


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
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
ANALYSIS OF SECURITY NEEDS:
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS



THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project
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The American University Law School
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CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO COURT
OF COMMON PLEAS

December, 1975

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MAR 8 1977

ACQUISITIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION.

In response to numerous incidents and threats of violence during and after criminal trials at the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas in Cleveland, technical assistance was requested from LEAA's Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project at The American University to survey the facilities and operation of the Court with a view to identifying potential security problems and recommending solutions.

Currently, the Court is housed in three buildings:

The Cuyahoga County Court Building (Lakeside Building), the center of court operations, contains 21 courtrooms and the offices of the court clerk, court administrator, law library and lock-up facilities.

The Criminal Courts Building (Twenty-first Street Building) contains five courtrooms, one arraignment room, probation offices, sheriff's department, clerk and county prosecutor's offices and the county jail (tower).

The Mott Building, shared by the Court with the Welfare Department, houses five courtrooms, lock-up facilities, judges chambers, jury rooms and county prosecutor staff offices, all of which are located on the second floor of the five-story building.

Since the Court will move within the year to a new county criminal justice complex currently under construction, the focus of the assistance necessarily required a study of both the current court facilities (three buildings) and a review of the plans and site for the new complex.

The consultants assigned by the project, Michael Bignell and Kenneth Ricci, made a preliminary site visit in July, 1975, at which time they discussed the scope of the requested study with the Hon. Leo Spelacy, Presiding and Administrative Judge of the Court; John Kern, Court Administrator; and Ron Ball, Deputy Court Administrator; and other representatives of the Court. A proposed workplan was developed by the consultants and approved by the Court in October. This workplan outlined the following objectives for the study regarding the Court's current facilities:

- 1) Development of security measures that can be instituted at minimal cost to alleviate the most pressing deficiencies in court security (for example, problems related to the mixture of welfare clients and court activities on the second floor of the Mott Building). These measures may relate to procedural, manpower, hardware or minimal architectural changes.
- 2) Development of security measures that can be initiated over the next four to six months at all three locations on a more comprehensive basis, to be replicated at the new Justice Center. Capability for replication might justify higher developmental costs. These measures would most likely involve procedural, manpower and possibly hardware recommendations.
- 3) Development of security measures that can be initiated over the next six to eight months, designed to remain in place and serve the needs of future users of the County Courts Building and the Criminal Courts Building. Longer life cycle of improvements may permit higher development costs.

Additionally, the study included a review of the new facility, security measures already planned and potential problems which might develop.

Site work and report preparation was conducted during the period of October and November. The analysis and recommendations documented in this report view the Court's security problems as created by or remedied through two different channels: 1) the actual physical conditions and/or layout of the building; and 2) administrative policies which can affect the flow of the public in the Court, the use of screening measures and the provision, where needed, of security resources.

II. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING SITUATION

A. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COURT BUILDING

1. Major Problem Areas

a. Public Access: Access to the building is gained through three entrances: the main entrance on the South (Lakeside Avenue); and two minor entrances at the East and West. The Main Entrance is an active, well lit and easily surveilled area. The two side entrances are off the beaten path, not well lighted either by natural or artificial illumination, and are neither very heavily used nor near to a heavily trafficked office area. Construction adjacent to the side entrances currently deters public usage, but the doors have been left open. Public access to the building via the three entrances is not controlled or surveyed in any manner, either formal or informal. The isolation, obscurity and light public usage of the east and west entries would permit easy entrance and exit for the individual intent on avoiding surveillance.

b. Interior Circulation: Detainees: Detainees are currently held upon arrival from the County Jail in a small lock-up area adjacent to the western entrance. Circulation of detainees from the lock-up to various courtrooms is via public corridors and elevators. This situation exposes both the detainee and sheriff's staff. The detainee is exposed to possible threat from an aggrieved defendant during this period; sheriff's staff are exposed to possible threat of forcible escape, either unassisted or assisted. Uncontrolled access (see above) provides ease of entry and exit.

c. Access to Judges: While the concept of security applies to the entire court operation, one of the early concerns expressed by some judges and reiterated by the Court Administrator's Office is the "availability" of judges who remain in the building after normal court hours to possible physical violence or abduction. Not only are the sheriff's deputies not required to be present in and around chambers; but bailiffs, clerical and administrative personnel have also left the building.

