

CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE SERVICES CASE STUDY
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

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Koepsell-Girard and Associates, Inc.

CONSOLIDATION OF POLICE SERVICES CASE STUDY

Jacksonville, Florida

prepared for

Office of the Sheriff
Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Florida

by

Koepsell-Girard and Associates
210 E. Broad Street
Falls Church, Virginia

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Chapter I

A STUDY OF EVENTS LEADING TO
THE JACKSONVILLE CONSOLIDATION

Section I

THE SETTING

POPULATION GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION

In the late 1960's, Jacksonville was faced with a problem common to many of our nation's cities: a growing suburban area outside the city and a declining inner city. Between 1950 and 1960, Jacksonville was the only large city in Florida to lose population. As middle-class whites filled the suburbs, lower-income groups, mostly blacks, became highly concentrated in the city.

Population trends in the city and county are shown in the following table.

Table 1. 1

Population Growth of Jacksonville and Duval County a/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u>		<u>Percent Population Outside City</u>
	<u>Duval County</u>	<u>Jacksonville</u>	
1900	39,733	28,429	28.3
1910	75,163	57,699	23.2
1920	113,540	91,558	19.4
1930	155,503	129,549	16.7
1940	210,143	173,065	17.6
1950	304,029	204,517	32.7
1960	455,411	201,030	55.9
1965 (est.)	525,000	198,000	62.3

a/ U.S. Census Bureau and Jacksonville Area Chamber of Commerce.

The suburban area adjacent to the former City of Jacksonville was entirely in unincorporated territory. Duval County's four smaller municipalities were all on the fringes of the county, separated from Jacksonville and its suburbs by open territory.

Prior to consolidation Duval County was responsible for governing all unincorporated areas within its boundary. Technically a subdivision of the state without home rule powers, it was commonly frustrated by its inability to handle increasing urban problems. Further, many city services were used daily by suburbanites who worked or shopped in the city.

As the area outside the city became more urbanized, the urban services it needed were provided by a mixture of private and governmental sources, much of it inadequate and costly. Police services were provided by the Duval County Road Patrol, a division of the Sheriff's Office, which was frequently criticized for its lack of adequate patrol car coverage. Fire protection outside the city came entirely from volunteer fire departments and suffered from inadequate water sources, which added substantially to local fire insurance rates. ^{1/} Garbage, water and sanitary services were provided by private industry; however, approximately 10,000 county residences subscribed to no garbage service and the county's 30,000 septic tanks created a situation which "endangered the public health of the entire county". ^{2/}

Inside the city, a severe housing problem had developed, along with a concentration of poor blacks north and west of the central business district. In this area, more than 60 percent of all housing was listed by the Census Bureau as either "deteriorating" or "dilapidated", and almost half the families lived below the federal government's "poverty line" of \$3,000 a year. Action to meet the problems of poverty and substandard housing had been largely on the local level, due to a general community aversion toward accepting federal anti-poverty funds. When Louis H. Ritter took office as mayor in 1964 he discovered that no one had even explored the possibility of federal matching funds as a source of revenue and that Jacksonville had not returned the proper forms for participation in the anti-poverty program. ^{3/} It was during Ritter's administration that the city's first Minimum Housing Standard Code became law and an organization called Greater Jacksonville Economic Opportunity, Inc., was set up to administer locally programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Mayor Hans G. Tanzler, who succeeded Ritter in 1967, set out to take care of the other problem: unemployment and underemployment in the Negro slums. In cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce, he persuaded local businessmen to offer training and jobs to unskilled blacks. That effort was credited with averting a serious racial outbreak that summer.

^{1/} Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, Blueprint for Improvement, (Jacksonville, 1965), p. 100, 105-106.

^{2/} Ibid., p. 135.

^{3/} Damon C. Miller, The Jacksonville Consolidation: The Process of Metropolitan Reform, a senior thesis to the Department of Politics, Princeton University (Princeton: by the author, April 16, 1968), p. 38.

Just prior to consolidation, Jacksonville had the third highest percentage of black residents among cities with over 100,000 population in the United States. ^{1/} Racial disturbances had flared twice--in 1960 and 1964. Yet, racial relations were amicable; although there was little voluntary desegregation before the passage of federal civil rights legislation, the law had been obeyed without incident. In 1960, 52.5 percent of all potential Negro voters in Duval were registered, compared to a statewide figure of 38.9 percent. ^{2/} There were no complaints about voter discrimination--42 percent of registered voters in the city were blacks, and two black women won City Council seats in 1967.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OLD CITY OF JACKSONVILLE

One of the factors making city-county consolidation possible was the relative lack of many autonomous governments. In Duval County, prior to consolidation, there were nine distinct local governments: the county, the cities of Jacksonville, Jacksonville Beach, Atlantic Beach and Neptune Beach, the town of Baldwin, an air improvement authority, and two mosquito control districts. The four municipalities other than Jacksonville contained only about 4 1/2 percent of the total county population and none of them abutted Jacksonville directly.

Jacksonville had a mayor-commission-council form of government, unique among cities in the United States. ^{3/} A charter adopted in 1887 was the basis of its structure, although many changes were made over the years. In 1917, following the popular trend toward the commission form of government, Jacksonville added a five-man elected commission to its mayor and council by abolishing five independent boards and consolidating their functions. The commission form of government was hailed for its "checks and balances" feature; retention of the council as well took the "checks and balances" feature one step further. The mayor was originally chairman of the commission, but was made an independent office in 1919. In 1949, after a straw ballot, the mayor was again made a commission member. ^{4/}

^{1/} Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 16. The figures: Washington, 58.4%; Richmond, 42%; Jacksonville, 41.2%.

^{2/} Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Rody, Florida Votes, 1920-1962, Florida Government Series No. 1 (Tallahassee: Institute for Government Research, Florida State University, 1963), p. 10.

^{3/} The following discussion of city government draws largely on: Charter Laws, City of Jacksonville, Florida (Tallahassee, Municipal Code Corporation, 1966), Vol. 1; League of Women Voters of Jacksonville, Politics Is Your Business, 1965 edition; and Dallas L. Thomas, Know Your City Government--City of Jacksonville, Florida (pamphlet, n. d.).

^{4/} Oscar O. McCollum, Jr., "History of the Charter of Jacksonville", unpublished paper on file in Jacksonville Public Library (1950).

The mayor served as the executive officer of the city, but he was also permanent chairman of the City Commission and held the office of Commissioner of Public Safety. He could appoint no one without a vote of the full commission. He was responsible for preserving the peace and could issue orders to the Chief of Police. He had a veto over the City Council (which could be overridden by a two-thirds vote), could recommend legislation to the Council, and call into emergency session both the Council and the Commission. He was head of the Fire and Police Departments, the Building and Plumbing Inspection Departments, the Signal Bureau, and the Office of Housing Director.

The Commission, the old city's administrative body, had five members, each responsible for certain departments. They were the Commissioners of: Health and Sanitation; Highways and Sewers; Finance, Public Utilities; and, Public Safety. Generally, the Commissioners were in charge of the departments and facilities suggested by their titles.

The Council passed all city ordinances, had final budget control and appropriated funds. It established the city tax millage rate, collected taxes, and could impeach city officials. Its nine members ran from wards in which they were required to live, but their election was at-large. Other elective offices in the city were the City Recorder, City Treasurer, Municipal Judge and Tax Assessor.

Jacksonville's city commissioners had high praise for their unique government and resisted attempts to abolish it. Former Commissioner Dallas Thomas called it "an almost perfect system of checks and balances which results in efficient governmental operation."^{1/} Commissioner George Carrison believed it to be the "most effective, least political, all-around best city government in my experience."^{2/} Nevertheless, there were more critics than supporters. The primary criticism was that its complexity made positive action difficult, and the pinning of responsibility impossible. A local television station called it "a needlessly complex and cumbersome arrangement that thwarts the goal of healthy, responsive government."^{3/} One local observer noted that it was "a perfect situation not only to pass the buck, but to completely lose it."^{4/}

^{1/} Thomas, Know Your City Government, p. 3.

^{2/} Florida, Times-Union, July 22, 1967.

^{3/} Editorial, WJXT, February 24, 1966.

^{4/} C. Howard Hill, "City of Spectacular Change: Jacksonville, Florida," paper written for the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 1967, p. 3.

Legislative and administrative functions were not always clearly delineated. Budgetary and zoning decisions, for example, required action by both the Commission and the Council.

The system resulted in inordinately high governmental cost, not only through the obvious necessity of maintaining offices and facilities for two bodies, but through the relative autonomy enjoyed by each commissioner and the tendency for both the Commission and Council to "rubber stamp" one commissioner's budget requests.

By the mid-1960's, the City of Jacksonville employed more than 3,200 full-time people for "common municipal functions", a figure far higher than that of any other city in the 100,000 to 250,000 population bracket. Their monthly payroll was nearly \$1.5 million, also the highest in the country for comparably sized cities. ^{1/} On the revenue side of the ledger, however, Jacksonville benefited from ownership of a profitable electric utility which provided power throughout the county as well as into adjoining counties. Annual gross revenue from this utility exceeded \$50 million, of which \$15 million was transferred to the city's general fund. About 75 percent of the city's general operational expenditures came from this source, a boon to city taxpayers. ^{2/}

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OLD COUNTY OF DUVAL

The county has always been an important level of government in the South. It was designed for the purpose of taking care of the governmental affairs of a rural constituency. In Florida, as in most states, it is a subdivision of state government; as such, its legislative body is the state legislature. ^{3/} Bills applying to a specific county originate with the county's delegation to the legislature, and the practice of "local courtesy" prevails, meaning the full legislature will pass virtually any local bill which was provided for all counties by the state constitution. ^{4/} Like the old city council,

^{1/} Municipal Yearbook, 1967 (Chicago: International City Managers Association), pp. 167-168.

^{2/} Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 147.

^{3/} An exception to this is, of course, various "home rule" counties, such as Dade County, Florida; and, since consolidation, Duval County. "Home Rule" powers must be granted by state legislatures, usually on a county-by-county basis.

^{4/} The following discussion of county government draws largely on: League of Women Voters, Politics Is Your Business, pp. 3-21; and Wilson K. Doyle, Angus McK. Laird and S. Sherman Weiss, The Government and Administration of Florida, American Commonwealths Series (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), pp. 367-371.

the commission's members were required to live in districts from which they ran, but they were elected at-large. The commission was in charge of administration for most county departments, recommended the county budget, distributed funds, authorized bond issues, maintained county buildings and roads, and levied taxes. In Duval, the commission also sat as a Tax Equalization Board to hear taxpayer appeals concerning property assessments for ad valorem taxes, and as a zoning board.

A separately appointed budget commission, specifically provided for in the state constitution, was unique to Duval County. It approved the final budget for all county departments, including the Board of Public Instruction. Its power extended to line-by-line review of all budgets, and no budgetary changes, including transfers within departments, could be made without its consent. This power was widely criticized as an excessive restriction on administrative affairs within departments.

All Florida counties comprise single school districts, eliminating much of the confusion and lack of coordination in other metropolitan areas. The Board of Public Instruction of Duval County has seven members. Prior to consolidation, five of these ran from districts and two ran at-large (although all seven were elected at-large). The Board appoints all school personnel (including, beginning in 1969, the Superintendent), makes policy under the rules of the State Board of Public Instruction, and submits a budget.

The elected Civil Service Board had jurisdiction over all county employees except teachers and elected officials. Other county elected officials were the clerk of the circuit court (who was also the clerk of the county commission, the recorder, and ex officio auditor), the sheriff, tax assessor, tax collector, supervisor of registration, clerk of criminal court, state's attorney, public defender, nine constables (elected from districts), nine justices of the peace (elected from districts), two county judges, two small claims court judges, two juvenile court judges, three criminal court judges, and eleven circuit court judges (the circuit court jurisdiction extends to two adjoining counties).

All these elected officials made for an extremely long ballot. The sanctity of the franchise was hailed as the power of the common man over his officials. There were 50 countywide offices, not including 16 members of the legislative delegation. There were also 24 officials who represented districts and 18 city officials. Most county voters elected 68 separate officials (71 if they lived in a mosquito control district) and city voters elected 86.

Government in Duval County was thus characterized by scores of autonomous bodies, boards and elected officials, the result of a sincere conviction on the part of officials and the public alike that the way to check the excessive use of governmental power was with more government. In addition, operating behind the formal complexity was a vast network of informal power--a city-county Democratic organization, headed by a recognized political "boss", rooted in the thousands of city and county employees who owed their jobs to it and in the large Negro bloc which it was able to line up behind its candidates.

Section II

HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION IN JACKSONVILLE

The history of public problems and the development of potential solutions can be traced back as far as Jacksonville's municipal incorporation. Similarly, the thought of annexation or consolidation as a remedy to many civic difficulties appears to go back as far. In the research phase of the project discussion and documentation of many such instances, beginning as early as 1867, are presented. ^{1/} For purposes of the case study, however, the review of government problems and changes begins in 1917.

CHARTER REVISIONS: 1917

The charter revisions of 1917, which created a commission-council form of municipal government in the City of Jacksonville, provided the organizational structure which was to last for the next 50 years. In general, a board of five city commissioners was created, each with administrative responsibility over a department of the city government. The City Council remained the legislative body. In addition, a number of boards and commissions were abolished, with their functions assigned to the City Commission. The office of the mayor was initially abolished, with one of the commissioners serving as ex-officio mayor. However, in 1919 the independent mayor was re-established.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONSOLIDATE: 1918 and 1923

A result of the new city charter, the limited flexibility of the Duval County government, and the rapid post-World War I population growth beyond Jacksonville city limits, was the further proliferation of service agencies and the increased inefficiency of local government. In particular, by the end of the war, the city and county had established and maintained separate tax collectors, tax assessors, civil service boards, police and fire departments, engineers, attorneys, prison systems, parks and recreation systems, health departments, planning and zoning agencies and other dual agencies.

^{1/} See Working Paper Number II: A Study of Events Leading to the Jacksonville Consolidation, pp. 1-90, for a detailed discussion of the historical underpinnings of government reorganization.

To add to the problem was the county's inability, as a political subdivision of the state, to maintain a responsive posture relative to the rapidly changing demands of its citizens. For example, to effect even minor reorganization within its structure, the county was entirely dependent on the Duval County legislative delegation. Further, in addition to time involved in passing special bills, the legislature convened on a biennial basis, and then for only 60 days per session.

Responses of dissatisfied voters to the cumbersome and unresponsive government of the day came five years apart. First in 1918 and again in 1923 movements in favor of city-county consolidations were launched. In essence, both movements were aimed at combining selected city and county functions into single, non-duplicative and more efficient administrative units. As a means of effecting the changes, adjustments to Article VIII of the Florida Constitution were proposed which would have granted the authority "to establish, change, and abolish a local government extending territorially throughout Duval County". 1/

Although passed by the legislature, the proposed consolidation amendment was defeated in a 1924 referendum both within Duval County and in the state at-large. 2/

THE BETTER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION: 1931

Responding to ever-increasing claims of public scandal, mismanagement and corruption, the Better Government Association was formed in 1931 to thoroughly investigate the city and county government. According to Association leadership, proposed recommendations would draw "from the ranks of civic leaders, men without political ambitions who will have to be forced into service to aid their community". 3/

Adding to the Association's impetus were several grand jury indictments. In particular in 1931 seventy-five indictments were handed down against public officials, including former school board members, the school superintendent of maintenance and buildings, five justices of the peace, a former constable and a deputy sheriff. 4/

1/ Arey White, "Brief Historical Background of Duval County and Jacksonville Government Growth", Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, April, 1966, p. 6.

2/ Martin, p. 16.

3/ Jacksonville Journal, September 3, 1931.

4/ Ibid., May 3, 1932, and March 26, 1932.

In studying the events of this period, however, it was observed that the successful indictments coupled with the annexation of South Jacksonville^{1/} served to satisfy public outcries and ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the Better Government Association.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: 1934

In 1934 a constitutional amendment was enacted which served as an important foundation for the consolidation of Jacksonville-Duval County. Providing even more extensive revisions to Article VIII than were proposed ten years earlier, the changes offered the legal authority for the 1967 city-county merger.

THE CITY-COUNTY CONSOLIDATION LEAGUE: 1934

Shortly following ratification of the above amendment, its first potential application in Duval County was spearheaded by the Jacksonville Bar Association. Working through a Bar Association committee, which ultimately evolved into the City-County Consolidation League, a major thrust was made to "simplify the governmental machinery of the city and county."^{2/} Among the League's proposals included the following recommendations:^{3/}

- the merger of city and county tax assessing and collection functions under a single tax officer;
- the creation of a single legal department;
- the reorganization of all lower courts into one county court;
- the consolidation of the city police and county sheriff's department;
- the retention of the City Council but the combination of the city and county commissions into one administrative body;

^{1/} Ibid., December 30, 1931.

^{2/} Martin, p. 18.

^{3/} Jacksonville Journal, February 23, 1935. Also, Martin, p. 18.

- the merger of city and county prison farms and jails into one system;
- the creation of a single accounting department; and,
- the merger of the city and county engineering functions, among others.

In fact, the League's proposal would have resulted in the dissolution of all existing governments in Duval County, save the City of Jacksonville.

In summary, the general factors leading to and effecting the defeat of the proposed consolidation on June 18, 1935, were three-fold. First, the Duval County legislative delegation spent nearly three months reviewing the proposed charter. During this time major revisions were made including complete departures from the recommended consolidation of law enforcement operations, the judiciary and city-county tax functions. 1/

Second, broadly financed and well organized opposition to the "delegation's plan" was mounted by public officials and employees in Jacksonville. Through both its external campaign vehicle (the People's League) and internal influence and manipulation, this force did much to create negative or apathetic voter reactions.

Finally, it has been noted by many observers 2/ that the inability of the business community to unite behind the plan combined with "lukewarm" media support directly affected the marginal voter support and interest shown at the polls. 3/

A REVIEW OF ANNEXATION

The only generally successful instrument available to improve government efficiency in Jacksonville and Duval County was annexation. Annexations in 1919, 1925, 1931 and 1932 added 26 square miles to the city. After a small addition in 1937, however, the city limits grew no more, with two attempts to annex large suburban areas in 1963 and 1964 failing in referendum. 4/

1/ One contemporary analyst indicated that "actually the legislative delegation gutted the League's plan". See Martin, p. 19.

2/ See Martin, p. 21.

3/ Ibid., p. 21. Of the 26,000 qualified city and county voters, less than 17,000 cast ballots defeating the consolidation by 9,499 to 7,145.

4/ These will be discussed more fully in Section III.

Section III

PROBLEMS AND CONDITIONS PRECEDING THE 1965 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION

A primary ingredient to quests for government improvement in Jacksonville was municipal crisis. Prior to 1965, these crises revolved around the need for economic improvement, poor municipal response to the devastation of disease or holocaust, and inefficient and corrupt government operations. Steps leading to the consolidation movement of the 1960's also involved municipal problems and crisis. This section summarizes the chronology of major events which preceded the 1965 Local Government Study Commission, the organization which authorized the Consolidation Charter for Jacksonville-Duval County.

SUBURBAN SPRAWL

Table 1.1 above depicted population growth in Jacksonville and Duval County through 1965. The table also described growth in Duval County outside Jacksonville. In summary, between 1950 and 1965, population of the City of Jacksonville declined by more than 6,500 persons, or approximately three percent. During that same period, Duval County's population outside the City of Jacksonville grew by more than a quarter million people; an increase of nearly 230 percent.

During the 1960's, although progress was made to facelift certain of the city's problem areas, 1/ little was done in terms of upgrading municipal services and facilities. Sanitary sewage, for example, had reached a state of crisis. In 1955, it was estimated that improvements and extensions to city and suburban sanitary sewers and storm drains would cost approximately \$160 million. Although some progress was made within the city during the late 1950's and early 1960's, few improvements were made in the urbanizing area of the county. The inability of local government to keep pace was clearly demonstrated by a 1968 estimate for similar purposes, which was set at \$250 million. 2/ Further testimony to this growing problem lies in the facts

1/ Such improvements included the completion of several miles of expressways, two major bridges and the construction of a new Duval County Courthouse and Jacksonville City Hall, along the decaying waterfront, among others.

2/ Martin, p. 48.

that more than 30,000 septic tanks were serving nearly 120,000 people in unincorporated areas by the mid-1960's, polluting both soil and water supplies; and, pollution of the St. John's River had also reached crisis stage, with the City of Jacksonville (some claiming it as the worst offender) dumping nearly 80 percent of its raw sewage directly into the river. 1/

Even where they existed, however, improper operation of water and sewage treatment plants caused further difficulties. According to several sources, treatment was so poor that many suburbanites were forced to boil or purchase drinking water. Arbitrary and sometimes exorbitant rate increases combined with this poor service to further compound the problem. Although obviously aware of the problem, however, the county could not act because of its total lack of regulatory powers.

Other mounting problem areas which increasingly became sources of public outcry and frustration included the lack of adequate police and fire protection in unincorporated parts of the county, the high and disproportionate cost of running city and county governments, the rising crime rate and widespread and deteriorating slums in the city, among others. 2/

THE ANNEXATION EFFORTS OF 1963 AND 1964

As the suburban area grew outward in the 1950's and the need for urban services grew more apparent, civic leaders again began talking about annexation. In 1958, the Jacksonville Area Chamber of Commerce authorized a feasibility study on annexation. As a result of the study, legislative authority was obtained in 1961, and the City Council set a special referendum for January 8, 1963. The area to be annexed contained some 130,000 residents; if the entire area had been added, the city's land area would have tripled. The city returned a 77 percent favorable vote, but the suburban areas voted against the move, albeit the margin was narrow in certain sections.

Encouraged perhaps by the closeness of the vote in certain of the suburban zones, annexation supporters decided to launch a second effort. A new bill was passed in the 1963 legislature and a referendum was set for the same day as the general election in 1964. The measure again won handily

1/ Ibid., p. 39.

2/ Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 16; McCollum, "History of the Charter", pp. 3, 30-38, and passim.

with 71 percent of the vote, but all suburban areas voted against being annexed.

The reasons annexation failed were clearly definable: dislike of the city; the desire to maintain at least the illusion of living in a non-urban area; satisfaction with the status quo; and, desire to avoid city taxes. Inside the city voters were attracted to the idea of spreading the tax burden and increasing the city's economic resources, size and prestige. Many of the suburbanites were suspicious of and confused about the Jacksonville government. Moreover, there was widespread suspicion that the city government was corrupt, machine-controlled and wasteful; and, that with such a large addition, the benefits of urban services would be slow in coming, whereas city taxes would not. 1/

THE SCHOOL CRISIS

The public school crisis in Duval County was not simply the upshot of a few years of mismanagement, but developed through decades of neglect. In an effort to generate support for the passage of a \$1 million school bond issue, for example, the Florida Times-Union mounted an on-going campaign which at one point asked:

Is Duval County to continue dormant and drowsy in its present state of lethargy until some terrible epidemic claims dear little innocent victims for its own as a result of overcrowded classrooms and old buildings that would not pass muster with a building inspector (even) if owned by private individuals or a corporation? 2/

The answer was apparently yes, as the bond issue was clearly defeated.

Crisis regarding schools was, however, no new problem in Duval County. In fact, the consolidation movements of the 1930's had gained substantial impetus by blatant corruption in the school system. Other scandals in school administration during the 1940's and 1950's also brought discredit to the county school system. 3/

1/ Lex Hester, "Consolidation? Yes!", Jacksonville Magazine, IV, 3 (Fall, 1967), p. 13.

2/ The Florida Times-Union, Editorial, October 11, 1913.

3/ For a detailed discussion of this subject see Martin, pp. 33-38.

In 1964, however, the public school crisis peaked when all 15 Duval County public high schools were discredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. This action followed a decade of stern warnings and a year of probation.

A primary reason for the poor condition of the school system was lack of sufficient local financial support, resulting in inadequate upkeep of buildings, insufficient textbooks and facilities, and lack of administrative planning and organization. The discreditation was a shock which brought many citizens face to face with their own long-time apathy and indifference to governmental affairs.

The basic problem confronting Duval County schools was a high and increasing public school enrollment, combined with a system of local property tax assessments that kept tax revenues low. Under Florida's Minimum Foundation Program, the state provides money to the counties for education under the assumption that the counties will put up a certain amount, based on a formula involving their total assessed property valuation. The amount of local support in Duval had been very low.

Local support is derived almost entirely from property taxes. Under Florida's constitution, the first \$5,000 of assessed value on every homestead is exempt from taxation. 1/ The law assumes that assessments will be made at full value, which was not the case in many Florida counties, including Duval. A study by the Florida Railroad Assessment Board in 1955 revealed that Duval County property was being assessed at an average of 41.64 percent of true value. The Duval County Taxpayers Association in 1964 put the figure at 30.52 percent. 2/ This low ratio, combined with the homestead exemption, actually eliminated the majority of Duval County's homesteads from the tax rolls altogether. It meant that a \$15,000 home, assessed at 30 percent of true value, or \$4,500, escaped taxes through the \$5,000 exemption. The Taxpayers Association estimated that about 60,000 of the 93,500 homesteads in the county were totally exempt from taxes. 3/ The remaining 30,000 homes were being taxed at high millage rates to bring in the minimum funds necessary to operate the schools and other county agencies. But Florida law restricts counties to 20 mills for school purposes. The lower the total assessed valuation, the lower the ceiling on school funds. This was the financial situation which resulted in the discreditation of Duval County schools.

1/ Art. X, Section 7.

2/ Peabody report, p. 319. National Education Association report, October, 1964, as cited in Peabody report, p. 317.

3/ Ibid.

A succession of ad hoc committees tried to mobilize community support for tax reform before disaccreditation, only to face "a gigantic wall of community apathy and public indifference."^{1/} The school crisis became an issue in the campaign for county tax assessor in 1964. The incumbent pledged to hold tax assessments at current levels, or an average of about 30 percent. His Democratic primary opponent, a school board member, ran on a platform of spreading the tax burden by increasing the assessment ratio. The voters, most of whom paid no taxes voted against approving an extra financial burden on themselves. The incumbent won handily and went on to defeat his Republican opponent in the general election.

Meanwhile, a new organization, the Taxpayers Association, was formed in October, 1963, to seek a more equitable property tax distribution which would provide the schools with more money. Formed by downtown businessmen, the association was headed by a railroad company executive. Its means were legal action. After completing an exhaustive study of county assessment ratios, the association brought suit against the county tax assessor claiming he was violating the state constitution, which required that property be assessed at "just valuation" for tax purposes.^{2/} Hearings on the suit were held in December 1964, with the court ruling in January that the county tax assessor was "systematically, deliberately and intentionally underassessing real and personal property at a steadily decreasing ratio of its true value."^{3/} In a landmark case which was to change assessment practices throughout the state, he ordered reassessment at full cash value.

The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools met in Louisville in November, 1964, to decide what action to take on the recommendation of its Florida Commission that the schools in Duval County be disaccredited. Jacksonville political and business leaders appeared in Louisville with impassioned appeals, but they were to no avail; the association, as expected, voted disaccreditation.^{4/}

In March, 1965, the Division of Surveys and Field Services of George Peabody College of Teachers completed an exhaustive study of the Duval County school system, undertaken at the request and financing of the

^{1/} Duval County Taxpayers Association, Duval County Public School Support, 1965, "Introduction", p. 1.

^{2/} Art. IX, Section 1.

^{3/} Florida Times-Union, June 6, 1965, p. 31.

^{4/} Peabody report, pp. 10-11.

Board of Public Instruction. The 336-page report, the result of personal interviews, school visits, and study of a vast amount of printed materials, came to be known as the "Peabody Report". Fortified with statistics and comparisons, the report described the unhealthy state of the schools and gave its recommendations for improvements. It laid the blame for the situation directly on inadequate financing and urged a "drastic overhaul of the present (tax) base." 1/

The report also unmistakably tied the school crisis to the county political structure and atmosphere. Lack of home rule resulted in excessive constitutional and legislative control over local affairs. There were too many elected officials, making for diffused authority, and the independent Budget Commission was "in a position to exercise too much control over budget details and financial operations of the schools." 2/

Informal as well as structural weaknesses added to the schools' plight. The report drew a connection between the school system and Jacksonville's machine politics which, it said, "appears to dominate the entire county".

The actual school budget expenditures for 1964-1965 were \$33.5 million. The Peabody report said that implementation of all its recommendations would require, at the minimum, an additional \$17.2 million, for a total budget of \$50.7 million. 3/ Prior to revaluation, it would have been unthinkable even to discuss such a budget, but court-ordered reassessment had some dramatic effects; it enlarged the tax base from \$523 million to \$1.66 billion, and reduced the number of totally exempt homesteads from 63,715 to 15,179. 4/ The school board actually recommended a \$50.7 million budget for 1965-1966, the bulk of the proposed increase going for higher instructional salaries. The Budget Commission cut the figure back to \$49.0 million, which still allowed for substantial improvements.

There were several reasons why the school issue is important in this discussion. First, it was the dominant issue in local politics for about a year before the effort for consolidation got under way in January, 1965.

1/ Ibid., p. 307.

2/ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

3/ Ibid., p. 321.

4/ Miller, p. 51.

The lines that were drawn during the school dispute--between the "good government" people (the civic groups, the news media and downtown business) on one side, and the politicians and their supporters on the other--remained, for the most part, throughout the consolidation controversy. Second, the success of the reassessment suit was a major victory for "good government" advocates, and provided evidence that the city and county political machine could be beaten. It was the beginning of a "spirit of reform" cited by many local leaders. Third, the school crisis illustrated in a striking way part of the ethos of the community--the apathy which allowed things to slide into crisis. With disaccreditation and sudden new taxes, however, the public was aroused. With the grand jury indictments a year later, it appeared ready for a change.

Section IV

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION

FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION

Spurred by the impetus created by several prominent Jacksonville businessmen, a request was made of the county's legislative delegation to "prepare an enabling act calling for the citizens of Duval County to vote on the consolidation of governments . . ." ^{1/} Following much debate between opponents and backers on the delegation, work began relative to the composition of the commission which was to study the city and county governments and make recommendations in terms of their consolidation.

After much wrangling, the delegation had agreed on a method of selecting members of the commission. There were to be 50 members, 17 of which were to make up an executive committee for the purpose of directing the commission's efforts. Each delegation member would be allowed to appoint a certain number of people to the executive committee and to the full commission. No nominee could be stricken from the list except by majority vote of the delegation. Many of the nominees were suggested by prominent individuals in Duval County, while others were appointed by legislators in return for previous political support during campaigns. ^{2/} However, no one was appointed who either held public office or appeared to be headed toward public office. This provision was inserted to keep the study commission entirely separate from local politics, and to be sure that no recommendations would be influenced by personal considerations. The study commission bill, which named the 50 members, passed the legislature just before the session closed.

The study commission included a diverse sampling of occupations, with downtown businesses and law offices contributing more than half the members. The commission was heavily weighted with attorneys, insurance executives and bankers.

^{1/} "Yates Manifesto", January 19, 1965.

^{2/} Miller, p. 73.

In addition to the study commission, the enabling act specified 26 organizations--government bodies, civic and professional organizations--from which the commission was to appoint an "advisory committee". In addition, the legislature left the commission free to appoint as many other people to this committee from whatever other groups it wished. It was on the advisory committee that representatives of county and municipal governments and their employees were represented.

THE COMMISSION'S WORK

Following successful efforts to raise financing for its work and to appoint a full-time paid director, ^{1/} commission members debated whether the study should be carried out by a professional survey firm or by commission members. The commission's director urged that it be done internally, realizing that the commission could be a ready-made source of campaign support for any new government charter if the members had obtained a sense of personal involvement in its generation. ^{2/} It was also felt that the use of an outside firm could have produced a convenient opposition argument: that change was being "imposed" from outside by people with no understanding for the community.

The director's view prevailed. The commission used its own resources to carry out the study, but it did consult several "outsiders"--speakers from Nashville, Baton Rouge, Atlanta, Miami and Tampa, all of which had undergone, or were undergoing, metropolitan reorganization.

The commission's work was divided into two segments: a fact-finding stage and an analysis stage. Six "task forces" were formed, with the commission members divided among them. The first five were concerned primarily with the "fact-finding" phase of the study; Task Force Six did most of the "analysis" and prepared the final recommendations for governmental structure. Members of the advisory committee were included on the task forces and were given full powers of regular commission members, except that they could not vote.

The task forces were divided by "areas of study" in the following manner:

^{1/} Ibid.

^{2/} Ibid., p. 74.

- Task Force One: airports, electric utility; library service; port; radio station; streets and highways; drainage; and, water and sewers.
- Task Force Two: agricultural agent; child care, fire protection; garbage collection; health; hospitals; recreation; and, schools.
- Task Force Three: building inspection; civil service; motor vehicles; garages; planning property maintenance; purchasing; tax assessing; and tax collecting.
- Task Force Four: courts, law enforcement; legal services; probation and parole office; public defender; state's attorney; veterans' office; and, weights and measures.
- Task Force Five: budgeting; budgeting commission; fund custody; and finances.
- Task Force Six: organization structure; authorities; county; municipalities; and, special districts. 1/

The task forces followed a fairly consistent procedure. 2/ First, questionnaires, prepared by the commission staff, were sent to all governmental offices and agencies by the task forces studying them. They sought not only factual data about functions, finances and employees, but recommendations for improvement. Following return of the questionnaire, the agency head was typically called in for a personal interview. Here elaboration was sought on some items in the questionnaire, and personal opinions as to the organization of his agencies and its effectiveness were sought.

With regard to the type of assistance provided by agency personnel there was a specific mandate:

The legislative act that created the Local Government Study Commission gave them no choice in the matter of cooperation. All county and city officials were required to assist the Study Commission in the conduct of its investigations and hearings. 3/

1/ Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 173.

2/ Miller, p. 87.

3/ Martin, pp. 63-64.

Government officials always agreed to be interviewed, according to the commission's director, but many would answer only factual questions. 1/ However, it was evident even before the interview stage that many officials were beginning to fear for their own jobs. One television station editorialized that some officials "apparently are second-guessing the outcome of the study and already find it dangerous to their positions. Thus far, few have spoken up publicly, but behind the scenes, some have hinted that they'll fight any effort or recommendation to eliminate or merge their job or office with another." 2/

Although the commission meetings were thoroughly covered by the local press, there seemed to be little public awareness of the commission's existence or of its work. The commission's director said the publicity was "very heavy" and "dry", and doubted that anyone was very interested. 3/ In the middle of July, after nine months of work, the commission held public meetings on three consecutive nights in various parts of Duval County. A total of 120 people attended.

"BLUEPRINT FOR IMPROVEMENT"

By the end of October, 1966, Task Force Six had completed its analysis, drawn up a plan of government, and had it unanimously endorsed by the 17-man executive committee. Mimeographed copies of its main features were prepared for commission members and a full commission meeting was set.

The plan called for consolidation of Duval County with all five of its municipalities. All governmental operations were to be vested in one countywide strong mayor-council government, with all 21 council members elected from districts. The mayor was given power to appoint the heads of major departments including the chief law enforcement officer whose title would continue as sheriff. Two different tax districts were to be created: an urban services district, initially covering the same areas as the old municipalities, and a general services district for the two kinds of districts, corresponding to the levels of services to be provided.

1/ Miller, p. 98.

2/ Editorial, WFGA-TV, December 29, 1965.

3/ Damon C. Miller, p. 98.

A seven-member non-partisan school board was recommended, in accordance with the Peabody report's recommendation that the school board be removed as much as possible from local politics. School board members were to be elected by districts. The court structure was also to be revamped to assure more simplicity. At the time, there were seven different court structures in Duval: circuit court, juvenile court, county court, criminal court, small claims courts, municipal courts, justices of the peace courts. These were to be consolidated into two: circuit court and magistrate's court, by combining the first four and the last three, respectively.

Under the plan, all voters would elect a total of 25 officials, including the mayor, one councilman, one school board member, 19 judges, a state's attorney, a public defender, and a clerk of courts. This was a considerable reduction from the lengthy ballot of the past.

At the scheduled meeting, both regular commission members and advisory committee members were there as all aspects of the plan were reviewed. After the presentation, questions and comments were entertained from the floor. Finally, the plan, as written, and the report were unanimously adopted. ^{1/} The report came out in January 23, a 179-page book entitled Blueprint for Improvement.

THE GRAND JURY INDICTMENTS

During the latter half of 1966, while the commission was completing its study, proponents of governmental reform were presented with a windfall consisting of a sweeping grand jury investigation of local government. Responding to charges of governmental waste and corruption made by a local television station, the grand jury indicted eight city officials and two county officials, apparently confirming the general public's worst suspicions about inefficiency and corruption in high places.

