


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FINAL EVALUATION REPORT ~~ON THE~~  
Harrisburg - Bureau of Police -  
INTENSIVE PATROL UNIT

BUREAU OF POLICE

CITY OF HARRISBURG

Grant No. SC-166-73A

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10 April 1975

MEMO TO: J. Dobbs E. Sweikert  
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FROM: F. Fletcher  
A. Sutor  
J. Eldred

DATE: 25 April 1975

SUBJECT: Final Evaluation Report on the I.P.U.

Enclosed is a copy of the "Final Evaluation Report on the Intensive Patrol Unit. The major modifications to the draft version, which you have seen, are the following:

- (a) The document has been slightly reorganized. Part 1 is now an expanded abstract, suitable for independent distribution with the cover and table of contents.
- (b) Appendix B, "Output of Survey Response Analysis by I.P.U. Working Group," is now included.
- (c) Part 6 has been retitled "Tactical Unit Management Issues (Survey Responses)."
- (d) Textual clarifications occur on pages 2-8 (additional paragraph), 4-2 (addition to item 2), and 7-6 (addition to item 3).

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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To the reader--

This document was prepared as part of an L.E.A.A. evaluation of the Harrisburg Police Intensive Patrol Unit. The period that was evaluated ended in December 1974. The operations of the I.P.U. have changed considerably since then (at least partly as a result of recommendations in this report). Therefore, material contained herein that describes the I.P.U.'s operations is not current and criticisms of those operations are not necessarily directed toward the I.P.U. as it exists today.

Part 1. SUMMARY1.1 How to Read This Report.

Those interested in establishing or improving tactical units will probably find Part 7, "Key Findings and Recommendations," most relevant, especially Section 7.4, "Pitfalls to be Avoided." The introductory pages of Part 6, "Tactical Unit Management Issues," suggest a typology of key issues to consider. Appendix C, "Standard 9.8, 'Special Crime Tactical Forces,'" would also be of interest, and its commentary includes details of current thinking on the topic.

The results of the survey of current and former I.P.U. members are in Part 6, "Tactical Unit Management Issues (Survey Results)." The survey instrument itself is Appendix A.

The experience of the Harrisburg I.P.U. specifically is variously detailed in the following passages: a list of key questions in the last half of Section 2.2, "The Larger Context"; Part 3, "Background of the Intensive Patrol Unit"; Part 5, "Crime Data"; Part 6, "Tactical Management Issues (Survey Results)"; and Section 7.1, "Findings Specifically Relevant to the I.P.U." Section 7.1 and the key questions in Section 2.2 are probably the most concise.

Those interested in the evaluation process itself are directed especially to Part 4, "Evaluation Design"; Part 6, "Tactical Management Issues"; and Appendix B, "Output of Survey Response Analysis by I.P.U. Working Group."

For other interests, the reader is referred to the Table of Contents.

1.2 Executive Summary.

An evaluation of the Intensive Patrol Unit (I.P.U.) of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police was undertaken during the period from June 1974 to February 1975. The subject of the evaluation was the I.P.U.'s experience from its inception in 1971 to the end of its L.E.A.A. funding in December 1974.

There were two major premises to this evaluation:

1. The particular history of the unit was such that no data which reflected a continuity in mission, strategy, and tactics of the unit existed. Moreover, there was no clear performance data regarding impact crimes for which the unit was (ostensibly) originally established.
2. The second major premise was that the benefits of this evaluation would be in the area of generating knowledge for future use by Harrisburg and other tactical units as well.

Although historical data on crime in Harrisburg could not be geo-coded in such a way as to properly analyze the effect of the I.P.U. on crime in the areas of its operation, the examinations of the data that were done indicate that there is no clear impact that the I.P.U. has had on crime in the long run. In comparison with two "sister" cities, Lancaster and York, Harrisburg improved its relative standing, in 1972 only, in total Part I crimes. For other years, the crime rate difference has been increasing rather than decreasing. With regard to Harrisburg alone, there was a slight decrease in burglaries and larcenies in 1972, and auto thefts and murders in 1974. Aside from those items, reported Part I crime has been increasing in Harrisburg through-

out the I.P.U.'s history. (See Part 5, "Crime Data," for details.)

The evaluation design utilized a survey of all present and former members of the unit to generate both attitudes toward previous and currently prevailing practices, as well as recommendations for improvements. The design and results of the survey were analyzed by a cross-section of the I.P.U. membership. Further analysis by the evaluators produced a sequence of management issues which appear to be important in the establishment of similar tactical units. (See Part 6, "Tactical Unit Management Issues.") This process resulted in findings and recommendations of several different types. Here we list a selection of the pitfalls to be avoided in special tactical units (from Section 7.4).

1. Avoid overstaffing. It seems better to begin with a small core of committed officers, refine the unit's approach, and build on it later. Many officers in the unit create more problems than the unit solves.
2. Avoid inappropriate staffing. Non-volunteers and untrained individuals downgrade both the effectiveness of the unit and its reputation.
3. Avoid instability in mission. A rapidly changing mission is probably worse than one which may be slightly "off target" but stable. (Stable, of course, does not mean never changing.) Objectives should be well-defined, preferably crime-specific, and well-known to all members of the unit.
4. Avoid "simple" misuse of the unit. We here refer to uses for which the unit was not designed or which are not part of its objectives, e.g. crowd control, etc.

5. Avoid "complex" misuse of the unit. Less obvious than simple misuse is the misuse that occurs when the unit is used as a visible symbol of the responsiveness of the department to political pressure. For example, the "showing the flag" type of activities may be counterproductive if the unit is attempting to operate in a low visibility mode.

Overall, the evaluators see the result of the three years of operation of the I.P.U. as a series of experiments and not just one experiment. This was not the claim in the grant application, but rather the historical development of the unit. It was probably unintentional as well. The discontinuities are seen as counterproductive to any improvement and learning by such a fairly sophisticated approach to policing (i.e. the tactical unit). In fact, Section 2.2 alludes to two recent developments whose joint implication may be that intensive patrolling approaches may be designed on misleading principles and fragmentary crime incidence data.

We point out that the above should not be construed as evidence or argument against the concept of special tactical units in general. The reverse is the case. We note that the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has called for the presence of special tactical units in all departments with 75 or more personnel. (See Appendix C.) This report is intended to contribute toward the better use of such units.

## Part 2. CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION

### 2.1 Introduction.

This report is the evaluation of the third year of funding of the Intensive Patrol Unit of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police. Because it is the final year of I.P.U. funding by the Governor's Justice Commission, the major parties involved agreed at the outset that the focus of the evaluation would not be a refunding decision but rather the learnings that could accrue from the I.P.U.'s experiences, both positive and negative.

Such learnings are the intent of this report. Several activities were undertaken in the evaluation, including a review of available crime data, a survey of past and present I.P.U. members, and a three-session workshop with selected I.P.U. and Bureau of Police participants. The outputs of these activities are discussed later in this report.

It is important to embed this particular evaluation in the context of some relevant external events, so the next section is directed toward this end. It concludes with some of the general themes that emerged during the evaluation.

### 2.2 The Larger Context.

Two recent reports have emerged to question seriously some of the basic assumptions embedded in the roles of the police and the public in their interactions. (See Crimes and Victims: A Report on the Dayton-San Jose Pilot Survey of Victimization, L.E.A.A., U.S. Department of Justice, 1974, and Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report, G.L. Kelling, T. Pate, D. Dieckman, C.E. Brown, Police Foundation, 1974.)

For the authors of this report, the primary ingredients of an effective police/community or police/victim relationship are the assumptions by each that the other will behave responsibly and reliably. In the case of the public's view of the police, responsible and reliable behavior would be demonstrated by efficient communication and dispatching, visible patrolling, a perceived absence of crime, sense of security, and full and fair processing of citizen complaints, requests for service, and reported victimizations. In the case of the police view of the public in general or victim in particular, reliable and responsible behavior would include willingness to cooperate with police requests for information, reporting of crimes, and cooperation throughout the justice process (courts, etc.).

If both roles were in fact fulfilled under these assumptions, the police would experience at least three significant

effects in the area of information alone. First, police would receive a stream of requests for service which would relate directly to specific criminal incidents. This would enable what the authors would call a tactical use of information. Second, the police would receive a stream of information which would detail a series of criminal activities. This could, if properly utilized, identify emerging patterns. While this information may not be directly useful in apprehending suspects in each event, it would be useful as an operational tool of supervision for general deployment decisions. Third, such information could be further distilled to serve as an index of both the overall quality of police services and the public receptivity to those services. This would be the strategic use of the information.

Taken together, these three uses of the reporting of events of criminal activity form a system. Each is needed and each depends of the other two.

