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COMMUNITY - ORIENTED POLICING IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE

Prepared for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice, in conjunction with the Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing Grant Program, by the

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Section 1

INTRODUCTION

Section 1: Introduction

THIS DOCUMENT'S PURPOSE AND FORMAT

In 1990, the Prince George's County Police Department submitted a grant proposal to the Bureau of Justice Assistance seeking to implement a community-oriented policing project under BJA's *Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing* grant program. The proposal sought to establish a form of community-oriented policing based on grass-roots "beat management" by specially selected and trained officers. The proposal resulted in an award and in January, 1991, implementation began.

This Implementation Guide is intended to record the process by which our project was conceived and implemented so that other agencies may replicate it. We recognize that most readers will have no prior knowledge of our program and may not even know much about community-oriented policing in general. For these reasons, we have written an extremely comprehensive document that should enable an agency to successfully implement this program, regardless of its prior program-development or community-oriented expertise.

Our primary intended audiences are law enforcement planning staffs and other police management officials who may be assigned to evaluate, adapt, and/or implement this program for their agencies. For these "hands-on" professionals, this document's abundant detail and deliberate style should be beneficial. We do not answer every conceivable question, certainly, but we believe this Implementation Guide is the most instructive, reliable blueprint that we have yet seen for the commencement of a community-oriented policing project.

Although we encourage casual readers to peruse the entire document, we realize that it provides far more information than a casual reader will need. Even many people with a serious interest in our program, such as law enforcement chief executives in search of community-based concepts for their own agencies, will find this document too extensive. Therefore, for the benefit of readers desiring a quick initial description of our program, we provide a four-page synopsis beginning on page 11.

The document is essentially organized into halves. In the first half, consisting of Sections 2 through 4, we explain how our program operates and why we designed it as we did. We also describe the jurisdictional and organizational environments in which it operates so that the reader can compare those environments with his own.

Although the "philosophy" section (Section 2) is long and contains no direct operational advice, it is important. It lays the groundwork for our program and raises serious policy issues that an agency should consider even if it eventually chooses a different community-oriented path. Bear in mind that community-oriented policing is not a narrowly defined or universally agreed-upon concept, but is instead an umbrella term for a variety of community-responsive programs. The operating methods, tables of organization, and overall goals and objectives for these programs vary considerably.

Naturally, we believe that ours is one of the better program designs available, but we also recognize that it will not be the right choice for every agency. Therefore, it is important that our program's philosophical concepts and operating style be thoroughly discussed among an agency's senior management corps, its jurisdiction's political leadership, and selected community representatives prior to any replication decision. Strong political and community support for this type of initiative is essential, and the input received from political and community sources will likely improve our program design as it relates to the local situation.

If a decision is made to replicate our program, the second half of this document (Sections 5 through 7) should be very useful. It provides a step-by-step, "how to" guide for agencies to follow. However, the processes which it describes may not be applicable to every jurisdiction. We have included our experiences for reference, but replicators should carefully examine their own governmental and managerial environments to determine whether additional steps are needed or whether local requirements demand modifications.

Although this Implementation Guide has been prepared in conjunction with Prince George's County's INOP grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (grant 91DDCX0005), the points of view and the opinions expressed in it are those of the Prince George's County Police Department. They do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of BJA or the United States Department of Justice.

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This Implementation Guide incorporates, without footnoting or other reference, some language from Prince George's County's original 1990 INOP grant application to BJA and its reapplication for second-year funding in 1991.

A SYNOPSIS OF OUR PROGRAM

On June 24, 1992, Prince George's County Chief of Police David B. Mitchell testified before the Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives. Included in his opening statement was an excellent description of the Prince George's County community-oriented policing program. In order to summarize this program for our readers, we now reprint excerpts from Chief Mitchell's prepared text for that testimony.

"In Prince George's County, we have developed an approach which we refer to as the 'beat management style' of community-oriented policing. It is similar to most other community-oriented programs in that it seeks to improve a community's quality of life through proactive, problem-solving strategies tailored to address crime's causative influences. And like most, it emphasizes community involvement in the development and implementation of those strategies.

"Our program differs from many others, though, in that we place somewhat less emphasis on actual problems and program operations, and greater emphasis on the management process by which problem-solving strategies are developed. We believe that the best means to ensure long-term success is to provide street-level officers with a proven problem-management process that they and their community partners can use, and then to regularly hold the officers accountable for how well they use that process.

"This management-based system was selected in part to guarantee that our program became a permanent, fully-integrated component of our patrol operation rather than a highly publicized and perhaps short-term community relations endeavor. Prior to my becoming Chief of Police in January, 1990, our Department had implemented a number of community outreach programs in response to specific problems, but I noticed that these programs often withered away once the initial problem was resolved. I noticed, too, that the problems usually returned in one form or another.

"In most police departments, strategic policies are usually developed by command-level personnel, whether they be community-oriented strategies or traditional enforcement campaigns. Specific tactics are sometimes developed by lower echelon officers, of course, but the overall approach is almost always dictated by senior management. Policy 'trickles down' for eventual implementation at the street level.

"In Prince George's County, we believe this traditional management model is inappropriate for our community-oriented policing effort. In our program, we reverse the process and require community-oriented strategies to 'trickle-up,' obtaining appropriate support and assistance as they move up the chain of command.

"We believe that even mid-level police commanders are not in the best position to recognize the true needs of a small neighborhood. Commanders' assessments of neighborhood problems usually derive from statistics and reports rather than personal observation and involvement, and they rely heavily upon civic leaders and activists for community feedback with little input from average residents. Their understanding of the local situation, and their subsequent ability to devise the most effective problem-solving strategies, may be somewhat diminished as a result.

"We also recognize that commanders' geographic areas of responsibility are so broad, and their personnel management and administrative duties so demanding, that it would be unrealistic to hold them strictly accountable for progress at the small neighborhood level. And yet, accountability is critical to the success of a program such as ours, where results are the bottom-line.

"Accordingly, we assign intelligent, motivated beat officers to 'manage' small neighborhoods, and we give them the time and freedom to meaningfully work on the problems affecting their communities' quality of life. It is important to also note that the assignment of an officer to a neighborhood is not contingent upon the presence or severity of problems. We believe that every neighborhood in the County needs and deserves community-oriented policing on a permanent basis, regardless of crime rates and social conditions. After all, it is best to close the barn door *before* the horse leaves.

"We expect our community-oriented beat officers to bond with their assigned neighborhoods and to become more than mere deliverers of police service. We also expect them to become forceful, personally-committed advocates for their neighborhoods and to arrange direct problem-solving support from other components of the Police Department and other governmental agencies. They also help form community coalitions to address problems with private sector resources, wherever possible.

"The officers work closely with local residents and merchants to identify the problems of greatest concern to the community, and to then devise effective strategies to combat those problems. The problems selected by the officer and his community partners may involve such small concerns as chronic disorderly complaints or garbage-strewn lots, or may include such challenging problems as homelessness and drug abuse. In any event, the identification of problems and their proposed solutions are generated at the grass-roots level and then forwarded up the governmental ladder for appropriate logistical support and assistance.

"The officers are held personally accountable for the quality and effectiveness of their strategies, and they utilize a monthly Beat Condition Report to keep senior management appraised of their activities and progress. This grass-roots accountability is the core of our concept, and sets us apart from some other community-oriented programs where the personnel who actually deliver the service may not always have a personal stake in how well it succeeds."

Note: Casual readers are also encouraged to review our program's core philosophical principles which are listed on page 41.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY AS A JURISDICTION

The remaining information in Section 1, presented under the headings "Prince George's County as a Jurisdiction" and "The Prince George's County Police Department," is meant to familiarize the reader with the general conditions that influenced our program, thus allowing him to compare our agency and situation with his own. However, this background information is not crucial to an understanding of the program and the reader may go immediately to Section 2, if he prefers.

Prince George's County, Maryland, is a major metropolitan jurisdiction immediately adjacent to Washington, D.C. along the capital city's northern, eastern, and southern borders. Although generally regarded as a suburb, the County is really more like a city. Most of its three-quarters of a million residents live in typically urban settings, and the problems and challenges facing the County are, both in nature and degree, much more like those facing the District of Columbia than like those facing other Maryland or Washington-area counties.

For example, during the three years of our community-oriented grant project, the County's homicide total averaged more than 125 per year (a higher annual total than is reported by many American cities with comparable populations). In comparison, no other county in Maryland or in the Washington metropolitan area experienced even 40 homicides in any of one of those years. As one would expect, the County's statistics for other violent crimes, as well as property offenses, were similarly high.

Beyond the issue of crime, Prince George's County faces a host of other social problems that are common to nearly all major urban areas in our country. The County suffers from unacceptably high rates of substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, and other health-related problems. It also encompasses areas of deteriorating housing, struggles with high unemployment among certain demographic groups, and has extensive social

service and public assistance responsibilities to meet. Quality of life in some areas of the County is, regrettably, not as high as we would like. These areas receive much of our attention and steady progress is being made, but the challenges are formidable and the progress comes slowly.

Despite these problems, though, the overall picture for Prince George's County is encouraging. During the ten years of his administration, current County Executive Parris N. Glendening has placed an extremely high priority upon economic growth and development. Numerous businesses have located headquarters or other vital functions in the County, and our professional community has blossomed.

As a result, the rate of economic growth in Prince George's consistently matches or exceeds that of every other jurisdiction in the Washington area, and the County has become one of the most attractive business environments in the Washington region. Fortunately, this growth has provided a stable, growing tax base from which many of the previously described social problems are being meaningfully addressed.

Of greater importance, though, is the outstanding character of the people in Prince George's County. Perhaps unique in all of America, Prince George's is home to a vigorous, emerging African-American majority who are primarily middle-class, upwardly mobile, professional, and well educated. This family-oriented population is investing heavily in the County's future, and along with a rich array of Hispanic, Asian, and Caucasian residents, is providing the vitality and moral commitment that will be needed to overcome many of our current difficulties.

THE PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

The Prince George's County Police Department is an accredited (CALEA), sophisticated police agency whose recent sworn complement has varied between 1,100 and 1,300 officers. These officers are augmented by more than 300 civilian personnel who perform administrative, managerial, and support functions. Civilian workers include, among others, crime scene processors, lab technicians, patrol dispatchers, crime prevention specialists, and managing directors of certain organizational units.

The Department is the primary law enforcement agency for the County wherein general patrol, call handling, and criminal investigation are concerned. It works in close cooperation with the Office of the Sheriff for Prince George's County, which has primary responsibility for serving warrants and other court process, transporting prisoners following judicial commitment, and maintaining courtroom security. The County's jail is staffed by a separate Department of Corrections.

The County Police Department also maintains excellent working relationships with the smaller police departments serving some of the County's townships, as well as with the Maryland State Police, whose primary focus is traffic enforcement along the County's arterial state highways and interstates.

The Department is headed by Chief of Police David B. Mitchell, a veteran of more than twenty years with our agency who has long been known as an ardent proponent of community-based policing. Recognizing this commitment and the soon-to-be Chief's strong ties to the community, County Executive Glendening named Chief Mitchell to his current position in January, 1990. Immediately upon taking office, Chief Mitchell made the implementation of a community-oriented program the cornerstone of his new administration.

Chief Mitchell is supported by three Bureau Chiefs who head the Department's Bureaus of Administration, Patrol, and Support Services. Within these three Bureaus, a variety of specialized components perform the various functions of the Department. The Bureaus of Administration and Support Services generally provide County-wide or headquarters-based services, while the Bureau of Patrol is territorially arranged in six local districts. Because the Department's community-oriented philosophy emphasizes local neighborhood orientation and accountability, the community-oriented policing program is organizationally situated within the Bureau of Patrol.

At the District-level, uniformed Patrol officers are grouped into squads which patrol beats, answer calls for service, and conduct preliminary investigations in assigned geographic sectors. Most squads consist of between eight and thirteen officers, including a working supervisor (a squad's exact strength depends upon workload, site demographics, and other factors). Squads of community-oriented policing specialists are similarly structured, although their duties differ from those of the Patrol squads.

In addition, each district maintains an appropriate number of plainclothes detectives to perform follow-up investigations of those criminal offenses that are not investigated by the headquarters "CID" or "NED" detectives (CID investigates homicides, rapes, and certain specialized crimes, while NED investigates conspiratorial drug operations).

A number of components within the Bureaus of Support Services and Administration provide non-operational services to the Patrol squads, the community-oriented officers, and the public. However, for purposes of our discussion here, it is unnecessary to describe most of them in any detail. There is one, however, which merits a special mention.

The Community Relations Division in the Bureau of Administration provides much valuable support to the community, including its educational programs in the schools (such as DARE), crime prevention speeches to civic and business groups, and charitable efforts on behalf of poor and disadvantaged citizens. However, while these activities certainly are of value to the public, and while they reflect a progressive and sensitive non-traditional approach to police service, we do not regard them as part of our formal community-oriented policing program.

As the next section of this document will explain, the mere provision of outreach service to the County's *community in general* does not, in our view, constitute the neighborhood-focused style of community-oriented policing which we embrace. Because the Community Relations Division provides its valuable services County-wide, and in so doing does not maintain close, continuing ties to any particular small neighborhood, it falls outside our philosophical definition of community-oriented policing.

The significance of this distinction will be amplified in the next section. We have mentioned it here because an organizational chart of the Department is presented in the Appendix section of this document and we'd like to ensure that the reader, if he reviews that chart, does not mistakenly associate the *Community* Relations Division with our *Community* Oriented Policing Program.

Section 2

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED PHILOSOPHY

Although this section provides no direct implementation guidance, it is important to an understanding of our program. While it is occasionally repetitive of some points addressed in Chief Mitchell's Congressional testimony (presented in section 1), its more thorough discussion of those points is enlightening.

Scattered throughout this section, we have boldfaced several important statements which collectively comprise the core principles of our philosophy. We recommend that the reader carefully consider these statements, as serious disagreement with any of them may make replication of our program unsuitable for the reader's agency. For the convenience of the reader, these statements are presented again as a group on the last page of this section (page 41).

Section 2: Philosophy

COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS

When the Prince George's County Police Department submitted its original grant application to BJA in June, 1990, it sought to advance a specific type of community-based police service, one which might best be described as a "beat management style" of community-oriented policing. This style differs significantly from some popular community-oriented programs that seem to rely on traditional "community relations" concepts.

Community-oriented policing is different from community relations, but many police officials hear the word "community" and assume they're the same. They don't realize that the police doing something good for the community or being responsive to community concerns does not, in and of itself, constitute community-oriented policing. Genuine community-oriented policing is far more ambitious, complex, and problem-focused than are traditional community relations programs.

Although community relations efforts admittedly provide worthwhile services and have an important role to play, they often fail to address a community's most pressing needs. Moreover, community relations initiatives rarely make *lasting* contributions to reducing crime or improving general quality of life. Their operational value is usually limited to short-term benefits in chronic situations, providing charitable or other generalized assistance, and occasionally resolving relatively minor problems.

There are many reasons why community relations programs aren't more effective, and a couple deserve brief discussion here. One reason is that the wrong problems are sometimes selected for attention. The problem is either so complex or pervasive that no genuine opportunity for success exists with available resources, or the problem is too minor to justify an expenditure of those resources. Sometimes the community relations official is even aware of these factors at the time an assignment is generated, but is nevertheless compelled to deploy his resources for public relations reasons.

Even when the targeted problem is an appropriate one, genuine problem-solving may not occur. One reason is that some community relations activities are not be intended to actually *solve* a problem. Instead, their main purpose is to improve a police department's image and build friendlier relations with the public (both of which, by the way, are proper objectives). In these instances, the community relations activity is mostly intended to demonstrate the department's concern and responsiveness to the problem.

Since the primary motivation is perception-oriented, little emphasis is placed on whether the activity will actually provide long-term benefits. Of course, such benefits are hoped for, but as long as the activity provides an observable short-term result or is seen to be sincerely and conscientiously rendered, the objective is satisfied. Consequently, levels of resources insufficient to genuinely solve the problem, but sufficient to generate the desired public relations reaction, are expended.

Finally, in some instances when adequate resources are deployed, they are withdrawn or reduced soon after the immediate crisis has subsided, or after the public becomes satisfied with the progress that has been made. Unfortunately, this often allows the problem to resurface or return to its previous severity.

These practices may seem at first glance to be shamefully inept, indifferent, or self-serving. They are not, though, because community relations officials and their policy-making superiors usually have few alternatives. Unfortunately, police agencies lack sufficient resources to tackle all of the problems which legitimately deserve our attention. And yet, in democratic societies the police are expected to be as responsive to community demands as possible. If we ignore or neglect any community complaint, we risk undermining public confidence and support.

Given these conflicting realities, it is commendable that officials try to stretch their resources in order to provide some level of service to the greatest number of citizens, neighborhoods, and problems possible. Even when the services are unlikely to succeed, it is important that the public be reassured that its police care enough to at least try. This is a basic matter of trust, and public trust is the bedrock upon which all other police actions, including those with real prospects for success, ultimately depend.

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING PROGRAMS

In contrast to community relations, **community-oriented policing is an aggressive, results-driven form of police work.** Although it embraces many of the "feel good" outreach practices found in community relations programs, **its bottom line is surpressing crime**, not building good public relations. It is focused on deriving measurable results and making permanent, observable improvements in a neighborhood's quality of life as a way to *reduce crime.*

The relationship between a neighborhood's quality of life and its crime rate is central to the community-oriented philosophy. It has been observed that high crime neighborhoods almost invariably are the same neighborhoods where the greatest social deprivation exists, while conversely, the least crime-afflicted areas seem to be those with the greatest prosperity, stability, and desirable living conditions. As a result of this observation, community-oriented proponents hypothesize that as a community's quality of life improves, its crime rate decreases.

The proponents contend that this phenomenon occurs because residents in the better areas have more invested in their neighborhoods and much more to lose if the neighborhoods deteriorate. Consequently, they work hard to protect their neighborhoods' quality of life, and are more likely to report suspicious or antisocial behavior. In so doing, they create a dangerous and inhospitable environment for active criminals.

Advancing to the next logical step, the proponents suggest that if quality of life can be improved in currently disadvantaged neighborhoods, the residents will experience a rebirth of stakeholder concern. Like people in the already prosperous areas, they will become less tolerant of criminal activity and will create a similarly inhospitable criminal environment. Therefore, it is appropriate that police officers work to improve neighborhood quality of life as an indirect means of preventing crime.

Unfortunately, this rationale is just theory. It may be that reduced quality of life actually does breed high crime, or it may be that high crime causes the reduced quality of life. In fact, both may be true, or it may be that the two have nothing to do with one another. The observed patterns may be coincidental or due to other factors. Nevertheless, proponents argue that as long as a possibility exists that the two conditions are interrelated and that crime can be reduced by improving quality of life, it is wise for police to use the community-oriented approach. We agree.

Therefore, a second central precept of our community-oriented philosophy states that **proactive, problem-oriented strategies must be used to obtain improvements in quality of life.** The community-oriented officer seeks to make improvements in symptoms, naturally, but he is really more concerned with the underlying causes of his neighborhood's problems. The officer's mission is to identify those causes and develop effective, long-term solutions.

To accomplish this, the officer's first step is the performance of a needs assessment which thoughtfully examines community conditions and their relationship to crime. Information to be considered comes from such traditional sources as crime statistics and police intelligence data, as well as similar statistical and professional data from other governmental agencies.

Of equal importance, however, are the opinions of community residents. This includes not only the high-profile community activists and business leaders already known to police officials, but also average residents whose views and concerns are often overlooked if they are not affirmatively sought out.

It should also be noted that this "first step" is actually a never-ending process of examination and reexamination. The needs assessment function must be performed by the community-oriented officer on a continual basis, since new problems periodically develop and the factors affecting older problems constantly change.

Once a community's problems are identified and the link between those problems and criminal activity is understood, the officer and his community partners devise problem-solving strategies to resolve or reduce the problems. This is the real heart of the proactive, problem-oriented process which we will discuss in greater detail in a later section of this document.

As suggested in the "crime and quality-of-life" theory, many of the neighborhood problems addressed by the community-oriented officer are social problems having only an indirect, theoretical influence upon crime. Other problems, though, are very clearly criminal in nature. Often they involve patterns of chronic criminal activity that have not been resolved through standard police responses. The community-oriented officer is expected to seek permanent solutions to these criminal situations, as well as to broader social problems.

Accordingly, the community-oriented officer is expected to conduct investigations, arrest offenders, and utilize other enforcement methods when doing so is his most effective problem-solving option. Unlike for his counterparts in the call-handling Patrol squads and in detective assignments, however, the enforcement option does not constitute the community-oriented officer's primary weapon against the criminal. Instead, the community-oriented officer's tactic is to deny the criminal a safe and encouraging environment in which to operate, or to create obstacles to illegal activity which the criminal cannot or will not overcome.

REQUIRING MORE THAN PROBLEM-ORIENTED STRATEGIES

We have stated that a problem-oriented approach is central to community-oriented programs, and that is very true. But in our view, the use of problem-oriented strategies alone does not necessarily make a program *community*-oriented. In addition, we believe that **the community-oriented program's focal point must be the neighborhoods that are to be served, rather than the problems afflicting those neighborhoods.**

Not all problem-oriented programs are neighborhood-focused. Many problem-oriented programs operate over expansive, multi-neighborhood territories. They seek to address problems that are of concern to the jurisdiction as a whole, but which may not be major concerns to the residents of all geographic areas where program activities occur.

Usually, these broad programs are directed from headquarters or command levels. They seek very little planning input from street-level police officers, and rely primarily upon community input from politically active sources such as civic activists, merchants, and elected representatives. They often overlook the perspectives of those average neighborhood residents who seldom go to civic meetings or write letters to government officials.

