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**Overview of the
Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program
and the
Street Sales Enforcement Program**

**Bureau of
Justice
Assistance**

150072

**U.S. Department of Justice
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MONOGRAPH

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The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

**Overview of the
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Street Sales Enforcement Program**

MONOGRAPH

**Bureau of
Justice
Assistance**

May 1993

Executive Summary

This monograph is intended to provide law enforcement agencies with detailed methodologies for developing and executing street-level narcotics enforcement programs.

Drug sellers and drug buyers on public streets are the most visible manifestation of the drug problem that pervades our society. Street markets have always been a problem with some drugs, like heroin, but they have proliferated with the rapid spread of crack cocaine—with its low cost, ease of use, and immediate highs. “Crack is responsible for the fact that vast patches of the American urban landscape are rapidly deteriorating beyond effective control by civil authorities.”*

Because of their blatant contempt for law and the common good, and because of the violence associated with their drug trafficking, crack dealers have created a fear of crime that imprisons law-abiding members of society in their homes. Crackhouses have made bad neighborhoods worse, blights in themselves and in the people they attract. While effective street enforcement will not totally solve the Nation’s drug problem, it can certainly alleviate public fear and improve safety and the quality of life for many of our citizens.

* *National Drug Control Strategy*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989, p. 1.

It has become commonplace to describe drug trafficking in market terms, contrasting supply-reduction programs with demand-reduction programs. This monograph concentrates on the places where a significant part of that market operates, on streets or in public places, or in crackhouses held hostage by traffickers, where supply actually meets demand and drug sales take place. The drug trafficking environment in which crackhouses flourish is so fluid that ordinary distinctions between public streets and private buildings are actually blurred. There is nothing abstract or theoretical, nothing indirect or delayed, about street markets. These markets can be targeted for direct actions that are known to be effective.

Although we may assume without arguing that there are other enforcement activities of equal or greater importance, this monograph focuses on street enforcement. Drugs are neither grown nor manufactured in most communities. Some distribution network must exist to bring them to market, but this monograph focuses on the *retail* market, not the wholesale drug distribution network. Beyond recommending that street enforcement officers coordinate intelligence with mid-level and high-level trafficking investigators, this monograph has little to say about those other enforcement activities. Every law enforcement agency should have whatever array of antinarcotics programs its resources will allow.

Acknowledgments

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The report outline was reviewed by Sam Knee, Chief of Police, National City (California) Police Department, and John O'Dell, Lieutenant, Denver (Colorado) Police Department. Ed Fennessy, University of California, Berkeley, wrote several key project site descriptions. Edward F. Connors, III, Executive Director of ILJ was primarily responsible for preparing this report. Additional ILJ staff who helped prepare the report included Michael S. McCampbell, principal associate; Barbara Webster, principal associate; Catherine Miller, programmer/analyst; Elaine Nugent, research associate; Lisa Cowan, administrative assistant; and Judith A. Norman, administrative assistant.

Overall guidance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance was provided by Don Anderson, chief, Courts/Information Systems Branch. His assistance has been invaluable not only during the preparation of this report, but throughout ILJ's partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance.

About the Bureau of Justice Assistance

The Bureau of Justice Assistance provides Federal assistance to State and local units of government for programs that improve the functioning of the criminal justice system. The Bureau administers a major grant program and a number of direct assistance programs.

The Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program provides grant assistance to enhance State and local drug control efforts. Programs eligible for funding include those that improve the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, detection, and rehabilitation of drug offenders. Enforcement programs, treatment programs, and programs that concentrate on major drug offenders are also eligible for funding. The States, District of Columbia, and territories receive block grant awards that are administered at the State level. The discretionary grant program administered by the Bureau is used to enhance, coordinate, and fill gaps in State and local efforts through national and multistate programs.

Direct Assistance Programs administered by the Bureau include the Public Safety Officers' Benefits, Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance, Regional Information Sharing Systems, Mariel-Cuban Reimbursement, Surplus Federal Property, and the Prison Industry Certification Programs.

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Chapter 1. Introduction and Background

The Justice Assistance Act of 1984 established the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) within the Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. BJA was created to administer grant programs that support national crime control efforts and improve State and local criminal justice systems.

This report describes the BJA-funded discretionary grant programs in two specific areas—the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and the Street Sales Enforcement Program. These two program areas made up a significant part of BJA's discretionary assistance to State and local efforts in reducing the Nation's drug problem.

This chapter provides the following information:

- Historical perspective of the funding authority of BJA and BJA's role in the war on drugs.
- Overview of the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and the Street Sales Enforcement Program.
- Role of the Narcotics Control Technical Assistance Program (NCTAP).

- Organization of the report.

Historical Perspective

The Justice Assistance Act authorized BJA to award criminal justice discretionary grants to public and private nonprofit agencies, specifying four broad areas of discretionary grants:

- Demonstration programs.
- Educational and training programs for criminal justice personnel.
- Technical assistance to State and local governments.
- National or multistate projects.

Congress intended the BJA Discretionary Grant Program to complement the Criminal Justice Block Grant Program, also administered by BJA, as required by Part D of the Justice Assistance Act. The philosophy behind the discretionary grant program was to provide carefully designed, quality criminal justice projects for States to apply under the block grant program.

Total BJA discretionary funding in fiscal year 1987 amounted to approximately \$9 million. Very little of these funds were spent on drug-related law enforcement because the primary emphasis was on reducing violent crime and dealing with serious offenders.

However, special consideration was given to drug prevention and education programs that could not be supported by other grant programs.

The BJA Discretionary Grant Program was increased in both size and scope over the next several years. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, signed into law on October 27, 1986, created the State and Local Assistance for the Narcotics Control Program within BJA. This Act authorized approximately \$13.5 million in discretionary funds for fiscal year 1987. Programs funded reflected an increased emphasis on assisting State and local drug control efforts. The specific strategy to accomplish this objective was to provide direct and complete information and guidance to States in developing and implementing statewide plans for combating drug problems.

The BJA Discretionary Grant Program was revised and enhanced in 1988 when the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 amended the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and created the Drug Control and System Improvement Program. The new Act unified two previous public laws—the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—and placed special emphasis on helping States implement drug control strategies. The original emphasis on improving the criminal justice system's response to violent crime and serious offenders became a secondary BJA objective.

Discretionary funding under the Drug Control and Improvement System Program was \$13.7 million in fiscal year 1988 and \$30 million in 1989. In 1990, discretionary funding reached \$50 million. This level of funding continued in 1991 and 1992.

Discretionary Drug Enforcement Programs

In keeping with its congressional mandate to provide discretionary funding for demonstration programs that could function as models for State and local law enforcement agencies, BJA funded two key programs in 1987: the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and the Street Sales Enforcement Program.

Although the objectives of these two programs differed somewhat, the intent of both was to provide an environment in which some of the Nation's largest law enforcement agencies could implement innovative techniques to combat drug trafficking. BJA provided funds previously unavailable to hard-pressed local agencies, and the agencies in turn developed unique approaches to reducing the drug problem at the local level.

Over the course of 4 years, beginning in 1987 and ending in 1991, BJA provided over \$9 million to 18 sites across the country to conduct demonstration programs in crack and street-sales drug enforcement. (This does not include funding provided to Federal and other agencies to fund the Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force.) Although BJA

funding has not been renewed, some agencies are still operating the projects on income derived from asset seizures.

The rest of this section briefly describes the objectives of these drug enforcement programs and lists the sites for each. An indepth description of each program site is provided in the next two chapters along with a detailed discussion of overall goals and strategies as envisioned by BJA.

Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. In late 1987, BJA began funding these discretionary programs for the purpose of establishing crack enforcement task forces. Awards were granted to five jurisdictions: Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. Each site received an initial award of approximately \$300,000 for the first 15 months with a supplement of approximately \$200,000 for an additional 12 months.

Five additional sites were added in 1988: Baltimore, Miami, Nassau County (New York), Northern Virginia, and San Diego. The Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force was also funded in 1989 but is not discussed in this report.

The goal of these programs was to improve the capabilities of local law enforcement agencies to investigate and immobilize crack cocaine trafficking organizations.

Street Sales Enforcement Program. BJA began funding these programs in 1987 and made grant awards to seven jurisdictions: Birmingham, Long Beach, Oakland, Orlando, Orleans Parish (New Orleans), San Antonio, and Seattle; Rochester was added as a site in 1988. Each site received an initial grant of approximately \$300,000 to \$400,000 (Birmingham received \$180,000) for 15 months with a supplement of \$150,000 to \$250,000 for the next 12 months.

The primary goal of the street sales enforcement program was to strengthen urban enforcement and prosecution efforts targeted at street-level drug dealers and buyers.

Narcotics Control Technical Assistance Program

NCTAP was funded as part of BJA's commitment to provide continuing assistance to State and local narcotics enforcement efforts. BJA awarded a cooperative agreement in August 1987 to the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ), a private nonprofit corporation specializing in criminal justice research, consulting, training, and technical assistance.

This cooperative agreement created a partnership between BJA and ILJ to manage and deliver technical assistance and training support to BJA grantees and other State and local law enforcement agencies.

From July 1987 to March 1991, NCTAP delivered over 100 tuition-free, specialized drug enforcement training programs to more than 8,000 law enforcement officers in 40 States

and territories. In addition, NCTAP provided free, onsite technical assistance to approximately 120 law enforcement agencies nationwide. This technical assistance helped agencies develop and improve drug enforcement efforts.

The following are examples of technical assistance provided by NCTAP: (1) study of crime laboratories to improve efficiency of drug analysis operations for the States of North Dakota and Hawaii and police departments in Chicago and Philadelphia, (2) review of standard operating procedures for the newly formed Philadelphia District Attorney's Narcotic Strike Force, (3) development of a computerized drug intelligenc system for the Detroit Police Department and the Tucson regional drug task force, and (4) a complete organizational review of the Miami Police Department's narcotics enforcement operations.

NCTAP also offered several other free services designed to improve drug enforcement:

- Monthly telephone technical assistance via a toll-free 800 telephone number to approximately 350 persons and agencies per month.

- Monthly newsletter (*NCTAP News*) to over 2,600 subscribers with information and articles on training, legal and legislative issues, innovative enforcement programs, and other topics.

- Monographs, briefing papers, videotapes, and other publications authored by NCTAP and distributed to over 10,000 requesting individuals and agencies. Examples of four monographs include the following: *Managing Confidential Informants*, *Entrapment Defense*, *Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement*, and *Managing Confidential Funds*.

BJA specifically assigned NCTAP the task of coordinating and assessing the progress of discretionary grantees conducting drug-related law enforcement programs. NCTAP provided direct support to 35 discretionary projects, including the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and the Street Sales Enforcement Program. Technical assistance to discretionary grantees took several forms: holding periodic management "cluster" conferences, conducting observational site visits to review grantees' procedures and practices, providing specialized training, and collecting quarterly performance and management data.

Because of NCTAP's early involvement in these projects, data collected were computerized and provided to the sites during the annual cluster conferences and to BJA more frequently. The data have been used as a management tool by BJA to ensure the most effective use of project funds.

Organization of the Report

This report has been produced by ILJ as a continuing part of the BJA-NCTAP partnership. To summarize, the rest of this report is organized as follows:

Chapter 2, Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program, describing the activities of this program.

Chapter 3, Street Sales Enforcement Program, describing the activities of this program.

Chapter 4, Aggregate Data Summary, detailing such a summary.

Chapter 5, Conclusions and Policy Issues, offering conclusions and policy implications for future drug enforcement programs.

Chapter 2. Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program

For the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program, this chapter provides the background, goals and objectives, program description, project sites, funding, and timelines. Each of the project sites' programs and activities are described in some detail.

Background

This program area was based on the task force approach to drug enforcement used successfully by Federal, regional, and State law enforcement agencies. In creating the concept of task forces to investigate crack trafficking at the local level, BJA drew heavily upon elements successfully used by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) task forces, Organized Crime/Narcotics Program task forces, and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Organized Crime discretionary grant programs. Techniques used in these efforts were adopted by crack enforcement task forces of local law enforcement agencies.

Goals and Objectives

The overall goal of the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program was to improve the capabilities of State and local law enforcement to investigate and combat crack trafficking organizations. This goal was achieved by developing operational task forces to attack crack

traffickers. The objectives were to foster Federal and State cooperation; form continuing enforcement partnerships; and develop Federal prosecution of criminals who were identified by State and local agencies.

The next section provides a detailed description of these goals and objectives.

Program Description and Elements

The Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program reflected BJA's overall strategy of integrating enforcement operations and making Federal resources available to establish crack task forces in major metropolitan areas. The program required participation by DEA and other Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Local agencies required grant funds primarily for purchase of evidence and information, overtime, specialized equipment, and administrative costs. DEA provided additional personnel and technical assistance to support the project sites' enforcement efforts.

BJA listed the following objectives to achieve this goal in its fiscal year 1988 discretionary program plan:

- Enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to attack higher-level crack cocaine trafficking organizations.

- Increase the rates of arrests, prosecution, convictions, drug removals, and asset forfeitures related to crack traffickers and organizations.

- Reduce the incidence of armed robberies and property-related crimes committed to support crack cocaine drug habits.

- Reduce the incidence of violent crime (such as homicides) related to crack cocaine drug habits.

- Improve the ability of State and local officers to develop strong Federal prosecution against crack traffickers by using Federal drug trafficking statutes.

- Increase use of Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) and Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statutes to target crack trafficking organizations.

- Facilitate the development, implementation, and dissemination by all members involved in the task forces of intelligence information on crack trafficking.

These goals required formation of a partnership between local and Federal law enforcement and prosecution agencies to use State and Federal laws for combating crack cocaine trafficking organizations.

Project Sites, Funding, and Timelines

BJA awarded grants to five original sites in October 1987: Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis. Five additional grants were awarded in 1988: Baltimore, Miami, Nassau County (New York), Northern Virginia, and San Diego. The Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force was also funded in 1989.

This report does not include a description of the Detroit site or the Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force. Detroit did not complete its project because of operational and administrative reasons. Because of its size, expenditures, and uniqueness, the Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force will be discussed in a separate report.

Exhibit 2-1 provides a description of funding amounts and dates of operation for all other sites. The rest of this section provides detailed reports on the activities of the nine Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program sites.

Exhibit 2-1. Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Sites

<u>Site</u>	<u>Award Date</u>	<u>Initial Award Amount</u>	<u>Supplement Award Date</u>	<u>Supplement Award Amount</u>	<u>Total Project Funding</u>	<u>Total Project Length</u>	<u>Project Completion Date</u>
Denver	10/01/87	\$300,000	04/12/89	\$200,000	\$500,000	55 Months	5/31/92
Detroit	10/01/87	300,000	None	None	300,000	24 Months	9/30/89
Houston	10/01/87	300,000	04/12/89	200,000	500,000	28 Months	1/31/90
Los Angeles	10/01/87	299,250	04/12/89	200,000	499,250	28 Months	6/30/90
Minneapolis	10/01/87	300,000	04/12/89	200,000	500,000	36 Months	9/15/90
Baltimore	06/15/88	350,000	05/15/90	300,000	650,000	43 Months	12/31/91
Miami	06/15/88	350,000	05/15/90	350,000	700,000	54 Months	12/31/91
Nassau County	08/15/88	350,000	06/07/90	200,000	550,000	38 Months	10/31/91
Northern Virginia	03/15/89	250,000	11/21/89	20,000	555,100	54 Months	9/30/93
		08/27/90		67,100			
		04/21/91		218,000			
San Diego	09/01/88	<u>175,000</u>	05/31/90	<u>275,000</u>	<u>450,000</u>	38 Months	10/31/91
Total Awards		\$2,974,250		\$2,230,100	\$5,204,350		

Denver Metro Crack Task Force Denver, Colorado

Denver's early substance abuse problems were largely local, anonymous, and nonviolent. Local people engaged in the sale and use of heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines, and marijuana. Most drug sales were conducted through slots in doors or through other means that kept the parties hidden from each other. The anonymity effectively limited the opportunities for theft, intimidation, and physical violence that often accompany drug dealing.

In early 1986, crack cocaine and Jamaican nationals from the East Coast arrived in metropolitan Denver and dramatically changed the scope and nature of the area's drug problem. Crack quickly replaced cocaine powder as the drug of choice. Its ready availability and addictive nature led to a significant increase in sales activity and to numerous complaints by citizens about crackhouses and attendant crimes in their neighborhoods.

The Jamaican drug dealers sold crack openly from well-fortified crackhouses. Through intimidation and violence, these dealers quickly gained control of street-level crack and cocaine distribution in Denver and Aurora. The Jamaicans were members of a Jamaican organized crime network in the United States engaged not only in drug distribution but also in terrorism and illegal arms and munitions dealing.

The Jamaicans were soon followed by members of several Los Angeles gangs looking to expand their crack trade into the Denver area. The Los Angeles gangs added still another dimension to Denver's drug problem—open street dealing in residential neighborhoods. Like the Jamaicans, the Los Angeles gangs controlled their operations through intimidation and violence.

In 1986 and 1987, the Denver police assigned 12 narcotics detectives and 2 sergeants to street-level narcotics enforcement and allocated \$1,200 a month in confidential funds. Paid overtime was not permitted, and officers could not work more than 171 hours in a 28-day period. As a result of these restrictions, more than half the narcotics unit was often off duty at the end of the month. In addition, in the 18 months before the Denver Metro Crack Task Force was formed, no narcotics officers were assigned to night duty on a regular basis. During this period, members of the Denver and Aurora departments and the DEA worked together informally on undercover drug buys and crack distribution investigations. Those efforts were successful to a point, but limited local resources and the constraints on DEA's involvement in street-level drug cases precluded the type of all-out effort the growing crack problem required. Considering itself to be "on the ropes in the street-level war on drugs and crack," the Denver Police Department (DPD) applied for grant moneys that would enable it to formalize the task force approach and initiate intensive narcotics enforcement activities.

Project History

DPD received two BJA discretionary grants for support of a Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. The Phase I grant (\$300,000) initially covered the period from October 1, 1987, to December 31, 1988, and was later extended to March 31, 1989. The Phase II grant (\$200,000) covered the period from June 1, 1989, to May 31, 1990. Project funds that were generated from the seizure of drug-related assets during task force activities were used to keep the task force operational through May 1992. The Denver Metro Task Force, a joint effort of DPD and the Aurora Police Department (APD), focused its narcotics enforcement activities in east and northeast Denver and in northwest Aurora, the areas most heavily affected by crackhouses and street dealing.

Project Goals and Objectives

The goal of the Denver Metro Crack Task Force, which is still operating on project-generated income, is to dismantle the major crack distribution networks by identifying, arresting, and prosecuting the key co-conspirators. The objectives in Phase I were to (1) reduce the availability of crack cocaine at the street level in the Denver metro area, (2) reduce attendant crimes of violence, and (3) reduce related property crimes. In Phase II, the project's objectives were broadened to include enhanced investigative efforts to arrest and prosecute more mid- and upper-level dealers.

Project description

The Denver Metro Crack Task Force is a multiagency effort involving, primarily, DPD, APD, DEA, and the Office of the District Attorney for Colorado's Second Judicial District. In Phase I, grant moneys were used to support street-level enforcement by providing manpower (paid overtime), money for undercover buys and informant payments, leased undercover vehicles, and equipment. The grant proposal also provided for targeting higher-level dealers, but attacking the street-level problem required almost all of the task force's personnel and financial resources.

The progress made during Phase I, particularly against the Jamaican drug operations, enabled the task force to take a new approach in Phase II. Task force members were organized into two teams. The street enforcement team maintained the pressure on street-level dealers, and the new enhanced investigation team targeted mid- and upper-level dealers in an effort to reduce the amount of cocaine and crack reaching the streets.

Organization and Management

Personnel. The initial composition of the task force was as follows:

- Executive Director: Chief of DPD.

- Project Director: Lieutenant, DPD vice/drug control bureau.

- Operations group: Supervisor, sergeant, DPD vice/drug control bureau; two full-time DPD narcotics detectives; one full-time DPD intelligence analyst; two full-time APD investigators, special assignment bureau.

