

WINSTON CHURCHILL MEMORIAL TRUST

**Criminal Surveillance and
Organised Crime in the
United States of America 1975**

By

**Detective Sergeant Richard Blakeley
West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police**

37860

MINUTE SHEET

Reference _____

Subject

Station Special Branch..... Date 13th October 1976.....

CRIMINAL SURVEILLANCE
& ORGANISED CRIME.

Dear Sir,


This short explanatory note may be of assistance to you in evaluating the attached report.

The report is divided into two parts. Part 1 deals with Criminal Surveillance, Part 2 with Organised Crime.

Part 1 is projected at producing criminal surveillance theory and techniques of benefit to police departments throughout the world.

Part 2 is a study of criminal aspects in an organised form already encountered by American police agencies. By dissemination of American experiences I have attempted to cover possible future criminal trends which may affect us. This section is in no way intended to portray the Organised Crime scene in the United States of America.

For obvious reasons certain information regarding Criminal Surveillance is not included in the report, but such information would be given in answer to questions received from a department of your security standing.


Detective Sergeant.

CRIMINAL SURVEILLANCE AND ORGANISED CRIME

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

I N D E X

NCJPS

NOV 19 1976

ACQUISITIONS

- i. Accomplishment of Project
- ii. Finance
- iii. Advice to Future Fellows
- iv. Letters of Appreciation
- v. Dissemination of Experience

	<u>Pages</u>
Introduction	1 - 5
 <u>PART I</u>	
Selection of Personnel	6 - 10
Training of Personnel	10 - 16
Foot Surveillance	16
Vehicles	17 - 24
Motor Cycles	25
Special Equipment	26 - 32
Aerial Surveillance	32 - 37
Ethics	38 - 40
 <u>PART II</u>	
Organised crime	41 - 50
 <u>Conclusion</u>	
	51 - 53
 <u>Appendix 'A' - Itinerary</u>	
	54 - 62

(i)

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROJECT

My purpose was primarily to study criminal surveillance methods and techniques, I also examined the new concepts of organised crime likely to be perpetrated in our own country and the means being used to fight the same by American law enforcement agencies.

My choice in visiting the United States was because of their greater crime problem than ours and their financial expenditure for police experimental purposes being a generous one giving them greater scope to progress quickly. Crime knows no boundaries and it is essential that we are aware of any crime or criminal organisation whose trends may affect us in the near future.

The following is a broad outline of my itinerary, a full itinerary is set out in Appendix 'A' :-

United States of America
1975

21st May - 25th May	Washington, Virginia.
26th May - 31st May	New York. (Boston omitted due to race riots)
1st June - 14th June	Detroit, Michigan.
15th June - 18th June	Chicago, Illinois.
19th June - 26th June	Kansas City, Kansas.
27th June - 30th June	San Francisco, California.
1st July - 13th July	Los Angeles, California.
14th July - 15th July	Las Vegas, Nevada.
16th July - 19th July	Albuquerque, New Mexico.
20th July to 22nd July	Austin, Texas.
23rd July - 26th July	Houston, Texas.
27th July - 1st August	Albuquerque, New Mexico.

(ii.)

FINANCE

By our standards, the cost of living in North America is high. Hotels are expensive in the commercial areas, but most of my studies were in such areas and therefore any saving made by staying out of town was consumed by travelling.

Hotels and motels were similar rates and therefore tended to use hotels because of their convenient additional services. I intended to use the forward booking service, but due to my hosts arranging my advance accommodation from city to city I did not use it. I would however recommend this service which ensures one of accommodation at a known standard within the allowance granted to fellows not as fortunate as myself. I did however, have to stipulate the type of accommodation I required, having been booked in at a luxury hotel outside my budget by one well meaning police officer.

Food can soon consume a great part of the daily allowance, especially when dining at hotels. By using drug stores and take-aways, it was easier to stay within the budget whilst maintaining a fair standard of cuisine.

Since my return I have received and given great benefit whilst using slides for lecture purposes. The camera provided by the trust was invaluable for recording pointed matters for use in both police lectures and lectures on the American way of life to outside organisations. The potential of slides has always impressed me as an aide to instruction and mainly due to this I spent my generous allowance of £20 on film and more besides. The money coming from slight savings made out of daily subsistence.

(iii)

Advice to Future Fellows

Laundry and dry cleaning are very expensive items and because of the excessive heat could prove expensive. Clothing, wherever possible, should be of the 'non-iron' type. I purchased, in America, a travelling iron for four dollars and found this invaluable particularly for taking creases out of clothing coming directly from the suit case.

I travelled by air all the time due to my journeys between cities being long ones. This mode of travel saved me a great deal of time and discomfort. Because of the reliability of the service I was able to plan my arrangements punctually and in advance. A plastic suit carrier which is a cheap item and can be bought in any large store was an asset. I was able to take this into the cabin of the 'plane and place it on a provided rack without folding.

The advice given to me by the Director-General and the travel agents to use open air tickets was sound advice which facilitated direct entry to flights without queing or delays.

On occasions it was not possible to meet the person with whom I had originally corresponded, but due to the nature of my studies I was able to find or be met by a suitable, if not better, deputy. On reflection of this point it would be advisable for fellows whose itinerary is not so flexible to have a reserve list in case of some unforeseen circumstance.

(iv)

Letters of Appreciation

The following persons were of particular help to me during my visit and it would be appreciated if letters of thanks from The Trust could be forwarded to each of them. This appreciation extends through them to their respective departments. I have sent letters of thanks to persons who assisted me in Britain or my host country.

1. Roger T. Castonguay,
Liaison Officer,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Headquarters,
Washington DC.
2. James A. Mull,
Detective Lieutenant,
Intelligence Section,
Michigan State Police,
Detroit.
3. James D. Elroy,
Inspector,
Bureau of Administration,
Kansas City Police,
Kansas.
4. John E. Truax,
Special Agent,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
11000 Wilshire Boulevard,
West Los Angeles,
California.

(v)

Dissemination of experience

On being awarded the Fellowship I had requests from magazines, national and local press, local BBC radio and regional commercial and BBC television for interviews and articles.

Since my return these have been repeated and I have undertaken talks regarding the social side of my visit to numerous organisations outside the Police Force.

The subject itself is one that can be classed as being politically volatile and for this reason careful selection in the acceptance of outside lectures has to be made.

Copies of my report are to be forwarded to the Chief Constable of my Force, the West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police, for his attention and suitable direction, and to the Home Office.

Report of Study Tour
of the
United States of America
as a Churchill Fellow

1975

CRIMINAL SURVEILLANCE and ORGANISED CRIME

20th May to 2nd August 1975

The study tour was made possible by the courtesy of the Winston Churchill Travelling Fellowship to whom I express my grateful thanks.

I wish also to express my gratitude to the West Yorkshire Metropolitan Police Authority for allowing me leave of absence to undertake this project and to the Chief Constable, Mr. R. Gregory, QPM, for his encouragement.

My gratitude also to the following, and the persons listed in my itinerary, for their hospitality and assistance,

Mr. W. R. Young, Assistant Director,
Independent Commission against Corruption,
Hong Kong.
(Former Regional Co-ordinator, No. 3
Regional Crime Squad HQ, Wakefield)

Mr. A. Macrae,
American Embassy, London.

Mr. J. A. Mull,
Michigan Police Intelligence Unit, Detroit.

Mr. C. Bloom,
F.B.I., Albuquerque, New Mexico,

and to all the members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States of America.

INTRODUCTION

In Great Britain criminal surveillance is a method of police work that is becoming more and more a major instrument in police armoury to combat crime.

