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ACQUISITIONS

Reorganization Recommendations,
Analysis and Options for
The Division of Law Enforcement,
California Department of Justice

Final Report: Volumes I & II

December 1, 1990

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U.S. Department of Justice
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C A L I F O R N I A P L A N N E R S
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California Planners*

*successor to Approach Associates

Alan Kalmanoff
J.D., Ph.D.

December 1, 1990

Mr. G.W. Clemons, Director
Division of Law Enforcement
California Department of Justice
4949 Broadway
Sacramento, CA 95820

RE: Transmittal of Final Report, DLE Reorganization Study

Dear Gerry:

Attached is the final edition of the above cited report which provides overall direction for a reorganization of DLE.

In such a complex and modestly funded effort, specifics could not be developed. Therefore, we recommend an Executive Services Group be assembled to finalize implementation of the following key recommendations:

1. Institute a plural-executive concept;
2. Establish a new program planning and evaluation office;
3. Implement manager rotation; and
4. Eliminate branches in favor of consolidated bureaus.

The study was driven by basic organizational principles and data. Because no program evaluation data exists, the data was from hundreds of management interviews and meetings. The ideas were all from people who manage the work on a daily basis.

The organizational principles employed were:

1. Stronger management through centralization and consolidation;
2. Stronger lateral coordination; and
3. Combatting layering and competition over "turf" through employing rotational management over a "flatter" and more participatory organizational structure.

A few final comments about the reorganization study process are in order. First, there has been excellent cooperation and continuing support and input from your office, and from the Chief Deputy Attorney General's Office, for which I am grateful. Second, there has been continuous and energetic interviewing and correspondence between the branch managers and bureau chiefs, and many other managers, throughout.

Third, there has been a great deal of widespread manager support for our findings and recommendations, proffered in words and writings. Because the report clearly "hit home," there were also strongly felt differences, especially by some bureau and branch managers

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Mr. Clemons
December 1, 1990
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directly affected. Consultants appreciate the sincere motivation behind the comments from these DLE managers. In many instances, Consultants reacted to negative comments, but did not always change findings or revise recommendations which were made to improve the organization of DLE and not simply to represent branch or some bureau managers alone.

There is a place in the final report for any further comments by these managers, as well as for comments by you and the Chief Deputy Attorney General, bound into the report immediately behind the recommendations.


Last, I must offer my own evaluation which is: the study was far too complex for the budget; it thus offers too little detail and some unevenness. Nonetheless, and by all accounts, it stimulated lively debates and resulted in making explicit many issues and concerns that had been "whispered in the hallways," and must now be faced. It brought forth many agendas, revealing that the organization's interests have not been attended to, and it laid the groundwork for change. Most importantly, I am convinced that the findings and key recommendations are "right" and will make DLE manageable.

A final note is my availability, and that of Captain Stinson, for any later briefings, meetings and presentations to help implement this study. We have budgeted time and expect to be called by the new administration, and we are well prepared to defend our work and assist in the transition.

Thank you for your constant support of our work, and good luck.

Your agency owes you a debt of gratitude for seeing the need for this study.

Sincerely,



Alan Kalmanoff
President

AK/mr

Reorganization Recommendations,
Analysis and Options for
The Division of Law Enforcement,
California Department of Justice

Final Report: Volumes I & II

December 1, 1990

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Volume I

Summary of Findings & Recommendations

Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Volume I contains a summary of findings, 17 reorganizational recommendations and a brief implementation plan. Volume II sets out the Final Options Report containing the study's background, analyses, detailed findings and options, and a discussion of methodology, sources, etc.

Volume II, the Final Options Report, stresses three major diagnostic findings affecting the Division of Law Enforcement's organizational effectiveness. These key findings are:

1. Excessive compartmentalization of DLE programs and services;
2. Unnecessary layering, both in the DLE management hierarchy and in its basic functions;
3. Anomalies in the distribution of tasks and responsibilities within DLE.

Examples of inadequate cooperation and coordination arising from these three major organizational deficiencies were observed and noted throughout the Final Options Report.

The 64 options presented in Volume II formed the basis for Consultants' recommendations (and are cross-referenced in Volume I). On the basis of the final meetings with the Advisory Committee and late input from branch and bureau managers, it became clear that some of the more specific recommendations for major organizational change would not be totally supported. There was some justification for the concerns voiced because of an acknowledged need to clarify recommendations and details and to study in greater depth specific linkages.

This final report responds to feedback provided by the Advisory Committee and DLE managers; it includes additional clarifying details on some of the recommendations and a new recommendation. A few have been eliminated or modified with alternatives; most, however, remain from the draft because additional review supported the recommendation as a desirable organizational change.

The most important recommendations, from a priority standpoint, also form the foundation for a brief five-point implementation plan set out at the end of the first volume.

The recommended organizational changes will significantly impact DLE hierarchical arrangements. The creation of new units and positions together with the retirements of upper and middle managers, however, will create new positions to offset the elimination of positions.

While the status of managers may be readily apparent in some proposed changes, other management positions, particularly in newly created units, await study and documentation required in the state's personnel system. Management personnel classification was beyond the scope of this study.

In any event, a managers classification study must await the new administration's decisions regarding implementation of the reorganization proposals.

Summary of Findings

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The following are Consultants' major findings and supporting logic (summarized from the Final Options Report).

1. The Division of Law Enforcement's (DLE) overall purpose is clear, and its various primary and secondary missions are articulated throughout the organization. The mission statements, however, are too generalized to provide useful guidance in a large and complex organization such as DLE.

It is clear from the study that interpretations of each bureau's mission/role vary radically within DLE. As a consequence, the organizational placement of programs often appear to have been based on subjective considerations.

2. DLE's three branches add a management layer while limiting management's capacity. Bureaus within each of the branches perform the same functions, but are organizationally separated, and thus, are reluctant to share resources (information, technology, funds). Additionally, managers at each level concentrate on their own problems, with the result that there is a serious competition for funds and personnel positions and a frequent lack of communication or cooperation.

There are few reasons for maintaining the current branch structure. The multiple layers of the organization employ a large number of administrative personnel, and communication becomes difficult. Documents must be approved at many levels before release, and managers thereby become insulated from responsibility. Planning, training and budgeting appear to occur at the branch and bureau levels, with the result that they are uncoordinated and become quite competitive.

3. The Law Enforcement Data Center (LEDC) should be somewhat separate from the bureaus in the new structure of DLE yet not an independent branch. LEDC does not serve only law enforcement; its activities are also involved in servicing all of DOJ, as well as an increasing number of related criminal justice agencies. Moreover, it is not the only repository for data; databases and technology have proliferated throughout DLE, leading to conflicts regarding control of technology specifications, choices, procurements and maintenance. LEDC, however, plays a crucial service role as technology advisor to DLE and the law enforcement field; it should remain in DLE.
4. Although there is an Advanced Training Center (ATC), training is decentralized throughout DLE, resulting in little data on training and no organized efforts at assessing overall training needs. Training is provided to local law enforcement agencies by both program- and technology-oriented bureaus in DLE, and training occurs in DLE and throughout DOJ in diverse ways. This decentralization of training causes inefficiencies and coordination problems.
5. Far fewer than eleven laboratories are needed statewide. The need for proximity to users for fast and efficient turnaround of evidence, analyses and pretrial testimony, which was behind the decentralized locations of the labs throughout the state, has eroded with the availability of inexpensive overnight delivery, electronic communications, jet travel, etc.

6. There is limited flexibility or cooperation among the bureaus of the Investigations and Enforcement Branch (IEB). Although sharing a common investigative mission, each bureau works to retain its own "turf" and control of extensive resources.

The Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) has at its disposal over \$6 million in the Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF). The bureau operates in local law enforcement jurisdictions to initiate, investigate and close narcotic cases often without adequate or timely involvement of local police. These independent BNE narcotic case investigations and the subsequent forfeiture proceeds are two current and potential sources of conflict with the law enforcement community.

The Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence (BOCCI) functions as an independent unit due to the confidential nature of the information it gathers and stores. However, there have been no rigorous external evaluations of the effectiveness of BOCCI's systems beyond the annual accounting report currently submitted by the bureau itself, and a great many managers question BOCCI's effectiveness in intelligence operations. BOCCI has moved far beyond the analysis and collection of organized crime information into programs which process and analyze crime and known offender information. BOCCI's assumption of responsibility for these programs in which other bureaus had a proprietary interest has aggravated inter-bureau coordination and management problems.

The absence of clearly defined organizational roles and responsibilities in BOCCI increases the tension between DLE managers, impairs cooperation and coordination between bureaus and weakens the organization's efficient progress towards mission objectives.

7. The existing DLE structure encourages competition. Structural problems, various organizational changes, personnel transfers, and questionable management and promotions practices have left DLE units in competition with one another over division resources.

Problems with individual managers are solved by transfer and/or reorganization rather than by documentation and strong personnel action. There is conflict regarding sworn v. nonsworn positions. There is a legislative liaison at the bureau level to procure special programs or funding. There are few incentives to manage well; few sanctions for managing badly. Additionally, some managers manage only one other person (layering), and the manager/worker ratio is often too close (compartmentalization).

Taken together, these problems among senior-level and top management cause morale to suffer and, in a cumulative fashion, are a general disincentive to carefully budget and spend, and to capitalize on the energies of managers.

8. DLE programs are useful, considered effective and perceived as well-targeted to DLE's mission and law enforcement needs statewide. There is, however, no central intake broker in DLE, nor is data systematically collected and analyzed with regard to the vast number of requests for service. This gap limits program planning and evaluation, the allocation of scarce resources, quality control and program evaluation, and management of information generally. DLE outreach and technical assistance services provided by field representatives are fragmented among several bureaus, programs and LEDC.

9. There is virtually no objective evaluation of the vast array of DLE programs and services. While some bureaus and programs now collect activity data, the only current evaluations of DLE's extensive and expensive services and programs are anecdotal, and limited to the Western States Information Network (WSIN) and a few legislatively required reports. Program evaluation is needed everywhere in DLE to assist in budgeting and planning, to improve service, and to enhance the agency's ability to obtain or maintain funds for valued and needed programs.
10. The overall size of DLE, the magnitude of IEB field operations, and the enormous sums in cash being seized in undercover drug investigations suggest the need for a permanent internal affairs unit to coordinate internal investigations.
11. The role of the Administrative Services Division (ASD) is unclear to many DLE managers. In addition, many ASD functions (purchasing, budget control, personnel) appear understaffed, and, therefore, are duplicated at the DLE branch or bureau level. As a result, there are abuses, such as programs hiding funds to avoid ASD scrutiny, and positions being changed informally, without ASD involvement.
12. Budget discipline is lacking, and surplus and deficit spending within branches and bureaus is not uncommon. Little or no meaningful budget information is available to managers. The planning process is fractured, decentralized and occurs at the lower levels, resulting in conflicts over procurement.
13. In DLE, as presently constituted, the technical and the information functions are each divided among a number of groups in different bureaus. Extremely serious and expensive disputes are ongoing between LEDC and CIIB over the choice of hardware, system use and control.
14. The information management process suffers similarly from the disjointed structure and assignment of responsibility within DLE. Many units are involved in interfacing with in-house or remote users, and they are scattered throughout DLE. Several groups have their own databases.
15. DLE functions are not adequately focused on the agency's mission because there is no appropriate means of coordinating and directing operations. The result is frequent intra-agency competition and low morale among staff who perceive themselves as losers in the struggle for resources. The division needs a stronger management function to take responsibility for planning, budgeting, auditing and evaluation, as well as the concerns of DLE as a whole. The activities of each program in DLE should be selected to advance the purposes of the division overall, not that of the program alone.
16. DLE is too vast and complex to be led by a single director. The director's workload requires extensive liaison with diverse outside agencies. Almost half of the director's time is spent travelling around the state and nationally. As a result of the director's far-ranging responsibilities, the internal organization is undermanaged and inadequately led, in spite of the energy and talent of the current and past directors.

These general findings summarized from the Final Options Report in Volume II result in 17 specific recommendations set forth in the next section.

Recommendations

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Establish a Deputy Director.

(See Option G1.)

Establish a "career" deputy director¹ position to act as "acting" director in the director's absence, to coordinate all internal administration and policy development, and to manage the operational bureaus on a day-to-day basis.

DUTIES IN PLURAL EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION

Director	Deputy Director
Supervise deputy director Represent Attorney General/DLE on: AG's staff CSSA CPCA IACP Terrorism Committee CPOA Executive Board WSIN Policy Board POST (AG alternate) CCCJ AG Zone Meetings DNA Advisory Board	Supervise administration, LEDC and operational bureaus. Act as director in director's absence. Represent director/DLE on: CLETS Advisory Committee Criminal Legislation Meetings CPOA Gaming Committee


When both the director and deputy director are present at DLE or are immediately reachable, their duties are divided as indicated. When either is not immediately available, the available one assumes all and has complete authority/responsibility.

Attach to the director's office the following new or currently decentralized administrative functions under a Director of Administration at the assistant director or (rotating) bureau chief level:

- a. Comptroller/Budgeting - budget staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
- b. Personnel - personnel staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
- c. Program Evaluation and Planning (see earlier discussions in Final Options Report and other recommendations herein).
- d. Audits/Inspections (for inventory audits, program inspections and administrative reviews).

¹Throughout this report, personnel issues regarding pay and grade have been left for subsequent study and appropriate decision by state officials.

- e. Legislative liaison (consolidate all DLE legislative liaisons).
- f. Facility Security and Safety (for background investigations, Criminal History System security).
- g. Intelligence (for central management control of all DLE intelligence policy and activities, including continued intelligence activities conducted at the bureau levels and conducting of high level intelligence).
- h. Internal Affairs (for central management control of all DLE internal investigations through accepting or initiating, noting, classifying, assigning to bureaus, approving and recommending).



Discussion

This recommendation would greatly strengthen day-to-day administration and leadership, and provide the administrative continuity needed to bridge the lengthy orientation interruption that occurs with each appointment of a DLE director. It would also centralize the tools of leadership and add necessary and missing functions (e.g., Internal Affairs).

Internal Affairs investigations would be selective and limited to the more serious complaints. The unit would review the investigations which would be conducted at the bureau level according to written procedures similar to those followed by the large urban police agencies.


The enlarged director's office would use mostly current staffing, greatly increase accountability and allow program and bureau administration to continue, yet maintain strong administrative leadership. This recommendation would involve several new planning and evaluation positions with the remainder of the required positions taken from CIIB and IEB.

The administrative functions placed in the director's office cannot be performed at a higher level (i.e., ASD) or at the bureau level due to the rapidly increasing demand for law enforcement services and programs, as well as the growing size and complexity of DLE.

Recommendation 2: Eliminate Branches.

(See Option B1.)

Eliminate the branch levels. Manage bureaus and programs from an expanded director's office.



Discussion

Eliminating the branch levels will increase accountability, by shortening the chain of command. It will result in more responsive, accountable and efficient organizational processes by eliminating positions whose principal function is transferring information (policies, directives, etc.) up and down the chain of command.

The elimination of the branch level, together with other proposed consolidation economies, largely offsets costs associated with Recommendation 1.

The head of LEDC would retain that position and not suffer any demotion (see Recommendation 5).

Recommendation 3: Establish a Planning and Evaluation Office.

(See Options B16, B17, B18, B19, C8 and E2.)

Establish a Planning and Evaluation Office (PEO) in the director's office to provide strong technical assistance and oversight in all DLE program policy and planning efforts and to review and support program evaluations throughout DLE.

The PEO will have three primary functions:

1. The PEO will serve as the director's technical arm in evaluating and coordinating the planning, budgeting, auditing/inspecting and special analyses at the bureau level. In this role, the PEO should act as a central filter through which the bureau's budget and program requests must pass.
2. The PEO will evaluate, at least on a modest scale, the activity, quality and impact of each DLE program annually. As a part of this function, the PEO will also collect and analyze intake and demand data for the programs such as the costs of major demand areas and the proportions of requests coming from the field and from other divisions of DOJ.
3. The PEO will undertake major division-wide planning projects assigned by the director.

Discussion

Planning and budgeting will still be done at the bureau level; the PEO's function is to review, coordinate, identify conflicts and help the director to assign priority to requests.

A centralized and objective Planning and Evaluation Office will greatly improve management, program planning, budgeting and auditing within DLE. It will also improve the delivery of services to DOJ and the field and will enhance DLE's budget posture within the Department of Justice.

The PEO will also serve as an impartial resource in resolving questions of overlapping responsibilities or conflicts over program expansion or technology acquisition.

There are two important requirements for the PEO:

1. It must work closely with the bureau managers;
2. It must have the expertise to carry out its technical functions.

These two requirements imply that the makeup of the PEO needs to include both respected, senior-level DLE personnel and technical experts in the appropriate functions. The PEO should be a permanent body, independent of the operating bureaus, to insure objectivity. It should be managed by a rotated bureau chief level administrator.

The senior membership of the PEO should be drawn from the ranks of experienced division staff as a career alternative to moving into a higher supervisory position. Pay,

benefits and future promotional opportunities should be the same as or higher than their previous line positions.

Recommendation 4: Rotate Managers Throughout DLE

(See Options C2, C3 and C5.)

Adopt a two- to three-year rotation schedule for all DLE managers. Withdraw management positions from the POST Special Program. Develop an orientation training course for managers without peace officer training who are assigned to manage enforcement units. (Training should include such items as the police officers' "Bill of Rights.") Identify those positions in which the de facto peace officer status authorized by Penal Code Section 830.1(b) attaches to the incumbent manager.

Discussion

Most DLE managers interviewed agreed as to the validity of the following findings relative to manager rotations and the peace officer status of managers:

1. Rotation is desirable through all management positions, including those positions currently restricted to peace officers through unwritten policy.
2. There are no serious legal, technical or fiscal constraints that preclude a division-wide rotation of managers on a scheduled, periodic basis.
3. There are ample examples of managers without peace officer training or background being appointed as peace officers because the position to which they are assigned is included within peace officer sections of the penal code (attorneys in the Major Fraud Unit and Special Prosecutions Unit).
4. There are important fiscal and organizational advantages to limiting peace officer status to those who require it in their work (i.e., agents).
5. DLE has been inconsistent in designating which managers are peace officers and whether peace officer managers retain their status when transferred into positions which do not supervise agents.
6. Some limited training tailored to management responsibilities vis-a-vis agents would facilitate the division-wide rotation program.

This major personnel recommendation should limit internal competition suffered by DLE, greatly increase the morale of managers and open up the agency to greater achievements of its mission and greatly increased cost-effectiveness.

Recommendation 5: LEDC Role

(See Option B8.)

LEDC should be left in DLE as a major organizational unit and retain its existing status. General training activities and programs should be moved to the ATC; specialized training should be coordinated by the ATC. The telecommunications/data transmission functions should be centralized in LEDC.

LEDC's Head should report directly to the DLE director's office. The head of LEDC should continue to attend the DOJ Council of Chiefs meetings.

Discussion

While it is true that LEDC system development services are provided to all divisions in the Department of Justice, the day-to-day technical support to DLE's massive data systems continues to form a very large part of LEDC's reason for being. There is, accordingly, substantial justification for organizationally maintaining LEDC in DLE.

There remains a need for the DLE director, with the assistance of newly proposed matrix management groups, to continue to clarify who controls what.

By continuing to attend the Council of Chiefs meetings, LEDC's Head can continue LEDC's role in standardizing and coordinating the development of technology department-wide.

Recommendation 6: Reorganize BOCCI Functions

(See Options A1, B20 and E8.)

- 6a. Establish a Bureau of Crime Analysis to include all DLE crime analysis functions.**

Discussion

The bureau title "BOCCI" is a misnomer. BOCCI has assumed the management of many programs and activities that are tenuously - if at all - related to organized crime and intelligence. As presently constituted, a large part of the bureau's work is crime analysis. In the recommendations that follow, these functions are being temporarily moved, or returned, to other bureaus.

DLE data systems often serve more than one purpose, e.g., information to law enforcement, analysis, intelligence. An early critical reorganization task for staff in the director's office will be the development of rigorous statements of bureau responsibilities to facilitate the placement of information programs which are not easily categorized, as for example, crime analysis.

Crime analysis is an activity related to many of the long-established computer data files. The effectiveness of crime analysis is adversely affected by organizational fragmentation. DLE is uniquely qualified to provide crime analysis to local agencies based on statewide input.

Although recommendations in this report temporarily consolidate some analytical programs currently in BOCCI, DLE should ultimately group all crime analysis programs with the objective of creating a Bureau of Crime Analysis (BCA).

BOCCI is currently managed by a bureau chief and assistant bureau chief. The principal justification for the one-on-one administrative arrangement was the external demand on the bureau chief's time. As proposed, BCA would be managed by a single chief.

- 6b. Assign an Intelligence Coordination Unit to the director's office for policy development and management.**

Discussion

A basic function of a law enforcement intelligence unit is to gather information about organized crime. This data has varying degrees of reliability and the management of the information requires a high level of security to insure that access is limited to only authorized inquiries. Law enforcement agencies ordinarily access DLE intelligence files for investigative leads. A major value to DLE, however, lies in the development of DLE targeting strategies (e.g., public education, prosecuting key organized crime figures, and anti-gang programs). Because such strategies need to be decided within the framework of the division's overall interests, an intelligence coordination unit should be situated in the director's office. The coordination would have the staff support of BCA analysts and, in

addition to coordinating various bureaus' activities which relate to organized crime, would be responsible for policy development.

- 6c. Link the BOCCI ACII file with WSIN and coordinate with LEIU clearing house functions.**

Discussion

The success of WSIN may have altered perceptions and requirements that caused it to initially be semi-independent from DLE operations. Currently, a plan is underway to create a computer "window" which will link the DLE ACII with the WSIN file. DLE should work toward consolidation of the WSIN programs with similar programs in BCA and BI.

- 6d. Consolidate the legislative liaison activities currently in BOCCI, along with any other bureau-level legislative liaison, into the director's office.**

Discussion

Legislative actions often critically impact DLE operations. For this reason, legislative liaison and advocacy functions should operate out of the director's office and be supported by the proposed Planning and Evaluation office.

- 6e. Place the Specialized Equipment Program in the Advanced Training Center (ATC).**

Discussion

BCA analysts and field agents will have unrestricted access to specialized equipment they may require, but will not be responsible for the specialized equipment storage, loan arrangements, maintenance and training (in the use of equipment).

- 6f. Move the California Witness Protection Program, Visual Investigative Analysis Unit, LEIU clearinghouse, Interpol liaison and the responsibility for gathering and verifying organized crime intelligence into BI.**

- 6g. Unify control and operation of the CRACKDOWN program under the narcotic unit in a consolidated Bureau of Investigation (see discussion of CRACKDOWN program).**

Discussion

These programs relate to the full range of investigative categories and would be appropriately situated in the consolidated Bureau of Investigation (see Recommendation 7 re: consolidating BNE and BI into one bureau).

6h. Unify BOCCI field operations with BI field operations.

6i. Move the VCIC and SHOP programs temporarily to Special Services.

Discussion

VCIC should be returned to Special Services and consolidated with VCIS pending development of the Bureau of Crime Analysis. An initial rationale for moving VCIC into BOCCI was that investigators used BOCCI services. This arrangement does not justify separating VCIC and VCIS inasmuch as Special Services has investigator clientele also. For similar reasons, SHOP should be consolidated with sex offenders files in Special Services where the Sex Offender Registration File is maintained.

VCIC, VCIS and SHOP should ultimately be in the Bureau of Crime Analysis.

Recommendation 7: Consolidate Investigative Functions

(See Options A1 and B20.)

- 7a. Combine BNE and BI into one bureau, with narcotic enforcement and criminal/civil investigations each headed by assistant bureau chiefs.**

Discussion

Narcotic enforcement and civil/criminal investigations were combined in one bureau from 1975 to 1979. The reasons for separating the functions are obscure. One enforcement manager claimed that the consolidated bureau "didn't work." No specific problems were noted. On the other hand, it is noted by many DLE managers that the separation into two bureaus was primarily supported because it created additional management positions.

The absence of program evaluation data throughout DLE was remarkable. Even activity data is unavailable; in the investigation branch, the Bureau Evaluation System (BES) has been inoperative for a year. Consultants' efforts to review old BES data were unsuccessful because BES files from prior years could not be located.

The unavailability of both qualitative and quantitative activity data in the investigative branch caused Consultants to depend largely on reorganizational principles, supplemented by extensive interviews of mid- and senior-level managers, in developing recommendations concerning the investigative functions and programs. Although interviewees contended that relationships between the investigative bureaus currently are good, it was also stated that coordination problems have plagued the bureaus in the past.

A single investigative bureau minimizes coordination problems, facilitates joint operation and personnel sharing and encourages training assignments of agents to varied kinds of investigations, thereby improving agent expertise.²

- 7b. Unify the disparate BI, BNE, and BOCCI agent operating procedures into a single set of consistent procedures.**

Discussion

Common procedures will facilitate joint operations and simplify training of agents.

² The consolidation benefits described in this section would also apply to DOJ investigations units outside DLE, e.g., Major Fraud, Special Prosecutions.

- 7c. Establish bureau-level protocols governing the involvement of local agencies and the distribution of assets seized in cases initiated by state narcotics agents.**

Discussion

The competition between the state BNE and urban police agencies for assets seized from narcotic traffickers is potentially damaging to the Department of Justice mission of supporting local law enforcement.

