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Working Bases for Corruption: Organizational Ambiguities
and Narcotics Law Enforcement

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WORKING BASES FOR CORRUPTION: SOME CONSEQUENCES
OF NARCOTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT

Narcotic Laws are subject to the corruption of their spirit because of the means by which they must be enforced. Corruption has its base in the erosion of formal rules and procedures, and their replacement with informal rules and procedures. However, informal rules and procedures, or "working agreements and arrangements" are crucial to maintenance of any organization. While informal rules and working arrangements serve several functions for organizations, one of the most important is that they help members achieve clarity in ambiguous areas and resolve problematic situations. In areas of police work like narcotic law enforcement, where many activities are ambiguous and problematic, informal working agreements may be the only way any enforcement is accomplished; yet, it is these informal arrangements which provide the structural base for further erosion and corruption of the law. Utilizing a structural-organizational perspective, we examine the general implications of formal rule erosion, and specifically we focus on ambiguities and problems surrounding the activity of case-making for narcotics officers. Analysis of case-making activities by officers indicates the manner in which formal rule erosion is accomplished and why erosion is seen as necessary. In addition, analysis reveals how information about informal working rules and their application is controlled and "slips" and "errors" handled so that significant publics do not become knowledgeable of the discrepancies between the law as statute and as action. Finally, analysis indicates how all traditionally defined areas of corruption (e.g., bribe taking, using and selling drugs, etc.) revolve around, and are conditioned by the activities of case-making. The implications of this pattern are discussed as they relate to the regulation of economic markets in general.

I. Introduction

Narcotics Laws are subject to corruption of their spirit because of the means by which they must be enforced. By "corruption" we mean a departure from idealized norms of procedure and, in addition, a departure from the officially presented versions of procedure. The latter refers to discrepancies between the official version or imagery of law enforcement presented to significant publics, such diverse groups as congressional committees, PTA's, city councils and a myriad of neighborhood groups, and actual practice. Such subtle, erosive corruption is a basis for other, perhaps more obvious, types of corruption that are traditionally examined (e.g., bribery). Although we will not focus on them, we will comment upon them and indicate how they are related to the processes we are examining.

In a previous paper (Manning and Redlinger, forthcoming), we characterized heroin markets as "legally suppressed entities" and we identified structural features that caused pressures and temptations to engage in "corruption"* to be more sharply directed to lower level agents. These pressures result because although licit and illicit markets share many common features, the moral intentions of the law differentially focuses agent activity: agents regulating licit markets are mandated to seek to induce compliance while sustaining market activity at some acceptable level while agents regulating illicit markets are

In this paper we examined some traditional forms of corruption such as bribery, obstruction of justice, use of drugs. We used the term corruption to denote infractions or violations of the laws governing appropriate agent conduct whether or not the agents were apprehended, and sought to indicate how these "corruptions" were due more to structural pressures and strains than flaws in individual agents.

expected to seek to eradicate the activity. Structurally, the differences in enforcement procedures and in the types and kinds of influences sellers have available to them to persuade agents focus pressures on lower level agents in illicit markets, whereas in licit markets such pressures appear to be spread more evenly throughout the market structure. As a result, we argue, one tends to find more instances of corruption (in the traditional sense) among lower level agents regulating legally suppressed markets, while overall one would find roughly equivalent levels or rates of corruption among regulatory agents in both licit and illicit markets.

In the present paper, we will examine what can be considered somewhat more subtle processes which link the structure of enforcement with types of outcomes associated with the corruption of that enforcement. In the regulation of both licit and illicit markets, corruption has its base in the negotiation of the idealized rules of procedure leading to their erosion and replacement with an informal, but pragmatically operating, set of rules built up by minute adjustments of enforcement agents. With regard to narcotic law enforcement, we will examine some of the ongoing interactional processes that act-out, make visible and durate the social structure of enforcement. What must be kept in mind, however, is that while idealized cannons provide the legitimizing base for enforcement activity, the activity itself provides the enduring features that give life to the law. It is the everyday workings of agents that regularize, routinize and make normatively binding the negotiated procedures through

which a social structure of enforcement emerges and endures. By careful analysis of the structure of enforcement, we can gain considerable insight into, not only the processes of negotiation, but in addition, into the genesis of organizational departures from idealized standards. It is these departures which form the base for further discrepancies some of which take on the forms that are labelled corruption. This perspective does not preclude analysis of traditionally defined and thought types of corruption. However, it does point to the practical working base for the actions of officers and place this base within an organizational framework.

II. Organizational Ambiguities

We assume that organizations seek to create and maintain a positive impression, and that this idealized impression becomes objectivated as a focus of accountability and career success for organizational members. However, in every organization, there remain problematic situations and ambiguous areas that serve to point up by contrast not only the degree of certainty in other operative areas, but also reveal the necessary transactions which sustain the formal structure, some aspects of which serve to maintain the organizational impression to outsiders (cf. Goffman, 1956; Manning, 1971). All occupations and professions encounter such areas and situations, as a result of which they must sustain both practical working arrangements that are departures from formal procedure and a fictive front that belies these arrangements. The informal working agreements and arrangements made by narcotics officers that are departures

from formal norms are often attempts to resolve the repetitive problematic situations in which officers find themselves.*

In the legal, social and political context of working narcotics officers in large U.S. cities, virtual adherence to idealized versions of enforcement would result in ineffectual enforcement at best, and at worst in little or no enforcement at all. Let us take an example of the ways in which working rules grow up in narcotics units, how they depart significantly from administrative rules, and how these patterned departures provide the basis for what we have called corruption. According to policy in one department (although it is not written, but verbally passed on by sergeants) all buys must be approved by a sergeant prior to buy money being issued. However, each sergeant keeps a fund of \$200 to allocate to his officers as he sees fit; and normally, each sergeant keeps it "in circulation." This gives men a pool of money to use in case they have an opportunity to make a controlled buy with an informant. After the buy, a voucher is submitted to the sergeant for reimbursement (a buy report for any drugs bought is also filled in). In effect, then,

Of course, not all of the informal arrangements negotiated out are attempts to resolve ambiguities and problematic situations; some are pragmatic ways to increase organizational efficiency, ease the strain on individuals, or to promote personal careers. However, in those areas where negotiation of informal working arrangements occurs for the purposes of reducing ambiguity and resolving problematic situations officers must necessarily depart from official rules and regulations. This is not to say that unambiguous areas and unproblematic situations are not negotiable and negotiated. In such areas and situations, where the degree of consensus is high, the processes are not as obvious, and less time and energy must be spent in negotiation. Boundaries are more set and the participants involved have some degree of closure over their areas and know what the criteria of evaluation are and how they are to be applied.

