


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AN EVALUATION REPORT OF THE **WORCESTER CRIME IMPACT PROGRAM**

prepared for the
**Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Committee on Criminal Justice**

by
**Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.
Cambridge, Massachusetts**

James M. Tien, Phd., Project Director
Richard C. Larson, Phd., Special Advisor

Joseph B. Green
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
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SEPTEMBER 1975

PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED BY ALFRED C. HOLLAND, STATE PURCHASING AGENT.



Public Systems Evaluation, Inc.

A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION

Dr. R. C. Larson, President
Mr. G. C. Larson, Vice President & Treasurer
Dr. K. W. Colton, Vice President
Dr. J. M. Tien, Vice President

August 16, 1976

Points of view or opinions stated in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice.

Mr. Geoffrey Alprin
National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice
LEAA
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Alprin:

Recently Public Systems Evaluation, Inc. (PSE) completed an evaluation of the Worcester, Massachusetts Impact Program, an on-going effort which has been funded by the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice. Operating at a level of over half a million dollars per year, this rather large program includes an innovative use of civilians (police service aides, or PSA's), in police work. Among other activities, PSA's patrol in marked vehicles, wear uniforms, and respond to certain types of calls for police service. In addition to PSA's, the Worcester program includes special police task forces which focus on burglary and robbery.

I'm happy to enclose for your perusal a copy of our final evaluation report. Naturally, any comments you may have would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Larson
President

RCL/epk

Enclosure

PREFACE

On March 1, 1975, the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice awarded Public Systems Evaluation, Inc. (PSE) a six-month grant to evaluate the police-related components of the Worcester Crime Impact Program. This report represents one of two major outputs of the brief evaluation effort--the other being an earlier presentation of preliminary findings and recommendations to a forum of members of the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice, the Worcester Police Department and the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee. The purpose of the report is not only to document findings in evaluative terms but also to detail some guiding recommendations. The findings documented herein should be relevant to policy considerations for not only the Worcester Police Department, but other police departments as well.

Unfortunately, PSE's evaluation effort began during the second year of the Impact Program, thus precluding PSE from having a longitudinal understanding of the Program. In effect, a "snapshot" evaluation of the Impact Program has been undertaken. Nevertheless, considerable effort has been made to view all snapshot findings in their proper historical perspective.

The contents of the report are contained in fourteen chapters and six appendices. For convenience, the fourteen chapters are divided into five parts. Part I is introductory: it includes an overview statement, a definition of the Impact Program, and a discussion of the evaluation effort. Parts II and III review each component of the Impact Program in qualitative terms: the Police Service Aide component is reviewed in Part II, while the Impact patrol, investigative and crime prevention units are reviewed in Part III. Part IV looks at the Impact Program in quantitative terms: performance and crime statistics are analyzed and discussed. Finally, Part V concludes with a summary of the evaluation results and an extensive set of recommendations. The six appendices constitute Part VI of this report, and contain the various survey instruments and a complete summary of the survey results.

A summary has been purposefully omitted, since Chapters 1, 13, and 14 constitute a summary of the report.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to acknowledge the active support of the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice (MCCJ); the hospitable environment of the Worcester Police Department (WPD); and the invaluable assistance of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee (WRLEC). Some key individuals deserve to be mentioned by name.

The authors would like to thank Mr. Arnold Rosenfeld (formerly, Executive Director of the MCCJ) and Mr. Robert Cole (MCCJ) for their confidence in Public Systems Evaluation, Inc. and for entrusting PSE with the evaluation effort; Ms. Karen Joerg (MCCJ) for being a supportive and enlightening project monitor; Chief John Hanlon (WPD), Mr. John Wheeler (WRLEC), Deputy Chief Halstead Taylor (WPD), and Captain John Hughes (WPD) for their keen interest and solid support of the evaluation effort; Mr. Clifford Karchmer (MCCJ), Lieutenant John Hackett (WPD), Lieutenant Robert Conroy (WPD), Ms. Mary Wheeler (WRLEC), Mr. Robert Sullivan (WPD), Mr. William Halacy (WPD), and Ms. Cynthia Johnson (WPD), for their technical assistance and expert advice; and the dozens of WPD personnel, who allowed themselves to be questioned and observed, for their frankness and warmth.

Internally, the authors have been supported by the pleasant demeanor and proficient typing and editing skills of Ms. Ellen Keir and Miss Joan Kanavich. The title page was prepared by Ms. Susan Larson.

Finally, Dr. Jack Fowler, Director of the Survey Research Program at the University of Massachusetts, has been a consultant to the project and contributed to the development of the various questionnaires.

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

- 1 OVERVIEW
- 2 IMPACT PROGRAM
- 3 EVALUATION PROJECT

1 OVERVIEW

This is an *evaluation* report of the Worcester Crime Impact Program. As such, it relates the elements and consequences of the Program to its stated goals: it does not purport to specify what the elements of the Program should be. The latter area of emphasis would have resulted in a planning document. However, by detailing what has been happening, we have highlighted the problems that require solutions and have provided a framework within which effective planning can be undertaken. Additionally, we have provided in the last part of this report some concise recommendations that should guide the planning process.

Ideally, the design of evaluation should be an integral part of program development. Program goals and corresponding evaluation measures should be specified along with the program design, prior to its implementation. The evaluation measures are then collected and analyzed during the course of the program, and used not only to *document* the program's impact but also to *monitor and control* its progress. In the case of this evaluation effort, the ideal was not realized. The evaluation has been a limited six-month effort, and was begun during the *second* year of the Impact Program. As such, it can be regarded as a "snapshot" evaluation, encumbered by all the problems associated with the lack of an evaluation design, including the paucity of effective evaluation measures.

The limited length and scope of this evaluation effort required that we view the Impact Program in proper perspective and decide upon the

most effective course to take for both a balanced and sound evaluation. Our view of the Program is contained in Section 1.2, following a brief background section. Section 1.3 details the scope of the report.

1.1 BACKGROUND

The Worcester Crime Impact Program was funded late in 1973, and was actually implemented in March, 1974. The main goal of the Program has been to achieve substantial short-term reductions in the incidence of robbery and burglary on a city-wide basis, but with greater emphasis on a specified target area known as the Impact Sector, or Sector 1. The Impact Sector is a part of Worcester's core city area and is centrally located; it is one of four designated patrol sectors in Worcester.

As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2, the Impact Program has seven components: they include 1) the Central Impact Staff (CIS) consisting of a captain (the Impact Commander), a lieutenant, an Impact Sector Patrol (ISP) Unit, and three secretaries; 2) the Police Service Aides (PSA's) consisting of forty-one unarmed, but uniformed civilians who respond to service calls (i.e., calls that do not require the presence of a police officer), assist police officers, and perform other communications and clerical duties; 3) the Robbery Strike Force (RSF) consisting of eight sworn investigators (supported by a civilian Crime Analyst) who perform robbery investigations in the Impact Sector and an adjoining sector; 4) the Burglary Task Force (BTF) consisting of

eight sworn investigators who perform burglary investigations in the Impact Sector only; 5) the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) consisting of a lieutenant, three specially-trained police officers, and 11 Community Service Officers (CSO's), who, like the PSA's, are also unarmed, but uniformed civilians; 6) the Operations Analyst who is a civilian; and 7) the Courts and Corrections Planner who is a civilian. The key and most innovative element of the Impact Program was the hiring, training, and deployment of forty-one male and female Police Service Aides; they replaced ten police officers on a one-to-one basis (three as complaint clerks/dispatchers, six as ambulance operators, and one as a main desk clerk) and relieved about another dozen patrol officers, all for assignment in the Impact patrol and investigative units.

Exhibit 1.1 shows the status of the Impact Unit in relation to other units of the Worcester Police Department. The Department has about 450 sworn officers and over 100 civilians; it serves a city of a little less than 180,000 in population, which makes Worcester the second most populated city in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.


1.2 IMPACT PROGRAM IN PERSPECTIVE

Another way to look at the Impact Program is to view each component in terms of its key characteristics. In this way, as is summarized in Exhibit 1.2, the Impact Program is seen as a police experiment in *civilianization, decentralization and specialization*.

CIVILIANIZATION

Civilianization is the most critical and substantial part of the Impact Program. It was through civilianization that the Worcester Police

Exhibit 1.1
Worcester Police Department Organization Chart



1-4

Exhibit 1.2
Impact Program in Perspective

Impact Program Components	Key Program Characteristics		
	Civilianization	Decentralization	Specialization
1. Central Impact Staff (including Impact Sector Patrol Unit)	--	X	--
2. Police Service Aide	X	--	X
3. Robbery Strike Force (including Crime Analyst)	X	X	X
4. Burglary Task Force	--	X	X
5. Crime Prevention Unit (including Community Service Officers)	X	X	X
6. Operations Analyst	X	--	--
7. Courts and Corrections Planner	X	--	--

1-5

Department (WPD) was able to assemble the other components of the Program. Civilianization has impacted the basic structure of the WPD in five ways. First, Police Service Aides have been able to assume traditional police roles; they have been deployed on patrol and ambulance duty to respond to service calls and to assist police officers. In effect, these PSA's have become part of a split force patrol team, in which PSA's concentrate on service calls and police officers concentrate on more serious criminally-related calls. As noted in Chapter 4, this civilianized split force approach* is quite innovative, although not unique.

Second, PSA's have been able to serve in other non-patrol capacities, serving as complaint clerks, dispatchers and main desk clerk. Third, Community Service Officers (CSO's) have been able to perform the bulk of the work in the Crime Prevention Unit. Fourth, both female PSA's and CSO's have been able to perform duties that have been traditionally performed by male officers; this assumes an even greater degree of significance, in light of the fact that there is only one female police officer in the WPD.

Lastly, civilian analysts (i.e., Operations Analyst, Crime Analyst, and Courts and Corrections Planner) have been assigned to assist in analysis and planning.

* Other police departments (e.g., Wilmington, Delaware) have a split force approach that splits the patrol officers into a group which responds to calls-for-service and another group which concentrates on preventive or structured patrol.

DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization was almost a requirement for Impact Program funding, since the basis of the Impact concept is the concentration of police resources on a set of target crimes within a target area. The Impact Sector serves as a decentralized police precinct with its own patrol force (the Impact Sector Patrol Unit) and its own detective force (the combined Robbery Strike Force and Burglary Task Force).

It is interesting to note that the precinct system (composed of decentralized police units), which was in great disfavor with police administrators, is now making somewhat of a reappearance through such programs as Impact, team policing, and foot patrols. In Worcester, the precinct system was abandoned in 1952 after an outside management study recommended administrative consolidation. The current Impact Unit is partially a return to the former system, but with more central administrative support than existed under the old system.

SPECIALIZATION

Like decentralization, specialization was also almost a requirement for Impact Program funding. In Worcester, the Robbery Strike Force and the Burglary Task Force were formed to specialize on the target crimes of robbery and burglary, respectively. (Nationally, specialization in police investigative work has been an area of continuing interest.)

The Crime Prevention Unit is also a specialized unit; it undertakes all of the WPD's crime prevention activities. Another area of specialization that has been focused upon in Worcester is the patrol area, where

the civilianized part of the split force patrol team specializes in handling service calls. (Specialization in police patrol work is a relatively novel area of concern.)

1.3 SCOPE OF REPORT

The report is divided into six parts, containing fourteen chapters and six appendices.

Part I consists of three introductory chapters. Chapter 1 views the Worcester Crime Impact Program in perspective; the Program is seen as a police experiment in civilianization, decentralization and specialization. Chapter 2 details the Impact Program in terms of its target area, its seven functional components, its progress to date and its effect on the manpower level of the Worcester Police Department. The philosophy, design and conduct of this evaluation is then summarized in Chapter 3.

Part II, consisting of the next four chapters, Chapters 4 through 7, deals, in a qualitative manner, with the Police Service Aide (PSA) component of the Impact Program. Chapter 4 reviews the PSA concept in terms of the national scene, the Massachusetts experience and the Worcester approach. Job performance issues are discussed in Chapter 5. The reaction of a limited number of PSA clients to PSA performance is contained in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 documents the perception PSA's have about their job and the aspirations they have about their future.

In a manner similar to that in Part II, Part III deals with the other three major components of the Impact Program. Chapters 8, 9, and 10 consider the Impact patrol, investigative and crime prevention units, respectively.

The background, job performance and job satisfaction issues are considered for each of the three units. Additionally, the reaction of a limited number of Crime Prevention Unit clients is summarized in Chapter 10.

Part IV consists of Chapters 11 and 12, which focus on the quantitative performance and crime measures, respectively. Chapter 11 considers the performance of PSA's in terms of how long they take to serve a call; how much work they are able to handle; and how busy each PSA patrol unit is during an eight-hour tour. In every case, the PSA performance statistic is compared with the corresponding statistic for police officers. Additionally, Chapter 11 contains some personnel statistics that have been traditionally used to indicate performance (including sick leave, injury, auto accident, complaint and commendation statistics). Chapter 12 documents the level of crime during Impact and compares it with the level before Impact. It looks at the detailed target crime statistics and some related clearance information.

Part V concludes the main portion of the report with a summary of evaluation results and recommendations. Chapter 13 focuses on the findings and recommendations related to the Impact Program, while Chapter 14 states some technical and policy recommendations. Chapters 13 and 14, together with Chapter 1, constitute a summary of the report.

Finally, Part VI, consisting of six appendices, contains the various survey instruments and a complete summary of the survey results. Some additional crime statistics are included in Appendix F.

For convenience, we have listed in Exhibit 1.3 the abbreviations and terms that are used most often in the body of the report.

Exhibit 1.3Glossary of Abbreviations and Terms

<i>BTF</i>	Burglary Task Force; an investigative component of the Impact Program.
<i>Call-for-Service</i>	A communication to the Worcester Police Department from a citizen, an alarm system, a police officer, or other detector, reporting an incident that requires on-scene police assistance. An Assignment Record number (AR#) is assigned to each call-for-service at the WPD's communications center.
<i>CIS</i>	Central Impact Staff; includes the officials and support staff of the Impact office and the Impact Sector Patrol officers.
<i>GPU</i>	Crime Prevention Unit; a component of the Impact Program.
<i>Day Shift</i>	Covers the period 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. for Impact personnel and 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. for non-Impact personnel (actually, a half-hour staggered shift system is used).
<i>Delay Time</i>	Length of time between when a call-for-service is received (usually by a complaint clerk) and when a radio dispatcher dispatches a patrol unit to serve the call.
<i>First Half Shift</i>	Covers the period 6 p.m. to 2 a.m. for Impact personnel and 4 p.m. to 12 a.m. for non-Impact personnel (actually, a half-hour staggered shift system is used).
<i>Investigator</i>	A police officer with investigative responsibilities; a member of the Detective Bureau, the Robbery Strike Force, or the Burglary Task Force.
<i>ISP</i>	Impact Sector Patrol; a component of the Impact Program.
<i>OA</i>	Operations Analyst; a component of the Impact Program.

Exhibit 1.3 (page 2 of 3)

<i>Official</i>	A sworn officer in the WPD with the rank of sergeant or above.
<i>Patrol Route</i>	A designated area of patrol, usually by one patrol car (often referred to as a "patrol beat" in other cities). The City of Worcester is currently divided into 25 patrol routes, five of which are contained in the Impact Sector.
<i>Patrol Unit</i>	A police vehicle (manned either by PSA's or PO's) that is on patrol.
<i>PO</i>	Police Officer (i.e., sworn officer).
<i>PSA</i>	Police Service Aide; a component of the Impact Program.
<i>Radio Call</i>	A call-for-service that is acknowledged by a radio dispatcher.
<i>Response Time</i>	Length of time between when a call-for-service is made and when a patrol unit arrives at the scene of the incident. Includes the delay time and the travel time.
<i>RSF</i>	Robbery Strike Force; an investigative component of the Impact Program.
<i>Second Half Shift</i>	Covers the period 12 a.m. to 8 a.m. for non-Impact personnel (actually, a half-hour staggered system is used). Note that Impact personnel have not been deployed during the second half shift.
<i>Sector</i>	A designated area encompassing several patrol routes (often referred to as a "district" or as a "precinct" in other cities). The City of Worcester is currently divided into four sectors, Sector 1 being the Impact Sector.
<i>Server</i>	Designation of a patrol unit while it is handling a call-for-service.

Exhibit 1.3 (page 3 of 3)*Service Time*

Length of time between when a radio dispatcher dispatches a patrol unit to a call-for-service and when the unit indicates the service is completed. It includes the travel time and the time on-the-scene.

Service Call

A call-for-service that does not require the presence of a police officer (i.e., a call that can be handled by a PSA).

Utilization Value

Fraction of time a patrol unit is busy handling calls-for-service during an eight-hour tour. Sometimes called utilization factor or utilization rate.

WPD

Worcester Police Department.

2 IMPACT PROGRAM

As elaborated in Chapter 1, the Worcester Crime Impact Program is a multifaceted police experiment in civilianization, decentralization, and specialization. The basic elements of the Program include: concentrated patrol in a target area or sector; increased investigative manpower for the target crimes in the target sector; improved administrative support for the officers in the target sector; use of civilians to handle service calls city-wide in order to free up sworn officers for assignment in the target sector; and establishment of a crime prevention unit. The six formal goals of the Program are presented in Exhibit 2.1. The first four goals are related and focus primarily on the two target crimes. Crime-specific and system-wide planning, along with crime prevention efforts, are mentioned as secondary goals. One of the efforts undertaken to establish the Impact Program might itself have been viewed as a primary goal: specifically, the training and deployment of Police Service Aides (PSA's) as a new police resource. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, this evaluation effort places great emphasis on the PSA component. The degree to which the goals were met is discussed in Chapter 13.

This chapter begins with a description of the target sector and compares it to the rest of the city. The Impact Program components are then reviewed, followed by an historical look at the Program. Finally, the effect of the Impact Program on Department manpower levels is discussed.

Exhibit 2.1Stated Goals of the Worcester Crime Impact ProgramImpact Program Goals^a

- I. To achieve substantial short-term reductions in the incidence of robbery and burglary on a city-wide basis, but with higher reductions in the Impact target area (Sector 1).
- II. To increase the proportion of resources allocated to concentrated activities designed to prevent the crimes of burglary and robbery.
- III. To institutionalize new capabilities to respond constructively and flexibly to the target crimes.
- IV. To increase the clearance rate for target crimes and to provide for additional disposition alternatives for offenders.
- V. To test and gain experience in the utilization of new methods of crime-specific planning and program development involving several components of the local criminal justice system.
- VI. To develop and encourage community involvement in and responsibility for crime prevention activities.

^a As stated in June 14, 1973, Grant Application.

2.1 IMPACT SECTOR


Although the Impact Program is city-wide in scope, a specific target area was identified for a more concentrated focus of Impact resources. The Impact target area, known as the Impact sector, is a part of Worcester's core city area and is centrally located, as shown in Exhibit 2.2.

Demographically, the Impact sector, in comparison to the rest of the city, has proportionately a larger percentage of the crime-prone, 15-24 age group and a larger percentage of the victimization-prone elderly. People in the Impact sector tend to have less formal education than others in Worcester. They represent 17.7% of the population and 17.4% of the work force; they are more likely to be unemployed than are other city residents. The average family income in 1970 was 20.8% lower in Impact than the city average. The Impact sector has a higher concentration of non-white and Spanish-speaking persons than does the rest of the city. However, even in the Impact sector, Worcester does not have the high concentration of low income and minority citizens which most other cities its size now have.

The Impact sector was chosen because it was the area in which 48% of Worcester's robberies and 22% of all burglaries were concentrated. From an evaluation standpoint, the choice of the Impact sector in the center of the city presents a difficult problem, since it is physically contiguous to the three other sectors and to a good number of the designated patrol routes, which are also indicated in Exhibit 2.2.

Exhibit 2.2

The Impact Sector



Note: Numbers 1 through 25 designate the patrol routes.

2.2 IMPACT COMPONENTS

The Impact Program can be viewed in terms of its seven components, as depicted in Exhibit 2.3. Each component is briefly discussed in this section, while an historical look at the Program as a whole is presented in the next section, Section 2.3. The organizational structure of the Impact Program is depicted in Exhibit 2.4.

CENTRAL IMPACT STAFF

The Central Impact staff consists of a captain (the Impact Commander), a lieutenant, an Impact Sector Patrol (ISP) Unit, and three secretaries. The ISP Unit is staffed by two sergeants and 18 police officers; it is responsible for patrolling the Impact sector during two shifts, the 10 a.m. - 6 p.m. and 6 p.m. - 2 a.m. shifts. During 2 a.m. - 10 a.m., the Impact sector is patrolled by officers from the regular Motor Patrol Unit.

POLICE SERVICE AIDE

The most innovative element of the Impact Program was the hiring, training, and deployment of 41 (initially 45) male and female Police Service Aides (PSA's). It was also the key element of the Program since it provided the means to form the other Impact components. The PSA's replaced on a one-for-one basis ten police officers (PO's); three as complaint clerks/dispatchers, six as ambulance operators, and one as a main desk clerk. The remainder were deployed through the regular Motor Patrol to free up police officers by performing calls strictly of a service nature. Of these, twelve are assigned to the Impact sector.

Exhibit 2.3

Impact Components


Impact Program Components	Assigned Personnel ^a					Jurisdiction Area (Time Period)
	OFF	PO	PSA	CSO	CIV	
1. Central Impact Staff (CIS), including Impact Sector Patrol (ISP)	4	18	-	-	3	Sector 1 (1000-0200)
2. Police Service Aide (PSA)	-	-	41	-	-	City-Wide (1000-0200)
3. Robbery Strike Force (RSF)	1	7	-	-	1	Sectors 1 and 2 (0800-2400)
4. Burglary Task Force (BTF)	1	7	-	-	-	Sector 1 (0800-2400)
5. Crime Prevention Unit (CPU)	1	3	-	11	1	City-Wide (1000-1800)
6. Operations Analyst (OA)	-	-	-	-	1	City-Wide (0800-1600)
7. Courts/Corrections Planner (CCP)	-	-	-	-	1	City-Wide (0800-1600)
TOTAL	7	35	41	11	7	

^a As of May 31, 1975. Personnel categories include OFF (Official), PO (Police Officer), PSA (Police Service Aide), CSO (Community Service Officer), and CIV (Civilian).

2-6

Exhibit 2.4

Impact Organization Chart



2-7

PSA's wear green uniforms which clearly distinguish them from police officers. Those on motorized patrol drive specially marked cars which are also clearly distinguished from police cruisers. PSA's are unarmed and have no power of arrest.

ROBBERY STRIKE FORCE

The Robbery Strike Force (RSF) is a seven-man plainclothes unit under the supervision of a sergeant, and, presumably, supported by a civilian crime analyst. The RSF is charged with primarily investigating robberies and responding to robbery-in-progress calls. They usually work from 8 a.m. to midnight, and their jurisdiction was recently expanded from the Impact sector alone to include the entire western half of the city. Although the crime analyst keeps statistics and pin-maps to support both the RSF and Burglary Task Force, she also provides staff support to the Impact Commander.

BURGLARY TASK FORCE

The Burglary Task Force is a separate seven-man plainclothes unit under the supervision of a sergeant with the responsibility of investigating burglaries and responding to burglary-in-progress calls in the Impact sector only. This unit was not formed until several months after the initial implementation of the Impact Program, and was modelled after the RSF. In effect, the RSF and BTF have become a decentralized detective unit for the Impact sector.

CRIME PREVENTION UNIT

The Crime Prevention Unit (CPU), consisting of three specially-trained officers and eleven Community Service Officers (CSO's) under the direction of a Lieutenant, is actually a physically separated component of the Impact Program. The CSO's, like PSA's, are uniformed, but unarmed civilians. The CPU's anti-crime activities include Operation Identification, presentations to the community, and target-hardening, premise surveys. It has recently limited its hours of operation to the 10 a.m. - 6 p.m. shift. Although the CPU has city-wide jurisdiction, it concentrates much of its efforts within the Impact sector.

OPERATIONS ANALYST

The Operations Analyst has responsibility for overall operations planning, especially with regard to the Impact Program. Together with the Police Planner, the Operations Analyst serves as a staff support to the Chief of Police.

COURTS AND CORRECTIONS PLANNER

A Courts and Corrections Planner was included under the Impact grant in order to develop post-arrest strategies for target crime offenders. This component was not included as part of the evaluation effort for two reasons. First, the component had not been on-going as long as the other components at the time of evaluation, and, secondly, it dealt with a separate part of the criminal justice system.

2.3 IMPACT HISTORY

The major Program milestones are shown in Exhibit 2.5. Based on these milestones, before and during evaluation periods were identified--these are further discussed in the next chapter.

The history of the Impact Program can best be presented by first detailing the request for proposal, then discussing the development of Worcester's proposal and, finally, summarizing Worcester's implementation plan. Much of what follows in this section is an adaptation of an historical account written by Alan Gerstenberger and submitted to the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice in November, 1974.


REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

The Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice (MCCJ), borrowing from LEAA's eight-city "High Impact Anti-Crime Program," began planning for an Impact Program in Massachusetts with their 1973 plan. Two basic concepts led the MCCJ to choose an Impact-type program: the theoretical soundness of crime-specific planning, and the thought that concentrating funding on one large program rather than many small ones was more likely to produce a significant improvement in a city's criminal justice system.

The purpose of the program was set out in the RFP as follows:

The Street Crime Reduction Program is designed to demonstrate that substantial commitments of resources, combined with detailed analysis of the crime problem and coordination of the various parts of a metropolitan criminal justice system, can within a short time achieve a substantial and

Exhibit 2.5
Impact Program Milestones



measurable impact on those categories of crime of greatest concern to the public: robbery, residential burglary and aggravated assault.

Your city may propose any action or set of actions which have a probability of affecting any of the target crimes. In preparing its proposal, the city should consider as wide a range of alternatives as possible, including prevention, deterrence, detection, apprehension, adjudication, pre-trial or post-trial diversion, probation, rehabilitation, and parole. Any combination of these may be proposed; however, the focus of the program (and of the proposal evaluation process) will be upon reduction of crime, not upon programmatic elegance, comprehensiveness, or innovation for its own sake.

The seven cities of Boston, Cambridge, Fall River, Lynn, New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcester were invited to submit proposals for a \$1 million program, \$750,000 of which would be supported with federal funds. Applications were to include specific analyses of crime by type and location in order to support decisions on the target crimes, the target area, and proposals for strategies.

In choosing a proposal to be funded, MCCJ sought a program which was both sound and backed by committed and competent personnel. Competence was judged through the overall professional quality of the application, abilities displayed during a question-and-answer session for the Technical Advisory Panel, and the abilities previously demonstrated by the agencies involved in other federally-funded programs.

WORCESTER'S PROPOSAL

The central idea of Worcester's proposal was to more effectively utilize the capabilities of the trained officers in minimizing the occurrence of target crimes. The Police Service Aide component was then

conceived with the basic intention of professionalizing the police officers. By allowing sworn officers to devote more man-hours to anti-crime duties, it was felt that PSA's would indirectly facilitate a decrease in crime.

Crime analysis for the Program indicated that aggravated assault should be discarded as a target crime since most of its occurrence was either indoors or between acquainted individuals. Robbery analysis revealed two patterns: armed robberies of small businesses spreading outward from the central areas of the city along major arteries, and unarmed robberies of persons concentrated in five centrally located patrol routes--this then became the Impact target area. Burglary analysis indicated that residential burglaries accounted for almost two-thirds of Worcester's problem, the highest burglary rate in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts outside of Boston.

Having identified a source of additional manpower in the PSA's, and a need to focus on the robbery and burglary target crimes, appropriate strategies were needed to bring the two together. To combat robbery, the Robbery Strike Force was conceived. To combat burglary, there was a need to circumvent the problem of poor quality in initial investigation reports and increase the commitment of individual officers to a case. It was therefore decided that patrol officers would be given full responsibility for burglary cases from start to finish.

A Crime Prevention Unit which was already functioning in Worcester was brought under the Impact grant and its duties expanded. According to the application, it was to focus on reducing opportunities for the

target crimes. Crime prevention was to be coordinated with field operations, and a crime prevention officer was to train officers and investigators in the Impact target area.

Additional portions of the Worcester proposal included provision for a courts and corrections component, which satisfied the criterion that the proposal be "system wide" as opposed to purely a police program. Since it could not be supported by the same kind of detailed analysis in the proposal, this area was felt to be weak and all that was funded was a courts and corrections planner.

WORCESTER'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

The full \$750,000 (federal share) for a Massachusetts Impact Program was awarded to Worcester in September, 1973. Planning for implementation began under the responsibility of an Impact Planning Committee at about the same time. This committee included the Acting Chief, the Deputy Chief in Charge of Operations, the Captain who would command the Impact unit, his Lieutenant, and two members of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee (WRLEC). Their three primary concerns were: implementing the Police Service Aide component, deciding on new equipment needs of the overall Program, and budgeting police manpower for the new unit covering the Impact target sector.

Planning for PSA's included the new development of a job description; the recruitment and selection of applicants; and the design of an effective training program.* In-depth planning for

* A more in-depth look at Worcester's approach to the PSA program is given in Section 4.3.

the sworn components, other than budgeting, was delayed until the PSA's and a group of 35 new police officers were trained and deployed.

The planning process was undertaken with speed and efficiency, due, in part, to the caliber and authority of the people involved. Since the WPD command staff had other responsibilities, the WRLEC did most of the detailed work. Citizen participation was not felt necessary; their input was solicited from a neighborhood Resident's Executive Council outside the context of the planning meetings. The police officer's union in Worcester was more or less forgotten at this stage, and since they offered no official stand on the Impact Program, their tacit consent was assumed by the Impact Planning Committee. Also, the hiring of 35 new police officers in the fall of 1973 was well timed: it reassured the sworn officers that the city intended to maintain the strength of the Police Department and that the PSA component was to supplement, not supplant, police operations. The 35 new officers were also trained at the same time as the PSA's.

Planning for PSA equipment proceeded concurrently with PSA selection, hiring, and training. Basic needs were for radios, uniforms, and vehicles. Each PSA required a portable radio, and each PSA car required a mobile radio. Twenty-five of each were purchased at about \$1,100 each. The uniforms had to be distinguished from policemen, meter maids, postmen, and various other uniformed government servants. Since green was the least likely color to cause confusion, it was selected for the PSA uniform. Their caps, in addition to being green, were in the same shape as the state police in order to insure that they would not be

confused with the Worcester police. Large vehicle expenditures constituted a major area of conflict with the MCCJ, the funding agency. The original complement of 37 was reduced to 29, and a compact model, the four-door 1974 Valiant, was selected. Nineteen of these vehicles were painted all white with the blue legend, "Worcester Police Department Service Aide," to contrast with the dark blue police cruisers.

The police components were given the least amount of advanced planning in an apparent effort to involve the personnel of the units in the development of strategies. The men who staffed the units were all to be volunteers; however, the Robbery Strike Force was hand-picked by its sergeant (who was himself picked by the Impact Captain) and several of the Impact sector patrol officers were assigned there after their graduation from the Worcester Police Academy.

Strategy development by the Robbery Strike Force (RSF) was limited. Due to the small size of the city of Worcester, infiltration and decoy were deemed difficult strategies to implement since the officers could not remain anonymous. The small size of the unit precluded the use of saturation patrol. The only basic strategies left were the use of informants, and various forms of surveillance, which were not substantially different from those used by the Department's existing Detective Bureau.

The other police component, the Impact Sector Patrol, tested two contrasting strategies: a walking-riding "team" and a strike force modelled after the RSF. The team approach was the initial strategy and it includes patrolling together, two on foot and one in a nearby cruiser. The

driver would rotate with the footmen so that each officer performed an equal portion of the team's workload. This approach was dropped after three months because of a perceived manpower shortage and opposition from the officers.

The second strategy tried, beginning in August, 1974, was a Burglary Task Force, modelled after the Robbery Strike Force. Some of the patrolmen were assigned to uniformed patrol in route cars, while others operated as a plainclothes unit. Officers rotated between the two duties. This policy was changed in October, 1974, so that seven of the men were assigned permanently to the Burglary Task Force, and the remaining 19 were permanently assigned to regular patrol. Manpower in the target area had been increased, resulting in a decentralized target area precinct with its own patrol and detective force.

The Crime Analyst and Operations Analyst were both hired during the first year of operations. The last of the planned components to be implemented was the deployment of the Community Service Officers, who staffed the Crime Prevention Unit. This was delayed because eight of the original ten CSO's in an earlier Model Cities program became PSA's under the Impact Program, necessitating the hiring and training of a new group.

2.4 IMPACT EFFECT ON MANPOWER

The basic design of the Impact Program, as mentioned previously, was to increase and focus manpower on the target crimes of robbery and burglary. The body of this report describes how the manpower was used,

but the level of increase is an important background consideration to all further discussion and merits a detailed presentation here.

As part of the Impact Program, 45 PSA's were initially hired and trained to take over certain service-type duties of police officers, which in turn released them for more pertinent law enforcement duties. At the same time a class of 35 recruits graduated from the Worcester Police Academy. As shown in Exhibit 2.6, the Worcester Police Department experienced an overall 25% increase in patrol and investigative manpower (in terms of workdays), two-thirds of which was contributed by the deployment of PSA's. In the Impact sector itself, manpower was increased 30%, as summarized in Exhibit 2.7. PSA's accounted for 80% of this increase.

The net increase of manpower during Impact as compared to before Impact has indeed been significant, albeit some of the increase was necessary to meet the higher radio call demand which also increased by a substantial 18%. Although two-thirds of the manpower increase was because of the deployment of unarmed, but uniformed civilians, the fact remains that police presence on the streets of Worcester was significantly increased (motor patrol manpower increased by 46%). This fact overshadows all other input measures.

Exhibit 2.6

WPD Patrol and Investigative Manpower Statistics

	<u>Before</u> (8/73)	<u>During</u> (1/75)	<u>Change</u> ^b (Based on Work Days)
<u>Foot Patrol/Precinct I</u> ^a			
Officials	19	23	
Police Officers	95	97	
Police Service Aides	-	10	
	114	130	+7%
<u>Motor Patrol</u>			
Officials	19	20	
Police Officers	83	106	
Police Service Aides	-	32	
	102	158	+46%
<u>Investigative</u>			
Officials	6	8	
Police Officers	27	40	
	33	48	+37%
<u>Crime Prevention</u>			
Officials	2	1	
Police Officers	2	4	
Community Service Officers	10	11	
	14	16	+11%
Total	263	351	+25%
Radio Calls/Month	8,172	9,674	+18%

^a In Worcester, duties of the Foot Patrol Unit include manning the ambulance, the wagons, the cell room, and the communications room.

^b It should be noted that the percent change is calculated on the basis of available number of work days. Effective April 1, 1974, WPD police officers (not including police officials) underwent a change in work schedule from a modified 5-2 (i.e., 5 days on, 2 off) plan to a 4-2 plan: the net effect being that each officer received 17.6 more days off per year. This effect is taken into account in the above calculations.

Exhibit 2.7

Impact Patrol and Investigative Manpower Statistics

Shift	BEFORE ^a (Daily Average from August, 1973 Data)			DURING ^a (Daily Average from August, 1974 Data)				Total PO/PSA
	Patrol PO	Investigative PO ^b	Total PO	Patrol PO	Investigative PO	Total PO	PSA	
1000 - 1800	5.1	1.2	6.3	4.4	3.0	7.4	2.3	9.7
1800 - 0200	8.3	1.9	10.2	5.8	4.3	10.1	1.7	11.8
Total	13.4	3.1	16.5	10.2	7.3	17.5	4.0	21.5

^a All manpower statistics reflect actual manning levels as averaged from August roll call sheets.

^b Since the Detective Bureau had city-wide jurisdiction before the Impact Program, an estimate was made based on the proportion of incidents occurring in the Impact sector.

3 EVALUATION PROJECT

Given the broad scope of the Worcester Crime Impact Program and the limited scope of the evaluation effort, a conscious decision was made for the evaluation to concentrate on the most innovative component of the Program, the Police Service Aides. Thus, civilianization was looked at more closely than either decentralization or specialization. Nevertheless, all the police-related components of the Impact Program (i.e., the courts and corrections component not being included) were considered in the course of this evaluation.

In the next section we discuss the considerations that influenced our final evaluation design, which is detailed in Section 3.2. The actual conduct of the evaluation is summarized in Section 3.3.

3.1 EVALUATION CONSIDERATIONS

The evaluation of the Impact Program was handicapped by problems related to the absence of an evaluation design, the complex nature of the Impact Program and the unreliability of the available data.

ABSENCE OF EVALUATION DESIGN

Although the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice attempted to have an evaluation underway at the beginning of the Impact Program, there was no concerted effort at evaluation until PSE's effort was undertaken during the second year of the Program. As a result, effective evaluation measures were neither defined nor tabulated. In addition, the goals of the Program were not stated from an evaluation point of

view; they lack the specificity that is required for a definition of corresponding measures. Also, the goals or objectives of the Program components were lacking and stated in very general terms.

We attempted to overcome the absence of an evaluation design by reviewing all available data elements that have been traditionally collected by the Worcester Police Department, and judiciously selecting and analyzing those that are relevant. In addition, we initiated the collection of other relevant information primarily through surveys.

COMPLEX NATURE OF IMPACT PROGRAM

As discussed in Section 1.2, the Impact Program can be viewed as a police experiment in civilianization, decentralization and specialization. It is obviously a very complex program. It is further complicated by certain temporal and spatial problems inherent in the basic design of the Program. For example, Impact personnel are only deployed from 10 a.m. to 2 a.m.

