

INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE AGAINST CIVIL DISTURBANCES BOMBINGS SABOTAGE

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20314

4 January 1971

This planning guide is prepared to assist management of facilities participating in the Department of Defense Industrial Defense Program in developing a comprehensive industrial defense plan to reduce their vulnerability to hostile acts and protect people and property during an emergency.

The Industrial Defense Program is designed to safeguard selected industrial facilities and utilities from sabotage and other hostile or destructive acts, including civil disturbances, through the application of industrial plant security measures and emergency preparedness measures.

The terrorist bombings and arson, the increasing number of bomb threats, and the potential for large-scale sabotage and other disruption of industrial plants and utilities require that industrial defense planning become an integral part of the management process.

It is not inconceivable that some groups have infiltrated industry to cause unrest, dissension and disruption, and that others are developing plans to sabotage and destroy vital communication lines, electric power distribution, and other industries and utilities.

Industrial defense planning can no longer be viewed as a non-productive thorn in the side of production, sales and profit. A properly developed industrial defense plan could well be one of your wisest investments for assuring the continuity of your company earnings.

In the interest of total community planning, we recommend that your plan be coordinated with the agency responsible for developing the metropolitan civil disturbance plan for the area wherein your plant is located.

Lloyd B. Ramsey

LLOYD B. RAMSEY
Major General, USA
The Provost Marshal General

INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE PLAN

AGAINST

CIVIL DISTURBANCES - BOMBINGS - SABOTAGE

Copy Number _____
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Date of Issue: _____

INTRODUCTION TO THE PLAN.
This presents the foundation on which the plan is based.

1. PURPOSE. (This paragraph should include a statement or statements comparable in scope to the following: "To establish a continuing program of preparation for protection against civil disturbances and sabotage, and to insure the continuation or restoration of essential operations in the event of other hostile or destructive acts.")

2. ASSUMPTIONS. (Assumptions stating in substance the premises shown below should appear in this paragraph.)

a. National.

(1) Potential civil disturbances in the United States could, with little or no warning, seriously endanger selected areas within the U.S. industrial base.

(2) Widespread sabotage against U.S. industry is not inconceivable.

b. Local. Each facility is vulnerable and subject to sabotage, bombings, civil disturbances, and other hostile or destructive acts.

3. BASIC PLANNING DATA. (This paragraph should include information as listed below.)

a. Maps. (Attach as appendix a topographical map showing the facility and surrounding areas, including the road and rail nets, the locations of neighboring industrial facilities, power plants, pumping stations, etc. Indicate on the map the location of residence of key employees residing in each area. Indicate the distance most of the employees live from the plant, i.e., 11–25 miles or whether there is no general pattern.)

b. Vulnerability. (The degree of vulnerability to civil disturbances is contingent primarily upon sociological, environmental, anl geographic factors. Vulnerability to sabotage bombings, and arson may in addition to these factors include criticality of the plant, criticality of the product

and accessibility to the plant. Answers to the following questions should provide indicators to the relative degree of vulnerability:)

(1) Is the facility located in an urban area?

(2) Is the facility located in close proximity, 5–10 miles, to an urban area?

(3) Is the facility located near other industries or near military installations?

(4) Is the facility in a remote location?

(5) Have there been previous incidents of civil disturbances, fire bombing or similar acts by dissident groups? At what frequency? To what degree of destruction?

(6) Are environmental and sociological conditions conducive to incidents which might erupt into a riot situation?

(7) Are there good plant/police/community relations?

(8) Is there good plant management-employee relations?

(9) Has a determination been made whether hostile factors exist among plant employees?

(10) Is the plant producing "war materials" under defense contract and has there been employee opposition to this endeavor?

(11) Have there been incidents of employee disfavor to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, or other areas?

(12) If producing war materials, are they "critical" to the defense effort?

(13) Have there been unexplained incidents of production stoppage? Slowdown? Defective end items?

(14) Have there been incidents of unexplained small fires in the plant?

(15) Have there been internal labor disputes which have not been completely reconciled?

c. Physical layout. (Maps, blueprints, and schematic drawings of production and or assembly lines.)

d. Operational data.

(1) Personnel. (Indicate the total number of employees and specify the number of contractual or vendor personnel present daily.)

(2) Shift operation. (Indicate the total number of employees and contractual personnel, male and female, assigned to each shift.)

4. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS.

(The resort to legal remedies should be a major consideration in industrial defense planning. All potential criminal acts or violations should be considered to assure adequate preparation for legal remedy. Advance consideration of the leadtimes and processing factors of legal recourse could mean the difference in pursuing a successful legal remedy.)

a. Essential considerations of protecting life and property under various contingencies.

b. Advance coordination with legal authorities and courts to determine methods of invoking legal options to avoid adverse reactions.

c. Thorough review of laws, statutes, codes, court decisions and common forms of preliminary legal action such as restraining orders and injunctions.

d. Maintain complete and accurate records of all incidents.

e. Document and preserve all evidence for possible legal action. This may be accomplished by:

(1) Photographs of the incident.

(2) Statements from witnesses.

(3) Physical evidence, e.g., explosives, incendiaries, weapons, etc.

(4) Copies of dissident literature/handouts.

(5) Other admissable evidence and useful information.

f. Liability for injury/death to employees of other persons on plant property.

g. Liability for damage to property of others in your possession or on your premises.

h. Insurance coverage against injury to persons or damage to property resulting from civil disturbances and bombings.

5. EMPLOYEE TRANSPORTATION. (Indicate the mode of transportation used by employees for getting to and from work, i.e., 60 percent bus, 30 percent private auto, 10 percent subway.)

6. TRAINING AND TESTS. (This paragraph should contain instructions for training and rehearsing personnel and testing the plan.)

7. IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS. (Include a statement to the effect —this plan is effective immediately for training purposes. It will be effective for emergency actions when ordered by (specify the job title(s) of the person(s) with authority to partially or completely implement the plan under emergency conditions).)

SIGNATURE
(Senior Executive)

ANNEXES

I Emergency Organization
II Personnel Protection
III Fire Prevention
IV Plant Security
V Utilities and Services
VI Planning Coordination and Liaison
VII Records Protection
VIII Damage Reduction
IX Restoration
X Emergency Requirements
XI Testing

APPENDIXES

I Bomb Threats
II Industrial Sabotage
III Check List
IV General Planning

ANNEX I

Emergency Control Organization

1. CHAIN OF COMMAND:

a. Legal aspects

(1) State and local laws should be examined to determine the legality of the management succession list.

(2) Company by laws should be adopted or revised to provide adequate authority for successors during a civil disturbance.

b. Succession list

(1) A management succession list should be developed to provide alternates or successors for key positions. The plan should provide for at least two or three successors for each position.

(2) Provision should be made for succession or emergency utilization of key operational personnel.

(3) Geographic employment location and residence data should be carefully considered in preparing succession lists for both management and operational personnel.

(4) Consider effect of military Reserve and National Guard membership of key personnel on operations if they are called to duty.

2. PERSONNEL UTILIZATION

a. Employee registration

(1) Prepare registration card on each employee for file at control center. Registration cards should contain information regarding secondary skills, pay data, other personnel identifying data and emergency assignment. Emergency assignments should consider training and degrees of competence in secondary skill.

b. Recall of former employees. (Provide for recall of retired personnel.)

3. MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS. Based upon the existing medical organization, the following should be taken into consideration in preparing medical requirements:

a. Is there a physician on duty at all times?

b. Alternately or additionally, is there a nurse on duty?

c. Has a plant emergency first aid station(s) been established?

d. Have first aid teams been organized?

e. Have litter-bearer teams been organized?

f. Have ambulance services been organized?

g. Has the plant health service plan been coordinated with the local health programs?

h. Has the American National Red Cross first aid course been offered to plant employees?

i. Is the plant health service organization a part of a coordinated mutual aid organization of several plants?

j. Have emergency first aid supplies been stocked in sufficient quantities?

k. Have employees been blood-typed?

l. Does the plant have a blood program?

4. WELFARE SERVICES

a. Provisions should be made for the following services to be available during and immediately after a civil disturbance or other emergency:

(1) Emergency feeding of employees.
(2) Emergency sleeping quarters.
(3) Emergency transportation.
(4) Registration and information service for employees.
(5) Emergency financial assistance for employees.
(6) Individual counselling services for employees.

b. Situation briefings. (Designate a management official to brief employees daily on the impact of the civil disturbance on plant operations and the impact on the community. These briefings must be factual in order to dispel fear, rumors and speculation.)

5. CONTROL CENTERS. (The control center is the plant command post. The focal point for directing all emergency actions.)

a. Location. (Indicate the location of an adequately protected site within the facility to be designated as the primary control center for the facility. To augment or replace the primary control center, an alternate control center should be selected. Include schematic drawing of internal layout of control center, to include location of equipment, communications, supplies and personnel.)

b. Equipment. (Indicate equipment to be habitually maintained in the control center, e.g., communication equipment, public address system, emergency power, maps, plant layout, food blank forms, office supplies.) Note: Necessary supplies and equipment can best be determined by testing the operation of the control center.

c. Operation. (List duties, responsibility, authority and hours of operation of personnel. Indicate restrictions or limitations on use of equipment. Require that a log be maintained of all emergency actions taken. All actions and damages should be photographed.)

6. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION. (Indicate personnel who will be notified in case of various types of disaster or incidents and method of notification. Consideration should be given to the use of chain or progressive (cascade) system of notification, i.e., two or three key personnel receive initial notification, they each in turn notify three or four other key personnel—this progression should continue until all key personnel have received notification.)

7. ORGANIZATION. (Figure 1 is a type of emergency organization which may be modified to meet the needs of your facility.)



Figure 1.

ANNEX II

Personnel Protection

1. EVACUATION. (The question to be resolved on this subject is whether to evacuate the plant during a civil disturbance. The decision must be made by management based on such things as the magnitude and severity of the disturbance, danger to employees, and availability of evacuation routes away from the danger area. This decision should be coordinated with local law enforcement, fire and civil defense officials. If the decision is to evacuate, consideration should be given to leaving a skeleton force at the plant. There are numerous incidents of buildings not being burned or looted because of the appearance that personnel were in the building. A skeleton force would provide a continuing capability of spotting, reporting, and fighting fires, emergency shutdown and liaison.) The following factors should be considered:

a. Buildings

(1) Evacuate by departments if practicable

(2) Exits

(a) Primaries

(b) Alternates

b. Plant

(1) Away from the emergency area

(2) Toward evacuation routes if possible

c. Routes

(1) Pre-select evacuation routes in coordination with local law enforcement officials

(2) Emphasize the importance of following these routes

(3) Inform employees, pre-emergency, of evacuation procedures

2. ASSEMBLY AREAS. (Conceivably a civil disturbance could continue in considerable severity and magnitude for several days. Therefore, consideration should be given to pre-selecting areas where essential employees could assemble for safe transport to the plant. This also requires coordination with local law enforcement and civil defense officials. Obviously, if the disturbance changes course and denies use of pre-selected areas, other areas would have to be selected, perhaps during the disturbance. Again, coordination is essential. Employees designated for these areas must be notified of primary areas and any changes made.)