sergeants cannot prospectively control, except after the fact, the amount, types, and number of buys made by persons in his unit. In order to make it possible for agents to take advantage of "fast-breaking" opportunities to make buys, or to provide money for an informant to make buys, money must be instantly available. It is accepted, then, that a vast majority of buys will be approved ex post facto (at which time they may be a source of criticism by the sergeant or the lieutenant who reads the vouchers). This approved and sanctioned departure from idealized procedure allows the submission of false vouchers, altering the amount of drugs bought, splitting fees with informants, paying of "bonuses" for seizures or for "good work" unconnected with specific tasks, etc. The working rules lead directly to the opportunity for corruption, and this type of corruption, since it can improve one's performance, is appealing to investigators. Thus, a dual standard is established, one side for the public, the other for private versions of the work and sub rosa practices. Officers must not only enforce laws pertaining to narcotics violations, but in addition, observe procedural rules and laws which protect the civil rights of the people involved, laws and rules which delineate what can be used as evidence, that limit searches and seizures as well as a host of other prescriptions. All of these generically stated abstract rules must be, in fact, applied by officers in specific situations and in such situations considerations of effort and efficiency must be weighed against those of legal

Packer (1969) has contrasted these two models of operation as a "crime control model" and a "procedural model."

constraints and internal regulations. As we will demonstrate, internal pressures from supervisions to agents are to "make cases," while the background expectancies are those of Departmental Regulations and the U.S. or State's Attorney's Office and their (often shifting) criteria of acceptable cases.

In most narcotics departments, there are no firm, written policies or guidelines covering the strategy and tactics of enforcement, although they are "known" and implicitly recognized and understood. Although for all police officers making a case is a dramatic focal point of the work, in narcotics it is fraught with fateful ambiguities, and adjustments to them become a source of the corruption of the spirit of the law. Pressure to "make cases," "to bring in bodies," "put meat on the table" to justify the enterprise pervade narcotics organizations, albeit in subtle and indirect ways - joking, banter, ridicule, and casual remarks. All are inducements to learning short-cuts, or ways around ideal procedures, or to do the expedient thing. Guidance in field decisions involving when, how and where to arrest are nowhere stipulated in writing. No special techniques, skills, approaches, or decision-making rules are taught or systematically conveyed to investigators, nor are any specifically stipulated as preferred or to be avoided. Dealings with informants, so crucial in narcotics since they provide access to drug deals, actually make buys under agent supervision, and provide critical information, with some exceptions regarding payment are left to the discretion of the officer. Thus, when an officer must decide who to investigate, when, how and to what length, and with what level of the market in mind, he is most consistently and powerfully

influenced by approved practice and taken-for-granted assumptions which he learns in interaction with his peers, especially those in his own squad (a unit of 4-6 men supervised by a sergeant). (See Manning, 1975). In order to successfully make cases or assemble facts for a charge, a narcotics officer relies on the practices and skills he learns, and his understandings of what is acceptable for all practical purposes in his department. These working rules, in time, become a structural base for judging acceptable performance. However, in the absence of written policies, there is always a double standard - a public, legalistic standard and a private, taken-for-granted standard. The ways in which narcotics officers deal with these ambiguities and dualistic standards, and the resolutions they make, under some conditions, can (and will) be revealed and labelled as "corruption." Until that time, they are simply "working rules."

To discuss the problematics of cases and case-making, a brief characterization of narcotics law enforcement and of modes of systematization of narcotics information is required. We can then attempt to link these relatively obdurate matters of organization and law to the occupational realities of narcotics work. We proceed both of these discussions, however, with a very brief description of our research method.

III. Method and Data

The observations and data here reported are derived from our research in the narcotics units of police departments in five cities: a large metropolitan city of nearly 800,000 in the middle Atlantic region ("Metro") and a nearby suburban county police department; two southwestern cities, one with a

population of over 650,000; the other a city of over 580,000; one southeastern city with a population of nearly 530,000, and one very large midwestern city police department. The departments, which range in size from 4,600 to officers, contain central narcotics units ranging in size from 61 to officers. Varying periods of time, from a week and a half to over four months, were spent in observation and interviewing of all levels within narcotics units from command personnel through working officers. The level of use, number of users and the kinds of narcotics problems faced by these departments, their policies, strategies and tactics of enforcement are quite different. What is reported here are administrative procedures and everyday practices which sustain the background against which corruption appears, and the general outlines of the legal and organizational problems associated with regulating an illicit market and a "life-style-crime" - narcotics use. The principle focus of our research was upon the interconnections of modes of enforcement and the market, and identification of the overall strategy and tactics employed.

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IV. Narcotics Use and Enforcement Problems

In this society it is estimated that there are between 200,000 and 600,000 users of opiates (cf. Heller, 1973:384; Holahan, 1973:287-288; King, 1974:33). As a consequence of a series of decisions made by dominant policy makers in this country, we have, since the early part of this century, attempted to control and criminally sanction the use and distribution of opiates and other powerful psychoactive substances. (Heller, 1973; Musto, 1973, Lindesmith, 1965). The degree and type of control varies from drug to drug, but the sole legitimate use of heroin is for scientific experimentation. The conditions of legitimate use are prescribed, while criminal penalties can be imposed for use or distribution outside legally constrained channels. The fact that these drug exchange transactions are defined criminally indicates at least in a preliminary fashion that there is a degree of conflict surrounding their meaning and consequence and that a form of non-criminal regulation based upon the interdigitation of producers and regulators (as in licit markets) is unacceptable to society. As a result of these policy and legislative decisions, the police are required to regulate with criminal sanctions

Another way of characterizing this situation is to note that the absence of primary and informal agreements among social groups concerning the "threat" and consequences of these drug transactions is at the root of the attempt by powerful groups to criminalize their use and exchange, and to virtually circumscribe the obligation and authority for regulation to the police. Rather than prohibit completely the use and trade in opiates, the powerful elements in this society have chosen to use the criminal sanction as a means of adding crime costs (i.e., the costs resulting from the needed protection against enforcement, the consequences of imprisonment, fines and the like) to other costs of production, distribution, marketing and packaging. (See Redlinger, 1969 for a parallel, in abortion see Davis, 1972). It is perhaps because control of the distribution and marketing of drugs is otherwise difficult if not impossible (because of their widespread availability, natural low cost and simplicity of manufacture) that the criminal sanction has been employed to regulate the drug trade in the western world.

a market in goods and services considered by a substantial minority of the population to be desirable both as a mode or style of life and/or as a source of livelihood. The crime exhibits seven aspects unique to drug law enforcement.

