

# AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

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## TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT

204458

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# Bureau of Justice Assistance

## CRIMINAL COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

A Joint Program of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, and  
American University School of Public Affairs  
National Legal Aid and Defender Association  
Justice Management Institute  
Pretrial Services Resource Center

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SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

## Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project Report No. 98-037

### Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project

Services to state and local criminal courts and related agencies on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice

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## Statewide Workshop on: Court Security for Mississippi Sheriffs (Memorandum Report)

January 2000

PROPERTY OF  
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)  
Box 6000  
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

### Consultant

**Mr. Lawrence Siegel**

**BJA-American University  
Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project**

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**Assignment Data Sheet**

Technical Assistance No.:	98-37
Requesting Jurisdiction:	Jackson, Mississippi
Requesting Agency:	Administrative Office of the Courts
Requesting Official:	Mr. Morris Wynn Project Manager
Local Coordinator:	Mr. Morris Wynn
Date of On-Site Study:	November 19, 1999
Consultant(s) Assigned:	Mr. Lawrence Siegel
CCTAP Staff Coordinator:	Mr. Joseph A. Trotter, Jr. Director, CCTAP Project
Central Focus of Study:	Statewide Workshop on Court Security for Mississippi Sheriffs

*This project was supported by Grant No. 97-DD-BX-0074, awarded to American University by the Bureau of Justice Assistance of the United States Department of Justice. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office of Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the United States Department of Justice.*



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**DATE:** January 10, 2000

**TO:** Mr. Morris Wynn  
Project Manager

**FROM:** Mr. Lawrence Siegel  
CCTAP Consultant

**RE:** Statewide Workshop on Court Security for Mississippi Sheriffs

## BACKGROUND

A daylong court security workshop for all Mississippi sheriff departments was presented in Jackson on November 19, 1999, organized by the Mississippi Administrative Office of the Courts with assistance from the Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project of American University. The proceedings were arranged and moderated by Morris Wynn of the AOC. The CCTAP sent court security consultant Lawrence Siegel to discuss with the sheriffs and deputies in attendance the results of his many years of court security projects in state courts across the country, and Supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal André J. Fuller addressed court security issues found in the federal courts. Mr. Siegel presented two video tapes as part of his discussion and provided a number of written reports and studies for distribution to each attendee. Additionally, Mr. Siegel, accompanied by Mr. Wynn, toured the Hinds County and the Rankin County Circuit and Chancery Court facilities to observe court operations and security provisions.

As a result of a number of requests for further information, the CCTAP is forwarding a copy of each of the two tapes and information on various other references to court security information to Mr. Wynn for his coordination.

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## COMMENTARY

A statewide meeting of sheriffs such as this is unprecedented in our experience and offers an equally unprecedented opportunity for Mississippi to begin a movement towards comprehensive improvements in court security throughout its counties. The AOC, with the guidance of the Supreme Court, is in a position to commence such an effort, and also to take advantage of the successes and avoid the failures of court security programs experienced by some other states in its attempt to further the safety and security of all persons and processes in its state courts.

The attendance and discussions at this initial workshop indicated both a widespread interest in the topic and a need for further assistance in making improvements. Among the most pressing issues brought up by the attendees were these:

- How to get information that would help them convince their county supervisors of the need for court security.
- How to find the money to fund court security operations and capital costs.
- Where to get court security training for their officers.

No questions were raised about the authority or responsibility of county sheriffs to provide court security, indeed in the four courthouses we visited sheriff's deputies were providing security services at the front door of each and in the courtrooms of the two Hinds County facilities.

The video tapes that were presented and discussed at the workshop and the documentation that was distributed to the attendees addressed these issues as will the additional sources of information that are being forwarded.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

At this point the important next steps concern process; how to build on the impetus that has been generated over the past several months and begin to provide the county sheriffs and the courts of Mississippi with the support they need to provide adequate court security in their jurisdictions. It is our experience that statewide guidance and coordination is a necessary condition for success; local sheriffs and courts do not have the political and financial resources to reliably accomplish it on their own across the state. The AOC can facilitate the process, acting on the authority and with the support of the Supreme Court. We recommend to the AOC a process organized around the following steps:

1. Form a statewide court security committee, chaired by an appellate judge and facilitated by the AOC, representing all the stakeholders: sheriffs, courts, prosecutors, public defenders and private bar, local police agencies, etc. It should be charged with developing the policies that will best assist localities across the state in improving their court security.
2. Establish a source of security information which local officials can query when they need assistance. This can be a library, but if the AOC cannot assemble the documents it should be able to operate as a reference and coordination center.
3. Develop a comprehensive statewide assessment of court security and a strategic plan for improvements, including both long and short term components.
4. The strategic plan should include a training component which proposes a central training agency and curriculum and a process which allows key persons in each jurisdiction to receive training and return to train others in their court communities.

5. The strategic plan should provide for developing a security incident reporting system to be used statewide. It will be invaluable in measuring the overall status of court security problems and accumulating valid statistical information on their rates of occurrence. An accurate and complete reporting system will help providing justification for the requests that ultimately will be made to improve local conditions.
6. The strategic plan should include an estimate of future security costs and recommend methods of developing funding.

These six recommendations constitute the nucleus of a court security improvement program which can be implemented over a period of years. The program is based on successful statewide programs which are operating elsewhere and offers a reasonable approach to reaching success according to the conditions and practices that are common to the Mississippi counties.

**Workshop Agenda**



**COURT SECURITY WORKSHOP**  
**FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1999**  
**Crowne Plaza Downtown Jackson**

8:00-8:45	Registration
8:45-9:00	Introduction and Opening Remarks
9:00-11:30	American University Morning Block
11:30-1:00	Lunch
1:00-2:30	US Marshal Service Block
2:30-2:45	Break
3:00-4:00	American University Afternoon Block
4:00-4:30	Questions & Answer Session
4:30	Adjournment

**BJA-American University  
Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project**

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SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

## ***SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI WORKSHOP ON COURT SECURITY***

### ***REFERENCE MATERIALS***

*November 19, 1999*

*Jackson, Mississippi*

### **Prepared By:**

Lawrence Siegel  
Court Facilities and Security Consultant  
Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project

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- Section I:     *Court Security: Why, What, How*
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Summary of Findings, Recommendations, and Strategies*
- Section IV:    *Illustrative Incidents of Court Security Deficiencies*
- Section V:     *Results of Statewide Court Security Survey Conducted by the  
Mississippi Supreme Court Administrative Office of the Courts*

# — WHY —

## **Why court security, why our concern about it, what should we expect of it?**

- Court security has a simple purpose: to protect the integrity of court processes and proceedings by separating the deliberations, people, and material of the courts from the passions, emotions, and intentions that bring men and women to court.
- Our concern is that courts should not be prevented from administering justice.
- Our expectation is that responsible agencies will act to ensure the safety of all persons, records, and other materials in courthouses.

# — WHAT —

- Security is a system that can be put in place step by step.
- It is built from combinations of three components—

**personnel/operations,  
space,  
and equipment—**

which are chosen to work together in each application.

# — HOW —

## **Court security threats:**

- are inherent in the matters that bring people to court,
  - take relatively predictable forms,
  - and can be dealt with in terms of specific measures, threats, and goals.

**The measures** taken in a courthouse are the tools for countering specific threats to security. They will succeed to the degree that:

- they **deter** potential threats to the safety of persons and facilities,
- they **detect** threats which are not deterred and bring them to the attention of those who can take appropriate action,
- they **limit** any **damage** that might be caused.





THE CORRECT VERSION OF THE PARAGRAPH ON PAGE 1, COLUMN 2,  
BOTTOM.

***SOME ISSUES IN COURT SECURITY***

article in Winter, 1997 issue of

***The Court Manager***

National Association for Court Management

What are the problematic mindsets? One is that court security is of only local interest because it is funded locally, and it thereby escapes the leadership roles of state administrators. Another is that the courts are not politically responsive or responsible to local government; therefore they must be opposed by local executive and legislative agencies wherever possible. A third is that judges sometimes have been slow to recognize that the people using their courtrooms do feel the presence of security problems and slow to agree on and stand together in support of minimum security standards.



# Some Issues in Court Security



LAWRENCE SIEGEL

EDITOR'S NOTE:

*Lawrence Siegel is a consultant specializing in court and criminal justice facilities. He is based in Columbia, Maryland.*

AUTHOR'S NOTE:

*This article was written well before the TWA Flight 800 and Atlanta Centennial Park incidents and does not respond directly to them, although it appears they may affect increased security procedures and attitudes in many government and public facilities and activities throughout the country.*

Why court security? Why be concerned about it? What should we expect of it? Court security has a simple purpose: to protect the integrity of court processes and proceedings by separating the deliberations, people, and material of the courts from the passions, emotions, and intentions that bring men and women to court. We should be concerned that courts not be prevented from administering justice. We should expect that responsible agencies will act to ensure the safety of all persons, records, and other materials in courthouses.

Since my first studies and audits of court security in 1971, I have been analyzing the results, trying to look beyond local differences to find some common threads that hold true across the range of court sizes, types of jurisdictions, locations, and local population sizes and demographics. That analysis leads me to believe that a few significant characteristics often overlooked by judges and court administrators, and certain mindsets of officials who should be concerned about court security, stand in the way of reaching improve-

ments. If our well-placed concern with perimeter security, high-tech equipment, and means of preventing bomb-laden trucks from being detonated near courthouses commands more attention than the day-to-day routine of safeguarding courthouse occupants and property, it also may be obscuring the importance and difficulty of that essential security responsibility.

Important, not only because the staff and public occupants of these buildings gain safety from such routine security, but also because they may infer from its absence that their courts and local governments are complacent about their well-being. Difficult, not because it is so hard to do, but because it has high personnel costs and is usually measured by its failures, rather than successes.

What are the problematic mindsets? One is that court security is of only local interest because it is funded locally, and it thereby escapes the leadership responsive or responsible to local government; therefore they must be opposed by local executive and legislative agencies wherever possible. Also, judges sometimes have been slow to recognize that the people using their courtrooms do feel the presence of security problems and slow to agree on and

stand together in support of minimum security standards.

In this article I explore these key aspects of court security.

## Background

Court security is an issue made to order for the good luck syndrome: If a disaster hasn't happened yet, it's not going to happen. Waiting until it does happen before taking elementary precautions is a prescription for trouble, yet many jurisdictions have waited and are still waiting. The recent history of court security failures is both tragic and widespread: no section of the country and no type of jurisdiction — urban, suburban, or rural — is immune. These twenty-five years of court security audits have consistently shown the nature of the risks waiting in them and demonstrated that good luck alone cannot be trusted to safeguard the occupants and the buildings.

On balance, these audits reveal that security is, at best, a mixed bag: too few good points, too many bad points; some strengths, and many serious omissions. They point to the need for improvements intended to leave court and government agencies with a mechanism for strengthening weak points and eliminating omissions. Improvements can

be made in simple facility design features, operating procedures, staffing, and the use of technology; and, most important, by causing a major organizational change in outlook and response.

But they also indicate that no suggestions will be helpful until three questions are answered on which the effectiveness of court security depends: (1) Who has the legal responsibility for security? (2) Who has the authority to carry out security services? (3) Where is the money to pay for security? Although these questions are fundamental, their simplicity is deceptive. Courts that have overlooked them while trying to improve security have too often seen their plans derailed and their hopes dashed.

Many courts have had so little security over the years that they are without experience or expectation of what it is and how it can be brought about. Even a quarter-century ago security was a problem in many courts, but today it is pervasive. To understand court security and find practical ways to make it work in given jurisdictions, the first step is to look at its construc-





tive elements, not its past compromises. Here's the mantra: *Security is a system that can be put in place step by step. It is built from combinations of three components—space, personnel and operations, and equipment—which are chosen to work together in each application.* To start improving security, forget for the moment what exists now and think about what is really needed; the politics can come in after the goals are set. Once the needs are known, specific recommendations can be drawn from assessments of security in actual facilities and the use of security system designs that have been cost-effective in improving security elsewhere.