3. SHELTERS.

a. Requirements. (List the total shelter requirements based upon the maximum number of personnel at the facility at any one time. It is recommended that an allowance be made of fifteen square feet per person. A

comprehensive survey should be conducted of the facility to determine **those areas which would afford the best shelter for employees against any type of an emergency.** Every facility has a shelter capability of some kind. Any structure regardless of its construction will provide shelter **better than** being out in the open. These shelter areas will possibly protect some personnel, if, due to time and type of emergency, personnel cannot be evacuated. The assistance of the local civil defense authorities and plant engineers who have completed the Shelter Analysis Courses, should be used in making a survey for **best** shelter areas. Upon the identification of these areas, they should be stocked with emergency supplies, communications, and other equipment essential to rapid activation and operation. Shelter areas should be properly marked, and directional signs posted throughout the plant directing employees to these areas. Management should also be aware of the National Fallout Shelter Program sponsored by the Office of Civil Defense.)

(1) Have shelter managers been appointed and trained? Civil defense conducts courses in shelter management. The proper operation of a shelter requires such instruction by at least the designated manager and an alternate.

(2) Have buildings been licensed by civil defense as public shelters? The benefits to be gained by the facility having a licensed shelter should be considered.

(3) Are shelters marked and stocked? Unmarked or unstocked shelters may be detrimental, rather than advantageous, in the facility's emergency program. Shelter areas within the facility must be available for immediate use and not simply unused or undeveloped areas of basements or such places as storage areas which would need extensive clearing before occupancy. Marking and stocking may be had at no cost to the facility by participating in the national shelter program.

(4) Are instructions for the movement of personnel to shelters posted? Such instructions may be very brief, as for example, in a small facility with few personnel and single shelter, or may be quite detailed in a larger facility or one with more than one shelter area. In the latter case, it may be necessary to designate personnel by section or other groups to specific shelters, and to post the routes with directive signs to be followed.

(5) Have communications been established from shelter areas to the facility control center and to local government? The need for internal and external communication is obvious. The shelter cannot exist as an entity completely isolated from others inside and outside of the facility. Communication with local government and with civil defense and similar agencies is extremely important since developments in the community will dictate actions to be taken by shelter management and occupants. Proper planning of cafeterias, lounges, and similar areas which can be used for dual purposes will provide shelter areas with no sacrifice of space and at no additional cost.

(6) Has management assured that all employees know the location of those public fallout shelters closest to the facility and to the homes of employees? (List of public shelters are available from the local civil defense organization, and should be provided to employees for their use when they are away from the facility.)

(7) Are all employees encouraged to participate in the facility's emergency preparedness program? (Instruction and training programs should include explanations of the advantages to the employee of participating in and supporting the emergency program. His livelihood and his life, along with those of his family and friends, may depend on the success of the program.)

b. Operations. (List personnel responsible for leadership in each shelter. Indicate health, welfare items and communications for each shelter.)

ANNEX III

Fire Prevention

These measures are of utmost importance in preventing or minimizing fire damage resulting from civil disorders because the services of the local fire department may not be available. While the possibility of arson, stemming from riot, commands your attention, don't casually overlook those little fires of unknown origin. You may have an arsonist inside the gate—in fact, he might even be a member of the brigade. Investigate every fire, no matter how small. If you eliminate all possible accidental causes, start looking for an arsonist. Some ways to do it:

a. Find out who turned in the report. Has he reported several fires?

b. Ask supervisors about workers who have had bad relations with the company, are easily upset, or are around the plant at odd hours?

c. Has anyone turned up consistently at scenes of in-plant fires?

d. Has anyone been seen hurrying from the fire, or acting suspiciously?

e. Look for these physical clues:

(1) Piles of wood shavings, debris, paint, or turpentine.
(2) Strands of gasoline-soaked cotton leading to flammables.
(3) Heating system which has been tampered with.
(4) Doors or windows forced open to provide a draft.

If you suspect arson, call your insurance company or the local fire department. They can provide you with a trained investigator. Don't allow mop-up operations to start until the investigator arrives, and post a guard at the scene so evidence won't be tampered with.

f. Ready defenses. If your plant already has solid fire defenses, you may simply have to set up a plan of action to use them effectively in case of civil disturbance or other emergency. If you're not up to standards on the basics, don't loiter. During the riots of the 1960's, it was not uncommon for fire departments to battle as many fires in four—five days as they normally would in a month. Could you have waited your turn for help?

(1) An adequate, properly maintained sprinkler system is a "must" in the fire prevention program. (The location of the shutoff valve for the system should be known by all key personnel and the security force.)

(2) Post and enforce fire prevention regulations.
(3) Place buckets of sand throughout the plant.
(4) Extend fire alarm systems to all areas of the facility.
(5) Provide a secondary water supply system for fire protection.
(6) Have facility fire protection equipment on-site and insure that it is inspected regularly and properly maintained.
(7) Coordinate with the local fire department to assure compatibility of fire hose connections and other firefighting equipment.

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(8) Determine from local fire department, the feasibility of using mesh wire or other screening material to protect roofs from fire bombs, molotov cocktails, or other incendiary devices.

(9) Organize employees into fire fighting brigades (for building if possible and rescue squads).

(10) Store combustible material in a well protected area.

(11) Instruct employees in the use of fire extinguishers.

(12) Place fire extinguishers near exposed windows. The use of Class B—(foam, dry chemical or inert gas) or multipurpose Class ABC (dry chemical extinguishers) should be used for extinguishing gasoline.

(13) Conduct fire drills periodically.

(14) Put people on roofs as spotters for fires. Provide them with special clothing for identification; radio or other means of communication—advise police of this action.

(15) Maintain good housekeeping standards.

(16) Assure that the following areas are adequately protected against fire bombs and other incendiaries. Some protective measures to consider are wood or metal shutters, shatterproof (unbreakable) glass, wired glass, protective screening or mesh.

(a) Package and trash chutes
(b) Skylights
(c) Roof hatches
(d) Ventilator shafts
(e) Windows and other glass areas
(f) Entrances to sewers and service tunnels
(g) Computer rooms

(17) Consider flooding flat roofs (depending on roof decking and building structure to carry the extra weight) with at least 2 inches of water. If flooding is impractical consider installing extinguishers on or near roofs.

(18) Implement recommendations in the latest fire insurance inspection report.

ANNEX IV

Plant Security

1. SECURITY PLAN. (Outline the emergency organization and responsibilities of the plant security force. The normal organization and responsibilities should be adapted to meet the requirements imposed by a civil disturbance, sabotage, bomb threat, unexploded ordnance or other hostile or destructive acts. The security plan should include all actions and techniques to be employed to protect personnel, materials, products or services, premises and process from hazards inherent in operations and other acts mentioned above. The security organization of a facility will depend almost entirely on the size, criticality and vulnerability of the facility.)

2. LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESTRICTIONS. (This is a most important element and must be understool by management and members of the security force. The facility legal counsel must coordinate with the city attorney, district attorney or other legal offices to determine the authority of the property owner, and his employees, in protecting property and life.) Some factors to be considered are:

a. What are the geographic limits within the authority of management?

b. What are local laws and statutes concerning security force being armed? Their use of weapons?

c. With what type weapons can they be armed?

d. What actions can the security force take during a civil disturbance?

e. How and under what conditions might they exercise "citizens arrest?"

f. Under what conditions can force be used? How much force can be used?

g. The advisability of **deputizing** the security force?

h. Are the legal limits of authority the same for "normal" (day to day) conditions and "emergency" conditions?

3. LIAISON AND COORDINATION. (List the names (positions), telephone numbers, law enforcement agencies, (local, State and Federal) with whom the plan has been coordinated and liaison should be maintained.)

4. SECURITY FORCE. (The organization of the security force should be tailored to meet the requirements of a specific facility. The security force is the most effective and important element of security planning. It is the only in-house element capable of physically responding, utilizing judgment in an incident. The following factors should be considered relative to the security force.)

a. Qualification standards

(1) Age

(2) Loyalty

(3) Intelligence

(4) Physical Qualifications

(5) Dependability

(6) Cooperativeness

(7) Ability to exercise good judgment; possess courage; alertness, self reliance, tact and even temper

(8) Security clearances may be required in some instances

b. Training. These are basic essentials:

(1) Discipline

(2) Familiarization firing of weapons

(3) Use and safe practices and maintenance of weapons

(4) Legal limits of authority

(5) Procedures for apprehension and restraint to include citizens arrest

(6) Self-defense

(7) Actions during civil disturbances

(8) Actions in event of bomb threats

(9) Actions upon discovery of unexploded ordnance

(10) Elementary first aid and fire protection

(11) Communications procedures

(12) Report writing

(13) Employee and public relations

(14) Basic rescue techniques

c. Uniforms. (It is recommended that security personnel wear uniforms or clothing with distinctive markings. This facilitates identification and minimizes problems which could arise from lack of immediate recognition of the individual as a member of the security force.)

d. Weapons. (The matter of arming the security force is quite controversial. The decision must be made by management. Consideration should be given to the mission of the security force. If the mission is to protect life and property, can this be accomplished without firearms? Will the presence of an armed security force deter the omission or commission of destructive acts? Will the presence of firearms incite trouble? Management may decide not to arm the security force during normal operations, but rather to have weapons available to arm the force during an emergency.) The following factors should be considered and included in the plan:

(1) Type of weapon

(2) Registration of firearms (check with local Internal Revenue Service, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division)

(3) Procedures for issue and turn-in of weapons and ammunition

(4) Maintenance

(5) Inspections

(6) Frequency of familiarization firing. (At least annually.) If your security force is armed, the question is: What should their orders be?

First of all, armed security people must be thoroughly trained in the use of and when they are legally authorized to use the weapon with which they are armed. Even when they're proficient with weapons, be sure they know the consequences of firing. In all cases, the byword is discretion. Minimum force should be standard, for instance, a member of the security force shoots an escaping felon who turns out to be 15 years old. He was still an escaping felon, but once it happens, he'll never again be known as anything but a defenseless, young boy. You'll have a case on your hands. If you even restrain a trespasser, you can be in trouble.

e. Organization. (Security forces may be organized in any one or any combination of the following.)

(1) Regular force

(a) Fixed post deployment

(b) Patrol deployment

(2) Auxiliary force. (An auxiliary security force should be established to supplement the regular force during an emergency. Personnel should be selected from the employee population and trained in their emergency security function.)

f. Shift changes. (Show the times of shift changes and tours of duty. Shift change times should not be the same as the time for employee shift changes. It is well to consider establishing shift changes of the security force at least one hour in advance of or one hour after employee changes.

g. Communications. Adequate communications are essential to the effective operation of the security force during normal times and especially in the event of a civil disturbance or other emergency. Consideration should be given to a communication system for the exclusive use of the security force. The type and comprehensiveness of the system will vary with the size of the facility and the size of the force.

h. Limitations of security force functions. (Members of the regular force should have no "fire fighting" or other duties. Cross training to provide an in depth-dual capability is acceptable. Such emergencies offer an excellent diversion to cover the entrance of a saboteur, or dissident groups. During such incidents the security force should be more than normally alert in the performance of its primary mission.)

5. PERIMETER BARRIERS. (Fences and other anti-personnel barriers are the physical media by which the boundaries of a facility, or restricted area with a facility, are physically defined for protection and control. The fundamental purposes of such barriers are to define the area, impede access or intrusion, aid security personnel, channel the flow of personnel and vehicles, and provide a psychological deterrent.)

a. Types of barriers:

(1) Natural (body of water, cliffs, canyons, or other terrain difficult to traverse.)

(2) Structural (buildings, chain link fence, barbed wire) Natural barriers should be reinforced by a structural system of barriers.

b. Construction:

(1) Chain link fence.