These headquarters-rooted programs are quite valuable, of course, despite their detachment from the *grass-roots* community. They constitute tactical responses to legitimate community complaints and criminal incidents or trends. They deserve our recognition and appreciation. In Prince George's County, we operate such programs through our Special Operations Division (where "Tactical Teams" are deployed against County-wide problems) and through District-level "ACTION Teams" (which are deployed by local commanders against problems of a more regional nature).

Our Tactical and ACTION Teams employ "problem-oriented" strategies which have proven to be dramatically successful. However, the operations of these teams are very personnel-intensive and the number of officers that can be spared for these effective,

specialized teams is limited. Consequently, after completing an operation the teams move on to other problems, usually in different geographic areas. In a manner of speaking, the teams are able to provide only a "hopscotch" delivery of problem-oriented service.

Our experience with these teams highlighted the need for someone to remain behind to continuously perform, on a smaller scale, the proactive, problem-oriented, and preventative services that the Tactical and ACTION Teams had proven can be effective. We also desired to improve these proactive services by basing them not at headquarters or command levels, but rather at the grass-roots level where a better understanding of unique local conditions was likely to be obtained.

Therefore, we designed our program to *permanently* deploy community-oriented officers to local neighborhoods. By making the relationship permanent, we seek to forge meaningful bonds between officer and community. We want the officer to develop a protective attitude about his assigned neighborhood, seeing himself as an advocate for its welfare. We also hope that neighborhood residents develop a similar identification with the officer, coming to think of him as "their" officer.

In summary, we believe that **a genuine community-oriented policing program relies upon continuing, permanent relationships between operational line officers and average local residents.** In our view, it is this permanence, along with the previously-discussed focus on neighborhoods rather than problems, that distinguishes genuine *community*-oriented policing from the broader, problem-oriented *public* service that should be inherent in all police endeavors.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is one of most basic aspects of sound management, regardless of the type of agency or program involved. Programs that fail to meaningfully assign accountability are unlikely to fully achieve their objectives, and certainly will be less successful overall than they otherwise might have been.

This principle applies to community-oriented policing programs, naturally. Because our program is extremely results-oriented rather than process-oriented, we recognized during our program design stage that we needed to place small-neighborhood accountability with someone possessing an genuine ability to impact conditions in a *direct, personal way.*

Unfortunately, the traditional organizational and managerial structure of our Department was not conducive to local neighborhood accountability. An evaluation of our accountability system revealed that, while responsibility for small neighborhoods was assigned, it was not assigned in a meaningful and genuine fashion.

For example, while District Commanders were held accountable for the quality of overall police service in specific geographic areas, the size of those areas was so large that the commanders could not be reasonably expected to pay close, continual attention to the unique needs of each small neighborhood. This problem was made worse by the fact that they also had numerous administrative and personnel management duties competing for their time.

The end result was that commanders were held accountable for the overall quality of a neighborhood's public safety health only in an abstract, theoretical way. In reality, they were evaluated on how well they responded to high-profile complaints from the community, and how well they managed their personnel and equipment. Understandably, it was considered unfair to judge them on how well they analyze and understand the unique needs of each apartment project and subdivision in their commands, and how effectively they personally address those needs.

And yet, analyzing and understanding each small neighborhood's unique needs, and then designing and executing effective problem-oriented strategies to address those needs, was exactly the criteria we sought to base our program accountability upon. It became clear to us that such accountability could only be assigned to officers who had manageably small areas of responsibility, and thus had genuine opportunities to be personally effective in those areas. Obviously, traditional management personnel do not fit this description.

Of course, there are police officers assigned to geographic areas small enough that personal effectiveness might reasonably be expected. These are the Patrol squads' "beat" officers whose assigned beats usually comprise only a few apartment complexes and perhaps a housing subdivision or two.

However, the territorial responsibility these officers have for their neighborhoods is applied only in the sense that it facilitates defining or dividing the workload. The beat identifies the area to be patrolled and determines which officer or officers will be dispatched to a given call. The beat assignment does not render the officer genuinely responsible for the neighborhood's quality of life or overall public safety situation.

This lack of beat accountability is due to the fact that our Patrol officers are essentially incident responders and preventive patrollers. They are figuratively tied to their radios and are so busy with calls for service that virtually no time remains for proactive work. Consequently, they are held accountable only for the skill and propriety with which they handle their assigned calls and other patrol tasks.

Ideally, these officers, who usually work the same beat day-in and day-out for years, would be the perfect personnel to initiate and nurture the grass-roots community relationships envisioned for our program. Consideration was given, therefore, to redefining the beat officer's work requirements so that proactive, problem-solving responsibility became a defined aspect of general street duty. This is a "generalist" approach which has met with success in a number of police agencies nationally.

However, our agency's high volume of calls for service and the emergency nature of many calls precluded such an expansion of patrol duties. Moreover, the accountability difficulties such an approach would face in a platoon scheduling system (we have five separate shifts of beat officers, with each shift deploying one officer to each beat) seemed inconsistent with our desire to narrowly affix proactive responsibility.

Therefore, the generalist concept was rejected in favor of a "specialist" system that combines a commander's managerial approach to problem-solving with the beat officer's small geographic service area and first-hand knowledge of neighborhood conditions. It provides a rare "unified accountability" situation in which the officer responsible for developing strategy is also responsible for carrying it out.

We call our accountability model the "beat management" style of community-oriented policing. At its core is the maxim that **in each neighborhood, a specific officer must be given sufficient time and resources to have meaningful personal impact on neighborhood conditions, and then be held accountable for the quality of the strategic police service he provides.**

UNDERSTANDING GENERALIST AND SPECIALIST SYSTEMS

As we just stated, there are two basic approaches to community-oriented policing: generalist systems and specialist systems. We now conclude our section on Philosophy with a discussion of these two systems.

We offer this discussion because there is much debate within the police industry about the superiority of one system over the other. It is one of the most controversial issues in community-based policing today, and by examining these systems a bit closer, the reader may enhance his ability to join in the debate.

However, this discussion is very theoretical and offers no further practical guidance regarding our program. Therefore, the reader may skip this discussion if he prefers. A replicating agency need not concern itself with making a choice between generalist and specialist systems if it replicates our program, as that choice is already factored into the program design.

Specialist systems deploy designated officers to perform the community-oriented services while the agency's remaining officers perform traditional police functions outside the community-oriented program. Responsibility for the success of the agency's community-oriented effort is narrowly placed in the designated community-oriented officers, their supervisors, and program or senior agency commanders.

In contrast, generalist systems assign community-oriented duties to all officers and components of the agency. No specialized community-oriented billet or component is created, and no operational element is given sole responsibility for the community-oriented mission. Accountability is usually task-oriented and administered in accordance with the agency's normal rank and discipline structures.

Subordinate officers bear responsibility only for their assigned tasks, of which the community-oriented duties comprise but a portion. The same can be said for most supervisory and command officials, although their tasks naturally differ from those of the subordinates. In short, accountability is based on whether assigned tasks are performed correctly and skillfully, and not whether the tasks succeed at generating the desired results.

In many generalist agencies, designated command officers bear responsibility for planning community-oriented initiatives and, in limited cases, the overall program processes. However, they are usually held accountable only in the same broad, detached sense that applies to other, more traditional police management responsibilities. Because they are typically not the same officers who actually carry out the plans, they have deniability if those plans fail. They are rarely held strictly and personally accountable for community-oriented *success* at the implementation level.

If an agency's community-oriented program is aggressively results-oriented, this splitting of planning and implementation duties may be inappropriate. Programs which emphasize high degrees of self-initiative, self-discipline, and strategic planning on the part of subordinate, operational officers will likely require a more stringent accountability and personnel evaluation environment. Specialist systems generally provide the best opportunity for such environments, in our view.

Specialist systems allow the tasks necessary for community-oriented success to be concentrated in fewer persons, which obviously aids accountability. More importantly, specialist systems allow planning and implementation to be vested in the same person, an arrangement that is far more difficult in generalist systems. In our view, only when planning and implementation are vested in the same place can true accountability for bottom-line results be fairly assigned.

One of the major attractions of generalist systems is that they encourage more officers to become involved in community-oriented activities. Theoretically, this makes the entire agency more sensitive to community needs and concerns. In addition, the involvement of many agency components may provide more diversified community-oriented

services, and coordination among the various components may be enhanced by their mutual participation in the program. On the other hand, one of the great dangers of a generalist approach is that some components may become less efficient at their primary tasks if distracted by formal community-oriented duties. This is most likely to occur in either of two situations.

The first situation involves components where community-oriented tasks are not easily identifiable within the primary component mission. These components include those with minimal public contact (such as internal clerical administration or recovered property storage) and those with highly technical duties (such as evidence processing and laboratory analysis). Unfortunately, given the real-world dynamics of management and public agency accountability, these components may expend unwarranted effort trying to demonstrate their community-oriented involvement, to the detriment of their core-mission productivity.

The second, more worrisome situation in which component efficiency is at risk involves operational components such as patrol squads and detective units. If those components are understaffed or if current workload demands are severe and strain the components' response/production capacities, there may be no margin for an expansion of duties. This is particularly critical where emergency response is concerned.

If call-handling Patrol officers are removed from service to perform outreach functions, or if they remain in service but stray too far from their vehicles while performing outreach tasks, their ability to respond quickly to emergencies will decrease. This isn't a problem when sufficient numbers of other officers remain immediately available for the emergencies. However, if the agency's staffing levels are low, those other officers may not exist. In that case, increases in emergency response times will result and the consequences might occasionally be tragic.

These concerns over core-mission impairments are important and must be resolved. However, the basic goal of the generalist approach, to involve as many personnel as possible in the community-oriented effort, is also important. We view it as so important, in fact, that we nearly crafted our program along generalist lines. We would have, too, if not for the emergency-response and accountability factors.

Thus, despite our use of a specialist system, we agree that involving numerous non-specialist components is desirable. Accordingly, we do so wherever appropriate. For example, our community-oriented specialists regularly employ personnel from the Patrol squads, the Narcotics Enforcement Division, and other components in carrying out their proactive neighborhood strategies.

However, we do not formalize these other components' response by mandating specific activities or establishing procedural and statistical requirements. Instead, we rely upon basic cooperation within our agency and management involvement when disagreements arise. A more institutionalized, mandatory-task approach is possible within the parameters of our program design, though. Therefore, a replicating agency may enumerate certain community-oriented support tasks for its non-program components, if it prefers.

It should also be noted that certain specialty components of our agency, such as the Community Relations Division and our Victim-Witness Assistance Program, provide core-mission services that are considered "community-oriented" by most other agencies. Other components perform secondary programs or services with a clear community-oriented dimension, such as our command staff's "Christmas In April" campaign each spring (our command officers chip in one day of personal time to help repair, without compensation, the deteriorating homes of elderly, poor, and other disadvantaged citizens).

In fact, given these additional outreach services and the cooperative interaction of our community-oriented officers with other components, it is perhaps misleading to describe our program as purely "specialist." Although we deploy specialists as our lead providers of formal community-oriented service, our program is probably more a hybrid of the two competing systems.

Our agency's chief executive, Chief of Police David B. Mitchell, has spoken prominently in support of a "split-force" concept that seeks to provide proactive service while protecting the traditional law enforcement base. This concept is embodied in the philosophy we present here, and it has been criticized by some who see it as a rejection of laudable generalist goals and principles.

We do not view it as rejection, though. Instead, we see it as a necessary modification designed to allow community-oriented proactivity while also providing maximum crisis intervention capability in the face of high service demands and comparatively low staffing.

In summary, we agree that it is beneficial for as many elements as possible within a police agency to become involved in the community-oriented effort. We also believe, though, that the public desperately needs for us to simultaneously maintain a high degree of efficiency in the delivery of our more traditional law enforcement services. Ultimately, the ideal system is any system that allows both of these objectives to be met, regardless of whether it is called "specialist" or "generalist."

Section 2 *continued*

RECAP OF OUR PROGRAM'S CORE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES

The following statements appeared at various locations in the narrative portions of this section. Collectively, they constitute the basic philosophical principles upon which our brand of community-oriented policing is based. We now present them in one list for the convenience of the reader.

1. Community-oriented policing is an aggressive, results-driven form of police work. Its bottom line is suppressing crime.

2. Proactive, problem-oriented strategies must be used to obtain improvements in quality of life.

3. A community-oriented policing program's focal point must be the neighborhoods that are to be served, rather than the problems afflicting those neighborhoods.

4. A community-oriented policing program relies upon continuing, permanent relationships between operational line officers and average local residents.

5. In each neighborhood, a specific officer must be given sufficient time and resources to have meaningful personal impact on neighborhood conditions, and then be held accountable for the quality of the strategic police service he provides.

Section 3

PROGRAM ORGANIZATION

This section describes the organizational structure, staffing, and deployment policies of our community-oriented policing program. The program's chain-of-command and managerial areas of responsibility are identified, as are the criteria by which community-oriented assignments are created. Our community-oriented policing program's organizational structure is also compared with that of other departmental components.

A replicating agency must make similar organizational decisions prior to implementation of a program. Consideration of how the Prince George's County Police Department has handled these issues will be beneficial, although the replicating agency is free to customize this aspect of the program to suit its own particular style.

Section 3: Program Organization

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED SQUADS

It is the normal practice of the Prince George's County Police Department to organize all operational officers into squads. This is true in the uniformed patrol function, detective components, and enforcement-oriented specialty components such as our Emergency Services Teams (our version of a SWAT Unit).

Accordingly, our community-oriented officers are assigned to squads and are supervised by a squad Sergeant, which is the standard first-line supervision billet in our agency. Community-oriented squad sizes currently range as high as eight officers, but this number is subject to adjustment in either direction, depending on manpower availability, workload, and other pertinent factors.

Our agency's uniformed Patrol squads are arranged into five rotating, department-wide "shifts" for purposes of providing 24-hour-per-day street coverage. The County is divided into ten geographic patrol sectors, and each shift contains one squad per sector. In accordance with a mathematically-based shift plan, on any given date three of the five shifts report for duty (one each on the day, evening, and midnight watches), while the other two shifts are on days off. Each multi-squad, multi-sector shift is commanded by a Lieutenant.

Our community-oriented squads, of which there is also one per sector, form a quasi "sixth shift" within the uniformed patrol ranks. However, unlike their counterparts in the regular patrol squads, community-oriented officers do not work schedules established by a shift plan. Because they have no emergency or call-handling responsibilities, they are allowed to adjust their hours individually to suit the unique needs of their projects. The community-oriented squad sergeant approves the hours and attempts to meet with each subordinate for at least a portion of his tour of duty.

For purposes of general conduct and adherence to departmental regulations only, the community-oriented officers and sergeant fall under the authority of whichever Shift Lieutenant happens to be on duty at a given time. For purposes of program management and mission performance, however, the community-oriented squads report directly to the Assistant District Commander (rank of Captain) for the respective districts where they are deployed.

Despite this management authority, the Assistant District Commander does not usually direct the activities of the squad or establish its assignments. Instead, he provides basic managerial support, evaluates officer and squad performance, and ensures that the activities and strategies of the community-oriented officers are appropriate and within program parameters. In our style of community-oriented policing, we insist that most strategy development be generated by subordinate officers in consultation with their community contacts, rather than by the police command officials.[1]

The geographic boundaries of the community-oriented squad's beats or neighborhood assignments are such that a contiguous cluster of assigned territories is created. In other words, every one of the squad's assigned territories is adjacent to at least one other such territory.

Within the squad, each community-oriented beat officer works relatively independently. However, because of the geographic proximity of the territories and the demographic similarities they share, cooperative work on common problems is appropriate in many instances. When this is the case, the squad sergeant helps coordinate the intra-squad cooperation.

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[1] Command-level input into problem selection and strategy development does occasionally occur. This exception to the basic premise that street officers generate strategies will be explained in greater detail later in this section.

The squad sergeant's role is similar to that of the Assistant District Commander, except that he provides more direct guidance and attention to his subordinates. Whereas the Assistant District Commander reviews the progress of the officers' strategies on a monthly basis, the sergeant keeps abreast of strategic progress throughout the month by regularly consulting with his officers. He also performs the more standard supervisory and leadership functions typical of all patrol sergeants, such as leave-approval and dispute resolution within the squad.

The District Commander (rank of Major) retains final authority over program operations in his district, although routine management of the program is delegated to the Assistant District Commander. All six District Commanders report to the Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, and he reports directly to the Chief of Police, who retains ultimate program authority and responsibility.

THE COMMUNITY-ORIENTED SERVICES MANAGER

Our agency also maintains a command billet known as the "Community-Oriented Services Manager," who has general oversight responsibility for our entire community-oriented program. However, this command officer (exact rank is unimportant; currently staffed by a Lieutenant) is not really a part of the community-oriented officer's chain-of-command in a traditional sense. He reports directly to the Chief of our Bureau of Patrol, has no actual executive or management authority over program personnel, and does not generally interact with the day-to-day local operations of the six districts.

Instead, this commander's duty is to monitor the program for overall quality control and ensure that the relatively autonomous operations of the six local districts do not stray from the Department's community-oriented philosophy and approved methods. He frequently consults with local commanders and operational community-oriented officers, of course, but his authority is limited to that of an auditor; if problems are noted, he reports them to the Chief of the Bureau of Patrol (a Lieutenant Colonel), who takes corrective action, if necessary.

In addition to his auditing role, the Community-Oriented Services Manager performs several other important functions. For example, he is responsible for all community-oriented training, including curriculum development and actual instruction (although he does not teach every class). This includes training of program personnel, in-service training to officers and civilian employees not involved with the program, and members of the public.

The Community-Oriented Services Manager also counsels local commanders with non-authoritarian advice and guidance, performs programmatic research, and assists local commands with equipment and materials procurement. He also plans and conducts periodic day-long "conventions" of community-oriented personnel from all six districts, at which time common problems are discussed and problem-solving ideas and strategies are shared.

The Community-Oriented Services Manager serves as the Department's central point of community-oriented contact for leaders of County-wide or State-wide community organizations, and is available to local civic groups who, for one reason or another, desire direct contact with headquarters. He also liaisons with other Departmental components, with elected representatives and political figures, and with higher-ranking officials of other government agencies.

His intra-governmental liaison role is particularly beneficial. When local community-oriented officers have difficulties or disagreements with other Departmental or governmental entities, the Community-Oriented Services Manager may intervene on their behalf. From his position as a direct representative of the Bureau Chief, he is sometimes able to secure from the outside components a more timely and cooperative response than was received by the local officer.

Unfortunately, when we originally designed our program we did not include the Community-Oriented Services Manager position. Because our program began as a pilot project in just one district, we relied instead upon the local command structure to perform the services described above. And it worked well. However, when we expanded our program to other districts in the second year, we observed that the various local commanders approached community-oriented policing in significantly different ways.

As the program grew and each local commander put his unique stamp on the local community-oriented effort, senior management became concerned that our overall program was in danger of fragmenting. The carefully crafted philosophical and operational principles we devised for the program were being modified or rejected at will. This was an unacceptable development, for although we value local autonomy in responding to local problems, the integrity of the basic program design must be respected if we are to render consistent, high-quality service to the public.

Senior management also noted that some of the local districts' functions seemed duplicative, or were less efficient when performed individually than they would be if performed from headquarters (training is a good example). Consequently, the Community-Oriented Services Manager billet was created to provide gentle *macro-management* of our program, but without the *micro-management* authority that could threaten local initiatives.

If a replicating agency is sufficiently small that satisfactory results can be obtained without creating the Community-Oriented Services Manager position, going without this billet may be appropriate. If this billet is waived, though, it is still important that the duties we reserve for the Community-Oriented Services Manager be explicitly assigned to the local commander or another appropriate authority.

If the replicating agency is mid-sized or larger, or if community-oriented services are to be performed by more than one Departmental component, we strongly urge that a community-oriented services manager be designated. This position need not necessarily be a full-time billet in smaller operations, and the individual so assigned can continue to operate under another title. However, these duties must be performed by someone, and that person must have access to centralized authority.

We also recognize that the overall organizational structure of replicating agencies may be significantly different from ours. As a result, they may find our other arrangements (shift supervision, rank designations, etc.) impractical. Fortunately, organizational structure is not a critical issue to the success of our program, and replicators should feel free to modify our community-oriented organization and supervision models to fit their local situation. We do recommend, though, that in all cases the community-oriented officers still be granted reasonable flexibility to adjust their work schedules, and that care be taken not to stifle their strategic self-initiative.

MANPOWER ALLOCATION AND DEPLOYMENT

When our program was launched in January, 1991, we placed it in just one of the County's ten patrol sectors. The original squad of community-oriented officers consisted of eight subordinates and a sergeant. Each officer was assigned to serve an entire patrol beat, and the sergeant supervised the squad.

As we gained experience with our program, we embarked upon a policy of gradual, careful expansion. In early 1992, another full squad was added to an adjacent sector, and a schedule for incremental County-wide expansion was published. Eventually, it calls for 101 officers to be deployed to full-time, primary community-oriented duty by the end of 1995. We are now more than halfway to that goal and we remain on schedule.

However, originally our program design called for only 64 subordinate-level officers. We have a total of 64 beats in our ten patrol sectors and we naively envisioned an allocation standard of one officer per patrol beat. Unfortunately, we learned through experience that an entire beat is often too large a territory for one community-oriented officer to serve (and in a few cases, too small).

In Prince George's County we define our beat sizes and boundaries according to the same criteria most other police agencies use. Prior to launching our community-oriented policing program, therefore, we'd drawn patrol beat configurations based upon such factors as:

* number of available officers
* crime rates
* volume of overall calls for service
* geographic distribution of the most serious or time-consuming calls
* emergency response times
* geographic distance to nearest back-up officer

* natural physical barriers that geographically affect routine patrol and response (rivers, limited-access highways, and large undeveloped areas, etc.)
* boundaries of political sub-jurisdictions, where applicable
* the number of miscellaneous demands upon officers (special assignments and unique police hazards, etc.)

