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Connecticut-

EVALUATION OF THE STATEWIDE  
ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
GRANT # A 73 -182 -220

Prepared for the Connecticut Planning  
Committee on Criminal Administration  
by  
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Evaluation

In the late sixties, drug abuse had become widespread throughout the United States. All indicators are that during this period more and more varied drug abuse existed in every strata of society. The nation responded with extensive prevention, treatment, and enforcement efforts at all levels of government. Supported in large part by federal funds, the number of drug education and information programs, methadone and other treatment facilities, as well as special police narcotics units have increased since 1968. The State of Connecticut has paralleled the national trend in responding to drug abuse. In October of 1970, there were 25 drug treatment facilities in the state offering 861 treatment slots. Two years later 49 facilities offered 2849 treatment slots. Similarly, drug enforcement efforts have increased considerably since 1968. Several of the larger cities have created special services divisions that are used almost exclusively for narcotics enforcement. In addition, the Connecticut Planning Committee on Criminal Administration (CPCCA) has invested more than one million in supporting police narcotics units throughout the state.

In the area of drug abuse law enforcement, the largest single program in Connecticut has been the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee (S.E.C.C.) S.E.C.C. is the policy making and administrative unit for five undercover narcotics squads serving various regions of the state. S.E.C.C. and the individual squads have been funded by the CPCCA for about \$360,000 annually. Since drug enforcement is a national priority and since S.E.C.C. had been awarded such a large amount of federal funds, the CPCCA decided to evaluate the S.E.C.C. programs for funding years 1972 and 1973. The following is the second of two reports that comprise the total evaluation of the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.....	p. i
History of Squads and S.E.C.C. ....	1
Description of Squads and S.E.C.C. ....	3
Description of the Evaluation Process .....	10
Evaluation of Goal Achievement .....	10
Remove significant quantities of drugs from the .. market .....	10
Provide undercover investigation service to the local police .....	30
Systems Impact of S.E.C.C. ....	54
Summary .....	67
Recommendations .....	69
Appendices	

## HISTORY OF THE REGIONAL NARCOTICS SQUADS

Before explaining the evaluation process, it is essential that some descriptive and historical information be provided about SECC. The regional narcotics squads originated in Fairfield County. Mainly because of its proximity to New York, Fairfield County was extremely hard hit by the drug epidemic of the late sixties. As drug traffic increased, it became more apparent to Fairfield County's chiefs of police that traditional policing structures were not adequate to stem the flow of drugs from New York. First, few departments could free men solely for drug enforcement. Second, drug traffic was organized and involved many jurisdictions. Such activity could only be addressed through the cooperation of many jurisdictions. Third, drug abuse, as most "victimless" crimes, did not provide complaints on which investigations could be based. Drug abuse enforcement required an undercover capability which most police departments lacked. Even departments with sufficient men lacked the financial support necessary for undercover operations. Unless alternative structures were devised, the impact on drug traffic and abuse in Fairfield County would have been piecemeal at best.

The Fairfield County chiefs of police met monthly to discuss problems of mutual interest. In approaching the problem of organized drug traffic, the chiefs expanded on a technique they had used successfully to combat an organized burglary ring in the county--a regional squad. Each of the 16 departments in the county contributed \$100 and the larger departments provided the manpower. The jurisdictional problems of combatting organized crime were overcome by the common consent of the participating chiefs. The manpower and financial burdens of undercover squads were shared by all and therefore made more manageable, in short, what was impractical for one department was easily borne by the region.

The results of the Fairfield County squad's activity were impressive. Between May and December of 1969, there were more narcotic arrests in Fairfield County than in the rest of the state. Inspired by the squad's success, other regions began to form similar squads to combat their drug problems. Soon there were five regional narcotics squads throughout the state. As these squads became more established, operational difficulties that were tolerable in an experiment but not in an continuing organization became dysfunctional. One of the most apparent shortcomings of the squad was the lack of sufficient buy money and logistical support in general. The small amounts of money allocated by the departments did not permit the squads to purchase narcotics at the levels they were capable of. Though small, this allotment was a substantial burden to the contributing departments. Some departments were slow to reimburse the squads for purchases made in their town. These logistical difficulties did not permit the squads to produce at their maximum level.

In order to provide more resources for the squads and to alleviate the financial burden from the local departments, the squads applied for federal funding from the CPCCA through their respective regional police association or council of governments. The CPCCA funds provided ample resources for squad maintenance and narcotics purchases but introduced management problems that the squads were not prepared to cope with. With the significant increase in money available to the squads, expectations of impact and fears of mismanagement increased. Squad personnel and CPCCA staff members expected the smooth flow of money to the squads to increase the number and size of narcotics purchases. Unfortunately, the disbursement systems governing the flow of funds from the town or association receiving the grant and the squads were not always adequate of administering confidential expenditures in such volume. In some instances, the flow of confidential funds was so slow or the amount allowable at any given time so limited that large quantity purchases could not be made. Also, the documentation of the squads' confidential expenditures was often too limited to ensure accountability.

In addition to the problems associated with increased funding, certain difficulties became apparent as the squads continued to become a more established fixture on the Connecticut law enforcement scene. The introduction of federal funds may have eased the financial burden of the locals but it did not supplement the lack of logistical and support systems necessary for a permanent organization. The squads, for instance, had no legal status and no formal authorization to operate in many jurisdictions. An informal understanding between chiefs may have sufficed temporarily but it would not do on a permanent basis. Questions of liability, insurance and funding could not be resolved unless the squads became legal entities. The exact nature of the squads' interrelationship with local police departments was unclear. The extent to which chiefs who contributed a man had control over that man had to be determined. The type and amount of supervision essential for undercover operations also became a salient issue to the chiefs and to the general public. Chiefs became reluctant to contribute men because of the ambiguity in these matters. These areas and many more became problems as the squads continued to function.


The increase in the number of squads introduced a new problem as well. The independent growth of the squads resulted in a certain amount of duplication and more importantly, the fear of duplication. It also introduced the possibility of more efficient operation of the squads through economies of scale. It became apparent that centrally administered squads could prevent duplication, permit more efficient operation, provide a more efficient and accountable transfer of funds, establish the legitimacy of the squads and develop standard operating procedures. In short, the squads had outgrown their own management capabilities and a central managerial unit was needed to improve the existing structure and to plan its continued growth.

### DESCRIPTION OF SECC AND THE REGIONAL NARCOTICS SQUADS

The description of SECC and the narcotics squads should begin with the squads themselves since it was their needs that prompted the creation of SECC. As the discussion of the historical evolution of the Connecticut Regional Narcotics squads suggests, the principle function of the squads is the apprehension of drug dealers and the seizure of illicit drugs by means of undercover purchases of drugs and resultant investigations. Each squad has between eight and 15 agents depending on the commitment of the departments in the region, and depending on seasonal variation. Each squad has a squad commander in charge of the overall administration of the squad. His duties would include assisting in the recruiting of personnel, their training and their assimilation, the supervision of personnel, serving as an information resource for his men, and serving as liaison with other enforcement agencies such as the court, other police agencies, the states attorney, etc. The squad commander often shares his duties with a field supervisor who is more involved with the supervision of the men in the process of purchasing drugs and pursuing investigations. While the squad commander may take a great interest in certain important cases, his concern with the overall operation of the squad does not permit him to have the depth of contact that the field supervisor has. The field supervisor should know the general whereabouts of an agent at any given time and why the agent is there. He should know what informant his man is with and what his men intend to do. He should ensure that the agents have conducted the buy and the ensuing background investigation properly. In some instances, he should undertake those background investigations himself. He should also ensure that the "paperwork" (affidavits, etc.) associated with prosecution are adequately completed. In many cases, this ideal differentiation between squad commander and field supervisor does not hold. Some supervisors favor a co-commander situation in which the general supervisory and administrative tasks of the commander and the more case-related tasks of the field supervisors are equally shared. Whatever the particular statuses of the individuals, the tasks of general and specific supervision are performed to a degree in every squad.


Each squad also has a secretary. The secretary provides clerical support (i.e., typing, filing, dictation, etc.) for the supervisory staff and serves as a bookkeeper and general office manager. The agents are, of course, the life blood of each squad. They are charged with making the initial purchase of narcotics ("buy"), the identification of the violator, the investigation of his activity and associates and the completion of reports necessary for prosecution.

### NARCOTICS SQUAD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



The narcotics squads are similar to all organizations in that they rely heavily on their external environment to provide the necessary resources to maintain themselves and to produce (i.e., to make buys and obtain warrants). In most elemental terms, the crime squads are reliant on their environment to provide men, money and information for maintenance and production. The men are obviously essential since without them there would be no squad. Unlike most organizations, the squads do not offer an incentive to their staff in the form of a salary. The men are paid by their department and donated to the squad by the local police department. The squad is, therefore, dependent on the departments for manpower. Money is essential for two reasons--first, money is essential for the basic maintenance needs of the squads such as rent for their facility, heat, light, furniture, supplies, cars, car maintenance, etc. Second, money is required to make buys and thereby obtain warrants and arrests. The squads rely on the CPCA under grants A73-180-221 and A73-180-220-2 for the bulk of their monies. There has been an increasing effort to solicit contributions from local towns for the 'hard' cash match required of federal funds. The hope is that local contributions will eventually support the squads when federal funds terminate. For all intents and purposes, however, the CPCA is the source of squad funds.

THE FLOW OF NECESSARY RESOURCES TO REGIONAL NARCOTICS SQUADS



Given the basic maintenance resources of men and money, the information about drug traffic received by the squads will dictate their effectiveness. The agents must have knowledge of where drugs are sold, and by whom, in order to make "buys." This information is provided largely by the agents' or squad supervisors' experience, local police departments, the state police, the Drug Enforcement Administration and police departments in neighboring states. These agencies usually obtain their information from informants (i.e., individuals who have been arrested and will provide information in return for a reduced sentence or for money) who are either delivered directly to the squad or whose information is passed to the squads through the agency involved. An inadequate flow of any one of these resources would result in less production by the squads.

In order to maintain the flow of resources, the narcotics squads must provide services to those agencies on whom they are dependent. In return for men and information the squads must provide warrants and intelligence information to the local police departments. Similarly, the squads must provide informants and information to the Drug Enforcement Administration about large inter-state drug networks so that D.E.A. will reciprocate with information pertinent to Connecticut local dealers. This exchange of service for resources is essential for the operation of the squads.

Earlier in this report, it was stated that after a few years of operation under federal funds, the squads' activity was endangered by insufficient management. The exchange of service for resources was basically sound but somewhat simplistic. As the number of squads increased and became more established, it became apparent that a great deal of effort was required to establish those support systems necessary to maintain and augment the service-resources exchange. Local chiefs had no benchmark from which to gage adequate service. They had no indication of how their men would be supervised. If they did not receive service, to whom would they have redress and with what result? Were they receiving the maximum service for their contributions? Who would be held accountable for federal funds? All of these questions and more began to emerge in early 1972. It was obvious that these questions must be answered or the flow of resources to the squad would be adversely affected. It also was very clear that the individual squads, police associations and local governments could not perform this function. It was in response to this situation that the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee (SECC) was formed.

At its inception, SECC was charged with constructing a management system for the regional narcotics squads and thereby enhancing the enforcement efforts of the squads. The specific objectives under these general goals are listed schematically below.

- 1.0 Construct a management system to improve the flow of resources to the Squads
  - 1.1 Standardize bookkeeping, records, grant administration and general operating procedures
  - 1.2 Establish liaison with other drug enforcement agencies and develop existing liaison with local police
  - 1.3 Establish a central intelligence system within SECC to gather information from the squads, analyze it and selectively return it to the squads
- 2.0 Remove significant quantities of drugs from the market
  - 2.1 Identify drug distribution channels
  - 2.2 Arrest and assist in the prosecution of middle-level narcotics dealers

3.0 Provide service to local police department

3.1 Satisfy undercover investigative needs of towns

3.2 Apprehend drug traffickers in local towns

To accomplish these goals the S.E.C.C. Board was created. It consists of 15 police chiefs and law enforcement officials who meet bi-monthly to formulate policy for the five regional narcotics squads.<sup>1</sup> Each squad region<sup>2</sup> sends two chiefs to the SECC Board to represent the region and the regional squad. In addition, the state police commissioner, two representatives of the CPCCA Executive Committee, and two chiefs who serve as "at large" members serve on the board. The subjects discussed by the board include such issues as the disposal of evidence, procedure in the case of large-scale drug seizures, applications for additional federal funds, etc.

The SECC Board has a five-man staff that will henceforth be referred to as SECC to avoid confusion with the SECC Board. The function of the SECC is to implement the board's decisions. SECC consists of an executive director, a director of intelligence, a director of planning and two secretary/bookkeepers. The duties of the executive director include supervision of the overall planning and operations of SECC and the squads, serving as a liaison between the SECC Board and SECC, serving as a liaison between SECC and state and federal agencies, and the direct implementation of certain programs such as the drive to collect local cash assessments from towns and the formulation of legislation essential for the squads. The intelligence director is charged with the daily supervision of the crime squads. In that capacity, he is in daily contact with the squads concerning logistical issues as well as operational questions. The intelligence director passes on all maintenance expenditures and exceptionally large confidential expenditures. He must keep abreast of the cases being worked by the squads and especially those that are extra-regional so that duplication of effort can be avoided. In addition to supervising and coordinating the logistical and enforcement activities of the squads, the intelligence director must accumulate crime-related information from the squads, analyze it, and disseminate it to the squads and other law enforcement agencies. In this way, separate and seemingly unrelated events may be correlated to produce a picture of drug traffic.


The director of planning must satisfy the informational and planning needs of SECC and the SECC Board. He must collect, present and analyze data relating to the performance of the regional narcotics squads. He must perform similar research on the problems that the squads are designed to address. With this data, he may make statements about the effectiveness of the squads and suggest ways of

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix I (SECC Board Bylaws)


<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 2 (Squad Region Maps)

increasing their impact. The SECC support staff must perform the normal secretarial functions (i.e., typing, filing, dictation) as well as maintain the records and bookkeeping systems constructed by SECC.

STRUCTURE OF S.E.C.C.



SUMMARY CHART OF THE STRUCTURE OF S.E.C.C. AND THE REGIONAL CRIME SQUADS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT



.....Men

-----Money

=====Information

\_\_\_\_\_Warrants

Description of the Evaluation Process

This report is one of two reports which comprise the S.E.C.C. Evaluation. The first report in this series addressed the extent to which S.E.C.C. had accomplished its systems construction goals as of August 1973. A detailed summary of the findings is attached as appendix.3 This report will deal primarily with the degree to which S.E.C.C. and the squads have accomplished their enforcement goals. These goals and objectives are presented schematically below.

- 1.0 Remove significant quantities of drugs from the market
  - 1.1 Identify drug distribution channels
  - 1.2 Arrest and assist in the prosecution of middle level narcotic dealers.
- 2.0 Provide undercover investigation service to local police
  - 2.1 Satisfy undercover investigation needs of the towns
  - 2.2 Apprehend drug traffickers in local towns

In the section that follows, each of these goals and the associated objectives will be examined redefining each goal for empirical investigation then documenting whether that goal has been achieved.

1.0 Remove significant quantities of drugs from the market

Prior to the creation of the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee, the Regional Crime Squads had been arresting drug dealers and, thereby removing drugs from the illicit market. In very simple terms, S.E.C.C. was given the task of improving squad production so that a greater amount of drugs would be removed from the market as a result of squad activity. S.E.C.C. has attempted to make the

squads more effective in several ways. The primary mechanism that S.E.C.C. has used to increase effectiveness of the squads has been an enforcement policy that places a priority on the pursuit of middle level drug dealers. This approach assumes the existence of an organized market in illicit drugs which has the same established interdependencies as legitimate markets. Retail dealers tend to establish fairly permanent relationships with wholesale dealers who may travel to New York to obtain their supplies. Arresting or otherwise removing the wholesale distributor not only removes the quantity of drugs purchased and/or seized, but it also removes an established drug distribution conduit or channel which must be recreated in order to market existing drugs. Time is required to bridge the gap between large volume dealers and the retail distributor. The time required to replace the wholesale dealer is time in which, for all intents and purposes, the total volume of drugs dealt by that channel is removed from the market.

S.E.C.C. has been engaged in a number of efforts designed to institutionalize the priority on the middle level of drug traffic. The systems goals evaluated in an earlier report and mentioned above<sup>4</sup> were improvements designed to prepare the squads for the pursuit of middle level. The ability to draw down larger sums of money for drug buys, squad commander meetings and other information exchange mechanisms were designed to facilitate the implementation of S.E.C.C.'s new policy. Similarly, the gradual replacement of pre-S.E.C.C. squad commanders with those less autonomous and more amenable to S.E.C.C.'s policies has been another attempt to institutionalize the priority on the middle level.