Given the lack of security experience, it is critical that responsible agencies cooperate in laying the groundwork to understand and build long-term future improvements. But security is generally viewed as a local (county) responsibility, which may explain why some three thousand local decisions are being made about court security and how to achieve it. A state judicial authority might well seek to reach at least a minimum level of security in all its courthouses. It could begin by:

- developing a statewide base of information,
- preparing guidelines and presenting them to the localities and courts,
- recommending improvements for each court facility, and

- and developing a comprehensive action plan.
- The localities, courts, and state could then work together to carry out the plans.

### A PRACTICAL APPROACH

Court security, like other hard-to-define but easy-to-recognize things, is intangible: security failures are obvious, but if problems haven't surfaced, how can we know whether they were deterred by good security or whether there were no threats?

The answer is pragmatic: court security threats are inherent in the nature of the matters that bring people to court. They take relatively predictable forms, and they can be dealt with in terms of specific threats, measures, and goals. The measures taken in a courthouse are the tools for countering specific threats to security and will be successful to the degree that:

- they **deter** potential threats to the safety of persons and facilities,
- they **detect** threats that are not deterred and bring them to the attention of those who can take appropriate action, and
- they **limit the damage** that might be caused.

Are there security problems in our courthouses today? Can a security disaster occur in your courthouse? Could it have happened in Grand Forks; San Bernadino; Colbert County, Alabama; Clayton, Missouri; Fort Worth; Cleveland; Milwaukee; San Jose; Washington, D.C.? It has happened all these places and elsewhere, all within the last few years! Courts often passively accept or remain unaware of certain conditions lying just below the surface of daily court routines that are made to order for hostilities and passions to erupt into violence.

### OKLAHOMA CITY: A WAKE-UP CALL?

The April 19, 1995, bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City brings home both the potential for damage and the reality of current facility security problems. The origin and motives of that attack may be examined in trial, but we can expect them to resemble those experienced by many state and federal courts during the past three decades.

The lesson of this experience is not about specific security measures and practices, but about the stark reality that security threats do exist and can emerge in any place and in any jurisdiction. "It can't happen here" is a common enough attitude, by no means limited to court or county officials. In the days after the bombing we heard much about the significance of its having taken place in Oklahoma City, deep in the heartland of the U.S., as if nothing in that locality's history could have prepared it for this experience of violence. Are we then to believe that Oklahoma City is free of domestic violence, that its juvenile and adult crimes are few in number and minor in severity, that it has no urban gangs and no intergroup or other tensions?

Most court security threats have mundane and ordinary origins, and that makes them much more difficult to counter, not easier! The security problem most difficult to solve is not a bomber or a vigilante attack; it is indifference, rooted in the belief that: "it can't happen here".

We have to realize that the potential for danger really does exist and we really do have to face up to it. The price of security is not simply dollars but also the loss of some of the easy access we have been so proud of for so long. But can the alternative, letting

the innate violence explode, be accepted?

What can be done? We must first make security a design key for new court facilities. It is much easier to leave it out, because design security may increase construction costs and can significantly complicate facility circulation, but security is as fundamental a design need as is an adequate number of case processing units. Methods to improve security in facilities lacking secure designs compensate by stressing the other means of providing security: personnel/operations and technology, the ongoing costs of which will rapidly exceed those of the missing design security. We should seek security system designs that have some promise of cost-effectiveness, even though their design problems may be more difficult to solve. Above all, we must understand how court facilities are actually used and develop reality-based views of the people and situations that are found in them.

Setting security goals implies deciding how much security to provide, both in individual court types or facility locations and overall. Good decisions demand accurate forecasts of what level of security is justified, not only by the current security climate, but by the likely future climate, and recognize that security problems, hence design needs, differ according to the various case types heard in given facilities. Dealing with current security problems is straightforward, except that if today's problems are not being adequately controlled, it is probably because yesterday's forecasts missed them.

Were it not that security measures invoke accessibility limits and dollar costs, they could be applied generously, but generosity in most facili-



ties is inhibited by the need for public and staff access and the reality of budget limits. Instead, the appropriate level of security measures for any court should be chosen in reference to the perceived threats to its security. We try to balance security measures against perceived problems without tipping the scales either way—we aim for effective security without too many access restrictions or too much expense. But in our media-driven society, where bad news spreads immediately throughout the country, we can tip the scales against safety and security by failing to recognize and adjust to imminent changes before they fully affect a court.

Court security is an important concern in those many courts that see threats increasing or the adequacy of security measures decreasing. Security threats, broadly speaking, include those caused by persons whose emotional stability breaks under the stress of some court situation and those caused by persons who are contemptuous of the law and its instruments. They can come either from individuals or groups, and they can take the form of spontaneous personal reactions or organized planned actions. The most common are triggered by the extreme and potentially explosive stresses involved in domestic relations proceedings and by juveniles, whose emotional maturity lags far behind their ability to cause damage. Others (for example, the "Freemen" in Montana) have specific purposes within a courthouse (prisoner escapes; judge, witness, or jury intimidation; revenge), and some (for example, Oklahoma City) have broader social or political implications (bomb threats against "the establishment" or some social group).

A desired level of courthouse security can be achieved by combining specific security measures into a comprehensive system. Because most security measures overlap one another and allow for alternative approaches, they can be implemented with some freedom by choosing from:

- facility design possibilities,
- security personnel and operations (especially where design security cannot be achieved), and
- technology used to enhance operations.

The appropriate choice will depend on construction and operations costs, propriety, legality, effectiveness of responses, adaptability to change, administrative control, and timeliness.

Setting too low a goal for security can be risky if security threats increase and security measures fail to keep up. Ironically, this might happen if the past success of security measures had led to some complacency, while other types of problems were arriving unnoticed.

### THREE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

#### *Who is responsible?*

References to common law generally lead to the conclusion that security in local courts in England originated as a duty and obligation of the sheriff of those jurisdictions. In the American colonies and the individual states, it has developed that county sheriffs' "principal duties are in aid of the criminal courts and civil courts of record." Usually, but not always, this is understood to include providing for security in courts, but time and custom have given us a variety of court security agencies and methods across the states.

Many state constitutions make their closest reference

to court security by declaring that county sheriffs "shall attend sessions of court." Some localities and states have established agencies specifically to provide court security services or have assigned such duties to existing police agencies. Courts in some states, including Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, and Washington, can employ their own security officers who may work in conjunction with the sheriffs' departments. Courts in some states, also including Florida, contract with private security companies to provide limited security services such as entrance screening. In any event, whether the duties and obligations are unequivocally stated and assigned to rest in the depths of case law, there is some official who is responsible for providing court security. More important than which agency has the legal authority and responsibility is the practical question of whether any agency has accepted this duty and is providing the necessary services.

#### *Who has authority?*

Security operations usually are most effective when the courts and their security agencies develop a cooperative approach that responds to the procedural needs of the courts and the operational needs of the security agencies. Security budgets are tight everywhere; cooperation makes them more elastic. In almost every jurisdiction with inadequate security, sheriffs report they would be willing to provide court security service if they could get the budgets, but judges often seem unable to develop a unified position about their courts' needs or who should provide the service.

Security authority depends not only on which official has the statutory responsibility, but also on what direction is provided by the court.



Security procedures within court facilities are ultimately approved and authorized by the court and carried out by those officials who are designated as security officers. Some are confirmed in court orders and carry the same force as other orders of court—dress codes, courtroom procedures, filing rules, etc. Police officers and deputy sheriffs, while they are within courthouses, generally are required to follow court orders with respect to carrying arms and exercising other police duties but may carry out court security duties only as authorized by the court. Throughout the country, courts generally have the authority and sometimes exercise it; where the system usually falters is in obtaining funding.

#### *Where is the money?*

Where, indeed? It's well-hidden and hard to acquire. Even in localities where serious security incidents have occurred—fatal shootings and knifings—security budgets often defy the conventional wisdom that "we'll have to wait until someone's killed before security is improved." Experience shows that only the minimum steps are likely to be taken and efforts will be directed simply at fixing the problem that brought notoriety, rather than reviewing the overall security operation and bringing it to a level of effectiveness likely to deter future incidents anywhere in the facility.

This happens principally because security improvements invariably require addi-



tional personnel whose costs, compared to capital costs, are high, ongoing, and cannot be bonded. Authorities are reluctant to incur either operating or capital security costs because, while the costs are all too visible, the results are invisible — the danger deterred is not an asset! And then, the division of court responsibilities between local and state agencies does offer fertile ground for wishful thinking and buck-passing.

### PROGRAMMATIC SUGGESTIONS

Regardless of where the legal responsibility lies, there is no doubt about the financial responsibility: it lies with county or city government, except in those states that fully fund the entire court system. But state and local cooperation can get an improvement program underway and to keep it healthy. Our observation is that an effective way to encourage localities to establish and fund adequate court security is for local and state court agencies to work together to develop and carry out a comprehensive plan that maximizes the benefits of even limited expenditures. Its implementation should be phased over several years ac-

ording to programmatic goals such as these:

1. Statewide, start by conducting a survey and assessment of security in the local courts, compiling data about their security incidents and the security measures they use. The first step is to develop a consensus among local courts, and, perhaps, other agencies, about its necessity and procedures.
2. Next, use the assessment to establish sensible statewide guidelines aimed at encouraging localities to accept security responsibilities and to recommend exemplary methods that have been used elsewhere in the state. The program should build on each improvement, step by step, while continuing to compile the security database, especially for security incident reporting, and refine the criteria and guidelines.
3. Develop funding strategies to defray the costs of adequate security, including the dedication of a portion of filing fees, court costs, fines, and designated security fees.
4. Locally, to deliver the needed protection at the lowest cost, design court security as a comprehensive system,

organized to provide the needed levels of security throughout a facility, and then optimized by applying resources across the range of architectural, personnel/operations, and technological measures. Shape local solutions to local conditions while responding to the comprehensive guidelines.

5. Each locality should be encouraged to establish a security committee that will represent and define the security responsibilities of all stakeholding agencies (typically including at least representative of the court and related agencies, sheriff, and county government).

### ANOTHER, AND FINAL, VOICE

*Because there was no town until there was a court house, and no court house until ... the floorless lean-to rabbit-hutch housing the iron chest was reft from the log flank of the jail and transmogrified into a by-neo-Greek-out-of-Georgian-English edifice set in the center of what in time would be the town square... But above all, the courthouse, the center, the focus, the hub ... musing, brooding, symbolic and ponderable,*



*tall as cloud, solid as rock dominating all: protector of the weak, judicate and curb of the passions and lust, repository and guardian of the aspirations and the hopes...*


WILLIAM FAULKNER,  
"REQUIEM FOR A NUN"

In the rush of everyday court activities, trying to keep up with all the pressures of caseload and procedures, we risk losing sight of something important: the image of justice. Faulkner captured it well, especially in the phrase "judicate and curb of the passions and lusts," but how well do we display that image to our constituents and live up to those responsibilities? Their safety and the propriety of their civil and criminal proceedings are essential safeguards of our democracy and our national life. Indifference breeds contempt, and contempt leads in a direction we cannot contemplate. That is rationale enough for doing what is necessary for effective court security. CM





**NEW MEXICO**  
**COURT SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC PLAN**  
**A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STRATEGIES**



New Mexico Supreme Court Building, Santa Fe, New Mexico

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**LSC**

# **NEW MEXICO COURT SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGIC PLAN**

## **A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STRATEGIES**

Between June, 1998 and April, 1999, the Supreme Court of New Mexico sponsored a ground-breaking project, an assessment of security provisions in the district and magistrate courts of the state. Carried out through on-site surveys of eighteen courts and a mail survey of more than 600 persons using and working in the courts, the project's results were reported in two stages. The first, based on the site visits, described 26 problems, recommended a solution for each, and proposed a strategy for achieving major improvements in the short term, while the second analyzed the results of the mail survey and added long term elements to the strategy.

Under the leadership of New Mexico's Supreme Court, Statewide Court Security Team, and Administrative Office of the Courts, and funded by the State Justice Institute and the State of New Mexico, the project was carried out by the firm of Lawrence Siegel—Consultant, Court and Criminal Justice Facilities, of Columbia, Maryland.

