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INTRODUCTION

Heroin addiction and its related social disruption remain the primary cause of moral decline and increased criminal activity in the United States. The late 1960's and early 1970's were the period of greatest public awareness of the threat of drug abuse, with an estimated 500,000 heroin addicts in the country at that time. Following the demise of Turkey as the leading source of raw opium, from which heroin is refined, the number of addicts declined to a low in 1974 of about 250,000 nationally. This progress, however, vanished with development of new sources of supply, so that today some estimates of the number of addicts in the United States exceed 800,000, and the cost of drug related crime is thought to be between $17 and $27 billion annually.

Clearly, the response of the Federal Government to drug abuse is failing and both the executive and legislative branches of government have been called upon to reevaluate their approaches to combating drug abuse. The executive response was contained in Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, which created the new Drug Enforcement Administration and reassigned responsibility for antinarcotic efforts from Customs and other agencies to it.

The legislative response to drug abuse was stated in House Resolution 1350 which was passed by the House of Representatives on July 29, 1976. H.R. 1350 created the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, and thereby gave to the Congress a single entity responsible for direction of the legislative effort against drug abuse, providing for the first time for systematic coordination of the work of those committees of the House with legislative jurisdiction over narcotics.

Many House committees, most notably the Committee on International Relations and the Judiciary Committee, had analyzed the drug abuse situation as it was reflected in their own jurisdiction. No committee, however, had undertaken the complete oversight and coordinative effort, and the low effectiveness of the House resulted from that piecemeal approach.

In this report the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control presents findings and conclusions which relate to a study mission to Europe and South Asia. The committee departed Washington, D.C., on November 4, 1976 and returned November 21, after visiting seven nations and meeting with 173 officials of foreign governments and Americans stationed abroad. The nations visited were: France, Switzerland, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, and Italy. Members of the committee participating in the mission were: Lester L. Wolff, James Scheuer, Mrs. Cardiss Collins, and Benjamin Gilman.

An indication of the increased degree of commitment of both the executive and legislative branches is the fact that Drug Enforcement Administration head Peter B. Bensinger accompanied the congressional delegation during the 17-day mission. His contributions were

exceptionally valuable, and his willingness to work in close cooperation with the Congress was evident. The committee feels that this evidence of cooperation among responsible Government officials of the United States set a positive example for the nations which were visited, and contributed to the success of the mission.

The report will discuss American and international successes and failures in antinarcotics efforts, and will present an urgent recommendation for a new international body comprised of legislators, jurists, law enforcement personnel and parliamentarians to deal with the problem of drug abuse in a neutral and objective manner.

A similar recommendation will be presented for creation of a correlative international body to deal with demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation.

In addition to the fact finding and policy study conducted by the study mission, a special review of the drug abuse situation among our NATO troops was initiated. Preliminary findings and recommendations are also presented concerning the response of the military to this persistent problem.

We wish to extend our gratitude to the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Drug Enforcement Administration for the assistance provided by their personnel in organizing and conducting the study mission.

Summary

Any effort to evaluate the position of the United States in combating narcotics abuse must address itself to many complex and interrelated factors. Perhaps foremost among these factors is foreign supply, for the United States produces no illicit narcotic drugs at all.

Prior to 1970 most of the illicit narcotics which were abused in the United States originated in Turkey, where the opium poppies were cultivated, and proceeded through Marseilles where the raw opium was refined into heroin of exceptional purity in clandestine laboratories. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that in 1970 over 10 tons of heroin entered this country from Marseilles, with a total street value, after repeated cutting, of over $10 billion.

In 1972, Turkey, in response to intense pressure from the United States, completely outlawed the growing of opium poppies. The result of the opium ban, coupled with law enforcement efforts and the fracturing of the "French Connection," was a dramatic shortage of heroin on the east coast of the United States. Such shortages, however, tend to create intense vacuums because of the incredible profits to be made in international narcotics trafficking.

In order that the magnitude of these illicit profits be appreciated, two examples are offered. In the case of Mexico, where brown, granular heroin, No. 3 heroin, is produced, 10 kilograms of raw opium would cost the trafficker about $16,000. The 10 kilograms of opium would yield 1 kilogram of No. 3 heroin with a street value, after reduction to 7-percent purity, of $925,000.

The profit for those doing business in Southeast Asia is even greater. The same 10 kilograms of raw opium would cost only $780 if purchased in Thailand. The 1 kilogram of white, fluffy heroin, No. 4 heroin, which could be processed from it would have a street value, when cut to 8-percent purity, of $1,650,000.

In 1974 the Turkish Government lifted its total ban on the growing of poppies, and licensed its farmers again to raise the crop, but with the Turkish Government as the sole authorized buyer and with strict controls on production and distribution. While this action has resulted in an overproduction of morphine base, there appears not to be significant leakage to the illicit market. Lancing of poppy pods to yield opium is strictly prohibited, and rather than harvesting raw opium, the Turkish method of production entails processing the entire pod, unlanced, in what is called the "straw process." This method of extracting morphine from the poppies is capital intensive and makes impossible the manufacture of heroin in the production process.

With Turkey now out of the market for illicit opium, and with the vacuum of demand still existing, attention must be directed to alternative sources for illicit narcotics. Mexico has become the primary

supplier of heroin to the United States, with its characteristic No. 3 heroin available in all major cities. A vigorous campaign to eradicate the poppy crop from the fields before it is harvested has been initiated by the Mexican Government, and the results may approach 50 percent of the total available crop. The true effectiveness of the eradication program will not be known until the spring of 1977, however, and many observers do not believe that such substantial results will be forthcoming. There is also the possibility of internal political and social difficulties diverting many of the resources which are now dedicated to the detection and elimination of the poppy crops. In any event, the Mexican situation is currently receiving substantial attention, and the results may be significant.

There are two other major opium producing areas in the world at this time: The golden triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand), and what may be called the silver triangle (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India). There are 600 to 700 tons of illicit opium presently being produced in the golden triangle, and over 400 tons of illicit opium produced in the silver triangle each year. It is of paramount importance to the United States that early and effective controls be established in these areas in order that new trafficking networks be prevented and old networks not be revitalized.

The objective of the study mission was in part to assess the effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral efforts to insure that significant amounts of narcotics from these areas do not reach our shores. The attention of the congressional delegation was focused on three major objectives: Preventive representations, fact finding, and positive action which could be achieved by legislative presence.

The great majority of the current crop in the silver triangle is consumed in Iran, where the addict population is almost as great as in the United States. Traffickers collect shipments of opium throughout Afghanistan and in northern Pakistan, then cross the Iran-Pakistan and Iran-Afghanistan borders. An obvious concern is that opium which passes so easily into Iran could continue through the traditional smuggling routes which exist through Turkey and into Marseilles, thus revitalizing the link between Europe and the east coast of the United States. The potential presently exists for this source to exceed the amounts that Turkey supplied in 1970.

The United States, acting in a bilateral capacity, can achieve only a limited success in the world effort against illicit narcotics. Therefore, a second preventive effort of the study mission was to meet with officials of countries which are playing or could play a significant role in this regard, including countries of production, transshipment and consumption. Many nations of the world which had no domestic consumption problem, and therefore were not as determined in their interdiction efforts against drugs transiting their country, now are being inundated, and addiction levels are on the rise in Europe at record rates.

Holland, a nation with generally permissive laws against narcotics trafficking, has clearly become the trafficking center of Europe, and was cited as such by every law enforcement official interviewed. The drug routes, ever responsive to political, enforcement and financial pressures, have shifted from the traditional area of supply, Turkey,

and the traditional center of refining and distribution, France. Asian opium, heroin and hashish now flood Amsterdam and the routes have been redrawn from there south into Europe's growing market and west to the United States. The drug scene is so permissive in the Netherlands that the son of the minister of health appears on a clandestine radio every Saturday to announce the prevailing prices for illicit drugs. Law enforcement officials from other European nations told the delegation that the police of the Netherlands are so distraught over lax enforcement and sentencing that they routinely attempt to cause the apprehension of Dutch traffickers in other nations in order that sterner justice may apply.

Police officials generally were far more alarmed over drug abuse trends in their nations than were the legislators and parliamentarians consulted. Rising drug-related crime rates, perhaps the earliest indicators of an incipient drug abuse problem, are detected first by enforcement personnel, but many nations do not have effective communications between enforcement officials and legislators. Many nations are just beginning to keep the kind of statistics necessary to identify such trends, and others still do not have that capability.

The United Nations has, for decades, been the center for multinational efforts to combat narcotics production and traffic. This body, however, is limited in its effectiveness in many respects and two in particular. It appears impossible to separate efforts to extirpate illicit traffic from the other political and economic matters which are considered in this forum. Treaties, such as the Single Convention of 1961 and the Psychotropic Substances Convention, are often stripped of enforceable measures and delayed in implementation. In addition, funding for pilot programs such as crop substitution and improved drug law enforcement is hard to come by, with many nations failing to contribute a fair share, and others, such as the Soviet Union and China, refusing to contribute at all or otherwise associate themselves with the U.N. effort.