In evaluating S.E.C.C.'s success in improving squad effectiveness through an emphasis on larger dealers, it is necessary to make several assumptions. First of all, it is virtually impossible to actually assess the extent to which S.E.C.C. has removed significant quantities of drugs from the market. The police themselves, in arresting drug dealers, have only the most vague and subjective indicators of the volume of drugs dealt by a given individual. More objective and inclusive measures of the state of the market (i.e. "purity level," hospital admissions etc.) are usually not available. When they are available in a uniform fashion it is impossible, using these indicators, to isolate the impact of the squad from that of D.E.A., Odale, Customs, and other enforcement agencies concerned with drugs. Given these conditions one must simply monitor the output of the squads and assume a constant variation of output with impact. In the case at hand we must assume the viability of S.E.C.C.'s market model and assess the extent to which the squads have been arresting larger dealers.

A similar assumption must be made concerning the extent to which the squads identify drug distribution channels through careful investigative work. Observation in the squads has produced evidence that the squad personnel do attempt to connect individuals in a distribution network and remove the entire network after tracing it as far as safety and resources (i.e. their own and often that of another agency) will allow. To be sure these observations varied from squad to squad, but they do occur. Unfortunately, these instances could not be recorded in any convenient, standard manner so the evidence must remain anecdotal. Even if these observations could be systematically recorded, control data on network

identification prior to S.E.C.C. were not available. Since it is impossible to objectively document the extent to which S.E.C.C. has caused increased identification of drug distribution channels, one must assume that the increased ability to identify drug distribution channels will also be manifest in squad output. The identification and arrest of networks usually involves large quantities of drugs and will be so evidenced in the production of the squads.

The extent to which S.E.C.C. has accomplished its enforcement goals, therefore, can be inferred from monitoring the production of the squads before and after the creation and operation of S.E.C.C. If S.E.C.C. has been successful, the cases made by the squad before the creation of S.E.C.C. should contain a small proportion of higher level dealers than those made after the creation of S.E.C.C. In addition to simply monitoring the proportion of low and middle level dealers over time, other qualities of squad production should be examined as well. The standardization of support systems, for instance, has been accomplished more quickly and easily than the socialization of squad personnel to the new policy. In such a situation the squad may increase its production simply in quantitative terms (i.e. more of the same) in response to the increased resources made available through S.E.C.C.'s efforts. Though a partial success, it would be a genuine improvement and should be noted.

The empirical sections that follow will provide a general description of squad production before and after S.E.C.C. including an assessment of the extent to which the squads, after the creation of S.E.C.C., have begun making cases on larger drug dealers.

1.1 Methodology

Before presenting the results of this investigation, some attention should be given to the methodology and the definition of certain terms used throughout the report. The statistics presented below were obtained from the records of the Regional Crime Squads and the Hartford Police Special Services Division throughout 1973. These are 1,199 cases in the sample of which 994 are Regional Crime Squad cases and 205 are cases made by the Hartford Police Unit. The sample was stratified by year, recording all cases from January and July for each year in which the squads existed. A second sampling was conducted taking cases randomly in each year in order to obtain a sample of sufficient size. With a sample of approximately 1,000 overall and more than two hundred for each year of the squads existence one may be 90% confident that sample statistics will be within a ten point interval of the actual population statistics. This is the worst result possible and limited data on the population of cases for 1973 suggests that the sample is considerably more accurate than that. The following table presents statistics from the sample for 1973 and from the total case population for 9 months of 1973. These population statistics were amassed by S.E.C.C. after the initiation of the evaluation and can be found in the S.E.C.C. Report to the Connecticut Drug Advisory Council (October, 1973).

COMPARISON OF SAMPLE OF BUYS FOR 1973 TO POPULATION OF BUYS FOR NINE MONTHS OF 1973

	Substance Purchased			
	Narcotics	Marijuana	Control drugs	Hallucinagens
1973 Sample	30%	50%	11%	9%
1973 Population (9 months)	27%	51%	13%	9%

\* The figures presented in the table are rounded to

This table suggests a much closer correspondence than indicated by the confidence interval mentioned above.

The specific data collected in this sample is detailed in Appendix B attached to this report.<sup>5</sup> The basic unit for data collection is the case. All data collected can be referenced by case identification number. The case was also designated as the standard production unit by which squad performance will be measured. For this purpose, case was defined as an investigation in which contact was made with a criminal and evidence obtained for his prosecution. The case usually involves the purchase of narcotics or other substances to be used as evidence. Burns, failures to identify defendants and non drug investigations are included as cases. Surveillance activity in which no evidence was purchased was not included as a case.

Several other measures could have been validly used as the standard unit of production, altering the results only slightly. Buys, for instance, are the basic unit employed by S.E.C.C. and provide an upper limit of production activity. Buys measure effort more than output. An agent can make several buys of the same quantity from the same individual and, using buys as a standard unit, he will be credited with several cases when in fact he may produce only one warrant and one arrest. The use of the case as a measuring unit prevents this crediting of effort as output.

Warrants provide another measure of output or production but it is too stringent as opposed to being too lax a standard. Obtaining a warrant depends as much on the court officers as it does on the quality of squad investigations. A rigorous court official

will seriously limit the output of the squads thus defined. One might say that warrants measure court performance as well as squad performance. Cases as a standard unit provides a compromise measure for squad performance.

A second definitional issue which must be discussed is the periodizing of the data. S.E.C.C. was created in the spring of 1972 and strictly speaking "before S.E.C.C." would refer to all cases sampled before the spring of 1972. In reality, however, S.E.C.C. did not become a force in the life of the squads until the late fall of 1972. With the introduction of standardized book-keeping and record keeping procedures in November of 1972 S.E.C.C. began to exert its influence on the squads. In view of the pluralistic authority structure of S.E.C.C. and the Regional Crime Squads, S.E.C.C.'s effort to exert influence is ongoing. Therefore, in all fairness, cases sampled in 1973 should be regarded as the "Post S.E.C.C." sample and all other cases will be regarded as part of the "Pre S.E.C.C." sample. This form of periodizing the data should permit the maximum impact of S.E.C.C.'s systems and procedures within the time frame of this report.

#### 1.2 Presentation of the data - Description of Squad Production

Of primary interest in this report is the extent to which the squads have been making cases on larger drug dealers with the assistance of S.E.C.C. In order to accurately assess the importance of the squads evolution towards middle level drug traffic, however, it should be viewed in the overall context of squad production over time. The emphasis on larger level dealers may have some unintended consequences on other facets of production activity. In addition,

a brief description of squad production over time is needed for information purposes. S.E.C.C. has made available a great deal of information concerning the performance of the squads during 1973, but there is virtually no assembled data on the efforts of the squads prior to S.E.C.C. The section which follows will examine the qualitative and quantitative changes of squad production before and after S.E.C.C.

Customarily the most important facet of production is how much one produces. In the case of S.E.C.C. and the Crime Squads more qualitative improvements in production are paramount. As much as "counting heads" or warrants is antithetical to the middle level philosophy of S.E.C.C. they are nonetheless valuable parameters in assessing S.E.C.C.'s success. To not have increased the extent to which the squads are making cases on larger dealers coupled with a general drop in quantitative production is much more damning than the failure to make larger cases in and of itself.

During the pre and post S.E.C.C. periods, the squads have remained relatively stable with respect to input except for those changes introduced by S.E.C.C. A review of manpower records in the summer of 1973, for instance, indicated that personnel levels of the squads had not changed significantly over time. Although the individual squads have remained fairly stable over time, the squads, as a group, were changed during the sample period by the introduction of the Eastern regional squad in the spring of 1972. Due to this increased input total cases recorded by the squads would not provide a comparable measure of performance. In addition, squad records prior to S.E.C.C. varied with respect to the manner in which cases

were recorded. Some squads recorded case numbers for each defendant, others for each buy. S.E.C.C.'s record system requires that each buy receive a case number. Since squad records and the size of the organization were not comparable over time, the sample months of January and July were used to estimate the change in average monthly output over time. The cases for January and July of each year were added and divided by the number of squads to produce the average monthly output.

AVERAGE MONTHLY CASE MADE PER SQUAD

Pre S.E.C.C.	Post S.E.C.C.
25.1	20.2

Chi sq. = .76 significant at the .25 level

The case production of the squads after S.E.C.C. seems to be somewhat lower than the monthly production per squad prior to S.E.C.C. The difference is not significantly different, however, so for all intents and purposes the case production of the squads has not changed since the introduction of S.E.C.C. as a central managerial unit.

The type of drug cases made by the squads has changed considerably during their four year history as the following table indicates.

Types of Drugs Purchases 1970-1973

Drug	Year			
	1970	1971	1972	1973
Narcotics	65.2%	42.5%	38.8%	30.6%
Control drugs	3.4%	7.9%	7.1%	10.3%
Hallucinagens	18.2%	23.3%	16.3%	9.2%
Marijuana	13.2%	25.4%	37.8%	49.8%

Chi sq. = 101 with 9 degrees of freedom significant at the .001 level.

There has been a fairly constant shift from purchases of narcotics to purchases of marijuana. There is almost a one for one exchange. The proportion of marijuana cases has increased approximately 36 points while the proportion of heroin cases has decreased nearly 35 points between 1970 and 1973. This enforcement pattern has evolved largely as a response both to changing usage patterns and resources of the squads. The use of 'hard' drugs is reputed to have lessened considerably since its peak in the late sixties and the enforcement efforts of the squads reflect that fact. Also, many enforcement authorities say that hard drugs have returned to the ethnic and racial 'ghetto's in which they existed prior to the drug epidemic' and the ensuing police attack on drugs. If this is the case, then the lack of minority group agents inhibits the squads efforts to penetrate the existing market. This theory is supported by the fact that one squad with an experienced black agent has maintained a relatively constant level of heroin case production over a three year period while other squads have fallen off sharply. Whatever the cause of this shift to soft drugs, it has most definitely not been a conscious policy on the part of S.E.C.C. and the squads.

Not all cases pursued by the Regional Crime Squads involve narcotics. Some involve other forms of criminal activity, such as gambling or prostitution. The extent of the squads involvement in non drug activity has always been and remains quite limited.

NON DRUG ACTIVITY 1970-1973

<u>Criminal Activity</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	1970	1971	1972	1973
Drug	96.7	91.6	88.5	93.9
Non Drug	7.3	8.4	11.5	6.1
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Chi Sq. = 6.43 significant at .1 level

The squads have always emphasized drug enforcement. In those instances which non drug enforcement activities have been pursued by the squads it has generally involved 1) gambling (30%), pool playing (22%), policy (18%) and prostitution (14%).

In summary, there has been little change in the number of cases produced by the squads over time. The small changes noted in the above figures are not statistically significant. There has been a marked shift in squad production from 'hard' drugs to 'soft' drugs. Since S.E.C.C. has not afforded 'soft' drugs any special priority, no causal relation is implied, however. The squads have always emphasized narcotics enforcement over other types of criminal activity. The findings here do not indicate that S.E.C.C. has in any way caused the squads to significantly expand their efforts into other types of crime.

1.3 Presentation of findings - Evolution towards the middle level.

The above section provides a general background of squad production and its change over time. The changes noted are interesting and important, but they do not specifically inform the assessment of goal attainment by the squads. The only explicit enforcement or production goal of S.E.C.C. and the squads has been the charge to increase the proportion of middle level dealers arrested as a result of squad investigations. It was mentioned previously that we are interested in squad output and not the actions of the local police and the courts. Since the handling of warrants and arrests are generally in the hands of local police we will examine the type of cases made rather than arrest statistics themselves. The principal measure of performance or production to be used here is the quantity

purchased in the course of the investigation. The greater the quantity purchased in a single buy the more likely that a defendant is a larger volume dealer. There have been a number of objections to the use of this measure, but none seem to be as convincing as the arguments for its use. A small volume dealer does not have and cannot sell large quantities of drugs, therefore, the chance of labeling a small dealer as a large volume dealer is minimized. The likelihood of a large volume dealer selling small amounts of drugs is contrary to the profit motive and his personal safety. The fewer transactions the less the possibility of apprehension. If one can sell larger volumes one will. The objections to this measure have usually been based on individual cases which though true in themselves are not supported by evidence or common sense in the long run.

The specific objective in this section is to use the quantity of drugs purchased in squad investigations as an indicator of the extent to which squads have begun to pursue larger volume dealers. It is important to note this emphasis. The initial phase of the S.E.C.C. evaluation was predicated on the assumption that the enforcement goal of S.E.C.C. was to actually make the majority of its cases on 'middle level' dealers. Pursuant to the first evaluation report, several meetings were held with the S.E.C.C. staff and the CPCCA evaluation staff to define the parameters of the second evaluation. At that time, all agreed that the initial goals were a bit ambitious and that emphasis should be given to the evolutionary and continuous nature of the goal. The most important factor was that the squads were making cases on larger dealers and not that the bulk of the dealers were 'middle level'. The emphasis is on progress

towards, not specifically the achievement of, the middle level and this will be the criteria used to evaluate the success of the S.E.C.C. and the squads in this next section.

The fact that the squads make cases on various substances makes a neat summary measure of output or production somewhat difficult. On the basis of the sample and some data on the population provided by S.E.C.C., it may be valid simply to compare the two drugs that comprise the vast majority of squad cases - heroin (25%) and marijuana (50%). The remaining 25% of squad drug cases are distributed over several substances each with different units of measure. LSD and hashish for instance, are both hallucinagens but one is recorded in pills or hits and the other in grams. A valid transformation of one to the other is virtually impossible. Given that the majority of squad cases are made in heroin and marijuana, the use of these two substances alone should provide an accurate picture of the squads performance.

As the previous section indicated, the proportion of total squad cases which involve heroin has lessened consistently since the creation of the squads in 1970. The size of heroin buys, however, has steadily increased over that period. Some indication of this increase is given by examining the change in the average quantity purchased per case from 1970 through 1973. The average amounts are recorded in milligrams with 60 milligrams to a "bag"

AVERAGE PURCHASES OF HEROIN PER CASE 1970-1973

	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
Average amount	<u>193</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>261</u>	<u>1536</u>

difference is significant at the .001 level of heroin. These figures must be carefully interpreted because of the wide variance of the sample. The majority of heroin cases in

1973, for instance could be grouped around 260 milligrams, but one extremely large case could increase the mean tremendously. It is safe to say that there has been a change in the average purchase of heroin per case but not of the magnitude suggested by these figures.

Because of the wide variance of the sample and the population of cases a more accurate measure of the change in the size of buys over time is provided by a frequency distribution of heroin purchases. The following table presents the frequency distribution of cases by quantity from 1970 to 1973. The quantity intervals are small in order to be sensitive to any progression toward large quantities.

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HEROIN PURCHASES 1970-1973

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	1970	1971	1972	1973
(1 bag) 60 mili or less	45%	18%	14%	8%
(2 to 4 bags) 61 mili to 240	39%	67%	62%	52%
(4 to 8 bags) 241 mili to 480	14%	8%	12%	17%
(8 to 16 bags) 481 mili to 960	2%	5%	12%	12%
more than 16 961 mili or greater	2%	1%	--	12%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Gama = .39

Chi Sq. = 63.76 significant at .001 level

As a rule of thumb, the middle level dealer can be regarded as those who fall in the highest quantity interval presented in the above table.

The above table indicates that there has been a steady progression towards the purchase of greater quantities of drugs in individual cases. Using size of buy to indicate the status of the dealer, the squads seem to be steadily moving toward the middle level. However, the majority of heroin cases still involve very small quantities and lower level dealers. Using the purchase of 16 or more bags (i.e. 1/2 load) as the lower limit of the middle level, however, the performance of the squads in 1973 marks the first time in which a noticeable proportion of cases involved middle level traffickers. In terms of progress towards the middle level, the squads have made their greatest progress following the creation of S.E.C.C. and the subsequent reorganization of the squads.

Another means of making the above table more comprehensible is to divide the 4 x 5 table presented here into three separate 2 x 5 tables comparing the progress between individual pairs of years. In this way the move towards the middle level experienced between 1972 and 1973 with the creation of S.E.C.C. can be compared to that of other years in which S.E.C.C. was not operative. The intention here is to avoid the pitfalls of simply comparing two time periods out of context. This often happens in police studies in which crime rates are used as indicators. Crime rates are not linear over time, but oscillate within a range. To say that the crime rate has changed, time series studies are needed to determine if the change in crime rate is something more than standard variation or the oscillation of the rates. If the change does exceed the standard variation or oscillation one can be extremely sure that a change has occurred. The data presented here are not sufficient to perform a legitimate time series study, but they permit us to apply the

same principles in a less rigorous fashion. By sub dividing the above 4 x 5 table into 2 x 5 tables, three separate measures of change in production are available - two prior to S.E.C.C. and one after S.E.C.C. Following the logic of the time series study, one can be extremely sure that the differences in squad production before and after S.E.C.C. (i.e. 1972 - 1973) are not simply normal variations due to increased experience of squad personnel or some other constant factor if this difference is greater than any previous change.

