AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM

Volume IV

IMPACT OF THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM ON THE STATE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM

by

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CENTER ON ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
University of California, Davis
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An Evaluation of the California

Probation Subsidy Program

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AN EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM

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An Evaluation of the California Probation Subsidy Program

Summary and Conclusions

In 1965 the State of California adopted a program of state subsidies to local probation departments designed to reduce commitments to state correctional facilities. On July 1, 1966, this program went into effect with 31 of the state's 58 counties--representing 91 percent of the population--participating. By 1972-73, 47 counties, representing 98 percent of the population were participating. By the end of 1973-74 the program had been credited with reducing first admissions to state correctional agencies by nearly 30,000 cases, and participating counties had earned subsidies totaling more than 119 million dollars.

The basic idea of the subsidy program was to reduce prison and juvenile commitments by providing more effective correctional services in the community, primarily intensive probation supervision in small caseloads. The program was seen as accomplishing several important purposes: reducing state costs by halting the spiral of increased commitments and ever greater capital construction budgets, while at the same time providing a greater degree of rehabilitation and services for the offenders involved.

From the start, the program contained one highly unique, and ultimately very controversial, feature: payments to the counties were to be geared wholly to reducing commitments. Counties failing to reduce commitments would receive no subsidy. Counties which did reduce commitments, under a state formula for making such determinations, would receive a subsidy approximating $4,000 for each reduction achieved. All subsidies received were

to be applied to the creation of intensive supervision programs. Participation in the program was essentially voluntary on the part of the counties, but the attraction, and sometimes the pressure, to participate was substantial.

It did not take long for the program to register its impact. Commitments to the California Youth Authority almost immediately began to drop and those to the Department of Corrections leveled off. Richard McGee, long-time head of corrections in California, spoke of the program "as having greater impact on California corrections than any program in the last 25 years." Interest began to be expressed by other states and jurisdictions, and the program rapidly achieved a reputation as a fresh and promising new approach to age-old problems. Other observers, however, particularly in law enforcement and including Los Angeles Police Chief Edward Davis, came to see the program and the commitment reduction principle in a very different way--viewing it as one of the central causes of increasing crime rates in the state. The program thus became something of a political football, with charges and countercharges ringing constantly in the press, the legislature, and in other places where criminal justice is discussed.

The Evaluation

This evaluation was undertaken to produce answers to five of the most important questions raised:

--The extent to which the program has actually achieved a reduction in local commitments to the state agencies.

--The economic impact of the program on both the counties and the state.

--The changes brought about by the program in county probation departments.

--The changes brought about in the state correctional agencies.

--The impact on recidivism in the state.

Each of these questions is addressed in a separate volume. This volume concerns the impact of the subsidy program on the state correctional system.

Volume IV

THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM:
IMPACT ON THE STATE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM

by Janice Holve and Sheila Smith

Corrections in California as in most states is a responsibility that is shared between the state and the local communities. Generally the pattern has been that of state care for the more serious offenders, local care for the less serious. In California this shared responsibility had by 1964 resulted in a program housing at the state level more than 29,000 inmates in some 30 different penal institutions and supervising at the state level some 24,000 additional persons on parole. Then as now, two major state agencies--the Department of the Youth Authority and the Department of Corrections--were charged with implementation of the state-operated program. Together these agencies not only formed the largest state system in the country but also were considered the most progressive, or at worst one of the most progressive, correctional systems in the country.

The most dramatic impacts of the subsidy program upon the

stage agencies have been:

--A reduction in commitments of nearly 30,000 cases.

--A decline in first commitments to the CYA of over 50 percent.

--A leveling off of commitments to the CDC.

--An older, more agressive population in the CYA and a younger, more aggressive population in the CDC.

--A widespread feeling in both agencies that probation subsidy has altered populations and working conditions for the worse.

--A real concern in the CYA for job security.

--A feeling in both agencies that they should have received more preparation and more assistance in what is perceived as a more difficult and dangerous task.

Despite these largely negative impacts there continues to be widespread support in both agencies for community treatment. This is particularly true in the CYA. Agency personnel--despite strong feelings about subsidy--recognize that many of the problems which they felt most pressing are in fact not caused by subsidy but by other factors--the courts, rising expectations, the changing times.

Other subsidy findings indicate that:

--Probation subsidy has not been an important factor in the increase in prison violence.

--While commitment reductions have slowed agency growth and opportunities for advancement, budgets and personnel have not declined proportionally.

--Agencies did not anticipate or plan for the substantial

changes that subsidy created but have adapted reasonably well to the altered circumstances.

IMPACT OF THE CALIFORNIA PROBATION SUBSIDY PROGRAM ON THE STATE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM

Corrections in California as in most states is a responsibility that is shared between the state and the local communities. Generally the pattern has been that of state care for the more serious offenders, local care for the less serious. In California this shared responsibility had by 1964 resulted in a program housing at the state level more than 29,000 inmates in some 30 different penal institutions and supervising at the state level some 24,000 additional persons on parole. Then as now, two major state agencies--the Department of the Youth Authority and the Department of Corrections were charged with implementation of the state operated program. Together these agencies not only formed the largest state system in the country but also were considered the most progressive, or at worst one of the most progressive correctional systems in the country.

Beginning with Earl Warren's reign as governor in the 1940's, California had sought to be a leader in the correctional field and was one of the first states to develop state correctional agencies capable of managing a multi-faceted system of many institutions and services as opposed to the older, more traditional single institution approach.[1]

The California system was also one that grew rapidly in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, consistently adding institutions and staff to the program. In 1964, partly out of concern for the future implications of this growth and partly out of desire to improve probation services in the state, the plan which ultimately

became the probation subsidy program was developed.[2]

The probation subsidy program was based on several related ideas:

1. Probation is as effective, if not more effective, than most institutional forms of correctional care;

2. Probation is the least costly correctional service available;

3. Probation grants can be increased without substantially increasing the number of crimes committed by probationers.[3]

To implement these ideas the state proposed to pay the counties for cases not committed to the state. For each such case above the county's historic commitment level the payment would be roughly $4,000. The money would be used by the counties to improve their probation services in ways that would make it possible for them to handle the additional cases.

This program was intended to reduce commitments to the state and was sold to the legislature as one which would halt the spiraling costs of more new state institutions. The intended impact was clearly a major shift of the California state correctional population to local care.

It is generally conceded that that is what has happened. Current state estimates indicate a reduction of over 24,000 commitments to state institutions since the subsidy program became operational in 1966. Current estimates also indicate savings to the state of over 240 million dollars through cancelled construction, closed institutions, new institutions constructed but not opened, and lower operating costs due to the smaller number of cases.[4]

Shifts of this magnitude almost necessarily produce major

organizational and management issues. The purpose of this study is to identify these issues and discuss how they have been handled. By far the most important issues are those which relate to the size and character of the population under state care. The size of the population is important because of the obvious relationship that it bears to agency workload. The character of the population is important also, however. As one principal purpose of the subsidy program was to eliminate those cases which could be handled locally, it could reasonably have been predicted at the outset that future referrals would as a group be more serious and more difficult. Without the "easy" cases as a buffer, the population in turn could be expected to have a different character, requiring changes in both the institutions and in parole.

This study seeks to determine whether these expectations as to reduced size and tougher character have materialized. And to the extent that the population has changed it also seeks to determine how these changes have affected the operation and management of institutions and parole. It does not attempt to deal with the wisdom or lack thereof in dealing on the local level with those persons not committed to the state agencies. Section I deals with questions in the CYA and Section II in the CDC. Section III concerns the impact of the program on the overall organization and staff of the two agencies.

In each of these parts there are a number of separate problems. One is that of describing the changes that have taken place since the subsidy program began. The second is that of determining which of these changes are attributable to the subsidy

program and to what extent. The second is by far the hardest question. The time period covered by the probation subsidy program has been a particularly turbulent one and the subsidy program only one of many factors that have been operating to produce change. Increasing crime, greater intervention by the courts in correctional matters, militance on the part of prisoners, changing ideas in the community, all have had their impact on correctional programs everywhere. Much of what has happened would undoubtedly have happened without subsidy. Attica occurred in New York, not California, and the "intense and critical reappraisal of the system of correctional services," which Lloyd Ohlin indicates as now in full stride "throughout" the United States is not limited to any one state.[5] As a result it is difficult at times to know what effects in California to ascribe to subsidy and what to these other factors.

A third issue concerns the fact that the probation subsidy program has not necessarily affected the two major California state correctional agencies--the Department of Corrections (CDC) and the Department of the Youth Authority (CYA)--in the same way. These agencies are each responsible for a different part of the population and each has its own distinctive history and tradition. The Department of Corrections has responsibility for adult prisons and parole; the Department of the Youth Authority responsibility for the state juvenile institutions and parole. Nearly all commitments under 18 go to the Youth Authority and all those 21 and over to the Department of Corrections. In the case of youths from 18 to 20 the committing court decides; currently about two-thirds of these cases go to the Youth Authority. These two organizations have also been involved in the subsidy program in different

ways. Most importantly, the Youth Authority has been responsible for administration of the program, while the Department of Corrections has played a more limited role.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind the extent to which the questions involved have become political issues. At the time of its adoption neither probation subsidy nor corrections were particularly controversial. By the early 1970's, however, with the increasing politicization of issues involving crime generally, both had become so. Consequently, even though the central focus of the subsidy debate concerned release to the community rather than administration of the prisons, the state system was itself sufficiently in the public limelight to make any effects--however small or large--a matter of importance.

Keeping these factors in mind it seems clear that the probation subsidy program has made a major impact on both the CYA and the CDC. The populations involved are both smaller and more hard core than they would have been in the absence of subsidy. The effect on the California Youth Authority has been much greater because the population decline has on a proportional basis been much larger. This in turn has required enormous change in the agency to stay on top of the changing population. Equal or greater change has taken place in the Department of Corrections since the beginning of the subsidy period but factors other than subsidy appear to play a much larger role in this than in the CYA.

I. DEPARTMENT OF THE YOUTH AUTHORITY

There is no question but that the population handled by

the California Youth Authority has changed markedly since the inception of the probation subsidy program in 1966. Fewer and different kinds of commitments have led to smaller and different kinds of institutional and parole populations. Longer stays and the transfer of the more experienced CYA wards from CDC facilities to CYA facilities have also strongly affected the institutional populations.

A. Changes in Commitments

The most important single change is the decline in institutional commitments. In the CYA this decline is not simply a decrease in the proportion of persons adjudged delinquent who are sent to state correctional facilities, but an absolute decline in the number of first commitments as well, as shown in Table 1.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Court of Commitment. Nearly as important as the decline in number has been the change in composition of CYA commitments. This population is made up of two parts: commitments from the juvenile court and commitments from the adult criminal court. By far the largest decline has been in commitments from the juvenile court, as shown in Table 2.

[Insert Table 2 here]

Age. Since criminal court commitments are predominantly in the 18-20 year old age group and the juvenile court commitments generally under 18, it is not surprising to find that the average age of CYA commitments has increased. The mean age of first commitments rose from 16.4 years in 1965 to 17.5 years in 1973. While those 18 and over accounted for around 30 percent of the new commitments in the early 1960's, by 1973 this group made up nearly 50 percent, as shown in Table A-1 (in the appendix).

Table 1

First Commitments to the California Youth Authority

	Number Committed		Number Committed
1960	4602	1967	4998
1961	5337	1968	4690
1962	5194	1969	4494
1963	5733	1970	3746
1964	5488	1971	3218
1965	6190	1972	2728
1966	5470	1973	2758

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table 2

CYA First Commitments - By Court

	Juvenile Court	Criminal Court	Total
1960	3350	1252	4602
1961	3852	1485	5337
1962	3739	1455	5194
1963	4371	1362	5733
1964	4171	1317	5488
1965	4648	1542	6190
1966	4130	1340	5470
1967	3571	1427	4998
1968	3164	1427	4690
1969	2779	1715	4494
1970	2204	1542	3745
1971	1651	1567	3218
1972	1462	1266	2728
1973	1464	1294	2758

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table 3

CYA First Commitments - By Offense
(In Percent)

Offense	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Homicide	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.5	2.2	2.3	3.6	4.0
Robbery	8.1	6.7	5.9	7.2	6.3	7.4	9.7	10.2	10.8	13.3	14.5	19.0
Assault, Battery	3.5	7.5	8.3	7.2	8.5	6.9	7.2	7.4	8.2	8.5	9.9	10.6
Burglary	20.8	18.7	16.2	16.2	15.7	15.9	14.4	13.1	13.6	16.6	16.8	19.4
Theft	9.4	8.4	8.6	8.2	8.4	7.3	7.5	6.3	7.0	7.8	9.1	8.2
Auto Theft	15.1	14.9	14.8	13.1	13.0	11.3	9.5	8.7	7.5	7.7	9.0	7.7
Forgery, Checks	2.5	2.4	2.7	2.5	2.0	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.5	1.2
Sex Offenses	5.6	5.1	4.6	3.9	4.2	3.9	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.2	4.0
Narcotics, Drugs	3.6	4.0	4.9	5.7	7.6	13.2	14.5	18.8	19.3	18.8	11.8	9.4
Escape, County Facilities	*	6.2	6.8	6.2	6.0	6.6	7.3	7.8	8.0	7.7	7.4	4.9
County Camp, Foster Home Failures	*	*	9.6	11.0	9.8	8.8	7.8	6.3	7.6	3.4	3.3	3.7
Incorrigible, Runaway	13.1	17.8	9.1	8.6	9.6	8.5	8.2	7.0	4.5	3.1	3.9	2.4
Other	17.7	7.7	8.0	9.3	9.2	6.9	7.9	8.0	6.8	15.9	6.0	5.5

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding. *"Other" category includes unspecified Welfare and Institutions Code Violations, Road and Drinking violation and miscellaneous uncategorized.

Race. The percentage of black first commitments increased during the subsidy period, as shown in Table A-2--going from 27.9 percent in 1965 to 33.9 percent in 1973. Whites declined somewhat and Mexican-Americans remained about the same.

Commitment Offense. There have been dramatic changes, however, in the commitment offense, as shown in Table 3. First, there has been a large increase both in the proportion and the number of first commitments for drug offenses, particularly in the early subsidy years. Second, even though the number of persons committed for violent offenses has not greatly increased, the proportion has increased substantially. Third, there have been dramatic decreases in the proportion committed for incorrigibility, runaway, foster home and camp failures. Finally, there has also been a decline in number and proportion in commitments for property offenses.

[Insert Table 3 here]

Sex. Another important shift has been the decrease in the number of female commitments to the CYA, as shown in Table A-3. Girls made up 16 percent of CYA commitments in 1965, but less than ten percent in 1973. The major reason for this shift is the decreasing number of girls sent to the state for incorrigibility, running away, or foster home failure. Until 1968 these categories accounted for over half of all female CYA first commitments. Since then this percentage has dropped sharply. This decline seems due in part to subsidy and in part to a growing concern over committing youths for offenses that would not be punishable for adults. This concern would affect girls more than boys, as a higher percentage of all girls committed are committed for this type of offense.

Prior Record. The percentage of new commitments with two or more contacts with the police or local institutions increased, as shown in Table A-4-- from 11 percent in 1960 to 15 percent in 1965, to 21 percent in 1973--indicating that first commitments have become more criminally experienced.

Even more in evidence than the increasing severity of prior delinquent conduct is the growth in first commitments with a history of narcotic, drug or opiate use. In 1965, 88 percent of the boys and 74 percent of the girls had no history of narcotic or drug use. By 1971, however, only 39 percent of the boys and 34 percent of the girls had no such histories.[6] This increase was partly due to an increase in drug admissions and partly to increased use regardless of offense. While this increase overlapped to some extent with the period of the subsidy program, the two are not connected and the subsidy program probably kept CYA from being inundated with drug cases. The pre-subsidy rate of sentencing drug offenders to CYA would have resulted in many times the current number in state institutions. Since 1972 this problem has receded somewhat.

B. Changes in Institutional Populations

Thus, the more recent CYA commitments taken as a whole are older, more experienced and contain a higher percentage of violent offenders but fewer females.[7] These changes in the number and characteristics of commitments naturally affect the institutional population also. In general the institutional population has changed in the same way as the commitments.

Number. This population has decreased over 30 percent since the inception of subsidy, as shown in Table 4--going from

6,536 in 1965 to 4,105 in 1973.

[Insert Table 4 here]

Race. The racial make-up of the institutional population has changed in much the same ways as the first commitments. Between 1964 and 1973 the total for whites declined from 52 to 40 percent while that for blacks increased from 27 to 35 percent, as shown in Table A-5.

Commitment Offense. Similar shifts have also occurred with respect to commitment offense. In 1964 only 21 percent of the institutional population had been committed for offenses against persons. By 1973, however, this total was 39 percent. During this same period the total committed for property offenses declined from 46 to 33 percent, as shown in Table 5.

[Insert Table 5 here]

Prior Criminal Record. No data concerning the prior record of the institutional population is available. It seems clear, however, from commitment data that the present population is more experienced than that of the pre-subsidy period. There has been an increase in the proportion of the institutional population attributable to first commitments, as shown in Table A-6, but because of changing court disposition patterns this does not indicate as much as desired about prior records.

C. Other Population Changes.

Even more important from the point of view of the CYA staff is the fact that the more serious CYA cases which used to be handled by the Department of Corrections have been shifted to direct CYA handling. Between 1960 and 1965, 1,500 or more of these cases were consistently handled by CDC. In 1973, the total, as

Table 4

CYA Institutional Population

	Population, January 1		Population, January 1
1960	4245	1967	6421
1961	4853	1968	6542
1962	5767	1969	6317
1963	6040	1970	5908
1964	6656	1971	5580
1965	6536	1972	4552
1966	6377	1973	4105

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table 5

CYA Institutional Population - Commitment Offense
Males Only
(In Percent)

	Against Persons	Against Property	Narcotics, Drugs	Other
1962	19.1	49.5	4.0	27.4
1963	21.4	47.7	3.9	27.0
1964	21.3	45.9	4.9	27.9
1965	21.5	45.2	4.5	28.8
1966	22.5	42.6	5.7	27.0
1967	20.7	42.2	8.5	28.5
1968	23.8	37.7	11.5	27.0
1969	25.8	35.7	13.1	25.4
1970	26.3	32.5	14.8	26.4
1971	30.1	31.8	15.6	22.5
1972	35.8	31.8	12.8	20.2
1973	38.8	33.3	8.2	19.7

Source: A Comparison of Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards, CYA Office of Research. Figures as of June 30 each year.

shown in Table 6, was 54.