It is against this background that one reads the recent report of a victimization study which relied not on police statistics but on confidential comprehensive interviews of a large sample of a city's population. One jarring revelation of the study is that "Half the crimes committed in both Dayton and San Jose in 1970 were not reported to the police." Follow-ups of the study were carried out in Chicago, Detroit,

Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia, as well as eight mid-sized American cities, with further results along this line, some even more astonishing. (See National Crime Panel Surveys, L.E.A.A., U.S. Department of Justice, 1974.)

The results of these studies challenge the basis of the assumptions of responsible and reliable behavior as defined above on the part of the public and/or victim. Donald Santorelli is quoted as commenting on this underreporting phenomenon: "The answers are loud and clear. The criminal justice system doesn't work well enough for them, and they are willing to pay the price of being crime victims rather than paying the higher price, in their opinion, of reporting and prosecuting crime."

What of the responsible and reliable behavior of the police? The previously cited Kansas City study has something to say. In the past, the conventional wisdom of police departments has been that a primary activity of police should be street patrol. It has been presumed that this would afford visibility and accessibility to complainants and crime scenes. The patrolling has been thought to offer a deterrent effect as well. However, the results of the Kansas City experiment call into question the value of routine preventive patrol. The design of the experiment was to "test variations in the level of routine preventive patrol within 15 Kansas City police beats. These beats were divided into three groups. In five "reactive"

beats, routine preventive patrol was eliminated and officers were instructed to respond only to calls for service. In five "control" beats, routine preventive patrol was maintained at its usual level of one car per beat. In the remaining five "proactive" beats, routine preventive patrol was intensified by two to three times its usual level through the assignment of additional patrol cars and through the frequent presence of cars from the reactive beats."

To the evaluators, the most important statement in the study was that the "experiment found that the three experimental patrol conditions appear not to affect crimes, service delivery, and citizen feelings of security in ways the public and the police often assume they do." (Emphasis added.)

Considering the above, it remains to examine the public's assumptions regarding responsibility and reliability in police behavior. One assumption was that police would have an efficient (or at least sufficient) communications and dispatching capability. Unfortunately, as the Dayton/San Jose and other studies show, they are expected to do this with only half the information on crime available to them. A second assumption was that the police would maintain the effects an active patrolling was presumed to accomplish. But, after Kansas City, it is not clear what, if anything, that patrolling accomplishes. The third assumption was that police stand ready to fully process citizen

complaints, when, in fact, the vigorous pursuit of these complaints elicits the possibility of "paying a higher price," as Santorelli points out.

One conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is both ironic and striking. This conclusion is that the only behavior which the criminal justice system (including courts and corrections as well as police) has been successful in deterring is the desired responsible and reliable behavior on the part of crime victims.

A secondary conclusion is that police have no presently workable model for effecting crime deterrence, using the patrol model as presently understood.

Against this background, the evaluators have attempted to sift the experience of the Intensive Patrol Unit of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police. In the course of the evaluation, several key questions emerge from this background. They are presented below.

1. To what extent has the I.P.U. followed a conventional model of a tactical patrol unit?

The classical image of the special tactical patrol unit involves both tangible and intangible elements. Most significant among the intangibles is the quasi-military ambience, including the prestige of an elite corps. The tangible elements should generally include tactical flexibility, task-appropriate supporting equipment, a reasonably well-defined mission, operations geared to that mission, and availability of relevant real-time



information. Not frequently made explicit are two elements that are also necessary: good management interfaces (both within the unit and between the unit and the rest of the department) and behavioral guidelines (often implicit).

The above is meant to be descriptive, not normative, of a certain class of police units. It is not necessarily the best model of special units, but it is an image often pursued.

It seems clear that the I.P.U. was originally intended to follow the general classic image, but without a good understanding of the necessary elements. Most noticeable were the absence of well-defined missions and consistent operational tactics that would address those missions in the short- and medium-term. The I.P.U. history can almost be characterized as a series of occasional spurts when the advantages of the flexibility and elite elements were obvious, with long "down" periods in between. Two such spurts seem to be the first few months of its first year and some recent productive undercover work.

2. Which of the I.P.U.'s experiences are intrinsic to the conventional tactical unit model itself, as opposed to this particular unit?

This question is important but difficult to answer. Both its importance and its ambiguity are increased by the observations noted earlier in this section. The evaluators conclude (with little reservation) that key elements of the conventional model were either absent or misunderstood for so much of the I.P.U.'s history that the problem does not rest on the model.

This does not mean that the authors unequivocally endorse the conventional model. (In fact, a "project management" model is later suggested as an alternative to the quasi-military model.) It does mean that the major conclusions about the conventional model from the I.P.U.'s experience will be pitfalls to avoid.

3. To what extent has the I.P.U. "invented" some new approaches to crime fighting that might contribute to a "post-Kansas-City" model for tactical patrol units?

This question is the obverse of the previous one since good things, as well as bad and indifferent things, can result from deviations from a known model.

It should be noted that operational innovations can be invented in many ways: by individuals or by group effort, with or without planning, consistently or intermittently. The problem is to capitalize on these inventions when they do occur. This generally involves two things: recognition of the invention, and "regularization" of it into practice.

Although one of the evaluators has experience with a tactical unit of a specialized nature where inventions were far more numerous than in the I.P.U., there are a few items that can be pointed out here. A plainclothes role has been identified and pursued with some measure of success. There has been cooperation with outside units in drug raids and surveillance. Certain elements of a de facto team policing model have appeared for a limited time.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence that these potentially useful inventions were either adequately recognized or made regular practice during the period covered in this report.

Part 3. BACKGROUND OF INTENSIVE PATROL UNIT

The Intensive Patrol Unit was initiated as a response to a need for experienced police officers in the Harrisburg Bureau of Police to patrol high crime areas during the critical hours of evening and early morning.

The original grant application stated that, as a precedent for this unit, a special 10-man tactical unit had operated, on an experimental basis, starting in September, 1970.

The grant application stated that the sole purpose of the funded unit would be the suppression of crime by utilizing intensive patrol methods.

The grant application further stated that the unit was to have been "dedicated solely to the problem at hand, and will not be handicapped or hindered by the routine performance of other police functions." It also stated that it would "serve to strengthen police prestige." A further statement intimated that criminals would be uncertain about the visibility of this unit, since apparently the unit at that time was seen as a low profile one.

This was the thinking in June 1971, when the unit was originally scheduled for funding. Of many documents the evaluators have seen, only two allude to how well the unit has performed since then.

The first document, "Critical Analysis of Harrisburg's Intensive Patrol Unit," was prepared by the South Central Regional Staff (of the Governor's Justice Commission). The first sentence of the document states that "the most glaring inadequacy of Harrisburg's Intensive Patrol Unit operation is in the area of administration." The document further cites the lack of relevant statistics by which the unit could be measured. The document ends with a list of six areas which needed improvement. The last area mentions that "innovation should be sought by the Unit. Since the Unit is voluntary...." We agree wholeheartedly that such innovation was and is absolutely crucial. Unfortunately there is no basis in fact for the second statement, that the unit "is voluntary." Statistics on the voluntary/non-voluntary nature of the unit are cited in Part 6.

The second document, "Operational Management Study of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police" (PRC Public Management Services, Inc.), is a comprehensive analysis of the Bureau. It lists several comments on and recommendations for both the I.P.U. and the Foot Patrol Unit. It is not clear how extensively PRC studied the I.P.U. It is clear that, at the time of the study, the I.P.U. was utilizing its personnel for foot patrols in high crime areas. The study makes the following statement: "The Intensive Patrol Unit

(despite its name, it is essentially a foot patrol unit) operates seven days a week between the hours of 6:00 P.M. and 2 A.M." (p. 94). We repeat this sentence for two reasons. First, it reflects the change in tactic and implied change in mission which the I.P.U. had undertaken. Second, it reflects the patrolling practice of seven-day coverage, which--with the benefit of hindsight and research--is questionable.

Neither of these documents analyzes the perspective of the members of the unit in an orderly fashion. Both apparently used field observation methods. Neither of these reports addressed the organizational problem of the cumulative effect of continuous changes in mission, strategy, tactics, without the benefit of evaluation. Neither report assessed what a cycle of management issues regarding such a unit would look like. However this report does. We define such a cycle in Part 6 and elaborate on it in Part 7. It is our overall impression that the unit has been in a state of continuous, uncontrolled, and un-evaluated change since its inception. The benefits and drawbacks of such change, we believe, are best reflected by the responses of those individuals who have lived through that change. It is hoped that their participation in this evaluation has enhanced its appropriateness.

