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MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT

Project: Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the 1960's and early 1970's, the juvenile crime rate was increasing with great speed in frequency and seriousness. At the same time, the manpower of the New Orleans Police Department Juvenile Division was decreasing. A Special Task Force report provided the impetus for a specialized enforcement unit funded through the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. The unit was designed to deal with the two problem areas.

Definition and Study Objectives

The Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component (JDEC) represented an attempt to deal with the increasing juvenile crime problem by increasing manpower in the Juvenile Division by means of a specialized enforcement unit and creating innovative investigatory techniques.

Two previous evaluation reports have concentrated on (1) program development and (2) programmatic accomplishments and preliminary impact. This final evaluation report focuses on project history and evaluates its functions as they relate to the juvenile crime problem in New Orleans.

Programmatic Functions

In a primarily descriptive analysis, the programmatic functions are viewed as a means of assessing whether or not

the project is operating in a manner consistent with the planning document and grants management procedures. The evaluator concludes that both administrative and fiscal management have been accomplished in a timely and efficient manner.

In the discussion of programmatic goals and objectives, the following analyses are made:

- (1) Deployment of JDEC officers is consistent with the goals and objectives of creating an investigatory unit.
- (2) Fifteen percent of all arrests made by JDEC were of adults; nearly half of adult arrests were for offenses targeted by the unit.
- (3) The majority of juvenile arrests (70%) were for target offenses which generally require investigation.
- (4) Significant numbers of escapees from juvenile correctional institutions have been apprehended by JDEC officers, thus further satisfying programmatic goals and objectives.
- (5) JDEC has successfully reduced the backlog of court warrants by serving the warrants and returning those unserviceable warrants to the Court.
- (6) The JDEC has developed several investigative aids.
- (7) Overtime expenditures provided by grant funds resulted in increased coverage by field officers.
- (8) A discussion of changes in the arrest/offense ratio.
- (9) JDEC officers have been responsible for a variety of other activities within the New Orleans Police Department.

Conclusions

The evaluator concludes that the primary goals of JDEC have been accomplished during the 31 months of operation. By following the objectives specified in the grant application, the unit was able to create "an enforcement system for juveniles" emphasizing "intensive research and investigation for all crimes believed to be committed by juveniles; the construction of appropriate data files; and the improvement in the transfer of information between the Juvenile Court system and the Juvenile Division."

Secondary goals were directed to the overtime reduction of juvenile crime in New Orleans. The evaluator concludes, from available crime data, that some of the procedures implemented by JDEC have resulted in decreases in juvenile crime; other procedures have "held the line" on the level of juvenile crime.

INTRODUCTION

This report is the third and final impact evaluation study of the Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component (JDEC), which was funded as a discretionary grant under the Target Area Crime Specifics Plan by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The first evaluation report concentrated on project implementation and the development of the evaluation component.¹ The second study emphasized programmatic accomplishments and preliminary impact.² This current study reviews project history and evaluates its functions as they relate to the juvenile crime problem in New Orleans.

This section reviews the project background, describes the project, and reviews evaluation criteria. Section II describes programmatic functions and addresses the program impact by relating programmatic functions to specific areas of the juvenile crime problem. The final section contains the evaluator's conclusions.

¹Target Area Evaluation: A Six Month Report of the Development of Target Area Projects and the Evaluation System, MCJCC, City of New Orleans, July, 1974, p. 39-48.

²Systematic Juvenile Enforcement: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Impact of Investigative Strategies on Juvenile Enforcement, MCJCC, City of New Orleans, December, 1974.

Background

By 1972 the severity of the juvenile crime problem in New Orleans prompted the Mayor to appoint a Special Task Force to study the problem and recommend viable solutions. The Task Force found that the problems were varied and serious in that the number of offenses which were attributable to juveniles had more than doubled as had the number of juvenile arrests. The number of local juveniles arrested as first offenders in 1972 was 72% more than 1960, and the number of repeat offenders remained about the same. Perhaps most serious to the community was the fact that the seriousness of the crimes being committed by juveniles was increasing. The number of homicides, rapes, burglaries, and thefts doubled; and the number of assault and battery and robberies tripled, indicating that the overall increase in juvenile crime was not in the categories of status and nuisance offenses. In addition, the number of juveniles who escaped from correctional institutions increased; and, in the opinion of police administrators, the juveniles committed serious crimes while on escape status.

It was apparent to the Task Force members that conventional methods of juvenile enforcement were not achieving success in retarding the spread of juvenile crime, and the conception and implementation of new and innovative methods of enforcement was required. Prior to the implementation of new techniques, the Task Force recommended the immediate

assignment of more men to the Juvenile Division.³ With only 2.7% of the total manpower complement of the Police Department being assigned to the Juvenile Division, the Division was well below the national standard of 5%. The two problems of increasing juvenile crime and manpower shortages were translated into an action program by the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council through the Target Area Crime Specifics Plan.⁴ Building on a previous experiment conducted by the Commander of the Juvenile Division in 1959, the Crime Specifics Plan suggested the creation of a specialized enforcement unit within the Division.

Project Description

The Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component (JDEC) was approved for LEAA discretionary funds in July, 1973, and became operational in September, 1973. The total budget for the project was \$424,394 of which \$312,493 was LEAA cash, and the balance in-kind match, to be spread out over a two-year period. Subsequent adjustments to the Crime Specifics Plan increased the JDEC budget to \$601,574 of which \$428,078 was LEAA cash and extended its operational period to 31 months.

³ Report of the Mayor's Action Force on Delinquency Prevention, City of New Orleans, November, 1972.

⁴ Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, MCJCC, City of New Orleans, 1972.

The rationale for the project was that with an increase in manpower vis-a-vis overtime payments to officers and vigorous and innovative investigation techniques, juvenile crime in New Orleans would decrease. To this end, a small special squad composed of four investigators and an administrator, with command assistance from a lieutenant and sergeant, was developed in the Juvenile Division. The unit was to concentrate on crimes of burglary and robbery, to apprehend escapees from juvenile correctional institutions, to execute the backlog of juvenile court warrants, and to judiciously allocate overtime funds in order to offset the manpower shortage in the division.

