

MICROFILM

ASSAULTS AND
ASSAULTIVE VICTIMIZATION WITHIN TEN
NORTH CAROLINA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS:

A Report Submitted
to the
North Carolina Department of Correction

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ACQUISITION

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM

One of the purposes of a correctional facility is to modify an offender's behavior so that he will be less likely to recidivate. Our correctional facilities strive to achieve this objective, at least in part, by placing those individuals which it holds in its custody in an environment which will educate, persuade, and otherwise convince these individuals that obedience to the rules of society is a normal and desirable mode of conduct. If, however, the offender is placed in an environment in which rule-breaking is extremely common, including infractions which, on the outside, constitute criminal offenses, then the ability of our correctional institutions to reduce the offender's criminalistic tendencies is accordingly seriously impaired.

In the fourth quarter of 1975, the North Carolina Department of Correction managed 77 correctional facilities. In this report we shall be concerned with ten of these facilities, viz.

Western Correctional Center
Harnett Youth Center
Polk Youth Center
Sandhills Youth Center
Burke Youth Center
Central Prison
Caledonia
Odom
Blanch
North Carolina Correctional Center
for Women

In this report these ten major correctional facilities are referred to as the ten institutions.

These institutions housed 4495 inmates. In that same quarter these 4495 inmates were responsible for 540 reported major violations of prison rules. On an annual basis this represents 2160 Disciplinary Reports; that is, somewhat less than one major violation for every two inmates. Although there is no way of knowing what a "normal" level of rule-breaking would be, and therefore no way of appraising North Carolina's experience against some more or less objective standard, by conventional, non-institutional standards it seems intuitively obvious that one major violation for every two inmates represents an undesirably large amount of rule-breaking within our prison system.

Of the many rule violations occurring within North Carolina's prison institutions, possibly the violations of most concern to its officials are those involving assault. The existence of assault within prison institutions indicates that some inmates are unable or unwilling to resolve conflict in a socially acceptable way. The existence of assault within an institution affects not only the participants in the assaultive act, but contaminates the entire inmate population, reenforcing their criminalistic tendencies, and frustrating the institutions rehabilitative objectives.

Furthermore, no matter what the offense that led to an individual's incarceration, once he is incarcerated he becomes, as it were, a ward of the state, and is entitled to the same protection from criminal victimization as a non-incarcerated individual. Hence, the state acquires an obligation to minimize, so far as it is feasible to do so, the amount of criminal victimization which occurs within its correctional facilities. In view of these considerations, a high incidence of assault within our institutions would be a matter of deep concern to the Department of Correction, for it would suggest the possibility that a large proportion of its inmate population is being criminally victimized.

B. GENERAL GOAL STATEMENT

This project has four general, interrelated goals: (i) to estimate the extent and nature of assault occurring within North Carolina's prison institutions, (ii) to estimate the extent and nature of criminal victimization associated with assault within North Carolina's prison institutions, (iii) to identify the immediate causes of assaults, and (iv) to offer guidance to the Department of Correction in formulating new programs whose purpose would be to reduce assaultive behavior and criminal victimization.

C. SPECIFIC MEASURABLE OBJECTIVES

Associated with the foregoing general goals are the following specific, measurable objectives. The first four objectives are essentially policy-neutral.

1. To produce a body of statistical data relating to assault occurring within the ten North Carolina prison institutions during the last quarter of 1975. More specifically, we provide estimates of the number of assaults which have occurred, and of the number of inmates involved in these assaults. Estimates of the degree of seriousness of the assault are also provided, as well as statistics concerning the physical circumstances surrounding the assaultive event (e.g. when and where the assault occurred), and the inmate's attitude toward violence.
2. To produce a body of statistical data relating to criminal victimization occurring within the ten prison institutions. More specifically, we provide estimates of the number of victimizations, the character of the victimization (sexual victimization, seriousness of victimization, etc.). In addition we provide a statistical profile of the victim: his age, race, attitude toward violence, and rel. charact.

3. To determine the immediate, prison-related causes of assault within the ten institutions enumerated above. Because of our concern for immediate causes, we shall focus on those explanatory variables that are most directly related to assault, and that are most likely to be helpful in developing policies to reduce assaultive behavior within prison.

Our intention is (i) to develop a theoretical model of assault, a model which distinguishes between the opportunities for assault and the motivations for assault; (ii) to enumerate a set of a priori plausible hypotheses concerning assault, which derive from the model; (iii) within the constraints imposed by data limitations, to test these hypotheses by means of standard statistical analysis; (iv) to develop from the theoretical and statistical analysis a statement which specifies which variables are most likely to contribute to assault.

4. To evaluate the data collecting process associated with the Disciplinary Report and the Investigative Report as these relate to assault.
5. To develop a policy-oriented overview of assault, victimization, and the circumstances surrounding these events within the prison system. This report shall not advocate specific policies. Rather, it shall identify broad policy categories so as to focus the attention of prison administrators on those specific areas which are likely to be productive in terms of policy innovation.

D. THE DATA BASE

The empirical data used in this report are derived from three separate sources. These sources, and the nature of the data derived from them, are described below.

1. Offense Report Data Base

All DC138 forms generated as a result of rule infractions occurring within the above enumerated ten institutions during the fourth quarter of 1975 were examined. For those DC138 forms involving an assault, the related DC138A, DC138B, DC138C forms, with accompanying Office Memoranda, were assembled. We define the Offense Report Data Base as the set of data which were compiled from the above documents.

One institution, Burke, reported no assaults for the fourth quarter. Hence, Burke often will not appear in our presentation of data for individual institutions, but it always appears in the data referring to All Institutions, and to All Male Youth Institutions.

2. Superintendent Data Base

At each of the ten institutions, the superintendent, or his designated representative was interviewed by the project director. The introductory statement made at the beginning of the interview suggests the general nature of the questions posed to each superintendent:

The purpose of this interview is to obtain your views and impressions concerning physical assaults by inmates against other inmates and custodial staff within your institution. I would like to ask you about the extent of such behavior, the immediate precipitating causes of this behavior, and what might be done, in a practical way, to reduce the amount of assaults at this institution.

We attempted to conduct the interview with a standard format, so as to obtain as uniform an interpretation of the questions as possible. At

the time, the superintendent was encouraged to expand or elaborate upon, or otherwise comment on the specific questions posed to him, and to introduce additional material which he deemed to be relevant to the interview.

3. Inmate Data Base

Approximately 300 observations are available, drawn from the North Carolina inmate population as of April/May, 1971. The observations were obtained by personal interview from cooperating inmates.² The observations were obtained from the following institutions: Caledonia, Odom, Cabarrus, Harnett, and Alexander.

The sample was stratified by felon-misdemeanant, by race, by age, and by time served on present sentence. The questionnaire dealt in detail with the inmate's sociological and criminal background, his experience within the prison environment, and his attitude toward the law, administrative regulation, the institution at large, and toward his fellow inmates.

If the sample does accurately represent the inmate population in mid-1971, and if that population is roughly similar to the present population, then we would be justified in using this data base to draw inferences concerning the present population. Because of the statistical procedure which we shall use, it is not necessary that the age, race, and seriousness of offense characteristics of the inmate population remain invariant. Our findings are not likely to be influenced by changes which may have occurred in these variables since mid-1971.

We define the Inmate Data Base as the set of data available from this survey.

²The description of sampling procedure indicated that the refusal rate was two percent. See Desmond Ellis and Bernard Gilman, "Causes and Consequences of Aggressive Behavior in the North Carolina Correctional System," (May, 1971), p. 23. (mimeo)

CHAPTER 2

EXTENT AND NATURE OF ASSAULT

The purpose of this chapter is to define assault, and to provide a statistical and verbal description of the extent and nature of assault occurring within the ten prison institutions during the last quarter of 1975.

A. DEFINITION OF ASSAULT

Generally speaking, assault is defined as an attack by one person on another. Included in the definition is both simple and aggravated assault. The latter may be defined as an attack by one or more persons upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe bodily injury, usually accompanied by the use of a weapon or other means likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Inmates who committed assault were charged with either a major or minor offense, depending on the nature of the assault, and on matters in aggravation or in mitigation relating to the assault. For purposes of this project, a known assault occurred whenever an inmate was found guilty of a major rule infraction involving one or more of the Major Offense Sections 21-26 and 39-41, inclusive;¹ or when an inmate was found guilty

¹The offenses corresponding to the above Section numbers are as follows:

| <u>Section</u> | <u>Offense (abbreviated description)</u> |
|----------------|--|
| 21 | Seizing or holding a hostage |
| 22 | Assault with a deadly weapon |
| 23 | Assault with a blunt instrument |
| 24 | Assault by stabbing |
| 25 | Assault by cutting |
| 26 | Assault with intent to commit a sexual act |
| 39 | Assault by fighting (no weapon) |
| 40 | Assault by throwing hot liquids |
| 41 | Assault by use of firearms |

of a minor rule infraction involving Minor Offense Section 10 (Disorderly Conduct). It was also required that the Offense and Disciplinary Report (DC138) data indicated that a simple or aggravated assault had, in fact, occurred. (In a few cases, an inmate was charged with more than one Section, but we have counted this as a single assault.)

In this report we use the term known assault, or when the context is clear, assault synonymously with a charge of assault filed, given that the inmate was found guilty. Obviously, not all the assaults occurring in an institution result in a charge being filed against an inmate. Hence, the total number of assaults occurring in an institution will exceed the number of known assaults. Let us refer to the total number of assaults as Estimated Total Assaults.²

In this report we distinguish between an assault and an incident. An incident was the assaultive event itself. It may involve more than one inmate charged and found guilty, and therefore more than one assault. For example, if an inmate attacks another inmate without provocation, there is one assault and one incident. If two inmates attack a third inmate without provocation, there are two assaults and one incident.

B. ASSAULT: EXTENT AND NATURE

1. The Extent of Assault

Within the ten institutions during the last quarter of 1975, there were 126 known incidents of assault. These 126 incidents resulted in 178 charges of assault against the inmate population. Twenty-four of these 178 assaults derive from minor rule infractions, 154 from major rule

²Refer to Table 2.3 for derivation of Estimated Total Assault rates.

infractions. The latter, in turn, represent 28 percent of all known major rule infractions.³

In the last quarter of 1975 these ten institutions held 4495 inmates. Hence, in that quarter the known assault rate was 4.0 percent. The corresponding Estimated Total Assault rate was 5.6 percent.⁴ If the fourth quarter data are typical, the annual known assault rate was 16.0 percent, and the annual Estimated Total Assault rate was 22.4 percent.

Are these rates "high" or "low"? One interesting comparison is this: In recent years, the probability that a male of age 16-34, living in a large city in the United States, would be assaulted during a twelve month period is roughly 6.8 percent.⁵ Thus, an inmate in one of our ten institutions would seem to be subjected to a risk of assault which is approximately 2.3-3.3 times that of his non-institutional male counterpart.

Table 2.1 shows the distribution of inmates by number of assaults committed during this quarter. We see that three inmates in a thousand were charged with more than one assault, and that altogether 36.3 inmates per thousand were charged with at least one assault. The group of inmates who have been charged with at least one assault will be referred to as the assaultive population.

³ Major rule infraction data are from North Carolina Department of Correction. Division of Prisons. Office of Research and Evaluation. Unit Evaluation System: Quarterly Report, 1975-4. [Hereafter referred to as DOC, Quarterly Report.]

⁴ See Table 2.1 for the Estimated Total Assault rate data.

⁵ Based on the National Crime Panel's victimization survey, involving eighteen of our larger cities, including the five largest cities. See United States National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service (NCJISS). Criminal Victimization Surveys in the Nation's Five Largest Cities (1975), passim; and NCJISS, Criminal Victimization Surveys in 13 American Cities (1975), passim.

TABLE 2.1
 DISTRIBUTION OF INMATES BY NUMBER
 OF ASSAULTS COMMITTED

| <u>Number of Assaults</u> | <u>Inmates</u> | | The Assaultive Population |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percentage</u> | |
| 0 | 4332 | 96.37 | |
| 1 | 149 | 3.32 | |
| 2 | 13 | 0.29 | |
| 3 | 1 | 0.02 | |
| More than 3 | 0 | 0.00 | |
| Total | 4495 | 100.00 | |

- Note: (a) Total number of assaults = 178
 (b) Total number of inmates = 4495
 (c) Inmates charged with assault =
 (d) Hence, the assault rate is $178/4495 = 4.0$ percent
 and the assaultive population ratio is $163/4495 = 3.4$ percent

In Table 2.2 we show the distribution of incidents by the number of inmates involved in each assaultive incident. The first set of data in the table--columns (1) and (2)--shows total inmate involvement: those charged, those victimized, and those who got away. These data indicate that in the overwhelming proportion of incidents (82%) there were just two inmates involved in the incident.

In columns (3) and (4) we show the number of inmates involved per incident less those whom we consider to be victims. We see that, in most instances, either one or two inmates were involved, and that gang-type action (more than two non-victim inmates involved in an incident) occurs relatively infrequently (3.2 percent of the time).

