Controlling Prison Population Growth Through Alternatives to Incarceration:

Lessons Learned From BJA's Correctional Options Demonstration Program[1]

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Background of the Correctional Options Demonstration Program

The past three decades have witnessed an unparallel increase in the nation's prison population. In 1970, the state and federal prisons held only 196,429 inmates. Today the number has reached 1.3 million, and those numbers do not include another 600,000 in jail, and nearly 110,000 in juvenile facilities.[1] The sheer size of this entire prison megalopolis (nearly two million) is so great that it now exceeds the population of most of our major cities and many of our states (Table 1).

As prison populations increased, the associated costs of constructing and operating them has raised concerns to policy makers. The estimated cost of the state prison system alone is estimated at $22 billion a year — more than triple the estimated $6.8 billion it cost in 1984.[2] Do we really need so many people incarcerated? Is it possible to place some of these offenders in alternative programs or sanctions without jeopardizing public safety? How can we ensure that model programs are well designed and implemented? Finally, which programs and policies would be most effective?

In response to the need for cost-effective alternatives to traditional incarceration, Congress authorized the Correctional Options Demonstration Program (CODP) as part of the *Crime Control Act of 1990.* These amendments authorized the Department of Justice (DOJ) to provide financial assistance to state and local governments for the development of alternatives to incarceration programs. DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) was assigned the responsibility of administering the program while the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) was to conduct a national evaluation. The demonstration grants were to be made to state and local correctional agencies for the primary purpose of reducing the use of incarceration for non-violent offenders. To help with this effort, grants were also authorized to private non-profit organizations to support the planning, development, and implementation of demonstration projects.

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TABLE 1

ADULT CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS
1980-1998

Population	1980	1998	% Change
Probation	1,118,097	3,417,613	206%
Jail	163,994	592,462	261%
Prison	329,821	1,302,019	295%
Parole	220,438	704,964	220%
Total Adults Under Corrections	1,832,350	6,017,058	228%
Adult Population	162.8 Million	192.6 million	18%
% of Adults Under Corrections	1.1%	3.1%	178%
Reported Serious Crime	13.4 million	12.3 million	-8%
Adult Arrests	6.1 million	8.6 million	41%

The primary objective of the CODP was to reduce the level of incarceration in a targeted jurisdiction by either diverting prison bound offenders or reducing their length of stay (LOS). The method(s) by which jurisdiction would undertake such an effort was left open to the agency(s) applying for BJA program funds. As it turned out, the CODP sites used such programs such as boot camps, intensive probation, electronic monitoring, drug courts, and other programs that have been touted by others as effective alternatives to incarceration.

The programs developed under this funding were to target youthful offenders who were not defined as dangerous or career criminals, but were deemed likely to become serious, career offenders unless they participated in some form of rehabilitative services. The immediate objectives of the programs were designed to:

1. Provide a degree of security and discipline appropriate for the offenders involved;

2. Provide diagnosis, treatment, and services to assist offenders pursuing a course of

lawful and productive conduct following release;

3. Reduce criminal recidivism by offenders who receive a variety of services through such alternatives;

4. Lower the cost of correctional services and facilities by reducing the level of incarceration and recidivism; and,

A total of $46 million was appropriated by Congress more than four years to fund 40 sites. The grants were structured in three parts to facilitate different activities. Part I grants were for the demonstration of correctional options in jurisdictions across the United States. Part II grants supported training and technical assistance provided by non-profit agencies. Part III grants were administered for the creation of correctional boot camps. In 1997, the program was discontinued by Congress. Today, only a modest BJA technical assistance program is available to help states and local governments develop, implement, and evaluate innovative programs and policies that reduce incarceration.

The Challenges of Alternatives to Incarceration

Before proceeding with the results of this study, it's important to set a context for understanding the dimensions to be considered as a correctional agency tries to implement a program or policy that can truly serve as an alternative to incarceration. There is considerable scientific evidence that large numbers of the current prison system can be released without posing a risk to public safety. For example, the Rand studies of inmates in three state prisons in the 1970s found large numbers of inmates who self-reported very little involvement criminal activities for the three years proceeding their admission to prison.[3] Early release programs studied in the 1980s found that large numbers of prisoners can have their prison terms reduced by modest amounts (2-3 months) which result in large savings in prison costs and without jeopardizing public safety.[4] The current prison population has largely grown is increasingly filled with non-violent low risk inmates many of whom are nearing their release dates. The most current data show that on any given day, about one third of all prisons are classified as minimum custody. Blumstein and Beck point out that the biggest growth in the prison population has been for non-violent drug offenders.

But despite this bounty of low-risk non-violent offenders, alternatives to incarceration have failed to materialize in any significant manner as evidenced by the spiraling increases in the prison and jail populations. There are several reasons, discussed below, why alternatives to incarceration have failed to have a major effect on the massive growth in the prison population. However, the major reason is that they have not provided strong evidence that they can reduce incarceration, recidivism, or costs -- the three core selling points of the such programs.

Problems in Reducing Prison Populations

The failure of alternatives to incarceration is directly linked to difficulties in targeting offenders who, had the program not existed, would have been incarcerated (i.e., reducing prison admissions) or would have served a longer period of incarceration (reducing LOS). These two target points are referred to as the "front-end" and "back-end" of the prison system. In order for an alternative to incarceration to be effective, it must have a measurable impact on either prison admissions or the length of stay and for a considerable number of inmates. Too often, these effects are limited to small programs that cannot be easily expanded to capture a larger "market" share of the prison admission or release streams.

Having an impact on the elementary equation of admissions x length of stay = prison population quickly becomes increasingly complex when one begins to consider the many ways one can be admitted to prison and the many factors that determine how long an inmate will be incarcerated. Significantly, many prison admissions are the result of offenders failing to complete terms of probation or parole. The most recent national data show that of the 541,000 prison admissions in 1997, nearly 215,000 (or 40 percent) were parole violators, about one half of which were admitted to prison after being revoked for one or more technical violations. National data do not exist on what proportion of the remaining 60 percent of prison admissions are due to due failure on probation (either technical violations or convicted of a new crime) but information from selected states suggest the numbers are quite high. For example, Texas reports that nearly 80 percent of all prison admissions are either probation or parole violators.[5]

Equally important is the accelerating length of stay for most prison systems. As states have moved to longer sentences and so called "truth in sentencing" (TIS), prison populations will continue to grow even if a state succeeds in controlling its prison admissions. The most recent national data show that the current LOS is 25 months first released prisoners. Assuming the number of admissions remains constant, the prison population would drop by about 150,000 inmates if the average LOS were reduced by three months.[6] But such an overall drop in the prison population if all releases experienced such a decline – not just a small sub-sample. The trick then is to launch a program (or more likely a policy) that will impact a large number of releases. Lengths of stay are driven by five basic factors:

1. Sentence length imposed by the courts;
2. Jail credits awarded while awaiting the court's disposition
3. Amount of good time awarded, revoked and restored while incarcerated;
4. Parole board decision to grant or deny parole; and,
5. The length of time set by the Board between the first and subsequent hearings when denied parole.