#### Part 4. EVALUATION DESIGN

The original design of the evaluation closely paralleled that used in the evaluation of the Foot Patrol Unit (see "Final Evaluation Report on the Foot Patrol Unit," Bureau of Police, City of Harrisburg, Contract No. 73-DF-03-0019). That design was essentially the preliminary definition of a unit's goals, activities, and methods of operation, and the derivation of performance criteria by which the unit would be measured. Problem identification, analysis, and resolution, in such a design, are treated during the course of the evaluation, so that the unit learns and adapts during the course of the experimental period. This design contrasts with more traditional approaches to evaluation, which treat the unit under consideration in the rather traditional "pre-test / post-test" mode of scientific experimentation.

The approach these evaluators take to their task is more of a problem-solving approach, which involves, to as broad an extent as possible, as many of the individuals impacted by the evaluation as possible. We have found that problem-solving attitudes, behavior, and skills can and do exist at all levels and in all functions of an experimental unit. With these comments as a backdrop, we will review what took place upon the initial activity of the I.P.U. evaluation. This review follows.

The evaluation was delayed some six months by contract negotiation and funding uncertainties. Upon commencement of the evaluation in June 1974, the evaluators learned that neither adequate data nor adequate consensus existed in the Bureau of Police concerning the four basic questions facing any evaluation process. We see these four as follows:

1. Determining what happened
2. Determining what effects that activity had both internally (on the I.P.U. and H.B.P.) and, ultimately, on crime.
3. Determining what effects that activity did not have
4. Recommending what changes/improvements could be made

It was clear to the evaluators, after discussion with Harrisburg personnel, that no clear statement existed for any of these questions. Upon subsequent examination, we learned that it was not readily clear if any could be answered from existing records. Furthermore, such an answer was, at that time, seen to be trivial, since, at a strategic level, it appeared highly unlikely that any continuing set of performance objectives had been set, against which the activities could have been compared.

Consequently the evaluation was redirected. This redesign was facilitated by the fact that no refunding decision was imminent, since this was the last year of L.E.A.A. funding. Moreover, since no previous external evaluation of the I.P.U. has been undertaken, it appeared that there had been no preceding recommendations that could be tracked

as to their implementation.

An additional consideration was that, since the unit was not to be continued on L.E.A.A. funding, the ultimate question which could be answered from such an evaluation is "what can other units learn from the experience of the I.P.U.?" It was toward this question that the redesigned evaluation aimed.

The redesign utilized two principles of investigation-- that of survey research and that of the case study. The advantages of a survey in this case was that it would capture, in a combination of open and closed-ended questions, all of the responses of all of the members of the I.P.U.

The case method, in this particular situation, was seen as an attempt to construct a case history of the unit, in such a way that particular design aspects of the unit, and particular features of the unit, could be generalized to broader principles.

The sequence of evaluation events was as follows:

1. Meeting with Evaluation Review Group to:
  - a. Discuss redesign of evaluation
  - b. Agree to use group of I.P.U. patrolmen to act as co-designers of survey
  - c. Select patrolmen for the group
2. Meeting with patrolmen to define initial issues parameters of interest

3. Design of survey
4. Pre-test of survey with four patrolmen
5. Refine survey
6. Mail survey to all present and former members of I.P.U. (see Appendix A for copy of survey)
7. Receipt of survey results
8. Meet with Evaluation Review Group
  - a. Review partial survey results
  - b. Enlarge membership of co-design group
9. Meetings (3) of enlarged group to:
  - a. Clarify responses
  - b. Cluster responses
  - c. Define ideal mission statements
  - d. Define unit's interface issues
10. Draft final report

This approach draws heavily on similar work which was undertaken with a metropolitan police force of similar size. That work is described in a recent publication by Marvin A. Weisbord. (See Improving Police Department Management Through Problem-Solving Task Force, M.A. Weisbord, H. Lamb, A. Drexler, Addison-Wesley, 1974.)

The output of the sessions mentioned are contained in Appendix B.

The insights and integration of survey responses which the enlarged group helped generate are reflected throughout

this report. We, as evaluators, are especially grateful to both them and to the Evaluation Review Group for sanctioning their participation.

In terms of the original responsibilities listed in the first evaluation design, we had paid almost exclusive attention to:

1. Responsibility 5--"Identify areas of management and operations whereby unit effectiveness might be enhanced and present appropriate recommendations."
2. Responsibility 6--"Analyze and evaluate organization, administration, functional responsibilities and procedures of the Patrol Unit and its relationship to other department components."

Both of these responsibilities were addressed within the context of the redesigned evaluation effort. Both are addressed, either directly, or by implication, in the "Key Findings and Recommendations" (Part 7).

Part 5. CRIME DATA.

In this Part of the report, a limited account of relevant crime data is presented in an attempt to determine the effects of the I.P.U. on its ultimate target, the level of crime in Harrisburg. The data review is in two forms: raw counts of Part I crimes in Harrisburg over a ten-year period, and comparisons of Part I crime rates per population in Harrisburg with similar rates in Lancaster and York.

For the most part, the data are taken from the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime Reports (U.C.R.'s). This data source has shortcomings which are well known to the evaluators, but it is the only source that covers the time span necessary to give even a crude account of the situation.

It should be especially noted that, while the data in this section are of necessity citywide statistics, the I.P.U. patrolled only in selected areas of the city. Ideally, comparisons would be made between crime rates in those areas and rates in other comparable areas. This was not possible because prior to 1974 there were no geographically coded statistics available for areas within the city. (A further problem is that the I.P.U. changed its scene of operations, so the geocoding would need to have been coordinated with a history of areas patrolled.)

The main consequence of the foregoing is that even more than the usual caution is needed in interpreting the statistics in the section.

Figure 1 tracks the levels of the seven Part I crimes in Harrisburg from 1965 to 1974. (The raw data for this and the following graphs are contained in the Tables at the end of this Part.) The I.P.U. was established in the latter part of 1971, and there was a slight decrease in assaults and a noticeable decrease in burglaries and larcenies in 1972. These changes may be results of the I.P.U., although it should be noted that the burglary decrease actually began the previous year. However, no decrease was maintained after 1972.

In the third year (1974) a slight decrease in auto thefts occurred, but a sharp increase in assaults was reported as well. The changes in murders (decrease) and reported rapes (increase) are noticeable, but are based on small absolute numbers.

More instructive than a purely isolated historical review of a single site (Harrisburg) are comparisons with other cities that might be expected to have similar conditions and experiences. Lancaster and York were selected as points of comparison for two reasons: first, they are similar in population (50,000 to 75,000) and geography (south central Pennsylvania); and, second, they have been cited by the Harrisburg Bureau of Police in applications for L.E.A.A. funds. Figures 2 through 4 graphically compare




FIGURE 1.  
PART 1 CRIMES IN HARRISBURG, 1965-1974

LEGEND: A = ASSAULT, B = BURGLARY, C = AUTO THEFT, L = LARCENY,  
M = MURDER, P = RAPE, R = POSSESSION.

NOTE: SCALE CHANGES ARE SEPARATED BY HORIZONTAL LINES.




FIGURE 2.  
CRIME INDEX RATES, THREE CITIES  
(RATES PER 100,000)

LEGEND: H = HARRISBURG, L = LANCASTER, Y = YORK

selected crime rates per 100,000 for these three cities.

Figure 2 shows the overall Part I Crime Index rates for the cities. The first full I.P.U. year (1972) has a slight absolute decrease, due mainly to the drop in burglaries and larcenies cited above. This improvement is not as striking when compared with the sister cities because, although there was a notable improvement in relation to York, there was none in relation to Lancaster. The following year showed a sharp increase in the Index rate in all three cities, but Harrisburg's increase was worse than the others'.

Figure 3 shows the relative rates for two Part I crimes against property, burglary and auto theft. To the extent that deterrence (as opposed to apprehension) was an objective of the I.P.U., one would expect positive I.P.U. effects to be reflected most in these two crime rates. Figure 3(a) displays the burglary rates. Here, Harrisburg improved its relative standing in 1972, but the trend appears to have been established in 1971 prior to the I.P.U. Again, ground was lost in 1973. In Figure 3(b) it appears that, although Harrisburg held its relative auto theft position for two years prior to the I.P.U., the gap has widened since 1972.

Figure 4 graphs two Part I crimes against persons, robbery and assault. For both of these crimes, the rate difference appears to have first lessened but later widened in the two




FIGURE 3.  
PROPERTY CRIME RATES, THREE CITIES  
(RATES PER 100,000)  
LEGEND: H = HARRISBURG, L = LANCASTER, Y = YORK







FIGURE 4.  
PERSON CRIME RATES, THREE CITIES  
(RATES PER 100,000)

LEGEND: H = HARRISBURG, L = LANCASTER, Y = YORK

years of I.P.U. operation covered by the graphs.