The first indictments came on July 22, 1966, against a former recreation department executive secretary and two city councilmen on counts of grand larceny, perjury and conspiracy to commit grand larceny. On August 24, another city commissioner, in whose honor the city's newest park had recently been named, resigned in the face of a grand jury probe into the use of city funds to repair his own property. The grand jury indicted him a week later on 40 counts of grand larceny.

^{1/} J. J. Daniel interview in Florida Times-Union, November 24, 1966.

By early November, the city auditor, two more city councilmen and a county commissioner had been added to the list. In December, a new jury began investigating charges that the mayor had used city funds for kitchen cabinets installed in his home. The mayor cleared himself, but he had been damaged politically--he lost his re-election bid in June, 1967. The new jury also turned to county government, indicting a retired purchasing agent and another county commissioner early in 1967, both for bribery.

Of course, the indictments were only charges, not convictions, but many people did not make the distinction. One defendant pushed for an early trial and was acquitted in May. The rest of the defendants were awaiting trial during the campaign for consolidation that summer, and proponents of change frequently pointed to the indictments in their campaign.

The grand jury's findings carried weight with the average citizen because it was not a "blue ribbon" jury. It consisted of average citizens from all walks of life, chosen at random from the county roll of registered voters. What it said carried weight because, unlike the big businessmen or newspapers, it could not be accused of any ulterior motive or of any desire to "get" the politicians. For the first time, the long-suspected mismanagement of public business was exposed, by independent citizens with no axe to grind.

The first grand jury finally completed its work in early November. It was in this atmosphere that the Local Government Study Commission released its final report on November 23, 1966.

Section V

THE DUVAL LEGISLATIVE DELEGATION

Between December, 1966, and August, 1967, a number of events occurred which were intimately related to the successful consolidation vote. These events included the efforts of the Duval Legislative Delegation, of the major supporters and opponents of consolidation, and the consolidation campaign, among others. In an attempt to describe these activities in a manner useful to the reader, however, this and the following section break down those efforts into workable components. Specifically, this section describes the work of the legislative delegation from its initial public hearings through its major conflicts and accomplishments. Section VI identifies the major groups which supported and opposed consolidation and summarizes the character and major events of the campaign.

THE PUBLIC HEARINGS AND EARLY CONSOLIDATION OPPOSITION

Before any reorganization plan can be submitted to a vote in Florida, the state legislature must approve a charter and pass a bill providing for the referendum. The actual power of determining the plan to be voted rests with the local legislative delegation.

Faced with reviewing and acting on the reorganization plan prepared by the Local Government Study Commission, the delegation planned to hold public hearings on the subject in January; but the issue of legislative apportionment intervened to disrupt this schedule. In January, the Supreme Court struck down the legislature's reapportionment plan, changed many districts, and required new elections to be held in March. The delegation hearings on consolidation, therefore, were delayed until after the special March elections had determined who the delegation members were going to be.

During the three month delay, steps were taken by supporters and opponents of the Study Commission's plan to "bring their message to the people". Supporters of the plan brought together a group of civic and business leaders to form the Citizens Committee for Government Study Recommendations, Inc. (later known as "Citizens for Better Government"). Officers and advisory committees were drawn primarily from Chamber of Commerce people

who had not actually served on the study commission, but who did sign the petition and had been involved in requesting the delegation to take action toward consolidation in January, 1965.

Meanwhile, opposition was growing principally among real estate people who feared the plan would result in higher taxes. In addition, many people were beginning to oppose the plan because they felt it gave too much power to the mayor or was simply too radical a change. Anti-consolidationists formed an organization called Better Government for Duval County, Inc. At the group's first meeting in mid-February, it was indicated that Better Government would present its own recommendations at the delegation's hearings in March.

Another early event pertinent to this stage of Jacksonville's consolidation effort involved the preparation of a draft charter. Although the initial schedule of hearings prohibited such a move, the study commission with the extra time decided to fulfill a suggestion made by several legislators to prepare the new charter embodying the commission's proposals, rather than wait for the legislature to appoint a charter commission which might have taken another two years. ^{1/} The commission thus engaged a group of attorneys to draft the charter.

Initial Hearing Issues

The Duval Legislative Delegation, changed only slightly by the special March elections, held its public hearings in late March. On the first day of hearings, proponents officially presented the study commission plan, urging the legislators to approve it as written.

The following day opposing recommendations were presented, including objections to the study commission plan. It was asserted first that the group was in favor of the principle of consolidation, but objected only to the provisions of the study commission plan. This was a common theme among the opposition throughout the campaign period. Few people publicly claimed to favor the status quo; the need for change was so overwhelmingly evident that the center of the debate was the degree of change needed, not over whether or not there should be change.

Among the objections presented on behalf of Better Government, the one most "violently and vociferously" ^{2/} argued concerned the strength

^{1/} Hester, Jacksonville Magazine, Fall, 1967, p. 15.

^{2/} Duval Legislative Delegation, Hearings, Jacksonville City Council Chambers, March 31, 1967, as broadcast by WJCT-TV (tape recording).

of the new mayor. In particular, objection was expressed regarding the mayor's power to appoint six directors (department heads) without the consent or approval of the City Council, and his veto power over the City Council on budget matters. With regard to the former, claims of dictatorship were frequently expressed. With regard to the latter point, it was claimed that if the mayor's veto could only be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the Council, "the all-powerful mayor and only seven members of the 21 (member Council), or eight people, would control the budget of Duval County." 1/

Other main objections of Better Government included:

- the election of the school board by districts;
- the large number of uncompensated appointed boards;
- the general lack of elective officials; and,
- that the beach communities and Baldwin could be consolidated with Jacksonville without their consent. 2/

THE WORK OF THE DELEGATION

By April, 1967, the Duval delegation had before it two proposals: the plan and charter of the Local Government Study Commission and the recommendations of Better Government for Duval County. It would be the decision of the sixteen-man delegation how much of the original consolidation plan would be retained and how much would be changed to suit the ever-increasing opposition.

Summarizing the positions and general voting posture of the delegation, there were 10 certain votes in favor of the original plan, with a maximum of six opposed. Since all opposition was in the House, that body could block any proposals if the House and Senate delegations voted as separate bodies. Although the delegation never formally agreed on the method of voting to be used, 3/ the separate-bodies method seems to have prevailed.

1/ Ibid.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Hester, Jacksonville Magazine, Fall, 1967, p. 38.

Beginning on April 10, 1967, and continuing for two months, the Duval delegation reviewed and modified the study commission plan. Details of the strategic and political maneuvering that took place will not be addressed in this paper, ^{1/} however, a chronology of major events and accomplishments is presented.

Before presenting this chronology, two elements of the delegation review process are important to note. First, Richard Martin, a special reporter for the Times-Union, personally covered all major meetings, keeping Duval countians regularly apprised of progress as well as roadblocks in the delegation's deliberations. It was this coverage which, at least in part, precipitated the second element: the frequent attendance at delegation meetings by members of the Citizens Committee. Many credit the pressure generated by the press and Citizens Committee members both with the tone and the dispatch in which the delegation made its crucial decisions on the charter.

In terms of the accomplishments of the delegation, following is a summary of the substance and timing of major decisions.

An Early Referendum on Consolidation

Through April, opponents of the study commission plan made several unsuccessful attempts to submit the plan, unamended or with minor revisions, to the voters. The most serious attempt was aimed at inclusion of the plan (as a referendum) in a general local election scheduled in June, 1967. It was the purpose of plan opponents among the delegation to submit the charter in a way that would likely lead to its defeat. If this attempt had succeeded, its imminent defeat was seen likely by many because:

- The plan, as submitted by the study commission, included several points which would have raised serious and broad-based questions. Among these included the strength of the new mayor, the Baldwin-beach communities issue, and the recommended judicial revamping (which many thought to be unconstitutional).

^{1/} See Martin, pp. 117-146 for a thorough account of this topic.

- By including the consolidation in the scheduled June election, the issue would not only have been diluted in the public's eye, but it could easily have become embodied in what was expected to be a hotly contested local race.
- Finally, by injecting the referendum in the June election, there would have been little time for supporters to mount an effective campaign. Proponents felt strongly that a well planned and carefully executed campaign was crucial to a favorable vote at the polls.

Although the several moves to introduce the plan to the voters in June brought consolidation close to defeat, they ultimately led to several important decisions. Most importantly, it was decided to:

present to the people in a referendum a plan for the restructuring of local government substantially the same as the one (on which the delegation was then) working on, plus any additional amendments 1/

Amendments to the Study Commission Plan

The first substantive changes to the study commission plan came in mid-April and involved a major area of disagreement--the Baldwin-beach communities issue. Although the study commission would have preferred to grant these cities local option, its interpretation of the 1934 constitutional amendment upon which consolidation was predicated pointed to their required abolishment. After careful study by attorneys for both the commission and delegation, however, an amendment to the charter was adopted which both satisfied the constitutional requirements and granted the beaches and Baldwin their option.

By late April, several other charter revisions had been developed and adopted by the delegation. These revisions called for:

- council confirmation of the mayor's appointment;
- an ad valorem tax limit of 30 mills in the city's general district and 36 mills in the urban services district;

1/ Martin, p. 129.

- an elective sheriff, supervisor of elections, tax assessor and tax collector; and,
- additional pensions and other employee protections.

In early June, an amendment was made by the House delegation to "reduce (the City Council) from 21 to 19 members, 14 of them to be elected by district and five at-large." ^{1/} This change was also adopted by the Senate delegation.

Also in early June the House delegation adopted changes which differed markedly from those of the Senate delegation. In general, the representatives had provided that: ^{2/}

- the mayor have line-by-line veto power over the budgets of independent agencies and boards;
- the Council have the same line-by-line veto power extending to the mayor's budget;
- the chiefs of divisions be brought under Civil Service regulations; and,
- public employees be allowed to participate in political activity during their off hours.

After extensive debate, the Senate delegation agreed to the terms of points 1 and 2. However, a stalemate was reached on the final two changes. In mid-June the representatives were persuaded to accept the senate version of point 3 in return for senate concurrence in negating the "Little Hatch Act" which had limited public employees' participation in politics. As a result of this action:

- the chiefs of divisions would not be brought under Civil Service regulations, and all the earned rights and seniority of those appointed as division heads would be held in abeyance during their tenure; and,
- public employees would be allowed to participate in political activity during their off hours and vacations, with the proviso that no leaves of absence would be granted for political purposes.

^{1/} Martin, p. 134.

^{2/} Ibid., p. 136.

Other significant changes made by the delegation during its final review included the elimination of the new court structure article and the establishment of a separate referendum to determine whether or not the school board budget would be reviewed by an independent body--the City Council if consolidation passed; the County Budget Commission if it did not.

The Backup Plan

Another element of the delegation's proceedings which is important to note concerns the introduction of the "Backup Plan". As part of the opposition's continuing effort to stalemate consolidation or block it from reaching the House floor, a representative on May 11 submitted to the delegation "an alternative plan for restructuring the Jacksonville and Duval governments". 1/

The "Backup Plan" was essentially an annexation plan coupled with a restructuring of Jacksonville government to provide a mayor-council form. The plan also called for the merging of selected city and county agencies, and the retention of the County Commission and county government.

After the failure of the opposition to submit the original plan to the voters in June, the backup plan became an important issue. As one observer noted: 2/

In the final weeks of debate over consolidation, this (backup) plan became the central issue around which the delegation's arguments raged. It became indeed the last resort of the (opposition's) strategy to prevent consolidation from coming to a vote, or to defeat if it did.

On May 30, a compromise was struck between the supporters and opponents of the original plan. The three-part compromise called for: 3/

- the opposition continuing to prepare their Backup Plan;
- August 8, 1967, to be the official date for the consolidation referendum; and,

1/ Martin, p. 130.

2/ Martin, p. 131.

3/ Richard A. Martin, "Duval Merger Vote Due August 8: Alternative Proposal Study Set," Times-Union, May 31, 1967.

- the Backup Plan to be hurried to completion in order to have it ready if consolidation was defeated.

HB 3029

The changes and amendments to the study commission's original plan were made for a variety of reasons. A few were instigated by legislators favoring consolidation in order to make the package more attractive. For example, the millage control provision was seen to be one of consolidation's biggest selling points, although it had little to do with the government structure. The separate referendum for the outlying municipalities was a Senate-sponsored bill introduced in light of the evidence of a desire for local autonomy in those communities. The referendum gave voters in those communities the option of retaining their own bodies, boards and officers, with one total vote applicable to all four municipalities. The court restructuring article was eliminated because of its possible unconstitutionality.

Most of the remaining amendments were proposed by dissenting House members who, failing to introduce the measure in its original form, sought to remove as many of the more distasteful features as possible. The senators, although reluctant to assent to many of the changes, nevertheless accepted them out of expediency. They needed the House delegation's support, and they recognized that the amendments were needed to remove possible objections that voters might have.

The leaders of the Citizens Committee and the study commission were disappointed at the changes, particularly the mayor-weakening provisions of council confirmation and election of some administrators such as the sheriff. The sheriff, a traditionally elected county officer, had caused some difficulty for the study commission. Under the old structure of the City of Jacksonville, the Chief of Police reported to the mayor, who had ultimate police authority. The study commission had envisioned the sheriff as essentially a replacement for the police chief, to be appointed by the mayor. The Blueprint for Improvement was adamant about this point: 1/

It is imperative that police power belong to the elected mayor. Elected police chiefs are a rarity in American government; no city over 250,000 population has an elected police chief . . . The person selected to head

1/ Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 100.

the city's police operations must be highly qualified and must be responsible to the elected mayor. To proliferate this responsibility between the elective mayor and an elective sheriff would undermine the major premise of the new government--the ability of the electorate to pinpoint responsibility. Authority must be commensurate with responsibility; it would not be so if the mayor did not have ultimate responsibility for police power.

Nevertheless, public administration theory gave way to tradition; the sheriff was made an elected officer and the police department was removed from under the Department of Public Safety. A senate proponent using the sheriff issue to illustrate the Senate delegation's philosophy, explained: 1/

You can debate with great logic as to whether the sheriff should be elected or appointed. That could have been the focal point of the discussion. But you don't want to get that type of issue into the debate, and risk losing the entire thing because of it . . . We determined to take anything reasonable from the House. It was very practical politics.

After a series of last minute compromises between the delegations, the House delegation finished the final plan on June 13. It passed both houses and was signed into law by the Governor on June 27.

1/ Miller, p. 113.

Section VI

THE CAMPAIGN

INTRODUCTION

Proposals for the reorganization of government do not ordinarily gain the broad-based enthusiasm on the part of the electorate which is found in campaigns involving personalities. Such proposals are hard for the average voter to understand and dull for him to study. The argument frequently takes place at a fairly high level--between influentials of one sort or another--with the confused general public either abdicating its vote, or casting a "safe" no. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, after studying 18 different attempts at metropolitan reorganization, reported:^{1/}

Typically . . . only one in four persons of voting age bothered to cast a vote in the reorganization proposal. In only two instances was there voting participation . . . the turnout on reorganization matters was typically less than one-half the vote cast for President at the national election of a nearby date.

In order to make reorganization "attractive" to the general public, proponents must emphasize issues often tangential to the reorganization proposal itself, such as inadequate municipal services, evidence of governmental corruption, or other types of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Where such dissatisfaction does not exist, it is unlikely that mere appeals to logic will have a significant effect.^{2/}

Secondly, a hard-hitting campaign is needed to bring the issues of reorganization constantly before the public and to get down into the wards and precincts. Such organization is just as important to the success of a consolidation campaign as it is to the election of a candidate to office; and, perhaps even more so as was learned in Tampa which was considering a consolidation proposal similar to Jacksonville's during the same period. That is, "grass-roots" campaigning did not take place and consolidation lost almost three to one with about 25 percent of the registered voters turning out.^{3/} The instigators

1/ U.S. Congress, House, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 24.

2/ Martin, Metropolis in Transition, p. 130.

3/ Jacksonville Journal, June 29, 1967.

of metropolitan reform are usually non-politicians who are reluctant to involve themselves in political methods. "Usually," noted one key participant in the Jacksonville consolidation, "the study commission makes a nice report, gets support from the papers, makes some speeches, then loses two to one." 1/

With these considerations in mind, proponents of consolidation in Jacksonville began a full-fledged political campaign in December of 1966.

THE PROPONENTS

The Citizens Committee continued campaigning during the legislative delegation's deliberations, but its activity was hampered because the charter was constantly being changed. Passage of the consolidation bill in late June was the signal for the beginning of the final campaign, a hard-fought, emotional and bitter battle between the supporters of consolidation and its critics.

Citizens for Better Government was the vehicle through which most of the consolidation-supporting organizations worked. Women's organizations sent many campaign workers to staff the headquarters while the Chamber of Commerce and downtown business supplied the funds and the leadership. To direct the drive in Negro areas, the committee had its secretary who was also president of the Jacksonville Urban League. One state senator put his entire county precinct organization into the drive. Former Mayor Louis Ritter, who had been defeated for re-election in June, agreed to write all his campaign supporters, urging them to vote for consolidation and a black council member campaigned in the core city area from a sound truck. 2/ State senators who supported consolidation frequently appeared as speakers and on local televised debates.

About 20 former members of the 50-member study commission worked actively for consolidation under Citizens for Better Government, as members of the speakers' bureau, volunteer office workers, and precinct workers. Almost all other study commission members at least lent their endorsement, even if they could not actively campaign.

According to the Director of the original study commission, who had been selected referendum coordinator, every registered voter in the county was contacted, either by telephone or door-to-door, and

1/ Miller, p. 89.

2/ Minutes of Citizens Committee meetings, from the files of Mrs. R. L. Miller.

every voter received a brochure in the mail. ^{1/} Various members of the committee were assigned different groups to contact--blacks, city and county employees, civic groups and churches, and the Beaches. Hundreds of bumper strips were printed. Residents--both "big names" and "little people"--lent their voices to television and radio spots, as well as newspaper ad endorsements.

The second arm of the pro-consolidation effort was the Florida Publishing Company, which ran articles and editorials favorable to the plan in both its papers. Richard Martin, Times-Union special writer, devoted all his time to writing about consolidation, and the Journal's religion editor turned his attention almost exclusively to the issue. In December and January, the Times-Union had published the full study commission recommendations in 30 daily installments. From July 16 to August 7, the day before the referendum, Martin and the referendum coordinator composed a daily column entitled "Consolidation Questions". The Journal, too, published a daily feature beginning July 24 called "Consolidation: The Facts". News stories consisting of interviews with consolidation supporters regularly made the front page of the local section. Features on consolidation even appeared in the church and women's sections. On August 8, the day of the referendum, the Times-Union contained two page one news stories on the front page of the local section all about consolidation.

With the two major television stations also lending their support to consolidation, the area news media was solidly behind the plan. Cries of "monopoly" and "biased reporting" were regularly tossed at the newspapers by opponents. A survey of the Times-Union for the two weeks immediately preceding the referendum shows that there was an overwhelming predominance of stories presenting the "pro" point of view--coverage which the newspapers called "explanation" or "interpretation", but which opponents regarded as "selling".

Many organizations lent endorsements to consolidation; however, downtown business was in the forefront from the start. Their primary thrust was based on the determination that change was necessary for new business and payrolls. Professional, service and civic organizations were motivated by similar considerations: an increase in the stature of the community, and a more progressive image.

^{1/} Hester, Jacksonville Magazine, Fall, 1967, p. 38.

Many black and civil rights associations also lent their endorsement, partly because district representation on the council practically assured at least three black members, and partly because they regarded it as a progressive step which would rid the city of the "old order" which had "held the Negro down". Some blacks opposed the move, however, with opposition coming from old-line Negro politicians who had helped put many white machine candidates in office over the years. 1/

Churches generally supported consolidation and some ministers endorsed it from the pulpit.

THE OPPONENTS

With the approval of a plan embodying many earlier opposition sentiments, the opposition forces suffered a split. Since the delegation had reduced many of the objections that Better Government for Duval County had raised, many members saw no further point in opposing the charter. A Beach resident appointed as the new chairman of Better Government and other mainstays of the organization were holding out for the "Backup Plan" of annexation which the House delegation was trying to introduce. However, the Backup Plan also entailed a restructuring of the Jacksonville city government to a mayor-council form, with mayoral appointment of department heads. This did not appeal to several of the city commissioners who wanted, at the most, annexation without structural changes. Thus, opposition forces were not agreed on what to offer instead of consolidation. Also, the legislative session ended without the Backup Plan being introduced, meaning it would not appear on the November general election ballot, where its backers hoped to place it. There was no guarantee of the availability of an alternative if consolidation lost at the polls, so Better Government's support of the Backup Plan had little meaning.

Better Government had other disadvantages. Principally, it did not have the degree of organizational, financial or volunteer support that Citizens for Better Government was able to generate. Its budget was only about a third as large, and it essentially lacked news media support.

One ally of Better Government was the Jacksonville Democratic Executive Committee. The committee adopted a resolution describing the

1/ Miller, p. 129.

plan as "not adequate to protect the continued rights of the individual citizen." 1/ City Democrats lent their precinct organization to the opposition cause; Democratic committeemen and committeewomen were given letters to mail to all voters in their precincts. 2/

The opposition had the support of most city and county elected officials. The politicians' opposition also filtered down to city and county employees. Beach officials supported Better Government, including the mayors of all three communities and Baldwin. Also in the opposition ranks were the unorganized rural residents of Duval County, as was clearly demonstrated by the low percentages given consolidation in those areas. Real estate interests generally opposed consolidation because of the fear of higher taxes, although several prominent realtors were in favor.

PRO-CONSOLIDATION ARGUMENTS

The discussion of issues will be divided into three parts: the pro-consolidation arguments, the anti-consolidation arguments, and the approaches of the two sides to certain special groups--the Negro community, the Beach municipalities, and the city and county employees. The arguments in the first two parts are listed in approximate order of their frequency of use.

Anti-Status Quo

One tactic frequently used by advocates of metropolitan reform is to point out deficiencies in the existing system. Consolidation supporters found numerous conditions to point to in Jacksonville. Corruption, high taxes, and the school crisis--all worked in the consolidationists' favor. The Governor, in endorsing the charter, stated: 3/

In my opinion, the people of Duval County should be asking themselves not so much what they are against in consolidation but rather what there is in their present systems of government that is worthy, or capable, or being defended.

In brief, there was a feeling of crisis in the community, and voters were told the crisis would end only with a new form of government.

1/ Jacksonville Journal, July 19, 1967.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Times-Union, August 4, 1967.

Tax Savings

The property tax limitation was a big advantage, offsetting what is traditionally the chief objection suburbanites have to any reorganization which will join them to a central city. The limitation meant that the highest permissible tax rate would be 4 mills under that projected for the county for the coming year, and 3.33 mills below the current city residents' taxes. ^{1/} This limitation was, in essence, a guarantee for the promises that consolidation would save money through increased efficiency.

The separate tax districts meant that despite the existence of a consolidated government there would still be a division between urban and rural areas. Proponents repeatedly emphasized that no one would pay for urban services until he actually received them. ^{2/} This eliminated the primary objection to annexation--immediate city taxes without corresponding services.

One Community, Two Governments

It was often stated by supporters that Jacksonville and its environs are really one community, artificially and needlessly divided into various governments. The study commission report stated that this was one of the reasons for recommending consolidation. ^{3/} Residents of the Beaches and Baldwin had much loyalty to their own municipalities, but for the rest of the county it was argued that separate governments were wasteful and illogical.

Consolidationists said that by consolidating its government the general community could better consolidate its resources. "Our vast natural resources, our great port, our new airport, and our wonderful people now need a single government to attract new business and industry", stated one Citizens for Better Government pamphlet. Furthermore, it was argued, those county residents who receive city services during the day and benefit from the area leadership of the central city mayor should have a voice in the electoral decisions of the central city. Finally, duplication of functions was costly and irrational.

^{1/} Times-Union, July 23, 1967.

^{2/} The charter requires extension of services within a year after any area is included in an urban tax district.

^{3/} Local Government Study Commission, Blueprint, p. 21.

Appeals to Authority

Proponents asked voters to compare the people who had prepared, and were endorsing, the consolidation plan with those who were opposing it. "This plan was put together by civic leaders and the legislative delegation", said one state senator. "They devoted a lot of man hours to it--quality man hours." 1/

Opponents of the plan were commonly tied in with the old machine, while proponents were pictured as having the true interests of the area at heart. State Senator Slade, expressing a common opinion, observed after the campaign, "Probably one-half of one percent of the voters knew anything about consolidation. They're going to identify with somebody who understands it, and everybody who is anybody here endorsed it." 2/ This opinion of lack of voter knowledge was disputed, however, by others--including Richard Martin, the Times-Union's special writer, who believed that the news media activities resulted in an electorate which was much better informed than they are usually given credit for.

ANTI-CONSOLIDATION ARGUMENTS

Big Government

The primary argument of the anti-consolidation forces was that the proposed change was too radical; that it represented a trend toward authoritarianism and away from traditional American "grass roots" government. The mayor, weakened as he was, was still being described as "all powerful", and the small number of elected officials was described as a disfranchisement of the citizen. It was asserted that under consolidation, government would become the ruler of the people, rather than their servant.

Much of the campaign involved an extended argument between proponents and opponents over the word "Metro". Opponents used the word to describe the proposed charter, thereby associating it with Miami's federated "Metro" system, which was known to be unpopular with many people in that city.

1/ Ibid.

2/ Miller, p. 137.

Proponents tried to explain that consolidation bore little resemblance to Miami's government. Opponents insisted, however, that by "Metro" they meant not only Miami's government, but all kinds of metropolitan government--federation, consolidation, metropolitan cooperation--which they asserted were substantially the same.

Higher Costs

Opponents maintained that governmental costs would skyrocket under consolidation and that these costs would be passed along to the people. The millage limitation was no real protection, they asserted, because the government could obtain revenue by levying higher fees and special charges, and the legislature could remove the millage limitation at any time.

"Rush Job"

One state representative and former member of the study commission's advisory committee, criticized what he considered the lack of careful deliberation given the plan all along the way. He called the charter a "crash program" which was pushed through the study commission by the executive committee--the "select few"--without sufficient deliberation over the final recommendations. When it was sent to the delegation,

it was considered under the most adverse circumstances. It was a hit-and-miss proposition, worked on a little bit at a time, early in the morning, with people coming and going, never having the full delegation there to fully debate the thing. Then, after it was passed into law . . . it was found to contain so many flaws, and so many things that mitigated against it that a number of amendments had to be made to supplement this . . . 1/

Superiority of Other Plans

As noted above, even anti-consolidationists generally agreed that change was needed, but more moderate change was preferable. One Better Government ad urged voters not to be "Stampeded into Metro":

Let's take time to look at the 'back up' plan. If that isn't satisfactory, let's have our legislators keep working until we find the best possible governmental plan for Jacksonville and Duval County.

1/ WJKS-TV, August 7, 1967.

Proponents insisted that this was a delay tactic, since no other plans were currently available.

SPECIAL APPEALS

Government Employees

A provision was written into the charter that guaranteed the rights of employees of former governments "without any loss of benefits". 1/ It was true, said proponents, that the consolidated government would eventually need fewer employees, but that this would be accomplished through normal attrition. Nevertheless, opponents insisted that job rights were threatened, and that the charter was "ambiguous" in this area.

A leaflet distributed by Local 220, County Employees Union, told its members,

Did you know that under the Consolidation Plan you stand to lose your job security? You will not be guaranteed a job! . . . Do not vote for a consolidation plan that will remove your right to vote! The officers of Local 220, County Employees, urge you to go out and arouse your friends and neighbors to the seriousness of this vital issue. IT MUST BE DEFEATED BEFORE IT DEFEATS US! 2/

Status of the Beaches

The separate ballot for the outlying communities read:

Shall the cities of Jacksonville Beach, Atlantic Beach, Neptune Beach, and the town of Baldwin become the second, third, fourth and fifth urban services districts and retain the same local government structure, boards, bodies, officers and laws of their respective former municipalities under the consolidated government of the City of Jacksonville pursuant to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Florida in the event such consolidated government is ratified and established?

1/ Section 22.08

2/ Central Labor Union, CLU News, as quoted in Times-Union, July 29, 1967.

There was a great deal of dispute during the campaign as to the degree of independence these communities could actually retain if they voted "yes" on this question. Proponents maintained that their status would remain exactly the same and that they would be independent municipalities, while opponents claimed they would become part of the consolidated government whether they wanted to or not. Actually both arguments were essentially correct; if the municipalities voted "yes" they would be under their own authority for municipal functions and the consolidated government authority for county government functions. The issue was complex, partly because there was no precedent for the idea of cities within a city, and the duality of authority admitted of several interpretations.

The Core City Black Population

Those opposing consolidation in the black community pointed to the reduction in voting strength that would occur (40 percent to 22 percent) and the fact that two Negroes already sat on the city council. But the charter provided for three mostly-Negro council districts, meaning a virtual guarantee of black representation which was not present under the old city government with at-large voting. Another argument in favor was that the new government would eliminate the waste and inefficiency that had hurt the black areas the most. A pro-consolidation leaflet directed toward the Negroes stated, "The present system has hurt us economically, has provided inadequate services, schools and recreational facilities." As one Negro supporter put it in a debate, "This city has suffered from political boondoggling, financial irresponsibility, and a high crime rate, and when the city suffers, the black man suffers the most." 1/

THE REFERENDUM

On August 8, 1967, slightly more than two and one-half years after community leaders had decided to pursue the issue of government reorganization, the question went to the voters. In the end, more than 84,000 votes were cast--which represented 46 percent of the county's registered electorate. Of this total, more than 54,000 , or 65 percent, were in favor of consolidation.

The outlying municipalities voted, as expected, to retain their own governments by a vote of 2,548 to 1,543. The vote on this question counted as one total, which was binding on all four municipalities, but even if they had been counted separately none would have consolidated with the county. Surprisingly, however, these municipalities voted for the consolidation question itself by 2,173 to 2,003. They consented to the consolidation of Jacksonville with Duval County, but voted not to join the consolidation themselves.

1/ Jacksonville Journal, July 18, 1967.

Section VII

A PERSPECTIVE FOR OTHERS

Each chapter in the case study will include a section on "perspectives for others". These sections will serve two purposes. First, the Jacksonville experience will be reviewed in light of broad questions about consolidation. Second, the discussion of the questions will focus on the Jacksonville merger in a way that is instructive to other communities contemplating consolidation. Moreover, it is the intent of the research team to begin building a set of hypotheses on consolidation while, at the same time, presenting Jacksonville's experience in such a light as to guide and improve future consolidation efforts.

PRINCIPAL FORCES WHICH PROMPTED THE JACKSONVILLE CONSOLIDATION MOVEMENT

As referenced in the preceding sections, a number of factors provided momentum to the Jacksonville consolidation movement. Following are highlights and brief analyses of these conditions.

Population and Business Growth

As indicated in Table 1 above, the patterns of population growth in Duval County reversed in the decade of the 1940's. Contrary to the pre-1940's, the new trend saw growth outside Jacksonville's boundaries outpacing growth within the city. What was dramatic, however, was the growth pattern from 1950-1965. During that period, the population outside the city grew by nearly 230 percent, while Jacksonville witnessed a net decline of three percent. Moreover, by 1965, Jacksonville's population was approximately 198,000 while nearly 327,000 people resided in the county.

The Capacity and Quality of Local Government Services

Although the location of population concentrations, in and of itself, may not have had a direct bearing on Jacksonville's consolidation, its interrelationship with the capacity and quality of local government services bears scrutiny. It was primarily because of the population growth

outside the city that the inadequacies of the old county government rose to the surface. Principally, the county was a subdivision of the state without home rule powers. It was, therefore, constitutionally limited from either directly providing or adequately regulating services provided by local contractors. As a result, although taxes were modest, county residents were faced with inadequate, poorly regulated and/or generally inconsistent public services. Services which fell into this category included police and fire service, zoning (over which the county had no jurisdiction), waste collection and water supply.

Within the city limits of Jacksonville several unsatisfactory conditions prevailed. Poverty and poor housing were widespread in the core city. Municipal water and sewer systems were inadequate as well as outdated. And, a general community aversion to the use of federal grant-in-aid assistance made such capital improvements as were made exceedingly expensive to the local citizenry.

Moreover, in both the old city and the old county, the quality and nature of many municipal services did not meet the demands of an increasingly urban population. It was felt by many that this mounting problem was closely related to cries for government reorganization. The proposed but unsuccessful annexation drives of 1963 and 1964 are cited as examples of the community attitudes and frustration extant at the time.

The Old City and County Governments

The nature of the old city and county government structures added more fuel to the fires of reform. The old city government was three-tiered. It included a mayor, who was both the chief elected officer of the city and chairman of the City Commission; the City Commission itself, which served as the administrative arm of government; and, the City Council which was, in essence, the legislative branch. Conceptually designed as a system with complete checks and balances, it was considered by many as a "hydra-headed monster" and a system which not only promoted buck passing, but where the "buck was often lost".

Besides claims of marginal accountability and responsibility, the old city system was also inefficient. For example, in the mid-1960's the city employed more people and expended more money than any other city in the nation in the 100,000 to 250,000 population bracket.

In addition to its dependence on the state legislature and its marginal authority to deal with the needs of a growing and increasingly urban populace, the old county government was characterized by scores of autonomous bodies, boards, and elected officials. At a single election, for example, a county voter might be expected to cast ballots for 68 separate officials. Further, operating behind the formal complexity was a vast network of informal power--a city-county Democratic organization operated by a recognized political boss--which controlled the destiny of the majority of city and county employees.

The Nature of Local Government Institutions

One of the factors making consolidation feasible in Duval County was the relative dearth of autonomous governments. At the time of consolidation only nine distinct jurisdictions existed: the county, the cities of Jacksonville; Jacksonville Beach; Atlantic Beach; Neptune Beach and Baldwin; an air improvement authority; and, two mosquito control districts. Added to this was the sparse population and generally isolated location of Baldwin and the beach communities. Other areas such as Miami found the road to total consolidation quite difficult because the more than two dozen local governments in the county made majority, not to mention unanimous decision, difficult and often impossible to reach.

Other Movements Toward Government Reorganization

Several contemporary theories maintain that major government reorganizations occur only after an extended period of incubation during which alternative solutions are tested. In Jacksonville, this hypothesis is only partially true. Only two and a half years elapsed between the initiation of action toward consolidation and the final vote--a period far shorter than in many other instances. A case might be made for carrying the history of this effort all the way back to the 1930's or even back to 1918 when a contemporary-type consolidation was first proposed. However, it is clear that these abortive attempts were not part of the same sequence of events that led to consolidation in 1967. The problems, the actors and the environment were all quite different in the 1930's than in the 1960's, and there is no evidence of a continuity of effort. Consolidation did follow two unsuccessful annexation attempts, but these were less sweeping and more traditional in approach, and they were not designed to solve all of the problems consolidation was designed to handle.

Identifiable Governmental or Political Crises

The 1964 disaccreditation of the city's 15 public high schools represents a classic example of crisis which motivated government reorganization. As was cited earlier in this chapter, the principal cause behind the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools' action was the poor physical, programmatic and administrative condition of the entire school system. This condition, in turn, was the result of inadequate financial support (which is further detailed below). Thus, the disaccreditation was the shock which brought many citizens face to face with their own long-time apathy and indifference to governmental affairs.

Equitability of the Tax Base

Brought to the forefront by the disaccreditation was the total inadequacy of the county's property tax system. As was cited earlier, the low de facto assessment of real property, combined with the state's \$5,000 homestead exemption, actually eliminated the majority of Duval County's homes from the tax rolls. In essence, conditions in the mid-1960's resulted in the total property tax burden being assumed by persons with homesteads priced above \$15,000.

The Grand Jury Indictments

The series of Grand Jury investigations and subsequent indictments which occurred just as the Local Government Study Commission released its final recommendations also had a definite effect on the tone and atmosphere of the consolidation movement. Although the indictments were only charges, not convictions, proponents of the merger were equipped with a highly volatile fuel to fan the flames of change. The indictments further allowed proponents to approach the general public with an argument to which all could relate--government mismanagement and corruption.

Summary

Although a number of conditions prevailed in the mid-1960's which could foster demands for government reorganization, analysis of the Jacksonville experience indicates that no one event can be labeled as the prime mover. Rather, it was the timing and combination of the events, coupled with the interest and involvement of key community and business groups 1/ which prompted the drive.

Two other points should be stressed. First it is, of course, not necessary that the problems and conditions experienced in Jacksonville exist in other communities in order to initiate government reorganization. In communities with a citizenry that is particularly alert to public problems and needs, a desire for governmental restructuring could develop before conditions became desperate. In other communities, conditions might have to become intolerable before change could be instigated. In any event, however, it should be recognized that in nearly all cases on record, reform has occurred only after governmental affairs have deteriorated noticeably. Moreover, demands for "good government" are seldom heard unless they are in response to identifiable and major public problems.