2. Major Strengths.

a. Ambiance: The Lakeside Building is a fine example of late nineteenth century neo-classical public building architecture. The ambience is eminently appropriate for a courthouse.

b. Plan/Function: Over and above esthetics, the courthouse is well-planned. Basically a double "donut" plan, with spaces necklaced around two open courtyards (see diagrammatic plan), the building functions well in terms of access, vertical and horizontal circulation, ease of orientation and relationship among departments.

c. Ventilation: A major new mechanical ventilation system providing air conditioning and fresh air ventilation was installed in 1964. The system serves the entire building and was accomplished with a high degree of meticulous planning complemented by equally adroit workmanship, so that the environmental standards of the building are quite up-to-date without marring or detracting from the original design.

3. Recommendations.

a. Public Access: The two auxiliary entrances to this building should be closed to the public at least for the duration of construction in and around the building. The western entrance should continue to be used by the Sheriff's Department for pick-up and delivery of detainees, but only on an as-needed basis. The main entry should be covered by uniformed Public Stewards, discussed later in this report, to monitor, survey and, if need be, search incoming visitors.

b. Interior Circulation: Detainees: Over the short term, there is no feasible alternative to the existing practice of using public corridors for moving detainees from lock-up to courtrooms. The ample dimensions of the corridors and halls gives deputies sufficient elbow room to remain clear of public.

c. Access to Judges: Restriction of entries to the building from three to one and surveillance of the flow through that one remaining portal during normal hours addresses the immediate fear over personal safety of the judges in their chambers.

B. CRIMINAL COURTS BUILDING.

1. Major Problem Areas

a. Public Access: Public access to the building is confined to the main entry. From there access to stairs and elevators allows circulation to the floors above and below (see plan). Neither the entry nor the public rotunda is controlled or surveilled in any way. The large number of people in the building during business hours and the large number of staff and deputies (the jail is located in this building) would

appear to discourage violent behavior, attempted escape or theft of property by a process of natural surveillance - this is problematic.

b. Interior Circulation: Public: The building contains many functions on the three main levels: Probation and Sheriff's Department in the Basement; Clerk of Court, County Prosecutor, Grand Jury, Bail Bond Office and Main Entry on First Floor; six Courtrooms, judges chambers on Second Floor. Consequently the volume of interior traffic is quite high - this, coupled with the meager proportions of this forty-five year old building, leads to severe overcrowding. Security problems increase in direct proportion to density of population in several areas, for example, the risk of spontaneous incidents increases as high density makes already volatile circumstances even more stressful. Second, overcrowding poses an obstacle to security personnel attempting to respond to a courtroom disturbance and even presents the possibility of secondary incidents occurring between bystanders and deputies.

c. Clerk's Office; Cash Drawer Security: The cashier's drawer located under the counter in the clerk's office is particularly vulnerable. Cashier receives payments for court costs, fines, bonds, victim restitution, support payments over-the-counter and stores cash and checks in this drawer. The counter is located in a large open clerical area (see plan); visitors coming in to use the court dockets are permitted uncontrolled access behind the counter and must pass the cash drawer on their way to the docket shelves.

d. Probation Department

(1). Cash Drawer Security: The Probation Department collected approximately \$46,000 in cash for court fees, support payments, victim restitution and fines in 1974. There is currently concern over the vulnerability of such cash in the present location and in the new

Justice Center.

(2). General Operations: The Probation Department handled approximately 5400 cases in 1974. Not including cases handled in five satellite offices and referred elsewhere (interstate and intra-state compact) the Criminal Courts Office handles about 2000 visits per week by probationers coming in off the street; in addition, it also carries out Pre-Sentence Investigations for the Courts, currently at the rate of about 300/month of which 60 or so are jail cases. In this instance the detainee is brought into the interview room in handcuffs accompanied by a deputy. This is usually done prior to normal office hours. During office hours, however, there are no security guards in the Probation Department area. Probation Officers, who are not permitted to carry sidearms, handle interviews without benefit of security; normally this does not present problems. On occasion, however, the P.O. must serve a "capias" (bench warrant) on an unsuspecting probationer; the resultant shock has caused probationers to react violently and have to be subdued. There have been instances when probationers have drawn pistols during an interview, not to threaten or harm the P.O. (although that could easily have occurred) but instead to turn the weapon in, fearing that they may use it to their eventual regret. These instances have only served to heighten the staff's perception of their vulnerability. Recently, a pistol was found in the desk drawer of a P.O. No one has yet figured out how it got there, but the fact that it did get there without anyone's knowledge adds to staff apprehension.

