-75	7-75
			171	7%	11-75	12-75
5		100%	170	67%	6-75	7-75
			171	60%	11-75	12-75
6		50%	161	67%	1-76	2-76
<u>William</u>	2	66%	141	17%	2-75	4-75
			142	66%	5-75	9-75
	6	82%	154	80%	2-76	4-76
			191	33%	4-76	6-76
	7	100%	188	100%	5-76	7-76
		191	67%	4-76	6-76	

Map 2.





BIP calls that were initiated from addresses other than where the crime occurred; (4) the number of BIP calls that included either suspect or suspect vehicle descriptions; and (5) whether an arrest occurred as the result of the BIP calls.

From the pre- to post-period in S-, the BIP rate increased 4 percent, or from 8.5 percent to 8.8 percent of the total calls. For the treated tracts, the BIP rate increased 27 percent, or from 9.1 to 11.6 percent of the total calls. (See Table 8.) When the post-treated data are adjusted to exclude the 4 percent increase observed in the S- area, the 9.1 percent to an adjusted 11.2 percent BIP rate is statistically significant ( $x^2 = 4.82$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

Given that objective two was achieved by the project, additional questions relating to this objective concerned the location from which BIP's originated, whether there was an increase in suspect information and whether such BIP's resulted in more patrol arrests.

Location of person making BIP call: The rationale for objective two was that with block watch organizations and education of citizens in treated areas, suspicious incidents (e.g., an unfamiliar person walking around a neighbor's house when the residents were known to be gone) would be more likely to be reported to the police. If this were to occur, one would expect that this would be reflected in a larger proportion of BIP calls being initiated from addresses other than the burglarized residence. To determine if this were the case, BIP calls were examined and grouped as coming from same or different addresses (see Table 9). Unfortunately, the accuracy of this particular analysis is unknown. Upon examination of SELECT data, it was found that over 50 percent of BIP calls did not include information concerning the location of the person calling the police department. In all such cases, it was assumed that they originated from the same address at which the burglary occurred.

While S- showed a non-significant 1 percent increase (from 23.0 percent to 23.3 percent) in BIP calls from other addresses within the treated car beats, there was a non-significant 17 percent decrease (from 27.5 percent to 22.8 percent;  $x^2 = 1.19$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .28$ ) in calls from other locations. The inconclusiveness of this particular analysis may be due to missing data on callers' location cited above.

Table 8--Burglary-in-Progress to Total Burglary Calls

Number of Calls Classified	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Burglary-in-progress (BIP)	160 9.1%	276 11.6%	431 8.5%	540 8.8%
Not BIP	1592	2109	4634	5583
Total	1752	2385	5065	6123
Calls per carbeat month	17.88	17.16	13.73	11.27
Number of Carbeat months	98	139	369	543

126

Table 9--Location of Person Making BIP Call

Caller's Location	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Other Address	44 27.5%	63 22.8%	99 23.0%	126 23.3%
Same Address	116	213	332	414
Total	160	276	431	540
BIP calls per carbeat month	1.63	1.99	1.17	0.99

Suspect information included in BIP calls: In line with the rationale that block watch and educational efforts of CCPP would lead to more BIP calls occurring, these same efforts should sensitize persons to the need of suspect description information. To examine this possibility, BIP calls were analyzed on the basis of whether a description of the suspect or the suspect's vehicle was included (see Table 10).

For the S- area, the 17 percent increase (from 55.2 percent to 64.8 percent) in the suspect information rate was significant ( $x^2 = 9.24$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .01$ ), while the 8 percent increase (from 60.6 percent to 65.6 percent) for treated areas was not significant ( $x^2 = 1.08$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .32$ ). Some part of this unexpected result might be due to the fact that the S- area had a lower suspect information rate to begin with, and the resultant change in the post-period was a regression phenomenon, since both the S- and treated area had virtually identical rates in the post-period ( $x = 0.05$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p = .82$ ).