Matters regarding international cooperation and mutual efforts to eliminate illicit drug traffic must, therefore, be considered in a forum which is free from extraneous considerations, and which is able to extract substantial commitment from individual governments. Full and candid discussions involving legislators, appointed officials, jurists, and enforcement personnel should be facilitated in a promising neutral setting. Law enforcement officials can neither make policy nor enact statutes. Legislators or appointed officials who are under-informed cannot appreciate the facts or act intelligently on them. In a related area, treatment and rehabilitation officials cannot coordinate their efforts without receiving informed support for funding and resources.

As a practical matter, such an independent international forum does not exist, the existence of the United Nations notwithstanding

MEETINGS ATTENDED

Representatives of the delegation attended the 23rd meeting of the highly professional France-United States-Canada Intergovernmental Committee for Drug Control in Marseilles on November 5, 1976.

On November 8, the delegation was received by the Geneva-based United Nations antinarcotics community and discussed the work of the Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC).

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On November 16, representatives of the delegation addressed the State Department's NEA Regional Narcotics Conference in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE GROUPS VISITED

In addition to the conferences attended, meetings were held with officials of executive and legislative departments of individual governments. President Daoud met in private with the chairman and received the delegation on November 14, 1976, in Kabul. Meetings followed with President Daoud's brother, Mr. Mohammed Naim, a key figure in the government, and Minister of the Interior Abdul Qadir, who directs the Afghanistan Antismuggling Unit.

In Cairo, President Sadat received the delegation on November 17 at the Abdin Palace. Meetings were also held with U.S. Ambassador Eilts and his staff, Prime Minister Mamdub Salim, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohamed Riad, and Minister of Interior Sayyid Fahmy. The official host of the delegation in Egypt, Speaker of the People's Assembly Sayyid Mari'i, held a conference for the delegation on November 18.

LAW ENFORCEMENT BRIEFINGS

The delegation met with many leading law enforcement officers in Europe, Afghanistan, Egypt and Pakistan during the study mission. In France, we were received by the following French law enforcement officials: Robert Pandraud, directeur-general, French National Police: Maurice Bouvier, directeur general de la Police Judicaire and Fernand Mathieux, controlleur general, chef du service de la Police Judicaire, Marseilles. Police Judicaire Principal Commissioner Gilbert Raguideau presented the current French antinarcotic position on November 6, assisted by Mr. Amie-Blanc, director of the Marseilles drug squad. In Kabul the delegation met with U.N. Narcotics Advisor Christian Magnussen and the Afghan and U.N. officers who work with him. Pakistan's narcotic control board director, Sahibzada Raoof Ali, met with representatives of the delegation in Islamabad. In Cairo, discussions were held with Gen. Sami Farag, chief of the General Anti-Narcotics Administration. In Rome, officials of the Guardia di Finanza, led by MGen Dosi and BGen Oliva briefed the delegation on the drug situation in Italy.

THE VATICAN

On November 20, 1976 the delegation was received by His Holiness Pope Paul VI at the Vatican, and received his blessing.

DRUG ABUSE IN THE MILITARY

An additional objective of the study mission was to evaluate the extent of and response to drug abuse among NATO forces in Europe. For this purpose the delegation visited American troops stationed in the vicinity of Frankfurt, Heidelberg, and Munich, Germany. Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Forces in Europe, General Blanchard, presented the response of the military to drug and alcohol abuse at a meeting in Heidelberg on November 9, 1976. The delegation subse-

quently divided into three groups for indepth briefings at three military communities—Giessen, Hanau, and Frankfurt. The Army in Germany has decentralized its drug and alcohol programs, with primary responsibility located in each community in a community drug and alcohol assistance center (CDAAC). In 1972 there were 34 such facilities; today there are 79.

The delegation concentrated on four factors in attempting to evaluate the drug situation among the NATO forces. Those factors were urine testing programs, number of military personnel receiving treatment, drug related discharges and availability of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

Each year approximately 3,300 men out of the total complement of 200,000 troops are lost through drug abuse related circumstances. The growing drug and alcohol abuse problem was viewed as, "the single greatest threat to the discipline and professionalism of the U.S. Army in Europe, and the number one problem in the command," by the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Army in Europe in 1972.

Discussion

FRANCE

France has had a centralized drug enforcement effort since 1939, active primarily in the traditional trafficking centers of Paris and Marseilles. Because of unique geographic conditions, France for many years was the trafficking center of Europe, and has historically been the chief supplier of heroin to the United States. Opium grown in Turkey passed either by sea or across the porous borders of central Europe to the seaport city of Marseilles, where skilled chemists, mainly from Corsica, processed it into pure heroin. Handled by members of the French underworld and the Italian Mafia, huge clandestine shipments of the drug were smuggled into the area of highest profit—the United States. This trafficking network and the underlying physical and economic geography came to be known as the "French Connection."

Several factors coalesced in the early 1970's to dismantle this structure. French governmental officials in the 1960's did not seem unduly concerned about the activity in Marseilles, and their attention was concentrated on such internal problems as the insurrection of French opponents of Algerian independence and by the student-worker disturbances of 1969. Police personnel were necessarily assigned elsewhere, and the traffickers operated freely, unmolested by political or enforcement pressures. Similarly, in the United States there was at first no full appreciation of the degree to which drugs were affecting the ghettos, the primary site of addiction during that period.

Advances in law enforcement intelligence in both countries in the late 1960's focused attention on Marseilles as the source of most of the heroin reaching the east coast of the United States. Turkey was identified as the source of opium which supported the clandestine industry, and political pressure was brought to bear on the Turks. In 1972 Turkey decided to outlaw the production of opium, and prohibited its farmers from growing opium poppies. This brought the supply of raw material to an abrupt halt in Marseilles, and the heroin laboratories soon went into mothballs until a supply could be reestablished.

At essentially the same time law enforcement officers in France and the United States collaborated to arrest many of the principal figures involved in the international trafficking, and the "French Connection" was put out of action, for the time being at least.

The French continue to place the Marseilles narcotics milieu under tight surveillance, but report that there is negligible illicit narcotic activity there at present. They caution, however, that rather than being considered dead, the "French Connection" should be considered to be in suspended animation, awaiting the reestablishment of a source for opium. Turkey, the convenient and traditional source, appears to be sealed off by strict government controls over licit production, and efforts to obtain opium from there have failed. There

have been indications recently that overtures have been made by French traffickers to sources in Southeast Asia, but no significant quantity of opium has yet been seized from that source.

As evidence of the basis for the French warning, officials of the police judicaire exhibited to the delegation a clandestine laboratory which had been seized only 3 months before. It was discovered in a bricked up room in Marseilles, and was described as capable of processing multikilogram amounts of heroin on 24 hours notice. In addition, one of the essential chemicals in the production of heroin, acetic anhydride, was available in quantity to the owner of the laboratory.

The present source of heroin and other illicit drugs to the addict population of France is Amsterdam. Laboratory analysis of seized illicit shipments of heroin indicate that it is of Southeast Asian origin. Hashish, another illicit drug of frequent abuse in France, is imported primarily from North Africa.

The United States enjoys exceptionally good relations with France in drug control and related intelligence exchange. Each nation has enforcement officials exchanged on a permanent basis.

THE UNITED NATIONS

In order better to understand the current function of the United Nations with respect to control of narcotics, it is necessary to present briefly the U.N. organization in that regard. There are three operational units—the Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND), and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB).

Essentially, the UNFDAC task is to decide which projects are worth financing, and to raise the necessary funds for that purpose. The DND is the main source of expert knowledge and is the body which carries out and executes all programs in the field. The INCB assures that all member governments abide by the provisions and obligations of the narcotics conventions.

There are at the moment almost 80 programs underway under the auspices of the United Nations. The two most successful programs in the past 2 years are the country programs in Turkey and Afghanistan.

The United Nations worked with Turkey to develop the "poppy straw," or "poppy capsule" method of refining opium. In addition, where there were once 67 provinces growing poppies in Turkey in 1972, there are now only 7 licensed to grow poppies. In 1974, Turkey announced that it intended to authorize a poppy crop of 20,000 tons, but weather and administrative delays in issuing licenses resulted in a harvest of only 6,000 tons. Last year the harvest was 14,000 tons, all of which was sold to the Turkish Government and in turn put on the market for sale to pharmaceutical companies.

U.N. observers do not feel that there was any diversion of opium from Turkey into illicit channels last year. There are 4,000 soldiers patrolling the authorized growing areas, and security appears to be very tight. Incising of poppy capsules is prohibited, and a farmer stands to lose all of his production if lancing is detected while the crop is in the field or when the farmer submits his harvest for sale to the government. Those farmers who have been penalized so far have

erred by growing poppies on more land than they were licensed to cultivate. No farmers have been detected lancing poppies.[1] One possible reason for the lack of clandestine opium production is that the government is offering the farmer a price which is slightly higher than he was getting for opium on the illicit market, about 22 Turkish pounds-per-ton of straw.

In an effort to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the Turkish Government, the United Nations delivered two small observation aircraft which are used for spotting illicit opium cultivation.

This support program costs the United Nations about $2.5 million per year. Total costs of the Turkish program have been about $4 million. Of this, the United States paid $3 million.

