


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EVALUATION OF THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM TWO CASE STUDIES (PRISON DETOXIFICATION PROJECT AND AND A COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL FACILITY)

PREPARED BY
THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COORDINATING COUNCIL

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COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL FACILITY,
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THE MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COORDINATING COUNCIL
MAYOR MOON LANDRIEU
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MR. ANTHONY GAGLIANO
Vice-Chairman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION	ii
DRUG TREATMENT IN PRISONS: THE CASE OF ORLEANS PARISH	1
COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITIES: THE CASE OF DREYFOUS HOUSE	45

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ORLEANS

INTRODUCTION

Each of the two reports included in this volume pertain to discretionary¹ programs that substantially changed their operating procedures and the logic of their activities. Neither program was declared nonoperational by either the New Orleans Criminal Justice Coordinating Council or the LEAA, and both were granted adjustments that altered the scope of their activities. The objective of the present report is to highlight issues that surround the continuation of programs whose original purpose has been changed and to discuss the role of evaluation in this context.

The larger issue involves the decision to defund a program that is, for a variety of legitimate reasons, no longer able to implement the work plan identified in the grant award and, more importantly, incapable of accomplishing the original goals. The issue of defunding of discretionary programs brings into accountability the roles and decisions of these agencies: the LEAA (or the regional office), the CJCC or state regional planning district in which the program is operating, and the host or parent agency that is receiving LEAA funds to operate the program. The question for each of the agencies is, what are the conditions under which a program should have its funding ended? Historically,

¹The LEAA distinguishes between grants to state planning agencies for purposes of implementing their comprehensive law enforcement programs and discretionary grants that are earmarked for special priority programs as designated by the LEAA.

there is no clear answer to the question, either at the national or local level. For example, LEAA has no guidelines that apply to the defunding of programs as a result of changes in scope or goals.² That is, there are no criteria identified by LEAA to be used by the regional offices or the CJCC to assess the effects of substantive changes in grant adjustment requests or the capacity of the program to achieve the goals for which the program was initially funded. As near as we can gather, it is also the case that defunding is an uncommon phenomenon, irrespective of region, state, or locality. It appears that the removal of funds (once the grant is awarded) for reasons relating to problems encountered in the implementation of the program is an action rarely initiated by either the local planning agency or the host agency--or the type of action taken by regional offices when in receipt of information that suggests the program may be prevented from meeting its stated goals.

In short, the question of defunding appears to be treated as a nonquestion. Unfortunately, because of the myriad difficulties encountered in generating social programs, the problems of programs that no longer seem capable of fulfilling the conditions of their grants is a relatively common occurrence. For example, two, and

²The LEAA uses a general standard, i.e., non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the grant, but makes no direct reference to the relationship of the logic of the program to the decision to defund. (See Guide for Discretionary Programs, July 10, 1975, Chapter 2, p. 26 and 27.)

perhaps three of the eleven Target Area programs fall into this category, and this figure is thought to be lower than for other discretionary programs in other localities and other regions.

The issue is not, however, as clear-cut as we have suggested. There are at least two general categories of factors that confound the decision process. The first is the distinction that all government agencies make between the ideal goals of any program and the reality of funding, creating and operating the program. The distinction is important, and one that need be elaborated. In the case of the former, the format and, in fact, the justification for the program, is derived from scientific or quasi-scientific models of human behavior. Programs are treated in this approach as if they were controlled experiments, and the outcomes of the experiments (i.e., the products of the program) are seen as tests of hypotheses. Despite the obvious usefulness of such an approach, this view of bureaucratic organizations, the political environment, and human behavior, is often in direct contradiction to the realities of governmental administration. The magnitude of the gap between the scientific model and the routine operations of government is seen, by example, in this discussion of how to build into an evaluation component, criteria for continuing a project.

"The Evaluation Component should contain a discussion of how the results of the analysis will be used to determine project or program continuation. If any of the following circumstances occur, the question of continuation should be considered: (1) the success levels achieved in meeting objectives or goals are not within the specified tolerance limits of the predetermined expected levels; (2) the evaluation measures indicate that the project or program will not achieve its objectives or goals at the end of the implementation period; or (3) the subjective evaluation of the entire project or program indicates that the objectives or goals will not be met and/or that the crimes that are a target of the Impact program will not be reduced by this project or program."³

The only flaw in the logic of these procedures is that government and governmental administrators do not act in the manner described. Perhaps they should; but because they do not, scientific models of decision-making are generally not applicable as a description of routine governmental choice behavior. Those factors that tend to intrude and often dominate decisions are personal or unique; i.e., cash flow considerations, employment commitments, agency relationships, and continuity. Thus, agencies tend to "see" programs that have had problems in implementation more in terms of personal criteria rather than scientific objectives, and defunding is normally not perceived as a viable alternative.

³Evaluation in Criminal Justice Programs, National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, June, 1973, p. 44.

The second general category of intervening factors is the administrative decisions necessary in order to defund. The defunding process is involved, time-consuming, and often highly controversial. Administrators at all levels of government have shown themselves reluctant--and perhaps wisely so--to take on the task of defunding.

In the context we have described, the position of the evaluator is somewhat paradoxical. He is charged with the task of using research skills in order to examine the manner in which the "experiment"⁴ was implemented, and to assess the impact of the experiment on the goals (or hypotheses) identified in the grant award. The increasing employment of persons in evaluation capacities that have research backgrounds is evidence of the scientific function required of evaluators. This orientation does not, however, prepare the evaluator and particularly those that work within institutional contexts (i.e., in-house evaluators) to deal effectively with those programs that are no longer experimental.

The most difficult aspect for the evaluator is the point at which he is willing to make the judgement that the program is "no longer experimental." This judgement

⁴I have used the word experiment interchangeably with demonstration programs. All demonstration programs, and for that matter, all social action programs, are intended as tests of ideas to determine if the idea will bring about desired changes in human behavior. For readings in this area, see Weiss (1972) and Suchman (1967).

by and large is a lonely one, as the official positions of the LEAA, the regional office, the regional planning district, and the host agency, are nearly always for approval of the changes in scope, goals and objectives, and thus, an implicit statement that no substantial change in the original logic of the program has occurred. In this situation, it is clear that the professional judgement required of the evaluator will, on this issue, cause him to come into conflict with the agency position. If the evaluator accepts his professional responsibilities, how then can he best treat an analysis of the program; one that is no longer an experiment but still classified as demonstration?

The response of evaluators in the CJCC has taken on two aspects: practical and ethical. With respect to the latter, the clear answer is that a non-experimental program cannot be evaluated by means of a research design. That is, the original experimental design is moot in this instance, and to treat the program as if it were still an experiment is an obfuscation of professional responsibility. Moreover, unless the logic of the program was changed to deal with a different criminal justice problem, the use of a revised design is also inappropriate.

There are instances, however, in which the changes in the goals and scope of a program, although substantial, permit a revision of the original research design. This has

occurred at least on two occasions in the Target Area program: the Drug Enforcement Component and the Parish Prison Rehabilitation Program. Each of these projects retained qualities that allowed the evaluation to continue, although revised. These qualities included sufficient time to test the "idea," the existence of realistic program goals after the changes in scope were made, and the definition of a criminal justice problem that was linked to the goals.

Nevertheless, the question of treating programs that are no longer experimental is still to be addressed. The practical solution, particularly in those instances in which the evaluator works within an institutional context, is to try to provide an account of the forces that contributed to the demise of the experiment as originally planned. The purpose of such an account should be to raise issues that are recurring in the development of demonstration programs and to identify new problems. Those who subscribe to the belief that government can be improved incrementally should agree with this general approach. There are however, two problems with this strategy.

The first obstacle is the feasibility of switching from a research format to a narrative in those circumstances in which the evaluator is on contract to an agency. Some of our colleagues, and especially Peter Venezia of the

National Council on Crime and Delinquency⁵ have urged that research evaluators are being paid to evaluate programs in an experimental framework and not to write commentaries. Venezia adds that it is the obligation of the evaluator who is retained on a contractual basis to exhaust all avenues of education, appeal, and persuasion with the director of the program under evaluation to make that person aware of the importance of retaining an experimental program. If those appeals fail, Venezia feels that the evaluator has no choice but to notify the agency that the services of an evaluator are no longer required.

As much as I respect his position (because of its internal logic and ethical nature), the routine actions of persons and firms in this situation are otherwise. In short, the absence of the experimental nature of a program is rarely, if ever, brought to the agency's attention by the evaluator on contract. It is unfortunate, but nevertheless this is a more accurate description of the behavior of evaluation contractors. It would seem that the catalyst for a change in evaluation format--from experimental to narrative--must originate within the agency underwriting the evaluation.

The second difficulty in effecting a shift from the experimental design to a narrative is the format, limitations,

⁵These comments are taken from an evaluation seminar conducted by Dr. Venezia in Tucson, Arizona, January, 1976. Any misquotation or misinterpretation is unintentional, and to the best of my memory, this is an accurate representation of what was said at the seminar.

and objectives of the narrative. The problem arises because as controversial as research evaluations can be, narratives have the potential for a higher level of controversy. This phenomenon occurs because unlike the research evaluation, the narrative has no recognized parameters. There are no hypotheses to be tested, no previously stated goals, and no operations objectives. Moreover, the purpose of the narrative is not to determine if the program was successful, but why it failed to develop.

In the present instance, we have chosen to use a modified case study approach in which a chronology of the program's life is arrayed and factors relevant to the "demonstration" of the program are discussed. We have tried to provide as much information as is available to us, and although we (CJCC planners and evaluators) have discussed and debated (1) the motivations of the actors and (2) the weighting of the factors, each report remains the sole product of the author.

The objective in publishing these case studies has been to highlight problems that are continually present in the planning and implementation of demonstration programs. These studies do not represent, and should not be interpreted as a consensus opinion or an agency position. They are analytic assessments by the two writers, who have relied upon all available documentation and have used their judgment to integrate the documents within a framework of

analysis and interpretation. To our knowledge, the use of case study techniques as an evaluative tool has not previously been attempted. We see it as a necessary and valuable function of evaluation and hope to see similar efforts from our colleagues.

Robert Sternhell
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DRUG TREATMENT IN PRISONS:
THE CASE OF ORLEANS PARISH

Robert Sternhell
Director of Evaluation

MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

June 1, 1976

MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL
INFORMATION SHEET

Project: Drug Detoxification in Orleans
Parish Prison

Project Number: 72-ED-06-0017-TA-2

Subgrantee: City of New Orleans

Date of Report: July 1, 1976

Prepared by: Robert Sternhell,
Director of Evaluation

Evaluation Assistance: Michele Duprey, Grants Administration
Cheryl Lyle, Clerical

Grant Award: LEAA - \$ 85,464
Subgrantee - \$ 23,099
Total Budget - \$108,563

Subgrant Period: July 15, 1973 to May 15, 1975

Authorized Official: Moon Landrieu, Mayor
City of New Orleans

PREFACE

We would like to thank Lieutenant Wayne Levet of the New Orleans Police Department for his assistance in tracing the arrest histories of the inmates in the test population, and each of the persons interviewed in Appendix A.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge the assistance of Michele Duprey in the preparation of the financial summary and Cheryl Lyle in the preparation of the report.

INTRODUCTION

The present report is a brief review of the history of the Parish Prison Detoxification Project, funded by a Crime Specific Target Area grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in June, 1973. The Detoxification Program did not achieve implementation as was described in the grant application. The objective of this report is to identify factors that have contributed to the failure of the program to become operational. The present study builds on a previously published analysis of the project, written in July, 1974¹, in which existing and potential problem areas were identified. In adopting a modified case study approach, the present report seeks to demonstrate a pattern of recurring problems for the Detoxification Program that began in the planning stage and were present throughout the "life" of the program. The Detoxification Project was ended officially on May 15, 1975, at which time all activity ceased. In the two years since the grant was awarded, the project experienced three changes in direction, each of which modified the goals and objectives of the original planning document. These changes can be summarized as follows:

- I. The decision was made to void the original plan and in its place, establish a research program to more carefully identify the modes and frequencies of drug usage in the prison.

¹Target Area Evaluation: A Six Month Report on the Development of Target Area Projects and the Evaluation System. Robert Sternhell and Stuart Carroll, New Orleans Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, July 26, 1974.