Because of the complex nature and scope of the Impact Program, our evaluation effort has in effect considered to some degree the entire Worcester Police Department. Fortunately, except for the initial deployment of 35 new police officers (which, as indicated in Section 2.4, we considered to be a peripheral part of the Impact Program), the Impact Program has been the only significant change to have occurred in the Worcester Police Department during the last few years.

Our broader look at the Impact Program in the context of the whole Department has also served to provide a balanced view (through the

identification of control groups). In this vein, we compare Impact patrol officers to Motor Patrol patrol officers and Impact investigators to Detective Bureau investigators. Similarly, Police Service Aides and Community Service Officers are viewed in a comparative manner.

UNRELIABILITY OF AVAILABLE DATA

Section 12.1 discusses the reliability problem in the available WPD data. We have tried to address this problem by exploiting other means of validation. For example, our analysis of the radio call data was supported by an analysis of activity sheets and an extended period of observation at the communications center.

Unreliable data have always been a problem. However, the problem is mitigated if the data are viewed in a relative rather than an absolute sense. This is the case in our evaluation: we compare crime statistics during Impact with those prior to Impact. We have also made certain that the crime data have been produced in a consistent manner during the periods of comparison. In fact, the data have been collected, coded and keypunched using the same procedures and the same facilities during these periods.

3.2 EVALUATION DESIGN

The evaluation design is summarized in Exhibit 3.1. Its development was influenced by 1) the decision to concentrate on the PSA component; 2) the considerations detailed in the last section; and 3) the recognition

Exhibit 3.1
Evaluation Design

<u>Activities</u>	<u>Impact Components</u> ^a					
	<u>CIS</u>	<u>PSA</u>	<u>RSF</u>	<u>BTF</u>	<u>CPU</u>	<u>OA</u>
1. Background						
a. Impact Program	x	x	x	x	x	x
b. Related Programs	x	x	x	x	x	x
c. WPD Data Sources	x	x	x	x	x	x
2. Data Analysis						
a. Crime Reports	x	x	x	x	x	x
b. Arrest Data	x	-	x	x	-	x
c. Radio Call Cards	x	x	-	-	-	-
d. PSA Daily Activity Sheets	x	x	-	-	-	-
e. WRLEC Data	x	x	x	x	x	-
f. Personnel Records	x	x	x	x	x	-
3. Anonymous Questionnaire Surveys						
a. PSA's (Police Service Aides)	-	x	-	-	-	-
b. PO's (Police Officers)	x	-	-	-	x	-
c. Investigators (Investigative PO's)	-	-	x	x	-	-
d. CSO's (Community Service Officers)	-	-	-	-	x	-
e. Patrol Sergeants	x	-	-	-	-	-
4. Participant Observation/Interview						
a. Communications Personnel	-	x	-	-	-	-
b. Impact Personnel	x	x	x	x	x	x
c. Motor Patrol Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-
d. Detective Bureau Personnel	-	-	-	-	-	-
e. Other Key Individuals and Officials	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. Telephone Survey						
a. PSA/PO (Service Call) Clients	x	x	-	-	-	-
b. CPU (Operation I.D./Premise Survey) Clients	-	-	-	-	x	-
6. Evaluation Products						
a. Presentation of Preliminary Findings	x	x	x	x	x	x
b. Final Report	x	x	x	x	x	x

^a Impact components include CIS (Central Impact Staff), PSA (Police Service Aide), RSF (Robbery Strike Force), BTF (Burglary Task Force), CPU (Crime Prevention Unit), and OA (Operations Analyst).

that the Impact Program is primarily a manpower program. Consequently, the design's emphasis was on the development and collection of a number of qualitative measures pertaining to the feelings, interactions, perceptions, reactions, and aspirations of the individuals involved in Impact (and, as a control, of a sample of individuals outside of Impact).

Six evaluation activities were identified. The first was to review pertinent background information for relevance to the evaluation effort and to place the Worcester Crime Impact Program in proper perspective. Following a review of all WPD data sources, the second activity was to undertake an analysis of relevant data. The third activity was to develop and administer questionnaires. The fourth activity was to provide another means of interpreting the results of the previous activities; it was to conduct, on a limited basis, a set of participant observations and/or interviews. The fifth activity was to conduct a limited number of telephone interviews with service call and crime prevention clients (i.e., those residents of Worcester who were assisted in connection with a service call or a crime prevention activity). This activity was felt to be essential, since the value of Police Service Aides and Community Service Officers is not only dependent upon their being able to assist and be integrated with police officers, but also on their ability to serve and satisfy the public. Finally, the sixth activity was to produce the evaluation products.

3.3 EVALUATION CONDUCT

About twenty professional person-months of effort were devoted to the evaluation which was carried out over a six-month period, beginning

in March, 1975. The details of the evaluation conduct are summarized in Exhibit 3.2; additional discussions of the evaluation activities are given at appropriate points in Parts II, III and IV of the text which follows.

Exhibit 3.2

Evaluation Conduct

<u>Activities</u>	<u>Pertinent Date(s)</u>	<u>Sample Element</u>	<u>Sample Size</u>	
			<u>Number</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
1. Background				
a. Impact Program	---	---	---	---
b. Related Programs	---	---	---	---
c. WPD Data Sources	---	---	---	---
2. Data Analysis				
a. Crime Reports				
• Keypunched Crime Reports	3/1/73 - 5/31/75	IBM Card	59,945	100
• Monthly UCR Reports	1/65 - 5/75	UCR Report	125	100
b. Arrest Data	3/73 - 5/75	UCR Report	27	100
c. Radio Call Cards				
• Radio Call Cards	4/22/75 - 4/28/75	Radio Call Card	2,086	100
• Keypunched Radio Call Cards (on computer tape)	3/1/75 - 6/30/75	Tape Record	38,536	100
d. PSA Daily Activity Sheet				
• Impact PSA Daily Activity Sheets	6/1/74 - 7/31/74	Activity Sheet	183	56
• Impact PSA Daily Activity Sheets	3/1/75 - 3/31/75	Activity Sheet	183	100
e. WRLEC Data				
• Contiguous Town Crime Statistics	4/1/73 - 3/31/75	Town Record	6	75
• Armed Robbery Clearance Statistics	5/1/73 - 2/28/75	---	---	---

Exhibit 3.2 (page 2 of 3)

Activities	Pertinent Date(s)	Sample Element	Sample Size	
			Number	% of Total
2. Data Analysis (continued)	---	---	---	---
f. Personnel Records (Sick Leaves, Injuries, Auto Accidents, Complaints, and Commendations)	---	---	---	---
3. Anonymous Questionnaire Surveys ^a				
a. PSA's	---	PSA	41	100
b. PO's	---	PO	18	100
• Impact PO's	---	PO	41	39
• Motor Patrol PO's	---	PO	3	100
• CPU PO's	---			
c. Investigators (including Sergeants)	---	Investigator	14	93
• Impact Investigators	---	Investigator	14	47
• Detective Bureau Investigators	---			
d. CSO's	---	CSO	10	91
e. Patrol Sergeants	---	Sergeant	2	100
• Impact Patrol Sergeants	---	Sergeant	9	75
• Motor Patrol Sergeants	---			

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^a It should be noted that all surveys were administered by an evaluator without forewarning and in anonymous fashion.

Exhibit 3.2 (page 3 of 3)

Activities	Pertinent Date(s)	Sample Element	Sample Size	
			Number	% of Total
4. Participant Observation/Interview ^b				
a. Communications Personnel				
• PSA's	---	PSA	3	100
• PO's	---	PO	14	61
• Civilians	---	Civilian	5	50
b. Impact Personnel				
• PSA's	---	PSA	34	83
• CSO's	---	CSO	11	100
• Patrol PO's	---	PO	11	61
• Investigators (including Sergeants)	---	Investigator	8	53
• Officials	---	Official	5	100
• Analysts	---	Analyst	2	100
c. Motor Patrol Personnel				
• PO's	---	PO	9	9
• Officials	---	Official	2	17
d. Detective Bureau Personnel	---	Investigator	4	13
e. Other Key Individuals and Officials	---	Individual/ Official	12	---
5. Telephone Survey				
a. PSA/PO (Service Call) Clients	---	Completed Call	221	---
b. CPU (Operation I.D./Premise Survey) Clients	---	Completed Call	66	---
6. Evaluation Products				
a. Presentation of Preliminary Findings	---	---	---	---
b. Final Report	---	---	---	---

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^b The participant observation and/or interviews were conducted in an unstructured manner; each observation or interview took from two to three hours.

PART II: QUALITATIVE MEASURES--POLICE SERVICE AIDE COMPONENT

- 4 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: BACKGROUND
- 5 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: JOB PERFORMANCE
- 6 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: CLIENT REACTION
- 7 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: JOB SATISFACTION

4 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: BACKGROUND

As noted in Chapter 2, the Police Service Aide (PSA) component of the Worcester Crime Impact Program was conceived to provide the Worcester Police Department (WPD) with the flexibility to reallocate sworn officer manpower in order to form the other Impact components, consisting of an Impact Sector Patrol Force, a Robbery Strike Force, a Burglary Task Force, and a Crime Prevention Unit. The idea was that the PSA's--uniformed but unarmed--would respond to "service" type radio calls, thus reducing the officer workload and permitting reassignment of officers to the other Impact components.

In this background chapter, we view the PSA Program in perspective by reviewing related programs elsewhere in the nation; relating similar previous attempts in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and documenting the Worcester approach.

4.1 NATIONAL SCENE

At the outset of this discussion, it is important to note that our research to date has indicated that the Police Service Aide concept is very innovative and quite unusual in the United States. To be sure, many police departments employ unarmed civilians in various capacities, but very few in field operations.*

* See, as examples, A Compendium of Selected Criminal Justice Projects (U.S. Department of Justice, LEAA, June, 1975) which lists eight "cadet" or "auxiliary police" projects, of which Worcester is one; Jurisdictional Guide to Productivity Improvement Projects (Diane Sims, International City Management Association, July, 1975) for the National Commission of Productivity and Work Quality, which lists five "paraprofessional" police projects; and Employing Civilians for Police Work (Alfred I. Schwartz et al., The Urban Institute, May, 1975).

In fact, in 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice recommended the creation of an unarmed civilian position titled Community Service Officer (CSO) within police departments. This position was envisaged as the first of three ranks that would progress to Police Officer and then to Police Agent. According to the Commission Report, CSO's would "investigate certain minor thefts and loss of property; provide continuing assistance to families encountering domestic problems; and work with specialized police units such as a community relations unit."*

Eight years later, there are very few police departments in the United States that have followed the Commission's recommendations. There are many "Community Service Officer" programs but these are for the most part very "watered down" versions of what the Commission recommended. Usually, the CSO's perform non-traditional functions such as public and community relations and crime prevention (as in the case of the Worcester CSO's), or what are perceived as menial functions such as clerical and dispatch jobs. Many police departments have used police cadets to relieve officers from clerical work and dispatching.

In Worcester, several factors distinguish the Police Service Aide Program from most other "CSO" or "cadet" or "auxiliary" or "parapolice" programs in the country. First of all, the PSA's are on patrol as well as in inside jobs. Second, the PSA's ride alone in marked vehicles. Third, the PSA's are dispatched directly by the police dispatcher.

* President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Avon Edition, 1968, p. 274).

Fourth, the PSA's on patrol handle approximately a third of all calls coming into the Worcester Police Department. (See Section 11.2 for discussion.) Fifth, the ratio of PSA's to sworn officers is about one to ten. And sixth, the PSA's are very well integrated into the police field operations, reporting to roll call with officers and being supervised by the same police officials that supervise the officers. In short, as indicated in Section 1.2, the patrol PSA's have become a part of a split force patrol team, responding to service type calls, while the sworn officers have concentrated on the more serious calls. Based on the criteria stated above, and an exhaustive search of the literature and related areas, we have been able to locate only two other programs--in Scottsdale, Arizona and in Miami, Florida--that are similar to the Worcester PSA Program. All three programs have the following in common:

- The personnel are uniformed, but unarmed civilians with no power of arrest;
- 18-35 years old;
- alone on patrol in radio-equipped vehicles;
- directly dispatched by the police dispatcher; and
- handle a substantial number of radio calls.

Exhibit 4.1 summarizes some key issues regarding the three programs.* Although details of the Worcester PSA Program are discussed in the ensuing chapters, it is interesting to note that all three programs were developed without knowledge of one another. In fact, a certain amount of "re-inventing the wheel" must have occurred with at least two of the three programs. Thus, a national evaluation and documentation of PSA-type programs should be undertaken to provide a sound basis for replication, if deemed desirable. Certainly, as explicitly stated in Chapter 13, this evaluation effort

* Information regarding these programs was obtained by telephone on 9/24/75.

Exhibit 4.1

Comparison of Three PSA-Type Programs

	Worcester, Massachusetts (Pop. 176,572)	Miami, Florida (Pop. 334,859)	Scottsdale, Arizona (Pop. 67,823)
Program Name	Police Service Aide	Public Service Aide	Police Assistant
Number in Program	41	51	13
Number of Females	16	Unknown	3
Number of Sworn Officers in Police Department	450	500	101
Date of Implementation	January, 1974	April, 1974	July, 1971
Starting Pay	\$425/Month	\$3/Hour ^a	\$641/Month
Working Hours	1000-1800, 1800-0200	0700-1500, 1500-2300	Unknown
Roll Call with Police Officers?	Yes	No	Yes
Vehicle Used?	Specially Marked	Unmarked ^b	Regular Police
% of Total Calls Responded To?	33%	15%	Unknown
Activities:			
Ticketing?	No	No	Yes
Hit and Run Reports?	No	No	Yes
Past Burglary Reports?	No	Unknown	Yes
Traffic Control?	No	Unknown	Yes
Credit Given Toward Becoming a Police Officer?	No	No	Yes ^c
Number Who Have Become Police Officers	0	6	17

^a Miami Public Service Aides actually work an average of 35 hours per week each.

^b Specially-marked vehicles are on order.

^c Scottsdale Police Department indicates that they are now only hiring officers who have been Police Assistants.

indicates that the PSA concept has tremendous merit and should be given serious consideration on a national level.

4.2 MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE

On a statewide level, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has had extremely negative experience with legislation designed to incorporate civilians into police work.

Soon after the President's Commission report, the Massachusetts legislature passed "enabling" legislation allowing cities and towns to hire police cadets who would serve as clerical assistants in the police department.* In April, 1968, the Boston City Council accepted the enabling legislation and hired 50 cadets between the ages of 18 and 20. Soon after, the Mayor of Boston instituted police cadets in purely clerical functions, and sought legislation in the Boston City Council to permit cadets to replace some of the 50 to 100 officers directing traffic in downtown intersections, thus allowing some of those officers to be reassigned to patrol. This seemingly innocuous proposal met with fierce opposition from the newly-formed Boston Police Patrolmen's Association (BPPA) which succeeded, by well-coordinated and vocal efforts, in having the bill soundly defeated. The union's claim was that the Mayor was seeking "bargain basement cops."**

* Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, Ch. 147, Sec. 21A (1967), states: "A police cadet shall maintain and file records, operate office machines, answer telephones, receive complaints, enter and index official documents, prepare routine reports, prepare and tabulate facts and figures for statistical purposes, and have similar duties of an administrative rather than an enforcement type."

** The Boston Globe, June 28, 1968, p. 18.

In 1968, similar legislation was introduced on the state level with the backing of the then State Attorney General Elliot Richardson and the Governor's Committee for Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (now the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice), an agency of the executive branch. This sweeping legislation sought enabling power so that *

a police cadet may perform all duties required of a police officer except that he shall not carry arms, nor shall he have any power of arrest other than that of an ordinary citizen.

The Boston Police Patrolmen's Association again mounted an extremely strong lobbying effort to defeat this bill. Representatives of every major police organization in the Commonwealth testified to the dangers of the police posed by replacing armed traffic policemen with unarmed cadets.** The BPPA also solicited and received letters from downtown merchants opposing the idea of unarmed personnel directing traffic in the business area. Again the measure was defeated.

In 1969, the Mayor of Boston made another legislative attempt (H.2308) which also died in committee. By 1973, the entire cadet program had been phased out of the Boston Police Department, even as related to clerical functions.

* H.4516 (1968), Appendix E, p. 10.

** During the course of the evaluation, we have had access to two unpublished accounts of the Massachusetts legislative battles: John G. Fabiano, "The Boston Police Cadet Program," Center for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, May, 1969, and Frederika Randali, "Union Resistance to Civilian Employees in the Boston Police Department: The Dispute Over Traffic Directors and Clerks, 1968-1969," to appear in Final Report of the Innovative Resource Planning in Urban Public Safety Systems Project, M.I.T., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976.

In light of the Massachusetts experience, Worcester's successful attempt at implementing a Police Service Aide Program assumes an even greater significance.

4.3 WORCESTER APPROACH

The Worcester approach to the establishment of a PSA Program in the Police Department differed from the abortive Boston and state attempts in several significant ways. First of all, the major impetus for the idea came from within the Police Department. One of the main architects of the plan was a Deputy Chief who is now Chief of Police. This origin of the program has resulted in a strong organizational backing directly from the Chief's office, a factor that was definitely not true in Boston, where the Commissioner of Police was almost openly hostile to the Mayor's idea.

Secondly, the planners associated with the local Regional Law Enforcement Committee in Worcester, who actually developed the plan for the grant and who took care of the details required by the state funding process, were very knowledgeable about the internal functioning of the Worcester Police Department. The planners were well respected by the Chief and other Department officials. This close working relationship and mutual trust resulted in both a better coordinated plan than those offered by other Massachusetts cities for use of LEAA money and a very smooth implementation.

A third factor in Worcester's success with the introduction of PSA's was in the way the program was presented to police officers. The label "cadet" was carefully avoided because of the negative connotations to

Massachusetts police officers. In addition, the architects of the plan presented the PSA's as a supplement to officers, not as replacements. To back up that position, the Chief brought the Department up to authorized strength by hiring some 35 police officers at the same time as the PSA's were hired. Thus, Police Service Aides were presented as an opportunity for officers to become more professional law enforcement specialists and as a direct answer to the common police complaint that much of their time is spent on "garbage" calls unrelated to "real" police work.

A fourth factor that was key to the successful implementation of the PSA program in Worcester was the non-involvement of the police union. In the 1968-1969 Boston and statewide legislative battles over the cadet programs, the Massachusetts Police Association (MPA) and the Boston Police Patrolmen's Association (BPPA) and their local chapters played a major role in having the bills defeated. In Worcester, the local chapter of the MPA was facing severe internal problems, which resulted in the ouster of the Association in favor of a local chapter of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers (IBPO). Furthermore, the President of the Association in Worcester was associated with the Community Service Officer Program (under Model Cities auspices) and was not unfavorable to the idea of having civilians in the police department.

In summary then, the new IBPO chapter in Worcester did not develop any coordinated opposition to the Police Service Aide program,

probably because the program was presented as a means toward increased police professionalism in general, instead of as a city budget-cutting device, as was the case in Boston. In addition, deployment of PSA's was to result directly in the formation of the Impact Program, with its Robbery Strike Force and Impact patrol force. To many officers, these new assignments were desirable. Also, the Chief placated most fears of layoffs and replacements by the simultaneous hiring of officers. Furthermore, the new union was somewhat distracted by more immediate issues of a new work schedule, pay raises, and court overtime pay. Finally, the support of the City Manager was both essential and instrumental in the successful implementation of the PSA Program.*

4.4 SELECTION AND TRAINING

The selection and training of PSA's was undertaken with extreme care and planning.

SELECTION PROCESS

After passage of an ordinance by the City Council creating the Police Service Aide position (a job description was included in the legislation), the City Manager appointed a committee of three to select candidates from among the applicants. The Selection Committee consisted of the Chief of Police or his representative, the Director of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee, and the Head of

* Worcester has a City Manager-Council type of government. However, the current City Manager has been in office for many years, and is therefore in a very strong position.

the Department of Personnel for the City. In addition, a member of the Human Rights Commission and the Police Internal Affairs Division (for background investigations) were present at the interviews as participating, but non-voting members.

The Police Service Aide job was advertised in local newspapers. Applicants had to fit the following qualifications:

- be between 18 and 35 years old
- have a high school diploma or G.E.D.
- have no felony convictions
- have a driver's license and a safe driving record
- be a resident of Worcester

Worcester already had Community Service Officers (CSO's) as part of the Model Cities Program. Several of these individuals were interested in becoming Police Service Aides because of higher pay and closer association with police work, but some of them did not have high school diplomas. As a result of CSO interest and the views of citizen groups in the Model Cities area, the educational requirement for Police Service Aides was modified. In lieu of the high school diploma, the application provided for a 50-word statement explaining why the applicant wanted to be a PSA. Since PSA's would be required to write many reports, this statement weighed heavily in the decision process.

Applicants were judged and given points on the basis of application, appearance, poise, interest, and understanding of the job

description. Forty-four were recommended by the Committee and accepted by the City Manager, who also requested that one other person be added to the list. As of June 1975, 41 PSA's remained in the Program. Their background is varied, including ten with experience as civilian employees of the Police Department (eight Community Service Officers and two dispatchers); two with other police-related experience; two with work experience in social agencies; four with medically related experience; three former college students; seven with clerical skills; four with sales experience; four former factory or construction workers; and five with other miscellaneous experience.

Exhibit 4.2 presents a profile of the 41 Police Service Aides as of June 1975. The average age is 22.5; 40% are female; the minority representation is 12%; and only 32% are married. It is interesting to note from Exhibit 4.3 that in terms of educational level, PSA's compare very closely with officers in both patrol and investigative units.

TRAINING

Exhibit 4.4 contains the subjects and number of hours of Police Service Aide training. PSA's received 303 hours of training over an eight-week period, which included three weeks of on-the-job training. Although a class of officer recruits was going through training at the same time, the two groups were trained separately, except for joint attendance at some guest lectures. It was felt that PSA's should not be given as intense a training as police officers, so

Exhibit 4.2
PSA Profile

	<u>Police Service Aides</u> (N=41)
<u>AGE (years)</u>	
Minimum	19
Mean	22.5
Maximum	34
<u>SEX (%)</u>	
Male	61
Female	39
<u>RACE (%)</u>	
White	88
Black	5
Puerto Rican	7
<u>MARITAL STATUS (%)</u>	
Married	32
Not married	68

Exhibit 4.3
Highest Level of Education Completed

<u>Percent Answering:</u>	<u>Patrol PO</u>		<u>Investigative PO</u>		<u>Police Service Aides</u> (N=41)
	<u>Impact</u> (N=18)	<u>Motor Patrol</u> (N=41)	<u>Impact</u> (N=14)	<u>Detective Bureau</u> (N=14)	
High school (G.E.D. certificate) or less	33	27	21	21	22
Some college but did not graduate	50	56	44	51	54
Graduated from technical school or junior college	6	7	21	14	10
Graduated from college (B.A., B.S., etc.)	6	5	0	0	5
Some graduate work	6	5	14	0	7
Graduate degree	0	0	0	0	2
No answer	0	0	0	14	0

Exhibit 4.4

PSA Training

<u>Subjects</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Orientation	1
Role of Law Enforcement	2
Department Rules and Regulations	2
Court Trials	2
Defensive Driving	4
Traffic and Crowd Control	5
Testifying in Court	6
Accident Investigation	6
Mentally Disturbed Persons	14
Community and Department Relations	16
Review of Training	18
Report Writing and Note Taking, Interviews	19
Administrative Details	26
Massachusetts Law and City Ordinances	48
First Aid	132
On-the-Job Training	<u>303</u>
Total Hours	<u>303</u>

that they would not think they had the proper training to perform police-related functions of law enforcement.

When asked to rate their training in terms of preparing them for their work, 81% said their training was either excellent or very good (see Exhibit 4.5).

Exhibit 4.5

PSA Perception of Training

HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE PSA TRAINING IN TERMS OF PREPARING YOU FOR THE PSA JOB?

<u>Percent Answering:</u>	<u>Police Service Aides Assigned to:</u>				<u>TOTAL (N=41)</u>
	<u>Impact Patrol (N=12)</u>	<u>Motor Patrol (N=19)</u>	<u>Communications (N=4)</u>	<u>Ambulance (N=6)</u>	
Excellent	25	37	50	49	37
Good	41	53	50	17	44
Fair	17	10	0	17	2
Poor	17	0	0	0	5
No answer	0	0	0	17	2

One important issue in the training of civilian personnel so closely integrated into the police department is the on-the-job training with police officers. Many of the PSA's said that the on-the-job part of training was most helpful, while others cited a "lack of specific direction or assistance" and the absence of meaningful work. Some Police Service Aides reported hostility from officers--for example, a few officers refused to let PSA's use the radio or do anything but observe. And, as one PSA put it, "When you put a PSA with an officer that the whole force considers a dud, then it's a waste of time and money." The Worcester experience points out the need for careful selection of officers to provide on-the-job training and for close monitoring of activities to assure a productive training period. Overall, Worcester's PSA training program was a success.

On May 1, 1974, Worcester's first civilian patrol force was officially deployed in its own specially marked vehicles. Uniformed but unarmed, and without the power of arrest, they assumed responsibility for all calls of a service nature which occurred between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 a.m. The next three chapters discuss PSA's job performance, client reaction, and job satisfaction, respectively. Specific quantitative performance measures are detailed in Chapter 11.

5 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: JOB PERFORMANCE

This chapter's review of PSA performance draws upon the findings of the anonymous surveys of PSA's and patrol and investigative PO's; the impressions developed from the limited participant observation task; and the detailed analysis and observation of the dispatch function. Unfortunately, there is no systematic procedure within the Worcester Police Department (WPD) to evaluate PSA's or even PO's; thus, no comparative analysis of PSA and PO performances can be undertaken. However, a limited survey of citizen reaction was conducted; the results are summarized in Chapter 6. In addition, quantitative performance measures such as workload and utilization factors are contained in Chapter 11.

In this chapter, we first discuss the Police Service Aide role in the WPD, then review job performance in terms of PSA and PO reactions. It should be remembered from Section 2.1 that out of the 41 PSA's under consideration, 31 are assigned to patrol, six to ambulance duty and four to communications. Unless otherwise stated, the discussions in this and the following chapters are focussed on the patrol PSA's.

5.1 ROLE DEFINITION

The role that the PSA's have assumed in the WPD can best be discussed in terms of the stated guidelines and the range of assignments that they have actually been dispatched to handle. As might be expected,

the radio dispatchers have played a major part in the evolving definition of the PSA role through their interpretation and implementation of the guidelines.

GUIDELINES

A set of guidelines was published by the Chief defining appropriate tasks to assign to Police Service Aides on motorized patrol; they are reproduced in Exhibit 5.1. They specify that PSA's are to assist sworn officers by replacing them on non-crime service calls whenever practical. It is emphasized that PSA's are not to respond to any calls involving disturbances which could result in arrests. If, after arrival at the scene, the Police Service Aide determines that the incident is crime-related or serious enough to need an officer's attention, a sworn officer is to be called in. Similarly, officers are to turn lower-priority service calls over to Police Service Aides. When no PSA's are available for dispatch, calls for non-crime services are to be held "for a reasonable time" rather than assigned to a sworn officer (except, of course, in emergencies).

In order to illustrate which particular tasks were to be handled by PSA's, Worcester developed a specific set of guidelines based on the radio call classification scheme. Exhibit 5.1 depicts the radio calls to be served by PSA's. However, in general, the radio call classifications describe the nature of the problem rather than the type of service required. Therefore, in comparing the classifications with the guidelines, certain ambiguities become apparent. For example,

Exhibit 5.1

Guidelines for Incorporating Police Service Aides into the Police Department Operation

Police Service Aides are designated to assist the Police Officer by performing those duties which do not require the service of a sworn police officer.

Police Service Aides assigned to work in a sector will respond to service type calls and are not to be assigned any call where there is any type of disturbance which could result in an arrest, such as felonies, fights, drunk disturbances and family disputes.

They will work in their respective sectors in cooperation with the officer on patrol in the same sector and will assist him where ever practicable such as: investigating motor vehicle accidents, relieving the route officer wherever possible such as a minor accident where there is no serious injuries involved.

They will assist the patrol officer at fires in the re-routing of traffic, relieving an officer wherever possible.

They will assist in administering first aid to the sick and injured when called upon to do so either when dispatched by the radio dispatcher or requested to do so by the route officer and in instances where it is brought to their attention that such assistance is needed by any citizen.

When an Aide has been sent to what has been interpreted as a service call and after arriving at the scene, learns that it is the type of call which fits the category of being crime related or it appears that it could result in a serious disturbance and could better be handled by an officer, he shall call for assistance from the route officer or sector sergeant and be guided by his judgement.

When the route officer has been sent to a call and after having arrived finds that it is a service call which could be time consuming and is not of an emergency nature he may call for the Service Aide in the area to handle such call if the Aide is available at the time, thereby relieving the officer for other duties which may be of a more serious nature.

The Radio Dispatcher will use Service Aides to answer all service calls except when there is no aide available in which case he will dispatch a regular patrol car to the service call.

The Radio Dispatcher will hold calls for a reasonable time where there is no aide immediately available to answer such call until an aide in the area is available except those of an emergency nature where it is imperative that someone respond such as: accidents, fire alarms, injuries, etc.

Exhibit 5.1 (page 2 of 3)

Radio Complaints - Service Calls

The following list of Radio Calls are a sample of the types of calls which are expected to be handled by Police Service Aides.

SNOW COMPLAINTS	Notifying tenants to shovel walks and submitting report on results.
NOTIFICATIONS	All kinds such as: death in family, children arrested by police or outside agencies, children injured, found, etc.
ASSIST CITIZEN	Assist citizens whenever possible and within scope of authority and jurisdiction.
FIRE ALARMS	Assist police officers in re-routing traffic also checking box alarms to determine validity of alarm.
NOISE COMPLAINTS	Check various noise complaints, with the exception of: Those noises which could be caused by a criminal action.
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS	Investigate minor motor vehicle accidents and submit reports. Assist police officers at the scene of motor vehicle accidents.
ANIMAL COMPLAINTS	Lost, stolen animals, investigate and submit report.
STOLEN AND LOST PROPERTY	Investigate and submit reports.
RECOVERED PROPERTY	Investigate and submit report, and turn into Supply Room unless directed to do otherwise by a police official.
STOLEN AND RECOVERED VEHICLES	Investigate and submit reports
MISSING PERSONS	Assist police officers in locating. Obtain descriptions and submit reports for all points bulletin.
SICK PERSONS	Provide transportation to hospital when needed or home or doctors office.
INJURED PERSONS	Administer First Aid when needed, and provide necessary transportation. Also investigate and submit reports.

Exhibit 5.1 (page 3 of 3)

DEFECTIVE STREETS AND SIDEWALKS	Investigate and make reports. Notify area sergeant if serious enough to justify the closing of the street or sidewalk.
AUTOMOBILE OBSTRUCTING	Investigate and attempt to have moved by owner if possible. If unable to have moved call route car or sector sergeant for assistance.
PARKED OR ABANDONED MOTOR VEHICLES	Investigate and attempt to have moved if possible. Submit report.
CHILDREN COMPLAINTS	Children playing in street, disturbing neighbors while playing, sliding in street, etc.
RUBBISH COMPLAINTS	Investigate and attempt to have removed or picked up. Submit report on results.

Detailed procedures for handling the above duties will be forthcoming.

Per: *John J. Hanlon*
John J. Hanlon
Acting Chief of Police

JJH:mkk

vandalism, not listed as a PSA type call in the guidelines, is most often a case of simply taking a report. In such cases, a Police Service Aide can (and does) serve as well as a sworn officer. Vandalism in progress, on the other hand, clearly requires the presence of a sworn police officer. Most of the ambiguities in these classifications can be resolved by judicious screening and categorization by the complaint clerk. The actual proportion of ambiguous classifications is discussed in the next subsection.

In general, the broad guidelines have remained intact. As the Impact Program progressed, certain guideline clarifications have been issued as the need arose. Specifically,*

- PSA's would not investigate hit and run accidents. This would be reserved strictly for the route officers.
- PSA's would not investigate any breaks, either commercial or residential. This would be reserved strictly for the route officers.
- PSA's would not respond to any type of burglary alarm. If they happen to be in the vicinity of the alarm, they may park a distance away from the building involved, for observation purposes; also for the purpose of possibly obtaining any descriptions which could be forwarded to the dispatcher or officers responding to the call.
- PSA's sent to investigate larceny complaints will, upon arrival, call the communications sergeant to be advised as to whether or not it is the type of larceny which can be reported by them. This is for the purpose of exercising some type of control over this particular type of crime, reserving the more serious type of larceny to be investigated by the route officers.

* From 5/14/74 memorandum by Captain John H. Hughes, Commander, Impact Unit, to all Impact officials.

Additionally, PSA's were restricted from responding to any type of calls from the Great Brook Valley housing project, a low-income, public housing project, where their safety might be endangered.

It is interesting to note that as time has progressed, the scope of PSA type calls has not only become more focussed, but also more limited. Part of this limiting process has been to insure PSA safety. But, part of it reflects a growing feeling in the police union that PSA's may be infringing upon police tasks.

DISPATCHING

In a strict interpretation of existing guidelines, we have attempted in Exhibit 5.2 to assign all radio calls to four server categories: PSA-only, PSA-assist, PO-only, and ambiguous. We then analyzed in detail a week's worth of dispatch data to ascertain the degree of cross dispatching; this analysis is summarized in Exhibit 5.3. It is seen that the PO-only category is the only one that is without uncertainty in terms of assignment; this is expected, since PO-only calls are usually clearly criminal in nature. The ambiguous category accounts for 21% of all calls of which slightly less than a half are assigned to PSA-only, while the PSA-only category contains 31% of all calls, of which a third is assigned to PO-only. The point here is that radio call classifications alone cannot be used to ascertain the type of server to send. Despite this fact, have dispatchers been able to "correctly" assign the right type of server to a call based on the total information contained on a radio call card (see Exhibit 5.4)?

Exhibit 5.2

Radio Call Assignments Based on Interpretation of Existing Guidelines

	PSA ONLY	PSA ASSIST	PO ONLY	AMBIGUOUS
000 UNCLASSIFIED				x
100 ROUTE ASSIGNMENTS				
111 Report to Headquarters, Precinct I, etc.				x
120 Standby (Precautionaries)	x			
121 Assist, Meet, Pick Up Officers				x
124 Pick Up Papers, etc.	x			
130 Escort Duty				x
140 Snow Complaints	x			
142 Guard/Transfer Prisoners			x	
144 Found/Recovered Property	x			
150 Notifications	x			
160 Assist Citizen				x
170 Verification				x
200 ALARMS				
205 House Alarms			x	
210 ADT Alarms			x	
220 Car Alarms (Burglary)	x			
230 Fire Alarms	x			
240 Bonfire	x			
250 Car Fires	x			
300 DISTURBANCES				
310 Vandalism				x
320 Disorderly Person			x	
321 Disorderly Gang			x	
322 Fight			x	
323 Drunk			x	
330 Suspicious Person (Prowler)			x	
331 Suspicious Car (Occupied)			x	
340 Children Disturbing (Playing in Street)	x			
341 Discharging Firearms			x	
345 Noise Complaints				x
350 Rubbish Complaints	x			
351 Animal Complaints	x			
360 Domestic Trouble (Include Child-Beating)			x	
400 NONCRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS				
450 Open Door/Window/Lights on in Building			x	
480 Defective Streets/Walks/Wires	x			
490 Licenses/Permits				x

	PSA ONLY	PSA ASSIST	PO ONLY	AMBIGUOUS
500 ALL POINTS BROADCAST				
510 Stolen Car				x
511 Recovered Car	x			
512 Stolen and Received Car	x			
520 Wanted Car	x			
521 Located Car			x	
530 Missing Person	x			
531 Located Person	x			
540 Wanted Person/Suspect				
550 Missing Patient			x	
551 Located Patient				x
570 Escaped Prisoner			x	
571 Apprehended Prisoner			x	
580 Lost/Stolen Plates	x			
581 Recovered Plates	x			
600 MEDICAL CASES				
601 Sick Person				
602 Injured Person	x		x	
603 Dead Person	x		x	
604 Overdose			x	
700 INVESTIGATIONS				
710 Homicide				
720 Rape			x	
730 Assault			x	
740 Armed Robbery			x	
750 Unarmed Robbery			x	
760 Larceny from Motor Vehicle			x	
762 Attempted Larceny of Motor Vehicle			x	
770 Breaking and Entering Dwelling				x
780 Breaking and Entering Commercial			x	
790 Bomb Threat			x	
791 Bombing			x	
799 Narcotics Offenses			x	
800 TRAFFIC INCIDENTS				
811 Auto Accident with Property Damage	x			
812 Auto Accident with Personal Injury		x		
813 Auto Accident with Hit and Run		x		
814 Auto Obstructing				
830 Traffic/Parking Violations			x	
840 Abandoned Car (Empty)	x			
900 CRIMES IN PROGRESS				
920 Rape			x	
930 Assault			x	
940 Armed Robbery			x	
950 Unarmed Robbery			x	
960 Larceny			x	
970 Breaking and Entering Dwelling			x	
980 Breaking and Entering Dwelling			x	

Exhibit 5.3

Cross Dispatching Statistics

RADIO CALLS THAT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ^a	PERCENT OF ALL RADIO CALLS THAT ARE ASSIGNED TO (DURING 1000 - 0200 PERIOD) ^b			
	PSA ONLY	BOTH PO & PSA	PO ONLY	TOTAL
PSA ONLY	13	8	10	31
PSA ASSIST	1	1	3	5
PO ONLY	0	0	43	43
AMBIGUOUS	9	1	11	21
TOTAL	23	10	67	100

a Based on interpretation of existing guidelines (See Exhibit 5.2).

b Based on radio call analysis during week of April 22-28, 1975; number of radio calls for 1000 - 0200 period was 83% of total for 24-hour period.

