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TIME, TRIAL AND TERROR:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PALESTINIAN  
GUERRILLA REVOLUTION

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## ABSTAINER

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY  
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TITLE: Time, Trial and Terror: An Analysis of the  
Palestinian Guerrilla Revolution

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This paper analyzes the Palestinian guerrilla revolution by comparison with criteria found in the extensive literature on guerrilla movements. Criteria selected for analysis are a unifying cause, charismatic and intellectual leadership, credibility and unity. A review of the history and organization of the Palestinian movement indicates that it satisfies all of the criteria except unity. Failure to resolve internal ideological differences threatens the Palestinian quest for nationhood at a time when a general Middle East settlement could award territory given up by Israel to the Palestinians. Realization of nationhood depends on the neutralization of the radical guerrilla leaders. Available evidence suggests continuing terrorism and assassination which might produce unity essential for responsible government, but could also lead to fragmentation of the movement and continued instability in the Middle East.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Nineteen seventy-four was a year of spectacular success for the Palestinian national movement. During Secretary Kissinger and President Nixon's tour of the Middle East in June after the Moscow summit, each Arab leader singled out the Palestinian question as the major issue for peace, a stark testimonial to Arab closing of ranks.<sup>1</sup> This was followed by a rapid series of events which propelled the Palestinians to the center of international attention, giving them an aura of legitimacy and a pivotal role in any future Middle East settlement. In September, the United Nations General Assembly decided to debate the "Question of Palestine." In October, the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate spokesman for all Palestinians, stipulating that the PLO should establish a "national authority" over any territory recovered from Israel. In November, the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat, was invited to address the UN General Assembly. Arafat made a triumphal appearance, being accorded the protocol of a head of state, and was acclaimed enthusiastically by third world delegates. He disdained moderation, addressing the UN with a holster apparently bulging under his traditional

Arab garb, and called for the replacement of Israel by a secular state in which "Jews, Christians, and Muslims may live in equality, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, free from racial or religious discrimination."<sup>2</sup> A few weeks later, third world delegations overwhelmed United States and Israeli opposition (with the abstention of the nations of the European Common Market) to pass by large majorities resolutions affirming the Palestinian people's right to "national independence and sovereignty" and observer status at future General Assembly sessions.

The award of political legitimacy to the PLO had two immediate consequences which appear to have damaged prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement and a Palestinian state. The first was a rupture of Palestinian unity, evidenced by a resumption of terrorism. Arafat's triumphal New York appearance immediately precipitated a rejectionist front in the PLO opposed to any settlement with Israel. A terrorist hijacking at Tunis and a particularly brutal attack on the Israeli village of Bet She'an underscored the inability of the PLO to control the fedayeen,\* and opened the question of whether the Palestinians can make

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\*The Arab term for Palestinian guerrillas, meaning men of sacrifice.

the transition from terrorist opposition to responsible government.

The second adverse consequence was intensification of Israeli opposition to a negotiated settlement.<sup>3</sup> Israel responded to increased terrorism by mounting air and ground operations against fedayeen bases in Lebanon. Israeli officials reiterated their refusal to negotiate with the PLO, whom Premier Yitzhak Rabin characterizes as "terrorist organizations whose avowed aim is the destruction of Israel."<sup>4</sup> The PLO ascendancy has thus pushed both the Arabs and Israelis toward hard line positions, jeopardizing Secretary Kissinger's efforts to promote constructive compromises that could yield a lasting settlement at Geneva.<sup>5</sup>

Since legitimate political status for the PLO has seemingly dimmed the prospects for a Palestinian state established as part of an Arab-Israeli settlement, the viability of the Palestinian national movement remains a perplexing question. Is it an authentic guerrilla revolution, inexorably mobilizing the forces of nationalism into irresistible momentum; or are the Palestinians destined for absorption within the Arab countries, defeated by the immovable obstacle of a more dynamic Zionist nationalism? The purpose of this paper is to address these questions

by an analysis of the Palestinian guerrilla revolution and its future prospects. The criteria on which the analysis will hinge have been distilled from the voluminous literature which has blossomed with the proliferation of guerrilla revolutions since World War II. The following elements have been cited consistently as indispensable for a successful revolutionary movement:

- . A unifying cause
- . Charismatic and intellectual leadership
- . Credibility and effectiveness
- . Unity

In subsequent chapters each of these topics is treated as a whole, first summarizing the theory, then evaluating the Palestinian movements against the theory. With this background some conclusions are then drawn in the final chapter on the viability of the movement, in particular the prospects for forming a responsible government on recovered territory, and the outlook if Palestinian national aspirations are denied or indefinitely delayed.



## CHAPTER II

### THE CAUSE

The abundant literature accompanying the proliferation of guerrilla revolutions since World War II has a common underpinning in the socialist doctrine of Marx, Lenin and Mao.<sup>1</sup> Later theorists and practitioners such as Guevara, Giap, Debray or Marighela all acknowledge these basic sources, and adapt the general theory to the political and economic conditions in a particular area. Therefore all writings stress that the basic premise for successful guerrilla revolution is to mobilize the masses of the people behind the guerrilla political goals or cause. According to Mao:

The mobilization of the people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things.<sup>2</sup>

The guerrilla mobilizes the masses by fighting for a political goal--or cause--which is tangible and significant to the people:

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political aspirations do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and sympathy cannot be gained.<sup>3</sup>

"The cause" gives the guerrilla a mystique and the cloak of "moral superiority" which distinguishes him from

a bandit by condoning violent, criminal acts as historically right and just.<sup>4</sup> For ultimate success the revolutionary cause must also possess a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the opposition, since victory generally is not envisioned through military means, but by erosion of the will of the opponent. According to J. Bowyer Bell, an eminent American scholar of guerrilla movements:

The revolutionary cause must represent an alternative legitimacy, however distasteful, or anticipate an adamant refusal of the opponent to lose heart. If the revolutionary has the power to force victory, then his legitimacy in alien eyes is immaterial, but most guerrilla-revolutionaries begin from a self-confessed position of weakness.<sup>5</sup>

To date the most fertile setting for a guerrilla revolution has been against colonial occupation as in Vietnam, Algeria or Angola. A variation of this context is the socioeconomic imperialism of communist ideology in which the masses rally against indigenous regimes which are "imperialist" by virtue of "capitalistic corruption." China and Cuba fit this model, but the experience of Che Guevara and others in South America illustrates the problems of inciting an anti-colonial revolution from outside:

Thus the guerrilla movements in Guatemala and Venezuela, in Bolivia and Uruguay, all failed even though they faced weak governments and ineffective regular armies, even though they had the Cuban example to guide them, and even though

social conditions were certainly conducive to revolutions. On the other hand, against foreign enemies, however strong, even weak guerrilla movements, lacking direction and military experience, have frequently succeeded. For the colonial powers have had to cope with the pressure of public opinion at home (Britain in Cyprus and Palestine), or with international condemnation (Portugal), and sooner or later have decided that the game was not worth the candle--and this despite the fact that they rarely suffered decisive military defeat.<sup>6</sup>

The Palestinians have scrupulously adhered to the imperative of articulating revolutionary political goals to mobilize the people. The cause is the central theme of the speeches and publications of the PLO and the fedayeen leaders. The goals of the movement were codified in the Palestinian National Covenant, which was approved by the First Palestinian Congress in 1964, and amended in 1968 by the Palestinian National Council. The Council delegates represented Palestinian organizations throughout the Arab world and the occupied territories, including the major fedayeen groups. The covenant thus constitutes a seriously deliberated manifesto accepted in 1968 by all Palestinian factions.<sup>7</sup> The articles of the covenant which define the Palestinian cause include the following:

Article 1 - Palestine is the homeland of the Palestinian Arab People and an integral part of the great Arab homeland, and the people of Palestine are a part of the Arab nation.

.....

Article 3 - The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to its homeland, and when the

liberation of its homeland is completed it will exercise self-determination. . . .

Article 4 - The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent characteristic that does not disappear. . . the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the disasters which came over it do not deprive it of its Palestinian personality and affiliation and do not nullify them.

.....

Article 6 - Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

.....

Article 9 - Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. . . .

.....

Article 15 - The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab view point, is a national duty to repulse the Zionist, imperialist invasion. . . . Its full responsibilities fall upon the Arab nation, peoples and governments, with the Palestinian Arab people at their head.

.....

Article 22 - Zionism is a political movement organically related to world imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatical movement in its formation, aggressive, expansionist and colonialist in its aims . . . . Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for world imperialism. . . . 8

By stressing the colonial nature of Zionism, the Palestinian covenant attempts to dovetail the theoretical imperatives for successful revolution. An American or

European, however, is apt to be skeptical of the genuine appeal of the covenant which seems to substitute rhetoric for reality on several important points. Israel with its own dynamic nationalism hardly seems comparable to decadent colonial powers that disintegrated in guerrilla revolutions after World War II. There is little indication that Palestinian Jews, who comprise one third of the Israeli population, would perceive a secular Arab state as preferable to Israel.<sup>9</sup> The Palestinian cause may thus generate Arab popular support, but be powerless to force revolutionary change inside Israel. The essential questions are whether the Arabs will maintain their dedication to the Palestinian cause in the face of unrelenting Israeli nationalism, and whether the cause can convince the Jews that their own security depends on some accommodation with the Palestinians.

The answers to these questions necessitate historical perspective in order to develop a feeling for non-Western perception and to probe the depth of Arab commitment. Unrelenting armed struggle over a long period of time against seemingly impregnable opposition is probably the best measure of the strength and the resilience of the Palestinian cause.