At the present time, there are no adequate division-level or bureau-level written protocols governing BNE field decisions on whether to involve local police in many investigations, whether and how to share information, or whether and how to distribute assets seized in drug case forfeiture proceedings.

The success of the CRACKDOWN program, which substantially increases the number of state narcotic agents operating in local jurisdictions, will depend in great part on local agency cooperation -- particularly the urban departments.

BNE has developed a draft proposal for MOUs whereby participating CRACKDOWN agencies will agree to specific asset forfeiture distribution formulas. There still remains the need, however, to address those solo BNE investigations which are outside of Task Force investigations.

- 7d. Consolidate agent training activities now in BI and BNE in the Advanced Training Center (ATC).**

Discussion

There are obvious coordinating benefits and potential economies (reduced number of personnel involved) in centralizing: agent training records; scheduling of required training; and, the planning for -- and evaluation of -- advanced agent training.

- 7e. As an alternative to Recommendation 7a, combine BI with the non-BCA remnants of BOCCI (see Recommendation 6) and retain a separate Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE).**

Discussion

Although a precedent exists for Recommendation 7a, the required dislocation of established bureau chiefs and SAC's present real problems at the personnel level.

Furthermore, assigning sole control of the massive CRACKDOWN program to the narcotic enforcement unit presents some justification for keeping their management structure intact. An alternative organizational structure of a Bureau of Investigations and a Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement could thus be justified if management concludes that the foregoing factors justify retention of the two-bureau arrangement.

Thus, Consultants recommend combining the two bureaus, BNE and BI, or future study of the merits of the recommendation based on the outcome of the CRACKDOWN program.

Recommendations 7b, 7c and 7d should also be implemented with establishment of the BCA even if BNE and BI remain separate.

Recommendation 8: Centralize Training

(See Options B9, B10, B11 and B12.)

Establish in the ATC a centralized training unit for controlling and coordinating all DLE and DOJ training and employing enhanced training to improve management and control throughout DLE. The ATC should be responsible for coordinating all training, whether offered by ATC, or in DLE's bureaus, DOJ or to the field.

Include a needs assessment and master planning program in the new ATC training unit, insuring that training resources throughout DLE are tied effectively to need and demand. Employ training resources from throughout DLE/DOJ and outside, in combination with professional training management, overseen by a multi-disciplinary and multi-unit advisory group. Develop a training infrastructure that matches the demand for facilities, instructional technologies, certification, etc., and obtain separate facilities.

Discussion

This recommendation will result in better quality training, more efficient training delivery and more efficiencies in program and service units currently administering separate training programs and/or impacted by training. While some strong, specialized, separate training should be left decentralized, central oversight and coordination will enhance even these efforts.

While there would be some loss of substantive control over training by various units and the nontraining units affected are likely to resist this change, the recommendation should result in significant cost efficiencies and a higher quality, more accessible training program overall.

Intensive management training will be needed to help implement the recommendations of this study.

Recommendation 9: Consolidate Laboratories

(See Options B14 and B15.)

Conduct a careful assessment of the need for eleven laboratories statewide, and seek far fewer facilities and the best sites.

Discussion

This recommendation for centralized laboratories would further enhance the quality and quantity of lab work, allowing better technology for fewer sites. It would also further standardize laboratory activity and the data and learning that comes from the criminalistics program.

A study is needed because stiff political costs can be expected from local agencies, who would expect a diminution in service, and certain losses in program quality might result from distance and more travel by criminalists. Nonetheless, extremely large life-cycle cost savings can be expected, especially as demand increases.

If a comprehensive needs assessment and siting study were to occur, it might cost \$50,000-100,000.

Recommendation 10: Management Study

(See Option C6.)

Commission a further in-depth, independent study of compartmentalization and layering at DLE.

Discussion

A further and in-depth study will provide information for making reassignments to newly created functions such as the PEO and will result in improved communication and coordination by shortening the chain of command and minimizing compartmentalization.

While the study should be labor-intensive (involving desk audits, observations, etc.), delay changes for some months, and have a high initial cost, the potential savings from elimination of further DLE positions are great.

Recommendation 11: Matrix or Task Force Approach

(See Option B3.)

Establish a "matrix" type of organizational structure (reporting to the director's office) where bureau and/or program chiefs have advisory responsibility for coordinating the lateral/horizontal management of certain areas, rather than only vertical responsibility. This advisory structure should aim at tying together and coordinating separate but related activities such as procurement of technology for programs.

An alternative would be to establish advisory task forces led by senior managers or bureau chiefs, to address major ongoing planning and budgeting areas and resolve conflicts "across" the organization.

Discussion

Telecommunications and automated systems are the two most likely areas with which to begin; technical assistance is also a likely area.

A good example might be the provision of technical assistance to the field. While various bureaus currently deliver such services, one existing manager could be charged with the coordination of technical assistance by all DLE units. Such a manager would operate horizontally, across the chain of command (as would a technical assistance task force).

A matrix or task force approach will improve lateral management, coordination/communications and efficiency. While either alternative requires careful thought in light of the chain of command, no major structural changes are required, and this approach addresses many organizational problems directly.

The key point is to add advisory horizontal elements to the current vertical chain of command.

Recommendation 12: Participatory Management

(See Option E1.)

Establish in the director's office support for a strong administrative and management culture and system of participatory management based on horizontal/lateral management (i.e., a matrix system) and on an agency-wide norm of extensive and meaningful problem-solving meetings (i.e., agendaized, open, regular). Implement, through team-building training workshops sponsored by the ATC and procured from outside the agency.

Discussion

With a system of strong, mission-oriented, horizontal and vertical participatory management, DLE administration would greatly improve. Combined with rotation of managers, team-building training will resolve many DLE problems that involve the management team not pulling together.

Cost savings and quality improvements can be expected in all programs and services. Reduced conflict, improved budgeting and planning, improved "futures" development and improved support from the field should follow.

Recommendation 13: Telecommunications

(See Options E4 and E5.)

DLE should recognize the "equipment/communications" dichotomy in its telecommunications activities and develop a horizontal management mechanism to resolve the associated problems. A Telecommunications Task Force (TTF) should be established for this purpose. It would be a standing group and would involve itself with all aspects of the subject: equipment, communications protocols, database structure and user interfaces. The interested parties - LEDC, BCI, BJIS, BI, etc. - should all be represented. The TTF would be an advisory body to the director/deputy director with no powers of implementation. It could be tied to the PEO and work directly with ASD and GSA.

Discussion

Telecommunications is concerned with both the physical communications system (hardware, software, network connections) and with the communication and comprehension of useful information.

These are specialized areas whose practitioners do not necessarily appreciate the problems and priorities of their opposite numbers. The purpose of the TTF would be to bring together the representatives of these two types of discipline in order to maximize the system's usefulness to law enforcement consumers.

Thus, the TTF, though a single body, would naturally find itself divided into two areas of expertise: equipment/systems/network (particularly LEDC and some units of CIIB such as Cal ID-RAN and BJIS Field Services); and information (BCI, the remainder of BJIS, BCS/SS Special Services, and units of all of the investigative bureaus).

Although the major problems reside in the area of data communications, the telephone and radio networks should be addressed by the TTF whenever issues in these systems transcend the jurisdictions of the controlling programs. However, it is anticipated that in most cases, the responsibility for telecommunications will remain where it is at present.

Establishment of this task force should help to resolve problems over selection of equipment, compatibility of different systems, and training and services to the end users. In particular, there should be developed a clearer definition of the responsibilities of LEDC and CIIB bureaus in the selection and use of equipment.

Other issues include the training of end users, the development of a mechanism to simplify access to the variety of databases maintained within the division, and a consistent approach toward dealing with vendors and with DOJ and other agencies. The TTF will provide a forum for airing the concerns of all the DLE programs involved in these issues, and for agreeing on the redirection of efforts or the redistribution of responsibilities if that should be indicated.

The end result of establishing the TTF should be more efficient delivery of telecommunications services and easier access to a wider variety of information sources.

Recommendation 14: Automated Systems

(See Option E8.)

DLE should, to the extent practical, consolidate units which maintain criminal information databases and are involved in communicating with in-house or remote users. LEDC is one possible site for such a consolidation; BJIS is another.

An alternative to consolidation is to establish a matrix management arrangement for all automated systems, or a task force to ensure lateral linkage.

Discussion

At present, these units and programs are scattered throughout DLE and include: BJIS, BCS/SS Special Services, VCIC (violent crimes), and SHOP (habitual offenders). Most of BCI would also fall into this category but would be too large to consolidate.

Although they do not all perform identical services, nor use the same technology, these units and programs share a common function: maintaining a compendium of information and providing access to or searches of it to remote users.

The reason for the dispersion of these units is more historical than logical, and significant operating efficiencies should be achieved by placing many or all of them together.

Examples of improved operations might be:

1. Consolidation of the expertise required to establish and develop information systems: this is at present unequally distributed, but should be made available to all systems;
2. For new users, or those less familiar with DLE's services, faster and more direct access to the desired information;
3. Access to more bodies of information with a single call (although it may not prove possible to establish a true single-inquiry system);
4. Reintegration of fragmented operations dealing with the same information (VCIC and VCIS); reduced gaps in coverage;
5. Standardization and sharing of technology.

Recommendation 15: Centralize DLE Interfaces

(See Option D3.)

Collect and publish definitive information on client demand and access to all DLE programs and services, complete with a "broker" phone number and single point for those unfamiliar with DLE and for consistent referral and data collection/analysis.

Centralize control over library and publishing functions that operate throughout DLE's bureaus by centralizing all approvals in the director's office.

An alternative is appointment of matrix managers or task forces to coordinate intake, demand and service data, library and publication functions.

Discussion

This recommendation helps avoid the development of programs with independent constituencies, serves to collect evaluation and demand data for stronger management, budgeting, planning, etc. by the PEO, and should improve some client access and service. DLE will speak more with a single voice.

There should be no new net costs because decentralized intake, library and publishing functions are currently staffed and centralization of control should not require new net staff.

This recommendation resembles a previous solution called the Liaison Bureau.

Recommendation 16: Consolidate Outreach

(See Option D4.)

Consolidate coordination for outreach for all programs within one field representative's unit.

An alternative would be to appoint a matrix manager or field services task force to ensure division-wide coordination.

Discussion

Currently, many DLE units have field representatives. Most recently, LEDC added its own field staff to this pattern. The result of many field units is further compartmentalization, competition versus coordination, and various inefficiencies.

Recommendation 17: Reorganize CIIB Bureaus

(See Option A1.)

The principle of locating like functions together suggests the following groupings, probably as new bureaus:

- Criminal Information (criminal histories: RCMP, CORP)
- Criminal Identification (fingerprints)
- Justice Information Services (BJIS automated systems and property/firearms, probably including REAP, and special services from BCS/SS)
- Telecommunications (BJIS field services, Cal ID-RAN). This might be connected in some way with LEDC's telecommunications section and the proposed telecommunications task force (TTF).

The last two of these may not individually be large enough to justify independent bureau status, in which case they might just be merged.

Discussion

Not fitting well into this scheme are the statistical data and analysis centers. Although they provide valuable services, they are almost academic programs in that they study crime in the aggregate and not individual crimes or criminals. If DLE were to set up a Criminology Academy (in conjunction with ATC) the statistical programs would best go there. Failing that, they could be attached to the director's office as a research program, or even left as they are while recognizing the problems of locating unlike functions together.

None of these recommendations are meant to imply that any of the activities mentioned should be decreased or downgraded, only that they do not appear to be organized in an efficient fashion.

The three bureaus currently constituting CIIB are of very different size. BCI (in 1987-88) had 651 employees, while BCS/SS and BJIS had 169 and 141 respectively.


BCI contains the very large criminal history and fingerprint systems. BCS/SS has two functions: compiling and analyzing statistics on crime (BCS) and developing databases on particular cases and responding to inquiries (/SS). BJIS maintains similar types of databases on different subjects (stolen property, gun purchases, second-hand sales). It also is responsible for the CLETS system.

This arrangement is awkward, though it is not apparent that there is any acute problem with it. BCI's enormous size (larger than most of the divisions of DOJ) suggests that it might be split up. The most logical split would separate the fingerprint systems (identification) from the criminal histories (information). Criminal information would still remain very large (380 employees) but it would seem that separation of RCMP from CORP would take apart two units that must interact frequently.


One major advantage of splitting BCI into separate bureaus is that the new bureau chiefs and program managers would have staffs and responsibilities more comparable in size to those of their counterparts in the other bureaus. Currently, the DOJ II program managers in BCI supervise more people than are in all of BJIS, where DOJ IIs may have only a few dozen employees.

Special Services and the database portions of BJIS (automated systems, property and firearms) perform such similar functions that it is difficult to see why they need to reside in separate bureaus. BJIS field services and Cal ID-RAN are both principally concerned with telecommunications networks, though they relate to different databases.


Three possible options are presented: A, B and C. Consultants Prefer Option B.



NOTE: This option does not include most of BCS.



NOTE: This option is a return to a previous structure which worked well.




NOTE: CIIB is reorganized as:

- Database maintenance and analysis (with elements of what is now BOCCI);
- Criminal statistics;
- Communications and field linkages (perhaps with a link to the telecommunications of LEDC).

Conclusion and Implementation

CONCLUSION & IMPLEMENTATION

The following organizational chart suggests the structure of DLE that might result if most of the above structural recommendations were implemented.



There are five absolutely vital structural and related changes which must be implemented as DLE undertakes the implementation of the 17 major reorganization recommendations.

The five essential initial organizational changes are:

1. Establish and fill the career position of assistant director.
2. Coincidentally with #1 (above), eliminate the three positions at the branch level. (Two branch chief positions will no longer exist.)
3. Create and staff an Executive Services Group (ESG) to perform the staff work associated with initial changes recommended in this study. This ESG will subsequently evolve into an administrative unit with the following chief functions: central planning (including budget control and program evaluation), internal affairs and inspections.
4. Initiate a division-wide management rotation program. The staff work required will include: resolving the peace officer/training issue by withdrawing managers from the POST special program, and setting up a schedule.
5. Develop clear, logical statements of functions and responsibilities to correct all those organizational anomalies not specifically addressed in this report, as well as those covered herein.

DLE Comments

Memorandum

Director
Division of Law Enforcement

Date: December 14, 1990

Telephone: (916) 739-5241

ATSS (8) 497-5241

From : G. W. Clemons, Director
Division of Law Enforcement
Office of the Director
Sacramento

Subject: COMMENTS RE REORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are some comments regarding the "Reorganization Recommendations, Analysis and Options for the Division of Law Enforcement, California Department of Justice Final Report: Volumes I & II, dated November 20, 1990." I have not attempted to pass judgment on the recommendations as a whole, but to focus on a few critical items.


- The organizational structure of the Division of Law Enforcement should be a plural executive. The Director and the Deputy Director should be in the same "organizational box" as recommended in the report. This would provide much needed continuity in the Director's office.

There should be two Assistant Directors, one for Operations and another for the Law Enforcement Data Center. The Deputy Director would head up the administrative units in the Director's Office. Another option would be for the Deputy Director to head up Operations and an Assistant Director to head up Administration. As head of Operations, the Deputy Director would supervise the Bureau Chiefs. As head of Administration, the Deputy Director would possess more up-to-date information on budget, personnel, etc.

- The current Bureau of Justice Information Services should be combined with the Bureau of Criminal Statistics/Special Services. This would provide a more meaningful job for the bureau chief, would reduce the number of bureaus reporting to the Deputy Director (or Assistant Director), and would provide for a better linkage between various functions.
- The Bureau of Investigation (BI) and the Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence (BOCCI) should be combined. The BOCCI functions, i.e., Criminal Intelligence Specialists, etc., which provide direct support to law enforcement operations, should be moved into BI. Program type operations, such as the Violent Crime Information Center, etc., should be moved to a combined Bureau of Justice Information Services/Bureau of Criminal Statistics/Special Services bureau as recommended in the report. Further study will be necessary if BI and BOCCI are combined.

December 14, 1990

- . A Planning and Evaluation Office should be created in an enlarged and strengthened Director's office. However, staff should be retained in the various bureaus for personnel and budgeting matters. If all such staff were removed from the bureaus, the staff in the Director's office would be forced to continually interact with the bureaus to get necessary information.
- . A planned and mandatory rotation system should be implemented.
- . The program responsibilities for automation and telecommunications should be centered in the appropriate program but the responsibilities for the technical aspects should be centered in the Law Enforcement Data Center. (Reference memorandum of October 29, 1990 delineating the responsibilities of CIIB and LEDC in automation/telecommunications.)



G. W. CLEMONS, Director
Division of Law Enforcement

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Memorandum

G. W. Clemons, Director
Division of Law Enforcement

Date : December 12, 1990

Fred H. Wynbrandt, Assistant Director

From : Criminal Identification and Information Branch
Sacramento

Subject : **COMMENTS REGARDING REORGANIZATION STUDY REPORT**

I have reviewed the Reorganization Study Report and find that although it presents some positive recommendations, the report as a whole lacks criteria and foundation for organizational recommendations.

Some of my major concerns with the report are listed below:

1. The placement of line program responsibilities such as the intelligence function is not appropriate in the Director's Office. Placement at this level would also appear to elevate its importance.
2. The reorganization of CIIB Bureaus, particularly BCID, is apparently based solely upon size. The consultant did not apply size criteria elsewhere and the document lacks basis for the recommendation. The consultant indicates there is not any acute problem, suggests BCID may be split up, and ultimately prefers to leave BCID as is. No discussions were held with CIIB regarding this recommendation.
3. The report fails to indicate why the Planning Evaluation Office (PEO) would be staffed by positions from CIIB and IEB. No reason is given for excluding LEDC.
4. The consultant failed to take DLE's mission into account in dealing with organizational placement of programs, and instead appears to have based his recommendations on subjective considerations.

In my opinion, DLE's mission is to provide investigative and information services. As such, I would propose for discussion, the following organizational structure:

1. Organize the Division of Law Enforcement into two branches.

Information Services Branch
Investigative Services Branch

2. Establish a PEO as recommended in the report.

DISCUSSION:**Organize DLE into two branches.**

To provide the most effective services, DLE should be organized functionally. Based upon what I see as the functions outlined in the Division's mission, the criminal justice community would best be served by dividing the organization into two branches.

The structuring of two branches would allow for each type function to operate within its own "mini division". This would permit similar personnel classifications to be utilized in one branch, and permit the shifting of resources within a common organization to take care of priority changes or short term problems. Additionally, one person would be responsible for policy implementation and operations regarding either information or investigative services.

Establish a Program Evaluation Office (PEO)

I agree with the recommendation as made by the consultant. However, the duties and responsibilities must be more carefully written. To a large extent, planning, personnel, and budget transactions must be accomplished at the program level. The following is offered as a general guideline for duties and responsibilities for the PEO unit.

Controller/Budgeting/Personnel. Though budgeting, purchasing and personnel transactions must be initiated at the program level, the PEO should ensure resources are being expended appropriately and uniformly. Also, personnel, budgeting, and purchasing guidelines should be uniformly applied. The PEO should ensure this is accomplished, although not in a control agency manner.


Program Evaluation, Audits, Inspections. This function is properly located in the PEO and should be on-going.


Legislative Liaison. The PEO should coordinate DLE's legislative liaison function and assign individuals as appropriate.


Training Center. The Training Center should be located within the PEO. It should be viewed as the Division's Training Center and not belong to either branch. In the past, technical training (such as CLETS training or fingerprint training) provided by the Training Center had very poor results. Therefore, I strongly recommend that technical training specific to individual programs be left to the appropriate program.

External Audits. The PEO should also be responsible for measuring client satisfaction with our services, providing input for program enhancements, and evaluation of user groups.

Following are proposed organizational charts.







BACKGROUND:

As shown on the proposed chart, BOCCI functions have been split -- intelligence functions to the Bureau of Investigation and the information functions to the Bureau of Justice Information Services. This split allows information systems to remain together and intelligence functions to be performed by special agents. Further study should be conducted to determine proper placement of certain other of BOCCI's programs.

BCS, though small in size, performs a specialized service for the criminal justice community. BCS data are widely used for decision making and development of future programs. Because BCS programs are more academic in nature and involve research into the data bases, it should be a bureau which stands alone. Its relationship to other functions in the Division, except for the criminal history program and the Data Center, are minimal.

LEDC is also included within the Information Services Branch because its origin and foundation lie with the creation of the criminal justice information system. The Data Center exists to maintain the CLETS and CJIS network. Even with the migration of data processing to other areas of the department, CLETS and CJIS continue to account for 85% of the Data Center's current workload. The problems outlined in the consultant's report regarding data processing and programs should be reduced as the vast majority of "information providing" would be located under the same management structure.

The Data Center's contribution to the CLETS/CJIS systems must not be compromised in any way through the expansion of current or proposed programs. With the data processing "wave of the 90's" -- greater numbers of personal computers, user programming, reduction in program and Data Center -- the close working relationship of the Data Center with its primary clients is imperative. This proposed organization allows for this and is consistent with placement of data processing units in other state and federal organizations.

CONCLUSION:

The report submitted by the consultant fails to provide recommendations which are supported with logic or reason. Therefore, the overall report lacks integrity. I believe my recommendations provide a clearer organizational scheme based upon functionality and a starting point for further specific discussions.

As stated by Robert Townsend "reorganization should be undergone as often as major surgery". It should be thoroughly evaluated and well planned.

We need to carefully review any reorganization plan with the mission of the Division in mind and carefully scrutinize all proposals for feasibility and practicality.

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Memorandum

To : G. W. Clemons, Director
Division of Law Enforcement

Date : December 7, 1990

Telephone: ATSS (916) 739-5442
8-497-5442

From : S. C. Helsley, Assistant Director
Investigation & Enforcement Branch

Subject : REORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS - NOVEMBER 20, 1990

The Division of Law Enforcement is a gathering of over 100 programs. Many are dependent upon, or interrelated with each other. Most of the programs are woven into the fabric of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. In total, it is an extremely complex operation which is difficult to characterize. The major growth of the past few years and the omnipresence of automation activities have done nothing to diminish the complexity faced by our management team. We are all awed by the organization that we help direct, and even the most senior among us are still students of the organization. It was the appreciation of that complexity and the understanding that a better way must be found to organize the Division which led us to seeking the aid of a consultant.

If a consultant is to be successful in such a massive undertaking, strong eyes and ears must be used to capture data which can be then be synthesized into compelling ideas and logic. From almost the beginning of this project, communication between the consultant and many of the managers was poor. Some managers took exception to seemingly inappropriate remarks made by the consultant, while many others opined negatively on the quality of their interviews. These concerns were communicated to the consultant in a memo from Assistant Director Helsley to you on October 23, 1990 (attached). As written drafts began appearing in October, feelings hardened and emotions flared because of our inability to communicate basic facts and concepts to the consulting team. Two points were repeatedly emphasized. They were:

- o The absence of, the lack of understanding of, or errors concerning - key facts.
- o The need to document the logic and facts supporting recommendations.

As we moved into November, the meetings and exchanges became more rancorous. At the conclusion of the November 9, 1990 meeting, our Branch representatives concluded that:

- o The project exceeded the consultants resources, and

- o There was little likelihood that the consultant would be able to explain his logic supporting his recommendations beyond - "It's my report."

The final report of November 20, 1990 seems to bear out those opinions.

The consultant would have future readers of these documents believe that there was general support for his work with only some disaffected managers complaining. Such is not the case. We are dissatisfied to be sure -- not just with the recommendations we don't like, but also those that we support. In both instances, our pleas for accurately and clearly defined logic were ignored. We knew going into the project what some of the "right answers" were, such as the notion of a plural executive structure for the Directors' Office. Yet like a high school math problem its not enough to get the right answer, one must also show the steps taken to get credit for the answer. We had hoped to have the luxury of debating fully developed recommendations at the conclusion of the consultants work - but that no longer seems possible. The final meeting of November 29, 1990 did nothing to narrow the distance between consultant and client.

Our opinions regarding the consultants recommendations are as follows:

Recommendation 1: Establish a Deputy Director

This is the central need which drove the idea of a reorganization study. As presented in this report, we have a mixture of sweeping bureaucratic statements and an inappropriate level of micro detail (specific CPOA Committee assignments). If we move to create a plural executive, there is nothing in this report which warrants excerpting, as we draft the necessary documentation for DPA. Chief Scheidegger feels differently. He feels that:

"The description of the complexity of the Director's position is accurate. The solution is not. Replacing the Assistant Directors with a Deputy does not remove a layer. As described, the functions of the Deputy Director could be performed by Assistant Directors. The loss of the Assistant Director level diminishes the high-level advocacy for programs (bureaus). No single person, Director or Deputy, could fully comprehend and adequately represent IEB or CIIB.

I concur that LEDC should not be a Branch; LEDC could be placed under the Assistant Director of CIIB -- the focus of most of its activities. The planning and administrative functions could be placed under a Bureau Chief or Assistant Director in the Director's office.

The "Acting Director" and representations on committees" functions could be accomplished by the appropriate Assistant Director."

Recommendation 2: Eliminate Branches

While we agree with the elimination of Branches in context with a Deputy Director, it would seem to warrant more than an 80-90 word narrative.

Recommendation 3: Establish a Planning and Evaluation Office

Agree in concept.