Secondly, Jacksonville's decision to attempt total city-county government consolidation requires review. As is discussed in the Study Commission report, various organizational options were reviewed and discarded. These included metropolitan government (of the Dade County variety), annexation, realignment of functions, intergovernmental agreements, extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the use of single and multi-purpose special authorities. Each had a weakness, according to the Commission, which made it unsatisfactory. The decision to attempt total consolidation was based on the sparsity of governments in the county as well as the facts that Jacksonville-Duval County: 2/

- was a single economic area;
- had a similar countywide population;
- had a high percentage of people not receiving adequate urban service;

1/ A broader discussion of community and business group involvement is presented below.

2/ Blueprint for Improvement, pp. 19-21.

- had a strong need for government reorganization; and,
- had a number of governmental services that were already being provided countywide.

It is of interest to note that a number of top officials in the Consolidated Office of the Sheriff were queried as to the likelihood of city-county police services consolidation without total government consolidation. The consensus was that: (1) a total police services merger, without the city-county consolidation was unlikely at the time; (2) the merger of selected services (e. g. central booking, jail, records, identification, etc.) might have succeeded if total consolidation had met defeat at the polls; and, (3) other communities should explore all plausible approaches to police services consolidation with or without a total government merger.

PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OR CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THE SUCCESSFUL VOTE FOR JACKSONVILLE'S CONSOLIDATION

The path from the presentation of a study commission report on government reorganization to a successful vote of the electorate has proved difficult for many communities. More have failed at the polls than have succeeded. Following is a summary of factors which led to Jacksonville's consolidation success on August 8, 1967.

The Nature and Role of the Duval County Local Government Study Commission

A number of points concerning the study commission may be relevant to other communities. First, commission members were selected from among respected members of the business and civic communities. It was agreed from the onset that no commission member could be holding public office or be headed in that direction. This posture was taken to insure the commission's separation from local politics; an important step in this instance because of the claims of corruption and machine politics that abounded at the time.

In terms of the management and workings of the commission, two additional points are important. First, a professionally qualified, full-time director was appointed to shape and coordinate the commission's

work. Secondly, for purposes of addressing pressing issues in the most complete and effective way, six internally staffed task forces were used. Five dealt with particular functions of the new government, while the sixth focused on organizing the new government.

Another pertinent point concerned the state mandate calling for officials of the old city and county governments to "assist the study commission on the conduct of its investigations and hearings." Although there was still a certain reluctance to "assist", the mandate supported the commission in the development of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The structure and composition of the Blueprint report is also worthy of note. It was a professionally sound document which identified major problems and issues; explained the process by which alternative solutions were explored; and, presented supportable conclusions and recommendations. Although consolidation opponents as well as the legislative delegation took exception to a number of the recommendations presented in the Blueprint, the report provided a sound point of departure.

Finally, with the "dead time" afforded by the special March election, commission representatives prepared a draft charter--a move not authorized by the original enabling legislation. The action, potentially, saved several additional months of debate and delay.

The Role of the State Legislative Delegation

As was referenced earlier, definite sides were taken among the delegation in support or opposition to the study commission's plan. In addition, a variety of maneuvers were employed in deliberations over the plan. These and other conditions would likely exist among any state legislative delegation contemplating a major local government reorganization.

Of particular relevance to other communities, however, was the ultimate impact the Duval delegation had on the success of the consolidation movement. Compromises that were reached and changes that were made in the original plan: (1) resolved or eliminated several provisions which were politically or legally questionable (e. g. the court revamping, the status of Baldwin and the beach communities; etc.); and, (2) reduced or split anti-consolidation forces by incorporating in the plan many of their major sentiments (e. g. reducing the "power" of the mayor, placing a ceiling on ad valorem taxes and guaranteeing employee security).

The role of compromise in the delegation's work was also important in assuring that the consolidation vote actually got to the people. Many compromises (i. e. the elected status of the sheriff, mayor-council veto power over budget items, and exceptions to the civil service system), avoided deadlocks, maintained momentum in the consolidation process and produced a merger vote on August 8, 1967--just 2 1/2 years after the process began.

Pro-Consolidation Forces

In the Jacksonville experience it was not only the number of supporters that was crucial, but the nature of the groups and individuals who backed the merger. For example, the business community was solidly behind the movement. In addition to businessmen who suggested to the State Legislature that it take action to permit study of government reorganization in Duval County, participated on the study commission, or served with Citizens for Better Government, the Jacksonville Area, as well as the North, South, West and Arlington Chambers of Commerce were strong supporters. The vast majority of the area's men's and women's political, civic and service organizations were also among the proponents of the merger. 1/

Working together through the "Better Government" organization, or as separate organizations and individuals, these supporters did much to "spread the word". Proceeding on the assumption that government reorganization was a "dull subject" and of "little interest" to the average citizen, these supporters helped make the issue of consolidation a matter of public concern.

The Media

In conjunction with the business community, the role and involvement of the media cannot be over emphasized. The Times-Union (morning) and Jacksonville Journal (evening) newspapers, 2/ and the two major television stations, WJXT-TV and WFGA-TV, actively supported the merger. Through both editorial presentations and the constant stream of reported news coverage, the media was an essential ingredient in educating and informing the Jacksonville-Duval County electorate.

1/ A list of the major consolidation supporters can be found in Appendix A of the Working Paper Number II: A Study of Events Leading to the Jacksonville Consolidation.

2/ Both published by the Florida Publishing Company.

Newspapers generally opposed to consolidation were limited to suburban daily, weekly and monthly publications. 1/

Anti-Consolidation Forces

As referenced in Section VI, above, anti-consolidation forces were hampered by several factors. These included marginal media support and limited organizational and financial underpinnings, as compared with pro-consolidation groups. The fact that many opposition arguments were resolved by the delegation and incorporated in the revised charter further weakened the opposition.

The Campaign

The final ingredient deemed essential to the successful vote was the pro-consolidation campaign machine. It was designed, organized and managed like a traditional political campaign. Precinct and block canvasses were employed, a speakers bureau was formed, media spots and specials were used, and many other approaches were utilized to support the movement and/or to defend it in light of opposition maneuvers.

Summary

As with the consolidation movement itself, several factors combined to produce the successful vote in August, 1967. Although certain details may be altered in other communities, it is felt that any successful consolidation movement must have, at a minimum, the following ingredients:

- broad-based business community support;
- media support and extensive coverage of events and issues; and,
- a well organized, sufficiently financed and adequately staffed promotional program designed along the lines of a traditional political campaign.

1/ A list of newspapers which opposed consolidation can be found in Appendix B of the Working Paper Number II: A Study of Events Leading to the Jacksonville Consolidation.

It is not deemed essential that opposition forces be poorly organized and financed to insure a favorable vote. Rather, assuming that pro-consolidation forces have sufficient strength, a well-structured opposition should shed even more light on the honest assessment of issues. As has been generally observed in other consolidation efforts, the higher the percentage of voter turn out (as should occur under a well-organized and balanced campaign), the greater the potential for a favorable merger vote.

Chapter II

POLICE SERVICE PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION:
A POINT OF DEPARTURE

Section I

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE DUVAL COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

THE JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Prior to the Civil War the active police force in Jacksonville consisted of a marshal and seven men; the latter were not full-time but were pressed into duty as necessary. ^{1/} The marshal, who was elected annually, was responsible for insuring that all town ordinances were served. He worked primarily during the day and was paid a small salary which was augmented by various fee payments.

During and immediately following the Civil War, police protection in Jacksonville was primarily a military matter. In 1886, it again became a civilian responsibility with the marshal being reinstated as the chief law enforcement officer.

In 1887, a new city charter was drafted which created Jacksonville's first Board of Police Commissioners and established the position of Chief of Police. The chief and a force of twenty-seven full-time salaried men were subsequently appointed. It was at this time that around-the-clock police patrols were instituted within Jacksonville's corporate limits and the Police Department began functioning as a municipal agency.

The Board of Police Commissioners was abolished in 1899 with its powers and duties divided among the mayor, the council and a Board of Bond Trustees. In 1917, following another major charter revision, a commission-form of government was established. The City Commission assumed responsibility for the administration of the city. Powers relating to police were reallocated among the mayor (who was chairman of the commission), the Commission and the Council.

^{1/} A detailed account of the history of Jacksonville Police Department can be found in the Working Paper Number IV: Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 1-10.

As the years passed, numerous changes were made in the police department's operating procedures. Some of these included establishment or use of:

- the Gamewell Call Box System of Communications in 1895;
- a mounted unit in 1897;
- a police training school in 1921;
- the first motorized traffic squad in 1919;
- a crime prevention bureau in 1922 which came to be known as the "Women's Bureau", to handle problem cases of women and children; and,
- the city's first patrol boat, put into service on the St. John's River in 1941.

A final and key aspect in the evolution of the department began in late 1963. Recognizing the existence of organizational and management problems, the city engaged the International Association of Chiefs of Police to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the department's operations. The I. A. C. P.'s work resulted in passage of the "Reorganization Act of 1965 of the Jacksonville Police Department" by the Florida State Legislature and the subsequent restructuring of the department. This reorganization took place just prior to consolidation; its effects are reported in the portion of this chapter which details the organization of the Jacksonville Police Department at that time.

One aspect of the I. A. C. P. study does, however, warrant review at this point in the discussion. As reported above, Jacksonville operated under a unique adaptation of the commission-form of city government prior to consolidation. Each commissioner, popularly elected, was a full-time administrator in charge of a group of city departments. Under this plan, the Mayor-Commissioner was the chief executive of the city, Chairman of the Commission, and also Commissioner of Public Safety. Thus, he headed the police department, fire department, building and inspection unit, signal bureau, traffic engineering function, and the housing director's office. Moreover, his responsibilities over the police department were in addition to demands of other important municipal services.

The I. A. C. P. focused on this as a significant problem in the administration of an efficiently functioning municipal police operation. More specifically, they pointed out that: ^{1/}

Detailed analysis of police operations indicates that we are dealing with an inefficient organization.

Authoritative opposition to the principle of commission government cites these weaknesses. First, it fuses politics and administration. Popular election is not the best way to attract competent administrators. The prospect of becoming a politician serves to deter many technically skilled managers from public service. The best and most assiduous politician, on the one hand, is not necessarily the best administrator. Indeed, he may have to neglect his administrative duties for the sake of politics since he must submit to election at recurrent intervals. A professional, trained administrator, on the other hand, fails or succeeds on the basis of his professional ability.

The history of police service in this country is replete with examples of failure when political leadership and administration of a police force are merged into one individual. In reality, the Mayor-Commissioner of Jacksonville is the head of the police department. The City Charter authorizes him to 'direct and control the police force under such rules and regulations as the City Commission may prescribe.' Since the Mayor is also Chairman of the Commission there can be no question of the ultimate source of authority or location of responsibility for police service in Jacksonville.

For police to exist under such circumstances, integrity and impartiality in administering criminal justice must suffer. A police department becomes manipulatable. And a manipulatable department becomes corruptible and usually corrupt. Then it draws not only from the public till, but also from a network of vice and rackets which fester beneath the complacency of a city.

^{1/} International Association of Chiefs of Police, A Survey of the Police Department: Jacksonville, Florida, a report prepared by the Field Service Division of the I. A. C. P. (Washington, D. C.: October, 1964), pp. 18-19.

To correct this deficiency the I. A. C. P. offered a variety of recommendations. Suggested organizational changes are described later in this chapter; however, recommendations which exhibit historical significance vis-a-vis their political/administrative impact on department operations were detailed as follows:^{1/}

- The law should expressly forbid the direct approach of any Commissioner or Councilman, other than the Commissioner of Public Safety, to the Chief of Police or any of his subordinates to make requests for changes in daily operations or policy of the police department. Such requests should properly be directed through the Public Safety Commissioner and then to the Chief of Police. Policy revisions, of course, must be subjected to normal legislative or executive process. Forbiddance of unauthorized approaches should be enforceable by some penalty provision. Similarly, it should be required that a member of any agency approached for such purposes report the facts in writing to his department head, who, in turn, should notify his superior.
- The city should vigorously enforce those provisions of the Charter which (a) forbid candidates for office or any officer to give or promise any benefit in return for political support (Sec. 238); and, (b) restrict political activity of members of the city's classified service (Sec. 317).
- The Charter provision regarding control over the police department should be modified as follows:
 - a. Appointing authority of members of the police department should be vested in the Chief of Police under the provisions of a merit system. This authority should be removed from the Commission and Council.
 - b. The Chief of Police should be appointed by the Mayor-Commissioner subject to Council confirmation. All subordinate positions should be filled by the Chief of Police.

^{1/} Ibid., pp. 22-23. It is also of interest to note that by their nature, the I. A. C. P. recommendations serve as a capstone in detailing the circumstances under which the Jacksonville Police Department operated just prior to consolidation.

- c. The Chief of Police should be provided with the authority to prescribe the rules and regulations governing the conduct of police members, subject to Council approval. Procedural directives should not be subjected to review outside the police department except to determine their legality.
- d. Disciplinary hearing authority should be transferred to the Civil Service Board upon appeal by the adverse party from action by the Chief of Police.

THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, DUVAL COUNTY ^{1/}

The Office of the Sheriff in Duval County dates back to the 1800's with its powers and duties closely linked to the early history of the state. When Florida became a territory, the United States Congress established Superior Courts in the state. This was done on a district basis with courts established in East Florida and West Florida. In 1822, the Legislative Council of the territory subdivided the East Florida district into the counties of Duval and St. John. As a concomitant of county formation, Duval County's first sheriff was appointed by the Territorial Governor.

Developments and problems faced by early sheriffs throughout Florida highlight the conditions faced in Duval County. In particular, there were numerous disputes between the sheriffs and U. S. marshals as to who were to be process-servers for the Superior Courts. The Legislative Council had appointed the marshals as executive officials of the Superior Courts in 1823, an act which was repealed in 1824 "as a result of the many supplications and petitions sent to said Council from the different counties of this territory." ^{2/}

In fact, by act of the Council on December 19, 1824, "all business confided to the Marshals of this Territory, (was) transferred to the Sheriffs

^{1/} A detailed account of the History of the Office of the Sheriff, Duval County, can be found in the Working Paper Number IV: Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and the Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 10-18.

^{2/} Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of Pensacola, March 27, 1826, in U.S. National Archives, The Territorial Papers of the U.S., Vol. XXIII, The Territory of Florida, 1824-1828, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 496.

of the respective Counties in which the business belong(ed). "1/ The intensity of this dispute reached a crescendo when two marshals appealed the decision to the U.S. Congress alleging that " . . . they were being denied the rights and emoluments of their office. "2/ As a result, in a report of the House Committee on the Territories, January 26, 1826, it was recommended that marshals be made the only ministerial officers of the Superior Courts, declaring the Legislative Council Act invalid.

Still other developments affected the Duval County Sheriff during his early years. For example, as more counties became established and developed their own legal systems, sheriffs became officers of the county courts, while marshals continued to serve the Superior and Appeals courts. Finally, in 1828, the sheriff was made an elective county officer.

During the Civil War following occupation of Jacksonville and Duval County by Federal troops in March, 1863, and again in February, 1864, the area was primarily controlled by a military government which handled the policing function. Albeit Federal troops occupied the area until April, 1869, following the abatement of major conflicts, a sheriff was elected by Duval countians as their chief law enforcement officer.

In 1885, with the ratification of a revised Florida State Constitution, the nature of the office and the role and responsibilities of the sheriff were re-defined. In general, the Constitution provided that a sheriff would be elected in each county every four years and that his powers, duties, and compensation would be prescribed by state law. More specifically, the role of the sheriff, as reported in the Florida Sheriff's Manual was defined as follows: 3/

He is the conservator of the peace and executive officer of the courts. He enforces the criminal laws by the apprehension and arrest of violators. He attends the courts and preserves order therein, and carries out the

1/ Florida, Acts, 1824, as quoted in Petition to Congress by Waters Smith and John M. Hanson, dated January 25, 1825, in U.S. National Archives, The Territorial Papers of the United States, Vol. XXII, The Territory of Florida, 1121-1824 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 166.

2/ Ibid.

3/ The Florida Sheriff's Manual: A Comprehensive Guide to the Operation of the Office (Gainesville: The Institute of Government, 1947), pp. 1-4.

orders of the court. He serves process by which people are brought into court, so that rights and liabilities may be determined, and he enforces liabilities as established by the court. It is his responsibility to maintain law and order and to see that people in his county are protected in their persons and property. He is the keeper of all persons imprisoned in the county jail and is responsible for their feeding, safekeeping, and welfare. He must cooperate with sheriffs of other counties in serving process in his county which originates elsewhere. He must arrest persons found in his county for whom warrants are issued elsewhere and cooperate with the sheriff of the county where such person is to be tried. He performs other duties as the legislature prescribes and is paid such compensation as the legislature sees fit to provide. Often he performs necessary services at no charge, because no compensation is fixed or because the law requires that such service be performed free of charge. He has an obligation to the public, as well as to the courts and other enforcement officers. As executive officer of his county, he must see to it that due process of law, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is complied with before any person is deprived of life, liberty or property.

Moreover, as a state officer, the sheriff was given the responsibility as the guardian of the public peace, safety and security in Duval County. Little change has occurred in this role although it has been complicated by many contemporary developments. For example, with the advent of new technology and rapid population growth, new pressures were placed on the sheriff. In urban areas such as Jacksonville, inflexible annexation laws and the arrival of the automobile transformed the traditional role of the sheriff into the counterpart of a big city police officer. Further, the automobile required that the traditional patrol modes of horseback and "shanks pony" be augmented by a motorized fleet operation.

It is important to note that these new and vexing problems were the result of multi-faceted dilemma faced by the sheriff during the phase of organizational development which preceded consolidation. Specifically, the nature of the sheriff's problems emanated from the authority base of the office. First, the county level of government had no ordinance-making power; all laws had to come from the Florida State Legislature. The state law makers, however, were not particularly concerned with the day-to-day

Section II

THE ORGANIZATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS IN JACKSONVILLE AND DUVAL COUNTY PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION

THE JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

The largest policing agency in Duval County prior to consolidation was the Jacksonville Police Department. ^{1/} It maintained a complement of 400 uniformed officers and 81 support personnel. While the national average of uniformed officers was 1.8 per 1,000 population, the City of Jacksonville reported a ratio of 2.0 officers per 1,000 population. Moreover, among cities of comparable population, Jacksonville had a very favorable ratio of uniformed police officers.

The organization of the Jacksonville Police Department in the mid-1960's was based on the scheme proposed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in their report of October, 1964. A chart depicting this structure is presented on the following page. A brief description of the purpose and function of each of the principal divisions within the department follows below. ^{2/}

Planning Division


The Planning Division was primarily designed to provide staff support for the Chief of Police. It assisted in the development of short- and long-term programs which involved more than one functional bureau, or where a staff study was required by a bureau chief on behalf of a subordinate unit. For example, the Planning Division developed a field reporting manual for the department since its effect clearly crossed divisional lines. It was also a standing responsibility of this Division to encourage and assist functional units in meeting their planning needs.

^{1/} This discussion is drawn directly from the Working Paper entitled Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and the Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 18-25 and 34-37.

^{2/} Ibid., pp. 21-27.

Chart 2.1

ORGANIZATION OF THE JACKSONVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION^{a/}



65

^{a/} City of Jacksonville, 1966 Annual Report: Police Department, Jacksonville, Florida, a report prepared by the Police Department (Jacksonville: December 31, 1966), p. 4.

problems of law enforcement at the local level, nor did they have a great deal of time to formulate and promulgate laws which did not have statewide significance. Thus, the sheriff often found himself faced with questions of enforcement that were not covered by specific laws.

Secondly, the sheriff's enforcement tasks were cumbersome. Incorporated cities such as Jacksonville had municipal courts which often met daily and dispensed justice in rather short order. Yet, Duval County had no direct counterpart to the municipal court. The county laws (e. g. state laws) were enforced through the state courts whose formal procedures were both slower and more costly than those of the City of Jacksonville. Further, the state courts were neither designed or equipped to handle the increasingly large volume of misdemeanor-type violations prevalent in a rapidly urbanizing county.

The third and perhaps most serious problem faced by the sheriff in the 20th century was that the office had an inadequate base of financial support. The Sheriff's Department was primarily supported by county-wide ad valorem taxes. Yet, increased pressure on county expenditures, especially for education, made it quite difficult for the sheriff to receive increasingly large appropriations during the 1950's and early 1960's.

Administrative Services Division

The Administrative Services Division assisted the Chief in general policy formulation, program execution, fiscal management and in the supervision of clerical personnel assigned to the Chief's office. The division was also responsible for departmental accounting and procurement services. One of its other functions was the provision of a chaplain program to minister to the spiritual needs of police personnel.

Inspection and Control Division

This division's primary responsibilities focused on intelligence and internal investigations. Its Intelligence Section, for example, conducted necessary field operations to produce intelligence on crime syndicates, racketeering, and subversive activities. The section also maintained records on organized crime; disseminated intelligence within the department and to other requesting agencies; and, conducted special investigations at the direction of the Chief or the commanding officer of the Inspection Division.

The Internal Investigation Section had as its main objective the implementation of a self-policing concept within the department. That is, the police officer has traditionally been expected to adhere to a special code of conduct more stringent than that required of the average citizen. It was the responsibility of the Internal Investigation Unit to see that department personnel lived up to this code.

Operations Bureau

The line functions of the Jacksonville Police Department were carried out through the four divisions of the Operations Bureau: Patrol, Traffic, Investigation, and Vice Control. The Patrol Division was charged with responsibility for all police line operations to the point where a specialized unit took over. This included the provision of an around-the-clock citywide patrol; the conduct of preliminary investigation of crimes and other incidents reported to the police; and, the provision of a variety of other general and emergency public services.

The Traffic Division was responsible for administering the Traffic and Parking Ordinance of the city. This includes the control of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in and through the city; the investigation of traffic accidents not assigned to another unit; and, the provision of assistance to other units in the department in enforcing the general laws of the city. The Traffic Division also organized and coordinated the School Crossing Guard Corps and the School Boy Patrols which functioned within the city.

The Investigation Division of the Operations Bureau was charged with investigating felonies and misdemeanors and with the preparation of evidence and cases to facilitate prosecutions. The division was also responsible for delinquency control, the investigation of delinquency-producing conditions and persons, and the referral of juvenile offenders to appropriate public agencies.

Finally, the Vice Control Division was responsible for investigating and eliminating vice and vice-related activities, including liquor, gambling, narcotics, and prostitution violations.

Services Bureau

The Services Bureau provided for the department's logistical and support needs. This included maintenance or provision of central records and identification services; evidence and property control; bailiff service, custodial services; central communications; and, the operation of the city jail. To carry out these functions, the bureau was subdivided into three divisions dealing with: Records and Communications; Central Services; and, Personnel and Training.

The Records and Communications Division was responsible for maintaining operating records (offense, arrest, complaint reports, etc.); criminal and civil fingerprint and photograph files; and, criminal records. It also received complaints and reports of crimes and other disturbances from the public; assigned radio car personnel to calls for assistance; and cared for all department-controlled property (evidence, contraband, and prisoner's property).

The Central Services Division handled departmental facilities operation and maintenance. This included operation of the city jail; building maintenance; inventory; maintenance; custody and distribution of department-owned supplies; equipment, and property; and, automobile maintenance. In addition, the division maintained a sign shop which prepared all regulatory signing for the department.

Finally, the Personnel and Training Division was charged with the development and maintenance of department training programs; operation of the police academy; maintenance of departmental personnel records; and, the provision for required medical and other physical examinations of police officers.


THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF, DUVAL COUNTY

The Sheriff's Department was the second largest policing agency in Duval County prior to consolidation. ^{1/} It had approximately 270 sworn personnel and 70 support employees. Based on the national ratio of 1.8 uniformed police officers per 1,000 population, the Sheriff's Department was notably understaffed with less than one officer per 1,000 population.

In addition to being smaller, the organization of the Sheriff's Department prior to consolidation was less formalized than that of the Jacksonville Police Department. Further, the Sheriff's Department had not been recently restructured to the extent that the International Association of Chiefs of Police had detailed for the city's police department. The following chart depicts the basic organization of the Sheriff's Department prior to consolidation.

Chart 2.2

DUVAL COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ^{a/}



^{a/} Numerous sources were used to develop this chart. They included: Duval County Sheriff's Department Eighth Annual Report, 1965, a report prepared by the Sheriff (Jacksonville, Florida: 1965), p. 4; Duval County Road Patrol Manual, a manual prepared by the Sheriff (Jacksonville, Florida: 1953), p. 1; and, interview with Edward Squyers, Personnel Director, Office of the Sheriff, May 17, 1972.

^{1/} This discussion is drawn from Working Paper Number IV: Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and the Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 40-44.

A general description of the functions and responsibilities of the major units of the Sheriff's Department are presented below. ^{1/}

Civil and Administrative Division

The responsibilities of this division were divided between assisting the Sheriff with his internal management duties and dealing with the numerous assignments which emanated from the State Court System. The basic organization utilized within the division consisted of an Administrative Department; a Civil Department; and, an Execution Department.

The primary duty of the Administrative Department was to provide management support and internal administrative staff direction and services. More specifically, the division served as the Sheriff's main office and liaison with the public; it was involved in the development of administrative policies and procedures; it was charged with hiring, processing and records maintenance; and, it was responsible for all of the accounting and miscellaneous administrative activities.

The Civil Department's activities related directly to the Sheriff's role as agent to the State Court System. As such, the department was involved in accepting, approving, and executing the myriad types of processes emanating from the various courts (e.g. circuit, small claims, criminal, juvenile, etc.). The department also directed all court bailiffs and supervised election deputies.

The Execution Department was responsible for serving the variety of writs and warrants issued by the county. In that regard, the department computed and collected various fees and fines and handled the seizure and sale of real and personal property. In addition, it executed state tax warrants for the State Comptroller and the Florida Industrial Commission.

Detective Division

The functions of the Detective Division centered on identification; investigations and enforcement; and vice. The Identification Unit was responsible for the collection and storage of fingerprint and photograph files of all persons arrested by the Sheriff and for the analysis of crime reports and modus operandi files.

^{1/} Ibid. , pp. 27-34.

The Investigations and Enforcement Unit was charged with investigating all criminal complaints and violations brought to the attention of the Sheriff's Department and/or identified by its intelligence operations. This unit was also responsible for delinquency control, the investigation of delinquency producing conditions and persons, and the referral of juvenile offenders to the proper authorities. Further, prisoner transportation was handled by this unit (e.g. the extradition and return of prisoners throughout the United States and the transporting of prisoners to and from state penal institutions).

The Vice Squad essentially served as the city department's counterpart. It was responsible for investigating and eliminating such vice and vice-related activities as liquor, gambling, narcotics, and prostitution violations.

Traffic Division (Road Patrol)

The Traffic Division, which was more commonly known as the Duval County Road Patrol, was responsible for around-the-clock patrol of all unincorporated areas in Duval County. In order to efficiently execute this responsibility, the division was divided into a number of component units: the Road Patrol and Traffic Department, which was subdivided into commands; a Motorcycle Squad; an Investigations and Training Section; and, a Records and Property Unit.

The Road Patrol and Traffic Department was the principal unit within the division. Its responsibilities included the: regulation of traffic; issuance of traffic citations; investigation of traffic accidents; maintenance of a twenty-four hour, preventive police patrol; and, the maintenance of specialized emergency equipment for use by the Sheriff's Department and other cooperating agencies.

The Motorcycle Squad assisted the Road Patrol. The squad also functioned as a tactical unit which was used in numerous special and emergency situations.

The Records and Property Unit was responsible for a variety of functions. These included: the maintenance of records relating to the Road Patrol's operations; the receipt and storage of property recovered and/or confiscated by the Road Patrol; the operation of the Division's radar cars; the organization and administration of the School Boy Patrol and School Crossing Guards programs; and, the administration of a sanitation program to protect the county's residents against improper and noxious utilization of property.

The final component within the Road Patrol was the Investigations and Training Unit. Its specific functions included the investigation of auto theft and hit and run cases, and the maintenance of an active program of in-service training for all members of the department. The latter function included the development of program curricula, the administration of training seminars, and the maintenance of the department's firing range.

Jail Division

The Jail Division was responsible for the safety and well-being of persons detained by the sheriff and/or remanded to the custody of the sheriff by the various courts of jurisdiction. More specifically, these duties included the booking of prisoners; detention of inmates; the feeding, health and safety of all persons in custody; preparation of inmates for court appearances; and, the release of inmates on court order or bond.

PRISON FARMS OF THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE AND DUVAL COUNTY

Prior to consolidation the City of Jacksonville and Duval County maintained separate prison farms. ^{1/} Essentially, the prison farms were operated like local government jails; that is, the facilities were used to house persons convicted for minor offenses, misdemeanors, and so on which did not call for long-term incarceration.

Clearly, the function performed by the prison farms was directly related to the overall police and law enforcement operations of the county and city. However, prior to consolidation the operation of these facilities was not associated, administratively or organizationally, with the Jacksonville Police Department or the Duval County Sheriff's Office. In fact, the City Prison Farm was run by a superintendent who reported directly to the Finance Commissioner of the City of Jacksonville. Informal liaison was, of course, maintained with the officials of the police department. The superintendent of the County Prison Farm reported to the Duval County Commission. As such, the Sheriff's Department had no direct administrative control over the operations of the County Prison Farm.

Other factors of interest with regard to the prison farms were as follows:

1/ Ibid., pp. 34-37.

- the County Prison Farm was located within the Jacksonville City limits while the City Prison Farm was located in an unincorporated area of the county;
- the City Prison Farm was constructed in 1960 while the County facility was much older;
- both facilities lacked any form of rehabilitation program; and,
- the manpower complement of both facilities averaged 23 men for the ten years preceding consolidation.

Section III

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION OF DUVAL COUNTY CONCERNING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE IMPACT OF POLITICS

ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PUBLIC SAFETY AND POLICE SERVICES CONSOLIDATION

The original intention of the Study Commission was to centralize all law enforcement and public safety agencies in one department. ^{1/} Specifically, it was proposed that a Public Safety Department be created in the consolidated government which included divisions dealing with civil process; police; prison farm and jail operations; traffic engineering; fire protection; weights and measures; and, civil defense.

The Study Commission further recommended that the Director of Public Safety be an appointed position and that it be filled by the Sheriff of Duval County. This recommendation was based on a 1934 Constitutional Amendment which allowed Duval County to create a countywide government but called for the retention of the Office of the Sheriff. The amendment, however, allowed for the Office of the Sheriff to be appointive and permitted the Sheriff's duties to be increased over those mandated by the Florida Constitution. Further, this direction was undergirded by the Study Commission's strong belief that: ^{2/}

It is imperative that police power belong to the Mayor. Elected police chiefs are a rarity in American government; no city over 250,000 population has an elected police chief. The persons selected to head the Department of Public Safety must be highly qualified and must be responsible to the elected Mayor. To proliferate this responsibility between the elective Mayor and an elective Sheriff would undermine the major premise of the new government--the ability of the electorate to pinpoint responsibility.

^{1/} A detailed account of this topic can be found in Working Paper Number III: The Recommendations of the Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, pp. 1-11.

^{2/} Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, Blueprint for Improvement, a report prepared by the Study Commission (Jacksonville: October, 1966), p. 100.

Focusing on the law enforcement recommendations one finds that the Study Commission's penchant for strict authority-responsibility relationships was complemented by a keen sense for economics and tax benefits which they hypothesized would accrue as a result of consolidated operations. Generally, the Commission maintained that a single law enforcement agency for the county would provide " . . . optimum law enforcement in the most efficient and economical way." ^{1/} It was cautioned, however, that such an arrangement would not result in a cutback in overall expenditures for police protection, but that under such a unification, the taxpayer would receive "far more" for his money. Their reasoning was that such a unification would save a "substantial" amount in future expenditures that might be necessary if law enforcement operations continued in the pre-consolidation manner. In sum, the Committee maintained that a unified countywide department would provide:

- uniform law enforcement;
- increased crime prevention and traffic control;
- provision for an adequate financial support base with the elimination of tax inequities;
- better utilization of manpower and facilities;
- elimination of competitive jealousies between departments (salaries, working conditions, etc.) which affected officer morale; and,
- cohesive planning to meet law enforcement needs.

In positing its feelings, the Commission noted specific problem areas and detailed a number of functionally oriented recommendations. The problem areas in which directions were suggested were as follows: police department housing; prison farms; records; communications; morale; sign shop; vehicle costs; manpower shortage; and, juvenile delinquency. Each of these subject areas is summarized below.

Police Department Housing

The Commission observed that the Jacksonville City Police Department was in need of a new headquarters building; the Sheriff's Department housed in the County Courthouse was extremely cramped for

^{1/} Ibid., p. 102.

space; and, that the facilities at the county jail were becoming overcrowded. Commission members noted that upgrading and construction of new facilities for each of these separate units would be very costly. Thus, they recommended that the consolidated law enforcement agency be located in a single new building. Further, they suggested that the county jail facilities remain in operation following consolidation but that the citizenry recognize the fact that additional jail facilities would be needed in future years.

Prison Farms

As noted above, the operations of the county and city prison farms were not administratively associated with the law enforcement operations of the Jacksonville Police Department or the Duval County Sheriff's Office. In addition, neither of the pre-consolidation prison farms had rehabilitative programs. Thus, the Study Commission recommended that:

- the prison farms be placed under the jurisdiction of the unified police department;
- the county prison farm (an outdated facility) be abolished and the city prison farm be expanded to accommodate the needs of the unified police agency;
- facilities for alcoholic rehabilitation be included in the combined prison farm operation; and,
- a more professional approach be developed regarding parole and probation for prison farm inmates including more emphasis on job placement.

Records

Recognizing that one of the most important elements of efficient law enforcement programming is a sound records system, the Commission analyzed conditions in the pre-consolidation departments. Their research found that major records centers existed in the Jacksonville Police Department and the Sheriff's Department, with more limited facilities in the Beach departments; the records center in the Sheriff's Department, primarily due to personnel shortages, was open only sixteen hours a day; and, each of the departments was interested in further mechanization of records

through the use of data processing. The Commission concluded that a single records center, open twenty-four hours a day, was needed. Further, the Commission maintained that a single records department within a unified police operation would prove economically advantageous vis-a-vis the utilization of data processing equipment.

Communications

As is traditionally the case among separate police and other public safety agencies, the various departments extant in the Duval County area received one another's calls. Thus, the Study Commission recommended the establishment of a single communications center in the proposed police department. It was maintained that such a center would provide for more rapid police response throughout the metropolitan area and would require fewer dispatch personnel.

Morale

The Commission noted that morale problems were experienced from time to time in the separate police departments. These problems were attributed in part to the varying salary schedules and differing fringe benefit programs which existed. It was concluded that a single department, with uniform salaries and fringe benefit programs, would eliminate problems.

Sign Shop

As reported above, the Jacksonville Police Department operated a regulatory sign shop. After considering the basic nature of the law enforcement function, the Study Commission concluded that this responsibility should be located in another department in the consolidated government. It was, therefore, recommended that the sign shop be removed from the police department and assigned to the Highway Department.

Vehicle Costs

The Commission recognized that transportation was a necessary but expensive item in the operation of any police agency. However, it was agreed that ". . . a unified department should realize savings in its motorized fleet operations, as fleet size and mileage rise, acquisition costs

and operating costs per mile come down." ^{1/} It was, therefore, recommended that the department's fleet be purchased and maintained through a city-wide central services operation.

Manpower Shortage

The Commission was cognizant of the fact that while the Jacksonville Police Department had a sufficient number of uniformed personnel, the Sheriff's Office was understaffed. It was maintained, however, that a unified police department would provide far better utilization of total police personnel. Further, the Commission advised that any statistical shortages that might still exist after the unification of police agencies would "be compensated in that better working tools, more promotional opportunity, better pay and better working conditions for its personnel . . ." would result from consolidation. ^{2/}

Juvenile Delinquency

The Commission noted that juvenile problems and the issue of juvenile delinquency had not been given high priority by the departments functioning in Duval County. As reported above, this function was handled by personnel detailed to the Investigations Division of the Operations Bureau in the Jacksonville Police Department and the Investigations and Enforcement Department of the Sheriff's Detective Division. This role was in addition to the more traditional and regular responsibilities of these units. Thus, maintaining that police specialists in juvenile delinquency often reduce the problem, it was recommended that the unified police department include a juvenile division.