1. It is a life-style-crime. Heroin in high dosage (rarely found on the street where the percent varies between 1-3%) is highly addictive. Its use, because it is criminalized, is restricted almost, although not entirely, to relatively powerless groups: young, Black and Latino lower class males (with much smaller numbers of Whites of the same class background) living in the inner cities of large metropolitan regions. It is, thus, a habit, a business, a mode of employment, a style of life and a crime.
2. What is subsequently labelled a crime occurs only when there is both a tacit and explicit agreement between the parties on the nature of the transaction. The common tie of participants with an economic system, a set of socio-moral relations in which these economic transactions are embedded, and an ecologic system, makes participants unwilling, other things being equal, to bring charges against other participants in the multiply determined system. This is true even when violations of "contract" and what would be considered bad faith in legitimate business occurs.
3. The distribution system is a pyramid of power, profit and vulnerability to police activities. (cf. Heller, 1973; Holahan, 1973). The smaller numbers of persons involved at the highest levels i.e., the importation and distribution of large amounts, make the largest profit. The middle and low-level dealers are more numerous and make less profit. Thus, those at the highest level in an organized market are in a position to control prices, to extract higher profit at greater margins, to restrict their clientele, and thus to protect themselves to a greater degree. They are least vulnerable to arrest, and even less vulnerable to conviction since they may virtually never handle the drugs themselves. Conversely, the lower level dealers and street pushers/users are characterized by the opposite features. Most importantly, they are visible to observation, exhibit a lower profit margin, must deal with people they do not know (in part, the reduced profit comes from having to deal in larger numbers of clients - some of whom are, of course, possible police informants), must deal to use, are best known to the police for their previous crimes, and are most often re-arrested.

For analysis of the drug market as an economic and political phenomenon, see Redlinger, 1969, Moore, 1970 and Heller, 1973.

The assumption has been that the quality of heroin is positively related to its position in the dealing chain - that at the highest (large Wholesaler) level one finds the purest heroin, and that street level heroin fluctuates between 0 and 10% purity. (See Redlinger, 1975; Heller, 1973; Moore, 1970). For a contrary view, see Brown and Silverman, 1973.

4. Information is needed to enforce narcotics laws: one way in which crimes of a life style, such as dealing and using opiates, are made known to the police is by third party informing e.g., a neighbor sees dealing going on out her window, or is bothered by the number of people going in and out of a nearby house and makes an anonymous tip to the police; inadvertant observation by policemen and arrest on other charges which leads to a seizure of drugs or other drug-related crime (the vast majority of arrests for drugs and drug related crime occur as a result of ancillary offenses; for example, traffic offenses which bring the violation to the attention of the uniformed officer).
5. However, narcotics agents do not rely on voluntary information or on uniform patrol for enforcement. They actively seek information by specially designed methods. They can either obtain the necessary information through the use of undercover agents to make buys, by observation of dealing, or most commonly by persuading persons already involved in the style of life to betray persons known to them to be dealers i.e., to make buys from these people under the control of narcotics officers, and to do so either for money and/or for a reduction, modification or dropping of their criminal charges. (These charges may be either drug-related or may involve other charges such as burglary, assault, homicide, etc.).
6. The narcotics agent makes crime happen. Even with confidential information, the police have only allegations of crime and their presence often modifies, leads to the stoppage of, or reduces the visibility of the crime they are legally required to regulate. Unlike other crime, the police have no evidence in narcotics cases until they create, make a buy, and an arrest -- "buy/bust"-coerce or observe transactions themselves, or create them through their legally protected agents. In effect, then, the police "make crime happen," or must induce, through money, persuasion, or involvement in the life style, potential criminals to commit crimes.
7. One of the major reasons that the police are dependent upon informants is the separation between them and the "crimes" that are occurring. In a simple manner, we can see this separation as one that is social, in the sense that the action is not within their sphere of interaction, but they must make it so, by seeking out the elements that make crime, and more importantly, crime is not ecologically related to them. The latter greatly influences the former. Ecologically -- spatially -- the officers are removed from the crime and the criminal, and thus, they must retroactively act upon the criminal; they can not stop the crime. But in order to stop the criminal, they must have information. Since they are ecologically removed, and socially removed, they must have some "contact" to the situation. They are socially removed in the sense that they most often would not, if left to their own devices, seek out those elements, associate with those elements, or be a party to those elements. If they would, then one has an officer who was once part of and may continue to be part of the


marginal classes; most officers may have originated in those classes but aspire to their more genteel elements, if they aspire to that class at all (usually they are upwardly mobile). In the more phenomenal sense they are socially removed in that they are not present at the action which would be a crime.*

* Undercover officers are an interesting exception in that not only are they present when the act that is criminal occurs, but that in addition, they do nothing about it because they cannot blow their cover! Their cover enables them to witness repetitive criminal acts, but obviates them from the enforcement of the law. Moreover, their commitment to their cover makes it easier for them not to enforce the law since most of the time they are operating under actual odds which would make enforcement not a clear-cut act. The numbers of conflicting parties may be actually greater than the agent or agents operating undercover. (In San Antonio, for example, they had another unit of two men monitoring the undercover man and his informant with a sensor device. We could sit a block away and hear the conversation -- in that way, if the officer was "made", the other officers could come to his rescue. This policy was initiated only after one officer had been "made" and beaten.)

V. Making a Case and Features of a Case: Two Models of Procedure

There are two basic patterns of administration within narcotics units that we observed; there may be many others, but these were salient in our research. The first one is the self-generation model, and the second is the organizationally generated model. Although clearly each has features shared with the other, and in each type there are self-generated and organizationally-generated cases, they tend to operate more with the one than the other. In order to understand the patterning of activity in any narcotics unit, the mode of assignment and investigation of cases must be uncovered. Recall that unlike other crimes, vice crime requires the investigator to "work forward" from information received to construct the facts such that they will support a charge, or that the Prosecutor's or U.S. Attorney's office will "paper" them or make the charge. One does not work "backward" from already previously established facts of crime, witnesses, statements at the scene, etc. to found the case and subsequently to close it except in a special sense. Let us first examine the traditional or self-generated model ~~first~~, as it is outlined in Figure One.