[Insert Table 6 here]

Length of Stay. The institutional population would have declined even more if the average length of stay in the institutions had not increased. The mean length of stay for CYA wards in schools, camps, and clinics jumped from 8.7 months in 1969 to 11.6 months in 1973--with most of the increase occurring during the probation subsidy years, as shown in Table 7.

[Insert Table 7 here]

This increase is clearly due in part to the changing character of the population. It also seems due in part to a parole board more oriented to a punishment philosophy.

Incidents and Escapes. Strengthening the view that the institutional population is becoming more difficult to manage than the population of the early 1960's is the data on incidents and escapes. Thus the number of institutional problem incidents, the number of wards involved in these incidents, and the number of escapes have all increased during the subsidy years. Between 1965-66 and 1971-1972 the number of incidents jumped from 536 to 1,545--an increase of 188 percent. The number of wards involved increased even more--211 percent, from 791 to 2,461, as shown in Table 8.

[Insert Table 8 here]

The number of escapes increased even more. In part the jump around 1968 is due to a change in the definition of escape. Prior to 1968, any escape or absence without proper leave was not reported until 24 hours had passed. Now an absence, regardless of duration, is recorded as an escape. Since may of the "escapes" were boys returning late from furloughs or boys off the premises for very

Table 6

CYA - Average Daily Population

	CYA Schools	CYC Camps	CDC	Other*	Total
1961	2918	280	1732	679	5609
1962	3458	336	1583	633	6010
1963	3823	353	1567	735	6478
1964	3970	345	1566	817	6698
1965	4110	353	1536	894	6893
1966	4225	323	1153	843	6544
1967	4306	275	1224	795	6600
1968	4378	251	1157	791	6577
1969	4485	280	852	755	6372
1970	4192	283	820	666	5961
1971	3790	306	362	727	5185
1972	3231	290	61	709	4291
1973	3214	350	54	725	4343

*Other category includes Reception Centers, Department of Mental Health and jail.

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table 7

Mean Length of Stay Prior to Release
(Months)

	CYC Institutions*	CDC Institutions
1960	8.7	11.1
1961	8.6	11.2
1962	8.9	12.5
1963	8.7	13.3
1964	9.0	13.4
1965	8.8	13.7
1966	8.6	14.2
1967	9.4	12.1
1968	10.0	12.6
1969	9.9	15.1
1970	10.5	15.5
1971	11.4	16.1
1972	11.0	18.2
1973	11.6	14.8

*Males only

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table 8

Escapes from CYA Institutions

	Average Daily Population	Number Escapes*	Percent Average Daily Population Escaped
1960	3475	275	7.9
1961	5609	288	5.1
1962	6010	288	4.8
1963	6478	217	3.3
1964	6698	222	3.3
1965	6893	208	3.0
1966	6544	333	5.1
1967	6600	610	9.2
1968	6577	428	6.5
1969	6372	669	10.5
1970	5961	826	13.9
1971	5185	891	17.2
1972	4291	857	20.0
1973	4343	493	

*In January, 1966, the definition of escape was changed. Previously, a ward was not an escapee if he was returned prior to midnight on the day of escape. After January, 1966, a ward was considered an escapee whenever he was out of custody or control of the institution, regardless of the time period involved.

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

short periods of time, the number recorded quite naturally increased. While these accounting changes may be responsible for the 28 percent jump in escapes between 1966 and 1969, they probably do not account for all of the 108 percent increase between 1968 and 1972, as shown in Table 9.

[Insert Table 9 here]

Taken altogether the available statistical information clearly supports the conclusion reached by the California Correctional Study in 1971:

> Both tables clearly reveal a decline in [CYA] population since 1965. This trend is in large measure due to the probation subsidy program initiated in 1966. The tables also show that over the past decade the median age of wards has increased significantly; the percent committed from the criminal courts has risen (over 350% for girls); the proportions of crimes against persons and drug offenses have skyrocketed; and the percentage of "third time losers" has more than doubled for boys and more than tripled for girls. These changes would strongly suggest that the Youth Authority's population is becoming a more "hard-core" group.[7]

D. Effects of Population Change on Institutional Management

Population changes of this magnitude could be expected to bring new problems to those responsible for running and operating the CYA institutions. While in large part the changes reflect decreases in the younger, more inexperienced categories rather than increases in the older, more experienced ones, the overall change is a very real one with which the CYA staff must deal. Many institution staff feel that because of these changes the job of managing and operating the institutions has become more difficult.

In order to obtain a first hand understanding, four CYA institutions were visited in the summer of 1973 and staff at all levels interviewed concerning their views as to the nature and extent of the population change and the effects of the changes on

Table 9

Number of Ward Incidents - CYA

	Average Daily Population	Number of Incidents	Number Wards Involved	Percent Average Daily Population Involved
1965-66	5,210	536	791	12.2
1966-67	5,342	841	1206	22.5
1967-68	5,289	783	1656	31.3
1968-69	5,394	866	1861	34.5
1969-70	5,312	1141	1675	31.5
1970-71	4,907	1319	2337	47.7
1971-72	4,460	1545	2461	55.2

Source: State of California Budget.

the institutions. The institutions visited included Karl Holton and the Preston School of Industry in Northern California and the Youth Training School and Ventura School in Southern California. A total of 51 staff members were interviewed overall, including seven or more at each institution visited and ten officials in Sacramento. Seventeen of those interviewed were classified as administrative.

Staff Views of Population Changes. Virtually all staff officers interviewed, including many whose experience spanned pre-subsidy and subsidy years, felt that the youths being sent to CYA today are more difficult to deal with: "more assaultive," "more crazy," and "more sophisticated."

One psychologist felt he was seeing more character disorders. Wards with low motivation, long histories of delinquency, and a "nothing-to-lose attitude" were felt to be on the increase, and all agreed that "we have no more incorrigibiles." The new offender is felt to have less respect for authority. They are more politically aware and have more legal expertise. "These kids don't care whether they hit someone in here [or not]...."[9]

Institutional administrators interviewed on the other hand took a somewhat more detached view. "We have talked ourselves into thinking that the kids are hard to deal with as a reaction to their serious commitment offenses and their delinquency histories." They also believed, however, that there have been changes. "Any impact you have in the community you have here; they have problems in the high schools, we have it here." Another administrator

stated: "We had the same kind of problems ten years ago, but the caliber [of ward] has changed; they used to be more amenable." Still another declared:

> Back ten or 15 years ago, an offender knew his place. Now people are talking about their rights. The staff is still the same as ten years ago. They believe prisoners should be seen and not heard. It's hard for us to listen and treat the kids with the respect they are demanding...."

"We may get more 'bad' kids now," he concluded, "but we did get 'bad' kids then as well. The kids here belong here; institutions for the good guys are going out of business."

Coping With the New Population. How have the institutions changed to accomodate the post-subsidy population? Perceived as housing older youths, with longer records and more serious offenses, for a longer length of stay, perhaps the most obvious change in the institutions is a strong shift toward security concerns--away from rehabilitation, counseling and helping.

The number one priority in every institution visited was security. Security staff in all institutions visited had increased. All had vehicular round-the-clock coverage on their fences, and one institution was in the process of installing a check-point outside the gate--a phenomenon previously foreign to CYA institutions. There is now five-post coverage in all units of all institutions, and a special unit has been opened in one institution to accomodate those youths whose lives are in danger. No longer able to use the Department of Corrections except for its very toughest cases, the CYA is faced with a population with which it is relatively inexperienced.

Security staff is concerned over what they regard as the department's failure to provide adequate staff and protection

for employees whose "lives are on the line" every day. Both treatment and line staff believe that the organization has failed to change and accomodate the needs of their more "sophisticated" population. The fact that there is no overlap of shifts, for example, prevents information from being passed from one shift to the next. Many staff find fault for the lack of innovation in ways of dealing with the new problems. Indeed, there was very little innovation in progress in the institutions visited. One had the sense that--at the time of the visits at least--staff and administrators were looking over their shoulders rather than ahead. Some energy to be sure was being spent in trying to create programs to appeal to the new kind of ward. Junior college programs have been created and four year programs may soon follow. The overall impression, however, was not one of innovation.

Whether, in fact, the youths committed for more serious offenses are always more difficult to deal with was a matter of some debate. Some administrators felt that the runaways and incorrigibles were extremely difficult management cases. What is certain, however, is that the populations are different. It is also clear that these differences have had a major psychological impact on the CYA staff. By their own description they are more tense, more careful with these youths; they feel more like jailors than rehabilitators. In those institutions with the "more difficult" cases, staff saw their role as one of "body management." Though they would like to provide "treatment" services, they believe that security is their first priority. They feel that they are too short-handed to do what they are required to do. Some admit to being afraid. Their

responses have become a little more rigid, and the consequence is a less open relationship with the wards.

Much of the problem is believed by staff to be attributable to longer stays. Youth Authority programs were developed around a nine-month stay. Now that stays average nearly 12 months, the additional inactivity created is felt to breed unrest and mischief. Staff feel that youths respond better to treatment if they can see the "light at the end of the tunnel." Most counselors agreed that there is a certain point at which a youth has received optimum benefit from the institution. To keep him longer, they believe, is detrimental. This is in part an argument with CYA parole board which is felt to have changed the rules and reduced staff authority at the very time staff needed it most.

These problems of course differ by institution. One of the institutions undergoing the greatest changes is the Youth Training School near Los Angeles. At one point this institution was geared to white, middle-class youths interested in learning a trade, and "amenable" to treatment. Youths from all over the state were sent there. In 1968, however, the department began to regionalize its institutions so that wards would be closer to their homes. About the same time it began to withdraw CYA commitments from the adult institutions. Suddenly YTS was receiving youths who were not trade-oriented and who were mostly from the ghetto areas around Los Angeles. YTS now houses very "difficult to manage" youths but without the physical plant to do so. Referred to by many as the "warehouse," there is virtually no treatment--and realistically treatment is not conceivable in the setting provided. One staff member listed the priorities of staff at YTS as "number 1, escape;

number 2, assaults on staff; number 3, assaults on each other; number 4, arson; number 5, treatment." Security travels in pairs, and one area is referred to as the "gorilla unit."

The wards are not active in a trade program and there is a lot of inactivity. Gang wars, hostilities, and vendettas from the streets are continued within the institution because many of the youths knew one another on the outside. The staff attitude in the past had been, "If the kids don't behave, we'll get tough." Effective with middle-class youths, this attitude no longer works to the same degree.

One staff member characterized what has happened by saying "you put together two mischievous little boys and they create mischief; you add a third and you have trouble; but put together 1,200 young men who have committed rape, murder, arson, drug trafficking and you have [chaos]...." Many of the wards are felt by some to be far more sophisticated and "streetwise" than the staff.

The Ventura School is another CYA institution which has undergone substantial change. Prior to subsidy, it was a girls school. Now it is co-educational, and most staff saw this as the cause of many of their problems. "We used to tell the girls that they could not get over the fence, so they did not try....Now with the boys here, they have tried and found they could get over...." There is the feeling in this institution that if the boys misbehave they will be shipped out. The girls feel more secure. It is still "their place."

The Preston School of Industry in the Northern Sierra foothills has long been known as the last stop for CYA offenders,

containing the older and the tougher population. Its present population, however, is described as much "rougher" and "hard-core" than pre-subsidy. In part this results from the transfer from the state prison facilities. In part, however, this results from the changing pattern of CYA commitments.

Effect on Wards. How has the changing population affected the wards themselves? Staff interviewed believed that the "group pressure" is the most significant influence on the behavior of the youths within the institution. The pendulum has swung at this point to the stronger and more aggressive youths who seize power and exert control. There is a good deal of racial pressure felt by the youths. For the most part, wards have ceased to believe that if they're good they will be out sooner. One staff member commented that if there were more blacks in a unit, they had the power; if there were more whites, they had the power, and so on. Those in power set the tone. Wards fashion weapons to protect themselves from other wards, not necessarily for attacks on the staff. They must keep up a tough front, and feel they are engaged in a fight for survival.

The Causes of Change. Is subsidy responsible for all these changes? Those interviewed did not see subsidy as the cause of all the changes described, but did agree that it was responsible for the older population and the longer histories of delinquent behavior. They also saw subsidy as responsible for the decreased population of CYA. There was some bitterness at the closing of three Youth Authority facilities and the disruption of the lives of those staff affected. Staff believes that the subsidy program

has resulted in the communities skimming off the top of the delinquent offenders, leaving CYA with the "dregs." "We get what's left over." This, they believe, makes their jobs more difficult.

Most staff firmly believe that the subsidy program removed the more stable and emotionally mature youths who "diluted" the population. They were "role models" with "strong character" who were not afraid to cooperate and who were interested in rehabilitation. Now, the concentration "of large numbers of emotionally unstable young men is the biggest problem resulting from the probation subsidy program." They are getting youths with a lot of probation and camp experience in the counties. The Youth Authority rarely gets a first-timer now, but rather the repeaters who have "become hard-core by being recycled through the community.... Kids think they can get away with it and...and do a bigger number next...."

Staff feels that often by the time a youth gets to their institution, it is too late--their lifestyles are developed. Today there are more youths coming in on Superior Court commitments for offenses such as murder, arson, rape and assault with a deadly weapon. These wards often have long rap sheets of lesser offenses and community treatment. Staff quote this kind of ward as saying, "if they would have given me the time two years ago, I wouldn't be here now...." Institutions are the last resort at present, used only when community treatment has proven ineffective. "We get the kids who aren't making it in the community."

Other staff members, however, feel that changes in the institutions are attributable to causes other than subsidy. They see the reduction in population and the changes in kids inside as due in part to the Gault decision (the 1967 U.S. Supreme Court

case extending many due process protections to juveniles), to the Vietnam War, and to increasing loss of respect for adults by the young. This denial of authority is demonstrated by defiance and by more youths looking down on the therapeutic aspects of the program. Youths are more politicized, particularly black youths. The movement towards violence and organization in the prison system is an extension of the student movement of the '60's, of racial tension and of drugs, which are being smuggled into the institutions now more than ever according to one member of the security force.

> Kids here are no different from the kids on the outside. They see their parents trying to beat the system by cheating on their income tax. They cheat in school. It's progressive.

While subsidy might have exacerbated an already volatile situation by keeping the more stable youths in the community, the "times" exert an equal or greater influence on the behavior of youths committed to CYA.[10]

The CYA Board. Most staff interviewed believed that the biggest problem facing them was longer lengths of stay. Staff feels that time is the single most important consideration of the wards. They are unable to relate to time in terms of years, and cannot find the logic in good behavior because they know that, regardless, they are in for a longer period of time than they can imagine. A "what's the use" attitude develops. Youths feel they can lose no more than they have already. They act out, they get more time; they act out, they get more time. And a hopelessness develops.

The length of stay is the responsibility of the parole board,

not the department. Parole board members and other official spokesmen attribute the increase in lengths of stay largely to changes in the characteristics of the wards with whom they are dealing. According to a 1972 newspaper article:

> To protect the public, the board members feel they have to stand between some very violent young people and a number of overly solicitous staff members who would set them free too soon....Indeed, the idea of the board as a buffer is woven into the fabric of the Youth Authority Act. The law gives the eight members of the board the last word on how long a juvenile is to stay in an institution once he has been committed to the Authority....The board has decided that the young offenders must stay longer.[11]

Others, however, suggest that there have been changes in the parole board itself. The same newspaper series also summarized this viewpoint:

> There is a strong, angry feeling among many California Youth Authority staff members that the youth Authority Board is punitive and arbitrary in its decision.
>
> They say the current board members are more interested in locking up youths than rehabilitating them. And they accuse the board of ignoring the whole spirit of the state's law on youthful offenders. They came in with a law enforcement background and are more punitive in their orientation than rehabilitative;....At first, there was a big struggle between the old board and the new....Then, they rewrote the board manual, making it much more punitive in its approach than it should be.[12]

Length of stay is felt to be determined by the crime committed, not by the individual or the progress he may have made. The community is tired of crime and they want those who commit crime punished. Populations are now on the rise again at CYA institutions because the board is revoking parole and recommitting cases if youths fail to conform to standards of behavior and morality as put forth in board policy. Thus, though staff for

the most part sees its function as rehabilitative and helping, the board is seen as punitive. The wards are affected by this disparity in attitudes. Staff has stopped encouraging youths to perform well for an early board appearance, because they know now that the chances of parole before one year are very slim.

Staff has very little control over board decisions. In one institution the whole program is based on behavior modification, the idea is that earning a certain number of points entitles a ward to an appearance before the board. The board, however, disregards the point system and replies, "we won't see anyone for that kind of a crime for another year." Treatment is thus undermined. The relationship between ward, counsellor, and board is severely threatened. Staff believes that if the youth knows he cannot go before the board for two years, his performance the first year is unremarkable if not poor. The second year, when he knows he must earn his points in order to make his appearance before the board, is fruitful. One administrator commented that there is no trust between his staff and the board because decisions are based not on performance, sincerity or desire, but on the crime committed and the appearance of the youth before him.

In the more serious offense commitments, the cases are "full board," which means that the parole baord makes all decisions relative to that particular individual: whether he will get a pass or be allowed to participate in the junior college program off grounds, etc. These issues cannot be resolved by the staff in these cases. Staff has no power, and probably little respect from the youth who feels, "You can't do anything for me anyway, so why should I talk

to you?" Staff questioned on this subject uniformly agreed that this loss of leverage has severely impeded their effectiveness in dealing with the "full board" offenders. The staff interviewed observed that the board and sometimes the Legislature are under the mistaken notion that "if we straighten out [the kids] in corrections, we'll straighten out crime in the streets, when it's really quite the opposite."

E. Effects on Parole Administration

As might be expected the changes which have been taking place in the CYA institutional population have also had major effects on parole as well, as shown in Tables A-7 to A-9.

Between 1965 and 1973:

--The total number of parolees declined from 13,660 to 11,852

--The number of male parolees declined from 10,509 to 9,185

--The number of female parolees declined from 2,244 to 1,546

--The proportion of male parolees originating in criminal court commitments increased from 32.5 to 48.9 percent

--The proportion of male parolees committed for offenses against the person increased from 16.9 to 32.2 percent

--The median age of male parolees increased from 19.2 to 20.5 years

In order to determine their perception of these changes parole administrative staff in both Northern and Southern California were interviewed. All those interviewed feel that the probation subsidy program had had a direct effect on the parole population, particularly in terms of their number and their age.

