

CLEVELAND IMPACT CITIES PROGRAM

DETERRENCE, DETECTION, AND
APPREHENSION OPERATING PROGRAM

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

June 1975

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

IMPACT CITIES

ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM

36513

RALPH J. PERK

MAYOR

DONALD P. BOGOSIAN

Acting DIRECTOR

NCJRS

SEP 17 1976

ACQUISITIONS

CLEVELAND IMPACT CITIES PROGRAM
DETERRENCE, DETECTION, AND APPREHENSION
OPERATING PROGRAM

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

June, 1975

NCJRS

JUL 26 1976

ACQUISITIONS

*This document is published as part of the
Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program under grant
number 74-NI-05-0004 awarded by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration,
U.S. Department of Justice.*

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1 OPERATING PROGRAM OVERVIEW

This is the final report on the Deterrence, Detection, and Apprehension Operating Program, one of five anti-crime programs of the Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program. The IMPACT Program was an intensive planning and action effort designed to reduce the incidence of stranger-to-stranger crimes (homicides, rapes, aggravated assaults, and robberies) and burglary in Cleveland by five percent in two years and 20 percent in five years. Based on this top-level goal, the IMPACT Program derived four sublevel goals, as follows:

- Minimize the need to commit crime;
- Minimize the desire to commit crime;
- Minimize the opportunity to commit crime; and
- Maximize the risk to offenders.

To achieve these four goals, five specific Operating Programs were devised, as depicted in the program structure, Figure 1-1. The Operating Programs, in turn, consisted of some 35 individual project components.

This report provides final evaluations of eight of the 10 projects making up the Deterrence, Detection, and Apprehension (DDA) Operating Program. * DDA was one of two Operating Programs aimed at minimizing

* Final evaluations of the other two projects were published separately, due to those projects' earlier completion dates. See: "Public Information Project Evaluation Report," August 1974, and "IMPACT Neighborhood Patrol Evaluation Report," October 1974, both published by the Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program.

ULTIMATE
GOAL

SUB-LEVEL
PROGRAM
GOALS

OPERATING
PROGRAMS

PROJECTS
AND/OR
ACTIVITIES




FIGURE 1-1

CLEVELAND IMPACT CITIES
PROGRAM STRUCTURE

*Cleveland Drug Abuse Program
**Cleveland Vocational Educational Program
***Note: A grant application has been submitted and LEAA approval is pending.

opportunities to commit crime and maximizing risk for offenders. The rationale was that minimizing opportunities and maximizing risks would in fact deter felony crime, leading to a reduction in crime from what it otherwise would have been.* In addition to acting as a deterrent to crime itself, the program sought to (1) increase the probability of apprehending felony offenders during the act or shortly thereafter, and (2) increase the probability of clearing the crime by means of arrest, so as to proceed to prosecution of the case. Thus, subsidiary DDA goals were to increase the number and rate of arrests and the number and rate of clearances.

The specific target crimes (IMPACT crimes) are the first five FBI Index crimes of (1) murder and non-negligent manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, (3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault, and (5) burglary.** The primary source of crime data are the monthly and annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) by the Cleveland Police Department (CPD) to the FBI. These data are compiled in the CPD's computerized crime and arrest data base, which records crime and arrest occurrence by census tract, and can aggregate the figures into subtotals for the six Police Districts and the City as a whole. Throughout this report, all crime data are based on reported crimes only, and are therefore subject to the inherent limitations of reported-crime

* A recent review of a number of statistical studies provides strong empirical support for the concept of general deterrence, i. e. that increased risks can reduce the incidence of criminal behavior. See Gordon Tullock, "Does Punishment Deter Crime?," The Public Interest, No. 36, Summer 1974, p. 103.

** The other two Index crimes are larceny and auto theft.

analysis, i.e. it is impossible to tell whether a rise in reported crime reflects an increase in crime incidence or merely an increase in the rate of reporting crime to the police. This data limitation severely restricts the extent to which valid conclusions can be drawn about the effects of anti-crime projects such as those of the DDA, and this report should be read with that limitation in mind.

1.2 DDA PROJECT OVERVIEWS

The starting and completion dates for the eight* DDA projects are listed in Table 1-1. Most of the projects began in 1973 and continued on into early 1975. A brief summary description of the DDA projects is presented below. The projects are discussed individually in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.

1.2.1 CONCENTRATED CRIME PATROL

The Concentrated Crime Patrol (CCP) consisted of 18 high-visibility patrol units operating in two eight-hour shifts in high crime areas of the City. The principal hypothesis was that an increase in police patrol visibility would deter crime and increase arrest and clearance rates.

The objectives of this patrol force were to:

- Decrease IMPACT street crime (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault);
- Increase the number of arrests (i.e., apprehensions) and the arrest rate;
- Increase clearances and the clearance rate; and
- Decrease the response time (i.e., time of complaint to time of arrival at the scene) to reports of serious crimes.

*The Auxiliary Police and Outreach Center projects, although originally funded separately and then latter merged, are analyzed together in this report, due to their close functional interrelationship. Thus, Table 1-1 lists seven projects.

Table 1-1
DDA Project Schedule

	Operational Start Date	End Date
Concentrated Crime Patrol (CCP)	April 23, 1973	April 30, 1975
Upgrading Felony and Narcotic Investigative Units (FIU)	March 19, 1973	April 30, 1975
Auxiliary Police (AP) and Police Outreach Centers (POC)	June 15, 1973	Sept. 30, 1975
IMPACT Response Time Reduction	Aug. 1, 1973	May 31, 1973
IMPACT Security Patrol for the Elderly	June 1, 1974	May 31, 1975
IMPACT Streetlighting	Sept. 1, 1973	May 31, 1975
IMPACT Awareness	June 1, 1974	May 31, 1975

One hundred twenty experienced patrolmen were transferred from other police duties into the CCP. The grant enabled the recruitment of 120 new patrolmen to take the place of those transferred. Twelve vehicles were purchased and another six provided by the Cleveland Police Department for the CCP. The three Police Districts on the East Side, i. e. Districts Four, Five, and Six, were selected as the areas for CCP deployment.

At the same time that the CCP was deployed on the East Side, the Cleveland Police Department shifted six of the 10 patrol units of the Tactical Unit to the West Side. (The Tactical Unit [TU] was organized before the CCP's deployment.) In September 1973, in order to ensure more intensive West Side patrol coverage, the remaining four TU units were also assigned to the West Side. During the spring months of 1973, both the CCP and the TU began to coordinate their operations much more closely. Specifically, after the introduction of the CCP on the East Side in April 1973, the CCP and the TU integrated their operations under the command supervision of an Inspector and two Deputy Inspectors.

1.2.2 FELONY AND NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIVE UNITS

The principal hypothesis of this project was that increased investigative manpower would increase apprehension and clearance rates. In order to test this hypothesis, the existing CPD Felony Investigative Units (FIUs) -- Homicide, Sex, Robbery, and Burglary -- received more manpower under the DDA grant so that more crimes could be investigated and more intensive investigations could be undertaken. The desired result was

to increase the apprehension of suspects and clearance of reported crimes. A significant portion of serious crime was believed to be connected with the drug dependency of some offenders. Thus, the Narcotics Unit was also strengthened and integrated into the FIU's under the DDA grant.

The objectives of this project were to:

- Decrease IMPACT crimes;
- Increase clearances and clearance rates;
- Decrease drug-related IMPACT crimes; and
- Increase investigative efficiency.

Table 1-2 indicates the increase in investigative manpower for each Investigative Unit. Sixty experienced patrolmen were transferred to the Felony Units.

Table 1-2
Investigative Unit Personnel

Unit	Initial Staff	IMPACT Additional	Total	Percent Increase
Homicide	27	15	42	56%
Sex	7	6	13	86%
Robbery	10	8	18	80%
Burglary	11	8	19	73%
Narcotics	29	25	54	86%
Total	84	62*	146	74%

*The grant award allowed for 60 detectives; two subsequently left the group.

1.2.3 AUXILIARY POLICE AND POLICE OUTREACH CENTERS

The principal hypothesis of the Auxiliary Police (AP) project was that increased police auxiliary manpower would reduce crime, improve community relations, and increase the operational effectiveness of the regular patrol force as well as the IMPACT patrol units.

The Auxiliary Police force consisted of uniformed, unarmed volunteers who patrolled on foot or in vehicles in their own neighborhoods. The AP operated out of 21 locations, 16 of which were also Police Outreach Centers. In January 1973, prior to IMPACT implementation, there were 182 AP personnel. Recruitment, uniforms, and equipment, including handheld radios, were provided by the grant funds. The first phase of the project added 400 new auxiliary police and the second phase an additional 300.

The objectives of this project were to:

- Improve community relations;
- Relieve regular police of less important tasks, e.g., vehicle damage, stolen vehicles, etc.;
- Reduce the incidence of crime in local neighborhoods; and
- Report crimes and potential crimes.

The plan of the Police Outreach Center (POC) project was to expand the pre-existing eight outreach centers to a total of 16 centers. A police officer was assigned to each center to provide police-citizen contact.

The principal hypothesis was that police community centers would improve community relations with the police. Convenient citizen access to the services which these centers provide would build long-term public cooperation with the police, particularly in neighborhoods where crime patterns are changing.

The objectives of this project were to:

- Offer lay-legal advice;
- Provide officer advice to youths;
- Recruit applicants for police examinations;
- Establish rapport with the community, and
- Coordinate activities with Auxiliary Police personnel.

1.2.4 RESPONSE TIME REDUCTION

The stated goal of this project was to increase apprehensions and reduce crime incidence through reduced response time to citizen calls for service. The means of reducing response time was the installation of two-way mobile digital terminals in 90 patrol cars, 20 supervisors' cars, and 15 back-up/auxiliary units. The first priority in terminal installation was the vehicles assigned to IMPACT projects, in particular the CCP and TU.

The specific stated objectives of the project were as follows:

- Reduce response time to complaints;
- Increase number and rate of arrests at the scene;
- Increase number and rate of arrests made shortly after commission of an IMPACT crime;

- Increase number and rate of arrests of known wanted persons;
- Provide data to permit dynamic resource allocation to areas of criminal activity;
- Provide precise measurement of officer workload and activity to permit better planning and scheduling.

In analyzing the priority goal of reducing complaint (dispatch) response time, the CPD and the IMPACT Cities Program adopted a response time objective of five minutes or less (average) upon full implementation of the mobile terminal system and three minutes or less (average) by 1978.

1.2.5 SECURITY PATROL FOR THE ELDERLY

The purpose of this project was to reduce the extent of victimization of elderly residents at five estates operated by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). The specific target crimes were assault, robbery, and burglary. The project's methodology called for hiring eight private patrol officers and equipping them with personal portable radios. The officers would patrol the five estates during the hours of darkness on a two-shift basis: 4 PM to midnight and midnight to 8 AM. Two CMHA staff coordinators were designated to manage the project and interface with other organizations, including the CPD. The specific objectives were as follows:

- Decrease the frequency with which the elderly residents of five selected CMHA estates were victims of assaults, robberies and burglaries;
- Decrease IMPACT and other crimes in the vicinity of the target locations by five percent during the grant period.
- Identify suspicious activity and provide faster notification to CPD, thereby leading to quicker apprehension of suspects;

- Create and/or encourage more positive resident attitudes towards security and towards law enforcement;
- Decrease residents' fear of crime.

The Patrol went into effect in mid-1974 and continued through May of 1975 at the five target estates: Riverview (District 2), Cedar (District 3), and King-Kennedy, Addison Square, and Willson (District 5).

1.2.6 IMPACT STREETLIGHTING

The purpose of this project was to reduce the incidence of nighttime street crime (particularly robbery and assault) by the installation of improved streetlighting in selected high-crime locations. The project was intended to install 850 mercury vapor floodlights, 500 mercury vapor streetlights, and 60 light poles in selected areas, based on their high incidence of IMPACT crimes between the hours of 6 PM and 6 AM. A 1972 CPD computer analysis of crime incidence by census tract led to the identification of the target census tracts for this project. In addition to these locations, improved lighting was also to be installed (1) at selected downtown locations, to encourage greater nighttime use of the streets downtown, and (2) at the Intervention and Development (I&D) Centers, to permit the operation of recreational programs at night. These recreational programs were aimed at crime prone youths by providing constructive alternatives to criminal behavior in the evening hours. Thus, a major objective of this project was to provide improved lighting at the I&D Centers in the hope that juvenile delinquency would be reduced in these areas.

The specific goals of the IMPACT Streetlighting project were as follows:

- Reduce nighttime (6 PM to 6 AM) robberies and assaults by ten percent in the target areas;
- Reduce nighttime homicide, rape, and burglary by five percent in the target areas;
- Reduce nighttime non-IMPACT felonies in the target areas;
- Increase IMPACT and non-IMPACT clearance rates in the three target areas;
- Improve residents' satisfaction with police operations and responsiveness;
- Improve police visibility and deterrent effects in the three target areas;
- Reduce juvenile delinquency in the three target areas, particularly in the census tracts where there are Intervention and Development Centers.

1.2.7 IMPACT AWARENESS

The purpose of this project was to provide information to the general public that would aid in reducing crime. The means selected was a citywide mass media campaign carried out by an experienced media contractor. Two types of information were to be provided: (1) generalized information on the IMPACT Program itself, so as to inform the citizens of the Program's services and its efforts to combat crime, and (2) specific information aimed at providing citizens with countermeasures to minimize the probability of their becoming victims of IMPACT crimes. The IMPACT Awareness project was in some respects a follow-up to the earlier Public Information Program. The PIP focused on residents of high-crime areas, providing seminars on specific IMPACT crimes and strategies to minimize victimization. The

Awareness project was designed to dispense this information to the entire City's population.

The specific project objectives were three:

- Acquaint the public with both the goals and objectives, and the services of the Cleveland IMPACT Program;
- Provide information on specific steps citizens could take to minimize their risk of victimization in IMPACT crimes;
- Produce a spirit of police-community cooperation.

To conclude this brief overview of the DDA projects, Table 1-3 reviews the objectives and methods of each. This table may be referred to by the reader, for comparison with the discussion of each project's accomplishments in subsequent sections.

1.3 OVERVIEW OF CRIME DATA

Since the primary goal of DDA projects, in contrast to those of the other four Operating Programs, was to reduce the incidence of crime, it is important at the outset of this evaluation to obtain an understanding of the crime trends for the time period in question. Although IMPACT planning began in the spring of 1972, none of the DDA projects discussed in this report began until the spring of 1973, and two began in June of 1974. Thus, any effects that they had on the rate of occurrence of IMPACT crimes must be reflected in the crime rates for the period after mid-1973 (except for those projects that began in 1974, for which mid-1974 and after data are appropriate). The data that follow are drawn from the Crime

Table 1-3

Deterrence, Detection, and Apprehension Operating Program Overview

Project Grant Title	Objectives	Methods
Concentrated Crime Patrol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease IMPACT street crime • Increase apprehensions • Increase clearances • Decrease response time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer 120 experienced patrolmen to CCP • Recruit 120 new patrolmen for regular patrol • 18 patrol zone cars on two eight-hour shifts on East Side • High priority to IMPACT crimes • Encourage investigative follow-up • Redeploy Tactical Unit to West Side
Felony and Narcotic Investigative Units	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease IMPACT crimes • Increase clearances • Decrease drug-related crimes • Increase investigative efficiency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer 60 experienced patrolmen to units • Recruit 60 new patrolmen to replace the transferred manpower
Auxiliary Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relieve regular police • Reduce crime • Report crimes and potential crimes • Improve community relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acquire enough new volunteers to reach 1200 • Train volunteers • Purchase special uniforms • Patrol in own neighborhoods at own discretion • Establish 10 new centers of operation

Table 1-3 (Continued)

Project Grant Title	Objectives	Methods
Police Outreach Centers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offer lay-legal advice • Offer advice to youth • Recruit police exam applicants • Establish rapport with community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish nine new centers of operation • Staff with trained police officers • Offer space to other agencies • Offer solicited advice to any citizen or police officer
Response Time Reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce response time to citizen complaints • Increase number and rate of arrests <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - at crime scene - shortly after IMPACT crime - of known wanted persons • Provide data for dynamic resource allocation • Provide officer workload measurement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Install mobile digital terminals in 125 police units • Provide required computer hardware and software • Provide dedicated duplex UHF radio channel
Security Patrol for the Elderly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease incidence of assaults, burglaries, and robberies at five CMHA estates • Decrease IMPACT and other crimes by five percent during grant period • Apprehend suspects more quickly due to faster notification of CPD • Improve tenants' attitude towards security and towards law enforcement • Decrease tenants' fear of crime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hire eight private patrol officers • Provide two CMHA staff coordinators • Patrol five CMHA estates during 4 PM - midnight and midnight - 8 AM shifts • Interface with CPD

Table 1-3 (Continued)

Project Grant Title	Objectives	Methods
IMPACT Streetlighting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce nighttime robberies and assaults by ten percent • Reduce homicide, rape, and burglary by five percent • Reduce nighttime non-IMPACT felonies • Increase clearance rates • Improve residents' satisfaction with police operations and responsiveness • Reduce juvenile delinquency in the three target areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Install 850 mercury vapor floodlights, 500 mercury vapor streetlights, and 60 light poles in high-crime census tracts • Install floodlights at 21 IMPACT Intervention and Development Centers
IMPACT Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acquaint the public with the general goals and services of the IMPACT Program • Provide information on specific steps one can take to minimize personal victimization • Provide a spirit of police-community cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design a mass-media campaign to publicize IMPACT • Design a mass-media campaign on crime-specific techniques to reduce victimization • Produce each component of the above mass-media campaigns

Analysis Report* and readers desiring a more intensive discussion of crime trends should consult that document.

Figure 1-2 depicts the month-by-month incidence of reported IMPACT crimes over the four-year period 1971-74. It thus permits comparison of IMPACT crime trends during the several-year period prior to the implementation of the DDA projects, with crime trends during the projects' existence. The time period when each project was in operation is indicated in the figure. It can be seen that, generally speaking, crime rose steadily and considerably throughout the time period of the projects' existence. A possible explanation for this apparently discouraging result is provided in the Crime Analysis Report. Analysis of the data for burglary and robbery using a sophisticated crime incidence and displacement model indicated that the IMPACT program had had a substantial effect on reducing the incidence of crime from what it otherwise would have been had there not been an IMPACT Program. Although the analytical efforts using the model concerned only burglary and robbery, it could be assumed that similar effects hold true for the other IMPACT crimes. In any event, since burglary and robbery constitute approximately 85 percent of the total IMPACT crimes, the above conclusion holds true for at least the majority of the crimes represented in Figure 1-2.

*"Crime Analysis Report," Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program, June 1975.




FIGURE 1-2

A more in-depth picture of crime incidence is provided in Table 1-4, which gives a six-year history for each of the five IMPACT crimes, together with the other Index and Part I crimes. For each crime, the 1969-71 (pre-IMPACT) average incidence is compared with the average for 1972-74 (IMPACT planning and implementation period). As can be seen, on this basis there were reductions in the three-year averages for robbery and burglary, despite the sharp uptrend of all crimes in 1974. It is interesting to note the more pronounced decreases in the averages for auto theft, larceny, negligent manslaughter, and simple assault. These non-IMPACT crimes may have been reduced as a spin-off effect from the IMPACT Program and specifically from the crime-preventive DDA projects.

A much more impressive change has occurred in the clearance rate averages over these same years (Table 1-5). As can be seen, the overall average clearance rate for IMPACT crimes increased by 32.6 percent over the time period in question, with over a 50 percent increase in the clearance rate for robberies. Such changes are very likely the results of improved police efforts, especially of more intensive investigation by the FIU and of greater police presence due to the CCP and TU. In addition, as the table shows, there were substantial increases in the clearance rates of the non-IMPACT crimes of larceny, auto theft, and simple assault -- all of which probably reflect increased police effectiveness in making arrests, thanks to the CCP and TU operations.