Rather than producing the tables here it will be more convenient to use the gama ( $\gamma$ ) statistic computed for each table. Gama is a statistic test used to measure strength of association between variables. It varies between +1 and -1. The more gama approaches +1 the more strongly two variables are associated in a positive direction. If, for instance, all squad (100%) cases in 1970 involved 1 bag of heroin or less, but in 1973 all cases involved 1/2 load of heroin or more. The relationship between S.E.C.C.'s intervention and size of case would be perfect and gama would equal +1. If the converse were true gama would equal -1. In short gama can be used as an indicator of the extent to which there has been movement toward higher level cases.

Between 1970 and 1971 the gama for heroin cases was very small gama = .09 indicating very little movement toward higher levels. Between 1971 and 1972 gama was a good deal larger gama = .27 indicating that some progress had been made in making cases at higher levels. The gama for 1972 and 1973 was still larger gama = .32 suggesting that the magnitude of the shift toward the middle level was greater than in any other period in the squads history. This indicates that the creation of S.E.C.C. has led to greater progress

In terms of marijuana case production, there has been a trend towards making cases on higher level dealers as well. This trend, however, has been much less pronounced than that for heroin. Again mean purchases

AVERAGE MARIJUANA PURCHASE PER CASE  
1970 - 1973

<u>Average Amount</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
	10	18	6	15

as an indicator must be treated with caution due to the influence of unusually large purchases.

The frequency distribution of marijuana purchases by quantity and year provides a much more accurate description of the change over time.

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA PURCHASE PER CASE 1970-1973

<u>Quantities</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
1 oz. or less	70%	66%	43%	41%
1 oz. to 8 oz.	7%	24%	30%	33%
8 oz. to 16 oz.	7%	5%	24%	21%
16 oz. or more	15%	5%	3%	5%
	*99%	100%	100%	100%

Chi Sq. = 8.06

The table indicates a persistent though not regular trend toward higher level cases. The most pronounced movement towards the middle level seemed to occur between 1971 and 1972. There is little or no trend towards the middle level before and after S.E.C.C. (i.e. 1972 and 1973). The gama for a 2 x 4 table relating 1972 production to

that of 1973 is only .04 indicating essentially no change. In contrast, the gama for the table relating production in 1971 to that of 1972 is .39 indicating substantial movement towards the middle level. These findings suggest that the squads have not increased the number of cases made on higher level marijuana dealers since the creation of S.E.C.C.

Combining the data on marijuana and heroin provides a relatively complete assessment of the extent to which the squads have begun making cases on higher level dealers. A rough summary measure of the squads progress toward higher levels can be obtained by adding the weighted gama scores mentioned above. The gama scores obtained from tables comparing 1972 with 1973 indicate the extent to which the squads have evolved towards making cases on middle level drug traffickers. If the squads only made heroin cases then the gama obtained from a table contrasting the quantities of heroin purchased per case in 1972 and 1973 would neatly summarize the success of S.E.C.C. and the squads. A gama of .70 would indicate that S.E.C.C. and the squads had accomplished roughly 70% of their goal. A gama of 1.0 would indicate that all or at least the vast majority of squad cases in 1973 were in the middle level (i.e. complete goal attainment) since two substances are involved, however, the gama from heroin alone will not suffice. Weighting gama by substance will produce a satisfactory summary measure. If all marijuana and heroin cases are combined to represent 100% of 1973 cases and the number of heroin cases and marijuana cases respectively are divided by this new total, the resulting percentages can serve as weights for gama. The following equations may clarify this procedure.

$$\frac{\text{total \# of heroin cases 1973}}{\text{heroin cases 1973 + marijuana cases 1973}} = \text{weight for heroin gama} = W_h$$

$$\frac{\text{total \# marijuana cases 1973}}{\text{heroin cases 1973 + marijuana cases 1973}} = \text{weight for marijuana gama} = W_m$$

$$\text{gama for 2 x 5 table comparing heroin purchases 1972, 1973.} = .32$$

$$\text{gama for 2 x 4 table comparing marijuana purchase 1972} = .04$$

$$W_h (.32) + W_m (.04) = \text{Summary measure of S.E.C.C. goal attainment}$$

Substituting the actual weights for  $W_h$  and  $W_m$  in the above equation we receive the following summary measure:

$$W_h (.32) + W_m (.04) = \text{Summary measure of goal achievement}$$

$$(.33)(.32) + (.67)(.04) = .13$$

A summary measure of 1.0 would indicate that virtually all squad cases in 1973 were made on middle level dealers. This outcome is impossible given the squads necessary mode of operation (i.e. buying from small dealers to arrange buys from larger dealers). A summary measure of 0.0 would indicate that there has been no change in the type of cases made before and after S.E.C.C. Interpreted within this range, the above score indicates that the squads have made some, but not a great deal of progress toward apprehending middle level drug dealers.

One additional caveat should accompany this summary statistic. It is based on the assumption that all types of drugs are of equal priority in squad enforcement efforts. If progress toward the apprehension of middle level heroin dealers is more important to

S.E.C.C. and the C.P.C.C.A. than similar progress involving marijuana, then the summary measure would be quite different. There has been a marked increase in the proportion of middle level heroin cases made by the squads (gamma = .32). If progress in heroin cases is considered twice as important as progress in marijuana then the weightings would be rearranged and the summary measure quite a bit higher. This would indicate that S.E.C.C. and the squads had been more successful in achieving their enforcement goal.

In summary, the majority of squad cases have and do involve small drug dealers. Over time, presumably as a result of experience and more refined systems, the squads have begun making cases on larger dealers. This evolution toward larger dealers varies by time period and substance. There has been a slight tendency to make larger grass cases between 1971 and 1972, but there was little or no change in cases before and after S.E.C.C. In the case of heroin, however, there is a persistent trend toward cases on larger volume dealers. This trend is most marked with the appearance of S.E.C.C. (i.e. between 1972 and 1973). In short, the squads have made their greatest progress toward larger heroin cases after S.E.C.C. was created. Simultaneously, however, the proportion of heroin cases has lessened over time and the proportion of marijuana cases has increased. In combining the two substances in a total measure of goal attainment the poor performance in the area of marijuana coupled with its increased volume has tended to lessen the import of the progress in heroin. In all, the squads have made some progress toward the middle level, but taken as a whole this progress has been limited.

## 2.0 Provide Undercover Investigative Service to Local Police

The Regional Crime Squads were created to accomplish a task which local police departments were not equipped to do--i.e., undercover investigations. The lack of sufficient "buy" money, and the extremely short useful life of an undercover agent in a single jurisdiction prevented efficient undercover investigations at the local level. The squads were designed to fill this void, and to serve as the undercover arm of the local police. As the squads have developed, the concept of service has evolved into two separate and at times conflicting goals. As the previous section indicated, the squads are charged with stemming the flow of illicit drugs in Connecticut. In doing so, the squads are performing a service to the local police and to the entire state. A second definition of service to local police is more explicit, and that is the direct response of the squads to specific requests for assistance made by local police agencies. Though these two goals appear compatible they vie for the scarce resources of the squads. It may, for instance, be more efficient for stopping the distribution of drugs to concentrate enforcement efforts in the larger cities that are reported to be distribution centers. Simultaneously, small towns have genuine drug problems as well, and though enforcement in these areas may not be as productive vis a vis regional problems or as efficient in terms of informants, they have a legitimate claim to service from regional squads. The legitimacy of the claim is further underscored when one realizes that smaller towns are part of the environment in which the squads rely for resources of men, money, and information. S.E.C.C. and the squads have attempted to manage this tension and ensure their existence on a support for service basis.

The purpose of this section is to assess the extent to which the squads are satisfying the service requirements of the local police departments and the extent to which the local chiefs perceive S.E.C.C. as having improved the level of service provided local police. Evaluating the service goal is complicated by several factors. First of all, the fact that S.E.C.C. and the squads must efficiently attack organized drug distribution and also demonstrate tangible service to client departments has resulted in rather inspecific definitions of what constitutes adequate service to local departments. To specify a fixed limit of adequate service would be operationally disastrous for S.E.C.C. since it may alienate crucial sectors of its environment on which S.E.C.C. depends for resources. However, functional this may be for S.E.C.C. and the squads, it complicates the evaluation process tremendously. How can one assess success against a standard that has never been set?

A second and seemingly omnipresent complication in evaluation is the lack of adequate control data to assess the change in squad service over time. Unless the crucial information is contained in records such as the case information used in the previous section no bench mark is possible.

These problems are solved to an extent if one employs the successful retailer's maxim--the customer is always right. If, as S.E.C.C. says, the primary function of the squads is to provide service to the local police, then the local police as clients will be in the best position to determine adequate levels of service. Similarly, as clients, the local police are uniquely equipped to provide an assessment of squad effectiveness over time and thereby serve as a control. To be sure, an objective control would be more desirable,

but since none is at hand, this impressionistic control must suffice. It would be hard to conceive of a more knowledgeable panel of experts on the crime problems of state municipalities. The logic used here is that the consumers are the only significant audience for a product and a product which does not satisfy the consumer should be modified or scrapped.

In order to determine consumer opinion, a sample of Connecticut police chiefs was selected. The sample totaled 48 out of a population of 86 and was structured by size of department and by region so as to be representative of the entire state. An explication of the sampling procedure is contained in Appendix 5.<sup>6</sup> Interviewers talked with each chief in the sample to determine his evaluation of the squad performance. The interviewers used a structured instrument to ensure comparability of responses between respondents. The interview was designed to answer the following questions:

- (1) Is there a continuing need for the service rendered by the Connecticut Regional Crime Squads?
- (2) What would constitute adequate service from the squads?
- (3) Are you satisfied with the level of service provided by the squads and the manner in which it is provided?
- (4) Has S.E.C.C. improved the service provided by the squads?

The sections that follow will address each of the above questions in evaluating the extent to which the squads have adequately provided service to local police.

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<sup>6</sup> See Appendix.5

2.1 Is There a Continuing Need for the Service Rendered by the Connecticut Regional Crime Squads?

As mentioned previously, the Regional Crime Squads were created in response to the drug epidemic of the late sixties and early seventies. Since that time popular opinion and some expert opinion has indicated that the drug epidemic is, in fact, over. Before assessing the effectiveness of the squads as a criteria for their continuance, one should pause to ask if the service is still needed. The local police chiefs provide an especially good indicator of need, in that they have the ability to situate the drug problem in the wider spectrum of enforcement problems. Objective indicators may measure the degree to which a problem has increased or lessened, but they are hard pressed to determine if, given changes in the entire enforcement picture, an objective lessening of the drug problem indicates a lessening in the relative priorities. To be sure, one pays a price in using subjective measures but in this case the benefit far outweighs the potential cost.

In order to determine the salience of drug enforcement problems and consequently the need for squad services two questions were asked. The first simply asked the respondent to rank several categories of crime in order of their urgency or importance as enforcement problems. ... "This list contains several enforcement problems common to police agencies throughout the U.S. Please rank

\_\_\_\_\_

these problems in order of their importance for this town. Indicate the problem you consider most urgent or pressing first. The second most urgent should be mentioned next and so on."

- Preventing or controlling juvenile delinquency
- Controlling prostitution
- Controlling gambling
- Solving burglaries
- Controlling traffic in drugs
- Traffic control
- Family disputes
- Controlling violent crimes
- Murder investigation
- Controlling muggings and rapes (street crime)
- Other (please specify)

The purpose of this question was to determine the importance of controlling drug traffic in the context of other problems confronting the chief. A high ranking (illustrated by a low score) for "controlling drug traffic" would indicate that the service provided by the squads is still in great demand. The rankings attributed by each respondent were summed and divided by the number of respondents completing the question to obtain an average. The lowest average indicates the highest priority crime.

	<u>Crime Area</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average Rank</u>
1)	Solving Burglaries	1	2.2
2)	Controlling Traffic in Drugs	2	2.6
3)	Preventing or Controlling Juvenile Delinquency	3	2.9
4)	Traffic Control	4	4.0

Crime Area	Rank	Average Rank
5) Family Disputes	5	4.6
6) Controlling Violent Crimes	6	5.8
7) Controlling Muggings and Rapes	7	5.9
8) Controlling Gambling	8	6.4
9) Murder Investigation	9	8.8
10) Controlling Prostitution	10	9.1

This priority ranking seems to indicate that if the drug epidemic is indeed over, it is not over in the minds of over half the police officials in Connecticut. Controlling drug traffic is second only to solving burglaries in the minds of policemen. Surely, these are rankings of average scores and therefore do not exactly represent the mind of one or every police chief. It is simply a summary of all opinions. The variance of the individual scores is not great, however, with 1, 2, or 3 being recorded with the most frequency.

An interesting feature of this ranking is that it appears to respond largely to the volume of offenses in the particular areas. Murder, for instance, is a much more grievous crime than burglaries but it received a much less significant place in the rankings. This quality of the ranking can be drawn too far since traffic offenses surely outnumber burglaries, yet traffic control is afforded less importance than drug control. Obviously, there is more than one dimension operating here. What the ranking does indicate, however, is that drug violations are still one of the most significant enforcement problems for local police.

A second question was asked to determine the need for squad services. This question was more direct and included specific reference to the squads.

"Some individuals have recently suggested that the crime epidemic has diminished and that there is no longer a great need for the Regional Crime Squads. Do you agree that the Crime Squads are no longer needed in Connecticut?"

The responses to this question were recorded in a Likert-type scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The results are as follows:

<u>Need for Squad Service Q #15</u>				
Reply to: Do you Agree That the Crime Squads are no Longer Needed in Connecticut?				
<u>Strongly Agree</u>	<u>Agree</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>
2%	5%	5%	17%	71%
(1)	(2)	(2)	(7)	(31)

The opinion of the chiefs is overwhelmingly opposed to the disbanding of the Regional Crime Squads. This coupled with the priority ranking afforded drug problems seems to indicate that there is still a need for the services provided by the regional crime squads.

Simply asking the question whether the crime squads' services are still necessary is not sufficient if it is not asked in a cost/benefit framework. As posed above, the chief has no exchange in which he can set the value of squad service. Previously, he was presented with a situation in which ranking drug enforcement high in priority would deprive him of putting another crime in that same priority rank. Before ranking the chief had to establish the market

value of each crime relative to other crime categories. People are much more likely to assent to something if they can foresee no cost to themselves in doing so.

In order to get some idea of the strength of need for squad services, the respondents were presented with the hypothetical situation in which the towns were forced to absorb the cost of maintaining the squads and S.E.C.C. This hypothetical situation did not specify the extent of local support and, therefore, the question does not provide an internal measure of desire for squad services. It does, however, indicate whether the need for squad services is stronger than a casual "no skin off my back."

Willingness to Finance Squads Q #17

Reply to: There is a possibility that Federal Funds to support the crime squads will be lessened in the near future and the financial burden of the squads will fall upon the local towns. Would you be in favor of the town supporting the squads by means of a per capita service charge?

<u>Strongly in favor</u>	<u>In favor</u>	<u>No opinion</u>	<u>Opposed</u>	<u>Strongly opposed</u>
43%	31%	12%	2%	12%
74%		12%		14%

When an element of cost is interjected, the need for squad services lessens somewhat, but it still remains extremely strong. This can be seen more clearly when the responses are grouped in three categories--in favor, opposed, and no opinion. With no element of cost 84% of all respondents claim that the squads' service is essential. When the local towns are asked to support this endeavor 74% of the chiefs are in favor of maintaining the squads even when it may mean a cut in the police budget.

Taken together the responses to the questions mentioned above provide striking evidence of the perceived need for squad services. The high priority afforded controlling drug traffic and the willingness to contribute to the support of the squads indicates that there is still a need for the Regional Crime Squads.

A warning should accompany the question concerning the willingness to support the squads in the event of a drop in Federal funds. This question cannot be used to indicate the attitude of towns toward assuming the entire burden of the squads, or even a large part of that burden. The question carried no estimate of the financial demands to be made on the towns so it must be interpreted simply as an expression of need for squad services, not as an indication that the towns are willing to assume the entire cost of the squads.

2.2 What would constitute Adequate Service by the Regional Crime Squads?

Given that the Regional Crime Squads' services are still in demand by local police chiefs, we must identify a standard of adequate service against which the delivery of service may be evaluated. The chiefs were asked to specify what they would consider sufficient service by the Regional Crime Squads. The intent was to identify specific standards for the two types of service provided by the squads: (1) response to requests for service and (2) making cases in regional towns.

Definition of Service Q #13

Reply to: "Which of these statements most closely describes what you would consider adequate service by the Regional Crime Squad?"

- 1 ( ) I would be satisfied if the R.C.S. responded to all requests for service made by this department.
- 2 ( ) I would be satisfied if the R.C.S. made as many cases in this town as they do in other regional towns.
- 3 ( ) I would be satisfied if the R.C.S. made cases proportionate to our share of the total regional population.
- 4 ( ) I would be satisfied if the R.C.S. made cases in this town proportionate to the number of men contributed to the squads by this department.
- 5 ( ) I would be satisfied if the towns with the most severe drug problems received the greatest amount of service."