Recalling that the interpretations of the data must be made with caution, the following statement should reflect the data presented. The I.P.U. may have had some initial effect on selected Part I crimes, but it does not appear to have maintained any long run effect citywide over the period of its operation.

TABLE 1.

PART I CRIMES IN HARRISBURG, 1965-1974.

YEAR	TOTAL INDEX	MURDER	RAPE	ROBBERY	ASSLT	BURGLARY	LAPC	AUTO THEFT	EMPLOYEES		
									TOTAL	SWORN	CIVILN
1965	1123	7	14	43	32	568	960	162	157	151	6
1966	1288	1	13	45	43	677	999	203	164	158	6
1967	1406	8	24	65	27	705	1042	278	165	158	7
1968	1584	13	16	75	49	747	1086	287	166	159	7
1969	2833	5	21	148	159	1106	1479	810	171	163	8
1970	2778	8	16	273	252	1212	1388	450			
1971	2952	11	24	308	304	1000	2140	416			
1972	2907	26	28	302	248	923	1790	561	209	181	28
1973	5413	22	24	397	372	1620	2306	672	223	192	31
1974	7158	10	53	582	1010	1917	2919	667			

NOTE:

F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS ARE THE SOURCE OF ALL ABOVE FIGURES, EXCEPT FOR 1972 AND 1974. H.B.P. STAFF AND TECHNICAL SERVICES WAS THE SOURCE FOR THOSE YEARS.

TABLE 2.  
ROBBERIES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	45	14	27
1967	65	24	91
1968	75	43	118
1969	148	45	120
1970	273	54	219
1971	308	90	168
1972	298	68	200
1973	397	100	204

ROBBERY RATES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	68.0	24.3	53.6
1967	98.3	41.6	180.8
1968	113.4	74.5	234.4
1969	223.7	78.0	238.4
1970	412.7	93.6	435.1
1971	465.6	156.0	333.8
1972	450.5	117.9	397.3
1973	600.1	173.3	405.3

NOTE:

RATES PER 100,000 CALCULATED FROM 1970 CENSUS FIGURES: HARRISBURG, 66,155; LANCASTER, 57,690; YORK, 50,335.

TABLE 3.

## ASSAULTS

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	43	38	21
1967	27	30	22
1968	49	34	42
1969	159	48	76
1970	252	46	113
1971	304	52	49
1972	243	51	39
1973	372	56	43

## ASSAULT RATES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	65.0	65.9	41.7
1967	40.8	52.0	43.7
1968	74.1	58.9	83.4
1969	240.3	83.2	151.0
1970	380.9	79.7	224.5
1971	459.5	90.1	97.3
1972	367.3	88.4	77.5
1973	562.3	97.1	85.4

## NOTE:

RATES PER 100,000 CALCULATED FROM  
1970 CENSUS FIGURES: HARRISBURG, 66,155;  
LANCASTER, 57,690; YORK, 50,335.

TABLE 4.

## BURGLARIES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	677	312	370
1967	705	299	535
1968	747	362	440
1969	1106	284	560
1970	1212	435	644
1971	1000	544	622
1972	923	544	661
1973	1620	617	738

## BURGLARY RATES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	1023.4	540.8	735.1
1967	1065.7	518.3	1062.9
1968	1129.2	627.5	874.1
1969	1671.8	492.3	1112.5
1970	1832.1	754.0	1279.4
1971	1511.6	943.0	1235.7
1972	1395.2	943.0	1313.2
1973	2448.8	1069.5	1466.2

## NOTE:

RATES PER 100,000 CALCULATED FROM  
1970 CENSUS FIGURES: HARRISBURG, 66,155;  
LANCASTER, 57,690; YORK, 50,335.

TABLE 5.

AUTO THEFTS

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	203	118	161
1967	278	77	216
1968	287	78	372
1969	810	99	370
1970	450	98	246
1971	416	122	194
1972	561	129	287
1973	672	162	350

AUTO THEFT RATES

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	306.9	204.5	319.9
1967	420.2	133.5	429.1
1968	433.8	135.2	739.0
1969	1224.4	171.6	735.1
1970	680.2	169.9	488.7
1971	628.8	211.5	385.4
1972	848.0	223.6	570.2
1973	1015.8	280.8	695.3

NOTE:

RATES PER 100,000 CALCULATED FROM  
1970 CENSUS FIGURES: HARRISBURG, 66,155;  
LANCASTER, 57,690; YORK, 50,335.

TABLE 6.

TOTAL CRIME INDEX

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	1288	603	758
1967	1406	564	1054
1968	1584	706	1185
1969	2833	718	1453
1970	2778	1077	1658
1971	2952	1342	1521
1972	2907	1235	1697
1973	5413	2529	2546

CRIME INDEX RATE

YEAR	HBG	LANC	YORK
1966	1946.9	1045.2	1505.9
1967	2125.3	977.6	2094.0
1968	2394.4	1223.8	2354.2
1969	4282.4	1244.6	2886.7
1970	4199.2	1866.9	3293.9
1971	4462.2	2326.2	3021.8
1972	4394.2	2140.8	3371.4
1973	8182.3	4383.8	5058.1

NOTE:

RATES PER 100,000 CALCULATED FROM  
1970 CENSUS FIGURES: HARRISBURG, 66,155;  
LANCASTER, 57,690; YORK, 50,335.

Part 6. TACTICAL UNIT MANAGEMENT ISSUES (SURVEY RESULTS)

As a result of the survey, twenty-nine present and former members of the I.P.U. responded. All are still members of the Bureau of Police.

Subsequent to the survey, three sessions were held with members of the I.P.U. (both supervisors and patrolmen) as well as members of other patrol units.

These sessions achieved the following objectives:

- a. Clarification of the responses
- b. Identification of central issues in the responses
- c. Formulation of "ideal" mission statements for the I.P.U.
- d. Problem solving and prioritization of issues and conflicting responses
- e. Specific recommendations

The specific output of these sessions is listed verbatim in Appendix B.


As a result of these sessions, a model of key issues in the formation and utilization of tactical units has been prepared. The model, outlined in Figure 5, depicts six issues:

Issue A. How individuals are recruited and assigned to a tactical unit

The manner in which individuals arrive at a tactical

FIGURE 5.

SCHMATIC OF KEY MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN FORMATION  
AND UTILIZATION OF TACTICAL UNITS



unit appears to be as important as their innate ability to perform the job. Several survey comments indicated the disadvantage of having unit members who did not want to be in the unit.

Issue B. How individuals are oriented, trained, and formed into a functioning unit

Responses indicated a lack of sufficient orientation, proper training, etc. demonstrating that not only were some people not wanting to be there, but many were not prepared to perform the mission of a tactical unit.

Issue C. How individuals are continually briefed on mission, strategies, etc.

Continuing, the responses often indicated a lack of knowledge about what they were to do.

Issue D. How individuals are prepared for daily activities

The responses indicated a widespread lack of information which was relevant to necessary coordination with other units. A sense of isolation comes up from the responses.

Issue E. How individuals are evaluated on performance

Some respondents indicated knowledge of the prevailing system. Other responses indicated a low image of the unit was held by regular patrol units.

Issue F. How unit learns from its experience

Several blocks to such learning were identified. This learning, at a minimum, is seen as contingent to effective resolution of Issues A-E.

The following pages detail the nature and integration of the specific responses. Each issue is identified, specific survey questions relating to that issue are named, and discussion of the question results is made. Recommendations follow each issue.

6.1. Issue A. How Individuals Are Recruited and Assigned to Tactical Units

A. Relevant survey results:

1. Question 5--"Did you volunteer for the I.P.U.?"
  - a. 14 respondents volunteered for the I.P.U.
  - b. 2 respondents volunteered for a Tac Squad and then were assigned to the I.P.U.
  - c. 13 respondents did not volunteer but were assigned
2. Question 6--"If you answered no to question #5, why were you assigned?"

Of the 13 who were assigned, but did not volunteer:

- a. 4 indicated they were assigned because of their low seniority
- b. 3 indicated they were assigned because of "political" reasons or personal conflicts with supervisors
- c. 3 said they were assigned for the good of the department
- d. 3 did not know why they were assigned

B. Discussion:

Any unit which operates on both unusual tactics and unfavorable hours constantly faces a recruitment problem. The I.P.U. experience indicates a 50-50 mix of individuals who wanted to work in such a unit and those who did not.

C. Recommendations (two options):

1. Strengthen the attractiveness of the unit with a mixture of increased autonomy, increased flexibility, and possible incentive compensation. To do this, individuals who are now on the unit but who wish to leave should be transferred.
2. Develop a uniform policy that all new sworn members of the Bureau of Police will be expected to serve a regular tour of duty (6 months to a year) on the I.P.U. as a form of coach/pupil training.

