

W71-1

MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIANAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

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MEASUREMENT OF PERFORMANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIANAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

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INTRODUCTION

> If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it.
>
> ---Abraham Lincoln[1]

Abraham Lincoln wrote these words over a century ago to describe the problems the commander-in-chief faced given the communications of the day. The vast improvements in communications technology since the Civil War have quite often left us still facing the problem of "where we are and whither we are tending," with the attendant problems in prescribing "what to do and how to do it."

The problems today are those of knowing what we are doing, and how well we are doing it. The measurement of performance is often restricted to how well we are doing without first asking what it is that we do; the argument presented here will attempt to show that when the first question is unanswered, or improperly answered, any answer to the latter question is not likely to be of great significance.

At the same time, it is important to note that even if an agency is able to state what it is doing and how it is doing it, there is often no incentive to provide data on how well it is performing its function. Most public agencies do not engage in quid pro quo relationships with customers, and most agencies need not compete with other providers of similar services. They need not

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[1] Quoted in Richard M. Laska, "Rx for Local Government Malaise," Computer Decisions (February, 1970).

justify their budget in terms of benefits provided for costs incurred, but rather in terms of an established base and a fair share of increased revenues.[2] A circular effect is at work here. If performance data is not considered in budgetary and other decision processes, the agency will have no incentive to provide it. On the other hand, if performance data is not provided to budgetary and other decision-makers in some consistent, regular fashion, they will not consider it an important input for their decision, and will not request it.

For the social scientist attempting to evaluate the performance of a public agency (or to compare many agencies) these considerations pose a serious problem. This problem is of particular relevance to those with a perspective which views citizens' evaluation of services rendered to be of major importance. Ostrom points out that ". . . the evaluation of the performance of most public bureaucracies is dependent upon the records maintained for internal purposes, which may not reflect the consequences of the actions actually performed for the clients of the agency."[3] This problem takes on added significance when evaluating monopoly agencies providing goods which are not packageable, or only partially so. The police forces of most communities are an example of such agencies; citizen evaluation, if recorded at all, is likely to consist of such data as the number of complaints received by a departmental review board.

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[2]Aaron Wildavsky. The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964).

[3]Elinor Ostrom. "Institutional Arrangements and the Measurement of Policy Consequences in Urban Areas," Urban Affairs Quarterly (June, 1971).

To illustrate the problems of measuring the performance of public agencies, particularly the problems of using the data routinely recorded by such agencies, a case study of a large, modern police department will be presented. Before discussing this specific study, however, it will be instructive to examine the provision of police services in general, with particular focus upon what police do.

The Functions of the Police

In a recent comparative study of the provision of police services[4], James Q. Wilson addresses himself to the function of "the patrolman insofar as he enforces laws and maintains order." He purposefully omits any analysis of the "service" functions of the police, arguing first, that they are intended to please only the client, and second, that they could just as easily be provided by "Emergency Services, Inc.," a private, profit-making firm. Wilson argues that the law enforcement and order maintenance functions of the police are activities "the quality of which the client cannot be allowed to judge for himself . . ." There are two serious implications that Wilson ignores in making such an assessment. The first implication is that the client (the citizen in this case) can evaluate the service function, contracting with Emergency Services, Inc. if he is dissatisfied. Second, and much more

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[4]James Q. Wilson. Varieties of Police Behavior. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

important in a democratic society, is the statement that the citizen cannot be allowed to judge the performance of police agencies in the areas of law enforcement and order maintenance. The implication of Wilson's analysis is that the police are capable of judging such performance and in fact are the only ones who can do so.

In the case study presented, the argument will be made that the client (citizen) is not provided the data which would allow him to evaluate the "service" functions; indeed, he is able to obtain better, yet still insufficient, data on the other functions. A second argument to be presented is that the police do not obtain the data necessary to evaluate their performance in the law enforcement and order maintenance functions. While extensive data is generated, recorded, and processed pertaining to these functions, particularly that of law enforcement, the data is not of a nature or quality which would be useful for a performance analysis.

Wilson has made a valuable contribution in broadening the scope of police activities which are subject to analysis. Quite often a much narrower view has been taken. A prominent police scholar of the 1940's spoke of police " . . . overburdened with many duties lying outside the proper sphere of criminal law enforcement."[5] Wilson's quotes from police officers identifying "real police work" with capturing felons can be corroborated by anyone who has known or worked with policemen. In a recently

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[5]Bruce Smith. Police Systems in the United States, Second Revised Edition. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960).

published book by a professor of Criminology, police patrol forces are said to " . . . operate under the philosophy of prevention, suppression, and apprehension"[6], here speaking of crime and criminals. The service function, and, to a large extent, the order maintenance function, are ignored.

Scholars and the police themselves are beginning to focus more attention on other police functions, in addition to those of enforcement and crime prevention. That such attention is warranted is highlighted by Wagner's estimate that 75 percent of the Chicago Police Department's 1969 Budget was allocated to "other than direct crime prevention activity."[7] Thomas Bercal[8] found that only 16 percent of all calls for service received by the Detroit Police Department were "crime" related. He points out that because of the orientation to crime, " . . . police find their performance being judged on but one-fifth of their activity . . ."

A description of police work provided by a judge in New York presents a view of the police which hopefully is gaining broader acceptance. Judge Asch states:

> The policeman's job is essentially that of keeping the peace rather than enforcing the law. Actually,

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[6]Harold K. Becker. Issues in Police Administration. (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1970).

[7]John Wagner. "An Experiment in Resource Allocation", in Allocation of Resources in the Chicago Police Department, Chicago Police Department Operations Research Task Force. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, forthcoming).

[8]Thomas Bercal. "Calls for Police Assistance: Consumer Demands for Governmental Services", American Behavioral Scientist, XIII (May/August, 1970), 681-691.

> what is required is that the officer be available - available for emergencies and to render all kinds of assistance to those who require aid.[9]

All kinds of assistance includes much that is related to crime, but it also includes much that is not. The police provide services such as emergency first aid, directing citizens to other government agencies, rescuing cats from trees, checking on the homes of vacationers and helping little old ladies, services for which there is often no one else to call, "Emergency Services, Inc." not being in operation at present. In the words of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,

> It is easy to understand why the police traditionally perform such services. They are services that somebody must perform and policemen being the only representatives of local government readily accessible twenty-four hours a day, makes the police logical candidates. Moreover, it is natural to interpret the police role of 'protection' as meaning protection not only against crime, but against other hazards, accidents, or even discomforts of life.[10]

In addition to these "services" and the crime-related law enforcement functions, a major police function is keeping the peace. This can involve such duties as "showing the flag" by routine patrolling, mediating family and/or neighborhood squabbles, dispersing raucous or suspicious-looking groups, and keeping order at public gatherings. It is essential that both the service and the peace-

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[9]Sidney H. Asch. Police Authority and the Rights of the Individual. (New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1967).

[10]President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

keeping or order maintenance functions be considered along with the crime-related law enforcement function in serious studies of police performance.

If such views of the functions of police do gain much broader acceptance, it will be possible to approach the problem of measurement of police performance with a much clearer picture of "what we are doing." That such a change in focus would be of value to the police and to society in general is best illustrated by a quote from Bruce Terris,

> The image of police officers must be radically changed to consider them as a part of the broad category of occupations which deal with people who are sometimes difficult to handle . . . If police work were seen in this light, individuals who were more sympathetic to human beings, and less prejudiced on racial or other grounds, would enter police work because they wanted to help human beings, instead of young men who are looking for excitement and the opportunity to exercise authority . . . . The heart of police work would be seen as consisting in work with difficult human problems by the majority of officers who would be recruited, trained, and promoted largely for this purpose.[11]

Measurement in Police Agencies

Likert[12] proposed the existence of two information functions which statistics (measurements) should perform. The first of these is to provide information about the "state" of the system, the

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[11]Bruce Terris, "The Role of the Police," quoted in Charles B. Saunders, Jr. Upgrading the American Police. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971).

[12]R. Likert , "The Dual Function of Statistics," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 55 (1960).

second, and more important, to provide information about the "nature" of the system. "State" information is that which describes the current situation of the system, "nature" information consists of the basic conceptual model utilized in decision-making pertaining to the system. If the "nature" of the system is misunderstood, it is likely that the information relating to the "state" of the system will not be meaningful.

That the nature of the police system is misunderstood is highlighted by the emphasis placed upon the index crimes in the FBI Uniform Crime Report. These index crimes were first defined by the Committee on Uniform Crime Records of the International Association of Chiefs of Police for implementation in 1930. This committee " . . . produced a new classification of offenses particularly adapted to police needs . . . . produced a system for scoring offenses; defined administrative procedures for crime recording, for compiling, and for publishing the results; . . ."[13] and collected and published results during a seven-month trial period. After an extremely successful trial, the system was turned over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as the operating agency. The FBI has been very diligent in its efforts to include as many jurisdictions as possible within this reporting system, and to insure that the Reports submitted by these jurisdictions are technically correct. That many crimes of varying degrees of gravity are omitted

[13]The discussion of the establishment of the Uniform Crime Reports is from Bruce Smith, op. cit., 278-282. (Emphasis added).

increase in affluence and continuing inflation in America provide a built-in escalator for crime rates, and, most importantly, increases in the crime rate may reflect improvements in the overall social system and in police performance, not the breakdown of society, as claimed by many commentators. Thus, as more people currently "outside" of society are drawn into it, in part due to services provided by the police, they will be more likely to report their problems to the police, resulting in an increase in "reported" crime, but none in actual terms.

The fact that the latter two are recognized to be operating by the police themselves is shown by the Atlanta Chief of Police's statement that "'Many homes have as much merchandise in them as some stores contained in the thirties", and his discussion of the effect of increased police efforts in the Negro community on the reporting of rapes of Negro women by Negro men.[17] Yet even with this awareness, great emphasis is placed upon the Reports, often to the exclusion of any other measures of performance. After all, it is the "Crime Is Up --- Percent" headline in the local paper, based upon the index crimes, that provides headaches for the police administrator, and no amount of other services provided can offset the criticisms engendered by such a "crime wave."

This illustrates the way in which the police have been able to get others, the press, the public, other government officials, to act upon the premise that a given state of affairs, i.e., a

[17]Herbert Jenkins, Keeping the Peace. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).

generally upward trend of crime in America, exists. This is functional for police agencies in justifying ever-increasing budgetary and manpower requirements, although it may become temporarily dysfunctional if the local press goes on a crime crusade. Such crusades are generally short-lived, however, and may often be satisfied by arrest-producing tactics such as aggressive patrol.

