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Responding to Violence in Cornet City:

The Problem-Solving Enterprise

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Responding to Violence in Cornet City:

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Chapter I. Executive Summary

The rise in urban violence since the mid-1980s has had at least two effects. First, it threatens the lives of urban residents, especially youth, and the social and economic fabric of the communities in which they live. Second, it has aggravated public doubts about the ability of government to maintain the quality of urban life. These doubts have called into question traditional responses to violence such as imprisoning its perpetrators, reducing poverty and other suspected "root causes" of violence, and rehabilitating criminal offenders.

Recently, an alternative perspective has begun gaining adherents: the notion that some violence can be averted by crafting simple, low-cost, common-sense solutions to specific local problems that give rise to repeated violent events. Advocates of violence problem-solving argue that surprisingly simple tactics can sometimes reduce violence more cost-effectively than incarceration, encounter less political opposition and work more immediately than efforts to fix "root causes," and offer greater prospects for success than interventions to rehabilitate violent offenders.

Elements of the problem-solving perspective can be seen in two movements that are gaining public prominence. The first is the adoption (or revival) of policing styles that are variously called "community policing," "problem-oriented policing," or fixing "hot spots" of violence. The second is termed "treating violence as a public health problem."

Both movements are still evolving, and so generalizations about their specific strategies and objectives should be treated cautiously. Nevertheless, previous comparisons have highlighted points of agreement and ways in which the approaches of problem-oriented policing and public health complement each other (See, e.g., Moore, et al., 1994). However, comparisons also suggest possible tensions between these two professions. Controversies emerge often enough and strongly enough that one commentator recently labeled them "internecine warfare" (Powell, 1994).

Violence prevention through problem solving seems likely to become an increasingly important component of the nation's response to urban violence -- out of dissatisfaction with traditional approaches, if for no other reason. Therefore, it seems useful to develop a more precise understanding of how violence problem-solving draws from both modern policing and public health perspectives. To do so, case study, "Violence in Cornet City," was developed, which describes the experience of a fictional city in which an especially bloody weekend has stimulated the mayor to create a task force to develop a response to the problem. By basing the case study on actual events, town meetings, and readily available public agency data in a real city and one of its neighborhoods, an attempt was made to develop realistic descriptions not only of urban violence, but also of public reaction and the information base available on short notice for planning a response to a siege of violence.

Second, we presented the case problem to three distinguished practitioners representing the perspectives of community policing, public health, and professional police work aided by modern technology. Finally, we asked the three practitioners to prepare written solutions to the case problem, then to convene for a full day's discussion of the problem and strategies for response.

Although the three practitioners had clearly struggled conscientiously with the problem presented by the case, it proved difficult for them to propose either specific programs or a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the violence. Instead, they focused on "re-engineering" Cornet City's response to violence -- developing a long-term process for analyzing and responding to different components of the

violence problem, using a mix of public and private agencies, together with human and technical resources. The group concurred that in Cornet City (and, by implication, in real cities across the United States), such a task force would be at best a temporary diversion unless it served as a catalyst for such re-engineering of the basic approach to violence reduction. Although the small number of seminar participants necessarily made the conclusions rather tentative, it also permitted fairly deep probing into details of the re-engineered process they were recommending and the thinking that underlay their recommendations.

To emphasize that this process is a long-term one, intended to develop specific responses to particular pieces of the violence problem, it could be called a "violence problem-solving enterprise." Although one day's discussion could only scratch the surface of defining such an enterprise, it seemed to be distinguished from other violence reduction strategies in the following ways:

(1) The enterprise differs from "get tough" policies in its emphasis on preventing violence before it occurs, yet it recognizes the role of individual responsibility for violent acts.

(2) It differs from "fixing the root causes of crime" by searching for smaller scale and more immediate repairs of local problems that underlie and connect clusters of violent events -- interventions whose cumulative effects are intended to produce both real and perceived reductions in local violence levels.

(3) It differs from "reclaiming or rehabilitating offenders" by focusing on situations and victims as well as offenders and by reflecting the difficulty of changing human behavior.

(4) For identifying violence problems and promising solutions, it borrows techniques of exploratory analysis from epidemiology and problem-oriented policing, but it uses quantitative and qualitative information from a broader range of public agencies and from the community itself.

(5) The enterprise concept borrows much from the public health perspective on violence, especially by involving the public in defining the problem and developing solutions, but it recognizes the validity of public demands for just punishment of persons who deliberately do physical harm to others.

(6) The enterprise differs from short-term antiviolence task forces comprised of senior officials by being more sustained, by opening up participation to agency staff at lower levels and to community residents, by focusing on more detailed operational issues, and by demanding more sophisticated analysis of information.

Like community and problem-oriented policing, the violence problem-solving enterprise would draw the community into the priority-setting process. There are some important differences, however. By engaging the community directly with the public agencies that serve it instead of relying on the community police officer as a representative, the enterprise is intended to focus the residents' and agencies' combined energies, united by a sense of common crisis, to deal with particular violence-promoting problems. By demanding responses that require more police officers' time in the community, the enterprises are likely to build pressure to streamline time-consuming administrative processes. The enterprises may also confer more power and responsibility on communities than do many community-policing initiatives. The enterprises also place new demands on police information and statistical systems.

In some respects, violence problem-solving enterprises would be an operational response to the call of the National Research Council's Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior for sustained problem-solving initiatives. Yet the enterprise being described here differs in at least two important respects. First, recognizing the time needed to establish causal relationships with scientific certainty and to deduce promising interventions from those relationships, the enterprises would place greater emphasis on learning from inductive trial-and-error processes involving small-scale, low-cost innovations. Second, recognizing that randomized experiments are costly and difficult to design and implement for some interventions in communities, the enterprise concept places somewhat less emphasis on rigorous evaluation, and more on accumulating experience from sizable numbers of small-scale innovations, than did the panel's call. These differences heighten the obvious trade-off of the possible benefits of "doing something new" about violence (i.e., that the intervention may be effective and that simply "doing something" may reduce violence-promoting conditions by increasing community cohesion) against the increased risk of wasting resources on ineffective interventions. A resolution of that trade-off lies far beyond the scope of this report.

The concept of violence problem-solving enterprises remains incomplete, beyond its emphases on community participation, innovative inductive uses of information, and small-scale exploratory innovations. Nevertheless, the concept may deserve further development and policy consideration for at least four reasons:

1) The "general problem" of violence is actually made up of a great many different problems that require different solutions, a conclusion of the National Research Council's panel report.

2) Because criminological theory and criminal justice managers' experience suggest so many plausible interventions but so little is known about how they work, the most efficient search strategy may involve testing many of them on a small scale.

3) To establish the legitimacy of local violence control efforts and to make resources available it seems important to include as many public and private sectors of the community as possible in planning those efforts.

4) Neighborhood organizations and projects lend antiviolence initiatives useful energy, information, and labor that are not otherwise available to government.

The days' discussion produced a number of insights about planning responses to violence. Their importance in planning a response to a fictional violence problem by no means guarantees their importance, or even existence, in real planning efforts. Nevertheless, awareness of them may be useful to leaders of those efforts. Of those insights, the following six seemed to be the most fundamental themes:

1) Plans for responding to violence should address both the perception and the reality of a local violence problem.

2) Planners may find general, "off-the-shelf" responses inadequate for specific local violence problems.

3) Initial short-term governmental responses to "out-of-control" violence may actually do harm unless they are converted into long-term enterprises with operational focus.

4) Violence problem-solving may expand information needs beyond agencies' existing reporting systems.

5) Community residents can play many useful roles in violence problem-solving.

6) Value differences may divert or impede violence problem-solving, but those difficulties may be avoidable by explicitly recognizing, acknowledging, and airing them.

The report is organized as follows. As background, Chapter II recounts the evolution of recent thinking about strategies for reducing violence and explains how the exercise reported here was developed, as a means of comparing and contrasting those approaches. Chapter III explains more fully the six themes that emerged in the day's discussion of Cornet City's violence problem. Appendix A contains the case study, "Violence in Cornet City." Appendix B contains a more extensive analysis of the day's discussion. Appendix C contains the memoranda prepared in advance by the three discussants asked to develop a response to Cornet City's violence problem.

Chapter II: Violence--A Crime Problem And A Health Problem

Since the mid-1980s, rates of violent crime reported to police in the nation's cities have increased significantly (Reiss and Roth, eds., 1993: 81). Most seriously, annual murder counts in recent years have hovered around 25,000, an unprecedented number. In addition, each year about 2 million Americans, fully 1% of the national population, suffer nonfatal but serious violent attacks, according to the National Crime Victimization Survey (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992).

Violence has a significant adverse effect on the nation's health, particularly among minorities. Homicide is the twelfth leading cause of death in the United States, and because its victims die at younger ages, on average, than do the victims of disease, homicide is the fourth leading source of years of potential life lost. For babies born in the United States in 1989, the lifetime probability of becoming a homicide victim ranged from 1:496 for a white female baby to 1:27 for a black male baby (Rosenberg and Fenley, eds., 1991). Violent injuries impose costs on victims for medical treatment, medical and psychological rehabilitation, and lost productivity; these costs, plus the criminal justice response, have been estimated at $60 billion (Rosenberg and Fenley, eds., 1991: 5). In Detroit, an estimated 40 percent of all traumatic spinal cord injury results from gunshot wounds, and hospital emergency departments in cities across the country report strained resources in the aftermath of violent attacks (Centers for Disease Control, 1987). Nor are the consequences of violence limited to the suffering of individual victims. The fear spawned by the attacks has sped the middle class flight from America's cities, leaving increasingly impoverished urban neighborhoods to fend for themselves. Tragically, in the resulting vacuum, national mortality statistics indicate that violence has become the leading cause of death among young black men (Fingerhut, 1993).

A. Violence and Criminal Justice

Society has traditionally looked to the criminal justice system to enforce criminal laws by apprehending and punishing the perpetrators of violence. To a degree, this law enforcement perspective reflects moral indignation. To the extent that violence seems deliberate or premeditated, victims and other citizens demand that offenders be called to account. Nothing less seems consistent with the demands of justice. And justice is at least part of what the criminal justice system is supposed to deliver.

Society has consigned violent offenders to the criminal justice system also because it expects criminal justice responses to produce a practical effect. At least in theory, the mechanisms of general and specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, triggered by arrests, prosecutions, and sentencing, could reduce crime in general, and violent crime in particular. Both to satisfy the demand for justice and to produce the practical effect of reducing future violence, then, society has looked primarily to the criminal justice system to deal with the perpetrators of violence.

Unfortunately, recent experience raises doubts about the ability of the criminal justice system, by itself, to achieve the intended practical effect. While criminal sentencing for violent crimes grew substantially harsher between 1975 and 1989, the number of serious violent crimes failed to decrease (Cohen and Canela-Cacho, 1994). This happened apparently because the violent crimes prevented by longer and more common prison sentences were offset by increases in the violent crimes committed by persons, including new offenders, in the community. Therefore, if harsher sentencing deterred a large number of potential crimes, then other processes must have increased the number of active violent offenders, encouraged violent offenders in society to become more active, or both. Given the high cost of incarceration, this raises the need for additional, more cost-effective approaches to reducing violence.

B. Violence and "Root Causes"

The seeming inability of criminal justice responses to cope with violence points to a different idea about the causes of violence and how the society might best deal with them. In this alternative view, the causes of crime lie not in the evil intentions of offenders, but in the social conditions that spawn angry, despairing and alienated citizens. The right response, then, is not to arrest, prosecute, and jail individual offenders, but to fix the "root causes" of crime -- to reduce unemployment, lessen racial discrimination, improve the quality of education, and help poor families raise their children to responsible citizenship. The implication is that the best policies for controlling crime and violence do not lie within the narrow grasp of the criminal justice system, but in the wider embrace of overall social policies.

One appeal of this approach is that it seems to promise an opportunity to prevent violence from occurring, rather than merely responding in the wake of violent crimes. Therefore, whether or not one believes that correcting these social ills is an ethically appropriate role for government, efficiency considerations seem to favor a *preventive* approach that averts violent events in advance over a *reactive* approach that is mobilized only after violence occurs. Thus, the goal of preventing crime has animated a long search for effective means of eliminating "root causes of crime" even when it has seemed impossible to do so.

Hopes for the success of this approach in dealing with violent crime have been battered somewhat by the nation's experience with the Great Society programs of the sixties. Yet, the ideal of attacking "root causes" retains enormous appeal in some sectors (See, for example, Eisenhower Foundation, 1993).

C. Reclaiming Criminal Offenders

A third longstanding preventive idea has focused on those who commit violent acts. The hope has been that such people could be remade or reclaimed for the society. It has always seemed an enormous waste (as well as a potential injustice) to do nothing more than condemn and abandon those who committed crimes. After all, without some kind of effective intervention, criminal offenders remained a continuing liability to the society. In prison, they remained expensive wards of the state. After completing their sentences, they harassed society with continued crimes. Given this reality, the alternative of *intervening* in their lives -- by teaching them to think differently about their role in society, increasing their marketable skills, treating their drug or alcohol addiction, for example -- to make them less of a burden to the society over the long run always seemed eminently sensible, as well as humane.

For two reasons, this idea seemed particularly compelling for young offenders. Because young people were relatively easily influenced, there was less reason to hold them morally accountable for the offenses they committed. At the same time, there was more reason to hope that small investments made now would be repaid later in lessened prospects of future offending.

This goal of rehabilitation has animated and sustained many important innovations within the criminal justice system over the years. It has sustained efforts to use prisons for the rehabilitation of criminal offenders. And it has provided some of the justification for developing a complex juvenile justice system whose special procedures and dispositions were designed (at least in part) to steer youth away from lives of crime.

Yet experience has not been particularly kind to these ideas, either. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of prison rehabilitation programs has been discouraging (Sechrest, et al., eds., 1979). And as doubts have grown about both the justice and practical effectiveness of juvenile justice systems, increasing

numbers of states are statutorily lowering the age at which youth accused of violent acts *can* be or *must* be tried and sentenced as adults.

D. New Ideas About Violence Prevention

A more recent development is the notion that violence might be prevented by interventions with less formidable goals than "eliminating root causes of violence" or "reclaiming criminal offenders" (though neither of these would be ruled out if they held some promise of success). In these newer conceptions, the opportunities for prevention lie in crafting solutions to particular problems that seem to occasion local incidents of violence; for example, negotiating a pact between feuding gangs, or reducing weapons carrying in bars where violent fights tend to break out. Or, they focus on reducing "risk factors" for violence that exist generally in the society; for example, high levels of alcohol and drug abuse, or lack of knowledge about how to resolve disputes peaceably.

These new ideas emerge from two professions -- policing and public health -- that, for somewhat different reasons, feel both responsibility for dealing with violence and frustration with traditional approaches to the problem.

1. Community and Problem-Solving Policing

Over the last decade, police executives and their agencies have begun experimenting with new strategies of policing variously called "community policing" or "problem-solving policing". While details of these concepts are still being defined, some simple ideas form their core. Significantly, these ideas place a great deal of emphasis on preventing rather than controlling violence. These ideas include the following:

1) Behind the "incidents" reported to police lie "problems" waiting to be solved. Therefore, the best police response to the incidents lies in understanding and repairing the underlying problem rather than mechanistically responding to the incidents as if they were unrelated. If small existing problems can be solved, future crimes and instances of violence might be prevented.

2) Arrest is only one of the tools available to the police in responding to incidents or problems. They can also take advantage of their office to offer informal mediation, to enforce municipal codes against the owners of violence "hot spots," or to mobilize other agencies of city government to fix local conditions that give rise to violent events.

3) The local community is a potentially valuable partner -- if not the first line of defense -- in responding to violence and disorder. Relationships among friends and neighbors can bind people to one another, teach youngsters non-criminal pathways to success, and help to limit opportunities for victimization. In important ways, the police "backstop" the community in discouraging violence.

4) In the interests of establishing effective working partnerships with local communities, the police should take their cues about what problems are important to solve from the community itself. They should learn about the problems through face to face contacts with individual citizens, and through community meetings as well as through calls to 911.

2. Public Health Approaches to Violence

An alternative approach to violence prevention comes from the field of public health. Public health practitioners' interest in violence has been engaged for two reasons.

First, the public health community noticed that *injury* (rather than *disease*) was a major threat to the nation's overall health status. Indeed, because victims of injury tend be younger than victims of disease, injury is especially important in accounting for total years of life lost to health threats in the country. Moreover, the public health community had learned that it could have an impact on *unintentional* injuries through preventive efforts such as laws mandating seat belts in automobiles, safety requirements on consumer products, and public information campaigns to educate the public about safer use of dangerous commodities. As success in preventing unintentional injuries increased the salience of violent *intentional* injuries as a threat to the nation's health, it seemed likely that they, too, might yield to preventive public health strategies.

Second, when epidemiologists looked closely at their statistics, they noticed that an important part of the intentional injury problem did not seem to be handled very well by the criminal justice system: violence that involved people in family and other intimate relationships, which was often not reported to the police. This included domestic assault, child abuse, and an emerging problem of elder abuse. Finally, it seemed to them that their commitment to epidemiological methods and models for identifying problems and searching for promising avenues of interventions, and their commitment to preventing problems rather than reacting to them, would be an important complement to existing criminal justice approaches to the problem.

Even more than community policing, the public health approach to controlling violence is still evolving. Even leaders in the public health community find it difficult to define. Yet, the writings of public health practitioners focused on reducing violence (Rosenberg and Fenley, eds., 1991) frequently reflect the following basic themes:

1) Violence is a threat to a community's health as well as to its social order.

2) Public health and medical personnel are often in good positions to see violence that goes unreported to criminal justice agencies.

3) Preventing violence and reducing its damaging effects requires attention to victims and witnesses of violence -- not just to violent offenders.

4) The general problem of violence is composed of many particular types of events, each with its own causes and opportunities for prevention. Epidemiological methods can be useful both in measuring overall levels and patterns of violence and in identifying factors that are correlated with the risk of rare types of violence.

5) In seeking to reduce the consequences of violence emphasis should be placed on preventing violent events rather than making the events less harmful. In the vocabulary of public health, primary prevention -- measures that prevent violent events from happening in the first place, and do so across a large portion of the population -- should be the primary focus. Secondary prevention -- measures that merely reduce the consequences of violence -- should receive less emphasis. And tertiary prevention -- measures that repair the damage associated with violence that has already occurred -- should only be the last resort.

6) Many opportunities to prevent violence do not depend on controlling or redeeming its perpetrators. Just as traffic deaths can be reduced by making cars and roads safer as well as by arresting careless or drunk drivers, violence may be preventable by making vulnerable convenience stores harder to rob, by teaching nonviolent ways to solve disputes, or by "de-glamorizing" violence in the media.

7) In seeking to prevent violence, it will often be important to involve the community that is afflicted by the violence. Community residents can make government actions more acceptable, provide information about where the problems are and what the points of intervention might be, place political pressure behind legislation needed to achieve preventive measures, and bring informal pressures on one another to take actions that reduce the violence.

E. Finding Overlaps, Contrasts and Complementarities in the New Preventive Approaches

These new approaches to preventing violence have much in common. They are quite different from reactive criminal justice traditions and bear closer resemblance to the compliance-based systems of administrative law. They both give greater emphasis to preventing violent events than to punishing the perpetrators of violent acts. They tend to emphasize community involvement in identifying violence problems, setting priorities among them, and devising solutions. Both approaches suggest the possibility that carving up the general violence problem into component parts may reveal solutions that would otherwise remain concealed; just as skin cancer and lung cancer call for different preventive strategies, so might drive-by shootings, convenience store robberies, and spouse assaults.

Yet, it is also clear that there are some points of tension between criminal justice and public health approaches. For example, the criminal justice models, both traditional and new, retain a commitment to punishing perpetrators of violence -- as both a matter of justice, and a means of socializing children and youth to condemn violence instead of inflicting it on others. Although public health practitioners recognize the distinction between *unintentional* and *intentional* injuries in their taxonomic approach to health problems, their writings rarely the moral culpability associated with *intentionally* injuring someone. Public health practitioners tend to view victims of violence as persons in potential need of psychological and other services, while criminal justice practitioners are less likely to look beyond victims' roles as witnesses. While both approaches view communities as important players in violence prevention, community policing practitioners tend to view officers as problem-solvers on behalf of a community, while at least some public health professionals stress empowering communities to solve their own problems, with or without police help.

F. The Purpose and Method of this Monograph

These rather abstract similarities and contrasts leave open the concrete question of what would happen if public health and law enforcement practitioners were brought together to plan a response to violence in a particular locality. To the extent that future national responses to violence emphasize local planning of responses that treat violence as both a health and a crime problem, it seems useful to investigate issues that are likely to arise during planning by partnerships that blend traditional policing, community policing, and public health perspectives.

To preview the planning of a response to urban violence, a case study exercise was conducted. First, a simulated urban violence problem was constructed, for which diverse groups could be challenged to make a diagnosis and recommend a mayoral response to violence that was seen as "out of control" in a hypothetical city.

The case study, "Violence in Cornet City," has already been published by the National Institute of Justice as a teaching tool (CITE NEEDED). The case premise is that in the wake of community outcry following a week-end of six unrelated murders, Cornet City's mayor has hastily created a Mayoral Task Force to plan a response. Based largely on the actual experiences of a city of about 1 million in population, and of one of its neighborhoods in particular, the case study describes the community violence problem in both anecdotal and statistical terms. In this way, an effort was made to achieve realism with respect to the nature of the underlying problem, public perceptions of the problem, perspectives of local officials speaking at a town meeting on violence, and previous responses by the city government and residents of a particular neighborhood to local violence.

By taking only about ten days to gather data from local agencies and prepare displays for the case study, an attempt was made to simulate realistically the quantitative information that would typically be available to a mayoral task force convened on short notice. Fictional liberties were taken primarily to raise the salience of violence among acquaintances, to illustrate the potential breadth of a mayoral antiviolence task force, to portray the public health perspective on violence as novel to Cornet City officials, and to discuss findings of the National Research Council's Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior about the roles of gangs in urban violence and the distribution of victim-offender r `ationships in murders.

Second, the case was presented to three distinguished practitioners chosen to represent different approaches to controlling and preventing violence.

1) James K. "Chips" Stewart, former Chief of Detectives for the City of Oakland, and now a criminal justice consultant for Booz, Allen, and Hamilton was selected to represent the potential that professional police work, aided by modern technology, held for the effective control of violence.

2) Sylvester Daughtry, currently Chief of Police in Greensboro, North Carolina and President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, was selected to represent the potential that "community policing" and "problem-solving policing" held for reducing violence.

3) Beverly Coleman-Miller, a physician, formerly the Special Assistant for Medical Affairs to the Washington, D.C., Commissioner of Public Health, responsible for liaison to the Medical Examiner and the Emergency Ambulance Bureau, was chosen to represent the public health perspective on diagnosing and preventing violence.

Third, each of these individuals was asked to prepare a short memorandum giving their diagnosis of the problem of violence in Cornet City, and offering some initial ideas about solutions. These memos were prepared in isolation from one another, but were made available to the participants before the meeting to discuss the problem.

Fourth, the individuals were convened for a day long meeting facilitated by co-author Mark H. Moore. The agenda for that meeting included: 1) defining the problem; 2) evaluating the Mayor's response to the problem so far; and 3) recommending particular solutions -- substantive and organizational -- for solving the problem of violence. The meeting was videotaped and transcribed.

Fifth, the record of that meeting was analyzed to see if there were distinct approaches taken by the different practitioners to the subject, where tensions arose, how those tensions were resolved in conversation, and what useful new ideas were contributed.

G. Preview of the Findings

The problem-solving exercise did not turn out precisely as expected. Given the three participants' distinct backgrounds and depth of experience, one might have expected them to offer comprehensive yet specific strategies to which they were strongly wedded and which differed substantially from one another. One might also have expected that the solutions they offered would naturally rely on the specific strengths of the respective organizations in which they had gained their experience: a technologically supported professional law enforcement organization, a community oriented police department, and the public health/medical profession. Given the distinct traditions of law enforcement and public health, they might well have held quite different views about whether the community was an asset in dealing with the problem or a part of the problem that needed to be managed. The distinct professional traditions might also have led to important value-laden conflicts among the representatives of the different views.

None of these expectations was fulfilled. The group was reluctant to recommend specific approaches based on the limited information available to them (and, perhaps, to typical antiviolence task forces assembled on short notice). No participant suggested relying on any single organization for a solution; rather, all of them repeatedly emphasized the need for interagency cooperation in developing solutions. All participants agreed that the community was an important asset in dealing with Cornet City's violence problem, although some differences did emerge over how best to utilize community resources to combat the problem. And while value-laden disagreements occasionally surfaced, they posed no serious impediment to discussions once they were explicitly aired, and they evaporated rather quickly when the moderator turned the conversation back to operational questions.

Most importantly from the standpoint of antiviolence policy, the participants were skeptical of the notion that a mayoral task force could, no matter how well informed, select "off-the-shelf" solutions to Cornet City's violence problem. Rather, they thought the best course of action for the task force would be to reduce the search for "off-the-shelf" solutions and, instead, to initiate a forum for developing new ad hoc solutions. The approach that emerged pursues the goal of preventing a specific component of the violence problem, uses epidemiological analysis to discover both broad risk factors associated with violence and specific points and ad hoc methods of intervention, and draws on the combined energy of concerned communities and governmental agencies, united by a common crisis, to deal with the urgent problem facing the community.

To emphasize the inductive, cumulative, and ad hoc nature of the approach, the term "violence problem-solving enterprise" is used in this volume. The nature of the enterprise was sketched out in Chapter I. Chapter III develops that sketch somewhat further, by exploring six themes of the discussion that distinguished the enterprise and highlighted demands for innovation that the enterprise seemed likely to raise. A more comprehensive analysis of the discussion appears in Appendix B.

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Chapter III: Violence Problem-Solving Enterprises

This chapter explores seven major themes that emerged from the discussion. These themes helped to flesh out the concept of citywide violence problem-solving enterprises and distinguish them from other approaches to reducing violence. At the same time, several themes foreshadowed needs or dilemmas that such an enterprise would need to confront and resolve. The themes were:

(1) The importance of prevention, as an adjunct to criminal justice responses;

(2) The importance of managing public perceptions of violence in addition to violence itself;

(3) The inadequacy of "wholesale" or "general" solutions for violence;

(4) The potential of sustained forums for devising solutions tailored to particular violence problems;

(5) The expanded information requirements for more effective violence prevention;

(6) The value of engaging the community in violence prevention; and

(7) The importance of personal values in shaping violence prevention strategies.

These elements are discussed more fully in the following pages.

The Importance of Prevention

The discussion did not begin with proposals for responding to Cornet City's violence problem. Rather, the participants devoted their early attention to describing the problem, questioning the adequacy of the mayoral task force as a response to violence deemed "out of control," exploring the events that precipitated that perception, and discussing the significance of the community's reaction to the violence crisis.

However, once the participants began groping toward possible solutions, all three focused almost exclusively on improving Cornet City's violence prevention capacity rather than improving the police and criminal justice response to violence. This came as a surprise in view of the serious gaps in criminal justice response capacity reported in the case study: a busy signal and recorded message on the 911 emergency telephone, 12 of the Southwood police district's 19 patrol cars out of commission, half the district's officers unavailable because of leave or court duty, outmoded technology for paperwork, a police corruption problem, a tripling of prosecution caseloads, a growing incidence of witness intimidation and murder, and a lack of prison capacity and resources for rehabilitative programs. Of all these problems, only the busy 911 line and the police corruption drew much comment, and those discussions focused on implications for public perceptions rather than tactical response.

The discussion of policing focused almost exclusively on the need to improve prevention, even though Cornet City's police department was already engaged in regular community meetings and a host of initiatives that seemed, at least superficially, to reflect prevention-oriented community policing:

Moore: At the surface, at least, Cornet City seems to have made a fairly serious effort at a form of community policing. They've got foot patrols -- a woman patrol officer who is out there in Southwood. They've got a Captain who feels responsible for the area, and shows up at community meetings and reminds people that they have to help law enforcement succeed. So, at some level, this department has moved in the direction of community policing designed to build a close relationship with the community. And yet that has failed to break through the anxiety that the community has about co-operating with the police.

Stewart: My sense is just the opposite. They thought community policing was simply foot patrol, and that's wrong.

Moore: They also seem to have the notion of broad accountability to the community.

Stewart: But the guy who showed up at the community meeting was an administrator, not the guy or woman who is going to come on the call. And the patrol units are vacant a lot of the time. The woman foot patrol officer said that many times they only had three cars on the street when they were supposed to have 16 to 19, and those three cars were being dispatched all over town. So there wasn't a focusing on the beat [or in the neighborhood]. The citizens said they didn't know who their police officers were....She was acknowledging that a close relationship would be good, but she was bemoaning the fact that it didn't occur.

Moore: What's missing?

Stewart: There's a lot of things that are missing. One is a dispatch policy based on differential police response so that you can get some more time to the guy who stays on the beat, and not this idea that we will dispatch whoever we've got to any call that comes in.

Moore: Okay. That would keep the police woman on the block a little bit longer.

Stewart: It would. The other thing is to do something about eliminating the repeat calls for assistance. There's no effort that I can determine any place in here that they're doing any work on that.....

Let me say that the one bright spot was that, as a result of the community meetings, Lydia Davis did say she had formed a relationship with a police officer who maintained her confidentiality. She gave information to the officer about drug activities, wrote down license numbers. As a result they were able to close down three crack houses and lock up some guys. And there was no retribution or intimidation because the police didn't leak their names. That was a very positive step...

If you could set 40% of their time so they could engage in this community problem solving, I think you would see the lack of confidence disappear...

Daughtry: I agree in part with you. I didn't see the philosophy of community policing being practiced by the police in this case study. I saw the decentralization of police services by districts. I saw the foot patrol, but in the comments from the officer, she was frustrated because people stood on the corner. I mean, that was one of her big things. She couldn't do anything about

people who stood on the corners. I'm not sure you want to do something about people who stand on the corner unless you see some kind of criminal conduct...

I don't know that there's been any structured training in their philosophy of what they want to accomplish in terms of mobilizing the community, and in terms of addressing what they perceive as police problems through methods other than just arrest. It seems like the system is stretched beyond its means already, and it does no good to arrest somebody for a misdemeanor standing on this corner when the courts can't accept that case. All it does is take you away from that 911 call that you are waiting on. So you should think of other means of trying to deal with the problem.

Moore: What are the other means?

Daughtry: Well, there are other things the community can do. For instance, I can remember one case in my city where there was this service station right in a residential community, and the reason that everybody congregated at the service station was because it had a pay phone. One thing we did was to ask the phone company not to allow incoming calls to that phone. Number two, they lowered the phone to about two feet off the ground so that it was very inconvenient to stand there and talk. Those little changes by the officer working in that area disturbed the activity on that yard.

Moore: So, we've got a picture now. This department has moved partly in the direction of community policing, but it's not gone far enough. It hasn't protected the foot patrol or community based officer quite enough in the dispatching system to ensure that the officer won't have to go driving all over the city to get to the calls. The officer hasn't been adequately instructed in how to ask people on the street what they're doing. If it turns out that what she sees is a drug market, she hasn't been taught all the nifty techniques that officers have discovered to make an area a little less attractive and useful as a drug dealing area. (Transcript, pp. 187-192)

The Importance of Public Perceptions of Violence

Despite their different backgrounds, the three participants had remarkably similar "first takes" on the problem of violence in Cornet City. Interestingly, what they agreed upon was that the problem to be managed was not just the violence, it was also importantly a *perception* -- a palpable sense of crisis that was overwhelming the broader community of Cornet City, and the local community of Southwood where most of the violence seemed to be occurring.

Stewart: The problem is the *perception* that.. a wave of violence is overwhelming the community without anything that can be done...An important overlay.. [is]..this sense that we are alone and [have] this feeling of insecurity. (p.5)

It's almost like an epidemic of the flu or some kind of new disease has struck, and people say, "Gee, there's no cure for this, and we have to endure it." (p.7)

Daughtry: [The problem is] that there's a lack of inclusiveness...A segment of the community..feel[s] disenfranchised; they don't have much hope,...and seem to be taking the path

of illicit drug sale and use...[That] in itself is a problem because..the attendant problems..[include]..violence in the form that you see it in Cornet City. (pp.5-6)

Coleman-Miller: I see a feeling of being out of control...The drugs and the violence are now out of control and the community has become paralyzed. (p.6).

The sense of crisis seemed to be important to the participants' definition of the problem for at least three reasons. First, the general demoralization of the community was viewed as one of the worst *consequences* of the violence that was taking place. The fear, the loss of community identity and pride, and the potentially widening gulf between Southwood and the rest of the city, that flowed from the growing violence were now serious enough to be problems in their own right. Therefore, community and governmental responses had to be designed to deal with these problems along with the underlying violence as important *ends* of public policy. Part of the policy problem was to restore a sense of confidence throughout the community.

Second, the community's perceptions of the violence constituted one of the important assets that the government would have to use in its struggle against violence. To the extent that local or city-wide concern mobilized individuals and agencies to take action against the problem, a flow of volunteer resources would be available for the solution of the problem that could usefully complement other resources that were available. To the extent that the community was paralyzed by indifference or despair, some needed resources would be missing from the required response.

Finally, there was some sense that the community's perceptions of the problem might be technically and substantively important in understanding what the real problems of violence were, and how they might be more effectively controlled. Without the benefit of community interpretations of the circumstances and conditions that caused the violence, planning efforts might well go awry. Thus, community perceptions represented an important *means* for addressing the problem as well as an important end.

The Inadequacy of General Solutions to Violence

To stimulate the participants' thoughts about plausibly effective responses to the problem of violence in Cornet City, the case presented some of the important recommendations of two recent "blue ribbon commissions" that had analyzed crime and violence and had issued recommendations about how to solve them: Attorney General William Barr's Task Force on Violent Crime (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992) and the Eisenhower Foundation (1992).

These two reports were chosen because they reflected quite different general approaches to controlling violence. The Barr report reflected what might be thought of as a traditional law enforcement approach: a view that put criminal offenders at the center of the problem, and that emphasized arresting and imprisoning offenders as the most just and effective solution. The Eisenhower Commission report came closer to what might considered a "root causes" approach: a view of the problem that put social conditions that produced criminal offenders and criminal offenses at the center of the problem, and that saw fixing those conditions as both the just and effective solution to violence.

While those two reports call for radically different solutions, they share a belief that some *general* approach is appropriate for dealing with violent crime. Neither authoring group chose to break the

problem into smaller categories and to look separately at each component to find promising lines of attack. Implicitly, each assumed that the whole problem would yield to a single line of attack.

By declining to debate the merits of the Barr and Eisenhower recommendations, our participants implicitly rejected those groups' faith in any general solution to an aggregate "violence problem." Instead, faced with the more immediate and concrete problems facing Cornet City, they began searching for smaller scale solutions to more particular pieces of the larger problem. Their approach seemed to consist of the following elements:

1) Dividing the general problem of violence into smaller component parts that had different levels of urgency and significance for the community, and that seemed to require different kinds of solutions;

2) Finding ways to reach out to local communities to engage their efforts in reducing the violence;

3) Thinking of ways to develop and use additional information to better inform their judgments about operational steps to solve the component problems; and

4) Recognizing and working through some important value conflicts that might arise as members of different communities and professional groups tried to find a way of representing and responding to the problem of violence.

The Value of a Violence Prevention Forum

At one level, the Mayor's response to the deepening crisis -- to establish an interagency Task Force -- seemed well suited as a response to violence in Cornet City. It recognized that a significant problem existed. It recognized that current solutions were not working. It created a context within which inter-agency co-operation could occur. And it created a process of community consultation and mobilization that might stir both volunteer action and bureaucratic inventiveness.

Yet, despite these positive aspects, the participants found much to criticize in the Mayor's initial response. Coleman-Miller was particularly critical:

> **Coleman-Miller:** They have taken very bureaucratic steps that paralyze people...They just kind of overstepped some of the operational problems (like the busy signal on 911 that could perhaps have been fixed very quickly) and moved quickly into a bureaucratic "call-a-meeting" syndrome...The feeling of numbness when you are out of control leads you to something you can read in a book as opposed to taking action that helps get you in control again...If you look closely in the case, you would see there are things that could have been controlled. (pp. 6-8)

She was also concerned that because the mayor's task force included only senior officials, it might overlook simple operational changes that could produce significant reductions in particular components of the entire violence problem. In turn, failure to fix these problems might aggravate the sense that violence was out of control.

Subsequent discussion raised another problem, but also an opportunity, with the task force approach.