Of the factors mentioned above, only the availability of officers, crime rates, boundaries of political sub-jurisdictions, and numbers of miscellaneous demands appear relevant to our community-oriented operation. Since our community-oriented officers have no significant call-handling and emergency-response duties, and since generalized preventive patrol is not a major program activity, the remaining factors are not appropriate criteria. Other factors relating to the unique duties of the community-oriented officers should replace them.

Unfortunately, we cannot easily or definitively identify those other factors, and we have no qualitative or statistical formulas for a replicating agency to use. It is clear, though, that the process for establishing community-oriented boundaries must relate to the workload demands placed upon community-oriented officers, rather than the workloads of traditional patrol officers.

Consequently, we used the activities and responsibilities we describe for community-oriented officers in Section 4 of this document, along with the demographic characteristics of the various areas of the County, to estimate the probable workloads of our community-oriented officers. From these estimates, we established new intended community-oriented service territories in 1992, abandoning the "one officer per patrol beat" concept we had started with.

For the most part, a replicating agency should probably follow our lead in this regard. However, the agency should also rely upon its own subjective judgements and preferences, as it may have unique local concerns that need to be factored in. Also, the replicating agency may find that not all of our criteria are appropriate.

For instance, in Prince George's County we have philosophically embraced the concept that every neighborhood in the County deserves community-oriented policing, not just those with particularly high crime rates or socially deprived conditions. Our decision to deploy 101 officers is deeply affected by this value judgement. However, the judgement is ours alone. It is not a mandatory principle of community-oriented policing in general.

A replicating agency may conclude that its own manpower situation does not allow every area of its jurisdiction to be represented, or that such representation does not constitute the most effective use of resources. Fortunately, our program provides great flexibility in defining the number and size of community-oriented service areas. A replicating agency should feel free to modify our allocation and deployment arrangements in whatever manner best suits its local needs.

As a matter of fact, our agency's current 101-officer target may be revised relatively soon, as the remaining officers come into service and actual experience replaces projections. We may find that more or fewer officers are needed to accomplish our program objectives. Further, as new housing areas are built and population patterns shift in the future, the 101 figure will inevitably change and territorial configurations will have to be redrawn.

It is well accepted in the police industry that beat/sector configurations and the manpower allotments for various departmental components should be periodically evaluated (and adjusted, if necessary). Most agencies have an established management mechanism for this purpose. If a replicating agency already has such a mechanism in place, it must ensure that this program is included in its future manpower allocation studies. If the replicator does not have a regular evaluation mechanism in place, it should develop one as part of this program's implementation.

Section 4

PROGRAM OPERATIONS

Section 4: Program Operations

BEAT MANAGEMENT AND THE "SARA" PROCESS

As stated previously, the heart of our program is its strategic problem-solving through a process we call "beat management." It is so named because we expect our community-oriented officers to "manage" their beats in a way that is analogous to a police management official "managing" his command. Naturally, specific objectives and duties differ, but their respective managerial approaches are similar.

Traditional police management (as well as management in other government and business fields) is a problem-focused endeavor. Managers are expected to resolve existing problems and to provide effective administration that prevents new problems from arising. Even when conventional problem-solving is not involved, the need to generate corporate profits or governmental services becomes a figurative "problem" that challenges the manager's creativity and leadership.

To accomplish his problem-solving objectives, the traditional manager relies upon an established set of principles, or a management "discipline," if you will. This discipline requires that he assess conditions, identify cause-and-effect relationships, and formulate action plans that will render desirable results.

After formulating a strategy, the manager leads or directs others in its execution. He must explain the plan and the specific roles that various implementors will play, and he may even have to convince some of those implementors to become involved if they are not organizationally under his authority. As work commences, he must obtain and coordinate resources, monitor and document the plan's progress, and make appropriate strategic adjustments when obstacles are encountered or conditions change. The ultimate adjustment, that of terminating the strategy when it is no longer viable or necessary, is also the manager's responsibility.

In our program, we apply the above-described traditional management model to the community-oriented officer. We expect the community-oriented officer to work on his neighborhood's existing problems, anticipate and prevent developing problems, and generate benefits for his community. We expect him to do these things by playing the roles of educator, salesman, procurer, coordinator, and tactician that we described for traditional managers in the preceding paragraph.

The management discipline that we have chosen for our officers to follow is described in Herman Goldstein's book "Problem-Oriented Policing," published by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Washington, D.C. We strongly recommend that the reader obtain and study that book if replication of our program becomes a serious possibility. Consequently, we will not report Mr. Goldstein's teachings in this document, except for one facet which is vital to our discussion here.

Mr. Goldstein describes the "SARA" model, which is an orderly step-by-step process for addressing community problems. "SARA" is an acronym for the four problem-solving steps of Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment. These steps were named by the Newport News (Virginia) Police Department during its early community-oriented work, although they are really common-sense practices that many other agencies use under different names.

Let us now consider each of these steps separately, in the chronological order in which they occur.

* STEP #1: SCANNING

Scanning is the term applied to basic problem-identification and, by implication, problem-selection. In this initial step, our community-oriented officers consult with neighborhood residents and leaders to define community problems and to cooperatively select problems for proactive attention.

In addition to their own police sense and expressed community concerns, the officers also rely upon statistical data, information from police management, and referrals from the jurisdiction's political leadership. However, these additional input sources are intended to be less critical in our locally intensive system than they are in more traditional outreach and tactical operations.

The degree to which statistics and higher-level input affects problem-identification and problem-selection should vary according to the geographic scope of the problem. Mr. Goldstein points out in his text that problems affecting large geographic areas require greater planning and coordination by higher authorities. However, he also acknowledges the unique advantages possessed by street-level officers when he writes, "Police officers on the beat - especially if they are permanently assigned to an area - are in the best position to identify problems from the bottom up."

As suggested in our philosophy section, we strongly agree with Mr. Goldstein's view that the beat officer possesses the best police perspective, and so we insist that our community-oriented beat officers have significant, genuine problem-selection authority. This is a core precept of our approach to community-oriented policing and the statements in our next paragraph in no way diminish our commitment to this principle.

At the same time, though, we recognize the need for higher-authority coordination in attacking certain jurisdictional-wide problems. Accordingly, we allow some degree of command input in the community-oriented officer's problem selection process, and we require the officer to participate in certain jurisdiction-wide initiatives in order to improve and enhance those initiatives as they relate to the local situation. Still, we place great value on the community-oriented officer's problem-selection autonomy, and we wish to emphasize that the number of instances where command-level direction occurs are purposefully kept to a minimum.

Within reasonable bounds, our community-oriented officers are authorized to work on any type of problem that they and their community partners select. The problems may be directly involved with criminal activity or they may have no criminal dimension whatever. They may be minor and easily correctable, or they may be chronic problems where mere

progress, rather than absolute solution, is the hoped-for result. We only insist that meaningful local impact be a realistic possibility and that measurable benefits be pursued.

Finally, during the Scanning stage, no effort is made to identify a specific problem's causative factors or identify its complete scope. These functions occur elsewhere in the SARA process. Instead, the officer concerns himself only with clarifying exactly what is and is not included in his target problem. In this regard, we recommend that the basic problem statement be as concise as possible, and that pains be taken to ensure that the problem's definition is not so vague or all-encompassing that realistic objectives and measures of success become impossible.

* STEP #2: ANALYSIS

In the Analysis step, the officer seeks to identify the underlying causes of the problem and the environmental conditions which allow it to continue. Factors to be considered include not only the obvious motives and behaviors directly affecting the observable situation, but also the more subtle influences which only indirectly facilitate the problem. This step requires thoughtful insight and requires careful supporting research in all but the simplest of situations.

During this step, the officer also assesses the problem's scope and its effects upon crime and community quality of life. Again, *indirect* cause-and-effect relationships must be considered in addition to the more obvious ones. The officer must be alert for domino effects as one problem facilitates or compounds another, and so on. Adequate research is essential here, as well.

Obviously, the nature and seriousness of the problem will dictate how much research will be required, but care should be taken not to be superficial or hasty. While an issue shouldn't be studied to death before action is taken, remember that the best efforts and intentions can be ruined by poor planning, and planning *will be flawed* if sufficient and proper analysis has not occurred in advance.

The research should seek out a wide diversity of perspectives. Information sources include typical neighborhood residents (both direct victims and those who merely suffer reduced quality of life as a result of the problem), recognized community leaders, and others who may not actually be part of the community, but who regularly interact with it (investors and business people, for instance).

Obviously, statistical data is also important in problem analysis, but officers must not restrict themselves to police and crime data alone. Relevant statistics from a wide variety of alternative sources may be useful. We will discuss these sources under the heading "Statistical Support Officer" later in this section.

Officers should also survey other police personnel, other government agencies, and private sector organizations, as appropriate. Finally, criminal suspects or others who are perceived as "being the problem" should not be overlooked, although special care may have to be taken in soliciting and qualifying their input (in certain situations, of course, this potentially valuable information source will simply be inappropriate for polling).

The specific types of information to be gathered will vary by problem, but the community-oriented officer must ensure that the questions he asks adequately address the subject. It is wise for officers to remember the six basic words of questioning: *who, what, where, when, why, and how.* All of these words should be examined when formulating appropriate, relevant questions.

Officers should also be aware that not all questions and issues can be anticipated in advance. New questions may arise during the research, some being posed by the persons the officer interviews. Officers should remember that research is a flexible give-and-take process. They must be open-minded and willing to accept the help of others in identifying alternative research avenues. They must also be willing to requestion previously-interviewed sources and restudy previously-resolved issues, if need be.

After learning as much as he reasonably can about a problem's causes, characteristics, and ramifications, the officer should pull together the various data and interpret it in a total context. In concert with his community partners and other

police/government officials, he must then draw rational conclusions about the problem. He will use these conclusions to develop his problem-solving strategy in the next SARA step.

* STEP #3: RESPONSE

Mr. Goldstein begins one of his book's chapters with the statement that "after a problem has been clearly defined and analyzed, one confronts the ultimate challenge in problem-oriented policing: the search for the most effective way of dealing with it." We agree. It is the ultimate challenge and we view it as the critical turning point in our beat management process.

It brings us to the third SARA step, that of formulating an appropriate problem-solving strategic response. Based upon the research data and conclusions from the Analysis step, the officer predicts what actions may be successful at resolving the problem and develops a plan to implement those actions. These strategic responses usually attack the problem's motivations and facilitating environmental conditions.

Unfortunately, there is no magic formula or foolproof problem-solving technique offered by community-oriented policing. Although some strategies have consistently proven successful and should, therefore, be studied by community-oriented officers (we have included selected SARA reports from our program experience in this document's Appendix), they will not necessarily be successful in every similar circumstance.

Instead, a strategy's ultimate success will depend upon the creativity and resourcefulness with which it was developed, the managerial skill with which it was implemented, and the availability and performance of various resources throughout the Response phase.

When devising strategies, officers must think imaginatively. They must search for innovative alternatives that offer greater potential for success than the traditional responses already in use by the police and others. After all, if those traditional responses had been adequate, the problem would probably not be selected for attention. Therefore, the community-oriented officer must consciously guard against being limited by traditional thinking, and he must be receptive to new concepts and possibilities that his police training may even predispose him to resist.

Hopefully, the conclusions reached in the *Analysis* step will point the officer in the right direction when it comes time to develop his strategy. If his research was comprehensive, and if prudent interpretations and conclusions followed, a viable strategic course that offers at least moderate prospects for success may be immediately evident.

If such an obvious strategic option emerges, the officer is ahead of the game. However, he should not stop there. He should still search for other potential options, including innovative approaches that may appear inferior at first glance. Ultimately, further reflection may show these innovations to be superior, or they may be needed as fall-back contingencies if the primary strategy falters.

If a strategic course is not immediately evident, the officer's creativity, imagination, and logical understanding of cause-and-effect relationships become crucial. By brainstorming with his community partners and other government officials, and by examining responses to similar problems in other communities, an appropriate strategy will hopefully emerge. Officers should also consider using strategic combinations; certain ideas or approaches may appear insufficient when viewed individually, but collectively may render satisfactory results that no single course could produce alone.

Of course, even with innovative vision, sound problem analysis, and excellent planning skills, the officer will often be limited in his strategic options by the unavailability of resources. Very often the most difficult aspect of strategic problem-solving is not figuring out how a problem can be corrected. Rather, it is determining how to achieve results with the limited resources at one's disposal.

If the existing level of government resources is adequate but simply needs better coordination, the community-oriented officer can use his position in the community to more efficiently redirect the existing government services. His strategy may call for direct multi-agency responses which he personally arranges with those agencies' officials, or it may involve improved access to existing services through a program of referrals and public education.

Very often, though, the officer will find that the existing government resources are not extensive enough to be effective, and so he must look to previously underutilized resources, particularly those in the private sector. The officer's role in mobilizing the community in these instances becomes a critical problem-solving function.

Community mobilization can take many forms. The community may be solicited to provide volunteer personnel, financial or material contributions, political support, behavior modifications, and so forth. The range of services and contributions that are available in the community are virtually limitless.

The types of community elements that can be mobilized include traditional civic organizations, homeowner and tenant associations, Neighborhood Watch groups, schools and PTA's, churches, and charitable organizations, etc. Also of great value are trade and labor associations, business clubs and chambers of commerce, and individual local businesses which may have a stake in the targeted problem.

The officer may also be able to use the media. Sometimes we forget that the media are a part of the community, thinking of them instead as outside observers. The media is a valuable community resource, however, and while they may have their own professional agenda and cannot be used in the same ways (or as often) as the groups mentioned above, media professionals are sincerely concerned about community quality of life. Therefore, occasionally the media will be receptive to providing positive coverage or other support for community-oriented endeavors.

When appropriate organizations do not exist or decline to participate, the officer should consider creating new groups as part of his strategy. Forming new community groups, or building coalitions among existing groups, may not be difficult when a genuine need exists. Citizens may already be eager to get involved, but are waiting for someone to show the way.

Despite the large number of potential community and governmental partners, though, the resources they offer are not without limitations. Therefore, the officer must ensure that the strategy he devises is, in fact, realistic. Developing an action plan based on *hoped-for* support and participation is extremely unwise. Before finalizing his strategy, the officer must confirm that sufficient resources exist and that promised support will actually be delivered and maintained throughout the course of the strategy.

After a strategy has been agreed upon, the community-oriented officer develops a written action plan which identifies the objectives that he hopes to accomplish. The plan should list all scheduled activities and responsibilities, indicate who will perform those activities or bear those responsibilities, and establish tentative timetables and performance benchmarks. Contingency plans may also be appropriate for mentioning in the action plan, particularly if they are to be automatically triggered by a specific event or condition.

Once a strategy has been developed and an action plan prepared, the next course is to put the plan into effect. This process of implementation is also part of the response phase. It requires the officer to skillfully exercise all of the functions we ascribed to traditional managers at the beginning of this "beat management" discussion. If the officer performs poorly in these areas, the plan will not achieve significant success no matter how strong it may be conceptually.

* STEP #4: ASSESSMENT

In the fourth step, that of Assessment, the officer evaluates how successful the Response (third step) has been. His primary concern is whether the targeted problem has been resolved and whether the major goals and objectives of his strategy have been achieved.

However, regardless of whether the primary objectives were satisfied, the officer should also assess how well the specific elements of his strategy worked and how well specific personnel and resources performed. Even if the problem has been resolved and the strategy is coming to a conclusion, this information may be valuable in terms of analysis and strategy development for other problems in the future.

Technically, Assessment is the fourth and final step in the SARA process. And when the strategic objectives have been achieved, the Assessment phase is indeed the end of the line. The strategy and action plan are terminated, although some continuing preventive activity may commence in its place.

In many instances, though, the assessment will reveal that initial objectives have not been achieved and that work remains to be done. When this occurs, the officer must go back to one of the previous three SARA steps and resume the process from that point.

For example, the officer's assessment may reveal that the problem was poorly or inappropriately defined in Step #1. Although it is rare, a complete reconsideration of the problem-identification may be called for. After the problem is subsequently redefined, all other steps must again be performed in their normal sequence. In other words, the officer starts over from the beginning.

On the other hand, the assessment may reveal that the problem was properly defined but poorly understood. In this more common situation, the officer returns to Step #2, conducting additional research or drawing new conclusions. Once these have occurred, he moves to the third step and adjusts his initial strategy in light of the new findings.

The most common situation of all, though, sees the officer return directly to Step #3. In such instances, the problem was properly identified and the research/analysis were adequate. However, the strategic response or action plan simply didn't work and something different needs to be tried.

Officers needing to revisit Step #3 should not be dismayed. It is normal that revisions to initial strategies will be needed in many cases, especially when complex or particularly challenging problems are involved. In fact, bouncing back and forth between steps #3 and #4 *many times* over a period of months or longer is not unheard of. Where strategy development and implementation are concerned, a process of trial and error is typical.

Hopefully, effective strategies or strategy combinations will emerge sooner or later. If they do, the Assessment step will eventually demonstrate that success has been achieved, and the strategic action can be concluded. As mentioned previously, preventive mechanisms may then be activated or, where appropriate, no further action will be taken whatsoever.

Sometimes, though, success will continue to elude the officer regardless of strategic adjustments. There may come a point when the officer concludes that success is simply not attainable with the resources at his disposal. When this conclusion is reached, it is the officer's duty to terminate work on the problem.

Of course, abandonment of a problem is a very unattractive option and we do not recommend that it be exercised quickly or casually. It should also not be done without prior notification to (and hopefully agreement from) the other elements participating in the strategy. Still, wasting resources that could be redirected to other problem areas accomplishes nothing, and is actually counterproductive to the *overall* community-oriented mission. Persistence in the face of adversity is a virtue, but so too is knowing when to admit defeat.

Remember that in our discussion of Step #1 (Scanning), we stated that our community-oriented officers are allowed to proactively work on almost any problem they and their community partners select. We also stated, though, that we "insist that meaningful local impact be a realistic possibility and that measurable benefits be pursued."

In closing, when an assessment shows that meaningful impact and measurable benefits are no longer realistically possible, the time has come to terminate the strategic response and move on to other areas of need. The officer must take the lead in helping others recognize when that time has arrived.

GENERAL OPERATING PRACTICES

When an officer and his community partners select a problem for proactive attention, the selection is a formal one. A strategic "SARA project" is opened and a control number is assigned for that project. The officer maintains appropriate records of his work and submits regularly scheduled progress reports to his commander. At any given moment, the officer can tell you how many proactive strategies he is working, identify them individually, and tell you what step of the SARA process each one is in.

Not everything that an officer does during the course of his tour of duty is related to one of his SARA projects, however. The officer performs many additional services and activities that contribute to the community's welfare, but which do not directly relate to the solution of a specific problem. We refer to these additional services and activities as "General Operating Practices."

We now present a sampling of some of these practices. Replicating agencies should feel free to add additional items to this list or to delete undesirable activities and services. Although we feel that all of the items we present here are worthwhile and beneficial to a program, none are absolutely essential.

SATELLITE OFFICES

Each community-oriented officer maintains a "satellite office" in his assigned neighborhood. A few officers have even established two offices in response to geographic necessity or community desire. The satellite office concept has proven to be incredibly popular with our public, and has become a highly visible symbol of our overall program. We feel that any replicating agency will reap significant benefits by establishing such offices.

The purpose of the office is to provide the officer with a physical base for operations within the neighborhood. Without such an office, the officer's patrol car must serve as his operating base, but having to operate from a vehicle is not convenient, efficient, or likely to inspire the officer's enthusiasm. The satellite office also eliminates or limits the need for the officer to respond to a police facility elsewhere when he makes telephone calls, prepares documents, or attends to other administrative tasks.

The office is also intended to provide a convenient contact location for community members who are involved in the officer's strategies or who have other business with him. Most officers hold planning committee meetings in these offices (these committees will be discussed later in this Section), and use them for conferences with individual citizens seeking advice. Many officers maintain scheduled "office hours" for the convenience of residents who may wish to speak to an officer without having to "call the police."

Each office is equipped with a telephone line for the officer's use, and it is hooked up to an answering machine to record messages when the officer is unavailable. Enabling the officer's community contacts to leave a voice message that they can be sure the officer will receive is extremely beneficial in sustaining citizen involvement.

The satellite offices are stocked with various brochures and other hand-out literature, including crime prevention and Neighborhood Watch materials, drug and health education/treatment information, Alcoholics Anonymous pamphlets, and other similar public service materials. Citizens are also able to borrow electric engraving pens from the office to mark their property in accordance with Operation Identification.

The offices are usually located in apartment complexes, churches, or business locations. The most common location is in apartment complexes, frequently in the rental office itself or in an adjacent apartment. The rental management firms happily donate the office space because it affords them easy access to an officer, and it is seen as a protective benefit by their tenants.

From the Police Department's vantage point, we value the closer working relationships that develop between our officers and the apartment managers. We are also pleased that the officer is ideally positioned to greet large numbers of residents who visit the rental office for various non-police reasons.

CRIME PREVENTION COUNSELING

In those areas of the County where this program is currently operating, the community-oriented officers have assumed primary responsibility for the delivery of crime prevention services. Elsewhere, those services are still performed by a dwindling number of crime prevention specialists who will eventually be phased out when our community-oriented program reaches full implementation.

The community-oriented officers perform security surveys at homes and businesses, give crime prevention speeches to all groups who request that service, and staff crime prevention displays at public events. They also fingerprint children for identification purposes (the parents retain the print cards for use only if the child is later reported missing), work with the Department's Explorer Scout and Block Parent programs, and perform all *ad hoc* crime prevention assignments that may come up in their assigned neighborhoods.