(a) Minimum height of chain link portion—7 feet.

(b) Mesh openings not larger than 2″ square.

(c) Number 11 gauge or heavier wire.

(d) Twisted barbed selvage—top and bottom.

(e) Extend to within 2″ of firm ground or below the surface if soil is sandy and easily wind blown or shifted.

(f) Fence mesh should be drawn taut and securely fastened to rigid metal posts set in concrete. Additional bracing, as necessary, should be placed at corners and gate openings.

(g) Topped with a 45° outward and upward extending arm bearing 3 strands of barbed wire stretched taut and spaced to increase the vertical height of the fence by approximately 1 foot.

(h) Provided with culverts, troughs, or other openings, where necessary, to prevent washouts in the barrier. If such openings are larger than 96 square inches in area they should be provided additional protection.

(i) Checked (inspected) periodically for undergrowth, damage or deterioration.

(2) Masonry walls when used as perimeter barriers should have a minimum height of 7 feet and topped by a barbed wire guard as indicated, or have a minimum height of 8 feet and be topped by a layer of broken glass set on edge and cemented to the top surface.

(3) Building walls, floors, roofs, and dikes, when serving as perimeter barriers, should in general be of such construction and so arranged as to provide uniform protection equivalent to that provided by chain link fencing as specified. **If buildings form a part of the perimeter barrier—protective grill work or laminated shatter proof glass should be installed to increase the protection for windows, doors or other openings.**

(4) Bodies of water. If a lake or stream forms one side or any part of the perimeter, it in itself should not be considered an adequate perimeter barrier. Additional security measures must be provided for that portion of the perimeter, such as a fence or frequent guard patrol and flood lighting.

c. Posting. Post with "no trespass" signs in accordance with criminal laws of the state.

d. Protective lighting.

(1) Inspect the perimeter barrier to insure that it is properly maintained and properly lighted.

(2) Without doubt, lighting is the best security bargain available. Most riot and firebomb damage occurs after dark, and nothing discourages hit and run types like full coverage, glare lighting. They don't know whether a camera—or an armed guard—may be waiting beyond the glare. You may be able to reposition existing lighting for this purpose, but light the villain, not the target. And don't make the mistake of relying entirely on mercury protective lighting, because even a momentary power dip can mean several minutes of darkness.

(3) One solution is direct substitution of instant-starting combination incandescent mercury lamps for some of the straight mercuries. Light output and wattage remain essentially the same. Another is to use low-cost quartz iodine fixtures on weighted pedestals on the plant roof.

(4) Insure continuous lighting in parking lots, and on ground floors.

(5) Use screening to protect lighting fixtures against rocks and other objects.

e. Vehicle parking. Vehicle parking should be located outside of the security fence or wall. (This reduces the fire potential from gasoline in vehicle tanks and minimizes the hazard of explosives and incendiary devices which are easily concealed in a vehicle.)

f. Intrusion detection devices. Anti-intrusion alarm devices are employed for the purpose of detecting and announcing proximity or intrusion which endangers or may endanger the security of a facility. These systems are utilized to accomplish one or more of the following purposes:

(1) To permit more economical and efficient use of manpower by substituting mobile responding security units for larger numbers of fixed security posts and/or patrols.

(2) To take the place of other necessary elements of plant security which cannot be used because of building layout, safety regulations, operating requirements, appearance, cost, or other reasons.

(3) To provide additional controls at vital areas as insurance against human or mechanical failure.

The advantage of a protective alarm is measurable reliability. While there is a wide range of complexity between the various alarm systems, each can be tested and evaluated to determine what degree of security can be expected from the device. Detection devices are usually designed to detect a single phenomenon. The choice of the type detection device to be employed is based upon what will be most readily detectable in the given situation. It may be desirable in some cases to employ more than one type of detection device to protect against all possible methods of entry. Usually, similar equipment is manufactured by several companies. Such equipment will operate on the same basic principles, but may well differ in refinements. These differences may, under certain circumstances, alter the degree of security provided.

The most common detection devices are:

a. Electro-mechanical devices are designed to effectively place a current carrying conductor between the intruder and the area to be protected. The most common in this category are foils, screens, contact switches and vibration detections which are damaged or disturbed by penetration (usually used for protection of doors, windows, ducts, and nonsubstantial walls or partitions).

b. Photoelectric device, whereby interruption of virtually invisible beam of light is detected. This device is highly effective in detecting vehicular movement since it is impractical to move vehicles over or under the beam.

c. Proximity detection device operates by surrounding an object with an electrical field in such a balance that, any disturbance of the field creates imbalance in the system that results in the initiation of an alarm. There are two different types of proximity alarms—electromagnetic and the capacitance. Both of these systems lend themselves to use as fence alarms and the capacitance device is also effective for interior use.

d. Acoustic detection device actuates by the sound or vibration made by the intruder during his approach or as a result of his attempt to gain entry. Environmental conditions must be carefully evaluated before applying these devices since peripheral noise will cause false alarms.

e. Movement detection devices are designed to create an alarm when there is movement of any sort within the established limits of the device. There are two types of movement detection devices: Ultrasonic and Radar.

(1) Ultrasonic detects movement by the reflection of sound waves which causes electronic control units to trigger an alarm signal.

(2) Radar detection is designed to serve any doppler shift in the frequency of transmitted signals. The movement of a human being within the sensitive detection field will generate an alarm signal.

The use of alarms in the protective program of a restricted area or facility may be required in certain instances because of the critical importance of the area or the facility and, in other instances, because of situations and conditions pertaining to the location or the layout of the area or facility. In some instances, their use may be justified as a more economical and efficient substitute for other necessary protective elements. In determining whether the use of alarms in a restricted area is essential or advisable, the various conditions and situations peculiar to the restricted area or facility will, of course, affect the ultimate decision. However, in general, the following criteria should form the basis for a determination of the use of alarms:

a. The critical importance and vulnerability of certain restricted areas or facilities require the additional control and insurance against human or mechanical failure which is provided by alarms systems. In this group are:

(1) Restricted areas or facilities which, because of a concentration of vital components, materials, or data, are attractive, high-priority targets for sabotage, theft, espionage, or other criminal acts.

(2) Critical processes and process controls.

(3) Very important restricted areas or facilities where it is desirable to have admission controlled by both guards and operational employees, or where it it desirable for operators to deny access to guards.

b. In certain cases due to restrictions imposed by location, layout, or construction, alarms are necessary to take the place of the more usual protective elements such as fences, lighting, patrols, etc. Included in this group are:

(1) Restricted areas or facilities which, because of proximity to adjacent structures, activities, or property lines, require the use of alarms in lieu of physical barriers to limited or exclusion areas.

(2) Restricted areas or facilities which are difficult or impossible to protect effectively due to terrain conditions, personnel hazards, or atmospheric conditions, and where other types of protection are not effective or practicable.

(3) Restricted areas or facilities, or components which are small, or remote areas requiring more than safe and lock protection but not justifying a full time guard.

c. Alarm systems, because of their cost, are justified only where their use results in a commensurate reduction or when need dictates a

higher level of protection to include a more positive or fail safe method of detecting unauthorized entry. In determining the advisability of substituting alarms for other protective elements, a careful comparison of relative costs is essential. This should include service and maintenance charges. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that many alarm systems have little salvage value and, consequently, the longevity of the activity being protected is an important consideration. The advice of a competent engineer from a reputable firm dealing in protective devices and signal alarms should be obtained when considering protective alarm systems.

To afford the required degree of protection and be acceptable as protective units, alarm installations should meet the following requirements:

a. The system should be so designed that the interval of time between the detection of activity and the achievement of the objective of such activity is sufficient to permit the application of necessary countermeasures.

b. Central station systems should be specified for all locations where security personnel are not continually in the immediate vicinity to pick up a local alarm signal and make adequate response.

c. All systems, materials, and equipment should meet the Underwriter's Laboratories, Inc. standards where applicable, for the purpose for which they are used.

Generally, it may be stated that there are two types of intrusion detection systems:

a. A central station system is one in which the operation of electrical protective circuits and devices is automatically signaled to a central station which has a trained response force and operators in attendance at all times. The central station monitors the signal end of the system, provides the response to a signal, and supervises the functioning of the system.

b. A local alarm system is one in which the protective circuits and devices are connected to a visual and/or audible signal element which is located at or in the immediate vicinity of the protected facility or component, and which is responded to by security personnel in the immediate vicinity.

6. CONTROL OF ENTRY. (Develop procedures for positive identification and control of employees, visitors and vehicles. A positive means of identifying employees is the use of a photograph identification card. Samples of the identification media should be given to law enforcement officials. (This is essential for getting through police lines and during times of curfew.) Coordinate with the police the category of personnel essential to plant operations, i.e., engineer, maintenance, etc.)

7. PROTECTION OF CRITICAL AREAS. (Identify and list critical areas within the plant.) (Refer to annex VIII.)

a. Enclose critical areas with physical barriers.

b. Designate specific personnel who are to have access to critical areas.

c. Admittance to critical areas should be controlled by:

(1) The guard force, or

(2) Supervisory personnel

(3) Where locks are used, they should be rotated upon notification of impending civil disorder or other emergency.

d. Develop a key control system

e. Develop package and material control procedures. (All packages and materials going into or out of critical areas should be checked.)

f. Institute procedures to protect gasoline pumps and other dispensers of flammable material. Disconnect power source to electrically operated pumps.

8. ARMS ROOMS

a. Keep arms rooms

(1) Locked

(2) Under 24-hour surveillance

b. Ammunition

(1) Stored in locked separate location

(2) Under 24-hour surveillance

9. PERSONNEL SECURITY.

a. Conduct pre-employment check of applicants, in accordance with existing laws.

(1) State and local police

(2) Former employers

(3) References ~~(not limited to those provided by applicant)~~

(4) High schools ~~(be watchful for falsification of education and background)~~

(5) Colleges and universities

~~b. Check Selective Service Classifications~~

~~(1) Registration certificate~~

~~(2) Notice of classification~~

~~(3) Selective service number~~

~~(4) Local selective service board number~~

c. Military Service and type discharge ~~(have applicant show discharge papers)~~

d. Make personnel checks, of persons who are authorized access to critical areas.

e. Brief employees regarding the importance of plant security and the need for exercising vigilance.

10. REPORTING OF INCIDENTS. (Show procedures as to how, when, where and to whom incidents will be reported.)

11. BOMB THREATS. (See appendix I.)

12. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION. (Prepare an emergency notification list or chart of personnel to be notified in the event of civil disturbance, or other emergency.) This list must be kept current.

13. EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN. (Indicate procedures to be followed by security personnel during and after shutdown.)

14. SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. (Specify procedures for safeguarding or removal of classified material. Security personnel should know how to contact custodians of classified material. They should also be advised of actions to be taken with regard to the Department of Defense Industrial Security Cognizant Office, if applicable.)

ANNEX V

Utilities and Services

The importance of utilities and services during an emergency cannot be overemphasized. The disruption of communications, electric power, water, transportation or fuel sources could seriously impair or stop production. It is essential that these utilities and services be considered critical to the continuity of operations; that they be properly protected and adequate emergency back-ups be developed. Essential utilities and services to be considered are listed below. The details for each should be coordinated with the respective utility or service company.

a. Communications

(1) Coordinate with local telephone companies

(2) Adequately cover plant area

(3) Back-up primary system with two-way radios, walkie-talkies, field telephones, or megaphones (bull horns).