5-10

FURN.		UNITS		8/9	
LOCATION 24 W C A St. Louis Jg.					
NATURE OF CALL Erasing 08 Dance 703 Prod. Call # 8					
CLERK NAME DISPATCHER					
NAME ADDRESS - COMPLAINANT					
THACT/BLOCK					
BEAT 17		JAN 31 12 27 AM		AR REC'D # 00 00	
DISPOSITION 7901		58/09 70		16 0	
CLEARED 0 30 15		ARRIVED 0 21 17		DISPATCHED 0 20 JAN 31	

Example of a Completed Radio Call Card

Exhibit 5.4

5-11

To find the answer, we further analyzed the categories in Exhibit 5.3 and undertook a complete week of observation at the Communications room.

With regard to PSA or service type calls that are assigned to PO's, we have found that the following factors (in descending order of importance) account for the cross-over:

- Unavailability of PSA units
- Call is a medical emergency that requires a nearest car assignment
- Call requires the legal powers of a police officer
- Call is actually self-initiated by a police officer
- Call is in a neighborhood that is dangerous to PSA's
- Dispatcher error
- Complaint clerk error

In instances of ambiguous calls, dispatchers tend to err conservatively (i.e., assign a PO instead of a PSA unit when in doubt). However, during periods when PO's are extremely busy, some dispatchers do assign PSA's to questionable calls.

Dispatcher competence is another factor contributing to the proper assignment of PSA's. Five criteria were observed to separate the good dispatcher from those who needed improvement: 1) a knowledge of PSA guidelines; 2) a knowledge of the motor route boundaries; 3) a sense of priority for calls; 4) an ability to keep track of the available units; and 5) an understanding of the use of the VU meter.

The first criterion seems to be the least source of confusion. By remembering "reports, transportation, and whenever a police officer requests one," a dispatcher is able to properly assign a PSA nine out of ten times. When observed, all but the most inexperienced dispatchers displayed a good knowledge of the whole PSA role. Knowledge of the motor routes and the development of a sense of priorities about incoming calls are also a simple question of experience. These two criteria are the primary objections which officers have against civilian dispatchers. Because PSA's had been assigned to patrol, police officers feel that PSA's can perform the dispatch function effectively. (Interestingly, the one non PSA civilian dispatcher seemed not to have any problems with remembering motor routes and being able to prioritize calls.) The last criterion, use of the VU meter, is a relatively trivial point which makes a big difference to the units in the field. By watching the meter, a dispatcher can adjust his tone so that he can be heard audibly and without distortion. Both PSA's and PO's who are regarded as good dispatchers are uniformly careful about this; those who are regarded as poor dispatchers have problems here.

Finally, dispatchers who dislike their assignments the least learn more about how to perform their function and are, in the end, much better than other dispatchers. This holds true independent of whether a dispatcher is a PO or a PSA. The current perception by some WPD personnel that communications duty is a punishment is, of course, an aggravating factor.

CONTINUED

1 OF 4

ACTIVITIES

The types of service provided by PSA's are detailed in Exhibit 5.5. The greatest portion of their activity (63.9%) is report taking, primarily auto theft and malicious mischief which are crime reports. Other reports include motor vehicle accidents, larcenies, missing persons, and animal complaints. An additional 17.3% of PSA activity involves transportation of persons, papers, and property. It should be noted that 7.5% involves intradepartmental transportation, and this does not include the activity of one Motor Patrol PSA who is always assigned to mail duty. Our observations suggest that there is a certain amount of unnecessary transporting of WPD personnel and papers. It is uncertain whether the PO's were performing these duties to the same extent before the deployment of the PSA's. At any rate, some PSA time can be saved by controlling and limiting requests for transportation.

5.2 SELF APPRAISAL

As part of our anonymous surveys, we asked both PSA's and PO's how clear they thought PSA guidelines are; Exhibit 5.6 summarizes the results. Combining some percentages, it is seen that of patrol PSA's, 35% think the guidelines are less than clear; as compared to 55% of patrol officers. Clarification of such ambiguities to the patrol force is central to the success of the PSA program. It is interesting to note that 100% of the PSA dispatchers do not find the guidelines at all ambiguous; 50% of them said the guidelines are very

Exhibit 5.5PSA Activities

	Percent of all Radio Calls Served by PSA
1. <u>Report Taking</u>	63.9 percent
Stolen motor vehicles	31.2
Malicious mischief	11.5
Motor vehicle accidents	10.0
Larcenies	5.7
Missing persons	5.0
Animals	0.5
2. <u>Transportation</u>	17.3 percent
Intradepartmental	7.5
Sick/injured citizens	7.3
Found/recovered property	2.5
3. Assist Citizens	9.2 percent
4. Disorderly	2.2 percent
5. Car Blocking	2.2 percent
6. Notifications	2.0 percent
7. Traffic Direction at Fires	1.5 percent
8. Precautionary Standbys	1.0 percent
9. Noise Disturbances	0.7 percent
TOTAL	100.0 percent

Exhibit 5.6

Clarity of PSA Guidelines

HOW CLEAR ARE THE DEPARTMENTAL GUIDELINES THAT INDICATE WHICH ASSIGNMENTS ARE TO BE HANDLED BY PSA'S?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA					PATROL PO	
	IMP (N=12)	MP (N=19)	COMM (N=4)	AMB (N=6)	TOTAL (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)
VERY CLEAR	42	16	50	33	29	22	8
CLEAR	33	42	50	67	45	33	30
SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS OR CONFUSING AT TIMES	25	37	0	0	24	39	44
VERY AMBIGUOUS OR CONFUSING	0	5	0	0	2	6	12
NO ANSWER	0	0	0	0	0	0	6

clear. Dispatchers seem to feel surer about the clarity of the guidelines than do any other PSA's. Ambulance PSA's, whose task is especially well defined, are the next most sure about the guidelines. Special attention was paid to dispatching during the first weeks of PSA deployment by the Director of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee and the Captain in charge of the Impact unit. By correcting and clarifying dispatcher errors made early in the implementation phase, potential problems in this area seem to have been held to a minimum.

Other performance questions that were asked of PSA's are contained in Appendix B, Exhibits B.2 and B.4. A comparable set of results for PO's is contained in Appendix C, Exhibits C.5 and C.6. Noteworthy points include:

- PSA's in general feel that dispatchers are much better at following the guidelines now than they were a year ago. PO's are less positive about this.
- There is general agreement that PSA's rarely request the assistance of police officers when it is not needed.
- PSA's feel that they call for officers because they needed assistance somewhat more often than the officers feel they did.
- PSA's and officers agree that PSA's rarely neglect to call a police officer when they need one.
- Over 30% of patrol PSA's answering the question felt that PO's called for PSA's when they should not have. Officers did not feel this was so.
- Officers and PSA's agree that PO's rarely neglect to call a PSA when they need one.

Exhibit 5.7 shows a list of services provided by the WPD and the proportion of respondents within each group who feel that the service can be provided by PSA's. Of the activities currently assigned to PSA's by the guidelines, only illegal parking complaints and noise complaints have low PSA response rates. Of those activities not assigned to PSA's by the guidelines, larceny reports and past burglary reports have the best PSA response: almost 80% of PSA's feel that they can perform such tasks. Patrol officers are more dubious; only about 25% of them agreed. And investigators are really negative about the use of PSA's for what they probably see as an investigative task. Summarizing the responses, PSA's tend to be most positive about their ability to handle tasks, followed by Impact officers, both patrol and investigative, then the Motor Patrol officers, and finally the Detective Bureau officers.

There is some feeling on the part of the PSA's, both male and female, that females are treated differently from males in terms of assignment, dispatching, and protectiveness by police officers. Many of the male PSA's are resentful of the fact that the women were hired to do the same job and receive the same pay, but do not do exactly the same work. The most obvious example of this is the ambulance duty. Two of the women with medical training (i.e., a licensed practical nurse and an operating room technician with military experience) felt they could handle they duty and that their experience would be valuable to the ambulance unit. They were refused the assignment because they "couldn't lift enough weight."

Exhibit 5.7
Activities Deemed Appropriate for PSA's

BELOW IS A LIST OF POLICE ACTIVITIES. NEXT TO EACH ACTIVITY, PLACE AN "X" IN THE BOX IF YOU THINK POLICE SERVICE AIDES SHOULD REPLACE POLICE OFFICERS IN PERFORMING THAT ACTIVITY. USE YOUR OWN OPINION, NOT THE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES.

	PSA (N=41)	PATROL PO (N=18)		INVESTIGATIVE PO (N=14)	
		IMPACT	MOTOR	IMPACT	DB
Percent Answering With An "X":					
Writing Stolen Auto Reports	100	89	61	93	71
Writing Larceny Reports	85	50	32	43	29
Writing Robbery Reports	17	0	12	0	7
Writing Burglary Reports	22	0	15	7	7
Writing Missing Person Reports	100	100	66	86	79
Handling Past Burglaries	78	17	22	7	14
Handling Motor Vehicle Accidents	100	100	54	71	71
Handling Abandoned Autos	98	94	61	93	50
Handling Illegal Parking Complaints	83	50	24	14	50
Handling Noise Complaints	29	22	7	0	29
Handling Notifications	100	94	61	86	79
Handling Disorderly Males	2	0	2	0	0
Handling Disorderly Females	5	0	2	0	0
Handling Domestic Disputes	0	0	2	0	0
Handling Victims of an Unarmed Robbery	34	6	2	0	0
Handling Down and Out Drunks	32	0	2	0	7
Standing by Stolen Autos	100	100	66	100	86
Assisting Motorists	98	100	61	100	93
Performing Ambulance Duty	90	89	66	93	71
Performing Mail Duty	85	100	71	93	86
Performing Clerical Duty (Inside Jobs)	73	89	71	100	71
Answering Assist Ambulance Calls	93	100	71	93	71
Transporting Papers	85	100	76	100	86
Transporting WPD Officials	68	67	61	71	71
Responding to Fire Alarms	88	89	41	86	79
Dispersing Groups of Noisy Juveniles	20	0	2	0	0
Questioning Rape Victims	39	6	5	0	0
Getting Information at Crime Scenes	46	6	2	14	7

In the assignment of radio calls, the female PSA's feel that dispatchers often discriminate in giving certain calls such as assisting police officers, vandalism, bad accidents, etc. to males. In one instance, a male PSA observed that when something happened on a female PSA's route (adjacent to his), he was taken off his route to answer the call. The females resent this too. They often come on the air and say, "That's my route, I'll take the call."

Finally, as reflected in Exhibit 5.8, PO's seem more protective of female than of male PSA's.* On a number of occasions when we were observing a female PSA, one or more police officers would turn up, unrequested. Usually it was a routine assignment (e.g., report on recovered stolen car, etc.). This "protectiveness" on the part of police officers seems unwarranted, especially in light of the fact that most PO's feel that male and female PSA's are about the same in job performance (see Exhibit C.6(g)).

5.3 OFFICER REACTION

During participant observation of police officers, the officers who were not favorable to the PSA program made remarks like "I don't know what we'd do without the PSA's." Less favorable officers felt the PSA's provided some assistance by answering calls-for-service, but that officers could answer those calls without any detriment to patrol performance. Officers with this view were not in Impact.

A definite effort was made to ride with stewards and officials of the police union--the International Brotherhood of Police Officers

* The tendency of male police officers to be protective of female co-workers has also been observed in Washington, D.C. (See P.B. Bloch, et al., Policewomen on Patrol, The Urban Institute, 1974.)

Exhibit 5.8

Male/Female PSA Perceptions of Cooperation and Job Performance

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA SEX:	
	Male (N=25)	Female (N=16)
HOW CLOSE IS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN PSA'S AND PO'S IN YOUR DIVISION?		
Very Close Cooperation	32	63
Close Cooperation	36	19
Some Cooperation, But Not Enough	24	13
Very Little Cooperation	4	0
No Answer	4	6
IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU THINK FEMALE PSA'S COMPARE IN JOB PERFORMANCE TO MALE PSA'S? THE FEMALE PSA'S ARE:		
Much Better	0	13
Better	4	19
About the Same	48	69
Worse	40	0
Much Worse	4	0
No answer	4	0

(IBPO). The IBPO includes only patrolmen in the union, while the Massachusetts Police Association, which the IBPO replaced in Worcester, allows officers of all ranks in its membership. Most of the active union leaders in Worcester are in the 1600-2400 shift in the Motor Patrol. The union's official position is against the Police Service Aide program, and an attempt was made during participant observation to determine the precise reasons for this opposition. The major reason, according to union officials, is the feeling that fewer additional police officers will be hired by the City if Police Service Aides are hired. There is also a fear that use of PSA's will further reduce the off-duty "pay jobs" available to officers. The personnel issue is especially true, it was thought, if the City must pay for the program when and if federal funds for the program are discontinued. The union position is that more officers would be both an added safety feature and a help in strengthening the union.

During participant observation, a difference was early noted between union rhetoric and the personal views of officers, even staunch union members. While top union officials expressed disapproval of the program mostly in general terms of police hiring, other active union members were less one-sided. One union steward said, "To be honest, there are very good things about the PSA program, but nobody is going to get up at a union meeting and defend the PSA's."

The anonymous surveys gave both patrol and investigative officers an opportunity to express their opinions anonymously in response to specific questions. Exhibit 5.9 presents responses to the question, "Do you think it is a good idea to have a Police Service Aide program?" In Impact, both uniformed officers and detectives were unanimous in replying that the PSA program was a good idea; in the Motor Patrol, the majority of officers also felt the Police Service Aide Program was a good idea. The highest percentage of negative responses came from the first half shift (1600 to 2400), the shift with the greatest number of active union members and officers. The results of the second half shift (2400-0800) should be interpreted cautiously. This shift overlaps only two hours with the PSA shift (1800-0200), and many officers felt they did not have a familiarity with PSA's. However, the responses of this shift may be considered as "gut" responses of police officers, without firsthand exposure, to the idea of PSA's. In this respect, the positive results are significant and encouraging. It should be noted that the Detective Bureau, usually thought of as a conservative, older element in the WPD showed a clear approval of the PSA concept.

The officers were also given the chance to explain (anonymously) their approval or disapproval of the PSA program. The responses to this open-ended question are categorized in Exhibit 5.10. The majority of responses (67%) indicated that the PSA's allowed officers to spend more time on patrol. A minority (26%) of responses were negative, and they were all from Motor Patrol officers.

Exhibit 5.9
PO Perception of PSA Value

5-24

DO YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A POLICE SERVICE AIDE (PSA) PROGRAM?	PATROL PO			INVESTIGATIVE PO	
	IMP (N=18)	MP (By Shift & Total)		IMP (N=14)	DB (N=14)
		0800-1600 (N=9)	1600-2400 (N=15)		
PERCENT ANSWERING:					
YES	100	56	47	64	72
NO	0	33	47	18	21
NO ANSWER	0	11	6	18	7

5-25

Exhibit 5.10
PO Reasons for PSA Value

DO YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE A POLICE SERVICE AIDE (PSA) PROGRAM? PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

COMMENTS	NUMBER OF RESPONSES	
	IMPACT PATROL	MOTOR PATROL
<u>Positive:</u>		
1. "Allows officers more time on patrol"	11	17
2. "Good training for police work"	--	1
3. "Because it gets Federal money"	--	1
4. "PSA's have a better attitude toward service calls"	1	--
<u>Negative:</u>		
1. "Need more officers instead"	--	3
2. "PSA's think they are policemen and are a hindrance to officers"	--	3
3. "Waste of money"	--	2
4. "All police calls should be handled by officers"	--	1
5. "PSA's can't handle all problems that arise"	--	1
6. "The public would rather have officers"	--	1

The unanimous approval of the PSA program from Impact officers is especially significant. Several factors probably contributed to this result: 1) Officers were able to volunteer for Impact because PSA's were used to reallocate police manpower, 2) Police Officers and Police Service Aides in Impact work the same hours for the same supervisors (this is not true in the Motor Patrol), and 3) the Impact commander implemented the PSA program in the WPD and takes special care to see that task guidelines are closely followed.

The last point is supported by the perception of the cooperation between officers and PSA's. Exhibit 5.11 shows that Impact officers and Impact PSA's feel cooperation is much closer between them than do Motor Patrol personnel.

Additionally, we asked officers how often they thought PSA's had improperly taken actions only officers should take. As stated earlier, such occurrences were felt to be infrequent. Even so, 13 of the officers mentioned specific examples, when asked, including:

- chasing stolen cars or moving violation
- attempting to break up disturbances
- showing up at breaks
- running red lights
- dispatch error, not turned over to PO
- calls whose description changed and were not turned over to PO

It should be emphasized that these are simply the officers' perceptions and not proven allegations, and that many of the officers did not

Exhibit 5.11

PSA and PO Cooperation

HOW CLOSE IS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN PSA'S AND POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR DIVISION?

	PSA					PATROL PO	
	IMP (N=12)	MP (N=19)	COMM (N=4)	AMB (N=6)	TOTAL (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)
VERY CLOSE COOPERATION	67	26	75	33	44	44	15
CLOSE COOPERATION	8	43	25	33	29	50	20
SOME COOPERATION, BUT NOT ENOUGH	17	26	0	17	20	6	45
VERY LITTLE COOPERATION	0	5	0	0	2	0	20
NO ANSWER	8	0	0	17	5	0	0

mention any improper actions by PSA's. In the most serious case which we could verify, the officer wrote "One PSA tried to handle a domestic dispute and was assaulted--an off-duty police officer saved him from injury. The police officer arrested the assailant." The most common problem mentioned was that PSA's improperly pursued cars: one participant observer noted a PSA's admission that he not only followed a stolen car, but that when it became involved in an accident, he detained the occupants until the police officer arrived. However, as documented in Chapter 11, there has been to date only one Departmental complaint against a PSA--for not being on assigned duty. The PSA received a one-day suspension.

Finally, in our conversations with and limited survey of police officials, there seems to be a unanimous feeling that PSA's are effective and are doing a good job. In fact, several high-ranking officials have stated that most of the current group of PSA's would make excellent police officers.

In the next chapter, we will discuss another perception of PSA performance--the client's perception.

6 POLICE SERVICE AIDE: CLIENT REACTION

In determining the value of the Police Service Aide concept, the reaction of those served by PSA's is as important as the reaction of those who work with them, since their value is not only dependent on their being able to assist and be integrated with police officers, but also on their ability to serve and satisfy the public. As discussed in Section 3.2, a very limited telephone survey of PSA clients was conducted to ascertain their reaction to the services provided. In addition, a small number of PO clients were also interviewed for comparison purposes. The PO clients included only those who had a service type complaint which could have been answered by a PSA. This chapter discusses the results of the survey of these PSA type clients. It must be remembered at all times that the results are based on a survey of only 221 residents of Worcester, representing approximately one out of every 815 residents. However, the results are significant in that they are not ambiguous: They reflect clear expressions of satisfaction with and acceptance of PSA's.*

The chapter is divided into three sections, dealing respectively with information regarding the survey sample, the satisfaction of clients, and the preference of clients. A summary of the client survey results is contained in Appendix D. The actual survey instrument is included in Appendix A. Some of the exhibits in Appendix D are reproduced in this chapter for convenience.

* These results were also substantiated by our limited participant observation findings.

6.1 SURVEY SAMPLE

As stated in Section 3.2, time and resource constraints dictated that the size of the client survey be limited to no more than 225 telephone interviews. This then constrained our flexibility in selecting the sample and our success in having the sample be representative of the service type of calls-for-service and of the population at large.

SAMPLE SELECTION


Because of the sample size limitation and our need to answer certain questions regarding the services provided by the different types of servers, we decided at the outset that of the 225 telephone interviews, 50 of them were to be with clients who were served by female PSA's only, 50 by male PSA's only, 50 by police officers (PO's) only, and 35 by ambulance PSA's, and the remainder (i.e., 40 of them) jointly by PO's and PSA's. In addition, we wanted to have the PSA and PO samples to be as representative of the service or PSA type of calls-for-service as possible. In actuality, 221 clients were interviewed; 52 of them were assisted by female PSA's only, 72 by male PSA's only, 48 by PO's only, 31 by ambulance PSA's, and 18 jointly by PO's and PSA's. Although an actual telephone interview took no more than 20 minutes, considerable effort was expended in getting the proper and valid telephone information. Telephone data on the final 221 respondents were developed from information contained on radio call cards and pink disposition slips of three different weeks during the months of April, June

and July, respectively. There was no explicit selection of respondents during the first two weeks--we tried to get as many completed telephone interviews of service type calls as was possible. A slight selection of respondents was made during the third week to adjust primarily for the calls-for-service mix--we had many respondents who were involved in traffic incidents. Also, it should be noted that all interviews were conducted within a month after the corresponding occurrence of incidents. As a result we found few respondents who had severe memory problems.

The difficulties we had in obtaining the survey sample can be seen in Exhibit 6.1, which summarizes for a sample week the steps we had to take in order to conduct the telephone survey. First, we reviewed a printout of all calls-for-service during the sample week and narrowed the list down to 43% of all calls; this represented calls that were of a PSA or service type. Next, we reviewed for each of these calls the complaint information contained on the radio call card (filled out by a complaint clerk) and the corresponding pink disposition slip (filled out by a patrol PO or PSA) to find any telephone relevant information (i.e., a name and/or address). Although, as can be seen in Exhibit 5.4, the radio call card does have the space to record name and address information, the information is often missing. Similarly, telephone-relevant information is often missing on the corresponding pink disposition slip, a sample of which is shown in Exhibit 6.2. The net result of reviewing both the radio cards and pink slips was that only

Exhibit 6.1

Locating A Telephone Survey Sample



Note: Each percentage value is expressed in terms of the entry in the box immediately above it.

6-4

Worcester Police Department		REPORT ON ASSIGNMENT	DATE	A. R. NO.
NATURE OF INCIDENT		LOCATION OF INCIDENT		TIME RECEIVED
ACTION TAKEN				TIME CLEARED
				REPORT R.B. No.
REPORTING OFFICER		BEAT NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> CRIME <input type="checkbox"/> TRAFFIC <input type="checkbox"/> VEHICLE <input type="checkbox"/> ARREST <input type="checkbox"/> OFFICER'S <input type="checkbox"/> INJURY <input type="checkbox"/> MISSING
FORM 2 NOTE: Mark all items which apply. Use other side if needed				

Pink Disposition Slip Form

Exhibit 6.2

6-5

43% of all PSA or service type calls had telephone relevant information. Because of misspelled and incomplete information and unlisted numbers, we were only able to find the telephone numbers for 63% of all calls-for-service that had telephone-relevant information--we used both name and address directories to locate the telephone numbers. Finally, our attempt at calling these numbers resulted in a success rate of 41%. Reasons for this relatively low rate included:

- No one at the number made such a complaint.
- Client not at home (three tries were made for each call-- during the day, night and weekend, respectively)
- Client no longer at the number and could not be traced
- Client could not remember the incident.

In summary then, as indicated in Exhibit 6.1, only 101 out of 922 possible calls-for-service resulted in completed telephone interviews based on the first week's effort; this overall success rate of 11% is reflective of the difficulties we encountered.

The success rates for the second and third weeks of data were even lower because they were taken during June and July. A large percentage of calls during the summer months are disturbance calls which PSA's do not handle. Also, it was more difficult to find residents at home because of vacation schedules.

SAMPLE REPRESENTATION

As mentioned earlier, an effort was also made to have the composition of the survey correspond to the types of calls-for-service

normally handled by PSA's. Exhibit 6.3 shows that the correspondence is adequate, at least by the radio call classifications scheme. Note that the comparison in Exhibit 6.3 is based on the initial radio call classification (as specified by the complaint clerk); our telephone survey revealed several erroneous classifications.

Although no demographic characteristics of respondents were used as a basis for sample selection, it is interesting to note from Exhibit 6.4 that the respondent characteristics are as one might have expected from a look at the 1970 census characteristics. Since most heads of households in Worcester, as elsewhere, are male, the percent of male respondents is, as expected, higher than their actual level in the population. Also, given that few children under 18 are complainants, our sample of respondents are older, especially those requiring medical assistance, than as reflected in the census data. The race distribution of our respondents matches that of the population, while the marital status distribution seems to be heavily biased toward married respondents. Again, given the service types of calls-for-service that we are dealing with here, it is logical that most of the respondents are married.

In reviewing the responses discussed in this chapter, it should be noted that not all of our telephone respondents were the actual persons who received the services of a PO or a PSA, or that they were the complainants who originally called for services. Of the total respondents, 55% both called for and received services; 19% received

Exhibit 6.3
Telephone Survey Profile by Radio Call Classification

Radio Call Classifications	Percent of Respondents Served by:				Radio Call Analysis Distribution of Calls Handled by PSA Only in %
	PO Only (N=42)	PSA Only		TOTAL (N=124)	
		ALL MALE (N=66)	MALE (N=58)		
Route Assignments	10	4	11	7	24
Alarms	0	1	0	1	3
Disturbances	27	28	13	21	15
Noncriminal Investigations	0	0	0	0	0
All Points Broadcasts	21	40	38	39	31
Medical Cases	15	10	5	8	6
Investigations	0	12	7	10	7
Traffic Incidents	27	4	27	15	14
Crimes in Progress	0	0	0	0	0

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1-June 30, 1975.

Exhibit 6.4
Telephone Survey Profile by Respondent Characteristics

PERCENT ANSWERING:	RESPONDENTS SERVED BY:					1970 CENSUS DATA
	PSA (N=124)	PO (N=48)	AMB (N=31)	PO/PSA (n=18)	TOTAL (N=221)	
<u>SEX</u>						
MALE	60	69	23	50	56	48
FEMALE	40	31	77	50	44	52
<u>AGE</u>						
UNDER 18	2	4	0	0	2	29
18 - 29	32	31	19	44	31	18
30 - 54	42	44	36	56	43	27
55 - OLDER	23	19	42	0	23	26
REFUSED	1	2	3	0	1	
<u>RACE</u>						
WHITE	96	94	97	94	95	94.4
BLACK	1	6	0	6	2	4.3
SPANISH-SPEAKING	1	0	3	0	1	1.3
ANOTHER ETHNIC ORIGIN	1	0	0	0	1	0
NO ANSWER	1	0	0	0	1	0
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>						
MARRIED	66	47	61	33	60	25.0
DIVORCED	5	2	7	6	5	4.7
SEPARATED	0	2	0	6	1	1.0
WIDOWED	6	6	10	0	6	8.0
NEVER MARRIED	21	29	19	55	25	34.7
NO ANSWER	2	4	3	0	3	27.6

services but did not originally call for it; 18% called for services to be rendered to someone other than themselves; while 8% neither called for nor received services, but were witnesses to the incident. Thus, only 64% of all respondents were true clients, while the remaining 26% were, sometimes involved, eye witnesses, whose perceptions and reactions are, of course, as significant as those of the true clients. In fact, in some cases (e.g., medical cases), the accounts of eye witnesses are more reliable than those who are actually served or assisted.

Finally, a question may be asked regarding the geographic distribution of the survey responses, either by address of incident or by address of residence. The problem here is that without a complete geographic distribution of PSA type calls-for-service, it is impossible to say whether the respondent distribution is representative. At any rate, it is important to remember that the telephone surveys were of PSA type clients (and knowledgeable eye-witnesses); it was not a random survey of Worcester residents.

6.1 CLIENT SATISFACTION

In this section, we view client satisfaction in terms of type of server, sex of server, and sex of respondent. In addition, we discuss client satisfaction with the response time and the Worcester Police Department.

TYPE OF SERVER

Overall satisfaction of PSA type clients is summarized in Exhibit 6.5. Of those respondents served by PSA's, 87% reported that they were

Exhibit 6.5

Overall Client Satisfaction with Type of Server

OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE ASSISTANCE YOU RECEIVED?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	<u>PSA</u> (N=124)	<u>PO</u> (N=48)	<u>AMB</u> (N=31)	<u>PO/PSA</u> (N=18)	<u>TOTAL</u> (N=221)
VERY SATISFIED	52	54	84	60	52
SATISFIED	35	35	10	28	31
NOT VERY SATISFIED	6	0	0	0	4
DISSATISFIED	6	11	6	6	7
NO ANSWER	1	0	0	6	1

either "very satisfied" or "satisfied" with the assistance they received. This compares very closely with 89% for PO's and 88% for combinations of PO's and PSA's. Respondents served by the ambulance were at least 94% satisfied with the service they received, but it should be noted that the calls to which the ambulance is dispatched are different from those to which patrol PO's and PSA's are sent. The important result of this question is that clients feel equally satisfied with the services provided by PSA's as with those provided by PO's in response to the types of calls presently handled by PSA's.

In addition to overall satisfaction, respondents were asked about two more subjective indicators--how well they were treated, and how standing was the server of their feelings. Results of these two questions are contained in Appendix D, Exhibit D.5. Again, there was little variation

between the two types of servers. Of those respondents served by PSA's, 97% felt they were treated quite well or very well during that particular incident. This compared with 94% of those served by PO's and 100% of those served by combination of PO's and PSA's. Similarly, 90% of respondents served by PSA's and 90% of those served by PO's felt that their server was understanding or very understanding. No difference was noted in the way respondents felt they were treated by PSA's and PO's in the services usually provided by PSA's.

SEX OF SERVER

Further, differences in perceived quality of service provided by male and female PSA's were examined. Exhibit 6.6 shows that there is no significant difference here either. Overall, 92% of the respondents served by females were either very satisfied or satisfied with the service they received, as opposed to 85% of those served by males. Of those served by females, 98% were treated very well or quite well, as opposed to 96% of those served by males. Respondents in 86% of the incidents surveyed felt that a female was either very understanding or understanding of their feelings, as opposed to 92% of those served by males.

SEX OF RESPONDENT

Judging from the information contained in Exhibit 6.7, female respondents seem to be only slightly more satisfied with the assistance they received, as compared to their male counterparts.

Exhibit 6.6

Client Satisfaction by Sex of Server

PERCENT ANSWERING:	SEX OF PSA SERVER:		
	FEMALE (N=52)	MALE (N=72)	TOTAL (N=124)
OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE ASSISTANCE YOU RECEIVED?			
VERY SATISFIED	59	47	52
SATISFIED	33	38	35
NOT VERY SATISFIED	4	7	6
DISSATISFIED	4	7	6
NO ANSWER	--	1	1
HOW WELL WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU WERE TREATED IN THIS INCIDENT?			
VERY WELL	73	70	71
QUITE WELL	25	26	26
NOT VERY WELL	--	4	2
POORLY	2	--	1
HOW UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR FEELINGS WAS THE PSA?			
VERY UNDERSTANDING	51	60	57
UNDERSTANDING	35	32	33
NOT VERY UNDERSTANDING	4	4	4
DON'T KNOW	4	3	3
NO ANSWER	6	1	3

Exhibit 6.7Client Satisfaction by Sex of Respondent

PERCENT ANSWERING:	SEX OF RESPONDENT:		
	MALE (N=167)	FEMALE (N=54)	TOTAL (N=221)
OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE ASSISTANCE YOU RECEIVED?			
VERY SATISFIED	57	59	57
SATISFIED	31	33	31
NOT VERY SATISFIED	3	4	4
DISSATISFIED	8	4	7
NO ANSWER	1	0	1
HOW UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR FEELINGS WAS THE PSA/PO?			
VERY UNDERSTANDING	63	52	60
UNDERSTANDING	29	35	31
NOT VERY UNDERSTANDING	4	4	4
DON'T KNOW/NO ANSWER	4	10	5

RESPONSE TIME

One of the most important aspects of police work from the public's viewpoint is the response time (i.e., the time from when a call-for-service is made till the time a patrol unit arrives at the scene of the incident). In the case of PSA or service type incidents, it could be hypothesized that response time may not be as important a consideration. This hypothesis is reinforced by our limited survey results. As indicated in Exhibit 6.8, 86% of all respondents were very satisfied or

satisfied with the response time, even though the median "perceived" response time was a little less than 15 minutes. Also, telephone survey respondents often commented that they didn't expect the police to arrive immediately unless it was an emergency; even those who waited up to an hour in non-emergency cases were quite satisfied. Consequently, client satisfaction is often a matter of expectation.

Exhibit 6.8Response Time Satisfaction by Type of Server

PERCENT ANSWERING:	TYPE OF SERVER				TOTAL (N=221)
	PSA (N=124)	PO (N=48)	AMB (N=31)	PO/PSA (N=18)	
HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR THE POLICE TO ARRIVE?					
LESS THAN 5 MINUTES	7	29	26	17	15
5-10 MINUTES	32	25	29	50	31
10-15 MINUTES	17	10	32	17	18
MORE THAN 15 MINUTES	40	25	10	11	30
DON'T KNOW	2	4	3	6	3
NO ANSWER	2	6	0	0	3
HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE RESPONSE TIME?					
VERY SATISFIED	45	52	68	44	50
SATISFIED	43	30	16	39	36
NOT VERY SATISFIED	3	2	6	0	3
DISSATISFIED	6	8	6	6	6
NO ANSWER	3	8	4	11	5

Response times, as shown in Exhibit 6.8, are perceived to be least for combination of PO's and PSA's, followed by longer times for individual PO's, ambulance PSA's, and individual PSA's. In terms of sex of

server (see Exhibit 6.9), the female PSA's seem to respond faster than male PSA's, yet satisfaction with female response time was a little less than that for male response time. This slight incongruity should remind us that we are dealing with people's perceptions, and they may not be consistent over a range of different questions.

Exhibit 6.9

Response Time Satisfaction by Sex of Server

PERCENT ANSWERING:	SEX OF SERVER		TOTAL (N=124)
	FEMALE (N=52)	MALE (N=72)	
HOW LONG DID IT TAKE FOR THE POLICE TO ARRIVE?			
LESS THAN 5 MINUTES	10	6	7
5-10 MINUTES	32	30	31
10-15 MINUTES	23	13	17
MORE THAN 15 MINUTES	29	48	41
DON'T KNOW	4	--	2
NO ANSWER	2	3	2
HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE RESPONSE TIME?			
VERY SATISFIED	35	53	45
SATISFIED	49	38	43
NOT VERY SATISFIED	2	4	3
DISSATISFIED	8	4	6
NO ANSWER	6	1	3

Exhibit 6.10 looks at response time satisfaction in terms of the sex of the respondents. It is seen that male respondents are more

satisfied than the females; however, both express over 80% satisfaction with the response time.

Exhibit 6.10

Response Time Satisfaction by Sex of Respondent

PERCENT ANSWERING:	SEX OF RESPONDENTS		TOTAL (N=221)
	MALE (N=67)	FEMALE (N=54)	
VERY SATISFIED	55	33	50
SATISFIED	31	50	36
NOT VERY SATISFIED	4	2	3
DISSATISFIED	6	7	6
NO ANSWER	4	7	5

WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT

Every police department must of course be concerned with the image it presents to the public. We tried to determine this image for the WPD, at least insofar as the PSA type clients were concerned.

When respondents were asked how their experience with a PO and/or PSA affected their opinion of the WPD (see Exhibit 6.11), an average of 68% said that it made no difference, and 27% felt that it had raised their opinion of the Department. It is interesting to note that an experience with a PSA, especially an ambulance PSA, raised the respondents' opinion of the WPD slightly more than an experience with a PO.

Exhibit 6.11Client Perception of WPD by Type of Server

HOW HAS THIS EXPERIENCE WITH A PSA/PO AFFECTED YOUR OPINION OF THE WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	TYPE OF SERVER				TOTAL (N=221)
	PSA (N=124)	PO (N=48)	AMB (N=31)	PO/PSA (N=18)	
RAISED	27	21	36	28	27
MADE NO DIFFERENCE	69	73	61	66	68
LOWERED	3	4	3	6	4
DON'T KNOW	1	2	0	0	1

Inasmuch as the majority of respondents indicated that their PSA/PO experience did not change their opinion of the WPD, then the obvious question is what is their stated opinion? Exhibit 6.12 indicates how respondents feel about WPD services in general. Of those served by PSA's,

Exhibit 6.12Client Feeling About WPD Services

IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT POLICE DEPARTMENT SERVICES? ARE THEY:

PERCENT ANSWERING:	TYPE OF SERVER				TOTAL (N=221)
	PSA (N=124)	PO (N=48)	AMB (N=31)	PO/PSA (N=18)	
VERY GOOD	24	21	45	44	28
GOOD	59	69	42	44	57
NOT VERY GOOD	7	2	3	0	5
POOR	4	2	7	6	4
NO ANSWER	6	6	3	6	6

83% thought WPD services were very good or good; of those served by PO's, 90% thought WPD services were very good or good. Over all types of servers, an average of 85% of respondents felt WPD services were very good or good. No significant difference was found in opinions about WPD services expressed by those served by PSA's as opposed to those served by PO's.

Another piece of evidence that collaborates the respondents' feeling that WPD services are good is their perception of neighborhood safety. As reflected in Exhibit 6.13, 76% of all respondents feel that their neighborhood is at least reasonably safe.