The most important crime prevention function of the community-oriented officers, however, involves Neighborhood Watch and Business Watch groups. Our community-oriented officers are the designated departmental liaisons for all such groups located in their assigned territories. The officers attend all of their groups' meetings, consult frequently with Neighborhood Watch leaders, and provide or coordinate all requested police department support for the groups.

This work is important not only because of the traditional crime prevention benefits (target hardening and improved reporting of incidents, etc.), but also because these groups provide valuable resources and networking capability that the officer needs to develop and implement proactive strategies. As we stated earlier, community mobilization is a critical aspect of the community-oriented officer's methodology. We felt that by assigning Neighborhood Watch responsibility to the community-oriented officer, we could provide him with a valuable head-start in that direction.

This approach has worked well for us, and we recommend that replicating agencies incorporate the crime prevention duty into the community-oriented program. However, we realize that some agencies may prefer that traditional crime prevention specialists continue delivering speeches and conducting security surveys, etc. This is a viable option, but if it is exercised, we still urge that some mechanism for significant, *mandatory* involvement by the community-oriented officer with Neighborhood Watch groups be arranged.

HOME VISITATIONS AND FOOT PATROL

If a community-oriented officer relies only upon the views of residents who participate in civic associations, Neighborhood Watch groups, and other such organizations, he will lose input from an important segment of the community. In reality, only a small minority of community residents become politically active or participate in organized activities. Most residents just go about their daily routines, tending to jobs, families, and recreational activities, etc.

The fact that these residents are not active in public affairs does not mean they lack opinions and insight. Also, the fact that they haven't yet become active in community organizations does not mean they are unwilling to become involved. Many people simply lack initiative, or perhaps feel that they have too little to offer. But if someone asks them to participate, or shows them how their small personal contributions can make a difference to the overall effort, many of these residents will become more active.

Our community-oriented officers are expected to tap into this underutilized information and resource base. We instruct our officers to conduct periodic "home visitations," which are very similar to the neighborhood canvasses employed by detective components following serious crimes. In the case of the home visitation, though, there is usually no specific incident or topic triggering the outreach.

In this activity, the community-oriented officer walks through the neighborhood, engaging residents in casual conversations about a wide variety of topics. This is the community-oriented officer's method of routine patrol, but it is not something he does only when there are no other assignments or there is nothing else to do. Home visitation is an important element of the program and the officer is required to set aside a significant portion of his time to perform this activity exclusively.

Obviously, as the officer walks through the neighborhood he encounters citizens on the street or in yards. As he does, he converses with them at these locations for as long or as briefly as the citizens desire. However, the officer also knocks on doors. If the knock is answered, he offers the resident an opportunity to discuss concerns and express complaints. This discussion may occur at the door or may move inside the home where more sensitive information can be discussed. And if the timing is not convenient but the citizen is receptive, the officer makes arrangements to return at a later time.

Not all members of the community welcome home visitations, of course, and those who do not can easily decline the officer's offer. However, many citizens find this practice to be refreshing. They view home visitations as surprising evidence of the Police Department's interest in their opinions and its openness to new ideas and criticism. As long as these police-initiated contacts are not high-pressure or negative in tone, the public reaction to them is exceptionally positive.

In a sense, the model for this dialogue between average resident and locally-based police officer is the foot patrolman of a bygone era. The old foot officers were the norm in police work before vehicular patrol and response took over in the 1960's. The officers usually spent years on the same beat and got to know local residents very, very well.

To most people in the neighborhood, these foot patrolmen were not merely the police. They were truly a part of the neighborhood. The officers' sincere commitment to the community's welfare was understood and believed by most residents, and many residents regarded the officers as personal friends. As a result, a greater degree of trust and communication existed between these officers and their public than exists today virtually anywhere in America.

The Prince George's County Police Department believes that recapturing this warmer police-community relationship is vital to the success of our program. It is not enough that community-oriented officers merely perform proactive services in cooperation with high-profile community activists. The "continuing, permanent relationships between operational line officers and average local residents" that we referred to in our core philosophical principles (page 41) must be achieved.

We regard frequent foot patrols and home visitations as an essential means of building this police-community relationship. We strongly recommend that replicating agencies retain this feature by requiring each community-oriented officer to invest a specified minimum number of hours per month on community-oriented foot patrol. The exact number of hours is best determined by the replicating agency, based on community demographics and officer workloads.

Finally, we'd like to close our discussion of home visitation by noting that the concept includes a "commercial visitation" dimension. Our officers also periodically visit shopkeepers, church pastors, school principals, and other "institutional" persons in a fashion similar to the home visitations. We recommend that a replicating agency also include these commercial elements in the visitation feature. However, officers should refrain from visiting businesses during peak commercial hours, and may find scheduled appointments with principals and pastors preferable to informal, unannounced visits.

REFERRALS

As we discussed earlier in this section, inter-agency cooperation is an important aspect of the community-oriented officer's strategic work. Officers frequently turn to other government agencies or private-sector organizations to obtain resources and support for their initiatives. However, turning to other agencies for help in solving problems is not reserved exclusively for beat management strategies.

During the routine course of their work, community-oriented officers encounter numerous conditions and situations which may not be appropriate for police intervention or may not justify a full-scale strategic response. Many of these situations, though, can be resolved or helped by an appropriate referral to another government agency or private-sector service provider. Therefore, our program emphasizes consistent use of informal referrals by community-oriented officers in non-strategic situations.

In the most common type of referral, the officer becomes aware of a problem and suggests appropriate sources of help to the involved citizen or concerned community leader. The citizen or community leader then directly contacts the referred agency and makes whatever arrangements are appropriate. In most cases, the officer has no further involvement.

Examples of this referral type include recommending that a civic association leader contact the Board of Education about unruly students in the area of a school, or recommending that a family member of an alcoholic contact Alcoholics Anonymous or Al-Anon for help with their personal problem.

The other prominent type of referral occurs when the officer becomes aware of a situation and personally makes the notification to the outside agency, asking that it take appropriate action. This type of referral usually occurs in strictly governmental matters, situations where a public hazard or threat is perceived, or personal cases where the affected citizen is unable to make the notification directly.

Examples of this type of referral include the officer observing illegally dumped trash and requesting the Department of Public Works to clean it up, or observing a traffic engineering flaw and requesting the Department of Transportation to correct it. Another example might involve an officer discovering that an elderly, impaired citizen is in need of social services, and the officer then personally contacting the Department of Aging to arrange those services.

Our referral program does not depend entirely upon word-of-mouth referrals by the officer, though. We also stock our community-oriented satellite offices with free brochures, educational posters, and other referral-related literature that visiting citizens can access without specific direction from the officer.

Examples of referral items appropriate for stocking in satellite offices include summaries of services and contact numbers for the County Animal Shelter, referral information for Spanish language services, AIDS prevention and testing information from the Health Department, and "Where and When" directories published by Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous. Obviously, the nature of problems and availability of services in a replicating agency's jurisdiction will dictate the stock selections.

ENFORCEMENT AND CALL-HANDLING

In too many police agencies, officers who become involved in community relations and community-oriented policing virtually cease to be police officers in the traditional sense of the word. They become so focused on their outreach missions, or they become so detached from criminal situations, that they lose their personal inclination to enforce the law. In some cases, their agencies even *prohibit* enforcement or call-handling activity except in serious emergencies.

In Prince George's County, we make no such prohibition and we encourage all of our officers, including community-oriented officers, to make arrests and enforce the law when appropriate. We also encourage every officer, regardless of assignment, to remain mentally and emotionally focused on the basic purpose of our profession, which is protecting people from danger, safeguarding their property, and ensuring that they are free to exercise their basic civil and human rights.

When community-oriented officers are on patrol in their neighborhoods, we expect them to function as *police officers*. If they witness criminal or traffic violations that are worthy of enforcement, or if they are the closest and most appropriate unit to handle a serious call for service, they are to take appropriate action. The idea that "enforcement is somebody else's job" has no place in our community-oriented philosophy.

At the same time, though, we do not want our community-oriented officers neglecting their outreach or strategic response duties to routinely perform the functions of a standard patrol officer. Similarly, we do not want the officers to view arrest and enforcement as an easy first resort in their proactive strategies, although strategic arrests should occur when they are the most effective means of accomplishing long-range objectives.

Consequently, our community-oriented officers make arrests and write traffic tickets, albeit not as many as other officers do. Our community-oriented officers also handle calls for service when they are closest to a serious incident, when they judge the call to be significant in terms of their understanding of the community, or when they feel the call relates to one of their strategic initiatives. Appropriate supervision from community-oriented squad sergeants ensures that these basic enforcement and call-handling guidelines are respected.

Although we feel our approach to the arrest and call-handling issue reflects a prudent balance, we recognize that a replicating agency must make its own decisions on this point. The agency's overall philosophy, its availability of other enforcement resources, the jurisdiction's levels of crime and violence, and the desires and expectations of the local community should all have a bearing on the policy that is selected.

At the very least, though, we urge that community-oriented officers be allowed to exercise the enforcement option in their proactive strategies. If the replicating agency is philosophically hesitant to embrace community-oriented enforcement, it can require supervisory approval of non-emergency enforcement actions. It may even arrange for other elements of the agency to actually carry out the enforcement, rather than the designated community-oriented personnel. Still, enforcement is a legitimate, effective proactive tool, and *it should never be foreclosed as a strategic option.*

THE MONTHLY BEAT CONDITION REPORT

In the Philosophy section of this Implementation Guide we expressed five core principles of our program. The fifth and final principle stated that "in each neighborhood, a specific officer must be given sufficient time and resources to have meaningful personal impact on neighborhood conditions, and then be *held accountable* for the quality of the strategic police service he provides."

We are serious about that accountability. Naturally, our community-oriented sergeants hold their subordinates accountable through the normal supervisory process, just as our patrol sergeants hold their troops accountable. But in our community-oriented policing program, we require something more, something which places the officer's performance under genuine scrutiny.

At the end of every month, each community-oriented officer is required to submit a "Monthly Beat Condition Report," which details his activities of the last thirty days. These reports are very comprehensive. They require the officers to demonstrate their understanding of community conditions, identify all strategic initiatives in progress, and explain the rationale behind each initiative. The reports also require the officers to document their actions of the past month and to identify their intended course of action for the upcoming month.

These are not the kind of reports that a lazy or incapable officer can hide behind. They require statistical data regarding both the progress of an officer's strategies and his performance as an individual. More importantly, though, they force the officer to express himself verbally. This ensures that he really *thinks* about what he's doing, and that he personally confronts the realities of his performance.

In the report, the officer is required to articulate not only what he has been doing, but *why* he has performed as he has during the past month. In a way, he must "sell" or "justify" his strategic thinking and performance. He is given the opportunity to fully explain

himself, which is certainly beneficial if there have not been many statistical accomplishments, but he is also placed in a very revealing position. By putting his thoughts on paper, it will be obvious if the officer's thinking is flawed, if he is unprepared, or if he has done little real work during the month.

Where his ongoing strategies are concerned, the officer must also present a coherent plan of action for the *next* thirty days, including specific activities to be performed and anticipated results. This ensures that appropriate planning has occurred and that the officer is not floundering. It also serves as a sort of "contract" through which the officer and his supervisor/commanders can agree upon expected outcomes and performance measures.

The Beat Condition report is not an actual report form, like an Accident Report with blocks to be checked and fields to be completed. Instead, it is a *format* that the officer follows. The report is usually typed or prepared on a word processor, runs several pages in length, and typically takes a day or two to prepare. The officer may include attachments to the report, including letters written specifically for this purpose by members of the community.

When the report is completed, it is submitted to the community-oriented squad sergeant, who subsequently reviews and forwards it to the Assistant District Commander. The sergeant also uses these reports to generate group discussions among all of the squad's officers at an end-of-month squad gathering. In this way, the officers benefit from each other's insight and experiences, and may find areas where joint efforts are desirable.

Both the sergeant and the commander provide specific comments to the officer about the report. These comments may be written or verbal, depending on the seriousness or complexity of the commentary. If written, they are attached to the Beat Condition report for long-term storage. The comments may offer advice, make observations, express approval, or even direct changes in a strategic course, if necessary.

The long-term storage of Beat Condition Reports is an important feature. These reports are filed by beat or neighborhood, and establish a "history" that future community-oriented officers and police officials can study. Having a lasting record of a neighborhood's demography and problems, its crime and disturbance patterns, the strategic initiatives that have been tried, and the results of those initiatives can be very beneficial.

The Beat Condition Report also lists community organizations and civic leaders, and documents their contributions to strategic initiatives. Therefore, stored reports can serve as a resource archive. Future strategists may use the reports to identify and recruit once-active community members who have lapsed into inactivity, or to locate specific skills and capabilities that are otherwise not readily apparent.

Certain information on the Beat Condition Report can be repetitive from month-to-month, especially in the first section where community conditions are described. However, officers need not frequently restate information that has previously been reported. Instead, officers should provide very brief summaries and indicate whether changes have occurred in the past month. A cross-reference to the report containing the more comprehensive information should also be included.

If desired, replicating agencies should feel free to change our format's terminology, add or delete statistical categories, and make other modifications to suit their local needs and style. We recommend that the Beat Condition Report's overall purpose be considered when modifications are made, though, and that care be taken not to weaken this feature of the program.

The Beat Condition Report's format is presented on the following pages (pages 83 through 88). The reader should carefully review all format instructions. They are self-explanatory and no further guidance regarding the completion of Beat Condition Reports will be provided in this document.

Community-Oriented Beat Condition Report
Beat or Assigned Neighborhood, Month/Year
Officer (name, I.D. #)

I. NEEDS ASSESSMENTS

A. Reported Crimes and Calls for Service Patterns

Provide a brief narrative description of the beat's crime and calls-for-service patterns, as identified from police reports and CAD statistics. Modus operandi, suspect descriptions, and police dispositions, etc., should be mentioned when appropriate. Any locations or situations generating repeated calls should also be listed.

B. Drug Activity

Briefly assess the level of drug distribution and drug use within the beat, identifying specific hot spots and how they were identified. Also describe methods of distribution and identification of known distributors, when pertinent.

C. Environmental Conditions

Briefly describe the current physical and environmental conditions affecting quality of life or contributing to crime and disorder within the beat.

Such factors as the conditions of buildings and other real property, the presence of trash or abandoned vehicles, and problems associated with traffic control, etc., might be cited. Also, street lighting and other physical plant characteristics of crime-prevention significance should be addressed.

D. Social Conditions

Briefly describe the prominent social problems affecting quality of life in the beat, particularly those which appear to have an impact on crime or calls-for-service. Whenever possible, assessments should be supported by examples of personal observation, commentary from the public, or statistical reference.

E. Community Organization and Involvement

Briefly describe the beat's community organization and networking capacities, identifying prominent leaders and groups with which the community-oriented officer currently maintains, or seeks to maintain, active problem-solving relationships. This section should also list all Departmentally-sponsored Neighborhood Watch and Business Watch groups, including current status.

(continued on next page)

II. PROBLEM-ORIENTED STRATEGIES

Identify the proactive strategies (SARA Projects) being actively worked by the community-oriented officer, using the following format.

SARA PROJECT CONTROL # _: (indicate problem or strategy by name)

Scanning: (briefly identify the problem, including its specific elements and limits)

Analysis: (if possible, identify problem's causes, enabling conditions, characteristics, symptoms, ramifications, and other relevant factors. Examine cause-and-effect relationships. Ensure that community, police, and other agency perspectives are represented. Draw appropriate conclusions).

Response: (describe strategic theory, goals, objectives, and action plan. Report all implementing actions taken, including those of the officer and those of his strategic partners).

Assessment: (assess the success or failure of the strategy thus far. Report known results or lack of expected results, and assess the likely causes for these outcomes. Present statistical data, where available. Draw conclusions about the wisdom of, and likely prospects for, the current strategy).

Future: (indicate whether the same strategy will be continued or modified, or whether the problem will be abandoned in light of the above-described assessment. If modification is selected, present revised action plan and identify any changes in goals and objectives, etc. If the same strategy is to be continued, identify hoped-for results that are expected during the coming month).

Use this same format to report all other current problem-oriented strategies, identifying each by its unique control number and name.

III. GENERAL OPERATING PRACTICES AND STATISTICS:

A. Neighborhood Canvassing (Commercial and Home Visitations)

Report this month's neighborhood canvassing activities using the following format:

Locations Canvassed: (identify by street or neighborhood names, and indicate number of foot patrol or canvassing hours expended)

Problem(s) Identified: (summarize what issues residents expressed concerns about. Include criticisms of police and governmental services, if applicable. Names of residents are not required)

Assessment: (assess whether the expressed concerns require police or government attention, or are appropriate for a SARA strategy)

B. Crime Prevention Activity

Report the following statistical information for the month:

Home Security Surveys: ____

Commercial Security Surveys: ____

Neighborhood Watch Groups Serviced: ____

Civic Meetings Attended or Speeches Made: ____

Other Crime Prevention Assignments ____

Also, report the substance of civic and Neighborhood Watch meetings attended in the following manner:

Meeting:	(identify group, date/time, location)
Group's Concerns:	(self-explanatory)
Response:	(how were concerns addressed by the officer or other government officials in attendance. Indicate whether problems identified at the meeting will become SARA projects or otherwise acted upon)

C. Referral Program

Indicate the number of referrals made during the past month (approximate if exact number is unknown):

Substance Abuse Referrals: ____

Other Health Referrals: ____

Social Service Referrals: ____

Public Works Referrals: ____

Domestic Violence/Dispute Referrals: ____

Referrals to other Police Components: ____

Referrals to Courts or State's Atty.: ____

Other Referrals: ____

Also, in narrative form describe new referral sources, if any. Indicate whether existing referral sources have proven unresponsive, ineffective, or have had other deficiencies noted in the past month. Finally, describe any unique referral event that may be enlightening to other community-oriented officers or the command staff.

D. Departmental Interaction

Briefly describe the degree of cooperation and interaction occurring between the community-oriented officer and other elements of the Department, particularly the beat detective and unformed patrol officers assigned to the beat. Administrative or support problems should be noted, along with recommendations for correcting these problems. Examples of joint actions or referrals rnay be included. Also report the number of patrol roll calls attended.

Roll Calls Attended: _____

E. Law Enforcement Activities

Briefly identify any SARA projects involving direct criminal enforcement during the past month and describe the nature of the enforcement. Identify all arrests, including specific charges lodged.

Also report the following statistics:

Calls Responded To: _____

Calls Handled: _____

Police Reports Written: _____

Criminal Arrests: _____

Tactical Field Interviews: _____

Moving Traffic Citations: _____

Parking Citations: _____

Other Traffic Enforcement: _____

PLANNING COMMITTEES

Input from the community is a key ingredient of any community-oriented policing program. If a police agency simply serves the community without allowing the community to help shape and define that service, it is not practicing community-oriented policing. Instead, it is providing a traditional form of police service.

Thus far in this document, we have stressed that our community-oriented officers solicit information from, and share problem-identification and strategy development authority with, community members. But if we've given the impression that this process is an entirely informal one, we'd like to clarify that it is not.

Although valuable, informal communications with average community members occur every day, we require that a more formal mechanism for community advisement also be utilized. To satisfy this requirement, we employ "planning committees" whose membership includes community representatives and officials from various government agencies. The committees serve as a forum for the identification and discussion of problems, exploration of potential solutions, and recruitment of resources and services.

Each community-oriented beat officer establishes a local planning committee in his assigned territory. He offers seats on this committee to a diverse assortment of community stakeholders, including civic leadership, average residents, school and church officials, and business persons, etc. He also invites workers from selected government agencies that have significant operations or interest in the local neighborhood, such as the Health Department or the Department of Public Works.

The local planning committee meets periodically, either on a set date or at other times convenient to the membership. The meetings may be held at a police facility, at a church or school, or even in someone's home. They are generally relaxed and friendly events with minimal parliamentary structure. Issues are not necessarily decided by votes, and the officer is not necessarily bound by the recommendations of the committee (he is, however, expected to give great weight to the committee's views).

At these meetings, the committee suggests community problems that may be appropriate for proactive attention. Once a problem has been selected for such attention, the committee also provides valuable research information and diverse viewpoints for use in the Analysis step of the SARA process. Eventually, the committee also assists the officer in formulating the strategic response required in the third SARA step. In a sense, *the committee helps the officer do his job*, but then again, that's the beauty of community-oriented policing. The community is deliberately brought into the police service process in a way that traditional policing never did before.

The officer also briefs the committee on the progress of ongoing strategies, and solicits their input and direct support or involvement, if needed. Unanticipated obstacles often arise during a strategy's implementation, and sometimes the government agencies and private organizations represented on the committee have an ability to counter those obstacles quickly and effectively.

The input of the committee is also critical to the officer's strategic assessment (SARA step #4). Objective, non-police perspectives of a strategy's relative success are especially valuable since the officer's conclusions may be too heavily influenced by traditional police performance measures (before-and -after crime rates, calls for service, and other statistics). Remember that quality of life is the ultimate barometer, and the community members of the committee will probably have the most enlightening perspective in that regard.

In addition to our program's use of local planning committees, we maintain a centralized Master Planning Committee to assist with broad programmatic concerns. This committee is comprised of community members and government officials in similar fashion to the local committees, except that its individual members are selected for their ability and experience in County-wide or programmatic issues. Community representatives are much more likely to be politically involved or activist in nature, and the government agency representatives are generally Directors or other higher-ranking management officials rather than subordinate-level service providers.