Palestinian nationalism emerged in World War I as a component of greater Arab nationalism. The Arabs revolted

against the Turks in exchange for a promise from Great Britain of an independent Arab state that would include Palestine.<sup>10</sup> Having concluded a successful campaign with the British, the Arabs felt doubly betrayed by the announcement of two British agreements concluded in secret. The first was the Balfour Declaration, a blatant assertion by the British of eminent domain over a portion of Arab lands for a Jewish "national home" in Palestine.<sup>11</sup> The second was the Sykes-Picot Agreement in which the British, French and Russians carved up the Ottoman Middle East territories into imperialist spheres of interest, disregarding wartime agreements with the Arabs and the League of Nations principle of self-determination.<sup>12</sup> These agreements were finalized after the war by the Treaty of San Remo in 1920 and the League of Nations assignments in 1922 of Mandates in Iraq and Palestine to Great Britain and Syria to France.

Palestinian Arabs had considered themselves an integral part of the promised independent Arab state. Their leaders had been members of secret pre-war Arab nationalist societies, and they had fought with Emir Faisal against the Turks in the rebellion. When Faisal formed a provisional government in Damascus, Palestinians served in the Army and civil administration.<sup>13</sup> The French deposed Faisal

after the Treaty of San Remo, forcing Palestinian Arabs to recognize that Palestine was essentially a national problem, intimately associated with greater Arab nationalism but with unique local objectives. Since that time the Palestinian national movement has passed through three phases of armed resistance and guerrilla revolution.

Phase I - Revolt Against the  
British Mandate, 1920-1940

The Palestinian Arabs opposed the British mandate, demanding an independent Arab state and regulated Jewish immigration within the absorptive capacity of the country. The powerful World Zionis' Organization had achieved British and League of Nations sanction for a Jewish national home in Palestine, despite the intense hostility of the 90 percent Arab majority<sup>14</sup> and in violation of British wartime agreements with the Arabs.<sup>15</sup> When British authorities failed to regulate Zionist immigration, Arab violence in 1922 and 1929 succeeded in forcing the London government to recognize Arab political rights and issue policy statements that Palestine would become an independent Arab country and Jewish immigration should be controlled.<sup>16</sup>

Worldwide reaction to Hitler's virulent anti-semitism led the British to relax immigration controls after 1932. Jewish immigration, which had averaged 9,000 per year prior to 1932, increased each subsequent year to a high of 60,000

in 1935. The Jewish population had grown from 10 percent of the total in 1917 to 25 percent in 1935. This occasioned Hajj Amin, Mufti of Jerusalem and a leading Palestinian nationalist, to declare: "We have had so many commissions, so much has been recommended by them in our favor; and what is the result? Over 60,000 Jewish immigrants in one year."<sup>17</sup>

The Arabs responded with a six-month general strike from April to October 1936 which ended when the British promised another commission to conduct a formal inquiry. When the British proposed a partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab countries, the Arabs instigated full-scale armed rebellion. Although the actual insurgents or mujahidin (freedom fighters) numbered no more than 1500, the active support of the population enabled the Arabs to control the small towns, interdict the countryside and even occupy Jerusalem for a short time in September 1938.<sup>18</sup> The rebellion was quelled in 1939 by the introduction of 40,000 British troops<sup>19</sup> and the 1939 British White Paper which satisfied Arab political aspirations. The British declared their intention of granting independence to an Arab Palestine in ten years, permitting no more than 75,000 Jewish immigrants for five years, and none thereafter without explicit Arab approval.<sup>20</sup> The Arabs had thus concluded the first modern guerrilla revolution with apparent



success. The cost had been high, however, particularly in the loss of leaders through combat action, exile, internment and execution. The Jewish community was quiescent during the rebellion, so that their community organizations were left intact.

#### Phase II - Palestinian Expulsion, 1940-1950

The outbreak of the war gave both the Jewish and Arab communities the opportunity to mobilize. The Arabs, essentially leaderless and neutral toward the war, did not exploit the opportunity. The Jews, their existence directly threatened by Hitler, enlisted 135,000 men in the regular army and police forces.<sup>21</sup> More significant was the clandestine arming and equipping of irregular forces--the infamous Stern Gang, a small fanatic terrorist group; the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization); and the Hagana, a self-defense force comprising 60,000 men and women.<sup>22</sup> As the German military threat receded in 1944, the Stern Gang and Irgun Zvai Leumi initiated terrorist acts aimed at reversing the British 1939 White Paper and, in particular, to permit refugees from Europe to land. The British, holding to their 1939 policy, were turning back shiploads of refugees, which often resulted in tragic consequences.<sup>23</sup> At first the Jewish leaders denounced terrorism, but by 1945 the Jewish Agency was conspiring with the terrorists to force

a British policy reversal, and ultimately the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine.<sup>24</sup> The campaign, which resulted in more British casualties than the Arab rebellion, succeeded in forcing the British to turn the issue over to the United Nations in 1947, announcing their intention of evacuating Palestine in June 1948. When the United Nations, influenced by intense United States pressure,<sup>25</sup> adopted a partition plan in November 1947, the whole Arab world erupted in protest.<sup>26</sup> Jewish and Arab demonstrations broke out with terrorist atrocities on both sides. The Palestinians could not cope with the vastly superior Jewish organization and preparation. The Irgun massacre of all the men, women and children in the village of Dier Yassin in April 1948 caused panic in the Palestinian community,<sup>27</sup> and refugees streamed into neighboring countries. The provisional government of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948. Armies from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq came to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs, but were no match for superior Israeli forces, now fighting a "War of Liberation."<sup>28</sup> By 1950 Israel had secured all of Palestine, and 750,000 Palestinians were refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Gaza. Approximately 160,000 Arabs remained in Israel where they were eventually accorded citizenship with certain restrictions on movement, residence and employment.<sup>29</sup>

Phase III - The Modern Palestinian  
Guerrilla Revolution, 1950-1975

The Palestinian scattering was somewhat analagous to the Jewish expulsion 2000 years earlier. A minority remained in Palestine, but the bulk of the people were refugees in neighboring countries. The Palestinians retained their national identity as did the earlier Jews. Political or social integration was inhibited by the inability of host countries to absorb the Palestinians into their economic life, causing concentration in urban ghettos and refugee camps, and the hostility of host populations during time of stress.<sup>30</sup> Palestinian political leaders at first relied on the established Arab regimes to restore their homeland. By the early 1960's, however, younger leaders were forced to conclude that inter-Arab politics would be a continuing obstacle to effective action against Israel. Several fedayeen groups were formed in the mid-1960's as successors to the mujahidin of 1936, and began carrying out commando raids against Israel in the hope of setting off a conflict between Israel and the Arab states.<sup>31</sup> The most important was FATAH, a group formed of young Palestinian activists from Kuwait and the Gulf States under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. FATAH succeeded not only in building up a credible infrastructure for guerrilla operations, but also actively published revolutionary

pamphlets with broad popular appeal. In 1964 the PLO was formed under the auspices of the Arab League in an attempt to unify the growing resistance. The PLO was led by old-guard Palestinian nationalists who viewed guerrilla warfare as unnecessarily provocative and counter productive. Instead, a conventional army was trained, equipped and stationed in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.<sup>32</sup>

Dissent among the guerrillas themselves and within the PLO inhibited an effective mass movement until the June 1967 Six-Day War. The crushing defeat of the Arab armies discredited both the Arab regimes and the PLO. The fedayeen program of guerrilla revolution was the only visible alternative of wresting Palestine from Zionist control. Fedayeen recruitment and support soared, growing from a few hundred guerrillas in 1964 to 20,000 full-time commandos by 1970, plus an additional 20,000 members of the popular militia. Arafat took over the leadership of the PLO which served to unify Palestinian efforts behind the guerrilla revolution, but did not quell intense internal rivalry with the more radical fedayeen leaders.

By 1970 the Palestinian movement directly challenged King Hussein's rule in Jordan. The fedayeen had seized control of several Jordanian strategic facilities including the Zarqa oil refinery. A general strike had been announced, and plans were underway for a decisive campaign

of civil disobedience.<sup>34</sup> In September 1970 (an infamous month for Palestinians, now termed Black September) the Jordanian Army initiated a campaign to eliminate the fedayeen from Jordan. Syria sent forces to aid the fedayeen, but they were quickly routed. By the end of 1971 the fedayeen had been eliminated from Jordan and operations had been reduced to small scale raids by a few hundred guerrillas in Syria and Lebanon.

Ironically, the military defeat enhanced Palestinian political objectives. International terrorism and small raids maintained the credibility of the fedayeen threat to Israel's security. Arafat, after a series of political power struggles, consolidated his leadership in the PLO. The Arab world coalesced behind the PLO, thus isolating King Hussein. West Bank Palestinian leaders recoiled from Jordanian leadership and swung to Palestinian independence.<sup>35</sup> These events permitted the formal recognition of the PLO at Rabat and the United Nations. By 1974 the Palestinians were closer to realization of their national aspirations than at any time since 1939.

More details of the leaders, program and effectiveness of the modern Palestinian guerrilla revolution will be developed in subsequent chapters. This abbreviated chronicle illustrates that the Palestinian cause has endured crushing defeat and repression by superior

conventional forces of Great Britain, Israel and Jordan, but each time succeeded in maintaining its national identity and reviving revolutionary momentum. Outside Israel the cause is stronger today than ever, uniting Arab leaders, Palestinian expatriates and Arab peoples throughout the Middle East behind Palestinian nationhood.