In Afghanistan, the situation is different because poppies are grown in much wilder areas. For this reason the United Nations concentrated more on a policing program, a law enforcement assistance program. The United Nations sent two police experts to train Afghani policemen, and about 50 have been trained in antinarcotics techniques. The results have been good, and seizures have increased from last year's 8½ tons to a rate of 1½ tons per month this year.

The 1973 estimate of production of opium in Afghanistan was 250 tons. Estimates for 1976 are closer to 150 tons, so the increased seizures are being made from a reduced yield, but there are indications that there is increased growing in the eastern provinces.

The United Nations has two major projects underway in Afghanistan. In the northeastern province of Badakhshan there is research into drug substitution programs, and a physician is attempting to get the tribesman to use drugs other than opium in their traditional medical treatment of ailments.

The other project deals with the Afghanistan-Iran border. Weather is extreme, with summer temperatures over 130 degees Fahrenheit and a total lack of water. Mr. A. A. Baggott, a U.N. observer, recently submitted a report on the border situation which addressed itself to the feasibility of greatly improving security against smuggling.[2]

The situation in Pakistan is similar to Afghanistan. In the regions which border Afghanistan, there are about 200 tons of opium produced illicitly each year. Four heroin laboratories have been discovered there recently. The United Nations would deny permission for Pakistan or Afghanistan to grow licit opium because neither country has the capability to monitor and secure the product.

The destination of Pakistani opium is also Iran, where opium is eaten and the needs of the addicts approach 500 tons per year. Iran itself has a licit production of 160 tons per year. Iran requests no help from the United Nations, and claims that it will eradicate opium abuse there in 10 years.

Other country programs are being administered by the United Nations in the golden triangle area of Thailand, Burma and Laos. Thailand is one of the oldest programs with five villages involved in a pilot program of crop substitution, which involves a change in the economy of the area. The program terminates in a year, and has been considered a success.

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[1] So far there have been 967 farmers detected overplanting. This resulted in the destruction of 426 hectares of fields.

[2] Report on a feasibility study in Afghanistan, July 1–16, 1976.

Burma is the site of a new 5-year program which is scheduled to cost $6 million. Burma is the biggest producer of opium in the world.

In Burma, the pilot programs will not be run in the opium producing areas because of the inaccessability of the villages, but will be run in adjoining areas. Major townships will be the sites of 11 demonstration centers.

The United Nations had spent very little in Burma because they had not been asked to help there. Negotiations have been very long because the Burmese Government appears to be suspicious of offers of assistance. Burma represents one area where the United Nations may be the only entity which can gain access since the Burmese would almost certainly reject offers of bilateral assistance from any single nation.

Funding of the U.N. programs

Ambassador de Beus, Executive Director of the UNFDAC, is rightfully concerned about funding, which is accomplished by voluntary contributions of member nations. The contributions to the Fund for the past 4 years are:

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL—STATUS OF CASH CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED OR RECEIVED AS AT NOV. 1, 1976

	Amount in U.S. dollars	Date	Amount unpaid
Algeria	1,998	Feb. 7, 1974	
Do	2,997	June 23, 1976	
Argentina	3,000	Jan. 30, 1973	
Do	3,000	Aug. 23, 1974	
Do	3,000	June 19, 1975	
Australia	100,000	Nov. 28, 1972	
Do	100,000	Mar. 11, 1974	
Do	100,000	Feb. 27, 1975	
Do	44,108	Apr. 23, 1976	
Do	4,908	June 15, 1976	
Austria	10,000	Dec. 13, 1973	
Do	10,000	Aug. 8, 1975	
Bahamas	500	Sept. 15, 1975	
Barbados	500	Sept. 24, 1973	
Belgium	25,000	Oct. 5, 1973	
Brazil	3,000	June 11, 1974	
Do	5,000	Nov. 3, 1975	5,000
Cameroon	422	Apr. 8, 1976	
Canada	150,000	Feb. 15, 1972	
Do	250,000	May 12, 1972	
Do	203,946	Feb. 4, 1974	
Do	200,000	Jan. 30, 1975	
Do	198,800	Jan. 30, 1976	
Chile	1,000	Mar. 24, 1976	
Cyprus	2,590	Jan. 20, 1972	
Do	2,762	Feb. 27, 1973	2,762
Do	300	Dec. 4, 1975	
Do	297	Apr. 8, 1976	
Denmark	50,000	Nov. 16, 1972	
Do	50,000	Aug. 16, 1973	
Do	25,000	Sept. 10, 1974	
Do	25,000	Apr. 23, 1975	
Do	50,000	Jan. 5, 1976	
Finland	25,773	Aug. 30, 1976	25,773
France	100,000	Oct. 27, 1971	
Do	100,000	May 1, 1973	
Do	100,794	May 21, 1974	
Do	104,706	Mar. 20, 1975	
Do	100,000	Jan. 20, 1976	
Germany, Federal Republic of	310,481	Dec. 30, 1971	
Do	188,775	Sept. 23, 1974	
Greece	2,000	Mar. 10, 1972	
Do	2,000	Oct. 10, 1973	
Do	2,000	June 18, 1974	
Do	1,884	Oct. 1, 1976	

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL—STATUS OF CASH CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED OR RECEIVED AS AT NOV. 1, 1976—Continued

	Amount in U.S. dollars	Date	Amount unpaid
Guyana	487	Jan. 26, 1976	
Holy See	1,000	Apr. 30, 1971	
Hong Kong	19,443	Aug. 27, 1975	
Do	20,182	Aug. 19, 1976	
Iceland	1,500	Feb. 9, 1973	
Do	1,500	May 13, 1975	
Do	1,000	Feb. 6, 1976	
Iraq	5,066	Feb. 18, 1976	5,066
Iran	5,000	Oct. 18, 1971	
Do	5,000	Dec. 31, 1973	
Do	5,000	May 31, 1974	
Do	10,000	Nov. 18, 1975	5,003
Do	10,000	do	10,000
Israel	1,000	Jan. 11, 1974	
Do	500	Aug. 5, 1975	
Do	500	Aug. 28, 1975	
Do	500	Feb. 20, 1976	
Do	1,500	Sept. 27, 1976	
Italy	103,200	Mar. 3, 1972	
Do	100,000	Feb. 19, 1975	7,705
Jamaica	1,096	Jan. 21, 1975	
Do	1,095	Feb. 2, 1976	
Japan	200,000	June 20, 1973	
Do	200,000	Sept. 3, 1974	
Do	200,000	Feb. 19, 1975	
Do	200,000	Oct. 11, 1976	200,000
Jordan	2,000	Dec. 15, 1975	2,000
Kenya	3,000	Jan. 14, 1976	
Korea	1,000	Oct. 8, 1976	
Kuwait	2,000	Feb. 1, 1974	
Do	14,000	Sept. 14, 1976	
Libya	6,460	May 11, 1973	
Liechtenstein	1,000	Feb. 22, 1973	
Do	1,000	Dec. 23, 1975	
Do	1,000	Feb. 16, 1976	
Luxembourg	1,000	Nov. 28, 1973	
Malta	251	Jan. 30, 1973	
Do	233	May 25, 1976	
Mauritius	500	Feb. 13, 1976	
Morocco	2,058	Jan. 10, 1972	
Do	2,207	Feb. 14, 1973	
Do	2,000	Aug. 4, 1975	
Do	2,000	Dec. 17, 1975	
Do	2,000	Feb. 18, 1976	
New Zealand	22,277	Sept. 1, 1973	
Do	24,073	Dec. 1, 1974	
Do	26,345	July 29, 1975	
Do	20,000	July 27, 1976	
Nigeria [1]	6,000	Feb. 19, 1975	6,000
Norway	76,365	Mar. 10, 1972	
Do	17,855	Sept. 17, 1973	
Do	18,357	Aug. 15, 1974	
Do	48,715	Feb. 12, 1975	
Pakistan	1,010	Oct. 7, 1976	1,010
Philippines	3,000	May 21, 1973	
Do	5,000	May 14, 1975	
Portugal	1,000	Feb. 9, 1973	
Do	1,000	Mar. 22, 1974	
Do	1,000	Mar. 18, 1975	
Do	1,000	Jan. 15, 1976	
Qatar	2,000	Sept. 5, 1973	
Do	10,000	June 28, 1976	
Republic of Vietnam	2,000	Sept. 9, 1971	1,000
San Marino	500	Oct. 27, 1975	
Saudi Arabia	2,000	July 29, 1971	
Do	5,000	Jan. 30, 1974	
Do	25,000	July 22, 1975	25,000
Singapore	1,000	Nov. 6, 1975	
South Africa	1,580	Jan. 9, 1974	
Do	1,474	July 9, 1974	
Spain	10,000	Jan. 12, 1973	
Do	10,000	June 23, 1975	
Sudan	1,000	Aug. 3, 1976	
Surinam	1,000	Sept. 14, 1976	
Sweden	63,073	Mar. 7, 1972	
Do	47,393	Oct. 10, 1973	
Do	44,395	Sept. 17, 1974	
Do	45,766	Nov. 12, 1975	
Do	47,007	Oct. 12, 1976	

[1] Contribution pledged during the 26th session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL—STATUS OF CASH CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED OR RECEIVED AS AT NOV. 1, 1976—Continued