Recommendation 4: Rotate Managers Throughout DLE

The logic/detail (these words are used advisedly) supporting this recommendation is flawed. Are we really prepared to move managers statewide to our 17 field locations where we have Special Agents in Charge or Criminalist Managers? We think not. In a minimum expense three-year rotation scenario, six field managers would come to Sacramento and six Sacramento based managers would go to field assignments. Thus we would incur 12 additional relocations per year at approximately \$30,000 per transfer. Since we have personnel turning down promotions now for financial reasons, in this sort of transfer scenario we could expect a number of voluntary demotions. There is nothing in the report which suggests that issues of this sort were considered.

There is no point in raising all the factual problems (such as the characterization of our relationship with POST), so suffice it to say that this recommendation was not thoroughly considered and lacks merit as written. That is unfortunate because conceptually, management rotation is an excellent idea.

Recommendation 5: LEDC Role

Agree in concept.

Recommendation 6: Reorganize BOCCI Functions

This is one of the most poorly developed recommendations in the final report. It is, however, the best example of how in spite of yeoman efforts by WSIN and BOCCI representatives, the consulting team could

not, or would not grasp the basic facts involved. The recommendation and all its options should be summarily rejected.

Recommendation 7: Consolidate Investigative Functions

This recommendation appeared spontaneously in the November 7, 1990 draft and nowhere in any document provided by the consultant can the underlying logic be found. More remarkably, this idea was never discussed with Assistant Director Helsley, Chief Doane or Chief Luca prior to publication of that draft - which is both incredible and inexcusable. Like Recommendation 6, it suffers from factual foundational errors which were repeatedly pointed out to the consultants - to no avail. This too should be totally rejected.

Recommendation 8: Centralize Training

Agree

Recommendation 9: Consolidate Laboratories

This has nothing to do with the DLE reorganization study and seems to be nothing more than a thinly disguised advertisement.

Recommendation 10: Management Study

Another advertisement.

Recommendation 11: Matrix or Task Force Approach

While we understand the general concept, the sketchy manner in which it is presented in this recommendation leaves us without specific comments.

Recommendation 12: Participatory Management

Who could argue with a "Mom and Apple Pie" recommendation. In the context of this report, however, it is unnecessary fluff.

Recommendation 13: Telecommunications

A Telecommunications Task Force is fine, but management responsibility should be in LEDC as described in recommendation 5.

Recommendation 14: Automated Systems

While this recommendation may have merit, it suffers from a lack of conceptual development. It is unclear whether either the problems or advantages are real.

Recommendation 15: Centralize DLE Interfaces

This is a two-part recommendation. The idea of centralized library and publication functions is appealing. Unfortunately no mention is made regarding organizational placement.

The idea of a "Broker" phone number would seem reasonable if there is a need beyond what currently exists via the Command Center. However, no description of a problem was presented, nor was it clear what use the resultant data would serve. Chief Scheidegger remarked that,

"As a member of the original Liaison Bureau, I strongly recommend reestablishing this function. The ability to measure client satisfaction, product quality and user needs would best be served by a program of this type."

Recommendation 16: Consolidate Outreach


No problem was identified thus we can't make informed comments.


Recommendation 17: Reorganize CIIB Bureaus


The proposals in this section are unique to this edition in the report series. I assume that its presence is in some part due to the concerns expressed in the Assistant Directors November 9, 1990 letter to the consultant (attached). As these recommendations fall within the domain of CIIB, it is best left to them to comment technically. It is, however, worrisome that so major a recommendation appears so late in the process. There does not appear to be any discussion of the options in this recommendation in any prior draft. We hope that the options were discussed with CIIB management.


It should be apparent that we are not satisfied with either the process or the final product. Our staff made extraordinary efforts to provide and then


explain critical data. In spite of this, communication was unsatisfactory. Our staff felt that they were dealing with "eyes that could not see, ears that could not hear." In spite of this, the Branch management team has used the process as a vehicle to focus our thinking for later and hopefully more productive reorganization efforts.



S. C. HELSLEY, Assistant Director
Investigation & Enforcement Branch



GEORGE J. DOANE, Chief
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement


R. J. LUCA, Chief
Bureau of Investigation


RANDY C. ROSSI, Chief
Bureau of Organized Crime and
Criminal Intelligence


DON MEYERS, Director
Western States Information Network


JACK BEECHAM, Chief
Advanced Training Center


JACK SCHEIDEGGER, Chief
Bureau of Forensic Services

sjb

cc: ADs
Kempsky
Kalmanoff

Memorandum

G. W. Clemons, Director
Division of Law Enforcement

Date : December 14, 1990

From : James L. Magers, Assistant Director
Law Enforcement Data Center

(916) 739-2201
ATSS 497-2201

Subject : DLE Reorganization

The reorganization report prepared by California Planners is an expansive document that identifies 64 options for dealing with a variety of real and perceived problems. Seventeen recommendations are made, of which only a few directly affect LEDC.

The weakness in the report is the lack of data to substantiate many of the recommendations. For example, the recommendation to consolidate the 11 BFS Labs to three may in fact be cost/effective, but it is only supported by the unsubstantiated statements that it should "enhance the quality of lab work and provide large cost savings." There is nothing in the report to substantiate those findings or suggest this should be a priority endeavor.

As far as LEDC is concerned, there are three specific recommendations I feel we should oppose.

Recommendation 4: Rotate Managers Throughout DLE

Since the report recommends that LEDC remain within LEDC as a separate entity reporting to the new Deputy Director, I assume this recommendation applies to us, as well as the rest of the Division.

The report recommends forced rotation through all management positions and finds no serious legal or technical constraints to a regular scheduled rotation program. The rotation program is reported to "reduce management impediments associated with complexity and poor coordination caused by a lack of cross-trained managers." The drawbacks to a rotation program are the costly and time-consuming training required and the inability to assign managers on the basis of an individual's knowledge, skill, and interest. I believe these drawbacks are significant.

While a rotation program could possibly be effective at the highest levels, such as Assistant Director, I seriously question its workability at the Bureau Chief or program manager level. Because of the technological nature of our profession, we have difficulty in rotating managers internally within LEDC, and I believe we would have considerable difficulty in using non-data processing personnel throughout our management positions. The lower the level we force rotation, the greater the probability of failure.

Recommendation 5: LEDC Role

- . Telecommunications functions should be centralized in LEDC
- . General training activities and programs should be moved to the ATC

We, of course, support the consolidation of telecommunications and this recommendation has already been implemented. However, the consolidation of all Division training within ATC seems totally unsubstantiated. The study somehow concluded that the decentralization of training has caused inefficiencies and coordination problems that are best solved by coordinating all training through ATC. The final report appears to allow some exceptions to total centralization by indicating "some specialized separate training should be left decentralized but under the central oversight and coordination of the ATC."

I do not believe we will improve the quality nor the efficiency of our IOS training by moving it to ATC. On the contrary, we may in fact cause just the opposite effect. Our IOS trainers must work very closely with technical personnel throughout the Data Center because of the constantly changing hardware and software technologies we support. While our training staff are not professional trainers, they are data processing technicians who have successfully developed the skills necessary to train our clients. Because of their technical background and expertise, as well as quick access to other technicians in LEDC, their value is enhanced by being able to consult with our clients and assist in analysis and troubleshooting.

Recommendation 13: Telecommunications Task Force

The report recommends the establishment of a Telecommunications Task Force (TTF) with representation from the bureaus, to "involve itself with all aspects of telecommunications: equipment, communications protocols, data base structure, and user interfaces." The TTF would be an advisory body to the Director with no powers of implementation. Somehow this multi-disciplinary group will provide for a "more efficient delivery of telecommunications services and easier access to a wider variety of information sources."

The telecommunications technological issues cited as the purview of the TTF are, in fact, technical issues which should be the responsibility of the Data Center. Our clients should be concerning themselves with their functional needs and requirements, not the specific equipment components and communications protocols needed to satisfy client needs. The task force being proposed would serve no useful function and would probably be counterproductive.

These then are the three most critical recommendations I feel we should oppose. I am available to discuss them at your convenience.



JAMES L. MAGERS, Assistant Director
Law Enforcement Data Center

ds

cc: Bob Silva
Sheri Stratton

Volume II

Final Options Report

TABLE OF OPTIONS

- Option A1** Develop unambiguous definitions of each bureaus' responsibilities based on organizational principles; reorganize bureaus based on the theory that like functions should be combined.
- Option B1** Eliminate the branch level and manage bureaus and programs from an expanded director's office, discussed in several subsequent sections. DLE should control all of its budget, personnel, and management analysis, but the Department of Finance has resisted this.
- Option B2** Another alternative would be to establish three new branches more logically related to law enforcement administration, as follows:
- a. Administration
 - b. Support
 - c. Operations
- Option B3** Establish a "matrix" organization, where current branch chiefs are responsible for lateral/horizontal management rather than only vertical. A matrix approach might show:
- Option B4** Restructure LEDC as a separate DOJ division, serving DLE as well as other DOJ divisions and the field.
- Option B5** Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a major arm of ASD.
- Option B6** Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a non-divisional "special" unit, reporting directly to the Chief Deputy Attorney General.
- Option B7** Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a free-standing data center.
- Option B8** Another alternative would be to leave LEDC where it is in the structure, but move training out, and centralize the telecommunications function in LEDC; this option is not further addressed here as it is covered in two other discussions of training and telecommunications. Many policies and areas of responsibility would require serious study and management work.
- Option B9** Establish in ATC a centralized training unit for all DLE (and DOJ) training, either in DOJ or DLE.
- Option B10** Include a needs assessment and master planning program in the new training unit, insuring that training resources are tied effectively to need and demand.
- Option B11** Employ training resources from throughout DLE/DOJ and outside, in combination with professional training management, overseen by a multi-disciplinary and multi-unit advisory group.
- Option B12** Develop a training infrastructure that matches the demand for facilities, instructional technologies, certification, etc.

- Option B13** Obtain separate facilities.
- Option B14** Consolidate all laboratory activities at one or three sites; a single site would be in Sacramento; three sites would suggest central sites away from lab-rich urban centers, perhaps in the central south and central north.
- Option B15** Conduct a careful assessment of the need for eleven labs statewide, and seek fewer facilities and the best sites.
- Option B16** Create a PEO as an advisor to the director, attached to his/her office but out of the main line of communication.
- Option B17** Create a PEO as a central filter through which all budget and programs must pass. Still reporting to the director, it would be in this case much more directly involved in the formulation and execution of the division's policies.
- Option B18** Create an Executive Model as a permanent and independent body, reporting to the Director. In this case it must contain expert but disinterested persons. Although some of its members will undoubtedly be drawn from existing units in the division, they must forego loyalties to their old programs and friends in favor of the interests of the entire agency. The current bureau management must have constant and meaningful input but no control over the PEO's recommendations.
- Option B19** Create a Representative Model led by bureau representatives - bureau chiefs have been suggested, especially when there are assistant chiefs to back them up - on a rotating basis. (At present only BCI, BI, and BOCCI have single assistant chiefs without line responsibilities.) They would then represent the interests of their bureaus in the planning function. This option would not exclude also having a permanent technical staff, but control would be vested in the bureau chiefs.
- Option B20** Move BOCCI investigative related responsibilities into BI. Move intelligence, coordination and legislative liaison functions into the director's office. Consolidate analytical programs and prosecution-oriented data bases into organizational units with the same function.
- Option B21** Develop common operating procedures for all IEB agents.
- Option B22** Develop case management system in BNE.
- Option C1** Identify, on a position by position basis within DLE, those managerial assignments which confer peace officer status on the person appointed to the position.
- Option C2** Establish a division-wide rotation plan for managers through both sworn and nonsworn positions.
- Option C3** Establish a rotation plan for managers in all nonsworn positions and a separate rotation plan for sworn managers.
- Option C4** Adopt a policy of division-wide eligibility for nonsworn promotion or transfer to sworn managerial positions.

- Option C5** Withdraw specified management positions from POST Special Program.
- Option C6** Commission a further study of compartmentalization and layering at DLE.
- Option C7** Conduct an internal survey/study of compartmentalization and layering at DLE.
- Option C8** The senior membership of the PEO could be drawn from the ranks of experienced division staff as an alternative to moving into a higher supervisory position. Pay, benefits, and future promotional opportunities would be the same as with the line positions.
- Option D1** Enhance and centralize public information in the director's office.
- Option D2** Centralize all libraries, including BNE, BCS/SS, LEDC, and ATC, to insure continuity.
- Option D3** Collect and publish definitive information on client demand and access to DLE programs and services, complete with a central intake point for consistent referral and data collection/analysis.
- Option D4** Consolidate field representative responsibilities (outreach for programs) within one unit.
- Option D5** Establish a program evaluation unit in the director's office.
- Option D6** Require each program and service to modestly but objectively evaluate program activity, quality, and impact annually.
- Option D7** Provide technical assistance to review and support evaluations.
- Option D8** Collect and analyze intake/demand data (e.g., ratio of requests from the field vs. DOJ, costs of major areas of demand, etc.)
- Option D9** Employ program evaluation in budgeting, planning, auditing/inspecting, and the intake functions discussed throughout this report.
- Option D10** Establish an internal affairs coordinating unit in the director's office.
- Option D11** Clarify ASD's role as "service" or "control."
- Option D12** Work out more explicit procedures for ASD and DLE management.
- Option D13** Increase ASD staffing.
- Option E1** Establish support for a strong administrative and management culture and system of participatory management based on horizontal/lateral management (i.e., a matrix system) and on a pattern of extensive and meaningful meetings (i.e., agendized, open, well-run).

Option E2

Establish a body to carry out the evaluative and planning functions should be formed. For convenience this body will hereinafter be referred to as the "Planning and Evaluation Office" (PEO). This designation is not meant to imply anything about the organization or structure of the office. The functions may be integrated or performed by different individuals. Some services could be contracted out or delegated to other bureaus. In the extreme there could even be four separate offices. But in this discussion the PEO will be treated as a single, if not clearly defined, body.

In Consultants' opinion there are two important requirements for the PEO. Without these it will be ineffective and ignored.

- It must have input from the operating bureaus at an authoritative level.
- It must have the expertise to carry out its technical functions.

These two requirements imply that the makeup of the PEO will include both respected senior-level DLE personnel and technical experts in the appropriate functions.

Option E3

Explicitly recognize the "equipment/communications" dichotomy and address this by establishing a mechanism to resolve the associated problems. The telecommunications group should involve itself with equipment, communications protocols, and the user interface. The interested parties should all be represented and should have equal voices. There should be a clear definition of the responsibilities of LEDC and CIIB units in the selection and use of equipment. With a small group it may be hoped that consensus could be achieved much of the time.

This could take several forms, as shown in the options below.

Option E4

Establish a standing telecommunications working group, with LEDC and representatives of the user bureaus (BCI, BJIS, BI, etc.) under the auspices of the director or deputy director.

Option E5

Establish a coordinating group to be a subset of the planning and evaluation office recommended elsewhere by Consultants in this report. In this case the group would be an independent body, but representatives of the user bureaus would be present to provide input and comments.

Option E6

Develop standards for the establishment of databases so all new ones, at least, will be compatible. (It may be too costly to reconcile all of the existing systems.) The telecommunications working group, as above, or another body similarly constituted could provide the guidance for this standardization.

Option E7

Coordinate the databases used for specific cases by the investigative bureaus.

- Option E8** Consolidate units involved in interfacing with in-house or remote users, most logically into BJIS. At present, these units are scattered throughout the division and include: BJIS Field Services, BCS/SS Special Services, VCIS and VCIC (violent crimes), SHOP (habitual offenders), and Cal ID-RAN. The reason for this dispersion is more historical than logical, and efficiencies might well be achieved by placing many or all of them together.
- Option E9** If consolidation of all of the telecommunications units is thought likely to impede the flow of information in investigations, another alternative would be for investigative bureaus to retain their criminal intelligence files, but have them tied in with CJIS to minimize incompatibilities.
- Option E10** Include radio and phone communications in the coordinating group.
- Option E11** Maintain separate coordinating groups, but establish consultation on overlapping issues.
- Option F1** The DLE director should settle all disputes, both inside and outside of the PEO.
- Option F2** Establish an "appeals court," made up of bureau chiefs not sitting on the PEO, to hear formal complaints on rejected proposals.
- Option F3** Within a representative PEO, consensus should be required.
- Option F4** Within a representative PEO, a majority vote should be required.
- Option G1** Establish a deputy director position to act as "acting" director in the director's absence, and to coordinate all internal administration and policy development.
- Option G2** Attach to the director's office, as staff to the deputy director, the following currently decentralized DLE functions:
- a. Comptroller/Budgeting - budget staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
 - b. Personnel - personnel staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
 - c. Program Evaluation (see earlier discussion).
 - d. Planning (see earlier discussion).
 - e. Audits/Inspections (for inventory audits, program inspections and administrative reviews).
 - f. Legislative liaison (as per current arrangement).
 - g. Internal Affairs/Facility Security and Safety (for background investigations, Criminal History System security and to review bureau inquiries).
- Option G3** Another alternative would be to place most of the support functions noted above in ASD, further centralizing administrative units.
- Option G4** Another alternative would be to attach various administrative units to the Chief Deputy Attorney General.

Option G5

Another alternative would be to maintain two assistant directors, one over LEDC and one over a new branch for Administration; and attach various administrative offices to the administrative assistant director. See chart below which also shows a variety of other selected options and possibilities noted in previous discussions.

Introduction

I. INTRODUCTION

This is the "Final Options Report" for the California Department of Justice's (DOJ) Division of Law Enforcement (DLE) Reorganization Study, by Alan Kalmanoff, Palmer Stinson, David Moulton, Myla Reyes and associates, of California Planners.

The Introduction sets out the study's background, the "Seven Box" organizational model employed to do the study, and the study methodology. An introductory critical review of DLE's chief organizational issues follows in the next section, Mission, Structure and Strategies.

The body of the report, the options section, is organized according to the "Seven Box" model in seven organizational areas. For each area, organizational problems are identified, and options for solution are analyzed according to their "pros," "cons," "costs" and "impacts." This is the organization that reflects how the study was done and all possible input from DLE managers. The "Plan" report which follows this "Options" report is organized more by priority recommendations.

A. Study Background

The Division of Law Enforcement is the largest division of the California Department of Justice (55 percent of total staffing) and undoubtedly also the most complex. Incremental growth and technological change have strained DLE's structure and weakened its ability to carry out its law enforcement functions at the same time that the demand for these functions has increased. During the 1990s, crime may be expected to rise much more rapidly, and DLE must be operating at maximum efficiency in order to meet this challenge.

DLE has had approximately a dozen organizational structures since 1946, ranging from simple to complex. These have generally reflected changes in program emphasis and accountability. However, there has been no formal reorganization study since 1972.

Many changes have taken place in the last twenty years, particularly growth in the area of technology and law enforcement operations. As a consequence of this growth, serious tensions have arisen between program-oriented and technology-oriented units in DLE as has a competition between operational and support units for limited resources. Also, the organization, as it has grown more complex, has become more layered, more difficult to manage, and increasingly beset by "turf battles." "Turf battles" refers to the competition among managers, often bitter, for funds and personnel. Turf issues are manifested in quarrels over where programs should be organizationally situated and which organizational units should control the acquisition of technological hardware and system development. These differences are debilitating in the sense that outcomes have not been based on generally accepted principles of organization or articulated policy. As a consequence, formidable coordination problems have arisen in DLE, leading to decreased efficiency and apathy on the part of losers in the "turf battles."

The DLE is also organized in a highly compartmentalized manner. Virtually every program or activity functions as a separate entity with a manager or supervisor in charge. Support functions, such as training, planning and budgeting, appear within each branch among the numerous bureaus. A common consequence of compartmentalization and duplicative support units is a significantly top-heavy ratio of managers to worker/operators.

Currently, in addition to the various levels of civil service managers, the DLE distinguishes between sworn (peace officers) and nonsworn (civilian) managers. In the view of many civilian managers, the peace officers form an elite group. This perception is fostered by peace officer "perks" and limiting some managerial positions to peace officers only while permitting peace officer managers to move into positions formerly occupied by civilians.

Accordingly, in addition to the need to evaluate programs, there is an apparent need to consolidate and, in some cases, centralize many of the existing units appearing on DLE organizational charts. The two processes, consolidation and centralization, greatly reduce coordination problems (which are widespread due to the complexity of DLE operations), and usually offer opportunities to more efficiently use personnel.

At the beginning of 1991, California will have a new Attorney General and a new director of DLE. Thus it is particularly appropriate at the present time (November, 1990) to consider how DLE might benefit from a critical examination of its structure with an eye toward reorganization. A master plan is needed based on a documented rationale.

The management study that follows involves many critiques. In fairness to the current administration - which recognized the need for organizational change - it must be emphasized that the problems addressed in this report have evolved through many prior administrations. The current director has struggled with these problems. However, significant changes in bureaucratic structures and processes are virtually always dependent on the catenation of political events and objective studies by qualified experts.

The scope and depth of California Planners' consulting work was limited by the time and funding available to complete the study. The Division of Law Enforcement is a massive enterprise with many mandated responsibilities which have never been catalogued into a comprehensive reference listing. Most interview information reflected in the report was corroborated. Study constraints, however, did not permit the systematic corroboration of all information reported to interviewers. These factors necessarily cause the report to be somewhat superficial in addressing some concerns, and some issues which deserve attention may have been overlooked.

The incumbent director has administered the DLE at the Attorney General's pleasure since May of 1986. His top priority has been to provide improved support to local law enforcement agencies and more recently, to improve DLE's organization. This mission causes the director to be absent from the office 20 to 30 percent of his time. Another 10 to 20 percent of his in-office time is entirely devoted to matters external to organizational issues. Some day-to-day internal issues necessarily bog down as a consequence of his commitments.

In spite of the demands on his time, the director's tenure has been marked by significant advances in the following areas: 1) Planning projects such as Agent 2000, which will produce a long-range plan to guide the selection, training and promotion of agents; 2) Improved services to law enforcement - particularly through the use of advanced technologies (e.g., fingerprinting, "Live Scan," DNA analyses, computer analysis); and 3) Expanded interaction with local agencies through the creation of multi-agency enforcement teams.

Most importantly, the mandate to develop a reorganization plan carried with it the need to develop a true constituency for the plan that resulted. With the current leadership leaving and new leaders taking office, it was felt that the DLE's entire group of nearly 200 managers at all levels should be strongly involved in the study. As demonstrated in the

following discussions of the model and methodology employed, this required active involvement of DLE's management has, in fact, occurred.

B. The "Seven Box" Organizational Model

Consultants proposed to conduct the requested reorganization study of DLE relying on a diagnostic model to analyze the current organization. The "Seven Box" model which was employed is described below.

Section C, "Project Methodology," summarizes various interviews and meetings that employed the "Seven Box" model to diagnose the organization and arrive at the reorganization options presented herein and in the plan that follows.

A description of each of the seven boxes is set forth below to explain and elaborate on the model consultants employed to facilitate the overall reorganization project and major involvement of all of DLE's managers and others. The "Seven Box" model is illustrated below.

1. Purpose

The purpose box asks, "What is our business?" It relates to DLE's mission statement within DOJ's mission. Assessment of purpose also relates to how current and clear the mission is and the degree of commitment to the mission that exists in the organization.

What purposes or missions are part of DLE's current mandate? What is the current and possible future impact of the agency's mission on its structure and on options for organization and planning? What can be learned from other state departments of justice and from similar agencies elsewhere? The first two questions are addressed generally in this introduction where major organizational issues are presented. The experiences of other jurisdictions are reviewed in the appendix.


2. Structure

An analysis of structure involves how the organization's work is divided up. Such divisions refer not only to the formal organizational chart, virtually unchanged since 1984 in DLE, but also to the informal structure which helps or hinders getting the work done.

DLE has had many small changes in structure, often geared to the pressures of the moment. The current formal and informal structure is really the "field of play" for the reorganization study. The current organizational structure is set out below for reference throughout this report.


ILLUSTRATION OF THE SEVEN BOX MODEL

There are seven organizational processes which should be examined in order to understand the needs of a law enforcement organization. The model shown below is an attempt to illustrate these seven interrelated processes which can be observed in all law enforcement organizations.



Reproduced and adapted with permission of M. Weisbord and Organization Research and Development, a division of Block, Petralla Associates. Source: M. Weisbord, *Organizational Diagnosis: Six places to look for trouble with or without a theory*. *Group and Organization Studies* (1976) 1:430.

Current Organization of the Division of Law Enforcement



3. Rewards and Incentives

Rewards include such things as salary, promotions, status and intangible benefits from a career ladder, as well as the more informal personal rewards and support that managers obtain for work well done in an agency setting. Punishments are similar, for performance that is bad for the organization. The question of rewards assesses whether they are adequate for all required work. It reviews the relationship between incentives and disincentives within the current organizational structure. One needs to ask, for example, are DLE managers rewarded for saving budgeted money, or are there any disincentives, organizationally, that result from overspending a budget?

4. Strategies

“Strategies” refers to the way an organization accomplishes its mission; it is the way an organization chooses to do its work and how it meets its goals or purposes. Currently, DLE’s strategies and its many programs and services are highly regarded but seem less effective to many in the face of rapid growth and a complex structure. The many programs and services are listed below. The storing and sharing of data, registering and control, the maintenance of security, training users, etc., are all strategies or programs and services DLE employs - often tied to technologies.

