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S T A T E M E N T

THE IMPACT OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ON SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS

by Barry Krisberg, Ph.D.

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CRIME AND DELINQUENCY



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INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to examine the available research and statistical data on the justice system's response to serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders. Besides highlighting the findings of that literature, our aim is to identify important information gaps and to specify a research agenda for the near future. It is remarkable how little we really know about the effects of justice system interventions and how fragile the data sources are that are currently used to assess these impacts. Even with the enormous expenditures in political rhetoric and taxpayer monies devoted to the formal apparatus of law enforcement, courts, and corrections, very little funding has been invested in finding out if present policies or proposed alternatives can genuinely suppress juvenile crime. During the national debates on the federal Crime Bill there were many critical comments about prevention programs, especially at those programs aimed at positive youth development. However, the billions of dollars that were pumped into police, prisons, and other justice system programs were hardly even discussed.

First, we will examine the proportion of serious and violent juvenile offenders in the annual workloads of juvenile and adult justice agencies. How these serious offenders are handled by the justice system will also be reviewed. Next, the research literature on specialized juvenile crime law enforcement and prosecution programs will be analyzed. This paper will look at the research on the impact of juvenile corrections on the criminal careers of serious offenders. Finally, the emerging literature on transferring juvenile offenders to adult courts will be assessed and summarized.

How many serious and violent offenders are there?

The juvenile justice system is awash in troubled and troublesome youths, but few of these are serious or violent offenders. For instance, of the nearly 2.1 million arrests of juveniles in 1995, only 5.5 percent were for Part I violent crimes.¹ Serious property crimes – including arson, burglary, automobile theft, and larceny – account for another 26.9 percent of all juvenile arrests. Almost 70 percent of all serious property crimes involve thefts (some of which might involve minor shoplifting offenses). There are almost twice as many youths arrested for liquor law violations as for robbery (87,843 versus 44,508). In 1995, there were more than 104,000 youths arrested for vandalism, compared to 2,560 arrests for murder (Uniform Crime Reports, 1996).

Overall, youths accounted for just 18 percent of all persons who were arrested in 1995. Despite the media's focus on juvenile violence, young people made up 15 percent of all those arrested for homicide. Adults outnumbered juveniles in the arrest statistics by almost 4.5 to one. While juvenile arrest rates increased significantly between 1983 and 1995, these rates grew for both adults and juveniles.


National juvenile court statistics reveal a picture similar to the FBI arrest data.² In 1993 there were almost 1.5 million delinquency cases referred to the juvenile court. This figure increased by 23 percent between 1989 and 1993. Part 1 violent offenses accounted for 8 percent of these referrals. Another 38 percent of court referrals were for Part 1 property crimes. There were 117,100 court referrals for vandalism, compared to 35,600 cases involving robbery. Cases involving simple assault were more than twice as common as those for aggravated assault (166,400 and 77,500, respectively). Juvenile courts also handled 111,200 cases of youths charged with truancy, curfew violations, running away from home, and incorrigibility.

In 1993 the nation's juvenile courts handled 47 percent of all delinquency cases on an informal basis. Approximately 43 percent of those cases involving crimes against persons were disposed of without a formal delinquency petition. It is estimated that juvenile courts placed 128,700 youths in a variety of out-of-home arrangements; another roughly 254,800 youths were placed on probation. Thus, it appears that just more than one-quarter (25.7 percent) of delinquency cases referred to the juvenile court result in a sanction as restrictive as probation.

Figure 1 illustrates the typical juvenile court handling of cases involving crimes against persons. Out of every 1,000 cases involving crimes against persons, 570 result in formal delinquency petitions. The remaining 430 are generally dismissed or diverted to informal probation. For the cases that continue along the formal processing path, 17 out of the original 1,000 referred cases are transferred to criminal courts. We will return to this topic of transfer later, but it is important to note how relatively infrequently this legal step is taken.³

For every 1,000 anti-person crimes referred to juvenile courts, 228 cases ended in dismissals or other non-formal dispositions. Approximately 30 percent of referrals for crimes against persons have these petitions accepted by the courts. The most typical disposition for adjudicated person offenders is probation. Of the original 1,000 referrals, nearly 100 result in out-of-home placements of all types, including secure and non-secure facilities. These data show the extent to which the juvenile court utilizes diversionary and informal means to resolve

**FIGURE 1: JUVENILE COURT PROCESSING OF PERSON OFFENSES
1993 RATES**



Source: Butts, J. A., H. N. Snyder, T. A. Finnegan, A. L. Aughenbaugh, and R. S. Poole, *Juvenile Court Statistics 1993*. Washington, DC: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1996.

* Note: Numbers may not add up due to rounding

referrals, even in cases involving crimes against persons. Despite the criticism of the juvenile court for its alleged excessive leniency, many studies of the juvenile court have emphasized the minor nature of the offenses that result in referrals. The preventive ideology of the juvenile court often results in formal legal actions in cases that police or prosecutors would immediately drop if the defendant were an adult (Krisberg and Austin, 1993).

The NCJJ court data reinforce the conclusion that the vast majority of the court's workload is taken up with non-violent and non-serious offenders, albeit that many of these youngsters may exhibit chronicity in minor offending. Even those crimes against persons that come to the attention of the court system seem to be disposed of with minimal investments in court time and correctional resources. The juvenile court, nonetheless, expends substantial resources on many minor offenders.

Correctional data can be used to complete this profile of the types of offenders processed through the juvenile court system.⁴ A one-day census of juveniles in public correctional facilities, conducted in 1993, revealed that there were 60,254 held in public juvenile facilities. Of these juveniles, 35 percent were charged with violent crimes, and another 20 percent were charged with serious property crimes. Looked at somewhat differently, a significant minority of confined juveniles are held for less serious offenses. It is important to note that one-day census data (as contrasted to admissions or flow data) are biased in favor of the inmates who have the longest stays, who are often those charged with the most serious offenses. Further, the one-day census data cover youths awaiting adjudication as well as those who have been sentenced by the juvenile courts. It is worth remembering that there are at least 35,000 youths confined in privately operated juvenile correctional programs. Of this latter group, only 9 percent were charged with violent offenses, and 11 percent were charged with serious property crimes.