(4) Monitor local and state police radios

(5) Monitor fire department radios

(6) Monitor hospital and ambulance radios

(7) Establish communications with adjacent plants and businesses.

(8) Establish communications with management and key employees.

(9) Train switchboard operators in emergency procedures

(10) Inquire as to availability of telephone—radio mobile equipment—license and frequency are assigned to the common carrier.

(11) Designate male operators as alternates for females who may not report.

(12) Unlisted telephone numbers, at control center, for use by management and key executives. Don't have all telephone numbers plainly listed—a few determined harassing callers can keep your lines occupied.

b. Electric power

(1) Coordinate this portion of the plan with local electric power companies.

(2) Emergency Power

(An auxiliary source for providing sufficient emergency power for lighting and other essentials. This should not be construed to mean a stand-by capability to continue full production operations. The following items are suggested:)

(a) Generators

1. Show size and location

2. Fuel supply

3. Operators

(b) Battery-powered equipment

1. Flashlights

2. Lanterns

3. Other battery powered sources of illumination

c. Water

(1) Secondary source for fire fighting, essential operational needs, drinking, and sanitation.

(2) Location of primary water main.

d. Transportation

(1) Primary routes of ingress and egress

(2) Alternate (emergency) routes

(3) Accessibility of alternate routes to suppliers

e. Fuel sources, i.e., pipelines, coal, and diesel fuel. (Stockpiling for emergency use should be considered.)

ANNEX VI

Planning Coordination and Liaison

This is a most important element of the plan and is designed to assure mutual planning approaches and objectives. It also provides a means of keeping you abreast of the social climate and receiving advance warning of the imminence and possible magnitude of a disturbance. Coordination and liaison should be maintained with:

a. Facility members and locations. (List the name and location of each industrial facility or organization of the mutual aid pact, or with which coordination has been affected. Indicate, who in each facility or organization can approve the implementation of the pact during a civil disturbance. Also include any other mutual aid pacts with which you may unilateral agreements. Show restrictions, if any, on mutual aid assistance during riots or civil disturbances.)

b. Local, State and Federal officials. (List the name, location and telephone number of each agency with which coordination has been accomplished:)

(1) Law enforcement
(2) Fire departments
(3) Adjacent plants and business firms
(4) Employee union officials
(5) Local utilities
(6) Local news media for news release policy

c. Communications and control. (List the primary and alternate methods of communications that will be used to alert the mutual aid pact members and local state and federal agencies and your facility. Include methods of alerting during normal working hours and non-working hours. Include the methods that will be used in controlling personnel at the scene of the emergency, including direction of police, fire and emergency vehicles and crews. Coordination must be made in advance for use of facility security personnel, state, and county police, as applicable.)

d. Facility responsibilities.

(1) Personnel. (List by job title the various skills that you have agreed to furnish the mutual aid organization. Maintain a current roster of these personnel by name, with alternates. Include supervisory responsibilities when aid is required.)

(2) Equipment. (List the material and equipment that your facility will have available for mutual aid. Establish a method of having the material and equipment delivered as needed.)

e. Other participants' responsibilities.

(1) Personnel. (List by job title or skill, the personnel to be furnished by other mutual aid participants. Indicate procedure for their

reporting, utilization and control. Indicate responsiblity for control and supervision for each group.)

(2) Equipment. (List the material and equipment that may be obtained from other mutual aid members. All items should be listed by location and include procedure for obtaining them.)

f. Operational procedures. (List special limitations, legal aspects, feeding and transportation of personnel, prorating cost and use of any special items not covered above.)

Note.—The Mutual Aid Pact or Coordination Agreement may be substituted for part of this annex.

ANNEX VII

Records Protection

1. CLASSES OF RECORDS.

a. Administrative. (Indicate those records needed by the administrative functions of the facility, to include as a minimum payroll, accounting, personnel and sales records.)

b. Operational. (Indicate those records needed by the operations, engineering, or maintenance sections, and production records.)

2. REPRODUCTION METHODS AND PRIORITY. (Indicate the methods that wil be used to reproduce administrative and operational records. Protection considerations should be given to microfilming, use of film sort cards, carbon copies, photocopying, and duplicate records. Specify the records in order of priority for reproduction. Reproduction of classified material must be coordinated with the issuing agency. Defense contractors are governed by the provisions of DOD 5220.22—M, [redacted], subject: Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information.)

3. PROTECTION OF RECORDS. (Indicate the location of reproduced or duplicated records. Consideration for the location of duplicate records should be given to the use of alternate headquarters, small town banks, commercial depositories, the homes of key employees living out of the probable damage area, and vaulting in special circumstances. If classified material is stored, suitable clearance from the issuing agency must be obtained for the location where the documents are to be stored. Special instructions should be included for protecting records in the hands of employees at the time of the emergency.)

4. PROTECTION OF COMPUTERS. (Do not rely solely on the "machine" to protect its content. The wide use of computers today has resulted in a "false" sense of security. Computer has no immunity from the vagaries of mankind. Tapes, cards and discs require the same degree of protection provided for ledgers, journals and other hard copy records in the days preceding the computer era. Computer protection comprises physical means of protecting against tampering and misuse and protection against fire.)

5. OPERATIONS. (List special instructions for handling and storage of records. Indicate the person or persons charged with record protection responsibilities and establish his definite authority.)

6. CASH, NEGOTIABLES AND OTHER VALUABLES. (Procedures should be developed for the immediate removal and protection of these items. Items of "attraction" and value should be removed from show windows and display areas.)

ANNEX VIII

Damage Reduction

1. FUNCTIONAL AREAS.

a. Criticality. (List functional areas, in order of priority, most critical to overall facility operations. This should include consideration for all types of emergencies.)

b. Protection. (Functional areas most critical to the overall operation and/or production should be given priority of protection, prior to, during and after the emergency.) Refer to Plant Security annex.

(1) Buildings. (Include measures for reinforcing walls, roofs, floors and protection of wall openings such as windows and doors of existing buildings. These protection factors should be considered in new constructions.)

(2) Machinery. (Factors to be considered are dispersal, protection of one piece of equipment by use of another, and parts removal.)

(3) Hand tools. (Indicate individual action and responsibilities for protection of hand tools. Include tool crib dispersal.)

(4) Special equipment. (Indicate methods used or to be used to disperse on- or off-site parts, sub-assemblies, completed items, jigs, dies, patterns, moulds and other critical items.)

(5) Transportation. (Indicate dispersal location of transportation equipment to protect machine tools.)

(6) Utilities. (Indicate protection afforded utilities and include location and protection of electrical transformers at load centers and communications centers.) Refer to Plant Security annex and Utilities annex.

2. SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES. (Specify shutdown procedures to include methods and sequence for individual sections within the facility and the facility as a whole. Designate title (positions) of individuals responsible for implementing shutdown procedures.) Refer to Item 12, Plant Security annex.

3. FIRE CONTROL. (See Fire Prevention annex.)

4. DISPERSION. (Consider the dispersion of machinery, material and personnel.)

5. OTHER MEASURES. (List other measures peculiar to your facility that may be necessary to minimize damage.)

ANNEX IX

Restoration

1. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONTROL. (Show plans and control of reconstruction and restoring damaged areas.)

2. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

a. Internal reporting. (Indicate procedure for reporting damage within the facility to the control center. The damage reported should be assessed for overall effect on the facility and as a guide for restoration.)

b. External reporting.

(1) Indicate procedure for reporting damage from facility tc corporate/company/system.

(2) Indicate procedure for reporting damage to local agencies and news media if applicable.)

3. RESTORATION MEASURES.

a. Alternate sources of supply. (List the names and addresses of those firms which can be used as a source of alternate supply. List agreements that have been made with them.)

b. Stockpile. (Cover information concerning inventory of essential raw material, component parts, parts for machine tools and maintenance, and critical machinery.)

c. Alternate production method. (Indicate those processes that lend themselves to alternate methods even though they may be slower and more costly. Outline the alternate methods and indicate conditions under which they will be put into effect.)

d. Sub-contracting. (Indicate those facilities or installations with which sub-contract agreements have been made.)

e. Utilities. (List the requirements of each subsection for continued operation. Include agreements with local utilities and others having facilities for furnishing the following utilities: electricity, water, gas, sewage, fuel.) Refer to Utilities annex.)

f. Salvage procedures. (List procedures for salvaging and rebuilding machinery, equipment and buildings.)

g. Transportation. (Based upon anticipated loss of transportation and remaining capability determine additional requirement, if any.)

ANNEX X

Emergency Requirements

These requirements should be based on estimated needs for the duration of the emergency. These items should be pre-stocked because conditions may preclude their procurement during the emergency. Unused portions can be carried over for post-emergency use.

a. Food, water and medical supplies

b. Emergency repair tools and equipment

c. Administrative supplies office equipment

d. Provide emergency sanitation facilities

e. Designate separate sleeping quarters for male and female employees

f. Maintain an inventory of 55 gallon drums to be filled with water or sand to reinforce barricades at entrances

g. Have on hand barbed wire to form a barrier directly in front of each row of 55 gallon drums. Concertina type wire is very effective

h. Maintain supply of panels or screen mesh to protect windows on ground floors

i. Develop procedures for employees to purchase gasoline from plant supply in case local stations are closed

ANNEX XI

Testing The Plan

Frequent testing and correcting the plan will improve its effectiveness upon implementation under actual conditions. An emergency plan, like a chain, is no stronger than its weakest link.

a. Types of tests. (Specify type of tests, whether partial or complete and when umpires or observers are to be present. Indicate frequency of partial or complete tests.)

(1) Partial—testing individual segments of the plan

(2) Complete—testing entire plan

b. Tests should be unannounced.

c. Weaknesses should be noted and the plan revised to include corrective actions. (Include reports of test results by observers or umpires and action to be taken by designated company official to improve techniques and take corrective action on deficiencies:)

Date and type of test	Deficiencies	Corrective Action and plan change

Note.—In order not to interfere with production or operations to a great degree, it is suggested that, initially, tests to determine adequacy of the plan be conducted on an individual annex basis, i.e., control center operations, plant security, coordination, etc. When these individual annexes prove effective, an overall test should be conducted.

APPENDIX I

Industrial Defense Against Bomb Threats

The following is a list of actions to be considered in coping with this very complex problem of bomb threats:

Selection of Target

The target for "terrorist bombings" are not usually selected at random. The modus operandi for selecting the target and planting the explosive appears to follow a pattern. The target is usually selected based on political gain to the terrorists.

It may be kept under surveillance to determine the entrances and exits most used, and the time of day when the majority of people enter or leave the building. This is done presumably to determine the hours when there are no people, or at least very few people in the building. A reconnaissance of the building may be made to locate an area where the explosive can be concealed to do the most damage, and where the bomber is least likely to be observed.

A rehearsal of the plan is often made to insure against slip-ups during the operation. After the rehearsal and at a predetermined time, the building is infiltrated by the bomber. The explosive or incendiary device may be fully or partially pre-set prior to planting. If it is fully set and charged, it is a simple matter for one or two persons to plant the device in a pre-selected concealed area in a minimum of time. If the device is not fully set and charged, one may act as a lookout while the other arms and places the device. The devices are usually of the time delay type. They can be set for detonation at a time sufficient for the bomber to be a considerable distance away before the bomb-threat call is made and the device is detonated.