The losses to the police, and to government and society caused by such an emphasis are hard to quantify. In discussing the allocation of police manpower, Wagner states that "Assigning a police officer to a beat consisting of two square blocks in an urban area can be an enormous waste of manpower if the officer is assigned because of a number of crimes over which he has no control."[18] The overwhelming bulk of the index crimes involve theft, usually by stealth, and are rarely solved by the police. Many crimes of this type which would appear on the Report if the police were aware of them are not reported by citizens because of their feeling that the police cannot do anything about them. If, through use of better techniques or more manpower, the police began solving more of such crimes, it is likely that citizen reporting would increase, and the resultant increase in index crime would discourage the police from using such a successful tactic.

One of the most significant losses to municipal government and society caused by the emphasis upon "crime" is identified by Bercal.[19]

[18]Wagner, op. cit.

[19]Bercal, op. cit.

He points out that metropolitan police departments can measure the community's demands for governmental services through analysis of calls for service received. If police emphasis upon "crime" is such that calls for non-crime related services are ignored in reporting frames or lumped into an indistinguishable "All Other" category, an invaluable source of data is lost to local government.

The Indianapolis Case Study

The author will attempt to illustrate some of the problems discussed above with data gathered pertaining to the Indianapolis Police Department.[20] The initial impetus for gathering this data was participation in a study of the provision of police services in suburban neighborhoods of Marion County, Indiana, as evaluated by citizens living in those neighborhoods.[21] During the course of this study, it was natural to ask how the Indianapolis Police Department evaluates its own performance. The data obtained is not inconsistent with the discussion presented above. As could be expected, the major emphasis is in the area of crime statistics.

[22]The gathering of such data in the Indianapolis Police Department would have been impossible without the cooperation of Lt. Douglas Lawrence of the Planning and Research Branch and Officer Cheryl Green of the Data Processing Section. Any conclusions drawn from the data are strictly those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views of Officer Green or Lt. Lawrence.

[21]Elinor Ostrom, William Baugh, Richard Guarasci, Roger Parks, and Gordon Whitaker, Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services, forthcoming.

It will be instructive to follow a case through the system of data recording and processing to see what is considered relevant for decision-making. As Biderman points out, "there is a high degree of interaction between judgements of the importance of a phenomenon, and the existence of measurements of it . . . The result is not only that social bodies seek to devise numerical indexes to gauge those phenomena that are important to them, but also that those phenomena for which a satisfying numerical index exists assume a special influence on judgements."[22] The process of data recording begins with the receipt of a call for service at the police Crime Alert number. A uniformed dispatcher answers these calls and determines the proper disposition of the request. If the dispatcher determines that an officer should be sent to answer the call, the dispatcher radios the information to the officer and prepares a card (Figure 1-Uniform Complaint Form) containing information on the type of run, the location and unit assigned, and the time out, i.e., the time at which the run is given to the officer. When the officer assigned to the run reports back to headquarters that he is available for a new assignment, i.e., back in service, the card is again stamped with the time.

No written record is maintained of calls for service in which no car is sent. These currently are estimated to comprise approximately 40 percent of the calls received.[23] However, a tape recording

[22]Biderman, op.cit.

[23]Conversation with Indianapolis Police Dispatcher, March 23, 1971.

Figure 1

Uniform Complaint Form





is made of all calls received by the dispatchers. This tape is reviewed by senior officers in cases involving disputes over police responses.

The cards with their coding for type of call, elapsed time, location, and unit assigned are used to generate a large number of reports which provide measures of performance and demand. These will be discussed in detail in a later section, but it is important to note a few points here. First, the time recorded is elapsed time in servicing the request, not response time (the time from receipt of request to officer's arrival at the scene). While response time could easily be recorded, and, indeed, has been in the past, it is not felt to be necessary at the present time. Many other departments do record response time and have found it to be a very significant factor.[24] Secondly, several of the categories on the card (e.g., wash-rack, court, headquarters) are not related to citizen calls for service, but rather to internal police matters. Thirdly, the call is coded by the dispatcher as to type of complaint based upon his conversation with the complaintant, not based upon what the officer assigned reports as the true problem. Lastly, no case number is assigned when a car is dispatched. As noted below, this occurs when an Incident Report is turned in. Thus, there is no direct tie between a call for service and the subsequent follow-up.

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[24]Boehm, George A.W. "Fighting Today's Crime with Yesterday's Technology," Technology Review, December, 1968.

If the officer assigned the run determines that a criminal act has occurred (or an accident or serious incident of a non-criminal nature) an incident report is prepared (Figures 2a, 2b-Incident Report; a similar type of form is provided for accidents). At present, the officer telephones portions of the report to a recording device at headquarters. The complete report is handed in later. A case number is assigned to the incident as the data is entered into the department computer via a terminal device.

The report is then split among several different files, those used for inquiry-response pertaining to the case, keyed by the suspect's name, automobile license numbers, etc., and those used to generate various statistical reports. After screening for consistency and completeness, portions of the report are transmitted to remote terminals within police headquarters and typed out for use in case assignment among the detective, juvenile and other branches.

The detective division and other branches provide additional data pertaining to the case to the computer system. When a detective is assigned to a case, his name is entered into the data bank and tagged with the case number. As arrests are made, cases cleared, and court dispositions obtained, this information is also entered into the files pertaining to the case. In addition, as a given case changes in type, say, from an assault to a murder when the victim dies, the appropriate coding changes for the case are made.

It is important to recognize the great deal of careful attention which goes into the gathering of data from the incident reports and subsequent follow-up reports, and the amount of processing

Figure 2a
Incident Report

INDIANAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

INCIDENT REPORT

ALL APPLICABLE ITEMS IN THIS SECTION MUST BE COMPLETED FOR ALL REPORTS

NEW CASE / ADDITION | CASE NO. IF ADD. | TYPE OF INCIDENT (Refer to Incident List) | INS. PURPOSES ☐ YES | DATE AND TIME OF INVESTIGATION | DATE AND TIME OCCURED | DAY OF WEEK

LOCATION OF OCCURANCE (Include Apt. No. Etc.) | TYPE OF PREMISES (Refer to Premises List) | ATTENTION PROPERTY ROOM ☐ YES | IDENT. NOTIFIED ☐ YES | NO. PERSONS TO BE NOTIFIED | NO. ARRESTED | NO. DEAD | NO. SENT TO HOSPITAL | NO. VEHICLES TOWED

NOTIFIED BY ☐ 01-RADIO RUN ☐ 02-OBSERVED ☐ 03-STOPPED ON STREET ☐ 04-TELEGRAM ☐ 05-LETTER ☐ 06-RADIOGRAM ☐ 07-LONG DISTANCE CALL ☐ 08-OTHER | DATE AND TIME NOTIFIED | SECTOR | THIS INVESTIGATION ☐ IS COMPLETE ☐ NOT COMPLETE | AGENCIES TO BE NOTIFIED

CHECK APPLICABLE ITEMS FOR CRIMINAL INCIDENTS ONLY

POINT OF ENTRY TO BUILDING: ☐ 01-FRONT DOOR ☐ 02-SIDE DOOR ☐ 03-REAR DOOR ☐ 04-THRU ROOF ☐ 05-THRU WALL ☐ 06-FRONT WINDOW ☐ 07-SIDE WINDOW ☐ 08-REAR WINDOW ☐ 09-ANY OTHER _____

POINT OF ENTRY TO VEHICLE: ☐ 01-DOOR DRIVER SIDE ☐ 02-DOOR PASSENGER SIDE ☐ 03-WINDOW DRIVER SIDE ☐ 04-WINDOW PASSENGER SIDE ☐ 05-THRU CONV. TOP ☐ 06-TRUNK ☐ 07-ANY OTHER _____

METHOD OF ENTRY TO BUILDING OR VEHICLE: ☐ 01-FORCED ENTRY ☐ 02-ATTEMPT FORCED ENTRY ☐ 03-UNLAWFUL ENTRY NO FORCE ☐ 04-LAWFUL ENTRY ☐ 05-ANY OTHER | IF ALARM WAS ACTIVATED-GIVE NAME OF COMPANY AND TIME OF ARRIVAL

METHOD OF ENTRY TO SAFE: ☐ 01-DRILL ☐ 02-PUNCH ☐ 03-PEEL ☐ 04-BLOW ☐ 05-TORCH ☐ 06-CARRIED OUT ☐ 07-NO FORCE NEEDED ☐ 08-ANY OTHER _____

WEAPON OR FORCE USED BY PERPETRATOR ON CRIMES AGAINST PERSON: ☐ 01-HAND GUN ☐ 02-OTHER TYPE FIREARM ☐ 03-KNIFE ☐ 04-ANY OTHER CUTTING INSTRUMENT ☐ 05-ANY OTHER DANGEROUS WEAPON ☐ 06-(AGGRAVATED ASSAULT) SEVERE BEATING A&B ☐ 07-NOT SEVERE ☐ 08-USED NO FORCE MAJR THREATS NO THREATS ☐ 09-NO FORCE ☐ 10-OTHER _____

AMOUNT OF STOLEN PROPERTY	MONEY $	JEWELRY $	FURS $	CLOTHING $	AUTO $	MISC. $	AMOUNT OF PROPERTY RECOVERED	MONEY $	JEWELRY $	FURS $	CLOTHING $	AUTO $	MISC. $

USE APPLICABLE ITEMS IN THIS SECTION FOR ALL PERSONS EXCEPT WANTED/MISSING PERSONS

PERSON NUMBER 1

STATUS OF PERSON	NAME (LAST NAME FIRST IF INDIVIDUAL)	RACE	SEX	AGE	ADDRESS	HOME PHONE AND HOURS	BUS. PHONE AND HRS.

COURT	DATE	TIME	LOCATION OF ARREST (If different than above)	SENT TO: ☐ CITY LOCKUP ☐ JUV. BUR. ☐ HOSP. ☐ COURT (Relate) ☐ EXPLAIN	CHARGES

INJURY CATAGORY	HOSPITAL SENT TO	CONVEYANCE USED	MED. TECH. (Last Name)	NATURE OF INJURY (ILLNESS)	RELATIVES NOTIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE	☐ TOWED (Any Reason) ☐ RELEASED ON SCENE	☐ STOLEN ☐ RECOVERED	VEH. TYPE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	V.I.N.

LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LICENSE NUMBER	LOT TOWED TO BY	DET. HOLD ☐ YES	MESSAGE OR COMMENTS

USE APPLICABLE ITEMS IN THIS SECTION FOR ALL PERSONS EXCEPT WANTED/MISSING PERSONS

PERSON NUMBER 2

STATUS OF PERSON	NAME (LAST NAME FIRST IF INDIVIDUAL)	RACE	SEX	AGE	ADDRESS	HOME PHONE AND HOURS	BUS. PHONE AND HRS.

COURT	DATE	TIME	LOCATION OF ARREST (If different than above)	SENT TO: ☐ CITY LOCKUP ☐ JUV. BUR. ☐ HOSP. ☐ COURT (Relate) ☐ EXPLAIN	CHARGES

INJURY CATAGORY	HOSPITAL SENT TO	CONVEYANCE USED	MED. TECH. (Last Name)	NATURE OF INJURY (ILLNESS)	RELATIVES NOTIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE	☐ TOWED (Any Reason) ☐ RELEASED ON SCENE	☐ STOLEN ☐ RECOVERED	VEH. TYPE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	V.I.N.

LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LICENSE NUMBER	LOT TOWED TO BY	DET. HOLD ☐ YES	MESSAGE OR COMMENTS

USE APPLICABLE ITEMS IN THIS SECTION FOR ALL PERSONS EXCEPT WANTED/MISSING PERSONS

PERSON NUMBER 3

STATUS OF PERSON	NAME (LAST NAME FIRST IF INDIVIDUAL)	RACE	SEX	AGE	ADDRESS	HOME PHONE AND HOURS	BUS. PHONE AND HRS.

COURT	DATE	TIME	LOCATION OF ARREST (If different than above)	SENT TO: ☐ CITY LOCKUP ☐ JUV. BUR. ☐ HOSP. ☐ COURT (Relate) ☐ EXPLAIN	CHARGES

INJURY CATAGORY	HOSPITAL SENT TO	CONVEYANCE USED	MED. TECH. (Last Name)	NATURE OF INJURY (ILLNESS)	RELATIVES NOTIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE	☐ TOWED (Any Reason) ☐ RELEASED ON SCENE	☐ STOLEN ☐ RECOVERED	VEH. TYPE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	V.I.N.

LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LICENSE NUMBER	LOT TOWED TO BY	DET. HOLD ☐ YES	MESSAGE OR COMMENTS

USE APPLICABLE ITEMS IN THIS SECTION FOR ALL PERSONS EXCEPT WANTED/MISSING PERSONS

PERSON NUMBER 4

STATUS OF PERSON	NAME (LAST NAME FIRST IF INDIVIDUAL)	RACE	SEX	AGE	ADDRESS	HOME PHONE AND HOURS	BUS. PHONE AND HRS.

COURT	DATE	TIME	LOCATION OF ARREST (If different than above)	SENT TO: ☐ CITY LOCKUP ☐ JUV. BUR. ☐ HOSP. ☐ COURT (Relate) ☐ EXPLAIN	CHARGES

INJURY CATAGORY	HOSPITAL SENT TO	CONVEYANCE USED	MED. TECH. (Last Name)	NATURE OF INJURY (ILLNESS)	RELATIVES NOTIFIED ☐ YES ☐ NO

DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE	☐ TOWED (Any Reason) ☐ RELEASED ON SCENE	☐ STOLEN ☐ RECOVERED	VEH. TYPE	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	V.I.N.

LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LICENSE NUMBER	LOT TOWED TO BY	DET. HOLD ☐ YES	MESSAGE OR COMMENTS

IPD Form No. 3-1-4-81 B

Figure 2b
Incident Report

WANTED OR MISSING PERSONS—Use Description of Wanted Persons, Runaways, Missing Persons, Escapees, Warrants & Capias

SUBJECT NUMBER 1

STATUS (Refer to Wanted List)	NAME-Last Name First	ADDRESS	DRIVER LIC. NUMBER	D.O.B.	SOC. SEC. NUMBER

RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR COLOR	EYES	COMPLEXION	BUILD	WEAPON ARMED WITH

CLOTHING DESCRIPTION AND OTHER DESCRIPTIVE REMARKS	CHARGE WANTED FOR	COURT OF ISSUE ON WARRANT

AUTO BELIEVED TO BE IN	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LIC. NUMBER	VEHICLE REMARKS:

SUBJECT NUMBER 2

STATUS (Refer to Wanted List)	NAME-Last Name First	ADDRESS	DRIVER LIC. NUMBER	D.O.B.	SOC. SEC. NUMBER

RACE	SEX	AGE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR COLOR	EYES	COMPLEXION	BUILD	WEAPON ARMED WITH

CLOTHING DESCRIPTION AND OTHER DESCRIPTIVE REMARKS	CHARGE WANTED FOR	COURT OF ISSUE ON WARRANT

AUTO BELIEVED TO BE IN	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	STYLE	COLOR	LIC. YR.	LIC. ST.	LIC. NUMBER	VEHICLE REMARKS:

NARRATIVE—Include All Property and Its Description:

ASSIGNED OFFICERS		
UNIT	LAST NAME, FIRST INIT.	I.D. NO.

ASSISTING OFFICERS		
UNIT	LAST NAME, FIRST INIT.	I.D. NO.

DATE AND TIME TO RECORDS

associated with it. There have been a long series of orders within the Department which deal with the proper filling out of these reports. A great deal of equipment, time, and money has gone into the on-line data entry and retrieval systems which maintain and access this data. Such attention highlights the quotation from Biderman at the beginning of this section. The availability of readily quantifiable, seemingly straight forward data such as Offenses Reported assures that it will receive emphasis in any reporting system and, in fact, in any decision-making situation.

A broad series of reports are generated from the case data obtained from the Incident Reports and subsequent case-oriented entries. Most of these will be discussed in a later section; one is of sufficient interest to merit discussion here.

A sample of this report, known as the Board of Public Safety Report, is presented in Figure 3. This report is provided on a weekly basis to the Chief of Police and the Public Safety Board. Apparently, it provides their major indicator of Police Department performance. Of course, the local newspapers and influentials provide additional inputs, but this is the only consistent data provided on a regular basis. All of the additional data gathered and reported by the department is available upon request, however.

It is of interest to examine this report in terms of what its providers and recipients find important. Thus, the bulk of the report contains data pertaining to major offenses (broadly defined in this case, since approximately two-thirds of the larcenies, and thus thirty percent of the major offenses, are under $50.00). This

Figure 3

Board of Public Safety Report

INDIANAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

WEEKLY ACTIVITY REPORT

02-26-71 TO 03-04-71

1. CASE ACTIVITY ON MAJOR OFFENSES

	CASES REPORTED	CASES UNFOUNDED	NR. OF ACTUALS	CASES CLEARED
MURDER	1		1	
RECKLESS HOMICIDE				
RAPE	4	1	3	1
ROBBERY	51	2	49	12
AGG. ASSAULT	42	1	41	11
BURGLARY	210	7	203	51
LARCENY	347	5	342	53
STOLEN AUTO	122		122	
TOTAL	777	16	761	128

2. RADIO DISPATCHES

TOTAL NUMBER OF ALL RADIO DISPATCHES	9987
*LESS NUMBER OF NON-COMPLAINT DISPATCHES	2492
TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPLAINT RESPONSE DISPATCHES	7495

* - NON-COMPLAINT DISPATCHES INCLUDE BANK CHECKS, CAR WASHES, ETC.

3. TRAFFIC TICKETS

TOTAL PARKING AND MOVING VIOLATION	3455

W. L. CHURCHILL
CHIEF OF POLICE

is the data that is likely to generate the "Crime Is Up ---- Percent" headlines in the local newspapers. Additional data is provided for Radio Dispatches, a rough measure of departmental activity, and for traffic tickets. A significant portion of departmental revenue is obtained from traffic tickets.

What is not included on the report, and therefore, probably considered insignificant, is an interesting study. From the figures for the week shown, only ten percent (761) of the Complaint Response Dispatches (7,495) were in response to actual crime. Since the time spent on non-crime related runs is slightly longer than on crime related runs (see Figure 9), this indicates that over ninety percent of the time spent in responding to radio calls was spent on non-crime items. It is hard to imagine an executive not wanting a more detailed breakdown on how so much of his operatives' assigned time is spent. In addition, there is no information pertaining to how the unassigned time is being spent. The communication dispatch data for March, 1971 presented below indicates that less than half of the patrol officer's time is spent on assigned runs. If, however, the Police and Public Safety executives view the police function as solely crime prevention and law enforcement, the emphasis is explainable.

That such a preponderance of non-crime related activity is not peculiar to Indianapolis is illustrated by the previous quotes from Wagner and Bercal pertaining to the percent of crime-related activity in Chicago and Detroit. The Indianapolis Police Department Statistical Report of 1969 shows that only sixteen percent of the runs assigned were crime related; this figure drops to thirteen percent

in 1970. Subtracting an estimated twenty-five percent non-complaint dispatches from the total boosts these crime-related figures to twenty-one percent and eighteen percent respectively. All of these figures indicate that there is a tremendous amount of activity that is carried out by the Indianapolis Police Department which is not available for management review. The following section, discussing the various reports prepared from the Communication Dispatch and Incident Report data, will further illustrate this fact.

Reporting in the Indianapolis Police Department

The Data Processing Section of the Indianapolis Police Department is providing a great deal of information to the Department through processing of data received on Communication Dispatches, Offenses Reported, arrests and case dispositions, etc., and by maintaining large on-line remotely accessible files for retrieval purposes. The fact that the information being provided is very heavily crime-oriented is no doubt due to the wishes expressed by departmental superiors, and to the police training received by the officers in the Section.

The data captured in the dispatching function is broken down in several ways to provide measures of demand and performance. The basic breakdowns are by uniform patrol beat (Figure 4 shows these as of the present); by category of run, Assault, Burglary, Larceny from Vehicle, Molestation, Purse-grabbing, Robbery, Automobile Theft, and All Others; and by shift, day, middle or late. Various combinations and summaries of these breakdowns provide the reporting frame. The

Figure 4. Uniform Patrol Beats



breakdowns by beat in particular seem most important. The categories chosen for reporting are those which were felt to be the most common of the more serious runs when the programs were established.