THE FINAL PROPOSAL FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSOLIDATED LAW ENFORCEMENT

Through the workings of the Duval Legislative Delegation, a description of which was presented as part of Chapter I, numerous changes were made to the Local Government Study Commission's original law enforcement recommendations. These changes included decisions to make the Sheriff an elective position; to give his office complete responsibility

1/ Ibid.
2/ Ibid.

for law enforcement; and, to assign general public safety and other regulatory activities elsewhere in the new government.

With specific reference to the elective status of the Sheriff, a number of forces were involved. These included the support of the Florida Sheriff's Bureau for an elected Sheriff; the attitude expressed by Duval countians that such a change would provide a check on the general government administration; and that it would enhance the power of their ballot. The strategy and compromise behind the shift from an appointed to an elected Sheriff was summarized by one member of the delegation as follows:^{1/}

You can debate the logic as to whether the Sheriff should be elected or appointed. That could have been the focal point of discussions. But you don't want to get that type of issue into the debate, and risk losing the entire thing because of it . . . We determined to take anything reasonable . . . It was very practical politics.

Moreover, these revisions were political compromises made under pressure. It is debatable whether the changes improved the structure of the new government. They did, however, improve consolidation's chance for success at the polls.^{2/}

Thus, the Office of the Sheriff became a separate operation from the Public Safety Department. In so doing, the delegation made the following revisions:

- the envisioned expansion of the Sheriff's duties as Director of Public Safety was cut back to make him in charge solely of law enforcement;
- the position of Sheriff was changed from appointive to elective;
- the Sheriff's qualifications, previously professional in nature, required only that he be a qualified elector residing in Duval County;

^{1/} Damon C. Miller, The Jacksonville Consolidation: The Process of Metropolitan Reform, a senior thesis to the Department of Politics, Princeton University (Princeton: by the author, April 16, 1968), p. 89.

^{2/} Richard Martin, Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County, The Dynamics of Urban Political Reform (Jacksonville: Crawford Publishing Co., 1968), p. 106, 118, 120 and passim.

- his term of office was set at four years instead of "at the pleasure" of the mayor;
- he was required to devote full time to the office;
- his salary, previously not mentioned, was specified;
- traffic engineering, a quasi-law enforcement function, was made the Sheriff's responsibility rather than that of the Director of Public Safety; and,
- the organization of the Office of the Sheriff was specified.

OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY COMMISSION THAT AFFECTED THE OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF^{1/}

Motor Pool

With regard to motor pool operations, the Commission learned that the pre-consolidation units operated over 1,600 motor vehicles of one type or another. Specifically, it was found that ". . . Jacksonville City garage maintained 1,040 vehicles; the Jacksonville Police garage operated, 184 vehicles; the Fire Department had another thirty or more vehicles . . . and, the County garage, for the offices under the County Commission had 266 vehicles . . . (while) the Sheriff's Department, County Fire Department and the School Board had their own separate arrangements."^{2/} In addition, it was found that the local governments subsidized a large number of employees with car allowances for use of their personal vehicles while on duty. As a result of these findings, the Commission concluded that ". . . the actual cost of all this transportation exceeded \$3,000,000 annually . . . the actual including purchase prices or resale depreciation . . . and the actual cost figures for this transportation were lodged in almost as many places as there were vehicles." The Commission further noted that ". . . as demands on the tax dollar have become tighter and government vehicle usage has increased, the shortcomings of 'loose' practice have become more evident. As of late,

^{1/} A detailed account of these recommendations can be found in the Working Paper Number III: The Recommendations of the Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, pp. 28-34.

^{2/} Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, Blueprint for Improvement, p. 65.

some severe criticism by the mass media and the Grand Jury has brought about an increased awareness of the problem by the public and local government officials alike. " 1/

Thus, to insure that the most modern and stringent management methods would be employed and that maximum efficiency and economy in vehicle acquisition, maintenance, and utilization would result, the Commission called for the creation of a countywide motor pool operation. A Motor Pool Division was subsequently incorporated in the consolidation charter.

Data Processing

Electronic data processing equipment was being used by pre-consolidation government agencies. For example, the Study Commission learned that the county, the City of Jacksonville and the School Board all had major computers in operation. In addition, it was found that the county was considering a second computer while both the Sheriff's Office and the Jacksonville Police Department were considering data processing equipment for their record centers. The prognosis was that even more data processing equipment would be used in the future.

Weighing these facts and recognizing that data processing equipment was extremely expensive, the Commission concluded that new equipment should not be purchased randomly. It was noted that qualified systems analysts and programming personnel were in short supply and such staff was necessary if maximum potential was to be realized from the use of data processing equipment. 2/

When the Study Commission's recommendations reached the voters of Duval County they were intact. A Data Processing Division was established in the Central Services Department which would serve the needs of all offices, departments, boards and agencies of the consolidated government.

Purchasing

Local government purchasing practices of the old city and county governments were among items given intense scrutiny by mass media.

1/ Ibid., p. 66.

2/ Ibid., p. 70.

In evaluating purchasing procedures, the Commission found that many officials were making government purchases and using a variety of rules and regulations. For example, it was learned that although the City of Jacksonville had a "central" purchasing agent, various departments, boards and commissions oftentimes made their own purchases. It was also found that the authority of the county purchasing agent was limited to those offices under the County Commission. The independently elected offices, board and authorities in the county made their own purchasing arrangements.

Moreover, the Commission concluded that ". . . all of the overlap, duplication and inconsistency lead to governmental and public confusion and to inefficiency and high cost." ^{1/} Consequently, the Commission recommended the establishment of a single, countywide Purchasing Division in the Central Services Department and outlined policy guidelines and responsibilities for the division. They reasoned that such a department would safeguard public spending by: providing a uniform set of policy rules; insuring the use of professionally trained purchasing staff; and, promoting increased saving through quantity buying. This provision was incorporated, en toto, in the final consolidation charter.

^{1/} Ibid., , p. 57.

Section IV

A PERSPECTIVE FOR OTHERS

THE HISTORY, STATUS AND ORGANIZATION OF POLICE OPERATIONS PRIOR TO CONSOLIDATION

The history of law enforcement operations in the City of Jacksonville and Duval County dates back to the 1800's. During this period organizational patterns and management strategies were forged. Employee and citizen expectations in terms of agency operations also developed. In short, albeit unique, each agency manifested characteristics common to their sister agencies throughout the country prior to consolidation.

On the one hand, the city police department was organized and administered consistent with contemporary local law enforcement theory. The department had been reorganized just prior to consolidation to provide for the most efficient, effective and non-political delivery of police services. The agency was also well financed and staffed. Finally, the department operated as the basis of the laws and ordinances of the city.

On the other hand, the county Sheriff's Office operated on a less structured framework; had fewer employees; found financing to be a problem and operated on the basis of state statutes. Finally, while the city force dealt through a municipal court system, the county Sheriff operated through and, in fact, served the state courts. Moreover, while the provision of police services was the responsibility of both agencies, their organization and approach toward providing these services differed. Further, the types of day-to-day operating problems faced by the two departments also differed. Thus, the framers of consolidation were confronted with a multifaceted problem--a challenge of a legal, organizational, personal and financial nature. These dissimilarities created problems when the two agencies were merged (this issue is detailed in the following chapter).

Patently, these difficulties did not dampen the enthusiasm of Jacksonville's consolidation architects. Others contemplating the subject should, however, carefully evaluate where the police agencies to be merged stand regarding these matters. In addition, other traditional issues with regard to the delivery of police services should be evaluated prior to a

decision to consolidate; e. g. crime rate by type of offense in the areas being evaluated for merger. In the end, such an evaluation might disclose that consolidation is not the best solution: dollars, manpower differentials and organizational arrangements may be insurmountable variables. Further, such an evaluation may point to the propriety of another technique; i. e. mutual aid pacts, interlocal contracting, or the consolidation of a selected number of various service functions such as communications, records and purchasing to improve the delivery of police services on an areawide basis.

THE PROPOSED RESTRUCTURING OF PUBLIC SAFETY OPERATIONS AND THE IMPACT OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Focusing on economy, efficiency and administrative accountability, by-words of "good government" and "modern administrative organization", the architects of the Jacksonville consolidation planned for a full-service public safety department. Its head was to be a trained professional, serving as a member of a homogenous management team accountable to the Mayor of the consolidated government.

Though this proposal had inherent advantages, it embodied one critical disadvantage--it was not politically palatable. The original recommendations of the consolidation framers were, as a result, significantly altered to the displeasure of some of those involved. The political process in Jacksonville mirrored the attitudes and expectations of lay citizens, local officials and state legislators alike. A similar experience might be expected by others contemplating a wholesale change in government organization; logic and the ideals of good government are oftentimes overshadowed by "practical politics" as illustrated by the Jacksonville experience and as seen in various other reorganization attempts which have been made throughout the United States.

Chapter III

THE MONTHS PRECEDING CONSOLIDATION:
A TIME OF TRANSITION

Section I

THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT MERGER

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDERGIRDING TRANSITION

The Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville authorized a transition period to serve as a first step in the process of achieving consolidated government. ^{1/} The process was initiated with a primary election held in October, 1967, followed by a general election on December 5. Officials to be elected included the mayor, city councilmen, a tax assessor, a supervisor of elections, the sheriff, a judge of the municipal court, and members of the new civil service board. Those persons elected were to take office on March 1, 1968, for purposes of organizing the consolidated government.

Together with authorizing the transition government to oversee and plan for the consolidation, the Charter provided specific guidelines for the funding of the transition government and the co-existence of the pre-consolidation governments with the transition structure. Provision was also made to limit confusion and possible acrimony between members of the governments to be merged. A summary of these topics is presented below.

Organization of the Consolidated Government

The responsibility for organizing the consolidated government during the transition period was placed on members of both the legislative and executive branches. Specific powers and duties mandated by the Charter were as follows:

- The Mayor was to appoint department directors; a chief administrative officer; a city accountant; a treasurer; and, a city attorney. Further, he was charged with the preparation of a budget for the first year of the consolidated government.

^{1/} A detailed account of charter provisions concerning this matter can be found in the Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 1-5.

- The Council was granted authority to hold organizational meetings; to establish standing and ad hoc committees; and, to select its officers and employees. The Council was further empowered to confirm departmental appointments made by the Mayor; fix the salary of those appointees; and, take action, by August 1, 1968, on the Mayor's budget.
- The tax assessor, tax collector, supervisor of elections, members of the Civil Service Board, and the Sheriff were to submit budget recommendations to the Mayor's finance director by July 1, 1968.

Although limited, the architects of the Charter felt that the efficient execution of these duties within the limited transition period would provide for the smooth transfer of functions and responsibilities from the old system to the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville on October 1, 1968.

The Financing of the Transition Period

Costs associated with organizing the new government were also provided for in the Charter. It was required that Duval County appropriate monies to cover the cost of the consolidated government election and the costs of paying the officials of the new government from March 1 to October 1, 1968. Notably, the Charter did not provide monies to purchase materials, equipment, or to enter into contracts or other long-term commitments. Seemingly, such expenses were considered to be part of the first year's operating budget which was to become effective on October 1.

The Co-Existence of the Old and New Governments

The Charter also included provisions for the co-existence of the City of Jacksonville, Duval County and the embryonic consolidated government during the period of transition. In particular, the Charter provided that all offices, officials, boards, commissions and agencies of the pre-consolidation units would continue to exist until October 1, 1968. However, no further guidelines were provided as to the specific functioning of those units. As such, the legislators and administrators were bound by the general dictates of state law in the case of the county and a charter which provided for the organization and functioning of the old City of Jacksonville.

The Minimization of Controversy

Finally, a number of specialized stipulations were included in the Charter to minimize controversy and provide members of the units to be consolidated with assurance that they would not be "disenfranchised" by consolidation. 1/ These provisions included:

- a mandate to all officers, officials, employees, departments and agencies of the pre-consolidation governments to cooperate with and assist officials of the consolidated government to develop the initial consolidated budget, to plan for the merger of the various functional units, and to transfer the various governmental functions from the old units to those outlined in the consolidated structure;
- a notification of fourteen officials and members of various boards and commissions of the old city and county that were to continue to function in the consolidated government; and,
- an assurance that all employees of the City of Jacksonville and Duval County would become employees of the consolidated government without loss of status, rank, job value or position.

THE WORK OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT

The Council of the Consolidated City of Jacksonville

The Charter was specific as to the powers and duties of the legislative branch of the consolidated government during the transition period. 2/ It did not, however, specify a strategy for the execution of these duties. The new councilmen, therefore, developed a strategy and took steps to facilitate the transition on their own volition. Based on a desire to "get a jump on the problem", the council began meeting in early January--three months prior to the date authorized in the Charter. 3/ In addition, the legislators

1/ Interview with Lex Hester, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, May 18, 1972.

2/ A detailed account of the work of the transition council can be found in the working paper entitled The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, p. 9-11.

3/ Comments of Ted Griffith in An Examination of the Consolidated Government of Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida (Washington: The National Association of Counties, 1971), p. 42.

organized into various committees to deal with particular areas of concern; e. g. budget and finance, public works, public affairs, public safety and education, among others. Moreover, the first nine months of 1968 provided valuable time during which each new councilman became involved in areas in which he was particularly concerned, learned to work as part of the new legislative team, and generally became involved in the consolidated government. As one participant in that process summarized it: 1/

Prior to consolidation we not only got organized, we got a budget ready to adopt, we got all other organizational methods . . . (detailed), (put) organizational ordinances which needed (to be) adopted in shape to adopt, and ran them through committee systems. On October 1, 1968, we had a special meeting to ratify what we had already done unofficially, and ran through the adoption of all those necessary implementing ordinances in one afternoon, because we had already done ground work on them through the preceding nine months.

The Mayor and Administration

During the transition the mayor and his administration were able to accomplish a number of important tasks. 2/ As noted above, the mayor's power was limited prior to the actual date of consolidation. Yet, he was able to appoint department heads; prepare and submit a budget; develop internal administrative procedures; and, develop and distribute an employee newsletter.

The appointment of more than twenty key department and division heads proved to be one of the first important tasks which was undertaken by the mayor. In an effort to identify the most effective possible leadership for the new government while avoiding accusations of appointment decisions based on political rather than professional criteria, a number of steps were taken. In particular, the mayor ran advertisements in numerous national trade journals; appointed a committee of seven community leaders to interview the candidates and to recommend three from which he would choose;

1/ The National Association of Counties, An Examination of the Consolidated Government of Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida (Washington: The National Association of Counties, 1971), p. 233.

2/ A detailed account of the work of the Mayor and administration can be found in the working paper entitled: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 11-15.

and, offered potential candidates salaries competitive with industry and other government units of comparable size and responsibility. It should be noted that approximately two-thirds of the department heads that had been in office prior to consolidation were ultimately retained by the new government.

A second key action taken by the administration concerned the development of a consolidated budget. In early April the mayor issued a budget calendar which included guidelines for the codification of budget requests. The calendar provided just over four months for the development, consideration and adoption of the budget. The guidelines included a budget format which required that each funding request be carefully identified and explained, and that specific decisions be made as to personnel, equipment, space and other organizational needs. As a result, employees of the pre-consolidation governments saw how they were to "fit into the consolidated government." ^{1/} On July 31, 1968, consistent with the dictates of the Charter, the transition council approved the budget for the first year of the consolidated government.

Two additional decisions made by the mayor during the transition period warrant brief comment. First, in an effort to avoid confusion as to his administrative policies, the chief executive issued all administrative procedures in the form of executive orders which were distributed to all appropriate officials. Second, he developed a special series of newsletters designed to minimize the spread of irresponsible and oftentimes damaging rumors and to keep the employees of the city and county informed of progress being made in the formation of the new government.

PROBLEMS FACED BY THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT ^{2/}

During the transition period it was intended that newly elected and appointed consolidation officials would devote a major portion of their time to pre-planning for the smooth implementation to the new government. Further, it was intended that members of the City of Jacksonville and Duval County governments would continue to keep both pre-consolidation governments functioning until "Consolidation Day". Yet, as recalled by one participant, ". . . under test tube conditions the transition period would

^{1/} The Charter: City-County Team Bulletin, published by the Transition Government, Jacksonville, Florida, Vol. 1, June, 1968, p. 2.

^{2/} A detailed account of the problems faced by the transition government can be found in the working paper entitled: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 15-26.

have been nothing short of hectic, but coupled with the anguish of the lame duck 'surprises' which appeared with an almost monotonous regularity, conditions were, at times, almost impossible." 1/ This situation was further complicated by the initiation of a number of sweeping legal attacks against consolidation.

Thus, transition proved to be a tumultuous period during which consolidation had to be planned, structured, protected and defended. In that the nature of difficulties generated and the types of issues that were raised by "anti-consolidationists" may be constructive to others considering governmental merger, several of the issues faced by the transition government are discussed below.

Actions of the Lame Duck Governments

The legislative and executive branches of Duval County and the City of Jacksonville took action in a number of areas which proved problematic to the transition government. 2/ Some of the more blatant actions taken by the "lame duck" governments are summarized below:

- An attempt was made by the old city to lower service rates of the city-owned utility company which would have left the consolidated government without revenues to fund future operations. In fact, this policy had been approved, but it was subsequently rescinded because of the controversy which it had stirred.
- Action was taken to abolish local government regulatory rights over privately owned water and sewer facilities. This not only gave private operators a free hand at price setting, but clearly inhibited future plans by the new government to establish and enforce uniform facility and operating standards.
- A cable television franchise which did not cover the City of Jacksonville and which included questionable public safeguards was awarded.

1/ Comments of Mr. Lex Hester, the Mayor's Chief Administrative Officer, as quoted in the Times-Union, October 1, 1968, p. AA-6.

2/ A detailed account of the actions of pre-consolidation units which hampered the smooth transition to a consolidated government in Jacksonville can be found in the working paper entitled: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 16-20.

- A number of zoning changes were approved which had a potential detrimental effect on a new zoning code which was being prepared pursuant to a professional long-range land use study.
- A "stop and frisk" ordinance was approved which empowered city police to search persons believed to be armed with deadly weapons or suspected of being engaged in criminal activities. In light of the then volatile racial conditions in the city, the manner in which this decision was made clearly lacked a thoroughness in concept and design.

In addition, considerable juggling of salaries of public employees took place. This was particularly true in the area of public safety. For example, the Jacksonville City Commission approved a pay raise for policemen and firemen in late August, 1968. The Commission's action was apparently based on a desire to equalize city police salaries with those of the Duval County Patrol and to afford city firemen a boost consistent with escalating living costs. Transition government officials pointed out that this action was not consistent with the consolidated government budget adopted in July; would require that service leaves be cut following consolidation to accommodate the increase; and, that their action would not be recommended at the time of consolidation in that it was "contrary" to the intent of the consolidation Charter. ^{1/} It was further pointed out by transition officials that a plan had been included in the consolidated budget which provided for pay increases for two-thirds of the old city's police personnel at the time of consolidation, with the remainder to be equalized with old county pay rates by mid-1969. Nonetheless, the Jacksonville City Commission did not alter its decision.

When the consolidated government took office it disregarded the police and fire pay plan as adopted by the old city and implemented its original pay equalization scheme for the police. Subsequently, the Fraternal Order of Firemen instituted a suit to force the consolidated government to pay the firemen at a rate consistent with the raise provided by the old city. The matter was resolved in Circuit Court in February, 1969, with the consolidated government being directed to give the firemen pay increases retroactive to the date of consolidation. It should be noted that although the consolidated city's General Counsel's Office felt that there were sufficient

^{1/} Times-Union, August 28, 1968, p. B-13.

"arguable reasons" to appeal the lower court decision, it was decided not to fight the decision because it might serve to aggravate " . . . morale problems in the new government" and because such a question " . . . would never occur again" under the consolidated government. ^{1/}

Legal Challenges to Consolidation

In addition to the salary controversy, various other legal battles in opposition to consolidation began in early 1968 and continued until late 1969. ^{2/} These legal challenges covered a variety of subjects, including the following:

- a suit challenging the constitutionality of major portions of the consolidation Charter was filed on behalf of persons who had qualified to run for Duval County offices which the architects of consolidated government had assumed were abolished by the new charter;
- a suit was brought against the Florida Secretary of State for certifying candidates to offices abolished by the consolidation referendum; the suit also charged that the total constitutionality of the consolidation Charter should be tested;
- litigation was initiated over the veracity of initiative petitions filed by anti-consolidationists which would have revoked the consolidation Charter by deleting each section, article by article, and reinstating all governmental bodies which existed prior to consolidation;
- questions were raised as to the legality of recall petitions filed against consolidation officials, including the mayor, city council president, and a city councilman; and,
- a suit was filed which charged that certain residents of the consolidated city were deprived of their civil and political rights assured under the one-man one-vote principle due to the malapportionment of council districts under the consolidated Charter.

^{1/} Times-Union, February 17, 1969, p. 17.

^{2/} A detailed account of legal challenges that were filed in opposition to consolidation can be found in Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 20-26.

A variety of interesting observations on the effect of these legal attacks on the newly organized government were offered by several city officials. For example, the consolidation mayor, on one occasion, poignantly noted that he " . . . could not help but wonder how much better off we would be and how much further along we could be if the people who are forever trying to keep consolidation from working would spend half as much effort and time trying to be constructive and make it work." 1/ Further, the city's chief administrative officer pointed out that these suits " . . . in many cases, resulted in legal defenses which were expensive and time consuming at a time when we badly needed our legal staff to iron out pressing transitional problems." 2/

Each of these cases was eventually denied in favor of the consolidated government; one not being decided until late 1969, nearly a year after consolidation. Moreover, the legal challenges to the consolidated government were many and varied; they were time consuming; and, they served to cast a shadow of doubt over the viability of the voter-approved structure. Nonetheless, the concept of consolidation, as stipulated in the consolidation Charter, was supported in the end.

1/ Times-Union, February 2, 1969, p. A-2.

2/ Times-Union, October 1, 1968, p. A-6.

Section III

THE POLICE SERVICES MERGER

KEY ISSUES FACED DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

Organization of the Sheriff's Office

One of the major issues faced by the newly re-elected Sheriff during the transition period dealt with the basic organization of the consolidated police department. Originally, the Consolidation Charter included an organizational breakdown and suggested staffing arrangement for the new department. This mandate proved unsatisfactory to the Sheriff for a variety of reasons. Steps were, therefore, taken prior to October 1, 1968, to outline an organization which permitted the Sheriff to more directly manage and control the consolidated city's law enforcement resources. In order to provide a clear picture of this process, the organizational structure presented in the Consolidation Charter is reviewed below. Problems inherent in the approved structure and the steps that were taken to adjust the organization in terms of perceived departmental needs are also discussed.

The Charter: Organization of the Sheriff's Department. ^{1/} The approved Charter outlined a number of organization aspects of the Sheriff's office. These included the:

- duties and responsibilities of the Sheriff;
- qualifications for the Sheriff, election thereto, term of office, and compensation;
- Sheriff's staff and budget;
- formation of the Office of the Undersheriff;
- designation of the divisions of the Office of the Sheriff; and,
- the make-up of the three legally mandated divisions; e.g. police division, prison farm and jail division and civil process division.

^{1/} The following discussion draws from the Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, Article 8: Section 8.01 through 8.07.

No major issues were raised relative to the first four of these Charter directives. The provisions concerning departmental organization and the make-up of the three line units, however, proved problematic.

Along with the three mandated divisions, the architects of the Charter provided for the appointment process of each division chief; adumbrated the responsibilities of the divisions; and, tacitly named persons to fill certain of these positions. More specifically, the Charter required that persons selected by the Sheriff to fill "chief" positions had to be confirmed by the City Council. Further, the former Jacksonville Chief of Police was to head the consolidated police division and Duval County's Civil Process Director was to continue in his pre-consolidation capacity as head of civil process operations. First, three major constraints were identified relative to the Sheriff's administrative prerogatives. Thus, only three appointive command positions beyond the Sheriff and Undersheriff were called for in the Charter. Second, the Sheriff was constrained in terms of the selection and appointment process. And, third, the degree to which the new department could be organized to respond to administrative preferences and the needs of the consolidated community were limited by the Charter verbage that outlined the responsibilities of the three operating divisions.

Stipulation of the make-up and responsibilities of the three line divisions was based on a conscious decision of the Local Government Study Commission. In particular, in late 1964, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. (IACP) completed a comprehensive analysis of the Jacksonville Police Department.^{1/} The IACP report called for a management and organizational arrangement (that included designation of the three line divisions) which the Study Commission considered a "current and professionally sound" approach to police administration. In that the new department was viewed as an "urban police department", the Study Commission incorporated in the Charter most of the IACP's recommendations with little or no change. Specifically, the Charter called for:^{2/} the Police Division of the Consolidated Department to be structured to include all the functions performed by the old Jacksonville Police Department;^{3/} the Prison Farm and Jail Division to have the overall authority

^{1/} See Chapter II of this report for a more thorough discussion of the nature, content and approach of the I. A. C. P. report.

^{2/} Interview with Mr. Lex Hester, Chief Administrative Officer, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, May 18, 1972.


^{3/} A complete discussion of the organization and operations of the Jacksonville Police Department is included in Working Paper Number IV: Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and the Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 18-25.

and responsibility for the retention and rehabilitation of offenders;^{1/} and, the Civil Process Division was to substitute for the Civil and Administrative Division which had existed under the old county structure.^{2/}

The following chart graphically depicts the structure of the consolidated law enforcement operation as it was presented in the original Charter.

Chart 3.1

ORGANIZATION PLAN OF THE CONSOLIDATION SHERIFF'S OFFICE AS PRESENTED IN THE CHARTER^{a/}



^{a/} The chart was developed from the following sources: An Analysis of the Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, Article 8, Section 8.01 through 8.07; and, interviews with Deputy Director J. L. Hamlin and Captain J. W. Wingate, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, March 22, 1972.

The Revised Organization Chart. Albeit theoretically sound, the organizational approach spelled out in the Charter was not considered appropriate or workable by the Sheriff or his advisors. In particular, it was believed that:^{3/}

^{1/} The responsibility for these functions prior to consolidation had been divided between the law enforcement operations of the two jurisdictions and officials representing the Finance Commissioner in Jacksonville and the County Commission. A complete discussion of this relationship is provided in Working Paper Number IV: Brief History, Organization and Manpower of the Jacksonville Police Department and the Duval County Sheriff's Office, pp. 30-33.

^{2/} Ibid., pp. 25-30.

^{3/} Interview with Deputy Director J. L. Hamlin, Investigation Division, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, March 22, 1972. Director Hamlin worked closely with the Sheriff during the transition period relative to departmental organization.

- there were more command level personnel in the two departments than could be accommodated in the proposed organization;
- the proposed organization did not provide the Sheriff with sufficient appointment latitude (two of three chiefs positions were specified in the Charter); and,
- the proposed structure did not provide for the appointment of additional policy level people to assist in the management of the department.

The issue concerning the inadequate number of command positions in the initial structure is made clear when the organization of the old county and old city departments are studied. Briefly, the county department was managed by four top-level commanders in addition to the Sheriff; e. g. the Chief of the Jail Division; Chief of the Civil and Administrative Division; Chief of the Traffic Division (Road Patrol); and, Chief of the Detective Division. The pre-consolidation Jacksonville department was run by twelve commanders in addition to the chief:^{1/} e. g. two assistant chiefs; and, the heads of the planning, administrative services, patrol, traffic, investigation, vice control, records and communications, central services, personnel and training, and inspection divisions. Thus, while sixteen persons in addition to the Sheriff and Chief of Police held high level command positions in pre-consolidation agencies, the Charter provided only five such positions in the new department. Moreover, eleven command personnel were seemingly left without a role in the new organization commensurate with their pre-consolidation positions.

This situation was compounded by two additional factors. First, the Sheriff felt that morale problems would surface if officers were not placed in positions relatively comparable with those that they had held prior to consolidation;^{2/} and, second, the Charter provided that ". . . every employee (of pre-consolidation governments) shall, as soon as practical,

^{1/} City of Jacksonville, 1966 Annual Report: Police Department, Jacksonville, Florida, a report prepared by the Police Department (Jacksonville: December 31, 1966), and interview with Captain J. W. Wingate, Office of the Sheriff, March 22, 1972.

^{2/} Interview with Sheriff Dale Carson, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, April 17, 1973.

acquire and retain the same status, rank, job value or position, or equal class that he held in the former government . . . "1/

Thus, an organization structure was developed during the transition period which provided for sixteen top-level command personnel in addition to the Undersheriff and Sheriff. The organizational framework for the revised structure is presented on the following page. cursory review indicates that the organization developed by the Sheriff provided for appointment of two directors, four deputy directors, eight chiefs, and persons to head an administrative services unit and a planning and research unit. This broadening of the top-level management structure tended to lessen each command persons' span of control and thereby permitted these officials more time to supervise manageable units within the consolidated department. As referenced by one of the organization's architects " . . . the organization developed during the transition period was a 'people' oriented structure and the chart which was used to depict the consolidated force was a 'people chart'."2/

In short, the revised organization took into account numerous factors, not the least of which was the placement of individuals in positions relatively compatible with those which they had held prior to the merger of the two departments. This organizational arrangement was approved by the Consolidated Council on October 1, 1968--Consolidation Day. 3/

The Subject of Top-Level Command Personnel. As was noted earlier, it was felt that the organization outlined in the Charter did not provide the Sheriff with a sufficient degree of choice in the appointment of his key assistants. In fact, the position titles of members of the pre-consolidation units were specified for two of the three chiefs openings in the Charter. Specifically, the Chief of Police of the City of Jacksonville was to head the new Police Division and the Director of the County Civil Process and Administrative operation was to become Chief of the reorganized Civil Process Division. Further, those persons that the Sheriff wished to appoint had to be confirmed by the Consolidated Council. Finally, no provision was made for the Sheriff to appoint a cadre of responsible and accountable second-level commanders to administer the department.


1/ Ibid. Also, Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, Article 22: Section 22.08.

2/ Interview with Deputy Director J. L. Hamlin, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, March 22, 1972.

3/ Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Ordinance 68-31-20, declared an emergency measure and passed by the Consolidated Council, October 1, 1968.

Chart 3.2

ORGANIZATION PLAN OF THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE



66

a/ General Order Number 68-3, Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Development of the Office of the Sheriff, Office of the Sheriff, November 1, 1968.

These factors limited the Sheriff's management flexibility in two ways. First, his management prerogatives were minimized with regard to the appointment process. Second, as an experienced police administrator he saw the need for a strong management team, directly accountable to him, whose members were comfortable in an environment where innovation was recognized as a necessary ingredient to the success of the consolidated police agency. However, the Charter provided for an organization wherein the day-to-day operations of the department would be controlled by police officers who were to be part of a strict and traditional civil service system. 1/

Thus, action was taken to revise these charter requirements. Specifically, the Sheriff worked with the Public Safety Committee of the Consolidated Council to develop an ordinance which embodied the organization structure outlined above and which provided the following: 2/

- Subject to the civil service laws, the Sheriff was designated as the sole appointing authority for members of the Sheriff's Office.
- The Undersheriff, Directors, Deputy Directors and Chiefs of Divisions were to be in the unclassified service; thus, they were not subject to the civil service laws affecting the city. Further, each such position required a college degree or at least five (5) years of training and experience.
- In case a Director, Deputy Director, or Chief who had been appointed from within the agency should be removed by the Sheriff, the ordinance provided that such persons would be restored to the same position in the classified service as he occupied at the time of his designation or to such higher position that he may have become eligible for as a result of promotional examinations taken while serving in a management capacity.

1/ Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, Article 8: Section 8.04 through 8.07, p. 24. Also interview with Captain J. W. Wingate, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, March 22, 1972.

2/ Consolidated City of Jacksonville, Ordinance 68-31-20, declared an emergency measure and passed by the Consolidated Council, October 1, 1968.

In summary, the original verbiage contained in the Charter had significantly limited the power and authority of the city's "popularly elected chief law enforcement officer". Not only had the organization been defined, but the Sheriff was at the mercy of the council in terms of the final approval of those he appointed. The revised organization structure, specification of additional unclassified positions, and the provision of appointment power to the Sheriff, however, corrected this situation and satisfied three objectives. First, the interest of members of former departments was protected. Second, the Sheriff was placed in a position to recruit and appoint those persons he desired as his key assistants. And, third, the Sheriff was granted complete control over the administrative structure of the combined police operation in that top-level administrators were not protected by the civil service system and could be removed at the pleasure of the Sheriff.

The Pay Issue

Prior to consolidation the pay scale of the City of Jacksonville police force was somewhat lower than that of the County Sheriff's Office. Because of this condition, the newly elected consolidation Mayor developed a pay plan to equalize police salaries over a period of time. This plan was incorporated in the budget which was deliberated by the Consolidated Council in mid-1968. As described by the Mayor, the plan would afford " . . . two-thirds of the policemen . . . their largest raise ever (from \$6,000 to \$7,056 a year) in the budget taking effect October 1, 1968." In addition, the plan provided for the full equalization of pay by October, 1969. 1/

Aware of the effect that "phased" pay equalization might have on personnel, the Sheriff took steps during the transition period to alter the plan. Specifically, prior to the adoption of the consolidated budget, the Sheriff made numerous appearances before the Consolidated Council's Finance Committee. On each occasion he discussed the lack of parity inherent in the Mayor's proposed plan with specific reference to the fact that many of the city officers were not to be equalized at the time of consolidation. Using the base pay for a patrolman after two years' service in each of the pre-consolidation departments the Sheriff argued that under the proposed plan it was conceivable that two men riding in the same car, facing the same dangers, could have a \$1,000 difference in pay. He further pointed out that

1/ Times-Union, August 28, 1968, p. B-1.

the situation would exist for an entire year following the merger of the departments and that " . . . we face enough problems in consolidation without the added problem of unequal salaries." He, thereby, emphasized the fact that " . . . of all the (budget) requests, the matter of utmost need . . . is that of \$300,000 necessary to equalize salaries on October 1." ^{1/}

Even though the monies needed to accomplish equalization were not available, the Mayor's original proposal was altered and " . . . a sizeable increase in the Sheriff's budget was made by the new government's finance committee to make equalization of salaries possible by . . . April (1969), six months earlier than the Mayor had proposed." ^{2/} Reflecting on this topic some years after consolidation, the Sheriff regretfully pointed out that " . . . equalization of salaries was a big thing for the city men. They liked it, they got a substantial raise. The county men didn't like it a bit because they didn't get a raise although they got a lot of fringe benefits (when consolidation took effect)." ^{3/} Thus, even though alterations were made to the mayor's original pay plan, questions of equitability still remained as to why some officers received raises at consolidation while others did not.

The Issue of Promotions

Another question faced by the Sheriff during transition concerned promotions. In particular, no provision had been made by the architects of consolidation to freeze or limit promotions during the transition period. Thus, officers in the pre-consolidation agencies were free to compete for "open" positions.

There were three important implications to this situation. First, open positions could be filled by personnel who successfully passed competitive examinations, but who did not "fit in" with the management team being put together by the Sheriff. Second, a free-wheeling promotion program, because of the salary increases which the higher positions commanded, could have adversely affected the balance of the approved consolidated budget. Third, if promotions were affected in each of the pre-

^{1/} Interview with Sheriff Dale Carson, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, April 17, 1973. See also, Times-Union, July 11, 1968, p. A-7 and July 24, 1968, p. A-11.

^{2/} Times-Union, August 7, 1968, p. B-3.

^{3/} The National Association of Counties, An Examination of the Consolidated Government of Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida, transcript from a meeting held on February 305, 1971, pp. 71-72.

consolidation departments prior to the merger, the number of persons available to compete for each position would have been fewer than after consolidation thus limiting the Sheriff's potential to draw from the highly competent manpower pool.

In response to these problems, the Sheriff worked with the city and county civil service boards and "froze" all promotions. Thus, at consolidation all officers had an opportunity to compete for the 30 sergeant vacancies, 11 lieutenant vacancies and 6 captain vacancies which existed. Further, the Sheriff was assured that these vacancies would be filled by the most qualified members of the newly consolidated force. 1/

THE ROLE OF PLANNING COMMITTEES IN EFFECTING POLICE SERVICES CONSOLIDATION

Dale Carson's role as Duval County Sheriff for several years preceding consolidation made him clearly aware of the myriad problems which would be faced in merging the two departments. A number of the key issues that were dealt with by the Sheriff and his immediate staff were discussed above. The purpose of this subsection is to detail one of the techniques utilized during transition to involve representatives of the Jacksonville Police Department and the County Sheriff's Office in planning the merger on October 1, 1968.

Planning Committees and Police Services Transition

Recognizing that planning is at the heart of administration and that no formal accommodations were made in the Consolidation Charter to consider problems inherent in the merger of the two police agencies, the Sheriff mounted an internal planning strategy. In addition, recognizing that members of the merging agencies identified personally with their respective organizations, he provided for regular agency interaction in the process.