6.2. Issue B. How Individuals Are Oriented, Trained, and Formed into a Functioning Unit

A. Relevant survey results:

From Question 10--"On a tactical level (everyday operations) how was the I.P.U. originally designed to operate?"

- a. Respondents reported a variety of labels and models for the unit ("undercover surveillance team," "strike force," "tactical unit"), as well as a variety of purposes (prevention, deterrence, apprehension)
- b. The highest number of similar responses indicated they did not know (6 responses in this category)

B. Discussion:

At best these responses indicate a mix of confusion and lack of knowledge on the part of the respondents. The most insightful response indicated that the individual doesn't "really know because I was never told. We are told what to do and not what is supposed to be done. Some guys will say what they think but they are going on rumor and not fact. I did not see what the government stated as far as we are concerned."

C. Recommendations:

Any recommendation in this area centers on the word communication. Furthermore, the stress is laid on not only what is communicated, but how it is communicated. The evaluators are somewhat skeptical that there were no attempts to communicate the intentions of both the Harrisburg Bureau of Police and the funding agency in initiating such a unit. Given the extraordinary amount of discretion which exists for any street policeman, whether he is on a regular patrol unit or a special tactical unit, a significant amount of attention and effort must be paid to communicating fully, when an individual is assigned to a new unit, what the specific nature of that unit is. This is the essence of a good

orientation program.

The specific recommendation here is as follows:

Any newly recruited individual for a tactical unit should participate in an orientation program the duration of which will be at least 4 continuous hours (and not at rollcalls). This special orientation session should consist of--if the individual is a veteran patrolman--at least a 1-hour block of time in which the function of the unit is sufficiently distinguished from the function of the unit which the individual left. All supporting documents and materials, including copies of grant applications and evaluations should be furnished to that individual. Furthermore, at least 2 members of the unit, in addition to the unit supervisor, should participate in this session.

In addition to this orientation, the individual should be fully re-tested and re-trained (if necessary) in the equipment of the unit and should be qualified in whatever weapons the unit utilizes.

6.3. Issue C. How Individuals Are Continually Briefed on the Mission, Strategies, Operations, and Tactics of the Unit

A. Relevant survey results:

1. Question 15--"Did/do you know what crime problem the I.P.U. is trying to combat?"
  - a. 12 respondents indicated they did not know or could not answer
  - b. 17 respondents indicated they did know
2. The second part of question 15--"What is it (the crime problem)?"--had the following sets of responses (number of responses in parentheses):
  - a.. Robbery only (1)
  - b. Burglary (1)
  - c. Burglary and robbery (3)
  - d. Burglary and sodomy (1)
  - e. Robbery, burglary and theft (1)
  - f. Burglary, rape, purse snatch, assaults (1)
  - g. Burglary and vice (1)
  - h. Burglary and crimes against the person (1)
  - i. Part 1 crimes (2)
  - j. All crimes from spitting on sidewalk to robbery (1)
  - k. Crime prevention in general (1)
  - l. Keep crime from spreading from high crime areas to others (1)
  - m. Major crimes, motorcode violations, and whatever other immediate problems there may be (1)
  - n. What they tell us/it varies.../no one knows (3)



3. Question 16--"How was that crime problem communicated to you?"
- a. 9 indicated they learned through some combination of roll calls and unit/division supervision.
  - b. 9 respondents indicated they learned through word-of-mouth, computer print-outs, informants, indirectly (apparently, they deduced it by virtue of where they were assigned to patrol)
4. Question 17--"Were/are you given numerical data regarding incidence of crime in areas patrolled?"
- a. 5 respondents answered no
  - b. 7 respondents answered yes
  - c. 5 respondents answered sometimes
  - d. 11 respondents elaborated with comments. These comments indicated three major aspects:

--The information was communicated sporadically

--The information which was communicated was insufficient

--The information communicated was not in "real time" (that is, it did not arrive quickly enough to help in tactical decision making)

#### C. Discussion:

Any police unit which follows a quasi-military model of organization ought to pursue fully the benefits of that model. One of the aspects of that model which apparently has not been sufficiently pursued in the I.P.U. is the supply and use of adequate, accurate, relevant, and timely information on a tactical level. The difficulty in furnishing such information is compounded when the tactical unit hours of operation span the hours of two shifts of the regular patrol unit. Consequently, the acquisition of adequate,

accurate, relevant, and timely information is accompanied by the transmission of such information. The usual solution in the military model is the use of a briefing officer, or role, who takes responsibility for both acquiring and transmitting such information between different organizations.

#### D. Recommendations:

Any tactical unit should appoint an individual who acts as a briefing officer. This individual should have this role in addition to regular duties. This role would probably not occupy more than 10% of any one individual's time. The role should be linked with the dispatching and street supervision of regular patrol units.

It is further recommended that this role be rotated among members of a tactical unit, and be viewed as a regular part of the duties of the tactical unit personnel. The unit supervisor should act as a trainer for this role. The use of pin maps and other easily updated visual aids is a necessary tool in this role.

#### 6.4. Issue D. How Individuals Are Prepared for Daily Activities

##### A. Relevant survey results:

1. Questions 15, 16, 17--see Issue C
2. Questions 1-6--specific reactions to the rating of six characteristics of the I.P.U.: overall services, responsiveness to calls for service, concern for public welfare, visibility in area patrolled, attempts to educate public, efforts to improve quality of services;

The respondents indicated a degree of confusion on what they would be doing, how they would be doing it, and where they would be doing it. One of the unit's members indicated, at a survey analysis session, that the "I.P.U. is a blind force going out on the street."

Specific comments indicated that the individuals do not have either clear and uniform expectations about what they are going to do, on a day-to-day basis.

3. Question 12--"How is it (the I.P.U.) operating today?"

Responses were divided among those who:

- a. Feel the unit is not operating well (8 responses)
- b. Feel the unit is going back to the way it had originally been designed to work (8 responses)
- c. Indicate a variety of ways in which the unit could make immediate improvements (usually around the theme of tactical flexibility) (10 responses)

##### B. Discussion:

The shifting emphasis which has appeared in the unit has apparently served to confuse not only the members of the unit but also the members of other regular patrol units. The endurance of this pattern of shifting is the most central theme throughout

the responses (responses to Questions 13, 14 and 22 also support this).

From the perspective of everyday operations, the respondents indicate lack of preparedness for whatever activities they undertake. A quite separate issue is whether or not the unit members agree with the way the unit is operating. The specific comments on the survey are grouped into the following classes:

1. Individuals who both indicated they understood and agreed with the actual way the unit is run (1 response)
2. Individuals who understood the way the unit is run but did not agree (16 responses)
3. Individuals who did not understand the way the unit is run (4 responses)

Two major points emerged from these responses. One is the need for more adherence to guidelines (whether they are governmental or departmental). The second major point is the need for more tactical flexibility. Taken together, these two points indicate that the lack of strong strategic guidelines, has been supplanted by strong tactical control. The responses are calling for a reversal of this situation.

##### C. Recommendations:

Unit supervision should undertake planning of interim goals and objectives for the unit (1-3 months) and, in conjunction with these goals, should communicate what the relationship of daily activities to short goals is. If, because of contingencies, there is no relationship, unit supervision should announce that the unit is "going off the plan." Special attention should be paid to the distinction between planning and the scheduling of activities which support that plan.

An organizational mechanism to support such short-term planning would consist of the unit supervisor, the briefing officer, and a member of the crime analysis section of departmental staff. These 3 individuals would meet at least monthly and review the progress toward the plan.

6.5. Issue E. How Individuals Are Evaluated on PerformanceA. Relevant survey results:

1. Question 24--"In what way are you evaluated by your supervision while a member of the I.P.U.?"

28 responses fell into 6 basic categories:

- a. The procedure for evaluation (standard form) (7 responses)
- b. The similarity for evaluation (compared to evaluations of individuals in other units (3 responses)
- c. The presence of evaluation (did it exist) (6 responses indicated they did not know)
- d. The fairness of the evaluation (3 responses)
- e. The outcome of the evaluation (5 responses)
- f. The criteria and standards used in the evaluation (4 responses)

2. Question 22--"How do you think the following groups would characterize their relationship with the I.P.U.?"

- a. 5 respondents indicated a lack of knowledge on the part of either other units or of departmental supervision.
- b. 5 respondents ranged from specific comments on individuals to comments on general characteristics of the I.P.U.

The ratings in the table included in Question 22 indicate a generally good set of relationships between the I.P.U. and other parts of the Department. Twelve of the 28 respondents felt they had only "fair" relationships with "other Bureau supervision." Eleven of the respondents felt they had either a fair or rather poor relationship with other patrol units. Nine respondents indicated they had either a fair or rather poor relationship with the "community."