Figure One*
The Origination and Disposition of Narcotics Information:**
The Investigator-Centered Model



*Metro Department is used as an example here; hence, the use of specific terms for forms e.g., 854, 68. The figure is intended to be representative of a type of information flow and administrative procedure found in narcotics departments. It should be noted that this is not a closed system in that at any point, information can be lost or ejected without formal notification. Implicit then in any decision point is the option of simply eliminating the case from further consideration

**Dotted lines show alternatives usually followed, solid lines indicate practice.

***Any source can be written or not written at officer's discretion except for undercover buys which must be vouchered if the officer desires repayment.

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
As Figure One shows, information flows in from a variety of sources. These incoming calls and informational tips are not tape recorded, unlike other calls to the main switchboard of the police department or otherwise required to be put in writing. No one monitors or records officially any of the sources. No one could verify or have knowledge of a complaint except through the official paper generated by the officer (e.g., his buy reports, investigative reports, and his submitted vouchers for reimbursement for buys or information) unless it were independently brought to his attention, e.g., phone call or complaint made directly to an official. They are not known by officials unless one should answer the phone. As a result, since an official record is not always made, few cases are assigned to investigators by sergeants in the manner of other investigative divisions. Most cases are thus self-initiated, self-defined as to promise, priority and length, and in effect, self-closed. If an investigator keeps a case file locked in his desk, as many do, rather than in a central file, he maintains almost complete control over and knowledge of his cases.

Although sergeants are informally given information on cases and activities as a matter of courtesy by their investigators, they do not know how many cases any one investigator is working at a given time. The sergeant's best indices are the buy reports of drugs bought if the man is working undercover, the monies he issues an officer for buys, expenses and mileage for undercover officers, and the investigative reports submitted to him. The sergeant is usually, although not necessarily, the supervising and/or signing officer on affidavits, search warrant executions

and statements of facts for court submitted by the members of his squad. In the Metropolitan Police Department, since there is no baseline of cases accepted, or founded crimes, no clearance/closure figures for narcotics investigations are kept. No cases are "opened" or "closed" (except in the mind of the investigator or an occasional administrative closure) because narcotics cases are infinitely expandable: each seller has a source, that source has another, etc. up the dealing pyramid. An arrest can be viewed as closure or as a mere overture because "You always try to 'spin' a guy when you arrest him [pressure him to become an informant in exchange for police intercession on the defendant's behalf with the U.S. Attorney], and try to go higher" (Sgt. 8). Thus, the number, type, promise, and current developments in a given investigation may be known only by the investigator. The further one goes from the street buy/bust situation or observation-arrest, to investigations involving dealing which may involve a network of employees, secondary level dealers and sources of dope, the more time is involved in surveillance and background work, and the greater manpower required. Given the opportunity costs involved in longer term investigations, in the absence of rewards and administrative actions to induce compliance with a strategy

Getting at higher level dealers often involves wire intercept evidence which is often excluded from court, constructing a conspiracy charge (very difficult to prove since it usually does not involve a seizure where possession can be shown collectively), and long and careful work. Thus, the "higher" in the dealing pyramid the investigation seeks to go, the more expensive it is, the less likely to yield arrests, the more subject to court control and decisions, and conversely, the fewer arrests it yields on a monthly basis.

of longer term investigations (and hopefully aimed at points nearer the top of the dealing pyramid), most narcotics policemen will seek to reduce the time spent in investigations by closing them out with arrests as soon as this is possible. And, if the jurisdiction pays additional (overtime) pay for court appearances, this will, in addition, motivate officers to make arrests sooner and more frequently.



*Each investigator retains about \$50 for miscellaneous expenses, and on occasion may use this for "buy money."

+For example, no further information available: information is received that a person is dealing from a certain location, surveillance is undertaken and no dealing is observed.

‡Every effort is made to close a case, whether by arrest, unfounding or by exception. An arrest brought about by whatever course of events, retrospectively generates a lead sheet, a local investigation #, and RD number (radio dispatch, a standard records nomenclature in the department, whether radio dispatch was used or not) and a classification. The classification categories are behavioral, and asterisks are used to indicate the types of violations on which the officer has discretion on use of arrest. The discretionary items are such things as littering and some types of traffic violations.

@For example, an informant makes a controlled buy, then leaves town or cannot be reached for further work e.g., introducing an undercover policeman to his (the informant's) source for a hand-to-hand buy. The investigation cannot go further without the informant, but might be revived if he returns to activity with the Department.

‡For example, neighbor claims that a field of marihuana is growing next door. Inquiries and investigation reveals that the plants are not marihuana.

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In the organizationally generated model, shown in Figure Two, information is more formally handled. All incoming information is classified into one of three types - information for local investigation (anonymous tip, citizen information, informant information); classified report (narcotics buy information -- also logged in a master sheet in the safe, reported in and out by a required written form) or special informant file. If the investigator who takes the call (or a secretary who answers one of the two confidential numbers) decides it has no promise, he can simply handle it by phone (this is rare), or a lead sheet can be written up. This lead sheet is usually typed by secretaries from notes or taped remarks made by investigators. It is then assigned by the sergeant or the shift commander, and given a status: information only (simply filed) or made a "local investigation." Two copies are made - one kept by the Sergeant and one assigned to an investigator by the region of the city (each investigator has a region assigned to him/her). The local must be dealt with in some way within 2 weeks - closed, closed by exception, pending, or closed by arrest. (see Figure 2). When an arrest is made, the incident is assigned an RD number (radio dispatch number) so that it can be processed thru central records (even though it was not radio dispatched); it is classified under a set of available categories, and given a general departmental arrest number. When in fact this works backwards - e.g., an officer opens an investigation and closes it with an arrest simultaneously, then all of the relevant numbers and classifications must be assigned retrospectively. Because this is both possible and done, it is difficult to know precisely what each investigator is work-

ing on, as is the case in the self-initiated model. Further, however, Sergeants do have a rough index of what investigators are doing because they have access to and must sign all requests for buy money, have a list of locals assigned to each officer (written and marked out in yellow so that the facts are readable), and must approve any SI file prior to its being established.