Exhibit 6.13Client Perception of Neighborhood Safety

HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE THE SAFETY OF YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	TOTAL (N=221)
VERY SAFE	20
REASONABLY SAFE	56
NOT VERY SAFE	13
VERY UNSAFE	9
NO ANSWER	2

6.3 CLIENT PREFERENCE

Another way of ascertaining client satisfaction with PSA services, as provided by both male and female PSA's, is to ask preference questions. As summarized in Exhibit 6.14, two specific preference questions were asked.

Exhibit 6.14

Client Preference by Type of Server

PERCENT ANSWERING:	TYPE OF SERVER				TOTAL (N=221)
	PSA (N=124)	PO (N=48)	AMB (N=31)	PO/PSA (N=18)	
IN THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT, WHO WOULD YOU PREFER TO ASSIST YOU?					
PO	12	40	10	28	19
PSA	15	10	0	6	11
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	72	50	90	66	69
NO ANSWER	1	0	0	0	1
WOULD YOU PREFER A					
MALE	12	21	26	17	16
FEMALE	3	0	0	0	2
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	82	79	74	83	80
NO ANSWER	3	0	0	0	2

When respondents were asked whether they would prefer a PO or a PSA for providing the kind of service they received, the answers were dependent to some extent on the type of server who actually served the respondent; thus 87% of PSA clients either preferred or were indifferent to being served by a PSA again. This contrasts with 60% of PO clients who preferred or were indifferent to being served by a PSA. The 60% figure is nevertheless quite favorable toward PSA's, since most of the PO clients were generally unfamiliar with PSA's. At first, one might think that the respondents who were served by both PO's and PSA's would give the most valid preference answers. However, it should

be noted that in such situations, PO's always assume responsibility, while PSA's usually play only a supporting role--thus respondents are less likely to see PSA's at their full potential. In sum, it is quite significant that an average of 69% of all respondents were indifferent about being served by a PO or a PSA, and, moreover, 11% of them actually indicated that they would prefer a PSA.

When respondents were asked whether they would prefer a male or a female to provide the kind of service they received, most respondents felt that it made no difference. Those served by PSA's were least likely to prefer a male; this is probably because some of the respondents were served by female PSA's and were satisfied by their performance (see Exhibit 6.6). Again, it is revealing to see that 80% of the PSA type clients are indifferent about being served by a male or a female. This is especially significant in light of the fact that WPD has only one female patrol officer.

Finally, Exhibit 6.15 contains preferences by sex of respondent. It is seen that male respondents tend to prefer PO's and male servers, relative to the preferences of female respondents.

Exhibit 6.15

Client Preference by Sex of Respondent

PERCENT ANSWERING:	SEX OF RESPONDENT		TOTAL (N=221)
	MALE (N=167)	FEMALE (N=54)	
IN THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT, WHO WOULD YOU PREFER TO SERVE YOU?			
PO	22	9	19
PSA	9	19	11
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	69	72	69
NO ANSWER	1	0	1
WOULD YOU PREFER A			
MALE	20	6	16
FEMALE	2	2	2
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	79	91	80
NO ANSWER	2	1	2

7. POLICE SERVICE AIDE: JOB SATISFACTION

The use of civilians by a police department in tasks which had previously been reserved for sworn officers presents a multitude of problems. So far in Part II we have seen that there is no inherent reason in the structure of police departments which should preclude civilianization of the patrol force, that in Worcester the PSA program is a functional and accepted part of the Department; and that the citizens of Worcester have responded well to the deployment of PSA's. In this chapter, we discuss the PSA attitudes toward their job and their future.

The anonymous survey results and participant observation findings indicate that Police Service Aides are quite satisfied with their jobs. Exhibit 7.1 presents a comparison of PSA and PO responses to the question, "Overall, how satisfied are you with police work?" While PSA's and Impact PO's are very similar in their feelings of satisfaction, Motor Patrol PO's are not as satisfied with police work. There is no significant difference in satisfaction resulting from whether a PSA is assigned to Impact Patrol, Motor Patrol, Communications, or Ambulance duty.

A closely related issue to job satisfaction is the pay. Dissatisfaction with pay is a problem common to many civilian programs in police departments.* Low pay has frequently been a cause of attrition;

* See A.I. Schwartz, et al, Employing Civilians in the Police, The Urban Institute, May 1975.

Exhibit 7.1

Satisfaction with Police Work by Type of Server

OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH POLICE WORK?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA					PATROL PO	
	IMP (N=12)	MP (N=19)	COMM (N=4)	AMB (N=6)	TOTAL (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)
VERY SATISFIED	50	47	50	67	51	56	22
SATISFIED	42	42	25	33	39	28	46
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	8	11	25	0	10	17	22
VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	0	0	0	0	10

on the other hand, the fact that civilian salaries are substantially lower than police salaries is a major reason why those programs are initiated in police departments.* In Worcester, however, the civilian PSA force is less dissatisfied with their pay than are the police officers. This is different from some national findings and is probably related to the fact that PSA's are well integrated into street police operations. Exhibit 7.2 shows that 46% of the PSA's are somewhat or very dissatisfied with their pay. The comparable percentage for Motor Patrol officers is 64%, and 95% for Impact officers. At the time of the survey in June 1975, PSA's were paid \$140 per week, while officers with less than two years experience were making \$176. Although the

* Actually, in Worcester no real cost saving was achieved, nor was it intended, since PSA's did not replace officers. PSA's are purely supplementary to the sworn officer force. Future policy decisions, however, may well look into PSA's as a cost-saving factor.

majority of PSA's seem satisfied with their current pay, they are quite unhappy about the lack of a career ladder and a corresponding pay schedule; this matter is discussed further in Section 7.3, where we consider PSA job aspirations. The next two sections consider PSA satisfaction with certain aspects of their work and with their current level of interactions with police officers and officials.

Exhibit 7.2

Satisfaction with Pay by Type of Server

HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR PAY?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA	PATROL PO	
	TOTAL (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)
VERY SATISFIED	5	0	5
SATISFIED	49	6	32
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	44	67	37
VERY DISSATISFIED	2	28	27

7.1 ASPECTS OF WORK

The anonymous survey asked PSA's in open-ended questions to briefly describe the most and least satisfying aspects of their jobs. Exhibit 7.3 lists those aspects that were mentioned by at least two PSA's; the most mentioned aspect in each category is listed first. Each listed aspect is expanded upon below, followed by a discussion of how PSA's feel the current PSA program can be improved. Additionally, a brief subsection on male/female PSA perceptions of certain aspects of work is included.

Exhibit 7.3Most and Least Satisfying Aspects of Work

<u>Most Satisfying Aspects</u>	<u>Least Satisfying Aspects</u>
1. Helping people	1. "Taking grief" from the public
2. Helping police officers	2. Having a bad work schedule
3. Investigating accidents	3. Transporting police officials
4. Training for a law enforcement job	4. Being used as a "taxi service"
	5. Performing mail runs
	6. Calling for police officers

MOST SATISFYING ASPECTS

The service aspect of helping people was most often mentioned in comments written by PSA's. They also felt that the PSA program is a good one because it frees up police officer time. One PSA wrote,

I feel the PSA's provide the PO's with some relief from the tedious aspects and time-consuming aspects of their job. I also feel that in certain situations, the public is glad to have someone not quite so representative of authority. I feel this also applies because PSA's can take more time with individuals in need of assistance.

Another wrote,

The PSA's definitely provide a service to the public. They have time to spend and talk over incidents with the people they have serviced, where officers are more rushed to answer more urgent calls. Also, seeing so many young people so involved in the community has a definite impact on young and old alike.

Training for a job in law enforcement was also frequently mentioned as a positive aspect of the PSA job, as indicated by the following remark:

I think every person who wants to get involved with law enforcement should first be a PSA, to find out what being a police officer is all about. Not only would you know if you want to be a police officer, but the Department would know by your performance if they want you, and that is very important to both parties.

LEAST SATISFYING ASPECTS

Each of the least satisfying aspects of work listed in Exhibit 7.3 is discussed in this subsection.

Taking Grief from the Public

"Taking grief from the public" is related to the issue of PSA authority. Several Police Service Aides mentioned that they receive verbal abuse from adolescents who realize that the PSA's do not have police authority. During observation, we witnessed minor incidents where teen-age groups made disparaging remarks at female PSA's, and instances where individuals committed traffic violations in front of PSA's. On the whole, though, there have been no major problems with the public's taking advantage of PSA limitations.

The additional authority suggested by PSA's is mostly the power to give parking tickets, to ask for the tow truck for abandoned autos, and to take more reports. Although PSA's understand that they are not police officers and that they were to have no punitive powers but would perform only service-related tasks, there are several situations

which are frustrating. When a PSA answers a call for an auto obstructing (a driveway, usually), he first tries to find the owner of the vehicle. If he cannot find the owner, the only thing he can do is call for a police officer who then tags the car and requests a tow. Sometimes, due to a large number of calls in progress, the complainant may have to wait several hours before having the car moved. The PSA's feel that this is a waste of their time, as well as the time of the police officer and the complainant. They would like to be able to tag the car and request a tow after making an effort to find the owner. A related problem is coming across a stolen car abandoned in the street. PSA's can take the report but cannot have it moved out of the way of traffic. There is sometimes a long wait while the owner is notified.

The following are three examples of PSA comments regarding the scope of PSA authority:

Service aides should have some authority. As it is, if we ask someone to move his car and he refuses, we either look foolish or else bother a cop for help. PSA's should be more involved in other crime departments such as juvenile and the rape team. Service aides aren't told anything because they're not supposed to get involved, but we have eyes and ears too. Sometimes it helps if we know what to look and listen for. Sometimes not enough involvement is dangerous.

I would give them a little more lead way--where they could give summons. And in some case go along with a PO to get experience. Parking tickets should be given to PSA's.

Let the PSA contribute more to the police department. Take over completely communication and ambulance service. The power to issue moving violations and parking ticket and the authorization of mace. Of course the PSA would need additional training.

Having a Bad Work Schedule

Several PSA's mentioned dissatisfaction with the PSA work schedule-- six days working and then two days off (police officers work four days and then have two off). Initially, Police Service Aides did not work on Sundays, but that was changed to allow for more complete PSA coverage. Actually, as can be seen in Appendix B, Exhibit B.3, only 31% of all PSA's are somewhat or very dissatisfied with the work schedule.

Transporting Police Officials and Citizens

Many PSA's are resentful of the use of their time in transportation because they feel it keeps them off their routes. Transporting police officials involves a task that many police departments have eliminated. Daily transportation assignments include the Chief, the Deputy Chiefs, and the Impact Captain, all of whom receive rides to and from work. In addition, these officials, as well as lower-ranked officials, use PSA's for transportation when needed during working hours. According to the Chief of Police, this is not a new task that has arisen because of the availability of the PSA's; he states that it was previously done by officers.

Citizens also make heavy demands on PSA's for transportation. While many requests are legitimate (transporting sick or injured persons to the hospital), many are no more than requests for a free taxi service. When asked what he liked least about the PSA job, one PSA said, "The thankless tasks; especially when the public or police officers treat me like a taxi cab driver. I feel that I am a professional, and should be treated as such."

During observation, several instances of taxiing were observed. In one, a PSA answered a call to take a report on a stolen car. When the PSA completed the report, the man asked for a ride part of the way home, since he said there was no other means of transportation. He lived in a neighboring town which was about a 30-minute drive. The PSA told him permission would have to be obtained. The PSA then radioed the dispatcher and permission was given to "take the man where he wants to go." (It was unclear who gave the authority.) He was then taken home. Altogether the call took one hour and 20 minutes. This was during the day shift when few PSA's are working.

In another instance, a man who had his car stolen was informed that it had been found and was on its way to an auto body shop because it was inoperable. He asked to have a PSA pick him up so that he could go over there and "take a look at it." The PSA felt that the complaint clerk should have refused the man.

Performing Mail Runs

Mail runs involve transporting mail from one station to another, and also delivering mail from the City Manager's office, including, at times, the hand delivery of mail to the homes of the City Council members. Again, because of a lack of a "before" data base, it is hard to say whether the level of paper transportation has increased because of PSA availability. Through observation, we do, however, feel that the transporting of paper and people could and should be better controlled and limited.

Calling for Police Officers

A few PSA's responded that having to call for police officers was one of the least satisfying aspects of their job. Guidelines state that PSA's are supposed to call for PO assistance when they are faced with a situation not specified in the PSA task guidelines.

But, as one PSA wrote, "Often a PSA will have to tie up a police officer for something routine," (e.g., tagging motor vehicles, investigating some past crimes--larceny, breaking and entering, and assault and battery). Furthermore, in actual street situations, the incentive is for the PSA to avoid calling for police officers. One PSA wrote that PSA's are

...sometimes hesitant, because some police officers resent being "dragged in" to a situation, especially one which the PSA comes upon on his own. Sometimes (the PSA is) told to "mind (his) own business" and stay out of trouble.

During observation, a PSA went by a car that pulled into a parking lot. The driver of the car was apparently intoxicated. When asked why he did not call for an officer, the PSA replied, "Officers don't like to be bothered with drunk drivers. And I want to be a police officer someday, so I don't want too many enemies in the Department."

SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS

PSA's were asked how they would improve the PSA program. This question elicited an enthusiastic response. Exhibit 7.4 lists the suggestions that were mentioned by at least two PSA's, beginning with the most frequently mentioned.

Exhibit 7.4PSA Suggested Improvements

HOW WOULD YOU IMPROVE THE POLICE SERVICE AIDE PROGRAM?

1. Give PSA's more authority (e.g., ticket parked cars, take more reports).
2. Improve the structure of the PSA program.
3. Improve PSA car lights.
4. Give PSA's credit for the police exam.
5. Give PSA's overtime pay when earned (instead of compensatory time off).
6. Screen PSA's better.
7. Make PSA job a prerequisite to becoming a police officer.
8. Make the guidelines clearer.
9. Improve the dispatching.
10. Have better training.
11. Have PSA's ride double during busy times.
12. Expand PSA coverage to 24 hours (instead of 16).
13. Get better officials.
14. Give PSA's mace or nightsticks.

The suggestion for more authority--primarily parking tickets and report writing responsibilities--has already been discussed.

The second most frequent suggestion dealt with the structure of the PSA program, a feature that was often reiterated by PSA's during participant observation.

Many PSA's felt the need for some kind of organization within their own ranks which would provide a means of solving supervision problems and would create a job ladder with higher pay and more responsibility. The following are three specific PSA comments on this issue:

I feel that the PSA's should be more organized. There is no one that we can go to with a complaint either about how a job was done or about how we are treated. I think that there ought to be a number of PSA's a rank higher as corporals to whom other PSA's can take their complaints and then the corporals can then go to the Police Officials and work the problems out. This is my main complaint.

Most officials are apathetic--overall lack of supervision exists. Officials feel they have enough to handle the policemen under their command--SUGGESTION: Promote certain PSA's with leadership qualities to supervisory positions.

One of the main gripes I have about the program is that there is no organized unit within the PSA program. I feel that grievances of PSA's need some outlet. ... Police officers are indeed an organized and somewhat separate group of people. They are bound together, because if they don't stick together, they don't have anyone or anything. The PSA's, on the other hand, don't have anything. We still receive the same "PIG" calls from people on the street; and yet we are not police officers. The PO's don't accept us as being part of themselves, so we are out all around the block. We are in but we are out. We are out, but we are in. I don't know if there is any real solution to this. I don't know one.

As the last comment states, there is no easy solution to the problem of incorporating a new unit into an established bureaucracy, especially a police department. The very structure of most police departments makes it difficult for a new civilian force to feel at home in the bureaucracy. One PSA felt that, "If the military structure of the police department would allow some PSA voices to be

heard, some individuals could contribute a lot." However, to our knowledge, Worcester has been able to integrate the civilian component to a greater degree than most other police departments in the country.

Most of the PSA suggested improvements, as listed in Exhibit 7.4, are discussed in Chapter 13 where we make certain recommendations regarding the Impact Program in general.

PERCEPTION OF WORK BY SEX OF PSA

An important question is whether male and female PSA's feel differently about their work. The answer, as indicated in Exhibit 7.5, is that there is no significant difference. An interesting statistic is that 12 out of the 16 female PSA's are very satisfied with their present assignment: this is significant.

7.2 INTERACTIONS WITH OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS

Many of the suggestions made by the Police Service Aides--especially the expressed desire for organizational solidarity and recognition--stem, at least partially, from the way in which PSA's are treated by police officers and police officials.

OFFICERS

An initial and understandable hesitancy on the part of patrol officers to accept the PSA's was found. As one PSA put it,

I find that some police officers, once they recognize me as an individual, and they see that I'm OK, then I can work well with them. Until that point, it's like I'm some sort of enemy that they are forced to tolerate.

Exhibit 7.5

Male/Female PSA Perceptions

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA		TOTAL (N=41)
	MALE (N=25)	FEMALE (N=16)	
OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH POLICE WORK?			
VERY SATISFIED	56	44	51
SATISFIED	32	50	39
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	12	6	10
VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0	0
HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT?			
VERY SATISFIED	52	75	61
SATISFIED	40	13	29
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	4	13	7
VERY DISSATISFIED	4	0	2
HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR SCHEDULE?			
VERY SATISFIED	16	38	24
SATISFIED	52	31	44
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	20	31	24
VERY DISSATISFIED	12	0	7

Several PSA's suggested a closer interaction with police officers.

For example, one PSA said,

I think that it would be a good idea that PSA's and PO's got together on occasions, say once a month, to discuss issues and Department policies so that everyone is aware of what's happening and what has changed and also know one another in a closer relationship.

The PSA's, by their presence on patrol, serve as additional "eyes and ears" for the WPD. For this reason, the following question was asked of both PO's and PSA's: "In general, how helpful are PSA's in providing information or suggestions for police activities?" Exhibit 7.6 shows the responses to the question. It is interesting to note that Impact PO's indicate that PSA's are more helpful than their counterparts in Motor Patrol; again, this reflects the closer cooperation that exists among Impact personnel.

Exhibit 7.6

PSA Helpfulness to Police Officers by Type of Server

IN GENERAL, HOW HELPFUL ARE PSA'S IN PROVIDING INFORMATION OR SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICE ACTIVITIES?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA	PATROL PO		INVESTIGATIVE PO	
	TOTAL (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)	IMP (N=14)	DB (N=14)
VERY HELPFUL	24	22	10	0	0
HELPFUL	56	44	17	71	36
NOT VERY HELPFUL	15	33	49	29	36
NOT AT ALL HELPFUL	2	0	20	0	14
NO ANSWER	2	0	5	0	14

Several PSA's also wrote comments about PO reaction to their suggestions. One PSA complained,

But no one listens (to our suggestions). I feel that we are objects that can be pushed around as puppets and treated as slaves at times and they (slaves) do not make suggestions.

Another felt that PSA's

could be more helpful, but police officers and administration are not receptive to such information and/or suggestions, especially suggestions.

OFFICIALS

PO's and PSA's were also asked questions about their officials since it is commonly thought that the relationship with supervisors affects job satisfaction. When asked "Are there one or more officials to whom you regularly talk about your job and job-related problems?", 93% of all PSA's replied affirmatively (see Exhibit 7.7). The PSA's felt they had more regular contact with officials than did Impact officers, and much more than Motor Patrol officers. However, in terms of how often officials were understanding and sympathetic about job-related complaints, 58% of all PSA's said that it was often or very often (see Exhibit 7.8). In Impact, 92% of the PSA's said officials were understanding and sympathetic, as compared to 48% of Motor Patrol PSA's. Impact PO's were as positive about their officials as were Impact PSA's. Motor Patrol officers mostly felt their officials were "occasionally" or "hardly ever" sympathetic to their complaints.

These results reinforce comments from individual PSA's (made during participant observation) that the relationships between officials

Exhibit 7.7Contact with Officials

ARE THERE ONE OR MORE OFFICIALS TO WHOM YOU REGULARLY TALK ABOUT YOUR JOB AND JOB-RELATED PROBLEMS?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA					PATROL PO	
	<u>IMP</u> (N=12)	<u>MP</u> (N=19)	<u>COMM</u> (N=4)	<u>AMB</u> (N=6)	<u>TOTAL</u> (N=41)	<u>IMP</u> (N=18)	<u>MP</u> (N=41)
YES	100	95	100	67	93	89	51
NO	0	5	0	17	5	11	6
NO ANSWER	0	0	0	17	2	0	2

Exhibit 7.8Understanding and Sympathy of Officials

WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLAINTS ABOUT YOUR JOB, HOW OFTEN ARE YOUR OFFICIALS UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHETIC?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA					PATROL PO	
	<u>IMP</u> (N=12)	<u>MP</u> (N=19)	<u>COMM</u> (N=4)	<u>AMB</u> (N=6)	<u>TOTAL</u> (N=41)	<u>IMP</u> (N=18)	<u>MP</u> (N=41)
VERY OFTEN	67	32	25	33	41	56	12
OFTEN	25	16	0	17	17	33	22
OCCASIONALLY	8	32	50	17	24	11	37
HARDLY EVER	0	21	25	17	15	0	20
NO ANSWER	0	0	0	17	2	0	10

and the quantity and quality of supervision is significantly better in Impact. This is partly due to the fact that Impact PSA's and PO's (as well as officials) work the same shifts; this is not the case with Motor Patrol PSA's, who overlap PO shifts.

7.3 ASPIRATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE

The PSA's were hired with no promise of job security. They are not protected by any union or association, have no social security or retirement benefits, and have no ladder for promotion which would provide better pay or more responsibility. Their principal aspiration is to become a police officer. Exhibit 7.9 shows that 88% of PSA's want to become police officers*; all except one of them would like to become PO's in the Worcester Police Department. If they do not become a PO in Worcester and, assuming that the PSA program continues in its current form, then 44% of them expect to leave within two years (see Exhibit 7.10). This would cause significant instability in the PSA program and recruiting and training problems for the WPD which, in two years, would have become quite dependent on PSA's.

When asked to explain why they do not have long-term commitments to the PSA program, almost all PSA's mentioned the issues of insecurity,

* The 12%, or 5 out of 41, who said they did not want to be a police officer, included two individuals who had already submitted their resignations at the time of the survey in June 1975. As of July 1975, then, 36 of the remaining 39 PSA's wanted to become police officers.

Exhibit 7.9

PSA Aspirations on Becoming a Police Officer

DO YOU WANT TO BE A POLICE OFFICER? IF YES, WHICH STATEMENT MOST NEARLY EXPRESSES YOUR PREFERENCE?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA				
	IMP (N=12)	MP (N=19)	COMM (N=4)	AMB (N=6)	TOTAL (N=41)
YES:					
NO EXPLANATION	8	0	0	17	5
I WANT TO BE A POLICE OFFICER ONLY IN WORCESTER	25	16	25	0	17
I WANT TO BE A POLICE OFFICER IN ANOTHER DEPARTMENT, ONLY IF I CAN'T BE A POLICE OFFICER IN WORCESTER WITHIN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME:					
<u>LENGTH OF TIME IN YEARS</u>					
NO TIME SPECIFIED	17	26	0	0	17
1 YEAR	0	11	0	0	5
2 YEARS	8	21	25	33	20
3-5 YEARS	8	11	25	33	15
<u>SUBTOTAL</u>	33	69	50	66	57
I WANT TO BE A POLICE OFFICER ANYWHERE I CAN	8	0	0	0	2
I WANT TO BE A POLICE OFFICER, BUT <u>NOT</u> IN WORCESTER	0	5	0	0	2
NO ANSWER	9	0	0	17	5
<u>TOTAL YES</u>	83	90	75	100	88
NO	17	10	25	0	12

Exhibit 7.10

Length of Stay in Current PSA Program

UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS, ASSUMING THE PSA PROGRAM CONTINUES, AND ASSUMING YOU DO NOT BECOME A POLICE OFFICER IN WORCESTER, WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM TIME YOU THINK YOU WOULD REMAIN IN THE PROGRAM?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA				
	IMP (N=12)	MP (N=19)	COMM (N=4)	AMB (N=6)	TOTAL (N=41)
I AM LOOKING FOR ANOTHER JOB AT PRESENT	17	11	25	0	12
LESS THAN ONE YEAR MORE	0	5	0	17	5
1-2 YEARS MORE	42	21	25	17	27
2-5 YEARS MORE	25	21	0	17	20
6 YEARS OR MORE	17	32	50	33	29
NO ANSWER	0	11	0	17	7

low pay, and not gaining any advantage toward becoming a police officer (see Appendix B, Exhibit B.5). The following four comments reflect their feelings on the matter:

At this time the PSA's do not have any social security or retirement taken out of their pay. I could not see staying on this job if you keep on losing out on this.

No security, low pay, and I do not want to be at the bottom forever. I don't mind starting there, but I'm not staying there.

We have no retirement fund and no social security is taken out. Who is going to pay us when we suddenly get dropped and there are no more funds? Jobs aren't easy to come by and I feel there should be more security to this job.

I would not remain a PSA if the program worsens and it is definite the chances of becoming a Worcester PO are not very good. I believe the PSA's should be given a better chance of becoming a police officer than the average citizen if their performance as a PSA is satisfactory.

Despite all the problems of job insecurity and difficulties with acceptance in the police department, it should be recalled that 90% of the Police Service Aides are satisfied with police work (see Exhibit 7.1) and 54% are satisfied with their pay (see Exhibit 7.2). Many consider their PSA experience training for becoming a police officer, and several have recommended that all future officers be required first to serve as PSA's.

As one PSA stated,

I plan to make a career of police work and the PSA program is a stepping stone. Before becoming a PSA I was not positive as to whether I would want to join the Police Department. But now I know that I will like the PO's work and feel I am capable of doing their work. I am very satisfied with the PSA program. I feel that so far I have been able to be of assistance to many citizens and this gives me a lot of satisfaction. I really love the job.

There is indeed tremendous potential for developing the Police Service Aide program into a recruiting and training program for officers. During the past decade, few police departments have implemented this idea. Worcester has the potential to be among the first, but problems of job security and permanence of the PSA program must first be overcome.

PART III: QUALITATIVE MEASURES--OTHER IMPACT COMPONENTS

8 IMPACT SECTOR PATROL UNIT

9 IMPACT INVESTIGATIVE UNITS

10 CRIME PREVENTION UNIT

8 IMPACT SECTOR PATROL UNIT

As stated in Chapter 2, the Impact patrol unit operates within the Impact sector and for only two shifts, covering the 1000-1800 and 1800-0200 periods of the day. For purposes of the evaluation, police officers (PO's) in Motor Patrol were selected as a comparison group for the Impact patrol PO's. A small sample of Motor Patrol and Impact officers were observed during their normal patrol hours. In addition, an anonymous survey was administered to all Impact patrol officers (18) and to a sample of Motor Patrol officers (41). The Motor Patrol officer sample consisted of all officers who were working 0800-1600 on July 23; 1600-2400 on July 29; and 2400-0800 on July 30, 1975. The Motor Patrol survey reached nine officers on the day shift (0800-1600), 15 officers on the first half shift (1600-2400), and 17 officers on the second-half shift (2400-0800). As discussed in Chapter 3, the surveys were administered and monitored by an evaluator to assure anonymity and non-interference. Results of the Impact and Motor Patrol PO surveys are contained in Appendix C.

This chapter is divided into four sections, dealing, respectively, with background, job performance, job satisfaction and unit interaction issues.

8.1 BACKGROUND

In considering the Impact patrol unit it is important to review the personnel that make up the unit; the supervisors or officials who command it; and the facilities and equipment that support it.

PERSONNEL

At the beginning of the Impact Program, the uniformed patrol officers and the non-uniformed investigators in Impact were volunteers from the Motor Patrol and Foot Patrol. These men volunteered primarily to get a better work schedule than they had in the other divisions (the Worcester Police Department has fixed shifts based on seniority) or to get out of the Foot Patrol. However, not enough voluntary transfers to the Impact unit were received from other divisions, probably because Impact was an unknown entity in a normally conservative police department and because the newly-selected commander had a reputation of being more of a disciplinarian than many other commanders. As a result, five officers were taken into Impact directly from the Police Academy; these recruits expressed a preference to come to Impact after the Impact commander had visited the Academy to explain the program.

In terms of personal background characteristics, Impact officers are not significantly different from Motor Patrol officers (see Appendix C, Exhibit C.1), except that the day shift officers in the Motor Patrol are substantially older than all other officers because of the seniority system of assignments.

SUPERVISORS

Impact supervisors were also specially selected. The Captain of the Impact Program was formerly the Administrative Assistant to the Deputy Chief for Operations. Although the Captain was not selected until planning for the Impact Program had been completed, he was given a clear mandate to assume full responsibility for the Program. The Captain has achieved a high degree of unit identity and solidarity by initiating publicity for

the Impact Program both within the Department and in the news media. The following qualities of the Impact commander have contributed to unit identity and officer morale:

- Flexibility -- The Captain is open to suggestions from patrol officers and has changed tactics based on their views and substantiated by crime analysis.
- Support of Officers -- The Captain has supported, in memos to the Chief, the desires of his men for equipment, overtime pay, and other morale-building issues.
- Press Relations -- The Captain has maintained an excellent relationship with the news media, resulting in many favorable articles dealing with the Impact Program (see, for example, Exhibit 8.1).

Lieutenants and sergeants have also been specially selected. The Captain is given the opportunity to express a preference for supervisors from among a group of supervisors eligible for transfer. Probably because of the supervisors having been specially selected and the fact that they are attentive to unit prestige and officer morale, Impact officers have a much more positive view of their supervisors or officials than do Motor Patrol officers. Exhibit 8.2 shows that in Impact 89% of the officers said there was at least one official to whom they talked regularly about their job and job-related problems, while only 51% of Motor Patrol officers felt they had regular contact with an official. Even more striking is the difference in response to the question, "When you do something outstanding, how often does one of your officials tell you that you did a good job?" In Impact, 44% of the patrol officers answered "very often" as compared to only 2% in the Motor Patrol (see Exhibit 8.3). While 32% of Motor Patrol

Exhibit 8.1

Sample of Impact Program News Coverage

Police Impact Plan Helps Drop in Crime

By ROSCOE C. BLUNT JR.
Of The Gazette Staff

In a survey of the new police Impact Program, almost one year in operation, police officials are "highly encouraged by a significant drop" in robberies and burglaries in the Impact area.

Police also report a drastic jump in arrests for burglary, robbery and receiving stolen property for the April-December period last year over the previous year.

A less dramatic decrease is also being noted in robberies and burglaries in the rest of the city, exclusive of the Impact section, a program statistician said today.

Impact was started April 1 with money from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Impact area extends from Pleasant Street to June Street and south to Webster Square, where it continues to Cambridge Street, Southbridge and Madison streets and back to Pleasant Street.

During the April-December period of 1973, there were 287 robberies in the Impact area. During the same period last year, the robbery totals dropped to 183 — a decrease of 35.5 per cent, according to Capt. John H. Hughes, Impact Program commander.

In other sections of the city, there were 326 robberies reported during the nine-month period of 1973. Last year, these totals dropped to 316 — a dip of 3.1 per cent.

The survey shows that bur-

glaries in the Impact section dropped 15.7 per cent from 1,056 cases investigated in 1973 compared to 890 last year.

In other parts of the city, 3,745 burglaries were reported in 1973. This dropped to 3,197 — a decrease of 14.6 per cent.

Hughes said there have been many contributing factors concerning what police regard as perhaps turning the corner on robberies and burglaries.

As part of the \$750,000 federal grant last year, police hired 44 police service aides who were expected to answer about 38 per cent of the total police calls. During the first eight months on the street, the PSA were answering an average of 26 per cent of the calls. In December, they answered 36.6 per cent.

"At the rate they have been increasing the calls, we expect to reach the ultimate goal of 38 per cent in the next few months," Hughes said. "This PSA program has freed the police officers for much more patrol activity and this has definitely been felt in the crime-reduction statistics."

Strike Force

Hughes said the Robbery Strike Force, the Burglary Task Force, the Crime Prevention Bureau and the Team-Policing Impact Sector Patrol

Unit, all segments of the Impact Program, have been effective because of innovative methods being used.

"The uniformed patrol unit has been extremely effective in gathering intelligence and building rapport and confidence with the public. They work like the old time cop on the foot beat who knew everyone on his beat. In police work, you can't beat this day-to-day contact with the citizen," Hughes maintained.

During the first nine months the impact units were in operation, more than 200 arrests were made for burglary, robbery or receiving stolen property, Hughes said. Although no figures were available for the same period the previous year in the impact area, "last year's figures were more than double the year before", Hughes added.

During January and February, robberies in other portions of the city soared. Asked about this, Hughes said, "the impact office joined forces even closer with the Detective Bureau in an all out effort to stop the quick rash of robberies."

Hughes said the arrest of five gunmen solved a large majority of the robberies in other sections of the city. "We knew who they were but it took a little time to catch them in the act," he said.

SOURCE: The Worcester Gazette, March 3, 1975.

Exhibit 8.2

PO Contact with Officials

ARE THERE ONE OR MORE OFFICIALS TO WHOM YOU REGULARLY TALK ABOUT YOUR JOB AND JOB-RELATED PROBLEMS?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PATROL PO	
	Impact (N=18)	Motor Patrol (N=41)
YES	89	51
NO	11	44
NO ANSWER	0	5

Exhibit 8.3

Encouragement by Officials

WHEN YOU DO SOMETHING OUTSTANDING, HOW OFTEN DOES ONE OF YOUR OFFICIALS TELL YOU THAT YOU DID A GOOD JOB?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PATROL PO	
	Impact (N=18)	Motor Patrol (N=41)
VERY OFTEN	44	2
OFTEN	28	12
OCCASIONALLY	28	44
HARDLY EVER	0	32
NO ANSWER	0	10

officers answered in the extreme negative that their officials "hardly ever" compliment them, none of the PO's in Impact felt this to be the case.

Personnel and supervision were specifically mentioned by several Impact PO's in the open-ended survey questions about the Impact Program.

One officer felt that

Impact has worked because of the incentive of our officials and of the closeness of the men and the Sergeant. Impact can work anywhere if you have the men who want to work and an official that has good leadership quality.

A second officer emphasized the importance of getting backup from officials

The Impact Program has finally developed for those police officers who want to do police work, a program where police work can be done without re-priminations from those officials who don't want police work done or don't want police officers receiving overtime in court Working under officials who encourage police work to be done, who want police work done, and who take time to commend a job is rewarding to both the department and the individual.

While personnel and supervision are cited by officers as a reason why Impact has worked, the actual reasons for Impact "success" as it relates to patrol is more problematic. The issue of success measures is discussed in Section 8.2.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

One of the causes for resentment from Motor Patrol PO's is the disparity in facilities and equipment between the two units. The total Impact Program is supported by a civilian crime analyst and three civilian secretaries, while the Motor Patrol, with approximately three times as

many officers, has only one civilian clerk.

Even the physical surroundings of Impact and the Motor Patrol are different, although the units are located in the same building. As one Motor Patrol officer remarked during observation, "We had to wait two years to get a water cooler, but Impact has air conditioners, wall-to-wall carpeting, and a soda machine. That's just not fair." Actually, the Impact offices are not unusually plush; they seem to be only because of the poor physical facilities of the Motor Patrol. The Department has recently completed plans for a new police station that will incorporate all units under one roof.

In addition to the facilities, officers in Impact have the use of equipment that is not available to Motor Patrol officers, including spare portable, handi-pak radios (originally obtained for PSA's), as well as spare PSA vehicles.

8.2 JOB PERFORMANCE

As in the case of the Police Service Aide Program, there were no measures in the design of the Impact Program by which to judge the performance of the uniformed patrol officers or to assess the factors relating patrol to output crime measures. Consequently, we can only consider the Impact patrol unit in terms of its relative performance to the Motor Patrol unit.

Participant observation during the evaluation revealed no difference between the patrol activities of Impact PO's and of Motor Patrol PO's. Although Impact experimented with a form of "team policing" in which, on

each route (beat), two officers walked and one was motorized*, this approach was dropped after three months because of a perceived manpower shortage and opposition from the officers. The PO's in Impact now perform normal patrol activity in assigned routes.

While the patrol activities of Impact and Motor Patrol officers are the same, the working hours are different. The Motor Patrol works the three basic police shifts: 0800-1600, 1600-2400, and 2400-0800. Impact patrol officers work only two shifts, 1000-1800 and 1800-0200. From 2 a.m. until 10 a.m., no Impact PO's are on duty. During that time Motor Patrol officers in routes contiguous to the Impact area have responsibility for the Impact sector (Sector 1). Since the period in which this transition occurs overlaps two Motor Patrol shifts (0200-0800 and 0800-1000), there is some problem with continuity of coverage and exchange of information. The Impact Captain has requested that his unit be assigned 24-hour responsibility for the Impact sector, but to date the Department has felt that this entails too great an allocation of personnel to the Impact unit.

8.3 JOB SATISFACTION

One significant difference between Impact and Motor Patrol PO's is, not surprisingly (in light of the discussion in Section 8.1), job satisfaction. Officer satisfaction was tested in four questions in the PO survey. Officers in Impact and in the Motor Patrol were asked how satisfied they were with

* Described in 7/2/74 memorandum from Captain John H. Hughes, Commander, Impact Unit, to all Impact officials concerning "Guidelines in Utilizing Team Policing Concept."

their present assignment, with police work, with their pay, and with their work schedule. The results are contained in Appendix C, Exhibit C.2. In brief, 56% of Impact officers are very satisfied with their assignment and with police work, while only 34% of Motor Patrol officers are very satisfied with their assignment and only 22% are very satisfied with police work.