Today's older parolee was thought to be more sophisticated, somewhat hostile, agressive, acting-out youth. He may have a strong sense of ethnic identity and an awareness of his rights. He is cynical, not trusting, and often not amenable to the social

work approach practiced by agents ten years ago. He will not be coerced. He demands rehabilitative services, but will not tolerate a paternal or control-type parole agent.

He brings with him different and complex problems. "Young adults have different concerns than the youths who previously made up the CYA population....Now...they are learning how and establishing an adult life...." Staff, from all descriptions, is finding it difficult to adjust to the type of offender with whom it is faced today and more particularly to the new policies and regulations related to his management.

The parole officer's view as to the cause of these changes is similar to that of the institutional staff. There is a strong feeling that the subsidy program has siphoned off the easier to manage youths: "We get those who are not amenable to probation...We get rejects, ones they can't do anything with....They've gone through so much counselling, so many personalitites. They're saying "Hey, we're sick of this." Agents are finding that parolees from a first commitment have extensive histories of custody or probation. Of the 15-year olds: "We get now the ones...subsidy cannot handle or "[we get them from] judges who believe only in CYA commitments; ...we get some 15 or 16 years olds, but when we get them they have have some heavy beefs."

There is also a clear recognition, however, that many factors other than the subsidy program have been operating. The last decade has been a time of great social upheaval: "Black movement, subsequent Watts Riot...a sense of identity...something has happened...in the black community gangs are back again...the general

population has a [feeling of] self worth" were one staff member's comments. Legal decisions which have broadened the rights of the juvenile offender and changed the role of the parole agent have also affected the behavior of the parolee towards his agent. There is an expanded availability of legal services to the needy with the result that the parole agent has become less the parolee's advocate and more his adversary.

Changes other than subsidy have had major effects on parole administration. Board policy over and over again was mentioned by those interviewed as significantly affecting staff attitudes, morale and working conditions. In response to community pressures and attitudes towards offenders, "protection of society" is now the motivating force behind most board decisions rather than rehabilitation. Youths are staying longer in institutions. Parole population is down. Technical violators are more often returned to institutions by the board.

Because parolees are fearful of being returned for longer stays "inside," they are less likely to turn to their parole agent for help when they are in trouble. Parole agents find themselves in the peculiar position of <u>not</u> encouraging honesty from their parolees because of certain new Parole Board policies: the parole board will not tolerate common-law marriage and sexual relationships; if a parolee is engaged in such a relationship and it is reported to the board, he may be returned to the institution; hair length and attire must not violate standards established by the board or length of time on parole may be extended.

II. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

A. Changes in New Commitments

The changes in the number of new commitments to the Department of Corrections are not as great as those in the CYA, but are nonetheless substantial. Overall, as shown in Table 10, there was a drop of nearly 15 percent between 1965 and 1973--from 6,004 to 5,147.

[Insert Table 10 here]

Moreover, this decrease in commitments has occurred at a time when Superior Court defendants convicted and sentenced have been increasing, as shown in Table 11. (Changes in the law make 1972 figures not comparable to prior years.)

[Insert Table 11 here]

Commitment Offense. As in the Youth Authority there have also been dramatic changes in the character of the new admissions. Perhaps the most important of these changes has been that in commitment offense. Commitments for crimes of violence (homicide, robbery, assault and sex) have increased from nearly 33 percent in 1964 to over 45 percent in 1973. Commitments for narcotics offenses also increased in this period--from 12.6 to 18.7 percent. Commitments for property offenses, however, decreased from 48 percent in 1964 to 31 percent in 1973, as shown in Table 12.

[Insert Table 12 here]

Age. While the age of commitments in the Youth Authority has been increasing, that of new commitments to CDC has been declining--from a median of 29.0 years in 1960 to a median of 26.8 in 1973, as shown in Table A-10.

Race. Another important shift has been the change in racial composition of those newly received, as shown in Table A-11. While

Table 10

New Commitments to CDC*

	Number New Commitments		Number New Commitments
1961	6214	1968	4949
1962	5164	1969	4754
1963	5289	1970	4690
1964	5307	1971	4788
1965	6004	1972	4579
1966	5525	1973	5147
1967	5144	1974	5359

*Excludes narcotic addicts civilly committed, Youth Authority Wards, and Narcotic Treatment-Control Units.

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table 11

Superior Court Defendants Convicted and Sentenced

	Number		Number
1960	24,800	1967	34,700
1961	28,000	1968	40,500
1962	27,000	1969	50,600
1963	28,400	1970	50,000
1964	27,800	1971	56,000
1965	30,800	1972	49,000
1966	32,000	1973	44,872*

*Based on 22,436 cases for first six months.

Source: California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, Crime and Delinquency in California.

Table 12

Male Felons Newly Received from Court
By Offense Group
(In Percent)

	Homicide	Robbery	Assault	Sex	Narcotics	Burglary	Theft	Auto Theft	Forgery Checks	Other	No. of Male Felons
1960	3.8	13.7	3.3	5.2	16.5	20.1	5.5	4.9	21.0	6.9	(5701)
1961	4.3	16.0	3.6	8.1	15.2	19.8	6.0	4.1	17.1	5.8	(5842)
1962	5.0	17.5	4.4	5.3	11.8	20.5	6.9	4.0	17.1	7.2	(4879)
1963	5.4	17.9	4.4	7.0	10.9	20.2	8.0	4.1	16.1	6.0	(5030)
1964	4.8	16.2	4.8	6.3	12.6	20.8	7.6	4.9	14.3	6.7	(4983)
1965	5.1	18.1	5.2	7.0	11.8	20.9	7.4	5.1	13.5	5.9	(5626)
1966	6.2	15.3	6.0	7.4	13.5	21.0	8.0	5.0	11.3	6.3	(5169)
1967	6.0	19.1	6.5	6.5	18.7	17.2	8.3	4.9	11.1	6.7	(4872)
1968	7.0	19.4	7.2	6.5	13.5	16.6	8.3	4.7	9.9	6.9	(4667)
1969	8.4	18.9	7.9	7.1	16.4	16.1	7.7	4.0	7.3	6.2	(4496)
1970	9.4	19.3	7.4	6.2	19.5	15.0	7.4	3.4	3.1	4.4	(4426)
1971	9.4	22.2	7.4	5.6	20.6	14.4	7.3	3.1	4.4	5.6	(4472)
1972	10.4	22.5	8.3	5.7	18.3	14.9	6.9	2.8	4.9	5.3	(4472)
1973	10.9	21.5	7.9	5.4	18.7	17.0	7.0	2.9	4.0	4.9	(4839)

Source: CDC, California Prisoners. Other category includes the following offenses: driving while under the influence of alcohol, or drugs; failure to render aid; deadly weapon; abortion; escape; kidnapping; habitual criminal; and others

the relative proportion of whites has been steadily declining, the proportion of minority felons has been increasing. Thus, while 60.6 percent of the male felons newly received at CDC institutions were of caucasian descent in 1960, the percentage had dropped to 52.7 percent by 1972. Black commitments increased from 20.8 to 29.3 percent in the same period.

Prior Record. Increasingly, more felons are being admitted to prison with no prior commitment of any kind. Of those who have previously served time in an incarcerative facility, the proportion of those who have served a prior prison sentence has declined, while the proportion of those previously committed to either a juvenile facility or to a county jail has increased. Table A-12 summarizes this trend for the years 1960 to 1972.

Base Expectancy. The base expectancy score is a measure developed by the Department of Corrections to predict parole outcome success probability. In 1970 a study by the Assembly Office of Research examined these scores for each new commitment from 1963-1968. This study found that "Base Expectancy score distributions have remained constant for all new prison commitments during the period...."[13] As "this measure has been shown to be very good in predicting post-release outcomes," the study concluded that if "change in the characteristics of prisoners" is measured by their probable success after release, the population received as new prison input has not changed over the years. By this measure, the average inmate received today is no better or no worse than the average inmate received in 1960."

This study also indicated, however, that "commitments for crimes against persons have steadily risen during the period, with

a corresponding decrease in crimes against property." Combining this with a finding that "within each offense category, prisoner characteristic profiles have not changed over time (i.e. 1968 robbers are indistinguishable from 1960 robbers)," it found that the changing proportions of offense groups being sent to prison had "resulted in introducing proportionately more younger, aggressive men with more serious prior commitment records into institutions."[14]

Summary of New Commitment Characteristics. Thus, taken as a whole, the more recent commitment, upon receipt at CDC institutions, is more likely to be younger; to be from a minority group, especially black; and to have been committed for a violent crime. He is less likely to have been in prison before.

B. Changes in the Prison Population

Number. The prison population, through 1972, declined, as shown in Table 13 from 22,710 in 1965 to 17,474 in 1972.

[Insert Table 13 here]

This decrease is attributable both to the decline in the number of first commitments and a decrease in the number of parolees returned to prison. Thus, as shown in Table A-13, the number of parolees returned declined from 3960 in 1965 to 3245 in 1972. The low water mark of 2396 was reached in 1971.

The decrease would have been even greater but for the fact that the median time served in prison prior to parole increased during this period--going from 27 months in 1960 to 35 months in 1972, as shown in Table A-14.

In 1973 this picture of a declining population began to change. Commitments increased, the number of parolees return to prison increased and the institutional population also began to increase,

as shown in Table 14. The projections for 1974 are for further increases.

[Insert Table 14 here]

This change is attributable in part to new policies adopted by the Adult Authority and in part to changing sentencing patterns by judges. Both these changes are related in part to changing attitudes within the state toward crime in general and to a lesser extent toward the subsidy program in particular.

Characteristics. The characteristics of the prison population depend not only upon the characteristics of those first committed to prison--the population most affected by the subsidy program--but also upon the characteristics of parolees returned to prison and the lengths of stay in prison. In general, however, the changes in population characteristics match closely the changes in commitment characteristics.

Offense. As with commitments, the most notable change is in commitment offense. A much higher proportion of the current male prison population was committed for "hard crimes" such as homicide, robbery and assault than in previous years. Offenders in these categories comprised 35.1 percent in 1960, but 48.4 percent in 1972. On the other hand, offenders committed for crimes against property, such as burglary, theft, auto theft, and forgery, declined from 40 percent of the population in 1960, to 22 percent in 1972, as shown in Table A-15.

Age. The median age of the male felon has been declining--from 31.9 in 1960 to 30.4 in 1972. Even more revealing is the percentage of male felons under 25 years. Before 1965 the proportion of felons under 25 had been going down; since then it has

Table 13

Population of California Correctional Facilities*

	Total Population, January 1		Total Population, January 1
1961	19,987	1968	23,505
1962	21,795	1969	23,986
1963	21,032	1970	22,839
1964	22,870	1971	20,772
1965	22,710	1972	17,474
1967	23,450	1973	16,970
		1974	19,794
		1974 (June 30)	21,296

*Excludes narcotic addicts civilly committed, Youth Authority wards, and Narcotic Treatment-Control Units.

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table 14

CDC Population - 1971-74

	1971	1972	1972-73	1973-74
First Commitments	4,788	4,579	4,596	5,275
Parolees Returned	2,396	3,245	3,409	3,675
Institutional Population	20,772	17,474	16,970	19,794

increased, and by 1972 was at a 14 year high of 21.9 percent, as shown in Table A-16.

Ethnic Group. The prison population, as well as the commitment population, is becoming increasingly black and Mexican-American, as shown in Table A-17.

Prior Record. The proportion of the prison population with no prior incarceration record at all has remained relatively unchanged in the subsidy period, as shown in Table A-18. The proportion with a prior prison record has declined but this indicates very little about prior criminality because of the changing sentencing patterns.

Increased Violence. No report of the changes in CDC in recent years would be complete without a discussion of increased violence in the institutions. By far the most serious result of this increased violence has been the number of inmate and staff killings--reaching a high water mark of 35 inmates in 1972, and seven staff in 1971, as shown in Table 15.

[Insert Table 15 here]

While the number of staff deaths has decreased since 1971, the number of assaults on staff has continued to increase, as shown in Table 16.

[Insert Table 16 here]

The number of incidents involving inmates also continues at a high level, particularly those involving stabbings, as shown in Table 17.

[Insert Table 17]

The figures alone, however, do not begin to carry the full measure of the shock to the system from the specific instances of

Administrative Information
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TABLE 15

NUMBER OF PERSONS FATALLY INJURED DUE TO ASSAULTIVE INCIDENTS

1960 through 1973

Calendar year	Total	Inmates						Staff
		Total	Stabbed	Beaten	Strangled	Shot	Poisoned	Stabbed
1960	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
1961	8	8	7	1	-	-	-	-
1962	8	8	6	-	2	-	-	-
1963	8	7	6	-	-	1	-	1
1964	5	5	5	-	-	-	-	-
1965	10	9	7	1	-	1*	-	1
1966	4	4	3	-	-	1*	-	-
1967	10	10	7	1	-	2*	-	-
1968	16	16	14	-	-	1	1	-
1969	15	15	12	2	1	-	-	-
1970	13	11	7	-	1	3	-	2
1971	24	17	13	2	-	2*	-	7
1972	36	35	32	1	2	-	-	1**
1973	20	19	15	1	2	1	-	1

* Inmates fatally shot while attempting to escape: 1 in 1965, 1 in 1966, 1 in 1967, 1 in 1971 and 1 in 1973.
** Officer fatally shot outside institution during the escape of inmate enroute to court.

TABLE 16

NUMBER OF ASSAULTS BY INMATES ON STAFF

1960 through 1973

Calendar year	Total	Men	Women
1960	9	8	1
1961	19	17	2
1962	23	19	4
1963	20	16	4
1964	43	39	4
1965	26	23	3
1966	31	29	2
1967	38	30	8
1968	25	21	4
1969	32	27	5
1970	59*	57	2
1971	67*	64	3
1972	55*	51	4
1973	84*	78	6

* In 1970, 59 incidents involved 78 staff members;
in 1971, 67 incidents involved 84 staff members;
in 1972, 55 incidents involved 74 staff members;
in 1973, 84 incidents involved 132 staff members.
For each prior year shown, only one officer was involved in each incident.

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TABLE 17

S U M M A R Y

NUMBER AND TYPE OF INCIDENT, AND NUMBER OF ATTEMPTED ESCAPES IN INSTITUTIONS

BY YEAR

1965 - 1973

Year	Incidents									Attempted escapes	
	Total		Type of incident								
	Number incidents	Rate per 100 average inst. pop.	Stab-bings*	Fights	Poss. of weapon	Nar-cotics	Sex	Suicide	Other	Number attempt. escapes	Rate per 100 average inst. pop.
1965	324	1.23	48	80	107	27	15	21	26	30**	0.11
1966	357	1.37	53	85	92	41	35	5	56	40**	0.15
1967	331	1.20	55	64	116	15	27	8	46	40**	0.15
1968	324	1.14	74	57	77	34	23	13	46	41	0.14
1969	303	1.06	56	64	63	56	18	7	39	31	0.11
1970	366	1.36	66	79	89	80	15	11	26	28	0.10
1971	446	1.96	110	64	103	105	14	14	36	32†	0.14
1972	592	3.04	168	90	132	144	9	9	40	42	0.22
1973	778	3.64	179	110	201	230	4	18	36	37†	0.18

* Includes fatal stabbings and other fatal incidents.

** Includes fatally shot while attempting to escape: 1 in 1965
1 in 1966
1 in 1967

† Does not include attempted escape at San Quentin on 8-21-71 and one at CMF on 8-17-73 counted as stabbing incidents.

NOTE: These data are based upon incident reports submitted to Central Office, and as interpreted by Administrative Information & Statistics Section.

violence involved and the resulting climate of fear and suspicion. In particular they omit the impact of the bloody 1971 shootout in San Quentin on Sunday, August 21, when George Jackson, three correctional officers and two inmate cell attendants met their deaths in Jackson's apparent attempt to escape.

Even prior to this the situation in the CDC has been tense. Three stabbings of Soledad staff members and the bizarre, bullet-ridden escape effort at the Marin County courthouse culminating in the death of a judge and George Jackson's brother had brought nerves to a taut point. It was the San Quentin incident, however, which electrified the system--bringing in its wake a whole raft of tightened security measures and a heightened concern for the safety of staff and inmates that has continued to the present day.

It also brought about a wave of concern for the causes of such violence. Only a month after the San Quentin eruption the California State Employees Association came out with a special report concluding:

> In 18 short months between January 1970 and September 1971--8 California correctional employees have been murdered by inmates.
>
> In that same period 20 inmates have been killed by other inmates...
>
> Ironically this violence comes...when more criminals ...are being rehabilitated.
>
> Statistics show a steady decrease in recidivism... and prison population.
>
> Yet violent incidents continue on the increase... The drop in prison population can in part be explained by the probation subsidy program...
>
> Many experts believe part of the answer is found in the changing complexion of prison population...there is evidence that by liberalizing probation and parole and in rehabilitating the most likely of the inmate prospects, we have emptied our prisons of their relatively stable and mature elements.[15]

At about the same time another special report was being made

to the governor. This report, as most other observers, agreed with the emphasis on the changing character of the prison population. It also saw other causes:

> The change in prison sentencing patterns, along with increased releases from institutions to parole and fewer prison returns, has altered the overall character of state prisons.
>
> Missing from the prisons today are large numbers of relatively innocuous property offenders. Many such non-violent offenders adjust well to confinement, and in the past, they have had a stabilizing influence on their peers in institutions....
>
> The staff killings over the past year and a half, and many of the assaults, do not appear to reflect animosity against individual employees. Instead, the killings and many of the assaults appear to be without specific personal motive--except as they might fit into a general pattern of revolutionary violence which is present in the world outside.[16]

In a newspaper interview a year later, another prison spokesman echoed some of the same themes:

> Along with the new attitude, the warden declares that because the current trend is toward treatment in the community of as many offenders as possible, those persons sent to prisons are increasingly more difficult to manage....
>
> The 10 percent the prison receives, he said, is mostly made up of people of crimes such as murder or aggravated sex offenses. "And what this does," he explained, is build a saturation of people who have resorted to violence to solve a problem."[17]

"Radicals," particularly "radical" lawyer groups, such as the National Lawyer's Guild, come in for particular criticism. Before the House Committee on Internal Security, CDC Director Raymond Procunier stated:

> In this same period (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) we also received much confidential information from inmates to the effect that laywers, their agents, and others were urging inmates to stage disruptions to get publicity, assisting escapees, and even instructing inmates to commit murders.[18]

The rise in the prisons of ethnic groups similar to teenage street gangs is also seen as a factor. According to a January 1974 report by the California Senate Subcommittee on Civil Disorder:

> California's penal institutions are now experiencing the worst stage of violence in their history, primarily the result of several violent organizations which operate mainly within the penal institutions but have lately been believed responsible for increased violence and narcotics activities outside the prisons....
>
> These groups are highly organized and dedicated to continued violence against prison authorities and against other inmates who are not inclined to join an organization or cooperate with them when asked or, more often, threatened. The groups are formed primarily along ethnic backgrounds and were originally for inmate self-protection. They have since their inception, however, sought control over illegal activities within the prisons and on the streets. They have reached an organizational level of extreme formality and their sophistication is indeed a grave problem for prison authorities to deal with. Although composed of convicts and ex-convicts, they have been able to create effective street operations that include narcotics distribution, extortion, contract killings, robbery and forgery.[19]

A 1974 CDC Task Force To Study Violence took a somewhat broader perspective:

> The nature of the violence problem in California prisons has changed dramatically over a short period of time. As recently as 1965, a major report on prison violence made no mention of the large, well-organized gangs or of the revolutionary groups that have been serious sources of violence in the past few years.
>
> The way in which violence is expressed has also changed. Confrontations involving large groups of inmates...have been replaced by the hit-run tactics of guerilla warfare. Assaults on employees prior to 1970 were typically the unplanned results of escapes or other incidents....Since 1970, violence against staff has had an increasingly deliberate, ideological character.[20]

Whether one agrees with these specific assessments or not, it seems clear that their authors at least see a variety of factors at work in the creation of prison violence. What the McKay Commission said about Attica seems also relevant to the situation in California. Rejecting the "conspiratorial" explanations of some and the equally

pat "political prisoner" explanations from the opposite corner, it concluded after wide ranging discussions with staff, inmates and others that the Attica rebels:

> were part of a new breed of younger, more aware inmates, largely black, who came to prison full of deep feelings of alienation and hostility against the established institutions of law and government, enhanced self-esteem, social pride and political awareness, and an unwillingness to accept the petty humiliations and racism that characterize prison life.[21]

In effect, the Commission concluded that the phenomenon was much like the urban ghetto and campus disturbances of the 1960's. That conclusion also seems applicable at least in part to California.