> **Moore:** The worrisome thing is what we find every time we look at the world through the eyes of one of these bureaucratic agencies...when I look out at the world from the vantage point of the Education Department, I'm going to find increases in assaults and attacks on teachers and students in the school, I'm going to find increasing truancy rates, I'm going to find all kinds of difficulties there. So it's like every time I add a new agency, I see a new problem or I get a new fix on what looks to me to be a terribly upsetting situation --
>
> **Stewart:** -- that requires more resources. That's what the mayor keeps saying. So if you bring in another agency or another discipline, you say "Uh-oh."
>
> **Moore:** But what I'm saying is that at some levels again, the bureaucratic agencies become important as windows into the problem that we're trying to solve... They are also potentially available as resources to begin solving the problem if we can figure out how to use them programmatically and there are enough resources or if we could somehow or another reprogram resources that they've got in more effective ways (Transcript, 22-23).

As experienced public administrators, all three participants recognized the pitfalls that the mayoral task force would need to avoid. It would fail to produce the necessary tailored, specific solutions if its deliberations remained at a general rather than operational level, or if the agency representatives treated the deliberations merely as an opportunity to advance the interests of their home departments, or if the task force simply "lost momentum" as the crisis atmosphere dissipated in the face of new issues that would inevitably replace violence on the public agenda. Such a failure, in turn, would deepen the despair and sense of powerlessness that, participants felt, already gripped the community.

Stewart expressed the concern concisely and issued a challenge to the public health perspective.

> **Stewart:** This task force is to some extent doomed because they don't have any expertise [or information] that's overlapping except for this Dr. Friese [the public health commissioner who had invited himself onto the task force]...He seems to be saying that we can apply this epidemiological approach to the police problem of violence. But he can't really go beyond that. He just says this is a way to somehow partition it. (pp. 209-210)

What seemed necessary was a departure from "business as usual." To be effective, the violence crisis and the mayoral task force would need to be seized as an opportunity to create a permanent forum that would re-engineer the community's entire approach to violence. The forum would need to focus on specific violence problems. It would need both members authorized to set agency policy and members with detailed operational knowledge of agency procedures. It would need to share information and ideas to a degree that government agencies often find difficult. And it would need to be institutionalized as a permanent entity, working until the community was satisfied that all the important violence problems had been solved.

In responding to Stewart's challenge, Dr. Coleman-Miller illustrated the kind of forum needed, drawing from her experiences leading a Washington, D.C., Public Health Department initiative several

years earlier. The initiative created a Death Review Board, empowered to investigate all deaths of youth aged 15 and younger. Though housed in the Medical Examiner's office, the board members included representatives of police, corrections, welfare, education, and other agencies, as well as citizens from outside the government structure. Initiating the process had encountered political difficulties, and the early death reviews had engendered some defensiveness, even though their purpose was to discover patterns that suggested preventive measures, not to assign blame.

Although Coleman-Miller's examples concerned nonviolent deaths, they illustrated cooperation among the police, emergency medicine, and public health agencies. They also illustrated an intriguing analytical and operational approach that the group felt might be transferrable to solving violence problems.

Coleman-Miller: This is exactly where we began to focus when we saw all the young black men being killed. One of the things we did--and this seemed very small then but it's huge now--is that we changed the death certificate so we could get more information. We thought we needed to understand whether these children were educated or not. So we crossed them with the Board of Education so that when a death certificate was filled in, the level of school years achieved was placed on it. We assumed that the drop-out probably does not have a big job as a CEO anywhere, and so the socioeconomic status could be inferred from the level of education.

We started a task force and we put on it all the people who had information. When we analyzed the first 500 cases [using the enhanced death certificate], we came up with some very interesting facts...

We brought the police department to the table with the medical examiner's office. That is the only meeting I have ever been to as a bureaucrat where every time I went a new policy came out, and it was usually out of the police department or the corrections office. That is extremely important because what they did was to each take a review of the case and say here is where this child fell through the cracks. Here's where a policy needs to be put in place to change this. This is a new day because 15-year-olds didn't used to die, and all of our old policies don't necessarily work.

An example. We looked at approximately three or four cases a month, and after awhile I noticed on the medical examiner's reports that some of these dead children had extremely high drug levels in the belly--up in the whole numbers, no more decimals of cocaine per deciliter of blood. We pulled every one of the reports--it was less than ten--and brought them to the Death Review Board. What we noticed was that they had all died in police custody. Their deaths weren't challenged because the cause of death was drug overdose--they weren't beaten. So we brought the police to the table and figured out that these were kids who ingested drugs to avoid possession charges, and the police would take them to the holding cell. Within that same day a special order was written by the chief that said if you witness or have reason to believe that a person has swallowed drugs to reduce their charge, you cannot take them directly to the police station. You have to call the ambulance, they will transport them [to the hospital], pump their stomachs, then you can do whatever you want.

Using two other examples (See appendix B), Coleman-Miller described how a similar approach had identified the need to place violence prevention education programs for children in welfare offices

as well as in schools, and had led to a new Corrections Department policy to cut the deaths of infants born to mothers in custody.

Coleman-Miller had characterized the approach as "epidemiological," referring to a method common in public health. However, Daughtry and Stewart had little trouble accepting its validity and applicability in police work. They recognized its similarity to problem-oriented policing and likened the analytical approach to that of an experienced murder investigator solving a particular case. And they reiterated their enthusiasm for the proactive nature of preventive problem-solving.

Yet, as Stewart noted later, implementing the approach will require a fundamental re-engineering of the policing process. Acting on the insights from problem-solving requires resources that are now controlled by dispatchers responding to 911 emergency calls, and the group had already acknowledged the importance of upgrading Cornet City's overburdened 911 system. He was optimistic that adoption of the problem-solving approach in the wake of the violence crisis could serve as the catalyst for overhauling outmoded routines. The urgency of spending officers' time solving problems in the community might highlight the time wasted waiting in queues to fingerprint arrested suspects, checking out patrol cars, and entering redundant information into multiple uncoordinated data systems. Overhauling such procedures would, he thought, produce side benefits: cutting response time to true emergencies, and making urgent tactical information available to other officers more quickly after a crime or arrest. However, it would require a far more integrated approach to policing than was customary in most departments.

Beyond police departments, the group pointed out three operational difficulties that a violence problem-solving forum would need to overcome. First, interagency information-sharing protocols would be needed that satisfied legal and ethical requirements. Second, the forum would need to overcome skepticism about devoting attention to specific problems that might deserve high priority because they were easily correctable but might prevent only a few violent deaths per year. Third, the fragmentation of organizational responsibilities would inevitably force the forum to draw more agencies into the process; yet, as noted earlier, broadening participation would complicate priority-setting.

Above all, the group recognized two areas in which violence problem-solving would require fundamental rethinking of conventional approaches: the ways in which information is gathered, stored, analyzed, and used; and the involvement of the general community in the enterprise. They devoted much of the remaining discussion to these topics.

Information Requirements for Effective Violence Prevention

To simulate the types of information that might be available to a Mayoral Antiviolence Task Force convened on short notice, the participants had been given two kinds of information: copies of *Understanding and Preventing Violence*, the report of the National Research Council's synthesis of existing research findings on violence; and 21 tables and figures, hastily compiled from "Cornet City" agencies and included in the case study, that described actual patterns and trends in violence and related causal factors. Although the participants made an unsuccessful attempt to interpret the agency statistics for planning a response to violence, neither source of information contributed much to the discussion. In attempting to explain that, Moore contrasted the problem-solving approach that Coleman-Miller had illustrated with other approaches to gathering and reporting information:

Moore: If I had to characterize this process pejoratively, I might call it "wool gathering." It's hands-on, eclectic. You don't know what you're going to find, but you go out and get it from the files of existing organizations. You don't know what the information means when you get it the first time, but you gradually build it up. Notice how different that feels from the design of a huge computer-based information system [in which every data element needs to be justified and incorporated when the system is designed]. And it's also different from the way that a social scientist would do this: to have a hypothesis [and collect only the data needed to test that hypothesis] (p. 197).

Stewart had already explained that standard police information was also unlikely to support violence problem-solving:

Stewart: [Crime analysis] has its roots...in what they thought was the scientific breakthrough of creating the UCR...Essentially, police were very good at reporting crime and essentially tallying the serial numbers of crimes into categories of offenses, and with that came a set of parameters and protocols that you have to follow [in investigation.] You can solve the individual crime, but it's difficult to solve conspiracies, and police quite frankly are really ill equipped to deal with the unrelated--*apparently* unrelated--homicide.

From their experience in crime investigation, Stewart and Daughtry already understood that experienced investigators often *solve* a violent crime by linking odd bits of information in seemingly unstructured ways. What was needed was greater use of this technique for *preventing* violent crimes, by discovering a hidden relationship that linked a series of crimes and using knowledge of that relationship to interrupt the series.

This approach, Stewart explained, would be a major departure from the standard police approach of treating each crime as an isolated event until confronted with evidence of a link. By lowering the cost of searching for relevant links, newly available information technology could turn that approach on its head by encouraging searches for such links at the outset of an investigation.

The group went on to develop this strategy in some detail, recognizing the different kinds of relationships that might connect a series of unrelated events. First, a series of violent events might be related because the same individual or organization carried them out. From their own experiences, each participant cited examples where an information link had been the key to discovering the common link and interrupting the series: a drug distributor's telephone number that had been called by suspects in two murders in other cities; discovery that a nephew had been visiting from college each time an elderly woman had come to the emergency room for treatment of unexplained bruises; a ballistics match between the shell casings recovered in two murders; and a kidnaper's nickname that a detective remembered from a similar case 12 years earlier. In each case, arrests had prevented further violence.

Second, a cluster of violent events might be a sequence of escalating retaliations between members of rival gangs, or between members of a couple locked in a violent relationship. Discovering such a relationship by linking names or nicknames of associates of offenders and victims could open the way to arrest, mediation, counseling, alcohol abuse treatment, or some other intervention to prevent further violence.

Third, a pattern of violent events at a given address might be related through some underlying characteristic that made that location attractive to different perpetrators. Identifying the "hot spot" by

analyzing logs of calls for assistance and diagnosing the underlying problem formed the essence of Repeat Call Policing (RECAP) (Sherman et al., 1989) and problem-oriented policing. This approach had led to violence prevention by installing lights at certain automated teller machines, "robbery-proofing" certain convenience stores, and setting up preannounced DWI checkpoints outside certain bars at closing time.

Fourth, a pattern of violent events might be related through specific characteristics or routine activities that make certain potential victims more vulnerable to violence than others. Borrowing an epidemiologic technique (case control analysis) used to identify risk factors for disease and unintentional deaths, public health practitioners collect and compare detailed profiles of victims and similar non-victims, searching for the differentiating characteristics. Case control studies have identified behaviors that placed certain young boys at greater risk than others during the Atlanta child murders and that place some adults at greater risk than others of being murdered in their homes. Developing and publicizing these findings allow potential victims to take protective steps to prevent their own victimization.

Fifth, a cluster of violent events may arise out of a broad causal mechanism, which might be identified through traditional criminological research. Understanding of the causal mechanism may suggest an effective line of preventive intervention. For example, recognizing that ongoing disputes were involved in both the murder of a supervisor by a disgruntled former employee and the murder of an estranged husband by his wife during a child custody battle might suggest creating and publicizing a community mediation service as a preventive intervention.

The participants concurred that while sophisticated information handling and analysis had substantial potential for discovering relationships that underlay and linked multiple violent events, it would represent a major departure from standard agency statistical and information systems. However, Stewart's memo to Cornet City's mayor had made it clear that the necessary computer technology already exists:

> The digitizing of police reports opens an entirely new world of performance opportunities. Incidents can be automatically reviewed, assessed, clustered by common elements, and analyzed for solutions based on relationships (people, places, things, locations, times, etc.)...Through integration, multiple data [bases] can be merged, and detailed patterns and relationships automatically searched and identified for appropriate action. This...converts data automatically into information required to intervene in Southwood's violence...Patterns can automatically be searched, particularly in the forensic areas of fingerprints (identification), DNA (rapes), paint chips (hit and run), fibers (rapes, murders), bullets and casings (drive-by shootings), tool marks (burglaries), and other evidence that conclusively links the defendant to the crime scene. Scientifically developed evidence typically results in a guilty plea and provides the officers with less court time and more community time. [Stewart memo, pp. 7-8]

During the conversation, he elaborated on just how such systems might work.

Stewart: You could have, through neural networks and other kinds of technology, decision tools that would greatly increase the efficiency of the officers. They would be looking for relationships, patterns and they would be able to spot those and say "Oops, here's a relationship that you may previously not have [noticed]." Much the way that analysts look over epidemiological reports to try to find out where the correlation is. They could do that automatically.

Coleman-Miller: Is it a computer network?

Stewart: It is essentially an algorithm that looks for correlations in the database that would show a relationship.

Moore: In other words, it takes every data element in the databases and compares it with every other data element, does it automatically and finds things that are related to one another and tells you.

Coleman-Miller: The more you know, the more interaction can go on. So if the guy worked at the waterfront in 1950, you get to see that.

Stewart: Or even more specific than that, you may find out that the telephone number that he used was also used by a drug cartel in a different city. As a detective you wouldn't spot that.

The other participants were impressed with the power of such a system but concerned about the cost of collecting the detailed information they considered necessary. Stewart argued that the costs of entering additional data could be at least partially offset by changing existing procedures to eliminate redundant entry of identifying information and other basic facts. He also explained that other new technology would allow community police officers and others working in the community to enter detailed descriptive information at low cost and without special training. Electronic pens and notebooks allow one to write what they see as they walk in the community, while the computer converts the handwriting into digitized information that can be stored in a data base and made accessible to others. He put the cost of the mobile units at $1200 to $1500, about the cost of a police radio.

The participants concurred that these advances in information technology held great potential for violence prevention. However, they also recognized that realizing this potential in many cities would require new procedures for interagency information-sharing, awareness of possible community objections to a system that might be misconstrued as "Big Brother," and above all, a commitment from senior levels to make violence prevention a priority and to adjust organizational procedures accordingly.

The Importance of Engaging the Community

The participants in this discussion unanimously agreed that community residents should be closely involved in setting priorities among violence problems and in devising solutions to those problems. They recognized that while public agencies have official authority and resources for dealing with violence, community residents have much of the information, energy, and moral authority needed for effective violence prevention. Nevertheless, some differences emerged, and discussion of those eventually crystallized into the statement of a dilemma that would not be easily solved.

From the outset, Coleman-Miller had advocated community participation more vocally than the law enforcement practitioners, as matters of both principle and effectiveness. In contrast, the law enforcement practitioners expressed more caution about overreliance on potentially idiosyncratic community-based social control measures, which might get "out of hand" in some sense. Stewart recalled several examples from Oakland, California: the Hell's Angels taking responsibility for maintaining order in their own fenced-in enclave of several square blocks; bars whose regular patrons chased away outsiders of different ethnicities they considered dangerous; and large numbers of merchants arming themselves with shotguns.

There was also recognition that some elements of some neighborhoods could be an obstacle to successful action. Indeed, finding ways to strengthen the elements of the community that wanted to act effectively against violence was considered both problematic and key to dealing effectively with the issue. Yet within those limits, all agreed that involving the community would offer operational advantages, as well as a sense of community ownership, in devising feasible and plausibly effective responses to violence in Cornet City.

Early on, Coleman-Miller criticized the Mayor's Task Force for not including enough members of local communities, especially youth -- the people who were most involved with the problem. In her view, it was unlikely that any solution created by the Task Force would be effective or have any legitimacy if the people who knew most about the problem, cared most about its consequences, and were best positioned to deal with were excluded from the discussions.

There would also be operational benefits from involving the community. All the participants agreed that the community was an underutilized source of information that could be useful in reducing Cornet City's violence -- in part, because potential witnesses were being intimidated into silence. Yet, by relating an unsuccessful experiment of her own, Coleman-Miller stimulated the group to consider tactics for engaging the community beyond helping the police investigate crimes.

> **Coleman-Miller:** About a year ago we called all of the parents of children who were killed in Washington, D.C., together, and we said to them, 'We as physicians know that if you have shortness of breath, sweating, chest pain, and a couple of other things, you are probably having a heart attack, and we act on that on an emergency basis. We believe that you as people who have lost your children and have seen them usually within minutes before their deaths have a similar list of warning signs that you could give us. Did a beeper go off? Was a call made? Did you get up in the middle of the night? Give us that list so that we can use it as the warning signs to help another parent pull an 800 number up and say that her son has seven of the eight warning signs.

This community in Washington, D.C. was so paralyzed that even bringing them to our office, not in the institution..., they were unable to pull that list together. And I think it had to do with pain.

Moore: What would the police say? Imagine for a minute that we're trying to investigate these crimes again, not to necessarily prosecute but to tell the stories. I've heard that sometimes cold cases turn out to be easier to solve because some of the heat around telling what really happened has gone away because the people who were intimidating have disappeared or --

Stewart: Right, have moved on to other things. That's right, but we don't go back on cold files as a rule because there are so many fresh ones and they keep piling up.

Daughtry: But there's pressure now, and you have to go back. I just had to form a cold crime squad because the difficulty of solving these has increased tremendously over the last five or six years. The organization has to respond. So now you have just a group of detectives who deal with nothing but cold cases, so they have to revisit them.

Moore: With the aim of solving the crimes. You could imagine getting two benefits, though. One is the prospect of solving it finally and clearing it. And the other is even if you didn't get that you would get epidemiological knowledge about the pattern of things that seem to lead to crimes happening.

Stewart: It's also a training ground for new detectives.

Moore: Has anybody ever tried civilian analysts our or a different group of interviewers than detectives? Has anybody ever used a community group to go and gather this information about the cold crimes? [Transcript, pp. 179-182]

Daughtry suggested that fear and anger over violence itself may be opening up some sources of information that had previously been closed, citing the example of teachers who had formerly refused to share information on their students with police, who were now demanding to exchange information about violent youth in their classes.

Coleman-Miller "pushed the envelope" by relating an incident in which the criminal element of a neighborhood had led police to an active suspect.

Coleman-Miller: I learned a very important lesson a couple of years ago about the community. We had an old woman in a housing project shot between her eyes at the sink while she was doing dishes. The neighborhood was outraged and so was the entire city of Washington, D.C. Police came from all over the city and focused just in on that area. After about two hours, they began to get calls from the community saying that the guy who shot her is in Apartment 2A in the living room. Now he's in Apartment 6B in the bathroom. Now he's in the kitchen. And they finally caught him and took him away. I went back to the community a few days later, and I asked them, "Why did you do them? You called up and made them go right to this man who did this drug killing!" (It ended up the lady was holding drugs for this man, and it was the drug dealer who shot her.) I said, "Why did you do that?" They said, "Because there were too many police officers around for us to do our deals. We had to get rid of the officers. So, we had to turn the guy in."

Stewart: They coughed up the suspect.

Coleman-Miller: Yes, in order to get rid of the police in their neighborhood. What an important lesson that was for me as we talk about the power of the community. The perceived power of the community is that they are paralyzed, disenfranchised, frightened and intimidated.

Stewart: Yet, at any given moment they can act to shape things for their purposes.

That discussion posed the problem of whether law-abiding community members could be mobilized to take similarly aggressive steps to prevent violence. There was no shortage of ideas for preventive tactics the community could implement: neighborhood patrols, disrupting street-level drug markets, serving as role models, assuming the supervisory role of "extended family" to children and youth on the street, and running informal programs to raise youths' self-esteem. The group also suggested tactics for dealing with the gangs themselves: threatening to increase harassment from the community and police unless they reduced their levels of violence (or bargaining for less violence in exchange for less harassment), drawing away potential recruits by establishing programs for pre-gang youth, and even creating forums for nonviolent competition between gangs -- Stewart reminded the group of Washington, D.C.'s experience several years earlier with competition among street break dancers.

Unfortunately, beyond visible police patrols to reduce community fear, the discussants were unable to come up with ways to mobilize the community to take steps such as these. And there was even uncertainty over the extent to which fear rather than simple inertia accounted for the community's reluctance to act.

Coleman-Miller: I have to go back to a moment [in the conversation] where a segue had been created that I had never thought about before...the moment where the neighborhood became an organized effort to the point where they could literally bring these children in front of them and say if you do this one more time, we will do this. Now, I'm struck by the position that as we read about them, that these are people with their slippers on and their dogs bringing them the newspaper, and please leave me alone... And I understand that. But as I said earlier, I believe that the treachery of the old people outweighs the energy of youth. We [old people] can be treacherous...And if we were allowed to be treacherous, we would enjoy it. But I'm not positive. The old people still have to face the Uzi. Still, this is beyond an aggressive community; this is a devious and treacherous community.

Moore: I think the important word there is "beyond", for this model of community organization sets the standard for effective community mobilization very high. It's beyond the capacity required just to mount a patrol. It involves a capacity for the community to sustain a relationship with a group of potentially dangerous people in which the community keeps them under control through the relationship, right?

Coleman-Miller: Yes. And that's creating a whole new model that people don't think of when they think of slippers and dogs and retirement.

Moore: Or even community mobilization, or community patrols.

Coleman-Miller: I'm kind of excited by this..because it takes us beyond the models and into the reality. Old people can be treacherous as hell, and maybe we ought to use that.

Moore: The question is whether they can be brave enough.

Coleman-Miller: I don't know. I told you the Uzi is the fulcrum.

Moore: So maybe there's an issue about how to help the community be brave as well as treacherous.

Coleman-Miller: And that would be a success -- when you answer that question. (Transcript, pp.42-54)

Thus, while the participants recognized the importance of engaging the community broadly in violence prevention, they recognized that the question how to accomplish that was still open.

The Role of Values in Planning Responses to Violence

At several points in the discussion, matters of values arose, which threatened briefly to divert the discussion. These diversions arose during discussions of defining the problem to be solved, labeling the youth involved as perpetrators or victims of violence, and the ways in which the community should be drawn into solving violence problems. It was encouraging that although value differences occasionally diverted the discussion, short clarifying discussions seemed to make it easy for the group to return to the operational questions of what Cornet City should do to deal with its violence problem. In the face of these practical issues, the ideological differences turned out to have little power for good or ill.

Southwood's Problem or Cornet City's Problem?

One early discussion made clear that if prejudice and cynicism affected the composition, it might also reduce the chance of success of an antiviolence task force, in part because the violence problem was being experienced in different ways in different parts of the city. Southwood, long the site of much of Cornet City's violence, was suffering the consequences of both new and old forms of violence most directly. The wider city, perhaps frightened by the spillover violence, perhaps embarrassed by the implicit indictment of the community in general made by escalating levels of violence, perhaps genuinely caring about the loss of its young citizens, experienced the violence much less personally.

Stewart: In Southwood, [the violence problem] has gotten worse. It's gotten so much worse there that the more stable, middle class families in Southwood are feeling more at risk. The attention by the police and press give the perception that violence is spreading throughout the community when, in fact, it is still very localized...But because the violence is so intense, and because the police seem ineffective,..it is beginning to frighten the larger community (including the mayor) so they think there must be a larger political response. The violence has not yet stained all of Cornet, it is still pretty localized, but people are frightened it could break out. (p.16)

The different perceptions and experiences of the violence create some political difficulties in organizing an effective city wide response to the problem. Indeed, from Southwood's perspective, the Mayor's recognition that the weekend of violence represents a "wake up call" for the entire city was a mixed blessing.

The good news was that the rest of the city might finally be willing to focus its attention and resources on a problem that had long beset Southwood, but which Southwood had not had the social and economic resources to solve alone. If the attention brought Southwood additional resources from other parts of the city, its residents might feel better equipped for their struggle against violence, and bound more tightly to the wider community.

The bad news was that the new attention might actually strain relationships between Southwood and the wider city. This effect could result from two different mechanisms. One was that the wider city's sudden concern about Southwood could easily feed Southwood's growing cynicism about the rest of Cornet City. They might reasonably observe that it is only when Southwood's problems spill over into the rest of Cornet City that the City rouses itself to take action. The other was that the image of Southwood as a lawless place, peopled by misfits and scoundrels, could be accentuated by focusing on the problem of violence, and seeing that the violence concentrated in Southwood. Ironically, then, the divisions between Southwood and the rest of the city might deepen even as the City as a whole was moving to respond to some of the problems in Southwood.

This basic political problem in managing the community's response to an unevenly distributed problem of violence had been the focus of many of Coleman-Miller's early observations about the problem, and the response that was being made. Early on, she had criticized the Mayor's Task Force for not including enough members of local communities and of the youth -- the people who were most involved with the problem. In her view, it was unlikely that any solution created by the Task Force would be effective or have any legitimacy if the people who knew most about the problem, cared most about its consequences, and were best positioned to deal with were excluded from the discussions.

She was also concerned that the perception of Southwood that was likely to come through in the Task Force's work and actions would be an inaccurate one. She observed that:

> **Coleman-Miller:** There is no balance [in the way that the data about the problem is presented]...When we look at the data, we really lose a sense of how the community really operates and exists...How many of the children are graduating from high school? How many of them are safe as they go out to their summer jobs? As long as that's not brought out, people are reacting to a perception that everything's bad. (pp. 21-22)

> **Coleman-Miller:** The truth is that this is a magnificent and strong segment of the society. Although disenfranchised, they have the strength to survive and to fix what's broken. (p.23)

Unless the wider city's perception of Southwood were changed, then, she saw serious difficulties in the future handling of the violence crisis. Not only would the citizens of Southwood be offended and further alienated, but their potentially important contributions to violence problem-solving would go unutilized. Once it became clear that everyone understood these risks, the discussion returned to operational matters.

Focusing and Defusing Blame

The second conversation about values took a bit longer to unwind. What seemed at first to be discomfort over a word choice turned out to be discomfort over what it implied for responsibility for violence and, in turn, what solutions should be considered for preventing violence.

The discussion grew out of Stewart's discomfort with Coleman-Miller's shorthand description of Cornet City's new violence problem as "Children killing children." That choice of words clearly raised the urgency of the problem but also raised some discomfort.

Coleman-Miller: We have a history of domestic abuse. Child abuse has been on the books for a while. Robberies of convenience stores have been on the books for a while. This is a new kind of killing--the killing of children and the fact that children are killing. It's a new phenomenon and that's what's being reacted to.

Stewart: I wouldn't define it as children killing children because we're talking about 15- to 18-year olds--at least teenagers. Teenagers are not seeing themselves like 7-, 8-, or 9-year-olds. They see themselves as being able to drive.

Moore: What's at stake, Chips, for you when you say you wouldn't call that children killing children?

Stewart: I'm not calling them adults either. But I think the term "children" presupposes some state of innocence, and the subset of people who are being killed do not look innocent.

Coleman-Miller: And for me the subset is absolutely innocent. Adults now have to take notice of the fact that our children, whom in our history they have always regulated up until they left the house, are now in the process of going into adult court for heinous crimes.

Moore: Which is consistent in Chips' mind with their culpability, with the seriousness of the offenses they commit, with the fact that they intended to commit it, and with the danger they represent to the rest of society.

Chief Daughtry began to shift this debate over language and values to operational terms, and doing so made it clear that no participant wished to absolve individual perpetrators of responsibility.

Daughtry: The more basic issue though is that society is in such a state that the kids don't have the opportunity to mature and develop, so they can't make rational choices given the environment they're coming up in. I lean more towards the perspective of "kids killing kids" because they're not mature. Most of them probably haven't done very well in school.

Moore: You're not asking us to make excuses for this conduct are you?

Daughtry: No.

Coleman-Miller: No. As a matter of fact, the one thing I've been using as a bottom line, which is a very scary bottom line across this country, is ... the fact that children are in adult courts is the only barometer for how bad it is. Because all of the rest of it we've gotten used to. We've actually gotten used to the fact of 15-year-olds killing.

Moore: Use it as a barometer of how bad things are getting on three different dimensions. I could say one of the following three things. Kids are behaving worse, and they are choosing to behave badly. I could also then say the reason for that is because their families are falling apart

and the reason for that is because of economic deprivation and racial discrimination and the general decline of the American economy or something like that. Right? The third thing I could say is that they are in adult court because we've chosen to respond to their crimes by exposing them to the rigors of the adult court system rather than protecting them in the more secluded environs of the juvenile court system. So those are three different ways of looking at "how bad" the problem has gotten. (Transcript, 26-29)

With that, the conversation moved on to other topics for awhile. But the same dispute re-emerged more vehemently later. The second time, by pushing the debate through to its operational implications, the group clarified what was at stake in terms of policy to reduce violence.

Stewart: I don't agree with the "kid violence" [terminology]. We're talking about young males, okay, because when you talk about kids, I get this overlay that you're talking about innocence, balloons, and birthday parties and stuff like that.

Coleman-Miller: Well now, wait a minute. These kids potentially are the balloon kids. I don't know where else balloons belong except around 12- or 13-year olds...

But let me say this. The reason why I would even spend five minutes discussing this...is because the federal government at this time is being fought hard by communities all over this country because of this genetic behavioral testing that they're doing to find out the genetic component in violence... And as long as that's so, I have to go for this 13-year-old and the balloons...[because that forces me to ask] what in his environment took him to that point. Otherwise, the research that's being done is going to pick up 13-year-olds who are in adult courts and start the testosterone to drop the violence level in these children early. That continuum is a scary one for me. (p. < >).

It took a few minutes for the group to work through the connection that Coleman-Miller was making: that responding to a 13-year-old's violent acts as either the outcome of a reasoned decision (which would suggest incarceration as a remedy) or as the expression of some genetic trait (which would suggest some biomedical intervention) would place the burden of prevention on the 13-year-old rather than on society. That allocation of burden would, in turn, restrict the set of tactics a community would consider in developing violence control policy.

Moore: It may be that this problem is so difficult to deal with precisely because we can't quite make up our minds whether these kids are innocents who deserve a second chance and a lot of investment in their care and assistance, or whether they are thugs who can't be trusted and have to be written off.

Stewart: I'm not seeing them as always thugs. I may see them as individuals who could go either way but are currently engaged in high risk behavior...

Moore: And are in any case accountable as a matter of justice and as a matter of community safety.

Stewart: I'm not writing them off and I don't want Beverly to think I'm saying these are disposable people. They are not. [High violence] is the kind of crisis that moves people, but it's

not distributed equally and I think that the risk factors can be identifiable if you have the right data. That's what I'm trying to head towards.

Moore: But you could imagine a situation where you would say, "I'm sorry, but these kids are going to be disposable for a while."...by convicting them in courts and meting out sentences for the violence they produce...It looks just. It looks effective. What's wrong with that?

Daughtry: It's taking a tremendous toll on society in the process. It is straining our basic institutions, the criminal justice systems, our health care systems. Psychologically it's affecting communities. Quality of life has been diminished. I'm not so sure that that's a price we want to pay if there's a better solution.

Coleman-Miller: There's another aspect to it: that society then will have taken no responsibility for this. If it didn't happen to you at 13, and it did happen to another group of kids who look just like you at 13, and the only thing that was different between you and them was the environment in which they lived, then by writing them off, society won't have taken any responsibility for the creation of that monster.

Moore: Why do you have such a stake in having the society take responsibility for those kids? Is it because of a desire for justice in your mind? Or is it because if society took responsibility in a different way it might do things that would turn out to be more effective?

Coleman-Miller: That's it. If we don't take responsibility for it, then it's going to be a cyclical process and it will continue...When you look down under the rug, you see things like a 65 percent dropout rate in the school system, and nobody says there might be something wrong with the school system here. Maybe we had better relook at that. We can go from everything to racism to disenfranchisement to --

Moore: Can we go to irresponsible parenting?

Coleman-Miller: Yes, no question...Recession, we could go to the whole long list. If we don't go to that list, then we are allowing for the nurture response to be thrown out of the window and the nature response to blossom. The smaller community and the larger community have to take responsibility to repair it. Otherwise, the cycle continues. There's no stopping it.

Stewart: Yes, but positive conduct occurs in the identical environment...I think at times we overlook that.

Coleman-Miller: I am very clear that even the youngest have to take responsibility for their actions and that the home and parenting have a role in all of this. (Transcript, 74-83)

Although Coleman-Miller illustrated the importance of this distinction with examples of broad social problems that are sometimes characterized as unchangeable "root causes of crime," it is worth reiterating that taking community responsibility for violence prevention also facilitated the low-cost operational and procedural interventions that she presented at other points in the discussion.

Community Involvement: Help or Hindrance?

At least two points in the discussion of mobilizing the community to confront and control drug dealers and emerging gangs had sounded alarm bells in the minds of the two police participants. The first was during interpretation of Coleman-Miller's anecdote about drug dealers coughing up a murder suspect to the police. The second, which provoked extended discussion, was triggered by the thought of turning angry residents into a "gang" to reclaim the streets from the lawless. The discussion revealed both a difference in the importance that discussants placed on community order as an end in itself and the implications of that difference for the violence prevention tactics they were willing to consider. Specifically, the police participants began to worry about things getting even more out of control if a third power base began to emerge in the community (in addition to the drug dealers and the police).

Stewart: Empowering the community [is more important] than bravery.

Coleman-Miller: Well, I think it is bravery!

Moore: What's at stake in renaming the quality we want from the community as "bravery" rather than "empowerment", Chips? Why don't you want to call the community "brave"?

Stewart: Because bravery is boldness, and usually reflects individual rather than collective action. Empowerment means that the group comes together and senses its own resources.

Daughtry: We have problems now. There's some examples in my area where individual home owners have shot kids protecting their property.

Coleman-Miller: Vigilantes!

Daughtry: Yes. So the bravery part --- it may be fear rather than bravery.

Moore: That's interesting because anger is one of the things that makes people brave sometimes. The dangerous part of all this is that we know that the emotional energy associated with anger and fear is an enormously useful asset when people have to do hard things. But we also know that it gets out of control. So, if you've got this community that's trying to suddenly get itself together enough to patrol, or negotiate, or to threaten drug dealers and gangs, there's probably going to be some anger and fear that goes into the stew. Then the question is how do you keep the anger and fear under control --

Coleman-Miller: The model needs to be created.

Moore: -- for channelling those feelings. One way to view Lydia Davis is that she is looking for some useful ways to channel her feelings of anger, fear and despair.

Stewart: Most of Southwood seem to be fairly moderate -- almost ideal. The way it's presented, its "Well, we ought to, and we probably can come together, and there's a good way to do this." It's almost like Ozzie and Harriet....[Yet] one of the things we talked about earlier is the pathological nature of some of the communities who are energized, who may want to take over rather than just turn [the offenders] into the police. They might say, "Quite frankly, the police are overwhelmed. They're not going to keep them in jail. So, we as the community are going to do it. We're going to burn down their house or kill them or whatever." And all of a sudden all this goodness turns into a very dark side.

Coleman-Miller: Now, wait a minute. Have you taken the bravery statement to the point where they are burning down homes?

Moore: He's worried about it, right?

Stewart: Yes...We're all of a sudden saying these are great community people...They will turn this guy into the police. That is..a very positive step. But it's nothing like the real empowerment that you can get to where the communities and people have an idea of mob rule....It's like "Death Wish 2."

Moore: We just passed Chips' tolerance point.

Coleman-Miller: Yes. I can see his face is red.

Moore: Suddenly he remembered Oakland in the late 60's.

Stewart: That's exactly right...What happened was that they said, "Gee, these people have this disease, and we don't want them in our neighborhood, and we will beat them up and shoot them because we don't want them here. Or, we will call the police because (this happened to me a couple of times) as a police officer they could eject people of different ethnicities because the bar was a neighborhood bar. It didn't have people like that in there. And I had to work with the bartender and the group and almost stay in there to guarantee this person's right to have a beer. The thing is that communities work this way...in Asian communities, in black communities, in white communities, in economic communities. There has always been this desire to keep other people out, and we feel empowered to do that.

Moore: Do you think, if you were asked, that you could draw a clear line between responsible community control and vigilantism?

Coleman-Miller: Great question!

Stewart: I think I could because I've thought a lot about that. One of the things I've brought up in the past is that the Hell's Angels in their more aggressive days actually had an armored car, a couple of cannons, and some 50 calibre machine guns (which we considered a major threat to the police!). They bought three square blocks of houses, and then they put a cyclone fence around that, and said that they would police that area! They created a compound. They said, "There's no crime here, and we're going to do what we want. We have our freedom. We own this property. It's private property." That was completely intolerant (sic).

Moore: Why?

Stewart: Because the activities that went on in the compound were illegal to the larger society...It was the narcotics trade and the processing of stolen car parts. They would retreat into this zone of safety. That kind of community cohesion, spirit, bravery and courage has a very pathological effect on the rest of the community.

Moore: We aren't against cohesion in communities; we like cohesion. What we don't like is when the cohesion is used to shield illegal activities within the community from external justice.

We don't like it when the cohesion is used to export crimes that offend the rest of the community....