COORDINATION

1. Contact the police, fire department, or other local government agencies and determine whether any of these agencies have a Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU).
2. If a local BDU is available:
   a. Under what conditions can it be utilized?
   b. Will it assist in the physical search of the building, or is it to be used only for disarming or removing explosives?
   c. Telephone number of the BDU.
   d. Procedures to be followed for obtaining the service of the BDU in the event of a bomb threat.
3. If a local BDU is not available recommend to the appropriate local agency that contact be made with the nearest Military Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control Unit (EODC). Information pertaining to these units is attached.

4. Arrange, if possible, to have police and/or fire representatives, with members of your staff, inspect the building(s) for areas where explosives or time delay incendiaries might be placed and concealed. A review of the architectural plan of the building(s) might accomplish this in some measure.
5. In the case of multi-tenant buildings, a committee should be formed with representatives from each major tenant to develop a complete, well coordinated plan for the entire building.
6. Coordinate with local telephone company for availability and legal usage of equipment for recording bomb threat calls.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Designate a control center, preferably the switchboard room or other focal point of telephone/radio communications.
2. Designate management personnel to operate the control center and make decisions on actions to be taken during the period of the threat.
3. Designate management personnel to control search and evacuation procedures and report information to the control center.
4. Consider a temporary relocation in the event there is an explosion and the building is rendered untenable for a considerable period of time.

EVACUATION

The decision to evacuate or not to evacuate may be made during the planning phase. Management may establish a policy that, in the event of a bomb threat, evacuation will be effected immediately. This decision reduces risk and gives prime consideration to the safety of personnel, but results in production down-time, and can be costly in terms of dollars if the threat is a hoax. The alternative is for management to make the decision at the time of the threat. There is no magic formula which can be applied to produce the proper decision.

The following actions are presented for your consideration:

1. Determine who will evaluate the threat and make the decision to evacuate or not to evacuate.
2. Establish a signal for evacuation. The signal may be the same as that used for fire. There is one problem in this regard. Normal procedure in case of fire is to close all doors and windows. In case of a bomb explosion, this could increase damage. You should consider a voice announcement for evacuation under conditions of a bomb threat. The announcement must be made calmly. Personnel should be instructed to leave all windows and doors open and proceed according to the preestablished evacuation plan.
3. Establish priority and routes of evacuation based on the type of building and location of personnel within the building upon receipt of a bomb threat.
4. Consider priority and routes of evacuation in the event a bomb is found in the building. This also will depend on the type building and location of personnel in relation to the area where the bomb is located. In multi-story buildings, personnel on floors above the danger area should be evacuated first. This can also be done simultaneous with the evacuation of lower levels.

5. If evacuation is effected upon receipt of a threat, are personnel expected to return to work upon completion of the search? Will they be dismissed for the remainder of the day, with pay?
6. Who makes the decision to permit re-entry into the building following a search in which no bomb was found?
7. If evacuation is effected and personnel held on standby pending completion of the search, an evacuation or "holding" area must be established and controlled. This area should be at a distance far enough away from the building to protect personnel against debris, etc., in the event of an explosion.
8. If evacuation is effected, and an explosion occurs, do employees draw full pay until the building is ready for occupancy?
9. Assume that a bomb threat is received, but evacuation is not effected. During the search the bomb explodes with resultant injury or death. What are your legal liabilities to employees? Customers? Visitors?
10. Who controls entry into the building during the search This may be managements responsibility exclusively or it may be performed concurrently by management and the police.
11. If the building is evacuated, all electricity, gas and fuel lines should be shut off at the main switch or valve. (There is some diversity of opinion as to whether electric power should be shut off. To leave it on increases the possibility of electrical fires. To shut it off leaves the building in darkness and may tend to hamper the search team. Check this with your local BDU.) "THE 'EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN' AND 'RESTART' PROCEDURE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PERSONNEL WHO ARE ENTIRELY COMPETENT TO SHUTDOWN OR RESTART THE PROCESS. BEFORE VALVES OR SWITCHES ARE CLOSED OR OPENED. ALL APPLIANCES, FURNACES, BOILERS, ETC., MUST BE CHECKED AND PROPERLY ADJUSTED TO INSURE SAFE AND ORDERLY SHUTDOWN AND RESTART."

TELEPHONE PROCEDURES

Instruct all personnel to follow established procedures in the event a bomb threat call is received. These procedures should include:

a. Keep the caller on the line as long as possible. Ask the caller to repeat the message. **Record every word spoken by the person making the call.**

b. If the caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of possible detonation, the person receiving the call should ask the caller to provide this information.

c. It may be advisable to inform the caller that the building is occupied and the detonation of a bomb could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people.

d. Pay particular attention for any strange or peculiar background noises such as, motors running, background music and the type music and any other noises which might give even a remote clue as to the place from which the call is being made.

e. Listen closely to the voice, (male–female) voice quality, accents and speech impediments. Immediately after the caller hangs up, the

person receiving the call should report this information to the person designated by management to receive such information.

f. The information should then be reported immediately to the police department, fire department, FBI and other agencies as appropriate. (The sequence of notification should have been established during the coordination phase).

PREVENTIVE CONSIDERATIONS

1. During the inspection of the building, particular attention should be given to such areas as elevator shafts, all ceiling areas, rest rooms, access doors and crawl space and other areas which are used as a means of immediate access to plumbing fixtures, electrical fixtures and the like, utility and other closet areas, areas under stairwells, boiler (furnace) rooms, flammable storage areas, main switches and valves, e.g., electric, gas, and fuel, indoor trash receptacles, record storage areas, mail rooms, ceiling lights with easily removable panels, and fire hose racks. While this list of areas to be noted with particular emphasis is not complete, it is sufficient to give an idea of those areas where a time-delayed explosive or an incendiary device might be concealed.
2. Establish and enforce strict procedures for control and inspection of packages and material going into critical areas.
3. Develop and enforce a positive means of identifying and controlling personnel who are authorized access to critical areas and denying access to unauthorized personnel.
4. Instruct all security and maintenance personnel to be alert for suspicious looking and acting people. All personnel should be alert for foreign or suspicious objects, items or parcels which do not appear to belong in the area where such items or parcels are observed.
5. Instruct all security and maintenance personnel to increase surveillance of all rest rooms, stairwells, areas under stairwells and other areas of the building to insure that unauthorized personnel are not in hiding in or reconnoitering these areas.
6. Insure that doors and/or access ways to such areas as boiler rooms, mail rooms, computer areas, switchboards, elevator machine rooms and utility closets are securely locked when not in use.
7. Check key control procedures to see that all keys to all locks are accounted for. If keys are in possession of persons no longer in your employment, or keys cannot be accounted for—**locks should be changed.**
8. Check fire exits to be sure they are not obstructed.
9. Check fire hose racks and fire extinguishers regularly to assure they have not been tampered with, i.e., hoses cut or exposed to acid and nozzles damaged.
10. Increase patrols/surveillance of receiving and shipping areas, garages and parking areas.
11. Assure adequate protection for classified documents, proprietary information and other records essential to the operation of your plant. (A well planted, properly charged device could, upon detonation, destroy records which are vital to day-to-day operations.)
12. Check perimeter fences/walls/barriers to assure a good state of maintenance and adequate clear zones. Post with "No Trespass" signs.

13. Check all exterior and protective lighting for proper operation and adequate illumination.
14. Protect ground floor windows with heavy mesh, grill work, or protective glass.
15. Conduct daily check for good housekeeping and proper disposal or protection of combustible material.
16. Have on hand, or arrange for immediate procurement of sand, sand bags or mattresses to be used as shielding in the event an explosive device is located in the building.
17. Have flashlights or battery operated lanterns on hand, in the event electric power is cut off.
18. Install closed circuit television to monitor areas where a bomb might be placed.
19. Install metal detecting devices.
20. Post signs indicating the use of closed circuit televisions and other detection devices.
21. Entrances and exits to and from buildings could possibly be modified, with a minimal expenditure of funds, to channel all personnel by a registration desk upon entering or leaving the building. Persons entering the building would be required to sign a register showing the name and room number of the person whom they wish to visit. Employees manning these registration desks could contact the person to be visited and advise that a visitor, by name, is in the lobby. The person to be visited may, in the interest of security and protection, decide to come to the lobby to meet with this individual to ascertain that the purpose of the visit is in fact valid and official. A system for "signing out" when the individual departs the building could be integrated into this procedure. There is no question that the institution of such a procedure would result in many complaints from the public. On the other hand, if it were explained to the visitor at the registration desk that these procedures are being implemented in the best interest and perhaps protection or safety of the visitor, this might tend to reduce complaints.

SEARCH TECHNIQUE

1. The search can be expedited if conducted by personnel who are familiar with the building and its content.
2. Areas housing critical equipment/machinery should be searched by personnel most familiar with the area and the equipment.
3. A staff member or supervisor should be designated as floor or area warden for each floor of the building, or perhaps several area wardens for single story buildings. Wardens should be responsible for directing the search of their areas, receiving information from search personnel and relaying it to the control center.
4. Alert medical personnel to standby during the search. This provides immediate medical attention in the event of accidental or premature detonation.
5. Alert fire brigade personnel to standby to operate fire fighting equipment.
6. An effective search technique is as follows:
   a. Security, maintenance and janitorial personnel search such areas

as hallways, restrooms, stairwells, elevator shafts, utility closets, and areas **outside** the building.

b. Supervisory and office personnel search their immediate office areas.

c. As the search of each area is completed, and no suspicious objects found, a report is given to the appropriate warden.

d. A sign or marker indicating "Search Completed—Area Clear" should be posted conspicuously in the area.

e. **SUSPICIOUS OBJECT LOCATED:**

NOTE: It is imperative that plant personnel involved in the search be instructed that their mission is only to search for and report suspicious objects, NOT to move, jar or touch the object or anything attached thereto. The removal/disarming of a bomb must be left to the professionals in explosive ordnance disposal.

(1) The location and a description of the object as can best be provided, should be reported to the appropriate warden. This information is relayed immediately to the control center who will call police, fire department and rescue squad. When these agencies arrive, they should be met and escorted to the scene.

(2) Sandbags or mattresses, **not metal shield plates,** should be placed around the object. **DO NOT ATTEMPT TO COVER THE OBJECT.**

(3) Th danger area should be identified, and blocked off with a clear zone of at least 300 feet—include area below and above the object.

(4) Check to see that all doors and windows are open to minimize primary damage from blast and secondary damage from fragmentation.

(5) Evacuate the building.

(6) Do not permit re-entry into the building until the device has been removed/disarmed, and the building declared safe for re-entry.

7. Communications during search.

a. A rapid two way communication system is of utmost importance. Normally communications between wardens, search teams and the control center can be accomplished through the existing telephone system, or building inter-communication system.

b. In many instances, two way (walkie-talkie) radios have been used. **CAUTION:** The use of radios could be dangerous. The radio beam could cause premature detonation of an electric initiator (blasting cap).