Arrests resulting from BIP calls: Another way to examine the quality of the additional BIP calls received by SPD as a result of CCPP activities is to analyze the result of such calls. Specifically, the question of interest is, does the increase of BIP calls in treated areas cause more high "precedence" dispatching of patrol officers to crime scenes without a corresponding increase in favorable outcomes (i.e., arrest of suspects)? It is possible that BIP calls were generated through project efforts that are actually counter-productive in terms of police manpower use.

To answer this question, BIP calls that resulted in the arrest of suspect(s) for the S- and treated areas were analyzed (see Table 11). In the S- area, the number of BIP calls resulting in arrest decreased -6.9 percent (from 18.1 percent to 16.9 percent), while for the treated area, the arrest-to-BIP rate increased 9.7 percent (from 17.5 percent to 19.2 percent). While these were statistically non-significant differences, they indicate that the increase of BIP calls in the treated area has not occurred at the expense of the quality of such calls. That is, the BIP calls have shown a non-significant increase in favorable outcomes (arrests) within the treated area, while decreasing in the control area.

Table 10--Suspect Information and BIP Calls

Suspect Information Was:	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Included	97 60.6%	181 65.6%	283 55.2%	350 64.8%
Not included	63	95	193	190
Total	160	276	431	540

128

Table 11--Arrests Resulting from BIP Calls

Arrest	Treated Car Beats		S- Car Beats	
	Pre-	Post-	Pre-	Post-
Did occur	28 17.5%	53 19.2%	78 18.1%	91 16.9%
Did not occur	132	223	353	449
Total	160	276	431	540

## Summary

1. Victimization surveys indicate that CCPP has significantly reduced program participants' residential burglary rate.
2. Program participants are representative of the general population in that their pre-program entry burglary victimization rate is comparable to those persons not participating in the project. They are neither more nor less likely to be burglarized than the general population.
3. Program participants are not representative of the general population in terms of their reporting behavior. Prior to program entry, they are significantly more likely to report burglary victimization to the police than those who do not join the program.
4. There is no evidence of burglary displacement to non-treated neighbors of program participants.
5. Reporting rates for burglary appear to increase for both members and non-members as a result of CCPP activities within treated areas.
6. Official police data for census tracts treated by the project are inconsistent indicators of CCPP effects. This most likely is due to the combined effect of decreased incidents with increased reporting. Additionally, first year SPD official data include the effects of other programs operating in the same tracts.
7. Victimization data suggest that program effects last from 12 to 18 months.
8. While the separate services provided by CCPP do not differ significantly in their effectiveness to prevent burglary, block watch activities appear to be the most beneficial. However, this conclusion should be treated as extremely tentative.
9. The reporting of burglaries-in-progress as a proportion of all burglary calls to the police has increased significantly for those areas treated by CCPP.

10. The quality of burglary-in-progress calls has not been significantly changed as a result of more burglary calls being received by the police. Both the number of calls including suspect information and resulting in arrests have increased, although non-significantly.

Appendix I  
Victimization Survey Instrument

APPENDIX I

VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

COVER SHEET

CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN SEATTLE

1. \_\_\_\_\_ 2. Date of Interview \_\_\_\_\_  
(Interviewer's Name) No.
3. Length of Interview (min.) \_\_\_\_\_ 4. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Respondent's Address)
5. I.D. No. \_\_\_\_\_ 6. Census Tract \_\_\_\_\_
7. Is there more than one dwelling unit at address? Yes No
8. INTERVIEWER: Select your respondent by the following method

1. In Column (a) below, list the relationship to, or connection with, the head, all persons age 18 or over, or the household head regardless of age.
2. In Columns (b) and (c), list the sex and age of each person.
3. Assign and enter an adult number in Column (d) by numbering the males first and then the females as follows: The oldest male = #1, the next oldest male = #2, etc; begin numbering with the oldest female, the next oldest, etc., until all adults are counted.
4. Using the selection table below, determine which adult is your respondent. In Column (e) check selected respondent. If not available, interview another household member over age 18.



(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
Adults by Relationship to or Connection with Head of Household	M=1 F=2			SELECTION TABLE If no. of Interview # adults is: adult no.