Following his election to the consolidated government in late 1967, the Sheriff met with the Jacksonville Chief of Police to address the organization of the new department. As he recalled during a later discussion on the subject, ". . . we had to do an awful lot of work in a hurry so we got it going right away." 2/ Specifically, it was decided to

1/ It is interesting to note that upwards of forty officers left pre-consolidation agencies just prior to the merger. Albeit a variety of reasons no doubt accounted for this personnel turnover, the freezing of promotions was viewed as an important precipitating factor by various officials of the Office of the Sheriff.

2/ An Examination of the Consolidated Government of Jacksonville (Duval County), Florida, The National Association of Counties, transcript from a meeting held on February 3-5, 1971, p. 70.

utilize members from each of the police agencies to serve on a number of transition planning committees. The committees were viewed as task forces to deal with the merger of various functional aspects of the Sheriff's operation. This technique was felt to provide a number of advantages including: resources to develop ideas and program strategies for merging various elements of police operations; pragmatic approaches to the merger through the eyes of persons who would be directly affected; and, a vehicle through which representatives of the two organizations could come together and work on problems of mutual interest and, thereby, foster cooperation necessary to a successful merger. 1/

As a result, the Sheriff in his dual capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of Duval County and as an officer in the new government, issued directives in early 1968. The directives provided for the formation of joint planning committees; named the participants; and, offered guidelines on the subjects to be considered. In addition, the directives noted that: 2/

All members of both departments are urged to submit their thought and suggestions to the committees for consideration. This is an opportunity for everyone to participate in the formation of our new department.

The Planning Committees and Their Membership. The referenced directives identified subjects for committee consideration and also named committee members from each department. The table on the following page presents the names of the committees and their representative membership.

Fourteen separate committees were organized. With regard to committee membership, though it would appear from the table that more than sixty officers participated, many of the committees had overlapping membership. This approach was adopted to insure that key command personnel could participate in the planning process. Along with the Sheriff and the Jacksonville Chief of Police, 3 chiefs, 2 inspectors, 16 captains, 13 lieutenants, 5 sergeants, and 5 non-ranking officers were named to the committees. Of this number, 18 represented the Sheriff's Office, the Sheriff, 3 chiefs, 8 captains, 5 lieutenants and a patrolman.

1/ Interview with Director John Riley Smith, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, May 3, 1972.

2/ Memoranda from Dale Carson, Sheriff of Duval County and R. C. Blanton, Jr., Chief of Police, City of Jacksonville, January 12, 1968.

Table 3.3

TRANSITION PLANNING FUNCTIONS AND PARTICIPANTS^{a/}

<u>Name of Committee</u>	<u>Number of County Representatives</u>	<u>Number of City Representatives</u>	<u>Total</u>
Budget	3	2	5
Communications	2	3	5
Data Processing	3	4	6
Detective Division	2	2	4
Jail Facilities and Personnel	3	3	6
Organization Chart	0	1	1
Patrol and Beat Structure	3	5	8
Personnel and Training	2	2	4
Records and Identification	3	4	7
Schoolboy Patrol	1	2	3
Traffic Division	2	2	4
Transportation and Motor Pool	2	3	5
Uniforms	1	3	4
Vice	1	1	2

^{a/} Memorandum from Dale Carson, Sheriff, Duval County,
January 12, 1968.

patrolman. Twenty-eight persons were members of the Jacksonville Police Department; the chief, 2 inspectors, 8 captains, 8 lieutenants, 5 sergeants, 3 patrolmen, and one civilian employee.

The Organization and Functions of the Planning Committees. To insure that committee inputs could be incorporated in the consolidated department budget, each committee was directed to meet and prepare preliminary reports by February 1, 1968. The Sheriff decided on this accelerated time schedule in hopes of submitting a composite budget to the Consolidated Council and the Mayor by late March. To facilitate this schedule, each committee was furnished planning and study guides to assist in the development of uniform reports. These included an excerpt from Municipal Police Administration, a publication of the International City Management Association, entitled "Planning"; staff study, a United States Army form detailing the steps necessary for completing a staff study; and, an example of a completed report.

The committees thus began the task of planning for the merger of the two departments in January, 1968. Committee work proceeded slowly, however. Factors which hampered committee progress included: the variety and complexity of subjects under consideration; the fact that the planning effort had to be conducted simultaneously with each participant's day-to-day responsibilities; and, the fact that committee meetings had to be scheduled around shift assignments and vacation leave. Nonetheless, with the exception of the Traffic Division Committee which was constrained by having no legal expertise available to develop a revised traffic ordinance, each committee developed merger recommendations. 1/

Moreover, the planning committee process resulted in the development of recommendations for consideration by top management at no additional cost to the transition government. Further, the process allowed for interaction between representatives of the two agencies. Finally, the committee process provided an extended period wherein important topics were debated by persons whose self-interests were at stake.

The Planning Committee Technique in Perspective

In an effort to identify problems, potentials and the value of the planning committee technique, participants in the Jacksonville process were

1/ For a more detailed description of the type and nature of recommendations developed by the various committees see Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 58-59.

surveyed. Initially, at least one member from each planning committee was interviewed. Second, questionnaires were distributed to members of the pre-consolidation departments for purposes of querying them on the consolidation and the effectiveness of techniques used in the merger. Finally, members of the Sheriff's top-level management team were polled regarding this topic.

The Attitudes of Transition Committee Participants. Five specific topics were reviewed with committee members. They dealt with committee structure; meeting schedules; committee activities; problems inherent in the process; and, recommendations for others facing consolidation. These questions provided findings as to the use of the process in Jacksonville, improvements that might have been made, and adjustments to the process which might be considered by others that choose to employ the planning committee technique.

The general attitude of former committee members can be best summarized in terms of perspectives offered by the majority of those interviewed. First, it was reported that the committee process and its use was "good". Second, it was noted that the knowledge that such committees were functioning "relieved apprehensions" among the men regarding their being "forgotten" in the consolidation process. Third, the committee planning process provided a forum which facilitated and "forced" representatives of each department to get together prior to the formal merger.

Participants also offered opinions as to improvements that might have been made to the process and that should be considered by others that choose to employ the planning committee technique. These opinions are summarized in Table 3.4. Review of the table indicates that eight factors might have been given more careful consideration in Jacksonville. They are the need to balance committee representation in terms of rank structure, departmental membership and so on; limit the size of committees to workable numbers; permit committees to develop a general working relationship with the official responsible for implementation of the committee's decisions; afford participants adequate time away from normal responsibilities to deal with committee activities; provide the committees with detailed guidance as to their role, responsibilities, and methods of operation; assign membership in terms of staff expertise in each functional area; carefully consider the specific subjects to be dealt with by committees; and, provide committee members with feedback as to the reasons for acceptance or rejection of specific recommendations.

Table 3.4

COMMITTEE UTILIZATION CHECKLIST a/

Items To Be Considered In Process

Reasons for Consideration

Balanced Representation on Committees

If carefully balanced representation is provided (rank structure, number of persons representing each agency and the experience of members), it is more likely that the committees will function effectively. The Jacksonville experience illustrated that while attempts were made to assign persons to committees on this basis, some overlapping of committee membership occurred. Also, in a few instances, persons who were not particularly knowledgeable as to a functional area served on a committee dealing with that area.

Limiting the Size of Committees

While committees are used to involve as many persons as possible in a planning process, care should be taken to limit the size of committees to a workable number. As noted in Table 3.3, the largest transition committee contained 8 persons. The experience of this committee and that of a number of others suggested that "practically" only a few of those represented participated in deliberations due to problems of scheduling meetings when everyone could attend; difficulties inherent in committee members' time to get involved in the process; and, clear understanding of what each was to do.

a/ This table was developed as a result of personal interviews conducted with members of each of the transition planning committees during 1972.

Table 3.4
(Continued)

COMMITTEE UTILIZATION CHECKLIST

Items To Be Considered In Process

Reasons for Consideration

Providing Committee Access to
Functional Policy Head

If possible, the person who will ultimately be responsible for a particular function should be involved in the planning process. In Jacksonville's case, top-level supervisory personnel had not been named when committee deliberations began. As a result, some of the recommendations that were developed were discarded due to misunderstanding on the part of a supervisor; or, a lack of understanding on the committee's part as to the practicalities of implementing particular ideas vis-a-vis funding and/or various broad-based policies. This situation subsequently caused confusion among certain committee members as to the actual value of and reason for the time devoted to committee work.

Providing Committee Members with
Adequate Time to Fulfill Committee
Responsibilities

If the committee process is used, thought should be given to allowing involved persons time away from their normal job tasks to perform committee work. In Jacksonville, committee responsibilities were added to day-to-day tasks. Thus, a number of those involved indicated that they were unable to devote the amount of time to committee activities that was essential while satisfactorily performing regular responsibilities.

Table 3.4
(Continued)

COMMITTEE UTILIZATION CHECKLIST

Items To Be Considered In Process

Reasons for Consideration

Providing the Committees with Detailed Guidelines

As noted in the text, generalized guidelines were provided to each committee regarding report preparation and the planning process. No guidelines were provided concerning the specific responsibilities of the committees or how they should organize in terms of selecting a chairman and completing specified work. As a result, a number of committees floundered. They deliberated topics which were beyond their scope (e.g. wages) and generally wasted time because of a lack of specific direction. Due to this problem a number of committee participants became alienated from the process and disenchanted with the basic idea of consolidation.

Assigning Committee Membership in Relation to a Person's Proven Expertise in a Given Functional Area

The most effective committees that functioned in Jacksonville were manned by persons who had a unique knowledge of the subject being considered; i. e. data processing and communications were considered by persons who had marked knowledge of hardware, operating techniques and operating procedures. In those instances where committee actions broke down, it often was attributed to the fact that people were offering opinions on subjects with which they had inadequate knowledge and experience.

Table 3.4
(Continued)

COMMITTEE UTILIZATION CHECKLIST

Items To Be Considered In Process

Considering Subjects for Committee Assignment

Reasons for Consideration

Two criteria might be used in this context. First, the degree to which technical expertise is necessary regarding the development of meaningful recommendations on a particular subject might be considered. This factor should, in turn, be related to the number, rank and experience of personnel who are members of the agencies to be merged. In the instance that difficulty exists in relation to membership balance as described earlier, the subject might be eliminated from committee consideration. In the Jacksonville experience the Beat and Patrol Committee had difficulty dealing with their complicated topic and the Budget Committee was not adequately equipped to prepare a budget. Second, topics which tend to relate to subjective versus technically oriented decision processes should be carefully weighted prior to being assigned to committees. For example, although the Uniform Committee in the Jacksonville experience sought to afford everyone an opportunity to express opinions on the type, style, color, etc. of the consolidation uniform, badge, and hardware, no concensus was reached-- everyone's personal taste was different. Thus, controversy was raised over an issue which, when decided, could not possibly be consistent with myriad personal preferences.

Table 3.4

COMMITTEE UTILIZATION CHECKLIST

Items To Be Considered In Process

Providing Committees with
Decision Feedback

Reasons for Consideration

After the committees presented their recommendations to top-management, their knowledge and understanding of the planning-decision process ended. That is, following submittal, policy-level officials took what the committees had presented, considered each recommendation in terms of its merits and in relation to overall policy needs and resources, and selected, or rejected, certain of the recommendations for implementation. For a variety of reasons including time, the need to deal with other priority items and administrative style, committees were not advised of the reasons behind the various management decisions. As such, various committee participants felt that their "hard work" had been futile in that recommendations were seemingly rejected "out of hand".

Moreover, while the Jacksonville transition committee process permitted a limited number of persons from pre-consolidation departments to become involved with the merger, a number of weaknesses were evidenced. Nonetheless, the idea of involving line officers, patrolmen, and civilian personnel in the merger provided them the opportunity to learn more about one another, the internal operations of the respective agencies; and, the problems faced by the top management of the Office of the Sheriff in consolidating the two forces. Thus, the committee process was seen as a valuable tool that aided in bringing the agencies together.

Employee Attitudes Regarding the Committee Process. ^{1/} Persons that served in pre-consolidation departments were randomly sampled by questionnaires as to their opinions concerning the role and value of the planning

^{1/} The following steps were taken in developing and testing the research questionnaire for validity and reliability. Briefly, to insure that the questionnaire measured what it claimed to, and was thus valid, and that it was structured in a manner which provided consistent results and was, therefore reliable, the following actions were taken. First, a variety of questions were structured by the research team. These questions were subsequently reviewed with officials of the Research and Planning Unit, Office of the Sheriff. As a result of this review, language modifications were made to the preliminary statements, new questions were added, and a number of the original items were deleted. Following this step, the questionnaire was pre-tested by various members of the Planning and Research Unit. The pre-testing, combined with knowledge developed from interviews with a variety of persons who had participated in the consolidation process, resulted in a final revision of the questionnaire. Further, it was decided to utilize an unsigned mail-back instrument to promote responses and insure anonymity.

The schedule entitled Office of the Sheriff--Personnel File: Seniority by Rank dated February 8, 1973, was utilized to draw the final survey sample. Specifically, this schedule listed the names of all members of the department by rank and date of entry. First, the research team, working with staff of the Research and Planning Unit, selected September 30, 1969, as the cut off date for persons of a civil service rank to be included in the sample. Second, in an effort to draw a large enough sample, one-third of those eligible were included (persons who had served on transition committees and had been interviewed were not considered eligible). As a result, the name of every third person on the schedule that met the above criteria was drawn. The total sample equalled 235. Personalized envelopes were subsequently addressed which included the questionnaire, a stamped addressed envelope for its direct mailing to Koepsell-Girard and Associates and an explanation (Continued on next page.)

committee technique. Questions regarding the importance, effectiveness and the propriety of others using the planning committee process were included in the survey schedule. When asked whether the committees played an important role in the merger, 85 percent of those responding answered the question positively. Only 20 out of the 133 responding to the question did feel that the committees were unimportant. The following reasons were cited as to the ineffectiveness of the planning committees: not enough time was provided for committee deliberations; committees were unorganized in their approach; committee members did not understand what they were to do; more knowledgeable persons should have been placed on committees; and, the process did not involve a large enough number of lower-level personnel.

The respondents were also asked whether other departments facing consolidation should use planning committees. Again, the vast majority--98 percent--responded positively. In addition, a number commented on how the committees might be made more effective. The majority of the comments closely paralleled the points noted above. Two additional guidelines were, however, offered. First, it was suggested that committees should maintain "open lines of communication" with the people that their deliberations affected--the line police officers. Second, many felt that persons appointed to committees should have a positive attitude about the overall merger process and should communicate this attitude to their peers while explaining committee deliberations--"nothing sells a patrolman like another patrolman telling him facts on the merger."

Top Management's Perspectives Regarding the Transition Committee Process. When questioned about the use of planning committees, the Office of the Sheriff's top-level administrators detailed some of the costs and benefits of using such a method. Among them were the following:

- The approach brought members of the pre-consolidation departments together which provided them an opportunity to learn more about one another. Thus, the committees helped breakdown personal barriers and prejudices prior to the departments being merged.

1/ (Continued from preceding page.) of the overall study and the purpose of the questionnaire. These packages were delivered through interdepartmental mail. Of the total distributed, seven were returned for such reasons as "officer on medical leave", "officer on vacation", etc. Thus, 228 were ultimately included in those sampled. Of this amount, 142 or 62 percent returned completed questionnaires.

- The committee process permitted line police officers the opportunity to deal with issues of a policy-level nature. As a result, such persons gained a better understanding of the problems and responsibilities of management.
- A cost associated with the process concerned the time required to make the technique effective. Officials noted that "there was so much to do and so little time" it was difficult to deal with the committee process in a comprehensive manner.
- Ill-will and misunderstandings were generated through the committee process as a result of topics being deliberated that should not have been dealt with by committees. For example, the selection of a uniform, badge and insignia, while important items to a police agency, relate to personal taste, costs and practicality. The recommendations of the transition committee on these subjects had to be revised in relation to all these factors; a condition which some did not understand.

One additional perspective offered by Jacksonville's law enforcement managers concerned the need to "carefully point out" the intended use of committee recommendations. It should have been stressed that committee recommendations would be "considered" in making final decisions rather than serve as final answers. In other words, it should be clearly stated that committees are "idea generators" and that the recommendations developed by such groups are simply inputs to the overall decisionmaking process.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF A POLICE AGENCY AND THEIR IMPORTANCE IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS

Certain factors which relate to the delivery of police services and to the ability of police officers to identify and be identified with their organization were found to have a particular effect on consolidation. Among these items are police department housing; laws and ordinances; records; communications; and, uniforms, among others. The following discussion provides others with an overview of the role these factors played in the Jacksonville process.

Police Uniforms, Equipment and Facilities

The departments to be merged in Jacksonville had different uniforms and equipment. Not only were colors dissimilar, but material types, hat styles, leather and hardware also varied. Similarly, each agency's patrol cars carried unique markings and were of a different color. The adequacy, location and conditions of the buildings in which the police agencies were housed also varied. Each of these items serve the individual police officer as tools of his trade and afford him symbols with which to identify. Recognizing their importance, officials representing the Office of the Sheriff took steps to resolve differences and problems associated with these items.

One measure taken to smooth the transition involved the repainting of all patrol cars. Similarly, the markings of all cars were standardized to signify that they belonged to the new Office of the Sheriff. This task was relatively straight forward and was accomplished soon after consolidation.

The standardization of uniforms and equipment was a more complicated problem. As noted above, a transition planning committee was organized to decide on a new uniform. Albeit this group attempted to reach a consensus, in the end the Sheriff and his chief advisors made the final decision. The committee deliberations, however, took a great deal of time which precluded the ordering of uniforms prior to consolidation. Further, during the transition period consolidation officials were not legally empowered to purchase materials and supplies in the name of the consolidated government. Thus, when the forces were merged, officers dressed as they had prior to the integration of the two departments. This situation confused citizens, created problems for supervisors in terms of dealing with one homogenous unit; and, made it difficult for the men to identify with a single consolidated agency. Conditions did not change until early 1969--nearly seven months following consolidation--when new uniforms were received.

Similarly, the facilities that were used by the consolidated force existed as reminders of pre-consolidation days. Albeit a new police building was needed to bring operations under one roof, only minor alterations were made to the former Jacksonville Police Station and the Duval County Courthouse following the merger. Members of the consolidated force were housed in terms of their particular function--patrol and traffic was located in the former with the majority of the remaining functions in the latter. When reviewing this situation with representatives of the Sheriff's Office, it was pointed out that the housing problem complicated the merger and made coordinating the day-to-day operations of the agency difficult.

Interestingly, these items were ranked highly when members of the Office of the Sheriff were polled as to their importance in the merger process. In fact, police uniforms and housing were most frequently selected as keys to the effective transition to consolidation. Patrol cars were viewed as the third most important factor to be dealt with in the consolidation of police agencies.

The General Orders Manual

Traditionally, police organizations have employed general orders manuals to outline policies, programs and procedures of broad application. Further, such manuals have normally been viewed as guiding documents to be maintained and updated over time. Therefore, the general orders manual provides police personnel with guidelines which permit them to respond in a consistent and planned manner in delivering various police services.

Action necessary to update, revise and, in fact, merge the operating manuals of the pre-consolidation units in Jacksonville was considered by those who assisted the Sheriff during the transition process. The basic philosophy of top-level administrators was to review existing procedures and select the most appropriate from each agency. However, efforts to employ this strategy met with difficulty for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, the various divisions of the County Sheriff's Department maintained separate operating procedures and general orders; i. e. the detective division and road patrol had separate manuals and used slightly differing procedures. On the other hand, the Jacksonville Police Department employed one detailed general orders manual. Thus, within this somewhat confusing environment and due to such factors as limited manpower to perform a thorough analysis, the cost of such an exercise and the time constraints faced by the transition officials--the decision was made not to act on a revised manual prior to consolidation. Rather, the Jacksonville General Orders Manual was to be updated and revised to reflect various matters concerning consolidation and used at the time of the merger. Unfortunately, due to printing backlogs and distribution problems this could not be accomplished. Thus, on October 1, 1968, a directive was issued to the effect that the general orders in effect in each agency prior to consolidation would continue to be used. In November, 1968, a composite manual was issued.

In surveying persons involved in the process, a number of findings instructive to others were documented. For example, it was indicated that the existence of a comprehensive general orders manual at the time of

consolidation is an important item to be considered in terms of creating an environment for a smooth merger. In fact, nearly 60 percent of the police personnel polled indicated that a number of problems occurred at the time of consolidation because one general orders manual was not in use. This attitude was explained in terms of the following:

- without standard guidelines, the overall delivery of police services was confusing;
- while there was one department, two sets of rules were in effect;
- men working side by side were using different rules; and,
- no one was sure which orders took precedence in a particular situation.

In short, as one interviewee reported, "the differences in procedures caused confusion, disagreements, lowering of morale, and a lack of uniformity in police services." Moreover, the Jacksonville experience indicates that, if at all possible, the general orders manual should be ready prior to a merger.

The Condition of Laws and Ordinances

In the administration of justice in the United States, several distinct steps take place. A particular act is defined by statute or ordinance as a criminal action. A police agency then is expected to enforce the statute. Finally, a court ascertains that due process was followed in the design and enforcement of the law. Thus, the mere existence of laws and ordinances for police officers to enforce is complicated by the fact that the laws themselves or the process used in enforcement might be judged lacking by a court system. This circumstance, combined with the existence of state statutes, city codes, as well as a state, county and municipal court structure proved extremely problematic following the Jacksonville consolidation. 1/

1/ Although the new City Council passed an emergency ordinance extending old city ordinances into the old county on the first day of consolidation, police officers nonetheless had to contend with enforcing the laws within an established legal system which did not change as a result of consolidation.

When asked whether the fact--that the laws and ordinances of the former City of Jacksonville and Duval County had not been recodified to provide one set of standards for the entire area prior to consolidation-- created problems for law enforcement officials, 75 percent of those responding answered affirmatively. Numerous explanations were offered. However, the following illustrate the nature of the most prevalent: what laws to enforce; when to enforce them; who had the authority to enforce them; what was the role of the existing courts systems.

In summary, the situation proved to be extremely "confusing" for all concerned: police officers, representatives of the judiciary and citizens alike. While former city officers were expert in administering city ordinances, members of the consolidated force that had been with the county were not. Similarly, former city officers had a limited knowledge of the county and state statutes and, in fact, were not authorized to function in the pre-consolidation county area because they were not sworn state deputies. ^{1/} Thus, a number of uncertainties concerning the enforcement of laws and ordinances existed at the time of consolidation. Albeit, many of these uncertainties were cleared by the enactment of a general ordinance in May, 1971, much of the confusion and controversy which followed the police services merger might have been avoided if steps had been taken following the vote on consolidation to recodify laws and ordinances.

Communications Operation^{2/}

The Sheriff was confronted by a number of problems concerning communications during the transition period. Among these were the question of system compatibility, the location of the consolidated communications center, and organization for purposes of dispatching and receiving calls. Briefly, prior to consolidation the county department operated on both UHF and VHF frequencies while the city department utilized only a VHF mode.

^{1/} In that laws existed regarding the liability of the Sheriff for all actions of his deputies, a sizeable bond had been taken by pre-consolidation county administrators to protect the interests of the county and the Sheriff against arbitrary and capricious acts of deputies. At consolidation, there was uncertainty as to the Sheriff's continuing legal liability for his deputies. Further, it was felt that to extend the bond to the expanded force would be extremely costly. Thus, no action was taken to deputize former city officers.

^{2/} See Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 45-47 for more detail on this subject.

The city maintained a communications center prior to consolidation as did the county. And, the county utilized separate dispatching and receiving stations while the city processed all communications through a single station.

Working with his key advisors, the Sheriff made the following decisions during the months preceding consolidation. 1/ First, the decision was made to utilize UHF as opposed to VHF as the common frequency base in that most existing communications hardware was equipped for this mode. Second, because the decision had been made to locate the consolidated communications center in close proximity to the records center, it was decided to house the central communications operation in the former county headquarters. However, because no monies were available to renovate the county quarters to accommodate the increased number of personnel which would result from combining the units, no action was taken to effect this decision at the time of consolidation. Finally, it was agreed that two separate dispatching and receiving operations would be maintained temporarily. 2/

The Sheriff reviewed these decisions with the Public Safety Committee of the Consolidated Council preceding the merger. As a result of these meetings and in an effort to insure that final decisions were based on the best available professional advice, the Public Safety Committee directed the Sheriff to see that existing communications centers were maintained, that two emergency phone numbers be instituted to expedite the receipt of police calls, and that an outside consulting firm be selected to conduct an in-depth communications study. When the departments were merged the existing communications system was maintained. In addition, in late 1968, a consulting firm was retained to perform a detailed study of the consolidated communications function.

1/ It should be noted that a special transition committee on communications was named in early January, 1968. The work of that committee resulted in the actions presented in this discussion.

2/ One of the problems inherent in the dispatching of calls when the consolidated government began operation related to past experience of dispatchers and the similarity of street names. Due to their past experience as city or county men, no individual receiving and/or dispatching agency was familiar with all the street locations in the consolidated area. Further, some six-hundred streets had common names; either phonetically or by spelling. As a result, when calls were received oftentimes the persons receiving the communications did not know where the street was; in which zone it was located; or which patrol beat should be notified. Further, no official maps were available; receivers used commercial maps for beat definition. This situation was later corrected when the communications section was brought together during the first year of consolidation and a street beat locator was devised.

Consolidation of Police Records ^{1/}

Prior to consolidation the two law enforcement agencies utilized different methods and techniques to file and store police records. During the transition period, steps were taken regarding the methods to be used at consolidation; the manning of the consolidated records center; and, the physical location of the center.

Briefly, the decision was made to adopt the then extant city system-- the FBI sanctioned procedure for the storage of records. It was planned that at the time of consolidation all records would be merged into one information bank by using standard categories and indices for organizing and identifying the nature, type and variety of crimes and offenders. Second, the Sheriff insured that the records center would remain open around the clock when the departments were consolidated. Prior to consolidation the records center in the county Sheriff's department had remained open only sixteen hours a day due to personnel shortages. Lastly, the decision was made to locate the consolidated records center as close as possible to the consolidated communications center.

THE IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATION ON PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

In an effort to more clearly determine the impact the Jacksonville merger had on police personnel, a special series of questions was included in the referenced survey instrument. Responses to these questions were as follows:

- 60 percent of those responding indicated that "the pending merger lowered morale";
- 72 percent attributed the morale problem to a lack of certainty as to how the merger would affect them personally (e. g. rank status, pay, working conditions, etc.);
- 93 percent indicated that speculation and rumors existed prior to consolidation with regard to "how things would really work after the departments were merged"; and,

^{1/} See Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 43-45 for more detailed information on this subject.

- 80 percent of the respondents felt that there was not enough emphasis placed on advising members of each department about consolidation prior to the final merger.

With regard to changes which might have been made in the process to improve morale, the following recommendations were made. First, nearly two-thirds of those responding indicated that conditions at consolidation would have been less tense, confusing and complicated if everyone had had the same uniform. Second, 85 percent noted that morale would have been higher if a plan had been implemented prior to consolidation to train each officer concerning the operations of the new department. Finally, 75 percent agreed that feelings in the departments would have been more positive if top-level command and supervisory personnel had been identified prior to consolidation.

Moreover, although the Sheriff and his chief advisors sought to insure the men that consolidation would not be a detrimental force, many felt that additional steps could have been taken prior to consolidation to make the merger easier. Clearly, the overall situation faced by the top-level administrators made some of these steps difficult as explained elsewhere in this chapter. Nonetheless, the experiences and attitudes reported above indicate that various changes might have made the overall process less difficult.

Section III

A PERSPECTIVE FOR OTHERS

THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT MERGER

The Value of a Formal Transition Period

The use of a transition period was judged extremely valuable in Jacksonville. It afforded the newly elected City Council an opportunity to "gear up" for the political process which was required under consolidation. It also allowed the Council to organize and to become familiar with its new responsibilities. Transition further permitted the new administration to plan for the merger within a framework that did not call for the concurrent delivery of municipal services.

Moreover, the transition period provided Jacksonville's newly elected and appointed officials an opportunity to ready themselves and the consolidated government structure. It offered a defined time frame and an environment which allowed the consolidated officials to detach themselves from the typical and ongoing problems of local government. As such, a consolidation budget was prepared, department heads were selected and organizational and operating strategies were detailed prior to consolidation.

The Nature of Legislation Authorizing Transition

Jacksonville's charter addressed such subjects as the organizational and fiscal responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of the new government. In addition, the charter defined the powers and duties of officials who were to function during the transition process; directed outgoing governmental officials to assist in transition; documented the continuation of the pre-consolidation governments during the period; made accommodation for the identification and protection of employees who were to staff the consolidated government, and provided for the financing of the transition period.

The powers and duties of transition government officials as presented in the charter were general in nature and focused on the development of a budget for the consolidated government--the framework on which

the new organization was to operate. This power, although limited, offered consolidation officials the "right" and the budget provided key "reasons" to work at consolidation before it was institutionalized. The powers and duties of officials of pre-consolidation government during the transition period were also generally discussed in the charter. The lack of specificity, however, proved problematic to the transition government. As noted by the newly elected Mayor, " . . . the delineation of responsibility was not spelled out and the outgoing officials were conducting business as usual . . . (and) they took their ire out on the ones that were to replace them to protect themselves politically." ^{1/} As a result, numerous problems were created which made it difficult for the consolidated government in its early days.

In summary, the Jacksonville experience made it clear that transition legislation should, on the one hand, account for the personnel, organizational and financial needs of an interim government and insure that employees of the various governments to be merged will not be disenfranchised. On the other hand, however, legislation should detail the role, responsibilities and limitations of the officials of governments that are to be consolidated.

The Duration of a Transition Period

The period between voter approval of consolidation and the merger of governments in Jacksonville was more than fourteen months. The formal transition period authorized in the charter spanned seven months. As one official of the consolidated government noted " . . . it was a period of endurance." ^{2/} Yet, it was also a period of accomplishment; the consolidated council was organized and the executive branch readied itself for the press operations.

Nonetheless, all of the time following voter approval was not used to plan for consolidation. Although the consolidated council began work prior to the beginning of the formal seven month transition, its deliberations lasted for only nine months. It was also during the extended fourteen month period that the old governments " . . . knew they were going to be abolished (and, thus) got stronger in their efforts to make it . . . more difficult for the consolidated government to work by changing laws, providing promotions and passing specialized local legislation." ^{3/}

^{1/} Times-Union, February 18, 1969, p. B-1.

^{2/} Ibid., comment of City Attorney William Durden.

^{3/} Ibid.

In summary, although it was strongly felt the transition period was valuable in Jacksonville, the time allotted for transition, when one considers the lack of specificity as to the role and activities of the outgoing governments, was too long. A general guide for others may be that a transition period be provided but be kept to a minimum--perhaps four to six months--or the time necessary to develop, consider and adopt a sound budget to guide the operations of a consolidated government.

Problems That May Arise During a Transition Period

The Jacksonville experience illustrated two types of problems that may occur during the transition phase of a government consolidation. First, unless specifically forbidden, local bills may be passed which directly and adversely impact the budget or operating efficiency of the consolidated unit. Examples in Jacksonville's case included the passage of salary increases for police and firemen, the issuance of franchises and permits for local cable communications systems, and the establishment of modified rate structures for private trash and utility operators--each of which took place after the consolidated budget was approved. Second, Jacksonville's transition provided a lengthy period during which consolidation opponents loosed a series of parting shots. These included legal suits which challenged the merger's constitutionality, the mechanics of the referendum process, and the civil and political rights of groups in the area that opposed consolidation.

To protect against such problems, others contemplating consolidation might consider the following. First, the efforts of the consolidated government should be buffered during the transition period. This may be done by detailing or limiting the power of the outgoing officers or by placing a moratorium on actions other than those essential for the continued delivery of services at the level budgeted by those governments. Similarly, the charter might be structured to allow consolidation officials to rescind or veto certain actions of pre-consolidation units if they deviate from programs and plans adopted subsequent to the approval of consolidation, or if they clearly and adversely affect the new government. Second, provision should be made for the eventuality of legal battles following consolidation. Monies might be earmarked or placed in a contingency fund to provide for legal defenses which may be necessary. Moreover, plans should be made to deal with contingencies brought on by consolidation and steps should be taken to insure that outgoing officials do not legislate the incoming consolidated government into a difficult position.

THE POLICE SERVICES MERGER

The Importance of Organization and Management in the Consolidation of Police Agencies

One of the major issues faced by the Sheriff in Jacksonville preceding consolidation dealt with the basic organization and development of a management team to insure that the new police agency functioned in a systematic manner. Although the mandates presented in the charter were theoretically sound, they proved unworkable in reality for the following reasons: (1) there were more command level personnel in the two departments than could be accommodated in the organization defined in the original charter; (2) the charter tacitly named two of the three top departmental assistants which severely minimized the Sheriff's appointment latitude; and, (3) the charter did not allow for the naming of additional non-civil service policy-level people which the Sheriff felt could be invaluable in the management of the consolidated police agency.

Consequently, a great deal of time and effort had to be put forth by the Sheriff prior to consolidation. Steps were taken to insure that a "workable" organization structure was defined and that an adequate cadre of top-level managers were available and directly accountable to the Sheriff. The results of these efforts provided that the interests of members of former departments were protected; the Sheriff was permitted to appoint persons he desired as his key assistants; and, he was given complete control over the administrative structure of his office in that members of his expanded management team were not protected by a staid civil service system but could be removed by the Sheriff at his pleasure.

The lessons for others with regard to these subjects are straightforward. First, during a critical period when time was at a premium, the Sheriff had to design, defend and sell the consolidated City Council a revised organization structure. Organizing to most effectively deliver police services was the job given to the Sheriff when re-elected as the new government's chief law enforcement officer. Unfortunately, although architects of the consolidation charter provided for the law enforcement function, they literally "tied the hands" of the official who was to be responsible for providing this critical service. Others should thus maintain a perspective as to the level of detail and purpose of the legal framework undergirding consolidation. Clearly, the broad-based topic of law enforcement should be addressed; it is questionable, however, whether management's operating prerogatives should be delimited by verbiage included in such a document.

The Effect of Pay and Promotions on the Merger of Police Agencies

Pay and promotions are oftentimes viewed as tools to be used by top management in effectively achieving an organization's desired goals. In Jacksonville, however, these items might well have served to divide the consolidated force. Thus, the Sheriff took definitive action prior to consolidation to insure that pay and promotions could be used as vehicles to help promote the smooth merger of the two law enforcement agencies. 1/

More specifically, recognizing that a differential existed between base salaries in the pre-consolidation departments, the Sheriff worked with the newly elected City Council toward the end of "equalizing" the salary structure. Unfortunately, these actions had to be taken in opposition to proposals offered by the new mayor and during the abbreviated budget process. Nonetheless, the propriety of the request was recognized by the Council and monies were allocated to insure that total equalization was achieved during the first year of consolidation. Had adequate resources been available, this change would have no doubt been scheduled for implementation at consolidation.

The Sheriff also took steps to freeze promotions in the pre-consolidation agencies prior to the merger. No arbitrary promotions were, therefore, made which might have been based on favoritism or attempts to protect particular employees. Rather, following consolidation, the Sheriff had a variety of command positions to fill and the entire consolidated force to draw from. As a result, he was able to fill key positions with the best available talent through a singular testing and selection process.

In summary, others facing consolidation should carefully evaluate salary structures operative in the agencies to be merged. In the instance that a differential is identified, steps should be taken to insure that monies are available to equalize pay scales when consolidation is implemented. Further, consideration should be given to providing the newly elected or appointed chief law enforcement officer the opportunity to be involved in selecting officers to fill as many command positions in the consolidation agency as possible. In fact, the "freezing" of promotions when agency unification is approved by the electorate might well be included in the consolidation charter as a safeguard against actions of outgoing governments.

1/ Fringe benefit and pension plans were also considered in the Jacksonville process. These subjects were, however, treated adequately by the Local Government Study Commission of Duval County. See Working Paper Number III: The Recommendations of the Local Government Study Commission of Duval County, pp. 23-27 for a detailed account of their work. These topics should, of course, be considered by others contemplating or facing consolidation.

Involving Members of the Agencies to be Merged in the Consolidation Process

In Jacksonville, transition planning committees assisted the Sheriff consider merger problems. The committees were assigned responsibilities concerning specified functional areas and/or topics relating to overall police operations. Further, they were manned by members of the departments to be consolidated. Thus, vehicles were provided through which representatives of the two agencies came together prior to consolidation. The committee process, moreover, played an important role in the Jacksonville police services merger and is recommended for use by others.