Whilst surveillance has been used for many years in different ways and for different means it has not in the past been treated in a professional manner or received the acclaim it deserves in its own right to warrant the study of the subject, the training of selected personnel and the financial support required to operate at maximum capability.

Fortunately in the past few years senior police officers have begun to realise the need and the full potential value of criminal surveillance and whilst the present schools of thought are heading in the right direction it is still not at a pace or in a manner to obtain the full benefits and results of this detection method.

In Part I of this semi-manual I have tried to deal completely with surveillance incorporating many of the methods at present in use in this country along with what I consider to be new and more positive thinking about the subject (this includes equipment and aids to surveillance).

Some of these methods are in direct conflict with present day legislation, but I feel to omit them would be wrong. I have therefore included them along with ethical considerations and reasons why present legislation should be re-appraised for the use of such methods to make them legal, professionally correct and/or admissable in evidence.

A large proportion of the information contained in Part I is common sense, but I know from personal instructional experience that police officers have the habit of forgetting the basic fundamentals during the crucial times of a surveillance operation and I therefore make no apology that I stress over and over again in Part I the need for selected trained personnel who are continually working together.

Part II deals with organised crime. This is not a study of the Cosa Nostra (Mafia), I have however tried to concentrate on new developments in crime trends by professional criminals and ethnic groups as opposed to family organisations which could affect our country. In particular I have examined the field of disposal of proceeds from crime and possible means of off-setting such types of operation.

Upon encountering this evaluation the reader may, and quite rightly so, observe that some of our present day legislation is not formulated to empower police and other enforcement officers to fight criminals perpetrating the type of crimes and operations laid out.

This matter is clearly in the hands of the legislators, but from my observations of American crime and its rapid professional growth of recent years without it being decelerated or contained to any acceptable degree the need for new laws to be introduced or existing ones to be strengthened is an immediate requirement.

In the United States the need for and benefits of trained surveillance personnel is truly recognized and used by police departments throughout the country.

Great emphasis is placed upon the efficiency of a surveillance officer and his team and a large amount of time and money is spent on research and evaluation of equipment and methods.

Primarily police forces and the F.B.I. divide their surveillance requirements into two groups. The first group are specifically surveillance teams. The officers of these teams work together daily doing no other employment than that of surveilling the present subject(s) allocated to them. At the same time methodically and chronologically recording any event that can be connected with the subject. (The extent of their workings will be brought out in Part I) This particular group of surveillance teams do not become involved in arrests of their subject(s) or any other activity which will uncover their identity as a police officer.

The second group are again a well trained unit, but working within a selective branch of police work i.e. narcotic, robbery and stolen vehicle squads etc. These units differ in the fact that surveillance is only part of their work and not a total commitment and they do make arrests and court appearances. In doing so they do not maintain the low profile of a 'full-time' surveillance team. This detriment is off-set by the situation that most of the postings to these squads are short term secondments very similar to our own terms of reference.

Of course squads as mentioned would be better with a unit engaged fully on surveillance, but even in the United States the point arrives when monetary consideration takes priority.

Having pointed out the two types of surveillance groups one can appreciate that the purely surveillance unit due to its amassed experience by keeping the same officers together (promotions tend to be for the majority within the unit) . The knowledge of each others reactions in addition to the continuous research and training and equipment available to them, plus their techniques with this equipment makes them superior to their squad contemporaries.

Because of this difference in effective operative skill when a department, for example a drug squad, which has its own surveillance unit, is carrying out an operation of any magnitude or importance requiring surveillance they invariably request and use the services of their Police Departments surveillance squad.

In conclusion, the requirement of a complete trained squad is better portrayed in kidnapping and other hostage situations where surveillance is required, but where detection of their presence could mean physical harm to themselves, and most important of all, to the hostage.

PART ISelection of Personnel

The majority of police surveillance teams at present being used in the United Kingdom are completely comprised of detective officers. This fact is brought about by the practical aspect in that surveillance is used primarily in cases dealt with by detectives. However, when selecting personnel for an effective full time operational surveillance unit many other points should be considered.

The officer selected must basically be patient by nature, a fact which rules out many good detectives by reason that they often tend to make things happen as opposed to waiting and observing things that do occur, enthusiastic and self confident.

Because of the patience factor, policewomen usually make good surveillance officers particularly on static surveillance operations.

An operative should be intelligent, alert and capable of making quick analytical decisions with confidence because he and he alone will be in charge of the surveillance team at some stage of the operation.

In recent years the argument has been put forward that older officers or "hippie" looking probationers are the ideal type for surveillance work, reasoning that they do not stand out as police officers. Of course it is a major point that surveillance personnel do not give the impression of being police officers, but older men do not usually have the reflexes or the strength mentally or physically required for this type of work unless they have been trained to it at an earlier stage in their career and retained in this field of work. This fact is not applicable in the United Kingdom due to the infancy of surveillance teams.

Studies in the United States show that concentration, the prime factor, decreases rapidly from the age of 45 years in the average persons.

A probationary constable is ideal, from the point of view of being young and enthusiastic and capable of blending, but these attributes are outweighed in most cases in that their inexperience renders them incapable of reading people and situations quickly and correctly. Again considering the fact that at some stage they would be in total command of an operation.

On formulating his team or squad the officer empowered with selection on knowing the establishment allowed should build his unit on the basic points mentioned. Having considered these points he can then go on to build a diversified force from this nucleus to meet further requirements.

Further requirements include selecting personnel with special knowledge, trades or traits (i.e. mechanics, electrician, pilot, photographer, etc) who can be encompassed within the team to meet the situations liable to be encountered in the area which the selection officer proposes to operate them.

It also includes having within the unit operatives from which you can select to place into any situation or environment. This means from being able to supply a bank manager to a miner, a vicar to an Irish labourer, in total the team leader requires "Actors" who between them can portray all parts and play them well in good or low class areas in a manner like the chameleon to fit the occasion.

Knowing what it required is the easy part, to obtain all the requirements in three or four men is impossible. Therefore because a team will normally contain three men, four at the most, and perhaps two or three teams to a squad. The selection officer or Squad commander must give every consideration and spend time carefully planning the balance of the officers working for him to meet the needs of the requests made upon the services of his unit.

The mentality of the officer chosen to command the unit should be carefully screened. The very nature of surveillance work at times leads to intense frustration both of individual officers and teams. This can be brought about for a number of reasons, the predominant ones being long hours of work without any immediate success, or having successfully obtained the information required to secure an arrest or conviction, to stay in the background watching other people obtain results and glory from the information you have handed to them.

This is particularly so in cases of public interest when praise is bestowed on the arresting officers through the various medias. We all have our ego.

Before the commencement of days work or an operation it is the duty of the commanding officer to ensure that he speaks with his men individually and abstract the thoughts of his men. This is to enable him to eliminate any worry or doubts the officer may have, because when one considers that a man sitting alone in a vehicle for eight hours plus with nothing to do but think, what at the beginning of the day was a molehill of a problem or worry becomes a mountain. If this is so that man is unable to give of his best to the matter at hand.

Training of Personnel

The departments within the United Kingdom who utilise surveillance teams invariably use the methods handed down by the security services with very little alteration. These methods are indeed a fine basis, but, because of the infancy of the subject and lack of experience, including the best police tutors, there has been very little experiment, adaptation or innovation of these basic methods. Instructors are adhering to the "text" as they know it and to the text only therefore remaining stagnant.

In contrast to this throughout the United States from state to state and force to force ways and means of carrying out a surveillance are different as are the instruction techniques. This is also a poor situation because of the lack of co-ordination between the forces of knowledge and ideas.

Despite seeing a number of different approaches to training surveillance officers of which most have some merit, to my mind there are two systems superior to the remainder.

