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WOMAN BECOMES HOSTAGE — Joliet Police Capt. Charles Hamilton, 24, is seen from behind as he talks to Mrs. Monica Golden in Joliet Wednesday. Police trapped Golden, who had previously attempted to rob a jewelry store, and Mrs. Golden, a jewelry store employee, as hostages. Mrs. Golden and Capt. Hamilton were held hostage for about 15 minutes, which ended with Pinkston being shot several times. Mrs. Golden was injured in the foot. Hamilton was not injured.

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
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Your Departmental Plan of Operation Form and Hostage Team Outline 31

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Background:



Any criminal serious about the practice of his profession must constantly review his techniques and his weaponry. From the flim-flam artist to the mass murderer, each has his own methods of achieving his aims. For the violent types there are machine guns and bombs; for the more timid there are deft fingers with which to pick pockets. But there is one weapon in the criminal arsenal which can throw the most complex coloration upon any police response: *the taking of hostages.*

There are over 210 million people in the United States. Every one is a potential hostage. Every serious, violent criminal knows this.

Every police officer serious about the

practice of *his* profession must also be aware of this and have his response mapped out. For the taking of hostages is not confined to New York City and Washington, D.C. It can happen — and has happened — in Augusta, Georgia and Huntsville, Texas.

The tactic has spread like an airborne virus, and it will continue to spread until such time as the forces of law demonstrate conclusively the fruitlessness of the tactic. But with the law always on the defensive, reacting to the latest in criminal fads, there will always be a time lag between the popularization of any such technique and its eventual eradication. The problem is to make that time lag as brief as possible.

Aircraft hijacking, which has much in common with — and is in fact a branch of — hostage taking, thrived until law enforcement officials were able to bring techniques superior to these of the hijackers to bear on the problem. Aircraft hijacking has now been brought well under control.

But the impulse to take hostages has not been similarly controlled for a variety of reasons. In fact, the situation grows worse.

It is the absence of a systematic

method for dealing with a hostage situation which helps to explain this in great part. And this lack is in turn explained by the fact that there is a seemingly infinite number of possible hostage situations.

Hostages can be held in a bank or a prison. They can be trapped in a retail store or a private home. But there are always certain constants, certain unifying characteristics, and it will be by recognizing these and analyzing them that a solution to the problem will come.

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1. The Hostage: Pawn in a deadly game



The taking of hostages is nothing new. For as long as men have been attempting to create order while other men seek chaos, it has been obvious to those opposed to order that at times it works to their advantage to seize others and hold their lives forfeit.

The hostages may be randomly chosen or they may be selected because of certain characteristics, i.e., their sex or their social prominence. Women have historically been considered ideal hostages for several reasons, among them that women are less likely to present a physical threat to the captors. Perhaps more importantly, the cultural predisposition to protect women makes it less likely that any assault which could conceivably result in harm to the hostages would be carried out.

The willingness to use hostages extends wherever the force of law cannot

be preemptively applied. Thus, even in international relations, a field conspicuously marked by the absence of any enforceable law transcending national boundaries, hostages are routinely used in the day-to-day business. If that seems an indefensible proposition, consider for a moment the long standing debate over anti-ballistic missiles — the ABMs. There are in fact devices to remove large urban populations from the status of hostages, which those populations are for as long as they live in cities targeted for nuclear destruction. It is probably correct to state that at this time three quarters of the American population is hostage to long range missiles.

This parallel is not drawn for any capricious reasons: law enforcement officials must realize that in any hostage situation they may encounter, the maneuvering and negotiating which they

will be forced to handle will be roughly analogous to the international diplomacy of the past dozen years. Every miscalculation brings with it the threat of the ultimate disaster befalling the hostages. And to those whose lives are on the line, it matters little whether they die alone, with two others or with 150 million others. The utmost skill is demanded of the police.

And to carry the analogy one step further, the same tools need to be employed in a hostage situation in a rural American town as are employed in the international arena. Concessions must be made. Blustery threats are occasionally called for. Subterfuges may

be woven. But above all, talk must go on. Negotiations must never break down.

Those are the rules. But toward what purpose? That the hostages not be harmed.

This is the ultimate standard by which all actions taken by any law enforcement bodies involved in hostage situations will be judged: were the hostages harmed? If not, the operation was a success.

There is no trick at all to capturing hold up criminals. Sufficient firepower can be brought in any conceivable situation. The trick is in seeing that the hostages come through alive. There is the problem in its essence.

2. Rationale for an Irrational Act

Although hostage taking has always been practiced through recorded history, it has in recent years grown to new worldwide heights. And it is no coincidence that this growth has paralleled the worldwide rise in political unrest. For hostage taking almost by its nature has political overtones not normally present in traditional criminal behavior.

The bank robber of the Willie Sutton stripe has no quarrel with the fundamental arrangements of society. From the great bank robbers to the smallest dip, most criminal behavior is actually marked by a profound agreement with reigning conventions. The bank robber takes money from banks because he concurs with the judgment of the banker that it is a good thing to have money. Once he has sufficient money, he reasons, he too, will live well and entertain, perhaps raise a family. Given the opportunity, the armed robber or the thief is convinced that he would build a life as stable and as tranquil as any. Of course the most cursory study of rates of return figures proves that the likelihood is much greater that the criminal will continue his criminal ways. All his training and his associations incline him

back toward the practice of criminal activities, and just as it is more likely that a salesman who leaves his job will find a new job in sales rather than as a merchant seaman, so it is probable that a criminal will continually gravitate to criminal employment.

But all this does not change the basic fact that most outlaws in fact hold in esteem the values of the society whose laws they violate. Acquisitiveness is an honored trait, and criminals for the most part merely seek to acquire things. According to some, the criminal is simply too lazy to do his acquiring in legitimate ways. A recent conversation with a police chief in a Georgia city captured this analysis.

"Looks like it'll be an easy night for us tonight, boys," he said as his night shift gathered in the squad room. Asked how he could make such a prediction, he marveled at the questioner's innocence: "Did you hear that weather report? It's going down to the thirties tonight. You don't think our crooks down here would go out on a night when it gets down to the thirties, do you?"

But the hostage taker, by the very commission of his crime, announces



KANSAS CITY, POLICE CLOSING IN — Law enforcement officers surround a suburban Overland Park, Kan., apartment building in which two bank robbers took refuge. A Kansas Highway Patrolman, Sgt. Eldon Miller, was killed by shots fired from the apartment. One of the two men in the apartment was shot in the stomach. The robbers set off a dynamite blast at the Overland Park city hall in an apparent diversionary action. While police rushed to the city hall, the two men robbed the bank. [AP Wirephoto].

something which sets him apart radically from other criminals. He tells the world that he is irrevocably setting himself upon a course different from that sailed by his fellow men. He announces that he is willing to execute other human beings whom in all probability he does not know.