Assault rates varied widely by institution, as Table 2.3 indicates. One institution reported no assaults during the quarter, while the highest reported assault rate was 7.4 per 100 inmates. Estimated Total Assault rates vary even more widely: their range being zero to 12.7 percent. The difference in ranges is attributable to very different non-reporting rates for assault: some institutions report almost all assaults, some report only 50 percent.

2. Seriousness of Assault

For this report we distinguish three degrees of injury resulting from assault. These are defined as follows:

Serious Injury = The injury required medical treatment--for example, hospitalization, sutures or other treatment necessitating the services of an M.D.

Moderate Injury = The person exhibited some physical trauma, and was given minor medical treatment within the institution--e.g. first aid.

TABLE 2.2

DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS
 BY THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INMATES INVOLVED
 AND BY THE NUMBER OF INMATES
 WHO WERE OR COULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH ASSAULT

| <u>Total Inmate Involvement^a</u> | | | <u>Assaultive Inmate Involvement^b</u> | | |
|---|---------------|-------------------|--|---------------|-------------------|
| <u>Incidents</u> | | | <u>Incidents</u> | | |
| <u>No. of Inmates</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percentage</u> | <u>No. of Inmates</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percentage</u> |
| (Total) | <u>126</u> | <u>100.0</u> | | <u>126</u> | <u>100.0</u> |
| 1 | 9 | 7.1 | 1 | 72 | 57.1 |
| 2 | 103 | 81.9 | 2 | 49 | 38.9 |
| 3 | 9 | 7.1 | 3 | 2 | 1.6 |
| 4 | 2 | 1.5 | 4 | 1 | 0.8 |
| 5 | 1 | 0.8 | 5 | 1 | 0.8 |
| 6 | 1 | 0.8 | 6 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Unknown | 1 | 0.8 | Unknown | 1 | 0.8 |

^aAll inmates referred to, and actively involved, in an assaultive incident as determined from the Offense Report data base.

^bThe 178 inmates actually charged plus eight inmates referred to in the Offense Report data base who, in the opinion of the writer, would have been charged if prison officials had had sufficient information.

TABLE 2.3

KNOWN ASSAULT RATES AND ESTIMATED TOTAL ASSAULT RATES, TEN INSTITUTIONS: 1975-IV

| Institution | Charges of Assault | Inmate Population | Known Assault Rate ^a | Estimated Percent of Assaults Not Reported | Estimated Total Assaults ^b | Estimated Total Assault Rate ^c |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| All Institutions ^d | 178 | 4495 | 4.0% | 29% | 251 | 5.6% |
| Western | 27 | 533 | 5.1% | 50% | 54 | 10.1% |
| Harnett | 39 | 511 | 7.4% | 25% | 52 | 10.0% |
| Polk | 28 | 502 | 5.6% | 30% | 40 | 8.0% |
| Sandhills | 6 | 134 | 4.5% | 17 | 6 | 4.5% |
| Burke | 0 | 59 | 0% | 0% | 0 | 0% |
| Central | 45 | 1211 | 3.6% | 20% | 56 | 4.5% |
| Caledonia | 16 | 572 | 2.8% | 10% | 18 | 3.2% |
| Odom | 6 | 381 | 1.6% | 10% | 7 | 2.0% |
| Blanch | 7 | 110 | 6.4% | 50% | 14 | 12.7% |
| Women's Institution NCCCW | 4 | 482 | .83% | 5% | 4 | .87% |

^a Computed as Column (3) = Column (1) ÷ Column (2)

^b Computed as Column (5) = Column (1) ÷ [1 - Column (4)] rounded to the nearest whole number

^c Computed as Column (6) = Column (5) ÷ Column (2)

^d The rates reported on this line are weighted averages, with inmate population serving as weights.

Sources: Column (1): Offense Report Date Base.
 Column (2): DOC, Quarterly Report.
 Column (4): Superintendent Data Base.

Minor Injury = No medical treatment was provided, except for the effects of mace.⁶

An incident may involve two or three degrees of injury. The highest degree of injury found in an incident determined whether that incident was classified as Serious, Moderate or Minor. For the 119 incidents for which the degree of injury could be determined, approximately half of the incidents involved only minor injury, as Table 2.4 shows; and only 14 percent could be said to involve serious injury.

The degree of seriousness of injury varied widely among institutions. This phenomenon may be explained in part by the small number of observations available for some institutions. We note that the distribution of injuries within larger institutions tended to parallel the average experience of the ten institution system, but the distribution within small institutions did not. Obviously, this cannot be the whole explanation. We shall examine the potential effect of other factors later in this report.

Another way of assessing the seriousness of assault is to ask whether or not a weapon was used in the assault. To this end, we have tabulated the 178 assaults by charge filed against the inmate. The distribution of charges indicates that in 76 percent of the assaults a weapon does not appear to have been used, as Table 2.5 shows. On an incident basis we get essentially the same distribution of non-weapon/weapon involvement.

In Table 2.6 we report the percentage of assaults and percentage of incidents in which a weapon was used, by institution. One result of interest is the

⁶We have classified an inmate who was maced as a Minor Injury, not a Moderate Injury, even though he might have received first aid as a result of being maced. We do this because our interest lies in the injury inflicted by inmates during the course of an assaultive incident.

TABLE 2.4

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS BY DEGREE
OF INJURY, TEN INSTITUTIONS: 1975-IV

| <u>Institution</u> | <u>Number Observations</u> | <u>Percentage of Observations</u> | | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | | <u>Total</u> | <u>Serious</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Minor</u> |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>119</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>33</u> | <u>53</u> |
| Western | 22 | 100 | 9 | 23 | 68 |
| Harnett | 24 | 100 | 4 | 29 | 67 |
| Polk | 15 | 100 | 27 | 33 | 40 |
| Sandhills | 5 | 100 | 0 | 80 | 20 |
| Central | 32 | 100 | 16 | 34 | 50 |
| Caledonia | 10 | 100 | 30 | 30 | 40 |
| Odom | 5 | 100 | 20 | 20 | 60 |
| Blanch | 4 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 50 |
| NCCCW | 2 | 100 | 0 | 50 | 50 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE 2.5
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS AND NUMBER OF
INCIDENTS BY TYPE OF CHARGE

| Charge | Assaults | | Incidents ^a | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------|
| | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| <u>Total All Charges</u> | <u>178</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>126</u> | <u>100.0</u> |
| <u>Total, No Weapon Reported</u> | <u>135</u> | <u>76</u> | <u>94</u> | <u>75</u> |
| #10 | 24 | 13.5 | | |
| #39 | 111 | 62.5 | | |
| <u>Total, Weapon Involved</u> | <u>43</u> | <u>24</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>25</u> |
| #21 | 2 | 1.1 | | |
| #22 | 20 | 11.2 | | |
| #23 | 5 | 2.8 | | |
| #24 | 7 | 3.9 | | |
| #25 | 4 | 2.2 | | |
| #26 | 4 ^b | 2.2 | | |
| #27 | 1 ^c | 0.6 | | |

^aAn incident was said to involve a weapon if at least one inmate was charged with a weapons offense.

^bAssociated with each charge was an additional charge for use of a weapon (#22), hence these particular sexual charges did involve a weapon.

^cAlthough the charge is for possession of a weapon, in this instance the inmate actually committed an assault with that weapon.

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE 2.6
NUMBER OF ASSAULTS AND NUMBER OF
INCIDENTS INVOLVING A WEAPON, BY INSTITUTION

| <u>Institution</u> | <u>Total Number Of Assaults</u> | <u>Assault Involving Weapon</u> | | <u>Total Number of Incidents</u> | <u>Incident Involving Weapon</u> | |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------|--|--------------------------------------|----------------|
| | | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> | | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>178</u> | <u>43</u> | <u>24</u> | <u>126</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>25</u> |
| Western | 27 | 4 | 15 | 22 | 3 | 14 |
| Harnett | 39 | 10 | 26 | 26 | 5 | 19 |
| Polk | 28 | 7 | 25 | 17 | 4 | 24 |
| Sandhills | 6 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
| Central | 45 | 13 | 29 | 33 | 12 | 36 |
| Caledonia | 16 | 6 | 37 | 11 | 5 | 45 |
| Odom | 6 | 2 | 33 | 5 | 2 | 40 |
| Blanch | 7 | 1 | 14 | 5 | 1 | 20 |
| NCCCW | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

striking difference in percentages among institutions. The variation in percentages seems to be just as great among institutions having a large number of observations, as among those having a small number of observations.

3. Sexual Assault

We posed the following questions to the superintendents of the ten institutions:

1. How many incidents of homosexual rape or of other sexual assault do you recall as having been committed at this institution during the past three months? In responding to this question, I would like you to consider only those incidents in which one person was physically forced to participate in a sexual act.
2. How many of these incidents do you recall as having occurred at this institution in the past year?

We summarize the responses to these questions in the following tabulation. (See Appendix A for institutional detail.)

| Institutions | Population | <u>Incidents of Sexual Assault</u> | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|------------------|
| | | <u>Within Last 3 Months</u> | | <u>Within Last Year</u> | |
| | | No. | Rate | No. | Rate |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>4495</u> | <u>9</u> | <u>0.20</u> | <u>30-31</u> | <u>0.67-0.69</u> |
| All Male Youth | 1739 | 3 | 0.17 | 15-16 | 0.86-0.92 |
| All Male Adult | 2274 | 6 | 0.26 | 15 | 0.66 |

Are those rates "high" or "low"? One interesting comparison is this: In recent years, the probability that a woman of age 12 or over, living in a large city in the United States, will be forcibly raped during a year is between 0.2 and 0.7 percent.⁷ Thus, an inmate in one of our ten institutions

⁷NCJISS, loc. cit.

would seem to be subjected to approximately the same risk of being sexually assaulted as our non-institutional female population.

Our Offense Report Data Base provides a measure of known sexual assault. In the survey quarter, there was one reported incident of sexual assault, resulting in four inmates being charged with Offense #26.

4. Locational Aspects of Assault

Our Offender Report data, tabulated below, indicate that the overwhelming proportion of incidents occur inside prison buildings:

| Location of Incident | Incident | |
|-----------------------------|------------|------------|
| | Number | Percent |
| <u>Total, All Locations</u> | <u>121</u> | <u>100</u> |
| <u>Inside Locations</u> | <u>97</u> | <u>80</u> |
| Segregation | 3 | |
| Normal Sleeping Quarters | 70 | |
| Recreation Areas | 6 | |
| Other | 18 | |
| <u>At Work</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>5</u> |
| <u>Outside Locations</u> | <u>18</u> | <u>15</u> |
| Recreation Areas | 7 | |
| Other | 11 | |

of the 121 incidents for which data were available, at least 80 percent occur inside.⁸ In terms of function, the important area was the inmates sleeping quarters, where approximately 60% of the assaultive incidents occurred. The superintendent Data Base supports this finding: 7 of the 10 superintendents interviewed cite cells and/or cell blocks as the principle location for assault.

⁸The true proportion exceeds 80% because some of the work-related incidents occurred inside.

Some assaults occur in places which are not readily observable or supervised, such as stairways and closets, and areas which are supposed to be closed off from general usage. What percentage of assaults occur in such places? We are unable to provide a satisfactory answer to this question on the basis of our information concerning individual incidents. However, taking assaultive incidents as a whole, the Superintendent Data Base indicates that in five institutions, relatively few incidents occurred in small, confined areas, in one institution a moderate number occurred in such areas, and in three institutions a great many occurred--i.e., viewing the nine institutions as a whole,⁹ we find it impossible to provide a clear-cut answer to the question.

Where was the custodial official at the time of the incident? The following tabulation indicates that, in about half of the cases, he was present when the incident began. In one-fourth of the cases, it appears that an incident followed its course without the presence of an officer.

| <u>Location of Officer</u> | | | <u>Initial Source</u> | | |
|---|------------|----------------|-----------------------|------------|----------------|
| <u>With Respect to Incident</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> | <u>of Information</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>120</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>116</u> | <u>100</u> |
| Present when incident began | 55 | 46 | Visual | 70 | 60 |
| Appeared while incident was in progress | 32 | 27 | Sound | 17 | 15 |
| Not present during incident | 33 | 27 | Inmate | 26 | 22 |
| | | | Other | 3 | 3 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

⁹One institution had so few assaults that the superintendent felt that no statement was warranted.

The same tabulation shows that the initial source of information about the incident was usually direct sensory perception: 60 percent of the time the officer actually saw the incident in progress--TV accounted for none of these cases--and in another 15 percent of the cases, he heard the incident in progress.

In this section, we have presented data which relate to the ten-institution system. Data for the individual institutions are presented in Appendix A.

5. Time of Assault

Do assaults tend to distribute themselves randomly over the course of a week, or do they tend to concentrate within certain days? Our Offense Report Data Base reveals a bimodal distribution: assaultive incidents were lowest on the weekend and highest on Monday, Thursday, and Friday.

| <u>Day of Week</u> | <u>Incidents</u> | |
|------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| <u>Total, All Days</u> | <u>126</u> | <u>100</u> |
| Monday | 21 | 17 |
| Tuesday | 15 | 12 |
| Wednesday | 17 | 13 |
| Thursday | 20 | 16 |
| Friday | 26 | 21 |
| Saturday | 14 | 11 |
| Sunday | 13 | 10 |

Our Superintendent Data Base confirms the existence of a Monday peak and high assault rates on Friday, but runs contrary to the Offense Report Data Base by suggesting that weekends were a time of high assault rates.