READ ALOUD

I am going to show you some cards about different kinds of crimes. I would like you to tell me if any of the things on each card have happened to you, personally, between January 1, 1974, and December 31, 1974. By a crime, I mean something somebody could be sent to prison or fined for doing, attempting or even threatening to do.

(Proceed through offense cards, reading all items on each card, giving respondents ample time to reply to each item. Complete incident form immediately for each positive response. Return to card series where interrupted.)

(Skip to Question #43 if respondent lives alone.) I am going to go through the cards again now, and this time I would like to know if any of the things on each card have happened to anyone who lives here with you; that is, anything between January 1, 1974, and December 31, 1974. (If no other member of household has been a victim, skip to Question #43.)

11. Crime card number \_\_\_\_\_
12. Actual ..... 1  
 Attempt ..... 2  
 Threat ..... 3
13. Victim identification (check one of three)  
 Respondent only ..... 1  
 Total household ..... 2  
 Other household member ..... 3
14. Could you tell me as exactly as possible when this crime took place?  
 Record day, month and year \_\_\_\_\_ (If answered, go to #16)

15. If month is not remembered, probe for season.
- Summer ..... 1
  - Fall ..... 2
  - Winter ..... 3
  - Spring ..... 4
16. What time of day did the incident occur?
- Morning (6 AM - Noon) ..... 1
  - Afternoon (Noon - 6 PM) ..... 2
  - Evening (6 PM - 10 PM) ..... 3
  - Night (10 PM - 6 AM) ..... 4
  - Don't know ..... 5
17. (If exact time is not remembered, probe for day or night)
- Daytime ..... 1
  - Nighttime ..... 2
  - Don't know ..... 3
18. (Were you/was victim) physically injured?
- Yes (Ask A) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #19) ..... 2
- IF YES:
- A. Did you/victim require medical attention?
- Yes (Ask B) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #19) ..... 2
- B. Were you/victim hospitalized?
- Yes (Ask C) ..... 1
  - No (Go to D) ..... 2
- C. How long did you/victim stay in hospital?
- Less than 1 day ..... 1
  - 1 - 3 days ..... 2
  - 4 - 7 days ..... 3
  - 8 - 30 days ..... 4
  - More than 30 days ..... 5
- D. Has there been any permanent physical disability as a result of these injuries?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2

19. Was any property taken or damaged - including any financial loss due to the incident (other than medical expenses or loss of income)?

- Yes (Ask Question #20) ..... 1
- No (Go to Question #22) ..... 2

20.

<p>(A) As I read, tell me whether or not you had that item taken or damaged in the crime.</p>	<p>(B) If <u>YES</u> to A: What was the approximate \$ value?</p>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------

	YES (ASK B)	NO (GO TO NEXT ITEM)	\$	CHECK IF ITEM WAS RECOVERED
Currency			\$	
Clothing			\$	
Household goods			\$	
Automobile			\$	
Auto parts/Acc.			\$	
Jewelry			\$	
Bike, Toys			\$	
Credit cards, check			\$	
Other			\$	

Just to summarize, was the value of what was taken less than \$50?

- Less ..... 1
- More ..... 2
- Don't know ..... 3

21. Was anything else damaged or lost; for example, broken windows, broken door locks, vandalism?

- Yes ..... 1
- No ..... 2
- Don't know ..... 3

22. Specifically, where did the incident take place?

- Inside home/apartment ..... 1
- Near home, in yard, sidewalk, etc. .... 2
- Home of friend, relative, neighbor ..... 3
- In family business or professional property ..... 4
- Inside public building (store, bar) ..... 5
- Inside private building (office, factory, etc.) .... 6
- In outdoor public area (street, park) ..... 7