He may profess to have no intentions of harming anyone, but his deed announces that he has in fact willed events which could lead to the deaths of his hostages. Even though he convinces himself that he means no harm to the

victims, that he only seeks to attain some end of his own, he actually establishes that his end is of higher priority than the lives of those he holds captive.

This constitutes a political act, a declaration of war against the authorities who govern the world outside that perimeter which he holds secure during the confrontation.

So it is natural that in our highly politicized age there would appear an upsurge in that most highly political crime, hostage taking.

3. Hostage taking at 30,000 feet



If every hostage situation is at least implicitly a revolutionary-political act, many or most are explicitly conceived of as such by the perpetrators, and more develop from simple escape attempts to confrontations couched in revolutionary rhetoric.

Airline hijackings, which, as mentioned earlier, are a narrow branch of the overall hostage problem, were occasionally brought off as straight cash propositions. The famous "D. B. Cooper" case was a classic. In that never-solved incident, a lone man calling himself D. B. Cooper took over a Boeing 727, and ordered the plane to land after instructing airport officials to provide him a large amount of cash and several parachutes. He then ordered the aircraft airborne once more and parachuted out over a forest with his cash prize.

But more and more skyjackings became the route of fugitives seeking to escape to Cuba, or in some cases

Algeria. These were seen as revolutionary states which provide a welcome and asylum to revolutionaries from the U.S.

In fact, neither Cuba nor Algeria was particularly eager to become a haven for American fugitives unstable enough to hijack airliners. The welcome usually consisted of a paddy wagon ride to jail. Leftist governments proved that they were more interested in order than in providing platforms for those whom they perceived to be illiterate crazies.

Despite the cool receptions provided by the revolutionary states, self-styled American revolutionaries continued to indulge in their pastime, and began adding a crass touch: they began demanding money as well as transportation to his ticketed destination.

It quickly became obvious to law enforcement officials that there could no longer be a presumption that everyone boarding an airliner desired transporta-

tion to his ticked destination.

The fad reached worldwide proportions; even the Iron Curtain countries were not immune.

But perhaps the most spectacular incident occurred in the baking deserts of the Mideast. In September 1970, four jetliners were hijacked simultaneously by Palestinian guerillas. One other hijacking was foiled when the El Al pilot put the aircraft into a steep dive, throwing the two hijackers off balance and allowing them to be captured. The captain of that plane, by the way, was acting not to resist the hijackers but to take a lower altitude to minimize the decompressive effect should a bullet penetrate the skin of the craft.

So it was that jetliners belonging to Swissair, TWA and BOAC all put down with their passengers at what had once been a British airfield in the Jordanian desert. Still another airliner, this one a Pan American 747 jumbo jet, was commandeered and flown to Cairo, where it was blown up by the guerillas within minutes after the last passenger had disembarked.

The entire episode was staged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an Arab commando group based in Jordan. It was an utterly political undertaking in that the perpetrators were making no cash demands: their proximate objective was the release of six Arab guerillas held in West Germany and Switzerland for other terrorist activities, and one woman terrorist being held in England. At one point it was reported that the PFLP also was demanding the release of Sirhan Sirhan, the Palestinian-born killer of Robert F. Kennedy. This demand was never confirmed.

The remote objective of the group was of course the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Mideast. This demand for sovereign territory is the ultimate political aim in any revolutionary undertaking. It constitutes

an act of war — which is an important point, for the taking of life then becomes almost an incidental thing, a regrettable by-product of any war.

So a challenge had been thrown down to the political authority of that geographical entity, King Hussein of Jordan. He in effect had the choice of resigning or moving against the commandos. He chose the latter. It was one of the ironies of the September 1970 crisis that none of the hostages whose lives were at issue when the crisis began lost their lives. But within a week, hundreds of others lay dead in Amman, the Jordanian capital, victims of reprisal raids.

Hussein's offensive against the Palestinians was swift, and in the short run, totally successful. Fiercely loyal Bedouin troops fanned out in an offensive that swept away the concrete manifestations of the Palestinian aspirations toward nationhood in Jordan.

Of course, from this conflict — which at one point saw Syrian armor crossing the deserts into Jordan in support of the Palestinians — came the birth of Black September, a group fanatically and totally devoted to the aim of avenging the massive Palestinian defeat.

About 250 Syrian tanks were left behind in Jordan, victims of the Jordanian air force and the desert during the nine-day war. The death toll in the fighting was never established firmly. But it is probably no exaggeration to say that thousands died in what had begun as the capture of three jetliners and their passengers. All three aircraft were blown up by the commandos, a loss of tens of millions of dollars for the insurance underwriters.

Perhaps the most interesting point in all of this was that the PFLP did not, when the chips were down, systematically execute the hostages. The opportunity to do so was certainly there. And there is the possibility that had the

situation been permitted to drag on, executions would have taken place. But Hussein's decisive action apparently was sufficient to convince the commandos that executions would have been to no avail.

So the question arises: what degree of response is called for? Not only must the degree of response be considered, but the timing is obviously an equally important factor. How soon is escalation necessary?

These questions cannot be answered in general terms, for the circumstances in each case can vary substantially. Every case of hostage taking is in effect a

new case. As things stand now, the airliner hijacking method of taking hostages seems a thing of the past. Metal detection devices and X-ray machines have closed down access to aircraft of those who would attempt to board while carrying weapons.

The apparent solution of the problem of skyjacking means only that one area of hostage taking has been closed off. But the passenger who is now reasonably secure against being taken hostage while at 35,000 feet is still vulnerable at ground level. Anyone at all is a potential victim of hostage takers.

4. The hostage taker as a revolutionary



Following the spectacular Palestinian operation of 1970, skyjacking became less and less popular. The introduction of sky marshals riding shotgun on airliners showed the U.S. Government's concern and disposition to deal with the problem, and the eventual introduction of technological screening has more or less ended that era. Just one year later, however, there began one of the most instructive hostage sagas ever: the Attica revolt.

Attica State Prison is nestled in the rolling countryside of upstate New York, just an hour or so from Buffalo. Inside the walls were 2,250 prisoners — three fourths of whom were black or Puerto Rican. Watching over the prisoners were 383 guards — all of whom were white.

Without conceding the correctness of their position one way or another, it is possible to state objectively that the prisoners saw themselves as victims of a racist society. The position they were in seemed remediable only by a revolutionary act. Their argument of course was that they wanted justice, but that "The System" denied it to them.

Therefore, they were forced into an *anti*-system, that is, revolutionary, position. The one factor left out of the calculation of course is the crime that landed each individual in Attica in the first place.