	Amount in U.S. dollars	Date	Amount unpaid
Thailand	4,000	June 15, 1976	
Trinidad and Tobago	1,000	May. 28, 1975	
Tunisia	2,564	Feb. 19, 1975	
Turkey	5,000	June 14, 1971	
Do	4,781	Feb. 13, 1976	
United Arab Emirates	5,000	Mar. 29, 1975	
Do	2,000	Apr. 30, 1976	
United Kingdom	120,556	Apr. 24, 1972	
Do	119,059	Sept. 3, 1973	
Do	115,839	Sept. 26, 1974	
Do	17,468	Feb. 19, 1976	
United States	2,000,000	Apr. 1, 1971	
Do	1,000,000	Oct. 6, 1972	
Do	1,000,000	Feb. 20, 1973	
Do	4,000,000	July 13, 1973	
Do	2,000,000	Feb. 28, 1974	
Do	4,000,000	Feb. 17, 1975	
Do	1,000,000	July 28, 1975	
Do	3,000,000	June 30, 1976	
Uruguay	1,000	Mar. 4, 1976	
Venezuela	2,000	July 30, 1975	2,000
Do	2,000	Mar. 22, 1976	
Yugoslavia	6,000	Feb. 22, 1974	
Do	5,367	Jan. 21, 1975	
Do	5,921	Dec. 23, 1975	
Total	22,816,569		298,319
Interest income	748,804		
Private contributions	14,907		
Total	23,580,280		
In addition the following contributions in kind have been received:			
Netherlands: Contribution for the publication of a monthly journal (Drug Dependence) by Excerpta Medica Foundation of Amsterdam (Aug. 4, 1972)			115,625
Poland: Contribution of agricultural machinery and implements for crop substitution projects (Feb. 2, 1975)			50,000

Many nations, such as the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, are conspicuous by their absence from this list. Others are conspicuous by their token presence. Some countries contribute to the U.N. program in their own individual country in addition to their UNFDAC contribution, but this represents a minimal additional resource to the United Nations in its global role.

Counterpart contributions by assisted countries to their own country programme (estimated),[1] $25,436,000.

[1] Country programmes:

	Country contribution	UNFDAC contribution
Afghanistan (1974-76)	$388,000	$1,363,000
Bolivia (1976)	85,000	85,000
Burma (1976-80)	6,985,000	6,571,000
Pakistan (1976-79)	2,425,000	3,304,100
Peru (1976)	(*)	165,000
Thailand (1972-77)	†5,163,000	2,784,400
	‡390,000	
Turkey (1975)	10,000,000	1,014,500
Total	25,436,000	15,287,000

*To be determined.
†In kind.
‡In cash.

The United Nations is aware that much more could be done to control narcotics if there were additional funds available to them for their operations. In deeming an operation as a success they also must point out that the success is limited by the size of the project. Ambassador de Beus has petitioned many of the noncontributing governments but with only limited success. The General Assembly of the United Nations has passed resolutions calling for support of the UNFDAC. The Secretary General sent telegrams to the members of the Narcotics Commission and the observers, which is about 60 governments. Two weeks later, a letter from the Fund was sent enclosing the list of country contributions and suggesting individual country targets. These appeals failed. Country ambassadors in Geneva were also approached, with somewhat better results. Ambassador de Beus then personally approached the individual governments in their respective capitals. Reactions to the appeal for funds included: "We have other problems in our country—inflation, economic development, illiteracy, delivery of health care * * *." Some governments stated that the problem was America's, not theirs, "so let America solve the funding problem."

The total number of contributing governments has increased from 48 a year ago to 65 now. Awareness of the menace of drug abuse appears to be spreading, but the new contributors are primarily small countries, and their contributions are modest.

One problem in increasing awareness of the drug situation in member nations appears to be that there is a lack of consultation between the executive department of the government and their police agencies. Almost universally, the police agencies are far more alarmed about the trafficking of drugs than are the executive agencies, but lacking input into fiscal and policy decisions, they are not effectively communicating. Drug abuse is simply not a high priority item in many countries.

The Central Training Unit of the Division of Narcotic Drugs has trained, since 1972, over 800 enforcement officers from developing countries on all continents. The Division is also involved in programs in Thailand and Laos. An agreement has recently been signed with the Government of Burma which provides for a 5-year program including crop replacement, law enforcement, education, treatment, and rehabilitation. Bolivia and Peru have also recently requested assistance from the Division.

One problem of the Division is that many countries, especially emerging nations, maintain data based only upon police records. Some other countries rely on health data services. Others use both sources while a few rely only on impressions. In these circumstances the reliability of data and estimates is open to question, and comparability of data is difficult or impossible. Common definition of terms and concepts and common ways of operationalizing them and measuring them is needed. A manual on drug abuse assessment is being prepared to assist the annual report each nation must submit to the United Nations.

The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and other treaties require international control over opiates, cannabis, and cocaine. On

August 16, 1976, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances entered into force. This convention now brings under international control psychotropic substances which contain varying degrees of risk of abuse. The United Nations considers this to be a most important document, particularly with regard to substances manufactured and distributed by developed countries. It is disquieting to note that only a few developed and producing countries have become parties to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The United Nations feels that this creates instability in the international family. Some members of the United Nations raise questions why the United States and Canada, whose past and present drug laws exercise control over psychotropic substances more stringently than does the convention itself, have not yet ratified the convention. The United States is the single largest producer of psychotropic substances.

Mr. J. Dittert, Secretary of the International Narcotics Control Board which is responsible for the licensing and supervision of licit opiates, feels that there are only very minor leakages from the licit market into the illicit. Those drugs which appear in the illicit market were illicit from the beginning.

Mr. Dittert reported that the price paid for 1,000 kilograms of Turkish straw last year was $1,900. From the 1,000 kilograms of poppy straw it is possible to manufacture 3 to 5 kilograms of morphine (probably closer to 3). Therefore 1 kilogram of morphine will cost about $630, with an added expenditure for processing it. The wholesale market for morphine is about $900 per kilogram.

For morphine derived from opium, rather than from poppy straw, the margin is much greater. Opium goes for $49 per kilogram and 10 kilos are needed to obtain 1 kilo of morphine, so the price of opium-derived morphine would come to $490 per kilo, and it is also sold for $900 per kilo. The margin is obviously greater for morphine derived from opium as opposed to poppy straw.

Morphine continues to be the drug of choice for physicians in treating coronary conditions, and there is at present no synthetic substitute. Codeine is the most effective antitussant. Synthetic agents have been produced in an effort to replace both these medicines, but there has not been developed an agent which has the pain reliever effect without undesirable side effects. During flu season there is an extreme demand for antitussants.

There is presently an overproduction of morphine in the world, but U.N. statistics show that there will be a continuing demand for codeine and morphine in many years to come. Stocks of these drugs had been depleted in the past 2 years, so the Commission knowingly agreed to overproduction. All the countries producing licit opiates will have to decide how they want to handle the economic effect of overproduction. The effect on the world price of the drugs has not yet been determined, but it will probably fall on the licit market, with a resultant decrease in income to the governments of the producing countries. This will in turn reduce the amount that will be paid to the farmer-producer, and may create pressure on him to return to illicit production.

The role of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs is to maintain an overview of production and to advise governments to reduce production if necessary. A quota is set for the amount of mediciments needed worldwide, but no quota may be set for the production of raw materials.

The Board has no authority to instruct any government to produce a certain amount. The prime function of the CND appears to be to advise of overproduction of opiates among nations. However, should the producing country wish to produce for export, the CDC can step in and control the amount exported.

Legally, the treaty under which the United Nations regulates dangerous drugs (the Single Convention), concerned itself with opium production only. Cultivation of the opium poppy for poppy straw production is far less rigorously controlled. The Board can influence cultivation for opium production, but has no say whatsoever for control of poppy straw production. This is why there is such a danger of overproduction of morphine in the world, and why there is no apparent way to control it. The treaty could not be amended before 1980, unless the General Assembly of the United Nations would amend it by floor action, an unlikely event.

At the time that the Single Convention was passed, there was no thought of production of morphine from poppy straw—the process was not yet perfected. The problem which presents itself, unfortunately, is that if there is a reduction of the return available to a producer of poppy straw, a necessary result of overproduction, then there may be economic pressure to replace that lost revenue through opium production.

Area programs

In Thailand the U.N. program is administered by Mrs. Waldheim-Natural. There are over 1,000 villages in Thailand, and the United Nations has programs in 30 of them. Crop substitution and economic freedom from the opium crop are stressed, and there is no law enforcement program. It is the feeling of Mrs. Waldheim-Natural that crop substitution is feasible based on experience over the past 3 years. She feels that the villagers would welcome being relieved of the pressures of law enforcement on one hand and traffickers on the other. A major question is the future of the effort when the pilot program expires. The program has cost the United Nations $700,000, with $300,000 of that going to construction of buildings, for an annual cost for crop substitution programs in 30 villages of $400,000. The program expires in 1978, and the Thai Government has requested additional U.N. assistance after that time to help in the transition to government operation of the program. Substitution crops include coffee, marigold seeds, and tobacco, with beans and other fresh vegetables now being grown and processed in a local canning plant. Seeds are a particularly essential crop since, weight for weight, they are as easily transported out of the mountainous areas, and the financial return to the farmer is as great as his return from opium.