Of these factors, the last three are under the control and influence of correctional agencies (prison and parole boards). The role of parole remains strong since the vast majority of states have retained indeterminate sentencing and discretionary release powers for most offenders.[7] The level of discretion enjoyed by these agencies in determining LOS makes them extremely influential in launching a cost-effective corrections option's strategy. It is clear, then, that

programs that seek to reduce prison populations must design interventions that will either divert those who would have served prison without the program, or would reduce their LOS.

National Evaluation of the Correctional Options Program

The CODP effort required that a national evaluation was required to conduct both process and impact studies of selected sites. The process evaluation was to focus on the design, development, and implementation of these projects and their key program elements. The impact study would address recidivism, costs, and the impact on correctional populations.

Although the amount of money allocated to this program by Congress was significant, early on it was decided by BJA that the money should be spread to as many sites as possible rather than concentrating these resources in a select number of sites. In total, more than 40 programs were funded at varying levels of support. The large number of sites also made it impossible to evaluate all sites. Consequently, only 11 sites were selected to participate in the national evaluation (see Table 2). All 11 sites were required to participate in the process evaluation which determined if the programs were implemented as designed and consistent with their original goals and objectives. Based on the process evaluation results, four sites were selected for a more rigorous impact evaluation (Maryland, Vermont, Washington state, and Florida). A fifth site (the California Youth Authority's boot camp program) was later added based on its subsequent BJA funding and its strong evaluation design.[8] Of these five sites, two were evaluated using experimental designs with random assignment to experimental and control conditions (Maryland and the California Youth Authority LEAD Boot Camp Program). Two other sites utilized quasi-experimental designs in which matching procedures were used to established control groups (Washington State and Florida). For Vermont, limited time series data were used to see if the program had a systemic impact on the courts and prison population.

The remainder of this report focuses primarily on the four original CODP sites. The results of the CYA impact study is presented later on in the report. What follows are more detailed descriptions of how each site proposed to operate and serve as an alternative to incarceration.

Florida

Florida's program was a front-end diversion program that targeted probation and parole violators who had been re-arrested for a new crime. In lieu of being readmitted to prison for the violation, the program offered an alternative sanction that consisted of residential drug treatment services followed by aftercare supervision. The drug treatment component of the program was to be delivered by a private provider while the Department of Corrections would maintain security at a treatment facility center that housed the offenders. The program was first planned as a co-ed facility so that both men and women could participate. Incarceration would be reduced by averting the re-admission to prison and reducing the probability of another violation through drug treatment.

Maryland

The Maryland program was both a front-end and back-end alternative to incarceration. Drug court participants and eligible technical violators were diverted from incarceration entirely (front-end). Sentenced inmates who met the eligibility criteria were admitted to the institutional-based treatment program. Upon successful completion of the program, they would be recommended for release to the Parole Board. If the Board granted parole, the average LOS would be reduced from what it would have been without the program.

Vermont

Vermont restructured its entire indeterminate sentencing structure by developing two tracks that addressed differing levels of an offender needs and risks through varying degrees of sanctioning. The Vermont Department of Corrections (VDOC) believed that a significant number of offenders sentenced to prison could be placed in the community without posing a serious risk to public safety if they received proper levels of supervision and services. A key component of the entire program was to apply objective risk assessment to the "stream" of convicted felons to determine those that should be incarcerated and the length of incarceration.

Washington State

The State of Washington had two programs — the Correctional Options for Youth Program (COY) and the Work Ethic Camp (WEC). Only the WEC was formally evaluated. The WEC was a boot camp program with a reduced emphasis on a military regimen. The WEC inmate served a shorter portion (four months) of a two year sentenced at the boot camp and then completed the remainder of the sentence under an intense supervision program (Community Custody Inmate Status). In essence, the WEC is a vehicle for early release. Generally speaking, two years of confinement are reduced to two months in prison for WEC reception and four months at the WEC or a total LOS of six months.

California Youth Authority Boot camp

The CYA program was a juvenile boot camp program called LEAD (leadership, esteem, ability and discipline). The program was designed as an alternative placement for the CYA's least serious offenders. LEAD was a 10-month program in two phases: a 4-month, highly structured, "boot camp" phase and a 6-month intensive parole phase (followed by standard parole for any remaining commitment time). The program combined a variety of treatment and training elements, including a 12-step substance abuse treatment component, practical life skills education classes, physical training, drill and ceremony training, and intensive parole supervision. The BJA awarded grant funds for an aftercare component that had not been provided for in the CYA budget.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF SITES PARTICIPATING IN PROCESS EVALUATIONS

Site	Date Funded	Program Description
Alabama Department of Corrections	1993	Drug court designed to divert offenders from prison.
Alameda County (CA) Adult Probation Department	1992	Multi-level program for adults on probation who have violated probation supervision or are classified as high risk.
California Youth Authority	1994	Boot Camp for youthful offenders who otherwise would have been committed to a traditional long-term security facility. Four month miliary type program followed by a six-month aftercare component under parole supervision.
Connecticut Judicial Branch	1993	Multi-level program for youthful female offenders and their children. Priority is given to substance abusers. A continuum of treatment including a residential component and community aftercare.
Florida Department of Corrections*	1992	Three-phase intensive drug treatment in a therapeutic community environment. Targets youthful parole violators in danger of prison re-commitment.
Maricopa County (AZ) Adult Probation Department	1993	Youthful Offender Day Reporting Center and After Shock Transition program. Resources are provided to meet counseling, educational, and vocational needs.
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services*	1992	Graduated sanctions model including a Boot Camp, Regimented Officer Training Center, day reporting, ISP, and home confinement. Designed to divert prison-bound offenders and speed release of those incarcerated.
New Hampshire Department of Corrections	1992	Early release program for youthful state prisoners. Includes a modified shock incarceration unit, high intensity supervision unit, and expanded pre- and post-release programming in substance abuse treatment and employment training.
Cumberland County Juvenile (PA) Probation Department	1993	Boot Camp for youthful offenders who otherwise would have been committed to the state's correctional system. Traditional boot camp regime with aftercare (probation) component.
South Carolina Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse	1993	Residential treatment program designed to divert youthful offenders from incarceration and to reduce recidivism.
Vermont Department of Corrections*	1993	Complete restructuring of offender classification and sentencing options. Various levels of community supervision are incorporated. Offenders are placed in sentencing tracks based on risk and need.
Washington Department of Corrections*	1993	Program focuses on work, education, and employment readiness for youthful offenders. Program has community and prison tracks.