The confrontation was purely political with strong racial implications, although a few of the rebellious inmates were white. Even so, the demands submitted by the inmates were generally geared to blacks' complaints. Among the 30 demands made initially was one asking for "freedom of religion" so that Black Muslims could worship in their own way. Others were of a more general nature, including such items as demands for grievance procedures for prisoners with complaints. One after-thought called for free, speedy, and safe transportation out of confinement to a "non-imperialist" country. Other initial demands were for an end to mail censorship, the right to communicate with anyone they wished, the right to hold political meetings, and other similar items.

Russell G. Oswald, Corrections Commissioner for the State of New York, called the demands "unalar-

ming," and immediately agreed to grant 28 of the 30.

Oswald's role in the entire episode was to come under criticism from the townspeople of Attica, most of whom were personally connected in one way or another with prison personnel. Oswald was known as a progressive prison official, and had won recognition within his field for innovations he had in-

which two guards were taken hostage. Mandel immediately told the prisoners "I've shown good faith by coming here, now you show your good faith by releasing them. If you don't, I'm leaving." The hostages were released within 20 minutes, after which the inmates recited their grievances to the governor.

Obviously, as must be stressed time



DALLAS, Tex. — *HOSTAGES FREED* — Patrons of the Inner Circle Lounge in Dallas, Tex. who were held hostage by two teen-age gunmen for over 12 hours are led from the scene by police officers after they were freed. Man in photo at right wearing cap is a Dallas Police Department detective. No one was injured in the seizure.

troduced to the Wisconsin prison system.

In contrast to Oswald stood Vincent Mancusi, warden at Attica, who was known as a disciplinarian. But above both men stood the Governor, Nelson A. Rockefeller. During the course of the four-day standoff at the prison, inmates demanded the Governor appear to take a part in the negotiations. He never complied.

Whether Rockefeller's presence could have averted bloodshed is a question which can never be answered, but some critics of his handling point to a similar incident that took place in Maryland the previous February.

There, Governor Marvin Mandel was called to the scene of a prison uprising in

and again, no two situations are identical. The Attica uprising had more of an explosive quality to it from the outset. But the Attica uprising was bungled incredibly, even given all the difficult circumstances.

The classical approach would have been to use force immediately, before the prisoners had a chance to consolidate their position. Oswald originally had indicated that no negotiations would begin until the hostages were released, but he quickly backed down from that position.

For four days the situation was allowed to deteriorate, even after one of the hostages was thrown to his death from a prison window. But the most incredible bungle of all was the decision

permitting a gaggle of outsiders including New York Times columnist Tom Wicker, radical-lib lawyer William Kunstler, Congressman Herman Badillo and others to enter into negotiations.

By permitting outsiders such as these, whom the inmates know they could manipulate, to enter the conversations, the rebellious inmates were encouraged to believe that they had a chance of achieving their goals. Black Panther leader Bobby Seals also made the scene, and though he was originally denied access to the inmates, when they learned of his arrival, the inmates refused to continue the discussions until permitted to speak to him.

Eventually, about 30 intermediaries were circulating around the Attica compound held by the prisoners. The prisoners used the time to construct trenches designed to impede any assault that might be in the offing.

Outsiders poured into the small town of 2,900 people to demonstrate in behalf of the inmates. At one point Lawyer Kunstler was reported to have told the convicts to hold out, claiming representatives of the Third World were beyond the gates, demonstrating in support of the revolt. Kunstler later denied having conveyed such a message to the rebels.

The point is not so much whether Kunstler or Seale said such and such or this and that. It is rather that they were allowed — and that the others were allowed — to approach the site at all. Attica was a circus for the four days in which the hostages were held. The bloody final outcome was just about guaranteed.

During the siege, the FBI became concerned lest such seizures spread. Sharing the bureau's concern, the 390 guards at New York's Greenhaven... correctional Facility submitted a letter to New York authorities demanding stern and timely measures be taken to quell any such uprising there — even if

they were held hostage and their own lives were threatened.

But Rockefeller and Oswald had forever traded away the opportunity for taking timely measures. After four days, negotiations were still at an impasse.

Interestingly enough, Theodore Kheel, the labor negotiator, pointed out that Oswald's quick acceptance of all but two of the rebellious convicts' demands probably hampered prospects for a settlement. By accepting all but the inmates' demands that Mancusi be fired and amnesty be granted, Kheel contended that the convicts found Oswald's ready acceptance "too good to be believed." They feared his promises were simply a ruse aimed at securing the release of the hostages, and that once the hostages were safe, the promises would be broken. Kheel also contends that "It would have been a mistake for the governor to negotiate with them face to face; but if he had come, it would have given the concessions credibility."

Finally, on the Monday morning four days after the rioting inmates had taken the hostages, the affair moved to its conclusion. Assault helicopters began moving in, ready for a gas drop. About 500 well-armed and flak-jacketed state policemen stood by at the ready. One last effort at negotiation took place at about 8:30 a.m. Again the prisoners demanded Mancusi's dismissal and complete amnesty for actions committed during the four-day standoff. Authorities again called for release of the 28 hostages.

With the inmates' refusal to comply, the helicopters moved in to make their run. Canisters of CS gas were dropped in the prison yard. The troopers moved in.

It was over in minutes. When the firing ceased, 35 men lay dead, 26 inmates and nine hostages. But interestingly enough, four other inmates were found dead of stab wounds — victims of squabbles from the past four days. And on the other hand, none of the

hostages were executed during the brief battle that morning; all the dead guards had been hit by police bullets. Several of the surviving guards reported that convicts had been armed with knives at their throats, ready to kill should an assault take place. But when the moment of truth arrived, apparently none of the inmates was able to complete his assignment. One guard reportedly suffered a slash wound on the neck, but it was superficial.

This last point deserves notice. The convicts already demonstrated their willingness to kill; the dead guard pushed from the window and the four dead inmates prove this conclusively. But in the final analysis, the prisoners were unable to commit wholesale slaughter. No fully satisfactory explanation is possible, but some of the speculation as to what prevented the prisoners from killing their hostages centers around these considerations: 1) When the final assault came, the outcome was obvious to all, and no purpose could have been served by killing the hostages; 2) During that assault, each man in the yard was primarily concerned with his own safety and sufficiently distracted to bother killing his assigned hostage; 3) That the inmates still carried within them a conditioned respect for the guards who had been for so long symbols of authority; and 4) That a bond had actually developed between the inmates and their hostages during the four-day period.

That last point is one of the more fascinating and recurrent themes in hostage situations, but it is not necessarily present in every case. When present, it can be recognized and utilized.