The primary goal for the unit was the creation of an enforcement system which would emphasize intensive research and investigation for all crimes believed to be committed by juveniles, the construction of appropriate data files, and the improvement in the transfer of information between the juvenile court system and the Juvenile Division. Secondary project goals included a short-run increase in arrests for juveniles committing the target crimes, and a long-run decrease in the number of target offenses being committed. The objectives or methods by which these goals were to be reached included the creation and maintenance of picture and slide files of previously arrested juveniles for the purpose of facilitating the identification of suspected juvenile offenders. Secondly, the creation and

maintenance of geographically-based offender files. Third, follow-up investigations were to be performed by JDEC personnel rather than district personnel, and lastly, interaction and cooperation between JDEC and other judicial and planning agencies.

Evaluation Procedures

Because of the system improvement nature of this project, the normal evaluation measures of efficiency and effectiveness are closely related. Measures of efficiency are used to demonstrate the project's ability to adhere to implementation according to the planning document. General measures of efficiency include time from notification of grant award to implementation, allocation of resources, proper activities, and fiscal responsibility. Measures of efficiency answer the question, "Is the project doing what it said it would do?" In the case of JDEC activities, several direct measures will be used and include:

- (1) The number of black and white photographs processed of juveniles.
- (2) The number of color slides processed of juveniles.
- (3) The status of warrants in the Juvenile Division.
- (4) The number of overtime hours used.
- (5) The number of fingerprints taken.

(6) The number of juvenile arrests.

(7) The number of adult arrests.

Whereas measures of efficiency are descriptive, measures of effectiveness are inferential. They attempt to evaluate the impact of project operations upon the target problem. Thus, these measures proceed from a set of hypotheses about what the project should do and, as such, are "end" oriented rather than means oriented.⁵ Individual hypotheses will be restated in relevant portions of this report in the context of the descriptive analysis.

The data used for the evaluation was collected from monthly narrative progress reports submitted by JDEC and the arrest and offense tapes maintained by the EDP Center.

Although research problems exist in all evaluations, two warrant special attention here. The first comes from the term "juvenile crime". Juvenile crime as it is used in this report and as it is generally used is a descriptive term indicating the level of criminal activity juveniles are involved in. However, in operational terms, "juvenile crime" is not easily measured since no accurate measures exist to determine exactly which crimes are committed by juveniles. As a result, "juvenile crime" is measured as the number of offenses cleared by the arrest of a juvenile. Obviously, this is not a measure of all

⁵See Evaluation, December, 1974, p. 10-19.

juvenile criminal activity; however, it is the only reliable measure and can be used as an indicator with some degree of accuracy, although in practice it is really a low estimate.

A second problem is the lack of control groups for JDEC operations. Since the unit operated at-large, no police zones or districts could be used for control purposes. Instead, comparisons must be made on an at-large, before-and-after project implementation basis which severely dilutes possible programmatic impact. However, in some instances where the unit participated in special short-term operations, it is possible to show short-run impact.

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PROGRAMMATIC FUNCTIONS

In order to determine whether the project is operational and adhering to the planning document and grants management procedures, it is necessary to view programmatic functions. This analysis is primarily descriptive in that it views progress made toward operationalizing the objectives or program methods. These descriptive measures or measures of efficiency, when related to overall juvenile crime, will be used to assess program impact. Other variables such as the actions of juvenile court, implementation of juvenile serving programs and population have been discussed in previous reports; and it should suffice here to restate that the impact of JDEC is relative to these other influences. While the efficiency of the unit can be treated straightforwardly, the potential for impact must be viewed as only one element in a complex set of intervening factors in the juvenile justice system.

Administration and Fiscal Responsibility

The grant award for JDEC was received on July 15, 1973, and funding was released during August, 1973. By September, all equipment was ordered, personnel were in place, and operations began. Definitions of tasks and operating procedures were formally developed during September, and the result has been used as an operating manual.

Monthly narrative progress reports began in September and since then have been submitted in a timely and efficient manner. Fiscal management and the submission of quarterly fiscal reports have been completed at an optimal level. There were three grant adjustment requests during the discretionary period, and each was submitted correctly and subsequently approved. Table 1 gives a brief financial summary for the project based on its revised budget. Funds were expended in the categories budgeted with the bulk of funds being allocated for personnel costs. Expenditures for supplies include items mostly related to the photographic capability of the unit, such as film, developing materials, and processing costs. Other expenses under supplies include gas and maintenance for the unit's automobiles. Non-recurring costs are included in the equipment category and consist of major expenses for the purchase of automobiles and UHF radios.

The overall administration for the project was professionally accomplished both in terms of grants management and operations scheduling.

Personnel Deployment

Since the unit's primary goal was to establish an investigatory unit, the allocation of personnel time should clearly reflect time spent by officers on investigation. Table 2 shows the distribution of time spent by officers

Table 1

JDEC FINANCIAL SUMMARY

March 31, 1976

Item	TOTAL GRANT FUNDS			LEAA CASH ONLY		
	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures	Balance
Personnel	\$553,414	\$553,324	\$90	\$407,502	\$407,475	\$27
Equipment	\$ 19,715	\$ 19,715	-0-	\$ 19,615	\$ 19,615	-0-
Supplies	\$ 956	\$ 955	\$ 1	\$ 956	\$ 955	\$ 1
Other Direct	\$ 27,114	\$ 27,114	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
Indirect	\$ 20,375	\$ 20,375	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	\$601,574	\$601,483	\$91	\$428,073	\$428,045	\$28

Note: Total grant funds includes both LEAA cash and City in-kind match

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Table 2

JDEC OFFICER ACTIVITIES
September, 1973 - March, 1976

ACTIVITY	HOURS	% OF TOTAL
Investigations	13,049.25	60.3%
Patrol High Crime Areas	7,248.00	33.5%
Pedestrian Checks	332.25	1.5%
Residence Checks	287.00	1.3%
Vehicle Checks	130.00	<1.0%
General Assignment and Emergency	66.50	<1.0%
Mardi Gras	515.00	2.4%
Meetings	28.25	<1.0%
TOTAL	21,656.25	100%

Note: This summary includes only time spent by the four detectives assigned to JDEC exclusive of overtime

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by category of activity. More than 60% of the officers' time was spent on investigations, with the bulk of the remaining time being spent patrolling those areas of the city which were identified by the Research and Planning Division of the New Orleans Police Department as potential areas for juvenile crime occurrence. Thus, deployment of JDEC officers is consistent with the programmatic goals and objectives of creating an investigatory unit.