- In outdoor private place (club, etc.) ..... 8
- No particular place ..... 9
- 23. (If not alternative 1 or 2, ask:) How far from your home/  
apartment did the incident take place? (Answer in blocks  
or miles \_\_\_\_\_ blocks/miles and indicate which.)
- 24. Were there any witnesses to the incident - other than the  
victim(s)?
  - Yes (Ask Question #25) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #26) ..... 2
- 25. Who were the witnesses? (Circle all relevant)
  - Household member ..... 1
  - Person not in household ..... 2
  - Police ..... 3
- 26. Who discovered the crime? (Circle all relevant)
  - Respondent ..... 1
  - Someone else ..... 2
  - Police (Go to Question #30) ..... 3
- 27. As far as you know, did the incident ever become known to  
the police?
  - Yes ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #31) ..... 2
- 28. Who reported the incident to the police?
  - Respondent (not victim) ..... 1
  - Victim ..... 2
  - Witness ..... 3
  - Offender ..... 4
  - Other ..... 5
  - Don't know ..... 6
- 29. About how long did it take for the police to arrive after  
they were notified?
  - Right away ..... 1
  - Just a few minutes ..... 2
  - About 15 minutes ..... 3
  - About half an hour ..... 4
  - One hour or more ..... 5
  - Did not come that day ..... 6
  - Did not come at all (Go to Question #33) ..... 7
  - Don't know ..... 8

30. How satisfied were you with the police?

	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Neutral	Somewhat Dis-satisfied	Very Dis-satisfied
A. Promptness	1	2	3	4	5
B. Courtesy	1	2	3	4	5
C. Competence	1	2	3	4	5

31. ASK ONLY IF INCIDENT NOT KNOWN TO POLICE (NO TO QUESTION #27: OTHERWISE GO TO QUESTION #33.)

A. Here are some reasons people often give when they do not notify the police of a crime. Which of these did you consider and which did you not consider at all? Read each reason and cricle YES or NO in Column A for each.

B. (If only one reason coded YES in Column A, circle the appropriate code in Column B without asking) Which of these reasons would you say was the most important reason you did not notify the police (Circle code in B).

	(A) Considered <u>at all</u>		(B) Most Important
	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	
1. Did not want to take time .....	1	2	1
2. Did not want harm or punishment to offender .....	1	2	2
3. Afraid of reprisal .....	1	2	3
4. Private, not criminal matter .....	1	2	4
5. Police couldn't do anything about it.	1	2	5
6. Police wouldn't want to be bothered..	1	2	6
7. Didn't know how or whether to notify police.....	1	2	7
8. Too confused or upset .....	1	2	8
9. Fear of insurance cancellation or rate increase .....	1	2	9

32. (If #31 answered by alternative(s) 5, 6 and/or 7, ask the following question.)

A. Here are some reasons why a person might choose not to notify the police of a crime. Which of these reasons did you consider and which did you not consider at all? (Read each reason and circle YES or NO in Column A for each.)

B. (If only one reason coded YES in Column A, circle the appropriate code in Column B without asking.) Which of these reasons would you say was the most important reason you did not notify the police (circle code in B).

	(A)		(B)
	Considered		Most Important
	<u>at all</u>		
	YES	NO	
1. Nothing could be done because of lack of proof .....	1	2	1
2. Reported to someone else .....	1	2	2
3. Nothing could be done because the police don't care .....	1	2	3
4. Not important enough .....	1	2	4
5. Too inconvenient .....	1	2	5
6. Private or personal matter .....	1	2	6
7. Afraid of reprisal - the person who did it might find out and do something to me .....	1	2	7

33. How many offenders were involved in the incident?

One .....	1
Two .....	2
Three .....	3
More than three .....	4
Don't know .....	5

34. Do you know who the offender(s) was/were?

Yes (Ask Question #35) .....	1
No (Go to Question #37) .....	2

35. Was/were the offender(s) ...

	Offender #1		Offender #2		Offender #3	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Family member(s) .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Former household member .	1	2	3	4	5	6
Friend, neighbor .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Acquaintance .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Stranger .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Business relation- services .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other .....	1	2	3	4	5	6
Don't know .....	1	2	3	4	5	6