Inside Israel, however, the Palestinians have little tangible support. Jews of all ethnic backgrounds emphatically reject the appeal to replace Israel with a secular Palestinian state.<sup>36</sup> The 470,000 Arabs with Jewish citizenship favor a Palestinian nation, but they play only a limited role in Israel's national life and are too tightly controlled even to assist the fedayeen.<sup>37</sup> Guerrilla operations are an irritation to Israeli authorities, but do not threaten internal upheaval.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence that the Palestinian cause satisfies Professor Bell's criterion of "an alternative legitimacy, however distasteful" sufficient to force political concessions. Israeli public opinion has changed radically in the few years since former Premier Golda Meyer could disdainfully assert that "the Palestinians do not exist."<sup>38</sup> Today both Premier Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon are on record as recognizing the Palestinian people. Premier Rabin, while still refusing to negotiate with the PLO, has stated:

. . . I believe that the Palestinian issue has to be solved, and in the long term it can only be done through negotiations with Jordan. There can be but two nations in former Palestine--the Jewish state of Israel and east of it a Jordanian-Palestinian state where the Palestinians will be able to express their special identity.<sup>39</sup>

Other Israeli commentators have publicly pressed for further concessions. General Matityahn Piled, a former hero of the Six-Day War and now a university lecturer, wrote an article in the Israeli newspaper Maariv calling for direct negotiations with the Palestinians as the only means of securing united Arab support for a Geneva settlement acceptable to both Israel and the Arabs. General Piled argued that the "ridiculous stage when Israelis said that there were no Palestinian spokesmen or that they were only terrorists has now passed."<sup>40</sup>

The preceding analysis reveals little likelihood that the Palestinian cause can be extinguished by Israeli military force or rejected in political negotiations. There is a growing awareness in Israel that a Palestinian state somewhere in the original Palestine is necessary to secure their own security. The Palestinian cause will endure. The prospects for achieving a viable state thus hinge on the political and military power that Palestinian leaders can marshal in support of the cause. These factors will be examined in subsequent chapters.

## CHAPTER III

### LEADERS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The intent of this chapter is to examine the Palestinian leaders and the organizations they direct. It hardly seems necessary to dwell at length on the leadership imperative, but some emphasis on the necessary attributes of guerrilla leaders is revealing.

Successful guerrilla revolutions have been conceived and executed by extraordinary leaders. These men have not only possessed the charisma and elan of instinctive leaders, but have also provided intellectual inspiration. The necessity for charisma is self evident. The cause must be transmitted to the people through every available medium, creating massive emotional response. Forces must be trained and recruited for hazardous missions, necessitating the ultimate personal example, courage and tenacity. Assistance must be obtained from outside powers, and leaders found who can deal effectively with international political personalities. These are tasks for dynamic men of action, blessed with instinctive abilities to attract strong personalities to their following.

Charisma alone is not enough, however, because the revolutionary leader is faced with formidable intellectual problems. He must be sensitive to the potential power of



the cause to mobilize the people, then conceive a plan to create political and military power where none exists. Strategy, organization and logistics must be developed without benefit of an established bureaucracy or facilities. Alliances must be formed, compromises made, and delicate negotiations conducted with the price of miscalculation being death or imprisonment at the hands of either the enemy or internal rivals. It is not surprising in view of such all-inclusive demands that successful guerrilla revolutionaries have a universal identity with their cause. Mao Tze Tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro are personal symbols of the revolutions they led, and their mystique will endure long after their deaths.

Guerrilla revolutions have failed, on the other hand, when the opponents countered with intelligent and popular leaders. Consider the rapid decline of the Huk revolution in the Phillipine Islands after Ramon Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense. He conceived new political reforms and military tactics, then stumped the countryside to convey his cause to the people. Both the intellect to conceive reform, and charisma to develop public support were necessary to reverse the momentum of an ably led guerrilla revolution.<sup>1</sup>

Fifty years of revolution have produced several generations of Palestinian leaders. The foremost today is

Yasir Arafat, leader since its inception of FATAH, the largest and most important of the fedayeen organizations.<sup>2</sup> Born in 1928 in Jerusalem, Arafat was related through his mother to the Husayni clan, the leaders of the 1945 Arab revolt. As a young man, Arafat worked as personal secretary to Ahd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who had fought against the Jews in 1945-49 and doubtlessly influenced Arafat to adopt armed struggle as the only means of regaining Palestine for the Arabs.<sup>3</sup>

In 1951 Arafat went from Gaza to Cairo University where he studied engineering and became active in student politics. In Cairo Arafat formed the political government that later became known as FATAH, with two other young Palestinians from Gaza, Salah Khalaf and Khalil Wazir. In 1956 Arafat was elected Chairman of the General Union of Palestinian Students and attended the International Union of Students Conference in Prague with Khalaf and Zuhair al-Alami, both of whom became members of the Central Committee of the PLO in 1970.<sup>4</sup>

In the second Arab-Israeli War in 1956 Arafat served in the Egyptian Army as a lieutenant, then left for Kuwait. He had a successful professional career as founder of a contracting company and in the Department of Public Works. Political activity remained his main concern, however, and the FATAH core group was expanded to include four Palestinian

activists in Kuwait.\* In 1954 this group published a pamphlet entitled "Our Palestine" which attracted attention in Palestinian circles. By 1964 Arafat was a recognized Palestinian leader, and was invited to attend a Palestinian Entity Congress held in May 1964. He was already actively recruiting members for al-Asifa (The Storm), the military wing of FATAH, and raising funds for a campaign of armed resistance against Israel.<sup>5</sup>

The FATAH commandos received support from Algeria where Arafat visited in 1963. The Algerians reportedly trained guerrillas with the proviso that operations would be restricted to raids inside Israel.<sup>6</sup> The main source of support, however, was the Syrian Ba'th regime which had come to power in 1963 and sought to counter Nasser's dominance of the Palestinian resistance movement.<sup>7</sup> FATAH initiated guerrilla operations in early 1965 and averaged about ten raids per month throughout the year. Al-Asifa reaped maximum propaganda benefit from the raids, issuing elaborate "military communiques" which were effective for Arab audiences, but were too inaccurate to gain Israeli or international credibility.<sup>8</sup>

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\*Farug al-Qadumi, Muhammad al-Nijar, Kamal Adwan, and Khalid al-Hassan.

The FATAH activities continued to average about ten raids a month until June 1967, less periods of one or two months of inactivity when inter-Arab rivalry forced a clamp down on operations.<sup>9</sup> The raids were of little tactical significance, but were an irritant to Israeli authority and a source of pride to the Palestinian people. Most Palestinian and Arab leaders, however, did not support armed resistance, but looked upon conventional military action by united Arab forces as the logical way to free Palestine.<sup>10</sup>

All this changed after the humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967. Raised to a frenetic pitch in anticipation of regaining Palestine, Arabs were stunned and disgraced by the convulsive defeat. Palestinians were faced with the alternatives of another decade of despair in depending on Arab military action, or turning to FATAH's program of armed resistance. FATAH alone possessed the "one true doctrine of victory" and now easily found converts and recruits for guerrilla revolution.<sup>11</sup> In the ensuing three years FATAH grew from several hundred to ten thousand commandos, and Arafat took over the leadership of the PLO and the 12,000 man conventional Palestinian Liberation Army.<sup>12</sup> FATAH forces were badly mauled by the Jordanians in 1970-71, but have been successfully reconstituted and today number about 6,700, including 2,000 active fighters.<sup>13</sup>

Since 1971 Arafat has successfully staved off several challenges to his leadership of the PLO. The Rabat summit clearly stamped him as the dominant Palestinian leader and FATAH the most formidable Palestinian organization in terms of manpower and organization. FATAH's organizational growth and success can be attributed to several factors that contrast visibly with rival fedayeen factions:

(1) FATAH has been led by a small but relatively cohesive group of nationalists who have worked together since the late 1960's.

(2) FATAH's program is broadly nationalist, appealing to supporters of all ideological perspectives.

(3) Arafat has steered clear of inter-Arab quarrels, allowing him to receive aid from such diverse regimes as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and Egypt.

(4) The simplicity of FATAH's political goals are easily understood by the large mass of poorly educated Palestinians.<sup>14</sup>

In essence, FATAH has risen to preeminence because the party's stand is relatively moderate and flexible, allowing the broadest popular appeal and avoiding conflict with the neighboring Arab states. While stressing armed resistance as the basis for the Palestinian movement, al-Asifa operations have generally opposed indiscriminate international

terrorism in favor of more routine guerrilla raids.<sup>15</sup>

Similarly, FATAH doctrine opposes extreme ideological commitment in favor of unity:

The struggle that will determine our destiny demands bringing together all the revolutionary forces which honestly struggle for liberation, and this requires evading Byzantine discussions concerning the social forms and structures following the liberation. . . . In such a struggle ideological differences ought to disappear.<sup>16</sup>

Arafat has been criticized for not moderating the strident demand of the covenant for elimination of the state of Israel in his November UN address. The hard line of the speech is indicative of the pressures operating on Arafat as the spokesman for all the Palestinians, and his vulnerability to charges of weakening in his opposition to Israel. In fact, however, there is considerable evidence that Arafat is willing to accept recognition of Israel. Since 1970 FATAH leaders in private have been willing to consider various forms of political systems of a federal nature.<sup>17</sup> A more moderate tone was adopted immediately after the speech by Farug-al Qadumi, head of the PLO Political Department and one of the original FATAH organizers. Mr. Qadumi, who is often referred to as the Palestinian foreign minister, stressed that the Palestinians sought to establish a national authority in liberated territory which could evolve into a satisfactory political association

with Israel.<sup>18</sup> Arafat himself stated in January 1975 that his main goal is a Palestinian state on the Gaza Strip and West Bank. He said his UN statement that he dreamed of a unified Arab-Israeli state was misinterpreted as a call for eradicating Israel.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to the relatively moderate pragmatism of Arafat and FATAH is the militant radicalism of Dr. George Habash and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Habash was born in Lydda in 1926 of Greek Orthodox parents. He received his medical education at the American University in Beirut where he was a political activist. By 1950 Habash was a leader of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a relatively non-ideological organization devoted primarily to Arab unity, but pledged to justice for the Palestinians. Initially, the ANM was not Socialist oriented, as was its rival, the Ba'th Socialist Party. In the 1950's Habash sought aid from Egypt and Syria, and became an ardent supporter of President Nasser and the UAR. The ANM as a whole developed a pro-Nasser stance, turning towards socialism after Nasser's turn to the left in 1961. In 1964 the failure of unity talks with Iraq and Syria caused Nasser to back down from military action against Israel to prevent Israeli diversion of Jordan River waters to the Negev desert. A militant left wing of the ANM challenged leaders such as Habash, Wadi Haddad and Ahmed al-Yamani. The

radicals called for class struggle and the need to replace the petit bourgeois governments in Syria and Egypt with genuinely revolutionary ones.<sup>20</sup>