Another view of serious offenders in juvenile corrections can be obtained through annual admissions data compiled by NCCD from state juvenile corrections agencies. Based on thirty-nine states reporting individual-level admissions data in 1994, it appears that 29.5 percent of those admitted to state juvenile corrections systems were charged with violent crimes. An additional 39 percent of these state corrections admissions were for Part 1 property crimes. For nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of these youths, the admission represented their first entry to the state corrections system. Thus, even at the "deep end" of the juvenile justice system, violent offenders constitute less than one-third of the caseload;

almost 30 percent of the admissions are for less serious offenses. One NCCD study of eleven states found that about one-third of the juveniles incarcerated in state juvenile training schools were not violent or serious offenders (Krisberg, Onek, and Schwartz, 1993), and studies of detention reveal that very small numbers of juvenile detention admissions are for very serious offenses (Schwartz, 1993).

There are also data on persons under age 18 admitted to state prisons in thirty-seven states that reported in 1993 to the National Correctional Reporting Program (Perkins, 1994). Of the 5,637 admissions of juveniles in these states, 47 percent were for violent crimes; 32 percent were for Part I property crimes; the remainder were for drug crimes.

Collectively, these justice system data reveal that serious and violent juvenile offenders comprise only a fraction of the workload of the juvenile justice system. Moreover, the more one moves to the “front door” or gatekeepers of the system, the less prevalent are the highest-risk juvenile offenders. Ironically, public policy debate and public fear are focused on the dangerous few, while the justice system must deal with the non-violent many. This, in part, explains why few justice system programs have responded successfully to the unique risks and needs posed by the most serious and violent juvenile offenders. Since there is a natural human tendency to work with those youths who respond best to various interventions, many system workers will “write off” the most serious offenders, thus creating a skewed image of reality. This contributes to the very high failure rates of most interventions with violent and chronic juvenile offenders. Only through the utilization of highly structured risk assessment decision-making tools and more structured case management can this practice be reversed.

In the next section we will examine research on the limited efforts of juvenile justice agencies to identify actual and potential high-risk offenders and to focus special supervision and control resources on this group.

Targeting the Dangerous Few

While it is true that the justice system is processing large numbers of less serious offenders, it is also true that a small number of offenders contribute disproportionately to the total amount of criminal behavior in any given community. Beginning with the classic Philadelphia cohort study (Wolfgang, Sellin, and Figlio, 1972), a number of researchers have demonstrated the concentration of

offending in a small percentage of the youth population. Moreover, these chronic offenders are responsible for a very large percentage of the most serious crimes. It also appears that serious and chronic juvenile offenders are likely to extend their law-breaking behavior into young adulthood (Howell, Krisberg, Hawkins, and Wilson, 1995). These research findings point to a seemingly obvious policy conclusion: if these high-rate offenders can be identified and controlled, either through suppression or treatment techniques, then a major impact on crime rates can be achieved.

While there have been several attempts to focus law enforcement resources on serious and violent juvenile offenders, the research on these programs has been limited and inconclusive. It is worth examining these prior programmatic efforts to understand why the results have been so disappointing.

Most of the targeted juvenile justice enforcement and prosecution efforts have been directed at members of juvenile gangs. Because of the emphasis placed on gang suppression during the Reagan and Bush administrations, a virtual “cottage industry” of gang control has emerged. Noted gang researcher Malcolm Klein has observed, somewhat ironically, that Los Angeles, California, became the model for innovative anti-gang programs. Few cities in America have faced the violence and escalation of gang problems that has plagued the City of Angels – despite all the resources devoted to gang suppression.

Gang programs in Los Angeles have involved police, prosecutors, and probation officers. Police have employed saturation patrols, special surveillance, special gang tactical units, and “even a ninja-style unit, complete with black clothing” (Klein, 1995:161). The most celebrated of these Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) programs, Operation Hammer, involved massive military-style police sweeps in the South Central portion of Los Angeles in 1988. During one weekend, the LAPD added almost 1,000 additional officers who moved through the target area making large numbers of arrests for traffic offenses, outstanding warrants, curfew violations, and gang-related behaviors. Altogether, 1,453 arrests were made requiring the creation of a temporary booking operation set up in the University of Southern California football stadium.

Of those arrested, all but 103 defendants were released without any charges being filed. Only 32 persons were charged with felonies. Most arrestees were not gang members. The Director of the California Youth Authority reported that not one youth had entered the state training school system based on all these arrests. Operation Hammer continued over several subsequent weekends,

although the size of the police strike force decreased dramatically and the number of arrests, most of them based on outstanding warrants, actually increased. Gang violence continued unabated, and the expensive police personnel deployment produced very little harvest in illegal weapons or drugs. Few anti-gang crusades such as Operation Hammer have been subjected to careful analysis. Sherman's 1990 review for the National Institute of Justice indicated that concentrated law enforcement sweeps sometimes show immediate positive results, followed by a rapid decay in their efficacy. The more successful programs targeted such offenses as parking violations, prostitution, drug sales, and drunk driving. There is no evidence that law enforcement sweeps are effective in reducing gang activity or in preventing other crimes that are typically committed by juveniles.

Many proponents of intensive police efforts argue for the deterrent value of these strategies. However, research on deterrence suggests that the swiftness and certainty of punishment are at least as important as the severity of the penalties (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Viewed through the lens of deterrence theory and research, Operation Hammer was destined for failure. Sanctions were rarely swift because they were often connected to outstanding warrants for offenses that had occurred well in the past. Certainty of punishment was almost non-existent. The most common case outcome was immediate dismissal of the charges. Very few offenders suffered any more punishment than a short involuntary visit to the USC football stadium. Penalties were not part of the campaign. Many gang members and residents of South Central Los Angeles saw Operation Hammer as a cynical, "made-for-television" public relations exercise by the LAPD.

Other gang suppression programs have dispatched roaming patrol cars to cruise gang areas with the goal of heavy surveillance and harassment of alleged gang members. This often involved arrests for minor offenses such as loitering, disorderly conduct, or wearing gang paraphernalia. Typically, these arrests led to early releases and to dropped charges. Some LAPD units were dispatched to disrupt truce or peace-making meetings among gangs. The Chicago police officers added their own touch to the gang repression approach. They would arrest youngsters and release them in the territories of rival gangs (Klein, 1995). In several cities there were repeated complaints of police misconduct, illegal searches, and even strip searches.