e. Arraignment; Court Security: One of the six courtrooms located on the second floor of this building is used solely for arraignments (Room One). While the courtroom does have the assets of an electric alarm system for the judges and secure detainee circulation to and from jail (described below), there still is a great deal of fear on the judges' part about the potential for violent threat to their safety during arraignment proceedings. These proceedings usually are attended by 30-50 defendants (half of whom are detainees) and friends, relatives, and observers. Two armed deputies are routinely assigned to arraignment sessions. Should trouble arise, the two deputies might be insufficient to deal with the numbers present.

2. Major Strengths

a. Courtroom Security System: Each of the six courtrooms in this building is equipped with a silent alarm system located at the judges' bench. These alarms are monitored in the sheriff's main command post in the intake area in the basement. This post is manned at all times. The sheriff's standard operating procedure is to have all available deputies respond to the courtroom indicated with weapons at the ready.

b. Custodian Alarm System: Supplementing the court alarm system is a custodian alarm system located in strategic spots throughout the building for the use of the building custodians during their rounds, either AM or PM. On past occasions, custodian personnel have encountered prisoners from the jail who in the process of attempted escape, have managed to make their way into the courtroom or office area. In order to protect custodians in such an occurrence the alarm system was installed.

Alarms are monitored in the sheriff's control room in the basement intake area.

c. Duct Space Monitors: Closed circuit T.V. cameras have been installed at critical points in the various duct spaces on the third floor that separate the courtrooms on the second floor and the jail on the fourth. Any attempted escape from the fourth floor must pass through these areas. Monitors are located in the sheriff's control room in the basement intake area.

d. Intake Circulation: Detainees: A very good feature of the Criminal Courts Building is the detainee circulation system devised by the building's original architects and incorporated into the original plans of the building. The system separates public and detainee circulation in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Separate elevators are provided for public and detainees. Where the detainee elevators pierce public spaces, access to the elevators is prohibited by omitting doors. It is possible to transport detainees from the jail to the courtroom without ever passing through public space. This is done by discharging detainees at the third floor, which contains only jury deliberation rooms, and entering secure stairways down to the second floor courtrooms (see section and plan).

3. Recommendations

a. Public Access: Public access through the main entrance should be monitored by Public Stewards as recommended for the Cuyahoga County Court Building supplemented with a policy of entry restriction, which, although not described, can reduce overcrowding and overconcentration. Public Stewards can be used to circulate through the public

areas in an effort to assist, guide and keep people moving freely.

b. Clerk's Office; Cash Drawer Security: An architectural alteration should be made in the clerk's open office area to permit persons who need to consult the docket books to do so without passing through the cashier's area. The County Engineers might be requested to develop detailed changes and plan and contract out the demolition and construction. For alterations under \$1000 the Department of Public Works can expedite construction by direct award of contract.

c. Probation Department: The handling of cash should be taken over entirely by the Court Clerks for the duration of occupancy of the building. The presence of a source of ready cash should be removed to the security of the Clerk's Office. The proposed Public Steward (Stewardess) service can be used for additional, non-threatening but visible security back-up for P.O.'s. One Public Steward circulating among the offices or on ready call (at this point installation of a silent alarm system is not feasible) should be sufficient to handle all except the most extreme cases; the proximity of the Sheriff's Department is an additional deterrant.

The efficiency of using female security personnel in the Probation Department is worth further study by the Department. The notion of a female in a uniform (un-armed) asking a male probationer to please obey the rules and sit down is difficult to resist, given what we are now learning from male/female police teams and their ex-

perience in domestic squabbles, the one area in which the rates of attack of heretofore all male officers had been phenomenally high.


d. Arrest: Court Security: The silent court alarm system, the presence of two armed deputies and the proximity of so many sheriff's men in the building are more than sufficient to deal with ordinary risks. Certainly no additional permanent installations are justified under the short time remaining in the Court's occupancy.