<u>DLE Programs and Services</u>	
Asset Forfeiture	Money Laundering
Advanced Training	Narcotic Enforcement
Child Abuse	Narcotic Intelligence
Criminal History Information	Narcotic Prescription Information
Sex/Arson/Narcotics Registration	Organized Crime Analysis
Criminal Statistical Data	Parent Locator
Dangerous Weapons	Property Systems Section
Data Base Audits	Public Information Office
Disposition Reporting	Record Sealing/Purge
Fingerprints	Records Security
Firearms	Research
Forensic Services	Special Requests/Studies
Fraud/Forgery Analysis	Stolen Vehicles/Boats
Gaming Registration	Surveillance Equipment
Homicide and Threats Analysis	Systems Technical Eval. and Planning
Humane Societies	Telecommunications
Investigations	Communications Administration
Law Enforcement Data Center	Terrorism Analysis
Liaison Services	Visual Investigative Analysis
Major Property Crime Analysis	Wanted Persons
Marijuana Eradication	Witness Protection
Missing/Unidentified Persons	

There are new technologies, new program mandates, and new ways of doing business on the horizon, and so new strategies must emerge. The simplest example is the optical scanning technology and DLE’s work with fingerprints. This work involves a set of strategies that will change with technology. New work, such as controlling child care workers via record checks or controlling firearms sales, and unexpected duties regarding drugs were all considered in the diagnosis of current and future strategies.

5. Helpful Mechanisms

Helpful mechanisms, such as budgeting, planning, training, and program evaluation, as well as computers, telecommunications, cars and buildings, all aid tremendously in coordinating the work of an organization. Questions of evolving technology must be considered with regard to software and computers, voice, data and radio transmission, and other hardware mechanisms; and questions of adequacy and change must be considered in reviewing the “softer” helpful

mechanisms that DLE employs to coordinate the work. This study focuses heavily on the mechanisms of budgeting, planning and program evaluation.

6. Relationships and Conflict

Every organization depends on good working relationships among its members and on the resolution of conflict in a manner that supports the agency's mission, strategies and structure. The diagnosis in this area includes assessing the organization's culture and reviewing its conflict resolution mechanisms, both within the agency and as they relate to the larger environment. DLE managers had a great deal to share with regard to conflict management in the agency.

7. Leadership

The role of leadership in any organization is to keep the other six elements of the organizational system in balance and to constantly monitor functions. This role complements the leader's other roles: chart direction or purpose, ensure proper programs or strategies, tend to the hierarchy or structure, look after incentives and helpful mechanisms, and resolve conflict.

Leadership within DLE is directly related to the roles of the director, three assistant directors, bureau chiefs, assistant bureau chiefs, senior and mid-managers and the overall structure of the agency. So the task of diagnosis comes full circle in the leadership box, from defining purpose to reviewing each aspect of the organization as it relates to accomplishing the mission.

C. Project Methodology

As noted above, the immediate requirements of this reorganization study project stemmed from the fact that a new organizational plan would be submitted "between" administrations, and implemented by a new administration which had not been involved in the study. For this reason, it was proposed that the study include a high level of involvement by all DLE managers and others who might be involved in implementation of a new plan. Objectivity would be maintained through use of an outside and independent consultant, and a commitment of noninterference in developing the ultimate reorganization plan. To meet the crucial requirement of involving all levels of managers and developing a constituency, Consultants conducted extensive interviews, meetings and briefings and solicited a wide and continuing level of involvement, as noted below.

Project methodology began with an extensive review of all prior planning documents and studies related to various organizational functions, including revisiting many of Consultants' own prior DLE studies. A high-level meeting with the director and three assistant directors followed, and an advisory committee was established by the director, representing the three DLE branches and key bureaus. Consultants proceeded to conduct in-depth interviews with the director and three assistant directors, and to interview the directors of the other four major Department of Justice divisions (civil, criminal, public rights, and administrative services), as well as the Chief Deputy Attorney General. Additional interviews were held outside DLE with police chiefs, sheriffs and local prosecutors familiar with DLE's current organizational environment, programs and services. These interviews stressed the seven distinct organizational aspects highlighted in the "Seven Box" model described above. All of the interviews were explicitly "not for attribution," and excellent cooperation resulted.

Contacts were made with several similar law enforcement agencies in other states, and a brief profile of key issues was made for a selected group of these state agencies with organizational attributes relevant to the study's issues (see Appendix).

Three major, day-long, organizational diagnosis workshops were then held with all of the mid- and senior managers of each branch. These workshops also followed the "Seven Box" model closely, allowing the large group of managers to debate and assess each organizational function separately, from the perspective of their branch and of DLE as a whole. These workshops resulted in three diagnoses of each branch, as well as DLE, and in each case, excellent cooperation and an extremely high level of agreement and consensus resulted.

In addition, Consultants spent time in quite a number of meetings and calls, and finally, in a day-long session to mediate a serious and systemic dispute between two DLE branches over the role of program and technology in relationship to procurement, planning and relations with vendors. Although little mediation resulted, a great deal of useful information about organizational problems was revealed.

Finally, the bureau chiefs and assistant bureau chiefs from each of DLE's bureaus were interviewed in depth (and "not for attribution"). In these interviews, the various key issues identified in previous interviews and workshops were targeted, and each chief was asked for any suggestions for solving various organizational problems. Follow-up interviews also occurred with DLE's three assistant directors, and numerous telephone follow-ups occurred with others previously interviewed. Further, in response to Consultant's request for follow-ups by telephone from managers wishing to express their input privately, over a dozen additional contacts were made. Frequent discussions were held with the DLE director who graciously and skillfully contributed many of the major insights to this study and many of the proposed options in this report.

Project reports have been regularly provided to the director and advisory committee. A meeting was held to review each report in draft and final versions.

Note that excellent feedback and cooperation was obtained from all managers with regard to their own input in the study. Those managers who commented on inadequate time for in-depth interviewing were re-interviewed, without time limit. The mid-managers were asked to evaluate the one-day workshops and did so in writing with a uniformly positive reaction. The director and three assistant directors' feedback and suggestions were solicited after each report, as was the feedback of the Chief Deputy Attorney General. The director and most other top managers and bureau chiefs responded quite positively to the draft options report, although one assistant director initially complained that some managers had received insufficient attention. The few complaints received overall were mostly from those whose bureaus or branch and/or management received critical evaluations from the study's broad range of management meetings and interviews. This is not an unexpected response in such a modestly funded major study of a large and complex agency.

Mission, Structure and Strategies

II. MISSION, STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIES

DLE is divided into three operating branches, plus the divisional administration. These three branches are Criminal Identification and Information (CIIB), Investigation and Enforcement (IEB), and the Law Enforcement Data Center (LEDC). CIIB and IEB are broken down into bureaus (three in CIIB and four, plus two units not called "bureaus", in IEB). Each of these in turn contains several programs, some of which are still further subdivided.

Thus, DLE resembles a giant, multilevel pyramid. But the structural details do not define DLE's mission, purposes or activities; in fact, they obscure these. DLE is extremely difficult to manage as currently structured. It is more useful in analyzing and designing an improved organizational structure to examine what DLE does, and for whom.

DLE's purpose or mission is to carry out law enforcement activities in the state's constant battle with crime. Its strategies or programs may be broken down into five general categories:


- **Information and Identification:** Maintenance of a comprehensive body of information on crimes and criminals in California; verifying the identification of criminal suspects and applicants for certain jobs/occupations or firearms purchases; statistical analysis of crime, criminals and the criminal justice system.
- **Analysis:** Compilation and interpretation of both information and physical evidence in support of particular criminal investigations and of law enforcement generally.
- **Investigation:** Field work in pursuit of particular violators when local authorities are unable to perform this task and in other circumstances.
- **Communications:** Maintenance of linkages with local law enforcement agencies and the FBI to make information or the results of analysis available rapidly.
- **Training:** Instruction of local law enforcement personnel in the latest techniques of the above activities.

Underlying all of these is a sixth activity which is not a primary function in and of itself but is essential to the achievement of DLE's goals:

- **Data Processing:** Maintenance of a very large computer network to support all of DLE's primary activities and DOJ overall, as well as many administrative functions.

The amount of effort devoted to each of these activities is difficult to determine as DLE does not break down its operations in this logical way. But in 1985-86 the Bureau of Criminal Statistics estimated that the information function occupied about 40 percent of DLE's total effort (excluding administration), analysis and investigation were about 20 percent each, and data processing about 13 percent. Training and communications consumed only a small fraction of total effort. These data, which are not generally kept, are displayed in charts below as they help to provide the background to this reorganization study.


DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT Staffing Distribution



DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT


Staffing, by Bureau

(ATC, CAMP, WSIN omitted for clarity.)



DIVISION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

Distribution of Functions, 1985/86



Analysis is 50% forensics,
50% information/data.

Very roughly, the information function is the province of CIIB and investigation is carried out by IEB. Both of these branches also perform analysis. LEDC is responsible for centralized data processing; however, all three branches carry out several other functions to some extent, and there are overlaps as well.

DLE is not a static organization. During the last several years, certain of its activities have grown much faster than others. In particular, the growth of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) has been spectacular. If this continues at the current rate, the investigative function could constitute the largest fraction of DLE's total efforts.

Why does DLE perform these operational investigation activities rather than leaving them to local authorities? Who are DLE's clients? DLE has four areas of capability beyond the cities and counties. First, it can serve as the central repository and clearinghouse of criminal justice data. Thus, for example, the fingerprints of an arrestee anywhere in the state can be compared with the central file. Descriptive criminal statistics are prepared to guide criminal justice planning. DLE also maintains the central communications network through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Cal-ID system (fingerprints); for all the counties to communicate directly with each other would be overwhelmingly complex.

Second, DLE can bring together a wealth of talents not available to the local agencies. The decentralized criminology laboratories serve smaller counties which cannot maintain their own, and certain advanced forensic techniques are available nowhere else. DLE can also put together specialized investigative and analytic teams of experts not found in most jurisdictions.

Third, DLE investigates crimes outside of the scope of local agencies. These may be cases of corruption extending over several counties, or situations when the local authorities themselves are the subjects of investigation.

Finally, DLE establishes a uniform set of standards for law enforcement techniques in California. It defines the format for crime reporting to ensure consistent information. Through the Advanced Training Center (ATC), it provides uniform instruction in specialized and general law enforcement techniques.

The main clients of DLE are local law enforcement agencies. Some activities, mainly analysis and data processing, are also performed for other elements of the Department of Justice, particularly the Division of Criminal Law. CIIB obtains security clearances for major clients, including licensing, regulatory and other nonpolice agencies. And of course, the various units of DLE make extensive use of each others' services. The requests from the clients in the field, as well as those from within DLE and DOJ, are not centrally identified, evaluated, or allocated; neither are they tallied. This missing and vital management data notwithstanding, there appear to be great increases in "client" requests for service from DLE/DOJ, and great increases in "self-initiated" activities, chiefly in IEB.

A. Structure

How does the structure of DLE relate to its activities? An efficient structure would group together similar or related functions, facilitate communication and coordination horizontally among units, and minimize bureaucratic overhead (e.g., layering, "turf battles," lack of accountability).

Consultants and most of those interviewed observed that certain functions within DLE are incongruously located. Their placement reflected some considerations other than organizational efficiency; changes occurred in a fragmented way without any attempt at overall planning, and often in response to management personnel decisions or administrative expediency. Certainly the principle of locating like functions together and dissimilar functions separately was and is frequently violated. Overall coordination is seriously hampered by structural complexity and serious internal competition.

1. Director

The DLE director's office provides overall coordination and performs some administrative services (as does the Administrative Services Division of DOJ). There is also an administrative function at the branch managers' level; and still more administrative functions at the level of the bureau chiefs (i.e., "layering").

2. CIIB

The overwhelming bulk of CIIB's activity lies in maintaining the massive criminal history and fingerprint files; these are in the Bureau of Criminal Identification (BCI). For technical reasons involving the computer hardware, the two types of database are physically separate from each other. Smaller databases (gun permits, second-hand sales, stolen goods) are kept by the Bureau of Justice Information Services (BJIS). The Bureau of Criminal Statistics and Special Services (BCS/SS) compiles and analyzes statistics on crimes and on persons arrested. BCS/SS' Special Services half contains the Registration, Child Abuse, Missing and Unidentified Persons, and Expedite Information Programs. These appear to be the bureaus' primary functions.

Then there are other activities within CIIB for which the organizational location is not easy to understand. BCI not only maintains the fingerprint files but is responsible for the Cal-ID remote telecommunications network, and is assuming responsibility for the proposed Cal-Photo system. On the other hand, BJIS controls the enormous CLETS system which provides telecommunications for everything except fingerprints and photos. CLETS handles over one million messages daily! The Special Services part of BCS/SS contains the criminal information resource center which handles requests from the outside and is functionally akin to the BJIS databases.

Many of the organizational arrangements within CIIB, particularly those made in the 1980s (i.e., creating BJIS, combining SS with BCS) were based on expedient decisions that need to be re-examined.

3. IEB

IEB encompasses an even more disparate set of functions. Three bureaus, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE), Bureau of Investigation (BI), and Bureau of Organized Crime and Criminal Intelligence (BOCCI), are primarily investigative; it is difficult to see where the dividing lines among them fall in many cases, and there are problems with accountability, operating procedures and coordination as well.

These bureaus also maintain criminal intelligence files. The Western States Information Network (WSIN) is a federally-funded program to coordinate interstate narcotic information. WSIN was conceptualized and implemented as a semi-autonomous program physically located outside the DLE building even though it

was directed by DLE personnel. WSIN now has a successful operating track record and the perceived need for physical separation should be re-examined. The Bureau of Forensic Services (BFS) is primarily an analytic service, rendering assistance both to local authorities and to IEB's own agents. The Advanced Training Center provides all sorts of training except in forensics, which is done by the California Criminalistics Institute (part of BFS).

Data-gathering and analysis for specific cases is located within the investigative bureaus. However, the jurisdictional boundary between these programs and units of BCS/SS and BJIS is unclear. For example, the Violent Crimes Information Systems in BCS/SS was split in two, with the Violent Crimes Information Center going to BOCCI. Major Property Crimes is in BOCCI, but the Stolen Property Records and Second-hand Sales systems are in BJIS.

The distinction between "information" and "intelligence" seems tenuous, and in fact, most interviewees criticized the quality of DLE's intelligence units. There are many examples of coordination problems, and there are serious disagreements and jealousies about intelligence and analysis.

4. LEDC

Only the Law Enforcement Data Center has a fairly clear and single purpose, which is in essence to develop and operate the computer systems. But even here, there is a peculiar division of responsibilities for telecommunications between LEDC and CIIB. Furthermore, running the data center and providing telecommunications are different sorts of tasks from criminal information or investigation; should LEDC not be regarded as an auxiliary (if essential) service rather than an integral part of DLE's mission? Finally, an increasing fraction of LEDC's activities serve other divisions of DOJ.

B. Management

Most of DLE's activities are interrelated. Analysts may search the computerized information files and transmit their results to field investigators. DLE can perform functions which would not be easily done by small organizations; it can bring to bear on a single case the efforts of many experts in diverse fields, and can search and analyze an enormous body of data for relevant information.

Such wide-ranging capabilities can be found only in a large organization with a number of experts in different disciplines. But organizational size has its price, unfortunately. Managers develop a narrow outlook and responsibility becomes fragmented. Bureaucracy proliferates and communication stagnates. In the field, clients cannot always keep up with DLE's structure, nor can newer clients easily identify proper contact points. For over a decade, the lack of a central intake point has been pointed out, and an intake and process tracking system has been suggested. Still, there is no central intake of client service requests. There is no overall program evaluation.

DLE has its share and more of these ills that accompany size and complexity. Briefly stated, the managers at each level tend to concentrate on their own problems, with the result that there is a serious competition for funds and personnel positions and a frequent lack of communication or cooperation among the units. The time spent in infighting and the loss of morale sap DLE's ability to perform its designated functions and result in inefficiencies.

The multiple layers of the organization employ a large number of administrative personnel, and communication becomes difficult. Documents must be approved at many levels before release, and managers thereby become insulated from responsibility. Planning, training and budgeting appear to occur at the branch and bureau levels, with the result that they are uncoordinated and become quite competitive. Some planning seems to be guided by the availability of new technology rather than by mission or organizational needs. Consultants have observed considerable rancor and dysfunction among top managers over the loss of programs and/or positions to other units, or the loss of procurement or intermediary roles with vendors.

Certain inherent circumstances militate against coordination. One is the very diversity of DLE. Investigations is far more in the public eye than is Criminal Record-keeping, and finds it much easier to attract a constituency and obtain funding. Investigative bureaus and even programs have "friends" in the legislature, publish their own brochures without division clearance, and can apparently achieve their budget aspirations by going outside the DLE chain of command.

There is also a "class structure" in DOJ. Lawyers rank at the top, then sworn personnel; analysts and information specialists are at the bottom. The prestige and funding accruing to the higher classes are observed to be prominent sources of dissatisfaction among the lower. Agents resent being assigned to work under lawyers in the Division of Criminal Law, and CIIB staff feel that the agents get all the privileges. Also, certain management positions are clearly reserved for peace officers although this policy is not explicit.

Furthermore, agents and information managers are not the same kind of people. They respond to different incentives and managerial techniques, and are not always sympathetic to each others' needs. The backgrounds of the top managers will naturally incline them to side with one group or the other, leading to allegations of favoritism. The lack of meetings, horizontal linkages, and management rotation seriously compounds these tendencies.

Finally, the practice of appointing a new director every few years, usually from the outside, almost ensures that that person cannot totally grasp the complexity of the organization before being replaced. Then, most of the operational detail devolves upon the branch and bureau managers, who look out for their own bureaucratic interests as opposed to the overall mission.

A number of specific organizational issues suggest themselves for further analysis. A few are:

- With the increasing amount of service by LEDC to other elements of DOJ, should its status be changed to that of an independent division or a central bureau?
- How can the differing needs of investigative agents and information managers be reconciled?
- Is there justification for maintaining BNE, BI, and BOCCI as three separate bureaus, given the major degree of overlap in their functions?
- The organization of some parts of CIIB is difficult to understand. Examples of anomalies include: 1) the placement of some field representatives in BJIS and others in BI; 2) the absence of relationships between tasks performed by BCS and SS. Units performing similar functions are separated and units with different and unrelated duties are grouped together. Why are the Field Operations Program of BJIS and the Special Services half of BCS/SS located where they are? Should they

and Cal-ID be combined into some sort of telecommunications program? How would the telecommunications unit of LEDC enter into this?

- Do the Automated Systems and Property/Firearms program and the two Violent Crime Information programs (BCS/SS and BOCCI) function optimally in three different bureaus?

C. Technological and Procurement Needs

Technology - particularly information processing - lies at the very heart of nearly everything that DLE does. The ability to search computerized files and transmit the information, instantly and with a high degree of security, is essential to DLE's primary mission. Yet vast amounts of data have still not been stored electronically. Complete automation would make DLE's operations much faster and more efficient, and would lessen the pressure on facility space.

Furthermore, the technology is constantly changing. DLE spends millions of dollars each year on upgrading its equipment and the facility to house it, and the volume of these purchases will certainly increase greatly. Yet the organization is currently ill-suited to strategic or long-term planning and the resulting procurement processes required; responsibility for these vital functions is both spread out horizontally and layered vertically. These are already truly serious organizational problems which can only become worse over time.

There are many choices to be made here - what to do and how to do it. DLE staff have identified a number of major needs:

- Complete automation of the Automated Criminal History System (a misnomer, as it is only partially automated now). Updating and editing, as well as conversion of older manual records, could be partially expedited by the use of an optical character reader, although verification of all old records prior to automation may no longer be cost effective.
- Optical imaging of the entire folder files, with digital indexing.
- Expansion of the Cal-ID and Cal-Photo systems.
- Improved data communications, perhaps allowing Cal-ID and CLETS to be transmitted over the same lines.
- Since CLETS is designed for rapid information transfer only, a system to allow remote users to spend time on-line searching and analyzing data.

Then there are policy issues:

- Should the information processing system continue to be dominated by the large central mainframe, or should more control be transferred to a network of local personal computers (still with access to the main databases, of course)?
- Where are jurisdictional lines drawn with regard to the selection and operation of equipment? Both LEDC and the program managers are vitally interested in this; each wishes to make the decisions. There is a terrible tension between program and technology territory.

- How can the acquisition of data processing and other expensive equipment (communications, forensics) be coordinated so that it is efficient yet meets the needs of the widest number of users?
- Given that different users, even within DLE, have diverse needs, is it possible or desirable to combine today's incompatible databases into a single giant system? If not, how can data in different locations be made accessible to all concerned parties? How can the client requests be best routed?
- A danger lies in allowing planning to be driven by the availability of technology rather than the needs of the program. Consultants have heard managers in more than one unit express a desire for the latest very expensive piece of equipment without being able to explain what it is or how it works, let alone having a specific purpose for it. The intelligent application of technology requires planning by both program users and technicians, under the grim overseeing eyes of financial managers. All of this must occur with a long-term and logical perspective (i.e., planning).

All of the discussions above provide both background and findings to support various problem statements and options for solution set out in the remainder of this report. The same discussions also provided a foundation for the recommendations in the final Plan.

Options

III. OPTIONS

The "Seven Box" model is a useful tool for organizing and discussing the changes suggested by Consultants. However, like all models, it is not a perfect representation of reality. Several of the options suggested herein fall into more than one of the boxes. For example, the planning/evaluation/budgeting function is described at length in "Helpful Mechanisms," but it has implications for "Structure," "Rewards," "Relationships," and "Leadership" as well. The reader may notice other examples where a topic has been broken up into sections in order to conform to the overall structure of this report.

For clarity, the options are numbered according to the section they fall under. For example, under section A, DLE Mission, options will be numbered "Option A1, A2," etc. Consultants stress that this numbering system in no way indicates the priority given to any of the options. Rather, the options result from the discussions that precede them.

A. DLE Mission

DLE's primary purpose is to assist in law enforcement. This general purpose results in four primary missions and three secondary missions, as follows.

Primary Missions

1. Maintaining and searching databases on crimes and criminals;
2. Communicating with local agencies regarding these databases and other services;
3. Examining physical evidence;
4. Directing investigations.

Secondary Missions

1. Analyzing statistics on crime;
2. Developing improved forensic techniques;
3. Training local agencies in advanced techniques.

All four of DLE's primary missions are interrelated; the investigation of particular offenses can often involve more than one - and perhaps all - of the four primary missions. For this simple reason, it is essential that there be enthusiastic and unhampered horizontal cooperation in DLE. This need for horizontal communication, lateral collaboration, and coordination throughout DLE is the major theme of this reorganization study. Horizontal cooperation needs to be continually coordinated and reinforced.

The purposes and activities of DLE make it inevitably a functionally and technologically complex organization. This complexity exists without regard to the formal structure of DLE, and it will exist regardless of structure. Thus, constant efforts must be made to coordinate the ongoing operations as well as the planning of new developments, especially the acquisition of technology and the regular evaluation of current operations.

In the future, DLE will need to enhance its ability to identify and pursue new directions in criminal investigation services. Proactive planning and program development will be required. Thus, DLE will need a strong planning function so as to become less reactive to public and legislative initiatives.

The following organizational principles are assumed to be valid and applicable to this situation:

- In a large, complex, diverse and growing agency, strong management is needed to insure the prioritization of scarce resources among demands of the field and parent agency, as well as to insure program efficiency and accountability.
- Communications and cooperation among units are facilitated by having the communicating units located together in the organizational structure.
- Communications are inhibited as the levels of authority through which they must pass are increased vertically, and/or not provided for laterally (e.g., staff meetings).
- Units performing essentially the same functions should be combined organizationally in order to reduce administrative overhead and to allow the sharing of resources and technologies (e.g., equipment, technologies and personnel).
- Units within an organization with fundamentally different purposes should be located separately from each other so that there are not conflicts in their operations.

Diagnosis

The DLE's overall purpose is clear, and its various primary and secondary missions are articulated throughout the organization. The mission statements, however, are too generalized to provide useful guidance in a large and complex organization such as DLE. It is clear from the study that interpretations of each bureau's mission/role vary radically within DLE. As a consequence, the organizational placement of programs often appear to have been based on subjective considerations.

This major finding, which was initially put forth to Consultants by the DLE director, provided a foundation for other diagnostic findings in this report, options for remedying organizational problems and the final recommendations.

- Option A1** Develop unambiguous definitions of each bureau's responsibilities based on organizational principles; reorganize bureaus based on the theory that like functions should be combined.

B. Structure - DLE's Current Organization

Previous discussions have stressed that DLE's current structure hampers its mission, is expensive and inefficient, and tends strongly to insulate management and limit accountability. The organization chart presented in the introduction showed three separated branches and many bureaus. Certain functions that are generic and impact on the entire DOJ are housed in DLE as a branch (LEDC); others with similar administrative requirements, such as training and many investigative programs, are decentralized throughout DLE; and still other functions, which are similar and extremely expensive, are decentralized geographically (e.g., laboratories).

The following discussion features inappropriately centralized and decentralized areas and structural issues in DLE and presents options to solve these problems.

1. Branches

DLE's three branches add a management layer while limiting management's capacity. Widely regarded as "transfer stations" by those Consultants interviewed, the branches are expensive in that they greatly limit the all-important need for lateral communications in DLE. Surprisingly, the branch chiefs (who are all assistant directors) do not meet regularly. Nor do they know about the other two branches' programs or problems.