Finally, each officer must on each lead sheet write in the times and places spent on each investigative episode, and must call in at least once an hour to the communications center for messages.

It should not be suggested that in such administrative systems that the same structural problems of accountability and invisibility are not present. They are, for the reasons discussed here. In part the difficulty arises because no one considers locals to have much potential. As one investigator put it, "we do better on ones we instigate ["investigate" was probably the intended word] ourselves." Their status is problematic as well because some investigators do not do the paperwork on them, others hold them as if they were pending, although they are not; extensions are allowed, and when someone is working something big, he is either given no locals, or is allowed to let them go. Nevertheless, this is an assignment made by the Sergeant, not the investigator himself.

VI. Case-Making, Ambiguity and Corruption

The previous features of a case in narcotics enforcement are not, of course, incidental to the generation of the sorts of corruption found in some narcotics units. We have noted how the usual means of assessing success through closure/clearance rates is impossible in units that keep no base figures on cases accepted, and less than meaningful in others since the closure rates for assigned cases indicate, at best, fairly perfunctory following up of leads provided by citizen's calls to the department. The tenuous relationship between paper, procedures, and practice introduces a consistently problematic

There are some general reasons why it is difficult to operate in an administratively "sound" fashion i.e., in the same hierarchically controlled fashion that is the model for supervision in patrol divisions. The absence of policy, for example, i.e., written procedures and policies, exists not only because of the inherent flexibility of the work and the numerous ad hoc decisions which must be made, but because if the public were aware of the policies, they would in all probability demand changes (see PCC, 1967). Secondly, the flexibility in narcotics and the presence of the "invitational edge" of corruption (cf. Manning and Redlinger) leads to high turnover in personnel. Transfer is a management technique designed to reduce temptation, but also comes because the units are virtually always voluntary, and persons can be transferred in and out on request. This very turnover rate, although on the one hand reducing the possibility that a young officer will come under the influence of practitioners of crime, also means that to the degree he does not possess these acquaintances and access points, he will be an ineffectual officer.

tie between the real and the apparent. Thus, we take the problem of accurate and meaningful control over cases and information as a synecdoche for the entire operation.

However, loosely articulated administrative procedures, are dramatically made salient by the very real and continuous dependence of narcotics officers upon informal bargaining and negotiation between themselves, their informants and their lawyers, and the prosecuting attorney's office. To understand the additional complexity of processing narcotics cases, influence exerted by the Attorney's Office upon successful prosecution and/or termination of a narcotics case must be appreciated.

As we have shown above, the policeman creates, generates, or makes happen events or transactions subsequently labelled as crime. He does this in conjunction with informants who are employed for this purpose, and who are either paid for the efforts in money or are "working off a beef," or are "under the gun," i.e., are working for the police in exchange for their possible intercession with the prosecutory agency and the judge indirectly in the reduction, nol-prossing or dismissal of a charge. Thus, arrests can be held in limbo, investigations can be put on "pending," charges can be withheld (especially in the Metropolitan Department where the charge is actually made by the U.S. Attorney, not the Police Department) or not processed in lieu of consideration of "work" in the final disposition of a case. In other words, following an arrest, there will be negotiations between the prosecutor's representative, the defendant's lawyer and the defendant and the police officer concerning the work that the person can do and the possible deal which can be

made if he successfully works off the beef. This work takes place between arraignment and final trial date. Often, the attorney can set a trial date such that the defendant can work, have his charges dropped, modified or nol-prossed, and never appear in court (either as defendant or as witness in any other case in which he participated). Promises are made to this effect by narcotics officers early in interrogation after arrest, and in deals with the relevant lawyers. But it should be underscored that there is no policy on the nature of an "acceptable deal" in the attorney's office; there is no written agreement involved, and that the "promise" also has the quality of a threat over the head of the person. It is legally sanctioned extortion.

Further, the promise of cases varies virtually from day-to-day, thus the utility of such categories as "closed by exception" or pending". As we have noted above, narcotics cases are infinitely expandable, if one wishes to "work up" to the source of a drug, thus a decision taken at any point to make an arrest terminates the case at less than its "full promise." This cannot be said concerning arrests in other criminal cases. Official records, arrests, charges, and convictions shift in meaning in narcotics for the following reasons, all of which reduce the utility of conventional performance measures based on cases:

1. Charges are often dropped because an informant is to be protected; because the buy itself is suspect; because deals have been made concerning the disposition of the case by the U.S. Attorney - U.S.A. and the person has "worked off the beef"; because the evidence is inadequate in the judgment of the U.S.A. - it is "no papered" (no charge is made).
2. Cases can be resolved by other means - DEA intervention; the actions of state agencies; because equipment or manpower is unavailable or an affidavit is denied.

3. Arrests may be made for reasons other than or counter to the aims of the department, and even a large number of arrests may not be thought of as representing "making good cases."
4. Cases may be dropped because of a lack of money to "buy up" (make larger buys to get to a source); because of an unwillingness of the department to further cover an undercover man, or because he has to actually deal in dope to maintain his cover to buy up. In other words, administrative decisions above or beyond the control of the agent can terminate cases.

It may not be true, as Skolnick writes, "It is impossible to count crimes without complaints" (1966:168), but it is true that all that can be counted does not count, nor is all that is counted taken into account, and many things that are not counted, do. Thus, official counts are viewed by all as "lie sheets," and fictive constructions, rather than a means to align policy and behaviors. The pressure to produce remains, assumed, even though official statistics are not viewed as valid indices of "quality work," or "activity."

Corruption and the Administrative Problem

The narcotics enforcement process is a reflection in an important way of the nature of the market that is being regulated: traditional forms of corruption emerge from this regulatory context. The market and its ramifications i.e., making life style a crime, creates the structural opportunities for traditional forms of corruption. It is precisely these forms of corruption which the administrative devices described above are meant to control. These very devices, and the problematics of case-making which they legitimate, multiply or secondarily determine the form of the processes which eventuate in the outcomes we have described. Let us sketch these intermediate processes to show how they link administrative controls (or their absence) with the externally labelled forms of behavior or corruption.

At least six forms of corruption: protection of informants; arrogation of seized property; violence; using and dealing in drugs; illegal searches and seizures and bribes,* can be directly linked to the ambiguities of case-making in narcotics units.