B. Discussion:

Both the "image" of the unit and the evaluations of individuals in that unit relate to this issue. Image is not an issue that should be worked on directly; it usually results from real performance. Furthermore, whether or not the individuals in the unit are evaluated regularly and equitably, there is a real evaluation process going on all the time--one which consists of how successful special tactical units are in both achieving their own mission and in complementing the mission of the regular patrol units. Such an evaluation process, while informal and often unrecognized, is likely to become unrealistic and inaccurate if the many differences between the tactical unit and the regular patrol unit are unmanaged. The simple structural difference in hours of work, and the continuous shift in areas of deployment, are two possible sources of conflict here. These two are also often the starting points of professional jealousy between tactical and regular units.

C. Recommendations:

If recommendation 2, Issue A, is adopted (rotate all individuals through a tour of duty in the I.P.U.), much of the informal evaluation problem should be obviated.

The use of regularized and standardized evaluation sessions (every 6-12 months) should be followed. This should be a known, and two-way process. The most effective evaluation process currently being used in many organizations involves the supervisor informing the individual of an impending evaluation, and separately both the supervisor and the individual fills out the evaluation sheet. (The supervisor may have to have a brief training session for the individual beforehand.) Next the two individuals compare their own sheets and resolve any differences in rating, accomplishments, wording, etc. (If there is an irreconcilable conflict, the supervisor's opinion would, of course, prevail.) Finally, the merged evaluation is sent "up the

line," and any subsequent changes are fully communicated back down.

This approach is an extremely effective communication and feedback tool. It differs vastly (as is probably obvious) in tone from the usual approach. It is a genuine learning approach.

## 6.6. Issue F. How Does the Unit Learn from Its Own Experience?

### A. Relevant survey results:

#### 1. Questions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

The responses to these questions highlight five blocks to such learning:

- a. Lack of clarity in setting the goals of the unit
- b. Lack of communicating what they goals are
- c. Failure to pursue such goals for a sufficient length of time
- d. Inappropriate organization in the pursuit of these goals
- e. Inadequate information quality
- f. Nonexistent mechanism for reviewing unit effectiveness

None of these blocks question the appropriateness of the goals that are set. Again, that is a different issue. All of these blocks do center on the question of how well a unit organizes itself toward an end objective. If the unit does not adequately address each of these, it cannot expect to learn from its own experience, since that experience will be nothing more than a tabulation of lists of fragmental activities.

#### 2. Question 18--"If you were in charge, would you continue the I.P.U.?"

- a. 27 respondents answered yes
- b. 2 respondents answered no.

#### 3. Question 19--"If you would continue, how would you change it?"

This question is intentionally redundant and repeats questions 13 and 14.

- a. 12 respondents referred to their answers to questions 13 and 14
  - b. 5 responses specifically mentioned the need for a plan or set mode of operation
  - c. 8 responses mentioned a need for some type of tactical flexibility, within the concept of a "tac squad"
  - d. 3 responses called for personnel changes in the unit
4. Question 20--"If you would not continue it, how would the mission it performs be handled?"

Nine respondents answered this question. All of the responses indicated that the individuals would be supplementing the regular patrol unit, in a backup mode, or as an integral part of the regular units.

#### B. Discussion:

The responses relevant to this issue are remarkable in both their simplicity and unanimity. The key message seems to be "run the experiment-- it is worth doing."

#### C. Recommendations:

A regular upward feedback session should be planned. The quasi-military model of organizations is not likely to include such upward feedback, so it must be decided on and planned for by unit and departmental supervision. Such a session is not a "bitch" session. It is a meeting of professionals to pool their knowledge and experience in an orderly and planned fashion.

Such sessions are logical followups to the short-term planning recommended under Issue D.

## Part 7. KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This evaluation, drawing from the experience of both present and former members of the unit, as well as unit records, has identified several sets of key findings with attendant recommendations. They are divided into the following sections: findings related to the I.P.U. specifically, findings related to departments using tactical units generally, suggested minimum conditions for tactical units, and pitfalls to avoid for tactical units. Obviously there will be some overlap between categories.

### 7.1 Findings Specifically Relevant to the I.P.U.

In this section we enumerate seven findings of particular relevance to the specific project being evaluated. They can be divided into three levels of consideration: the level of the individual officer, the level of the tactical unit, and the level of the Bureau (or department).

#### A. At the level of the individual officer.

1. We find an insufficient amount of information on the part of the individual. This information is insufficient about both the overall mission and strategy, and the tactical situations of daily patrol. In the absence of such information, the individuals relied on word of mouth, informants, or inferences made by virtue of where they were geographically assigned.
2. We find the individuals believed assignment to the I.P.U., if not voluntary, was a result of a mixture of low seniority and/or "punishment." Several individuals indicated that non-volunteers

lacked the necessary commitment to perform in such a unit. Conversely, almost all of the unit's members, present and past, indicated that the unit could perform a valuable function if operated correctly.

3. Several members indicated the need for more specialized training, both in-service and at special schools. Such training would appear to be in support of a more distinguished and specialized role than now exists in the unit itself.

#### B. At the level of the Intensive Patrol Unit.

4. We find that no adequate mechanism existed for the accumulation, interpretation, and dissemination of either tactical or strategic information.
5. We find that the unit was often fragmented in its deployment, and that deployment apparently represented a mixture of three rules of thumb:
  - a. Backup of regular patrol units.
  - b. Deterrence of vice and other "predictably visible" crimes which may tarnish the city's public image.
  - c. Cooperation with other units (both internal to the Bureau of Police and external).

Each of these rules of thumb individually might be justified and contribute to an overall goal of quality police service. They operate, however, at different levels of control, measurement, and effectiveness. The simultaneous pursuit of all three of these has left the unit with both an unclear "track record" and a fragmented set of experiences and skills.

Furthermore, they may indicate a lack of qualitative difference between the I.P.U. and regular patrol. To the extent that this is true, the question of supplantation is raised.

6. We find that relationships between the unit's supervision and that of other units left something to be desired. Jurisdiction at a crime scene and other real tests of these interfaces, as well as the question of who handles the trivial calls for service, indicate that the lack of clarity in the goals of the unit was paralleled by a lack of clear agreement among such supervision.

#### C. At the level of the Bureau of Police.

7. The evaluators found no evidence of well-defined operational goals that the Bureau had in mind for the I.P.U., both when it was first established and since. In particular, there were no crime-specific goals. Such a "shotgun" approach is inappropriate for a special tactical unit.
8. The Bureau had not paid enough attention to the complexity and difficulty of making an experiment like the I.P.U. successful. In relation to this point, we do not find that sufficient signals and indicators of the difficulty of running the I.P.U. were absent. Rather, what appeared to be absent was a lack of management process or mechanism for receiving these signals and taking appropriate steps. In the absence of such a mechanism, any new part of an organization is likely to be treated like all the other parts. In the case of the I.P.U., this is apparently what happened.

A concern to the evaluators was the presence of the usual quasi-military concept of organization which was used by the I.P.U. An alternative concept which we believe would be more relevant to Harrisburg is the "project management" concept of organization. This concept is discussed in detail in Section 7.5, and is recommended for consideration.

7.2 Findings Relevant for Police Departments Considering Special Tactical Units.

We have five major findings which we believe relevant to any police department considering the establishment of a special tactical unit or reviewing an existing one.

1. A concerted effort must be undertaken to establish and communicate a definite set of goals for such a unit. The ideal way to do this is to identify "crime specific" goals for the unit. Any department which has not done this previously should undertake some training before it establishes the unit.
2. A "real-time" information base and system must be established. This system can be simple and inexpensive, but it must be adequate, relevant, and timely. Computerized systems are usually not sufficient to meet this need. We would emphasize that the information need not (and should not) be voluminous. It should be relevant.
3. The tactical unit must be supported by tactical equipment and flexibility whose guidelines are worked out before their use is required. Any unit whose only difference is hours of work and designation (or shoulder patch) is not likely to exploit fully their tactical opportunities.
4. An evaluation and feedback process has to be utilized so that the unit does not "drift" through a sequence of activities whose relationship to the original goals is not clear.
5. Top management support of the unit needs to be developed and clarified. We find that, if a tactical unit is working successfully, it is extremely likely to generate conflict, since it naturally cuts across the boundaries of many other organization units. A process for resolving such conflict must be present and used by management.

7.3 Minimum Conditions for an Effective I.P.U.

We here identify several conditions which are viewed as being necessary for the effectiveness of a tactical unit. These are suggested as being applicable to most departments.

1. The unit must have unity of command, with unit command having easy access to division command.
2. The unit must be composed primarily of volunteers (the present I.P.U. mix appears unstable).
3. The unit must maintain an adequate information system.
4. The unit must be able to exhibit some degree of self-direction and control.
5. The unit should be of a size that could be managed by no more than one supervisor. There should not be more than one street supervisor.
6. The objectives must be specific and clearly recognized by the unit itself and all levels of police management. Crime-specific goals are preferable. The activities of the unit must be as directly related to these objectives as possible.