No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	Total
7% (3)	36% (15)	5% (2)	9% (4)	7% (3)	36% (15)	100% (42)

It is evident from the above table that the overwhelming majority of chiefs feel that the squads' performance should be judged by one of two standards--their response to requests for service and their response to the severity of the drug problem. In the section which follows these two standards will be used to determine the success of the crime squads.

The definition of service has a form as well as a content. Very often, the manner in which service is provided is as important as the provision of the service itself. Again, S.E.C.C. and the squads have, of necessity, remained fairly vague as to a uniform mode of operation in the delivery of service. The obligations of the squad members to the local towns when providing service has been addressed only recently in the interlocal agreements between the squads and the local towns. In order to adequately evaluate the form of service delivery some idea of the expected mode of operation which they believed the squads should follow when servicing the town

i.e., either responding to a request for service or simply making a case. The responses to the question were arranged on a continuum from absolute freedom from local control to absolute control by the local police agency.

Desired Mode of Operation Q #6

Reply to: Which of the following statements best describes the way in which the squads should operate?

- 1 ( ) The squads should pursue investigations in this town only at the request of this department.
- 2 ( ) The squads should pursue investigations in this town only with the prior consent and notification of this department.
- 3 ( ) Squads need not consult this department before pursuing investigations in this town, but activity reports should be sent to the department frequently and certainly before warrants are issued in the town.
- 4 ( ) Squads should pursue investigations in this town without consulting the department except in the case that they encounter information of immediate interest to the department.

No opinion	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	Total
2% (1)	5% (2)	40% (17)	40% (17)	12% (5)	99%* (42)

\*Discrepancy due to rounding

It is obvious that the majority of local chiefs desire some type of control over the squads either in the form of prior notification of operations in the town or in the form of frequent activity reports. A number of chiefs indicating the desirability of prior notification qualified this statement by acknowledging that exigencies of the case may not always permit such notification, but that they should be notified as soon as possible in any event. In the following section the congruence between the real and ideal mode of operation will be reviewed.

2.3 Do the Crime Squads Provide an Adequate Level of Service in the Appropriate Manner?

In answering this question, the areas of level of service and form of service delivery will be taken separately. All of the respondents were asked to provide a general evaluation of the service delivered by the squads. In addition, specific questions addressed the response of the squad to requests for service and the relative severity of drug problems in regional towns. Lastly, all respondents were asked to characterize the actual mode of operation for the squads and the resulting responses were correlated with the previous typification of the ideal mode of service delivery.

The general evaluation of the level of squad service indicates overall satisfaction with the level of squad service, though this satisfaction is by no means universal.

General Evaluation of Squad Performance Q #9

Reply to: Generally, would you say that the service the squad provides to you is 1) very good, 2) good, 3) fair, 4) poor, or 5) very poor?

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Total</u>
29% (12)	33% (14)	19% (8)	14% (6)	5% (2)	100% (42)
62% (26)	19% (8)	19% (8)			100% (42)

The majority of the chiefs said that the squads are doing a good or a very good job in delivering service. There is, however, a substantial minority which is not satisfied with the service of the squads.

The specific reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction can be understood more clearly if we examine the relationship of expectation to performance. Of those respondents who had ever requested service from the regional crime squads, 56% claimed that the squads always responded to these requests. Another 25% claimed that the squads usually responded to requests for service. Only 8% of the respondents claimed that the squads responded sometimes, 8% claimed that the squads seldom responded, and 3% claimed that the squads never respond to requests for service. Generally, the squads respond well to requests for service made by local police.

Squad Response to Requests for Service Q #12  
(controlling for requests Q #11)

Reply to: Does the squad respond to your requests - 1) always, 2) usually, 3) sometimes, 4) seldom, 5) never?

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>Total</u>
56% (22)	25% (10)	8% (3)	8% (3)	3% (1)	100% (39)
81% (32)		8% (3)	11% (4)		100% (39)

A juxtaposition of the general evaluation with the specific evaluation of response to service indicates that the chiefs are more satisfied with the response to requests for service than they are with squad performance overall.

Evaluation of Squad Response to Requests for Service by Scores on General Evaluation

	<u>Good</u>	<u>Fair</u>	<u>Poor</u>	<u>Total</u>
Scores on general evaluation of service	62%	19%	19%	100%
Scores on responses to requests for service	81%	8%	11%	100%

This table suggests that other factors, such as the number of investigations pursued in a specific town or the method of delivering service may be causing dissatisfaction.

The second standard of performance--that of response to the severity of the drug problem--is somewhat more difficult to measure, since the exact nature of the drug problem is not known. Some indication of the relative need for squad services in each region can be obtained by asking the chiefs to rank regional towns in order of their need for squad services. The chiefs interviewed were asked to list the three towns in their region with the most severe drug problem. Those chosen the most was ranked first, the second most prevalent choice second, etc. The resultant ranking of towns by need is as follows:

Capitol	Regions - In Order of Rank			
	So. West	So. Central	Eastern	Naugatuck
1) Hartford	1) Bridgeport	1) New Haven	1) Willimantic	1) Waterbury
2) New Britain	Norwalk	2) West Haven	2) Norwich	2) Ansonia
3) Middletown	2) Stamford	3) Meridan	3) New London	3) Torrington
4) West. Htfd.	3) Stratford	4) Hamden.		Naugatuck
5) East Htfd.		Wallingford		4) Derby
Bristol				

The level of service provided by the squads was measured by the number of cases made in each town, as indicated in the sample of cases mentioned previously. The town with the greatest number of

cases was ranked first, the town with the next largest number of cases was ranked second, and so on. If the squads are, in fact, providing service in accordance with need, then the ranking of towns by need for service should roughly correspond to the ranking of towns by level of service (based on the sample of squad cases used previously). The following table indicates the rank of the above towns on measures of both service and need.

Rankings on Service and Need by Town					
Town	Need Rank	Service Rank	Town	Need Rank	Service Rank
Hartford	1	1	Stratford	3	9
New Britain	2	3	New Haven	1	1
Middletown	3	2	West Haven	2	4
West Hartford	4	4	Meriden	3	3
East Hartford	5	5	Hamden	4	6
Bristol	5	4	Wallingford	5	5
Bridgeport	1	1	Willimantic	1	2
Norwalk	1	5	Norwich	2	3
Stamford	2	2	New London	3	1
Waterbury	1	1	Naugatuck	3	6
Ansonia	2	3	Derby	4	4
Torrington	3	2			

Service ranks were regressed on need ranks resulting in a correlation coefficient (r) of .51. The correlation coefficient can vary between -1 and +1. A coefficient of zero would indicate

that there is no relationship between service and need. A correlation of +1 would indicate a perfect positive correspondence of perceived need and service, a -1 a perfect negative correspondence. In light of the possible range of variation, squad service is moderately related to need for service, but this correspondence is not perfect.

This measure must be treated with caution, however, since it is based on an ordinal, not an interval, measure of service. It is possible, for instance, that the first and second rankings may be only one or two cases apart. On the other hand, the first and second ranks may be extremely different. In either of these cases the service received may not be in proportion to need, though they may be in order of need.

In terms of a general evaluation of service, an evaluation of response to requests for service, and an evaluation of response to perceived need, the crime squads seem to be providing adequate service in the majority of cases. The chiefs are by and large satisfied with the squads response to service. They are somewhat less satisfied with squad service overall. Part of this dissatisfaction may be due to the discrepancy between perceived need and the actual level of service. There is a moderate correlation between perceived need and level of service, but a gap still exists.

A second factor in explaining the dissatisfaction of a minority of police chiefs may be found in the mode of service delivery rather than in the level of service itself. Preliminary research in 1972 suggested that some police chiefs were anxious about a fairly autonomous police unit functioning in their jurisdiction. Concern

focused on the issues of communication and control. Would the squads inform the local police of their activity in local jurisdictions? How and when would this communication take place? What control would local police have over squad operations in their town?

The mode of operation question described earlier indicates that the majority of chiefs would be satisfied if the squads notified their departments when operating in town or provided periodic reports of squad activity. The chiefs were asked to indicate not only the ideal mode of operation for the squad, but also the actual manner in which the squads functioned. More than seventy-three percent, (73%) of the respondents indicated a congruence between the real and ideal mode of operation for the regional squads. In the majority of cases the squads have been able to establish a satisfactory working relationship with the local police vis a vis communications and control.

The source of dissatisfaction among a number of police chiefs is best determined by examining the questions referring to problem areas. Controlling for evaluation of squad performance, the single greatest complaint among chiefs rating squad service as poor is the fact that squads are viewed as dominated by larger towns. More than sixty-eight percent (68%) of all chiefs expressing a fair or poor rating of squad service mentioned large town dominance as a problem. Only eleven percent (11%) of the towns expressing satisfaction with squad service mentioned large town dominance as a problem. This dissatisfaction is supported somewhat by case sample statistics. Warrants in the five largest cities for 1973 totalled 43% of total squad production. According to the market theories employed by S.E.C.C. and the squads, cases made at the distribution point (i.e.: large cities) impact the entire region. Suburban dealers and users

must come to the large cities to purchase drugs, and therefore cases made in the central city benefit the entire region. This is plausible and may very well be the case. These findings indicate, however, that the major cause of dissatisfaction among chiefs is the dominance of larger cities in both case production and in squad control. Whatever the validity of the market theory and the emphasis on larger urban centers, a dissatisfied minority of chiefs do not believe it or have not been exposed to it.

In summary, the local police are generally satisfied with both the level of service provided by the Regional Crime Squads and the manner in which it is provided. The squads are responsive to requests for service from local towns and, by and large, the squads have been able to satisfy the local towns' needs for communication and control. The single greatest area of dissatisfaction with squad services stems from the belief that larger towns have disproportionate control over the squads and service.

2.4 Has S.E.C.C. Improved the Level of Service Afforded the Local Towns?

In addition to improving the production of the squads (i.e.: move toward middle level) S.E.C.C. was given the charge of ensuring adequate service to local towns. This goal was slighted somewhat in the original evaluation, but subsequent meetings with S.E.C.C. and C.P.C.C.A. evaluation staff members established the importance of S.E.C.C.'s role in ensuring and improving service to towns. By establishing standard operating procedures and a governing body to ensure accountability, S.E.C.C. was intended to prevent and rectify discrepancies in the level of service to local towns and improprieties

in the mode of delivery. Chiefs who thought that they had not received service would have recourse to the S.E.C.C. Board. Similarly, with the mode of operation specified in formal agreements or less formal arrangements, the local police could approach S.E.C.C. with any breaches of these practices. Granted, some of these intended improvements have not been implemented formally (i.e.: interlocal agreements, standard operating procedures), but the extent to which S.E.C.C. has established itself as an equilibrating mechanism between the squads and their clients should be manifest in the perceptions of the chiefs. An ideal measure of the change in squad service as a result of S.E.C.C. would be obtained by a panel survey with one panel conducted prior to S.E.C.C. and the second conducted at the current time. The change in perceived service between the two panels could then be attributed to S.E.C.C. Since this is not possible, we have asked the chiefs to assess the change in service over time.

Change in Service Over Time

Reply to: Have you noticed any change in the service that the squad provides you? (If yes) Has it improved or worsened, in your opinion, since it began in 1970?

<u>No opinion</u>	<u>Improved</u>	<u>Worsened</u>	<u>Same</u>	<u>Total</u>
2%	17%	19%	62%	100%
(1)	(7)	(8)	(26)	(42)

As the above table indicates, the majority of the respondents have detected little or no change in the service provided by the squads (62%). Those respondents who have seen some change are

approximately evenly divided as to the direction of the change. This provides no clear indication of S.E.C.C.'s impact on squad service. One can only say that, in the minds of most police chiefs, there has been no change in squad service over time.

When the chiefs were asked to draw a direct relationship between S.E.C.C.'s efforts and the performance of the squads, however, the picture changes somewhat.

Change in Squad Service since S.E.C.C. Q #36

Reply to: Would you say that the service of the squads to the towns has 1) improved significantly, 2) improved somewhat, 3) not changed, 4) become worse, 5) become much worse?

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>no opinion</u>
19%	17%	38%	17%	-	9%
(8)	(7)	(16)	(7)		(4)
36%		38%		17%	9%
(15)	(16)		(7)		(4)

The proportion of chiefs claiming that squad service has improved more than doubled when linked with S.E.C.C.'s efforts. The apparent contradiction in these findings can be better interpreted if one examines the explanations given for the above responses. The majority of respondents attributing an improvement in squad service to S.E.C.C. referred to superior administration and communication as the reason for their positive evaluation. Those respondents expressing dissatisfaction referred more to lack of service rather than administrative questions. One interpretation that follows from this data is that the chiefs view the squads as administratively more

efficient as a result of S.E.C.C., but this more efficient administration has not led to a noticeably greater level of service.

Further evidence for this position is given by responses to questions involving direct evaluation of S.E.C.C.'s efforts.

Direct Evaluation of S.E.C.C. Q #35

Reply to: In general, do you think that S.E.C.C. is doing 1) a very good job, 2) a good job, 3) a poor job, or 4) a very poor job? Why do you say that?

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>no opinion</u>	<u>Total</u>
14%	38%	12%	-	36%	100%
(6)	(16)	(5)	-	(15)	(42)
52%		12%		36%	100%
(22)		(5)		(15)	(42)

More than fifty-two percent of the sample said that S.E.C.C. is doing a good or a very good job. This represents a 16 percentage point increase over the proportion of respondents attributing improved service to the activities of S.E.C.C. The explanation of responses again provides a valuable tool for interpreting the results. The most often cited reason for approving of S.E.C.C.'s performance were the improved flow of information about squad activities and more efficient overall administration. In a few instances, improved response to requests for service was mentioned as a reason for positive evaluation. Generally, it was the administrative improvements of S.E.C.C. which accounted for the favorable view of S.E.C.C.'s performance.

The conclusions to be drawn from these findings are that S.E.C.C. has been fairly successful in improving the administration

of service, but that these improvements have not been transferred directly into improved service per se. A number of respondents mentioned manpower constraints that prevented the squads from providing greater service to local towns.

A word should be said concerning the very high proportion of respondents saying that they did not have any opinion about the performance of S.E.C.C. This non-response rate would certainly cast considerable doubt on the validity of the findings. The open ended question that followed the evaluation of S.E.C.C.'s performance does provide some interpretation of this high non-response rate. The most prevalent reason given for non-response was simply a lack of contact with and knowledge of S.E.C.C. Of the seventeen (17) respondents failing to answer, six (6) mentioned insufficient knowledge and contact with S.E.C.C. as the reason. Five respondents refused to explain why they had no opinion on the subject. If we assume that those claiming insufficient knowledge are answering truthfully, and if we further assume that the five who refused to answer were unwilling to give their true opinion and that this true opinion is not favorable toward S.E.C.C., the above table still indicates that the local police think that S.E.C.C. is doing a good job.

## 2.5 Summary

This section began by posing four questions around which the evaluation would be structured. It is only fitting that the summary should be structured as responses to these questions.

### 1) Is there a continuing need for the services rendered by the Regional Crime Squads?

The chiefs questioned overwhelmingly agreed that the Regional Crime Squads had not outlived their usefulness. Controlling drug traffic is still high in local police priorities and the chiefs strongly oppose the discontinuance of the squads.

### 2) What would constitute adequate service from the squad?

The definition of adequate service has remained vague since the inception of the squads and it is necessary to define these standards before evaluating them. The majority of the chiefs interviewed would be satisfied if the squads responded to all requests for service and made cases in towns in proportion to the severity of their drug problem. In terms of the mode of service delivery, chiefs would be satisfied if the squads notified them of activities in their town during the investigations or provided periodic reports on squad cases in the town.

### 3) Are the chiefs satisfied with the level of service provided by the squads and the manner in which it is provided?

In general, the majority of chiefs (62%) rate the service received by the squads as very good or good. When asked specifically if the squads respond to requests for service, over 81% of the sample claimed that the squads always or usually responded. In order to assess the extent to which the squads provide service according to need, the chiefs were asked to rank the towns in their region with the most severe drug problem. The ranked towns were also given a received-service rank on the basis of the number of cases. The town in which the most cases were made was ranked first, etc. When the need rank was regressed on the service rank

the result was a correlation coefficient of .51, that indicates that squad service is moderately correlated with need for service. The level of squad service must be redistributed somewhat to achieve a perfect correlation with perceived need. The dissatisfaction with squad service that does exist most probably originates with the inequities between need and service.

Chiefs are generally satisfied with the manner in which squads operate in their jurisdiction. A few chiefs are dissatisfied with the communications between the local departments and the squads, but this remains a small minority.

4) Has S.E.C.C. improved the service provided by the squads?

The majority of the chiefs who responded said that S.E.C.C. was doing a good job. This approval generally referred to improvements in communications with the squads or increased administrative efficiency. The chiefs, however, have not seen a corresponding improvement in the service received by the squads. Many chiefs cite manpower shortages and other constraints as inhibiting improvement in the delivery of service. In short, S.E.C.C. has improved the administration of the squads, but these administrative improvements have not overcome certain environmental (esp: manpower) constraints to better service.