36. ASK QUESTION #36 FOR EACH OFFENDER KNOWN: OTHERWISE, GO ON TO QUESTION #37.

	Offender #1	Offender #2	Offender #3
A. Male or	1	3	5
Female	2	4	6
B. White	1	4	7
Black	2	5	8
Other	3	6	9
C. Did he/she live in			
Neighborhood	1	4	7
Different Neighborhood	2	5	8
Don't know	3	6	9
D. Did he/she have previous record?			
Definitely none	1	1	1
Probably none	2	2	2
Definitely YES	3	3	3
Probably YES	4	4	4
Don't know	5	5	5
E. Were your relations with offender(s) friendly or unfriendly before incident?			
Friendly	1	1	1
Unfriendly	2	2	2
Neither	3	3	3

Offender #1   Offender #2   Offender #3

- F. Have you ever had trouble with offender(s) before?
- |     |   |   |   |
|-----|---|---|---|
| Yes | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| No  | 2 | 2 | 2 |
37. Do you know if the police ever arrested anyone for the incident?
- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Yes (Go to Question #38) .....        | 1 |
| NO (Go to Question #41) .....         | 2 |
| Don't know (Go to Question #41) ..... | 3 |
38. What was the outcome of the arrest as far as you know? Was the offender:
- |                                         |   |
|-----------------------------------------|---|
| Let go (Go to Question #40) .....       | 1 |
| Tried (Ask Question #39) .....          | 2 |
| Case pending (Go to Question #40) ..... | 3 |
| Don't know (Go to Question #40) .....   | 4 |
39. Was/were the offender(s) found guilty or acquitted?
- |                      |   |
|----------------------|---|
| Acquitted .....      | 1 |
| Convicted .....      | 2 |
| Pleaded guilty ..... | 3 |
| Other .....          | 4 |
| Don't know .....     | 5 |
40. On the whole, how satisfied were you with the outcome?
- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Very satisfied .....       | 1 |
| Somewhat satisfied .....   | 2 |
| Somewhat unsatisfied ..... | 3 |
| Very unsatisfied .....     | 4 |
41. Have you or any of your household members changed your habits as a result of this incident?
- |           |   |
|-----------|---|
| Yes ..... | 1 |
| No .....  | 2 |
42. Is there anything that you can think of that might have prevented the incident, i.e., more safety precautions around the house, etc.? SUMMARIZE RESPONSES:



43. If you were a victim of a crime, would you be willing to testify in court?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2
  - Depends on the crime ..... 3
44. When you leave your house/apartment, even if only for a short time, do you lock the doors?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4
45. Do you lock your doors at night?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4
46. When you or other family members are at home, do you keep the doors locked?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4
47. When you leave your house/apartment, even if only for a short time, do you lock the windows?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4
48. Do you lock your windows at night?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4
49. When you or other family members are at home, do you keep the windows locked?
- Always ..... 1
  - Sometimes ..... 2
  - Hardly ever ..... 3
  - Never ..... 4

50. On the average, how many hours during the week is your house/apartment unoccupied by any member of the household?
- Never ..... 1
  - No more than 1 hour ..... 2
  - 1 to 10 hours ..... 3
  - 10 to 50 hours ..... 4
  - 50 hours or more ..... 5
51. Did you call the police (telephone number 911) in 1974 to report any suspicious activity in your neighborhood?
- Yes (Go to Question #52) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #53) ..... 2
52. What did you report?
- Suspicious person(s) ..... 1
  - Suspicious automobiles ..... 2
  - Suspicious noises ..... 3
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
53. Are you married, widowed, divorced, separated or never married?
- Married ..... 1
  - Widowed ..... 2
  - Divorced ..... 3
  - Separated ..... 4
  - Never married ..... 5
54. What is the highest grade you attended in school?
- 0-8 grades ..... 1
  - 9-12 grades ..... 2
  - 13-15 grades ..... 3
  - Completed college ..... 4
  - Graduate degree ..... 5
55. Are you employed full-time, part-time, retired or unemployed?
- Full-time ..... 1
  - Part-time ..... 2
  - Retired ..... 3
  - Unemployed ..... 4
  - Housewife ..... 5