* Participated in subsequent impact evaluations

Results of the National Evaluation

The above discussion suggests that an effective CODP will have the greatest influence if it focuses on reducing the length of stay by introducing new policies rather than small pilot programs. Front end diversion programs which rely upon the courts to determine who is admitted to the programs, will be problematic unless they can target offenders who are likely to be incarcerated and will spend a significant period of time incarcerated. And it goes without saying that program integrity (i.e., the effective delivery of the proposed program services) must also be ensured. It is within this context that the CODP effort was evaluated.

Process Evaluation

The process evaluation was designed to inform policy-makers, correctional administrators, criminal justice authorities, and other public officials about both the successes and failures of program implementation, and to provide recommendations for replicating or modifying the five following critical program elements that must be logically consistent in order for an alternative incarceration program or policy to have an impact on recidivism, incarceration rates, or costs:

- *Program Context*: The set of conditions and assumptions that operationally and conceptually define the distinctive features of the program. Included are the theoretical assumptions guiding offender selection criteria and intervention strategies (supervision and services) as well as the financial, historical, and organizational characteristics of the program.

- *Program Goals*: The measurable outcomes of the program's interventions which can be used to measure its effectiveness.

- *Offender Selection*: The combination of procedures and criteria employed to define program eligibility and to select offenders for the program.

- *Program Services*: The full range of activities and services provided by the programs to offenders admitted to the program.

- *Organizational Linkages*: Those formal and informal conditions and relationships with other organizations that may hinder or support program operations.

The evaluation design determined the extent to which each site was logically organized along all five dimensions. For example, if the program had a goal of reducing prison crowding, then it must target a potentially large offender population that otherwise would have been diverted from prison or would have a longer length of stay had the program not been implemented. Should the program target offenders who have a very low risk of being incarcerated, then the selection criteria are not consistent with the program's goals. Similarly,

selecting inmates who have a low risk of recidivating would not be consistent with a goal of reducing recidivism.

The process evaluation results showed that many of the CODPs experienced substantial implementation problems that hampered the potential of each program to achieve its goals and objectives. These implementation problems adversely affected their "program integrity," which in turn made them inappropriate candidates for impact evaluations. What follows is a summary of those components of program implementation and operations that severely hampered the site's ability to function as designed.

Program Context

Initially, most of the programs funded in 1992-93 experienced considerable delay in implementing their programs. Many of these delays can be attributed to difficulties in obtaining and maintaining the full support of key departments (such as courts, correctional facilities, probation and parole services, and law enforcement offices) for program referrals and/or services, and a lack of pre-project planning by persons who would be intimately involved in the program's operations. For example, one of the early problems encountered by the Maryland project was the difficulty completing the "pipeline" study which would determine the number and characteristics of offenders that fit the selection criteria. Consequently, the selected target populations and program services were not based upon an analysis of current criminal justice system processes.

In some sites, the project proposal submitted to BJA was not written by staff who were responsible for program implementation. By relying upon consultants or non-program staff to develop the BJA proposal, a great deal of time was wasted later trying to modify the proposal so that the proposed program could be implemented within the organizational restraints of each jurisdiction's criminal justice system's policies and procedures. In particular, there was insufficient time allocated to developing a practical and efficient screening process that would target the appropriate offenders.

Internal organizational issues also developed in several sites as key project staff were replaced during the planning process. For example, project directors were replaced during the first few months of receiving the BJA grant. At other sites there was considerable turnover in line staff essential to the program's operations. What follows are examples of difficulties encountered at the Maryland site which was typical of the first set of sites awarded demonstration grants.

1. Turnover of key staff

The Secretary of the agency was on medical leave during the spring of 1993, creating a void in the department in terms of direction and leadership for CODP. After some delay, a project director was identified. Her tenure with the department was short (nine months) and because her responsibilities included numerous pressing concerns within the division, she was not able to give her full attention to the program. Upon her departure, the project director's

responsibilities were shifted to another staff person. The project's organizational structure was also altered so that the Program Manager would report directly to the Secretary on matters concerning CODP.

2. CODP as an Agency Priority

Securing and maintaining the full support of the respective agencies within the department required that the program be perceived as a top priority of the Secretary. While it may seem obvious that the CODP is a high priority program, how it fit into the Maryland correctional system was not immediately clear to all divisions of the department. The program demanded support and cooperation for the following program components:

- Correctional facilities to identify, screen, and transport participants;
- Parole Commission to approve early parole release plans; and
- Probation and parole services to provide community supervision.

Each agency had to rethink and reorganize how it did its work in order to create and implement CODP. This process of acquiring the full support and cooperation of the respective divisions, while badly needed, took time and delayed the project's opening.

3. Relationship of CODP to other Departmental Initiatives

Another issue that delayed the planning process was the need to define the relationship between CODP and the Baltimore City Drug Court. The CODP had received another federal grant to develop a drug court. The questions centered on (1) how to link the Drug Court programs with the CODP program; (2) who would have responsibility for the respective components of CODP and the Drug Court programs; and (3) what front- and back-end options were needed for the respective offender populations. The CODP manager was given responsibility for both initiatives. While this ensured that the two programs would not conflict with each other, the extensive planning and development processes were delayed by the need to coordinate and secure cooperation and contracts with virtually all agency divisions, state and local service providers, the courts, and federal funding agencies.

4. State Budget and Financial Requirements

Because state funds were required to supplement the development as well as assume responsibility for the CODP after the initial 18-month federal grant, the budget had to be reviewed and approved by the State legislature. This requirement alone delayed the planning and development processes for approximately 90 days.

5. Cumbersome State Procurement Regulations

The numerous waiting periods and reviews as well as the staff time required to "walk" a contract through the development, advertisement, review, negotiation, and signing processes was daunting. The process for contracting treatment services for the offender populations were initiated in June of 1993 and contracts were not signed until March of 1994. Services began shortly thereafter.