Jacksonville's experience also highlighted a number of items that should be considered if the committee technique is employed by others. They include:

- Committee representation should be balanced among the agencies to be merged, as well as in terms of rank structure, and experience;
- Committee size should be limited to workable numbers;
- Committees should work with persons that will be involved in the consideration and implementation of their recommendations;
- Committee members should have time away from their normal job tasks to fulfill committee responsibilities;
- Committees should be given detailed guidelines as to their responsibilities, functions and direction;
- Committee membership should be assigned on the basis of staff expertise in particular functional areas; e.g. data processing, communications, traffic, etc.;
- Subjects should be selected for consideration by committees that can be evaluated on the basis of hard facts as opposed to subjective opinions; e.g. data processing versus the selection of a uniform type.

- Time should be allocated to provide feedback to committee participants with regard to the final disposition of their recommendations.

With regard to involving members of the agencies to be merged in the consolidation process techniques other than committees might also be employed. Specifically, when asked to rank various techniques which might have been used in the Jacksonville merger and which could be considered by others facing consolidation, members of the Office of the Sheriff offered the following opinions. As might be expected, the technique which was most frequently ranked first concerned the use of special committees (43 percent of the respondents reported this as their first choice). The technique which was most frequently--30 percent of the time--ranked second concerned the use of general sessions to inform members of each department as to the personal effect consolidation would have on them. Small group sessions in such areas as vice, communications, etc. were ranked third as vehicles to review the various procedures and policy changes to be effected when the agencies merged. Ranked last was the use of general joint training sessions to familiarize employees with consolidation.

Moreover, persons that experienced the merger in Jacksonville indicated that in addition to planning committees, two techniques may be used to involve people in the merger process: briefing sessions and training programs. The underlying principal regardless of which technique is selected, however, focuses on the effect consolidation will have on "people" and management's ability to "minimize" this effect.

In conclusion, findings indicate that involving members of the police agencies to be merged in the consolidation process can be a valuable approach. Further, the Jacksonville experience illustrates that once such a decision is made, regardless of what techniques are employed, top management should set aside time to make the involvement process effective. This is a critical issue which should be judged prior to selection of any technique; if time is at such a premium that serious questions exist concerning management's involvement in the process, consideration should be given to keeping employee involvement at a minimum.

A Checklist of Factors Which Affect Police Operations

Certain factors which relate to the delivery of police services and the ability of police officers to identify and be identified with an organization were found to have particular relevance in Jacksonville. These included:

pay and fringe benefits; uniforms (color and style); patrol cars (color and style); general orders (operating procedures and specific guidelines); laws and ordinances; police department housing; communications; and, records.

Those facing consolidation can draw from the Jacksonville experience in a number of ways. First, the nature of variations existing in these factors among the agencies to be merged serve as indicators of the magnitude of the change which will be required if consolidation is effected. Second, evaluation of these factors might aid in determining how time can best be used prior to the implementation of consolidation; i. e. although law and ordinance recodification was recognized by Jacksonville officials as critical prior to consolidation, few steps were taken in this regard. Finally, a priority ranking of these items should be established to allow the best use of time and resources during the period preceding consolidation.

Chapter IV

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIES AND EFFICIENCIES OF
THE CONSOLIDATED OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

Section I

THE LAW ENFORCEMENT BUDGET AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE EVALUATION OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

CONSTRUCTING A PROGRAM BUDGET FOR THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF

To examine the effectiveness of Jacksonville's law enforcement operations, a structure for evaluation had to be developed. ^{1/} Further, an evaluation framework had to be designed to account for the costs of providing police services while relating these expenditures to the basic objective of the Office of the Sheriff--the maintenance of law and order in the Consolidated City. To accomplish these purposes, program budgets were constructed for the operation of the Office of the Sheriff for fiscal years 1968-1969 through 1971-1972. ^{2/}

A key to the development of the program budgets was the determination of specific organizational objectives and the grouping of various functionally related activities into program categories that constituted a structure for evaluating costs. A list of the program categories used in the budget is presented in the following table.

- ^{1/} See Working Paper Number VII: An Examination of the Conceptual Approaches to Economies of Scale and the Allocation of Resources in Law Enforcement for a complete discussion of the state of the art in economic evaluation of law enforcement operations. An optimal approach for measuring the relationship between law enforcement expenditures developed by the research team is also presented in the working paper.
- ^{2/} The City of Jacksonville and Duval County employed the expenditure form of budget prior to consolidation. The expenditure form with its sole emphasis on the quantity of funds available for the purchase of various inputs makes it virtually impossible to translate information into a program budget format. This shortcoming, coupled with the considerable passage of time since consolidation and the resultant loss of information, prevented the construction of program budgets for pre-consolidation years. A detailed discussion of the development of the program budgets along with the problems encountered in the process, is included in Working Paper Number VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement Services in the Office of the Sheriff, pp. 2-13.

Table 4.1

PROGRAM CATEGORIES USED IN A HYPOTHETICAL
PROGRAM BUDGET FOR THE OFFICE OF THE
SHERIFF, JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

Control and Reduction of Crime

Crimes Against Persons
Crimes Against Property

Traffic Regulation

Maintenance of Public Order and the Provision
of Public Services

Administration and Support

Direction and Control
Law Enforcement Education and Training
Support Services

Other Programs of the Criminal Justice System

Jails and Prisons
Civil Process

As the table illustrates, five program categories were selected as constituting a useful structure for evaluating costs. The first program category aggregated costs directly associated with the control and reduction of crime. The program is divided into two sub-categories: crimes against persons, such as murder, assault, rape and armed robbery; and, crimes against property, such as theft, forgery and fraud. The second category focused on traffic regulation. It is comprised of resources associated with facilitating traffic movement, promoting traffic safety and accident prevention. The third program covered such diverse activities as maintaining public order and providing public services. For purposes of analysis, public order was defined to include the control and reduction of disorderly conduct, drunkenness, private quarrels, and other forms of quasi-criminal

behavior as well as the prevention and suppression of civil disorders. Public service activities consisted primarily of investigating missing persons, providing emergency services, and carrying out unilateral or bilateral efforts to foster goodwill. The administration and support category was designed to account for general overhead and support activities such as the salaries of the Sheriff and his staff of directors; training and personnel; and, general administrative expenditures. The fifth and final category was structured to cover those activities which are a part of the criminal justice system but which may not be traditionally viewed as part of a law enforcement system. In the case of Jacksonville, these activities include the operation and maintenance of the jail and prison farm and the execution of civil process.

Following the definition of the program categories, the costs by organizational units in the Sheriff's Office were assigned to the various categories for each fiscal year. This assignment was made on the basis of the breakdown presented in Table 4.2. The process of assigning organizational units to program categories varied according to the units in question. For example, some of the assignments were straightforward given the nature of the unit and the definition of its program activities. ^{1/} Units which fell into this group included the Office of the Sheriff; the Police Services Department; the Traffic Engineering Department; the Civil Process Division; and, the Division of Jails and Prisons. The remaining units were assigned to program categories according to information supplied through primary and secondary source research. ^{2/}

1/ See Working Paper Number VI: The First Four Years of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Agency, pp. 3-15 for a detailed description of the organization of the Office of the Sheriff following consolidation.

2/ See Working Paper Number VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement Services in the Office of the Sheriff, pp. 3-12 for a detailed description of the allocation process.

Table 4.2

OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF:
 ORGANIZATION UNITS AND THEIR PROGRAM ASSIGNMENTS a/

<u>Organizational Units</u>	<u>Program Categories</u>				
	<u>Control and Reduction of Crime</u>	<u>Traffic Regulation</u>	<u>Public Order and Public Services</u>	<u>Administration and Support</u>	<u>Other Programs of the Criminal Justice Program</u>
Office of the Sheriff					
Sheriff				X	
Undersheriff				X	
Administration Services				X	
Internal Investigation				X	
Traffic and Patrol Division					
Director				X	
Patrol Division	X		X		
Traffic Division		X	X		
Traffic Engineering		X			
Police Services Division					
Director				X	
Administrative Services, Personnel and Planning				X	
Law Enforcement Education				X	

a/ Office of the Sheriff, 1972 Organization Chart and Koepsell-Girard and Associates, Inc.

Table 4.2
(Continued)

<u>Organizational Units</u>	<u>Program Categories</u>				
	<u>Control and Reduction of Crime</u>	<u>Traffic Regulation</u>	<u>Public Order and Public Services</u>	<u>Administration and Support</u>	<u>Other Programs of the Criminal Justice System</u>
Police Services Division					
Deputy Director Records, Identification, Crime Lab and Communication	X	X	X	X	
Civil Process Division					X
Division of Jails and Prisons					X
Division of Investigation					
Deputy Director Investigations	X		X	X	

Section II

THE COST OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SINCE CONSOLIDATION

LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS IN UNADJUSTED DOLLARS

Law enforcement program costs for the fiscal years 1968-1969 through 1971-1972 are reported in Table 4.3. Examination of the table indicates that the allocation of resources to the various program budget categories remained relatively constant during the first four years of consolidation. The only notable exception was the Administration and Support program category which increased from three percent of the total budget in 1968-1969 to eight percent in 1970-1971. Despite this exception, however, the results suggest that since consolidation no significant changes in the distribution of resources have occurred.

Aside from the generally balanced distribution of resources expressed in the table, the most surprising observation pertains to the cost of law enforcement services. Drawing from annual totals, the cost of police services rose from approximately \$8.6 million in 1968-1969 to nearly \$14.4 million in 1971-1972. This represents a total increase of 67 percent during the first four years of consolidation.

Another significant indication of the rising cost of law enforcement concerns the relative increases before and after the merger. This information is exhibited in Chart 4.4 which illustrates annual law enforcement costs and percentage changes for two years prior to and four years after consolidation. As shown in the chart, the annual rate of growth averaged 7.6 percent prior to consolidation versus an average annual rate of 18.2 percent subsequent to consolidation.

LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION

To responsibly interpret police services costs, cognizance must be taken of the impact of inflation. In response to this need, a law enforcement price index was developed for fiscal years 1966-1967 through 1971-1972. The results of the index are presented in Table 4.5. ^{1/} An

^{1/} A detailed explanation of the techniques employed in the construction of the price index is presented as an Appendix to Working Paper Number VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement Services in the Office of the Sheriff.

Table 4.3

THE COST OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}
(In Current Dollars)

Program Category	Fiscal Year							
	1968 - 1969		1969 - 1970		1970 - 1971		1971 - 1972	
	Costs	% of Total	Costs	% of Total	Costs	% of Total	Costs	% of Total
<u>Control and Reduction of Crime</u>								
Crimes Against Persons	\$ 452,975	5.3	\$ 543,256	5.5	\$ 624,748	5.3	\$ 744,895	5.3
Crimes Against Property	2,877,724	33.6	2,852,076	29.0	3,498,599	29.1	4,391,069	30.5
<u>Traffic Regulation</u>	1,372,457	16.0	1,785,889	18.2	2,061,827	16.9	2,357,343	16.4
<u>Maintenance of Public Order and the Provision of Public Services</u>								
	2,048,152	23.9	2,136,124	21.8	2,601,590	21.9	3,232,986	22.4
<u>Administration and Support</u>								
Direction and Control	80,304	.9	104,000	1.1	109,218	.9	114,870	.8
Training and Personnel	30,426	.4	65,262	.7	114,323	1.0	151,986	1.1
Support Services	145,048	1.7	597,405	6.1	743,660	6.2	606,163	4.2

a/ Annual Budgets, City of Jacksonville, Florida, and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.3
(Continued)


<u>Program Category</u>	<u>Fiscal Year</u>							
	<u>1968 - 1969</u>		<u>1969 - 1970</u>		<u>1970 - 1971</u>		<u>1971 - 1972</u>	
	<u>Cost</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
<u>Other Programs of the Criminal Justice System</u>								
Jails and Prisons	\$1,235,912	14.4	\$1,458,976	14.8	\$ 1,931,327	16.1	\$ 2,425,555	16.9
Execution of Civil Process	<u>329,936</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>276,539</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>314,063</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>325,993</u>	<u>2.4</u>
Totals	\$8,572,936	100.0	\$9,818,527	100.0	\$12,016,315	100.0	\$14,380,770	100.0

Chart 4.4

LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS FOR JACKSONVILLE-DUVAL COUNTY
1968-1969 THROUGH 1971-1972 a/

(Expenditures By Year and Percent Increase Between Years In Current Dollars)

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a/ Duval County and City of Jacksonville, Annual Budgets, Consolidated City of Jacksonville Annual Budgets.

Table 4.5

UNADJUSTED AND ADJUSTED LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS
FOR JACKSONVILLE AND DUVAL COUNTY
1966-1967 THROUGH 1971-1972 a/

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Unadjusted Costs</u>		<u>Adjusted Costs <u>b/</u></u>	
	<u>Police Services Budget</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>	<u>Police Services Budget</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
1966-1967	\$ 7,449,607	-0-	\$7,449,607	-0-
1967-1968	7,843,537	5.3	7,309,913	-1.9
1968-1969	8,572,936	9.3	7,600,120	4.0
1969-1970	9,818,527	14.5	7,829,766	3.0
1970-1971	12,016,315	22.4	9,007,732	15.0
1971-1972	14,380,770	19.7	9,703,623	7.2

a/ Duval County, City of Jacksonville, Consolidated City of Jacksonville Annual Budgets and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

b/ Fiscal year 1966-1967 represents the base year for the index.

examination of the tables shows that costs for police services have risen in both unadjusted and adjusted dollar terms. However, since consolidation the average annual increase in adjusted dollars has been 8.2 percent. This compares with a reported 18.2 percent average annual increase in unadjusted dollars.

EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA

Another measure of law enforcement costs is expenditures per capita. This indicator is useful because it incorporates a variable that is frequently overlooked--population growth. This is significant in Jacksonville's case because the city's population increased by approximately 34,000 people over the past five years. Thus, part of the increase in the cost for police services has occurred because there have been more people to serve.

Employing this indicator Table 4.6 arrays expenditures per capita for police services (in adjusted dollars) between fiscal years 1966-1967 and 1971-1972. As reported in the table, expenditures per capita increased from \$14.17 for the year prior to consolidation to \$17.77 for the 1971-1972 fiscal year.

The importance of this finding is as follows. In unadjusted dollars the average annual increase for police services (since consolidation) has been 18.2 percent. Using adjusted dollars to account for the effect of inflation, this average drops to 8.2 percent increase per annum. Finally, using the expenditure per capita indicator (in adjusted dollars), the average annual increase for police services falls to 6.2 percent.

Thus, although the cost for police services has risen since the merger, when one discounts the effects of inflation and population growth, the increase is not so intense as it might otherwise appear.

SUMMARY

Although caution must be exercised in interpreting these findings, it can be said that the amount of resources devoted to law enforcement efforts has risen since consolidation. Thus, the economic benefits of consolidation have not taken the form of lower costs per se. This, however,

does not rule out the possibility that savings were created in other forms. For example, another study concerning the costs of police services concluded that "economies of scale may exist in law enforcement services; however, the benefits may likely be embodied in additional or expanded services rather than lower per unit costs."^{1/} Others, including Sheriff Dale Carson, have publicly stated that the consolidation of police services will not save the taxpayer money. Rather "you can promise them a much more efficient operation . . ."^{2/} In the following sections the veracity of these notions is examined.

^{1/} Schmandt, Henry J. and G. Ross Stephens. "Measuring Municipal Output," National Tax Journal, XIII (December, 1960), pp. 369-375.

^{2/} Sheriff Dale Carson, undated speech prepared by the Sheriff (in the files of the Office of the Sheriff, Jacksonville, Florida).

Table 4.6

POLICE SERVICES EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Average Estimated Population^{a/}</u>	<u>Expenditures Per Capita (Adjusted Dollars)</u>
1966-1967	512,000	\$14.55
1967-1968	516,000	14.17
1968-1969	522,000	14.56
1969-1970	528,900	14.80
1970-1971	538,800	16.72
1971-1972	546,100	17.77

^{a/} With the exception of 1970-1971 figures, population estimates were provided through the Office of the Sheriff, Planning and Research Unit. 1970-1971 figures are drawn from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population.

Section III

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIES OF SCALE OF SELECTED LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

A crucial aspect in the analysis of economies of scale is the consequence of increased size or volume of particular activities which make up a law enforcement agency. The importance of this component stems from the notion that changes in scale may have significantly different effects on the average cost of selected services or activities. More specifically, out of the myriad activities which comprise law enforcement programs, some are more likely than others to realize the benefits of economies of scale. Activities which hold the greatest promise for benefiting from economies of scale are generally considered to involve quantity purchases, the opportunity to utilize more efficient equipment, and/or the greater utilization of specialized skills. Particular activities which possess one or more of these characteristics include motorpool, data processing, communications, personnel and purchasing. This section is devoted to an examination of these activities in an effort to gain further insight into the issue of economies of scale.

MOTORPOOL

Prior to consolidation, the law enforcement agencies of the City of Jacksonville and Duval County were individually responsible for purchasing and maintaining motor vehicles. The depreciation and operating costs for each department for the two years prior to consolidation were estimated from an examination of the pre-consolidation budgets. This information is presented in Table 4.7.

An examination of the table shows that the level of expenditures as well as the percentage of total law enforcement costs were higher for the Duval County Sheriff than for the Jacksonville Police Department. Whether or not these differences relate to the quantity or quality of motorpool services is not possible to determine from available information. However, given the geographical differences between the service areas of the two agencies, it appears that the most probable explanation for the higher costs of the Sheriff's Office was the greater territory it covered.

Table 4.7

PRE-CONSOLIDATION MOTORPOOL COSTS a/

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1966 - 1967</u>		<u>1967 - 1968</u>	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of Total Law Enforcement Budget</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of Total Law Enforcement Budget</u>
Jacksonville Police Department	\$273,679	6.7	\$288,833	7.0
Duval County Sheriff	<u>326,600</u>	9.8	<u>340,033</u>	9.1
Total	\$600,279	8.1 <u>b/</u>	\$629,033	8.0 <u>b/</u>

a/ City of Jacksonville and Duval County Annual Budgets and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

b/ Represents percent of total budget for both pre-consolidation agencies.

At consolidation, the motorpool activities of the two agencies were combined under the Department of Central Services. The depreciation and operating costs for the first four years of consolidation are presented in Table 4.8. An examination of the table reveals a rather substantial reduction of motorpool costs during the first year of consolidation. Whereas the combined cost for the Sheriff and police was \$629,033 in 1967, the cost for the consolidated Sheriff's Office was only \$467,088 in 1968-1969. This represented a reduction in motorpool costs of nearly 26 percent in one year. Some of this reduction may have been precipitated by a decline in the number of motor vehicles required by the consolidated agency. Unfortunately, information on total number of vehicles or miles driven during this period is not available. Thus, it was not possible to determine an exact basis for this cost reduction.

A further examination of Table 4.8 shows that motorpool costs began to increase sharply after the first year of consolidation. In fact, the average annual rate of growth in motorpool costs was approximately 23 percent over the first four years of consolidation. There are obviously a number of possible explanations for this growth, including a general increase in the number of miles driven coupled with rising prices for acquiring and maintaining motor vehicles. It is important to note, however, that while the level of motorpool expenditures increased rapidly, the percentage of total law enforcement costs represented by motorpool activities remained at a level which was below the pre-consolidation rate. More specifically, motorpool costs represented approximately 8 percent of the combined Sheriff's and police budgets for the two years prior to consolidation; the average for the post-consolidation years was slightly more than 7 percent. Thus, while costs for law enforcement activities in general and motorpool costs in particular have increased since consolidation, the rate of growth for motorpool costs has been somewhat lower than before the merger.

DATA PROCESSING

Although motorpool expenses represent the bulk of Central Service charges to the Sheriff's budget, there are other services which may be affected by economies of scale. Two of these services are data processing and communications. In terms of the budgetary significance of these services, they rank closely behind motorpool expenses as the most costly Central Service charges incurred by the Sheriff's Office. Furthermore, the very nature of these services suggests that when provided on a larger scale it is likely that per-unit costs will decrease.

Table 4.8

POST CONSOLIDATION MOTORPOOL COSTS a/

<u>Year</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent of Total Law Enforcement Budget</u>
1968-1969	\$ 467,088	5.5
1969-1970	612,917	7.3
1970-1971	1,032,073	8.6
1971-1972	1,053,946	7.3

a/ City of Jacksonville, Annual Budgets and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Modern data processing services require a heavy investment in high speed electronic computers and related software services. Economical use of this equipment is attained when there is a relatively large scale need for data analysis and storage. The enlarged law enforcement organization created by the 1968 consolidation presumably created a unit which was capable of efficiently using this technology. However, the evidence as to whether these advantages have been realized in Jacksonville is mixed.

A breakdown of Central Service charges to the Sheriff's Office is presented in Table 4.9. As indicated therein, data processing costs increased from approximately \$39,000 in the 1968-1969 budget year to over \$136,000 in 1971-1972. Each year over this period has seen an increase in these costs. This, of course, is a relatively rapid rate of growth, which may be the result of many factors.

One of these factors is certain to be the general increase over the period in prices of inputs and supplies used in data processing. Analysis of the cost index presented in Table 4.5 provides evidence of this fact. Thus, even if the same volume of services had been produced, data processing costs would have increased.

Even more important, however, is the fact that the data processing needs of the Sheriff's Office have been increasing. This need has been met by greater utilization of data processing equipment. In addition, completely new uses of data processing services have been instituted to provide for correlative information on criminal activity and traffic mishaps, as compared with the "data summary" orientation employed prior to consolidation. Moreover, findings indicate that increased data processing costs have been affected not only by a larger volume of services, but the many new uses to which computer technology has been applied.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to measure the exact increase in data processing output which has occurred since the merger due to the lack of measurable units of service on which to evaluate costs. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether gains in efficiency and productivity have been realized. It should be noted, however, that as indicated in Table 4.9, Central Service data processing charges have increased from approximately .5 percent of total law enforcement costs in 1968-1969 to nearly 1 percent in 1971-1972. In other words, the relative importance of this particular cost item has more than doubled. Moreover, it is quite possible that per-unit cost reductions have occurred since consolidation, but the significantly expanded use of computer technology may well have hidden and even dwarfed these savings.

Table 4. 9

CENTRAL SERVICES CHARGES TO THE OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF a/

Service Item	Fiscal Year							
	1968-1969		1969-1970		1970-1971		1971-1972	
	Annual Cost	% of Total Budget	Annual Cost	% of Total Budget	Annual Cost	% of Total Budget	Annual Cost	% of Total Budget
Motorpool	\$467,088	4.45%	\$ 712,917	7.26%	\$1,032,073	8.59%	\$1,053,946	7.33%
Data Processing	39,001	0.45	61,983	.63	103,117	.86	136,250	.95
Communications	75,837	0.88	130,315	1.33	214,275	1.78	225,129	1.57
Purchasing	24,351	0.28	19,452	.20	22,283	.19	25,705	.18
Printing	865	0.01	1,258	.01	2,415	.02	--	--
Legal	9,174	0.11	20,607	.21	17,276	.14	21,105	.15
Personnel	31,763	0.37	53,522	.55	61,039	.51	65,460	.46
Total	\$648,079	7.55%	\$1,000,054	10.19%	\$1,452,478	12.09%	\$1,527,595	10.62%

a/ City of Jacksonville, Annual Budgets and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

COMMUNICATIONS

The communications network which supports law enforcement efforts is an important determinant of the overall quality and efficiency of a law enforcement agency. This is particularly important when an agency must service a large geographical area such as the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. Modern communications technology helps meet these needs, but due to the capital-intensive nature of these operations, the initial cost of instituting the system can be substantial. ^{1/}

Referring again to Table 4.9, it can be seen that Central Service charges for communications increased nearly threefold, ranging from approximately \$76,000 in 1968-1969 to more than \$225,000 in 1971-1972. Not only have these costs grown in absolute terms, but their importance as a percentage of total law enforcement costs have increased as well. Communications charges amounted to nearly 1.6 percent of total law enforcement costs of the Sheriff's Office in 1971-1972, up from approximately .9 percent in 1968-1969.

The most important causes of this increase have been the investment in new types of communications equipment and a general enlargement of the entire communications operation. Since this new technology is more efficient and of a better quality, it is reasonable to assume that an improvement in communications support has accompanied the cost increase. However, it is not possible to measure the extent to which these benefits have been realized. Observations over the next few years should indicate whether these costs have stabilized and if economies have actually been attained.

OTHER CENTRAL SERVICE CHARGES

In addition to the Central Service items discussed above, the Sheriff's Office is charged for a portion of Central Service costs for purchasing, printing, legal services and personnel. Budgeted costs for these expenses are also presented in Table 4.9.

Since consolidation the absolute cost of these services has increased; although purchasing costs have remained relatively stable. It is also clear, however, that since the 1969-1970 budget year, the relative importance of these costs to the overall budget of the Sheriff has decreased.

^{1/} In an undated paper delivered by Sheriff Dale Carson shortly after the consolidation, expenditures for the new communications center were expected to approach one million dollars (in the files of the Office of the Sheriff, Jacksonville, Florida).

Thus, it is quite possible that with regard to these remaining Central Service items some economies have been realized. This observation, however, should be interpreted cautiously. Unlike services such as motorpool, communications and data processing, these latter services may not be as susceptible to economies of scale. For example, the provision of legal and personnel services is not of a particularly capital-intensive nature. Thus, the advantages of large scale operations are less likely to be an important prerequisite for efficiency than for a service such as data processing.

SUMMARY

Measuring the impact of consolidation on subsets of activities which make up a law enforcement system is subject to many of the same problems which have been detailed in previous sections of this paper. Thus, an examination of those activities which appear to be likely candidates for exploiting the benefits of economies of scale provides only a few clues as to the potential economic benefits of consolidation.

Despite the limited cost data and the absence of unambiguous measurements of the quality and quantity of outputs, findings indicate that consolidation has had a favorable impact upon the costs of at least one of the areas studied in this section. Specifically, the consolidation of motorpool activities has resulted in economic benefits. These benefits took the form of both absolute and relative reductions in the level of motorpool costs. Coupled with the benefits is the fact that motorpool costs represented over 70 percent of the Central Service charges studied. Thus, the consolidation of motorpool activities should be considered by other law enforcement agencies as a means of reducing the costs of providing police services.

Section IV

THE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCIES OF JACKSONVILLE'S CONSOLIDATED POLICE AGENCY

MEASURING THE VOLUME AND QUALITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

Two steps must be taken in measuring the efficiency and quality of police services delivery over time. First, the volume of services provided by a law enforcement agency must be examined; second, those dimensions of the service which relate to quality must be specified. For many reasons these are very difficult tasks which complicate any attempt at an economic evaluation of police services. ^{1/}

The most obvious reason for this difficulty lies in the fact that law enforcement agencies provide a multitude of distinct services--some are directly related to combating criminal activity--others only touch on law enforcement. In the course of daily activities a police officer may be responding to calls for assistance; patrolling; covering traffic accidents; filing reports; performing community relations work; testifying at trials or traffic court; or making arrests. Thus, the output of a law enforcement agency has many distinct, often unpredictable, but interrelated dimensions.

A second problem associated with measuring law enforcement output relates to the "service" nature of police work. The problem is basically one of determining what constitutes a measurable unit of activity. For example, even if an agency dealt only with criminal activity in a community, it would be possible to measure a unit level of police service in a variety of ways. Depending upon one's purpose this could be defined as the investigation of a reported offense, an arrest, or a conviction. Thus, measuring the volume of police services may be subjective and imprecise. This difficulty is further compounded by the different types of crime which require varying amounts of the resources available to police agencies.

Similar problems are encountered in attempting to specify the quality of police services. For example, differing definitions may be attributed to the term "quality" in that police services have many characteristics which contribute to the overall sophistication and effectiveness of a

^{1/} For additional discussions of these points see: The Challenge of Productivity Diversity: Improving Local Government Productivity Measurement and Evaluation, Part III. Measuring Police-Crime Control Productivity. National Commission on Productivity, Washington, D. C., 1972; Werner Z. Hirsch, "Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidation," Review of Economics and Statistics, 1959; and, Schmandt and Stephens, "Measuring Municipal Output," National Tax Journal, March, 1960.

particular agency. These may include the attitudes and behavior of police officers; the speed of service; time required to respond to service requests; or the effectiveness of police activities. Many of these characteristics are difficult to quantify and measure, while some can be interpreted as measures of the quantity, rather than the quality, of service; i. e. the number of arrests made by an officer may not only serve as an indicator of his productivity but may also serve as a measure of how effectively he is doing his job.

In addition to these difficulties, no individual statistic is comprehensive enough to register changes in the quality of a law enforcement agency. As a result, a series of statistics was used to measure the direction, if not the exact amount, of change in productivity and quality of police service in Jacksonville. These measures are discussed in the following pages. 1/

The rationale for this approach was as follows. Prior to consolidation both the Duval County Sheriff's Office and the Jacksonville Police Department provided law enforcement services. At consolidation, these units were merged into one larger law enforcement agency, the present Office of the Sheriff. If consolidation had a discernible impact on the efficiency and quality of police services, differences should be revealed through a trend analysis of such indicators as costs, productivity and crime rates over a period prior to and subsequent to the merger. The following analyses are based on this proposition. 2/

THE CRIME RATE AS A PERSPECTIVE FOR ANALYSIS

Part I Criminal Offenses

Part I criminal offenses for the years 1967 through 1972 are presented in Table 4. 10 by type and number. 3/The data points clearly to

1/ See Working Paper Number IX: The Effect of Consolidation on the Productivity and Quality of Law Enforcement in Jacksonville, pp. 3-11 for a discussion of indicators which were examined for possible use.

2/ It should be noted that these analyses do not account for developments in the incorporated areas of Baldwin, Jacksonville Beach, Atlantic Beach and Neptune Beach; the jurisdictions in Duval County which are not part of the consolidated government. Also, no cognizance is taken of private law enforcement efforts; e. g. guard services, detective agencies, and so on.

3/ It should be noted that data for 1967 presented in the table refer to the entire Duval County area, including the jurisdictions of Atlantic Beach, Baldwin, Jacksonville Beach and Neptune Beach. These figures thus overstate the number of Part I incidents which would correspond to the post-
(Continued on next page).

Table 4.10

PART I CRIMINAL OFFENSES a/

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Year</u>					
	<u>1967 <u>a/</u></u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969 <u>b/</u></u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide <u>c/</u>	50	74	71	96	136	167
Forcible Rape	175	176	214	296	254	293
Robbery	1,188	1,436	1,145	1,507	1,264	1,426
Assault <u>d/</u>	1,622	1,960	2,238	2,380	2,466	2,884
Burglary	9,013	9,396	9,059	11,568	12,035	10,619
Larceny <u>e/</u>	3,033	3,220	13,282	16,194	16,582	15,462
Auto Theft	<u>1,725</u>	<u>1,878</u>	<u>2,636</u>	<u>2,944</u>	<u>2,547</u>	<u>1,968</u>
Total Part I offenses	16,806 <u>f/</u>	18,140 <u>f/</u>	28,645	34,985	35,284	32,819

a/ Uniform Crime Reports, 1967 and 1968 (figures refer to all of Duval County).

b/ Source for 1969 through 1972: Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports.

c/ 1967 and 1968 figures do not include negligent manslaughter offenses.

d/ 1967 and 1968 figures are for aggravated assaults only.

e/ 1967 and 1968 figures are for larceny over \$50 only.

f/ Several sources have indicated that these figures may not be accurate due to inconsistent reporting procedures.

a steady annual increase in the number of offenses from 1967 through 1970. In 1971, however, only a negligible increase in total offenses occurred and in 1972, Part I offenses declined. Thus, over the period 1970-1972, total Part I offenses leveled off and decreased. With the exception of criminal homicides and assaults, this same pattern was experienced for the individual types of Part I offenses.

There is insufficient information available to define why this pattern occurred and whether a new trend in the number of Part I crimes has been established. It might be hypothesized, however, that consolidation has had a positive effect on the provision of law enforcement services in Jacksonville, producing better deterrent effects on crime than existed previously. This notion is supported when one reviews national trends ^{1/} over the same period. For example, both nationally and in Jacksonville, Part I offenses increased at a decreasing rate between 1970 and 1971. Although Jacksonville's rate was above the national average between 1968 and 1970--due in part to improved reporting and recordkeeping procedures instituted at consolidation--the city's rate between 1970 and 1972 was below the national average. Specifically, Part I offenses increased by .8 percent between 1970 and 1971. While the national average rose by 2.1 percent. Between 1971 and 1972, Jacksonville witnessed a decline in Part I offenses of 7 percent. Although national data is not yet in final form, preliminary information indicates that the Part I rate for cities over 100,000 population in all the southern states declined by 2 percent. ^{2/}

Sworn Officers Per 1,000 Population

Although this indicator does not take account of the quality of police service or visitor population, it does offer an interesting observation when compared with national averages for Part I offenses and sworn officer ratios.

(footnote from preceding page continued) consolidation area of Duval County. Likewise, for certain types of offenses in this category--criminal homicide, assault and larceny--the data are less inclusive than those for 1969 through 1972. For example, criminal homicides do not include negligent manslaughter for the years 1967 and 1968. These compromises were necessary because it was not possible to construct a data series for 1967 and 1968 that was exactly comparable to the data from 1969 forward. Nonetheless, some tentative patterns in Part I crimes can be identified.

^{1/} Information drawn from Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Data is for cities over 250,000 population.

^{2/} Preliminary data obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C.

As Table 4.11 describes, Jacksonville's ratio of sworn officers per 1,000 population has increased by only 5 percent since consolidation, while the national ratio has grown by nearly 14 percent. ^{1/} Yet, in 1971, although Jacksonville's ratio was less than half the national average, the city's effectiveness in curbing Part I offenses was substantially greater as noted above. Preliminary data for 1972 points toward a continuation of this trend.

Although little is known about the precise deterrent effects of the consolidated force, it appears that the technical efficiency of the department-- which may or may not have a direct relationship with changes in scale-- is showing a positive trend.

Clearance Rate of Part I Offenses

Table 4.12 presents data on the number of Part I offenses cleared from 1969 through 1972. No clearance information was available prior to consolidation, thus the analysis is confined to the post-consolidation period. As the table indicates, the number of offenses cleared, with the exception of auto theft, increased since consolidation. Further, while total Part I offenses declined from 1970 to 1972, the number of clearances continued to climb. This trend can be viewed as a significant development, for under many circumstances one would expect that the number of clearances would bear a direct ratio to the number of incidents. Further observations over the next few years should establish whether this pattern can be directly related to the consolidation of police services in Jacksonville.

Part I and Part II Arrests

Data referring to the number of persons arrested by type of crime is presented in Table 4.13. As noted earlier, arrest data can serve as a potentially useful measure of productivity. It is also used by many agencies as a means of gauging the morale and activity of a police agency. A review of the data points to a clear increase in arrests between 1969 and 1971. More specifically, the ratio of Part I arrests to Part I offenses (see Table 4.10 for Part I offense data) increased by nearly 60 percent during the three-year period. The decrease in total number of arrests between 1971 and 1972 corresponds closely with the decline in Part I offenses during the same period. The ratio of arrests to offenses is still revealing, however, in that it remained constant for the two-year period.

^{1/} Information obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C.

Table 4.11

SWORN OFFICERS PER 1,000 POPULATION

<u>Year</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>a/</u>	<u>Sworn Officers</u> <u>b/</u>	<u>Sworn Officers Per 1,000 Population</u>	
			<u>Jacksonville</u> <u>c/</u>	<u>National Average</u> <u>d/</u>
1968	495,000	660	1.33	2.90
1969	502,000	699	1.39	3.10
1970	508,000	715	1.41	3.30
1971	517,000	724	1.40	3.30

a/ Figures were calculated from countywide population estimates provided by the Planning and Research Unit, Office of the Sheriff, minus a constant 4 percent to take account of the population of the City of Baldwin and Atlantic, Neptune and Jacksonville Beaches.

b/ Information compiled from Master Roll Calls, Office of the Sheriff.

c/ Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

d/ Information compiled from Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Averages are for cities of 250,000 population and above.

Table 4. 12

PART I OFFENSES CLEARED SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	60	78	127	140
Forcible Rape	107	175	161	178
Robbery	434	664	493	537
Assault	1,543	1,638	1,510	1,672
Burglary	1,947	2,074	2,098	2,203
Larceny	1,428	1,966	2,026	2,670
Auto Theft	<u>717</u>	<u>848</u>	<u>740</u>	<u>634</u>
Total Part I offenses	6,236	7,443	7,155	8,034

a/ Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports.