LEDC, whose structure is covered separately below, is quite different from IEB and CIIB in that it is technology- and support-oriented; IEB and CIIB have substantive program relationships that are greatly interfered with by branch lines, and each houses programs that logically should be in the other branch.

Consultants' interviews and observations found few reasons for maintaining the current branch structure. Thus, the following options are presented to remedy problems seen as resultant from the current branch structure.

Option B1 Eliminate the branch level and manage bureaus and programs from an expanded director's office, discussed in several subsequent sections. DLE should control all of its budget, personnel, and management analysis, but the Department of Finance has resisted this.

Pros

- Increases accountability, enhances planning and budgeting, and reduces conflict.

Cons

- Requires stronger central management.
- Requires more resources in the director's office (e.g., a deputy director).

Costs

- Should result in savings areas of one senior management position and related support staff.
- Should result in savings through consolidation.

Impacts

- More responsive, accountable and efficient organizational processes.

Option B2 Another alternative would be to establish three new branches more logically related to law enforcement administration, as follows:

- a. Administration
- b. Support
- c. Operations

Pros

- Congruence with traditional police structure might improve law enforcement service.
- More management control.
- Facilitates management rotation.

Cons

- DLE remains too layered.
- Mission and strategies are too complex to simplify in this broad way.


Costs

- Little change.

Impacts

- More accountability and coordination could be expected.

Option B3 Establish a "matrix" organization, where current branch chiefs are responsible for lateral/horizontal management rather than only vertical. A matrix approach might show:



Organization goes up and down and across. Another alternative would be to establish task forces led by branch or bureau chiefs, to address major planning and budgeting issues and resolve conflicts.

Pros

- Should improve management, coordination/communications and efficiency.

Cons

- Fails to reduce layering.
- Violates chain of command.

Costs

- No major changes.

Impacts

- Addresses many organizational problems directly.

2. The Law Enforcement Data Center

LEDC is misnamed and mislocated. It does not serve only law enforcement; its activities are also involved in servicing all of DOJ, as well as an increasing number

of related criminal justice agencies. Moreover, it is not the only repository for data. Databases and technology have proliferated throughout DLE.

LEDC is actually an organizational unit designed for the issue of technology, serving the entire DOJ. It was planned and built with Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) money which is why it was originally placed in DLE. LEDC plans and manages the ever increasing needs of the field through technology for DLE primarily, and similarly serves the law enforcement and criminal justice field, as well as DOJ, through technical assistance, training, and planning and managing technology.

LEDC is an extremely technical and complex organization in its own right, and by most accounts, it is not properly placed in the current DLE organizational structure. There are many aspects that account for the finding that LEDC is structurally "misplaced." First, LEDC's current placement as a branch of DLE pits it against CIIB (and to a lesser degree, IEB) with regard to the proper role of technology and programs.

In theory, programs or operating units would provide specifications to LEDC and LEDC would plan and implement the requisite technology. In fact, however, because of the constant battles in DLE over "turf" and scarce resources, conflict between programs and technology is more the norm than is collaboration.

This fundamental problem is worsened by the misplacement of certain data bases and technologies in various program offices, and to a lesser degree, by the placement of certain programs, training and field operations in the essentially service-oriented LEDC.

These problems result in other problems, from the small question of "who does a local agency call?" to the larger question of "who is responsible for the intermediary role with large technology vendors?" This last question concerns the predominance of LEDC's or CIIB's bureaus in dealing with new technology specifications, choices, procurements and maintenance. This question has been terribly disruptive, expensive, and perhaps harmful to the long-term quality and cost-effectiveness of California's criminal justice information systems.

A recent feud between LEDC and CIIB concerned the best fingerprint technology and which branch should control the choice as well as procurement relations. This conflict has been harmful to DLE overall, and could have compromised law enforcement's immediate need for the program as well as the long-term, most cost-effective, technology choice.

Due to its placement as a DLE branch, LEDC is caught between the conflicting demands of the other DLE branches, the constant queries and special requests of the field, and the newly mounting pressures of other automated DOJ divisions.

LEDC's critics in other branches and divisions complain about LEDC's gatekeeper behavior with regard to technological information, and its large and growing base of embedded resources. LEDC complains of interference in its acknowledged technological expertise, and rightly points to the inefficiencies of decentralized data, communications and hardware. Almost all those interviewed spoke of the need for better LEDC management within or outside DLE, and for an effective priority-setting mechanism.

The following are options for remedying the above structural problems.

Option B4 Restructure LEDC as a separate DOJ division, serving DLE as well as other DOJ divisions and the field.

Pros

- Places LEDC at a "height" in DOJ structure considered correct by many.
- Makes LEDC a service agency for DLE, as well as a control unit.
- Gives technology expertise unimpeded access to technology usage.
- Reduces conflicts; improves procurement, maintenance, planning, compatibility, etc., in technology.
- Should help centralize DOJ technology use and result in large, long-term savings.
- More fairly allocates costs of LEDC services, now disproportionately and unfairly carried only by law enforcement.

Cons

- Will likely limit law enforcement's relatively free access to LEDC services.
- Involves change that will elicit resistance.
- Places LEDC in conflicted position, vis-a-vis ASD.


Costs

- Should save resources by eliminating obstacles to LEDC-spawned cost efficiencies.
- Would be prohibitive (and unnecessary) to move LEDC from its current expensive/delicate space .

Impacts

- Should ensure continued predominance of DOJ in technology field.
- Should rationalize DLE structure.

Option B5 Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a major arm of ASD.



Pros

- Same as above.
- Limits conflict with ASD.
- Enhances LEDC's control agency role.

Cons

- Creates grounds for conflict between administrative services and technology services.
- Complex to implement.


Costs

- Should not result in major new costs.
- Should result in cost efficiencies.

Impacts

- Similar to above

Option B6 Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a non-divisional "special" unit, reporting directly to the Chief Deputy Attorney General.



Pros

- Avoids current conflicts and possible ASD conflicts.
- Establishes LEDC's role most clearly vis-a-vis DOJ/DLE's major area of growth, costs, planning, and difficult administrative and management choices (i.e., technology).
- Ensures that legal branches pay their "fair share" for LEDC's services (currently DLE law enforcement is subsidizing these LEDC services to the other DOJ divisions).

Cons

- Further removes LEDC services from law enforcement control.
- Fear.

Costs

- Not clear.
- Minimal.

Impacts

- Similar to above.
- This structural arrangement has already been put in place informally by the current Chief Deputy Attorney General, in that the LEDC branch chief sits with the DLE director at the DOJ Council of Chiefs meetings (i.e., top management).

Option B7 Another alternative would be to establish LEDC as a free-standing data center.

Pros

- Would allow LEDC's technological expertise to be consolidated around data and technology functions, without interference by other organizational values (i.e., DLE's structural problems, law enforcement interests, etc.).
- Would match several other state data-base oriented centers (e.g., Stephen P. Teale Data Center, Franchise Tax Board).

Cons

- Would greatly reduce law enforcement access to data center services.
- Would be costly and disruptive.

Costs

- Extremely high costs if a physical move (which is not necessary) is involved.
- Might result in savings from clarification of role.

Impacts

- Creates a new bureaucracy.
- Many unknown impacts. Some parts of LEDC are inextricably linked with DLE, especially Cal-ID (but this is a turnkey system; BCI could manage it). Also, the CJIS and CLETS systems are DLE functions. Open shop is used by all DOJ; Batch is used by LEDC itself (for clients). So LEDC has a special relationship with DLE which should not be attenuated by reorganization.

Option B8 Another alternative would be to leave LEDC where it is in the structure, but move training out, and centralize the telecommunications function in LEDC; this option is not further addressed here as it is covered in two other discussions of training and telecommunications. Many policies and areas of responsibility would require serious study and management work.

Pros

- Minimizes competition.

Cons

- Leaves structural problems.

Costs

- None.

Impacts

- Leaves need for more clarification over who controls what.

3. Training

DLE's training function was originally structured to "coordinate" all DLE trainings. Now, while training is seemingly headquartered in the Advanced Training Center, is in fact decentralized throughout the division. Because of this, the costs, targeting, user interface and quality, as well as utility to DOJ/DLE, are reduced. As a consequence, there is very little data on training, nor are there organized efforts at assessing overall training needs appropriate to DOJ/DLE.

Training is provided to local law enforcement agencies by both program- and technologically-oriented bureaus in DLE, and training occurs in DLE and DOJ in equally diverse ways. Although many talented trainers and training managers are involved, and nationally recognized substantive expertise is delivered, the inefficiencies and coordination problems stemming from decentralization seem to limit the overall effort.

The following options are aimed at these problems.

- Option B9** Establish in ATC a centralized training unit for all DLE (and DOJ) training, either in DOJ or DLE.
- Option B10** Include a needs assessment and master planning program in the new training unit, insuring that training resources are tied effectively to need and demand.
- Option B11** Employ training resources from throughout DLE/DOJ and outside, in combination with professional training management, overseen by a multi-disciplinary and multi-unit advisory group.
- Option B12** Develop a training infrastructure that matches the demand for facilities, instructional technologies, certification, etc.
- Option B13** Obtain separate facilities.

Pros

- Results in better quality training.
- More efficient training delivery.
- More efficiencies in program and service units currently administering separate training programs.

Cons

- Some loss of substantive control over training by various units.
- Non-training units affected are likely to resist this change.

Costs

- Should result in significant cost efficiencies.

Impacts

- Should result in a higher quality, more accessible training program.

4. Laboratories

As noted in earlier discussion, one of DLE's primary missions involves laboratory analysis of evidence from criminal investigations. This work is done in eleven decentralized laboratories throughout the state. These labs were sited many years ago, and have long represented one of DLE's most highly regarded programs, especially from the viewpoint of local law enforcement users. For small and remote agencies, with little or no access to other lab facilities, and for larger agencies with more limited labs, the widely decentralized/dispersed DLE lab program is of great value. In recent years, with local funding problems leading to cutbacks in local labs, DLE's crime lab program has become of even greater value.

The problem is that the existence of eleven separate labs, spread around the state, filled a need for proximity that no longer exists. Originally these labs needed to be close to the user agencies to facilitate fast and efficient turnaround of evidence, analyses and testimony. Subsequently, the proximity of the labs has become an important political issue; users strongly advocate maintaining all labs. On the other hand, the need for proximity has eroded due to the proliferation of relatively inexpensive overnight delivery, electronic communications, jet travel, etc.

While the scope of this study did not allow for a careful analysis of siting and the underlying pattern of local demand, interviews suggest strongly that no more than one to three labs are needed. Centralization of the lab function would save a great deal of money as these facilities are cost-intensive from a staffing and facility perspective.

Thus, the following options are suggested for centralization of the DLE criminalistics function.

Option B14 Consolidate all laboratory activities at one or three sites; a single site would be in Sacramento; three sites would suggest central sites away from lab-rich urban centers, perhaps in the central south and central north.

Option B15 Conduct a careful assessment of the need for eleven labs statewide, and seek fewer facilities and the best sites.

Pros

- Centralized labs would further enhance the quality and quantity of lab work, allowing better technology for fewer sites.
- Centralization would further standardize lab activity and the data and learning that comes from the criminalistics program.

Cons

- Stiff political resistance can be expected from local agencies who would expect a diminution in service.
- Certain losses in program quality might result from distance.
- Certain security problems might result from shipping evidence.
- Costs.

Costs

- Extremely large cost savings can be expected.
- A comprehensive needs assessment and siting study might cost \$100,000.

Impacts

- Further consolidation of DLE would be advantageous in agency management.
- Reduction of local service access would distance DLE away from many clients.
- Increased travel by criminalists.

5. Planning and Evaluation

In section III E, "Helpful Mechanisms," the establishment of a central Planning and Evaluation Office (PEO) is discussed at length. The location and structure of the PEO is of concern here.

A centralized planning office is, of necessity, located at the center of the organization (i.e., with the executive). Thus, the following options were formulated.

Option B16 Create a PEO as an advisor to the director, attached to his/her office but out of the main line of communication.

Pros

- Little resistance to its formation.

Cons

- May be bypassed.

Costs

- Staffing only.

Impacts

- Not large, since it serves in an advisory function only.

Option B17 Create a PEO as a central filter through which all budget and programs must pass. Still reporting to the director, it would be in this case much more directly involved in the formulation and execution of the division's policies.

Pros

- Will come closer to achieving global planning and evaluation objectives.

Cons

- Liable to elicit much opposition; adds a layer of bureaucracy.

Costs

- Staffing only, but it may require more than the advisory option.

Impacts

- Major.

The PEO could be formed in at least two ways:

Option B18 Create an Executive Model as a permanent and independent body, reporting to the Director. In this case it must contain expert but disinterested persons. Although some of its members will undoubtedly be drawn from existing units in the division, they must forego loyalties to their old programs and friends in favor of the interests of the entire agency. The current bureau management must have constant and meaningful input but no control over the PEO's recommendations.

Pros

- Independence of parochial interests. Greater stability and consistency; more "professionalism." Probably more harmonious decision making.

Cons

- Needs a way to assure significant bureau input.

Costs

- Probably higher than the representative model since the senior staff would not be supported by their bureaus.

Impacts

- If not run by senior managers it may not win the respect of the operating units.

Option B19 Create a Representative Model led by bureau representatives - bureau chiefs have been suggested, especially when there are assistant chiefs to back them up - on a rotating basis. (At present only BCI, BI, and BOCCI have single assistant chiefs without line responsibilities.) They would then represent the interests of their bureaus in the planning function. This option would not exclude also having a permanent technical staff, but control would be vested in the bureau chiefs.

Pros

- Highly influential with operating bureaus.

Cons

- Danger of domination by the strongest personalities, with abrupt shifts when they are rotated. Possible divided loyalties by bureau chiefs.

Costs

- Probably less than the executive model unless an assistant bureau chief is needed.

Impacts

- More independent of the director than the executive model. A bureau chief serving full-time might lose authority back in the bureau, but if service were substantially less the impact of the PEO would be weakened.

6. Investigations and Enforcement Branch (IEB)

IEB is composed of three investigative bureaus (BNE, BI, and BOCCI), a support bureau (BFS), ATC, and WSIN.

Each investigative bureau functions under different operating rules and procedures. Although sharing a common investigative mission, there is competition for programs and resources between the bureaus. Each bureau works to retain its own "turf" control. As a consequence, there is limited flexibility or cooperation in the creation of task forces which would temporarily move agents from one bureau to another to deal with extraordinary investigations.

No one interviewed in IEB could recall a program being systematically evaluated.

The Bureau of Investigation's cases tend to be evenly divided between criminal and civil investigations. (The civil investigations relate to litigation involving state agencies). Most criminal cases are worked with, and at the invitation of, local law enforcement agencies. Self-initiated criminal investigations only occur when specified criteria are met; examples are: when a state agency is involved; when local corruption is alleged; and recently, in money laundering cases. Except in corruption cases, the local agency is notified of these self-initiated investigations. BI has its own training unit responsible for insuring that the 70 BI agents meet POST training standards. Planning responsibility has been assigned to a special agent, and the bureau also handles most Internal Affairs investigations. There are no written policies governing the investigations of internal complaints.

Narcotic enforcement cases are initiated by agents in BNE field offices and by the 25 field task forces comprised of neighboring local agency officers on teams organized by BNE agents. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in the field offices operates autonomously insofar as deciding when to initiate an investigation. Management control depends on summary statistics, significant case summaries and periodic housekeeping inspections. For a significant number of cases, the investigation, subsequent arrest(s) and asset seizure proceedings, if any, are a solo BNE operation.

In this respect, BNE differs from BI in that the mission of supporting local law enforcement is interpreted to include initiating and investigating narcotic cases without bringing in the local police. In these solo cases, local agency notification usually does not occur until the investigation is concluding with arrest(s), execution of search warrant(s), and narcotic buy(s). The purpose of these notifications is essentially the safety of undercover agents who, on occasion, have become involved in gunplay with police from other agencies.

The DLE mission of serving local law enforcement can well be weakened by the BNE practice of initiating, investigating, and closing narcotic cases with notice, but without necessarily involving local police. The sharing of assets seized with locals has been largely limited to BNE task forces where the distribution is negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

There are no uniform protocols governing whether a narcotic case is worked by BNE alone, turned over to the task forces or jointly investigated with a local agency. Decisions in this regard are made, in the field, on an ad hoc basis. While limits reportedly are recently in place, competition between the local police and BNE for asset seizures has prompted some local agencies to demand (and in one case receive) a fixed percentage of all assets seized by BNE drug cases in the jurisdiction (based on local policy).

Although the task force sharing of assets is an incentive for smaller agencies to join the teams, the competition for asset seizures is a powerful disincentive to coordination of effort or cooperation between BNE and the larger police agencies who have resources to successfully investigate narcotic cases. The sums of money seized and the value of property forfeited in BNE narcotic cases are very substantial. Currently, the Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF), managed within the Department of Justice, exceeds \$6 million.

The AFF is being encumbered to support BNE activities. As a consequence, narcotic enforcement is being driven by the AFF which as it grows, provides additional resources for more enforcement. In other words, the process perpetuates and fosters greater BNE investigative involvement within local jurisdictions. Continued dependence on the AFF for DLE project funding will increase the competition between local police and the BNE for cases likely to yield large asset forfeitures.

In BNE, complaints about personnel or procedures are ordinarily investigated by BNE investigators.

An early justification for the establishment of an organizationally independent organized crime unit was the sensitive and confidential nature of the information being gathered. This information is unique from other DLE data - most of which is based on public record. The BOCCI intelligence file, for example, contains statements of informants with varying degrees of reliability as well as print media clippings, submissions from the law enforcement intelligence community of informant information and material abstracted from crime reports by bureau analysts. Because much of the information stored by BOCCI is unverified, a much higher level of confidentiality is required and maintained. Access to the voluminous hard copy files in BOCCI is through an automated indexing system (ACII) which has random search capability based on various specified descriptors. In addition to the ACCI file and various programs, there are approximately a dozen field agents within BOCCI. The field agent function is to collect information from informants (raw data); attempt to validate information that may not meet ACII entry criteria; and pursue and develop leads which may justify a full-scale investigation by the appropriate agency.

There have been no external, rigorous evaluations of the effectiveness of BOCCI's systems. The annual accounting report currently submitted by BOCCI is an anecdotal summary of events in which BOCCI has had varying degrees of involvement.

BOCCI is one of several bureaus with a one-on-one reporting and command chain (i.e., bureau chief and assistant bureau chief). The justification presented for the arrangement is that legislative and other liaison duties of the bureau chief make him unavailable for day-to-day operational decisions.

The legislative liaison for DLE should, however, function directly out of the director's office where the interests of the entire DLE can be coordinated.

BOCCI has moved beyond the analysis and development of organized crime intelligence leads into programs which process and analyze crime and known offender information. BOCCI's assumption of missions and responsibilities for programs which were formerly the sole responsibility of other bureaus has aggravated already existing inter-bureau coordination and management problems. Two recent developments illustrate the difficulties that arise when programs are located on the basis of ad hoc circumstances rather than a clearly defined organizational plan.

A new computer-based program to analyze violent crime *modus operandis* (homicides, sexual assault, kidnapping) for suspects and serial crimes had its conceptual genesis in the BCS/SS Violent Crimes Information Center. BCS/SS maintains data files on missing and unidentified persons, child abusers, sex and narcotic registrants. When the new concept was approved for staffing and development, it was organizationally placed in BOCCI while some data files, useful elements in the new program, remained in BCS/SS. The rationale supporting the move was that BOCCI had a clientele base of investigators which would use the system.

Another new program, CRACKDOWN, founded by the legislature, is an investigative program creating dozens of new agent positions. The CRACKDOWN objective is to make cases against the Colombian drug cartels. The administration of the program is divided between BNE and BOCCI. Agents from both bureaus which are assigned to CRACKDOWN teams will report to either a BNE manager/supervisor or a BOCCI manager depending on the nature of the issue.

In the foregoing examples, major organizational principles were violated; similar functions and responsibilities should be grouped together in a logical manner; each employee should be answerable to only one supervisor/manager.

Diagnosis

The absence of clearly defined organizational roles and responsibilities increases the tension between managers, impairs cooperation and coordination between bureaus and weakens the organization's progress towards mission objectives.

Option B20 Move BOCCI investigative related responsibilities into BI. Move intelligence, coordination and legislative liaison functions into the director's office. Consolidate analytical programs and prosecution-oriented data bases into organizational units with the same function.

Pros

- Eliminates tensions created by inappropriate organization of programs.
- Reduces excessive compartmentalization and achieves cost savings by improving manager to worker ratios (i.e. fewer managers).

Cons

- Some locals think intelligence merged with enforcement undermines credibility.

Costs

- None.

Impacts

- Improves IEB structure.

Option B21 Develop common operating procedures for all IEB agents.

Pros

- Facilitates management control.
- Improves accountability by agents.
- Improves relations with local agencies.

Cons

- None.

Costs

- None.

Impacts

- Improves structure.

Option B22 Develop case management system in BNE.

Pros

- Aids evaluation of agents and programs.
- Facilitates data entry into other systems (e.g. WSIN).
- Facilitates cooperation with local law enforcement.

Cons

- Resistance.

Costs

- Some system design costs.

Impacts

- Improves control.

C. Rewards and Incentives

The area of rewards and punishments is important for any organization, and particularly so for a large and complex, difficult-to-manage public agency like DLE. Previously discussed structural problems and various organizational changes, personnel transfers, and

questionable management and promotions practices have saddled DLE with traditional problems in the area of rewards and incentives.

Perhaps the most serious area in this regard is that of personnel policies and practices, and the sub-area of management promotions and transfers. Past problems with individual managers have been solved by transfer and/or reorganization rather than remedied by documentation and strong personnel action.

In current practice, certain management positions are only available to sworn peace officers; yet there is no explicit policy to this effect, and civilian managers pass tests and fail to get promoted into the unofficial sworn positions.

Also, there are few punishments for bad management. Throughout DLE, managers who "save" budgeted funds for their bureau or program are "punished" by losing the money; there is thus little incentive to save, and many incentives to "hide" money. Managers in DLE talk knowingly about "pots of gold" which are funds that can be hidden from the bureau, branch, division, and/or ASD. A simple example is a fee for a service budgeted at one rate, when the service, in volume, is heavily discounted. The incentive is to budget high and use the savings for pet projects that cannot otherwise be funded.

There are personnel issues here, including inconsistent promotional criteria and practices which go along with the lack of an effective management assessment program. Consultants' interviews suggest that there are a great many DLE managers who are established in a position with little accountability or incentive to manage, and some who do not manage. This is compounded by layering of assistant chiefs in some bureaus whose chiefs thus have very modest workloads, and a reputed high ratio of managers to workers, overall. Perhaps the most serious contributing factor to poor performance is that managers in DLE do not rotate in a systematic or regular way.

Rotation is widely supported in DLE by those who believe it would help hold all managers more accountable to division-wide priorities, and make it more difficult for poor managers to "hide" and avoid accountability. Taken together, these personnel problems among senior-level and top management cause morale problems and further, in a cumulative fashion, are a general disincentive to carefully budget and spend, and to manage strongly.

The following options are suggested to remedy underlying management problems and create a more proper environment of incentives and disincentives so necessary to a healthy organization.

1. Personnel Issues Options

Regularly scheduled rotation of managers below the director's office is an essential element in the plan to minimize the adverse effects of "turf battles" which have plagued DLE.

There are also important collateral benefits to the practice of rotation which have prompted many, if not most, large private corporations to systematically transfer managers. These include improved managerial skills resulting from the diversity of experience and the advantages of fresh viewpoints being applied to persistent problems.

Implementation of a broadly applied DLE manager rotation plan would depend on organizational changes suggested by Consultants and resolution of the sworn/civilian personnel issue described below.

DLE has both peace officers (sworn) and civilians (non-sworn) filling bureau chief, assistant bureau chief and program director positions. In the view of many civilian managers, the peace officer managers form an elite group. This perception is fostered, in part, by the existence of peace officer prerequisites and the management practice of limiting some managerial positions to peace officers while approving the movement of peace officer managers into positions which were formerly occupied by civilians.

The problem is compounded by: 1) The absence of written policies explicitly identifying which management are de facto peace officer positions¹; and 2) The prospect that all peace officer managers must be extensively trained to bring the Department of Justice into compliance with standards established by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

DLE, through the Attorney General's office, recently requested POST to accept all DOJ peace officers (including managers) in the POST Special Program. The Special Program requires that every peace officer undergo 300 hours of training (as of November 1, 1990), a psychological evaluation and background investigation. There are no grandfather provisions and, accordingly, every person designated as a peace officer by DOJ must have met, or must undergo, the foregoing requirements.

Some confusion exists over the recent agreement with POST, but this topic is being worked on. It appears that POST, on one hand, understands that all DOJ sworn managers are to be included in the Special Program while some DOJ administrators are under the impression that certain sworn managers are exempt from the requirements.

Under existing DLE practices, chiefs in IEB and program managers who oversee peace officers are awarded peace officer status. In at least two instances, however, managers assigned to a noninvestigative branch or bureau have retained their peace officer status gained in some prior assignment.

The impact of the agreement with POST became apparent with the recent transfer of a nonsworn manager to a BNE program which included special agents. The newly appointed manager will be absent from his duties for six or more weeks undergoing training, most of which is unrelated to management duties.