Although the project is specific to the New Mexico courts and their procedures, its approach is of general applicability and the security issues it examined are those which would be found in any state. Believing these lend the project a broad utility, we underline in this summary the essential topics and the comprehensive process for realizing security improvements.



*“But above all, the courthouse: the center, the focus, the hub . . . musing, brooding, symbolic and ponderable, tall as cloud, solid as rock, dominating all: protector of the weak, judicate and curb of the passions and lusts, repository and guardian of the aspirations and the hopes . . .”*  
William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun*

## 1. FOREWORD

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The Supreme Court of New Mexico, acting from its concern for the safety of the people who use and work in the state courts and for the security of documents and other material stored there, initiated in mid-1998 a comprehensive assessment of security issues in the courts and the preparation of practical guidelines for improving security. It was the first such statewide assessment ever attempted in New Mexico. Funding was provided by a grant of \$40,000 from the State Justice Institute, the U. S. Department of Justice’s funding arm for local justice-improvement projects, and \$36,661 from the State of New Mexico. The firm of Lawrence Siegel—Consultant, Court and Criminal Justice Facilities, of Columbia, Maryland, was selected to carry out this project. Mr. Siegel has been active in court security operations and facility planning throughout the United States for more than twenty-five years. His colleagues included Ms. Beverly Bright, a former court administrator and elected county clerk from Washington State, and Mr. James F. Klopp, former Chief Deputy Sheriff of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, where he was in charge of court security for a number of years.

Incidents threatening safety and security, some even life threatening, have been increasingly seen in courthouses across

the country for many years. While New Mexico has yet to be visited by the extreme violence plaguing other states, its people should be able to feel secure in their courts, even though workplace violence and crime have become common in our society. At one time court security was considered necessary only during high-risk or controversial trials, but during the past thirty years security in the courts has become a daily concern; the New Mexico courts are no exception.

New Mexico had no consistent or standardized security protocols, policies, procedures, or budgets applicable to the components of the state courts. This was the compelling reason to institute a statewide assessment of security needs and to develop a strategic action plan for implementing and budgeting security initiatives.

Based on the statewide court security assessment, the strategic action plan is a practical guide for implementing a comprehensive security program in New Mexico’s courts. The goal of the program is to protect the safety of everyone in court facilities—jurors, litigants, court personnel, witnesses, and other members of the public—and to safeguard the integrity of court records. Its components include procedural and personnel

methods, those that use technology, and those derived from facility designs and includes both short-and long-term strategies.

Our assessment of the current state of security in the courts statewide rests on observations of court procedures and security operations made in the courts we visited and on a mail survey of some 600 persons regularly in the courts: employees of court and related agencies, law enforcement personnel, attorneys, and others. Concentrating on the magistrate and district courts, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, the consultant partnered with representatives from those courts and the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) to prepare a program of security recommendations which address the need for safety, yet respect open access to the courts.

Cooperation from all quarters was exemplary and welcome. In the Administrative Office of the Courts, Director John Greacen, project manager Robert J. Klein, and magistrate court specialist Stephen Pacheco, were extraordinarily helpful. The New Mexico Statewide Court Security Team, headed by Court of Appeals Judge Christina Armijo, was an invaluable source of encouragement, guidance and information. Particular notice must also be given to the financial support from the State Justice Institute that made the project possible. Its willingness to fund important projects that are proposed and carried out by the states and localities is crucial to the success of this, and many other, worthwhile projects.

## 2. INTRODUCTION

### PROJECT HISTORY

Project planning began in June of 1998, when the consultant met with staff of the Administrative Office of the Courts and the New Mexico Statewide Court Security Team and visited the First Judicial District Court in Santa Fe, the magistrate courts in Santa Fe and Española, and the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals in the Supreme Court Building. From this exploratory visit, a three part approach followed for conducting the security assessment and developing a strategic plan for carrying out improvements.

First in this approach was an on-site security survey of

eighteen courts, documented and assessed in the *First Stage Report*, which proposed a strategic plan of short-term improvements. Next was a mail survey of about 600 people working in and using all the state courts, which confirmed the earlier assessment, and third was the completion of the strategic plan, presented in the *Second Stage Report*. This addressed the longer-term elements of the comprehensive strategy; including personnel, budgeting and funding, facility procurement policies, technology, and prisoner custody issues.

In the first part of the study we surveyed security in three district courts, ten magistrate courts, the Supreme Court, and the

Court of Appeals during a two-week period of visits conducted by the three members of the consultant team, accompanied the first day by AOC staff and members of the Statewide Court Security Team. The results were described in a site report for each court visited and in the *First Stage Report*. The latter assessed security in those courts in terms of their facilities, procedures, security personnel, and technology, and was organized into assessments and recommendations generally applicable to magistrate courts and others applicable to district courts. Based on the problems we found and the recommendations we made to remedy them, the report also presented the first stage of the strategic plan, hence its name.

Our analysis of the results of the mail survey, which returned 210 questionnaires out of the 600 mailed, reinforced and heightened the insights gained from the site survey. The anonymity of the mail survey responses, while it slightly hindered statistical analysis, allowed respondents to speak their minds, sometimes vehemently, about their lack of confidence in the security of the courts in which they worked or practiced.

It became clear early on that an effective strategy for improving security in the state courts of New Mexico would best be made in two parts: 1) recommendations that could demonstrably improve security in a short period of time while invoking as little cost as possible; and 2) recommendations that might take some time to implement and might incur more significant costs. Hence the short term strategic plan provides inexpensive, but effective, improvements while the long term strategic plan covers

those more-difficult activities that do incur costs and, perhaps, break with some conventions—and therefore are likely to take longer to carry out than the provisions of the first stage. The recommendations on which the second stage rests were reported and documented in the first stage (and bolstered by the mail survey) but did not enter its shorter term strategic plan.

### **OUTLINE OF STRATEGIC PLAN**

In the *First Stage Report* we developed strategies for operational, procedural, and consciousness-raising measures aimed principally at deterring problems and detecting them when they did occur. The *Second Stage Report* adds other measures aimed at deterrence, detection, and damage limitation which make use of security personnel and technology and may cost more or take longer to implement, or both.

#### **Premise**

Our premise is that security—including providing for the safety of all occupants of New Mexico's courts—is a pursuit that should not end with the conclusion either of this project or the one-time funding opportunities of the capital costs fee. In a goal-oriented budget, security should be a continuing responsibility of the state's courts, sharing in the budget according to how that responsibility is viewed.

Over a period of time appropriate security operations should become institutionalized in the administration of the district, magistrate, and appellate courts, and their costs should become

formalized in the courts' budgets. Over how long a period of time and for what cost? Below we look at the possibilities and develop some guidelines.

### The Strategy

Our approach was to separate the goals into those that could be achieved relatively quickly, at little cost, and make a significant improvement in security and those that were more expensive, might require legislative or procedural changes, and might require changes in the mindsets of officials throughout state and local government.

The short term measures were aimed at heightening security awareness among the people of the district and magistrate courts throughout the state, with such simple goals as:

- strengthening the Statewide Court Security Team,
- developing a security committee in each court,
- increasing the formality of magistrate court proceedings,
- soliciting staff advice about problems and engaging them in developing solutions,
- providing security training for staff,
- improving the professionalism of signs,
- repairing facility discrepancies and developing facility security and procurement guidelines,
- encouraging the development of policies regarding the separation of public and private spaces,
- learning how to use duress alarms and regularly exercising the alarm systems and procedures.

The long term measures added several vital steps:

- increasing the number of security personnel in the courts;
- adding weapons detection capability, comprehensive access controls, and video arraignment over a period of time;
- and repeating in more detail several measures introduced in the short term plan—developing a security incident reporting system and database, improving facility procurement policies, and establishing security training for court personnel.

### Time

Instituting a new activity within the budget and operations of an existing organization takes time; time to test the concepts and their implementations, time to build consensus in the staff and the public, and time to resolve the issues that cannot be discovered until the process is well underway. In this instance a period of five years seems appropriate; long enough for growing pains to be discovered and dealt with yet short enough to build and maintain momentum in the program.

Taking five years to fully implement the program also allows the budget to be built gradually and allows a sufficient period for incremental improvements to be developed and added.

### Personnel

The most significant part of any security system is its personnel: visible, knowledgeable, trained, and competent security officers; also the most expensive part. No system can promise the essentials of court security—deterrence, detection, and damage limitation—without providing security personnel. If we are serious about court security, we will have to provide security personnel in the courts. It will be appropriate to look for ways to bring security personnel on board without incurring excessive costs, especially in the smaller magistrate courts with the least busy schedules, but the services will have to be provided.

Later in this summary we present some maximum estimates of security staffing for the state court system, based on a gradually increasing complement of personnel in each of the magistrate and district courts.

### Custody of Prisoners

In most of the counties we visited, county employees, rather than sheriff's departments, were operating detention centers and providing prisoner transportation and custody operations in magistrate and in district courts. Speaking to custodial operations that we observed, including transport and court custody, they could not be called adequate. Thus we examined issues of training, organizational status and placement, and rules of operation and offers recommendations about the source and funding of custodial services.

### Facility Procurement Policy

Based on our observations and the results of the mail survey, several issues of facility procurement and funding are considered further here. For district court facilities, comments are offered on the tradeoffs between facility funding and facility quality; for magistrate courts we reexamine issues of landlord vs. state ownership of facilities. A choice of facility guidelines is recommended as well as the development of procedures and an organizational basis for overseeing adequacy.

### Technology

The most important applications of security technology, where improvements are urgently needed, are for comprehensive and standardized access control systems, for effective weapons detection systems, and for comprehensive duress and intrusion alarm systems. We commented on issues of funding, technical specifications, and procedures with the aim of developing a uniform effective level of protection across the state. Additionally, video technology used to carry out remote arraignments can increase security and make more effective use of judicial and detention center time.

### Security Training

Both the site survey and the mail survey revealed an important need for security training for all court personnel. The men and women who work in the courts in positions where they have most of the public contacts would benefit from training to

help them develop and refine ways to handle many of the routine daily situations that sometimes can escalate with tragic consequences. Periodic retraining also can be a great source of reassurance as they carry out their daily work.

#### **Incident Reporting and Security Assessments**

Without regularly collecting and analyzing data that indicate the extent of potential security problems, and without conducting periodic assessments of the condition of security in the state courts, it will be difficult to argue that improvements are needed. Currently, except for the Supreme Court Building where security incidents have been reported and recorded since 1974, security incidents are not reported, data about problems are not collected, and, other than in this assessment project, security in the courts is not regularly evaluated. As an adjunct to the strategic plan presented here, a program of security incident reporting and periodic security assessments is essential.

Several means of collecting and analyzing security incident data statewide are discussed together with several methods to make them feasible. Also recommended is a series of periodic security assessments intended to keep track of the success of the improvements recommended here, based on the type of assessment developed for this project but simpler to implement.

#### **Budgeting**

We examined the probable costs for implementing the programs recommended throughout the report. Most significant

among these are the costs of installing weapons screening stations and the personnel to staff them and provide other security services in the court facilities.

#### **PERSONNEL**

The position of Court Security Officer (CSO) should be established and a cadre should be brought on board, trained, and deployed in the multi-judge magistrate and district courts over a five-year period.

14 Magistrate Courts: \$731,761 annual costs, total of 28 CSO

10 District Courts: \$653,358 annual costs, total of 25 CSO

**\$1,385,119 Total Annual Costs**

**\$6,725,595 Total 5-Year Costs**

#### **TECHNOLOGY**

Technology should be installed to improve capabilities in:

- Weapons detection
- Access control
- Video arraignment

#### **Weapons Detection**

The use of weapons screeners, consisting of magnetometers and Xrays, follows the same protocols as the assignment of security personnel, indeed one prime duty of court security

officers is to operate this equipment and ensure that weapons are not brought into the court facilities.