3.0 Systems Impact of S.E.C.C.

The police at all levels of government are dependent organizations whose ultimate effectiveness is determined by the activities of other organizations. The ability to make an arrest is, to be sure, a formidable power; yet the exact meaning of the arrest is determined by the court. The court (i.e.: judge, prosecutor, states attorney etc.) sets the charge, decides guilt or innocence, and sentences the arrested party. The anger caused among policemen by this dependent situation is evidenced by the oft heard complaint that the man arrested today is free tomorrow. Earlier in this report, we dismissed the idea of evaluating the impact of the squads because of the untold number of intervening variables (e.g.: Federal and local enforcement efforts, changes in usage patterns etc.) which would invalidate the results. It was decided that output or production of the squads would serve as an adequate measure of squad effectiveness over time. In the following section, we will go one step beyond output and examine the interrelationship between the squads and the courts. This information is still several times removed from the direct assessment of impact on the drug market, but it will provide some information concerning the congruity of efforts in the squads and the court. Without coordination among the squads, the courts and corrections, the output of the squads will be deflected from its goal of reducing drug traffic.

The congruence of squad policy and court performance will be examined within the framework of several questions:

- 1) Are drug dealers, arrested as a result of crime squad warrants, removed from drug distribution channels?

2) Do the courts sentence differently according to the substance involved in the case?

3) Is there any variation in the sentencing of large and small volume dealers?

Several cautionary statements should preface this presentation. First, this analysis takes the perspective of the optimum efficiency of the squads and therefore its conclusions will be heavily weighted toward obtaining this end. It is possible that a given incongruity between court policy and squad policy may be detrimental to squad efficiency, but necessary for court functions. In these instances, the duties and goals of the court will be considered, but the efficiency of the squad will remain of primary concern. Secondly, the data used in this section must be regarded with some caution. The sample used here is approximately one half the size of the sample used in the first section. As a result the accuracy of this sample will be reduced as will the flexibility of the sample for analytical purposes.<sup>7</sup> The attrition in the sample is due largely to the inability to locate squad cases in court files. This could be explained by any number of factors - the local police fail to serve warrants, inaccurate or incomplete data on a defendant (e.g.: misspelled names), inaccurate copying of defendant identification by the data collection staff etc. In addition a systematic bias was introduced into the sample by the circuit courts' refusal to disclose information concerning nollies, youthful offenders, pending or continued cases, and bind overs. This particular bias must be kept in mind when reviewing the data presented here.

<sup>7</sup> Exact confidence intervals for the sample are included in appendix.

3.2 Are drug dealers arrested as a result of squad warrants removed from the drug distribution network? What type of sentences have been given to defendants arrested as a result of squad warrants?

The actual sentencing pattern for squad defendants is the topic of much debate. In general, the police criticize the court for being too lenient thereby complicating the job of policing society. Lawyers, civil libertarians, and others say the courts are too severe. The following description will not resolve the disagreement, but it will provide an alternative to simply arguing prejudices and limited personal experience.

The first decision made by the court is the decision to convict. In very rough terms, this constitutes a judgement on the quality of squad cases. If the case is well prepared one would expect conviction and if not one would expect acquittal. The sample data indicates that 8% of squad cases are nollied in the court. This figure may be somewhat low because of the inaccessibility of nollied cases in the circuit court. Even if the circuit court data were to double the proportion of nollied cases, they would still comprise a very small percentage of squad cases. On the basis of this information it would seem that the cases made by the squads are "good" cases.

The complaint that the courts are too lenient (i.e. "everybody walks") generally does not apply simply to the proportion of cases nollied, but also to the extensive use of sentences that do not include a jail term. Approximately 47% of the sample received a sentence that did not include some form of incarceration. These sentences included (1) suspended sentence, (2) probation, (3) probation and a fine, (4) a fine only, and (5) outpatient drug treatment

More than 4% of the sample receive a suspended sentence, 3% were given probation and a fine, and 7% were given a fine. By far the most prevalent non-jail sentence was probation which was given to 29% of the sample defendants. The judgement as to whether or not this type of sentencing is too lenient obviously depends upon one's assumptions about the efficacy of prison as a deterrent to crime. If one believes that probation and other alternatives to incarceration provide sufficient structure to prevent an individual from returning to the drug trade, then the courts are not too lenient. Similarly if the experience of a trial and the eminent threat of jail is seen as adequate to dissuade the defendant from continued traffic in drugs, then, again, the court is not overly lenient. On the other hand, if one is convinced that only physically removing an individual from society will prevent him from selling drugs then the sentencing of the court is not sufficient.

If 8% of squad cases are nolleed and 47% are given non-jail sentences, then approximately 45% of squad defendants receive jail terms of varying duration. The specific breakdown of sentences is contained in the following table:

Distribution of Jail Terms

Inpatient Treatment	1 mo.-3 yrs.	2-5 yrs.	5-10 yrs.	10+	Indefinite
4.5%	6%	23%	3.5%	.5%	7.5%
(17)	(23)	(86)	(13)	(2)	(28)

The jail sentence categories in the above table represent minimum and maximum sentences received by defendants. The category 1 month to 3 years, for instance, includes all sentences having minimum term of not less than one month and a maximum term of not more than 3 years.

Similarly the category "2 years to 5 years" includes all sentences that have a minimum value of 2 years or more and a maximum value of 5 years or less. The category 10+ years contains all sentences whose maximum value is 10 years or more. The Inpatient Treatment category refers to all referrals to the Commissioner of Mental Health. The indefinite sentence category refers to a flexible sentencing format generally reserved for youthful offenders.

It is obvious from the table that the majority of squad defendants that received a jail sentence are usually sentenced for at least two, but no more than five years. It is extremely unusual for a defendant to be sentenced to a maximum sentence of 10 years or more. It is surprising that there are so few sentences in the category from 5 to 10 years, since the prescribed sentence for sale of narcotics or controlled drugs is 5 to 7 years in jail. Another curious pattern is the relatively infrequent use of inpatient treatment sentences. Either the traditional image of the addict pusher is false or the courts simply do not use drug treatment facilities.\*

From the squads perspective, the reluctance of the court to impose the maximum sentence for certain drug sellers limits the effectiveness of the squads. The use of alternatives to incarceration can be interpreted as impeding or enhancing squad effectiveness depending on one's view of various correctional techniques. The consistent failure to impose prescribed sentences for the sale of narcotics, however, can be better explained by the organizational practices of the courts than any conceptual disagreement over the role of the courts. In short, plea bargaining seems to be the most

\* It should be noted that addicted defendants sentenced to prison may receive treatment in prison.

plausible explanation for not imposing maximum sentences on drug dealers. Several factors indicate that plea bargaining may be influential. First, the two to five year sentence is characteristic of dispositions for possessing narcotics. A defendant will be charged initially with both possession and sale of narcotics. In the plea bargaining process the defendant will change his plea of not guilty to guilty in return for having the sentence for sale (i.e.: 5-7 years) suspended. As a result, the defendant only serves the sentence for possession of narcotics (i.e. 2-5 years). A second indication of plea bargaining is the type of plea entered in court. More than 77% of sample defendants presented a plea of guilty in court. Though the guilty plea need not necessarily indicate plea bargaining, it is not to the defendants advantage to plead guilty without having some sort of incentive in the form of a 'deal'. To be sure, sentencing is extremely complex and involves many variables not included here. However the infrequent imposition of the standard sentence, the relatively frequent application of the standard sentence on the lesser charge, and the prevalence of the guilty plea in court seem to indicate the existence of extensive plea bargaining.

In sum, more than half the defendants arrested on crime squad warrants are not incarcerated. The extent to which this type of sentencing actually inhibits the impact of the squads cannot be readily assessed. It depends to a large extent on ones assumptions concerning the efficacy of alternatives to incarceration. In general, if one assumes that incarceration is the only effective means of

preventing a defendant from selling drugs, then the sentencing pattern of the courts seriously inhibit the potential effectiveness of the squads.

### 3.2 Do the courts sentence defendants differently according to the substance involved?

The courts treatment of cases involving various drug substances is important for two reasons (1) the squads have no formal policy affording priority to one drug category over another and (2) the nature of the drug involved may clarify the sentencing pattern discussed in the previous section. Since the squads have no formal policy stressing one type of drug over another, it is interesting to note the courts policy in this area. If these policies are not congruent the return on the squads' investment of time and effort may be significantly less for some drug substances. Similarly, if the courts sentence differently according to drug substance, then controlling for drug sentence may provide further explanation of the particular sentencing pattern discussed earlier.

In the following table, the sample of defendants was grouped according to the nature of the substance sold to crime squad agents. The first category refers to marijuana and hashish, the second to amphetamine and hallucinagens, the third to L.S.D. and barbiturates, the final category to opium derivatives and methadone. These groupings are arranged on a dimension of soft to hard drugs with category one being the softest drug and category four being the hardest drug. The sentencing dimension of the table is divided into two categories. Ranging from the least severe sentence to the most severe sentence. The first grouping contains all sentencing

alternatives which do not involve incarceration. The second category includes all dispositions which do involve incarceration. Nolles and indefinite sentences are omitted from the table:

Sentence Received by Type of Drug Involved # 1

Sentence	Type of Drug				Hard
	Soft				
	1	2	3	4	
Not incarcerated	82% (85)	85% (17)	80% (12)	30% (47)	55% (161)
Incarcerated	18% (19)	15% (3)	20% (3)	70% (108)	45% (133)
	100% (104)	100% (20)	100% (15)	100% (155)	100% (294)

Chi Sq. = 79.39 with 3 degrees of freedom significance = .001  
 $\gamma = .514$

The table indicates that there is a significant ( $\chi^2 = 79.39$ ) relationship between the type of drug involved in a case and whether the defendant is sentenced to jail. Not only is this relationship significant but it is also quite strong ( $\gamma = .514$ ) An individual arrested for selling opium derivatives is roughly four times as likely to be imprisoned as a defendant selling softer drugs.

A more complete picture of the relationship between type of drug and sentence imposed can be obtained by expanding the sentence dimensions and dichotomizing the drug categories into the very hard and very soft drugs (i.e. opiate derivatives and cannabis derivatives).

Sentence Received by Type of Drug Involved # 2

Sentence	Type of Drug		
	Soft	Hard	
Not incarcerated	81% (84)	22% (34)	46% (118)
Treatment	7% (7)	15% (23)	12% (30)
1 mon. - 5 years	10% (11)	47% (73)	32% (84)
5 - 10+ years	2% (2)	16% (25)	10% (27)
	100% (104)	101%* (155)	100% (259)

Chi Sq. = 88.87 with 3 degrees of freedom  
 significance .001  
 $\gamma = .595$

\* Due to rounding error

The sentence dimension of the above table is somewhat different than that of the previous table. The not incarcerated category is essentially the same. The treatment category includes both out-patient and inpatient treatment. The categories for years in prison include all sentences whose minimum term is not less than the first value and whose maximum term does not exceed the second value.

The table indicates that hard drug dealers arrested by the squads are not only much more likely to be imprisoned but they are also more likely to be imprisoned for a longer period than defendants selling softer drugs. If one measured squad efficiency by years sentenced per case (i.e.: years in which a dealer is removed from the market) the efficiency of soft drug arrests is much less than that of hard drugs. In section 1.2 it was shown that there is a

trend toward more soft drug cases and fewer hard drug cases. Since soft drug cases are less likely to result in incarceration and more likely to result in shorter as opposed to longer sentences, the efficiency of the squads can be said to have lessened over time. This logic assumes, of course, that only incarceration will remove an individual from drug distribution channels.

If drug type is controlled for, the charge of excessively permissive sentencing patterns must be re-examined. Again assuming that incarceration is the only effective type of sentence, one could say that the court is overly lenient in sentencing soft drug dealers while the same could not be said of harder drug dealers (i.e. opium derivatives). An additional assumption is implicit in the statement and that is, the essential equality of drug types. One assumes that selling heroin is equal to selling softer drugs. Since S.E.C.C. has no set priorities for types of drugs, the equality assumption is implicit. This incongruity between squad policy and court procedure results in less than optimal impact for squad output. The solution seems to involve either a change in court policy or a change in squad policy or even a possible change in the law. In effect the courts have removed the criminal penalty for engaging in soft drug distribution. It would be more efficient, in terms of jail sentences for the squads to restrict their activity to harder drugs. Decriminalization of soft drug use and legalization and standardization of soft drug distribution would be a long term solution to this inefficiency. In the short term, a more feasible solution would have S.E.C.C. place greater formal priority on hard as opposed to soft drugs.

3.4 Do the courts sentence large volume dealers more severely than they do small volume dealers?

The entire first section of this report was concerned with the extent to which the squads have arrested larger volume dealers under the guidance of S.E.C.C. The concern here is whether the courts sentence large volume dealers more severely than small volume dealers. According to S.E.C.C.'s market theory, the larger volume dealer is a crucial link in the drug distribution chain. If he is removed from circulation a number of dependent dealers as well as the defendant himself will be without drugs. Therefore optimum efficiency would dictate that larger volume dealers be removed more often and for a longer period than smaller dealers.

The sample data indicate that there is no uniform relationship between size of buy and a person's sentence for cases involving hard drugs. The distribution is essentially the same for each quantity category. A similar result is obtained when years sentenced is regressed on the quantity

Sentence by Size of Buy for Hard Drugs

Sentence	Size of buy in Milligrams				
	0-60	60-240	240-480	480+	
not incarcerated	23% (9)	32% (25)	37% (7)	35% (6)	30% (47)
incarcerated	77% (30)	69% (55)	63% (12)	65% (11)	70% (108)
	100% (39)	100% (80)	100% (19)	100% (17)	100% (155)

Chi Sq. = 1.49 with 3 degrees of freedom - not significant

of hard drugs purchased. The  $r^2$  is .009, indicating no relationship between size of buy and length of sentence.

The treatment of defendants selling soft drugs (i.e. grass and hashish) is different from that of defendants selling hard drugs. There is a significant ( $X^2 = 7.6$ ) and persistent relationship between size of buy and the sentence received. The following table indicates that the larger the amount of soft drugs purchased the greater the likelihood of being incarcerated.

Sentence by size of buy for soft drugs

<u>Sentence</u>	<u>Size of buy in Ounces</u>			
	<u>1 oz. or less</u>	<u>1+ oz. to .8'oz.</u>	<u>.8+ oz.</u>	<u>8+ oz.</u>
Not incarcerated	94% (31)	84% (21)	65% (13)	83% (65)
Incarcerated	6% (2)	16% (4)	35% (7)	17% (13)
	100% (33)	100% (25)	100% (20)	(78)

Chi sq. = 7.6 with 3 degrees of freedom  
significance .025

Gamma = .875

These figures seem to indicate that the court usually gives its more severe sentences to squad defendants who deal "hard" drugs and those who deal in larger quantities of soft drugs. The return, in terms of removal from the drug market, on squad investments of time and money are less than optimal in cases other than those mentioned above. As mentioned earlier, this incongruity between squad policy and court procedure detracts from the potential impact of the squads on the drug market. Again, the resolution of this incongruity can be achieved by a revision of squad policy or court procedure. The more feasible revision seems to be that pertaining to squad policy.

The suggestion of policy revision raises a fundamental question concerning the squads - are they designed primarily as elite drug units or as regional service agencies? This in turn raises another fundamental question - who will finance the regional crime squads? The issues of congruence and efficiency bring these questions to the fore because they are ultimately connected. If the squads are designed to be elite drug units then they should concentrate on those types of defendants for which they will obtain the greatest return. Phrased somewhat differently, the squads should concentrate on those types of defendants who the court defines as sufficiently dangerous to remove from society. In attempting to optimize efficiency of course, the squads would necessarily neglect many towns in the region that do not have heroin dealers or large volume soft drug dealers. It is doubtful that these towns would subsidize the squads activity if they did not receive service. If the state government is willing to fully subsidize squad activities, then it would be feasible for the squads to change their policy to achieve maximum efficiency. If local towns will be expected to help finance squad activities, then the squads must tolerate less than optimum return on their efforts.

#### 4.0 Summary

The purpose of this report has been to evaluate the success of S.E.C.C. and the Regional Crime Squads in (1) making cases on larger volume dealers and (2) providing undercover investigative assistance to the local police. In the two years that the State-wide Enforcement Coordinating Committee has been in existence, several basic improvements have been made in squad support system to facilitate the pursuit of "middle level" drug dealers. The nature of this improvement and the extent to which they have been successful are addressed in the previous S.E.C.C. report. The sample data presented above examines the extent to which the squads have begun arresting middle level dealers since the introduction of the new systems. The progress in arresting higher level dealers has not been uniform for all drug substances. In the cases of heroin, significant progress has been made in arresting larger volume dealers since the creation of S.E.C.C. and the new support systems. Marijuana cases, however, have not involved larger volume dealers since S.E.C.C. began. Since the proportion of soft drugs cases is much greater than that involving heroin, overall measures of the change in squad case production over time does not indicate an evolution toward the middle level since the introduction of S.E.C.C. and the new support systems.