Researchers such as Klein and Spergel have reported that aggressive police tactics that are disconnected from community organizational efforts actually make the gang problem worse. Police crackdowns reinforce gang reputations and promote group solidarity (Klein, 1995 and Spergel, 1996). The more gang

cohesion, the more likely that gangs will engage in violent behavior and other serious crimes (Klein, 1995).

Anti-gang programs also have involved selective prosecution programs, often in combination with stepped-up police enforcement efforts. Prosecutors have attempted to utilize novel applications of existing laws to broaden their attack on youth gang members. The 1980s saw the Los Angeles County District Attorney ask for a court order declaring gangs to be quasi-corporate entities and thus permit legal actions against any member based on the activities of the group. One such program forced identified gang members to participate in a graffiti removal program. This approach possesses the same defects as earlier “innovative” deterrence programs. The punishments were unconnected to the criminal actions, were fairly arbitrary in their application, and lacked sufficient severity. Other efforts attempted to declare parks and other public places as “gang-free zones,” thereby allowing police to pursue gang members for their presence rather than for criminal activity. Prosecutors have also asserted that gangs are a new form of organized crime, and have sought to use state and local racketeering statutes to attack gang activities. There is some evidence that these programs actually enhanced the reputations of young gang members and fed their teen fantasies that they were “real Gs.”

Perhaps the best-known gang prosecution program was Operation Hardcore. This involved most of the key elements of career criminal prosecution programs, including (1) special training of police and prosecutors in evidence gathering and expert testimony, (2) witness protection programs, (3) elimination of plea bargaining and requests for high bail, and (4) vertical prosecution, in which one district attorney carries the case forward from its inception through its conclusion. An evaluation of Operation Hardcore conducted by the Mitre Corporation showed that the program achieved a 95 percent conviction rate, as well as longer prison terms for convicted gang members (Dahmann, 1982). However, the intensive personnel commitment required by Operation Hardcore (and its expense) limited its application to just a few gang members. These efforts exerted a marginal incapacitation effect on the targeted offenders, but the broader deterrent effect was more difficult to achieve. Operation Hardcore, by itself, did not appear to stem the growth of gangs in Los Angeles. The program continues today, but its caseloads have grown tremendously, reducing both conviction rates and the length of prison sentences.

Research conducted by Cronin et al. (1988) examined the Habitual Serious and Violent Juvenile Offender Program (HSVJOP) funded by OJJDP. This project examined targeted prosecution models in several cities. The study found that

targeted prosecution programs were able to overcome the initial resistance of the juvenile justice system and became institutionalized components of the local justice systems. There have been subsequent iterations of the HSVJOP approach known as SHO/DIP (Serious Habitual Offender Directed Intervention Program) and SHO/CAP (Serious Habitual Offender Comprehensive Action Program) that have been less well researched but have yielded similar results.

Cronin and her colleagues (1988) found that the key ingredients to the success of these programs were more experienced prosecutors, more case preparation resources, greater interaction with victims and witnesses, and greater continuity in case handling. In some locations this led to speedier prosecution of habitual, serious juvenile offenders and contributed to increases in conviction rates, as well as increases in the numbers of youths transferred to criminal courts. However, it was less clear whether the programs increased sentences in the juvenile justice system. Further, OJJDP had hoped that comprehensive treatment responses would complement the prosecution efforts; these did not materialize. Cronin and her colleagues suggested that case screening and identification criteria were overly broad and produced more cases than the projects' resources could handle.

Evaluators of the HSVJOP could not answer a number of crucial policy concerns. The projects were able to select high-rate offenders (those who had committed a large number of offenses). However, it is less clear whether the screening criteria are the best predictors of criminal involvement in the future. There are a range of targeting options that might have been selected, such as violent offenders with no prior convictions, or offenders with long histories of misdemeanors but no serious offenses. Cronin et al. could not predict the consequences of focusing on different offender groups.

Other researchers have raised similar concerns about prioritized prosecution programs. Chaiken and Chaiken (1987) studied programs aimed at career criminals in Los Angeles, California, and Middlesex, Massachusetts. They found that information contained in case files was not very helpful in discriminating between high-rate and lower-rate offenders. The Chaikens were better able to identify the much smaller group of high-rate offenders, who committed the most serious crimes. The best predictors of future violence were the frequency and severity of violence in the youth's recent past. Weiner's 1996 reanalysis of the Philadelphia birth cohort data failed to produce a tool that prosecutors could employ effectively to target prosecution of potential high-rate offenders. The factors that distinguish youths who have been frequent offenders were not helpful in predicting which juveniles would present the most serious problems

in the future. Weiner concluded: "There is little reason to believe that warning signs, early or otherwise, can soon be developed that will provide a firm basis for identifying serious habitual offenders or connecting the juvenile or adult divisions." (Weiner, 1996:5) Further, data from self-reports of serious and chronic juvenile offenders suggest that (1) most of their offenses do not result in arrests, and (2) the duration of high-rate offending careers among juveniles is relatively short, often less than one year (Elliott, 1994). Thus, targeted prosecution programs may have even less impact on future crime control among juvenile offenders than for adults.

The HSVJOP study (Cronin et al., 1988) also could not answer questions about the consequences, intended and unintended, of holding youths in juvenile facilities for longer periods of time or placing them in adult facilities. Ultimately, the HSVJOP research could not determine if targeted prosecution programs actually deter youths from continued criminal behavior. The core questions that must be resolved are whether traditional juvenile correctional interventions or adult-style punishments exert positive, neutral, or negative impacts on youthful criminal careers. For example, if correctional interventions are criminogenic, as some advocates have asserted, then getting more youngsters into "schools for crime" for longer stays seems self-defeating. But if one can demonstrate crime suppression effects of correctional interventions, then successful and speedy prosecutions may make a difference.