Adult Arrests

Because of the complex nature of police work, it is not possible for officers in special units to ignore criminal activity which might be observed even though that activity is not directly their concern. As a result, officers of the JDEC have made arrests of adult suspects. Many of those arrests were made jointly with the arrests of juveniles or on leads supplied directly by the juvenile at the time of arrest. In some cases, the juvenile may have been the victim. Although barely 15% of all arrests made by JDEC officers were on adults, this activity does figure prominently in their activities. Table 3 shows the type of offenses for which adults were arrested by JDEC and those figures are exclusive of warrant arrests. It should be pointed out that 49% of all adult arrests were for the offenses being specifically targeted by the unit.

Table 3

ADULT ARRESTS BY JDEC OFFICERS

OFFENSE	NUMBER	% OF TOTAL
Burglary	37	28%
Robbery	27	21%
Theft	15	11%
Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor	15	11%
Drugs	11	8%
Other Violent Crimes	21	16%
Other Property Crimes	6	5%
TOTAL	132	100%

Juvenile Arrests

Since the arrest of juveniles for target offenses is one of the primary responsibilities of the unit, importance should be placed on this activity. The number of local juvenile arrests increased steadily during the 1960's and early 1970's. The number of arrest incidents involving local youth increased by 95% from 1960 to 1972. During the period immediately preceding the grant award for JDEC, the average yearly increase in the arrest incidents for local youth was 8.63% per year as is illustrated in Table 4. Since JDEC operations began, there has been an average decrease per year of 5.56%. One commonly accepted hypothesis about arrest rates is rejected in this case. That hypothesis states that increased emphasis on law enforcement should dramatically increase the number of arrests in the short run. The alternative hypothesis for this project is that because of improved investigative techniques, the number of arrest incidents will decrease because fewer juveniles will be initially arrested who are subsequently not charged. In effect, improved investigatory techniques will reduce or eliminate what is generally called "dragnet operations" in which investigation follows arrest.

Eighty-five percent of all JDEC arrests were on juveniles, and Table 5 shows the breakdown by offense category excluding Juvenile Court warrants. Seventy percent of all arrests made were for the target offenses of burglary,

Table 4

LOCAL JUVENILE ARREST INCIDENTS

Year	Number	Difference	
		(F)	(%)
1967	4,195	-	-
1968	5,012	+817	+19.47
1969	5,838	+826	+16.48
1970	6,390	+552	+ 9.45
1971	6,525	+135	+ 2.11
1972	6,243	-282	- 4.32
1973	5,288	-995	-15.29
1974	4,971	-317	- 5.99
1975	5,199	+228	+ 4.58

Table 5

JUVENILE ARRESTS BY JDEC OFFICERS

Offense	Number	% of Total
Burglary	321	36%
Robbery	165	18%
Escape	148	16%
Theft	123	14%
Other Violent Offenses	66	7%
Status and Nuisance	51	6%
Drugs	17	2%
Other Property Offenses	12	1%
TOTAL	903	100%

robbery, and escape. Minor, status and nuisance offenses accounted for only 7% of arrests. This indicates that because of the proper allocation of time and resources that results in the form of arrests for target offenses occur. The offenses targeted are those normally requiring a considerable amount of investigation and follow-up.

Property Recovered

As a result of the above mentioned arrests, stolen property valued at approximately \$75,745 was turned over to the juvenile court for return to victims.

Escapees

The apprehension of escapees from Louisiana's juvenile correctional institutions was a serious concern of JDEC. Since New Orleans is responsible for most of the inmates of these institutions, New Orleans escapees are more highly represented. Escape status per se is only one part of the problem, since it is the consensus of juvenile officers that escapees commit numerous offenses while on escape status. Thus, the early notification of and swift apprehension of escapees is an essential element in reducing juvenile crime. JDEC has been responsible for the apprehension of 148 escapees, and this accounts for 16% of all JDEC arrests. Figures from the Department of Corrections indicate that at the end of the discretionary grant period, only 6 escapees

from the New Orleans area were still at large; and it is suspected that most of these did not return to the area after escape. JDEC officers believe that the vigorous apprehension of escapees has had a residual effect on potential escapees by making escape less attractive to them because of the certainty of apprehension.

Warrants

One of the problems existing in the Juvenile Division at the time of grant inception was the backlog created by unserved adult and juvenile warrants. JDEC was able to reduce the backlog of 400 unserved warrants to 110 within several months of operations. Procedures were then established to have those warrants which could not be served, such as those where the subject had moved, returned to court for disposition. Procedures were also implemented for notification to JDEC for warrants that had been recalled. Since the backlog reduction, 1,230 warrants have been received by JDEC, of which 35% were for adults and 65% for juveniles. Fifty-three percent of the warrants received were successfully served, with the balance being returned to the court.

Investigative Aids

An integral component of the JDEC concept was the development of investigative aids which would assist in the

arrest of juveniles and/or clearances of offenses believed to have been committed by juveniles. Aids were designed to assist officers in systematically investigating leads and enable them to perform follow-up investigations in cases where there were and were not witnesses to the incident. Several investigative aids were developed or implemented by JDEC for that purpose.