C. Effects of Population Change on CDC Institutional Management

The statistical data available clearly shows a marked change in the CDC institutional population. In order to get some idea of what this change meant in terms of operation of the CDC institutions 45 institutional staff were interviewed in the summer of 1973 concerning their attitudes and perceptions of the change. Five of the 13 major CDC institutions were visited, including one minimum (Chino), one medium (Soledad), one maximum security institution (San Quentin), one institution for younger offenders (Tracy), and one psychiatric facility (Vacaville). Staff members interviewed generally were experienced enough to have worked with both pre- and post-subsidy prison populations, although a few newer staff members were also interviewed. Interviews covered a broad cross-section of personnel, including every major job classification except teaching. The average staff member interviewed had worked 14.8 years for CDC and in more than one facility, as shown in Table A-19.

Population Change. At four of the five institutions visited staff members were asked how the current population differed from that of eight years before. All believed that the population was

more violent, militant, and assaultive than ever before. Inmates were also seen as more group-oriented, aware, educated, open and questioning than previously. Inmate criminal histories not only include more violent acts but are seen as longer. The number of incidents inside prison walls has increased, and the nature of the incidents has shifted. Rather than personal vendettas based on sex or gambling, the inmate now fights for his group.

> [Inmates are] many times more violent than ever before.... It used to be a very rare inmate who would attack staff... now as many as seven [attacks] in one day...and for no reason whatever.... There wasn't a conflict between the officer and inmate.
>
> A guy [inmate] doesn't think twice about taking a swipe at a guy [either inmate or staff] anymore.
>
> Used to be a rule--don't touch a guard or you are going to pay--now the opposite...violent potential is definitely there.

Recent inmates are viewed as having a fundamentally different value structure than those before. They do not accept the fact that they did something wrong and must pay the price. Rather, they see themselves as unlucky to get caught at something everyone else is doing. This attitude is not considered all-pervasive, but it is considered prevalent among the growing number of inmates causing the problems within the prison. "Only about 3 percent of the population is violent, about 8-10 percent are borderline with violent potential, the rest are trying to do their time."

At Chino the question of how the population has changed during the staff member's tenure with CDC was asked in more structured form, as shown in Table 18.

[Insert Table 18 here]

Table 18

Differences Between Inmates Entering CDC Now and Eight Years Ago

	More	Less	Same
Emotionally Disturbed	7	0	3
Alienated from Conventional Society	1	2	0
Identified with Deviant Subcultural Groups such as Drug Users, Gangs, Etc.	6	0	4
Involved in Peer or Family Relationships Which Contribute to Criminal Behavior	4	1	5
Likely to Seek Redress of Grievances Through the Court System	10	0	0
Likely to Resort to Violent Means When Trying to Solve a Problem	6	2	2
Likely to Assault a Staff Member Without Direct Provacation	8	0	2
Educated	1	3	6
Likely to Present Internal Management Problems	9	0	1
Open Hostility and Antagonism in Their Attitudes Toward Authority	9	0	1
Self-Esteem	3	4	3
Awareness of Social and Institutional Processes	9	0	1

CDC Organizational Changes to Cope With New Population. When asked to indicate how the CDC administration has attempted to meet the challenge of a more difficult population, the staff interviewed indicated a number of specific steps, including the hiring of more staff, increasing security measures, decreasing the amount of work done by inmates and increasing employee training. The most frequently cited was an increase in security personnel, as shown in Table 19.

[Insert Table 19 here]

Other changes mentioned by at least a few staff members include the recruiting of a different type staff member, an increasing complexity of procedures, institution of a new floor system, the planning of a more restrictive classification system, changing the vocational educational program, increasing maintenance by outside personnel, increased perimeter control, improving prerelease programs, establishing more inmate self-help groups, and changing to the buddy system.

In the early subsidy years, despite the fact that the population went down, there was no great change in the number of institutional personnel. Many officials nevertheless felt that even with fewer inmates their job was harder. Requests for more personnel were continually refused, however, until 1971. With an increased number of officer murders in that year, the situation changed. The department hired new custodial personnel, "largely as a result of violence."

One administration summarized the changes:

> 1. New custodial personnel have been hired. 2. Metal detectors and alarm systems have been added, more protective equipment and training. 3. One officer used to be able to handle a 600 man cell block [at night] and not be afraid now have two [officers] but still a dangerous situation...

Table 19

Commonly Cited Organizational Changes
By Job Classification

	Administration	Custody	Counseling	Misc.	Total
Increase in Security Staff	8	5	3	0	16
Increased Training	2	1	0	1	4
Increased Use of Security Alarm Systems	3	3	1	0	7
Increased Use of Lockup	1	1	1	0	3
Work Made More Difficult, More Paperwork	2	1	3	0	6

> now buddy system most of the time. 4. More counseling staff...we are trying to reduce counseling caseload so [they] can see inmates more often. Now counselors are more involved--they used to do the pre-board reports and that was all they would have time for.

As the type of inmate changed, administrators became more concerned about the type of staff they hired: "Now there is a greater concern with the type of person hired. While young guys are less experienced, many make good, dedicated officers. We place greater emphasis on social rather than martial skills."

Staff turnover has been a major problem at some institutions during these volatile years.

> The turnover rate very bad...Our roster's not full... [there is] no place to shop. [It's] one big garden patch out here...It's been terrible for two years and four months....[We're] still paying price for that... upset."

For most, however, the turnover rate has settled down and the crisis of confidence has passed.

> Greater ratio of staff to inmate [exists now].... Sacramento looks down on us....If people don't like their inmates, they send them to us....[We are the] dumping ground...but the place continues to function... [with] high morale and a very few dishonest staff... just a bunch of good people pulling together. After 8/21/71, when 3 officers were murdered, there were lots of resignations...lots of sick leave...[used but] only half dozen left. Officers are more "aware" now.... [They] have confidence....[But] still looking in nooks and crannies because of the tension....Soledad has had more killings....[There] officers are standing out on corridors rather than in the tiers where they belong.

During this period many correctional officers developed the feeling of being social lepers. They talked of feeling ostracized and getting a cold shoulder when people learned their occupation. To deal with these problems and others the department has sought to upgrade the correctional officer position. An attempt was made

to create promotional opportunities without moving into administrative positions. Raising the salary level, improving working conditions, and providing early retirement were all viewed as means of making the position more attractive. The idea that a career as a guard or counselor was a good one and that promotion to an administrative position was not necessarily a mark of being better at one's assigned task was stressed. While most correctional officers and counselors did not fully buy this line, this approach did seem to help employee morale. During the slow growth period between 1968 and 1971, the department lost many of its most ambitious new employees, but policies like these mentioned above helped stem the tide of defection.

Many of the older staff members were not pleased by all the changes in the department. They felt the new, "more educated" employee was being babied too much, and was destroying the esprit de corps. As one older employee put it,

> Don't think we're getting the caliber of personnel we used to get....Again this is from outside society... now all they want to do is get the paycheck.... Overall society has brought this about through the giveaway program as I call it.

While many of the new employees were sons of correctional officers, many others were of a new school that is more questioning and less interested in the clubbiness that had been so much a part of being an officer. All of those interviewed identified three groups of officers: the old school comprised of many ex-military men, and members of correctional families; the transition group; and the young officers, primarily college educated, union-oriented and independent. Each groups tends to have a different attitude toward inmate treatment, their right to dictate job conditions,

and the militarism of correctional organization. The lines between groups varies tremendously by facility and by unit.

As the population became more difficult to manage and the number of assaults and escapes increased, there was a shift away from a parity between treatment and custody, toward an emphasis on control.

> Great emphasis on security now. Before, on paper, custody and control were equal with care and treatment. Now custody foremost...treatment back seat. Lots of changes...all different kinds of security measures. Lock up used to let them [inmates] exercise...now only out with handcuffs. Staff routinely carries handcuffs and tear gas paraphernalia. Program secure. We're becoming more stereotyped and equated with Folsom and San Quentin as a warehouse. I resent this as part of care and treatment...I still think they [custody and treatment] should be equal....Vocational and school programs aren't as good. Loss of Federal funds...The image of this institution has changed...so the vocational and treatment oriented inmate isn't sent here. Increase in violent incidents, the media keeps a count of the number of stabbings, etc. we are number 1. New intake are scared to death. They make up stories to try not to come here. Emphasis on custody.

* * *

> The practice has been more of containment rather than treatment....More people to watch more people....Hiring of younger staff in some ways possible to have staff that can relate more. People more upset about escapes, so we built gun towers. More change away from treatment.

* * *

> Always has been line of demarcation [between custodial and treatment staff]. California Correctional Officers Association got legislation passed to improve their station considerably....Created a pay and benefits difference between staff which created some dissention. [Displayed copy of "State Employee" CSEA May 18, 1973, p. 9 which discussed the inequities being described.] Emphasis more on restraint than treatment.

Most treatment staff prefaced their remarks by saying treatment is impossible in an institution where inmates and staff fear for their safety and that some increase in custody staff was necessary. They resented, however, what they saw as a downgrading of the treatment

function through salary and retirement differences which allow a custody officer to retire with full benefits at 55 while a counselor or teacher has to wait until 65. They also resented what they regarded as the Adult Authority's attitude toward treatment as at the bottom of the list of priorities. They see treatment as the only long term means of perhaps preventing recidivism. They don't, for the most part, think warehousing does anything but harm.

Economical operation of the prisons depends to a large extent on the availability of a pool of minimum security inmates. As the number of minimum security inmates has dropped, the problems of maintaining the institution has increased.

> 70 percent of [maintainence] work is done by inmates ...[now there are] not enough inmates to keep up the grounds...inmates have no investment to work here... [there is] no way to coerce them to work, we can only threaten them with a bad report.

> We have had to change our style a lot...increased [outside] staffing...people who will do the work... [they] don't feel they should contribute.

Almost all the top administrators interviewed bemoaned the appearance of their physical plant.[22] The Legislative Analyst and the Finance Department, however, have continually refused most institutional requests for outside personnel to help with maintainence. To meet minimum prison needs administrators have had to increase security risks by allowing marginally trustworthy cases to fill their work slots. All claimed to have reached the point where this practice is no longer satisfactory in terms of community risk but indicated that these tasks must be performed somehow. Society must pay for filling these basic needs one way or the other. If escapes and incidents are to be kept down, then outside people

must be hired--even if this is an expensive proposition. Most felt if subsidy was eliminated or if judges changed their disposition patterns, it would solve at least this one prison problem. But no one advocated this solution very strongly.

An additional problem created by the changed inmate population has been a need to readjust prison vocational and education programs. A 1972 management survey indicated that:

> In addition to the problem posed by having fewer inmates from which to draw, those inmates now in the system are much more program resistant than in the past. As a result, the various training divisions are actually competing with each other for the available inmates. The Task Force was advised that in many institutions academic classes and vocational training courses are only partially full. We were also told that most of the correctional industries are being forced to operate at substantially less than maximum capacity and efficiency because of the lack of inmate workers. Programs have not been redirected to accomodate the more hardened criminal profile and character of the present population.[23]

Causes of Change. Both from the statistical information and from staff comments, it seems clear that the population within CDC institutions is fundamentally different than the population of a decade ago. The fact of population change during the years of the probation subsidy program, however, does not necessarily imply that it has created the change.

The period between 1960 and 1973 has been a period of tremendous social, political and economic change for this country, the prison system can hardly be expected to have escaped these currents.

When asked what had caused the changes taking place within CDC during the past decade, the most frequent answer was society itself. Two-thirds of those responding mentioned this spontaneously. Nearly as many, however, mentioned the probation subsidy program, and, as shown in Table 20, nearly half mentioned the courts. Two-thirds

gave multiple answers and overall there were 16 different combinations of nine separate factors.

[Insert Table 20 here]

(a) Changes in Society. Prisons are distilled microcosms of society. In duiscussing changes inside the prisons, many staff commented on that taking place outside.

> Society outside has changed; therefore the same has happened inside. Prisons are usually just behind the change on the outside.

* * *

> Inside population acts differently in this day and age as they do outside. Prisons are designed to control behavior and those are [the] people we get...[There's] a growing attitude among all citizens that they can appeal... can challenge the establishment....They have rights... inmates challenging some of our procedures....[There's] a tendency to disbelieve there is cynicism, and a lack of credibility....Inmates see other people "get away" with it....[There is] a change in morality....[This] certainly applies to inmates too.

* * *

> Activities in society are directly connected to what the inmate is today....[There is] more group violence. Probation has not stopped anyone from coming to prison. It has taken the guy who could have been stopped and been easy on him so it doesn't stop him. He sees no consequences ... so why, why change it [behavior]....No consequences for your actions....Often [inmates] don't know what's wrong.

Values are in a state of flux, people are being asked to change opinions held for generations. There is an emphasis on civil rights and on the individual's right to challenge the decisions of the government. Top caliber young lawyers are willing to champion the cause of the poor defendant. The search for identify and belonging so common among the young does not bypass the young inmate.

The effect of these currents on the prisons is profound. The

Table 20

Staff Responses to Question: What do you Think is Responsible for the Changes in Population; by Number of Times Each Cause Mentioned and Job Classification.

Causes:	Administrative	Custody	Counseling	Misc.	Total
Probation Subsidy	9	11	4	2	26
Society	9	11	2	1	23
Courts	5	7	2	1	15
Adult Authority Decisions	3	3	1	1	8
Internal Organization	2	1	2	0	5
Concentration of Offenders	1	1	0	0	2
Gangs	1	0	1	0	2
Narcotics	0	1	0	0	1
Age	0	1	0	0	1

inmate finds a counter-culture identity and protection with his gang. He rationalizes his violence in the excuse that "society did this to me" and "only the little guy gets caught." Inmate response to Watergate was one of "well, what's new about that, surely you knew that this stuff was going on all along." Inmates ask why they shouldn't try to get everything out of the system they can, everyone else does. Minorities have a new awareness of themselves as oppressed groups.

Even after controlling for offense and age, staff felt that the inmate of today was far more dangerous than his counterpart of a decade ago. Even if court disposition patterns had not changed so as to bring in a different kind of inmate, they felt that the prisons would still be much more difficult places to manage than they were before. When asked if things would be easier if the minimum custody cases were returned to prison, the reply was that staff might feel better because they could witness more successes, but that things within most facilities would not change appreciably. They would still be running out of adjustment center and maximum security space.

(b) Courts. Courts were mentioned as a principal source of change, primarily because of decisions concerning prisoner's rights wich have had a tremendous impact on the administration of the prisons.

The first change mentioned was one allowing inmates access to the department's rule and procedure books. Prior to this decision an inmate could never be sure whether a correctional officer's requests were legal. Many inmates, some officers claimed, now know

the regulations better than the staff members charged with their care. Recently the courts ruled that inmates must have access to law libraries and be allowed reasonable time to work on any legal problem relating to their case. This ruling has had a similarly intimidating effect on staff members without a basic legal background.

The decision creating the most vocal reaction among respondents was the California Supreme Court ruling against the death penalty.

> A lot of things that happen in prison come from the outside...[from] people who advocate violence.... Outside society has changed in the last 34 years. Farthest from the truth that subsidy is responsible for the changes in the institutions. Crimes of violence have gone up on the outside. At San Quentin 19.1 percent are murderers. Abolishing the death penalty is the major problem. I firmly believe in the death penalty as a deterrent.

The desire to see the death penalty restored, at least for the murder of peace and correctional officers, was primarily mentioned by correctional officers. Their animosity over the court's decision may or may not be shared by other segments of the staff. Without the threat of capital punishment many officers feel that there is nothing to stop inmates from assaulting a guard. Officers cite an increase in the number of officer deaths and injuries since the moratorium on the death penalty.

Recently inmates threatened with revocation of parole were granted the right to be confronted with witnesses against them and to present witnesses supporting their case.[24] A different decision allows them the right to be represented by counsel before the board.[25]

"The courts have a tendency to believe witnesses more than staff....How long has it been since a judge has been here--inside?"

These words were repeated frequently by staff members who believe that judges tend to give more credence to inmate witnesses than to staff testimony. Many held the courts more responsible than probation subsidy for the reduction of offenders, and felt that even in the absence of subsidy disposition patterns would have changed. This is especially true in the shift in how narcotics cases are handled. Prisons no longer receive marijuana cases involving simple possession. At the beginning of the subsidy period the courts were tougher on narcotics charges than they have been in subsequent years.

Even if the courts have not been principally responsible for the shift in population coming into the prison, they have been supportive of the inmates right to make additional demands on staff. The courts have encouraged inmates in their challenge of prison authority.

