


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HIGH IMPACT ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM A HISTORY OF THE PORTLAND IMPACT PROGRAM

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice

**NATIONAL IMPACT PROGRAM EVALUATION
A HISTORY OF
THE PORTLAND IMPACT PROGRAM**


**BY
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THE MITRE CORPORATION**

OCTOBER 1975

**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice**

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ABSTRACT

This document reconstructs the history of LEAA's High Impact Anti-Crime Program in Portland and represents one element of an overall, eight-city, program history. The effort is being undertaken by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and The MITRE Corporation as part of a nation-wide evaluation of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program presently in operation. The document provides a narrative of key issues, events and decisions which shaped the program in Portland.

PREFACE

Scope and Purpose

This is one among a series of case studies describing key events which took place and decisions which were made in each of the eight Impact cities and in Washington, D. C. during the course of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The case studies, together with a report viewing the program from a national perspective will comprise Task 8 of the national-level evaluation of the Impact program; they are intended to help answer the three questions which form the basis of the national-level evaluation effort, namely:

What happened - in terms of planning and implementation processes - when the LEAA provided eight large cities with a significant sum of money and guidance on crime-specific planning and evaluation?

What were the key factors which promoted or inhibited the success of the program in terms of the program's overall goals?

What meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the record of the Impact program and the overall evaluation effort?

This case study focuses on key program-level, rather than project-level, events. The word "key" is deserving of special emphasis here. In no way does this report pretend to stand as a day-by-day chronology of events; rather, it attempts to describe those decisions and events which have seemed most significant during the time period which has passed since the Portland Impact program was begun.

General Research Procedures for the History Task

Visits were made to each of the main agencies of the Impact program structure - the Regional Office of the LEAA, the State Planning Agency, and the city organization known as the Crime Analysis Team - to obtain information relevant to the task. The files of each agency were searched, and memoranda and correspondence concerning meetings held, decisions made, and progress achieved or problems encountered in the course of the program were selected. Documents were also obtained from relevant offices of the Washington headquarters of the LEAA.

Interviews were held with key members of the Impact program bureaucracy. Depending upon the respondent, one of two techniques was used. In the first case, a semi-structured interview schedule had been constructed to obtain from the respondent a chronological description of Impact program events. The questions also included certain functional

areas such as "interagency coordination" which encompass a continuous series of discrete events and seemed likely to be best captured in summary, rather than chronological, form. In some cases, the interview schedule was followed quite closely.

In other cases, the interview was begun with a few background questions about functional areas, such as the organization of the CAT, and led up to a request that the respondent recreate for the interviewer the history of the program as he himself knew it or had heard it from others. The respondent was asked, in effect, to place himself back in time to when he first joined the program and tell how events seemed to him as they unfolded. The role of the interviewer was to use his basic knowledge of the program to keep the narrative on a chronological track and occasionally to ask the respondent to amplify or explain a statement. When the narrative was finished, the interviewer would ask a few questions to fill in gaps which seemed immediately apparent.

Several rules have been followed in the presentation of the findings of this study. Information derived from written records has been attributed to its source. However, in the interests of confidentiality, the sources of quotations drawn from interviews have not been cited. Finally, since the personal identities of the actors are less important than their institutional positions, they are identified, wherever possible, by their organizational titles rather than by name.

The interviews with key personnel of the regional, state and city planning units were conducted by R. E. Brown. His notes and background information on the Portland Impact program were of inestimable value in placing the information here transcribed within what is believed to be an accurate historical context.

Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the case method are well known. In terms of the most generally accepted paradigm of social science research, the case method is open to the charges that it deals with the specific rather than the general, is descriptive rather than analytic, and leaves so much to the discretion and judgment of the researcher that validation of the data and replication of the study are impossible.

There are more specific problems with this particular study which must be recognized. The validity of the information acquired through interviews is open to question because they were conducted at least eighteen months after the program began and the recollections of the respondents may not always have been reliable. On the other hand, too little time may have elapsed before the interviews were conducted. The program was in full operation while the study was being carried out. After an evaluator has come and gone, the participants in a

program still need to carry on with very real personal and political relationships to accomplish their jobs. Thus, some of the respondents may have perceived certain information at their disposal as sensitive in nature and some reservation on their part was probably inevitable.

In the case of written records three problems are apparent. The tone and degree of selectivity of some documents led to the conclusion that they had as their purpose not only the recording of the "facts" but also the providing of a rationale for a past or future decision. Moreover, some documents were not strictly contemporaneous but rather constituted written summaries of prior events. Thus, the passage of time may well have affected the emphases of the writer. Finally, it is probably a condition of bureaucratic life that the more routine and non-problematic the events, the fewer the memoranda and letters generated by the actors. When conflicts arise and issues are drawn, the formal and informal communications among those responsible for a program will normally increase. Thus, available records are more likely to reflect "problems" or management crises about which decisions are difficult and which tend to be forced upon the organizational hierarchy and thereby generate even more paperwork. The danger here is that the researcher would conclude that a particular program was characterized solely by one problem after another. Yet, there is a routine "everyday life" in any human activity, political and otherwise, which is no less real and important than are conflict and crises.

To the best of our knowledge, the events which occurred during the development phase of the Portland Impact program have been amply documented here. It is true, however, that some of the projects (most notably, the adult corrections package) supported by the program have only recently been implemented and the data on their operations available at the time this study was written were not voluminous. The result is that the study may heavily emphasize the coordination and planning aspects of the early part of the program, and may fail to reflect enough of the reality of the later implementation phase. It is hoped that information made available by the review process and with the passage of more time will allow the final version to include a more lengthy treatment of the administration of the program at the operational level.

The Utility of the Case Method

In many ways, however, the very characteristics of the method which weaken it serve as its strengths. While the following report is long on description and short on analysis, its level of detail should be sufficient to permit the reader to draw his own conclusions from what is here presented rather than force him to accept solely the frame of reference of the writer. The study attempts to deal with social and political life on its own terms. To a large extent, the participants were taken at their own written or spoken words. Their definitions of reality, their statements of problems, their qualitative judgments, were

reported but not to any significant degree analyzed for their "objective" validity. Eventually, the findings of the case studies will be synthesized and analyzed for their overall significance. In the meantime, it is hoped that the events described in each of the studies can usefully speak for themselves.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When the High Impact Anti-Crime Program began in January 1972, Portland was experiencing a significantly lower incidence of most of the crime types targeted by the program than existed in the other seven Impact cities. In Portland, therefore, the relative absence of violent crime, combined with what Portland's Impact planners termed a "high youth and recidivist involvement" orientation, triggered the development of a different kind of program, featuring a strong prevention and corrections component (rather than one focusing on high levels of police activity, for example) than those which evolved in the other Impact cities. Corrections and prevention programs, however, to prove their effectiveness, normally require a treatment continuity of longer duration than the time allotted to Impact cities to implement and achieve their projected quantified goals and objectives. Thus a conflict existed between Portland's perception of its crime problem and the overall Impact program goal to demonstrate a significant and visible reduction in stranger-to-stranger crimes over a relatively short time period.

The city of Portland and Multnomah county had established, in 1971, a consolidated planning agency called the city-county office of Justice Coordination and Planning and it was fully expected that Impact would serve as a unifying vehicle for this still newly implemented agency. Instead, by July 1, 1974, city-county differences had reached such an impasse that the county would withdraw completely from the joint agency. Despite this clear-cut failure, both city and county representatives were to play integral roles in the development of Impact and, in effect, would serve as liaison with the various city and county criminal justice agencies which came under their respective jurisdictions.

Final grant development and submission was completed by August 1974, and by September 30, 1974, 23 separate grant awards had been approved by the Region X Offices at Seattle, Washington. These awards included two planning grants to the city Crime Analysis Team, one evaluation grant to the Oregon Law Enforcement Council, and 20 grants to 19 individual projects. In all, the city received \$16,032,465 in grant awards to individual projects and \$1,268,389 in planning and evaluation awards. The current grand total is \$17,300,854. Of the more than \$16 million in project awards, \$9.8 million, or 61.4 percent, went to corrections programs.

As in each of the city programs, there were special features associated with the Portland effort. The major ones are cited below.

- The City/County/State Relationship. The police is the only criminal justice system component controlled by the city. The corrections and courts components are controlled by the county and the state, and therefore, the city of Portland had to include the county and the state in Impact planning. The Portland program, then, became an experiment in inter-governmental cooperation in planning.
- The Commitment to "Quality" Evaluation. Even before the announcement of the Impact program, the legislature of the State of Oregon had made an announced commitment to perform "quality" evaluations. Because there was a political acceptance of evaluation as a necessary public policy tool, Oregonians, at all levels of government, were highly accepting of the evaluation aspects of the Impact program. Portland is the only Impact city to receive a five-year funding commitment from the LEAA for a component of its proposed evaluation. The money, \$254,350, will provide 50 percent funding to develop two predictive models and some supporting annual surveys.
- The Attempt to Plan Beyond the Dimensions of the Criminal Justice System. There were major attempts to include other agencies in their Impact program. With the exception of the renovation of the Kelly Butte facility as part of the Strike Force Project, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. This appears to be, in the main, due to the ex post facto nature of the proffered inclusions. For example, the attempts to involve the Federal Regional Council in the Early Intervention Project were made after the project concept was fully developed, and the city was merely looking for a funding source. Failure may also be due, however, to the intrinsic difficulties of achieving coordination across federal agencies. In any case, the attempts to do "broader vision" planning led to the inclusion of several projects (e.g., Early Intervention), which could not be funded under the Impact program given its narrow scope, and which accounted for delays in getting projects approved and implemented.
- The Separation of Planning Responsibilities from Evaluation Responsibilities. In Portland, project planning and overall program monitoring were assigned to the Impact Staff while program/project evaluation and fiscal monitoring responsibilities were assigned to the OLEC, the State Planning Agency. (In six of the seven other cities evaluation of the program is conducted by the planning staff proper, who have in-house teams of evaluation analysts.) Although the evaluation designs and reports received thus far from Portland have been slow in coming, they are, for the most part, comprehensive and well conceived.

- The "Root Causes" Approach to Crime Control. A basic attitude which permeates Portland's Impact Program is that crime causality can be treated effectively through early intervention in the lives of those individuals most likely to become criminal offenders. This led the Impact Task Force to plan projects and programs which ostensibly would prevent, intervene in, and when too late for the application of either of the former strategies, correct deviant behavioral patterns. This led to an Impact Program focus which eventually would see 67 cents of every Impact dollar put into projects which Portland planners believed would prevent or correct crime problems. The relentless pursuit of this long-term approach led to countless interventions by LEAA headquarters and its National Institute. Those interventions, this case study indicates, led ultimately to an Impact Program falling more generally within the constraints of the LEAA-generated guidelines, while allowing the city an opportunity to develop the kind of program it deemed appropriate to its particular crime problems.

Clearly, the non-Impact (i.e., non-short-term payoff) character of several projects proposed by Portland for implementation was a primary cause of program delay, and it is in this area that the conflict between the Impact program philosophy and the Portland approach seems most apparent. Impact, a federally-funded action program which addresses specific crime problems and whose effectiveness was to be measured over a defined time period via a quantifiable reduction in targeted crimes, has implicit in its design the understanding that the specified crimes will be addressed, and that the posited time periods will be adhered to. The Portland position, on the other hand, called for a "broader vision" planning approach "without regard to funding sources and addressing areas which are not Impact-related." In addition, problems of interagency coordination, among others, led to further and continuing delays which left Portland with six of its nineteen projects unawarded as of April 1974, and two projects still pending approval by the Regional Office as late as September 1974.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 The High Impact Anti-Crime Program

The High Impact Anti-Crime Program, announced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) in January 1972, represented a noticeable departure from prior agency policy in at least two ways. First, previous LEAA programs had generally been directed toward improvement of the criminal justice system. Grant monies had been spent mainly on modernizing equipment, training personnel and refining the operational techniques of criminal justice agencies. The Impact program defined its goals in terms of crime rather than of the criminal justice system. It had dual purposes: the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crime and burglary in the Impact cities by 5 percent in two years and 20 percent in five years, and the demonstration of the utility of the comprehensive crime-oriented planning, implementation and evaluation process. This process includes an analysis of the victims, offenders, and environment of the Impact target crimes; an elaboration of the cities' crime problems in quantified terms; the development of a set of programs and projects to address them; and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects and programs implemented. Second, the program represented a marked change in the character of the administration of LEAA discretionary funds which previously had been parceled out in small amounts but would now be concentrated largely in a single program thrust.

The Impact program was carried out in the cities of Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and St. Louis. The criteria for their selection were as follows:

- Since it was assumed that the funds available would have little measurable effect upon the largest cities and because the target crimes were less frequent in cities with populations below 250,000, only cities with populations between 250,000 and 1,000,000 were considered for inclusion in the program.
- The overall crime rate and statistics for robbery and burglary of each city in this population category were examined.

- To assure geographic distribution no more than one city was to be selected for each LEAA region.
- In those regions where the above criteria resulted in more than one eligible city, the final selection was based on an assessment of the city's ability to manage the program.

Time would show that each of the eight Impact cities would respond in its own way to the policy guidelines established by the LEAA for the management of the program. However, there were a number of activities which were expected of all the cities and these serve as a convenient means to organize their program histories. Each city was expected to:

- Distribute and analyze a questionnaire which had been devised by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice to provide a basic store of information upon which to build its crime-oriented plan.
- Establish a Crime Analysis Team (CAT) as the organizational mechanism for the coordination of the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of the Impact program.
- Develop an application for the funds made available by the National Institute to carry out the planning and evaluation functions. The application was to include a "plan of operation" for the CAT which would describe how it intended to develop a master program plan and organize its evaluation function.
- Gather data for and carry out program evaluation at the local level.
- Develop a master plan for the program within a crime-oriented planning framework.
- Coordinate the development of projects, monitor their implementation, and evaluate their effectiveness.

In a policy sense, decision-making authority was to be shared by the appropriate representatives of the President of the United States, the governor of the state, and the mayor of the city. The Regional Administrator, the SPA director, and the CAT director or the mayor were

personally to form a "partnership" responsible for program policy in their Impact city. A "Policy Decision Group" composed of three high-level officials in the LEAA Washington headquarters would serve to oversee the consistency of the program nationally.

At the operational level, the decision-making apparatus directly concerned with the Impact program included the Crime Analysis Team (CAT), the State Planning Agency (SPA), and the Regional Office of the LEAA (RO). The actual roles of each would vary in style and substance. The SPA's role in discretionary grant programs had been to serve as a conduit for grant funds from the Regional Office to local agencies and as a financial monitor. They could not, as it were, veto discretionary grant proposals. Under the Impact program, many SPA's would be asked to assume a role in the decision-making process that would prove to be more active and influential than had traditionally been the case under the discretionary grant program. Finally, the Regional Office of the LEAA had been delegated the final authority to approve Impact plans and projects.

In the case of Portland, the organizational title of the CAT is the Impact Staff. The Impact Staff is housed in the offices of the City-County Office of Justice Coordination and Planning (OJCP) and may be correctly termed a subunit of the city-county group. OJCP was in existence prior to the start of the Impact program and maintained responsibility for all block and discretionary grant planning for the city of Portland and surrounding Multnomah County. At the state level, the organizational title of the SPA is the Oregon Law Enforcement Council (OLEC). As the Impact program was developed in Portland, the OLEC was designated as the Impact program's evaluator. This step represented a marked departure from the LEAA guidelines which stipulated that all planning and evaluation functions would be the responsibility of the city Crime Analysis Teams. It also set up the one instance in the Impact program where a city planning unit was stripped entirely of the important

evaluation function. This decision, as this document will attest, has had far-reaching implications for the Portland Impact program and figures prominently in the early conflicts between key city, county and state personnel involved in the implementation of Impact.

The Regional Office for the LEAA Region X, based in Seattle, Washington, was charged with the overall responsibility for the Portland Impact program. However, the RO quickly transferred many duties and responsibilities to the SPA, with the Regional Office coordinator having verbalized his long-term view of Impact "as a state program".⁽¹⁾ In addition, an umbrella group was formed to provide policy guidance and direction to the overall Portland Impact program. This group, called the Impact Task Force, was headed by the State Attorney General and was comprised of individuals representing the various city, county and state units of government. The Impact Task Force became the highest local-level authority for approving or disapproving Impact projects and was, therefore, to occupy a pivotal role in Portland's Impact program.

2.0 THE CONTEXT OF THE PORTLAND IMPACT PROGRAM

2.1 The Portland Crime Picture

In a January 1973 national magazine profile, Portland was described by its newly elected mayor as "a very small big city." In explanation, he pointed out that Portland was about 10 years behind other comparable urban areas in terms of growth and problems. Viewing Portland, nestled peacefully in its own special corner of the far Northwest with Mt. Hood's peak for a backdrop, it is difficult to conceive of the city as having serious crime problems. Indeed, Portland appears to be at great variance with the other seven cities chosen for the High Impact Anti-Crime Program in terms of key sociodemographic variables. The 1970 census, for example, showed the city's population at a low 381,927, the smallest in the Impact program, with only Newark at 382,374 being of roughly comparable size. This similarity, however, does not go very far, as the following data indicate. The same 1970 census reports Newark's population as consisting of a continually-migrating black majority with a white minority largely of Italian extraction and a growing Puerto Rican subgroup, whereas the population of Portland consists chiefly of native-born whites largely of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian descent with only a scattering of blacks and Orientals. Further, Portland is among the least densely populated of the eight Impact cities, whereas Newark is the most densely populated and geographically compact. From the viewpoint of Impact program evaluation, this has its importance because a densely populated city will have different problems than one with a low population density, and the crimes associated with slums and overcrowding may be more pressing in a thickly populated urban place. In addition, the anonymity, transience and disorganization of social relations associated with large urban populations may be conducive to the commitment of stranger-to-stranger crimes.

It is natural to hypothesize that planners of the Portland Impact program recognized at a very early stage not only that the crime picture in Portland was different from that of the other cities but also that it might well fail to lend itself to the short-term, highly visible results anticipated under the Impact program. The FBI statistics for 1971 showed Portland to have a less serious problem with violent crime than any of the seven remaining Impact cities. Noting the differences in Portland and other Impact cities, the Region X Administrator for LEAA could say the following:

(Portland) has substantially different contours than what I expect that other cities are finding, e.g., a much smaller minority population, less drug-related crime, lesser court delay problems, strong recent consolidation moves, and high youth and recidivist involvement. (2)

The racial composition and interrelationships of major groups within a city's population are thought to be related to the incidence of certain crimes. And because of the disparities which so often exist between the educational and economic status of whites as opposed to members of minority groups, the relative sizes and tensions of the minority components of a city's population can be important parameters of a city's crime problem. Given Portland's relatively homogeneous population, then, it is not surprising to find that there was a significantly lower incidence of most of the crime types targeted by the Impact program than existed in the other seven Impact cities. In Portland, therefore, the relative absence of violent crime combined with the "high youth and recidivist involvement" orientation seems to have triggered the development of a different kind of program, featuring a strong prevention and corrections component (rather than one focusing on high levels of police activity, for example) than those which evolved in other Impact cities. Corrections and prevention programs, however, to prove their effectiveness, normally require a treatment continuity of longer duration than the time allotted to Impact cities to implement and achieve their projected quantified goals and objectives. Thus a conflict existed between Portland's perception of

its crime problem and the overall Impact program goal to demonstrate a significant and visible reduction in stranger-to-stranger crimes over a short time frame; this conflict was to become a major theme of the Portland program.

2.2 Portland's Emerging Criminal Justice Priorities

The FBI statistical reports for 1971 indicated that only the reported crime rates for burglaries and robberies in Portland compared with similar crime rates in other Impact cities. Commenting on the direction Portland's Impact program was to take, the second director of the Portland Impact Staff made the following comments in a profile appearing in The Oregonian in early 1973:

Portland's High Impact Anti-Crime projects probably will not cause a dramatic, quick reduction of burglary and robbery, but should reflect a gradual decline over the long haul.

I think we're under the gun to make this program work here not just because it's funded by LEAA but because we have a chance to keep Portland from becoming a Cleveland or Newark.

Stressing the program's emphasis on corrections, he continued:

It is painfully clear that corrections is the weakest link in the criminal justice system. If we can't rehabilitate offenders in the corrections system, they'll come back again and again and again. That's what's happening now. (3)

Thus, the die appears to have been cast in Portland for a program which, in the opinion of its administrators, met the needs of that city. These needs would not always coincide with the announced objectives of the High Impact Anti-Crime Program. Where there existed a conflict, it would be Portland's strategy to fight for what it perceived as being in the best interests of the city and its citizenry.

2.3 A Philosophical Mutuality Versus Problems of Interagency Coordination

In the city of Portland itself, there would develop serious differences among key actors. These differences, however, would revolve around the way in which individuals would view the allocation of programmatic and evaluative responsibilities. The focus and fundamental philosophical base upon which Portland Impact rested, however, would remain virtually unchanged. This philosophical focus toward prevention and corrections appears to have been due as much to the influence of Mrs. Elizabeth Preston (now Welch), the Portland Impact Staff's first director, as it was to that of any other single individual associated with the program. This University of Chicago Law School graduate and former Administrative Aide (to then City Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt) was forthright and clear about her intentions. At the highest policy level in the LEAA, she would be essentially unyielding in her fundamental approach, candidly stating that the Portland program would not be totally responsive to the short-term goals of the national program, but due to the city's approach to the program, it would be necessary to address "areas which were not Impact-related."⁽⁴⁾ But the stance taken by her city, according to Mrs. Preston, had been encouraged by the Seattle Regional Office. In a recent interview, she would state the following:

We were told very definitely that we could plan any kind of program we wanted with the planning monies that had been provided, even if we clearly understood that some of the programs would not be fundable with Impact action money... Certainly we were made aware that the Safe Streets Act was the Safe Streets Act and it had some obvious limitations... It was a sort of 'nothing ventured, nothing gained' kind of thing but all very friendly here locally, between us and the Regional Office.⁽⁵⁾

Problems among key actors developed for a variety of reasons. At first, it appeared that city planners felt they were intruders and had been by-passed by prior OLEC/RO relationships; there were many

Impact Staff efforts to recuperate what they considered to be city prerogatives. It should also be noted that Portland's mayor, Neil Goldschmidt, was newly-elected four months after Impact began. Six months after his having taken the oath of office as the nation's youngest big city mayor, he would be described in an Oregonian editorial as so dynamic that under his leadership, "City Hall had erupted like an explosion in a confetti factory."⁽⁶⁾ Commenting on his many programs, the editorial continued:

There are plans for District and Neighborhood Planning Organizations, a federal \$20 million High Impact Anti-Crime Program, police department reorganization, youth diversion and aging programs, a downtown transit mall, reorganization of the personnel system, a new Financial Management System, creation of the Bureau of Neighborhood Environment and a plethora of other projects, including the Bureau of Human Resources...

In the rapid-fire stream of new plans and programs that rushed forth from the new mayor's office, city/county cooperation, deemed essential to the success of Impact, because of the dual responsibility for program areas, appeared to be eroding. Commenting on this, The Oregonian continues:

Additionally, a period of city-Multnomah county cooperation which flourished during the last two years of Mayor Terry D. Schruk's administration has deteriorated badly.

The modus operandi of the new mayor and his chief aides also left many Portlanders in a quandary. The Oregonian concluded:

With the professed goal of helping Portland, City Hall is getting moved and shaken...The problem is that despite an avowed commitment to citizen involvement in the governmental process, too few citizens have any clear or rational picture of the full scope of the mayor's program and what it means to them.

Lots of citizens glimpse bits and pieces but the big picture... has yet to be explained in a manner which permits citizens to sensibly evaluate and react to the Goldschmidt administration and its "game plan" for Portland.⁽⁷⁾

In summary, it was in an environment stabilized by the presence of a shared crime control philosophy but permeated by political upheaval and bureaucratic infighting among the various levels of city, county, and state government, that the Portland Impact program was born.

3.0 THE PROGRAM BEGINS

3.1 Portland Is Selected

When in September 1971, LEAA's Statistics Division prepared a list of thirty-eight cities for possible inclusion in the High Impact Anti-Crime Program, Portland ranked ninth in terms of total index crime¹ rates for the prior calendar year. (This is not surprising inasmuch as burglary comprises such a large proportion of total crimes.) Although Portland was not listed among the top 10 cities for robbery, it was listed among the top 10 cities for burglary as was Seattle, the only other Region X city included in the list of 38. Additionally, this list, shown as Table I below, contained rankings for population size and burglary and robbery rates. Examined for Portland, these rankings naturally reflected a very high correlation between the overall index crime rate and the burglary and robbery rates, the city ranking tenth and thirteenth in these categories, respectively. Just six weeks later, George Hall, then director of LEAA's Statistics Division, transmitted an important memorandum to Martin Danziger, LEAA Assistant Administrator, recommending nine cities as primary choices and five others as alternate choices for the Impact program. Portland was listed as the primary choice for LEAA Region X with Seattle, Washington listed as the alternate choice.