In Burma, Mr. F. Verhagen is the U.N. administrator. The government of Burma has embarked on a major program of eradication of poppies, and a national campaign against drugs has been declared in every level of government. A Central Committee on Drug Abuse Control has been formed with technical assistance being given to local drug abuse entities. The Burmese Government has been very reluctant to request foreign assistance, but its attitude may now be relaxing.

A continuing problem in Burma is that most of the opium producing areas are not under central government control. At least six independent insurgent groups among the hill tribes control these areas, and the government in Rangoon is unable to control them.

The Burmese U.N. effort is much less developed than the Thailand program, with initial efforts just being completed. It took the United Nations 3 years just to negotiate the program agreement.

Crops to be substituted include fruit trees, other medicinal plants, and seeds. Animal husbandry is also being taught. The government of Burma has donated almost $7 million to assist the United Nations.

AFGHANISTAN

A DEA survey of Afghanistan estimates that the 1976 production of opium in that country will be well in excess of 200 metric tons (see page 19. If the production of the Maiwand border area is included, then the total Afghanistan-Pakistan harvest will exceed 400 metric tons. Almost the entire opium crop is smuggled into Iran for consumption by the local addict population, but several factors indicate that Afghanistan and Pakistan could easily become massive suppliers to the Western World.

Iran has announced a 10-year plan to eliminate opium addiction in that country. Should the program be even partially successful, a large amount of opium would become available to other markets, with demand currently being highest in the United States. In fact, a June 12, 1976 seizure in Cairo, Egypt of 124 kilograms (272.8 lbs.) of opium appears to have been produced in Afghanistan. This opium had already bypassed the consuming area of Iran, and was obviously destined for the Western market.

Afghanistan borders on the Soviet Union to the north and the Peoples Republic of China to the east. For this reason the country has maintained a studied neutrality and has traditionally been wary of bilateral relations with the United States, the United Nations being the primary source of assistance in antinarcotic matters. As previously described, however, the United Nations is severely limited politically and economically in the degree of assistance which it is able to provide, and the Afghan Government continues to have woefully inadequate resources with which to police its opium growing areas and its desolate border with Iran.

In Kabul the committee attended a briefing on November 14, 1976, which was presented jointly by the State Department and the DEA. It was moderated by Mr. R. T. Curran, chargé d'affairs, a.i., and included Mr. Mike Hurley, the DEA agent assigned to the area. Representatives of the USIS and the Peace Corps were also in attendance.

The largest growing areas in Afghanistan are in the provinces of Badakhshan, Nangahar and in several additional southwest provinces.

The following figures represent the results of an opium production survey conducted between May 9 and October 31, 1976. The figures were arrived at by inquiries in the specific areas and averaging the consensus. Although these figures do not represent the total Afghanistan opium production they are indicative of the quantities grown in the specific areas surveyed. The averaged total amount of opium grown in the surveyed area for 1976 is 220.75 metric tons.

AFGHANISTAN OPIUM PRODUCTION, 1976

Province and area surveyed	Estimated total (tons)	Average (tons)
Badakshan: Jurm-Zebak	15-25	20
Jowzjan:		
Saidabad	8-9	9
Khoja Dokoh	6-7	6.5
Balkh: Daulatabao	8-10	9
Bamiyan:		
Salgha	3-4	3.5
Kahmano	2.5-3	2.75
Kapisa: Paryan	1	1
Helmand:		
Sangin	10	10
Qalai Bist	7-10	8.5
Moosa Qala	8-10	9
Nauzad	8-10	9
Kandahar: Argan Bad	7-8	7.5
Oruzgan: Tirin Kot	8-10	9
Laghman: Shalatik	6	6
Kunarha: [1]		
Maiwand	60	60
Kunarha	8	8
Nangahar:		
Shinwar	15	15
Chaplar	7	7
Baghe Mimla	20	20

[1] Estimated total of 200 tons produced annually in Maiwand border region when Pakistan side is included.

The U.N. program is under the guidance of an experienced German police officer who encourages the Afghans to expand their antinarcotics effort. Law enforcement is impeded by the fact that many of the growing areas, particularly those in the northeast area, are so remote that they can only be reached on foot. There are 11,000 miles of road in the entire country, of which 1,300 are paved. Along the Iranian border there are essentially no roads, and smugglers follow traditional trails. There is no aerial reconnaissance program, but there is U.N. capability to operate several light planes. The problem is that there are no funds to maintain and operate the aircraft.

In 1975, the U.S. Government provided intelligence to the Afghan police which resulted in the seizure of 6,656 kilograms of opium at an enforcement cost of $18,323. This averaged a cost of $2.75 per kilogram. In 1976, through the month of October, 11,096 kilograms of opium were interdicted, at a cost of $32,348, for an average cost of $2.91 per kilogram. The average sentence for opium traffickers is 18 months in jail.

In the Helmand Valley, the Afghan Government has destroyed standing field of opium poppies. There is also a continuing campaign to induce farmers not to plant opium poppies in the less accessible areas, coupled with a promise to the United Nations to increase crop destruction in the southwest areas. Out of an annual production of 200–400 tons of opium the government is seizing about a ton a month. The effort of the DEA and the Afghan Government must obviously be directed toward disrupting production of poppies, since seizures only approach 5 percent of estimated total production.

The border with Pakistan is poorly defined in the mountains to the east of Kabul, in the Maiwand area. In one small area, there is estimated to be an annual production of 200 tons of opium. It is a region of tribal domination, and there are no roads.

The Afghan Government is trying to develop a coherent resource development plan for the northeast area and, when that is done, to

present individual projects. Administration of law enforcement or crop substitution programs in most of the country is impossible because the infrastructure of government does not exist. It is impossible to induce a mountain farmer to grow a perishable crop when there is no refrigeration or transportation facility to assist him in getting it to market. The province of Badakhshan is isolated by snow for 6 months of the year.

State Department representatives in Washington and Kabul informed the committee that, while extremely desirable, the Afghan Government would under no circumstances permit bilateral assistance in law enforcement. They emphasized the neutrality of the Afghans because of the proximity of the Soviet Union. According to Mr. John Warner, DEA Regional Director, the ideal situation in Afghanistan would be a program similar to the Mexican program, where we could identify the growing areas, eradicate, and interdict. State and DEA briefers agreed that this would be under the most ideal conditions. Limited and unofficial efforts to offer bilateral assistance had been made, but appeared to be stalled.

A high priority of the delegation was to meet with President Daoud and other officials of the government of Afghanistan in order to attempt to enhance the capabilities of the antinarcotic forces there. The meeting took place on November 14, 1976 when Chairman Wolff, DEA Administrator Bensinger and Congressman Scheuer discussed American assistance in this matter with President Daoud. The agreement which resulted, following a broad range conversation concerning the independence of Afghanistan in doing its own policing, was that a bilateral agreement to provide training and equipment would be forthcoming. State Department and DEA personnel were firming up the terms of the agreement and requirements of the Afghan Government when the delegation departed.

PAKISTAN

The primary mission of the delegation in Pakistan was to attend the State Department's NEA Regional Narcotics Conference in Islamabad which was hosted by Ambassador Sheldon Vance. The purpose of the conference is to coordinate the efforts of the various American agencies in the region and to exchange information of potential interest to those attending.

DEA Regional Director John Warner stressed the importance of completing a specific assessment of opium production in the region in order that DEA and State could better project needs and trends into the future. The delegation had noted that individual nations were frequently remiss in performing this function, and officials of the United Nations in Geneva had identified the lack of reliable production data as an impediment to effective planning.

In further discussing this need, Mr. John Cusack, Chief of DEA's Division of International Policy and Support, stated that from the year 1930 to 1965, seizures of heroin in the United States averaged under 5 kilograms. As world production and U.S. demand increased, this figure increased until in the first 6 months of 1976 over 300 kilograms were seized in the United States, a figure which exceeds the total seizures made in 1975.

Mr. Cusack also added that there are now over 85,000 heroin addicts in Europe, a number which reflects a rapid recent growth. Addiction

does not appear to be leveling off, and the influx of narcotics into Amsterdam for further distribution in Europe is increasing. The heroin is primarily No. 3 quality from Southeast Asia.

Conference participants, in commenting on the reputation of the United States as a nation with rampant drug abuse problems, felt that other countries often looked better in comparison because the U.S. media are so strong and this is a nation free to criticize itself. In addition, most other nations do not maintain the data necessary to identify a severe drug abuse problem, such as overdose admission rates and deaths. There is an old axiom which originated in the League of Nations stating that a given nation has as many addicts as it chooses to discover.

The State Department and the DEA are actively engaged in assisting nations to improve their data maintenance and interpreting capabilities, for this is necessary before such factors as drug production and abuse can be properly quantified and dealt with.

Following the conference, representatives of the delegation met with Pakistan's Narcotic Control Board Director, Mr. Sahibzada Raoof Ali, at the headquarters of the PNCB in Islamabad. Director Ali feels that Pakistan enjoys excellent professional relations with the DEA, and cited a number of recent enforcement successes. He echoed the enforcement problems of Afghanistan in eradication of the opium crop from the inaccessible regions of the northwestern tribal areas of Pakistan, but pledged a continuing effort in that region, assisted by equipment and technical assistance of the DEA.