Do assaults tend to distribute themselves randomly over the course of a day, or do they tend to concentrate within certain hours of the day? The superintendent data indicate that assault rates were lowest during the time that the inmate was supposed to be sleeping. These data also show that assault rates were highest from the evening meal hour to bedtime, and reached secondary peak immediately before and during the breakfast hour.¹⁰

In this section, we have presented data relating to the ten-institution system. Data for the individual institutions are presented in Appendix A.

6. Inmate Characteristics

a. Sex Differences

Our data support the common opinion that female assault rates are substantially lower than male assault rates. Table 2.3 shows that the known and Estimated Total Assault rates for women during our survey period were respectively 0.83 and 0.87 per 100 inmates. The corresponding male rates were 3.9 and 5.6; i.e., male assault rates were five to six times greater than female assault rates.¹¹

b. Race Difference

The following tabulation indicates that white assault rates were substantially lower than non-white assault rates. The known assault rate for whites during our survey period was 3.3 per 100 white inmates. The non-white

¹⁰ We are unable to use our Offense Report Data Base to answer this question because the DC138A form (Investigation Report) does not explicitly request the time of the assault, but rather, the time when the misconduct is reported.

¹¹ The difference in rates is statistically significant at the 0.001 level of significance.

rate was 4.4. Blacks accounted, approximately, for 96 percent of the non-white population. Hence, the black assault rate was also 4.4 percent.

| <u>Race</u> | <u>Number of Assaults</u> | <u>Population</u> | <u>Assault Rate</u> |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| <u>Total, All Races</u> | <u>178</u> | <u>4495</u> | <u>3.9</u> |
| White | 63 | 1888 | 3.3 |
| Non-white | 115 | 2607 | 4.4 |
| Black | 111 | 2503 | 4.4 |
| Indian | 4 | 104 ^a | 3.8 |

^a Based on the Indian/Non-White ratio for the total North Carolina felon prison population.

This rate is 24 percent greater than the white rate, and is statistically significant at the ten percent level of significance, indicating that blacks within the ten-institution system tend to be more assaultive than whites. Although the Indian population's assault rate is also reported in the tabulation, there are too few observations relating to this population to warrant comment.

d. Custody Grade Difference

Our Offense Report data, presented below, reveal no obvious relation between closeness of custody and assault rates. The range, excluding the psychiatric grade,¹² is fairly narrow compared to sex and age differences: medium custody, including safekeeping, had the highest assault rate, and minimum custody had the lowest.

The foregoing data refer to our ten-institution system. Data for the individual institutions are present in Appendix A.

¹² The assault for the psychiatric grade is based on too few observations to warrant comment.

| <u>Custody Grade</u> | <u>Population Size</u> | <u>Assault Rate (percent)</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <u>All Custody Grades</u> | 4546 | 3.9 |
| Minimum | 1002 | 3.0 |
| Medium | 2179 | 4.2 |
| Safekeeping | 264 | 4.6 |
| Close | 775 | 3.5 |
| Maximum (inc. death penalty) | 317 | 3.8 |
| Psychiatric | 9 | 11.1 |

c. Age Difference

The following tabulation indicates that adult assault rates are substantially lower than youth assault rates. The known and Estimated Total Assault rates for male adults are, respectively, 3.1 and 4.1 per 100 adult inmates. The corresponding male youth rates were 5.7 and 8.8; i.e., rates for male youths were approximately twice the rates for male adults, indicating that youthful offenders tend to be more assaultive than adult offenders.¹³

(For details concerning the individual youth and adult institutions, see Table 2.3.)

| <u>Institution</u> | <u>Number of Reported Assaults</u> | <u>Known Assault Rate</u> | <u>Estimated Total Assault Rate</u> |
|------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|---|
| All Youth ^a | 100 | 5.7 | 8.8 |
| All Adult ^a | 74 | 3.1 | 4.1 |

^aFor method of derivation, see Table 2.3.

¹³These differences are significant at the .001 level of significance. We present only male age differentials, because we have too few observations relating to female offenders to warrant description.

Although youthful offenders tend to be more assaultive, the assaults which they commit tend to be less serious. This difference is reflected in our degree of injury data, as the following tabulation shows.

| <u>Offender</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Degree of Injury (percent)</u> | | |
|-----------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | | <u>Serious</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Minor</u> |
| Youth | 100 | 11 | 32 | 57 |
| Adult | 100 | 18 | 34 | 48 |

Our alternative index of seriousness, involving the presence or absence of a weapon in an incident, also reflects more favorably on youthful offenders. The data show that youthful offenders are much less likely to use a weapon in an assaultive incident than an adult offender.

| <u>Offender</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Was a Weapon Used in an Incident (percent)</u> | |
|-----------------|--------------|---|-----------|
| | | <u>Yes</u> | <u>No</u> |
| Youth | 100 | 16 | 84 |
| Adult | 100 | 37 | 63 |

One surprising, unanticipated finding is that youthful offenders are much more likely to commit an assault on a weekend (Saturday or Sunday) than an adult offender. The percentage of youthful incidents occurring on weekends is 26 percent, that of adults is only four percent.¹⁴

The higher assault rates for youthful offenders is also found when the population is stratified by race, as the following tabulation shows.

¹⁴ See Appendix A for institutional details.

Ratio of Youth Rates to Adult Rates (in percent)

| <u>All Races</u> | <u>White</u> | <u>Non-White</u> | <u>Black</u> |
|------------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| 1.84 | 1.59 | 1.95 | 1.97 |

Age does affect the propensity to assault; but, as the data suggest, the effect of age is more pronounced among non-whites.

CHAPTER III
CAUSES OF ASSAULT

This chapter is concerned with the immediate, precipitating causes of assault within the ten institutions. The results to be reported in this chapter are derived from all three data bases. In the following section, we examine the evidence directly available from the Offense Report and Superintendent Data Base.

A. CAUSES DIRECTLY CITED IN THE DOCUMENTS

1. Offense Report Data Base

We read all DC138 documents relating to our 126 incidents. We were able to determine the principal cause of assault in 96 of the incidents. The causes fall naturally into two major categories, one involving economic factors, the other involving what we have loosely defined as inmate interaction. The following tabulation shows that these two categories account for 94 percent of all response items, with the latter constituting a clear majority.

| <u>Cause of Assault</u> | <u>Number of Times Cited</u> | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|----------------|--|----------------|
| | <u>As Principal Cause</u> | | <u>As Principal or Secondary Cause</u> | |
| | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| <u>Total, All Causes</u> | <u>96</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>131</u> | <u>100</u> |
| <u>Economic</u> | <u>37</u> | <u>39</u> | <u>44</u> | <u>34</u> |
| Gambling | 4 | | 4 | |
| Debt and Other Money | 14 | | 16 | |
| Property | 19 | | 24 | |
| <u>Inmate Interaction</u> | <u>52</u> | <u>54</u> | <u>79</u> | <u>60</u> |
| Verbal Abuse | 26 | | 36 | |
| Horseplay | 8 | | 10 | |
| Revenge | 8 | | 14 | |
| Sex | 4 | | 10 | |
| Racial | 3 | | 6 | |
| Peer Group Position | 3 | | 3 | |
| <u>Mental Illness</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>8</u> | <u>6</u> |
| <u>Drug Related</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> | <u>0</u> |

2. Superintendent Data Base

The following question was posed to the superintendents of the ten institutions: "What do you think are the most likely causes of assaults?"

We recorded all causes suggested by the nine superintendents.¹ The actual causes mentioned, and the number of citations of each are reported below. (Obviously, the maximum number of times each cause can be cited is nine.)

We have grouped our causes into general categories. The reader can see that prison environment is regarded by the supervisors as the dominant factor precipitating assault. Combined economic factors and inmate interaction are equally important, but separately they are distinctly of secondary nature.

| <u>Cause of Assault</u> | <u>Times Cited</u> | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|------------|
| | No. | Percent |
| <u>Total, All Causes</u> | <u>34</u> | <u>100</u> |
| <u>Economic</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>18</u> |
| <u>Inmate Interaction</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>21</u> |
| Sex | 4 | |
| Race, Horseplay, Peer Pressure | 3 | |
| <u>Prison Environment</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>43</u> |
| Lack of Supervision | 4 | |
| Inmate Idleness | 5 | |
| Overcrowding | 6 | |
| <u>Age, Type of Inmate</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>12</u> |
| <u>Drugs</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>6</u> |

¹This question was not applicable to Burke.

3. Reconciling the Two Data Bases

The results of this tabulation are strikingly different from those derived from the Offense Report Data Base. For example, prison environment is not cited in the latter, but is the dominant cause in the former. The two sets of results are not necessarily contradictory, however. Due process requires that the disciplinary hearing confine itself to the specific circumstances surrounding the assaultive event. The question posed to the superintendents permits a broader view of the circumstances surrounding that event. Thus our two data bases may reflect essentially the same cause under two different categories. For example, a condition of overcrowding in inmate living quarters (superintendent's cause) may lead to verbal abuse among the inmates (DC138 cause), thereby precipitating an assault.

The fact that economic factors are accorded much more importance in the first tabulation than in the second, warrants comment. Several explanations come to mind. First, it could be that superintendents really do underestimate the importance of economic factors. Second, the superintendents may actually believe that economic factors are an important excuse for fighting (a precipitating cause), but that the elimination of money and property within the institution would lead to the same amount of assault, but with a different ostensible cause. Finally, the superintendents may have deemphasized economic factors in favor of those factors which are more susceptible to policy implementation.

B. CAUSES INFERRED FROM THE QUANTITATIVE RECORD

In this section we shall consider two general categories of causes which have immediate policy implications, viz. the effect of sanctions and of selected inmate characteristics.

1. Sanctions

It is widely believed that the crime rate, including the assault rate, vary inversely with the probability of being sanctioned for an offense, and inversely with the severity of the sanction. We have reason to believe that these two components of the sanction variable also operate within the ten institutions.

The presumption is that the closer the degree of supervision of the inmate population, the greater the probability that an offender will be sanctioned for an assault, and, accordingly, the less likely it is that he will commit that assault.²

The superintendent data support this view by suggesting that assault rates vary with the quantity and quality of supervision. When asked the following question: "Do you think that an increase in supervisory personnel would lead to a significant reduction in assaults in this institution?" seven of the nine superintendents responded, "Yes, definitely," and only one said that he doubted there would be much effect. When the supervisors were asked if assault could be reduced by reassigning personnel so that fewer manhours were devoted to non-supervisory activity, their response was virtually identical to the preceding question.

We do not mean to imply that all inmates respond to the likelihood of being punished. There is ample evidence that some would commit assault even when it is absolutely certain that they would be sanctioned. Notice that 46 percent of known assaults took place within the presence of an officer.

²One would expect the estimated Total Assault rate to vary inversely with the probability of being sanctioned. The known assault rate may not. On the one hand, an increase in supervision would tend to deter offenders and hence reduce the assault rate; but, on the other hand, an increase in supervision would imply that more assaults would be reported.

However, as long as a substantial subset of the inmate population does respond to the likelihood of being sanctioned, this variable could have a significant effect on the assault rate.³

The presumption that assault rates may vary inversely with the severity of sanctions is also supported, although, again, the evidence is fragmentary. A number of superintendents suggested that the informal handling of a minor assault, with the threat of disciplinary action, if the inmate recidivates, is a very effective deterrence for some classes of inmates. Some superintendents indicated they would like to use this policy, but are afraid of the possibility of legal complications.

Furthermore, some superintendents indicated that one of the most effective deterrents was the threat of reclassification. And, one superintendent argued that assault would be reduced if segregation were made less pleasant, as through the reintroduction of a monotonous diet.

2. Inmate Characteristics

In the preceding chapter we showed that male inmates are much more assaultive than female inmates, and that blacks are probably more assaultive than whites. Although these two characteristics of the inmate population do not lend themselves to policy innovation, a few comments concerning the racial aspects of assault seem warranted. In the main, however, we shall confine ourselves to the age and psychological characteristics of the inmate.