In contrast to the assignment and police work answers, the pay satisfaction question brought a more negative response from Impact officers than from Motor Patrol officers. Only 6% of Impact PO's were either satisfied or very satisfied with their pay, while 32% of the Motor Patrol officers were at least satisfied.

The majority of both Impact and Motor Patrol officers are satisfied with their work schedules, although the percentage of Impact PO's who said they were very satisfied with their work schedule was almost double that of the Motor Patrol.

In sum, the Impact PO's seem on the whole to be more satisfied with their jobs than their fellow officers in the Motor Patrol are. This was also supported by our limited participant observation findings.

8.4 INTERACTION WITH OTHER UNITS

While the separateness of Impact may have been a cause for the higher job satisfaction in that unit, there have been intradepartmental problems in terms of relations between units. The Communications and Motor Patrol units are the two most significant units with which Impact patrol PO's interact.

COMMUNICATIONS

One of the first functional problems confronted by the Impact Program was that Impact route cars were frequently being dispatched outside the Impact sector for minor or low-priority calls. The Impact commander was intent on concentrating his men within the sector, and he sent several memos complaining to the Chief about dispatchers needlessly assigning Impact officers outside the Impact sector.

While the Impact staff wanted results within their sector, the incentive of the dispatcher is to clear any backload of calls as expeditiously as possible. The specific route of occurrence is of no particular interest to the dispatcher, and since the Impact motor routes are quite small and numerous, because of their concentration in the center city, it would appear quite reasonable to a dispatcher to send one of these units when a car covering a huge outlying area is occupied. In fact, using mathematical modelling techniques, Dr. Larson has shown that a centrally located patrol unit will tend to be dispatched across patrol routes more often than an outlying unit.*

To cope with the intersector dispatching problem, a directive was issued requiring dispatchers to request permission from an Impact official before assigning an Impact car outside the Impact sector for other than emergency assignments. This directive has helped improve the situation.

* Richard C. Larson, "Illustrative Police Sector Redesign in District 4 in Boston," Urban Analysis, Volume 2, 1974, pp. 59-60.

As one Impact sergeant said

If we didn't make them ask for permission to go out--it happened in the beginning--they sent them out, and they let us hang . . . because they wouldn't send anybody in to handle our calls. So now they must ask. They get permission to go out. They never get refused.

MOTOR PATROL

During participant observation with Motor Patrol officers, the most common remarks about Impact were that "Impact is a separate police department" and "they think they're something special." This type of resentment and jealousy is quite common when police departments establish special units. Although the Impact Captain does attempt to emphasize to his men the importance of not appearing "elite," he believes that his men are superior, and he finds the resentment from the Motor Patrol somewhat ironic. He said

I think the big kicker is that we asked for volunteers and a lot of old-timers did not want to come in here because they were very suspicious of it and they thought it involved something they would be sorry for later . . . I think the other units have built up a certain amount of animosity against us primarily because of professional jealousy. This is what it boils down to.

A question on the survey asked officers, "How close is the cooperation between Impact officers and Motor Patrol officers?" The results in Exhibit 8.4 show that officers in both units feel the cooperation between them is minimal. Note that the Motor Patrol responses are listed by the three shifts--day (0800-1600), first half (1600-2400), and second half (2400-0800), respectively. The results indicate that the worst problem is with the second or first-half shift, where 93% of the officers felt

there was "not enough" or "very little cooperation" with Impact officers. According to one Impact sergeant, "In the first half you can't pay a guy extra money to drive a car into Impact."

Exhibit 8.4

Cooperation Between Impact and Motor Patrol

HOW CLOSE IS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN IMPACT OFFICERS AND MOTOR PATROL OFFICERS?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PATROL PO				
	IMP	MP (By Shift and Total)			TOTAL
	(N=18)	1 (N=9)	2 (N=15)	3 (N=17)	
VERY CLOSE COOPERATION	11	23	0	12	10
CLOSE COOPERATION	28	11	7	6	7
SOME COOPERATION, BUT NOT ENOUGH	50	22	60	24	37
VERY LITTLE COOPERATION	11	33	33	34	34
NO ANSWER	0	11	0	24	12

Inasmuch as many Motor Patrol routes are contiguous with Impact routes, a lack of cooperation between the units could result in serious problems.

Officers responding to the open-ended questions about Impact all expressed positive views if they were in Impact and mostly negative views if they were in the Motor Patrol. Below are some of the officer comments.

I honestly feel that the Impact Program is the best thing that has ever happened to the Department. I

only hope the rest take notice and make changes. It's a smooth unit. All working together toward a common goal. In fact, Impact is the best thing to ever happen to the people of Worcester.

(Written by an Impact Officer.)

The Impact Program has put too many men into a small area and left the rest of the city lacking. This has endangered officers not in the Impact area by forcing them to go alone on a call that two or more men should respond to. If an assist is needed outside of Impact, a volunteer is hard to find. He (an Impact officer) will not leave the area without permission. I believe the Impact Program is a good program except it should be used throughout the city. The "elite men" are not just in Impact.

(Written by a Motor Patrol Officer.)

PSA's and Impact have created a separate police department. Officials in Impact are on a high horse and think that their men are so superbly trained where in fact they are trained the same as the regular men of the department.

(Written by a Motor Patrol Officer.)

Impact Program and the Motor Patrol are like two separate police departments with no communication between them.

(Written by a Motor Patrol Officer.)

Thus, some of the very factors which make Impact an organizational success lead to some of the basic problems common to decentralized and specialized police units--namely, problems of resentment and lack of cooperation between units.

9 IMPACT INVESTIGATIVE UNITS

The Impact Program has significantly changed the organization of the investigative function in the Worcester Police Department. Previously, investigation was centralized in the Detective Bureau, except for special investigations relating to the Vice Squad, the Juvenile Division, or the Internal Affairs Division. Specialization within the Detective Bureau was attempted only in isolated instances, as a reaction to cope with special situations. With the formation of the Robbery Strike Force (RSF) and the Burglary Task Force (BTF) in Impact, investigative personnel for the first time are working in the same office and under the same lieutenant and captain as patrol officers. In addition, a civilian Crime Analyst works in the Impact office to assist in crime-specific planning. The link between uniformed and plain-clothes personnel in Impact is even stronger because almost all the RSF and BTF personnel came directly from uniformed patrol.

The Robbery Strike Force, consisting of one sergeant and five plain-clothes officers, was implemented at the beginning of the Impact Program. The officers were selected from the uniformed division and had no prior investigative experience. The Burglary Task Force was formed when the three-man "team policing" procedure was terminated (see Section 8.2). With the exception of the two officers who had spent one year in the Detective Bureau, the BTF officers were selected from among Impact patrol officers. Although at first the BTF was to consist of two-man teams that

would concentrate on plain-clothes patrol activities and conduct investigations only when there were especially promising leads, the unit has developed into a predominantly investigative unit, very similar in activity and procedures to the RSF. In fact, both units work together and exchange equipment at times. In function, they are both quite similar to the Detective Bureau (DB), and for that reason the DB was chosen as a comparison group. The survey sample of detectives (14) consists of all the detectives who were working on July 31, 1975. The Impact investigative PO sample (14) consists of all but one Impact investigator (who was on vacation at the time of the survey).

At the outset of the chapter, it should be emphasized that this evaluation effort was not designed to study the investigative effectiveness of Impact investigators as compared to detectives in the Detective Bureau. To perform this function would have required an evaluation in its own right; it would have considered the many measures in investigative work, including the amount of time between the crime and the assignment of an investigator, the amount of time between initial police response and assignment of an investigator, and the actual investigative techniques used by each investigator--including canvassing neighborhoods, interviewing witnesses, processing physical evidence, contacting informants, contacting known suspects, and using victim identification. Only by carefully collecting and analyzing these types of measures can questions of investigative effectiveness even be approached. Furthermore, in Worcester, the evaluation of investigative effectiveness is hindered by the absence of certain key data elements (e.g., clearance and conviction rates).

Given the limited focus of this evaluation on the investigative component of the Impact Program, this chapter is directed at qualitatively comparing the Impact investigative units with the Detective Bureau. As in the previous chapter, the subjects considered here deal, respectively, with some background, job performance, job satisfaction and unit interaction issues. The position of the Crime Analyst is discussed in the background section. Results of the anonymous surveys of investigative officers are contained in Appendix C.

9.1 BACKGROUND

In considering the two Impact investigative units it is important to review the personnel that make up the units; the Crime Analyst who assists them; the supervisors who command them; and the facilities and equipment that support them.

PERSONNEL

Exhibit 9.1 shows the difference in police experience between Impact investigators and detectives. Besides police experience, there is of course a great difference in investigative experience (see Exhibit 9.2). While the mean time spent in the Detective Bureau is almost ten years, Impact investigators at the time of the evaluation had of course been in the Impact unit for one year. These figures are close to an actual reflection of investigative experience because only two of the original Impact investigators had had any prior investigative experience. As of July 31, 1975, however, two detectives, with 18 and 13 years of investigative experience, had transferred

Exhibit 9.1

Years of Police Experience

HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU WORKED IN THE WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT?

Number of Years:	Investigative	
	Impact (N=14)	Detective Bureau (N=14)
Minimum	5.0	6.0
Mean	8.6	18.3
Maximum	21.5	33.0

Exhibit 9.2

Years in Unit

HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU BEEN IN YOUR UNIT?

Number of Years:	Investigative	
	Impact (N=14)	Detective Bureau (N=14)
Minimum	.63	.67
Mean	1.01	9.75
Maximum	1.29	23.00

to the Robbery Strike Force from the Detective Bureau. The 18-year veteran was included in our survey.

The advantages of selecting a group of police officers directly from uniform to become investigators are better morale, flexibility, enthusiasm, and their responsiveness to supervision. This is true especially in light of the fact that appointment to the Detective Bureau in Worcester is widely believed to depend upon "knowing someone" in the City Government or on "having friends" high in the police department. As one uniformed Impact officer stated in the anonymous survey:

The Detective Bureau, Juvenile, Vice Squad have seen that patrolmen can do their (investigative) work as good if not better sometimes, and they didn't have to KNOW SOMEONE to get in. Their performance and willingness to work was their ticket, not Captain so-and-so, or Deputy so-and-so. AND POSITIVELY NOT 5-10-20 years on the job, that's for sure!!!

CRIME ANALYST

The position of Crime Analyst was created in Impact to serve as an intelligence collater and crime-specific planner for the Impact investigative units. The job description contained ten activities to be performed by the Crime Analyst:

- (1) In conjunction with the Worcester Police Department staff, to develop and implement procedures for the immediate transmittal of all burglary and robbery investigation reports to the Crime Analyst.
- (2) To review investigative reports of burglaries and robberies to ensure proper classification under U.C.R. (Uniform Crime Reporting) guidelines.

- (3) To determine, through review of investigative reports, thoroughness and completeness of reporting, accuracy and detail, and proper identification of persons, property, and locations.
- (4) To review all robbery and burglary investigative reports and ascertain patterns (geographical), temporal, and modus operandi) for those offenders.
- (5) To develop and implement procedures for dissemination of crime incidence patterns to officers of the Robbery Strike Force and Impact Sector Patrol for field operations deployment, and to other operations units as needed.
- (6) To attend all intelligence collating meetings of officers of the Impact Sector Patrol Unit.
- (7) To disseminate to the Crime Prevention Unit or to the Appropriate commanding officers, proposals for specific crime prevention activities to be undertaken.
- (8) To develop plans and strategies designed to increase the effectiveness of investigations, particularly in the Impact Sector.
- (9) To maintain liaison with Police Planner to ensure uniformity of reporting systems and paper flow under Impact operations.
- (10) To assist the Law Enforcement Planning Committee and the Police Planning Section in data collection on the functions of the Police Service Aide Unit.

Activities 1 through 4 involve the Crime Analyst's reviewing crime reports for U.C.R. purposes and for determining patterns of robbery and burglary offenses. To accomplish these tasks the Crime Analyst first reviews all departmental reports for robbery and burglary and photocopies all reports that pertain to incidents occurring in the IMPACT sector. The reports are then given to the investigative units. Most of the time, however, because of the relatively small number of incidents--especially

in the case of robbery--the investigators are already aware of the incidents. The fourth activity calls for the Analyst to ascertain geographical, temporal, and modus operandi crime patterns. This is accomplished through a series of pinmaps in the Analyst's office, which is located between the RSF and BTF offices.

The fifth activity--dissemination of crime pattern information to officers--is accomplished through dissemination of a Weekly Beat Activity Sheet, a sample of which is included in Exhibit 9.3. At first, 25 copies of these were reproduced for the 18 patrol officers and 15 investigators. Many sheets were not picked up by officers, so now only ten copies are reproduced, and there are still some that remain. There is evidently a lack of interest on the part of officers to use these sheets, and the Crime Analyst finds her position somewhat frustrating in this respect.

One of the problems involved with the Analyst's position revolves around activity 6--attending intelligence collating meetings. The Crime Analyst is in fact excluded from meetings of the investigators, so it is doubtful how much useful intelligence collating could be performed.

Since the analyst does not interact directly with the Crime Prevention Unit, activity 7 is not performed. (It should be noted that none of the investigative or patrol units interact with the Crime Prevention Unit either--this is further discussed in Chapter 10.)

Activity 8--designing strategies for investigation--is accomplished only in part because the Crime Analyst is not a totally accepted member of the investigative unit.

Exhibit 9.3Sample of Weekly Beat Activity Sheet

WEEKLY BEAT ACTIVITY

MARCH 6, 1975 - MARCH 12, 1975

Route 11

No breaks or robberies on this route so far this month.

Route 12Robbery

Friday	3-7	1900	Mayfield Street Unarmed	White Males - 2
Friday	3-7	2120	May & Mayfield St. Unarmed	2 White Males 1 Black Male

Burglary

Thur./Fri.	3-6/3-7	7:30 p/10 a	Main Street	Commercial
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Two purse snatchings this past week, occurring in the Zayres (Mayfield Street) area. Area should be given special attention.

Breaks very light for this route with only one commercial occurrence

Route 13Burglary

Thur./Sun.	3-6/3-9	1200/1050	Clark University	Cafe
Friday	3-7	8:15 pm	Maywood Street	Private Apartment
Saturday	3-8	0100/1000	Clark University	English House
Sunday	3-9	0218	Lovell Street	Commercial
Sunday	3-9	9:00 pm	Main Street	Private Apartment

Much more activity for this route during this month. So far, it's the most active route for breaks, mostly in the area of Clark University.

Exhibit 9.3 (Continued)Route 14Burglary

Saturday	3-5	0400/0650	Park Avenue	Party Pak, Inc.
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Very quiet! Only one commercial break.

Route 15Burglary

Saturday	3-8	0410	Douglas Street	Market
Tuesday	3-11	0216	Douglas-Arrest	Market

Only two breaks this past week, both at the same location. Arrest has been made on one of these. Special attention should be given to this area.

Liaison with the Police Planner to assure uniformity of reporting systems (Activity 9) is difficult for the Analyst to accomplish because of the separateness--both physical and functional--of the Police Planner. However, some coordination between the two is achieved by telephone.

The last activity of the Crime Analyst, assisting the Law Enforcement Planning Committee in data collection for the Police Service Aide unit, is minimally accomplished through the development of an Activity Sheet for all PSA's to complete daily. Although the data contained on these activity logs are analyzed by the Operations Analyst, there has been no guidance from the Law Enforcement Committee as to what precise PSA data the Crime Analyst is to collect.

Although the Crime Analyst's intelligence collating goals have not been entirely achieved, the Crime Analyst does perform important administrative functions for the Impact Captain, including providing statistics and drafting memos for the Captain. However, according to the technical assistance report of the consultant hired at the outset of the Impact Program,*

care must be taken to see that (the crime analyst) does not become a statistician for the planning unit. He must be linked to operational units, and the kinds of information he disseminates must be geared toward line rather than staff use.

Unfortunately, the result has been precisely what was to be avoided. The analyst's "intelligence" function has been limited to the culling of reports to

* Richard H. Ward, Institution of the Robbery Impact Program, Westinghouse Police Technical Assistance Report, 4-74-106, March 1974, p. 5.

see what has occurred in Impact and the updating of pinmaps showing robbery and burglary locations. The fact that the Crime Analyst is a civilian and a female creates difficulties in terms of gaining full access to and impacting upon the line investigative personnel. As a result, the analyst has more and more withdrawn from the original plan of an intelligence collator serving field units, and has become an important administrative assistant to the Impact Captain.

SUPERVISORS

The biggest differences in supervision between the Impact investigators and the Detective Bureau stems from the relatively small size of the two Impact units. As of July 31, 1975, the RSF and the BTF each consisted of a sergeant and seven officers. There are frequent meetings held between the sergeant and his unit, thus encouraging the sharing of information much more than in the Detective Bureau. The sergeants, who also serve as investigators, are given a great deal of freedom to plan assignments and strategies, and generally act as unit commanders.

In exceptional circumstances, such as a rash of robberies of carry-out stores, the Captain will order stakeouts to be conducted by both units. In addition, the Captain conducts "strategy meetings" with each unit separately. Transcripts from tape recordings of these meetings were made available to the evaluation team.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

The RSF and BTF are located in the same premises as the Impact patrol officers, whose facilities have been discussed in Section 8.1. As for the physical facilities, the chief complaint of Impact investigators is inadequate space within which to interview witnesses or conduct investigations. The units are separated from the central hall only by temporary partitions, and the physical layout allows for very little privacy. The Detective Bureau, on the other hand, has private rooms available for interviews and interrogations.

The equipment supplied to the RSF and now used by the BTF as well, is presented below, with a statement of usage for each item.

- Minolta camera with three lenses: Very rarely used (one officer has taken the initiative to be the Impact unit's cameraman).
- Slide projector and screen: Very rarely used (originally intended for viewing those suspects photographed by the Minolta camera).
- Two Polaroid cameras: Used for in-office photographing of arrested suspects.
- Compositor (approximately \$2400): Never used (compositor not equipped with long-hair format, so suspects look as if in 1950's era).
- Tape recorders: Very rarely used (originally intended for taping reports, but now used by Captain to record strategy meetings).
- Bullet-proof vests: Used by RSF members.
- Wigs (\$200): Never used (officers claim wigs are of poor quality).
- Ten-speed bicycles: Very rarely used (originally intended for BTF patrol).

- Baseball caps: Rarely used (originally intended as a form of identification).
- Rental vehicles: Used extensively for both surveillance and patrol.
- Four PSA vehicles: Converted for BTF use.

While it is not within the purview of this evaluation to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the Impact equipment, there is definite indication that Impact, as with many other federally-funded police projects, has purchased some equipment of minimal utility.

9.2 JOB PERFORMANCE

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the actual activities and methods of the Impact investigators are not noticeably different from those of the Detective Bureau. Although one of the ideas of the RSF was to develop and test "innovative strategies," no evidence of innovation in strategy was observed. The key differences in the Impact units, and these could well be considered *innovations in Worcester*, were the decentralization of investigative personnel, specialization, greater workload flexibility, the use of rental vehicles, and strong organizational backing from supervisors and from the Impact commander. In terms of "strategies" or "tactics," however, Impact investigative units are no different from most urban police investigators.

While the youth and inexperience of newly made investigators can be an advantage, certain disadvantages can arise. The most obvious disadvantage is the lack of useful informants and sources of information in

the community. There were no guidelines or standards for the Impact investigators to follow, and the benefits of a week spent in the Detective Bureau as a sort of "orientation" are questionable. Training for investigators is all too often exclusively the on-the-job type, where more experienced investigators merely teach new investigators the same old tricks. Also questionable is the usefulness of a consultant's report for the RSF, which provided a "shopping list" of equipment without elaborating on the key issues facing investigators.

In addition to the inexperience with sources of information and the lack of guidelines for investigation, there was a perceived pressure to do something "innovative" and to show some results. The source of this pressure is probably tied to the funding process itself and is also typical of newly formed police units. As a result of a combination of inexperience and pressure, some unfortunate strategy attempts were made. Questionable methods of obtaining information, mostly stemming from promises of immunity on condition of furnishing information, were utilized (to what extent is unknown). In one case, a prostitute was followed with her client until the pair was observed to be in a compromising situation; the client was sent away and the prostitute was threatened with arrest unless information were given to Impact investigators. In addition, there was some discussion of illegal electronic surveillance, although there is no hard evidence that this "strategy" was implemented.

It should be emphasized that these questionable activities were probably not frequently done; neither are all of them illegal. The point here

is that there were no guidelines; there was pressure to produce, and there were inexperienced investigators. Even the lack of guidelines is common in most police departments, especially in the investigative functions.* If Impact faced these controversial issues squarely and developed working guidelines, a model investigative unit could result.

9.3 JOB SATISFACTION

Referring to Appendix C, Exhibit C.2, it is seen that, in comparison with the officers in the Detective Bureau, the Impact investigators are much more satisfied with their assignments, their schedule, and overall police work. Again, as in the case of Impact patrol officers (see Section 8.3), the organization, supervision, equipment and facilities of Impact are key reasons for their satisfaction. In addition, an overwhelming reason for most of the Impact investigators was the opportunity to be investigators directly out of uniformed patrol.

9.4 INTERACTION WITH OTHER UNITS

The RSF and BTF have interactions primarily with two units--the Detective Bureau and the Impact Sector Patrol Unit.

DETECTIVE BUREAU

The relationship of a new, decentralized investigative unit with an

* See, for example, Joseph Goldstein, "Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice," Yale Law Journal, 1960.

established Detective Bureau has been a problem in many police departments. In Worcester, the factors underlying the resentment of the detectives include loss of jurisdiction for many robberies and burglaries and a feeling that the Impact investigators are inexperienced and receive a disproportionate share of local publicity.

The results of the anonymous survey administered to Impact investigators and to a sample of officers in the Detective Bureau (see Exhibit 9.4) show that both units feel that the cooperation between them is poor. The perceptions of detectives and of Impact investigators are almost identical. This result points out one of the disadvantages resulting from the creation of a separate unit.

One of the factors most bothersome to the detectives is the fact that Impact investigators are now called "detectives". Traditionally, only those assigned to the Detective Bureau received that appellation, although in Worcester the title brings no additional remuneration or any difference in rank. The importance of the title lies in the status and the privilege of taking command at crime scenes for the purpose of investigation. It started when the Robbery Strike Force wanted clear authority within the Impact sector. The Impact Captain supported their position and convinced the Chief to designate the RSF members as "detectives". As for the Burglary Task Force, they were simply referred to as "detectives" by Impact without any official departmental policy directive.

Another very important privilege accruing to detectives is rendition. Rendition is the surrendering of prisoners in another jurisdiction, and

Exhibit 9.4

Impact Cooperation with Detective Bureau

PERCENT ANSWERING:	INVESTIGATIVE	
	<u>IMPACT</u> (N=14)	<u>DETECTIVE BUREAU</u> (N=14)
HOW CLOSE IS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DETECTIVE BUREAU AND THE IMPACT ROBBERY STRIKE FORCE?		
VERY CLOSE COOPERATION	0	0
CLOSE COOPERATION	0	0
SOME COOPERATION, BUT NOT ENOUGH	43	43
VERY LITTLE COOPERATION	57	43
NO ANSWER	0	7
HOW CLOSE IS THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DETECTIVE BUREAU AND THE IMPACT BURGLARY TASK FORCE?		
VERY CLOSE COOPERATION	0	0
CLOSE COOPERATION	7	7
SOME COOPERATION, BUT NOT ENOUGH	43	43
VERY LITTLE COOPERATION	43	43
NO ANSWER	7	7

for the officer involves free, expense-paid trips (paid by the bail bondsman) anywhere in the country to pick up a prisoner who has waived extradition. This popular assignment was always a privilege of the Detective Bureau until the Impact Captain won this privilege for the Impact investigators, when the rendition involved one of their prisoners. There have been several quarrels between Impact and the Detective Bureau over rendition.

There are also certain jurisdictional conflicts that arise with the Detective Bureau. Initially, the Robbery Strike Force was to deal exclusively with the offenses of armed and unarmed robbery. Likewise, the Burglary Task Force was to deal with the burglary problem in Sector 1. However, as stated in an Impact Quarterly Report:

Another problem which surfaced early in the program was the question of investigative responsibility by either the Robbery Strike Force or the Detective Bureau. The main goal of the RSF was set as being the reduction of robberies city-wide, with an emphasis on reduction in the Impact Sector, which was a high risk area, particularly for purse-snatchings and street muggings. However, by physically housing the RSF in the Impact Sector office, the RSF immediately became a "separate unit" whose investigative jurisdiction remained somewhat vague. (Emphasis added)

Despite the issuance of Departmental directives aimed at clarifying some of the jurisdictional ambiguity, the RSF and BTF eventually expanded their functional jurisdiction to include other Part I crimes besides the target crimes of robbery and burglary. One of the reasons behind this development lies in organizational incentives. With the creation of special Impact investigative units for robbery and burglary, the detectives

in the Detective Bureau were not at all enthusiastic about coming into the Impact area for other lesser crimes. At the same time, the newly formed Impact units, in order to prove their self-reliance and independence, have an incentive to keep the Detective Bureau out of Impact, thus establishing clear territorial responsibility.

Another jurisdictional problem occurred in the Spring of 1975 when the RSF was allowed to expand its responsibility to an adjoining Sector, Sector 2. This then gave the RSF the responsibility for investigating robberies occurring in half of the City. Several instances of friction and confusion have occurred in Sector 2. Incidents that are borderline robbery cases have created confusion in assignment.

The experience with the RSF points out some of the advantages and disadvantages in police specialization. On the positive side are higher morale and perhaps increased productivity. On the other hand, resentment and a lack of coordination with other units present difficulties for the police administrator.

Impact Patrol Unit

The results of the survey of patrol officers show a marked difference in the perception of cooperation between Impact patrol officers and Impact investigators on the one hand, and between Motor Patrol officers and the Detective Bureau on the other (see Appendix C, Exhibits C.9 and C.10). In Impact, over 60% of the patrol officers feel there is close or very close cooperation with both the RSF and BTF. In the Motor Patrol, on the other hand, only 7% of the officers feel there is close or

very close cooperation with the Detective Bureau. Thus, while the preceding subsection described the poor relationship with the Detective Bureau as a disadvantage in having a separate unit, the relationship with uniformed officers seems to be improved by taking investigators directly from uniform patrol and housing the investigative units in the same office as the patrol officers.

10 CRIME PREVENTION UNIT

Created in April of 1974, the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) is theoretically a part of the Impact Program but is physically and functionally separate. The primary function of the CPU is to perform crime prevention and community relations. The CPU is now commanded by a lieutenant who was previously a sergeant in a pre-Impact Model Cities foot patrol unit that was actually the predecessor of the current CPU. At present there are three police officers (PO's) and eleven Community Service Officers (CSO's) in the CPU. Because they perform the bulk of the prevention activities, and because they represent another innovative use of civilians (in a different way than PSA's), our evaluation of the CPU focused primarily on the CSO's.

The contents of this chapter are also primarily concerned with the CSO Program; they are based on an anonymous survey of CSO's*, a telephone survey of CPU clients, and limited participant observation of all CPU personnel. The four sections of the chapter cover background, job performance, client reaction, and job satisfaction issues, respectively. The results of the anonymous survey are included in Appendix B, while those of the telephone survey are in Appendix E.

10.1 BACKGROUND

In this background section we attempt to view the Worcester CSO Program first from a broader national perspective and then in terms of

* Ten out of the eleven CSO's were surveyed; one male CSO's completed questionnaire was missing.

CONTINUED

2 OF 4

the Worcester experience, followed by a discussion of the selection and training of the current CSO's.

CSO PROGRAMS IN PERSPECTIVE

As stated in Section 4.1, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in 1967 recommended that "Community Service Officers" be used to reduce the non-crime service call workload of sworn officers. A number of less ambitious CSO programs were begun in the early 1970's. There are now CSO programs in Buffalo, Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Minneapolis and New York, to name just a few. There are also a number of forms of Community Service Officer (CSO) programs, most of which serve a distinct (usually minority) neighborhood, and provide non-crime services (both new services and some of those previously performed by police officers).

A recent documentation was made by the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice of seven CSO programs, including Worcester, in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Of the six programs outside of Worcester, four are based in housing projects and two in other neighborhoods. The housing project programs are located in Boston, Springfield, Fall River, and Somerville. Their basic focus is to provide patrol services and answer minor calls for service placed to the CSO headquarters. There are an average of ten CSO's in each program; they range in age from 25 to 30 years old, and all are males. In general, the CSO programs represent an effort towards self-policing on the part of the program community.

Another program in Holyoke involves five CSO's as members of a neighborhood police team. Their basic function is to help enhance

community relations; often they serve as intermediaries between the police and the Spanish-speaking community.

An Urban League Program in Springfield has 17 CSO's patrolling a model cities area on foot and reporting unusual conditions to the police. The program's basic focus is to orient high school seniors toward careers in law enforcement.

WORCESTER EXPERIENCE

The original Worcester CSO Program ran from 1971 to 1973; in 1974, eight of the ten original CSO's in that program became Police Service Aides. In the original program, the activities included foot patrolling in the Model Cities area, noting any unusual conditions on reports to the police, conducting Operation Identification, and providing support to other police units (sometimes CSO's assisted the Detective Bureau with translation).

Under the Worcester Crime Impact Program, the old CSO functions were split up into the patrol and report writing chores, which were enhanced and made into the present PSA functions, and the Operation Identification and community relations chores, which were enhanced and made into the present CSO functions (as part of the Crime Prevention Unit).

SELECTION AND TRAINING OF CSO'S

Because eight of the ten original CSO's under the Model Cities Program became PSA's, a new group of CSO's had to be selected and trained under the Impact Program. This process began after the PSA's had been deployed for several months. Qualifications for CSO's specified that applicants be

between the ages of 17 and 35; have a high school diploma or the ability to qualify for one; have the ability to read and speak English; have no felony convictions; and possess residency in Worcester. (These qualifications are essentially the same for PSA's.)

Serving on the selection committee were the Director of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee, the Commander of the Crime Prevention Unit, a community representative, a Model Cities representative and a Human Rights Commission representative. Although initially the desire was to select CSO's from candidates residing in the Model Cities area, the end result was a selection of candidates from all areas of the city.

A profile of the CSO's (see Exhibit 10.1) shows that the average age is about 22; that there is a fairly equal balance of males and females (actually*, there are six males and five females); and that the minority representation is 20% (actually*, there are two Puerto Rican CSO's and one black CSO, resulting in a 27% minority representation). Three CSO's have college degrees, four have some college experience (or technical schooling), and four have a high school diploma or less. Before becoming CSO's, individuals were students, nurses, or employed as clerical sales or factory workers. Two worked for Model Cities, one as a mail clerk and one as a CSO. In looking further at Exhibit 10.1, it can be seen that the CSO's strongly resemble the PSA's in most personal characteristics, although they are slightly more likely to be married and their level of educational achievement is not as high.

Exhibit 10.2 shows the breakdown of three weeks of training at the Police Academy, comprised of 91 hours of classroom and 13 hours of practical

* Based on all 11 CSO's (including the CSO whose questionnaire was missing.)

Exhibit 10.1

Personal Characteristics Profile

	PSA (N=41)	CSO (N=10)
<u>AGE (YEARS):</u>		
MINIMUM	19	18
MEAN	22.5	21.9
MAXIMUM	34	27
<u>SEX (%):</u>		
MALE	61	50
FEMALE	39	50
<u>RACE (%):</u>		
WHITE	88	80
BLACK	5	10
PUERTO RICAN	7	10
<u>MARITAL STATUS (%):</u>		
MARRIED	32	10
NOT MARRIED	68	90
<u>HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION COMPLETED (%):</u>		
HIGH SCHOOL (OR G.E.D. CERTIFICATE)	22	40
SOME COLLEGE BUT DID NOT GRADUATE	54	20
GRADUATED FROM TECHNICAL SCHOOL OR JUNIOR COLLEGE	10	10
GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE (B.A., B.S., ETC.)	5	20
SOME GRADUATE WORK	7	10
GRADUATE DEGREE	2	0

Exhibit 10.2CSO Training

<u>SUBJECT AREAS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
First Aid/Drugs	22
Referral Services	14
On the Job Training	13
Elements of Particular Crimes	12
Report Writing/Note Taking	9
Crime as a Social Problem	9
Orientation	7
Crime Scene Protection	4
Visual Aids	3
Juvenile Problems	2
Self Defense	2
Traffic Control	2
Officer in Court	2
Role of Police	1
TOTAL	104

experience. No formal evaluation of CSO training (like the survey given PSA's) was ever made. At the end of each week of training, however, the CSO's wrote a brief essay on their impressions. Here are some of their comments:

The only thing wrong in my estimation is that the training isn't long enough.

'Elements of Burglary,' as discussed by Sgt. McKiernan, was a fantastically involved subject. I feel he should have had more time in which to present his topic.

'Self Defense' by Ptlm. Dehas was one of our best classes. I truly wish we could have had a lot more of this. It would be excellent if our CSO squad could attend this type of class in the future.

I was amazed at the demonstrations presented on locks and alarms, and especially the demonstration of different types of glass. This subject actually is the "meat" of the job and seems extremely interesting.

To me, first aid was most helpful, in that it will prove very useful on the street.

In his speech concerning his work in the Human Rights Committee, Rev. Rosario revealed in a very personable manner the dedication, concern and selflessness of people like himself, who feel that something must be done to deal with injustice and discrimination within our society. As a member of a minority group, I can honestly say I identified with him and he earned a great deal of my respect.

In our anonymous survey, administered in July, 1975 (after CSO's had been on the job for ten months), 80% said they would rate their training as good or very good in terms of preparing them for crime prevention and community relations work. Some comments made in that survey were:

Excellent...as far as what you can learn in a classroom. But the real training is out there in the street.

On-the-job training has been more beneficial.

The training sessions were "fair" simply because they did not concern themselves with the practical aspects of crime prevention. Most of my knowledge of security was learned from people I met on the job. It would also be good if more knowledge of alarms and electronic security systems were available.

10.2 JOB PERFORMANCE

As stated before, a discussion of performance of any Impact component is handicapped by the fact that no evaluation design was incorporated into the original Impact Program. This is especially true in connection with crime prevention and community relations activities, which are by their very nature difficult to measure. The impact of these activities are usually long-term and somewhat subjective in nature. A definitive determination of their impact would require comparing those who are served to a control group. This was obviously outside the scope of this evaluation effort.

In this section we discuss each of the CPU activities and consider the PO reaction to the CPU and CSO's. First, we review the assignment of the CPU personnel.

ASSIGNMENT

At the beginning of the Impact Program, there were four police officers assigned to the CPU and it covered two shifts. Two officers worked 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. and two worked 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. At present there are three police officers, all of whom work 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday through Friday, as do the 11 Community Service Officers. Of the three PO's, two are white males and one is a black female. All have had at least

some college experience. Two of the three officers have been in the unit since its inception and received approximately 160 hours of training at the National Crime Prevention Institute, University of Louisville. The third officer (who is at present the only female patrol officer in the WPD) transferred to the CPU from Impact in June, 1975. The three are between the ages of 28 and 33.

Of the 11 CSO's, three work in the office, two full time. One of these is the planner who turns out all the data for the unit. Another is a secretary who types up cards for Operation I.D. and premise survey reports. A third CSO also does secretarial work but this position is filled by two or three CSO's who rotate between the office and the street. The secretarial work is usually done by females, and they strongly resent this. When asked to compare what they actually do on the job with what they were told the job would be like, one female replied that it was very different because "office work was not in the job description." Actually, 40% said the work was somewhat or very different--see Appendix B, Exhibit B.2.

The other CSO's work on the street, either walking a footbeat (three males) or doing premise surveys, presentations, business listings, etc. Assignments are given out at roll call each morning by the Lieutenant or officer-in-charge.* The police officers usually have a car and sometimes work with a CSO.

* Since there are no sergeants in the CPU, the three officers often serve in that function. They take over when the Lieutenant is ill or away, and often listen to and advise the CSO's about work-related problems.

A problem relating to use of vehicles, which is a constant source of friction among CSO's, is that females usually get the cars, and the males end up walking. The male CSO's are as resentful of this as the females are resentful of having to do office work. One male CSO said

We have discrimination between the guys and the gals. I don't think it's right that the girls should have the car every single day of the week. I know there is a lack of cars, but the girls make the same amount of money as us and they should have the same duties too. That includes a footbeat.

This problem can only be solved on the supervisory level and should be dealt with by specific departmental guidelines.

ACTIVITIES

Exhibit 10.3 shows a list of the activities of the CPU with totals for a nine-month period (October 1, 1974 to June 30, 1975) and the percentages handled by PO's and CSO's. A discussion of each activity follows.

Operation Identification

Operation I.D. is a program in which Worcester residents engrave valuable property with their social security number and the City's name. The number is then kept on file at the CPU office so that if any item is stolen and recovered, it can be returned to its rightful owner. So far, there has been no clear way of measuring the effectiveness of the program.* The only way in which the CPU has been able to determine how many of those residents enrolled in the program have had breaks where engraved merchandise was taken was to ask them when they went to do a premises survey. Since

* Recently, the National Evaluation Program of NILECJ/LEAA funded a Phase I effort to evaluate the effectiveness of Operation Identification--the results should be available shortly.