- Project control group: executive director and project director; administrator, APD special assignment bureau; DEA special agent, Denver State and local task force; deputy, District Attorney's office.

In addition, other members of DPD's street narcotics unit were assigned to task force operations as resources permitted, and other members of APD's special assignment bureau participated in cases in which APD was the agency of primary jurisdiction.

Within 2 months of project initiation, another DPD detective was assigned to the task force. Additional personnel assignments in November 1988 brought the task force's operating strength to a total of 2 DPD sergeants, 10 DPD detectives, and 4 APD investigators. With the formation of two operational units within the task force in Phase II, the street enforcement team consisted of one DPD sergeant, six DPD detectives, and four APD investigators. The enhanced investigation team consisted of one sergeant and four detectives from DPD.

All task force participants work as a team and are kept informed of all aspects of investigations as they progress. The project control group meets monthly to discuss progress and plan activities, and the supervisor and other operational members of the task force meet monthly with the project director to update him on project activities.

Investigative policies and procedures. Activities of the task force are shaped in large part by four policy guidelines: (1) involve local and Federal prosecutors and courts in the early stage of each investigation, (2) pursue CCE and RICO prosecutions whenever possible, (3) engage in continual planning to ensure goals and objectives are being met, and (4) conduct ongoing planning and coordination of task force cases with the DEA State and Local Task Force.

The core operating hours for the task force are from 7 p.m. to 3 a.m., the peak activity period for drug dealers. Each investigator works with at least two paid informants.

Investigators conduct covert and overt operations, including surveillance, undercover buys, reverse stings, zero-tolerance sweeps, and seizures of assets under Federal and State statutes.

Procedures were developed to streamline the processes for obtaining and executing search warrants. In addition, guidelines were developed for prioritizing task force responses to citizen calls to the crack hotline, which was installed in the narcotics unit as the task force was being formed. Citizen calls to the hotline were instrumental in identifying key crack locations within areas targeted by the task force.

Project Activities

Enforcement activities, The task force adopted a comprehensive narcotics enforcement strategy aimed at buyers, sellers, and facilitators. Buyers were largely targeted through sting operations, sellers through buy-bust operations and search and arrest warrants, and facilitators through seizures of drug-related property and other assets.

The task force used undercover and sting operations extensively in its street-level operations, but the search warrant based on informant information became its primary tool against low-level crack dealers. In 1988 and 1989, for example, an average of 20 search warrants, most of the immediate-entry type, were executed each month. Task force members quickly became expert in writing search warrant applications that were technically correct and that would stand up to suppression and other motions hearings. The liaison established with the deputy district attorney was another important factor in speeding the process of obtaining warrants. Immediate-entry warrants were executed by DPD and APD special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units. This freed investigators to continue developing cases and placed responsibility for entry operations in the hands of highly skilled units. An added reason for the use of SWAT units was the fact that the Jamaican and Los Angeles drug dealers were well armed. During the first 2 years of operations, weapons were seized in many of the warrants executed.

As noted, the enhanced investigation team was organized to target mid- and upper-level dealers. The team used a variety of techniques to identify and gather information on individuals and organizations responsible for introducing, procuring, manufacturing, or distributing crack or powdered cocaine.

The enhanced investigation team also targeted major crack suppliers through participation in Federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) cases. One such case targeted Jamaican drug traffickers and other interstate gang traffickers operating in the area. Another OCDETF case began as three independent cases being developed by three separate agencies. The communication/coordination channels established by the task force led the agencies involved to realize that they were all targeting one large cartel, and the three cases were then combined. As part of an OCDETF investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the team obtained its first telephone search warrant, a tool it anticipates using extensively in the future.

Other activities. Community involvement has also been an important aspect of task force operations. Citizen complaints were among the first indicators of a crack problem in the metro area, and citizen calls to the crack hotline were a continual source of important information for investigators. For their part, task force members attend neighborhood meetings and other functions to keep citizens informed about their antidrug efforts and to solicit feedback on progress and problems. Task force members also participate in antidrug educational programs conducted through the schools.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

A number of indicators demonstrate that the task force, in conjunction with other DPD, APD, and Federal enforcement efforts, has made significant progress in curtailing the availability of crack in the Denver metro area:

- Several neighborhoods that were about to be declared uninhabitable in 1987 and 1988 were reclaimed.
- The number of weapons recovered during execution of search warrants began to decline dramatically as dealers recognized the liability of being in possession of a firearm when the task force SWAT unit hit their premises.
- Crack dealers were forced to give up operating from static locations and had to move quickly from place to place to avoid being arrested.
- As crack dealers were put out of business, the number of complaints coming in to the hotline began to decline—for example, from 3,000 in 1988 to 1,700 in 1990.
- Between 1988 and 1990, task force activities led to 1,437 arrests, 893 filed cases, and the seizure of 42 pounds of crack and 24 pounds of cocaine.

■ Over \$1 million in U.S. currency was seized as part of the task force's aggressive efforts to confiscate the assets of drug dealers.

Another important indicator of the success of task force activities is that officials in Denver and Aurora have made the task force concept a permanent part of police operations in metropolitan Denver. Beginning in June 1992, Denver will provide task force funds through a special city ordinance.

**Houston Police Department
Houston, Texas**

Houston, with approximately 1.8 million people, is the fourth largest U.S. city. It is spread over an area of approximately 600 square miles, making it by far the Nation's largest municipality in land area. Houston is the hub of a three-county, metropolitan area with a population of 3.1 million persons.

In 1986, the Houston Police Department (HPD) had a total staff complement of 5,550 employees (4,490 sworn officers and 1,060 civilians). By 1989, HPD's sworn police staffing had decreased by 402 officers—a decrease of 9 percent. During this same period, calls for police service showed a dramatic increase, rising from 663,878 in 1985 to 877,000 in 1988.

Project History

As one of the five original sites, HPD was awarded an initial Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement grant of \$300,000 from BJA on October 1, 1987. This 15-month grant period ended in December 1988. In April 1989, BJA awarded another \$150,000 to HPD to continue the program; this latter grant ended in February 1990.

The initial grant application in July 1987 described Houston's need for a project of this type:

- The sale and use of crack as well as cocaine powder had become widespread in Houston. Crack had emerged as one of the most marketable drugs sold on Houston streets because of its growing availability and its convenient use.

- During 1986, HPD arrested 575 suspects for cocaine possession (including crack). Until 1987, arrest statistics did not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine. In the first 3 months of 1987, HPD arrested 99 individuals for possession of crack.

- Many crack dealers had taken refuge in crackhouses, which were fortified in some way to delay police entry long enough for occupants to flush the narcotics or to conceal them in walls or other hiding places.

- The department identified 120 locations where crack was sold. Thirty-one of these locations were crackhouses, 18 of which were heavily fortified. The extent of the fortifications varied by location. Some had steel doors and bars on the windows. One had heavy steel doors, bricked-in windows, and 4-foot-high iron posts embedded around the perimeter of the property to prevent vehicles from ramming the building.

- The mere existence of a crackhouse in a neighborhood forces a deteriorating quality of life on that neighborhood. So long as neighborhood residents know that drugs are being sold out of these houses and that police actions have not deterred the operation, crackhouses often become symbols of lawlessness and crime in a neighborhood. This was one of the most serious aspects of the crack problem.

The department believed that while some crack trafficking was conducted by individuals with small operations, there were also some well-organized and well-financed organizations that operated multiple crackhouses. Some crackhouse operators rented from landlords who were not involved in the drug trade, while other landlords knew that their buildings were being used for drug trafficking.

The initial HPD application further indicated that the city of Houston would supplement the \$300,000 in BJA funds with an "in-kind" commitment worth over \$519,000.

Project Goals and Objectives

HPD proposed to attack the crack problem through the coordinated efforts of uniformed patrol officers, plainclothes patrol tactical officers, narcotics division officers, and Federal law enforcement agents. The program had three primary objectives:

1. Direct enforcement at the 120 identified crack sales locations.
2. Reduce the availability of crack.
3. Lawfully seize all assets of crack dealers.

The operational objectives of the project were as follows:

- Dedicating a crack task force to focus on the apprehension and prosecution of crack dealers.
- Pursuing forfeiture of crack dealer assets in cooperation with DEA.
- Establishing a closer working relationship among investigative personnel, patrol personnel, and DEA agents.

- Developing a multilevel approach toward eradicating the crack problem.
- Expediting criminal prosecution by establishing a closer working relationship between police and the district attorney's office and criminal justice system.

Project Description

The police department's approach to this project evolved as the understanding of the crack problem evolved, and this project was undertaken at approximately the same time as the department was implementing its Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (NOP) Program. NOP had an influence on the way HPD eventually attacked the crack problems.

In its initial grant application, HPD's plan of action essentially concentrated efforts on the problem of crackhouses. With the crackhouse as the primary target, the program design involved the implementation of three strategies to address the problem: (1) traditional enforcement, (2) nontraditional enforcement, and (3) real property seizure and forfeiture.

Under the traditional enforcement strategy, HPD expected to use informants, undercover officers, undercover buys, and the execution of search warrants. The objectives of this strategy were to arrest and prosecute drug violators and to seize their narcotics.

The nontraditional enforcement strategy covered a wide range of options, including high-visibility saturation patrols in the area of crackhouses; parking marked patrol units in front of a crackhouse; stopping approaching customers for field interrogation and warrant checks; stopping exiting customers who may be high on narcotics and charging them with public intoxication or other appropriate violations; overtly photographing persons entering and exiting crackhouses; notifying building owners that their property is being used for narcotics trafficking and that continued violations may result in appropriate action against the property; and enlisting the assistance of other municipal agencies to vigorously enforce fire, building, and health codes.

The real property seizure and forfeiture strategy involved cooperation with DEA and the U.S. Attorney's Office to seize assets involved in narcotics trafficking.

The department expected to use the traditional enforcement strategy more frequently than the other two options. The idea was to use these three strategies in a progressive manner beginning with the traditional enforcement option. If, for whatever reason, the traditional strategy was deemed inappropriate or ineffective, then the other strategies would be employed.

The police department also intended to devote the salary and fringe benefit costs of the full-time equivalent of eight police officers, one clerk typist, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the crack enforcement effort during the initial grant period. This was an in-kind match of

approximately \$510,000. The only personnel costs to be paid from the BJA grant were to be for police overtime (\$118,000). Other grant-funded items included field narcotics screening kits (\$2,000); ultraviolet spectrometer for the crime laboratory (\$19,000); computer equipment and software (\$9,000); rental of eight vehicles (\$46,000); and criminal intelligence money to be used for undercover drug buys, "flash," and informant payments (\$100,000). The second grant award was primarily for overtime, vehicles, equipment, and a replenishment of the criminal intelligence fund.

Each of HPD's 10 district substations fields a 9- to 14-officer tactical response unit. These units are deployed to deal with district-specific crime problems that cannot normally be addressed by regular patrol units because of their heavy calls-for-service workload. The tactical response units were a key component of HPD's crack enforcement effort, particularly during the 1988 grant period.

In 1986, HPD implemented the NOP model. Among its other innovations, NOP involves line police officers, the community, and other agencies of government and the private sector in addressing chronic crime problems in specific neighborhoods. As a result, the department commitment to NOP strengthened HPD's Crack Enforcement Program. Under NOP, the responsibility for street drug enforcement is shared between the narcotics division and the patrol division tactical response units.

Early in the grant period, the severity of Houston's problem was shown in results of a survey developed by the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program, jointly funded by the National Institute of Justice and BJA. DUF results showed that 44 percent of all male arrestees in Houston from January 1988 to March 1988 tested positive for cocaine. These data also revealed that 61 percent of arrestees tested positive for one or more illicit drugs (i.e., marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, or cocaine).

In the spring of 1988, the Houston City Council approved the use of \$600,000 in Federal community development funds to mount a major short-term, high-visibility police assault on this problem. This effort, known as the *Crackdown on Crack*, stressed increased narcotics enforcement in specific neighborhoods. Officers working scheduled overtime targeted street-level narcotic activity with the heaviest emphasis on weekends. A unique feature of this heavily publicized program was that it openly targeted the consumers as well as the sellers of drugs.

This intensive program was initiated and completed over a 7-week period extending from mid-May 1988 to June 1988. During this relatively brief period, 590 officers devoted a total of 22,985 hours to crack enforcement, at a cost of \$435,545 in police overtime. The immediate outcome of this effort was 1,032 arrests, 952 of them for a narcotics-related offense. Despite these impressive statistics, Houston officials felt that the program's effects would only temporarily reduce the open dealing of drugs, and plans were made to develop a long-term strategy for dealing with the crack problem.

Project Organization and Management

A police captain, the commander of HPD's central narcotics division, served as project director of the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. A police lieutenant, assisted by a sworn police officer coordinator, was responsible for day-to-day project management activities. As noted earlier, under the NOP concept responsibility for street-level drug enforcement is shared between the narcotics division and the tactical response units assigned to each of the 10 police districts.

Under this management model, the tactical units were responsible for initiating the traditional enforcement strategies against neighborhood-based crack organizations. They, in concert with narcotics division personnel, were also responsible for the planned nontraditional enforcement strategies. The narcotics division coordinated with DEA all drug trafficking investigations aimed at the upper levels of crack organizations. The narcotics division also coordinated with DEA and the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding asset seizures related to Federal cases. By using a microcomputer system, project staff developed a data base to monitor all project-related activities.

HPD's criminal intelligence division was also involved in the project, by researching information about property ownership and by providing technical support to crack enforcement investigative operations.

As the project evolved, HPD created a central narcotics coordinating unit to further enhance the collaboration between district tactical units and the narcotics division. In addition, a narcotics analysis unit was established to collect data from citizens, patrol officers, narcotics officers, and other sources. By 1989, HPD had also designated two squads (each composed of one sergeant and six officers) from the narcotics division to work on a daily basis with the divisional tactical units.

Project Activities

The BJA Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Grant was one part of an overall HPD drug enforcement effort to cope with the explosive growth of crack cocaine in the community. At the time this grant was initiated, Houston was just emerging from a bleak economic period related to the drastic decline in oil prices and the consequences of this decline for the area economy. The BJA grants provided the police department with essential financial resources to focus an appropriate level of police effort on the crack problem.

Crack enforcement selection and training. Any officer or supervisor involved in street-level narcotics enforcement was required to attend a training program developed and

presented by the narcotics unit. This training included both classroom and practical exercises addressing such topics as the following:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Psychology of officer survival. | Undercover survival. |
| Case studies of officer shootings. | On- and off-duty weapons and accessories. |
| Forced entry of dwellings. | Raid planning. |
| Plainclothes felony vehicle stops. | Interviewing and handling informants. |

One entire day was devoted to planning mock search warrants and gaining forced entry into locations. Other exercises included practical combat-shooting techniques, self-defense, tactical takedowns, and proper handcuffing procedures.

Enforcement activities. During 1988, the police department focused its efforts on crackhouses. The primary enforcement strategies used were undercover buys and the execution of search and arrest warrants. HPD's final report for the first year of the program notes the following:

. . . 120 houses were targeted for crack enforcement. Buys and arrests were made in an effort to determine the effectiveness of enforcement. . . . there were a large number of arrests and a significant amount of crack was seized. Many of the 120 targeted crackhouses were put out of business . . . one of the interesting aspects of the targeted location enforcement was the change that occurred in trafficking. As the houses became targets and enforcement was stepped up, there began to be a decrease in the number of new houses being used for selling purposes. The traffickers began to deal out of apartments where they became more transient and mobile. Enforcement on apartments was increased and the traffickers began to move again.

More dealers were prevalent on the street where their anonymity was even more guaranteed than in the apartments. There were more escape routes and no overhead. Dealers above the street level would make passes to drop the product to street dealers. Small quantities were kept on hand so

losses were minimal when the dealers were caught in the enforcement net. Many "independents" converted the cocaine to crack themselves. The conversion of the cocaine enabled the corner dealers more profit because they did not have to share profit with the middle men who would drop the crack at the corner.

We learned a great deal during the first year about our crack problem in Houston. Most importantly, we discovered [that] each geographic area of the city had its individual problems.

In learning these lessons, the department made increasing use of the NOP model as a basis for its attack on the crack problem. A drug hotline was established so citizens could call the narcotics division directly and provide information about drug activity in their neighborhoods. Three examples of how HPD used the NOP approach are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

Link Valley Project. Link Valley is a six-block apartment community of well-constructed single-family dwellings with 3,000 units available. Link Valley and the surrounding nine neighborhoods in the early 1980's were listed among some of Houston's more developed and stable neighborhoods. The area is near a major transportation artery and the Texas Medical Center. By 1988, the occupancy rate of the Link Valley complex was 10 percent.

Over the prior 5 years, Link Valley had become a haven for drug users and suppliers. Its proximity to major thoroughfares provided easy access in and out of the neighborhood, making the complex a perfect location for a drive-through drug operation. Nestled behind reinforced doors, drug pushers, users, and prostitutes had set up shop in a considerable number of Link Valley's 2,700 vacant apartments. By the late 1980's, Link Valley had

become a magnet for drug-related crime that soon spilled into the more affluent adjacent neighborhoods. The area had become so unsafe that the department would dispatch only two-officer units to calls for service from the area.

Surrounding homeowners made numerous complaints to the police department to do something about the problem. Fear of crime, personal safety, and a decline of property values were common themes of these complaints. In September 1988, an elderly woman living in an adjacent neighborhood was raped and murdered. Less than 45 minutes after the crime, a teenager was apprehended in the victim's vehicle parked outside a Link Valley drug spot.

A meeting was arranged between community representatives, city council members, and police officials to develop goals and a program to reverse neighborhood crime and blight. It was clear that a joint effort was necessary and the Stella Link Revitalization Coalition was formed. It was agreed that HPD's objectives would be to remove drug dealers from the streets and to stop people from entering and leaving Link Valley for the purpose of obtaining drugs. The basic idea was to stabilize the neighborhood for future revitalization.

The Beechnut Police Substation was given the task of coordinating this effort. This substation assumed full responsibility for developing and implementing the enforcement strategy. Under the substation captain's direction, district personnel worked closely with other internal police department divisions (such as narcotics, vice, mounted patrol, SWAT, and motorcycle), the

Harris County District Attorney's Office, U.S. Attorney's Office, and community leaders.

Task force personnel met with these groups to exchange information and coordinate action plans to assure that police and community plans were complementary.

First, the police took steps to deter drug trafficking by erecting barriers at all points of egress in the six-block Link Valley area. Four streets were barricaded with checkpoints established. City marshals were on the scene to check licenses and traffic warrants. A drug sweep was conducted by closing off the development for several hours to everyone other than persons residing legally in the complex. A combined total of 100 police officers, SWAT, mounted, and tactical unit officers, then conducted door-to-door searches of vacant apartments to make sure there were no squatters. Undercover officers were used to conduct buy-bust operations for 30 days. Injunctions were obtained against the owners of two nearby motels where drug arrests were made.

While the police were engaged in these tasks, over 300 volunteers from the community solicited by the Stella Link Revitalization Coalition worked to rid Link Valley of over 250 cubic yards of trash and to mow the tall grass to an acceptable height. The community goal is to keep the area clean. Police officials state that the area is now drug free and that civic pride is felt by all involved in the effort. The effort was an excellent example of police and citizens working together for the common good.

Scott Street Project. This was an area of Southeast Houston that had been overrun with drug dealers and consumers. Crack and many other drugs could be purchased on virtually every street corner or in nearby apartments at any hour of the day or night. Dealers were found to range from 9 years old to over 70.

Once again, working with community representatives, the police department engaged in undercover buy-busts, area saturations, and other efforts in different parts of the area. According to department officials, this operation successfully removed street-level dealers from the neighborhood and allowed residents to regain control. Another benefit was the creation of positive communication between the police and the community.

North Shepherd Area Project. This is a 52-square-mile area of Houston with a population of approximately 250,000 and a pattern of heavy drug dealing. Street-level dealing was concentrated in three locations within the North Shepherd Area: Acres Homes, Independent Heights, and Greenspoint. Crack cocaine was the primary drug sold in these locations. Over 95 percent of the suspects arrested by HPD in the 2-year period prior to project initiation were African-American males.