So it seems like we have this dilemma. On one hand, we would like to have the community as a powerful partner in the effort to either stop the violence that is being committed by the gangs, stop the fear that they're spreading, maybe even find a basis to begin turning the gangs toward more appropriate action and more appropriate purposes. So we need to build a strong community for all of those reasons. We understand that to build a strong community we might have to traffic in emotions that are very powerful and could easily get out of control. Therefore, if we're searching for a solution to the violence problem that lies with community empowerment or mobilization, it's going to be a tricky path -- partly because we're not sure it will be successful, partly because we're not sure that we would like it if it does succeed! (Transcript, pp.56-63)

Conclusion

The day's effort to begin developing a response to violence in Cornet City had taught several lessons. First, cities plagued by violence may find it useful to adopt an approach that Chapters I and II designate as violence problem-solving enterprises. These enterprises clearly differ from such traditional approaches as "locking 'em up and throwing away the key," or, alternatively, "eliminating root causes of violence." Rather, they draw on new developments in policing and public health approaches to violence. However, as the discussion recounted in Chapter III makes clear, such enterprises require integrating elements of those approaches into new ways of thinking about violence, violence-ridden communities, and local governments. They will be shaped by political realities and considerations of personal values. And they carry risks of small-scale failures as they reach for solutions to the tenacious urban violence problem. Whether they can, over time, reduce both urban violence and the sense of despair it produces, remains to be seen.

Appendix A:

Violence in Cornet City

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Introduction

Background on Cornet City Case

"Violence in Cornet" describes violence as it appeared and was responded to in a major American city in the late 1980's. Although the case is based on real events, it has been augmented both by incorporating statistical information from other cities and by introducing some specific fictional aspects that could have happened in almost any city.

The case was developed to stimulate discussion about how America's cities might best respond to the violence that seems to be overtaking them. Thus, the case combines historical and fictional events to challenge the creativity of those responding to the problem of urban violence.

The case has been used as a group discussion piece at least twice with good results. It was first tried with a small group of experts representing the law enforcement, community policing, and public health approaches to violence prevention. It was later used as the basis for discussions among mayors, Federal officials, academics, and practitioners at the National Research Council conference on violence in urban America in 1993. In both instances, the case proved challenging and provocative.

How To Use This Case

The case is intended as a teaching tool. It permits discussants to work through realistic problems and issues to form an integrated multidisciplinary response. These skills will be directly transferable to any group focusing on urban violence in their own community.

To use the case most effectively, it is helpful to adopt a particular point of view and to undertake a particular task using the case materials, such as development of a task force plan. It is also helpful to bear in mind a number of analytic distinctions, discussed below.

A Point of View: The Mayoral Perspective

The case is designed to be analyzed from the perspective of the mayor of Cornet City. Although other perspectives are useful, it is primarily mayors who face the problem of urban violence most urgently and most immediately. For them, finding some kind of effective response is a top priority—perhaps their most compelling task.

As local chief executives, mayors can mobilize the various resources necessary to combat a multifaceted problem like urban violence. At their command (more or less) are important organizations of the city government, the police, the schools, the parks and recreation departments, and other local service providers. Mayors also may call upon county- and State-level agencies and programs—the courts, the correctional system, social service agencies, and so on.

In addition, mayors may be able to draw upon the resources of the Federal government and social science researchers familiar with the problems of violence. Federal agencies such as the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, and Education have all issued reports on the nature and extent of violence and on programs considered effective. Social science researchers have studied different aspects of the violence problem and have issued numerous reports on the problem, its causes, and potentially effective responses.

Using the mayoral perspective permits the discussants to draw on the widest possible political mandate and to draw in resources from the largest possible pool of assistance. Other perspectives—for example, that of the police chief of Cornet—are also useful and can be explored as well.

The Task: Devise a Plausible Response

The task presented by the case study is to draw on the collective wisdom of discussants to outline a plausible and potentially effective response to the problem of urban violence as it appears in the case study. In effect, discussants should think of themselves as members of the task force established by the mayor of Cornet. They may even choose to adopt the roles of individuals highlighted in the case. For example, someone could take on the role of the police chief. The ultimate goal is to produce an outline of a realistic response—in the form of a strategic plan—for dealing with the problem of violence as it appears in Cornet.

Analytic Tools for Developing a Strategic Plan

Previous uses of the case study have revealed the importance of some general analytic distinctions. These distinctions should be kept in mind during the course of the discussion and during formulation of the strategic plan. It is hoped that a brief discussion of these distinctions will simplify the strategic planning process.

Perceptual versus substantive problems. Groups that have previously discussed the Cornet case have found it useful to draw a distinction between the two types of violence problems highlighted in the case. The most obvious part of the problem is the real victimization that is occurring in the community: the injuries and deaths that mark the growth of violence. Groups that have discussed the case have also thought it important to deal with the political and perceived problems as well—the sense that things have gotten out of control, that the city has no effective response to the violence, that people have become paralyzed by fear, and that the neighborhoods in which the violence is occurring have been abandoned and ostracized.

Short, medium, and long run. In developing effective responses to the problem, it is also important to distinguish what should be done in the short run (that is, in the next 6 months), what should be done in the medium run (that is, over the next 2–3 years), and what should be done over the long run (that is, the next 5–10 years). It might also be important to think about the relationship between the things done in the short run and those that are supposed to occur over the longer run. Ideally, things done now would build the foundation for longer-run objectives. It may also be important to ask what things could be done now that will aid the long-run objectives even though they will not necessarily produce short-run results.

Institutional and substantive responses. Experience has shown that it is useful to distinguish between institutional, or process-oriented, responses and programmatic, or substantive, responses. Institutional, or process, responses refer to establishing or creating new institutional mechanisms or procedures. Creating a task force is one such response. Other examples include shifting law enforcement from rapid response to community policing, or forming intergovernmental working groups drawing membership from local, State, and Federal agencies.

Institutional responses are useful for meeting a number of objectives. Obviously, they can create a capacity to implement a complex programmatic response to problems involving coordination among agencies or across levels of government. Less obvious is how useful institutional responses can be in dealing with short-run political issues, or in sustaining a spirit of innovation and cooperation among agencies and communities searching for new programmatic responses to the violence problem.

Programmatic, or substantive, responses refer to either program or policy changes that may plausibly have an impact on one or more aspects of the violence problem. Substantive policy or program changes could include improving the capacity to arrest and prosecute

dangerous offenders; mobilizing community support to suppress street-level drug dealing; establishing youth recreational activity programs; removing guns from homes experiencing family violence; intensive family interventions providing such wide-ranging services as financial and job counseling, housing assistance, and promoting education for school-age children; and improving the quality and relevance of youth job training programs. Some of these responses will require special institutional arrangements; others can be implemented using existing mechanisms or procedures.

Gauging the scope of substantive program or policy changes. As groups worked through the Cornet case, it became obvious that there are many dimensions along which to measure the size of an intervention. It is important for the group to recognize these differences and the implications that they have for creating an overall strategic plan.

One dimension is program impact: What is the size of the target group? How many elements of the violence problem will be positively affected? How strong an effect can the program be expected to have? Some programs suggested by the group may have a large target group, may affect many aspects of the violence problem, and could substantially reduce the level of urban violence. A large-scale intensive family counseling and assistance program is one example of this type of "masterstroke" program designed to reduce domestic violence.

Some program suggestions will focus on a smaller target audience and seek to intervene in only one part of the larger violence problem. An example of this is parenting classes for a group of single parents living in a particular housing complex. Each of these smaller programs would be expected to have less impact on the overall rate of violence, but the cumulative effect of many such programs could be quite large.

Another dimension to be considered is cost. Program cost can be thought of in two ways. The first is straight monetary cost. How much will a program cost to deliver? The second component is the institutional and political costs associated with a substantive program or policy change. Some programs will require little institutional reform and can be implemented pending the availability of funds. Other programs will require extensive institutional reorganization so that they can reach the implementation phase. Finally, some programs will be too costly, given the prevailing political climate, or will require extensive community mobilization and bureaucratic innovation to ensure success. These considerations all influence how many programs can be mounted and how quickly they can be undertaken.

Intergovernmental coordination. Finally, it is important for groups discussing the case to recognize that different programs require different kinds of cooperation across and among different levels of government. There are many programmatic options that can be implemented at the community or municipal level with preexisting resources.

However, efforts undertaken at higher governmental levels can complement or even supersede local effort. For example, local efforts to regulate the availability of alcohol or firearms can be made much more effective if supported by county, State, and Federal regulations. In fact, some programmatic responses are best vested in higher levels of government. Also, some local efforts will require the financial and technical support of State and Federal agencies to initiate and sustain innovative programs.

Strategic Planning

There are no hard-and-fast rules governing the strategic planning process. For the purposes of this case discussion, it is important to ensure participation by representatives from relevant agencies and community groups. This case is designed to provoke discussion among a wide variety of governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

As a starting point, representatives of the following community groups are recommended as participants: mayor's office; police department; city manager's office, if appropriate; parks and recreation department; community corrections department; public housing, both departmental representatives and residents; representatives of social service agencies; community leaders from a wide variety of community groups; and school district representatives. This list is far from exhaustive, and users of the case should feel free to invite additional participants as the local situation warrants.

In practice, strategic planning consists of forming a multidisciplinary integrated action plan. Drawing on the viewpoints and expertise of all case discussants is crucial for the planning process. Groups should emerge from this exercise with a concrete plan translatable into action. This would include but not be limited to "work assignments" for discussants, a schedule, the creation of additional working groups, and an overview of programs proposed by participants. These products are similar to what actual task forces would produce as a necessary first step in analyzing and combating the problem of urban violence in their own communities.

The plan that ultimately emerges from the strategic planning sessions should

- Distinguish the perceptual from the substantive problems and identify solutions that will have an effect on both parts of the problem.

- Include responses to the problem that will have their effect in the short-, medium-, and long-run, and identify the ways in which short-run responses can reinforce the longer-term solutions being proposed.

- Identify the important institutional and programmatic innovations that must be made to make effective responses now and build the capacity for even more effective responses in the future.

- Develop a portfolio of programmatic responses, including broad- as well as limited-impact programs, and programs that are innovative and experimental as well as proven successes.

Part I:
The Problem

The Murder of Anita Woods

There were 12 shots: 6 in rapid succession, a pause, and then 6 more. Lydia Davis reached for the phone and dialed 911. There was a recording.

> *You have reached the Cornet City Police Department. All of our operators are currently handling emergency calls. Please stay on the line and your call will be answered. Thank you.*

Davis was not surprised that the line was busy. She had called the police on a number of occasions, and this was not the first time she had heard a recording. She was mad, however. How on earth could the emergency number *ever* be busy? The message was repeated five times before an operator answered. "Hello, how may I help you?"

"Gunshots in the 700 block of Forten Street, Northwest," Davis said wearily.

"How many gunshots, ma'am?"

"Twelve, I think."

"We'll send someone right away."

She hung up. Davis called her neighbor Martha Heywood. "Did you hear those gunshots?" she asked.

"Yeah. I can see whoever it is lying in a pool of blood right across the street from my house. I'm tellin' you, Lyd, I don't know how much more of this I can take." Heywood lived on Forten Street, the main hangout of the neighborhood's drug dealers. There were times when Heywood was kept awake all night by the constant traffic: cars driving up with their stereos blaring, dealers shouting to one another, the sound of bottles breaking. She was glad that at least she was retired and didn't have to get up for work the next day. She would get her sleep before noon, when the next shift of drug dealers began appearing.

"I'm coming around in a minute," Davis replied. She pulled on a jogging suit over her pajamas and grabbed her coat. As she was locking her door she saw other neighbors walking toward Forten Street, one block north of them. Davis was a 46-year-old office administrator who was relatively new to the neighborhood, having moved there 10 years ago.

This section of Southwood, called Poplar Hills, was populated by middle-income African-American families who had initiated the area's racial turnover in the 1940's. Poplar Hills was a mixture of semidetached and row houses with small lawns and porches. The turn-of-the-century residences had recently attracted a handful of young whites to the area, including college students looking for cheap housing away from the state university's main campus. However, the white population was still too small–and too poor, in relative terms–to cause any real gentrification of the neighborhood. There was still a small-town air in Poplar Hills, a sense that everyone knew everyone else–which, indeed, was the case. It was one of the factors that attracted Lydia Davis to the place. She had never imagined that there would be a drug problem in a neighborhood where small vegetable gardens could be found in many backyards and a tricycle forgotten on the front lawn overnight went undisturbed.

"Here we go again," she said to herself. "We all come out here after there's been a shooting. We shouldn't be living this way. We know who these boys are. We know what they're doing. We shouldn't put up with this. We shouldn't." Davis joined a crowd of people standing a few yards away from the body.

"Who is it?" she asked her friend Martha.

"That Woods boy's sister." Mark Woods was 19 years old and the youngest of four children. He and his sister Anita lived with their grandmother several blocks north of Forten Street. Mark was one of about a dozen neighborhood youths who hung out in front of a string of abandoned businesses on Forten Street, stepping up to cars to make unhurried drug sales. He was a lieutenant in the street hierarchy: an intermediary between the local supplier and the boys and young men–and a few females–who made the actual drug transactions. It was clear from the way he carried himself, and the way others treated him, that he was powerful.

"Why on earth would they kill Anita? She wasn't dealin' those drugs, was she? I thought she was just usin' drugs. Are they starting to kill their customers now?"

"Maybe the ones who don't pay up," someone in the crowd commented dryly.

"Or maybe they tryin' to get back at the brother," said Leonard Francis, who lived on Sixth Street, a few houses down from Davis. "Gettin' back at him for something he did, through her." Francis was a retired government employee who was active in local politics. He had recently been elected the representative for Section 4C10 in the Southwood Civic Association.

"I don't care what the reason is, it don't make no sense."

Davis turned to Francis. "Maybe we should form one of those neighborhood patrol groups, like they have out in Northwood. We have enough people, don't you think?"

Francis shifted uneasily. "Yeah, sure, that would probably be all right."

Davis was dismayed by his tepid reaction. He was one of the most outspoken people at all the community meetings, talking about how they shouldn't wait for the police to do things, they should take the matter into our own hands, but he had never tried to form a citizens' group.

"We too old to be out here standin' on the corner against these boys. You see how ruthless they are. What makes you think they're gonna pay attention to us?" This comment was from Hattie Mason, a retired schoolteacher who also lived on Forten Street, two doors down from Heywood.

As Davis stood there listening to her neighbors, she began to feel increasingly frustrated. Why couldn't they all band together and try to do something? Some of these people were the parents or grandparents of the children who were tearing the neighborhood apart; it wouldn't be surprising if they were against a patrol group, but what about the others?

The young woman who had been shot was loaded into the ambulance. Her brother Mark, the drug dealer, was pacing angrily, his eyes glassy with tears. "I'm gonna get 'em," he kept saying, his teeth clenched. "I swear I'm gonna get 'em." His friends stood nearby, hands deep in their pockets.

A Weekend of Violence and the Government's Response

The next morning, the death of Anita Woods made the front page of the *Cornet Courier.*

Six Slain in Weekend Murders
Victims Include 3-Year-Old

In the city's bloodiest weekend this year, six people died under circumstances ranging from child abuse to robbery.

On Friday evening there was an emergency call to an apartment in the Southwood section of the city, where police found a 3-year-old girl on the livingroom [sic] floor. The child had broken bones and multiple skull fractures, and was pronounced dead at the scene. Frank Cartwell, the common-law husband of the child's mother, was taken into custody. The mother has not yet been located.

In a second domestic matter a woman was shot by her estranged husband as she left her apartment. The previous week Teresa Cordoba had tried to get her husband arrested for threatening to kill her. A restraining order had been issued, according to Superior Court officials.

On Saturday night a convenience store clerk was shot twice in the head after being robbed by two men. Sung K. Suk, father of the slain man and the store's owner, witnessed the murder. He said that his son had offered no resistance. "He had given them [the] money and he was on his knees with his hands on [his] head. But the guy stood there . . . shot him point-blank. It was really brutal."

Early Sunday morning an argument in the parking lot of a local bar left one man dead of multiple knife wounds. His assailant, Lawrence J. Peterson, also was wounded during the altercation and is listed in stable condition at the County Hospital. Patrons of the Hitching Post said the fight started when Peterson and the deceased, Michael Harrington, tried to leave the parking lot at the same time and had a minor collision. This was the third violent altercation at the bar so far this month.

A 17-year-old restaurant employee who was fired last week returned to his former place of work and opened fire on employees in the kitchen. The restaurant's owner was killed and several employees were wounded, one seriously. The youth, whose name is being withheld because of his age, fled the scene but was later arrested at his home.

Finally, 22-year-old Anita Woods was gunned down in the 700 block of Forten Street, in an ageing [sic] section of Southwood known as Poplar Hills. CCPD detectives report that they have no motive at this time.

The article provoked a political firestorm; city officials were deluged with calls from citizens demanding action. Commissioner Willie Farnsworth, chairman of the Public Safety Sub-Committee, said that his office alone received 300 calls within hours of the story's publication. "The people who have been calling my office are just fed up. This violence is

getting totally out of control, and they want something done about it," he said. "We have got to get these criminals off our streets.

"I have been calling for a tougher approach to law enforcement for years, and maybe now the mayor will listen. This latest bloodbath makes it clear that the criminals control our city, and we need to take back our streets from them. I am calling once again for reinstatement of the death penalty. We also need to lower the age when you can try as adults these young thugs out here who are literally getting away with murder. We are living in extreme times, and we need extreme measures to bring this situation under control.

"We've also got to have longer sentences to keep these violent criminals in prison, where they belong. Let's give the streets back to the law-abiding people. We've got it backwards right now—it's the good people who are locked up in their homes, and the criminals who are roaming the streets freely. This has got to be rectified. The people of Cornet deserve better, and I hope that the city commission is ready to do what's necessary to stop the insanity in the streets."

In his oblique criticism of the city commission, Farnsworth was targeting Martin McCafferty, chairman of the commission's Human Services Sub-Committee. McCafferty was often pegged as the commission liberal because of his voting record on the "law-and-order" issues—particularly his efforts for stringent gun control. He, too, made a statement to the press.

"It is easy to get emotional when these kinds of tragedies occur, but we need to look at the facts. In four of the six murders we had this weekend, guns were used. One of them, I believe, was a young man who in a fit of rage went home and got his father's gun to kill his boss. The only reason that that man [the owner of the restaurant] is dead, and the only reason the other people in the restaurant are in the hospital today, is because the young man had access to a gun. That's the only reason. The way to stop the carnage is not just to say we're gonna lock people up after they've already killed someone. The answer is to take away the means to kill. We are not going to eliminate homicides in this city, but at least we'll prevent a lot of them."

The mayor's office also was swamped with telephone calls and even a few telegrams from angry citizens. By the end of the day, Mayor Chris Warren had called a press conference. Flanked by the deputy mayor and the chief of police, Warren read from a prepared statement.

"This weekend's spate of murders in our city has been a wake-up call for all of us. I have heard from every group in the city: the old and the young; working and retired; male and female; black and white. I have heard from the citizens of Northwood, and those of Southwood, from the business community and from government workers. The citizens of Cornet agree, and I am in full accord, that *something must be done.* This city—indeed, this nation—is awash in blood. It must stop.

"Today, I am charging 12 people to come up with a plan in 100 days to deal with the problem of violence in Cornet. The members of the Anti-Violence Task Force will be: Police Chief Tony Burnett; two of my colleagues from the Commission, Willie Farnsworth, who chairs the Public Safety Sub-Committee, and Susan Wolfe, chair of the Tourism and Economic Development Sub-Committee; the Honorable Connor Bradley, senior judge in the Juvenile Court Division; David Silver, chief prosecutor; Thomas Eckert, Commissioner of Prisons; Stephen Balliet, President of the Chamber of Commerce; Samuel Lee of the Small Business Association; Sheila Robinson, Commissioner of Public Housing; the Reverend Aaron Weems; and Dr. Gail Hodges, professor of urban studies at the State University. Chairing the Task Force will be Deputy Mayor John Canady.

The duties of the task force were threefold: first, to attend community meetings throughout the city to get firsthand knowledge of the nature of the problems different constituencies faced and to gather information on effective grassroots initiatives; second, to hold citywide public hearings to obtain testimony from "experts" as well as local citizens; and finally, to review the history of antiviolence and anticrime initiatives before developing a strategy. The task force could also evaluate efforts in other States, as well as any national programs and policies.

"This Task Force will look at the causes for the skyrocketing homicide rate, and it will develop concrete solutions. I am authorizing and requiring that they mobilize every member of this city, from the grassroots level to the government bureaucracy. Every one of us has got to

be a part of this effort, because crime and violence are the number one problems facing this city and this nation. Violence affects everyone, and stopping the violence has got to be everyone's priority."

The View From the Police Department

After the press conference Chief Anthony Burnett got into his car and returned to the office. He felt a little subdued. More than anyone else, he knew that violence was now commonplace in Cornet. Although he wanted to see an end to the problem as much as anyone else, it worried him that such an important public policy issue was taking place in a highly charged, politicized context. There also would be intense pressure to solve the six weekend murders. Burnett used his car phone to call Deputy Chief Jerry Rauss.

"Hello, Jerry, this is the chief. I'm calling about this task force thing. Yeah, it's going to be [tough]. Listen, I want you to call each of the precincts where those six weekend murders took place and tell them that we're sending our best homicide detectives to their areas, and I want full cooperation from everybody. Next, I want you to call down to ODA [the Office of Data Analysis] and tell them to bring me everything they've got from 1980 to now on homicides: number of people, motives, weapons used. Everything. I want to meet first thing tomorrow morning."

The Office of Data Analysis

The Office of Data Analysis was located in a large room shared by Jack Newman, the director; Sylvia Patton, a research analyst; a data entry clerk; and a secretary. There were printouts everywhere, and boxes of papers were stacked in every corner. Newman and Patton had stayed late to get the chief's data. They walked into his office the next morning with a sheaf of documents.

"Well," Newman began, "including the death of Anita Woods this past weekend, a total of 452 have died in Cornet this year. If this keeps up, we'll have another record-breaking

number of deaths. We've only got a population of 600,000, so if this continues, our homicide rate will rival that in urban areas like the District of Columbia, Chicago, and New York City."

"That's a distinction we definitely don't want," the chief replied. ODA data showed that after several years of decreasing homicide rates, the number of murders in Cornet began to climb precipitously in 1985, from 148 to more than three times that number by the end of 1990. (See exhibit 1.) More than half of the victims were black, mirroring national trends.

Exhibit 1:



Newman continued. "When you look at the information we're getting—from lockup, the coroner, the supplementary homicide reports—you see that drugs seem to be the main problem." First, the number of homicide arrestees testing positive for any drug use rose from 44 percent in 1986 to 64 percent in 1988 and declined after that. (See exhibit 2.) In the general population of arrestees—for violent and property crimes—drug use was even more prevalent: a record 73

Exhibit 2:

PERCENT ARRESTEES TESTING POSITIVE FOR DRUG USE
1986 - 1990

	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
	%	%	%	%	%
Homicide Arrestees Testing Positive for:					
Any Drug Use	44	49	64	35	26
Cocaine Use	25	31	49	32	23
PCP Use	24	25	25	5	3
All Arrestees Testing Positive for:					
Any Drug Use	68	72	73	67	56
Cocaine Use	40	50	64	63	53
PCP Use	39	43	33	17	7

percent tested positive for any drug use in 1988, with small decreases observed since then.

A significant number of murder victims also had some type of drug or alcohol in their systems at the time of death. Toxicological data for the period 1985–1988 showed that PCP, cocaine, or alcohol was found in the bodies of almost two-thirds of all murder victims. (See exhibit 3.) Although the overall fraction of victims using any drug had remained roughly constant over the period, a review of victims' drug-use trends showed substantial differences by type of drug:

- Victims' use of alcohol, although still among the highest of all psychoactive drugs, had been declining, from a high of 38 percent in 1985 to 23 percent in 1988.
- Heroin use had fallen by half, from 14 percent in 1985 to 7 percent in 1988.
- Marijuana use had almost doubled, from 12 percent in 1985 to 23 percent in 1988.

Exhibit 3:

DRUG USE AMONG VICTIMS, 1985 - 1988

Substance	1985 No.	1985 %	1986 No.	1986 %	1987 No.	1987 %	1988 No.	1988 %
PCP	23	15	55	27	73	30	26	22
Cocaine	26	17	54	26	70	29	54	45
Heroin	21	14	25	12	8	3	8	7
Marijuana	19	12	60	29	57	24	27	23
Alcohol	59	38	60	29	57	24	27	23
Other	17	11	2	1	12	5	4	3
None	56	35	78	37	93	38	39	32
No. Cases Tested	156		207		242		119	

Source: *Homicide in Cornet City,* December 1988, p. 10.

- The use of PCP had fluctuated during that period but was very high, ranging from 15 percent in 1985, peaking at 30 percent in 1987, and dropping to 22 percent in 1988.

- Cocaine had become the most commonly used drug, its use increasing dramatically from 17 percent in 1985 to 45 percent in 1988.

Next, there were more drug arrests than commissions of either robbery or burglary. (See exhibit 4.) Since 1985 there had been a dramatic increase in the number of drug violations, and in 1986 drug arrests exceeded the number of robberies or burglaries. These data did not necessarily indicate that the number of drug-related crimes was overtaking the numbers for other Part I offenses—only the fact that apprehension rates for robberies and burglaries remained low. Nevertheless, homicides continued to rise even as arrests for drug violations began to fall.

Finally, Newman presented data on murder weapons. "As you can see, firearms continued to be the weapon of choice. Over the last decade, the percentage of homicides involving gun use rose from 62 percent to 76 percent." (See exhibit 5.) The chief recalled

Exhibit 4:



hearing one of the commission members talk about gun control on the previous day and wondered how the ODA information would be put to use.

Exhibit 5:

Weapons Used In Homicides
1980, 1985, 1989

Weapons Used	1980	1985	1989
Firearms	124	95	331
All other	76	53	103
Total homicides	200	148	434

Now that he had the big picture, Burnett began to consider the individual cases: two domestic situations, one robbery with a possible racial component, a disgruntled employee, and a barroom brawl. Then there was that young woman gunned down in Southwood.

"I want to be informed on a daily basis about the progress of these cases," he told the deputy chief. "The whole city is watching. Use whatever resources are necessary to get the cases solved. Especially that 22-year-old woman, Woods. She's the only one with an unknown motive at this time, is that right?"

"Yes, sir. Detective Soames has been assigned to it."

Investigating the Murder of Anita Woods

Detective Franklin Soames had arrived at the murder scene not long after Anita Woods' body was taken away. In his inspection of the site he had found one bullet lodged in the side of the building where the woman had been standing just before she was killed. Several bullet shells were found in the street.

The only other clues Soames hoped to obtain were from members of the dead woman's family or from people who lived in the neighborhood. He was not at all hopeful that he would get information from any of them. An officer on the scene had told Soames that the girl's brother had been walking around crying and talking about avenging her death. But the young man had been unwilling to talk to the police and had even dismissed them angrily, spitting out that they were never around when you really needed them. There seemed to be more to his unwillingness to cooperate than just grief, though. Soames discovered that the brother had a record: possession with intent to distribute cocaine. It seemed likely that Mark Woods was a drug dealer and that this was a factor in his sister's murder.

"Very few of the cases I see now are, you know, the typical murders that we were dealing with 10 or even 5 years ago." Soames was speaking to a reporter from the *Courier* who was doing a follow-up story.

"Now there's almost always a drug connection. It's drug dealers beefing with each other over territory, or it's a dealer killing off a customer who won't pay up—the dealer feels he's got to kill the person; otherwise, he's gonna be considered a punk [weakling] on the street, and it's

really hard to solve these cases, because nobody wants to come forward. They can't, really, because then they'd be admitting that they're involved in something illegal. The people on both sides are 'bad' individuals, and there's no incentive for anybody to cooperate."

Soames drove back to his office and stuck a pin in the map in back of his desk. (See exhibit 6.) Anita Woods' death had occurred in Southwood, one of the prime drug-dealing sectors of the city. "Look at this," he said. "We've had, what, 450 murders so far? Over half have been here in Southwood." Both geography and demography made the Southwood area a magnet for drug activities, for it was not only the poorest section of the city, it was also on the State border, attracting carloads of out-of-State buyers and sellers.

Soames turned his attention back to the Woods murder and the unlikelihood of getting any evidence to solve it. The family of the victim had no incentive to cooperate with the police, and members of the community faced real disincentives. "I know that somebody in that neighborhood—lots of people—know something or heard something, but I can't get them to tell me, and you know what? I don't blame them, not really. Because if word got out that they said anything, then these people could get killed." Intimidation and murder of witnesses had become so common that when Soames wanted to get information he would never approach the person in public. He knew from experience that drug dealers would not hesitate to kill a "snitch."

"We're just not dealing with the same kinds of criminals," he lamented. "They will kill people on mere *suspicion* of talking to the cops. I used to tell informants that they didn't have to worry about anything happening to them, but I don't anymore, because some people I swore to protect got popped. You can't imagine what that does to a police officer, someone who is out there to protect people. When you give people your word, lay down your honor like that and then you're not able to come through . . .," he trailed off, shaking his head. He understood why law-abiding citizens refused to get involved. He understood their fear, because he, too, was afraid.

"I've been on the force for 19 years and doing homicide for 6 years. When I started out in this job I wasn't afraid, not at all. I mean, sometimes I would be outnumbered by the crooks, you know, but I wasn't afraid, because, number one, they didn't use to have guns and number two, I had this . . . you know, *authority*. I don't mean that I was abusive or anything, just that

EXHIBIT 6

CITY OF CORNET
POPULATION 590,000



people had some kind of respect for police officers. Both the 'good' people and the 'bad' people. Now, though . . . these guys out here are better armed than I am. Not only that, they're not afraid to kill, even if you're a police officer." The data did indicate that police work was dangerous, with 138 assaults on police officers in 1990, 13 percent of them involving a gun.

Without witnesses or other information, it was going to be very hard to solve the Woods case. As shown in exhibit 7, the police department's closure rate for homicide cases peaked in

Exhibit 7:



1986 at 81 percent, but by 1990 the rate was only 57 percent. Clearance rates for other Part I offenses, although lower, had remained virtually constant since 1983, ruling out a general "police overload" explanation. It seemed clear that it was the nature of the murders that was making it difficult to solve them. "In the old days you had lovers' quarrels or maybe an argument between friends," Soames explained. "You would usually get the murderer to confess

right there on the spot, but now you've got nothing to go on. No witnesses, no anguished parents demanding justice, nothing."

An examination of known circumstances for murders over the last decade supports his statement. (See exhibit 8.) In 1980 police were able to determine the circumstances under which death occurred in 75 percent of their cases, including arguments/altercations (23.5 percent), robbery (19.5 percent), domestic disputes (14 percent), drugs (5.5 percent), burglary (3.5 percent), and police shootings (3.5 percent). By 1989 police were recording the reasons for less than half of their cases: only 39 percent had a known motive or assailant. Even more intriguing, in cases where police could determine neither the reason nor the offender, the majority of victims (76 percent) were black males between the ages of 16 and 39.

Indeed, the rates of homicide among black males was noted with alarm by many groups; these rates were many times higher than those for white males, at every age. (See exhibit 9.) In the last decade, homicide had become the major cause of death among black males, particularly young men between 15 and 19 years of age. (See exhibit 10.) High rates of homicide for other age groups were lower but still significant.

Exhibit 8:


HOMICIDE CIRCUMSTANCES
1980
Unknown (24.5%)
Argument (23.5%)
Drugs (5.5%)
Other (8.0%)
Police Shootings (3.5%)
Domestic (14.0%)
Robbery (19.5%)
Burglary (3.5%)


HOMICIDE CIRCUMSTANCES
1989
Argument (9.2%)
Drugs (15.7%)
Robbery (2.8%)
Burglary (0.7%)
Domestic (6.2%)
Police Shootings (0.5%)
Other (3.7%)
Unknown (60.8%)

Exhibit 9:


HOMICIDE RATE FOR BLACK MALES
(Rate per 100,000 Population)
500
400
300
200
100
0
290.4
295.2
219.0
264.0
190.1
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
Age Group
1980
1985
1989


HOMICIDE RATE FOR WHITE MALES
(Rate per 1000,000 Population)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
47.6
75.9
18.2
19.6
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
Age Group
1980
1985
1989

Exhibit 10:

Major Causes of Death in Cornet City
For Adolescents (Aged 15-19)
1980, 1985, 1990

	Black Males	White Males	Black Females	White Females
1980				
Total deaths	26	2	10	1
Homicide	18	0	3	0
All other	8	2	7	1
1985				
Total deaths	19	2	6	0
Homicide	12	0	2	0
All other	7	2	4	0
1990				
Total deaths	84	6	7	1
Homicide	70	5	5	1
All other	14	1	2	0

Not only were the victims young, but so were the assailants: the fraction of murderers under age 18 had tripled in the last five years, from 6 percent in 1986 to 20 percent in 1990. (See exhibit 11.)

With both killers and victims being so young, journalists often tried to portray the killings as a gang problem. Soames remembered trying to explain the situation to a tabloid reporter a month earlier. "Look, kids do everything else dressed alike and traveling in groups, so they commit crimes and do drugs dressed alike and traveling in groups. But that's got nothing to do with big, formal gangs with initiation rituals, turf staked out, protection rackets, and all the stuff

Exhibit 11:

MURDER ASSAILANTS UNDER THE AGE OF 18

1986		1987		1988		1989		1990	
No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
8	6	9	7	26	14	63	19	67	20

you read about in places like Chicago and Los Angeles. Here in Cornet City, you might have six or eight guys hanging out together for a few months, maybe dealing some drugs or knocking over a liquor store or two. It's serious stuff, but they don't hang together for long, and there's no organized leadership. Maybe we'd have less violence if the kids were better organized . . . . they'd work out their own rules so there would be fewer 'beefs' to turn violent. When there *was* a gang hassle that turned violent, you could expect the leaders to work it out like they did after the riots in L.A. Here in Cornet City, no one's in charge, so there's no telling what's going to set off a chain of killings, and it's awfully hard to turn things around." Despite this detailed explanation, the day after the interview the headline read: GANG VIOLENCE PLAGUES CORNET CITY, POLICE SAY.

Soames worried about all the publicity and the pressure to solve this murder. Even as he had watched yesterday's press conference, he'd known that Chief Burnett would be expecting results. He jotted down a few notes and put them in a file marked "WOODS, A.—12/11/90." He then began to review his other cases, most of them unsolved. "No, we're just not dealing with the same kinds of cases anymore."

The View From the Public Health Department

Another person who had watched the mayor's press conference was Dr. William Freis, commissioner of public health. Freis noted with dismay that the mayor had named representatives of all the usual law enforcement perspectives to the task force: police, courts,

prisons. Only two or three people from the human services view were represented. Freis decided to ask the mayor to be included on the task force.

"Mayor Warren," he began, "there are compelling reasons why I should be part of this initiative. Let me put it to you this way: Last year there were roughly 200 deaths from pneumonia or the flu, and almost 200 deaths from diabetes, but so far this year more people have been victims of homicides than of these other two sources combined. If you consider the flu and diabetes to be serious health problems, why aren't we looking at homicide as a serious health problem? If the public health community is concerned that 458 people died from tuberculosis, which is preventable, we should be just as concerned that an equal number of our citizens are dying from guns, knives, and beatings. These deaths are also preventable. We need to start looking at the problem of violence differently, as a public health issue and not just a law enforcement issue."

Freis was part of a growing movement among health professionals to broaden the definition of public health to get the topic of violence into the "mainstream" of public health policy. They argued for a mandate from the highest levels of government to the individual members of society to address violence as a health problem that had ramifications for the entire Nation. For example, the economic costs of violence include not only expenditures to arrest, try, and imprison offenders but also the medical and psychiatric care of victims; their lost earnings; and, most important, years of potential life lost. It was estimated that homicides and nonfatal violent injuries cost the Nation $180 billion in 1990.

In his discussion with the mayor, Freis pointed out that he would like to apply the same epidemiological procedures to address violence as a cause of death as he would to investigate any other disease or condition: "The issues we need to be concerned with are: Whom is this 'disease' of violence affecting? What are the risk factors? Where is the violence taking place? Are certain groups more affected than others? What are the circumstances surrounding these deaths? What would be the appropriate interventions for each of these circumstances? These are the things we need to be looking at."

A cursory epidemiological analysis of homicide and violence produced two important observations. First, much of the victimization occurred among black and low-income

populations. Freis was concerned that these simple descriptive statistics would be interpreted causally—as confirming the stereotype that African Americans were more violent than whites. He showed, however, that once one controlled for socioeconomic differences between blacks and whites, the racial differences disappeared. This led him to the view that the real explanation for the high rates of violence lay with poverty and inequality instead of race. It was important to know that the worst consequences of violence were accumulating within the African-American community. However, that fact did not constitute evidence that African Americans were inherently more violent than whites: they were neither more nor less violent than whites of a similar socioeconomic status.