In the case of extraordinary circumstances which present an above normal potential for a security threat, proper advance notice of upcoming volatile cases should be arranged by the Court Administrator. At present, there does not appear to be a system of security management which generates this type of information in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. A future study should be conducted to determine the role and scope of such a system (see below). Once advance notice has been made, it should be then decided how the arraignment is to be conducted (public or limited audience).

C. MOTT BUILDING

1. Major Problem Areas

a. Public Access: Public access to the second floor of the Mott Building, via public elevator and three fire stairs, is literally uncontrolled. The fire stairs appear to be capable of being travelled in both directions, that is, for both ingress and egress. The locking system on fire doors to permit egress only does not appear to be operative. This means that an individual can enter and leave the second floor without being observed.



partitions can be moved, conflicting circulation patterns may be analysed as follows:

- courtroom visitor circulation
- detainee circulation
- welfare circulation

However, due to the general density of office and courtroom development, this would involve major space reorganizations which would not be justifiable in terms of the costs and reshuffling involved and the short term benefits thereby gained.

D. NEW CUYAHOGA COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER

1. Findings

Field preparation for this report included a three hour combination briefing and walking tour of the new facility under construction, specifically the Courts Tower and the Corrections Building, as well as a thorough study of the plans and drawings of the building. A great deal of safety and security analysis has been included in this complex, including separate horizontal and vertical circulation systems for:

- the public
- judiciary
- detainees

A discussion of this circulation system is included (below) as is a chart of the elevator systems.

In addition to these measures, provisions have been made for TV surveillance of the public areas, as well as a series of communication and control centers inter-related throughout the complex.

2. Recommendations


a. Public Access: Notwithstanding the provision for TV Monitors and control equipment, no measures have been entertained to screen the public entering the building. While vertical transportation for judiciary, public and detainee have been separated, eventually all three must come together in the courtroom. Likewise, certain features of the plan indicate that the horizontal circulation patterns in the courtroom floors that meticulously separate public and judiciary may be vulnerable to a breach of security (see Interior Circulation below).

For these reasons further thought and planning should be given to consider placing "stewards" in all entrance lobbies, covering elevator and escalator entrances. These individuals would surveil incoming visitors, would have facilities for searching briefcases and parcels, either physically or electronically and would have metal detectors in ensure that no weapons are taken into the facility.

Care should be exercised to ensure that a hostile environment is not created at the entrances to the facility.

b. Training: The extremely large and complex Justice Center has a sophisticated array of safety and security measures incorporated in its interior environment. In order to optimize the investment, and to provide as safe a facility as possible, the personnel responsible for monitoring security should be trained to completely understand the intent of the protective devices and spatial separations that form the basis for the design of the complex.

c. Vertical Circulation: Like the architects for the original Criminal Courts Building, the designers of this facility have incorporated a system of independent elevators for public and prisoner.



unused corridor, out of normal visual field, an out-of-the-way corner allowing an individual plenty of time to force the lock or await an accomplice to open the door from the inside.

Item 2, as noted on Typical Plan for levels 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, points to a fire door which permits passage from the public area into the judicial corridor and over to a fire stair. Normally, this door would have "panic" hardware on the public side which allows entry in case of emergency. Since such a set-up would violate security, the architects received permission to have a lock placed on the door, to be opened only in case of fire by the staff member occupying the control point in the lounge. This arrangement could endanger the lives of the public who must rely on the courage of a humble security guard to remain at his post in case of fire, select the proper key, insert it into the proper lock and open a locked fire door, all the while accompanied by a horde of panic-stricken patrons. Although this apparently has been approved by the local building and fire departments, it should be noted that

- a) Locked fire doors are self-defeating
- b) Fire and liability insurance underwriters will probably not allow this condition to stand.

Item 3, as noted on typical floor plan for levels 13 through 23, inclusive refers to the potential security problem where a fire door connects the judge and jury elevator lobby to a public telephone lobby. The problem of an unobserved forced entry is similar to that discussed in Item 1 above.