After the Six-Day War Habash and his followers rejected nationalism and socialism as requested by Nasser and the Ba'th party as a weak basis for mobilizing the Arab masses and for recovering Palestine. They also rejected FATAH's doctrine that a popular front led by middle class intellectuals could carry guerrilla revolution to a successful conclusion. They formed the PFLP, initially including the left wing ANM faction, under a program of total revolutionary transformation to mobilize the peasants, urban workers and refugees. The PFLP further called for revolution engulfing all Arab society, meaning that the struggle would not be confined to Israel and the occupied territories as FATAH maintained, but should include the whole context of Palestinian confrontation. "World Zionism," "imperialism," "Arab reaction," as well as Israel proper were targets. With the publication of its "Political Program" in February 1969, the PFLP emerged as a full-fledged Marxist-Leninist movement with strong Maoist tendencies.<sup>21</sup>

The PFLP lacks the long term organization, buildup and manpower of FATAH. Having branded the regimes in Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia as reactionary and



calling for their eventual overthrow, they have not had the material aid or access to overt propaganda media that have sustained FATAH.<sup>22</sup> The strength of the PFLP has been a dedication to the principle of total war--if Israel used napalm to kill civilians and exacted collective punishment, then the guerrillas were justified in refusing to distinguish between civilian and military targets or to limit their operations to Israel proper. They concentrated instead on urban sabotage and special operations such as airplane hijackings and bombings in foreign countries. They have forged alliances with international terrorist groups (e.g., the Japanese Red Army) for the conduct of such raids as the murder of twenty-seven people in Israel's Lod Airport in 1972 and the blowing up of an oil refinery in Singapore.<sup>23</sup> These spectacular operations have gained the PFLP enormous prestige and influence as well as broad popular support. Further enhancing PFLP influence is a weekly publication, al-Hadaf, which is probably the most sophisticated leftist publication in the Arab world and an effective instrument for influencing the political thinking and orientation of a significant portion of the rising young Arab generation.<sup>24</sup> The PFLP thus has been able to rival FATAH for supremacy in the Palestinian movement, although its membership has never exceeded current estimates of 3,500.<sup>25</sup>

The PFLP's militant Marxist doctrine has led to numerous confrontations with FATAH. Since 1967 Habash has periodically walked out of the Executive Committee of the PLO, challenging Arafat's leadership and revolutionary program, only to rejoin under the pressure to maintain a semblance of unity in the struggle against Israel. In October 1974 he again withdrew from the PLO to form the "rejectionist front" which opposes any inclination by Arafat to conclude a settlement with Israel or to reconcile with Jordan.<sup>26</sup>

Habash has also had to contend with divisions in the PFLP from the original left wing adherents of the ANM. The crisis came to a head in 1968 when Habash visited Syria seeking permission to use Syrian territory for PFLP raids on Israel and the release of arms intended for the PFLP that Syria had confiscated. The Syrians accused Habash of plotting to overthrow the Syrian government, and imprisoned him with three other PFLP leaders for seven months.<sup>27</sup> This led to an attempt by the left wing, composed of young men following Nayif Hawatmah, to take over the PFLP. Hawatmah is a former East Bank Jordanian student at American University who had formed "The Vengeance Youth," a small commando organization, in 1965-66. He has vied with Habash since the early 1960's, insisting on a more rigorous ideological posture along Marxist-Leninist

lines.<sup>28</sup> Joining Hawatmah were two other left wing groups that had formed the PFLP with Habash: the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) under Ahmed Jabril, a former Syrian Army officer; and the "Heroes of the Return" under Wajih al-Madani, an officer in the Palestine Liberation Army. These leaders are all younger than Habash and even more militant. During Habash's imprisonment they were able to outvote the Habash faction in the PFLP Congress, but were unable to enforce discipline over the movement. The activist military leaders chafed over the esoteric ideological quarrels of the intellectuals on such questions as the role of the petite bourgeoisie in the revolutionary struggle.<sup>29</sup>

This led to the defection of two important military leaders from the PFLP in the fall of 1968, Ahmed Jabril and Ahmed Za'rur. Jabril enjoyed a reputation as an able military strategist, particularly after his followers hijacked an Israeli airliner flying to Algeria in the summer of 1968. Syria reportedly paid Jabril eight million Syrian pounds to finance armed action in Lebanon after the break with the PFLP.<sup>30</sup> The group used several names, including the PFLP-General Command (A) and the al-Aqsa Fedayeen Front. Jabril's forces today number 150 pro-Peking extremists called the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). The PFLP-GC's most notorious terrorist acts were

the blowing up of a Swissair flight enroute to Israel in the spring of 1970, and the murder of sixteen civilians in an apartment house in Quiryat Shemona in the spring of 1974.<sup>31</sup>

Za'rur and his followers were unwilling to follow Jabril, and formed a separate group called the PFLP-General Command (B), and later the Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP).<sup>32</sup> The OAP was prominent in the resistance movement until 1971 when it probably dispersed during the suppression of the fedayeen by the Jordan army.

The most important split in the PFLP occurred when Habash returned from Syrian imprisonment in November 1968. His efforts to reassert his authority over the PFLP led to bitter disputes with Nayif Hawatmah. Clashes were frequent in January and February 1969, with the better armed Habash forces attempting to intimidate the more ideologically sophisticated dissidents. When the situation got out of control, the warring factions asked FATAH to mediate the dispute. In February 1969, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) was recognized as a separate commando group under Hawatmah's leadership. The split was accentuated by the PDFLP's receipt of aid from Syria, while the PFLP was supported by Syria's bitter rival, Iraq.<sup>33</sup> The PDFLP now numbers 500 men following a rigid Marxist line particularly

critical of the existing Arab regimes. Their most publicized recent operations were the May 1974 raid on a school in Ma'alot, Israel in which twenty-one children were murdered, and the November 1975 Bet She'an attack.<sup>34</sup>

Organizational integrity has been a continuing problem for the PFLP and its offshoots. Within the PFLP there is a rightist group led by Wadi Haddad that favors hijacking and terrorism as strategically advanced. The right wants better relations with the Arab states, particularly Egypt. The leftists, led by Abu Shabab and Abu Khaled, consider terrorism as self destructive in the campaign against Israel. The left opposes relations with existing Arab governments in favor of association with Arab national movements. In 1972 a group of leftists left the PFLP, protesting Habish's "rightist" policies, and formed the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP). This group has made little impact, but the defection indicates the problems facing Habash in reconciling the divergent views within the PFLP.<sup>35</sup>

The evolution and offshoots of the PFLP are depicted in Appendix A. The radical groups differ from FATAH in believing that armed struggle cannot be decisive until fundamental social and political changes in the Arab world topple reactionary regimes to form a large socialist

Arab nation ruled by a Marxist-Leninist party. Habash stresses that armed struggle can help mobilize and educate the masses, and accuses Hawatmah of following a dilatory strategy of first building a political movement, second educating the people, and only then fighting. The militancy of the radical groups ensures that they will remain small, since no existing Arab regime can fully agree with their objectives. This leads the radicals to oppose a settlement with Israel that would perpetuate a Zionist state, while leaving the Palestinians only a fraction of their former homeland. This line of reasoning has enormous appeal and gives Habash, in particular, a following far exceeding the actual membership of the PFLP.<sup>36</sup>

FATAH and the groups described previously represent the most significant Palestinian fedayeen organizations from the standpoint of leadership, following and effectiveness. FATAH has maintained supremacy since 1968 by its greater size and by control of the Palestine Liberation Army through its dominant position in the PLO. In 1968 and 1969 numerous other groups were formed, some of which retain an identity today. Particularly notable are the Syrian sponsored Vanguard of the Revolution, now known as Saiqa (thunderbolts), and the Arab Liberation Front (AFL) composed of Palestinians sympathetic to the Iraq Ba'th Party. Saiqa consists of 2000 members with 1000

active guerrillas. It has little political influence, serving as an unofficial auxiliary of the Syrian Army. The ALF has about 100 full-time guerrillas, devoted to non-terrorist guerrilla operations.<sup>37</sup> A compendium of active organizations is included in Appendix B, which shows the diversity of leadership, ideology and foreign involvement in the Palestinian movement.

There is obviously no shortage of leaders to promote the Palestinian cause. The problem is rather one of avoiding disintegration of the movement through factional conflict. The PLO has been the umbrella organization to meld political unity. Since 1968, Yasir Arafat has headed the PLO and FATAH's influence has been dominant. There have been numerous clashes with Habash and Hawatmah, but the overriding issue of opposition to Israel has permitted a semblance of unity. The major fedayeen leaders have been members of the PLO Central Committee. Arafat forged military unity under pressure of Jordanian repression in 1970 with the formation of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command which exercised some coordination of fedayeen actions. In fact, however, the separate existence of so many groups, the wildly independent tactics of the PFLP and PDFLP, and the dedication of some Palestinians to the Iraqi Ba'th ideology or the Arab National Movement

remain serious problems.<sup>38</sup> Unity has been forged from adversity, and Arafat's ability to maintain the integrity of the PLO is no small accomplishment. Whether he can continue to avoid a convulsive internal bloodletting will be the subject of further analysis in Chapter V.