II. Following completion of the research component, the new director of the program, the incoming Sheriff, contracted with Odyssey House, Inc. to implement a treatment program.

III. The project terminated on May 15, 1975 with no indication of programmatic direction.

These formalized decisions are one indication of the nature of the development of the program. The text of this report will discuss the relevant actions and institutions since the inception of the project, and will suggest reasons for the ultimate failure of the program to (1) become operational, and (2) become institutionalized.

PREPARATION OF THE STUDY

The account of the Prison Detoxification Program that is presented here should not be classified as an evaluation. It is not an evaluation in the sense that the effectiveness and efficiency of the program are being measured. This report is a case study of the evolution of the original Prison Detoxification plan. The case study format allows the writer to discuss issues and relationships in a developmental context and to place emphasis upon areas much broader than the original focus of the program. The data used in this study are taken from interviews with the actors in the program, inter-office correspondence, narrative reports, grant applications, grant awards and adjustments, and cost files. Care has been taken to understate the implications and inferences of the written documents, in the event that the

documents do not capture the subtleties and nuances of the project's development.

THE PROJECT IDENTIFIED IN THE PLANNING DOCUMENT

The original planning document was written in a five-month period, October, 1972 - February, 1973. At the time the plan was being written, the Parish Prison did not have in its employ persons with a background in correctional rehabilitation. Social services in the prison were limited to a volunteer program and a narrowly-focused "family crisis" project funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

In reconstructing the circumstances of the original plan, the predominant factor was the absence of professional correctional persons with experience. It appears that as a means of compensating for the vacuum in correctional rehabilitation, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and the planner in charge relied on model programs discussed in the literature. There seems to have been no available alternative, other than the hiring of a consultant to "impose" a program. That option was precluded by the desire of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council to develop a local planning capacity.

The original plan had as its primary objective the medical detoxification of 600 inmates. Secondary objectives were directed at using detoxification as a lever for the

participation of the inmates in a soon-to-be developed rehabilitation program. The means to accomplish these objectives were the expansion of the existing Medical Unit in the Prison (administered by Charity Hospital of New Orleans) and the development of a procedure for the screening of inmates for the purpose of detecting heroin addiction.

(The unique and interesting feature of the detoxification program was its relationship to the comprehensive rehabilitation program that was not confined to detoxification for its own sake (although, of course, the value is considerable), but was intended as a condition of participation in the rehabilitation program.

REVISING THE ORIGINAL PLAN

The first noticeable flaw in the implementation of the plan was the difficulty experienced by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council in effecting a "manager" for the program. Due to a change in directors of the Charity Hospital Medical Unit, the original plan was delayed and there was a possibility of default. Negotiations undertaken with the City Department of Health and Charity Hospital did not result in a solution. As a consequence, a grant award received in July, 1973 was not followed up by a request for money until June, 1974.

The purpose of the negotiations was to structure a working relationship among the Parish Prison, the City, and

Charity Hospital. In order for Charity Hospital to undertake the additional work, it was necessary to find a sponsor either within the City or from the prison. The sponsor serves as the responsible agency and is a requirement inasmuch as the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council does not act as a supervisory unit.

From July, 1973 through March, 1974, a period of nine months, a series of negotiations among the following actors was carried out: The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council; Parish Prison; Charity Hospital; the Coroner's Office; and, after November, the newly-elected Sheriff. The discussions tended to be discontinuous, and a broad range of problems arose. The first issue was the position of the Department of Health that their agency was the appropriate sponsor, inasmuch as they were presently supervising the Charity Hospital Medical Unit in Parish Prison. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council agreed with this assessment. It was at this point, however, that the director of the Medical Unit resigned. His replacement disputed the need for a detoxification program and made it apparent that all prior agreements with regard to the implementation of the program were suspended. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council requested Charity Hospital to appoint a director more sympathetic to the objectives of the program. The request was honored, and a third director was selected. The issue came full circle with the rejection of the new director

by the City Department of Health on the grounds that he was not qualified for the position.

The second issue, and one that was to change the structure and substance of the original plan, was the defeat of the incumbent Sheriff and the election of the former Police Attorney to that office. Whereas the incumbent Sheriff was cooperative with the program, his primary orientation was passive. It was symptomatic that he did not insist upon being declared project director, a demand that his successor announced almost immediately, and one that was satisfied almost immediately. Had the incumbent Sheriff been more interested in the program, he would have been in the position to intervene in the negotiations and reduce the amount of time consumed in implementation. As it was, five months after the plan was approved, he had played a minimal role in implementation.

The second issue, raised by the defeat of the incumbent Sheriff in November, 1973 focused on the detoxification process identified in the original plan. The incoming Sheriff raised an objection to the original plan, with particular reference to the use of methadone in the prison. He opposed the use of drugs, and as a consequence would not allow the program in the prison, irrespective of the limitation of methadone to inmates during detoxification. The effect of the Sheriff's opposition was to seriously threaten the implementation of the program. As the official designated

to be responsible for the Parish Prison, the Sheriff was well within his authority to prevent the program--as designed--from entering the prison proper.

In response to the opposition of the Sheriff to methadone and the continuing inability of Charity Hospital and the City Department of Health to agree on personnel and functions, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council rewrote the original plan. The new proposal was research in nature and was intended as a tool for the establishment of reasonably accurate information about the frequency and modes of drug abuse in the prison. It was during this time (January - March, 1974) that another actor became involved in the detoxification program. The November, 1973 election saw the incumbent Coroner defeated; and his successor, a doctor, very quickly expressed an interest in drug abuse programs in the parish. The Coroner soon approached the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council with several recommendations. As the original prison detoxification plan was at that time being revised, the influence of the Coroner on the substance of the revision seems to have been substantial. Ultimately, he was named as the project director on the first official statement of grant award dated May 24, 1974. It should be noted that from the time that the original plan was approved by LEAA in late March, 1973, the awarding of the grant required fourteen months. All of the other ten Target Area programs were formally awarded by August 1, 1973.

The application in which the Coroner was named as director called for an allocation of 36 per cent of the program funds (\$50,000) to the research project, with the remaining \$86,000 reserved for treatment. Upon reflection, the wording on the grant application should have prepared observers for the problems to follow:

"As described in the narrative section of the grant, this program is broken down into two phases: first, a research phase, to be followed by a psychological treatment phase. The precise psychological services to be provided in Phase II cannot be ascertained until the results of Phase I have been analyzed. However, the remaining funds (\$86,099) included in the detailed budget under "operating expenses," will be used to provide psychological treatment services. It is anticipated that part of these funds will be used to purchase services from the Odyssey House program on a "fee for service" basis. The remainder of the funds will be used to hire an as yet to be specified number of drug counselors to work within the prison. This number (and type) of counselors will be based on the findings of Phase I research."²

The source of the problems was the level of uncertainty as to exactly what was going to follow the research phase, and more immediately, what the relationship of the research was to the treatment. There is a statement in the application that links the results of the research to the hiring of counselors, with the inference that many of the decisions regarding treatment will be based on the findings of the drug study. Although the grant does identify

²For additional detail, refer to the project grant award statement of May 24, 1974.

Odyssey House, Inc. as the source of psychological treatment services, neither the type nor costs of these services is specified.

In late July, under the direction of the Coroner, the drug use study was initiated. The study concluded one month later, early in September. For a variety of reasons, the data was never fully examined by either the Coroner or the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, although the latter did produce a brief three-page summary of the findings. This report did not, however, address the primary criterion to be used by the Sheriff in the screening of inmates: violent crime in the arrest history.

On September 15, 1974, a contract between the Sheriff and Odyssey House was effected, with the latter agreeing to, "establish a drug abuse treatment program for the inmates of Orleans Parish to include screening, motivation, and treatment phases."

The contract with Odyssey House was the culmination of five months of negotiation among the Coroner, the Sheriff, and the treatment program. The Coroner had first publically recommended Odyssey House to the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council in May of 1974 in a proposal for the implementation of the research phase of the revised grant to be used immediately in a drug rehabilitation program in Parish Prison of the Odyssey House type therapeutic community. As it turned out, Odyssey House was the only treatment program (that was drug free) with the capacity and the interest

to operate in prisons, and a sole source request was placed by the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and ultimately approved by the Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

ODYSSEY HOUSE IN PARISH PRISON (OHMU)

At no point in the short life of the drug treatment program did the Sheriff and Odyssey House arrive at a workable accommodation. Although several factors were operative, two have been identified as having greater importance.

The first factor was the timing of the program. Although the new Sheriff was elected in November of 1973, he took office in April, 1974. At that point, he began replacing the existing prison administrators with his own staff; and as any new Sheriff must, he began to encounter the institutional problems that carried over from the previous administration. The two major problems were security and the condition of the prison. As a result, his first appointments reflected a concern for security. All other prison programs were secondary.

The impact of this emphasis was felt both by the new prison rehabilitation unit (also funded under a Target Area grant) and the Odyssey House drug program. The common denominator for these programs was access to the inmates under conditions favorable to the treatment logic. In the

case of Odyssey House, access to inmates was predicated on clearance by the Sheriff's screening committee.

Screening was the final stage in the selection procedure, which began with the referral, often self-referral, of inmates to the OHMU. The unit would interview these applicants, assess their motivation, and the extent of addiction, and then recommend to the Sheriff those inmates acceptable to the OHMU. (Officials of Odyssey House report that at this stage in the referral process, they did not review the arrest histories of the inmates but relied upon self-reported accounts.) During this process, it was more common for inmates to eliminate themselves after hearing about the requirements of the program. Thus, of the 198 persons referred, only four were found unacceptable by OHMU and 23 eliminated themselves. (See Table 1)

Inmates identified as potential clients were referred to the Sheriff for his review. The Sheriff took those recommendations and either approved the change in status (i.e., moving to the OHMU tier) or rejected the request.

THE EFFECTS OF SCREENING ON THE ODYSSEY HOUSE POPULATION

By the close of the Odyssey House program in May, 1975, 198 inmates had been referred to the unit. Eighteen per cent, or 36 inmates, were awaiting the decision on the Sheriff's screening procedure. Extracting those 36 inmates from the total, the revised figure for inmates with a

disposition (i.e., accepted by the program, rejected by the Sheriff, etc.) was 162. Nearly 50 per cent of the 162 referrals were rejected by the Sheriff on the grounds that the inmate had a history of violent criminal activity. In contrast, only 25 per cent of the 162 referrals were inducted into the OHMU. Table 1 indicates the dispositions for all referrals.

The magnitude of the inmates found unacceptable to the Sheriff affected the size of the OHMU population (although it was not the only factor) so that the total number of clients inducted during the eight-month program period was 40--an average of only five per month. The 40 inductions are the cumulative total for the eight months. The number of residents in the program at any one point did not exceed 23, with a median of 15. These figures are a vivid contrast to the projections made by OHMU in December, 1974. As Figure I shows, the projected resident population by April, 1975 was 60.³

The reasons given for the rejections by the Sheriff were that the inmate had a history of criminal violence. Interviews with both the Sheriff and Ms. Margaret Pike, State Director of Odyssey House Louisiana, confirm that both parties understood the violence provision; and that although there was no indication of that stipulation in

³ Excerpted from a letter dated December 20, 1974, to the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council from Lt. Colonel Mark C. Berent, USAF (retired), the Director of OHMU.

the contract between the Sheriff and Odyssey House, it was agreed that arrestees with a history of violence would not be allowed to participate in OHMU.

The acknowledgement by both parties that inmates with histories of violent crimes would be excluded from the program raises an element of uncertainty about the expectations of Odyssey House with regard to the size of the client population. It would appear that on the one hand, OHMU fully anticipated a client population that would approach 60 within six months. On the other hand, there seems little appreciation of the relative frequency of violence associated with drug use; and thus, the possibility of severe constraints on the size of the OHMU client group. (See Table 2)

It is ironic that this information had been collected in the drug study (referred to earlier) by the Coroner and the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council but had not been analyzed until late 1975, many months after the program closed. A graduate student for the Department of Urban Studies of the University of New Orleans interning with the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Mr. Eleck Craig, took the surveys conducted at Central Lock-Up (in November, 1974) and began to code and collate the information during October, 1975. In preparing the data, he adapted the information so that the criminal histories of persons identified as opiate users could be studied for previous incidences of violence.