Item 4, as noted on typical floor plan for levels 13 through 23 inclusive, is again a minor detail in the overall scheme but is important relative to the concern over the "availability" of judges in their chambers. The door connecting the judges' chambers to the corridor could provide opportunity for an individual, once having entered the secure corridor system, to enter and leave the chamber without ever being observed. Omission of the door would remove this potential. If this is not feasible, the door might be equipped with hardware that permits egress from the chamber while prohibiting ingress.

E. COURTS MANAGEMENT

1. Relevance to Court Security

The primary focus of this study has been upon manpower, hardware or architectural responses to reduce the risks of personal or property damage in court operations. All of this attention is appropriate; however, hardware and manpower solutions are only one dimension in the range of responses to security that are available to the Court, and if this one limited response is not carefully controlled, the desire for an almost hygienically controlled courthouse security environment may well overwhelm the natural need for dignity, tranquillity and impartiality in our courts.

2. Recommendations

a. Management and Security: A set of security measures should be developed that will include not only hardware, architectural and manpower solutions but also a broader systems management approach to security problems. In its simplest form security is a matter of

probability. The more cases a judge hears, the more people flowing in and out of the building, the more interaction between public and judge, juror or defendant, the heightened likelihood of violence or theft. A management view of this situation suggests that there may be ways to reduce this probability by

- a) reducing the sheer volume of defendants and cases
- b) developing a knowledge base about traffic flow, defendant personalities, case background, etc.
- c) structuring a security program around a growing knowledge base.

A management strategy to security problems is attractive because it holds the promise of using operational knowledge to supplement, although not supplant, field measures. Insofar as this strategy supplements these other measures it may help to keep personnel costs down by maximizing the effectiveness of these measures. If field measures can be maximized and improved as time progresses, proliferation of personnel and hardware can be confined and thereby the proper milieu for justice retained.

Following are recommendations for management strategies dealing with security.

b. Centralized Handling of Security Requests: A personal docket system has been recently introduced. Under this system each judge, operating out of the same courtroom, handles a mix of criminal and civil cases. Each criminal case is assigned one deputy automatically. In case additional security is required, each judge must individually make his request to the sheriff.

It is recommended that all requests for security, regular or extra, be managed by a single office. Because of the irregularity of case calendaring even normal requests for deputies may have very little advance notice. A central manager for requests would do the following:

- a) act as permanent liaison with the Sheriff's Department
- b) expedite security requests
- c) develop a "security pool" of deputies on a regular daily basis, from which requests could be met. This requires developing and interpreting some data on security requests to determine size of the pool on a given day.
- d) monitor judges' personal calendar so as to anticipate requests.

c. Pre-trial Services: The Court should seriously consider and examine the establishment of a range of Pre-Trial Services, one goal of which would be to increase security measures. For the purposes of security, this program would provide:

1. Diagnosis and Classification, aimed at flagging the severely disturbed or criminally insane category of prisoner whose behavior in a stressful courtroom situation might be dangerous. The need for elaborate diagnostic work-ups along the medical model are no longer generally considered valid for general detention population, but some gross testing mechanism to identify the small group that could potentially explode under courtroom stress would accomplish the purposes of this service.

2. Diversion Programs, to reduce the flow into the Criminal Justice System and avoid the costs of detention, are quite widespread. Diversion programs intervene in the normal flow of events to channel off offenders awaiting trial and/or in lieu of trial. Reduction in the number of cases coming to trial is one form of control over the sheer volume of traffic in court. Offenders eligible for these programs are by definition not charged with crimes of violence, so their elimination from the courthouse does not lessen the security risk per se.

d. Public Steward Program: As part of this report's recommendations for the three existing court sites and for the new Justice Center, the use of trained personnel to maintain surveillance and control at the main access points to these buildings has been proposed. These personnel should be civilian employees, not law enforcement personnel, hired directly by the County Commissioner or Court Administrator. They should be responsible to the Court Administrator. Their job function should be to serve as reception and control agents. Their tasks might include:

- o Providing information to public entering building
- o Monitoring flow of people entering and leaving premises
- o Examining briefcases, packages, etc., either manually or with X-ray type machinery.
- o Searching for weapons, either with a walk-through device or a hand-held scanner.