³The known assaultive population represents about four percent of the total inmate population. If half of these four percent do not respond to sanctions, we are left with a maximum of ninety eight percent of the inmate population who may be responsive. We simply do not know what the assault rate would be like if the probability of sanction were zero, but surely that assault rate would be many times the existing rate.

a. Racial Aspects of Assault

We confine ourselves to one dimension of the race question, viz. the relation of race to seriousness of assault. The following tabulation suggests that blacks are somewhat less likely than whites to use a weapon in an assault, but that an assault by a black tends to result in greater injury. Neither difference, however, is statistically significant.

| Race of Offender | Was a Weapon Used | | | Degree of Injury | | | |
|------------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|----------------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| | Yes | No | Total | Serious ^a | Moderate | Minor | Total |
| Blacks | 19 (25%) | 57 (75%) | 76 (100%) | 9 (12%) | 28 (39%) | 36 (49%) | 73 (100%) |
| White | 10 (29%) | 25 (71%) | 35 (100%) | 3 (10%) | 7 (23%) | 20 (67%) | 30 (100%) |
| Mixed | 3 (20%) | 12 (80%) | 15 (100%) | 3 (20%) | 5 (33%) | 7 (47%) | 15 (100%) |
| Total | 32 | 94 | 126 | 15 | 40 | 63 | 118 |

^aWe omit one incident involving an Indian committing a serious injury, which could be entered in row #1 of this column. The other three Indian offenders were involved in multi-racial incidents, and therefore are included in the tabulation (in the row #3).

b. Age

There is strong support, both theoretical and empirical, for the hypothesis that age is an important determinant of criminal behavior.⁴ Chapter 2 provided some confirmation for the hypothesis, by showing that adult institutions, on the average, had lower assault rates than youth

⁴Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey. Criminology, 9th ed. (New York: Lippincott, 1974), 121-126.

institutions. A breakdown of assault rates by more detailed age classes provides much stronger support for the hypothesis, as Table 3.1 indicates. The age-specific assault rate is highest for the youngest population, and declines strikingly as age increases. For example, the assault rate among 15-17 year olds is 3.4 times that of the 38-44 age group. ($3.4 = 1.68/0.49$). Using our age grouping, the population under 25 has a higher than average assault rate, those over 25 a less than average assault rate.

How is the age-assault rate relation to be explained? Theory suggests three general categories of causes which are relevant to a prison environment: sanctions, economic opportunities, and maturation.

(1) Sanctions

With respect to the non-institutional population, youthful offenders are less likely to be sanctioned for an offense; and, if they are sanctioned, the degree of severity is less. Is the same true for our ten institutions? The only concrete information which we have to offer is the fact that the proportion of assaults which are not reported is approximately 60 percent higher within youth institutions.⁵ This suggests that youths are less likely to be sanctioned for assault, and, consequently, that part of the explanation for higher youthful assault rates is due to this difference in sanctions.

We have not attempted to explore this issue any further, because the youth-adult assault rate differential might be affected by a number of other variables--e.g., the degree of supervision and the extent to which unofficial sanctions are imposed. Until the analysis accounts for the effects of these other variables, it is not possible to infer that the assault rate differentials are related to the probability of being sanctioned.

⁵From Table 2.3.

TABLE 3.1
ASSAULT RATES, BY AGE

| <u>Age</u> | <u>Inmate Population (June 1976)</u> | | <u>Assaults</u> | | <u>Age-Specific</u> |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|
| | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> | <u>No.</u> | <u>Percent</u> | <u>Assault Ratio</u> |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) = (4) ÷ (2) |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>4696</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>177</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>1.00</u> |
| 15-17 | 410 | 8.7 | 26 | 14.7 | 1.68 |
| 18-21 | 1558 | 33.2 | 84 | 47.5 | 1.43 |
| 22-25 | 880 | 18.7 | 38 | 21.5 | 1.15 |
| 26-29 | 745 | 15.9 | 15 | 8.5 | 0.53 |
| 30-33 | 375 | 8.0 | 8 | 4.5 | 0.57 |
| 34-37 | 223 | 4.8 | 2 | 1.1 | 0.24 |
| 38-44 | 219 | 4.7 | 4 | 2.3 | 0.49 |
| 45-51 | 161 | 3.4 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.00 |
| 52-64 | 112 | 2.4 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.00 |
| Over 64 | 13 | 0.3 | 0 | 0.0 | 0.00 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

Determining the relation between severity of sanctions and differences in assault rates by age is even more difficult. Extensive statistical analysis would be required, involving the isolation of such complicating variables as those cited above, and the need to cope with large institutional and temporal variation in the severity variable. Such analysis is beyond the purview of this report.

(2) Economic Opportunities

In the non-institutional population younger persons tend to have lower incomes. Hence the economic rewards from crime are relatively greater, and the economic losses from crime tend to be lower--loss of job through imprisonment, for example. It is thought that this combination of effects tends to produce a higher crime rate among youths. It may be that this combination of effects also operates within the prison population. Unfortunately, our data bases allow no assessment of the hypothesis that economic differentials are operative.

(3) Maturation

One theory presented as an explanation for the age-assault rate relation is based on the notion that persons who are strong, vigorous, and aggressive are more likely to commit crimes. And, it is thought that these qualities reach a maximum in the middle or late teens, and decline progressively thereafter. There is some evidence to support this contention with respect to the inmate population. First, we note that age-specific assault rates do exhibit a general decline. Second, some superintendents have observed that, in contrast to the adult population, youthful assaults are more spontaneous, often show little apparent motive, and are more frequently resolved by imposing a brief cooling off period on the inmate. Third, we observe that youthful offenders commit fewer assaults with weapons, and are

responsible for fewer assaults involving serious injury, which also supports the hypothesis that youths are motivated more by "animal spirits" than by deliberate, rational calculation.

c. Inmate Attitude

Inmates vary in their attitude toward violence. We would expect to find those inmates who approve of violence to be more violent themselves. Our inmate data base permits a test of the hypothesis that those who endorse violence are more assaultive. Approximately 300 inmates were given four hypothetical situations to consider. In each case, inmate Green, faced with a problem situation, assaults inmate Blue. The interviewee was asked whether he approved, disapproved, or was indifferent concerning Green's assault.⁶ Later in the interview, the inmate was asked if he had assaulted another inmate within the past five months. We have cross-tabulated the inmate's self-confessed history of assault with his attitude toward assault. The results are presented below.⁷

| <u>Did Inmate Commit Assault</u> | <u>Was Green's Assault Justified</u> | | | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|--------------|
| | <u>Yes</u> | <u>Indifferent</u> | <u>No</u> | |
| Yes | 173 (45%) | 71 (19%) | 140 (36%) | 384 (100%) |
| No | 227 (32%) | 163 (23%) | 322 (45%) | 712 (100%) |
| Total | 400 | 234 | 462 | 1096 |

Source: Inmate Data Base

⁶ See Appendix B for the particular questions posed to the inmates.

⁷ There are less than 1200 responses in the tabulation because some inmates did not respond to all four questions.

The hypothesis is confirmed: those who commit assault are much more likely to approve of assault.⁸ For example, 45 percent of those who committed assault approved of Green's behavior, while only 32 percent of the non-assaultive population approved of it.

It is clear that the superintendents recognize the importance of the inmate's attitude as a factor in assaultive behavior. Their view is expressed in a number of ways:

- (i) Three institutions say that assaults had increased in recent years because a larger proportion of the inmate population were hard-core criminal types.
- (ii) Some institutions say that their assault rates were relatively low because they had "higher quality" inmates.
- (iii) Several institutions would like to isolate assaultive, or potentially assaultive, inmates from the general population.
- (iv) One institution wants to segregate inmates by finer custody grade classes.
- (v) One institution wants a more careful classification of the inmate upon entry into the system.
- (vi) One institution wants to segregate potential victims.

Presumably, one function of classification by custody grade is to segregate inmates with respect to their potential for violence. In Chapter II we saw no pattern to assault rates by custody grade. Such a result is not inconsistent with having more assaultive inmates in closer custody. Indeed, as we shall show in Chapter V, an optimal deployment of supervisory personnel would result in equal assault rates across custody grades.

⁸The difference is statistically significant at the .01 level.

However, supervision cannot be expected to fully control for the degree of injury associated with assault. One would expect the more assaultive inmates to inflict more serious harm. Our data confirm this. The percentage of assaults resulting in serious harm increases dramatically with closeness of custody.

| <u>Custody Grade</u> | <u>Degree of Injury</u> | | | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | <u>Serious</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Minor</u> | |
| Minimum | 1 (5%) | 6 (29%) | 14 (66%) | 21 (100%) |
| Medium (incl. Safekeeper) | 9 (13%) | 24 (35%) | 36 (52%) | 69 (100%) |
| Close | 3 (19%) | 6 (38%) | 7 (44%) | 16 (100%) |
| Maximum (incl. Death Row) | 3 (27%) | 3 (27%) | 5 (46%) | 11 (100%) |
| Total | 16 | 39 | 62 | 117 |

C. MOTIVATIONAL VS. OPPORTUNITY FACTORS

If we define an inmate's likelihood of committing assault (L) as $L = f(Z)$, where Z represents a collection of environmental variables, then we can formally distinguish between motivation and opportunity as determinants of assault. Any factor belonging to Z is then defined as an opportunity variable. Any factor causing a shift in the L function is defined as a motivation variable.⁹ Thus, Z represents the external environment affecting

⁹ If inmates i and j have identical Z vectors but different L values, then we say the function has shifted, and we ascribe the shift to factors peculiar to the inmate himself.

the inmate, and the shift in the L function represents a change in the inmate's value system, or preference, or taste for assault; i.e. it relates to factors internal to the inmate.

The results developed in this chapter lead us to believe that both motivation and opportunity factors have contributed to assault. Among the motivation factors which we have examined in this chapter, certainly the age of the inmate, in so far as we were able to identify the motivational effect (maturation process),¹⁰ must be regarded as very important. We have also shown that the inmate's attitude toward violence is an important motivating factor.

Among the opportunity factors, we have seen that the possibility of economic gain, of inmate interaction, and of a lack of activity incline the inmate toward assaultive behavior, while the degree of supervision and the severity of sanctions tend to restrain assaultive behavior.

From a policy point of view, it would be desirable to measure the relative importance of the motivation and opportunity factors. Unfortunately, the data do not permit any quantitative assessment of their relative contribution to assault.

¹⁰We have identified three components of the age variable: maturation, and differential sanctions and economic opportunities. The latter two are opportunity factors.

CHAPTER IV

EXTENT AND CAUSES OF VICTIMIZATION

A. DEFINITIONS

We define a "pure" victimization as an event in which, without provocation, one inmate or custodial official is physically assaulted by another inmate. And we define a pure victimization rate -- hereafter referred to as PVR -- as the ratio of the number of pure victimizations to the inmate population. This definition only asks if a victimization took place. It does not account for degrees of victimization -- e.g., the extent of physical injury to the victim, or the extent to which the inmate contributed to his own victimization through provocation. Furthermore, the definition excludes instances of theft, fraud, robbery, and extortion -- i.e., crimes against the person or against his property which do not involve actual physical aggression against that person. Hence, our definition is rather restrictive. Ideally, we would have preferred a definition of victimization which included these other crimes, and which recognized that victimization is a continuous variable, but data limitations precluded our adopting a wider definition.

Data limitations also prevent the development of a uniform empirical measure of "pure" victimization. In this report, we shall use a variety of measures of victimization, dictated by the exigencies of our data bases. Although these measures of victimization are empirically different, they have, as their common basis, the fact that a person was physically assaulted.

These measures are defined as follows:

1. Superintendent Data Base

The best way to define the victimization measure which is based upon our superintendent data is to present, verbatim, the question posed to each of the ten institutions:

In some assaults it would be fair to say that there is no victim. For example, inmate Green might call inmate Brown a homosexual, and thereby precipitate a fight between Green and Brown, a fight which results, at most, in minor bruises to one or both parties. In this instance, it would be hard to say that either Green or Brown was victimized.

But there are other cases in which it is obvious that one inmate has been victimized. For example, Green might assault Brown without the slightest provocation, or because he wants to rob Brown. In this case Brown has been victimized.

Let us focus on these genuine cases of victimization, cases in which one inmate is assaulted, and in which the assault was unprovoked, undeserved, unjust, unfair, and so forth; so that we can truthfully say that the inmate was a victim: he ended up on the short end of the stick. (In this question we refer only to crimes against the person, not to crimes against property.)

We expected this measure of victimization to provide us with a subjective estimate of the PVR. We have reason to believe, however, that some superintendent's interpreted the definition much more broadly; and that, as a result, the superintendent estimate is upward biased.¹

¹We discuss this bias below.

3. Inmate Data Base

In April/May, 1971, the following two questions were posed to the inmates belonging to the Inmate Data Base.

"Since January 1, 1971, have other inmates done any of these things to you?

1. Hit you with an object (broom handle, lead pipe, knife, etc.)
2. Hit you or roughed you up, using only head, fists, legs, etc."

A response of yes to either #1, #2, or both questions provides a measure hereafter referred to as gross inmate victimization.

This measure of the victimization rate will tend to overstate the PVR because it does not account for the fact that the inmate may have provoked the incident, or may have been equally responsible for the incident,

In April/May, 1971, the inmate was also asked the following two questions:

"Since January 1, 1971 have you done any of these things to another inmate?

3. Hit him with an object (broom handle, lead pipe, knife, etc.)
4. Hit him or roughed him up using only head, fists, legs, etc.

A response of yes to either #1, #2, or both, and a response of no to both #3 and #4 provides a measure hereafter referred to as net inmate victimization. Thus a net victim is an inmate who alleges that he was assaulted, and also alleges that he, himself, committed no assault during the survey period. We believe that this estimate is also upward biased, because we cannot assess the degree to which the inmate was responsible for provoking the assault.