The first system is basically the one at present in use in this country whereby the surveillance trainee learns his trade whilst attending and participating in a specially conducted course. This course being made up of lectures and mock surveillance exercises.

The second system which I personally favour is to take the apprentice officer and enrol him into a qualified surveillance team engaged in genuine operations and build on this allowing him to develop his own ideas within and alongside the surveillance fraternity. This includes officers from the types of departments mentioned who practice surveillance but not on a full time basis.

By attaching a man to a totally committed fully trained operative unit working in the field an officer is able to pick up the basic aspects and also the initiative and adaptability to make himself a good professional operator and more important in time capable of forming his own unit.

I have not thought it necessary to outline the basic general principles already adopted in this country assuming that the reader will be or have acquainted himself with them. However, I shall endeavour to promote alternatives and additions to these basic points, some of which are in direct conflict with these basics.

Throughout the United Kingdom the instructional advice given on radio procedure during a surveillance operation is to use short cryptic messages. General conversation and the use of code are not encouraged. These were exactly my own sentiments but which were completely changed on seeing a number of squads use code with speed, ease and total efficiency.

The Americans have a great problem caused by the ease with which the general public can obtain sophisticated radio equipment capable of receiving police radio calls on all wave lengths. Because of this the police surveillers have adopted a code system which can only be deciphered by the men actually out on the surveillance. Neither the target sitting at home listening for messages or even the police radio controller are able to de-code these fluctuating but skilful messages.

The mechanics of the code are based on relative name associations with buildings, roads, sites etc. For example, if the subject was travelling along Windsor Avenue, then turned into Cadbury Street and stopped for the traffic lights before moving on and negotiating a roundabout leaving by the second exit, the message would sound something like "Up the Castle (Windsor), Roger (right) at the chocolate bar (Cadbury) held at a ruby (red light) two at carousel (roundabout).

Obviously this message would be slightly different from another officer within the team but the word associations for that case could only mean the same directions and it is these variances that protect the code.

I know there will be many who immediately scoff at this suggestion and object to it mainly on the grounds that the messages are not specific in content and open to anomalies. However when used by officers continually working together it soon becomes instinctive and despite my own scepticism that mistakes would be made by wrong interpretation this was not so.

I have experimented with this system since my return to England and found it to be 100% effective and preferred by other officers who took part in the experiment. The adaptation took very little time and officers stated that it stimulated them and improved their concentration.

Officers adopting this system are given code names, usually animals or birds in order to identify the receiver or sender of the message. A name is also given to the target and any vehicles which it is known he owns or has access to, are individually listed and given a number so that by consulting the list one may identify to other members of the team, who are out of visual contact, what vehicle the target is using instead of reading the registration mark over the air. This numbering system can also be used for property which the target owns or anything else which may be referred to often, particularly where a lengthy surveillance is anticipated.

Major routes and roads which are travelled with any regularity are given code words. For example, the M1 may be called anything from "giant" to "Mickey Mouse", providing the team instantly identify the "loci" the aim is achieved.

Whilst our radio system is not infiltrated to the extent of the American Police, the professional criminal is capable of and does listen to our police broadcasts including the safer frequencies such as the Crime Squad car to car installation. Because of this fact and in the event of a breakdown on one of the more secure channels it is my submission that the code system has more to offer in its adoption than the one presently in use. It also cuts down on the need for expensive radio equipment.

Should direct instructional training be given as against actual operational participation a great deal can be gained from the use of video tape in recording the ploys used on surveillance and to highlight the mistakes made by officers during training. It is an excellent aid in educating the potential agent and bringing home to him the matters that would also stand out to the criminal. It is also advantageous in taking recordings of a trained team and indicating the finer points of good surveillance.

Members of any surveillance team should be trained to the police standard of advanced driving. A man or woman working alone concentrating on maintaining contact with the target in addition to passing radio messages and keeping a low profile along with driving safely is a mammoth task. A task which can only be reduced if the driving is instinctive but safe. A further factor being that at times one reaches high road speeds and the officer should feel confident of handling such speeds. Being taught how to commentate when driving also helps when passing messages at speed.

Having selected the personnel to build your unit upon the previously mentioned trades, traits must be utilised to the maximum. Every officer within the team should be trained to operate basic photographic equipment. In the case of the sophisticated equipment an officer having the aptitude should receive further training.

All agents require basic instruction on the maintenance of the radio equipment which they will use. Where possible selection of a person with radio or electronic knowledge is invaluable. Mechanical knowledge is to be desired within the team. Obviously one can go on indefinitely to build on this training format, but it is with such thoughts in mind that the efficient independent squad will be born.

Foot Surveillance

In the majority, the Americans adopt the "leap frog" method, that is to say, three men all on the same side of the road as the target and altering position at intervals. In no way does it compare with the efficiency of the A.R.C system at present in use in this country.

For maintaining radio contact whilst on foot most of their units use a small compact radio with a throat microphone. This radio is concealed on the person before the commencement of any surveillance. Completely different and far better than our method of having a spare radio in the car and then nearly rupturing one's self trying to hurriedly conceal it on our person when the subject unexpectedly leaves his car. Professional ?

Vehicles

The most important tool of the surveillance craftsman is his vehicle. Without a reliable means of transport capable of dealing with the situation or surroundings no matter how good and professional the man, the advantage is lost.

More consideration and evaluation is given by the Americans to choice of vehicle than any other factor in the surveillance world. Obviously they are not restricted financially to the extent of the British Police, but this must surely be an additional factor why we should be even more selective in the choice of our vehicles.

No longer can we allocate or use vehicles which are the same type as the other police fleet vehicles. This method gives negative results and therefore defeats the penny saving logic by working out more costly in manpower alone.

A further advantage the American police have is that confiscated vehicles do not necessarily have to be sold, but can if suitable for any police purpose be retained for such use. It goes without saying how advantageous this can be and the amount of money saved. Comparing it with our own system where vehicles are usually sold by auction or tender and the monies being paid into the Police Fund. If legislation could be introduced or existing acts amended to allow us to keep any such confiscated vehicle (this applies to keeping a vehicle for use by any branch of the police service).

We also would benefit practically and financially. Having acquired a vehicle in this manner giving it a new identity to fit the requisites of the receptive department would be at very little cost.

The colour of a vehicle is most important. It must be one that blends with other vehicles and the habitat of where it is to be used. Bright and unusual colours soon register with a person who is not surveillance conscious and will automatically stand out to a person who is.

Pastel shades combine with surroundings better than most. Vinyl roofs, fancy stripes and other additional features all increase the chances of the vehicle having a separate identity which is what we are trying to avoid. This also applies to other fittings, roof racks, spot lamps and like extras, particularly when placed on the front of the vehicle which in the majority is the most the target should see of your vehicle.

These extras tend to give the car a 'face' which may after seeing that 'face' on separate occasions, consciously or sub-consciously give the target reason for suspicion.

Make of vehicle is important. If one was to use a Rolls Royce, whilst the suspect under surveillance would not at the beginning give any thought to a Rolls being connected with the Police, the mere fact that it is a Rolls Royce stands out to the suspect and continuous sightings of the car will eventually register and transmit warning signals to him. So expensive or rare motor cars or other such vehicles are out. However the point that the criminal would not associate such a vehicle with the police is an important one.

We can build on this point by accepting that the policy of the Home Office and Police Chiefs is to buy British vehicles even though 60% of the cars sold in Britain at the moment are foreign made vehicles. This leaves us with vehicles that are far from being bonded with the police, with the bonus of being unobtrusive.

A surveillance vehicle will require to have good acceleration and top speed. This is necessary for keeping up with the target, catching up with the target having been delayed or having to turn off and also to avoid the target should it be necessary. Most professional criminals especially the travellers, like a large fast vehicle and if one is to follow such in a vehicle that is requiring all your concentration just to keep up with the target then other important considerations to the surveillance will suffer.