PANIC CONTROL

Panic is defined as "a sudden, unreasoning, hysterical fear, often spreading quickly." Panic is caused by fear, although those involved may not know what they fear. People may be tempted to join a fleeing crowd; the fright of those in motion is enough to suggest the presence of something to fear. When this stage is reached, it may become difficult to control the group. Attempting to reason with such a crowd may be futile, but it may be possible to control the group by assuming leadership or distracting key members of the group. In any case, corrective action should be taken before the movement stage, if possible.

a. **Panic Deterrents.**—An effective pre-emergency program of informing personnel what is expected of them in an emergency coupled with the example of strong, competent leadership by officers of the organization will go far toward preventing panic. To reduce the likelihood of panic, the physical causes of panic should be eliminated. In an emergency, the organization should be prepared to remove the injured and the dead from general view, clear away debris which appears to cut off escape; quickly control fire; and approach any disturbance with calmness. Pre-emergency preparations should include arrangements to facilitate routes to be taken in evacuating the building or going to shelter; and locating organization personnel where they can take command and give calm, decisive instructions at places where groups are likely to congregate.

b. **Antidotes for Panic.**—In certain circumstances, it is conceivable that, despite pre-emergency preparations, an unorganized group may be on the verge of panic. Organization personnel should be prepared to deal with this in terms of the following principles:

(1) **Provide Assurance.**—Exert positive leadership. Reassure the group by giving information and instructions calmly.

(2) **Eliminate Unrest.**—Dispel rumors. Identify troublemakers and prevent them from spreading discontent and fear.

(3) **Demonstrate Decisiveness.**—Suggest positive actions. Indicate what to do, rather than what not to do.

In summary, these are recommendations—in the final analysis of this entire complex problem, the decision is yours.

ORDNANCE DETACHMENTS
(EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CONTROL)

FIRST US ARMY EOD CONTROL CENTER
542nd/549th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
b. Telephone: 301 677–5182 or 677–5183.
c. Area of Responsibility: ME, NH, VT, NY, MA, CT, NJ, PA, DE, MD, OH, VA, WV, KY, RI, and MDW.

THIRD US ARMY EODC
547th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Mc Pherson, GA 30330
b. Telephone:
(1) Duty hours: 404 752–3004, 752–3055
(2) Non duty hours: 404 752–3113
c. Area of Responsibility: NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, TN

FOURTH US ARMY EODC
546th ORD DET (E)DC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
b. Telephone:
(1) Duty hours: 512 221–4646, 221–5308
(2) Non duty hours: 512 221–5500, 221–[illegible]
c. Area of Responsibility: TX, LA, AR, OK, NM

FIFTH US ARMY EODC
543rd ORD DET (EODC)

a. Mailing Address: Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473
b. Telephone: 314 368–3814, 368–4313
c. Area of Responsibility: ND, SD, WY, CO, KS, MO, IA, WI, MN, IL, IN, MI, NB.

SIXTH US ARMY EODC
548th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129
b. Telephone: 415 561–4203, 561–4312
c. Area of Responsibility: CA, WA, OR, AZ, NV, ID, MT, UT

Incl 1 to Appendix I

APPENDIX II
Industrial Sabotage

The scope of sabotage in which American industry has an interest is much broader than the enemy agent or foreign trained saboteur. It goes beyond the limits of the legal definition.

The saboteur is not necessarily a foreign national or of foreign parentage. He may be a highly trained professional or a rank amateur. He may be a laborer, a machinist, a foreman, a top-flight engineer, or even a member of management. He may be anyone. But one thing is certain—he is likely to be one of the least suspected members of the organization. His motives may be as varied as his personality. He may work for love of his native land; for pay; for hatred, for sincere if misguided, devotion to a cause; for revenge; to settle a real or imaginary grievance; or under threat of blackmail or fear of reprisal against relatives in a foreign country.

Generally, there are two basic types of saboteurs. The first is the enemy agent. He is usually directed, trained, supported and supplied by a sabotage organization. He coordinates his activities in an overall effort to impede or disrupt our industrial potential. He may attack his targets directly from the outside; however, if he cannot penetrate the facility's outer defenses, he may infiltrate the facility as an employee and lie dormant for a considerable period of time, withholding any act of sabotage until directed by his superiors. This "dormant" enemy agent, while an employee, will probably be industrious and outwardly apparently harmless. He will do his utmost to avoid suspicion. He will become familiar with all phases of operations by showing interest in the work of others. By thoroughly examining the entire facility for security, and for structural and functional vulnerabilities, he can fit together his complete scheme of sabotage. He will never reveal any anti-American or anti-production sympathies; he will probably be well-liked and respected, and may be considered by some to be a model employee.

The second type, the "individualist" or "independent" saboteur, commits acts of sabotage for personal reasons and has no affiliation with a foreign power or military group. He might be the disgruntled employee who commits sabotage for revenge; he might be mentally ill; he could be a person who has been duped by enemy propaganda. Since sabotage essentially is an inside job, and requires the assistance, knowingly or unknowingly, of someone inside, he may be the sabotage contact or key within a plant or facility. The efforts of this type of saboteur are exceedingly difficult to detect. In many instances, his actions cannot be predicted or anticipated. Although he will have no particular training for sabotage, his presence and familiarity with the facility pose a serious problem, for he may strike at anytime, anywhere.

No facility is immune to attack, for some form of sabotage can be committed despite efforts to prevent it. The enemy will attack production anywhere between the raw material stage and the delivery of the finished product; he will attack any facility where loss of production, even though temporary, would hinder or retard the war effort of a nation. The large industrial complexes established for the production of newly-developed weapons of war, dispersed or not, have expanded the field of operations for the saboteur. However, there is no reason for guesswork in determining the probability of attack by the saboteur. The type of targets in a given area, as well as where and how they may be attacked, can usually be predicted with reasonable accuracy. The saboteur will look for a target which is critical, vulnerable, accessible, and at least partilly conducive to self-destruction.

Criticality and vulnerability are discussed in the plan outline. Target accessiblity will be closely related to target vulnerability; it refers to the ease with which the saboteur may approach the target. Accessibility depends primarily on two factors; the amount and type of plant security maintained, and the geographic location. In most cases, the security of the facility is the only factor which can be controlled. It should be noted that, from a saboteur's point of view, any target which is accessible is vulnerable to attack by at least one of many methods.

The capability of self-destruction is one of the more important elements of target susceptibility to sabotage. A target is said to be capable of self-destruction when its nature is such that it will continue its own destruction as a result of even a comparatively minor act of sabotage. For example, when a explosive charge is placed on a rail line at midpoint on a timber trestle bridge, the wheels of the locomotive will detonate the explosive, thus destroying the tracks. The continuing motion and weight of the train will not only destroy the bridge, but the train as well. Still another example would be a high-speed, revolving electric motor or generator, where a comparatively small disturbance in the alignment of the shaft would cause considerable damage to the target.

The tools and methods of sabotage are limited only by the skill and ingenuity of the saboteur. A major sabotage effort may be undertaken after thorough study of the physical layout of the facility and its production processes by technical personnel fully qualified to select the most effective means to strike one or more of the most critical and/or vulnerable parts of the facility. Sabotage may, on the other hand, be improvised by the saboteur relying solely upon his own knowledge of the facility and the materials available to him. Industrial engineers are well aware of the potential acts of sabotage which may be consummated through the use of materials readily available in the normal course of operations. Examples are the periodic availability of explosives intended for industrial purposes; product and process contamination by the use of additives and spoilers; incorrect cycle time-phasing; tampering with control devices, operating equipment, and so forth. The saboteur, in such a case, may or may not possess or need high degree of technical knowledge. Hence, the selected vehicle may range from the crude or elementary to the ingenious or scientific.

The methods of sabotage may be generally classified as follows:

a. Mechanical—breakage or omission of parts, substitution of improper or inferior parts, failure to lubricate or properly maintain.

b. Chemical—the insertion or addition of destructive or polluting chemicals in supplies, raw materials, equipment, or utility systems.

c. Explosive—damage or destruction by explosive devices or the detonation of explosive raw materials or supplies.

d. Fire—ordinary means of arson, including the use of incendiary devices ignited by mechanical, chemical, electric, or electronic means.

e. Electric or electronic—interfering with or interrupting power, jamming communications, interfering with electric and electronic processes.

f. Psychological—the inciting of strikes, jurisdictional disputes, boycotts, unrest, personal animosities; inducing excessive spoilage and inferior work, causing "slowdown" of operations or work stoppage by false alarms; character assassination; on a larger scale, the instigation of false political and economic public issues and the dissemination of inflammatory propaganda so as to break morale.

The prevention of sabotage involves the reduction of target accessibility and vulnerability. This may be accomplished by:

a. Institution of security measures to prevent unauthorized access to target areas.

b. Development of an employee security education program.

c. Security screening of employees, and the removal or relocation of known or suspected security risks.

d. Development of appropriate emergency plans and organizations.

e. Protective construction and/or modification of equipment or material design where appropriate.

The program for the prevention of sabotage must be dynamic and continuous; it must receive the full support of all echelons; and it must be so designed that it will complement operational requirements and situations.

APPENDIX III

CHECK LIST FOR INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE AGAINST CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND SABOTAGE

This check list is designed to provide a rapid inventory of the essential elements of your industrial defense plan.

Introduction

( ) Assure orderly and efficient transition from normal to emergency operations.
( ) Delegate emergency authority.
( ) Assign emergency responsibilities.
( ) Indicate authority by company executives for actions contained in plan.
( ) Vulnerability.
( ) Legal limits and liabilities.

Implementing Instructions

( ) Appoint individual(s) to implement plan.
( ) Specify conditions under which plan may be partially implemented.
( ) Specify conditions under which plan may be fully implemented.
( ) Coordinate plan among all responsible individuals to assure sequence of implementation.

Emergency Control Organization

( ) Prepare management succession list of executive and administrative personnel and key employees. Designate alternates.
( ) Assure that management continuity and emergency organization are in accord with state corporate laws and company charter or bylaws.
( ) Pre-publish company orders constituting emergency authority.

Control Center

The control center is the plant command post, the focal point for directing all emergency actions. For decentralized operations, all emergency actions should be coordinated through the central control center.

( ) Is location well protected?
( ) Can access be controlled with minimum manpower?
( ) Select alternate location.
( ) Communications, equipment, administrative supplies.

Planning Coordination (Mutual Aid)

( ) Coordinate plan with local and state officials—Civil Defense.
( ) With police departments.
( ) With fire departments.
( ) With FBI.
( ) With adjacent plants and business firms.
( ) With local utilities: Power, telephone, transportation.
( ) With employee union officials.
( ) With local news media.

Communications

( ) Adequately cover plant area.
( ) Back-up primary system with two-way radios, walkie-talkies, field telephones, or megaphones (bull horns).
( ) Monitor local and state police radios.
( ) Monitor fire department radios.
( ) Monitor hospital and ambulance radios.
( ) Establish communications with adjacent plants and businesses.
( ) Establish communications with management and key employees.
( ) Train switchboard operators in emergency procedures.
( ) Designate male operators as alternates for females who may not report.
( ) Establish emergency communications procedures.
( ) Unlisted telephone numbers at control center.

Personnel

( ) Survey secondary skills. Match with emergency requirements.
( ) Train personnel in emergency skills required, where necessary.
( ) Shelter areas.

Emergency Notification

( ) Keep switchboards open and operators available.
( ) Establish cascade system of notification for recall to work.
( ) Prepare reporting instructions.
( ) Designate reporting points, primaries and alternates out of emergency areas.
( ) Inform employees of locations and procedures.
( ) Instruct employees to report to points if normal routes to plant are closed.
( ) Plan transportation, i.e., busses, trucks, company-owned or contracted.
( ) Coordinate mutual needs with other plants.
( ) Arrange police escort for emergency repair crews.
( ) Pre-select routes from reporting points to plant.
( ) Plan for escort of female personnel; consider car pools.

Training

( ) Primary or secondary emergency skills (relate to survey of secondary skills).
( ) Train for immediate internal or external emergency repairs.