7.4 Pitfalls to be Avoided

Here we list several pitfalls which are easy to be trapped in unless they are being watched for. They are singled out here as key factors which can impede the progress of a special tactical unit. Some have been experienced by the I.P.U. in particular, while others are potential problems but have not occurred in Harrisburg.

1. Avoid overstaffing. It seems better to begin with a small core of committed officers, refine the unit's approach, and build on it later. Many officers in the unit create more problems than the unit solves.
2. Avoid inappropriate staffing. Non-volunteers and untrained individuals downgrade both the effectiveness of the unit and its reputation.
3. Avoid instability in mission. A rapidly changing mission is probably worse than one which may be slightly "off target" but stable. (Stable, of course, does not mean never changing.) Objectives should be well-defined, preferably crime-specific, and well-known to all members of the unit.
4. Avoid "simple" misuse of the unit. We here refer to uses for which the unit was not designed or which are not part of its objectives, e.g. crowd control, etc.
5. Avoid "complex" misuse of the unit. Less obvious than simple misuse is the misuse that occurs when the unit is used as a visible symbol of the responsiveness of the department to political pressure. For example, the "showing the flag" type of activities may be counterproductive if the unit is attempting to operate in a low visibility mode.
6. Avoid insufficient tactical flexibility. Day-to-day use of old vehicles, disguises, patrol and walking routes, etc. are desirable.

7. Avoid data overload and information scarcity. In the absence of the unit deciding what information it needs, two things are likely to happen: either the unit receives irrelevant computer printouts (data overload) or the unit does not receive specialized information suited to its needs.
8. Avoid street confrontations with supervision of other units. Such confrontations, in the absence of pre-established guidelines, are likely to elicit support for the regular units, and not for the tactical unit.
9. Avoid normal feedback systems. Much of the overall management function of the larger department may use a feedback process which distorts and filters out relevant information. A positive step can be taken if this unit regularly debriefs after any concerted activity, while the data and experience are "hot."



7.5. "Project Management"--An Alternative Concept of Organizing Tactical Units.

The project management concept that has become associated with the term was originally used by N.A.S.A. It affords three principal elements which distinguishes it from more traditional management structures.

1. There is a "project manager" who is the single point of management responsibility for the conduct of the task.
2. Centralized planning and control are exerted by the project manager and his organization.
3. Some of the work is performed by individuals outside of the project management's organization, but this work is all coordinated by a project executive in that outside organization.

The appropriateness of these elements may vary from time to time within each tactical unit. The limited time frame (one to three years) under which many tactical units operate because of federal support makes them candidates for the project management approach.

More importantly, the experience of the project management approach has uncovered additional findings on the relationship of the project manager with the overall organization. These findings are repeated here, in a form adapted to the special conditions of tactical units. They reflect the kind of relationship which we believe desirable between tactical unit supervision and departmental supervision.

Six necessary preconditions for effective experiments in tactical unit management.\*

1. Senior management committment to focus on a well-defined and time-limited task.
2. Strong support by department senior officials of the unit commander.
3. Authority to act across organization lines.
4. A basic but simple system for keeping senior management and those affected by the project informed.
5. A system for periodic review by senior management at points in the life cycle (of the project) keyed to reporting and management decisions.
6. Relatively easy access to senior management by the unit commander.

\* Adapted from Project Management in N.A.S.A.: The System and the Men, R.L. Chapman, N.A.S.A., Washington D.C. 1973.

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APPENDIX A

INTENSIVE PATROL UNIT EVALUATION SURVEY

THE WHARTON SCHOOL  
VANCE HALL  
3733 Spruce Street

MANAGEMENT AND BEHAVIORAL  
SCIENCE CENTER

20 August 1974

Dear Officer:


As you probably know, the Intensive Patrol Unit of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police is sponsored by a grant from the Governor's Justice Commission of Pennsylvania. This grant requires an independent evaluation, and the Justice Commission has commissioned me to prepare this evaluation.

As a staff member of the Management and Behavioral Science Center of the Wharton School, I am strongly convinced of the value of opinion from those actually performing a job, and not being limited to statistical data and statements from supervisors. I hope you share my eagerness in this regard. As an officer currently or formerly assigned to the I.P.U., you have knowledge and experience of the I.P.U. which no one else has.

Therefore, I ask your cooperation by completing the enclosed survey, which is being sent to all current and former I.P.U. members. It is fairly extensive, and it was prepared with the cooperation of four I.P.U. officers who should be able to clarify any unclear points. (Their names are listed in the survey itself.) The survey is ruled by strict professional confidentiality. The Bureau of Police has agreed to the survey, and we have their cooperation. They will not see any individual responses; only the evaluation team here at the Center will have access to identified response forms.

I would appreciate your returning the survey to us no later than Thursday, August 29, 1974. Please use the enclosed postage-paid envelope. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Sincerely,



John C. Eldred  
Senior Management  
Research Analyst

INTENSIVE PATROL UNIT

EVALUATION SURVEY

Part I (Introduction)

This survey is part of the I.P.U. evaluation.

The survey consists of four parts:

Part I (introduction)

Part II (personal data)

Part III (survey questions)

Part IV ("Who else should we talk to?")

The evaluators would like to stress two ground rules that have been established for this survey:

1. The survey is being conducted under professional rules of confidentiality, meaning that the identity of individual responses will be seen only by the evaluators, and not by anyone else. This is a standard practice of the evaluators. Furthermore, all responses will be included in the feedback of survey results, but in aggregate form only. Thus, all remarks will be reported anonymously. We plan to mail a personal copy of these results to your home.
2. The second ground rule is that this survey has been sanctioned by the management of the Harrisburg Bureau of Police, and we have had their fullest cooperation and support in the evaluation. We believe that all parties are extremely interested in a candid and complete

picture of the I.P.U. from the viewpoint of all of the individuals who have been a part of it (both present and past members).

The remaining three parts of the survey require your candor and cooperation. We have been assisted in the preparation of this survey by four members of the I.P.U. (W. C. Durham, T. L. Olsen, J. A. Vucenic, and J. F. Zang, Jr.). If you need clarification on any of the points raised, please feel free to contact them.

Part II (Personal Data)

1. Name
2. Address (include zip code)
3. Years (months) in I.P.U.: Starting        mo./yr.  
Until        mo./yr.
4. Total years (months) on force: Starting        mo./yr.  
Until        mo./yr.
5. Did you volunteer for the I.P.U. (circle one)?  
Yes  No
6. If you answered "no" to question #5, why were you assigned to the I.P.U.?
7. If you left the I.P.U., what was your reason for leaving?
8. If you have left the department, what was your reason for leaving?
9. If given a choice, would you prefer to stay on the I.P.U. (circle)?  
Yes  No
10. Have you ever served in any other tactical unit?  
(If so, list that unit)

Part III (Survey)

On the basis of your experience and information, how would you rate the following characteristics of the I.P.U.? (Check under appropriate column.)

Out-  
standing

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Fair

Rather Poor

Poor

1. Overall I.P.U. services
2. I.P.U. responsiveness to calls for service
3. I.P.U. concern for public welfare in areas patrolled
4. I.P.U. visibility in area patrolled
5. I.P.U. attempts to educate public on crime prevention
6. I.P.U. efforts to improve quality of police services

What comments, if any, do you have on your responses to the above questions?

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7. Taking the six previous characteristics mentioned, how would you rate the overall

Harrisburg Bureau of Police in each of these areas?

Outstanding   Excellent   Very Good   Good   Fair   Rather Poor   Poor

- Overall services
- Responsiveness
- Concern for public welfare
- Visibility
- Attempts to educate public
- Effort to improve quality of services

Note: What comments, if any, do you have on your responses to the above question?

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The first seven questions covered broad dimensions of police operations. The next questions deal with more specific functions.

8. The following are a number of purposes for which many tactical units operate. From your experience, rank the following in order of importance (rank the most important as #1, the next as #2, etc.) as to how the I.P.U. now operates:

- apprehension/improvement of clearance rate in general
- apprehension/improvement of clearance rate of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- prevention of crime in general
- prevention of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- deterrence of crime in general
- deterrence of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

9. If the I.P.U. were starting all over, how would you rank the following in order of importance (#1 is most important, etc.)

- apprehension/improvement of clearance rate in general
- prevention of crime in general
- deterrence of crime in general
- apprehension/improvement of clearance rate of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- prevention of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- deterrence of specific crimes; namely, \_\_\_\_\_
- other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

Answer questions 10 to 14 with a sentence or brief paragraph.