The first effort in the Acres Homes location was to involve residents in a localized "war on drugs." This involved a community meeting and the formation of an Acres Homes War on Drugs Committee. The committee decided that a parade and rally would be a good way to broaden community involvement against drugs. This rally and parade were held at a park

well known for drug dealing. Police enforcement efforts (i.e., buy-busts, saturations, sweeps, etc.) were intensified in the park for 1 month prior to the rally.

Two weeks before the rally, a beat unit was assigned to the park to keep the dealers away. Over 2,000 residents attended the highly successful rally, and their commitment to reclaim the park has persisted from late 1988 to the present. Since that time, up through early 1990, HPD has not had to make a single arrest in this park.

A second parade and rally attended by 1,000 persons was held at another area park in April 1989. The enforcement efforts at this park were just as intense, but the results were less successful. As noted by the police department final report, "The park was drug free the day of the parade, but within several days, the drug dealers returned. The North Shepherd Substation tactical unit continued to make undercover arrests of street dealers, but for every dealer placed in jail, two seemed to take his place."

Another war on drugs committee was formed in Independence Heights, and the same intensified enforcement/parade/rally strategy was employed in one of this area's major parks that was well known for street dealing. Attendance was estimated at around 800 residents. While effective in the short term, the major result of this effort was to displace the dealers to street corners a few blocks from the park. However, the park, at least, was reclaimed for use by neighborhood residents.

The War on Drugs committees in these areas have emerged as a continuing police enforcement resource. They provide information on drug dealers and crackhouse locations to the police department. They also clean up vacant lots used by drug dealers. They contact apartment owners to advise them of tenants dealing drugs and also put on drug-free workshops to educate neighborhood children to the dangers of drugs.

Other enforcement strategies. The police department adopted a new tactic, termed the "hot spot detail," in April 1989. This strategy involved uniformed beat officers combating the street dealers and drug consumers in specific, targeted locations. This tactic was unique because it was a "bottom-up" effort developed and proposed by two veteran uniformed patrol officers, both of whom had been with the police department for over 20 years.

Faced with both a staffing shortage and a hiring freeze, beat officers were so busy answering calls for service that they did not have the time to arrest street dealers. The dealers knew the officers did not have time to enforce most drug laws when they were on call-for-service work, and the dealers would not move from "their" corners even when they saw patrol cars.

Officers proposed a plan to relieve uniformed beat officers from running service calls, enabling them to devote full shifts to the street dealers. HPD took a unique approach to applying the split force concept to crack enforcement. A detail began in January 1989 with seven uniformed officers assigned to concentrate on drug-dealing locations. The detail was coordinated by tactical unit supervisors who allowed the uniformed and undercover tactical

officers to work together on particular locations in the Acres Homes Area. The seven detail officers worked different hours to provide 24-hour coverage. The hot spot detail worked as follows:

- Officers rotated among three locations checking for drug activity.

- Officers checked any suspects at these locations for warrants or drug paraphernalia (crack pipes, etc.). If the suspects were wanted, they were placed under arrest. If not, they were told to leave the area.

- The officers concentrated on consumers who walked by or drove by these locations to buy drugs. Numerous traffic stops were made on potential drug consumers driving suspiciously at these target locations. They were told why they were stopped and were asked why they were at the location. If they did not possess valid driver's licenses, they were arrested for the offense.

- Officers observed the targeted locations and suspects to obtain probable cause to either search the suspects, arrest them, or both. For example, if officers observed a suspect selling drugs, they had probable cause to search the suspect.

The hot spot detail also involved other agencies in addressing crack problems in specific locations. At one crackhouse, the detail called on the services of the health department, the fire department, the lighting and power department, the city marshal's office, and the narcotics tactical unit. Building owners and managers were issued tickets for such violations as no emergency exit, faulty wiring, no fire extinguisher, no health permit, and approximately 10 other minor violations. In addition to these violations, suspects were arrested for carrying weapons, traffic warrants, and possession of controlled substances.

The hot spot detail arrested 1,234 suspects in the first month. A key element of this tactic was its focus on potential crack consumers as well as dealers.

At another location, the Huntington Forest Apartments, this hot spot detail experienced a major success. These apartments had a reputation as a drive-through drug store. The detail first established a working relationship with the apartment managers, who had lost control of the situation and were grateful for police assistance. Apartment managers were fully supportive of this effort and hired a private security firm to provide around-the-clock coverage to assist the hot spot detail. Abandoned vehicles were towed. Residents' vehicles received parking stickers to show they belonged in the apartments. Security guards checked all visitors to the area. This operation was so successful that it was 6 months before another undercover drug sales arrest was made at this location. As HPD notes, before this operation, an arrest for sales could be made every day, and officers would actually observe dealers arguing over who would sell crack at particular sites in the Huntington Forest Apartments.

The department's division tactical units used many other approaches during the course of these grant projects. The listing below is far from inclusive, but illustrates the ingenuity of HPD's strategies for addressing particular enforcement problems:

- The department disguised a patrol unit as a yellow cab to allow undercover officers to purchase crack in areas where purchases previously could not have been made.

- Houston Power & Light (HP&L) provided undercover officers with HP&L uniforms, magnetic decals for undercover vehicles, and timely discontinuance of service prior to raids. This aided the police by hampering the suspect's ability to retaliate against officers or destroy evidence.

- The Houston Fire Department allowed officers to use a training tower as a vantage point to observe drug dealing in a particular location. Using this tower, officers were able to identify suspects and direct ground units to stashed contraband.

- Tactical units used marked units to stop undercover vehicles and initiate loud and attention-getting confrontations in areas where surveillance was difficult and counter-surveillance was detected. These confrontations allowed undercover teams to drop off surveillance teams in vacant buildings, abandoned cars, thick brush, and sewer drains.

In the initial BJA grant, the department recorded 5,378 hours of police overtime that resulted in 2,204 investigations, 137 search warrants, 2,512 felony arrests, and 67 misdemeanor arrests. The department also seized over 16 pounds of crack cocaine, 5 pounds of cocaine, and \$112,962 in cash. The operational phase of the first grant year was from April 1, 1988, to December 31, 1988.

During the 12 months from January 1, 1988, to December 31, 1989, HPD recorded 4,857 drug investigations, 5,701 felony arrests, and 477 misdemeanor arrests. During this period, HPD seized over 32 pounds of crack cocaine, 4 pounds of powder cocaine, and \$124,198 in cash.

Other activities. HPD was instrumental in developing a city ordinance (CH 89-918) that prohibited solicitation to acquire a prohibited substance. This was one of the tools needed by the department to address the "demand" side of the crack problem. The ordinance provided for fines ranging from \$100 to \$2,000. This ordinance was passed in June 1989 and provided HPD the authority to undertake reverse sting operations in which police undercover officers posed as street dealers and then arrested their customers. Between July 1989 and December 1989, these reverse stings resulted in the arrest of 500 drug consumers.

The department crime lab also acquired an ultraviolet spectrometer to help cope with a backlog of drug identification cases. The department's citizen drug hotline (4 NO-DOPE) has

proved to be an important source of intelligence regarding crack cocaine dealers and drug sales locations. This phone line averaged over 60 calls per day during 1989.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

The BJA grants enabled HPD to make an impact on the street-level crack cocaine problem and helped the police and community to win some battles in particularly besieged neighborhoods.

The department engaged in many useful activities during the course of these BJA-funded projects. The most important of these accomplishments are summarized below:

- The department's NOP orientation enabled communities to rally against the crack problem in certain neighborhoods. These neighborhoods learned that the police were listening to their complaints and that joint police-community efforts could have an impact on the drug problem.

- The department used a reverse sting approach to deter consumers from purchasing crack cocaine.

- The department developed an integrated strategy that mobilized many department resources against the crack cocaine problem. Crack enforcement remains one of HPD's highest priorities.

- The neighborhood War on Drugs committees have proved to be very useful, in concert with appropriate enforcement procedures, in addressing neighborhood-specific drug problems.

- The department's hot spot detail is an example of an operational tactic that involves uniformed patrol personnel in crack enforcement efforts.

**Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California**

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was awarded a BJA discretionary grant in support of a Crack-Focused Substance Abuse Task Force. The original grant (\$299,250), which covered the period October 1987 through September 1988, was augmented with supplemental funding of \$200,000, and the grant period was extended through June 1990. The geographical focus of the task force was the city of Los Angeles, in particular the south central area, which had the greatest concentration of chronic and blatant narcotics activity in 1987.

Project History

Federal interdiction efforts in Florida and other East Coast areas in the early 1980's led Colombian drug cartels to develop another route for getting cocaine into the United States through Mexico and into Southern California. The magnitude of the crack cocaine problem in Los Angeles at the time of the grant award is clear. LAPD seizures of cocaine in the city increased from 362 pounds in 1982 to 6.5 tons in 1986. Arrests for cocaine sales more than doubled between 1985 and 1986, and arrests in the first 4 months of 1987 were double the number of arrests in the first 4 months of 1986.

Police department intelligence indicated that over 90 percent of the cocaine brought into Los Angeles was transformed into crack; that new, high-level crack trafficking organizations were continually springing up; and that members of the city's street gangs were involved in mid-level crack cocaine distribution. The gang members belonged to named "sets" (subgroups) of two of the city's largest street gangs, the Bloods and the Crips. They had their own direct links to major suppliers and were trafficking in California and other States. Their evolution from users and street dealers to mid-level dealers was accompanied by increased violence related to maintaining their crack distribution territories. Members of the Jamaican Posse, a violent cartel of narcotics traffickers with organized ties to Jamaica, were also engaged in drug trafficking in Los Angeles.

The Los Angeles Crack Task Force was a multistrategy enforcement program designed to (1) identify the leadership and members of crack trafficking organizations and their major suppliers, (2) identify the street gangs affiliated with each crack trafficking organization, (3) investigate possible conspiracies and prepare the necessary arrest and search warrants to prosecute members of each organization or associated gang, and (4) seize the illegal narcotics, tangible assets, and currency controlled by the crack organizations. Grant moneys were allocated for overtime pay for sworn and civilian personnel, leased vehicles, confidential funds, and equipment and supplies. Task force personnel worked 10 to 20 hours of overtime per week.

The goal of the task force was to immobilize crack cocaine trafficking organizations and to reduce the availability of crack through improved coordination, investigations, and prosecutions. LAPD intelligence information indicated that crack dealers were proliferating because most narcotics enforcement efforts were directed at the top and the bottom of the drug market. Thus, the task force sought to eradicate the suppliers who were the link between major traffickers and street dealers by accomplishing the following objectives:

- Increase arrests and assist in the prosecution of members of crack trafficking organizations and street gangs involved in crack cocaine distribution.

- Increase seizures of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

- Conduct financial investigations of arrested suspects to seize their assets.

Project Description

The Crack Task Force was a program of the field enforcement section of the LAPD's narcotics division, the entity responsible for coordinating all LAPD narcotics enforcement activities. The division also has a major violators section. At the time of the grant application, the field enforcement section had 108 sworn officers assigned across the department's four geographic bureaus.

As the task force was finally constituted, it consisted of 15 sworn officers in the field enforcement section: a lieutenant; 8 detectives; and 6 officers for undercover buys.

The officer in charge reported to the task force coordinator, a captain in the narcotics division, who in turn reported to the chief of police.

Other LAPD divisions and units provided ancillary personnel as needed, in particular, the air support division (surveillance activities), the scientific investigation division (laboratory analyses), the asset forfeiture detail (financial investigations), the clandestine laboratory squad, and the detective support division/gang information section.

The task force followed LAPD's established policy of applying a "full spectrum approach" to narcotics enforcement. The approach encompassed eight components: support/proposal of narcotics-related legislation, application of new technology, drug prevention/training/education, juvenile narcotics enforcement, entertainment industry enforcement, major dealer enforcement, smuggled narcotics interdiction, and street sales enforcement.

During the planning phase of the task force operations, liaison was established with outside narcotic enforcement agencies to gather and disseminate information on drug trafficking by Los Angeles gang members across the United States. Gang members were known to be active in 47 U.S. cities. Liaison was also established with the Federal Jamaican Task Force and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force to coordinate investigations involving the Jamaican Posse, and with the DEA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and other Federal agencies to facilitate CCE and RICO prosecutions. In addition, daily meetings were scheduled with prosecutors in the offices of the city attorney and the district attorney to review progress in task force investigations and to ensure early involvement by prosecutors and the courts in task force cases.

The narcotics division's computerized narcotics information network (NIN) was designated as the primary tool for the storage, analysis, and dissemination of information on task force investigations, and guidelines were developed regarding dissemination of NIN information.

The network had been established earlier by LAPD to coordinate narcotics investigations involving local, State, and Federal agencies.

Project Activities

Law enforcement activities. The task force used a multistrategy approach in its enforcement activities, including narcotics buys, use of informants, ground and air surveillance, and undercover operations. Integrated operations were conducted in conjunction with law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and courts.

Arrest and prosecution of crack dealers. Through surveillance activities, informant- and citizen-supplied information, and coordinated effort with other enforcement agencies, the task force identified organization and gang members who were suspected of being major suppliers of crack in Los Angeles. Buy-bust operations, undercover buys to further investigations, and infiltration of crack organizations were the principal means used to develop cases against the suspects. Once arrested, individuals were interrogated and encouraged to provide information about their sources of supply.

Once a mid-level organization was identified, air and ground surveillance was initiated to obtain information about organization members, gang affiliations, crack labs, storage locations, crackhouses, and entry routes of cocaine into Los Angeles from foreign sources.

One such investigation led to the arrest of a primary supplier who was providing kilo

quantities of cocaine to street dealers. Sixty-six pounds of cocaine and \$152,000 in U.S. currency were also seized.

Seizure of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and contraband. To accomplish its objective of increasing seizures of drugs and other contraband, the task force conducted followup investigations of information obtained incidental to executing search and arrest warrants, made undercover buys and controlled purchases and deliveries of cocaine, and executed search and seizure warrants.

Interstate drug couriers were often intercepted and arrested through the use of "profiles" of suspected courier behavior that had been developed by experienced investigators. This technique was used at the Ontario and Los Angeles airports, bus and train terminals, post offices, and United Postal Service offices. Packages of narcotics were often intercepted during transshipment through the cooperation of the involved local narcotics enforcement agency, and the agencies would then work to identify the sender and intended receiver. In cooperation with the U.S. Postal Service, for example, task force personnel were able to identify the Los Angeles shipper of a package of cocaine that was intercepted in New Orleans. A fingerprint on the package led to a search warrant for the suspect's residence, the suspect's arrest, and the seizure of 18 ounces of cocaine, several thousand dollars, and four handguns.

Financial investigation and asset seizures. The task force worked closely with the LAPD asset forfeiture detail and with Federal agencies to accomplish its objective of exerting maximum pressure on drug enterprises by seizing their real property and other financial assets. In conjunction with the asset forfeiture detail, task force personnel identified assets that were seizable during arrest and search warrant stages of narcotics investigations.

Postarrest financial investigations, including examination of financial records from banks and lending institutions, were used to identify assets that were subject to forfeiture subsequent to criminal prosecution.

Other Activities. Training. The narcotics division provides narcotics enforcement education through a departmentwide narcotics school that trains over 200 officers a year. Personnel selected for the task force participated in a special, 3-day training course before assuming their task force duties. Through their daily meetings with local prosecutors, task force personnel acquired valuable information and insights into narcotics investigations and case-processing strategies, which were then incorporated into officer training and enforcement activities to ensure quality investigations and successful prosecutions.

Drug abuse education. Task force personnel were also involved with the LAPD's Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program. Working in conjunction with the Los Angeles Unified School District, the department helped to develop a school curriculum geared to reducing the demand for drugs among school-aged youths.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

At the inception of the task force program, the narcotics division had identified 71 locations in South Central Los Angeles as hotspots of chronic narcotics activity. As a result of task force and other narcotics division activities, 27 hotspots were deactivated. That is, narcotics activities at those locations were eliminated, and citizen complaints were no longer being received.

Task force personnel were also involved in the investigation and ultimate closure of 462 crackhouses. Those locations accounted for about 60 percent of the 753 crackhouses shut down throughout the city.

As of March 1989, task force activities had also led to the arrest of 226 suspects. During the same period, narcotics valued at close to \$35 million and \$2 million in U.S. currency were seized.

Minneapolis Police Department Minneapolis, Minnesota

Minneapolis, with a population of approximately 360,000, is the hub of a growing metropolitan area of slightly over 2 million persons. The city itself covers an area of 58.7

square miles. At the time this project was initiated, the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) was staffed by 691 sworn officers and 89 civilian employees.

Minneapolis is divided into four precincts, each served by a precinct police station. The police department recorded 302,628 call-for-service dispatches in 1986. Approximately 55 percent of departmental resources are devoted to the patrol bureau. The overall MPD budget in 1986 was \$38.7 million. By 1989, MPD staffing was 740 sworn officers (an increase of 7.1 percent), and civilian staffing was 132 (an increase of 48 percent).

Before the BJA project, only 14 sworn officers were assigned to the MPD narcotics unit, which targeted mid- and upper-level drug dealers. In addition, four officers were assigned to a joint DEA/MPD task force. Uniformed officers, lacking time and training, were seldom involved in enforcement efforts directed at street-level drug sales.

Project History

In October 1987, MPD received an initial BJA grant of \$300,000 to help the department focus enforcement efforts on street-level crack cocaine traffic. The department received a supplemental award of \$200,000 in April 1989. Although the supplement did not expire until September 1990, MPD efforts under the grant were essentially complete by February 1990.

MPD listed the following drug-related indicators as justification for the project:

- Reported drug offenses increased by 21 percent from 1983 to 1986. MPD officials believed that this drug problem was directly related to the increases in violent crimes such as assault, robbery, and homicide. Minneapolis homicide investigators reported that 7 of the 15 homicides that occurred in the first 4 months of 1987 were drug-related.

- In the last quarter of 1986, 58 percent of treatment admissions to five metro area drug abuse treatment programs reported cocaine use. In the same quarter of 1984, only 33 percent of treatment admissions reported using cocaine.

- Daily cocaine users jumped from 6 percent of total drug abuse treatment admissions in the first quarter of 1984 to 22 percent of total admissions in the first quarter of 1987.

- Hospital emergency room mentions of cocaine use increased from 83 cocaine mentions in 1984 to 171 mentions through the third quarter of 1986. Cocaine mentions increased from 26 in the first quarter of the year to 81 in the third quarter.

- The MPD narcotics unit received 330 complaints about suspected crackhouses in 1986. In the first 4 months of 1987, the unit had already received this same number of crack complaints. Undercover narcotics officers observed as many as 50 people per hour entering and leaving suspected crackhouses. Through confidential informants, the MPD narcotics unit was aware of at least 100 crackhouses that frequently changed their location.

■ Reliable narcotics intelligence indicated that outside groups were attempting to organize and control crack distribution in Minneapolis. A Kansas City group was suspected in the torture-murder of a local crack dealer as part of an attempt to take control of Minneapolis crack distribution. In addition, a Chicago gang was actively attempting to gain control of crack distribution in the North Side of Minneapolis. Many of the out-of-town dealers were gang members or former gang members who can easily access the gangs as a drug distribution network.

In 1987, two incidents occurred that were indicative of an increasing trend toward crack cocaine-related violence. Specifically, on July 16, 1987, MPD officers shot and killed an armed look-out while serving a search warrant at a known crackhouse. Drugs and weapons were confiscated in the search, and 13 people were arrested for aggravated assault and weapons charges. Less than 2 weeks later, MPD officers, during a routine traffic stop, exchanged shots with an armed crack cocaine drug courier who was subsequently arrested on weapons and drug charges.

Project Goals and Objectives

MPD's crack-focused enforcement project had one primary goal: to disrupt, through undercover operations, the crack distribution network in the city by identifying, apprehending, and referring for prosecution crack cocaine distribution sources large enough to prosecute in Federal court through the DEA/MPD task force. Achieving this objective was to involve identifying, apprehending, and prosecuting (or using as informants) dealers at all levels leading up to the larger crack cocaine distributors.