With the cooperation of the Research and Planning Division and the Data Processing Section of the New Orleans Police Department, a geographically-based offender file was developed and implemented. This character trait or "CT" file has as its rationale that juvenile offenders tend to commit offenses near their residence. With this in mind, juveniles are sorted into the police zones of their residence; and information relevant to fingerprints, photographs, sociological characteristics, and police record is computerized. When an offense occurs in a particular zone, the investigating officer can request a print-out of previously arrested juveniles in that area. By doing this, the officer can pin-point likely suspects based on previous behavior or eyewitness descriptions. If this does not prove fruitful, the officer can request a print-out of an adjacent zone and so-on until he has exhausted the possibilities this file has to offer. In some cases where the actual suspect is not identified from the file, leads furnished during this investigation will lead to the apprehension of the proper individual.

As mentioned above, fingerprints are an essential part of the CT file. During the project life, 1,774 fingerprints were taken of arrested subjects. Facilities were established at the Juvenile Division which greatly enhance this process. Fingerprints as an investigative tool are especially important in those cases where there is normally no eyewitness, such as burglary. During the first year of operations, 18 juveniles were arrested as a result of latent fingerprint identification. Since that time, the use of fingerprint identification has ceased pending a ruling of the State Attorney General concerning this technique.

A photographic capability is an indispensable investigative aid in those cases where an eyewitness is present. JDEC instituted two types of photographic capabilities to the division. Both black and white (mug shots) and color slides are made of juveniles at the time of arrest. Black and white prints are used in the traditional manner for suspect identification, and 2,634 photographs have been made by project personnel. The use of color slides is an innovation necessitated by laws protecting juveniles from personally appearing in "show up" or "line up" procedures. As an alternative, color slides are projected which correspond to the height, color, clothing, etc. of the suspect; and the witness or victim has a clear representation from which to make an identification. During the project, color slides were made on 2,288 juveniles. Photographic displays

Table 6

POSITIVE ID'S FROM PHOTO DISPLAYS

Offense	Number	% of Total
Armed Robbery	32	40%
Simple Robbery	28	35%
Simple Burglary	7	9%
Attempted Armed Robbery	3	4%
Aggravated Burglary	3	4%
Aggravated Battery	2	3%
Kidnapping	1	1%
Aggravated Rape	1	1%
Attempted Aggravated Rape	1	1%
Simple Battery	1	1%
Attempted Murder	1	1%
TOTAL	80	100%

were used 235 times and resulted in 80 positive identifications. Eighty-eight percent of all positive identifications were for the target offenses, thus emphasizing their utility as an aid where follow-up investigation is necessary. Photo identifications were responsible for about 15% of all JDEC arrests for burglary and robbery.

Manpower

The judicious use of overtime funds by JDEC was an attempt to offset the manpower shortages existing in the division. By taking the number of hours in a normal work week (H) and the number of overtime hours used (O) and the number of weeks in the period (W), it is possible to translate the overtime figure into an approximate additional manpower figure. In the preliminary report on this project, it was determined that approximately 11.5 additional men resulted from the use of overtime. For the period September, 1974, through March, 1976, approximately 11.8 men were added using the computational method below:

$$T = \frac{O}{H \times W}$$
$$T = \frac{36,726.5}{40 \times 78} = \frac{36,726.5}{3,120} = 11.77$$

By rounding off, it can be estimated that approximately twelve officers were added to the Juvenile Division during the grant period. Two aspects of this suggested manpower increase must be viewed in order to assess its impact on

enforcement operations. First, what effect did it have on total manning; and second, what is the comparative cost for overtime manpower versus additional assigned manpower. One question which is not dealt with here because of its extreme qualitative nature is the comparative effectiveness of officers who are working on overtime and officers entering a shift fresh. It is the opinion of city police administrators that officers on overtime perform at a high level; and, in fact, because of departmental manpower shortages, overtime has become a normal operating procedure. Because of manpower shortages, most, if not all, special units in the New Orleans Police Department are manned on an overtime basis.

As stated in the introduction, the lack of manpower in the Juvenile Division prior to the grant inception was viewed as a major problem and, in fact, was an impetus for the creation of JDEC. It was anticipated that with additional personnel in the Juvenile Division that the problem of juvenile crime could be attacked more efficiently. Table 7 details the Juvenile Division manning from the year 1969 to 1976. Although there have been fluctuations between years, the actual manning is essentially the same as it was prior to grant inception. At the beginning of the grant, the Juvenile Division had 2.7% of the total personnel complement of the New Orleans Police Department. In 1974 it had 2.5% and by the beginning of 1976 had 2.8%. By adding the number of the estimated personnel increase as a result

Table 7

ACTUAL JUVENILE DIVISION MANNING

1/69 - 1/76

	1/69	1/70	1/71	1/72	1/73	1/74	1/75	1/76
Total	42	45	50	44	42	40	36	43
Line Only	22	21	23	26	25	19	21	26

Table 8

ESTIMATED JUVENILE DIVISION MANNING

1/69 - 1/76

	1/69	1/70	1/71	1/72	1/73	1/74	1/75	1/76
Total	42	45	50	44	54	52	48	55
Line Only	22	21	23	26	37	31	33	38

of overtime (Table 8), the percentage changes to 3.3% for 1974 and 3.6% for 1976. While these increases helped, they did not enable the division to reach the 5% figure recommended by the National Standards and Goals.

In operational terms, overtime expenditures did result in increased coverage by field officers. As an example, the actual manning would allow an average of 23 field officers for the division. Breaking this into shifts and not adjusting for days off or holidays, a maximum of seven field officers would be on duty during each shift. Considering that there are eight police districts, this does not even allow coverage for each district. By adding the estimated increase, it is suggested that an average of 35 officers would be available for field assignment or approximately 12 per shift, an increase of 71%. Total division manning, field, rank, administrative, and bicycle section was increased an average of 30%.

Comparative costs of overtime versus regular manning are extremely difficult to compute. Since there is variance in individual officer's pay because of length of service and state supplemental pay, it becomes necessary to generalize. A comparison of costs in this case does not indicate the appropriateness of spending the funds; rather, it is intended as an aid to decision makers concerning future manning in the Juvenile Division. The average pay per officer was computed as a base pay rate for a patrolman

with three years experience, excluding state supplemental pay. Overtime rates were computed as those appropriate for that scale. The cost for an additional twelve officers at regular pay (\$4.51 per hour) during the grant period would have amounted to approximately \$270,600. The cost for the twelve additional men on an overtime basis was \$407,745, or a difference of 34%. If the difference, \$137,145, was used to purchase services at regular time, an additional six officers would be added to the Juvenile Division, thus increasing the total personnel complement by 18, or an average of 46%.