Almost exactly one year later there occurred in Munich one of the most gripping hostage-taking incidents of all time. With the world's attention focused on Munich, site of the 1972 Olympic games, Black September, the com-

mando group formed in the wreckage of the 1970 desert war between Palestinians and Hussein's army, took the opportunity to invade the Olympic village. Dressed in athletes' garb, eight guerrillas climbed the fence and made their way to the Israeli team's apartments. They immediately killed two members of the team, then took nine more hostages.

For 20 hours the incident progressed — with live television coverage beamed out to a shocked world.

The area was cordoned off and a command center was set up 220 yards from the apartment where the hostages were held. Then began the long, and ultimately unsuccessful ordeal of negotiations.

As had been the case in previous incidents, the Arab commandos demanded the release from Israeli prisons of a number of Arab prisoners — this time 200, plus two German leftists being held in Germany and one Japanese imprisoned in Israel. Officials were told that they had until noon to respond, at which time the hostages would be executed at the rate of two every half hour. The Germans relayed the demands to Israel, where it was quickly decided that there would be no concessions to the terrorists. The Germans later contended that the athletes' fate was sealed at that point.

Israel also notified Germany that Germany had full responsibility for any rescue attempt, adding that they would not object to the Germans granting safe passage to the Arabs provided that ironclad guarantees of the hostages' safety were received in return.

Although the commandos had already demonstrated their willingness to kill by slaying the two men earlier that day, they began to show signs of softening (perhaps the mysterious bond was developing) when they agreed to extend their execution deadline. They did this a total of four times during the course of

the day.

Eventually the German Interior Minister and the Arabs reached an agreement whereby commandos and hostages would all be taken to Furstenfeldbruck, a German airbase just outside Munich, where they would then be given transportation to Cairo, Egypt. Actually, the Germans had no way of fulfilling the offer since no aircrew could be found willing to fly the group out of the country.

They left the Olympic village by bus, which took them to an emergency helicopter pad nearby. There they boarded two helicopters for the flight to Furstenfeldbruck, where five sharpshooters awaited their arrival.

The wisdom of the German authorities' decision to have only five such marksmen has been questioned in light of the fact that there were eight commandos to be taken out. In the recriminations that were to follow, both Germans and Israelis hurled charges and countercharges of bungling.

There is undoubtedly a case to make that the affair was bungled. The results speak for themselves: as the Arabs moved about their effort to cut down the eight, but after an hour, all nine hostages were dead along with five of the terrorists.

When the firing began, one of the commandos tossed a grenade into a helicopter holding one group of hostages; the rest were machine-gunned by their captors.

There is an interesting contrast to be noted between the different response of the Attica inmates to that of the Black Septemberists: when faced with certain defeat in the form of an all out assault by police, the Attica inmates could not or did not choose to execute any hostages. The Arabs, however, showed no mercy; even with their hands full trying to ward off an attack, they still took the time to claim every hostage's life.

The question, of course, is: how can it

be known ahead of time whether the captors will actually kill their hostages? The answer is that it can never be predicted with certainty.

But it must be recalled that the captors are — even though they have willed the sequence of events which could result in the hostage(s) death — at least as interested in keeping the captives alive as are the police. The reason, obviously, is that as long as the hostages are safe, the hostage taker has bargaining power. If he loses his captives by death or escape, he is without leverage, and stands a good chance of being shot down.

In a hopeless situation, such as a shootout with superior firepower, the hostage taker can gain no advantage by killing hostages. Once the decision has been made to end a hostage stalemate by force, there can be only one outcome — and all parties to the situation know this ahead of time. The normal reaction of normal men is to shield themselves further punishment by sparing the hostages' lives.

Of course it could be pointed out that in the absence of a death penalty, further punishment may not be at issue. Someone already facing life imprisonment is not likely to be deterred by the likelihood of another life term. But there are such things as paroles and preferential treatment which could conceivably be forfeited by any executions. So there are many considerations which go into the final decision which the hostage holder must make. And then again there is the question: is this particular hostage holder rational right now?

The best way to ascertain the state of mind of the hostage-taker is, obviously, by talking to him. This point cannot be emphasized too much: KEEP THE CONVERSATION GOING. For many reasons which will be touched upon throughout, the lines of communications must not be severed.

5. Modus Operandi of the Hostage Taker

Attempting to evaluate the intentions and the reasonableness of any hostage taker is a chancey proposition at best. It's sometimes thought stylish to analyze minds and establish neat little categories for individuals and to declare that the hostage taker has certain characteristics in common with other hostage takers.

For example, Dr. David G. Hubbard, a psychiatrist, asserts that almost all terrorists are paranoid schizophrenics with overt suicidal tendencies. "To this kind of mentality, death is not the ultimate punishment; it is the ultimate reward," says Hubbard. In commenting on the Munich massacre, he faulted German police authorities for not dragging the situation out longer. "Had they any experience in these things, they would have known that the terrorists did not sleep the night before the event. These types never do." Hubbard asserted.

In fact, it is impossible to know with

any certainty whether or not a particular terrorist had eight hours in the rack or paced the floor the night before his escapade. A recent hostage situation in the Federal Courthouse in Washington, D.C., provides some insight into the problem of trying to generalize about such situations.

According to John Russell, Public Information Officer from the Justice Department, who participated in the entire 104 hour ordeal, one of the most maddening aspects of the situation was the ability of one of the hostage holders, Frank Gorham, to take a 10-minute nap and wake up completely refreshed and capable of 10 more hours of tough negotiating.

"The man was an amazing physical specimen," Russell reported. So there can be no guarantee that hostage takers will eventually be worn down sufficiently by protracted talks to enable law enforcement forces to just walk in and end



Carrasco, Rosa: Killing as an occupational hazard

the situation.

Too, it has become commonplace to dismiss hostage takers as "losers" who crave attention so that they may repair their egos. But Fred Gomez Carrasco, whose life ended in August, 1974 as he made his way from the state penitentiary in Huntsville, Texas, behind a shield of hostages, was allegedly the head of an \$840,000-a-year drug smuggling business before he took a fall for assault with intent to kill. He had also boasted of killing 47 men during his crime career. A vicious murderer and a drug pusher, yes, but Gomez Carrasco could hardly be labeled a loser.

"I'm not the type of man who can live behind bars," Gomez was quoted as saying. And the probable truth is that it was precisely that which motivated him to seize 15 hostages with the help of two other inmates at the Huntsville institution. There is no reason whatsoever to suspect that Gomez was seeking to build his ego by calling attention to his plight. The man wanted to get out of prison and go to Cuba (if Fidel Castro would have him), an eminently reasonable thing for him.