The purpose of the Master Planning Committee is to provide community and inter-agency input for our *overall* community-oriented program. Committee members comment upon a wide range of issues, including training, operating practices, program management, and inter-agency cooperation. The committee also serves as a networking resource for the Community-Oriented Services Manager, who may call upon individual members between meetings if the need arises (scheduled meetings are held every one to two months at the police headquarters facility).

Although the Master Planning Committee does not routinely involve itself in actual proactive strategies, it may become involved if so requested. Community-oriented beat officers have an open invitation to address the committee about specific problems, if necessary. Generally, this occurs when difficulties are encountered at the subordinate level which cannot be resolved through the local planning committee.

The wider governmental and executive perspective of the Master's Planning Committee's membership sometimes is able to identify a potential solution that local or subordinate committees could not envision. In addition, Master Planning Committee members possess greater agency authority and broader access to resources than do persons sitting on the local committees. Consequently, they may be able to authorize actions or procure resources that are not possible at the local/subordinate level.

THE STATISTICAL SUPPORT OFFICER

In our original 1990 program design, we placed the responsibility for analysis of statistical crime and calls-for-service data with the community-oriented officers. They were expected to obtain raw statistical information about their beats from our agency's Crime Analysis Section, and then interpret that data as it related to community problems. Unfortunately, this arrangement did not work well.

Our headquarters-based Crime Analysis Section is involved in numerous statistical and computerized services, many of which are very time-consuming and time-sensitive. They have many customers and many high-priority projects. We found that these competing demands negatively affected the Crime Analysis Section's ability to respond to the community-oriented officers in as timely a manner as we desired.

Of greater concern, though, was the fact that our community-oriented officers were not trained in statistical analysis. The analysis of statistics is a complicated scientific field, and without technical training, our officers might draw incorrect conclusions or fail to recognize important relationships. We also were concerned that some of our officers were spending large amounts of time working with statistics. We felt this time could be better spent in proactive outreach activities.

In addition, we realized that crime, calls-for-service, and other police statistics were insufficient data by themselves. Community-oriented policing focuses on crime's causative influences and enabling conditions. Analyzing crime and police data alone, without comparing it to available statistics for social conditions and behavior patterns, seemed very unwise. Unfortunately, tracking down and analyzing data from outside the police department would be too time-consuming for our community-oriented officers, even if they had the computer skills to do so (which most did not).

With these difficulties in mind, we concluded that the program needed its own professional data analysis technician. Our response was to create a billet known as the "Statistical Support Officer," which we refer to as the "SSO." The officer selected for this job is an officer with an extensive computer and statistics background. He joined the program in 1992 (as our program expands, so too will the number of SSO's; when all 101 officers are deployed, there will be a minimum of three Statistical Support Officers, each serving different regions of the County).

The SSO is assigned full-time statistical analysis duties in support of the community-oriented officers. He routinely provides the officers with up-to-date crime and police statistics, works on the officers' special data analysis requests, and also independently assesses other data that he regards as significant. He informs the community-oriented officers of his independent findings when he believes they may benefit from the information.

The SSO is an integral part of the program and works on program-related projects only. He maintains frequent consultations with the community-oriented beat officers, as well as with their supervisors and the command staff. He also maintains networking contacts with his data analysis counterparts at other government agencies.

The SSO's relationship with these other government agencies is very important. As we stated a few paragraphs ago, we recognize the need for comparative analysis of non-police statistics with our traditional law enforcement databases. To satisfy this need, our SSO obtains raw statistical data from other government agencies and assesses it in terms of potential impact on crime rates and police calls-for-service. Typical examples of the shared data include, but are certainly not limited to:

* The Department of Environmental Resources supplies data regarding various housing code violations and other environmental enforcement activities which may quantifiably demonstrate the degree of physical deterioration and neglect that a neighborhood is suffering.

* The Fire Department supplies data regarding fire calls and ambulance runs, particularly those that appear to be narcotic-related. Arsons and fire code violations are also of interest.

* The Health Department supplies data regarding the numbers and locations of drug overdoses and alcohol-related medical emergencies, as well as more generalized health statistics such as teenage pregnancy rates and mental illness data, etc.

* The Board of Education supplies statistics regarding rates of truancy, disciplinary suspensions, and drug/alcohol-related incidents in specific schools located within the community-oriented beat areas. Also of interest may be raw data regarding performance on standardized test scores and grade point averages, etc.

* The Department of Parole and Probation supplies statistics regarding the number of clients in given areas, and the types of offenses that they were incarcerated for.

* The Department of Social Services supplies statistics regarding a wide variety of social ills, including homelessness, children in need of assistance or protective intervention, and concentration of elderly residents, etc.

* The Apartment and Office Building Association, a private organization representing apartment project owners, provides statistics regarding the monthly numbers of apartment vacancies, drug and non-drug evictions, and the numbers and identities of properties which do or do not employ security patrols. This latter set of data may be particularly useful in analyzing the effectiveness of security patrols when overlaid with Police Department crime, drug, and other disturbance data for the respective properties.

Obviously, the SSO has serious computing needs. Therefore, we have provided him with an IBM-compatible 486 computer and the standard software packages for his type of computing. However, we have also provided him with an additional software package that is not often used by police agencies. This software is the "MapInfo" system.

The MapInfo system is a computer program for visually displaying and comparing various databases in a geographic format. The basic foundation of the program is a computerized map which accurately depicts local areas (Prince George's County in our case, although the manufacturer has maps for virtually every developed area of the nation). These depictions are very flexible and very detailed; they have zoom capability from large jurisdiction-wide displays right down to individual streets and hundred blocks.

With the computerized map in place, various statistical datasets are imported into the program. The MapInfo system then plots the data by location and visually presents it on the local area map which appears on the computer screen. MapInfo accepts importing from "d-Base" and other popular data management programs. Hard copies of the maps produced on-screen can be printed.

Numerous imported datasets can be overlaid at a time, thus allowing the SSO to graphically plot crime rates, calls-for-service, truancy patterns, drug overdoses, and other datasets he wishes to compare. The various datasets (as well as statistical differences within datasets) can be distinguished by different colors, shading, and symbols, etc.

By geographically overlaying police and crime datasets with those from the other government agencies, a better understanding of cause-and-effect relationships between crime and community conditions is possible. Only when these relationships are understood can a logical and well-planned attack upon crime's underlying causes be executed. We are firmly convinced that this type of computer software is a very useful, beneficial technology for police.

The MapInfo system is used by a number of local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. It is also used by marketing and advertising firms, by polling and research groups, and by government agencies not involved in law enforcement. Its applications are extremely varied, and replicating agencies may find other uses for the MapInfo program in addition to the ones we describe in this document.

We obtained the MapInfo system from Mapping Information Systems Corporation of Troy, New York. In addition to the basic grid mapping program, various datasets for use with the maps are available. These datasets include such topics as population distribution, median education and income, and other demographics. For the most part, we did not use the Corporation's datesets, but instead relied upon locally generated government statistics. Finally, the Corporation provides training classes in the use of the Mapinfo System, and we did avail ourselves of this service.

To compile its commercially-offered datasets and make the maps, the MapInfo company uses United States government geological data, Census Bureau data, and other public-domain sources. Obviously, this data is also available to other firms. As a result,

MapInfo is not the only program of its kind on the market. Other companies offer similar programs, some of which may be as suitable for a replicating agency's use as MapInfo. Replicating agencies may wish to contact some of these firms, as technology moves quickly in this field and superior offerings, or equivalent offerings at lower prices, may be available.

We do not recommend MapInfo over these competitors, but we found Mapinfor's product to be very useful for our purposes. Replicating agencies who wish to deploy this technology may contact MapInfo at 1-800-FAST-MAP.

Finally, if the replicating agency prefers, there is no reason why the SSO duties cannot be performed by the agency's existing data analysis component. However, as our experience demonstrated, care must be taken to ensure that the existing data analysis component has sufficient manpower to respond in a timely and responsive manner. In addition, replicators must ensure that a process of regular, close consultation between community-oriented officers and data analysis personnel is created and supervised.

Section 5

BUILDING SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM

The next three sections (sections 5, 6, and 7) describe the planning, preparation, and commencement functions that a replicating agency should conduct to implement this program. However, the material that we present is very subjective; it is only our advice. We recognize that replicating agencies may have management styles or local regulations that are incompatible with some of our recommendations. When this is the case, replicators should not hesitate to reject our suggestions and pursue more appropriate alternatives.

At the same time, though, we believe that most replicating agencies will find nearly all of the advice to be beneficial. We have had considerable experience with this type of program and have learned through experience, some of which was painful. Therefore, we suggest that replicators attempt to carry out our suggestions wherever possible. In any event, careful planning and preparation, followed by genuinely dedicated and sincere leadership from the replicating agency's senior managerial, are essential if this program is to succeed.

Section 5: Building Support for the Program

OBTAINING SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP

In most jurisdictions around the nation, local law enforcement agencies are subordinate to their local governments. The law enforcement agencies' chief executives are usually appointed by the elected government officials, the agencies' budgets are nearly always controlled by local government, and the agencies' major policies and regulations are frequently subject to governmental review and concurrence.

Even when the law enforcement agency has an unusual degree of autonomy (such as when its chief executive is elected directly by the populace or when its budget is set by law or direct taxation), it is still heavily influenced and limited by local political and governmental realities. Fortunately, no police agency in America operates truly independently. Therefore, any major program initiative launched by the police should have prior local government backing, regardless of the governmental structures employed by the jurisdiction.

This is true for community-oriented policing initiatives even more so than for other police programs. By its very nature, community-oriented policing is a consensus-seeking, coalition-building operation. Cooperation between various government agencies, sometimes even at different levels of government, is essential if meaningful improvements in community conditions are to occur.

It would be foolish to suggest that the police might be capable of generating these improvements ***by themselves***. We mean no criticism, but the police can't even control or adequately respond to crime ***by themselves***, as they must rely upon the help of prosecutors, courts, and other criminal justice components at the very least.

Thus, it is clear that the real power of government lies in its collective strength, not in the strength of its individual parts. Community-oriented policing seeks to harness this sort of strength through improved coordination of government and private-sector resources. Although the community-oriented process starts with and is administered by police officers, it is as much a ***local government program*** as it is a police department program.

For this reason, a replicating agency must recruit the active and enthusiastic support of its local governing body before attempting this program. The best means for doing that will, of course, depend upon the kind of governmental and political relationships that exist in the replicating agency's jurisdiction.

Fortunately for our agency, our local government was receptive to our plans from the beginning. Our County Executive, Parris N. Glendening, had advocated the community-based policing concept long before we began our program. In fact, Mr. Glendening's desire to bring community-based policing to the County was a critical factor in his January, 1990 appointment of David B. Mitchell to be Chief of Police.

Then Deputy-Chief Mitchell had a reputation as a community-oriented policing advocate, and Mr. Glendening was intent on moving our agency in a community-oriented direction. Mr. Glendening was encouraged by Chief Mitchell's vision for our program when they discussed the issue, and he nominated Chief Mitchell on the basis of that vision and Chief Mitchell's other qualifications.

Because our County's legislative body, the County Council, confirms nominations for Chief of Police, public hearings were held at which Chief Mitchell's views were widely discussed and endorsed. The County Council subsequently confirmed Chief Mitchell, expressing enthusiastic approval for his community-oriented agenda. Thus, our local government supported our basic program concepts even before the detailed operating design was fully crafted.[2]

As we've expressed before, our agency was fortunate. The good news is that most replicating agencies will probably receive a similarly receptive response from their local governments. Community-oriented policing is a well-publicized, quality concept with a proven track record of success. Further, it is an extremely popular idea with most of our nation's public and with most political leadership, as well. If this program is properly presented, a favorable reaction is likely.

However, not all local governments will welcome this type of program, especially in today's political climate. Crime is a serious and frightening issue, and many people believe that aggressive enforcement is the ***only*** way out of the problem. Some of these people see community-based policing as a trendy, "politically correct" gimmick that makes people feel good, but is ineffective at protecting lives and property. Opposition to this kind of program can be fierce.

If a replicating agency encounters negative sentiment when it approaches its political leadership (or the community, for that matter), we recommend that the crime-suppression dimension of this program be emphasized. Recall that in Section 2 of this document, we stated that "community-oriented policing is an aggressive, results-driven form of police work. Its bottom line is suppressing crime."

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[2] At the hearings, only the program's basic values, philosophy, and objectives were identified. Following his confirmation, Chief Mitchell directed our agency's planning staff to develop a comprehensive program design based upon his basic vision. Most of this program's organizational and procedural elements were then developed.

Replicators should point out to critics that this program's community-oriented officers are expected to consciously pursue crime-reduction as the program's central purpose. They should emphasize that the program specifically authorizes community-oriented officers to make arrests, conduct investigations, and perform other enforcement actions during the course of proactive strategies. It should also be noted that many of the proactive strategies will, in fact, target specific criminal offenses and situations, rather than focusing exclusively on societal problems.

In addition, it may be helpful to point out that the community-oriented officers will perform regular foot patrols and will be permanently deployed in local neighborhoods rather than at headquarters. Doubters might be reassured to know that community-oriented officers will be available to respond to emergency calls and will be expected to take appropriate enforcement actions in all criminal situations that they encounter, regardless of whether those situations relate to the community-oriented assignment.

Replicators should also explain that officers will be heavily involved with crime prevention and Neighborhood Watches. The officers' work in these areas will likely decrease the number of easy criminal opportunities, and hopefully decrease the number of criminal offenses as a result. Of course, preventive target hardening isn't the sort of serious crime-fighting that many of the critics will prefer, but it will be more readily accepted as legitimate police business than will outreach efforts aimed at broad social ills.

Although we have stressed the enforcement and crime-suppression aspects of the program during the past few paragraphs, we hope the reader will not misunderstand our intentions. We do not advocate that replicators, when faced with opposition, deny or downplay the social service aspects of the program. To the contrary, we believe that replicators should defend community-oriented principles and help educate their opponents.

Instead, we are merely suggesting that when concerns are raised about community-oriented policing being unrelated to crime, the replicator should be very strong in communicating this program's crime-fighting features. Ours is a ***balanced*** program which recognizes the public's legitimate short-term need for aggressive enforcement, while at the same time recognizing the need for non-enforcement solutions to our long-term crime problem. This is a balance that the public and most responsible political leaders can understand and support.

Obtaining general or philosophical support from government leaders is certainly important, but it is not the only kind of support the program needs. Tangible support, both in terms of funding and inter-agency cooperation, is also required. When first approaching local government leaders, replicators must convey this point clearly.

On the funding side, the greatest need will be for personnel. Community-oriented policing is not an equipment-intensive operation; it's need is for people. If sufficient numbers of officers can be redeployed from existing ranks, the replicating agency may not need to increase its overall departmental complement. That's a best-case scenario, of course, and most agencies probably are not in that position.

The greater likelihood is that a replicating agency will need to hire additional personnel if this program is fully implemented throughout the jurisdiction. This ***may*** be true even if the program is applied only to a limited number of disadvantaged and severely-impacted neighborhoods. Most police agencies operate on a relatively thin personnel margin, and moving officers to this new program from other components may leave those components intolerably short-staffed.

Of course, there are alternatives to new hiring, and we will discuss some of them later in this document (Section 6, "Budget Preparation and Hiring Alternatives"). It may be that by reorganizing certain aspects of the agency's operations and structure, manpower efficiency can be improved and hiring costs contained. In any event, we recommend that local government leaders not be approached on the possibility of new hiring until the alternatives have been explored.

Although community-oriented policing is not equipment-intensive, some additional equipment and supplies will almost certainly be needed. Thus, even if existing personnel are used to staff this venture, some previously unappropriated expenses are likely to be incurred. Before proceeding very far in the program planning process, the replicating agency should confirm that funding for these expenses will be available, either through new appropriations or through redistributions within the existing budget. Again, it is wise not to seek fiscal commitments from the political leadership until after a realistic cost estimate has been prepared.

Local government officials must also take the lead in ensuring that government resources will be available to community-oriented officers, and that other government agencies are fully aware of what is expected of them. Although a police department can often arrange inter-agency cooperation on its own, the arrangements may not be entirely reliable. Understandably, the other agencies' commitments may soften as demands upon the agencies increase, both as a result of this program and other situations beyond their control.

For this reason, it is important that high-ranking local governmental officials, particularly in the executive branch, become involved in the process. In Prince George's County, we were again fortunate to have County Executive Glendening in our corner. At the very beginning of our program, he made it clear to the Directors of all local governmental

departments that he was personally committed to this program and that he expected all agencies to render appropriate assistance.

Mr. Glendening expressed his commitment ***in writing***, first by providing a letter of support that our agency was able to include in its BJA grant application, and also through memoranda to the affected department heads. However, Mr. Glendening did not formulate official directives, guidelines, or inter-agency agreements to ensure compliance. Instead, he trusted his agency directors to apply his policy in the most appropriate and effective fashion.

In our case, this turned out to be a very effective executive approach. With understandable limitations, the other agencies have supported our program and provided us with much valuable assistance. Their senior management officials sit on our Master Planning Committee and their field workers provide services in support of proactive strategies. These other agencies have not displayed any resentment (as one might expect if heavy-handed executive orders had been issued), and they have obviously joined with us in a sincere commitment to the broad community purposes of our program.

Unfortunately, this type of naturally cooperative environment does not exist everywhere in the nation. Therefore, replicating agencies should assess whether the governmental lines of authority and other dynamics in their local situation are conducive to executive ***encouragements*** rather than executive ***directives***. If they are not, the replicating agency would be wise to seek specific executive orders or formal agreements to facilitate the inter-agency cooperation.

CLARIFYING PUBLIC AND POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS

Community-oriented policing programs are usually very popular and are viewed with great hope. To some people, they have taken on an almost "salvation" quality where crime and related disorder are concerned. These proponents tout community-oriented policing as the ultimate answer, a virtual cure-all that can lead us out of the unprecedented violence and crime we now suffer as a nation.

This view is unrealistic and dangerous. If expectations are raised beyond reasonable levels, the long-term prospects for success diminish. Everyone must understand from the outset that a community-oriented program is just one facet of a broader governmental and criminal justice policy, and its expected benefits are not without limits. The value and eventual performance of the program should be judged on this basis, and they will not be if initial expectations are inherently unattainable.

When the replicating agency approaches government leaders for program support, therefore, it should also clarify for those leaders what is expected of this program. The leaders should be told that prospects for meaningful progress and measurable improvements exist, but they must also be made to understand that the program will not produce a stunning and dramatic turnaround in our public safety fortunes. The replicating agency should seek the government officials' cooperation in conveying this awareness to the public.

Another potential "expectation" that replicators should discuss with governmental leaders involves the degree of ***direct*** involvement that those leaders and other government officials will have with program operations. This is a potentially delicate issue; it should be approached discreetly and with all due respect. However, it will benefit the program if agreement is reached early in the process so that later misunderstandings are avoided.

Senior government officials, including elected legislative and executive officials, have a legitimate right and duty to direct the actions of the government's various agencies. Obviously, this includes law enforcement agencies. Accordingly, it is appropriate for government leaders to take an active and meaningful role in providing community-oriented policing services.

At the same time, though, the integrity of community-oriented programs requires that political interference not occur. This is especially true in a program such as this one, where self-initiative at the grass-roots level is emphasized. We do not encourage our police command officers to significantly direct proactive strategies, and we certainly would discourage such direction from superior authorities outside our agency.

Thankfully, our County Executive and County Council have not attempted to do this, but we recognize that not every police agency will be so fortunate. Therefore, we suggest that the replicating agency's chief executive explain the program's strong emphasis on grass-roots autonomy to his superiors, and solicit their restraint. We believe that most public officials will be sensitive to this concern and will appreciate being respectfully shown how they might best contribute to the program's success.

Another potential problem area involves constituent service requests. Because community-oriented programs are known for local problem-solving effectiveness, elected officials have a natural tendency to refer many minor constituent complaints to the program. Some of these complaints are of genuine concern to community-oriented officers, of course, but others are probably more appropriate for referral elsewhere. Unfortunately, given the elected official's distanced vantage point, it is often difficult for him to discern which is which.

Naturally, community-oriented officers appreciate a reasonable number of appropriate referrals, but problems can arise when too many referrals occur. After all, if community-oriented officers become bogged down performing constituent-service duties, they will have little time to plan and implement proactive strategies, nurture Neighborhood Watch groups, and perform the many other important services assigned to them under this program. No one wants that, least of all the public officials.

Therefore, we recommend that the replicating agency arrange an agreeable screening process with the elected officials. Specifically, we suggest that the officials direct their constituent-service requests to one designated official within the replicating agency, rather than directly to the community-oriented officers or their commanders. That designated official should then determine whether the matter should be handled by a community-oriented officer, be referred to a different component of the police agency, or redirected back to a more appropriate component of the overall local government.

In Prince George's County, we employ this type of process. Government officials direct constituent-service requests to the Office of the Chief of Police, from where they are assigned to appropriate components. Because many of these requests eventually go to management personnel or traditional enforcement units rather than community-oriented officers, we've chosen to route them through our Department's central administration. However, if the replicating agency prefers not to involve its chief executive's office, the Community-Oriented Services Manager would be an excellent alternative.

We also suggest that routine written responses back to the elected officials ***not*** be required for most constituent referrals. Preparation of these responses can be time-consuming and distract the officer from other duties. Instead, the elected official might initially respond to his constituent by reporting that the matter has been referred, and inviting the constituent to recontact him if the matter is not resolved. Only when that recontact occurs should a disposition report be required from the law enforcement agency.

OBTAINING COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Support from the community is just as important as support from local government leadership. The community's contributions to the identification and accurate analysis of problems will be crucial, and private-sector resources are often of greater value and more readily available than government resources. Community-oriented policing is a team effort, and the local community is government's full and equal partner in every aspect of it.