Table 4.13

PERSONS ARRESTED BY TYPE OF CRIME SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	69	108	111	83
Forcible Rape	52	86	100	113
Robbery	276	396	434	490
Assault	607	1,060	2,252	1,932
Burglary	1,129	1,180	1,515	1,181
Larceny	1,794	2,346	3,283	3,390
Auto Theft	<u>307</u>	<u>418</u>	<u>562</u>	<u>478</u>
Total Part I offenses	<u>4,234</u>	<u>5,594</u>	<u>8,257</u>	<u>7,667</u>
Total Part II offenses	<u>17,892</u>	<u>20,041</u>	<u>23,153</u>	<u>26,431</u>
Total Offenses	22,126	25,635	31,410	34,098

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports.

Table 4. 14 presents the number of Part I offenses cleared annually since consolidation. As is illustrated, clearances for 1970 and 1971 declined slightly from the previous year although both offenses and arrests increased. Since clearance by arrest is one indicator of the quality of arrests, this comparison is of some importance. Because the decline was relatively slight, and the clearance rate increased by 25 percent between 1971 and 1972, however, it is felt that an overall improvement in the system took place.

OTHER INDICES AS ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Cost of Clearing Part I Offenses

Total Part I offenses cleared by type and per thousand dollar expenditure are reported in Table 4.15. ^{1/} Review of the table indicates that the ratio of total offenses cleared per thousand dollars of expenditure has decreased since consolidation. This decline has been experienced in each year since consolidation with the exception of 1970. Moreover, the data indicate that the cost of clearing a Part I crime has increased since the merger. Before premature conclusions are drawn, however, it must be pointed out that the expenditure figures used in these calculations are in 'current' dollars; that is, no allowance was made for inflationary elements which tend to increase the costs of providing police services. In addition, it must be noted that during this period police wages and fringe benefits increased as did prices of supplies and equipment.

Correspondingly, Table 4.16 presents a reconstruction of the clearance data found in Table 4. 15 employing constant or "deflated dollars".

^{1/} The expenditure figures reported in Table 4. 14 were computed in the program budget analysis undertaken in conjunction with the Working Paper Number VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement Services in Jacksonville-Duval County. The clearance data are those presented in Table 4. 12. The statistics computed for the individual types of crime are based on the total expenditures for all crimes. As noted earlier, it was not feasible to allocate expenditures on a per type of crime basis. Therefore, the figures computed for the individual classes of crimes are meaningful only if it is determined that the expenditures made in relation to these crimes remained relatively constant over this period. Further, it should be recognized that the figures for total Part I offenses must be interpreted cautiously in that part of the total crime control expenditure was devoted to Part II offenses and it was not possible to determine whether relative expenditures for Part I versus Part II expenses remained constant over this period.

Table 4.14

PERCENTAGE OF PART I OFFENSES CLEARED
SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	85%	81%	93%	84%
Forcible Rape	50	59	63	61
Robbery	38	44	39	38
Assault	69	69	61	58
Burglary	21	18	17	21
Larceny	11	12	12	17
Auto Theft	<u>27</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>32</u>
Total Part I offenses	22%	21%	20%	25%

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports, and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.15

PART I OFFENSES CLEARED PER THOUSAND DOLLAR
EXPENDITURE SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.02	.02	.03	.03
Forcible Rape	.03	.05	.04	.03
Robbery	.13	.20	.12	.10
Assault	.46	.48	.36	.32
Burglary	.58	.61	.51	.43
Larceny	.43	.58	.49	.52
Auto Theft	<u>.22</u>	<u>.25</u>	<u>.18</u>	<u>.12</u>
Total Part I offenses	1.87	2.19	1.73	1.55

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4. 16

PART I OFFENSES CLEARED PER THOUSAND DOLLAR
REAL EXPENDITURE SINCE CONSOLIDATION ^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.02	.03	.04	.04
Forcible Rape	.03	.06	.05	.04
Robbery	.15	.25	.16	.15
Assault	.52	.60	.48	.47
Burglary	.65	.76	.68	.64
Larceny	.49	.73	.65	.77
Auto Theft	<u>.25</u>	<u>.31</u>	<u>.24</u>	<u>.18</u>
Total Part I offenses	2.11	2.75	2.31	2.30

a/ Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Using the city's 1966-1967 fiscal year costs as a base, ^{1/} the constant dollar mode presents a more accurate assessment of the resources devoted to law enforcement. Comparing these tables, it can be seen that changes in Part I offenses cleared per thousand dollars of real expenditure are much more modest. Although the data in Table 4.15 reveal the same declining trend as in Table 4.16, one notes that clearances per thousand dollars expended were actually higher in 1972 than in 1969, the first year after consolidation. This indicates that some productivity increase has occurred since the merger.

Offenses Cleared Per Sworn Officer

An additional perspective on the cost-productivity issue can be found in Table 4.17 which presents clearances per sworn officer. Specifically, total Part I clearances were higher in 1972 than in 1969, although a negligible decline in the ratio occurred from 1970 through 1972. This would indicate that there has been an increase in productivity associated with clearances since consolidation. ^{2/}

One caveat should be noted with regard to clearances per police employee and costs of clearances. That is, reductions in the crime rate will tend to slow down and even decrease the number of clearances. Increased police effectiveness in lowering crime rates might well have biased these figures downward. Therefore, it could well be that clearances per employee have decreased as a concomitant of Jacksonville's declining Part I crime rate since consolidation.

^{1/} A description of the methods and techniques used in constructing this model can be found in Working Paper Number VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of the Law Enforcement Services in Jacksonville Duval County, pp. 3 - 13.

^{2/} It should be noted that the number of employees represents sworn personnel not including recruits as reported in the Monthly Roll Call, Office of the Sheriff, for September of each year. Further, caution should be exercised in data interpretation in that no attempt was made to break down sworn personnel on a per crime basis or to determine what proportion of personnel were engaged in activities other than crime control.

Table 4. 17

PART I OFFENSES CLEARED PER SWORN OFFICER
SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.09	.11	.18	.18
Forcible Rape	.16	.24	.23	.22
Robbery	.64	.93	.70	.68
Assault	2.27	2.29	2.15	2.11
Burglary	2.85	2.90	2.99	2.77
Larceny	2.10	2.75	2.89	3.36
Auto Theft	<u>1.05</u>	<u>1.19</u>	<u>1.05</u>	<u>.80</u>
Total Part I offenses	9.16	10.41	10.19	10.12

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Arrests Per Thousand Dollars Expenditure

In Table 4.18 arrest data presented in Table 4.13 is expressed by year as a ratio of the costs of providing police services in Jacksonville. ^{1/} Review of the table illustrates that arrests per thousand dollar expenditure increased for Part I crimes through 1971, then declined sharply. A similar pattern was found for Part II arrests. In essence, this trend suggests that the cost to Jacksonville taxpayers of Part I and Part II arrests decreased between 1969 and 1971 and in 1972 rose to a level similar to that of 1969.

In order to obtain a more objective view of these costs, however, it is necessary to examine Table 4.19 which presents the same data in deflated dollars. Although a modest decline in Part I arrest costs appeared between 1971 and 1972, all Part I and Part II offense arrests were substantially less expensive than in 1969. More specifically, as compared with 1969 costs, Part I arrests were 54 percent less expensive, while the cost per arrest of a Part II offense declined by 25 percent. In total, combined Part I and Part II arrests were 31 percent less expensive during the fourth year of consolidation than during the first year.

Although data limitations make it impossible to compare these costs with conditions that existed prior to consolidation, it is clear that the efficiency of police activity has increased since the merger.

Arrests Per Sworn Officer

Arrests per sworn police officer by year, since consolidation, are summarized in Table 4.20. Although arrests for individual Part I offenses show fluctuating patterns, overall Part I arrests increased through 1971, then fell off in 1972. Arrests per sworn officer for Part II offenses increased steadily throughout the first four years of the merger. In summary, arrests per sworn officer for Part I offenses increased by 56 percent since 1969; arrests for Part II offenses grew by 28 percent.

The decline in Part I arrests per sworn officer between 1971 and 1972 cannot be interpreted as the beginning of a negative trend. In that such elements as the percent of total sworn personnel assigned to patrol duties could not be factored into this equation, only the experience of the next two to three years will clearly depict future trends.

^{1/} See Working Paper VIII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement Services in the Office of the Sheriff, pp. 14-20 for a discussion of the development of cost data used in the analyses.

Table 4. 18

ARRESTS PER THOUSAND DOLLAR EXPENDITURE
SINCE CONSOLIDATION ^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.02	.03	.03	.02
Forcible Rape	.02	.03	.02	.02
Robbery	.08	.12	.10	.09
Assault	.18	.31	.54	.37
Burglary	.34	.35	.37	.29
Larceny	.54	.69	.79	.67
Auto Theft	<u>.09</u>	<u>.12</u>	<u>.14</u>	<u>.09</u>
Total Part I offenses	<u>1.27</u>	<u>1.65</u>	<u>1.99</u>	<u>1.48</u>
Total Part II offenses	<u>5.37</u>	<u>5.90</u>	<u>5.59</u>	<u>5.12</u>
Total Offenses	6.64	7.55	7.58	6.60

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.19

ARRESTS PER THOUSAND DOLLAR REAL EXPENDITURE
SINCE CONSOLIDATION ^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.02	.04	.04	.02
Forcible Rape	.02	.04	.03	.03
Robbery	.09	.15	.13	.14
Assault	.20	.39	.72	.55
Burglary	.38	.44	.49	.39
Larceny	.61	.86	1.05	.97
Auto Theft	<u>.10</u>	<u>.15</u>	<u>.19</u>	<u>.14</u>
Total Part I offenses	<u>1.43</u>	<u>2.07</u>	<u>2.65</u>	<u>2.20</u>
Total Part II offenses	<u>6.06</u>	<u>7.40</u>	<u>7.46</u>	<u>7.58</u>
Total Offenses	7.49	9.47	10.11	9.78

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.20

ARRESTS PER SWORN OFFICER
SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offense</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Criminal Homicide	.10	.15	.16	.10
Forcible Rape	.08	.12	.14	.14
Robbery	.41	.55	.62	.62
Assault	.89	1.48	3.21	2.43
Burglary	1.66	1.65	2.16	1.49
Larceny	2.63	3.28	4.68	4.27
Auto Theft	.45	.58	.80	.60
Total Part I Offenses	<u>6.22</u>	<u>7.81</u>	<u>11.77</u>	<u>9.67</u>
Total Part II Offenses	<u>26.27</u>	<u>28.03</u>	<u>32.98</u>	<u>33.29</u>
Total Offenses	32.49	35.84	44.75	42.94

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Vehicle Registration and Traffic Accidents

Table 4.21 presents data on annual vehicle registrations; traffic accidents; traffic fatalities; and, traffic-related injuries. 1/ Review of the table indicates a substantial rise in vehicular registrations--more than 20 percent since consolidation. Traffic accidents grew at the even higher rate of 33 percent over the four year period. In other words, while there were 61 reported accidents per 1,000 registered vehicles for 1969, there were 67 accidents per 1,000 registered vehicles in 1972.

Although the number of traffic fatalities in Jacksonville increased slightly between 1971 and 1972, the four year period since consolidation has shown a downward trend. In 1969, there were 4.6 traffic fatalities per 10,000 registered vehicles; in 1972, this figure was reduced to 3.4 fatalities per 10,000 registered vehicles.

Traffic-related injuries remained generally constant from 1969 through 1971. 2/ Each year during this period there were approximately 30 traffic-related injuries per 1,000 registered vehicles.

Because of the limited number of years for which this information was available, together with the variety of factors that influence traffic accidents and are beyond the Sheriff's control (e. g. state highway engineering and construction, street signalization, the use or non-use of seatbelts, etc.), it is not possible to draw concrete conclusions from this data. It should be stressed, however, that: (1) the reduction in traffic fatalities may be an indication of more effective traffic control and ordinance enforcement; and, (2) if consolidation had not occurred, traffic-related accidents beyond the boundaries of the former City of Jacksonville (where the majority of growth has occurred in the last four years) might have been substantially higher.

Traffic Ticket and Docket Arrests

Table 4.22 presents data on traffic tickets and docket arrests, by year, since 1969. In summary, the issuance of traffic tickets and docket arrests has increased substantially. Hazardous moving violations increased by 84 percent; non-hazardous moving violations grew by 247

1/ Because of the incomplete records maintained by pre-consolidation departments, no accurate and compatible information was available concerning the total number of accidents, fatalities, or traffic-related injuries for 1967 and 1968.

2/ At the time this paper was prepared 1972 traffic-related injury data was not available.

Table 4.21

TRAFFIC-RELATED PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES

<u>Type of Measure</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Annual Vehicle Registrations <u>a/</u>	303,292	322,913	333,973	365,874
Traffic Accidents <u>b/</u>	18,444	21,002	22,494	24,555
Traffic Fatalities <u>b/</u>	138	132	114	125
Traffic-Related Injuries	9,174	10,153	9,902	<u>c/</u>

a/ Atwell Tag Agency, Jacksonville, Florida. It should be noted that vehicle registrations overlap successive years due to the period for which they are issued.

b/ Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports.

c/ At the time this paper was prepared, 1972 figures were not fully tabulated.

Table 4.22

TRAFFIC TICKETS AND DOCKET ARRESTS
SINCE CONSOLIDATION^{a/}

<u>Type of Offenses</u>	<u>Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Hazardous Moving Violations	48,948	53,237	62,677	89,956
Non-Hazardous Moving Violations	7,127	8,952	15,282	24,564
Parking Violations ^{b/}	32,341	29,043	33,302	53,092
Warnings and Illegal or Faulty Equipment Violations	<u>5,353</u>	<u>5,637</u>	<u>11,256</u>	<u>17,304</u>
Total Violations	93,769	96,869	122,517	184,916

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports.

^{b/} Parking violation data presented in this table represents only those citations issued by the Office of the Sheriff. The reader should note that parking citations are also issued by the Jacksonville Airport Authority and the Division of Public Parking of the Department of Public Safety. The manpower and budgets of these units are separate and distinct from that of the Sheriff.

percent; parking violations rose by 64 percent; and, warnings and illegal or faulty equipment violations climbed by 223 percent.

This information not only illustrates a substantial increase in productivity in traffic-related services, but may be a direct factor in the decrease in traffic fatalities.

Traffic-Related Employee Productivity Measures

In an effort to more precisely determine change in productivity relative to traffic-related services, the data in Tables 4.21 and 4.22 were converted to ratios of employee activity and expenditures. Table 4.23 presents measures of traffic-related employee productivity. As the table illustrates, sworn personnel responsibility per registered vehicle has increased only slightly since consolidation. However, non-parking violations per employee increased by 84 percent during the first four years of the merger while total traffic violations per employee grew by nearly 70 percent.

The efficiency of traffic control personnel also improved during this period. ^{1/} Table 4.24 which presents the data series in current or inflated dollars shows increases of 25 percent and 15 percent, respectively, for non-parking violations and total traffic violations per \$1,000 expenditure. When these ratios are converted to constant or deflated dollars, improvements in operating efficiency are even more significant. Specifically, as illustrated in Table 4.25, non-parking violations per \$1,000 real expenditure increased by nearly 65 percent between 1969 and 1972; total traffic violations per \$1,000 real expenditure grew by more than 50 percent.

SUMMARY

Although four years is not sufficient time to develop definitive trends, a number of findings and observations relative to technical efficiency and productivity in the Office of the Sheriff warrant review.

^{1/} Expenditure data presented in Tables 4.24 and 4.25 were derived from the program budget analysis and the price index model developed in conjunction with the Working Paper Number VII: A Program Cost Analysis of Law Enforcement in Jacksonville-Duval County, pp. 13-20 and passim.

Table 4.23

TRAFFIC-RELATED EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY
MEASURES a/

<u>Type of Measure</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Vehicle Registrations per Employee	445.4	451.6	475.7	461.7
Non-Parking Violations per Employee	90.2	94.9	127.0	166.0
Total Traffic Violations per Employee	137.7	135.5	174.5	232.9

a/ Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.24

TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS PER THOUSAND
DOLLAR EXPENDITURE ^{a/}

<u>Type of Measure</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Non-Parking Violations per \$1,000 Expenditure	44.8	38.0	43.3	55.9
Total Traffic Violations per \$1,000 Expenditure	68.3	54.2	59.4	78.4

^{a/} Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Table 4.25

TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS PER THOUSAND DOLLAR
REAL EXPENDITURE ^{a/}

<u>Type of Measure</u>	<u>Ratio by Year</u>			
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Non-Parking Violations per \$1,000 Real Expenditure	50.5	47.7	57.8	82.9
Total Traffic Violations per \$1,000 Real Expenditure	77.0	68.0	79.2	116.3

a/ Office of the Sheriff, Annual Reports and Koepsell-Girard and Associates.

Police Officer Productivity: Output

A number of output indicators were reviewed in the preceding pages. Following is a summary of major findings.

Crime Rate. Part I offenses in Jacksonville increased through 1970, leveled in 1971, and then declined. Initial increases paralleled, but exceeded national averages. It is felt that this was due, in part, to improved reporting procedures and the general "de-bugging" of the new system. In 1971 and 1972, Jacksonville's index crime rate also paralleled, but was below, national averages. This is a particularly significant indicator when one considers that Jacksonville's ratio of sworn officers per 1,000 population was only 42 percent of the national average for cities over 250,000 population.

Clearance by Arrest. Clearances between 1969 and 1972 rose by 29 percent. Of particular relevance is that between 1971 and 1972, Jacksonville's index crime rate declined by 7 percent; for the same period clearances increased by more than 12 percent.

Arrests for Part I Offenses. Between 1969 and 1972 arrests per 1,000 Part I offenses rose from 148 to 234--an increase of more than 58 percent. Although Part I arrests declined between 1971 and 1972, the ratio of arrests per 1,000 index offenses remained constant.

Percentage of Part I Offenses Cleared. Clearances per 1,000 index offenses declined by 7 percent between 1969 and 1971, but increased substantially in 1972. During the four years since consolidation, total clearances per 1,000 Part I offenses rose from 218 to 245, or 12 percent. This pattern does not appear sufficient to establish a definite trend.

Part I Offenses Cleared Per Sworn Officer. This productivity indicator shows an increase from 1969 to 1970, followed by a period of general stability. Nonetheless, since consolidation index offenses cleared per sworn officer rose from 9.16 to 10.12, an increase of 11 percent.

Arrests Per Sworn Officer. Part I arrests per sworn officer rose through 1971, then fell off markedly; this trend closely paralleled Part I offenses. In summary, since the merger, Part I offenses increased by a net 15 percent; Part I arrests per sworn officer rose by a net 55 percent. Part II arrest patterns showed a similar trend, with arrests increasing by 27 percent over the four years.

Traffic Ticket and Docket Arrests. Non-parking violations rose from 61,400 in 1969, to 131,000 in 1972--an increase of 115 percent. During the same period, total traffic violations climbed by 97 percent, from 93,800 to 184,900.

Traffic Related Productivity. Non-parking violations per sworn officer increases steadily over the four years, from 90.2 to 166.0, or 84 percent. Total traffic violations per sworn officer dropped slightly between 1969 and 1970, then increased substantially. In summary, productivity increased from 138 to 233 citations per officer, or 69 percent.

Police Officer Productivity: Efficiency

Moving from output productivity to the examination of costs, the following was found:

Part I Offenses Cleared Per Thousand Dollars Expenditure. Using adjusted or deflated dollars, offenses cleared per thousand dollar expenditure was found to be in a state of flux between 1971 and 1972. However, for the four year period, Part I clearances per thousand dollars rose from 2.11 to 2.30 or 9 percent.

Arrests Per Thousand Dollars Expenditure. Total Part I arrests per thousand dollar expenditure rose through 1970, then stabilized. For the four years, however, the ratio rose from 1.43 to 2.20--an increase in efficiency of more than 50 percent. Part II arrests witnessed a similar pattern with the four year ratio changing from 6.06 to 7.58 arrests per thousand dollar expenditure. This represents an increase in efficiency of 25 percent.

Traffic Citations Per Thousand Dollars Expenditure. A final indicator of efficiency relates to traffic citations issued per

thousand dollar expenditure. The data indicates that non-parking violations per \$1,000 expenditure rose by 64 percent, from 51 in 1969, to 83 in 1972. Similarly total traffic violations increased from 77 to 116, or 51 percent.

CONCLUSIONS

Although sufficient time has not passed to clearly document the efficiency of the consolidated Office of the Sheriff, trends developed during the first four years display certain definable patterns. First, with regard to output, certain instability remains, but it can generally be concluded that the Jacksonville taxpayer is receiving more "service" for his tax dollar than he did at the time of the merger. The crime rate has declined to the extent that personal and financial losses to the community have decreased (the precise definition of this decrease, or savings, however, cannot be determined from available data). In addition, a larger percentage of offenders are being apprehended, which, in turn, has a deterrent effect on the incidence of new crime. Further, the number of arrests per sworn officer--a relatively sound indicator of the efficiency of both police personnel and the current police services system--has increased by more than half. Finally, total citations, and those issued per sworn officer for all traffic-related offenses have doubled.

Second, the per unit cost for certain measurable police services has declined on a relative scale. For example, analysis of the total budget figures for the program categories of Control and Reduction of Crime and Traffic Regulation (see Tables 4.3 and 4.5) points out the following relative cost reductions: 1/

- The cost to clear a Part I offense has declined from \$474 to \$434.
- The cost per Part I arrest has been reduced from \$700 to \$433; while Part II arrest costs have decreased from \$165 to \$132.

1/ The reader should note that this approach uses the total adjusted dollar budgets for the Control and Reduction of Crime and Traffic Control. Although the resulting "costs" are valid for comparative purposes, the same program category budget allocation, or "money pool" is used to perform more than one output activity.

- Finally, the cost for issuing a non-parking citation declined from \$20 to \$12, while similar costs for all traffic citations were reduced from \$13 to \$8.

When confronted with these findings one may question how per unit costs for these services can decline so noticeably, while police services expenditures since consolidation have increased. Although a number of complex factors are at play, a partial answer can be offered. As an example, in 1969, the Office of the Sheriff cleared 6,236 Part I offenses. The relative cost per clearance (using the research team's comparative formula) was \$474. Thus, the total cost for all Part I clearances in 1969 was \$2,956,000. In 1972, there were 8,034 Part I offenses cleared. At a relative cost of \$434, the total cost for Part I clearances was \$3,487,000. Therefore, although "per unit costs" declined on a comparative scale, the number of "service units" grew by such a margin that the total cost increased. Moreover, while the average citizen may be paying a higher tax bill for police services, on the basis of this analysis, he is receiving greater and more efficient service.

Section V

A PERSPECTIVE FOR OTHERS

THE COSTS OF CONSOLIDATED LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

As is referenced in Chapter I, moves to consolidate local governments and/or police agencies are commonly precipitated by public crisis or other untenable conditions. In such cases, governmental structures, operating conditions and basic financial underpinnings are frequently in a "poor state of repair". With specific reference to police services, this condition often results in undermanned and underpaid forces, antiquated or inadequate internal systems and equipment, and the like. Thus, when a consolidated agency begins operations, substantial amounts of capital are required to correct the ills of past public neglect.

These were the conditions which the consolidated Office of the Sheriff faced at the time of the Jacksonville merger. In 1968, for example, the department had 1.3 sworn officers per 1,000 population, as compared with the national average of 2.9 for similar size cities. Thus, a recruiting effort was necessary from the beginning to more adequately meet the city's law enforcement need. Other investments which were required during the early years of the merger were aimed at: (1) equalizing police salaries; (2) purchasing compatible automobiles, uniforms, and hardware; (3) remodeling and equipping a base of operations; and, (4) purchasing a new and compatible communications system. In addition, investments became necessary to devise and man new, improved and expanded services and programs which had either been overlooked or neglected prior to the merger. ^{1/}

Thus, the first few years of the consolidated department represented a highly capital-intensive period. Although the referenced investments were necessary to consummate the merger and to improve previously substandard conditions, the effect was to balloon total costs. Other communities contemplating consolidation might well be prepared for this eventuality. Although future savings and economies may develop as the new system matures, initial investments to consolidate and raise the level of police services to acceptable standards will not be inexpensive.

^{1/} For a discussion of programs and services developed after the merger, see Working Paper Number VI: The First Four Years of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Agency.

ECONOMIES OF SCALE

The investigation of economies of scale in Jacksonville was based on the premise that activities which hold the greatest promise for benefiting from this concept involve: (1) quantity purchases or the provision of quantity services; (2) the opportunity to utilize more efficient equipment; and, (3) the opportunity for greater utilization of specialized skills.

In analyzing particular activities regarding the generation of economies of scale, only motorpool services showed conclusive and positive evidence of savings. It should be understood, however, that research findings concerning data processing, communications and support services, were inconclusive, but not negative. That is, definitive conclusions could not be drawn because it was not possible to effectively define "per unit output costs" due to data limitations. Thus, although actual savings or economies were not documented, it should not be concluded that economies of scale were not at play. Consequently, the premises surrounding economies of scale are still interpreted as theoretically valid as they may apply to a police services merger.

TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY

Reference is made earlier in this chapter to the notion that savings produced by the consolidation of police operations may take the form of additional or expanded services rather than lower per unit costs. In Section III the technical efficiencies of the Office of the Sheriff are considered and this notion is supported. The findings also suggest, however, that the savings realized in Jacksonville: (1) may or may not be the result of changes in the scale of operations; and, (2) may or may not be the result of "consolidation". That is, the referenced improvements in technical efficiencies could have occurred if consolidation had not taken place, if Jacksonville and Duval County had been able to resolve their major political, financial and institutional difficulties.

Significantly, however, as Chapter 1 explains, the city and the county had long been troubled with problems of this nature and had not been able to develop an effective solution. Thus, on August 8, 1967, the Duval County electorate selected consolidation as the best available solution. In conclusion, although system improvements might have occurred without the merger, it is doubtful in Jacksonville's case. Thus, consolidation, of the Jacksonville variety, must be defined as the vehicle or "precipitator" of the improvements described in this paper.

DATA AGGREGATION AND ANALYSIS

Several tools were employed as a basis for scrutinizing police services costs and technical efficiencies in Jacksonville. Two of these tools--the program-type budget and the series of productivity indicators--could have application in other communities. In the case of Jacksonville, these tools produced information on the allocation of resources, levels of output for given service activities, and relative costs of given service activities. In other communities that have selected consolidation as a course of action, it is felt that application of these tools could significantly aid in police agency management.

For example, use of a program-type budget would allow police management to assess agency services on an output basis. More specifically, resources would be allocated to program categories which would have defined goals and objectives. By manipulating the amount of resources assigned to various programs over time, police personnel could develop a profile of the effect of increased or decreased resources on the achievement of these goals and objectives. Ultimately, by evaluating the profile, it would be possible to allocate resources according to a schedule based on the desired level of achievement of the various programs that often compete for the same, limited resources. The program budget approach could be "city wide" in nature if a particular local government adopts this format. If it does not, however, the program-type format could be developed solely for the police agency and used principally as an internal management instrument.

With regard to the series of productivity indicators used in Section III, ^{1/} a number of advantages could be realized by other consolidating jurisdictions. Specifically, use of the indicators could provide an ongoing or periodic capability to evaluate the progress and improvements of various police agency functions. For example, police officer productivity could be assessed relative to clearances, arrests, traffic citations, etc. This information, in turn, could be used to determine the need to adjust financial or manpower resources; to institute more intensive efforts in particular service areas; or, to develop programs to improve officer morale.

^{1/} For a further discussion on productivity indicators, see Working Paper Number IX: The Effect of Consolidation on the Productivity and Quality of Law Enforcement in Jacksonville, pp. 3-11.

The indicators designed to assess the relative costs of police functions might additionally be employed to highlight the need to adjust or expand various management policies. For example, if the relative cost of issuing a traffic citation began to increase significantly, two questions could be asked. First, have the number of current and potential violators decreased to the extent that resources can be pulled from the traffic unit and placed in an area of greater need? Or, second, has management and/or morale in the traffic unit deteriorated to the extent that corrective measures are needed?

Moreover, although the task of utilizing these indicators in conjunction with program productivity and cost data may be time consuming, the potential advantages of this approach can be significant.

Chapter V

CONSOLIDATION AS A TOOL FOR REFORM:
AN OVERVIEW

Section I

THE TENOR OF THE TIMES--CONDITIONS AND ACTIONS BEHIND THE MOVE TO CONSOLIDATE

A COMMUNITY IN CRISIS

Over the years municipal crisis has served as a primary ingredient to quests for good government in Jacksonville. As early as the mid-1800's the need for economic improvement, poor municipal response to the devastation of disease or holocaust, and inefficient and corrupt government operations provided criteria to undergird reform. Conditions promoting the consolidation movement in the 1960's also involved municipal problems and crisis. Among them were the impact of suburban sprawl on the costs and quality of public services, the disaccreditation of the city's high school, and the indictment on a variety of charges of a number of municipal and county officials.

Suburban Sprawl and the Condition of the Area's Public Facilities

In the 1960's, Jacksonville was faced with a problem common to many of our nation's cities: a growing population in unincorporated areas adjacent to the city and a declining inner city. This condition was compounded by decaying and inadequate municipal facilities and services. More specifically, between 1950 and 1965, Jacksonville's population declined by more than 6,500 people, or approximately three percent. During this same period, Duval County's population outside the City of Jacksonville grew by more than a quarter million, an increase of nearly 230 percent. Moreover, as middle-class whites fled to the suburbs, lower-income groups, mostly blacks, became highly concentrated in the city.

During the 1960's, while some progress was made to ameliorate certain of the blighting influences along the city's decaying waterfront, little was done to upgrade municipal services and facilities. Sanitary sewage, for example, had reached a state of crisis with needed improvements estimated at nearly \$250 million just prior to consolidation. Further, pollution of the St. John's River--Jacksonville's nautical link to the Atlantic--had also reached crisis stage, with the City of Jacksonville dumping nearly 80 percent of its raw sewage directly into the river. Public dissatisfaction

also abounded due to the reported inadequacy of police and fire protection in the old county, the high and disproportionate cost of running city and county governments, the rising crime rate, and the widespread and deteriorating slums in the city. In short, county and local government had not kept pace with the changing needs of the Jacksonville area.

The School Crisis

The public school crisis which arose in the mid-1960's was clearly the result of public neglect. Voters continually turned down school bond issues, while claims of mismanagement by school administration became commonplace. Time after time bond issues to upgrade physical facilities, provide more teachers and textbooks and improve school management and organization were denied a plurality at the polls. Thus, when the area's high schools were disaccredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools in 1964, it should not have come as a surprise to the citizens. The primary reason given for the disaccreditation was the generally poor condition of the school system and its lack of financial support which had restricted the adequate upkeep of buildings, insufficient textbooks and facilities and lack of administrative planning and organization. Yet, the disaccreditation was a shock which brought many citizens face to face with their long-time apathy and indifference to governmental affairs.

There were several reasons why the school crisis played a role in the Jacksonville consolidation process. First, due to its very nature it was a dominant issue in local politics for nearly a year prior to January, 1965, when the effort to consolidate was initiated. During this period the lines were drawn between the "good government people" who fought to reform the system, and the politicians and their supporters who remained lethargic as to the results that reform would provide. These "battle lines" remained throughout the consolidation controversy. Second, victories gained by good government forces over the established politicians regarding this issue provided evidence that the city and county political machine could be beaten. Consequently, a "spirit of reform" began to sweep the community. Third, the school crisis illustrated the ethos of the community--apathy had allowed things to slide into crisis.

The Grand Jury Indictments

During the latter half of 1966 proponents of governmental reform were presented with an additional windfall. Responding to charges of governmental waste and corruption, a grand jury conducted a sweeping

investigation of local government. Eight city and two county officials were subsequently indicted. Albeit the indictments were only charges, not convictions, many people did not make the distinction. Further, due to the fact that the jury consisted of average citizens chosen at random from the county roll of registered voters, its actions carried weight with the total populace; and, unlike a "blue ribbon" group made up of the business and cultural elite, it could not be accused of ulterior motives or capricious desires to "get" the politicians. Moreover, the grand jury confirmed the worst suspicions of many about inefficiency and corruption in high places.

Another important factor was that the grand jury investigations and indictments occurred during a time when the "quest for reform" was being vigorously pursued. A special commission authorized by the Florida State Legislature had been investigating the organization, function and operations of local government when the jury convened. ^{1/} The commission's findings and recommendations were released following the actions of the citizens jury. The atmosphere for reform created by the ombudsman-like work of the jury coupled with the finding of the commission provided the capstone to consolidation deliberations.

Local Governments in Duval County

Prior to consolidation, there were nine distinct local government within the area to be merged: the county, the cities of Jacksonville, Jacksonville Beach, Atlantic Beach and Neptune Beach, the town of Baldwin, an air improvement authority and two mosquito control districts. The four municipalities other than the City of Jacksonville contained approximately four percent of the total county population. None abutted Jacksonville directly and each maintained small scale municipal operations when compared with the county and the City of Jacksonville. Many claim that the paucity of autonomous governments coupled with the nature of local government structures and the outcry of citizens for better services, clearly facilitated city-county consolidation in Jacksonville.

The Government Institutions Prior to Consolidation

The county has always been an important level of government in the south. It was originally established to minister the governmental affairs of a rural constituency. In Florida, as in most states, it is a subdivision of state government which makes the State Legislature its legislative arm. Thus, bills applying to a specific county originate with the county's delegation to the legislature, with the entire state's elected representatives subsequently acting on local problems.

^{1/} The nature and activities of the committees are reviewed below in the section dealing with The Decision to Consolidate and the Mechanics of the Political Process.

Prior to consolidation, Duval County was responsible for the governance of all unincorporated areas within its boundary. As a subdivision of the state without home rule powers, the citizens elected more than 50 countywide officers. In addition to a board of county commissioners that was in charge of administering most county activities, a county budget commission functioned along with an elected school board and civil service board. Other county elected officials included: the clerk of the circuit court, sheriff, tax assessor, tax collector, supervisor of registration, clerk of criminal court, state's attorney, public defender, nine constables, nine justices of the peace, two county judges, two small claims court judges, two juvenile court judges, three criminal court judges, and eleven circuit court judges.

Incorporated as a home rule city, Jacksonville had a mayor-commission-council form of government, unique among cities in the United States prior to consolidation. The structure was authorized in a charter dating back to the 1880's and was heralded by some for its "checks and balances". Briefly, the mayor served as the executive officer of the city, sat as permanent chairman of the City Commission and held the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety. The Commission, the city's administrative body, had five members, each responsible for the administration of certain city departments. The Council's nine members passed all city ordinances, set tax rates, controlled the budget and appropriated funds. Other elective officers in the city were the city recorder, treasurer, municipal judge and tax assessor.

Moreover, all these elected officials made for an extremely long ballot. There were 50 countywide officers, not including 16 members of the legislative delegation. There were also 24 officials that represented various districts and 18 city officials. Thus, most county voters elected 68 separate officials (71 if they lived in a mosquito control district), while city voters elected 86 persons. Further, the myriad government structures and their "complexity" were frequently criticized for making positive action difficult, and the "pinning" of responsibility impossible. This labyrinthian structure of government was clearly a candidate for reform and reorganization; especially when considered in relation to the crisis being faced by the community at-large.

Law Enforcement Services

Prior to the merger, the two major law enforcement agencies were the Duval County Sheriff's Department and the City of Jacksonville Police Department. Police services in the unincorporated areas of the county

were provided by the Sheriff's Department, which was frequently criticized for its lack of patrol car coverage. The city police department serviced those within the city's municipal boundaries. The police department had received a major "face lift" just before consolidation to correct various organization and management problems.

More specifically, in terms of size and manpower, the largest policing agency was the Jacksonville Police Department. It had approximately 400 uniformed officers and over 80 support personnel. It reported a ratio of 2.0 officers per 1,000 population prior to consolidation; a ratio which exceeded the national average for cities of similar size. Further, the department, while well manned, was in the process of being reorganized in relation to a plan prepared by the International Association of Chiefs of Police in late 1964. Moreover, while the department had not fully implemented the revised organization plan, it was manned, structured, and was beginning to function consistent with contemporary tenets of police administration.

The Sheriff's Department had approximately 270 sworn officers and some 70 support employees. As compared with the national average of uniformed police officers per 1,000 population prior to consolidation, the Sheriff's Department was notably understaffed, with a ratio of less than one sworn officer per 1,000 population. As a result, the department was unable to follow up 40 percent of the major crimes committed in the area. Further, during evening and night hours, a high crime period, there were only 12 patrol cars on duty in the entire 800 square mile area; each car responsible for an area twice the size of the City of Jacksonville. Similarly, the manpower shortage only permitted the records center of the department to remain open sixteen hours a day. Thus, while the Sheriff was making every effort to apply modern policing techniques, it was conservatively estimated that the department's manpower shortage was so severe that the force could have been "doubled" and effectively used without overlap or duplication.