The project had four objectives:

- Augment the personnel resources of the narcotics unit by training a network of officers throughout the patrol division to be more knowledgeable about and participate in narcotics enforcement activities aimed at street dealers.

- Create a visual law enforcement presence for the public by directing enforcement at street-level crack distributors.

- Use more sophisticated undercover tools to expand narcotics enforcement capabilities and to provide more safety for undercover officers.

- Increase coordination between prosecution and enforcement personnel by creating a local crack enforcement task force.

Project Description

Accomplishing these objectives involved three interrelated program elements. These are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

Involvement of patrol officers in street-level crack enforcement. Under this program element, 27 officers and 9 sergeants from the MPD patrol division received 2 days of intensive training in crack cocaine enforcement procedures. Officers receiving this training then worked overtime to target street dealers using informants for controlled buys. This effort was expected to open new lines of communication and information sharing between uniformed street officers and narcotics investigators both during and after the grant. Arrests of small-time street dealers—"the biggest irritation to the public"—would increase as a result of this initiative.

Enhanced undercover operations directed at crack cocaine distribution networks. This approach was designed to provide MPD narcotics unit officers with increased buy money and overtime pay to enable them to concentrate on developing the larger narcotics cases. These cases could then be prosecuted through the DEA/MPD task force in Federal court. It was also expected that availability of grant resources would result in both increased search

warrants and arrests by full-time officers assigned to the narcotics unit. MPD also planned to upgrade its secure narcotics communications systems through the purchase, with grant funds, of 15 mobile radios with encryption modules and a code inserter to program encryption codes into the mobile radios. Other equipment purchases to be made with grant funds included two body sound transmission devices and a used van that would be modified for surveillance purposes. Finally, grant funds would also be used to move the narcotics unit from the City Hall-Courthouse to an anonymous downtown location to facilitate operational security.

Local crack task force. The third element of the MPD project envisioned creation of a local crack task force that would include the MPD narcotics unit supervisor, MPD's Deputy Chief of Investigations, two assistant Hennepin County attorneys, and an assistant Minneapolis city attorney. The purpose of this task force was to target crack-related cases for special attention by prosecutors with detailed knowledge of crack distribution networks and the problems crack causes in the community. As originally planned, prosecutors would participate in the planned police crack enforcement training program and would work closely with narcotics unit personnel in observing crack-related search warrant and street enforcement problems at first hand. The task force would also serve as a sounding board for police personnel in the development of crack-related cases.

While the initial grant award date was September 30, 1987, it was expected that the operational period of the project would begin in January 1988 and extend through December 1988. The second grant award was made in April 1989 and was scheduled to run through June

1990. Of the \$500,000 in BJA funds awarded MPD in these two grants, the largest projected budget item was for police overtime, with a total of \$218,000 (44 percent of grant funds) allocated for this purpose.

Project Organization and Management

The deputy chief of police, investigations bureau, served as project director for the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. Day-to-day operational supervision of the grant was the responsibility of the crack enforcement coordinator—an experienced sergeant assigned to MPD's narcotics unit. Financial administration of the grants was performed by MPD's research and development unit. As the project evolved and lessons were learned, other elements of MPD, described later in this section, became more heavily involved in the department's efforts to address crack cocaine problems.

Project Activities

Planning and implementation. The primary focus under the initial grant was on street-level crack dealers. The basic first-year MPD plan provided for training patrol officers in street-level drug enforcement and having these officers then develop their own cases on an overtime basis.

To this end, shortly after grant award in September 1987, MPD project administrators developed a 3-day Crack Enforcement Training Program (CETP). This course was developed and presented by experienced MPD narcotics investigators with assistance from City of Minneapolis and Hennepin County attorneys, City Health Department chemists, and members of MPD's emergency entry team. CETP was subsequently accredited by the Minnesota Peace Officers Standards and Training Board (POST).

The initial CETP was presented to 50 uniformed precinct officers, including 9 sergeants, between December 1 and 3, 1987. The first day of training involved formal classroom training about case, informant, and warrant development; the nature of the crack cocaine problem; and evidentiary and prosecutorial issues. The next 2 days were devoted to "hands on" simulated exercises with the trainees divided into 10 teams (each consisting of 1 sergeant and 3 officers). First, half acted as a warrant team, and the other half served as the backup team; then the teams reversed roles.

These simulations were based on actual situations encountered by MPD narcotics unit personnel. Five simulation exercises were used in which narcotics officers played the parts of informants, defendants, county attorneys, judges, and observers. Examples of exercises used during this training included recruiting informants, making informant controlled buys, planning execution of a warrant with a backup team, determining probable cause for narcotics offenses and others, and presenting cases for charging. At the conclusion of each

exercise, trainees critiqued each other's performances by identifying and discussing problem areas.

At the conclusion of this training, officers were expected to be able to meet the following learning objectives:

Identify targets.	Arrest persons on warrants.
Create plan of attack/establish probable cause.	Inventory property and items seized.
Use informants for controlled buys.	Return and file search warrants.
Identify uses and effects of crack cocaine.	Bring contraband to city chemists.
Draw up search warrants.	Prepare reports.
Organize and execute search warrants.	Present cases for charges.
Use emergency entry team.	Complete timesheets for overtime pay.
Identify contraband.	
Know responsibilities of team leaders/sergeants.	

Officers were trained to identify targets for enforcement in three key ways: complaints assigned by the narcotics unit, inperson complaints by uniform officers while on patrol, and personal knowledge of problem areas and houses. Once a target was established, the uniformed officers were trained to develop plans of attack that included controlled buys by informants, uniformed surveillance (the so-called "stop and roll"), and garbage searches to help establish probable cause for issuing a search warrant. The training, which was videotaped, was rated as successful by both instructors and trainees.

Other preparatory activities during this period included the move of the narcotics unit from MPD headquarters to a more anonymous downtown Minneapolis location. A used

surveillance van was also acquired and equipped with a camera, television monitor, tinted windows, backup battery packs, and a scanner. Camera mounts and wiring were installed to permit use of the camera from the front, back, and either side of the van. Unfortunately, a new radio system MPD had planned to purchase with grant funds for undercover surveillance lost power in the data voice-privacy mode and was incompatible with the radio system from the local DEA office. MPD changed vendors to acquire the appropriate equipment.

Enforcement activities. The MPD crack enforcement program grant began with a very successful operation. During the second week of January 1988, each of 9 uniformed crack enforcement teams was assigned about 20 addresses where the MPD narcotics unit suspected crack dealing was being conducted. After assessing these locations, the teams selected specific targets and initiated a series of raids and warrant-based searches. By the end of the first weekend, 25 persons had been arrested, and a substantial quantity of drugs and weapons had been seized.

Less than a week later, MPD made its first surprise entry using a front-end loader to punch a hole in the wall of a fortified crackhouse. Over 30 officers were involved in this high-risk entry that resulted in the arrest of 3 men, the seizure of over 100 packaged crack cocaine doses and drug-related property (scales, portable radio scanners, lists of police frequencies, packaging equipment, and the like), thousands of dollars, numerous weapons (such as sawed-off shotguns and revolvers), and flak jackets.

Despite these initial successes, numerous crackhouses were still functioning in Minneapolis, and as they were identified and search warrants were obtained, MPD's crack enforcement and emergency response teams stepped up their activity.

As these well-publicized raids continued, dealers began to shift their activities more and more out of houses and onto the streets. In response, MPD began to use more buy-bust and street-sweep tactics by overtime patrol officer teams as these constantly shifting crack-dealing locations were identified.

MPD crack enforcement efforts by overtime precinct officers were so intense that by July 1988, the grant-budgeted overtime funds were completely depleted. High arrest numbers and mounting crack-related complaints from the community made the crack enforcement program a high priority for the police department. The program was deemed so essential and effective by MPD officials that they made the decision to commit another \$103,000 in drug-related asset forfeiture funds to maintaining the neighborhood drug enforcement overtime effort.

To illustrate the intensity of MPD efforts during the first 6 months of the BJA grant, narcotics unit arrest production was about the same, narcotics-related arrests by patrol and other investigative units increased by 68 percent, and the precinct-based crack enforcement program (CEP) overtime effort accounted for an additional 376 arrests alone. Overall, MPD narcotics-related arrests increased by over 118 percent (from 566 to 1,235) during these two 6-month periods.

Another indication of change during this initial period is equally instructive: there was a 228-percent increase in warrants served (70 percent CEP-related) by the MPD narcotics unit in 1988 versus the same period in 1987.

During the remainder of 1988 and through early 1989, CEP overtime efforts were funded by asset forfeiture funds. In March 1989, a supplemental grant of \$200,000 was awarded MPD. Just over \$100,000 of this grant was to be used to fund MPD's neighborhood crack enforcement overtime efforts. Again, these overtime funds were depleted within 6 months, and from August 1989 through the end of the year, another \$51,000 in asset forfeiture moneys were used to fund MPD crack enforcement overtime. In short, over a 24-month period, extending from January 1, 1988, to December 31, 1989, a total of \$370,000 in combined grant and asset forfeiture funds supported the overtime portion of MPD's CEP. This funding allowed MPD to devote over 15,000 additional sworn officer hours to the control of street-level crack and narcotics problems during this period—the full-time equivalent of almost 8 police officers. Two additional crack enforcement training programs were presented to MPD patrol officer volunteers, one in mid-1988 and one in mid-1989. In all, over 200 MPD officers attended the 3 MPD training programs.

A notable addition to CETP was the incorporation of an instructional module by MPD's child abuse unit dealing with procedures for handling children found in crackhouses. This training segment was valuable because in 1989 officers found children present in over one-third of all places where narcotics warrants had been served. In most of these cases, the children were

present in conditions that were dangerous, filthy, and laden with drugs and weapons associated with the crack trade.

Precinct activities. As police experience with crack enforcement developed over this period, the MPD approach to crack enforcement also evolved. For example, a new cadre of trained and experienced patrol officers was assigned to handle neighborhood crack dealers. This allowed the narcotics unit to pursue higher level drug traffickers. Each of MPD's four precincts had what is termed a precinct-specific crack enforcement team. Each team was headed by a sergeant, who directed and supervised narcotics cases and warrant execution at the precinct level. Officers who had completed CETP were invited to join these teams as vacancies occurred.

The crack enforcement coordinator, an experienced sergeant in the narcotics unit, oversaw the precinct teams and provided citywide coordination of crack enforcement. All crack arrests were processed through the recordkeeping systems of the narcotics unit, thereby centralizing information and arrest data. All crack-related overtime enforcement was approved by the crack enforcement coordinator; this assured proper supervision of overtime for grant activities. Examples of precinct-specific efforts in the area of crack enforcement include the following:

- MPD's fourth precinct initiated a foot patrol in the Knox neighborhood in an area known for drug trafficking. The foot patrol continued for 22 days from 7 p.m. to 4 a.m. This produced a 62-percent decrease in offenses compared to a baseline period.

- This same precinct implemented a variety of approaches to cope with changing methods of crack dealing in their precinct. Dealers moved from barricaded buildings to bicycles and vehicles. Sweeps aimed at these methods of drug dealing were developed and implemented as conditions changed.

- Another precinct targeted two troublesome blocks that accounted for a disproportionate number of drug-related complaints. Simultaneous crack warrants were served, and a neighborhood alliance was set up to work with landlords to remove drug dealers from their buildings.

Citywide activities, Beginning in September 1989, a full-time crack enforcement team operated out of the central narcotic unit. This five-member team was made up of one patrol officer from each precinct and a uniformed sergeant from one of the precincts. The sergeant and patrol officers served 30 days on this citywide team and then rotated back to their precincts. The team responded as needed throughout the city. The benefits of this approach were substantial. The direct experience the officers gained in this assignment enhanced their knowledge and skills of more complex investigations and provided them with a citywide perspective on crack problems.

Early in 1990, the department also decided to implement a reverse sting program.

Previously, all MPD efforts were focused on the supply side of the crack enforcement marketplace. This effort was targeted at the demand side of this market. The program involved employing experienced undercover police officers to pose as drug dealers and make sales of crack cocaine on street corners or in houses. Once sales were made, purchasers would be immediately arrested and charged with possession. Where applicable, property within the control of the purchaser (vehicles, money, jewelry, and the like) would be seized.

Other project activities. In addition to the enforcement activity described, MPD pursued a multilevel strategy in addressing the crack problem. For example, the department used and expanded its Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program in the city schools. The department also began planning the implementation of community-oriented policing.

As part of this grant project, MPD developed and presented a 1-hour crack enforcement presentation to 35 city and county judges who discussed the nature of the problem and ways in which the judiciary could help the department combat the drug trade. A 4-hour training program was also developed and presented to 30 hotel security personnel. The intent of this training was to provide information on how the crack trade operates and to advise personnel on what to look for to identify drug operations in their hotels.

Additional training was also made available to city and county prosecutors. Part of this training included a tour of known crackhouses, some of which were operational at the time.

A member of the high-risk entry team accompanied this tour and provided detailed information of what was encountered in the houses that had been raided. The purpose of the tour was to sensitize prosecutors to the problems encountered in arrests resulting from these raids.

Considerable research was also conducted by MPD's project team in an effort to predict where crack or other illicit drugs might appear in the city. The initial step in this process was to evaluate addresses compiled by the high risk entry team. These properties were inspected to record physical characteristics and to determine any history of environmental violations. From this and other information available, MPD hoped to identify variables that would enable it to develop profiles of at-risk neighborhoods. This effort was still in progress at the time of this report.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

There are several successful results that relate to implementing the BJA grant:

- The police department now has a cadre of over 200 officers trained in crack cocaine enforcement. Prior to award of these grants, uniformed patrol officers had very little involvement in planned drug enforcement efforts.

- Each of the MPD's four district stations now has a precinct-specific crack enforcement team that focuses on neighborhood-based crack problems. In addition, MPD has formed a full-time uniformed crack enforcement team to support precinct efforts. Formation of these teams has enabled MPD's narcotics unit to properly focus efforts on higher level drug traffickers.

- The flow of information between uniformed officers and the narcotics unit has increased substantially and has enabled MPD to develop coordinated strategy and tactics for addressing the crack cocaine problem.

- Drug-related arrests by MPD have more than doubled, compared to the baseline year.

**Baltimore Police Department
City of Baltimore, Maryland**

Baltimore is located in the New York to Washington, D.C., corridor along Interstate 95, a populated path for the distribution of narcotics. In the late 1980's, the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) saw a significant increase in both the quantity and quality of cocaine seized. Undercover operations resulted in cocaine purchases with purities as high as 96 percent, and the 1988 street value of all cocaine seized was estimated at more than \$16 million.

While crack first surfaced in Baltimore during the summer of 1986, BPD was not overly alarmed until one investigation uncovered a crack organization run by women and children. BPD identified a New York woman who supplied and oversaw a network of other women and juveniles in the preparation and sale of crack in Baltimore. This network was disrupted in early April 1987 when the supplier and five others were arrested. The operation apparently used the remnants of an old heroin trafficking organization that had previously imported heroin into Baltimore from New York. It was believed that from spring 1986 to November 1987, the network was responsible for selling thousands of vials of crack in Baltimore.

Project History

In 1988, BPD applied to BJA for a grant under its Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. Baltimore planned to use the grant to intensify its cocaine trafficking enforcement with hopes of preventing the development of other crack organizations.

BPD was awarded \$350,000 in June 1988 to begin the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. In May 1990, the department received an additional \$300,000 to continue its efforts.

Project Goals and Objectives

In its application, BPD cited as its goal the identification, investigation, and apprehension of individuals targeted as major drug violators, and stated that enforcement efforts would be intensified by the program through surveillances, undercover operations, and use of informants. The department listed the following objectives:

- Identify the crack problem by determining the availability of crack at the street level.
- Implement methods to prevent the emergence of a crack problem in unaffected areas.
- Reduce correlative property crimes and violence where crack does occur.

To achieve these objectives, the department developed four plans: target street-level crack cocaine dealers, pursue leads towards major violators, push for early involvement of State and Federal prosecutors and full use of all prosecutorial enhancements, and evaluate methods on an ongoing basis and redirect when necessary.

Project Description

The department divided the project into the following phases:

- Phase 1. Organizational Period.
- Phase 2. Information Analysis/Targeting Strategies.
- Phase 3. Investigative Operation.
- Phase 4. Project Summary.

During Phase 1, definitive lines of responsibility were established for both operational and administrative areas of the project. The fiscal division of the department set up appropriate accounting ledgers and journals needed for handling all project funds. Vehicles and other items were leased.

During Phase 2, the department began planning its strategy for selecting cases (see *Investigative Policies and Procedures*).

During Phase 3, actual investigations began during the first quarter of the project. After a review of first quarter operations, modifications were made. During the second quarter, the department decided to take advantage of BPD's narcotic enforcement structure. Baltimore is divided into nine police districts with a drug enforcement unit in each district. These units consisted of a sergeant and from four to six officers. They concentrate on street sales, narcotic enforcement, and mid-level investigations within their respective districts.

Additionally, the department has a special operations division that concentrates on narcotic enforcement in public housing developments and a centralized drug enforcement section focusing on major violator investigations.

The district units spearheaded a concentrated effort on street-level crack traffickers. Grant funds were directed to these units to supplement their resources. The department's covert vehicle inventory was immediately determined to be inadequate to accomplish district-level crack enforcement objectives. Grant funds were used to lease 10 additional vehicles.

The department also received a block grant to develop an interdiction squad. Money from this grant was applied to the salaries of four detectives. The squad's responsibility was to interdict narcotics at the city's train station, bus depots, and hotels and motels. Within 2 years of operation, the squad had a major impact on the transportation of narcotics into Baltimore. As a result, additional personnel were committed to this program on an overtime basis using Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program funds. The overtime personnel were directed to focus their efforts on the importation of crack cocaine.

Finally, a review of outstanding arrest warrants within the city showed that a significant number were for narcotics violations. In light of this information, an intensified effort was begun by the escapee apprehension unit to execute as many of these warrants as possible. When arrested, the defendants were questioned for specific information about crack trafficking. Grant overtime funds were earmarked for this program to maximize its effectiveness.

Project Organization and Management

Personnel. The commanding officer of BPD's drug enforcement section directed the project and was ultimately responsible for its administration. The drug enforcement section assigned one detective lieutenant as assistant project director with responsibility for all administrative, financial, and statistical reports.

The drug enforcement section assigned one detective sergeant as project supervisor to coordinate case planning, case management, and investigative tactics with enforcement personnel.

The drug enforcement section had 30 detectives assigned to work exclusively on drug investigations. These detectives were used as needed to fulfill the goals of the project. In addition, investigators from affected areas of the city were used in special enforcement assignments related to crack cocaine. This project was also made available to the 10 district drug enforcement units. On numerous occasions during the project, the department's K-9 unit was also used.

To manage the information gathered during the project, the drug enforcement section assigned personnel with experience in gathering and maintaining information on drug organizations. Also, the BPD inspectional services division acted as a repository for all information related to investigations implicating Jamaican organizations. This information was considered crucial considering the extent of Jamaican involvement in other nearby jurisdictions in crack cocaine distribution and related violent crimes.

The drug enforcement section also improved its communication with the homicide unit so that drug-related information was shared.

In addition, members of BPD continued to work with Federal and local agencies in cocaine and crack investigations. They actively participated in the drug enforcement coordinating system, which is a "pointer index" whose basic design is to facilitate interagency investigations within the Baltimore Metropolitan area.

BPD currently has a detective sergeant and two detectives assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration's task force. The department also actively participates in Organized Crime Drug Enforcement task force cases and is involved with other East Coast law enforcement agencies in a profile-interdiction effort to reduce the flow of illegal drugs.

Investigative policies and procedures. Weekly meetings were held to discuss case progress and plans and to ensure that all affected members were aware of the project's direction. The following elements were considered when selecting project-related cases:

- Analysis of current information.
- Identification of organized distributors and related hierarchy.
- Evaluation of targets for purchases, surveillances, and search warrants.
- Analysis of information from confidential sources.