Juvenile Crime

Once new investigative techniques were instituted and personnel was increased via overtime, it would be expected that some impact would be made on the level of juvenile crime. Normally, the expectation would be that there would be a short-term increase in both reported crime and the number of arrests made. Problems arise, however, when considering juvenile crime because reported incidents are not reported or categorized as juvenile or adult. It is only until an arrest of a juvenile has been made and a clearance of a reported incident takes place that an incident is categorized as a juvenile offense. Thus, the only close indicator of "juvenile crime" and the one most commonly used is the number of offenses cleared by the arrest

of a juvenile. By using this method, the process of hypothesizing about expected trends in the increase or decrease of "juvenile crime" becomes meaningless.

For the purpose of example only, consider the following: In New Orleans, the police annually clear by arrest approximately 25% of reported crime. For the purpose of analyzing crime, the figure for reported crime is used. So if 50,000 offenses were found to have been committed in Orleans Parish, that is the figure that would be used to illustrate the extent of crime. (This also would be a low estimate since it does not include non-reported crime.) If the police reported only those offenses cleared by arrest, that figure would drop to 12,500, obviously a low indicator of crime. By reversing this equation somewhat, it is possible to arrive at a hypothetical upper limit for juvenile crime. Suppose there were 5,000 offenses cleared by the arrest of juveniles ("juvenile crime") and suppose the police clear 40% of all offenses committed by juveniles (this assumes juveniles are easier to catch than adults--the percent is arbitrary).


Since using the number of offenses cleared by the arrest of a juvenile (CBA's) is concerned only with those juveniles who got caught, the real utility of this measure is that it can be used to display identifiable juvenile crime. It can reasonably be expected that this identifiable juvenile crime is, in reality, only a low estimate of youthful involvement in crime.

The problem of identifying programmatic impact on juvenile crime is further compounded by the fact that if estimates or projections are made for the actual extent of juvenile crime, the development of categories from the estimated aggregate data would make all conclusions from the data tenuous.

Therefore, the following analysis of JDEC operations as they relate to overall juvenile crime is primarily descriptive. Because most of the offenses to which JDEC devotes its attention are basically follow-up investigations based on leads supplied by others, dramatic shifts in trends could not be expected. Rather, the impact of JDEC will be viewed as its relative participation in the clearances of offenses by the arrest of juveniles.

Juvenile crime as measured by offenses cleared by arrest experienced dramatic increases during the 1960's and early 1970's as is illustrated in Figure 1. In 1973 (the inception of JDEC, this trend began to reverse by decreasing by over 4% in 1973, by over 5% in 1974, and increasing less than 1% in 1975. Since the inception of JDEC, there has been an overall decrease of 9% since 1972. During the two full years of JDEC operations (1974 and 1975), the unit was responsible for clearing 6.9% of all juvenile offenses. Considering the relative size of JDEC and the fact that it concentrates mainly on the more serious juvenile crime or those requiring extensive follow-up investigation, this

Figure 1
TOTAL OFFENSES CLEARED BY THE ARREST OF JUVENILES
1960 - 1975



FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
& PERCENT CHANGE

	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
f	2647	2810	2738	2802	3051	3426	3311	3580	4189	4970	5335	5682	5683	5431	5137	5159
% change		+6.1	-2.5	+2.3	+8.8	+12.2	-3.3	+8.1	+17.0	+18.6	+7.3	+6.5	0	-4.4	-5.4	0

percentage is respectable since the entire Juvenile Division accounts for only 3.6% of the department manpower and JDEC for less than 1%.

Since JDEC was created to target in on specific crimes, it is necessary to view separate categories of offenses and JDEC's contribution. JDEC was to concentrate on the offenses of robbery, burglary, and escape and was to help alleviate the backlog of Juvenile Court warrants.

1. Robbery

The number of robberies cleared by the arrest of a juvenile and their proportion of total CBA's for the years 1970 through 1975 are displayed in Table 9. Since the inception of JDEC, the frequency of robberies cleared experienced an increase initially and experienced a decrease during the last full year of operations. By looking at the proportion to total offenses, at least two possible conclusions can be drawn. One, more youth are committing robberies and getting caught, or more emphasis is being placed on investigative efforts to clear these offenses.

During 1974, JDEC cleared 68 of 306 robberies cleared or 22%. In 1975, it cleared 45 of the 267 or 17%. Within the robbery category, armed robbery is by far the most serious type of offense. Table 10 displays the frequency and proportion of armed robbery from 1970 through 1975. A similar pattern to that of total robberies is apparent. Forty-one percent of all robberies cleared were armed.

Table 9

TOTAL ROBBERIES CLEARED BY THE ARREST OF A JUVENILE

Year	Frequency	% Change	% of Total CBA
1970	251	+39%	4.70%
1971	225	-10%	3.95%
1972	243	+ 8%	4.27%
1973	293	+21%	5.39%
1974	306	+ 4%	5.95%
1975	267	-13%	5.17%

Table 10

ARMED ROBBERIES CLEARED BY THE ARREST OF A JUVENILE

Year	Frequency	% Change	% of Total CBA
1970	112	+103%	2.09%
1971	95	- 15%	1.67%
1972	92	- 3%	1.61%
1973	121	+ 32%	2.22%
1974	125	+ 3%	2.43%
1975	99	- 21%	1.91%

Forty-six percent of all robberies cleared by JDEC were armed, and JDEC cleared 25% of the total armed robberies cleared. The utility of investigative techniques can be seen by the fact that 49% of JDEC armed robberies cleared were as a result of photo identification.

2. Burglary

The number of burglaries cleared by the arrest of a juvenile and the total proportion of CBA's for the years 1970 through 1975 are displayed in Table 11. Although the pattern is similar to that of robbery, the changes are not as great. However, the proportion cleared of total CBA's has remained high since JDEC inception. JDEC efforts cleared 14% of all burglaries in 1974 and 17% in 1975.