New sworn managers also move into the peace officer "safety" retirement plan which is generally regarded as superior to the retirement plan of nonsworn employees. The safety benefits, designed to compensate for the rigorous duties of operational police and fire fighters, include earlier retirement dates, more favorable computation of pensions and more generous worker's compensation rights with presumptive job-related disabilities (heart, lung, hernia). Although definitive cost comparisons were not developed for the study, it can be safely concluded that making a non-sworn manager into a sworn manager incurs substantial initial and recurring costs because of the decision in 1990 to include them in the POST Special Program.

It makes fiscal sense, accordingly, to use nonsworn managers, wherever practical, for all DLE functions and programs, including those which directly oversee agents.

¹ Section 830.1 (b) California Penal Code confers peace officer status on anyone appointed as a bureau chief or assistant bureau chief.

From a strictly fiscal viewpoint, it is also sensible to not assign agents to programs which function to gather, process and analyze information. This objective can be facilitated by organizing enforcement units to include principally operational functions as opposed to program support functions (i.e. reversing the current trend).

Option C1 Identify, on a position by position basis within DLE, those managerial assignments which confer peace officer status on the person appointed to the position.

Option C2 Establish a division-wide rotation plan for managers through both sworn and nonsworn positions.

Pros

- Reduces management impediments associated with complexity and poor coordination by cross-training managers in all aspects of DLE operations.

Cons

- Managers would undergo time-consuming and costly training which is mostly unrelated to managerial skills.
- Lessens opportunities to assign managers on the basis of special skills.
- Confusion regarding retirement.

Costs

- Costs are significant for training and time.

Impacts

- Requires that managers move into and out of the "safety" retirement on many transfers.
- Takes managers "out-of-service" while undergoing training, and may require temporary appointment of backup managers.
- Persons may go in and out of retirement systems.

Option C3 Establish a rotation plan for managers in all nonsworn positions and a separate rotation plan for sworn managers.

Pros

- Reduces management impediments associated with complexity and poor coordination by cross-training managers in support functions and operations (enforcement).
- Exempts managers of support of functions from POST training requirements.
- Minimizes traffic in and out of safety retirement plan.

Cons

- Lessens opportunities to assign managers on the basis of special skills.

Costs

- As above.

Impacts

- As above.

Option C4 Adopt a policy of division-wide eligibility for nonsworn promotion or transfer to sworn managerial positions.

Pros

- Provides incentives to broaden base of those eligible.

Cons

- Newly appointed sworn managers would undergo time-consuming and costly training which is mostly unrelated to managerial skills.

Costs

- As above.

Impacts

- Takes the previously nonsworn managers "out of service" while undergoing training, and may require temporary appointment of backup managers.

Option C5 Withdraw specified management positions from POST Special Program.

Pros

- Would eliminate the need to provide managers with basic training designed for agents.
- Can be implemented administratively.
- Acceptable to POST.

Cons

- None.

Costs

- As above.

Impacts

- None.

The DLE has many organizational anomalies which include:

- One-on-one management positions in which the manager on top has only one person reporting to him/her (layering).
- Unnecessary compartmentalization, manifested by many small program units with only a few employees but each with a program manager. Where this occurs the manager/worker ratio is often too close (e.g. 1:2, 1:4). Most manager/supervisors, for example, should be able to satisfactorily oversee 6 to 12 or more employees (in more repetitive tasks).

Although these conditions occur in some degree in many bureaucracies, the current DLE organization appears to be both excessively compartmentalized and unnecessarily layered at certain levels.

Many of the reorganization options will require the movement of personnel and, in some cases, the creation of new positions. These options can be most effectively implemented by identifying any supernumary manager positions that may exist and consolidating programs to free personnel for reassignment to newly created functions (e.g., a central planning office).

Option C6 Commission a further study of compartmentalization and layering at DLE.

Pros

- Will free an optimum number of reassignments to newly created functions such as a central planning office.
- Will result in improved communication and coordination by shortening chain of command and minimizing compartmentalization.

Cons

- Study could be labor-intensive, involving desk audits, observations, etc.
- No results for three to six months.

Costs

- High initial cost for study.

Impacts

- Potential savings from elimination of positions.

Option C7 Conduct an internal survey/study of compartmentalization and layering at DLE.

Pros

- Will identify some of the more readily apparent anomalies, which, when corrected, will free up positions for assignment to new units created by reorganization.
- Will result in improved communications and coordination by shortening the chain of command and minimizing compartmentalization.

Cons

- DLE may not be able to free suitably trained personnel for project.

Costs

- Modest costs.

Impacts

- Will objectify needed changes.

2. Planning and Evaluation Options

The formation of a Planning and Evaluation Office (PEO) is suggested in section III E. This office would advise the director on a large number of issues involving choice of direction or allocation of resources. For its decisions to be respected by the operating bureaus, this needs to be a prestigious and influential body, visibly supported by DLE management.

- Option C8** The senior membership of the PEO could be drawn from the ranks of experienced division staff as an alternative to moving into a higher supervisory position. Pay, benefits, and future promotional opportunities would be the same as with the line positions.

Pros

- Informed input; impact among managers.

Cons

- Need to establish new senior staffing categories.

Costs

- Salary and benefit increments.

Impacts

- Alternative advancement for valuable staff.

D. Strategies/Programs

DLE employs its data bases, communication links, crime lab capacities and investigation programs primarily to serve the needs of local law enforcement. Secondly, CIIB clients are the regulatory, licensing and permitting agencies. DLE's budget is significantly augmented by fingerprint fees. DLE's efforts in support of the Division of Criminal Law of the Department of Justice (and to some lesser degree, the other DOJ divisions) trail far behind.

Diagnosis

Consultants' interviews and observations inside DLE, among DLE clients in the field and within DOJ support the finding that DLE programs are useful, considered effective, and perceived as well-targeted to DLE's mission and law enforcement needs statewide. (Problems for management, duplication, lack of accountability, and concerns with efficiency are considered elsewhere in this report, in discussions of structure, rewards, technologies, etc.)

Below are five separate areas of discussion dealing primarily with options for the program environment, and the strategic and program roles of several investigative bureaus.

1. Public Information, Intake and Outreach Options

As noted above, DLE provides a great many programs and services to local law enforcement as well as to DOJ. DLE's interface with the "field" (i.e., local agencies and DOJ) is extremely spread out; queries and requests for service come to the DLE through electronic interfaces with data bases as well as through extensive telephone and correspondence contacts. (The CLETS program, alone, is said to involve over a million transactions daily.)

Contacts with DLE from the field are, in essence, the "demand" aspect that stimulates DLE's strategies and programs. These contacts are therefore important to DLE's management and organizational structure. Nonetheless, there is no central intake function in DLE, nor is data systematically collected and analyzed with

regard to the vast number of requests for service. This is a serious gap in that it limits program planning and evaluation, the allocation of scarce resources, quality control and program evaluation, and management of information generally. With significant exceptions in some areas, no one knows who serves whom, how often, and what the service requires in resources.

In addition to a lack of "intake data," DLE's many bureaus and programs operate outside the channels of a central public information function. As a consequence, the Public Information Office has difficulty maintaining an agency history and key documents. Also, various bureaus publish brochures and program documents without any central oversight.

Furthermore, the public information function is relatively uninvolved in receiving and "routing" requests for service with the result that there is no central source of information about DLE's activities that can help manage the demand for service or a consistent program identity. Interviews document that regular clients usually know whom or where to call, but for others, there is often a confusion about whom to seek what kind of help from.

DLE outreach services provided by field representatives are fragmented among several bureaus, programs and LEDC. It would be operationally more efficient and more attractive to the clients if all field representative functions were centralized. The personnel should be trained to respond to inquiries about all programs and services offered to the law enforcement community. Consolidation of all field representatives into one unit would facilitate systematic client contacts. Local law enforcement interviews indicated that stability in the area assignments of field representatives is highly valued by DLE clients who noted that they are most comfortable with representatives they see on a regular basis and with whom they have developed a professional relationship.

The above problems should be resolved to aid strong management of a complex agency, to improve the all-important interface with the field, and to enhance overall DLE continuity. The following options are suggested:

- Option D1** Enhance and centralize public information in the director's office.
- Option D2** Centralize all libraries, including BNE, BCS/SS, LEDC, and ATC, to insure continuity.
- Option D3** Collect and publish definitive information on client demand and access to DLE programs and services, complete with a central intake point for consistent referral and data collection/analysis.
- Option D4** Consolidate field representative responsibilities (outreach for programs) within one unit.

Pros

- Avoids programs with independent constituencies.
- Collects evaluation and demand data for stronger management, budgeting, planning, etc.
- Improves client access and service.

Cons

- Reductions in autonomy will result in resistance.
- May stimulate resistance outside DLE and DOJ.

Costs

- Should be no new net costs; decentralized intake, library, publishing and field representative functions are currently staffed.
- Some space-related costs.

Impacts

- DLE will be better managed; planning and budgeting will be better informed; and efficiencies in intake for DLE and clients will result.
- DLE will speak with a single voice.

2. Program Evaluation Options

With only a few minor exceptions, there is virtually no objective evaluation of the vast array of DLE programs and services. There was a program evaluation function from 1964-1975, but objections to locating staff functions at the division level led to its elimination. While some bureaus and programs now collect activity data (as would the above suggestion for central intake), the only current evaluations of DLE's extensive and expensive services and programs are anecdotal, and limited to WSIN and a few legislative required reports.

Program evaluation is needed everywhere in DLE: 1) to assist in budgeting and planning; 2) to improve service; and 3) to enhance the agency's ability to obtain or maintain funds for valued and needed programs.

Closely allied to program evaluation is the need for an independent internal affairs unit which reports directly to the director's office. The overall size of DLE, as well as the magnitude of IEB field operations, and the enormous sums in cash being seized in undercover drug investigations justify the creation of a permanent internal affairs unit in the director's office. The internal affairs unit would investigate personnel complaints and conduct audits of compliance to policies, procedures and systems security. An independent internal affairs unit exemplifies good risk management whereby the likelihood of incidents occurring which damage confidence in DLE could be greatly reduced. These security considerations should be applied to investigative operations in other Attorney General divisions as well.

The following options are suggested.

- Option D5** Establish a program evaluation unit in the director's office.
- Option D6** Require each program and service to modestly but objectively evaluate program activity, quality, and impact annually.
- Option D7** Provide technical assistance to review and support evaluations.
- Option D8** Collect and analyze intake/demand data (e.g., ratio of requests from the field vs. DOJ, costs of major areas of demand, etc.)

Option D9 Employ program evaluation in budgeting, planning, auditing/inspecting, and the intake functions discussed throughout this report.

Option D10 Establish an internal affairs coordinating unit in the director's office.

Pros

- Enhances management, program planning, budgeting and auditing.
- Improves service to field and DOJ.
- Enhances DLE's budget posture.

Cons

- Resistance can be expected from poorly evaluated programs with political constituencies.
- Requires new function.

Costs

- Requires professional evaluator. 2-3 full time employees (FTEs).
- Requires support staff. 1-2 FTEs.

Impacts

- Poor quality programs and services will be improved or eliminated.
- Data will rationalize DLE's internal and legislative budget/planning process.

3. Administrative Services Division (ASD) Role

To many DLE managers, the various activities of ASD are not clear and are understaffed. They claim that they do not know whether ASD is a "services" unit or a "control" unit. These problems result in confusion and conflict in DLE and DOJ, and may have resulted in some ASD functions being duplicated at the DLE branch or bureau levels. Purchasing, budget control, and personnel are only a few of the many areas where Consultants' interviews showed some dissatisfaction with the role ASD is said to play. Consultants' observations also sustained the belief that understaffing and uncertainty results in problems, such as programs "hiding" funds to avoid ASD scrutiny, positions being changed "informally" without ASD involvement, and procurement activities arranged solely to avoid ASD involvement. Consultants have not conducted the kind of study required to evaluate ASD, but the following options are nonetheless suggested:

Option D11 Clarify ASD's role.

Option D12 Work out more explicit procedures for ASD and DLE management.

Option D13 Increase ASD staffing.

Pros

- Rationalizes/eliminates DLE "layering" and various administrative abuses.
- Limits future potentials for corruption and abuse.

Cons

- Changes in ASD's role are likely to be disruptive.
- ASD supports entire DOJ.

Costs

- Cost savings should result.

Impacts

- Clarification of ASD's role should improve DLE management and accountability.
- ASD services should improve.

E. Helpful Mechanisms

Helpful mechanisms include both "soft" and "hard" technologies and processes that help to coordinate an organization's work. While DLE is widely known for its extensive technologies, the softer areas of management processes were generally found to be lacking, according to Consultants' interviews and observations.

Those interviewed made few serious complaints about computers, DLE's excellent physical plant, or any of the myriad categories of equipment (except, perhaps, aspects of the telephone system, some of which are still rotary-dial). Complaints about budgeting, planning, training, and more mundane processes like meetings and lateral communications were seen as a serious source of concern, as was the problem of decentralized communications. In addition, the problem of decentralized telecommunications surfaced from reviews of prior studies, as well as interviews and observations. The telecommunications issue is tied to structure in many ways, and is also relevant to budgeting and planning. It is reviewed in some detail in another section below.

The budgeting problem has been alluded to in part in earlier discussions in this report. Budgeting problems include the lack of centralized budget control mechanisms and an allocation/planning process, the incentives for branches, bureaus and programs to "play budget games" by hiding funds and/or seeking funds or positions allocated to other units; and the lack of incentives for managers to save money. Interviews have shown that budget discipline is lacking and that surplus and deficit spending within the division's branches and bureaus is not uncommon. Complaints were voiced frequently, noting that little or no meaningful budget data is available to managers (i.e., even if a manager wanted to save money from budget allocation, the "fourth quarter" reports showing spending would not be available in a timely manner).

The lack of a central data-based budgeting system and an inspection element to insure adherence is paralleled by a fractured, decentralized and low-level planning process. Some planning in the DLE is done "gladiator-style," with little or no agency strategic or long-term plans or agendas. There is no central planning office and thus the best/most important planning occurs at the branch, bureau, and program levels, compounding the layering conflict and coordination problems previously touched upon in this report.

Planning at the branch level results in conflicts typified by those between LEDC and CIIB over procurement of expensive new fingerprint technology. Other procurement problems relate to the previously discussed ambivalence in ASD's role as a service versus control unit.

Little thought has been given to the long-term future with the exception of the DLE director's Agent 2000 project, which seeks to envision what law enforcement agents will best need in the way of training and support. But the huge procurements (certainly in DLE's future), as optical scanning and further automation potentials escalate, are not now planned at the top. Many of these problems with planning are thus played out in problems of procurement, particularly in areas of computer compatibility, separate databases that cannot now communicate, and rival factions for choice of long-term program and technology.

Elsewhere in this report are options for budgeting and planning improvements. Below is a discussion of the telecommunications issue, and separate discussions about the simpler helpful mechanisms, that of "meetings" and "management rotation."

1. General Structural Options

Option E1 Establish support for a strong administrative and management culture and system of participatory management based on horizontal/lateral management (i.e., a matrix system) and on a pattern of extensive and meaningful meetings (i.e., agendized, open, well-run).

Pros

- With a core of motivated, nonturf-oriented managers, DLE's work can greatly improve.
- Cost savings and quality improvements can be expected in all DLE programs and services.
- Reduced conflict, improved budgeting and planning, and improved "futures" development should follow.

Cons

- Resistance to change.

Costs

- None other than some increased learning curves for rotated managers.

Impacts

- Improvements in DLE management and administration can be expected in all areas covered in this study.
- Improved support can be expected from the field.

2. Planning and Evaluation Options

DLE is a large and complex organization, performing a large number of disparate functions. Any such organization needs some means of coordinating its operations and directing them toward its overall mission. In a business the activities would be judged by their contribution to profitability, but DLE is not a business; its programs are not subject to the discipline of the marketplace and the balance sheet.

Diagnosis

Without this discipline they have grown to become quite independent. Planning is done at the program level, with little consideration of division priorities; sometimes the Director's office is bypassed. Intra-agency competition is frequent, and staff morale is low among those who perceive themselves as the losers in the struggle for resources.

The division badly needs a strong management function. This is not the same thing as a strong director; its management needs include being able to carry out four interrelated technical activities that together are well beyond the capabilities of any single individual. These are planning, budgeting, auditing, and evaluation.

Auditing and evaluation are ways of examining the organization's current activities. Planning and budgeting are directed toward the future. The auditing or inspection function determines how well a program is actually run. Auditing is concerned with efficiency of operation, appropriate activities, and adherence to required procedures; it is used not so much to determine the (potential) usefulness of a program as to rate the adequacy of its management. An unfavorable audit will normally lead to corrective procedures. As envisioned here, auditing does not have as its primary goal the uncovering of improper or illegal activity by division personnel.

Closely related to auditing is program evaluation, but it is undertaken from a somewhat more conceptual viewpoint. In any bureaucracy, unfortunately, programs develop a momentum and a life of their own. Once begun they are hard to stop, or even modify substantially, until a crisis faces the organization. Program evaluation ranges from the academic - "does it significantly impact the crime problem?" - to the mundane "is it in fact doing what it was set up to do?"

It is essential that programs not be evaluated in a vacuum; their most important function may be to supplement the activities of other programs. Once again the concerted activities of the entire division must be considered. Is a program performing a useful function? Is there a demand for its services? (This may be from the outside or from within DOJ or even DLE.) Are its services adequate? Is there a way of measuring its usefulness? Does it have a well-defined purpose, and if so, is it actually carrying it out?

Planning can be both short-range - for the current or next budget year - or long-range (strategic), defining the course for the agency over the next half-dozen years or more. Planning says in a detailed and systematic way what the organization will do, and/or engulfs what it would like to do. Planning is a critical function; it should define the policies of the agency and reexamine its goals, and then lay out the most efficient overall strategy for attaining them.

Budgeting is far more than adding up each bureau's requests for next year. Budgeting is really resource allocation: what programs get how much? Should existing resources or staff be reassigned? How are building space and computer access divided up? These are sensitive questions, but the process can be made less painful when done in the light of the organization's overall needs. Effective budgeting recognizes agency priorities in the allocation of funding. Tradeoffs are made not to "buy off" any interests but to maximize the organization's performance of its mission within the limit of available resources. And as with planning, both short-and long-range budgeting give valuable information to the management.

The functions suggested here are not new or untried. All organizations, certainly including DLE, perform them to some extent and in some fashion. What consultants suggest is that these activities be formalized, centralized in the Director's office, and made public. A mechanism for the rational allocation of resources will greatly improve operating efficiency. The perception by division staff of a regularly constituted, impartial, and informed budget and planning process will improve morale and strengthen cooperation at the expense of competition.

Implicit in all of this discussion are global concerns. The activities of each program in the division must be selected to advance the purposes of the division overall, and not that of the program alone without regard to anyone else. In an organization not formed to make a profit, such as DLE, there is no clear signal to show how well this goal is attained. Thus there is no substitute for a centralized, high-level planning and evaluating mechanism through which all of DLE's operations are controlled.

Options for the establishment of such a mechanism are part of the core set of options in this report. The functions envisioned here are for the division to evaluate and plan its own operations; they are not necessarily intended to interfere with or substitute for the work of existing bodies such as the Administrative Services Division of DOJ or the Departments of General Services or Finance.

With aspects of this mechanism in place, DLE should be able to attain the following:

- a. DLE's mission, goals, policies, and priorities will be clearly outlined.
- b. Auditing, evaluation, planning, and budgeting will be carried out on a global level in conformity with the mission, goals, policies, and priorities.
- c. Programs will be initiated, enlarged, continued, decreased, or terminated in accordance with how well they meet DLE's overall needs. The PEO may wish to serve as an "incubator" for new programs until they are strong enough to stand on their own.
- d. The efficiency of utilization of fiscal and material resources will be maximized.

The establishment of priorities and the resolution of differences must ultimately lie with the executives of DLE and DOJ. And only the executive has the authority to accept and ensure implementation of the planning and evaluating recommendations. But the planning and evaluating process is a technical activity which will not be carried out by top management in an organization of DLE's size and complexity. These activities will require a substantial amount of effort by competent personnel, well acquainted with DLE's makeup, activities and purposes.

Option E2 Establish a body to carry out the evaluative and planning functions should be formed. For convenience this body will hereinafter be referred to as the "Planning and Evaluation Office" (PEO). This designation is not meant to imply anything about the organization or structure of the office. The functions may be integrated or performed by different individuals. Some services could be contracted out or delegated to other bureaus. In the extreme there

could even be four separate offices. But in this discussion the PEO will be treated as a single, if not clearly defined, body.

In Consultants' opinion there are two important requirements for the PEO. Without these it will be ineffective and ignored.

- It must have input from the operating bureaus at an authoritative level.
- It must have the expertise to carry out its technical functions.

These two requirements imply that the makeup of the PEO will include both respected senior-level DLE personnel and technical experts in the appropriate functions.

Pros

- Rationalized strategic management, adherence to the goals of the total organization, reduced competition, operating efficiencies.

Cons

- Confusion and delays until the program is established. Another step in the bureaucratic process. May be seen as just one more obstacle to circumvent or resist.

Costs

- Consultants estimate a staff of 6 - 10 (FTE): 2 - 3 senior staff members, 3 - 5 technical staff, and 1 - 2 clerical and support workers. Actual costs depend on whether existing planning positions from the bureaus would be reallocated.

Impacts

- Much planning and control removed from the bureaus. Vested interests may well resist it.

3. Information Systems Options

There are two major tasks related to information systems: managing the information to be communicated, including the interaction with outside users; and providing the data processing system and the telecommunications network, whether by phone, data line, or radio. Both of these must be working if the system is to function efficiently. They overlap to a considerable extent, yet in some ways they conflict with each other.

The conflict is this: these are different types of problems. Establishing the physical system requires computer and engineering skills; managing the information requires understanding of the subject matter and its use, and being able to deal interactively with the users. These abilities typically are found in different individuals in different parts of DLE. How can the work be assigned to the best qualified persons and still coordinated for maximum efficiency and effectiveness?

A secondary - significant, but not intrinsic - issue is that in DLE as presently constituted the technical and the information functions are each divided up among a number of groups in different bureaus, for no apparent logical reason. The

proliferation of responsibilities reduces overall system compatibility and leads to intra-agency competition.

CRC Systems, Inc. produced a report in 1989 outlining DLE's technical telecommunications needs and proposing changes. The report was not received with enthusiasm by all of DLE's managers and their recommendations have not been implemented. Consultants will not comment on the bulk of their findings as these technical issues fall outside of our competence. However, some of their recommendations on the management structure deserve consideration.

There are three communication modes in use by DLE: phone, data transmission, and radio. Consultants focused their attention on data transmission; observations on the other two modes are based mostly on the CRC report.

Diagnosis - Data Processing and Telecommunications

It appears that the phone system presents no unusual problem that other large organizations would not have, at least when security needs are considered. However, the present system is reported to be seriously over budget, and no one has the responsibility for managing or upgrading it. The phone networks at 4949 Broadway and in the branch offices are both included in this.

It appears that the main problems with the radio network are: 1) Its capacity is severely limited; and 2) The hardware is obsolescent. New equipment should be evaluated and procured. Units of IEB are the primary users of this mode, which is managed by DOJ.

Leaving technical improvements aside, what is needed for these two modes is for someone in DLE to be clearly and permanently designated as responsible for managing them.

There are four data processing systems of concern:

- **Open Shop** is primarily internal to DOJ (not just DLE). It is used for electronic mail, word processing, local calculations of all sorts, and some individual data bases, as in BI and BOCCI.
- **CLETS** is the statewide telecommunications network connected to some 8,000 users (law enforcement agencies). It accesses CJIS (the Criminal Justice Information Service, under BJIS), the Automated Criminal History Program (BCI), and some smaller databases.
- **Cal ID-RAN**, managed by a special section of BCI, is the fingerprint identification and telecommunications activity. System hardware and software are proprietary and are maintained exclusively by the vendor. Cal Photo is being added here.

(The Batch system is used primarily by LEDC for its own internal operations and is not a candidate for reorganization.)

The following are some particular problems relating to data processing and communications as identified by DLE's staff:

- There have been major and ongoing disputes between LEDC and CIIB over the choice of hardware, especially for the optical imaging programs (e.g., Cal

ID). Optical imaging is an area in which computing center staff usually have less experience than in data processing, and CIIB feel that they themselves understand the technical needs better than does LEDC.

- CIIB staff also claim that the LEDC technicians cannot communicate well with the data analysts, clerical staff, police, etc., who use the CLETS or Open Shop system. From this point of view, LEDC emphasizes technical aspects of telecommunication (where they are clearly expert) rather than user problems, and are thus not the ideal trainers in using the system or troubleshooting.
- The telecommunications section of LEDC maintains the hardware on Open Shop and CLETS, but the exact boundaries of their responsibilities are not the same in these two cases.
- CLETS handles a huge volume of calls (a million a day). It should be used only for short inquiries. But there is sometimes a need for the user to be on-line for a longer amount of time to research various possibilities. Calls of this type would tie up CLETS terminals.
- Issues pointed out by CRC Systems: both the technology and the degree of regulation of telecommunications have become increasingly complex and fluid, and require informed monitoring and planning. In addition there are areas where the three telecommunications modes overlap, so they cannot be managed completely in isolation from each other.