TABLE 1-4

SIX-YEAR CRIME COMPARISON

	1969	1970	1971	69-71 AVG	1972	1973	1974	72-74 AVG	% Change
HOMICIDE	266	271	270	269	307	277	306	297	+10.4
FORCIBLE RAPE	303	307	428	346	462	440	441	448	+29.5
ROBBERY	5,638	5,475	5,987	5,700	5,639	4,621	6,113	5,458	-4.2
AGG. ASSAULT	2,073	1,909	2,004	1,995	1,988	1,967	2,728	2,228	+11.7
BURGLARY	11,867	10,765	11,780	11,471	10,446	9,109	12,791	10,782	-6.0
TOTAL IMPACT	20,147	18,727	20,469	19,781	18,842	16,414	22,379	19,212	-2.9
LARCENY	18,252	18,546	16,356	17,718	12,860	13,058	16,003	13,974	-21.1
AUTO THEFT	22,279	19,603	19,855	20,579	17,526	12,668	13,640	14,611	-29.0
TOTAL INDEX	60,678	56,876	56,680	58,078	49,228	42,140	52,022	47,797	-17.7
NEGL. MANSLAUGHTER	48	42	31	40	22	32	25	26	-35.0
SIMPLE ASSAULT	3,603	3,215	2,859	3,226	2,315	2,710	2,684	2,570	-20.3
TOTAL PART I	64,329	60,133	59,570	61,344	51,565	44,882	54,731	50,392	-17.8

Source: CPD Annual Reports

TABLE 1-5


SIX-YEAR CLEARANCE RATE
COMPARISON

	1969	1970	1971	69-71 AVG	1972	1973	1974	72-74 AVG	% Change
HOMICIDE	66.5	73.4	85.6	75.1	79.5	94.6	74.5	82.5	+9.8
FORCIBLE RAPE	50.2	58.0	51.4	52.9	55.2	66.8	65.5	62.3	+17.8
ROBBERY	12.0	16.2	16.9	15.1	17.9	24.8	25.7	22.7	+50.3
AGG. ASSAULT	48.8	65.2	66.2	59.8	68.4	79.2	64.6	70.0	+17.0
BURGLARY	10.0	10.1	12.7	11.0	11.2	17.8	11.9	13.3	+20.9
TOTAL IMPACT	15.9	19.2	20.9	18.7	21.5	29.7	24.0	24.8	+32.6
LARCENY	11.5	14.6	14.7	13.6	15.6	18.1	17.0	16.9	+24.3
AUTO THEFT	5.3	4.7	3.8	4.6	4.9	9.8	9.9	7.8	+69.6
TOTAL INDEX	10.7	12.7	13.1	12.1	14.0	20.1	18.1	17.3	+43.0
NEGL. MANSLAUGHTER	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	96.0	100.0	0
SIMPLE ASSAULT	49.6	74.8	78.6	66.6	82.2	87.1	77.9	82.4	+23.7
TOTAL PART I	12.9	16.1	16.3	15.0	17.1	24.2	21.1	20.7	+38.0

Source: CPD Annual Reports

Another aspect of crime occurrence that is important in evaluating crime-control programs is the variation in crime by area. Crime incidence data are available by census tract and by Police District; both types of data were used in evaluating the DDA projects. One important comparative measure is the crime rate, obtained by dividing the number of reported crimes by the population of the area in question; this is particularly important when making comparisons among areas of markedly different population, such as the six Police Districts. The crimes rates for IMPACT crime occurrence in the Police Districts are shown in Figure 1-3 for the years 1972, 1973, and 1974. The figure makes clear the seriousness of the crime problem in District 3 relative to the other districts. It also shows the dramatic increase in the crime rate in District 2, putting this West Side district nearly on a par with "high-crime" East Side Districts 4 and 6 in terms of IMPACT crime rates. It is burglary and aggravated assault that are chiefly responsible for District 2's rapid rise in crime rate, as revealed by Table 1-6. This table provides the crime rates for each of the IMPACT crimes for each of the five districts.

These summary crime data should be kept in mind in reading the reports on the individual DDA projects, which follow in Sections II through VIII. Where applicable in these sections, additional detailed crime and arrest data are used to supplement the preceding overview.



IMPACT CRIME RATE BY DISTRICT, 1972-1974
(Reported Impact Crimes per 10,000 population)

FIGURE 1-3

Table 1-6

IMPACT Crime Rates by Police District
(Crimes per 10,000 Population)

	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	District 6
Homicide Rate						
1972	0.53	1.38	7.36	4.36	11.12	4.02
1973	1.28	1.82	8.55	3.16	8.54	3.81
1974	0.68	1.31	14.49	3.87	9.63	3.46
Forcible Rape Rate						
1972	1.66	3.12	14.72	4.52	15.79	6.23
1973	1.66	3.85	11.40	5.28	12.71	6.37
1974	2.33	3.12	14.72	3.97	11.62	6.99
Robbery Rate						
1972	22.2	30.3	191.4	77.6	178.7	61.6
1973	16.8	36.4	162.9	59.9	132.3	53.8
1974	25.5	43.1	235.6	88.5	139.6	76.9
Aggravated Assault Rate						
1972	13.5	21.6	56.8	23.8	53.3	20.6
1973	4.4	15.7	51.3	24.7	64.5	25.9
1974	19.4	30.8	80.8	30.0	62.9	34.2
Burglary Rate						
1972	95.0	93.8	244.6	149.0	177.6	161.8
1973	82.3	138.9	238.0	124.0	126.6	107.2
1974	137.6	176.5	287.8	171.4	181.3	160.7

Source: CPD Crime and Arrest Data Base

SECTION II

CONCENTRATED CRIME PATROL (CCP)

2.1 CCP PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This project was aimed at reducing IMPACT street crimes by providing intensive crime patrol teams. The LEAA grant funding was utilized to field the Concentrated Crime Patrol (CCP)* on the East Side (Districts 4, 5, and 6) while local resources were used to field the functionally equivalent Tactical Unit (TU) on the West Side and Downtown (Districts 1, 2, and 3). Both forces were commanded and supervised from a single headquarters (1825 Lakeside Avenue); the net effect was to provide a Citywide crime patrol force directed against IMPACT crimes. The basic rationale for such a force was that an intensive, visible patrol in the higher-crime areas would discourage criminals and potential criminals from committing such acts. In addition, crime would be more effectively controlled by removing persons committing crime from the streets by apprehension at the crime scene or subsequent identification and apprehension through the investigation process (see FIU, Section III). The increasing number of calls for service received by the Cleveland Police Department had reduced the availability of the regular patrol force for prevention patrol and for quick response to crime complaints. It had also resulted in reducing the amount of time officers could spend investigating and searching for leads

* Within CPD, the CCP was known colloquially as the "IMPACT Task Force." Throughout this report, the terms CCP and IMPACT Task Force are considered synonymous.

and witnesses in the time immediately following the occurrence of a crime. The provision of an intensive patrol force in high-crime areas was designed to remedy these problems.

The CCP consisted of 120 officers, equipped with 18 distinctively marked patrol cars and three unmarked supervisors' cars. The 120 officers were assigned to the CCP in April, 1973, and were replaced in the regular patrol force by 120 newly-hired officers. The TU consisted of 10 additional patrol units manned by 80 officers. Six of the TU cars were assigned to the program in July, 1973 and the other four were added in September of that year. From that time on, the full strength deployment of 18 units on the East Side (CCP) and 10 units on the West Side (TU) was maintained. Figure 2-1 shows the zones to which the CCP and TU units were assigned, providing Citywide coverage.

In order to ensure continuous patrol coverage during the high crime periods of the day, the CPD developed a plan for the coordinated deployment of the regular patrol force, the CCP units, and TU units. The regular patrol forces were reorganized into four eight-hour shifts, called "platoons,"* three of which overlapped during the critical periods of shift changes. The CCP and TU units, which were organized into two separate

* Of the four platoons, the first and second platoons, consisting of 62 units each, operated during two separate eight-hour shifts. The third platoon, consisting of 32 units, operated during an eight-hour shift which overlapped with the second and fourth platoon shift changes. The fourth platoon, consisting of 30 units, operated during an eight-hour shift which overlapped with the third platoon shift change.




FIGURE 2-1

CCP AND TU PATROL ZONE MAP

eight-hour shifts (10:00 AM to 6:00 PM and 8:00 PM to 4:00 AM), were deployed to operate during the high crime hours and to reinforce patrol coverage during the shift changes of the regular patrol force. This patrol deployment scheme ensured a maximum coverage by 102 units during the high crime period to minimum coverage by 32 units during the low crime period. On the average, there were 77 patrol units operating throughout the City during any given hour.

Although the CCP and TU forces were justified as primarily a crime-specific operation, focused on IMPACT street crimes, in practice these units were required to perform many other functions, as well.* As shown previously in Figure 2-1, these units were primarily spread uniformly throughout the City in a set of IMPACT zones superimposed on the regular patrol zones. The CCP and TU units were dispatched by the Communications Unit at central police headquarters, as were regular patrol units. One of their important functions, as directed by the Chief, was to provide "radio backlog relief" i. e. to respond to backlog calls for service when the regular patrol officers were overloaded. (The alternative would have been much longer delays in responding to many citizen complaints.) In addition, the CCP and TU units were asked to provide supplementary parking ordinance enforcement, in response to many citizen complaints. Further, as a result of the Response Time Reduction project (see Section V), mobile

*In January 1972, the CPD had 2315 sworn personnel and an authorized strength of 2841, or a shortage of 526 personnel. The IMPACT Program provided for an additional 120 officers for CCP and 60 for the TU, 180 in all. This increase in force initially would have brought the total to 2495. But attrition had to be taken into account. Thus, by January 1, 1975, the Department had a total of 2336 sworn personnel and the same authorized strength, or a shortage of 505 personnel. This reduced level of sworn personnel helps to explain the demands placed upon the CCP and TU personnel and should be kept in mind while reading this section.

digital communication terminals were installed first in CCP and TU vehicles, leading to huge increases in license number checks by these units. The CCP and TU also made large numbers of traffic stops and issued citations. Although verbal orders had been issued to the dispatch personnel as early as July 1973, to give priority to CCP and TU units in assigning IMPACT-related calls for service, it was not until November 1974 -- 18 months into the project -- that a formal written order was issued for the CCP to concentrate on IMPACT street crimes.* Thus, the evaluation which follows considers both IMPACT-related and non-IMPACT activities of the CCP and TU.

2.2 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE

2.2.1 ACTIVITY STATISTICS

Each quarter the CPD produced a report on the CCP and TU which tabulated a number of indicators of the workload and activities of these special patrol units. The data from these reports are assembled together in Table 2-1, covering both Phase I (April 1973 to March 1974) and Phase II (April 1974 to March 1975). As discussed in Subsection 2.1, the CCP and TU engaged in a large number of activities in addition to preventive patrol and apprehending IMPACT offenders. During Phase I, both of these special forces made more misdemeanor arrests than felony arrests, although as

*GPO 28-74

TABLE 2-1

CCP AND TU ACTIVITY STATISTICS

STATISTICS	Felony Arrests	Misde-meanor Arrests	Crime (RC-1) Reports	Investi-gative (Form #1) Reports	Suspicious Persons Checked	Suspicious Autos Checked	Traffic Citations	Parking Summonses	Damage Accident Reports	Autos Towed	Radio Assignments
<u>CCP STATISTICS</u>											
4/25/73 - 10/14/73	983	1,367	2,950	1,207	13,641	10,352	4,672	1,241	256	1,392	27,959
10/15/73 - 3/31/74	987	1,304	3,313	780	9,076	7,887	2,875	707	234	1,109	16,268
Phase I Total:	1,970	2,671	6,263	1,987	22,717	18,239	7,547	1,948	490	2,501	44,227
April - June 1974	547	501	1,914	336	4,148	44,721*	734	295	110	550	11,583
July - Sept. 1974	621	445	2,002	478	4,497	69,905*	1,082	321	128	628	11,723
Oct. - Dec. 1974	431	391	2,210	374	3,678	82,620*	712	262	228	539	11,105
Jan. - Mar. 1975	468	457	2,140	356	4,828	53,573*	904	291	246	564	10,664
Phase II Total:	2,067	1,794	8,266	1,544	17,151	250,290*	3,432	1,169	712	2,281	45,075
CCP GRAND TOTAL:	4,037	4,465	14,529	3,531	39,868	268,529*	10,979	3,117	1,202	4,782	89,302
<u>TU STATISTICS</u>											
4/25/73 - 10/14/73	309	1,222	655	241	2,526	4,081	393	222	67	258	4,954
10/15/73 - 3/31/74	396	533	1,348	334	4,721	62,898	627	441	68	382	7,159
Phase I Total:	705	1,755	2,003	575	7,247	66,979	1,020	663	135	640	12,113
April - June 1974	163	316	1,009	162	2,742	23,512	394	375	29	253	5,213
July - Sept. 1974	168	292	670	185	2,685	15,368	393	1,212	27	304	4,759
Oct. - Dec. 1974	151	232	1,443	178	2,336	16,040	302	147	70	233	5,095
Jan. - Mar. 1975	242	267	1,124	189	2,875	15,478*	405	305	107	170	5,992
Phase II Total:	724	1,107	4,246	714	10,638	70,398	1,494	2,039	233	960	21,059
TU GRAND TOTAL:	1,429	2,862	6,249	1,289	17,885	137,377	2,514	2,702	368	1,600	33,172

*Includes "computer checks."

time went on (Phase II) the emphasis shifted more towards felonies for the CCP while the TU remained approximately the same. Overall, however 52% of the CCP's arrests and 67% of the TU's arrests were for misdemeanor offenses. In terms of total numbers, the CCP made 8502 arrests while the TU made 4291 arrests. Over the two-year project period, the CCP issued 10,979 traffic citations and 3117 parking summonses; the corresponding figures for the TU are 2514 and 2702. Both types of units produced large numbers of crime reports (RC-1's) and investigative (Form #1) reports. In addition, once the digital mobile radio terminals had been installed in the CCP and TU vehicles, these units made extremely large numbers of license number checks -- 268,529 and 137,377 respectively -- in addition to checking large numbers of suspicious persons (39,868 and 17,885, respectively). Overall, the CCP received 89,302 radio assignments to respond to calls for service, while the TU received 33,172 such assignments.

The Concentrated Crime Patrol and the Tactical Unit were specialized patrol units aimed primarily at felonies, specifically IMPACT street crimes. In addition to these specialized functions, their intermittent assumption of the full range of patrol officer duties occurred because of the heavy workload of the regular patrol forces and the numerous citizen complaints for calls for service.

2.2.2 DECREASED STREET CRIME

The question still remains, however: despite these additional duties, did the CCP and the TU serve as a deterrent to street crime by their presence? Because 1973 was a transition year, and since 1974 was the first full year of coordinated CCP and TU operations, it is desirable to make a comparison of IMPACT street crime occurrence in 1974 and 1972 (the first full year prior to CCP and TU). This comparison is shown in Table 2-2. As can be seen, only District 5 showed a decrease in street crime -- nearly 14% -- while the other districts all showed increases. Comparing the three East Side Districts where the larger CCP force (18 units) patrolled with the three West Side Districts where the 10-unit TU patrolled reveals that the total increase in street crime was less -- 6% -- on the East Side than on the West Side, where a 31.1% increase in street crime occurred. This differential rate of increase could be due to the greater deterrent effect of the larger patrol force in Districts 4, 5, and 6. This difference is confirmed by a further analysis at the census tract level. Table 2-3 lists the number of census tracts in each district whose IMPACT

TABLE 2-2

IMPACT STREET CRIME BY DISTRICT, 1972 AND 1974

DISTRICT	1972	1974	% CHANGE
District 1			
Homicide	7	9	
Rape	22	31	
Robbery	295	339	
Agg. Assault	<u>179</u>	<u>257</u>	
TOTAL	503	636	+ 26.44
District 2			
Homicide	19	18	
Rape	43	43	
Robbery	417	594	
Agg. Assault	<u>298</u>	<u>424</u>	
TOTAL	777	1079	+ 38.87
District 3			
Homicide	31	61	
Rape	62	62	
Robbery	806	992	
Agg. Assault	<u>239</u>	<u>340</u>	
TOTAL	1138	1455	+ 27.86
District 4			
Homicide	80	71	
Rape	83	73	
Robbery	1425	1625	
Agg. Assault	<u>437</u>	<u>551</u>	
TOTAL	2025	2320	+ 14.57
District 5			
Homicide	112	97	
Rape	159	117	
Robbery	1799	1405	
Agg. Assault	<u>537</u>	<u>633</u>	
TOTAL	2607	2252	- 13.62
District 6			
Homicide	58	50	
Rape	90	101	
Robbery	890	1111	
Agg. Assault	<u>298</u>	<u>494</u>	
TOTAL	1336	1756	+ 31.44
West Side (TU) percent change: + 31.1			
East Side (CCP) percent change: + 6.03			

TABLE 2-3

CHANGES IN IMPACT STREET CRIME
BY CENSUS TRACT, 1972 TO 1974

DISTRICT		INCREASE		DECREASE		UNCHANGED	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
WEST SIDE	1	21	70.0	7	23.0	2	7.0
	2	31	79.5	8	20.5	0	0.0
	3	26	74.3	8	22.9	1	2.9
EAST SIDE	4	26	57.8	18	40.0	1	2.2
	5	11	40.7	15	55.6	1	3.7
	6	23	76.7	6	20.0	1	3.3
WEST SIDE TOTAL		78	75.0	23	22.1	3	2.9
EAST SIDE TOTAL		60	58.8	39	38.2	3	2.9

Source: CPD Crime and Arrest Data Base

street crime increased, decreased, or remained the same from 1972 to 1974. Once again, District 5 is the only one in which a majority of the tracts showed a decrease in street crime. Overall, 58.8% of the East Side tracts showed increases in street crime, while 75% of the West Side tracts showed increases.

2.2.3 Increased Apprehension and Clearance

Another objective of the CCP and TU was to increase the extent of apprehensions. One way to measure this is to compare the extent of street crime arrests with the extent of reported street crimes. This permits us to compare the extent to which the police were responding to the street crime problem in each area. The number of arrests for IMPACT street crimes in each census tract was compared with the number of reported IMPACT street crimes in that tract, using data for the six-month period - October 1974 through March 1975. For each tract, the ratio of arrests to crimes was calculated and expressed on a percentage. The distribution of these results is tabulated in Table 2-4. It can be seen that District 5, which showed the only net decrease in IMPACT street crimes, also had a larger fraction of census tracts with high ratios of arrests to crimes: in only 32% of District 5's census tracts was the ratio of arrest to crime for IMPACT street crimes less than 20%, compared with 68% of the tracts in District 1, 61% of the tracts in District 2, 48% of the tracts in District 3, 62% of the tracts in District 4, and 63% of the tracts in District 6.* Thus, the enforcement pattern against IMPACT

*. These numbers are obtained by adding together the fractions in column 1 (0-10% arrest percentage) and column 2 (11-20% arrest percentage) and converting to a percentage.

TABLE 2-4

DISTRIBUTION OF CENSUS TRACTS BY ARREST PERCENTAGE
OF IMPACT STREET CRIMES (OCT. 1974 - MARCH 1975)

DISTRICT		STREET CRIME ARRESTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF CRIMES						
		0 - 10 %	11 - 21 %	21 - 30 %	31 - 40 %	41 - 50 %	51 - 75 %	76 - 100% OVER 100%
WEST	1	0.34	0.34	0.14	0.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
	2	0.29	0.32	0.08	0.21	0.05	0.03	0.00
	3	0.34	0.14	0.20	0.11	0.09	0.03	0.06
EAST	4	0.30	0.32	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.00	0.00
	5	0.07	0.25	0.46	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.00
	6	0.30	0.33	0.13	0.10	0.00	0.03	0.00

Source: CPD Crime and Arrest Data Base

TABLE 2-5

ARRESTS FOR IMPACT STREET CRIMES
BY DISTRICT, OCT. 1974 - MARCH 1975

DISTRICT		STREET CRIME ARRESTS	REPORTED STREET CRIMES	PERCENTAGE
WEST	1	93	540	17.2
	2	187	791	23.6
	3	457	1011	45.2
EAST	4	298	1687	17.7
	5	363	1498	24.2
	6	311	1286	24.1

Source: CPD Crime and Arrest Data Base

street crimes was significantly different in District 5 than it was elsewhere.