56. Of what racial or ethnic group do you consider yourself a member?
- Caucasian ..... 1
  - Black ..... 2
  - Mexican-American ..... 3
  - American Indian ..... 4
  - Asian-American ..... 5
  - Other ..... 6
57. How long have you lived at this address?
- Less than 6 months ..... 1
  - 6 months to 18 months ..... 2
  - 18 months to 3 years ..... 3
  - More than 3 years ..... 4
  - More than 5 years ..... 5
  - More than 10 years ..... 6
58. Of the crimes listed below, which do you feel is the biggest problem Seattle residents face?
- Burglary ..... 1
  - Robbery ..... 2
  - Theft - stealing ..... 3
  - Vandalism or Arson ..... 4
  - Assault ..... 5
59. Do you feel burglary is a problem in your neighborhood?
- Yes (Go to Question #60) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #61) ..... 2
  - Don't know (Go to Question #61) ..... 3

FOR THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, CIRCLE ALL ANSWERS WHICH APPLY

60. How did you hear burglary was a problem in your neighborhood?
- Police officer who came to your door ..... 1
  - Neighbor/friend ..... 2
  - Seattle or local newspaper, i.e., Times, P.I.,  
West Seattle Herald, The Sun, etc. .... 3
  - Other news media ..... 4
  - Member of your family ..... 5
61. Are you aware of the Burglary Reduction Program being conducted by the City of Seattle?
- Yes (Go to Question #62) ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #71) ..... 2

62. How did you find out about the Program?
- Neighbor/friend ..... 1
  - Police department ..... 2
  - Civic organization ..... 3
  - Church group ..... 4
  - News media ..... 5
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_ 6

63. Did you use any of the following services?
- Community meeting (Go to Question #64) ..... 1
  - Home Security Check (Go to Question #65) ..... 2
  - Property Identification (Go to Question #65) ..... 3

If none marked, go to Question #70

64. How helpful did you find each of the following parts?

	<u>VERY</u> <u>HELPFUL</u>	<u>HELPFUL</u>	<u>SHOULD BE</u> <u>IMPROVED</u>	<u>SHOULD</u> <u>BE DROPPED</u>
Information on security				
devices ..... 1	2		3	4
Information about burglary. 1		2	3	4
Film ..... 1		2	3	4
Information about police				
services ..... 1		2	3	4
Information on citizen				
involvement ..... 1		2	3	4
Question and answer period. 1		2	3	4

65. Why did you participate?
- Burglaries in your neighborhood ..... 1
  - Police recommendation ..... 2
  - Friends/neighbors recommendation ..... 3
  - Personal interest ..... 4
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_ 5

66. Have you taken any actions to make your home more secure?  
(CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY)
- Improved locking devices ..... 1
  - Better lighting ..... 2
  - Marked your property ..... 3
  - More willing to report suspicious activity  
  in your neighborhood ..... 4
  - Purchased a weapon ..... 5
  - Better communication with your neighbor ..... 6
  - Lock your residence when you leave ..... 7
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_ 8

67. Of the services associated with this Program, did you request any that were not provided?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No (Go to Question #69) ..... 2
68. Which services were not provided?
- Community meeting ..... 1
  - Home Security Check ..... 2
  - Property Identification ..... 3
69. What do you feel is the community's responsibility in burglary prevention?
- Report suspicious activity to the police ..... 1
  - Provide adequate locking devices for your home ..... 2
  - Lock doors to your residence when you leave ..... 3
  - Know your neighbors ..... 4
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_ 5
70. What do you feel is the police's responsibility in burglary prevention?
- Analyze the burglary problem in the community ..... 1
  - Educate the public to reducing burglary opportunities ..... 2
  - Provide burglary prevention information to the public ..... 3
  - Other: List \_\_\_\_\_ 4
71. Do you know your neighbors who live adjacent to you?
- To the immediate left ..... 1
  - Left nonapplicable ..... 2
  - To the immediate right ..... 3
  - Right nonapplicable ..... 4
  - Directly behind your home ..... 5
  - Behind nonapplicable ..... 6
  - Directly across from your home ..... 7
  - Across nonapplicable ..... 8
72. Do you know any of the police officers who work in your area by name?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2

73. If you could, would you like to move from your current residence during the next 4 months?
- Yes ..... 1
  - No ..... 2

If yes - why?