Automatic transmissions are superior to manual gear shifts. They allow the officer to have one hand free which is often important when travelling in traffic congested areas. It allows him to do and operate things with less danger and effort even if it's only to eat a sandwich. An important asset to back the argument of one person per vehicle.

Registration plates are to be selected and not just accepted under the normal allocation procedure. They should not be consecutive numbers, i.e. ACX 456L or letters that are liable to attract attention, i.e. FOP 173L.

Whilst working one's own area it is better to use a local registration again for the reason that one foreign to that area is more likely to show out. One set of ghost plates and appropriate documents are to be carried in each vehicle for the reverse reason. Having followed someone out of his own area he is going to start thinking if he sees registration plates from his own area.

For night surveillance the vehicle is to be equipped so that by operating a switch or switches in the interior of the vehicle one can alter the cars appearance. This can be done by having a side light go out or headlamp, or both, in whatever combination is required. This adaptation is easily and quickly made at no cost. By doing this three cars over a period can be utilised to give the impression of having had 15 to 20 cars. This switch system is successfully used in cutting out the reversing lights when required, again taking very little time or cost to complete.

Static vehicles used as observation points require to be self-contained and whilst not having good top speed or acceleration must be quite mobile. They again have to blend with the surroundings more so because of the length of time they have to remain in one place.

No hard and fast rules can be laid down on the exterior of this type of vehicle, local environment will dictate what is required.

From an observation vehicle it should be possible to view outside with ease and impossible for someone to view inside. Whereas we tend to set up an observation post and operate it on a shift system, thus having to take men to and from the vehicle and in doing so drawing attention, if not to the subject, to the local inhabitants.

The American system is to use small campers, already commercially converted, caravans or large vans and fit them out themselves. By using vehicles which have their own beds, cooking facilities, etc they can eat and sleep in the vehicle keeping a continuous vigil upon the subject.

The fittings should also include a multi-channel radio, maps and writing surface for logging events.

The American forces allocate a vehicle to one particular officer which includes allowing the officer to keep the vehicle at his home.

By making avail of this procedure one can make the full use of the potential mentioned in the sections on selection and training of personnel. By this a man is able to stock his vehicle with his own needs, clothing, binoculars, minocular, toiletries etc and also that equipment of his speciality. In the case of a mechanic his tools and minor parts for the vehicles in his team, water hoses, jubilee clips, bulbs, oil etc.

The picture building up to make a competent team ready to travel at any time at the shortest possible notice. In this country allocating one car to one man would be utopia, but most forces would be reluctant to do this putting forward the financial drawback of a car not being used full time.

The argument against this is that the surveillance unit is a highly specialised team which would gain from less rather than more use of a vehicle and again we must think about the long term gain. If it is not practicable to allocate one car per man then we must take it to the next stage and have the same man from each team (on a shift system) using a particular vehicle. Thereby enabling the officer to leave his equipment in that vehicle and not having to be continually transferring equipment.

The offices used by a squad including garaging facilities, if not keeping the vehicles at home, must be completely separate from any other police establishment or connection. Vehicles should not fill up with petrol at police establishments. This could be averted by issuing credit cards which are also of tremendous value when on surveillance in other parts of the country to one's own area.

Every surveillance squad I evaluated in America had at least one taxi in its fleet in New York City where there are more taxis than private cars. Consequently 90% of the surveillance fleet are taxis. When one stands back and analyses the role of a taxi thinking in terms of a London type cab its functions and capabilities are endless.

It can drop a man anywhere without drawing suspicion, remain static for lengthy periods without attracting attention and following immediately behind suspects in city and town areas with great scope. This type of vehicle is a must if we are craving for perfection.

In kidnap cases when following the person making the drop the taxi has been used in more successful criminal captures than any other method in the United States. It is a vehicle with which a team commander can use his imagination with endless limitations.

In allocating a vehicle to a person it is just as important that the man is right for the vehicle as the vehicle is right for the job. An operative dressed like a builders labourer shows out like a sore thumb driving something like a Rover 2000, and vice versa with the pin stripe suit, bowler hat type, driving a mini van.

Obviously this is common sense but the amount of times we try to do things like this or use vehicles and equipment that are totally wrong or inadequate for the job is alarming. We tend to look at our present surveillance teams with approbation, whereas the true picture is one of inadequacy that we are attempting to justify.

Other equipment carried in vehicles are magnetic signs which a large amount of commercial companies and small firms fit to the side of their vehicles. These are quickly taken off and put on a vehicle replacing one sign for another or leaving them off for varying intervals of time. Private hire signs (not suggested to replace the aforementioned London-type taxi) and other like signs can be fitted to the roofs, again with speed and ease.

Motor Cycles

The benefits gained by using motor cyclists for surveillance work in the United States varies from one extreme to the other.

In New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles and other such cities the motor cycle was given no or very little place in a surveillance team. This was basically due to the large amount of road accidents involving motor cycles, in such areas, a great many of which are fatalities. Because of this high accident factor the public at large tend to shy away from using motor cycles, thus causing a motor cyclist to draw attention to himself which is the thing a surveillance officer wants least.

However in the smaller cities and particularly places in the mid-west I found the exact opposite. Motor cyclists were an integral part of the surveillance machinery and because of their manoeuvrability and accelerative powers were highly successful.

Perhaps the greatest advantage the American surveillance motor cyclist has over his English counterpart is the reliability of his radio. Without good communication no surveillance team can function well. I have found that because of the bulkiness of the radio systems fitted to our motor cycles much of their reliability and effectiveness is lost in having to make adaptations to conceal them. The radios used on the American machines are small, light and efficient as are all other types of their radio equipment.

Special Equipment

The use of electronic devices by American law enforcement agencies is part of an everyday routine. Their laws in this respect are more liberal than ours and consequently a large field is open to commercial electronic companies which they have successfully cultivated. Because the market for this equipment is both large and varied, rivalry between firms creates competitive prices which benefit the police.

Despite the hospitality, public opinion being what it is there is no doubt that because of the present climate in the United States involving the use of certain 'eavesdropping' equipment both by the F.B.I. and C.I.A. the full range of electronic aids were not shown to me.

As stated in the opening introduction some procedures are not yet lawful in this country and this section deals with the majority of such procedures and equipment with hopeful suggestions that they will become lawful.

Perhaps the most commonly used piece of equipment is the surveillance receiver system, more commonly known as the mobile tracker. This is a method of surveillance by car or air using a receiver to identify the whereabouts of a suspect vehicle.

The signals are transmitted from a small power pack placed underneath the vehicle it is intended to surveil.

The pack can be powered by batteries or connected directly to the vehicle's electrical circuit. If powered by batteries usual effective life of radio messages is 72 hours. When attached to the electrical system continuous messages are transmitted. Both types of pack take less than a minute to connect. There are various ways to attach the transmitter, the most common being the clamp and magnetic type.

The transmitter itself is invariably less than the size of a pocket transmitter. Detection of the transmitter is only possible when specifically looking underneath a vehicle. There are no other tell-tale signs.

The receiver, like the transmitter, is very portable and easily and quickly installed into any vehicle or aeroplane. It consists of a cowl 12" x 4" x 4" which is mounted inside the designated tracking vehicle.

The cowl is wired to the vehicle's electrical circuit, most surveillance units have a socket-type installation in their vehicles ready to plug the receiver into. On the fascia of the cowl are two separate meters, one indicating the approximate distance the suspect vehicle is away from the receiver, the other indicating the direction of the vehicle.