CRC Systems recommended a single managing body for all three forms of telecommunication. It is not clear to Consultants that the phone and radio system management need to reside in the same group as data communications, but there are obvious interrelationships, such as the cabling network, which must be considered. Telephone system management, once the system is decided upon, can be the responsibility of the vendor; and it should not be an onerous task for DLE. Radio communication is used almost exclusively by the investigating branches, and they can perhaps deal with it by themselves.

Diagnosis - Information Management

Although it is technically distinct from data processing, the information management process suffers similarly from the disjointed structure and assignment of responsibility within DLE.

- The units involved in interfacing with in-house or remote users are scattered throughout DLE and include BJIS Field Services, BCS/SS Special Services, VCIS and VCIC (violent crimes), SHOP (habitual offenders), and Cal ID-RAN. The reason for this dispersion is more historical than logical, and efficiencies might well be achieved by placing many or all of them together.
- Several groups - BCS/SS, BJIS, BOCCI, BI - have their own databases. When these are created independently they tend to have incompatible formats so the data in them cannot be combined.
- There has been interest in a "single-inquiry" system which would give access to all the information on a person or case without having to inquire of each database separately. Opinions differ on whether this is a good idea; it would be convenient for the user but may not be feasible. In either case the question deserves further study, but there is no mechanism for its resolution.

It is clear that these problems demand the elimination of fragmented and conflicting efforts by individual bureaus and substitution of a coordinated effort across the entire DLE.

Option E3 Explicitly recognize the "equipment/communications" dichotomy and address this by establishing a mechanism to resolve the associated problems. The telecommunications group should involve itself with equipment, communications protocols, and the user interface. The interested parties should all be represented and should have equal voices. There should be a clear definition of the responsibilities of LEDC and CIIB units in the selection and use of equipment. With a small group it may be hoped that consensus could be achieved much of the time.

This could take several forms, as shown in the options below.

Option E4 Establish a standing telecommunications working group, with LEDC and representatives of the user bureaus (BCI, BJIS, BI, etc.) under the auspices of the director or deputy director.

Pros

- No new staff. Bureau desires communicated directly to the group.

Cons

- Domination by strong bureau representatives; possible abrupt shift of direction if they are replaced.

Costs

- Minimal, except for staff time.

Impacts

- Better coordination of technical issues; some reduction of competition; resolution of procurement issues with possible major savings.

Option E5 Establish a coordinating group to be a subset of the planning and evaluation office recommended elsewhere by Consultants in this report. In this case the group would be an independent body, but representatives of the user bureaus would be present to provide input and comments.

Pros

- Relative independence of the bureaus. Perhaps more long-term consistency.

Cons

- May be seen as another obstacle to be bypassed.

Costs

- Staffing (unless positions are reallocated from bureaus).

Impacts

- As above; may be more effective in reducing competition. Bureaus have input but not control; it is not clear how this would work out.

Option E6 Develop standards for the establishment of databases so all new ones, at least, will be compatible. (It may be too costly to reconcile all of the existing systems.) The telecommunications working group, as above, or another body similarly constituted could provide the guidance for this standardization.

Pros

- Database standardization can be comprehensive and well-coordinated.

Cons

- Some databases may not be amenable to standardization.
- Users may claim that they are losing control or that their access time is increased unacceptably.
- The telecommunications group may not be the right people for the job.

Costs

- Possible increase in input time.
- Staff time to serve in group.

Impacts

- If this is done, information can be transmitted from one database to another, avoiding duplicate manual entry.
- More sources of information will be available to users.

Option E7 Coordinate the databases used for specific cases by the investigative bureaus.

Pros

- As above.

Cons

- Less comprehensive coverage.
- Possible fade in interest if this is a strictly informal and voluntary group.

Costs

- Somewhat less than the above.

Impacts

- As above, but probably less.

NOTE: The division management should strongly discourage any activity which bypasses these groups unless it is very clearly the province of one unit only.

- Option E8** Consolidate units involved in interfacing with in-house or remote users, most logically into BJIS. At present, these units are scattered throughout the division and include: BJIS Field Services, BCS/SS Special Services, VCIS and VCIC (violent crimes), SHOP (habitual offenders), and Cal ID-RAN. The reason for this dispersion is more historical than logical, and efficiencies might well be achieved by placing many or all of them together.

Pros

- Coordination of efforts
- Reduction of duplication.
- Pooling of talents in this area.

Cons

- Possible massive resistance by the units involved.
- Jurisdictional disputes and questions as to who is in charge of the combined program.

Costs

- Should require no new staff, but whatever cost is incurred by reassignment of personnel will be entailed.

Impacts

- Simplified and consistent access by users. This could be a major step toward the "single-inquiry" system.

- Option E9** If consolidation of all of the telecommunications units is thought likely to impede the flow of information in investigations, another alternative would be for investigative bureaus to retain their criminal intelligence files, but have them tied in with CJIS to minimize incompatibilities.

Pros

- Possible maintenance of flexibility for investigative units.

Cons

- Loss of overall coordination and system compatibility.

Costs

- Less than that of total consolidation since less staff is reassigned.

Impacts

- Retention of competitive functions (similar activities in different bureaus).

CRC Systems recommended a single managing body for all three forms of telecommunication. It is not clear to Consultants that the phone and radio system management need to reside in the same group as data communications, but there are obvious interrelationships such as the cabling network which must be considered. Telephone system management, once the system is decided upon, can be the

responsibility of the vendor; and it should not be an onerous task for DLE. Radio communication is used almost exclusively by the investigating branches.

Option E10 Include radio and phone communications in the coordinating group.

Pros

- All telecommunications areas can be coordinated and interactions accounted for.

Cons

- Increased resistance to reorganization.
- Specialists in the three areas may not have much in common.

Costs

- Little more than having these three functions separately.
- Possible savings on administrative overhead.

Impacts

- Voice and radio coordinators - expected to be much smaller groups - can be formally constituted and have the benefits of more expert opinion than would be justifiable for them.
- Integrated advanced technology can be best explored.

Option E11 Maintain separate coordinating groups, but establish consultation on overlapping issues.

Pros

- Simpler structure.
- Smaller bodies.

Cons

- Fragmented approach.
- Data communications may dominate.
- In case of disagreement, it is not clear who would prevail.

Costs

- Staffing costs minimal.
- Bad equipment decisions could be very expensive.

Impacts

- Some of the same as in the previous option, but diluted.

F. Relationships

A Planning and Evaluation Office (PEO) option in section III E would advise the director on a large number of issues involving choice of direction or allocation of resources. Some proposals will be rejected; some areas will not receive funding. These can be painful and difficult decisions, and conflicts will arise between the disappointed proposers and the PEO.

Secondly, in the "representative" model of the PEO, the office is directed by rotating bureau chiefs. In these cases there is a possibility that some chiefs will experience a conflict of interest between their mission on the PEO - to serve the interests of the division as a whole - and their duties to their bureaus. It is not even clear how a disagreement among bureau chiefs would be resolved before the PEO makes its recommendation to the director. How the technical staff would take its direction from conflicting senior managers is also not clear.

Option F1 The DLE director should settle all disputes, both inside and outside of the PEO.

Pros

- Administratively simple and quick.

Cons

- Infringes on director's scarce time.

Costs

- Opportunity costs of time.

Impacts

- This is how it is done now.

Option F2 Establish an "appeals court," made up of bureau chiefs not sitting on the PEO, to hear formal complaints on rejected proposals.

Pros

- Serves as a check on the PEO.
- Promotes objectivity.

Cons

- Extra effort and time.
- May be overused.

Costs

- The time of all involved.

Impacts

- Formalizes the process, but could be a serious delaying tactic.
- Could be used to threaten delay.

Option F3 Within a representative PEO, consensus should be required.

Pros

- Would gain maximum support from all concerned.

Cons

- Could be lengthy.
- Some issues might not get decided.

Costs

- Time.

Impacts

- At the cost of lost time, would get best compliance with recommendations.

Option F4 Within a representative PEO, a majority vote should be required.

Pros

- Fast, well-accepted procedure.

Cons

- Does not resolve underlying conflict.

Costs

- Minimal.

Impacts

- Greatly improves efficiency of operation of PEO.

G. Leadership

One of the major diagnostic findings of this study is that the current DLE structure hampers the accomplishment of its mission. This finding is nowhere more obvious than in an assessment of the structure of the DLE director position. Currently, there is one director and three assistant directors who are not really "assistants" but instead are branch chiefs.

By almost all accounts, DLE is too vast and too complex to be led by a single director. The workload requires tremendous liaison with outside agencies as diverse as the International Association of Police Chiefs and California State Sheriffs' Association to labor unions and the legislature. Fully half of the director's time is spent travelling around the state and nationally, representing the DOJ and DLE to such groups.

These basic leadership requirements involve buffering the division at its boundaries with the external environment. The consequence, however, is that the internal organization is undermanaged and inadequately led, in spite of the energy and talent of the current director.


Most of those interviewed by Consultants supported a "pluralistic executive" concept with a director for the external environment and a "civil service" permanent deputy director for the everyday management and control of the organization itself. The deputy director position, of course, would require staffing by units that would, as a consequence, centralize a variety of currently decentralized positions.

The following options are suggested for the deputy director's office, and are seen as solutions to the leadership problem currently structured in DLE.

- Option G1** Establish a deputy director position to act as "acting" director in the director's absence, and to coordinate all internal administration and policy development.

Option G2 Attach to the director's office, as staff to the deputy director, the following currently decentralized DLE functions:

- a. Comptroller/Budgeting - budget staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
- b. Personnel - personnel staff would come from IEB and CIIB.
- c. Program Evaluation (see earlier discussion).
- d. Planning (see earlier discussion).
- e. Audits/Inspections (for inventory audits, program inspections and administrative reviews).
- f. Legislative liaison (as per current arrangement).
- g. Internal Affairs/Facility Security and Safety (for background investigations, Criminal History System security and to review bureau inquiries).



Pros

- Allows proper administration and leadership, with continuity and strength for a large, complex agency.
- Centralizes tools of leadership.
- "Flattens" a layered organization.
- Adds necessary and mission functions (e.g., Internal Affairs).
- Uses mostly current staffing.
- Increases accountability.
- Allows program and bureau administration to continue, but under strong administrative leadership.
- Unifies and standardizes internal affairs procedures.
- Insures integrity of internal investigations.

Cons

- Involves major changes and is thus likely to be resisted.
- Results in complex director's office.
- Centralization may reduce initiative and creativity.

Costs

- Would involve several new planning and evaluation positions; remainder of required positions should be taken from CIIB and IEB.
- Requires some remodeling of space.
- Staffing from existing agent pool.

Impacts

- Would make DLE far more manageable.
- Is likely to prevent future problems.
- Improves director's control of agency.

Option G3 Another alternative would be to place most of the support functions noted above in ASD, further centralizing administrative units.

Pros

- Simplifies DOJ structure.
- Improves Attorney General's control over DLE.

Cons

- Service vs. control orientation of ASD may limit utility.
- Administrative function would be too far removed from operations.

Costs

- Would cost less than many new units attached to deputy director.
- Would generally help cut DLE budgets (but also services and programs).

Impacts

- Enhanced administrative control.
- Loss of DLE initiative, autonomy and visibility.

Option G4 Another alternative would be to attach various administrative units to the Chief Deputy Attorney General.

Pros

- Enhanced control for Attorney General of largest and most expensive DOJ unit.

Cons

- Loss of DLE autonomy, visibility, etc.

Costs

- Less expensive than if housed in DLE, but more than if housed in ASD.

Impacts

- Similar to above.

Option G5 Another alternative would be to maintain two assistant directors, one over LEDC and one over a new branch for Administration; and attach various administrative offices to the administrative assistant director. See chart below which also shows a variety of other selected options and possibilities noted in previous discussions.

Pros

- Simpler.
- Less resistance to change.

Cons

- Less control.

Costs

- More expensive.

Impacts

- Some more control, but not as much as previous options.

Conclusions

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This Final Options Report has stressed several major diagnostic themes and 62 options for solving organizational problems. The chief themes revolved around the layering problem of DLE's complex structure, the resulting lack of horizontal communication and coordination, and the resulting problem of competition among various units. Many of the options suggested to deal with these structural problems involved forms of centralization.

Consultants met with the Advisory Committee to review this report and also consulted with DLE's director and many others. Many written comments were submitted by various DLE managers concerning this report, and extensive corrections resulted.

The next step involved Consultants evaluating feedback on the document and developing final recommendations. A draft final Reorganization Plan resulted, for discussion at the meeting scheduled for November 2, from 1 to 4 p.m. Immediately thereafter, Consultants submitted a final edition of the Reorganization Plan.

Appendix A

APPENDIX A CONSIDERATION OF OTHER STATES

As Consultants' previous research has shown, technology is a driving force behind the structure and growth of the Division of Law Enforcement (DLE). DLE's planning and budgeting functions are not centralized, and because of this and the growth of technologies, there is conflict and discord among DLE's bureaus over scarce resources.

In an effort to present DLE with alternative techniques of planning and budgeting for technology-driven growth and different states' organizational structures (with respect to the planning and budgeting functions), Consultants surveyed eight states. Consultants attempted to survey a sampling of states that were representative of the nation's diversity in size, regions and population. The states chosen were: Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Consultants found all of the state agencies surveyed to be extremely cooperative and forthcoming in their responses.

Information was requested from the state agency as similar in function as possible to DLE. The following questions were asked:

- 1) How does your agency plan for and accommodate new technologies? For example, if a manager within your agency discovered a new line of computers that would aid his employees in their work, would that manager be able to purchase them, or would he have to go through a procedure to assure that the equipment is what's needed and that it is compatible with existing systems?
- 2) Describe your agency's organizational structure, and explain where the planning and budgeting functions are located.

The following information, by state, presents the result of Consultants' survey. No judgments have been made about whether these various techniques work better or are better than those of DLE.

Colorado State Attorney General's Office, Katherine Newell, Director of Administration and Planning, (303) 866-5013

Technology

The state legislature has an Information Management Commission through which requests for computer equipment must be routed. The commission was founded in an attempt to maintain some compatibility between the state's computer systems. Requests that are approved by the commission are sent to the Joint Budget Committee of the legislature, and if approved there, the request is funded.

Requests must be submitted in August to the Information Management Commission. The approval process takes approximately nine months to complete. Generally, the process works well; however, there have been some complaints about the length of time necessary to complete it. While the request is being processed, agencies must share equipment.

Other technological equipment is provided to requesting agencies by the purchasing department. Any purchase of more than \$200 must go through a bid process within the purchasing department. For purchases of less than \$200, an agency can obtain price quotes over the telephone, and purchase the equipment from the lowest bidder. Non-computer equipment that is very expensive (e.g., \$30,000) must go through the Information Management Commission.

Planning and Budgeting

Both planning and budgeting are done for the Attorney General's Office in Administration. In Colorado, the legislature requires that if an agency wants to increase its budget from the previous year, it must submit "decision items" which include how much money the agency wants, what it's for, and why. Any part of the Attorney General's Office can submit decision items for inclusion into the budget. Once the decision items are gathered (in early September), the Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General and Solicitor General convene to decide which items will be included in the budget, and to prioritize these items. Ultimate decision-making authority lies with the Attorney General.

Planning personnel in the department do staff and space projections, look at administrative details related to growth within parts of the department (such as how many new staff, and where they will be housed, etc.), and coordinate the legal services provided by the Attorney General's Office with the funds that are received for the services (e.g., if a client agency that provides the AG's Office with \$50K a year gets additional funds from the legislature and will spend \$90K a year, the planning office must make sure that the AG's Office will have enough staff and other resources to provide the required services.)

Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Diane Zom, Director of Statistical Analysis Center, (904) 487-4808

Technology

The Department of Law Enforcement has an Information Resources Commission (IRC), to which every division submits an Information Resource Management Plan. This plan includes the division's goals and objectives, how they manage information, data bases, and recommendations. Generally, the IRC makes decisions as to what equipment to buy unless the equipment costs an inordinately large amount of money. In this case, budget funds must be requested from the legislature.

Although the IRC approval system applies to all requested "hardware," in practice, it affects primarily computer equipment.

Planning and Budgeting

The Florida Department of Law Enforcement is divided into two branches under the direction of the Commissioner: 1) Deputy Commissioner and 2) Assistant Commissioner.

The Deputy Commissioner heads several divisions, among which are Staff Services (including Planning, Budgeting, Resources, Personnel, Accounting), Criminal Justice Information Service, and Standards and Training. The Assistant Commissioner also heads several divisions such as Executive Investigations, Criminal Investigations, Local Law Enforcement Assistance, Crime Labs and Medical Examiners' Commission.

Each of the two divisions prepares its own budget. Planning is conducted for the whole department by Staff Services which compiles a Five Year Plan, based on the input of the divisions. This plan is not pro-active in that it does not make planning decisions. Instead, it makes recommendations to a Command Staff (composed of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner and division heads). The Command Staff prioritizes and decides which requests for funding will be approved. All decisions go through the Command Staff.

Illinois State Police Department, Sgt. Ted Kemp, Captain Dennis Bowman, Research and Development Bureau, Division of Administration, (217) 785-8940.

Technology

Illinois seems to have made an effort towards a comprehensive system for learning about, evaluating and purchasing new technologies. Five bureaus located in three different divisions are responsible for evaluating and purchasing equipment and new technology used by the Illinois State Police (IPS). These bureaus are: Bureau of Logistics, Information Services Bureau, Research and Development Bureau, Illinois State Police Academy and Division of State Troopers. Close coordination between these bureaus and the field occurs. Additionally, each division has a section which is involved in research concerning their respective divisions.

The Information Services Bureau is responsible for electronic data processing (EDP) equipment. The Information Processing Support (ISP) Section provides EDP consultation for the rest of the department. Services are provided for hardware, software, peripherals, and training. Section personnel evaluate new equipment, procedures and software and provide recommendations to the field.

The section meets with each organization within the ISP to develop annual EDP plans. Field personnel provide information concerning their needs. The section then develops a plan, which includes configurations and costs, which will best meet the needs of the field. Additionally, the section will obtain and evaluate new technology that has been requested from the field. The results of the evaluation and acquisition recommendations are forwarded through appropriate channels.

The Research and Development Bureau handles new technology, evaluations, and needs assessments. Research is conducted to determine what equipment will meet both current and future needs in the department. When a new system or equipment item is identified for purchase, a formal proposal is developed and submitted to the director. If the proposal is complex, a committee comprised of the appropriate field and support personnel is formed to implement the proposal. If the proposal is routine, close coordination occurs between the Research and Development Bureau and the appropriate support organization to procure the equipment.

Evaluations are routinely conducted whenever significant acquisitions occur. The purpose is to ensure that the implementation was efficient, that the equipment or systems performed as expected, and that user needs were met. Potential improvements are also closely examined.

The bureau conducts or coordinates needs assessments for the department. The needs assessments are conducted using management reports, audits, surveys, interviews, and reviews of operations in other agencies.

The ISP has a suggestion program, whereby recommendations are solicited from field personnel. Evaluations of these suggestions are coordinated by a team of personnel from the Research and Development Bureau. When a suggestion is considered feasible, a proposal is developed and submitted to the director. If approved, the suggestion is implemented using normal procedures.

The Division of State Troopers' Communications bureau is responsible for evaluation, procurement, and maintenance of all communications and radar equipment. The bureau has an Engineering and Maintenance Section and a Fiscal and Procurement Section which are primarily responsible for these activities. The bureau provides consultation services to the field and is responsible for insuring that all equipment purchases are compatible with the ISP communications system.

Planning and Budgeting

Budget decisions are controlled functions at the director level. Planning is from the bottom up, but is controlled in large part by the availability of resources.

The department is broken down into divisions which are further divided into bureaus. The budget cycle begins with an "executive committee" which is comprised of the department's director, first deputy director, the deputy director of each of the six divisions and the chief fiscal officer. Bureau/zone/district managers then prepare a plan that details how budget dollars will be used in their organization. If significant services will be eliminated or reduced, an impact statement is prepared and submitted through the chain of command to the director. The executive committee then determines whether priorities should be changed, resources diverted, services curtailed, or additional funds should be requested from the legislature. The action plan is finalized based on the direction from the executive committee.

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, George Mitchell, Deputy Commissioner for Management and Information Services, (518) 457-6091.

Technology

The division has a multi-year agenda which is updated as many as three times per year. Major requests for technological equipment are in this agenda. Those which come up during the year and are not in the agenda initiate updates. The division has an annual budget and expenditure plan which allocates funds for technological purchases.

Once a need for equipment is identified, a purchase request is filled out, eventually making its way to the Deputy Commissioner of an office or bureau. They pass the request on to the head of the information resources group who approves it based on standards that have been adopted by the division to assure compatibility of software and hardware. If the request is not approved, it is passed on to a higher authority. Eventually, approved requests are sent to Finance, which purchases it.

Planning and Budgeting

The Division of Criminal Justice Services is headed by a Commissioner who also works for the governor as the Director of Criminal Justice in charge of coordinating local, state and federal agencies. The division has several bureaus or offices which are responsible for: identification, training, criminal justice aid programs, research and policy analysis, and management information systems. Each of these bureaus or offices is headed by a Deputy Commissioner. Budgeting and Planning (for staffing, space needs, budget funds, etc.) is done by Management Information Services (MIS). This office/bureau is on the same level as the other bureaus/offices, not set apart at a different level. It does not report directly to the Commissioner.

To create a budget, a base budget is generated from the previous year. Additional funds are allocated for a new budget based on requests from bureaus/offices, and prioritization by the Commissioner, Executive Deputy, and in some cases, the Deputy Commissioner.

Planning for policies and programs (e.g., to increase services related to drugs) is done by the research/policy analysis group. This is not within the scope of the MIS group.

**Oregon State Police, Lt. Brent Mellbye, Planning and Research Office,
(503) 373-7842**

Technology


To obtain new equipment, such as computers, patrol cars, bullet-proof vests, etc., a division or bureau head must submit a request through the chain of command. The request eventually reaches the data processing section where a manager will review and generally approve the request, unless it would cause massive changes in the department. In this case, the request is sent to the Superintendent's Executive Committee, comprised of the Deputy Superintendent, the Lt. Colonel, majors from the five bureaus, and the Planning and Research Office. This committee determines the new equipment's capabilities, and weighs the cost of the equipment against its benefits.

Decisions regarding technology can also be guided by the Executive Department which decides what type of equipment will be used. For example, they could make a decision to use only IBM computers. If this decision was changed, the department would be required to solicit (at least three) bids from computer firms. This bid process can be circumvented if the department can prove that only one company can provide them with equipment to meet their needs. In this case, there would be a sole source.

Planning and Budgeting

The State Police is not, according to the Planning and Research Office, a political agency. Only the Superintendent is appointed by the governor, but there has not been much turnover in the Superintendent position, regardless of the change in the Governor's Office. Thus, the agency is relatively stable.

The organizational structure of the State Police is as follows:



The Planning and Research Office is responsible for determining the department's goals and objectives, publications, the department's policy manual, and long range planning. The Business Office compiles budget information from the lower levels, makes projections, prioritizes budget requests and makes recommendations to the Superintendent, who makes final budget decisions. Generally, the Superintendent approves the Business Office's recommendations.

The National Accreditation Standards recommend that there be no more than one person between an agency's Planner and Budgeter and the agency's head. The Oregon State Police has found that the centralized planning and budgeting system described above is satisfactory and prevents "squabbling" among units.


Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Martha Ewell, Administrative Secretary, (802) 828-3171; Ted Nelson, Administrative Officer, Administrative Division of the Vermont Department of Public Safety, (802) 244-8718

Technology

When a department wants new technology (specifically, computers), the state first determines if the request is budgeted for the fiscal year. If it is not, the request goes through the normal appropriation cycle. If it is budgeted, quantities, specific types/brands, etc. are determined by the "State Information Systems" office to assure that the equipment will meet the performance requirements of the state (will it do what they think it will do), that it is compatible with the equipment the state already has, and that the state does not already have the equipment, or something similar, that can be used by the requesting department.

Planning and Budgeting

The Vermont Department of Public Safety is similar to DLE. There is a Commissioner below whom are two general appropriations: for State Police, and for Emergency Management. The Administrative Division and the (lone) state planner are organizationally below the commissioner, above the two "divisions," as illustrated below. The Administrative Division works with the heads of the State Police and the Emergency Management "divisions" to prepare budgets.



Washington Attorney General's Office, Mr. David Walsh, Deputy Attorney General, (206) 753-2550; Lt. Bill Ford, Commander of Budget Fiscal Services, Washington State Patrol, (206) 753-1012

Technology

The Department of Information Services (DIS) establishes standards for acquisition of equipment. The state has an annual acquisition plan that lists (and describes) the state's major equipment purchases. State agencies can get their own equipment if the cost is not large, but large purchases must go through DIS. DIS is a controlling agency; it doesn't actually give any money to the requesting agencies. It only gives its approval to agencies to use their own money to purchase equipment.

The DIS procedure applies primarily to computers and telecommunications equipment.

Planning and Budgeting

In descending order, their organizational levels are Bureau, Division, Section. The budget is formulated at the division level. Section managers have input which is important, but not dominant. At this stage, however, the division heads have the final word on prioritization. Once formulated, the budget is submitted to the bureau chief who further prioritizes the items in the budget. From here, the budget is submitted to the State Office of Financial Management which prioritizes it further and gives it to the Legislature.