- Identification of assets.
- Evaluation potential for development into major violator case.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

Closing several crackhouses in the west and northwest sections of Baltimore was a major accomplishment during the grant-funded period. In December 1988, the drug enforcement section identified a major crackhouse in the northwest section of Baltimore and made undercover purchases. In January 1989, this operation recovered 2½ ounces of crack cocaine and 4½ ounces of powdered cocaine, arresting six members of a drug trafficking organization.

A similar crackhouse operation later in January 1989 netted seven arrests, 2¼ ounces of cocaine, and \$1,057. Also in February 1989, the drug enforcement section identified a major supplier of crack cocaine in West Baltimore. Surveillances determined that the supplier would drive to designated street corners and resupply his distributors. On one such trip he was arrested, and 40 vials of crack cocaine and \$1,360 were seized. Two other members of his organization were also arrested.

In the early 1990's, the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the interdiction squad. For example, the department was able to work closely

with U.S. Customs agents under the Freighter Interdiction Strike Team Program (FIST). One case began in May 1990, when a Venezuelan ship docked in the port of Baltimore. After Customs inspectors discovered a container filled with cocaine, members of the Baltimore interdiction squad placed the container under 24-hour surveillance. The container was cleared for pickup and soon reached its New Jersey destination. Three search and seizure warrants were issued and netted 222 kilograms of cocaine, \$141,000 in cash, and one vehicle.

This investigation led to the identification of another Venezuelan container that was filled with 225 kilograms of cocaine destined for Baltimore.

As a final example, on April 24, 1991, the interdiction squad arrested a Baltimore citizen who was returning from New York City. One kilogram of crack was seized, along with a TEC 9 machine pistol and a 9 mm handgun. This recovery represented the largest single crack seizure for Baltimore.

**Miami Police Department
Miami, Florida**

According to the DEA, South Florida, specifically Dade County and the city of Miami, continues to be a principal cocaine importation and distribution point for the United States. In 1985, 70 percent of the 73,000 kilograms of cocaine that the Vice President's task force estimated were imported into the United States, came through South Florida. In 1986, the

amount of cocaine that entered the United States through Dade County was estimated at over 80,000 kilograms. This exceeded the total amount of cocaine imported to all of the United States in 1985.

To make local matters worse, crack cocaine exploded onto the scene in the Miami area during the summer of 1985. As in other cities, crack gained tremendous popularity because of its cheaper cost and intense, short-duration high as compared to powder cocaine. At its inception, crack was produced at relatively few centralized locations, then distributed to and sold from inner-city crackhouses.

During its early experience with crack, the Miami Police Department (MPD) attacked the problem using a variety of tactics, the most successful of which was the use of search warrants. In 1985, the police department executed 453 search warrants. Over 85 percent of these warrants were obtained because of the investigative efforts of the street narcotics unit (SNU) and were related to drug use or distribution. Over 90 percent of those warrants were issued to search crackhouses.

As a direct result of the drug enforcement efforts conducted by the police department, the traffickers were forced out of the crackhouses and into the streets. Because of this, the department was forced to reorganize its efforts and create innovative methods to attack the drug problem as it spilled onto the streets of Miami.

During this transition, it became obvious that the crack epidemic was reaching a crisis point. The police department developed new tactics to be used against the drug problem. Drug stings were aimed at the street-level drug purchaser in the hope that this would reduce the demand for illicit drugs. The use of street-level buy-busts was expanded, targeting the corner drug pusher. Operation Apartment Cleanup was developed to bring civilian criminal actions against slumlords who actively or passively allowed drug pushers to use their properties as a home base for drug activities.

Project History

In July of 1988, MPD was awarded an initial BJA grant of \$350,000. Upon completion of the original grant period, the department applied for, and was awarded, additional funding of \$350,000 in May of 1990. This brought the total grant award to \$700,000.

The department initiated a crack task force that consisted of members of the department's SNU and special investigation section (SIS). The crack task force mission was to focus more effort and resources on attacking the crack cocaine problem.

The crack task force was composed of investigators capable of making hand-to-hand purchases of crack cocaine from street drug distributors. Crack task force members were also selected based upon their ability to pose as street vendors of crack cocaine within the context of sting operations.

A strategy was formulated for investigators from the department's SIS to use arrests made during buy-busts and stings to develop intelligence information that would spin off into mid-level investigations of crack cocaine distribution networks.

Project Goals and Objectives

The most significant goal of the project was to remove drug sellers and purchasers from the community through the use of street-level drug enforcement strategies.

Asset seizures and forfeitures were considered a key objective of the grant and were also initiated by crack task force members. The department's legal unit and forfeiture detail provided technical assistance in all forfeiture cases. Successful asset seizure actions provided additional project income to fund buy-bust and sting operations not originally scheduled for funding in the grant application.

Another goal of the grant was to establish a technical unit responsible for maintaining and housing equipment that was to be purchased to assist the enforcement activities projected during the grant period.

Project Description

The department's crack task force (CTF) was originally developed as a Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and was to operate for a 15-month period. Funding was designated to pay the overtime costs of crack task force members solely for the purpose of conducting crack enforcement operations that would not have been conducted by the department without benefit of this Federal financial resource.

Funding was also supplied to purchase support equipment that was designated in the grant application. A confidential informant/buy money imprest fund was also established with grant funding to pay informants and to purchase drugs within the scope and context of scheduled grant operations.

Project Organization and Management

During scheduled sting operations, the CTF provided 33 sworn police positions: 1 lieutenant, 4 sergeants, 27 officers, and 1 forfeiture detail supervisor. During buy-bust operations, the CTF provided 29 sworn police positions: 1 lieutenant, 3 sergeants, and 25 police officers. Officer safety and number of assignments necessary played a key role in determining the number of personnel required for both types of operations.

Three investigators assigned to mid-level crack cocaine investigations also interviewed persons arrested for sale and possession of drugs during buy-bust operations. These investigators developed this information and worked additional investigations derived from informants and intelligence information.

Mid-level investigations were staffed by members of the SIS and the street narcotics squad as warranted.

The core personnel selected for the CTF were sworn officers already assigned to the police department's SNU. Additional task force members were selected from the department's SIS and the criminal investigations tactical apprehension team.

Most project personnel attended a basic drug investigation school sponsored by DEA.

Additionally, many of the task force members attended training schools conducted by the city of Miami, Florida, Department of Law Enforcement.

All crack grant operations were conducted on an overtime basis and were designed to augment regularly scheduled work assignments of personnel assigned to the CTF.

The original grant application specified that 12 stings and 15 buy-bust operations were to be conducted between July 1988 and September 1989. Since the grant did not become operational until January 1989, it was necessary to initiate an accelerated scheduling of grant supported enforcement operations.

From inception to May 1991, the CTF conducted 27 stings, 47 buy-bust operations, and a number of other successful mid-level investigations.

Specific operational cost factors revealed that the average cost of each sting was \$7,888 and each buy-bust \$8,665.

Project Activities

Operation Sting. This operation was initiated from a concept developed by the department during 1986, in response to the overwhelming demand for assistance from community,

neighborhood, and religious organizations. The operations were designed to target the open and blatant drug problem at the street level. Personnel used to conduct stings were selected from the street narcotics unit and the CTF.

Sting operations specifically addressed the street-level drug problem by focusing enforcement efforts against the drug buyer who came into a neighborhood for the purpose of purchasing drugs for personal consumption.

Targeted locations within the city of Miami were selected by the SNU commander based upon the following criteria:

- Frequency of drug complaints.
- Community requests.
- Previous drug history of a given area.

Undercover police officers were placed as sellers at the targeted areas. When drug purchasers bought drugs from the undercover officers, they were quickly arrested by backup teams of officers on foot and in unmarked cars.

A successful operation might account for 150 to 200 arrests during a 5- to 7-hour period.

Most of the sting operations were well covered by the media.

Operation Sting has been considered successful because of the traumatic effect that arrest and incarceration has upon the occasional drug buyer and the deterrent effect that occurs when a drug buyer believes that his "supplier" may be an undercover police officer. The aim of Operation Sting was to have a direct impact upon the drug trade by reducing demand among occasional drug users.

Operation Buy-Bust. Operation Buy-Bust supplemented Operation Sting. Whereas Operation Sting targeted the large number of buyers who came into an area to purchase drugs, Operation Buy-Bust targeted the street-corner drug dealers. This operation used selected members of the street narcotics unit and personnel from the CTF.

As in the sting operations, multiple locations throughout the city of Miami were targeted based upon the following criteria:

- Tips and leads sheets.
- Frequency of drug arrests.
- Designated hot spots.
- High-profile drug activity.

Two-person undercover buy teams conducted street-level drug transactions with street drug peddlers at designated locations.

Once a drug purchase was made (the buy) by the undercover officers, support officers moved in to make the arrest (the bust). The arrested offender was held until an undercover officer could make an identification from a photograph. The arrestee was immediately transported to the command post for processing.

The operation then continued until all predesignated locations were addressed. Each buy-bust operation lasted for approximately 7 to 9 hours and accounted for between 50 and 75 arrests.

Search warrants. Search warrants were used at houses, stash pads, and freebase houses for drug purchases that did not lend themselves to buy-bust tactics. Search warrants were evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if they provided the only feasible alternative by which to pursue the case.

Search warrant investigations were usually initiated based upon tips and other information gained by an undercover officer during the course of a buy-bust operation. Based upon the situation, the undercover buy officer pursued the case through the prosecuting authorities and obtained a search warrant. The warrant was then served at a later date by personnel assigned to the SNU.

Mid-level investigations. Mid-level crack cocaine investigations were initiated and developed by the department's SIS and members of the CTF. Using intelligence information and confidential informants developed during stings and buy-bust operations, mid-level

investigations were initiated when warranted. The goal of the mid-level investigation was to develop information about crack suppliers and distribution networks and conduct followup investigations to arrest offenders, disrupt drug organizations, and effect seizures of drugs and assets whenever possible.

Supervisors and investigators from SIS developed case files documenting drug activity pertaining to crack cocaine dealers in Miami. They used existing operating procedures to disseminate this information to street-level enforcement units within the department.

Summary of Successful Activities

The crack grant funding expanded drug enforcement efforts to 5 and 6 days a week. This placed added pressure on drug offenders and resulted in significant increases in arrests.

During the 1989 calendar year, enforcement operations funded solely by the grant accounted for 23 percent of the total drug arrests made by the department's street narcotics unit. This was also true for 1990 and 1991.

The grant has afforded the department a critical and timely opportunity to fight the difficult battle against the ravages of crack that besiege many of the Nation's major cities. From the project's inception, the city of Miami has actively and successfully recruited support for its enforcement efforts from local media as well as community, neighborhood, and religious organizations.

The grant has allowed Miami police drug officers to gain a high-visibility enforcement profile and produce a large number of drug arrests and drug seizures. As a side benefit to this added coverage and high visibility, it is widely believed that the level of homicides, assaults, and general street violence surrounding the drug traffic in the city of Miami has experienced a general downturn.

A direct correlation between the downward trend in violence and Miami's high-profile drug enforcement can be drawn when Miami's total drug program is compared with that of other major cities such as Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. All other indicators suggest that Miami should lead the Nation in violent drug-related crimes. However, Miami's decrease in its rate of violent crime may be, in part, attributable to the comprehensive drug enforcement program that has been enhanced by this Federal grant.

**Nassau County Police Department
Nassau County, New York**

The Nassau County Police Department (NCPD) was awarded two BJA discretionary grants for support of a Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program during the period August 1988–October 1991. As explained in the department's concept paper, the grants were intended to create a catalyst to "bring manpower and expertise together into a cohesive unit to combat Nassau County's growing illicit narcotics problem." Along with the rise of

narcotic-related activities in the county, serious personal crime increased, much of it committed by out-of-county career criminals.

Nassau County is a densely populated (1.3 million people in 1988) suburban metropolis covering an area of 300 square miles on Long Island. The population is highly mobile and generally affluent (although about 100,000 live at or below the poverty level). The county offers many social, recreational, and athletic activities. NCPD provides total police service for 80 percent of the population (NCPD's district covers 69 percent of the county's land area) as well as investigative support to villages served by independent police forces.

Project History

Narcotics trafficking in Nassau County primarily involved highly visible street-level sales in low-income areas and the distribution and use of cocaine powder (HCl—cocaine hydrochloride) within private residences and licensed premises in more affluent areas.

Nassau's proximity to New York City and the ease with which people travel between the two areas for work and social activities have had a direct bearing on the nature of the county's narcotics problem. County residents can purchase drugs in anonymity in New York City, and sellers from the city can easily extend their operations into the county. Moreover, New York City operators of the major regional, national, and international drug cartels control cocaine distribution in Nassau and use the county as a base of operation for their drug storage and money laundering schemes. This process complicates narcotics enforcement efforts while

making it easier for the distributors to protect their assets and to remain at a safe distance from the scene of sales activities.

Before the crack task force program, NCPD's narcotics enforcement efforts largely involved the use of a county-level task force made up of undercover narcotics bureau personnel, uniformed officers from NCPD, and village police forces. The county task force had identified six geographical areas and numerous licensed premises such as bars, restaurants, and disco clubs for enforcement activities. But because of the ever-increasing influx of narcotics from New York City and the limited staff hours and equipment available, the task force could only target one area at a time for enforcement activities. Operational constraints also led to premature termination of some investigations and the backlogging of complaints involving lower priority areas. In addition, the limited availability of confidential funds hindered the narcotics bureau's ability to penetrate crack cocaine trafficking organizations. To help overcome these constraints on its narcotics enforcement efforts, NCPD applied for discretionary funding through the Crack-Focused Substance Abuse Enforcement Program of BJA.

Project Description

Through its crack task force, NCPD created multiple task forces patterned after the county-level task force already in operation. Each task force consisted of a supervisor and 5 to 10 experienced narcotics officers. The task forces responded to police and civilian complaints and worked proactively to increase narcotics enforcement activities in targeted areas and licensed premises and in areas in which drug activity was developing.

The grant moneys were used to provide personnel, equipment, confidential funds, and training for task force activities. Additional staff hours were provided, on an overtime basis, for narcotics-related investigation and enforcement and related support activities. Equipment was purchased to enhance the department's surveillance and evidence-gathering capabilities, including state-of-the-art miniaturized video equipment, videocassette recorders, and night-vision photographic equipment. In addition, several existing vans were outfitted with surveillance equipment. Confidential funds were allocated to enable narcotics officers to focus on mid- and high-level dealers, rather than small-time dealers, in their efforts to penetrate cocaine trafficking organizations. Finally, continued training was provided for task force and related support personnel to keep them abreast of narcotics-related information and countermeasures.

Project Goals and Objectives

The goals of NCPD's crack task force were twofold: break up the high-visibility, street-level sale of crack cocaine in low-income areas of the county and interrupt the chain of distribution that made crack available on the streets, and target the distribution and use of cocaine in private residences and licensed premises in more affluent areas.

To achieve its goals, the NCPD identified the following objectives for the crack task force:

- Penetration of crack cocaine trafficking organizations significant to Nassau County.
- Suppression or eradication of drug trafficking organizations.
- Arrest of career criminals involved in trafficking and enhancement of cases in which they are defendants.
- Arrest of mid- and high-level traffickers involved in the sale and possession of crack cocaine and the seizure of contraband, including drugs, weapons, and related properties illegally possessed.
- Dissemination of intelligence information on crack cocaine organizations through existing criminal justice liaison channels.

- Increased professionalization of investigative procedures.
- Development of State and Federal prosecution against traffickers.
- Reduction in UCR Part I offenses.

In addition, the project sought to achieve a 25- to 50-percent increase in crack cocaine arrests and their successful prosecution.

Project Organization and Management

The crack task force was organizationally assigned to NCPD's narcotics division. The task force reported to the division commander, an inspector.

The investigative policies of the crack task force encompassed the full range of narcotics enforcement activities, including buy-bust stings, reverse stings, stakeouts, wiretaps, and infiltration of drug trafficking operations. During its early narcotics enforcement efforts, the department made heavy use of confidential informants and "turned" defendants, particularly in street-level buy-busts. However, reliability problems that surfaced during the investigative and prosecutory stages led the narcotics bureau to increase its use of carefully prepared undercover officers.

Several procedures that were put in place or revised to enhance the efforts of the task force are summarized below:

- Procedures were developed within the department and with the office of the district attorney so that case preparation by police and prosecutors could proceed simultaneously with the development of evidence against targeted suspects.

- Coordination was increased with the office of the district attorney to streamline the process of applying for search warrants and thereby improve the timeliness of enforcement activities.

- Procedures were established to govern preparations for and execution of enforcement raids. The procedures covered timely completion of paperwork, selection and preparation of arrestee processing sites, preraid briefings for arrest teams, and on-scene suspect identification and transportation to processing sites.

- Task force-oriented liaison and coordination were established with Federal and State investigative and regulatory agencies, with the U.S. Attorney and District Attorney, and with the courts to increase the effectiveness of investigative and prosecutory efforts.

- An asset forfeiture unit was established within the department's legal bureau to coordinate efforts to seize drug-related real estate and other assets.

In addition, computer programs were designed for the storage and retrieval of information related to task force operations.

Project Activities

NCPD's crack task force conducted four basic types of narcotics enforcement activities:

- Street-level enforcement.
- Mid- and upper-level drug trafficking enforcement.
- Licensed premises enforcement.
- Private residence enforcement.

As described below, the mix of enforcement procedures used and the processes followed varied with the type of enforcement activity being conducted.

Street-level enforcement. The task force made extensive use of buy-bust and reverse sting operations to snare street-level buyers and sellers of cocaine and other drugs. Immediate buy-busts were made on isolated street corners and in other out-of-the-way places; observation and videotaping of undercover buys and followup investigation by precinct officers were used in more congested areas. Major undercover street-level operations often culminated in early morning enforcement raids and the arrest of large numbers of street-level dealers. Task force

personnel systematically returned to high-volume, high-visibility areas, which resulted in the arrest of many repeat offenders and their prosecution under career criminal statutes.

The task force had to develop its own version of the reverse sting because of an opinion by the New York State attorney general that the actual sale of a controlled substance by a police officer would constitute a criminal act. Undercover officers offered an imitation substance for sale, and buyers were arrested on a lesser charge of "solicitation," rather than purchase, of a controlled substance.

To complement task force efforts, NCPD established a narcotic enforcement team unit in May 1989 to help combat street-level problems. The unit conducted observation-type arrests or buys followed by almost immediate arrest. The creation of the unit enabled task force personnel to spend more time investigating mid- and upper-level dealers. In addition, members of the unit were often able to provide task force personnel with information that was helpful in their investigations.

Drug trafficking enforcement. The crack task force engaged in a variety of enforcement activities in its efforts to penetrate and break up mid- and upper-level drug trafficking operations. Confidential informants of proven reliability were used to obtain introductions to dealers so that undercover operations could be initiated. Similarly, confidential funds were used to develop quality information for targeting and prosecuting known crack dealers. Long-term trafficking investigations often involved the use of undercover police officers,

surveillance and videotaping, electronic eavesdropping, and enforcement raids to execute search and indictment warrants. These types of activities were conducted, for example, in a housing project area as part of sustained efforts to remove mid- and upper-level dealers from the area and to quell the violence that accompanied their drug activities.

Drug trafficking enforcement also often involved joint investigations with Federal agencies. For example, the task force conducted a joint investigation with DEA in the smuggling of cocaine from Colombia and Guatemala into the United States and, ultimately, Nassau County. The investigation concluded with the arrest of three suspects on Federal conspiracy charges and the seizure of 360 kilos of cocaine. A joint investigation was conducted with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms when a cocaine dealer offered to sell weapons to an undercover officer of the narcotics bureau. That investigation resulted in the arrest of two suspects and the seizure of weapons and cocaine. In an effort to build cases against crack dealers on the grounds of "possession with intent to sell," the task force also conducted extensive multiwiretap investigations in conjunction with Federal investigative agencies and on its own.