THE DECISION TO CONSOLIDATE AND THE MECHANICS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The democratic form of government has certain inherent characteristics which frustrated Jacksonville's consolidation architects and permitted the antagonists of reform to take steps to block the ultimate merger. The

framers of the consolidation charter included local politicians, members of the Duval County delegation to the Florida State Legislature, the state legislators themselves, and the local electorate. The original reform proposal had to be altered in various ways to accommodate the whims, desires and needs of persons active in the adoption process. In short, though logic and tenets of good government undergirded the proposed charter, "practical politics" and its resultant trade offs and compromises played an important role in Jacksonville's successful vote to consolidate.

The Manifesto for Consolidation

As reviewed above, the 1960's had brought crisis to Jacksonville's governmental institutions. As a result, there was a general feeling that business was suffering and that poor government--corrupt and inefficient--was partly to blame. Thus, spurred by several prominent businessmen, on January 19, 1965, a request was submitted to the county's legislative delegation to take action which would permit the study and subsequent "vote" on improvements to government in Duval County.

After much wrangling, the delegation agreed to the request and settled on a method to establish a study commission that would examine the city and county governments. The resulting commission was comprised of a diverse sampling of community leaders, with downtown businessmen and attorneys representing more than half the members. Labor leaders, accountants, architects, physicians and educators, including four Blacks and six women also served. In short, the commission represented business interests and, at the same time, provided for input from a variety of other community groups.

Following successful efforts to raise financing for its work and to appoint a full-time paid director, the decision was made to use commission members, as opposed to an outside contractor, to carry out the work of the group. This approach was taken to insure that commission findings were received and viewed as local statements of needed improvements, rather than consultant recommendations that were not so closely and intimately responsive to the problems of Jacksonville. Consequently, six task forces were formed from among commission members to begin examining government capabilities in Duval County.

By late January, 1967, the Commission had completed its analysis and drafted a plan for the consolidation of Duval County and all five of its municipalities. All governmental operations were to be vested in one county-

wide, strong mayor-council form of government. The mayor was to have the power to appoint the heads of major departments including the chief law enforcement officer whose title would continue as sheriff. Two taxing districts were also planned: an urban services district, initially covering the same areas as the old municipalities, and a general services district. The two kinds of districts were designed to respond to the levels of services needed in the consolidated city. In addition, a non-partisan school board and a revamped court structure were proposed.

In short, under the plan which was printed in book form and referred to as the Blueprint for Improvement, all voters would elect a total of 25 officials; a considerable reduction from the lengthy ballot of the past. Further, the proposed government structure was designed to provide for the efficient delivery of municipal services through a structure which insured that responsibility would be "pinpointed" for various official functions. It is important to note that this proposal was issued during a time of controversy and decreasing confidence in local government--the grand jury indictments referred to above had been issued in late 1966 and a second jury was convened in early 1967 to continue probing government mismanagement and corruption.

Practical Politics

Before a reorganization plan can be submitted to a vote in Florida, the state legislature must approve a charter and pass a bill providing referendum. The power of ultimately defining the plan to be voted upon rests with the county legislative delegation. In addition, however, the people to be affected by the proposal also have the opportunity to become involved by means of public hearings. Thus, the Blueprint for consolidation was scrutinized by the citizens of Duval County, local politicians, the elected delegation to the state legislature and the legislature itself.

As might be expected, a variety of substantive changes resulted from the process. Among them were an amendment which provided a local option to the Beach communities and the Town of Baldwin to become part of the new government or to remain independent; a stipulation which called for the confirmation of the mayor's appointments and budget by the council; ad valorem tax limits for the general and urban services districts; for the election of the offices of sheriff, supervisor of elections, tax assessor, and tax collector; and, the elimination of the proposed court restructuring.

Understandably, the architects of the original consolidation plan were disappointed at the changes, particularly the provision weakening the authority of the mayor and the elective status of the sheriff. Nonetheless, public administration theory gave way to tradition; and, on August 8, 1967, slightly more than two and one half years after community leaders had decided to pursue the issue of government reorganization, the question went to the voters. As a result of a vigorous campaign with extensive media coverage more than 84,000 votes were cast--of which more than 54,000, or 65 percent, were in favor of consolidation.

The outlying municipalities voted to retain their own governments. Surprisingly, however, these municipalities voted for the consolidation of Jacksonville and Duval County; while choosing not to join themselves.

LESSONS FOR OTHERS--A CHECKLIST

Each chapter in the case study includes a section on "perspectives for others". These sections serve two purposes. First, the Jacksonville experience is reviewed in light of broad questions about consolidation. Second, the "lessons" focus on the Jacksonville merger in a way to be instructive to other communities contemplating consolidation. The essence of these perspectives are, for similar purposes, presented below in checklist form.

Principal Forces Which Prompted the Jacksonville Consolidation

- Population and growth patterns
- Business conditions
- The capacity and quality of local government services
- Identifiable governmental and/or political crises

Principal Elements or Conditions Which Led to the Successful Vote for Jacksonville's Consolidation

- The need for indepth local involvement in the planning process
- The affect that the political process can have on the logic of "good government" proposals

- The need for strong doses of media support and public information
- The need for a well organized, sufficiently financed and adequately staffed promotional program

The Subject of Law Enforcement

- The need to evaluate the history, status, organization and operations of agencies to be merged
- The need to consider law enforcement as a political issue
- The need to consider alternative strategies to law enforcement merger

Section II

THE MERGER OF THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE AND DUVAL COUNTY

THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATION

The consolidation Charter approved on August 8, 1967, provided for a transition period to effect the smooth transfer of functions and responsibilities from the former City of Jacksonville and Duval County administrations to the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville. Transition was scheduled to begin in late September, 1967, and to be completed by October 1, 1968--the day the consolidated government was to be officially installed. In that the Jacksonville experience illustrated the importance of a transition period to the merger of local governments and highlighted problems inherent in transition, key aspects of the process are reviewed below.

The Legal Framework Undergirding Transition

The formally designated transition period was designed to serve as the first step in instituting the consolidated government. The process was initiated with a primary election in October, 1967. A general election was subsequently held on December 5. Officials elected included the mayor, city councilmen, a tax assessor, a supervisor of elections, the sheriff, a judge of the municipal court and members of the new civil service board. Those persons elected were to take office on March 1, 1968, for purposes of "organizing" the consolidated government.

Together with authorizing the transition government to oversee and plan for consolidation, the Charter provided specific guidelines for: (1) funding the transition government; and, (2) the co-existence of the pre-consolidation governments with the transition structure.

The Work of the Transition Government

The responsibility for organizing the consolidated government during the transition period was placed on both the mayor and the new City Council. The basis for this responsibility was incorporated in the new Charter where emphasis was placed on the preparation of a budget for the first year of operations.

Based on a desire to "get an early start", the council began meeting in January, 1968--three months prior to the date authorized in the Charter. In this process, the legislators organized into a number of committees to address particular areas of concern; e.g. budget and finance, public works and public safety, among others. Moreover, the first nine months of 1968 provided a valuable time during which each new councilman became involved in areas in which he was particularly concerned, learned to work as part of the new legislative team, and generally became familiar with the consolidated government.

Similarly, the mayor and his administration were able to accomplish a number of important tasks. These included: the appointment of more than twenty key department and division heads; the preparation and submittal of budgets; and, the development of a variety of internal administrative and operating procedures. In addition, the mayor spearheaded the development of a special series of newsletters designed to minimize the spread of irresponsible and oftentimes damaging rumors and to keep the employees of the city and county informed of progress being made in the formation of the new government.

Moreover, the transition period was important in Jacksonville. It afforded the newly elected City Council an opportunity to "gear up" for the political process which was required under consolidation. It also permitted the council to organize and to become familiar with its new responsibilities. Transition further offered the new administration a defined time frame to plan for the merger in an environment that did not call for the concurrent delivery of municipal services.

Problems Faced by the Transition Government

During the transition period it was intended that newly elected and appointed consolidation officials would devote a major portion of their time to pre-planning for the smooth implementation of the new government. It was further intended that members of the City of Jacksonville and Duval County governments would continue to function until "consolidation day". Yet, outgoing government officials took action during this period which came to be known as "lame duck surprises". In addition, a number of sweeping legal attacks were initiated against consolidation. Thus, transition proved to be a tumultuous period during which consolidation had to be planned, structured, protected and defended.

Some of the more blatant actions taken by outgoing officials included attempts to lower service rates of the city-owned utility company which would have severely affected the consolidated government's revenue generating potentials; abolish local government regulatory rights over privately owned water and sewer facilities; and, vary local zoning and subdivision controls. In addition, considerable juggling of salaries of public employees took place. This was particularly true in the area of public safety, where no regard was given to the fact that such moves could not be accommodated by the consolidated budget which had been developed and adopted prior to these actions.

Legal challenges covered a variety of subjects including: suits challenging the constitutionality of consolidation; litigation over the veracity of initiative petitions filed by anti-consolidationists which would have revoked the charter; and, a suit charging that malapportionment of council districts under the consolidation charter deprived residents of their civil and political rights. Each of these challenges was eventually decided in favor of the consolidated government.

Moreover, the Jacksonville experience illustrated two types of problems that may occur during the transition phase of government consolidation. First, unless specifically forbidden, local bills may be passed by outgoing legislators which directly and adversely impact the budget or operating efficiency of the consolidated unit. Second, transition provided a period during which consolidation opponents loosed a series of parting legal shots which were time consuming and costly to deal with when the new government needed its legal staff to iron out various transition problems.

THE POLICE SERVICES MERGER: AN ACCOUNTING OF KEY ISSUES

A variety of issues were faced by the newly re-elected sheriff during the transition period. They spanned the horizon of political, organizational, financial and personal problems that many elected and appointed officials do not confront in a lifetime of public service. The methods used to deal with these issues were similarly as numerous and expansive as the problems themselves.

Organization of the Sheriff's Office

One of the major issues encountered by the Sheriff during the transition period dealt with the basic organization of the consolidated police department. Originally, the Charter designated the divisions of the Office of the Sheriff; provided for the appointment process of each division chief; outlined the responsibilities of the divisions; and, tacitly named persons to fill certain division head positions.

Although theoretically sound, the organizational approach spelled out in the Charter was not considered appropriate or workable by the Sheriff or his advisors. In particular, it was judged inappropriate because: (1) there were more command level personnel in the two departments than could be accommodated in the proposed organization; (2) the proposed organization did not provide the Sheriff with sufficient appointment latitude (two of three chiefs positions were specified in the Charter); and, (3) the proposed structure did not provide for the appointment of additional policy level people to assist in the management of the department. Consequently, the Sheriff had to expend a great deal of time and effort during the transition period to correct these Charter deficiencies.

In summary, the verbiage contained in the Charter had significantly limited the power and authority of the city's popularly elected chief law enforcement officer. Not only had the organization been defined, but the Sheriff was at the mercy of the council in terms of the final approval, the numbers and types of assistants he could appoint. The revisions designed by the Sheriff, however, protected the interests of members of pre-consolidation departments; placed the Sheriff in a position to recruit and control a cadre of top-level assistants; and, permitted him to organize the department in the manner that he felt best satisfied the consolidated city's needs based on the principles of sound police management.

The Pay Issue

Prior to consolidation the pay scale of the City of Jacksonville police force was somewhat lower than that of the County Sheriff's Office. Because of this condition, the newly elected consolidation mayor developed a plan to equalize police salaries over a period of time.

Aware of the effect that "phased" pay equalization might have on personnel, the Sheriff took steps to alter the plan. Specifically, prior to the adoption of the consolidated budget, the Sheriff made numerous appearances

before the consolidated council's Finance Committee. Arguing that the pay differential would divide the department along the lines of pre-consolidation agencies and would result in men being paid different salaries although they faced the same responsibilities and challenges, he won alteration in the mayor's plan toward the end that equalization of salaries occurred six months earlier than originally proposed.

The Issue of Promotions

Another issue faced by the Sheriff concerned promotions. In particular, no provision had been made by the architects of consolidation to limit promotions during transition in pre-consolidation agencies. Four important implications were inherent in this oversight. First, open positions could be filled by personnel who did not "fit in" with the management team being put together by the Sheriff. Second, a free wheeling promotion program in pre-consolidation departments could have adversely affected the approved consolidated budget. Third, the number of persons available to compete for each position would have been fewer than after consolidation, thus limiting the Sheriff's potential to draw from the most highly competent manpower pool. Fourth, the potential existed for arbitrary promotions which might have been based on favoritism or attempts to protect particular employees.

In response, the Sheriff worked with the city and county civil service boards to freeze all promotions. Thus, at consolidation the Sheriff had the opportunity to draw from the combined forces to fill nearly fifty command level vacancies.

Police Uniforms, Equipment and Facilities

Certain factors which relate to the delivery of police services and to the ability of police officers to identify and be identified with their organization were found to have a direct effect on the consolidation process. Among these factors were police uniforms, equipment and facilities. Briefly, the pre-consolidation departments used different types and styles of uniforms and equipment. The adequacy, location and conditions of the buildings in which the police agencies were housed also varied significantly.

The Sheriff took a variety of steps to correct these conditions. One measure accomplished just after consolidation involved repainting and remarking all patrol cars to signify that they belonged to the new Office of the Sheriff. Attempts were also made to standardize uniforms

and associated equipment prior to the merger. However, because funds could not be committed before "consolidation day", when the forces were brought together, police personnel dressed as they had prior to the merger. This situation prevailed for nearly seven months after consolidation. It caused confusion among citizens, produced problems for police supervisors in terms of dealing with one homogenous unit; and, made it difficult for the men to identify with a single consolidated agency. A final steps taken by the Sheriff to ease the change to a consolidated department involved minor alterations to facilities used by the pre-consolidation agencies. Unfortunately, these facilities were old, physically separated, and in general, not designed to accommodate the operations of a modern-day department. Thus, although some improvements were made, the housing problem complicated the merger and made coordinating the day-to-day operations of the agency difficult.

The General Orders Manual

Traditionally, police organizations employ general orders manuals to outline policies, programs and procedures of broad application. Due, in part, to the number of pressing issues that required attention during the limited transition period, a formal, integrated manual was not available at consolidation day. Rather, a directive was issued which continued in effect the manuals used in each agency prior to the merger. This condition precipitated a number of problems. For example, it was found that without standard guidelines, the overall delivery of police services was confusing; men working side by side were using different rules; and, no one was sure which orders took precedence in a particular situation.

The Condition of Laws and Ordinances

A number of uncertainties existed at the time of the merger regarding the enforcement of laws and ordinances. This occurred for two reasons. First, the laws and ordinances of the former City of Jacksonville and Duval County had not been recodified to provide one set of guiding principals. Second, the multi-tiered court system (i. e. state, county, municipal) which existed prior to consolidation was not altered when the merger occurred. Thus, questions arose in terms of which laws to enforce; when and where to enforce them; and, which court had the authority to judge the validity of their enforcement. This situation proved extremely confusing for all concerned; police officers; representatives of the judiciary and citizens alike. These uncertainties were subsequently reconciled by the enactment of consolidated laws for the City of Jacksonville in mid-1971. Prior to that time the Sheriff worked closely with representa-

tives of the area's legal community to minimize problems in the enforcement of the existing laws.

Communications

A number of problems concerning communications surfaced during the transition period. Among these were the questions of system compatibility, the location of the consolidated communications center, and organization for purposes of dispatching and receiving calls. Working with key advisors, the following decisions were made. First, a "frequency base" which could be handled by existing city and county equipment was selected. Second, to maximize effective use of the communications system, it was decided to ultimately locate the consolidated communications center in close proximity to the records center. Finally, it was agreed that two separate dispatching and receiving operations would be maintained until a detailed communications study could be made by an outside consulting firm.

Consolidation of Police Records

Prior to consolidation the two law enforcement agencies utilized different methods and techniques to file and store records. During the transition period, a new "hybrid" records system was designed; methods to man the consolidated records center were developed; and, the physical location of the center was defined. Thus, when the merger was effected, a clear strategy had been developed to deal with records collection, storage and retrieval.

The Use of Transition Committees

Recognizing that planning is at the heart of administration and that no formal accommodations were made in the Charter concerning this element of consolidation in relation to specific departmental mergers, the Sheriff mounted an internal planning strategy. Members from each of the police agencies to be merged were selected and placed on one or more transition planning committees. The committees were used as task forces to deal with the consolidation of various functional aspects of the law enforcement operation; e.g. jail facilities, communications, vice and so on. This technique was found to provide a number of advantages including: resources to develop ideas and program strategies for merging various elements of police operations; pragmatic approaches to the merger through the eyes of persons that would be directly affected; and, a vehicle through which representatives of the two organizations could come together and work on problems of mutual interest which, in turn, fostered cooperation necessary for the successful merger.

Albeit successful in Jacksonville's case, analysis of this approach pointed to a number of factors that should be considered if others facing consolidation plan to involve department members in the merger process. For example, committee representation should be balanced from among the agencies to be merged, as well as in terms of rank structure and experience; committee members should have time away from their normal job tasks to fulfill committee responsibilities; committees should be given detailed guidelines as to their responsibilities, functions and direction; and, top management should allocate time to provide committee participants with feedback regarding the final disposition of recommendations.

Moreover, involving personnel of the police agencies to be merged in the consolidation process can be a valuable tool. Top management should, however, recognize the need to set aside time to maximize the effectiveness of the involvement process.

LESSONS FOR OTHERS--A CHECKLIST

The General Government Merger

- A formal transition period can be extremely valuable to the merger of various units.
- Legislation authorizing transition should outline the role and responsibilities of transition officials as well as detail the role of the officials of governments that are being consolidated.
- The time allotted to transition should be kept to a minimum--perhaps from four to six months--or the time necessary to develop, consider and adopt a budget to guide the consolidated government through the first year of operations.
- Merging governments should expect to be confronted by a variety of problems prior to consolidation--legal, personal, and financial, among others.

The Police Services Merger

- The legal framework that undergirds consolidation should be designed in a manner which does not severely limit management's prerogatives in terms of organizing for the delivery of police services.
- Every effort should be made to have all officers on a compatible pay and benefit scale when the merger takes place.
- During the transition period, promotions should be frozen or severely limited in pre-consolidation departments.
- Action should be taken during the transition period to standardize and/or deal with variations among uniforms (color and style); patrol cars (color and style); general orders; laws and ordinances; communications; and, records.
- Careful consideration should be given to the potential of involving members of the agencies to be merged in the consolidation process.
- When considering techniques for involving employees in the consolidation process, include the time that management will have to devote to make such techniques workable as an important factor.

Section III

THE EFFECT OF CONSOLIDATION IN JACKSONVILLE

THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION

When the Local Government Study Commission authored the proposal for consolidation, distinct benefits from a singular areawide law enforcement agency were envisioned. Generally, the Commission maintained that such an agency would provide optimum law enforcement in the most efficient and economical way. It cautioned, however, that such an arrangement would not result in a cutback in overall expenditures for police protection, but that under the unification the taxpayer would get more for his money. In sum, the committee maintained that a consolidated countywide department would provide uniform law enforcement; increased crime prevention and traffic control; better utilization of manpower and facilities; elimination of competitive jealousies between the two largest departments in the area; and, cohesive planning to meet law enforcement needs. Further, the Commission defined expected results from various functionally oriented topics such as the prison farms, records, and communications, among others. A look at Jacksonville four years after consolidation produced a variety of findings as to the realization of the Commission's expectations. These findings are summarized in the following pages.

The Cost of Consolidated Law Enforcement Services

Moves to consolidate local governments and/or police agencies are commonly precipitated by public crisis. Such crises may result from or take the form of poor or corrupt governmental structures, operating conditions and basic financial underpinnings. With specific reference to police services, this condition often produces undermanned and underpaid forces and antiquated or inadequate internal systems and equipment. Thus, when a consolidated agency begins operations, substantial amounts of capital are required to correct the ills of past public neglect.

These were the conditions which the consolidated Office of the Sheriff faced at the time of the Jacksonville merger. In 1968, for example, the department had 1.3 sworn officers per 1,000 population, as compared

with the national average of 2.9 for similar size cities. Thus, a recruiting effort was necessary from the beginning to more adequately meet the city's law enforcement needs. Other investments which were required during the early years of the merger were aimed at: equalizing police salaries; purchasing compatible automobiles; uniforms, and hardware; remodeling and equipping headquarters; and, purchasing new and compatible communications systems.

Thus, the costs for police services increased in Jacksonville following consolidation. More specifically, drawing from annual totals since consolidation, the cost of police services rose from approximately \$8.6 million in 1968-1969, to nearly \$14 million in 1971-1972. This represents a total increase of 67 percent during the first four years of consolidation. Similarly, the rate of growth in the annual costs for police services increased from that which existed prior to consolidation; for the two years before consolidation, the average rate of costs grew by 7.6 percent versus an average annual rate increase of 18.2 percent for the first four years of consolidation. When these costs were adjusted to account for inflation, however, the average annual increase since consolidation fell to 8.2 percent. Finally, when consideration was given to the effect of population growth on police services costs (by use of an "expenditures per capita" formula) the annual average increase dropped to 6.2 percent.

Clearly, the amount of resources devoted to law enforcement has risen since consolidation. This increase was based primarily on investments to consummate the merger and to improve pre-consolidation sub-standard conditions; the effect, however, was to "balloon" total police services costs. Thus, as hypothesized by the architects of consolidation, economic benefits associated with merged police agencies have neither taken the form of lower costs per se, nor have provided actual dollar savings to the local taxpayer. Others contemplating consolidation might well expect these results to prevail.

The Efficiency of the Consolidated Police Agency

The desire to provide efficient police services has long been a goal of public administrators. The architects of the Jacksonville merger similarly saw consolidation as a vehicle to achieve this objective. Unfortunately, sufficient time has not passed and comparable data is not yet available to unequivocally conclude that the Jacksonville police merger is more efficient than that which existed previously. A pattern of increasing

efficiency has, however, developed since the merger. In fact, with regard to output it was found that the Jacksonville taxpayer is now receiving more "service" for his tax dollar than he did at the time of consolidation. For example, a larger percentage of offenders are being apprehended; the number of arrests per sworn officer has increased by more than half; and, total citations along with those issued per sworn officer for all traffic related offenses have doubled.

In summary, consolidation has provided the mechanism whereby police services in Jacksonville can be delivered more efficiently. It may, therefore, be concluded that the framers of the merger selected a responsive tool to resolve Jacksonville's problems.

The Economies of Scale of Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations

The members of the Local Government Study Commission reasoned that the increased size and volume of operations of a consolidated police operation might well result in cost advantages through economies of scale. Activities which held the greatest promise for benefiting from economies of scale were felt to involve quantity purchases, the opportunity to utilize more efficient equipment and/or the greater utilization of specialized skills. In terms of consolidated law enforcement in Jacksonville, the particular activities which possessed one or more of these characteristics included the motorpool, data processing, communications, personnel and purchasing operations.

In analyzing these activities, only motorpool services showed conclusive and positive evidence of savings through increased scale. These savings took the form of both absolute and relative reductions in the level of motorpool costs. Coupled with this fact was the realization that motorpool costs represented over 70 percent of all expenditures which were felt to potentially benefit from economies of scale; e.g. data processing, communications, purchasing, printing, among others. Moreover, the fact that costs associated with motorpool services make up such a large portion of the total support services budget of the agency--a condition likely to exist in other police operations--illustrates the potential inherent in the consolidation of this function vis-a-vis reducing the costs of providing law enforcement services.

Interestingly, the findings concerning data processing, communications and other support services were inconclusive, but not negative. That is, definitive conclusions could not be drawn because it was not possible to define "per unit output costs" due to data limitations. Thus, although actual savings or economies were not documented, it should not be concluded that

economies of scale are not at play among these remaining support functions. Consequently, the premises surrounding consolidation's positive relationship with economies of scale remain theoretically valid in terms of their applicability for a police services merger.

Police Department Housing

The major recommendation offered by the Local Government Study Commission in terms of police department housing concerned the need to construct a new building for use by the consolidated agency. This topic was pertinent to the operations of the Office of the Sheriff for a number of reasons. For example, the facilities that were to be used by the consolidated force existed as reminders of pre-consolidation days. Their adequacy, location and state of repair varied, with neither capable of supporting the entire force. Yet, no funds were available at the time of consolidation to construct a new headquarters facility.

Thus, only minor alterations were made to the former Jacksonville police station and the Duval County Courthouse to accommodate the needs of the new department. Operations were eventually located in terms of their particular function--patrol and traffic being located in the former Jacksonville Police headquarters with the majority of the remaining functions housed in the Duval County Courthouse. Reflecting on this topic representatives of the Sheriff's Office pointed out that the housing problem complicated the merger and made coordinating the day-to-day operations of the agency difficult. In fact, a special messenger service had to be instituted to expedite communications between the separated facilities. Albeit time consuming, cumbersome, and costly, this was the only way documents and orders critical to ongoing police operations could be transmitted between the working units of the agency. ^{1/} Although the agency was consolidated in name, the housing problems served as a barrier to the smooth merger and operations of the department as a single functioning unit.

Consequently, the Sheriff's Office began the monumental task of planning for a new police facility shortly after consolidation. A bond issue to support the project was subsequently placed before the voters in 1972, and received necessary support. ^{2/}

1/ See Working Paper Number VI: The First Four Years of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Agency, pp. 21-22 and 70 for more detail on this subject.

2/ Working Paper Number VI: The First Four Years of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Agency, p. 71.

Moreover, the consolidated force has worked out of crowded and physically separated facilities since the merger of the two police agencies in 1968. The situation created problems, but the first hurdle toward its solution was finally crossed in 1972--four years after consolidation.^{1/} Patently, the Local Government Study Commission's foresight in calling for unified police housing prior to consolidation was a point well taken--unfortunately, the need could not be realized earlier in the process. Others facing consolidation might well recognize that although an agency may be organizationally merged, total and effective unification can occur only when facilities are provided that permit this agency to function in a unified manner.

Police Records and Communications

Recognizing that two important elements of law enforcement programming are a sound records system coupled with a total communications capability, the Local Government Study Commission analyzed conditions in the pre-consolidation departments. Their research disclosed that records centers existed in both agencies. Further, it was learned that the old county records center operated only sixteen hours a day due to personnel shortages. Thus, the Commission concluded that single records and communication centers for the consolidated city, operating around the clock, were needed. Prior to and at the time of consolidation, steps were taken to realize this desire.

In terms of the records center, decisions were made regarding the type of records system to be used; the manning of the consolidated center; and, the center's physical location. Briefly, the FBI-sanctioned procedure for records storage was adopted; the center was located as close as possible to the consolidated communications center; and, the center remained open around the clock when the departments were merged. Merging the two records systems was, however, a monumental task both in terms of implementing a compatible format and providing a physical facility that could effectively house the new system. In an effort to efficiently "purge" old records and reorganize the system, part-time persons under programs such as the Neighborhood Youth Corps were used. As noted by one observer of the process " . . . without such assistance, the job would have been impossible. Even with it, a year was required to complete the records merger."^{1/} Others facing consolidation should not overlook the fact that the

^{1/} Interview with Director John C. Nelson, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, February 23, 1973.

records merger might not only be a time-consuming project, but may also be a costly process. Nonetheless, it should be faced during the early stages of consolidation.

The communications merger also became a costly and time-consuming project. Among the issues that had to be resolved were system compatibility, the location of the consolidated communications center, and organization for purposes of dispatching and receiving calls. Although each of these subjects was addressed prior to consolidation, to insure that final decisions were based on the best available professional advice, the Consolidated Council directed the Sheriff to maintain pre-consolidation communications and dispatching centers while an outside consulting firm conducted an indepth communications study. ^{1/} Thus, the final system development and merger of communications services did not occur until the receipt of the consultant's report approximately a year after consolidation. During this period, due to the non-compatibility of systems which were used by pre-consolidation departments, two communications and dispatching centers were maintained. This arrangement produced a variety of frustrations for those involved in the process. For example, communications between mobile units had to be handled through a transfer process at one of the communications facilities. Further, patrol supervisors had to maintain three communications capabilities: one for use with former county vehicles; one for former city vehicles; and, a separate walkie-talkie system to maintain communications with foot patrolmen and others. ^{2/} Following completion of the study, a massive communications reorganization effort began. The effort resulted in a communication's network which " . . . is recognized by law enforcement agencies across the nation as (one of) the finest systems in use today." ^{3/} One caveat is offered, however, regarding the development of such a system by others facing consolidation. Specifically, it was pointed out that "some \$1 million has been or will be expended on the complete communications set up. This money is difficult to raise and other large departments should not expect to solve the basic communications problem without incurring such costs." ^{4/}

^{1/} See Working Paper Number V: The Months Preceding Consolidation: A Time of Transition, pp. 45-47 for more detail on this subject.

^{2/} Interview with Captain M. P. Richardson, Office of the Sheriff, Consolidated City of Jacksonville, May 3, 1972.

^{3/} Bold View--Consolidated Government: Better Service for a Better Community, published by the Public Relations Office, City of Jacksonville, Vol. 3, No. 2, June, 1971, p. 13.

^{4/} Ibid.

Thus, the Local Government Study Commission's original expectations regarding records and communications were fulfilled only after the merger of the two agencies. The problems, time and costs which were incurred in this process might well be anticipated by others facing consolidation. 1/

Perspectives Concerning the Consolidated Police Agency

Members of the Office of the Sheriff and citizens alike were queried concerning the merger of police services. In an effort to document the attitudes of Jacksonville police on this issue, a number were randomly sampled and asked specifically whether consolidation brought better police services to the Jacksonville area. 2/ Nearly eighty-five percent of those responding indicated that better police services have been provided since consolidation. Interestingly, when the responses were broken down between civilian employees, officers and patrolmen this percentage varied only slightly; ninety percent of the patrolmen felt that police services have improved since consolidation, while 82 percent of the officers and 81 percent of the civilians sampled held the same opinion.

When queried about police services by WTLV-TV, Channel 12, in cooperation with the research team, Jacksonville's citizens expressed views similar to those of police personnel. 3/ In fact, of those offering an opinion, nearly 60 percent maintained that police services in Jacksonville are good or excellent. Another 25 percent said the services are fair and

1/ Other areas in which marked improvements have been made since consolidation and which were addressed by the Local Government Study Commission include the prison farm and juvenile delinquency services. For details concerning actions taken in these areas, see Working Paper Number VI: The First Four Years of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Agency.

2/ See Chapter III for a detailed description of the random sampling process and the types of questions included in the questionnaire.

3/ The sampling procedures utilized by WTLV-TV have received national awards including two Innovator Awards presented by the American Research Bureau in recognition of the quality of the surveys. Briefly, a coincidental telephone sampling technique is utilized. Persons are randomly selected from current telephone directories and contacted by telephone on selected week-day evenings during hours when a reliable and valid sample can be expected. The survey that was conducted to elicit opinions on the police included over three-hundred Jacksonville residents.

only 6 percent rated them as poor. Further, when asked whether the quality of police services in Jacksonville has improved, remained the same, or declined since consolidation, the concept of merged police operations received another vote of confidence. Nearly one-third of those having an opinion noted that services have improved; slightly more than 30 percent indicated that services have remained the same; and, only 7.6 percent maintained that services have deteriorated. Moreover, consolidated police services were viewed positively by those within and outside the system.

LESSONS FOR OTHERS

The Economies and Efficiencies of Consolidated Law Enforcement

- When agencies are consolidated it may be necessary to expend large sums of capital to make up for past public neglect.
- Consolidated police operations may be more costly.
- The taxpayer may pay more for consolidated police services, but it is likely that he will receive more "service" for his tax dollar.
- Consolidation of various support functions (e. g. purchasing, motorpool, data processing, etc.) may result in saving through exploitation of "economies of scale".

Topics Related to the Consolidation of Police Agencies

- Physically separated and/or inadequate police agency headquarters may serve to hamper the smooth merger of police agencies.
- The consolidation of records and communications systems is a necessary but often a costly undertaking.
- An extended time period following the merger of police agencies may be necessary before various operations and functions are totally and effectively consolidated.
- Consolidation has brought better police service to Jacksonville in the eyes of the police agency personnel and the community at-large.

Section IV

CONSOLIDATION--THE ANSWER IN JACKSONVILLE

Governments as public institutions evolved in response to demands for community order and protection. Although the forms and functions of governments in this country have changed significantly in the past three centuries, their purpose remains essentially to serve community needs. Further, according to this precept, fulfillment of this purpose is to be accomplished at the minimum control of and expense to taxpayers. All too often, however, contemporary governments have failed to meet the tests of responsiveness and adaptability in satiating public needs. Although many governments are undeserving of the charge, it is not uncommon to observe public institutions operating not by and for the people, but in spite of them. Fanned by the fuels of petty jealousies, selfish interests, and delusory traditions, and precipitated by the enigma of public apathy, a problem frequently compounds--taking the form of new, overlapping and often marginally responsive government bodies.

The proliferation of governmental bodies is observable at all levels--federal, state and local--attention in this study focused on Jacksonville area county and municipal institutions. In examining the growth and directions of governments at this level, one frequently observes the "need" each feels to maintain control over its own local functions, with law enforcement services being a case in point. Commenting on this situation, one student of local government pointed out that:^{1/}

. . . despite gross changes in other facets of our society, the basic organizational structure of law enforcement has remained relatively unchanged since the turn of the century. Regardless of size, location, relation to other units of local government, or financial resources, each local unit is deemed capable of administering basic law enforcement within its own jurisdictions.

^{1/} Gordon E. Misner, "Recent Developments in Metropolitan Law Enforcement," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 50: p. 497, January-February, 1960.

Paralleling, yet going a step beyond this observation, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice noted that: 1/

. . . formal cooperation or consolidation is an essential ingredient in improving the quality of law enforcement. Crime is not confined within artificially created political boundaries, but, rather, extends throughout the larger community. A workable program of formal cooperation or consolidation for law enforcement services within a "common community of interests" is the desired goal for improving the quality of law enforcement at the local level.

This point was stressed further by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals which noted that: 2/

. . . local governments generally can benefit from some form of combined police services--consolidation can frequently upgrade police service and lower its costs.

The Jacksonville police services merger clearly illustrates that these potentials of consolidation can be realized at the local level. Yet, no one governmental form or model exists which is "perfect" for all communities and/or circumstances. However, out of the accumulated experience of centuries of governmental business, certain guidelines have evolved which may provide direction to current and future generations of public administrators. Consolidation, as it has been employed in Jacksonville, may offer one such guideline.

Consolidation, as one method of solving local government's ills, is frequently recommended by political scientists and citizens study commissions. Such recommendations have, however, met with limited success at the polls. One of the aspects of consolidation's repugnancy to voters has been the absorption of one government entity by another. The

1/ The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 68-69.

2/ National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police (Working paper utilized during the National Conference on Criminal Justice, January 23-26, 1973, p. 123) prepared through the assistance of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Washington, D.C.

seeming disenfranchisement of one unit by an all encompassing larger one, oftentimes has not been viewed as a practical answer to the solution of local problems, albeit the new structure is based on government concepts which hold widespread theoretical acceptance.

Local circumstances in Jacksonville-Duval County in the mid-1960's, however, served to reinforce the need to consider a unified approach to governmental reform. Not only was the area a composite economic community, but similar countywide population characteristics existed, a high percentage of the area's population was not receiving adequate urban services, and a strong need existed for the reorganization of both the Jacksonville and Duval County governments. Further, a number of key governmental services were already provided on a countywide basis including public schools, electric power, expressway development, port development, hospitals and courts. In short, a common community of interests existed in which consolidation was accepted as the mechanism through which local needs could be fulfilled.

However, consolidation should not be viewed as a panacea for all government problems. In Jacksonville, for example, one learned observer has stated that "consolidation has not cured all our government problems. It has not allowed us to rip up our tax bills and pave all the streets in gold. But, it has certainly proved to be a much better vehicle for attacking problems brought on over the years." ^{1/}

Further, one must not automatically view consolidation as a workable solution even if pre-conditions and voter response parallel that experienced in Jacksonville. To be successful, a consolidated jurisdiction will still require a structure manned by a team of competent professionals, sufficient financial resources, and a community prepared to accept and support the changes and innovations necessary to raise it from the conditions in which it was born. Given these circumstances, and the foregoing examination of the Jacksonville experience, it is believed that the consolidation of local governments and, particularly, law enforcement services, can be a viable means of resolving many of our past public mistakes.

^{1/} Remarks of Lex Hester, Chief Administrative Office, Jacksonville, Florida, National Association of Counties, New County, U.S.A. Report: City-County Consolidation Seminar (Washington, D.C. : February, 1972), p. 8.

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