**Magistrate Courts**

14 facilities at \$34,500

Total Installation Cost: \$480,893

**District Court Facilities**

10 Cts w 2 or more JJ and no screeners

Total Installation Costs \$358,993

**Comprehensive 5-Year Installation Costs \$839,886**

**Annual Costs for Five-Year Installation Period**

\$167,977

**Access Control**

Several approaches that might yield different comprehensive costs can be visualized for procuring access control systems across the state; statewide procurement, regional procurement, or individual facility procurement. They should be investigated in detail, but for budgetary purposes we address only a single, statewide pricing system. For 82 facilities currently without access control systems, we estimate an installation cost of \$2,500,000, including protection for all interior and exterior doors. This excludes computers, which should already be in the facilities, but includes software, door hardware, and installation costs.

**Video Arraignment**

The installation costs of video arraignment systems depends directly upon the type of technology adopted, including both the studio equipment and the transmission system. To estimate a statewide cost of installation we must make a choice of both, although the implementation chosen in any one system might well differ from a single cost-estimating model.

The cost-estimating model chosen here is a video conferencing application using PCs with appropriate hardware and software, and DSL communications linking a pair of studios. This is not necessarily the best choice in every situation, and may not even be widely available, but it would be applicable in all situations. We define the basic installation as a "conference", consisting of two studios, one in the courthouse and one in the local detention center. The distance between the two is not a factor, although the availability and cost of the DSL service is. Such a conference could have an installation cost of about \$4,900 and an annual operating cost of about \$1,200 for DSL service.

**14 Magistrate Courts**

Installation Costs \$68,600

Annual Costs \$16,800

Total 1<sup>st</sup> year Costs \$85,400

Total 5-Year Costs \$427,000

## **IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY**

We recommend carrying out the full implementation just described, allowing a period of five years to reach completion. For budgetary purposes, we have computed the costs by adding one fifth of the recommended items annually, synchronizing the procurement of personnel and weapons screening equipment each year.

It is important to realize that each court facility, and especially the district court facilities, may present problems specific to its design. District courts are noted here because some are located in county buildings that also house county government offices. For example, in the Curry County Courthouse in Clovis, district court facilities occupy interior spaces that do not have their own building entrance. This implies a need to either design and locate a screening installation somewhere within the facility where it controls access to the court spaces or to negotiate with county government security measures which are satisfactory to both entities.

### **Implementation Process**

To deal with this and other problems that will develop as the overall strategy is carried out, we need a process capable of anticipating and reacting to them. The role of the New Mexico Statewide Court Security Team, acting under the authority of the New Mexico Supreme Court, will be essential. Guidance from the team will be necessary in establishing goals and suggesting methods, perhaps even preparing action scenarios, to help the

district and magistrate courts develop plans and put them in place. It may be necessary to recruit additional team members and appoint sub-committees, perhaps even develop some formal staffing support, before the team becomes overwhelmed by detail. In any event, it appears that the team is the necessary incubator and can be the strategic organizer of the process of improving security in the courts of New Mexico.

Among the tasks which would define the process, we recommend these to the team's consideration:

1. Develop an implementation plan—including step-by-step goals and activities and a timetable for achievement.
2. Appoint key people to oversee the implementation.
3. Develop a schedule, milestones of achievement, and reviews of progress.
4. Coordinate the program with appropriate legislative and public relations and a campaign to build court-community support.
5. Continue to solicit policy feedback from the community of court users and staffs modeled on the mail survey as a starting point.
6. Work actively to organize support throughout the state for improved court security.
7. Conduct semi-annual or annual reviews of implementation progress and of security policies as they develop. Work also through the existing organizational structure such as the Conference of Chief Judges and other groups.



FIVE YEAR IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY						
Year	Personnel	Screeners	Access Controls	Video Arraignment	ANNUAL TOTAL	CUMULATIVE TOTAL
1	\$277,024	\$167,977	\$500,000	\$85,400	\$1,030,401	\$1,030,401
2	\$554,047	\$167,977	\$500,000	\$85,400	\$1,307,425	\$2,337,825
3	\$831,071	\$167,977	\$500,000	\$85,400	\$1,584,448	\$3,922,274
4	\$1,108,095	\$167,977	\$500,000	\$85,400	\$1,861,472	\$5,783,746
5	\$1,385,119	\$167,977	\$500,000	\$85,400	\$2,138,496	\$7,922,242
<b>Totals</b>	<b>\$4,155,356</b>	<b>\$839,886</b>	<b>\$2,500,000</b>	<b>\$427,000</b>	<b>\$7,922,242</b>	



## NATION IN BRIEF

### Colo. Governor Calls Dead Child's Father 'Suspect'

**BOULDER, Colo.**—Gov. Bill Owens turned down offers by the parents of JonBenet Ramsey to meet while he was considering a special prosecutor in the girl's death because he was concerned about a "prime suspect" influencing the investigation.

Owens said it would have been wrong to meet with the Ramseys because John Ramsey would have wanted a hand in deciding whether a prosecutor should be named, and if so, who should be appointed.

"Mr. Ramsey is considered to be a prime suspect," Owens said Friday. "It would be very inappropriate to meet with him."

On Thursday, Ramsey attorney L. Lin Wood of Atlanta branded Owens a liar for having said the Ramseys were hiding behind their lawyers and failing to help solve the Dec. 26, 1996, slaying of their daughter. The Ramseys were willing to meet with the governor and testify before a grand jury, he said.

Owens dismissed Wood's accusation that he lied and slandered the couple. "He knows the truth is the ultimate defense against slander," Owens said. "Let's quit calling each other names."

### Judge Calls for Security After Attack by Defendant

**READING, Pa.**—A judge who was beaten unconscious by an enraged defendant has called for a comprehensive study of courthouse security, saying the attack might have been prevented if there had been more guards.

Judge Linda K.M. Ludgate suffered a broken arm, nose and facial bone when she was punched and kicked in the head by Derrick J. Neidig, 38, of Reading on Oct. 19, after she said he could be committed to a mental health facility.

Instead of the usual four deputies, Ludgate's courtroom was guarded by two. As Ludgate lay unconscious, Neidig was subdued by probation officers and city police present for other cases. He is charged with assault.

# Courtroom Skirmish Rattles Spectators

## *Fights Worry Prince George's Officials*

By RUBEN CASTANEDA  
*Washington Post Staff Writer*

A fracas broke out in a Prince George's County Circuit courtroom Monday—the second in three weeks—after a man whom a judge had just ordered to jail on an assault conviction screamed at the judge and refused to be handcuffed, officials said yesterday.

Two deputies and the man then toppled onto the wooden defense table, which broke under their weight, witnesses said.

None of the men was injured, though a number of courtroom personnel and spectators were shaken by the episode, witnesses said.

Such outbursts, while still unusual, have occurred with increasing frequency in county courtrooms and have become a growing concern for the sheriff's deputies who provide security, as well as for judges, lawyers and other court-room workers.

"Of course, there's concern it's happening with greater frequency," said Sgt. Bill Ament, a sheriff's department spokesman.

Circuit Court Judge Richard H. Sothoron Jr., in whose courtroom Monday's fracas occurred, said "it's tragic" that the confrontations occur at all.

Three weeks ago, the brother of a slaying victim jumped a low courtroom wall and attacked the

defendant while startled lawyers and spectators scrambled for cover. In January 1998, the widow of a slain D.C. police officer tried to climb over a low courtroom wall to get a man accused of helping kill her husband. Also last year, a witness injured his shoulder intervening when another witness attacked a defendant.

Judges and sheriff's deputies attribute the increase in courtroom violence in part to budget cutbacks that have left the sheriff's department understaffed. On a typical day, 31 deputies are assigned to 25 courtrooms that hear adult and juvenile criminal cases. Those deputies also guard six prisoner holding cells, escort prisoners to and from the county jail and perform other tasks.

A court order requires that two deputies be present for all trials and hearings involving criminal charges and juveniles. But because of a staffing shortage, there is often only one deputy present for such cases, sheriff's officials said. Only one deputy was initially present three weeks ago when the brother of the slaying victim rushed the defendant.

On Monday, two deputies were present, but only because another courtroom had finished its business for the day and the deputy assigned

there went to Sothoron's courtroom, Ament said.

The Monday incident occurred after a jury had found Robert Augustus Davis, 24, of Temple Hills, guilty of second-degree assault for stabbing someone during after a minor traffic accident, officials said.

Jurors had been dismissed when Sothoron asked lawyers about Davis's criminal background and learned that he was on probation after having been convicted of assault with intent to murder.

Sothoron ordered Davis's bail revoked and ordered deputies to take him into custody. Deputies John Dorman and George Gaskill were standing behind Davis when he began screaming at the judge and refused to be handcuffed, officials said.

Sothoron said he and other courtroom officials remained in the courtroom during the scuffle. Davis was charged with resisting arrest and disorderly conduct, officials said.

"We still feel we can address the security concerns of the court, maybe not as expeditiously as we could have a few years ago," before budget cuts reduced staffing, Ament said. "Only time will tell if we can continue to do this."

# Victim's Brother Attacks Defendant in Courtroom

## *Pr. George's Leaders Cite Deputy Shortage*

By Ruben Castaneda

*Washington Post Staff Writer*

Upper Marlboro, April 21, 1999

The brother of a murder victim jumped a low wall into the front area of a Prince George's County Circuit courtroom Monday and attacked the defendant while startled attorneys and spectators scrambled for cover, sheriffs officials confirmed yesterday.

The incident occurred when only one sheriff's deputy was assigned to provide security in the courtroom, despite a court order that two deputies be present for all trials and hearings involving criminal charges or juveniles.

Officials acknowledged yesterday that a shortage of deputies to provide courtroom security is a chronic problem for the sheriff's office and a continuing effect of budget reductions sparked by a longtime feud between County Executive Wayne K. Curry (D) and the former sheriff.

"There actually aren't enough deputies to have one staff each [criminal or juvenile] case," said Sgt. Bill Ament, a sheriff's department spokesman. "We end up determining where the court needs us the most, based on the severity of the cases scheduled before it."

Although outbursts such as Monday's are unusual, they are occurring with increasing frequency, judges and lawyers in Prince George's said yesterday. In January 1998, the widow of a slain D.C. police officer tried to climb over a courtroom barrier to get at a man accused of killing her husband. Last year, a bailiff injured his shoulder intervening when a witness attacked a defendant.

As the number of cases increase and the number of deputies decrease, we're

seeing more violence in courtrooms. We're definitely short of deputies said Prince George's County Circuit Court Judge Graydon S. McKee, III. Monday's incident occurred in McKee's courtroom.

In the fiscal year that ended in June, the sheriff's department had a budget of \$16.6 million and was authorized to have 212 deputies. Currently the department has 151 sworn deputies, and Currie's proposed budget for fiscal 2000 would give the department \$10.9 million, which authorizes only 117 sworn deputies, Ament said.

The budget cuts also have affected the serving of warrants in the county, which last year had nearly 30,000 backlogged.

Thirty-one deputies are assigned to the courthouse, Ament said. Yesterday, a typical day, those deputies had to cover 25 courtrooms with adult criminal and juvenile cases, guard six prisoner holding cells, escort prisoners to and from the county jail, guard visits between attorneys and defendants, and staff the sheriff's control room.

Ament said the office has used overtime pay to fill some of the security gaps, spending about \$1 million so far this fiscal year, a significant amount of which went for court room security.

The budgetary crush is in part a result of a feud between Curry and former sheriff James V Aluisi. The two filed competing lawsuits over funding and management of the sheriff's office.

In December, shortly after newly elected Sheriff Alonzo D. Black (D) took office, Black and Curry said they expected to settle the lawsuits and

pledged to work together.

In Monday's incident, the jury had been seated and opening statements were about to begin in the first-degree murder trial of Cedric Cameron Clark, 17, of Landover. Clark is charged as an adult in the May 16, 1998, stabbing of Joemel McNair, an honor student from Oxon Hill who was killed as he left a party.

According to witnesses of the courthouse incident, this is how the fracas occurred: Joseph Gray McNair, 30, the brother of the victim, began swearing at Clark, who was seated at the defense table. McNair began moving toward the well (front portion) of the courtroom.