Licensed premises enforcement. Bars, restaurants, disco clubs, and similar licensed premises in Nassau County were the scene of considerable cocaine sales activity. To counter this aspect of the county's narcotics problem, the Crack Task Force used a combination of on-scene arrests and undercover investigations. Low-level buyers and users were targeted through on-scene arrests outside disco clubs known to be frequented by cocaine users.

Higher-level cocaine activities were targeted through confidential informants and undercover investigations inside bars and other establishments. The latter activities were supported by confidential funds provided by the Crack Task Force grant. In the first six months of the grant, 159 licensed premises across the county were investigated, 144 of which resulted in arrests.

Confidential informants, many of whom were wired, were used to develop information about activities within the establishments. Informants were often instrumental in introducing an undercover officer to the clientele of a particular establishment. Informants were used despite the attendant problems because of the difficulty in getting undercover officers accepted into private drug circles and because of the time and expense involved in such investigations. These investigations often involved large amounts of cocaine and cash, protracted negotiations with sellers, backup detectives, and considerable investigative time to protect undercover personnel.

Private residence enforcement. Because of the difficulty of gaining access to private residences and getting subjects to make sales to strangers, the task force relied heavily on confidential informants and long-term undercover infiltration efforts to disrupt private drug distribution networks. Targeted residences were placed under surveillance to collect evidence of buyers going in and out, undercover buys were made, and wiretap warrants were obtained so additional evidence of drug distribution could be gathered. Search warrants were then

obtained, buyers and sellers at the scene were arrested, and cocaine and other assets were seized.

Summary of Successful Activities

The narcotics enforcement activities of the crack task force, in combination with other NCPD enforcement efforts, have succeeded in making inroads into the county's drug problems and, in the process, improved the county's capabilities to conduct its continuing narcotics enforcement program. The success stories summarized below illustrate the progress that has been made.

- Four raids conducted simultaneously in October 1989 demonstrated the value of the detailed case and raid preparation procedures developed at the beginning of the crack task force program. Indictment warrants were obtained for 214 suspects, 195 of whom were arrested as a result of the raids.

- Information provided by a confidential informant led to an undercover investigation of a police officer alleged to be selling cocaine at a local bar. The investigation culminated in the arrest of the suspect and a network of low-level dealers operating from a number of bars in the county.

■ A wiretap investigation into drug distribution by a man and woman from a private residence and their place of business led to the arrest of the suspects, their drug runner, and six other persons at the residence. Cocaine, weapons, U.S. currency, and motor vehicles were also seized. Cases were developed against more than 20 customers, some of whom provided information about other felony sales activity in the county.

■ A lengthy joint investigation with DEA resulted in two arrests for first-degree money laundering, the first case of its kind prosecuted in Nassau County.

■ Interaction between narcotics bureau personnel and officers of village police departments has enhanced the capability of village police to conduct narcotics enforcement and has fostered close coordination and cooperation between the two groups.

■ Task force activities have heightened community awareness of the county's drug problems and of the police response.

**Northern Virginia Regional Crack Task Force
Arlington, Virginia**

The Northern Virginia region contains a number of cities and counties in the Washington, D.C., area. The area consists of the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, and Prince William; the cities of Alexandria, Fairfax, and Falls Church; and a number of smaller towns. It has a

population of over 1.5 million and a land area of over 1,000 square miles. Although Northern Virginia is one of the most affluent areas in the United States, it has not been immune from drug trafficking problems affecting the rest of the country.

Local law enforcement agencies in Northern Virginia recognized the existence of a crack problem beginning in spring 1987 when an influx of Jamaicans and drug dealers from New York infiltrated the area and established crackhouses and distribution networks. The amount of crack distributed in Northern Virginia rose sharply during the next year, in part because the market was so attractive. Crack sold for twice the price in Northern Virginia that it did in New York City during this time.

Investigators determined that both the Jamaican and New York distributors preyed upon women with children who resided in low-income, subsidized housing in Northern Virginia and paid them either in crack or in cash so they might use their homes as crackhouses.

During 1987, an increasing number of local Northern Virginia traffickers became involved in the distribution network, with the source of supply still being the Jamaicans and drug dealers from New York. While the individual law enforcement agencies attacked the problem vigorously, the offenders merely moved across jurisdictional lines to rebuff the pressure of any single agency's enforcement efforts. The amount of crack distributed in Northern Virginia continued to grow.

Several obstacles prevented local law enforcement agencies from successfully removing these mid-level crack distributors from the area:

- Lack of financial resources prevented local law enforcement agencies from concentrating on mid-level multijurisdictional crack dealers.
- Mid-level crack dealers moved between the jurisdictions in Northern Virginia as well as throughout the Washington metropolitan area. This movement retarded intelligence gathering and limited prosecution.
- Unlike the Federal statutes, Virginia State law did not differentiate between cocaine base and cocaine and had not yet targeted crack as representing a serious danger to the community.
- Virginia State law in the area of conspiracy was very narrowly drawn and as a result was rarely employed.
- Each defendant in the Virginia State system has a right to a separate trial; the prosecution of conspiracy cases, even if possible, was seldom economically feasible in the State system.
- The Virginia State system did not allow for regular investigative grand juries, which are so essential to prosecuting crack conspiracy cases.

- The Virginia State legal system did not have a sophisticated forfeiture statute, such as the Federal system has, that allowed for seizing of the assets of narcotics traffickers both civilly and criminally.

Project Goals and Objectives

Local law enforcement agencies and the Federal agencies recognized that the goal of removing mid-level as well as street-level dealers of crack from Northern Virginia would require a team effort. The team would need to gather an effective data base across the various jurisdictional lines and coordinate the efforts of all local and Federal law enforcement officers in focusing on targets who move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In addition, local agencies wanted to use the Federal judicial system to prosecute drug traffickers. These agencies recognized that the Federal system is currently better equipped to prosecute the violators successfully because of the minimum mandatory penalties for relatively small quantities of crack. The local agencies also wanted to use the Federal forfeiture laws further to enhance enforcement and prosecution efforts. There was also a need for local law enforcement officers to be deputized federally to operate successfully in the many jurisdictions of Northern Virginia.

As a result, an ad hoc task force was implemented whose goal was to attempt to identify those individuals in Northern Virginia who were distributing crack cocaine to the street-level dealers. The task force used the Federal grand jury system, undercover operations, and other

traditional methods of investigation to gather sufficient evidence to indict these distributors in Federal court for conspiracy, distribution of crack cocaine, or both. Emphasis was also placed on the identification and seizure of automatic weapons known to be used by these groups.

Originally, it was not contemplated that this task force would be permanent, but rather participation from local departments would be on a case-by-case basis. When Arlington County received the grant formally to create the Northern Virginia Regional Crack Task Force (NVRCTF), these goals were made formal and a permanent task force was created.

Project History

A \$250,000 discretionary grant was awarded on March 15, 1989, to the Arlington County, Virginia, Police Department (host agency) for NVRCTF to become a full-time operation. The task force, which is still in operation, currently is directed and supervised by DEA and coordinated by the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. It includes representatives from the following law enforcement agencies:

- Alexandria Commonwealth's Attorney's Office and Alexandria Police Department.
- Arlington County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office and Arlington Police Department.
- Fairfax County Police Department.
- Prince William County Police Department.
- DEA.
- United States Park Police.
- Virginia State Police.

Representatives from the Arlington County Commonwealth's Attorney's Office and the City of Alexandria Commonwealth's Attorney's Offices have been appointed special assistant U.S. Attorneys, which enables them to participate in Federal grand jury investigations and prosecute cases in the U.S. District Court. Similarly, appointments of other area prosecutors are pending.

Although the grant was awarded effective April 6, 1989, the actual task force startup was not until several months later. First, a suitable satellite location to house the task force had to be selected and furnished. Contractual negotiations involving an office lease, insurance, telephones, etc., were time consuming and resulted in a 2-month delay in startup time. Second, as this task force was being started, the much larger Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area Drug Enforcement Task Force (MATF) was being established, which placed manpower demands on all area law enforcement agencies. Because of these simultaneous requests for manpower, some local departments hesitated to commit manpower to the Northern Virginia task force, which further delayed the startup. In addition, the manpower resources of DEA were severally taxed because of demands from MATF. As a result, DEA was not able to commit manpower resources to the Northern Virginia task force until September 1989.

As the task force evolved into a viable enforcement group, it became evident that its efforts required coordination by a Federal host law enforcement agency. Accordingly, this group was designated as DEA Task Force Group No. 35 of MATF.

Project Description

As stated, NVRCTF was implemented to address the problem of crack cocaine in Northern Virginia as a regional cooperative effort and to make the benefits of the Federal judicial system more readily available to State and local agencies. The following benefits were seen by the participating agencies:

- Enhanced conspiracy statutes with more prosecutorial emphasis.
- Access to the Federal grand jury as an investigative tool.
- Sentencing according to the Federal sentencing guidelines with their stringent policies to crack cocaine.
- Federal deputization of participating officers giving them jurisdiction in all areas of Northern Virginia, as well as Washington, D.C., and Maryland.
- Federal asset forfeiture.
- Enhanced sharing of intelligence and information among participating agencies.

These continue to be important despite several improvements in Virginia state drug laws.

Project Organization and Management

Because the task force included officers from various law enforcement agencies, each of which had its own policies and procedures, it was clear the group would have to adopt one

set of guidelines for all agencies. With the stated purpose of using the Federal judicial system for prosecution, obviously the the most expedient course was to adopt the policies and procedures of DEA. Additionally, this was also necessary to facilitate access to the DEA laboratory for analysis of evidence. With the establishment of MATF and the inclusion of the crack task force within it, all officers were sworn as DEA Task Force agents. At this point, the operating policies of DEA were formally adopted.

At present, the crack task force is composed of 12 full-time investigators and supervisors, along with one case-specific officer from the Herndon Town Police. The group supervisor is provided by DEA, and the operational supervisor is a lieutenant from the Fairfax County Police Department. The breakdown of the investigators is as follows: two Alexandria City police officers, two Arlington County police officers, three DEA agents, one Fairfax County officer, one Prince William County police officer, one Herndon police officer, and one Virginia State Police officer.

In addition to these full-time personnel, other local and Federal agencies in Northern Virginia provide support on a case-by-case basis.

Apart from these investigative personnel, but very much a part of the overall effort of the task force, are the personnel of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, who are the coordinators of the task force. Also, prosecutorial support is provided

by Assistant Commonwealth's Attorneys of Arlington and Alexandria who are appointed as special assistant U.S. attorneys.

The selection of personnel who are assigned to the task force was left to each participating agency. In most, but not all cases, investigator selection was conducted on a voluntary basis. All of those chosen for the NVRCTF are experienced officers with a wide range of narcotics enforcement backgrounds. However, some of these investigators had little prior exposure to the Federal judicial system and its prosecution of narcotics violators.

Initial training provided task force members was a 2-week investigator course at DEA's training facility at Quantico, Virginia. Officers later attended a 1-week seminar on DEA reporting policies and procedures.

No additional formal training as a unit is anticipated. On-the-job training is used constantly as the more experienced officers assist new officers. The group critiques each operation at its conclusion, and a weekly operational meeting discusses progress and problems.

Turnover of assigned State and local personnel has not posed a significant problem thus far. Only one local investigator has been replaced since the task force was staffed in June 1989.

Project Activities

The enforcement activities undertaken by the crack task force have been varied, but can be placed into four major categories. These categories are broad and, in many instances, a particular investigation may fall into two, or even three, categories as it progresses from initiation through conclusion. The four categories are as follows:

- Conspiracy investigations.
- Undercover investigations.
- Adoption of cases conducted by participating agencies.
- Assisting participating agencies with investigations.

All of the above types of investigations have as common targets those individuals who supply street-level crack cocaine dealers. Experience to date indicates these individuals provide half-ounce to 1-ounce quantities of crack to multiple runners several times a week.

Conspiracy investigations. At this point, the majority of time and resources have been committed to conspiracy investigations. Those investigations that have been concluded (resulting in the arrest and indictment of groups of conspirators) have resulted from cases that were adopted from participating agencies. Specifically, these cases were being pursued by an investigator who was then assigned to the task force upon its implementation.

Additionally, in the majority of these cases, an undercover officer was used to further the investigation.

The majority of the defendants who have been convicted or pleaded guilty have received substantial terms of incarceration (10 or more years). Most of these sentences are for mandatory incarceration without the possibility of suspended sentences or parole that would be available in the State system.

The investigative function of the Federal grand jury has been instrumental in the development and success of the conspiracy cases investigated thus far. By identifying unindicted co-conspirators and other individuals possessing first-hand knowledge of a crack distribution organization and by summoning them before the grand jury, a vast amount of evidence and additional intelligence is gained.

The liabilities connected with conspiracy investigations are that they have taken 3 to 4 months from initiation to indictment and are very manpower intensive. The typical indictment names 6 to 10 co-conspirators at various levels of an organization. For each indicted conspirator, numerous witnesses must be located and interviewed, and corroborative evidence, both physical and testimonial, must be established.

Undercover investigations. The short-term goal of these investigations is to make undercover purchases of crack cocaine from a targeted individual. Whenever possible, a

purchase of 50 grams or more (usually 2 ounces, which is 57 grams) of crack cocaine is attempted as soon as a transaction can be negotiated. The arrest of the violator is planned either at the time of the 50-gram purchase or shortly thereafter. The justification for this short-term goal is that the 50-gram transaction carries a 10-year mandatory incarceration under the Federal sentencing guidelines and provides a substantial incentive for the violator to subsequently cooperate with investigators in continuing the investigation.

The long-term goals of undercover investigations are to enhance existing conspiracy investigations or to develop new organizations to be targeted for prosecution. Investigations of this nature conducted thus far have proven successful. One limiting factor has been that the resources directed at conspiracy investigations have minimized those available for the cultivation of informants capable of arranging drug transactions.

Adoption of in-progress investigations. A typical scenario of this type of case is when the task force acts as a means of providing access to Federal prosecution. Participating agencies will make seizures and/or arrests that involve targets meeting the criteria of the task force. These cases will be referred to the respective agency's representative, who will initiate the required reports for adoption and Federal prosecution. The task force's role in these cases runs the full spectrum from simply "papering" a completed investigation where defendants are already incarcerated, to working in conjunction with agencies already engaged in a case, to assuming the lead in an investigation, to entirely accepting a case from the initiating agency.

Assisting participating agencies. The last area where the crack task force has participated in enforcement activities has been that of simply providing support and assistance to agencies in the Northern Virginia area. This support has included sharing intelligence information, providing access to informants useful to agencies, and providing manpower, when requested, to assist on raids and arrests.

Summary of Successful Activities

An example of the task force successes is the Arthur McArthur investigation. Arlington County Police had identified McArthur as a source of large amounts of crack cocaine to numerous dealers in the South Arlington area. Additionally, McArthur had enraged the community by using juveniles (as young as 13 years old) as dealers and in other roles and by operating close to a local elementary school.

With an Arlington County investigator as the lead agent and an undercover officer on loan from the city of Alexandria Police Department, NVRCTF was able to charge and convict McArthur, two of his suppliers, and three of the dealers who supplied McArthur.

The task force has elevated the level of its targets as evidenced by the fact that four cases each have multiple defendants charged with eight CCE (21 U.S.C. § 848) or RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1961).

The task force has documented 12 cooperating individuals using established DEA procedures since October 1990. In addition, the availability of significant amounts of money to purchase drug evidence has allowed for documenting intelligence information on major crack trafficking organizations of foreign nationals. These organizations originate in New York City and distribute to either Washington, D.C., Maryland, or Virginia.

The results of the task force's efforts to prosecute defendants in the Federal system have been excellent. Only one defendant has been acquitted, while the average sentence exceeds 10 years in prison.

The creation of the task force has increased the cooperation and coordination among all parties involved, particularly the member departments. On very short notice, member departments or the DEA respond to assist the crack task force with money, manpower, or equipment.

**San Diego Police Department
San Diego, California**

San Diego is the sixth largest city in the United States. Prior to its grant, San Diego experienced an increase in the presence of crack cocaine street dealers and drive-by

shootings. In 1987, there were over 20 drive-by shootings, most of which were attributed to rival gangs fighting over drug turf.

Several reasons created high vulnerability to drug trafficking in the San Diego area:

- It has an international border with Mexico, many miles of which are unprotected.
- A major Mexican airline was providing direct service from Bogota, Columbia, to Tijuana, Mexico. Tijuana is adjacent to the border crossing immediately south of San Diego.
- The city is near Los Angeles, which has a major crack epidemic and has many large violent gangs.
- It has five major universities and four community colleges (with a combined enrollment of almost 100,000 students).
- It is a major seaport that serves commercial, military, and pleasure craft.
- It has an international airport and many area airports.
- It is home to the Naval Recruit Center and the Marine Corps Depot (with more than 138,000 active duty personnel, half of whom are males under age 25).

- It is a large, year-round tourist attraction.

Because of these geographic and cultural characteristics, San Diego has many points of entry for illicit drugs and a large population that has high-risk potential for drug abuse.

The widespread use and highly addictive nature of crack cocaine created both an enormously profitable market for the drug and a criminal subculture. This subculture had two dangerous characteristics: the economic means to purchase sophisticated weaponry and protection items (steel doors, steel grates for windows, etc.) and the financial incentive to engage in turf wars and other violent acts to protect and expand the illegal operations.

A significant volume of all crime in San Diego was attributed to the use and sale of controlled substances. Of the 86,764 total arrests in San Diego in 1988, 25 percent were drug related. About 33 percent of these were drug felony violations, and 67 percent were drug misdemeanor offenses.

A study by the San Diego County Jail revealed that 85 percent of the recently arrested inmates had illicit narcotics in their systems. Of all the inmates tested during the period from January 1989 to March 1989, 41 percent of the men and 52 percent of the women showed evidence of cocaine use.

The San Diego Police Department has 1.6 officers per 1,000 citizens, one of the lowest ratios in the United States (the national average is 2.5 officers per 1,000 citizens). In addition, San Diego has held the unfortunate distinction of having more officers killed in the line of duty than in any other city in the United States.

Crack cocaine can probably be found in most neighborhoods in San Diego; however, two sections of San Diego had become crack epidemic areas:

Southeast San Diego is a primarily black residential area, consisting of both large apartment complexes and single family homes and commercial/retail zones, and bordering on a light industrial area. Crackhouses and gang activity were common in this area. Crack cocaine had replaced PCP as the drug of choice and was available on the street in various quantities and prices. A small amount could be purchased for as little as \$5.

East San Diego is a cultural melting pot of international origins and is heavily populated with Southeast Asians, blacks, whites, and Hispanics. East San Diego comprises largely single and multiple family dwellings and a large retail zone. The Los Angeles gangs focused on this area to facilitate their narcotics trafficking.

Project History

In September of 1988, the San Diego Police Department received initial BJA funding of \$175,000 for its Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program. The city was awarded an additional \$275,000 in May of 1990. This program was initiated because of the drug-related violence on the streets of San Diego. Most of the violence had been attributed to local residents, some of whom were documented gang members; however, some of the violence

had involved gang members from the Los Angeles and Long Beach areas. These gangs seemed to be more established and more violent than the San Diego gangs.

Shooting incidents began during the summer of 1986 when rival gangs were fighting for control of the highly profitable crack cocaine trade. Of the approximately two dozen drive-by shootings that involved narcotics dealers in 1986, 11 resulted in homicides.

Project Description

The grant funds were used to create additional police officer positions; purchase communication equipment; add to undercover funds; and promote more complete recordkeeping, research, and statistical analysis.

The San Diego crack abatement team (CAT) was funded by BJA grants from September 1988 to October 1991. Together, these grants provided a total of \$450,000 for equipment, salary for a police investigative aide, overtime, miscellaneous supplies, training, and travel.

Project Goals and Objectives

The main goal of the San Diego CAT was to reduce the blatant sales of crack cocaine, eliminate the organizations that were profiting from its sale, and, thereby, reduce street violence.