He defined violence according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's definition in the Uniform Crime Reports (i.e., murder, rape, assault and battery, and armed robbery). Of the 150 persons identified as opiate users (through either urinalysis or self-admission), 69 (or 46 per cent) had a previous record of arrest for aggravated battery, simple battery, or armed robbery. He excluded rape, murder, weapons violations, and resisting arrest from his data collection, the effect of which would have been to substantially increase the percentage.

These findings represent the arrestee population and not the prison population, so that no direct transformation can be made. Nevertheless, the significant percentage of opiate users with arrest histories of violent crime suggest serious problems for an opiate program that would operate within the prison proper. This is the type of research findings that should have been available to all parties prior to the letting of the contract. Had the information been prepared, questions of cost effectiveness might have been addressed before any program was undertaken.

Lacking this information, Odyssey House initiated its program, referred 162 inmates to the Sheriff for approval (subtracting 36 inmates that were still being considered when the program ended), and nearly 50 per cent were rejected because of their arrest histories.

In order to check the close agreement of the 50 per cent figures, the arrest histories of the 77 inmates referred to the Sheriff by OHMU and rejected were traced with the cooperation of the New Orleans Police Department to determine the incidence of violent crime. It was hypothesized that the percentage figure for the "rejectees" should approach 100 per cent.

The search of arrest histories was limited by the absence of identifiers other than first and last name. In many cases, there were two or more individuals with the same or similar name (similarity was taken into account because there was no assurance that the names provided by the Odyssey House program were those under which arrest records were kept). Where this occurred, the arrest histories of all individuals were examined in order to determine if an arrest had occurred during the program period, September, 1974-May, 1975, or within the six months prior to the program. In most cases, this review eliminated the questionable individuals. If any doubt persisted, the name of the individual was removed from the test population.

There were several instances in which no arrest record could be located, and the assumption drawn was that the name had been badly misspelled.

All members of the test group had their arrest histories checked in order to support the assumption that they had been arrested during the target period. Table 2 shows

the disposition of the record search. Due to the problems of identification, the original test population decreased from 77 to 51, and the discussion of the group will have reference to the lower number.

FINDINGS

Table 3 indicates that 80 per cent of the inmates (N=41) rejected by the Sheriff (of the 51 records found) had a history of violence, and another 14 per cent had either legal or residential restrictions. Only six per cent, to judge by the arrest histories, seemed to be eligible for the program. Violence was defined in this study as the arrest for commission of one of the following offenses:

- (1) Armed robbery
- (2) Murder - Negligent homicide - Manslaughter
- (3) Rape
- (4) Kidnapping
- (5) Assault or battery
- (6) Carrying a concealed weapon - Dangerous weapon
- (7) Aggravated burglary
- (8) Illegal carrying of a weapon
- (9) Resisting arrest
- (10) Mugging
- (11) Aggravated arson

Using this definition, the arrest histories of the 41 inmates were reviewed in order to determine the frequency of violence in the population. Table 4 presents that information. Twenty-six (or 63 per cent) of the 41 inmates had two or more previous arrests that involved one of the offenses identified above. With respect to the 15 inmates who had only one previous arrest for violence, six were

charged with armed robbery, four with aggravated battery or assault, and one with attempted murder. The others (N=4) were arrested for weapons violations.

Another way of illustrating the pattern of violent crime in the group rejected by the Sheriff is to compare the seriousness of the crimes. Obviously, the absence of violence as a criterion for selection into Odyssey House is a prima facie distinction between the inmates rejected and those allowed to participate. By systematically comparing the rejected population to a hypothetical and greatly crime exaggerated group of eligible inmates on the measure of seriousness, we are able to demonstrate the disparity between the two groups.

The best available procedure for ranking crime seriousness has been developed by Sellin and Wolfgang.⁴ Using a Guttman scaling technique, the authors have established a standardized ranking procedure based on surveys of citizen perceptions of the relative seriousness of various crimes. From this methodology, they have assigned the following points or weights to the Crime Index as defined by the FBI:

(1) Homicide	26
(2) Rape	11
(3) Robbery.	5
(4) Assault.	4
(5) Burglary	3
(6) Theft (including auto theft)	2

⁴Thorstein Sellin and Marvin E. Wolfgang, The Measurement of Delinquency, New York, John & Sons, 1964.

Using the crime seriousness approach for violent crimes only (excluding all burglaries, thefts, and drug charges) and correcting for resisting arrest and weapons violations (N=2), the average crime seriousness score for the rejected group is 17.34. Note that we have not arrived at an index per crime, but per person, having divided the total score by the population. This score of 17.34 is somewhat below the actual total, due to the exclusion of non-violent crimes. The actual total is approximately 25.0 per subject. (Our review of the arrest records of the rejectee population revealed that non-violent offenses were frequent, particularly thefts, burglaries, and drug crimes. The eight point increment, from 17 to 25, is a very conservative increase.)

In contrast, the average violence score for persons accepted into Odyssey House approaches 0. Moreover, if we were to hypothetically designate 41 inmates acceptable to the Sheriff, and arbitrarily give each an average of five arrests (slightly higher than the estimated average), with three of those arrests burglaries and two thefts (thus exaggerating somewhat the actual scores), the average seriousness score per hypothet would be 13, half the total for the rejected group. We would expect that a crime index would further separate the scores of the two groups, and have used the procedure in the present study to provide the reader with a hypothetical comparison. These findings clearly

support the Sheriff's position that inmates would be rejected for violent offenses.

Because the Sheriff was adamant with regard to the violence criterion, a relatively small number of inmates were approved to enter the OHMU program. The Sheriff's precise position was that he would refuse to allow those persons with violent crime histories to enter the program because the logic of the program was to transfer inmates out of the prison (after six months) and into the Odyssey House residential program in the community. He maintained throughout that he would not allow those inmates to leave Parish Prison and reenter the community--under any circumstances--until their sentence had been completed. It is speculative whether the violence criterion might have been modified if the program had been broached several years later, but it seems certain that the promise of eventual release of inmates with violent crime histories was in direct opposition to the Sheriff's needs as a newly-elected official. Thus, the timing of the program exacerbated what has always been a controversial issue in Orleans Parish--the early release of violent criminals.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SHERIFF - ODYSSEY HOUSE RELATIONSHIP

In addition to the problems of timing, the Odyssey House unit was troubled by a second influence: the circumstances surrounding the entry of the program into the

prison. The following analysis is a reconstruction of the major events and their significance relative to the Sheriff's contracting with Odyssey House to initiate a motivational unit. The analysis is based on interviews with many of the key actors (see Appendix A) and a review of the relevant correspondence and documentation.

Odyssey House's capacity in Parish Prison was undermined by the fervor of its advocates and the intensity of program personnel to implement the treatment logic. Thus, the manner in which Odyssey House entered the prison, and its orientation once it began operating, are seen as the primary reasons for the short life of the program. Understandably, there may be significant disagreement with these conclusions; and that, too, may be evidence of the broad range of perceptions regarding the events of September, 1974. Moreover, the conclusion advanced is admittedly both provocative and controversial. The reasons for drawing this conclusion are outlined in the following pages.

THE IMPLICATION OF AGENCY PREROGATIVES

In the course of evaluating eleven Target Area programs, one persistent pattern of agency behavior has been brought to light, and the lesson of this phenomenon is important to the planning and implementation of criminal justice programs. Irrespective of the merits or absence of merit from a proposed program, it is nearly impossible

to coerce an agency into accepting a program it does not feel comfortable with; and it is absolutely impossible to implement such a program in those situations in which the host agency has indicated discomfort. Our assessment of the nature of the Odyssey House-Sheriff's relationship is that it fits this general rule.

As early as May, 1974, both the Coroner and supporters of the Odyssey House treatment program (and logic) began working enthusiastically to bring the unit into the prison (as was indicated earlier). The application and negotiation procedure was made volatile by the intensity of the pressure placed on the Sheriff to adopt Odyssey House, and the reluctance of the Sheriff to agree to turn over to Odyssey House the level of authority requested by the program as a precondition to implementation.

In the former case, advocates of the program strenuously urged the Sheriff to accept the proposal, and that enthusiasm was communicated in the form of personal phone calls and letters from several community and national leaders. There is no doubt that each party was concerned with drug abuse in the prison and individually sought to convey that interest. Given the highly publicized nature of the federal court order to improve the condition of the prison and to reduce the population (November, 1972), a ruling presented to the previous Sheriff, it is probable that all interested parties saw Odyssey House as

a program that could contribute to the easing of the order. This was the position taken by the Coroner, who speculated that although he had little contact with other advocates, he felt their roles were probably similar to his. With respect to the Coroner, he has exhibited a long-term interest in both volunteer and charitable institutions, and the enthusiasm he expressed in advocating Odyssey House seems characteristic of his interest in the area.

On the other side of the aisle, the new Sheriff was still in the midst of reorganizing personnel and prison procedures and had publically placed emphasis on the new discipline of the prison; i.e., no escapes, riots, or disturbances. Neither he or his staff were yet in a position to administer and supervise an ambitious drug treatment program--particularly one that was directed by an agency outside the prison. The internal problems of the prison, including the decay of the facility and vast overpopulation, were his primary concerns. Yet, in the end, he was persuaded to work out a compromise with Odyssey House and allow the unit to establish itself with the prison as of October, 1974. The Sheriff has stated that this magnitude of the pressure placed him in an untenable position. On the one hand, he was not ready to admit an outside agency into the prison; and on the other, he was presented with a proposition he was unable to reject.

The question of authority was one that came up repeatedly in the course of the program. Odyssey House asked for control over the program; and as it has been said earlier, the Sheriff was not only reluctant to give up such authority, he was sensitive to the frequent requests. In such a context, many issues became sources of conflict. One of those issues was the salaries of the Executive Director and President of Odyssey House. The Sheriff's position was that the amount of money asked for their consultant fees was excessive, and the exchange between the parties was not entirely pleasant.

Within this context, the rejection of significant numbers of referrals by the Sheriff took on implications of non-cooperation and harassment. However, as we have indicated earlier, without exploring the motives of either party, the Sheriff's rejections were in accordance with policies he set prior to the signing of the contract.

When the grant period expired in May, 1975, the Sheriff had three options. Because approximately \$28,000 was left in the program area, he could have applied for a grant extension. The \$28,000 could have taken the program through August, 1975. Alternately, he could have asked the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council to transfer the funding of the unit from discretionary monies to state bloc funds. (Of the eleven Target Area programs, five have made this transformation--including the Parish Prison Rehabilitation Unit.) The Sheriff chose to end the program and shift the balance

to the Rehabilitation Unit. His position has been that he will soon undertake a drug program, but one that is run by in-house personnel.

DISCUSSION

With the close of the grant period, the Odyssey House program ended. During its eight-month operation, ten inmates completed the motivational program and graduated to the Odyssey House residential facility. Had all parties known prior to the letting of the contract that the criterion of no arrest histories of violent crime would severely limit the eligible population, one of the questions that might have been brought forth and, of course, should have been surfaced, was the potential cost effectiveness of the program.

By cost effectiveness is meant the cost per unit of outcome. In the present instance, the appropriate question was, "How much money was the City willing to pay out for each successful⁵ referral to the long-term Odyssey House residential facility?"

As it turned out, the average cost for the ten referrals to the residential facility was \$5,500 per person (based on a total eight-month expenditure of \$55,000). Assuming (arbitrarily) that the overall cost would decrease slightly

⁵The notion of "successful" in this context refers to an inmate that completes the motivational unit and transfers to the residential facility.

over time (based on a reduction in consulting fees and capital outlays) to a figure of \$4,500 per referral--an 18 per cent decrease--it is possible to estimate the cost of referrals. The computation of the costs would offer policy makers a more informed set of alternatives.

Thus, the approximate cost of referring 25 inmates to the program would be \$112,500, and the decision to invest that amount would rest on the following questions:

- (1) Of the inmates referred to the residential facility, how many remained as long as one year? (Of the ten referred, three are still in the program.)
- (2) Is \$112,500 a price that the City is willing to underwrite?
- (3) What are the alternative approaches and their costs?
- (4) What is the likely size of the client population?