As McNair approached the well, a stepbrother of the victim, Reginald D. Wayne Reed, followed McNair in an apparent attempt to stop him. When McNair tried to vault the barrier separating the well from the courtroom

gallery, Lisa Vallario, McKee's clerk, tried to grab McNair's shoulder to try to stop him.

Concerned for Vallario's safety, McNee ordered her to back off, which she did. McNair and Reed tumbled over the barrier, and threw a heavy wooden chair at Clark, missing him.

Clark bolted from the defense table while the lone deputy tried to keep him from escaping. Eventually, Clark, McNair and Reed ended up in front of the horrified jury, with McNair and Reed apparently slugging Clark as many as three times. Deputies and police officers responded from a hallway and subdued all three.

McKee found McNair and Reed in contempt of court. He sentenced McNair to 30 days in jail and Reed to 10 days in jail. Defense attorneys requested and were granted a mistrial. Clark's trial has been rescheduled for June 14.

(Reported in *Law Enforcement News* and in *American Jails* of May/June, 1995)

## Mail-Order Wife Killed By Spouse at Courthouse

SEATTLE- A gunman killed his pregnant mail-order bride and one of her friends, and critically wounded another woman as they waited to testify against him yesterday in a marriage annulment hearing, police said.

Timothy C. Blackwell, 47, met and married Susana Remarata Blackwell, 25, in the Phillipines two years ago. They separated two weeks after she arrived here.

Blackwell claimed his wife duped him into the marriage, in part so she could live in America, court records show. She contended he beat her, forcing her to move out in fear. He filed for annulment; she filed for divorce, seeking \$350 a month in alimony for six months.

Yesterday, shortly before a scheduled annulment hearing, Blackwell opened fire with a semiautomatic handgun at the three women inside the King County Courthouse, police said.

Killed were Susana Blackwell, her seven-month-old fetus, and Phoebe Dizon, 46, authorities said. Veronica Laurenda was in critical condition with multiple gunshot wounds.

The gunman was subdued by three prison guards who heard the shots from a nearby courtroom. Blackwell was arrested and booked for investigation of homicide, officials said.

(Incident must have occurred in late 1994 to early 1995; neither article gives a date)

*(American Jails, May/June, 1995)*

Teamwork and professionalism are words synonymous to corrections. These are concepts and characteristics that are pursued in the specialized field of corrections.

When the normally peaceful halls of the King County Courthouse in Seattle, Washington, were suddenly disrupted by a burst of gunfire, three King County Department of Adult Detention (KCDAD) corrections officers sprang into action.

Unknown to corrections officers Carlos Duell, Ramil Pagulayan, and Michael Woodbury, an armed assailant was headed their way. Seconds after the last shot rang out, the three officers had effectively taken charge of the situation and put down the threat.

The officers apprehended 47-year-old Timothy Blackwell who, just moments earlier, allegedly shot and killed his estranged wife Susan Blackwell, 25; her 8-month-old unborn baby; 42-year-old Veronica Johnson; and 46-year-old Phoebe Dizon.

The second of March started out like any other day for the three corrections officers who are assigned to the 46-man Court Detail Section of the King County Jail.

Officers Pagulayan and Duell were teamed up to transport two inmates to Courtroom W278, a courtroom equipped with video cameras. Their inmates were scheduled to plead guilty to minor felony charges.

Accompanying them on the way to court were Corrections Officers Woodbury and Forrest Covington. They were assigned to transport another inmate to Courtroom W276 for trial.

The four corrections officers arrived at their respective courtrooms at 9:00 a.m. At 9:07:11, the first shot was fired. Five seconds later the last of 11 shots rang out.

Videotapes taken from Courtroom W278 showed Pagulayan and Duell running towards the sound of gunfire. Officer Woodbury also headed toward the hallway at the same time.

Even though the officers had no idea what awaited them outside their courtroom, they rushed out thinking fellow corrections officers were in trouble.

"My first thought was for my fellow corrections officers in the courtroom next to us," Duell said, a five-year veteran.

Woodbury agreed. "From the sound of gunfire, I thought for sure it was coming from next door," he said. He added the decision to have Covington stay in the courtroom was due to the inmate's serious charge and his proximity to the exit door. "I was closer to the door so I ran," said the 14-year veteran.

"Everything was crazy," Pagulayan added. He remembered glancing at Duell and seeing a concerned look as they headed for the door. "I was thinking of their (Woodbury and Covington) safety."

When the three corrections officers stepped out into the gunsmoke-filled hallway with their guns drawn, their training took over. "We are trained to assess the situation," Pagulayan said. "At first I didn't see anyone. All I knew was shots had been fired,"

He then saw a man coming toward him holding a gun. He turned his weapon toward the man and ordered him to disarm. Woodbury then restrained him with handcuffs. Duell took charge of calling for backup and medical help.

"We identified the threat, neutralized the threat, and secured the area," Duell said. "With the in-depth training we received I believe anyone in our department could have done what we did. We behaved the way we were trained."

In-depth training for qualified officers in KCDAD included going through a week-long class that included target analysis, and an identification course at Fort Lewis, a U.S. Army Base in Tacoma, Washington.

"Training helped me get through this difficult and stressful situation," Pagulayan said, a four-year veteran of KCDAD. "I can't emphasize it enough."

Seattle Police Investigators and King County Prosecutors asked the corrections officers not to discuss



details of the incident. Investigators revealed that Blackwell was armed with a loaded 9mm semiautomatic gun, and a full load 13-round clip at the time of his arrest. No shots were fired by officers.

"These corrections officers performed in an exceptional manner in a dangerous situation that only happens once during an officer's career," said KCDAD Associate Director Ray Coleman. "You usually have one chance to perform it correctly and they did it by the book, and did it incredibly well."

Woodbury started his career in corrections after three years of U.S. Army service where he was in military police work. He is married with two children.

Duell also served as a military police officer. He joined the U.S. Air Force after high school and continues his service as a reserve. He was activated back to full duty during the Desert Storm operation in 1990.

Pagulayan also came to the department via the Air Force. He is the youngest of eight children, married, and the father of two. He emigrated to the U.S. with his family from his homeland in the Philippines in 1977.

King County Executive Gary Locke issued a commendation to each officer for their "Extreme Heroism" in disarming and apprehending the suspect.

King County Prosecutor Norm Maleng filed three counts of aggravated first-degree murder and first degree manslaughter charges against Blackwell. "In every tragedy there is a hero," Maleng said, "and these corrections officers rushed into danger, captured a killer, and prevented further loss of life. They are certified heroes."

U.S. Marshal Rosa Melendez also cited the corrections officers for their heroism and professionalism. In a job where anonymity is the norm, the three corrections officers' actions were broadcast throughout the community and thrust them into the limelight.

It was their concern for their fellow officers' safety, a true sign of professionals, that made them heroes.

*Edwin Bautista, author, has been a corrections officer since December 1987. He has been a member of the Court Detail Section of the King County Correctional Facility for over three years.*

*He served as a U.S. Marine photojournalist from 1983-1987. Edwin Bautista, 30835-2nd Ave. S, Federal Way, WA 98003, (206) 296-4113.*

**The Washington Post**  
**January 31, 1997**

- An explosion blew a manhole-sized crater in the wall of the Solano County courthouse in Vallejo, Calif., smashing windows and damaging nearby buildings but injuring no one.

# Government Offices in California On Alert in Response to Bombs

By William Booth

Washington Post Staff Writer

SAN DIEGO, Feb. 2—Security will be increased at government offices across California following the discovery of three mail bombs in as many days here, and the eruption of two other devices in Northern California last week.

Police today arrested a man in the bombings of a courthouse and bank in Vallejo, north of San Francisco, but no one has been apprehended for mailing pipe bombs to three addresses here, including the FBI office. Police and federal investigators do not believe the bombings and the mailings are connected.

The arrest today of an unnamed suspect in the Vallejo bombings caps a week of explosive activity in California that has rattled nerves up and down the state. The bomber in Vallejo, police said was part of a plot to disrupt the criminal justice system there. The motives in the San Diego case are not yet known. There have been no injuries in either case.

In San Diego, all three devices, which shared some similarities, were pipe bombs delivered by mail. The two bombs that exploded in Vallejo had been put in place.

On Thursday, a suspicious package was discovered at FBI offices in the San Diego suburb of Kearny Mesa during a routine screening of incoming mail. The building, filled with about 200 employees, was evacuated and the package was removed by robot and detonated by a bomb squad in the FBI parking lot.

The FBI said the bomb was inside a brown cardboard box. Handwritten in the upper left corner were the French

words: "JE SUIS PREST" or "JE SUIS PRESTE," meaning "I am quick" or "I am ready." The package also had six 32-cent stamps that appeared to have been canceled.

The device consisted of "two pipe bombs in a package sent through the U.S. mail," Assistant FBI Director Thomas J. Pickard said in Washington. "We have no information on the sender, yet. We could not read the postmark."

Another similar device, with the same French phrase, was discovered at the offices of Laidlaw Waste Systems in the San Diego suburb of Chula Vista on Friday.

And on Saturday, Chula Vista police said Dave McGruer, a 45-year-old federal employee, received a package containing two pipe bombs. Bomb squad vice as "fairly sophisticated" and similar to the ones sent to the FBI and the waste management company, though it did not contain any French phrases.

McGruer opened the package, realized it was a bomb, threw it on the bed and called 911, police said. The device did not explode.

"This guy is 0-for-3 so far," Hula Vista police Sgt. Tom Keblish said of the San Diego bomber. Among the three bombs, "the pipes are the same-brass or copper ... shiny," the Associated Press quoted Keblish as saying.

McGruer's neighbors, who said they often were disturbed by gunshots emanating from his back yard, told AP that FBI agents removed arm loads of rifles and cases of ammunition from

his house today.

In Northern California, bombs exploded last month in Vallejo outside San Francisco—and threats were received.

On Jan. 25, two children found a backpack filled with 30 sticks of dynamite and three detonators outside a Vallejo public library. The device was not primed to explode.

Later the same day, however, a dynamite bomb exploded beside automated teller machines at a bank. No one was injured.

On Monday, a bomb threat was received at the Solano County Courthouse in Vallejo and the building was evacuated. No device was found. But early Thursday morning, a powerful explosion erupted at the courthouse, breaking 22 windows and gouging a small crater in the wall. A wire led from the exploded device outside the building to an alley, where police suspect the bomber set off the charge.

Police in Vallejo released a photograph of a man crouching in front of the bank ATM's and said they suspect he placed the bomb. Police today did not reveal whether the suspect they arrested early today at an apartment complex was the man in the photograph. They said, however, that they seized a car that contained 60 sticks of, wired dynamite outside, the apartment complex.

As the investigation continued, at least two other suspects were being sought and more search warrants were issued, Vallejo police said.

# Suspected Leader in Calif. Bombs Surrenders

## *Police Allege Attempt To Disrupt Drug Trial*

By William Booth

Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 3—A felon suspected of engineering a series of bombings at a Northern California courthouse and bank in order to derail a drug trial that could imprison him for life surrendered today.

Kevin Lee Robinson, 29, allegedly lured several men to carry out the bombings so he could disrupt his cocaine trial at the Solano County Courthouse in Vallejo, a city north of San Francisco.

Robinson, previously convicted of drug and weapons charges, was facing a "third strike" trial that under law a sentence of 25 years to life. Robinson, described as the mastermind behind the bombings, was arrested this afternoon. He had been scheduled to appear in court today on his drug charges.

"We believe it was an attempt to stop pending hearings," Vallejo Police Chief Robert Nichelini told reporters at a news conference today. "What they thought that would accomplish, I'm not sure."

Vallejo police said authorities received a call early this morning from someone who reportedly was in contact with Robinson and encouraged him to surrender. Police arranged to meet Robinson on the street this morning, then brought him in for questioning and placed him under arrest.