Figure 5 presents one of these reports,[25] Category Within Beat, which identifies the number of runs in a given category by beat, the average time spent on a category within a beat, the percent of runs in the beat represented by the category (percent of runs assigned, not of time expended), and the average time per day spent on the category on that beat. One effect of lumping data into the All-Others category is illustrated by this report. Very little analysis can be performed upon ninety percent of the runs made. The average time per run is obviously dominated by the All-Others category. By lumping runs as All-Others, runs which are taking up an unusual amount of the beat officer's time may not be identifiable. Strictly as an hypothetical example, but consistent with the data shown, a beat officer assigned to the A6 beat could be spending an hour and a half each day on a single emergency medical run. If the 300 remaining All-Others runs averaged only thirty minutes each, the report would be as shown. A crying need for emergency ambulance service and/or a public nurse in the area would be missed. Obviously, this is far-fetched. A beat officer would quickly transmit such a need up the chain of command. Yet the example is valid in illustrating the danger of lumping ninety percent of anything into an All-Others category in terms of data loss.

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[25] The reports shown in Figures 5 through 9 are samples of actual reports for March, 1971. While some of these have been retyped for improved legibility in reproduction, the data and the format are the same as in the originals.

Figure 5
Category Within Beat Report

BEAT	CATEGORY	TOTAL RUNS	ELAPSED TIME	AVERAGE TIME	PERCENT BY CATEGORY	AVERAGE TIME PER DAY
A03	ASSAULT					
	BURGLARY					
	LARCENY-VEH					
	MOLEST					
	PURSE-GRAB					
	ROBBERY					
	AUTO-THEFT					
	ALL-OTHERS	4	5.4	81.3	100.000	.2
	TOTAL	4	5.4	81.3		
A04	ASSAULT	2	.9	29.0	.717	
	BURGLARY	11	12.6	68.7	3.943	.4
	LARCENY-VEH	2	1.3	40.5	.717	
	MOLEST					
	PURSE-GRAB					
	ROBBERY	2	1.3	40.5	.717	
	AUTO-THEFT	2	.6	20.5	.717	
	ALL-OTHERS	260	110.2	25.4	93.190	3.6
	TOTAL	279	127.2	27.4		
A06	ASSAULT	1	.5	30.0	.274	
	BURGLARY	25	12.6	30.3	6.849	.4
	LARCENY-VEH	3	1.5	30.3	.822	
	MOLEST					
	PURSE-GRAB					
	ROBBERY	5	.5	6.2	1.370	
	AUTO-THEFT	1	.4	24.0	.274	
	ALL-OTHERS	330	193.6	35.2	90.411	6.2
	TOTAL	365	209.2	34.4		
A07	ASSAULT	2	.3	9.0	.509	
	BURGLARY	28	12.1	25.9	7.125	.4
	LARCENY-VEH					
	MOLEST					
	PURSE-GRAB					
	ROBBERY	2			.509	
	AUTO-THEFT	2	.5	17.0	.509	
	ALL-OTHERS	359	192.1	32.1	91.349	6.2
	TOTAL	393	205.1	31.3		

Figure 6 presents a summary of Communications Dispatches for all beats by category. This report is included in the Monthly Statistical Report published by the Department. Note that only two beats (EO4 and EO8) have less than eighty-five percent of these Dispatches in the All-Others category, only about one-half have less than ninety percent in that category. In total, about ninety percent of the runs are All-Others runs.

The same data is summarized in a different fashion in the report shown in Figure 7, Total Runs By Beat. This report provides a measure of demand, as does the Category Within Beat report; here the emphasis is upon the average time spent in responding to a run, and the percent of total runs assigned to the beat. The data provided in the above reports, and in subsequent ones where beat is the major key are obviously useful in identifying high volume beats. Once identified, these beats can be assigned additional support from sector, task force, and K-9 personnel.

Biderman[26] presents a humorous anecdote which illustrates the dangers of using administrative categories and boundaries indiscriminately in analyzing government activities. In brief, a Department of Defense study of its contracts indicated that Manhattan Island was the greatest oil-producing area in the United States since the Department paid most of its oil bills there. The data shown in Figures 6 and 7 could lead the unaware analyst into a similar trap. In these figures, the FO8 beat alone is shown to account for well over ten percent of the runs assigned for the month. Anyone unaware

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[26]Biderman, op.cit.

Figure 6

MARCH . RECAPITULATION OF GEOGRAPHIC POLICE BEATS

COMMUNICATION DISPATCHES -- UNIFORM FREQUENCY

BEAT	ASSLT	BURG-LARY	LARC FROM VEH	MOLEST	PURSE GRAB	ROB-BERY	AUTO THEFT	ALL OTHER	TOTAL RUN
A03								4	4
A04	2	11	2			2	2	260	279
A06	1	25	3			5	1	330	365
A07	2	28				2	2	359	393
A08	5	31	1	1		1	10	495	544
A09	2	14	2	1		2	5	192	218
A11	2	18		1		2	2	367	392
B03								1	1
B04		31	3	1		1	8	419	463
B06	11	46	4	1		2	5	711	780
B07	9	16	2	1		2	6	394	430
B08	13	41	3	2	1		7	576	643
B09	9	25	2			5	2	338	381
B11	15	46	1	1	2	3	7	607	682
B12	16	44	9	2		4	6	639	720
C03								3	3
C04	4	24	1	1	1	3	1	296	331
C06	23	45	7	3		3	4	630	715
C07	26	67	7			6	3	662	771
C08	10	30	3	1			5	382	431
C09	9	25	1					430	465
C11	10	46	5			6	4	626	697
C12	11	57	4	1		1	5	658	737
D03								3	3
D04	10	25	2				7	488	532
D06	10	43	1			1	4	594	653
D07	1	14	1	1		1	4	350	372
D08	17	50	4	1	1	7	8	874	962
D09	26	46	7	4	1	2	2	712	800
D11	15	44	1	1		3	2	459	525
E03								3	3
E04	13	71	1			5	8	462	560
E06	13	87	4	1	1	2	7	723	838
E07	6	40	3			1	3	411	464
E08	49	79	8	1	2	4		776	919
E09	27	77	4	2	1	8	4	771	894
E11	41	70	1	2	2	3	2	768	889
F03									
F04	23	50	1	4	2		3	591	674
F06	33	56	2	2	2	4	3	705	807
F07	18	49	3	3		2	4	698	777
F08	35	65	6	3	1	4	6	4471	4591
F09	52	105	9	3		3	14	1516	1702
G03									
G04	11	31	3		1	1	11	345	403
G06	10	30	3			2	1	332	378
G07	26	72	6	1	2	2	8	692	809
G08	11	19	2			2	5	400	439
G09	5	38	5	1			5	392	446
G11	34	72	4	1	3	5	8	1137	1264
UNKNOWN	191	529	46	3	6	30	68	7042	7915
TOTAL	857	2432	187	51	29	142	272	35094	39064

NOTE - THE ABOVE FIGURES INDICATE RADIO DISPATCHES GIVEN TO ALL CARS IN EACH UNIFORM PATROL BEAT. THEY INDICATE POLICE ACTIVITY WITHIN BEAT BOUNDARIES AND SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH ACTUAL OFFENSES REPORTED.

Figure 7. TOTAL RUNS BY BEAT

BEAT	TOTAL RUNS	ELAPSED TIME	AVERAGE TIME	PER CENT BY BEAT	PER CENT BY SECTOR
A03	4	5.4	81.3	.010	
A04	279	127.2	27.4	.710	
A06	365	209.2	34.4	.930	
A07	393	209.1	31.3	1.010	
A08	544	377.1	41.6	1.390	
A09	218	109.5	30.1	.560	
A11	392	154.7	23.7	1.000	
SECTOR TOTAL	2,195	1188.2	32.5		5.620
B03	1	.6	35.0		
B04	463	244.9	31.7	1.190	
B06	780	363.2	27.9	2.000	
B07	430	304.9	42.5	1.100	
B08	643	335.2	31.3	1.650	
B09	381	190.4	30.0	.980	
B11	682	368.3	32.4	1.750	
B12	720	418.4	34.9	1.840	
SECTOR TOTAL	4,100	2225.9	32.6		10.500
C03	3	.9	18.3	.010	
C04	331	176.7	32.0	.850	
C06	715	408.4	34.3	1.830	
C07	771	439.0	34.2	1.970	
C08	431	219.7	30.6	1.100	
C09	465	226.9	29.3	1.190	
C11	697	328.5	28.3	1.780	
C12	737	426.0	34.7	1.890	
SECTOR TOTAL	4,150	2225.9	32.2		10.620
D03	3	1.2	24.7	.010	
D04	532	302.3	34.1	1.360	
D06	653	338.4	31.1	1.670	
D07	372	186.2	30.0	.950	
D08	962	460.1	28.7	2.460	
D09	800	380.1	28.5	2.050	
D11	525	302.1	34.5	1.340	
SECTOR TOTAL	3,847	1970.3	30.7		9.850
E03	3	1.9	37.0	.010	
E04	560	325.3	34.9	1.430	
E06	838	470.5	33.7	2.150	
E07	464	292.8	37.9	1.190	
E08	919	465.2	30.4	2.350	
E09	894	513.2	34.4	2.290	
E11	889	464.3	31.3	2.280	
SECTOR TOTAL	4,567	2533.1	33.3		11.690
F03					
F04	674	350.0	31.2	1.730	
F06	807	397.9	29.6	2.070	
F07	777	343.9	26.6	1.990	
F08	4,591	4970.4	65.0	11.750	
F09	1,702	812.2	28.6	4.360	
SECTOR TOTAL	8,551	6874.3	48.2		21.890
G03					
G04	403	221.3	32.9	1.030	
G06	378	217.6	34.5	.970	
G07	809	413.6	30.7	2.070	
G08	439	209.3	28.6	1.120	
G09	446	218.8	29.4	1.140	
G11	1,264	955.9	45.4	3.240	
SECTOR TOTAL	3,739	2236.3	35.9		9.570
ALL UNKNOWNS	7,915	4610.2	34.9	.203	
GRAND TOTAL	39,064	23864.7	36.7		

of the location of the police garage and headquarters within this beat would find it rather unfairly loaded.

An additional report which would appear very valuable for police purposes (and for the City of Indianapolis as a whole if breakouts on All-Others were provided) is one which would reverse the sort keys on the Category Within Beat report, providing a Beat Within Category report. Such a report would rank the uniform beats in decreasing order of runs within a category, thus allowing the immediate determination of high Burglary run beats, high Auto Theft beats, and others. If the All-Others category was further broken down on such a report, the city administration would receive a ranking of areas in terms of demand for items such as emergency medical service, facilitating decisions about clinic locations and roving ambulance assignments.