The success of S.E.C.C. and the crime squads in providing service to local police seems to be somewhat greater than their attempts to attack larger volume dealers. In general, squad clients (i.e. police chiefs) think that the squads are providing adequate service. When asked to evaluate the change in squad service over

time, however, the majority of chiefs think that the service has not changed. When asked to evaluate S.E.C.C.'s role in the provision of service, the proportion of respondents saying that service has improved doubles and is approximately equal to the proportion claiming no change. The explanation offered by respondents provides some explanation for this apparent contradiction. In general the chiefs noting no improvement in the first instance and improvement in the second, were referring to actual service delivery in the first instance and largely administrative improvements in the later instance. In sum, there is some indication that S.E.C.C. has improved the administration of squad service (i.e. information dissemination) but not the actual delivery of service to the local towns.

The final section of this report dealt with the handling of squad cases by the courts. The intent was to assess the effect of court sentencing patterns on the output and subsequently the impact of the crime squads. If court sentencing is not at least somewhat congruent with the goals and procedures of the squads, the impact of squad efforts will be significantly reduced. Only a very few defendants arrested on squad warrants had their cases nolleed in court.(8%). The sentencing pattern for hard drugs is much different than that for soft drugs. The courts are much more severe on defendants found guilty of selling heroin than those selling marijuana. Only 18% of defendants convicted for selling marijuana or hashish were sentenced to prison terms while 70% of the defendants convicted of selling opium derivatives received a prison sentence. The amount of drugs sold by a defendant was not a significant factor in the sentencing of defendants dealing in hard drugs. The size of

the buy was a significant factor in sentencing soft drug dealers, however. The greater the amount of soft drugs sold the greater the likelihood that the defendant will be incarcerated. Assuming that incarceration is the only means of removing dealers from drug distribution networks, then the sentencing pattern of the court severely reduces the potential impact of squad efforts.

#### 5.0 Recommendations

It is apparent from the data presented here that S.E.C.C. has not had a great deal of success in impacting the middle level of drug traffic or in improving the level of service afforded local towns. The import of these findings, however, is not equally obvious and a viable interpretation of the findings is dependent upon several assumptions not within the purview of this evaluation. In spite of S.E.C.C.'s failure to improve squad production or delivery of service, the squads have continued to produce the vast majority of warrants for the sale of narcotics or controlled substances in the state (approximately 1200 in 1973). In addition, a majority of local chiefs still perceive a tremendous need for the service provided by the squads, and a similar proportion express satisfaction with the level of service received. If more weight is given to attacking the middle level of drug traffic and improving the level of service, then substantial revision or even replacement of S.E.C.C. may be in order. If, however, one assumes that the orderly administration of satisfactory service to the local police is in itself sufficient, then S.E.C.C. and the squads should continue to receive support.

Assuming that the former criteria for success is chosen, and the decision made to replace S.E.C.C. and the squads with a different agency, the logical choice for a substitute would be the State Police. This choice occasions the question of whether or not local police departments will contribute men to what is essentially perceived as a state level operation. Without voluntary contributions of men by the local police, the cost for maintaining the squads would be prohibitive. Some indication of the probability of local departments contributing men can be obtained from the success of similar efforts with regard to OCTAFORCE. If this attempt to recruit local resources has not met with success, then the likelihood of a similar attempt succeeding is very small.

In the event that the State Police's alternative does not seem viable or necessary, some attempt should be made to restructure the organization of S.E.C.C. and the squads to facilitate improving service and production. S.E.C.C.'s inability to significantly improve service or production can be attributed to the interrelated problems of conflicting goals and lack of sufficient manpower. The goal of service demands that squad time, money, and energy be employed at the discretion of local police chiefs. If the local police perceive a problem, the squads must respond to the degree desired. This is to be done regardless of the type or amount of drugs dealt. If service, as defined above, is paramount, then it is unreasonable to expect the squads to simultaneously devote resources to investigating higher levels of drug traffic. Agents needed to pursue all possible leads and respond to all requests for service

cannot be expected to undertake the substantial background investigations necessary to apprehend middle level traffickers. Unless the manpower resources of the squads can be increased, it will be impossible to pursue both goals simultaneously. It is extremely difficult to recruit additional manpower; therefore, it would seem more feasible to adjust the role of the squads. The squads should be either elite drug units or regional service units, but not both.

If it is decided that S.E.C.C. and the squads should become an elite drug unit, some mechanism must be created to ensure squad manpower levels. Without the promise of tangible service, it is doubtful that local police will contribute men to the squads. One possible alternative is some form of reimbursement for towns that contribute men. In this way, the squads would be under no obligation to make lower level buys in the name of service and thereby neglect the pursuit of larger dealers. Similarly, by providing its own incentives (i.e.: essentially paying squad members) as opposed to completely relying on the local departments, S.E.C.C. will be better able to control the squads and to ensure compliance with the middle level policy.

If, on the other hand, it is decided that S.E.C.C. should become strictly a service agency, then some attempt must be made to provide somewhat more equitable service to the regional towns. The complaint of large city dominance is widespread. S.E.C.C.'s claim that the smaller jurisdictions would receive more service if they contributed more men is equally plausible. The discrepancy between the level of service provided large as opposed to smaller cities is generally proportionate to the number of men contributed and the extent of

participation in S.E.C.C. at all levels (i.e.: S.E.C.C. Board, squad commanders, etc.). If the smaller municipalities are to receive more service, then they must have more input into the squads and S.E.C.C. To be sure S.E.C.C. has always sought men from the smaller cities and towns, but the squad commanders have generally come from the central city in each region. The squad commander can tremendously influence the delivery of service and, consciously or unconsciously, commanders from the central city are likely to favor the central city. Similarly the large city chiefs are or have been heavily represented on the S.E.C.C. board and undoubtedly this influences the policy of S.E.C.C. and the squads. It is possible that by affording the smaller cities and towns more control in S.E.C.C., both the level of service to and supply of men from the smaller jurisdictions will increase. Placing more smaller city chiefs on the S.E.C.C. board and using personnel from smaller cities as supervisory staff in the squads may contribute to achieving a more equitable distribution of service.

In addition, a more specific definition of equitable service should be negotiated with the municipalities as part of the inter-local agreement. A fairly specific listing of the rights and duties of the towns and the will prevent faulting the squads for a town's unwarranted expectations. Admittedly, this specificity will make selling the interlocal agreements more difficult, but it will facilitate a more objective evaluation of squad service by the town and thereby ensure long term support for the squad.

## BY-LAWS

of the

STATEWIDE ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEEI. PURPOSE

The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee is formed for the purpose of determining policy and procedures and coordinating enforcement operations of the organized regional crime squads in the State of Connecticut.

II. MEMBERSHIP

A. Number The Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee shall be composed of a total of 15 persons.

B. Selection

1. Ten members shall be two representative chiefs of police from each of the five crime squad regions. Such chiefs shall be selected respectively by acclamation of a simple majority of the chiefs of police within the boundaries of each defined crime squad region.
2. Two members shall be appointed by and will serve as representatives of the Connecticut Planning Committee on Criminal Administration.
3. The Commissioner of the Connecticut State Police shall serve as a member.
4. Two Chiefs of Police shall be appointed as members-at-large by the above designated persons.
5. Representatives serving on the committee at the time of adoption shall constitute the initial membership of the committee.

C. Length of Term

1. All members shall serve a term of one year on the Statewide Enforcement Coordinating Committee.
2. Members may serve any number of consecutive terms provided that their appointment is annually reaffirmed by their designating bodies as stipulated in Section II B.

D. Loss of Membership

1. A member may be removed from membership at the discretion of the member's designating body at any time, and they reserve the right to appointment of a new member to serve for the removed member.

III. POWERS AND DUTIES

- A. The Committee shall have the power to establish and monitor the policies and procedures for operation of the regional crime squads of the State of Connecticut.
- B. The Committee shall have the power to undertake activities and adopt policies, for the coordination of law enforcement activities and operations of the regional crime squads.
- C. The Committee shall have the power to apply for, receive and disburse federal and state funds on behalf of and for the operation of the regional crime squads.
- D. The Committee shall have the power to establish operating budgets and determine allowable expenses for the regional crime squads.
- E. The Committee shall have the power to employ an appropriate staff of persons to assist them in the conduct of their business.

IV. OFFICERS

- A. The Committee shall select by simple majority vote a chairman, vice-chairman, and secretary-treasurer as officers of the Committee.
- B. The officers shall be selected on an annual basis.
- C. An officer may serve any number of consecutive terms, provided the officer's selection is annually reaffirmed by the Committee.
- D. The Chairman shall serve as the presiding member at all meetings of the Committee, shall act as arbiter in all disputes, and shall be responsible for interpreting and implementing policy enacted by the Committee.
- E. The vice-chairman shall serve as the Chairman in the absence of the Chairman, and shall assume all powers of the Chairman when doing so.

F. The secretary-treasurer shall serve as the interpreter of all matters of record of Committee business, and shall be responsible for all financial affairs and business of the Committee.

V. CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

- A. The Committee shall meet for the purpose of conducting business on at least six occasions during the calendar year.
- B. There shall be a total of fifteen votes for the conduct of business of the Committee. Each member shall exercise one vote.
- C. Eight votes shall be present to constitute a quorum for the conduct of business of the Committee.
- D. A simple majority of votes present shall be required to carry all motions offered for consideration of the Committee.
- E. The Committee shall follow accepted rules of parliamentary procedure in the conduct of business.
- F. Members may designate representatives to attend meetings, but the representative shall not vote in place of the member.

VI. ADOPTION OF BY-LAWS


The by-laws contained herein shall be considered adopted by a three-fourths majority of the present Committee at a scheduled business meeting.

VII. AMENDMENT OF BY-LAWS

The by-laws contained herein may be amended at any time at a scheduled business meeting by a three-fourths majority of the Committee members.

ADOPTED: SEPTEMBER 27, 1972

APPENDIX 2



01-401-6467a

### APPENDIX 3

The following summary of the first phase of the S.E.C.C. evaluation was prepared by Todd H. Taylor, the Executive Director of S.E.C.C. It provides a very brief, but accurate description of the major findings of the first evaluation.

#### MAJOR TOPICS OR AREAS COVERED IN REPORT

1. Description of mode of operation and problems of squads prior to creation of S.E.C.C.
2. Stated goals of success and analysis of relative degree of success in goal attainment.
3. Statement of existing problems, issues, and program deficiencies.
4. Analysis of attitudes of program participants and beneficiaries of squad service.
5. Set of recommendations based upon problem areas identified.

#### EVALUATION PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY

1. Analysis of S.E.C.C. and squads records and information.
2. Personal interviews with SECC members and staff, squad commanders, Chiefs of Police, and other law enforcement personnel.
3. An objective analysis by an unbiased observer.
4. Issues and problem areas have been "depersonalized" to permit inclusion of sensitive statements and personal viewpoints.
5. No conclusions drawn or inferences made as to causation factors for success and failure in goal attainment, unless substantiated by reliable and verifiable data.

## SUMMARY

### LEGITIMACY OF S.E.C.C.

Even though the legislation was passed, interlocal agreements must still be signed.

### STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

Formal set of comprehensive standard operating procedures needs to be developed and enforced.

### STANDARD BOOKKEEPING AND RECORD KEEPING

- 1) Significantly improved systems were implemented.
- 2) Utilization of these systems by the squads is not complete.

### INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

- 1) Various pieces of information are correlated
- 2) Level of sophistication and volume of activity indicates more of a liaison than intelligence function.

### LIAISON ACTIVITY

- 1) Among squads and S.E.C.C. - generally good
- 2) Between Squads and local departments
  - based primarily on personal relationships
  - communicate well with some departments, but not others
- 3) Among squads, S.E.C.C. and State Police
  - not very effective
  - animosity detected on both sides
- 4) With D.E.A. - generally good
- 5) S.E.C.C. staff with Chiefs of Police
  - significant activity
  - has not increased manpower levels
  - still a reluctance to provide manpower

## MAJOR ISSUES

### 1. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITY

The non-compliance of the squads in completing utilizing the implemented systems is primarily a result of

- 1) lack of sufficient time devoted to compliance by S.E.C.C. staff.
- 2) ambiguity as to the authority and responsibilities of the S.E.C.C. staff vis-a-vis the S.E.C.C. board, and squad commanders.

### 2. ATTITUDES TOWARD REGIONALIZATION

The program continues to exist primarily on the basis of exchange of resources (manpower, money, information, informants) for services of the squad. Many Chiefs are committed to the program only, to the extent they can evaluate the squads in terms of activity (cases made) in their towns. There needs to be a clarification as to the specific objectives of the squads in providing law enforcement services on a regional basis.

### 3. INADEQUATE AND INEFFECTIVE COOPERATION

The flow of information and informants is not formalized, but exists primarily through personal contacts and relationships in departments and agencies. A certain amount of jealousy and parochialism exists in the protection and withholding of information.

## GOAL ATTAINMENT OF S.E.C.C.

### 1.0 ESTABLISH LEGITIMACY OF S.E.C.C. AND THE SQUADS

- 1) legislation was introduced and passed by the General Assembly.
- 2) legislation is a significant and necessary step in that direction.
- 3) interlocal agreements still need to be signed in each squad region.

### 2.0 STANDARDIZATION OF BOOKKEEPING, RECORDS AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

#### 2.2.1: STANDARDIZATION OF BOOKKEEPING FORMS AND PROCEDURES

- 1) new fiscal forms and procedures for each squad were implemented.
- 2) it provides more documentation than some of the pre-existing squad systems.
- 3) utilization of these systems is not complete.
- 4) generally improved the speed with which money can be disbursed to squads, and larger amounts of money readily available.
- 5) more attention should be paid to maintenance of the systems.

#### 2.2 STANDARDIZATION OF RECORD KEEPING AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

##### RECORDS

- 1) new series of standard record keeping forms and procedures implemented
- 2) system has been generally accepted by the squads, although some initial reluctance and maintenance of duplicate systems.
- 3) from management perspective, system is superior to pre-existing squad records in that it contains more data and this data is more accessible

- 4) several areas in which squads and client agencies consistently fail to provide adequate information.
- 5) S.E.C.C. does not adequately supervise its newly created system or does not enforce it, or both.
- 6) S.E.C.C. itself has failed to utilize the wealth of management information that its system provides.

##### OPERATING PROCEDURES

- 7) records must be supplemented by an explicit and rigidly enforced code of standard operating procedures; S.E.C.C. is about to begin work on them.
- 8) current uniformity among the squads as to operations is more a product of common experience than purposeful cooperation established by S.E.C.C.
- 9) variations as to policy, structure and purpose e.g. some squad commanders see themselves as crime squads others as narcotics squads.
- 10) structure of the squads and their relationship to S.E.C.C. is ambiguous.
- 11) confusion about the role of squad supervisors and how the activities of these supervisors should relate to that of the S.E.C.C. staff.
- 12) crucial need for an operational definition of supervision and definition of undercover agent role.
- 13) several areas indicated that should be addressed in S.E.C.C.'s set of forthcoming set of standard operating procedures.

### 3.0 ESTABLISH LIAISON ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE SQUADS, S.E.C.C. AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

#### 3.1 LIAISON ACTIVITY WITH THE LOCAL POLICE

##### POLICE CHIEFS

- 1) Intelligence Director of S.E.C.C. has visited 46 Chiefs.
- 2) there has been little or no change in manpower levels
- 3) principal problems with manpower recruitment based upon interviews with local Chiefs:

- squad structure
  - logistical constraints of local chiefs
  - attitude of Chiefs toward regionalization
  - lack of standard operating procedures
  - general manpower shortages
  - belief that resources invested will not bring the service desired; not verified.
- 4) non-participation is related more to attitudes about the squads rather than hard facts about resources and cost/benefit.
- 5) greatest impediment to recruitment efforts and regionalization is parochialism of local chiefs to the extent that they are a mirror of parochialism in local government.
- i.e. a chief is evaluated on the ostensible success of law enforcement in his own town, not the actual success on a regional basis.

#### LOCAL PERSONNEL

- 6) squad personnel and local detectives did not seem to detect a significant change in levels of communication and information since the appointment of liaison personnel.
- 7) both squad commanders and detectives were adamant in saying that police work is based upon personal contacts and could not be formalized.
- 8) competition exists between the squads and some of the larger cities that have special narcotics divisions.

#### 3.2 LIAISON AMONG THE SQUADS

- 1) seven documented instances of agent exchange among squads
- 2) S.E.C.C. has established several mechanisms for exchange of information - squad commander meetings and intelligence director.
- 3) communications among squads varies considerably with the proximity of the squads.
- 4) interviews and toll analysis indicates
- a. strong liaison between Capitol and Eastern Squads, South Central and Southwestern, and Capitol and Southwestern.

- b. all squads, except Naugatuck, are in fairly constant contact with at least one other squad and S.E.C.C.