In addition to Robinson, police on Sunday arrested three other men,

Oston Osotonu, 24, who was captured at a Vallejo motel, his brother, Army Osotonu, 34, and Francis Ernestburg, 40, who was arrested at a nearby residence. Today, two more suspects were arrested, Orlando Johnson, 30 and Jason Pascual, 22. They face conspiracy, explosives and weapons charges. Police said the alleged bombers have no apparent ties to militias or gangs. Moreover, the explosions in Northern California do not appear to be connected to a trio of mail bombs found last week in the San Diego area. One of those bombs was delivered to the offices of the FBI there. No arrests have been made in the San Diego case.

The Vallejo case began on Jan. 25 when two children found a backpack with 30 sticks of dynamite and three detonators leaning against the city library. The next day a stick of dynamite exploded outside a Wells Fargo Bank branch, damaging three automatic teller machines.

On Thursday, a dynamite bomb tore a three-foot crater into the Solano County courthouse. Then on Sunday, investigators seized 500 pounds of stolen dynamite cached at a Vallejo house. They also uncovered more than 60 sticks of wired dynamite in the trunk of a car parked in a Vallejo garage. Vallejo Police Lt. Ron Jackson told reporters today that investigators suspect the trunkload of explosives was to be used for a second attempt to

blow up the city library, where police use the basement to store evidence for upcoming trials.

Authorities are still searching for additional explosives in the area.

The arrests and the capture of explosives led police and federal agents to conclude that they have ended the rash of Vallejo bombings that rattled the nerves of city.

"If anybody had been around, [he] would have been seriously hurt" said Mike Morrissey, an agent of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, whose agency assisted in the case. The ATF agent described the devices as not particularly sophisticated, but "effective and extremely dangerous."

Morrissey said that the amount of dynamite captured could have created catastrophic explosions. Noting that the Oklahoma City bombing used some 4,000 pounds of explosive, "imagine what you could do with a couple of hundred pounds," he said. "I've seen five pounds of dynamite strip car of all its metal."

No one was injured in the two Vallejo blasts last week. The explosion at the courthouse, though, blew a crater into the building's wall. The shock wave from the blast blew out 22 windows in the courthouse. The explosion at the row of ATMs did less damage. Police suspect that the ATM bomb might have been set as a distraction to confuse investigators.

## Courthouse Metal Detectors Cause Delays but Get Favorable Verdict

Wednesday, July 7, 1999

Courthouse Metal Detectors Cause Delays but Get Favorable Verdict

By BOB POOL, Times Staff Writer

It didn't take long for people to start piling up Tuesday when guards switched on metal detectors at the door to the Los Angeles County Courthouse.

And it didn't take long for confiscated "weapons" to start piling up, either.

"One had a paring knife. One person was carrying some specialty shears. One had pepper spray," said Sheriff's Sgt. John Stites, who is in charge of 45 new guards at the North Hill Street building.

Long lines of lawyers, jurors, witnesses and plaintiffs waiting to pass through security checkpoints snaked down the civil courthouse's steps as the \$770,000 X-ray and magnetometer system was used for the first time.

Beefed-up security also includes closure of 12 of the courthouse's 17 entrances and the use of closed-circuit TV cameras in hallways. The new system will cost about \$1 million a year to operate.

The increased surveillance is the result of the 1995 murder of a woman after a courthouse divorce hearing. Court visitors on Tuesday said they appreciate the extra security.

"I support it 100%," said Alexander El-Darzi, a Burbank cook involved in a trusteeship dispute, who had to walk through the beeping magnetometer four times before guards discovered his belt buckle was triggering the alarm.

About 8,000 people a day visit the courthouse, where civil matters such as child custody cases and lawsuits are handled. Lines started forming at 7 a.m., according to officials.

Stites--who said the owners of confiscated items were able to reclaim them when they left--said he timed the line several times and found the longest wait was four minutes.

Businessman Bill Rice of South Pasadena set off alarms three times when he passed through the metal detector. He blamed the foil in a pack of cigarettes, but assured guards he didn't mind the sensitive metal detector.

"I like it. I built it," said Rice, whose Vanir Construction

Management handled the three-month courthouse installation project.

Court workers also praised the increased security. They said emotions can run high in civil lawsuits, probate issues and divorce cases like the one that sparked the murder of Eileen Zelig four years ago.

The 40-year-old Chatsworth woman was killed as she rode a courthouse escalator clutching the hand of her 6-year-old daughter after a hearing over spousal support. Her ex-husband, Woodland Hills physician Harry Zelig, 48, fired one shot from a .38-caliber pistol into her chest. He was convicted in 1997 of first-degree murder and sentenced to 29 years to life in prison.

"The extra security is worth the aggravation," said Edward Dill, an Arcadia resident who handles divorce cases as a Superior Court filing clerk. "We deal with so many difficult people and situations here."

Lawyer Joe Girard said courthouse regulars will learn to arrive a little earlier for hearings in order to pass through the detectors. "We're used to it in other courts," he said.

In fact, officials said, only four county courthouses--Torrance, Rio Hondo, Santa Anita and Malibu--now lack metal detectors. A fifth, in Inglewood, is partially protected.

Only one group Tuesday seemed distressed by the new downtown security measures: the corps of bicycle messengers who make multiple trips to the civil courthouse daily.

Courier Jon Harrelson, 29, vowed he wouldn't stand in the metal detector line if he faced an impending deadline to file court papers.

"I'm cutting in front of everybody," said Harrelson, whose 13 years as a bike messenger have earned him the nickname "Psycho." "Nothing will stop me."

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From The Washington Post,  
Friday, September 27, 1996

### **Violence in Alabama**

● A man who set off a metal detector in a courthouse lobby in Mobile, Ala., pulled a gun, and opened fire, killing a security guard and wounding another before dying in a burst of gunfire from officers nearby.

The gunman had carried no identification and police hoped to identify him from fingerprints. The victims were Charles Greenwald, who was fatally shot, and Kinard Henson, who was wounded.

## THE EARLY '93 CHAPTERS OF COURT WARS

From the N. Y. POST, February 25, 1993

This proved to be but the first of two shootings in New York City courts in the period of February 25 to March 12, 1993. The facility here was the Bronx County Courthouse; the March incident took place in the Brooklyn Family Court. The Bronx Courthouse is one of the few in the city without a metal detector. The Bronx gunman was said to have been wearing a bullet-proof vest.

### AVENGER KILLS A MOM in Bronx courthouse

By ANNE E. MURRAY, PETER MOSES and MIKE HUREWITZ

A man trying to avenge the deaths of six people in the Valentine's Day massacre opened fire in the lobby of a Bronx courthouse yesterday — and killed a woman pushing her baby in a stroller, police said.

Police sources told The Post that the gunman, wearing a bulletproof vest, had intended to kill the woman's husband, Anthony Cassellas.

Cassellas, 21, is suspected of being one of two men who killed six people in a Bronx apartment on Valentine's Day, 14.

Instead of killing Cassellas, the assassin fatally shot Cassellas' 22-year-old wife, Lourdes, in the back of the head.

The gunman also wounded a 17-year-old friend with the couple.

**"I saw her after she was shot.  
She was against the wall, limp."**

CUSTODIAN RICHARD ERVIN

Sources said Ortiz was out inside the courthouse en-



## MARYLAND

### Husband Charged With Courtroom Assault

*Washington Post, April 23, 1999*

A Beltsville man was arrested yesterday by Maryland State Police after he allegedly assaulted his wife in a Hyattsville courtroom.

Trooper David Thomas and other police officers arrested Romeo Gipson, 29, after Gipson allegedly pushed his wife, Angela, as the two were leaving a Prince George's County District courtroom about 10:30 a.m. yesterday, state police said.

Romeo Gipson apparently was upset after a second-degree assault charge he had filed against his wife was dropped by an assistant state's attorney, authorities said. Angela Gipson also had filed a second-degree assault charge against Romeo, which is still pending, officials said.

Romeo Gipson was charged with an additional count of second-degree assault for allegedly pushing his wife, officials said.

Friday, March 12, 1999

# Howard Man Accused of Killing Wife Outside Courthouse

By Amy Argetsinger  
and Paul W. Valentine  
*Washington Post Staff Writers*

When Tsu John Liu met So Shan Chan at the Howard County Courthouse to end their marriage yesterday, no one in the chamber sensed his anger.

Liu quibbled with the judge's alimony order of \$350 a month to his estranged wife, including tuition for her English language courses. But the lawyers ultimately agreed to draw up the papers, and the judge set a date to finalize the divorce.

But when he left the courthouse, Liu walked to his car, pulled out a shotgun and semiautomatic pistol, and turned on his estranged wife and her grown daughter, police say. There, in the parking lot of the suburban courthouse, police say, the Columbia man shot both women several times, execution-style.

Chan, 52, of Baltimore, was pronounced dead at Howard County General Hospital, and her daughter from a previous marriage, Wing Wu, 26, was in critical condition last night at the Maryland Shock Trauma Center in Baltimore. Liu, 49, was arrested almost immediately by sheriff's deputies assigned to the courthouse. Police were questioning him last night.

The shootings jolted denizens of the courthouse in small town Ellicott City. Though many are accustomed to emotional eruptions in courtrooms, they said the Chan-Liu divorce proceedings seemed relatively calm, offering no warning of the violence that would follow.

"There were no outbursts, no storming out," said a dazed Joseph Gaffigan, the lawyer who represented Chan. There were no hot-button issues like child custody or anything. There was nothing to alert anybody that anything like this would happen."

Court documents chronicling their

divorce proceedings, however, offered glimpses of the couple's troubled history.

Both Taiwanese immigrants, they met in Florida just weeks before their marriage in February 1989. Chan was a \$5-an-hour seamstress who spoke almost no English. "Just a lovely lady, not threatening to anybody, not nasty," Gaffigan said.

Liu, formerly a waiter in Chinese restaurants, worked in a warehouse. His boss at JFC International, an Asian food importer and distributor in Savage, described him as "a good worker, a hard worker," whom he had never known to be angry.

But by February 1995 the couple had separated, amid Chan's complaints that her husband had physically abused her and threatened to kill her. That month a District Court judge in Baltimore ordered Liu to leave their home. Chan's daughter later testified that she had seen Liu hit her mother on the head.

Court officials said yesterday that Chan had received a protective order against her husband several years ago but that it was no longer in effect.

According to court officials, Chan and Liu had decided that their separation constituted grounds for divorce. The only matters left to settle yesterday in Judge Lenore R. Gelfman's courtroom were financial ones, such as attorney fees and alimony.

The discussions, conducted through a Cantonese translator, were sticky. Both accused the other of draining their bank account after their separation. Chan also had accused her estranged husband of cashing their tax refund and selling her car, keeping the money from both transactions.

Yet according to Sally Rankin, a spokeswoman for the Maryland judiciary administrative office, "The proceeding was orderly and quiet. . . There were no raised voices."

At the end, the judge asked both attorneys to draw up a divorce decree and set a date in April for the couple to sign the documents that would end their marriage.

Chan and her daughter left the courthouse with two friends. In the parking lot, they encountered Liu.

Police and witnesses said he fired two or more shots with the shotgun before the women wrestled it from him. Then he fired 12 to 15 shots with a semiautomatic handgun.

Randy Hawes, who observed most of the incident from the window of a nearby building, said he saw the man fire two or three times at the older woman with a handgun. The younger woman "was hitting at him with a large black pocketbook and screaming" Hawes said.

The man appeared to back off for a moment, Hawes said, but then fired one or two more times. Both women fell to the ground, he said. "Then he walked and stood about two feet away," Hawes said. "and fired at least six or seven times directly down at them. . . I heard one or two screams."

The man walked a few steps away "and put the gun to his head," Hawes said, but then lowered it, tossing it about 25 feet away onto grass at the edge of the parking lot.

A deputy sheriff rushed up with his gun drawn and ordered the shooter to lie down and then handcuffed him, Hawes said.

"I thought I was watching television," said Hawes, owner of Tristate Courier Service. "It didn't look real."

Gaffigan, a Beltsville-based divorce lawyer, said he was nearby at the time of the shooting but could not discuss what he may have seen while police are still investigating.

"I'm sitting here in a daze," he said. "We're on the verge of entering the 21st century, and the human race seems prone to such sudden, irrational violence."