There is, of course, no guarantee that public policy would be developed in such a manner, but the absence of relevant information forecloses on the option of concerned policy-makers using cost effectiveness as a criterion for funding. It is also possible that the use of cost estimates and product outcomes might have changed the nature of the conflict between the Odyssey House program and the Sheriff, so that the decision to initiate the drug program would not have been a question of "doing the right thing," but a choice of which alternative to choose given limited resources and constraints on inmate eligibility. Thus, a

timely analysis of the arrestee survey for drug users could have assisted the decisions made by all parties because that analysis would have highlighted the potentially small eligible population, and thus the relatively high cost per referral.

It should be noted, however, that the timely analysis of the arrestee survey--irrespective of the implications of the findings--may have had little effect upon the felt urgency of Odyssey House to enter the prison. Research findings are, of course, often misplaced in decision-making processes. The lesson of the Parish Prison-Odyssey House relationship is that the coordination of programs cannot be accomplished if the participating agencies do not understand basic administrative and organizational custom; i.e., a respect for the prerogatives of the agency acting as sponsor of the program. This is not so much a commentary on the worth of the program or its potential to impact its goals, rather it is a warning that the boundaries perceived by an agency with regard to its functions and authority is a primary consideration in the cooperation of two or more agencies in the development of social programs.⁶ The assessment in the present case is that Odyssey House did not sufficiently appreciate (1) the implications of a prison setting, (2) the perceptions and style of the Sheriff, and

⁶For a discussion of organizational boundaries, see Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, (Boston: Little Brown & Co.), 1966.

(3) its own essentially entrepreneurial role within the prison context. Had it recognized the three elements, its approach to Parish Prison might have been modified, and its operating procedures made to fit the style of the Sheriff.

CONCLUSIONS

The history of drug detoxification at Parish Prison provides support for two related conclusions. First, the early problems of implementing the program are not all that unusual. To some extent, they occur in all action programs. Thus, the task of the planning agency, and primarily the host agency, is to reach a firm position prior to the grant award as to what activities will be implemented and which organizations will be asked to cooperate. If for any number of reasons the host agency does not know fairly clearly and in some detail what is to be done with the grant award, there is little the coordinating agency can effect with any success. In the case of Parish Prison, the change in Sheriffs (as a result of the election) and the lack of involvement of the previous Sheriff created a series of difficulties that were "solved" only by the active intervention of the incoming Sheriff. The point to be made is that social action programs require substantial administrative support from the host agency, simply so that the program can begin to operate. This conclusion has been a recurring theme in the evaluation studies of the New Orleans Criminal

Justice Coordinating Council, and its importance is underlined by the frequent failure of programs to reach an operational stage within a reasonable period of time.

The second point has reference to the Odyssey House experience. In considering the history of the relationship between the Sheriff and the treatment program, the analyst must decide which questions merit a priority status, or which general model of behavior is appropriate. In true evaluations, experimental and quasi-experimental modes are preferable and to a large extent, straightforward. In the context of a case study, the experimental model is irrelevant. So, too, is the question of the worth of the program, since one must accept on faith the potential impact of the program had it been implemented as expected. To debate what "might have been" is usually a fruitless expenditure of energy.

The appropriate model in the case of Parish Prison and Odyssey House is that of the marketplace. Clearly, Odyssey House was selling a service. The Sheriff was the potential buyer, with the option of negotiating for the best possible service as he defined it. As economists have been quick to point out, free market mechanisms frequently break down, so that the relationship between vendor and vendee is often not purely confined to costs and services.⁷

⁷The use of economic models in the analysis of government and politics is becoming increasingly frequent. See Niskanen (1971), Downs (1966), Buchanan (1968), Tullock (1965).

Other factors intervene, among them government policies and other non-market mechanisms. The pressure placed upon the Sheriff to "purchase" the services of Odyssey House was not at all unlike behavior in the "private sector."

If one accepts this model (and the description has been all too brief), then the logical starting point for the analyst is to inquire into the reasons that Odyssey House approached the Sheriff in the manner described earlier. If I were the Director of Odyssey House, the first question I would have asked my staff would be, "Under what conditions will the Sheriff of Orleans Parish purchase the treatment services we are proposing?" The second question would have been, "Can the program operate under these constraints and limitations?" If both questions could not have been satisfactorily answered, the logical decision would have been to go elsewhere for the treatment program.


This analytic method is neither a defense of the Sheriff nor a judgement on the value of the Odyssey House services. Rather, it is simply a statement of what is, based on the idea that before a program can demonstrate its worth, it must be able to operate as it expects. The actions of Odyssey House in its negotiations to enter the prison invite the conclusion that the basic gut questions were never asked, and the consequences never anticipated. The dissipation of the program has left a void, and the administrative lesson seems clear. When services are proposed to a

host agency, in most instances all the important operating decisions are those of the host. It is in the interest of the program to create a relationship with the agency that minimizes conflicts. Of course, even when the initial agreement is clear, conflicts frequently arise later. In the case of Odyssey House and the Sheriff, the relationship could never have been adequate, given the nature of the negotiations.

ODYSSEY HOUSE MOTIVATIONAL UNIT (O.H.M.U.)

self - projection *


(FIGURE 1)



* Dated DEC. 20th., 1974

(FIGURE 2)

(O.H.M.U.) PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
A COMPARISON of REFERRALS, INDUCTIONS & RESIDENTS



DISPOSITIONS OF INMATES REFERRED TO
ODYSSEY HOUSE MOTIVATIONAL UNIT (O.H.M.U.) (TABLE 1)
IN PARISH PRISON

	N	% of Total Referred	% of Total--Corrected for Those Not Screened
TOTAL INMATES REFERRED TO OHMU FOR POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT	198	N/A	N/A
TOTAL INMATES UNACCEPTABLE TO SHERIFF	77	39%	49%
TOTAL INMATES UNACCEPTABLE TO OHMU	4	2%	3%
TOTAL INMATES AWAITING SHERIFF SCREENING	36	18%	N/A
TOTAL INMATES ELIMINATING THEMSELVES	23	12%	14%
TOTAL INMATES WITH NO PRIOR PRISON RECORD	10	5%	6%
TOTAL INMATES REMANDED TO ANGOLA	7	3%	4%
TOTAL INMATES PENDING FURTHER OHMU EVALUATION	1	1%	1%
TOTAL CLIENT INDUCTIONS	40*	20%	25%
		100%	101%**

*10 of 40 transferred to Odyssey House Residential Program

**Rounding error

Table 2

AVAILABILITY OF ARREST HISTORIES FOR INMATES
REFERRED BY OHMU TO SHERIFF AND REJECTED

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Record Could Not Be Found	18	23%
Too Many Similar Names To Clearly Make Identification	8	10%
Records Found	<u>51</u>	<u>66%</u>
TOTAL	77	99%*

*Rounding error

Table 3

THE REVIEW OF ARREST HISTORIES OF
INMATES REJECTED BY THE SHERIFF

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
An Arrest History With At Least One Incident Of Violence	41	80%
No Violence But A Long Record	3	6%
Former Patient At Mental Hospital	1	2%
Out-Of-City Resident	1	2%
Legal Factors	1	2%
Female	1	2%
Reason For Rejection Cannot Be Determined From Arrest Histories	<u>3</u>	<u>6%</u>
TOTAL	51	100%

Table 4

FREQUENCY OF ARREST INCIDENTS OF
VIOLENCE FOR INMATES REJECTED BY SHERIFF*

APPENDIX A

<u>Number of Arrest Incidents**</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
One Arrest	15	37%
Two Arrests	10	24%
Three Arrests	9	22%
Four Arrests	1	2%
Five Arrests	4	10%
Six Arrests	<u>2</u>	<u>5%</u>
TOTAL	41	100%

*Whose records were found--with previous arrests for violent offenses

**Incidents refers to distinct events, and should not be confused with charges or counts

APPENDIX A

Those persons interviewed include:

- (1) Mr. Terry Alarcon, Administrative Assistant to the Sheriff
- (2) Mr. Charles Foti, Criminal Sheriff of Orleans Parish
- (3) Ms. Margaret Pike, State Director, Odyssey House of Louisiana
- (4) Dr. Frank Minyard, Coroner of Orleans Parish
- (5) Mr. Walter Dupaire, formerly the Corrections Planner at the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council
- (6) Mr. Barry Pike, Director of Odyssey House Residential Facility, New Orleans, Louisiana

APPENDIX B

DRUG DETOXIFICATION FOR PARISH PRISON
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
May 15, 1975

ITEM	TOTAL GRANT FUNDS			LEAA CASH ONLY		
	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures To Date	Balance To Date	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures To Date	Balance To Date
Personnel	\$ 33,510	\$ 27,612	\$5,898	\$14,684	\$14,684	-0-
Fringe Benefits	\$ 859	\$ 859	-0-	\$ 859	\$ 859	-0-
Equipment	\$ 6,539	\$ 6,539	-0-	\$ 6,539	\$ 6,539	-0-
Supplies	\$ 1,886	\$ 1,886	-0-	\$ 1,886	\$ 1,886	-0-
Other Direct Costs	\$ 61,496	\$ 61,496	-0-	\$61,496	\$61,496	-0-
Indirect Costs	\$ 4,273	\$ 4,273	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	\$108,563	\$102,665	\$5,898	\$85,464	\$85,464	-0-

Note: This financial summary was prepared by Michele Duprey, Analyst I

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COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITIES:

THE CASE OF DREYFOUS HOUSE

Marcia Slotnick
Evaluator

MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

July, 1976

MAYOR'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATING COUNCIL

CASE STUDY

Project: Community-Based Residential
Treatment Facility

Project Number: 72-ED-06-0017-TA-8

Subgrantee: Department of Welfare,
City of New Orleans
Morris Jeff, Director

Date of Report: July 1, 1976

Director of Evaluation: Robert Sternhell

Prepared By: Marcia K. Slotnick,
Projects Evaluation Specialist II

Evaluation Assistance: Stuart P. Carroll,
Projects Evaluation Specialist III

Michele Duprey,
Administrative Analyst I

Cheryl Lyle, Steno III

Marci Onie, Student Intern

Grant Award: LEAA - \$300,618
Subgrantee - \$138,309

Total Budget - \$438,927

Subgrant Period: September 1, 1973 to March 31, 1976

Project Staff: Mary E. Jordan, Project Director
James Williams, Program Director

Authorized Official: Moon Landrieu, Mayor
City of New Orleans

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

A Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility was established in New Orleans as part of an attack on the increasingly serious juvenile crime problem. Juvenile crime was increasing at an alarming rate. Between the years 1960 and 1970, the total arrests of juveniles rose by 99%. Additionally, there was a 100% increase in the number of repeater arrests. These rates were rising at the same time total population figures were decreasing. This trend continued through the early 1970's until a decline began in 1972. Available data indicates that although there was an increasing number of total arrests in the period from 1970 to 1971, the number of first offenders and individual repeater arrests was declining. These data lend credence to the argument that recidivism is the primary reason for rising juvenile crime rates. A core group of approximately 350 individuals were identified by the Juvenile Bureau of the New Orleans Police Department as contributing significantly to the rising juvenile crime rate.

A second feature of the environment at the time was the unavailability of treatment alternatives for juvenile offenders. While a large number of juvenile offenders were identified as having severe emotional disorders, there was no institution equipped to treat those problems. The

Louisiana Training Institute (LTI) was overcrowded, understaffed, and not designed to treat emotional problems.

While it was recognized that institutionalization at LTI was not the most beneficial treatment possible, there were few alternatives available to the Juvenile Court judges in dealing with the more serious offenders (here identified as those with arrest recidivism and/or more serious arrest records). For example, during the period March, 1972, through November, 1972, the Diagnostic Unit of the Youth Study Center recommended institutionalization at LTI of only one individual. During that same time period, however, the court sent approximately 150 juveniles to that system.¹ In an attempt to expand upon the available treatment alternatives, the notion of the "Half-Way In" house was developed as a prototype for future treatment alternatives in New Orleans.

The Group Home Concept

The "Half-Way In" house was designed with the intention of:

"providing a meaningful placement alternative for adjudicated youths with needs which lie between the two extremes of institutionalization and free community living."²

¹Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, p. 34-35.