(Check any and all of the following that apply:)

- Job related (new job) ..... 1
- Better or bigger home ..... 2
- Schools ..... 3
- To get away from neighborhood crime problem ..... 4
- Neighbors ..... 5
- Inconvenient location or services ..... 6
- Dissatisfied with present residence ..... 7
- Other ..... 8
- (what?) \_\_\_\_\_

74. CODE \_\_\_\_\_

Please consider this possible crime incident:

If you were the [(1) victim (2) witness] of a crime committed by [(1) a stranger (2) acquaintance (3) relative] involving [(1) no weapon (2) a weapon] and a loss of [(1) no money (2) between \$1 and \$250 (3) more than \$250] and [(1) no physical injury (2) an injury not requiring medical attention (3) an injury requiring medical attention].

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT YOU WOULD REPORT SUCH AN INCIDENT TO THE POLICE?

- Extremely unlikely ..... 1
- Moderately unlikely ..... 2
- Slightly unlikely ..... 3
- Don't know ..... 4
- Slightly likely ..... 5
- Moderately likely ..... 6
- Extremely likely ..... 7

HOW IMPORTANT OR NECESSARY DO YOU FEEL IT WOULD BE TO REPORT  
SUCH AN INCIDENT?

- Should never be reported ..... 1
- 2
- 3
- Should be reported about 50% of the time ..... 4
- 5
- 6
- Should always be reported ..... 7

CARD 1

BURGLARY-BREAKING AND ENTRY

1. Someone breaking into your home? (or garage, shed, store or office?)
2. Trying to break in?
3. Have you ever found:
  - A. a door jimmied?
  - B. a lock forced?
  - C. a window forced open?
4. Has something been taken or stolen from your home? (or garage, shed, store or office?)
5. Has anyone tried to steal anything of yours from a locker or safe?



CARD 2

ROBBERY

1. Something taken directly from you by force or by threatening to harm you?
2. Hold-up/stick-up?
3. Mugging or yoking?
4. Strong-arm robbery?
5. Money or bicycles taken by force?
6. Violent purse snatching?
7. Any attempts to rob you by force?

CARD 3

THEFT - STEALING

1. Car stolen?
2. Things stolen from car?
3. Hub caps, tires, battery taken from car?
4. Bicycle stolen?
5. Purse snatched, things taken from purse/wallet?
6. Pocket picked?
7. Coat or hat stolen in restaurant or bar?
8. Things stolen from you while on bus, train, boat or plane?  
In a station?
9. Things taken from mail box?
10. Any attempts to steal things?

CARD 4

VANDALISM OR ARSON

(things purposely damaged or set fire to)

1. Window broken maliciously?
2. Property broken or damaged deliberately?
3. Fire deliberately set?
4. Car damaged maliciously -- antenna broken, lights broken, tires slashed, paint scratched?
5. Walls marked, fences or other property or premises damaged?
6. Teenagers or children bothering you by mischief?

CARD 5

ASSAULT

1. Beaten up?
2. Attacked with a weapon (club, knife, gun, hammer, bottle, chair)?
3. Stones or other dangerous weapons thrown at you?
4. Hit or kicked?
5. Fight picked with you?
6. Any attempts or threats to assault you or beat you up?

CARD 6

SERIOUS AUTO OFFENSES

1. Hit and run accident?
2. Trying to force you off the road into an accident?
3. Deliberately driving a car at you?
4. Someone failing to identify himself/herself after damaging or running into your car?

CARD 7

SEX OFFENSES

1. Someone peeping in your windows?
2. Indecent exposure in front of you?
3. Rape or attempted rape?
4. Molested or sexually abused?

CARD 8

THREATS

1. Blackmail?
2. Threatening or obscene letters or telephone calls?
3. Someone demanding money with threat or harm if you don't pay?
4. Someone demanding anything else with threats?
5. Someone threatening to make a false report about you to the police or to your employer or someone else?
6. Someone selling "protection"?