10. On a tactical level (everyday operations), how was the I.P.U. originally designed to operate?
11. How actually did it operate, when it started?
12. How is it operating today?
13. How could it be operating (with minor changes)?
14. If you could change anything in the I.P.U. or the Bureau of Police, how would you have the I.P.U. operating "ideally"?

15. Did/do you know what crime problem the I.P.U. is trying to combat?

No

Yes. What is it? \_\_\_\_\_

16. How was that crime problem communicated to you?

17. Were/are you given numerical data regarding incidence of crime in areas patrolled?

18. If you were in charge, would you continue the I.P.U.?

Yes  No

19. If you would continue it, how would you change it (if at all).

20. If you would not continue it, how would the mission it performs be handled?

21. How would you characterize the relationships of the I.P.U. to the following (check one):

Out Excel- Very Good Fair Rather  
standing lent Good Good Fair Poor Poor

- With other patrol units
- With I.P.U. supervision
- With other Bureau supervisors
- With the community
- With the Foot Patrol Units
- With your fellow members of the I.P.U.

What comments, if any, do you have on your responses to the above question?

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22. How do you think the following groups would characterize their relationship with the I.P.U.?

<u>Out-</u> <u>standing</u>	<u>Excellent</u>	<u>Very</u> <u>Good</u>	<u>Good</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Rather</u> <u>Poor</u>	<u>Poor</u>
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- Other patrol units
- I.P.U. supervision
- Other Bureau supervision
- Community
- Foot Patrol Unit
- Fellow members of the I.P.U.

What comments, if any, do you have on your responses to the above question?

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23. How do you see the I.P.U. as different from the regular patrol units?

24. In what way are you evaluated by your supervision while a member of the I.P.U.?

25. What comments do you have on questions 15 to 24?

26. What general comments, suggestions do you have on the overall survey?

Part IV:

Now that you have finished the survey, is there any other individual, including civilians, with whom we should talk to or have fill out this survey (please give their name and address if possible)?

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What are your general comments/suggestions regarding the evaluation?

What important points regarding the I.P.U. has this survey not covered?

APPENDIX B

OUTPUT OF SURVEY RESPONSE ANALYSIS

BY I.P.U. WORKING GROUP



Introduction

The following pages represent the output of working sessions of a group of eight police officers who have had either direct experience as members or supervisors in the Intensive Patrol Unit, or who have had close contact with the unit's operation.

The working sessions were designed by the evaluators with two purposes:

--to analyze the results of the survey of all present and former members of the I.P.U.

--to brainstorm both strategic and tactical approaches which the I.P.U., as a prototypical tactical unit, could use under idealized operating conditions.

Extensive effort was made to cluster and prioritize the results of the survey and to identify potential applications both for the Intensive Patrol Unit and for tactical units in other police departments.

EXHIBIT B-1

RANKINGS OF FUNCTIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE WITH OTHER H.B.P. UNITS

Function	Other Units Interfacing with I.P.U							Average Ranking of Function
	Regular Patrol	Foot Patrol	Detective	Community Relations	Command Supervision	Juvenile Bureau	Other Police Agencies	
Apprehension and improved clearance rates in general	4	6	1	7	6	4	4	4.58
Apprehension and improved clearance rates for specific crimes	2	7	2	8	3	5	3	4.28
Prevention of crime in general	3	1	5.5	1	5	2	5	3.21
Prevention of specific crimes	6	5	5.5	2	4	7	6	5.07
Deterrence of crime in general	5	2	5.5	3	7	3	7	4.64
Deterrence of specific crimes	7	4	5.5	4	8	6	8	6.07 (lowest)
Intelligence gathering	1	3	3	5	1	1	1	2.14 (highest)
Traffic	8	8	8	6	2	8	2	6.00

Key: Reading down the columns indicates which functions require the most or least interdependence with other units.

Scale: 1 = "This function is most important in our interface with this unit."

8 = "This function is least important in our interface with this unit."

Notes on Functional Interdependence Matrix

1. Individuals were asked to rank, with respect to each interfacing unit, which functions were most important (i.e., in which were the I.P.U. and the other unit most "interdependent").
2. These rankings were then averaged (see "average ranking" column) to indicate which functions required the most interdependence (work with interface units).
3. In this case, intelligence gathering ranked highest, followed by prevention of crime in general, etc.
4. While all of these functions are contemplated by the I.P.U., the implications of an intelligence-oriented unit are seen as structural in nature and are best illustrated in exhibit B-2, "Alternative Mission Statements."

ALTERNATIVE MISSION STATEMENTS FOR THE I.P.U.

"INDEPENDENT" MISSION STATEMENT

"This unit shall be designated as a full\* tac unit for the purpose of attacking crimes of the following nature:

- robberies
- burglaries
- theft"

[\*"Full" was explained to be fully free to innovate tactically, with maximum flexibility.]

"INTERDEPENDENT" MISSION STATEMENT

"This unit shall have as its primary function, apprehension, general prevention, and shall be free to change tactics to fit the situation.

"It will rely on information from the following sources (in order of priority):

1. Patrol and Traffic
2. Inter-platoon communication and street informants
3. Juvenile bureau
4. Detective bureau
5. Statistics (if up to date [timely] from record bureau)"

## Notes on Alternative Mission Statements

1. The working group divided into subgroups of four after each individual had listed in three iterations his best definition of a mission statement for the I.P.U.
2. The group then derived two different styles of operation. The first style would be that of a fully independent unit, which would have complete freedom within department regulations to operate as it saw fit. Under such a concept, there would be minimal joint work with other organization units. The second style would be interdependent, in which the unit would work closely with other organizations (as it had actually done on occasion) and in which its activities would complement those of other units.
3. These two mission statements were composed, and then presented to a mock review board, composed of two of the evaluators for questioning and clarification.
4. This process had considerable value for the working group, since it was mutually educational for both the evaluators and the working group, and it served as "closure" for the survey analysis process.
5. Both of these missions reflect fundamentally different

styles and, if logically pursued, different operating characteristics. These are included in this appendix to illustrate the kind of choices and communication which would seem necessary if tactical unit operation is to be successful.

EXHIBIT B-3

KEY ISSUE LIST FOR DIFFERENT FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITIES

<u>Function</u>	<u>Issues</u>
1. Prevention (General)	--What type of prevention (education vs. saturation/visibility) --Preventive maintenance approach before crime takes place
2. Prevention (Specific crimes)	--Street crimes → intensify patrol --Shops/stores → educate --Communications media → utilize fully
3. Deterrence (General)	--Intensify patrol/visibility --Use "Officer Friendly" program --Crime repression--educate public --Audible alarms
4. Deterrence (Specific)	--Traffic violations--marked cars --Push uniformity among officers in traffic signals
5. Apprehension (General)	--Plan where and how unit works --Use traffic stops --Eliminate overlap/traffic duty conflicts --Better data on crime and population characteristics of different areas
6. Apprehension (Specific)	--What crimes are high likelihood of apprehension --Look for all on view felonies and misdemeanors --Push silent alarms --Watch overload, over-response

EXHIBIT B-4

PRIORITY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES

I. Group 1 output:

1. First priority: Deal with ignorance, attitude, and apathy of some members of present unit.
2. Second priority: Compose specific lists of tactical characteristics (get some certainty and continuity in how the unit operates tactically).
3. Third priority: Utilize uniform and appropriate training resources.
4. Fourth priority: Define apprehension as primary function.
5. Fifth priority: Determine methods to achieve and maintain highest degree of tactical flexibility.
6. Sixth priority: Once flexibility is achieved, begin crime prevention activities.
7. Seventh priority: Establish and maintain realistic goals.

II. Group 2 output:

1. First priority: Organize the unit into a coherent unit with a single direction.

2. Second priority: Define the objective of the unit.  
This will deal both with attitudes and communications problems.
3. Third priority: Give unit specialized and relevant training.
4. Fourth priority: Establish flexibility in tactics as the key operating characteristics.
5. Fifth priority: Define specific crimes to be attacked.
6. Sixth priority: Maximize arrests in all on view situations.
7. Seventh priority: Take steps to change the image of the unit as a "Punishment" platoon.

#### Notes on Priority Analysis

As in the process outlined in B-2, "Alternative Mission Statements," two groups worked separately to analyze key questions in the survey responses. The technique they used was called a 7 x 7 sort (see Gregory's The Management of Intelligence). As a result of the work, each group assembled a matrix of responses. Reproduced above are the topic headings of the responses. They are listed in order of priority (as they should be attacked within the situation of the I.P.U. at that time).

APPENDIX C

STANDARD 9.8, "SPECIAL CRIME TACTICAL  
FORCES," POLICE, National Advisory  
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards  
and Goals, Washington D.C., 1973.

**END**