The distribution of arrest percentage among census tracts does not tell the full story, however. When the total IMPACT street crime arrests for this same six-month period are added up for each district and compared with total reported street crime there, a different picture emerges, with District 3 having a substantially higher percentage of arrests -- over 45% (see Table 2-5). Even though a number of District 3's tracts had low arrest percentages, those tracts with high percentages* had sufficiently large numbers of arrests to result in a very large overall total.

Several other measures of arrest performance were examined. Overall CPD arrests increased from 34,435 in 1972, (prior to CCP/TU implementation) to 37,002 in 1973, to 38,262 in 1974. As noted earlier, the CCP in its two-years of operation accounted for 8,502 arrests, while the TU produced 4,291. With 120 men, the CCP represented only 7.6% of the Department's total arresting force, but its 8,502 arrests represented 11.3% of all arrests. The 80 TU officers, constituting 5.1% of the arresting force, produced 5.7% of all arrests.

In addition to producing a disproportionate share of total arrests, the CCP and TU contributed to an increase in both arrests and clearances for the Department. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 show the changes in CPD arrests and

* There were four tracts in District 3 in which the rate of IMPACT street crime arrests to crimes was over 50%.

TABLE 2-6
CPD ARRESTS, 1972 - 1974

OFFENSE	1972	1973	1974	% Change
Homicide	256	241	258	+ 0.8
Rape	185	157	146	- 21.1
Robbery	987	925	1027	+ 4.0
Aggravated Assault	382	482	701	+ 83.5
Street Crime Total	1810	1805	2132	+ 17.8
Burglary	1273	1170	1749	+ 37.4
IMPACT Crime Total	3083	2975	3881	+ 25.9
Part I Total	6317	6060	7554	+ 19.6

TABLE 2-7
CPD CLEARANCE RATES, 1972 - 1974

OFFENSE	1972	1973	1974	% Change
Homicide	79.5	94.6	74.5	- 6.3
Rape	55.2	66.8	65.5	+ 18.7
Robbery	17.9	24.8	25.7	+ 43.6
Aggravated Assault	68.4	79.2	64.6	- 5.6
Street Crime Total	34.2	44.6	40.1	+ 5.9
Burglary	11.2	17.8	11.9	+ 6.2
IMPACT Crime Total	21.5	29.7	24.0	+ 11.6
Part I Total	17.1	24.2	21.1	+ 23.4

clearances before and after implementation of the special patrol forces. As can be seen, street crime arrests increased by nearly 18% between 1972 and 1974, with a nearly 84% increase in arrests for aggravated assault; only forcible rape showed a decline (21%) in arrests over this period. Including burglary, total arrests for IMPACT crimes increased by nearly 26% during this period, while total Part I arrests increased by nearly 20%. A good portion of these increases is probably due to the existence of the CCP and TU -- exactly how much is difficult to say, due to the absence of any control group area for comparison purposes.

Clearance rates also increased during this time period, principally for rape and robbery, with an overall increase of nearly 6% for street crimes and 11.6% for IMPACT crimes overall. It is even more difficult to tell how much of this improvement may be due to the CCP and TU, since the Felony Investigative Units (see Section III) were significantly strengthened during this same time period, thereby making it difficult to ascribe credit properly.

2.2.4 Decreased Response Time

Another objective of this project was to decrease the response time to citizen complaints. Unfortunately, no data were collected on response time, so it is not possible to evaluate whether this objective was achieved. To the extent that the CCP and TU units were assigned to reduce the radio

backlog of regular patrol forces, they probably contributed to reducing overall CPD response times from what they otherwise would have been (as would any general increase in patrol forces). But the lack of data does not permit a precise measure of such effects.

2.3 CONCLUSION

The data available for this evaluation limited the assessment to a simple before and after (1972 to 1974) comparison of changes in the levels of crime by Police District. In this case, because so many other factors affect the crime rate,* this approach does not take into account non-project explanatory factors for observed changes in street crimes such as the city- and county-wide trends in crime or other factors like the radio backlog issue, i.e. calls for service. Further, the comparison is based upon reported crime figures only; therefore, there is no way of really knowing if more people are reporting crimes in 1974 as compared to 1972.

In summary, IMPACT crime arrest and clearance rates increased -- a good portion of which the CCP appeared to be responsible for. Based upon the 1972 to 1974 comparison, street crimes increased in all Police Districts except District 5; the rate of increase was much less on the East Side than on the West Side.

But there some lessons to be learned from the CCP and other police

* See Final Crime Analysis Report: Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program, June, 1975.

projects. First, it is extremely difficult to implement and maintain a highly visible, specialized crime-specific police patrol force. Any police patrol force is looked on by government and the community as a public safety and services resource, to be called upon to meet any and all needs, from non-criminal activities to actual crime fighting. In the case of the CCP, even though their primary mission was to combat IMPACT street crime and burglary, they were required to operate in a Department whose sworn personnel are undermanned by approximately 18%. Until this specialized resource can be dedicated to purely anti-crime efforts and the issue between public service and crime fighting is resolved, it will be hard to draw any comprehensive conclusions about the ability of the police to prevent crime. And, second, a rigorous assessment of the police presence as a deterrent to crime, and specifically as apprehenders of criminals, depends upon performance by other institutions of the criminal justice system, namely prosecutors and courts. The police alone cannot be held responsible for all of the improvements sought for crime reduction and deterrence effects. The value of even the most effective police arrests depends upon the vigor with which the rest of the system responds. Effective arrests should lead to swift adjudication, and where convictions result, to certain imposition of appropriate penal sanctions -- sanctions especially which incapacitate recidivist felony offenders for fixed periods of time.

SECTION III
FIU PROJECT DESCRIPTION

SECTION III

FIU PROJECT DESCRIPTION

3.1 FIU PROJECT DESCRIPTION

As noted in Section I, this project was provided LEAA funding in order to upgrade the existing CPD Felony Investigative Units: Homicide, Sex Crimes, Robbery, Burglary, and Narcotics. The rationale was that increased investigative manpower would make it possible for more crime to be investigated, and investigations to be more intensive. In particular, increased manpower would make it easier to provide investigative personnel for preliminary investigations immediately following crime occurrences, when it is most likely that suspects are still in the vicinity or witnesses are still available to supply information. The end results were expected to be a decrease in IMPACT crimes, increased clearances of crimes, a decrease in the percentage of drug-related crimes, and increased investigative efficiency.

The project went into operation on March 19, 1973, with the transfer of 60 experienced officers into the Detective Division's existing Felony Investigation Units (see Table 1-2 in Section I). These 60 officers were replaced on the regular patrol force by the hiring of 60 new patrolmen. The five units were consolidated under a single command at the 1824 Lakeside Avenue CPD facility, the same location from which the CCP and TU were managed. Thus, maximum coordination between these components of the Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Program was ensured.

One example of this kind of coordination was the provision of weekly roll call training sessions by FIU personnel to the personnel of the Concentrated Crime Patrol and Tactical Unit. Among the topics covered were proper investigation procedures, trouble spots within IMPACT neighborhoods, and modus operandi of suspects. Each session included a question and answer period. In addition, FIU personnel provided instruction at CPD In-service training classes and gave lectures on crime prevention to various community and civic groups. To assist the Police Districts and individual units, the FIU set up a program to distribute 5 x 8 photos of suspects wanted on felony warrants, and also provided videotaped line-ups of suspects arrested for felonies, for use at roll calls throughout the City.

Operationally, the basic policy of the FIU was to team each newly assigned officer with a detective experienced in criminal investigation. This provided valuable on-the-job training to the newly assigned officers (who were already experienced in patrol operations). Well-established investigative procedures were followed by the Homicide, Sex Crimes, Robbery, and Burglary Units. The Narcotics Unit received various items of sophisticated communications and investigation equipment for use in undercover surveillance and investigative functions. In addition, personnel of this unit acted as a tactical field patrol force covering locations where

drug traffic was known or suspected, such as taverns, bars, and bus stations. Working in pairs and teams, some officers engaged in drug purchases with others acting as back-ups. In addition, raids were conducted on locations suspected of concealing narcotics activities and illegal drugs. The Narcotics Unit established liaison with the Federal Task Force on Narcotics, with other police departments in Cuyahoga County, and with social agencies involved with drug problems.

3.2 MANAGEMENT and PERFORMANCE

3.2.1 Unit Activities

Each month and each quarter the Detective Division prepared a series of statistical reports on the activities of each of the five Felony Investigative Units. The data from these reports are summarized in the subsections below. In reviewing these data, the following definitions should be understood:

- Investigations - This term refers to the number of new crimes investigated by the unit. The units did not report how many total cases were investigated each month.
- Investigation Rate - This term refers to the percentage of reported UCR crimes that are investigated by the unit, e.g., the percentage of UCR reported robberies that are investigated by the Robbery Unit.
- Arrests - This term refers to the number of persons arrested by the Unit for Investigation.
- Charged - This term refers to the number of persons charged with a crime(s).

- o Crimes Cleared by Unit - This term refers to the number of crimes that are considered cleared, i. e. solved, by the police as the result of investigation and, usually, an arrest.
- o Investigative Clearance Rate - This term refers to the ratio of the number of crimes cleared by the unit against the number of crimes investigated by the unit, expressed as a percentage, i. e. the fraction of those crimes investigated that are cleared.
- o Unit Clearance Rate - This term refers to the ratio of the number of UCR crimes cleared by the unit against the number of UCR reported crimes, expressed as a percentage, i. e. the fraction of the total CPD clearance rate attributable to the unit.
- o CPD Clearance Rate - This term refers to the ratio of UCR crimes cleared by the CPD against the number of UCR reported crimes, expressed as a percentage. Comparison of this measure with the "Unit Clearance Rate" is a measure of the investigative unit's contribution to the overall Department clearance rate.

The number of investigations, arrests, and persons charged are the basic workload measures for each unit. The investigation rate indicates the extent to which a particular type of crime is dealt with by the unit--this rate runs close to 100 percent for homicides, but is much lower for most other felonies, reflecting their higher incidence and the unit's limited resources, which force it to concentrate on the more important cases of a given type of crime. The number of crimes cleared by the unit, and its investigative clearance rate, are the basic measure of the unit's performance; the purpose of the unit is to solve crimes, and these numbers measure the extent to which this goal is achieved. For comparative purposes

the unit clearance rate is a measure of the impact of the unit, relative to the remainder of CPD, in clearing a particular type of crime. For example, if the unit clearance rate is 30 percent and the CPD clearance rate is 60 percent, for a given crime type, this means that the unit was responsible for half of all CPD clearances.

3.2.1.1 Homicide Unit

The Homicide Unit investigates all homicides, and selected assaults which are usually related to an "intent to kill". Table 3-1 summarizes the activities of the Homicide Unit during the quarterly period prior to project implementation and during the two years of the LEAA grant. (Unfortunately for this comparison, comparable data prior to the first quarter of 1973 do not exist). During the project period, the average number of reported homicides per quarter, increased from 71 prior to project implementation to 74.5 for the first year and 87.5 the second year. The Unit's investigative workload kept pace with the increase, and the investigation rate averaged above 95% for the entire period. In the quarter preceding the project, the Unit cleared 76% of the cases investigated; over the project's first year it averaged 84.5% cleared, and in the second year as workload further increased, it averaged 81.2%. The Unit produced nearly all of the CPD's homicide clearances, accounting for 84.5% out of a total 88% for the first year, and 77.2% out of the total 77.8% the second year. *

* These figures mean that the Unit cleared 84.5% of all homicides while the remainder of the CPD cleared 3.5%, for a total of 88% the first year; and cleared 77.2% while the rest of the CPD cleared 0.6% the second year.

TABLE 3-1

HOMICIDE UNIT PERFORMANCE

HOMICIDE INVESTIGATIONS	1st Qtr. 1973	2nd Qtr. 1973	3rd Qtr. 1973	4th Qtr. 1973	1st Qtr. 1974	First Year Avg.	2nd Qtr. 1974	3rd Qtr. 1974	4th Qtr. 1974	1st Qtr. 1975	Second Year Avg.	Percent Increase from 1st Qtr. 1973
	First Year of Project						Second Year of Project					
No. Reported Homicides	71	80	77	82	59	74.5	75	91	106	78	87.5	23.2
No. Investigated	67	80	68	84	59	72.8	69	86	108	82	86.2	28.6
Investigation Rate	94%	100%	88%	102%	100%	97.5%	92%	94%	102%	105%	98.2%	4.5
No. of Arrests	N/A	N/A				--	N/A				--	--
No. Charged	48	57	50	63	48	54.5	43	51	63	57	53.5	11.5
No. Cleared by Unit	51	68	61	63	57	62.2	50	67	83	70	67.5	32.3
Invest. Clear. Rate	76%	85%	90%	75%	97%	86.8%	85%	78%	77%	85%	81.2%	6.8
Unit's Clear. Rate	72%	85%	79%	77%	97%	84.5%	67%	74%	78%	90%	77.2%	7.2
Total CPD Clearances	69	62	73	83	46	66.0	58	66	82	66	68.0	- 1.4
CPD Clearance Rate	97%	78%	95%	101%	78%	88.0%	77%	72%	77%	85%	77.8%	- 19.8
ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS												
No. Reported Assaults	421	537	545	464	591	534.2	664	793	679	593	682.2	62.0
No. Investigated	37	37	60	40	84	55.2	116	97	94	70	94.2	154.6
Investigation Rate	9%	7%	11%	9%	14%	10.2%	18%	12%	14%	12%	14.0%	55.5
No. of Arrests	N/A	N/A				--	N/A				--	--
No. Charged	22	19	49	29	50	36.8	47	41	52	30	42.5	93.2
No. Cleared by Unit	26	33	57	29	55	43.5	49	47	52	34	45.5	75.0
Invest. Clear. Rate	70%	89%	95%	72%	65%	80.2%	42%	48%	55%	48%	48.2%	- 31.1
Unit's Clear. Rate	6%	6%	10%	6%	9%	7.8%	7%	6%	8%	6%	6.8%	13.3
Total CPD Clearances	318	405	423	412	401	410.2	458	497	406	373	433.5	36.3
CPD Clearance Rate	76%	75%	78%	89%	68%	77.5%	69%	63%	60%	63%	63.8%	- 16.0

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

N/A = not available in disaggregated form by groups or by unit; department-wide data reported by the CPD's Bureau of Criminal Investigation not commensurable for inclusion in this table.

The number of assaults also rose steadily, from 421 per quarter prior to the project to 534 per quarter during the first year and 682 per quarter the second year. The number of assaults investigated, while only a small percentage of the total, increased both in absolute terms (by 155%) and a percentage going from 9% of all assaults, prior to the project, to 10.2% the first year and 14% the second year, more than keeping pace with the increased potential caseload. The number of persons charged increased substantially in both years, as did the number of cases cleared. However, the percentage of cases cleared increased in the first year to 80.2% but dropped in the second year to 48.2%, perhaps in consequence of the tremendous increase in workload. In addition, the CPD's clearance rate for assaults decreased during the second year, indicating that the cases encountered, especially in the project's last quarter, were more difficult than in prior time periods.

Overall, the 56% increase in Homicide Unit manpower permitted a 29% increase in homicide investigation and a 155% increase in assault investigations. The increased investigations produced a 32% increase in homicide clearances and a 75% increase in assault clearances, at a time of sharply rising caseloads. The unit's clearance rates for both types of crime showed net increases over the two-year period, while the Department's clearance rates declined.

3.2.1.2 Sex Crimes Unit

The Sex Crimes Unit investigates rape and other crimes of a sexual nature. Table 3-2 summarizes the Unit's investigations of the IMPACT crimes of forcible rape and attempted rape. As can be seen, the number of rapes per quarter increased from 96 prior to project implementation to 111 during the first year and 116 during the second. The Unit's investigations rose from 11 during the first quarter of 1973^{*} to an average of 52 per quarter the first year and 66 per quarter the second year. The investigation rate rose from 46% of all rapes the first year to 57% in the second year. The number of arrests per quarter made by the Unit increased from 18.5 the first year to 23.0 the second year, while the number of persons charged increased from 11.2 to 20. The unit averaged 33% of its cases cleared the first year, and increased this to 52% the second year. This impressive performance led to the Unit contributing 15.4% of the CPD's 67.8% clearance rate the first year, and virtually doubling this the second year, in which it accounted for 30% out of the 62% CPD clearance rate. Thus, the 86% increase in sex crime Unit manpower made possible a substantial increase in investigation, leading to more arrests, charges, and clearances.

* For this unit, the first quarter of 1973 cannot be used for "before" comparisons because virtually the entire Unit was engaged in investigating the disappearance of two young boys during this quarter. Consequently, all comparisons are between the first and second years of the project.

TABLE 3-2

SEX CRIME UNIT PERFORMANCE

SEX CRIME INVESTIGATIONS	1st Qtr. 1973*	2nd Qtr. 1973	3rd Qtr. 1973	4th Qtr. 1973	1st Qtr. 1974	First Year Avg.	2nd Qtr. 1974	3rd Qtr. 1974	4th Qtr. 1974	1st Qtr. 1975	Second Year Avg.
	First Year of Project						Second Year of Project				
No. Reported Rapes and Attempts	96	97	126	121	100	111.0	113	123	105	124	116.2
No. Investigated	11	36	56	63	53	52.0	75	58	65	66	66.0
Investigation Rate	11%	37%	44%	52%	53%	46.5%	66%	47%	62%	53%	57.0%
No. of Arrests	15	13	26	12	23	18.5	30	23	20	19	23.0
No. Charged	15	8	13	10	14	11.2	25	23	17	15	20.0
No. Cleared by Unit	11	12	16	14	24	16.5	41	31	34	33	34.8
Investigative Clear. Rate	100%	33%	29%	22%	45%	33.2%	54%	53%	52%	50%	52.2%
Unit's Clearance Rate	11%	12%	13%	12%	24%	15.2%	36%	25%	32%	27%	30.0%
Total CPD Clearances	59	61	82	92	67	75.5	73	82	67	64	71.5
CPD Clearance Rate	61%	63%	65%	76%	67%	67.8%	65%	67%	64%	52%	62.0%
* First Quarter 1973 activities are not representative of the Unit's normal activities											

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

3.2.1.3 Robbery Unit

The number of reported robberies declined slightly during the project's first year, but increased sharply during the second year (see Table 3-3). The number of investigations made by the Unit increased by 727% over the two-year period, rising from 51 per quarter to 164 the first year and 422 the second year. The percentage of robberies intensively investigated rose from 4% to 14% the first year and 25% the second year. This massive increase in investigations led to a 64% increase in the number of arrests and a 371% increase in the number of persons charged, leading to a 298% increase in the number of clearances achieved by the Unit. However, with this massive increase in caseload, even though the absolute number of clearances increased three-fold, the percentage of the Unit's cases ending in clearances declined 44% over the two-year period. Despite this drop, the large number of clearances boosted the Unit's contribution to total CPD clearances by 200%, accounting for 4% of the 25% of robberies cleared prior to the project, 9.8% out of the 23% CPD clearance rate the first year, and 12% out of the 26% CPD clearance rate the second year.