CAT was instituted to attack several targets using different techniques. The primary targets of CAT were low- and mid-level distributors, dealers, and buyers, but did not exclude high-level operations for operators of fortified crackhouses and street-level sellers.

The goals of CAT (and the project) were as follows:

- Decrease complaints from the community as crack dealers and distributors are forced away from their operations.
- Decrease shootings and other gang- and crack-related violence.
- Increase arrests, drug seizures, and asset seizures.
- Increase community and media support.
- Increase the number of successful prosecutions.
- Train patrol personnel to develop their crack cocaine enforcement skills by learning the strategies and tactics of CAT members.
- Weaken the link between supply and demand that fuels the crack epidemic.

Project Organization and Management

CAT consisted of one sergeant, seven detectives, two investigative aides, and one word processing operator. All of the positions, except three of the detectives, were funded through the grant. The three detectives were salaried through the regular police department budget.

The sergeant and five of the detectives formed the core of CAT. They worked together on enforcement activities. One detective was designated the abatement officer. His activities are described later in this section. Another detective was assigned to a multijurisdictional cooperative task force called Operation Alliance and worked with other investigators from local and Federal agencies. This group concentrated on narcotic traffic interdictions, primarily working the Mexican border area.

The investigative aides took citizens' complaints of narcotic activity and did complete computer workups on them. The results of these background checks frequently determined whether or not a detective would be assigned to do followup work. Since manpower was limited, not all complaints could be addressed. They also facilitated the recordkeeping requirements to complete quarterly statistical reports.

The word processing operator was responsible for typing the reports generated by the team's activities.

Selection and training. CAT was one of four teams of investigators within the narcotics section of the San Diego Police Department. Officers selected for CAT were experienced detectives chosen from the other three teams based on their demonstrated investigative skills, motivation, and abilities.

All detectives assigned to the narcotics section were given specific training courses to increase their expertise. The schools they attended included the following:

- Basic Narcotic Investigation, a 2-week program conducted by either the DEA or the Department of Justice.

- Surveillance School

- Under-the-Influence School.

- Informant Development and Maintenance School.

- Clandestine Lab School.

- Wiretap School.

The detectives had received much of the training by the time they were selected to be part of CAT.

Turnover. Because detectives on CAT were highly qualified, they were frequently prime candidates for promotion or transfer. Since many team members were aiming to be part of the narcotics task force, a group that concentrates on major narcotic violators, CAT was a natural stepping stone toward this goal or toward other promotions. CAT averaged about one detective turnover every 3 months.

Scheduling. Although several different shift schedules were tried during the 2-year period, the team always reverted to a 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. shift. Having search warrants signed by judges, making mandatory court appearances, and acquiring access to business contacts, such as the telephone company or gas company, dictated that the detectives often work these hours. However, their hours often had to be adjusted to accomplish enforcement activities. Most of the street sales took place from the early evening to the early morning hours.

CAT often worked overtime to facilitate a successful prosecution. Each detective averaged about 38 overtime hours per month (230 hours per month for the team; 5,500 hours of overtime for the team over the 2-year period).

Project Activities

During the first 15 months of operation, CAT made 512 arrests; seized 62 weapons, 4,492.43 grams of cocaine base, 913,388.63 grams of cocaine HCl, other narcotics, and thousands of dollars worth of assets; and initiated 1,346 investigations as a result of citizen complaints and informant information. Some of the successful techniques used by CAT are discussed in the following sections.

Buy-bust operation. During a buy-bust operation, an undercover police officer purchased a controlled substance, and the seller was immediately arrested. This tactic was most frequently used at the street-dealer level.

The undercover police officer was selected because of his or her ability to fit the profile of a buyer within a targeted area. A team of cover officers provided protection for the undercover buyer, and an arrest team was responsible for apprehending the seller after the buyer gave a bust signal. The seller was taken to a command post to be processed and then to the county jail to be booked.

Patrol officers were frequently assigned to CAT to assist in buy-bust operations.

Special enforcement operations/search warrants. Special enforcement operations and search warrants were the "meat and potatoes" of CAT's efforts. These techniques usually targeted the low-level to mid-level dealers; however, some high-level dealers were targeted. Narcotic purchases were usually in the \$20 to \$50 range, but some purchases of \$100 to \$500 were made.

Each detective assigned to this team maintained contact with informants who were used to make controlled buys and to provide intelligence on locations of crack sales.

A controlled buy was conducted as follows: Informants were searched to make sure they were not carrying any controlled substances. They were then given a designated amount of money and sent to a specific target location to purchase a specific drug. Visual contact was maintained as long as possible, usually until informants entered their locations. After the informants returned and produced the purchased controlled substance, they were searched again to make certain they were no longer carrying any money or controlled substances. Undercover officers as well as informants were often used as buyers.

Reverse stings. Reverse stings were designed to affect the user and targeted operations where small quantities of narcotics were being sold. Often CAT encountered buyers coming to make a purchase at a residence where a search warrant was being executed. The reverse sting strategies were implemented after selected search warrants were executed.

To identify and arrest low-level and mid-level drug offenders, team members posed as sellers. The drugs used in the reverse sting were acquired with a court order from cases that had already been adjudicated. Law enforcement officers found that these operations stopped trafficking at the premises and forced buyers to find new locations.

Reverse stings usually resulted in arrests of buyers who were either in possession or under the influence of a controlled substance. One reverse sting operation typically resulted in 10 to 15 arrests.

Abatement proceedings. The abatement process was used in neighborhoods where drug activity had occurred over a long period of time despite the team's most concerted enforcement efforts and where the drug activity was considered a public nuisance. This process employed civil litigation rather than criminal procedures and focused on the place as well as on the persons committing the illegal drug acts.

California Health and Safety Code Section 11570 et seq., a specialized public nuisance statute, states the following:

. . . every building or place used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, keeping, manufacturing or giving away any controlled substance, precursor or analog specified in this division and every building or place wherein or upon which those acts take place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated and prevented and for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or private nuisance.

The Drug Abatement Act authorizes district attorneys, city attorneys, and private citizens to file civil complaints seeking equitable relief to abate and perpetually enjoin the owners, lessees, agents, or responsible persons from conducting or maintaining this public nuisance. The court may issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in an effort to abate and prevent the recurrence of the nuisance. The legislature granted the courts the following four powers:

- Seize all fixtures, musical instruments, and other movable property which are used to maintain the nuisance.
- Close the building for any use for a period of 1 year.
- Assess a maximum civil penalty of \$25,000 against any of the defendants, depending upon the severity and duration of the nuisance.
- Pay damages equal to the fair market rental value of the property for one year, instead of closing the building.

Before filing this type of action, the municipal attorney must decide if the evidence shows a pattern of continuous and repeated drug use. The amount and type of evidence necessary to obtain abatement orders is not clear in the statute. In addition, no published cases that interpret the Drug Abatement Act exist. Therefore, guidance comes from other appellate

decisions and from general equitable principles, which apply to standard abatement actions. Often, the quantity of arrests (regardless of convictions) may be a sufficient indicator that a drug abatement action is the most appropriate method to abate the public nuisance.

While the arrests alone may be reason enough to use this process, statements from neighbors are an excellent source of evidence in three areas: the long history of drug activity in their neighborhood, the general reputation of the property, and the general reputation of a business (although the evidence may be circumstantial in this third area, it is admissible to prove the existence of a public nuisance).

To facilitate the abatement process, one member of CAT was designated as the department's abatement officer and was assigned to the Abatement Task Force, a group of representatives from the police department, city attorney's office, housing commission, zoning department, fire department, and housing inspection. Each of the seven police department area stations had a problem-oriented policing (POP) coordinator who acted as a liaison with the abatement officer. The POP coordinator submitted worksheets that described problem properties.

After reviewing the worksheets, the abatement officer determined whether to begin the abatement process or to refer the problem to the appropriate city department. Once the abatement officer decided that the process should begin, the officer immediately contacted the property owner to schedule a formal office meeting. Since voluntary compliance of the property owner was a goal, the owner was given a list of suggestions that would alleviate the

problem. These suggestions included such things as erecting a fence in a given location, putting up light fixtures and keeping them on during certain hours of the night, keeping certain individuals off the property, and making structural repairs. If the property owner agreed to voluntary compliance, he or she was given a certain amount of time to meet the demands. In over 95 percent of the cases, the property owners voluntarily complied.

If the property owner did not agree to voluntary compliance, the city attorney's office became involved, and the civil litigation process began. The deputy city attorney obtained a temporary restraining order while a formal case was structured to lead to a preliminary injunction. If the property owner still did not comply, the case went to a final injunction.

Summary of Successful Activities

Arrests averaged a little over 100 per quarter—415 arrests were made in 1988 and 421 arrests were made in 1989. The number of search warrants increased from 67 in 1988 to 143 in 1989—an increase of 113 percent.

A total of 1,288 grams of crack cocaine were seized in 1988, and a total of 6,486 were seized in 1989—an increase of 400 percent. In addition, more than 900,000 grams of powder cocaine were seized.

Citizen complaints that generated investigations peaked in 1988. That year the police department received 1,099 complaints, an average of 92 complaints per month. In 1989, the police department received 896 complaints, an average of 75 complaints per month. This is an 18 percent decrease in complaints of crack sales and use during this time period.

Although controlled substances in general and crack cocaine in particular remain a serious and evident problem in San Diego, the police department made progress in its local battle through use of this BJA grant.

Chapter 3. Street Sales Enforcement Program

For the Street Sales Enforcement Program, this chapter provides the background, goals and objectives, program description, project sites, funding, timelines, and site descriptions. Each site description details the activities of the program site during the life of the project.

Background

The Street Sales Enforcement Program was based on the idea that local law enforcement agencies are best qualified to design innovative, effective street-level drug enforcement programs. BJA encouraged local agencies, within broad guidelines, to design and implement their own programs tailored to their own local conditions, and to rely heavily on available local law enforcement, municipal, and community resources.

Unlike the crack task forces, BJA did not require the participation of Federal agencies in these projects. Instead, it emphasized the importance of collecting and analyzing drug market and abuse data by local agencies to allow them to concentrate on their most serious drug trafficking problems.

Goals and Objectives

The goal of the street sales projects was to demonstrate effective police efforts to target street-level drug dealers and buyers through effective planning, investigation, and prosecution. BJA directed the individual sites to set their own specific objectives to achieve this goal; in addition, the BJA program description required each site to address a number of elements that, if implemented, were expected to lead to an effective enforcement program. These elements are discussed in the next section.

Program Description

BJA intended the Street Sales Enforcement Programs to strengthen urban enforcement and prosecution efforts targeted on street drug dealers and buyers. Sites were required to include a number of program elements that showed a coordinated effort toward addressing the street sales drug trafficking issue:

- Data collection and analysis for identifying and using results of internal evaluation to revise programs to fit changing conditions.

- Emphasis on early involvement of prosecutor and courts.

- Training and using uniformed personnel, and certifying uniformed officers as narcotics experts for testifying in court.

- Deploying street teams for ongoing investigations and arrests of street drug traffickers, and for being responsive to citizen complaints.

- Vigorous enforcement efforts to arrest and convict drug users.

- Organizing and deploying mobile task forces to target blatant drug trafficking areas.

- Undercover drug-buy program aimed at street traffickers.

- Asset seizure and forfeiture efforts when practical.

- Coordination with the forensic laboratory and jail.

In selecting the sites, BJA strongly considered the level of commitment and effective use of applicant agencies' own resources to implement the projects.

Project Sites, Funding, and Timelines

BJA began funding projects in October 1987 and awarded grants to seven jurisdictions:

Birmingham, Long Beach, Oakland, Orlando, Orleans Parish (Louisiana), San Antonio, and Seattle; Rochester was funded in September 1988.

Exhibit 3-1 displays funding amounts and dates of operation for each of these sites. The remainder of this section consists of detailed descriptions of Street Sales Enforcement Program sites.

EXHIBIT 3-1. Street Sales Enforcement Sites

Total	Total	Project	Initial	Supplement	Supplement		
		Award	Award	Award	Award	Project	Project
Completion		Date	Amount	Date	Amount	Funding	Length Date
	<u>Site</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Funding</u>	<u>Length Date</u>
09/30/90	Birmingham	10/01/87	\$180,000	4/12/89	\$150,000	\$330,200	36 Months
09/30/90	Long Beach	10/01/87	399,590	4/12/89	150,000	549,590	36 Months
02/28/90	Oakland	10/01/87	299,826	4/12/89	150,000	449,826	29 Months

03/31/91 Orlando 10/01/87 359,903 6/09/89 150,000 509,903 42 Months

Months Orleans Parish 10/01/87 418,476 4/12/89 150,000 568,47632
06/30/90

12/31/91 Rochester 09/01/88 350,000 3/30/90 250,000 600,000 29 Months

Months Seattle 11/01/87 356,753 None None 356,753 34
08/31/90

06/30/90 San Antonio 10/01/87 394,500 4/12/89 150,000 544,500 32 Months

Total Awards

\$2,759,248

\$1,150,000

\$3,907,248

Birmingham Police Department Birmingham, Alabama

Birmingham is the largest city in Alabama, with a metropolitan area population of 270,000. In addition, Birmingham includes surrounding Jefferson County, which has a population of roughly 1 million. Demographically, approximately 25 percent of the county residents and 50 percent of city residents are African American. Less than 1 percent of the remaining population is Asian or Hispanic; the rest is Caucasian.

Approximately 5 years ago in the original grant application, the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) estimated that 75 percent of all crimes committed in Birmingham were drug related, and nearly 90 percent of personal injury crimes could be linked to illegal drug use. The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program, jointly funded by BJA and the National Institute of Justice and operated locally by the University of Alabama's Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program, has since provided supporting data. DUF data from 1988 showed that 75 percent of males arrested in Birmingham had used illegal drugs. Only New York and San Diego had higher percentages than Birmingham.

Project History

During the summer of 1986, Birmingham was plagued with open-air drug markets and street drug dealers. Drugs were sold on many street corners day and night with no regard for the

community or its residents. "Turf" battles broke out among dealers for control of certain street corners, and crime escalated in the city. To combat the problem of street sales, the BPD began a pilot program called Street Sweep. This program was aimed at combating the open-air drug markets that had appeared in many city neighborhoods. Prior to the program's implementation, the police department was hampered in its efforts to police the problem. Because of the nature of the street drug sales, normal police surveillance was virtually impossible: the street dealers were too mobile, dealers changed frequently and did not operate from a home base. By selling drugs on street corners, the dealers were able to dodge police officers continuously and avoid arrest.

At first, the police department tried undercover operations. These operations often proved futile. The normal procedure of identifying suspects prior to an operation was not possible since the officers could not get home addresses, license plate numbers, or phone numbers because that information was not available. Buy-bust and sting operations were not feasible due to the small size of the narcotics unit and the limited number of undercover officers. The department then turned to the patrol bureau to increase its presence in the areas where drugs were sold in an effort to drive the dealers away. To displace the sellers, the department increased the number of marked police cars in target areas; however, this enforcement proved to be sporadic. The number of vehicles and officers needed to have continuous visibility was impossible to meet. The street sellers, aware of the increase in patrol cars, devised a warning system that reported police in the area.

It was in response to the question of how to police the open air drug markets that the Birmingham police devised Operation "Street Sweep." This program allowed for long-term surveillance, identification, and arrest of suspects without jeopardizing the identities of undercover officers. Undercover police cars, equipped with video cameras and microphones, enabled the undercover officer to drive into target areas, make drug transactions, and leave with a videotape of the violation. The videotapes were later shown to patrol officers who were assigned to the drug infested areas and who identified suspects. The success of Street Sweep depended upon the ability of patrol officers to identify suspects. The program lasted 28 days and cost \$10,000; as a result, nearly all of the suspects were identified and prosecuted.

Armed with the success of Street Sweep, BPD applied to BJA for discretionary grant funds to continue and enhance the program. The new program, called Caine Break, began in October 1987 and continued through April 1990.

Project Goals and Objectives

Through the Caine Break program, BPD sought to combat the open-air drug trade through the arrest and prosecution of a substantial number of drug dealers and users and the imposition of monetary losses on offenders through automobile seizures. The police department based the Caine Break program on the theory that elimination of street drug sales would result in a general reduction of criminal activity in the city. The overall project

objective was to enhance the Street Sweep program. To accomplish this objective, the Birmingham Police Department set specific goals:

- Identify areas where street drug sales and related criminal activity are prevalent.
- Train patrol officers in narcotics investigations so that, at the project's conclusion, their training will be a permanent asset to the department.
- Create and mobilize a street drug task force continually to infiltrate and combat the street drug trade.
- Involve a specifically designated and trained deputy district attorney to ensure quality case management, expeditious drug analysis and prosecution, proper use of seizure condemnation procedures, and assistance in training officers chosen for the project.
- Quantitatively compare and analyze crime data statistics and citizen complaints both before and after project implementation to determine the impact of the project in the target areas.
- Conduct a victim impact study to measure the effectiveness of the project on the community's attitudes.

- Widely publicize the operation and its techniques at the project's conclusion to make citizens aware of the department's activities and to discourage sellers and buyers from making drug transactions by instilling fear that the person they are dealing with may be a police officer.

When the project funding was renewed in 1989, the department added an additional goal. This new goal was to streamline the judicial process and ensure better case presentation through vertical prosecution of defendants. To achieve this goal, the police department enlisted the help of the district attorney's office.

Caine Break was a different concept for BPD in that sellers and buyers of illegal narcotics were equally at risk for arrest. Through widely publicized buy-bust and sell-bust sweeps the police department was able to reduce the number of open-air drug markets. In addition, the police department hoped that this program would deter casual drug users.

Project Description

Under the Caine Break program, the first task was to determine the size and extent of the open-air drug trade problem. The police department developed a management information system that tracked citizen complaints, intelligence information gathered by patrol and narcotics officers, and offense reports in target areas. From this information, the police found that the largest concentrations of street dealers were found in and around public

housing complexes. Based on this effort, five primary target areas and nine secondary areas were identified for project implementation. After identification of the target areas, the program was separated into three phases that targeted specific individuals in the drug sale.

The phases are listed below.

Phase I: Target drug sellers.

Phase II: Target drug buyers.

Phase III: Target sellers and buyers simultaneously

Phase I—Undercover officers drove into the target areas in specially equipped cars to make drug transactions. The cars were customized to include hidden video cameras that recorded the transactions and an audio transmitting device that allowed surveillance officers to monitor the deals. After making and taping as many buys as possible in the target areas, the undercover officers would take the videotape to patrol officers. The patrol officers assigned to the target areas viewed the tape to identify suspects. This phase had a fairly high success rate because of the patrol officers' ability to identify a majority of suspects on the tapes.

The drugs purchased in the reverse stings were analyzed by a forensic specialist, and the police department began building the case against the offender. In each case, the undercover officers made two buys from the suspect to ensure that the offense was not an isolated incident. This second buy also enabled the police department to secure another videotape of the suspect. Finally, the deputy district attorney was consulted on each case prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant.

Phase II—Armed with a recently mandated statute that made it a Class B felony to solicit a controlled substance, the police department was able to plan Phase II, the targeting of buyers. With the help of the department's technical surveillance unit, a "boom box" radio was designed to contain a hidden video camera that undercover officers set on the ground while transactions occurred. The recording produced by this video recorder provided the corroboration needed to prove solicitation. Care was taken to train the undercover officers in the proper verbal exchange to avoid entrapping suspects.

After a solicitation was made, the officers directed the buyers to drive around the block while the officers went to get their stash. As buyers drove around the block, a marked patrol car stopped the vehicle to question the suspects. The patrol car was equipped with a video recorder that provided positive identification and recovery of the interview. After the interview was complete, the suspects were allowed to drive away.

Suspects identified from the tapes were arrested, and the police department seized the vehicles used by the suspects in the transactions. Phase II was completed 3 weeks after the mass arrests of drug sellers identified during phase I. Both events received extensive media coverage which contributed to the program's effect on street sales.