²Ibid., p. 35.

It is residential in nature, housing a small group of youths (usually 10-15) of a specified age group. The house is located within the community in a location where local services are readily available. "Half-Way In" houses attempt to remove from the youth's environment those influences which are perceived to be negatively affecting the youth's behavior patterns and to prepare the youth for more responsible behavior.

In other words, the "Half-Way In" house was to be a residential treatment facility to accommodate those youths who could not benefit from the traditional forms of court dispositions, primarily probation or incarceration at a training institute. Probation is often viewed as having little therapeutic benefit because the home environment is a source of the problems exhibited in a youth's delinquent behavior. By removing a youth from the home setting to a Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility (CBRTF), rehabilitation can begin and can include interaction with the individuals in the home environment in attempts to establish a more suitable relationship. As an alternative to the traditional training institutes, the CBRTF is also viewed as an advantageous source of treatment:

- (1) It allows for parental involvement in the rehabilitation of the child. Traditional institutionalization generally removes the child from the community in which he lives, thus inhibiting the potential for family involvement.

- (2) The size, which is small by design, allows for the institution to concentrate on rehabilitative efforts rather than the maintenance functions served by training institutions.
- (3) The community setting eliminates much of the reintegration of the child back into the community, necessitated by the nature of traditional institutions.
- (4) Finally, the potential for adequate education and/or vocational training is higher when one can make use of community resources. Generally, at the institutional level, education has often been neglected.³

Goals and Objectives

As originally intended, the "Half-Way In" house was to include those emotionally disturbed youth who had encountered problems with the criminal justice system or in their personal lives. Also, it was to include some juveniles who had been adjudicated delinquent (this was originally intended to be the primary participant; but as will be detailed later, the adjudicated juvenile was to be excluded).

The goals and objectives include the following:

Goals:

- (1) The reduction of recidivism rates among juvenile participants in the program by 50%.

³For further discussion regarding the advantages of community-based treatment, see R. W. Kobetz and B. B. Bosarge, Juvenile Justice Administration, IACP, 1973, pp. 546-557.

- (2) An increase in regular school attendance among program participants.
- (3) The direction of juveniles toward satisfactory employment either as a supplement to regular school attendance or as a continuing vocation.
- (4) Acceptance and support of the program by the immediate community.
- (5) The expansion of the "Half-Way In" model to other areas of the city.
- (6) The reorientation of the juvenile participant's "life-style".

Objectives:

- (1) Providing an alternative system of diversion from the traditional juvenile institutions by creating a "Half-Way In" house.
- (2) The establishment of close relationships with relevant education officials in order to maximize educational opportunities.
- (3) The utilization of an employment service both in the public and private sector with adequate compensation and reasonable opportunities.
- (4) A continuing public relations effort directed at the immediate community--particularly in those months preceding the opening of the home.
- (5) A continuing information flow from program to relevant city officials, including the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and other interested agencies and individuals.⁴

⁴Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, pp. 36-37.

The Project

The Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility (TA-8) was created as a result of a planning process and grant award made by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to be administered by the Welfare Department of New Orleans. The original grant award was announced July 15, 1973, for a total budget of \$438,927; LEAA funding amounting to \$300,618; and the remainder (\$138,309) being provided by the City in cash and in-kind match. Funding for the project was released in September, 1973, budgeted for a two-year period. Due to substantial remaining funds at the scheduled conclusion date of this and several other projects of the Target Area Crime Specifics Program (of which TA-8 is part), there was a reallocation of remaining funds, thus extending the project through March, 1976.

The Treatment Facility - Participants

The home was designed to be a therapeutic community which would accommodate approximately fifteen male youths between the ages of 14 and 16. They were to be referred by the Youth Study Center through discretion of Juvenile Court. The Court would have ultimate control in determining whether or not the adjudicated delinquent would have the choice of entering the project rather than the Louisiana Training Institute. The final choice would be based upon

decision by the youth and the home. The basic treatment modality was to be Guided-Group Interaction, which is based on peer pressure as the primary therapeutic element.⁵ Ancillary services were to include individual therapy, vocational services, medical services, and other related services that might direct the juvenile to responsible behavior. Residency was expected to be for a term of six to eight months with release occurring in stages.

The Treatment Facility - Accommodations

The project called for a structure that would have four sleeping rooms sufficient to accommodate the live-in counselors and all project participants and their belongings. Other areas of the facility were to be designed with regard to the safety of participants and the functions to be served by particular rooms.

The primary concern regarding the structure was its location, which later proved to be a problem. It was located in:

"a racially, culturally, and economically diverse community which offers advantages to mixed populations. The area must be zoned properly. Public transportation and commercial services should be within walking distance."⁶

⁵Larsen, C., Guided Group Interaction: Theory and Method, Department of Court Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota, pp. 17-21.

⁶Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, p. 52.

The Staff

The administrative structure of the Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility (Dreyfous House) was under the direction of the City Welfare Department. There was to be a Project Director who would be responsible for supervising the administrative and operational developments of the project. A Director of Community Resources was to develop relationships with the community which would enable project participants the use of existing services. The Chief Counselor was to supervise all house counseling activities (to include staff operations and training) and to conduct initial participant interviews. Additionally, there were to be two Counselors and two Assistant Counselors to participate in the operation of the program.

Project Development

The Department of Public Welfare, the subgrantee of the award, was notified of the award in July, 1973. By September, 1973, project administrators had begun to implement the project. Plans were made for hiring of project personnel, a task that was nearly complete by February, 1974. An architect was hired to make plans for the renovation of the building to be used as the project base. By May, the project staff had moved into temporary quarters for the project. During the entire period, negative community reaction inhibited development and implementation

of the project (to be detailed below), and therefore, construction on the building to be renovated did not begin until July of that year. Project participants moved into the renovated facility in January, 1975. (See Table 1 for a chronology of critical events in the development of Dreyfous House)

THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE

The project was to have numerous delays and changes previous to the entry date of its first client and full implementation of the project. As indicated in the six-month report, most of the delays took place as a result of adverse community reaction and the possible legal consequences of that reaction.

The residential treatment facility (eventually to be known as Dreyfous House) was to be located on the grounds of the Milne Boys' Home, which is operated by the City Welfare Department. It was anticipated that community reaction would be minimal because the existing facility was already providing services to youths similar to expected participants in the project. The magnitude of the reaction was underestimated.

Announcement of the grant award, however, was interpreted by some community members as indicating the project was to include "hard-core" juvenile offenders. Neighborhood organizations responded quickly and strongly to this apparent threat to community safety with a resolution opposing any such rehabilitative effort on the Milne grounds (September, 1973). Community relations efforts were begun to ameliorate the fears of the neighborhood residents, and the District Councilman was contacted to enlist his support. Additionally, several thousand fact sheets were

distributed regarding the planned participants of the home, and the Superintendent of Milne Boys' Home had several speaking engagements with civic groups in the area to generate further support for the project. The Superintendent had been a long-time employee at Milne and, thus, had established a relationship with the community which potentially could have been a basis for understanding the project. In November, however, the Superintendent died, and the rapport with the community disintegrated. By that time, it appeared to Welfare Department officials that the negative community response had subsided, that the residents had an understanding of the nature of the planned project.

Assuming neighborhood agreement to the project and understanding of the behavioral background of project participants, the project administration proceeded with hiring staff and planning for renovation of the building to be used for the project. Early in 1974, however, the District Councilman proposed that implementation of the project be stopped until the City Council could conduct hearings on the acceptability of the project.⁷ These actions necessitated a move from project implementation to a greater community relations effort. By June, 1974, the City Council had passed a resolution that implementation of the project

⁷This resolution failed as the result of a 3-3 tie vote.

be halted until a Citizens' Advisory Committee (comprised of professionals and neighborhood residents) could be established (the committee being created as a result of a prior resolution of the City Council). Finally, by the end of June, the Citizens' Advisory Committee was formally appointed and the project allowed to proceed subject to that committee's scrutiny. At that time, the project was permitted to operate under strict monitoring.

Throughout the summer, questions regarding the use of the Milne grounds for youth legally defined as delinquent persisted. Admission to Milne had been questioned earlier (1958-1960), based upon the design of the will of Alexander Milne. Juveniles were to be excluded from Milne if they were determined to be delinquent by the City Welfare Department.⁸ This position was in opposition to the one taken by the community group; the group interpreted the will to exclude juveniles who had legally been found delinquent (the City opinion was based on a social definition of delinquent). The issue was resolved on September 19, 1974, when the City Council passed a resolution prohibiting admission into Milne Boys' Home to any youth adjudicated delinquent after October 1, 1974. The Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility was to follow the admission criteria for Milne Boys' Home.

⁸During the three-year period, three ordinances specifying these points were written.

Table 1

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

July 15, 1973	Target Area Crime Specifics Program announced. Included Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility.
September, 1973	Funding released by Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to subgrantees--Department of Public Welfare, City of New Orleans.
September 6, 1973	Resolution by neighborhood civic groups protesting rehabilitation facility for "hard core" juvenile offenders.
October, 1973	Community relations effort begins: (1) fact sheets distributed, (2) superintendent of Milne makes speeches.
November, 1973	Superintendent of Milne Boys' Home dies. Architect hired to plan renovation; operating director hired.
February, 1974	Staff hiring nearly complete. District Councilman meets with neighborhood groups.
March, 1974	District Councilman proposes resolution prohibiting implementation. Community relations efforts continue.
April 4, 1974	Councilman's March resolution defeated by City Council (3-3 tie vote).
April 18, 1974	City Council passes resolution creating a Citizens' Advisory Committee.
May, 1974	Project staff moves into temporary quarters.
June, 1974	First project participants admitted.
June 6, 1974	City Council passes resolution halting further implementation until committee established.
June 20, 1974	Resolution proposed by District Councilman--re: succession of Milne Citizens' Advisory Committee named by City Council.

July, 1974	Renovation begins on project facility.
July, 1974 - September, 1974	Concerned parties discuss intake procedures of Milne Boys' Home (relative to June 20, 1974 resolution).
September 19, 1974	Resolution excluding juveniles adjudicated delinquent subsequent to October 1, 1974 passed by City Council.
January, 1975	Project moves into renovated quarters.
April, 1975	Renovated quarters dedicated--Dreyfous House Residential Facility.
March 31, 1976	LEAA funding ends. Project picked up by City.

CASE STUDY PROCEDURES

The Dreyfous House Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility was created to provide a treatment alternative for juvenile offenders. It was designed to be a therapeutic community for the juvenile who had needs between the traditional forms of treatment (i.e., institutionalization at a training institute) and free community living. This rehabilitative effort was expected to produce reduced recidivist rates among program participants.

The present study is not an evaluation in the normal sense but, rather, it is a case study of a project which encountered peculiar problems which inhibited program development. The study is, first, a narrative history of the project through its ending date of March 31, 1976. It deals with the issues that arose during the implementation of the project and problems which surfaced as a result of these issues. Furthermore, the study will attempt to assess the impact of the therapeutic model on the individual participants (we cannot here assess the impact of the model on project goals due to the small number of participants). Measures of efficiency and effectiveness, then, will be used in the context of the case study. The dates selected for analysis are from project start to end (September, 1973 through March, 1976). In the assessment of impact of the therapeutic model, however, we will discuss only those youths who entered the project prior to January 1, 1976; those who entered after the date

had not been project participants long enough for changes to occur when data collection took place (March, 1976).

Measures of Efficiency

The measures of efficiency are used to assess the implementation of the project as it was planned. Specifically, the efficiency of the project is measured in terms of length of time between receipt of grant and implementation, allocation of resources, funds expended, and program activities. These measures are all designed to address the adherence of the project to the planning documents. Additionally, if there were scope or funding changes, there should be like changes documented in grant adjustments. Beyond that, questions regarding compliance with grant adjustments are to be asked. Service delivery will also be assessed as a measure of efficiency.