(c) Adult Authority. The parole board for CDC cases is the California Adult Authority. Under the indeterminate sentence law it is responsible not only for granting and revoking paroles but also for determining the length of an inmate's sentence. In 1968 two riots occurred in which inmate demands centered chiefly around Adult Authority policies rather than inside conditions. Board members are political appointees and generally reflect the philosophical leanings of the administration placing them in office. As the political administration in the State changed in the late 1960's, so did the Adult Authority's philosophy. Currently, the board wants a higher level of assurance of parole success before it releases someone than it did before.

CDC administrators are aware of the impact of the board's decisions on the population, but see it as part of a long term, pendulum-like, oscillation from lenient to strict: "Can't get too excited over [the board's] changes, tomorrow it could begin swinging back." Many first line personnel were afraid that the 1973 change in board policy would result in an increase in violence and disturbances but at the time of the interviews this had not materialized.

> Before [1971-72], 75 to 85 percent got dates [when they went] before the board....That helped us to recoup, to let this place bounce back....Then there was a sudden switch...like turning off a water faucet....Only ten percent getting dates now....Inmates survived the change, and so did we, I don't know how....Liberal term setting and paroling policies make a prison easy to manage, but that's not the name of the game....It's the needs of the community.

While the percentage getting dates was never as high as 80 percent and the drop was never 10 percent, these figures nevertheless give the mood. The disheartened attitude over board policy changes so evident among CYA staff members was not so prevalent among CDC staff, but there was a feeling among staff members that the opinions of correctional officers and counselors should carry more weight.

The longer sentences being observed now were considered to be primarily the result of the board's change rather than a change in the type of offender. Even comparing terms over time controlled both by offense and age, inmates today were felt to be receiving longer sentences. While many respondents felt that the longer terms were a reflection of the more serious felons within the system, an equal number felt that any shifts in the length of stay data were primarily due to changes in political philosophy rather than by any prison or prisoner action.

(d) Probation Subsidy. When asked if subsidy, or community treatment programs in general, has affected CDC institutional

operations, over 80 percent answered "yes," as shown in Table 21.

[Insert Table 21 here]

At Chino staff were asked to rank the major cause of change indicated at other institutions. The probation subsidy program, as shown in Table 22, tied with social change as the principal cause of prison population change--being ranked as the first or second by eight of the ten staff interviewed.

[Insert Table 22 here]

Staff comments in the institutions generally varied from blaming subsidy for most of what happened to considering it as only a minor part of other changes.

> Yes, probation subsidy has hindered prisons by not permitting the law to invoke punishment upon those committing crimes against society, thus removing the stabilizing element. Result, our prison system is being demolished.

* * *

> See rap sheets and don't know how people stayed out so long....They gave 'em break after break...then they got in jail and [the inmates] thought they were given the purple shaft...'I don't belong here'....Parole policy changed at same time probation subsidy. Subsidy caused collapse of camps.

* * *

> Everybody is more difficult to handle, not just prison community. The whole world has shrunk. Less peer group pressure. All over...people less inclined to want to take orders. No respect for authority. We're not treating anybody right, let alone treating convicts [right] ....All looking for leisure, status, money.

* * *

> It [probation subsidy] is not totally responsible. It has contributed to a different kind of population... would rate it quite high as [reasons for change].... In retrospect, changes which have occurred have been good changes.

* * *

> A lot of people in Sacramento have forgotten what it was like when they were officers. Lose sight of what it's like where the rubber meets the road. [Problem

Table 21

Has Probation Subsidy Affected CDC Institutions?

	Yes	No	Not Sure	No Response	Total
Administration	10	0	0	0	10
Custody	11	1	2	0	14
Counseling	7	1	0	0	8
Miscellaneous	2	0	0	1	3
Total	30	2	2	1	35

Table 22

Five Major Causes of CDC Population Change
Ranking by Chino Staff

	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Probation Subsidy	4	4	1	1	0
Society	4	0	3	1	2
Courts	3	2	2	2	1
Gang Formation	0	0	1	5	4
Adult Authority Decisions	1	2	3	1	3

not so much the changes but the lack of resources to be able to handled the changes.]

* * *

San Quentin has always been a place for other facilities' failures, now those failures are even worse. Officers are more tense and must be more aware...more have ulcers now than before. Subsidy helped cut population way down... but more coming to prison now....Society reached the saturation point...too many failures; consequently board policy changing. Community treatment idea got out of hand...too liberal.

Staff Familiarity with the Probation Subsidy Program. All but two of those interviewed were at least vaguely familiar with the probation subsidy program, although there was no way to test the extent of their knowledge. For most employees there was no real interest in how the program operated other than the desire to know why the population had changed. They know their jobs are harder, more dangerous, and more frustrating than ever before, and would like to know why and if anything can be done about it. The principal concerns were how to manage the problems of today; and while all were very courteous and helpful, they made it clear that interviews took time away from their assigned duties. Correctional officers especially felt that they were not paid to ponder over population changes but to keep the inmates they were given safe and within the institution. Administrators, and only to a slightly less extent, counselors, tended to have a fairly complete knowledge of the program and how it operates, as shown in Table 23.

[Insert Table 23 here]

The program's payment mechanism was vague to almost everyone. Most thought there was a direct link between a judge's decision not to commit a case and the $4,000. Or they thought the money was a direct grant to the county with no performance principle built in.

Table 23

Staff Familiarity with Probation Subsidy - by Job Classification

	Administration	Custody	Counseling	Misc.	Total
Understands purpose and operation	13	4	7	2	26
Understands purpose but not operation	1	3	2	0	6
Has vague understanding	0	8	1	1	10
Has no knowledge	0	1	1	0	2
No response	0	1	0	0	1
Total	14	17	11	3	45

Many of those believing the former model felt that a better job could be done if the $4,000 were given to the prison system for an intensive program. There were a lot of misconceptions about how the subsidy money was being used:

> The money was not spent as intended....[It] was spent on new automobiles, desks, furniture, without providng needed backup services...no other resources...medical, psychological. Community was not prepared....[It] saw only dollar signs.

This type of comment was heard frequently, along with the request for better monitoring procedures of those retained in the community.

> Yes, read a lot about it [subsidy]....[I have] listened to people's propaganda....[I] noticed that a good number of cases we have in here have been on probation....It's been revoked. There are a lot of people really working on getting put in prison.
>
> Court theoretically supervised [those] on probation.... Rehabilitation is being abused...some on caseloads shouldn't be there, some people should be in the joint.

Nearly everyone agreed with the probation subsidy's basic philosophy. If someone could be dealt with <u>safely</u> on the outside, then that is where he belonged. The degree of acceptable risk was the point of divergence. Staff questioned the program's ability to achieve its goals of reducing recidivism and improving judicial consistency. They believed judges were often incapable of making the correct placement decision--especially when influenced by the need to keep subsidy units financially solvent. Staff jobs on the inside were felt to be more difficult without the satisfaction of something better happening on the outside. Much of the hostility directed towards the program came from staff feelings that society, or the legislature and the courts, had not made a particularly wise decision about changing the institution's role

within corrections. Being civil servants they could not question the right of the government to change their role, but they could complain about what the change had done to their ways of operating and their sense of professionalism. Even more, they felt it unfair of the government to redefine their task without properly equipping or preparing them for their new position.

Most people felt that diversion of first offenders and petty felons was a good thing when consistent with public safety. "Prisons destroy; only when the risk to society is greater than the risk of personal destruction should someone be sent to prison." Removing the more easily managed cases makes prisons more difficult places to work both because of the greater personal risk involved in concentrating more serious offenders and of lessened opportunities for being able to help someone with a problem. These "good" inmates exerted a moderating effect on others within the unit and set an example for others who wanted to "do their own time."

The lack of minimum security cases has created a crisis in the maintainence of the facilities. All prisons in the past depended very heavily on inmate labor; now there are fewer men willing or able to work in situations requiring responsible self-management. Correctional officers claimed many inmates could not understand why they received a prison sentence when before they had just been placed on probation. In many cases the commitment offense was not as bad as the prior offenses for which they received community treatment, leading many inmates to feel the judicial system is capricious. By the time an inmate is sentenced to prison, he has been involved in criminal patterns so long that many feel change is hardly possible.

Staff response to the probation subsidy program is probably best summed up by the following quotes:

> I think it makes our job harder....We don't have the more level-headed individuals anymore....Most of the people we have here [are] very explosive personalities....We've had 33 assaults in San Quentin thus far this year....We have officers assaulted everyday...[it's] just a constant hassle...We lost most of the stable types....We lost a lot of level heads, those people probably should be on probation [sigh].
>
> * * *
>
> Probation subsidy provided a greater concentration of hard-core offenders but it is as it should be. If adequate community safety procedures are observed, and a proper community program provided, then these offenders should be kept locally.
>
> * * *
>
> Think its good. Many people used to come to prison who should not have been here....[It has] drained off the easier population.
>
> * * *
>
> Some counties have kept people they shouldn't have kept, just to get the money. Some of them got a little greedy ....Sonoma County had extensive damage done to [the] jail by people who were there....They ended up bringing 120 inmates down here for safekeeping....Maybe if they built more secure facilities, they could handle more [of] the population they're getting....The counties are going to have to educate communities.
>
> * * *
>
> Probation subsidy is a means of keeping people in the community. Idea good but a lot of failures, not planned too carefully....Counties saw dollar signs but not responsibility....Judges, probation people taking a second look at offenders...send their failures, orangutans to prison ....Those cases too tough to touch [get sent here].

E. Effects on Parole Administration

The changing character of the institutional population is also reflected in changes in the parole population, as indicated in Table A-20.

Between 1963 and 1973, the total parole population:

-Increased from 11,502 to 12,996
-Increased in the percentage of second, third or more paroles; from 22 to 33 percent
-Increased in percentage charged with serious crimes; from 7.7 percent homicide, 15.8 robbery, and 3.1 assault to 10.3 percent homicide, 23.3 robbery and 6.1 assault

In order to determine the relationship of the probation subsidy program to these changes, interviews were conducted with 11 parole staff members throughout the state. Interviews included both regional and district administrators and case-carrying agents from both regular and work unit. Work units are special programs with smaller caseloads and with a more difficult offender. Parolees are assigned to either work unit or conventional units by the Adult Authority. All those interviewed had been with CDC for more than four years, with the average length being 13.1 years.

What Are the Changes in the Parolee Profile Since Probation Subsidy? "A more violent, more crazy kind of guy." "More hardened, less responsive to counseling, recidivistic and mentally ill." "A more hardened criminal, a more habitual criminal; hard-core, back on the streets, more difficult to deal with." "We have fewer property offenders....It looks as though there is a change or an increase in violence, but I'm not sure its true...."

In summary, according to those interviewed, the adult parolee is likely to be younger, to have a longer prior record, to have been sentenced for an offense against persons, to be a person "who subscribes to a different system of morality" than his counterpart of several years ago, and to be less likely to have had any successful experience in school or jobs.

Is Subsidy Responsible for the Changes? All interviewed were familiar with the probation subsidy program. All supported the

concept of community treatment for offenders, but most felt that counties had been inadequately prepared for the task. Each felt that the subsidy program had affected their population "somewhat." Administrative personnel tended to see subsidy as having a minimal effect, and as part of a larger process of both practical and philosophical changes which have taken place in corrections in the last ten years: "There are so many forces working on the parole population. Subsidy has had very little effect on the parole population." Work unit agents in Northern California gave subsidy half of the responsibility for the changes which have occurred in their population, while those in Southern California gave it none. Younger agents with the department saw no change in the population but had "heard" things from older agents.

Most interviewed believed that subsidy had siphoned off the property offender and left the more difficult offender for the institutions and that because the Adult Authority now sees only hard-core offenders, their policies have grown more conservative. Those paroled had a more violent criminal record and seemed more difficult to handle. They had been in prison longer and their transition to the outside is more difficult. Some parole agents feel parolees are embittered by their long terms and are therefore uncooperative when they are released.

Most people interviewed, however, thought that there were many other factors responsible for the changes in the parole profile. "We're just a small microcosom of what's going on. Ten years ago you'd never hear a parole agent say he was afraid to go into certain areas....I've had some agents robbed at knifepoint." Other reasons given for the more difficult offender is the growth

of political awareness and close-knit ethnic organizations in prison.

Very few people interviewed felt that the subsidy program was directly responsible for the decrease in parole population taking place at the time of the interviews (which has since reversed). Most believed it was due to a change in Adult Authority policies. In 1970 the Adult Authority liberalized their release policies and parole offices expanded. According to those interviewed, the reasons for this were the rising populations in the institutions. The Reagan administration saw that more institutions would have to be built if their populations continued to increase.

The parole board was therefore encouraged to begin paroling more inmates. This policy continued until the early part of 1973. Community pressure then resulted in a change in Adult Authority policy and now the offender is being kept in the institution for a longer period of time.

> The pendulum swings to keep society comfortable...the governor has to hear people...when it hits their pocketbook...but the swing seems to be going faster and faster.

Throughout its existence, the parole board has had periods of both liberal and conservative policies with regard to length of stay in the institution.

How Has This Made the Job More Difficult? The parole agents no longer carry a mixed caseload of casual and more serious offenders. When they did, there was a certain percentage of cases which took care of themselves--requiring little supervision. Now an agent will have a caseload of 75 in a conventional unit and all will require close supervision. In the work unit, the caseload is 30--most being hard-core cases assigned by the Adult Authority.

Another factor which influenced the type of caseload handled is the change in community attitude towards the minor drug offenders. These are no longer sentenced to prison and are consequently no longer in the caseloads. They have been diverted to local handling or the California Rehabilitation Center.

Virtually all interviewed are discouraged with the way corrections is going at this time. The Adult Authority priorities reflect an attitude about corrections which is different from the majority of those people who work in parole. Rehabilitation and casework were the methods in which many of the agents see themselves as proficient and which they believe help the offender. With punishment the unspoken goal of CDC, the agent finds his role a perplexing and difficult one--and his relationships with his parolees thwarted. If it is accepted that the parolees are more aggressive, they need a "different kind of assistance but they still need assistance in moving into society." What has made the parole agent's job more difficult are the Adult Authority regulations insisting on more rigid supervision and reporting.

No common-law relationships are to be tolerated, for example. Yet the agent might see the relationship involved as healthy and stable. This forces the parolee to lie about his living situation. Parole people feel the attitudes and philosophies of the Department of Corrections seem to have more of a law enforcement base than a humanitarian and sociological one. There is a change in the focus of work--more time spent in investigation and less in helping; more policing and less social work. The parole agent really must keep a close check on his parolee; he must see people more than he did before. He is required to do more investigation, more paperwork.

Most agents resent this restriction of their activities. There are more audits, more checks on the performance of the agent--his credibility appears to be in doubt: "Used to be we could be more discretionary, deciding when we wanted to do something....Now do don't have the power." Now the board is sending back more parole violators. In the past parole agents have had a great deal of latitude in making decisions about their parolees. They were able to use discretion in their reports and their recommendations for disposition were often taken by the Adult Authority. Now, as a result of current legislation, their authority is diminished. All infractions must be reported to the board. Some agents did agree, however, that with a more difficult offender on parole, there was more community concern.

III. STAFF AND ORGANIZATION ISSUES

Prior to 1965, the Department of Youth Authority and the Department of Corrections were "rapidly expanding State agencies adding staff, new institutions and increased administration each year to take care of growing workload."[26] One of the central purposes of the subsidy program was to halt this growth. The target was to reduce the number of commitments to CYA and CDC by 25 percent.[27] In the 1964 Board of Corrections study recommending adoption of the program the effects that a reduction of this amount would have on local probation departments was spelled out in some detail. The effects that might be expected with respect to the state agencies, however, were not. In fact, they were not mentioned at all, except in terms of the cost to the state of a single commitment.[28]

As the subsidy program began to unfold and commitments began to drop, it became clear, however, that subsidy was going to have an impact at the state level as well as the local level. Declining commitments meant smaller populations, creating the strong possibility that the number of new jobs would decrease, that there would be significant changes in promotional opportunities, and that at least some institutional staff would become concerned about the continued existence and viability of their jobs.

Anthony Downs in "Inside Bureaucracy" describes the response of a typical organization to this kind of situation.[29]

> [A] decline, stagnation, or just slower than average growth tends to reduce the opportunity for promotion within the bureau to a level below that prevailing in comparable organizations. This will usually serve notice for climbers to depart....[T]hose who will have reached high positions in the bureau will lose hope of climbing much higher, and will tend to become conservers instead of climbers.
>
> As a result:
>
> [T]he entire bureau will shift toward greater conserver dominance, thereby reducing its ability to innovate...[T]he bureau will be less able, and willing to take advantage of [innovation opportunities].

The previous sections of this report have sought to describe the effects of the probation subsidy program on day-to-day life in the individual institution or field office. This section seeks to describe its effects on the overall organization and its staff.

A. Growth

It might be expected that as the population decreased or leveled off, the California correctional agencies would start to shrink, or at least slow their growth. This did not occur, however. The total budgets for CDC and CYA operations continued to rise, although more slowly than before subsidy. The buying power of the CYA and CDC budgets was maintained and even slightly increased, as

shown in Table 24.

[Insert Table 24 here]

These figures represent a decline in the percentage of total state budget expended for correctional services--from 3.5 percent in 1960-61 to 2.6 percent in 1972-73. This reflects increases in health and welfare expenditures, however, rather than a lack of growth in corrections. Overall, CYA staff increased 27 percent between 1965-66 and 1972-73, while CDC staff increased by 11 percent, as shown in Table 25. The total state correctional staff increased slightly over one percent.

[Insert Table 25 here]

The fact that the CYA registered the greatest staff gains is interesting, since it experienced the greatest reduction in the number of commitments. This is partially explained by the very sizeable shifts of the CYA older population from CDC to CYA facilities. Thus, in 1965, there were over 1,536 CYA wards in CDC facilities, while in 1973 the number was only 54. In percentage terms, the greatest increase came in the CYA parole staff which went from 434 positions in 1965-66 to 621 in 1972-73. In numerical terms, however, the greatest increase was in the institutional staff which, as shown in Table 26, increased from 2277 to 2813 positions in the same period.

[Insert Table 26 here]

In the CDC the growth patterns were somewhat similar. Proportionately, parole staff increased the greatest amount but in terms of numbers, the greatest increase was in the institutional staff--which, as shown in Table 27, went from 5456 in 1965-66 to 5843 in 1972-73.