3. Escapes

The escape of youth from state institutions has been a continuing problem over the last six years. The importance of apprehending escapees is compounded by the fact that law enforcement officials believe that escapees commit numerous offenses while on escape status. Since New Orleans youth account for the largest percentage of youth detained in state institutions, they correspondingly commit the most escapes. Table 12 displays the recent history of escapes cleared by arrest. At the onset of JDEC in 1973, more escapees were apprehended since 1960. In 1974 and 1975, that number dropped dramatically as did the proportion of

Table 11

BURGLARIES CLEARED BY THE ARREST OF A JUVENILE

Year	Frequency	% Change	% of Total CBA
1970	591	+21%	11.07%
1971	717	+21%	12.61%
1972	629	-12%	11.06%
1973	727	+16%	13.38%
1974	674	- 7%	13.12%
1975	676	N/C	13.10%

Table 12

ESCAPES CLEARED BY THE ARREST OF A JUVENILE

Year	Frequency	% Change	% of Total CBA
1970	191	+34%	3.58%
1971	143	-25%	2.51%
1972	198	+39%	3.48%
1973	260	+31%	4.78%
1974	198	-24%	3.85%
1975	101	-49%	1.95%

escapees of CBA. While escapees are still a problem to New Orleans, it is suggested that their certainty of capture is working to discourage future escapes. During 1974 and 1975, one fourth of the escapees apprehended were caught by JDEC officers.

4. Warrants

The inclusion of warrants in this discussion of offenses is necessitated because those youth picked up as a result of a warrant issued by the Juvenile Court are counted as juvenile offenses. Generally, these warrants are served on youth who have violated the terms of their probation or because they did not appear for their Juvenile Court hearing. Thus, those CBA's as a result of warrants can be viewed as officers acting as representatives of the court rather than clearing an actual offense. Table 13 displays the frequency and proportion of warrant services during the past six years. It is clear that at the inception of JDEC that efforts were made to reduce the backlog of warrants. From 1972 to 1973, the number of warrants successfully served more than doubled. The number, although remaining high, has decreased since the initial impetus. JDEC has assumed almost total responsibility for warrant service, serving 84% of all warrants in 1974 and 99% in 1975.

5. Summary

In each of the categories of offenses for which JDEC was to exert its efforts, there was, by the last year of

Table 13

WARRANTS CLEARED BY THE
ARREST OF A JUVENILE

Year	Frequency	% Change	% of Total CBA
1970	78	+24%	1.46%
1971	118	+51%	2.07%
1972	160	+36%	2.81%
1973	252	+58%	4.64%
1974	231	- 8%	4.49%
1975	198	-14%	3.83%

Table 14

SUMMARY OF JDEC PARTICIPATION IN CBA'S

	1974	1975
Total Offenses CBA	5,137	5,159
JDEC Offenses CBA	323	408
% JDEC of Total	6.28%	7.90%
Total Robberies CBA	306	267
JDEC Robberies CBA	68	45
% JDEC of Total	22.22%	16.85%
Total Armed Robberies CBA	125	99
JDEC Armed Robberies CBA	31	18
% JDEC of Total	24.80%	18.18%
Armed Robbery/Robbery %	45.58%	40.00%
Total Burglaries CBA	674	676
JDEC Burglaries CBA	96	193
% JDEC of Total	14.24%	28.55%
Total Escapes CBA	198	101
JDEC Escapes CBA	47	26
% JDEC of Total	23.73%	25.74%
Total Warrants CBA	231	198
JDEC Warrants CBA	193	195
% JDEC	83.54%	98.48%

the discretionary grant period, a reduction in the amount of identifiable juvenile crime. The extent of juvenile crime is a result of numerous and complex variables, of which enforcement is only one. The operations of JDEC have been clearly aimed at reducing the target crimes and share in those factors causing a decrease relative to their participation.

Arrest/Offense Ratio

Lacking an adequate measure for offenses, an alternative measure was suggested. It was hypothesized that if the project was effective, the relationship of offenses cleared to arrest (arrest/offense ratio) would narrow significantly and perhaps reverse itself. That is, the number of clearances would exceed the number of arrests for a finite period of time or more probably, the gap between the two would close. Underlying this hypothesis are the following assumptions:

First, improvements in the investigative techniques are designed to reduce the number of arrests. Particularistic investigative aids, i.e., fingerprints, photo identification, geographically-based offender files, should narrow the range of suspects to be arrested, therefore reducing the number of arrests needed for clearance.

Second, the investigative techniques are intended to result in the increased arrest of multiple offenders,

whose incarceration will clear several additional cases. The multiple offender is defined as that youth who commits several offenses whether or not he is caught as a first offender arrestee or a repeater. A repeater, on the other hand, is that youth who has more than one arrest.

Third, given the unknown number of offenses actually committed by juveniles, the upper limit of offenses susceptible to clearance (by the arrest of a juvenile) may be far greater than the level of cases presently being cleared.


Fourth, the best available historical indicator of the arrest of a multiple offender is the percentage of repeaters that have been arrested. This percentage has remained relatively stable for local juvenile residents during the years 1960 through the early 1970's. A rise in the percentage of repeaters being arrested would have implied either an improvement in investigative techniques or a shift in the nature of the juvenile criminal element.

The introduction of new investigatory techniques should result in an increase of repeater arrests and multiple offender arrests. The effect of this increase will be to narrow the ratio between arrests and offenses cleared as was hypothesized.