Another significant report derived from the Communications Dispatch data is shown in Figure 8, Runs Per Beat By Shift. This report analyzes the distribution of activity on a given beat by shift (an eight-hour period), generally following the format of the Category Within Beat report of Figure 5. Thus, similar data on number of runs, average time per run, and average time per day are provided. In addition, the percent of the total beat activity (again, number of runs, not time expended) occurring on each shift is shown.

Here, as in the Category Within Beat report, the emphasis is upon the uniform beat breakdown, and here, as in that report, it appears to the author that the reverse report would be equally, if not more, valuable. In this case, the reverse report, Runs Per

Figure 8

Shift Within Beat Report

BEAT	SHIFT	TOTAL RUNS	ELAPSED TIME	PERCENT BY SHIFT	AVERAGE TIME	PERCENT OF TOTAL	AVERAGE TIME PER DAY
A03	DAY	2	1.5	50.000	46.0		
	MIDDLE	1	.2	25.000	16.0		
	LATE	1	3.6	25.000	217.0	.010	.1
	TOTAL	4	5.4		81.3	.010	.2
A04	DAY	95	49.8	34.050	31.5		1.6
	MIDDLE	131	48.3	46.953	22.1		1.6
	LATE	53	29.0	18.996	32.9		.9
	TOTAL	279	127.2		27.4	.714	4.1
A06	DAY	119	74.9	32.603	37.8		2.4
	MIDDLE	177	88.3	48.493	29.9		2.8
	LATE	69	45.9	18.904	40.0		1.5
	TOTAL	365	209.2		34.4	.934	6.7
A07	DAY	122	86.4	31.043	42.5		2.8
	MIDDLE	163	74.2	41.476	27.3		2.4
	LATE	108	44.4	27.481	24.7		1.4
	TOTAL	393	205.1		31.3	1.006	6.6
A08	DAY	178	211.6	32.721	71.3		6.8
	MIDDLE	232	109.2	42.647	28.3		3.5
	LATE	134	56.2	24.632	25.2		1.8
	TOTAL	544	377.1		41.6	1.393	12.2
A09	DAY	72	30.4	33.028	25.4		1.0
	MIDDLE	97	51.8	44.495	32.1		1.7
	LATE	49	27.1	22.477	33.3		.9
	TOTAL	218	109.5		30.1	.558	3.5
A11	DAY	143	39.8	36.480	16.7		1.3
	MIDDLE	149	72.1	38.010	29.1		2.3
	LATE	100	42.7	25.510	25.6		1.4
	TOTAL	392	154.6		23.7	1.003	5.0

Shift By Beat, would rank beats in decreasing order of runs within a shift. This would facilitate the assignment of additional personnel within a shift to high volume areas. An even further breakdown, to Runs Per Shift By Category By Beat with beats ranked within categories for each shift would allow more specialized assignment of personnel; a problem here would be the very low occurrence of any category but All-Others within a beat on a given shift. The highest non-All-Others would be approximately one Burglary Per Shift on the F09 beat. This again illustrates the dangers of data lumping.

The Shift Within Category report, Figure 9, highlights in particular one of the major theses being argued here. All-Others is shown to be 89.8 percent of the total runs. All-Others and Burglary combined represent over ninety-six percent of the runs on the report. Yet six other categories, ranging from 2.2 percent down to .07 percent of the total runs are given equal weight in terms of reporting. If the categories are weighted by seriousness, surely there must be categories within All-Others, say, Ambulance Call, Heart Attack, or Miscarriage, which involve greater danger to both the complaintant and the officer assigned the run, and which occur with greater frequency than Purse-Grab.

The Department has the capability of analyzing the All-Others runs in detail. A trial run was made in February, 1971 to test this capability.[27] That such analyses are not made on a regular basis indicates the lack of interest in such non-crime-related activities by Departmental and city executives.

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[27]Telephone conversation with Lt. Douglas Lawrence, Indianapolis Police Department, May 24, 1971.

Figure 9
Shift Within Category Report

PAGE 1 — MARCH 1971

CATEGORY	SHIFT	TOTAL RUNS	ELAPSED TIME	AVERAGE TIME	PERCENT BY SHIFT	PERCENT OF TOTAL	AVERAGE TIME PER DAY
ASSAULT	DAY	137	71.8	31.5	15.986		2.3
	MIDDLE	432	206.7	26.7	50.408		6.7
	LATE	288	130.3	27.1	33.606		4.2
	TOTAL	857	408.9	28.6	33.606	2.194	4.2
BURGLARY	DAY	656	414.3	37.9	26.974		13.4
	MIDDLE	926	559.7	36.3	38.076		18.1
	LATE	850	475.3	33.6	34.951		15.3
	TOTAL	2,432	1449.5	35.8	34.951	6.226	15.3
LARCENY-VEH	DAY	90	59.5	39.7	48.128		1.9
	MIDDLE	54	26.4	29.4	28.877		.9
	LATE	43	21.1	29.5	22.995		.7
	TOTAL	187	107.1	34.4	22.995	.479	.7
MOLEST	DAY	16	6.6	24.8	31.373		.2
	MIDDLE	30	21.0	42.1	58.824		.7
	LATE	5	2.9	35.4	9.804		.1
	TOTAL	51	30.6	36.0	9.804	.131	.1
PURSE-GRAB	DAY	3	1.3	26.7	10.345		.4
	MIDDLE	20	12.9	38.9	68.966		.1
	LATE	6	2.5	25.5	20.690		.1
	TOTAL	29	16.9	34.9	20.690	.074	.1
ROBBERY	DAY	47	17.0	21.8	33.099		.6
	MIDDLE	61	25.3	25.0	42.958		.8
	LATE	34	21.4	37.9	23.944		.7
	TOTAL	142	63.9	27.0	23.944	.364	.7
AUTO-THEFT	DAY	98	44.5	27.3	36.029		1.4
	MIDDLE	107	47.4	26.6	39.338		1.5
	LATE	67	26.7	24.0	24.632		.9
	TOTAL	272	118.8	26.2	24.632	.696	.9
ALL-OTHERS	DAY	11,183	7933.9	42.6	31.866		255.9
	MIDDLE	14,477	8120.9	33.7	41.252		262.0
	LATE	9,434	5614.2	35.7	26.882		181.1
	TOTAL	35,094	21669.2	37.0	26.882	89.800	181.1
GRAND TOTAL		39,064	23864.7	36.7			

While a great deal of processing and reporting is based upon the data obtained from the Uniform Complaint Form, much more importance is attached to the reports generated from the Incident Report and from data entered into the computer identifying detectives assigned and case dispositions. The Board of Public Safety Report shown previously is one of these reports, perhaps the most important due to its distribution to the top management levels of the Department and City government. The many additional reports and analyses based upon this data, some of which are presented below, are used by the various command levels of the Department and the officer on the street in planning their day-to-day work and in evaluating their performance of the crime-fighting task.

The data from the Incident Reports are loaded into the Department's computer along with detective assignments, case dispositions and other pertinent data. Much of the data is available for on-line inquiry. One of the goals of such a system is to allow the officer on patrol quick access to data which would be of value in a given situation. The data available would consist of such items as previous history of disturbances at an address where a run has been assigned, stolen car descriptions and license numbers, a suspect's previous arrest history, and others. Leaving out normative considerations of the "Big Brother" aspects inherent in such a system, the data availability should be quite helpful to the officer in the field.

The system is not yet fully operational, but does provide the Department with crime-related data which they find useful. An example

is shown in Figure 10. This report lists Major Offenses occurring in a given sector in a given week. Major Offenses as defined here are those offenses considered to be "onsite controllable,"[28] that is, those which might be prevented by patrolling in the area. The report is distributed to the Sector Lieutenants to assist them in assigning their men and identifying trouble areas, and to the Planning Branch for evaluation of overall crime trends geographically The detective assignments can also be determined from the report.

There are some problems with this report which are apparent from the figure. The officer who fills out the Incident Report is expected to identify the beat on which the offense occurred. Occasionally, he does not, or identifies it incorrectly, or the operator entering the data enters it incorrectly. Since the computer system is unable at the present time to match address with beat, some of the offense locations are incorrectly reported. While this is corrected on this report before use by Department personnel, the geographical summaries of Offenses Reported produced by the system have a built-in error. Another problem of the report is the failure to sort out the offenses into any logical order. A simple addition to the computer system could correct this, making the report of much greater use to field personnel.

The data from this report is used by the Planning Branch in evaluating the geographic distributions of crime. Figure 11 shows the basic framework utilized. The city is broken down into a grid

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[28] Ibid.