Second, although a lot of attention was focused on drug-related murders, in particular the extremely high murder rate among young black males, outside of these special circumstances, most victims were killed by people they knew—very often family members.

"Most family homicides involve spouses and occur in the home," Freis explained. "Citywide hospital data show that when women are killed by the men in their lives, it's usually after many, many assaults. Doctors' offices, clinics, and hospitals are a real flash point. They should be considered sentinel points, because they offer an opportunity for prevention. When we fail to break these cycles of [spousal] assault, the burden falls back on women."

An analysis of the relationship of the victim to the offender showed that women were more likely to be killed by a spouse, lover, or other family member, whereas men were more

likely to be killed by friends or acquaintances (See exhibit 12). Freis continued, "You see, the

Exhibit 12:

RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM TO OFFENDER

Percent of Victims Killed by:	MALE VICTIMS	FEMALE VICTIMS
Spouse/Lover	6%	30%
Other Family Member	8%	12%
Friend/Acquaintance	45%	25%
Stranger	16%	9%
Unknown	30%	27%

Source: *Understanding and Preventing Violence,* NRC, Table 2.6, p. 80 (1993).

circumstances of murder are very different, so the strategies would be different. A violence prevention strategy for women, for example, might focus on therapy for their partners, on anger management, or couples therapy."

Familial abuse wasn't limited to husbands and wives. The number of Cornet children dying of abuse or neglect had doubled in the last two years: from half a dozen in 1989 to 13 in 1990. The mother was as likely to be the perpetrator as the father. Cornet saw almost 1,800 reported cases of child abuse in that year. At the same time, social service workers could respond only to the most extreme cases: Budget cuts in the Department of Human and Rehabilitative Services had reduced the number of child abuse case workers by half. Without the money to hire appropriate staff, the agency had little time for prevention.

Freis concluded his pitch, hoping that his frustration wasn't too apparent, "The fact is, the law enforcement system is not adequately addressing the violence issue. It isn't even a question of giving them more resources or whatever, because most violent incidents don't pass through the law enforcement agencies. We have battered women in our hospitals who don't press charges against the men who abuse them, so the police aren't intervening there. We see a lot of children with shaken baby syndrome in our clinics. We've got doctors and teachers and social service people who for whatever reason aren't reporting suspected cases of child abuse, so the police aren't able to protect that population. Mayor Warren, we can't ignore the fact that

the health care system sees more preventable violence. There isn't any reason to wait until there's a homicide for the criminal justice system to step in. Then it's too late. You've got to do more than just get additional cops and longer prison terms. That approach isn't going to reach everybody who needs help."

From a practical standpoint it was impossible to ignore violence as a public health issue, because medical professionals were already dealing with the problem. Public medical facilities like the county hospital in Cornet were overwhelmed, for example, with multiple-gunshot-wound cases. These patients, many of whom had no health care, were an additional burden in financial as well as medical terms; hospitals were reeling from the large increase in AIDS patients and a poor population that was often forced to use emergency rooms as a source of primary health care.

Freis had one last request. "I must tell you Mayor Warren that I'm surprised that someone representing the schools isn't on the task force. We need to include the schools in this dialogue for two basic reasons. First, we have an awful lot of violence taking place in the schools. Second, the schools can be part of the solution: they can teach young people about conflict resolution. I think someone from the school board needs to be represented."

With some misgivings, Mayor Warren appointed Freis to the task force. He was worried that the health commissioner's prescription would require expensive programs that were no longer feasible in the current fiscal climate. Large funding requests by both law enforcement and social service agencies might force a tradeoff between the two approaches or a compromise where neither of them would get enough money to do anything effectual.

Warren also agreed to appoint School Board President Monica Reeves to the task force. He hoped this would end the lobbying for inclusion in the task force. Warren could not spend too much time worrying about it, in any case. He had to make some immediate decisions about which of many community meetings held throughout the city should be attended by task force members and who should testify at the public hearings scheduled for the next three and a half months. One certainty was that Southwood would be a major focus.

A Community Meeting in Poplar Hills

Lydia Davis had also been making decisions. After being questioned by Detective Soames, she asked for the name of the local district police commander and, after consulting with several neighbors, arranged to meet him at the local church. Because of the publicity surrounding the death of Anita Woods, this was one of the community meetings that task force members had been asked to attend. The prosecutor and Chief Burnett sat quietly in the last pew.

Representing the local precinct was Captain Michael McDougal, a 22-year veteran of the Cornet City Police Department (CCPD) who had found himself attending a lot of community meetings in the last few years. His approach was never to make excuses for the police but to present residents with all of the facts. He began his meeting with Davis and her neighbors by talking about the lack of resources in the police department.

"I know you probably don't want to hear this, but resources are the number-one reason why we can't do as much as we want and what really needs to be done in your neighborhood—or any other for that matter. Last month we only had 7 cruisers out of 19 available, because the others were either in the shop or had been totaled in accidents.

" . . . Then there's the problem with not enough police officers. Every neighborhood is asking for more officers on the beat, more foot patrols. But my number-one priority is to make sure we have the ability to respond quickly to a crime in any part of this district. Sometimes I only have half the force available to me at any one time—officers are either out injured, or they're on maternity leave, whatever. If I only have a handful at rollcall, I can't put two officers on foot in this area, because if we get a call all the way over on Wyckoff [several miles away], there's no way they can get over there as fast as a squad car."

It wasn't just cars that were outdated or insufficient in number. The bulk of the paperwork was still done by hand. There were very few computers, and no money available in the police budget to buy more. Indeed, there was no attempt by the top brass at CCPD to develop a strategy to show how and why this new technology would bring efficiency and more time for actual law enforcement. Officers complained that even though they might want to clear a particular street corner of drug dealers, they were reluctant to do so when the arrestee had

often paid the fine for "incommoding" and was back on the street before the paperwork had been completed.

Teams of foot patrolmen were sometimes sent out with one walkie-talkie between them. This could be extremely dangerous if they had to pursue a suspect on foot and became separated. Officers complained that Cornet was "in the Stone Age" compared with other cities as far as crime-fighting technology was concerned. In cities on the West Coast, for example, they had portable machines that could take fingerprints on the scene and immediately identify suspects with prior criminal records. Cornet officers said there were times when they could not serve a warrant because they could not prove that the person standing before them was the one they sought; the suspect naturally denied being that person.

Resources were especially lacking for the kind of long-term investigation needed to incapacitate a drug operation. First, there were only a handful of undercover officers available. With so many citizens complaining about street-corner drug trafficking, the police department decided that a high-visibility "buy-bust" was necessary politically, even if it was futile from a law enforcement perspective. At least the police could say that they had made a certain number of raids in a given locality. They could not be accused of doing nothing. Because CCPD lacked the surveillance equipment necessary for a long-term investigation, officers even used their own video cameras to do police work.

Police officers were frustrated and cynical, and so was the public, which felt besieged and frightened not only by the violent criminals but also by corrupt police officers. In 1990 there were an unprecedented number of indictments of police officers, for crimes that included drug distribution, robbery, and murder. The increase in corruption was attributed to a confluence of factors. First, hundreds of officers were hired in the 1980's without any background check; not surprisingly, many had criminal records. Second, a policy change during that time meant that a prior criminal record was no longer justification for disqualification for police work. Third, both the length of training and its content had been reduced significantly. The combination of youth and poor training was at the root of many of the department's problems. At the same time that there was an influx of young, inexperienced officers, many of the department's most experienced people were retiring. There weren't enough senior officers

who could be partnered with new recruits. The net result was low morale on the force, and a public that distrusted the police and believed it to be thoroughly corrupt. The subject of "bad cops" was one of the first raised in the meeting with McDougal.

"We got a cop who patrols right in this neighborhood, and I swear there's something funny about him," said Leonard Francis. "Just the other day I saw him over here on his private time—it must have been, because he wasn't wearing his uniform—but he was talkin' to those drug boys in broad daylight. You can't tell me somethin' isn't goin' on with that. You scared to even trust the police, 'cause half of 'em are in on all this mess." Several people agreed.

"Make no mistake," McDougal stated, "there are some bad cops out there. If you have some information, please give it to us and we'll have our Special Investigations Unit look into it." Francis thought to himself that he wasn't going to give any information to anybody and end up dead in an alley.

McDougal continued, "But one thing that I really want to stress in this meeting is that we need the help of the community. The police can't be everywhere at once, and the only way we can start to solve these problems is if the law-abiding citizens help us. We need your help. If you have information, please let us know about it. Maybe you see certain cars constantly stopping at a particular house. Well, you can write down the tag number, the date, the time, pass that information on to our vice unit. The more information we have, the better the evidence we can get to lock these guys up."

A man in the back of the room, Dennis Pettibone, stood and pointed at McDougal angrily. He said, "I can't believe you're comin' in here and tellin' us to snitch on our own people. People in the community should refuse to get involved with cops. If you-all were serious about stopping this drug problem, you could do it. Black people don't own the planes that bring the drugs into this country. Black people don't own the gun shops in Virginia where all these weapons are coming from. My personal opinion is that this society *wants* black people out here sellin' drugs and killin' each other over a piece of rock, and if we don't kill each other off, then the police are right there to do it for us. You askin' us to help you lock up more black men, more young black men? No, I don't think so."

Another resident entered the fray: "Now wait a minute Denny. I can understand what you're sayin' about the police brutality and all, but one thing you're forgetting is that these black people are out here killing other black people." The observation was correct: 93 percent of black victims were killed by other black people; the rate for whites killing other whites was 86 percent.

He continued, "I agree with you that if all this drug abuse and murder was happening to whites then they would have solved it yesterday."

"You got that right," said Pettibone.

"It's just like with the AIDS thing. As long as it was only killing off gay people and people in Africa and poor blacks and Puerto Ricans here, nobody cared, but now that you got these celebrities and other famous people dying, all of a sudden everybody's got all this sympathy for AIDS people.

" . . . I *do* want all this foolishness in the community to stop, and I'm willing to get involved. The only thing is I don't want to give any evidence no matter *what* I see, because I'm scared of retaliation."

Getting tangible evidence and witnesses was a major problem in the prosecution of drug trafficking and other crimes. A review of the cases dismissed after an initial decision to prosecute showed that an exceedingly high proportion were dropped because of evidence or witness problems. (See exhibits 13 and 14.) For example, in 1974 only 1 percent of victimless crimes including drug trafficking were dismissed for evidence problems; and 2 percent, for witness problems. By 1990 26 percent of victimless crimes were being dismissed for evidence-related reasons, and 24 percent for witness-related reasons. These trends held for robbery and other violent crimes.

Exhibit 13:

CASES DISMISSED DUE TO EVIDENCE PROBLEMS*

Type of Crime	1974	1990
Robbery	2%	19%
Other Violent (Homicide, Rape, Assault)	1%	36%
Victimless (Drugs, Gambling, Sex Offenses	1%	26%

* Cases dismissed after initial acceptance by prosecutor.

Exhibit 14:

CASES DISMISSED DUE TO WITNESS PROBLEMS*

Type of Crime	1974	1990
Robbery	20%	43%
Other Violent (Homicide, Rape, Assault)	33%	58%
Victimless (Drugs, Gambling, Sex Offenses	2%	24%

* Cases dismissed after initial acceptance by prosecutor.

McDougal conceded, however, that there was good reason for citizens to be wary of testifying in drug cases. The intimidation and murder of witnesses was now common. "I can understand how the people in this neighborhood would be afraid to come forward with information," he told those at the meeting. "I don't know exactly how to fix the problem, but I know there has got to be some remedy available."

A woman in the front row spoke up. "You know, it's not just in these drug cases that people don't think the police do any good or can protect you. The woman who used to live next door to me was beaten for years by her husband. The police would come, but they wouldn't do anything—just tell him to go out and cool off or stupid things like that. She couldn't get a restraining order or anything. She eventually had to move because the man would not stay away. Lord, I remember that man would beat her something terrible, and the police wouldn't do anything about it. I mean, you may not know how to protect people against drug dealers,

but you should be able to protect a woman against somebody right in her own home who is trying to hurt her or kill her."

"You're right, ma'am, the laws used to be really inadequate, but now we have special procedures for domestic violence cases. We don't even necessarily have to have the woman herself sign a complaint against him. If the officer sees that the woman is bruised and the house is all torn up, he can make the arrest based on his own judgment."

Although their meeting with Captain McDougal did not satisfy Davis and her neighbors completely, some good did result from it. They got to know one of the officers on a personal basis and were willing to provide information on suspicious vehicles and other events in the neighborhood. This led to several raids and the closing of three crack houses. Once residents saw that their reports would be treated confidentially and that the police would respond to them, they were even more willing to work with the police. They began talking seriously about starting a neighborhood patrol group.

Police Chief Burnett and David Silver, the chief prosecutor, felt they had learned a great deal at the meeting and were anxious to have other task force members hear some of the arguments that had been made. They asked Davis and some of her neighbors to attend the public hearings once they got under way. Davis and the neighbors were eager to do so.

"It's about time the mayor started paying attention," said Martha Heywood. "It's just too bad they always wait for something bad to happen."

Part II:
Developing A Citywide Response

The Mayor's Charge to the Task Force

Mayor Warren sat at the head of the conference table. This was the task force's first executive session. It was being held just two days after the press conference.

"I want to welcome you all and inform you that there are two additional members. First, we have Dr. William Freis, the head of all our health services, and also the president of the school board, Monica Reeves." Each nodded on being introduced. "I am happy to have them join us in this important task of finding a solution to the problem of violence in this city.

"Let me remind you all once more why you have been appointed to this body.

"This task force has 100 days to tell the law-abiding people in this city what, based on your experience and that of other experts in various fields, Cornet City needs to do. My charge to all of you," the mayor continued, "is to give me real, honest opinions. Lay aside any fear you have of being criticized by me or the public or anyone else. This is not a political problem, so please don't give me political answers. Our first hearing is next week, and I want to make it clear from the start that this task force is serious. Remember that we must act in the public interest.

"Your first duty is to listen to the people. Go to the community meetings, to the churches, to the PTA meetings. Meet with the owners of the small grocery stores, and the taxi drivers. And I want you to *listen* to what they have to say. Find out what it's like out there, from the average person's perspective. I especially want you to go to the most distressed parts of this city and find out the conditions people are living under. I believe some of you already went out there to Southwood, where the young woman was gunned down."

Police Chief Burnett responded. "Yes, Mayor Warren. I was down there and so was Mr. Silver."

"Good. That's exactly what we need, to hear from the people who are coping with this on a daily basis.

"The other part of your duty as a member of this task force is to hear public testimony from a range of individuals, both professionals and lay people, average citizens, on various aspects of the violence issue. Your first hearing takes place next Monday, at the Municipal Building.

"Finally, I want you to conduct a very careful review of prior initiatives, both here in Cornet and in other States, to combat violence. Find out what has been tried, what has been successful, and why. Tell me whether it can be done here in our city and how. I want specifics on what can be done at a citywide level, at the community level, down to the neighborhood level, and down to the family level. You will have a day-long briefing in preparation for this review.

"I expect your final report to be candid. Are there any questions? No? Then let's get to work. Your first hearing starts next Monday, as I understand it. I'll hear from you in 100 days."

As they left the briefing, panel members wondered the extent to which they could believe the mayor's call for honesty.

The Public Hearing

The first public hearing was called to order four days later in a small room in the Municipal Building. Reporters had been allowed to attend, but not television crews. Deputy Mayor John Canady opened the proceedings.

"All of the people in this room are concerned about crime and want to do something. The mayor and I, and the members of this task force, are equally concerned. We are all here today to try to find out the dimensions of this seemingly intractable problem, its causes, and, we hope, some solutions. This is the first of four public hearings, part of an open process to get every member of every community involved in this. We have been listening to and talking with community activists, religious leaders, representatives from homeless shelters, and shelters for battered women, police, everyone.

"We all want to create change, but we need to do it in an informed way. Before we act we must understand. Before we spend taxpayer money, we need to know what's already been done and what works. Only then can we make wise decisions.

"Each of the people brought here today will provide testimony on how he or she sees the problem of crime and drugs. I want to remind everyone in the room that one of the reasons we limited the number of people who could attend—and the mayor and I got a lot of flak for that—[was] that we wanted this to be a real give-and-take session. We want those of you in the audience to feel free to approach the mike over there with your questions or your comments, and please, we are all on the same side. It may not seem like it, but we are. Let's try to listen to each other and sort this out together."

The first person to testify was Officer Constance Yarborough, a 32-year-old black woman who had been on the force for three years. The mayor had made a specific request to hear from lower-level police officers to get a sense of what was happening on the front lines. Yarborough had been working with the residents of Sector 4C10 on improving conditions in the neighborhood.

"I want to thank you all for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. I agree with the mayor that it's important that we all work together to solve this problem. One thing I can tell you is that the police department cannot solve the problem. We need the members of the community to help us, otherwise these problems are gonna be here forever.

"I'm just gonna tell you what it's like from the perspective of the beat cop who is out there on a day-to-day basis dealing with crime and other problems in our city. When I walk into a neighborhood and I see guys hanging out on the street, let me tell you, I want to get them off the corner. I grew up in a neighborhood just like the one I patrol right now. Most of the people in the neighborhood are nice people. They raised their kids right, and they keep their houses up and everything. So when I see a bunch of guys out there hangin' on the corner it does make me mad, 'cause I know they're out there selling drugs, and they're rowdy, and they're all packin' too. Does everybody know what that means?" She looked at the audience. "No? Well, *packin'* means that they're carrying guns. Now, I'm not saying that to frighten

anybody, but you just need to know that those boys out there who seem kinda harmless, well, they are the ones out here killin' people."

"When I come into a neighborhood, and I see them hangin' out on the corner, I can't just tell them to move on. Sometimes they'll leave on their own, but most of the time they'll just stay there and wait for me to leave, but if I stay there or try to talk to them, usually they're gonna get abusive. They'll say things like, 'Why don't you stop harassin' me, you're only doin' it 'cause I'm a black man.' They tell me that I wouldn't be sayin' anything to people over in the Brockwood section of town. "Sometimes they'll go around the corner and throw things at me from beside a building, try to hit me with a bottle or somethin'. Police work is not easy, it's not a picnic. It's dangerous.

"The only law that I can use to get these guys off the streets is what they call the incommoding statute. Under that law they have to be blocking the sidewalk in such a way that pedestrians can't get by. In addition, I can only arrest someone for incommoding if there's a citizen complaint. So do you see what I'm saying? Somebody in the neighborhood has to call the dispatcher and say, 'There's a bunch of guys on Forten Street, and they're blocking the sidewalk so I can't get by. *Then* I can come around and arrest them, but I can't, as a police officer, charge them with incommoding.

"Now, how many citizens in a neighborhood are willing to register a formal complaint about the guys hanging out on the streets? None, right? I can understand that, because like I said before, these guys are ruthless, and they have guns. But then that puts me as a police officer in a real box, because I come into the neighborhood and I'm perceived as the bad guy. Even the law-abiding citizens won't speak to me. They don't want to be seen conversing with me because probably they're scared of retaliation. Then when a crime is committed and I come around and try to get information, nobody saw anything. I find it really frustrating sometimes, because you know that the person who won't give you any information about a murder across the street from them, that is the same person who is gonna criticize you and the police department if *their* child gets killed and the police can't find out any information. It's a no-win situation for us.

"Another thing that I really want people to understand is that even if I make an arrest, it's up to the prosecutor's office to decide if they want to try that case, so if I arrest somebody for distribution of crack cocaine, and the person only has a couple of rocks on them, after I go to all this trouble of arrestin' the guy and filling out the paperwork, the D.A. tells me that the amount of drugs is too small, so they want to charge the person with possession rather than distribution, so they end up plea-bargaining and the person is out on the street again. As a cop, you're not gonna do that too many times, because you're wasting your time. What happens is you at least try to stop the blatant stuff.

"Most of the time I'm not on foot patrol anyway because I have to be in the squad car. One night only three people showed up for roll call—three people. We had to cover the entire sector, so they put each of us in a squad car. There was nobody available to patrol on foot that night. I hear the people in the neighborhoods often complaining about the lack of foot patrols, but I just want you to understand that we take our orders from the desk sergeant, and if he or she says I gotta be in the patrol car, then I can't tell them, 'Oh, I promised that neighborhood patrol group in Sector 4C10 that I would walk with them tonight.'

"While we're talking about those groups, I just wanna say that I think they're great. I know this is gonna sound weird, but the truth is *I* feel safer when I'm in a neighborhood where there's people out patrolling." There was a burst of laughter from the audience.

"I'm not saying I want them to protect me or anything," Officer Yarborough continued, smiling, "but just that I feel better about the neighborhood. I know that the people are at least trying to do something to make the place better, and I know that I can count on them to call the police for help if they see me in trouble. A few weeks ago I had to patrol in a different neighborhood, and I got into an altercation with this guy. Well, I was out patrolling by myself that night—which is not at all unusual—and so I had radioed for help and had to struggle with this guy while I was waiting for backup. Well, there were people around on the streets in that neighborhood, and not one of them did anything to help me. I mean, I wouldn't expect them to jump in or anything, but they didn't express any kind of concern or anything. I later found out that there were no calls to the station that night saying that a police officer was being attacked.

"Anyway, that's how I ended up with this broken wrist, and I know that in my regular patrol neighborhood this would not have happened. I know that some of the people from there would have called the police or screamed or thrown rocks at the guy or somethin' to try to help me out. This is the kind of relationship that we need between the police and the public. Police officers are just like everybody else. They have kids and families. They like to watch television and have cookouts. I have one child myself, and although I do sometimes feel conflicted about my job, I really like this work, I think it's important. I always wanted to be a police officer, but it wasn't until I was in my late twenties that I decided to follow that dream.

"When the system works, you feel really great about your job, but when it doesn't work, . . . well, this job is very stressful.

"I just want to close by reminding every person in this room that society is only as good as the people who are in it, and if all of us don't try to make things better, one day we're just gonna have chaos—just pure chaos. That has already happened in a lot of neighborhoods, and sometimes even the cops don't care because they think that the people who live there don't care. If you want the system to work for you, you have got to get out there and complain to the captains and the police chief and the mayor. You've got to let them know that you just don't want to live like this anymore. Thank you."

The next person to testify was Judge Carolyn Frazier. Judge Frazier had been on the bench for over 10 years, and had a reputation for being tough but fair.

"I'm really glad to be taking part in this hearing, which I think will be really illuminating. I hope that as I hear from some of the other people testifying I will gain a better understanding of the kids—and the adults—I see in my courtroom. The fact is, when these kids don't get what they need, for whatever reasons, from their parents, from their schools, from their communities, and from the police department and probation officers, *I* am the person left to deal with them, and I see the same faces again and again, since about 70 percent of people arrested are repeat offenders.

"I think that we have been thinking about and writing about these problems for a while now, and I think that researchers and social scientists and citizens in this city and in the country have pretty much figured out what the problems are that have led to the violence that permeates

our society. I think things really began to change in 1985/86, when crack started coming into Cornet. Unquestionably, that was the start. You had this significant influx of people from the big cities because of the enormous sums of money that could be made here. You had this infiltration from New York, from Miami, from D.C., and other places, and as a result you had turf wars. That's when the homicide rate in this city began to skyrocket.

"Another cause for the lethal environment is the availability of high-powered weapons. The NRA can talk all it wants about how guns don't kill people, people kill people. The fact is that *people with guns* kill people." There was a burst of applause. "The criminal element in our city is better equipped than the police. They have higher-caliber weapons, and they have more of them. The criminals even have bullet-proof vests. There are people in these drug operations whose sole job is to kill people. They are enforcers.

"The people involved in the drug trade today, whether they're the street-level dealers or the suppliers and their lieutenants or the 'enforcers,' they have this total lack of respect for human life. The drug culture breeds this callousness. Some of the kids involved are really hardened and inured to violence because they grew up with it. It's learned behavior.

"Another very important factor is that so many of the young black males have no sense of self-esteem, and traditionally, or should I say historically, there has always been a certain level of violence among black males, because so often it is the only way of proving one's manhood. The homicide rate among black males in general, and the young ones in particular, is phenomenally high. A lot of people only look at the number of kids aged 15 to 19 who are being killed, but I can tell you that this holds for almost all ages. Homicide is the leading cause of death among black males of nearly all ages.

"We live in a society where 'real men' are those who have power. Power is essentially defined as having control over people and having lots of money. Now, there are legitimate ways of acquiring lots of money, but there are prerequisites. Education is one route, because the more education you have the better your chances of earning a good living, but many of these kids are dropping out of school. Black men have attained fame and fortune through sports and the entertainment business but obviously not everybody is going to be a Magic Johnson or a

Michael Jackson, and when you stop to consider the controversies that these two famous black men are now embroiled in, they aren't such clear role models anymore.

"So that leaves only a few legitimate ways to make money—those basic nine-to-five jobs, the kinds of jobs that don't pay a lot and the ones young people today despise. Of course, the level of opportunity for blacks in Cornet, and throughout this society, has always been less than what was available for other groups. What is new is that the drug trade gives these young men the chance to earn a lot of money and to live the kind of life they see depicted everywhere. They become much more willing to murder people to protect these new economic interests.

"Probably the single most important contributor to the violence that now plagues this city is the deterioration of the family, and especially the unavailability of fathers. I am telling you from personal experience that good fathers have a stabilizing influence. I remember when I was growing up, I had a brother who suddenly started getting into trouble. Our father was working two jobs because he had lost a position at the factory that had closed down, and so he had to take *two* janitorial positions to make ends meet. Well, my brother, who is a few years younger than I, started acting out for some reason: coming home late, being disrespectful to our mother. He was hanging out with a pretty rough crew and, I later found out, was carrying a gun. Our father was coming in really late at night and was getting tired of hearing these stories from me and my mother about what Bobbie had done.

"Well, one day my brother had just gone over the line. I forget exactly what he did, but my father had a heart-to-heart with him, told Bobbie he just wasn't going to tolerate that kind of behavior, and my brother was gonna have to straighten up and fly right or else. And my brother did.

"The offenders who come before me in court are different. I can tell you that. They have no remorse. There is a seeming indifference to the value of human life. It is chilling, and the younger they are, the more potentially violent they are. When you have a 12-year-old or a 13-year-old who has already killed two or three people, there is no way of making that child understand the seriousness of what he or she has done. They haven't developed emotionally or spiritually to the point where they understand what they've done. They have no concept of the future. They don't understand the idea of change or hope. They are, after all, children.

They're emotionally younger than their stated years—they're really 6 or 7 emotionally, not 12 or 13, and you know how hard it is to make a six-year-old understand what *next year* means.

"It's clear to me and to all judges that people are really fed up with crime. Citizens are tired of living in fear. They want the criminals in prison no matter how young they might be. It is tempting for judges to be influenced by this pressure, but I think that most of us, wisely, do not feel it's our role to be crime fighters. Most of us see ourselves as upholders of the law. I certainly see myself that way. I have to look at the facts of each case and the evidence before me. Then I have to use my experience and my judgment to determine what would be fair, what would be a just outcome for the perpetrator and for his or her victim. I've heard people say they think judges are too soft on criminals. There are probably some judges out there who see themselves as social workers and are more lenient, but I don't think most judges are like that or should be like that.

"Obviously, though, there are a lot of weaknesses in our criminal justice system. The main reason that so many criminals are set free is that prosecutors have too many cases and cannot adequately prepare for them. When I started out as a prosecutor, each of us had maybe 50 cases to deal with, on average. Today's prosecutors have twice that many—and those are the *senior* prosecutors, who have the lightest work load. Those who are doing their rotations in the criminal division can have 150 cases to prosecute.

"Even if they have more time to prepare their cases, they have problems getting witnesses. The law-abiding citizen is not going to testify in a drug case because the possibility of retaliation is real. The only witnesses left are usually people who are themselves involved in illegal activity. They are unsavory people and lack general credibility with a jury.

"Prosecutors sometimes lose cases because evidence is legally inadmissible. The police officer doesn't fully understand search and seizure laws or the rules of evidence, so I have on occasion had to exclude incriminating evidence that would probably [have led] to conviction. Some of you out there are probably thinking: Why can't you just look the other way? You know the person is guilty, or at least you think you do. How can you just let this person back out on the streets?

"I can tell you that it's hard to do. I once had to suppress evidence of a gun. I hated to do it. The case was being handled by a young prosecutor, and he broke the chain of custody in handling a gun seized at the crime scene, because of that I couldn't allow it into testimony. It would be totally inappropriate, not to mention dangerous to the very foundation of our judicial system, for me to let my personal feelings or frustrations influence my interpretation of the law.

"I understand how the public can get so frustrated they almost don't care about legalities and principles and procedures. I think that frustration leads us to use the political process to change the judicial process in order to solve social problems. I think that's why the minimum sentences for drug cases were legislated. For a long time judges did not appear to take these drug distribution cases seriously. Since they didn't live in communities where this was going on, judges didn't have a sense of how destructive this activity was to neighborhoods. Judges were giving out these very light sentences, and communities saw these dealers being repeatedly sent back to them with what seemed like a slap on the wrist. Citizens expressed their outrage to the politicians, and that's how we got these very stiff penalties for drug crimes.

"I must confess to you that I am extremely uneasy with the mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. I have real philosophical problems, because these minimums do not allow you to actually judge the case and its particularities. I have seen some injustices. There was the case of a young woman who got hooked on crack. She lost her job. She eventually lost her kids to Child Protective Services—her life was just completely centered on getting this drug, and she did whatever she had to, to achieve that end.

"Well, she racked up some pretty substantial debts with this dealer. He had beat her up and was threatening to kill her if she didn't come up with some way of paying the money she owed. She worked out this deal with him where she agreed to transport some drugs for him. She was instructed to meet someone at the train station in the District of Columbia, which is a major drug corridor, and the drugs were to be passed to her in an overnight bag.

"She was caught. She had a very significant quantity of drugs on her. Now the woman was being prosecuted in Federal Court, and she was facing a minimum of 10 years. This is her first offense, but that doesn't matter. She is a drug user, but that doesn't matter. It seems to me that what this woman really needs—what she needed all along—is treatment. Instead the

courts are treating her the same way as the person who's really high up in the drug hierarchy—the really 'bad' person, the dealer or distributor. Actually, the higher-up person gets better treatment, because he has information on all his enemies that he can offer to the prosecutor to get a sentence discount.

"I don't see how 10 years in prison benefits this woman or society. We're going to spend tens of thousands of dollars each year to incarcerate her. Her children are probably going to end up in the foster care system, at a cost of tens of thousands of taxpayer dollars. Some of the children will probably end up in the same situation as their mother, and the cycle continues.

"I don't want you to think that the courts are hopeless, that the system is poisoned fatally, but I do want to sound the alarm that things *will* fall apart, the center *will not* hold if we do not address some of the issues that are undermining our judicial system and our society. Thank you."

Lydia Davis was clapping and shaking her head at the same time. The more she heard the more depressed she became. To her right she saw one of her neighbors standing at the microphone.

"What I want to say is not really a question, just a comment, and that is that even though I would want to tell the police about some of the things I see, testifying maybe, I think it is too dangerous out there. There was this one woman a few blocks from here, she was beat up bad by her own son because she had to tell about the drugs that her boy was putting in the basement of her house. Now, I don't know if the mother was herself involved, but if these boys are going to beat up their own flesh and blood, then I don't see why they would really hesitate to hurt or even kill somebody else."

"Yes, I think you're right," Frazier responded. "The intimidation and murder of witnesses is really destroying the integrity of the system. The people in the community, people like you, feel there is total anarchy and that the judicial system affords no protection for those few brave people who are willing to testify in a drug case. We need to take a comprehensive look at witness protection programs and other ways to help these people, and we need to have remedies that fall somewhere between telling the witness to 'dial 911 if he threatens you' at one

end of the spectrum, and 'you have to quit your job, change your name, move to Idaho, and never contact your family again' at the other end.

"I think another reason people in the community don't want to get involved is that there is a fundamental distrust of prosecutors. The D.A.'s office needs to do what the police department has done: community outreach. The chief prosecutor needs to do what the police chief has done: go to the churches, the community meetings, the schools, and there needs to be a systemic link to the community—maybe mentor programs—so that prosecutors could get to know kids from the community and vice versa. In the State just west of us the D.A. has a public relations office, and it would of course help if more minorities were hired."

The next person to testify was the warden of the State prison. Joseph Alston was a burly man with close-cropped hair and a trim mustache. "With all due respect to Judge Frazier," he began, "*I'm* the last one to deal with the people who end up in the criminal justice system, and the number of people in that system keeps growing and growing and growing." There was laughter as people caught the allusion to a well-known commercial.

"In 1985 there were a total of 20,521 people in Cornet City who were either in jail, in prison, on probation, or on parole. That was 4 percent of the entire adult population of this city, and that was the highest rate for any similar jurisdiction in the entire country.

"In 1990, just five years later, Cornet again ranked highest in the country for percentage of the population in jail, in prison, on parole, or on probation: more than 5 percent of the adult population. This is twice the national average. This is 1 out of every 20 adults." (See exhibit 15.)

"While the number of prisoners has been increasing steadily, the space for housing them has not. There are 11 facilities available, and they are all at or near capacity. Nine of them are under Federal Court order or consent decree to hire more staff and improve conditions or because they are overcrowded.

"It is costing the taxpayer $14,000 to house each inmate each year. That's more than $100 million. People say that we need more prison space, but people also say they don't want to pay higher taxes.

Exhibit 15:

1985 and 1990 Cornet Population in Correctional Care, Custody, or Control

YEAR	Population in:					
	Total	**Jail**	**Probation**	**Prison**	**Parole**	**% of Total Adult Population**
1985	20,521	*	11,777	6,404	2,340	4.2
1990	25,354	1,629	9,742	8,637	5,346	5.17

* Included in prison category.

Source: *Correctional Populations in the U.S., 1985*; *Correctional Population in the U.S., 1990.* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

"Some of you may have the idea that prisons are these real nice places, like country clubs, where inmates sit around playing pool and watching TV. That may be the case for the prisons they send politicians and rich people to, to do their time but not for the typical Cornet offender. Almost 20 percent of them are in a maximum-security environment. About 68 percent are in medium-security facilities, and only about 21 percent are in minimum-security areas.

"What are they doing while they're incarcerated? There are some services available, but they're very limited. Some prisoners get treatment for alcoholism and drug dependency. About 12 percent get psychiatric or psychological counseling. They'll see a therapist maybe once a week, or every two weeks, for an hour. Another 10 percent or so get job training or counseling. I can tell you that the demand for these services is much greater than the supply.

"Most of the people in the prison system are repeat offenders. This may be the first occasion when they have served time, but it's not the first time they've been arrested or convicted of a crime. Whatever it is we are doing or not doing before they get to the point of imprisonment, I can tell you that what happens in prison doesn't seem to be working either. When we release them, they are either substantially unchanged, or they're worse than when they come in.

"One thing we really need to look at is the juvenile detention facilities. These places were built two or three decades ago when a young person got sent there for, say, joyriding or playing hooky from school, and the philosophy back then was you send them away for a couple of weeks, 'put some sense into them' by having them stay at this very regimented, strict environment, and then they would go back home to become law-abiding citizens. Well, those are not the kinds of juveniles we are locking up today.

"These kids are extremely violent. We don't have the physical security or the staff who can handle violent types. These kids don't stay for a few weeks: some of them come in at 13 or 14; they've committed murder; and they'll be there until they're 18 years old. If you think that the adult inmates aren't getting much in the way of treatment, even less is being done with the juveniles. They have GED classes, some of them are getting counseling once a week maybe, but other than that they're just sittin' around every day.

"One of the decisions we need to make as a society is what we expect from incarceration. Do we want to focus on punishment or on rehabilitation, and what do we mean by *rehabilitation*, and, most importantly, how much are we willing to pay for it? We're already spending $100 million a year, and maybe we need to do a little cost-benefit analysis to determine exactly what we're getting for our money. Thank you."

The next person to offer testimony was Dr. Marie Banfield, a social worker with the Department of Human and Rehabilitative Services. She began with some sobering statistics. "Last year we had 474 homicides, but we lost more than the 474 people who were killed. We lost almost 10,000 years of potential life." (See exhibit 16.) "We lost 10,000 years of creativity perhaps. This community has lost 10,000 years of productivity, and then you need to consider that the deaths of these people—most of them young black males—is a loss to hundreds and even thousands of others—the mothers, fathers, wives, siblings that they leave behind. Some of these murdered men were fathers, and now their children have got to grow up without them. This means more households headed by single young mothers.