2. Offense Report Data Base

The basic approach to this measure of victimization is as follows: we determine the total number of inmates involved in an assaultive incident (A), the total number of inmates charged with an assault in that incident (B), and, in gang-type incidents, the total number of inmates not charged, but who are actively aggressive in that incident (C), as determined by our reading of the Offense Report documents. The number of victims (V) in an incident then becomes $V = A - B - C$. A typical example of a victim is this: Two inmates are involved in a fight, and one is charged with assault. We define the other inmate as the victim.

This measure of the victimization rate will overstate the PVR ("pure" victimization rate) because some of the inmates whom we define as victims actually provoked the assault -- e.g. through verbal abuse, racial slurs, etc. -- and some might have been equally guilty of assault but might not have been charged because of insufficient evidence. In our judgment, based on a reading of the Offense Report documents, in approximately 70-80 percent of the cases of victimization, as we define it with respect to this data base, the victim contributed in one way or another to his victimization. Hence, the PVR would tend to be much lower than the reported rate.

On the other hand, this measure of victimization will tend to understate the PVR because it is based on known, rather than Estimated Total, assaultive incidents. We shall argue below that the net effect of these two biases will be to overstate the PVR.

B. EXTENT OF VICTIMIZATION

1. Victimization Rates

We have generated four estimates of victimization. Two of these are based on the ten institutions during the last quarter of 1975, and two on the inmate survey. The range of victimization rates obtained from these sources are, respectively, 1.7 - 10.6 and 5.8 - 19.4, as the following tabulation shows.

| <u>Data Base</u> | <u>Population Base</u> | <u>Victimization</u> | |
|------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | | <u>Number</u> | <u>Rate/3 months</u> |
| Offense Report | 4495 | 76 | 1.7 |
| Superintendent | 4495 | 154-478 | 3.4-10.6 |
| Inmate | | | |
| net victim. | 303 | 29 | 5.8 |
| gross victim. | 303 | 98 | 19.4 |


We believe this wide variation in victimization rates is largely due to differences in definition of victimization. As we argued above, none of the estimates is a measure of the PVR. In our judgment, the Offense Report Data Base comes closest to this estimate. We have seen that all estimates permit some persons to be counted as victims who provoked the assault. The Offense Report Data Base provides an estimate of the proportion of victims who provoked their victimization. This proportion, together with the Offense Report victimization rate, allows us to establish, as our best guess, an upper bound value of 0.6 percent for the PVR.² That is, we believe that the pure victimization rate is no

²Our estimate is based on the following argument. First, we reason that an assault involving a victim would be regarded by a custodial official as being at least as important as an assault in which both parties share

[footnote 2 continued on next page]

greater than six inmates per thousand per three month period, or an annual rate of 2.4 percent.

The other victimization rates are still useful, however. We suggest that victimization, defined simply to mean that a person is assaulted, is functionally related to the degree to which he, himself, contributed to the assault. The relation might be depicted as follows:



some responsibility, and, accordingly, that the official would be at least as likely to report an assault involving a victim. This being so, the following relation would hold

$$(1) \frac{V_R}{A_R} \geq \frac{V_T}{A_T},$$

where A and V represent the number of assaults and victimizations, respectively, and R and T represent reported and actual values. From Table 2.3 we know that

$$(2) A_R = (1 - .29)A_T, \text{ whence}$$

$$(3) V_T \leq 1.41V_R.$$

If the ratio of known pure victimizations to known victimizations is .2 - .3, as we stated above, and if this ratio also holds for actual victimization, then the actual number of pure victimization (PV) would be, on the average,

$$(4) PV = .25 V_T \leq (.25)(1.41)V_R = .35V_R.$$

If we divide both sides of Equation (4) by the inmate population, we obtain a relation involving the pure victimization rate (PVR) and Offense Report victimization rate

$$(5) PVR \leq .35(1.7) = \underline{\underline{0.60}}.$$

Q.E.D.

We suggest that the differences in victimization rates reported in the above tabulation are due to differences in the degree to which the inmate contributed to his own victimization. For example, the net inmate victimization rate of 5.8 percent takes no account of the victim's own culpability. The Offense Report data accounts for this factor, but only to the extent that he was, himself, not convicted of an offense. Hence, the latter data base should provide a lower victimization rate; which, of course, it does.

We also suspect that the superintendent data reflect varying degrees of inmate culpability. Despite our effort to obtain a PVR estimate from the superintendents, we believe some superintendents gave us victimization rates which included victimizations in which the inmate was partially contributory to the assault.³

In effect, therefore, these data permit the reader to choose among a broad range of victimization rates, depending on the degree to which he would allow the victim to contribute to his own victimization.

2. Distributional Aspects of Victimization

Our Offense Report Data permit us to describe the distribution of inmates by number of times the inmate was victimized during our survey period. The data, shown below, indicate that 71 inmates were victimized, five of them twice, and none more than twice.

³This is particularly evident from the extreme variation in estimates across institutions and within institutions. See Table 3-1.

| <u>Number of Times Victimized</u> | <u>Inmates</u> | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| 0 | 4424 | 98.42 |
| 1 | 66 | 1.47 |
| 2 | 5 | .11 |
| More than 2 | 0 | .00 |
| Total | <u>4495</u> | <u>100.00</u> |

For the ten institutions, we are able to present two sets of estimates of the victimization rate. These appear in Table 4.1. The Offense Report data indicate a range of victimization rates from zero (for two institutions) to 2.7 per 100 inmates per three month period. The Superintendent data indicate a higher average level and a much greater range of victimization (0 to 52.8 per 100 inmates). As we indicated earlier, we believe that the differences in overall level, in rates among institutions, and in rates within some institutions -- notably Harnett and Polk -- can be attributed to differences in definition of victimization. Notice that, when a uniform definition of victimization is used, as with the Offense Report data, the range of variation among institutions is much less pronounced.

C. DEGREE OF SERIOUSNESS OF VICTIMIZATION

For the 118 incidents for which the degree of injury could be determined, the Offense Report Data base indicates that victims and now-victims were subjected to approximately the same risk of being seriously injured (14 percent vs. 13 percent, as the following tabulation shows). On the other hand, a victim was somewhat more likely to be moderately injured (37 percent vs. 29 percent).

TABLE 4.1
 VICTIMIZATION, SUPERINTENDENT AND OFFENSE REPORT DATA BASES:
 TEN INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| <u>Institution</u> | <u>Superintendent Data Base</u> | | <u>Offense Report Data Base</u> | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Rate (%)</u> | <u>Number</u> | <u>Rate (%)</u> |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>154-478</u> | <u>3.4 - 10.6</u> | <u>76</u> | <u>1.7</u> |
| Western | 45-54 | 8.4 - 10.1 | 13 | 2.4 |
| Harnett | 9-270 | 1.8 - 52.8 | 17 | 2.3 |
| Polk | 75-120 | 14.1 - 22.9 | 10 | 2.0 |
| Sandhills | 3 | 2.2 | 4 | 2.0 |
| Burke | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Central | 3 | 0.2 | 19 | 1.6 |
| Caledonia | 1 | 0.2 | 6 | 1.0 |
| Odom | 6-12 | 1.6 - 3.1 | 4 | 1.0 |
| Blanch | 12-15 | 10.9 - 13.6 | 3 | 2.7 |
| NCCCW | ≅ 0 | 0 | 0 | 0. |

| <u>Did Incident Involve a Victim</u> | <u>Degree of Injury</u> | | | |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | <u>Serious</u> | <u>Moderate</u> | <u>Minor</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| Yes | 10 (14%) | 26 (37%) | 35 (49%) | 71 (100%) |
| No | 6 (13%) | 14 (29%) | 28 (58%) | 48 (100%) |
| Total | 16 | 40 | 63 | 119 |

We shall not discuss sexual victimization in this section. The number of incidents of sexual assault and number of sexual victimizations are identical, and the former has already been described in Chapter II (pp. 12-13).

D. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Race Differences

Our Offense Report data show that whites are much more likely to be victimized than blacks. During the three month period, approximately 2.2 percent of the white inmate population was victimized. The corresponding victimization rate for the black population was 1.2 percent -- or 45 percent lower. The Inmate Data Base yields a net white inmate victimization rate of 12 percent, and a black rate of 7.5 percent. The corresponding gross inmate victimization rates are 41 and 26 percent, respectively.

2. Age Differences

The following table, based on the Offense Report Data Base, shows that adult victimization rates are much lower than youth rates. Indeed, the data reveal a very strong inverse relation between age and victimization. Inmates 25 years of age and younger are subjected to higher than average

rates of victimization; those over 25, are subjected to substantially lower than average rates.

TABLE 4.2
AGE-SPECIFIC VICTIMIZATION RATES:
TEN INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| <u>Age</u> | <u>Inmate Population (Percent)</u> | <u>Victimizations (Percent of total)</u> | <u>Victimization Ratio (Percent)</u> | <u>Victimization/ Assault Ratio^a (Percent)</u> |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) = (2) ÷ (1) | (4) |
| <u>Total, All Ages</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>100.0</u> | <u>100</u> | <u>100</u> |
| 15-17 | 8.7 | 17.8 | 204 | 121 |
| 18-21 | 33.2 | 46.6 | 140 | 98 |
| 22-25 | 18.7 | 20.6 | 110 | 96 |
| 26-29 | 15.9 | 6.8 | 43 | 81 |
| 30-33 | 8.0 | 1.4 | 17 | 30 |
| 34-37 | 4.8 | 1.4 | 29 | 121 |
| 38-44 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 88 | 182 |
| 45-51 | 3.4 | 1.4 | 40 | b |
| 52-64 | 2.4 | 0.0 | 0 | - |
| Over 64 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0 | - |

^aColumn (3) of this table + column (5) of Table 3.1.

^bUndefined, since the denominator equals zero.

3. Differences by Custody Grade

In order to estimate victimization rates by custody grade, one needs to know the custody grade of the victim. We do not have these data. Accordingly, we present data relating victimization to the custody grade of the offender. Thus, our data measure the offender's propensity to victimize, rather than the inmate's risk of being victimized.

If the victim and the offender are always of the same grade, the victimization rate and propensity to victimize would be identical. Our Offense Report data indicate that nine of the 126 incidents (seven percent) involve offenders from two custody levels, which suggests that offenders do victimize across custody levels. However, since seven percent is a small proportion, we believe that the data presented in Table 4.3 do provide an approximate estimate of victimization rates by custody grade.

These data reveal no obvious relation between closeness of custody and victimization. The range is fairly narrow compared to sex,⁴ race, and age differences: minimum custody had the lowest victimization rate (1.3 percent) while maximum custody had the highest (1.9 percent),

E. VICTIMIZATION OF CUSTODIAL OFFICIALS

There were twelve staff victimizations in the survey period. By institution, these break down as follows: five in Central -- four of which involved mental patients -- four in Western, and one each in Odom, Caledonia and Harnett. Deriving a staff victimization rate is difficult.

⁴There were no female victimizations reported, hence we have not considered sex explicitly in this chapter.

TABLE 4,3
VICTIMIZATION BY CUSTODY GRADE

| <u>Did Incident Involve Victim</u> | <u>Custody Grade</u> | | | | <u>Total</u> |
|---|----------------------|------------------------------------|--------------|--|--------------|
| | <u>Minimum</u> | <u>Medium (incl. Safekeep)</u> | <u>Close</u> | <u>Maximum (incl. Death Row)</u> | |
| No | 8 | 30 | 5 | 5 | 48 |
| Yes | <u>13</u> | <u>44</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>75</u> |
| Total | 21 | 74 | 17 | 11 | 123 |
| Victim/ Population Ratio | .013 | .018 | .015 | .019 | .017 |
| Percent of Incidents Involving Victim | 62 | 59 | 71 | 55 | 61 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base.

The rate should measure the degree of risk which the staff experiences. Ideally, this rate should be based on the number of assaults per manhour of inmate contact. There were 1543 staff members in the ten institutions in 1975 - IV. If we can assume that these persons spent, on the average, 70 percent of their time in contact with the inmate population, then the twelve assaults produce a victimization rate of 1.1 percent. This means that a staff member spending all his shift time in contact with inmates has a 1.1 percent chance of being victimized in a three-month period. This rate is almost twice the pure victimization rate (PVR) experienced by inmates.

Another way of viewing staff victimization rates is to consider the risk of victimization in the event of an assaultive incident. The following tabulation shows that an officer was victimized in one out of ten incidents. If we consider only those incidents in which an officer was

| <u>Type of Victimization</u> | <u>Incidents</u> | |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| | <u>Number</u> | <u>Percent</u> |
| <u>Total, All Types</u> | <u>126</u> | <u>100.0</u> |
| No staff victimization | 114 | 90.5 |
| Staff was direct victim | 9 | 7.1 |
| Staff was third-party victim ^a | 3 | 2.4 |

^a Staff member was assaulted while trying to deal with an assaultive incident involving two inmates.

Source: Offense Report Data Base

present during the assault, the rate is thirteen percent.

F. CAUSES OF VICTIMIZATION

This section is concerned with the immediate, precipitating causes of victimization within the ten institutions. Underlying the analysis is the requirement that we distinguish between assault and other (assault-specific) factors as determinants of victimization. We turn to this task first.