1. Protection of informants. It is to the advantage of narcotics agents to have criminals (their informants) on the streets, even if other charges are voided, or officers are persuaded to overlook crime. The loose controls over negotiations

Unless otherwise noted, instances cited are from fieldnotes or observation.

with informants permits this body of criminals to operate. Control over establishing informants can be either loose or carefully controlled. If there is no careful control on the creation of an SE (special employee paid by the police department), fictive names and persons can be created; or false payments registered to an SE who never receives them (the investigator makes up a report or voucher, signs the SE's name, and pockets the money). Some informants in Metro Department were virtually on salary for services rendered, or future services to be rendered. Since in this department there were no guidelines for payments for seizures ("We just lay some coin on them if it's a good seizure, a better one than we expected"), amounts from a nickel (paid as an insult) to a \$200 a week salary have been paid. Since payment is personalized and variable, varying amounts of cash may actually reach an SE (and if he is working off a beef, he may be paid, but has no recourse if he feels it is inadequate, nor does any SE in Metro Department).

The calculus of payment is understood best by viewing it as a reflection of several aspects: the size of the dealer to which the activity is directed, the risk involved to the informant, the level at which the informant is buying (whether in weight or in bags) and the biographical context of the relationship between the informant and the officer e.g., what do you expect from him, what has he done in the past. Thus, there is no gradient of payment based on the size of bag alone (e.g., payment for making a \$10 buy), because all such payments reflect the moral relationships outlined above. Payment reflects both expressive and instrumental aspects of the relationship, and payments are made in a sense on "principle" or the relationship: one investigator said about payments "[if a good informant] calls me up, I tell them, call me up if you need some money -- I can take care of them. If they have been working for me in the past and I know they'll work in the future, then I'll take care of it [their request for money]. They just have to come by and pick it up. I'll take care of it for them." This is possible in this department because the voucher requesting reimbursement simply requires the investigator to write "for information received in connection with investigation..., Police Department". No further explanation is necessary.

Protection of informants from criminal charges is very common and protects effective informants from immobilization. Informants arrested on another charge, for example by a uniform man, may be handled in a variety of ways depending on the importance of the cases he is working, what (or who) the investigator thinks the informant can do, what previous charge he is working off, and what charge he is presently facing. Since this is done informally, no records are kept, and the arrangement is worked out and kept solely between the investigator whose snitch is in trouble and the uniform man. In some cases, when facing an additional charge as one investigator put it, "He just has to work harder to clear that charge, too." But in others, protection of a "good" informant against subsequent charges is requisite to success in investigations. Cases are dropped as a matter of working agreement in Metro. Department if the "snitch" has to appear in court to testify in the case. (As a result, they attempt to get a search warrant which does not name the snitch, or obtain a hand-to-hand buy from the dealer to an undercover agent.)

Such protection of informants is sometimes ironic. For example, in Suburban Department, if one is convicted of a personal possession charge ("292") and has no criminal convictions during the following year, the conviction is expunged. However, these persons are known to the police to be vulnerable, and as one sergeant put it, "We like to see people on 292 charges" [because they can be "asked" to work] and even after "expungement," the records are kept in the narcotics branch for further

reference. Because they have the threat of a charge hanging over them, informants are induced to do things outside legal requirements -- the bargain which they thought they had struck. Informants in Metro Department have been coerced to have sex with officers, to smoke dope with them, to inform on their brothers (for \$22, the amount the brother who informed had stolen from his mother's purse). Informants have no guarantees that if their information or work is judged to be inadequate (doesn't yield drugs in a raid) that they will not have to testify in a case (which may endanger them), and thus be "burned" or alternatively
^(their names can be put out on the streets by officers naming the person as a "snitch"), nor that their own cases will go forward for charge and trial. Their payments are personalized, based on investigator's judgment, and there is no guarantee that they will be paid at all.

The flexibility of protection arises and persists both from the absence of policy and administrative complicity. It is two-sided and catches up agents and informants in a very dangerous game of deception and manipulation. The problematic nature of the "contract" between the agent and the informant, is such that he is extorted to work, fears further conviction (the longer his record in narcotics, the greater the threat against him), and is pressured to produce useful information. Since this information is judged almost solely by the officer as to its relevance to alteration or dropping of charges, the officer bears responsibility to evaluate the knowledge he is given. He bears frequent fears of being "turned," that the snitch will "get over" on him. On the other hand, informants feel pressures to lie to add credibility to their claims

(that they can "do" or buy from someone); to provide low-level information (turn in someone at the same level as one's self against retributive violence from other dealers or junkies (and thus to restrict information given) and to "cover one's own ass" (e.g., to protect one's own dealing while working off a beef; or the dealings of one's lieutenants or source).

2. The arrogation of seized property. The existence of drugs on a raid is problematic. The serving of a warrant is predicated on its existence, but a variety of things can lead to a raid "coming up empty." Thus, it is possible for a raid party or officer to collect drugs for personal use or sale. Collusions between officers allows it to be seized for personal use; for payment to informants; or for dealing oneself. Money and drugs are often found to which no one wants to admit ownership (since it would implicate them in a conspiracy to deal, to manufacture or to deal). Even after securing a dwelling that has been legally entered, money, guns and drugs can "walk" if the raid coordinator is not fully in charge, if confusion ensues, if uniformed officers are absent, badly placed, or inexperienced in securing the premises, etc. If there is no policy requiring a sergeant or higher ranked officer to accompany all raids, no supervision to speak of is present (this was true in Suburban Department).^{*} Drugs can often be cut or "lost" as was the case in New York, or simply misplaced as a result of faulty handling of evidence. Further, if informants are interrogated by only one officer who reports to the raid group,

^{*} Quasi-legal seizures of automobiles also occur, but the rules on handling them vary so much that it is unfair to speculate about the practice. Many jurisdictions use seized autos as undercover vehicles, so make great efforts to seize them. Departmental policies on this are written and thus are less subject to manipulation than handling of money and drugs.

then the existence and location of drugs or money is unknown to others, and this administrative flexibility permits manipulation of evidence by the officer once in the house.

3. Violence is an inherent part of narcotics enforcement. It is so, of course, because it regulates and interpenetrates an illicit market where legal protections are non-existent and where trust and trust-violations in business dealings are frequently the source of revenge, retribution, betrayal and the like. The mode of enforcement, which itself creates, requires, and perpetuates deceptions, duplicity and surprise intervention in private affairs by both citizens and police (in the form of arrest and search warrant servings), creates the opportunity for violence.