## CHAPTER IV

### CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Leon Trotsky wrote in 1911 that a pinch of powder and a slug of lead were not sufficient to change the social order.<sup>1</sup> France in Algeria, Great Britain in the Palestine Mandate, and the United States in Vietnam learned the futility of attempting to judge the strength and endurance of a guerrilla revolution by measuring the conventional instruments of military power. Success or failure hinges on credibility, the basic trust and belief the people give the guerrilla and his cause:

Credibility must be established among the guerrillas themselves, it has to be transmitted to their friends and enemies, and the times require its ultimate verification by the tribunal of world public opinion.<sup>2</sup>

Credibility is established by demonstrated effectiveness in carrying out a revolutionary program. Power must be demonstrated both to mobilize support and to "persuade the opponent that his perceived vision of security is ephemeral, a temporary misjudgement."<sup>3</sup>

Effectiveness, however, is not absolute, but must be assessed relative to fairly well-defined phases of a revolution. These phases were originally codified by Mao and have been generally accepted as universal principles

by subsequent theorists.<sup>4</sup> Mao postulated three states to revolutionary war, with a method of warfare adaptable to each. The first stage he termed strategic defense, in which guerrilla warfare is employed to enlighten the masses and secure a climate in which the guerrilla can gradually expand operations. The guerrilla's objectives are to secure base areas in order to accelerate mobilization, and to increase the intensity and scale of hit and run tactics. When the guerrilla base areas extend throughout the country, the government can no longer hope to defeat the guerrillas, only contain them. Then the second stage, called equilibrium, begins. This is a period of positional war, where the guerrilla forces exploit mobility to maintain an overall position of stalemate and attrition of enemy forces. The emphasis is on convincing friend and foe that war will continue endlessly, all the while striving to change the general balance of forces. Eventually, the guerrillas are strong enough to mount offensive operations in battalion or regimental strength, marking transition to the final stage, strategic offense. Here the revolutionary army may still lack overall superiority, but by superior mobility concentrates forces to achieve a major victory, rather than seeking only attrition as in the former stage. According to Mao, in the final stage

of mobile warfare, the masses will be mobilized and the oppressors in disarray, resulting in the "collapse of the exploiters torn apart by their society's contradictions, isolated from the people, frustrated on the battlefield--relics of history."<sup>5</sup>

Mao did not envision a mechanical application of his universal laws of guerrilla warfare. He was fully prepared to retrogress to an earlier stage if necessary, and to adopt the laws to the peculiar local environment:

Thus the different laws for different wars are determined by the different circumstances of those wars--differences in time, place and nature. . . the laws of war in each historical stage have their special characteristic and cannot be mechanically applied in another stage.<sup>6</sup>

A corollary of Mao's theory of guerrilla warfare is that credibility can be established even though the guerrillas appear to be virtually powerless in the overall confrontation. Effectiveness in the first stage requires no more than establishing popular support. Success in the second stage is measured by a sense of hopelessness in the government ranks of ever stamping out the guerrillas by military force. Only in the final stage are tactical victories essential indicators of credibility.

A new dimension to the theory of guerrilla revolutions has been developed subsequent to Mao, emphasizing

that tactical victory is not a prerequisite to success. Terrorism has already been described as the key to the Palestinians' successful guerrilla revolution against the British mandate, and the Jews' subsequent expulsion of the British and the Arabs from Palestine. Terrorism now occupies a pivotal role in the theory of guerrilla revolutions.

The impetus for legitimizing terrorism was Frantz Fanon's book, The Wretched of the Earth. A psychiatrist born in Martinique, Fanon wrote widely on the problems of colonialism and revolution, particularly the Algerian war. Fanon theorized that for a "native" to become a man, he must resort to violence. The psychic need of oppressed people cannot be satisfied by evolutionary political gains, since they are engulfed in simmering hatred and unquenchable vengeance. The transformation to a free man can only be the product of violence.<sup>7</sup>

Later scholars adopt a more dispassionate approach, analyzing terrorism as a shortcut to mobilizing the masses and avoiding the lengthy and tedious process of organization.<sup>8</sup> Robert Taber stressed the vulnerability of constitutional democracy to terror in his book The War of the Flea. Modern nation states are vitally sensitive to world opinion, since they depend on military alliances for security and international financial institutions

for economic livelihood. As a result, "they must maintain the appearance that contracts will be honored, that treaties will be upheld, that loans will be repaid with interest, that investments will continue to produce profits and be safe."<sup>9</sup> Terrorism destroys this essential image of stability and thus becomes a highly destructive revolutionary weapon.

However repugnant terrorism may be to civilized society, it is a reality of modern life. Terrorist groups operate in such diverse political climates as Japan (Red Guards), Northern Ireland (IRA), South Vietnam (VC) and the United States (Symbionese Liberation Army). World opinion does not repudiate revolutionary movement because of terror, but tends to let judgments of legality and morality be determined by the ultimate success or failure in seizing power.

An assessment of the credibility and effectiveness of the Palestinian guerrilla revolution follows three distinct periods. The first is from the mid-1960's to the Six-Day War in June 1967 when the fedayeen groups were first organized. The second is from June 1967 until the end of 1971 when the guerrillas reached their maximum military power, only to become a threat to King Hussein and suffer defeat at the hands of the Jordanian army. The final period covers the regeneration of the

movement which still continues. During the latter two periods distinction must be drawn between the guerrilla tactics of FATAH and the urban terrorism which distinguished the operations of the radical fedayeen organizations.

Prior to the Six-Day War FATAH was the only Palestinian organization pursuing a significant political or military campaign. From January 1965 to June 1967 raids were carried out against Israel on an average of ten per month.<sup>10</sup> The raids were hit-and-run affairs, involving infiltrating a Jewish village to plant a mine or bomb, then withdrawing. Overall results were unimpressive. Israeli defense data for the period attributes to the fedayeen fourteen deaths (four civilians, four policemen and six soldiers) and seventy-two wounded (twenty-seven civilians, six policemen and thirty-nine soldiers). There were 122 cases of sabotage and mining, of which forty-five were detected and foiled.<sup>11</sup> Even considering the problems inherent in the initial stage of a guerrilla revolution, the balance of credibility was overwhelmingly in favor of Israel.<sup>12</sup> There was a conspicuous absence of widespread popular support. Arab governments were restrained in providing support fearing a military confrontation with Israel for which they were not prepared. The Arab masses continued to look to Cairo for political guidance and leadership

in any military undertaking.<sup>13</sup> The exorbitant claims in the military communiques of al-Asifa, the FATAH military arm, were grossly exaggerated, which undermined fedayeen credibility with the Israelis and foreign observers.<sup>14</sup>

After the humiliation of the Six-Day War, the situation changed abruptly. Palestinians had no alternative to resistance except guerrilla revolution, a view shared by the majority of the Arabs. This led to a dramatic increase in FATAH's strength as well as the emergence of new leaders and organizations, backed by extensive aid from the Arab states. Greater strength quickly led to increased tactical operations. In the second half of 1967, fedayeen activities accounted for five Israeli casualties per month, growing to seven per month in 1968, nine per month in 1969, and eleven per month in 1970. For each casualty there were five to six Israeli wounded. Military casualties exceeded civilian by a four-to-one ratio.<sup>15</sup>

The number of incidents increased even more dramatically. In 1968 Israel reported seventy-five incidents per month, rising to 200 per month in 1969 and 300 in 1970. Of these incidents about three-quarters consisted of mortar and rocket shellings of Israeli positions, 15 percent were acts of sabotage, and 10 percent mining of roads.<sup>16</sup>

By the fall of 1970 the Palestinian strength was estimated at 20,000 full-time commandos and 20,000 trained

members of the popular militia, with a manpower base for military recruitment of 50,000-75,000 men.<sup>17</sup> FATAH had evolved an elaborate civil and political apparatus, setting up schools, hospitals and well-organized training camps serving the refugee camps and the commando recruits.<sup>18</sup> A degree of political unity was achieved when Yasir Arafat became chairman of the PLO. The major fedayeen groups were represented on the Executive Committee. Arafat subsequently became commander in chief of the Palestinian military forces consisting of the 12,000 man Palestinian Liberation Army and the fedayeen. Military coordination was developed through the Palestinian Armed Services Command which included membership from FATAH, PDFLP, PLA, Saiqa, PFLP-GC and OAP.

FATAH publicity organs stressed the conformance of the Palestinian movement to Maoist theory. Immediately following the June 1967 war the First Stage began, stressing organization and establishment of new networks to replace those shattered in the June War. On March 21, the Second Stage was initiated at the battle of Karameh. The Israelis sent an armored brigade to eliminate a fedayeen base of approximately 300 men on the east bank of the Jordan River. The Palestinians did not withdraw but engaged in a house-to-house battle. Jordanian artillery came to the assistance of the guerrillas and inflicted heavy casualties on the



Israelis. The fedayeen were ultimately defeated, suffering 130 casualties, but the Israelis lost heavily in men and equipment. FATAH painted Karameh as a glowing victory, shattering the myth of the "invincibility" of the Israeli armed forces.<sup>19</sup> The Third Stage, according to FATAH, began on May 2 when a three-pronged, ninety-two-man column seized the town of El Hamma in the Golan Heights for three hours. The PASC claimed destruction of one M-48 tank, five half tracks and numerous casualties. The Israelis acknowledged the temporary occupation of El Hamma, but indicated that losses were far less than FATAH claimed. In reality the Third Stage differed little from earlier stages, other than increased tactical activity, but FATAH and the PASC seemed genuinely confident that they were inflicting significant losses on the Israeli Army, and that the movement had progressed into a true War of National Liberation.<sup>20</sup>

The radical fedayeen, restricted in size by their hostility to the Arab regimes and FATAH, concentrated on occasional terror bombing in Israel. Initially, these activities were overshadowed by the more conventional FATAH operations, but in September 1969, the PFLP hijacked an Israeli commercial airliner enroute to Damascus. The result was instantaneous worldwide publicity. Thereafter the radicals specialized in urban terrorist acts

which gained them credibility far out of proportion to their actual numbers.<sup>21</sup>

In September 1970, the PFLP sought to provoke a confrontation with FATAH and the Jordanian regime. This objective was accomplished with the spectacular hijacking of four international airliners, three of which were landed in Jordan and a fourth in Cairo. This precipitated the 1970 civil war in Jordan and marked the zenith of Palestinian military power.