1. The Victimization/Assault Relation

Analytically, the relation between the victimization rate (V/P) and the assault rate (A/P) can be expressed as

$$\frac{V}{P} = \frac{V}{A} \cdot \frac{A}{P},$$

where V, A, and P represent the number of victimizations, number of assaults, and the population, respectively. That is, the victimization rate can be decomposed into two effects: the assault effect (A/P) and the assault-specific effect (V/A). The former expresses the relation between assault and victimization, the latter the relation of the victimization rate to the number of victimizations, holding the assault rate constant.

Let us now empirically examine the relation between the victimization rate (V/P) and the assault rate (A/P). A victimization cannot occur without an assault, but an assault can occur without a victimization. Hence, one would expect to find a positive correlation between victimization and assault, but not necessarily a very close correlation. Our Offense Report data permit an estimate of the relation. We computed the rank correlation between the ten institutional victimization rates reported in Table 4.1, column (4) and the corresponding assault rates of Table 2.3, column (3). The coefficient equals 0.92, which indicates that the rates V/P and A/P have a high degree of covariation,⁵ with assault rates tending to be 3 1/3 times higher. One might also say that variations in assault rates (A/P) provide most of the explanation for variations in victimization rates (V/P).

Since assaults and victimizations are such closely related phenomena, the same motivation and opportunity factors that precipitate assault can be

⁵ This is statistically significant at the .01 level.

assumed to precipitate victimization. The reader may therefore refer to the results which we presented in the preceding chapter for an approximate explanation for the (dominant) A/P effect on victimization. In this chapter we shall concentrate our attention on the V/P effect; i.e. we shall fix our attention on those factors which produce victimization rates which are disproportionate to their corresponding assault rates.

1. Causes Directly Cited in the Offense Report Data Base

We read all DC138 documents relating to our 126 incidents. We were able to determine the immediate, precipitating causes relating to 96 of these incidents. Furthermore, we were able to distinguish between those incidents involving a victim and those not involving a victim. Table 4.4 shows the distribution of causes by type of incident.

One result of interest is that economic factors seem to be an important contributor to victimization. Assaults involving inmate interaction account for more victimizations than assaults involving economic factors (28 vs. 24 victimizations). However, this is due to the fact that, in general, there are more assaults deriving from inmate interaction than from economic factors, (54 vs. 39 assaults). (This is the A/P effect.) Actually, economic factors are very important as a contributor to victimization. For example, while economic factors account for only 43 percent of victimizations, and inmate interaction for 50 percent, it is also true that an incident precipitated by economic factors is much more likely to produce a victim than an incident precipitated by inmate interaction ($24/37 = 65\%$ vs. $28/52 = 54\%$). Indeed, verbal abuse and horseplay, two important components of inmate interaction, are much less likely to produce a victim than any

TABLE 4.4

DISTRIBUTION OF CAUSES OF ASSAULT BY
PRINCIPAL AND SECONDARY CAUSE AND BY
PRESENCE OF A VICTIM

| <u>Cause of Assault</u> | <u>Number of Times Cited</u> | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|------------------|--|------------------|------------------|
| | <u>As Principal Cause</u> | | | <u>As Principal or Secondary Cause</u> | | |
| | <u>Victim</u> | <u>No Victim</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Victim</u> | <u>No Victim</u> | <u>Total</u> |
| <u>Total, All Causes</u> | <u>56</u> | <u>40</u> | <u>96</u> | <u>76</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>127</u> |
| <u>Economic</u> | <u>24</u> (65%) | <u>13</u> (35%) | <u>37</u> (100%) | <u>26</u> (65%) | <u>14</u> (35%) | <u>40</u> (100%) |
| <u>Gambling</u> | 3 | 1 | | 3 | 1 | |
| <u>Debt & Other</u> | | | | | | |
| <u>Money</u> | 10 | 4 | | 12 | 4 | |
| <u>Property</u> | 11 | 8 | | 11 | 9 | |
| <u>Inmate Interaction</u> | <u>28</u> (54%) | <u>24</u> (46%) | <u>52</u> (100%) | <u>46</u> (58%) | <u>33</u> (42%) | <u>79</u> (100%) |
| <u>Verbal Abuse</u> | 12 | 14 | | 18 | 18 | |
| <u>Horseplay</u> | 4 | 4 | | 4 | 6 | |
| <u>Revenge</u> | 5 | 3 | | 10 | 4 | |
| <u>Sex</u> | 3 | 1 | | 8 | 2 | |
| <u>Race</u> | 2 | 1 | | 4 | 2 | |
| <u>Peer Group</u> | | | | | | |
| <u>Position</u> | 2 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | |
| <u>Mental Illness</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>8</u> |

other factor in the table (16/34 = 47%).

Thus, looking at the details of the table, we see that victimizing inmates are more likely to be motivated by money, sex, and revenge than by other factors.

2. Causes Inferred from the Quantitative Record

In this section we shall consider the two general categories of causes which were dealt with in Chapter III, viz. the effect of sanctions

and of selected inmate characteristics.

a. Sanctions

In Chapter III we argued that the assault rate varied inversely with the probability of being sanctioned and with the severity of the sanction. Hence, we may infer that the victimization rate also varies inversely with the sanctions variable. We do have some fragmentary, but direct evidence to support this inference.

The probability of being sanctioned should vary directly with the degree of supervision. Is there a relation between the degree of supervision and the likelihood of victimization? The question can be answered from several different points of view. First, we observe from the following Offense Report data that a disproportionately large number of victimizations occur when an officer was not present during the assault. In 79 percent of

| <u>Did</u> <u>Incident</u> <u>Involve Victim</u> | <u>Presence of Officer With Respect to Incident</u> | | | <u>Total</u> |
|--|---|--|------------------------------|--------------|
| | <u>Present When</u> <u>Incident Began</u> | <u>Appeared While</u> <u>Incident in Progress</u> | <u>Not</u> <u>Present</u> | |
| No | 23 (49%) | 14 (30%) | 10 (21%) | 47 (100%) |
| Yes | 32 (43%) | 18 (25%) | 23 (32%) | 73 (100%) |
| Total | 55 (46%) | 32 (27%) | 33 (27%) | 120 (100%) |

the victimless incidents an officer was present sometime during the assault; while, with respect to victimizing incidents, an officer was only present 68 percent of the time. There are two possible interpretations for this difference. First, an officer on the scene has more information about the assault, and may be less likely to declare one of the parties to the assault to be a victim. Second, an incident involving a victim is more likely to be premeditated, to take cognizance of the risk of detection, and, therefore,

to occur outside the presence of an officer.

Further evidence to support the hypothesis that victimization and the degree of supervision are related is given by the following tabulation. In 11 percent of the victimless incidents, an inmate was the source of the

| <u>Did Incident Involve Victim</u> | <u>Initial Source of Information</u> | | | | <u>Total</u> |
|--|--------------------------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| | <u>Visual</u> | <u>Sound</u> | <u>Inmate</u> | <u>Other</u> | |
| No | 31 (67%) | 8 (17%) | 5 (11%) | 2 (4%) | 46 (100%) |
| Yes | 39 (56%) | 9 (13%) | 21 (30%) | 1 (1%) | 70 (100%) |
| Total | 70 (60%) | 17 (15%) | 26 (22%) | 3 (3%) | 116 (100%) |

information concerning the assault; whereas, in victimizing incidents, an inmate was the source of information 30 percent of the time.

Thus, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that more supervision reduces victimization, both because it reduces assault, -- the A/P effect -- and also because victimizers seem particularly sensitive to the risk of being sanctioned -- the V/A effect. We cannot be certain of the latter conclusion, however, because it is possible that observed assault, compared to assault known indirectly, as through inmate testimony, may be less likely to lead to an inmate being defined as a victim. Our own intuitive impression is that this definitional bias cannot be large enough to account for the observed difference; which is to say that we believe that victimizers are more sensitive to the risk of being punished than other assaultive inmates.

b. Inmate Characteristics

(1) Race

Race has two important victimization effects. The dominant fact is that the race of the victim and the assailant tend to be the same, as the following tabulation shows. In 61 percent of the Offense Report incidents involving a victim, both victim and assailant are of the same race. The other 39 percent of the incidents -- the multiracial incidents -- show that blacks are more likely to assault whites than whites are to assault blacks; i.e., the data show that race is less of a barrier to black victimizers than to white victimizers.

| <u>Race of Victim</u> | <u>Race of Offender</u> | | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------|
| | <u>White</u> | <u>Nonwhite</u> | |
| White | 18 (78%) | 23 (47%) | 41 |
| Nonwhite | 5 (22%) | 26 (53%) | 31 |
| Total | 23 (100%) | 49 (100%) | 72 |

Since whites tend to have lower assault rates the A/P effect tends to produce lower white victimization rates compared to black rates, but the assault-specific effect (V/A) -- in this case, the racial cross-over effect, blacks assaulting whites -- produces the higher white victimization rate.

(2) Age

Age-specific victimization rates roughly parallel age-specific assault rates -- that is, there is a strong, positive A/P effect. Generally speaking, assault and victimization both decline with an increase in age.

The V/A effect is not so regular, however. We have recorded the V/A effect in Table 4.2, column (4), above. Therein we observe disproportionately high victimization rates for the 15-17 age group and for those in the over-33 age group.

The reason for the disproportionately high victim/assault rate for the older group is due to the fact that older persons are less prone to horseplay and verbal abuse, or, at least, are less likely to respond in an assaultive way to these provoking factors. Hence, the mix of causes precipitating an assault changes with age. Accordingly, a larger proportion of assaultive incidents will be provoked by factors that tend to produce a victim, i.e., money, sex, and revenge become relatively more important among the causes producing assault in the over-33 age group. Thus, the older inmate stands less chance of being victimized because assault rates are much lower, but this effect is somewhat offset by changes in the motive for assault within his age group. We are less sure of the explanation for the disproportionately high victim/assault rate for the 15-17 year age group. Our best guess is that there is greater variation in factors such as physical size which provide a larger proportion of "easy marks" within this age group for the assaultive inmate,⁶ Thus the 15-17 year old stands more of a chance of being victimized because assault rates -- the A/P effect -- are higher in his age group and also because of a positive V/A effect.

⁶The "easy mark" hypothesis could also be used to explain the higher victim/assault rate within the over-33 age group.

One would expect that, on the average, the victim would be weaker than his assailant. A derivative inference might be that the victim tends to be younger (or older!) than his assailant. Our Offense Report data permit a comparison of the age of the victim with that of his assailant. In 34 percent of the cases the victim was younger than his assailant, in 40 percent of the cases he was older. (In the remaining 26 percent of the cases, they were of the same age.) Thus, on the average, the victim does tend to be older than his assailant, but the difference in proportions is too small to support the hypothesis that, in general, the victim is older than his assailant.

(3) Inmate Attitude

We have argued in Chapter III that assault is related to inmate attitude. We now wish to consider the relation between victimization and inmate attitude. It seems reasonable to suppose that a pure victim, in the sense defined in the introduction to this chapter, would be a person who is not aggressive, and who eschews violence and the instruments of violence. As we begin to admit increasing degrees of culpability into the definition of a victim, we would expect our victim to be less opposed to violence and the use of the instruments of violence. In the following section, we develop a statistical model which permits a test of the relation between victimization and inmate attitude.

(a) The Statistical Model

The Inmate Data Base can be used to relate net and gross inmate victimization, as defined in the introduction to this chapter, to two direct measures of inmate attitude toward violence, three indirect measures of

attitude, and the age of the victim. Specifically, we propose to estimate a linear relation of the following form:

$$V_i = b_0 + b_1 \text{ JUST} + b_2 \text{ FORCE} + b_3 \text{ GUN} + b_4 V_j + b_5 \text{ CUST} \\ \dots + b_6 \text{ AGE} + \mu,$$

where $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, $j = 2, 4$, and

V_1 = Net inmate victim. $V_1 = 1$ if inmate was assaulted but did not commit assault. Otherwise $V_1 = 0$

V_2 = Gross inmate victim. $V_2 = 1$ if inmate was assaulted. Otherwise $V_2 = 0$.

V_3 = Net inmate offender. $V_3 = 1$ if inmate assaulted another inmate, but was not himself the victim of assault. Otherwise $V_3 = 0$.

V_4 = Gross inmate offender. $V_4 = 1$ if inmate assaulted another inmate. Otherwise $V_4 = 0$.

JUST = Is inmate assault justified? Based on response to four problem situations described in Appendix C. Yes = 2, Indifferent = 1, No = 0, for each problem situation. Thus, $0 \leq \text{JUST} \leq 8$.

FORCE = Should an inmate use force if he needs something badly? Yes = 1, No = 0.

GUN = Does the inmate possess a weapon? Yes = 1, No = 0,

CUST = Inmate custody grade. Maximum = 4, Close = 3, Medium = 2, Minimum = 1.

Age = Age of inmate in years.

μ = A random, normalized error term.

The questions relevant to our model, and used to derive our data, are found in Appendix B.