Measures of Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the treatment model will be assessed primarily in a subjective analysis on a case-by-case basis. Each participant in the project will be measured against himself; that is, an assessment of changes in behavior prior to, during, and after participation in the project is expected to give some indications as to the effectiveness of the therapeutic model used at Dreyfous House. The explanation for this type of analysis is clear;

given the small number of participants in the project, it is impossible to generate a rigorous quantitative analysis based upon cumulative data. Additionally, impact upon the criminal justice system cannot be estimated because the nature of program participants changed. Because adjudicated youths could not be considered for participation in the project, there is no way to assess whether or not the project was a viable, effective alternative to traditional treatment models (i.e., Louisiana Training Institute).

Assessment of the effectiveness of the treatment model will be based upon analysis of two data sets:

- (1) Arrest records of participants
- (2) Evaluation of participants made in case files by project personnel

Data Sources

Data for discussion of Dreyfous House have come from several sources:

- (1) Grant Application (SLEPA 1) - the basic planning document of the project which establishes the general framework of the project (operations and budget) and specifies the goals and objectives.
- (2) Grant Adjustment Requests (SLEPA 12) - those documents which request changes in either the scope or budget of the project.
- (3) Subgrantee Narrative Progress Reports (SLEPA 5) - the monthly reports prepared by the project giving a narrative description of activities.

- (4) Subgrantee Report of Expenditures - this is prepared by project personnel showing the status of funds and are used in the preparation of the financial summary.
- (5) Monthly Monitoring Reports - statistical tabulations of activities and services forwarded to the evaluator monthly. (Appendix A)
- (6) New Orleans Police Department Juvenile Division Arrest Records - these records include the arrest history of juveniles (under age 17).
- (7) Juvenile Probation Department Records - these files contain data regarding a youth's contact with the Probation Department and the Juvenile Court. They were used to ascertain the existence of adjudications after October, 1974.
- (8) Personal Interviews With Project Staff and Administration - includes observation of treatment sessions and operational activities.
- (9) Case Files - the records of the project are a major source of demographic information as well as success measures. (Appendix B)

All data are stored under lock in a secure location in the evaluator's office.

Research Problems

Although there are inherent problems in trying to assess the success of program participants on a basis similar to those measures designed to assess adjudicated youth, there are few alternatives to arrest recidivism as a primary measure of program impact on the youth. Thus, we are left with an assessment of participants for whom

the project was not designed. As a result, when attempting to measure success, there are fewer cases which we can discuss since the "lower risk"⁹ individuals with whom this program deals often have not made contact with police. Secondly, juvenile arrest records are generally not difficult to collect but are a function of maturation; when a juvenile is 17 years old, any prior police record is purged from the files of the Juvenile Division of the New Orleans Police Department and either sealed or destroyed, unavailable for an evaluator's analysis. This problem, coupled with the low-risk nature of the project clientele, limit assessment of nine individuals for whom no police records could be found. In these cases, the assessment will rely solely on project records.

Finally, no assessment of program impact can be made on those individuals who spent little time in the program (i.e., less than 30 days), those for whom no services could have been provided.

⁹"Lower risk" to be defined as those youth not adjudicated delinquent subsequent to October, 1974.

THE PROJECT AS IMPLEMENTED

The actions of the City Council during the first nine months of 1974 effectively diluted the program to the extent that it would not serve what were expected to be the primary participants (i.e., the more serious juvenile offender, often those adjudicated delinquent). Therefore, the original goals and objectives were, in a sense, irrelevant to the target population. While a grant adjustment was made to reflect the characteristics of the client population and the creation of a Citizens' Advisory Committee, there was no concomitant change in the goals and objectives. Within these constraints, we consider the implementation of the Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility.

Participants in the CBRTF were first admitted in May, 1974, after the many months of planning and negotiating. Although eventually subject to the approval of the Citizens' Advisory Committee, treatment sessions were begun. After the slow start-up time for this project, there was the final delay of waiting until the committee could be formally established until activities could proceed. It is to that committee to which we now turn.

Role of the Citizens' Advisory Committee

The New Orleans City Council, in an understanding of the concerns of the neighborhood residents in which the

CBRTF was to be located, created by ordinance a committee to be responsible for admissions to the program. Admissions were to be based on a majority vote by the full committee. In an effort to protect the confidentiality of juvenile records, the committee was further defined into subcommittees: the Citizens' Review Committee was to be comprised of three professionals in the community--a physician, an attorney, and a certified social worker; the remainder of the Citizens' Committee was comprised of six elected representatives of the neighborhood and the Superintendent (or his representative) of Milne Boys' Home. The Citizens' Review Committee was to review the records of potential participants and return to the full committee with recommendations (the professionals were responsible for protecting the confidentiality of records) relative to acceptance of an individual to the project. The committee was expected to serve a watchdog function by ascertaining that all criteria for admission to Milne Boys' Home were followed in screening for the CBRTF. This later extended to the ordinance passed by the City Council in September, 1974, requiring adjudicated delinquents be excluded from admission. A further role played by a Professional Advisory Committee has been to provide the professional advice needed to solve problems of a more general nature. Finally, the committees were responsible for informing the neighborhood of the progress of the project; they sustained the community relations effort.

The committees met, initially, on a regular basis to review potential participants and to address critical problems. As the project became established and procedures for admission became routine, the "watchdog" function of the committee diminished, and the need for regular meetings also decreased. The committees now meet solely on an as-needed basis. Review of records of project applicants continues, and approval is subject to vote by committee members (these routines are now accomplished by mail).

Referrals, Admissions, and Release

Although the Citizens' Advisory Committee (and the professional subcommittee) is of critical importance in the screening process of prospective participants, there is a more extensive process through which participants are admitted.¹⁰

First, referrals come from a variety of sources. Information describing the program had been communicated to agencies in the area who dealt with the target population. Based on the requirements of the project, it was expected that the various agencies would recommend clients. Between May, 1974, and March, 1976, 29 clients were accepted to the project. (See Table 2) Twenty of these

¹⁰For a detailed account of the admission process, see the Residential Facility Procedure Manual, Section VII.

Table 2

<u>REFERRAL SOURCES</u>	
Juvenile Court/Probation*	17
Probation Department	3
Milne Boy's Home	3
Youth Study Center	1
Other	5

*Juvenile Court and the Probation Department often refer clients in concert.

Source: Dreyfous House
Prepared by: CJCC


clients were referred by the Juvenile Probation Department and/or Juvenile Court. These two agencies often acted in concert in making referrals. In several cases, Juvenile Court committed the youth to Dreyfous House, thus making release impossible without the approval of the court. This procedure is acceptable to the project staff because the court is not likely to terminate participation before staff recommends termination (in one case, the project staff evaluated a participant as making successful progress, but his mother removed him from the home before ready; there were no legal holds on the child, however, and the child was released).

If the referral is appropriate, an investigation of the youth begins with a home visit. During this interview, the project is described to the youth and his parents, and an assessment is made of any psychological reports written on the youth--in many cases, the Diagnostic Unit of the Youth Study Center has completed a psychological evaluation of the youth. If the youth appears to be a candidate for participation, he is subjected to eligibility criteria of Milne Boys' Home, a staff screening committee, the Citizens' Advisory Committee, and finally, the residents and staff of the group home (Figure 1).

Release from the group home takes place in stages. After being in the group home for a time determined by progress being made, the youth is permitted to return to his

Figure 1

SCREENING PROCEDURE FOR ADMISSION TO CBRTF



home for short visits first, and later, more extended visits. Final release is decided upon by staff, the resident, peer group, and family.

Residents of Dreyfous House

Between May, 1974, and March, 1975, 29 individuals have entered the Dreyfous House treatment program. Criteria for entry has been met in all cases and the client population resembles that described in the Residential Facility Procedure Manual:

"The client population will consist of adolescent males ranging from 14 through 17 years of age. The program is geared to the youth with an average to borderline intelligence and functioning level. Previous juvenile record will be considered, and priority will be given to boys who display the highest potential for change. First-time offenders, and boys whose major problem involves adjustment problems at home and/or school or crimes against property, fall in this category."¹¹

The average age of residents entering the program was 15 years with the range between 14 and 16. Termination in the program has generally occurred by the 17th birthday. The participants were a racially mixed group (16 black, 13 white). By March, 1976, 17 terminations had taken place. Of these 17 terminations, 3 were terminated soon after entry and therefore will not be included as potentially being affected by the treatment modality of the project.

¹¹Residential Facility Procedure Manual, Section VII

In a search of Juvenile Probation Department records, there appeared to be no adjudications of delinquents prior to entry for any participants, with the exception of one.¹² There were no conscious violations of the ordinance passed by the City Council relative to adjudications; in most cases, if there was court contact and/or commitment to the CBRTF, the child was found to be "in need of supervision" (R.S. 13:1569) by the court (Table 3). The arrest for which the youths were brought to court were generally status offenses, minor in nature, or crimes against property.¹³ Not all arrest incidents progressed through the court. For the 20 individuals for whom arrest records could be found, there were 67 incidents of arrest prior to admission into Dreyfous House (an average of 3.35 arrests per youth for whom records were located). In only four incidents of arrest was there a crime against a person (see Table 4), thus fulfilling the requirements of the

¹²The one juvenile found to have been adjudicated delinquent prior to entry into the CBRTF was rearrested four days after his arrival at the home. At that time, it was found that Probation Department records were not in order and that the youth had been adjudicated delinquent subsequent to October 1, 1974. He was terminated from the project and sent to Louisiana Training Institute.

¹³The classification scheme used here is based upon one documented in a report by S. Carroll, "Volunteers in Juvenile Probation: A Preliminary Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the New Orleans Demonstration Project," CJCC, August, 1975, pp. 18-19 and Appendix A.

Table 3

PRIOR JUVENILE COURT DISPOSITIONS*

In need of supervision	18
Adjudicated delinquent	1
File unavailable	3
Neglect	1
No court contact	4
Name listed, no probation file	2

*Court dispositions chosen by one immediately prior to admission; all adjudications noted.

Source: Juvenile Probation Department, City of New Orleans
Prepared by: CJCC

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Table 4

PRIOR ARRESTS BY TYPE

<u>Status Offenses</u>	
Unruly and Uncontrollable	3
Truancy/Loitering	12
Runaway	4
<u>Minor Arrests</u>	
Criminal Mischief	2
Disturbing the Peace	4
Drunk	2
Attempted Bike Theft	1
Threats	1
Shoplifting	7
Possession of Stolen Auto	1
Theft	2
Trespassing	7
Attempted Simple Burglary	1
<u>Serious Arrests</u>	
Auto Theft	1
Simple Battery	2
Simple Burglary	11
Aggravated Burglary	1
Purse Snatching	2
Drugs	3
TOTAL	67

Source: Juvenile Division, New Orleans Police Department
Prepared by: CJCC

project regarding participants. For the most part, juveniles of this age group who have been committed to the Department of Corrections--LTI--have been found guilty of very serious offenses including crimes against persons.¹⁴ Obviously, the client population of the CBRTF does not have the serious arrest history nor the serious crimes against persons that youths committed to LTI have generated. Evidence here indicates the project complied with all ordinances passed by the City Council relative to the admission of youths to Dreyfous House. The careful screening process, including a review of juvenile court and probation records, apparently has served as a further guarantee of this compliance.

Treatment Modality

The primary treatment modality for Dreyfous House residents is a modification of Guided Group Interaction. Guided Group Interaction (G.G.I.) is a method of therapy in which the leader of the group directs the group to certain ends, but solely that; the ego strengths of the group are the basis for therapeutic treatment rather than the group leader. Peer group pressure is the "agent of change" in G.G.I. The group serves three primary functions in the therapy process:

¹⁴Curtis and Davis, Juvenile Justice, New Orleans: Correctional Design and Utilization 1975-2000, October, 1975, p.3:46.

- (1) The group is responsible for assisting each member in the resolution of his social problems,
- (2) The group controls the conduct of the meetings, and
- (3) The group, and this is critical importance for Dreyfous House, assists in decision-making specifically in determining when a member is ready to be released.¹⁵

In addition to the peer pressure mode of G.G.I., reality therapy and behavior modification techniques are used as part of the group therapy model. Unless there is a special event, group sessions occur five days a week. On weekends, residents are free from group sessions. The Monday night session includes the entire staff and all residents; this session deals with special problems, forthcoming activities, and anything participants wish to discuss. The remaining four nights are solely treatment oriented. Group sessions have been occurring an average of 19.86 times per month.