Earlier we described the resistance that some replicating agencies may encounter when introducing this program to their government leaders. Everything that we mentioned in that discussion holds true with respect to the community, as well. Replicators must devote the same careful attention to securing community support as they do to securing government support.

If community resistance or skepticism is encountered, the agency should emphasize the same enforcement aspects we suggested earlier for government leaders. We also recommend, though, that the replicating agency strongly emphasize the community's role in proactive policy development. This may be the single-most effective argument that a replicating agency can employ to build community support, since in most jurisdictions where community-oriented policing has not yet arrived, local neighborhood elements have very little direct input into police strategy and tactics.

Traditional police managements have always been concerned about the public's welfare, of course, and they nearly always have given much weight to the community's expressed fears, desires, and concerns. However, they've also usually felt that when it comes to formulating operational responses to those concerns, the community lacks sufficient training and experience to meaningfully participate. Therefore, strategic and tactical planning has traditionally been left to the police "experts."

However, our program rejects that attitude. Meaningful community participation in strategic and tactical planning is at the heart of our program. Making this fact clear to the public will almost certainly increase community support. It may even generate "demand" for the program, thereby prompting political leaders who initially opposed the program to soften their opposition.

There are two basic approaches to enlisting community support. The first approach involves directly publicizing the program to the general population, while the second focuses on community organizations, businesses, and other institutions. Replicating agencies should use both approaches

In the first approach, the most efficient method for directly reaching large numbers of citizens is probably through the journalistic media. Local newspapers, radio stations, and community magazines will nearly always provide coverage if they know that the police are seriously considering such a program. And although air-time constraints may be tight for local television news operations, even they will probably be interested.

The television news directors may be receptive to a one-day feature story on a regular newscast, especially if their programs exceed one-half hour and emphasize local coverage. A piece can even be filmed and held for use on a slow news day, at the news director's discretion. An even stronger presentation is an investigative-style serial feature spanning several days, in which the television station examines community-based policing generally and features the replicating agency's plans in the final installment.

Finally, some television stations (and radio stations, as well) broadcast local public affairs programs which feature in-depth examinations of important public issues. These formats are perfect for publicizing a replicating agency's.community-oriented intentions. Often, these programs involve the police chief or other departmental and governmental officials being interviewed or participating in a group discussion.

Another excellent means of publicizing the proposed program is to launch a public polling campaign. Officers, civilian employees, or even trained citizen volunteers can be positioned at shopping malls and other public places, go door-to-door, or make telephone calls to solicit public opinion about the proposed program. Naturally, prior to the posing of questions, an explanation of the program concepts must be presented. When the questions are asked, the responses should be documented so that the public opinion can be quantified for future use.

In Prince George's County, it was not necessary for us to use either the media publication or public polling method prior to final approval for our program. However, we used both methods during the three-year period of our grant. Media coverage began with the press conference where our program and grant award were announced in early 1991, and continues today with periodic articles and television spots describing program successes. Public polling has occurred mostly during door-to-door home visitations, and has been used as an evaluation tool to help identify the level of public satisfaction with the program.

The second approach for building community support is aimed at organizations rather than individual members of the community. At the earliest opportunity, replicating agencies should reach out to civic organizations, the business community, charitable service providers, and other appropriate institutions. This may de done by making speeches to organization memberships, consulting with organization leaders, or executing formal agreements with groups whose involvement in proactive strategies is anticipated.

The groups should be asked for their general philosophical support, of course, but as was the case with governmental leadership, they should also be asked for tangible support. Most groups will possess resources that may be useful in implementing proactive strategies. The potential for this type of participation should be pointed out to them, and an explicit expression of their willingness to provide resource support should be sought.

Even when no likely role in direct strategic implementation is evident, though, groups can be invited to participate through membership on Planning Committees and other avenues of community advisement.

In Prince George's County, numerous groups quickly stepped forward to support our program, including Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, Catholic Charities, homeowner and tenant associations, our regional association of apartment management firms, the County Chamber of Commerce, and many others. Some gave us their political and public opinion support, some volunteered to provide satellite office space, and some offered direct help with proactive strategies.

We are very grateful to all of these groups, of course, but one group, the Interfaith Action Communities (IAC), deserves special recognition. The IAC is a large, multi-denominational group of local churches who are deeply involved in community service endeavors. It lobbies for, and supports with its resources, a wide variety of progressive social initiatives. These initiatives include improved housing for the poor, strengthened public education, and enlightened public safety policies. The IAC is an organization with a very active and noble social conscience, and they have been the catalyst for many important advances in our community.

Rather than providing support in just one area, the IAC supported our program in every conceivable way. It arranged satellite office space in some of its member churches, its pastors and congregations work with our officers on selected strategic initiatives, and the organization has become our program's most ardent and visible supporter in the political and public opinion arenas.

As was the case with County Executive Glendening, the IAC had a long history of speaking out in support of community-based policing, including before our program was introduced. In that sense, they are partly responsible for creating the atmosphere that led

to the implementation of our program. And although the IAC did not participate in crafting our program design (we unveiled it to them simultaneously with its presentation to other community organizations), it took the lead in promoting the program. If any single community group can be said to have championed our cause, it is the Interfaith Action Communities.

We mention this unique role of the IAC because there may be a similar group upon which a replicating agency can rely. If there is, the replicating agency should encourage that group to take a leadership role in advocating the program within the community. The involvement of a high-profile community "sponsor," especially one with kind of wide respect and political influence that IAC enjoys in our jurisdiction, is extremely beneficial for building support and sustaining the program during its fledgling period.

GAINING ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE AGENCY

Generally, police administrators have found that the greatest resistance to community-oriented policing comes from within their own agencies. Rank-and-file officers are particularly wary of the community-oriented philosophy, and surprisingly, many senior police officials and mid-level managers are also skeptical. This seems true regardless of the agency's personality and the region of the nation where it is located.

A replicating agency should expect resistance from its personnel and take steps to contain it as quickly as possible. The proposed program should be explained at roll calls, in-service training, or other assemblies of officers. Handouts which describe the program's main features and objectives may be useful.

Notice that in the above paragraph we used the word "contain" instead of "eliminate" or "prevent." That is because combatting employee resistance to this concept is a very difficult task, one at which the replicating agency may never thoroughly succeed. For most agencies, overcoming rank-and-file resistance proves to be far more difficult than persuading community and governmental leaders. Therefore, if an agency can achieve general acceptance among its officers, rather than enthusiasm or agreement, it should consider itself to have done well.

The resistance probably grows out of the conservative attitudes that many police officers hold where public safety issues are concerned. The majority of these officers, particularly those in operational assignments and support assignments without a community-relations dimension, believe that enforcement is the only truly reliable means of fighting crime.

Over the years, the officers have probably witnessed many community relations and outreach programs. They may have concluded that most or all of them had little or no impact on crime and the street situation. Thus, unlike most citizens and political leaders, these officers' skepticism to community outreach programs has been hardened by long-term, negative personal experience.

As a result, it is probably hopeless to try changing these officers' view through logical persuasion and argument. Instead, we suggest that replicators appeal to the values and beliefs already accepted by the officers. As was the case with the governmental opponents we discussed earlier, emphasizing the enforcement aspects of this program is a wise course.

Another concern that officers may have is that community-oriented policing will be a "gravy assignment" or a hiding place for lazy, unproductive officers. In one major jurisdiction where the community-oriented program was known by the acronym "COPE," rank-and-file patrol officers referred to the program as "Cops On Pension Early." The perception was that officers could perform pleasant public relations work, avoid having to confront the harsher realities of "the street," and be judged by less demanding standards than apply to officers in the field.

This perception is common in community-oriented agencies. To counter it, we suggest that the replicating agency prominently highlight the accountability feature of this program. Officers should also be told that community-oriented personnel will be required to justify their proposed actions in advance, will be required to submit written accounts of their past month's activities, and will be critically judged on how well their strategies were conceived and implemented.

It may also be helpful to point out that community-oriented officers will be supervised by squad sergeants just like their patrol counterparts, and that they will not be able to "get lost" because no one's watching closely. It should be noted that the community-oriented officers will fall under the authority of the general patrol force's shift lieutenant.

The replicating agency should also encourage and publicize frequent interaction and cooperation between community-oriented officers and other operational units. In Prince George's County, we require community-oriented officers to periodically attend patrol roll calls where they inform patrol personnel of their proactive strategies. Our community-oriented officers are also required to routinely consult with beat detectives and any other operational units working in their neighborhoods. And, of course, our community-oriented officers often turn to operational components, including general patrol, for help in carrying out specific activities in the proactive strategies.

Finally, the potential resistance or non-compliance of higher-ranking police administrators should not be overlooked. We strongly recommend that a replicating agency's entire command staff be briefed on this program as early as feasible. Failure of the command staff to properly implement the program is a real danger that must not be allowed to occur.

In Prince George's County, we learned about this danger the hard way. When we expanded to additional districts in our program's second year (the program had started as a pilot project in just one district), we did not train and closely monitor the newly-participating district commanders. We provided them with written information about how the program had been implemented in the initial district, and we presumed they would implement in similar fashion. Unfortunately, each commander had his own philosophy and management style, and our program essentially fragmented into six different programs.

We recognized this problem and corrected it by appointing the Community-Oriented Services Manager (see Section 3). However, many difficulties could have been avoided if we had developed program training for our command elements early on, and made clear to them that deviations from the basic program design would not be tolerated. We urge replicating agencies to take this precaution.

We suggest that ***all*** members of the command staff be briefed, not just those slated for direct involvement with the program. We make this suggestion because nearly all components of the agency will have some interaction with the program, and the input and reactions of a wide range of commanders may help identify areas of conflict or misunderstanding before implementation occurs. Secondly, future transfers in command assignments will probably occur, and inclusion of all commanders in the initial briefing will ensure that these transfers do not necessitate additional training.

The method for command briefing is not crucial, although we encourage group presentations and discussions. Many agencies hold periodic agency-wide management conferences, and these might be an excellent forum for presenting this program. If no such conference is routinely scheduled, a special conference for this purpose might be arranged. Also, smaller-scale staff meetings may be sufficient, especially if the same presenter addresses each group and the material is consistent for all.

DEPARTMENTAL MISSION STATEMENTS

In conjunction with the building of community support, the replicating agency should consider the publication of a departmental mission statement. These statements are useful for conveying to the public the basic goals, values, and service philosophy of an agency. In that sense, they are appropriate devices for a community-oriented policing campaign, since community-oriented policing is itself a philosophical concept.

If a replicating agency has already published a mission statement, it may want to reexamine that statement to ensure that no inconsistencies between the new program and the statement exist. The agency may even find that the current mission statement can be improved in light of new attitudes and services inherent in the community-oriented program.

In Prince George's County, we've published a detailed mission statement and a shorter, accompanying "vision statement" which summarizes our agency's commitment to the public. We also have published "critical success factors," which we regard as the tasks and activities that are essential to fulfilling our mission and achieving the vision.

We have included these statements in Appendix D of this document as examples for agencies who may be interested in publishing similar statements. However, those agencies are reminded that mission statements are not boilerplate publications; they are products of an agency's self-evaluation of its basic purpose and role in the community. As such, they should be individually crafted to reflect the agency's sincere sentiments.

Finally, we suggest that a replicating agency obtain input from all of its components during the preparation of the statements (as we did through our Strategic Management Program). Doing so will provide all members of the agency with an opportunity to contribute, and will likely improve the final product.

Section 6

MANAGEMENT PREPARATIONS

The order in which various topics are presented in this Section is not meant to convey a chronological sequence. Although we make suggestions about the timing of certain tasks, we cannot properly say which tasks should be performed first. Replicating agencies must examine their unique administrative environments to determine which tasks will take longest to complete, and which may be dependent upon the prior resolution of others. We recommend, though, that replicating agencies attempt to perform these functions as simultaneously as possible.

Section 6: Preparations for Commencement

DRAFTING AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

As soon as practical, the replicating agency should draft an "Implementation Plan" to guide all remaining planning and commencement activities. The plan should also identify any relevant actions that have already transpired, so as to create a complete record of the commencement process.

In a manner of speaking, the Implementation Plan (IP) serves as a blueprint for construction of the program. All of the specific activities and preparations required in advance of program operations should be clearly listed in the IP. In addition, the IP should identify all persons responsible to perform these activities, as well as the time frames in which the activities are to occur.

The IP should be a comprehensive and detailed document. No requisite task should be excluded from the IP, no matter how minor it may appear to be. In fact, the individual steps needed to satisfy a single task may be suitable for listing, particularly if they are to be performed by different people or at different times.

The times frames for the performance of various tasks need to be flexible enough to allow for unanticipated setbacks, yet definitive enough to keep the implementation process on track. It is probably wise to include a comprehensive time-line for the overall implementation process, placing each task's scheduled commencement and completion dates at their appropriate locations on the line. Using this time-line, implementors can get a better overview of the full implementation process, and can more readily assess the pace of progress by comparing scheduled deadlines with actual task completions.

Where the assigning of individual responsibility is concerned, we strongly recommend that one person be given responsibility for the overall implementation process. We shall refer to this person as the Implementation Manager, although any title may be used. In fact, it may be advisable for this position to be filled by the same person who will eventually become the Community-Oriented Services Manager, if the replicating agency chooses to create that billet.

The Implementation Manager should delegate most planning and preparation tasks to qualified subordinates or to committees, but he alone should be held accountable for ensuring that all necessary preparations are carried out. Obviously, the Implementation Manager should be a command-level official with genuine management skills and experience. He should also probably be detailed to the implementation project on a full-time, or nearly full-time basis.

Regardless of the Implementation Manager's formal rank and the various chains-of-command that may exist among officials participating in the implementation process, the Implementation Manager's authority to direct activities must be unquestioned. If he is outranked by anyone designated to perform an individual task, the Implementation Manager's authority with respect to that task should be understood to emanate directly from the agency's chief executive.

A copy of the IP should be provided to all persons significantly involved in the implementation effort. This allows each participant to fully understand the process and see how his role relates to the roles of others. The IP should also be revised periodically as new tasks are identified, changes in assigned responsibilities occur, or revisions to the time-line become necessary.

PROGRAM ADAPTATION AND POLICY REVISIONS

Naturally, the most difficult and challenging task in implementing a new program is development of the program itself. Fortunately for replicators, this program has been carefully crafted, tested and revised over three years of operation. By choosing to replicate this existing program, the replicating agency is avoiding much work and many problems.

However, as we stated at the opening of this document, our program may not be perfectly suited for everyone. Even if the basic design is attractive, replicating agencies may wish to add, delete, or modify various aspects. It is important that these changes be identified very early in the implementation process, since changes to the program design may dictate or influence the entire range of management preparations.

We recommend, therefore, that the replicating agency settle on a finalized program design, including all additions or modifications, before other management preparations proceed very far. Although some limited research may be needed before the final design can be identified, the agency's senior officials should be able to decide what will or will not be a part of the program relatively quickly.

Once a final program design has been agreed upon, the replicating agency should survey its entire departmental landscape to assess how well the design fits in. During this survey, potential conflicts between the new program and the agency's existing organizational structure, management processes, and operational and administrative procedures should be identified.

One of the more obvious issues to be explored during this survey involves departmental organization. A determination should be reached as to whether the squad, shift, district, and bureau structures used by the Prince George's County Police (see section 3 for descriptions) have comparable equivalents in the replicating agency. If they do not, the replicating agency must decide how the new program's personnel will be organized for reporting and discipline purposes, and how that structure will relate to the agency's overall table of organization.

The replicating agency should also review policy directives such as General Orders and Special Orders. These directives should be examined for all references that might become obsolete or inaccurate with the new program. Particular care should be taken to ensure that all conflicts between previous procedures and the new program are resolved. Even when no conflicts are noted, it may be wise to add the program to the central policy manual, if for no other reason than to enhance the agency's civil liability defense posture.

The agency-wide policy directives are not the only publications that should be examined. In Prince George's County, for instance, each of our police districts maintains its own "Standard Operating Procedure." This publication addresses issues such as site security, office procedures, standing responses to specific community institutions, and other purely local matters that are inappropriate for inclusion in our agency-wide General Order Manual.

Our agency also maintains managerial and contingency publications that are not included in our central policy manual, including our Strategic Management Program Procedures and an Emergency Mobilization Plan. This latter document, for example, establishes the protocol for responding to natural disasters, civil disorders, and riots. It identifies the reporting locations, call-out schedules, and other automatic contingency arrangements for each component of our agency.

If the replicating agency employs these types of single-topic or component-level publications, they should be reviewed and revised, where needed. Also, if the replicating agency is accredited by the Commission for Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), a review of CALEA standards should occur. An accredited agency may need to perform additional management processes or produce documentation for the new program in order to remain in compliance with accreditation requirements.

Although CALEA's standards do not currently address community-oriented policing specifically, a number of its general standards have an indirect applicability to the new program. For instance, one CALEA standard requires that periodic manpower allocation studies be performed for all agency components. If this standard has been satisfied for existing components but is subsequently neglected for the new program, the agency might inadvertently fall into non-compliance.

Whether or not the above-cited example applies, there are probably numerous other areas where minor managerial or documentary action is advisable. Therefore, we recommend that ***accredited*** agencies review the full range of CALEA standards to identify those actions. Obviously, if the replicating agency is not accredited by CALEA, these concerns do not apply.

SITE SELECTION AND SCOPE

One of the most basic questions that program planners must answer involves the program's scope. Will the program eventually cover the entire jurisdiction, as we intend in Prince George's County, or will it cover only selected high-impact neighborhoods? There is no correct or preferred answer; this program is adaptable to either approach.

Fortunately, this decision does not necessarily have to be made at the inception of the program. If the replicating agency chooses to implement the program in stages, it can buy time to evaluate program performance, procure additional resources, and contemplate the wisest course to pursue. A final decision on the eventual breadth of the program can be made later.

A smaller initial deployment also increases the chances for the program's eventual success. No matter how sound any program design is, and no matter how well an agency plans in advance of its introduction, mistakes and deficiencies are going to occur during the early stages of operation. By launching a smaller "pilot" project, these problems are more easily corrected and less likely to be damaging to the program's public acceptance and long-term health.

We chose to implement our program in increments, and we recommend that others do so, as well. For a period of six months to a year, we suggest that replicating agencies limit their deployment to no more than one squad (up to ten officers). Smaller initial deployments are certainly acceptable, although an agency should probably try to create a small squad, if possible. By doing so, it is able to assess supervision issues and the benefits of cooperative interaction among the community-oriented officers.

Of course, we realize that some replicating agencies, particularly smaller ones, may already know that their programs will remain modest. For such agencies, a single officer working our program's principles may be sufficient to begin the program. In fact, very small agencies may never intend to deploy more than one or two officers to full-time, community-oriented policing. Fortunately, this program is very adaptable to small agencies; virtually every operational aspect of this program will work for single-officer applications.

In addition to deciding the number of officers to be deployed, the replicating agency must also decide where the officers will be geographically assigned. In smaller jurisdictions, such as small towns and sparsely populated rural areas, the assignments may cover the agency's entire service area. In most jurisdictions, though, some neighborhoods will receive an officer during the initial deployment, and some will not.

Deciding which neighborhoods will get an officer first may not be an easy or obvious choice. For guidance on this point, we refer the reader back to the discussion we presented in Section 3, entitled "Manpower Allocation and Deployment." In it, we described a number of criteria that should be used to identify community-oriented territory size and boundaries. Some of these criteria will be helpful in deciding which neighborhoods to select, and all of them will be important in drawing the precise service-area boundaries.

In our case, we chose to introduce our program in the patrol sector which most often reports the County's highest statistics for violence and felony crime. Within that sector are seven patrol beats comprising numerous distinct neighborhoods. Many of those neighborhoods (although certainly not all) are severely impacted, both in terms of crime and overall quality-of-life.

There are several reasons why this sector was selected. Foremost, of course, was the crime factor. As we've already said, community-oriented policing is a crime-suppression concept, and introducing our program into a higher-crime area made sense. We also desired to place our first community-oriented squad into an area where there was genuine potential for visible improvements in quality-of-life. And finally, the community in that sector was exceptionally receptive to this placement, and community acceptance was an important concern for us.

We suggest that a replicating agency consider these same factors, along with others that the agency may identify, in selecting the introductory site. We also recommend that the community and the political leadership be asked for input before the selection is made. However, the replicating agency should be prepared for disappointment from neighborhoods that ultimately are not selected. If desired, a tentative schedule for additional program expansions can be published, which may soothe some of that disappointment.

Section 6 *continued*

BUDGET PREPARATION AND HIRING ALTERNATIVES

Of all the planning and commencement tasks described in this document, none is more important than the development of an accurate program budget. Adequate funding is the ultimate bottom-line for every government service, and this program is no exception.

The ***projected*** costs for personnel, equipment, and supplies should be identified early in the planning process. However, calculating an accurate final budget will not be possible until the final program design and the scope of initial implementation are decided. Therefore, replicators should begin a ***tentative*** budget as soon as possible, even though it will likely have to be revised, perhaps several times.

Some replicators may be tempted to postpone preparation of a budget until costs can be more definitively established. We recommend against this, however, as cost factors will probably affect some planning and commencement decisions. In addition, unless commitments have been made to fund this program regardless of eventual cost, the local governing body or other funding source will probably demand cost projections before final approvals are granted.

As we stated previously, this program's major expense will be for personnel. The first step in calculating the budget, therefore, lies in determining the number of officers to be deployed. When this number has been established, the one-year personnel costs can be calculated by multiplying the typical annual cost for one officer by the number of officers to be deployed.

The typical annual cost for one officer includes more than base salary. Fringe benefits, anticipated holiday and court compensations, use of a departmental vehicle, and other hidden costs should also be included. If new officers must be hired, training expenses and the cost of new uniforms and equipment should be factored, as well.