3.2.1.4 Burglary Unit

Table 3-4 summarizes the activities of the Burglary Unit. As the table shows, the number of burglaries increased steadily during the project's two years, an overall increase of 45%. The Unit's 73% boost in manpower allowed it to increase the number of burglaries investigated

TABLE 3-3

ROBBERY UNIT PERFORMANCE

ROBBERY INVESTIGATIONS	1st Qtr. 1973	2nd Qtr. 1973	3rd Qtr. 1973	4th Qtr. 1973	1st Qtr. 1974	First Year Avg.	2nd Qtr. 1974	3rd Qtr. 1974	4th Qtr. 1974	1st Qtr. 1975	Second Year Avg.	Percent Increase from 1st Qtr. 1973
		First Project Year					Second Project Year					
No. Reported Robberies	1253	1020	1042	1306	1277	1161	1274	1528	2034	1808	1661	32.6
No. Investigated (Intensive)	51	107	143	221	186	164	262	294	469	663	422	727.4
Investigation Rate	4%	10%	14%	17%	15%	14.0%	21%	19%	23%	37%	25.0%	525.0
No. of Arrests	63	51	79	110	64	76	94	84	120	113	103	63.5
No. Charged	21	24	58	77	45	51	81	82	120	113	99	371.4
No. Cleared by Unit	49	80	101	133	139	113	243	141	233	164	195	298.0
Investigative Clear. Rate	96%	75%	71%	60%	75%	70.0%	93%	48%	50%	25%	54.0%	- 43.8
Unit's Clearance Rate	4%	8%	10%	10%	11%	9.8%	19%	9%	11%	9%	12.0%	200.0
Total CPD Clearances	315	250	272	307	243	268	432	441	454	365	423	34.3
CPD Clearance Rate	25%	24%	26%	24%	19%	23.0%	34%	29%	22%	20%	26.0%	4.0

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

TABLE 3-4

BURGLARY UNIT PERFORMANCE

BURGLARY INVESTIGATIONS	1st Qtr. 1973	2nd Qtr. 1973	3rd Qtr. 1973	4th Qtr. 1973	1st Qtr. 1974	First Year Avg.	2nd Qtr. 1974	3rd Qtr. 1974	4th Qtr. 1974	1st Qtr. 1975	Second Year Avg.	Percent Increase from 1st Qtr. 1973
	First Project Year						Second Project Year					
No. Reported Burglaries	2300	2339	2248	2422	2746	2438	2909	3289	3847	3325	3342	45.3
No. Investigated	291	528	581	594	844	637	1074	625	664	385	687	136.1
Investigation Rate	13%	25%	26%	25%	31%	26.8%	37%	19%	17%	12%	21.2%	63.1
No. of Arrests	42	60	51	35	54	50	63	48	58	64	58	38.1
No. Charged	17	27	29	29	42	32	40	37	46	53	44	158.8
No. Cleared by Unit*	N/A	194	107	143	113	139	63	115	154	192	131	--
Investigative Clear. Rate	N/A	37%	18%	24%	13%	23.0%	6%	18%	23%	50%	24.2%	--
Unit's Clearance Rate	N/A	8%	5%	6%	4%	5.8%	2%	4%	4%	6%	4.0%	--
Total CPD Clearances	438	398	289	498	300	371	339	483	406	496	431	- 1.6
CPD Clearance Rate	19%	17%	13%	20%	11%	15.2%	12%	15%	11%	15%	13.2%	- 30.5
*Burglaries only.												

N/A = not available

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

by 136% over the "before" period, while the percentage of burglaries investigated was increased 63%, from a pre-project average of 13% to over 21% of all reported burglaries. This increase in investigations led to a 38% increase in arrests and a 159% increase in persons charged. As was the case with robbery, the project resulted in a much higher fraction of persons arrested being charged, thanks to better investigative work. Since no "before" data are available on clearances, it is possible only to compare the project's first year with its second year. The percentage of investigation resulting in clearances increased from 23% in the first year to 24.2% in the second, but the Unit's contribution to total CPD clearances declined from 5.8% (out of 15.2%) in the first year, to 4% (out of 13.2%) in the second.

3.2.1.5 Narcotics Unit

The Narcotics Unit makes nearly all the arrests for drug-related crimes. Table 3-5 summarizes this Unit's activities during the project's two years of operation. As can be seen, there are no data available for the period prior to project implementation, making before-after comparisons impossible. In addition, conventional clearance rates cannot be calculated for drug offenses, since there are no "reported crime" figures; for the most part, such crimes are discovered by police work, not by citizen complaints. Examination of the table shows that the Unit averaged 232 cases investigated

TABLE 3-5

NARCOTICS UNIT PERFORMANCE

NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS	1st Qtr. 1973	2nd Qtr. 1973	3rd Qtr. 1973	4th Qtr. 1973	1st Qtr. 1974	First Year Avg.	2nd Qtr. 1974	3rd Qtr. 1974	4th Qtr. 1974	1st Qtr. 1975	Second Year Avg.
		First Project Year					Second Project Year				
No. of Cases Investigated	--	352	238	191	145	232	151	207	203	193	188
No. of Arrests	--	395	436	414	391	409	501	532	439	418	472
No. Charged by Unit*	--	324	428	370	325	362	424	461	389	351	423
Charges Other Than Narcotics											
Felonies	--	30	3	7	10	12.5	33	13	18	9	18.2
Misdemeanors	--	71	83	81	74	77.2	59	135	55	91	85.0
*Narcotics cases only.											

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

each quarter during the first year, and 188 cases per quarter the second year. These investigations produced more arrests and charges during the second year --472 persons arrested and 423 persons charged per quarter-- than during the first year (409 arrests and 362 persons charged per quarter). Certain of the investigations led to charges for crimes other than drugs; in the first year, the Unit averaged 12.5 felony charges and 77.2 misdemeanor charges per quarter for non-drug offenses, while in the second year non-drug charges increased to 18.2 felony and 85 misdemeanor charges per quarter.

3.2.1.6 Felony Unit Performance Summary

Tables 3-6 and 3-7 summarize the IMPACT-related activities of the Felony Investigative Units. Table 3-6 compares the increases in manpower of each Unit with the increases in investigations, arrests, and numbers of crimes cleared (wherever before-after data are available). The most dramatic increases were in the extent of investigations of assaults, robberies, and burglaries, and in the three-fold increase in robbery clearances. The Units' contributions to overall CPD clearance rates are summarized in Table 3-7. As can be seen, the Units accounted for virtually all murder clearances, for nearly half of all rape and robbery clearances, and about one-third of all burglary clearances. Since CPD clearances and clearance rates generally increased during the project period, compared with 1972 and prior years, it is likely that the increased investigative manpower of the F.I. U's was an important factor in these increases.

TABLE 3-6
FELONY UNIT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

UNIT	PERCENT INCREASE AFTER FIU IMPLEMENTATION			
	MANPOWER	INVESTIGATIONS	ARRESTS	CRIMES CLEARED
HOMICIDE				
Murder	56%	29%	N/A	32%
Assault		155%	N/A	75%
SEX				
Rape	86%	N/A	N/A	N/A
ROBBERY	80%	727%	64%	298%
BURGLARY	73%	136%	38%	N/A

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

TABLE 3-7
IMPACT CRIME CLEARANCE SUMMARY*

UNIT	CRIME TYPE	PERCENT CLEARED		
		BY UNIT	BY OTHER CPD	TOTAL
Homicide	Murder	77.2	0.6	77.8
	Assault	6.8	57.0	63.8
Sex	Rape	30.0	32.0	62.0
Robbery	Robbery	12.0	14.0	26.0
Burglary	Burglary	4.0	9.2	13.2

*For the second year of the project, April 1974 - March 1975

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

3.2.2 Drug Survey Results

The other important component of the FIU project was the development of a department-wide drug survey. The Division of Criminal Investigation was given the responsibility of obtaining information on drug use for each person arrested on a felony charge. The detective assigned to the case in the appropriate FIU filled out a drug survey card on each such arrestee, containing information as to the charge and whether the arrestee was involved in some way with drugs. It should be noted that no medical tests were administered to determine current drug usage objectively; rather, the designation of an arrestee as a drug user is based on the detective's judgement and/or the arrestee's response to questions.

Table 3-8 gives the results of the drug survey, over the 27 month period. As can be seen, the average drug involvement of felony arrestees remained remarkably stable at about 22% throughout this long time period. But no determination could be made as to whether or not drug involvement in these felony cases was a primary contributing factor in the crime.

3.3 CONCLUSION

This project provided the CPD's existing Felony and Narcotics Investigative Units with a 74% increase in manpower, in order to achieve four objectives:

- o To decrease the incidence of IMPACT crimes,
- o To increase clearances and clearance rates of IMPACT crimes,

TABLE 3-8
DRUG SURVEY RESULTS

PERIOD	TOTAL ARRESTS	DRUG-RELATED ARRESTS	PERCENT DRUG-RELATED
Jan. - Mar. 1973	1682	374	22%
Apr. - June 1973	1701	375	22%
Jul. - Sep. 1973	1915	432	23%
Oct. - Dec. 1973	1787	389	22%
Jan. - Mar. 1974	1858	385	21%
Apr. - June 1974	2044	467	23%
Jul. - Sep. 1974	2311	496	22%
Oct. - Dec. 1974	2024	439	22%
Jan. - Mar. 1975	1949	369	19%

Source: FIU Quarterly Reports

- To increase investigative efficiency, and
- To decrease the percentage of drug-related felony crimes.

The project's results in achieving these objectives are mixed.

As noted above in subsection 3.2.2, the percentage, increase or decrease, of drug-related felonies could not be ascertained, but the percentage of drug involvement of all arrested felony offenders remained essentially unchanged throughout the project period. In addition, the incidence of all five IMPACT crimes increased over the course of the project period, as has been discussed in Section I of this report and in the Crime Analysis Report. There is, however, evidence that the presence of IMPACT, including projects such as this one, depressed the upward crime trend to a level lower than would otherwise have been the case. Thus, while not reducing the number of IMPACT crimes absolutely, the FIU project probably contributed to reducing the extent of increase in these crimes.

The project's performance on the other two objectives -- increasing clearance rates and increasing efficiency -- is recapped in Figures 3-1 through 3-5, for the five IMPACT crimes. Each figure plots the quarterly average CPD total clearance rate for the crime in question and the quarterly average investigative clearance rate (the basic measure of investigative efficiency, since it measures the percentage of investigations resulting in

3-20




FIGURE 3-1

HOMICIDE RESULTS




FIGURE 3-2

ASSAULT RESULTS




FIGURE 3-3
RAPE RESULTS




FIGURE 3-4
ROBBERY RESULTS




FIGURE 3-5
BURGLARY RESULTS

clearances). No clear-cut trend is apparent in either indicator for homicide; both factors remained at relatively high levels throughout the project period, while reported homicides increased 23%. For assaults, the overall clearance rate declined somewhat over the project period, and the efficiency of investigation dropped substantially in the face of a 62% increase in reported assaults. The clearance rate for rape increased slightly, except for a fall-off in the project's final quarter, while the Unit's efficiency increased sharply from the first year to the second. For robbery, the Unit contributed to an increase in the average CPD clearance rate in the second year, but this rate has declined for the most recent three quarters. The Unit's investigation efficiency, after being quite high for most of the project, fell off sharply in the final three quarterly periods when reported robberies were increasing substantially. Finally, the burglary clearance rate remained relatively low throughout the project, while the Burglary Unit's investigative efficiency declined during the first year and rose considerably during the second year, in the face of a large increase in reported burglaries.

For the most part, therefore, it would seem that the project's principal results have been to enable the Felony Investigation Units to hold their own against a considerable increase in felony crime. Without the 74% increase in manpower, it is likely that CPD clearances would have declined substantially in the face of increased crime incidence, rather than increasing or remaining relatively constant.

SECTION IV

AUXILIARY POLICE AND OUTREACH CENTERS

SECTION IV

AUXILIARY POLICE AND OUTREACH CENTERS

4.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS

The Auxiliary Police and Outreach Centers projects are both administered by the CPD Community Relations Unit. Both concepts were already well established prior to the start of IMPACT; some eight existing Outreach Centers were in operation, serving as "storefront" local centers of law-enforcement assistance, and 182 Auxiliary Police * (AP) volunteers already existed, serving as a supplement to the CPD's regular patrol forces. The aim of the DDA projects was to substantially expand both of these existing operations, so as to improve community relations, provide improved services in crime-prone neighborhoods, and relieve the CPD of some of its non-crime workload. The grant application called for adding 400 new Auxiliary Police in the first phase and 600 more in the second, and adding eight Outreach Centers to make a total of 16. Wherever possible, the AP's were to use Outreach Centers as their base of operations, rather than locating separate quarters. (In fact, all 16 Outreach Centers were used as AP bases; in addition, the AP used five other bases in locations where no Outreach Center was available.) Both projects are still under way as this evaluation is written (May 1975).

4.1.1 AUXILIARY POLICE

The Auxiliary Police Officers are used to supplement the efforts of

*The grant had stated that the AP force was at 600.

the Cleveland Police Department. As a uniformed patrol, their presence on the street is intended as a visible deterrent to crime. They also act in the capacity of observers, reporting hazardous situations and illegal activity to police. Patrolling in high-crime areas by designated beats, and in neighborhood and business areas, they act as additional "eyes and ears" of the Cleveland Police Department. During special events (such as parades, sporting events and church services) and emergencies (such as windstorms and fires), AP's assist the police by directing traffic. By performing such services, the AP's relieve the CPD from the necessity of assigning regular police officers to such duties. This provides more time for regular police to respond more rapidly to complaints.

Although the Auxiliary Police project officially began in January 1973, it was not until June that the AP's began patrolling. It took six months to train, uniform, and assign to patrol areas the 582 men and women assigned to the AP force. Phases I and II ended by March 31, 1974, at which time Phase III operations were begun. Although the Phase III goal called for adding additional volunteers to reach a total of 1200, no more than 950 had been achieved by the end of 1974, nine months into Phase III.

The present Auxiliary Police project is administrated by the Community Relations Unit, an external arm of the Bureau of Administrative Services of the CPD. The Unit is under the command of a Police Deputy Inspector who is assisted by two lieutenants, three sergeants, and five patrolmen in administering and directing the functions of the AP project.

The AP force is formed into three groups, "A," "B," and "C," with each group subdivided into platoons. Each group is under the direction of a Group Supervisor (sergeant) and a Group Director (patrolman). An Auxiliary Commander is appointed to direct the functions and activities of each platoon. The AP members are volunteer adult females and males, ages 18 through 65 years. These citizens have been provided with a standardized uniform, gray in color, with a uniform cap, wreath, breast badge, and shoulder patches. They have also been provided with batons but are not authorized to carry any other weapons. There is no pay for the services rendered by these people but they do get reimbursed for mileage. AP members are recruited from the neighborhoods in which they patrol. Because of this, individual members of each group are often well known to each other and work well together. By patrolling the neighborhoods in which they reside, they can do a better job because of their intimate knowledge and interest in the area being patrolled and stimulate community involvement.

Each Auxiliary Policeman must attend a six-week training course, consisting of four-hour classes, one night each week. The subjects covered under the training program are as follows:

Class 1 - Introduction; Crimes - Felonies, Misdemeanors.

Class 2 - Laws of Arrest; Search Warrants; United States and State of Ohio Constitutions.

- Class 3 - Rules of Evidence; Protection of Evidence at the Scene.
- Class 4 - Reports and Communications; Traffic Regulation and Control.
- Class 5 - Auxiliary Police Rules and Regulations; Handling the Public; Tact and Judgment; Enforcement of Emergency Laws and Regulations.
- Class 6 - Patrol Work; Baton; Description of Persons; Searches; and Examination.

The classes are conducted by the personnel assigned to the Community Relations Unit under the direction of the Group Supervisor. Visual aids are used, including training films on police-related subjects along with training manuals produced by the Department; the manuals are distributed to Auxiliary Police members. A continuing in-service training program is conducted as part of the permanent operations of the AP project. Training films and lectures are provided once a month to each platoon.

Upon completion of training, AP members are assigned to a platoon in the area in which they reside. They report to and work out of 21 base stations strategically located throughout the City. Sixteen of these are Police Outreach Centers manned by regular police officers of the Community Relations Unit; the other five are AP centers specifically designed for AP functions. The AP's all carry citizens band walkie-talkies and maintain constant communication with the base. Any condition requiring police action is reported to the base and the information is forwarded by telephone directly to the CPD dispatch center so that regular police can be dispatched. Upon completion of their tour of duty, the AP's return to their base station and make a coded duty report relative to their activities.

Auxiliary Policemen are required to contribute four hours per week or 16 hours per month and attend the monthly in-service training programs. Auxiliaries perform the following duties:

1. Patrol on foot in pairs in high crime areas and in the various business and residential areas of Cleveland, including the downtown business district, acting as a visible crime deterrent.
2. Patrol in their own personal vehicles on the lookout for situations requiring police attention.
3. Relieve regular policemen on the scene of incidents involving damaged or stolen autos requiring towing so that police officers need not spend many hours of non-productive waiting for tows.
4. Assist in the recovery of stolen autos by observation while on patrol.
5. Assist the regular police at parades, special events at the Municipal Stadium, at the Public Auditorium, and at other civic occurrences; to assist with traffic details at churches, social events and shopping centers.
6. Respond to emergency situations such as severe windstorms, tornados and fires when traffic must be detoured around blocked streets, thereby reducing the need for detailing large numbers of regular police to such incidents.

The majority of the Auxiliary force is concentrated in high-crime areas. They are working in various business and residential areas throughout the City; the Buckeye Road area (a changing ethnic community); Lee-Harvard area (primarily middle-class Blacks); downtown Cleveland business district; the Fairfax area (inner-city low-income Blacks); and the near West Side (a mixture of low-income Puerto Ricans, Indians, Blacks and Appalachian Whites). Table 4-1 lists the AP base station locations,

TABLE 4-1

Locations of Auxiliary Police Base Stations
and Outreach Centers

Address	Census Tracts	Police District
Auxiliary Police and Outreach Centers (dual-use)		
3830 West 140th Street (OC #62)	1242, 1239, 1243	1
2621 West 14th Street (OC #58)	1045, 1044	2
1416 West 25th Street (OC #57)	1033, 1037	2
5207 Bridge Avenue (OC #59)	1034	2
3886 Lee Road (OC #54)	1217, 1219, 1221	4
5723 Broadway (OC #55)	1149, 1108	4
13524 Miles Avenue (OC #63)	1214	4
2685 or 2802 East 79th Street (OC #51)	1143, 1148	4
10803 Union Avenue (OC #65)	1205	4
11701 Buckeye Road (OC #50)	1194	4
11025 Woodland Avenue (OC #61)	1193	4 and 5
9502 Cedar Road (OC #53)	1136, 1132	5
8047 Superior Avenue (OC #60)	1118, 1122	6
1021 East 105th Street (OC #52)	1182, 1181	6
12904 St. Clair Avenue (OC #56)	1168, 1167	6
9010 St. Clair Avenue (OC #64)	1164, 1161	6
Auxiliary Police Only		
10119 Detroit Avenue	1015, 1013, 1011	1
4910 Memphis Avenue	1061, 1062	2
4452 Warner Road	1159	4
12104 Woodland Avenue	1194	4
6417 St. Clair Avenue	1113, 1116	6

together with the census tracts and Police District number of each. The locations which are also Outreach Centers are indicated as such. Figure 4-1 illustrates the locations of the AP base stations and the Outreach Centers. As can be seen, the majority are located in the high-crime East Side census tracts, in Police Districts 4, 5, and 6.

4.1.2 OUTREACH CENTERS

The existing eight Outreach Centers were supplemented by eight more during Phases I and II of this project. The basic idea was to build rapport with the community in order to establish long-term public cooperation by citizens with the police, especially in high-crime and changing neighborhoods. Each Center was manned by a regular CPD officer. Thus, the Centers could service "walk-in" requests for information and assistance, on general governmental and public service matters as well as law enforcement and crime-related subjects. In addition, the Centers were intended to implement various community crime prevention projects such as "Block Watch" and "Operation Identification" under CPD direction and supervision.

The CPD officers assigned to the Outreach Centers were selected to be of the same ethnic background as the people they served. A total of 17 CPD officers took part in the project. Eight veteran officers were selected from the Division of Basic Patrol on the basis of ability, potential, character, and personal evaluations. These eight joined nine others already

KEY:

- ⊙ = Auxiliary Police and Outreach Centers
 X = Auxiliary Police only




FIGURE 4-1

AUXILIARY POLICE AND OUTREACH CENTER LOCATIONS

assigned to the pre-existing Outreach Centers. The veteran officers were replaced in their district assignments by newly recruited officers who completed their Police Academy training on April 24, 1973. The project's operational phase began in August of that year when the new Outreach Centers began operations.

Throughout the course of the project, the Outreach Centers have worked closely with the Auxiliary Police. The Centers carried out recruiting for AP volunteers and, as noted above, served as headquarters for the local AP organization, providing office space, meeting and training areas, and a location for the citizens band radio set used to communicate with the AP members on patrol duty. The Centers worked closely with neighborhood civic groups, churches, clubs, local businesses, and various social service agencies. They encouraged neighborhood residents to take the police civil service exam, conducted crime-prevention lectures and presentations, received miscellaneous questions and complaints and forwarded them to the appropriate agency, and answered citizens' legal questions. The specific projects and interactions varied from Center to Center, depending on the characteristics and needs of each neighborhood.