Retribution is an important aspect of narcotics - investigators like to drive around or cruise in dealing areas to "get things started," or to mount massive surveillance against a dealer, or to occasionally put an informant "out front" because he burned an investigator or lied to him. All the above are means to induce violence against each other among the user/dealer world. Informants can also be burned in court by making them testify, making them vulnerable to retributive violence.

The most common form of violence is that encountered in a raid, touched off at either of several key points where the fragile order is shattered - when an unexpected event occurs just after a door is hit e.g., a dog springs out at the raid party, a man stands directly in front of the entry-way with a gun, everyone inside scatters and screams; when someone rushes for the john, or window to destroy the evidence, or to swallow it (in one case reported to us, a girl who attempted to swallow the dope had to

have surgery that evening to remove it); when frustration mounts when dope is not found. At the latter point we have seen threats made to the occupant or owner - to either tell us where the dope is, or we take apart the house.*

Since a strong case rests heavily on the finding of dope evidence, if it is not found, retribution in the form of the search-wrecking takes place, or violence (beating) is administered to the individual. A raid may be used as revenge, even if no dope is expected to be found; or everyone present on the premises at the time of a raid may be arrested and brought in, even though evidence is weak against them in an attempt to coerce people to turn as informants against the person suspected, or to work in subsequent cases. There is pressure to coerce "confessions" from persons arrested where the evidence is weak, where no dope was found, although buys had been made, and violence can erupt during this time of frustration. All of these opportunities increase the chances of making a case, are administratively permitted or invisible to supervisors, and therefore, are produced and given life through the working agreements that govern the process of narcotics enforcement.

In a county adjoining Metro, not studied by us, sledge hammers are used in the walls, and houses torn apart in searches (with no county liability to pay unless a civil suit is brought.

4. Using and dealing in drugs is found in undercover work.

We observed cases of using (cf. Manning and Redlinger) while on surveillance, but undercover work in suburban department virtually required it. Agents (with one exception) admitted to using a Hash-smoking apparatus when passed, although heroin was not used. In one case we encountered, an undercover policeman sold 50 pounds of previously seized marihuana to another undercover policeman in a parking lot to impress or "get in with" the person accompanying the policeman who dealt. In this same department, the Attorney's office approved selling or giving substances represented as drugs to persons by officers. Aspirin was sold as Quaaludes (Methaqualone), and a mixture of milk sugars was given to an addict to shoot up in the officer's presence. All are quasi-legal means to entrap a user/dealer, or to simulate narcotics involvement by agents, in spite of official structures against use and dealing. Thus, although the Captain in charge of one narcotics unit told one of us that "no drugs of any kind were used by investigators," and that "if they did use, they would be transferred out of the unit immediately," he was also aware of the fact that it is virtually impossible to work undercover without having to weigh the danger to oneself of refusal to use, the implications that that revelation might have for a continuing or successful investigation, and the long-term impossibility of simulating use. The moral dilemmas can be succinctly stated: in order to work up the dealing chain, dealing and/or using drugs is a virtual requirement; any capable undercover policeman will continually face situations where he either gives, sells or uses drugs, or terminates an investigation. Obviously, decisions have

been made to act in accord with unwritten rules to avoid use, and to act in the interest of a more effective i.e., higher level investigation.

5. Illegal searches and seizures. Illegal searches are facilitated by ruse to enter a house (see Manning, 1974; Skolnick, 1966: 79); claims are made to having seen items (contraband, guns, implements) "in plain sight" through windows (also occurred once in the Metro department after an anonymous tip led officers to the scene); or smelled marihuana (Lansing case). Threats are made to gain illegal entry: "Let us in and give us your dope, and we won't charge you with possession of what we find, or we get a search warrant and come back and wreck the place."

Since much evidence is obtained by means of warrants, the handling of warrants is critical. Some departments allow officers to write affidavits without a sergeant's signature. Administratively, the definition of an "illegal search" is not determined by the police department, but by the judge after the fact; this increases the neutralization potential of the officer's views that the courts are "handcuffing" them and that the work can only be done by systematic evasion of the spirit of the law in searches.

Let us eliminate initially as problematic/retrospective (see below) those searches which were entered into with the approval of affidavits and signing officials, but where evidence is excluded by a judge prior to returning a warrant e.g., in Metro department a judge excluded as evidence telephones and a sawed-off shotgun with pistol grips obtained in a gambling/narcotics raid.

6. Bribes. An illicit market centers discretion in regulation and seller pressure upon the agent and thus makes him most subject to bribes. However, the procedures surrounding and leading up to arrest for a narcotics crime are secret and protected, both by policy and by proclivity of narcotics agents. Their actions and decisions in a case are largely invisible, and they have discretion in deals made concerning working off beefs, payment made for work, seizures, guns or information leading to apprehension of felons on other charges. This opens the possibility for the conversion of these fees into personal gains, or to accepting money in return for consideration. In Metro department, an agent was being paid-off by a large Cocaine dealer to inform him of when a raid was planned; the agent was paid in part in drugs and in part in money. Further, because there are not fixed and public points at which decisions are made about the termination of cases, private decisions can be made, and may come under the influence of suspected violators. Supervisors do not, generally speaking, have independent knowledge concerning the credibility of information given to them by an agent. And, for example, by skillfully manipulating information, agents can carry out "false raids" that come up dry to protect a person, or can plan and execute raids against competitors of a dealer. This may be administratively approved - e.g., when a snitch is working to revenge himself against his competition, but may be, nevertheless, induced by bribes.

VIII. Comment

We have reiterated some of the themes of the previous paper. This paper argues and analytically defines previous examples to be a function of the administrative structure of narcotics departments. Given such a system and its generation of miscellaneous delicts, the visibility and labelling of the episode still requires some explications. Assuming by our definition that all occupations are characterized by corruption, why are some forms in some occupations more visible, more public as it were?