Nevertheless, some rather provocative conclusions have been drawn concerning the hostage taker. One recent attempt to analyze hostage takers contended that the terrorist does not take his victims in order to achieve some goal; rather, he dreams up a goal in order to take hostages. The taking of hostages is the end, instead of a means to an end, according to this analysis.

Now the point is not that this is always incorrect; it is not. It may be true, in certain cases, that a hostage taker is merely using a pretext in order to take his hostages and stage a production for the world to see. He may just want to cut through the complexities of life in one stroke. But often enough, as with Gomez Carrasco, there is a genuine effort made to achieve some highly reasonable aim, e.g., the freeing of one's self from the

dismal prospect of a lifetime behind bars.

Thus in dealing with a hostage holder, one of the first things to do is to arrive at an evaluation of the level of competence he displays. The entire strategy to be employed will depend largely upon this appraisal.

Highly intelligent hostage holders acting in rational manner present perhaps the greatest challenge to law enforcement officials. Those of lesser intelligence, or those who show indications of frenzied behavior, can be duped into giving up their advantages — that is, their hostages.

The Washington, D.C., courthouse drama showed how imaginative solutions can be applied in a tight situation.

In that case, two armed prisoners held seven hostages for four and a half days until a key was smuggled inside a sanitary napkin, enabling the hostages to open a locked elevator and escape from the basement in which they had been held.

That particular case was a complete success, in that, in the words of John Russell, "We started out with two givens: there were seven live hostages and they were going to stay that way, and the two prisoners were not going to go anywhere. And that's exactly the way it worked out."

To complicate the situation, there was a tremendous jurisdictional problem at the D.C. courthouse.

"U.S. marshals, D.C. police, there was a great problem with overlapping jurisdictions at the outset," Russell pointed out. But the problems didn't stop there.

"One of the problems," according to Russell, "is you have an awful lot of suggestions coming in from the community. We had experts coming in from Attica even — someone from Attica who had been involved in the takeover up there; he wanted to talk to the prisoners. And you can't have too many hangers-on

'A pillar of the community' 'A very stable person'

That's how friends and relatives described 44-year old Napoleon Lechoco Sr., a country law clerk and president of his community's civic association. These comments were elicited shortly after Lechoco, armed with a gun, burst into the Philippine embassy in Washington, D.C. and took the Philippine ambassador hostage.

Lechoco barricaded himself in the ambassador's office, tying up and gagging the ambassador and holding a gun on a wounded attaché. He was driven to hostage-taking in a desperate attempt to gain an exit visa for his son to come to the U.S. from the Philippines.

A negotiating team was rushed to the scene and set up telephone communications to hear Lechoco's demands. Outside, D.C. police in flak jackets, Secret Service and FBI agents surrounded the embassy's grounds.

Ten hours later, after assurances that his son had been put on a plane for the U.S. Lechoco surrendered.

In retrospect, many found it hard to believe that such a mild-mannered father of seven, as Napoleon Lechoco could have committed such a potentially violent act. But it serves to emphasize the fact, that **anyone** at **anytime**, **anywhere** in the U.S. harbours the potential to take hostages.

getting into the act.

"It's got to be kept on a professional level. After a while, we had politicians running for office in the primaries coming down giving speeches on the steps. People running for the city council, that sort of thing," Russell reported.

The mother and a sister of one of the convicts also complicated matters on the scene. Commenting on that aspect of the negotiations, Dr. Harvey Schlossberg, a New York City detective with a degree in clinical psychology said: "The Washington police did an excellent job, but I imagine that having the mother complaining that her son was framed incited rather than calmed the situation."

Schlossberg also noted that he was not surprised at the outcome of the D.C. incident.

"Their demands weren't direct," Schlossberg pointed out. "They started talking about radio and TV time. If they had meant business, they'd have

demanding an airplane and stuck to it."

But the point to be observed in the case was not that the two hostage holders were insufficiently serious about their objective — even if they did waver during the negotiations — but that the police and the hostages were able to improvise a plan based upon a correct evaluation of the competence of the two convicts.

One interesting sidelight involves the fact that one of the hostages, a U.S. marshal, later revealed that he'd had the opportunity at one point to seize one of the convicts' guns and, in his opinion, kill both men. Some observers suggested that his not doing so thereby constituted a grave dereliction on his part. "Not so," said John Russell.

"It's easy to second-guess," Russell acknowledged, "but you have to look at the outcome: everyone lived. Had he started shooting, some combination of convicts and hostages would possibly have died. No, it's much better that things worked out the way they did."



SANTO DOMINGO, D.R. — POLICE CLOSE IN ON KIDNAP SITE — Dominican police close in on Venezuelan Consulate office in Santo Domingo, where Barbara Hutchison, director of the U.S. Information Service in Santo Domingo, was a captive. Her captors demanded a \$1 million ransom from the United States and the release by the Dominican government of 37 political prisoners.



CHILD HOSTAGE FREED — Three-year-old Ricicia Scott is carried out of the housing project she lives in by her aunt Ramona Scott, in Brooklyn, New York. Ricicia and her mother Brenda Scott were held hostage by Ricardo Washington for several hours before police persuaded him to release them and give himself up.



The New York Police Department Hostage Negotiating Team:

A model for the nation

Within two weeks of the Munich Olympics killings, the New York City Police Department moved to meet the threat on an organized basis. On September 22, 1972, the department issued a document entitled, "Recommended Guidelines, Incidents Involving Hostages."

The foreword to that document states that "each occurrence has its own characteristics and solutions, and therefore summary action at the scene should be *flexible* (emphasis in original)." It is difficult to draw up standard procedures for a step by step handling of each situation. However, based on similarities which do exist, recommended procedures are presented here for use as a guide in

such situations.

Those words must be emphasized: *there is no such thing as a cut and dried response to the seizure of hostages.*

All during the fall of 1972, the N.Y.P.D. was busy setting up its Hostage Negotiating Team. Instrumental in that effort was Dr. Harvey Schlossberg, whose comments on the Washington, D.C., episode were reported earlier.

Schlossberg is recognized as an expert on hostage response situations. He is the author of the book, *Psychologist With a Gun*. A patrolman for 13 years, Schlossberg now runs New York's hostage unit.

Within two weeks of the completion of the first hostage negotiations course, the new graduates were given their first stiff



BANK HOSTAGES RELEASED — A woman shouting hysterically and a man carrying an umbrella leave the Chase Manhattan Bank branch in Harlem, New York, after they were released by bandits who police said held a total of about 20 hostages in the bank before surrendering.

test. Brooklyn police interrupted a holdup in progress at a sporting goods establishment. The four holdup men immediately seized 11 hostages and settled in for a long siege.

With large quantities of arms and ammunition taken from stock in the store, the holdup men were in excellent position to drive a hard bargain. They shot one policeman to death at the outset, thus giving ample proof of their willingness to kill.