The choice of Portland over Seattle was made with relative ease. In fact, an LEAA memorandum on final selection of Impact cities mentions the Portland/Seattle situation only as a backdrop to the more volatile selection process which surrounded Region IV choice of Atlanta (a city which does not appear on the original list of 38 cities, see Table I below).

In Region IV the Regional Administrator felt that local administrative problems would make it difficult to carry

¹As defined by the FBI, Index crimes include homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

out an Impact program in Tampa. Similar problems dictated the choice of Portland over Seattle... (8)

TABLE I
SELECTION CRITERIA FOR IMPACT CITIES

CITY AND STATE	TOTAL INDEX CRIME RATE RANK	ROBBERY RATE RANK	BURGLARY RATE RANK	POPULATION RANK
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY	1	2	3	24
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA	2	6	7	7
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA	3	8	1	25
WASHINGTON, D. C.	4	1	4	3
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI	5	4	2	12
DENVER, COLORADO	6	15	5	19
MIAMI, FLORIDA	7	5	9	28
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND	8	3	18	1
PORTLAND, OREGON	9	13	10	23
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS	10	11	28	10
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA	11	19	8	38
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA	12	9	20	13
CLEVELAND, OHIO	13	7	32	5
DALLAS, TEXAS	14	20	12	2
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON	15	16	6	16
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI	16	10	13	20
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA	17	12	26	18
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY	18	18	29	26
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA	19	14	16	21
TAMPA, FLORIDA	20	24	14	34
PHOENIX, ARIZONA	21	29	11	14
HONOLULU, HAWAII	22	36	17	31
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA	23	22	27	36
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA	24	25	15	17
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA	25	17	19	32
AKRON, OHIO	26	27	30	35
COLUMBUS, OHIO	27	23	25	15
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA	28	31	24	37
LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA	29	21	22	27
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA	30	37	31	33
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	31	32	23	9
FORT WORTH, TEXAS	32	28	21	22
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	33	35	34	29
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	34	30	36	30
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE	35	33	33	11
SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA	36	34	37	8
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	37	26	35	4
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	38	38	38	6

1970 RANKINGS OF TOTAL INDEX CRIME RATE, ROBBERY RATE, BURGLARY RATE AND POPULATION FOR 38 CITIES 250,000 TO 1,000,000 POPULATION

(Source: Statistics Division, LEAA, September 1971.)

In a MITRE interview, the former Region X Administrator recalled four significant factors which critically influenced the selection of Portland over Seattle. First, although the statistical rates for (Index) crimes being targeted were fairly parallel in both cities, Portland's rates were moving up rapidly whereas the rates for Seattle had leveled off and already were beginning to reflect a downward trend. Second, Portland had demonstrated a greater ability to cooperate with Multnomah county in city/county coordinated activities than had Seattle with King county; e.g., the consolidation of several city and county criminal justice agencies under a single authority, and the city/county experience in coordinated criminal justice planning. Third, the attitudes of the city of Portland and the State of Oregon were viewed as more positive for achieving the goals of the Impact program than were those of Seattle and the State of Washington. This was due largely to Oregon's having a larger experience base to draw upon because of having implemented successfully a greater number of LEAA programs than Washington State. Also, there appeared to be keen interest displayed in the basic tenets of the Impact program by Oregonians who would be called upon to play pivotal roles if Impact were to become a success. Fourth, the city of Seattle had suffered a major scandal in its police department just prior to the launching of Impact. Although the police problems had been virtually solved before the decision had to be made for a primary choice for Impact from Region X, it was felt that Seattle was still in the midst of a transitional phase. Portland, on the other hand, reported no extraordinary police problems and was busy with the prospect of consolidating its police bureau with the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office. From the region's view, this clinched Impact for Portland. At the very least, Seattle did not appear to be as promising a site for Impact as did Portland. (9)

Ultimately, the decision as to which city in Region X would be recommended lay with LEAA's Administrator for the Office of Inspection and Review, Gerald Emmer. He was familiar with Region X and he knew something of both the political climates and state administrative structures in Oregon and Washington. He knew that Portland and Multnomah county had already performed some key steps essential to the successful implementation of a crime reduction program such as Impact. Together, the city and county agents had reviewed the whole status of their criminal justice agencies. He also believed that a "climate of cooperativeness" existed among state and local officials in Oregon, and based on his experience with both state planning units, he believed the Oregon SPA to be far more likely to cooperate with the goals of the Impact program than its Washington State counterpart.⁽¹⁰⁾ When the final list of Impact cities was forwarded to LEAA Administrator Jerris Leonard, Portland remained the Region X representative for the High Impact Anti-Crime Program.

3.2 The Impact Program Is Announced: The Reaction of Portland Officials

The eight mayors, state governors and SPA directors or their delegated representatives were invited to Washington, D. C. for the official ceremonies announcing the Impact program on January 13, 1972. Although no one specifically representing the city of Portland was present for the ceremonies, Oregon Governor Tom McCall and Attorney General Lee Johnson did attend. Almost simultaneous with the Washington festivities, the Oregon press carried announcements of Portland's selection. The very next day a press conference was held at the Oregon State capitol. Representing Governor McCall at this conference, Attorney General Johnson spoke of the Impact program in laudatory terms. To make certain that the LEAA goals for Impact would be achieved, the Governor was appointing a seven-member Task Force to oversee the program. This Task Force was to become the policymaking body for Impact and was intended to comprise individuals representing all components of the criminal justice system as well as the community. The Attorney General, who served as

chairman of the State Supervisory Board, would also chair the Impact Task Force. Three other members of the State Supervisory Board - Multnomah county's Director of Administrative Services, a Portland State University Professor of Police Administration and a Portland City Commissioner - were to be appointed to the Task Force. There would be three at-large members also appointed to the Task Force. Two of the latter appointments - that of an executive assistant to the governor, and that of a labor leader - had been decided and were announced. Conspicuously absent from the list of appointees to the Impact Task Force, however, was the name of Portland's mayor. Presumably, he would be named to fill the one remaining vacancy on the Impact policymaking body.

The following Tuesday, January 18, a meeting was convened in the offices of Portland's mayor to discuss the Impact program. All eyes were riveted on Region X's Administrator as he first explained, in great detail, the purposes of the Impact program, and then, the selection process which had culminated in Portland's receipt of program funding. Apparently, the Impact award had taken most Portlanders by surprise and Mayor Terry Schruck and some of his closest aides were as uninformed about the program as anyone else.

With the possible exception of City Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt, already an appointee to the Impact policymaking body, very few persons in the mayor's office that day had more than the most cursory acquaintanceship with the concept of Impact. Whatever their knowledge gap, however, they remained keenly aware of one thing: their city had suddenly fallen heir to 20 million dollars, and this had occurred without any haggling or negotiating on their parts. Even a man as capable as the Region X Administrator had difficulties in placing this whole set of unusual circumstances in their proper perspective. Almost 25 months later he would remember:

Impact was announced very suddenly. The only preliminary work had been a brief exploration of the crime-specific planning.

In terms of the city and state, there had been no forewarning. Suddenly we had a richly funded program with no pre-negotiation. There was no structure at hand to deal with it. The details of the program were still to be worked out. (11)

3.2.1 The Impact Task Force

The Impact Task Force was scheduled to convene for the first time on January 24th. But even before that meeting could be held, there were rumblings of dissatisfaction over the composition of the Task Force on the part of many community-oriented Portlanders. The Region X Administrator expressed the following concerns:

First, we dealt with the question of the make-up of the policymaking board. The Task Force did not represent the line agencies who would be competing for funds. It represented government, labor and business; it reflected the way they do business in Oregon. (12)

Just such a policymaking body, though, was exactly what early planners of Portland's Impact program had envisioned.

We discussed the internal organizational possibilities and we agreed that, for Oregon, the best arrangement would be for the State Commission to create a small, tough Task Force group to provide and to direct the work of a staff made up of key professionals selected from the SPA, the Regional Council and the city and added to as balance and coverage require. (13)

Of the original Task Force appointees, only Gordon Swope, a labor leader, and Lee Brown, a black university professor, could be termed citizen members of the policymaking body. The four other appointees were representatives of the state, county and city, with the seventh position, ostensibly to be filled by the mayor of Portland, bringing to five the number of appointments to the Task Force of representatives from the three units of government. There was also a move afoot to make the RA an ex-officio member of the Task Force. In voicing his own concerns over the possible conflict of interest such an appointment might create, he wrote the following to LEAA headquarters in Washington:

Attorney General Johnson raises an interesting question: Could I be formally made an ex-officio member of the Task Force? My first reaction is that such an appointment would place me in a prejudicial position since I must ultimately approve the Impact plan and the release of funds to support that plan. On the other hand, the Attorney General argues that this would be testimony to the true partnership of federal, state and city government and would provide an open means by which he and the Task Force group can be guided in its program efforts. (14)

The RA was designated an ex-officio member of the Impact Task Force, and in the early developmental stages of Portland's program, his insights and expertise proved of real value to the policymaking body. As for the Task Force itself, the number of appointees was expanded to 11, excluding the RA, and its composition would change over the life of the program as the political climate in the city and the personal situations of its members would make it necessary. Joining the original six appointees to the Task Force at the outset were Portland Mayor Terry Schruck (who became co-chairman), Multnomah County Commissioner Donald Clark, Civic Leaders Ruth Hagenstein and Robert Noyes, Jr., and Mayoral Assistant Keith Jones. Lee Brown, the lone black member among the original appointees, would eventually resign, leaving Portland for more financially advantageous employment. So would Portland's then mayor, Terry Schruck, due to illness and retirement from public life. Neil Goldschmidt, upon taking office as Portland's mayor, succeeded Schruck to the co-chairmanship. Labor leader Gordon Swope and civic leader Robert Noyes, Jr., would also resign by the fall of 1974. Adding Goldschmidt Aide Phil McLaurin and Commissioner Mildred Schwab to the Task Force membership brings the presently constituted body to a total membership of nine. Thus, as the Table II below reflects, only Portland Civic Leader Ruth Hagenstein is free of active affiliation with a unit of city, county or state government.

Very early, the Task Force made the decision to solicit suggestions and ideas for the use of Impact funds from all criminal justice agencies.

TABLE II
PORTLAND'S IMPACT PROGRAM TASK FORCE

CO-CHAIRMEN

The Honorable Lee Johnson
Attorney General of the State of Oregon

The Honorable Neil Goldschmidt
Mayor of the City of Portland

MEMBERS

Donald Clark, Commissioner
Multnomah County Board of County Commissioners

Robert Davis
Administrative Assistant to the Governor

Ruth Hagenstein
Portland Civic Leader

Keith Jones
Head of Security, Portland Housing Authority

Loren Kramer, Administrative Officer
Multnomah County Board of County Commissioners

Phil McLaurin
Aide to the Mayor, City of Portland

Mildred Schwab, Commissioner
Portland City Council

Appropriate sections of the LEAA Questionnaire were also distributed to these agencies for their inputs. The question of a staff to provide operational-level support to the Task Force was a top priority as was the naming of a director for this support group. The Task Force chairman's choice for the director's job was a young lawyer, J. Bradford Shiley, "with an excellent reputation both in the city and in the state, with a great interest in crime-specific planning and in this (Impact) program in general."⁽¹⁵⁾

3.2.2 The Impact Staff Is Established

On January 19, 1972, the state and regional Impact coordinators met in an all-day session to determine what staff allocations should be established in support of the Impact Task Force. Following that meeting, a written communique was transmitted to the RA which said, in part,

...It has been determined that there will be a staff director, two planners, two analysts, a secretary and one assistant fiscal officer...⁽¹⁶⁾

The director's slot was slated to go to J. Bradford Shiley. His credentials were good. A Harvard Law School graduate, he had served on the legislative staff of Attorney General Lee Johnson. He was also known by the Regional Administrator whose confidence in Shiley had been communicated to LEAA Assistant Administrator Gerald Emmer. Shiley, however, was viewed as the state's man, although in the initial round of meetings, his selection went unopposed. As the Regional Office coordinator put it, "At the initial meeting, there was block voting. It was everybody else against the city. Actually, Shiley was named without opposition since people could see it would not be worth opposing him."⁽¹⁷⁾

But at the very first opportunity it was given, the city began to limit Shiley's power. On February 8, a noon meeting was convened in Mayor Schunk's conference room to further define the relationships

(Source: Portland Impact Program Update: Fall 1974)

of various levels of government, the Impact Task Force and its support staff. Out of that meeting came a decision to greatly curtail Shiley's authority.

The result of this meeting was the agreement to limit the staff of the Task Force to the initial development of statistics and analysis of the problem and then to the evaluation of specific programs. The development of individual programs in the Portland area would be undertaken by an expanded city-county planning staff. (18)

Thus, Shiley's group was quickly shorn of all programmatic responsibilities for Impact. For the time being, he had been left with the responsibility for data collection and specific program evaluation.

3.2.3 The City-County View of the Shiley Appointment

The Shiley appointment, even in a greatly-reduced role, continued to disturb both city and county representatives. As Attorney General Johnson put it, "There was some feeling on the city's part that the money was the city's money, and what was the state doing here?" (19) Both the city and the county believed that Shiley's group would be duplicating the efforts of the city/county planning agency already set up by OLEC. This consolidated planning agency, called the city-county Office of Justice Coordination and Planning (OJCP), had been set up in 1971 through an LEAA-funded action grant and was, the city and county felt, the ideal vehicle for administering Impact. Yet Impact did not seem to aid in unifying the efforts of this joint agency. Rather, it served to polarize the two governmental bodies to such an extent that they could not reach an agreement to use a single individual to coordinate Impact planning responsibilities for the city and county. Consequently, they each named a coordinator. Elizabeth Preston would serve as Senior Criminal Justice Planner for the city of Portland, and Kurt Engelstad would occupy the same position for Multnomah county. Ultimately, the differences between the city and county would increase

to such a degree that the county would withdraw completely from the joint agency, establishing its own planning office by July 1, 1974.

The city/county push for a reduction in Shiley's authority seemed well-founded. No representative from their joint agency was to be a member of the small support staff operating under Shiley as the Impact Staff was originally conceived. Yet, their offices were clearly meant to be involved in any planning being done in behalf of either jurisdiction. Note the following statement from an early Portland Impact planning document:

In the initial phases of program planning, the city-county Justice Planning Staff will work with the constituent agencies in the criminal justice system to assist in and coordinate agency-level planning. (20)

Thus, the city and county representatives were to play an integral role in the development of Impact and, in effect, were to serve as liaison with the various city and county criminal justice agencies. They would be instrumental in shaping the direction and goals of programs generated under Impact. Yet they felt their ability to fulfill their responsibilities would be greatly hampered, slowed and even altogether stymied, were it necessary for them first to report to Shiley's staff. Such concerns, coupled with the city/county perception of Shiley as an outsider, had already led to the reduction of the Shiley role in Impact. This point won, the OJCP planners would now proceed to keep Shiley's staff informed as to program proposals but would report directly to the Impact Task Force as to their plans relative to Portland's Impact program.

3.3 The Task Force Function and Programmatic Directions

As February ended, Task Force members were faced with two pressing problems. First, they were concerned with clarifying their own developing role in the Impact program, and second, they struggled to

somehow wed the LEAA-generated objectives for the Impact program with their own perceptions of criminal justice priorities in Portland. The problem of Task Force role clarification seemed the easier of the two issues to tackle, if for no other reason than that it appeared accessible to solution through interaction among the various members of the group. At a February 28 meeting of the Task Force, one of its members verbalized concern over the group's actual function. The following excerpt from the minutes of that meeting reflect the group's consensus perception of one aspect of their role.

Conclusion was reached that the city-county Criminal Justice Planning Agency...was responsible for development of programs for Impact funding. Programs would be presented through the sub-committee to the respective local government agency affected for approval. If approved, the programs would be presented to the Task Force for final evaluation prior to submission to Regional LEAA. (21)


At that very early stage of program development, then, the Task Force perceived itself as a body possessing program approval rights second only to those of the LEAA's Regional Office. An important intermediary step not reflected in the approval cycle at this meeting of the Task Force was SPA approval. This omission appears not to have been accidental as the following comment by the RO coordinator shows:

There is nothing in the organizational chart which relates to the SPA. It is my understanding that the SPA has prime responsibility for fiscal control of Impact funds. (22)

That organizational chart, shown as Table III below, contains no provision for linkage of the Task Force and Impact Staff to the SPA. And yet, the Institute grant was to the Oregon SPA. The stance being taken by the Task Force, in the RO coordinator's view, was an untenable one. He proposed a compromise:

I suggest that the SPA enter into a contract jointly with Portland and Multnomah county as first parties with the City-County Planning Commission...mentioned as a second party to actually provide criminal justice planning services. (23)

TABLE III
IMPACT TASK FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL LINKAGES



(Source: Region X LEAA Office, Seattle, Wash.)

It appears, then, that there would be more of a role for the SPA in the Impact program than had been envisioned by the Task Force. Still further role clarification would be in order as Task Force positions came into clearer focus.

The second major issue raised at the February 28 Task Force meeting dealt with programmatic focus. On this matter, the Task Force agreed to adopt a resolution which would speak generally to the type of programs they should encourage. Early disagreement settled on whether programs funded under Impact would focus on the apprehension of criminal offenders or on corrections and prevention. The amendment, as adopted, reads as follows:

The objective of the Impact funding is to reduce the occurrence of street crime and burglary by 5 percent during the first two years...and 20 percent over the five-year period of funding. The Task Force does not have sufficient data available to provide specific guidelines in respect to the types of programs necessary to achieve this objective. However, it is apparent that there is a need to develop programs to decrease the opportunity for criminality, to increase the risk of apprehension, and make commission of the specified crimes more difficult. In order to get an effective planning effort underway, the initial priority should be focused on developing programs which increase the apprehensions, increase the risk of apprehensions, decrease the opportunity for criminality and make commission of the crime more difficult. In developing these programs, special attention should be given to ascertaining the effects of increased apprehensions on other components of the criminal justice system. This resolution is intended merely to establish an initial priority in the planning effort. We remain interested in other parts of the system which might not have the direct and immediate effect sought by the guidelines. As data become available to us, we will try to set more specific guidelines and priorities.(24)

There were, then, at least two positions espoused by the Task Force in its February 28 resolution. First, they expected Impact funding to continue for five years. Yet the LEAA had made clear that they did not intend to provide Impact funding for longer than three years. The mistake made by the Task Force in total funding time was

one made by most of the cities during the early stages of their programs. In Portland, however, funding level would eventually be coupled with program focus to develop into a major program issue. Second, the Task Force resolution called for a heavy emphasis on programs to decrease crime opportunities, programs to increase the risk of apprehension, and programs to make the commission of specific crimes more difficult. Although many Task Force members were unhappy with such a focus, they apparently realized that such programs more easily fit the LEAA guidelines and major objectives of quick reduction in specific crimes with high visibility features in their community than those in corrections and prevention with more long-term and indirect possibilities for achieving reduction. There was, however, enough of a dissenting voice among Task Force members at this early stage to require the addition of a statement to the original resolution expressing Task Force interest in other parts of the criminal justice system where the direct and immediate effects sought by the LEAA guidelines could not be so easily obtained.

3.4 The Task Force Meets with Criminal Justice System and Other Advocates: Prelude to Salishan.

In the meantime, pressures were being exerted from several directions to get programs on the street. By April 1, the OLEC had awarded the city of Portland a \$50,000 planning grant to develop a work plan for its Impact program planning process. "This work plan," the face sheet of the grant application stated, "will be a clear, detailed statement of proposed step-by-step planning activities broken down into phases or tasks."⁽²⁵⁾ It would also "reflect the activities of the city-county Office of Justice Coordination and Planning with corresponding time phases...up to the actual submission of the...program plan to the Law Enforcement Council."⁽²⁶⁾ Portland was expected to submit its work plan within 30 days of receipt of the award.

The Task Force's strategy called for conducting a series of weekly meetings with key officials (from the various components of the criminal justice system) and concerned citizens throughout April, and for concluding this series of sessions with a two-day meeting at Salishan to resolve the differences noted and to settle on programmatic direction and alignment of major responsibilities for Impact planning and evaluation.

The first Task Force meeting of this type took place on April 3rd. The police were the invited group and they presented a three-hour presentation to the Impact Task Force, covering all aspects of robbery and burglary in Portland. The two lieutenants representing the Portland Police Department had what appeared to be good statistical support for their suggestions to the Task Force and they handled all inquiries with ease. In the cover letter to the notes of that meeting, the RA's representative commented, "the presentation was excellent..."⁽²⁷⁾

But the next such Task Force meeting, with officials representing the corrections area, was not to go so smoothly. The meeting took place on the afternoon of April 10th. The key corrections officials there were the director of the Oregon Department of Human Resources, the administrators of the Oregon Corrections Division and of the Multnomah County Juvenile Court and the Chief Deputy Sheriff for Multnomah County Corrections. As in the first meeting, the press were there. The Human Resources director made a strong case for community-based corrections and for programs which got at "the root causes of crime."⁽²⁸⁾ Over the life of this meeting, the corrections people would cite no less than eight foci from their area for Impact funding. Among these were included the following: (a) community-based correctional facilities, (b) misdemeanor diversion, (c) mini-correctional centers statewide, (d) expansion of the traditional school nurse role, (e) a network of agencies to treat the emotionally

disturbed, (f) offender residences and apartment living situations for married offenders, (g) juvenile branch or outreach centers, and (h) modernization of county correctional facilities. Thus, the thread of the corrections argument dealt in major part with the humanization of treatment and focused on three general types of offenders as the following excerpt from The Oregonian indicates:

Portland's Anti-Crime Task Force was told Monday that more money should be spent on crime prevention and rehabilitation of criminals so that less can be spent on the prisons that now get most of the corrections dollar.

"It is better to treat causes of crime rather than criminal symptoms", Task Force members were advised by the director of the Oregon Department of Human Resources.

"Prevention and Rehabilitation programs should be aimed, primarily, at three areas where there are crime bulges." The director then described these as "juveniles, from the early teens to adulthood; releases from jails and correctional institutions...and narcotics and alcohol addicts."⁽²⁹⁾

Thus, the second such Task Force meeting - with corrections officials - had sown the seeds for a program focus which sought to deal with the "root causes" of crime. Some Task Force members, mainly state representatives to the policy making body, favored a law enforcement focus for the program and did not align themselves with the position articulated by the Human Resources director, although he had gone beyond statements of crime causality to posit program areas and identify specific offender types. Others--most notably then Public Safety Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt--would side with the strong advocacy made by corrections officials for a preventive and rehabilitative focus to Portland's Impact program.

Reflecting upon the lines drawn between the city and state representatives on the Task Force, and especially the Goldschmidt stance, the RA made the following comment: "Neil had campaigned as

a 'man of the people' with a concern for social problems. In this, he had substantial support within the Task Force. The state representatives probably leaned toward enforcement. Finally, there was a corrections/preventions group."⁽³⁰⁾

The courts were the third and last component of the criminal justice system to meet with the Task Force. The meeting occurred on April 17 and lasted for only one-and-one-quarter hours. Present to discuss the concerns of the courts were two judges and an administrator, all three of whom were representatives of the Multnomah County Circuit Court. These officials provided the Task Force with 10 program suggestions from the courts area. The major emphasis was, in the first instance, placed on expanding the court's diagnostic center to provide both additional psychological services and quicker response time to the court on the question of the emotional stability of referred offenders, and in the second instance, on implementing the Columbia Region Information Sharing System (CRISS) which had been proposed to assist in the development of the court records and management system. There was but one meeting remaining. As Attorney General Johnson brought the court's meeting to a conclusion, he announced that the final meeting would be held on April 24th and that the major group to appear before the Task Force would be the National Prisoners Alliance (NPA), an ex-offender organization with nationwide affiliations.

With the Attorney General presiding, the April 24th meeting was called to order. No sooner had the meeting officially begun when the NPA went to the attack, verbalizing its extreme objection to the Task Force's composition. "There were," the NPA stated "no ex-offenders among its members."⁽³¹⁾ The NPA spokesman argued for more community-based facilities and stated that the Impact program could only be successful if fewer people were to be incarcerated. When pressed by various

Task Force members to speak to the issue of Impact programmatic direction, the NPA took the stance that their views concurred with those of Oregon's director of Human Resources. But the NPA position, as their excerpted formal statement below will attest, called for more radical remedies than those outlined by corrections officials, e.g., the release of everyone then awaiting trial in jail because of failure to post bond and unspecified resources for all who ultimately would be released.

The National Prisoners Alliance thanks this Task Force committee for extending an invitation for us to give our vital testimony. As the national representative of many ex-offender groups around the country, NPA must, however, object vigorously to the composition of this committee, for it does not represent the persons most affected by its policies -- prisoners and ex-prisoners. The stated policy of the NPA is that those most directly involved must be included in the planning, development and implementation of all justice programs which affect their lives and their future. No longer can things be done to and for people; they must be done with people. This is the national policy in welfare, education, and it must become so in justice. The NPA is part of this national trend toward self development.