The signals are collected by two antennae placed at an equal distance apart on the roof of the receiving vehicle, inside the cockpit in the case of aerial surveillance. Ground signals are effective up to a range of 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Six miles range can be expected with aerial surveillance.

This equipment can pin-point a vehicle which is stationary and in an underground car park in a busy city centre. It allows full surveillance of a suspect whilst maintaining complete absence from the criminals view. Whilst there are such similar devices in this country the size of both the transmitter and receiver make its use almost totally impracticable.

Further 'strings to the bow' of the mobile tracker are the benefits it gives in detecting thefts of loads and goods in transit. By placing the transmitter (which is cheap and dispensable) inside a parcel or load whether it be in a warehouse, on board a ship, aeroplane or wagon. From the time such parcel is moved the receiver will record that movement and indicate the direction of such movements.

The ease with which the receiver can be transported and erected in any type of vehicle or location alleviates many problems and substantially increased the usefulness of this technical aid.

Customs officers and British Transport Police would gain much by employing equipment of this nature.

Many American surveillance teams have a tape recorder connected to, and working when necessary in conjunction with, the radio network. This is because of the requirement to log correctly pieces of intelligence obtained during the surveillance. Many pieces of such information are gathered during a moving surveillance when it is not possible to immediately transcribe the data obtained.

A delay in such information being recorded can result in an erroneous report or complete omission of a fact. The use of a tape recorder or pocket memo resolves this problem.

All cars should contain a pair of binoculars and a monocular. It is insufficient to have one pair for each team. One never knows at what stage a pair of binoculars may suddenly be required and a good surveillance may be 'blown' by showing out transporting a pair to the man having need of them.

A pair of infra-red binoculars should also be carried but this can be in one vehicle only. Whilst this is in direct contradiction of the previous paragraph, in the case of infra-red binoculars they will only be of use in complete darkness, therefore the target will be unable to see any exchange of them from one vehicle to another.

On the market at the present time are a pair of infra-red goggles which have been used with excellent results by the American Forces.

The goggles enable a person to maintain observations in complete darkness without the discomfort of having to hold a heavy pair of binoculars or nightscope. They are of major benefit on a static surveillance. Whilst they are comfortable and weigh very little they cannot be disguised as ordinary spectacles due to standing proud 4" from the face. This eliminates the wearer from doing so in public.

I previously mentioned in the personnel chapter the need for a photographer. This officer should have his camera and equipment readily available to him at all times. Most photographs of any benefit are taken of the suspect or associate in his or their natural habitat as the occasion presents itself.

Equipment should be capable of taking close and long range photographs and suitable for use with the infra-red scope. It is rare that suspects are photographed at night time, but this is the only part of the day that a fair proportion of them surface.

Labouring on the point of always having the equipment available also includes carrying the miniature camera or other such device effective in obtaining covert photographs especially inside buildings.

The practice likely to cause most controversy is perhaps the one of installing a listening device into vehicles. By gaining access into the interior of a vehicle it is a simple matter to connect and conceal a piece of equipment capable of transmitting a conversation being carried out in the vehicle.

The transmitter is about the size of a packet of polos and available again on the American market at very little cost. One can be wired into a vehicle in less than five minutes with the chances of it being detected under normal circumstances being nil.

Transmissions can be picked up on a previously selected frequency. Signals are normally effective up to a range of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

I was fortunate to see the placing of this type of device on a suspects vehicle and see the results from the information obtained by its use. This type of accurate substantiated forward information could not have been gained in any other way.

A specialist piece of apparatus, but still falling within the terms of reference of surveillance is the portable automatic telephone tester. This equipment would probably be most advantageous to members of the special branch, with emphasis on V.I.P protection work.

It is a compact unit capable of detecting tampering with any chosen telephonic system. It will test single lines, key sets and directors without any external attachments. Digital rotator readings are given and every wire is tested for audio. It incorporates an automatic sweep and disconnect function and tests for triggered devices. A complete six line key set can be tested in 20 minutes.

An operation of this nature would take a team of four men at least a day to carry out and then not achieving the total reliability that this machine arrives at.

Aerial Surveillance

At the mention of the words 'Aerial surveillance' one automatically thinks in terms of helicopters. This was my idea prior to visiting the United States so much so that I examined the workings and cost effectiveness of this method of operation.

From the financial aspect the helicopter is a very expensive machine and requires continuous maintenance. Because of the amount of maintenance require further expense is added and a large amount of flying time is lost.

There are a number of different types of helicopter available, but even the cheapest is outside the realistic budget one could allow for the benefits derived from such craft. This expense also precludes the hiring of helicopters.

From an operational point of view the helicopter is noisy and far too conspicuous. It lacks a reasonable top speed and has very limited flying time. In my opinion it has no part to play in an operational surveillance unit.

Having decried the helicopter, one can conceive the pleasure I received when the attributes of the fixed wing light aircraft were practically and so graphically demonstrated to me. This was a horizon of surveillance hitherto not considered.

The fixed wing aircraft is unequalled in factual presentation and overall observation of the scene or scenes in question. It allows one to give an immediate evaluation, thus giving the commander a platform from which he may gain material which will greatly enhance the speed and correctness of his decisions.

One is able to control and, of more importance, supply information to ground staff warning them of pending or approaching hazards.

The mobility of the fixed wing plane presents the opportunity to maintain constant, undetected surveillance of suspected criminals and of crime susceptible areas. The communications between air and ground render it possible for nearby and distant units and command personnel to participate in the surveillance whether it be in front or at the rear of the subject. This gives flexibility in planning the strategy to be used.

Fixed wing aircraft offer a unique manner of gathering intelligence. It provides a totally new means of stake-out and mobile surveillance directed towards people, places and things, suspected of causing, contributing or promoting crime. Criminal factions will not be provided or afforded the protection of some of the man-made and natural elements that impede ground surveillance.

Aerial surveillance is as good if not better working in night time conditions. The trained observer can readily pick out the suspect vehicle in all types of conditions or terrain, obviously excluding loss of visibility caused by inclement weather. Where there is prior knowledge of the suspect's vehicle it can easily be marked making it undetectable from the ground or naked eye, but instantly recognisable to the surveillance spotter.

All types of equipment previously mentioned can be used in the fixed wing concept. It required no extra tools of the trade other than a light aircraft wireless communications system and a pair of girosopic binoculars.

For safety reasons when flying the crew should consist of two men. One being the pilot who controls the aircraft and monitors the surveillance on the directions of the second officer who is the 'spotter'. The reason the pilot does not carry out the surveillance alone is because of his requirement to keep observations for other aerial traffic with which there may be danger of colliding with.

The fixed wing is the most economical means of surveillance. It can undertake alone a surveillance travelling the length of the country which would require at the very minimum, three ground mobile units and the chances of it being detected being far less than those of vehicles.

A fixed wing light aircraft suitable for police purposes can be obtained on the market at the present time for a cost of approximately £8,000, roughly the price of two motorway cars. Little if any modification would be required. The time and expense required to train a police pilot is minimal or a civilian pilot could be engaged at a very acceptable cost.

At times, because of the low flying required for surveillance purposes, permission and terms of reference regarding altitudes and working areas would have to be agreed with the British Aviation Board. From my enquiries to date with the authorities these problems can easily be overcome.

The cost of fuel and maintenance is equal to that of the normal vehicle. Repairs and routine overhauls are again comparative to the motor car. In fact the aeroplane offers far more than any other type of surveillance method I have encountered at an all round equal expense.

The advantages of the fixed wing over the helicopter are that it can maintain a fixed surveillance for anything up to 10 hours without re-fuelling and without being detected. Besides being inaudible when flying at recommended heights it is also almost impossible to detect by the naked eye even when its presence is known.

The majority of light aircrafts available are capable of achieving the speeds attained by the modern motor car and above in many cases.