The Washington State Patrol has a separate planning unit called Research and Development which works out of the Chief's Office. The sections work with the planning unit on long range plans for the State Patrol.

**Wisconsin Division of Law Enforcement Services (DLES), John Killian,
Division Administrator, (608) 266-7751**

Technology

Within the state's Department of Justice, there is a Management Information System (MIS) Group. All of the Division of Law Enforcement Services' (DLES) requests for equipment/technology goes through the group which has a "long range plan." If the MIS group approves the request, it is sent to the controlling agency for the state, the Bureau of Information, Technology and Management (within the state's Department of Administration). This process assures that there is consistency in the software/hardware that the Department and Division acquire.

The state legislature has authorized a statewide review of agencies' and universities' technology and information systems. Ernst and Young (Indianapolis) is conducting the review which aims to provide a plan for the next three to five years and recommendations to the governor and legislature regarding whether to upgrade/revamp existing systems (primarily computers) or to begin with an entirely new system. Thus far, it seems that there is fragmentation and lack of coordination in the state's systems. The review has not affected small purchases of computer equipment; however, large purchases have been discouraged until the review is completed at the end of September.

Planning and Budgeting

As described, the structure for planning and budgeting is very similar to what California's DLE has. DLES has three bureaus beneath it. Each bureau director does planning and prepares his own bureau budget, and submits it to the Division's administrator. The administrator makes minor or no modifications to the plans and budgets, and then submits them as the Division's plans and budget to the Division of Administration.

The Division of Administration does nothing more than compile them at this stage. Prioritization and decision making take place between the Attorney General, the Division of Administration and the Division Director.

Appendix B

Alan Kalmanoff

Education

- 1972 Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, College of City and Regional Planning
- 1969 M.S.W., University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work
- 1967 J.D., University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law
- 1964 B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Honors in Political Science

Experience

- 1980-present Executive Director, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, a non-profit agency specializing in planning and research.
- 1990
- Facilities Planning Review for the California office of the Auditor General. An analysis of why the state's 1977 master plan had not been implemented, including review of location/consolidation issues, restoration of older buildings, public benefits and costs/benefits of leasing vs. constructing office buildings.
 - Reorganization Study for the Department of Justice's Division of Law Enforcement. Intensive study of the Division's functions, processes and procedures and recommendations to improve them.
 - Mariposa County Jail Needs Assessment.
 - Humboldt County, California, Jail Needs Assessment Update.
- 1989-1990
- Palm Beach County, Florida, Criminal Justice System Evaluation. A comprehensive analysis of all criminal justice related agencies in Palm Beach County.
 - Humboldt County, California, Facilities Master Plan. A comprehensive, data-based policy and space plan for 20 years for all County departments.
- 1989
- Evaluation of Institutional Operations, Arkansas Division of Children and Family Services. In-depth assessment of operations and planning following organizational/operational changes, rapid growth, and adverse litigation.

- Detention and Corrections System Phases I-III, Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Needs assessment, master plan and pre-architectural program for a seriously overcrowded system.
- 1988-1989
- California Department of Justice Facilities Master Plan, Sacramento. Planning for long-term growth of large and highly specialized Division of Law Enforcement complex and site for uninterrupted expansion of all operations.
 - California Department of Justice Interagency Child Death Investigation Protocols. Evaluation of the effectiveness of teams and procedures established by all California counties to investigate suspicious child deaths (preliminary to establishing protocols and providing training). Second year involves establishing protocols.
- 1987-1988
- Leon County (Tallahassee), Florida. Major jail overcrowding study for County Commissioners. Also a Comprehensive Master Plan for Sheriff, New Jail, and Operations Division buildings (site planning, space planning, courts and system development).
 - Jail Needs Assessments and Feasibility Studies for Tehama, Placer, Nevada, Sutter and Butte Counties (California).
- 1987
- Solano County, California Facilities Master Plan. A comprehensive, data-based policy and space plan for a 20 year period for all 48 County departments.
 - Santa Clara County, California Juvenile Justice System. Comprehensive Plan for System Depopulation and enhanced programming in living units, mental health and schools, as well as program for facility remodeling.
 - Santa Clara County, California. Served as facilitator for Jail Overcrowding Committee of agency heads meeting monthly, seeking compliance with court order.
- 1986
- Office of the Governor of Arkansas and the Board of Corrections. As a special consultant, conducted a management audit of contract health care for the Arkansas prisons. Served as compliance officer to develop oversight for medical program.
 - University of California, Berkeley, Chancellor's Office. Served as a special consultant/investigator of complaints against UC Police. Designed internal and external review process for UCBPD.
 - Livermore City Council. Served as special consultant and investigated police and public disorder.
- 1971-present
- President/Lead Trainer, California Planners (successor to Approach Associates), conducting training and investigations in corrections,

law enforcement, city and health planning, education and related social policy areas, and management/organizational development.

- 1979-present
- National Institute of Corrections, Boulder, Colorado, National Academy of Corrections. Teaching in Advanced Management: Leadership, Suicide Prevention, Large Jail Management, Organizational Diagnosis, Managing Change, Planning of New Jails, Influencing the External Environment and Legal Issues.
- 1976-present
- Consulting to the National Institute of Corrections, including a major training role at the National Academy, and numerous major NIC Technical Assistance assignments through the divisions of Prisons, Community Corrections, and the Jail Center.
- 1965-present
- Initially under Approach Associates, and continuing under California Planners, consulting to the U.S. and California Departments of Justice, Human Services Rehabilitation, over 200 law enforcement and corrections agencies, legislatures and governors in California, Arkansas, Alaska, Nevada, and New Mexico; local governments in over 50 counties.
- 1989
- Advanced Management Training for Virginia Department of Correctional Education; Orange County, Florida Division of Corrections; Miami/Dade County, Florida Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
- 1987-1988
- Special consultant to the California Department of Justice, for various organizational development engagements.
- 1987
- Served as expert witness for Colorado Sheriffs in litigation against Colorado Department of Corrections; Yolo County, California jail overcrowding lawsuit; Leon County, Florida jail overcrowding lawsuit.
- 1967-present
- Attorney at Law, with a background in criminal law and constitutional issues.
- 1989
- Faculty, University of California, Berkeley, Schools of Social Work, Criminology, and City and Regional Planning.
- 1976-1979
- Faculty, California State University at San Francisco, Departments of Sociology and Political Science.
- 1973-1976
- Faculty, University of California, Berkeley, School of Criminology.
- 1971-1973
- Director, federal planning and research team for development of information systems and systems analysis for reorganization of Oakland, California Police Department.
- 1969-1970
- Executive Director, Oakland, California Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights (most were Bar Association directors) in programs involving private lawyers in public problems.

- 1967-1969 Associate, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work.
- 1966-1971 Analyst, Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education in America, for Dr. Clark Kerr; Analyst, University of California, Berkeley, School of Social Work, for Dean J. Scott Briar.
- 1964 Intern, New York State Attorney General's Office, Civil Rights Division.

Selected Consulting Engagements

- 1987 - 1988 Consultant, San Diego County, California. Directed major Jail Population Management Study for Board of Supervisors involving analysis of overcrowding and alternatives. Similar studies for NIC in numerous counties nationally, including Polk County, Iowa, Mercer County, New Jersey, Montgomery County, Ohio, Shawnee County, Kansas, Solano County, California and Leon County (Tallahassee), Florida.
- Director, San Francisco County, California Sheriff, Training Needs Assessment and Jail Needs Assessment.
- Director, Kern County, California Facilities Master Plan. Directed General Plan involving space planning for 60 departments, automated space management database, and finance scheme. Director of similar study emphasizing jails and courts for Butte County, California.
- Director, Tulare County, California Court Study. Preparation of County Court House Facility Planning involving workload projections, database, site planning and cost estimation.
- Special Consultant, Monitor, Toussaint v. McCarthy (the "San Quentin Case"), U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. Assistance in implementation of consent decree; hearings on prison gangs, lock-down and related compliance concerns held.
- 1986 Consultant, Washington County, Oregon Department of Community Corrections. Developed comprehensive employment program.
- 1985 Consultant, Idaho Board of Corrections, Department of Corrections. Developed management strategies and defined roles and responsibilities of District Managers.
- 1983-1984 Principal Investigator, Alameda County Office of Court Services. Directed major analysis of the impact of 1982 DUI legislation.
- 1983 Consultant, Violent Crime Task Force, National Institute of Corrections. Assessed all Federal corrections violent crime initiatives, developed recommendations for funds and legislation.

- 1982-84 Dean-in-Residence, Bureau of Prisons, National Institute of Corrections. Directed Policy units, Advanced Management Training for the National Academy of Corrections.
- 1981-1984 Consultant, for Corrections Needs Assessments. Justice system planning and programming, development of comprehensive facility plans and funding applications to Board of Corrections. Numerous contracts; California clients included San Francisco, San Mateo, Placer (3), Merced, Ventura (3), San Diego, Kings, Nevada (2), Yuba, Sierra, San Benito, Monterey, Sutter and Butte Counties.
- 1980-1986 Trainer, for trainers and advanced in-service training for over 150 law enforcement agencies. Subjects included: Field Interrogation, Interviewing and Interrogation Skills, Sexual Assault, Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Investigation.
- 1982 Consultant, American Correctional Association. Developed a major corrections plan for Nevada, consolidating state prisons, probation and parole.
- 1981 Consultant, National Institute of Corrections. Major national policy seminars on jail and prison overcrowding; evaluated planning for National Academy of Corrections; planning for National Information Center, and national corrections clearinghouse; training seminars on jail planning.
- 1980 Director, National Institute of Corrections. Program planning and major technical assistance to Arkansas Department of Corrections for new reception and diagnostic, mental health, and pre-release/work furlough facilities. Plan led to compliance with twelve-year old court order.
- Expert Consultant, U.S. Department of Justice. Policy analyses and technical assistance in narcotics and organized crime enforcement, policy planning and research.
- Consultant, Center for Independent Living and Rehabilitation Services Administration. Research and training agency directors in disability law.
- 1979-1980 Principal Consultant, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Civil Rights. \$2,000,000 in major national training and technical assistance contracts with the Center for Independent Living, to train 2,500 disabled consumers in 26 states in "504" compliance activities.
- 1979 Consultant, Disability Law Resource Center. Train trainers and facilitate training at Navajo Nation, Arizona, for disabled Native Americans.
- Director, Wisconsin Criminal Justice Planning Board. Planning evaluations of 12 district attorney offices.

- Consultant, for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ). Assess and assimilate police research on patrol and investigation.
- 1978 Director, California Legislature's Study of Correctional Needs. Five volume, 800-page evaluation of all prison facilities, programs, and incarceration alternatives to determine future needs.
- 1977 Director, study of Impact of Alternatives to Incarceration in Alaska, for Attorney General.
- 1976-1979 Director, Alameda County, California Revenue Sharing Evaluations. Evaluated 300 community-based social service programs over a three year period.
- 1976 Director, New Mexico Department of Hospitals and Institutions. Developed Master Plan for Mental Health and the Las Vegas Hospital (including population projections) and feasibility study for delivery of community-based services.
- Director, New Mexico Master Plan for Corrections (unimplemented). Planning for adult, juvenile, and local jail system, including all programs, services and institutions.
- Consultant, planned the California Protection and Advocacy System for Developmentally Disabled, and Ohio's needs assessments for the statewide Protection and Advocacy System.
- Consultant, for Contra Costa County, California direct supervision New Generation Jail. Programming for new jail and, later, study of comparison with pre-trial release in Middlesex County, Massachusetts.
- 1975 Consultant for California counties. Curriculum development and trainer in sexual assault investigation.
- Principal Investigator, study of plea bargaining for University of California, Berkeley, and Alameda County District Attorney.
- 1974 Principal Investigator, Santa Clara County, California. "Sexual Assault; the Institutional Response."
- Consultant, California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Wrote California Corrections and Designated Funds Plan. Developed program monitoring curriculum, trained state and regional planning agencies' staff, and developed proposals in delinquency prevention and control, narcotics enforcement and police response time analysis.
- Principal Consultant, University of California, Berkeley. Cost-benefit study of Alameda County Work Furlough Program with Alameda County Sheriff.

1972 Director, Field Interrogation Project, San Diego, California Police Department.

Selected Publications

1990 A Study of the State's Office Space Facilities Planning Goals, Policies and Recommendations, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

Palm Beach County, Florida, Criminal Justice System Study, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1989 Caddo Parish Detention and Corrections System Phase I: Needs Assessment, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

Space Reallocation, Solano County Hall of Justice, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

The Development of Interagency Child Death Investigation Protocols for California Department of Justice Special Services, Child Abuse Unit, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

Facilities Master Plan Report, California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1988 Causes of Jail Overcrowding Report for Leon County (Tallahassee), Florida, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1987 Facilities Master Plan Report for Butte County, California, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1986 Facilities Master Plan Report for Kern County, California, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

An Inquiry into Contract Medical Care Performance in the Arkansas Department of Corrections for Arkansas Department of Corrections, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

The Moffitt Library Incident Report to the Chancellor's Special Investigator at the University of California, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1985 Causes of Jail Overcrowding Report for San Diego County, California, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

1982 "Double Trouble: The Alienation of Disabled Inmates," Corrections Today, December 1982.

- 1980 Review of Population Projection Methods in Washington Corrections Planning, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.
- 1979 "Police Research: An Assessment of the Investigations/Patrol Interface," National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (with K. Brown).
- 1978 California Legislature's Study of Correctional Needs, Vols. I-V (with C. Kizziah, et al), Approach Associates, Oakland, California.
- 1977 New Mexico Master Plan for Correction and Sourcebook for New Mexico Corrections, Approach Associates, Oakland, California.
- 1976 Criminal Justice: Enforcement and Administration (college textbook), Boston, Massachusetts, Little, Brown & Co.
- Crisis Identification and Management, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (with M. Silbert).
- The Plan for the California Protection and Advocacy System for Persons with Developmental Disabilities, for the California Department of Health, California Planners, Berkeley, California.
- 1974 Guide to Corrections Planning, Sacramento, California, Office of Criminal Justice Planning (with C. Kizziah, J. Brown, and P. Stinson), California Planners, Berkeley, California.
- 1973 Field Interrogation Training, for the Police Foundation, California Planners, Berkeley, California.

Memberships and Honors

Chairman, Board of Directors, Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund

University of California Alumni Association

Boalt Hall Alumni Association

California State Bar Association

Alameda County Bar Association

Police Management Association

American Corrections Association

American Jail Association

California Community Colleges, life-time teaching credential in Law, Public Services and Administration and Professional Education

Special Career Development Fellowship, National Institute of Mental Health (1969-1971)

David Moulton

Education

- 1973 University of California, Berkeley, 1971-73: Department of Economics (Postdoctoral Associate). Public finance, public policy, and urban economics; Teaching Assistant.
- 1964 Harvard University, 1958-64: Ph.D., Physical Chemistry. Teaching Assistant.
- 1958 Princeton University, 1954-58: A.B. Summa Cum Laude, Phi Beta Kappa.

Employment

1988 - present Senior Planner/Data Analyst, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.

- Facilities Planning Review for the California Office of the Auditor General. An examination of why the state's 1977 master plan had not been implemented, including review of consolidation/location issues, restoration of older buildings, public benefit and costs/benefits of leasing vs. building office space.
- Humboldt County Facilities Master Plan. Fifteen year plan for all county facilities, including study of court security and reorganization, temporary rehabilitation and ultimate conversion of jail.
- Palm Beach County, Florida. Broad-scale investigation of all components of the criminal justice system in a large, rapidly growing county with multiple state, county and municipal agencies.
- California Department of Justice 4949 Broadway Facilities Master Plan, Sacramento, California. Planning for long-term growth of large and highly specialized Division of Law Enforcement building and site plan for expansion with uninterrupted maintenance of all operations. Development of automated data base and projection of staff and space needs. Examination of growth rate differentials. Development and analysis of survey methodology.

- Solano County, California Facilities Master Plan. Coordinated planning research and projections on General Plan, involving space planning for 48 departments, automated space management data base, and fiscal impact.
- Interagency Child Death Investigation Protocols; evaluation of the effectiveness of teams established by several large California counties to investigate suspicious child deaths, leading to the development of training and investigative protocols.

Automated System Manager, Institute for Law and Policy Planning. Selection and installation of computer systems, spreadsheet development, preparation of automated billing and cash flow systems.

1987 - present

Data Analyst, Institute for Law and Policy Planning. Forecasting population projections for jail planning studies in Nevada, Sutter, Butte, Stanislaus, Placer and San Mateo Counties, California, and Leon County, Florida, Caddo Parish, Louisiana, and numerous other jurisdictions.

1987

Lecturer, Weekend College, New College of California. (Grantsmanship: Program development, proposal writing, organizational management).

1982-1987

Director, Administrative Division, ASIAN Inc. Internal management of a minority business development agency with 15-20 employees. Administrative supervision of several MBE programs. Managed budgets up to \$1,000,000. Designed and developed automated systems for multi-source budgeting, payroll, employee benefit plans, financial reporting and contract compliance. Directed installation of automated accounting system; supervised all accounting and administrative personnel. Developed procedures to adapt financial statements for reporting to multiple government agencies with incompatible overhead cost allocation requirements. Heavy use of Lotus 1-2-3.

Manager, on-the-job training component (OJT) of a minority small business development program.

1979-1981

Deputy Director, CSEARR (Center for South East Asian Refugee Resettlement), community-based agency employing 45 persons. Responsible for internal management during a period of rapid growth. Supervised and coordinated opening and staffing of two branch offices. Supervised accounting and administrative staff. Prepared budgets.

Program Developer, wrote proposals and developed new programs in preparation for subsequent expansion. Responsible for incorporation and acquisition of tax-exempt status.

- 1976-1979 Researcher/Program Developer, ASIAN Inc., Research and Evaluation. Studies included:
- Prepared funding proposals for a variety of minority business development programs.
 - Evaluation of bilingual educational programs and teaching materials, considering particularly the attainment of stated objectives. Demographic studies on the socio-economic status of Asian Americans.
 - Analysis of publicly-funded programs for alcohol abusers and the developmentally disabled with regard to the adequacy of service provision to Asian-American clients.
- 1974 - 76 VISTA Volunteer, ASIAN, Inc. Studies of employment discrimination among Asian-Americans. Program development for a large number of community non-profit agencies, including organization, startup funding, and initial staffing. Minority small business development consultant.
- 1973 Researcher, Environmental Defense Fund. Studied feasibility, cost/benefit, and impact of proposed light rail system in Los Angeles area.
- 1966-1972 Researcher, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Research on fuel reprocessing cycles for thermal breeder reactors; investigation of the economic effects of air pollution.
- 1963-1966 Laboratory Supervisor, Prototech, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts. Investigation of the commercial feasibility of various processes for energy production and detection and removal of pollutants.

Publications

A note on the determination of dates associated with range maxima in "Absolute Reference" (the Lotus 1-2-3 journal), May, 1987.

"The Socioeconomic Status of Asian-American Families in 5 Major SMSA's:" ASIAN, Inc., 1978. (Presented at NIMH national conference).

Co-author of a chapter in Molten Salts, G. Mamantov, ed., Marcel Dekker, 1969.

Author or co-author of papers (5) in chemical journals and of U.S. patents (5).

Related Volunteer Activities

- 1987 - present Gum Moon Residence Hall, Asian Women's Resource Center, San Francisco, California. Facilities management and program development assistance for a community-based women's agency.
- 1985 - present Board of Directors and Treasurer, Parents for Immersion Education, San Francisco, California. Incorporation, tax-exemption and financial management of a community-based educational corporation.
- 1980 - 1983 Board of Directors, Northeast Community Federal Credit Union, San Francisco, California. Management of a federally-chartered financial institution.

Palmer Stinson

Education

- 1975 B.S., University of San Francisco, San Francisco, California.
- 1969 Awarded Advanced Certificate by the California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training.
- 1960 Graduate, Northwestern University Traffic Institute, Evanston, Illinois.

Experience

- 1983 - present Consultant, Institute for Law and Policy Planning, Berkeley, California.
- Palm Beach County, Florida, Criminal Justice System Study.
 - South San Francisco, California, Jail Site Study.
 - Facilities Master Plan Study for the California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement.
 - Leon County, Florida, Overcrowding Study and Master Plan.
 - Sutter County and Placer County, California, Jail Needs Assessment.
 - California Department of Justice, Organizational Development Studies.
 - Investigation of Livermore Police Department, and University of California Police Department.
- 1986 Consultant, Contra Costa County, Consolidation Study of Marshall and Sheriff Court Services.
- 1985 Consultant, City of Dixon. Organization and Personnel Practices of the Dixon Police Department.
- 1976 - 1983 Senior Consultant, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Sacramento, California
- 1974 - 76 Consultant, Approach Associates, Oakland, California.
- 1976 Project Director, Search Group Incorporated, Sacramento, California. Implementation and Test of Standardized Crime Reporting Systems.

- Consultant, Approach Associates, Oakland, California. Programming study for the proposed County detention facility in Contra Costa County. Developed report on alternatives to incarceration.
- 1975 - 76 Director, Alameda and Contra Costa County Criminal Justice Training Study, Alameda County Criminal Justice Planning Board, Oakland, California.
- 1975 Consultant, Approach Associates. General Planning of incident reporting system for the Berkeley, California, Police Department.
- 1974 - 75 Chief, Planning and Programs Division; Chief, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Branch, Office of Criminal Justice Planning, Sacramento, California.
- 1974 Consultant, Approach Associates. Curriculum development and law enforcement training for the Field Interrogation Project, San Diego Police Department.
- 1972 Consultant, International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Selective Enforcement".
- 1969 Consultant, Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police.
- 1968 Consultant, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Louisiana Survey of Law Enforcement Needs.
- 1960 - 61 Instructor, "Criminal Investigation," Merritt College, Oakland, California.
- 1954 - 57 Instructor, "Criminal Investigation," Merritt College, Oakland, California.
- 1950 - 74 Oakland Police Department, Oakland, California.
- Commanded Traffic Division, 1961-64; Jail Division, 1964-66; Patrol (Watch Commander), 1966-68; Criminal Investigation, 1968-69; Research and Development, 1969-72; and Management Services, 1973-74.
- Patrolman, 1950; Sergeant, 1955; Inspector, 1957; Lieutenant, 1958; Captain, 1961.
- Operational assignments in Oakland included the following: investigator (homicide, burglary, internal affairs); patrol field supervisor; field commander of special forces for the control of anti-war demonstrations and vandalism incidental to neighborhood disturbances.
- Wrote seven successful grant proposals and worked closely with private agencies in developing delinquency prevention programs.

Conceptualized and implemented a system for reporting police car locations via mobile terminals. The success of the digital communications systems has prompted the installation of terminals in all Oakland patrol vehicles.

Authored series of reports on the feasibility of discontinuing the Oakland City Jail.

Designed and implemented a computer/microfilm information system which provides leads to detectives. Users of the system during its initial year of operation solved numerous crimes of robbery, assault, murder, etc., which would not otherwise have been cleared. The software/hardware package, as well as the system design, have served as models for similar systems in other police departments.

Manuscripts and Publications

Author of monographs in: Police Patrol Readings, eds, Chapman and C.C. Thomas, 1970.

Selected Academic Readings, eds. Rabin and Allen, Auburn University, 1974.

Articles in the following periodicals: Traffic Digest, Journal of Criminal Law, Traffic Safety and FBI Magazine.

References

The references that follow include officials of agencies which have employed Mr. Stinson as a consultant on municipal investigative functions and related management concerns.

Mr. George Hart, Chief of Police, Oakland, California. (415) 273-3365.

Mr. Norman Boehm, Executive Director, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). (916) 739-3864.

Mr. George Roehmer, Executive Director, Criminal Justice Agency of Contra Costa County. (415) 327-4855.

Mr. Gerald Galvin, Chief of Police, Vallejo, California. (707) 648-4540.

Mr. David Harris, City Manager, City of Dixon. (96) 678-2326.

Persons Contacted

PERSONS CONTACTED

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Gerald W. Clemons, Director, Division of Law Enforcement

Ida T. Zodrow, Deputy Director, Division of Administrative Services

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Richard B. Igleheart, Chief Assistant to the Attorney General, Division of Criminal Law

Arnold O. Overoye, Sr. Assistant to the Attorney General, Sacramento Appeals, Writs and Trials, Division of Criminal Law

Richard D. Martland, Chief Assistant to the Attorney General, Division of Civil Law

Division of Law Enforcement

Fred H. Wynbrandt, Assistant Director, Criminal Identification and Information Branch

S.C. Helsley, Assistant Director, Investigation and Enforcement Branch

James L. Magers, Assistant Director, Law Enforcement Data Center

Kati Corsaut, Public Information Office

Criminal Identification and Information Branch

All bureau chiefs, assistant bureau chiefs, mid- and senior-level managers were also interviewed with the exception of one or two managers who were unable to attend Consultants' scheduled one-day meeting.

Investigation and Enforcement Branch

All bureau chiefs, assistant bureau chiefs, mid- and senior-level managers were also interviewed with the exception of one or two managers who were unable to attend Consultants' scheduled one-day meeting.

Law Enforcement Data Center

All bureau chiefs, assistant bureau chiefs, mid- and senior-level managers were also interviewed with the exception of one or two managers who were unable to attend Consultants' scheduled one-day meeting.