Target Population and Program Selection Process

As suggested earlier, the general thrust of the CODP was to identify offenders for program admission who otherwise would be incarcerated or would serve a longer prison term. It was also expected that the selection criteria would target offenders who are youthful, had not been convicted of a violent crime, did not have a violent criminal history, and could benefit from treatment. Initially, the sites listed extremely restrictive criteria which severely the number of offenders who could be classified as eligible for CODP.

Over time, the sites relaxed their initial criteria and succeeded in targeting offenders who either were in prison or had a high likelihood of being incarcerated. For example, Florida selected inmates who were parole or probation violators who had been re-arrested for a felony level crime. An early study of this population showed that these offenders were very likely to be incarcerated and serve several years in prison before they could be released.

Table 3 summarizes the primary attributes of offenders screened for the four BJA sites. As expected they were primarily young males with poor employment end education records. They were largely convicted of either a property or drug-related crimes. It is noteworthy that a substantial number of screened offenders were charged or convicted of violent crimes (primarily robbery and assault). While this ran counter to the official criteria of the CODP program, it also reflected the experience of the sites where many offenders who had been convicted of such crimes were viewed as suitable candidates for CODP. Indeed, it was often stated by project managers that using the current offense as a selection criterion does not properly identify the so-called violent offender. In terms of prior criminal record, the vast majority of cases had no prior prison terms but a large proportion had prior felony arrests and convictions. The majority of the prior convictions were for nonviolent crimes. These projects were efficient in terms of admitting high proportions of the cases they screened for admission (from 72% in Florida to 99% in Washington). Relative to drug use, a significant number had prior drug treatment and were poly-drug users (Table 4). There were variations among the sites with respect to drug use patterns. Vermont's offenders had a higher use of alcohol while the other sites reported higher levels of cocaine use.

In general, these offenders posed considerable challenges to treatment efforts by virtue of their age, lack of education, poor job skills, high unemployment, lack of social stability, history of drug abuse, and extensive records of prior contacts with the criminal justice system in terms of arrests and prior convictions. They also faced enormous difficulties "making it" in today's growing but highly competitive and technologically advanced economy.

In terms of the screening decision itself, most of the screened offenders were admitted to the program. Relative to selecting offenders who otherwise would have been incarcerated had the CODPs not existed, the initial process evaluation and the impact sites were largely successful in meeting that objective. The Maryland site selected offenders who were already incarcerated while the Florida project targeted probation violators who have a very high probability of being

incarcerated and sentenced to substantial periods of time if convicted of their new charges.

TABLE 3

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS SCREENED FOR CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS PROGRAMS

Characteristics	Florida	Maryland	Vermont	Washington
	%	%	%	%
Sex				
Male	85.4	71.0	83.0	69.9
Female	14.3	29.0	17.0	30.1
Average Age	21.1	31.3	29.8	23.7
Age	21 years	31 years	30 years	24 years
Race				
White	62.0	10.7	97.1	53.2
Black	33.6	83.4	2.3	37.4
Asian	0.0	0.2	0.2	1.6
Other	3.5	0.4	0.5	7.3
Employment Status at Arrest				
Full- or Part-Time	44.0	29.0	57.0	31.8
Unemployed	29.4	60.4	19.6	36.8
Education Level at Arrest				
No High School	68.4	59.2	39.4	41.4
High School/GED	24.8	29.2	45.6	42.1
Some College	5.3	6.3	14.4	15.2
Screening Decision				
Accept	72.1	88.4	88.3	99.3
Reject	27.9	5.7	26.4	0.2
Most Serious Crime				
Violent	21.3	6.1	14.7	6.0
Property	41.5	22.7	20.8	20.7
Drug	32.4	37.9	30.4	69.5
Other	4.7	27.8	33.3	1.8
Prior Criminal History Characteristics (Had one or more of each)				
Adult Arrest	64.3	89.9	69.5	42.7
Adult Conviction	59.4	86.0	69.1	40.1
Violent	21.3	23.1	24.5	1.7
Drug	33.2	67.5	14.7	21.9
Property	47.1	46.5	31.9	24.2
Prison Term	21.3	52.7	16.9	13.9
% Accepted	**72.1**	**88.4**	**88.3**	**99.3**
Total	**574**	**507**	**658**	**449**

Note: Percents may not sum to 100 due to rounding or missing data.

TABLE 4

DRUG USE AND TREATMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS SCREENED FOR CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS PROGRAMS

Characteristics	Florida	Maryland	Vermont	Washington
	%	%	%	%
Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous Experience				
Currently in AA/NA	16.6	9.4	23.9	21.2
Ever in AA/NA	31.0	28.0	37.6	30.3
AA/NA in 6 Months	8.7	9.2	9.7	10.6
Prior Treatment Experience				
Had prior Treatment	51.2	57.7	52.7	41.6
Primary Drug Used				
Alcohol	21.5	17.5	63.8	18.2
Marijuana	26.8	0.4	10.6	23.3
Cocaine	41.5	19.4	1.2	13.2
Other	4.7	51.1	1.2	13.4
Total	**578**	**468**	**423**	**433**

One issue that was not dealt with by the programs was the use of objective, reliable and valid risk and needs assessment instruments to determine which offenders required which services and levels of supervision. Instead, sites relied upon fairly broad criteria and assumed that the types of services provided by the CODPs (as described in the next section) were appropriate and effective. None of the sites were able to conduct studies of their offender populations to assess how many and what types of inmates would be best suited for their proposed forms of treatment.

Two major recommendations were made to BJA based on these results. First, sites should not overly restrict participation in the CODP by age and convicted offense. Too many incarcerated offenders who are low-risk and could benefit from these programs are being unnecessarily excluded by a somewhat arbitrary age limit. Furthermore, there are many inmates convicted of a violent offense who pose less risk to public safety than inmates serving time for property or drug crimes. Sites, especially prison-based programs that target inmates nearing completion of their sentences, should be encouraged to expand their age and offense-based selection criteria. Second, in the future, BJA should provide planning grants to states so that "pipeline" analyses can be conducted to determine program size and the most appropriate service system prior to a full award being made by BJA. Both of these recommendations were acted upon by BJA as it funded other sites in the latter years of CDOP program.[9]

Program Services

If there was a single program element commonality across the sites, it was that a period of incarceration in a treatment-oriented facility was first required for a relatively short period of time (two to three months). Upon successful completion of the first phase, the offender would be released to a less restrictive and often nonresidential treatment program where additional services would be provided. In some instances, there was another residential-based program the offender had to complete before being placed directly in the community.