A recent study by Rasmussen and Yu (1996) appears to lend considerable support to the claim that timely intervention for high-risk youths and increased incarceration of juvenile habitual offenders can have large public safety benefits. The authors use economic modeling techniques to conclude that efforts of Florida's Duval County State's Attorney's Office and the Sheriff's Department led to preventing more than 7,200 robberies, burglaries, and motor vehicle thefts, by incarcerating habitual juvenile offenders between 1992 and 1995. Researchers arrived at these estimates by comparing incidents in Duval County with those in two other Florida counties which did not have similar programs. Rasmussen and Yu admit that their analyses are more suggestive than conclusive. They were unable to control for a broad range of other community factors that may have produced the observed reductions in youth crime. Further, the juvenile justice system in Duval County simultaneously introduced a number of innovations, making it impossible to attribute the results to only one aspect of this multifaceted program. It should also be noted that the incarceration program in Duval County contained extensive educational and mentoring services. Indeed, Duval County youths sent to this program may have spent less time in

the local Sheriff's custody than if they had been placed in the custody of the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. In addition, youths exited the Duval County program with their conviction records expunged. Reducing the stigma of criminal conviction may have played some role in the positive results.

Not surprisingly, policies of targeting the dangerous few have generated intense support among law enforcement officials and politicians. Unfortunately, the ample investments in these programs were not matched with adequate research expenditures. We know little more today about the efficacy of targeted enforcement programs than we did two decades ago. What little we do know raises important questions about the potential value of these efforts actually to reduce youth violence. Since it is likely that crackdowns on juvenile crime will remain popular public policy responses in the foreseeable future, it is imperative that more rigorous research be conducted on these programs. In particular, future programs should incorporate randomized designs to test whether special handling of selected offenders produces measurable deterrent effects. Moreover, researchers need to examine critically the decision-making processes in these programs, especially the relationship of these criteria to prediction of future criminal behavior. It may also be worth examining whether the addition of comprehensive treatment components could improve the productivity of targeted enforcement programs.

The Impact of Juvenile Corrections

Conceptualizing the impact of juvenile corrections on serious and violent juvenile offenders is no simple task. Juvenile corrections consists of a range of facilities that vary widely with respect to size, location, security levels, and staffing patterns. Juvenile corrections encompasses 15-bed secure facilities in Massachusetts and individual California Youth Authority institutions that hold over 1,000 youthful offenders. There are training schools, detention centers, camps, ranches, wagon trains, environmental institutes, group homes, boot camps, residential programs for emotionally disturbed youths, chemical dependency programs, correctional sailing ships, and independent living arrangements. While most juvenile facilities are run by government agencies, an increasing share of the residential "market" is held by non-profit and for-profit organizations. Most serious and violent juvenile offenders are confined in facilities operated by state juvenile corrections agencies, but there is a definite trend toward creating special serious juvenile offenders' institutions operated by adult departments of corrections.

States vary widely in their juvenile correctional policies (Krisberg et al., 1984). For instance, the ages defining the jurisdiction of juvenile corrections vary tremendously – and laws setting these age ranges are changing rapidly. States differ on the mix of correctional programs operated by state versus county governments. States such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and California operate many correctional programs at the local level, whereas state agencies in Georgia, Florida, Massachusetts, and Louisiana control virtually all juvenile corrections programs in their jurisdictions. In Maryland most juvenile corrections facilities are operated by private agencies. Massachusetts contracts out about half of its secure beds and all of its community-based programs to non-profit groups, whereas California and Missouri utilize few, if any, private providers. States also differ on the extent to which they provide aftercare or post-release services. As noted earlier, there is substantial variability in the size of facilities, the security of these programs, and the quality and quantity of educational and treatment resources.

The general status of juvenile corrections is not very good. A national study of the conditions of confinement revealed that many juvenile correctional facilities were not meeting minimal professional standards (Parent et al., 1994). Other data suggest that juvenile corrections facilities are becoming more crowded, especially the larger urban facilities. In the competition for tax dollars, juvenile corrections has lost out to prisons and jails. There has been little new construction or renovation of juvenile facilities, increasing the number of youthful inmates housed in unsafe and deteriorated institutions. Reports of institutional violence and escapes, which have always plagued juvenile corrections, continue to the present day (Krisberg, 1996).

Whether juvenile confinement halts or accelerates juvenile criminal behavior has been debated since the mid-19th century. Advocates of alternatives to incarceration, from Charles Loring Brace to Jane Adams to Jerome Miller, have argued that institutionalization breeds crime (Krisberg and Austin, 1993). Defenders of juvenile corrections have claimed that confinement, even in terrible conditions, exerts a deterrent effect (Murray and Cox, 1979; DiIulio, 1995). Defenders of juvenile corrections have asserted that institutional treatment is a useful response to youth crime (Rhine, 1996). This policy debate has rarely been enlightened by empirical data.

Presumably, rates of reoffending or recidivism would be instructive in calculating the impact of juvenile corrections on serious and violent juvenile offenders; but there are no universal agreements on how to measure recidivism or the

crime control effects of incapacitation for serious and chronic offenders. Studies examining the success of juvenile corrections have employed a number of different indicators to gauge subsequent criminality. The most frequently employed measures include (1) proportion of youths who are crime-free during a specified follow-up period, (2) incidence or frequency of reoffending before and after correctional interventions, and (3) severity of the crimes committed before and after intervention. Other researchers have examined the "survival rates," which measure the distribution of time until the next criminal event. The vast majority of studies use official data to measure recidivism and are subject to the known limitations of these data. In particular, official data are as much indicative of justice system policies and practices as they are descriptive of individual behavior (Lerman, 1975). Few researchers have employed self-report data to measure post-program performance (Barton and Butts, 1988; Austin et al., 1988; Gottfredson and Barton, 1992). However, the interpretation of self-report delinquency data when used in program evaluations raises many additional methodological concerns. Due to the well-known problems of virtually all recidivism measures, it is generally advisable to use multiple indicators, although this advice has rarely been followed (Maltz, 1984).

Even more troubling is the virtual absence of recidivism studies in the juvenile corrections field. Most state juvenile corrections agencies do not routinely collect these data. Given the intense public interest in controlling serious juvenile offenders and the major expenditures for correctional budgets, this lack of attention to a regular assembling of outcome data is puzzling.

There are a handful of intriguing studies of the impact of juvenile corrections. While each of these research efforts has some limitations, especially the absence of experimental designs or adequate control groups, each offers some telling insights.

A study by Tollett (1987) looked at a cohort of 1,664 youths who were released from a range of Florida juvenile corrections programs in 1984. Recidivism was defined as having been placed on probation or confined in an adult or juvenile facility within one year of the date of exit from the original juvenile corrections placement. During this period 44.2 percent of the sample were convicted (or had sustained delinquency petitions) for new charges. The study does not indicate how many others were arrested and whether these charges resulted in convictions. However, only 25.9 percent of the group were recommitted to a correctional facility.