According to press reports, Schlossberg sensed that the bandits were more concerned with survival than with slugging it out to the death. He sent in a walkie-talkie and began a prolonged dialogue.

After 48 hours, the hostages broke through a plasterboard wall and escaped through a concealed stairway.

"We got lots of praise, but our big secret really was that we did absolutely

nothing," Schlossberg noted. "By waiting it out and talking to them, we gained time. Their alertness relaxed and they fell for the ruse."

Despite that incident to the contrary, Schlossberg is one of those who contends that hostage-takers can be typed. According to Schlossberg, "These criminals are really what we call inadequate personalities — people unable to compete in, or succeed at anything in our society."

Furthermore, he contends, "Most hostage situations are fancy suicide attempts. But these criminals feel so inadequate, that they can't even commit suicide. So they trigger a police assault to get the cops to do the job."

The important point to note is that Schlossberg, with his acknowledged competence in the field, can make such a generalization about suicidal tendencies, yet still is alert to recognize individual

characteristics in each case. He consequently was able to discern, in the Brooklyn siege, the eagerness to survive on the part of those particular hostage-takers.

So general rules must be used as tools in evaluating particular situations. To say that most hostage holders are seeking their own death does not mean that police proceed on the assumption that any hostage-holder is intent upon his own destruction. It is the function of those in communication with the hostage holder to delve into his mind, to read between the lines in an effort to best evaluate his intentions.

This problem can rarely be approached directly. Ask a hostage holder what he means to accomplish, and most likely the answer will have very little to do with reality. Whatever the response, however, the words will convey meaning. Upon the correct interpretation of the words, the entire outcome of the situation may depend.

Obviously, not every police force can afford to have its own expert — especially one with Schlossberg's combination of academic training and actual experience on the beat. Nor can each police force have a special Hostage Unit set up to deal with only that particular type of oc-

currence. (New York City experiences about 400 such situations each year.)

But every force should have a game plan to be used should the necessity arise.

The N.Y.P.D. Hostage Negotiating Team consists of about 70 men at present. These 70 were chosen after intensive screening of 500 applicants. A small city might require a team consisting of as few as three men designated to take charge at the scene of an incident involving hostages. The main consideration is that there be someone capable of directing the activities of the forces in the field — based upon competent evaluation of the progress of negotiations.

In the hypothetical small city with a three-man hostage team, if a bank robbery in progress were to deteriorate into a hostage situation with bandits and victims trapped inside the building, one of the three-man unit would immediately take over negotiating responsibility, the second man would assume tactical command over police forces, while the third might be responsible for overall strategy. The point to be made here is not so much that these functions must be broken down in such a manner, but rather that each team member goes into action knowing exactly what he must do.

7. Planning, preparation and implementation of methods to deal with the hostage situation

The NYPD *Guidelines for Incidents Involving Hostages* divides such situations into three phases: Phase I, Location of Incident; Phase II, Transit from Scene; and Phase III, Arrival at Destination. Obviously not all incidents will progress through the three stages; some will never get beyond Phase I. But it is sound planning to be prepared to cope with all three phases should they arise.

A previously designated officer (in New York the Patrol Borough Commander; in a small city it could be a member of the hostage negotiating team) assumes duties as field commander. Again, the important point is that the field commander

take charge, and that all forces on the scene are made aware of this. In no way is the chain of command violated. The field commander is properly designated by the force's highest authority prior to the occurrence of the incident.

The field commander should provide for the containment of the perpetrators with whatever unit he has at the scene. The area should be sealed off and all civilians evacuated from the scene. When police lines are established, contact with the hostage holders should be initiated.

At this point, Phase I has been enacted and the situation stabilized for the time being. This time should be used for

consultations with the commanding officer, be he commissioner or chief of police. The main concerns now are what avenues of action are open.

By now the importance of flexibility in response should be obvious. Should the police become locked into a particular solution, the results could be disastrous. So contingency plans must be made during this relatively stable point in the crisis. Such and such will be done if the perpetrators do this; if they do that, then thus and so much be considered. Along with this flexibility goes the obligation not to over-react in Phase I.

Again, there are no such things as rigid guidelines. The duration of Phase I has to be taken into consideration. The Gomez Carrasco shootout in Huntsville occurred during Phase I. Did the police over-react? Exactly what happened?

In that case, nine days had elapsed when the convicts and their hostages finally emerged. That fact in itself constituted an alarming indication of Gomez Carrasco's seriousness. Proceeding behind a shield constructed of blackboards, the convicts and the hostages had made it half way to a waiting truck in which they were to leave the Phase I site. Then police turned on the water hoses. The convicts began firing, killing two hostages, then themselves.

But according to the NYPD guide, use of the hoses was probably not justified. "Do not over-react in Phase I," says the manual, "since the possibility of apprehension still may appear during Phase II or Phase III."

However, no amount of second guessing is called for, since deaths of hostages can occur at any stage — witness the Israeli athletes dying in Munich during Phase III.

The exact procedures to be followed during the course of Phase I will vary depending upon the size of the police force having jurisdiction. A small town force will obviously bring fewer policemen to any such scene that would

the NYPD. But certain rules can be followed by all.

Billets useful to the field commander would include those of 1) operational aide, and 2) administrative aide, both of whom should report to the field commander.

With the area cordoned off, the operational aide should set up a temporary headquarters, coordinate assignments of off-duty personnel arriving on the scene and assign units as necessary.

The administrative aide should supervise the temporary headquarters and maintain a record of operations and units on the scene.

Patrol personnel on hand have the primary responsibility of containing the perpetrators, and, as soon as the situation is stabilized, yielding their positions to specialized units if available and applicable. These specialized units could consist of assault teams with flak vests, high powered rifles, sharpshooting teams, etc. If and when such specialized units arrive, patrol personnel should holster their weapons and take up standby positions. Their orders would come to them via the operational aide. Any order to fire weapons should be made only by the field commander.

One of the biggest problem areas in any hostage situation is likely to be communications. Walkie-talkies should be available for use by the field commander, his operational and administrative aides and selected tactical personnel such as assault team leaders and senior patrol personnel. Since all communications should take place on a single frequency, strict net discipline is a must. Communications should originate with the operational aide in the form of orders or requests for updating information. Subordinates should initiate communications only when absolutely necessary.

Communications with the perpetrators may be set up in any of several ways: telephone lines left open; walkie-talkies sent

in set on frequency not being used by police; written notes; or even face-to-face verbal exchanges. In one recent episode in New York, a hostage negotiator spent hours with a .357 Magnum pointed at his head while he talked. Eventually, the criminal, who had just killed his brother-in-law and was keeping the dead man's 5-year-old girl hostage, gave up.