"In the city of Cornet, almost *two-thirds* of all infants are born to single women. In addition, almost 20 percent of the women giving birth today are teenagers under the age of 20." (See exhibit 17.) Now, I'm not saying that *single* motherhood in and of itself means failure for

Exhibit 16:

Years of Potential Life Lost
1980, 1985, 1989

Year	Total	Male	Female	Black	White	White Male	White Female	Black Male	Black Female
1980	5118	4005	1113	4675	443	293	150	3713	963
1985	4645	3953	693	4415	230	203	28	3750	665
1989	9230	8210	1020	8735	495	407	88	7803	933

Source: "Age-Adjusted Mortality and Years of Potential Life Lost, by Race and Sex, City of Cornet: 1980-1989.

Exhibit 17:

VITAL STATISTICS - INFANTS
1981-1990

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Live Births, of which:	9,332	9,378	9,524	9,549	9,840	10,043	10,178	10,514	11,567	11,806
Born to single women	5,487	5,317	5,467	5,577	5,737	5,785	6,086	6,487	7,680	7,686
Percent	58.8%	56.7%	57.4%	58.4%	58.3%	57.6%	59.8%	61.7%	66.4%	65.1%
Born to Women < 20 yrs	1,950	1,847	1,791	1,747	1,752	1,707	1,659	1,840	2,094	2,101
Percent	20.9%	19.7%	18.8%	18.3%	17.8%	17.0%	16.3%	17.5%	18.1%	17.8%
Low Birth Weight	1,204	1,210	1,400	1,222	1,299	1,225	1,384	1,504	1,862	1,712
Percent	12.9%	12.9%	14.7%	12.8%	13.2%	12.2%	13.6%	14.3%	16.1%	14.5%
Infant Deaths	211	190	173	202	204	211	199	244	267	237
Rate Per 100	22.6%	20.3%	18.2%	21.2%	20.7%	21.0%	19.6%	23.2%	23.1%	20.1%

a child or societal chaos, nor is *young* motherhood in and of itself a problem if the woman has a social network that gives her emotional and financial support. What makes single motherhood problematic is that single mothers tend to be poorer than mothers who are married. This is logical, since married couples can have two incomes, and even on one income men usually earn more than women. Young motherhood also is a problem because generally such women have attained a low educational status—a high school diploma at best. From an economic standpoint, the more education you have the more earning power you have, so when you have children

being born into situations where they are already disadvantaged economically and perhaps emotionally, it isn't surprising that you end up with troubled youths.

"The young men and women who end up in the morgue or in jail usually start out in some part of the social service system. They are neglected as children. Some of them have been abused physically and sexually. They grow up knowing violence and force as the only instruments for getting what they need. I remember interviewing one kid, and I asked if he had ever been the victim of violence when he was growing up, and he said no. Well, when I began asking other questions, he told about one time where his mother had beat him severely and brutally with a high heel, leaving marks all over his body. This boy didn't consider that violence. He didn't think there was anything wrong with it, because he had accidentally set something on fire and he felt his mother was justified in beating him for it.

"No wonder these kids' ideas of right and wrong are so completely different from what you or I [grew] up with. Given the world that they live in, their behavior—including murder—makes sense to them. They will kill somebody who owes them $100 for drugs because, in their world, they will be considered weak if they let a customer get away with owing them money. They feel they have to kill the person, or all of their clients are going to start 'stiffing' them, or they may decide to kill somebody instead of just beating the person up, because he may come back later and kill *them.* Over and over you hear these kids say, 'It was either him or me' and you can see how they would come to that conclusion.

"I'm not saying that all of the people who murder and are murdered are angels but a lot of them could become decent, law-abiding, productive people *if the resources were available to help them:* drug treatment, job training, remedial education, psychological counseling. We as a society must be willing to commit a massive amount of resources if we really want to solve this problem, but we need to be clear about the choices we are making. One, we can try to help these young people by providing services in prisons, in juvenile facilities, and in the communities they come home to. Two, we could just say, 'Write these teenagers off as a lost generation.' Lock them up and throw away the key. We are going to throw all our resources into the children coming up right now: invest in health care, education, parent training, etc., before they ever get involved in crimes or drugs. Three, maybe we decide to just let things

continue as they are because 'the money is not available' for the kind of massive intervention that I feel is needed.

"Whatever decision we make, we need to understand that there are kids growing up right now who will replace the ones in jail today—actually, more than replace them. I don't know about here in Cornet, but if we're like the rest of the country, we'll have 20 percent more 16-year-olds by the year 2000 than we have now—and that's the high-crime age range. Just 16 years from now there will be more African-American and Latino 16-year-olds than ever before, and, let's face it, they're not only at the greatest risk of being murdered but also of doing the killing unless something changes. Sooner or later we have to deal with these problems.

"I want to leave you with some information that surprised me when I first came across it. When you look at the socioeconomic profile of victims, you'll see that it's almost identical to that of offenders." She paused and looked at the task force members. "Almost identical—about 61 percent of the assailants had been or were on Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and so were 60 percent of the victims. Among those who murdered, 42 percent were on Medicaid or received health care from charitable sources; the rate for victims was 43 percent. About 13 percent of the murderers had been in the foster care system at some point in their lives, as had 6 percent of the victims.

"The point I'm trying to make here is that poverty is a major contributing factor to the problem of crime and violence. Until we seriously try to eliminate poverty—and I'm not sure we have the political will to do that—we will continue to lose thousands of years of productive life every year. Thank you."

A member of the audience stood up to make a comment.

"I just wanted to say that these children are getting their values from somewhere, and that is the home." There was scattered applause. "If they grow up with a father who's a drug dealer or a drug addict, and if everyone in their environment has that same lifestyle, well, how can we expect them to turn out?"

Another woman stood up. "That's right. Because if they grow up and there's no father at home and the mother sits home all day and she's on welfare or having one baby after another,

that's what they learn is normal. These are the only models for adult behavior that they know, and these are negative models."

Another woman raised her hand to speak. "I just want to comment on what you said about the young mothers and the single mothers. I understand what everybody is saying about a lot of these young girls out here today havin' babies, and they're not much more than children themselves, but I am a single parent, almost 40 now, and I am doin' my best to raise my children in a good home with the things they need. But it is hard raisin' children in this day and age. There's a lot of new stuff out there for kids to get into, stuff that you and I never had to deal with as children.

"I have two boys and one girl, and let me tell you it is *hard* bringing them up in this society. I mean, there is all this . . . just violence out there. They get it in the movies and on the television. These doggone music videos are full of all this violence and sex. I try hard to raise my children right, but I can't be with them 24 hours a day. I do have two jobs, practically going from one to the other, and I just cannot be home to see what my child is doing every minute of the day. I try to set rules, but there are so many temptations and pressures out here on my children to do wrong. It's really hard to get a young boy to listen to his mother. I'm not, you know, saying it isn't the parents' responsibility to raise their children right but just that it is so hard out here. My daughter comes home asking me to buy her a Coach R. bag. Now, I can't afford one of those things for *myself,* let alone for my 14-year-old daughter. Yet and still all her friends have these bags, she says. I was fit to be tied one day when she came home with this Coach R. bag, telling me that this guy had given it to her as a gift. I told her to give it right back, and I wasn't havin' none of that. She was too young to be acceptin' those kinds of gifts from anybody.

"It's just really hard to be a parent these days, especially if you out here strugglin' by yourself." Others in the audience agreed with her.

The next speaker was Rev. Gerald Carpenter of St. Paul's A.M.E. Church. He began, "It is a sad thing to lose so many young people—a very sad thing—and we all know that people who are in need, or who think they are in need, are more likely to do whatever they can to *get* what they need." He paused, looked down at his notes, and then at the task force members.

"But I'm still finding it a little difficult to accept the idea that poverty and want can be used as an excuse to kill other people. I know that's not what Dr. Banfield is saying, but I'm afraid that there are some people out there who are listening to her words and thinking, 'Yeah, that's right, it's not my fault. It's my parents' fault. It's society's fault.' I'm having a very hard time with the notion that because I had a hard life I have the right to make somebody's else's life hard. I'm having a hard time with the idea that because I want your coat, or your car, then I have the right to take it from you—even if I have to *kill* you for it!" There were murmurs of assent from the audience.

"Our previous speaker was a social worker. It is her profession to try to see to the physical needs of children, of families, make sure there is enough food to eat, and that there is shelter. This is excellent and necessary work, and you know something? It didn't use to be up to the government to do it. We used to be able to depend on our families. We used to be able to depend on our neighbors. We used to live by the words in the Bible, the part in Revelation that says: 'The one sitting on the throne will shelter them, they will never be hungry again, nor thirsty, and they will be fully protected from the scorching noontime heat. For the lamb standing in front of the throne will see them and be their shepherd, and lead them to the springs of the water of life, and God will wipe their tears away.' We used to *take care* of each other. Now we don't want to help anybody, or we're afraid. We have lost the spirituality that makes us feel compassion for each other. Now we live by the dollar: 'I have to have this and I have to have that.'

"One of the things that really struck me was the information that the murderers weren't very different from their victims. Both groups were relatively poor. Both groups had suffered, but what distinguished the one from the other was the willingness to take someone else's life. This was not an economic decision, my friends, this was a *moral* decision. Do we want to start excusing people because they grew up in a certain environment and they 'can't help' the way they act? Do we want to start saying that it's all right to hurt other people just because you yourself are poor or abused? What we need to tell these people out here murdering other people is, 'It doesn't matter *what* kind of home you grew up in, we still expect you to live by the rules of a decent society!' 'Do unto others' is what we should be saying to these people. 'Do unto

others.' Just because you want to make a lot of money, does that give you the right to sell drugs to a pregnant woman? Is it all right to say to yourself, 'Well, *she's* the one making the decision to use drugs, it's not my problem.' What happened to 'I am my brother's keeper'?

"Why doesn't every poor person become a murderer?" Rev. Gerald Carpenter turned to look at the audience. "Why does one poor person go out and get two jobs and another poor person go out and get welfare? Now don't get me wrong. There's nothing wrong with welfare. When I was growing up there were times when we had to get food stamps. My mother did [a] day's work, and sometimes there was no work and therefore no food, so my mother swallowed her pride and did what she had to do to feed us, and she didn't think that just because she had a family to feed she could lie and cheat and steal to feed them.

"Let me ask you this: Twenty years ago, how many strong, intelligent black men were working as janitors and shoeshine 'boys' and chauffeurs and cooks and orderlies so they could feed their families and make ends meet? How many came home at night, bone tired, and spent a little time with their sons and their daughters? How many of them got up on Sunday morning, even though they wanted to sleep late, and got *out* of bed, and got their *children* out of bed, and went *down* to the church to learn about how to lead an upright life?

"[W]hat do we have today? Well, you got men out here—they *think* they're men just because they've brought a couple of children into the world (and not even supportin' those kids). You got these 'men' who say, 'I don't wanna work at McDonald's.'" Rev. Gerald Carpenter smiled. "Did you hear what I said? They don't *want* to work at McDonald's for $5 an hour. No, they wanna start off—at age 18 and *maybe* a high school diploma. They wanna start out wearing a suit and tie and driving a BMW.

"Make no mistake. The rampant drug dealing, the total disrespect for family and community—these are only partly economic issues. These are essentially *moral* issues. I want you to remember that these kids are not out here sellin' drugs and killing each other because they're trying to keep a roof over their heads. They're not trying to buy groceries or pay for a medical operation. They're doing these things for $200 tennis shoes. They're doing it for leather jackets and tickets to fancy nightclubs. This is not a problem of economics. It's a problem of *values*.

". . . I hear what this woman was saying, the one who talked about how she is working two jobs and still trying to raise her kids right. We need more mothers and fathers in this community who are like that. We need men and women to give children the right values. Otherwise, where are they gonna get those values from? From television and movies, where you got Joan Collins sleeping with everybody so she can get ahead. You got J. R. Ewing lying and cheating and stealing and double-crossing everybody, so he can get *more* money, *more* power, *more* things. The kids out here are gettin' their values from the street corners instead of the home, and I am here today to tell you: We need to put *God* out there on the street corner! We need to put *respect* out there on the street corner! We need to put *compassion* out there on the street corner!

"Well, someone has just slipped me a note saying that my time is up. I apologize for taking so much of your time. I know you've got to hear from a lot more people, but I am a preacher, and you know how we are once we get to talkin.'" Many people laughed, including Davis and Heywood. "I just want to close out by saying to all of you, start taking responsibility for what is happening to our young people. Everybody in this room needs to be doing *something* to try to save these kids. It needs to start *in the home.* We need to be asking ourselves: Am I being a responsible parent? Am I setting the right example? If the parents are so concerned about what's happening with Bob and Mary Sue down the street, who just got a new car and are goin' on a cruise in February—meanwhile everybody's in debt up to their eyebrows—well, what values do you expect the children to have? You have the parents out here buying their 6-month-old kids designer clothes. Babies out here whose outfits cost more than mine! We shouldn't be surprised if the kids grow up thinking they need designer this and designer that or they aren't anybody. The parents are responsible for these materialistic views. The apple doesn't fall far from the tree." There was enthusiastic applause and amens from several people.

The next person to be introduced was Cassandra Harding, principal of Martin Luther King High School.

"I want to thank Reverend Carpenter for all the wonderful and important ideas he has asked us to think about. He has said so much that is true. There's one thing in particular he

brought up that I want to reemphasize: children learn their values at home, and as an educator I know that too many of the children today are not getting the parental support they need to do well in school.

"We have kids coming in who haven't had any breakfast, or they've had a bag of potato chips and a soda. They're tired because they were up until 2 o'clock in the morning watching movies on cable television—*with their parents.*" There were some gasps in the audience. "We give the children homework, and when they get home, there isn't a quiet place for them to do it. The television is going, everybody's watching 'In Living Color.' The parent doesn't ask the child if homework is finished. They don't have any rules that the child has to follow about doing homework first and being entertained afterward. Then when the child brings home a poor report card, the parent is running into my office complaining that the teachers are no good and they're unfair, and the parent is demanding to know, 'Why did you fail my child?'

"Dr. Banfield brought up an extremely important point: young mothers for the most part don't have the education or the skills to establish a good economic or emotional foundation for their children. Last year, nearly one-third of the black women giving birth in Cornet did not have a high school diploma. [See exhibit 18.] The children don't learn the value of education from the example of the parents, and without education, as Dr. Banfield pointed out, your chances of earning a decent living are greatly reduced.

"One other trend I have noticed—and I tell you it breaks my heart—is the devaluation of intelligence among our youth. I have seen brilliant young blacks *purposely* fail because it wasn't 'cool' to be smart or do well, and you know, they might be able to deal with that peer pressure for not being 'cool,' for being a 'nerd,' but the peers do something even worse to these young people. They tell them they aren't *black* if they're smart. I mean, here you are, a teenager. You're already vulnerable and insecure about so much. Then you get everybody around you saying, 'you think you're white' just because you're doing well in school. I'm telling you, it really astounds and saddens me that in a single generation we've gone from admiring people who are smart and who achieve academically to taking away their very racial identity. Let me tell you a story that speaks to this issue.

Exhibit 18:

Age and Education of Mother (Black Residents)
Percent of Total Age Group

Yrs. Educ.	< 15 Yrs.	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40 +	Unknown	Total
0-8	0.57	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.03
9-11	0.30	0.59	0.26	0.21	0.17	0.15	0.11	0.27	0.29
12	0.08	0.32	0.55	0.48	0.45	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.45
13-15	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.20	0.20	0.24	0.20	0.23	0.15
16	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.11	0.18	0.07	0.04
17 +	0.01	0	0.00	0.03	0.06	0.13	0.16	0.06	0.03
Not stated	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Total #Cases	79	1825	2613	2367	1481	493	99	71	9048

Source: "Age and Education of Mother by Maternal Race," 1990, Department of Human Services, Washington, DC.

"A couple of weeks ago I had this young man in my office for disrupting the class or something, and somehow we got to talking about role models. This young man starts saying that there aren't any role models around today, no black men to look up to. He points out that we only bring up dead people as role models—Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, for example. He said that our race was in a sorry state if the only role models we had were dead ones.

"I asked him if he ever saw any black men at work. He said yes. So I asked him, Don't you think they are role models? Then I asked him about Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and this young man dismissed him out of hand. He said, 'Yeah, I see him on television, and he sounds just like a white man. He ain't black.'

"When I hear things like this I am just astounded. This young man went on to talk about the blacks in corporations who had big jobs, how they had probably 'sold out,' and how they didn't care about the blacks left behind. I tried to point out to him that there was a contradiction in what he was saying. On the one hand, he was saying that there weren't any black male role models around. On the other hand, when I pointed some out to him, he argued that blacks who *did* achieve and had made it were 'sellouts' and didn't deserve his admiration or respect.

"The kids who are in mixed schools really catch hell. When these black kids get into the classes for the gifted and for high achievers, they find fewer and fewer children of color, and it can be very hard for them. They are torn. They have to talk a certain way when they're in school, and they come home and get blasted by their 'homeboys' for being 'white.' And what does it mean to these kids to be a 'black man'? Well, you've got to walk a certain way, and talk a certain way, and wear certain clothes. ...While this pressure to follow the crowd confronts *all* teenagers no matter what race, for black teens academic excellence and peer acceptance are all wrapped up with *racial* identity and not just individual identity.

"Another very disturbing trend is that the violence that children confront in their neighborhoods and their communities is starting to show up at the schools. This used to be the one place where they could feel safe, where there was some kind of order. Some of the schools in our city are like prisons. You've got armed security guards. You've got metal detectors. The drug dealing that occurs on the street corners where they live also goes on inside the schools. We've got kids afraid to go to the bathroom because of the drug dealing and intimidation going on in there. Just two weeks ago a teacher was shot by a 14-year-old. What I want to know is, Why doesn't that child's parents know that he has a gun? Where is the parental supervision? ...It just so happens that I had called this young man's parents *three times* a week before the shooting. I got no response from them.

"Everybody expects the schools to solve these problems. Schools are not just supposed to provide our children with a solid educational foundation. Society wants us to feed them, collect clothes for them, find shelter for those who are homeless, provide preventive medical care, offer counseling, discipline them, entertain them, and now we're expected to give them civic values. In short, you are asking us to become their parents. You are asking the schools to do what communities used to do, what families used to do.

"Finally, we're supposed to accomplish all this with classes that are too large, with students in the 11th grade who can't read, with too few textbooks to go around, with no computers like the schools in the suburbs. You pay us less to do this than you pay the person who picks up your trash. Educating our children is the most important work, after parenthood, that we have to do in this country.

"Like the other people testifying here today, I also believe that we need to make some fundamental decisions about what kind of children we are producing and raising, and we need to make the personal and financial sacrifices as individuals and as a society to make these changes possible. We need to spend more money on education. We need smaller classes. We need to pay teachers what they're worth, so we can attract the best and the brightest to this profession. We desperately need parents to *get involved.* I can't tell you how depressing it is to have three parents show up for parent-teacher night, and the ones who show up are usually the parents whose kids are already doing well.

"The bottom line is that we need the commitment of everyone in the community if we're going to solve the crisis in education, because I can tell you that principals and teachers and administrators cannot do it alone. In the words of the old African proverb, 'It takes a whole village to raise a child.' Thank you."

Davis and Heywood hardly noticed that they had been there for almost an hour. They had found each speaker provocative and challenging. Other members of the audience were raising their hands to ask questions.

A young woman spoke first. "I wanted to ask Principal Harding why don't they just take these unruly kids out of the schools and put them in a place just for them." Several people clapped or expressed agreement. "I mean, they are messing things up for the kids who *do* want to learn."

"But suppose it was your child causing the problems," someone shouted.

"I would still say send them to a special school. I have a nephew who I know belongs in a special school. His mother cannot handle him at all. He is constantly being suspended and I know my sister is tired of going down there and signing him back in. He is the type of child who probably needs to be in a stricter environment, with a smaller number of kids in the class so the teacher has more control."

Harding responded, "We are exploring those very options, but one of the problems we're facing is finding a site and getting the funding for staff and equipment. We're having a hard enough time finding money for the traditional schools."

A man in his late thirties stood at the microphone with his arms folded across his chest. "I wanted to respond to what the social worker was saying earlier. I don't want to sound like I'm a hard-hearted person or cold or anything, and I do feel for some of these kids you-all are talking about, but all I keep thinking about is, Where is the responsibility? There are more opportunities out here today and more programs than ever before. When I was growing up we didn't have *any* of this stuff—midnight basketball and job training and all that. I mean, I listen to these kids, and it seems to me that a lot of 'em just don't *want* to work. They want that easy money, and they're not poor either. Their mothers would *give* them whatever it is they want. Just like the Reverend said. But they just . . ." His voice trailed off. "I don't know. I really don't know."

Rev. Gerald Carpenter raised his hand to speak. "Like I was saying, we have lost our moral bearings. We are quick to blame everyone but ourselves. I will be the first one to admit that racism is very real. It is prevalent in this society, but there is no white person out there telling this young person to sell drugs to a pregnant woman."

Judge Frazier entered the discussion. "Well, I think you're right, Reverend Carpenter, when you point out that there is this tendency to look outward to place the blame for everything. At the same time, though, today's society is very different from the one you and I grew up in. We don't have the same neighborhoods anymore, where people looked out for each other and didn't hesitate to correct someone else's child."

Dr. Banfield responded, "I can definitely understand this gentleman's frustration, but I do want to point out that these kids really do need massive intervention, starting with some intensive, long-term psychotherapy or counseling. We've got to go back with these kids and uncover the really harmful and devastating events of their childhoods. I'm talking about four, five, six years of this kind of intensive therapy, several times a week. I think it's unrealistic to think that you can spend one hour a week with these kids for a year and expect to make any substantial progress."

Someone in the audience yelled out, "What about recreation? The kids don't have anything to do."

Judge Frazier responded. "Recreational activities are just crucial. I mean, you have children out there in the suburbs acting out and having beer parties in the garage when the parents aren't home. They're bored. Why should we expect poor children to be any different? We do need to offer some recreation alternatives for our children."

"And we need to start early," Banfield added. "If a child's on the wrong path by fourth grade, it's going to be hard to pull him back." Several people said incredulously, "The *fourth grade?"*

"That's right, the fourth grade," Banfield repeated. "You can save some after that, and we have to keep trying. But if we wait past third or fourth grade, we're going to lose a lot of them."

The moderator announced that there was time for one or two more questions. Davis was at the microphone.

"My name is Lydia Davis, and I live in the 1300 block of Sixth Street over in Southwood. Today I have listened to the police officer say that, you know, it's hard to arrest these boys out here in the street terrorizing us, and then the judge said that it's so hard for the prosecutors to convict the drug dealers, and then the man from the prisons said that he doesn't have any place to put them even if they were convicted. What I want to know is what all this means. Are you-all saying that we have to live with this problem? 'Cause that's what I'm hearing."

There were murmurs from the audience; the task force members looked at each other. Finally, the deputy mayor responded.

"Mrs. Davis, I believe I understand some part of the frustration you're expressing right now, but I want to assure you that Mayor Warren and I, and every member of this task force, are working to make sure that you, and everyone else in Cornet, ... *don't* have to live with this problem anymore. We are not proposing a quick fix. It isn't going to happen in a few months, but we will have a plan, a strategy, for the mayor to implement in a few months. No, you are *not* going to have to live with this problem. No one should have to live with this problem."

Drafting the Plan

Testimony from the public hearing had been sobering, and throughout the next day's executive session strands of the various arguments were pulled out for examination and discussion. There was among the task force members a remarkable effort to avoid the simplistic and the ideological; after all, they reminded themselves, real people would be affected by their decisions.

"We also need to look at past and current anticrime programs here in Cornet," the deputy mayor told them. This information was contained in the *Background Report on Anti-Violence Initiatives in Cornet,* a 30-page document that revealed that many of the efforts were less than a year old and focused on law enforcement. (See exhibit 19.) It would be difficult to evaluate their impact, since they were so new.

Finally, the task force received a summary of major studies and commissions on violence in U.S. cities, from 1917 to 1982 (listed in exhibit 20). The two most recent reports they focused on were *Combating Violent Crime: 24 Recommendations To Strengthen Criminal Justice,* a 1992 report from Attorney General William P. Barr; and *Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime for the Nineties,* published in 1990 by the Eisenhower Foundation. The conclusions in these documents represented the extremes in the crime debate, with Barr emphasizing incarceration and its desired progeny, deterrence, and Eisenhower arguing for the effectiveness of broad-based prevention. (See exhibit 21.)

"Well," said the deputy mayor, "what are your initial thoughts? You've got yesterday's testimony from the experts and from the average citizens. You've been briefed on Cornet's antiviolence programs, and you've got some national reports before you. Most important, each of you has personal knowledge and experience to bring to bear on this issue. To borrow a phrase: 'What is to be done?'"

Exhibit 19:
Summary: *Background Report on Cornet City Anti-Violence Initiatives*

POLICE INITIATIVES	• **Domestic Violence Teams (DVTs).** Established in 1986. Police allowed to make an arrest without a complaint by the battered individual, based on their judgment of the situation. Police help the woman to contact the County's Office on Women's Domestic Violence Program, and are also given discretion to transport the battered woman and her children to the local women's shelter. • **Operation 'Sunset':** Intensive investigation of drug trafficking and related murders that started in 1984 and ended in virtual failure in 1988. An internal investigation found that police corruption fatally compromised the effort. • **Community-Oriented Policing Strategy (COPS).** Established in early 1990 on a limited basis in low- and middle-income neighborhoods with significant increases in crime and violence. The program involves foot patrols by officers who are specifically and, where possible exclusively, assigned to a particular area. Officers authorized to use some of their time to interface with other government agencies (Public Works, Sanitation, Regulatory Affairs, etc.) to address problems such as poor lighting, abandoned vehicles, dumping and housing code violations.
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES	• **1975 Weapons Control Act.** One of the country's most restrictive laws, it barred the purchase of any new handguns. Additionally, this law limited possession of handguns to police officers, security guards and those who owned these weapons before the law was enacted. • **Youthful Offenders Act.** Announced in 1990 in a highly-publicized $20 million "Youth Crusade." The Act lowered the age at which youths could be charged as adults in felony murders from 16 to 14. • **Youth Crusade.** A 1990 effort to focus more resources on prevention and intervention through a diversion program; penal and institutional aftercare; and inter-governmental liaison. • **Spousal Abuse Law.** A 1991 law (commonly referred to as the "battered woman syndrome law") which allowed defense attorneys to introduce evidence of past physical abuse by women who had murdered their husbands. The law also permitted the use of expert testimony on "battered woman syndrome" as an argument that the woman was acting in self-defense.
SOCIAL SERVICE INITIATIVES	• **"Lead Paint Project."** An education and lobbying campaign started in 1980 to remove lead-based paint from public housing units. • **Visiting Nurse Program.** A highly successful effort to reduce the incidence and prevalence of child abuse and neglect by having visiting nurses address issues of nutrition, prenatal care, parenting and stress management. The program had been cut recently, severely limiting the ability of staff to do effective case management. • **Child Protective Helmet Campaign.** An initiative that had only recently been introduced by the Public Health Commissioner. Its objective was to reduce head injuries among young people. • **Prenatal Education Classes.** These classes were offered beginning in 1988 in local health clinics and the County Hospital. Budget cuts had eliminated the program.

Exhibit 20:

Summary of Major Studies and Commissions on Violence in U.S. Cities

YEAR/PLACE	NAME OF COMMISSION	APPOINTED BY	CHAIRMAN	NAME OF FINAL REPORT
1917 - East St. Louis	Special Committee Authorized by Congress	House of Representatives	Ben Johnson	Report
1919 - Chicago	Chicago Commission on Race Relations	Gov. Frank Lowden	Edgar A. Bancroft	The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot
1935 - New York	The Mayor's Commission on Conditions in Harlem	Mayor Fiorello La Guardia	Charles Robertson	The Negro in Harlem: A Report on Social and Economic Conditions Responsible for the Outbreak of the March 19, 1935 Riot
1943 - Detroit	Governor's Committee to Investigate Riot	Gov. Harry Kelly	Herbert J. Rushton	Final Report
1965 - Los Angeles	Governor's Commission on Civil Disorders	Gov. Edmund Brown, Sr.	John A. McConea	Violence in the City: An End or Beginning?
1968 - Washington	National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders	President Lyndon B. Johnson	Otto Kerner	The Kerner Report
1968 - New Jersey	Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorders	Gov. Richard J. Hughes	Robert D. Lilley	Report for Action
1968 - Chicago	Chicago Riot Study Committee	Mayor Richard J. Daley	Richard B. Austin	Final Report
1969 - Washington	National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence	President Lyndon B. Johnson	Milton S. Eisenhower	To Establish Justice, To Insure Domestic Tranquility
1970 - Washington	National Commission on Campus Unrest	President Richard M. Nixon	William W. Scranton	The Scranton Report
1982 - Miami	U.S. Civil Rights Commission	President Ronald Reagan	Clarence Pendleton	Confronting Racial Isolation in Miami

Exhibit 21:

Summary of 1992 Barr Report and 1990 Eisenhower Report

Combating Violent Crime (Barr Report)	*Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction* (Eisenhower Report)
► Protect the community from dangerous defendants through pre-trial detention.	► Comprehensive attack on the social and economic factors associated with crime and violence through efforts ranging from education to primary health care to housing.
► More effective deterrence to include "truth-in-sentencing"; mandatory minimum penalties for gun offenders, armed career criminals, and habitual violent offenders; the death penalty; and asset forfeiture.	► Replication of early education programs such as Head Start, in order to reduce subsequent criminality and drug use.
► More effective deterrence of youthful offenders to include treating juvenile offenders as adults; use of juvenile offense records in adult sentencing.	► Cost-effectiveness of investment in social services over criminal justice services.
► Efficient trial, appeal and collateral attach procedures.	► Adequate funding and technical/managerial support of grassroots anti-crime and anti-violence programs.
► Detection and prevention of crime by investing in quality law enforcement personnel; computerizing criminal data; and statutory changes in immunity and surveillance laws.	► Replication of and emphasis on small-scale efforts.
► Greater protection and respect for witnesses, to include victim restitution and compensation; and protection from intimidation and harassment.	

Appendix B:

Responding to the Cornet City Violence Problem

APPENDIX B: RESPONDING TO THE CORNET CITY VIOLENCE PROBLEM

I. Framing the Problem

A. Violence as a Community Crisis

Despite their different backgrounds, the three participants had remarkably similar "first takes" on the problem of violence in Cornet City. Interestingly, what they agreed upon was that the problem to be managed was not just the violence, it was also importantly a perception -- a palpable sense of crisis that was overwhelming the broader community of Cornet City, and the local community of Southwood where most of the violence seemed to be occurring.

> **Stewart**: The problem is the perception that.. a wave of violence is overwhelming the community without anything that can be done...An important overlay.. [is]..this sense that we are alone and [have] this feeling of insecurity. (Transcript, p.5)
>
> It's almost like an epidemic of the flu or some kind of new disease has struck, and people say, "Gee, there's no cure for this, and we have to endure it." (p.7)
>
> **Daughtry**: [The problem is] that there's a lack of inclusiveness...A segment of the community..feel[s] disenfranchised; they don't have much hope,...and seem to be taking the path of illicit drug sale and use...[That] in itself is a problem because..the attendant problems..[include]..violence in the form that you see it in Cornet City. (pp.5-6)
>
> **Coleman-Miller**: I see a feeling of being out of control...The drugs and the violence are now out of control and the community has become paralyzed. (p.6).

The sense of crisis seemed to be important to the participants' definition of the problem for at least two reasons. First, the general demoralization of the community was viewed as one of the worst consequences of the violence that was taking place. The fear, the loss of community identity and pride, and the potentially widening gulf between Southwood and the rest of the city, that flowed from the growing violence were now serious enough to be problems in their own right. Therefore, community and governmental responses had to be designed to deal with these problems along with the underlying violence as important ends of public policy. Part of the policy problem was to restore a sense of confidence throughout the community.

Second, the community's perceptions of the violence constituted one of the important assets that the government would have to use in its struggle against violence. To the extent that local or city-wide concern mobilized individuals and agencies to take action against the problem, a flow of volunteer resources would be available for the solution of the problem that could usefully complement other resources that were available. To the extent that the community remained indifferent, or despaired, or became enured, some needed resources would be missing from the required response.

There was also some sense that the community's perceptions of the problem might be technically and substantively important in understanding what the real problems of violence were, and how they might be more effectively controlled. Without the benefit of community interpretations of the circumstances and conditions that caused the violence, planning efforts might well go awry. Thus, community perceptions represented an important means for addressing the problem as well as an important end.

B. Sources of the Crisis

Given these views, an important question became what was creating the perception that things were "out of control". The participants came up with many different explanations for this phenomenon.

One was that levels of violence had finally crossed some threshold of community tolerance:

> **Stewart**: What happened, I think, is that four years of violence accumulated to the realization that Cornet City was now approaching New York, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., and that crossed a threshold where people said, "Gee, we ought to do something about it. (p.9)

Coleman-Miller also noted that the inclusion of a member of the tourist board on the Mayor's Committee signalled an important concern about the city's external and internal perception of itself as a community. In essence, the broader community's understanding of itself and confidence in its financial well-being were being undermined by the level of violence and the fact that it kept getting worse.

A second explanation for the heightened concern was that the violence had finally moved beyond the boundaries of the Southwood community and become a general problem for the city.

> **Daughtry**: One of the issues that promotes insecurity is that it's not confined to a general area within the city. Now we're having people who are mugged at the grocery stores!...[The problem has] spread beyond the borders of a certain community. (pp.14-15)

Part of what engaged the broader community was the sense that people living in other parts of Cornet City might be victimized. But perhaps, too, the intensity of the problem in Southwood finally mobilized the sympathy and concern of the other parts of Cornet City. Perhaps it was not just that the rest of Cornet City was afraid for itself; residents elsewhere might also be ashamed of what was happening in Southwood, or concerned about the people who lived there.

A third idea was that the situation felt out of control because there were many signs that the community's standard response to the violence was breaking down -- that the bureaucratic agencies that were supposed to handle the problem were falling back in disarray. Both Stewart and Daughtry emphasized this aspect of the crisis.

> **Stewart**: The perception is that [the community] didn't know what to do because all their institutions were, in their view, ineffective. [They] couldn't provide the right response. (p.9)

> **Daughtry**: One thing I've neglected [in explaining the sense of crisis] is that the past successes no longer fit...There's a new problem, and the traditional responses that enjoyed success in the past are not now working. (p.11)

Indeed, all three of the participants were particularly concerned about the inadequate response made by the police department to the developing crisis. Coleman-Miller observed that the unanswered 911 system was clearly a sign of bureaucratic breakdown. (pp.6-7) Stewart directed everyone's attention to the declining ability of the police department to solve the homicides that were occurring. (pp.11-12) And both Coleman-Miller and Daughtry observed that although the local police department had many of the forms of community policing, the department seemed to lack its operational essence -- the ability to form close working partnerships with local communities to identify and solve local problems. As Coleman-Miller explained:

Coleman-Miller: There's a real schism between the community and the bureaucratic process. (p.10)

Eventually, a fourth idea about what was precipitating the crisis emerged from the conversation. It seemed that what had gotten under the community's skin was not violence in general, but a particular component of violence: "the reality that there are children dying on the street". (Coleman-Miller, p.24). This piece of the violence problem was new. (Coleman-Miller, p.26) This piece was the fastest growing. This piece of the problem spread fear and despair most widely throughout the community. And it was this piece of the problem to which the traditional police response seemed to have the fewest answers. (Stewart, p.__) Not only were city agencies failing to prevent these murders, but police were failing to solve them.

C. Different Perceptions in Different Neighborhoods

The participants also recognized that the violence problem was being experienced in different ways in different parts of the city. Southwood, long the site of much of Cornet City's violence, was suffering the consequences of both new and old forms of violence most directly. The wider city, perhaps frightened by the spillover violence, perhaps embarrassed by the implicit indictment of the community in general made by escalating levels of violence, perhaps genuinely caring about the loss of its young citizens, experienced the violence much less personally.

> **Stewart**: In Southwood, [the violence problem] has gotten worse. It's gotten so much worse there that the more stable, middle class families in Southwood are feeling more at risk. The attention that is being given by the police and the press and by other forms of violence give the perception that violence is spreading throughout the community when, in fact, it is still very localized...But because the violence is so intense, and because the police seem ineffective,..it is beginning to frighten the larger community (including the mayor) so they think there must be a larger political response. The violence has not yet stained all of Cornet, it is still pretty localized, but people are frightened it could break out. (p.16)

The different perceptions and experiences of the violence create some political difficulties in organizing an effective city wide response to the problem. Indeed, from Southwood's perspective, the Mayor's recognition that the weekend of violence represents a "wake up call" for the entire city was a mixed blessing.