Recidivism rates were considerably higher for males, non-whites, and those who had previously committed property crimes. Current felony offenders who had previous juvenile corrections commitments had the highest recidivism rate of 58.9 percent. This finding suggests, but does not prove, that Florida juvenile correctional interventions had very limited effects on deterring criminal activity. Tollett also found that two non-residential programs possessed the lowest failure rates and that the worst results were recorded for youths released from Florida's most secure juvenile facilities. These findings must be viewed cautiously because the research did not control for the differing risk levels of youths in different programs. Interestingly, Tollett did compute the ratio of program failure rates to the proportion of clients with prior commitments, which is a very crude attempt to control for individual client differences. He used this ratio to examine the relative cost-effectiveness of various programs.

The Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges Association sponsored a study of ten residential placement programs (Goodstein and Sontheimer, 1987). The measure of recidivism was rearrest and reconviction within the first twelve to eighteen months after release. The study consisted of random samples of youths released from ten programs. The final sample contained 527 youths or approximately one-third of all those released from these programs in 1984.

By the end of the follow-up period, 55 percent of the sample had been arrested; 48 percent were arrested during the first twelve months. Roughly 30.7 percent of the study sample were convicted of a new offense during the follow-up period. Juveniles with the most extensive prior arrest records were much more likely to be arrested, convicted, or incarcerated during the follow-up period. The same finding held true for youths with more extensive histories of residential placements. This raises further doubts about the ability of juvenile correctional interventions to deter future misconduct. The younger the age of first arrest, the higher the failure rates. Poor school performance and difficulties in adjusting to institutional placements were predictive of higher recidivism rates. Race was not predictive of differential failure rates. Interestingly, drug and alcohol problems or family difficulties were not statistically related to outcomes.

Goodstein and Sontheimer (1987) did not find statistically significant differences among the ten programs in terms of recidivism data, although the small sample sizes from each program would have permitted them to detect only large differences among the programs. The study authors note that inter-program differences may be masked because judges actually have a very narrow range of options for individual cases. They suggest that "future research should

direct itself to performing ‘head to head’ comparisons of placements which pose themselves as real choices for judges to make.” (Goodstein and Sontheimer, 1987:58)

Many other studies have confirmed the finding of very high rates of failure for graduates of the secure juvenile corrections programs. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) examined the post-release behavior of 2,200 youths from the California Youth Authority (CYA) between 1981 and 1982. The CYA wards had experienced an average of fourteen months’ confinement in large training schools. Within twelve months of release, 70 percent of this group were arrested (Baird, 1988). Another NCCD study found that 78.8 percent of those released from Utah’s secure juvenile facilities were arrested in the subsequent twelve months (Austin et al., 1988). A study of youths released from the Massachusetts training schools, before they were closed by Jerome Miller’s reforms, revealed rates of subsequent arraignments of 66 percent (Coates et al., 1978). This same Harvard University study revealed that the failure rate of youths placed in the early community-based programs was 74 percent. However, later research involving a cohort of Massachusetts youths released from the community-based programs in the mid-1980s reported a rearraignment rate of 51 percent (Austin, Krisberg, and Steele, 1991).

More recent data from the OJJDP Juveniles Taken Into Custody Research Program (JTIC) expand the coverage of states reporting recidivism data (Krisberg et al., 1996). This project tracks individual data on youths entering and exiting juvenile corrections in thirty-five states. By examining those states that report comparable data each year, it is possible to calculate the proportion of youths who exited a youth corrections system and who were readmitted to that same system within one year of their release dates. This is a very conservative measure of failure. It is limited to those juveniles whose new crimes result in commitments to state juvenile institutions and does not cover youngsters who are transferred to the adult system or who “age out” of the jurisdiction of the juvenile court; but even with these limitations, the JTIC database provides a robust picture of juvenile recidivism.

There were twenty states in the JTIC reporting program sharing the age 18 as the upper age of juvenile jurisdiction that permitted readmission rates to be calculated. Of the 8,057 youths released in 1992 (who were younger than 17 years and thus had at least one more year’s eligibility to be sent back to the juvenile corrections system), 27 percent were readmitted within one year of their release. Male readmission rates were much higher than those of females (28 percent and 16 percent, respectively). Property and drug offenders had the

highest failure rates. There was a strong relationship between the number of prior correctional commitments and readmission rates. Neither race nor age at release were predictive of differential failure rates.

Analyses of similar data from seven states whose upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction was age 17 showed similar results. There were two exceptions in these states: (1) the overall readmission rates were higher, and (2) failure rates for these younger juveniles charged with violent offenses were as high as for property offenders. This confirms earlier findings that young, violent offenders with previous institutional commitments have the highest failure rates. Once again, this is not good news for those hoping that juvenile incarceration can stop criminal behavior.

A somewhat more optimistic picture can be obtained if one looks at the incidence of recidivism rather than at its prevalence. Put simply, the prevalence measures that were reviewed above are examining the issue of absolute desistance from justice system contacts during a specific period. They fail to measure declines in the incidence of reoffending (the rate of crimes per time period), as well as changes that might occur in the severity of the offenses being committed. Corrections policy might well be posed as a problem in managing chronic illnesses (i.e., if we cannot cure the disease, can we at least lessen the frequency and severity of relapse?). Charles Murray and Louis Cox (1979) were among the first to popularize this measure, calling it “the suppression effect.” They reported substantial reductions in the offending frequency of Illinois youths when comparing their arrest patterns one year before and one year after correctional interventions. This suppression effect held up for youths placed in secure training schools and other intensive residential placements. Youngsters placed on probation also showed suppression effects, but these were of much smaller magnitude than those of the incarcerated juveniles.

Murray and Cox’s work set off a professional firestorm, in part because much of the book is a polemic on behalf of deterrence strategies. Liberals, who had always argued that incarceration made troubled youngsters become more hardened criminals, did not like the idea that locking up youths might exert positive influences. Researchers, most notably Michael Maltz (1984), attempted to illustrate that the suppression effect was a statistical artifact (produced by regression to the mean) or was produced by maturation (in theory, rates of offending slow down with aging). The methodological debate was inconclusive.