[Insert Table 27 here]

Table 24

CYA and CDC Budgets
(In Millions of Dollars)

	CYA*	CDC
1963-64	26.0	61.1
1964-65	29.0	67.3
1965-66	31.9	74.5
1966-67	38.3	79.6
1967-68	35.2	82.4
1968-69	44.4	89.8
1969-70	52.2	103.5
1971-72	53.9	110.6
1972-73	63.2	126.9
1973-74 (estimated)	64.8	147.0
1974-75 (proposed)	66.8	166.6

*CYA figures exclude program costs of probation subsidy.

Source: State of California Budget.

Table 25

CYA and CDC Personnel

	CYA	CDC
1963-64	2633	5541
1964-65	2796	5924
1965-66	2915	6301
1966-67	3194	6412
1967-68	3317	6221
1968-69	3340	6383
1969-70	3529	6550
1970-71	3508	6536
1971-72	3416	6750
1972-73	3663	7109
1973-74 (estimated)	3638	7825

Source: State of California Budget.

Table 26

CYA Personnel

	Youth Authority Board and Administration	Division of Delinquency Prevention Services*	Division of Parole and Community Services**	Institutional Staff ***
1963-64	168	21	318	2126
1964-65	176	21	379	2220
1965-66	183	21	434	2277
1966-67	201	26	467	2500
1967-68	214	26	468	2609
1968-69	219	26	468	2627
1969-70	142	29	465	2893
1970-71	150	33	494	2831
1971-72	172	37	584	2623
1972-73	189	40	621	2813

*"Division of Community Services," 1970-74.

**"Division of Parole," 1960-63; "Division of Rehabilitation Services," 1970-72.

***Includes all camps, ranches, schools and reception centers.

Source: State of California Budget.

Table 27

CDC Personnel

	Board of Corrections and Administration	Releasing Authority *	Parole and Community Services Division **	Institutional Staff ***
1963-64	132	32	413	4964
1964-65	143	33	564	5184
1965-66	158	36	651	5456
1966-67	175	44	649	5544
1967-68	161	42	641	5377
1968-69	162	48	669	5504
1969-70	163	49	722	5616
1970-71	175	49	823	5489
1971-72	182	48	914	5606
1972-73	262***	49	955	5843

*Includes Adult Authority, Womens Board of Terms and Parole, and Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority.

**Adult Parole Division, 1960-62; "Parole and Community Reentry Services," 1970-72.

***Includes 59 positions for research and reimbursement services projects.

Source: State of California Budget.

CONTINUED

1 OF 2

Security staff in the CDC increased from 3,175 in 1966-67 to 3,488 in 1969-70, an increase of almost ten percent while total staff increased by less than 3 percent. Similarly, recreation, counseling, and training staff grew from 804 to 864 during the same period (a 7.5 percent increase).

There is no question, however, but that the rate of growth in both agencies decreased during the subsidy period. Thus while the number of personnel in the CYA increased 45 percent in the six year period between 1960-61 and 1965-66; it grew only 27 percent in the seven years from 1965-66 to 1972-73. In the CDC the change was even more dramatic--going from a growth of 56 percent between 1960-61 and 1965-66 to a growth of 11 percent between 1965-66 and 1972-73.

A number of facilities and units have actually been closed in both agencies. These include five of the seven CDC conservation camps that existed when subsidy started and all three of the CYA Spike camps. These camps typically housed minimum security inmates who worked in various conservation projects.

[Insert Table 28 here]

A number of projected institutions were also not constructed, as shown in Table 49.[30]

[Insert Table 29 here]

In addition, the Department of Correction was able to adopt a plan for single cells for inmates and the Youth Authority to split a large 800-ward institution so as to establish two smaller programs, one in a new, modern facility.

Both the CDC and the CYA increased the level of parole services during the period of the subsidy program. In the CDC this was less a matter of response to the probation subsidy than the logical

Table 28

Institutions Closed and New Institutions Not Opened

CDC:

California Treatment Facility South
California Medical Facility West
Five conservation camps

CYA:

Fricot (220 beds)
Three spike camps (60 beds)
Living units closed per institution:

Fred C. Nelles,	60 beds
Ventura	50 beds
Los Guilucos	40 beds
Preston	90 beds
Paso Robles	80 beds

Older boys' reception center
Dewitt Nelson

Accumulative savings to 1973-74: $42,818,460.

Source: A Quiet Revolution, Robert L. Smith; U.S. Department of of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service, (DHEW Pub. No. (SRS) 72-6011), p. 69.

Table 29

Cancelled Construction

CDC:

San Diego

CYA:

Northern California Youth Center
Institution No. 4
Medical Psychiatric
Training School
Reception Center

Southern California Youth Center
Medical Psychiatric
Institution No. 4

Two Camps

Accumulative Savings to 1973-74: $205,346,000.

Source: A Quiet Revolution, Robert L. Smith; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and Rehabilitation Service (DHEW Pub. No. (SRS) 72-6011), p. 70.

development of work started prior to the subsidy program. Thus, as early as 1961, the department had begun research into the effects of very small parole caseloads through the Special Intensive Parole Unit (SIPU) and the Narcotic Treatment Control Project (NTCP).

Based on the results from these programs, the more ambitious Work Unit Program was developed. In 1964, the legislature authorized 107 caseload positions and the program was put into effect for approximately half of the parole population.

The results from this were considered favorable and the program increased in number of agents assigned during the subsidy years--despite the fact the percentage of parolees covered actually went down, as shown in Table A-21.

In the CYA the favorable results being reported from the Work Unit Program were of course watched with interest. They were felt to be in line with the CYA's own experience with early parole and small caseloads in the Community Treatment Program. Based on these results, the CYA developed its own small caseload parole program in 1971. Entitled the "Increased Parole Effectiveness Program," this was funded from federal monies through the California Council on Criminal Justice.

While the primary justification for the program was that of reducing the recidivism of parolees, the program also increased the number of parole agents at a time of declining population. In addition, through its enriched training program and other innovative features, it restored to the CYA parole division some of the leadership role it had held in juvenile field services prior to the creation under probation subsidy of intensive supervision units at the local level.

B. Effects on CYA

Staff Morale and Concerns: Institutions. The question of how these changes have affected CYA staff was asked during the interviews conducted. For CYA institutional staff the responses indicated the few years of probation subsidy have not been easy ones. Most staff feel sympathetic to the wards and say they try to provide treatment: One young security officer, for example, commented that he stayed on the job because he loves young people and has some awareness of their needs--"Otherwise, I couldn't take this day to day hassling." Most also feel, however, a certain frustration. There has been a decrease in "psychological feedback" from the wards to the counselors and an increase in apathy. One security staff member stated that at his institution they have given up the therapeutic approach: "People justcount time...and go home tired." Staff is short in the larger institutions, so that if there is no initiative, time is occupied mainly with monitoring. All staff felt they are working harder now: The wards are more difficult, there is more paperwork, and the noise level in the lodges and halls has been intolerable. "It's worse than a boiler factory."

Some of the frustration indicated appear to be directly related to the subsidy program; they arise, however, from other sources as well. One such source was legislation pending at the time of the interviews conducted which would have merged the CYA and CDC. Because most employees are very attached and protective of their organization, such a merger was resisted.

Another such source leading to frustration and despair, even for those with vitality, talent and clear dedication to the youths they serve, is the lack of a satisfactory answer to the question:

"Can people really change, and if so, is there any service we can perform to facilitate it?"

Growing disbelief in the ability of young people to change, especially in the prison-like atmosphere of certain institutions; and at the same time a recognition of the need for institutions for unmanageable youths have created for many an uncomfortable moral dilemma. They do not feel they are getting enough support from Sacramento, and in fact see their concern for young people reaping no ultimate profit either for themselves or for their wards. In the end many withdraw their emotional investment and mark time, playing it safe.

Most line staff felt that communication with the administration was poor, and that sometimes the administration supported the wards rather than the staff. Senior counselors in particular felt that they are caught between administration, other staff and wards; and yet that they really have no access to administration. They are not included in decision-making, but they are responsible. For the most part, staff feel that the organization has not changed sufficiently to accomodate the changes that have occurred in the last several years. Only at the Karl Holton School did the staff seem generally satisfied with the institution, perhaps because of the uniformity of the treatment ideas in use there. Those who had worked elsewhere in Youth Authority were able to notice a difference in staff morale and cohesiveness and attributed it to a lack of competition and jealousy among staff vis-a-vis treatment methodology.

Some of the staff felt that a good part of their frustration was due to the parole board and administrative practices in Sacramento: "There is no system approach to corrections....There are

ways of changing kids, but we are not allowed to use them" Staff feel they have marginal influence on parole board decisions, and that their reports are of secondary importance.

One administrator felt that staff morale was basically related to a lot of local issues which vary from one year to the next. Nevertheless at the time of the interviews in 1973 there was evidence of stress which seemed more systematic. Staff at most of the institutions visited reported increases in the use of sick leave, and high incidences of divorce and ulcers. Over 20 heart attacks were reported at one institution as a result of a reorganization, and a 50 percent turnover rate in the youth counselor classification at another. Custody staff had just been awarded higher wages due to claims of the increased difficulty and danger of the jobs. One administrator felt that staff exaggerated the difficulty of their jobs in order to get the pay increase and the entrance into the public safety classification which has early retirement benefits and other advantages. Administrators tended to see less radical changes in their institutions than the line staff, perhaps because of their relative insulation from these changes.

Job uncertainty has certainly contributed to lower staff morale, though most staff denied that a great deal of tension was caused from this. Among those who have already transferred from a closing institution, however, there is a great deal of fear; and this is transmitted by them to other staff in their new jobs. Distrust runs high due to staff claims that up until three days before closing of one institution, there were administrative assurances that the institution would remain open. This lack of faith in the

organization must necessarily affect job performance. Staff, reluctant to make the investment in what has been called a "dying organization," ultimately end up merely "putting in time." Job uncertainty may too influence claims by line staff that the wards are becoming more difficult to supervise so as to justify their institution, and thus promote job security. It was interesting, however, that in all institutions visited, staff felt that their positions would be the last to go because theirs were either "the toughest" or the "most elite." Each institution visited was unique, existing for itself and apart from the whole organization.

Staff Morale and Concerns: Parole. The individual parole agent is beginning to see his job to some extent as a "bastard role: "One is expected to be both peace officer and a social worker at the same time." The parole agent seems to be bearing the burden of the changes which are occurring in corrections. He is being accosted from all sides. He is faced with a youth who will not capitulate to the casework approach. He is dealing with a difficult population. He has fewer cases, he is required to be more investigative, his work includes more surveillance, and he is being watched by the central office. His concerns for youths is now seen as a sort of permissiveness, and he finds the adjustment difficult. An "identity crisis" has resulted. Things are changing, and those unwilling to do so will be left behind. Of those interviewed, few seemed to be actively in opposition to the changes: rather there seemed a malaise, a "so be it" attitude and a withdrawal in investment in the job. "Just putting in my time." There is a great deal of frustration being felt, however; and despite claims to the contrary,

this frustration must affect job performance.

These findings are similar to those found by the 1971 California Corrections Study. In that study, a survey of all CYA parole staff found that 50 percent considered morale to be poor. The study attributed this largely to the decreasing population brought on by the probation subsidy. This study also found that:

> Surprising as it may seem, the morale factor has not yet observably affected staff dedication to the work they are doing. According to questionnaire response, 70% of all staff were planning to make a career in corrections and would recommend the field to other persons. Only 7% planned to leave corrections and 12% would not recommend it as a career.[32]

Some administrators feel that "parole morale has never been high. That just seems to be the nature of the beast. We've cut their caseload from 72 to 46; we've decentralized; we've set up new promotional patterns, new programs; more money...[but they complain] of the declining caseload....That isn't it....It's salary [and other things]...that's just their nature." It is said that the real reason parole people are complaining is their lack of enthusiasm about transfer into institutions and they seem to believe he handwriting is on the wall. Those who have been transferred have been told they will be returned to the field as openings occur. One top level administrator indicates that there are now "more directives and instructions...than we've had in years." He agrees that there is indeed more paperwork for the line worker now, but notes that parole agents have been complaining about too much paperwork for the last 20 years. Because of the drastically declining population, he feels that matters which would not have caused morale problems earlier do so now because the organization is in a period of crisis. People fear that the organization is collapsing and

therefore are much more vocal in expressing their dissatisfactions. He sees staff as unhappy with the political climate which gave birth to the rigid controls now placed on personnel, and senses their feeling of impotency in effecting any changes in those policies. The tension with the parole board in particular he sees as having no historical precedent.

Job security is a real concern. Parole positions are not being filled because the population is down. There are positions open in institutions, but parole agents in the field are not happy about going "inside." Some have been transferred with the assurance that they will return to the field as positions are available. According to one administrator, "CYA is not going anywhere right now. Not too many new programs are being tried, and communication is really poor." Communication from the top down has been of a reassuring nature. But staff feels somewhat betrayed by top level administration. Rumors abound. There is conflicting information about the future of the agency. Parole staff would like a seniority list published so that each agent might know where he stands if and when he might be subject to transfer.

The 1971 study of state correctional services hints that parole may have been lengthened to provide more jobs.[33] This may have happened to some extent but does not appear to have been widespread. The mean length of stay on parole for both violators and non-violators has been increasing--28 percent since 1962. The fact that this increase is primarily for violators (up to 38 percent) rather than for non-violators (up only 8 percent, as shown in Table A-22), however, suggests that the change is due primarily to

increased parole board concern.

The relationship of these attitudes to subsidy is ambiguous. Parole agents tend to see subsidy as a good thing. It is keeping youths out of institutions who should not have been there in the first place. But because their loss of caseload has in some ways been the end result, they are concerned.

View From Sacramento. Administrators of the Youth Authority tend to see the last ten years as a period of great change not only in the area of corrections but as a period during which a kind of cultural revolution has taken place. All interviewed had an awareness of what is going on in the field, but in addition had a broader perspective than those in lower levels. They have seen an increase in civil rights; the minority population in the Youth Authority has skyrocketed; at the same time they see that there is now a certain futility in the ability of people to change. Administrative staff believe that much of the discontent is that:

> The average age of employee has gone up....A lot of poeple came into the agency in the 50's and 60's are still here...and this has been a great growth for Youth Authority....Now they've gone through all the programs [behavior modification, transactional analysis, etc.] and a certain disenchantment results.

For this reason, those in Sacramento feel that change is a good idea. Let old people tackle new problems and vice-versa, thereby creating new interest and enthusiasm in the job and the agency. They see the attitudes within corrections as changing constantly. The pendulum persistently swings from rehabilitation to protection of society and punishment and back again. Each attitude reigns for about ten years and then accedes to the other.

Some interviewed felt that a good deal of the dissatisfcation

voiced resulted from the agency's philosophy of "participatory management." Freer attitudes make it possible for the staff to articulate discontents that would not have been communicated ten years ago. In addition, because of the rapid growth of the agency during that time, issues died or were replaced and energies were redirected. Top administrators believe that staff have not yet really adjusted to the changing population and their changing role in the organization.

For the most part those in CYA administrative ranks see the agency moving away from the social work tradition toward an adversary role.[34] They believe that parole agents will require a great deal more training in the law and see this new role as a positive one for both the client and the parole agent. The agent will no longer have to contend with the view that social workers are "soft on crime" nor will he have the exhausting task of attempting to change behavior.

The future of the Youth Authority, they believe, is dependent upon political philosophy. They see this as the "era of the politicization of social programs." "There are cycles...related to political order...and society in general....This is the era of law and order...of systems analysis, or program analysis and cost effectiveness." Ten years ago, many new programs were being started and there were funds available. Now the priorities are not in the direction of social programs and helping but in saving money, "tightening our belt, being fiscally sound."

Those administrators interviewed in Sacramento admit that when subsidy began, they hoped to obtain a 25 percent reduction in caseload. "There's always been an element in our agency which was

organized to put the other part out of business...but don't think anyone thought we'd put the organization out of business....We deliberately set on this course...with the hope of developing alternatives."

C. Effect on CDC

Staff Morale and Concerns: Institutions. Job security and opportunity is not the same problem in CDC as in CYA. Only one institution has been closed and overall the change in number of inmates has been less.

All but two of the staff interviewed claimed that staff never had to worry about job security. Some uncertainty over the department's future growth was said to have existed at the very outset of the problem. The limits of the community's and the judge's tolerance was felt to begin to appear around 1968, however; and from then on a realization developed that society's willingness to absorb offenders would stop well short of eliminating either the need for or the growth of the Department of Corrections.

The principal reason given for the drop in population was the change in the Adult Authority's policy.

> Board got very liberal and gave a lot of dates...that cut population down. Then we were able to be single-celled. This was helpful, but did not offset the type of cases we began to fill institution with...they (storefront lawyers and law students) come in here canvassing for clients...inflamatory rhetoric makes inmates harder to work with.

Between 1968 and 1971 the Board was granting parole dates to a large number of the inmates seen. The parole population swelled then, just as it is beginning to shrink now. Even though a number of units closed, they were units the department had wanted to close

for many years or which were unsuitable for the higher risk inmates.

The shift in the type of inmate being sent to CDC was far more important than the lack of population as an explanation for the closing of the conservation camps. Any crisis due to shrinking population was met and passed in 1970-71. Current population upswings has the staff far more concerned about the impending problems of double-bunking and re-opening of unsafe units.

More medium and maximum security cases damaged programs designed for minimum security inmates. They were forced to adopt stricter security methods, and better classification techniques to keep the inmates within prison walls. This problem was compounded in 1970 when the Adult Authority required all inmates being granted parole dates to be reclassified as minimum security risks before the last 90 days of their terms. This flooded the minimum security units principally Chino, with men not used to so much freedom. Violations and escape attempts proliferated. As internal fear grew, the need for group protection grew.

On the other hand, administrative personnel thought the subsidy program had helped the department to accomplish many of its long-term goals. It made single-celling possible, improved the staff-to-inmate ratio, and eliminated minor offenders who would otherwise have returned to society as more hardened criminals. It was as if the state provided two new locally based institutions at no added cost or responsibility to the department.

One measure of staff content and organizational health has always been a staff that would recommend the organization or career to others. For the most part, CDC staff members would recommend a correctional career for others, but not for all others. They made it clear that anyone who could not live with tension, change or

people should stay out. "In institutions [one] will see everything from brilliance to ignorance. Wouldn't [encourage] just anyone to come in....If they can think, willing to do a job and willing to go to school to get an education, I'd encourage them. If they like to hurt people...[they had] better stay out or [they] will get hurt for sure." Twenty-seven of the 44 responding felt corrections would be a good career and would encourage people to enter. Only seven, however, felt they would make an unconditional recommendation. Ten would not encourage anyone to enter, unless the prespect was highly motivated towards a career in corrections, knew himself and what the job entailed. Even then, this group would not encourage such a prospect but would simply not try to discourage him. Four others felt that it depended entirely upon the prospective employee, but would discourage their own children from entering an institutional correctional center.