In conjunction with our Alliances in the other seven High-Impact cities, the NPA suggests that the bulk of justice money, whether LEAA or local, must be spent to keep people in their own communities, not for more police equipment, and especially not to lock human beings in cages. Our basic approach is that no progress is made in our quest for justice unless fewer people are locked in prisons and jails. We measure the effectiveness of the justice process in this way.

So, this special LEAA High-Impact program must show a decreased population in the metropolitan jails of the cities involved. A bail program which will release everyone who is now awaiting trial in jail because he cannot pay the price of bail, personal contact and resources for all who are released, community facilities, and adequate legal counsel (public defenders) are the real crime prevention measures."⁽³²⁾

And so more than two months of listening to governmental agency and other views came to an end for the Task Force. Their planned agenda had called for a meeting with "concerned citizens". However, the fourth

and final meeting had focused almost solely on one citizens group, the NPA. Community attitudes, in general, had not been polled.

Commenting on operations up to that point in time, the RA would write the LEAA headquarters the following:

The various staffs related to the Impact program are hired and functioning. The present situation does not afford efficient and cohesive operations. Complaints on the structure have been received from all levels of government and will require some corrective action.(33)

In four days, the Task Force was to hold its meeting to formulate program policy and focus. Mayor Schrunk had suffered a heart attack only days before and could not attend. Commissioner Neil Goldschmidt, who would win the non-partisan primary in the mayoralty race the following month, temporarily assumed the mantle of city government and became, therefore, a pivotal actor at the forthcoming meeting. The RA would attend, as would all the other members of the Task Force. Salishan lay immediately ahead. Expectations ran high that it would crystallize and sharpen the focus of policy and direction for Portland's Impact program.

3.5 The Salishan Meeting: An Emerging Programmatic Focus

The Impact Task Force membership met in full session at Salishan, Oregon, the weekend of April 29 and 30. The planned agenda contained 5 major items. First, they were to receive and evaluate carefully information made available through the data collection efforts of the Impact Staff; second, they sought to adopt a framework for plan development; third, they wished to bring to a more open forum the many operational, political and philosophical problems which had lain unresolved since the program began; fourth, they desired to establish overall programmatic priorities; and fifth, they saw a need to identify their immediate priorities.

Commenting on the degree of success achieved at Salishan, the RA would write the following in his weekly report of May 1-5:

The meeting was largely successful in accomplishing these objectives and convinces me that the Task Force is now prepared to take and exert forceful leadership and direction of the program.(34)

The Task Force was unanimous in its adoption of the Performance Management System (PMS) as the framework for its efforts. PMS is a method of measuring how well federal programs are doing in terms of actual results accomplished. Addressing the Task Force view of PMS, the RA continued, "It saw this as an extremely useful tool for problem solving and one which stretches its vision beyond the programs fundable by LEAA. The Task Force will seek to develop an 'ideal' plan without regard to funding source. It saw PMS and its categorizations as making it possible to tailor programs to the Portland situation."(35)

At Salishan, the Task Force concluded tentatively that 75 percent of all funds allocated to the Portland Impact program should be devoted to alleviating the conditions which promote crime, and to preparing offenders for reintegration into society. The remaining 25 percent of funding should be used for controlling the incidence of crime and for improving the ability of the government to reduce crime. All four of Portland's stated objectives were taken from the PMS guidelines.

The proposed 75/25 split of Impact funds would give corrections and prevention projects the lion's share of federal dollars. The RA and City Commissioner Goldschmidt were among those who supported a strong correctional component for Impact. In an interview in which he discussed the results of the Salishan meeting, the RA remembered that "the data presented by the Impact Staff justified a correctional focus."(36) Indeed, even a very quick look at some of the statistics made available by the Impact Staff at Salishan gives credence to the

RA's statement. For example, data for 1971 indicated that youths 20 or under committed 74 percent of the total number of reported burglaries and 49 percent of the total number of reported robberies in Portland. The Task Force believed it could ameliorate the conditions which gave rise to such statistics and to their continuing climb by improving the conditions of the individual offender, his family and his environment. It also wanted to improve the capabilities of the total criminal justice system to prevent and control the effects of criminal behavior.

These goals - ameliorating the underlying causes of crime and exerting control over the incidence of crime - were essentially the same ones the Task Force had addressed in its resolutions of February 28. This time, however, they were reversing their priorities and placing major programmatic emphasis on programs with a corrections/prevention focus rather than a police focus. This dramatic reversal in programmatic direction, surprisingly, met little resistance. Commenting on this very point, the RO coordinator offered the following explanation:

There were liberal types on the Task Force, but even the police saw corrections as the problem.⁽³⁷⁾

The controversial issues at the Salishan meeting, then, centered not so much on program direction as it did upon Task Force authority, and the dispute over what projects could be funded with Impact dollars. An integral part of the Task Force authority issue revolved around the leadership of the Impact Staff. The Shiley-led staff had earlier been shorn of all programmatic responsibility. How much of its remaining duties - data collection and evaluation of projects - would also be taken away remained to be answered. As the RA put it, the whole issue "reflected the tugs and pulls of internal politics."⁽³⁸⁾

The fund flow issue centered on the range of projects LEAA funds could be used to implement. Could they fund projects for income

maintenance and housing, for example? The RA's succinct answer was "no, legally you can't." When pushed for a solution, he added "We recognize the problem as a broad one, but LEAA can only provide part of a response to it."⁽³⁹⁾

Under J. Bradford Shiley, Impact program data collection had proceeded reasonably well. This seems especially clear in light of the voluminous amounts of data generated by the LEAA questionnaire, coupled with the fact that Shiley had been allocated only one staff person to assist him in his task. Further, there were no real problems voiced by the Task Force relative to Shiley's work at Salishan. In fact, his presentation, with the RA, of PMS had been enthusiastically received and unanimously approved by the Task Force. Later, in an interview on Impact planning, the Attorney General would remark: "The best part of the plan was the data based on Shiley's material."⁽⁴⁰⁾ Shiley's competence, then, was not in question. The RA believed "internecine wars played some havoc."⁽⁴¹⁾ The city representatives on the Task Force, in particular, did not view Shiley with favor and "his position became increasingly untenable."⁽⁴²⁾ It was decided to name the city of Portland's Senior Criminal Justice Planner, Elizabeth Preston, as Impact Staff Director. Evaluative responsibilities would be handled by OLEC. The county Senior Criminal Justice Planner would be responsible for non-Impact block grant planning. Shiley was left with responsibility for collecting data but this job now had built-in time constraints. As of November 1, 1972, the data collection work was to end.

This series of events was bound to have repercussions. First, the naming of Mrs. Preston to the Impact Staff director's post was perceived as a concession to Public Safety Commissioner Goldschmidt and the city of Portland. It would give Portland an opportunity "to run the program under the Task Force but basically as a city agency."⁽⁴³⁾ Second, OLEC, a virtually silent voice until now, was to be given the important

evaluation task. This decision was a surprise to many and would, for a long time, be the basis for further confrontations between the city and the state. Third, the limiting of the county Senior Criminal Justice Planner to a block grant planning role was to give the county no Impact voice at all. Just days after the Salishan meeting, the RA wrote LEAA headquarters, "I will not give the money on a block grant basis, but will rather retain project-by-project approval to ensure appropriateness."⁽⁴⁴⁾ Finally, Shiley would now concentrate on data collection alone. It was a big job and he would have to do it hurriedly for in 6 months his job would be abolished entirely.

By the conclusion of the Salishan meeting, several issues of a policy nature had been resolved; on the other hand, many others, some with important political overtones, had not been resolved satisfactorily. Two major programmatic decisions had been reached. First, the Task Force would "plan fully, the LEAA would fund what it could and would find other agencies to push up the balance," and second, "there would be a strong emphasis on corrections."⁽⁴⁵⁾

3.6 Multnomah County and OLEC Roles in Impact: Aftermath of Salishan

With Salishan over, there was a general feeling of success permeating the Task Force with the exception of the members representing Multnomah county. The county did not believe it was "getting the share of money it was entitled to."⁽⁴⁶⁾ Word of county dissatisfaction was quickly communicated to the office of the National Impact Coordinator, Joseph L. Mulvey. Mulvey, in turn, sent a letter to the Seattle Regional Office requesting clarification on four points relative to Multnomah county's role in the Portland Impact program. The RO coordinator, addressing these four points in his response to the Mulvey inquiry, stated (a) that the county was and always had been an integral part of Impact planning, (b) listed the titles of the various Task Force members and briefly explained the Task Force role in Portland

Impact, (c) named, specifically, the two county representatives on the Task Force, and (d) substantiated the key steps of the project approval cycle. He concluded by saying: "The current relationship between the city of Portland and Multnomah county is excellent."⁽⁴⁷⁾


Although surface relationships between city and county may have indeed been excellent, this did not appear to be the case at a deeper level. Time and again, between this point in time, May 17, 1972, and the county's decision to pull out of the joint city-county planning agency by July 1, 1974, there would be problems which would speak with unquestionable clarity to the county's feeling of having been denied an adequate voice in Impact program planning.

If a major surprise could be said to have come out of the Salishan meeting, it was the assignment of all evaluation responsibilities to the Oregon Law Enforcement Council (OLEC). In fact, however, this assignment had been preceded by statements from various Task Force members that the separation of planning responsibilities from the evaluation task would assure greater evaluative objectivity. In addition, if evaluation responsibilities were given to the OLEC, the state could then have greater control and direction over projects in Portland which were run by the state.⁽⁴⁸⁾ It was true that the state maintained responsibility for all corrections projects, and that corrections were slated to receive the bulk of Impact dollars in Portland. It was just as true that the city of Portland maintained control over the Police Department alone. Ultimately, there would have to be inter-governmental cooperation. As matters now stood, though, several groups were going to be responsible for separate pieces of program action. Planning would be done by the Impact Staff, data collected by the Shiley group, now called the Independent Data Collection Staff, and evaluation was now the responsibility of OLEC. Yet as the LEAA headquarters had envisioned the Impact program, all these responsibilities were to be handled by a single cohesive unit termed the Crime Analysis Team.

Table IV is a diagram of Portland Impact planning relationships and responsibilities. What effect would the formal separation of planning, data collection and evaluation responsibilities have on Portland's Impact program? Delay problems of both a programmatic and evaluative nature seemed certain to occur. Commenting on this very point, the second Impact Staff director stated, in a February 1974 interview: "The separation of planning and evaluation did have an effect. There was little contact with the SPA until September of 1972 and there has been ex post facto evaluation planning."⁽⁴⁹⁾


But there were problems other than delay which were caused by the split of planning, data collection and evaluation functions. These concerned role perceptions which arose not only from the fragmentation of Impact responsibilities, but also as a result of the hurriedness with which Impact had come into being. For example, the Impact Staff, always a small group, as Table V reflects, saw itself as having been given two short-term tasks to perform. In the first case, they were to plan Impact projects, and in the second case, they were to prepare the Portland master plan. Once these two functions were completed, the group could be dissolved, and whatever loose threads were left over could be subsumed by an existing agency, most probably the city-county joint planning group. Given this view, it is then unsurprising to find Portland's Impact Staff failing to request additional funds for evaluation support when these were offered by the LEAA's National Institute in the fall of 1972 to city Crime Analysis Teams. The Impact Staff simply did not view itself as a full-fledged CAT. In a situation where that staff had none of the responsibilities for data collection and evaluation allocated to other Impact city CATs, this seems to have been a fairly natural turn of events.

TABLE IV
IMPACT PLANNING RELATIONSHIPS AND RESPONSIBILITIES



(Source: Region X Office, LEAA, Seattle, Wash.)

TABLE V
IMPACT PLANNING STAFF



3.7 The Preliminary Portland High Impact Program Plan

Elizabeth Preston was named director of the Impact Staff at Salishan, and under her leadership, work began on the "plan for a plan." The data to be collected in support of the plan was the responsibility of J. Bradford Shiley's Independent Data Collection Staff. Although Shiley had been Impact Staff director prior to the Preston appointment, this did not necessarily mean that problems would develop between them. Evidence indicates, however, that relations between the Preston and Shiley groups were less than harmonious. Some of these differences may not have had a very substantive nature. For example, Mrs. Preston wrote Shiley a letter in mid-June (1972) explaining her staff's further data needs and levied a request for 136 additional data items upon him. Her last paragraph to Shiley read:

I can't promise whether this is the last set of information that we need, but if you can't get some of this information, please let me know and we will see what other means we can employ to get the data that we need.⁽⁵⁰⁾

By the terms of the organizational structure, the Impact Staff, struggling with a seemingly impossible deadline to meet for submission of the plan, was dependent on Shiley's group for data, and time was running out. This may explain some of the curttness implicit in the Preston request. Shiley's reply equalled the Preston terseness. He could not supply the data; the request had come too late.⁽⁵¹⁾ Nevertheless, many of the data items requested were included in the Shiley appendix to the final version of the Portland High Impact Program Plan. But relations between Preston and Shiley had deteriorated to such an extent that the RO coordinator wrote the following comments in his report of July 27:

The bitterness between Brad Shiley and Betsy Preston has spilled over into Betsy's staff. I was advised during the week of July 24 that Shiley's statistics were completely unreliable. This was determined by using an X² test. I have discussed this matter with Betsy and her staff...In the meantime, Betsy is not making any contact with... Shiley on this matter.⁽⁵²⁾

3.7.1 The Plan-for-a-Plan's System-Wide Focus

The Impact Staff director wanted very much to avoid the kind of criticism of the new draft Portland High Impact Program Plan which had been levied against the "Plan-for-a-Plan." Yet, there were strengths in the earlier document, relative to Portland's needs as she perceived them, which she did not want to abandon. In the "Plan-for-a-Plan," she and her county government counterpart had urged that Impact program planning take the long-term view, and that special programs with no chance of being institutionalized after Impact not be entertained as funding possibilities. They wanted Impact programs which strengthened the criminal justice system and they set forth guidelines for planning Impact projects that would assure "the ultimate healthy growth of Portland's criminal justice system."⁽⁵³⁾ The "Plan-for-a-Plan" also called for projects to modernize the communications capacity of the police and courts, and to rehabilitate high risk recidivist offenders. Special emphasis was focused on the prevention area as the following excerpt will attest:

The effective identification of potential classes of offenders and their referral to preventive programs of education, training, employment, counseling and residential care hold the greatest potential for the reduction of the incidence of target crimes.⁽⁵⁴⁾

3.7.2 The Draft Plan's Focus Is Unchanged

Much of this focus, then, remained unchanged in the new draft plan and it, too, was unfavorably received. One key SPA staff member commented:

This preliminary plan certainly reflects a significant abandonment of the Performance Management System adopted by the Task Force. The conceptualization of this plan is highly fragmented...This plan, unfortunately, is highly non-specific. That is, it does not, for the most part, directly focus upon the reduction of target crimes. Rather, it relies on a generalized system improvement in the hopes that burglars and robbers will be affected by general improvements in the system...The strategy of spending 4 or 5 million a year in a generalized attempt to reduce

robberies and burglaries seems questionable. There is no apparent reason why each of the projects could not be focused directly upon the target crimes and their perpetrators.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Much of the SPA criticism levied at the draft plan is difficult to refute. The plan maintained a concern for developing programs which would deal with the root causes of crime and hence contained a project "to provide for the early identification and treatment of chronically disruptive or disturbed children, kindergarten to 4th grade."⁽⁵⁶⁾ Concerning such projects, the SPA wrote:

The projects proposed in [the High Risk Groups] section seem to be based upon an assumption that many burglaries and robberies are perpetrated by juveniles who were chronically disruptive or disturbed...in kindergarten... and could have been identified at that time. This seems highly speculative...⁽⁵⁷⁾

Despite mounting problems with the several versions of Portland's Impact plan produced by Elizabeth Preston's staff, she, herself, was being perceived in an increasingly favorable light by both city and regional officials. The RO coordinator, commenting on the state of the Impact program as the first half of calendar year 1972 drew to a close, had written:

The political fights have pretty well washed themselves out, and Mrs. Preston has emerged as the undisputed head of the Impact Staff.⁽⁵⁸⁾

3.8 The Portland High Impact Program Plan Is Prepared

The SPA's major criticisms of the Impact plan did not go ignored. Using statistics compiled by the Independent Data Collection Staff, the final version of the Portland plan did contain projects largely supported by the data. Its focus, however, remained centered on corrections and prevention. True, its authors saw the need for looking at the criminal justice system as a total entity but they felt justified, after having examined the system carefully, in placing "substantial emphasis upon

the human services aspect of the crime control effort."⁽⁵⁹⁾ Since the courts and police were constantly reprocessing the same people, the plan concluded that corrections and prevention programs were those areas most in need of shoring up. Portland believed that programs aimed at the underlying conditions fostering crime would yield more long-term payoff than would programs aimed at quick reductions in the incidence of highly visible, stranger-to-stranger crimes. Recognizing that their position ran counter to the LEAA guidelines, the authors of the Portland High Impact Program Plan, anticipating the reaction of its most ardent critics, wrote the following in the Preface of their document:

Although planning funds are made available through LEAA, the staff is authorized to develop goal-specific plans which will not be fundable through LEAA. Cooperation with other federal agencies provides the opportunity to fund programs aimed at the reduction of burglary and robbery but which are not eligible for LEAA funding, e.g., employment, education, and other "root cause" programs.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The plan itself identified three broad program areas: (a) prevention, (b) justice administration, and (c) juvenile and adult corrections. For each of the program areas, the plan listed the factors which, in the opinion of the plan's authors, could affect entry of an offender into the criminal justice system.

For the prevention category, the plan listed eight influencing factors. These were: (a) early behavioral problems, (b) learning disabilities, (c) inadequate or poor school attendance, (d) receiving inadequate or inappropriate services from the criminal justice system, (e) the vulnerability of crime targets, (f) the failure of potential victims to safeguard their property, (g) the use and abuse of drugs, and (h) employability problems.

Under justice administration, the plan cited four influencing factors. These were: (a) the lack of adequate manpower, (b) slow response time, (c) the lack of modern technology, and (d) the lack of operations-oriented data systems.

For the areas of juvenile and adult corrections, the plan listed six major influencing factors. These were: (a) inadequate diagnostic resources, (b) the lack of sufficient manpower, (c) the negative impact of the criminal justice system, (d) the lack of continuity of treatment, (e) inadequate coordination with community treatment resources, and (f) inadequate specialized, need-oriented offender services.

The plan posited a program goal, sub-program areas and sub-goals for each of the three major program areas. These are reflected in Table VI below. Under prevention, high risk groups and victims were treated separately. Justice administration was categorized in terms of three sub-program areas: (a) improved police capability to detect and respond to criminal activity, (b) swift and appropriate disposition of criminal cases, and (c) inter-agency planning and coordination for criminal justice. The plan focused on corrections objectives in terms of (a) the need to identify and treat the mental, emotional and physical disorders of offenders and (b) the need to provide offenders with academic and vocational training and placement.

Table VII lists the 21 projects proposed initially for implementation under Portland's Impact program as they appeared in the master plan. Five projects were proposed under the prevention program area, six were proposed under the justice administration program area, and ten were proposed under the corrections program area. A unique feature of the plan was the cross-referencing by program area of those factors identified as contributing to the incidence of crime and the particular projects selected. These diagrams appear as Table VIII.

TABLE VI
PORTLAND IMPACT PROGRAM GOALS

<p><u>I. PREVENTION</u></p> <p>PROGRAM GOAL: Reduce the number of persons who enter the criminal justice system by alleviating the environmental conditions which promote crime.</p> <p>PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:</p> <p>A. <u>High Risk Groups</u></p> <p>A-1 Provide opportunities for comprehensive services when persons with high risk for criminal behavior are first identified.</p> <p>A-2 Improve the abilities of members of high risk groups to provide for themselves through education and employment training and placement.</p> <p>B. <u>Victims</u></p> <p>B-1 Alter the environment to reduce the vulnerability and/or accessibility of the target or areas of crime and education the potential victim to reduce opportunities for crime.</p> <p><u>II. JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION</u></p> <p>PROGRAM GOAL: To secure for the community an atmosphere to safety, protection and freedom from injury and loss of property by improving the capacity of the government to administer the criminal law.</p> <p>PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:</p> <p>C-1 Improve the capacity of the policy to detect and respond to criminal activity.</p> <p>C-2 Establish swift disposition of criminal cases.</p> <p>C-3 Plan and coordinate the processes of criminal justice in order to enable them to function as a system.</p> <p><u>III. CORRECTIONS</u></p> <p>PROGRAM GOAL: Reduce recidivism by providing comprehensive services to offenders.</p> <p>PROGRAM OBJECTIVES:</p> <p>D-1 Treat the mental, emotional and physical disorders of offenders.</p> <p>D-2 Provide academic, vocational training, and placement.</p> <p>(Source: <u>Portland High Impact Program Plan</u>, December 1972.)</p>

TABLE VII
PROPOSED LIST OF PRIORITY PROJECTS

<u>Program Area</u>	<u>Project</u>
I. Prevention	Early Intervention Project Youth Service Bureau Crime Prevention Bureau School Burglary Prevention Street Lighting
II. Justice Administration	Police Strike Force Police Communications Police - Models CRISS - Law Enforcement Data District Attorney's Office CRISS - Court Data
III. Corrections	Multnomah County Juvenile Court Case Management Children Services Division Screening Team for Residential Placement Project Picture Multi-Resource Facility Oregon State Corrections Division Diagnostic Center Field Services Special Services for Corrections Institutions Vocational Rehabilitation Special Training for Corrections Personnel Youth Progress

(Source: Portland High Impact Program Plan, December 1972.)

Priority-setting and goal quantification appear to have been weaknesses of the plan. Commenting on these features, a NI/MITRE review of Portland's plan would state the following:

In general, program goals and project objectives were not quantified. That is, no measurable indication was given for any of the program areas or projects selected as to the expected impact upon the incidence of crime within specified periods of time. In addition, the planning documents did not detail what alternative problems/programs/projects may have been considered and whether a priority-setting process was utilized. (61)

Proposed funding levels for the 21 projects are shown in Table IX. As originally conceived, Portland's Impact program planned to devote 53.4 percent of a program budgeted at \$20,064,412 to juvenile and adult corrections, the total dollar figure for this program area amounting to \$10,711,872. Another \$2,698,416 or 13.5 percent was to be devoted to prevention programs. This meant that \$13,410,288, representing 66.9 percent of expected federal funding would be devoted to corrections and prevention projects. To outsiders, the corrections/prevention dollar figures could well seem surprising. To Portland planners, however, they represented a focus that both the Task Force and the Impact Staff had envisioned almost from the outset and which had gradually developed into their perceived ideal for their city.

While the proposed list of Portland Impact projects was unusual, per se, due to the strong corrections/preventions focus, it was equally noteworthy for its inclusion of one project, Early Intervention, and the absence of another, Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC), an anti-drug abuse program given widespread federal support and sponsored originally by the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP). The progression of rapid-fire events surrounding the inclusion or exclusion of these projects is extremely helpful in gaining an understanding of Portland's attitude relative to its administration of the Impact program.

TABLE VIII
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: INFLUENCING FACTORS AND IMPACT PROGRAM RESPONSES

PREVENTION SUB-SYSTEM		JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION SUB-SYSTEM		CORRECTIONS SUB-SYSTEM-JUVENILES		CORRECTIONS SUB-SYSTEM-ADULTS	
Influencing Factors	Impact Responses	Influencing Factors	Impact Responses	Influencing Factors	Impact Responses	Influencing Factors	Impact Responses
1. Early Behavior Problems	Early Intervention Project	1. Inadequate Manpower	a) Police Strike Teams b) CRISS - Acceleration Police & Courts c) District Attorney Program	1. Inadequate Diagnostic Resources	a) Case Management (Juvenile Court) b) Out-of-Home Care c) Project Picture	1. Inadequate Diagnostic Resources	Diagnostic Center
2. Learning Disabilities	Early Intervention Project					2. Inadequate Manpower	a) Diagnostic Center b) Field Supervision c) Staff Orientation
3. Inadequate School Attendance	a) Early Intervention Project b) Youth Service Bureau	2. Slow Response Time	a) Police Strike Teams b) Police Communications c) CRISS - Acceleration Police & Courts	2. Inadequate Manpower	a) Case Management b) Out-of-Home Care c) Project Picture		
4. Inadequate Service in Criminal Justice System When Once Identified	Youth Service Bureau			3. Negative Impact of Criminal Justice System	Diversion	3. Negative Impact of Criminal Justice System	Diversion
5. Lack of Employability	a) Youth Service Bureau b) Vocational Education	3. Lack of Modern Technology	a) Police Strike Teams b) Police Communications c) CRISS - Acceleration Police & Courts	4. Lack of Continuity in Treatment	a) Case Management b) Out-of-Home Care c) Specialized Residential Care d) Project Picture	4. Lack of Continuity in Treatment	a) Diagnostic Center b) Field Supervision c) Special Services for Institutions d) Vocational Rehabilitation DVR - Job Therapy
6. Drug Abuse	a) Youth Service Bureau b) JANIS (D-1) [non-Impact new program]			5. Lack of Coordination with Community Treatment Resources	a) Case Management b) Out-of-Home Care c) Project Picture d) Youth Progress	5. Lack of Coordination with Community Treatment Resources	a) Diagnostic Center b) Field Supervision c) Special Services for Institutions d) Vocational Rehabilitation DVR - Job Therapy e) Youth Progress
7. Potential Victims Fail to Safeguard Their Persons and Property	Crime Prevention Bureau	4. Lack of Operations-Oriented Data Systems	a) Police Strike Teams b) CRISS - Acceleration Police & Courts	6. Lack of Services Specialized to Particular Needs of Offenders	a) Case Management b) Specialized Residential Care c) Project Picture d) Youth Progress	6. Lack of Services Specialized to Particular Needs of Offenders	a) Special Services for Institutions b) Vocational Rehabilitation DVR - Job Therapy c) Youth Progress
8. Targets of Crime are too Vulnerable	a) Crime Prevention Bureau b) School Burglary Alarm c) Street Lighting						

(Source: Portland High Impact Program Plan, December 1972.)