The good news was that the rest of the city might finally be willing to focus its attention and resources on a problem that had long beset Southwood, but which Southwood had not had the social and economic resources to solve alone. Insofar as Southwood could count on receiving additional resources from other parts of Cornet City, they might be advantaged in their struggle against violence, and bound more tightly to the wider community.

The bad news was that the new attention might actually strain relationships between Southwood and the wider city. This effect could result from two different mechanisms. One is that the wider city's sudden concern about Southwood could easily feed Southwood's growing cynicism about the rest of Cornet City. They might reasonably observe that it is only when Southwood's problems spill over into the rest of Cornet City that the City rouses itself to take action. The other is that the image of Southwood as a lawless place, peopled by misfits and scoundrels, is accentuated by focusing on the problem of violence, and seeing that the violence is concentrated in Southwood. Ironically, then, the divisions between Southwood and the rest of the city may deepen even as the City as a whole is moving to respond to some of the problems in Southwood.

This basic political problem in managing the community's response to an unevenly distributed problem of violence was the focus of many of Coleman-Miller's early observations about the problem, and the response that was being made. Early on, she criticized the Mayor's Task Force for not including enough members of local communities and of the youth -- the people who were most involved with the problem. In her view, it was unlikely that any solution created by the Task Force would be effective or have any legitimacy if the people who knew most about the problem, cared most about its consequences, and were best positioned to deal with were excluded from the discussions.

She was also concerned that the perception of Southwood that was likely to come through in the Task Force's work and actions would be an inaccurate one. She observed that:

> **Coleman-Miller:** There is no balance [in the way that the data about the problem is presented]...When we look at the data, we really lose a sense of how the community really operates and exists...How many of the children are graduating from high school? How many of them are safe as they go out to their summer jobs? As long as that's not brought out, people are reacting to a perception that everything's bad. (pp. 21-22)

> **Coleman-Miller:** The truth is that this is a magnificent and strong segment of the society. Although disenfranchised, they have the strength to survive and to fix what's broken. (p.23)

Unless the wider city's perception of Southwood were changed, then, she saw serious difficulties in the future handling of the violence crisis. Not only would the citizens of Southwood be offended and further alienated, but their potentially important contributions would go unutilized.

D. The Mayor's Response

At one level, the Mayor's response to the deepening crisis -- to establish an interagency Task Force to begin developing a response to the escalating violence -- seemed well suited to the situation. It recognized that a significant problem existed. It recognized that current solutions were not working. It created a context within which inter-agency co-operation could occur. And it created a process of community consultation and mobilization that might stir both volunteer action and bureaucratic inventiveness.

Yet, despite these positive aspects, the participants found much to criticize in the Mayor's initial response. Coleman-Miller was particularly critical:

> **Coleman-Miller:** They have taken very bureaucratic steps that paralyze people...They just kind of overstepped some of the operational problems (like the busy signal on 911 that could perhaps have been fixed very quickly) and moved quickly into a bureaucratic "call-a-meeting" syndrome...(pp.6-7)

She thought that missing the operational problems that could have been fixed contributed to the sense that things were out of control, since it was hard to make progress in visible ways.

> **Coleman-Miller:** The feeling of numbness when you are out of control leads you to something you can read in a book as opposed to taking action that helps get you in control again...If you look closely in the case, you would see there are things that could have been controlled. (p.8)

As noted above, she was also critical of the composition of the group. It had plenty of bureaucrats, but not enough local community people, and not enough youth. Without their participation, they might

continue to feel powerless, and their views about how the problem might be handled would be ignored. The sense of despair in Southwood might not be alleviated; only its alienation widened, and cynicism deepened.

An important question, then, was what could constitute a better political and operational response to a problem that was recognized as having both political and operational components. Participants focused most of their attention on that question, but not quite in the way that we anticipated.

II. Planning An Alternative Response Strategy

To stimulate the participants' thoughts about plausibly effective responses to the problem of violence in Cornet City, the case presented some of the important recommendations of two recent "blue ribbon commissions" that had analyzed of crime and violence and had issued recommendations about how to solve them: Attorney General William Barr's Task Force on Violent Crime (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992) and the Eisenhower Foundation. These two reports were chosen because they reflected quite different general approaches to controlling violence.

A. General Policy Approaches: Improved Law Enforcement v. the Amelioration of Root Causes

The Barr report reflected what might be thought of as a traditional law enforcement approach: a view that put criminal offenders at the center of the problem, and that emphasized arresting and imprisoning offenders as the most just and effective solution. To the extent that such actions would deter other offenders, or incapacitate those who were jailed, or provide an occasion for rehabilitation of those convicted, future violence would be prevented.

The Eisenhower Commission report came closer to what might considered a "root causes" approach: a view of the problem that put social conditions that produced criminal offenders and criminal offenses at the center of the problem, and that saw both the just and effective solution in the amelioration of the bad social conditions that spawned the offenders and the violence. To the extent that jobs could be provided to those seeking work, poor families equipped to raise their children, and racial discrimination reduced, violence might be prevented -- without having to wait for offenders to commit their first crimes in order to mobilize the criminal justice response.

What both these reports have in common, however, is that each claims a general approach to dealing with violent crime. Implicit in each report is a fundamental and general assumption about the causes of crime and violence: the Barr report finds them in the willful acts of individual "criminal offenders"; the Eisenhower report finds the "root causes" of crime in existing social conditions. Because the causes are general, the solutions can be as well: the Barr report focuses on deterring, incapacitating, or rehabilitating offenders; the Eisenhower report on ameliorating root causes. Because both groups attribute "violence" to quite general causes, neither group needed to break the problem into smaller categories and to look separately at each component to find promising lines of attack. Implicitly, it was assumed that the whole problem would yield to a single line of attack.

B. General Ideological Approaches v. Community Problem-Solving

Interestingly, while the discussion of how best to deal with the problems facing Cornet City occasionally engaged these broad, ideological themes, they did not feel particularly helpful to the participants. Instead, faced with the more immediate and concrete problems facing Cornet City, they rejected the general

solutions, and began searching for smaller scale solutions, to more particular pieces of the larger problem. The process might best be called "community problem-solving." This approach seemed to consist of the following elements:

1) Dividing the general problem of violence into smaller component parts that had different levels of urgency and significance for the community, and that seemed to require different kinds of solutions;

2) Finding ways to reach out to local communities to engage their efforts in reducing the violence;

3) Thinking of ways to develop additional information to better inform their judgments about how best to divide up the larger problem, and what points of intervention might be effective in dealing with larger or smaller parts of the problem; and

4) Recognizing and working through some important value conflicts that might arise as members of different communities and professional groups tried to find a way of representing and responding to the problem of violence.

What these four elements looked like in the actual conversations of the participants is described in the rest of this chapter.

C. Partitioning the Problem for Solution

An important part of the participants' work in defining the violence problem in Cornet City focused on deciding whether and how the general problem of violence could be partitioned into different elements that could be worked on separately. This possibility was suggested to the participants by the fact that what precipitated the crisis in Southwood was not just the occurrence of the particularly tragic homicide of a young women who was related to a drug trafficker, but also the fact that six homicides took place in a single weekend.

Indeed, in discussing the nature of the problem, the participants noted this variety.

Coleman-Miller: The reality is that there are children dying in the street..

Moore: That's an important way to view the problem..But actually, dying is too polite a word. Kids are being killed, and kids are killing other kids. Is that the problem?

Coleman-Miller: That's the reality -- that children are dying on the streets.

Stewart: But that is different from the six catalyzing murders, because the six murders were not children being killed on the streets..You've got child abuse; you've got spouse abuse; you've got a bar fight; you've got a convenience store robbery, and that has nothing to do with the fact that children are dying on the streets. (pp.24-25)

Stewart's observations about the six homicides were accurate. Moreover, their implication -- that the violence problem in Cornet City was composed of many different kinds of violence -- was also supported by the available statistical information. Cornet City's aggregate "homicide problem" actually contained sizable counts of all these types of violence, and others besides.

Despite these cues, when asked directly to partition the problem, the participants found it quite hard to do. On one hand, there were some obvious advantages to dividing the problem up and setting priorities on different parts for solution. Stewart continually emphasized the fact that resources were limited, and not all problems could be solved simultaneously. He also observed that there might be a natural division of labor that allowed some organizations to deal more effectively with one aspect of the problem while other organizations could deal with another; for example, that the police might have an advantage in dealing with the drug and gang related violence while the medical community might have an advantage in identifying and responding to domestic violence and family violence that only showed up in hospitals. And, applying an important management principle that claims that organizational morale and performance can be improved by producing "small wins", he observed that the morale of the community might be built by taking on particular pieces of the problem that seemed both important and solvable, before one dealt with the problems that were either less urgent to solve, or more difficult, or both.

On the other hand, Coleman-Miller emphasized that dividing up the problem and setting priorities might make it more difficult to see connections among the different parts of the problem, and more acceptable for the community to cease its efforts to deal with the rest of the problem once it had taken care of the easiest and most important components.

The discussion revealed that one difficulty in giving priority to some aspects of the problem over others was that it was not clear what criteria should be used to rank one aspect of the problem more important than the others. Perhaps what was important was what aspect of the problem seemed most shocking or upsetting to the community. The worry was that this would exclude the pieces of the problem that people had gotten used to, or that were not a problem for any but a few individuals. Other criteria were mentioned, such as the most frequently occurring, or most damaging, or most frightening component of the problem. But the discussion implicitly raised the possibility that a range of bureaucratic self-interests will impede global priority-setting: all else being equal, representatives of each organization will tend give higher priority to the forms of violence with which their organization is best equipped to deal, impeding the development of consensus.

Consider the following discussion about categorizing the different components of the violence problem and prioritizing them:

> **Moore**: If you were given your choice, how would you begin to break down the violence problem into discrete pieces? Maybe you don't want to do that. Maybe it doesn't make any sense to do that. But I want to experiment with the possibility that it might be worth it to divide the problem of violence into different categories.
>
> **Coleman-Miller**: Actually, it's being done. For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have [distinguished the] spousal abuse or family violence that happened to <u>pregnant</u> women [from other forms of spousal or family violence] because that's what they see. The American Medical Association has taken on violence as an issue this year, but they're focusing mostly on domestic abuse. Who knows how they made that choice!
>
> **Stewart**: I think they made that choice because the victims of domestic abuse go to the doctors to seek solace among other things, and typically don't report it to the police. It's something they see more of than anybody else.
>
> **Coleman-Miller**: But [the fact that the women don't report their victimization to the police] is an indicator that scares me. If the police intervene in situations where kids show up in the emergency

room with eight bullet holes in them, why won't they intervene in the situation where a women has been beaten but only tells her doctor? It is as important to prevent that women from sticking her neck back in the noose of her relationship with her husband as it is to stop the shooting violence among the kids....

But what Mark is asking is how do people pick particular kinds of violence and then focus in on that. That's a reasonable question.

Moore: But there's a question that comes even before that which is how do we categorize the violence.

Stewart: Right! And why should we categorize it?

Moore: There's one answer to the why question which is that by categorizing the violence, we can see different lines of attack on different pieces of the problem more clearly than if we left the problem as an undifferentiated whole. We might see that there are a lot of different things we need to do rather than just one.

Coleman-Miller: Eventually it has to come back together as one, though.

Moore: Well, that's one possibility. The other possibility would be to say -- to make a crass metaphor -- that there are different violence prevention businesses that we could be in. Some of these businesses might be high payoff businesses in the sense that the community could actually produce a significant impact on the problem at relatively low cost.

Coleman-Miller: Like bar violence.

Moore: Maybe. There might be an easy intervention there. But we haven't said whether there's much social value in controlling barroom violence compared with other kinds of violence. We could talk not only about whether the problem is easy or hard to control, but also whether it is particularly valuable to control and what makes us think that.

Coleman-Miller: And what are the implications of controlling the barroom violence? If you close the bars does domestic violence go up?

Moore: That's an interesting question.

Stewart: Well, you could find just the opposite: that by leaving the bars open, the domestic violence rate increased!

Coleman-Miller: Eventually it has to come back into one.

Moore: Sure....but we've made some distinctions among kinds of violence; we've distinguished drug related violence among kids, from domestic violence against pregnant women, from barroom violence as though these distinctions were important for some reason. Chips has focused our attention on spousal abuse and family violence because it is a serious problem for the victims, even though it doesn't directly threaten the community at large.

Stewart: It may also be that you have a way to intervene in domestic violence that you don't have for the others because it nominates itself for a graduated response.

Coleman-Miller: But the fact that it's easy to intervene shouldn't be a reason to or not to intervene!

Moore: I disagree. The ease with which we could make progress on a component of the violence problem should be a reason to intervene. All other things being equal, we should solve simple problems before hard ones.

Stewart: The key policy question is what can you do that will do the most good with the limited resources you have. If you can save women from being killed by an easy medical intervention, Sylvester wouldn't be as busy, and he might be able to make inroads on other parts of the violence problem. He might even be able to declare that we've had a 20% drop in homicides not because they did anything about the problems of violence among young men, and the gangs and the drugs, but because they did something about the spousal abuse that tends to escalate.

Coleman-Miller: At which time, the Task Force stops meeting, the mayor goes back to the other priority, whatever it is this week, and the murder rate is down! The incidence of deaths is down only because the domestic abuse got solved. The problem is that the overall rate stays up! And that's where my problem is with picking one of these and allowing the rest to go unattended.

Moore: I didn't say anything about allowing the rest to go unattended. I was making an argument about priorities.

Coleman-Miller: I want to do a comparison for you on this one. It's very short. The CDC had two kinds of injuries they looked at for years: one was unintentional injury; the other was intentional injury. But if you drew [an] arrow [indicating where all the energy and resources went], the big thick arrow would point toward unintentional injury. That's the history. When the numbers finally lit up on the side of intentional injury, some of the resources had to go. But over on this side, there were a lot of seat belts, fences around pools, etc. So we got a huge amount of work done when we were counting numbers.... Now we're on intentional injury, and the numbers are still lit up! And as long as they're lit up, the work must continue. It's clear that the epidemic is still here. So the work has to be sustained. You are now in the process of getting ready to say that if we have something we can solve right away and drop the homicide rate down by 20%, then we should put some energy into doing that. That makes sense. But I'm worried about the light on the other arrows. The Task Force is going to fall apart if they reduce homicides by 20%.

Moore: That's possible. But the other possibility is that the Task Force won't fall apart. They'll say, "Gee, we did something that worked. Let's try something else!"

Stewart: They might have some confidence that they could do something.. The other thing though is that if you do something about the domestic violence it doesn't necessarily take away from the young male violence or the robbery violence or the violence against special populations.. A different group of resources go towards domestic violence, and you free up some of the other resources to deal with these different components of the problem... What I'm suggesting is that this not a zero sum game, but this is a way to create more resources and a greater awareness and build a sense of confidence... I think that's an important thing to begin to catalyze the community, because right now they're looking for a sense of confidence builders, and they want to know that people are smart and can do something.

They're willing to contribute their time to what they consider inept health care, completely incompetent police services, and political gestures. (Transcript, pp. 115-124)

Despite the reluctance to divide the problem into parts and to establish priorities for dealing with them, the group did eventually make and begin working with a key distinction: the distinction between a new kind of violence that seemed to be occurring among young people in the community, and older kinds of violence that seemed endemic to the community. The latter embraced such aspects as robbery violence, and barroom assaults. Implicitly, the participants began focusing on finding responses to the new form of youth violence because that seemed the most urgent, the most tragic, and the one that most required some kind of innovation.

The participants also tended to want to give increased emphasis to the domestic violence problem. By the domestic violence problem they meant not only spouse abuse, but child abuse and neglect. Importantly, this problem came into focus as an important component of the violence problem for two important reasons, both related to the public health perspective represented by Coleman-Miller.

One was that this particular component of the violence problem was more visible to the medical community of a city than it was to the criminal justice community. It showed up in emergency rooms as people sought treatment for the victims of the violence, but was rarely reported to the police as a crime. Thus, it was quite natural for the medical and public health community to see this problem as more important than the police would.

The second was that public health practitioners tend to see domestic or family violence was seen as an important "risk factor" for subsequent acts of violence committed by children who grow up in violent families. Exposure to violence, either as a victim or witness, increases the likelihood that children will resort to violence later in their lives. Because primary prevention is an important goal of public health, and because family violence breeds more violence in the future, the public health community sees an additional reason to give particular emphasis to the reduction and control family violence -- particularly where children are involved.

As the conversation focused increasing attention on (and therefore implicitly gave priority to) the particular problems of violence among youth, and domestic violence, however, one could feel some reluctance in Daughtry and Stewart. They kept coming back to the fact that there were other elements of the violence problem than these two components, and that police agencies could not abandon their responsibilities for dealing with the other components. Part of this reluctance was undoubtedly linked to the same worries that Coleman-Miller had expressed in focusing on one piece of the problem over another: for example, that such "triage" might result in de-valuing components of the problem that could not in good conscience be given anything other than the highest priority.

But one also got the sense, confirmed by a rueful smile from Daughtry when challenged, that his and Stewart's reluctance might also reflect the facts that police departments are well equipped to respond effectively to such traditional violence problems as robbery and assault, but that they do not yet have accustomed responses to the new forms of street violence among youth, and to family violence involving children. Indeed, to a degree, Stewart and Daughtry wanted to characterize the youth violence problem as more traditional problems of gang violence, or drug violence. (See below)

Despite their initial reluctance, however, the law enforcement practitioners in the discussion were willing to go along with a representation of the violence problem that gave a great deal of emphasis to the "new" youth violence and a somewhat heightened degree of emphasis to family violence, now understood to

include abuse and neglect of children. All seemed to acknowledge that family violence in this sense was both bad in itself and a contributor to more violence in the future. They were prepared to admit that this piece of the problem represented a large portion of the overall problem, a particularly important component, but one to which law enforcement agencies were poorly equipped to respond.

D. Mobilizing Community Assistance in Analyzing and Responding to the Violence

The participants were in unanimous agreement that the community had to play an important role in ensuring the success of any collective efforts to deal with the violence. Although the word "community" was used somewhat loosely, what it meant most of the time was the local community of Southwood, which was strongly identified with Cornet City's violence. Of particular interest to the participants was whether and how the strong elements of that community (symbolized by Lydia Davis and her friends) might be engaged in problem-solving efforts.

1. The Problems of Southwood

Stewart catalogued the problems of the Southwood community, and the ways in which their problems were making the police ineffective in dealing with the new and most problematic piece of the violence problem.

> **Stewart**: This neighborhood has a serious problem in unsolved homicides. They have a serious problem in terms of intimidation and witness harassment. They have a serious problem in not having any way to contact the police in any kind of meaningful sense. They have a serious problem in that they have been generally politically disregarded..They [also] have a serious problem in the fact that they are on the border with another state, and a lot of out of state people who do not belong to their community (which we have not talked about) are coming in, giving them a sense of disorder, [providing] a source of criminal conduct, but also a source of income apparently.....
>
> You have a lot of elements that are producing a new overlay of violence that was never there before... Murders were [once] being solved and handled, but this new overlay is brand new, and our old way of dealing with it is not working. The detective says that... They can't solve the cases. They can't get the evidence because the community won't talk to them. The community won't talk to them because they're too intimidated. They feel they can't get the protection. (Transcript, pp. 32-34)

2. Strength and Divided Loyalties in Southwood

Coleman-Miller then picked up on this theme in a way that revealed the potential difficulties of mobilizing the community to deal with the problems of youth, drugs, and violence that constituted one of the important components of Southwood's violence problem:

> **Coleman-Miller**: I learned a very important lesson a couple of years ago about the community. We had an old woman standing in her sink in the housing project shot between her eyes at the sink while she was doing dishes. The neighborhood was outraged and so was the entire city of Washington, D.C. Police came from all over the city and focused just in on that area. After about two hours, they began to get calls from the community saying that the guy who shot her is in Apartment 2A in the living room. Now he's in Apartment 6B in the bathroom. Now he's in the kitchen. And they finally caught him and took him away. I went back to the community a few days later, and I asked them, "Why did you do them? You called up and made them go right to this man who did this drug killing!" (It ended up the lady was holding drugs for this man, and it was the drug dealer who shot her.) I said, "Why

did you do that?" They said, "Because there were too many police officers around for us to do our deals. We had to get rid of the officers. So, we had to turn the guy in."

Stewart: They coughed up the suspect.

Coleman-Miller: Yes, in order to get rid of the police in their neighborhood. What an important lesson that was for me as we talk about the power of the community. The perceived power of the community is that they are paralyzed, disenfranchised, frightened and intimidate.

Stewart: Yet, at any given moment they can act to shape things for their purposes.

Coleman-Miller: That's why I keep talking about the difference between the truth and reality. You are dealing with a community that could handle this, but the imperatives are...

Moore: Handle what? I don't get it.

Coleman-Miller: They could handle this circumstance. They literally solved the killing of an old lady.

Moore: But the "they" you are describing is the community there.

Coleman-Miller: That's exactly correct.

Moore: The "they" you're describing is a group of drug dealers who are interested in being able to operate without police presence!

Coleman-Miller: And, indeed, a community; a part of the community.

Moore: The drug dealers?

Coleman-Miller: Yes. They made up part of the community.

Moore: And, in fact, the only piece of the community that was courageous enough to call the police.

Coleman-Miller: For their own reasons.

Moore: Now this is very interesting. What you describe is a strength in the community to be sure. But you've described a strength that is founded on an illicit enterprise that may be dangerous to the local community.

Coleman-Miller: It exemplifies power and strength within that community.

Moore: Right. And this goes back to your observation that because of the exclusion of this community from the broader social and economic structure of Cornet City, some of the most talented members of the community have been tempted by the economic opportunities of drug dealing. So we now have this painful situation where the very strength of the community is now committed to activities that are killing the community and exposing them to hazards.

Moore: Let's suppose it was true that many of the most powerful, resourceful young men in the community were now engaged in organized drug dealing, arming themselves to exert internal discipline, arming themselves to be able to hold onto their turf vis-a-vis other competitive gangs, that occasionally the violence would break out beyond the circle of drug dealers and involve innocent parties. And suppose further that the drug dealers were corrupting community -- defeating the community's ability to function partly by providing the only jobs, and spreading favors around the community, and partly by threatening people who testified against them. I think I'm describing the emergence of something like an organized crime family. Eventually, the drug dealers might use their economic and social power to run candidates for election.

Now, suppose that's what's going on. What do you think either the citywide community, or the police force, or the local community ought to do to respond to that?

Coleman-Miller: I want to take [the discussion] off the level of organized crime or gangs....We're not necessarily talking about a cohesive group that is inherently bad; we're talking about a strong, cohesive group that is now behaving badly. Their strength is in their cohesiveness; the negative is in their behavior.

Moore: Absolutely. I want to be clear about this. Everybody thinks these people are enormously resourceful, competent individuals. They're just doing the wrong thing.

Coleman-Miller: They're doing the wrong thing.

Moore: And we can even <u>understand</u> why they are doing the wrong thing.

Coleman-Miller: So, take me back to your original question.

Moore: The question is what should we do about the fact that this strong, cohesive group in the community is behaving badly. What would the right response of the citywide community, or the police force, or the local community be?

Coleman-Miller: There have been efforts to do something about that..They offer children jobs at McDonald's...Clearly the kids don't want to work for $5 an hour, so that doesn't work.... When you get some of the organized groups together (as they did with the Crips and the Bloods in LA after the insurrection), then they begin to see that they have incredible power among themselves, and they started to recognize and own some of that power..And their behavior was not negative at that point.

Moore: Okay. Let's play that one out. I think that's an interesting idea.

Coleman-Miller: We're smarter than they are, so we've got to be able to think of something...They're mostly kids. I've got to believe we're smarter than they are.

Moore: A little while ago, we were delighted to find the strength and competence of these groups. Once we discover that they're using this strength for bad purposes, we need to find out that they aren't quite as competent.

Coleman-Miller: I guess you're right. They're not as smart as we are even though they are competent! (Transcript, pp. 35-44)

3. The Middle Class of Southwood

At this point, Daughtry intervened to refocus the conversation on another piece of the community -- the piece that might be able to become an effective partner to the police in controlling the drug dealing and violence rather than the piece of the community that was committed to drug dealing. (This is the natural way for a community policing advocate to think.)

Daughtry: An equally important group you did not mention was the middle class, blue collar people who had devoted their entire lives to a profession. Some had retired, hoping to enjoy the benefits of their community. What I saw [in the case] was a failure of them to recognize how strong and how influential they were. They were not working in a concerted way to combat the [other] group...One of the ways you can combat the situation you described is to mobilize that [middle class] group in the community, because they still have influence in the community. They were successful in rearing their kids. They did well.

Moore: Let me test that one out. If they had the confidence, they could call the police, and get the police to deal with the drugs and violence. It's also clear that they could make life difficult for these groups in various ways by monitoring and controlling and exercising informal social control over their own neighborhoods. They can block off and blunt criminal opportunities for these guys. That's clear. (Transcript, pp. 41-42)

4. Informal Social Control versus Role Models and Self-Esteem

Coleman-Miller then intervened in the discussion to focus our attention more sharply on exactly what the stronger elements of the community could do most effectively to deal with the violence, and that moved the participants into a discussion of how gangs or powerful criminal associations emerged, and what either the city or the local community could do to deal with them.

Coleman-Miller: No. Wait a minute. It's not clear. Tell me again how they could control the violence.

Moore: Well, as many citizen groups have done, they could disrupt the street level drug markets.

Coleman-Miller: That would affect their economic power, but not the other sources of the [drug dealers'] power... They have a cohesiveness that puts group dynamics at work. They have images they have to maintain..

Moore: And that helps them recruit additional members, right?

Coleman-Miller: That's part of their power base.

Moore: Okay. I take the point. But I think you are arguing with Sylvester as well as with me. You're casting doubt about the real, effective power that the older, middle class people in the community would be able to exert.

Coleman-Miller: Sure. One of the things I mentioned in my paper was that there were potential role models in the community who simply never touched the kids. They never talked with them. They

never walked with them. They never went near them. So, whatever their potential was, it was completely strangulated by intimidation, or whatever it was that kept them apart.

Daughtry: I'm not so sure it was intimidation that was keeping them away as that it was their choice. It seems to me that some of them worked a very productive life, had reached a plateau of retirement, and then they wanted to drop out of the community and be within themselves..

Moore: Don't you have that feeling sometimes, Sylvester?

Daughtry: Oh yes, all the time!

Coleman-Miller: It was quoted in the case. "I've done all I can do now. I'm old and ready to retire. I'm tired."

Stewart: I already gave at the office.

Moore: Here's the thing that's puzzling me. I think the older middle class might be able to bring the drug dealers and the gangs a little bit more under control by restricting opportunities for them to deal drugs or hang out as gangs. But I'm not at all sure that they're in a position to offer attractive alternative opportunities to the young men who join these groups. That weakens them because they can't prevent the gangs from forming. All they can do is affect how the gangs behave. Take Anita Woods and Lydia Davis. They're 45-year-old women with jobs. What can they do to weaken emerging gangs?

Coleman-Miller: I have to stop you here. I have a three year old patient I saw in the emergency room the other day. I asked him how he was. He said, "I'm from a dysfunctional family". At three years old, he recognizes that a dysfunctional family is his household! So, I'm in a different space about gangs. I'm not surprised to see them forming.

Coleman-Miller: I think we're talking about the re-creation of the communal family [in the gang]. It's going to be hard to separate [the gangs] just because the community is upset...I've figured out that the creation of self-esteem has about 12 components to it, and I've described them in my textbook. I know no gang member has read my book, but he's met every single one of those 12 components by creating a gang and making it work for him. So, I'm not positive that the gang didn't come about as urgently as air would come if we ran out of air, or if we ran out of water...

[Self esteem] is an essential need. If you run out of air, you're going to find it..If you run out of water, you will do the same thing. If you run out of self-esteem, you will create it in whatever form it must be created. That's how I'm looking now at gangs...(Transcript, pp. 41-46)

Moore: If that analysis of the emerging gangs was right, I could imagine three different lines of attack. One is to do everything we could to blunt the gang's behavior: cut off its markets; restrict the ways it could operate on the street; etc. A second would be to make a deal with them: ask for a little less violence, a little less frequent drug dealing.

Stewart: Keep it confined.

Moore: Yes. Just keep it under control. We'll make peace with you. You can be here, but we want you to be here in a particular way. The third way would to weaken the power of the gangs by drawing potential members away from them by providing for the needs of the other kids in the community -- the needs that Beverly has described as essential as the need for air and water.

Coleman-Miller: Yes. Then there must also be a fourth approach and that is to keep the gang together and change their behavior.

Moore: Good point. In effect, we could rehabilitate the gang rather than the individuals who belong to the gang! That's an interesting idea. Can you imagine what that would look like concretely?

Stewart: Remember the street dancers? They had dance-offs for a while. Instead of gang fights they got better dancers!...

Moore: Let's look at this in this concrete case, though. In the case, there's a guy, Anita Woods brother, who's suspected of being a drug dealer, and who's mad, and who's going to kill somebody else.

Daughtry: Someone has got to pay.

Moore: What should we do with this guy in the conception we're now working on [that seeks to use the strong elements of the community to control such conduct]? We could imagine the group of community elders going to this guy and saying, "Look, if you commit another murder in retaliation for this, we will give you up to the police. We want to see the violence stop in this community. We will assume that you did it, and we will give you up to the police". Can you imagine that? That's step number one. Then, step number two is, "Now introduce us to some of your other friends, and let's talk about the violence that you are doing to this community, and what your problems are, and how we can help solve them in some other way".

Coleman-Miller: Do you think [the elders] have that level of [energy and] aggression? I mean, you're still talking about them being happy, sitting back in their houses.

Stewart: But that's what you said Beverly. You started the conversation by observing that the community gave up the guy who shot the woman in front of the sink. Mark is using this to suggest...

Coleman-Miller: Where the neighbors form a gang?

Moore: Maybe that's the right image!

Daughtry: Didn't we talk about neighborhood patrols someplace?

Stewart: The very first thing that Lydia says is, "Maybe we ought to form a neighborhood patrol. Why don't we do that?" Then they said, "Well, we never got organized."....

Coleman-Miller: I have to go back to a moment [in the conversation] where a segue had been created that I had never thought about before...the moment where the neighborhood became an organized effort to the point where they could literally bring these children in front of them and say if you do this one more time, we will do this. Now, I'm struck by the position that as we read about them, that

these are people with their slippers on and their dogs bringing them the newspaper, and please leave me alone... And I understand that. But as I said earlier, I believe that the treachery of the old people outweighs the energy of youth. We [old people] can be treacherous...And if we were allowed to be treacherous, we would enjoy it. But I'm not positive. The old people still have to face the Uzi. Still, this is beyond an aggressive community; this is a devious and treacherous community.

Moore: I think the important word there is "beyond", for this model of community organization sets the standard for effective community mobilization very high. It's beyond the capacity required just to mount a patrol. It involves a capacity for the community to sustain a relationship with a group of potentially dangerous people in which the community keeps them under control through the relationship, right?

Coleman-Miller: Yes. And that's creating a whole new model that people don't think of when they think of slippers and dogs and retirement.

Moore: Or even community mobilization, or community patrols.

Coleman-Miller: I'm kind of excited by this..because it takes us beyond the models and into the reality. Old people can be treacherous as hell, and maybe we ought to use that.

Moore: The question is whether they can be brave enough.

Coleman-Miller: I don't know. I told you the Uzi is the fulcrum.

Moore: So maybe there's an issue about how to help the community be brave as well as treacherous.

Coleman-Miller: And that would be a success -- when you answer that question. (Transcript, pp.42-54)

5. Informal Social Control and Vigilantism

The idea of mobilizing the community to confront and control the drug dealers and emerging gangs sounded some alarm bells in the minds of the two police participants. They began to worry about things getting even more out of control if a third power base began to emerge in the community (in addition to the drug dealers and the police).

Stewart: Empowering the community [is more important] than bravery.

Coleman-Miller: Well, I think it is bravery!

Moore: What's at stake in renaming the quality we want from the community as "bravery" rather than "empowerment", Chips? Why don't you want to call the community "brave"?

Stewart: Because bravery is boldness, and usually reflects individual rather than collective action. Empowerment means that the group comes together and senses its own resources.

Daughtry: We have problems now. There's some examples in my area where individual home owners have shot kids protecting their property.

Coleman-Miller: Vigilantes!

Daughtry: Yes. So the bravery part --- it may be fear rather than bravery.

Moore: That's interesting because anger is one of the things that makes people brave sometimes. The dangerous part of all this is that we know that the emotional energy associated with anger and fear is an enormously useful asset when people have to do hard things. But we also know that it gets out of control. So, if you've got this community that's trying to suddenly get itself together enough to patrol, or negotiate, or to threaten drug dealers and gangs, there's probably going to be some anger and fear that goes into the stew. Then the question is how do you keep the anger and fear under control.

Coleman-Miller: The model needs to be created.

Moore: For channelling those feelings. One way to view Lydia Davis is that she is looking for some useful ways to channel her feelings of anger, fear and despair.

Stewart: Most of Southwood seem to be fairly moderate -- almost ideal. The way it's presented, its "Well, we ought to, and we probably can come together, and there's a good way to do this". It's almost like Ozzie and Harriet....[Yet] one of the things we talked about earlier is the pathological nature of some of the communities who are energized, who may want to take over rather than just turn [the offenders] into the police. They might say, "Quite frankly, the police are overwhelmed. They're not going to keep them in jail. So, we as the community are going to do it. We're going to burn down their house or kill them or whatever." And all of a sudden all this goodness turns into a very dark side.

Coleman-Miller: Now, wait a minute. Have you taken the bravery statement to the point where they are burning down homes?

Moore: He's worried about it, right?

Stewart: Yes...We're all of a sudden saying these are great community people...They will turn this guy into the police. That is..a very positive step. But it's nothing like the real empowerment that you can get to where the communities and people have an idea of mob rule....It's like "Death Wish 2".

Coleman-Miller: But there have been a number of models. The first model I'm thinking of is the more recent one with the tuberculosis and the homeless. The public knew that they were exposed to tuberculosis among the homeless and they were find until it got in the news that people were beginning to get this tuberculosis as they walked down the street because they were exposed over long periods of time to the homeless. So they said, "Oh no, no, no! They're going to do this. We are going to put them here. We make sure you do this." ..

But the other model I'm thinking about is the civil rights model where people came off their sofas, and they came off their chairs, and they said we will call the police if you do this...And, as a result, the legislative arm came in, the administrator, the police. So there is a model for this bravery as I see it.

Stewart: Let me contrast that model, which is very positive....

Moore: We just passed Chips' tolerance point.

Coleman-Miller: Yes. I can see his face is red.

Moore: Suddenly he remembered Oakland in the late 60's.

Stewart: That's exactly right...What happened was that they said, "Gee, these people have this disease, and we don't want them in our neighborhood, and we will beat them up and shoot them because we don't want them here. Or, we will call the police because (this happened to me a couple of times) as a police officer they could eject people of different ethnicities because the bar was a neighborhood bar. It didn't have people like that in there. And I had to work with the bartender and the group and almost stay in there to guarantee this person's right to have a beer. The thing is that communities work this way...in Asian communities, in black communities, in white communities, in economic communities. There has always been this desire to keep other people out, and we feel empowered to do that.

Moore: Do you think, if you were asked, that you could draw a clear line between responsible community control and vigilantism?

Coleman-Miller: Great question!

Stewart: I think I could because I've thought a lot about that. One of the things I've brought up in the past is that the Hell's Angels in their more aggressive days actually had an armored car, a couple of cannons, and some 50 calibre machine guns (which we considered a major threat to the police!). They bought three square blocks of houses, and then they put a cyclone fence around that, and said that they would police that area! They created a compound. They said, "There's no crime here, and we're going to do what we want. We have our freedom. We own this property. It's private property." That was completely intolerant (sic).

Moore: Why?

Stewart: Because the activities that went on in the compound were illegal to the larger society...It was the narcotics trade and the processing of stolen car parts. They would retreat into this zone of safety. That kind of community cohesion, spirit, bravery and courage has a very pathological effect on the rest of the community.

Moore: We aren't against cohesion in communities; we like cohesion. What we don't like is when the cohesion is used to shield illegal activities with the community from external justice. We don't like it when the cohesion is used to export crimes that offend the rest of the community....