Obviously, hiring additional officers to staff this program is a very expensive proposition. Unfortunately, it may be necessary at some point, especially if the program is to be applied on the large, jurisdiction-wide scale that we intend in Prince George's County. However, additional hires may not be necessary during the first year or two of the program if initial deployments are small.

If the number of officers involved in the initial deployment is small, the replicating agency may be able to staff the program from its existing complement. Of course, this will require transfers in which the transferred officer is not replaced, but there may be components where the loss of an officer does not diminish unit effectiveness.

If the replicating agency's personnel margin is so thin that no such components can be readily identified, new hiring may still not be necessary. If the replicating agency critically assesses the functions of its various components and is willing to restructure some of those functions, it may derive a manpower windfall from improved component efficiency and decreased workloads.

For instance, the agency may discover that some services are performed in a duplicative or overlapping fashion by more than one component, or it may identify more efficient ways for a single component to deliver services. It may also conclude that some services are ineffective or inappropriate, have become obsolete, or are less beneficial to the public than the community-oriented program would be. By eliminating, scaling back, or merging certain services, the agency may free up the additional manpower needed to staff the community-oriented program.

Personnel costs might also be reduced by having civilian employees perform certain functions that were previously performed by police officers. The officers who are freed up as a result might then be reassigned to the community-oriented program. Even if new civilian employees have to be hired to perform these converted duties, the cost of the new civilian hires will be less than the cost of hiring additional sworn officers.

In fact, even outside the context of this program, conversion of non-enforcement positions from sworn to civilian status is a progressive, cost-effective management policy. With proper training and procedural guidelines, civilian employees are as capable of performing nearly all job tasks in a police agency as are sworn personnel, including minor enforcement functions such as writing parking tickets. Only those functions which are dangerous, involve full arrest power, require operational experience, or which local/state laws expressly reserve for sworn personnel should be off-limits to civilian employees.

Replicating agencies may also consider the use of auxiliary or reserve police, as well as citizen volunteers to perform clerical and public reception duties, as a means of freeing full-time officers for assignment to community-oriented positions. Our agency does not use auxiliary officers (although others in our area, such as the Baltimore City Police, do), but we operate a citizen volunteer program. Interested replicating agencies may obtain information about that program by contacting either our Personnel Division or our Planning/Research Division.

It should be noted, though, that citizen volunteer and reserve/auxiliary programs are major undertakings in themselves, and the replicating agency would be wise to delay consideration of these options until after the community-oriented program is underway. Nevertheless, use of reserve/volunteer personnel may be a long-term option that will allow a replicating agency to eventually operate a broader community-oriented program than would otherwise be possible.

In addition to personnel costs, the program will likely incur expenses for equipment, supplies, training, and other essential provisions. We will not discuss these expenditures in detail at this time, as they are enumerated in a later discussion (Section 7, "Procurement"). However, their costs should be estimated for inclusion in the program's proposed budget at the same time personnel costs are calculated.

Section 6 *continued*

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

Nearly all law enforcement agencies establish job descriptions, qualifications, and performance standards for their personnel. Some of these provisions apply to all officers generally, as in entry-level qualifications and conduct-related standards. Others apply only to specific ranks, such as the eligibility criteria for promotion. This community-oriented program will probably not have much impact on such ***generic*** and ***rank-related*** provisions.

However, the program will have impact on personnel provisions which define job tasks, acceptable levels of performance, and areas of responsibility ***for specialized assignments.*** This impact will encompass the knowledge, skills, and aptitudes necessary to successfully perform in these assignments, as well as the measurable criteria upon which performance will be judged for retention, merit pay, and promotional purposes.

Replicating agencies that maintain ***only*** generic job descriptions and standards (and do not draft assignment-related standards, etc.) may not have to make any adjustments at all. On the other hand, agencies that customize personnel standards by position or task will probably need to revise those standards, or create new standards, for community-oriented officers.

In any case, we suggest that the replicating agency assign someone to review all pertinent personnel issues. The most likely candidate, of course, is the commander of the agency's Personnel Division or equivalent component, or some other person uniquely qualified in the personnel administration field.

For the reader's convenience, we now present a listing of personnel issues we believe may be impacted by this program. The timing of this impact may be immediate in some cases (thus calling for immediate attention), while for others it is clearly long-range.

POSITION DESCRIPTIONS

If the replicating agency employs position descriptions for specialized components, it is likely that new descriptions should be prepared for community-oriented officers (and perhaps for the community-oriented supervisor and Community-Oriented Services Manager). If the agency uses only generic job descriptions that apply to all officers regardless of assignment, those descriptions should still be reviewed to ensure that the community-oriented personnel's responsibilities are constructively covered.

Because community-oriented officers perform a number of crime prevention and traditional community relations duties, it may be tempting to define their position with the same descriptions already in use for crime prevention and community relations personnel. However, those descriptions are likely to be inadequate.

The responsibilities that this program assigns to community-oriented personnel are fairly unique for street-level subordinate officers, regardless of assignment. Rarely will an agency hold community relations or crime prevention officers accountable for developing effective strategic responses or managing multi-agency, multi-component operations. Nor will many agencies establish a results-based standard instead of a performance-based one. And yet, strategic "beat management" and bottom-line results are what this program is really all about.

Therefore, if the replicating agency publishes a position description for the community-oriented officer, it must ensure that the description emphasizes the beat management process and holds the officer accountable for ***successful*** strategy development and implementation. Of course, appropriate traditional community-outreach activities, such as crime prevention counseling, should be included in the description, as well.

JOB QUALIFICATIONS

It may be possible to eventually include community-oriented issues in the entry-level hiring process. After all, hiring tests and other selection criteria are required to be task-related so as to properly measure a candidate's ability to perform. To the extent that an agency employs community-oriented policing, measuring the candidate's ability and willingness to perform community-oriented duties is reasonable.

However, we do not include programmatic community-oriented issues in our hiring process at this time. We also are unaware of any other agency that does so, although some may exist. Consequently, we are not qualified to give advice in this area.

Like most agencies, though, we do apply eligibility qualifications to our internal transfers. For instance, officers must possess eighteen months experience before being allowed to transfer to any specialty assignment, including community-oriented policing. Other requirements may apply, depending on the specialty position involved.

Replicating agencies should consider whether formal eligibility qualifications should be established for the community-oriented program. The issue may not be discretionary. For instance, there may be local personnel law provisions or labor agreements which mandate the publication of qualifications before transfers can occur.

We recommend that if job qualifications are established, an attempt be made to keep them as flexible as possible. After the program has become operational and the agency has studied officer performance, more definitive qualifications can be written. Later in this document (Section 7, "Personnel Selection"), we will discuss criteria that a replicating agency might want to consider when choosing community-oriented officers.

MERIT EVALUATIONS

Most agencies use scheduled supervisory evaluations of officer performance to regulate seniority-related pay raises, advancement in classification steps, and awarding of retention points for reduction-in-force purposes, etc. These evaluations are usually generic and measure broad capabilities and performance rather than specific task production.

Even when the evaluations are generic, though, a replicating agency must ensure that their rating categories are relevant to the community-oriented officers' unique duties and responsibilities. If they are not, the categories should be revised. The revisions can also be written in a generic tone, but they must fairly and reliably measure the community-oriented officers' unique tasks and responsibilities.

PROMOTIONAL EVALUATIONS

Not all agencies use supervisory evaluations in their promotional process, particularly competitive evaluations where points are awarded. Of those that do, however, many relate their rating categories to specific job tasks. In Prince George's County, for instance, we employ different rating categories for patrol, investigative, and staff personnel, although the potential point values and difficulty factors are ostensibly the same for all officers.

If replicating agencies use promotional evaluations, they should review them in the same fashion that merit evaluations are reviewed. The agency must ensure that community-oriented officers are not placed at a competitive disadvantage by being rated in categories where they have no genuine opportunity to excel. If it appears that they might be disadvantaged, additional categories tailored for their community outreach activities should be devised.

PROMOTIONAL TESTS, INTERVIEWS, AND ASSESSMENT CENTERS

For the most part, implementation of this program will not require any revisions to promotional tests, oral interviews, assessment centers, or other devices used to rank promotional candidates. Community-oriented policing need not be included among the issues examined in these forums unless the agency career-tracks officers into community outreach fields, or uses a relatively uncommon assignment-related testing method.

However, just as an officer's knowledge of general law enforcement operations and management principles are measured during promotional testing, it may be desirable to measure his awareness of community-oriented policing concepts. Questions about the agency's program or the community-oriented philosophy in general may be appropriate.

In Prince George's County, we augment our supervisory evaluations with written tests and oral interviews. Each year we provide officers with a list of resource materials from which test questions will be drawn, and since 1992 have included on that list "Problem-Oriented Policing," the book which we regard as our community-oriented management discipline. We have also included community-oriented policing topics among our oral interview questions.

Replicating agencies may wish to do the same. By including this testing material, an agency is able to enhance community-oriented awareness and sensitivity throughout its ranks, rather than just among those personnel directly involved with the program. Ultimately, both the agency and the public benefit from this enhancement.

Still, the inclusion of community-oriented topics in promotional testing is not necessary for program commencement. Therefore, in order not to distract from more important implementation tasks, we recommend that community-oriented additions to the promotional testing process be postponed until after the program has become operational.

COMPUTER DATABASES, PAYROLL, AND HIRING

Prior to commencing program operations, the replicating agency's Personnel and Payroll components may need to adjust their computer databases or other records to accommodate the new community-oriented billets. For example, some agencies use computerized employee locator systems to deliver paychecks or track the officer's eligibility for overtime, holiday pay, "tech" pay, and similar benefits. Creation of a new component or job classification may also require that new codes be programmed into these systems.

A wide range of other computer and clerical preparations may be required, depending on the personnel and accounting systems in use at the replicating agency. Obviously, we cannot anticipate all of these preparations, nor should we try. The replicating agency's accounting and personnel professionals will recognize what needs to be done without any guidance from us.

However, we have raised this issue in order to remind the reader or other implementing official that this type of preparatory work must be performed. We urge that official to bring the appropriate payroll and personnel staff into the commencement process as early as practical, so that ample lead time is provided. Any tasks assigned to them should be included in the Implementation Plan, with a tentative completion date well in advance of the program's first operational pay period.

Similarly, if new hiring will be required in advance of program operations, the hiring process should be commenced as quickly as possible. At the best, hiring is likely to take months to complete, and if ***basic recruit training*** is included, the process could well extend to a year or more. Therefore, if program implementation is contingent upon first replacing the experienced officers who will be removed from other components to staff this program, it is obvious that commencement of the hiring process must be an immediate priority.

SECURING GOVERNMENT APPROVALS

In most jurisdictions, the law enforcement agencies are wholly subordinate to the elected local government. This is the case in Prince George's County, where our agency is just one of our government's many operating departments, much like the Department of Transportation or the Department of Social Services. Since our situation is probably similar to that of most replicating agencies, we'd like to briefly describe it for reference purposes.

Although our agency is granted reasonable flexibility in our basic departmental management, we are powerless to take truly independent action. For instance, all hiring and personnel services, all procurements, and the acceptance of all legal obligations are technically taken on our behalf by the Prince George's County Government. This arrangement is mandated by law.

In accordance with this relationship, we are required to submit major proposals and all binding contracts or obligations to the County Government for its approval. These submissions go to our government's "Administrative Review Committee," where the propriety and wisdom of a proposed action is discussed, and approval is subsequently granted or denied.

The Administrative Review Committee, also known as the "ARC," consists of five members. They include representatives from the County's Office of Law, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Finance, and Office of Central Services (procurement and maintenance). Chairing the committee is the County's Chief Administrative Officer (the County's second-ranking official behind the elected County Executive) or one of his three deputies.

When we submitted this program's grant application to the federal Bureau of Justice Assistance, the application had to be pre-approved by the Administrative Review Committee. Similarly, the award had to be formally accepted by the Committee. All significant aspects of the program, from budget and procurement issues to legal obligations and their ramifications, were carefully reviewed and approved by this Committee before any concrete action was taken.

We anticipate that a similar process exists for most replicating agencies. It may go by another name or have a substantially different composition, but the basic approval requirements are probably comparable. If they are, the replicating agency will have to work closely with its "Administrative Review" overseers to get this program running.

In our agency, it is not unusual for management officials to have little personal experience with, or knowledge of, our Administrative Review process. Most officials who command operational components or oversee already-approved programs have no interaction with our Administrative Review Committee. Only those officials or employees routinely involved in budget matters, contracting, or program development have significant ARC contact.

We have described our process because we realize that the replicating agency's implementing official might possibly be as inexperienced with his agency's ARC-equivalent process as many of our own commanders are with our process. If this is the case, we hope this discussion alerts him to the need for securing government approvals. We would also like to caution him that, if his process is anything like ours, approvals sometimes are not granted quickly. Consequently, we recommend that he lay the groundwork for his approval requests well in advance of the date approval is needed.

Early submission of required documents is certainly one very important way to secure timely approvals. However, we also suggest that the implementing official establish personal working relationships with the appropriate employees in the approving government offices. By discussing his requests or proposals in advance of the documents, and by taking any advice that might be offered in those discussions, the implementing official is likely to avoid problems and misunderstandings. The approval process should be much faster as a result.

If no mandatory ARC-type process exists in the replicating agency's jurisdiction, the implementing official may still benefit from consultation with other government officials. For example, it may be wise for someone in the local government's legal office to review the program's proposed activities and community relationships for potential conflicts of interest or other legal difficulties. Similarly, the local government's procurement component may be aware of less expensive purchasing alternatives, or may offer practical advice.

Section 7

LOGISTICAL PREPARATIONS

Section 7: Logistical Preparations

PROCUREMENT

As we stated in an earlier discussion, this program is not equipment-intensive; its primary need is for personnel. Still, the purchase of some additional equipment and supplies is probably necessary and is certainly recommended.

For openers, if new officers are being hired to facilitate staffing of this program, initial issues of uniforms and equipment for those officers must be purchased. This expense may not be directly attributable to the community-oriented program for accounting purposes, but the replicating agency must consider these costs in its fiscal planning. It must also consider training and recruitment/processing costs, if any. Of course, if new hiring is not immediately in the offing, these costs do not apply.

Similarly, if the agency's sworn complement is being expanded, additional police cruisers or other vehicles may have to be purchased. Even if the agency does not operate a personal car program, more on-duty officers at any given moment will likely require more vehicles.

If the replicating agency does not hire additional officers, it may still desire to purchase vehicles. When we commenced our program, we purchased lightweight motorcycles for every one of our eight community-oriented officers. We felt that such vehicles encouraged greater officer-citizen interaction than did police cruisers, while simultaneously giving the officers greater range and quickness than foot patrol would allow (bear in mind that although our crime situation is comparable to a city, much of our physical geography is spread out like a typical suburb).

Unfortunately, the purchase of the motorcycles turned out to be an unwise expenditure for us. Our officers demonstrated a marked preference for foot and cruiser patrol. The officers expressed several reasons for this preference, including their belief that foot patrols were superior to motorcycle patrols wherein meaningful dialogue with the public was concerned.

Of greater concern to the officers, though, was the fact that they felt more vulnerable on motorcycles. A number of the neighborhoods they patrolled are in high crime areas where assaults upon police are ever-present threats. The officers felt they were more conspicuous targets on the cycles than they were in cruisers. And although they were equally conspicuous while on foot patrol, the officers felt they were able to react quicker if they were not constrained by the motorcycle. In their view, foot patrol allowed them to seek cover and concealment more quickly, if need be.

Since we did not mandate motorcycle patrol, the officers were free to use or not use the machines, at their discretion. Consequently, the motorcycles sat idle much of the time, even in excellent weather. We still possess the original eight cycles and our community-oriented officers occasionally make use of them, but they are underutilized and we have purchased no more. Our program has not suffered for lack of their use.

We do not suggest that replicating agencies refrain from purchasing motorcycles (or bicycles, for that matter). The replicating agency's officers might have different experiences and different preferences than do ours where this issue is concerned. We have merely passed our experience along for the replicating agency to consider, without recommendation.

Most of the replicating agency's other equipment and supply expenses will be associated with the satellite offices. We were fortunate in that the overwhelming majority of these expenses were paid for by the federal government through our grant. However,

even if no grant monies are available, replicating agencies may be able to reduce satellite office costs by using existing agency stocks where available, appropriating unclaimed recovered or seized property, or soliciting donations from the business community and civic organizations.

As for the office space itself, we do not pay to lease satellite office space anywhere. All satellite office space and related utility usage (heat, electricity, etc.) are provided free by private-sector organizations as a contribution to the community-oriented policing effort. We suggest that the replicating agency model this approach; finding willing contributors will probably not be difficult.

Our agency does purchase furnishings and office equipment/supplies ***when those items are not provided by the private-sector contributor.*** If purchased by us, the items remain our departmental property (and are removed, naturally) if the contribution of office space is ever withdrawn following their installation. If a replicating agency establishes satellite offices using donated space, this "contents ownership" issue should be explicitly agreed upon with the office space donator in advance.

Each of our satellite offices is equipped with a desk for the officer, an adequate storage capacity (whether it be drawers, file cabinets, or bookcases, etc.), and sufficient chairs to host a community or planning committee meeting. A table around which such a meeting can be held is also helpful, although we do not have one in every office. Each office also maintains a small quantity of basic office supplies, such as paper, envelopes, pens, staplers, and postage, etc.

Every one of our officers has his own exclusive telephone line, installed either by our agency or by the contributor of the office space. All phone bills are paid by our agency, although replicating agencies may be able to persuade contributors to pick up this cost, as well. This might be especially appropriate if the contributor already maintains numerous

separate lines at the site and is willing to free one for the officer's exclusive use. We strongly suggest, though, that the officer ***not share*** a line with the contributor wherein the reception of calls is concerned.

Each of our offices is also equipped with a telephone answering machine for accepting messages while the officer is out or on days off. As we expressed in our previous discussion of the satellite office in Section 4, we believe that these machines are very beneficial in sustaining community involvement with the program. Remember that the officer will spend most of his time out of the satellite office and no secretary will be employed to take messages. We strongly recommend an answering machine; it is not a frill.

We also provide pagers to our officers, although these are clearly less important than the answering machine. Given the very low cost of pagers, though, and the favorable reaction of citizens to whom the page number has been given for timely on-duty responses, we regard the expenditure as worthwhile. Of course, this is a value judgement, and replicating agencies may certainly dispense with pagers if cost containment is an issue.

Our offices are stocked with educational brochures and referral documents from a large number of government and private-sector agencies. Almost all of these brochures are provided free of charge. However, our agency has printed some brochures that we customized for this program, and a small amount of printing costs were incurred as a result. In addition, some of our community-oriented officers incur relatively high xeroxing costs in the course of their public-education and input-solicitation functions. Replicating agencies certainly need not incur significant printing costs, but a small budget for this activity might prove beneficial.

When we began our program, we also stocked the offices with computers and word processors for the officers to use when writing Beat Condition Reports, letters to citizens, and other clerical tasks. Some officers used these machines to great benefit, but most used them sparingly. Some of our officers simply lacked word processing skills, while others reported that they had only sporadic need for "typewriting" equipment. When the need arose, they preferred to use equipment at their regular police station, where they were able to complete their work without distraction.

Consequently, we no longer routinely purchase typewriters or word processing equipment for our satellite offices, although an officer may still obtain a machine if one is available within our agency. In a sense, our experience here somewhat parallels that with the motorcycles. We believe word processing equipment can be beneficial and should be deployed if it is available. However, if a replicating agency does not already have a surplus of these items and desires to contain costs, it can dispense with this equipment without adversely affecting program performance.

One area where computers are essential, though, is in the Statistical Support aspect of the program. If the replicating agency employs a Statistical Support Officer, he must be provided with a quality personal computer, a printer (color capacity is preferable, given the color and shading capabilities of the MapInfo system), and appropriate software (d-base, word processing, MapInfo, etc.).

Of course, with the probable exception of the MapInfo software, many agencies already have this equipment and software in their data processing or crime analysis components. Purchasing new items for use with the community-oriented program may not be necessary. Therefore, during the budget planning process (see Section 6), a determination should be made whether existing agency resources can sustain this aspect of the program, or whether a new PC and related equipment should be budgeted.

As indicated above, most agencies will not already possess the MapInfo software. Consequently, if that capability is desired by the replicating agency, the software must be purchased. In addition, it will probably be necessary for the agency's designated SSO or other crime analysis employee to attend MapInfo's two-day school to learn how to use the software. There is a charge for this training, and it should be calculated into the budget, as well.

There also may be minimal costs incurred for training the community-oriented personnel. Community-oriented policing experts or other guest instructors may require fees or reimbursement of travel expenses, etc. Small expenditures for refreshments, training-related printing, and other incidentals may also be appropriate.

Further, it may be beneficial for the replicating agency's initial group of community-oriented officers to travel to a nearby agency where a similar community-oriented program is already established, so they can observe and learn from its operation (subsequent groups of officers can learn from the replicating agency's first group). Naturally, if the visited agency is some distance away from the replicating agency's jurisdiction, travel expenses may be incurred.

We suggest that all necessary procurements be initiated well in advance of the program's operational commencement. Unless the replicating agency's procurement process is superior to that of most governments, some delays should be expected. Therefore, if the community-oriented officers are not to find themselves starting work without appropriate materials, requisitions should be submitted and satellite office space arranged as early in the planning process as practical.

PERSONNEL SELECTION

The selection of officers for this program is a delicate and crucial task which must be approached with the utmost seriousness. If the wrong officers are selected, there's an excellent chance the program will fail. Not every officer is suited for proactive community-oriented police work, and the replicating agency must ensure that unsuitable officers do not enter the program.