In an attempt to replicate the Illinois results, NCCD conducted a study of all youths adjudicated in the Salt Lake City, Utah, Juvenile Court (Austin et al., 1988). NCCD found results that were remarkably similar to those reported by Murray and Cox (1979). Probationers showed small suppression effects, compared to the much larger declines in the rate of offending for youths placed in residential programs. Similar to the Illinois research, large suppression effects were seen for youths who had short-term residential stays, as well as longer periods of institutionalization. The NCCD research further reported that minimal supervision produced the same crime reductions as intensive forms of probation supervision and services. The Salt Lake City data suggested that maturation and regression to the mean explained some, but not all, of the reduced frequency of offending for juveniles committed to state correctional programs. Interestingly, Utah correctional programs tended to involve smaller facilities and were more community-based than the Illinois correctional programs.

NCCD's study of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services (DYS) replicated the findings of the Utah and Illinois studies. Youths showed sharp reductions in the frequency and severity of their offending behavior after leaving the DYS program, compared to that in the previous twelve months when they had been in the community (Austin, Krisberg, and Steele, 1991). The 819 youths in the Massachusetts sample had committed 3,468 offenses in the twelve months prior to their current commitment. This number declined by more than half (1,715) in the first twelve months that they were in the community after DYS placement. The number of offenses committed by these youths remained at the lower level for the next two years. While regression to the mean and maturation exerted some impact on these Massachusetts recidivism data, those two explanations were insufficient to explain the observed results.

The most extensive follow-up study conducted to date was completed by Haapanen (1990) based on samples of youths released from the California Youth Authority in the 1960s. He found that more than 96 percent of the sample continued to be arrested into adulthood. Haapanen was able to examine entire juvenile court histories of his study group and was able to compile arrest records on these youths for approximately fifteen years after their release from the Youth Authority. The research maps the criminal careers of a large cohort of serious juvenile offenders. Long-term crime patterns differed among racial groups, with African Americans having the highest proportion of violent offending. Offending rates declined steadily over time, and there was a strong maturation effect seen in the data. Criminal careers exhibited a high degree of instability over time, making it very difficult to predict which offenders would

be high-rate offenders in the future. In general, the frequency of offending increased rapidly in the years immediately before commitment to the Youth Authority and dropped off just as rapidly in the years immediately following release from correctional facilities. Haapanen concluded that the observed decline in the frequency of offending was partly due to maturation and regression to the mean, but that strong correctional interventions did appear to suppress some criminal behavior. The sharp decline in offending rates and the general instability of crime-committing rates did not support the idea that longer sentences would produce further crime reductions. Haapanen estimates that adding more years to the incapacitation of these youths would be a very expensive policy that would produce 1 to 3 percent reductions in the crime rate. The study also raised serious questions as to whether selective incapacitation programs would enhance the crime control potential of the Youth Authority. Haapanen notes:

Under these conditions, it would be difficult (if not impossible) to identify "high-rate offenders" for differential sentencing. It would also be difficult to take seriously models that forecast the effects of lengthening prison sentences for various offenders, since their behavior cannot be counted on to stay the same. (Haapanen, 1990:147)

The Haapanen study lends considerable support to similar findings noted in the Illinois, Utah, and Massachusetts research. His study illustrates that most serious and high-rate offenders slow down their rate of offending after correctional interventions. While there is some instability or lack of predictability in offending rates, the best prediction one could make is that over time serious offenders continue to offend, albeit at lower frequency rates and with less serious offenses.

This research review raises as many questions as it resolves. Overall, we note that large percentages of serious juvenile offenders continue to commit crimes and come back into the juvenile and adult justice systems. Further, there is some evidence that intensive correctional interventions do not stop criminal careers, although these interventions may slow the rate and severity of offending. There are also some suggestive data that involvement of younger offenders in juvenile correctional programs worsens their subsequent behavior.

There is an obvious need to stimulate more experimental designs to assess the relative effectiveness of different correctional programs for different types of youths. The additive effects of aftercare services should also be examined.

More fundamentally, the policy and practitioner communities need to work with researchers to establish standard measures of success and failure. More exploration should be conducted on the usefulness of self-report data in assessing correctional impacts. We need studies that cover much longer follow-up periods in offender careers. Further, cohort studies in the future should collect detailed data on the extent of various correctional interventions among the general youth population and among high-risk youths. Current longitudinal studies have largely ignored the effects of justice system interventions or other social service impacts on delinquent pathways. These researchers have implicitly assumed that criminal misconduct is somehow independent from the social response to that behavior (but see Lemert 1951).

Studies of released offenders can only offer a very incomplete view of how correctional experiences mold future behavior. We need to open the corrections “black box” and actually describe the experience of confinement in juvenile facilities. Is it the benign treatment world portrayed by many administrators, or is it a world of violence, sexual exploitation, and cruelty, as described by many current and former inmates and youth advocates? What are we really measuring when we attempt to gauge the impact of the corrections experience on young people? There need to be far more detailed descriptive, as well as evaluative, data on educational, vocational, drug treatment, counseling, and family reunification services provided by juvenile corrections agencies. The stunning lack of data on these specific components of juvenile corrections makes it quite difficult to defend current practices, particularly against those who argue that juveniles should be placed in adult prisons and jails. We also need to understand in more detail the impact of the criminogenic environment that youths often return to upon their release from custody.

The End of Childhood: Transferring Juveniles to the Criminal Justice System⁵

Few juvenile justice policies have received more political and media attention in recent years than the idea of shifting juveniles to the adult system. Yet there is remarkably little empirical evidence that this approach would produce any positive benefits. No one knows for sure how many juveniles are transferred to the adult court system. One of the first national studies of transfers (Hamparian et al., 1982) estimated that in 1978 there were more than 9,000 youths waived to criminal courts by juvenile courts; another 2,000 cases were transferred through the discretion of prosecutors, and more than 1,300 were prosecuted as adults because of statutes that excluded certain offenses from the juvenile court. This

study gave no estimates on the number of youths moved to the criminal court system due to lowered ages for the adult court's jurisdiction. More recent estimates suggest that more than 176,000 youths below the age of 18 are tried in adult courts in states that set the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction at ages 16 or 17 (Snyder and Sickmund, 1995). In 1993 there were at least 11,800 cases waived from juvenile courts to the adult system (Butts et al., 1996). There are no national data on prosecutors' practice of directly filing juvenile cases in adult courts when legislation grants concurrent jurisdiction. In Florida, there were 7,000 such direct filings in 1991 (Snyder and Sickmund, 1995).