4.2 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE

4.2.1 AUXILIARY POLICE PERFORMANCE

The objectives of the Auxiliary Police project, and the associated performance measures, are as follows:

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Performance Measures</u>
1. Improve Community Relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assistance to citizens • Information received
2. Report Crime and Potential Crime	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime incidents reported by AP
3. Relieve Regular Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Man-hours relieving police of <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Crime incidents - Tows, traffic, etc. - Traffic control - Special events
4. Reduce Crime Incidence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decrease in crime in AP areas

Several methods can be used to assess the improvement of community relations in a project of this nature. The most rigorous method would include a controlled experiment inclusive of detailed reporting and before and after surveys. This approach would necessitate the development of a mechanism or model which would permit the identification, isolation, and estimation of the extent for which other factors operating in the area under consideration were influencing community relations. Obviously, this would be very time consuming and costly. The method used to assess the improvement in community relations was the frequency with which citizens provided information to the AP's. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 summarize the AP's performance during Phases I-II and III.

Table 4-2 shows that the AP's averaged 84 assistances to citizens per month during Phases I-II and 142 per month during Phase III. Citizen assists began at a relatively high level in Phases I-II but dropped off sharply in the winter of 1973-74 and continued at a low level until the fall of 1974 when they suddenly increased very substantially. The number of times

TABLE 4-2
AUXILIARY POLICE ACTIVITIES

PHASES I-II

	1973							1974			TOTAL	AVG.
	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR		
# Crime Incidents Reported	21	21	17	30	16	23	16	24	9	21	198	19.8
# Assists in Arrests	17	17	17	6	6	4	9	1	3	1	81	8.1
# Stolen Autos Spotted	41	42	53	11	0	20	13	5	31	2	218	21.8
# Assists to Citizens	71	71	101	104	218	123	34	39	59	16	841	84.1
# Times Information Received	25	25	28	31	15	2	12	6	3	3	150	15.0
# Doors Found Open	NA	NA	NA	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	--	2.6
Total # AP at End of Month	NA	NA	NA	600	548	583	580	586	565	651	--	558

TABLE 4-2...CONT.

AUXILIARY POLICE ACTIVITIES

PHASE III

	1974										TOTAL	AVG.
	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC			
# Crime Incidents Reported	1	6	28	127	79	29	135	246	479	1130	126	
#Assists in Arrests	11	0	21	28	10	18	62	88	32	270	30	
#Stolen Autos Spotted	1	33	23	11	16	36	33	20	44	217	24	
#Assists to Citizens	42	46	28	56	94	55	246	236	478	1281	142	
#Times Information Received	10	22	14	54	36	15	121	189	310	771	86	
#Doors Found Open	0	0	13	13	4	18	15	20	25	108	12	
Total # AP at End of Month	802	901	901	910	907	922	942	937	943	--	907	

citizens supplied information to the AP's appeared to parallel the rise and fall in assists to citizens by the AP's, an interrelationship which should be explored further. Without knowing more about the reasons for these changes, it is difficult to say whether these two factors actually indicate the status of police/community relations.

The second objective of the project was to report crimes and potential crimes. As Table 4-2 reveals, during Phases I-II the AP's reported an average of 19.8 crime incidents per month; in Phase III this increased substantially to 126 per month, again climbing sharply in the fall of 1974 after reaching very low levels in early and mid-1974. Other indicators of the AP's assistance to the CPD in dealing with crime are the number of AP assists in arrests (which averaged 8.1 per month in Phases I-II and rose to 30 per month in Phase III), the number of stolen autos spotted by AP's (which averaged 21.8 per month in Phases I-II and 24 in Phase III), and the number of doors found open (2.6 per month in Phases I-II and 12 per month in Phase III). All three indicators increased as time went on, although since the total AP force was 54 percent larger in Phase III, some of the increases were to be expected.

A breakdown of AP manhours is presented in Table 4-3. As can be seen, overall, the 64,924 donated manhours in Phase I-II and 135,183 donated manhours in Phase III represent a rather remarkable sense of civic duty and community support for the police. The largest portion of AP manhours,

61 percent in Phases I-II and 73 percent in Phase III, was devoted to patrol operations, most of it mobile rather than on foot. Table 4-3 tabulates the number of manhours of regular police time saved by the AP. In Phases I-II the AP's averaged 8.5 manhours per month on crime incidents, 55.5 manhours per month on towing and similar duties, and 47.5 manhours on traffic-control. More significantly, they averaged 772 manhours per month on special events. (The corresponding monthly figures for Phase III are 29 manhours on crime incidents, 118 manhours on towing, etc., 98 manhours on traffic control, and 1150 manhours on special events.) Adding up these categories, during Phases I-II the Auxiliary Police saved 8837 manhours that might otherwise have been required of CPD patrol officers; Phase III (through December 1975) the AP saved a further 13,563 CPD manhours.

The manhour data from Table 4-3 are further analyzed in Table 4-4 to compute the average monthly contribution of manpower by each Auxiliary Patrolman. Table 4-4 indicates the number of AP members in each of three categories -- administration, mobile patrol, and foot patrol -- each month, and the number of manhours recorded for each type of activity. Administrative AP members averaged 13.2 manhours per month in Phases I-II and 16.3 in Phase III, thereby reaching the required 16 manhours per month in Phase III. AP members engaged in patrol differ sharply in manhours depending on whether they patrol by car or on foot; mobile patrol members averaged 14.4 manhours per month in Phases I-II, rising to 23.0

TABLE 4-3(A)

AUXILIARY POLICE MANHOURS

PHASES I-II

	1973						1974			TOTAL	AVG.
	JUN & JUL	AUG	SEP	CCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR		
Total On-Duty	7289	3444	7518	9208	7985	5311	6243	6730	11,196	64,924	6492
Total On Patrol	3738	1585	4658	6446	5329	3548	4059	3636	6718	39,717	3972
Foot	805	486	788	1400	1535	697	845	831	1039	8,426	843
Mobile	2933	1099	3870	5046	3794	2851	3214	2805	5679	31,291	3129
Relieving CPD											
-Crime Incidents	10	9	21	2	3	10	23	6	1	85	8.5
-Tows, etc.	58	29	79	78	77	51	67	46	70	555	55.5
-Traffic control	116	41	50	62	73	20	32	16	65	475	47.5
-Special Events	1236	717	1509	964	1080	537	471	557	651	7,722	772
Admin. Duties	378	489	1167	1584	1496	1291	1450	1959	2866	12,680	1268
In-Service Training	10	8	34	8	173	52	203	245	234	967	97
Supervisory Staff											
Admin. Duties	1999	872	1346	898	858	892	782	939	1264	9,850	985
Training AP	192	63	143	128	157	144	116	86	180	1,159	116
Training Staff	0	0	8	31	28	8	114	47	55	291	29
Total	2191	935	1481	1057	993	1044	1012	1072	1499	11,284	1128

TABLE 4-3(B)
AUXILIARY POLICE MANHOURS
PHASE III

	1974										TOTAL	AVG.
	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC			
Total On-Duty	13,428	14,799	14,183	14,206	14,887	13,306	16,773	17,471	16,130	135,183	15,020	
Total On Patrol	9,128	10,853	10,640	10,423	10,204	9,604	12,398	13,201	11,847	98,298	10,922	
Foot	1,209	1,296	760	697	628	743	1,236	1,047	1,212	8,828	981	
Mobile	7,919	9,557	9,880	9,726	9,576	8,861	11,162	12,154	10,635	89,470	9,941	
Relieving CPD												
Crime Incidents	37	15	9	18	31	18	7	29	97	261	29	
Tows, etc.	70	130	35	162	86	118	93	130	241	1,065	118	
Traffic Control	184	114	23	131	55	95	71	80	130	883	98	
Special Events	791	1,603	909	1,534	1,074	943	1,054	996	1,450	10,354	1,150	
Admin. Duties	2,816	2,895	2,562	2,653	3,315	2,243	2,748	2,717	2,273	24,222	2,691	
In-Service Training	429	345	352	212	101	388	480	527	319	3,153	350	
Supervisory Staff												
Admin. Duties	870	631	716	428	634	820	680		788			
Training AP	84	78	96	68	88	114	100		113			
Training Staff	34	30	48	24	10	46	28		60			
Total	988	739	860	520	782	980	808		961			

TABLE 4-4

AUXILIARY POLICE MANPOWER ANALYSIS

PHASES I-II

	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	AVERAGE
AP Admin.								
# AP	85	141	124	108	120	150	164	127.4
# Hrs.	1167	1584	1496	1291	1450	1959	2866	1687.6
Avg. Hrs.	13.7	11.2	12.1	12.0	12.1	13.1	17.5	13.2
AP Mobile Patrol								
# AP	278	279	282	245	246	242	316	269.7
# Hrs.	3870	5046	3794	2851	3214	2805	5679	3894.1
Avg. Hrs.	13.9	18.1	13.4	11.6	13.1	11.6	18.0	14.4
AP Foot Patrol								
# AP	92	121	113	85	85	74	90	94.3
# Hrs.	788	1400	1535	697	845	831	1039	1019.3
Avg. Hrs.	8.6	11.6	13.6	8.2	9.9	11.2	11.5	10.8
Total AP								
# AP	600	548	583	580	586	565	651	587.6
# Hrs.	7518	9208	7985	5311	6243	6730	11,196	7741.6
Avg. Hrs.	12.5	16.8	13.7	9.2	10.6	11.9	17.2	13.2

TABLE 4-4....CONT.

AUXILIARY POLICE MANPOWER ANALYSIS

PHASE III

	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	AVERAGE
AP Admin.										
# AP	176	180	172	139	172	148	168	162	105	164.7
# Hrs.	2816	2895	2562	2653	3315	2243	2748	2717	2273	2691.3
Avg. Hrs.	16.0	16.1	14.9	19.1	19.3	15.2	16.4	16.8	13.7	16.3
AP Mobile Patrol										
# AP	422	439	439	436	398	395	516	453	400	433.1
# Hrs.	7919	9557	9880	9726	9576	8861	11,162	12,154	10,635	9941.1
Avg. Hrs.	18.8	21.8	22.5	22.3	24.1	22.4	21.6	26.8	26.6	23.0
AP Foot Patrol										
# AP	93	112	80	58	70	59	79	85	77	79.2
# Hrs.	1209	1296	760	697	628	743	1236	1047	1212	980.9
Avg. Hrs.	13.0	11.6	9.5	12.0	9.0	12.6	15.6	12.3	15.7	12.4
Total AP										
# AP	802	901	901	910	907	922	942	937	943	915.0
# Hrs.	13,428	14,799	14,183	14,206	14,887	13,306	16,773	17,471	16,130	15,020.3
Avg. Hrs.	16.7	16.4	15.7	15.6	16.4	14.4	17.8	18.6	17.1	16.4

in Phase III -- an impressive increase. Foot patrol members, by contrast, averaged 10.8 manhours per month in Phases I-II and 12.4 in Phase III, probably indicating the relative desirability of the two types of patrol. Overall, the total AP force averaged 13.2 manhours per month in Phases I-II and 16.4 manhours per month in Phase III.

The final objective of the AP was to serve as a deterrent to crime by being a visible uniformed patrol. If they did indeed have such an effect, the increase in crime in those areas where the AP patrolled should be less than the increase in similar, unpatrolled surrounding areas. To examine this hypothesis, crime incidence data by census tract were analyzed for the years 1972 (prior to the IMPACT-funded AP project) and 1974 (well into the project's implementation phase). The percentage increase (or decrease) in crime from 1972 to 1974 for the census tracts containing and surrounding an AP base station in each Police District was compared with the overall percentage increase in crime for that district.

The overall results, as shown in Table 4-5, reveal that of the 21 AP patrolled areas, nine reported crime decreases less than the average of their Police District, five reported increases less than or equal to that of their District, and only seven reported crime increases greater than the average of their Police District, compared with the period (1972) prior to AP implementation. In District 1, reported crime increased in one of the areas served by AP patrols, by 5.8 percent, but decreased 5.1 percent on the other, while crime increased 7 percent in District 1 as a whole from 1972 to 1974. In District 2, crime increased by 15.8 percent overall, and three of the four AP areas had increases greater than this (50 percent,

Table 4-5

Crime Incidence Comparison

Part I Crimes

Auxiliary Police Base Station	Census Tract	District	1972	1974	Percent Change
<u>District 1</u>	1242	1	326	424	
3830 West 140th Street	1239	1	264	168	+5.8
	1243	1	134	174	
10119 Detroit Avenue	1015	1	180	188	
	1011	1	551	470	-5.1
	1013	1	194	220	
District 1 - Total	----	--	6769	7242	+7.0
<u>District 2</u>					
2621 West 14th Street	1045	2	68	123	
	1044	2	71	86	+50.4
1416 West 25th Street	1033	2	251	295	
	1037	2	164	247	+30.6
5207 Bridge Avenue	1034	2	329	347	+5.5
4910 Memphis Road	1061	2	153	230	
	1062	2	115	141	+38.4
District 2 - Total	----	--	7350	8513	+15.8
<u>District 4</u>					
3886 Lee Road	1217	4	262	241	
	1219	4	169	153	-2.9
	1221	4	254	271	
5723 Broadway	1149	4	155	267	
	1108	4	175	240	+53.6
13524 Miles Avenue	1214	4	365	628	+72.0
2685 East 79th Street	1143	4	275	238	-7.5
	1148	4	301	295	
10803 Union Avenue	1205	4	294	308	+4.8
11701 Buckeye Road	1194	4	378	349	-7.7
12104 Woodland Avenue	1194	4	378	349	-7.7
4452 Warner Road	1159	4	115	122	+6.1
11025 Woodland Avenue	1193	4 & 5	691	799	+15.6
District 4 - Total	----	--	11134	11809	+6.1

Table 4-5 (continued)

Crime Incidence Comparison

Part I Crimes					
Auxiliary Police Base Station	Census Tract	District	1972	1974	Percent Change
<u>District 5</u>					
11025 Woodland Avenue	1193	4 & 5	691	799	+15.6
9502 Cedar Road	1136	5	293	255	-6.7
	1132	5	332	328	
District 5 - Total	-----	--	9517	9014	-5.3
<u>District 6</u>					
8047 Superior Avenue	1118	6	283	314	-12.5
	1122	5	412	294	
1021 East 105th Street	1182	6	377	330	-9.9
	1181	6	177	169	
12904 St. Clair Avenue	1168	6	613	578	+1.2
	1167	6	265	311	
9010 St. Clair Avenue	1164	6	358	356	+5.6
	1161	6	162	193	
6417 St. Clair Avenue	1113	6	177	192	-8.2
	1116	6	187	142	
District 6 - Total	-----	--	7765	8395	+8.1

38 percent, and 31 percent) while only one showed a smaller increase (5.5 percent). In District 4, where crime increased by 5.1 percent, three AP areas showed larger increases (72 percent, 54 percent, and 15.6 percent), two had increases of about the same as the district average (6.1 percent and 4.8 percent), while four AP-patrolled areas reported actual decreases in crime (-3 percent, -7.5 percent, and two tracts with -7.7 percent). District 5's results were also mixed, with one AP area's crime increasing (15.6 percent) and the other decreasing (-7 percent) while the district as a whole was the only one to show a decrease in reported crime (-5.3 percent). In District 6 reported crime increased 8.1 percent from 1972 to 1974. Of the five AP-patrolled areas, three reported decreases in crime (-12.5 percent, -9.9 percent, and -8.2 percent) while two reported increases smaller than the District increase (1.2 percent and 5.6 percent). Given that some of the AP-patrolled tracts had substantial crime increases, it is difficult to attribute the difference in crime rates to the presence or absence of the AP patrols; nonetheless, such an inference is at least plausible. A more detailed analysis, which examined the differences in how the AP's actually operated in each location, and explored other factors that influence the crime rate, would be necessary before firm conclusions could be drawn.

4.2.2 OUTREACH CENTER PERFORMANCE

The objectives of the Outreach Centers were the following:

- Offer lay legal advice;
- Offer advice to youth;
- Recruit police exam applicants;
- Establish rapport with community.

The data available to measure achievement of these objectives are the activity measures reported on monthly evaluation reports prepared in a standard format for each Center. As with the Auxiliary Police project, measuring rapport with the community could probably best be done by a controlled experiment and by means of a professional before and after survey of citizen attitudes; however, time and money constraints did not permit this to be done. Instead, achievement of this objective must be evaluated based on inferences from the activity statistics.

The activity statistics are summarized in Table 4-6 for Phases I-II and III of the project. The Centers together were open an average of 3028 hours per month during Phases I-II and 3030 hours per month in Phase III. They gave out lay legal advice an average of 131 times a month in Phases I-II, and increased this to 217 times a month in Phase III. Usage of the Centers increased in nearly every category as time went on -- an indication of increasing community acceptance. The number of people given referrals to other agencies or programs each month increased from 229 to 407; the number of meetings on safety problems increased from 87 per month to 110 per month, while the number of crime prevention problems dealt with and programs presented increased marginally from 97 per month to 98 per month. Other public or private agencies made use of the Centers an average of 38 times per month in Phases I-II, accounting for an average of 139 hours each month; in Phase III, such usage increased to an average of 67 times a month, and 463 hours. The number of people visiting the Centers increased steadily throughout the project, averaging 785 per month in Phases I-II and 1406 in Phase III -- another indication of rising community support. Only two activity indicators declined from Phases I-II

TABLE 4-6

Outreach Center Activities

PHASES I-II

	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Total	Average
# Hours Open	2400	3092	3256	2949	3603	3095	2545	3284	24,227	3028
# Times Lay Legal Advice	18	152	194	121	124	81	46	311	1047	131
# People Given Referral	57	292	323	204	248	238	226	242	1830	229
# Meetings on Safety	25	79	79	57	100	104	138	116	698	87
# Crime Prev. Probs/Progs.	19	104	85	103	121	121	106	119	778	97
# Uses by Other Agencies	1	15	28	27	81	41	74	41	308	38
Hours Used by Other Agencies	4	141	176	74	85	313	151	170	1114	139
# Police Reports	35	177	136	101	79	114	98	68	808	101
# People Visiting	91	594	893	739	719	826	890	1528	6280	785
# Recruits for Civil Service Exam	0	0	49	54	24	66	13	0	206	26

PHASE III

	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Aver.
# Hours Open	2653	2496	3337	2625	3014	3383	2671	3307	3782	27,268	3030
# Times Lay Legal Advice	174	165	249	262	175	211	177	261	277	1,951	217
# People Given Referral	211	313	482	466	300	424	468	477	521	3,662	407
# Meetings on Safety	94	123	120	92	75	135	109	129	116	993	110
# Crime Prev. Probs/Progs.	87	53	104	79	129	87	109	130	105	883	98
# Uses by Other Agencies	25	43	42	54	90	58	56	80	156	604	67
Hours Used by Other Agencies	187	361	392	566	400	305	442	768	748	4,169	463
# Police Reports	48	78	95	108	99	77	26	93	138	762	85
# People Visiting	1312	1329	1524	1374	1384	1516	1107	1550	1562	12,658	1406
Recruits for Civil Service Exam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

to Phase III: the number of police reports filed (down from 101 per month to 85) and the number of people recruited to take the police civil service exam (down from 26 per month in Phases I-II to none at all in Phase III). * No data elements were collected to indicate the Centers' interaction with youths; thus, it is impossible to tell whether they achieved the objective of offering advice to youth.

Table 4-7 summarizes the reported manhour distribution of the officers manning the Outreach Centers. (The breakdown of on-duty man-hours represents about 75 percent of the total on-duty time; the remainder is unaccounted for.) During Phases I-II, administrative duties consumed slightly over half of all on-duty manhours; this was reduced by Phase III to 38 percent as greater experience was gained in operating the Centers. The amount of time spent on crime prevention activities remained about the same from Phases I-II to Phase III at about 10 percent of total manhours. Advertising the Centers increased from eight percent of total manhours in Phase I-II to 14 percent in Phase III, which may help to account for the Centers' increased level of activity and community contact in Phase III.