Situation Briefings

Brief employees on potential for civil disorder. Police can help.

( ) Brief employees on emergency plans. (Do this with caution. Do not create a "scare program.")
( ) During disorder, brief employees daily on impact on disorder on plant and community. Must be factual to dispel rumor and speculation.
( ) Prepare employees psychologically to remain on job: Need for loyalty, self-restraint; act only as directed by management or police; report rumors to supervisors.
( ) Plan post-emergency recognition of exemplary performance.
( ) Explain impact of emergency on plant.

Evacuation

( ) Designate routes to evacuate buildings or plants.
( ) Inform employees of routes and procedures.
( ) Evacuate by departments (if practical).
( ) Designate primary and alternate exists away from emergency area.

Electric Power

( ) Coordinate plan with local power companies: Transmission lines, transformer banks, alternate distribution lines.
( ) Provide emergency power for lighting and other essentials (not for full production).
( ) Generators, size, location, fuel, operators.
( ) Battery-powered equipment, flashlights, lanterns, radios, batteries.

Plant Security

Organizational Plans

( ) Develop plant security organization.
( ) Write security plans and procedures.
( ) Report promptly to FBI any actual or suspected acts of sabotage or espionage.
( ) Coordinate with local and state law enforcement agencies.
( ) Have supervisory personnel attend plant protection training.

Security Force

( ) Organize force.
( ) Prescribe qualification standards.
( ) Training.
( ) Uniforms.
( ) Arms (weapons) (check with local officials the authority and legal liability).
( ) Deputization, if necessary (check with local officials).
( ) Assure security force is on duty at all times.
( ) Issue written orders.
( ) Set up internal communications for exclusive use by security force.
( ) Plan auxiliary security force for emergency: Company employees, contract security.

Perimeter Barriers

( ) Inspect security fence (or other barrier) regularly for proper maintenance.
( ) Post trespass warnings on all barriers.
( ) Park vehicles outside of security fence or wall, to reduce fire potential and minimize hazard of concealed explosive or incendiary devices.

( ) Light perimeter barriers and internal critical areas.
( ) Use screening to protect lighting fixtures against rocks and other objects.
( ) Insure continuous lighting in parking lots and on ground floors.
( ) Install intrusion detection devices.
( ) Install protection for glassed areas exposed to streets, i.e., windows, doors, and roof light windows.

Control of Entry

( ) Develop procedures for positive identification and control of employees.
( ) Give samples of identification media (photograph identification cards or badges) to local police. (Essential for crossing police lines or during curfew.)
( ) Security force controls admittance to facility.
( ) Control movement and parking of vehicles.
( ) Procedures for control of visitors.

Protecting Critical Areas

( ) Identify critical areas within plant.
( ) Enclose critical areas with physical barriers.
( ) Designate specific personnel who may have access to critical areas.
( ) Control admittance to critical areas.
( ) Protect unattended critical areas with high security locks or intrusion detection devices. (Rotate locks upon notification of impending emergency.)
( ) Develop a key control system.
( ) Develop package and material control procedures.
( ) Protect gasoline pumps and other dispensers of flammables.
(Disconnect power source to electrically operated pumps.)

Arms Control

( ) Keep arms room locked and under 24-hour surveillance.
( ) Store ammunition in a separate, locked location under 24-hour surveillance.

Personnel Security

( ) Conduct pre-employment investigations of applicants.
( ) Check personnel who are authorized access to critical areas.
( ) Brief employees on importance of plant security and vigilance.

Fire Prevention

( ) Post and enforce fire prevention regulations.
( ) Extend fire alarm system to all areas of facilities.
( ) Determine when fire department can arrive. Under conditions other than civil disorders; five minutes after report of fire? Ten minutes?
( ) Provide secondary water supply for fire protection.
( ) Install fire protection equipment on-site. Maintain properly.
( ) Install mesh wire or screening material to protect roofs of buildings immediately adjacent to the perimeter from fire bombs, molotov cocktails, or other incendiary devices, if feasible (check with local fire department).
( ) Organize employees into fire fighting brigades and resuce squads.
( ) Store combustible materials in well protected areas.
( ) Instruct employees in the use of fire extinguishers.

( ) Post signs showing location of fire hose connections.
( ) Insure that fire hose connections are compatible with local fire department equipment.
( ) Conduct fire drills periodically.
( ) Maintain good housekeeping standards.
( ) Implement recommendations in latest fire insurance inspection report.
( ) Fire department check and assist in hardening against arson.

Protect Vital Records

( ) Classify and protect vital corporate records, cash and other valuable items.

Property and Liability Insurance

( ) Review property and liability insurance against loss or obligation resulting from riots and/or other destructive acts.

Emergency Supplies

( ) Photographic equipment.
( ) Pre-stock food, water and medical supplies because conditions may not permit procurement during emergency.
( ) Designate separate sleeping quarters for male and female employees.
( ) Provide sanitation facilities.
( ) Stock administrative supplies.
( ) Stock emergency repair tools, equipment and parts.
( ) Develop procedures for employees to purchase gasoline for automobiles from plant supply in case local stations are closed.
( ) Maintain sufficient inventory of empty 55 gallon drums to be filled with water or sand for use barricades at entrances.
( ) Have on hand enough barbed wire to form a barrier directly in front of each row of 55 gallon drums. Concertina type wire is very effective.
( ) Maintain supply of panels or screen mesh to protect windows on ground floors.

Test the Plan

( ) Test individual parts of the plan.
( ) Test the entire plan.
( ) Test without prior announcement.
( ) Note weaknesses. Revise plan to include corrective actions.

APPENDIX IV

General Planning

IN THE INTEREST OF TOTAL EMERGENCY PLANNING, AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED:

CIVIL DEFENSE READINESS

All who plan for industry defense against sabotage, civil disturbances, and bomb threats should remember to prepare for all types of emergencies including industrial accidents, natural disasters and enemy attack. Companies can be prepared for all types of emergencies by enlarging and extending their day-to-day emergency plans. For example, disaster control measures involving hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, explosions, fires, sabotage, and civil disturbances have equal application in event of nuclear attack. By addition of only a few measures such as fallout shelters and radiological detection the company can also be prepared for nuclear attack. A company emergency plan that covers all contingencies is not only a good investment, it is a significant contribution to the national security.

All industrial defense plans should be developed in close cooperation with local government in order to ensure maximum coordination and preparedness for not only corporate survival but community survival of major emergencies.

The Congress has supplemented the military defense of the United States with a civil defense system for the protection of life and property in the event of an attack. It has defined civil defense to mean all those activities and measures designed or undertaken: (1) to minimize the effects of an attack on the civilian population of the United States; (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions created by any such attack; (3) to expedite the restoration of vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack.

The term *attack* includes "any attack or series of attacks by an enemy of the United States causing, or which may cause, substantial damage or injury to civilian property or persons in the United States in any manner by *sabotage* or by the use of bombs, shellfire, or atomic, radiological, chemical, bacteriological, or biological means or other weapons or processes." (Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended: Section 3.)

The main elements of the National Civil Defense Program consist of (1) a national working system; (2) nationwide fallout shelter system; (3) community shelter planning; (4) training and education; (5) Federal financial assistance to State and local governments; (6) radiological detection and reporting; (7) emergency communications.

Management of the National Civil Defense program is the joint responsibility of the Federal, State, and local governments, working in close cooperation with public and private institutions and organizations, commerce and industry, and other major elements of our society.

Guidance and assistance on emergency preparedness measures for industry is available through numerous civil defense publications and local CD officials.



INDUSTRIAL EMERGENCY AND DISASTER PLANNING GUIDANCE

Copies of Industrial Civil Defense publications which provide comprehensive guidance on methods of preparedness in the event of a nuclear attack, natural disaster, and major industrial accident, are available from local CD offices or from the Director, Liaison Services Office, Office of Civil Defense, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310. Industrial CD publications available free and in quantity are:

Industrial Civil Defense Seminars (FG–F–3.2)
Industrial Civil Defense Workbook (FG–F–3.3)
Industrial Mutual Aid Associations for Civil Defense (FG–F–3.4)
Civil Defense Activities for Local Chambers of Commerce (FG–F–3.5)
Civil Defense Aspects of Waterworks Operations (FG–F–3.6)
Protection of Vital Records (FG–F–3.7)
A Guide to Developing a Company Industrial Civil Defense Manual (FG–F–3.8)
Staff College Course Announcement—Industrial Civil Defense Management (FG–F–3.10)
Continuity of Corporate Management in Event of Major Disaster (FG–F–3.11)
Preparedness Programs for Emergency Operations in Banking (FG–F–3.25)
Civil Defense in the Textile, Apparel, and Related Industries (FG–F–3.30)
Preparedness in the Chemical and Allied Industries (FG–F–3.35)
Civil Defense Management for Sewerage Systems (FG–F–3.42)
Emergency Preparedness Guidelines for Credit Unions (FG–F–3.43)
Emergency Operations Guide for the Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution Industry (FG–F–3.44)
Civil Defense Training for Business and Industry (FG–F–3.46)
Fallout Protection in the Design of New Industrial Facilities (FG–F–3.47)
A Guide to Civil Defense Management in the Aluminum Industry (FG–F–3.52)
Railroad Planning for National Defense Emergencies (FG–F–3.53)
Facility Protection for Food Processing Plants (FG–F–3.54)
Emergency Planning in the Communications and Electronics Equipment Industries (FG–F–3.56)
Disaster Planning—Security World Magazine Article (FG–F–3.R10)
Disaster Control and Civil Defense in Federal Buildings (PBS P 2460.1A)
Civil Defense in the Minerals and Solid Fuels Industries
Civil Defense and Emergency Planning for the Petroleum and Gas Industries
What is the Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration?
Industrial Civil Defense Kit Cover (K–22)

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requestor: N Boston

DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY
HEADQUARTERS
CAMERON STATION
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

15 APR 1975

REPLY REFER TO DCAS-NI

Dept. of Justice
National Criminal Justice Reference Service
ATTN: Mr. J. G. Cady, Manager
Washington, D. C. 20531

Dear Mr. Cady:

Reference is made to your recent request for a copy of the pamphlet entitled "Industrial Defense Against Civil Disturbances, Bombings and Sabotage."

By way of explanation, the pamphlet was published by the Office of the Provost Marshal General while the Industrial Defense Program was under the aegis of the Department of the Army. With the transfer of the Program to the Executive Directorate, Industrial Security, Contract Administration Services, Defense Supply Agency, it was renamed the Industrial Facilities Protection Program.

We regret that our supply of the latest pamphlet, dated 10 January 1972, has been depleted. However, enclosed is a copy of a previous issuance, from a very limited supply, dated 4 January 1971, which is updated by the telephone checklist and directory of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control Detachments.

We are in the process of rewriting the pamphlet as a Defense Supply Agency product and will advise you of its availability when published.

Your interest in the Industrial Facilities Protection Program is appreciated.

Sincerely,

JACK G. PRUETT
Colonel, USA
Executive Director, Industrial Security
Contract Administration Services

1 Encl

54130

ORDNANCE DETACHMENTS
(EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL CONTROL)

FIRST US ARMY EOD CONTROL CENTER
549th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Meade, Maryland 20755
b. Telephone: 301 677-5182 or 677-5183.
c. Area of Responsibility: ME, NH, VT, NY, MA, CT, NJ, PA, DE, MD, OH, VA, WV, KY, RI, and MDW.