EGYPT

Egypt is not now a source country of opium or heroin but could in the future become a transit country of considerable importance for narcotics bound for the United States.

Ambassador Eilts, in briefing the delegation, stated that there was no DEA agent stationed in Egypt at this time because he did not feel that there was sufficient work to be done to justify having a full-time agent in the Embassy. He agreed, however, that trafficking routes and methods were constantly shifting, especially in light of the cessation of Turkish activity, and that recent events in Egypt could warrant a full-time DEA presence. He agreed in principle to accept an agent, and Administrator Bensinger is presently making selection arrangements.

The DEA agent's function will be to provide intelligence exchange, technical assistance and professional aid to the Egyptian antinarcotics police.

The delegation met with President Anwar Sadat for over an hour on November 17, 1976 in the Abdin Palace. In addition to the subject of Egypt's position with regard to narcotics traffic, the discussion concerned peace in the Middle East and projected OPEC oil price increases.

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohamed Riad addressed the delegation following the interview with President Sadat. He stated that Egypt is centrally located geographically and has always had to be alert to the threat of narcotics. He alleged that prior to 1967, the Israeli permitted Bedouin tribesmen to bring narcotics into Egypt, but that this practice is no longer prevalent.

Minister Riad was emphatic that Egypt is determined to combat the threat of narcotics and is very active in enforcement.

On November 18, Prime Minister Mamduh Salim greeted the group in his office. He feels that Lebanon and Syria are the source countries for narcotics and hashish which are seized in Egypt. Synthetic drugs do not represent much of a problem in Egypt at this time. He believes in treatment and rehabilitation techniques being developed hand in hand with enforcement capabilities.

The delegation was also received by Sayyid Mari'i, Speaker of the People's Assembly of Egypt, who was the official host of the congressional delegation. The meeting, which took place on November 18, 1976, dwelt on parliamentary structure, human rights, and population control measures.

The delegation also met with Interior Minister Sayyid Fahmy, and later met with Minister Fahmy and Gen. Sami Farag, chief of the General Antinarcotics Administration (ANA). The Egyptians are particularly concerned with the prospects of increased planting of poppies in their country and with control of consumption. The Egyptian antinarcotics department is the oldest such police agency in the world. Minister Fahmy raised the narcotics administration to the departmental level last year in response to growing activity in Egypt among narcotics traffickers and increasing consumption levels.

The average of hashish seizures in Egypt has traditionally been 15 tons per year. In the first 10 months of 1976 hashish seizures exceeded 19 tons, with Lebanon identified as the primary source of the drug. One and one-half tons of opium used to be seized annually, but last year it dropped to 112 kilograms because of the demise of the Turkish market. This year, however, in the first 9 months there were 320 kilograms of opium—three times the quantity seized last year. The going price for opium in Egypt is presently $7,000 per kilogram.

Egyptian authorities are convinced that there is a stock of Turkish opium which is still being drawn down. There was a recent seizure of 34 kilograms of opium which came from Syria, but which appeared to be characteristic of the old Turkish opium. Several opium plantations were eradicated in Egypt in the past 2 years, but there has been some leakage, and constant vigilance is required. In the past 9 months there have been 1,243,000 marijuana plants and 167,900 poppies destroyed, with both crops often found planted among corn stalks and other tall crops. The result of this eradication has been a higher street price of illicit drugs.

The ANA patrols in helicopters and photographs suspected fields. The photographs are then enlarged and the poppies are detected by their distinctive colors. They would benefit from advanced photographic equipment which could be made available through U.S. aid funds or counterpart funds. This possibility is being explored by DEA and the State Department in Cairo.

ITALY

In Rome, the delegation attended a meeting at the American Embassy at which representatives of the Guardia di Finanza, Italy's principal antinarcotic agency, presented their views.

MGen Ferdinand Dosi, director of the antinarcotics effort, explained that, historically, Italy provided law enforcement intelligence

to the United States with regard to organized crime. The situation today has reversed, with the DEA providing intelligence to the Guardia di Finanza relative to foreign supply and trafficking situations which impact on the Italian drug scene (see appendix, exhibit H). The significant change is that Italy has developed a problem of consumption of illicit drugs where before there was only a problem of interdiction of drugs which were passing through Italy en route to other markets. Italy has benefited greatly from participation in DEA training courses, and is very pleased with the fine relationship which it enjoys with the United States.

The Italian Government's response to the narcotics trafficking shift, from a transit nation to a consuming nation, comes at a difficult time economically. The Guardia di Finanza, Italy's internal revenue service, is hard pressed to control tax evasion and other revenue-losing crimes and has concentrated its assets in those areas, but there have been no cuts in the resources assigned to the antinarcotics effort. In fact, an increased effort is being made in the antinarcotics field, in spite of other pressing claims on the Guardia di Finanza.

THE VATICAN

On November 20, 1976 the delegation was granted an audience by Pope Paul VI in the Papal Chambers of the Vatican. The message of the congressional party was delivered by Chairman Wolff:

MESSAGE BY HON. LESTER WOLFF, CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL AND CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Your Holiness, my companions and I, who are honored at being received by your Holiness today, bring Your Holiness the respectful greetings and best wishes from the people of the United States of America and, in particular, from the Congress of the United States, of which many of us are Members.

We arrive in the Holy City and in your Sacred Precincts at the end of a 2-week voyage in which we studied foreign affairs, the prospects for peace in the Middle East, and the problem of the alarming spread of narcotics abuse throughout the world.

Knowing as we do of Your Holiness' active dedication to the cause of advancing the well-being of all mankind, we would be most grateful if Your Holiness could again see fit, at an early date, to address this problem of drug abuse and urge all men of good will to join the struggle against this scourge which, if left unchecked, will surely destroy the youth of many nations. We are sure that the words of Your Holiness once again would alert good people to the problems and deter others from participating in or tolerating drug traffic.

With peace happily restored in most of the world, we earnestly believe the drug problem is the major one facing much of humanity, and it is in this context that we seek the enormous support that the words of Your Holiness would bring to this good struggle.

His Holiness responded with the strongest position on drug abuse he has ever taken publicly:

POPE PAUL VI STATEMENT TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, ROME: NOVEMBER 21, 1976

We extend a cordial welcome to all of you who make up a U.S. congressional delegation on drug abuse and control.

Convinced as we are of the many deleterious effects of narcotics on society, we have on various occasions spoken on this topic. And today we wish to express our sincere encouragement of your efforts directed at the extirpation of drug abuse.

This reality of our day has truly ravaged society, and in particular our youth. At stake is the very question of human dignity. The problem is one of multiple human dimensions, in which the person is profoundly affected in the exercise of intellect and will, in the fulfillment of his or her true role as a human being, and finally in the attainment of a high spiritual destiny.

For these reasons we willingly lend our support to the endeavors that are aimed at combating this evil and at providing those services that are so necessary for rehabilitation. Likewise deserving of attention are the important factors of prevention and timely education.

As the roots of the whole complex problem are studied, there emerges more clearly than ever the need for severe legal measures to be taken against those who traffic systematically in drugs for the sake of profit. We have already expressed the conviction that the narcotic problem would not exist, "at least in its present proportion if there did not also exist a whole network of responsible conspirators: The clandestine producers and drug peddlers" (address of Dec. 18, 1972). And in our own bicentennial message to the American Bishops we reiterated the, "hope that the immense forces of good would exert pressure against the unworthy activities of those who are greatly responsible for the corruption of youth" (AAS 68, 1976, p. 413).

Of supreme importance is the mobilization of public opinion, coupled with the wide diffusion of accurate information on the many ramifications of drug abuse. The time has come to unite all the powers at our disposal, in order to put an end to this scourge that is such a real danger for the future of humanity.

We hope that you will be able ever more effectively to coordinate your efforts with those being made outside your own country. May the combined forces of the international community of this generation be remembered as history records the incessant struggle for true human dignity.

And because we know that human efforts are insufficient in themselves, we ask Almighty God to bestow his light and strength on you and on all who are working for this great cause.

In the informal exchange with Chairman Wolff and others which followed the presentation of the prepared statements, the Pope evidenced a strong personal commitment against drug abuse and requested that the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control submit to the Vatican all reports and recommendations which will be made by the committee in the future.

At the end of the audience the Pope blessed the delegation and all who participate in the world effort against drug abuse.

Abuse of narcotics, dangerous drugs and alcohol has been a problem faced by almost every military establishment which has ever existed. Lack of normal social contacts, boredom, loneliness, language barriers, and a sometimes undefined sense of purpose will always create a receptive climate for substance abuse. In the modern Army located in NATO host countries there is another necessary factor for the flourishing of drug abuse—ready availability.

In Heidelberg, Germany, soldiers told representatives of the delegation that heroin, hashish, a host of synthetic drugs and marijuana are freely available in bars which exist within a few hundred yards of most military bases. In Europe a growing population of civilian drug abusers augments the demand created for illicit drugs by members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and shipments of such drugs arrive constantly from The Netherlands.