By 1970 the balance of credibility had shifted in favor of the Palestinians. This does not imply that the Israelis feared their national existence, for the Palestinians were strictly an external force, more of a nuisance than a substantive threat. Still the Palestinians were now established "on the political map of the Middle East" by Israeli admission,<sup>22</sup> and both foreign and Israeli writers saw dangerous implications for the future. Elie Landau, one of Israel's leading military analysts wrote:

The fighting with FATAH goes on violently every day. This is never mentioned in the news. . . . Despite severe casualties, they /the guerrillas/ keep mounting operations as though nothing has happened. . . . Terrorist bands, acting on all fronts force us. . . to exert increasing defensive efforts. This makes it doubtful that the element of time is really in our favor.<sup>23</sup>

Unfortunately, the PFLP had misjudged the strength of the redoubtable King Hussein, a miscalculation fully as serious as the euphoric march to catastrophe by the Arabs in June 1967. Hussein appointed a military government under Brigadier General Muhammad Daoud, a Palestinian, and ordered him to take all necessary measures to "restore security, order and stability to the country."<sup>24</sup> Syrian forces moved into Jordan to assist the fedayeen. After ten days of bitter fighting the Jordan Army had won a decisive victory. The Syrians had been routed, and the fedayeen eliminated from the large towns with heavy casualties.

A truce was signed by Arafat and King Hussein, thanks largely to Egypt's President Nasser who pressured Hussein for a cease fire to preserve Arab unity. In the ensuing months the Jordan Army ignored the truce and exploited the weakness and disorganization of the fedayeen to eliminate them completely from Jordan.

The civil war cost the Palestinians 910 fedayeen and 2,500 civilians (including militia) killed, 10,800 wounded, and 20,000 imprisoned.<sup>25</sup> The movement had retrogressed to the First Stage, reconstituting base areas in Syria and Lebanon, where activities remain tightly controlled.

FATAH's effectiveness has been sharply curtailed. Even though able to rebuild to a strength of 6,700, the level of operations since 1971 has been no more effective than prior to June 1967. PFLP and PDFLP operations have not been curbed, as urban terrorism and hijackings do not necessitate the extensive infrastructure of more conventional guerrilla action. The PFLP has even expanded its scope of operations, conducting bombings throughout the world, often in alliance with the IRA and Japanese Red Guards. Letter bombs and explosive packages became a new and pernicious threat, with incidents reported in France, Canada, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus.<sup>26</sup> Even FATAH turned to terrorism as a means of publicizing the endurance and viability of the resistance. A dissident group called Black September, reportedly under the leadership of Salah Khalaf, one of the original FATAH founders, carried out the murder of eleven Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games and the slaying of two Belgian and one American diplomats at Khartoum in March 1973.<sup>27</sup> Arafat condoned terrorism, even when particularly violent acts appeared to have a negative impact on world opinion. His attitude was summed up at the UN where he declared, "whoever stands by a just cause. . . cannot possibly be called a terrorist."<sup>28</sup>

FATAH, though limited by denial of bases in Jordan and rigid control in Lebanon and Syria, still retains the potential to resume extensive operations if permitted operational freedom. In the October 1973 Yom Kippur War both the Palestinian Liberation Army and the guerrillas were active in the Suez, Golan Heights and on the Lebanese border. Units of the PLA were transported by helicopter to perform commando operations ahead of the Syrian Army. FATAH was once again able to move freely via Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian territories into Israel to strike supply convoys, troop concentrations, radar installations and secondary airports (such as Al-Bassa) in support of the Arab operations plan. On the Lebanese front Palestinian guerrillas occupied Mount Hermon in a seige and hold operation designed to prevent or impede any Israeli effort to encircle the Syrians through that sector.<sup>29</sup>

The war succeeded in buttressing the Palestinian resistance in two significant ways. The PLO was able to demonstrate that it could still coordinate effective military action. By active participation with the Arab armies the Palestinians effectively refuted King Hussein's claim to speak for them.<sup>30</sup> Palestinian credibility was maintained in the Arab world which led to recognition of the PLO by the Arab states and the United Nations following the war.

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Having been accorded political legitimacy by the Arab states and the United Nations, the Palestinian guerrilla revolution has, to all appearances, regained the credibility lost in the civil war with Jordan. This can be attributed to the use of terror by the radicals to influence world opinion, as well as the potential of FATAH and the PLO to raise the tempo of guerrilla activities when conditions permit free use of border base areas. The Palestinians alone are not a threat to the existence of Israel, but as part of the Arab alliance they are assured of a voice in any lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On this evidence rests the case for Palestinian credibility today.

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## CHAPTER V

### UNITY

The conviction is inescapable that the Palestinian resistance has indeed made notable accomplishments, but there are ominous internal divisions that threaten future growth. Mao's prescription is explicit on the imperative for unity--under the direction of expert leadership, all military, political, cultural and economic action on the national and international level must be coordinated.<sup>1</sup> Before the guerrilla revolution can seize power there must be unity.

Hisham Sharabi of Georgetown University asserts that all liberation movements in the twentieth century have experienced two fundamental transformations before emerging as united fronts.<sup>2</sup> First, the revolutionary cause breeds the simultaneous rise of several groups, perhaps differing from one another in organization and ideology, but striving toward the same revolutionary goal. As the resistance escalates, alternative forms of cooperation are devised in order to maintain revolutionary momentum. Expediency alone invariably proves to be short lived, resulting in further tension after crisis is surmounted. When the resistance progresses to a point where broad

popular support is achieved, the leadership no longer can afford division. One of the groups must dominate the political relationships, thus permitting a national front and transformation to a war of national liberation. Groups persisting in opposition become isolated outside the revolutionary momentum. They are regarded as counter-revolutionary and become a target for suppression. Failure to resolve differences within a national front inevitably results in fragmentation of the movement and eventual collapse.

This model seems consistent with Mao's universally accepted three-stage revolution. The final stage of strategic offensive requires national union and close coordination of political, economic and military power.

Examining the Palestinian guerrilla revolution uncovers a paradoxical departure from the theory. The PLO has gained international recognition as a national front by the Arab summit meeting at Rabat and the subsequent UN resolution. Internally, however, the PLO has not resolved the differences between FATAH and the PFLP. Since the Jordanian crisis, Habash's intransigence on eliminating the State of Israel and on dramatizing the resistance by international terrorism has gained wide popular support. Habash has directly challenged Arafat's



leadership by calling for a "rejectionist front" of the PFLP, PFLP-GC and the Iraqi sponsored Arab Liberation Front to combat any accommodation with Israel or reconciliation with Jordan.<sup>3</sup> Arafat has moderated his inflexible position regarding Israel at the UN and moved to control radical terrorism, but thus far there is little evidence that he has the political or military weight to impose an accommodation.<sup>4</sup> It would appear that the Palestinian movement has been handed the scepter of authority without having progressed into the final stage of a guerrilla revolution.

There are formidable obstacles barring the transformation. Though united by implacable opposition to Israel, the Palestinians have always been divided on fundamental issues by diverse social and national differences. The majority are Sunni Muslims who tend to be narrowly nationalist in outlook. A significant minority, particularly among the fedayeen, either is not Palestinian by birth or is not part of the dominant Sunni population. These non-Sunni Palestinians tend to give priority to issues of radical and secular change throughout the Arab world.<sup>5</sup> Culturally, the Palestinians share with all Arabs a genetic individualism which idealizes clannish devotion to charismatic local leaders in contrast to national organizational effectiveness and hierarchy. Thus loyalty

to a national political movement traditionally takes second place to more local attachments. The displacement of the Palestinians from their homes has reinforced the pattern by generating strong leaders with independent bases of power, who are unwilling to subordinate themselves to national leadership.<sup>6</sup>

The PLO was formed in 1964 to overcome the problems of political division. Over 400 Palestinians from a wide variety of backgrounds met and selected an Executive Committee and approved a text of the National Covenant. Funds were supplied by the Arab League to form the Palestinian Liberation Army. Ahmed Shukayri was appointed chairman, and selected an Executive Committee of middle-aged professional men. To members of FATAH, Shukayri and the PLO were bureaucrats and handmaidens of Egypt's President Nasser. Lacking fedayeen representation, the PLO in its early years was little more than a propaganda organization. After the Six-Day War the PLO was totally discredited, leading to another National Congress in 1968 to revise the Covenant and rejuvenate the national political organization. The fedayeen leaders were now the dominant elements in the Congress, and by January 1969, FATAH delegates established a commanding majority of delegates. Arafat was elected Chairman of the PLO, and attempted thereafter to unify the fragmented Palestinian movement.

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Arafat was successful in establishing the PASC to coordinate fedayeen activities in April 1969, and in asserting his control over the Palestinian Liberation Army whose commander, with Syrian assistance, had attempted to defy Arafat's authority.<sup>8</sup> Arafat was notably unsuccessful, however, in exerting any influence or control over George Habash and other radical leaders. Habash boycotted sessions of the National Congress and the PLO Executive Committee, and refused to join the PASC. In August 1970, the UAR and Jordan announced that they would accept the US Rogers Plan for direct negotiations with Israel. This was a mortal threat to Palestinian objectives, and Habash reluctantly consented to join the PLO and coordinate with the PASC.<sup>9</sup>

The reconciliation proved to be short lived. The PFLP precipitated the Jordanian crisis in 1970 by sensational hijackings, effectively undermining Arafat's efforts to prevent a confrontation. Having miscalculated Jordan's power, Habash again agreed to follow FATAH's lead. By late 1971, Arafat had reasserted his control over the PLO with a policy of cementing relations with Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in order to rebuild bases after the Jordanian defeat and maintain Saudi financial assistance. This policy required at least going through

the motions of accepting the Egyptian-Saudi effort to negotiate the dispute between Hussein and the PLO. The willingness to compromise sparked sharp PFLP and PDFLP opposition. The radicals found allies within FATAH and the PLA. Salah Khalaf, second in importance only to Arafat in FATAH, was reportedly closer to Habash in his ideas than to Arafat.<sup>10</sup> The Commander in Chief of the PLA, Brigadier General Yahya, called for Arafat's ouster. Arafat replaced General Yahya with Brigadier General Budieri to end the PLA crisis, but Khalaf has continued to lead a dissident faction in FATAH. Extremists in the group formed the infamous Black September terrorist group whose operations were described in the previous chapter.