City: Portland (1)
Source: Master Plan
12/8/72

TABLE IX
PROPOSED FUNDING AND PROJECTS FOR THE PORTLAND IMPACT
PROGRAM BY FUNCTIONAL AREA

PROJECTS	PREVENTION	POLICE	COURTS	ADULTS CORRECTIONS	JUVENILE CORRECTIONS	DRUG ABUSE	RESEARCH AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS	COMMUNITY INVOLVE- MENT	TOTAL
Early Inter- vention Project	\$1,354,875								
Youth Services Center	\$ 423,375								
Crime Preven- tion Bureau								\$ 477,000	
School Burglary Prevention	\$ 210,916								
Portland Lighting Project (a)	\$ 709,250								
Portland Police High Impact Project (b)		\$4,100,000							
Police Models		\$ 750,000							
CRISS Project Acceleration							\$ 827,124		
Multnomah County District Attorney's Office			\$ 500,000						
Case Management Corrections Services					\$2,535,868				
Children's Ser- vices Division Juvenile (c) Component					\$2,591,334				
Diagnostic Center				\$ 962,304					
Field Super- vision				\$1,516,750					
Institutional Services				\$1,525,149					
Youth Progress					\$ 102,000				
Vocational Rehabilitation				\$1,316,084					
Orientation, Training and Information				\$ 162,383					
Totals	\$2,698,416 13.5%	\$4,850,000 24.2%	\$ 500,000 2.5%	\$5,482,670 27.3%	\$5,229,202 26.1%		\$ 827,124 4.1%	\$ 477,000 2.4%	\$20,064,412

(a) The Federal Funding includes the \$536,250 awarded this project under separate grant titled Supplemental Street Lighting Project.

(b) This project includes the Police Strike Force and Police Communications Projects.

(c) This component includes the screening Team for Residential Placement, Project Picture, and Multi-Resource Facility Projects.

3.8.1 The Case of the Early Intervention Project

A memorandum from then Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, to an audience including all Regional LEAA Directors, called for a strong connecting link between the Impact program and juvenile delinquency prevention. In part, he wrote:

...A special initiative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration will focus resources on crime prevention efforts in eight "Impact Cities." We are committed to assist in identifying and developing the specific kind of youth service system feasible for each city, bringing our counter-part agencies together to implement LEAA's efforts. (62)

The Richardson message seemed clear. It was a call for inter-departmental coordination of youth services with the LEAA, including a special focus on Impact cities. Even earlier in the Impact program, there had been a similar connecting link made between Impact and juvenile prevention/diversion programs. In a letter to the RA, HEW's then Commissioner for Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration had arranged for a meeting in Portland where he could speak with "those participating in the development of the juvenile delinquency component" for Impact. He continued, "This meeting will provide the opportunity for all of us to become better acquainted, identify roles and develop a working relationship toward the end that the community's delinquent youth and those in danger of becoming delinquent may be diverted from a criminal career." (63)

From the standpoint of Portland, the problem of juvenile delinquency prevention was clearly a major issue. In the city's programmatic efforts in the area, planners would find precedents in the 1967 Task Force Report on Corrections which had urged prevention and diversionary concepts as a possible solution to continually-spiraling juvenile crime. Further, the 1973 National Conference on Standards and Goals had placed a strong emphasis on community-based

corrections and this fact would be alluded to by the RA in his January 1973 report to LEAA headquarters.

The Early Intervention Project, then, which called for the early identification and treatment of chronically disruptive children, kindergarten to 4th grade, and which Portland planners expected to have long-term preventive results, was a reasonable candidate, as the city viewed it, for inclusion in their Impact program. The fact that the project could never demonstrate short-term effectiveness and, indeed, would service a population of children so young (ages 5 to 10) that they could not be Impact offenders, bothered Portland planners very little, if at all. Early Intervention, from their view, was an exciting concept and presented an opportunity to move in the direction advocated by the 1967 Corrections Task Force and by the National Conference on Standards and Goals every year since 1967.

Impact, they were told time and again, was not a tool for such projects as Early Intervention. Impact must produce measurable results quickly. But the more the project was criticized, the more its supporters would fight for its survival. Among the most ardent of these were the Impact Staff director and the mayor-elect of Portland. For example, in a November meeting with Portland school officials at which MITRE analysts were present, Mrs. Preston stated she would request Impact funds for Early Intervention despite its non-crime-specific nature and, if unsuccessful, would look elsewhere for funds.⁽⁶⁴⁾ And, shortly after taking office as Portland's mayor, Mr. Goldschmidt would state that he considered the Early Intervention Project to be "critical to the Impact program." It stood as the first project to be listed in the master plan at a proposed funding level of \$1,354,875, a symbol of the Portland Impact ideal.

3.8.2 The Case of Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC)

A program being strongly advocated by the LEAA for Impact funding was the drug program TASC which was being implemented nationwide to rehabilitate heroin addicts. TASC clients were court-coerced in that their criminal prosecution could be deferred and ultimately negated entirely if the identified addict offender would agree to undergo treatment for his addiction.

When the Impact Staff director first became aware of the TASC program, she wrote the RA of her office's interest in the program since "the TASC funding may well be the most appropriate source for drug programs."⁽⁶⁵⁾

She also asked specific questions relative to TASC eligibility requirements, funding sources and the relationship between TASC and Impact monies. The RA responded that money for TASC would come from Impact funds but that "no special eligibility requirements exist since this [TASC] program simply is one area in which you may wish to expend funds."⁽⁶⁶⁾

Given the straightforward nature of the foregoing correspondence, it appeared that TASC would certainly be funded as a part of the Portland Impact program. So certain did Portland's commitment to TASC appear that the notes of the Impact Coordinators' Meeting held July 31-August 1, 1972, recorded the following:

Portland has been selected as one of the primary TASC cities. SAODAP will soon have a presentation for the Portland officials on TASC. The city people will get considerable help by both SAODAP and, probably, LEAA on development of the application...⁽⁶⁷⁾

Portland, of course, had not yet been informed of its selection. Indeed, the communique from the Office of the Vice President of the

United States to Portland Mayor Terry Schruck was done via telephone the morning of August 2nd. Taken by an assistant to the mayor, the memorandum received by the mayor, in part, read:

Please be informed that I took a call at 11:10 a.m. today from Mr. Jim Kolstad in the Vice President's office--Intergovernmental Relations...Mr. Kolstad wanted you to know that Portland is in there as a High Impact city for consideration of TASC... (68)

Clearly, there was a strong desire on the part of the LEAA to see TASC implemented in Portland. Too, there did appear to be at least a feeling within the Portland community that the city had a drug problem, as the Task Force notes of August 10 report:

Citizens in the [Irvington] area felt that a [drug] problem existed but that it was not as great as some other parts of the Model Neighborhood and that drugs throughout the city of Portland probably existed on a larger scale than people realized. (69)

What really existed was a community perception of a probable drug problem. No data were presented in support of that perception. Further discussions were in order. The first real indication that TASC was in trouble in Portland occurred at the Task Force meeting with SAODAP on August 29. The RO coordinator wrote:

The TASC presentation to Portland was received fairly coolly, but the city will prepare a TASC application, I believe. Mr. Goldschmidt has indicated, privately, that he does not really believe that narcotics addiction in Portland is of sufficient magnitude to warrant a TASC program. He probably will not be a very active supporter of the project, should it come into existence. (70)

The probable reason for Portland's coolness becomes clearer, from the city's viewpoint, through the following communique to the Impact Staff director from a member of her staff:

The morning session alienated many, as the SAODAP representative was unaware of our drug proposal, of the existence of the Office of Justice Coordination

and Planning, and was evidently unaware even of the merging of the city and the county. By the afternoon session, the SAODAP team had filled their spokesman in on the existing programs...and the tune changed from "do it our way or not at all" to "it is not in the least incompatible with our thinking" to integrate TASC with existing and proposed justice systems...

As Portland saw it, they were faced with three alternatives. They would:

- (1) tell them to stay in Washington with their program; or
- (2) invite them to Portland to help...design a model TASC project; or
- (3) invite SAODAP...specifically, to help...integrate TASC with the police and courts, using the TASC administration with alternative funding to coordinate intake of all drug abuse cases in the metropolitan area... (71)

Eventually, Portland would opt for alternative one and refuse TASC altogether. The Impact Staff director would question the whole structure of the TASC program in a report to Task Force members. She wrote in conclusion:

In light of statistics which have been developed in relation to the Impact planning process, it would appear that heroin is not a problem among juvenile offenders... Since the juvenile involvement [with pills] appears to be the most serious in the target offenders, it is questioned whether the allocation of substantial resources to heroin addiction identification and treatment will prevent appropriate attention being focused on youthful drug involvement problems... (72)

Despite some local support for TASC, particularly that of the outgoing mayor, the Impact Task Force declined to implement TASC in Portland. In his letter to SAODAP, Task Force Co-chairman Johnson wrote:

I have been directed by the Impact Task Force to advise you that we have decided not to commit LEAA Impact funds to TASC...The members of the Task Force are convinced that a serious problem does exist, but it is not sufficiently related to the target crimes at which the Impact funds are directed to justify commitment of those funds... (73)

SAODAP protested vociferously to the National Institute, prompting the National Impact Coordinator to write the following to the Seattle RA:

We are disappointed to learn of Portland's decision not to implement the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) model as part of its High Impact program. LEAA and the White House Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) previously designated the eight Impact cities to be among the first TASC target cities, and Mr. Leonard previously had expressed the desire for the incorporation of TASC into each city's crime reduction program...(74)

Portland's denial of TASC was, in part, predicated on the conclusion that "only a very slight correlation between opiate addiction and the targeted crimes" existed in its city. The National Impact Coordinator was not certain of the accuracy of that contention. In rebuttal, he wrote:

Other sources indicate that heroin addiction may be a significant problem in Portland. In a study conducted by SAODAP, state and local criminal justice officials, health officials, program operators, and government officials estimated the addict population of the Portland SMSA to range from 600 to 1,500, mostly individuals found among lower socio-economic and minority groups. Approximately 310-485 heroin users now are receiving treatment, indicating a gap of from 280-1,015 heroin users who need treatment...

After stating his recognition of the fact that "heroin addiction among juveniles might not be a major problem in Portland," he concluded:

...However, we cannot help but feel that Portland's downgrading of its heroin problem and its dismissal of TASC reflect other unstated difficulties, either philosophical or political...(75)

These protests were of no avail. Portland was unyielding in its decision. It would be the only Impact city not proposing a TASC program for implementation under Impact. The real death-blow to Portland's TASC, however, seems clearly linked, in time, to August 28, 1972, when SAODAP's representatives made what appeared to Portland planners to be a narrow, didactic and parochial presentation of the TASC program.

3.9 The Portland High Impact Program Plan Is Approved

The Impact Staff assistant director presented the master plan to the Task Force at their regular meeting of November 20, 1972. While there were some questions from Task Force members as to how certain proposed projects related to the crime reduction goals of the Impact program, no one seemed startled at the \$10.7 million to be devoted to the corrections area. On December 2nd, at a Task Force meeting attended by the RA, the policy-making body voted approval of the Portland High Impact Program Plan and specific projects totaling "slightly less than \$20 million for the Impact program."(76)

3.9.1 The Policy Decision Group Meets on Portland's Impact Program Plan

Regional Office approval was forthcoming. First, however, there was a major obstacle to be hurdled. Key Region X, SPA, and city officials had been invited to Washington, D.C. to appear before the LEAA Policy Decision Group. That meeting was scheduled for December 19. Representing the city of Portland was the Impact Staff director. Also present were representatives from NILE&CJ, the Office of the National Impact Coordinator and The MITRE Corporation. Chairman Gerald Emmer

discussed the Policy Decision Group's function, after a brief discussion of the Portland master plan by the Regional Administrator.

The Impact Staff director was next to be heard from on the subject of the plan. She spoke of the plan's development and the various program areas the plan contained. Of the Policy Decision Group members, Martin Danziger, the LEAA Assistant Administrator in charge of the NILE&CJ, was perhaps the one most keenly interested in the research and evaluation features of the Impact program. He found that the Portland plan was not crime-specific in its approach and he could envision no short-term results from such a program of either a crime reduction or an evaluative nature. These views were reflected in the following discussion which took place at the Policy Decision Group's meeting:

Mr. Danziger proceeded to ask Mrs. Preston the following questions: "Do you feel your plan is Impact-related? Do you feel your plan is responsive to the short-term, High Impact goals of the program?"

Mrs. Preston replied: "No." Mr. Cooper, SPA director, added that although a large portion of the plan involved long-range goals, some of the projects were, in fact, short-term. Mrs. Preston explained that Portland had a much broader vision than many of the other Impact cities. Therefore, planning was done without regard to funding sources and addressed areas which were not Impact-related... (77)

It was clear that the Policy Decision Group found the Portland plan to be seriously inadequate because of its non-Impact character. The RO coordinator later reported that the Policy Decision Group "was not especially impressed with the plan due to its 'soft' approach." (78) With "great reluctance", the Policy Decision Group felt the RA might approve the plan subject to the condition that individual grant applications be based on crime-specific planning and contain evaluation components "along with specific objective quantification." (79)

3.9.2 The Regional Office Reviews and Approves the Portland High Impact Program Plan

The Regional Office's review of the Portland High Impact Program Plan declared the document to be a basically good one but cautioned that the city seemed to be focusing most of its efforts in one direction. "What if", the review asked, "even improved corrections services fail? What about the untreatables?" The review suggested the city might want to "hedge" its bets against the "untreatables." Hence, they might be careful "to avoid premature releasing of high-risk offenders" in their fervent desire to avoid unnecessary incarcerations of low-risk offenders. Speaking in laudatory terms of the corrections component, the review stated:

This component of the Impact plan includes just about everything advocated by modern correctional theories. It further provides workloads and facilities at a level which should be accurate in theory. Thus, the success or failure of this element of the Portland Impact plan will provide a test of modern correctional theory which should have national implications...The corrections component must have first priority for evaluation resources since it, alone, has potential national significance... (80)

The announcement of the approval of the Portland Impact plan was made in the office of the mayor on February 15, 1973. In his prepared press statement, the RA again spoke of the plan's corrections focus.

The Portland Impact plan has a unique thrust in that it focuses substantially on the corrections component of the criminal justice system. This direction is well supported by the data behind the plan, for those data clearly indicate that most of the target offenders have already one or more contacts with the criminal justice system. Until the rate of recidivism is slowed, little hope of long-range criminal reduction is possible... (81)

Speaking of the Portland plan's strong kinship with the Standards and Goals Commission, he noted:

A most significant fact is the plan's striking resemblance to the recommendations recently made by the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. This is especially true as it relates to Corrections. The fact that this plan was developed independently of the National Commission's effort and is based on locally-developed data, is strong testimony to the worthiness of the effort made by a dedicated group of people interested in their community and concerned with its problems... (82)

The Regional Office's approval of the Portland High Impact Program Plan cleared the way for the development of projects to make the plan a working reality. The first full year had come to its end and, despite the tireless hours of work and countless frustrations, there was really very little to look at in the way of concrete accomplishments. If there was one word to describe the program as it limped into 1973, it was "delay" - delays of both a programmatic and evaluative nature. And changes were in the offing which could mean further delays. The Impact Staff director, responsible for much of the programmatic direction, had resigned to become the Chief of Planning for the city's new Bureau of Human Resources. Mayor Terry Schunk and his assistant, Keith Jones, both active members of the Task Force, were resigning since the mayor was returning to private life. Lee Brown, the Task Force's only black member, had resigned earlier in order to go to Washington, D.C. Nothing in the way of evaluation had been decided. Indeed, there was nothing as yet of Portland's Impact program to evaluate. In her next-to-final act as Impact Staff director, Mrs. Preston expressed her extreme dissatisfaction with the SPA's performance in the area of fiscal assistance and evaluation services to the Impact program. She believed the situation "must be resolved if Impact is expected to work." (83)

The Impact Staff had always been small in number. The resignation of Mrs. Preston, coupled with uncertainty as to the future of the support group, triggered more resignations. Initially, only three Impact Staff members were expected to remain in their jobs and the Task Force was busy investigating "how the staff would function for the remainder of the program." (84)

In addition to the uncertainty surrounding the future programmatic role of the Impact Staff, the county's long-time dissatisfaction resurfaced. As discussed above, Multnomah county had believed it was being refused a major role in Impact planning and that it was being vouchsafed a disproportionately small share of Impact funds. But the straw that broke the county's back was the newly-formed Bureau of Human Resources (BHR). A creation of Mayor Goldschmidt when he was still Portland's Public Safety Commissioner, it would have former Impact Staff director Elizabeth Preston as its Planning Chief under the general supervision of a Goldschmidt appointee to the City Commission, Mildred Schwab. The new agency would operate all major poverty programs in Portland and serve as the official Community Action Program (CAP) agency for the Portland area (i.e., Multnomah county as well as Portland proper). As the CAP agency, it would serve as the disbursing of all OEO funds, as well as any other federal dollars designated for anti-poverty programs.

In April 1973, The Oregonian began a series of articles which, in essence, portrayed Multnomah county as accusing the new Bureau of duplicating county services, citing the BHR's Youth Diversion Program as a duplication of its own Youth Services Bureau. Just weeks later, another controversy would arise over the city's request that it be named the area's Agency on Aging. One of the county's outraged commissioners reacted by accusing the BHR of "lurching over the landscape in search of a problem." (85) In summary, these events did not bode well for the prospects of receiving approval of the city-county consolidation charter

scheduled to go before the voters in the distant future. It began to appear that the city's struggle to bring new federal dollars into Portland and to put its own stamp on "human services" in the Portland area via its newly-created CAP agency might cause as many problems as it would solve. To win such a power struggle at the expense of future city-county consolidation would be, at best, a pyrrhic victory. This possibility notwithstanding, and also notwithstanding Impact Staff criticism of SAODAP's narrowness, it now seemed that a top emerging priority for the city of Portland would be to do it their way, or not at all.

4.0 PROJECTS ARE DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED

4.1 A New Impact Staff Director Is Named: Program Focus Is Unchanged

Neil Goldschmidt, an original Task Force appointee of Oregon's Governor Tom McCall and a pivotal member of that policy-making body from its inception, had become Portland's mayor on January 1, 1973. On that same day, Michael D. Letter, formerly assistant Impact director, assumed the staff director's job. Both men were under pressure to produce. Letter was not long in voicing his opinion of the strong corrections component in the Portland Impact plan, saying to The Oregonian that he fully supported the Task Force's commitment of \$10.7 million to corrections projects. He stated his belief that the present corrections system tended to reinforce criminal behavior and indicated that there was a growing awareness that corrections techniques must be changed and upgraded.⁽⁸⁶⁾

The continued adherence to the correctional philosophy for its Impact program meant that Portland could not expect to produce the short-term reductions in the incidences of target crimes expected by the LEAA. Unable to reconcile the differences between its goals and that of the LEAA for Impact, Portland opted to pursue the course it genuinely believed to be in the best interests of its citizenry and the community. They would work toward strengthening the criminal justice system over the long term. Three-year proposals for projects were developed for the various components of the Impact plan. Having made that decision, the time was now ripe and, in fact, overripe, for getting projects developed and implemented. Because of the lengthy and complicated project review cycle, it was imperative that projects be started through as rapidly as possible so as not to create additional delays in getting projects finally approved.

4.2 The Project Review Cycle

Nine separate steps were involved in the grant approval cycle. Summarized, the typical review cycle from project/program conception to final approval is as follows:

- (1) Review by appropriate governmental agency (informal approval of concept);
- (2) Task Force - (informal approval of concept);
- (3) Grant is developed by Impact Staff;
- (4) Ordinance to allow appropriate agency to make application;
- (5) Appropriate governmental agency (formal approval);
- (6) Task Force - (formal approval);
- (7) Oregon Law Enforcement Council (OLEC) (SPA approval);
- (8) Region X (LEAA approval); and
- (9) Ordinance to accept funds and establish project/program.

The Task Force insisted that each sponsoring governmental agency, which submitted a project idea for Impact funding, first informally approve that concept. Informal approval of the concept by the Task Force would follow and the "go ahead" would be given to the Impact Staff to proceed with grant development. Once a grant was developed, a city ordinance had to be passed merely to allow the appropriate agency to make application for funding. Formal approval by the appropriate governmental agency and the Task Force would precede transmittal to the OLEC and Region X for interim and final approval, respectively. Then the city of Portland was required to pass a second ordinance so that the sponsoring agencies could accept the funds and begin the implementation process. This lengthy review cycle, needless to say, resulted in long implementation delays. Upon reviewing the organizational structure for approval of funding, the RO coordinator had found it "extremely cumbersome and unwieldy." He doubted if any Portland projects would ever be implemented and stated that "this maze of

politically oriented administrative bodies appears to be extremely formidable."⁽⁸⁷⁾ As matters turned out, his worst fears came close to becoming a reality with some proposed Portland projects still unimplemented as late as February 1975, four full years after the launching of Impact.

4.3 Project Development and Implementation Proceeds Amid Attempts to Achieve Inter-Agency Coordination

Of the 21 projects recommended for implementation in the Portland master plan, only Street Lighting had been awarded when the second year of Portland's Impact program began. Despite having now reached two major milestones--Task Force approval of the plan in concept--the review cycle itself would account for a time lag of several months under optimal conditions. Portland thus did not enjoy excellent working conditions as the serious bargaining-for-dollars was to start. The city of Portland had, from the beginning, held most of the policy prerogatives in terms of Impact planning. But only the police were a city-run agency. The bulk of projects and dollars were scheduled to go to projects run by state and county agencies. This circumstance gave the state and county a proprietary interest in Impact.

The final decision as to which projects would or would not be funded under Impact would be made by Region X. The RO was aware of the Policy Decision Group's dissatisfaction with the plan (see the discussion, pages 53-55, above), and had promised to make certain that specific steps were taken to ensure that the individual grant applications were crime or offender-specific and contained adequate evaluation components featuring specific objective quantification.⁽⁸⁸⁾ This meant that projects would need to be developed and approved on an individual basis.

If the city persisted in attempting to use Impact funds for projects clearly outside the Impact guidelines, a major confrontation lay

ahead. This would surely result in additional delays in getting projects funded and implemented. The Washington Office of the National Impact Coordinator was becoming increasingly perturbed at the Portland attitude. After the Policy Decision Group meeting with Portland, a memorandum was written to the Portland file saying, in part:

Portland anticipates funding several projects which were somewhat beyond the scope of LEAA's Impact objectives... One project in particular, a juvenile intervention project for school children from Kindergarten through Grade 4, was discussed. Portland admitted they were not necessarily following the LEAA guidelines for crime-specific planning...

From the viewpoint of the National Impact Coordinator, it might well be impossible to salvage Portland's program except for the Seattle Regional Administrator (RA). Continuing, he wrote:

After the formal presentation, Dave Head met with the Policy Group to discuss his strategy for handling the plan approval process. This met with the satisfaction of the group and Portland... was given the go-ahead.... (89)

The initial step in the RA's strategy occurred on February 15. Regarding that event, he wrote LEAA headquarters the following communique:

Approval of the Portland Impact plan is scheduled with appropriate ceremony in Mayor Goldschmidt's office. Approval does not constitute award of funds for we are reserving approval on a project-by-project basis because of the unique thrust of the plan and the need for very precise project development...