So it seems like we have this dilemma. On one hand, we would like to have the community as a powerful partner in the effort to either stop the violence that is being committed by the gangs, stop the fear that they're spreading, maybe even find a basis to begin turning the gangs toward more appropriate action and more appropriate purposes. So we need to build a strong community for all of those reasons. We understand that to build a strong community we might have to traffic in emotions that are very powerful and could easily get out of control. Therefore, if we're searching for a solution to the violence problem that lies with community empowerment or mobilization, it's going to be a tricky path -- partly because we're not sure it will be successful, partly because we're not sure that we would like it if it does succeed! Is that where we are? (Transcript, pp.56-63)

E. Community Policing

The discussion of community mobilization, and the kind of partnerships that could be created with the police department to allow the community to become "brave" without getting out of control is one that is central to the discussions now occurring within the field of policing. Many police departments and police executives have begun experimenting with a new strategy of policing that is variously called "community policing", or "neighborhood policing", or "problem solving policing". Even Cornet City's police department seems to have been at least partly infected by these ideas. Yet the participants did not think that the Cornet City Police Department had yet gone far enough in this direction, and they doubted that even the officer assigned to Southwood understood the neighborhood very well.

Daughtry, the representative of community policing, initiated this part of the discussion, which developed into a short seminar on the substance of community policing.

Daughtry: Number one, I think we [the police] have to be as close to the community as we possibly can as a law enforcement agency. And that means that our folks must be empowered to work with people within the community that do not feel inhibited about working with the police.

Moore: At the surface, at least, Cornet City seems to have made a fairly serious effort at a form of community policing. They've got foot patrols -- a women patrol officer who is out there in Southwood. They've got a Captain who feels responsible for the area, and shows up at community meetings and reminds people that they have to help law enforcement succeed. So, at some level, this department has moved in the direction of community policing designed to build a close relationship with the community. And yet that has failed to break through the anxiety that the community has about co-operating with the police.

Stewart: My sense is just the opposite. They thought community policing was simply foot patrol, and that's wrong.

Moore: They also seem to have the notion of broad accountability to the community.

Stewart: But the guy who showed up at the community meeting was an administrator, not the guy or woman who is going to come on the call. And the patrol units are vacant a lot of the time. The woman foot patrol officer said that many times they only had three cars on the street when they were supposed to have 16-19, and those three cars were being dispatched all over town. So there wasn't a focusing on the beat [or in the neighborhood]. The citizens said they didn't know who their police officers were....She was acknowledging that a close relationship would be good, but she was bemoaning the fact that it didn't occur.

Moore: What's missing?

Stewart: There's a lot of things that are missing. One is a dispatch policy based on differential police response so that you can get some more time to the guy who stays on the beat, and not this idea that we will dispatch whoever we've got to any call that comes in.

Moore: Okay. That would keep the police woman on the block a little bit longer.

Stewart: It would. The other thing is to do something about eliminating the repeat calls for assistance. There's no effort that I can determine any place in here that they're doing any work on that.....

Let me say that the one bright spot was that, as a result of the community meetings, Lydia Davis did say she had formed a relationship with a police officer who maintained her confidentiality. She gave information to the officer about drug activities, wrote down license numbers. As a result they were able to close down three crack houses and lock up some guys. And there was no retribution or intimidation because the police didn't leak their names. That was a very positive step...

If you could set 40% of their time so they could engage in this community problem solving, I think you would see the lack of confidence disappear...

Daughtry: I agree in part with you. I didn't see the philosophy of community policing being practiced by the police in this case study. I saw the decentralization of police services by districts. I saw the foot patrol, but in the comments from the officer, she was frustrated because people stood on the corner. I mean, that was one of her big things. She couldn't do anything about people who stood on the corners. I'm not sure you want to do something about people who stand on the corner unless you see some kind of criminal conduct.

Moore: I think she thought they were dealing drugs on the corner.

Coleman-Miller: She didn't know, but that's what she said! "Why else would they be standing there?"

Daughtry: Unemployment!....

I don't know that there's been any structured training in their philosophy of what they want to accomplish in terms of mobilizing the community, and in terms of addressing what they perceive as police problems through methods other than just arrest. It seems like the system is stretched beyond its means already, and it does no good to arrest somebody for a misdemeanor standing on this corner when the courts can't accept that case. All it does is take you away from that 911 call that you are waiting on. So you should think of other means of trying to deal with the problem.

Moore: What are the other means?

Daughtry: Well, there are other things the community can do. For instance, I can remember one case in my city where there was this service station right in a residential community, and the reason that everybody congregated at the service station was because it had a pay phone. One thing we did was to ask the phone company not to allow incoming calls to that phone. Number two, they lowered the phone to about 2' off the ground so that it was very inconvenient to stand there and talk. Those little changes by the officer working in that area disturbed the activity on that yard.

Moore: So, we've got a picture now. This department has moved partly in the direction of community policing, but it's not gone far enough. It hasn't protected the foot patrol or community based officer quite enough in the dispatching system to ensure that the officer won't have to go driving all over the city to get to the calls. The officer hasn't been adequately instructed in how to ask people on the street what they're doing. If it turns out that what she sees is a drug market, she hasn't been taught all the

nifty techniques that officers have discovered to make an area a little less attractive and useful as a drug dealing area. (Transcript, pp. 187-192)

F. Developing and Using Information to Find Plausible Lines of Attack

Early in the discussion, as the group worked on defining Cornet City's problem, there were occasional references to the statistics and graphs presented in Chapter 2. Those exhibits had been prepared from "agency statistics"--data that were routinely published or readily available from law enforcement, school, and social service agencies. No special analyses of large data bases had been prepared expressly for the mayor's task force.

The agency statistics were recognized as useful in mobilizing the local government to attack Cornet City's violence problem, and they suggested certain lines of attack. The more-than-tripling of Cornet City's homicide count over five years clearly documented a devastating problem that was growing worse. Earlier discussions had cited the special despair over the high and growing concentration of both murders and victims among young black men and the implications of that concentration for the city's future. The declining arrest clearance rates for youth gun murders, along with the growth in case dismissals due to witness intimidation and other problems, heightened despair by reinforcing perceptions that traditional criminal justice responses weren't helping. The group easily recognized the value of such data in mobilizing the local bureaucracy and community.

At least one participant, however, had early doubts about whether readily available agency statistics would be helpful or harmful in focusing Task Force attention in useful directions:

> **Stewart**: What we're talking about is how do you fix what has gone wrong. What has gone wrong is six murders of different kinds in one weekend. The perception is that everything is related to drugs. If you analyze the murders, though, they're not related to drugs...I think the problem is that they haven't done a very good job in collecting the data that's going to help them find a solution. (Transcript, p.51)

Indeed, a later attempt to interpret the agency data as a basis for action trailed off into confusion. All agreed that agency statistics would offer little guidance for planning an overall violence prevention strategy.

> **Moore:** Exhibit 2 tells us that the fraction of arrestees testing positive for some drug use at the time they're arrested, wherever that is in relation to when they committed the crime, went up, particularly for cocaine use, dramatically from '86 to '88, but then declined. Homicides are going up more when the drug use is going down than when it was going up.
>
> **Stewart:** My explanation for that was that they may be competing over territory.
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> **Moore:** Right, so that you end up with a different dynamic. It's not that they're taking drugs that's causing them to commit the violence. In Exhibit 5 we see the total number of homicides that are committed with firearms. If you looked at it as a proportion of total homicides, we've got 60 percent, up to about 65 percent, and then suddenly up to 80 percent. Does that tell us anything important?
>
> **Coleman-Miller:** That sad thing is that we don't have the number of guns that are available that weren't used in homicides.

Moore: We know that's a big number.

Stewart: You might know about how many guns were stolen. Burglary in gun stores...might give you some indication of what's on the market. The other thing I would like is to figure out where the firearms were used.

Moore: In Exhibit 7 we see the homicide clearance rate going down, and then in Exhibit 8 we get the reason for that which is that the circumstances under which the homicides are being committed are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Coleman-Miller: A lot of them include drive-bys, and nobody knows whether there was an interpersonal conflict prior to it or not.

Stewart: ...the impression you get from this is that spousal abuse and family violence has been a small proportion [of all homicides]. It hasn't grown very much but might have grown a little bit. Youth gun violence started off as small, about the same size, is the fastest growing, and is now a big piece of the problem that we're worried about...But none of this data gets us exactly at the right set of questions. So we're making a lot of assumptions about the nature of the problem because we don't have the data that we would really like to have to get a sense of it.

The fear was expressed that with neither overlapping expertise nor a common base of information needed to support operational planning, the Cornet City mayor's task force was likely to fail. Certainly, the exercise would produce well-intentioned but vague statements of concern and intent to work together. But the possibility that the effort would produce no operational plan or, even worse, a plan misdirected toward solving the wrong problem, was deeply troubling to the participants. They feared that under those conditions, Task Force members would quickly forget their commitments to cooperative action and return to traditional competition for limited city resources once they returned to their own organizations and became re-immersed in those organizations' missions, cultures, and information.

Moore: The worrisome thing is what happens every time we look at the world through the eyes of one of these bureaucratic agencies, whether it be the police or the social services agencies. They're available as resources to begin solving the problem if we can figure out how to use them programmatically and there are enough resources. But when I look out at the world from the vantage point of the Education Department, I'm going to find increases in assaults on teachers and students in the school, I'm going to find increasing truancy rates, I'm going to find all kinds of difficulties--

Stewart: --that require more resources. That's what the mayor keeps seeing. So if you bring in another agency or another discipline, you say, "Uh-oh..." (p. 22)

Indeed, the group agreed that the data provided to the Task Force could be marshaled in the name of violence prevention to request more resources to increase educational expenditures, to increase drug abuse prevention and treatment, to support youth programs, and to remove firearms from the community, for example. While no one opposed any of these objectives, they were concerned that the entire process could degenerate into bureaucratic competition for larger shares of a limited total budget rather than effective concerted action that would reduce Cornet City's violence levels. Launching effective multi-agency action instead of inter-agency budget competition would require different kinds of information and new mechanisms for sharing and using it for operational rather than bureaucratic purposes.

Stewart: This task force is to some extent doomed because they don't have any expertise [or information] that's overlapping except for this Dr. Friese [the public health commissioner who had invited himself onto the task force]...He seems to be saying that we can apply this epidemiological approach to the police problem of violence. But he can't really go beyond that. He just says this is a way to somehow partition it. (p. 209-210)

1. Epidemiological Violence Problem-Solving

In response to Stewart's challenge, Dr. Coleman-Miller described several examples of what she called "operational" use of information and what the group came to call "epidemiological problem-solving." The examples were drawn from her experiences leading a D.C. Public Health Department initiative several years earlier. The initiative had been intended to reduce deaths of young people, whether intentional or unintentional, so not all the examples concerned violence. Yet they reflected an intriguing analytical and operational style that the group felt instinctively might be useful in developing violence prevention strategies.

Example One: From Death Certificates to Welfare Offices

Coleman-Miller: This is exactly where we began to focus when we saw all the young black men being killed. One of the things we did--and this seemed very small then but it's huge now--is that we changed the death certificate so we could get more information. We thought we needed to understand whether these children were educated or not. So we crossed them with the Board of Education so that when a death certificate was filled in, the level of school years achieved was placed on it. We assumed that the drop-out probably does not have a big job as a CEO anywhere, and so the socioeconomic status could be inferred from the level of education.

We started a task force and we put on it all the people who had information. When we analyzed the first 500 cases [using the enhanced death certificate], we came up with some very interesting facts. We noticed that 65 percent of the kids who were killed in Washington, D.C. had dropped out of school. About 90 percent were in income maintenance. We also found some ridiculous things like 93 percent of them had goatees or mustaches.

To many social scientists, the high rates of school drop-out and income maintenance participation among murder victims would appear as merely another (rather poorly designed) replication of a well-established correlation between low social class and high violent victimization rates. But in the hands of D.C.'s operationally oriented interagency task force, the findings took on profound significance for delivering preventive interventions.

Coleman-Miller: It had incredible implications for us. One was that school-based strategies wouldn't work because 65 percent of the kids who were killed had dropped out of school. So we created a buddy system so that every time we put a new initiative in the school system, we also had to put it somewhere else, and the question was where else? So we put income maintenance on the task force. That's where the kids were. They spent hours waiting with their mothers or daddies in the welfare system, and they just sat and stared,...every once in awhile drinking a soda or eating a bag of potato chips. What we found...was that 90 percent of those kids were in the income maintenance offices even though they were not in the school system, so that's where we put the initiative. So if that [Cornet City] task force were going to give some kind of guide, they need to put on it the people who can help them see the bigger picture. (pp. 194-5)

Example Two: Drug Overdoses in Police Custody

Another example of epidemiological problem-solving concerned unintentional deaths, but illustrated the importance of operational rather than merely bureaucratic cooperation between law enforcement and health care agencies. When the D.C. Task Force began to focus on children's deaths, it made all deaths of persons aged 15 or younger legally "reportable," which required full investigation by a Death Review Board that included representatives from the police department, emergency medical services, and the medical examiner's office. Initiating the process had encountered political difficulties, and the early death reviews had engendered some defensiveness, even though their purpose was to discover patterns that suggested preventive measures rather than to assign blame.

> **Coleman-Miller:** We brought the police department to the table with the medical examiner's office. That is the only meeting I have ever been to as a bureaucrat where every time I went a new policy came out, and it was usually out of the police department or the corrections office. That is extremely important because what they did was to each take a review of the case and say here is where this child fell through the cracks. Here's where a policy needs to be put in place to change this. This is a new day because 15-year-olds didn't used to die, and all of our old policies don't necessarily work.
>
> An example. We looked at approximately three or four cases a month, and after awhile I noticed on the medical examiner's reports that some of these dead children had extremely high drug levels in the belly--up in the whole numbers, no more decimals of cocaine per deciliter of blood. We pulled every one of the reports--it was less than ten--and brought them to the Death Review Board. What we noticed was that they had all died in police custody. Their deaths weren't challenged because the cause of death was drug overdose--they weren't beaten. So we brought the police to the table and figured out that these were kids who ingested drugs to avoid possession charges, and the police would take them to the holding cell. Within that same day a special order was written by the chief that said if you witness or have reason to believe that a person has swallowed drugs to reduce their charge, you cannot take them directly to the police station. You have to call the ambulance, they will transport them [to the hospital], pump their stomachs, then you can do whatever you want.
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> **Moore:** The thing that would worry me about it is this notion that fine, you have a complete understanding of one individual case, but you don't know how often that problem occurs in the general run of cases.
>
> **Coleman-Miller:** But we can't know. All we can do is to say, three times this month we change policies. Now what we know is that when we look again in six months, those deaths won't occur because the policy was changed. So we're saying, "So what if you only save one, two, three?"
>
> But the fact is that since, many lives have been saved. It's hard to prove it, but there have been many lives that have been saved because the ambulances come to do that. Now that's important and it was a policy that occurred because the chief was at the table. (pp. 205-208)

Example Three: Violent Deaths of Female Prisoners' Babies

Dr. Coleman-Miller recounted the revision of Corrections Department policy by the Death Review Board in order to prevent violent death through abuse of babies born to mothers in prison. Standard

Corrections Department policy had been to give temporary custody of the baby to the prisoner's mother in such cases.

> **Coleman-Miller:** What we found was that the mother delivered the baby, [the Corrections Department] took it to Grandma, and Grandma says thank you very much. But she hates the baby, doesn't want a baby, has a job, is only something like 33 herself, and leaves the baby upstairs [or perhaps with a live-in boyfriend who is totally unprepared to care for a baby], and the baby dies. When it's reported to [the Death Review Board], we say we need to bring in the Corrections Department to make a new policy: they must have an interview prior to the baby being taken home. Grandmothers are different now. They're not who they used to be, and [we need] a "new day" policy. (pp. 208-9)

2. Characterizing Epidemiological Problem-Solving

The group devoted considerable effort to characterizing the violence problem-solving approach that Coleman-Miller's examples represented, and to distinguishing that approach from "business as usual." The discussion began with skepticism but wound up feeling familiar to Daughtry and Stewart, with their law enforcement perspectives.

> **Moore:** If I had to characterize this process pejoratively, I might call it "wool gathering." It's hands-on, eclectic. You don't know what you're going to find, but you go out and get it from the files of existing organizations. You don't know what the information means when you get it the first time, but you gradually build it up. Notice how different that feels from the design of a huge computer-based information system [in which every data element needs to be justified and incorporated during the system design phase]. And it's also different from the way that a social scientist would do this: to have a hypothesis [and to structure collection of the data needed to test that hypothesis].

> **Coleman-Miller:** It's the way public health people are trained to go after something like a new disease. When we try to find out about that disease, we have to go to the locality,..., we have to check dust, we have to check rug fibers, we have to check things that don't make sense to check until finally everything does make sense.

> **Stewart:** Sounds like a murder investigation. Sure, we have a protocol. But when you get no answer you go back and you start going over everything, and you say "I don't know whether it's going to mean anything about dirt samples, or traffic tickets," but you go back and try to put it together.

> **Daughtry:** I have a case in Greensboro that happened two weeks ago. A young lady coming to campus from an off campus job, her car is bumped and she is abducted and kidnapped for a period of 24 hours. She's released and she's able to talk with us. She gives us a nickname, a first name that was communicated between one of her abductors and the other. The young detective on the case is kicking it around with a 27-year detective, and this younger detective asks, "Have you ever heard this first name before?"
>
> "Oh yes, 12 years ago. 12 years ago, I had a guy, his name was such and such, same first name." They get a palm print from the back of the car window, they've got a name, it matches. (p. 168)

These examples seemed to reflect a group consensus that transcended their perspectives of law enforcement or public health: information stored so that it can be retrieved and reassembled into complete pictures of violent events can reduce violence by increasing both the capacity to arrest and punish offenders and the capacity to diagnose violence patterns and prevent events before they occur. Despite their common information needs, however, solving violent crimes and preventing violent events require different analyses of similar information:

> **Stewart:** [Crime analysis] has its roots...in what they thought was the scientific breakthrough of creating the UCR...Essentially, police were very good at reporting crime and essentially tallying the serial numbers of crimes into categories of offenses, and with that came a set of parameters and protocols that you have to follow [in investigation.] You can solve the individual crime, but it's difficult to solve conspiracies, and police quite frankly are really ill equipped to deal with the unrelated--apparently unrelated--homicide.
>
> **Moore:** But notice two different kinds of relationships. One is related in the sense that the same individuals or same social relationships that produced one offense produced the second offense. The serial killer, or dangerous offender, or an ongoing dispute among gangs--in effect, those are all causal relationships. Offense 1 is related to Offense 2 because the same guy did it, or because Offense 1 produced a dispute that was responded to by Offense 2.
>
> Another kind of relationship is that there is no direct connection between the offenses except that they arose out of the same causal mechanism, which might be approached through a citywide effort. For example, alcohol causes violence, and even though there's no connection from one barroom dispute to another, the same intervention gets us leverage on both those offenses. Or even though there's no relationship between the fact that my boss is screwing me out of money at the workplace and you and Beverly are having a terrible fight about the custody of your children, we nonetheless might get a handle on the violence that emerges in both those things by having more access to adjudication or mediation services, or some training in how to resolve disputes, or something like that.
>
> **Stewart:** It's not the same individuals, but it is a replication of the same set of conditions [that produced the result.]
>
> **Moore:** So what you get is sort of this risk factor epidemiological analysis, which is different than the narrative story line that connects one event to another. (pp. 129-131)

Eventually, the group found it useful to distinguish between two varieties of epidemiological problem-solving as a means of violence prevention:

> **Moore:** Here's the difference, it seems to me. You can get more and more and more information about the background of an individual incident--the in-depth analysis of individual incidents.
>
> **Stewart:** Then you try to cluster those incidents into groups of common problems.
>
> **Moore:** Right, or you can get evidence about many incidents. So you can have 20 data elements on one incident or you can have two data elements about each of 20 incidents. What we're imagining is trying to create a world in which we have 20 data elements on 20 incidents, which gives us the best

picture of what it is that we're looking for. And among the data elements that we're trying to get about the incidents is an idea about how the story unfolds, not just the correlates.

Coleman-Miller: Now I need you to compare that to what we talked about earlier when I said that I went over the 500 cases and found that 65 percent of them were not in school but 90 percent of them were in the income maintenance office. Is that any different?

Moore: I would call that a wide and superficial epidemiological approach as opposed to the narrow and deep epidemiological approach, just to invent a vocabulary for that. And what you tend to find as a solution to the problem depends upon a little bit on which of those approaches you're talking about, it seems to me. If you go with the deep and narrow, you find the clever quite precise way to [prevent one or two deaths]. With the wide, superficial approach you find a large crude instrument that may have an impact on 50 deaths. (pp. 253-254)

3. Improving Capacity for Violence Problem-Solving

Once the group focused on the similarities and differences between crime-solving and violence problem-solving, the discussion turned to building the capacity for both kinds of work by storing, retrieving, and acting on information more effectively. Examples came from medicine, police work, work inside bureaucracies, and work in communities. The techniques ranged from highly technological to highly personal. Yet three themes emerged repeatedly:

(1) Supporting "creative browsing" through available information.

(2) Expanding available information.

(3) Acting operationally on the available information.

Supporting "Creative Browsing"

The examples raised by Coleman-Miller and Daughtry illustrated two different information-handling processes that, in combination, could be labeled "creative browsing." The first was linking data stored in different repositories: different agency record systems or different detectives' memories, for example. The second was partitioning data: categorizing violent events in different ways and comparing information patterns across categories. Partitioning information is simple if the desired categories happen to be those that were built into the information systems. Unfortunately, conventional storage methods do not provide the capacity to retrieve data from multiple systems and recombine it in new, unforeseen categories in the kind of "trial and error" approach that our participants' examples illustrated. Often, the investigators' creativity--whether investigating a single case or a pattern of cases--is constrained by the vision of the system designers.

Stewart's memo to Cornet City's mayor had stated the problem concisely:

Police data is not arranged for analysis. It is useful for trends and benchmarking but is not illuminating in terms of developing insights on prevention, reduction, and risk management. The police tabulate a "call for service" or a "criminal violation" without details that could provide causal factors. Police, courts, and corrections cannot manage the risk factors of violence as the health professionals have done with flu epidemics. (p. 2)

The group picked up this point.

Moore: The way that we [in criminal justice] are imagining capturing evidence right at the moment is additional data elements about the victim or about the offender or maybe about the incident, although I heard less about the incident. The thing you [in public health] began with...is evidence about the history of the events that culminated in the death.

Coleman-Miller: What I meant was the history of this [victim], and I was thinking more about family abuse. Has she been in [the hospital emergency department] nine times for nine domestic accidents? A victimization profile. Has this old lady been here six times in a row and all six times her nephew was home from college? That's the kind of additional history I meant. [Transcript, p. 178]

Because many risk factors for violent events are well known, information systems could theoretically be designed in advance to store information on all the relevant ones (The cost of recording the information is a barrier, to which the discussion turned later). The problem is that knowledge of the risk factors usually defines categories that are too broad for defining interventions. More information, on characteristics that are not easily foreseeable, is usually needed to subdivide each category into subtypes of events that are so similar that they might have been prevented by a particular intervention.

Coleman-Miller: I'm not positive I can make the analogy, but I can tell you that there's a common cold. We notice a lot of people have sniffles. Now there's a possibility that she's allergic and he has a strep throat. Both of them are going to have the same symptoms.

Moore: What caused you to invent the idea of allergy as an alternative explanation to strep throat?

Coleman-Miller: When we kept trying to treat her just like we treated him and it didn't get any better. So we said well then it's not that, it's something else. And then we couldn't find what it was so we invented allergies.

Daughtry: It kept coming at the same time every year.

Coleman-Miller: That's right, there were consistent factors.

Stewart: But you really are talking hay fever as opposed to cat hair. We've discovered two different kinds of allergies.

Coleman-Miller: Yes, but first we had to treat her with antibiotics and find out she wasn't getting better. He did and she didn't. Then we did blood studies and found that his blood did not have that same rise in the eosinophilia count as hers did. So now we're thinking eosinophils, now we're going for allergy. Now we're going to divide the allergy up even more and say no this isn't hay fever, this is dust and cat hair. Then it gets even more specific.

Moore: Right, and essentially along with each of these distinctions came both a theory about what might be causing disease as well as a series of measurements that allowed you to find the strep in him as well as see that he was reacting to the intervention and discover that she was allergic to cat hair but

not to pollen. And so, was there ever a moment when you finally said, "Now we've got all of the things that cause sniffles and that we've got them all accurately?"

Coleman-Miller: Clearly not.

Moore: You kept reinventing, and what you used to think was Allergy 1 became Allergy 3. It's this inductive iterative process that you just keep going through over and over and over again. You keep saying, "What was the problem? Let's act as though this were the problem. What do we see as a result?"

Stewart: The problem isn't the same problem if it doesn't succumb to the same solution. That's how you discovered there were two different things. In violence, we may say that jail has worked in these three categories, but in these 27 other categories, jail seems to be completely ineffective.

Coleman-Miller: An interesting analogy. [Transcript, 131-134]

Stewart's memo to the Cornet City mayor had made it clear that flexible computer technology already exists for storing data and partitioning it in unforeseen ways:

> The digitizing of police reports opens an entirely new world of performance opportunities. Incidents can be automatically reviewed, assessed, clustered by common elements, and analyzed for solutions based on relationships (people, places, things, locations, times, etc.)...Through integration, multiple data [bases] can be merged, and detailed patterns and relationships automatically searched and identified for appropriate action. This...converts data automatically into information required to intervene in Southwood's violence...Patterns can automatically be searched, particularly in the forensic areas of fingerprints (identification), DNA (rapes), paint chips (hit and run), fibers (rapes, murders), bullets and casings (drive-by shootings), tool marks (burglaries), and other evidence that conclusively links the defendant to the crime scene. Scientifically developed evidence typically results in a guilty plea and provides the officers with less court time and more community time. [Stewart memo, pp. 7-8]

The group wanted some clarification of just how such systems might work.

Moore: I know a big part of your memo focuses on the potential utility of databases that would allow us to reaggregate data that's now in the manual files in a variety of different ways.

Stewart: That's right. You could have, through neural networks and other kinds of technology, decision tools that would greatly increase the efficiency of the officers. They would be looking for relationships, patterns and they would be able to spot those and say "Oops, here's a relationship that you may previously not have [noticed]." Much the way that analysts look over epidemiological reports to try to find out where the correlation is. They could do that automatically.

Coleman-Miller: Is it a computer network?

Stewart: It is essentially an algorithm that looks for correlations in the database that would show a relationship.

Moore: In other words, it takes every data element in the databases and compares it with every other data element, does it automatically and finds things that are related to one another and tells you.

Coleman-Miller: The more you know, the more interaction can go on. So if the guy worked at the waterfront in 1950, you get to see that.

Stewart: Or even more specific than that, you may find out that the telephone number that he used was also used by a drug cartel in a different city. As a detective you wouldn't spot that or --

Coleman-Miller: Big Brother.

Stewart: Wait a minute, let me put it to you this way. They use neural networks to examine X-rays and MRIs, they look at it to do credit accounts, they do it to a whole host of things. It winnows down the haystacks, so the kind of work you have to do is less and it can be automatically done. (pp. 113-115)

Participants recognized that effective use of such technology for violence prevention would require new organizational traditions and new capabilities on staff.

Moore: The nice thing about your system is that the system will organize [the data] for you.

Stewart: That's a partial solution. The police are not structured to deal with it in a problem solution way. They are structured to respond to [a call] and say we either cleared this case or we didn't and go on to the next one.

Moore: The police don't have any theory about how to cut up and organize this at this stage.

Coleman-Miller: No prevention.

Daughtry: I agree with that. We don't have time for that. We're too busy putting out the fire rather than to try and [prevent the fire in the first place].

Moore: Maybe another possibility is that [police] don't have the analytic talent or traditions [on staff].

Daughtry: That's true. (pp. 127-8)

Expanding Available Information

The group recognized that even if the organizational and technological constraints on violence problem-solving can be loosened, other constraints remain. The power of the approach depends on the range of information that can be retrieved and manipulated. Yet the relevant information lies in multiple public agency record systems, and in community residents' memories, out of reach of any public agency. Moreover, such information is costly to enter. The group wrestled with these problems, and with possible lines of solution.

Daughtry: Mark, I would suggest that the information that you're desiring is available but not just from the police department. There are other institutions and agencies in the community that can paint

that complete picture for you now but there's no mechanism of drawing all that information together. [Transcript, p. 165]

Coleman-Miller's examples had already illustrated one kind of forum for extracting and using data from agency record systems. Discussion now turned to the possibility of retrieving additional data from the community itself, by talking with community residents, through unstructured community observation, and perhaps by using files of old inactive cases.

Moore: What I'm imagining is that we might want information to see how we could intervene in deaths that are now occurring. We may need to find out what were the series of events that culminated in a sample of deaths that we think exemplify the problem that we're trying to deal with. You could imagine commissioning [Cornet City] residents like Lydia Davis to try to tell the story of Anita Woods death--the part that right at the moment is invisible.

Stewart: The family won't tell them, the brother won't tell them.

Moore: We tried to tell the story of the death through a process of investigation and prosecution. That presumably didn't get very far in a lot of these places because we couldn't get the information and part of the reason we couldn't get the information was we were looking for prosecutions. Now you can imagine somebody trying to get as much information as they could, to fill out the story of what events seemed to be related, or what were people's speculations about what had happened that culminated in this particular death.

Coleman-Miller: About a year ago we called all of the parents of children who were killed in Washington, D.C., together, and we said to them, 'We as physicians know that if you have shortness of breath, sweating, chest pain, and a couple of other things, you are probably having a heart attack, and we act on that on an emergency basis. We believe that you as people who have lost your children and have seen them usually within minutes before their deaths have a similar list of warning signs that you could give us. Did a beeper go off? Was a call made? Did you get up in the middle of the night? Give us that list so that we can use it as the warning signs to help another parent pull an 800 number up and say that her son has seven of the eight warning signs.

This community in Washington, D.C. was so paralyzed that even bringing them to our office, not in the institution..., they were unable to pull that list together. And I think it had to do with pain.

Moore: What would the police say? Imagine for a minute that we're trying to investigate these crimes again, not to necessarily prosecute but to tell the stories. I've heard that sometimes cold cases turn out to be easier to solve because some of the heat around telling what really happened has gone away because the people who were intimidating have disappeared or --

Stewart: Right, have moved on to other things. That's right, but we don't go back on cold files as a rule because there are so many fresh ones and they keep piling up.

Daughtry: But there's pressure now, and you have to go back. I just had to form a cold crime squad because the difficulty of solving these has increased tremendously over the last five or six years. The organization has to respond. So now you have just a group of detectives who deal with nothing but cold cases, so they have to revisit them.

Moore: With the aim of solving the crimes. You could imagine getting two benefits, though. One is the prospect of solving it finally and clearing it. And the other is even if you didn't get that you would get epidemiological knowledge about the pattern of things that seem to lead to crimes happening.

Stewart: It's also a training ground for new detectives.

Moore: Has anybody ever tried civilian analysts our or a different group of interviewers than detectives? Has anybody ever used a community group to go and gather this information about the cold crimes? [Transcript, pp. 179-182]

Some of the discussion suggested that fear and anger over violence itself may be opening up some sources of information that had previously been closed.

Daughtry: This issue of sharing information is a critical point in law enforcement. We have a police effort underway now dealing with that small percentage of juveniles who are dangerous. In the past, under protective laws, schools wouldn't give information to probation officers, courts, law enforcement. So you've got all these folks operating in the blind...But school attitudes are changing, because the biggest complaint we get from teachers now is, "I've got a kid in my class that robbed a convenience store with a semi-automatic pistol and nobody has told me anything about it. He is out on bond, and he's sitting in my class."

Teachers are really angry right now with having to police their classrooms rather than instruct, and with this whole issue of safety in the classroom. They are really rebelling. I think the time is right for us to start sharing this information, and they are very receptive to that. Not as intelligence information [to help us arrest their students] but information to help us intervene in the lives of these young folks before it results in their deaths. It's a tough deal given how we work now as law enforcement officers.

Coleman-Miller: But it's the essence of prevention. [Transcript, 185-6]

Some useful information comes from an old technique: unstructured observation of the community. But new technology allows that information to be stored by one officer and retrieved by others for use in violence prevention.

Coleman-Miller: I used to take walks with the police chief. He used to build the coalition by having the health people and the education people walk with him through a hostile neighborhood. He explained to us [what was happening] now when you see these kids on the phones [making drug contacts], and what you have to do. He would never pass a parked car without looking in it, especially if there are kids playing around it. We look in it, we find a Street Sweeper [automatic shotgun], he gets rid of the Street Sweeper. Those were pieces of education in a million years I wouldn't have learned. I guess I teach him and he teaches me. This is so primitive that it must be distressing when you think of [high technology] data bases.

Stewart: Actually, just to run on that, they now have pens and notebooks that you can actually write with, and the computer converts it to text for you, so the officer could be in the field and he or she could write out naturalistically what they see, [and it's available for analysis].

Coleman-Miller: You don't have the resources for that.

Stewart: Sure you do. They're not very expensive. About the cost of a police radio--$1200, maybe $1500...The neat thing is that you don't have to be keyboard competent because you can write with it. It creates digitized information that you can then begin to put into a database. If you had true community policing, you could go out and you could profile the community by writing all that stuff in and then writing in the guys who they think are doing [crimes]. Plus criminal histories. Every time you book a guy, they would also digitize that stuff. This is cheap...and you don't have to spend hours training the police to use it.

Moore: And it's flexible both in what it can record and what can be analyzed from the data. And you need that flexibility in a world in which you're not sure what you're looking for in the set of things that you are examining. [Transcript, 198-200]

4. Acting on the Information

The group shared a sense that the approach to violence problem-solving that they were defining involved more than storing, retrieving, and analyzing information. The approach seemed to involve a distinctive way of acting on it. As Moore expressed it, there is a "busyness" about violence problem-solving in trying to understand the dynamics that underlie clusters of related or similar events and taking action based on that understanding, which bears some similarities to criminal justice approaches in apprehending offenders and setting their punishments. More specifically, the approach seemed to involve willingness to focus on operational rather than theoretical or bureaucratic questions, to consider only a few similar cases at a time, to introduce innovations before having scientific certainty about their effectiveness, and to cross the boundaries of agency jurisdiction.

Moore: [The approach involves]...an appetite for information in somebody's mind, a curiosity that drives them to go out and get information from records. When [you] find out something that raises another question, go out and get the answer to that and then go out and get an answer to the next thing...[Also], you find very specific things that can be done to eliminate two or three deaths, rather than big things [intended to] knock out the whole problem...And if you do it enough, maybe you get a [measurable] cumulative effect.

Stewart: That sounds like the way that medicine works. I am always aghast that medical experiments tend to go out with samples of 6 or 9 or 2 or something like that and they publish it. [In criminology,] that's hardly a study that's worth even looking at. But maybe that's how [medical researchers] have built an understanding and sets of insights with all these small numbers. They've got a few things that seem to work and then they check them against larger numbers and then pretty soon they come up with a public health policy.

Coleman-Miller: I'm trying as you speak to open the umbrella. I can see the umbrella is very sturdy and does save a few lives. Opening the umbrella, I think, has to do with raising awareness. If I sit

in one room and meet a police chief that never sits with the health commissioner, then I have made an alliance that's going to save somebody's life.

Moore: There's a form of interagency cooperation that isn't worth very much, just as there's a form of community policing that isn't worth very much because it never quite gets to the active ingredient that actually does the work. You can get the foot patrol officer out there on the street, but unless she makes contact and talks to somebody --

Stewart: About something important--

Moore: It doesn't happen. Similarly you can get the captain up there in front of the people and you can get the health commissioner and the police commissioner together and have them nod at one another and pledge cooperation but they don't have any idea about what it is that they could do together that would make a difference. And it seems to me that the difference here is [in] coming up with examples of things they could have done to avoid one or two deaths. [The D.C. Death Review Board]...brought a kind of insight about the nitty gritty of what was causing the deaths that allowed their minds to work on that problem and to imagine how they could restructure their organizations to begin working on it. You had descriptions of what was happening.

Coleman-Miller: That was my prescription for that death, not only description. I said here's the cause, I've got to go over here to get the prescription written. And as a physician there was only one patient with one disease who has to get the prescription written over in this other department. There were no doors to knock down. The chief opened the door. [He may have] said, "Oh God, here she comes again!" But it worked.

G. Coping with Value Conflicts

In planning the Cornet City case study experiment, the authors had wondered about the possibility that different value systems might impede constructive conversations between members of the law enforcement and public health communities. While value differences arose, they did not impede the work of the group. Instead, they seemed to lead to one of two kinds of constructive conversation.