The actual job functions of the Public Steward should be worked out by the Court Administrator. The variety and severity of measures employed could vary according to conditions. For example, a volatile trial could be isolated on a particular floor; general precautions at the main entry would then be increased while access to the floor would be

limited with all visitors searched for weapons.

o Public stewards can be either male or female. The use of women in quasi-security personnel has the distinct advantage of eliciting less hostile reactions from males and of being less likely to threaten a male into overreacting.

o Public stewards can also be used to advantage in other areas of the court building, for example, in Probation Department and Court Clerk.

o Stewards should be uniformed for easy recognition.

o Recruitment and training of Public Stewards should begin as early as possible in order to have a cadre of personnel who will have had experience in the existing sites ready to begin operations in the new Justice Center.

e. Security Knowledge Base: A key part of a security management system is the development of a knowledge base upon which to build planning and operational decisions in the future. Imposition of increased personnel and hardware will have value only insofar as they meet an assumed need. The purpose of creating a knowledge base is to provide a more precise picture of the need and assist in its solution.

A study might be undertaken to identify the following types of data relevant to security planning:

- o number of visitors/day
- o number of visitors/courtroom
- o number of total visitors to a case
- o number and types of incidents

① number and types of persons involved

① correlation of incidents to variables

- time

- location in building

- type of case associated with


- method of solution

- security personnel involved.

These data can be used as a guide to future planning relating, for example, to the location of additional equipment, the placement of security personnel, regulating location and shifts of such personnel, determining whether personnel are being used efficiently, and what types of personnel are most effective in various situations.

The Courts Tower of the new Justice Center is a twenty-three story building with 30,000 square feet of space per floor, totaling 690,000 square feet. At this level of magnitude the provision of security becomes a complex and demanding operation, far removed from the small scale concerns now facing the courts.

While the planners and managers of the new facility have incorporated some of the latest safety and security devices, the issue of managing these resources and the personnel that go with them still has not been breached. Development of a knowledge base will be founded on the collection of feedback from the operation of planned systems.





should be based on a process that replaces hunches, perceptions and rumors with data and knowledge. Incidents of security breaches will have to be analyzed and responded to carefully in the context of the vast operation underway. The collection and analysis of security data on a yearly basis will form the basis for annual planning and allocation of scarce security resources.

The development of a security management system would take steps toward analyzing the background of incidents and devising strategies to reduce to an acceptable level the element of risk for all participants, although no security system can reduce to zero the element of risk.

APPENDICES


- A. CUYAHOGA COUNTY COURT BUILDING
- B. CRIMINAL COURTS BUILDING- SECOND FLOOR
- C. CRIMINAL COURTS BUILDING- THIRD FLOOR
- D. JAIL INTAKE PROCESS: CUYAHOGA COUNTY JAIL
- E. MOTT BUILDING: SECOND FLOOR
- F. CUYAHOGA COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER
 - (1) Courts Tower, Level 7
 - (2) Courts Tower, Level 18
 - (3) Security Elevator Systems





CRIMINAL COURTS BUILDING


2ND FLOOR



CRIMINAL COURTS BUILDING

3RD FLOOR

APPENDIX D



JAIL INTAKE
PROCESS
CUYAHOGA CO. JAIL

Floor	User	JUDICIARY	PUBLIC	DETAINEEES	Access	Holding Area	Security Vestibule	Correction Center	Attorney Conference
P-1	P-1	*	*						
P-2	P-2	*	*						
Mezzanine	Muny Clerk Corrections Police	*	*						
1		*	*		*	*	*		
2		*	*		*	*	*		
3	Police Corrections	*	*		*	*	*	*	
4	Tower	*	*		*	*	*		
5	Probation	*	*		*	*	*		
6	Prosecuting Attorney	*	*		*	*	*		
7	same	*	*		*	*	*		
8	County Court	*	*		*	*	*		
9	Administration	*	*		*	*	*		
10		*	*		*	*	*		
11		*	*		*	*	*		
12		*	*		*	*	*		
13-23	COURT ROOMS	*	*		*	*	*		*

SECURITY ELEVATOR SYSTEMS
NEW JUSTICE CENTER

END

7 ables/m