- 5) there is no baseline data against which to assess the change in information and agent exchange.
- 6) there is not enough evidence to determine whether S.E.C.C. was a catalyst for information exchange.

#### 3.3 LIAISON WITH OTHER POLICE AGENCIES

##### STATE POLICE

- 1) consensus of squad commanders and State Police officials is that the liaison is not an effective one.
- 2) squad commanders generally thought that the State Police are not in "the drug business" and that they would have little information of benefit to the squads.
- 3) animosity of squad commanders toward State Police concerning:
- a. limited disclosure list on wiretaps
  - b. alleged one-way flow of information to the State Police.
  - c. failure of the State Police to acknowledge local participation in investigations.
- 4) liaison between S.E.C.C. and the State Police is no better than that of the squads and the State Police, and it is probably worse.
- 5) S.E.C.C.'s staff thinks that the State Police has placed several obstacles in the path of crime squad development:
- a. after establishing probable cause for wiretape, the squads are "cut out" of the case.
  - b. withdrawal of State Police personnel from the squads and their refusal to commit men.
  - c. advocacy of certain State Police officials for the dissolution of S.E.C.C. and the squads.
- 6) State Police said that lack of standard operating procedures in the squads jeopardizes troopers.
- 7) State Police officials interviewed said:
- a. S.E.C.C. is no longer necessary and should be phased out.
  - b. S.E.C.C. is attempting to become a "mini-State Police"
  - c. S.E.C.C. refuses to provide information about violators who, the State Police think, are rightfully their targets.

D.E.A.

- 1) Relations are much better than those between the squads and the State Police.
- 2) There is contact with one squad or another approximately twice a week.
- 3) Exchange of information is fairly active, but there is some indication that the flow of information is only one way. (i.e., to DEA)

4.0 CONSTRUCTION OF AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

- 1) forms developed by S.E.C.C. are not completed in such a fashion as to permit extensive use in intelligence.
- 2) no set procedure for debriefing agents.
- 3) not a great deal of information is received by squads from S.E.C.C. Intelligence Director; majority of his time is spent answering logistical questions of the squads.

CODE BOOK FOR SECC  
EVALUATION

CODE BOOK FOR STATEWIDE ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE EVALUATION

Format and Format Abbreviation

This code book will present the columns or field in which certain data is entered: a description of the data, the various codes used and an explanation of these codes. Since this data for each case will undoubtedly occupy more than one card, the columns or field will be described by a letter (A for the first card, B for the second.....Ncards) indicating the card and numbers indicating the columns used. Codes will be numeric in most cases and the explanations, of course, will be in narrative form.

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>EXPLANATION</u>
A 1-6	Case Identification Number	312007	3 - year 1973 1 - month of Jan. 2 - Eastern squad 007 - Case number

<u>COLUMN</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>EXPLANATION</u>
A 1-6	Case identification number	<u>1st digit</u> <u>Year</u>	
		0	1970
		1	1971
		2	1972
		3	1973
		<u>2nd digit</u> <u>Month</u>	
		1	Jan.
		7	July
		<u>3rd digit</u> <u>Squad Id.</u>	
		1	Southwest squad
		2	South Central squad
		3	Naugatuck squad
4	Capitol squad		
5	Eastern squad		
6	Htfd. Police special services		
<u>4-6 digits</u> <u>Case Id. #</u>			
A 7-8	Number of defendants involved in a single case	Number of defendants	
A 9-36	The identification of each defendant by a four digit number beginning at the right hand most space in the field (i.e.: 36)	<u>Identification #</u> A 4 digit number given to each defendant sequentially each defendant is given only one	
A -37	Substance purchased	Substance	
	Each substance will be entered at the far left of the field. At most three substances will be included	0	Heroin
		1	Morphine
		2	Barbiturates
		3	Cocaine
		4	"grass"
		5	Hashish
		6	L.S.D.
		7	Hallucinagens
		8	Amphetamines
		9	Opium
		X	Methadone

COLUMN	DESCRIPTION	CODE	EXPLANATION
A 38-44	Amount purchased	Quantity	
	Entrees will be right hand specific e.g. 10000001 = 1 miligram of heroin	# miligrams	Heroin
		# miligrams	Morphine
		# ounces	Opium
		# miligrams	Cocaine
		# ounces	Grass
		# grams	Hashish
		# pills	L.S.D.
		# pills	Hallucinagins
		# pills	Amphetamines
		# pills	Barbiturates
		# miligrams	Methadone

Since the amount of purchase is not always available in standard units of measure the following rules of thumb will be employed.

- Heroin
  - 1 bag = 60 miligrams
  - 1/2 spoon = 4 bags
  - spoon = 8 bags
  - 1/2 load = 16 bags
  - load = 32 bags
  - oz. = 472 bags

Street quantity is determined by taking the purity level and dividing it by 1/2 until it approaches 4% pure heroin. Take the initial quantity and multiply it by the number of times the original quantity must be half to reach 4%

e.g. 5 grams of Heroin at 62%

$$62\%/2, 31/2, 15.5/2, 7.75/2 = 4\%$$

$$H \times 5 \text{ grams} = 20 \text{ grams} = 20,000 \text{ grams}$$

This should be done only for large purchases (grams)

A 45-52	Additional purchases. This field is to be used if more than one substance was purchased. It follows the same format as Col. 37-44.		
A 53-61	Amount of drug seized		Same format as Col. 37-44
A 62-68	Additional Drugs seized		Same format as Col. 37-44

Number of buys made on a single case

- 1..... 1 buy
- 2..... 2 buys
- 3..... 3 buys
- etc.

Amount spent on case to the nearest dollar (Record the total dollar amount spent in all buys)

Identification of town in which the case was made

Andover town	001	Bristol town	018
Ansonia city	002	Brookfield town	019
Ansonia town		Brooklyn town	020
Ashford town	003	Burlington town	021
Avon town	004	Canaan Center (U)	
Bantam borough	005	Canaan town	022
Barkhamsted town	006	Canterbury town	023
Beacon Falls town	007	Canton town	024
Berlin town	008		
Bethany town	009	Chaplin town	025
		Cheshire town	026
Bethel town	010	Chester town	027
Bethlehem town	011	Clinton town	028
Bloomfield town	012	Colchester town	029
Bolton town	013	Colebrook town	030
Bozrah town	014		
Branford borough	015	Columbia town	031
Bridgeport city	016	Cornwall town	032
Bridgeport town	016	Coventry town	033
Bridgewater town	017	Cromwall town	034
		Danbury city	035
		Danbury town	036
Bristol city	018		

Danielson borough	036	Middlebury town	090
Darien town	037	Middlefield town	091
Deep River town	038	Middletown city	092
Derby city	039	Middletown town	093
Derby town	039	Milford city	094
Durham town	040	Milford town	095
Eastford town	041	Monroe town	096
East Granby town	042	Montville town	097
East Haddam town	043	Moodus (U)	098
East Hampton town	044	Moosup (U)	099
East Hartford town	045	Morris town	100
East Haven town	046	Naugatuck borough	101
East Lyme town	047	Naugatuck town	101
Easton town	048	New Britain city	102
East Windsor town	049	New Canaan town	103
Ellington town	050	New Fairfield town	104
Enfield town	051	New Hartford town	105
Essex town	052	New Haven city	106
Fairfield town	053	Newington town	107
Farmington town	054	New London city	108
Fenwick borough	055	New Milford town	109
Franklin town	056	Newton town	110
Glastonbury town	057	Norfolk town	111
Goshen town	058	North Branford town	112
Granby town	059	North Canaan town	113
Greenwich town	060	North Haven town	114
Griswold town	061	North Stonington town	115
Groton borough	062	Norwalk city	116
Groton town	063	Norwich city	117
Guilford town	064	Old Lyme town	118
Haddam town	065	Old Saybrook town	119
Hamden town	066	Orange town	120
Hampton town	067	Oxford town	121
Hartford city	068	Plainfield town	122
Hartland town	070	Plainville town	123
Harwinton town	071	Plymouth town	124
Hebron town	072	Pomfret town	125
Jewett city borough	073	Portland town	126
Kent town	074	Preston town	127
Killingly town	075	Prospect town	128
Killingsworth town	076	Putnam city	129
Lake Pocotopaug (U)	077	Putnam town	130
Lebanon town	078	Redding town	131
Ledyard town	079	Ridgefield town	132
Lisbon town	080	Rocky hill town	133
Litchfield borough	081	Roxbury town	134
Litchfield town	082	Salem town	135
Lyme town	083	Salisbury town	136
Manchester town	084	Scotland town	137
Madison town	085	Seymour town	138
Mansfield town	086	Sharon town	139
Marlborough town	087		
Meriden city	088		
Meridian town	089		

Shelton city	140	Wallingford town	163
Shelton town	141	Warren town	164
Sherman town	142	Washington town	165
Simsbury town	143	Waterbury city	166
Somers town	144	Waterford town	167
Southbury town	145	Watertown town	168
South Windsor town	146	Westbrook town	169
Sprague town	148		
Stafford Springs borough	149	West Hartford town	170
Stamford city	150	West Haven city	171
Stamford town	150	Weston town	172
Sterling town	151	Westport town	173
Stonington town	152	Wethersfield town	174
Storrs (U)	153	Willimantic city	175
Stratford town	154	Willington town	176
Suffield town	155	Wilton town	177
Thompson town	156	Winchester town	178
Tolland town	157	Windham town	179
Torrington city	158	Windsor Locks town	180
Trumbull town	159	Windsor town	181
Union town	160	Winsted city	182
Vernon town	161	Wolcott town	183
Voluntown town	162	Woodridge town	184

Woodbury town	185
Woodstock town	186
Niantic	187
Collinsville	188
Rockville	189

A 1-7	Case identification number	1st digit	Year
		0	1970
		1	1971
		2	1972
		3	1973
		2nd digit	Month
		1	Jan.
		7	July
		3rd digit	Squad
		1	Southwest squad
		2	South Central squad
		3	Naugatuck squad
		4	Capitol squad
		5	Eastern squad
		6	Htfd. Police Special Services
		4-6 digits	Case Id. :
		7th Dist.	The letter B to designate the second card in a set of two.

B 8-17 Court Data on First defendant arrested in case

B 8 Type of warrant issued  
0..... Bench or superior court warrant  
1..... Circuit court warrant  
2..... No warrant issued

B 9 Amount of bail set  
0..... 15,000 +  
1..... 15,000  
2..... 10,000  
3..... 7,500  
4..... 5,000  
5..... 3,000  
6..... 2,500  
7..... 2,000  
8..... 1,500  
9..... 1,000  
A..... 500  
B..... Release on own recognizants

B 10 Bail made or not made  
0 - bail made  
1 - bail not made

B 11 Initial charge and plea

	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Plea</u>
0	Sale of drugs	Guilty
1	Sale of drugs	Not guilty
2	Possession of drugs with intent to sell	Guilty
3	Possession of drugs with intent to sell	Not guilty

**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Plea</u>	<u>Sentence Range</u>	
4	Possession of drugs	Not guilty	(1 month - 9 months)	7..... 6 months in jail
5	Possession of drugs	Guilty	(1 year - 3 years)	8..... 1 year in jail
6	Sale and possession of drugs	Guilty	(2 years - 4 years)	9..... 2 years in jail
			(2 years - 5 years)	A..... 3 years in jail
7	Sale and possession of drugs	Not guilty	(3 years - 5 years)	B..... 4 years in jail
	Charge and plea presented in court		(4 years - 5 years)	C..... 5 years in jail

B 12

	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Plea</u>		
0	Sale of drugs	Guilty	(5 years - 10 years)	D..... 6 years in jail
1	Sale of drugs	Not guilty	(6 years - 10 years)	E..... 7 years in jail
2	Possession of drugs	Guilty	(7 years - 10 years)	F..... 8 years in jail
3	Possession of drugs with intent to sell	Guilty		G..... 9 years in jail
4	Possession of drugs	Guilty		H..... 10 years in jail
5	Possession of drugs	Not Guilty		I..... 10 + years in jail
6	Sale and Possession of drugs	Guilty		J..... Indefinite sentence
7	Sale and Possession of drugs	Not guilty		

B 13

Sentence given in court  
 (Note: Jail sentences are usually given in minimum and maximum sentence. The ranges corresponding to the coding classes listed below are recorded to the left of the coding classes.)

- 0.....Nolle
- 1.....Suspended sentence
- 2.....Probation
- 3.....Probation and a fine
- 4.....Fine
- 5.....In-patient drug treatment
- 6.....Out-patient drug treatment

B - 14

Prior Criminal history  
 (Five type of crime are of particular interest here (1) sale of drugs (2) possession of drugs, (3) Felonies, (4) misdemeanors and (5) property crimes. Sale of drugs and possession refer to any type of drugs. Felonies refer to the index crimes of Rape, Murder, Aggravated assault, and assault. Property crimes refer to Larceny, Burglarly, Breaking and entering and auto theft. Misdemeanors refer to any crimes not included as sale and possession of drugs, Felonies or property crimes)

- 0..... No previous arrests
- 1..... 1 or more arrests for sale of drugs
- 2..... 1 or more arrests for possession of drugs
- 3..... 1 or more arrests for misdemeanors
- 4..... 1 or more arrests for felonies
- 5..... 1 or more previous arrests for sale and possession of drugs
- 6..... 1 or more previous arrests for sale of narcotics and a misdemeanor

- 7..... 1 or more previous arrests for sale of narcotics and a felony
- 8..... 1 or more previous arrests for possession of drugs and a misdemeanor
- 9..... 1 or more previous arrests for possession of drugs and a felony
- A..... 1 or more arrests for a felony and 1 or more for a misdemeanor
- B..... 1 or more arrests for a felony, a misdemeanor, and sale of drugs
- C..... 1 or more arrests for a felony, a misdemeanor, and possession of drugs
- D..... 1 or more arrests for a felony, a misdemeanor, sale and possession of drugs.
- E..... 1 or more arrests for property crime
- F..... 1 or more arrests for property crime, sale of drugs
- G..... 1 or more arrests for property crimes and possession of drugs
- H..... 1 or more arrests for property crimes, sale and possession of drugs

B - 15

Age of defendant

- 0 under 16
- 1..... 17
- 2..... 18
- 3..... 19
- 4..... 20
- 5..... 21
- 6..... 22
- 7..... 23
- 8..... 24
- 9..... 25
- A..... 26
- B..... 27

- C..... 28
- D..... 29
- E..... 30
- F..... 31
- G..... 32
- H..... 33
- I..... 34
- J..... 35
- K..... 36
- L..... 37
- M..... 38
- N..... 39
- O..... 40
- P..... 41
- Q..... 42
- R..... 42+

B 16

Sex of Defendants

- O..... Male
- 1..... Female

B 17

Race of Defendants

- O..... White
- 1..... Black
- 2..... Puerto Rican
- 3..... Oriental
- 4..... Other

B 18-27

Information on second defendant using the same format as in B 8-17

B 28-37

Information on third defendant.

The data presented in the second section of this report was obtained in 42 interviews with local police chiefs throughout Connecticut. Each chief was sent a letter describing the purpose of the interview. The letter was followed by a phone call from a member of the interviewing staff, at which time an appointment was made. Of the 50 chiefs contacted only four refused to be interviewed. Two interviews were left to be completed by the chiefs, but were not returned. Two additional interviews were returned after the reporting deadline and could not be included in the analysis.

The respondents interviewed constitute a structured random sample of all the police chiefs in Connecticut. The sample was structured along two dimensions-- location and department size. All police departments in the state were grouped according to squad region. Within each squad region the departments were grouped according to four size classes - 1) 0 to 25 men, 2) 26 to 75 men, 3) 76 to 200 men, and 4) more than 200 men. Departments were chosen randomly from these subgroups according to the proportion of a given size in a given region. For instance, the Capitol region contains 35% of all organized police departments in the state, therefore 35% of the sample was drawn from the Capitol Region. Approximately three percent of the departments in the Capitol Region have 200 men or more, therefore three percent of the departments chosen from the Capitol Region contained 200 or more men. Similar procedures were carried out for each region and size category. Since the problems confronting large departments differ from those confronting smaller departments and since squad service may differ from region to region, a sample structured along these dimensions will provide a more accurate sampling of police opinion.

A copy of the interview schedule used follows.

Planning Committee on Criminal Administration  
S.E.C.C. and Regional Crime Squad Education  
Police Chief Interview Schedule

As we have already mentioned in our letter and over the phone, we want to talk to you about the Connecticut Regional Crime Squads. Since we are interested in comparing problems in the various squad regions we shall not be able to have a completely free ranging discussion, but shall follow an interview guide to ensure that we cover all the questions in the shortest possible time.

1. Before we begin talking about the crime squads directly, we would like to have your opinion of crime in this town. (Hand the respondent list A) This list contains several enforcement problems common to police agencies throughout the U.S.. Please rank these problems in order of their importance in this town. Indicate the problem which you consider most pressing or urgent first. The second most urgent should be mentioned next and so on. As you mention the areas I will rank them on the interview schedule. (Place a 1 next to the first choice, a 2 next to the second choice etc.)