> Yes. Prospects are greater for promotion in this field than the average law enforcement agency in California. With the latest 10 percent pay raise, the lowest paid Correctional Officer will receive approximately $1,100 per month plus time and half over-time, plus many fringe benefits...not bad.
>
> * * *
>
> I would be particularly careful that the person understood what it involved in the various jobs and types of correctional work. The answer is a qualified yes.
>
> * * *
>
> I don't know, often wonder why I got in it. For those tempermentally suited more promising than ever before ...need much more awareness. Job is much more challenging and much more rewarding, it's more professionalized. A new employee must be flexible and able to live with tension.
>
> * * *
>
> Wouldn't encourage others to enter now. Ten years ago, yes...I'm moving up now, so committed. More lucrative careers with less stress. Lots of heart attacks. All

kinds of psychosomatic illnesses. When you're up to your ass in alligators, it's hard to remember you're here to drain the swamp.

* * *

Definitely not...impossible, exacting, difficult business, very disheartening, disappointing, dangerous... very little satisfaction, never see finished product, little success, see only failures, never know if contributed to someone's success.

Staff Morale and Concerns: Parole. Because of the decreasing parole population, there is a good deal of anxiety on the part of the agents that they will be transferred into institutions. (Parole population declined from 1965 to 1968 but has been growing steadily since. Population greater in 1969 than 1965. See Table A-20). Agents used to independence and free movement are naturally unenthusiastic about this possibility. As a result, one parole agent characterized the ambience around his office as one of "low trust and high fear." The consensus, then, seems to be that the parole agents are less fearful and concerned about the population they are serving than confused and frustrated by internal policy changes.

Almost all those interviewed felt that their job is harder today. Subsidy has made their job harder because they are handling a difficult offender and they have increased paperwork and must cope with what they felt to be confusing and contradictory policies. Most felt that corrections is an interesting and challenging field but believed those entering the field should be willing to give a great deal. Some would leave because of the direction corrections has taken now, but cannot or would not because of age, salary, position and the commitments they have already made.

Nine out of the 11 interviewed believed that the effect of the subsidy program on parole is negligible. Other factors were more often mentioned as depressing morale and increasing the dif-

ficulty of their jobs.

Most interviewed were men 40 or over who had been in the department for more than ten years. Nine came to the department when the concepts of community treatment and rehabilitation were the vogue. Parole officers then had power and respect in the department. What is now identified as the "era of permissiveness" has disappeared yet for those in parole the "melody lingers on."

Supported by the Adult Authority statement of priorities, they see those inside the institutions as in the driver's seat since "protection of society" is CDC's first policy. Last and chancy is rehabilitation. No small wonder parole people are disillusioned, feel slightly betrayed and trapped in their jobs. "I'm discouraged right now....[I'm going] to wait through this administration...and hope that it would [change]....[The] system is trapped in not doing a damn thing...." "Sacramento doesn't begin to understand the problems of the case carrying agent...we have no voice....If I were 30, I'd leave."

CDC--An Overview. Probably the most important effect of probation subsidy on the CDC has been in diverting many minimum security inmates away from the department to the community. Percentagewise, this means a larger portion of the inmates who are committed are committed for crimes against persons. They are the persons that the department would have received anyway, however. What the department no longer received were the check forgers and burglars that would have increased the percentage of CDC's non-violent offenders.

Thus, while it is true that the probation subsidy program has had an important impact on the Department of Corrections, it is doubtful that the absence of the program would have alleviated any

great amount of prison violence. The increase in violence in the California prison system, for example, has been at least as severe at the medium and maximum security facilities as at the minimum security institutions. Perhaps certain institutions, like Chino, might not have been forced to institute more rigorous security measures. But more than likely the department would have had to build a new facility to house those medium security felons somewhere else. That somewhere else would have had the problems experienced at Chino, while Chino continued to house those inmates that really didn't need institutionalization for their "rehabilitation." Probation subsidy, then, can be considered indirectly responsible for changes that resulted from (1) the elimination of the minimum security inmate, (2) the concentration of more serious felons in facilities unprepared to handle greater security risks, and (3) the slowdown in the need for Department of Correction's services.

While many feel that the elimination of the minimum security inmate was a desirable and important shift, they also admit to a discouragement arising from dealing with the more serious felons. The minimum security inmate is the one most likely to be willing to develop a meaningful relationship with staff members and the most likely to lessen the gap between inmate and staff. Having fewer of this type person to work with has also meant a reduction in the manpower available for grounds or sensitive maintenance work. In some institutions this has necessitated the hiring of outside people to do the work normally done by inmates.

One administrator talked of the subsidy program as if it was a large minimum security facility built on the outside. Consistent with this view, minimum security facilities within the CDC system had been reclassified as medium security to the extent

possible. While CDC does not operate the adult subsidy programs, this analogy is apt--only it was as if someone forgot to tell the staff members at the minimum security facilities and the physical plant planners that this transfer was taking place. These facilities were not equipped to handle the type of inmate they were being required to take. There was bound to be more trouble among inmates as more violent offenders were pushed together in institutions ill-equipped to handle them.

Prior to the elimination of so many minimum security felons, the management problems could be spread among a variety of facilities. With no new facilities and the number of inmates coming to CDC remaining fairly constant, the institutions stacked up with hard-core offenders. In the absence of some program to divert offenders and no change in the disposition pattern of judges, CDC would have been forced to built many new facilities. With new facilities the classification staff would have been able to spread out troublemakers a bit more evenly. The legislature did not consider the remodeling of existing CDC plants as a cost of the subsidy program as it would have if they had elected to built two or three new minimum security prisons. The remodeling and the installation of security equipment at Chino is probably directly related to the intervention of subsidy. Staff at these minimum security facilities were not psychologically prepared for the population change as they would have been if transferred to a more secure place. The change happened gradually, and being reluctant to shift to more structured, formal modes of operation, staff members tried to continue as if nothing had happened until jarred into accepting the new reality.

The slowdown in the need for CDC services was brief, and unlike what happened in the CYA organization, the fear of organizational

"suicide" or lost jobs was negligible. The courts had plenty of people to send to the prisons but the type of person had changed. This change created certain pockets of structural unemployment. For example, teachers involved in programs instructing minimum security inmates were forced to redesign their programs to meet the needs of a different population or face retirement. The uncertainty surrounding the restructuring of these programs created a certain amount of stress for these employees. With the current increase in population and in the average length of time an inmate can expect to be within the system, most of these inside programs are flourishing again. The conservation camps, with their emphasis on community involvement when environmental problems arise, probably cannot be revived to the prior extent and still meet standards for community protection.

The probation subsidy program has not brought about CDC organizational stagnation as many predicted nor has it forced CDC to change its basic direction. If commitments had continued to decline, perhaps it would have had to confront the CYA's problems of staff discontent and of alienation from the central office. However, the CDC seems to have been more prepared for this possibility as evidenced by the increase in salary and benefits for first-line employees, plans to close institutions long outmoded and attempts to improve intradepartmental communications. Subsidy provided a means to end double-celling of inmates, increasing the amount of time a counselor could spend with an inmate, and closing facilities that were a hazard. CDC had just begun to be able to fulfill some of these goals when the population started to increase again.

Some Concluding Thoughts

One major impact of the attempt to shift care of correctional

clients from state institutions to community alternatives was to create a difficult dilemma for the administrators of the state system. On the one hand they could continue with the program of community alternatives at the risk of committing what has been called "organizational suicide."[35] On the other hand, they could attempt to reverse directions and go back to the older policy of state institutionalization. Neither of these alternatives were very attractive, and what has happened has been an attempt to steer a third course. The state agencies have continued to push the community alternative approach, but have also themselves attempted to play some new roles and to handle some old ones in different ways. Parole has been given an increased importance as has state leadership in the development and monitoring of community alternatives.

The problems of adjustment to subsidy have necessarily been greater in the CYA than in CDC because of the greater changes in population. Overall the amount of change in the subsidy period may be as great in CDC as in the CYA. Changes due to decreased commitments are much more clearly attributable to subsidy, however, than those due to changes in the characteristics of commitments. The changes due to decreased commitments are also more threatening to employees in some ways for they affect job security as opposed to working conditions. Both are obviously important, but job security is the more sensitive issue.

Neither the CDC nor the CYA appears to have anticipated in advance the major changes that would be required by the subsidy program. Both apparently underestimated the amount of commitment reduction rather consistently in the early years of the program, and neither appears to have done much long range planning with

subsidy in mind. Changes due to the altered population make-up appear to have been perceived even less than the changes due to commitment reduction.

Despite this lack of overall planning--which is to a considerable extent excusable in the light of what could then be safely predicted about a new and untried program--both agencies appear to have begun at an early date to take advantage of some of the organizational possibilities created by the program and to minimize the problems created by it. Although in very different ways, both have sought to improve their institutional programs. Both have also sought to make appropriate adjustments in the number and kind of personnel employed and to maintain employee morale through upgrading and shifting staff.

The major portion of the impact of the probation subsidy program on the California correctional system is today in the past rather than the future. To be sure the effects of the past are likely to persist for a long time, but the pace of change has clearly slowed and perhaps stopped altogether. What can be said about the effects of the program on these agencies?

Most importantly it seems clear that the state agencies have survived intact and have adapted to their new roles. The process has been often painful and the agencies involved are no longer what they once were. This seems particularly true of the CYA and its new population. The process has created new opportunities, however, as well as difficult readjustments--as the expanded CYA role in the planning of delinquency prevention services at the local level shows. That these results have occurred seems due in large part to the nature of the organizations themselves--the high competence

of their managers and middle managers, their traditions of leadership as opposed to sheer survival, their willingness to run risks to accomplish goals they felt to be desirable.

Because this assessment is necessarily directed to the problems arising out of the subsidy program and does not cover the many other problems with which these agencies have had to contend during this period, it is not really possible to assess how the California agencies stand as organizations now as opposed to the beginning of the subsidy program. The subsidy program was never sold as a way of improving correctional programs at the state level, however, and that is not the basis on which it should be judged. That assessment must depend primarily on what it accomplished or failed to accomplish in the larger arena--community corrections. It is enough at the state level to indicate that it did not make things impossible and that the state agencies were able to adapt to their new roles, albeit slowly. Given the right kind of administration there would seem to be no reason why other states could not do this as well, particularly if the right kind of advance planning is undertaken with respect to likely problems and opportunities.

FOOTNOTES

1. See generally Sheldon Messinger, Strategies of Control (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA 1969).

2. California Board of Corrections, 1964 Probation Study (1965).

3. See Robert Smith, A Quiet Revolution, U.S. HEW Pub. No. (SRS) 72-26011 (1972), p. 5.

4. Ibid, pp.68-70. California 1974-75 Budget Supplement, Vol. II, Health and Welfare Education, p. 275. The Smith fiscal figures are updated through 1972-73. Independent estimates essentially substantiate the state commitment reduction figures. See Hirschi and Rudisell.

5. Lloyd Ohlin, Prisoners in America (1973), p. 1.

6. California 1974-75 Budget Supplement, Vol. II, Health and Welfare Education, p. 278.

7. A 1971 study using multivariate techniques found that there have been substantial changes in the type of youths committed to the CYA for the first time during the years 1962-70. The characteristics which were the most helpful in identifying these changes were prior delinquent contacts, grade last enrolled, escapes, age, co-offenders, psychological disorders, school misbehavior, prior record, narcotic history, weapons, alcohol and public welfare. Public Systems, Inc., Multivariate Analysis of Changes in Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards: 1962-1970 (1971), p. 4-4.

8. California Board of Corrections, Correctional Systems Study, Juvenile Institution Task Force Report (1971), p. 28.

9. A 1971 survey of 595 CYA staff members found similar views:

> In comparing characteristics of CYA wards seen now to wards five years ago, most staff in virtually all job classes...perceived the contemporary CYA wards as, on the average, more emotionally disturbed, more antagonistic toward authority, more alienated from conventional society, more identified with deviate subgroups, more involved in school misbehavior, and more apt to have very weak attachments to socializing influences such as family and school.

Doug Knight, Delinquency Causes and Remedies, The Working Assumptions of California Youth Authority Staff (CYA Research Report No. 61, 1972), p. 28.

10. The CYA staff survey found a similar mix of opinions on the changes in ward characteristics:

> Many staff attributed the perceived changes to California's probation subsidy program; the counties were seen as "skimming off" the better prospects and committing the worst to CYA. Other staff blamed a proliferating drug culture in California; and still others blamed general social unrest--exacerbated among the delinquents. P. 31.

11. Sacramento Bee, December 5, 1972, p. A3.

12. Sacramento Bee, December 6, 1972; p. A5; December 7, p. A13.

13. Assembly Select Committee on the Administration of Justice, Parole Board Reform in California (1970), p. 23. See also T. Barnett and D. de Lange, Population Characteristics Study of California Male Felons (unpublished Masters thesis, California State University, Sacramento, undated).

14. Ibid, 19, 23.

15. California State Employees Association, California Prisons in Crisis (1971).

16. California Board of Corrections, Report to Governor Ronald Reagan on Violence in California Prisons (1971), pp. 17-19.

17. New York Times, December 18, 1972, Interview with San Quentin Associate Warden James W. Parks.

18. H.R. Committee on Internal Security, Revolutionary Activities Directed Toward the Administration of Penal or Correctional Systems, Part III, p. 1218 (1973).

19. California Senate Subcommittee on Civil Disorder, 1974 Report Civil Disorder, Executive Session, Gang Violence in Penal Institutions (1974), p. 11.

20. California Department of Corrections Task Force to Study Violence, Report and Recommendations (1974), p. 1.

21. New York State Special Commission on Attica, Attica (1972), p. 105.

22. To the same effect see Health and Welfare Agency Task Force, Management Survey, California Department of Corrections (1972), pp. 67-68.

23. Ibid, p. 53.

24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

25. People v. Vickers, 8 Cal. 3d 451 (1972). See also In Re Sturm, 11 Cal 3d 258 (1974). (Parole board must give reasons for denial of parole.)

26. Robert Smith, A Quiet Revolution, U.S. HEW Pub. No. (SRS) 72-26011, p. 71.

27. California Board of Corrections, Probation Study (1964), p. 1.

28. Ibid, p. 180.

29. Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (1967), pp. 13-14.

30. CDC has continued to harbor plans for a new maximum security facility in Southern California. The relationship between this proposed facility and subsidy is a complicated one. In addition to the changing size and character of the CDC population, existing maximum security facilities are old and outmoded and largely concentrated in Northern California.

31. S.B. 391 (1973).

32. See California Board of Corrections, Correctional Systems Study, Field Services, Parole Task Force Report (1971), p. 32.

33. The report cites the fact that 90 percent of all violations occur within the first two years of parole and on the basis of this recommends that "No ward should be retained on parole involuntarily more than two years unless it can be demonstrated to the parole board, at least every six months that the protection of the community is substantially increased by doing so." Ibid, p. 40. The report also hints that part of the reason behind the increasing length of stay is the desire to safeguard parole and administrative positions: "If any part of the answer (to the causes of longer parole terms) has to do with attempts to preserve parole agent positions, then stronger procedural safeguards will of course be mandatory." P. 39.

34. The 1971 CYA survey of attitudes toward delinquency showed the staff committed to making changes and seeking alternatives. Two major alternatives suggested were that the CYA should become a Social Policy Advocate, or a Direct-Action Prevention Agency in the Community, or both. Those staff committed to the social policy advocate role felt that while CYA continues its "caseload treatment-oriented programs of individualized prevention, control and treatment, CYA might reorganize somewhat to lobby actively and systematically for the social policies and legislation (Federal and State alike) that may make a big difference in the level of delinquency in California." Doug Knight, Delinquency Causes and Remedies, The Working Assumptions of California Youth Authority Staff (CYA Research Report No. 61, 1972), p. 28.

The need for direct action prevention was seen as coming out of the nature of delinquency:

While staff's specific recommendations about prevention and treatment encompassed a wide variety of approaches, the common denomiation was the overwhelming staff focus on solving the delinquency problem in the community, on normalizing rather than abnormalizing the lives of marginal youth....[O]ver two-thirds of sampled staff felt to make a large dent in the delinquency problem we should mount a massive attack against broad social and economic conditions. Likewise, large numbers of specific recommendations offered by staff called for broad-based community or other strategies not confined to the standard caseload method of operation." P. xi.

35. Robert Smith, A Quiet Revolution, U.S. HEW Pub. No. (SRS) 72-26011, p. 71.

Table A-1

Age at Admission of CYA First Commitments
(In Percent)

	8 - 12	13 - 17	18 and over	Mean Age
1960	3.3	65.7	31.0	--
1961	3.4	64.6	32.0	--
1962	3.4	65.2	31.4	16.9
1963	3.7	68.9	27.4	16.7
1964	3.9	68.8	27.3	16.3
1965	3.4	66.9	29.7	16.4
1966	4.3	67.2	29.5	16.3
1967	2.5	63.5	34.0	16.6
1968	2.0	61.7	36.3	16.8
1969	1.3	55.8	42.9	17.1
1970	0.8	54.3	44.9	17.2
1971	0.2	48.0	51.8	17.5
1972	0.1	50.8	49.1	17.4
1973	0.1	50.4	49.5	17.5

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table A-2

CYA First Commitments - By Race
(In Percent)

	White	Mexican-American	Black	Other
1961	58.1	18.4	22.3	1.2
1962	56.2	19.0	22.7	2.1
1963	53.6	18.4	26.1	1.9
1964	53.9	18.0	26.1	2.0
1965	51.5	18.6	27.9	2.0
1966	52.8	17.7	27.6	1.9
1967	54.8	17.1	26.0	2.1
1968	53.6	15.7	25.8	1.6
1969	53.6	16.7	27.9	1.8
1970	55.4	17.5	24.8	2.3
1971	52.0	19.0	25.9	3.1
1972	48.6	19.6	29.3	2.5
1973	44.6	18.8	33.9	2.7

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table A-3

CYA Admissions - By Sex

	Males	Females	Total
1960	3929	673	4602
1961	4625	712	5337
1962	4431	763	5194
1963	4889	844	5733
1964	4651	837	5488
1965	5210	980	6190
1966	4583	887	5470
1967	4217	781	4998
1968	3913	717	4690
1969	3860	634	4494
1970	3319	427	3746
1971	2880	338	3218
1972	2476	252	2728
1973	2535	223	2758

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table A-4

CYA First Commitments - Prior Delinquent Conduct
(In Per Cent)

			Type of Prior Delinquent Conduct		
	None	Prior Delinquent Conduct*	Contacts Without Commitment	One Prior Commitment	Two or More Prior Commitments
1965	3.3	96.7	44.4	37.1	15.2
1966	3.6	96.4	45.1	36.5	14.8
1967	3.8	96.2	47.4	36.1	12.7
1968	3.7	96.3	47.7	35.0	13.6
1969	3.6	96.4	48.1	33.1	15.2
1970	2.9	97.1	42.9	34.9	19.3
1971	3.6	96.4	40.3	32.9	23.2
1972	4.0	96.0	39.3	32.0	24.7
1973	4.8	95.2	43.6	30.6	21.0

*The definition of prior delinquent conduct is any police contact or any delinquent or criminal commitment to a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, or county jail.