Individual therapy is provided on an as-needed basis by staff or a contracted psychiatrist.

Family involvement is a fundamental element of the treatment model. In an attempt to establish or re-establish satisfactory relationships between participant and family, a family therapy session is conducted once weekly to confront problems facing the participants and families. These Parent

¹⁵A detailed analysis of the G.G.I. model can be found in Guided Group Interaction: Theory and Method, by Charles Larsen, published by Hennepin County Court Services, Minneapolis, 1970.

Councils, as they have come to be known, generally do not include Dreyfous House residents but are group sessions for their parents. Attendance at these sessions is irregular; therefore, project staff try to communicate the importance of parental participation by letter and phone. Although attendance proportions are generally not high, the regularity of the sessions is routine, meeting each week unless special circumstances prevent sessions from occurring. At times, there are joint sessions including staff, residents, and parents. Parent Councils have met at the rate of 3.71 per month.

The final treatment modality is vocational training. There is an attempt to assess the needs of each resident relative to educational and/or vocational training. If working is the appropriate vocational mode for the youth, then attempts are made to assist him in finding a job. Several times monthly, guest speakers are invited to present information regarding various professions, and project staff have made contact with agencies in the community that provide educational and vocational services. Residents' progress in their education and vocations is monitored closely and assistance provided when possible.

Length of Residency

The length of stay in Dreyfous House was expected to be six to eight months. By March, 1976, seventeen individuals had been terminated from the project, three of whom were

terminated before substantial treatment could have occurred.¹⁶ If we exclude these three from analysis (because the treatment model could have no therapeutic effect), we find the average stay per participant is 215 days or 7.2 months. Although this measure indicates average residency to be the same as expected, the range of days indicates otherwise. Of those fourteen terminated residents, the minimum stay was 58 days, the maximum 366 days. Project staff explain the wide variation in residency in three ways:

- (1) The expected six to eight month stay was an underestimation of the length of time for the therapeutic model to be effective,
- (2) Although an individual might be prepared to leave the home, there have been problems in placing such individuals in environments that sustain the therapeutic effort; some of these individuals have remained in the home for this reason, and
- (3) Those residents who account for the minimum stay were terminated before successful completion of the project (e.g., in two cases, adjustment problems accounted for early termination; a third resident, although progressing well according to project records, was removed by his mother).

¹⁶The three terminated individuals resided in the home for no more than eight days each; all were terminated due to immediate violations of house rules.

Fiscal Administration and Grant Adjustments

The Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility was allocated a total of \$438,927 in LEAA grant funds to be budgeted over a two-year period. This represented \$300,618 in LEAA funds and \$138,309 provided by the City to match the federal funds. Management of these funds has proceeded in an efficient manner, and reports are prepared regularly. Due to a substantial amount of remaining funds at the end of the Target Area Program, the project was extended through March, 1976. A financial summary of funds expended through that date appears in Table 5.

There have been six grant adjustments made since approval of the grant application. One adjustment represented a scope change; the remaining adjustments were funding shifts.

Scope Change

This grant adjustment (July 9, 1974) incorporated two elements into the grant:

- (1) Provided for the inclusion of admission criteria of Milne Boys' Home, and
- (2) Provided for the creation of the Citizens' Advisory Committee.

Funding Adjustments

- (1) May 1, 1974 - A shift of \$14,300 in funds from Categories .02 (Personnel-Other) and .06B (Supplies and Operating Expenses) to category .06A (Construction/Renovations) to cover increased costs of renovation since grant submission.
- (2) November 11, 1974 - A shift of \$330 in monies from .06B (Supplies/Operating Expenses) to .06A (Construction/Renovations) to adjust for error in original site specifications. Additionally,

this adjustment deleted the 20 per cent of the Assistant Director's salary and substituted 5 per cent of the Director's monthly salary and 15 per cent of the Assistant Director's salary.

(3) February 14, 1975 - A shift of \$3,500 from category .05 (Equipment) to .06B (Supplies/Operating Expenses). Additionally, the in-kind contribution was increased to reflect promotions made within the project.

(4) March 10, 1975 - A transfer of \$3,000 from .05 (Equipment) to .06B (Supplies/Operating Expenses).

(5) December 22, 1975 - Decrease in .06B (Supplies/Operating Expenses) by \$5,900. This shift is represented in two categories: \$1,900 shifted to .04 (Travel) and \$4,000 transferred to .03 (Consultants). The adjustment was made to maintain the existing operating level through March, 1976.

Table 5
FINANCIAL SUMMARY

COMMUNITY-BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY
March 31, 1976

ITEM	TOTAL GRANT FUNDS			LEAA CASH ONLY		
	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures To Date	Balance To Date	Amount Budgeted	Total Expenditures To Date	Balance To Date
Personnel	\$215,602	\$209,643	\$5,959	\$195,918	\$189,959	\$5,959
Travel	\$ 4,000	\$ 3,763	\$ 237	\$ 4,000	\$ 3,763	\$ 237
Equipment	\$ 19,800	\$ 16,428	\$3,372	\$ 19,800	\$ 16,428	\$3,372
Consultants	\$ 10,708	\$ 8,930	\$1,778	\$ 10,708	\$ 8,930	\$1,778
Construction	\$ 84,630	\$ 84,630	-0-	\$ 49,630	\$ 49,630	-0-
Supplies	\$ 48,399	\$ 50,740	<\$2,341>	\$ 20,562	\$ 22,903	<\$2,341>
Other Operating Expenses						
A. Other Direct Costs	\$ 36,196	\$ 36,196	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
B. Indirect Costs	\$ 19,592	\$ 19,592	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-
TOTAL	\$438,927	\$429,922	\$9,005	\$300,618	\$291,613	\$9,005

Note: This financial summary was prepared by Michele Duprey, Administrative Analyst I

PROGRAMMATIC IMPACT UPON PARTICIPANTS

Inasmuch as we are limited in our assessment of the impact of program participation to two measures that may not be totally valid, it is not possible to draw implications regarding the impact of the program on the general juvenile crime problem. We look, here, at two sources of measurement to describe behavior patterns of those fourteen individuals who were terminated from Dreyfous House; the first measure is based upon assessment by project staff (this assessment is of general nature--if the youth does not get into any more "trouble" and he reaches all of the internal goals set by the project, his termination is considered successful); and the second measure is based upon a review of juvenile arrest records--this measure is used only as a general indicator of diverting youths away from more serious involvement with the criminal justice system. Finally, a general discussion of what happened to the juveniles subsequent to termination will follow. This analysis is, by necessity, of the most general descriptive nature and cannot be used to assess the effectiveness of the treatment model, particularly limited because of the small number of participants. The analysis is, rather, simply a description of the terminated client population, and the possible impact of the treatment model upon those individuals.

Staff Assessment

The fourteen individuals who were terminated from the project after residing at Dreyfous House for a considerable length of time (the minimum stay of this group was 58 days) were evaluated and re-evaluated throughout their stay by project staff. The final assessment is based upon performance within the confines of the project and with the criminal justice system. Of the fourteen terminations, five have been evaluated as successful, seven as unsuccessful, and two referred to as released.¹⁷ One of the five successful terminations later was readmitted on new charges, later ran away and was terminated a second time, unsuccessfully.

Arrest Patterns

To further assess the ability of the project to divert youths away from involvement with the criminal justice system, a search of Police Department records was made to examine arrest patterns of the terminated participants. This search yielded limited results; the arrest records of only six youths were located (the remainder either had no arrest record, or they had reached their seventeenth birthdays and juvenile files had been sealed). The arrest record of only

¹⁷The two "released" clients were terminated before the project was prepared to release them, although both were progressing well according to their own records. Neither resident had been committed to the project by Juvenile Court; therefore, the staff had no choice but to release them.

one of the successful terminations was found, and this could not produce any confirmation of project assessment since the youth was placed out of state and thus could not generate a continued local record. Further review of police records produce similar limitations.

Available police and Probation Department records, however, indicate that the project has operated efficiently. When, for example, a youth has been adjudicated delinquent or has had a continuing pattern of serious delinquent involvement, he is terminated and referred to a more appropriate agency. We cannot discuss programmatic impact, however, even upon individuals, given the small amount of available data regarding the participants. There is, simply, a project with fourteen terminated participants, among whom five are considered successful by project staff.

Termination Dispositions

Upon successful termination, the project attempts to either place the youth back with his family or in a situation which will help to sustain the new "life style" developed during project participation. In other cases, the project has made recommendations as to different placements or returned the youth to Juvenile Court.

Of the five individuals terminated successfully (based upon project assessment), it appears that four were released

to their parents or guardians and the fifth was placed with an aunt in a different state.

The unsuccessful terminations were handled a variety of ways, often based upon the reasons for the termination. Six of the seven unsuccessful terminations resulted from runaways. Although termination upon running away from the home was not a requirement of the project, problems surrounding the event often could not be solved and the youth was terminated. Attempts were made in four of the cases to encourage the youths to return and when they refused, they were terminated by the Court or on their seventeenth birthdays. The other two runaways were also involved in more serious delinquent behavior and were referred to agencies more appropriate to their needs. The remaining unsuccessful termination returned to Juvenile Court on a new delinquent charge and was sent to LTI. (See Table 6)

The three individuals who were terminated soon after entry into Dreyfous House were all returned to the Court. One of the three was rearrested soon after admission; at that time, it was determined he had been previously adjudicated delinquent and the judge sent him to LTI. The other two ran away and were returned to the Court with recommendations relative to alternative placements.

Table 6

DISPOSITIONS OF ALL TERMINATED PARTICIPANTS

Released Successfully To Parents/Family	5
Ran Away - Returned To Court	6
Ran Away - Referred To Other Agencies	2
Sent To ITI By Court	2
Released Prematurely - Voluntary Commitments	2

Source: Dreyfous House Case Files
Prepared by: CJCC

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The case study has provided a context in which the writer can discuss both specific issues raised during project development and those more broad issues that have a more universal applicability. In this case, the broad issues are raised as a result of those issues that were of particular importance to Dreyfous House.

Narrative histories of project also give the writer the benefit of hindsight. Looking back, one can easily argue that had certain events occurred previous to project implementation, issues threatening to the continued existence of the project may not have arisen. It must be kept in mind that the discussion here is not to attack the planning and implementation of a specific project, but, rather, to be used as an aid to the planning of future projects. Given the pilot nature of the CBRTF in New Orleans, it was particularly difficult to design a project free from flaws. Prediction of the critical events which led to the problems of Dreyfous House was difficult, if not impossible. The case study, then, in examining specific issues related to project problems, can be a guide to future planning and implementation efforts.

First, the community reaction to the proposed facility brought several issues into play. Particularly relevant to that reaction are the planning issues that arose. The

community relations effort, although attempted, was not sufficient to satisfy the needs of the neighborhood. As suggested in the six-month evaluation of this project¹⁸, a plan outlining the community relations effort should have been developed by the subgrantee and then implemented upon receipt of the grant award (July, 1973). Given the experience of other community-based projects, the adverse neighborhood reaction could have been anticipated regardless of any community relations effort; however, with a more systematic plan of operation, the magnitude of that reaction might have been ameliorated.

On the other hand, a more carefully planned sustained community relations effort may have exacerbated the problems the project eventually faced. It is possible the project would never have been accepted in the neighborhood regardless of any community relations effort or community involvement. By involving neighborhood residents in the preliminary planning for the project, it could have been ascertained prior to implementation whether or not the neighborhood would accept it. Assuming the Board and staff of Milne Boys' Home had previously established a rapport with the community in which the project was to be located, it logically follows that consultation on the proposed project

¹⁸A detailed discussion of the community relations issue can be found in Target Area Evaluation: A Six Month Report on the Development of Target Area Projects and the Evaluation System, R. Sternhell and S. Carroll, MCJCC, July, 1974, pp. 58-59.

with community members could maintain this rapport and provide a basis of support for the CBRTF.