Figure 11
Geographic Distribution Grid



Figure 10
Major Offenses Report

MAJOR OFFENSES FOR FEB 2-8, 1971

BEAT	TYPE OF OFFENSE	LOCATION OF OFFENSE	CASE NO	DATE AND TIME OCCURED	
	VICTIM-BAILEY MARVIN	DETECTIVE-			
A-7	INDECENT EXPOSURE	5001 N COLLEGE AV	696093D		
	VICTIM-ETTER TONYA	DETECTIVE-KAISER			
807	LARC-OVR 50-FROM CAR	1915 N COLLEGE AV	696082D	02-06-71 1600	
	VICTIM-LANDIS REX	DETECTIVE-DAVIS			
A6	LARC-OVR 50-FROM CAR	6101 N KEYSTONE	696072D	02-06-71 1500	
	VICTIM-KERNER LINN	DETECTIVE-WALSH			
A06	LARC-UND 5 -AUTO ACC	6101 N KEYSTONE AV	696065D	02-06-71 1400	02-06-71 1730
	VICTIM-PLASS MARSHA J	DETECTIVE-GERDT C			
A10	LARC-OVR 50-FROM CAR	46 W 38TH ST	695933D	02-05-71 1800	02-06-71 0900
	VICTIM-MCNAPCE USED CARS	DETECTIVE-WALSH			
A07	BURG-ATMPT -RES NGT	5689 N ILLINOIS ST	695741D	01-03-71 2300	01-04-71 0700
	VICTIM-MAXEY HOWARD	DETECTIVE-COLEMAN B			
A08	BURG-NO FORC-RES NGT	4725 N RALSTON	695714D	01-29-71 1530	01-29-71 1730
	VICTIM-OSIKY FLORENCE	DETECTIVE-SMITH			
A12	COUNTERFEIT MONEY	3820 N FALL CRK PKWY	695579D	02-04-71 2345	
	VICTIM-TEE PEE RESTAURANT	DETECTIVE-BURNS			
ADM	LARCENY	E 46TH ST & N HILLSIDE AV	695539D	02-04-71 0700	
	VICTIM-MAYNARD VERNI	DETECTIVE-FENSLEY			
811	LARC-UND 5 - FROM CA	2832 N WINTHROP AV	695475D	02-04-71 1100	
	VICTIM-COLE HELEN	DETECTIVE-FENSLEY			
ADM	LARC-OVR 50-AUTO ACC	5500 N KEYSTONE AV	695408D	01-29-71	02-04-71
	VICTIM-JERRY ALDERMAN FORD	DETECTIVE-BURNS			
A12	FRAUD-INVESTIGATION	2325 E 46TH ST	694674D	01-19-71 1056	
	VICTIM-NORTHSIDE RENT ALL I	DETECTIVE-BURNS			
ADM	LARCENY-VEH ACCESSRY	3806 N BYRAM ST	694632D	02-03-71	02-04-71
	VICTIM-CLIVER ELLIS	DETECTIVE-GERDT C			
A09	LARCENY	5000 N KEYSTONE AV	694526D	02-03-71 1710	
	VICTIM-STRICKLAND MOTORS IN	DETECTIVE-SMITH B			
A06	LARC-OVR 50-SHOPLIFT	6101 N KEYSTONE AV	694004D	02-02-71 1635	
	VICTIM-THE LERNER SHOP	DETECTIVE-CLEICH			
A10	BURG-FRC ENT-RES DAY	4236 N GRACELAND AV	694002D	02-02-71 0845	
	VICTIM-SMITH JOSEPH A	DETECTIVE-LIPSCOMB			
A06	LARC-UND 5 -AUTO ACC	6114 N CARVEL AV	693983D	01-31-71 1200	02-01-71 0900
	VICTIM-BATES CECIL	DETECTIVE-GERDT C			
ADM	LARC-OVR 50-OTHER	4145 N PARK AV	693914D	02-01-71 1200	02-01-71 1300
	VICTIM-BRINKMAN WAYNE	DETECTIVE-BYRNE			
A09	INDECENT EXPOSURE	6100 N KEYSTONE AV	693842D	02-01-71 2105	
	VICTIM-JASTRZAB LYNN	DETECTIVE-LUND			

of five-block-by-five-block squares (by hundreds). Every two weeks a series of charts is prepared which shows the number of offenses of a particular type occurring within each grid square for that period. This type of analysis is very useful when new beat boundaries are assigned.

The overall summary of Offenses Reported for 1970 is shown in Figure 12.[29] This data is generally shown by beat rather than by sector, but a change in beat boundaries in May of 1970 and the lack of ability to match address to beat within the computer system prevented it for this report. Figure 12 consists of Offenses Reported as summarized geographically by the computer system. That a fair amount of modification and interpretation must be applied to such data is indicated by Figure 13, which presents similar data after interpretation and correction by the Planning Branch and others. The recoding of offenses as their nature changed (e.g., from assault to murder) was mentioned above; from a comparison of these two figures, one can see what a volume of recoding is required to maintain correct data within the computer system (there is almost a 10 percent difference in category totals alone, to say nothing of possible geographic errors). Apparently, those files relating to case type and disposition are being recoded at present, those relating to location are not.

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[29]The reports shown in Figures 12 through 17 are from the Statistical Report for December, 1970 and Annual Report, published by the Indianapolis Police Department.

Figure 12

Offenses Reported

1970

OFFENSES REPORTED - UNIFORM PATROL BEATS

SECTOR	MURDER	RAPE	ROBBERY	AGG. ASLT.	BURGLARY	LARC. AUTO	LARC. OTHER	STLN. VEHICLE	TOTAL
ADM	3	15	128	36	725	262	915	426	2510
BOY	2	29	179	113	1403	492	1723	654	4595
CHR		34	132	141	1239	461	1095	527	3629
DVD		20	249	123	1063	367	1405	535	3762
EDW	19	83	700	356	2191	400	1150	857	5756
FRK	7	55	445	262	1449	588	1764	813	5383
GEO	17	55	573	242	1126	638	1501	756	4908
OVL	6	18	255	44	787	491	1226	371	3198
XXX	2	19	50	113	251	430	1275	682	2822
GRAND TOTAL	56	328	2711	1430	10234	4129	12054	5621	36563

Figure 13

CRIME TREND

MONTHLY CRIME TREND COMPARISON DECEMBER 1970 TO DECEMBER 1969

OFFENSE	DEC. 1970	DEC. 1969	CHANGE	% OF CHANGE
Murder Non Negligent Manslaughter	5	4	+1	+25.0%
Manslaughter by Negligence	1	2	-1	-50.0%
Forcible Rape	19	11	+8	+72.7%
Robbery	230	185	+45	+24.3%
Aggravated Assault	67	101	-34	-33.7%
Burglary	952	807	+145	+18.0%
Larceny	1717	1341	+376	+28.0%
Vehicle Thefts	535	325	+210	+64.6%
T O T A L S	3526	2776	+750	+27.0%

COMPARISON OF CRIME - YEAR TO YEAR - 1970 TO 1969

OFFENSE	YEAR 1970	YEAR 1969	CHANGE	% OF CHANGE
Murder Non Negligent Manslaughter	60	65	-5	-7.7%
Manslaughter by Negligence	28	50	-22	-44.0%
Forcible Rape	253	167	+86	+51.5%
Robbery	2073	1651	+422	+25.6%
Aggravated Assault	1205	859	+346	+40.3%
Burglary	10309	8923	+1386	+15.5%
Larceny	18374	15735	+2639	+16.8%
Vehicle Thefts	5314	4933	+381	+7.7%
T O T A L S	37616	32383	+5233	+16.2%

Crime for the year 1970 showed a 16.2% increase over 1969. An increase was expected since we installed a different direct entry computer system to handle crime reports. Some misclassification of crime could be reflected in this year's crime rate increase.

As was true the entire year, the arrest rate for these offenses [illegible] in keeping pace of the crime rate. We experienced a substantial [illegible] increase in arrests for these major offenses in 1970 compared to 1969.

Compiled by Planning Branch

The footnote to Figure 13 highlights a problem which Ostrom[30] and others have pointed out with respect to the FBI Index. Thus, changes in reporting systems cause changes in reported crime, independent of any actual change whether up or down. Such reporting changes almost invariably cause an increase in reported crime since they tend to be in the direction of more inclusive systems. Biderman's observation that such changes "operate to inflate the newer figures relative to the older ones"[31] is borne out by this note.

A further breakdown of Offenses Reported, and crime-related performance measures are provided in Figures 14 and 15. These figures, better than any others illustrate Bercal's assertion that,

> The supposition that the police can prevent and/or control crime is an extremely dangerous one. There is evidence that most crimes, especially those of stealth, are not prevented and most criminals are not caught.[32]

The data shown here indicate that the police solved (cleared) only 19.7 percent overall in 1970. Skolnick's[33] discussion of bargaining to increase clearance rates casts doubts upon even such a low figure. For crimes of stealth, Burglary and Larceny, the figures are even lower (that auto theft should not be included is argued later). Bercal is clearly correct in his statement, the police cannot prevent crime, and have great difficulty enforcing the law after the fact. Thus, it makes little sense to use cases cleared as a performance

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[30] Ostrom, op.cit.

[31] Biderman, op.cit

[32] Bercal, op.cit.

[33] Skolnick, op.cit.

Figure 15
Offenses Reported, Arrests, Cases Cleared - II

NATURE OF LARCENIES REPORTED - ARRESTS - CASES CLEARED - JUVENILES INCLUDED

NATURE OF LARCENIES	OFFENSES REPORTED 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR	ARRESTS 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR	CASES CLEARED 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR
A-POCKET-PICKING	6	85	1	27		8				10		3
B-PURSE SNATCHING	69	478	47	354	3	53	7	42	9	84	3	46
C-SHOPLIFTING	188	1777	123	1247	211	1931	124	1387	179	1608	110	1152
D-FROM AUTOS-EXC E	491	4234	370	3451	5	146	11	124	11	206	15	330
E-AUTO ACCESSORIES	315	4137	299	3236	9	103	4	84	6	126	12	153
F-BICYCLES	45	2178	34	2629	2	53	2	74	1	159	17	293
G-FROM BLDG-EXC C	71	1547	234	2100	4	98	6	103	7	138	18	150
H-FROM COIN OP MACH-EXC C	8	177	10	156		30		29	1	35	2	22
I-ALL OTHERS	524	3761	223	2535	44	790	70	654	82	734	74	617
TOTAL	1717	18374	1341	15735	278	3212	224	2497	296	3100	251	2766

VEHICLE SECTION	DEC 1970	YTD 1970	DEC 1969	YTD 1969
AUTO TOWED IN & PROCESSED	1707	17441	1620	24699
AUTOS RELEASED	1627	16691	1629	22292
AUTOS RECOVERED LOCALLY	448	4032	257	4034
AUTOS RECOVERED FOR US BY OJ	5	284	36	395
TOTAL	453	4316	293	4429
AUTOS RECOVERED BY US FOR OJ	21	211	26	400

MISCELLANEOUS	DEC 1970	YTD 1970	DEC 1969	YTD 1969
BICYCLES RECOVERED	29	404	24	507
PAWNSHOP RECOVERY	$ 6741	$ 60888		
SAFE BURG-NUMBER	3	63	5	55
SAFE BURG-AMOUNT	$ 196	$ 31346	$ 1000	$ 9230

UNFOUNDED OFFENSES		
SEVEN MAJOR CRIMES		
MURDER		
MANSLAUGHTER BY NEGLIGENCE	4	31
FORCIBLE RAPE	6	25
ROBBERY	11	49
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	7	32
BURGLARY	28	255
LARCENY-$50 AND OVER	13	89
LARCENY-UNDER $50	33	172
VEHICLE THEFT	26	175
TOTAL	128	832