CARD 9

FRAUDS, FORGERIES, SWINDLES

1. Passing worthless checks, counterfeit money?
2. Someone forging your name to something?
3. Someone pretending to be somebody else to get you to give something or do something?
4. Being cheated by a confidence game?
5. Selling you something stolen or something they had no right to sell?
6. Embezzling: misusing money you trusted someone with?



**Appendix J**  
**Sample Size Considerations for a Victimization Survey**

APPENDIX J

SAMPLE SIZE CONSIDERATIONS FOR A VICTIMIZATION SURVEY

Survey costs depend heavily on the sample size needed to yield estimates of victimization rates at desired levels of confidence. The tables below summarize available procedures for approximating a suitable sample size. Both burglary and robbery are included to show differences in the confidence one can place in the estimates.

First, rough estimates of victimization rates are computed from official police counts:

	<u>Burglary</u>	<u>Robbery</u>
Official Crime Count	3,296	457
Households	79,730	-
Persons over 12	-	127,901
Official Rate	41 (per 1000 households)	3.6 (per 1000 people over 12)
Approximate Reporting Rate	58%	61%
Estimated Victimization Rate	71 (per 1000 households)	5.9 (per 1000 people over 12)

The next table shows the 95% confidence ranges on the number of victimizations per thousand for survey samples of 1000, 5000, and 10,000 that produced these estimated rates. These were derived as the Estimated Victimization Rate plus or minus 1.96 times the standard error of a binomial distribution with p set equal to the Estimated Victimization Rate.\* Thus, for example,

\* For samples of this size, the binomial can be approximated by the normal distribution, whose 95% range is between 1.96 standard errors on either side of the estimated mean.

the range 55-87 burglaries per thousand households represent  $71 \pm 16$ , where 16 burglaries per thousand households is derived as:

$$1.96 \text{ std error} = 1.96 \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}} = 1.96 \sqrt{\frac{(.071) (.929)}{1000}} = .076$$

	Sample Size		
	<u>1000</u>	<u>5000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
Burglary	55-87	64-78	66-76
Robbery	2.6-9.6	3.8-8.0	4.4-7.4

Note the decreased degree of improvement from 5000 to 10,000 when compared to the improvement in going from 1000 to 5000. As you can see, relatively little confidence can be placed in estimates made from as few as 1000 respondents.

**Appendix K**  
**Estimated Professional Survey Costs**

## APPENDIX K

### ESTIMATED PROFESSIONAL SURVEY COSTS

The cost estimate outlined here is based on previous survey experience and uses rough estimates of contributing factors. Depending on the degree of use made of existing questionnaires, the design and production of a large number of these instruments might cost between \$2000 and \$3000 (assuming approximately 20,000 copies are produced). Key punching may cost another \$1000. Data editing and cleaning is quite expensive, ranging from \$1000-\$2000 (including computer cost)--depending on the complexity of the instruments.

The cost of implementing a telephone system to permit adequate quality control will vary according to local rates. Touch-tone is a necessity for this volume of calling, and special equipment that allows a supervisor to monitor calls is highly desirable. Altogether, the phone-related costs will total approximately \$500.

The largest cost item is interviewer/supervisor time. Costs stated thus far correspond to an operation consisting of about 10 people, full time for one month. Hourly rates for these individuals range from \$3.00 to \$4.00. Thus, about \$6000-\$7000 should be budgeted.

The cost for analysis of the data can range widely. The creation of SPSS files and the generation of basic tabulations should cost little more than \$1000 (including programming and computer time). Total cost should therefore range between \$11,500 and \$14,500, including manpower, to survey about 5000 households.

Projects should obtain the services of a consultant to help design the survey questionnaires and develop survey operations. This would add at least another \$1000 to the overall effort. Because the traps are many and sometimes subtle in victimization surveying, such professional assistance is well worth the cost.

If only an attitude survey is planned, costs can be reduced significantly since the entire design would be revised. The large sample is necessitated by the fact that victimization is a statistically rare event.

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**EXEMPLARY PROJECT: Seattle Community Crime Prevention Program**

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