The replicating agency should examine two facets of an officer's general qualifications for the program. The first facet encompasses the officer's personal character, natural abilities, and public service attitudes. The second focuses on his professional experience and qualifications.

Where the personal characteristics are concerned, the qualities that distinguish a truly outstanding general-service police officer are also desirable in community-oriented officers, naturally. These qualities include intelligence, maturity, conscientiousness, sound judgment, honesty, and so on. If appropriate screening and investigation of hiring applicants occurred, the majority of officers will have all of these qualities to one degree or another.

For our community-oriented program, though, we look for something more than the standard requisite qualities. For instance, where intelligence is concerned, we want our community-oriented officers to be unusually good abstract thinkers. We prefer analytical, logical people who possess strong deductive reasoning skills. They should also be creative, innovative thinkers who are capable of delving deeply into complicated issues. In short, we want them to have the same intellectual qualities we find in our best detectives.

We also believe it is important for community-oriented officers to have unusually good "people skills." They should be articulate and persuasive, but we also want them to be good listeners. We prefer officers who work well with others and who seem to naturally put people at ease. We look for friendly and open personalities.

Perhaps the greatest single factor is the officer's attitude. Community-oriented officers should ***believe*** in this program. They should be idealistic about public service and compassionate toward people. Above all, they must identify with the public and accept that it has a legitimate, active role to play in police activities and decision-making.

We recommend that officers be interviewed prior to acceptance into this program. During these interviews, officers should be asked about their public service attitudes in general and about community-oriented policing specifically. We suggest that summaries of this program's operations be provided to the officers in advance of the interviews so that they may comment about their prospective duties.

In regard to the professional considerations, the preferred criteria are less clear. On the one hand, many within our agency believe that an officer's desire to perform community-oriented service is the paramount qualifier. These officials believe that only ***volunteers*** should be considered for this program. Their fear is that non-volunteers would lack personal commitment and might have little faith in the community-oriented approach.

Initially, we accepted this reasoning and selected all of our personnel from a list of volunteers. No effort was made to recruit uninterested officers or "sell" the program to doubters. We discovered, though, that nearly all of our sincerely-motivated volunteers were younger, less experienced officers (older troops who expressed interest seemed to view the program as an opportunity to get off the street and take it "easy"). With the exception of one officer, all of our beat-level appointees had less than five years experience, and many had less than three.

This lack of experience did not injure the program, but some missed opportunities and uncertain judgements were noted. The young officers were essentially learning the art of problem-solving on the job, whereas older officers, particularly those with investigative experience, would probably have been more confident and effective from the start.

This observation gave rise to an opposing view that only seasoned veterans should be eligible for the program. Proponents of this requirement contend that beat management is too challenging for officers with no investigative or managerial experience. They suggest that experienced personnel are more familiar with governmental and community resources, are quicker to recognize significant information, and can assert their leadership much more effectively than younger officers.

These proponents also believe that a lack of enthusiasm and personal commitment will not adversely affect performance, provided the officers are generally conscientious and obey orders. Their maturity and pride will prevail. Even if they do not believe in the program, they will believe in themselves and make it work to the best of their ability. Besides, the proponents say, in time many of these skeptical veterans will become converts as a result of their program experiences.

We can't say which view is the better one. There is merit in each argument, and ultimately the replicating agency must decide for itself whether professional experience outweighs personal commitment. We've adopted a position somewhat in the middle of these conflicting views.

We still do not assign officers to this program against their will, regardless of their experience or other qualifications. We also still accept younger volunteers who may have only the minimum eighteen months experience that is required for all inter-component transfers. We believe that attitude is a crucial factor, and any officer whose attitude may be inappropriate for our program will not be selected.

However, if we do not get enough experience among the overall pool of volunteers, we seek out more seasoned officers. Command personnel will explain the program to selected veterans, explain why the veteran officers are being recruited, and ask that they willingly agree to a placement, at least for an initial trial period. Only officers who consent will be eligible for a non-volunteer assignment. Thus far, this approach has been successful, and we suggest that it might be an appropriate course for the replicating agency, as well.

TRAINING

The training of community-oriented personnel should be the final preparatory step before actual program operations begin. We recommend that the training commence on the date when transfers to the program become effective, and that field deployments take effect immediately upon its conclusion.

Preparations for training, however, must begin much earlier. A curriculum must be developed, written materials collected and handouts printed, and guest instructors (if any) arranged. Curriculum development and class preparation duties may be delegated to the replicating agency's regular training academy staff or to individuals involved with the community-oriented program implementation.

We strongly recommend that the replicating agency try to secure the assistance of community-oriented experts or other police professionals with experience in this type of program. In our case, speakers from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted separate classes in community-oriented theory and operating techniques. Some community-oriented classes were also taught by our own personnel, but only with respect to our local program design, our policies and objectives, and other departmental issues.

The exact length and content of the basic community-oriented training is really best determined by the replicating agency. However, we now offer the following synopsis of our initial classroom training curriculum as a general reference:

* two days of community-oriented policing instruction emphasizing concepts, philosophy, managerial principles, and the techniques of problem-oriented policing generally. This training was administered by the FBI.

* one day of program training, emphasizing program goals, departmental organization issues, reporting requirements and procedures, and specific directives of the program, etc. This training was administered by our agency's own personnel.

* one day of drug enforcement training taught by members of our department's Narcotics Enforcement Division, with emphasis on the identification of specific types of drugs, their methods of use and distribution, and the enforcement techniques and resources availability of various departmental components.

* two days of crime prevention training, with particular emphasis on the creation and coordination of Neighborhood Watch groups. Additional crime prevention training regarding robbery and sexual assault prevention, residence and business target hardening, and flim-flam resistance, etc., were also included. This training was conducted by experienced crime prevention practitioners from our agency.

* three days of referral training in which spokespersons from selected public and private agencies speak about the services that are available from their organizations, as well as provide specific advice regarding the most effective referral procedures. Participating agencies included Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous, other police department components, the Health Department, and various county agencies with responsibility for property standards and social services, etc.

* one day of miscellaneous training for motor scooter operation, computer use, and other issues identified during curriculum development.

* one additional week of general police procedures, tactical coordination, survival techniques, and similar topics not directly related to the community-oriented process.

The above curriculum consisted of three weeks' total instruction, and took place immediately prior to the officers' deployment to the field. About two months later, the officers were brought back for one more week of advanced community-oriented classroom instruction which was taught by the Police Executive Research Forum. This training was particularly useful because, unlike the case when the initial training occurred, our community-oriented officers now had a couple months of personal community-oriented experience with which to relate.

In addition to the classroom instruction described above, our officers were also provided with selected reading materials which they were required to read. These materials were provided at the very outset of the program and included:

1) ***Problem-Oriented Policing*** by Herman Goldstein
(the book we use as our management discipline)

2) Our agency's community-oriented BJA grant application, in which our program philosophy, methodology, and objectives were presented

3) ***Playing the Home Field: A Problem-Oriented Approach to Drug Control*** by Deborah Lamm Weisel, PERF

4) "Community Policing Is Not Police-Community Relations" by Robert Trojanowicz, Ph.D., in the October 1990 edition of the ***FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin***

5) "Newport News Tests Problem-Oriented Policing" by William Spelman and John Eck, in NIJ's January 1987 ***Research in Action***

6) Making Neighborhoods Safe by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling in the February 1989 edition of ***Atlantic Monthly***

7) Community Policing: A Practical Guide for Police Officials by Lee Brown in NIJ's September 1989 ***Perspectives on Policing***

8) The Return of Officer Friendly by John Persinos in August 1989 edition of ***Governing***

9) 5 issues of ***Problem Solving Quarterly***, including Fall 1988, Winter 1989, and Summer, Fall, Winter 1990. Published by PERF in conjunction with a BJA grant

In addition to the above training of program officers and supervisors, we also provided basic community-oriented training to the non-departmental participants who serve on our Planning Committees. This training occurred at Planning Committee meetings and was administered by program officers and other police officials.

Finally, we'd like to mention that for calendar year 1992, we included a three-hour block of basic community-oriented instruction in our In-Service Training classes. The Maryland Police Training Commission requires law enforcement agencies in our state to provide week-long retraining and requalification to all police officers every year. With certain core-curriculum exceptions, though, it allows the agencies to select the topics.

We chose to include community-oriented policing in that year's curriculum because we felt it was important for all officers, not just those directly involved in the program, to understand community-oriented principles. We have also established a community-oriented

policing block of instruction in our basic recruit training curriculum. We suggest that replicating agencies consider similar training arrangements within one or two years after program commencement.

Appendix A

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



FEBRUARY 1993

Appendix B

HOME IMPROVEMENT FRAUD

Cpl. Diane Salen

SCANNING:

A citizen complained at a recent civic association meeting of a home improvement scam being operated in the area of Chapel Oaks.

ANALYSIS:

A Mrs. Johnson informed me at a recent Civic Association meeting of a possible home improvement scam being operated in the Chapel Oaks area. Mrs. Johnson advised that she had contracted with Quest Remodeling (now out of business) to renovate the kitchen and basement of her home. The company began construction to Mrs. Johnsons home in December, 1990. Mrs. Johnson paid Quest Remodeling, in full, an amount of $21,000.00 upon their initiating work to her home.

When Mrs. Johnson became dissatisfied with the quality of work being performed as well as the fact Quest Remodeling wasn't completing the work as scheduled, she began to question the companies credentials. Mrs. Johnson confronted the company owner and discovered that he didn't have a Home Improvement license. Upon her confronting the company owner, all work to her residence stopped and she hasn't seen the company owner since.

This officer, after receiving Mrs. Johnsons complaint, contacted the Prince George's County Police Check and Fraud unit. An investigator with the Check and Fraud unit supplied this officer with a copy of the Maryland State Home Improvement Laws. Upon examination it was discovered that the owner of the company had violated two laws, home improvement without a license and abandonment of a home improvement contract. A

complete criminal records check, nationwide and local, was made on the identified owner of Quest Remodeling. It was discovered that the company owner had six open warrants for an assorted range of crimes, to include other acts of home improvement fraud.

This officer then contacted Mrs. Johnson again and was informed that Quest Remodeling had contracted with other residents in Fairmount Heights as well. Investigation revealed that in most cases even though the work had been completed, the work was of a very poor quality. The residents names were obtained for additional follow-up at a later date.

RESPONSE:

On 5/02/90 this officer began conducting covert surveillance on the Johnson residence in an effort to apprehend the owner of Quest Remodeling. On 5/03/90 this officer, while conducting surveillance, apprehended the owner of Quest Remodeling. He was served with the outstanding warrants as well as the charges emanating from Mrs. Johnsons complaint.

This officer has since written numerous articles in regards to the Home Improvement problem discovered in the Fairmount Heights area. These articles were placed in civic association newsletters around the area. A Home Improvement Fraud presentation and flyer was created by this officer and given to Civic Association groups within the District III area.

Mrs. Johnson was informed by this officer to file a formal complaint with the Home Improvement Licensing Commission. She was also informed to pursue the Quest Remodeling company in civil court as well.

ASSESSMENT:

Mrs. Johnson has pursued her case through the Home Improvement Commission, the District Court and Civil Court. The owner of Quest Remodeling has been found guilty of all charges and restitution has been ordered in Mrs. Johnsons case. The Home Improvement Fraud presentation has been a tremendous success. The community has been educated and frequently cases are discovered through this process.

CMAST/PETITION OF INJUNCTION

Pfc. Tony Avendorph

SCANNING:

The acronym CMAST stands for County Multi-Agency Services Team. It is an idea conceived from the Oakland, California Police Departments SMART Team, Special Multi Agency Response Team. The SMART concept was originated by Sgt. Robert Crawford, Oakland California Police Department. The SMART concept is a joint effort of assorted city agencies that while working together, target abandoned and occupied dwellings that are used as drug houses. The SMART team will, upon identification, visit dwellings used for drugs, complete an inspection, cite health code violations and then immediately board up the structure, evicting the occupants.

Due to the amount of citizen complaints in regards to drug houses in the County it was decided by this officer to attempt to implement the SMART Team concept within Prince George's County.

ANALYSIS:

In September, 1991, there were a group of multi-family dwellings identified within the Towns of Seat Pleasant and Capital Heights, Maryland, that were identified as drug houses. These houses were located on 68th Place, 69th Street, Jansen Avenue, and F Street. These dwellings were being occupied and used primarily as drug houses.

After receiving information through community groups, civic meetings and anonymous tips, this officer began to conduct covert surveillance. Home visitation was then used within the affected areas to gather additional information. The Criminal Justice Information System was used to conduct records checks on identified occupants and to identify the owners/renters of the dwellings.

RESPONSE:

Vice Referrals were submitted to the Narcotics Enforcement Division for action. The Narcotics Enforcement Division was able to execute a search and seizure warrant on only one of the five addresses.

As a result of the original analysis of the suspected drug locations, it was discovered that they each lacked some or all of their utilities. There were obvious signs of structural defects found both inside and outside of the dwellings. It was based on these observations that a County Multi-Agency Services Team (CMAST) was organized. Mr. Frank Monaco, Department of Environmental Resources, was contacted and arrangements were made to form the CMAST Team. The CMAST Team was formed and is composed of the following agencies and departments:

Prince George's County Police Department
Department of Environmental Resources
Prince George's County State's Attorneys Office
Prince George's County Office of Law
Prince George's County Fire Department
Prince George's County Department of Public Works and Transportation

Prince George's County Department of Central Services
Housing and Urban Development
Child and Adult Protective Services
Prince George's County Sheriff's Department
Prince George's County Health Department

In October, 1991, this officer met with Anne Magner, County Office of Law, and other members of the CMAST Team, to design an affidavit to be used for enforcement of petition of injunction measures against the offending locations. An agreement was reached that after submitting affidavits for petition of injunction, the Circuit Court would render a decision within ten working days on whether to close the offending location.

This officer then visited Oakland, California and met with Sgt. Crawford. Sgt. Crawford explained his SMART Team and the process he used to close drug locations.

On November 17, 1991, a Circuit Court Judge ordered the first of three petition of injunctions against the drug house locations. On November 21, 1991, the CMAST Team executed the court orders and served the occupants with the petitions of injunction. On November 23, 1991, the CMAST Team executed court ordered petitions at the remaining addresses.

The response from the community was overwhelming. The drug house locations that were closed caused calls for service to be eliminated or reduced, the community fear was eliminated and this process was found to be an effective means of closing drug locations. Based on the success of this process, interested elected officials began to inquire as to how the CMAST Team operated. Their inquiries led to a discussion as to the ten day process involved in serving the petition of injunction. Due to their interest, a special

legislative development team was formed at the request of the Prince George's County Council. The team was formed in order to draft county legislation that would accelerate the petition of injunction process and to enhance the CMAST concept.

ASSESSMENT:

The legislative development team, as of 2/26/93, is in the process of drafting County legislation to accelerate the petition of injunction process. Since the inception of the CMAST Team there have been numerous petition of injunctions served and drug house locations closed. It should be noted that of all the houses that were closed and occupants evicted, there has not been any families displaced. Normally, the occupants consist of drug users that are transient to the area. Calls for service have been dramatically reduced or eliminated.

The citizens that have lived within the area of the drug house locations, based on interviews after the locations are closed, have been extremely grateful and supportive of the Police Department's efforts.

DRAG RACING

LT. STEPHEN BIGELOW #634

COMMANDER SHIFT I DISTRICT III

SCANNING:

A problem concerning drag racing has been identified in the Glenarden area. The drag racing has been brought to my attention through numerous complaints from the businesses in the area as well as my own personal observations. This drag racing is occurring in the area of Corporate Drive, Professional Place, and at the Crown gas station in the area of Route 704 and Ardmore-Ardwick Road. This area is a light industrial business district with several large office buildings, and many small condominium office buildings. It is bordered on one side by a Metro rail station.

ANALYSIS:

On May 2, 1991 an employee of Digital Corporation called and complained about the drag racing that was occurring and the large crowds that were gathering in front of and around his company. The employee explained that some of his employees and employees from other businesses work late and are having a problem leaving due to the cars and large crowds of spectators. This area is ideal for drag racing as it is a long straight stretch, with relatively no traffic at the end of the business day. The drag racing occurs at night usually beginning between 9-10 p.m. and draws crowds of hundreds from as far away as Virginia. Many of the cars used for racing are not street legal and are actually towed in on trailers. These crowds effectively block the road way and fill the parking lots of the businesses.

On May 3, 1991 the members of Squad 13, other Squads working the sector and Metro Police were contacted. These officers were asked first if they had observed this activity and secondly how they had attempted to deal with it. Most officers contacted had noticed the problem and had tried to deal with it in a traditional fashion, however the racers could not be caught and the spectators fled upon seeing uniformed officers.

RESPONSE:

On May 3, 1991 the members of Squad 13 met with me and we discussed the problem and possible solutions. We obtained a map of the area and identified possible escape routes, we then discussed how many officers it would take to seal the area, issue citations and make arrests. Officers were given assignments and an open radio channel was obtained for the operation. Metro Police was contacted and two of their officers were assigned to assist us. This was done because many times the activity spills over into the Metro parking lots. This would still leave available manpower for routine patrol functions.

On May 4, 1991 we gathered at a previously designated staging area. At this time all officers were briefed, and officers then responded to their assigned locations. The officers blocked off all escape routes and all persons and vehicles were stopped. Each person was checked for open warrants and each vehicle was checked for violations. All drivers and spectators were advised that they were trespassing and that they were not welcome in the area, they were further told that if found in the area again they would be dealt with in a more stringent manner. This was continued all evening until all vehicles and spectators had dispersed.

At this time we went back to the station and critiqued our activities. We found one escape route that had not been accounted for and we realized that we could not catch many of the racing vehicles (out of about 20 racers we were only able to stop two). We

decided to modify our response to include the following; we would block off the new escape route, and with the large numbers of persons walking around it would be relatively easy to plant plainclothes officers in the crowd to identify the drivers of racing vehicles.

On May 5, 1991 we went back to the area and implemented the new plan. Plainclothes officers found it easy to observe the drivers of the racing vehicles for some time. The plainclothes officer would then relay this information to us via radio. After observing the activity for some time we again moved into the area with uniformed officers. We were able to block all escape routes. We stopped all persons and vehicles again, however the vehicles and persons that were identified as racing were pulled into a separate line.

Every person was checked for open warrants and every vehicle was checked to make sure it was legally registered. The first racer in line was asked to produce his license and registration. As the glove box was opened a loaded automatic weapon was observed by officers. This person was arrested and this seemed to have a definite impact on the other persons in line waiting to be processed. All persons stopped and all vehicles stopped were compiled onto a list, this list was used as we went back to the area several times. Each time a person was stopped or a driver was cited for racing we let it be known that plainclothes officers had been planted in the crowd to identify them. We felt that if the drivers were aware of the fact that there would be a good chance of being cited or arrested in this area they would stop racing here, and would stop the large crowds of spectators from gathering. We continued this operation for several more weeks. By the third week we found that there was no racing activity in the area.

ASSESSMENT:

The first night the officers went to this location there were approximately 85 cars and 250-300 spectators. The second night there were 50 cars and 150-200 spectators, although none were repeat offenders. The second night there were 5 drivers that were cited for racing and one flagman.

On May 17, the third night we went to the location , there were only 12 cars and 30 spectators. Four of the drivers were cited for drag racing. The fourth night we went to the area we found absolutely no cars or spectators at all. This operation has been a success, by word of mouth we have let it be known that this type of activity is not welcome and will not be overlooked. The complaints from the citizens and businesses in the area have ceased. We realize that this problem did not escalate to such proportions overnight. We also have to accept the fact that it will take some time for the word to spread that vigorous enforcement is taking place here.

FUTURE STRATEGIES:

This problem will have to be closely monitored. We have contacted the Department of Public works and have requested that a low level speed bump be installed to prevent further racing as well as a sign discouraging further racing. This would not stop the legal flow of traffic at 35 mph but when a racing car hits it at 100 mph it will be a different story altogether. We will continue our enforcement efforts on a periodic basis.

Appendix C



VISION STATEMENT

The Prince George's County Police Department will foster a relationship with its community that is rooted in mutual trust, respect and pride. We will strive to value the dignity and rights of all our employees and citizens in creating an environment where responsibility and service reflect justice and equity. We pledge to provide determination, inspiration and compassion to fulfill the mission of this department.

CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS

To facilitate and manage the exchange of information within the Department and communication with the community.

To acquire, maintain and allocate material and personnel resources that are responsive to community needs and operational requirements.

To devise prevention and enforcement strategies and programs that reduce crime thereby decreasing community fear and increasing confidence in the police department.

To ensure that employee selection, training and development is consistent with community expectations, departmental needs, and contemporary law enforcement practices.

PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

AN ACCREDITED AGENCY

MISSION STATEMENT

To work in partnership with the citizens of Prince George's County toward providing a safe environment and enhancing the quality of life consistent with the values of our community.

To accomplish our mission we will adhere to values of Professionalism, Integrity, Responsiveness, Sensitivity, Respect and Openness.

VALUE STATEMENTS

PROFESSIONALISM	•	*We are committed to providing professional law enforcement services by highly trained personnel accountable to our community.*
INTEGRITY	•	*We are committed to demonstrating and maintaining the highest ethical standards both personally and organizationally.*
RESPONSIVENESS	•	*We are committed to providing competent and effective delivery of service in response to community concerns.*
SENSITIVITY	•	*We are committed to providing services in a manner sensitive to our diverse and multicultural communities.*
RESPECT	•	*We are committed to providing courteous police service with respect for the rights and dignity of all the people we serve.*
OPENNESS	•	*We are committed to a shared and open relationship of involvement with all segments of our community.*

PGPD SERVING TODAY FOR A BETTER TOMORROW