Narcotics abuse increased dramatically in the Armed Forces during the Vietnam war, and in response the Army developed a vigorous antinarcotics program. It is a program, however, which reflects the same frustrations which plague civilian programs in the United States: inability to control supply, inability to consistently control demand, inability to retain trained personnel in counseling positions, constant turnover of clients which inhibits followup counseling, and funding cutbacks.

The single greatest cause for disciplinary separations from the U.S. Army in Europe is drug abuse. Almost half of the general court martial procedures are for drug-related cases. In addition, over one-third of the special court martial and one-quarter of the summary court martial procedures are drug related (see appendix, exhibits A–F).

This amount of judicial activity represents an obvious burden on the military authorities. An additional 1,621 soldiers requested discharge in lieu of court martial for drug-related offenses under the provisions of chapter 10, Army regulation 635–200 during the period January 1, 1974 through September 30, 1976.

The U.S. Army in Europe (USAEUR) has initiated two major actions in developing its drug and alcohol abuse program. The detection and treatment function has been decentralized, with each discrete military community becoming responsible for this function under the guidance of Army headquarters in Heidelberg. These program centers, called community drug and alcohol assistance centers (CDAAC) numbered 34 in 1972; today there are 79.

The second initiative in the drug and alcohol abuse program was the establishment of the alcohol and drug abuse prevention and control training center in Munich. The school offers courses to commanders, administrators, counselors and educators. It also provides all commanders from company to community level a 4-hour block of instruction on this program prior to assuming command or in the early weeks of command.

Random urinalysis testing program

During the Vietnam era, drug abuse in the military skyrocketed, reflecting a similar increase in the civilian population but accelerated by the easy availability of narcotics in Southeast Asia. The military responded by implementing a urine testing program on a random basis

for detection of use of narcotics. The program served a dual function: identifying drug users and deterring nonusers from experimentation. The program would have to be considered a success on both fronts from an operational point of view, but was costly and raised questions of involuntary incrimination and invasion of privacy which remained unresolved until the program for random testing was ended on October 1, 1976.

Program efficiency

The random testing program was discussed at length at meetings in Heidelberg and Frankfurt. Program officers stated that it had identified 28 percent of all soldiers under treatment for drug abuse while it was in effect. (Others were apprehended by the military police or entered the program voluntarily.) A clear indication of the value of the program as a deterrent to drug abuse is the fact that while the program was temporarily suspended from July 1974 to February 1975, drug abuse apparently doubled, with positive urinalysis increasing from an all time low of about 1.2 percent to over 3 percent (see appendix, exhibit G). This increase can only partially be explained by the fact that when the program was reinstated new equipment was used which was more sensitive than before, and that a test had been developed for the presence of the synthetic drug mandrax (also called methaqualone) which is available on the open market in Germany. The number of servicemen under treatment increased from 392 to over 750 following the reinstatement of the random program.

In the place of the random urinalysis program, which tested as many as 57,000 persons per month in mid-1974, has been substituted the commander-directed program which generates only an average of 7,000 tests per month. This program gives each unit commander the option to test a limited number of soldiers under his command each month. The program has three limitations. First, one company or brigade commander may be more alert to the symptoms of drug abuse than another, and therefore make more effective use of the program. Second, any abuser who is able to mask his symptoms is essentially exempt from testing and discovery while his problem increases. Third, the deterrent to experimentation or occasional social use, with its potential for addiction, ceases to exist.

It is true that the percentage of positive tests has increased under the commander-directed urinalysis program, but that would be expected considering the selectivity of the process. This, however, must not be the sole criterion used in evaluating the value of a urine testing program. Certainly the deterrent effect of the existence of the chosen program must also be weighed. Additionally, it is axiomatic that success in rehabilitation depends in large measure on the length of time that the subject has been using narcotics. Early detection, long before the almost hopeless stage of serious addiction, is essential if the program is to be at all effective. Many early users and experimenters were detected through the random program, but are going undetected today.

Whether or not to reinstate the random urinalysis testing program should be at the discretion of the military, but it is an option which it does not presently possess, that authority having been withdrawn by the Congress for largely economic reasons that would appear to be shortsighted. (See appendix exhibit E, conference report to accompany H.R. 14262, Department of Defense Appropriation, 1977, printed Sept. 3, 1976.)

Findings and Conclusions

NARCOTICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(1) The body of international treaties and agreements is presently insufficient effectively to control trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs.

(2) Control of opium poppy crops is beyond the ability of many producing countries for reasons of political instability, poverty, social tradition, and/or complicity on the part of corrupt officials.

(3) Crop substitution and economic reorientation is possible in the cases of many producing countries, but the resources needed to support such programs are largely lacking at present. Similarly, income substitution programs necessary to support the transition from opium to licit crop production are essentially nonexistent.

(4) It is impossible to control the distribution of opium and heroin after they enter international trafficking networks. The present interdiction rate for illicit narcotics is only 5 to 10 percent of total production.

(5) There is presently a deliberate overproduction of licit morphine base by many countries in response to a temporary shortage in the world stockpile of this drug. The overproduction will probably lead to falling prices on the world market and to diminished return to the producers. As a result, there will be economic pressure to increase the return to the farmer and producing government—a situation conducive to illicit production of opium and an increase of available heroin.

(6) A major emphasis must be placed on crop substitution and poppy eradication if the end product, heroin, is to be effectively curtailed.

(7) World antinarcotics resources include the internal enforcement apparatus of individual countries, international enforcement organizations such as INTERPOL, multinational enforcement and control organizations such as the United Nations, organized religious bodies, international economic aid to producing nations, and world public opinion. These resources, however, must be coordinated to be effective, and this coordination does not now exist.

(8) Many nations do not recognize the existence of a domestic drug abuse problem but consider it to be a problem of the United States. These nations are generally suffering an increase in addict populations, rising crime rates, and drug trafficking activity but fail to recognize this because of underdeveloped ability to measure these events and political currents which favor permissive legislation and lax enforcement.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT

(1) The "French Connection" has been broken and Marseilles is no longer producing heroin in large amounts for export to the United States, but this is primarily because of a lack of opium from which to manufacture it. Should a renewed supply of opium be secured in Marseilles, the clandestine laboratories would be turning out heroin in quantity in less than 24 hours. Fortunately, cooperation between the United States and French authorities is excellent, and the French police are maintaining a careful vigil over narcotics related activity in Marseilles.

(2) Turkey appears to have been successful in preventing diversion of opium from its licit production of poppies.

(3) The production areas of greatest threat to the United States now appear to be Mexico, South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India), and the southeast Asian area of the golden triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand).

(4) Central and Southeast Asia produce a combined illicit crop of opium which exceeds 1,000 tons per year. Much of this is, of course, consumed locally, but most of it is smuggled into other consuming nations such as Iran and Western Europe. Increasing seizures in these countries indicate increasing traffic.

(5) The Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States is instrumental in assisting many producing and transit countries in combating narcotic activity, but much more could be accomplished. This is to the direct benefit of the United States, since any interruption of international traffic impedes the flow of narcotics to America.

(6) In Afghanistan the delegation was successful in obtaining the consent of President Daoud to accept American bilateral aid for suppression of the illicit drug traffic there. The DEA and State Department had been unable to reach such an agreement in the past despite their efforts in that direction.

(7) In Italy, the Guardia di Finanza is seriously pressed to combat economically debilitating crimes, and many of its other duties have been curtailed. Narcotic law enforcement, however, has been fully supported and resources have been increased in this area. There is excellent cooperation between Italy and the United States in the area of intelligence exchange.

(8) It is essential that all areas of government of all affected nations act in concert to control drug trafficking and abuse. Law enforcement agencies acting alone are ineffective. In many nations there is no substantive or regular communication between branches of government responsible for narcotics, so information is not shared and coordination is impossible.

This same lack of communication also unfortunately exists on the international level despite the existence of numerous conferences and coordinative efforts.

(9) Law enforcement officials in every European country visited insist that the Netherlands is now awash in illicit narcotics and that Amsterdam is the trafficking center of Europe. Unusually lax penalties for drug-related offenses there created a "soft spot" in Europe which the traffickers have been quick to exploit.

THE UNITED NATIONS

(1) The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has conducted several promising pilot projects in crop substitution and law enforcement, but severe budgetary restrictions have seriously curtailed its efficiency. Many nations contribute only token amounts to it, and others do not contribute at all.

(2) Active support of the UNFDAC benefits all mankind, and it should be encouraged through financial and policy support by all nations.

DRUG ABUSE IN THE MILITARY

(1) The U.S. Army in Europe has initiated a vigorous, decentralized drug abuse program which is conducted in headquarters and in 79 communities.

(2) In spite of the efforts of the military, drug abuse among the uniformed services continues to be a major problem, compounded by easy availability of narcotics in Germany, and by the length of the tour of duty for military personnel there.

(3) The random urine testing program has been suspended, primarily for cost reasons, but it was successful as a detector of drug users and a deterrent to drug abuse. No equally effective program has been implemented. The suppression of random urinalysis for budgetary reasons was clearly a false economy, penny-wise and pound-foolish.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) In order to optimize international coordination of antinarcotic efforts a conference comprised of legislative, law enforcement and executive officials of affected countries should be immediately convened. The primary mission of the conference should be to seek continuity and consistency of policy, enforcement efforts, and resource allocation.