In order to test this hypothesis and its component assumptions, several methods are used. Figure 2 shows the arrest and offense history from 1967 through 1975. From 1967 through 1972, the average difference between the number

Figure 2

JUVENILE ARRESTS AND CLEARANCES
1967 - 1975



	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
Arrest f	4520	5416	6323	6907	7199	7002	5949	5497	5721
CRA f	3579	4189	4970	5335	5682	5683	5431	5137	5159
Difference	941	1227	1353	1572	1517	1319	518	360	562
Ratio	1.26	1.29	1.28	1.29	1.27	1.23	1.10	1.07	1.10

of juvenile arrests and offenses cleared was 1,321 or, stated differently, there was an average of 1.27 arrests to clear one offense. Beginning in 1973, after the inception of JDEC, the difference between the number of juveniles arrested and the number of offenses cleared narrowed significantly. The average difference since JDEC inception was 480 or 1.09 arrests for every clearance. This means that fewer arrests are necessary to clear an offense. This difference, although attributed to improved investigative strategies, is difficult to prove based on available data. It was assumed that changes would appear in the distribution of first offenders and repeaters and in the proportion of multiple offenders.

Table 15 and Figures 3 and 4 show a breakdown of the relationship between local first offender and repeater arrests from 1970 to 1975. When considering first offender and repeater arrests as a proportion of arrest incidents (Table 15 (1)), it can be seen that repeaters account for fewer arrests in 1975 than they did in 1970, although the change is slight. When considering first offenders and repeaters as a proportion of individuals arrested (Table 15 (2)), it is apparent that the relationship has remained fairly constant through the entire period. Thus, little change in the distribution of first offenders and repeaters can be seen since the inception of JDEC activities.

Table 15.

LOCAL FIRST OFFENDER
AND REPEATER ARRESTS


1) % of Total Arrest Incidents

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
First Offender	31.75	30.85	30.05	31.95	34.60	36.55
Repeater	68.25	69.15	69.95	68.05	65.40	63.45

2) % of Individuals Arrested

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
First Offender	60.68	60.77	59.29	58.70	59.68	60.50
Repeater	39.32	39.23	40.71	41.30	40.32	39.50


Figure 3
 LOCAL REPEATER ARRESTS (INDIVIDUALS)
 1960 - 1975



FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
 & PERCENT CHANGE
 PERCENT OF TOTAL LOCAL INDIVIDUAL ARRESTS

	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
f	1205	859	919	1191	975	1057	1039	1043	1150	1221	1315	1299	1288	1188	1162	1240
% change		-28.7	+6.9	+29.5	-18.1	+8.4	-1.7	+3	+10.2	+6.1	+7.6	-1.2	-.8	-7.7	-2.1	+6.7
Repeaters Local ind. arrests	52.4%	41.4%	41.4%	46.5%	40.2%	42.1%	40.7%	39.5%	41.5%	43.3%	39.3%	39.2%	40.7%	41.2%	40.3%	39.5%

Figure 4
 LOCAL FIRST OFFENDER ARRESTS (INDIVIDUALS)
 1960 - 1975



FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
 & PERCENT CHANGE
 & PERCENT OF TOTAL LOCAL INDIVIDUAL ARRESTS

	'60	'61	'62	'63	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75
f	1093	1213	1298	1366	1448	1448	1511	1596	1620	1806	2029	2013	1876	1689	1720	1900
% change		+11.0	+7.0	+5.2	+5.8	+.1	+4.3	+5.6	+1.5	+11.4	+12.3	-.7	-6.8	-9.9	+1.8	+10.5
1st Offenders Local ind arrests	47.5%	58.5%	58.5%	53.4%	59.7%	57.8%	59.2%	60.4%	58.4%	59.6%	60.6%	60.7%	59.2%	58.7%	59.6%	60.5%

A second method can be used to test the hypothesis which does not make the assumption that a strong correlation exists between repeaters and multiple offenders. This is accomplished by using the charge file or the number of charges resulting from the arrest of juveniles (not clearances). Table 16 displays the number of arrests, the number of charges resulting from the arrests, and their ratio. As can be seen from this summary data, fewer arrests are being made, yet more charges are resulting from the arrests. One explanation for this is that juvenile arrestees, whether first offenders or repeaters, are being charged as multiple offenders. While the bulk of arrestees are only charged with one offense, Table 17 shows the distribution of charges for the arrestees. The distribution has changed slightly during the period, indicating that proportionately more juvenile arrestees are having more than one charge filed against them.

Since the changes evidenced, except for the arrest/offense ratio, are slight, it is suggested that the operations of JDEC have not reached the scope to dramatically alter the historical pattern. It should be remembered that JDEC operates with only four full-time field officers and that these officers are concerned primarily with follow-up investigations. If the operations of JDEC officers are viewed as separate from the Juvenile Division as a whole, the following information results.

Table 16

CHARGES RESULTING FROM JUVENILE ARRESTS

Year	Charges	Arrests	Ratio
1970	7,637	6,907	1:11
1971	8,209	7,199	1:14
1972	8,159	7,002	1:17
1973	7,802	5,949	1:31
1974	7,115	5,497	1:29
1975	7,048	5,721	1:23

Table 17

DISTRIBUTION OF CHARGE FREQUENCIES BY PERCENTAGE

Number of Charges During Year	1972	1973	1974	1975
1 only	69.2	65.8	64.6	62.8
2 or more	30.8	34.2	34.4	37.2
3 or more				
Range	1-36	1-50	1-33	1-35

During the 31 months of operation, JDEC officers effected 903 juvenile arrest incidents and by these arrests cleared 918 cases. Thus, JDEC not only narrowed the gap between arrests and offenses, it reversed the relationship in those instances where it had primary responsibility. By using the JDEC data, two elements of the juvenile crime problem which can affect hypotheses and projections become apparent. First is the instance of one youth committing numerous offenses and second, groups of youth being arrested for one offense.⁶ Table 18 illustrates the number of arrests effected to clear offenses by type of offense in these cases except where a one to one relationship was noted. This display illustrates how the arrest/offense ratio can be effected by the type of offense being cleared and the effects of elements of one youth versus several youths committing offenses. Extreme examples are the youth whose arrest cleared 47 cases of issuing worthless checks and 7 youth being arrested to clear one case of negligent homicide.

Other Activities

JDEC personnel have coordinated their activities with both the Headquarters Division and the Research and

⁶This second element is generally associated with urban juvenile gangs. While the presence of gangs in New Orleans is not viewed as a serious problem, it is not uncommon for groups of youth to be involved in one offense.