Under normal working conditions the advantage of the helicopter over the fixed wing plane is its ability to take off and land in confined spaces. This, however, is of little or no benefit to a surveillance operation. The fixed wing like all other units is for surveillance only and must at all times maintain a low profile to ensure its continual effectiveness.

Ethics

Whilst there is very little legislation or Home Office direction on the use of electronic surveillance and audio devices, consensus of opinion by the media condemn them out of hand. Because of this lack of immediate instruction we can do much to utilise some of the equipment mentioned if we examine the ethical considerations and take this as a common sense guideline.

Whether it be a device to surveil a motor vehicle or to overhear the conversations of others, the problems of ethical considerations are complicated at the best of times. Involved are such questions as if in the present state of technology it is technically feasible for actual privacy to exist in a transaction between one person and another. The fact that such transactions may deal strictly with a relationship between the persons involved or whether some facet of the transaction impinges upon the security of the society of which they are a part is another question to be examined. Is a society merely a collection of independent individuals or is it an entity unto itself independent of the individuals of which it composes.

An individual placed in a society probably has little personal impact upon the society and when that individual is removed from that society it may be observed that the society continues to function without noticeable change.

In past legal considerations it is the acts of the individual which are actionable rather than his words, although a determinant of the 'mens rea' is often decided on the action and words of an individual where they bear some interrelationship. In a democratic society the individual is guaranteed some basic rights as part of his participation in that society. These rights include a right to privacy and a right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act and detention without trial is perhaps the forerunner of further legislation of this nature which conflicts with known democratic policy, but the present day situation demands this legislation. Again this raises the standpoint of where might the rights of the individual begin to falter in opposition to the right of a society to be secure in itself from the criminal and terrorist alike.

When the words or actions of an individual or minority group threaten the norm of the co-operative society it would seem that society should have the right to protect itself. Science places before us the capability for increased efficiency in the observations of mans verbal and physical actions, and information so gained should be admissable in courts of law to protect society.

Where audio or vehicular surveillance is used for the good of society against the interests of an individual who is attempting to harm that society, that action achieves a 'good' morality. If it is used to protect an individual, a member of society, it is then a benefit to both the individual and society, again achieving a moral of 'good'.

On this argument to achieve a beneficial status, a moral act must have intrinsic goodness which outweighs, or at least balances, the evil it is projected against. Any act based on this principle must be of benefit to the country as a whole, but as yet our respective governments still seem to fear the word surveillance in any form and view it in the context as given by George Orwell's novel '1984'.

One is obviously aware that as an instrument of justice, surveillance, whether it be vehicular, foot, electronic or audio, may be a double-edged sword and if not adequately controlled could be perverted into an instrument of oppression, however it is my own sincere belief and argument that the controlling bodies in charge of police personnel are such that abuse of methods and equipment on surveillance would not be tolerated.

Dr. David A. Pollock, the American criminologist and one of the world's leading authorities on electronic surveillance sums up his thoughts on the matter of ethics by saying "The individual is a unique person who makes up society, but society itself is over and above just a collection of individuals".

PART IIOrganised Crime

As stated in the introduction my main objective was to examine new trends in organised crime outside the family type organisation. I soon found that all or most new trends were formulated by the established Mafia families.

However it is interesting to note that the groups that are adopting methods and adapting to organised crime are the ethnic groups gathered in most big cities throughout the United States.

By virtue of their creed, i.e. Chinese, Puerto Ricans, members of these organisations have a visible physical appearance which categorizes them. This fact alone makes it virtually impossible to infiltrate and plant undercover officers, a ploy which in the past has been the most successful in obtaining information regarding organised group activities.

The origin of these criminal sects started when groups formed into street gangs protecting their own particular manor. These groups because of their size created fear and used this fear for extortion purposes and from extortion to theft, robbery and so on. Of course these organisations didn't set out to be criminal syndicates, but like everything else someone at some stage sees the potential and takes command.

The differences between organised ethnic groups and Cosa Nostra are many, the principal ones being the make-up of the syndicates. The Mafia administration is comprised like an army, having commanders, field operators, soldiers and specialised men. The groups are split into sections each having a leader responsible to an overall chief of the groups. They invariably work in the immediate area of their own city, but are just beginning to form relationships with racial gangs in other areas, a venture which the organised families have conducted with success for a great many years.

The ethnic groups may not be sophisticated but their damage to society is immense without too high a success against them by the authorities. Proceeds from crimes are not ploughed back into legitimate business like the Mafia working, but shared between members of the syndicate who use it to obtain more illegal money, but not under the guise of a legal front. This I feel is the big difference at the moment between the two mentioned types of operation. The Mafia, because they have so many tentacles and are not as close knit as they were, due to marriages outside the family, require the chain of protection which an organised business gives them. The ethnic syndicate however are working within their own community and can still use the tool of fear and are protected by this animal protective charisma.

Strong-arm extortion is still one of the basic crimes of the Ethnic, their main money spinner being drugs, one of the few crimes where they work and supply people outside of, as well as in, their own groups.

To combat ethnic empires, American Police agencies are finding that they are having to utilise the collation system they use for Mafia operatives in that when a group is recognised, each member or suspected member or associate is charted and plotted and accorded his place in what is a literary tree.

From such basic information enquiries are made along with an enormous amount of surveillance, which can amount to thousands of miles across country, the ulterior motive being to ammass enough evidence, the majority being circumstantial, to secure a conviction for conspiracy.

My own observation is that the many differences in criminal law procedure between America and ourselves is because of the effects of organised crime syndicates on the community and the need to legislate particularly for them. This legislation has grown away from the basic English law but the growth was essential.

An example of this is the conspiracy law. On retracing the history of American conspiracy law we find that in the beginning it was as our own, but the loopholes and flaws were continually exploited by 'syndicates' lawyers so much so that at one stage the law was being changed weekly particularly case law. These loopholes and flaws were finally made tighter and tighter until the law of conspiracy is once again an effective piece of legislation to such degree that it is the pitfall most feared by organised syndicate members.

Whilst racial units are difficult to infiltrate along with other organisations it is worth looking, with a view to the future, at some of the successful methods adopted by the various police agencies.

One such ploy is to set up a business, the type of business dependant on the circumstances. These business ventures financed by the authorities are run in the same manner as a business 'straight' or 'bent' again circumstances dictating. I experienced first hand working of this type of operation in Chicago where they formed their own trucking company. The reasons for the formation of the company in this case were varied. Information was at hand that strong-arm protection tactics were being used to extort money from companies. Large scale internal and external thefts, all organised, were being carried out.

A new crime which is being perpetrated by the organised criminal elements and a crime with far reaching economic and political side effects is that of trade extortion teamsters, the equivalent of our trade unions, the leaders of which are being manipulated financially or otherwise by the syndicates. This is the latest means of blackmail. By controlling unions monetary demands, approaches are made to the professional administrators in business concerns intimidating them to meet the demands or work will not be carried out due to industrial dispute. This crime is being practised throughout the United States.

With these three main objects in mind the Chicago Police formed their haulage firm in cheap shabby premises with second-hand vehicles and 'slag' police officers to match. All officers (four officers, four vehicles) were supplied with authentic documents from ministerial departments and worked independent of and from anything and anybody connected with the police other than when passing reports by telephone.

They found their own contracts and developed contacts. Within two months they had formed a tidy business which was showing a profit. The fact that they were showing a profit was not essential but accelerated criminal approaches being made to them.

Approaches were made to them from all angles including those for which the mock company was originally formed. Evidence against persons concerned was accumulated and after the firm had been trading for a period of fourteen months it was decided to move against the criminal organisers and their 'Henchmen'. The arrests included many major Mafia members, from in and out of Chicago, politicians, union officials and city council administrators.