A diverse array of treatment services was proposed to be delivered to the program participants in these different phases of treatment. The underlying theory was that these offenders were deficient either in their personalities or social and work skills. Consequently, the task of the CODP service providers was to correct these deficiencies and to do this relatively quickly. The services to be provided were diverse and ranged from general counseling to anger management to vocational training. The list of program services taken from the Florida proposal one site was fairly typical of what all the sites were proposing to do (see Table 5).

In providing these individual-level services, the programs hoped that within a 3-6 month time period positive changes would occur within the offender's personality and skill levels so that they could secure meaningful employment, reduce or stop illegal drug use, and refrain from future criminal activity. Many sites felt that drug use was the major reason that many individuals become involved in criminal behavior and cannot succeed on traditional forms of supervision. In such sites, the focus was to provide drug treatment, as well as other support services. But in general, the proposed services were not well focused and tended to promise all things to all offenders. This problematic feature of the sites was related to the lack of risk/needs assessment instruments as part of the screening process. The early process evaluation results also showed that in many sites it was difficult to keep clients in the treatment or to maintain a high quality of program services. The situation improved over the course of the evaluation, but participation remained highly variable across clients and never obtained the levels originally envisioned.[10]

As shown in Table 6, most of the sites provided a diverse array of treatment services to the participants with the most frequently provided services being education, drug counseling, job/vocational training, and general counseling. There was considerable variation among the sites, with Florida and Vermont reporting higher rates service hours per week and Maryland reporting very few hours of services for its institutional based program.

TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF SERVICES PROPOSED TO BE DELIVERED BY FLORIDA

General Counseling/Therapy	Vocational and Educational Services	Other Services
Group counseling; Relapse prevention group; Criminal thinking errors; Skills of daily living; Leisure skills; Self-help groups; AIDS education and prevention; Drug education; and Individual counseling	GED educational program; Vocational education assessment; Vocational training; and Institutional employment.	Anger management; Problem-solving skills; Stress management; Parenting skills; Communication skills; Assertiveness training; Drug testing; Recreation; and Restitution planning.

Organizational Linkages

The sites were relatively successful in establishing organizational linkages although such linkages took time to develop. For front-end diversion programs like Florida, correctional agencies had to work closely with the courts and the prosecutors in particular to reach agreement on allowing re-arrested parole and probation violators to receive an alternative sanctions. Back-end programs like Maryland had to develop ties with a sometimes reluctant Parole Board which was not part of the same correctional agency. Most sites that focused on substance abuse treatment contracted these services to privately operated vendors (either profit or non-profit). In those instances where the treatment was provided within a correctional facility, some start-up difficulties were reported between the security and treatment staffs. But over time, these problems were resolved.

TABLE 6

AVERAGE HOURS OF SERVICES DELIVERED PER WEEK TO CODP PARTICIPANTS BY TYPE OF SERVICE

Services and Terminations	Florida	Maryland		Vermont	Washington
		Community	Institutional		
Services Delivered[2]					
General Education	4.0	0.7	0.4	1.2	1.5
Drug Education	16.0	1.3	1.2	3.4	0.4
12-Step Counseling	4.4	0.5	0.4	3.1	1.8
Job/Vocational Training	7.5	0.7	0.4	20.0	2.7
Individual Counseling	4.1	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.7
Other Counseling	29.9	0.4	0.5	0.8	2.3
Community Service	2.6	0.2	0.1	39.3	1.2
Physical Activity	5.3	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0
Cognitive Development	3.8	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.8
Heath Related Education	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Criminal Behavior Counseling	0.0	0.0	0.0	29.0	0.1
Other	3.0	1.2	0.4	1.7	0.6
Total	**71.9**	**2.3**	**2.6**	**38.3**	**6.7**

[2]Average hours are computed for only those cases that received some amount of services in each category.

Impact Evaluation Results

Impact Designs

In both Maryland and CYA, an experimental design was executed. In both sites the random assignment was controlled by the researchers and occurred only after the offender had been screened and identified as eligible for the program. For two other sites (Washington and Florida), a quasi-experimental design was used where offenders who were similar to the "experimental cases" in their background attributes but were not selected for the experimental program were assigned to a comparison group. In these sites, offenders were identified who met program eligibility criteria but were not admitted to the program as it was not in existence at that time.[11] In Vermont, the small size of the prison population plus its focus on system-wide reform made the creation of a comparison group impractical. However, pre and post reform comparisons were made if the reforms had altered criminal justice sentencing.

Recidivism

Each participant and comparison case was followed-up after he/she had been at risk for committing new crimes and technical violations for at least 12 months (Table 7). The Maryland experimental cases reflected offenders who went through the institutional phase and specialized community supervision or aftercare components. Maryland had the lowest recidivism rate, with 10 percent being returned to prison within one year. Six percent had committed technical violations and four percent had committed a new crime but these rates were similar to the randomized control population. Florida had the highest recidivism rate at 32 percent with 25 percent having committed a technical violation and 8 percent had committed a new crime. The overall rate is much higher than the matched comparison group. However, the percentage of offenders who committed a new crime was similar for both groups (7.5 percent versus 7.2 percent) to the experimental cases . For Washington, the WEC had higher overall recidivism rates than the matched comparison group. Similar to the other sites, the technical violation rates reflect most of the recidivism with relatively low rates for the offenders returned to prisons with new sentences.

TABLE 7

RECIDIVISM RATES OF PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS ACROSS SITES

12 Month Outcome Measures	Maryland		Florida		Washington State	
	Exper.	Control	Exper.	Comparison	WEC	Comparison
	282	126	265	250	159	127
Tech. Violation	5.7%	4.0%	24.5%	0.8%	25.2%	13.4%
New Offense	4.3%	8.7%	7.5%	7.2%	2.5%	5.5%
Total Recidivists	**10.0%**	**12.7%**	**32.1%**	**8.0%**	**27.7%**	**18.9%**

Analysis was also done across the sites to identify the attributes of offenders who did recidivate versus those who did not. In general, the following attributes were most often found to be moderately associated with recidivism:

- *Gender*: Women tend to have lower recidivism rates.
- *Education*: Persons with a high school diploma or college education had lower recidivism rates.
- *Employment*: Persons who were employed full- or part-time had lower recidivism rates.
- *Age*: Older offenders (those 30 years and older) tended to have lower recidivism rates.
- *Current Offense*: Persons convicted of violent crime had the lowest recidivism rates when compared to offenders charged with property and drug crimes.
- *Prior Adult Record*: Persons with histories of prior prison and jail terms had higher recidivism rates when compared to those without such histories.
- *Prior Drug Treatment*: Those with a history of at least one drug treatment program have a higher recidivism rate compared to those who had not had such treatment.
- *Prior Drug Use*: Those who reported using alcohol and other drugs have a much higher recidivism rate when compared to those who did not report such use.