VENTURA--Those headed to court here this week should prepare to check their bags at the door as courthouse security kicked into action Monday morning, as authorities for the first time required that people entering the Ventura Hall of Justice be screened for weapons on the first floor.

Although some courthouse employees grouched about the long lines to new metal detectors and X-ray machines, authorities said they received few complaints.

The full-entry screening system is designed to prevent people from carrying concealed weapons into the county's main courthouse, where a growing number of violent felonies and volatile family law cases are heard each year. Although two metal detectors have been operational outside family court on the building's fourth floor since 1994, authorities have long felt tighter security was necessary throughout the Hall of Justice. Upgrades were first considered after the 1993 shooting rampage at the Employment Development Department offices in Oxnard in which three people were killed by an unemployed computer engineer. But a lack of available funding stalled the county's efforts. A break came earlier this year when Ventura Superior Court was allocated more than \$800,000 in state funds for new security equipment and staffing. county kicked in additional \$400,000 for improvements, and after several weeks of authorities launched the new system.

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SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI  
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS

POST OFFICE BOX 117  
JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI 39205

TELEPHONE (601) 354-7406  
FAX (601) 354-7459

MEMORANDUM

TO: County Sheriffs

FROM: Morris Wynn-Project  manager

DATE: September 10, 1999

RE: Court Security Survey

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The Administrative Office of Courts sent out survey forms to each county sheriff office in the state. For your information I have enclosed the results from the surveys returned to us. If your jurisdiction failed to respond but wish to be a part of this survey please contact my office and I will send you a survey form.

The AOC is planning on presenting a workshop using experts in the field of court security in the coming months. This workshop is going to be held without a registration fee for the sheriff or a representative from your office.

Look for a notice of this meeting in the near future.

In the Circuit & Chancery Courts  
Please CIRCLE the best answer

Are autos used by or accessible to the general public, parked near or adjacent to doorways of the Courtroom area building?

Yes	No.
Adams County	Benton County
Amite County	Bolivar (Cleveland)
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Chickasaw County
Calhoun County	Copiah County
Clarke County	Jackson County
Claiborne County	Kemper County
Clay County	Madison County*
Coahoma County	Pearl River County
Choctaw County	Pike County
Covington County	Quitman County
Forrest County	Washington County
Franklin County	Yazoo County
Greene County	Hinds County
Leflore County	
Grenada County	
Hancock County	
Harrison County	
Holmes County	
Itawamba County	
Jasper County	
Jefferson County	
Jones County	
Lauderdale County	
Lafayette County	
Lee County	
Lincoln County	
Lowndes County	
Madison County*	
Marshall County	
Monroe County	
Montgomery County	
Newton County	
Noxubee County	
Panola County	
Rankin County	
Scott County	
Sharkey County	
Stone County	
Sunflower County	

At all times (or at least during court sessions) is there a central entrance into and out of the court area?

Yes	No	
Adams County	Union County	Calhoun County
Amite County	Walthall County	Chickasaw County
Benton County	Washington County	Greene County
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Winston County	Harrison County
Bolivar (Cleveland)	Yazoo County	Kemper County
Clarke County	Hinds County	Lafayette County
Claiborne County		Rankin County*
Clay County		Sharkey County
Coahoma County		Yalobusha County
Choctaw County		Warren County
Copiah County		
Covington County		
Forrest County		
Franklin County		
Leflore County		
Grenada County		
Hancock County		
Holmes County		
Itawamba County		
Jackson County		
Jasper County		
Jefferson County		
Jones County		
Lauderdale County		
Lee County		
Lincoln County		
Lowndes County		
Madison County		
Marshall County		
Monroe County		
Montgomery County		
Newton County		
Noxubee County		
Panola County		
Pearl River County		
Pike County		
Quitman County		
Rankin County*		
Scott County		
Stone County		
Sunflower County		
Tallahatchie County		
Tate County		

Are there clearly identifiable parking spaces for judges which can be accessed by the general public?      Yes      No

- Adams County
- Bolivar (Rosedale)
- Calhoun County
- Clarke County
- Claiborne County
- Clay County
- Coahoma County
- Choctaw County
- Copiah County
- Covington County
- Forrest County
- Greene County
- Leflore County
- Grenada County
- Hancock County
- Harrison County
- Holmes County
- Itawamba County
- Jackson County
- Jefferson County
- Jones county
- Lauderdale County
- Lee County
- Lincoln County
- Lowndes County
- Madison County\*
- Monroe County
- Montgomery County
- Newton County
- Noxubee County
- Panola County
- Pike County
- Scott County
- Sunflower County
- Tallahatchie County
- Tate County
- Union County
- Walthall County
- Washington County
- Yalobusha County
- Yazoo County

- Amite County
- Benton County
- Bolivar (Cleveland)
- Chickasaw County
- Franklin County
- Jasper County
- Kemper county
- Lafayette County
- Madison County\*
- Marshall County
- Pearl River County
- Quitman County
- Rankin County
- Sharkey County
- Stone County
- Winston County
- Warren County
- Hinds County



(At this central entrance) Is a walk-through metal detector used?

Yes	No	Non-applicable
Clarke County	Adams County	Chickasaw County
Clay County	Amité County	Coahoma County
Copiah County	Benton County	Kemper county
Leflore County	Bolivar (Rosedale)	Rankin County*
Grenada County*	Bolivar (Cleveland)	Sharkey County
Jones County	Calhoun County	
Lauderdale County	Claiborne County	
Lincoln County	Choctaw County	
Lowndes County	Covington County	
Noxubee County	Forrest County	
Pearl River County	Franklin County	
Pike County	Greene County	
Rankin County*	Grenada County*	
Tallahatchie County	Hancock County	
Washington County	Harrison County	
Winston County	Holmes County	
Yalobusha County	Itawamba County	
Hinds County	Jackson County	
	Jasper County	
	Jefferson County	
	Lafayette County	
	Lee County	
	Madison County	
	Marshall County	
	Monroe County	
	Montgomery County	
	Newton County	
	Panola County	
	Quitman County	
	Scott County	
	Stone County	
	Sunflower County	
	Tate County	
	Union County	
	Walthall County	
	Yazoo County	
	Warren County	

(At this central entrance) If no walk-through metal detector is used, is a hand held metal detector used?

Yes	No	Non-applicable
Holmes County	Adams County	Chickasaw County
Lauderdale County	Amite County	Clarke County
Lee County	Benton County	Clay County
Pearl River County	Bolivar (Rosedale)	Coahoma County
Sunflower County	Bolivar (Cleveland)	Copiah County
Tate County	Calhoun County	Leflore County
	Claiborne County	Grenada County
	Choctaw County	Jones county
	Covington County	Kemper County
	Forrest County	Lincoln County
	Franklin County	Lowndes County
	Greene County	Noxubee County
	Hancock County	Pike County
	Harrison County	Rankin County
	Itawamba County	Sharkey County
	Jackson County	Tallahatchie County
	Jasper County	Washington County
	Jefferson County	Winston County
	Lafayette County	Yalobusha County
	Madison County	Hinds County
	Marshall County	
	Monroe County	
	Montgomery County	
	Newton County	
	Panola County	
	Quitman County	
	Scott County	
	Stone County	
	Union County	
	Walthall County	
	Yazoo County	
	Warren County	

(At this central entrance, or at the courtroom chamber entrance) are all handbags, briefcases and incoming carried bags searched/cleared by security staff?

Yes	No	Non-applicable
Clarke County	Adams County	Chickasaw County
Clay County	Amite County	Covington County
Copiah County	Benton County	Kemper County
Leflore County	Bolivar (Rosedale)	Rankin County*
Grenada County*	Bolivar (Cleveland)	Sharkey County
Lauderdale County	Calhoun County	
Lee County	Claiborne County	
Lowndes county	Coahoma County	
Pearl River County	Choctaw County	
Pike County	Forrest County	
Rankin County*	Franklin County	
Sunflower County	Greene County	
Tallahatchie County	Grenada County*	
Yalobusha County	Hancock County	
Hinds County	Harrison County	
	Holmes County	
	Itawamba County	
	Jackson County	
	Jasper County	
	Jefferson County	
	Jones County	
	Lafayette County	
	Lincoln County	
	Madison County	
	Marshall County	
	Monroe County	
	Montgomery County	
	Newton County	
	Noxubee County	
	Panola County	
	Quitman County	
	Scott County	
	Stone County	
	Tate County	
	Union County	
	Walthall County	
	Washington County	
	Winston County	
	Yazoo County	
	Warren County	

Are incoming packages to this building cleared by security staff (mail, package deliver etc..)?

Yes

No

Pearl River County

Adams County	Scott County
Amite County	Sharkey County
Benton County	Stone County
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Sunflower County
Bolivar (Cleveland)	Tallahatchie County
Calhoun County	Tate County
Chickasaw County	Union County
Clarke County	Walthall County
Claiborne County	Washington County
Clay County	Winston County
Coahoma County	Yalobusha County
Choctaw County	Yazoo County
Copiah County	Hinds County
Covington County	Warren County
Forrest County	
Franklin County	
Greene County	
Leflore County	
Grenada County	
Hancock County	
Harrison County	
Holmes County	
Itawamba County	
Jackson County	
Jasper County	
Jefferson County	
Jones County	
Kemper County	
Lauderdale County	
Lafayette County	
Lee County	
Lincoln County	
Lowndes County	
Madison County	
Marshall County	
Monroe County	
Montgomery County	
Newton County	
Noxubee County	
Panola County	
Pike County	
Quitman County	
Rankin County	

Are court area restrooms secured, or not accessible to the general public?

Yes

Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Chickasaw County  
Clarke County  
Copiah County  
Covington County  
Leflore County  
Harrison County  
Itawamba County  
Jasper County  
Lauderdale County  
Lafayette County  
Lowndes County  
Monroe County  
Montgomery County  
Pearl River County  
Pike County  
Scott County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Walthall County  
Yazoo County  
Hinds County

No

Adams County  
Amite County  
Benton County  
Calhoun County  
Clay County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Forrest County  
Franklin County  
Greene County  
Grenada County  
Hancock County  
Holmes County  
Jackson County  
Jefferson county  
Jones County  
Kemper County  
Lee County  
Lincoln County  
Madison County  
Marshall County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Panola County  
Quitman County  
Rankin County  
Sharkey County  
Stone County  
Tate County  
Union County  
Washington County  
Winston County  
Yalobusha County  
Warren County

If the restrooms are not secured, is a security sweep of these restrooms made prior to a trial proceeding?

Yes	No	Non-applicable
Amite County	Adams County	Bolivar (Rosedale)
Jackson County	Benton County	Bolivar (Cleveland)
Winston County	Calhoun County	Chickasaw County
Yalobusha County	Claiborne County	Clarke County
	Clay County	Copiah County
	Coahoma County	Covington County
	Choctaw County	Leflore County
	Forrest County	Harrison County
	Franklin County	Itawamba County
	Greene County	Jasper County
	Grenada County	Lauderdale County
	Hancock County	Lafayette County
	Holmes County	Lowndes County
	Jefferson County	Monroe County
	Jones County	Pearl River County
	Kemper County	Pike County
	Lee County	Scott County
	Lincoln County	Sharkey County
	Madison County	Sunflower County
	Marshall County	Tallahatchie County
	Montgomery County	Walthall County
	Newton County	Yazoo County
	Noxubee County	Hinds County
	Panola County	
	Quitman County	
	Rankin County	
	Stone County	
	Tate County	
	Union County	
	Washington County	
	Warren County	

What is the number of security staff or bailiffs on duty in the courtroom, during a regular court session.