In the first kind of conversation, what at first appeared to be emerging value conflicts over community participation and priority-setting were rather quickly displaced by collaborative efforts on operational solutions. As previously recounted, Coleman-Miller had criticized the Cornet City mayor's failure to include on the Task Force enough residents of local communities, including youth, who were most affected by the local violence problem. Any concern by the other participants that broadening the community role in this way might merely provide a platform for rhetoric or a diversion from useful work, especially by police, was dispelled as the discussion produced specific suggestions for operational "joint ventures" between community residents and public agency staff in gathering information and taking other steps to control violence. Similarly, the early controversy over the language of categorizing violence and setting priorities in terms of the categories faded as the discussion gravitated rather naturally toward methods of reducing violence involving young black men and violence in families. Informally, these two categories bubbled up as the ones generating the greatest public concern and accounting for the largest share of Cornet City's violence problem.

The other type of value-related conversation occurred twice: once concerning the focusing and defusing of blame for violent acts, and again concerning the roles of firearms in American life. In each case, the

discussion began with a recognition that different value structures would point toward different strategies for reducing violence. Both times, participants managed to set their own value differences aside and push the discussion forward without resolving the values conflict. But despite their ability to make progress in fictional Cornet City, the discussions left no doubt that in real cities facing violence problems, these conflicts would influence violence_control strategies at least as heavily as organizational considerations and information-handling capacity.

1. Focusing and Defusing Blame

The discussion of blame grew out of Stewart's discomfort with the shorthand description of Cornet City's new violence problem as "Children killing children." That choice of words clearly raised the urgency of the problem but also raised some discomfort.

Coleman-Miller: We have a history of domestic abuse. Child abuse has been on the books for a while. Robberies of convenience stores have been on the books for a while. This is a new kind of killing--the killing of children and the fact that children are killing. It's a new phenomenon and that's what's being reacted to.

Stewart: I wouldn't define it as children killing children because we're talking about 15- to 18-year olds--at least teenagers. Teenagers are not seeing themselves like 7-, 8-, or 9-year-olds. They see themselves as being able to drive.

Moore: What's at stake, Chips, for you when you say you wouldn't call that children killing children?

Stewart: I'm not calling them adults either. But I think the term "children" presupposes some state of innocence, and the subset of people who are being killed do not look innocent.

Coleman-Miller: And for me the subset is absolutely innocent. Adults now have to take notice of the fact that our children, whom in our history they have always regulated up until they left the house, are now in the process of going into adult court for heinous crimes.

Moore: Which is consistent in Chips' mind with their culpability, with the seriousness of the offenses they commit, with the fact that they intended to commit it, and with the danger they represent to the rest of society.

Chief Daughtry began to shift this debate over language and values to operational terms, and doing so made it clear that no participant wished to absolve individual perpetrators of responsibility.

Daughtry: The more basic issue though is that society is in such a state that the kids don't have the opportunity to mature and develop, so they can't make rational choices given the environment they're coming up in. I lean more towards the perspective of "kids killing kids" because they're not mature. Most of them probably haven't done very well in school.

Moore: You're not asking us to make excuses for this conduct are you?

Daughtry: No.

Coleman-Miller: No. As a matter of fact, the one thing I've been using as a bottom line, which is a very scary bottom line across this country, is ... the fact that children are in adult courts is the only barometer for how bad it is. Because all of the rest of it we've gotten used to. We've actually gotten used to the fact of 15-year-olds killing.

Moore: Use it as a barometer of how bad things are getting on three different dimensions. I could say one of the following three things. Kids are behaving worse, and they are choosing to behave badly. I could also then say the reason for that is because their families are falling apart and the reason for that is because of economic deprivation and racial discrimination and the general decline of the American economy or something like that. Right? The third thing I could say is that they are in adult court because we've chosen to respond to their crimes by exposing them to the rigors of the adult court system rather than protecting them in the more secluded environs of the juvenile court system. So those are three different ways of looking at "how bad" the problem has gotten. (Transcript, 26-29)

With that, the conversation moved on to other topics for awhile. But the same dispute re-emerged more vehemently later. The second time, by pushing the debate through to its operational implications, the group clarified what was at stake in terms of policy to reduce violence.

Stewart: I don't agree with the "kid violence" [terminology]. We're talking about young males, okay, because when you talk about kids, I get this overlay that you're talking about innocence, balloons, and birthday parties and stuff like that.

Coleman-Miller: Well now, wait a minute. These kids potentially are the balloon kids. I don't know where else balloons belong except around 12- or 13-year olds...

But let me say this. The reason why I would even spend five minutes discussing this...is because the federal government at this time is being fought hard by communities all over this country because of this genetic behavioral testing that they're doing to find out the genetic component in violence... And as long as that's so, I have to go for this 13-year-old and the balloons...[because that forces me to ask] what in his environment took him to that point. Otherwise, the research that's being done is going to pick up 13-year-olds who are in adult courts and start the testosterone to drop the violence level in these children early. That continuum is a scary one for me. (pp. 74-6).

It took a few minutes for the group to work through the connection that Coleman-Miller was making: that responding to a 13-year-old's violent acts as either the outcome of a reasoned decision or as the expression of some genetic trait would place the burden of prevention on the 13-year-old rather than on society. That allocation of burden would, in turn, restrict the set of tactics a community would consider in developing violence control policy.

Moore: It may be that this problem is so difficult to deal with precisely because we can't quite make up our minds whether these kids are innocents who deserve a second chance and a lot of investment in their care and assistance, or whether they are thugs who can't be trusted and have to be written off.

Stewart: I'm not seeing them as always thugs. I may see them as individuals who could go either way but are currently engaged in high risk behavior...

Moore: And are in any case accountable as a matter of justice and as a matter of community safety.

Stewart: I'm not writing them off and I don't want Beverly to think I'm saying these are disposable people. They are not. [High violence] is the kind of crisis that moves people, but it's not distributed equally and I think that the risk factors can be identifiable if you have the right data. That's what I'm trying to head towards.

Moore: But you could imagine a situation where you would say, "I'm sorry, but these kids are going to be disposable for a while."...by convicting them in courts and meting out sentences for the violence they produce...It looks just. It looks effective. What's wrong with that?

Daughtry: It's taking a tremendous toll on society in the process. It is straining our basic institutions, the criminal justice systems, our health care systems. Psychologically it's affecting communities. Quality of life has been diminished. I'm not so sure that that's a price we want to pay if there's a better solution.

Coleman-Miller: There's another aspect to it: that society then will have taken no responsibility for this. If it didn't happen to you at 13, and it did happen to another group of kids who look just like you at 13, and the only thing that was different between you and them was the environment in which they lived, then by writing them off, society won't have taken any responsibility for the creation of that monster.

Moore: Why do you have such a stake in having the society take responsibility for those kids? Is it because of a desire for justice in your mind? Or is it because if society took responsibility in a different way it might do things that would turn out to be more effective?

Coleman-Miller: That's it. If we don't take responsibility for it, then it's going to be a cyclical process and it will continue...When you look down under the rug, you see things like a 65 percent dropout rate in the school system, and nobody says there might be something wrong with the school system here. Maybe we had better relook at that. We can go from everything to racism to disenfranchisement to --

Moore: Can we go to irresponsible parenting?

Coleman-Miller: Yes, no question...Recession, we could go to the whole long list. If we don't go to that list, then we are allowing for the nurture response to be thrown out of the window and the nature response to blossom. The smaller community and the larger community have to take responsibility to repair it. Otherwise, the cycle continues. There's no stopping it.

Stewart: Yes, but positive conduct occurs in the identical environment...I think at times we overlook that.

Coleman-Miller: I am very clear that even the youngest have to take responsibility for their actions and that the home and parenting have a role in all of this. (Transcript, 74-83)

Although Coleman-Miller illustrated the importance of this distinction with examples of broad social problems that are sometimes characterized as unchangeable "root causes of crime," it is worth reiterating that taking community responsibility for violence prevention also facilitated the low-cost operational and procedural interventions that she presented at other points in the discussion.

2. Values about Firearms

Because firearms are a major focus of the public health perspective on preventing violence, the authors had expected some discussion of gun control as a potentially useful violence control measure for Cornet City. Instead, there was only a brief discussion of how urban teen-agers' access to guns and willingness to use them against humans had increased. That discussion noted that gun use had always conferred self-esteem on young men, but that the old "gun culture" had treated admission to gun use as a rite of passage to adult responsibility for the safety of others and for self-defense against unprovoked predators. The discussion suggested that in today's urban communities, guns still confer self-esteem, but the link between self-esteem and a sense of adult responsibility has been broken, with disturbing results.

The conversation began by discussing links between children's self-esteem and the presence of guns.

Coleman-Miller: Well, I actually have this on video [from a presentation I did in a junior high classroom]. Probably one of the most important things about the video, which I did not notice when I was in the room with them, was that [when I started talking about guns] there was a literal physical transformation. Their reactions went from [totally expressionless] to [waving hands, calling out] "Oh, Miss! Miss!"

Daughtry: So the subject of guns was empowering to them.

Coleman-Miller: Empowerment, and literally they <u>became</u> their knowledge of guns. You could see it happen. Age 14, 13, they started talking about pistol whipping. [One little girl said] "I went out with my boyfriend. He was pistol whipping somebody." And this little girl described pistol whipping to me in such a way! On the video you watch her turn from a little girl Tanya into a grown man saying, "If it's loaded you have to put the gun like this in your hand. Otherwise it will go off and shoot you." Her voice got deeper, her beads fell away, her earrings disappeared. She turned into something! Her body language changed, you could literally see the transformation right on the screen! It was quite an experience.

Moore: With a gun you now have a quantum leap in esteem.

Coleman-Miller: But we're saying that we did not have the vision as adults to recognize that, 10 years ago when these guns were over there by those kids who were [making money] doing those bad drug deals. We didn't have the vision to understand what that means in the whole picture. Why would they give it up?

Moore: Where was the NRA when we really needed them? [Laughter] Seriously, the NRA has always been real clear about--

Stewart: Marksmanship and safety.

Moore: Right, and the idea that these guns are very empowering. And one of the important experiences in getting in touch with guns is learning how to use them properly and all that sort of stuff. So the NRA would say we teach our people to respect guns and use them properly and keep them locked up.

Stewart: Respect life, too.

Moore: So in some ways if you were looking for mentors... the NRA could have come in and said, "You guys are interested in guns, great! Let's start talking about guns. No, we don't use them in cities, we only use them in the country..."

Coleman-Miller: It's interesting you should say that, because these children believe what the NRA believes: right to privacy of ownership, the right to protect their families, the right to own a gun.

But Stewart and Daughtry were well aware of other traditions regarding guns.

Stewart: Sylvester, did you own a gun when you were a boy and hunt with your father?

Daughtry: No, my father was not that kind of an outdoorsman, even though I grew up on a farm. He had an old shotgun. The only thing he used it for was to get rid of the squirrels. Other than that, it was just something that was there. I would see him walk off with the gun maybe once in the fall of the year.

Stewart: It was sort of man's work, too. My dad hunted a lot, but he wouldn't take me. He said, "When you get old enough to do this." I was around guns, but I hardly ever got to handle one.

The discussion turned to differences in the social roles of guns: differences over time, and between rural and urban settings, especially in communities where residents feel vulnerable to violence. Chief Daughtry recounted a personal experience that made these differences crystal clear.

Moore: So we can imagine a gun meaning quite different things for people, right? For some people, suddenly being in the presence of a gun means this is a time that you become disciplined and responsible, right? And other times--

Stewart: Undisciplined and irresponsible. You could do whatever you want to do.

I look at it just a little bit differently, getting to the context of Cornet. Acquiring a gun [may reflect that sense] that the system and the social order can't protect me or doesn't represent my interests. [Years ago] when I was involved very deeply in communities and policing...the people that had small guns were nurses who worked nights, poor people, and old people. They said, "I'm getting older. I'm now 65 and I've got my fruit trees. The kids are stealing fruit and I'm scared of them, they call me bad names, and my house has been burglarized twice. And so now I have gone down and bought this Saturday night special and put it in the drawer next to the bed." They are burglarized, the kid steals the gun, sells it for $15 and all of a sudden the gun ends up killing people. [The gun got onto the streets] because these vulnerable groups wanted some protection because the police are too

busy, they take too long to get here. And to some extent in Cornet, I see the very seeds of this growing.

And the police sometimes offer that as a prescription! I was shocked that the police officers would come to the door of somebody's house who had been burglarized and say "Well, either you move out of this community or--I never come into this area without a gun." I would take him aside and say, "Listen, do you realize that you are working against yourself? These people look at you as an authority, and now they'll flee. So you will either lose the stabilizing influence of these people, or they will buy a gun which will then be burglarized and used against you. Just tell them to get a baseball bat."

Coleman-Miller: Or dogs.

Stewart: We saw some of it in the LA riots when the police did not respond and there was this sense that the people whose stores were protected were those that had guns. We saw them on TV. We saw a Korean community...who actually had guns and all of a sudden appeared at the front of their doors. And in Oakland I once had that same experience. We had six of us trying to keep back 600 people. They broke the windows, and all of a sudden people came out with guns. Their stores weren't bothered.

Moore: It creates conflict, it creates potential [violence].

Daughtry: This whole issue of guns and violence today comes down to a personal level with me. I have a 17 year old daughter that we're always asking, "Where are you going? What time are you going to be back? Who is going to be there?"

One day we said, "Listen, you go to some of these social affairs and you don't know who else is there and someone may have a gun and bring the gun out and you may be an unintended victim." She says, "Everybody's got guns."

I'm the Chief of Police! I asked her, "Are you sure everybody has guns?"

"Everybody has guns, guns are everywhere."

And that was a terrible indictment of our community that here she is, she's not subject to much violence, we control where she goes, but she understands that [guns are everywhere]. That influences the quality of life for young people. That's why I go back to the environment of needing a gun for security and not having training in their use and the potential for destruction and all those things. (Transcript, 63-73)

Appendix C:

Participants' Statements

Written Statement of Chief Sylvester Daughtry

VIOLENCE REDUCTION STRATEGY
CITY OF CORNET
Submitted by Sylvester Daughtry, Jr.

The problems of violence and crime experienced by the City of Cornet as presented in the case study, are diverse and complicated. Unfortunately, many of our cities and communities in American are experiencing the same problems with no sign of improvement. The problems run a continuum of crime and despair, ending up with clients of the Criminal Justice System and/or the health services industry. Some still hold the opinion that the Criminal Justice System will correct problems of deviant behavior and lack of human development that other better prepared institutions have failed to achieve. We now require law enforcement and other criminal justice officials to be active community leaders, called upon to explain the serious problems of crime and social decay. In most cases, the officials have the dubious advantage of coordination of the delivery of critical services to too many clients and victims under stressful and in many cases, crisis conditions. I believe that many now realize that in order for significant improvement to occur, we must begin by individually doing all we can to address the problems of our communities. The government and private sector agencies can make significant contribution but cannot solve our problems alone.

COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING PROBLEM

A program of Community Oriented Policing would be very helpful in addressing the problems of violence in the City of Cornet. I believe that many of the components of a Community Policing Program are already in place in the city. This is indicated by the decentralization of the delivery of police services, accessibility and visibility of police managers in various geographical areas and beat ownership/accountability by patrol officers. Officer Yarborough who provided testimony before the Community Forum referred to traditional means of patrol and enforcement to address problems she encountered on her beat. She appeared to be in a state of frustration and sounded as if she believed that she was not supported by the police department and the community. Effective community based policing programs seek to empower the

community and officers to work in partnership in order to improve the quality of life of those affected by crime and violence. Two of the most important responsibilities of management are to provide the necessary training and to acquire the necessary resources that are easily accessed by officers at the level of operations. Creative problem solving is encouraged and accountability enhanced. There are no absolute safeguards against frustration; however, it has been my experience that officers feel good about their efforts to effect positive change in the community. I am by no means suggesting that the answer to all the serious problems faced can be solved by Community Policing Programs. I do believe that by working with our citizens in partnership allows us to devote the majority of our scarce resources at the problems and not at differences between the police and the community served.

ENHANCE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS THAT SUPPORT THE FAMILY UNIT

We must continue to enhance the family as a unit by supporting programs that keep families intact such as day care, head start programs and alternative schools as opposed to expulsion. The majority of our nation's prison population has less than a high school education. There is a parallel between the lack of education and criminal behavior. Our policies regarding school attendance, parental accountability, information sharing and promoting civic responsibility must be reviewed and changed where necessary.

We must re-evaluate our strategy nationally and locally in addressing the illicit drug problem. We must now look more seriously at demand reduction and treatment, balancing enforcement domestically rather than attempting to influence foreign governments. Our problems have increased rather than decreased over the last decade, fueled by the proliferation of guns. We must institute local initiatives on gun control and gun ownership accountability.

We much encourage the media and entertainment industry to take on a greater share of promoting inclusiveness in this diverse society of ours. The message regarding success must re-emphasize hard work in order to acquire material possessions. Conversely, the industry must stop promoting the image of wealth as a criteria for success.

COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF THE CITY

I believe there must be a comprehensive effort at community mobilization to provide a well coordinated effort to address community problems of violence and crime. Most communities are replete with boards and commission and I believe that most public and private human service agencies do a good job of working in partnership with citizens within the community. The coordination of effort between the various agencies and institutions needs improvement. Most organizations are beyond protecting their turf and are in dialogue with other agencies, but a well coordinated community, state and national effort is not in place.

It is my opinion that no other issue is more important to American than the problem of crime and violence. This problem should receive the same attention and priority assigned when the country is at war or a natural disaster has occurred. I propose that a commission on the status of the city or community be created with the best of our business, governmental, educational, religious, medical and citizens at large comprising membership.

Again, I cannot over emphasize the importance of this commission and the selection of members. The commission should meet on a regular basis for allowing all members to present statistical data regarding the activities of the past 30 days. From the presentations and evaluations, profile of services and needs should be explored and problem areas of coordination identified with adjustments made. This meeting should include the media, open to the general public with results and recommendations reported to the citizen on a monthly basis. A barometer of the city/community is communicated monthly in a comprehensive manner, giving the citizens a full picture of what is occurring in their community. Information about crime, medical services, educational problems, economic indicators, and the activities of the various advocacy groups. This information should provide correlations between such activities and should invoke the creative thinking of the whole community.

This commission would operate on the same level as medical officials who gather to review the case of a patient who died in the care of a medical facility. In this case, the patients are the victims and offenders of crime and violence.

Written Statement of Beverly Coleman-Miller, M.D.

DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF AND COMPONENTS TO THE PROBLEMS OF VIOLENCE IN CORNET

- Acceptance by community/ helplessness/ apathy.
- Level of fear engendered
- Racism, disenfranchisement, miseducation and unemployment
- Statistical significance to African American race
- Innaprioriate feelings of retribution (cycle)
- Access to assistance (911) during crisis slow and inconsistent
- Source of violence questioned (gangs? bad drug deals? domestic interpersonal confict?)
- Lack of evidence for criminal investigations
- Lack of administrative / institutionalized assistance by local community leaders
- Availability / access to firearms
- Illegal drugs and changing statistics over time
- Draining of / lack of hospital resources
- Lack of police officers / equipment
- Unwillingness of community to use / experiment with potential power of community to assist police in making arrest
- Corruption of police department, real or perceived
- Community's role / committment to youth in neighborhood (potential role models abound)
- Margins of "over there" and "those people" created and affirmed
- Lack of respect of community / police and police / community
- Preventive initiatives not encouraged / sponsored / supported
- Becomes a black and brown problem with accompanying prejudices (nature v. nuture)
- Stastics when corrected for socioeconomic status reveals poverty as the causative factor
- Role of interpersonal conflict vs. commission of felony or bad drug deal
- Domestic abuse and child abuse stats produce significant potential initatives
- Understanding statistics (a problem due to poor or non-exsistence reporting processes)
- Bureaucratic approach to preventing violence: → (task force)
- Criminal court component (effectiveness of trials, imprisonment) without community support and assistance
- Task force poorly structured with strong political agenda
- Legislative issues not discussed
- No evident leader in community therefore "blaming" and "excuses" in town meeting.

The Most Salient issues to be addressed

There are five:

Community reaction

- Apathy due to the continuous cycle (within/without community)
- Children learn by watching (cycle)
- Fear and helplessness
- Helplessness and lack of institutionalized support (eg. 911)
- Lack of leadership in community / rhetoric

Drug related crime emphasis

- Must be looked at for closer evaluation (Real v. Perceived)
- Alcohol major drug (still legal and prevalent)
- Economic sucesses with drugs v. established profession (Supply/demand)
- No arrests of buyers??

Access to fire power in community

- Source of guns could be preceived as vector of disease (eg. with malaria, mosquito would be vector of the disease and would be exterminated)
- Legislative initiatives are often watered down prior to passage

Lack of prevention iniatives

- Ignorance of possiblity of prevention
- Task force created to suppress crime with no preventive component until forced

Lack of employment, training and fundamental resources

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Where is everybody? Working? In school? Income maintenance offices? Public housing?

What is positive in community? (ie church attendance, block clubs).

How are successes in community dealt with by larger community .

Median income (consider professionals described).

Level of support by larger community (eg. repair of street lights, maintenance of recreation facilities, response time of police, 911, etc.).

Safety levels in schools.

Interaction with youth in neighborhood (organized; eg. boys and girls clubs, other after-school activities.)

Number of children in adult court for heinous crimes.

Initiatives in place for prevention (funded or not).

Toxic waste in area.

Programs in other parts of same city.

Police presence and level of interaction with community (culturally responsible interaction).

Billboards/bars per square mile.

History of previous support by community of police or other institutional body.

Head Start programs.

Teen programs/after school programs.

CAUSES OF VIOLENCE

America is violent country!

Violence works in America.

Drugs, access to firearms, added to disenfranchisement, racism, unemployment, stress VIOLENCE

MAYOR'S APPROACH

- Approach is political with politically correct members of task force.
- Mayor "sets tone" of "temporary and significant changes" in statistics over 100 days. No regard for change in human condition.
- Uses statistics for affirmation of his actions without further appreciating their significance in prevention.
- Does not address (But is aware of ??) operational deficiencies in system (e.g. 911, corruption, significant resource deficits, poor community relationships).
- Closed to cross-fertilization of criminal justice system with other disciplines (e.g. health, art, bean counters, schools, etc.). Members of task force well chosen but needs more substance (e.g. no community member included!)
- Crisis-oriented and reactive, although statistics show potential proactive initiatives, even with limited resources

MAYOR'S REACTION

- Very few existent coalitions in place during or prior to crisis between community and administrations or coalitions between administrations.
- No community policing what-so-ever.
- Level of seriousness about "ending violence in Southwood" questioned.

Written Statement of James K. "Chips" Stewart

To: John Canady, Mayor, City of Cornet

From: James K. "Chips" Stewart, Principal
Booz • Allen & Hamilton
Justice Systems Technologies

Subject: Violence in Cornet: A Strategy for Recovery

Problem:

The City of Cornet is facing a major public safety crisis. The homicide rate has been at record levels for four straight years. Communities, particularly in Southwood, are fragmented by fear of criminal violence reinforced by the disorder of open air drug markets and front page media stories of violent incidents. The public institutions of police, courts and corrections are overwhelmed by the demand for service. Citizens report that the emergency number is frequently busy. The responses to special requests for public safety were denied due to lack of resources, and emergency assistance is often delayed, causing an erosion of public confidence. The management decisions are completely incident driven with no strategic consideration or managed response. Calls for service and crime reports are dispatched and distributed to sworn officers on a first called, first served basis. There is no capability for analysis or a triage strategy to selectively concentrate on the incidents that can be solved and to reduce non-productive activities. Most resources are consumed in brush fires, even sending patrol officers across town to handle waiting calls.

Citizens, leaders and administrators feel that the entire criminal violence situation is out of control and unresolvable. Clearly business as usual is not working. The Mayor has convened a task force of department heads and leaders to engage in public hearings, surveys or other municipal responses to crime and to produce a plan of action in one hundred days. It is likely that the task force will produce a plan that will provide some time to cool down but the track

record of special committees is minimal. There must be a fundamental change in the way violence is approached. An evolutionary process cannot solve this crisis of violence. A new strategy must be developed.

One unexpected bright spot is Public Health Commissioner Dr. William Freis, who has observed that the traditional enforcement approach to violence has not stemmed the recent escalation of murders. He suggests the epidemiological model used by Public Health to manage epidemics and other large scale health emergencies. This model's strategy is to manage the crises by analyzing the relevant data.

Dr. Freis suggests that violence has been framed as an enforcement issue, a violation of the law, accordingly all the data collected is general and related to a statute rather than the conditions that are associated with the on-set of different categories of violence. By organizing data into categories of shared factors, violence can be viewed as a problem to be prevented or resolved. Tuberculosis is communicable, and seems to strike at random. Without careful analysis it appears unmanageable. However, by collecting profile data on circumstances where tuberculosis emerged, risk factors were identified. These factors then could be mitigated and result in significant drop in cases of tuberculosis. The violence in Comet needs to be grouped in common categories and intervention strategies specifically developed.

The Police Chief, Anthony Burnett, also sought baseline data on violence trends and risk factors. Police data is not arranged for analysis. It is essentially incidents in gross totals (i.e. 17,000 burglaries). This database is useful for trends and benchmarking but is not illuminating in terms of developing insights on prevention, reduction and risk management. The police tabulate a "call for service" or a "criminal violation" without details that could provide causal factors. Without refined information, any analytical capability is diminished. Police, courts and corrections cannot manage the risk factors of violence as the health professionals have done with flu epidemics.

A further consequence of the lack of a coherent information architecture strategy is that

staff resources are exhausted without apparent effect. There is always another call or crime. The frustration over too few resources may actually be the result of an improper arrangement of assets based on numbers of calls handled or arrests made rather than problems solved.

The public policy issue is not the numbers but what the impact is of police intervention on future events.

There is agreement that most defendants are repeat offenders (70%). The system already knows these offenders, yet this knowledge is difficult to access and impossible for the patrol officer to get. Knowledge is essential when trying to deal with drug related violence. Much of the drug-related violence arises from organization and interaction. Knowledge of relationships is a key factor in the investigation of gangs or criminal associations. Without information, the police, courts and corrections cannot make informed decisions about risks of future violence. The community also has knowledge of offenders and non-offenders, but because of the estrangement with the community the patrol officer cannot access this vital knowledge either.

Police have the information on the locations of repeat calls, but they do not have it accessible. Research indicates 66% of the calls are repeat calls to less than 5% of the addresses. The police need to solve the cause of these repeat calls, thereby reducing their workload. But if they can't get that information, every calls becomes a first time incident. These two factors suggest that the system could know the high risk people and locations. Most crime and violence is actually concentrated in geographical pockets. It is possible to develop a prevention intervention with specific people and locations.

A brief assessment of the community reveals a potential asset, an untapped resource of some robustness. Southwood has a stable, long-term population of African-American middle-class. A new resident is someone who moved in 10 years ago. Many are employed as office administrators, or are retired government employees and are politically active. However fear, lack of confidence in their capability, and institutional non-performance keeps the community resource inaccessible to the police.

On the positive side, the recent media focus on violence, the Mayor's public hearings, and community participation have resulted in tangible first steps to forming community partnerships. A relationship at the beat officer and neighborhood level resulted in several arrests and the closing of three crack houses. This success was significant because the community participation was maintained in confidence. There was no intimidation of retaliation - trust and confidence can emerge. This success in joint police-community action provides reason to believe in a new police strategy which may increase available resources, improve the quality of community life and actually reduce violence.

Proposed Solution:

There are three major components to the solution: (1) Strategic; (2) Management; and (3) Technology.

The first is the development of a strategic vision for Cornet in terms of public safety. This involves basic understanding of the clients concerns (fear of violent crime, community disorder and police responsiveness) and the positioning of the public assets (police, schools, courts, health, corrections) to directly address these concerns. A strategy that focuses police service delivery on a specific geographical location (a beat) will fundamentally restructure the police department. By concentrating on the beat and the quality of life, police management can be accountable for dealing with problems, not just calls. The strategy must produce responsive teams to work with the community. Since this is a new concept, it must be developed as a prototype and fielded in Southwood. Police beat teams can be relieved of the crush of calls for service by reducing beat size, developing a differential series of responses to 911 calls, and concentrating on reducing the repeat calls to the same address. Police beat teams need to have information structured to support the new strategy. In addition, time must be allocated to collect data, identify problems and work with community assets for an appropriate intervention.

Management must be reorganized to push decisions down to beat level and empower officers. Assignments must be reviewed to ensure sworn personnel in high value, high impact community assignments. Management improvement opportunities can free-up a significant number of sworn personnel from desk jobs for reassignment to the community. For example, many jobs presently held by Cornet police can be consolidated, transferred, civilianized or out-sourced. The net personnel are a benefit and can be deployed to demonstrate the new strategy with no major budget impact. Involved in this transition is benchmarking of the value of each job. Many police jobs are considered essential because the data processed is related to a public safety activity (i.e. staffing the warrant file section). Most of the inside jobs are labor intensive and require large numbers of staff to process data. An investigator following up on a Southwood homicide looking for photos to construct a line-up of possible suspects may spend hours getting criminal histories at one location, photos at another and still going to another to

get the photos reproduced. Hours of high value resources are lost in Cornet just tracking down records. Delays are costly in public safety terms too.

Technology has not been used extensively in law enforcement, courts or corrections. It has been used to great advantage in the military, medical, banking, insurance, and transportation sectors. All these areas are required to deploy resources, manage risk and solve problems. They have experienced quantum leaps in performance with careful requirements analysis, an information architecture, and training. Technology is now able to replicate professional judgements in target recognition, diagnostic health assessments, loan qualification, risk of accidents, and scheduling optimization. The breakthrough came with the development of the digitized relational database. This technology has resulted in many sectors experiencing record increases in productivity with fewer personnel.

This technology is sufficiently mature that it can be transferred to public safety to improve performance, reduce costs and provide quality data. There is an immediate return on investment with technology that frees-up personnel and managers. The benefits can be taken as salary savings, through attrition, or the assignment of sworn personnel to high value positions, thereby maximizing the professional's contribution. The knowledge of technology-assisted performance in areas similar to enforcement can be leveraged to help Cornet reduce violence.

In Cornet, thousands of staff hours are consumed in processing arrestees, scheduling court appearances and processing for corrections. At every stage in the process, the staff duplicate, reprocess and collect the same information. It takes 75 minutes to book one arrestee. This is very labor intensive and absolutely required. Today, Southwood rolls fingerprints with a 25% rejection rate, takes photos (15% rejection) and types arrest reports (15% error rates). Now using photo-imaging, digitization and text, this process can be fully automated, collected and integrated into a central database. A Cornet detective could access mug-shots, arrest reports, evidence and criminal associates. The prosecutor can do the same without delay or legibility problems. Time saved is average of one hour per arrestee. Only eight arrests per shift

would free-up one staff year!

Not only are personnel freed-up for other assignments, but a database (not a file folder) is created to identify gang members, associates, past criminal histories, M.O. profiles, and automatic photo-line-ups. The database permits real data analysis for risk analysis, investigative research, and appropriate intervention in dealing with violent defendants. This database can prevent case information from slipping through the cracks.

Selected portions of the database can be shared among agencies to provide assistance, supervision and required support. Health professionals may need information and Corrections may provide improved health management where planning and anticipation of needs can be retrieved in advance.

Beyond arrestee booking information, essential data can be fused from the communication sector (calls to 911) and the beat officer taking reports on electronic notepads, laptop or hand held computers. A major urban police department demonstrated a 25% time savings in report waiting times and freed-up significant personnel. Most importantly, by networking these instruments police files could be updated in real time which allows identification of suspected stolen property or additional crimes. The technology permits officers to access information which is already in police possession.

The digitizing of police reports opens an entirely new world of performance opportunities. Incidents can be automatically reviewed, assessed, clustered by common elements, and analyzed for problem solutions based on relationships (people, places, things, locations, times, etc). This is the equivalent of having the best homicide detective carefully reviewing and analyzing every homicide 24 hours a day. The violence incidents can be managed as they cannot be today.

Through integration, multiple data can be merged and detailed patterns and relationships automatically searched and identified for appropriate action. This represents a break-through

in labor intensive activities but it also converts data automatically into information required to intervene in Southwood violence. Information changes accountability and performance. Agencies can be evaluated once the information is available in a comparable form.

Integrating evidence with criminal histories and crime reports can achieve surprising results without extensive training or expensive system maintenance. Patterns can automatically be searched, particularly in the forensic areas of fingerprints (identification), DNA (rapes), paint chips (hit and run), fibers (rapes, murders), bullets and casings (drive-by shootings), tool marks (burglaries) and other evidence that conclusively links the defendant to the crime scene. Scientifically developed evidence typically results in a guilty plea and provides the officers with less court time and more community time.

Once data is collected, imaged, and digitized, it can be transported and screened to facilitate improved system performance with fewer staff years. The development of neural networks replicate human mental processes. When correct patterns and judgements are made the neural network is reinforced, when an incorrect judgement is made the network is atrophied. Neural networks use actual data to be trained and learn from each subsequent decision. Unlike artificial intelligence that require expert rules to make a "yes" or "no", neural networks make judgements on data similar to a police analyst, investigator, pre-trial investigator or probation officer. Neural networks can quickly sort large amounts of data into small, manageable files a human expert can sift through to make the final judgement.

Neural networks have been used to make rapid data searches to improve the target assessments of satellite photographs, review complex medical procedures (MRI and CATscans), make judgements on business and personal loan applications, and other pattern recognition. In many instances the performance of this advanced technology was consistent and superior to humans. Recently, neural networks were used by a probation agency to assess risk to public safety of their incoming clients. The neural network prediction score was 87% significantly higher than the overworked probation officers. The agency could assign intense supervision for high risk and less or community supervision for lower risk. In effect, neural networks permitted

better management decisions, superior supervision and lower risk to the public with fewer professional staff.

Patterns among identified risk factors are the basis of the epidemiological approach to disease prone population subsets. Violent acts in Comet need to be segregated into sub-sets of related incidents. As pointed out in testimony, domestic violence requires a complex intervention involving treatment, arrest and joint counseling. Research reveals that many spousal homicides could be prevented with early intervention. In robbery (ATM; convenience store) video tape can capture the face of the suspect. With a digitized database, it is possible to search, using neural networks, for facial recognition, something the investigator would view as a needle in a haystack.

The steep increase in Comet homicides began in 1986 with crack cocaine markets. Now, with the decline of drug use, competition for turf and customers is violent. The Woods murder produced no witnesses, family testimony or motive. The detective did recover one slug and several shell casings. By transferring existing technology to this problem, these bullets can be identified and similarities searched in the database. If the gun was recovered in a street bust, it could be revealed as the murder weapon. This kind of technology coupled to a database can prevent additional gun homicides by rendering the weapon identifiable and traceable to past violent crimes. The result is disposing of a gun after a drive-by shooting or eventually being linked to previous violent incidents.

Community policing as a strategic enforcement model requires substantial information support to be effective. The beat police team needs to be able to access a wide variety of city services (suspect identification, probation restrictions, stolen property, incidents and clusters of related events, relationships, location histories, mug-shots, gang members, images of new gang symbols, activities on adjoining beats and other relevant information) to be effective and energize the community. The beat team needs quality information to make appropriate intervention. Community policing is far more complex than foot patrol. The beat officer is a costly public resource that requires support to leverage the full benefit. The officers must make professional

judgements that will effect the community quality of life and sense of security. The officer needs the best information, including access to internal and outside agency data. Currently, the beat officer in Cornet is the least informed regarding departmental information; specialized units have better information. They do not need the beat officer because s/he cannot add critical information on crime patterns, suspect information or community resources. The current brush fire approach to calls keeps officers from becoming experts on activity in a neighborhood. The fundamental shift to a new strategy for a neighborhood as opposed to handling calls in a sector for eight hours is extraordinary. To complete that shift in strategies, management improvements must be made. An information architecture to support the problem-oriented beat team strategy is required.

Both increased police resources and information support can be realized by technology insertion and application of neural network software for analysis of risk and emphasis on prevention of violence. Properly designed, a seamless transition could be managed. Most community policing initiatives have failed because of lack of support for information and relief from the onslaught of 911 calls. In Cornet, under your leadership, changes will reduce fear and violent incidents prevented.

Information defines the problem and the police (and the entire criminal justice system) have been unnecessarily handicapped because of the lack of a strategy and because data was only serial tabulations. In the past, collecting new data was labor intensive and cost prohibitive. Now an entire system can benefit with the right technology. By creating a prototype district Cornet can respond to localized violence in a comprehensive way using networked information to bring together enforcement, education, public health, and the community to reduce violence. This prototype can develop a core of experience, success, and refined crime analysis to spread throughout Cornet in a series of planned phases.