Exhibit 10.3

CPU Activities

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Number</u> ^a	<u>% Handled By</u> ^b	
		<u>CSO</u>	<u>PO</u>
Operation I.D.	1653	100	0
Premise Surveys	924	96	4
Warning Tags	909	100	0
Elderly Programs	804	No breakdown	
Vacant House Checks	556	92	8
Assisting Other Units	327	48	52
Listings	281	No breakdown	
Community Services	257	88	2
Investigations	197	27	73
Youth Involvement	178	No breakdown	
Complaint Checks	154	88	12
Presentations	93	59	41
Court Appearances	77	0	100
Bank Escorts	71	0	100
Arrests	58	0	100

^a During the period 10/1/74-6/30/75.

^b Based upon activities during 4/1/75-6/30/75.

only 48% of those people the CPU attempted to contact were actually reached and since for the first month after the CSO's started they only did surveys in the Impact area, no accurate figures are available.

Premise Surveys

Each day the Crime Prevention Unit receives a list of breaks which have occurred in the city the day before. An attempt is made to go to each of the houses or businesses to check all points of entry and provide suggestions as to ways that the building can be made secure. A report is mailed to the resident or business within two or three days with results of the survey. Exhibit 10.4 contains a completed sample survey.

One of the problems that has been encountered by the unit on this activity is that the completion rate in the nine-month period was only 48%; no attempt is made to determine whether anyone is home or at the business beforehand. Another reason for this low completion rate is that all the surveys are done between the hours of 10 a.m. and 6 p.m. when many people are at work. Extending the hours of the unit to at least 9 p.m. would be helpful in this respect.

Warning Tags

Warning tags are placed on unlocked cars or cars with open windows that are seen by CSO's as they walk their footbeats. An example is shown in Exhibit 10.5.

Exhibit 10.4

Sample of CPU Premise Survey



WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT

CRIME PREVENTION UNIT
PREMISE SURVEY

C.P.U. No. R-205
DATE: 7-15-74

NAME: RESIDENCE SURVEY

ADDRESS:

CATEGORY	GOOD	DEFECT	N/A	CATEGORY	GOOD	DEFECT	N/A
1. Grounds	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	9. Alleys	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
2. Parking Lot	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10. Locks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Doors	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	11. Hinges	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Garage	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	12. Safes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
5. Roof	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	13. Alarms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
6. Windows	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	14. Walls	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. Transoms	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	15. Cellar	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. Lights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	16. Other	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

DEFECTS:

- 4. Door on garage left open or unlocked
- 8. Outside floodlights inadequate on south side of building
- 1. Locks on front, rear and side doors (external doors) inadequate

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 4. Garage door should be locked and closed whenever it is not being used to prevent an intruder from entering living quarters through garage
- 8. South side of house should be lit up with floodlights to prevent an intruder from trying to gain entry through sun porch
- 10. All external doors with glass in them should have locks changed to double cylinder deadbolts if locks are within 30" of windows. If doors are solid wood or locks are more than 30" from windows standard thumb turn type dead bolt locks will be adequate. All locks should have a minimum of a 1" throw to the bolt.

REPORTING OFFICER(s) Ptlm. Guittar & Carroll

Exhibit 10.5Sample of CPU Warning Tag

WARNING!

OVER 5000 CARS WERE STOLEN IN WORCESTER IN 1973.
 DON'T HELP A THIEF STEAL YOUR CAR.
 LOCK YOUR CAR WHEN YOU LEAVE.
 PLEASE CLOSE YOUR WINDOWS, TOO.
 HELP YOUR POLICE HELP YOU.

Police Community Service
 697 Main Street
 Worcester, Mass. 01608
 752-3338

Community Service Officer

No 927

Elderly Programs

These programs include activities like the Lunch Program and Old Age Housing Checks. A church near the CPU office is one of several centers in the city where the elderly can receive a hot lunch at a very low cost. It was the scene of recent purse snatchings and assaults until CSO's started going there. Those on footbeats patrol the Impact area housing for the elderly which has had similar problems.

Vacant House Checks

These checks are done by CSO's in cooperation with the Fire Prevention Unit. They drive by and walk through vacant houses to see if there are public health or fire hazards. Owners are notified when such hazards are found and encouraged to take whatever measures necessary to secure the building.

Listings

Listings are only done periodically which is why no percentages are given for the three-month period shown in Exhibit 10.2. CSO's collect names, addresses, and phone numbers of businesses in the Impact area and keep them on file in the CPU office. In case of emergency (fire, burglary, etc.) these owners can then be quickly reached.

Youth Involvement Programs

These community relations programs include the Essay Contest and Ride-a-Long Program. Usually, school children write essays on crime prevention issues and winners are taken for a ride in a police cruiser to see how the police officer does his job. Another program is the

Bicycle Engraving Program which, like Operation I.D., attempts to discourage theft and to aid police in returning recovered bicycles.

Complaint Checks

These checks are done in response to requests of residents and business owners in the Main South Area who see the CSO's or police officers on the street. An example would be a church requesting the police officers to remove drunks or disorderly persons from the church property which is directly across the street from CPU headquarters.

Presentations

Presentations on crimes against women, vandalism, locks and alarms and related topics are given to schools, businesses, neighborhood and community organizations, and have reached approximately 5300 residents to date. The police officers and CSO's work together on these. Most of the speaking is done by officers and the CSO's provide demonstrations. For example, one of the male CSO's is skilled in the martial arts and has taught one of the females so that they can demonstrate self-defense techniques. Audiences for these presentations range between 20 and several hundred people and are largely enthusiastic, if those observed by us are typical. One client remarked that the presentation was "a great morale-building tool for employees--branching out into this type of activity is a great thing for PO's to do."

Bank Escort

Providing bank escorts was the idea of CPU police officers after they did a business survey of a federal program with branch offices all over

the city. (There had been several robberies.) A bonded messenger is picked up by a police officer and taken to the bank under guard.

Arrests, Investigations and Court Appearances

The arrests are usually made in response to incidents which the CPU police officers see taking place in the course of their duties, and are usually of minor offenses pertaining to disturbances, shoplifting, purse snatching and simple assaults. Investigations and court appearances are usually related to these arrests although the figures shown in Exhibit 10.3 for investigations apparently overlap other figures for complaint checks, vacant house checks, etc. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the CPU officers have made a significant number of arrests, principally in response to citizen-initiated complaints that are called into the CPU office. It is possible that officers assigned to this unit use these arrests as a way of stressing their police role. In any event, Departmental guidelines should be issued specifying the function and duties of crime prevention officers, including when the officers should refer complaints to the motor patrol units. In general, we found the CPU officers to be very enthusiastic and conscientious about their work. (This is significant, since it is a well-known fact that crime prevention work does not appeal to the majority of urban police officers.) However, their being apart from the rest of the Department has frustrated them somewhat. In fact, one of the original officers in the CPU transferred back into patrol partly because of his feeling of separation.

POLICE OFFICER REACTION

In our surveys, we asked WPD personnel their opinion of the value of the CSO and CPU programs. However, it was necessary first to ask whether the respondents even had a good knowledge of the CSO program. The results, as shown in Exhibit 10.6, indicate that over three-quarters of the officers and about one-half the PSA's feel they do *not* have a good knowledge of the current CSO program. Thus it is not surprising to find, as in Exhibit 10.7, that most members of the Department say they do not know how valuable the CSO program is. The answers of those who did express an opinion about the value of the CSO program were a broad range. The CSO's, of course, do feel the program is valuable.

When asked how valuable the Crime Prevention Unit is, PSA's and CSO's expressed some feelings that it was valuable, which contrasts with the more negative feelings expressed by sworn personnel as shown in Exhibit 10.8. There seems to be a major problem in the way the WPD views the CPU. Further efforts at educating the Department's field personnel on the value and uses of crime prevention techniques are necessary, if the WPD is to maintain a definite commitment to crime prevention.

10.3 CLIENT REACTION

In addition to asking WPD personnel about the value of the CPU, we conducted a very limited survey of 66 of its clients. Two somewhat different surveys were conducted, one for Operation Identification and one for premise surveys and presentations. The composition of the respondent

Exhibit 10.6

Department Familiarity with CSO Program

DO YOU HAVE A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THE CURRENT CSO PROGRAM IS?

	PSA	PATROL PO		INVESTIGATIVE PO	
	Total (N=41)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)	IMP (N=14)	DB (N=14)
<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>					
YES	49	11	22	29	29
NO	49	89	76	71	64
NO ANSWER	2	0	2	0	7

Exhibit 10.7

Perceived Value of CSO Program

HOW VALUABLE DO YOU THINK THE CSO PROGRAM IS?

	PSA	CSO	PATROL PO		INVESTIGATIVE PO	
	Total (N=41)	Total (N=10)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)	IMP (N=14)	DB (N=14)
<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>						
VERY VALUABLE	12	50	0	0	0	7
VALUABLE	12	50	11	7	7	7
SOMEWHAT VALUABLE	34	0	6	15	29	7
NOT VALUABLE	7	0	6	15	14	21
DON'T KNOW	24	0	61	51	50	36
NO ANSWER	10	0	17	12	0	21

Exhibit 10.8

Perceived Value of the Crime Prevention Unit

HOW VALUABLE DO YOU THINK THE CRIME PREVENTION UNIT IS?

PERCENT ANSWERING:	PSA	CSO	PATROL PO		INVESTIGATIVE PO	
	Total (N=41)	Total (N=10)	IMP (N=18)	MP (N=41)	IMP (N=14)	DB (N=14)
VERY VALUABLE	22	30	17	12	7	7
VALUABLE	44	30	22	17	36	21
SOMEWHAT VALUABLE	24	30	39	34	29	36
NOT VALUABLE	0	10	22	27	21	29
NO ANSWER	10	0	0	10	7	7

population is compared with that of the PSA survey and the 1970 Worcester Census Data in Exhibit 10.9. All of the samples are similar, except for a higher proportion of older persons who attended presentations.

Since the services of the CPU are not traditional police services, we asked the citizens how they learned about the services. Exhibit 10.10 shows the effectiveness of an advertising campaign for Operation Identification in contrast to the premises surveys which are provided as follow-up to burglaries.

OPERATION IDENTIFICATION

Of the 31 Operation I.D. enrollees surveyed, 89% did the engraving themselves (see Appendix E, Exhibit E.2); thus there was no basis on which to judge the quality of services provided by CSO's.

Exhibit 10.9

Composition of the CPU Client Population

PERCENT ANSWERING:	CPU CLIENT OPERATION I.D. (N=35)	PREMISES (N=31)	PSA CLIENT (N=221)	WORCESTER 1970 CENSUS DATA
<u>SEX</u>				
MALE	57	58	56	48
FEMALE	43	42	44	52
<u>AGE</u>				
UNDER 18	0	0	2	29
18 - 29	23	22	31	18
30 - 54	31	35	43	27
55 - OLDER	40	65	23	26
REFUSED	6	6	1	--
<u>RACE</u>				
WHITE	94	97	95	94.4
BLACK	0	0	2	4.3
SPANISH-SPEAKING	0	0	1	1.3
ANOTHER ETHNIC ORIGIN	0	0	1	--
NO ANSWER	6	3	1	--
<u>MARITAL STATUS</u>				
MARRIED	71	61	60	25.0
DIVORCED	3	3	5	4.7
SEPARATED	0	0	1	1.0
WIDOWED	6	6	6	8.0
NEVER MARRIED	14	19	25	34.7
NO ANSWER	6	10	3	27.6

Exhibit 10.10Source of Information About CPU Services

HOW DID YOU FIRST LEARN ABOUT THIS SERVICE?

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>OPERATION I.D.</u> (N=35)	<u>PREMISES</u> (N=31)
NEWSPAPER	26	3
TELEVISION	3	0
FRIEND	3	0
CPU STAFF	11	87
POLICE OFFICERS	17	3
OTHER	40	6

In judging the value of the service itself, 77% of the enrollees felt that Operation I.D. was somewhat useful or very useful in preventing loss of property, as shown in Exhibit 10.11. Two participants reported that they had been victims of breaks since enrolling in the program and that their property had not been recovered. Understandably, they did not feel that the program was useful. This sample is obviously too small, however, to objectively judge the effectiveness of the program. Not until a larger proportion of the population has been enrolled and a longer test period has elapsed can the usefulness of Operation Identification be evaluated objectively.

PREMISES SURVEYS

Of the 31 respondents who had had premises surveys, 68% felt that the recommendations that they had received were useful (see Appendix E, Exhibit E.3).

Exhibit 10.11Reported Usefulness of Operation Identification

HOW USEFUL DO YOU THINK THE PROGRAM IS IN PREVENTING LOSS OF VALUABLE PROPERTY?

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>OPERATION I.D.</u> (N=35)
VERY USEFUL	40
SOMEWHAT USEFUL	37
NOT VERY USEFUL	3
NOT AT ALL USEFUL	3
NO ANSWER	17

However, only 19% had fully carried out those recommendations, and only 19% more had even partially carried them out. Once again, there is an insufficient test population available for an objective evaluation of the program.

Since respondents to the premise survey questions did meet the CSO's and PO's of the Crime Prevention Unit who served them, they could respond to questions concerning service quality. Questions about overall satisfaction with service and preference of server were asked, with the results found in Exhibit 10.12. A total of 84% felt either very satisfied or satisfied with the service they were provided. As compared to the results of the same questions asked of PSA clients in Chapter 6, satisfaction with CPU service is not significantly different. The majority of premise survey clients are indifferent to whether a PO or CSO assists them and whether the server is a male or female.

Exhibit 10.12CPU Client Satisfaction with Service
and Preference for Type of Server

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PREMISES</u> (N=31)	<u>PSA</u> <u>CLIENTS</u> (N=221)
<u>OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED WERE YOU WITH THE ASSISTANCE YOU RECEIVED?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	58	52
SATISFIED	26	31
NOT VERY SATISFIED	3	4
DISSATISFIED	6	7
NO ANSWER	6	1
<u>FOR THIS TYPE OF SERVICE, WHO WOULD YOU PREFER TO ASSIST YOU?</u>		
PO	29	19
CSO/PSA	10	11
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	61	69
NO ANSWER	0	1
<u>WOULD YOU PREFER A</u>		
MALE	16	16
FEMALE	0	2
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE	84	80
NO ANSWER	0	2

DEPARTMENT SERVICES

In providing a new type of service, a police department must monitor its effect on the total public image of the department. Exhibit 10.13 shows that the premise survey clients' responses to the new services are generally positive, although most respondents reported no change in their opinion of the WPD. The response paralleled the response to the PSA survey very closely.

Overall opinion of the WPD was higher for Operation I.D. clients than for premise survey or PSA type clients. The major reason for this is that Operation Identification requires that the recipient seek out the particular service. Thus, we have an already biased group of respondents in the Operation I.D. clients.

In summary, the client reaction to the crime prevention services provided by the WPD has been good, in spite of the fact that the usefulness of such services has been neither proved nor disproved. There is no strong objection raised by clients toward the use of civilians and women in the provision of these new services, although citizens were more receptive toward the use of civilians under the PSA Program.

10.4 JOB SATISFACTION

During our anonymous survey of the CSO's, we asked them a number of questions to determine how satisfied they were with their jobs. As with the PSA's, we asked them how they felt about the different aspects of their work, interaction with their supervisors, and the future they feel the job holds for them. In this section, we compare the CSO responses with

Exhibit 10.13

CPU Client Satisfaction with WPD Services

- (a) HOW HAS THIS EXPERIENCE WITH A CSO/PSA/PO AFFECTED YOUR OPINION OF THE WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT?

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PREMISES</u> (N=31)	<u>PSA CLIENTS</u> (N=221)
RAISED	26	27
MADE NO DIFFERENCE	65	68
LOWERED	0	4
DON'T KNOW	10	1

- (b) IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT POLICE DEPARTMENT SERVICES?

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>OPERATION I.D.</u> (N=35)	<u>PREMISES</u> (N=31)	<u>PSA CLIENTS</u> (N=221)
VERY GOOD	57	32	28
GOOD	37	42	57
NOT VERY GOOD	0	13	5
POOR	0	10	4
NO ANSWER	6	3	6

the ones given by PSA's in order to comment on the relative merit of the program.

ASPECTS OF WORK

Some of the aspects which affect CSO job satisfaction are such that they depend more on the way the job is defined than on the people in the job. These structural characteristics include pay, work schedule, functions performed, and the organizational context in which the job exists.

As can be seen in Exhibit 10.14, CSO's, who are paid about 15% less than PSA's, are considerably less satisfied with their pay. Since they do have better hours than PSA's, it is not surprising that CSO's are better satisfied with their schedules.

When asked how satisfied they were with their function, the CSO's responded very positively, as can be seen in Exhibit 10.15. "Talking with people" was mentioned often as the most satisfying aspect of the job. Office duty and patrolling the area on foot were cited most often as being the least satisfying.

In participant observation, a related problem was often mentioned-- that of public confusion about who they are and what they do. CSO's feel that there are two reasons for this. First, their uniforms are similar to PSA's except for color (meter maids have the same basic uniform in yet a third color). Male CSO's wear an all blue uniform which is virtually identical to that of a police officer. As a result, male CSO's are often confused with police officers and asked to take actions they have no authority to take. Female CSO's wear white blouses and, consequently, citizens

Exhibit 10.14

CSO Satisfaction with Pay and Work Schedule

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PSA TOTAL (N=41)</u>	<u>CSO TOTAL (N=10)</u>
<u>HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR PAY?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	5	0
SATISFIED	49	10
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	44	40
VERY DISSATISFIED	2	50
<u>HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR WORK SCHEDULE?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	24	60
SATISFIED	44	30
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	24	10
VERY DISSATISFIED	7	0

Exhibit 10.15

CSO Satisfaction with Function

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PSA TOTAL (N=41)</u>	<u>CSO TOTAL (N=10)</u>
<u>HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH WHAT PSA'S (CSO'S) HAVE BEEN DOING IN THE WPD?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	56	50
SATISFIED	29	50
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	12	0
VERY DISSATISFIED	2	0
<u>HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR PRESENT ASSIGNMENT?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	61	40
SATISFIED	29	20
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	7	40
VERY DISSATISFIED	2	0
<u>OVERALL, HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH POLICE WORK?</u>		
VERY SATISFIED	51	50
SATISFIED	39	30
SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED	10	20
VERY DISSATISFIED	0	0

tend to confuse them with meter maids. The occasional use of PSA cars further complicates the problem, so that it is sometimes very difficult for citizens to tell CSO's apart from other WPD personnel.

INTERACTION WITH SUPERVISOR

Because the CSO's as a group are young and inexperienced with police-type work, there is a considerable need for careful supervision. Exhibit 10.16 shows CSO's are less likely than PSA's to feel that their officials are sympathetic to their complaints about the job. Yet they feel that their officials are much more likely to praise them for a job well done. In a striking contrast to the 93% of PSA's who feel comfortable talking to at least one official about their job-related problems, fully 50% of the CSO's report that there is no official to whom they regularly talk about their job and job-related problems. This is puzzling, especially in light of their other responses and the fact that CPU is a small unit, commanded by a Lieutenant who seems to be liked and respected. Moreover, despite the separation from the rest of the Department, morale in the CPU is good--a credit to the commanding Lieutenant.

ASPIRATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE

The development of a good CSO Program obviously requires a strong commitment on the part of the CSO's. We asked the CSO's how long they thought they would remain in the program. The results, shown in Exhibit 10.17, show that none of the CSO's plan to stay more than five years, and only 50% of them plan to stay more than two years. The major reason given for wanting to leave the program was pay.

Exhibit 10.16

Interactions with Supervisor

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PSA</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=41)	<u>CSO</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=10)
<u>WHEN YOU HAVE COMPLAINTS ABOUT YOUR JOB, HOW OFTEN ARE YOUR OFFICIALS UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHETIC?</u>		
VERY OFTEN	41	20
OFTEN	17	30
OCCASIONALLY	24	40
HARDLY EVER	15	10
NO ANSWER	2	0
<u>ARE THERE ONE OR MORE OFFICIALS TO WHOM YOU REGULARLY TALK ABOUT YOUR JOB AND JOB-RELATED PROBLEMS?</u>		
YES	93	50
NO	5	50
NO ANSWER	2	0
<u>WHEN YOU DO SOMETHING OUTSTANDING, HOW OFTEN DOES ONE OF YOUR OFFICIALS TELL YOU THAT YOU DID A GOOD JOB?</u>		
VERY OFTEN	7	50
OFTEN	27	40
OCCASIONALLY	32	0
HARDLY EVER	32	10
NO ANSWER	2	0

Exhibit 10.17
Job Commitment

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING:</u>	<u>PSA</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=41)	<u>CSO</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=10)
<u>UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS, ASSUMING THE PSA (CSO) PROGRAM CONTINUES, AND ASSUMING YOU DO NOT BECOME A POLICE OFFICER IN WORCESTER, WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM TIME YOU THINK YOU WOULD REMAIN IN THE PROGRAM?</u>		
I AM LOOKING FOR ANOTHER JOB AT PRESENT	12	20
LESS THAN ONE YEAR MORE	5	10
1-2 YEARS MORE	27	10
2-5 YEARS MORE	20	50
6 YEARS OR MORE	29	0
NO ANSWER	7	10
<u>IF YOU DO NOT PLAN TO REMAIN A PSA (CSO), WHY NOT?</u>		
PAY	5	50
NO SECURITY	5	0
WANT TO BE A PO	24	10
NO PROMOTIONS	7	10
DON'T LIKE TO WORK	5	0
BETTER USE OF EDUCATION	7	10
OTHER	5	0
NO ANSWER	41	20

Like PSA's, the CSO's aspire to become police officers. In fact, if given a choice, 50% would like to become detectives (see Exhibit 10.18). The conclusions we made about the PSA program in Chapter 7 apply equally well to the CSO program.

Exhibit 10.18
Job Aspirations

BELOW IS A LIST OF JOBS IN THE WORCESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT. CHOOSE THE 5 JOBS YOU WOULD MOST PREFER, ASSUMING YOU HAD ALL THE NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS. NUMBER YOUR PREFERENCES 1 TO 5 IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE.

<u>PERCENT ANSWERING</u> <u>FIRST PREFERENCE:</u>	<u>PSA</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=41)	<u>CSO</u> <u>TOTAL</u> (N=10)
PSA	2	0
CSO	0	0
IMPACT PATROL	15	0
MOTOR PATROL	24	10
FOOTBEAT	7	0
TRAFFIC DUTY	2	0
ROBBERY STRIKE FORCE IN IMPACT	5	10
BURGLARY TASK FORCE IN IMPACT	2	0
DETECTIVE	15	50
AMBULANCE	5	10
DISPATCHING	0	10
INSIDE CLERICAL JOB	0	0
(CRIME PREVENTION UNIT PATROL)	-	0
NO ANSWER	24	10

PART IV: QUANTITATIVE MEASURES

11 PERFORMANCE STATISTICS

12 CRIME STATISTICS

11 PERFORMANCE STATISTICS

Measures that bear on the important qualitative aspects of the evaluation have been discussed at length in Parts II and III of this report. In this and the following chapter, we discuss the more quantitative measures.

The quantitative performance measures contained in this chapter are primarily based on an analysis of radio call data for a four-month period (March 1 - June 30, 1975), during which the Impact Program was on-going. Although we would have liked to have undertaken a before and during analysis of radio call data, we were unable to secure a reliable and comparable set of before data.*

The radio call analysis has been able to provide answers to some key questions concerning the performance of the Police Service Aide (PSA) patrol force in comparison to that of the regular Police Officer (PO) patrol force. The questions include: How long does a PSA unit take to serve an incident as compared to a PO unit? How much work are the PSA's handling? More specifically, what is the PSA patrol unit utilization as compared to that of a PO unit? These three questions are answered in the next three sections, respectively. In each case we have been able to closely corroborate our findings with the results of our limited analysis of PSA

* The Worcester Police Department has just recently (since January, 1975) been able to record radio call data on a computer tape. Our four-month radio call analysis has made use of this data base--we omitted January and February from our analysis because data during the first two months had errors and were deemed unreliable.

daily activity sheets. The final section of this chapter deals with some personnel statistics that have been traditionally used to indicate performance; these include sick leave, injury, auto accident, complaint and commendation statistics.

11.1 DELAY AND SERVICE TIMES

The delay and service time statistics are discussed in this section. The delay time is the length of time between when a call for service is received (usually by a complaint clerk) and when a radio dispatcher dispatches a patrol unit to serve the call. Although the service time is usually the length of time a patrol unit is on the scene servicing the call, we have *included* in our calculations for service time the associated travel time. Unfortunately, this kind of aggregation was beyond our control. As can be seen in Exhibit 5.4, which shows a sample of a completed radio call card, there are only three times that are clocked on the card: the time the call-for-service arrives; the time it is dispatched; and the time the patrol unit indicates the service is completed. The time at which the patrol unit arrives at the scene is neither reported nor, of course, recorded.

DELAY TIME

Exhibit 11.1 contains delay time statistics by radio call classification by shift of day. The shifts are actually Impact shifts which are two hours behind Motor Patrol shifts. Each shift is indicated in terms of military time. The average and standard deviation statistics are given in the exhibit. The standard deviation can be regarded as a measure of

Exhibit 11.1
Delay Time Statistics by Radio Call Classification

Radio Call Classifications	Delay Time Statistics during Shift ^a :											
	1000 - 1800			1800 - 0200			0200 - 1000			Total 24 Hour		
	Ave.	Std. Dev.		Ave.	Std. Dev.		Ave.	Std. Dev.		Ave.	Std. Dev.	
000 Unclassified	7.30	17.98		5.43	12.35		7.41	15.60		6.42	15.08	
100 Route Assignment	5.23	11.09		6.60	13.25		6.77	12.27		6.06	12.26	
200 Alarms	4.25	9.44		4.69	9.52		4.38	7.61		4.49	9.03	
300 Disturbances	7.20	12.93		7.11	12.27		6.29	11.13		7.02	12.30	
400 Noncriminal Investigations	11.04	20.60		4.06	5.99		3.39	5.42		5.56	11.74	
500 All Points Broadcasts	8.26	14.67		8.49	14.73		11.14	19.48		9.08	15.17	
600 Medical Cases	3.47	9.43		3.39	7.76		3.36	7.55		3.42	8.46	
700 Investigations	9.84	16.28		9.29	14.82		9.94	14.32		9.61	15.27	
800 Traffic Incidents	6.87	12.81		7.23	13.96		8.44	14.56		7.31	13.64	
900 Crimes in Progress	4.83	11.73		4.30	9.95		3.95	7.58		4.35	9.99	
TOTAL	6.70	13.03		6.90	12.60		7.14	12.54		6.88	12.73	

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

the spread of the delay time distribution about its mean or average.

It is seen that incidents involving medical cases, crimes in progress and alarms have the shortest delays; yet these delays average about four minutes with a standard deviation of nine minutes (this indicates that the delay time distribution is spread over a very wide range). An average delay of four minutes for these types of calls-for-service seems extraordinarily long. It could be caused by a number of factors, including laxity on the part of the communications personnel, unavailability of a unit which could be dispatched, or cumbersome communications procedures and facilities.

Looking at the delay statistics by shift reveals a surprise; the delays in all three shifts are about the same (i.e., average of seven minutes) and yet, as we will discuss in Section 11.3, the patrol units' radio call activity levels are significantly different during these shifts. This seems to indicate that patrol unit availability is not a significant determinant of delay time. The impact of this statement suggests that the lengthy dispatch delays are primarily caused by factors *internal* to the communications unit. Our observation of the communications function tends to corroborate this deduction. Low morale and poor physical facilities seem to limit dispatch effectiveness.

SERVICE TIME

Exhibit 11.2 contains service time statistics by radio call classification by shift of day. It is interesting to note that disturbances and crimes in progress take the shortest time to serve--or do they? Inasmuch

Exhibit 11.2
Service Time Statistics by Radio Call Classification

Radio Call Classifications	Service Time Statistics during Shift ^a :							
	1000 - 1800		1800 - 0200		0200 - 1000		Total 24 Hour	
	Ave.	Std. Dev.	Ave.	Std. Dev.	Ave.	Std. Dev.	Ave.	Std. Dev.
000 Unclassified	26.51	28.19	15.75	17.99	28.72	27.63	21.74	24.42
100 Route Assignment	26.57	23.61	18.73	18.82	27.76	23.32	23.41	22.02
200 Alarms	18.99	19.13	20.31	20.72	22.08	22.53	20.43	20.85
300 Disturbances	20.05	19.16	14.87	16.30	20.61	21.38	16.98	18.02
400 Noncriminal Investigations	21.73	21.49	14.46	15.74	30.37	26.21	20.80	21.71
500 All Points Broadcasts	29.83	23.75	23.42	19.62	36.88	25.69	28.82	23.23
600 Medical Cases	27.40	20.41	22.57	20.98	37.57	24.04	27.50	22.05
700 Investigations	32.97	23.98	23.58	20.59	39.01	25.75	29.86	23.67
800 Traffic Incidents	32.63	27.21	28.84	26.62	40.59	29.59	32.61	27.77
900 Crimes in Progress	20.00	18.30	18.49	20.43	22.53	23.67	19.54	20.69
TOTAL	25.77	22.80	18.86	19.48	29.68	25.53	22.99	22.18

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day. It should also be noted that all service times with durations of more than 90 minutes were truncated to 90 minutes for the purpose of calculating the above service time statistics.

as the service time in this analysis includes the travel time, it may just be that the comparatively shorter times are only a reflection of shorter travel times to these critical types of incidents. As might be expected, traffic incidents take the longest to serve--over half an hour. From a statistical point of view, it is interesting to note that the standard deviation is about equal to the average: this is at least a necessary (but not sufficient) condition that the service time distribution can be exponentially distributed.

In terms of the Impact Program, the key question is what is the average service time for a PSA patrol unit as compared to a PO unit? The answer is given in Exhibit 11.3. The PSA unit takes just one minute longer than a PO unit. Again, one must remember that this service time includes travel time. Since PO units tend to travel faster than PSA units, the one-minute difference is probably reversed when comparing on-the-scene service times. Nevertheless, it is revealing that on the average a PSA unit spends just one minute longer in connection with an incident than does a PO unit. Care must be taken in interpreting this result, since PSA's are only allowed to respond to service type calls or to assist PO's in their work.

Exhibit 11.3 shows another interesting fact. The average service time is inversely proportional to the radio call level, irrespective of the type of server. This reflects a well-known phenomenon in queueing or waiting line theory--that is, a server tends to work fast when there are a large number of customers waiting to be served, and conversely, slow when there are a few customers.

Exhibit 11.3

Average Service Time by Shift of Day by Type of Server

Shift	Radio Calls ^a (%)	Average Service Time (in Minutes) per Radio Call per Patrol Unit: ^b			
		PO Only	PSA Only	Amb. Only	Other/ Mixed ^d
0200 - 1000	17.8	29.4	- ^c	37.8	30.79
1000 - 1800	31.9	27.1	26.5	27.0	25.36
1800 - 0200	50.3	18.5	22.9	22.9	19.73
TOTAL 24 HOUR	100.0	23.5	24.6	27.8	23.26

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

^b All service times greater than 90 minutes were truncated to 90 minutes for the purpose of this analysis.

^c PSA's are currently not deployed during this shift.

^d The other/mixed category includes those calls served by other type of units (including bike, wagon, traffic, investigative and foot) and those calls that are responded to by two or more units of mixed types. This category accounted for 26% of all radio calls.

11.2 WORKLOAD DISTRIBUTION

In assessing the radio call workload that the PSA's have been able to handle, there are two ways to determine it. On the one hand, one can view the workload from a demand standpoint and determine the percent of total radio calls that the PSA-manned units have either directly handled or assisted in. On the other hand, one can view the workload from a response standpoint and determine the percent of total patrol unit time that PSA-manned units have spent either directly handling or assisting in calls. Although the demand-related statistic is easier to determine, the response-related statistic is more realistic since it takes into account not only the number of radio calls but also the number of patrol units responding to each call and the time it takes for each unit to serve the call. The demand and response-related PSA workload statistics are further discussed and determined in the next two subsections, followed by a summary statement. First, for background information, Exhibits 11.4 and 11.5 show the radio call workload distributed by sector and by shift, respectively. It is seen that the number and type of radio calls are not distributed evenly among the four designated patrol sectors, with 24.4% of all calls occurring in the Impact sector (Sector 1), and a high proportion of them being disturbance calls. Likewise, as expected, the radio calls vary significantly between shifts, with 50.3% of all calls occurring during the first half shift (i.e., between 6 p.m. and 2 a.m.).

DEMAND-RELATED WORKLOAD

As defined earlier, the demand-related, PSA workload refers to the percent of radio calls that the PSA-manned units have either directly

Exhibit 11.4
Radio Call Workload by Sector

Radio Call Classifications	Percent of Radio Calls in Sector: ^a				Total
	1 ^b	2	3	4	
000 Unclassified	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.2	1.2
100 Route Assignment	2.3	2.1	4.1	1.6	10.1
200 Alarms	1.6	2.6	2.6	1.7	8.5
300 Disturbances	11.1	7.9	11.1	9.2	39.3
400 Noncriminal Investigations	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.5
500 All Points Broadcasts	2.0	2.5	3.8	2.6	10.9
600 Medical Cases	2.3	1.7	2.5	1.9	8.4
700 Investigations	2.6	2.4	3.2	2.3	10.5
800 Traffic Incidents	1.8	2.3	2.7	2.3	9.1
900 Crimes in Progress	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.5
<u>TOTAL</u>	24.4	22.2	31.1	22.3	100.0

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

^b Sector 1 is the designated Impact sector.

Exhibit 11.5
Radio Call Workload by Shift

Radio Call Classifications	Percent of Radio Calls During Shift: ^a				Total 24 Hour
	1000-1800	1800-0200	0200-1000		
000 Unclassified	0.3	0.6	0.3		1.2
100 Route Assignment	4.2	4.3	1.6		10.1
200 Alarms	2.3	4.0	2.2		8.5
300 Disturbances	10.2	23.8	5.3		39.3
400 Noncriminal Investigations	0.1	0.2	0.2		0.5
500 All Points Broadcasts	3.5	4.7	2.7		10.9
600 Medical Cases	3.5	3.3	1.6		8.4
700 Investigations	3.8	4.8	1.9		10.5
800 Traffic Incidents	3.7	3.7	1.7		9.1
900 Crimes in Progress	0.3	0.9	0.3		1.5
<u>TOTAL</u>	31.9	50.3	17.8		100.0

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

handled or assisted in. Exhibit 11.6 contains the radio call workload by type of server; two types of server are identified--the PSA patrol unit and the ambulance unit, which is also primarily manned by PSA's during the 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. period.

In fact, a more valid look at PSA workload is to just consider the period of PSA deployment. Exhibit 11.7 shows that during this period the PSA patrol units handled 21.0% of all radio calls and assisted in 6.7%. Using an estimate that PSA's man the ambulance units 85% of the time during this period,* PSA's are then handling an additional 3.7% and assisting in another 1.5% of all radio calls. In summary, PSA's are handling 24.7% of all radio calls and assisting in 8.2%, making a total of 32.9% of all radio calls that PSA's are involved in.

RESPONSE-RELATED WORKLOAD

As defined earlier, the response-related PSA workload refers to the percent of total patrol unit time that PSA-manned units have spent either directly handling or assisting in calls. In order to arrive at the response-related statistic, one must consider the radio call response pattern. As indicated in Exhibit 11.8, on the average, 1.30 PO patrol units respond to a call, as compared to 1.04 PSA units. The difference is, most likely, due to the more serious nature of the calls that PO's

* This estimate is based on observation and an analysis of a small sample of data. In practice, police officers are deployed in ambulance units only when the PSA-manned ambulance unit is busy. Currently, there are six PSA's who are assigned as ambulance operators, three per shift. Each ambulance unit is staffed by a team of two people.

Exhibit 11.6

Radio Call Workload by Type of Server

Radio Call Classifications	Radio Call (%)	Percent of Total Radio Calls Served By: ^a					
		PSA Only	PSA Assist	PSA Total	AMB Only	AMB Assist	AMB Total
000 Unclassified	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	b	b	b
100 Route Assignment	10.1	4.1	0.3	4.4	0.1	0.1	0.2
200 Alarms	8.5	0.6	1.4	2.0	b	0.1	0.1
300 Disturbances	39.3	2.5	0.7	3.2	0.1	0.1	0.2
400 Noncriminal Investigations	0.5	b	b	b	b	b	b
500 All Points Broadcasts	10.9	5.4	0.5	5.9	b	b	b
600 Medical Cases	8.4	1.0	0.8	1.8	4.4	1.2	5.6
700 Investigations	10.5	1.1	0.2	1.3	b	b	b
800 Traffic Incidents	9.1	2.4	1.5	3.9	b	0.3	0.3
900 Crimes in Progress	1.5	b	b	b	b	b	b
<u>TOTAL</u>	100.0	17.3	5.5	22.8	4.6	1.8	6.4

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

^b Negligible percentage value.

11-12

Exhibit 11.7

Radio Call Workload Distribution in Terms of Number of Calls

Shift	Radio Calls (%)	Percent of Total Radio Calls During 1000-0200 Period Served By: ^a					
		PSA Only	PSA Assist	PSA Total	AMB Only	AMB Assist	AMB Total
1000-1800	31.9	9.2	2.8	12.0	2.1	1.0	3.1
1800-0200	50.3	11.8	3.9	15.7	2.3	0.7	3.0
1000-0200	82.2	21.0	6.7	27.7	4.4	1.7	6.1

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 260 calls during 1000-0200 period of a day.