Figure 14
Offenses Reported, Arrests, Cases Cleared - I

ACTUAL OFFENSES REPORTED - ARRESTS - CASE CLEARED - JUVENILES INCLUDED

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES	OFFENSES REPORTED 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR	ARRESTS 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR	CASES CLEARED 1970 DEC	1970 YEAR	1969 DEC	1969 YEAR	PERCENT CLEARED 1970	1969
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE														
MURDER NON-NEG MANSLAUGHTER	5	60	4	65	2	55	7	69	8	60	4	55	100.0%	84.6%
MANSLAUGHTER BY NEGLIGENCE	1	28	2	50		13	1	16	1	12	1	20	42.8%	40.0%
FORCIBLE RAPE	19	253	11	167	8	114	7	110	15	150	6	84	59.2%	50.2%
ROBBERY														
HI-WAY, STEET, ALLEY	151	1318	99	974	45	322	18	185	40	311	27	221		
COMMERCIAL HOUSE	52	370	39	322	19	144	12	83	9	145	6	130		
OIL STATION	12	158	23	181	6	60		30	4	63	2	33		
CHAIN STORE		44	9	52		10	3	11		27	3	12		
RESIDENT PREMISE	13	132	6	56	9	39	5	22	1	33	2	16		
BANK	1	3	2	12		1				4	1	6		
MISCELLANEOUS	1	48	7	54		33		28		15		17		
TOTAL	230	2073	185	1651	79	609	38	359	54	598	41	435	28.8%	26.3%
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT	67	1205	101	859	21	465	55	453	71	676	33	572	56.0%	66.5%
BURGLARY														
RESIDENCE - NIGHT	579	4462	274	3394	52	387	15	163	143	720	48	383		
RESIDENCE - DAY	64	2165	243	2279	12	310	23	221	5	370	37	411		
NON-RESIDENT - NIGHT	285	3362	264	3063	55	545	33	394	33	609	54	562		
NON-RESIDENT - DAY	24	320	26	187	8	125	9	101	2	68	6	84		
TOTAL	952	10309	807	8923	127	1367	80	869	183	1767	145	1440	17.1%	16.1%
LARCENY														
$50 AND OVER	677	6133	493	4666	45	543	39	335	44	556	49	533		
$5 TO $50	328	4418	267	5060	100	859	59	666	53	798	80	872		
UNDER $5	712	7823	581	6009	133	1810	126	1496	199	1746	122	1361		
TOTAL	1717	18374	1341	15735	278	3212	224	2497	296	3100	251	2766	16.8%	17.5%
AUTO THEFT INCL. JOY RIDE	535	5314	325	4933	56	850	45	736	102	1071	52	1222	20.1%	24.7%
GRAND TOTAL	3526	37616	2776	32383	571	6689	455	5109	730	7434	533	6594	19.7%	20.3%

measure for two reasons. First, because it is virtually impossible for a department to achieve a high percentage score on this measure, and second and more important, its use encourages the use of such dangerous means as those identified by Skolnick in attempting to score well. It is only the insistence upon viewing the police function solely or mainly as "fighting crime and/or evil"[34] which encourages its use.

This is a perfect example of what Lipsky[35] calls "an unattainable goal dimension," leading to the police "develop(ing) frustrations with the institutional framework inhibiting them from doing their jobs 'professionally.'" Many of the comments of Indianapolis Police Officers, which were recorded by non-participant observers during the course of the previously mentioned Indianapolis study, bear witness to this frustration. These officers believe that most of what they do., i.e., providing generalized services to citizens is not "real police work." Perhaps a measurement frame which did not focus upon cases cleared, or considered it in context as a very small portion of what police do, would help to change the officers' view of what their function is, and thereby relieve much of the frustration which they feel.

In discussing the FBI Index Crimes, Biderman points to the problems generated by including automobile theft in the Index. The automobile population in the United States is constantly rising,

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[34]Quote from the author's favorite St. Louis patrolman, Michael Leahy.

[35]Lipsky, Michael, "Toward a Theory of Street Level Bureaucracy," paper presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969.

providing a built-in escalator for crime rates. Citizens are highly motivated to report a stolen car rapidly due to their "legal responsibility for use made of the vehicle"[36] and for insurance purposes. The automobile is a valuable piece of property which is often left unattended in a public place, providing easy access to potential thieves.

An indicator which highlights the problem of including auto theft is the very high recovery rate for stolen automobiles. Contributing to such a high rate are the many instances of joy-riding by teenagers, disputed or unauthorized use of a vehicle, and failure to unfound reported thefts which are later found to be the result of repossessions, tow-ins, and other non-theft incidents.

This high recovery rate for "stolen" automobiles tends to bias one possible police performance measure, the value of stolen property recovered. To illustrate, Figure 16 represents an analysis by the Indianapolis Department of the value of property stolen and recovered in 1969 and 1970. Looking at the total line, the recovery rate is near 60 percent for both years. However, in analyzing the 1970 data, some interesting results appear which agree with Biderman's discussion. Thus, of the over $5 million recovered in 1970 (out of nearly $9 million stolen), 96% was in the category of auto theft, including joy ride. The recovery rate for Robbery was only 8 percent, for Burglary, 6 percent, for Larceny, 8 percent, and for automobiles, 83 percent. In 1970, the Department recovered 58 cents out of each dollar stolen, 55.5 cents of which was "stolen" automobiles.

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[36]Biderman, op.cit.

Figure 16
Value of Property Stolen and Recovered - I

VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN AND RECOVERED

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES	STOLEN - 1970 DECEMBER	STOLEN - 1970 YEAR TO DATE	STOLEN - 1969 DECEMBER	STOLEN - 1969 YEAR TO DATE	RECOVERED - 1970 DECEMBER	RECOVERED - 1970 YEAR TO DATE	RECOVERED - 1969 DECEMBER	RECOVERED - 1969 YEAR TO DATE
ROBBERY								
HI-WAY, STREET, ALLEY	$ 9449	$ 83341	$ 5642	$ 59122	$	$ 10088	$	$ 3544
COMMERCIAL HOUSE	8067	50109	8375	78768	30	376	425	1247
OIL STATIONS	1068	16905	1671	10112		110		379
CHAIN STORE		4620	1568	3080		55		
RESIDENCE OR PREMISE	599	32503	674	9386	157	2454		379
BANK		2913	2484	31857				24021
MISCELLANEOUS		4898	145	24527		2042		33
TOTAL	19183	195289	20559	216852	187	15125	425	29603
BURGLARY								
RESIDENCE NIGHT	$ 137903	$ 596841	$ 37831	$ 448254	$ 990	$ 33560	$ 390	$ 26115
RESIDENCE DAY	20532	282053	34834	290270	81	9108	3910	20380
NON-RESIDENCE NIGHT	56453	504910	55000	490008	525	33692	1522	44399
NON-RESIDENCE DAY	1641	17703	2575	18271		2495		783
TOTAL	216529	1401507	130240	1246803	1596	78855	5822	91677
LARCENY								
$50 AND OVER	$ 172564	$ 1199972	$ 98166	$ 1079804	$ 3804	$ 88707	$ 9291	$ 95728
$5 TO $50	7441	81795	5885	83871	1115	17109	1354	14862
UNDER $5	2721	13882	202	2562	375	1936	61	11141
TOTAL	182726	1295639	104253	1165237	5294	107752	10706	121731
AUTO-THEFT INCL JOY RIDE	$ 512730	$ 5907795	$ 455179	$ 5678342	$ 406087	$ 4890644	$ 363356	$ 5038114
GRAND TOTAL	$ 931168	$ 8800230	$ 710231	$ 9307234	$ 413164	$ 5092376	$ 380309	$ 5281125

Figure 17 shows these same data in a different fashion. Here the breakdown is by type of property stolen. The highest recovery rate for non-auto thefts is 18 percent for stolen clothing.

Two points relative to measurements can be made from these figures. First of all, two different phenomena are being measured. That is, auto theft does not fit with the other types of theft. This is illustrated by an exceedingly high recovery rate, both in dollar and in unit terms, relative to the others. An interesting way to analyze the data shown above, and that of Figures 14 and 15 is to note that in 1970, 5,314 auto thefts were reported, 4,316 automobiles were recovered, but only 1,071 cases of auto theft were cleared. Such a high recovery rate, combined with such a low clearance rate indicates that many of these recoveries must have been of abandoned cars or possibly, failure to unfound wrongly reported thefts. The clearance rate for Robbery, Burglary, and Larceny combined in 1970 is quite similar to that for auto theft (18 percent compared to 20 percent), yet the recovery rate in these crimes is only about 8 percent of that for automobiles in dollar terms.

The second point follows from the first. Combining these different types of theft does not allow the public or the police themselves to evaluate performance, and, in fact, tends to greatly overstate it. Thus, a recovery rate of 58 percent (1970) might be considered rather good. Looking at this rate in a different way may reveal that it is not. The recovery rate for non-autos is only 7 percent, that for autos is 83 percent. But the clearance rate for autos is about 20 percent. If one assumes conservatively that one-third of those automobiles recovered, where the case was not cleared,

Figure 17

Value of Property Stolen and Recovered - II

VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN AND RECOVERED

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES BREAKDOWN	STOLEN - 1970 DECEMBER	STOLEN - 1970 YEAR DATE	STOLEN - 1969 DECEMBER	STOLEN - 1969 YEAR DATE	RECOVERED - 1970 DECEMBER	RECOVERED - 1970 YEAR DATE	RECOVERED - 1969 DECEMBER	RECOVERED - 1969 YEAR DATE
NATURE OF THEFTS								
CURRENCY AND NOTES	$ 46491	$ 459740	$ 46561	$ 449972	$ 878	$ 46153	$ 2152	$ 53190
JEWELRY AND PRECIOUS METALS	26821	233190	8327	245156	96	6967	252	17029
FURS	9041	45321	7175	35569	29	2860		8246
CLOTHING	53945	278104	37948	250666	2659	51052	5987	32686
LOCALLY STOLEN AUTOMOBILES	494180	5825218	450514	5655574	404975	4848143	362256	5016092
MISCELLANEOUS	300490	1958657	159706	1670297	4547	136771	9662	153882
TOTAL	$ 931168	$ 8800230	$ 710231	$ 8307234	$ 413184	$ 5091946	$ 380309	$ 5281125
NATURE OF LARCENIES								
POCKET PICKING	$ 65	$ 2628	$ 40	$ 1162	$	$ 49	$	$ 55
PURSE SNATCHING	1328	13499	1364	8753		659	295	797
SHOPLIFTING	5304	40836	3616	35860	3451	43588	2967	30011
FROM AUTOS	87108	523497	44632	477727	100	10011	737	21034
AUTO ACCESSORIES	22052	233062	17075	191159	260	4155		1502
BICYCLES	550	22071	348	26789		2960	240	5190
FROM BUILDING	10688	208331	22099	230909	228	15767	2070	31951
FROM COIN OPER MACHINE	150	3244	39	2534		547	9	87
ALL OTHERS	55481	248471	15040	190345	1255	30016	4388	31104
TOTAL	$ 182726	$ 1295639	$ 104253	$ 1165237	$ 5294	$ 107752	$ 10706	$ 121731
VEHICLE THEFT VALUE OF AUTOS RECOVER FOR OJ	$ 21000	$ 408110	$ 55300	$ 853675	$ 21000	$ 408110	$ 55300	$ 853675

were not truly thefts (i.e., were joy rides, unauthorized use, etc.) and exclude them from the stolen and recovered figures, the overall recovery rate for stolen property drops to 51 percent. If one half of the not-cleared recoveries were of such a nature and were excluded, the recovery rate would be only 47 percent. Whether such factors are at work in the data shown cannot be determined by inspection, but do tend to cast doubt upon the recovery rate in crime-fighting terms. If one wishes, however, as the author does, to view the police as much more than a strictly law enforcement, order maintenance agency, then the 58 percent recovery rate is a generally valid performance measure, since the return of an abandoned vehicle to its owner is a service provided by the police to citizens. In fact, when viewed from this perspective, recovery rate is a much more pertinent measure than is clearance rate.