4.3.1 A New Work Plan Is Developed

The precise project development referred to by the RA would include a new draft work plan addressing programmatic direction, problem identification, data collection procedures and evaluation methodology. At the February 12 meeting of the Task Force, the newly-appointed Impact

Staff director presented the Draft Work Plan. Under the heading, Continued Program Development, it stated:

Continued program development shall be the prime responsibility of the Impact planning staff and will require close coordination with the OLEC staff, project administrators, operating agency administrators, local and state governments, the Impact Task Force and Region X of the LEAA. In addition to inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination and cooperation, the establishment of efficient and comprehensive data collection and analysis procedures, accurate problem and needs definitions, sound monitoring procedures and reliable evaluation strategies will be essential to effective planning. (90)

The Draft Work Plan contained outlines of procedures for additional project development, project review, project implementation, data collection and analysis. Under Plan Update and Modification, the document spoke to the question of institutionalization of successful project strategies and the phasing out of those projects failing to meet stated goals and objectives. To assist institutionalization, Portland would develop transitional plans for successful projects for submission to the appropriate governmental agency.

Under Evaluation, the fiscal monitoring and evaluation roles of the OLEC were outlined thoroughly. This was an important step since the SPA role had never been previously articulated in a manner deemed satisfactory either to the Task Force or its support staff. It was now being proposed that "the Impact Staff, applicant agencies and SPA, work cooperatively in the: (a) development of the evaluation design and (b) selection of the criteria measures to reflect the project's goals and objectives." "Where differences of opinion occurred," the Draft Work Plan stated, "the SPA will have the final decision regarding such matters."


In developing the comprehensive evaluation plan, PMS would definitely be used.

"Each general objective," the draft continued, "constitutes a sphere of activity which is seen as bearing directly upon the success of the criminal justice system in controlling and reducing crime. Particular programs contemplate specific goal-oriented activities which will contribute to the general categorical objective and to the overall objectives. Consistent with the model of the PMS, each project will have a specific result-oriented objective." (91)

To clarify the various activities and roles of the various agencies and organizations which Portland now saw as feeding into the evaluation process, the Draft Work Plan contained the matrix which follows as Figure 1.

The undertaking seemed both ambitious and worthwhile, and it appeared that if the planning and evaluation process could be wedded in the manner described by the Draft Work Plan, the Portland Impact program could yet become a success both for the city and for the LEAA. There was, however, the immediate and overdue problem of project development and it would be, at best, most difficult to resolve satisfactorily. One thing was certain, the Impact Staff would have to involve itself heavily in project development if good results were to be obtained. Commenting on this problem, the 1974 Portland Impact Program Update states:

It was the experience of the Impact Staff that few potential participants had well-developed planning capabilities. Consequently, the staff had to become directly involved in each agency's efforts to articulate program strategies, to develop program dynamics, prepare program descriptions, assist in the evaluation design, etc. It was axiomatic from the start of the planning process that each proposed project be fully supported by its respective administrative entity. The importance of this principle relates to the ultimate interest and capacity of each agency to bring its program to fruition and make maximum use of the resources available to it. The planning staff assisted, urged and criticized, but could not usurp the responsibility of the operating agency.



(Source: Portland Draft Work Plan, February 1973)

FIGURE 1
MATRIX UTILIZED TO ASSIGN ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
EVALUATION ACTIVITIES OF EACH IMPACT PROJECT

The balance of the planning process involved the development of the Impact Plan. The plan involved the identification of needs within the system, and means of reducing the instance of target crimes in response to the Impact guidelines. The unique character of the local crime problem was isolated and, thereby, those activities which would, in fact, correct, improve and enhance the criminal justice system's capacity to reduce crime identified for funding. This analysis required a thorough knowledge and understanding of existing operations and services. The lack of data relating to crime incidence, victimization, offender profiles, and agency and system capacities was a severe problem.

As the two functions--program development and plan preparation--came together, a final task of the first phase planning emerged: the criticism and screening of projects on the basis of relevancy to the plan, suitability under Impact guidelines, and the potential of the project to bring about substantial change in the effectiveness of service delivery.⁽⁹²⁾

4.3.2 The Early Intervention Project: A Case for Inter-Agency Coordination

The criterion which caused Portland the most difficulty as it embarked upon project development was "Suitability Under Impact Guidelines." Some projects appearing in the Portland plan--Early Intervention most notably--had already been criticized severely for their non-Impact character. These projects, however, were among the ones the city wanted most to fund. The RA was indecisive as to what course to follow. It was clear that if he turned down all such projects without at least looking for alternative funding sources, he risked the possibility of alienating the city altogether. He decided to seek companion funding through the Federal Regional Council (FRC).⁽⁹³⁾

The first meeting with the FRC took place on February 13, with the RA presiding. In addition to city, state and Region X representatives, there were officials from HUD, HEW, and DOL in attendance. The RA

explained to the assembled group that the city of Portland and its Impact Task Force had been encouraged "to plan to solve a problem without limiting their view...purely to the criminal justice system." He then encouraged the members of the FRC "to get acquainted with the plan, the direction of the plan, and the promise that the plan holds for real yield..." If anyone wondered where the RA thought "the promise of real yield" lay, the answer was in his next remark. "The elements of the program of interest to you would be those of Early Intervention and Youth and Delinquency." The FRC agreed to take the whole matter under advisement but the Region X participants left the meeting with a definite feeling that "the federal representatives were not especially enthusiastic."⁽⁹⁴⁾ There would be several subsequent meetings held with members of the FRC and, as a direct result of those meetings, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) would award a grant of \$225,000 to rehabilitate Portland's Kelly Butte facility.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Originally an underground emergency communications center built during the 1950s, Kelly Butte was abandoned during the 1960s and the site's ownership was transferred to the city of Portland. Through the FRC High Impact Task Force, DCPA made money available to the Portland Police Bureau to completely refurbish the center and to make it into a modern police-communications facility. This was accomplished through the Strike Force, one of two projects under Portland's Impact Police Program. Despite this achievement, the degree of interagency coordination hoped for would not be achieved and in the case of the Early Intervention Project, HEW would never get beyond a verbal commitment to "look at" possible funding sources.

In June, the RA wrote LEAA headquarters, "We will be taking specific action this week to deny the Early Intervention Project submitted to us. This denial is based on grounds of inappropriateness to both the Impact program and to legislative restrictions." Though this was the sum and substance of his message, he saw fit to add:

It may be useful to reflect briefly on why we permitted such a project to be submitted to us when we could be reasonably certain that it would not qualify for LEAA funding. First of all, the Portland Impact Task Force took very seriously the concept of planning fully to deal with the target crimes. They vigorously stated that the solution to the crime problem may well extend beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of a single federal, state or local agency. Second, Region X promoted, upon LEAA request, the use of the PMS as a vehicle for Impact city planning. That vehicle does not draw artificial boundaries in problem solution. It rather classically addresses a problem and the range of elements which contribute to its solution and only at the final stages of planning assigns responsibilities and accountability to operative units and resources. The Portland plan utilizes that process and the resources to be applied to their plan are being determined by the specific content of each project. Therefore, there are some proposals in the plan, such as Early Intervention, which do not qualify for LEAA [Impact] support but are fully appropriate for funding by other federal or state agencies... (96)

The RA's eloquent plea on behalf of Portland's rationale for having pursued an Impact program of "broader vision" without regard to funding sources and focusing on non-Impact-related areas reflects well on the city in terms of the sincerity of its planning effort. However, in addition to delay problems associated with Portland's unusually lengthy review cycle, the fact remained that its "broader vision" approach had left Portland, 14 long months after program inception, with nothing more than an Impact program plan approved in concept only. And while it now appeared that some headway was being made in the evaluation area, evaluation could not proceed independently of project development and implementation. The Impact Staff had already discovered that most agencies were novices at preparing grant applications, not to speak of developing evaluation designs, data collection schemes and analysis strategies. In this area, the largest hurdle was still to come, with the development of proposed corrections projects totaling in excess of \$10.7 million.

4.4 Corrections Projects Are Implemented

The State of Oregon's Division of Corrections was the body responsible for the development of the adult corrections projects being proposed for Impact funding. The corrections administrator, as early as the September 1972 Task Force meeting on corrections, had come into open conflict with Impact planners. On that occasion, he expressed the view that his division "was not being fully integrated into the program." He wanted "more information, dialogue and guidelines." The Impact Staff director responded by indicating some surprise at the feeling expressed by the corrections administrator and recalled a meeting held with members of his staff several months earlier. He stated, though, that those contacts "were not at a level he felt was important." He wanted to be kept informed regularly at the top level and he pressed for an "overall plan" which brought the state agencies together before any individual corrections projects were approved. When the Attorney General asked for a status report on the whole corrections planning process, the Impact Staff director replied that "the case manager concept is the heart of the corrections effort of Impact." Case Management was a project to be developed not by the state but by Multnomah county and the corrections administrator went on record as opposing the Impact Staff director's view that caseload reductions, as typified in the case management concept, was the heart of the system. (97) This polarization of attitudes did not augur well for the interagency coordination needed to get projects implemented speedily. Especially in the case of adult corrections was speedy implementation essential due to the "innovative thrust" and "national significance" of the projects contained in the package. (98)

Oregon's Governor Tom McCall also let it be known that the corrections component was to be given top consideration for implementation. He then proceeded to issue a March 8 deadline for the completion of all corrections grant applications. The meeting to discuss the Governor's

edict took place on the afternoon of February 15. The RO coordinator stated that no grant applications would be approved from the corrections package unless each contained a suitable evaluation component.

The initial response of the corrections administrator was that the Governor's request for a deadline would be impossible unless they embarked on a "crash program." He then repeated his earlier claim that the delay in developing grant applications was due to a lack of clarification of Impact guidelines. What occurred next gave real support to his contention. Specifically, he wanted to know who would do the evaluations: OLEC or the Impact Staff? The SPA director answered, "OLEC" but the State Human Resources representative present added that "although the Impact Staff was not responsible for evaluation, [surely] they should be involved in the evaluation planning process since they would be monitoring the projects." As it turned out, no member of the Impact Staff had been invited to the meeting and the issue was not resolved satisfactorily. One thing was certain: the corrections package could not be completed by March 8. (99)

It would, in fact, be more than a full year before all projects in the adult corrections package would be approved. In the intervening time span, a plethora of problems would occur to account for countless delays in implementation. Several such problems were directly related to evaluation. Among those problems not so related, however, were the following: (1) SPA/county/city "haggling" over funds allocated for the corrections program area, and (2) the state's difficulties in appropriating the 10 percent "hard match" requirement.

4.4.1. Delay Problems Are Encountered: Stumbling Blocks to Implementation

The whopping \$10.7 million allocated to the corrections program area led to political infighting among the various individuals responsible for this functional area in Portland. Adult corrections were

the responsibility of the Oregon Department of Human Resources and juvenile corrections were the joint responsibility of Multnomah county and the State of Oregon's Children's Services Division. The city of Portland, whose program Impact was, would be dependent upon county and state authorities to administer the corrections component. The county had never been happy with the way Impact was being run and, in fact, had declared a moratorium on approval of any county Impact grant application pending the completion of an overall plan for county participation in Impact. This occurred on August 1, 1972. Although the moratorium ended by September 1, there remained some feelings of discontent among county-run corrections agencies. These feelings, coupled with the city's insistence on scrutinizing every move the corrections people made, discouraged and further delayed their efforts. Yet pressure was really being applied by the Federal Regional Office and by the State Planning Agency as well. The RO coordinator complained of the difficulties in getting corrections "to move", and later reported to his superior that corrections "does not have its heart in the Impact program and has been dragging its heels." (100) Earlier, both OLEC and the RO coordinator had thought the Human Resources Division was "getting 'cold feet' and really doesn't want to be [a] national test for modern correctional theory." (101) As a result, the corrections people decided "that the chances of funding were problematical" and that they had best devote their efforts to the pressing demands of administering their division. (102)

The corrections projects received formal approval from the Task Force on October 15, 1973. However, another obstacle emerged which delayed the OLEC's approval of the adult corrections package--the matching fund requirement. Regarding this problem, the RA wrote the following to LEAA headquarters:

A problem exists with respect to the retroactive features of the 90/10 funding ratio under the new legislation. If it applies to Part E funds used for the Impact program the problem is that the Human Resources package was considered by the Oregon Legislature under the old Part E which required no hard match. The State does not have sufficient hard money appropriated to cover the application if the 10 percent hard match requirement applies... (103)

Thus, the delay in submitting corrections grant applications to the Impact Task Force for approval had inadvertently created still further delays. The 1974 fiscal year requirements required hard match funds for corrections (Part E) projects whereas fiscal year 1973 requirements did not. When would the state have the money? It required the SPA director's meeting with the Oregon Legislature during a special session to obtain the necessary funds. By this time, calendar year 1973 was coming to a close with no part of the adult corrections package having been implemented. (104)

4.4.2 Adult Corrections Projects Implemented

The adult corrections package contained six projects which were aimed at determining the rehabilitative needs of targeted offenders and at seeing to it that those needs were met by an array of services. The projects and the services proffered, as described in the 1974 Portland Impact Program Update, are listed below:

Client Diagnostic and Tracking Services Project

The Diagnostic Center component of this project will provide Circuit Courts with comprehensive pre-sentence data and recommendations for sentencing concerning 90 percent of the target offenders convicted in Multnomah county. The diagnostic assessment generated will also assist institutional and field service staffs in planning rehabilitative services for target offenders committed to the Division.

The tracking component of this project provides for development of a standardized collection, storage, analysis and feedback of data concerning each target offender and "high risk" client in terms of the service objectives, actual

services delivered, and case outcome. Net effect of tracking is a systematic case management device that makes the cost-effectiveness of each of the division's six projects visible to managers and line staff, as well as to OLEC evaluation staff. Using information generated, staff of the Division will be able to modify each Impact project, if necessary, during the course of program operations.

Field Services Project

Through intensive supervision and systematic case management techniques, this project will afford parole and probation officers the opportunity to improve the level of services to their target offender caseloads. Current caseloads do not allow either the intensive supervision or an opportunity for client advocacy and community resource development most target clients require. Staff shortages, inadequate referral processes and resources, the absence of specially-designed treatment plans, the lack of adequate procedures for monitoring the progress of individuals in the rehabilitation process and other problems addressed by this project are factors that contribute to the high rate of recidivism among target offenders. This project would overcome these problems by providing comprehensive, timely, accurate assessment of client problems, interests, and needs, followed by provision of required services. Through the expanded availability and use of community resources supported by the project, the offender will have more varied and appropriate options open to him in the community.

Institutional Services Project

This project provides academic and vocational training as well as academic, vocational and recreational counseling for target and "high risk" offenders in institutions. Assessment of individual client vocational, academic and recreational needs will be established upon admission to the institution and rehabilitative goals will be established for the clients. Based on goals set, individualized programs will be developed and appropriate placement in an institutional program will be implemented. Remedial intermediate and secondary educational subjects will be taught and G.E.D. tests administered. Vocational training will be given, followed by appropriate certification in an effort to prepare the offenders for competition in the labor market on release. Recreational programs will be directed toward training clients to use their leisure time constructively.

Project Transition

This project will attempt to reduce recidivism among target offenders who are eligible for Vocational Rehabilitation Division services and who are: (1) discharged directly from the correctional institutions; (2) paroled without benefit of work release programs; and (3) placed on probation after evaluation by the Diagnostic Center.

The project will meet the needs of the target offenders by providing comprehensive vocational rehabilitation services not met by existing resources. Such offenders require specialized services from medical, psychiatric, vocational and educational professionals. Vocational Rehabilitation Division resources cannot meet the needs of all eligible target offenders without expanded resources allowed through this project.

Client Resources and Services Project

This project will supplement resources for serving flat discharges, and target offenders included in Institutional Services, Field Services, and Transition Impact projects. Such resources will afford remedial instruction, GED preparation, vocational training, job development, individual counseling, family counseling and residential care and other services not included in the budgets for the latter grant applications.

Training and Information Project

This project will augment existing training resources of the Corrections Division to meet training needs of staff, volunteers and students participating in the other five Corrections Division Impact projects. Impact project personnel will receive specialized training according to job requirements.

4.4.3 State Juvenile Corrections Projects Implemented

Of the three juvenile corrections projects proposed for implementation by the Oregon Children's Services Division, one, Hope West, a rehabilitation project designed to provide intensive psychiatric care for youthful offenders aged 12-17, at a cost of \$1,043,377 over a three-year period, was rejected by the RO as not falling within Impact guidelines. The two funded Children's Services Division projects are described below:

Project Picture (Intensive Care, Training Unified Rehabilitation Effort)

Project Picture is a parole-service model that consists of the juvenile offender, parent, school personnel, community persons and CSD personnel. This community treatment team plans and implements a re-entry program for the client. The team works closely with MacLaren School for Boys staff to monitor diagnosis of problems, assessment of needs and services delivered. A halfway house has been rented to serve a daily population of fifteen to twenty boys. It provides living facilities for clients whose own living situation is temporarily disrupted, for those in danger of committing new crimes, for those just coming out of MacLaren, and for older juveniles without families. Admission is by request and emergency referral.

Specialized Out-of-Home Care Project

Specialized Out-of-Home Care will match the identified needs of the child requiring an alternative living environment with the most appropriate living arrangement available. Maximum use of this project should help to reduce the number of juvenile target offenders committed to MacLaren School for Boys (now co-educational) because of lack of adequate community resources.

The project will closely coordinate activities with the Case Management program. Case managers and case workers will share caseloads as well as utilize existing services in support of rehabilitative efforts. The key element is professional assessment of the child's needs and matching such needs with available resources.

4.4.4 Other Corrections Projects Implemented

The single most expensive juvenile corrections project, funded in the amount of \$1,961,349, belonged not to Oregon's Children's Services Division but to Multnomah county. Called Case Management Corrections Services, it is described below, along with the tenth funded corrections project, Youth Progress:

Case Management Corrections Services Project

This program will focus on establishing service in the three high-crime juvenile referral areas of Portland: North, Northeast, and Southeast.

The objective of this project is to provide the juvenile offender with more intense and aggressive case supervision. Both private and public agencies are utilized as providers of services. This process helps to reduce the inconsistent, fragmented, and inadequate services provided to the juvenile offender. The program gives enhanced service to the target offender through a strong diagnostic component and a new "client advocate" role for the counselor.

Proposed caseloads for case managers will be 20 as compared to caseloads of 150 and 200 normally assigned to Juvenile Court counselors.

Significant for this program is the contractual fee for service, which will enable the counselor to purchase needed services for his client. It provides the criminal justice system with linkage between private and public treatment agencies and the Juvenile Court.

Youth Progress Project

Youth Progress Association offers comprehensive job finding and counseling services to young persons while also providing temporary living accommodations to some of those referred.

Under Impact, Youth Progress will expand its services by opening two additional residential care centers, each manned by a resident-care supervisor. The units utilize present counseling and job development staff. Referrals are target offenders from Multnomah county Juvenile Court, State Juvenile Parole, Children's Services Division, and local law enforcement agencies. A comprehensive program consisting of evaluation of applicant problems, job placement, counseling and scholastic assistance is provided each accepted referral.

4.5 Other Projects Developed and Implemented

Final grant development and submission was completed by August 1974, and by September 30, 1974, 23 separate grant awards had been approved by the Seattle RO. These awards include two planning grants to the Impact Staff, one evaluation grant to the OLEC, and 20 grants to 19 individual projects. Table X shows that Portland had received \$17,300,854 in awards to date with two grants, totaling \$1,994,535, pending RO approval. Functionally, all projects and awards may be broken out, as shown in Table XI. A comparison of projects implemented

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1 OF 2

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TABLE X
PORTLAND IMPACT DISCRETIONARY GRANTS

PERIOD ENDING: SEPTEMBER 30, 1974

Date Awarded	Grant Number	Title	Grant Period	Amount Awarded	Amount Disbursed	Expenditures
2/23/72	72 NI 10 0001	Portland Impact Program	7/1/72-6/30/74	625,000	591,623	591,623
6/28/74	72 NI 10 001/S-1	Portland Impact Program Planning Supplement	7/1/74-6/30/75	222,587	-0-	-0-
3/26/73	72 DF 10 0102	Crime Prevention Bureau	3/1/73-11/29/73	27,743	27,743	27,743
3/29/73	72 DF 10 0103	Youth Progress Association	7/1/73-6/30/76	106,031	20,500	21,921
5/3/73	72 ED 10 0101	Case Management Corrections Service	1/1/73-11/30/74	1,067,226	918,077	713,668
11/3/72	73 DF 10 0101	Portland Light Project	10/1/72-9/30/75	173,000	91,829	134,364
5/23/73	73 DF 10 0104	Portland Public Schools Pilot Program to Reduce Burglary	6/1/73-5/30/76	210,886	32,253	31,753
6/29/73	73 DF 10 0105	Portland Police High Impact Project	7/1/73-6/30/76	3,669,509	786,132	1,456,353
10/3/73	74 DF 10 0106	CRISS Project Acceleration	10/1/73-9/30/76	1,058,602	195,411	260,919
10/12/73	74 DF 10 0107	Multnomah County District Attorney's Impact Project	10/1/73-9/30/75	394,517	175,777	181,059
1/22/74	74 DF 10 0108	Crime Prevention Bureau	12/1/73-11/30/75	404,499	149,984	133,467
5/16/74	74 DF 10 0109	Crime Prevention Bureau - Public Information and Education	4/1/74-3/31/76	133,964	-0-	-0-
1/24/74	74 ED 10 0102	Specialized Out-of-Home Care	1/1/74-9/30/76	915,242	15,143	32,214
1/24/74	74 ED 10 0103	Corrections Division Training and Information Project	1/1/74-9/30/76	159,891	17,000	704
1/31/74	74 ED 10 0104	Client Diagnostic and Tracking Service	1/1/74-9/30/76	816,221	25,000	4,570
2/4/74	74 ED 10 0105	Client Resources and Services Project	1/1/74-9/30/76	1,489,723	15,000	-0-
2/4/74	74 ED 10 0106	Project Picture (Intensive Care Training Unified Rehab. Effort)	1/1/74-9/30/76	1,381,410	15,390	-0-
2/4/74	74 ED 10 0107	Project Transition	1/1/74-9/30/76	402,007	12,000	13
4/17/74	74 ED 10 0108	Field Services Project	1/1/74-9/30/76	1,067,301	25,000	3,721
4/17/74	74 ED 10 0109	Corrections Division Institutional Services Project	1/1/74-9/30/76	1,536,438	35,000	6,332
4/1/74	74 NI 10 0002	Portland Impact Evaluation Plan	1/1/74-12/31/74	420,802	135,458	157,034
9/26/74	75 DF 10 0101	Research, Advocacy, Prevention & Education (RAPE)	10/1/74-9/30/76	124,132	-0-	-0-
12/17/74	75 ED 10 0101	Case Management Corrections Service	12/1/74-5/30/76	894,123	-0-	-0-
TOTAL AWARDED				17,300,854		

STATUS OF GRANT APPLICATIONS AS OF 1/15/75

Application Number	Applicant	Project Title	Amount	No. of Days In-House	90-Day Expiration Date	Recommended Action
0102-10-DF-75	City of Portland Lighting Bureau	Portland Commercial Street Lighting	637,340	147	11/19/74 Placed in Suspense 11/19/74	1
0103-10-DF-75	City of Portland, Office of Support Services	Public Safety Communications Project	1,357,195	110	12/26/74 Placed in Suspense 12/24/74	2
<p>1. Application to be resubmitted consistent with the efforts of Westinghouse' "Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design"</p> <p>2. This application will be reviewed again for possible funding.</p>						

TABLE XI
FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION—PORTLAND

PROGRAM AREA	AWARDS
A. <u>Adult Corrections (6)^a (6)^b</u>	
Client Diagnostic and Tracking Services Project	\$ 816,221
Field Services Project	1,067,301
Institutional Services Project	1,536,438
Project Transition	402,007
Client Resources and Services Project	1,489,723
Training and Information Project	159,891
TOTAL	\$5,471,581
B. <u>Juvenile Corrections (5) (4)</u>	
Project Picture	\$1,381,410
Specialized Out-of-Home Care Project	915,242
Case Management Corrections Services Project (2 awards)	1,961,349
Youth Progress Project	106,031
TOTAL	\$4,364,032
C. <u>Police Projects (2) (4)</u>	
CRISS Acceleration (2 projects)	\$1,058,602
Police High Impact (Strike Force and Communications) Projects	3,669,509
TOTAL	\$4,728,111
D. <u>Community Projects (6) (4)</u>	
Crime Prevention Bureau (2 awards)	\$ 432,242
Crime Prevention Bureau - Public Information and Education	133,964
Portland Light Project	173,000
Portland Public School Pilot Program to Reduce Burglary	210,886
Research, Advocacy, Prevention and Education (RAPE) Project	124,132
TOTAL	\$1,074,224
E. <u>Courts Projects (1) (1)</u>	
Multnomah County District Attorney's Impact Project	\$ 394,517
F. <u>Planning and Evaluation Grants (-)</u>	
	\$1,268,389
GRAND TOTAL	\$17,300,854

- a) The first number appearing at each of these headings signifies the number of different awards.
b) The second number appearing at each of these headings signifies the number of different projects.