Adams County	1	Newton County	2
Amite County	2	Noxubee County	4
Benton County	1	Panola County	1
Bolivar (Rosedale)	1	Pearl River County	3
Bolivar (Cleveland)	3	Quitman County	2
Calhoun County	0	Rankin County	1 (1 Chancery)
Chickasaw County	1	Scott County	1
Clarke County	4	Sharkey County	4
Claiborne County	2	Stone County	1
Clay County	4	Sunflower County	2
Coahoma County	2	Tallahatchie County	2
Choctaw County	1	Tate County	1
Copiah County	4 (1 in Chancery)	Union County	1
Covington County	3	Walthall County	1
Forrest County	2	Washington County	3
Franklin County	1	Winston County	2
Greene County	2	Yalobusha County	2
Leflore County	1	Yazoo County	1
Grenada County	3	Hinds County	1
Hancock County	2	Warren County	1
Harrison County	1		
Holmes County	2		
Itawamba County	2		
Jackson County	2		
Jasper County	1		
Jefferson County	2		
Jones County	1		
Kemper County	3		
Lauderdale County	8		
Lafayette County	1		
Lee County	1		
Lincoln County	3		
Lowndes County	2 (1 Chancery)		
Madison County	1		
Marshall County	1		
Monroe County	2		
Montgomery County	3		

Are these security staff or bailiffs rotated during a trial proceeding (moved about or are relieved on a scheduled basis)?

Yes	No
Amite County	Adams County      Hinds County
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Benton County
Clarke County	Bolivar (Cleveland)
Coahoma County*	Calhoun County
Choctaw County	Chickasaw County
Forrest County	Claiborne County
Harrison County*	Clay County
Itawamba County	Coahoma County*
Jackson County	Copiah County
Lowndes County	Covington County
Monroe County	Franklin County
Pearl River County	Greene County
Sharkey County	Leflore County
Sunflower County	Grenada County
Walthall County	Hancock County
Washington County	Harrison County*
Winston County	Holmes County
	Jasper County
	Jefferson County
	Jones County
	Kemper County
	Lauderdale County
	Lafayette County
	Lee County
	Lincoln County
	Madison County
	Marshall County
	Montgomery County
	Newton County
	Noxubee County
	Panola County
	Pike County
	Quitman County
	Rankin County
	Scott County
	Stone County
	Tallahatchie County
	Tate County
	Union County
	Yalobusha County
	Yazoo County
	Warren County



Are there security measures available which allow a judge or court personnel to contact outside courtroom security if a situation requiring assistance develops?

Yes

Adams County  
Amite County  
Benton County  
Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Calhoun County  
Clay County  
Clarke County  
Claiborne County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Copiah County  
Covington County  
Franklin County  
Leflore County  
Grenada County  
Hancock County  
Harrison County  
Holmes County  
Itawamba County  
Jackson County  
Jefferson County  
Jones county  
Lafayette County  
Lee County  
Lowndes County  
Madison County  
Marshall County  
Monroe County  
Montgomery County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Panola County  
Pearl River County  
Pike County  
Quitman County  
Rankin County  
Sharkey County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Tate County  
Union County

No

Chickasaw County  
Forrest County  
Greene County  
Jasper County  
Kemper County  
Lauderdale County  
Lincoln County  
Scott County  
Stone County  
Washington County  
Warren County

Are there means for security staff or bailiffs to contact outside courtroom security if a situation requiring assistance develops?

Yes

No

Adams County	Sunflower County	Greene County
Amite County	Tallahatchie County	Kemper County
Benton County	Tate County	Lincoln County
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Union County	Stone County
Bolivar (Cleveland)	Walthall County	Yalobusha County
Chickasaw County	Washington County	
Clarke County	Winston County	
Claiborne County	Yazoo County	
Clay County	Hinds County	
Coahoma County	Warren County	
Choctaw County		
Copiah County		
Covington County		
Forrest County		
Franklin County		
Leflore County		
Grenada County		
Hancock County		
Harrison County		
Holmes County		
Itawamba County		
Jackson County		
Jasper County		
Jefferson County		
Jones County		
Lauderdale County		
Lafayette County		
Lee County		
Lowndes County		
Madison County		
Marshall County		
Monroe County		
Montgomery County		
Newton County		
Noxubee County		
Panola County		
Pearl River County		
Pike County		
Quitman County		
Rankin County		
Scott County		
Sharkey County		

Is there a secure means of exit for a sitting courtroom judge to use in order to leave the courtroom (a door locking behind the judge as they leave)?

Yes

Benton County  
Calhoun County  
Clarke county  
Copiah County  
Forrest County  
Franklin County  
Leflore County  
Hancock County  
Harrison County  
Holmes County  
Itawamba County  
Jackson County  
Jefferson County  
Jones County  
Lafayette County  
Lee County  
Lowndes County  
Madison County  
Montgomery County  
Panola County  
Pearl River County  
Pike County  
Sharkey County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Union County  
Walthall County  
Washington County  
Hinds County

No

Adams County  
Amite County  
Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Chickasaw County  
Claiborne County  
Clay County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Covington County  
Greene County  
Grenada County  
Jasper County  
Kemper County  
Lauderdale County  
Lincoln County  
Marshall County  
Monroe County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Quitman County  
Rankin County  
Scott County  
Stone County  
Tate County  
Winston County  
Yalobusha County  
Yazoo County  
Warren County

Are judge's chambers/offices secured (not accessible to the general public or behind locked doors)?

Yes	No
Adams County	Washington County
Amite County	Washington County
Bolivar (Rosedale)	Washington County
Bolivar (Cleveland)	Washington County
Calhoun County	Washington County
Chickasaw County	Washington County
Clarke County	Washington County
Clay County	Washington County
Choctaw County	Washington County
Copiah County	Washington County
Covington County	Washington County
Forrest county	Washington County
Franklin County	Washington County
Leflore County	Washington County
Grenada County	Washington County
Hancock County	Washington County
Harrison County	Washington County
Holmes County	Washington County
Itawamba County	Washington County
Jackson County	Washington County
Jefferson County	Washington County
Jones County	Washington County
Lauderdale County	Washington County
Lafayette County	Washington County
Lee County	Washington County
Lowndes County	Washington County
Madison County	Washington County
Marshall County	Washington County
Monroe County	Washington County
Montgomery County	Washington County
Newton County	Washington County
Noxubee County	Washington County
Panola County	Washington County
Pearl River County	Washington County
Pike County	Washington County
Quitman County	Washington County
Scott County	Washington County
Sharkey County	Washington County
Sunflower County	Washington County
Tallahatchie County	Washington County
Union County	Washington County
Walthall County	Washington County
	Benton County
	Claiborne County
	Coahoma County
	Greene County
	Jasper County
	Kemper County
	Lincoln County
	Rankin County
	Stone County
	Tate County
	Warren County

Is there written policy for courtroom staff which prohibits the bringing of scissors or letter openers or other potential weapons into court proceedings?

Yes

Clarke County  
Cochise County  
Lauderdale County  
Panola County  
Pearl River County

No

Adams County  
Amite County  
Benton County  
Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Calhoun County  
Chickasaw County  
Claiborne County  
Clay County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Covington County  
Forrest County  
Franklin County  
Greene County  
Leflore County  
Grenada County  
Hancock County  
Harrison County  
Holmes County  
Itawamba County  
Jackson County  
Jasper County  
Jefferson County  
Jones County  
Kemper County  
Lafayette County  
Lee County  
Lincoln County  
Lowndes county  
Madison County  
Marshall County  
Monroe County  
Montgomery County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Pike County  
Quitman County  
Rankin County  
Scott County  
Sharkey County  
Stone County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Tate County  
Union County  
Walthall County  
Washington County  
Winston County  
Yalobusha County  
Yazoo County  
Hinds County  
Warren County

Are there written policy and procedures for all court staff to use/follow in an emergency courtroom security situation or evacuation situation?

Yes

Clarke County  
Jones County  
Panola County  
Yalobusha County

No

Adams County  
Amite County  
Benton County  
Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Calhoun County  
Chickasaw County  
Claiborne County  
Clay County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Copiah County  
Covington County  
Forrest County  
Franklin County  
Greene County  
Leflore County  
Grenada County  
Hancock County  
Harrison County  
Holmes County  
Itawamba County  
Jackson County  
Jasper County  
Jefferson County  
Kemper County  
Lauderdale County  
Lafayette County  
Lee County  
Lincoln County  
Lowndes County  
Madison County  
Marshall County  
Monroe County  
Montgomery County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Pearl River County  
Pike County  
Quitman County  
Rankin County  
Scott County  
Sharkey County  
Stone County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Tate County  
Union County  
Walthall County  
Washington County  
Winston County  
Yazoo County  
Hinds County  
Warren County

Are there written procedures for outside the courtroom law enforcement officers to use/follow in an emergency courtroom security situation or evacuation situation?

Yes

No

Clarke County  
Jones County  
Panola County  
Quitman County  
Yazoo County

Adams County  
Amite County  
Benton County  
Bolivar (Rosedale)  
Bolivar (Cleveland)  
Calhoun County  
Chickasaw County  
Claiborne County  
Clay County  
Coahoma County  
Choctaw County  
Copiah County  
Covington County  
Forrest County  
Franklin County  
Greene County  
Leflore County  
Grenada County  
Hancock County  
Harrison County  
Holmes County  
Itawamba County  
Jackson County  
Jasper County  
Jefferson County  
Kemper County  
Lauderdale County  
Lafayette County  
Lee County  
Lincoln County  
Lowndes County  
Madison County  
Marshall County  
Monroe County  
Montgomery County  
Newton County  
Noxubee County  
Pearl River County  
Pike County  
Rankin County  
Scott County  
Sharkey County  
Stone County  
Sunflower County  
Tallahatchie County  
Tate County  
Union County  
Walthall County  
Washington County  
Winston County  
Yalobusha County  
Warren County  
Hinds County

Please make any brief comments about the level of Security provided to your county's Circuit and/or Chancery Court judges. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

And finally, are there any additional measures that you are contemplating doing or would wish to see done (assuming funding was not a problem) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Person Completing This Form

\_\_\_\_\_  
Title







AMERICAN UNIVERSITY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
Technical Assistance Program

CLIENT EVALUATION FORM: TRAINING/FACILITATION

CCTAP #: 98-37  
CTAP #: \_\_\_\_\_  
DCCTAP#: \_\_\_\_\_  
Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Subj. Code \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE RETURN TO:  
American University/Justice Programs Office  
Brandywine Building - Suite 100  
4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20016-8159

AGENCY RECEIVING ASSISTANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS

LOCATION: JACKSON MISSISSIPPI

FOCUS OF ASSISTANCE: WORKSHOP ON COURT SECURITY FOR MISSISSIPPI SHERIFFS

CONSULTANT(S): LAWRENCE SIEGEL

Please rate the technical assistance provided using the scale of 1 - 5  
(1 is least effective and 5 is most effective):

You were kept adequately advised of the status of your request for assistance prior to notification by the Technical Assistance Project that your request was approved.

1 2 3 4 5

Arrangements for delivery of technical assistance were handled adequately by Technical Assistance Project staff.

1 2 3 4 5

The consultant appeared competent in his/her field and brought the necessary background and experience for dealing with the designated problem areas.

1 2 3 4 5

The consultant appeared to have reviewed site-relevant background material and otherwise consult with the Local Coordinator to prepare for his/her site work.

1 2 3 4 5

The consultant dealt fully and adequately with the specific areas of requested assistance.

1 2 3 4 5

Please rate the technical assistance using the scale of 1 - 5  
(1 is least effective and 5 is most effective):

The consultant was effective in identifying and addressing minority, as well as majority, viewpoints and interests in his/her training or facilitation sessions.

1 2 3 4 5

The training or facilitation services provided by the consultant helped develop a consensus among local officials about a course of action to follow to achieve specific goals.

1 2 3 4 5

The services provided by American University's Technical Assistance Project met the expectations of the requesting agency or official.

1 2 3 4 5

From what sources did you learn of the availability of technical assistance?

I contacted American University (CTAP) after spending several days wandering among the Feds (Internet, writing works, phone calls)

What actions do you intend to take as a result of this technical assistance?

We have developed a pamphlet for a general overview of Court Security matters which we are going to mass mail. We also took this assistance on the Threat Management course and are going to mass mail a telephone sheet (threat assessment). We also will make use of the six listed recommendations as we can.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS (including any recommendations for improving the delivery of technical assistance in the future):

We hope to contact the University again and hold similar workshops in related areas on much the state-wide basis (if possible)

Morris Wynn  
Signature

4/12/00  
Date

Project Manager  
Title