- \_\_\_\_\_ Preventing or controlling juvenile delinquency.
- \_\_\_\_\_ controlling prostitution.
- \_\_\_\_\_ controlling gambling.
- \_\_\_\_\_ solving burglaries.
- \_\_\_\_\_ controlling traffic in drugs.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Traffic control.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Family disputes.
- \_\_\_\_\_ controlling violent crimes.
- \_\_\_\_\_ murder investigation.
- \_\_\_\_\_ controlling muggings and rapes.
- \_\_\_\_\_ other, please specify

2. Now let us turn to drug problems, specifically. Do you feel that your drug problem is more severe, less severe or about the same as other towns in this region? (Check one)

- 0 ( ) more severe
- 1 ( ) about the same
- 2 ( ) less severe

3. I am interested in how your drug problem relates to all other towns in the region - in very explicit terms. (Hand the respondent list B). Could you please indicate the three towns in the region which have the most severe drug problem? (Record the name of the towns in the spaces below) Include your own town if it is appropriate.

(most severe)   1    
  2    
  3  

3a. Could you please indicate the three towns that, in your opinion, have the least severe drug problem? Again include your town if appropriate.

(least severe)   1    
  2    
  3  

4. Over the past several years do you feel that the drug problem in your town has become more severe, less severe, or remained about the same? (check one)

- ( ) greater (i.e. more severe)
- ( ) less severe
- ( ) remained the same

5. Let us turn now to the regional crime squad itself. There has been a great deal of discussion concerning the exact purpose of the squads and their relationship to existing law enforcement agencies. I am going to read several

statements describing various opinions of the squads' purpose. Please indicate which closely corresponds to the purpose of the squad, in your view. (Check one of the following).

- Regional Crime Squads are designed to supply local departments with undercover narcotics agents when they are needed.
- Regional Crime Squads are designed to investigate middle level narcotics traffickers and aid in their prosecution.
- Both of the above statements.

6. There has also been a good deal of discussion concerning the manner in which the crime squads operate. Which of the following statements best describes the way in which the squads should operate. (Hand the respondent card C). (Check one).

- The squad should pursue investigations in this town only at the request of this department.
- Squads should pursue investigations in this town only with the prior consent and notification of this department.
- Squads need not consult this department before pursuing investigations in town, but activity reports should be sent to the department frequently and certainly before warrants are issued in the town.
- Squads should pursue investigations in the town without consulting the department except in the case that they encounter information of immediate interest to the department.

6a. (If the Respondent does not characterize the squad performance in any of the above ways) How do you feel that the squad should operate in this town? (Record his response as completely as possible).

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7. Do you think the squad actually functions in this way?

- Yes
- No

8. (If Q. 7 answered No) which of these statements most closely corresponds to the squads actual mode of operation?

- The squads should pursue investigations in this town only at the request of this department.
- Squads should pursue investigations in this town only with the prior notification and consent of this department.
- Squads need not consult this department before pursuing investigations in town, but activity reports should be sent to the department frequently and certainly before warrants are issued.
- Squads should pursue investigations in the town without consulting the department except in the case that the squads encounter information immediately useful to the department.

8a. (If the respondent does not characterize the squad in any of the above ways) How does the squad actually operate in this town?

(Record the response as completely as possible)

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9. Generally, would you say that the service the squad provides to you is very good, good, fair, poor or very poor? (Check one)

- Very good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor
- Very poor

10. As in the case of the squad's purpose, exact standards for evaluating the adequacy of squad service to local town have been open to much debate. (Hand Respondent Card D) Which of these statements most closely describes what you would consider adequate service by the Regional Crime Squad. (Check one)

- I would be satisfied if the regional squad responded to all requests for service made by this department.
- I would be satisfied if the regional squad made as many cases in this town as they do in other regional towns.
- I would be satisfied if the regional squad made cases proportionate to air share of the total regional population (i.e. if we comprise 20% of the regional population, we should receive 20% of the cases).
- I would be satisfied if the squad made cases in this town proportionate to the number of men contributed to the squad by this department.
- I would be satisfied if the towns with the most severe drug problems received the greatest amount of service.

11. Have you ever requested service from the Regional squad? (Check one)

- Yes
- No

11a. (If yes) About how often, would you say? (Read the following response categories and ask the respondent to choose one. Check appropriate category).

- once a week or more frequently
- once every few weeks
- once a month
- once every few months
- very seldom

12. Does the squad respond to your requests - always, usually, sometimes, seldom, never? (Check one)

- always
- usually

- sometimes
- seldom
- never

13. The structure of the squads and their personnel have changed considerably since their inception. Have you noticed any change in the service which the squad provides you? (Check one)

- Yes
- No

13a. (If yes) Has the squad's service improved or worsened, in your opinion, since it began in 1970?

- Improved
- Worsened

Both the Planning Committee and the direction of the squads are interested in improving the crime squads whenever possible. Very often, however, we simply do not know exactly how the program function and therefore cannot improve them. I would like to ask you a few questions about problems associated with some squads and your opinion of suggested changes in squad structure.

14. (Hand the Respondent List D) This is a list of problems commonly associated with regional policing arrangements. Could you please indicate which, if any are true of the regional crime squad in this area. If you refer to the problem by number, I will record it on the interview schedule. (Check the appropriate items).

- 1  Regional Police function independently of the local police who are held responsible for all police activity in the town.
- 2  Regional Police do not share evidence that would be beneficial to local police investigations.
- 3  Regional Police often obstruct local police investigations of which they are not aware.
- 4  Regional Police tend to be dominated by the largest towns in the region and provide little service to other towns.

- sometimes
- seldom
- never

13. The structure of the squads and their personnel have changed considerably since their inception. Have you noticed any change in the service which the squad provides you? (Check one)

- Yes
- No

13a. (If yes) Has the squad's service improved or worsened, in your opinion, since it began in 1970?

- Improved
- Worsened

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- 1  Regional Police function independently of the local police who are held responsible for all police activity in the town.
- 2  Regional Police do not share evidence that would be beneficial to local police investigations.
- 3  Regional Police often obstruct local police investigations of which they are not aware.
- 4  Regional Police tend to be dominated by the largest towns in the region and provide little service to other towns.

5  Small towns dominate the Regional Police Agencies to a degree which far exceeds their enforcement needs and their contribution to the agency.

6  Regional Police generally lack accountability and cannot be controlled for the good of the region.

14a. Are there any problems not included on this list which cause difficulties in your dealings with the crime squad? Please specify (Write response briefly below)

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14b. (If the respondent has mentioned more than one problem area) which of the problem areas that you have mentioned, do you consider the most in need of reform? Refer to the problem by number (Record the number below).

15. As you know, the crime squads were created in the late sixties to combat a growing drug problem. Some individuals have recently suggested that the drug epidemic has diminished and that there is no longer a great need for the regional crime squads. Do you agree that the crime squads are no longer needed in Connecticut? (Check one)

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- No opinion

16. Do you think that the Regional Crime squads should confine their efforts to narcotics investigation or should they place more emphasis on other types of crime as gambling, prostitution, burglary, etc? (Check one)

- Restrict activity to drugs
- become involved in other forms of criminal investigation
- other (Please specify)

17. There is a possibility that Federal funds to support the crime squad will be lessened in the near future and the financial burden of the squads will fall upon the local towns. Would you be in favor of the town supporting the squad by means of a per capita service charge? (Check one)

- Yes, strongly in favor
- Yes, moderately in favor
- No, moderately opposed
- No, strongly opposed
- No opinion

18. Do you feel that the local government (i.e. the mayor or city manager and the city council) would be in favor of supporting the squads with a per capita service charge? (Check one)

- Yes, strongly in favor
- Yes, moderately in favor
- No, moderately opposed
- No, strongly opposed
- No opinion

19. Do you know if the town has paid the assessment levied by the Regional Crime squad in order to meet the cash match assessment? (Check one)

- Yes, it has been paid
- No, it had not been paid
- I do not know.

19a (If No) Do you think that they intend to pay this assessment before the end of the fiscal year?

- Yes, they do.
- No, they do not.
- I do not know

In addition to financial contributions the regional crime squads have always depended on the voluntary contributions of men by local police departments.

20. Have you ever committed a man to the regional crime squad? (Check one)

- Yes
- No (If No, go to Q 22)

20a. (If Yes) For how long a period? (Record the number of months and round to the nearest month) Do not be concerned with the exact period, a rough estimate will suffice. ( )

20b. Do you presently have one or more men assigned to the crime squads (Check One)

- Yes
- No

21. Why do you contribute men to the crime squads? (Record the response to the questions as completely as possible. List the reasons given in the order in which they are given. Do not spend an inordinate amount of time recording the response. If they are rambling record them briefly and embellish the response after the interview).

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(If respondent answers Q. 20a -21 omit Q 22)

22. Why don't you contribute men to the crime squads? (Record as completely as possible. List reasons in order that they are given. Do not spend great deal of time recording answers. Record them briefly and embellish after the interview).

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Departments have complained that the voluntary commitment of men to the squads has resulted in some departments providing a disproportionate share of squad manpower. There is a plan under consideration in which each town will be asked to contribute men according to its size and the size of the police department. The larger departments would, of course, contribute the most men, but all departments would be expected to contribute a number of man/months proportionate to their size.

23. Would you be willing to contribute men to the squad, if your share were determined by this type of formula? (Check one)

- Yes
- No
- No opinion.

23a. (If No) Would you be willing to contribute men according to this formula if you could be assured of a budget increase from the town to compensate for the loss of the specified number of man/months?

- Yes
- No
- No opinion

24. If the squads should continue to rely on the voluntary contribution of men from the towns, some observers have suggested that the squads provide service only to those towns which contribute men. Do you agree with this plan? (Check one)

- Yes
- No

25. I would like to ask you a few very general questions about the government in this town. Do you have a mayor - council, a city manager - council, or some other form of government? (Check one)

- Mayor - council
- City manager - council
- Other, please specify \_\_\_\_\_

26. Who usually appoints the heads or directors of city departments? (Check one)

- Mayor
- City manager
- Council
- Other

27. Who would you say has the most control over the budget - the mayor, the city manager, the city council, or someone else? (Check one)

- Mayor
- City Manager
- Council
- Other, please specify \_\_\_\_\_

28. Would you say, in general that the city government is very much in favor of the squads, in-favor of the squads, opposed to the squads, very much opposed to the squads or indifferent? (Check one)

- Very much in favor
- In favor
- Opposed
- Very much opposed
- Indifferent.

29. Who appoints the chief of police in this town? (Check one)

- Mayor  
 City manager  
 the city/town council  
 board of police commissioners  
 chief is elected  
 other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

30. I would like to read a list of several types of decisions which you might have occasion to make as police chief. Could you indicate which decisions you could (a) make without the prior approval of local government officials and (b) which must have prior approval of local government officials. (After each of the following statements please record an A or a B which ever is appropriate).

30a. The hiring of new types of police personnel such as: Planners, computer operators etc.  
\_\_\_\_\_

30b. The reallocation of budgeted funds from personnel to equipment and similar adjustments in your allotted budget.  
\_\_\_\_\_

30c. Sending officers for training outside the department or the Municipal Police Training Academy. (e.g. to F.B.I. school, for instance, or to D.E.A. training programs).  
\_\_\_\_\_

30d. Assigning officers to work with other police agencies.  
\_\_\_\_\_

30e. The promotion of personnel.  
\_\_\_\_\_

30f. Purchasing New equipment within the confines of your budget.  
\_\_\_\_\_

30g. The decision to pursue one type of enforcement, for instance, gambling rather than another such as prostitution  
\_\_\_\_\_

30h. The decision to reduce patrol forces and increase detective division personnel.  
\_\_\_\_\_

The majority of this interview has dealt with the squads directly. We have not discussed the statewide enforcement coordinating committee which was created to help administer the squads. I would like to ask you a few questions about S.E.C.C.

31. Have you ever been a member of the statewide enforcement coordinating Committee Board? (Check one)

- Yes  
 No

32. Are you now a member of the S. E. C. C. Board?

- Yes  
 No

33. Have you ever had professional contact with any of the S. E. C. C. staff?

- Yes  
 No

34. To the best of your knowledge which of the following functions are performed by S. E. C. C. staff as opposed to the individual squads? (Check each function performed by S. E. C. C. staff)

- Recruitment of squad personnel  
 Managing the flow of Federal Funds  
 Training of personnel  
 Coordinating intelligence information  
 Providing information on squad activities to participating communities.

( ) setting enforcement priorities

( ) other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

35. In general do you think that the statewide enforcement coordinating Committee is doing a very good job, a good job, a poor job, or a very poor job?

( ) a very good job

( ) good job

( ) poor job

( ) very poor job

( ) no opinion

(Ask for all responses to Q. 35 except "No opinion")

35a. Why do you say that? (Probe: How has S. E. C. C. done a good/bad job?)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

36. Would you say that the service of the squads to the town has improved significantly, improved somewhat, become worse, become much worse, or essentially has not changed since the creation of S. E. C. C.? (If the respondent is not clear as to the origin of S. E. C. C., say "since approximately the summer of 1972") (Check one).

( ) improved significantly

( ) improved somewhat

( ) become worse

( ) become much worse

( ) no change

36a. How has service improved/become worse? (Record response as completely as possible)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

37. I would like to ask you a few brief questions about your ideas and interests. I am going to read a list of statements. Please indicate if you strongly agree with the statement, simply agree, disagree or disagree strongly. (Check the response below)

37a. Police work more than any other profession is essential for society.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37b. Policemen are able to judge pretty well the competence of their fellow officers.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37c. It is more important for me to be a policeman in this town than to be able to do police work elsewhere.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37d. Police organizations such as the Connecticut Police Chief's Association should be supported.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37e. Civilian review of policemen is a good idea.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37f. The importance of Police work is often overstressed.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37g. If I had the opportunity to take a higher paying job that did not involve policework I would do it.

Strongly agree    agree    disagree    strongly disagree    no opinion

37h. Police organizations do not really do much for their members (This does not refer to Unions)

Strongly agree agree disagree strongly disagree no opinion

38. How long have you been a policeman? (Record the number of years)

\_\_\_\_\_

39. How long have you been chief of police in this town? (Record years)

\_\_\_\_\_

40. What was your rank prior to becoming chief? (Record rank)

\_\_\_\_\_

40a. How many years were you in that rank (Record years)

\_\_\_\_\_

41. Were you born in this town?

( ) Yes

( ) No

41a. (If no) Where were you born?

\_\_\_\_\_

42. How many years of school did you complete?

_____ 0-8	_____ 9-11	_____ high school grad.	_____ Vocational Training
_____ 13-15 yr.	_____ some college	_____ college grad.	_____ 17+ grad. Training

↓ ↓  
What college of Univ.? What degree?

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

43. What is your religion?

( ) Protestant

( ) Catholic

( ) Jewish

( ) Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

43a. In general, how religiously minded would you say you are?

( ) Very religious minded

( ) more religious than the average person

( ) average

( ) Less religious than average

( ) Not religious at all

44. Do you belong to any Political, Civic or fraternal organization? (e.g. Elks, school board, Holy name Society, Political parties etc.)

( ) Yes

( ) No

44a. Could you list briefly those organizations? (Record name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

45. How many of your close personal friends are policemen? (Record number)

\_\_\_\_\_

46. How many of your close personal friends are not policemen? (Record number)

\_\_\_\_\_

Thank you for your time. I am sure your responses will be most helpful to the Planning Committee in determining Policy.

Name of respondent \_\_\_\_\_

Police Department \_\_\_\_\_

Rank \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Interview \_\_\_\_\_

Place \_\_\_\_\_

Length of time \_\_\_\_\_

General Remarks: \_\_\_\_\_

The original sample used in section 1.0 of this report contained observations on 994 crime squad defendants. For various reasons outlined in the body of the report, court data was available for only 294 of these defendants. In spite of this smaller sample, we may have essentially the same degree of confidence in the inferences drawn from this sample as those drawn from the larger sample. The original sample was designed to provide accurate information on all cases made by the squads in each of four years. Using that sample we could make reasonably accurate statements about cases made in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973. In the case of the smaller court sample, if we wished to make statements with the same degree of accuracy as in the first sample, we can only draw inferences concerning the entire four year period taken together. Because we are interested in making statements concerning one large population as opposed to four large populations, we may use a smaller sample without an appreciable loss of reliability.

The specific confidence interval for the court sample is computed below.

$$N \frac{4 z^2 p q}{w^2}$$

N - sample size  
w - interval width  
p - sample proportion -  
q - sample proportion -

$$294 \frac{4 z^2 (.5) (.5)}{.01}$$

$$z \ 1.71 \approx .09$$

Given a sample of 294, we may be confident that in nine instances out of ten that the sample statistics will be within a ten point interval of the actual population statistics. This is the worst possible result given a sample of 294 and an essentially infinite population.

**END**