(b) The Statistical Results

The above linear relation was estimated, using a multiple regression procedure. The b coefficients which we have estimated, using our four dependent variables (V_i), are presented below in Table 4.4,

TABLE 4.4

REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR VICTIMIZATION
/INMATE ATTITUDE RELATION
(Absolute t values in parentheses)^a

| Equation | Dependent Variable | Independent Variable | | | | | | | R ² |
|----------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | | JUST | FORCE | GUN | V ₄ | V ₂ | CUST | AGE | |
| (1) | V ₂ | -.00 (.08) | .03 (.42) | .20 (3.03) | - | - | -.05 (1.74) | -.02 (5.32) | .14 |
| (2) | V ₂ | -.01 (.77) | .03 (.44) | .02 (.34) | .47 (8.90) | - | -.04 (1.71) | -.01 (3.57) | .32 |
| (3) | V ₁ | -.00 (.26) | .10 (1.97) | -.07 (1.58) | - | - | -.00 (.16) | -.01 (2.04) | .03 |
| (4) | V ₄ | .02 (1.33) | .01 (.07) | .38 (5.89) | - | - | -.01 (.47) | -.01 (4.45) | .20 |
| (5) | V ₄ | .02 (1.53) | -.01 (.14) | .29 (4.97) | - | .45 (8.90) | .01 (.36) | -.01 (2.15) | .37 |
| (6) | V ₃ | .01 (1.71) | .08 (1.36) | .11 (2.36) | - | - | .03 (1.67) | -.00 (.53) | .07 |

^at values in excess of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.58 provide statistically significant values at the ten, five, and one percent levels of significance, respectively, on the assumption that the usual requirements for multiple regression hold -- in particular, that the error term is a random, normal variable with zero expectation.

Equations (1) and (2) suggest that the attitude toward violence of gross victims -- defined simply as those who have been assaulted -- is no different than the attitude of non-victims. The coefficients of JUST and FORCE are both close to zero. On the other hand, Equations (4) and (5) offer some evidence that gross offenders -- defined simply as those who have committed assault -- are more likely to justify the use of violence than non-offenders. However, they, too, do not appear to be more willing to use force to achieve their ends.

The relation between possession of a weapon and victimization is more clear-cut. Gross victims seem more likely to possess a weapon -- Equation (1) -- but when account is taken of their own assaultive history, as in Equation (2), we obtain the more plausible result that a victim is no more likely to possess a weapon than a non-victim. On the other hand, as we would expect, gross offenders are definitely more likely to possess a weapon, whether or not one allows for the fact that the offender was himself victimized.

Our analysis led us to believe that an inmate's own assaultive history contributes to the likelihood that he will become a victim. Equation (2) confirms this expectation by showing that the most important variable in explaining victimization is the fact that the victim was, himself, an assailant. Notice, also, that the addition of this variable to the model considerably increases its explanatory power (R^2 increases from 0.14 to 0.32).

We showed that one minimizes the overall victimization rate and assault rate by deploying one's staff across custody grades so as to equalize these two rates. If staff were, in fact, optimally deployed, the coefficient of custody grade with respect to victimization and assault

would be expected to be close to zero. Our assault equations have such coefficients, our victimization equations do not. The implication of these results is that staff are optimally distributed with respect to assault, but may be relatively overrepresented in the closer custody grades with respect to deterring victimization.

Finally, the age coefficients are negative, as we expected. Both victimization and assault are less likely to occur with older inmates.

The foregoing results pertain to gross victimization (and gross offense). Ideally, we would wish to provide the corresponding results for net victimization (and net offense). Unfortunately, our data grossly violate the conditions necessary for performing a multiple regression analysis.⁷ Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we report the results for these two variables in Equations (3) and (6). The results tend to support the findings of the other equations, except for the peculiar, rather contradictory results with respect to FORCE and GUN in Equation (3) -- results which we are at a loss to explain.

⁷ The dependent variables in these regressions are dichotomous. The closer their mean value is to zero or one, the further the expected value of the error term will depart from zero; and, accordingly, the greater will be the bias in the estimates of the coefficients and their t values. The mean value of net victimization is 0.09, which is, subjectively speaking, quite far from the ideal of 0.5.

CHAPTER V

POLICY DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. POLICY DISCUSSION

1. Demographic Reorganization

The results presented in this report suggest the need to reconsider the present organization of the inmate population. At the present time, this population is organized, or structured, with respect to several characteristics--sex, age, and potential for violence come readily to mind. One reason for this organization is to maintain an appropriate level of control over inmate contact. In the following sections we shall indicate why we believe there is a need to reconsider the present demographic structure. We hasten to add, however, that we shall not advocate any particular demographic restructuring. Our function is to suggest potentially fruitful areas for policy innovation, not to engage in advocacy.

a. Custody Grade

Presumably, one function of classifying inmates by custody grade is to segregate them by their propensity to commit assault. If, indeed, custody grade does segregate by the assaultive nature of the inmate, and if the objective is to minimize the overall assault rate, then supervisory manpower should be distributed across custody grades so as to produce equal assault rates within each grade. The formal proof for this contention is as follows.

If A is the total number of assaults committed, and c_i is the number of manhours of supervision for custody grade i , then the assault relation can be written as

$$(1) A = F(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k).$$

Let there be a fixed number of manhours available for supervision, K ; i.e.

$$(2) K = \sum_{i=1}^k c_i.$$

Combining Equations (1) and (2) we obtain

$$(3) A = F(c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k) - \lambda(\sum_{i=1}^k c_i - K),$$

where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier.

Assault is minimized with respect to manhour inputs when

$$(4) \frac{\delta f_1}{\delta c_1} = \frac{\delta f_2}{\delta c_2} = \dots = \frac{\delta f_k}{\delta c_k} = \lambda. \quad a$$

Consider the special case in which Equation (1) takes the log linear form

$$(5) A = \alpha_0 c_1^{\alpha_1} c_2^{\alpha_2} \dots c_k^{\alpha_k}.$$

This equation implies that a one percent increase in custody grade supervision c_i produces a constant percentage decrease in assault ($=\alpha_i$). If Equation (5) correctly describes the assault-supervision relation, then it can be shown that


$$(6) \frac{\delta f_i}{\delta c_i} = \frac{A}{c_i} \quad (i = 1, 2, \dots, k).$$

Equation (6) implies that assault rates are minimized when manhours are so distributed that assault rates are equal across custody grades.

Since assault and victimization are positively and highly correlated, one would expect this distribution of manhours to tend to minimize victimization rates as well.

^aTo assure that we have a minimum, rather than a maximum, it is necessary that the second derivatives be positive.

In Figure 5.1 we present a graphic description of the optimizing condition. Suppose there



are two custody grades, Min and Max, containing an equal number of inmates, and that inmates in Max are more assaultive. If, for example, the same amount of supervision, s_3 , is devoted to each, we would have an assault rate of a_0 in Min and a higher rate, a_2 , in Max. If a total of $(s_1 + s_2)$ manhours of supervision are available, then s_1 should be allocated to Min and s_2 to Max, thereby producing a uniform a_1 assault rate.

Suppose that Min is composed of inmates having different propensities to assault. The implication of the foregoing analysis is that the assault rate could be reduced by subdividing Min. Indeed, the assault rate can always be reduced as long as there are any two subpopulations which have different assaultive propensities.

How fine the classification, or subdivision, should be is a policy question, involving complex cost/benefit calculations; and is, of course, beyond the scope of this project. However, our data--especially our superintendent data--argue the possibility that the system would benefit from a finer degree of inmate classification. Such restructuring, assuming no change in staff, would probably reduce the assault rate; or, alternatively, would permit a reduction in staff with no increase in assault.

b. Age

The inmate population is presently segregated into three basic age groups. This structure appears to be reasonable because, as we have shown, youth and adults do behave differently. What we find, though, is that the present organization disguises great variation in assault and victimization rates within the adult population itself. This suggests the possibility of segregation by age within the adult population as a way of reducing the overall assault rate, or as a way of reducing supervisory staff with no increase in the assault rate.

To see why this is so, consider Figure 5.1 again. Let the Min and Max curves represent older and younger adults, respectively. To minimize the overall assault rate, one does not allocate the same number of staff manhours to each age group, as one tends to do when adults are treated as a homogeneous group.

c. Victim/Assailant

One intent of such measures as segregation by finer custody grades and by age within the adult population is to isolate the assaultive population from the non-assaultive population. This restructuring of the population also has the effect of segregating the two types of victims. Those victims who, themselves, commit assault, and therefore tend to bring victimization on themselves would tend to be placed in the assaultive population. The pure victim, he who does not provoke assault, would tend to remain in the general population. Since the pure victim is no longer available as an easy mark for the assaultive population, we should expect a decrease in the pure victimization rate.

On the other hand, we do not know what would happen to the victimization rate within the assaultive population. It could be that a potential assailant within that population, lacking an "easy mark" would become non-assaultive. But it might also be true that the interaction of potential assailants, thrown

closer together, would lead to more assault. Even if the latter is true, however, this would represent an increase in victimization among a group of assailants, which is a different thing from pure victimization.

d. Inmate Contact

It is obvious that one cannot have an assault without inmate contact. We have seen that inmate interaction, as a general category,^a is a very important factor leading to assault. Moreover, we believe that economic conditions, as a motivation for victimization, would decrease with a reduction in inmate contact. Furthermore, superintendents tend to think in terms of single cell occupancy, reduced inmate density, and reduced idleness as the principal means for reducing assault. These, too, imply less inmate contact. Hence, it would seem that the system would benefit from policies which would reduce the extent of inmate contact.

2. Quantity and Efficiency of Supervision

In a number of ways, both direct and indirect, our evidence indicates that assault and victimization vary inversely with the risk of being sanctioned, and that the risk of being sanctioned, in turn, varies directly with the amount of supervision. Thus, more supervision means fewer assaults and victimizations.

Obviously, because of budgetary constraints, a prison administration can do little to increase the total number of hours of staff time available to him. His attention naturally, and necessarily, turns to ways of increasing the efficiency of his staff. Two potentially fruitful possibilities for increasing staff efficiency, and therefore supervisory output, were explored in this project:^b (i) Achieving a more efficient distribution of staff manhours, and

^aVerbal abuse, horseplay, revenge, sex, etc.

^bWe have not explored another obvious possibility, viz. improving supervisory skills through training and other programs.

(ii) Providing staff with more and better equipment and facilities.^a

a. Allocative Efficiency

If total staff time is fixed, one can still increase the amount of supervision by decreasing staff time devoted to other activities. We explored a number of possibilities with the supervisors whom we interviewed--such as the possibility of reducing the amount of paperwork associated with the supervisory function, and reducing the time spent transporting inmates to court and to medical facilities. Our impression is that no one program is likely to have much effect, because of the extraordinary diversity of conditions facing the administrators of the different institutions--different inmate populations, different housing facilities, etc. Furthermore, our impression from talking with the superintendents is that the possibility for a reduction of non-supervisory activity on an institution by institution basis--one program here, another there--is not very great.

If a significant increase in supervisory manhours cannot be achieved by a reduction in non-supervision, then we must look for ways to optimize the distribution of manhours within the supervisory function. One reason why we have given so much attention to the possibilities for demographic reorganization is that we believe that this is one feasible way of achieving a more optimal allocation of supervisory manhours. We showed that the average efficiency of supervision can be increased by segregating inmates in such a way that each inmate group becomes more homogeneous in terms of its assaultive or victimization potential.

There are other distributional possibilities, however. It may be that supervisory manhours are not optimally allocated over the course of the day

^aIn economists' jargon, the average and marginal efficiency of the labor input (staff manhours) increases with an increase in capital input (equipment, building improvements, etc.).

and over the course of the week, since, as we have seen, assault exhibits daily and weekly cycles. The superintendents were asked if a reallocation of supervision was feasible as a way of moderating these cycles. All of them were of the opinion that they had carried this type of allocation as far as possible, consistent with maintaining minimum security at times of minimum assault. So it would seem as if little could be done in terms of daily and weekly manpower reallocation.^a

There is one more possibility. Supervisory personnel perform a variety of non-supervisory duties. Perhaps some reorganization of the time for execution of these duties within the shift would be possible.

b. Equipment and Other Capital Inputs

Let us define capital as the collection of equipment, facilities, and other man-made objects used in conjunction with the provision of supervision. Generally speaking, an increase in capital input increases the productivity of a unit of labor input. We would expect the same to be true for the supervisory function. This expectation is supported by our interviews with the superintendents. Hence, there can be no quarrel with the proposition that more capital would lead to a reduction in assault and in victimization.

^a Hourly assault rates or daily assault rates need not be equal when man-hours are optimally distributed. Our optimality principle is developed on the implicit assumption that the cost of a manhour of supervision is equal across uses. When we dealt with custody grade and age, this assumption seemed reasonable. But night and weekend work may cost more than daytime and week-day work. Furthermore, we assumed that supervision is a continuous variable, whereas, in actuality, one cannot always adjust supervision by small amounts--e.g. we either use a man or do not use him at a certain location, we cannot use half of a man. The more general principle, which allows for different costs of supervision and for "lumpy" labor inputs is easily developed, but is not essential to our argument.