On winding the company up it showed a profit running into thousands of dollars and had expanded vastly. The only regret of the Chicago Police was that three of the police officers responsible for bringing this operation to a successful conclusion left the Force to form their own company.

This account may appear to be a 'one-off' job fit only for a television programme, but it is one of many operation, successful operations, I revealed during my Scholarship.

I acknowledge that the reader will be thinking "yes it would be very nice, but the expense would overrule such a project". If the operation is large enough surely some body financed by central and provincial funds could establish a unit capable of carrying out such workings without an individual Police Authority bearing the cost alone, but still having the use of such a unit.

A most recent and highly successful format used against organised crime is the 'Strike Force'. This department is a national one and Federally funded. The 'Strike Force' is derived from specialists in various government fields of law enforcement. These specialists include accountants (fraud squad), tax investigators, Customs officers, F.B.I and Police officers.

All the officers work together in a controlled team collating their knowledge, experience and powers to form a spearhead to conduct a thorough investigation into the affairs and workings of suspected organised criminals.

A close inspection of this scheme shows why it is so successful and the co-operation it builds between the said and other government offices. By placing men together and making them into a group whereby they are judged on their results (the head count system not being peculiar to the British Police) they immediately form a bond for professional survival. This bond leads to trust and the pooling of information and ideas.

Like our own separate departments each have different powers in certain circumstances. For a police officer to use a power of a Customs officer through the customs officer or vice-versa for a common purpose can only be good for the community as a whole.

Through officers being seconded to the 'Strike Force' the parent departments begin to work together in order to uphold their own organisation's standing. The knowledge obtained regarding the methods and powers of other agencies is soon related into natural Police workings.

Prior to and without this group formation the liaison between departments was very little in the United States, as it is at the present time in the United Kingdom and will remain to be so until some common purpose such as the 'Strike Force' brings them together. By forming a 'Strike Force' not only are large organisations broken down, but are spotted early and attacked whilst trying to build an empire as opposed to concentrating on them after they are established which is a harder task.

The efficiency of the 'Strike Force' again depends a great deal on the law of conspiracy for securing a criminal conviction. This requirement caused the legal senate to introduce a bill which catered completely for organised criminal syndicates. This bill looked at the workings of the mobs and analysed their methods of illegally obtaining money and the distribution and investment of such money.

The law itself has many excellent points, but the main one being that anything found to be established, run or concerned with the use of illegal money can be confiscated. The confiscation being the deterring factor and support to having selected a conspiracy charge.

Without information a Police Force or any other investigation department cannot operate. With this fact in mind having regard to the drug problem savaging America and the lack of information coming forward, a committee examined possibilities of obtaining more information from the normal citizen.

The main idea proposed by the committee was for the need to facilitate the public with a means by which they could contact the police other than the normal channel and pass on information which they thought would be of benefit. After much consideration the committee decided to experiment in one police area with the idea of a telephone line set aside specifically and for no other purpose than to answer calls regarding information re drugs given by the public. Because of the delicacy of the project, many people providing information regarding their own sons and daughters, a great deal of thought was put into the selection of the telephone answering personnel.

The results obtained by this system were far greater than even the original committee had hoped for, so much so that the idea was adopted throughout the United States. It was soon encountered that people also wanted to give information about other criminal activities including organised crime operations. By reason that the people now had somewhere to contact without having to visit police stations or approach police officers direct and still able to retain their anonymity they were willing to give information.

The final result of this public informant idea is the establishment of a telephone in each police area which has its own number and deals with nothing but information telephoned in by the public. This system is known as the Telephone Informant Police Service and the telephone number can be found at the front of any American telephone directory under the heading T.I.P.S. which is next to the Police and Fire telephone numbers.

Whilst it must be pointed out that a certain amount of false and vindictive calls are received the benefits derived from the input of information negative such calls. My opinion is that an experiment of this nature would be advantageous to our own crime fight bearing in mind the number of people who come to 'light' after an offence has been committed and an investigation commenced and say that they wanted to tell someone of their suspicions, but didn't know who to tell.

The requirement for the F.B.I. and Police Departments to be ahead of organised crime syndicates and for that matter any criminal element is greatly supported by the American Government's policy of allowing military surplus or equipment taken off the classified list to be made available to these departments.

In practice the departments are notified of all military stores, vehicles, weapons, electronics, etc, which are surplus to requirement. If, after examination of such equipment, any of the said departments can show good reason for requiring that equipment it is given to them usually free of charge. I came across a good example of this in Los Angeles where the F.B.I. had obtained Ex American Air Force 'planes for surveillance.

Although our armed forces do not have the same military budget as the United States I am sure that given the opportunity the Police Force could put to good use a fair percentage of equipment scrapped or auctioned for well below their operational value.

CONCLUSION

Criminal surveillance is an essential part in the American Police machinery and is still expanding both in methods and achievement. Whilst this is not so in the United Kingdom the 'writing is on the wall' and if we are to keep pace with criminal activities and crime trends we must adapt and perfect surveillance techniques better and faster than of recent years.

Not only is surveillance, that is professional surveillance, required to combat local and domestic crime it is now abundantly clear and poignant that the present trend of using guerrilla and terrorist means to fulfil political demands not only in this country but throughout the world can be best monitored, controlled and defeated by incorporating surveillance skills to a great degree, a fact which has and is continually being proved correct during our present offensive against Irish terrorists.

Looking to the future and bearing in mind that the criminal knows no boundaries the influx of members of the criminal fraternity from Common Market countries must increase, particularly in the case of the better class criminal who is aware of his prowess being known to the resident Force. This will also be reciprocal with our own criminals travelling abroad. If we are to beat these travelling criminals we have to be readily available to take up on any prior information supplied regarding the movements of such villains.

The effectiveness of the collator system has abundantly proved itself to be an efficient early warning system within Britain and surveillance should be added to reward and compliment such forward information.

My own interest in surveillance was brought about because of my involvement in a team of detectives engaged in waging war against an element of the criminal fraternity praying on old people using the guise of bogus officials to rob them. In the majority of cases this being life savings which the loss of occasionally caused so much shock and grief leading to premature death.

Because of the senility and infirmness of these old people they are unable to identify or give reliable evidence against the perpetrators of such knavery and therefore few are brought to justice. Surveillance is one method that has obtained some success in this field, but not enough to stamp it out completely. Changes of legislation are required to do this, and such changes would aid and abet all other criminal investigations and still protect the rights of the individual.

My studies have led me to the conclusion that new legislation must be introduced regarding the law of conspiracy, particularly the aspect of circumstantial evidence. The law of conspiracy in England has not been changed since the proverbial 'time immemorial' and a complete overhaul is well overdue. Inroads into crime syndicates in America were not made with any force until the conspiracy laws were altered.

Because surveillance is gradually beginning to receive acclaim and will undoubtedly grow, even if slowly, it is time the legislators produced an act with regard to the law and ethics of surveillance both physical and electronic or at least publish a directive, reviewed and more concise than the present minimal yet diverse instructions.

I have returned from the United States convinced of the attributes of criminal surveillance and the part it has to play in criminal investigation. I realize it is only a spoke of the legal enquiry system, but a spoke that must be acknowledged as being an intrinsic spoke in the wheel of the Police service.

A P P E N D I X 'A'ITINERARY20th May 1975

Travel via Heathrow Airport to
Washington via New York.

21st May 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington.

N.C.I.C. computer,
collation and distribution.

Electronic surveillance
equipment.

22nd May 1975

Washington Metropolitan Police,
Robbery Squad.

Urban Static surveillance.

23rd May 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Academy,
Quantice

Hi-jacking prevention
and containment.