To discuss the conditions under which narcotics corruption is revealed, some aspects of the power hierarchy in criminal justice should be outlined: occupations seek to maintain control over areas which effect their discretion and autonomy (there are a variety of ways in which they attempt to carry this out - cf. Form, 1968). The more authority and power possessed by an occupation relative to another, the more it will have carved out semi-autonomous status in that relationship with reference to the definition of error made by its practitioners (cf. Friedson, 1970). The occupation may have developed its own mode of dealing with and processing such errors, once they become known (Goode, 1962?). Conversely, the probability that such practitioners will be subject to civil or criminal actions is radically reduced, and civil suits are much more likely than criminal suits among high status occupations (professions). In less prestigious occupation, the problematic areas of occupational functioning will be surrounded by rules, but the context within which those rules are interpreted, utilized, and applied is

subject to the definition of other more powerful occupations. Therefore, the definitions of error or bad practice, or violations of procedural expectations in less powerful groups remains shifting and ambiguous in spite of their own attempts to provide definitional clarity and to control the context within which the violation is defined and labelled (e.g., Hughes, 1958). Organizational rules dealing with procedures in uncertain areas are those from which flow the types of problems alternatively labelled as corruption, malfeasance, and violations of trust, as well as a variety of other delicts.

This is not to say that the prestige and power of occupations is static and unchanging, rather to point out that it has structural and more or less enduring arrangements. For example, while the State may be more likely to focus its defining power on less powerful occupational and class groups, that does not obviate its changing of focus to those that are more powerful. We can observe processes through both the legislative and judicial branches of the State. In one, hearings of accountability are held with reference to changes in the law, while in the other criminal proceedings may be brought against groups and organizations heretofore left to define problems and administer themselves. This change in focus by the State may be temporary and have little structural effect on the arrangements of social power within the society, or the effects may be more enduring and alter radically the arrangements. For example, the growth of State authority in the definition, and control of what constitutes legitimate treatment of persons addicted to drugs, and prescribing options (cf. Controlled Substances Act, 1972), can be seen to be a direct and successful challenge to the heretofore private domain of physicians. This alteration in authority of course did not occur overnight, but through a series of legislative and judicial proceedings (cf. Lindesmith, 1965; Musto, 1973).

For example, as the policies of the Attorney General and Justice Department change with regard to the evidence required for "probable cause" to issue an order approving a wire intercept, and as court interpretations change, the definition of the conduct of given police departments change - and sometimes retroactively. These changes cannot be controlled by the police and in the instance of retroactive rulings leads to, at least, cases being thrown out of court. In addition, such rulings can lead to officer embarrassment in court and before the public and public discreditation of the department. Retroactive rulings redefine actions done in good faith by the department at the time of initiation of the investigation. Thus, in the instance of retroactive rulings the public definition of legitimate action is transformed, and the actions taken by police that were once legal become tainted. Public disclosures of procedures, previously legal or quasi-legal, now add credence to public belief that narcotics officers engage in widespread and intentional violations of the law (Parallels with the CIA investigations are clear).

Achieving "probable cause" itself involves operating in the "grey areas" or margins of the law. One frequent manner is to obtain information on telephone communications by the use of "one party consent" taps, which can be accomplished by the use of a \$1.50 instrument. The manner in which this can be done is to have a paid informant who knows a dealer make phone calls to the dealer concerning the sales of illicit substances. This information, once taped, then provides one of the essential features of an affidavit that constructs a network of relationships and interactions that, police claim, will be incontrovertibly verified by a tap.

With regard to narcotic officers, law enforcement in general, and less powerful occupations, one is more likely to see more of their errors made public than those committed by members of more powerful occupations. In addition, the context within which these errors will be viewed will be biased toward a "group" or stereotypic interpretation, rather than viewing the error as individual. Furthermore, as we have argued, the points at which tension leads to errors and corruption vary in the regulation of licit and illicit goods; in illicit markets, agents are more susceptible for not only charges of corruptions but in addition are more visible targets for those investigating corruption. We must assume these structural features are aspects contributing to the visibility and consequentiality of a given delict, whatever the contextual definition within the occupation might be.

There are a variety of instances in narcotic law enforcement, such as grabbing someone by the throat to prevent the destruction (swallowing) of evidence, using elaborate costumes (mailman, exterminator) and ruses (supra), and hitting the "wrong" door, which are contextually defined at that time, as legitimate, shrewd, and approved practices, that when reproduced in court lead to a retrospective redefinition of those actions as "brutality," "excessive force," and violations of constitutional right to privacy.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Knapp Commission "twisted" tainted officers into becoming informants who were wired for sound. According to the Serpico volume (1973), every attempt was made to avoid investigation and/or prosecution of officers from lieutenants level and above. Likewise, scholars investigating corruption among police (for example, Sherman, ed., 1974) are more likely to focus on visible lower participant errors.

As these examples suggest, the relative power of organizations multiply determines the pattern of errors which can be revealed: first, because organizations have differential access to rule-makers and enforcers; secondly, because the types of errors that are criminalized reflect the relative positions of such groups within the symbolic and power orders of the society; and thirdly, because the capacity to cover up such errors is less enduring and well distributed in lower-prestige occupations (cf. the use of lawyers by the corporations of Washington, Goulden, 1972; and the use of lawyers by policemen and police departments, PCC, 1967). Finally, the differential visibility of errors in a direct reflection of the common-sense focus on the certain groups, given the political-historical emphases on such types of delicts.

Given these critical structural conditions, further research should focus on the interactional processes that lead to surfacing of the phenomena that are commonsensically labelled "corruption". What this says, then, is that "corruption" is a highly relativistic and contextual term on the one hand, and a clearly structured matter on the other. Both features of the term must be retained in any examination of the topic.

One of the most important implications of this analysis is that structural dilemmas maintain the ambiguity and associated corruption in narcotics law enforcement. To the extent that a society demands that laws be enforced which are themselves a reflection of conflict in the political community, and it delegates this enforcement to agents and agencies to which it grants insufficient authority, resources, and protection to adequately (in relative political terms) "do the job," then the community

will reap the consequences in terms of periodic relevation of the adjustments and rules of thumb which make a semblance of success possible (after all, the expectations of "success" is generated by public outcry about the "narcotics problem"). By that structural adjustment, society assures itself that nothing more effectively will be done. As one sergeant said: "If people want us to go out and drag 'em in by their hairs [users, dealers], then we'll do it, that's my job, but they gotta pass the laws so we can do the job. But if they want to have legal controls on us, and the courts and all, well, we'll bring 'em in and the courts will just release 'em." But as long as society both requires the regulation of drugs, and makes demands upon agents that they cannot meet, given legal constraints, the socio-moral pattern of the market, and the intent of the regulatory legislation itself, then the concepts of "error", "corruption", "crime" and "working practices" or adjustments will constantly rotate into public concern and continue to be differentially defined by different political audiences. It is difficult to imagine that the police will benefit from the process, and both directly and indirectly the consequences of such regulation are costly to the society as well as the police.