11-13

Exhibit 11.8
Radio Call Response Pattern by Type of Server

Period	Radio Calls (%)	Number of Units Responding Per Radio Call Which is Served By: ^a			
		PO Only	PSA Only	AMB Only	Other/ Mixed ^b
1000-1800	31.9	1.22	1.05	1.01	1.81
1800-0200	50.3	1.35	1.04	1.00	2.00
0200-1000	17.8	1.29	--	1.00	1.92
<u>Total 24 Hour</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>1.30</u>	<u>1.04</u>	<u>1.00</u>	<u>1.93</u>

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

^b The other/mixed category includes those calls served by other type of units (including bike, wagon, traffic, investigative and foot) and those calls that are responded to by two or more units of mixed types. This category accounted for 26% of all radio calls.

handle, thus requiring more back-up.

Combining the response pattern with the service time statistics in Exhibit 11.3, one can determine the response-related workload statistics as detailed in Exhibit 11.9. Again using an estimate of 85% for PSA manning of the ambulance units, we see that 19.7% of total patrol unit time can be attributed to PSA units for handling radio calls and 5.7% for assisting. In sum, PSA units are able to contribute 25.4% of total patrol unit service time which is required to respond to radio calls.

SUMMARY

Exhibit 11.10 summarizes the PSA workload statistics. It is seen that although PSA-manned units are involved in about a third of all radio calls during the period they are deployed, they are only able to alleviate about a quarter of the total radio call workload in terms of the total patrol unit time required to respond to radio calls. Thus, under *current* circumstances, there should be one PSA-manned unit to every three PO units, *assuming* one would like to equalize the utilization of each type of unit. The next section, Section 11.3, discusses the current patrol unit utilization patterns.

We have thus far considered PSA workload statistics only during the period of PSA deployment. Inasmuch as 82.2% of all radio calls occur during this period, the 32.9% PSA workload statistic becomes 27.0% of all radio calls during the complete 24-hour period. The question remains; how much more can PSA's do if they were deployed around the clock? Assuming PSA's can handle the same type of calls during the second half shift, and combining the information contained in Exhibit 11.6 with that in Exhibit

Exhibit 11.9

Radio Call Workload Distribution in Terms of Service Time

		Percent of Total Patrol Unit Time Spent During 1000-0200 Period Responding to Radio Calls By: ^a					
Shift	Radio Calls (%)	PSA Only	PSA Assist	PSA Total	AMB Only	AMB Assist	AMB Total
1000-1800	31.9	8.0	2.2	10.2	1.8	0.8	2.6
1800-0200	50.3	8.8	2.5	11.3	1.6	0.4	2.0
1000-0200	82.2	16.8	4.7	21.5	3.4	1.2	4.6

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; patrol unit (including motor patrol, PSA, bike, wagon, traffic, investigative, foot, and ambulance units) time spent responding to radio calls averaged 139.2 hours during 1000-0200 period of a day.

11-16

Exhibit 11.10

Summary of PSA Patrol Workload Statistics

Radio Calls During 1000-0200 Period Served By: ^a			
	PSA Only	PSA Assist	PSA Total
PLANNED ^b	--	--	37.5
ACTUAL:			
a) Percent of Total Radio Calls	24.7	8.2	32.9
b) Percent of Total Service Time	19.7	5.7	25.4

^a Including PSA's who are ambulance operators.

^b As estimated by Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee, based on analyses of 92,000 radio calls in 1972. Actually, the 37.5% figure was for a complete 24-hour day; for lack of detailed information, it is assumed here that the 37.5% figure remained constant during the 1000-0200 and 0200-1000 periods of the day.

11-17

11.5, it can be shown that PSA units can handle an additional 5.7% of total radio calls (i.e., 32.0% of the 17.8% of all radio calls that occur during the second half shift). The total of 32.7% is still less than the 37.5% originally estimated by the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee from 1972 radio call data.

The determination of whether PSA's should be deployed during the second half shift must be made with caution, taking into consideration not only the additional workload that PSA's can undertake but also, of course, their safety. From the point of view of workload alone, it cannot be effectively argued that PSA's should be deployed around the clock. However, in order to achieve complete integration of PSA's in the WPD, full-scale deployment and utilization of PSA's should be considered and attempted. Perhaps PSA's can be doubled up while patrolling during the second half shift, *if* safety is a problem.

11.3 PATROL CAR UTILIZATION

The workload statistics presented in the last section give an incomplete picture of PSA performance; they only reflect the total level of work that the current complement of PSA's has been able to undertake. In this section, we attempt to derive the average workload per PSA patrol car and compare it with that for a PO unit. We determine for each type of unit a utilization value, which is the percent of time spent per unit on an eight-hour tour responding to radio calls. Note that in this section we are only considering the PSA-manned patrol units, and not the PSA-manned ambulance units.

We first compute the average time spent by the patrol car units responding to radio calls per day (see Exhibit 11.11). Next, we estimate the average patrol unit time that is available in a day on the basis of 1) the number of assigned patrol personnel (see Exhibit 11.12), 2) the fact that each PO works an average of 212 days a year (see Exhibit 11.13) and each PSA averages 230 days, and 3) the knowledge that certain PO units are manned by two officers. The ratio of the average time spent responding to calls to the total time that is available is then the utilization value. Exhibit 11.12 summarizes the utilization of PO and PSA units by shift; three important points should be discussed and expanded upon.

First, we note that utilization of PO units varies significantly from one shift to another, with the PO units in the day shift being utilized the most; more than twice as much as those assigned to the second half shift. Similarly, the PSA units assigned to the day shift are utilized more than those assigned to the first half. Obviously, if patrol unit utilization is to be equalized on all shifts, the deployment of both PO and PSA manpower should be readjusted.

Second, we see that the average PSA unit utilization is 19% as compared to 28% for a PO unit. The difference suggests that PSA's are not utilized as much as PO's, at least insofar as responding to radio calls is concerned. A 19% utilization implies that the PSA unit is responding to radio calls for 1.52 hours out of an eight-hour tour; this in turn implies that the unit responds to 3.7 radio calls in an eight-hour tour, assuming an average service time per call of 24.6 minutes (see Exhibit 11.13). The 19% figure derived from radio call data is confirmed by our

Exhibit 11.11

Total Service Time by Type of Patrol Unit

Period	Radio Calls ^a (%)	Average Time (in Hours) Spent by Patrol Cars Responding to Radio Calls per Day ^b	
		PO Unit	PSA Unit
0200 - 1800	17.8	29.4	-
1000 - 1800	31.9	32.2	14.1
1800 - 0200	50.3	43.6	15.6
TOTAL 24 HOUR	100.0	105.2	29.7

^a Based on radio call analysis during period of March 1 - June 30, 1975; number of radio calls averaged 316 calls per day.

^b Not included is time spent by other patrol units (i.e., bike, wagon, traffic, investigative, foot, and ambulance units).

Exhibit 11.12

Patrol Car Utilization

Periods ^b	Radio Calls (%)	Patrol Car Personnel				Estimated Utilization ^a	
		PO (#)	PSA (#)	Total		PO Unit ^c (%)	PSA Unit ^d (%)
				(#)	(%)		
0200 - 1000	17.8	35	-	35	29.4	19	-
1000 - 1800	31.9	17	12	29	24.4	46	23
1800 - 0200	50.3	36	19	55	46.2	27	16
TOTAL 24 Hour	100.0	88	31	119	100.0	28	19

^a Utilization implies % time spent per unit on an 8-hour tour responding to radio calls.

^b Note: Motor Patrol shifts are actually two hours before Impact patrol (including PSA) shifts, which are during the 1000-1800 and 1800-0200 periods.

^c Although the utilization values are per PO patrol unit, the utilization per PO is slightly less since a couple of the PO units are each manned by two instead of one officer.

^d Although the utilization values are per PSA patrol unit, the utilization per PSA is the same since all PSA units are each manned by one PSA.

Exhibit 11.13

WPD Personnel Statistics

Period	Percentage of Sworn Police Officers and Officials:						
	Working	Day Offa	Absent With Reason	Sick	Vacation	Injured on Duty	Personal Day
January, 1973	62.05	26.37	5.11	4.25	1.21	0.63	0.38
February, 1973	59.97	26.57	5.47	4.30	2.57	0.66	0.46
March, 1973	58.84	26.37	5.69	4.94	3.04	0.56	0.56
April, 1973	56.55	26.31	6.04	5.72	4.32	0.44	0.62
May, 1973	57.01	25.12	6.44	5.71	4.40	0.67	0.65
June, 1973	54.37	26.10	6.33	5.05	5.86	1.37	0.92
Average (%)	58.13	26.14	5.85	5.00	3.57	0.72	0.59
Average (Days/Year/Officer)	212.20	95.40	21.40	18.30	13.00	2.60	2.20

^a Effective April 1, 1974, each Worcester police officer (not including officials) received an additional 17.6 more days off per year.

SOURCE: Worcester Police Department

analysis of PSA daily activity sheets, as summarized in Exhibit 11.14. In fact, it is seen that if all activities which were recorded in the daily activity sheets were counted (including those not reported to the dispatcher), then the PSA utilization would be 29%. Assuming a 20% figure for maintenance and meals, the PSA is only accounted for during 49% of the time; presumably the PSA is performing random preventive patrol during the remaining 51% of the time--this represents a significant amount of uncommitted time. In sum, these statistics reveal that the PSA's who are assigned to patrol are being somewhat under-utilized, a fact that was also substantiated by our limited participant observation findings. By decreasing the current number of PSA's assigned to patrol, one could of course raise their radio call utilization: one might want to raise it to 28%, the current average utilization of a PO patrol unit. Thus, some of the PSA's that are currently in patrol could be reassigned to duty in the second half shift and/or other functions. The exact number of PSA's that should be reassigned must be determined with care, especially in light of the yearly growth of radio calls--in particular, service type calls.

The third point of discussion is: How reasonable is the 28% utilization figure for a PO patrol unit? A 28% utilization implies that the patrol unit is responding to radio calls for 2.24 hours out of an eight-hour tour; this in turn implies that the unit responds to 5.4 radio calls on an eight-hour tour, assuming an average service time per call of 25 minutes (see Exhibit 11.3). This represents quite a substantial workload; in fact, as indicated in Exhibit 11.15, it is the highest of the half dozen utilization

Exhibit 11.14

PSA Utilization

<u>Data Source</u>	PSA Utilization (in %) Based on: ^a	
	Activities Known to Dispatcher ^b	All Recorded Activities
Radio Call Cards	19	--
Daily Activity Sheets	18	29

^a Utilization implies % time spent per unit on an eight-hour tour responding to indicated activities.

^b Includes both dispatcher assigned and reported self-initiated activities--does not include any activity that is not reported to the dispatcher.

Exhibit 11.15

Comparison of Patrol Unit Utilization Values

	Utilization	
	<u>PO</u> (%)	<u>PSA</u> (%)
Worcester, Massachusetts (1975)	28	19
Wilmington, Delaware (1975)	23	-
St. Louis, Missouri (1974)	20	-
Arlington, Massachusetts (1974)	15	-
Kansas City, Missouri (1973)	19	-
Chicago, Illinois (1966)	14	-

values that we are aware of.* Given the need to have patrol units available to dispatch (especially in serious cases), and the desire to have some preventive patrol time, we feel that the 28% utilization figure for a PO patrol unit is quite reasonable.**

In conclusion, a remark should be made regarding the different PSA and PO utilization values. The Worcester Police Department insists that the 29% PSA figure should be compared to the 28% PO figure, because the 28% figure also reflects the PO's total workload since the more mundan  PO activities (i.e., those not reported to the dispatcher) are now being handled by the PSA's, thus allowing the PO's to concentrate on radio calls which in turn has resulted in the substantial 28% figure. (It is a pity that, for lack of data, a comparable PO utilization figure for the before period could not be determined.) However, even *assuming* that the WPD's hypothesis is correct, it can still be argued that the PSA utilization figure could and should be substantially higher than the PO figure. The basic reason being that the availability of PSA's is far less critical than that of PO's: thus, although a 28% utilization figure is quite reasonable for PO's, a 29% figure may be quite low for PSA's.

11.4 PERSONNEL STATISTICS

In contrast to the operational statistics presented in the last three sections, some personnel statistics that have been traditionally

* A comparison of radio call utilization values between cities should be undertaken with extreme caution; it is obviously highly dependent on each city's communications procedures, especially with regard to the recording of self-initiated calls and calls that require back-up units.

** Additionally, it should be noted that the utilization values have been based on personnel assigned to patrol. Inasmuch as some of these assignments are "desk" assignments, the patrol unit utilization values calculated in this section can be regarded as conservative or minimum estimates.

used to indicate performance are presented in this section. In particular, the section focuses on sick leave, injury, auto accident, and complaint and commendation statistics.

SICK LEAVE

Referring to Exhibit 11.16, it is seen that a PSA takes, on the average, one more sick leave day per year than an Impact PO.* The tenuous status of the PSA and the fact that PO's have more days off than PSA's might tend to cause PSA's to take more sick time. For possibly the same reasons, Community Service Officers (CSO's) are also taking the majority of their allowable sick leave days. It is interesting to note that PSA's assigned to ambulance duty have a dramatically lower number of sick leave days taken than other PSA's. This is probably due to their cohesiveness as a unit and to their satisfaction with the job.

Looking at the police officers in Impact, it is seen that the Impact investigators have registered a significant decrease in the number of sick days taken while in Impact as compared to before Impact, again possibly due to the greater satisfaction with their current job. Compared to the 18.3 sick days taken by a PO in 1973 (see Exhibit 11.13), the 8.6 sick days taken by Impact patrol PO's seems very low. However, it should be remembered that the Impact PO's are quite young and they are probably still trying to bank their sick days. Additionally, the figure for 1973 did not exclude sick periods of ten consecutive days or more, as was done in compiling Exhibit 11.16.

* Both PSA's and PO's receive 15 sick days per year and can accumulate up to 150 days in their sick leave bank.

Exhibit 11.16

Impact Personnel Sick Leave Statistics

	AVERAGE # SICK DAYS ^a /PERSON/YEAR	
	BEFORE	DURING
IMPACT PATROL PSA (N=12)	-	10.5
MOTOR PATROL PSA (N=19)	-	10.5
AMBULANCE PSA (N=6)	-	2.5
COMMUNICATIONS PSA (N=4) ^b	-	9.5
ALL PSA (N=41)	-	9.2 ^c
IMPACT PATROL PO (N=19)	8.3	8.6
IMPACT INVEST. PO (N=13)	9.5	7.5
ALL IMPACT PO (N=32)	8.8	8.2
CSO (N=11)	-	8.9 ^d

^a Note, sick periods of ten consecutive days or more are not included in average.

^b Actually, one of the four PSA's is usually assigned to the Precinct 1 (Headquarters) desk.

^c In terms of sex, male (N=25) and female (N=16) PSA's averaged 8.1 and 11.2 days/person/year, respectively.

^d In terms of sex, male (N=6) and female (N=5) CSO's averaged 8.0 and 9.9 days/person/year, respectively.

Finally, Exhibit 11.16 shows that both PSA and CSO females take more sick leave than their male counterparts. This phenomenon has also been observed in other manpower studies.

INJURY

In a program incorporating uniformed, unarmed civilians into police field operations, a primary concern should be the safety of the civilian aides, the sworn police officers, and the public. This evaluation has found absolutely no indication of an increased safety risk to any of these groups because of the deployment of PSA's.

Exhibit 11.17 lists all injuries reported by PSA's from March 1, 1974 through July 31, 1975. Of 13 reported PSA injuries during this 16-month period, only six resulted in time taken off work. Of the 13, only one injury (hit by car) resulted from any contact with the public. During the same period, Impact PO's sustained 44 injuries, including eight while apprehending suspects, and 15 while pursuing suspects.

These results are quite significant and highlight at least two points. First, they indicate that none of the PSA injuries could have been prevented by having the PSA's armed or protected. Citizens are not taking advantage of the unarmed and non-authoritative status of PSA's. Secondly, the results are additional evidence that PSA's are following the job guidelines. The type and small number of injuries indicate that PSA's are not trying to assume police authority and are not overstepping the bounds of their authority.

During the evaluation, we heard isolated, unconfirmed stories of a few PSA's overstepping their authority by stopping motorists or chasing stolen autos. The police union did discuss this problem with the Chief,

Exhibit 11.17

Reasons for PSA Injuries on Duty

TYPE OF INJURY	NUMBER ^a	TIME OFF TAKEN
TRIPPED AND FELL	1	No
CUT BY GLASS	1	No
FOREIGN OBJECT IN EYE	1	Yes
SPRAINED ANKLE	1	Yes
HIT NOSE ON CAR	1	No
HIT BY CAR	1	Yes
EXPOSURE TO DISEASE	1	Yes
AMBULANCE:		
EXPOSURE TO DISEASE	4 ^b	Yes
PULLED MUSCLE	1	No
PINCHED FINGER	1	No

^a During the period 3/1/74-7/31/75.

^b Two incidents.

and a few PSA's were warned. With the vast majority of PSA's following the guidelines closely and with quick and firm corrective action taken for the few who were overenthusiastic, the injury rate has been virtually negligible.

AUTO ACCIDENT

Exhibit 11.18 shows that the number of motor vehicle accidents sustained by all PSA's is comparable to the total sustained by Impact PO's. Although a couple of PSA's have been involved in repeated accidents,

Exhibit 11.18

Impact Motor Vehicle Accidents

Status of Vehicle	Number of Motor Vehicle Accidents Sustained By:		
	Impact PO	All PSA	All CSO
PARKED	2	5	1
OCCUPIED BUT STOPPED	6	6	1
MOVING	15	14	1
<u>TOTAL</u>	23	25	3

the number of PSA accidents does not seem exhorbitant; it is to be expected, given the nature of the job where driving a car takes up about three-quarters of an eight-hour workday.

COMPLAINTS AND COMMENDATIONS

Exhibit 11.19 contains a list of citizen and Departmental complaints and the resulting Departmental actions. Of the total of 101 complaints from citizens, only three were directed against PSA's, and none of these was found by the WPD to be justified.* There were a total of six disciplinary actions initiated by the Department against its personnel over the 14-month period. Of these, only one was directed against a PSA, and

* It should be noted that the WPD itself determines whether citizen complaints are "justified" or "unjustified."

Exhibit 11.19
Complaint Statistics a

Target	Nature of Complaint	Number of Complaints b	Number Justified	Departmental Action
PSA c	Lack of Service	2	0	--
PSA c	Improper Action	1	0	--
PO	Brutality	6	1	25 days suspension and 30 extra days duty
PO	Police Actions	29	0	--
PO	Lack of Service	18	0	--
PO	Missing Items	8	0	--
PO	Treatment	5	0	--
PO	Discrimination	2	0	--
PO	Harrassment	6	1	Written Reprimand
PSA c	Not on Assigned Duty	1	--	One Day Suspension
PO	Not on Assigned Duty	2	--	Two One-Day Suspensions
PO	Missing Prisoners	1	--	Written Reprimands to 5 PO's
PO	Abuse of Sick Leave	1	--	Written Reprimand
PO	Violation of Regulations	1	--	One-Day Suspension

a Source: Worcester Police Department.

b During the period 6/1/74 to 8/31/75.

c All PSA complaints were against male PSA's.

this was for returning late from a lunch hour. In sum, Exhibit 11.19 shows that neither citizens nor the WPD have had any significant problems with the conduct of PSA's, supporting the discussions in Part II of this report.

In terms of commendations, the WPD received 291 letters of appreciation during the period July 5, 1974 to August 31, 1975. Of these, 47 related to police service in general; 202 commended the actions of police officers; and 42 expressed appreciation for specific PSA actions. Again, it is seen that PSA's have contributed positively to the image of the Worcester Police Department.

12 CRIME STATISTICS

As defined in Exhibit 2.1, the primary goal of the Worcester Crime Impact Program is "to achieve substantial short-term reductions in the incidence of robbery and burglary on a city-wide basis, but with higher reductions in the Impact target area (Sector 1)." A secondary goal is to increase the clearance rate for the target crimes of robbery and burglary. The objective of this chapter is to answer the question of whether and to what extent these goals have been met. It is seen that the primary goal has for the most part been achieved, while the secondary goal remains in essence a question mark. In addition to discussing target crime and related clearance statistics, this chapter also attempts to set these findings in proper perspective by relating the Worcester crime experience to the national experience and by considering the extent to which the target crimes have been displaced. First, some background issues are discussed in the next section.

12.1 BACKGROUND

Lack of an evaluation design in the initial development of the Impact Program has limited our ability to undertake a comprehensive statistical analysis of the output crime measures. In fact, some critical data elements (e.g., clearance rate information, conviction rate information, etc.) have not been compiled and, therefore, are unavailable for analysis. We have been limited to those crime incident records that are available and retrievable. We have also been hampered by the unreliability of various

data elements. In this section, we discuss the incident records that have been analyzed; the data reliability issue; the method of analysis; and the data processing limitation of the Operations Analyst, who is also a component of the Impact Program.

INCIDENT RECORDS

The Worcester Police Department, like other police departments, maintains four major sets of records that pertain to crime incidents. They correspond to:

- Radio Call Cards (each identified by an Assignment Record number--AR#)
- Crime Reports (each identified by a Records Bureau number--RB#)
- Investigative Reports (each identified by a Detective Bureau number--DB#)
- Arrest Reports (each identified by an Arrest number)

As indicated in parenthesis, each of the four sets of records is maintained by a separate numbering system, which is rarely recorded on the records of another set. Thus, it is virtually impossible to correlate records to determine such statistics as whether a particular crime was ever cleared.

During the course of the evaluation effort, all four sets of data have been studied. Results of the radio call analysis are discussed in Chapter 11. Detailed analysis of the crime reports was also undertaken; results of the analysis are contained in this chapter. Basically, analysis was performed on a little less than 60,000 data processing cards that were prepared from crime reports and covering the period March 1, 1973

through May 31, 1975. These cards are punched daily by members of the Planning Unit of the WPD from crime reports that are at the same time cursorily checked and coded. Investigative and arrest reports were also briefly reviewed, but were not analyzed inasmuch as they were not consistently correlated with the crime reports and therefore would have yielded limited information from an evaluation viewpoint.

However, arrest information was obtained from WPD's monthly reports to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. Ten and a half years of these monthly reports were also analyzed to determine long-term crime trends, in particular in the target crimes of robbery and burglary.

Finally, two other sets of crime data are reflected in this chapter. Both were provided by the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee (WRLEC). The first set contained totals of target crime levels in some of the neighboring towns to Worcester, and it was used to see if there are any indications of crime displacement to these towns. The second set is a manual analysis of robbery clearance rate performed by WRLEC.

DATA RELIABILITY

The reliability of the Worcester crime data as reflected in the data processing cards is highly questionable.

The central problem is in the coding and keypunching areas. Neither the coding nor the keypunching is verified. In fact, there is not even any visual verification of the cards once keypunched since the cards are not interpreted as they are punched (interpreting refers to printing, in small characters along the top edge of the card, each punch made in the card). This is a critical problem, since, except for instances of glaring

errors, it is almost impossible to detect an error after the fact. Yet, all the UCR reports generated by the Planning Unit are based on those unverified data processing cards, and compiled by a card sorter that can only detect one punch in a column at one time.

Another major difficulty with the data involves the method of calculating stolen automobile counts. Part of the problem lies with the method of coding the data as specified by the FBI. For example, if a car is stolen in connection with another crime, say burglary, it is not counted because the FBI states that you can only count the most serious crime. However, if this same car is recovered, it is counted as a recovered car. The fact that attempted auto thefts are counted as thefts presents an additional complication, as an attempted theft would have to be counted as a car stolen and recovered. For these reasons, much of the work related to the counting of stolen autos is performed manually by the Planning Unit.

The data problem was also reflected in cases where two or more cards had the same identifying Records Bureau number. These instances need not be keypunching errors, as they could be due to the fact that only four digits are allotted on the data processing card, while RB numbers can run as high as five digits. Thus, for example, the numbers 1,111; 11,111; and 21,111 would all appear as "1111."

Other errors contributing to the unreliability of the crime data can be attributed to the patrol officer or investigator who writes the report. There is no systematic procedure by which the reports are checked and verified.

Although we have highlighted the fact that the WPD crime data are problematic and error prone, we do feel, however, that it is no less reliable than the data produced by other police departments of comparable size who are also reporting their statistics to the FBI UCR.

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Comparative analysis is the basic method used in this chapter to analyze the various crime incident records for the purpose of evaluating the Impact Program. Wherever possible, we compare "before" and "during" statistics. As discussed in Chapter 2, two twelve-month periods were selected based upon the progress of the Impact Program. The before period covers the twelve months immediately preceding the start of the Program; it was from March 1, 1973 to February 28, 1974. To eliminate transient effects caused by Program implementation, the next three months were skipped. The during period then became the period from June 1, 1974 through May 31, 1975. Although longer comparison periods would increase the reliability of the findings, it was not possible to define longer periods because of the schedule limitations on the evaluation effort. However, twelve-month periods are long enough to eliminate such problematic effects as seasonality and small sample sizes.

Another method of evaluating the Impact Program could be to predict the crime level that would have occurred had the Impact Program not been implemented and comparing it to the actual level. However, through an analysis of the underlying fluctuations in the data, it was determined that a time series analysis would have yielded doubtful results. Further discussion of this matter is contained in Section 12.3.

OPERATIONS ANALYST

During this part of our evaluation effort, we have had ample opportunity of working with the Operations Analyst, who, as discussed in Chapter 2, is also a component of the Impact Program. Ostensibly, his function is to provide technical assistance through the analysis of data that is required for decision-making, especially in regard to the Impact Program. Actually, he has been severely limited in his capacity to provide comprehensive and timely information, inasmuch as the analysis of large amounts of data can only be undertaken with the proper data processing facilities, including direct access to a computer and a computer programmer. Thus, the current paucity of facilities is limiting the effectiveness of the Operations Analyst as an analyst. This is especially unfortunate since we believe that he has the background and skills to be a first-rate analyst. More specific recommendations in upgrading the data processing facilities in the WPD are contained in Chapter 14.

12.2 CRIME IN WORCESTER

The City of Worcester, Massachusetts is a medium-sized city. Its 1970 population was listed as 176,572, a 5.4% drop from the 1960 population of 186,587. However, it is estimated that there has been some increase in population in the early 1970's and that the current population of the city is roughly 180,000.

In an attempt to view the crime problem in Worcester in perspective with that in other cities of comparable size, Exhibit 12.1 was developed, based on 1973 data (i.e., before Impact). This exhibit compares crime

Exhibit 12.1
Pre-Impact Crime Rates

	1973 Crime Rates Per 100,000 Population	
	Worcester	U.S. Cities 100,000-250,000
Total Crime Index ^a	8,980	6,150
Total Crime Index Except Auto Theft	6,200	5,460
Violent Crime ^b	510	550
Property Crime ^c	8,470	5,610
Burglary	3,230	1,810
Robbery	420	240

Source: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, 1973.

^aAccording to the FBI UCR, the Crime Index category includes the major crimes of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny \$50 and over in value, and auto theft.

^bThe violent crime category includes murder, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.

^cThe property crime category includes burglary, larceny \$50 and over in value, and auto theft.

rates per 100,000 population with cities of comparable size (i.e., 100,000 - 250,000 population) throughout the U.S. It is seen that in the comparison of the overall Crime Index, Worcester appears to have a considerably higher rate than comparable cities nationwide; in fact, the Worcester rate is 46% higher. There are at least two good reasons for this: first, New England cities have historically had Crime

Index rates higher than comparable cities nationwide, and, secondly, the crime of auto theft is a major problem in Worcester, as it is throughout the state of Massachusetts. For this latter reason, the Crime Index rates were recalculated without the crime of auto theft. The second row of the exhibit gives this comparison; Worcester appears much better, although its rate is still 14% higher than comparable cities. Rates for the FBI-defined categories of violent crimes and property crimes reflect that the basic crime problem in Worcester is not with violent crimes (although, as we can see, the rate of robbery is quite high), but rather with property crimes. The crime of auto theft accounts for 33% of the total property crimes. Finally, again referring to Exhibit 12.1 and looking at the crimes of robbery and burglary, it is seen that their rates were 78% and 51% higher than those for comparable cities, respectively. This was why Worcester picked robbery and burglary as the target crimes for the Impact Program.

A longitudinal look at Worcester's crime experience indicates that up until 1965 Worcester maintained a crime rate which was comparable to or less than the national rate. Even through the dramatic national rise in crime in the 1965 to 1968 period, Worcester maintained a comparable rate. However, starting in about 1968, Worcester experienced a sharp rise in crime especially in the target crimes of robbery and burglary. Choosing 1968 as a base year, Exhibits 12.2, 12.3, and 12.4 show percentage changes in the annual levels of the Crime Index, robbery, and burglary, respectively, over the base year. Each exhibit's plot does not imply that Worcester's rate was identical to the national rate in

Exhibit 12.2

Crime Index: 1968 - 1973




Exhibit 12.3

Robbery: 1968 - 1973





Exhibit 12.4

Burglary: 1968 - 1973



1968, but rather that it is designed to show relative trends since that time, in a manner similar to that used to display cost of living indices. The exhibits contain annual rates through the end of 1973 which is immediately prior to the start of the Impact Program. The dramatic increase in the years immediately prior to the start of Impact are apparent, especially in the crime of robbery which went from a 140% of base figure at the end of 1972 to over 260% increase by the end of the following year.

12.3 CRIME INCIDENCE

The last section discussed Worcester's crime experience up to the beginning of the Impact Program. This section deals with the results of a comparative analysis of crime incidence "before" and "during" Impact.

Overall, looking at the total reported crime* (i.e., Part I and Part II crimes) in Exhibit 12.5, it is seen that although the crime level is down 5% in the Impact area, the city-wide level is up 3%, due to the 4% increase in the rest of the city. Referring to Exhibit 12.6, it is seen that the incidence of robbery is down significantly; 41% in the Impact area, while rising 9% outside of Impact, yielding a net drop of 15% city-wide. Exhibit 12.7 indicates that burglary is down 23% in Impact and down 13% outside Impact, yielding a net drop of 16% city-wide.

* Reported crime means that crime known to the police and reported to the FBI as part of the monthly Return A report to the Uniform Crime Report.

Exhibit 12.5

Total Reported Crime: Before and During Comparison





Exhibit 12.6

Robbery: Before and During Comparison






Key: Before  During 

Exhibit 12.7

Burglary: Before and During Comparison



Key: Before  During 

It can therefore be concluded from this comparative analysis* that the Impact Program has *achieved its primary goal* of reducing the target crimes of robbery and burglary. Two questions still remain. First, were the crimes displaced? This is the subject matter of the next section, Section 12.4. Second, given the rising crime trends prior to the Impact Program, would not the decreases in target crimes be even more significant if compared to the predicted levels of those crimes? The answer is most likely yes.

In fact, Exhibits 12.8 through 12.10 are extended versions of Exhibits 12.2 through 12.4, respectively, to include the levels for two additional years; the shaded region in each exhibit indicates the time period that the Impact Program has been on-going. The levels for 1975 are based on first quarter estimates; that is, if the crimes maintain their present first quarter rate of change through the rest of 1975 then their positions relative to the 1968 base year are as indicated in Exhibits 12.8 through 12.10. Once again, the reader is cautioned not to interpret a point on the graph as either a crime level or rate but rather only in relation to the 1968 base year. Based on these exhibits, it is an easy task to extrapolate and find an answer to the second question. However, such an answer would be very unreliable, especially since the 1975 levels are based on the first quarter's estimates. In addition, fluctuations in the data made it apparent that

* More detailed comparative analysis results are continued in Appendix F.

Exhibit 12.8

Crime Index: 1968 - 1975




Exhibit 12.9

Robbery: 1968 - 1975





Exhibit 12.10

Burglary: 1968 - 1975



time-series analysis would be difficult. To get a larger and more reliable data base, we analyzed the monthly tallies of the two target crimes for the period January, 1965 through May, 1975. Although the data did demonstrate some seasonality, it was not homogeneous in any way; that is, it did not have a constant variance over its length. Normally, transformation of the data would solve this problem. To attempt transformation, the data were divided into annual groups of monthly data. (This grouping reflected the seasonality factor.) The range and mean of each group were calculated. The pairs of range and mean values were then plotted against each other. The data thus plotted demonstrated an almost total lack of correlation, thus indicating that a transformation of the data into a usable form was impossible. In summary, the extreme fluctuations in the monthly levels of the target crimes, apart from the seasonality factor, would render any time-series analysis tenuous, at best.

12.4 CRIME DISPLACEMENT

Comparison of before and during statistics for the target crimes of robbery and burglary indicate both tremendous decreases in the Impact area and somewhat less, but still significant, decreases for the city as a whole. The question remains: were the target crimes displaced? This section attempts to answer the question by first discussing the different possible forms of crime displacement and then documenting some analyses pertaining to territorial or geographic displacement.

FORMS OF DISPLACEMENT*

One can hypothesize at least five forms of displacement that might occur after the implementation of a crime control program: temporal, tactical, target, territorial, and functional.

Temporal Displacement

Perhaps the simplest displacement for the offender is to continue to commit the same type of crime, in the same places, against the same targets via the same tactics, but at a different time. For example, intensive police patrol in the Bronx section of New York City during evening hours reportedly produced a reduction in certain types of crime but at the expense of an increase in the number of crimes occurring in the late afternoon.**

At first thought, one may think that a way to look at the temporal occurrence of crime is to analyze the radio call cards, since they have accurate time information. However, accurate crime information cannot be obtained from the radio call card for several reasons, principally because the call for service does not usually describe the situation. What is often reported as burglary might turn out to be larceny, malicious mischief might be vandalism, sick assist might be aggravated assault, etc. On the other hand, time data which is contained on crime reports is of little use. This is because of the difficulty in assessing

* See J. M. Tien, T. A. Reppetto et al., "Elements of CPTED: A Preliminary Report," Urban Systems Research and Engineering, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, January, 1975, Chapter 4.

** Michael Maltz, Evaluation of Crime Control Programs, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 21.

the occurrence time of many crimes, especially those against property. This problem is compounded within the Worcester Police Department where time information on crime is not recorded in military time but rather "regular" time, and then only the hour is recorded. Furthermore, rather than recording A.M. or P.M., the indication is "day" or "night," where the official definition of day and night in their coding book is

Day is when it is light out, night is when it is dark out. Changes year round.

For these assorted reasons, no detailed analysis of temporal displacement of crime was undertaken.

Tactical Displacement

Alternatively, offenders may continue to commit the same crime at the same times, places, and against the same targets but may alter their tactics. The installation of alarms in commercial establishments, for example, may cause burglars to switch from breaking and entering a store to smashing and grabbing; i.e., breaking a window, seizing something and running away.*

Target Displacement

When one target appears relatively impervious to any criminal tactic, offenders may simply shift to another target. After an increase in police patrol in the New York City subways, for example, there was an apparent

* This type of crime is in fact common in areas where there is extensive use of locks, alarms, and grills to secure commercial establishments. See Gerald Luedtke Associates, Crime and the Physical City (Detroit, 1971), p. 19.

increase in bus robberies. Later, when exact fare was instituted and bus robberies dropped, subway robberies rose. One study of this phenomenon concluded that displacement both away from and toward the subways occurred because of perceived or actual changes in the relative attractiveness of buses and subways as targets for robbers. The study also hypothesized that, because of displacement, the anti-crime programs instituted in various parts of the transit system constituted forms of sub-optimization. As the authors of the study commented, "a transportation system administrator whose domain included buses and subways would not have consented to the installation of exact fare systems on the buses."*

Territorial Displacement

Offenders may not only move from target to target but also from place to place. A substantial increase in police manpower in one Manhattan precinct apparently produced a reduction in street robbery, but may also have been responsible for an increase in the same crime in adjoining precincts.**

Functional Displacement

Finally, offenders may simply switch functionally from one crime type to another: robbers could become burglars or vice versa. Presumably,

* J. Chaiken, M. Lawless, and K. Stevenson, The Impact of Police Activity on Crime: Robberies on the New York City Subway System (NYC Rand Institute, 1974), pp. 26-28, 30-31.

** See S. James Press, Some Effects of an Increase in Police Manpower in the 20th Precinct in New York City (New York: Rand Institute, 1971).

it would constitute a net gain for society if armed robbers switched to stealing hubcaps, since the consequences in terms of fear and risk of life would be much less, but clearly the reverse switch would negate the value of any crime control program against hubcap stealing.

SOME ANALYSES

It is obvious that the measurement of crime displacement is a very difficult and tenuous task, since it deals with human behavior. Undertaking extensive offender interviews is one way of getting somewhat of a handle on the problem. Unfortunately, our limited resources precluded the inclusion of any offender interviews.

However, we have performed some analyses of crime data to see if there is any indication that territorial or geographic displacement is occurring. Although territorial displacement of crime is probably the most amenable form of displacement to be quantitatively identified, it is extremely difficult to say what caused it.