(Source: MITRE derivation from Region X documentation)

(Table XI) and projects originally proposed for implementation (Table VII, see page 45 above), shows that only four projects proposed for development, Early Intervention, Youth Service Bureau, Police Models, and Multi-Resource Facility, failed to be implemented. Hope West is not included here because it did not appear in the original list of proposed priority projects. Using the Performance Management System format, as demonstrated in Table XII, it becomes easy to see what projects and how many federal dollars were awarded to the three program areas, prevention, justice administration and corrections, used by Portland in developing its Impact program. Because the School Burglary and RAPE projects have activities which cross two program areas, the monies awarded these projects are being divided equally in reflecting the funding breakout. Of \$16,032,465 awarded to projects to date, (planning and evaluation awards total an additional \$1,268,389 for a current grand total of \$17,300,854) \$9,835,613, or 61.4 percent, went to the corrections program area; \$5,290,137, or 32.9 percent, went to justice administration, and \$906,715, or 5.7 percent, went to prevention.

A brief description of each funded project in the prevention and justice administration program areas follows:

Crime Prevention Bureau

The Crime Prevention Bureau conducts, on a large scale block meetings and property identification programs for residences and businesses. Meetings allow dissemination of information on the burglary and robbery problems in Portland; how potential victims can protect themselves; preferable security hardware; how to conceal the vulnerability of a residence to burglary; the advantages in marking valuable property; promote watching out for the welfare of neighbors; and handling money away from home to avoid becoming a victim. The grant also develops an Environmental Crime Hazard Reporting System, Residential Crime Hazard Reporting System, and looks to the potential of a uniform municipal Building Security Code.

TABLE XII
PORTLAND HIGH IMPACT PROGRAM

GOAL	I. PREVENTION	II. JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION	III. CORRECTIONS
OBJECTIVE	<p>A. HIGH RISK GROUPS</p> <p>A1 PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES WHEN PERSONS WITH HIGH RISKS FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR ARE FIRST IDENTIFIED</p> <p>A2 IMPROVE THE ABILITIES OF MEMBERS OF HIGH RISK GROUPS TO PROTECT FOR THEMSELVES THROUGH EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT TRAINING & PLACEMENT</p> <p>B. VICTIMS/ENVIRONMENT</p> <p>B1 ALTER THE ENVIRONMENT TO REDUCE VULNERABILITY AND/OR ACCESSIBILITY OF THE TARGET OR AREAS OF CRIME</p> <p>B2 EDUCATE THE POTENTIAL VICTIM TO REDUCE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CRIME</p>	<p>C.</p> <p>C1 IMPROVE THE CAPACITY OF THE POLICE TO DETECT AND RESPOND TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY</p> <p>C2 ESTABLISH SWIFT AND APPROPRIATE DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL CHARGES</p> <p>C3 PLAN AND COORDINATE THE PROCEDURES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ORDER TO ENABLE THEM TO FUNCTION AS A SYSTEM</p>	<p>D.</p> <p>D1 TREAT THE MENTAL, EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL DISORDERS OF OFFENDERS</p> <p>D2 PROVIDE ACADEMIC VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND PLACEMENT</p>
PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES	<p>CRIME PREVENTION BUREAU</p> <p>11 Crime Heard</p> <p>12 Police in City Planning</p> <p>13 Building Security</p> <p>14 Operation I.D.</p> <p>15 Crime Heard Inspections</p> <p>SCHOOL BURGLARY</p> <p>11 Harden Schools</p> <p>12 Neighborhood Lites</p> <p>13 Street Lighting</p> <p>STREET LIGHTING</p> <p>11 Neighborhood Lites</p> <p>12 Lloyd Center Area</p> <p>13 Union Avenue</p> <p>14 School Yard Lites</p> <p>D.A. RAPE Project</p> <p>11 Alter-Community Attitudes</p> <p>21 Reduce Actual No. of Offenses</p>	<p>CRIME ACCELERATION</p> <p>11 CRIME L.E.</p> <p>21 CRIME-Courts</p> <p>31 CRIME Management System</p> <p>STRIKE FORCE Communications</p> <p>11 Police Operations</p> <p>12 Crime Analysis</p> <p>13 A.D.A. I.C.P.</p> <p>14 Manpower</p> <p>15 Forensic</p> <p>16 Fencing Op's</p> <p>17 Burglar-Bober Activities</p> <p>SCHOOL BURGLARY</p> <p>11 Central Monitoring for Schools</p> <p>DISTRICT ATTY.</p> <p>11 Legal Aids</p> <p>21 Swift Prosecution</p> <p>22 Reduce Neglected Files</p> <p>D.A. RAPE Project</p> <p>11 Increase Reported Rape</p> <p>21 Increase No. of Arrests and Convictions</p>	<p>JUVENILE COMPONENT</p> <p>Project Picture</p> <p>1.1 Community Treatment Teams</p> <p>1.1.1 Halfway Houses</p> <p>Specialized Out-of-Home Care</p> <p>1.1 Develop New Resources</p> <p>1.1.1 Supervise Placement</p> <p>Youth Progress</p> <p>1.1 Residential Care</p> <p>2.1 Job Counseling & Referral</p> <p>Case Management</p> <p>1.1 Incentive Supervision</p> <p>2.1 Job Referral</p> <p>2.2 Purchase of Training</p> <p>FIELD SERVICES</p> <p>1.1 Supervision Treatment Teams</p> <p>2.1 Referral & Coordination</p> <p>DIAGNOSTIC CENTER</p> <p>1.1 Diagnostic Treatment Teams</p> <p>2.1 Institutional Services</p> <p>TRANSITION</p> <p>1.1 Academic</p> <p>2.1 Vocational & Institutional</p> <p>CLIENT RESOURCES</p> <p>1.1 Counseling, Educational, etc.</p> <p>2.1 Training Institute Alliance</p> <p>CORRECT STAFF TRAINING</p>

Source: Portland Master Plan Update
Fall 1974

Crime Prevention Bureau - Public Information and Education

This project is housed with and operated through the Crime Prevention Bureau and will coordinate a broad-based information and education campaign to alert citizens, through the media, to ways in which they can protect themselves from burglary and street-crime victimization. The project will keep citizens abreast of the target crime problem in Portland, create an awareness of the Portland Impact Program, and meet public information needs of the individual Impact projects.

School Burglary Prevention Project

The project is divided into several stages, including a detailed planning and hardware systems design stage, bidding stage, implementation, de-bugging and operational stage. Planning, de-bugging and implementation will be followed by intensive evaluation of the project.

Portland Street Lighting Project

This project furnishes three Portland high target crime neighborhoods--Boise, Humbolt and Irvington--with a lighting improvement program, above the minimum standard service presently required, in order to deter crime. The areas of the three neighborhoods to receive improved lighting include streets, alleys, school grounds, parks, and specific high crime pockets.

The project was developed jointly by the citizens of the target neighborhoods, Portland's Lighting Bureau, Park Bureau, School District, Development Commission and each of the neighborhood community development associations.

Research, Advocacy, Prevention and Education (RAPE) Project

This project will conduct a public information campaign to advise potential victims of the kind of evidence needed to obtain a conviction. Victims will be encouraged to report the occurrence of a rape and to press for a conviction of the assailant.

Training sessions for police officers and deputy district attorneys will improve the quantity, quality and procedural aspects of investigation and prosecution. It is expected that the training programs will be designed by professionals and will be presented by practitioners from various disciplines, including law, psychology, sociology, law enforcement, etc.

The "victim advocate" component of this program will prepare the victim for trial. The Advocate and her assistant will be available on a 24-hour basis to respond to reported occurrences. Initial contact with the victim will be at a single local hospital just prior to the necessary physical examination. It is expected that the pre-trial counseling provided the victim will enhance her ability to respond to cross-examination by the defense attorney and to assist in the prosecution of the assailant. In addition, it is expected that in some, if not all, cases the advocate herself will provide an excellent witness for the prosecution. She will be acceptable to the jury and will be able to testify to the condition of the victim at the time of reporting. The advocate will also help the victim to understand the evidentiary needs for conviction.

CRISS Acceleration Project

This project, the Columbia Region Information Sharing System (CRISS) provides a computerized data base for the use of police and courts. Its two basic objectives are:

- (a) To accelerate the development of CRISS and complete within 32 calendar weeks from the day of funding, a subsystem that will improve the capacity of the Portland Police Bureau and the Multnomah County Sheriff's Office to detect and respond to criminal activity.
- (b) To prevent court case congestion and delay in the processing of criminal matters and reduce the recidivism rate, by accelerating the development of CRISS and completing within 55 weeks from funding date an automated Courts Data System.

Police High Impact Program

The combined Strike Force and Police Communications projects are designed to significantly reduce the incidence of crime through intensive suppression of target crimes and apprehension of target offenders (Strike Force) and increase police response time for the Strike Force and the entire Police Bureau (Communications).

The Strike Force provides intensive patrol of high target crime areas by assignment of regular officers on overtime basis, intensive surveillance of suspects and intervention of hold-ups in progress through the use of police-installed burglar alarms. Tactical decisions,

such as allocation of personnel and definition of patrol targets, are based on a daily analysis of reported crime occurrence.

District Attorney's Impact Project

A separate trial team of deputy district attorneys has been established under this grant. These deputies work closely with the investigative units of the Portland Police Bureau to promote better evidence gathering and preparation of target-crime cases for trial, including provision of training in preparing search warrant affidavits. By preparing stronger cases, it is expected that deputies will not have to engage in the "plea bargaining" process with defense counsel in order to clear cases from the docket expeditiously. Effort will be directed to trying and winning cases on their merits on the original target-crime charges, rather than accepting pleas to "lesser included" charges in the absence of convincing evidence. (105)

5.0 THE PROGRAM IS EVALUATED

Perhaps the first thing to say about evaluation in Portland is a repetition of a major point made earlier in this document: evaluation was not the responsibility of the Impact Staff. As discussed earlier, the April 1972 meeting at Salishan assigned evaluation to the SPA located outside of Portland at Salem, Oregon. Although this arrangement was unique for the Impact program, in that no other city opted for such an organizational structure, it is not impossible to understand from the perspective of early Portland Impact planners. From at least four vantage points, the choice of the SPA can be seen as a natural one. First, the Oregon State Legislature was preoccupied with evaluation and "refused to grant state funds for Impact unless there was an acceptable high-level evaluation...There was a political acceptance of evaluation as a necessary public policy tool."⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ In particular, the legislature was concerned about the evaluation of its Human Resources (adult corrections) program. Being a state-run program, it was felt that the state ought to serve as evaluator. Second, some key officials had always viewed the program, due to its evaluation focus, to be a state program. "The original concept was that the staff would be an arm of the SPA housed in Portland to start data collection."⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Third, it was known that the OLEC already had proven evaluation capability and the city had no demonstrated experience in this area. With the insistence on "quality evaluation" and the fact that "the state might have to pick the program up later," the feeling was that the state ought to do the evaluation.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ And finally, the SPA had received the evaluation assignment at Salishan when the influence of the city of Portland over the direction and organizational structure of the program was not nearly so strong as it would later become.

During the first six months of 1972, there was little communication between the Impact Staff and the OLEC. Then, in late August, the Policy Decision Group sent a memorandum to all ROs addressing two

issues relative to the use of the National Institute funds. In addition to levying additional data requirements on the regions, the Policy Decision Group memorandum clarified what it considered to be an essential evaluation capability.

With the magnitude of this program and the number of projects that can be expected in one city, it is not realistic to expect that one or even two individuals can carry out as completely and rigorously as we would like to see, the evaluation of most of the projects and programs implemented in the city. Although with careful planning for the evaluation components of each project proposal, most of the necessary data will be collected routinely as part of the operational phase, the analysis of these data, the application of appropriate measures of effectiveness, and the collection of other necessary information not provided automatically may require more support.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾

Clearly, the LEAA Policy Group expected serious evaluation efforts from the cities, and it wanted to be certain that an adequate evaluation capability was being planned for, given the dimensions of the work involved. They also expected the cities to each produce an evaluation plan which would contain, in addition to evaluation components, the details of how these and related evaluations would be carried out.

5.1 The Question of Evaluation Assistance

The OLEC had assigned Clinton Goff, a psychologist attached to their Salem headquarters, as principal evaluator of the program. Assisting him in the early developmental phase of the evaluation concept was the SPA Impact coordinator who was, himself, a senior level systems analyst. Very early, he had anticipated some of the problems sure to surface in the evaluation area and had communicated these to his superior at the OLEC.

I still believe that there are going to be some very difficult problems in effectively evaluating Portland's program either on a total program basis or an individual project basis, because of the split between the planning and our operation.

Somehow, we have to be in on the day-to-day planning insofar as evaluation is concerned because we simply cannot afford to wait until they [the Impact Staff] get a plan done and try to stick in the evaluation component.(110)

Apparently, the SPA's warning that evaluation needed to occur as a phased activity in concert with planning was not immediately listened to for the Impact Staff's then assistant director would recall having had "little contact with the SPA until September 1972...."(111)

In the intervening months, the Shiley-led Independent Data Collection Staff had been busy working on the data base to be used in support of the Impact plan. That work was due to be completed by mid-September, but the resulting data would input to the Portland planning document and had no connection to the evaluation plan called for by the LEAA Policy Decision Group. The Seattle RO, in response to the Decision Group memorandum wrote the National Impact Coordinator that all Portland activities - data gathering, planning, program development, fiscal management and evaluation - were carried out under the direction of the Task Force. Commenting specifically on evaluation, the RO coordinator wrote:

Evaluation is done by the SPA. The evaluation program, headed by Dr. Clinton Goff, devotes 2.6 man-years to the Impact program. Dr. Goff develops the evaluation criteria for each project prior to approval. As a consequence, he works very closely with the Impact Task Force Staff. It is the belief of the Regional Office that separation of the program development and evaluation component will produce a more objective evaluation.(112)

The OLEC portion of the budget narrative is shown as Table XIII below. A close look at this budget shows that the 2.6 man years of evaluation effort referred to by the RO coordinator are the anticipated full-time equivalents listed under the heading Evaluation System in column two of Table XIII. However, the present full-time equivalents

TABLE XIII
PORTLAND IMPACT BUDGET NARRATIVE: OLEC PORTION

Special Note: Brad Shiley's data collection operations will terminate on September 15, 1972; therefore, calculations for personnel, office rental, and phones have been divided into two segments--Segment A - July 1 through September 15, 1972 and Segment B - September 16, 1972 through June 31, 1973, when these three positions will be moved to OLEC.

Although we no longer designate particular Impact positions, the activities now being performed by the OLEC as a whole (and the average expected once projects are underway) for Impact include:

	Present F.T.E.	Anticipated Average F.T.E.
Coordination functions		
a. Attending task force meetings	.20	.10
b. Attending national meetings	.05	.05
c. Coordination-state programs	.25	.20
d. Project review (total staff)	.10	.50
Monitoring		
a. System design	.05	-
b. Actual operation	-	.20
Evaluation System		
a. System design	.90	.10
b. Implementation	-	1.50
-Related data collection	-	1.00
Auditing		
a. System design	.10	-
b. Actual operation	-	.75
Grant Management		
a. Budgeting (planning)	.10	.10
b. Fund transfers	.05	.10
c. Project review	.10	.20
d. Accounting	.05	.10
Support functions		
a. Secretary	.60	1.00
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
	2.55	2.55

Totals 2.55 man years of effort

(Source: LEAA Region X Office, Seattle, Washington.)

listed under column one included not only the efforts of the Shiley-led Independent Data Collections Staff, but all coordinating, evaluating, monitoring, auditing, grant managing and supporting functions as well. Essential as these functions were, most of them had little direct relationship to the actual development of the evaluation component designs and the subsequent analysis of these designs which were needed by Portland Impact planners. In fact, all available documentation indicates that between September 1972 and February 1973, Goff worked virtually alone on Impact evaluation, devoting, by his own admission, 75 percent of his time to Impact from September-October 1972 to January 1973.⁽¹¹³⁾ By February 15, 1973, Goff was joined by Jeff Barnes who was hired by the OLEC as director of the Justice Data Analysis Center but was assigned, temporarily, to assist full-time in Impact evaluation.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

It would seem, then, that the Impact Staff had valid reason to complain of limited evaluation assistance. Despite these complaints, the following information was recorded in late November after a MITRE visit:

There is evidence that some evaluation planning has been done, as demonstrated by the inclusion of an evaluation component in Portland's Street Lighting Grant Application. Though the evaluation planning was incomplete, there was some reasonable effort involved. What was the process used to develop this component, i.e., did the staff, host agencies and the SPA work jointly or independently? We asked this question of Dr. Goff and the Impact Staff and were unable to ascertain to what extent they each participated in the development of the component.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

The RO coordinator, following the MITRE visit, indicated his concerns to the RA over the evaluation picture in Portland.

A potential problem has developed with respect to the evaluation component to the Impact program which is being done by the SPA. The Impact Staff maintains that the SPA representative (Dr. Clinton Goff) has not been

spending enough time with project applicants constructing evaluation components to projects. Dr. Goff maintains that the Impact Staff is not telling him when projects are under development, and thus, he is not aware of projects until they are already well along. To correct this problem, Ed Cooper has agreed to station Dr. Goff in Portland in the Impact Staff office until the evaluation component is complete.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

The problem, then, was one of availability. If the SPA director would consent to allow his evaluator to spend all of his time on the Portland evaluation, the problem could certainly be eased. This agreement was reached by January 3rd, and by mid-February, matters had improved between the Impact Staff and the OLEC evaluator to such an extent that the staff director could report that Goff and the Impact Staff were working closely together on evaluation components. The Portland Impact plan was scheduled for approval at the same time. Since the formal approval was only to be of the concept and not of the priority projects listed in the plan, the SPA evaluator would be able to accomplish his task as a cooperative effort with the Impact Staff. One evaluator, however--even devoting all of his time to the effort--would hardly be enough if the RO were to comply fully with the guidelines proposed by the Policy Decision Group memorandum of August 24th which called for the development of a separate evaluation plan.

The new Draft Work Plan, produced at the request of the Task Force and described previously, recognized the OLEC's primary responsibility for producing the evaluation plan but observed that Impact Staff participation was absolutely germane since the evaluation plan was to provide a "specific goal-oriented framework" within which Portland Impact would develop. The position of the OLEC evaluation effort was greatly strengthened by the statements made in the draft document. There was, though, another major question yet to be answered. Which state agency - OLEC or Department of Human Resources - would write the evaluations for the "nationally significant" Human Resources (adult corrections) package?

5.2 The Evaluation of the Human Resources Package

The issue over who would write the evaluation components for the adult corrections projects occurred only because the Department of Human Resources had its own Program Evaluation and Research Department. The Department's director of research was so certain the job would be done in-house that he had already presented a budget to the Oregon State Legislature for performing the evaluation. The SPA evaluator, despite the size of his staff (by February 15, one other evaluator and himself), was just as anxious that the corrections designs be developed under his direction. When the question of who would develop the designs had been raised at a February 15 meeting (on page 69 above) by the Corrections Division director, no clear-cut, satisfactory answer had been forthcoming.

Initially, it was thought that the Human Resources group could assist the OLEC staff. This solution was favored by the OLEC director who did not want to further enlarge his staff, preferring to hire consultants and agreeing to provide some funds to the Human Resources staff. The matter became a moot issue in March 1973 when the Oregon State Legislature met to discuss the Human Resources package. Speaking of the long-range costs of the effort, the Chairman of the State's Joint Ways and Means Committee stated:

Any plan to implement on-going corrections programs, either adult or juvenile, with these federal monies will represent a very real requirement for General Fund financing after 3 years. Eleven million dollars represents a commitment of approximately \$4 million in 1975-1977 and \$8 million in 1977-1979. (117)

The scale of the financial commitment, the Legislature felt, called for first-class evaluation. Both the OLEC director and chief evaluator appeared before the State Legislature to press the claim for their unit. It was decided that the OLEC would conduct a "more objective" evaluation than Human Resources, and the latter agency's budget request was rejected. (118)

It was an unqualified legislative mandate for the OLEC. At last its director felt free to increase the size of his Impact evaluation unit. Eventually, four researchers, in addition to Goff, would be hired specifically for the Impact evaluation and contracts would be let to the American Justice Institute to perform the evaluation of the adult corrections package, and to the Oregon Research Institute to perform the analysis based on survey data for the Crime Prevention Bureau and Street Lighting projects.

A first effort at producing an evaluation plan had been completed and submitted informally to the RO on October 26, 1972. Almost simultaneously, Denver's evaluation plan was received by the OLEC. After reviewing the Denver plan, the SPA, apparently finding its own plan inadequate, set about doing some preliminary project-level evaluation designs. It was also during this period that the first Impact Staff director resigned. (119)

The SPA, in the meantime, was working on the overall evaluation plan as well as on evaluation designs for corrections projects. Additionally, Human Resources talent was supplementing the SPA effort, and the SPA Impact Coordinator was assigned full time to work on the Portland police project evaluation. The latter move came about as a direct result of the staff director's outcry that other projects were being shunted aside so that the Human Resources projects could be developed first. With the SPA deputy director assigned to head up the evaluation effort, 6 people (Goff, Jeff Barnes, Norman Duncan and Keith Stubblefield, all from the SPA, and two corrections evaluators from Human Resources) were working full time in the evaluation area. It was now March 8. Summarizing the state of the evaluation progress, the RO coordinator wrote:

The evaluation problem developed partially as a result of conflict between the SPA and the Impact Staff, especially Betsy Preston who openly opposed SPA evaluation efforts. Ed Cooper was also not helpful in this area in that he

didn't assign necessary staff to evaluations. For several months, Dr. Clinton Goff was the only person working on Impact evaluations and his efforts were far from full time. (120)

An important evaluation meeting was scheduled for Monday, March 12. According to the RO coordinator, its purpose was two-fold:

- (a) to make it clear to both the SPA and the Impact Staff that bickering must stop and they must coordinate their efforts; and
- (b) to assure ourselves that something is actually being accomplished with respect to: (1) evaluation plan completion; and (2) development of adequate evaluation components to each Impact project. (121)

Despite aired grievances and the internecine wars which played havoc with the total evaluative process, an evaluation plan was produced and submitted to the RO by March 27. How good would it be? Having been conceived in the turgid atmosphere of charges and countercharges, this was a major concern of the RO. Upon receipt of the plan, the RA wrote LEAA headquarters:

We now have a revised evaluation plan in-house and under review. The proposed price is steep but the proposals themselves are ambitious. I suspect some careful negotiations will be in order. There will be some direct communication with the Institute, Mr. Mulvey and MITRE, very shortly. (122)

As events were to develop, it would be an in-house review of the evaluation plan by Region X personnel which would be first out of the hopper. Constructive in tone, it would, nevertheless, find the plan seriously wanting in several aspects.

5.3 Region X Reviews the Portland Evaluation Plan

Among the areas the RO's initial review of the Portland evaluation plan addressed were: (a) basic evaluation approach; (b) OLEC evaluation

unit work plan; and (c) four project-level evaluation designs. The reviewer found that there was "not much specific associated with individual projects" in the basic evaluation approach and that data analysis was "treated in a name-dropping, superficial manner." Regarding the OLEC evaluation unit work plan, the single comment made was "further discussion and explanation is required." Specific project comments centered on the Case Management Corrections Services Project, which called for the use of goal attainment scaling, a device wherein a client defines his own major problems and, in concert with a counselor, develops a scale of outcomes for handling each identified problem from "worst" to "best" anticipated outcome. Achievement towards attaining the goal for each identified problem is measured at the end of the treatment process against the scale developed by the client and counselor. The review found the goal attainment scoring concept to be objectionable for the four reasons cited below:

- (a) It is overly simplistic.
- (b) It is clearly subjective. The resultant score is influenced quite directly by both the client and the counselor. In a sense, the evaluatees become the evaluators.
- (c) It is digressive. What is the relationship between the resultant score and the frequency and seriousness of subsequent recidivism? Presumably, the correlation is negative, but is it really? One can only postulate.
- (d) It may very well be irrelevant or misleading with respect to the number and seriousness of subsequent offenses. It is felt quite strongly that the criterion measures of accomplishment should be restricted to the latter. (123)

Although the review had found the plan seriously wanting in several areas, it had only alluded to the 5-year duration of the evaluation plan and the approach which called for financing evaluation separately from projects at a rather high cost. As it would later develop, these issues, the Portland predictive models, and the non-Impact character of

projects like Early Intervention, would be the causes of a bitter and prolonged battle between Portland and LEAA headquarters.