A recent study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO, 1995) documented the increased popularity of laws permitting the transfer of juveniles to criminal courts. The GAO reported that since 1978 there have been forty-four states and the District of Columbia that passed laws affecting the process by which juveniles could be transferred. Besides altering court practices, in twenty-four jurisdictions the changes explicitly increased the range of juveniles who could be tried as adults. The GAO noted broad variation among states in the conviction rates of juveniles in criminal courts. The probability that juvenile offenders would be convicted in criminal courts for selected offenses was similar to the conviction rates of young adults (ages 18-24) in these same states.

In 1992 the National Correctional Reporting Program (NCRP) found that there were 5,975 persons under age 18 who entered prisons in the thirty-seven states participating in the NCRP (Perkins, 1995). The analysis of the characteristics of these admissions was conducted by Krisberg and his colleagues as part of the Juveniles Taken Into Custody Research Program. These adolescents comprised less than 1 percent of all prison admissions in these states, almost always were male, and were typically 17 years old. About 47 percent of the persons under age 18 admitted to prison were charged with violent crimes; 53 percent were charged with serious property crimes or drug offenses. African-American youths constituted nearly two-thirds of the youngest persons admitted to prison. These youthful prisoners generally came from states with the lowest upper age of original juvenile court jurisdiction.

The average prison stay for those entering prison before age 18 was slightly more than two years – almost three times as long as the stay of the most serious offenders admitted to juvenile corrections facilities. However, future research will need to examine if prior offense histories or the aggravated circumstances of their offenses may account for this difference in average length of stay. Some research suggests that younger prison inmates commit many

institutional infractions, thus losing “good time” release credits and lengthening their periods of incarceration (Forst et al., 1989).

Howell’s excellent review of the literature on juvenile transfer makes clear how very little is known about this important public policy decision (Howell, forthcoming). The available research is focused primarily on judicial waiver decisions, but these represent at best 10 percent of all the cases in which juvenile offenders are treated as adults. Howell notes “results of judicial waiver studies are confounded by the role that prosecutors and legislatures play in most states in requesting transfers and in establishing waiver criteria.” The current research literature offers little practical guidance on the relative merits of mandatory waiver provisions, direct file procedures, or more traditional judicial waiver hearings. Indeed, the available studies cover a melange of diverse policies and practices. We have not even developed an adequate typology by which to classify these differences to study the effect of transfer.

Most of the studies on waiver (Howell found thirty-eight of them) are intended to examine how the process of judicial discretion is exercised. A much smaller set of research projects has compared how offenders are handled in the adult versus juvenile justice systems. None of these studies compared young offenders with similar criminal careers. Transfer seems to be limited to the older adolescents, and factors such as race, prior treatment histories, severity of instant offense, victim-offender relationships, etc., are related to the transfer decision in some locales, but not others (Howell, forthcoming).

Data on the comparative outcomes of those transferred to adult courts versus those handled in the juvenile court system are rare. An early study by White (1985) compared juveniles charged with very serious crimes in the juvenile justice system with similar cases involving young adults in criminal courts. White found that criminal courts were slightly more likely to convict and incarcerate young defendants than juvenile courts. The young adults served considerably more time in prison than the juveniles in state training schools. The young adult offenders had a recidivism rate that was much higher than that of the juveniles. A study by Martin Forst and his colleagues (1989) found that juveniles in training schools were more likely to receive more treatment services than youths sent to prisons, although there were few reported differences in educational and employment services. Juveniles in prisons reported higher rates of personal victimization while incarcerated compared to residents of juvenile facilities, much of it at the hands of staff.

A Minnesota study by Podkopacz and Feld (1996) looked at youths waived to the adult court versus those retained in the juvenile justice system. Transferred youths were more likely to be incarcerated and for longer periods than the juvenile justice sample. Comparative recidivism data revealed that the transferred youths had a 58 percent rearrest rate versus the 42 percent rearrest rate for non-transferred juvenile offenders during the next two or more years of "street time." Podkopacz and Feld suggest that this finding may be the result of the juvenile court transferring the more high-risk offenders to the adult court system. But they also speculate that the difference in recidivism rates could be a function of the superior treatment resources available to the juvenile court or the failure of more severe adult court penalties to deter juveniles from committing more crimes.

In another study, Fagan (1995) contrasted the handling of serious and violent juvenile offenders in New York and New Jersey. He looked at almost 1,200 felony offenders who were ages 15 and 16, arrested for robbery or burglary, in matched counties. Because of state laws, New Yorkers were more likely to be handled in the adult system, and New Jersey youths mostly were processed by the juvenile justice system. In fact, Fagan discovered that the sanctions were more certain and more severe for the New Jersey sample, compared with the New York sample. However, the New York youths had higher recidivism rates, committed more new offenses, and were crime-free for a shorter time period than were the New Jersey offenders (Fagan, 1995). While these results are intriguing, the findings are clouded by the inability to truly match offenders from the same jurisdiction. It is difficult to interpret the results: Were they produced by the lesser penalties of the New York system, the adverse consequences of adult correctional interventions, or other differences between the New York and New Jersey youths?

Donna Bishop and her colleagues (1996) have produced a more compelling study of the longer-term outcomes of transfer decisions in Florida. This study compared the recidivism rates of youths waived to the criminal courts, compared to those retained in the juvenile court system. The authors report: "To ensure equivalence across the two groups, we sampled the non-transfer population and employed a matching procedure to control for seriousness of transfer offense, number of charges, number of prior offenses, severity of prior offenses, and sociodemographic characteristics" (Bishop et al., 1996:175). The resultant study group consisted of 5,476 transferred and non-transferred youths who were at risk for reoffending during some portion of the follow-up period. The transferred group had higher rates of recidivism, committed more serious subsequent offenses, and experienced a shorter time until failure than the

matched sample of non-transfer youths. Bishop and her colleagues conclude that Florida's waiver policy had little deterrent value. They note that the short-term benefits of incapacitating juvenile offenders in the adult system were negated quickly as the transferred youths returned to the community and committed many more crimes than their juvenile justice system counterparts.