Limited data were obtained from all but two (Auburn and Millbury) of the towns contiguous to Worcester. The data are displayed in Exhibits 12.11 and 12.12 for the crimes of robbery and burglary, respectively. Indicated for each town are the crime levels in defined Periods I and II (which are slightly different from the before and during periods) and the percentage increase or decrease. (The data are combined for West Boylston and Boylston as the two towns share a common police dispatching unit.) More detailed analysis of the data is given in corresponding Exhibits 12.13 and 12.14, respectively. It should be noted that some of the data from surrounding towns, especially that for

Robbery: Comparison by Locale





Exhibit 12.11

Burglary: Comparison by Locale



Key:
 $\frac{\text{Period I Level (4/1/73 - 3/31/74)}}{\text{Period II Level (4/1/74 - 3/31/75)}} - 1$
 Percent Change

Exhibit 12.12

Exhibit 12.13

Robbery: Comparison by Area

	Percent Increase/Decrease in Period I and Period II Statistics ^a		
	Armed	Unarmed	Total
Impact Area	- 17	- 50	- 39
City except Impact	+ 35	- 15	+ 5
City-wide	+ 13	- 33	- 16
Area except City ^b	+136	+133	+135
Area-wide	+ 18	- 32	- 13

^a Periods I and II cover 4/1/73 - 3/31/74 and 4/1/74 - 3/31/75, respectively.
^b The robbery crime level in the area except City category (i.e., the surrounding towns except for Auburn and Millbury) is quite low--the total robbery level was 14 in Period I and 31 in Period II.

Exhibit 12.14Burglary: Comparison by Area

	Percent Increase/Decrease in Period I and Period II Statistics ^a		
	Commercial	Residential	Total
Impact Area	- 12	- 28	- 21
City except Impact	- 10	- 21	- 16
City-wide	- 10	- 23	- 17
Area except City	+ 12	+ 74	+ 51
Area-wide	- 8	- 13	- 11

^a Periods I and II cover 4/1/73 - 3/31/74 and 4/1/74 - 3/31/75, respectively.

robbery, reflect very small numbers, so that a relatively small change in crime level results in a large percentage change. In addition, some of these changes could be analyzed statistically and could be termed "statistically insignificant." But, of course, as is the problem with much statistical evaluation, a statistically insignificant change such as the town of Grafton's increase in robbery from one to six, may be very significant to the residents of that community.

Another problem with data from surrounding communities is that it is incomplete. No data was received from the neighboring towns of Auburn and Millbury. This is unfortunate not only because they are the only missing contiguous towns, but also because their crime rates are usually second in the area only to Shrewsbury. An additional point is that they lie directly south of the City of Worcester and are connected to the City with several main roads as well as the expressway. Mobile criminals, often intent on robbery, might travel out these roads to beyond the Worcester City border.

The crime of robbery appears more than any other crime to have shown evidence of possible territorial displacement. For this reason, an additional analysis of this crime by individual patrol route within the city was performed. This analysis produced total number of both armed and unarmed robbery for the before and during time periods. The percentage change in the total robbery statistics during these periods is displayed in Exhibit 12.15 by patrol route. More detailed analysis results are contained in Appendix E.


The conclusion from these various analyses is that there is no clearly defined evidence of territorial displacement. Rather it appears

CONTINUED

3 OF 4

Exhibit 12.15

Robbery: Before and During Comparison by Patrol Route



that the areas outside of the Impact area and outside of the City itself are reflecting a growing national trend in these target crimes, and that the Impact area is definitely the exception from the trends, but not necessarily their cause. This hypothesis is supported somewhat by reviewing Exhibits 12.8, 12.9, and 12.10, and seeing what has happened to the national rates of Index crimes, robbery and burglary, respectively, since the start of the Impact Program.

Finally, as can be seen from Exhibit 12.15, it is extremely difficult to calculate any hard evidence of crime displacement without a small area reporting system. Such a system creates a data base wherein the location of each incident is identified to within a few city blocks. This detailed location information aids not only in the territorial displacements analysis, but also enhances a police department's ability to perform effective patrol route redesign and resource allocation.

12.5 CRIME CLEARANCE

The FBI UCR defines a crime as being cleared when the police have identified the offender, have sufficient evidence to charge him, and actually take him into custody. Crime solutions are also recorded in exceptional instances when some element beyond police control precludes the placing of formal charges against the offender, such as the victim's refusal to prosecute after the offender is identified or local prosecution is declined because the subject is being prosecuted elsewhere for a crime committed in another jurisdiction. The arrest of one person can clear several crimes or several persons may be arrested in the process of clearing one crime.

Thus not only can a crime be cleared by arrest, but also by exceptional clearance.

It is unfortunate that, in light of the fact that a stated goal of the Impact Program is in terms of the clearance rate, the Worcester Police Department has not been compiling reliable clearance statistics. The reasons for this problem and its corresponding solution have been documented by the Operations Analyst.* As pointed out in his report, the WPD rarely records that an incident is "exceptionally cleared" as defined by the FBI. Also clearances are difficult to define since the pertinent records cannot be easily correlated, as they are under different numbering systems.

The clearance by arrest data as submitted by the WPD to the FBI UCR is summarized in Exhibits 12.16 and 12.17 for the crimes of robbery and burglary, respectively. Judging from these statistics, one could conclude that the number of target crimes cleared by arrest is increasing.

However, in an attempt to analyze the problem of calculating clearance information, as well as to partially evaluate the degree to which the goal to increase clearance rates of target crimes has been met, the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee performed a laborious manual analysis of the particular crime of armed robbery. This crime is perhaps one of the easiest to track through the investigative function because of its relatively small numbers and what is normally a reasonably high clearance rate due to the personal nature of the crime; that is, the presence of a victim who can identify the offender. The net result of this analysis is inconclusive. It indicates an increase in clearance

* William Halacy, Memorandum to Chief John J. Hanlon on "Clearance Rates," Worcester Police Department, November 14, 1974.

Exhibit 12.16

Robbery: Percent Cleared by Arrest





Exhibit 12.17

Burglary: Percent Cleared by Arrest



rate of this particular crime in the Impact area, but a drop in the City outside of Impact, resulting in a during City-wide rate identical to the before rate. Although the results of this analysis are inconclusive, they do tend to verify the claim that the present method of calculating clearance rates results in an underreporting of clearance rates, due principally to a failure to include those incidents which can be exceptionally cleared. To show this comparison, clearance rates for the same 11-month periods used in the WRLEC study were calculated from data routinely submitted to the FBI as part of Return A. This comparison is given in Exhibit 12.18, which indicates that although the WPD has been underreporting armed robbery clearances, there is some improvement in the percentage reported--but there is no evidence of improvement in the clearance rate itself. One additional fact should be pointed out which is that even accepting the 22.1% clearance rate as calculated by the WRLEC, this is still substantially below the rates for cities of comparable size. The most recent data available for nationwide cities with 100,000 - 250,000 population is a total robbery clearance rate of 27.9%. (A breakdown by armed and unarmed is not available, although historically the rates for these two crimes has not differed widely.) There is the additional question that if these other cities of comparable size had the resources to manually track down the clearance for each individual incident, whether that national rate, too, might take a corresponding jump.

Exhibit 12.18Armed Robbery Clearance Rates

	<u>WPD Data</u> ^a	<u>WRLEC Data</u> ^b
Period I ^c (5/1/73 - 3/31/74)	15.3%	22.1%
Period II ^c (4/1/74 - 2/28/75)	17.2%	22.1%

^a WPD data was that submitted to the FBI as part of the Uniform Crime Report - Return A.

^b WRLEC data was that manually calculated by Mary Wheeler of the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee.

^c Note that Periods I and II do not exactly correspond with the before and during periods defined by this evaluation; they are also based on 11-month periods.

One additional method was used to attempt to analyze the quality of the investigative function within the Worcester Police Department. This was to totally eliminate the variable factors such as exceptional clearances and to look at total number of arrests as a percentage of total number of incidents. Of course, this data does not reflect any type of clearance rate, but rather tends to look at raw numbers. The findings, which are included in Exhibit 12.19, are based on the before and during periods. They tend to show a marked increase in arrest percentage for total robbery. *

This, of course, is further indication that one must not view arrest percentage as any type of indication of clearance rate, as it does not conflict with the judgments made earlier but is fundamentally a meaningless quantity.

Exhibit 12.19

Arrest Rates

	Number of Arrests as a Percent of Total Incidents	
	<u>Before</u>	<u>During</u>
Total Robbery	17.1	28.8
Total Burglary	6.2	7.9
Total Part I	11.8	11.4
Total Part II	61.8	42.1
Total Reported (Parts I & II)	24.2	18.6

Exhibit 12.19 shows percentage of arrests for burglary, robbery, Part I, Part II, and total Parts I and II crimes. It should be noted that the arrest percentage for Part I crime has not changed significantly during the two comparison periods. The dramatic drop in arrest percentage for Part II crime is because of the change in Massachusetts law in 1974 which eliminated the crime of drunkenness. Obviously, the crime of

drunkenness has a virtually 100% arrest percentage and has grossly affected the number of arrests made in all Massachusetts police departments. (In fact, the City of Boston had so many arrests for drunkenness that each day they assigned one number to cover all such arrests.)

In summary, it could be stated that there has been no definitive evidence of an improvement in clearance rates for the target crimes of robbery and burglary. Our attempt at analyzing other arrest-related quantities revealed results of questionable significance.

PART V: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

13 IMPACT EVALUATION RESULTS

14 TECHNICAL AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

13 IMPACT EVALUATION RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to consolidate and summarize the major evaluation results, each of which has already been discussed in one of the nine chapters in Parts II, III and IV. For the sake of conciseness, the results are indicated in exhibit form. Section 13.1 summarizes the major evaluation findings, while Section 13.2 addresses the problem issues and makes specific recommendations. In an attempt to focus on some viable alternatives for the Impact Program, Section 13.3 identifies three possible Program alternatives.

13.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The stated goals of the Worcester Crime Impact Program are presented in Exhibit 2.1. The degree to which the goals have been met is summarized in Exhibit 13.1. It should be noted that of the six stated goals, one is an input goal; two are process goals; and three are output goals. Categorizing the goals by whether they are impacted by the input, process or output of a social experiment is critical in any evaluation effort. For example, the achievement of an input goal is much less significant than the achievement of either a process or an output goal.

In addition to the determination of whether the stated goals of the Program have been met, there are a host of other important findings that need to be highlighted. We present these findings in terms of the effects of civilianization (see Exhibit 13.2), decentralization (see Exhibit 13.3) and specialization (see Exhibit 13.4). (As discussed

Exhibit 13.1Evaluation Summary of Impact Program GoalsImpact Program Goals^aEvaluation Determination

- I. To achieve substantial short-term reductions in the incidence of robbery and burglary on a city-wide basis, but with higher reductions in the Impact target area (Sector 1).
- Output Goal: Extremely Successful
- Sector 1 robbery level decreased by 41%.
 - City-wide robbery level decreased by 15%.
 - Sector 1 burglary level decreased by 23%.
 - City-wide burglary level decreased by 16%.
 - No statistically significant indication of geographic displacement of target crimes to outskirts of Worcester, based on partial information provided by contiguous towns.
- II. To increase the proportion of resources allocated to concentrated activities designed to prevent the crimes of burglary and robbery.
- Input Goal: Achieved
- Effective Sector 1 patrol and investigative manpower level increased by 30% (PSA's accounted for four-fifths of this increase).
 - Effective city-wide patrol and investigative manpower level increased by 25% (PSA's accounted for two-thirds of this increase).
 - Robbery Strike Force (RSF) and Burglary Task Force (BTF) established.
 - Positions of Operations Analyst and Crime Analyst established.
 - New equipment and facilities for Impact patrol and investigative personnel.
 - Crime Prevention Unit established.

^a As stated in June 14, 1973, Grant Application.Exhibit 13.1 (page 2 of 4)Impact Program GoalsEvaluation Determination

- III. To institutionalize new capabilities to respond constructively and flexibly to the target crimes.
- Process Goal: Moderately Successful
- Impact flexibility and organization have allowed for relatively more effective use of investigators in RSF and BTF than in Detective Bureau.
 - Except for rented vehicles, most of the available equipment has not been put to maximum use by Impact investigators.
 - No significantly different or innovative strategy has been undertaken by Impact personnel for any length of time. A three-man, walk-and-ride-team approach to burglary patrol lasted only a few months and was deemed ineffective relative to the resources required.
- IV. To increase the clearance rate for target crimes and to provide for additional disposition alternatives for offenders.
- Output Goal: Unable to Evaluate Definitively
- Available clearance information is unreliable, and attempts at developing clearance rates are handicapped by the difficulty of correlating pertinent records, each of which is under a separate numbering system for control purposes.
 - A preliminary effort by the Worcester Regional Law Enforcement Committee indicates that armed robbery clearance rate is unchanged.
 - Providing for additional disposition alternatives for offenders is the responsibility of the courts and corrections planner and is therefore outside the scope of this evaluation effort.

Impact Program GoalsEvaluation Determination

V. To test and gain experience in the utilization of new methods of crime-specific planning and program development involving several components of the local criminal justice system.

Process Goal: Moderately Successful

- Crime-specific planning provided by the Operations Analyst and the Crime Analyst has been helpful but limited in scope.
- Operations Analyst has provided valuable technical support to the Chief but has been handicapped by the unavailability of adequate data processing facilities and support.
- Crime Analyst has provided valuable administrative support to the Impact Captain but has been limited in terms of gaining full access to and impacting upon the line investigative personnel.
- Program development involving several components of the local criminal justice system is the responsibility of the courts and corrections planner and is therefore outside the scope of this evaluation effort.

VI. To develop and encourage community involvement in and responsibility for crime prevention activities.

Output Goal: Unable to Evaluate Definitively

- A general survey of Worcester residents to assess community involvement and responsibility for crime prevention activities was not undertaken.
- Crime Prevent Unit has undertaken numerous activities to educate the community (through presentations, youth involvement programs, business and community group

Impact Program GoalsEvaluation Determination

VI. (continued)

- listings); to provide target-hardening services (through premise surveys and operation identification enrollments); and to raise the level of community awareness (through auto theft warning tags, vacant house checks, and elderly assistance programs).
- Telephone survey of a limited sample of those who were clients of the operation identification and premise survey services indicate general approval of WPD crime prevention services. Although 68% of premise survey clients felt that the recommendations they had received were useful, only 38% had fully or partially carried out those recommendations.
- Judgment concerning the effectiveness of the various crime prevention activities must be delayed until a larger proportion of the population has been affected and a longer test period has elapsed.

Conclusion: Worcester Crime Impact Program has successfully met its main output goal of reduced target crimes of robbery and burglary, primarily because of the significant increase in manpower (most of which was provided through civilianization) and, secondarily, because of the flexibility and organization provided by the Impact Program (through decentralization and specialization).

Exhibit 13.2Effects of CivilianizationCivilianized Components

1. Police Service Aides:
Part of a Split Force
Patrol Team Responding
to Service Calls and
Assisting Police Officers.
(Includes 31 PSA's
assigned to patrol duty
and 6 PSA's assigned to
ambulance duty.)

Major Evaluation Findings

- During the period of PSA deployment (i.e., 10 a.m. to 2 a.m.), PSA's have been able to handle 24.7% of all radio calls and assist in 8.2%, making a total of 32.9% of radio calls that they are involved in.
- In terms of the total patrol unit time required to respond to radio calls during the period of PSA deployment, PSA's have contributed 25.4% of total patrol unit time; 19.7% handling calls and 5.7% assisting in calls.
- In terms of workload or utilization per PSA patrol car manned by one PSA, it is conservatively estimated that a PSA unit spends 19% of an eight-hour tour responding to calls for service, as compared to 28% for a patrol car manned by one or more PO's. In general, patrol PSA's are being somewhat underutilized.
- PSA units assigned to the day shift are utilized more than those assigned to the first half shift.
- Average service time per radio call is 24.6 minutes for a PSA unit, as compared to 23.5 minutes for a PO unit.
- PSA's understand the stated PSA guidelines and have not abused them.
- PSA duties have included transportation of WPD personnel and papers, as well as Worcester residents--some of which may be unnecessary.

Exhibit 13.2 (page 2 of 4)Civilianized ComponentsMajor Evaluation Findings

1. (continued)

- Review of PSA injuries suggest that no injuries could have been prevented by having PSA's armed or protected.
- Only one PSA has received a disciplinary action by the Department--for returning late from a lunch hour.
- PSA's have only been partially integrated in the WPD: the integration is much better in Impact (where PSA and PO shifts are the same) than in Motor Patrol (where PSA and PO shifts differ by two hours).
- In general, PO's approve of the PSA concept: Impact patrol and investigative PO's approve by 100%, Motor Patrol PO's by 56% and Detective Bureau PO's by 72%. Although PO's feel that PSA's free up PO time, they are worried about PSA's being hired instead of PO's in the future.
- WPD officials are enthusiastic about PSA's and have stated that most of the current group of PSA's would make excellent PO's.
- PSA's are well received by Worcester residents. 87% of PSA clients felt either very satisfied or satisfied with the services provided and most were indifferent about whether a PSA or a PO assists them the next time (under similar circumstances).
- PSA's are quite satisfied with their jobs (especially those assigned to ambulance duty), but are concerned about a lack of advancement and job security in the WPD.

Exhibit 13.2 (page 3 of 4)Civilianized ComponentsMajor Evaluation Findings

1. (continued)
 - 88% of all PSA's aspire to become PO's in the WPD and a little less than half expect to leave within two years if unable to do so. (PSA's feel they should receive credit towards becoming PO's.)
2. Police Service Aides: Performing Non-Patrol Duties. (Includes three PSA's assigned to communications and 1 PSA assigned to the Precinct I desk.)
 - The non-patrol-related results stated above are also applicable to this group of PSA's.
 - Thus far, PSA utilization in the WPD has been limited to the patrol, communications, and clerical areas.
3. Community Service Officers: Performing Crime Prevention and Community Relations Duties. (Includes 11 CSO's.)
 - CSO's perform the bulk of the crime prevention activities, the effectiveness of which, as stated in Exhibit 13.1, is difficult to measure.
 - Most WPD personnel do not have a good knowledge of the CSO program: 49% of PSA's, 80% of patrol PO's, and 68% of investigative PO's do not have a good knowledge of the program. CSO's are, in fact, isolated from the rest of the Department.
 - CSO's are well received by Worcester residents: 84% of interviewed clients felt either very satisfied or satisfied with the services provided.
 - Worcester residents have difficulty differentiating CSO's from other WPD personnel.
 - CSO's are quite satisfied with their jobs, but unhappy about their pay (especially in relation to the PSA pay).

Exhibit 13.2 (page 4 of 4)Civilianized ComponentsMajor Evaluation Findings

4. Females: Performing Traditional Male Duties. (Includes 16 female PSA's and 5 female CSO's.)
 - Dispatchers sometimes tend to discriminate against female PSA's by assigning only male PSA's to certain calls such as assisting police officers, vandalism, bad accidents, etc.
 - The majority of PO's feel that male and female PSA's are about the same in job performance. However, PO's seem more protective of female than of male PSA's.
 - Most PSA clients were indifferent as to whether they were assisted by male or female PSA's; they were satisfied with both.
 - Male CSO's feel that they are being discriminated against because female CSO's are usually given a car, while female CSO's complain that they are given more than their share of secretarial assignments in the CPU office.
 - CSO premise survey clients were in general indifferent as to whether they were assisted by male or female CSO's; they were satisfied with both.
5. Analysts: Performing Crime-Specific Planning. (Includes the Operations Analyst and the Crime Analyst.)
 - See evaluation determination of Impact Program Goal V in Exhibit 13.1.

Conclusion: Civilianization has been effective and has been implemented smoothly. There have been no major problems except for the key issue regarding the career and growth potential of civilians in the Worcester Police Department. Full integration and isolated instances of sex discrimination are some minor problems that need to be resolved.

Exhibit 13.3Effects of DecentralizationDecentralized Components

1. Central Impact Staff:
Performing Impact
Sector Patrol Duties.

Major Evaluation Findings

- Impact Captain has become an invaluable and possibly indispensable part of the decentralized Impact Unit. His flexibility in dealing with the men, his support of the men, and his acumen in press relations have contributed to the Impact identity and morale.
- Compared to Motor Patrol PO's, Impact PO's are more satisfied with their jobs, have better relationships with their officials, and are supported by better equipment and facilities.
- There is a lack of coordination between Impact and Motor Patrol PO's, who are also resentful of Impact's status.
- In general, patrol activities in Impact are no different than those undertaken outside of Impact.
- A problem with continuity of coverage and exchange of information is caused by the fact that the Impact Sector is not under Impact jurisdiction during the period 2 a.m. to 10 a.m.

2. Robbery Strike Force and
Burglary Task Force:
Performing Impact Sector
Detective Duties.

- Compared to Detective Bureau investigators, Impact investigators are more satisfied with their jobs, enjoy more backing from their officials, have better coordination with the corresponding patrol PO's, are supported by better equipment and facilities, and have greater flexibility.

Exhibit 13.3 (continued)Decentralized Components

2. (continued)

Major Evaluation Findings

- There is a lack of coordination between Impact and Detective Bureau investigators, who are also resentful of Impact's status.
- In general, investigative activities in Impact are no different than those undertaken outside of Impact.

Conclusion: Decentralization has benefited those within Impact, but has caused resentment from and lack of coordination with those outside of Impact.

Exhibit 13.4Effects of SpecializationSpecialized Components

1. Split Force Patrol Team: Responding to Service and Non-Service Calls.

2. Robbery Strike Force: Performing Robbery Investigative Duties in Sectors 1 (Impact Sector) and 2.

3. Burglary Task Force: Performing Burglary Investigative Duties in Impact Sector.

4. Crime Prevention Unit: Performing Crime Prevention and Community Relations Duties.

Major Evaluation Findings

• See major evaluation findings in Exhibit 13.2.

• See evaluation determination of Impact Program Goal III in Exhibit 13.1.

• There is a lack of coordination between RSF and Detective Bureau investigators, who are also resentful of RSF's status.

• Several instances of friction and confusion have occurred between the RSF and the Detective Bureau over RSF's jurisdiction in Sector 2.

• High-ranking WPD officials have recently established a specialized robbery squad within the Detective Bureau.

• See evaluation determination of Impact Program Goal III in Exhibit 13.1.

• Actually, as noted in Exhibit 13.3, the BTF and the RSF have in essence formed a decentralized detective unit within Impact.

• Although CPU is physically and functionally separated from other units in the WPD, morale in the CPU is good--a credit to the Commanding Lieutenant.

Exhibit 13.4 (continued)Specialized Components

4. (continued)

Major Evaluation Findings

- See evaluation determination of Impact Program Goal VI in Exhibit 13.1.
- A little less than a third of patrol and investigative PO's do not think the CPU is at all valuable.
- There is hardly any coordination between CPU and other WPD units.
- Working a 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule has limited CPU effectiveness, especially in conducting residential premise surveys.
- CPU PO's tend to make a significant number of minor arrests resulting from answering complaints which could (and probably should) have been handled by patrol PO's.
- CPU PO's are enthusiastic and diligent about their crime prevention work.

Conclusion: Split force patrol specialization has been effective and smoothly implemented. Like decentralization, specialization in investigative units has benefited those within Impact, but has caused resentment from and lack of coordination with those outside of Impact. Specialization in crime prevention (a relatively new police function) has resulted in an almost total lack of coordination with and appreciation by other units in the Worcester Police Department.

in Section 1.2, the Impact Program can be viewed as a police experiment in civilianization, decentralization and specialization.) Other major evaluation findings are listed in Exhibit 13.5.

13.2 PROBLEM ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The major problem issues identified in Exhibits 13.1 through 13.4 are again stated in Exhibit 13.6, along with a corresponding set of recommendations. A word of caution is required at this time. Inasmuch as the purpose of this effort is not to plan but to evaluate, the recommendations listed in Exhibit 13.6 should be considered tentative, since they have not been reviewed in light of other fiscal, political, technical and social constraints. The recommendations have been made primarily to provide a basis for discussion.

The problem issues identified in Exhibit 13.5 are addressed in the technical recommendations exhibit in Section 14.1.

13.3 PROGRAM ALTERNATIVES

Based upon our recommendations in Exhibit 13.6, we detail in Exhibit 13.7 three viable alternatives for the Impact Program. At the minimum, we feel that the innovative Police Service Aide component of the Program should be continued and a goal to develop standards and guidelines on PSA utilization should be added. Additionally, should the combined Robbery Strike Force and Burglary Task Force remain intact in the Impact Sector, we feel that it would be an ideal opportunity to develop standards and guidelines for a model investigative unit. The "expanded" alternative is merely an expansion of the Impact Sector to

Exhibit 13.5

Other Major Evaluation Findings

Areas

1. WPD Data Sources

Major Evaluation Findings

- Completed reports are not systematically checked and verified.
- Coding and keypunching of reports are not verified, not even by visual verification (through interpreting the keypunched data elements).
- Different records pertaining to the same incident are very difficult to correlate, since there are at least four separate (and usually uncoordinated) numbering systems for control purposes.
- Clearance rate information is currently unreliable, and generally difficult to develop under current report control procedures. Exceptional clearances are not reported.
- Court disposition information is not collated or analyzed.
- Radio call classifications cannot be used to distinguish between service and non-service calls.

2. WPD Delay and Response Times.

- Average delay time for all radio calls is seven minutes, while for emergency calls (i.e., medical cases, crimes in progress, and alarms) it is four minutes.
- Low morale and poor physical facilities seem to limit dispatch effectiveness. Assignment to the communications center has often been perceived as a punishment assignment.

Exhibit 13.5 (continued)

<u>Areas</u>	<u>Major Evaluation Findings</u>
2. (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 86% of all service call clients (that were interviewed) indicated that they were very satisfied or satisfied with response time, even though the median "perceived" response time was a little less than 15 minutes.
3. WPD Manpower Allocation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilization of PO patrol cars for responding to radio calls vary significantly, with the PO units in the day shift being utilized almost twice as much as those assigned to the second half shift.
4. WPD Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 85% of all service call clients (that were interviewed) indicated that WPD services are very good or good. • 76% of all service call clients (that were interviewed) indicated that their neighborhood is very safe or reasonably safe.

Exhibit 13.6

<u>Problem Issues and Recommendations</u>	
<u>Problem Issues</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>
1. Civilianized Components	
a. PSA duties have included some unnecessary transportation of WPD personnel and papers, as well as Worcester residents.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish guidelines for controlling and limiting requests for PSA transportation.
b. PSA's have only been partially integrated and utilized in the WPD.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake full integration and expanded utilization of PSA's in the WPD by having PSA's attend the same roll calls as PO's; extending PSA period of deployment to cover the entire 24-hour day; giving PSA's overtime pay when earned (instead of compensatory time off); broadening PSA activities to include, for example, writing larceny and past burglary reports; and expanding PSA duties to include, for example, traffic duties. In order to highlight and develop their service role, PSA's should <i>neither</i> be given punitive powers (e.g., ticketing powers) <i>nor</i> armed with either mace or night clubs.
c. PSA's are concerned about their growth and job security in the WPD.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake immediate steps to address this critical long-term problem. Consideration should be given to creating a PSA rank of corporal; giving PSA's credit towards becoming a police officer; and creating the PSA position in the civil service structure.
d. CSO's have problems of recognition, isolation, and low pay (as compared to PSA's).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have CSO's become PSA's--then have PSA's be assigned to or rotated through the Crime Prevention Unit.

Exhibit 13.6 (page 2 of 3)Problem IssuesRecommendations

1. (continued)

- | | |
|---|--|
| e. Female PSA's and CSO's have experienced some isolated instances of discrimination (both for and against) in the WPD. | • Establish guidelines to eliminate all forms of sex discrimination. |
| f. Operations Analyst has been handicapped by the unavailability of adequate data processing facilities and support. | • See technical recommendations in Exhibit 14.1. |
| g. Crime Analyst has been limited in terms of gaining full access to and impacting upon the line investigative personnel of Impact. | • Originally conceived goal for the Crime Analyst to be fully integrated with investigative personnel is unrealistic. Therefore, establish a goal that better reflects reality and enhances the Crime Analyst's effectiveness. |

2. Decentralized and Specialized Components

- | | |
|---|--|
| a. Impact Captain has become an invaluable and possibly indispensable part of the decentralized Impact Unit. | • Must recognize and mitigate this critical long-term problem. |
| b. There is a lack of coordination between Impact personnel and those outside of Impact, who are also resentful of Impact's status. | • Must recognize and mitigate this critical long-term problem. |

Exhibit 13.6 (page 3 of 3)Problem IssuesRecommendations

2. (continued)

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|--|--|
| c. A problem with continuity of coverage and exchange of information is caused by the fact that the Impact sector is not under Impact jurisdiction during the period 2 a.m. to 10 a.m. | • Extend Impact jurisdiction of Impact sector to 24 hours. |
| d. Several instances of friction and confusion have occurred between the RSF and the Detective Bureau over RSF's jurisdiction in Sector 2. | • Limit RSF's jurisdiction to within the Impact sector. |
| e. There is hardly any coordination between CPU and other WPD units. | • Establish procedures for coordination and cooperation between CPU and other WPD units. (For example, patrol units could directly refer burglary victims for CPU services.) |
| f. Working a 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. schedule has limited CPU effectiveness. | • Extend CPU working hours to at least 9 p.m. |
| g. CPU PO's tend to make a significant number of minor arrests resulting from answering complaints which could (and probably should) have been handled by patrol PO's. | • Establish guidelines for PO's who are assigned to the CPU, defining their primary activities and responsibilities, including when to refer complaints to patrol units. |

Exhibit 13.7

Impact Program Alternatives

	<u>MINIMUM</u>	<u>MODIFIED</u>	<u>EXPANDED</u>
<u>GOALS:</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop Standards and Guidelines on PSA Utilization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop Standards and Guidelines on PSA Utilization Current Impact Goals Develop Standards and Guidelines for Model Investigative Unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop Standards and Guidelines on PSA Utilization Current Impact Goals Develop Standards and Guidelines for Model Investigative Unit
<u>CIS:</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eliminate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but <i>extend</i> CIS jurisdiction to 24 hours 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but <i>expand</i> CIS patrol area to include some contiguous patrol routes and <i>extend</i> CIS jurisdiction to 24 hours
<u>PSA:</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish PSA Unit under a full-time lieutenant, and fully integrate and utilize PSA's 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but fully integrate and utilize PSA's 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but fully integrate and utilize PSA's
<u>RSF/BTF:</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eliminate as separate unit, but integrate RSF into corresponding specialized unit in Detective Bureau; and attempt also to integrate BTF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but limit RSF jurisdiction to within Sector 1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as current set-up, but limit RSF jurisdiction to within expanded Impact sector
<u>CPU:</u> ^a	Integrate CSO's with PSA's, and continue CPU activities but with better coordination and cooperation with patrol and investigative units		
<u>OA:</u> ^a	Provide OA with better data processing facilities, and make him responsible for Program Monitoring and Documentaiton, as well as Technical Assistance		

^a Same for all three alternatives.

Note: Impact components include CIS (Central Impact Staff), PSA (Police Service Aide), RSF (Robbery Strike Force), BTF (Burglary Task Force), CPU (Crime Prevention Unit), and OA (Operations Analyst).

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include contiguous patrol routes that are characterized by a similar socio-demographic make-up. Again, our identification of the three Program alternatives is not definitive; there are, of course, numerous other alternatives or combinations of alternatives, all of which must be assessed in light of the prevailing fiscal, political, technical and social constraints.

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14 TECHNICAL AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The contents of this chapter are a by-product of the evaluation effort. Section 14.1 contains specific technical recommendations based upon our knowledge of the Worcester Police Department and our technical expertise in the area. The policy issues discussed in Section 14.2 were identified during the course of our association with the Impact Program.

14.1 TECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Five sets of technical recommendations are contained in Exhibit 14.1; they are provided for consideration by the Worcester Police Department. A comment should be made regarding the first set of recommendations, which is to enhance the split force patrol concept by upgrading communications procedures. It is important to realize that the heart of any modern-day police patrol system is at the communications center (i.e., the command and control center). This is especially true in the case of a split patrol force system, where there is a greater need to exercise command and control.

14.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Five policy issues and their corresponding sets of recommendations are contained in Exhibit 14.2; they are provided for consideration by the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice. The first three issues deal with those aspects of the Impact Program that we feel deserve further attention, not only in Worcester but on a state-wide basis. They include

Exhibit 14.1Technical Recommendations for WPD Consideration

1. Upgrade Communications Procedures to Enhance PSA/PO Split Force Patrol Concept and Decrease Dispatch Delays.
 - Establish a professional communications unit under full-time direction of a Lieutenant. Assignment to communications unit should no longer be perceived as a punishment duty.
 - Modify radio call card to allow for complaint clerk to indicate whether the call for service is a service call or not. This added bit of information should then be used to qualify the radio call classification.
 - Change dispatcher orientation from an incident-based radio call card to a patrol unit-based card; a card should be made out for each patrol unit (and assigned the same AR#--Assignment Record #) in instances where more than one unit respond to a call. Besides providing more reliable data of patrol unit utilization, this would allow a dispatcher to keep better track of busy units. Additionally, any reason (including meals, breaks, etc.) that takes a patrol unit out of service should be recorded on a radio call card.
 - Establish standards and procedures for complaint clerks and radio dispatchers.
 - Improve and upgrade physical layout of communications center.
2. Upgrade and Streamline Reporting System to Provide Reliable and Effective Management Information.
 - Eliminate the pink slip--incident disposition (including whether a report follows) should be communicated to the radio dispatcher and recorded on the radio call card.
 - Establish procedure to systematically check and verify all reports.
 - Establish a single number report control system^a (based, probably, on the AR#) to allow for correlating different records.

^a See, for example, J.M. Tien et al., "A SPRINT Based Single Number Reporting System for the New York City Police Department," WN-8003-NYC, New York City Rand Institute, January, 1973.

Exhibit 14.1 (continued)

2. (continued)
 - Establish procedure to collect reliable clearance information.
 - Establish a court information feedback system to allow for collection of disposition information.
 - Work with WPD officials to identify reports or analyses that would meet their needs.^b
3. Upgrade Data Processing Facilities to Enhance Planning Capabilities
 - Consolidate Police Planner, Operations Analyst, and current Planning Unit into a single Planning and Data Processing Division with access to time-sharing and batch facilities, as well as programming assistance.
 - Establish procedure and provide necessary facilities to verify the coding and keypunching of reports.
4. Improve Patrol Manpower Allocation to Meet Radio Call Demand
 - Reallocate patrol manpower over time and space to equalize workload per patrol unit. Using small reporting areas, redefine, if necessary, patrol route boundaries.^c
5. Establish Evaluation Design to Monitor and Document Ongoing Impact Program
 - Develop and implement an evaluation design tailored to the scope of the Program, using the contents of this report as a guide.
 - Define, collect, and analyze evaluation measures. Crime reports may have to be modified to capture additional data. (For example, crime prevention information should be indicated on all burglary reports.)
 - Make Operations Analyst responsible for Program monitoring and documentation.

^b See, for example, the recommendations made by J.C. Williamson in his April, 1974 report to the Massachusetts Committee on Criminal Justice.

^c See, for example, R.C. Larson, "A Hypercube Queuing Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services," Computers and Operations Research, Volume 1, Number 1, March, 1974.

Exhibit 14.2

Policy Issues for MCCJ Consideration

<u>Policy Issues</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>
1. <u>Police Service Aides</u> : An Innovative and Potentially Cost-Effective Police Service Resource. (The Worcester experience augurs well for this type of resource.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish and evaluate other PSA programs in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. • Establish standards and guidelines on PSA training and utilization, using Worcester as a model. • Consider creating a PSA position in the civil service structure.
2. <u>Specialization</u> : An Area of Growing Interest. (The Impact Program undertook specialization not only in their investigative area but also in the patrol area.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further explore specialization in police investigative area. • Further explore split force specialization in police patrol area.
3. <u>Crime Prevention</u> : A Potentially Effective Police Activity. (The Worcester experience shows that crime prevention is still alien to most police officers, and that a crime prevention unit may become totally separated from the rest of the police department.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish mechanism to disseminate crime prevention information and assist local police departments. • Emphasize integration of crime prevention activities with patrol and investigative activities. • Develop and integrate evaluation measures with each crime prevention program.
4. <u>Evaluation</u> : A Necessary Process Control and Program Documentation Tool. (The lack of an evaluation design in the initial Worcester Crime Impact Program has resulted in no systemic monitoring and controlling of the Program.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop evaluation design prior to program implementation. (An evaluation design should either be required of or provided to each program applicant.) • Develop and disseminate a manual on design of evaluation, tailored to police programs.

Exhibit 14.2 (Continued)

<u>Policy Issues</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>
5. <u>Funding</u> : A Cause of Internal Inequities and Conflicts. (The obvious need to identify a target group, area or crime prior to the funding of a police manpower program almost requires the decentralization and specialization of a part of the department, which in turn causes resentment and lack of cooperation. Also, the curtailment of funding causes hardships, especially in manpower programs like the Impact Program.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consider and minimize divisiveness within police department caused by program funding. • Establish a contingent (i.e., providing the program meets its stated goals) funding phase-out plan <i>with each newly-funded program</i>. (A contingent funding phase-out plan established at the beginning of a program, especially a manpower program, would make everybody sensitive to the issues and consequences that are involved.)

the deployment of Police Service Aides, the adoption of crime prevention activity, and the testing of specialization in both police patrol and investigative areas.

The fourth issue, evaluation, concerns the need to establish an evaluation design at the beginning of each program, since evaluation measures *are not only invaluable (to the evaluator) in documenting and assessing the program but also (to the decision-maker) in monitoring and controlling the progress of the program.* The final issue pertains to a need for both the funding and funded agencies to be fully aware of the implications of the funding and the subsequent phase-out of funding so as *to minimize the inequities, conflicts and hardships that may be caused by the process.*

END