Cost Analysis

To perform this analysis, comparisons were made between the experimental and control cases in terms of their operational costs and averted prison construction costs. Because the CODP sites were experimental in nature, the number of cases used for analysis was relatively small. Consequently, one must be aware that unless these programs can be significantly expanded, the potential for "true" cost savings is not possible. Put differently, unless it can be shown that prisons were closed or the need for new prisons was averted, there would be only marginal costs savings for these relatively small programs.

Florida

The first step was to estimate the costs associated with the comparison cases. A large proportion of the comparison cases (65 percent) were admitted to prison while 29 percent were recommitted to supervision only and 6 received no subsequent sentence. Offenders admitted to prison served an average of 14 months (436 days) and another 14 months (415 days) in community supervision. For those that were placed back on probation or parole by the court were sentenced to an average of 32 months (985 days) supervision. Using daily costs, the

average cost for control cases recommitted to prison was $32,729 while the supervision case cost was only $3,359 (Table 8).

For the program participants two scenarios were developed. First, for those offenders that successfully completed the program, the costs were significantly lower than the comparison case that was incarcerated. The daily cost for all three phases of the program over an 18-month period is $29.20, which is well below the prison daily cost of $71.82. When one adds the probation cost of $1,280, the projected total cost for a program participant who completes the entire program is $10,040 which is well below the $32,729 for the incarcerated comparison case but more expensive than the community supervision case.

However, the program had a high participant failure and recidivism rate. Many of these offenders absconded and committed a new crime or technical violation. As noted in the recidivism section, 32 percent of the program participants were returned to prison within one year. These recidivists spent an average of 392 days in prison as a result of their technical violation or new crime. Technical violators spent an average of 382 days in prison and those with new sentences spent an average of 428 days (Table 8). To be cost-effective, the program would require a success rate in the 70-75 percent range and target offenders who otherwise would be incarcerated for substantial periods of time.

Maryland

Participants in the Maryland CODP were screened and admitted into either an institutional program before being released or are directly released into the community component via parole without participating in a special institutional based program. Consequently, the cost analysis was attentive to the differential costs associated with these two options as well as the costs associated with the randomized control cases (Table 9).

Offenders admitted directly into a community treatment/supervision component spent an average of 542 days in prison before spending another 271 days under CODP community supervision. For the males admitted to the CDOP institutional program, they spent less time in prison (474 days) but had an additional 40 days in the CDOP institutional phase of the program which was more expensive than the typical prison costs. Assuming the same period of community supervision, these inmates cost about the same as the CDOP community supervision cases (about $25,000). Females assigned to this track had the lowest costs (about $17,000) simply because their time in prison before being admitted to the CDOP program was well below that for the males (474 days versus 260 days). Conversely, the control cases had the highest costs ($28,328) as they sent an average of 652 days in prison and 225 days in standard community supervision.

TABLE 8

FLORIDA COST COMPARISON PER OFFENDER

Cost Factors	Experimental Group		Control Group	
	Success	Failure	Supervision	Incarceration
Incarceration Costs				
Prison Cost per day	$71.82	$71.82	$71.82	$71.82
Prison Days	0	392	0	436
Total Prison Costs	$0	$28.153	$0	$31.314
Community Supervision Costs				
Supervision Cost per Day	$3.41	$3.41	$3.41	$3.41
Supervision Days	375	0	985	415
Total Supervision Costs	$1.279	$0	$3.359	$1.415
Program Participant Costs	$8,760	$2,920	$0	$0
Total Average Cost	**$10,039**	**$31,073**	**$3,359**	**$32,729**

TABLE 9

COST COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS AND CONTROL CASES

Cost Component	CDOP Community	CDOP Institutional		Control
		Males	Females	
Prison Days	542	474	260	652
Daily Cost	$43	$43	$43	$43
Prison Cost	$23.306	$20.382	$11.180	$28.036
CODP-Institution Days	0	40	90	0
Daily Cost	$45	$80	$45	$0
CODP-Institution Cost	$0	$3.200	$4.050	$0
Incarceration Costs	**$23,306**	**$23,582**	**$15,160**	**$28,036**
CODP-Community Days	271	271	271	0
Daily Cost	$6.38	$6.38	$6.38	$6.38
CODP-Community Cost	$1.729	$1.729	$1.729	$0
Standard Supervision Days	N/A	N/A	N/A	225
Daily Cost	N/A	N/A	N/A	$2.11
Standard Supervision Cost	N/A	N/A	N/A	$475
Community Costs	**$1,729**	**$1,729**	**$1,729**	**$475**
Total Cost	**$25,035**	**$25,311**	**$16,959**	**$28,511**

TABLE 10

PROJECT AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS AVOIDED BY THE MARYLAND CODP
FOR A 600-700 BED FACILITY

Item	Cost
Avoided Construction Costs	
Base cost for new facility @110.834 sq.ft.* $130 per sq. ft.	$14.408,420
Telecommunications	$221.668
Escalation @ 6.72	$982,654
Construction Contingency Costs @ 5 of Base Costs	$720,421
Total Construction Costs	**$16,333,163**
Avoided Site and Utilities Costs	
Site and Utilities	$2,750,000
Escalation @ 6.72	$184,708
Total Site and Utilities Costs	**$2,934,708**
Avoided Project Costs	
Inspection and testing	$593,518
Contract Management services	$100,000
Contract Schedule Maintenance	$25,000
Movable equipment	$657,000
Design fees and related costs	$1,071,115
Total Project Costs	**$2,446,633**
Total Project and Construction Costs	**$21,714,504**
Debt Service 15-year tax-exempt bonds sold @6 interest	**$10,697,580**
Total Costs	**$32,412,084**
Estimated Annual Operating Costs	**$9,340,461**

Source: Maryland DOC.