Relevance of the Case Study

For a case study to be more than just that, it must be possible to generalize the findings to other cases where similar conditions are found. It will not be argued that the Indianapolis Police Department is typical of all 40,000 odd police departments in America, but rather that it is an example of departments in cities of a given size range, approximately 250,000 to 750,000 population and indeed may be more advanced than many of these in adopting recommendations for modernization and professionalism. The department has been quite innovative over the years and has a firm commitment to modern information processing. It has

instituted extensive training programs, both in-house and at outside institutions. It is organized with a great deal of functional specialization. Thus, it may be possible to generalize from this study to other medium-to-large departments, at least in terms of the direction in which they are tending.

The intent of the author in presenting the preceding study of reporting in the Indianapolis Police Department was to highlight some of the problems discussed in the literature relative to measurement of the performance of public agencies. In pursuing this intent, all of the reporting and processing done by the Department was not presented or analyzed, but rather a sample of those felt to be more important. If through ommission of some data an injustice has been done the Department, it was unintentional.

At the beginning of this paper, the problem of knowing "what is being done" was identified as perhaps the key problem leading to difficulties in measuring performance. The data presented in the case study tends to illustrate this, at least for police agencies, by showing the overwhelming concentration upon "crime" and crime prevention related activities in the Department. This concentration is apparent in the reporting system, both by what is recorded and by what is reported in identifiable terms. Nearly 90 percent of the reporting of runs assigned is focused upon 10 percent of the runs, those potentially crime related. A great deal of reporting is done on Offenses Reported, Arrests, and Case Clearance, indicating use as performance measures in spite of the small portion of time spent on such activities and the low value of cases cleared (20 percent). The police are

consciously or unconsciously ignoring 80 to 90 percent of what they actually do when they evaluate performance in such terms. This indicates a serious misunderstanding of "what we are doing."

That the internal records do not allow evaluation of the consequences for citizens of the police actions is fairly clear. The only data pertaining to this is the value of stolen property recovered, which in a broad sense measures service to citizens, but which suffers from certain limitations noted in the discussion. As to Wilson's claim that the citizen can evaluate the service function of the police, he is perhaps correct in terms of the citizen who has recently received direct assistance, however, no records are maintained which would allow measurement of the levels of service provided in general. In the Indianapolis survey [37] (in white, middle-class neighborhoods) only 22 percent of the families interviewed had been assisted by the police, leaving 78 percent with no way to evaluate police performance of "service" functions. Wilson's implication that the police receive adequate performance data to evaluate the law enforcement functions is partially challenged by the problems in interpreting the reported data presented in the case study.

Finally, in the discussion accompanying the case study, the attempt was made, with some degree of success, to illustrate Bercal's and Biderman's critiques of police reporting and the use of the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. While not adding anything

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[37] Ostrom, et al., op.cit.

significantly new to their arguments, the case study does present additional validation of their arguments.

Summary and Conclusions

In the preceding pages, the author has attempted to bring together a few of the more salient critiques relating to problems of measurement of performance in the public sector. The primary focus of the discussion was upon police agencies, but it is at least partially pertinent to problems found in all public agencies. The underlying factor is that such agencies are not in competition with alternate suppliers of similar services and are not evaluated upon any objective standards of performance in determining their budgets. Thus, they have no incentive to provide detailed measures of task performance. Indeed, one of the major problems facing one who would analyze police performance is that fairly adequate records are maintained on only ten percent of police activity, the remainder being lumped as "not police work."

A case study was presented to illustrate some of the arguments presented in the literature. In that study, of reporting in the Indianapolis Police Department, the emphasis upon crime prevention and law enforcement to the exclusion of other activities, predicted by the critiques was indeed found. The Indianapolis Department is basing its performance evaluations upon only a small fraction of its activities, those considered relevant for internal purposes. The Department has, as have most other police agencies, been successful in getting governmental superiors to accept its premises relating to "police work."

In view of the problems of measurement of the performance of public agencies based upon the use of internal records, two courses appear open to the social scientist. One of these was pursued in the previously mentioned Indianapolis study. In such an approach, the basic performance measures utilized are citizen evaluations of various aspects of the agencies' functions. While such an approach is inherently satisfying to those with a view of society which emphasizes citizen choice as a guiding criteria, certain problems exist in using these evaluations as performance measures.[38]

To combat some of these problems, and to provide data from within the agency studied, a second course should be pursued in conjunction with the first. Here the social scientist should not merely look at the records produced by the agency and reject them as invalid for measuring performance, but should rather study the recording and measurement process within the agency, attempting to suggest better methods which would be meaningful to the agency. Such a course serves three important purposes: one, by studying what is recorded and how it is used, the scientist can obtain knowledge of the agency's self-image and of power relationships within the agency; two, better data would become available if better methods were adopted; and three, the agency might improve its performance by utilizing the data. All three purposes are eminently worthwhile.

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[38]See Ostrom and Whitaker, and Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker for a discussion of these problems.

APPENDIX: Some Recommendations for the Indianapolis Police Department

While the author attempted to avoid direct criticism of the Indianapolis Police Department in presenting the case study, it is inevitable that some of his discussion will be interpreted in this fashion. It was the intent of the author, as stated in the introductory paragraph, to use the case study to illustrate measurement problems in public agencies; if the Indianapolis Department was not representative of such agencies, these illustrations would be meaningless. Still, to avoid being tagged as one who criticizes without suggesting alternatives, and to fulfill commitments made while gathering data in the Department, the following suggestions are made.

The recommendations fall into three basic categories, recommending a major change in reporting philosophy, recommending some improvements within the existing framework, and "nitpicking," pointing out some flaws in existing reports.

The basic philosophical change called for lies in the area of reporting calls for service. The recommended change is one involving a change in philosophy because it involves acceptance of many services in addition to law enforcement as "police work" or at least as work which the police are likely to be doing for many more years.

First of all, the Uniform Complaint Form should be expanded to provide coding such that all calls for service received would be recorded. This would include those where the dispatcher was able to solve the caller's problem personally (perhaps just by listening)

and those where the dispatcher transferred or referred the called to another governmental unit or to a private agency. (Since this would generate a large additional card volume, the cards could be designed to be read by an optical scanning device, eliminating a large keypunching load.)

Once this change was implemented, the Department Data Processing section could produce reports which would greatly assist the City in evaluating citizens' demands for services, particularly those needed on an emergency basis, but also many others. Such analysis would be quite valuable in determining not only the level of such demands, but also the geographic and temporal distributions, facilitating better decision-making in allocating City resources.

Additionally, this would require the Police Department to analyze in much greater detail the data now lumped into All-Others in their reporting framework. This should allow better evaluation of the types of services being performed by officers, by both command personnel and the public. In the latter sense, the department would surely benefit from increased citizen awareness of the many services provided by police officers in performing their job. Such awareness could not help but lead to greater citizen appreciation and respect for officers. In the words of John Griffin,

> Both internal and external data possess significance as a purely historical record but, of much greater significance, can be used by the administrative heads of the department in the measurement of accomplishment and efficiency. These date also keep the public informed of police activity, and may do much to create a favorable climate of public opinion. [39]

[39] Griffin, John, Statistics Essential for Police Efficiency, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, 1958. p. 31. Quoted in Skolnick, op.cit.

In addition to these considerations, the recognition of these services as valid police work would go a long way in alleviating the frustrations that many observers have noted, which result from the pursuit of a virtually unattainable goal, crime prevention.

Within the existing reporting system, several improvements might be made. A significant one would be the recording and analyzing of response time. This would be a useful input to adjusting beat boundaries, identifying beats which might be too large or severely congested by noting relatively higher response time for given run types. A policy of adjusting boundaries to reduce response time might pay off in reduced crime and/or increased clearances, as evidenced by studies showing probability of apprehension falling off very rapidly as response time increases.[40]

A change which would be of value to field supervisory personnel would be the addition of two more sort levels on the Major Offenses by Sector report. The first level would sort out the beats within the sector, the second, the category of offense within the beat. This would enable Sector supervisors to determine easily where the activity was within their sector, and what type of offenses were occurring.

Two additional reports which would appear to be of value and which could be easily produced from the run data, are Beat Within Category, and Runs Per Shift By Beat. In both of these, the beats would be ranked in decreasing order of activity, allowing the Department to determine at a glance those beats ranking highest

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[40] Boehm, op.cit.

in a given category of activity, and those ranking highest on each shift. Both reports could be very helpful in allocating Task Force and other Operations personnel.

Finally, it would appear valuable for statistical purposes, if for no other, to produce an error report each day showing case number and address for those Incident Reports not coded or incompletely coded by beat. A clerk could be assigned on a part-time basis to correct these and enter the data into the files properly.

The "nit-picking" recommendations are quite trivial, things which the Data Processing section would normally correct anyway, but which may not have been brought to their attention. First, the program which produces page 17A of the Statistical Report (Yearly Recapitulation of Geographic Police Beats) does not allow room for printing of the proper totals. The totals for All Other and for Total Runs on that page (1970 Report) are wrongly truncated from the left.

Secondly, the category total lines on the Shift Within Category report are incorrect in the Percent By Shift and Average Time Per Day columns. The figures shown are those for the late shift rather than a total for all three shifts.

Finally, and perhaps not as nit-picking, it would seem worthwhile to subtract out those runs on the F08 beat which involve trips to the garage, to headquarters, etc., By including these on the reports, a false impression of an overloaded beat is generated for the uninformed reader.

If any of these suggestions are of use to the Department, the author will be quite pleased. This paper depended greatly upon the splendid cooperation which was afforded, and the author would like to repay this debt, if only in a small way.

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