Arafat's policies of compromise and conciliation have been remarkably successful in projecting Palestinian unity on the international front, but it is a false image. The PLO remains dangerously divided. The rigid ideological refusal of Habash and his radical adherents to accept anything short of elimination of the State of Israel and social revolution in the Arab states precludes their amalgamation in the PLO. Nor is it likely that Arafat and FATAH can eliminate them. The PFLP is the second largest Palestinian fedayeen organization and Habash's popularity spreads far beyond his own ranks. The PFLP and PFLP-GC are smaller and have less political influence,

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but they are assured of support from Iraq and Libya which gives them the power to mount highly destructive terrorist campaigns. This could well ignite yet another Arab-Israeli war, which always presents the threat of a US-Soviet confrontation with unforseeable consequences. The Palestinian guerrilla revolution has seemingly reached a point of no return--too strong to move back, yet too divided to make the final transformation that could yield nationhood. It is an explosive situation with the outcome very much in doubt.

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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSIONS

This paper was written to examine the viability of the Palestinian guerrilla revolution in accordance with accepted revolutionary theory, then to draw certain conclusions relating to events in the Middle East. The analysis has shown that the Palestinian guerrillas are motivated by a cause that has prevailed for fifty years, and has withstood suppression on three occasions by a superior national power only to surge back with increased intensity. Palestinian leaders have the charisma to enlist popular support throughout the Arab world. They have the intellect to articulate revolutionary programs closely aligned to classical theory, and even to innovate striking applications of terrorism to support their revolutionary cause. The revolution is credible, having crystallized Arab resistance, and having forced Israel to accept Palestinian existence and the necessity of some degree of national recognition. Most significantly, the revolution has gained international recognition in a favorable resolution by the United Nations. Despite these impressive accomplishments, the Palestinians are by no means assured of achieving their national objectives since they have not resolved internal power struggles that

threaten their ability to form a responsible government in territory given up by Israel.

Relating this to the current Middle East situation, a critical question is how the Palestinians will react if a general formula leading to a Geneva settlement is developed in 1975. Assuming first that Israel can be convinced to give up Gaza and the West Bank in return for national recognition and defined borders, the PLO can be expected to form a Palestinian government that approximates the structure of the PLO Executive Committee. It includes representatives from the main fedayeen groups, the Palestinian National Front, and independent groups. Yasir Arafat, who has successfully guided the PLO through so many crises since 1968, would appear to be the logical candidate to head the government. Recently, however, there have been hints that other leaders, not directly affiliated with the fedayeen, might have broader political appeal and forestall clashes with Arafat's rivals. Candidates mentioned include Dr. Walid Kamhawi, a senior deputy of the PLO Executive Committee, or Ibrahim Bakr, a former PLO official spokesman residing in Jordan.<sup>2</sup>

It seems evident that most Palestinians favor nationhood even though restricted to Gaza and the West Bank. The PLO Planning Center in Beirut advocated such a solution as early as 1971, and leaders in the West Bank

reportedly favor Palestinian autonomy.<sup>3</sup> In the past, economic viability has always militated against artificial partition of the original Palestine, but presumably Arab oil wealth would subsidize such a nation for a considerable period. It is not inconceivable that viable economic relations could be established with Jordan and Israel in a stable political environment.

The stumbling block to such a plan is the opposition of the radicals. Habash, Hawatmah and Jabril have denounced accommodation and they are not likely to relent. Perhaps the acquisition of territory would be sufficient to calm the radicals, or permit a strong government to exterminate them. Successful exploitation of terrorism in the past, however, tends to indicate that the radicals would foment increasing border tension with Israel and Jordan, preventing the stability a new government would need to resolve political, economic and social problems.

Since the odds do not seem to favor a Geneva settlement in 1975, where does delay leave the Palestinians? Arafat has openly predicted a renewal of fighting between the Arabs and Israel.<sup>4</sup> The radicals would delight in this turn of events, since it furthers their dual directives of promoting social upheaval in the Arab world and unmitigated opposition to Israel. The Tunis hijacking

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


and Bet She'an incidents following the Rabat summit are typical responses to signs of accommodation that will undoubtedly continue. Should war break out, the fedayeen are most likely to follow the October 1973 scenario, shelving their differences in an all-out effort to defeat Israel and to promote Palestinian military credibility. Since the United States is firmly committed to preserving the territorial integrity of Israel, Arab victory seems a remote possibility. More probable is a cease fire and return to the bargaining table under joint US and Soviet auspices. War thus would seem to bring the Palestinians no closer to nationhood than they are today, and could jeopardize the international goodwill and prestige they have gained in recent months.

If one assumes that the Palestinian resistance will not dissolve, and the analysis strongly supports that hypothesis, the Gaza-West Bank Palestinian solution is the path of least danger and bloodshed. The prospects are not promising, but not impossible either. It is difficult to see how a solution can be reached until Habash, Hawatmah and Jabril and their followers are neutralized. Assassination and terrorism appear to remain in the cards however future events unfold.

APPENDIX A

PFLP PRECURSORS AND OFFSHOOTS



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Source: William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Rand Report R-782-ISA, November 1971, p. 19. Modified by the author.

## APPENDIX B

### PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS

#### A. National Organizations

##### 1. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

The umbrella organization for all other groups. Consists of several subordinate bodies including the Palestine Information Center, the Palestine National Fund, the Palestine Planning Board, the Palestine Research Center, the Palestine Liberation Army, and the PLO Executive Committee. The PLO has offices in all Arab states, the United States, China, Yugoslavia, and Switzerland. The Chairman of the PLO is Yasir Arafat.

##### 2. Palestine National Council

The head organization of the PLO. Meets twice annually, usually in Cairo. The Council has 151 members representing all PLO bodies, trade unions, students, women's organizations, the fedayeen groups, and political groups from the occupied territories. The PLO Executive Committee is elected by the Council and runs the PLO between Council meetings. Yasir Arafat is Chairman of the National Council and the PLO Executive Committee.

##### 3. Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance Movement

Created in 1969 under the name of Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) to coordinate the fedayeen resistance. The major groups with the exception of George Habash's PFLP participated in the PASC during the 1970 Jordan crisis. The PFLP is now represented in the Central Committee. Arafat, as Palestinian Commander in Chief, heads the Central Committee.

#### B. Fedayeen Groups

##### 1. Active Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP)

Radical group established in 1969. Received support from Egypt and Kuwait. It is now believed inactive. Leader: Isam Sartawi.

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2. Al-Ard (Earth)

Established in Israel in 1959 as pro-Arab nationalist group. Banned in 1964. Affiliated with FATAH in 1968. Small group still operating in Israel.

3. Ansar (Partisan Forces)

Established in 1970 by the Arab communist parties. Once had about 200 members, but now believed inactive.

4. Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Composed of Palestinians sympathetic to the Iraqi Ba'th Party. Consists of 100 active fedayeen commanded by Wahab Kayyali. Seldom involved in terrorist raids.

5. Arab Palestine Organization (AOP).

One of the offshoots of the PFLP. Supported by Egypt. Now believed inactive. Leader: Ahmed Za'nur.

6. Asifa

Established in 1965 as military arm of FATAH.

7. Black September Organization (BSO)

Established in 1969 as the "special services section" of Rasd, FATAH's undercover agency. Gained public notoriety in 1972 by extremist terrorist activities. Estimates range from 100-400 activists. Particularly active in Germany where funds are raised in lucrative hashish trade. Leaders: Shalah Khalaf and Ali Hassan Salamah.

8. Jordanian National Front (JNF)

Established in 1971 with objective of regaining base in Jordan. Has ties with FATAH which occasionally broadcasts JNF statements.

9. Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)

Formed in 1964 as conventional army under PLO. Now numbers 17,000 men organized in three brigades stationed in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Commander: Brigadier General Misbah Budieri.

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10. Palestine National Liberation Front (PNLF)

Joined FATAH in 1968, broke away in 1971. Currently supported by Syrian government. Leader: Hasan al-Sabarini.

11. Palestine National Liberation Movement (FATAH)

Largest and most important fedayeen group. Established in 1965, now has 6,700 members including 2,000 active fighters. Engages in some terrorist activities, but also operates many Palestinian social organizations. Asifa is military arm, and Rasd is undercover group which includes Black September Organization. Broad non-ideological appeal has permitted support from all Arab nations. Leader of FATAH and PLO: Yasir Arafat.

12. Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)

Broke from PFLP in 1969. Marxist-Leninist Group with 500 members. Supported by Syria. Leader: Nayif Hawatmah.

13. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1967. Second largest fedayeen organization with 3,500 members. Carries out spectacular terrorist acts. Supported by Iraq. Leader: Dr. George Habash.

14. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC)

Broke from PFLP in 1969. Marxist-Leninist, pro-Peking extremist group. Hard core guerrilla membership of 150. Supported by Iraq and Libya. Leader: Ahmed Jabril.

15. Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)

Established in 1967 as fedayeen arm of PLA. Now believed inactive.

16. Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP)

Small Marxist-Leninist group that broke from the PDFLP in 1970. Supported by Egypt.

17. Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP)

Dissident left wing faction that broke from the PFLP in 1972.

18. Popular Struggle Front (PSF)

Small organization now believed inactive. Leader: Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah.

19. Saiqa (Thunderbolt)

Established in 1967 by the Syrian Ba'th Party from Palestinian refugees living in Syria. Now numbers 2,000 members, including 1,000 full-time guerrillas. Functions as an unofficial auxiliary of the Syrian army. Leader: Zuheir Mohsen.

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NOTES ON CHAPTER I

1. "President Nixon Visits Five Middle East Countries," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXII, No. 1829, July 15, 1974, pp. 77-101. The reference contains a text of speeches by Hafiz Asad of Syria, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia welcoming Mr. Nixon to their respective countries. Each leader unequivocally proclaimed the primacy of the Palestinian issue.

2. "Arafat's Speech," New York Times, November 14, 1974, p. 22.

3. Francis Ofner, "Arafat Speech Hardens Israelis," The Christian Science Monitor, November 15, 1974, p. 1.

4. "The Palestinians Become A Power," Time, November 11, 1974, p. 27. Hereafter cited as Time, November 11, 1974.

5. David Anable, "UN View: Peace is Set Back," The Christian Science Monitor, November 15, 1974, p. 1, and Dana Adams Schmidt, "How to get Israel and PLO to talk," The Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1974, p. 2.

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1. J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1971, p. 44.
2. Mao Tse Tung, Selected Military Writings, Peking, 1963, p. 228, cited in Bell, pp. 21-22.
3. Mao Tse Tung, Primer on Guerrilla Warfare, Translation and Introduction by Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Retired), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961, p. 43.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Kuiper, "Theory and Practice of Insurgency," Education Journal, USAF ROTC, Air University, September-October, 1974.
5. Bell, pp. 53-54.
6. Walter Lacquer, "Guerrillas and Terrorists," Commentary, Vol. 58, No. 4, October 1974, p. 42.
7. Y. Harkabi, The Palestinian National Covenant, An Israeli Commentary, originally printed in Maariv, December 12, 1969, p. 1.
8. Ibid., pp. 3-18.
9. While there is no evidence that Palestinian Jews would forswear allegiance to Israel in favor of an Arab secular state, the covenant's appeal is not entirely without foundation. Jews have lived in peace with Arabs since the Exile, in contrast to persecution in Eastern and Western Europe. The introduction of Western Jews in the twentieth century led to conflicts with resident or Asiatic Jews as well as Arab Muslims and Christians. The following comment illustrates the tension that still exists: "Apart from the Arab minority, Israel has an internal demographic problem about which little is said: more than one-third of Israel's Jewish majority consists of Middle Eastern or African Jews, some of them quite dark skinned, who are looked down upon by some of the dominant European element and who are, in fact, in some respects more like the Arabs among who they have lived for centuries than like the sophisticated Jews from the West." James R. Warburg, Crosscurrents in the Middle East, New York, Athencum, 1968, p. 235.



10. Sherif Hussein of Mecca, ruler of the Muslim Holy Cities, negotiated an agreement with Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, in a series of letters called the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Concluded in January 1916, the Arabs agreed to revolt against the Turks in exchange for a Greater Arab Kingdom after the war. Hussein's sons led the rebellion, assisted by the famous British Captain T. E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia. See George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times, Seventh Revised Edition, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1964, p. 126.

11. Warburg, p. 42.

12. Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, Second Edition, New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971. p. 103.

13. William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Anne M. Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, p. 14. Hereafter cited as Lesch.

14. Kirk, p. 152. The King-Crane Commission toured the Levant under instructions from President Wilson to test the reaction of the population. The Commission reported intense hostility to Zionism.

15. The British contended that Palestine was not included in the British agreements, but there is no reference to Palestine in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, and the British argument is barely plausible. See Kirk, p. 146.

16. Ibid., pp. 158 and 181-182.

17. Ibid., p. 183.

18. Lesch, pp. 37-38.

19. Bell, p. 66.

20. Kirk, p. 188.

21. Peretz, p. 270.

22. Kirk, pp. 204-205.

23. Warburg, pp. 106-107.

24. Kirk, p. 210.

25. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, Palestine Between 1914-1967, New York, The New World Press, 1967, pp. 92-94. It is unlikely that the partition which favored Zionists claims at the expense of the Arabs could have passed without extensive US pressure.

26. Peretz, p. 273.

27. Ibid., p. 275.

28. Ibid., p. 276.

29. Hadawi, pp. 201-203.

30. Don Peretz, The Palestine Refugee Problem, Rand Report RM-5973-FF, October 1969, pp. 48-49.

31. Fuad Jabber, The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics, Rand Report P-4653, May 1971, p. 2.

32. William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, Rand Report R-782-ISA, November 1971, p. 6.

33. Ibid., p. 35.

34. Quandt, p. 92.

35. Ibid., pp. 110-113.

36. James Ring Adams, "Two Different Worlds at the UN," The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1974, p. 10.

37. "The Palestinians Become a Power," Time, November 11, 1974, p. 32. Hereafter cited as Time, November 11, 1974.

38. Frances Ofner, "Israel Challenges PLO and Arafat, but Recognizes Palestinian People," The Christian Science Monitor, November 13, 1974, p. 1.

39. "New Premier of a Struggling People," Time, December 2, 1974, p. 45.

40. "News Out of Israel and the Occupied Territories," The Middle East International, No. 34, April 1974, p. 24.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Bell, pp. 75-76.

2. The word FATAH means conquest. The acronym was formed by reversing the first letters of the Arabic name of the Palestine Liberation Movement--Harakat al-Tahuir al-Filastini.

3. Quandt, p. 42.

4. Ibid., p. 43.

5. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

6. Jabber, p. 3.

7. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

8. Hisham Sharabi, Palestinian Guerrillas, Their Credibility and Effectiveness, Georgetown University, 1970, p. 2.

9. Ibid., p. 13.

10. Bell, p. 73.

11. Ibid., p. 180.

12. Quandt, p. 26.

13. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.

14. Quandt, p. 12.

15. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35. Black September, a terrorist group responsible for the Munich and Khartoum massacres, is an offshoot of FATAH, but may be an independent group.

16. "FATAH Doctrine," quoted in Sharabi, p. 49.

17. Quandt, p. 70.

18. James Ring Adams, "Did Arafat Leave Room for Maneuver," The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 1974, p. 12.

19. "World News," The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 1975, p. 1.
20. Quandt, pp. 45-48.
21. Ibid., p. 76.
22. Ibid., p. 62.
23. "Terrorist Group Shifts Operation" New York Times, September 15, 1974, p. 8.
24. Sharabi, p. 28.
25. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.
26. "Rabat Summit Supports PLO," Middle East Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 21, November 15, 1974, p. 4.
27. Jabber, p. 25.
28. Quandt, p. 17.
29. Ibid., p. 20.
30. Ibid., p. 21.
31. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 36.
32. Quandt, p. 21.
33. Ibid., p. 22.
34. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.
35. John Laffin, Fedayeen, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, New York, The Free Press, 1973.
36. Quandt, pp. 62-63, 77.
37. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.
38. Bell, p. 191.

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1. Lacquer, p. 45.
2. Sharabi, p. 1.
3. Bell, p. 55.
4. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. Mao Tse Tung, Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, Peking, 1965, p. 4, quoted in Bell, p. 23.
7. Y. Harkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, Adelphi Papers No. 53, London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968, p. 14.
8. David Galula, Counter Insurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice, New York, Praeger, 1964, cited in Kuiper, p. 28.
9. Robert Taber, The War of the Flea, New York, Lyle Stuart, 1965, p. 28.
10. Jabber, p. 13. This reference is a chart showing the number of raids per month extending from a high of twenty-three in September 1965, to a low of zero in seven of the eighteen months when inter-Arab political developments forced clamping down on the guerrillas.
11. Harkabi, p. 24.
12. Sharabi, p. 1.
13. Jabber, p. 10.
14. Sharabi, pp. 1-2.
15. Quandt, p. 87.
16. Ibid., p. 87.
17. Ibid., p. 35.
18. Russel Stetler, ed., Palestine, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, San Francisco, Ramparts Press, 1972, pp. 158-160.

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19. Bell, pp. 191-192.
20. Ibid., pp. 192-193.
21. Quandt, p. 80.
22. Sharabi, p. 8.
23. Quoted in Sharabi, p. 9, from columns in Maariv, an Israeli newspaper, on June 9 and 12, 1969.
24. Jabber, p. 30.
25. Ibid., p. 31.
26. Francis Ofner, "Arab-Israeli Secret War Spills into more Countries," The Christian Science Monitor, January 30, 1973, pp. 1 and 4.
27. Time, November 11, 1974, p. 35.
28. "Arafat's Speech," The New York Times, November 14, 1972, p. 22.
29. Yassin El-Ayouty, "The Palestinians and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War," Current History, Vol. 66, No. 390, February 1974, p. 76.
30. Ibid., p. 76.

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NOTES ON CHAPTER V

1. Bell, p. 23.
2. Sharabi, pp. 25-26. This paragraph is an abbreviated summation of Professor Sharabi's model outlined in the reference.
3. "Rabat Summit Supports PLO," The Middle East Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 21, November 15, 1974, pp. 3-4.
4. "Hijacking Tests Arab Unity, PLO Authority," The Middle East Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 22, December 1, 1974, pp. 1-2.
5. Quandt, p. 38.
6. Ibid., p. 39.
7. Bell, p. 171.
8. Quandt, p. 32.
9. Ibid., p. 33.
10. Ibid., p. 110.

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NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

1. "Rabat Summit Supports PLO," The Middle East Monitor, Vol. IV, No. 21, November 15, 1974, p. 3.

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Quandt, pp. 102 and 111-112.

4. "PLO Bomb Rocks vs Tourist Bus," The Montgomery Advertiser, December 23, 1974, p. 1.

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