547th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Stewart Park, GA 30050
b. Telephone:
(1) Duty hours: 404 752-3004, 752-3055
(2) Non duty hours: 404 752-3113
c. Area of Responsibility: NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, TN

FIFTH US ARMY EODC
546th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234
b. Telephone:
(1) Duty hours: 512 221-4646, 221-5308
(2) Non duty hours: 512 221-5500, 221-907
c. Area of Responsibility: TX, LA, AR, OK, NM

543rd ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473
b. Telephone: 314 368-3814, 368-4313
c. Area of Responsibility: ND, SD, WY, CO, KS, MO, IA, WI, MN, IL, IN, MI, NB.

SIXTH US ARMY EODC
548th ORD DET (EODC)
a. Mailing Address: Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129
b. Telephone: 415 561-4203, 561-4312
c. Area of Responsibility: CA, WA, OR, AZ, NV, ID, MT, UT

34130

HEADQUARTERS
CAMERON STATION
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

IN REPLY REFER TO DCAS-NI

TELEPHONE PROCEDURES
BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

INSTRUCTIONS: BE CALM. BE COURTEOUS. LISTEN, DO NOT INTERRUPT THE CALLER
NOTIFY SUPERVISOR/SECURITY OFFICER BY PRE-ARRANGED SIGNAL WHILE CALLER IS ON LINE

NAME OF OPERATOR _____ TIME _____ DATE _____

CALLERS IDENTITY
SEX: ----Male ----Female ----Adult ----Juvenile APPROXIMATE AGE: ____ Years

ORIGIN OF CALL
----Local ----Long Distance ----Booth ----Internal (From within bldg?) If internal, leave plug in board.

VOICE CHARACTERISTICS		SPEECH		LANGUAGE	
------ Loud	------ Soft	------ Fast	------ Slow	------ Excellent	------ Good
------ High Pitch	------ Deep	------ Distinct	------ Distorted	------ Fair	------ Poor
------ Raspy	------ Pleasant	------ Stutter	------ Nasal	------ Foul	------ ----------
------ Intoxicated	------ ----------	------ Slurred	------ Lisp		Other
	Other		------ ----------		
			Other		

ACCENT		MANNER		BACKGROUND NOISES	
------ Local	------ Not Local	------ Calm	------ Angry	------ Factory Machines	------ Trains
------ Foreign	Region	------ Rational	------ Irrational	------ Bedlam	------ Animals
------ Race		------ Coherent	------ Incoherent	------ Music	------ Quiet
		------ Deliberate	------ Emotional	------ Office Machines	------ Voices
		------ Righteous	------ Laughing	------ Mixed	------ Airplanes
				------ Street Traffic	------ Party Atmosphere

BOMB FACTS

PRETEND DIFFICULTY WITH HEARING
KEEP CALLER TALKING
IF CALLER SEEMS AGREEABLE TO FURTHER
CONVERSATION, ASK QUESTIONS LIKE: WHEN WILL IT GO OFF? Certain Hour ----- Time Remaining -----
WHERE IS IT LOCATED? Building ----- Area -----
WHAT KIND OF BOMB? ----- WHERE ARE YOU NOW? ----- HOW DO
YOU KNOW SO MUCH ABOUT THE BOMB? ----- WHAT IS YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS? ----------
IF BUILDING IS OCCUPIED, INFORM CALLER THAT DETONATION COULD CAUSE INJURY OR DEATH.
Did Caller appear familiar with plant or building by his description of the bomb location? Write out the message in its entirety and any other comments on a separate sheet of paper and attach to this checklist.

ACTION TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER CALL

Notify your supervisor/security officer as instructed. Talk to no one other than instructed by your supervisor/security officer.

PROTECTION OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES

1. THE PRESENTATION OF SUCH A PLAN TO CORPORATE EXECUTIVES MUST BE MADE WITH DISCRETION WITHOUT CREATING A "SCARE PROGRAM." EVEN THOUGH THE POSSIBILITY OF KIDNAPPING, EXTORTION, OR OTHER TERRORIST ACTS ARE REAL, THE EXECUTIVE MAY FEEL "THIS WON'T HAPPEN TO ME." RECENT EVENTS, HOWEVER, PROVE THAT IT CAN HAPPEN, AND WITHOUT WARNING.

2. PROTECTION OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' PLAN NOT ONLY PRESERVES THE SAFETY OF THE EXECUTIVE BUT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ORGANIZATION, AND EQUALLY IMPORTANT THE FAMILY OF THE EXECUTIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE HARD AND FAST RULES AND PROCEDURES TO MEET ALL CONTINGENCIES, THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED AS FOOD FOR THOUGHT. THESE SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE EXPANDED, CONTRACTED, OR MODIFIED TO MEET SPECIFIC SITUATIONS:

a. PARK CARS OFF THE STREET AT NIGHT, AND IF POSSIBLE, IN A LOCKED GARAGE.

b. LOCK UNATTENDED CARS AT ALL TIMES.

c. PERFORM VISUAL INSPECTION OF VEHICLE BEFORE ENTERING -- LOOK FOR SUSPICIOUS OBJECTS, UNEXPLAINED WIRES, STRINGS INSIDE, OR STRINGS UNDERNEATH. CHECK UNDER THE HOOD, INSIDE THE TRUNK, THE GASOLINE FILLER CAP, THE GLOVE COMPARTMENT, UNDER THE DASH, UNDER THE SEATS, AND UNDER THE CHASSIS FOR SUSPICIOUS OBJECTS, OR EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING.

d. EQUIP OFFICIAL, AND PERSONAL VEHICLES WITH HOOD AND TRUNK LOCKING DEVICES TO BE OPERATED FROM INSIDE THE VEHICLE (SIMILAR TO THE VOLKSWAGEN TRUNK LOCKING MECHANISM).

e. INSTALL LOCK TYPE GASLINE FILLER CAPS ON ALL VEHICLES.

f. INSTALL TWO WAY RADIOS IN OFFICIAL VEHICLES WITH BASE STATION IN THE CORPORATE/COMPANY SECURITY OFFICE. DEVELOP CODES FOR RAPID TRANSMISSION OF EMERGENCY MESSAGES, e.g. 10-1 (BEING TAILED BY SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE - VINE STREET AT 4th AVENUE, NORTH), 10-2 (EXECUTING OFFENSIVE DRIVING IN EXCESS OF POSTED SPEED LIMIT).

g. AVOID ROUTINE ROUTES, AND TIMES OF MOVEMENTS TO AND FROM WORK, AND AROUND TOWN.

h. KEEP WINDOWS ROLLED UP TO WITHIN TWO INCHES OF THE TOP, AND KEEP DOORS LOCKED.

i. PROVIDE OFFENSIVE DRIVER'S TRAINING FOR CHAUFFEURS. (HOW TO AVOID BEING TRAPPED AGAINST A CURB, BEING TRAPPED IN A LINE OF PARKED CARS, etc, AND HIGH SPEED HANDLING INCLUDING 180° TURNS UTILIZING A SKID TECHNIQUE.) ONE SOURCE OF SUCH TRAINING IS AVAILABLE FROM BONDURANT SCHOOL OF HIGH PERFORMANCE DRIVING, c/o SEARS POINT RACEWAYS, HIGHWAYS 37 & 121, SANOMA, CALIFORNIA 95476.

j. INSTRUCT SECRETARIES TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING ANSWERS TELEPHONICALLY, OR OTHERWISE TO STRANGERS FOR SUCH QUESTIONS AS: IS MR. SMITH IN? WHERE IS HE HAVING LUNCH? WHEN IS HE EXPECTED TO RETURN? HAVE THE CALLER LEAVE A TELEPHONE NUMBER AND REFER THE INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY OFFICER.

k. HAVE UNLISTED TELEPHONE NUMBERS AT HOME. INSTRUCT THE FAMILY NOT TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM STRANGERS, OR UNIDENTIFIED CALLERS PERTAINING TO WHO IS AT HOME, WHERE THEY ARE, AND WHEN THEY ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN; GIVE SOME ANSWER SUCH AS: HE/SHE IS BUSY AT THE MOMENT, PLEASE LEAVE YOUR NUMBER.

l. NEVER PERMIT STRANGERS, OR UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS TO ENTER THE HOME.

m. DO NOT ARRANGE TO RENDEZVOUS WITH STRANGERS, AND WITH UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WITHOUT POLICE, OR OTHER PROTECTION.

n. ALWAYS ADVISE THE FAMILY WHERE YOU ARE GOING, AND THE EXPECTED TIME OF RETURN.

o. KNOW WHERE THE CHILDREN ARE AT ALL TIMES. ADVISE SCHOOL TEACHERS THAT CHILDREN ARE NOT TO LEAVE SCHOOL DURING REGULAR HOURS EXCEPT WITH YOU. ESCORT CHILDREN TO AND FROM SCHOOL.

p. KEEP UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN OUT OF TAXIS, AND OTHER FORMS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.

q. HAVE BACKGROUND CHECKS MADE OF ALL SERVANTS, CHAUFFEURS, etc.

r. REFUSE TO ACCEPT UNSOLICITED PACKAGES, OR REQUIRE THE BEARER TO OPEN IT AT SOME DISTANCE FROM YOU.

s. REPORT ANY SUSPICIOUS PERSONS, OR VEHICLES IN THE AREA OF THE OFFICE, OR RESIDENCE.

t. PREPARE, AND PROVIDE EACH SERVANT SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS OF ACTIONS TO TAKE REGARDING STRANGERS, AND SECURITY OF THE HOUSE.

u. INSTALL RELIABLE ELECTRONIC INTRUSION DETECTION DEVICES ON GROUND LEVEL DOORS, WINDOWS, AND HIGHER LEVEL AREAS ACCESSIBLE BY TREES, LOW ROOFS, etc.

v. LARGE GLASS AREAS (PICTURE WINDOWS) SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY USING IMPACT RESISTANT MATERIAL WHICH PROVIDES THE SAME VISIBILITY AS CLEAR SAFETY GLASS.

w. DOORS SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH "PEEP HOLES," SMALL INSIDE/OUTSIDE SPEAKERS, CHAINS, OR OTHER RESTRAINING DEVICES TO PREVENT FULL OPENING BY PERSONS ON THE OUTSIDE.

x. HOME TYPE FUEL FILLER PIPES SHOULD HAVE LOCK TYPE CAPS/COVERS.

y. A GOOD WATCHDOG IS AN EXCELLENT ALERTING MEDIUM.

AIRCRAFT SECURITY

1. KEEP COMPANY AIRCRAFT UNDER CONSTANT SECURITY WHILE GROUNDED.

2. HAVE SECURITY OFFICER, AND PILOT INSPECT AIRCRAFT INSIDE AND OUTSIDE PRIOR TO TAKE-OFF.

3. DO NOT MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FOR THE USE OF COMPANY AIRCRAFT.

4. SEARCH/EXAMINE ALL BAGS/PACKAGES THAT ARE PLACED ALOARD THE AIRCRAFT.

FOREIGN TRAVEL

1. DETERMINE, THROUGH AMERICAN EMBASSIES, AND CONSULATES THE TERRORIST THREAT TO AMERICAN CITIZENS, PARTICULARLY INDUSTRIAL EXECUTIVES.

2. ARRANGE WITH THE EMBASSY/CONSULATE SECURITY OFFICERS FOR ASSISTANCE WITH NECESSARY SECURITY, AND POLICE PROTECTION.

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