4.3 CONCLUSIONS

Although it is difficult to measure improvements in community relations without citizen attitude surveys, the superficial indicators measured in these two projects imply that the relationship between the police and the neighborhoods served by these projects gradually improved during

*Civil Service exams are given on an average of a two year cycle; during Phase I-II there was an active recruitment program which was conducted at the Centers. Since the examinations were taken during this time period, this explains why there was no additional recruitment in Phase III.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

TABLE 4-7

Outreach Center Manpower Analysis

PHASES I-II

	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Total	Average
Total on Duty	2400	2520	2240	2080	2668	2040	1800	2320	18,068	2258
Crime Prev. Progs.	38	175	276	304	229	184	198	368	1,772	222
Prepare Police Reports	23	109	109	97	51	96	61	47	593	74
Advertise Center	10	215	216	178	105	148	283	312	1,467	183
Grievance Problems	8	107	152	95	68	66	143	151	790	99
Admin. Duties	1295	1391	1228	980	1617	981	813	924	9,229	1154

PHASE III

	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total	Avg.
Total on Duty	1840	2000	2420	1840	2000	2500	1920	2080	2340	18,940	2104
Crime Prev. Progs.	200	302	217	197	285	212	139	228	260	2,040	227
Prepare Police Reports	59	57	86	85	73	53	25	71	72	581	65
Advertise Centers	325	207	403	268	265	316	238	281	310	2,613	290
Grievance Problems	152	145	156	228	154	162	124	118	110	1,349	150
Admin. Duties	776	709	963	729	689	670	785	942	955	7,218	802

the course of the projects. People reported more information to the Auxiliary Police patrolmen, and the AP's assisted the citizens more frequently. Many more people visited the Outreach Centers, and community groups and other agencies used the Centers more frequently for meetings. All of these changes imply an improving trend of police-community relations.

In addition to improving community relations, between June 1973 and December 1974 the Auxiliary Police relieved the regular patrol forces of 21,400 manhours which the latter could devote to crime control activities. They assisted the police in 351 arrests, spotted 435 stolen autos, and reported 1328 crime incidents. Although the AP fell short of its goal of reaching 1200 members, it did achieve its manhour goal of at least 16 hours per month per volunteer (although the foot patrol volunteers were spending only 12.4 hours per month). In addition, there is some evidence to indicate that a majority of the areas patrolled by the Auxiliary Police experienced a reduction in crime, or a reduction in the rate of increase in crime, compared with their surrounding Police District.

The AP's Phases I-II expenditure of \$333,568 resulted in tangible manhour savings to the regular patrol force and a possible reduction in crime in at least some of the areas served. The Outreach Center's Phases I-II expenditure of \$228,867 produced some indication of improved police-community relations, but it is difficult to assess how much such an increase is worth in dollars in the absence of controlled experiments.

Some of the more important benefits of the Outreach Centers project was the establishment of headquarters, supervision, and coordination of the AP forces by the uniform police officers regularly assigned to each of these Centers. If the Centers had not existed, some other quarters would have had to be obtained (as was the case in five locations where there were no Outreach Centers). Thus, the Outreach Centers contributed to the success of the AP project but how much is difficult to assess. In any event, the two projects have been formally combined in Phase III, at a budget level of \$353,252, and extension of Phase III through September 30, 1975, is pending as this evaluation is being written.

SECTION V

RESPONSE TIME REDUCTION

SECTION V

RESPONSE TIME REDUCTION PROJECT

5.1 RESPONSE TIME REDUCTION PROJECT BACKGROUND

This project was planned and developed to bring about functional improvements in the field operations of the CPD, particularly those required to support police responses in the high-crime areas of the City. Functional improvements included response time reduction, rapid availability of field data, field assignment dispatching, and administrative/management data collection. In June 1973, a grant application was prepared and submitted to LEAA which proposed the following objectives:

- Reduce response time to complaints;
- Increase the number and rate of apprehensions of suspects at the scene for crimes in progress;
- Increase the number and rate of apprehensions of subjects made shortly after the commission of an IMPACT crime;
- Increase the number and rate of apprehensions of known wanted persons who are in the community;
- Provide departmental administration with meaningful data to permit dynamic allocation of resources to needed areas of criminal activity; and
- Permit departmental administration to precisely measure officers' workloads, activities, and scheduling in order to more effectively plan, evaluate, and coordinate CPD activities in the field.

As originally conceived, the project represented a multi-year effort, divided into four technical phases: (1) equipment procurement, (2) development

of an "assignment tracking" system, (3) merger of phases one and two, and (4) development of computer-assisted dispatching of police units in the field.

To accomplish the first phase objectives, the CPD planned to purchase 125 mobile computer terminals for installation in patrol cars. The terminals were to enable officers to request and receive information relevant to their field activities, e.g., information about wanted persons, suspicious persons, automobiles, and status of field units in specific locations, much more rapidly than is possible with standard police radio equipment. In addition to these operational functions, the project eventually planned to record all transactions conducted through the terminals so that police administrators could develop management reports about field activities, workloads, schedules, and allocation of resources.

The completion of the first phase was estimated to require nine months. The second phase, which was to be concurrent with the first phase beginning at the third month, was estimated to require four months. The third phase, which also was to be partially concurrent with the first phase beginning at the seventh month, was estimated to require five months. Together, the first three phases were to require approximately one year. The fourth phase, which was to commence during the second year of the project, was estimated to require two years of technical effort. IMPACT funding was only awarded to the City of Cleveland to support the first three phases.

The remainder of this section presents the management and implementation

milestones of the project, discusses a number of alterations which were made in the course of undertaking various tasks of the technical development effort, and explains results to date on the basis of preliminary data.

5.2 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE

At the present time, the Response Time Reduction Project is not fully susceptible to a performance evaluation because the first three phases have not yet achieved full implementation. A brief chronology of the project's implementation since the summer of 1973 reveals a series of management alterations, introduced to enhance overall effectiveness, which necessitated a number of delays.

Initially, the phase one schedule called for competitive procurement of 125 mobile terminals which were to be installed in police field vehicles. Shortly after the grant award of June 29, 1973, a request for proposal was promulgated to a number of original equipment manufacturers. Highly attractive proposals were submitted by two manufacturers.*

Upon receipt of these proposals, two developments occurred which delayed completion of phase one. First, the City of Cleveland was successful in obtaining a software package known as the Sea/King Alert System which was developed in Kansas City and Seattle under LEAA funding to support many of the functions proposed pursuant to the response time reduction objectives. The City's Data Processing Center concluded that the Sea/King Alert System was susceptible to modification to support the mobile terminal

*International Business Machines Corporation and Kustom Electronics, Incorporated.

system. In order to allow time to make the desired modification, the project's management group decided to extend the timeframe of phase one. Second, because of the sophisticated nature of the proposals received from the two equipment manufacturers, the Management Committee,* responsible for the equipment selection, decided that the technical assistance of an independent evaluation contractor was desirable in addition to an actual test of the equipment under field conditions. All of the foregoing developments, and concomitant delays, took place during the fall and winter months of 1973-1974.

By December 17, 1973, both equipment manufacturers had agreed to place 20 units each of their mobile terminals in CPD vehicles for testing under field conditions. CPD patrol officers, and particularly IMPACT Task Force officers, were trained in the use of the terminals and they were encouraged to express their preferences. The field test was conducted over a 10-week period between mid-December 1973 and the end of February 1974. During this test period, officers were queried on at least two occasions by the Management Committee representatives to indicate their preferences according to their comparative experiences with each manufacturer's terminal.

Concurrent with the field test, a consulting firm performed an independent evaluation of the terminals using computer-assisted simulated conditions of operation to evaluate performance specifications and

*Richard L. Boylan, Director, IMPACT Program; Vincent C. Campanella, Director, Office of Budget and Management; James J. Carney, Director, Department of Public Safety; William G. Howard, Manager, Data Processing (Edward H. Lehane, Lt., CPD, Project Director after March 1, 1974); and Gerald J. Rademaker, Chief of Police.

characteristics.* The Management Committee wanted to assure themselves that their decision to select the optimal capability left no important issue unexamined. Given the magnitude of the procurement, and the need to accept the longer-term consequences of the equipment selection, such as possible eventual purchase of more of the same manufacturer's terminals, the Management Committee wanted a sound basis upon which to judge the field reliability and performance of each manufacturer's product and maintenance logistics.

The delays therefore which necessitated the foregoing technical thoroughness extended well beyond the original procurement schedule of phase one. On the basis of the contractor results and the field test, the equipment selection was made by the Management Committee at the end of February 1974, eight months after the project began. At this point, contract negotiations began with the successful vendor and plans were made for the installation of the 125 terminals.

However, by the spring of 1974, still a further technical development produced an additional delay. The results from the field tests and evaluation identified the necessity of supplementing the terminals with printer hardware and digital radios to insure better system performance and reliability in the field. A decision therefore was made to reduce the number of terminals from 125 to 100 to compensate for the added hardware costs.

*See the report prepared by Ernst & Ernst, "Response Time Reduction Project Contract #26167," (December 5, 1973), Annot: The report only evaluated the performance qualities of the two terminals. It did not evaluate such operational considerations as mechanical reliability, ease of use, human engineering, and vendor support, all important factors in the selection decision.

In addition, by late 1974, the City's Data Processing Center began to undertake a series of changes in the structure of the computer system supporting the telecommunications network and the file structures of the data base for the CPD operational data. These changes required a number of technical conversions in conjunction with the modification of the Seattle Sea/King Alert System. These changes were estimated to require programming development until the early summer of this year.

While these developments were evolving, 40 terminals were installed in CPD vehicles during the summer months of 1974 and deployed in the field. During any given month, there were an average of 25 terminals operational in CPD patrol cars. On a test basis, after installation of a central processor and other necessary peripherals, some 350,000 messages were processed by the system over the three-month period July-September 1974. By the end of the year, this figure had grown to 1,270,524 messages processed from the State of Ohio law enforcement computer system, LEADS (Law Enforcement Automated Data System), compared to a total of 615,924 messages processed during the same period in 1973, an increase of over 100 percent. While these data are by no means definitive as to the effectiveness of the terminal telecommunications system or the data bases upon which it can draw, it does give some indication of the ability of the system to handle greatly increased volumes of message traffic rapidly and efficiently. These results of course were test results based upon installation of an average of 25 terminals during the last six months of 1974. Once all 100

terminals are operational, the actual field results should be even more impressive.

During the first quarter of 1975, arrangements were made for the CPD to take delivery of the additional 60 terminals, 100 printers, and 100 digital radios.

As noted above, the Sea/King Alert software modification also included changes in the structure of the computer telecommunications system. Specifically, the conversion from the Telecommunications Access Method (TCAM) communications system to the Customer Information Control Storage System (CICS) and from an Operating System (OS) to Virtual Storage (VS) necessitated temporary removal on March 18, 1975 of the terminals which had been installed in vehicles up to that date. During the period that the software conversion was being completed, the project's management group decided that the most prudent "hardware control" procedure would be temporary removal of the terminals.

At the present time, approximately 50 vehicles are equipped with the terminals, including printers and digital radios. An additional 50 cars are scheduled for installation in the near future. Installation in approximately 30 of these vehicles is contingent upon delivery of 30 new police station wagons by early summer. The project management team expects that the Sea/King Alert System software, including the telecommunications

conversion from TCAM to CICS should be operational by early July. At this point, the CPD will begin to appreciate the real impact of the introduction of this new technology into the department's field activities. Until data can be developed during the summer and ensuing months, a complete evaluation cannot be rendered.* However, preliminary data collected during February 1974 on a test basis did give some indication of the system's potentialities.

During the month of February, prior to the removal of the terminals for the telecommunications conversion, the project staff noted that the computer mobile terminal information network received high volume usage by CPD field officers. During February, 1,056 of a total of 8,678 arrests by the CPD were computer-assisted, 5.3 percent of which were mobile terminal assisted. Given the fact that only an estimated 25 percent of the terminals were considered operational in the field during February, these results show great promise with respect to future performance. Once the system is fully operational, and officers become experienced in its effective utilization, the first phase of the Response Time Reduction Project should pay substantial dividends to the CPD in increasing the number of field arrests and in providing much more reliable information in response to queries from the field.

It should be noted that during the month of May of this year, the

*The CPD's management group, working in the City's Data Processing Center, intends to develop a complete set of evaluative reports regarding terminal performance on a regular in-house basis.

project staff began training all superior officers in the utilization of the mobile terminal system. An estimated 320 superior officers in the CPD received training at the Police Academy during May. Plans are now underway to expand this training for all training officers in each platoon. By the time the system is operational in the field, all key officers should be certified to operate the system and to train patrol officers as the terminals are installed in the remaining 50 vehicles.

With completion of phase one of the project later this summer, the CPD will be ready to begin phase two on an in-house basis. The department plans to develop the phase two assignment tracking system in conjunction with its development of the department's record processing, report distribution, and information system. Eventually, completion of phase two should permit the merger of both phases one and two and initiation of more sophisticated computer-assisted dispatching applications.

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

This project represents a major technological innovation for the CPD. Although the project experienced considerable delays in completing the first phase, the decision to undertake extensive software development and conversion to support the mobile terminal telecommunications system insured implementation of a much more effective system. The design of the system has incorporated development and implementation of a transaction file which will enable preparation of detailed management reports to permit incisive

evaluation of system performance once it becomes fully operational in the field later this summer. The CPD and the City's Data Processing Center intend to coordinate development activities very closely in the coming months to insure that the overall capability of the system supports field operations in the high-crime areas of the City. On the basis of the available data, reporting preliminary system results, there is every expectation that the CPD will eventually achieve its goal of reducing response time and improving the effectiveness of patrol operations in the field. In this sense, the Response Time Reduction Project has been a success and should show even greater success, namely, a good return on the investment in the form of more efficient and better documented felony arrests.

SECTION VI
SECURITY PATROL FOR THE ELDERLY

SECTION VI
SECURITY PATROL FOR THE ELDERLY

6.1 PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of this project was to reduce the frequency of occurrence of IMPACT crimes at five estates for the elderly operated by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), by providing an armed, uniformed security patrol. The project was aimed particularly at assaults, burglaries, and robberies -- the offenses constituting the bulk of the serious crime at the CMHA estates.

Originally, this project evolved out of a preliminary effort initiated by the Cleveland IMPACT Cities Program Office, the Mayor's Commission on Aging, and CMHA. The concept proposed creation of a security escort patrol, utilizing non-commissioned high school students from the Model Cities neighborhoods, to escort elderly residents to and from shopping areas and other destinations under the supervision of eight commissioned adult patrolmen. A grant application was prepared which proposed establishment of security escort services in three CMHA estates. The application was submitted on the assumption that the Model Cities Program would provide a substantial cash match to supplement the federal funds sought. However, Model Cities budget limitations precluded this joint venture. Subsequently, the grant application was modified by the IMPACT Office as an exclusively

IMPACT project supplemented by CMHA matching funds. Specifically, the grant application called for security patrols to be provided to five CMHA estates: Addison Square, Cedar, King-Kennedy, Riverview, and Willson, all five of which had been selected because of their locations in high crime areas of the City. Due to the large number of elderly residents (2,051) in the five estates, the escort service idea was determined to be impracticable and the project was designed to provide instead a professional security patrol force.

The revised security patrol was to consist of ten commissioned patrol officers (nine paid for by IMPACT and one by CMHA) and two coordinators.* Five patrol officers were to work, each of two shifts, from 4 p.m. to midnight and from midnight to 8 a.m. At the start of each shift, they would report to the CMHA security office (1441 West 25th Street) where they each picked up a portable radio, building keys, and a three-wheel scooter. The officers used the scooter for transportation to each estate and for patrolling the grounds (including all parking lots and play areas); they also patrolled the interiors of the buildings, on foot. The walking patrol included basements and storage areas. Being equipped with a portable radio, the patrol officer was able to respond to radio instructions from a CMHA field supervisor or the CMHA security officer, and to call for assistance from the CPD or the Fire Department, if needed. In addition,

*Originally, the grant application proposed only eight patrol officers. Subsequently, their number was increased to a projected 10 once operations began.

the officer was required to report to the security office base station by radio at least once per hour.

The two coordinators were originally conceived of as supervisors of the patrol forces, but since the patrol worked nights and the coordinators worked during the day, a modified role for the coordinators was developed. Their main function became liaison between the CMHA Security Department and the ongoing "Resident Guides" program operating in 21 CMHA estates. This program encouraged the formation of groups of concerned elderly residents at each high-rise. The guide members volunteer their services two hours per day to monitor the entrances of their respective buildings. One of the two coordinators was assigned to the East Side Guide Program and the other to the West Side Guide Program. The coordinators were to assist the Guide groups, investigate resident security complaints, gather information on security problems in the buildings, and arrange for other community groups to work with the residents to increase their "sensitivity to safety and security."

After several delays, the one-year project began in July of 1974. Uniforms and equipment for the patrol officers were purchased, desks and telephones were installed in the 21 CMHA estates where Guide programs were in operation, and job applicants were screened. Two male coordinators, three male patrol officers, and three female patrol officers were hired in August and underwent field indoctrination (with both CMHA Security Department personnel and the estate managers) during the first

half of August. An additional four patrol officers (two male, two female) were hired in September, during which time one of the original patrolmen transferred out; a replacement (female) was hired late in September but transferred out in November. Another patrolwoman resigned in March and was replaced by a new hire (male). Thus, as the table below indicates, the project almost fully achieved its goal of employing ten patrol officers with a monthly average of nearly nine on the staff for most of the project period.

SECURITY PATROL OFFICERS

	1974					1975		
	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR
MALE	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	5
FEMALE	3	6	6	5	5	5	5	4
TOTAL	6	10	10	9	9	9	9	9

6.2 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE

This project was justified as an anti-crime project and its grant application set forth ambitious goals for measuring the project's achievements in this regard. The specific objectives were listed as the following:

- To decrease the frequency with which elderly residents of the CMHA estates were victims of assaults, burglaries, and robberies.
- To reduce IMPACT and other crimes by five percent over the project's one-year period.
- To permit identification of suspicious activity and faster notification of the CPD, thereby leading to quicker apprehension of suspects.
- To create and/or encourage more positive attitudes toward authority in general, and toward the law enforcement role in particular.

The achievement of these goals was to be measured by before-after comparisons of crime rates at the five target estates, by comparison with before and after crime rates at other CMHA estates, and by comparison with before and after crime rates in other areas of the City or County having similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics. (No specific ways of measuring changes in residents' attitudes were proposed, nor were any carried out.)

Unfortunately, these worthy evaluation goals could not be assessed, since the necessary data proved to be unobtainable. Neither the CMHA Security Department nor the CPD could provide crime data specifically limited to the estates; the CPD's data extended only to the level of detail of the census tract, and although the CMHA Security Department does keep activity logs, the requisite crime incidence data could not be extracted. After extended

discussions with the IMPACT staff, the CMHA Security Department agreed to provide data on reported crimes, arrests, and clearances occurring at the five estates during the project period. Tables 6-1 and 6-2 summarize the data thus obtained (beginning only in December 1974). No conclusions can be drawn from this very limited set of data, however, because there is no "before" data (or data from other estates) with which to compare it.

In an effort to provide an approximate measure of crime changes in the vicinity of the target estates, the available crime data by census tract were utilized. It should be recognized at the outset that an increase or decrease in crime incidence in a target estate's census tract does not necessarily imply that the same type of change in crime incidence occurred at the target estate itself. Still, it was thought that such a comparison might be better than nothing. Table 6-3 shows the incidence of reported IMPACT and Part I crimes in 1972 (well before the security patrol project) and in 1974 (since the project was in operation during the last five months of 1974), in the census tracts where the 26 CMHA estates* are located. The five target estates located in four census tracts, are listed first, followed by the other 29 estates. In the four tracts containing the target estates, IMPACT crimes increased by 21 percent overall, between 1972 and 1974; however, two of these tracts showed massive increases (of 52 and 102 percent), while one of the other two experienced a modest increase (10 percent) and the fourth had a 10 percent decrease. The other 18 tracts, however, averaged a nearly 37 percent increase, with individual tracts ranging from a 151 percent increase to a 25 percent decrease. Something accounted for the relatively good results in tracts 1125 (where Addison and Willson are located)

*The 27th estate, Apthorp, is located outside the City of Cleveland; consequently, CPD crime data for that census tract (1507) were not available.