For Maryland, the major savings for CODP were achieved by reducing the prison LOS for CODP participants. Using aggregate data for all components of CODP, the experimental group (both successful and unsuccessful terminations) spent an average of 143 fewer days in prison. Maryland was successful in expanding the original pilot program so that an estimated 1,600 inmates are processed through the program on an annual basis. Using these numbers one can estimate that the DOC is averting the need to construct a 600 plus facility (1600 x 143 days/365 days = 627 ADP). The cost associated with constructing and financing a minimum security bed facility or housing unit to house such an inmate population is $32.4 million (Table 10). The operating cost would be $9.3 million annually in operational costs.

Vermont

The Vermont CDOP represented the one site that attempted to initiate a comprehensive change on the entire correctional system. As shown in Table 11, there were three major offender tracks or correctional options which the courts and/or the DOC could place a convicted offenders. The table also shows the annual costs per offender for each track which were derived from actual annual expenditures and average daily populations. The composite figures were comprised of several individual components as outlined below:

- Court/Reparative Service Units: Direct supervision, treatment, building costs, community service, and administration.
- Community Corrections Service Centers: Direct supervision, job counseling, community service, building costs, treatment, and administration.
- Correctional Facilities: Direct supervision, treatment, building costs, education, food, work, administration, and clinical services.

TABLE 11

ANNUAL COST PER OFFENDER FOR VERMONT'S CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS

Component/Track	Description	Per Capita Cost (1996)
Court/Reparative Service Units	This is for the less serious offender. This cost includes reparative, administrative, and standard probation; reparative community sentence; and community restitution.	$642
Community Corrections Service Centers	This includes costs associated with managing the offenders in the more serious track of the system (*i.e.*, the Risk Management Track). It includes probation and other specialized services provided to offenders	$2,893
Correctional Facilities	Includes costs associated with incarceration for all correctional facilities including work camps.	$27,147

Source: Vermont Department of Corrections.

TABLE 12

VERMONT COURT DISPOSITIONS BY TYPE
(As a Percent of All Dispositions)

Year	Probation	Probation w/Jail	Intermediate Sanctions	Jail/Prison
1991	41.0	15.4	Not in effect	43.6
1992	40.5	15.5	Not in effect	44.0
1993	36.4	14.3	5.1	44.2
1994	39.1	14.7	5.7	40.5
1995	37.9	13.9	24.6	23.6
1996	30.0	11.8	46.5	11.8
Percent Change 1991-1996	-11.0	-3.6	41.4	-31.8

Note: Percent change for Intermediate Sanctions is from 1993 to 1996.
Source: Vermont Department of Corrections.

TABLE 13

VERMONT INCARCERATED POPULATION

Year	Total Prisoners	Sentenced to More than One Year	Incarceration Rate
1992	1,254	865	151
1993	1,223	893	154
1994	1,301	981	168
1995	1,279	1,048	143
1996	1,125	807	137
% Change 1992-1996	-10.3%	-6.7%	-9.3%
1997	1,270	828	140
1998	1,426	1,110	188
1999	1,507	NA	193
%Change 1996-1999	34.0%	NA	40.9%

Note: (1) Jails and prisons form one integrated system in Vermont; (2) Incarceration rate is the number of prisoners with a sentence of more than one year per 100,000 Vermont residents.
Source: Prisoners in 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics.

At the outset, there were some promising trends. Starting in 1994, a significant number of offenders were being diverted from prison and to the two community corrections tracks. At this time, dispositions to the community service and court reparative service units sanctions increased sharply while admissions to prison dropped significantly from 1994 to 1995 (Table12).

However, the prison population did not drop (Table 13). In fact, over time, the prison population has increased due to the state adopting truth in sentencing laws and longer sentences in general for those still being sent to prison. Thus, while it appears that fewer people are being sentenced to prison, those who ate imprisoned serve longer prison terms which serves to negate the cost savings of the prison diversions.

Washington State

The most promising component of the Washington state site was the Work Ethic Camp (WEC). As noted earlier, two years of confinement were reduced to two months in prison for WEC reception and four months at the WEC or a total LOS of six months. To conduct a comparative analysis, a group of offenders who, in general, would have been eligible for the WEC prior to the WEC's implementation formed the comparison group.

Based upon the most recent data at the time of the evaluation, 439 inmates were released from the program in 1996. WEC cases spent six months incarcerated while the controls were imprisoned for 16 months or a savings of 10 months. On an annualized basis, this program reduced the projected prison population by approximately 366 inmates. Using these numbers one can estimate that operating costs of WEC was $5.3 million based on a daily rate of $65.58. The control population cost less per day ($57.80) but had a much longer LOS (16 months versus 6 months). Consequently, its projected costs was approximately $10.2 million or $4.9 million more than the WEC program. However, these rates assume that the WEC program has been sufficiently large enough to avoid the construction of a new facility or housing unit. The numbers presented here (an ADP of only 220 inmates) suggest that the bed savings were not sufficient to avoid prison construction as was the case for Maryland. In fact, since this evaluation was completed, the program has been significantly reduced to just a handful of inmates. This reduction is the result of fewer inmates being referred to the program each year.

TABLE 14

COST COMPARISONS FOR WEC AND CONTROL CASES

Cost Factor	WEC	Controls
Graduates per Year	439	439
LOS	6 months	16 months
Average Daily Population	220 inmates	585 inmates
Daily Costs	$65.58	$57.80
Total Costs	**$5,254,830**	**$10,156,704**

Source: Washington Department of Corrections

Results from the California Youth Authority's LEAD Program

A number of important findings were produced by the CYA evaluation of it boot camp program that mirror the evaluation results noted above.[12] In terms of client selection, from July1, 1995 through December 31, 1996, nearly 800 youth were admitted to the program out of approximately 5,500 admissions (or about 15 percent of all admissions). Although this number reflects a sizeable proportion of all CYA admissions, the program suffered in trying to keep its 120 bed program filled. With regard to program services, a "shot-gun" service system approach was used that assumed that by exposing youth to a wide variety if services (group and individual) rehabilitation would occur. It was demonstrated that the LEAD program successfully delivered a diverse array of individual services that, in comparison to the control cases, produced (1) a safer, healthier institutional environment; (2) reduced gang-related activity; and (3) increased the participant's sense of confidence and accomplishment. The process evaluations also revealed some problems and limitations which were being addressed over time, including (1) minimal opportunities for work and training on parole; (2) the need for continuous vigilance against ward abuse; (3) the need for highly qualified staff in leadership positions; and (4) the need for a shared vision or shared goals at all levels of the department.