5.4 The National Institute Review of the Portland Evaluation Plan

The LEAA review of the Portland evaluation plan was written by its Program Manager for the National-Level Evaluation. A lengthy review, it served to concretize much of what had gone wrong, from the national-level viewpoint, with the evaluation in Portland. Written to LEAA Assistant Administrator Martin Danziger, it began with a statement of the problem.

From the announcement of the Impact program in Portland, it has been clear that the SPA would design and carry out the project/program evaluations and the Impact Staff (CAT) would be primarily involved in planning, program development, and, to some extent, program management. The organization of the Impact program, including responsibility for the evaluation, has always been considered the prerogative of the state/local level. In fact, there are many reasons to feel that SPA involvement would be beneficial and could result in excellent and objective assessments of project/program effectiveness. The National Institute has never been at odds with this strategy. Our only concern has been with the paucity of information and documentation to indicate the SPA's progress in the project/program evaluation development. We have, as a result, been unable to see if our efforts to assist evaluation development in the Portland program have been helpful and if our general guidelines have been understood and adopted. In addition, we have had practically no way of making rational judgments as to whether or not, for example, their evaluations will supply our needs in doing a national evaluation...The recent receipt of the draft evaluation plan has not alleviated these problems. (124)

Referring to the Policy Decision Group's memorandum of August 24, 1972, he stressed the point that the data collection effort should be built into Impact projects as much as possible, citing three reasons:

First, the data needed for project-level evaluations result from agency operations and primary responsibility for data collection must reside with participating agencies. Impact

guidelines, therefore, reflect the realities of project evaluation; secondly, an important objective of the program is to increase the interest in and commitment to evaluation by operating agencies. Developing such "in-house" capabilities will ensure that evaluation is institutionalized after the initial Impact effort ends. Thirdly, evaluation is expensive and the Institute's resources for this program are limited. Integrating data collection into the specific project design (and budget) increases the resources available for this important activity. (125)

He noted that the Portland plan's discussion of project evaluation was on a very general level and, while they clearly understood the steps involved in planning for and carrying out project evaluations, their plan identified "what the Oregon SPA intends to do, but gives no clue as to how it will be done."

In discussing project evaluation components, he voiced agreement with the Region X review and added, regarding the use of goal-attainment scaling, "Certainly, its use will have little to do with measuring any change in the Impact crime picture in Portland." The other evaluation components in the plan he found to be in varying degrees of development but very far from being "considered acceptable and comprehensive." He was hopeful, though, as his next remark reflects: "On the other hand, they all indicate that work has been started and some of the measures have been articulated. If more manpower can be pulled together to work on these, the indications are favorable that good components would emerge." But he found the budget section confusing, as the following remarks indicate:

There is clearly a problem in communications among the Institute - RO - SPA and CAT. Therefore, OLEC developed separate evaluation budgets. The DHR evaluation budget calls for \$917,468 for five years, \$394,210 for the first two years. The Case Management evaluation budget calls for \$364,667 for five years, and \$132,074 for the first two years. The OLEC budget calls for \$1,788,872 for five years and \$787,743 for the first two years. Dr. Goff

indicated that a new budget has been developed which represents the total evaluation budget for two years. The figure I was given for the two-year budget is \$1,098,238.

Based on the information found in the evaluation plan, he felt it impossible to comment on whether or not the \$1,098,238 figure was justified. In his opinion, the budget called for "a large evaluation staff but no information is given that really shows when the Portland program will be able to utilize such a staff."

In conclusion, he recommended the following:

1. That it be recognized by the Regional Office that the SPA needs assistance now in developing evaluation components and a viable evaluation plan.
2. That until Dr. Goff can get a staff on board, this assistance should be provided either by (a) the Regional Office staff or (b) outside short-term contractor support.
3. That the Policy Group meet within the next two weeks with Mr. Head and possibly other Regional Office staff to discuss and iron out some policy decisions about the entire Portland program. The following items should be included on the agenda of such a meeting:
 - a) Non-impact nature of many projects.
 - b) Inability of evaluation design to provide short-term conclusions.
 - c) Apparent consolidation of all evaluation related activities (including data collection) in SPA, with resultant budget problems. Given the Institute's limited resources and its level of supplemental funding to the other cities, how is the Portland evaluation program to be organized and financed? (126)

It was a cogent review, clearly delineating the viewpoint of the LEAA in terms of the short-term goals of the Impact program. Most importantly, it contained a directional focus for future Portland programmatic and evaluative efforts which the LEAA Policy Group could

take under advisement. One day after receipt of the memorandum, the Assistant Administrator for NILE&CJ wrote the other members of the policy body of his concurrence with the National-Level Evaluation Manager's review. What is more, he went beyond the memorandum's recommendations:

Even further, I see no reason to give Portland an additional 1.1 million dollars for evaluation. The requirements to use, where possible, action program money to collect evaluation data should be adhered to. (127)

5.5 Evaluation Meetings Are Held in Seattle and Portland: The Attempt to Reconcile Differences

The National Institute was sufficiently concerned to send an LEAA/MITRE team comprised of the National Impact Coordinator, the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager and a MITRE analyst to meet with key members of the Region X Staff, the OLEC and the Impact Staff. The first day was spent in Seattle. In addition to the LEAA/MITRE team, the RA, RO coordinator and an RO analyst were present for the first session, Wednesday morning, May 23. The RA explained the reasons for Portland's development of a 5-year evaluation plan as being primarily due to the program focus on corrections projects which do not yield reliable short-term results. Many questions were raised by the LEAA representatives regarding funding levels and evaluation time-frames. It was toward the end of this interchange that the RA explained that Portland was requesting the National Institute's endorsement of the 5-year evaluation concept rather than a 5-year funding commitment. This led easily into the next area of concern: "Why a request of \$1.1 million for evaluation?" The response was that the Portland evaluation plan "was richer in concept" and "more sophisticated" than some of the other plans and would "require more money."

In the afternoon session, the plan would be discussed in greater detail with the RO coordinator and RO analyst. The RO analyst had

severely criticized the goal attainment scaling to be used in the Case Management project in his review of the second cut at an evaluation plan. Although he had rejected it as a measure of project outcome, he, nevertheless, believed the technique should be carefully evaluated "as a decision-making aid" since it was to be employed by case managers in making dispositional decisions and in contracting services. (128) Many of the questions raised by the LEAA representatives could not be answered satisfactorily by the RO. It was decided to raise these issues again the following day when they would meet with members of the Impact Staff and the OLEC in Portland.

At Thursday morning's meeting, the OLEC director posed a question which he directed to the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager. "What does the Institute consider to be an adequate evaluation?" The Program Manager replied that, "As a minimum, every project should have an evaluation component which identifies its objectives, measures, data requirements and methods of analysis." He added, "Impact is a narrow program with very specific goals and the funding is viewed as a short-term commitment to get the program started." (129)

When the matter of separating the evaluation from the action portion of the program was discussed, both the Impact Staff director and the OLEC director stressed the importance of keeping evaluation separate in order to eliminate biases, explaining that it was essential for the OLEC to control the entire data collection process. It seemed another turnabout. Suddenly, all segments of Portland's Impact program appeared to be forming a wall of solidarity. Perhaps this new front owed something to the presence of visitors from the East; perhaps not. In sum, the LEAA visit, while certainly a facilitator of lively discussion, had done very little to answer the major question nagging at the Institute: How will Portland's program address the two-year goals of

the Impact program? Nothing had been concretized as to how Portland would use its proposed predictive models within the context of the Impact program. All key issues, then, were left unresolved.

5.6 The Institute Recommends a New Evaluation Strategy

Upon hearing of the results of the Seattle/Portland visits, Assistant Administrator Danziger would pen another memorandum to his fellows on the Policy Decision Group.

There are some indications that the Portland Impact program is not developing within basic Impact constraints. A recent site visit to Seattle and Portland did not result in a complete clarification to dispel these apprehensions. Of greatest concern is the lack of sufficient information that describes and documents how the program expects to achieve and measure the two-year Impact goals. These goals represent the overriding constraints of the program. (130)

Danziger then spoke of the reason for the Policy Decision Group's existence, stressing that while the "final authority and responsibility for the program rests at the national level," the whole program had been structured in such a way as to allow for "national intervention... only...under the most serious conditions." He listed seven:

1. Failure to achieve cooperation and coordination among regional, state, and local agencies to the point of jeopardizing program success.
2. Failure to utilize national program guidelines wherever possible.
3. Failure to collect and utilize appropriate data necessary to do crime specific planning.
4. Failure to develop a comprehensive and balanced program.
5. Failure to develop quantifiable project objectives that include an estimation of expected contribution to Impact goals.

6. Failure to build in evaluation components to proposed projects that are at least adequate enough to determine and assess achievement toward two-year Impact goals.
7. Use of Impact funds for non-Impact projects and programs. This applies to Institute and action money. (131)

Had Portland's Impact program been found seriously wanting in any of these areas? He wrote:

In the case of Portland, there is just enough written information in our hands that could be interpreted to indicate that some of these conditions may exist. Whenever we raise this possibility with Seattle, we only get oral assurances that either the condition does not exist or that they will correct it at the appropriate time.. A serious lack of communication exists between the Regional Office and Washington when it comes to the Portland Impact program. That this has been intentional on the part of the RO has not been stated. However, the rationale behind this approach is unclear. To determine what the situation is in Portland requires cooperation on the part of the Regional Office.

His strategy called for two actions, to be taken in time sequence;

- (a) The Regional Office should be instructed to prepare a written defense of the Portland Impact program for the Policy Group. Most important, the defense should specifically address the two-year Impact Goals and how the Portland program and its component parts are designed to achieve them and to measure this achievement.
- (b) The Policy Group should carefully evaluate this response and, if found inadequate, should recommend the return of program control and direction to OCJA. (132)

5.6.1 The National Impact Coordinator's Assessment of Portland's Evaluation Problems

A memorandum from the National Impact Coordinator covering the Seattle/Portland visit, was written June 4th. Among the many issues it discussed and brought into clearer focus was the attitude of the

Seattle-based RA, an important subject given that it had been at least implied during the two-day site visit that "some information problems... experienced with the Portland program hinge on the RO attitude as it relates to their assigned delegation of authority." The National Impact Coordinator had found these remarks sufficiently disturbing to telephone Seattle upon his return to Washington, D. C. for clarification of the remarks. The RA was quite candid, as the following excerpt from the National Impact Coordinator's memorandum shows:

[The RA] stated...he does jealously guard the delegations of authority that have been given to him, and is not favorably inclined to giving these away. This revolves, mainly, around the approval authority for grants as it relates to the Impact program. Dave did stress that he does appreciate the need for headquarters to know certain types of information and feels that he has been responsive. The Seattle RO feels that Impact is a local program requiring local problem analysis and solutions and that it is improper for the RO to interfere with this process until such time as a proposal is submitted for an award at the RO. It is at this point that the RO should act either favorably or negatively toward the issue. (133)

The National Impact Coordinator found that view untenable.

Personally, I don't share this concept and feel that even though crime is a local problem, and local initiative is the key factor in the Impact program, a certain amount of positive-type action on the part of LEAA seems in order for areas where the locals are drifting from the intent of the Impact program.

He saw Portland as a basically "high risk effort" but explained his use of the term meant "immediate rapid pay-off" would not be as evident from Portland as from other Impact programs. He offered three alternative recommendations.

1. Reject outright the evaluation plan and ask for a submission which is more reasonable and responsive to our needs. This would be difficult to do because the evaluation plan, as submitted, is perhaps professionally sound from the point of view of design and concept, although the pay-off will not be forthcoming for a number of years.

2. Set a maximum dollar figure and require a resubmission of the evaluation plan to fit this dollar figure. This seems to be somewhat of an arbitrary mechanism, but I personally feel that adequate evaluation can be obtained on a much reduced funding level.
3. Approve the evaluation plan after modification, clarification and revision of necessary items, and contribute X amount of dollars toward the implementation of the plan. Require the SPA and CAT to raise the additional funds from other sources. (134)

5.7 The Regional Office Review of Portland's Evaluation Plan and the National Institute Reply.

Meanwhile, in Portland and Seattle, the May 23/24 meetings were having a decidedly different effect. And the RA, at least, seemed totally unaware of LEAA headquarters' extreme dissatisfaction with aspects of Portland's proposed evaluation plan. Soon after the second day's sessions, he had forwarded an activities report to LEAA headquarters which included the following statement:

A meeting was held in Portland on May 24, 1973...A very productive exchange of views took place with excellent suggestions offered by MITRE and Dr. Barnes which will all serve to improve the evaluation plan. As a result of this meeting, a revision of the evaluation plan is underway. (135)

The RO's formal review of the Portland Evaluation plan began on July 16, 1973. On August 13, the RO coordinator transmitted a memorandum to the RA titled, "Review of Portland Impact Evaluation Plan." Although it contained a review of the evaluation plan, it went well beyond what one might expect in an objectively written review. It was, in reality, a strong advocacy and justification of the various components of the plan. Perhaps this strategy was necessary since the plan contained many of the features (e.g., the crime and recidivism predictive models, annual statistical surveys, and goal attainment

scaling) LEAA headquarters had opposed during the meetings held in May. The review's final section stated:

In the final analysis, we come down to the very basic issue: LEAA demanded that a goal evaluation be a part of the Impact effort. LEAA did not provide strong guidance on how this should be done since the Impact program was viewed as a local solution to a local problem...Oregon has responded to the challenge with a product which is something more than what we expected. In candor, we cannot fail to uphold our end of the challenge and support this effort. (136)

It concluded with a single recommendation for the LEAA: "Recommend funding by the National Institute in the amount of \$1,116,406 for a two-year period." (137)

The National Institute's newly-appointed director, himself as yet unfamiliar with the details of the Portland situation, assigned the task of responding to the RO's review and recommendation to the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager. His letter to the RA was straightforward. In part, he said:

I remain of the view that funding in the neighborhood of \$1.1 million is not justifiable. Accordingly, my recommendations...are as follows:

1. That the predictive models and associated annual surveys not be supported by the National Institute because of their lack of utility as short-term evaluation tools. That the Regional Office and Portland be encouraged to seek other sources of funding if they feel these predictive models are of sufficient long-term importance.
2. That Portland receive \$194,000 to support one-year funding for the street lighting survey and the case management evaluation, as well as eighteen-month funding for the OLEC Impact evaluation unit.
3. That an additional \$155,000 be set aside and awarded at such time as Portland's Human Resources program and its evaluation plan are approved for evaluation funding. (138)

After a detailed discussion of budget problems and National Institute constraints, he wrote:

Further, upon reading the revised Portland Impact evaluation plan, I found that, in substance, it had not changed from the earlier drafts of last Spring. It is disappointing that there is still so little information available concerning the evaluation of the Human Resources portion of the program, especially since it represents 50 percent of the action money to be used for the Portland Impact program. Hopefully, the development of this portion of the program and its evaluation is moving ahead as swiftly as possible under existing circumstances. When this portion of Portland's Impact program and its evaluation component are complete, we would be willing to consider the additional funding of \$155,000 for its evaluation. (139)

5.8 Emerging Programmatic Problems as the Regional Office Reacts to the Institute's Review

Very likely, the RA would find this letter disconcerting. From his view, it would add to the mounting problems with Portland's Impact program. It seems that in Portland new problems were already surfacing, and old wounds, thought healed, were reopening. The wall of solidarity and amicability demonstrated in May had deteriorated with the passing of summer into a mere reflection of itself by September. The RO coordinator would write in his monthly report:

The Impact program is undergoing a difficult time. Conflicts between various levels of government which have been kept below the surface since the departure of Mrs. (Preston) Welch have begun to emerge once again. Now that the newness of the program has worn off, the extraordinary efforts of the Impact Task Force have slowed up. (140)

Much of the emerging conflict related to evaluation monitoring responsibilities. The OLEC had put in a new monitoring unit which was quite aggressive in carrying out this responsibility toward all OLEC programs. But the Impact Staff did its own monitoring and, according to the RO coordinator, "feels the SPA is getting on its

turf." He believed the problem to be easily solvable but, as he was quick to point out, "it had not been solved and seemed to be blown all out of proportion with all sorts of threats and counter-threats." While the Region had been successful in smoothing over "most of the conflicts," he noted, "they are becoming increasingly regular and more serious."

The RO coordinator believed, though, that it was the matter of evaluation funding which was the major problem. He wrote:

Evaluation is the major problem facing Impact. The SPA, which has been assigned responsibility for evaluation by the Task Force and by the Oregon Legislature for Human Resources, feels that it must have a decision which supports its evaluation concept in order to do the job it has been charged to accomplish. Mr. Cooper has recently been talking about withdrawing from evaluation entirely unless some realistic commitment from LEAA is forthcoming soon. I believe he has substantial support for this position and may well do just that. In any case, if evaluation is going to be done, some action by the Institute is critical, and we need it fast. (141)

With the OLEC director's threat to withdraw from Impact, the RA knew he must act fast. He wrote the director of the National Institute a lengthy letter so that he might "be fully apprised of the impact of these recommendations [made by the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager] in order that we may proceed to a speedy and satisfactory resolution of the long-standing issues and an early fulfillment of LEAA's commitments to Impact...Portland and the State of Oregon."

The body of the RA's letter, though, seemed not very much in disagreement with the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager's recommendations. To the question of short-term utility of the models and the accompanying problems of validation and calibration of them, he reiterated Portland's intention to use quarterly estimates to make "program adjustments and appraisals during the course of the Impact

program." He thought, too, "that the precision required for usefulness [of the models] will not be of the level typically demanded in the physical sciences." (142)

In his report to LEAA headquarters in September 1973, he would communicate more of the urgency of the situation with which he was faced. He wrote of two major concerns:

1. The on-going rumors about LEAA's willingness to deliver on its commitments to the program which result from uncertainties of funding level and duration are unsettling to staff and state. We could benefit from a clear statement and reaffirmation of our national interest.
2. The long-standing problems of the Portland evaluation component have to be resolved in short order. I have been in personal contact with Mr. Caplan on this and am very much heartened by his personal interest in the issues and his willingness to take them up immediately. My discussions with him have and will continue to be on the merits of the case, but I think it important for you to know that the specific issues of quality of that evaluation are matters which the Oregon Legislature, through its Ways and Means Committee, took up directly and insisted upon as a condition of its support, not only of the Impact program but of all state-agency criminal justice activities. If we fail to support an appropriate quality of evaluation, we will face a major crisis. (143)

5.9 Decisions/Reactions/Decisions: A Compromise Position Is Reached

By October 5, 1973, the RA had his answer. The director of the National Institute wrote that the Institute would transfer immediately \$245,802 to the RO for evaluation and would set aside "an additional \$175,000 to be awarded on receipt and review of the Human Resources plan." Table XIV shows the amounts budgeted to features of Portland's evaluation effort and the appropriate time periods the funds were proposed to cover.

TABLE XIV
LIST OF EVALUATION FUNDS AUTHORIZED
FOR PORTLAND'S IMPACT PROGRAM

Impact Evaluation Staff	\$112,000.00 (18 months)
Street Lighting Program	10,000.00 (24 months)
Case Management Program	72,804.00 (1 year)
Travel	17,011.00 (1 year)
Equipment	9,887.00
Supplies & Operating Equipment	<u>24,100.11</u> (1 year)
Total -	\$245,802.00 (1 year)

An additional \$175,000 will be set aside awaiting receipt and review of the Human Resources Plan.

(Source: National Institute Director's Letter to Region X Administrator dated November 20, 1973.)

When news of the National Institute decision reached the OLEC, its director found it totally unacceptable. Immediately, he wrote a memorandum to key members of the Impact Task Force, including the Oregon Attorney General and the Mayor of Portland, saying:

The recommendation of the Institute is unacceptable, both in terms of the level and duration of funding. An evaluation at the level recommended by the Institute could only identify and not explain changes in crime. The annual sample survey could provide information about the changing social and demographic composition of the Portland population, and with the crime and recidivism predictions could help in explaining why crime has changed and whether Impact or some factors influenced the change.

In addition to restoring the funding for these studies, and the consultation necessary to develop them, the Institute must be willing to provide a minimum of two full years of support and to commit funds for the three additional years of the five-year program conditioned on the attainment of the objectives of the evaluation.(144)

Thus, the ball was being bounced back to the Institute for yet another decision. For some time now, the National-Level Evaluation Program Manager had been toying with the idea of setting up a National Level Advisory Board to the Impact program to bring the weight of their experience and objectivity into play in cases such as this one. From the University of Southern California's Social Science Research Institute, Solomon Kobrin was asked to serve on this advisory group. The National-Level Evaluation Program Manager requested he make a site visit to Portland. Professor Kobrin was joined at the meeting by the Deputy Director of the Institute. His report of this visit indicated he "was most favorably impressed with the commitment of the [OLEC] group to high-quality evaluation." However, he questioned "the validity of their position that no evaluation at any level of usefulness is possible short of radical improvement in the state-of-the-art." In speaking to the latter, he wrote, "its limitation is failure to conceptualize fully the component variables required in its construction."

He offered three alternative recommendations for funding-level commitment by the National Institute. The second of these recommendations, calling for separate, half-and-half funding of the prediction models and the supporting annual statistical surveys over a five-year time frame, was the one the Institute would follow. Its decision was communicated to the RA in a letter from the Institute's director, dated November 20, 1973. The funding of the model building project was outlined as follows:

	<u>Institute</u>	<u>Non-Institute</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 1974	\$ 88,350	\$ 88,350	\$176,700
FY 1975	54,000	54,000	108,000
FY 1976	54,000	54,000	108,000
FY 1977	54,000	54,000	108,000
FY 1978	4,000	4,000	8,000
	<u>\$254,350</u>	<u>\$254,350</u>	<u>\$508,700</u>

A compromise position was thus reached and it won the grateful approval of the RA who wrote LEAA headquarters, "the solution seems an excellent one to all parties."⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ It had taken 23 months since the announcement of Impact to settle the question of the evaluation funding level. It remained to be seen how successful this effort would or would not be. Recognizing this point, the Institute's director had included the following statement in his November 20th letter, "Both the Institute and the state and local authorities will be given the right to discontinue funding if satisfactory progress is not made on the developmental efforts."⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

6.0 PROGRAMMATIC PROBLEMS RESURFACE

With the decision made as to what the Institute would fund, in what proportions and over what time periods relative to evaluation, interest could now refocus on program/project activities. One problem the RO faced was possible turnover in the Impact Staff. As early as September 26th, the RO coordinator had written of his concerns over "the continuation of the Impact Staff beyond June 30, 1974." He warned the RA that "this situation must be resolved soon to avoid the loss of good staff members who require more job security than the rumor mill."⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ It was a very real problem. Unless something concrete was decided soon, they could expect wholesale defections from the Impact Staff.

All eight Regional Administrators were invited to Washington, D.C. for a December 14 meeting to discuss Impact program policy and funding issues. One of the unanimous recommendations to come out of that meeting related to continuing support of city Crime Analysis Teams. They listed as a major priority that the LEAA support Crime Analysis Team operations for the full five years of the program. Such a recommendation, the RAs knew, would require additional funding, estimated at \$4-5 million, through January 1977.

6.1 The Problem of Impact Staff Continuation

In the case of Portland, its Impact Staff had responsibility for formulating overall program goals and supporting the preparation and submission of grant proposals from the local criminal justice agencies which qualified for Impact funding. It was an important role in the Impact program; however, once projects and programs were implemented, the Impact Staff role would change. In a regular activities report for January 1974, the RO coordinator reported that the Impact program would soon be moving into its final phase which would cause some re-ordering of Impact Staff responsibilities in that staff efforts

would be directed primarily to team monitoring and reporting. Evaluation responsibilities, on the other hand, would be enlarged in scope as projects became implemented. In Portland, evaluation as well as fiscal monitoring were the responsibilities of the OLEC. It seemed, then, that the Impact Staff, with its highly specialized role in the Portland Impact program, stood in a far more precarious position than other Impact city CATs which were attached to existing agencies or operating units of local, county or state government.