So communication both among police and between a negotiator and the hostage holders must be swiftly established and maintained. The talks will possibly break down, and this normally means that the hostage taker is trying to come to some sort of decision. Communications must never be broken off by the police.

In addition to verbal communications, a line will have to be established for access to and from the setting. Food, and in some cases, medical supplies will enter the site through this line. In most cases this line will be insufficient for use as an avenue from which to mount any attack. It will normally be more fruitful to consider other junctures, usually in Phase II or Phase III, to initiate an assault.

Other personnel on hand in a hostage situation will vary from case to case. Medical personnel with an ambulance should be standing by throughout.

In the case of a bank robbery which has developed into a hostage holding, the FBI will be called in (a standard procedure, but the field commander should be sure that it has been done). Also, should the hostage takers announce their intention of proceeding to an airport (should the initial setting not call for the FBI), the Bureau must be called in. Too, if political hostages or diplomats are involved, notify the Bureau.

Should the situation progress to Phase II, steps must be taken to contain the convoy while en route. Again, the exact procedures will vary with circumstances: for example, is there a helicopter available for en route surveillance? Have the hostage takers demanded that they be

allowed to drive the escape vehicle(s)?

Preparations and contingency plans for use during Phase II should be worked out in some detail (always allowing for flexibility) during Phase I. The normal length of the Phase I environment gives sufficient time for such plans to be prepared.

Of course one of the priorities in any conceivable situation, be it in a large city or rural town, is the clearing of the agreed-upon escape convoy route.

The New York procedures call for a detective to be assigned as operator of the vehicle to be used by the hostage takers.. This vehicle may or may not be bugged and taped, and, another important option available, it may carry a hidden gun.

When there is more than one hostage taker the criminals will most likely seek to exclude any outside driver during the negotiations. And since the driver becomes, in effect, a new hostage, there is no particular advantage in pressing to allow a detective to drive.


As soon as a destination — usually an airport — is agreed upon, one member of the team, possibly the administrative aide, should assign to another the job of preparing the destination for the arrival of the convoy.

First, an assault team must be rushed to the destination. If negotiators decide to permit a transit to a new site, such as an airport, the decision should be withheld (provided it does not endanger the lives of the hostages) from the hostage takers until the new site can be secured and staked out by the assault team. The obvious negotiating tactic would be, "We have to go higher up before we can give an affirmative answer to that request."

Personnel assigned to escort vehicles during Phase II must be briefed beforehand and kept informed by radio communications throughout the transit. The criminals have left their safe environment and are quite likely to be extremely edgy during this phase. It is a

Chain of Command for hostage team

For Police Departments



point of great danger for the hostages, and care must be taken to avoid creating any situation in which the hostage takers are likely to begin killing. A stray vehicle coming on to the route because of faulty work in closing it off beforehand could be interpreted as a police trick. It is absolutely essential that Phase II be carried off smoothly, without a hitch.

One unit of suitably armed and flak-jacketed officers should accompany the escape convoy. Ideally this could be an assault team trained for such action, but

manpower levels of the force may prevent this. In any event, this one unit must be assigned the job of controlling en route firepower. They should be under direct command of the field commander — who will be accompanying the convoy.

When he leaves the Phase I site, the field commander should turn over control of that site to a detective who will then supervise the investigation and securing of the situation.

Phase III begins with the establishing of positions at the destination. This

should be accomplished as far in advance of the arrival of the convoy as possible.

Much of what took place at the initial site will be duplicated at the destination. New units on the scene have to be instructed to withhold their firepower. Conditions may again become fixed.

If the situation does become static, the negotiator's skill will again be put to the test. Should the hostage takers demand an aircraft, there are any number of delaying ploys: no aircraft on hand with sufficient range to reach proposed destination; no aircrew available checked out for trans-Atlantic (or whatever) runs; charts and approach procedures for the proposed journey being rounded up. Any delay works in favor of the police.

It can also be decided that no alternative exists (based on the particular situation) to attempting to pick off the criminals with highpowered weapons. This will of course depend upon many factors, such as the number of targets, etc. But if it is decided upon, it is of primary importance that the initial volley be decisive. In Munich, the decision to attempt to hit eight commandos using only five sharpshooters allowed the surviving commandos to take cover and kill the hostages. Any such move will be judged later how effectively it turned out. The command to fire must be issued only at such time that each sharpshooter has his target in his sights, and the bullets must hit the targets as close to simultaneously as is humanly possible. The targets cannot be taken one at a time without maximum danger to the hostages.

The outcome of such a situation can never be predicted. What can be done, however, is to prepare for such encounters. Standardization of tactics used in response to a seizure of hostages is one of the surest ways of bringing about a

successful outcome. The alternative is to grope through, improvising all the way, and hope the hostages are released unharmed.

A standardized response will minimize the chances for a miscue. The object is to minimize the variables. Since each situation has its own variables in terms of the number of hostage takers their state of mind, the state of mind of the hostages, layout peculiarities, vantage points available, etc., the last thing needed is an additional variable.

"Dry runs" are one way of insuring that a hostage negotiating unit is capable of establishing control over a situation. As pointed out earlier, this team could be comprised of three members in a small city. But these team members, whatever their numbers, must be competent to assume control of the situation.

To insure that these units are in fact capable of taking over a hostage situation, considerable screening should be done ahead of time. In New York, 500 applicants from the force were considered, but only 68 chosen for the duty. "We didn't want anyone self-destructive," said Schlossberg, adding, "Offering yourself in exchange for a hostage is a great way to commit suicide and earn a medal."

Once chosen for this duty, however, the team members should be given free reign in the handling and evaluating of any incidents. Should a senior officer begin countermanding orders on the site, the result will almost certainly be a botch. Patrol units, detectives, assault teams, should all know exactly whose command they are under. ALL hostage rescue efforts have to be run strictly from the top down. No flights of imagination and daring from an individual policeman are likely to do a hostage any good.

STATISTICS:

Crimes of Terror

Based upon the period ending June 30, 1974, from records of the FBI. These facts appear startling:

KIDNAPPINGS

1971	1,357
1974	3,585

UP 164%

EXTORTION

1971	3,404
1974	4,591

UP 35%

BOMBINGS

1971	5,200
1974	1,800

DOWN 65%

8. Life and death negotiations

The negotiations themselves are in a sense the key to the entire operation. The preferred method of acquiring skills as a negotiator would be to learn in an actual incident at the side of an experienced negotiator. Tapes of such negotiations could also be useful.

Barring any such means, however, there remain certain rules which come recommended by the NYPD.