While the Bishop study (1996) is the best that has been conducted to date, it is far from conclusive. For example, the study fails to account for the social or psychological processes that might be responsible for the observed results. Could it be that the samples are weighted on certain factors such as age, race, and offense severity to compare similar groups of offenders, but that the transferred youths experienced a diverse range of criminal justice sanctions, including probation, house arrest, and incarceration in jails and prisons? The matching techniques did not cover specific case factors (i.e., aggravating or mitigating circumstances) that might have differentiated the adult versus juvenile processing decision. The OJJDP is presently funding an in-depth study of Florida waiver practices that considers the impact of these case factors. Previous research suggests that juvenile sanctions may be more restrictive than adult sanctions. To what extent are the results a function of differing lengths of confinement, different levels of community surveillance, or variation in treatment services? As noted earlier, in one Florida county, transfer to the adult system produced shorter lengths of stay and more treatment resources than the juvenile system. The absence of a large number of well-designed, experimental studies hinders one's ability to clarify a murky public policy debate.

Concluding Observations

This review has shown the severely underdeveloped state of our knowledge about the effect of the justice system on the careers of serious and violent juvenile offenders. While there is scant evidence that strong justice system sanctions accelerate criminal careers, there is not much support for the thesis that current sanctioning policies reduce recidivism or contribute much to crime reduction. Given the enormous fiscal and human consequences of various sanctioning approaches, it is tragic that our research base is so slender. Contemporary public policy on juvenile crime might be fairly characterized as "hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil." In particular, juvenile corrections and the movement to try more children in criminal courts are informed by anecdotes, flawed research, and media-popularized fads. We happily move from "scared straight" to "tough love," from boot camps to chain gangs. One wonders if the responsible public officials are genuinely concerned about public safety outcomes or cost-effective solutions to juvenile crime.

The research agenda to remedy the present knowledge gap must be bold and ambitious. Investments that have already been made in specifying the causes and correlates of criminal behavior must be expanded to include data collection on the impact of societal interventions on criminal pathways. Information about causes and correlates which ignores the real or potential impacts of social, educational, and justice interventions is virtually meaningless. Most of the previous longitudinal research has delivered important, albeit largely ignored, insights on effective prevention strategies. This situation should be remedied by enhancing the existing longitudinal research to gather data on the experiences of those handled by the child welfare system, law enforcement, mental health, and other social programs.

Another pressing research priority should be to involve more sophisticated use of self-report data in correctional evaluations. Existing national self-report studies, such as the National Youth Survey, should be enhanced to follow youths into later adolescence and adulthood. The data on desistance and continuity in criminal behavior are woefully inadequate. Not surprisingly, Sampson and Laub (1994) needed to utilize Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck's data from the 1930s to examine the transition from juvenile crime to adult criminal careers. Although Sampson and Laub's findings are valuable, there are enormous social and economic factors separating the Glueck cohorts from contemporary youths.

Experimental studies are essential ingredients in developing the knowledge of "what works" with youthful offenders. Three issues deserve priority attention: (1) determining the most cost-effective length of stay in correctional facilities, (2) measuring the utility of early or more immediate responses to juvenile law breaking, and (3) the appropriate mix of residential and home-based services for different types of offenders. It is likely that states and communities will devote substantial funding in these areas without much guidance from research. Experimental studies should also be launched to refine offender classification and risk assessment systems.

Justice system administrators and researchers must work together to develop standards to assess the performance of a wide range of interventions. Good public policy choices cannot be made if misleading, and oftentimes meaningless, data are offered as proof that one or another program is "working." Do we really want to know more about program outcomes beyond just simple recidivism rates? How can honest evaluations be routinized in the operations of justice system agencies? Are we willing to build the necessary information and data systems to permit accurate comparisons of different programs and policies?

The shadowy world of the juvenile justice system needs to be opened up for research. Current work by OJJDP in the area of performance-based standards for juvenile corrections is an excellent start. Ideally, these performance-based standards would be derived from rigorous research and would be tested to determine the levels of compliance that improve longer-term outcomes for youths passing through correctional programs. These studies should inform policy-makers on areas of needed cost savings and streamlining, and on programmatic areas in which higher levels of service should be delivered. Future research should answer questions about the best mix of services for different offender populations and should provide guidance on the optimum timing, duration, and intensity of justice system interventions.

Researchers should develop models to help policymakers forecast the likely impacts of policy changes (e.g., mandatory waiver laws, new truancy and curfew laws, or school expulsion policies) on various components of the justice and social service systems. Work should be commenced to measure the relative cost effectiveness of new expenditures in law enforcement, incarceration, treatment, or prevention programs. The work of Greenwood and his colleagues (1996) is a very important first step in this direction.

Despite the general tone of negative findings reported in this paper, it is important to recall that there are several studies documenting the successes of small-scale programs aimed at serious and violent juvenile offenders. Many of these promising approaches are reported in the Implementation Guide for the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent and Chronic Juvenile Offenders (Howell, 1995). The OJJDP is presently helping a large number of communities to apply the lessons of that positive research to local and state juvenile justice systems. The progress of these field tests needs to be monitored and evaluated carefully.

The fact is that almost any reasonably smart research program will reap great potential public policy benefits – the level of our collective ignorance on the impact of the juvenile justice system is so grave. Despite the trend of humanistic rhetoric about the value of funding more crime prevention programs for juveniles, the justice system will continue to expend the lion's share of state and local tax dollars in the near term. It is in our communal interest to attempt to minimize the damage done by some justice system operations (e.g., discriminatory practices toward minorities) and to promote those interventions that genuinely advance public safety.

Endnotes

1. Part 1 violent crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation include homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
2. All the juvenile court statistics come from the National Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ). See, for example, Butts et al., 1996.
3. As will be discussed later, an increasing number of juveniles are sent directly to the adult court system through statutory mandates or other laws giving prosecutors the power to file directly certain juvenile cases in criminal courts. The role of the juvenile court in making transfer decisions is evolving rapidly.
4. The best source of the most current juvenile corrections data is Krisberg et al., *Juveniles Taken Into Custody Fiscal Year 1995*.
5. This review relies very extensively on the exhaustive literature review on this topic compiled by James C. Howell. The full version will soon appear as "Juvenile Transfers to the Criminal Justice System: State-of-the-Art" in *Law and Policy*, in press.

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
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