On January 7, 1974, a meeting for all Crime Analysis Team directors was held at Washington, D.C. "to obtain input from the Impact Staffs concerning continuation funding and the final award date of Impact grants."⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ LEAA headquarters was represented by Deputy LEAA Administrators Richard Velde and Charles Work, among others. These men and the LEAA Administrator Donald Santarelli were new appointees to their jobs and they wanted the cities to know of their full support of the Impact program. At the same time, they were very interested in seeing the highly visible demonstration project brought to its completion. With that end in view, they announced a schedule which would see the Impact program virtually completed by December 1976. They proposed to extend city CATs until June 30, 1975.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

On February 5, 1974, the question of how long the LEAA intended to provide funding support to Portland's Impact Staff was communicated in a letter signed by the LEAA Administrator. In part, that letter stated:

LEAA will extend the period of its support of city crime analysis teams through June 30, 1975. The amount of continuation support will depend upon the level of team activity associated with the administration, monitoring and evaluation of on-going Impact-funded projects and will be negotiated individually with each city.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾

For the Impact Staff, this letter assured federal funding support for at least fourteen more months. "The Impact Staff," according to the RO coordinator, "would have liked more but would pretty much settle for what they could get." (151)

6.2 The \$20 Million Ceiling and the Two- Versus Three-Year Funding Cycles

Two issues raised at the January 7 meeting were a source of concern for Portland. They were: (1) the two-year limit on funding with a final submission date for grant applications of September 30, 1974; and (2) the \$20 million limit on each city. With LEAA Deputy Administrator Charles Work presiding, the Portland Impact Staff director asked to be heard. He pointed out that Portland had never been under the impression that the \$20 million included planning. He also stated that the Portland program was based on a three-year design which would complicate the two-year limitations on projects since a subsequent extension of many of the projects would be required in Portland. This would only further complicate their administration of the program. (152)

The \$20 million limitation for each city, according to the National Impact Coordinator, was nothing new and it included all action as well as planning and evaluation funds. Even the RO coordinator thought this to be a new understanding but would write in his trip report covering the one-day meeting:

In any case, Mr. Work indicated that \$160 million was the total LEAA effort and no city was going to get more than \$20 million total. New policy or old, the issue was settled. (153)

It seemed useless to fight the battle of the \$20 million ceiling. Besides, the LEAA Assistant Administrator had defended the \$20 million ceiling on grounds that were to Portland's advantage. "The \$20 million limit on each city is to assure that the slower cities [will] be assured of their fair share." (154) But the other issue, the two-year

versus three-year funding limit, was another problem altogether. Above all, it would affect adversely the funding time frame of the Human Resources package. The city decided it would have to seek some relief from this decision.

6.2.1 The Two-Year Funding Cycle Decision Is Amended

The Impact Task Force met on Monday, February 11, to discuss their strategy. In the wake of the Santarelli letter, The Oregonian reported the next day that "Portland's...Task Force voted to oppose 'outrageous' new federal rules that the Task Force believes will hinder...the effectiveness of the \$20 million crime reduction program here." (155)

The Task Force authorized its co-chairmen to negotiate with the LEAA Administrator in an effort to get the rules modified. Though not himself present for the meeting, Oregon Attorney General Lee Johnson had drafted a letter to Mayor Goldschmidt stating his opinion on the LEAA decision and this letter served as the basis for much of The Oregonian article. Commenting on the funding cycle, Johnson had written:

In particular, it was contemplated that all grants were to be for a three-year period. The effect of the two-year limitation will dramatically limit the amount of funding for a major component of the program with respect to the State Corrections Division and the Children's Services Division.

The Attorney General's letter also noted that there would be comparable effects on programs approved for the city and county as well. Those local governmental bodies had "committed themselves to the projects on the premise there would be three years of funding available." (156)

Behind the scenes, the RO had already begun the necessary negotiations to obtain an exception to the two-year limitation on certain Portland grants. In commenting on the cries of outrage by Task Force members, the RO coordinator had written in his monthly report, "I suspect the cries of outrage are more for press consumption than anything else."⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ The Task Force, though, was very sincere about the focus and direction of its program and had devoted an extraordinary amount of time to developing and implementing it in a manner which they believed best for their city. They considered the LEAA directive more injurious to their program than to that of other cities. The Task Force and community position is best articulated by this excerpt from The Oregonian:

Portland, selected for the program in February 1972, received approval of its comprehensive plan 53 weeks ago, in 1973. Unlike other participants who rushed programs out onto the street, sought annual renewals for those that looked promising and found substitutes for those that failed, Portland (with state and county help) developed a three-year, phased approach requiring careful timing of program implementation by the police, courts and corrections system. The planning involved delicate political agreements on when the city, county and state would pick up the local match totaling \$2 million.

Although LEAA accepted the phased, integrated approach, it has suddenly and with no publicly stated rationale that can be considered adequate, said that no programs will be funded longer than two years--as opposed to three years agreed upon--and that no applications will be accepted after September 30th for either continuing programs or their replacements.

The effect of the order, which is more injurious to the Portland program than to any of the others, is that the various governing units will be asked to pick up costs before any of the programs have had solid evaluation; they are being asked to buy a pig-in-a-poke. In addition, if the order stands, a major rewrite of the program, particularly in the corrections field, will be required.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾

The major issue at hand really involved the corrections projects, most notably the Human Resources package. They had been developed for a three-year time frame and comprised the largest component of the Portland Impact program. The real problem, from the Regional Office's view, lay in a denial made on December 28, 1973, of a request for relief from the two-year grant award period limitation which had been in force since June 1973. That denial had come in a letter signed by the National Impact Coordinator, and on the basis of that denial, the RA had awarded six grants for two years and held up two others since their successful implementation had been predicated on the basis of a three-year time frame. What was needed, then, was the approval of LEAA Deputy Administrator Work to amend the denial issued on December 28th. This would permit six supplemental awards to six corrections projects for a one-year period (January 1-December 31, 1976) and the award to two remaining adult corrections projects for the three-year period (January 1, 1974-December 31, 1976).⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ By March 1 a week later, The Oregonian was able to report that the RA's request had been granted.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The Portland Impact program is now well into its fourth year of existence as this narrative is brought to a conclusion.

As in each of the other city programs, there were special features associated with the Portland effort. To date, the major ones appear to be those listed below.

1. The City/County/State Relationship. The police is the only criminal justice system component controlled by the city. The corrections and courts components are controlled by the county and the state. The city of Portland had to include the county and the state in Impact planning. The Portland program, then, became an experiment in inter-governmental cooperation in planning.
2. The Commitment to "Quality" Evaluation. Even before the announcement of the Impact program, the legislature of the State of Oregon had made an announced commitment to perform "quality" evaluations. Because there was a political acceptance of evaluation as a necessary public policy tool, Oregonians, at all levels of government, were highly accepting of the evaluation aspects of the Impact program. Portland is the only Impact city to receive a five-year funding commitment from the LEAA for a component of its proposed evaluation. The money, \$254,350, will provide 50 percent funding to develop two predictive models and some supporting annual surveys.
3. The Attempt to Plan Beyond the Dimensions of the Criminal Justice System. There were major attempts to include other agencies in their Impact program. With the exception of the renovation of the Kelly Butte facility as part of the Strike Force Project, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. This appears to be, in the main, due to the ex post facto nature of the proffered inclusions. For example, the attempts to involve the Federal Regional Council in the Early Intervention Project were made after the project concept was fully developed, and the city was merely looking for a funding source. Failure may also be due, however, to the intrinsic difficulties of achieving coordination across federal agencies. In any case, the attempts to do "broader vision" planning led to the inclusion of several projects (e.g., Early Intervention), which could not be funded under the Impact program given its narrow scope, and which accounted for delays in getting projects approved and implemented.

4. The Separation of Planning Responsibilities from Evaluation Responsibilities. In Portland, project planning and overall program monitoring were assigned to the Impact Staff while program/project evaluation and fiscal monitoring responsibilities were assigned to the OLEC, the State Planning Agency. (In six of the seven other cities evaluation of the program is conducted by the planning staff proper, who have in-house teams of evaluation analysts.) Although the evaluation designs and reports received thus far from Portland have been slow in coming, they are, for the most part, comprehensive and well conceived.
 5. The "Root Causes" Approach to Crime Control. A basic attitude which permeates Portland's Impact Program is that crime causality can be treated effectively through early intervention in the lives of those individuals most likely to become criminal offenders. This led the Impact Task Force to plan projects and programs which ostensibly would prevent, intervene in, and when too late for the application of either of the former strategies, correct deviant behavioral patterns. This led to an Impact Program focus which eventually would see 67 cents of every Impact dollar put into projects which Portland planners believed would prevent or correct crime problems. The relentless pursuit of this long-term approach led to countless interventions by LEAA headquarters and its National Institute. Those interventions, this case study indicates, led ultimately to an Impact Program falling more generally within the constraints of the LEAA-generated guidelines, while allowing the city an opportunity to develop the kind of program it deemed appropriate to its particular crime problems.
- Clearly, the non-Impact (i.e., non-short-term payoff) character of several projects proposed by Portland for implementation was a primary cause of program delay, and it is in this area that the conflict between the Impact program philosophy and the Portland approach seems most apparent. Impact, a federally-funded action program which addresses specific crime problems and whose effectiveness was to be measured over a defined time period via a quantifiable reduction in targeted crimes, has implicit in its design, the understanding that the specified crimes will be addressed, and that the posited time periods will be adhered to. The Portland stance, on the other hand, called for a "broader vision" planning approach "without regard to funding sources and addressing areas which are not Impact-related." In addition, problems of interagency

coordination, among others, led to further and continuing delays which left Portland with six of its nineteen projects unawarded as of April 1974, and two projects still pending approval by the Regional Office as late as September 1974. A concrete result of implementation delay in the corrections program area is that--as of September 1974--Portland had expended in the corrections program area only \$15,340 (or 0.3 percent) of the \$5.5 million awarded for adult corrections.

8.0 EPILOGUE: AN INTERVIEW WITH THE MAYOR OF PORTLAND, OREGON

As a final (albeit necessarily subjective) overview of the Impact program experience in Portland, the following interview with the Honorable Neil Goldschmidt, Mayor of Portland, Oregon, was taped on June 30, 1975 at the Portland City Hall.

Q: Mayor Goldschmidt, Impact was seen as an experiment in the New Federalism with the cities given a major say in the planning and implementation of the program. In your view, how effectively did intergovernmental relations function in the case of Impact?

A: I think that our best experience in the program was with the Regional Office of LEAA. While it was a new office, Dave Head and Mike Dalich did a super job for us. They tried to help us get decisions in a timely way and basically said, 'Quit looking to us for the answers when it's your program.'

Our experience with national LEAA was not particularly satisfactory in that they changed the rules of the game so many times. By the time we were done, whatever the project's purpose might have been, we just hoped to get our money and get out clean.

On balance, our experience with the state, at the political level, was extraordinary. As you know, the office of mayor in Portland is non-partisan. Although the prior mayor and myself are registered Democrats, Lee Johnson, a Republican Attorney General, managed to establish a working relationship with both of us. The governor, through his executive assistant Bob Davis, kept an active interest in the program. That was really more than I think we had

(A CONT):

a right to hope for at the beginning. I didn't have any expectations one way or the other, but I thought it worked out very well. I do not think the relationships between the state and local institutions ever materialized and I don't think they ever will until the state generally begins to function a little differently with local government. I don't say that as a criticism of the program. I just say that it happens to be the situation in Oregon. Even though I haven't seen much change since that time, I haven't come away from Impact with a sour taste. I do, however, think that some of the opportunities for real state and local cooperation were blown! So, as far as an experiment in New Federalism, Impact turns out to have been six of one and half a dozen of the other.

Q:

As I recall, Mayor Goldschmidt, the Portland Impact program called for a large amount of citizen participation. What was the city's policy toward community involvement in Impact and, in your view, what were the contributions of the Task Force and of the newspapers to the program?

A:

Most people, myself included, think about citizen participation in terms of block meetings and neighborhood association meetings. Now, the staff encouraged proposals from inside and outside the institutions, in order to generate systems change. In some cases, particularly in the juvenile delinquency area, these efforts were really partnerships, and I think that's healthy. But in areas where the crime was occurring, I don't think there was enough community participation for the program to be cost-effective. The whole city was not involved. There was,

(A CONT):

however, an enormous community effort in Model Cities during the original discussions over what the community wanted out of a Youth Diversion Program. There was a lot of discussion about street lighting which the community had, to some degree, been involved in beforehand; there was also a great deal of discussion about the police but, you see, the police were already actively involved in the community. So, while we had quite a lot of citizen involvement, I think the real difficulty lies in the fact that the Task Force and the Impact Staff were not permanent things. They were created for purposes of staying with the planning process and the monitoring process, but over the long term, most people's loyalties or problems or conflicts are tied to the institutions that were already there before Impact came on the scene.

I think we came out of it with some better planning tools which include the community, but not necessarily with a usable model. In that respect maybe we ought to be disappointed, but I didn't have big expectations there.

We did come out with a program which is the Neighborhood Block Crime Prevention Program. This has probably brought us closer to the point of being able to have a community-wide criminal justice planning process. That was derived not only from the literature we got from elsewhere, but from our own experience here in terms of when burglars are apprehended and why, and what kind of benefits are involved in supporting activities that bring neighborhood cohesion. This matters not only in crime repression or prevention, but in the bigger sense of what

(A CONT):

the community feels about itself as an important ingredient in government and how effective government is in general.

As far as the press is concerned, I think we got treated very well. Maybe somebody else has different views about that, but the press was interested. They had a hard time following it because it was very complicated. The task force approves a program and then you file an application with the state and then state sends it to the regional, and then the regional sends it to the national and then somebody says modify it and it's just very hard for the press to capture that kind of information and write it all down.

But there was a great deal of interest, and as far as encouragement -- it was super. If we went in there to talk about an innovative program, they weren't out there slapping our heads for trying. They were really encouraging, I think, at least in my conversations with them.

Our program had a very heavy prevention orientation which was not uniformly received in Washington with great acclaim. It was very well supported here and I think, in some respects, that made us the step-child.

We were willing to work longer to get a coherent package of preinstitutional services and predelinquent behavioral activities, some of which we still haven't been able to get funded. Other proposed projects represented changes in police and corrections and so on, but I think the plan was to try to stick these together.

(A CONT):

It was very difficult to get LEAA to buy into that, and to this day, I wonder if we shouldn't have had our psychiatrists in to examine us all for sanity for having taken a run at it because we really did not get that much local flexibility.

Let me put it this way: it's not to say that we didn't get some programs funded. But there are other projects that, to this day, I think are really good; however, we really didn't have a completely free hand. The target crime concept -- stranger-to-stranger crime -- really did have some serious limitations.

Q:

Impact was aimed at all elements of the criminal justice system in Portland. How would you characterize the role of the police, courts, and corrections in Impact?

A:

Well, the courts were probably the most disappointing because they essentially didn't really generate much in the way of proposals. One proposal came in at the very end from a judge who wanted to do a volunteers-in-probation kind of program. In many respects, I guess we shouldn't be surprised, because, by national standards, our courts are in much better shape than most in terms of backlog and docket problems.

We did not have really strong planning tools in police when the program started and we had to deal with big numbers, big problems, and think on a large scale while trying to develop some creativity in police planning.

A (CONT): Impact probably has really accelerated the rate of normal growth in the police organization by several years. I think there are some people now in the command staff and the bureau who were there before but didn't have the opportunity to work with this sort of a project. They might never have been able to get the exposure to what other people were doing around the country. Exposure to this program showed them choices that could be made here.

While I don't know that all of our programs turned out to be as good as we hoped, I think that the tools our people picked up are something of lasting value and are being used now.

Corrections. I'm almost reluctant to comment about that. They are totally county and state, mostly state, and that's the place where I still think we have the greatest failure in our whole program. I mean, without regard to Federal money, I'm talking about public expenditure-- our focus was on prevention and corrections. We gave a third of the money, maybe more, to corrections. At this point, I don't think anybody has the feeling that the results are going to be correspondingly large, but maybe it's too early to tell.

They are a very old, traditional institution in American society and I have at various other times been close enough as a spectator to see how difficult it is to change prison activities, or adult or juvenile corrections workers' attitudes about their role in relation to other institutions in our lives, or the people they serve.

(A CONT): They aren't any different I suppose than city bureaucrats in that sense except that they just happen to have a very important job in the Impact program. I think, in many respects, our relationship, as I said, is not much improved and I'll just have to wait to see about the programs. But as far as participation and innovative programs are concerned, I don't believe corrections has produced them thus far.

Q: Which of the program areas would you describe as being most successful in relating to the overall Impact goal?

A: I think that the programs that ended up being the strongest are the ones that managed to use community resources better than they did before. The courts didn't really have that much invested in trying to do it. As I said, there really wasn't a lot of effort there, but again you have to understand that maybe they didn't have the expectations from Federal money that others did. They were in better shape than some of the rest. I think that one of the better things that ended up being done that still has a great potential is the Case Management Program which was a delinquency program. I don't know whether the juvenile court has changed for the better or for the worse since then, but I think that the methodology that the program used is going to still be there and work. We're going to have a chance to use it.

As far as police go, in many respects it's too early to tell. You know we started out with a five-year program and three years of money and before we knew it we had a

(A CONT):

two-year program and two years of money and your perspective changes as I said.

I think the police never had gone head-to-head with a group of people on the outside quite the way they did with the political structure and the task force and I don't know whether they think it's better or worse for having done it. I personally think, as I said, that the skills are there, so if you were to pick a place where there's a residue of things that are positive -- that you could use -- it would be prevention and in police. I think then, you have to get down to saying, "Which program?" and I think you could do that. But, I don't have any big claims to make about the institutions themselves.

Going back to federal/state relations, the Impact people gave that up long before we got around to realizing it. They changed administrators many times along the way. I'm not criticizing the federal government for that, per se, because, if people change, then maybe other things are going to change. But you can't criticize the local police people for not believing anybody after a three-year program is reduced to two years. When you're spending all of your time rewriting, there's a tendency to just say, "Buy your hardware and run for the hills."

Q:

A great deal of attention has been directed at the crime reduction goals of 5% and 20%. In your view, how effective has Impact in Portland been in reducing stranger-to-stranger or "fear" crime?

A:

I think we have demonstrated some things that are really worth having done. I think it is worth finding out whether fencing interdiction here is a successful tool. In that sense it's been a successful program. But to some degree, and we knew this was a problem in the beginning, you don't want to claim success if what you've proved is that, if you only had more money you could do more.

I think the crime prevention things that we felt we needed to do in this town because of what we perceived to be our particular problems, were not able to be done in the way we would have liked to have done them. Our first priority, my first priority, was a program to get at behavioral problems of young children who were entered in the grade school system -- children who, in many cases, were in families with other children who would have problems down the road. We wanted to intercept those children and work with them so they didn't end up being burglars.

We were constrained by the way Impact crimes were defined. Therefore, we had to deal with people who already were target offenders. So, essentially, we have a problem between us and LEAA which maybe they didn't feel they could get away from legally and I didn't feel I could get away from politically because of what I see this community to be all about. That is to say, I didn't know whether we could get there or couldn't get there but I didn't object to somebody saying, "Well here's some numbers and this is what we want you to try to do." I don't think we reorganized the city around the numbers, which is the objection that some local government might

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be able to give. You know "the feds made us do this or that." I don't think we did that.

I do think that the survey techniques that LEAA used have been worthwhile for us to look at. They tried to measure real crime and then tried to decide on whether or not -- on the basis of their measurements rather than the FBI-reported statistics -- to see if we made any progress at all. I think that's valuable, but there are so many things beyond the control of both the LEAA folks and ourselves. With problems like the unemployment rate, and the drug problems of people coming back from Vietnam, I don't have any real expectations that we knew for sure that the way we went about the program was right or wrong. It was just the best shot at the time.

I think we got put through a pretty good wringer and in some respects we came out looking stupid because we thought we'd be thorough and sort of steady and careful and wait instead of rushing in and just allocating the funds. Those people who allocated their funds and got them committed early I think did better financially. It's one of those things that comes out in the end but I don't know what more I can say about it.

Q:

One of the original purposes of Impact was to bring about improvement in criminal justice planning capability at the local level. Could you give your assessment of the changes in criminal justice planning and program evaluation in Portland that would be a result of Impact, per se?

A:

I think that the staffs and institutions we have in this community are more sophisticated and maybe more skeptical, which is a good thing. In that respect, I feel that it has been worthwhile. We have not been as successful at institutionalizing some of the successes, but again it's because I kind of feel like we got the rug pulled out from under us a little early. But, I don't want to beat that to death anymore.

I remember sometimes what it was like when we started trying to plan for the program and how little we really knew. I think there's an enormous amount of data now available, but I don't think the institutions are using it anywhere near as effectively as they could right now. Maybe we're closer to getting everybody to share it than we were but I think the verdict is still out on that also.

The state had most of the evaluation money and it's a very expensive, very sophisticated evaluation model. I think the verdict is still out on that as well.

I think one thing I've learned is that I'd be happier with a simpler, less sophisticated, less expensive evaluation model for local government to maintain. We couldn't afford to keep what they had nor did we ever intend to. It may provide us, nationally, with some interesting stuff, but I just don't think it's something that we could carry on.

Q:

Looking back over the past 3-1/2 years of Impact, what has impressed you the least about the program?

A: I've never liked being involved in programs where I don't deliver what I promise. We've been very selective about the competitions we've entered and the work we've done with federal agencies. I think our record on Impact is really spotty. The federal government felt very strongly that we should be involved with the state, because they're the SPA for the planning agency for the state.

They felt it should be a state/city/county relationship with them and it was. But in many respects, it was very cumbersome, very complicated, and tremendously time consuming and I'm not sure whether we've built anything of lasting value. We may have avoided a lot of problems that we would have had otherwise, but I suppose the biggest disappointment is that the innovation that should have come out of this planning effort was not there.

With their financial problems there's a great temptation of local government agencies to use up whatever is offered to them to replace what they can't get from their voters at the polls. There's nothing dishonest about it, but it doesn't necessarily mean that the stated goals or the private goals are always going to be the same.

I think the biggest disappointment is just that we never really had the kind of program that we started out to have. I fought for that for a long time until the slip-page started catching up with me and when LEAA abandoned the program when the elections were over. Those of us here just wanted to get through it. We're still implementing the communications system and it's going to have a long-term lasting benefit to the community. The crime prevention block program, as well, is having value.

(A CONT): I think we could take you through eight or ten programs, but I'm not satisfied with the community attitude about it, its own planning, and how it deals with the federal government.

Q: What changes do you feel have been brought about by Impact that will be permanent? You spoke about that to some degree when you spoke about what would be institutionalized, but I'm asking now in terms of real specifics.

A: I don't know that I can say for sure because you are about a year early. We managed to keep portions of what we were doing in the planning unit going in the criminal justice office of the police. We have managed to keep going the crime prevention program from LEAA block funds, and I hope eventually that we'll see portions, if not all, of that program carried as a general fund program for the city in some form.

I think we have learned some things in the police bureau that are going to be incorporated because they are already using some of the techniques from their strike force operation, without Federal funds, in one of the precincts as a coordinating thing.

You can see on the delinquency side, the Case Management Program. The evaluations I saw looked fairly good, but meanwhile they've changed the method of operation right around in the Case Management Program. They've changed the management of the whole juvenile court and it's a little difficult for me to center in on how much of that is going to survive.

(A CONT):

With corrections, I've just got to draw a blank. I don't have any idea what they are going to do with any of those programs. That doesn't mean they aren't but they get their approval from the state legislature and I just have no feeling at this point as to what they will do. I think that in some of the evaluations we are looking for on target hardening, like the burglary program of the school district and some things like that, it's a little premature for me to say. I've gotten some material on that program today and there isn't an evaluation available, but I suspect some of them are going to be cost-effective.

Q:

The final question is this: if you had to do it over again, what would you do differently?

A:

If I had the emotional energy to sit down and rethink it, or sit down with some of the participants, I might have done it differently. One of the things that concerned me was that the state, city, and county were treated as equal partners. Nobody was really ever in charge. We had the police, the county had the jails, and the state had the corrections system, children's service division, and so on. There was an enormous amount of horse-trading as we call it, and maybe it has to be that way. I guess that's the real world, but it would have been nice, I think, for the city and the people who live here to take more responsibility for the program. It just didn't work out that way.

In terms of what the federal government felt we had to have as a relationship, it was as good as we could have done. It wasn't really an Impact city program. It was

(A CONT):

an Impact city/state/and county program. Again, maybe that's the way it had to be, but the amount of leverage we had over anybody to develop any innovative programs was marginal.

Essentially, we weren't in a position to require too much. I obviously would like to have changed the way we ended up working with the federal government; I thought the regional people were fantastic but they didn't write the rules and they didn't change the administrators, or change their influence and their interests. One administrator says it's a great idea and we're all committed to the program when somebody else comes along and says we'll finish our commitments but that's it, and after that somebody else comes along and says, well, not only that, we're not going to be able to finish some of those commitments those guys made. They just make it damn hard for you to put some of those programs together financially.

On balance, I'm glad we did it and that's something to say. I don't think we wasted the federal government's money. If you go in and look at the amount spent in administering the planning of that program it was peanuts. We really did not try to bilk the federal government. We didn't try to hire people, or try to take care of a lot of local and political hacks or anybody who was unemployed. We spent the money relatively conservatively, I think, and I'm still glad we did. I don't think, in that respect, that any of us feels bad about the experience, but I don't have the feeling that it is going to have the sort of relationship-changing long-term results that we wanted. I don't point the finger at anybody on that, but maybe there's something we could have done differently. Once

(A CONT):

the expectations were made clear that it was going to be a state/city/county program, this is what you get. We gave back what was there. I think it was unique that we managed to stay peaceful as long as we did because I've been in other situations where the three of us weren't nearly as friendly.

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