First, keep in mind that with one perpetrator, a show of force may be unwise. Second, the negotiator should wear civilian clothes and speak in a firm, but not threatening, manner; over-friendliness may be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Third, keep alive in the hostage taker's mind the possibility of escape; he should not be driven to desperation.

In the case of several hostage holders, a show of force by the negotiator may be helpful at the start, since it could cause a breakdown in the resolve of one weak member, thereby opening the way to successful negotiations. Any wedge that can be driven between the hostage holders is to be used and re-used. Dissension and weakness among the hostage takers is one of the strongest police weapons.

According to the NYPD, "The possibility of the perpetrator releasing his hostage(s) at the cost of allowing him to flee the scene unharmed must also be considered." Such a decision would certainly have to be approved at the highest command level, but if the negotiator suggests it as a possible way of securing the primary objective, that is, the release of the hostages, it must be considered.

When negotiations fail, as they will in certain cases regardless of the competence of the hostage negotiating team, the final move must be made swiftly and with no looking back. Any assault must proceed with skill and professionalism. It is always a judgment call, up until that time when the captors begin executing hostages. According to Schlossberg, "Once they throw out the first body, it's an entirely different situation. They're going to kill them all."


At that point it becomes a question of speed. The sooner the assault team can kill the hostage holders, the sooner will any remaining hostages be safe.

The possibility of such an assault hovers over the entire situation in all its phases. At the initial site, as early as possible during Phase I, assault tactics

should be decided upon. The assault team will be briefed as soon as the plan is firmed up, and from that point on, the team is, in effect, just being kept on a leash.

During transit and upon arrival at destination, the same holds true. The assault team is ready to go into action on signal. Delays in just about any area can be tolerated — in fact they can be expected. If the communications link is a

bit slow being set up (always within reason), it can be forgiven. Every one can understand such delays, criminals as well as the police. But when the assault team is sent into action, it must go now, not 30 seconds from now. Assault planning may go for naught. In many cases, no assault will be needed. But it is one of the first priorities throughout any hostage episode.



Bullet that was stopped by the police badge of an officer. All Law Enforcement Officers should be issued bulletproof jackets as standard equipment.

Notes and Departmental Plan for Hostage Team Program

Conclusion

Of course there are too many different types of hostage situation even to begin getting very specific. Such a situation can originate in a bank, a liquor store, a prison or a hospital — or just about anyplace else. But there is one variant of the hostage seizure which rates mention. It is the situation that arises when someone with access to large sums of money — usually a banker — is informed that his family is being held, and will be released unharmed if he will deliver a sum of money to a drop.

In many cases, the hostages are held in their own home, which makes the situation slightly different from a standard kidnaping. In other cases, the victim may be put in the trunk of a car and driven around until the money is delivered. In one recent case, the wife of a

banker in Augusta, Georgia was later found dead in the trunk of her car. Such situations are variants of kidnaping as it has always been practiced, and traditional anti-kidnaping procedures are the only recourse.

In such a setting, there is no face-to-face confrontation of police and hostage takers characteristic of the type of situation dealt with in this study. Such crimes perhaps rate a separate study, but though they technically deal with hostage taking, do not fall under the proper scope of this discussion.

Rather, we have dealt here only with the type of hostage situation which has become more and more a worldwide problem: the direct confrontation of police and perpetrators protected by the presence of numbers of hostages.

1. Team Commander _____

Name
Rank

 Home phone _____
2. Team members _____
 - a. _____

Name
Rank

 Phone _____
 - b. _____

Name
Rank

 Phone _____
 - c. _____

Name
Rank

 Phone _____
3. Marksmen _____
4. Bombs and explosives experts _____
5. Police physician and reserve unit _____

Name
Rank

Name
Rank
6. Military and civilian aircraft unit _____

Name
Rank
7. Fire Chief _____
 Phone _____
 Home emergency phone _____

Media (press) Contacts

1. _____
Newspaper _____ Phone _____
2. _____
Radio _____ Phone _____
3. _____
Television _____ Phone _____

Specialists

1. Phyciatrist _____
Name _____ Phone _____
 2. Catholic Chaplain _____
Name _____ Phone _____
 3. Protestant Chaplain _____
Name _____ Phone _____
 4. Rabbi (Chaplain) _____
Name _____ Phone _____
 5. Other _____
Name _____ Phone _____
- Hospital disaster unit _____
Phone _____
- Red Cross Unit _____
Phone _____
- Miscellaneous _____



About the project director

Gerald S. Arenberg,

Mr. Arenberg, a native of Chicago, Illinois, is now a resident of Miami, Florida and is Executive Director of the National Police & Fire Fighters Association and the American Federation of Police. He began his career in public safety as a Deputy Sheriff in Cook County, Illinois, in 1950, serving as a Highway Deputy for several years both in the juvenile and traffic departments. Later, Mr. Arenberg helped to organize a new village police force, a suburban area of Chicago where he rose in ranks to be appointed in 1960 as Chief of Police. He served in the Army Reserves as a military policeman as Chief, Provost Marshals Section of the 85th Division. Later he became a special agent in the newly organized Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force. After a line of duty injury Chief Arenberg retired from the police force to become chief executive for a police fraternal organization in nearby Sarasota, Fla. While in this position he was a sponsor and subscriber to the formation of the city fire department and later to a Ambulance-Rescue Squad. This, his experiences in both police and fire departments left him with a knowledge that teamwork was essential between the two services.

LAW ENFORCEMENT PROFESSION'S



Code of Ethics

- I *As a law enforcement officer, I regard myself as a member of an important and honorable profession.*
- II *As a law enforcement officer, I will keep myself in the best physical condition, so that I may at all times, perform my police duty with efficiency, and if necessary defend my uniform with honor. It is my duty to know the art of defense and be proficient in the use of my revolver.*
- III *As a law enforcement officer, it is my duty to know my work thoroughly and to inform myself on all other phases of law enforcement work. It is my further duty to avail myself of every opportunity to learn more about my professional work.*
- IV *As a law enforcement officer, I should be exemplary in my conduct, edifying in my conversation, honest in my dealings, and obedient to all the laws of my city, state, and nation, and I shall regard these as my sacred honor.*
- V *As a law enforcement officer, I should not, in the performance of duty, work for personal advantage or profit. I shall, at all times, recognize that I am a public servant obliged to give the most efficient and impartial service of which I am capable and I will be courteous in all my contacts.*
- VI *As a law enforcement officer, I will regard my brother officer with the same standards as I hold for myself. It is my duty to guard his honor and life as I guard my own.*
- VII *As a law enforcement officer, I should be loyal to my superiors, who determine my policies and accept responsibilities for my actions. It is my duty to do only those things which will reflect honor upon them, upon myself, and upon my profession.*