TABLE 6-1
CRIME REPORTED AT CMHA TARGET ESTATES

<u>REPORTED CRIMES</u>	<u>1974 DECEMBER</u>	<u>1975 JANUARY</u>	<u>1975 FEBRUARY</u>
Addison			
IMPACT	1	0	0
Other	9	16	4
Cedar			
IMPACT	9	8	3
Other	184	204	38
Woodland			
IMPACT	9	4	5
Other	146	134	55
Willson			
IMPACT	1	2	1
Other	30	52	17
Riverview			
IMPACT	8	1	0
Other	71	38	73
<u>ACTUAL CRIMES</u>			
Addison			
IMPACT	1	0	0
Other	3	1	0
Cedar			
IMPACT	5	8	5
Other	3	3	13
Woodland			
IMPACT	9	1	4
Other	16	15	9
Willson			
IMPACT	1	2	1
Other	0	1	1
Riverview			
IMPACT	1	1	0
Other	3	6	0

TABLE 6-2

ARRESTS AND CLEARANCES AT CMHA TARGET ESTATES

<u>ARRESTS</u>	<u>1974 DECEMBER</u>	<u>1975 JANUARY</u>	<u>1975 FEBRUARY</u>
Addison			
IMPACT	1	0	0
Other	0	1	0
Cedar			
IMPACT	3	3	0
Other	1	3	2
Woodland			
IMPACT	3	0	1
Other	3	1	3
Willson			
IMPACT	0	2	0
Other	0	1	1
Riverview			
IMPACT	0	0	0
Other	3	2	0
<u>CLEARANCES</u>			
Addison			
IMPACT	1	0	0
Other	2	1	0
Cedar			
IMPACT	4	7	4
Other	3	3	8
Woodland			
IMPACT	5	1	4
Other	3	5	4
Willson			
IMPACT	0	2	0
Other	0	1	1
Riverview			
IMPACT	7	1	0
Other	3	5	0

TABLE 6-3

1972-74 CRIME INCIDENCE COMPARISON

CMHA ESTATE	CENSUS TRACT	IMPACT CRIME			PART I CRIME		
		1972	1974	% CHG	1972	1974	% CHG
Addison and Willson	1125	249	223	-10.4	363	328	- 9.6
Cedar	1079	157	239	+52.2	646	719	+11.3
King-Kennedy	1138	203	223	+ 9.8	382	465	+21.7
Riverview	1037	65	131	+101.5	164	247	+50.6
TOTALS:		674	816	+21.1	1555	1759	+13.1
Arrowhead and Carver Park	1089	134	100	-25.4	340	191	-43.8
Beachcrest	1172	69	84	+21.7	209	279	+33.5
Bellaire Gardens	1244	53	85	+60.4	99	139	+40.4
Bohn Towers	1072	36	61	+69.4	186	226	+21.5
Crestview	1057	50	50	0	171	183	+ 7.0
Garden Valley	1147	90	92	+ 2.2	159	196	+23.3
HomeOwnership	1033	97	146	+50.5	251	295	+17.5
Training Center and Lakeview Terr.							
LaRonde	1193	240	434	+80.8	691	799	+15.6
Lorain Square	1236	85	151	+77.6	349	525	+50.4
Manhattan Towers	1047	35	88	+151.4	96	212	+120.8
and Valley View							
Miles Elmerge	1213	104	116	+11.5	187	198	+ 5.9
Mt. Auburn	1202	100	198	+98.0	200	358	+79.0
Outhwaite Homes	1098	113	181	+60.2	250	345	+38.0
PK Denison	1054	51	88	+72.5	154	205	+33.1
Riverside Park	1238	36	47	+30.6	171	273	+59.6
Scranton Castle	1041	76	86	+13.2	205	154	-24.9
Springbrook and Wade	1186	170	239	+40.6	322	479	+48.8
Union Square	1204	273	233	-14.6	429	371	-13.5
TOTALS:		1812	2479	+36.8	4469	5428	+21.5

and 1138 (site of King-Kennedy), but it is not possible to say to what extent the IMPACT Security Patrol, operating in only a limited portion of those tracts and for only 5 of the 12 months of 1974, was responsible for these results.

Similar results hold true for Part I crime, with the four tracts containing the target estates averaging a 13 percent increase, compared with a 22 percent increase for the other 18 tracts. Changes in Part I crime incidence are probably a better indicator of deterrence effects than changes in IMPACT crimes (since a visible patrol force can be expected to deter, for example, simple assaults as well as aggravated assaults). Thus, the Part I comparison deserves to be taken a bit more seriously than the IMPACT crime comparison. It suggests, but most certainly does not prove, that the presence of the IMPACT Security Patrol in the target tracts may have had a slight deterrent effect on crime incidence, resulting in a smaller percentage increase of crime in those tracts than in other similar tracts. It is unfortunate that specific before-after figures on crime incidence at the target estates are not available to confirm or refute this rather subjective conclusion.

6.3 CONCLUSIONS

This project deployed nine security patrol officers to patrol five CMHA estates for the elderly, during the evening and night shifts. It also provided coordinators to work with the residents' Guide associations to monitor entrances at 21 CMHA estates. No measures are available to determine if the project led to a reduction in crimes committed at the estates or in

victimization of elderly estate residents. However, the average increase in crime between 1972 and 1974 was somewhat less in the set of census tracts containing the five patrolled estates than it was in the set of census tracts containing the other CMHA estates.

It is difficult to quarrel with this project's objectives of reducing the victimization of the elderly and reducing their fear of crime. It is quite possible that this project has achieved these goals to some extent. The problem lies not with the project, per se, but with the difficulty in developing the required sets of geographic-specific data which were commensurable. Specifically, the lack of any sort of baseline ("before") data on crime incidence at the target estates severely limited what could be measured. This should provide a lesson for the design of future projects of this type. If their justification rests on achievement of some specific objective (such as reducing crime), then care must be taken, well before the project is begun, to ensure that the data required for evaluation are available. In the case of crime reduction projects, this especially includes crime incidence data for a reasonable period (e.g., at least one year) prior to the beginning of the project. It must also be recognized that both data collection (during the project) and data extraction (from records of prior years) can be time-consuming, costly aspects of a project. These costs must be estimated and included in the grant application's proposed budget.

SECTION VII

IMPACT STREETLIGHTING PROJECT

SECTION VII

7.1 IMPACT STREETLIGHTING PROJECT DESCRIPTION

This section presents the final evaluation of the IMPACT Streetlighting Project since the project began in July 1973.

This project is one of 10 contained within the Deterrence, Detection and Apprehension Operating Program of the Cleveland IMPACT Anti-Crime Program, and was one of the last projects to get underway.

The project initially was divided into three phases; Phase I, Survey of Areas and Particular Power Sources; Phase II, Competitive Procurement; and Phase III, Installation. The project was originally scheduled for completion in June, 1974. However, due to delays in the grant award process, and in the performance of the efforts required for each of the three phases, the completion schedule was extended for an additional 12 months.

The purpose of the project was to provide better streetlighting in selected East Side, Downtown, and West Side high crime areas and in the areas surrounding the 21 Intervention and Development (I&D) Centers of the City in an effort to reduce the number of IMPACT offenses committed in those areas. To accomplish this overall goal, a grant was awarded to the City of Cleveland in July, 1973 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The grant award committed \$300,000 (the LEAA share) and

\$65,000 cash match from the City* to support the purchase and installation of 850 mercury vapor floodlights, 500 mercury vapor streetlights, and 600 light poles.**

Implementation of the project was under the auspices of the Division of Light and Power, Department of Utilities, of the City of Cleveland. Basically, the project was carried out in accordance with the methods proposed in the original and revised grant applications. The following discussion describes the three phases set forth in the original grant; the revised version of the grant simply combined Phases I and II because it made the timetable for implementation more practical. (See Section II, Performance and Management Status, for a more detailed description.)

Specifically, the Phase I efforts included the hiring of two engineers and an administrative assistant to perform the site analyses, the drafting and layout tasks, the specification preparation, and the assumption of the administrative and fiscal reporting responsibilities. The Phase II efforts included the preparation of a request for proposal for the purpose of selecting a qualified independent contractor to assist the Department of Utilities in the Phase III

* The required cash match was \$40,000; the additional amount of \$25,000 was set aside to cover a portion of the independent contractor's contract. Of course, any unexpended funds from this account are to be returned to the Department.

** See Grant Number 73-DF-05-0022 dated July 1, 1973, and the approved Grant Adjustment Notice (GAN) dated November 1, 1973, for additional information on the distribution of floodlights, streetlights and poles, and the breakdown of LEAA funds and grantee contribution.

installation efforts. The Phase III efforts included tasks to be conducted by staff members from both the Department and the contractor to replace the existing relatively low-light level incandescent lights in the high crime areas with the more efficient, six times higher intensity (400 and 480 watt) mercury vapor streetlights, inclusive of additional luminary components. In addition, new poles and mercury vapor streetlights and floodlights were to be installed in the vicinity of and on the grounds of the Intervention and Development (I&D) Centers located throughout the City.

Before proceeding with the management and performance status of the project, it would be helpful to provide some background information on the accomplishments of streetlighting projects in other parts of the United States. The specific purpose for the discussion which follows is to place into perspective the IMPACT Program staff's view on the extent to which an evaluation for this type of a project should be executed.

One of the most widely publicized high intensity streetlighting projects began in Washington, D. C. in 1969 when that city actively engaged in a war on crime. By the close of 1971, over 6,000 high pressure sodium discharge lamps and fixtures had been installed at an estimated cost of over one million dollars. The total plan called for converting some 30 percent of the city's total lighting to the high pressure sodium discharge units by the end of 1972, and eventually, converting the entire city's street lighting at

an estimated cost of over 10 million dollars. Ample evidence exists that high levels of street lighting have been a most significant factor in that successful attack on crime in Washington, D. C.

Cities such as New York, Gary, Savannah, Plainfield, Louisville, Kansas City and many others also have experienced similar significant reductions in crime, especially in assaults, murder, and rape. Some of these cities have used rigorous methods to test the hypothesis of the reduction in nighttime crime attributable to improved lighting projects with varying analytical results. Kansas City and Portland provide two illustrative examples. Kansas City has used test and control sites in order to make before and after comparisons of the extent to which improved lighting affected night street crime. The results of the Kansas City study demonstrate that street lighting can be an effective crime prevention technique; however, the Kansas City results should be qualified insofar as there were strong indications of crime displacement to other areas.* In the second instance, the preliminary results of the Portland Lighting Project indicated that virtually no evidence was detected on the issue of whether or not the lighting project reduced crime in the areas of improved lighting.**

* See National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ) grants 71-132, 72-0020, and 73-0046.

** These findings were presented while the installation of the lights was approximately 30 percent complete, and the study did not account for (1) other resources which may have been operating in the control and or test areas such as changes in patrol activity, or (2) possible changes in pedestrian and motor traffic, or (3) possible changes in lighting in nearby areas. See "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Portland Lighting Project" prepared under NILECJ grant number 74-NI-10-0002

These two examples of a rigorous statistical analysis to determine the effects of improved lighting tend to show distinctively different results and it is hard to explain why these apparent differences exist.* Despite these differences, all of the projects in the cities mentioned here have at least two things in common which help to give the public a greater sense of security in the streets and in their parks: (1) The noticeable reduction of violent crimes (2) the reduction of the fear of these violent crimes in the minds of the citizenry. It is basically for these two reasons that the Cleveland IMPACT Streetlighting Project was proposed.

Because this project represents one of the last to be implemented by the IMPACT Anti-Crime Program, the effort required to conduct a rigorous statistically-significant evaluation design was deemed infeasible by the IMPACT staff. The evaluation can take into account, however, before and after comparisons of crime by census tract on a month-to-month basis for the period beginning immediately preceding most lighting installations and for a period shortly thereafter. However, the staff does not anticipate making any attempt to draw conclusive inferences from the 1974-1975 data as to what extent the improved

* Many studies have shown that sudden increases in resources, either manpower or equipment or a combination of both, have had the tendency to decrease crime for a while in the areas in which the resources are applied, but then, once the criminal element becomes accustomed to the new situation, their activities in the areas resume. This often happens when better lights are installed; crime decreases for a while, but then returns to its previous levels. See James Q. Wilson, "Do the Police Prevent Crime?", THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, pp. 18-19 and 96-101, (October 6, 1974).

lighting produced a decrease (or increase) in crime, or the fear of crime, in the areas in which the lighting had been installed.

7.2 PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT STATUS

The IMPACT Streetlighting Project has encountered numerous fiscal and administrative problems since the grant award in July, 1973. The project actually did not get underway until September, 1973, because of the time required to recruit and hire two engineers who possessed the necessary qualifications and experience, and to assign an administrative assistant. The initial problems focused on the schedule of events to be accomplished and the rise in costs of the poles and luminary components. These two problems were responsible principally for the submission of a Grant Adjustment Notice (GAN) which was approved by the LEAA Chicago Regional Office in November, 1973.

The problem of scheduling the activities was first brought to the attention of the IMPACT staff in late September, 1973 just after the project personnel had outlined a display map indicating the Division's jurisdiction in the high crime areas and the areas around the (I&D) Centers. The subsequent analyses of the areas and centers to be served pointed out that in order to finish the entire drafting and layout procedure, the project would have to be extended far beyond its expected termination date. A meeting was arranged between the Division personnel and IMPACT staff to explore feasible and practical alternatives to this problem. The outcome resulted in a decision to process a GAN which would reflect a phase breakdown as follows: (1) the drafting and layout procedure

would be accomplished by the electrical engineers of the Department, while the installation of the lights at the 21 I&D Centers would be accomplished by the work crews of the Department; and (2) the drafting and layout of specifications and placements by the electrical engineers and, later, the release of competitive bidding on the specifications to independent contractors whose responsibility would encompass the installation of the lights in the high-crime and downtown areas. Other factors which entered into this decision to emphasize the higher priority given to the I&D Centers were (1) the high incidence of vandalism, (2) the increase in the use of the Centers during the nighttime hours, and (3) the numerous complaints by citizens living near the Centers, who were concerned about the safety of their children. This latter point became so acute that even Councilmen expressed interest in improvement of the lighting at the I&D Centers.

The problem of rising equipment costs principally was due to the increase in the cost of wood poles and the labor costs for the installation and removal of poles. For example, the cost of wood poles had reached an unprecedented high representing a 60 percent inflationary increase over the original costs budgeted for poles. In addition to this increase, the costs for transformers, brackets, and other luminary equipment also rose considerably. As a consequence, the GAN proposed at the meeting and approved in November, 1973 as noted above, effected a change in the originally estimated number of poles and lights to be purchased as follows:

1. Poles - from 600 to 124 (of course, existing poles were used to accommodate the increase in streetlights and floodlights);
2. Streetlights - from 500 to 588; and
3. Floodlights - from 850 to 378.

Other problems were encountered in the bidding process and in the purchasing of the equipment which also accounted for more delays in the projected timetable. These delays in conjunction with the concentration of activities initially on the survey work for the I&D Centers further aggravated the timetable such that the project completion date had to be extended by eight months, specifically until June, 1975. This extension was requested by the IMPACT Program Office in June, 1974 and subsequently approved by the LEAA Chicago Regional Office.

The survey work for the I&D Centers and the high crime areas was completed in April, 1974, and installation began in May, 1974. At the end of August, 1974, the work efforts had been completed pursuant to work orders which were issued by the Division of Light and Power for 11 of the I&D Centers. Work orders for these Intervention and Development Centers initially were mixed in with other Division work orders and were accomplished as maintenance crews became available. Despite some early delays, the installation phase progressed in accordance to the most recently revised timetable, i. e. all installations were accomplished by June, 1975.

Drawings and specifications were developed and released to bid in April, 1974. An independent electrical contractor was awarded a contract by the City in August, 1974 and all work by the contractor (i. e. installation of 89 poles, 572 streetlights, 279 floodlights and various other streetlighting equipment) progressed in accordance with the schedule).

Even though the project had been plagued with a number of administrative and fiscal problems, many of which have impacted on the original operational objectives and the time frame in which these objectives would be met, the Department met the revised objectives and timetable. As problems arose, the project personnel brought them to the attention of the IMPACT staff so that alternative courses of action could be explored in order to find the most viable solution. In addition, the coordination with and the cooperation of (1) the Law Department in the competitive bidding phase, (2) the Office of Budget and Management in finding appropriate cash match, and (3) the Commissioner of Recreation and his staff in expediting the installation of lights in the I&D Centers, has demonstrated that overall City resources on complex operational and organizational matters can be brought to bear.

In the December, 1974 evaluation report, three recommendations were made. The first recommendation was directed at expediting the work orders pertaining to the replacement of old lighting and the installation of the new lighting in the high crime areas and at the I&D Centers. Since the schedule pursuant to the GAN dated June, 1974 has been adhered to and all of the lights have been installed and energized as of this writing, it must therefore be concluded that this recommendation has been satisfactorily addressed.

The second recommendation pertained to the analysis of needs in the

downtown area. A determination has been made by the Division of Light and Power that the downtown street lighting, as it now configured, provides sufficient illumination. Even though this illumination exceeds the national average for lighting, the Division did decide to install nine of the new floodlights in the downtown area at Ontario Street and Lakeside Avenue.

The third recommendation was directed at the collection of monthly IMPACT crime data* for certain of the census tracts in which improved lighting took place, and for certain other groups of census tracts, (which received no new lighting) around those with improved lighting. The data was then to be analyzed in order to ascertain if any noticeable changes in crime could be accounted for by the installation of the lights. This recommendation has been addressed but since the majority of the lights were installed, and energized, between January, 1975, and May, 1975, it is too soon to determine any noticeable changes. However, a preliminary method was developed and a discussion of this is presented below. Before proceeding with that discussion, it is desirable to orient the reader with a brief overview of the City's high crime areas and to display where the lights were installed.

The IMPACT staff has been analyzing crime by geographical area for about two years. The analysis provides specific observations with respect

* Monthly crime specific data by census tract has only been available since June, 1974; therefore, no baseline data is possible for preceding years and month-to-month comparison is the only practical approach to undertake. It must be kept in mind, however, that the geographical area of observation, i. e. census tract, is probably too large an area to relate to an increase or decrease in crime trends. The ideal analysis should take into account the entire census tract and the geographical areas immediately in the vicinity where the lights were installed. This type of analysis, of course, means a significant increase in data collection and it is questionable if it would be of any value as mentioned in Section I above.

to shifting crime incidence by a particular type of crime by census tract. Figure 7-1 shows the fifty census tracts with the highest IMPACT crime in 1974. Figure 7-2 displays the census tracts in which improved lighting has taken place. As can be seen, the tracts in which improved lighting occurred closely parallel the top 50 high crime tracts. In fact, 33 of the 46 census tracts which received improved lighting are in the top 50 high crime tracts for 1974. In addition, a review of the top 50 high crime census tracts for the first quarter (January through March) 1975, reveals that 36 of the 46 lighted tracts are in the top 50 high crime tracts. As it turns out, the three additional tracts which account for this during the first quarter of 1975 contain I&D Centers,* further strengthening the issue of citizen complaint noted earlier.

Tables 1 and 2 list a group or cluster of census tracts where lights were installed and a nearby group in which lights were not. The tables also present the total number of IMPACT offenses by census tract for 1972 and 1974, and the calculated percent change over that time frame. In addition, the IMPACT crime incidence for the first quarter of 1975 is compared to the incidence of IMPACT crime in 1972 and 1974 also by quarter.

* The three Centers and tracts are: (1) Fasino on Detroit Avenue (C. T. 1012); Central on Central Avenue (C. T. 1093); and (3) Woodland on Woodland Avenue (C. T. 1144).