Table 18 .

JDEC ARRESTS PER OFFENSES BY TYPE

Offense	Arrests	Cases
Simple Burglary	312	364
Aggravated Burglary	8	7
Armed Robbery	71	60
Attempted Armed Robbery	6	4
Simple Robbery	88	82
Theft	97	77
Aggravated Battery	25	20
Molesting Pedestrians	13	6
Loitering in an Alcoholic Beverage Outlet	3	1
Runaways	10	9
Negligent Homicide	7	1
Weapons	12	11
Possessing Marijuana	17	14
Auto Theft	26	19
Possessing Stolen Property	4	3
Loitering, Causing Alarm	19	13
Simple Battery	14	12
Attempted Simple Arson	3	1
Worthless Checks	1	47

Planning Division of the New Orleans Police Department and in both cases followed up leads supplied to them. In conjunction with Research and Planning, specific areas of the city were forecasted as likely crime areas, and patrol activity by JDEC fluctuated among these areas. In addition, JDEC personnel have been instrumental in establishing positive relationships with outside agencies such as the School Board, Juvenile Court, and youth-serving agencies. They have also cooperated with other agencies of the city in attempting to implement change in the juvenile justice system through participation on advisory boards, workshops, and seminars. Further, members have represented the city at the state capitol during the legislative sessions.

One of the most extensive special projects implemented by JDEC was "Operation Crime Prevention - Back to School". There was a belief by juvenile officers that a strong correlation existed between truancy and crime. Officers were instructed to ascertain reasons for juveniles being on the streets during school hours and loitering in high crime areas. The juveniles' names and reasons for absenteeism were transmitted to the Orleans Parish school system, the District Attorney, and the Juvenile Court. In some cases, parents were called directly to notify them of their child's absenteeism. The juveniles were not arrested unless they were in the act of committing an offense; and the agencies notified were expected to take remedial action. In those

areas of the city where this experiment was carried out, there was a short-term drop in the frequency of crime, particularly burglary, in some cases up to a 30% reduction.

III
CONCLUSIONS

Federal Review

On March 19, 1975, the program was visited by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Dallas Regional Office monitor, for the purpose of preparing an on-site monitoring report. This report was completed on April 14, 1975, and was subsequently forwarded to this office by the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement during June, 1976.⁷

The monitoring report was very positive concerning program operations, and it was recommended that it be given approval to extend its operations. The approval was subsequently granted.

Evaluation Follow-Up

Three recommendations were made in the preliminary evaluation of this project in December, 1974. The first recommendation concerned the process by which warrants were maintained at the Juvenile Division. It was suggested that procedures be established with the Juvenile Court which would enable JDEC to return unserviceable or recalled warrants to the court. This procedure was instituted.

⁷U. S. Government memorandum, Department of Justice, LEAA, April 14, 1975, "On-Site Monitoring Report, 72-DF-06-0042-TA-7, Juvenile Delinquency Enforcement Component," from R06 Juvenile Delinquency Specialist, Frank M. Porpotage.

A second recommendation concerned the relationship of the Juvenile Division to youth-serving agencies in the New Orleans area. The Juvenile Division Commander and officers of JDEC have been involved in numerous meetings with youth-serving agency personnel and have made literature available at the Juvenile Division concerning the availability of these services.

The final recommendation was directed more toward police administrators rather than the Juvenile Division. It was suggested that the preliminary report indicated a need for additional full-time officers to be assigned to the Juvenile Division. Because of manpower shortages within the entire police department, this recommendation was not accomplished.

Summary and Conclusions

Within two months of grant notification, JDEC was operational. The administrative ability to quickly implement the project was carried through the project life as a result of proper grants management and fiscal responsibility. All components of the project were implemented; and activities were maintained at a high level, resulting in an integrated, innovative enforcement system for juveniles. Through the proper allocation of overtime funds, the manpower complement of the division was increased so that better coverage by officers would result in more positive investigative

attempts. The construction of appropriate data and photographic files has demonstrated its usefulness as an investigative aid. Positive relationships developed with other divisions and outside agencies have increased the city's ability to react to the juvenile crime problem because of the atmosphere of cooperativeness.

The primary goal of JDEC has been accomplished during the 31 months of operation by following the objectives contained in the grant application. The primary goal of JDEC was "the creation of an enforcement system for juveniles" emphasizing "intensive research and investigation for all crimes believed to be committed by juveniles; the construction of appropriate data files; and the improvement in the transfer of information between the Juvenile Court system and the Juvenile Division." All of the following objectives or methods were used to accomplish this goal.

- (1) The creation and maintenance of both picture and slide files of previously arrested juveniles for the purpose of facilitating the identification of suspected juvenile offenders.
- (2) The creation and maintenance of geographically-based offender files for the purpose of speeding the investigatory process. These files will be created through the cooperation of the Data Processing Department of the New Orleans Police Department.

- (3) The practice of follow-up investigation (by members of the division, rather than district personnel) as a means of increasing arrest/crime ratios. Intense investigations will focus upon designated target areas.

- (4) The increased interaction with Police Planners and CJCC personnel for the purpose of defining new approaches to investigative and administrative procedures to be used with juvenile offenders.

The secondary and tertiary goals of the project were directed toward the overtime reduction of juvenile crime in New Orleans. It has been shown in Section II that both the number of arrests for juvenile offenders and the number of offenses cleared by the arrest of a juvenile have been less since the inception of JDEC. Further, those offenses requiring intensive follow-up investigation (and those targeted by JDEC) such as robbery and burglary experienced increases in the short-run and during the last year of JDEC operations experienced decreases. The more subtle aspects of the juvenile crime problem, i.e., repeaters and multiple offenders, have been more difficult to analyze, therefore making conclusions based on their analyses inconclusive. It appears that JDEC has not eliminated juvenile crime in New Orleans but has instituted procedures which, in some

cases, have resulted in decreases and in others, held the line on juvenile crime. The procedures and policies of JDEC appear to be leading toward improved methods which could be instituted in the Juvenile Division as a whole.

END