(2) The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control should be enhanced in terms of personnel, budget and authority to deal with international narcotic matters. Nations which do not presently contribute to the Fund should be subjected to pressure by the international community to meet their humanitarian obligations.

(3) If necessary, the United States must continue to provide the great majority of the resources of the UNFDAC, since unquestionably the work of the Fund is of highest importance to us, and in many cases could not be performed by us in a bilateral relationship.

(4) The Drug Enforcement Administration should continue to support the antinarcotic law enforcement of nations which request it. This support should be in the areas of intelligence capability, crop identification, eradication techniques, technical resources, and training.

(5) The Department of State should consider the use of counterpart funds or excess currencies for support of antinarcotics programs whenever feasible.

(6) The random urinalysis testing program should be made available to the Department of Defense for use as an optional tool in their drug abuse program. The appropriate committees of Congress should take steps necessary to provide funding to DOD to be used at the discretion of the military for this program. In addition, the DOD should immediately resolve any questions as to the constitutional legality of the testing.

(7) Among those factors contributing to the high incidence of drug abuse in Germany appears to be the length of the tour of duty required of uniformed personnel. The DOD should review this requirement with a view toward providing appropriate relief, especially in the case of unmarried individuals or married individuals who are unaccompanied by their families in Germany.

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT A

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE,
APO New York, N.Y., November 15, 1976.

WILLIAM G. LAWRENCE.
Chief of Staff,
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. LAWRENCE: Pursuant to your request for information concerning disciplinary actions involving drugs in US Army, Europe, the following information is provided:

During the period 1 January 1974 until 30 September 1976, 769 individuals were tried by general courts-martial for offenses involving drugs. This number is 49.1% of all general courts-martial conducted in US Army, Europe during that period.

During the period 1 January 1974 through 30 September 1976, 2020 individuals were tried by special courts-martial in the US Army, Europe for drug-related offenses. This number represents 36.5% of the total number of special courts-martial tried in US Army, Europe during that period.

During the period 1 January 1974 through 30 September 1976, 497 individuals were tried by summary courts-martial in US Army, Europe for drug-related offenses. This number represents 24.6% of the total number of summary courts-martial conducted in US Army, Europe during that period.

During the period 1 January 1974 through 30 September 1976, 1621 individuals in US Army, Europe requested discharge in lieu of court-martial for drug-related offenses under the provisions of Chapter 10, Army Regulation 635-200.

A quarterly breakout of these figures is enclosed.

Your interest in these matters is appreciated. I hope that this information will be helpful to you and your committee.

Sincerely,

VICTOR A. DE FIORI,
Brigadier General,
Judge Advocate.

EXHIBIT B

COURTS-MARTIAL—DRUG/ALCOHOL

[From JAG-2 report—January 1974 to September 1976—by quarters]

	General	Special	Summary	Chapter 10
January to March 1974	41	240	49	158
April to June 1974	70	230	60	129
July to September 1974	45	192	43	132
October to December 1974	74	203	53	137
January to March 1975	74	279	54	188
April to June 1975	84	178	52	209
July to September 1975	88	166	43	152
October to December 1975	71	136	30	171
January to March 1976	75	161	39	124
April to June 1976	80	131	35	119
July to September 1976	67	104	39	102
Total	769	2,020	497	1,621

EXHIBIT C

USE OF SOME HARD DRUGS BY AGE, AS OF FEBRUARY 1976

[In percent]

Age	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Infrequently [1]	Not using [2]	Row sum
17 to 18	0.9	3.5	7.1	6.1	82.4	100
19 to 20	1.2	2.9	5.1	7.7	83.2	100
21	.6	2.6	5.2	6.5	85.1	100
22	.5	2.6	2.9	6.4	87.6	100
23 to 25	.1	1.2	2.4	5.3	90.9	100
26 to 30	.2	.7	.5	1.7	96.8	100
31 to 40	0	.1	0	.5	99.5	100
Over 40	0	0	0	.5	99.5	100

[1] Infrequent implies use of drugs at least 3 times a year but less than monthly.
[2] Not using includes never used, experimented, used and quit.

Source: U.S. Army, Europe.

EXHIBIT D

AGE 25 AND UNDER POPULATION USE OF DRUGS, FEBRUARY 1976

	Daily	5 to 6 times per week	3 to 4 times per week	1 to 2 times per week	1 to 3 times per month	Less than once per month, more than 3 times per year	Used and quit	Experimented	Never used	Cumulative percentage
Some hard drug [1]	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.0	4.3	6.6	9.0	14.0	63.0	100
Barbiturates	.1	.2	.1	.4	1.5	3.6	5.9	10.3	77.8	100
Amphetamines	.1	.2	.3	.7	1.9	5.1	6.4	9.5	75.7	100
Opiates	.2	.4	.1	.2	1.7	1.4	2.7	5.5	87.7	100
Hallucinogens (LSD)				.2	1.7	4.7	5.7	9.5	78.1	100
Methaqualone (mandrax)	.3	.2	.2	.4	1.7	3.6	4.8	13.3	75.5	100
Cocaine	.0	.1	.1	.1	.3	1.8	6.9	7.4	83.4	100
Cannabis	6.6	2.7	3.8	3.0	6.1	7.5	10.2	24.5	35.5	100

[1] Use of one or more of the listed hard drugs.

Source: UPOS, U.S. Army, Europe.

EXHIBIT E

[Report No. 94–1475]

TITLE I—MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY

OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO TITLE I

Military Drug and Alcohol Abuse Programs.—The House directed that one-half of the $56,400,000 currently being spent on drug abuse should be shifted to alcohol abuse programs. The House further directed that participation in a drug or alcohol abuse rehabilitation program is of itself not to be considered a reason to deny reenlistment. Also, the House would exclude use of alcohol and drug abuse facilities to civilian employees of the government in the USA when civilian public and private programs are available. The Senate did not endorse a 50% transfer of funds to alcohol abuse programs but said there should be some redistribution of funds.

The conferees agreed that the random urinalysis testing programs should be terminated not later than October 1, 1976, and that the resources made available by the termination of this testing should be redirected to the alcohol abuse program. The conferees further agreed that the Department of Defense should carry out House direction with respect to the reenlistment of personnel who have successfully completed a rehabilitation program and with respect to use by civilian employees of military drug and alcohol abuse facilities. A report is to be submitted to the Committees in conjunction with the submission of the fiscal year 1978 budget request detailing actions taken with respect to the transfer of funds and other matters addressed by the Committees.

EXHIBIT F

AGE 25 AND UNDER POPULATION USE OF DRUGS FEBRUARY 1976

	Daily	Weekly or more often	Monthly or more often	Using more than 3 times per year	Not currently using [1]
Any urine testable drug:					
February 1976	0.7	2.9	6.7	12	88
August 1975	.1	3.2	4.2	11	89

[1] Includes: Never used, used and quit, experimented.
Source: U.S. Army, Europe.

Urine testable Drugs are: Opiates, Barbiturates, Amphetamines, and Mandrax.

Use of Any Urine Test Drug Connotes use of one or more of the above. Percentages are cumulative through the rate; using more than 3 times per year.

EXHIBIT G



EXHIBIT H

From: Strickler FM SAIC Angioletti.
State: M. Lawrence S/NM: E. Beigel, Eur/We.
Subject: Codel briefing 11/20/76.
(Attention: DEA, HQS, congressional relations/Stutman).

During briefing at Rome on 11/20/76 statement was made by Guardia di Finanza, General Dosi re recent seizures/case consummated by his service as direct result of DEA intelligence sharing and cooperation. Listed below are seven recent examples of DEA/Finanza Joint Cooperation:

1. 10/8/76—XL-76-0013—Seizure of 2½ kgs morphine base at Rome, Italy and arrest of two defendants. Seizure direct result of info furnished by DEA SOI and Joint DEA/Finanza surveill. Investigation continuing.
2. 10/11/76—XM-76-0013—Seizure of 73 kgs hashish at port of Venice and arrest of two defendants. Seizure direct result of DEA courier profile info.
3. 6/14/76—XM-75-0022—Seizure of 1 kg heroin and arrest of three defendants at Bergamo, Italy. Seizure direct result of info furnished by DEA SOI and Finanza U/C agent.
4. 7/5/76—XR-76-0003—Seizure of 43 kgs Colombian marihuana and arrest of seven defendants at Port of Genoa. Seizure culminated as direct result of DEA courier profile info and detection of smuggling techniques by DEA agent.
5. 7/27/76—XR-76-0004—Seizure of 171 kgs Colombian marihuana and arrest of five defendants at Genoa. Seizure culminated as direct result of joint DEA/Finanza program targeted against 5 American cocaine/marihuana traffickers.
6. 4/28/76—XM-76-0013—Seizure of 40 kgs hashish at Port of Venice and arrest of two defendants. Seizure direct result of DEA courier profile info.
7. 12/11/75—XL-75-0023—Seizure of 200 kgs hashish at Rome and arrest of two defendants. Seizure effected on prior info furnished by Finanza. However, one defendant escaped and was subsequently identified and recaptured through the joint investigative efforts of the Rome DO, Munich DO and German authorities. Subject's extradition pending due to other outstanding charges in Germany.

Decontrol by DEA only upon receipt. BEAUDRY.

O

END