FIGURE 7-1
FIFTY CENSUS TRACTS WITH HIGHEST CRIME - 1974




FIGURE 7-2
CENSUS TRACTS WITH IMPROVED LIGHTING

TABLE 1
 IMPACT CRIME BY CENSUS TRACT
 (CENSUS TRACTS WITH IMPROVED
 LIGHTING)

Census Tract	1972	1974	% Change Δ	One Qtr '72 vs/ One Qtr '75			One Qtr '74 vs/ One Qtr '75		
				72	75	Δ	74	75	Δ
1075	8	37	+362.5	2.0	20	+800	9.3	20	+115
1086	23	71	+208.7	5.8	23	+297	17.8	23	+29.2
1093	59	65	+ 10.2	14.8	41	+177	16.3	41	+151
1129	137	124	- 9.5	34.3	60	+ 74.9	31.0	60	+93.5
1098	75	108	+ 44.0	21.3	45	+111	24.5	45	+83.6

TABLE 2

IMPACT CRIME BY CENSUS TRACT

(Census Tracts with no new lighting)

Census Tract	1972	1974	% Change (Δ)	One Quarter 1972 vs. One Quarter 1975			One Quarter 1974 vs. One Quarter 1975		
				'72	'75	Δ	'74	'75	Δ
1082	14	19	+35.7	3.5	19	+443	4.8	19	+296
1083	35	28	-20.0	8.8	10	+13.6	7.0	10	+42.9
1084	27	49	+81.5	6.8	22	+236	12.3	22	+78.9
1085	43	40	- 7.0	10.8	20	+85.2	10.0	20	+100
1087	85	64	-24.7	21.3	25	+17.4	16.0	25	+56.3
1089	79	78	- 1.3	19.8	20	+ 1.0	19.5	20	+ 2.6

TABLE 3

Lighted Crime Tracts, Rank, and Installation Date

Census Tract	Top Fifty High Crime Tracts	Installation Date
1075		May, 1975
1086		March, 1975
1093	X	December, 1973
1129	X	April, 1975
1098	X	May, 1975

As can be seen, crime in both of these clusters rose appreciably between 1972 and 1974. The quarterly comparison shows that the rise in crime is still sharply upward.

Table 3 lists the census tracts which received improved lighting, shows whether or not each is contained within the top 50 high crime tracts, and gives the date of installation and energization or turn on. Only one census tract (1093) has been in any length of time. The installation consisted of four new floodlights and affected only the Central Avenue I&D Center portion of the census tract. Even though this census tract exhibits extremely high quarterly percent changes in crime in the positive/upward direction, no conclusions can be drawn about the effects of improved lighting at the I&D Center except that the lighting enhanced the recreational area.

The preceding figures and tables provide a method for before and after comparisons by geographic area. However, in the absence of controlled experiments in which the effects of all other factors (i.e. patrolling in the area, changes in bicycle or automobile traffic patterns, changes in socio-economic conditions, etc.) influencing crime incidence can be estimated, the best that can be hoped for is to observe any noticeable affects in the immediate area of concern. Unfortunately, in the above discussion, the geographical area of concern is the entire census tract while the lighted area is only a recreational facility. This type of analysis might be better applied to those census tracts which received a higher proportionate

illumination (in terms of watts) when compared to the total wattage in the census tract. It must be borne in mind, however, that the census tract selection process should be carefully considered. That is, narrow the selection to only those census tracts which have had the greatest increase in illumination and if possible to those immediate areas either within the census tract or those external to it depending upon whether or not the lighting installations cross census tract boundaries.

7.3 CONCLUSIONS

The IMPACT Streetlighting Project, after a slow start, achieved its operational objectives as set forth in the revised grant application. The Project was able to install a total of 1090 units. Of the 1090 units installed, 89 of the 124 poles, 572 of the 588 streetlights, and 279 of the 378 floodlights, were installed in the high crime areas; the remainder were installed near or on the grounds of the I&D Centers.

SECTION VIII
IMPACT AWARENESS

SECTION VIII

IMPACT AWARENESS

8.1 IMPACT AWARENESS DESCRIPTION

The objectives of the IMPACT Awareness project were presented in Table 1.2.7, and are restated below:

- Acquaint the public with both the goals and objectives, and the services of the Cleveland IMPACT Program;
- Provide information on specific steps citizens could take to minimize their risk of victimization in IMPACT crimes; and
- Produce a spirit of police-community cooperation.

To accomplish these objectives, the IMPACT Program executed a contract on June 1, 1974, with Carlton & Douglas Advertising, a firm experienced in mass media advertising and located in the City of Cleveland.

Carlton & Douglas immediately began educating its staff members to a full understanding of the IMPACT Program goals and objectives to ensure that the mass media campaign to promote IMPACT awareness would be effective. Staff met with IMPACT personnel, reviewed available IMPACT materials and documentation, and developed the basic concepts to be put forth in the campaign. Within the first two months of the project, Carlton & Douglas had designed the campaign materials and had developed the distribution plan for these materials. IMPACT awareness was implemented in earnest in October 1974, and continued through May 1975. The following subsections explain the specific activities performed by Carlton & Douglas Advertising and discuss their success in achieving the project objectives.

8.2 MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE

The mass media campaign designed by Carlton & Douglas sought to reach every citizen of the City of Cleveland. The campaign was, therefore, quite broadbased. Media employed included general and limited circulation newspapers, a local magazine, radio and television, transit advertising, billboards, and direct mailing. The materials presented through these media were aimed toward (1) increasing citizen confidence in the police as the "best defense against crime," and (2) increasing citizen awareness of home and self-protection through simple crime prevention techniques.

The police-oriented theme generally was expressed by a picture of an "alerted" police car and the IMPACT logo on a bright yellow background. The presentation, which is shown in Figure 8-1, was simple and striking. It was used on billboards, transit posters and display posters throughout the IMPACT Awareness campaign.

The campaign theme of citizen self-protection was expressed primarily through brochures which presented a quiz on self-protection awareness. The quiz is shown in Figure 8-2. The outside of the brochure (Figure 8-2A) explained that the IMPACT Program was fighting crime in Cleveland and that citizens could help by making it difficult for criminals to operate successfully. Inside the brochure (Figure 8-2B) was an instructive quiz for citizens to take. The brochures were distributed in a variety of ways to achieve maximum coverage of Cleveland's citizenry.





FIGURE 8-1

POLICE ORIENTED IMPACT AWARENESS THEME

Take this test to see if you're
playing it safe against crime

IMPACT City of
Cleveland
A plan against crime

Ralph J. Perk, Mayor
Richard L. Boylan, Director



Richard L. Boylan,
Director, Cleveland Impact Program

Impact is a program that has been fighting crime in Cleveland. We'd like to tell you about it. The whole idea is for the citizens of Cleveland to take steps to make it more difficult for criminals to operate successfully. This test has been prepared for you so you can see how you score in avoiding crime. If you pass the test there's a good chance that you'll be passed up by crime.

FIGURE 8-2A

AWARENESS BROCHURE (COVER)

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ Do you have good locks on your doors and windows, and do you use them?
- ☐ ☐ Are you aware that an open, empty garage is the number one tip-off to a burglar that no one is home?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep alert to strangers in the neighborhood, and do you report suspicious persons or activities to the police?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid admitting strangers into your home unless you are absolutely sure who they are?
- ☐ ☐ Are you careful to never tell strangers, including telephone callers, that you are home alone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid putting your address on wedding, obituary, or other public notices?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep your money and valuables in the bank, instead of leaving them in your home?
- ☐ ☐ Have you protected your property by participating in *Operation Identification*, sponsored by the Cleveland Police Department?

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid walking alone at night?
- ☐ ☐ Do you stay alert to what's going on around you when driving down city streets?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep your windows rolled up and all doors locked when driving your car?
- ☐ ☐ Are you sure to never pick up a hitchhiker and to never be a hitchhiker?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid unattended parking lots and parking buildings during the hours when few people are using them?
- ☐ ☐ Do you stay away from vacant and vandalized buildings, both day and night?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid shortcuts and isolated areas when walking alone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you check bus schedules in order to avoid waiting alone at bus stops and transit stations at night?
- ☐ ☐ Are you careful to guard your purse, both when carrying it and when setting it down in public places?
- ☐ ☐ Do you carry your wallet in an inside pocket rather than in your back pocket?

100 Questions

100 Questions

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ If you become a crime victim, would you report the incident?
- ☐ ☐ Would you prosecute and testify in court as a victim or a witness of a crime?
- ☐ ☐ If you become a victim, or a witness to a crime, would you be able to give a good description of the criminal to the police?
- ☐ ☐ Do you have police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency numbers by your telephone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid talking to strangers about details of your life, such as where you live and work or your income and possessions?
- ☐ ☐ Do you vary your day-to-day routines, such as banking or leaving your home unoccupied for extended periods?
- ☐ ☐ Have you taught your children how to act cautiously in avoiding crime and how to react should they be confronted?

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ Do you make arrangements to have your newspaper and mail deliveries discontinued and your yard taken care of while you are on vacation?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid discussing your vacation plans in public?
- ☐ ☐ Do you wait to place society notices in the newspaper until after you have returned from your trip?
- ☐ ☐ Do you notify police and neighbors when you are leaving and returning so that they can pay special attention to your home while you are away?
- ☐ ☐ Do you take the time and effort to keep an eye on your neighbors' house when they are on vacation?
- ☐ ☐ When visiting a different city, are you alert and aware of potential dangers there?

FIGURE 2-2B

AWARENESS BROCHURE (INSIDE)

The more questions you have been able to answer with a "yes", the better your chance of never experiencing the victim of a crime. Share this test with your family and friends and help IMPACT make Cleveland the safest city in the country.

8.2.1 ACTIVITY STATISTICS

The materials and distribution media used in the Awareness campaign are briefly outlined in annotated format.

- Brochures and Phone Stickers/Self-Protection Theme
 - Distributed to City Council members, selected public schools and PTA Presidents, Outreach Centers, and selected community organizations (1,000)
 - Mailed in quantity to those listed above upon request (22,000)
 - Mailed in response to coupon in newspaper ad (600)
 - Mailed in response to requests stemming from TV spots (300)
 - Direct mail campaign to randomly selected Cleveland addresses (150,000)
 - Distributed to Police Outreach Centers (35,000)
- Brochures - Protect Your Home
 - Distributed to City Council members (6,000)
- Billboards - "Call Your Best Defense Against Crime"
 - 24-sheet Boards, displayed for four months each (90 Boards) (cost of \$5,132, advertising value of \$31,150). Carlton & Douglas purchased two weeks of billboard space for 66 displays immediately after Christmas, at the beginning of a period of traditionally low demand for outdoor advertising. A total of 90 IMPACT boards actually were displayed and all remained up until space demand increased -- a period of four months. Thus, the campaign purchased 66 boards for one month's display, and actually received 90 boards which were displayed for four months. Table 8-1 shows the locations for the 66 purchased displays. As the table shows, the boards were located throughout the City, and all but four of the displays were illuminated boards.
- Signs - "Call Your Best Defense Against Crime"
 - 8-1/2" x 11" signs (2,100)

TABLE 8-1

AWARENESS BILLBOARD LOCATIONS

<u>STREET</u>	<u>CROSS STREET</u>	<u>ILLUMINATED</u>
Abbey	West 24th	Yes
Bellaire	Guardian	Yes
Berea	Lakewood Heights	Yes
Broadview	West 22d	Yes
Broadway	East 34th	Yes
Broadway	Harvard	Yes
Brookpark	West 27th	Yes
Brookpark	West 164th	Yes
Carnegie	East 70th	Yes
Cedar	East 36th	Yes
Cedar	East 79th	Yes
Columbus	Franklin	No
Denison	West 58th	Yes
Detroit	West 28th	Yes
West Shoreway	West 32d	Yes
Detroit	West 81st	Yes
Detroit	Berea	Yes
East 4th	Scranton	Yes
East 9th	Eagle	Yes
East 18th	Chester	Yes
East 55th	Chester	Yes
East 55th	McBride	Yes
East 79th	Colfax	Yes
East 93d	Ramona	Yes
East 93d	Union	Yes
East 105th	Hampden	Yes
East 105th	Wilbur	Yes
East 116th	Benham	Yes
East 152d	St. Clair	Yes
Euclid	East 75th	Yes
Euclid	Wayside	Yes
Harvard	East 116th	Yes
Huron	West 3d	Yes
Lake Shore	East 140th	No
Lee	Miles	Yes
Lorain	West 76th	Yes
Lorain	Denison	Yes
Lorain	West 130th	Yes
Madison	West 61st	Yes

TABLE 8-1 (Continued)

<u>STREET</u>	<u>CROSS STREET</u>	<u>ILLUMINATED</u>
Miles	East 131th	Yes
Miles	East 139th	Yes
Miles	Wyatt	Yes
Payne	East 27th	Yes
Pittsburg	East 30th	No
Prospect	East 46th	Yes
Puritas	West 160th	Yes
Quincy	East 105th	Yes
Ridge	Brookside	Yes
St. Clair	Glenside	Yes
St. Clair	East 176th	Yes
St. Clair	East 186th	Yes
Scranton	Train	Yes
State	Coburn	Yes
Superior	East 24th	Yes
Superior	East 115th	Yes
Triskett	West 140th	Yes
Unior	East 113th	Yes
West 25th	Franklin	Yes
West 25th	Columbus	Yes
West 73d	Denison	Yes
West 130th	Gilmore	Yes
West 140th	Lorain	Yes
Woodland	East 58th	Yes
Woodland	East 79th	Yes
Woodland	East 89th	No
Woodland	East 127th	Yes

- Transit Posters

- 21" x 144" Side Posters, one year (120 posters)
- 21" x 72" Taillight Displays (60 posters)
- 11" x 28" Inside Bulletins (500 posters)

- Magazine Ad

- Full page black and white ads in Cleveland Magazine (monthly readership of 41,000) in October, November, and December. The copy for these ads is shown in Figures 8-3 and 8-4.

- Newspaper Ad

- One-half page double truck black and white ad, one time, in The Press.
- Small coupon ad, 11 times, in The Press.
- One-half page double truck black and white ad, one time, in The Call and Post, a newspaper oriented toward the Black community.

- TV Features*

- One general 30 second spot and two 30 second spots on protection tips, total of 360 showings between March 24 and May 4, 1975. Spots continue as public service messages. (No cost to IMPACT to show.)

TOTAL DISTRIBUTION: 217,000

The total estimated dollar value of the foregoing IMPACT media exposure is estimated to be over three-times the actual costs expended.

This value derives particularly from the added benefits of the billboard, bus card, newspaper/magazine, and television advertising. The following subsections discuss the ways in which the activities described above addressed the IMPACT Awareness project objectives.

*Carlton & Douglas staff visited area TV stations at the beginning of the Awareness campaign to acquaint staff with the program. These visits resulted in a number of TV features on area crime and in the appearance of IMPACT personnel on highly rated local programs. These features and appearances were the result of station interest, and were without cost to the IMPACT program.

Who says Cleveland is a safer place to live?

Richard L. Boylan,


Director, Cleveland Impact Program



"Cleveland is safer because Impact is attacking crime on all levels—placing 188 additional police officers on the streets, expanding the city's recreational programs, and implementing many rehabilitation and youth directed activities by working with such agencies as the Salvation Army, Big Brothers, Boys Clubs, PAL, and The Seventh Step Foundation."

Gerald J. Rademaker,

Chief, Cleveland Police Department



"According to 1973 FBI statistics, Cleveland has experienced a major reduction in serious crimes. Much of this success is attributable to the reorganization of the police department involving the creation of specialized units and intensification of patrol activity."

IMPACT City of
Cleveland
A plan against crime

FIGURE 8-3

AWARENESS AD, CLEVELAND MAGAZINE

Take this test to see if you're playing it safe against crime.

Impact is a program that has been fighting crime in Cleveland. We'd like to tell you about it. The whole idea is for the citizens of Cleveland to take steps to make it more difficult for criminals to operate successfully. This test has been prepared for you so you can see how you score in avoiding crime. If you pass the test there's a good chance that you'll be passed up by crime.

Around Home

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ Do you have good locks on your doors and windows, and do you use them?
- ☐ ☐ Are you aware that an open, empty garage is the number one tip-off to a burglar that no one is home?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep alert to strangers in the neighborhood, and do you report suspicious persons or activities to the police?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid admitting strangers into your home unless you are absolutely sure who they are?
- ☐ ☐ Are you careful to never tell strangers, including telephone callers, that you are home alone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid putting your address on wedding, obituary, or other public notices?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep your money and valuables in the bank, instead of leaving them in your home?
- ☐ ☐ Have you protected your property by participating in Operation Identification, sponsored by the Cleveland Police Department?

On the Street

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid walking alone at night?
- ☐ ☐ Do you stay alert to what's going on around you when driving down city streets?
- ☐ ☐ Do you keep your windows rolled up and all doors locked when driving your car?
- ☐ ☐ Are you sure to never pick up a hitchhiker and to never be a hitchhiker?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid unattended parking lots and parking buildings during the hours when few people are using them?
- ☐ ☐ Do you stay away from vacant and vandalized buildings, both day and night?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid shortcuts and isolated areas when walking alone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you check bus schedules in order to avoid waiting alone at bus stops and transit stations at night?
- ☐ ☐ Are you careful to guard your purse, both when carrying it and when setting it down in public places?
- ☐ ☐ Do you carry your wallet in an inside pocket rather than in your back pocket?

In General

YES NO

- ☐ ☐ If you become a crime victim, would you report the incident?
- ☐ ☐ Would you prosecute and testify in court as a victim or a witness of a crime?
- ☐ ☐ If you become a victim, or a witness to a crime, would you be able to give a good description of the criminal to the police?
- ☐ ☐ Do you have police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency numbers by your telephone?
- ☐ ☐ Do you avoid talking to strangers about details of your life, such as where you live and work or your income and possessions?
- ☐ ☐ Do you vary your day-to-day routines, such as banking or leaving your home unoccupied for extended periods?
- ☐ ☐ Have you taught your children how to act cautiously in avoiding crime and how to react should they be confronted?

The more questions you have been able to answer with a "yes", the better your chance of never becoming the victim of a crime. Share this test with your family and friends and help IMPACT make Cleveland the safest city in the Nation.

IMPACT City of
Cleveland
A plan against crime

FIGURE 8-4

AWARENESS AD, CLEVELAND MAGAZINE

Ralph J. Perk, Mayor
Richard L. Boylan, Director

8.2.2 INCREASED CITIZEN AWARENESS OF THE IMPACT PROGRAM

This objective was addressed by all material disseminated by the Awareness Campaign. As can be seen in the Figures presented above, the IMPACT logo was displayed prominently on all materials. Text accompanying the informative materials furthered IMPACT awareness by explaining, in straightforward terms, what the Program was trying to accomplish and the methods which were being employed to fight crime.

The fact that citizen awareness was increased is evidenced by the large number of requests received by the IMPACT office for additional educational materials. As mentioned in subsection 8.2.1, above, nearly 23,000 pieces of literature and as many phone stickers have been mailed to date in response to the requests. Although many of the requests were from organizations, a large number of requests was received from private citizens.

The random mailing to 150,000 Cleveland homes of Awareness literature was the last activity of the project and has just been implemented. Therefore, response to that mailing, in terms of requests for additional literature, cannot be assessed. However, the mailing in itself certainly addressed the awareness objective directly.

8.2.3 PROVIDE CRIME PREVENTION INFORMATION

This objective was addressed by one of the major Awareness Campaign themes. Figures 8-2 and 8-4, it will be recalled, are examples of the ways in which specific prevention and deterrence suggestions were relayed

to Cleveland's citizens. Further prevention techniques were explained in the "Protect Your Home" brochure, developed as a result of the IMPACT Public Information Project.

The information contained in these materials was disseminated through ads and by the mailings described in the subsection above. The quantity of material distributed indicates that this objective was achieved.

8.2.4 PRODUCE A SPIRIT OF POLICE-COMMUNITY COOPERATION

This objective also was addressed by a major campaign theme -- "Call Your Best Defense Against Crime." Achievement of the objective can be assessed only in terms of increased citizen willingness to interact positively with the police. Such willingness, in turn, can be measured only by increased crime reporting and increased cooperation of witnesses to crimes. A sophisticated data base of the type necessary to measure increased crime reporting and witness cooperation does not exist, and these measures thus cannot be made.

However, the project certainly achieved a high level of citizen exposure to the police-oriented poster which encouraged community cooperation with the police. Insofar as the broad coverage reflects on success of the project, this objective was achieved.

8.3 CONCLUSIONS

Although the objectives of the IMPACT Awareness project were not quantifiable, and thus their achievement could not be measured explicitly, the project was successful in accomplishing what it set out to do.

The citizens of Cleveland received a high level of exposure to Awareness material, and the campaign was structured to ensure that this exposure was inclusive of all components of the community. The materials were simply and strikingly designed, and were presented in a straightforward manner; again, to ensure acceptability by the general population. The quantity of material distributed in response to citizen requests indicates that awareness in fact was achieved.

END

7 11/25/1964