The superintendents recommended a variety of capital inputs, designed to increase the efficiency of supervision. Among those that appeared most desirable were improved communication equipment and single cell occupancy, while metal detectors and closed-circuit TV received a more mixed response. The fact that there was so little uniformity of opinion with respect to particular types of capital input points up the principle that a unit of capital will have different efficiencies depending upon the conditions existing where it is being used. Since supervision operates under such different conditions within the ten institutions, one would expect the prison-wide introduction of a particular type of equipment to be less efficient than its introduction into those institutions where a clear-cut need is indicated.

B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

An efficient way of summarizing our results and conclusions is to organize and enumerate these using a format suggested by our chapter organization. Obviously, what we say applies to our ten institutions during the fourth quarter of 1975.

1. Nature of Assault

(i) The known quarterly assault rate was 4.0 percent; the estimated total assault rate, 5.6 percent.

(ii) An inmate was subjected to a risk of assault which was approximately two to three times that of his non-institutional counterpart.

(iii) Known assault rates vary widely by institution--from zero to 7.4 percent per quarter.

(iv) Males commit more assaults than females, youths more assaults than adults, younger adults more assaults than older adults, and nonwhites more assaults than whites.

(v) Fourteen percent of all assaults result in serious injury.

(vi) Adults are more likely than youths to use a weapon in an assault, and to inflict serious injury.

(vii) Sixty percent of all assaults occur in inmate sleeping areas.

2. Causes of Assault

(i) Assault varies inversely with the risk of getting caught.

(ii) Assault varies inversely with the amount of supervision.

(iii) Part of the reason for the inverse relation between assault and age is that youths are less likely to be punished for an assault.

(iv) Part of the reason for the inverse relation between assault and age appears to be due to a lessing of aggressiveness with age.

(v) The main precipitating causes of assault are verbal abuse, property and money matters, and revenge.

(vi) Assault varies directly with the amount of inmate to inmate contact. Without this contact, the above precipitating factors would not exist.

(vii) Both motivation and opportunity are important factors contributing to assault.

3. Nature of Victimization

(i) Quarterly victimization rates vary from less than 0.6 percent to 19.4 percent, depending on one's definition of victimization. The 0.6 percent refers to victims who were assaulted without provocation, i.e. to persons who were in no way culpable.

(ii) The quarterly homosexual assault rate is 0.2 percent. An inmate was subjected to the same risk of being sexually assaulted as a non-institutional female living in a large U.S. city.

(iii) Victimization rates vary markedly by sex, race, age, and institution.

(iv) The quarterly staff victimization rate is 1.1 percent. A staff member is victimized in one out of ten assaultive incidents.

4. Causes of Victimization

- (i) Victimization rates vary directly with assault rates.
- (ii) Victimization varies inversely with the degree of supervision.
- (iii) Victimization rates are lower among older inmates, partly because older inmates commit less assault.
- (iv) Economic matters, sex, and revenge are the main factors precipitating victimization.
- (v) The main precipitating factors causing victimization are relatively more important for older inmates; and, therefore, lead to a somewhat higher victimization rate for older inmates than would otherwise occur.
- (vi) The likelihood that an inmate will become a victim is considerably greater if that inmate has, himself, committed assault.
- (vii) White victimization rates are higher than black victimization rates because blacks are more likely to victimize across racial lines.

5. Policy Implications

- (i) Increasing the quantity and efficiency of supervision is a direct and obvious means for reducing assault and victimization. (But this takes money.)
- (ii) Given departmental budget constraints, the most likely area for policy innovation would appear to involve a reorganization of the inmate population. A finer classification of the inmate population by their propensity to commit assault would increase the efficiency of supervision, and, therefore, would permit a decrease in assault and victimization rates. As possibilities, we have considered more inmate custody grades, including a more efficient reclassification process, and classifying inmates by age within the adult inmate population.

APPENDIX A

DETAILED INSTITUTIONAL DATA

TABLE A1

INCIDENTS OF HOMOSEXUAL ASSAULT: NINE INSTITUTIONS,
1975-IV and 1974-IV - 1975-IV

| Institution | <u>Estimated Number of Sexual Assaults</u> | |
|-------------------------|--|---------------------|
| | Within last three months | Within last year |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>9</u> | <u>30-31</u> |
| Western | 0 | 4-5 |
| Harnett | 1 | 6 |
| Polk | 2 | 5 |
| Sandhills | 0 | 0 |
| Central | 1 | 3 |
| Caledonia | 0 | 0 |
| Odom | 5 | 12 |
| Blanch | 0 | 0 |
| NCCCW | 0 | 0 |

Source: Superintendent Data Base

TABLE A2

ASSAULT RATES BY CUSTODY GRADE:
NINE INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| Institution | All Custody Grades | Custody Grade | | | | Maximum (including death row) | Psychiatric |
|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| | | Minimum | Medium | Safekeeping | Close | | |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>4.0%</u> | <u>3.0%</u> | <u>4.2%</u> | <u>4.6%</u> | <u>3.5%</u> | <u>3.8%</u> | <u>11.1%</u> |
| Western | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Harnett | 7.4 | 10.6 | 6.2 | 8.7 | 100.0 | 0 | 0 |
| Polk | 5.6 | 0 | 6.3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Sandhills | 4.5 | 4.2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Central | 3.6 | 4.7 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 50.0 |
| Caledonia | 2.8 | 7.2 | 2.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Odom | 1.6 | 0 | 4.8 | 0 | 1.5 | 0 | 0 |
| Blanch | 6.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6.8 | 0 | 0 |
| NCCCW | 0.83 | 0 | 1.8 | 0 | 6.7 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE A3

INCIDENTS OF ASSAULT, BY DAY OF THE WEEK:
NINE INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| Institution | All Days | Sunday | Monday | Day of the Week | | Thursday | Friday | Saturday |
|-------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | | | | Tuesday | Wednesday | | | |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>126</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>21</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>17</u> | <u>20</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>14</u> |
| Western | 22 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 2 |
| Harnett | 26 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| Polk | 17 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| Sandhills | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 |
| Central | 33 | 0 | 8 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 1 |
| Caledonia | 11 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Odom | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Blanch | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 |
| NCCCW | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE A4

LOCATION OF ASSAULTIVE INCIDENT:
NINE INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| <u>Institution</u> | <u>Total All Incidents</u> | <u>Inside Locations</u> | | | | | | <u>Outside Locations</u> | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|------------------------------|--|
| | | <u>Total % No.</u> | <u>Segregation</u> | <u>Sleeping Area</u> | <u>Recreation</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>Total % No.</u> | <u>Recreation</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>At Work % No.</u> | |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>121</u> | <u>80</u> <u>97</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>70</u> | <u>6</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>15</u> <u>18</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>11</u> | <u>5</u> <u>6</u> | |
| Western | 20 | 85 17 | 0 | 13 | 3 | 1 | 10 2 | 2 | 0 | 5 1 | |
| Harnett | 24 | 71 17 | 2 | 11 | 1 | 3 | 25 6 | 2 | 4 | 4 1 | |
| Polk | 17 | 71 12 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 24 4 | 1 | 3 | 5 1 | |
| Sandhills | 5 | 100 5 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 0 | |
| Central | 32 | 78 25 | 0 | 16 | 2 | 7 | 19 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 1 | |
| Caledonia | 11 | 87 9 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 0 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 2 | |
| Odom | 5 | 100 5 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 0 | |
| Blanch | 5 | 100 5 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 0 | |
| NCCCW | 2 | 100 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 0 | |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE A5

LOCATION OF OFFICER AND SOURCE OF INFORMATION WITH RESPECT
TO ASSAULTIVE INCIDENT: NINE INSTITUTIONS, 1975-IV

| Institution | All Locations No. | Location of Officer | | Appeared While Incident in Progress | | Not Present During Incident | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|---|-----------|--------------------------------|-----------|
| | | Present When Incident Began No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>120</u> | <u>55</u> | <u>46</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>27</u> | <u>33</u> | <u>27</u> |
| Western | 22 | 12 | 55 | 3 | 13 | 7 | 32 |
| Harnett | 24 | 10 | 42 | 8 | 33 | 6 | 25 |
| Polk | 15 | 4 | 27 | 7 | 46 | 4 | 27 |
| Sandhills | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 20 | 4 | 80 |
| Central | 32 | 17 | 53 | 7 | 22 | 8 | 25 |
| Caledonia | 11 | 5 | 45 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 37 |
| Odom | 4 | 2 | 50 | 2 | 50 | 0 | 0 |
| Blanch | 5 | 4 | 80 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| NCCCW | 2 | 1 | 50 | 1 | 50 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

TABLE A6

SOURCE OF INFORMATION WITH RESPECT
TO ASSAULTIVE INCIDENT: NINE INSTITUTIONS,
1975-IV

| Institution | All Sources No. | <u>Initial Source of Information</u> | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | Visual | | Sound | | Inmate | | Other | |
| | | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| <u>All Institutions</u> | <u>116</u> | <u>70</u> | <u>60</u> | <u>17</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>22</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>3</u> |
| Western | 20 | 12 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 30 | 2 | 10 |
| Harnett | 23 | 14 | 61 | 5 | 22 | 4 | 17 | 0 | 0 |
| Polk | 14 | 10 | 72 | 2 | 14 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| Sandhills | 5 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 80 | 0 | 0 |
| Central | 32 | 17 | 53 | 7 | 22 | 7 | 22 | 1 | 3 |
| Caledonia | 11 | 7 | 64 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 27 | 0 | 0 |
| Odom | 4 | 3 | 75 | 1 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Blanch | 5 | 5 | 100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NCCCW | 2 | 1 | 50 | 1 | 50 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Offense Report Data Base

APPENDIX B

INMATE DATA BASE QUESTIONNAIRE

Some of the questions underlying the Inmate Data Base require no definition. Those that do are presented below, together with the variable name used in the regression analysis.

VariableDefinition

JUST

The sum of the following four questions (nonresponse to an individual question given a value of 2)

A newly arrived young inmate named Blue accepts a packet of cigarettes from an older inmate, named Green. Later on, Green approaches Blue and asks him to return the cigarettes. Blue says he does not have any. Green then says that Blue can repay the "gift" in another way--by dropping his pants. Blue gets really mad and beats up on Green.

How do you feel about what inmate Blue did? Did Blue do right, that is, give Green what he had coming to him, did Blue do something that was wrong, or do you not give a damn one way or the other?

- 1. Blue did wrong.
- 2. Don't give a damn, one way or the other.
- 3. Blue did right.

Brown had lost a considerable amount of money through gambling. After giving him some time to repay the debt, Red, the inmate to whom Brown owed the money, confronted Brown and demanded repayment. Brown replied that he would not repay the debt now or at any other time. Two days later, Red smashed in Brown's face with a broom handle.

How do you feel about what Red did? Did he do right, that is, give Brown what was coming to him, did Red do wrong or do you not give a damn one way or the other?

- 1. Red did wrong.
- 2. Don't give a damn, one way or the other.
- 3. Red did right.

Officer Green often does illegal favors for inmates--like carrying contraband letters outside the institution. Inmate Lemon discovers this and snitches to the supervisor. Green is demoted and transferred to another institution. One week later Blue, an inmate for whom officer Green had done quite a few favors, arranged for a heavy steel wrench to "accidentally" fall on inmate Lemon's foot. Three of his toes were broken.

How do you feel about what inmate Blue did? Did Blue do right, that is, give Lemon what was coming to him, did Blue do wrong or do you not give a damn one way or the other?

1. Blue did wrong.
2. Don't give a damn, one way or the other.
3. Blue did right.

Inmate Red works as a cook. A member of the custodial staff tells Red that coffee is being stolen, and that as he is in the kitchen most of the time, it looks as if Red is the thief. Later on, Red learns through the grapevine that another inmate, Blue, is really stealing the coffee. Red tells Blue what the situation is, and asks him to stop. The next day some more coffee is stolen. Red catches Blue alone in the shower room and beats the hell out of him.

How do you feel about what Red did? Did he do right, that is, give Blue what was coming to him, did he do wrong or don't you give a damn one way or the other?

1. Red did wrong.
2. Don't give a damn, one way or the other.
3. Red did right.

VariableDefinitionV₂

Gross Victim

- = 1 if inmate responded that other inmates did either of the following since January 1, 1971
- a) Hit respondent with an object.
 - b) Hit respondent using only hands, fist, or legs.
- = 0 otherwise.

V₃

Gross Offender

- = 1 if inmate responded that he did either of the following since January 1, 1971
- a) Hit someone with an object.
 - b) Hit someone using only hands, fist, or legs.
- = 0 otherwise.

V₁

Net Victim

- = 1 if V₂ = 1 and V₃ = 0.
- = 0 otherwise.

V₄

Net Offender

- = 1 if V₂ = 0 and V₃ = 1.
- = 0 otherwise.

GUN

Since January 1, 1973 have you ever owned a home-made weapon, or an item that could be used as a weapon?
Yes = 2, No = 1.

FORCE

Some guys say that inmates should not behave violently. Others say that if a guy needs something really badly and if using physical force or threats is the best way to get it, then it is OK. What do you think?

INSTRUCTION: let the respondent answer the question. If he does see force as useful in getting a guy what he wants badly, check response option two below. If he believes inmates should not behave violently, check response option one.

___ 1. Force should not be used.

___ 2. Force OK if used by a guy to get something he wants badly.

END