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table A-5

CYA Institutional Population - By Race
Males Only
(In Percent)

	White	Mexican-American	Black	Other
1962	54.6	20.6	23.5	1.3
1963	53.5	19.1	25.8	1.6
1964	51.9	19.8	26.6	1.7
1965	50.0	20.5	28.0	1.5
1966	49.7	19.8	28.7	1.8
1967	50.3	19.3	28.9	1.5
1968	51.2	18.4	28.8	1.6
1969	50.0	19.9	28.4	1.7
1970	47.5	18.9	31.7	1.8
1971	48.9	18.9	30.1	2.1
1972	44.0	20.6	32.6	2.8
1973	40.1	22.0	35.5	2.3

Source: A Comparison of Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards, CYA Office of Research. Figures as of June 30 each year.

Table A-6

CYA Institutional Population - Admission Status
Males Only
(In Percent)

	First Commitment	First Return	Second Return	Third or More Returns
1962	61.1	24.6	9.5	4.8
1963	59.7	25.0	10.4	4.9
1964	55.0	27.4	11.5	6.1
1965	55.7	25.4	11.5	6.4
1966	55.3	26.3	11.5	6.9
1967	52.5	27.1	12.8	7.6
1968	53.5	27.5	13.5	7.3
1969	53.9	24.0	12.7	8.5
1970	57.5	22.3	11.9	8.3
1971	59.0	22.2	11.1	7.7
1972	62.5	21.0	9.3	7.2
1973	62.8	21.9	8.5	6.8

Source: A Comparison of Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards, CYA Office of Research. Figures as of June 30 of each year.

Table A-7

CYA - Parole Population

	Parole Population, January 1		Parole Population, January 1
1961	10,057	1968	15,320
1962	10,645	1969	14,778
1963	11,491	1970	14,646
1964	12,221	1971	14,463
1965	12,834	1972	
1966	13,660	1973	11,852
		1974	9,847

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

Table A-8

CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH AUTHORITY WARDS, MALES ON PAROLE
TOTAL
JUNE 30 EACH YEAR, 1964 - 1973
(Showing percent of totals)

MALES ON PAROLE	JUNE 30									
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total Parole Caseload.....	10,509	11,175	12,381	12,107	11,838	11,620	11,481	11,237	10,723	9,185
Court										
Juvenile.....	67.5	69.2	70.0	70.0	68.7	65.3	62.3	59.2	54.7	51.1
Criminal.....	32.5	30.8	30.0	30.0	31.3	34.7	37.7	40.8	45.3	48.9
Area or County										
Southern California Area..	61.2	62.4	62.9	65.2	65.7	66.9	66.9	65.6	63.5	61.0
Los Angeles County.....	38.2	40.4	42.2	44.3	43.8	43.2	41.8	40.2	37.1	33.9
San Diego County.....	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.7	6.7	7.4	7.5	7.5	8.0	8.4
8 other counties.....	15.9	15.3	14.2	14.2	15.2	16.4	17.7	17.9	18.4	18.7
San Francisco Bay Area....	21.6	21.7	20.9	19.6	18.7	17.5	17.3	18.2	19.9	21.0
Alameda County.....	8.0	7.6	7.2	6.8	6.3	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.9	6.1
San Francisco County....	5.0	5.4	5.5	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.4	3.9	3.9
7 other counties.....	8.6	8.6	8.2	7.7	7.6	7.0	7.2	8.1	10.1	11.0
Sacramento Valley Area....	5.8	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.7	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.2	6.8
San Joaquin Valley Area...	8.2	7.3	7.7	7.2	7.0	6.7	6.6	6.9	6.7	7.0
22 other counties.....	3.2	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.6	2.9	3.7	4.1
Commitment Offense										
Offenses against persons..	16.9	16.6	16.7	17.5	16.5	17.6	18.8	19.6	21.1	23.2
Offenses against property.	51.3	49.2	47.6	45.8	44.5	42.8	40.0	37.6	36.9	37.2
Narcotic & Drug offenses..	5.1	4.2	5.1	6.5	9.0	11.6	14.3	16.2	17.0	16.4
Other offenses.....	26.7	30.0	30.6	30.2	30.0	28.0	27.0	26.6	25.0	23.2
Parole Status										
1st Parole.....	69.0	66.8	65.2	63.4	60.2	59.4	59.8	60.3	62.2	64.2
2nd Parole.....	20.8	22.1	21.9	23.1	23.9	23.5	23.4	22.5	21.7	21.1
3rd Parole or more.....	10.2	11.1	12.9	13.5	15.9	17.1	16.8	17.2	16.1	14.7
Ethnic Group										
White.....	53.9	52.4	49.6	49.1	49.4	50.6	50.9	50.2	51.1	50.1
Mexican-American.....	19.7	19.7	20.3	19.8	20.1	18.3	18.2	18.2	17.7	18.3
Negro.....	24.7	26.1	28.3	29.2	28.7	29.3	29.2	29.8	29.2	29.4
Other.....	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.2
Median age in years.....	19.2	19.0	19.1	19.2	19.4	19.6	19.9	20.1	20.3	20.5

Source: A Comparison of Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards, CYA Office of Research.

Table A-9

CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUTH AUTHORITY WARDS, FEMALES ON PAROLE
TOTAL
JUNE 30 EACH YEAR, 1964 - 1973
(Showing percent of totals)

FEMALES ON PAROLE	JUNE 30									
	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Total Parole Caseload.....	2,244	2,369	2,533	2,566	2,545	2,424	2,363	2,093	1,794	1,456
Court										
Juvenile.....	93.9	93.4	92.2	92.8	92.5	90.7	90.1	87.0	84.4	82.1
Criminal.....	6.1	6.6	7.8	7.2	7.5	9.3	9.9	13.0	15.6	17.9
Area or County										
Southern California Area.	57.2	59.8	63.1	66.4	65.0	67.1	68.2	66.6	63.2	60.8
Los Angeles County.....	34.0	37.0	40.6	44.6	43.1	42.2	40.3	36.9	31.4	27.0
San Diego County.....	7.4	8.0	8.3	8.4	8.4	9.5	11.1	11.1	10.8	10.1
8 other counties.....	15.8	14.7	14.2	13.4	13.5	15.4	16.9	18.6	21.0	23.7
San Francisco Bay Area..	26.6	25.7	23.6	20.2	20.2	18.6	17.2	19.8	22.6	23.6
Alameda County.....	7.2	7.3	7.0	6.6	6.2	5.5	5.2	5.3	5.5	5.1
San Francisco County..	9.6	8.2	7.6	6.6	6.0	5.6	5.5	6.5	7.2	7.8
7 other counties.....	9.8	10.2	9.0	7.0	8.0	7.5	6.5	8.0	9.9	10.7
Sacramento Valley Area..	4.3	3.6	3.8	4.4	4.8	4.9	4.7	4.6	4.8	5.3
San Joaquin Valley Area.	8.6	7.8	7.1	6.7	7.7	7.5	8.1	7.1	6.6	6.6
22 other counties.....	3.3	3.1	2.4	2.3	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.8	3.8
Commitment Offense										
Offenses against persons	6.9	6.4	6.6	6.0	6.9	8.0	9.2	10.3	10.6	12.9
Offenses against propert	17.0	17.5	17.9	17.1	16.0	15.0	14.4	14.1	14.2	14.7
Narcotic & Drug offenses	4.5	5.1	5.0	5.3	6.0	7.5	9.2	11.1	13.4	13.2
Other offenses.....	71.6	71.0	70.5	71.6	71.1	69.5	67.2	64.5	61.8	59.2
Parole Status										
1st Parole.....	74.5	71.9	70.6	67.1	64.8	64.1	63.1	62.5	63.7	66.6
2nd Parole.....	19.2	20.6	21.3	23.7	25.0	24.6	25.3	25.1	24.7	22.5
3rd Parole or more.....	6.3	7.5	8.1	9.2	10.2	11.3	11.6	12.4	11.6	10.9
Ethnic Group										
White.....	52.9	52.0	51.2	51.2	51.6	52.5	53.7	54.2	55.4	55.0
Mexican-American.....	17.3	16.1	16.5	15.7	16.0	16.2	15.1	14.3	13.8	15.2
Negro.....	26.8	29.3	30.1	30.1	29.8	28.5	28.3	28.6	27.2	26.4
Other.....	3.0	2.6	2.2	3.0	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.6	3.4
Median age in years.....	18.1	18.3	18.4	18.3	18.5	18.6	18.9	19.1	19.3	19.6

Source: A Comparison of Characteristics of Youth Authority Wards, CYA Office of Research.

Table A-10

Male Felons Newly Received from Court
Median Age at Admission

	Median Age	Percent Under 21 Years	Percent Under 25 Years	Total Received
1960	29.1	8.5	32.9	5,701
1961	29.0	8.8	33.9	5,842
1962	28.8	9.1	34.5	4,879
1963	28.5	8.8	35.5	5,030
1964	28.0	8.9	37.9	4,983
1965	27.6	10.5	39.4	5,626
1966	27.7	10.4	38.6	5,169
1967	27.1	10.7	41.3	4,873
1968	27.0	11.5	41.3	4,667
1969	26.5	10.7	43.4	4,496
1970	26.3	11.3	44.1	4,472
1971	26.2	10.6	44.2	4,472
1972	26.5	10.0	43.0	4,272
1973	26.8	10.8	41.7	4,839

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table A-11

Male Felons Newly Received from Court - By Ethnic Group
(In Percent)

	Caucasian	Mexican-American	Negro	Other	Total Received
1960	60.6	16.7	20.8	1.9	5701
1961	60.7	15.7	22.1	1.5	5842
1962	59.7	13.8	24.9	1.6	4879
1963	60.4	12.3	25.7	1.6	5030
1964	51.5	14.5	22.6	1.3	4983
1965	60.1	13.2	25.2	1.5	5626
1966	59.2	15.1	24.3	1.4	5169
1967	58.9	13.4	26.4	1.3	4872
1968	58.5	13.7	26.4	1.4	4667
1969	54.9	15.2	28.3	1.6	4496
1970	52.7	16.3	29.3	1.7	4426
1971	53.3	16.8	28.3	1.6	4472
1972	52.7	16.3	29.3	1.7	4272
1973	49.1	18.1	30.5	1.8	4839

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table A-12

Male Felons Newly Received from Court
Prior Commitment Record
(In Percent)

	No Prior Commitment	Prior Jail or Juvenile	Prior Prison	Total Received
1960	13.5	53.4	33.1	5701
1961	16.6	51.6	31.8	5842
1962	12.8	52.8	34.4	4879
1963	13.2	52.9	33.9	5030
1964	12.7	55.8	31.5	4983
1965	13.4	55.9	30.7	5626
1966	13.2	56.8	30.0	5169
1967	14.0	57.4	28.6	4872
1968	14.5	56.8	28.7	4667
1969	15.0	59.3	25.7	4496
1970	15.9	59.0	25.1	4426
1971	17.1	60.5	22.4	4472
1972	17.2	59.1	23.7	4272
1973	16.3	61.2	22.5	4839

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table A-13

Parolees Returned*

	Parolees Returned With New Commitment	Parolees Returned Without New Commitment	Total Returned
1961	1050	1631	2681
1962	1205	1864	3069
1963	1216	2525	3741
1964	1006	2539	3545
1965	1128	2832	3960
1966	1043	2306	3349
1967	876	2394	3270
1968	738	2196	2934
1969	715	1946	2661
1970	685	1878	2563
1971	773	1623	2396
1972	1033	2212	3245
1973	914	2238	3152
1973-74 (Projected)			3675

*Excludes addicts civilly committed.

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table A-14

Median Time Served in Prison Before Parole and on Parole Before Discharge
(Male Felons)

	In Prison Before Parole (Months)	On Parole Before Discharge (Months)	Total of Medians (Months)
1960	27	24	51
1961	24	24	48
1962	24	25	49
1963	24	24	48
1964	24	27	51
1965	27	29	56
1966	27	25	52
1967	30	25	55
1968	30	25	55
1969	30	25	55
1970	34	25	59
1971	36	24	60
1972	35	18	53
1973	34	25	55

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division.

Table A-15

Male Felons in Prison - By Offense Groups
(In Percent)

	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1973
Homicide	7.0	7.6	8.4	8.6	9.5	11.9	14.7	14.5
Robbery	19.8	21.1	26.4	24.6	25.5	26.0	26.4	26.8
Assault	3.7	3.7	4.6	5.4	6.1	7.2	7.3	7.3
Burglary	18.0	17.1	17.6	17.8	16.0	14.3	13.3	14.3
Theft (exc. Auto)	3.6	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.6	4.4	3.9	3.9
Forgery, Checks	14.1	11.8	9.3	7.5	6.8	4.9	3.4	3.4
Auto Theft	3.0	2.4	2.6	2.9	2.6	2.1	1.9	1.7
Sex Offenses	8.1	8.3	8.1	8.1	8.6	8.6	8.0	7.2
Narcotics	16.8	18.5	15.7	15.8	15.1	15.4	16.1	16.3
Other	5.9	5.7	3.2	5.0	5.2	5.2	5.0	4.6

Source: Compiled from information provided by the California Department of Corrections.

Table A-16

Male Felons in Prison - Median Age

	Median Age	Percent Under 21 Years	Percent Under 25 Years	Number
1960	31.9	2.5	18.9	17,840
1961	31.9	2.2	18.1	19,557
1962	32.9	2.3	18.4	18,950
1963	32.4	2.0	17.1	20.669
1964	32.3	1.7	17.3	20,591
1965	31.8	2.5	19.2	20,467
1966	31.8	2.5	19.3	21,593
1967	31.9	2.4	18.8	21,888
1968	32.0	2.0	18.3	22,410
1969	31.8	2.0	19.2	21,240
1970	31.4	2.1	20.6	19,314
1971	30.5	2.6	22.7	15,734
1972	30.4	2.5	21.9	15,382
1973	30.6	2.4	20.2	18,080

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division. Excludes persons in Reception-Guidance Center and Narcotic Treatment-Control Units.

Table A-17

Male Felons in Prison - By Ethnic Group

	Total	Caucasian	Mexican-American	Negro	Other
1960	17,840	10,258	3,050	4,121	410
1961	19,557	11,010	3,559	4,615	371
1962	18,950	10,550	3,354	4,680	360
1963	20,669	11,471	3,452	5,374	372
1964	20.591	11,304	3,459	5,477	350
1965	20,467	11,257	3,356	5,505	348
1966	21,593	11,790	3,606	5,852	345
1967	21,888	11,929	3,568	6,063	328
1968	22,410	12,191	3,630	6,275	314
1969	21,240	11,384	3,483	6,053	318
1970	19,314	10,043	3,206	5,765	309
1971	15,734	8,040	2,596	4,846	252
1972	15,382	7,660	2,569	4,922	231
1973	18,080	8,771	3,172	5,840	297

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division. Excludes persons in Reception-Guidance Center and Narcotic Treatment-Control Units.

Table A-18

Male Felons in Prison - Prior Commitment Record
(In Percent)

	No Prior Commitment	Prior Jail or Juvenile	Prior Prison	Number
1960	11.6	40.7	47.7	17,840
1961	11.9	41.4	41.8	19,557
1962	11.7	41.8	46.5	18,950
1963	10.8	41.0	48.2	20,669
1964	10.7	42.1	47.2	20,591
1965	10.6	43.7	45.7	20,467
1966	10.6	44.1	45.3	21,593
1967	10.8	44.5	44.7	21,888
1968	10.8	45.0	44.2	22,410
1969	11.3	46.1	42.6	21,240
1970	11.6	47.3	41.1	19,314
1971	12.5	49.0	38.5	15,734
1972	12.4	48.2	39.4	15,382
1973	12.0	49.1	38.9	18,080

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division. Excludes persons in Reception-Guidance Center and Narcotic Treatment-Control Units.

Table A-19

CDC Interviews - Staff Experience and Job Classification

	Administration	Custody	Counseling	Misc.	Total
Number with Experience at:					
One facility only	0	7	2	2	11
More than one facility	12	9	5	1	27
Unknown	2	1	4	0	7
Total	14	17	11	3	45

Table A-20

Felon Parole Population From California Prisons

	Parole Population		Parole Population
1960	9,303	1967	12,002
1961	10,006	1968	11,833
1962	11,856	1969	13,027
1963	11,502	1970	14,927
1964	12,447	1971	15,808
1965	12,866	1972	14,848
1966	12,461	1973	12,996
		1974	18,035 (Projected June 30)

Source: California Prisoners, Department of Corrections, Research Division. Figures as of January 1 of each year.

Table A-21

CDC Parole

	Conventional		Work-Unit	
	Avg. Caseload Male Felons	Man-years	Caseload Male Felons	Man-years
1965	4302		5825	107.0
1970	6731		5289	
1971	9446		5087	
1972-73	7795	135.7	5280	151.5
1973-74	6690	123.0	5200	151.0
1974-75	6845	137.0	5200	151.0

Table A-22

Mean Length of Stay on Parole for Wards Removed from Parole - by Type of Removal
(In Months)

	Non-Violators Discharged	Violators Revoked	Violators Discharged
1960	25.2	8.5	16.5
1961	24.8	8.1	17.5
1962	23.6	7.8	16.1
1963	25.6	10.3	20.1
1964	25.5	9.9	20.0
1965	24.9	10.1	19.7
1966	25.4	10.4	19.6
1967	25.1	11.3	20.3
1968	25.9	11.1	21.4
1969	26.5	11.5	22.9
1970	27.9	12.2	24.9
1971	28.4	12.7	26.5
1972	29.4	13.9	27.1
1973	30.5	15.2	29.4

Source: Annual Report, Department of the Youth Authority.

END