Counter surveillance
by hi-jack teams.

24th May 1975

Discussions
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington.

Surveillance training methods.

Family organisations and
deployment of collative offices.

25th May 1975

Discussion
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington.

Racketeer, influenced and
corrupt organisations Act
(Workings and origin)

Travel to New York.

26th May 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
New York.

"Strike Force"
Formation and terms of
reference.

Discussion/lecture.

27th May 1975

New York City Police Department,
Aerial Division.

Use of helicopters to deter crime.

Use of helicopters for surveillance
purposes.

28th May 1975

New York City Police,
Narcotics Unit,
Harlem.

Participate in street surveillance.

Participate in street arrest.

29th May 1975

New York City Police,
Public Information Department.

Examine workings of T.I.P.S.,
Public Informant Service.

30th May 1975

At leisure.

31st May 1975

Travel to Detroit, Michigan.

1st June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Format of Intelligence Section.

Discussion.

Surveillance Joint Unit operations
and terms of reference.

2nd June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Training surveillance officers.

3rd June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Electronic aides to surveillance.

Other essential surveillance equipment.

4th and 5th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Working actual surveillance.

6th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section

Selection and adaptation of
surveillance vehicles.

7th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Night surveillance.

8th June 1975

At leisure.

9th June 1975

Windsor, Canada.

Discussion.

Attend monthly conference of
Intelligence Officers.
(Windsor Police, Ontario State Police,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Detroit Police and Michigan State
Police)

10th June 1975

As above.

11th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Recording of facts whilst on
surveillance.

Dissemination of intelligence
gathered.

12th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Surveillance training films.

Use of video recordings for
training purposes.

13th June 1975

Michigan State Police,
Intelligence Section.

Photographic equipment.

Documentation -- and identities
for undercover operatives.

14th June 1975

Travel to Chicago, Illinois.

15th June 1975

Chicago Police Department.

Audio listening devices.

Detection methods of telephone
'taps' and audio devices.

16th June 1975

Chicago Police Department,
Training Academy.

Lecture.

Organised crime patterns.

Features of organised crime workings.

17th June 1975

Chicago Police Department,
Detective Bureau.

Use of informants.

Categorising potential informants.

18th June 1975

Travel to Kansas City, Kansas.

19th June 1975

Kansas City Police,
Intelligence Section.

Collation of illegal operations
information.

Discussion.

Use of undercover operatives in
"need to know" areas.

20th June 1975

Kansas City Police.

Aerial surveillance.

Demonstration.

Aerial equipment and aviation safety.

21st and 22nd June 1975

Kansas City.

At leisure.

23rd June 1975

Kansas City Police, Missouri.

Use of audio surveillance equipment
on static suspects and freight.

Demonstration.

24th June 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Kansas City.

Liaison and support to local
surveillance teams.

Discussion.

Selection and terms of reference
for "Strike Force" case work.

25th June 1975

Kansas City Police, Kansas.

Actual operation (night).

Surveillance and counter surveillance to protect undercover drugs officer whilst making a "buy".

26th June 1975

Travel to San Francisco, California.

27th June 1975

San Francisco Police.

Demonstration.

Lecture.

Use of equipment and boats for water front surveillance.

"Foot surveillance".

28th June 1975

San Francisco Police.

Actual Operation.

Foot surveillance of suspects and vehicular support.

29th June 1975

San Francisco Police.

Lecture/demonstration.

Counter surveillance and protection of V.I.P's.

30th June 1975

Travel to Los Angeles, California.

1st July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles.

Discussion / organised crime agents.

Identification of organised crime members and operations.

Dissemination of organised crime information within department and nationally.

2nd July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles.

Surveillance Unit, actual operation.

Vehicular surveillance.

3rd July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Los Angeles.

Actual operation.

Aerial surveillance using standard
production aeroplanes and equipment.

Aerial surveillance using ex-military
surplus aeroplanes and equipment.

4th July 1975

Independence Day -- at leisure.

5th July 1975

At leisure.

6th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Los Angeles.

Discussion.

Using and obtaining free ex-
government surplus equipment.

The retention and use of confiscated
equipment.

7th July 1975

Santa Monica Police,
California.

Demonstration.

Aerial surveillance off shore.

Aerial surveillance - high crime
areas.

8th July 1975

Los Angeles Police Department,
Special Assignment Squad.

Discussion.

Demonstration.

Use of surveillance in kidnapping
cases.

Special weapon training.

9th July 1975

Los Angeles Police Department,
Special Assignment Squad.

Demonstration.

Discussion.

Undercover photography.

Placing of selective authorised
equipment.

10th July 1975

Los Angeles Police Department,
Special Assignment Squad.

Demonstrations.

Actual surveillance (night).

Natural movements and ability to
converse in public and private
places whilst carrying out sur-
veillance.

Use of radio code.
Electronic aids to night surveillance.

11th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Los Angeles.

Combined operation of vehicular,
foot, aerial and electronic
surveillance.

Actual Operation.

12th July 1975

At leisure

(Visit San Diego and Tijuana, Mexico)

13th July 1975

Travel to Las Vegas.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police,
Organised Crime Unit.

Surveillance/recording/
photographing of arrival and
departure of suspected
organised crime members.

14th July 1975

William S. Weinberger,
President,
Caesars Palace,
Las Vegas.

Scientific aids to prevent
criminal actions, internal and
external, against the "house".

Discussion.

Discussion/demonstration.

International "early warning"
system practised by casinos
against known large scale fraud,
cheats and confidence men.

15th July 1975

Travel to Albuquerque, New Mexico.

16th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Albuquerque.

The problem of vehicular
surveillance in open country.

Discussion.

Aerial surveillance open country.

17th July 1975

Drug Enforcement Agency.

Use of electronic equipment to
secure evidence.

Discussion.

Monitoring movements of light
aircraft used for drug transportation.

18th July 1975

Albuquerque Police Department.

A study of the police strike by Albuquerque Police Department taking place at the time.

19th July 1975

Travel to Austin, Texas.

20th July 1975

Texas Department of Public Safety, Intelligence Section.

The use and reasons of legal wire-tapping.

Discussion.

The methods used to install 'telephone taps'

21st July 1975

Texas Department of Public Safety, Intelligence Section.

Vehicular surveillance.

Demonstration.

Adaptation of vehicles for surveillance purposes.

22nd July 1975

Travel to Houston, Texas.

23rd July 1975

Texas Department of Public Safety, Houston Intelligence Section.

The use of commercial campers for static surveillance.

Discussion/demonstration.

The basic equipment of a full surveillance strike team.

24th July 1975

Texas Department of Public Safety, Narcotics Division.

The tracing of narcotics from "user" to "supplier".

Lecture.

Drug Enforcement Agency, Lecture.

International suppliers and routes.

25th July 1975

Houston, Texas - at leisure.

26th July 1975

Travel to Albuquerque.

Because of further studies and the Police Strike, I exchanged my ticket for New Orleans (intended destination) for a ticket to Albuquerque.

27th July 1975

Arbitration Meeting,
Albuquerque Police Department,
Mayor and City Officials.

Albuquerque Police Strike.

Albuquerque Television and Press.

The consequences of a police strike.

28th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Albuquerque.

Assimilation of a prosecution file for conspiracy.

Discussion.

Night surveillance in open country.

29th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Albuquerque.

Internal structure of organised crime (Mafia).

"Loan Sharking" and commercial enterprises of organised crime.

30th July 1975

Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Albuquerque.

The use of "citizen wave band" radios by criminals.

Lecture.

New Mexico Police.

Visit New Mexico Police Academy.

31st July 1975

At leisure.

1st August 1975

Travel to New York.

2nd August 1975

Travel home.