The second issue, the legal question, emanated from the adverse community reaction which has profound implications for planning agencies and agencies that seek to implement similar projects. Reviewing the experience of similar projects, planners recognized the potential neighborhood reaction to the project:

"It can be assumed from the outset that there will be negative community reaction to the development of residential facilities for delinquents."¹⁹

Recognizing the potential adverse reaction by neighborhood residents, it should have been incumbent upon the planning agency and especially the Welfare Department to research all possible avenues that could be taken by these groups. One critical avenue that should have been explored was the legal one eventually taken. When the District Councilman's motion to halt project development was defeated, the neighborhood groups hired an attorney to attack the project from a different approach. The attorney quickly discovered the legal history of the Milne admissions policy, thus having a firm basis from which to attack the proposed CBRTF. Although a compromise was reached and the CBRTF opened, the project was effectively diluted in

¹⁹Target Area Crime Specifics Plan, p. 52.

an unnecessary manner. Had the planning agency conducted legal research or been made aware of the legal history of Milne by the Welfare Department, another location, free from legal constraints, could have been selected for the facility. The selection of an alternate site in conjunction with a more structured community relations plan could have produced a more flexible admissions policy (i.e., the more serious juvenile offenders could have been accepted).²⁰

Resulting from the legal controversy was a scope change which limited participation in the project to those who had not been adjudicated delinquent subsequent to October 1, 1974; admissions policy was to be determined by a Citizens' Advisory Committee. These two changes in project operations were documented in a Grant Adjustment approved by LEAA. The scope change diluted the purity of the project to the extent that the client population would be substantially different than the population for which the project was designed. Accompanying this dilution was a change in the general nature of the project; instead of a rehabilitative program for the more serious offender, the project was functionally restructured to be a diversionary program for the predelinquent youth. Although many of the eventual participants had had contact with the criminal

20

A persuasive case for the legal research effort is made in an unpublished paper by Frank R. Serpas, "A Study of the Legal Restraints Against the Establishment of a Community-Based Residential Treatment Facility for Juvenile Delinquents at Milne Boys' Home," May, 1975.

justice system, this contact was of a minor nature (Table 4), and none had been adjudicated delinquent. Given this substantial change in the client population, there should have been a concurrent change in the planning document; however, this change did not accompany the scope change request. This adjustment would have been reflected in changes in several goals to apply to the new client population.

Adjustment of Goals and Objectives

Referring to the original goals and objectives, adjustment to reflect the general scope changes did not occur and thus made irrelevant these elements of the project.

Goals

- (1) The reduction of recidivism rates among juvenile participants in the program by 50 per cent--this goal was written with reference to a client population that had more extensive contact with the criminal justice system than the eventual population. Often, as stated previously, the residents of Dreyfous House had minor criminal justice contact, if any. Rather than reducing recidivism rates, the new client population was to be diverted away from criminal justice activities.
- (2) Acceptance and support of the program by the immediate community--obviously the scope change to the project came as a result of the lack of community acceptance and support; following the scope change, the need for such a goal disintegrated.
- (3) The expansion of the "Half-Way In" model to other areas of the city--upon modification of the client population, the model that was originally designed to be placed elsewhere no longer existed.

The remaining original goals needed no such extensive adjustment to be applicable to the modified client population.

Objectives

- (1) Providing an alternative system of diversion from the traditional juvenile institutions by creating a "Half-Way In" house--for the most part, the residents of Dreyfous House would never have been placed in the traditional institution given the nature of their problems; thus, it would be impossible to address the issue of alternative institutions.
- (2) A continuing public relations effort directed at the immediate community--like the goal of gaining acceptance in the community, this objective became irrelevant to project success when the project was restructured.

The establishment of the remaining objectives could have been useful in the modified project.

The responsibility for recommending these general changes should be with LEAA and the local planning agency before any grant adjustments representing scope changes be approved (if the subgrantee does not correct the project proposal to consistently reflect scope changes). In essence, this advisory role would protect the integrity of the project proposal; additionally, restructuring of the grant proposal would make the project subject to a rigorous evaluative effort. Currently, there are no guidelines relative to the role of the planning agency or LEAA in the reorganization of a project. Finally, there are currently no LEAA guidelines relative to the withdrawal of funds from

projects that are not implemented generally in the manner in which the project was designed. If funds are awarded based upon a project proposal, and if the thrust of that project is changed to the extent that it no longer resembles the original proposal, it is reasonable to argue for the withdrawal of funds. This is not to say that all projects that have scope changes should be dismantled; rather, if the basic premise upon which a grant is awarded is no longer a fundamental element of the project or the project no longer has relevance to the criminal justice system, then the continued funding of the project might reasonably be questioned. In the absence of guidelines, it is imperative that relevant actors assist projects in assessing the impact of programmatic changes.

Recommendations

The pilot nature of the CBRTF in New Orleans produces many issues for discussion relevant to similar projects. The utility of a pilot project is that of a learning mechanism; it is a useful device for those involved in the design and implementation of similar programs, providing cues as to the essential elements of such projects. The issues discussed here provide the basis for the following general recommendations, applicable to similar projects.

- (1) When a project is of a controversial nature in the community, there should be community

involvement in the development of the plan (in an effort to assess the feasibility of such a project) and a well-structured plan for community relations to be implemented immediately upon receipt of the grant award.

- (2) Planning agencies should thoroughly re-search all possible sources of attack upon projects of controversial nature.
- (3) Planning agencies should advise projects regarding the impact of programmatic changes if the subgrantee fails to make such adjustments.
- (4) The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) should establish more specific guidelines for the withdrawal of funding when the basis for funding is removed from the scope of the project.

A Final Note

At the end of March, 1976, federal funding for Dreyfous House came to a conclusion. As is the intent with federal grants, Dreyfous House funding was absorbed by the City of New Orleans. With this transition to City funds came a change in the administrative structure of the project. It was under the supervision of Milne Boys' Home, operated by the City Welfare Department. The operational director of the project was transferred to the Milne staff as the Institution Program Coordinator, responsible for all direct services at the institution. Social workers and counselors were transferred to their appropriate functional divisions at Milne, and the technical features of the project were switched to the business manager of Milne.

Plans are to continue operation of Dreyfous House as a group home with similar treatment methods, although administratively, it will be under Milne. Admissions procedures from Dreyfous were integrated into the established procedures of Milne. The procedural changes were accomplished through meetings of all personnel of Dreyfous and appropriate staff from Milne.

APPENDIX A

MONITORING FORM FOR CBRTF

RESIDENTIAL FACILITY
(TA-VIII)

MONTHLY MONITORING REPORT

Reporting Month and Year _____

Note: This form should be completed and forwarded to the evaluator at CJCC by the 15th of each month.

1. Total number of residents as of last day of preceeding month: _____

2. Total number of residents accepted this reporting month: _____

Source: _____

3. Total number of residents who succesfully completed program this month: _____

4. Total number of residents who have been dropped from program this month: _____

Reason and disposition: _____

5. Total number of participants currently in residence. _____

6. Number of residents arrested or rearrested during this reporting month: _____

7. Number of residents presently in school: _____

8. Number of residents presently in vocational training programs: _____

9. Number of residents employed: _____

F/T
P/T

10. Number of individual casework sessions
this month: _____
11. Number of group meeting sessions this
month: _____
12. Number of family counseling sessions this
month: _____
13. Number of group recreational or cultural
activities this month: _____

APPENDIX B

FORMS USED IN CASE FILES

SOCIAL SERVICE FACE SHEET

COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL
TREATMENT FACILITY

Name _____

Address _____

Previous Address _____

School _____

Date Ref'd. _____

Worker _____

Birth Place _____

Date of Birth _____

Religion _____

Church _____

Race _____

Grade _____

Household	Kin	Date of Birth	Phone

Relative Resources	Age	Relation-ship	Address	Phone

By whom referred and reason: _____

Disposition _____

Discharge Date _____

DREYFOUS HOUSE

NAME OF CHILD:

☐ ACCEPT

☐ REJECT

REASON: _____

SIGNED: _____

DATE: _____

"TRY A NEW WAY"

DREYFOUS HOUSE

NAME OF CHILD:

PRESENTING PROBLEM:

1.

2.

3.

4.

GOALS:

1.

2.

3.

PROGRESS FROM LAST GOALS:

PERIOD COVERED: FROM _____ TO _____

ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION ON ACCEPTED BOYS

Date: _____

Boy's Name _____ Address _____

School _____ Grade _____

Birthdate _____ Religion _____

Place of Birth _____

Mother's Maiden Name: _____

Address _____

Natural Father's Name _____

Address _____

Step-Parent's Name _____

Address _____

COMMENTS:

PARENTAL CONTRACT FOR COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL FACILITY:

I, _____ Parent of _____
entrust my son to the Community Based Residential Facility,
5420 Franklin Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, for an indefi-
nite period of time.

I shall always let the Community Based Residential Facility
know where I am living and agree to meet with its workers
when requested, to discuss my boy's progress. I also agree
to make plans with his social worker for his weekends and
holidays. I also agree to participate in regular therapy
sessions related to improving my son's functioning and sup-
port treatment programs.

I give the Community Based Residential Facility permission
for medical care to be given to my son, and to sign for
emergency surgery or the administering of all anesthetics
if I cannot be reached immediately, should an emergency
arise.

I will provide my son with clothing and a weekly allowance.

I agree not to remove my son from the Community Based Resi-
dential Facility without giving at least one months notice,
nor will I make such plans with my son before consulting
with the Social Service Staff.

The Community Based Residential Facility reserves the right
to return my son should he be unable to benefit from or ad-
just to its program for any reason whatsoever.

Parent _____

Witness _____

Community Based Residential Facility

Date

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY

PARENTAL CONSENT FOR MEDICAL CARE AND SURGERY

I, _____, understand that my child,
or ward, whose name is _____ has been
committed to Community Based Residential Treatment Facility
by the Juvenile Court, and I wish Community Based Residential
Treatment Facility to consent to any medical or surgical care
or the giving of an anesthetic to _____,
if this is necessary and I cannot be reached immediately.

Date

Agreed to by _____
Parent or Guardian

Agreed to by COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITY

By _____
Signature

Title

Witness _____

COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTER
REPORT FROM CLINIC TO SUPERINTENDENT

DATE: _____ (ANNUAL EXAM.)

NAME OF PATIENT: _____

SUMMARY OF PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

RECOMMENDATIONS:

INSTRUCTIONS:

SIGNED

COMMUNITY BASED RESIDENTIAL
TREATMENT CENTER

FAMILY CONTACTS

DATE

STATEMENT

GROUP NO.:

DATE:

PRESENT:

ABSENT:

WORKER:

MAJOR THEMES DISCUSSED:

MAJOR PARTICIPANTS:

MINOR PARTICIPANTS:

NAME:

GROUP RECORDING

THERAPIST'S NAME _____

RECORDER'S NAME _____

DATE AND TIME OF MEETING _____

MEETING NUMBER _____

GROUP MEMBERS PRESENT:

GROUP MEMBERS ABSENT:

GROUP PURPOSE AND THERAPY USED:

SIGNIFICANT EXPERIENCES REGARDING GROUP PROCESS:

THERAPIST'S EVALUATION OF MEETING:

PROBLEM AREAS AND/OR COMMENTS:

COURT REPORT

NAME OF CHILD: _____

NAME OF JUDGE: _____

DATE OF COURT: _____

REASON: _____

RESULTS: _____

WORKER

DATE

JOB PERFORMANCE
STATEMENT

DATE

SCHOOL CONTACTS
STATEMENT

NAME: _____

NAME: _____

DAILY LOG

11:00-7:00

7:00-3:00

3:00-11:00

11:00-7:00

7:00-3:00

3:00-11:00

11:00-7:00

7:00-3:00

3:00-11:00

NAME OF STUDENT: _____

GRADES 1975 -1976

Subject	Grade					Conduct					Citizenship					Absences				
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Final	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Final	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Final	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	Final

INSTRUCTORS:

PERIODIC SUMMARY (every 2 weeks)

DATE _____

STATEMENT

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are approximately 20 lines visible. The paper appears to be from a notebook or a set of legal pads. The edges of the paper are slightly irregular, and there are some small dark spots or specks scattered across the surface, possibly due to dust or the scanning process. The overall appearance is that of a clean, unused piece of stationery.

NAME: _____

DREYFOUS HOUSE

FOLLOW-UP

DATE _____

STATEMENT

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are approximately 20 lines visible. The paper appears slightly aged or off-white. There is no handwriting or other markings on the page.

NAME: _____

END

7 dec/1944