During the evaluation period, the LEAD program at the Preston facility graduated and paroled 131 of the 182 that were admitted to the LEAD institutional phase (an attrition rate of 28 percent). The Nelles School successfully paroled 118 wards of the 176 youth admitted to its program (an attrition rate of 33 percent). These drop out rates were the result of general disciplinary problems, gang-related activities, and fighting. Significantly, 23 percent of the dropouts were due to the Parole Board's refusal to grant parole even though the youth had successfully completed the boot camp program. Although the average LOS for the LEADs cases was four months less than the control cases, there was no statistically significant differences in arrests and parole revocations for the two groups which were quite high (Table 15). The LEAD program turned out to be more expensive than traditional incarceration due to the high costs of the program's staffing level and program services. Based on these disappointing results the LEAD boot camp has been discontinued.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

The national evaluation has shown that the pilot programs had some success in achieving some of their core implementation goals. They were successful in targeting offenders who without the program would have been incarcerated. They also succeeded in various degrees in providing substantial and appropriate services to offenders who can be placed in the community without compromising public safety.

TABLE 15
SELECTED 12 MONTH FOLLOW-UP
IMPACT MEASURES OF THE CYA LEAD PROGRAM

Impact Measure	LEAD Cases (N=309)	Controls (N=230)
Re-arrested within 12 months	85%	78%
Positive Parole Completion	19%	25%
Parole Revocation	38%	31%
Average Number of Arrests	0.54	.045
Total Average Length of Stay	8.2 months	12.4 months
LEAD Program	4.0 months	NA
Non-LEAD Program	4.2 months	NA
Total Institutional Costs	$23,910	$12,035

Source: California Youth Authority.

These goals were realized despite considerable implementation obstacles which delayed program implementation and impaired the delivery of treatment services. Many programs benefitted considerably from BJA's technical assistance providers in the design, implementation, and evaluation of their programs. However, it's also clear that funding so many sites so quickly as a "demonstration program" too often led to poorly designed and implemented programs with little chance of demonstrating success or survival once federal funding ceased to exist.

Program participants received far more services and supervision than similarly situated offenders in prison or on probation; thus, programs were somewhat more successful in delivering critically needed services to the target population. Still, the higher concentration of services and supervision did not translate into reductions in recidivism. However, the relatively low recidivism rates for both experimental and comparison groups re-affirms the earlier statement that today's prison populations consist of a substantial number of offenders who can either be diverted or have their lengths of stay reduced without jeopardizing public safety.

Correctional options programs also showed the *potential* for being cost-effective but only if they can be greatly expanded to target a far larger pool of incarcerated inmates. This goal is unlikely to be achieved as long as alternatives to incarceration are viewed as a individual programs without reforms in existing policies and laws that will serve to reduce admissions and/or lengths of stay. This initiative has shown that it is difficult for a prison system to launch major rehabilitative services to large numbers of inmates. The most current estimates are that no

more than 10-15 percent of the prison population is involved in meaningful treatment or rehabilitative services.[13] Expanding that number will require a major re-organizational change in terms of how prisons are constructed and operated -- something that is unlikely to occur in the near future.

Given correctional trends noted earlier in this report, future correctional options initiatives should focus on administrative changes in release policies which will serve to reduce the lengths of stay. These changes can be instituted most easily in those states that have retained their indeterminate sentencing with discretionary parole release powers (like Maryland). For other states, new laws will need to be adopted that grant more authority to correctional officials to control the release dates. This scenario also assumes that along with discretionary release powers, correctional agencies must develop risk and needs assessment instruments to guide the release decision.

Front-end diversion programs can also be effective, but only if they have the full support of all parties within the court system (prosecution, defense, judges) and there is a consensus to divert offenders who otherwise would have been incarcerated for a substantial period of time. The most promising group to target for these types of initiatives is the large number of probation and parole violators entering prison for technical violations and/or minor offenses.

Field tests of innovative programs and policies will be most successful if they are implemented under very controlled conditions coupled with the requirement of a rigorous experimental evaluation design. Specifically, field tests should be limited to no more than five sites with resources and time frames to ensure the experimental conditions are properly delivered to targeted offenders for a sustained period time. Under such conditions, the potential for 1) targeting the proper offender population, 2) determining whether current lengths of stay can be reduced without jeopardizing public safety and 3) delivering well-administered programs that focus on enhancing the offender's employability either through vocational training, education, general counseling, and/or drug treatment will be greatly enhanced as well as our understanding of what works with what offenders.

1.Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 1998. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1999.

2.Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison Expenditures, 1996. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, August 20, 1999.

3. For a detailed review of the Rand studies and their results see Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey Roth, and Christy A. Visher, eds. (1986). *Career Criminals and "Career Criminals" Vol I.* Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

4. James Austin (1986) "Using Early Release to Relieve Prison Crowding." *Crime and Delinquency* 32:404-502.

5.Texas Criminal Justice Policy Council, Criminal Justice Policy Council Biennial Report to the Governor and the 76th Legislature: The Big Picture in Juvenile and Adult Criminal Justice, Austin, Texas: Texas Criminal Justice Policy Council, January 1999.

6.Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, *National Corrections Reporting Program, 1996.*

7. Bureau of Justice Assistance. 1996 National Survey of State Sentencing Structures. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1998.

8. Bottcher, J. and T. Isorena (1994) "LEAD: A Boot Camp and Intensive Parole Program: An Implementation and Process Evaluation of the First Year." Washington, DC: California Youth Authority and U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, NCJ 150513.

9. Bureau of Justice Assistance. Critical Elements in the Planning, Development, and Implementation of Successful Correctional Options. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1998.

10. It was extremely difficult for the program staff to document the number and type of services provided to their clients. Record keeping systems were cumbersome and incomplete. Project staff were to designate a single person to maintain these records for the national evaluation but these staff were often diverted to other tasks or not skilled in completing the data forms. In hindsight, the data collection tasks should have been under the direct control of the national evaluator.

11. In Washington state, the offenders were released from prison at approximately the same time the WEC graduates in the present evaluation were released to the community. From a larger pool of these "eligibles," a sample was selected that was similar to the WEC graduates in terms of sex, race, age, and current offense. It should be noted that WEC may have been an option for

a minority of these offenders, but for administrative or other unmeasurable reasons they were not recruited for the program. In all other respects these offenders are similar to the WEC graduates in the present evaluation.

12. State of California, Department of the Youth Authority. (July 1997). *LEAD: A Boot Camp and Intensive Parole Program: The Final Impact Evaluation.* Sacramento: CA.

13. Criminal Justice Institute, Inc. (1999). *The Corrections Yearbook, 1998.* Middleton, CT: Criminal Justice Institute.