Phase III—Phase III combined the efforts of I and II, targeting both sellers and buyers. This phase was designed to include high profile buy-bust and sell-bust operations and immediate, on-the-scene arrests. The buy-bust and sell-bust operations were conducted intermittently

throughout the target area to deter drug sales and purchases. To keep the operation in the public spotlight, the media were periodically invited to ride along during the sweeps.

Since the inception of Caine Break, an additional strategy has been included in Phase III that targets both sellers and buyers simultaneously. An undercover officer is posted in a covert location where he or she can observe drug transactions. Once a transaction has occurred, other officers will arrest the offenders.

During all phases of the program, considerations were made as to officer safety and court presentation. All operations conducted by officers were under constant visual and video surveillance. To maintain a high profile of the arrests and also to protect the program's integrity and secrecy, all the cases made as a result of the program were brought before the grand jury.

Because of the creative planning of the BPD, the program can continue after grant funds have been exhausted. Under the project goals, the department stated that funds would be used to train street officers in narcotics investigations and also to create and mobilize a permanent street drug task force. By meeting each one of these goals, the department has created a means to address recurring problems with open-air drug markets.

Project Organization and Management

The Caine Break program involved a cooperative effort between law enforcement for identification and arrest of drug dealers and buyers, and prosecutors for speedy and effective case prosecution. To foster the cooperative effort, the city of Birmingham formed a task force to staff the program. When the Caine Break program began, BPD had 34 officers assigned to its vice and narcotics unit. To accomplish the program goals, manpower was borrowed from the patrol bureau. Fifty patrol officers were selected and trained for the program. In addition to the police officers, a specially trained deputy district attorney and forensic scientist who analyzed seized narcotics worked on the task force.

The patrol officers were first asked to volunteer for assignment to the task force. Final selections came from various shifts throughout the city with final approval by the project director. Each officer received training in several areas including the following:

- Search and seizure procedures.
- Search warrant exceptions.
- Use of the Miranda warning.
- Interviewing and interrogating techniques.
- Alabama Criminal Code (as it applied to the program).
- Undercover techniques.
- Surveillance techniques including audio and video surveillance.
- Drug recognition.
- Safe drug handling and packaging.
- "Chain of custody."
- Documentation.
- Safety issues.
- Liability issues.

On average, each officer received 8 hours of training, which was conducted during the officer's off-duty time.

The program ran in shifts that ranged from 4 to 6 hours and were rarely the same for any given time period. In other words, during the program, teams were in the field on every day of the week and at all times of the day and night. These random shifts helped avoid predictability.

Each team consisted of 7 police officers, creating several teams from the available 84 officers. One lieutenant from the vice and narcotics unit was designated the overall project director. Staff assignments within the team were as follows:

- One sergeant and two police officers worked undercover to make buys from dealers and sales to customers.
- One sergeant and one specially trained police officer operated the technical surveillance equipment.
- Two uniformed police officers served as a backup team.
- A designated deputy district attorney reviewed the evidence and case.

- A forensic specialist analyzed the substances seized in the buys.

Because of manpower constraints, all work on Caine Break was conducted on an overtime basis. Officers averaged 88 hours of overtime each.

The turnover rate of officers in the program was very low. Officers began working as undercover officers in the program. As an officer became more recognizable in the field, he or she was reassigned to one of the support positions. The rotation of officers within the task force helped keep interest in the program alive.

Summary of Successful Activities

Part of the program's goals included an assessment of crime rates, citizen complaints, and community attitude before and after the program. In the beginning, BPD estimated that 75 percent of all crimes committed in its jurisdiction were drug related. DUF data for 1990 showed that 64 percent of males arrested had used illegal drugs, indicating a slight decline in the number of drug-related crimes since 1988.

In addition to statistical indicators of the program's success, there are other indicators within the community that the program has had an impact on street sales of drugs. These indicators include the reappearance of children playing where dealers used to sell drugs, cleaner streets, and an overall increased sense of community pride.

Furthermore, project success can also be measured in terms of good media response. Both the *Birmingham News* and the *Birmingham Post-Herald* covered the project extensively, giving good reviews to the police department.

During the project, the Police Foundation, under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, evaluated the project. As part of its evaluation study, the Police Foundation conducted citizen surveys on the effectiveness of the programs and the police department in general. The study found that certain target areas had a higher level of success, particularly those where community policing tactics had been applied. However, overall, the results of the survey indicated that Birmingham residents have a positive attitude about police work in their neighborhoods.

Researchers for the Police Foundation examined three target areas: where the Caine Break Program had been implemented, where a door-to-door approach had been implemented, and where a control group had been designated. Assessment of the Caine Break Program was based primarily on data from the unit's drug arrests and qualitative findings resulting from onsite observations and interviews. Also, as part of the evaluation, the Police Foundation tracked the cases brought under the Caine Break program to see if the program helped strengthen the cases in court.

The focus of the evaluation study was to determine whether the Caine Break Program had had an effect on community attitudes about crime, drugs, police visibility, and others. To

make these determinations, the Police Foundation selected a random sample of citizens in each of the target areas. This citizen panel was interviewed on two occasions—before program implementation and 9 months after program implementation. The survey measured attitudes on the following issues:

- Drug trafficking problems in the area.
- Quality of life.
- Frequency of property crimes and violent crimes in the area.
- Nature and quality of police services.
- Feelings of safety and fear in the area.

Results of the citizen survey (administered after program implementation) showed that perceptions about drug trafficking in the community had improved. Half of the citizens surveyed noted that drug trafficking as a problem had decreased over the previous 6 months. In addition, the evaluation showed that the residents of the target areas had a good opinion of police activities in general.

In addition to the citizen surveys, the Police Foundation examined data on crimes against property and crimes against persons. The data showed that property crimes decreased slightly after the inception of Caine Break while violent crimes increased slightly. After the program ended, violent crimes in the target area dropped by more than 10 percent. Citywide, violent and property crimes both decreased while the program was in place. However, after the

Caine Break Program ended, violent crimes increased dramatically—by more than half—and property crimes increased slightly.

The Police Foundation's evaluation also included two other experimental approaches in Birmingham, not covered under the scope of the BJA grant: door-to-door contacts by police and establishment of a police substation in one area. Both these, like the BJA-funded program, were found to have some impact on crime in the target areas.

Among the biggest successes of the Caine Break Program was the use of video recording equipment to record transactions. This approach allowed for solid case building and helped eliminate the possibility of an entrapment defense. The Police Foundation noted in its recommendations that high-profile buy-bust operations, including a means for recording the transactions, should be coupled with community policing efforts to achieve a high rate of success.

**Long Beach Police Department
Long Beach, California**

Long Beach is located in southwestern California on the Pacific Ocean in Los Angeles County, immediately south of the city of Los Angeles. It covers an area of 49.8 square miles.

In 1990, Long Beach had a population of 429,433, an increase of 10 percent over the preproject year. Approximately 12 percent of the population is over 65, and 25 percent is under 18. Minorities compose slightly over 45 percent of the population: 27.5 percent are Hispanic and 18 percent are African American.

In 1990, a total of 41,272 Part I crimes were reported to the Long Beach Police Department (LBPD)—an increase of just over 19 percent from the preproject year. LBPD was staffed in 1990 by 641 sworn officers and 340 civilian employees. Despite the city's increase in population, sworn staffing was 3 percent lower than in the preproject year.

Project History

LBPD was awarded two Street Sales Enforcement grants by BJA. The first grant of \$399,590 was scheduled to cover the 18-month period extending from September 30, 1987, through March 31, 1989. A second followon BJA grant of \$150,000 to LBPD covered the next 15-month period. Over the 33-month period, LBPD received a total of \$549,590 from BJA.

LBPD faced a variety of drug-related problems that could be addressed by the implementation of a Street Sales Enforcement Program:

- The influx of Mexican heroin was a major problem in California. Multipound seizures of cocaine were becoming commonplace. PCP was a major problem, and the Los Angeles area was often referred to as the PCP capital of the world.

- Long Beach is the fifth largest city in California, its population near 400,000. It has many gateways for illegal drugs onto city streets—a major airport, harbor, and marinas.

- In 1986, LBPD arrested 5,262 persons for drug-related offenses; 584 of these arrests made by officers assigned to the drug investigations section were accomplished by search warrant or street buy-bust operations.

- The drug investigations section responded to approximately 250 citizen complaints per month. The staffing level did not permit a timely response. One of the goals of this program was to respond directly to these complaints.

- Because of the small number of officers assigned to the drug investigations section, street-level enforcement activity by trained narcotics officers has been extremely limited.

Project Goals and Objectives

LBPD proposed to approach street-level enforcement by creating two 2-officer uniformed field narcotics teams. These officers would be specially trained and expert in all phases of

narcotics investigations, capable of developing street-level informants, and completely knowledgeable about high narcotic activity areas. LBPDP requested grant funds to strengthen current police efforts targeted at street-level dealers and users of narcotics by implementing a street sales enforcement program tailored specifically for the Long Beach community.

Project Description

The original project plan placed the uniformed narcotic field teams in the drug investigations section. However, as the result of a December 1987 departmental reorganization—essentially before the project became operational—LBPDP management decided to transfer the responsibility for the street sales detail from the drug investigations section to the patrol bureau.

The original grant application requested funding for four officers and one clerk for the street sales team. After a closer review of needs, LBPDP management decided to supplement the unit with one sergeant and one additional police officer, both positions funded from the regular department budget. Thus, including the police lieutenant commanding the unit (also funded by the department), the street sales team was staffed with eight positions (one lieutenant, one sergeant, five police officers, and one clerk).

As the program evolved, the street sales team emphasized the implementation of the following program elements:

- Use of uniformed two-officer teams to identify and arrest narcotic users under the influence.
- Data collection and analysis to track project activities.
- Training and certification of uniformed officers as narcotics experts for testifying in court.
- Emphasis on early involvement of prosecutor and court functions to assure that citizen rights and system impact were protected.
- Deployment of street sales teams for ongoing investigations and arrests of street-level dealers and for responding to citizen complaints regarding drug sales activity and locations.
- Vigorous enforcement to arrest and convict addicts.
- Organization and deployment of mobile task forces to target those areas of the city where street sales of drugs had become blatant.
- Institution of undercover buy programs aimed at street retailers.
- Pursuit of asset seizure and forfeiture when practical.

- Coordination of project mission with forensic laboratory services.

Project Organization and Management

The street sales team was based in the Long Beach Police Academy Building. Assigned officers worked primarily in uniform and, depending on the complaint area, occasionally in plain clothes or undercover. The unit had a surveillance van, previously assigned to the narcotics detail, to assist in its undercover activities. This unit worked very closely with the gang violence unit because street gangs were heavily engaged in the sales of crack cocaine.

Grant funds were provided for radio equipment, vehicles, weapons, office supplies, and computer support. Problems were encountered with the security encryption devices on the radio equipment being purchased; they were not resolved during the initial grant period. A little-used city public service frequency was provided LBPD during this period, and it proved adequate for its needs.

The project director, a police lieutenant, reported directly to the commander of the patrol metropolitan division. A police sergeant, who was assisted by a clerk typist, was responsible for day-to-day supervision of the team and administration of the grants. Part-time assistance was provided by a statistician and a programmer.

Project Activities

In responding to complaints, the street sales team engaged in six basic types of enforcement and enforcement related activities:

- Surveillance.
- Undercover buy-bust operations.
- Informant introduction.
- Reverse sting operation.
- Knock and talk.
- High-profile area saturation.

Each of these activities will be described briefly below, based on a variety of materials prepared by LBPD, particularly a report entitled "Street Sales Enforcement Team: The Long Beach Police Department, January 1990."

Surveillance activities. The street sales teams engaged in a wide range of creative and effective surveillance activities to identify drug enforcement targets and locations. Examples included the use of plain vans with smoked glass windows, rooftops, common (nonprivate) areas, balconies, trees, and construction sites. They also used citizens' houses, yards, and fence lines to conceal officers. Bicycles were used to survey unusually awkward areas or ones that needed to be examined at slower speeds. A diverse array of disguises were used by

officers (such as dressing as a bum carrying a paper sack or carrying a trash bag full of aluminum cans, faking a car stall with the hood up, working as a laborer with tools, etc.).

The unit also used a city public service boom-truck to obtain a high vantage point from which to survey an area which otherwise had been impossible to openly approach. The boom truck and city uniform worked well and appeared to go unnoticed by the drug dealers. These surveillance activities (which frequently involved videotaping of drug transactions) were vital for establishing the existence of a drug problem for warrants, for operational planning, for charging, and for testimony purposes.

Undercover buy-bust. LBPD has used traditional buy-bust enforcement techniques for many years. The street sales teams used bicycles, facial and wig disguises, undercover vehicles, and recorded or photocopied money to conduct these operations. The procedure is valuable because it enabled officers to compose affidavits for probable cause search warrants to search houses or apartments from which drugs were being sold. Use of this procedure required that the drug buyer be identified, arrested, searched, and found to be in possession of drugs before a dealer was arrested. The officers preferred not to use a citizen's house, private yard, or balcony because of recent court decisions that have demanded that the police reveal the name of the person who gave permission to the police to use a privately owned location and the exact location from which the surveillance was conducted. Forcing complaining citizens to come forward in gang-dominated areas may endanger the citizens' lives and could discourage others from providing police with necessary information.

Informant introductions. The officers had the most success in using informants solely for introducing the undercover officer to a drug dealer; they preferred to dismiss informants from any further role. All street undercover buy transactions were monitored by officers hiding in the immediate vicinity to monitor the action and call in the arrest teams when needed. All currency used was photocopied and time stamped before deals were made. If the money was recovered, it was again photocopied, and the new photocopy was time stamped. Officers found this procedure useful for later court testimony. In short, the sole purpose of the use of informants was to enable one of their officers to gain acceptance by dealers to allow them to purchase the drugs.

Reverse sting operations. LBPD usually focused its reverse sting operations on locations that had a long and persistent history of drug dealing and were resistant to normal police enforcement methods. The basic procedure used was to make undercover drug purchases from dealers in an area, use arrest teams to arrest the dealers immediately after such sales, and send in police undercover drug sellers to set up shop and use arrest and support teams to make subsequent arrests of drug buyers for possession. Early in the program, LBPD used a court order to obtain a kilo of confiscated cocaine. A laboratory criminalist then reduced the cocaine hydrochloride to cocaine base (crack), which was then tested and found to be 90 percent pure. This crack cocaine was used bit by bit during LBPD's reverse stings. In these efforts, the police seller wore a body wire, which transmits conversations to a nearby location where it is recorded. Each buyer was given a number in sequence, and that information was recorded on tape by the undercover officer following the sale. A large

transport van was used for field booking of arrestees. When the van reached capacity, prisoners were taken to jail for further processing. These reverse sting operations required extensive manpower, and the street sales teams were supported by officers from throughout LBPB.

Knock-and-talk. The knock-and-talk scheme simply involved police officers knocking on the door of a suspected drug sales residence, telling the occupants that the police had received information that drug selling was going on at the location, and asking to come in to talk about it. More often than one would expect, the officers were invited in. Once inside, the officers continued to claim that they were only interested in illegal activity and wanted to clear up the complaint. The officers then asked for permission to search the house for drugs. If consent was given, a legally responsible occupant signed a statement of permission before the search commenced. LBPB reported that many arrests and drug seizures resulted from this simple but surprisingly effective method. LBPB also developed specific written procedures to guide this type of operation.

High-profile saturation. This method basically involved a combination of some or all of the activities described above and consisted of an all-out assault on a location that was highly resistant to police control efforts. This procedure, besides being costly, was reserved for only those locations characterized by blatant and overt street drug sales.

High-profile saturation first involved flooding the area with marked police units operating in a high visibility mode. Uniformed officers completed field interview (FI) cards and took Polaroid photographs of everyone present on the street. At the same time, undercover officers were sent into the area to purchase drugs from as many different dealers as possible. When purchases were complete, the undercover officers looked at the photographs and FI cards and identified every dealer who sold drugs to them. Crime reports naming the suspects were then filed.

When that phase was complete, uniformed officers again entered the area in force with a list of identified suspects. As many as possible were found and arrested and booked on the basis of the crime reports, photographs, and FI cards. The LBPB would end the high-profile saturation with a reverse sting operation. If the problem resurfaced, the street sales teams once again entered the area and began taking pictures. When word of this activity got out, LBPB notes that it was surprising how fast the drug trafficking subsided.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

Some of the more salient examples of LBPB's successful project activities are summarized below:

- Street sales teams provided LBPB with a highly effective means of responding to complaints from both individual citizens and members of the city council about drug

problems in the neighborhoods of this community. SSED has proved to be so valuable that when the grant ended, the program was institutionalized with municipal funds.

- LBPD met almost all of its grant enforcement objectives. The plan was to address five drug complaints per month. In fact, 380 complaints were addressed, or an average of 15.8 such complaints per month. During the grant period, the unit accounted for 377 felony and 49 misdemeanor arrests—the vast majority on drug-related charges.

- LBPD now has the capability to rapidly deploy an experienced and effective street-level drug enforcement team against street-level retail drug dealers. This capability was not present to the degree needed prior to these grants.

- LBPD now has a trained cadre of uniformed narcotics enforcement experts with the capability to develop and present expert testimony in court.

- LBPD successfully adapted, tested, implemented, and evaluated a wide range of drug enforcement methods targeted at street-level drug dealers. Particularly noteworthy are the applications of the high profile saturation technique, the reverse sting operation, and the knock-and-talk method.

Oakland Police Department Oakland, California

Oakland covers 79 square miles and has an approximate population of 370,000. The city is located in the San Francisco Bay Area, a vast metropolitan region populated by well over 5 million people.

Oakland's population is racially diverse: 45 percent African American, 37 percent Caucasian, 10 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent Asian.

At the outset of this project in 1988, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) budget was approximately \$80 million. This budget provided for a staffing of 677 sworn officers and 425 civilian employees. However, because of budgetary problems, actual staffing was closer to 635 police officers and 330 civilians. By fiscal year 1990-91, OPD's budget had increased to \$95 million and its authorized staffing to 714 sworn officers and 440 civilians. Again, actual staffing did not approach these levels because of budget problems.

Oakland has long confronted serious drug and narcotics problems and has pursued a wide range of law enforcement strategies to deal with these problems. Noteworthy efforts include a special downtown patrol initiative designed at alleviating the fear of crime in the central business district.

A principal tactic used by uniformed officers, both in the central business district and other areas of the city, was the use of Section 11550 of the California Health and Safety Code because its application does not require undercover or surveillance activity. This section of the code permits officers to arrest persons who are under the influence of drugs in public places. Conviction brings a mandatory 90-day jail sentence.

In addition to the normal range of narcotics unit efforts targeted at major drug dealers, the police department established a street-level drug trafficking enforcement unit in 1984. Special duty unit number 2 (SDU-2), consisting of 1 sergeant and 12 police officers, employed a variety of techniques to identify and arrest drug dealers and buyers. These techniques ranged from quick buy-bust arrests to highly visible and concentrated drug patrols. Officers directed their attention to key trouble spots identified by beat officers, individual citizens, and representatives of community organizations.

While such strategies had a favorable impact in some neighborhoods, drug dealers simply resumed their activities in other sections of the city. In addition, the sheer volume of citizen complaints calling for immediate drug enforcement action had simply overwhelmed SDU-2, the vice/narcotics unit, and all other units of the department. This situation led directly to the preparation of the grant application that resulted in the establishment of SDU-3 with BJA funds.

Project History

On September 30, 1987, OPD was awarded a \$299,826 BJA grant. The award was for a 15-month period ending December 31, 1988. After the initial grant was extended through March 1989, a followon BJA grant of \$150,000 was made to OPD to continue the street sales enforcement project through the remainder of 1989.

Oakland cited the following circumstances in describing its need for this project:

- Illegal drug trafficking, particularly at the street level, was a problem of extraordinary proportion in Oakland. Serious and determined efforts were undertaken to control the activity, but had limited impact principally because the police department lacked the resources needed to initiate and maintain new enforcement strategies.
- The city faced the problems of urban decay, fear of crime, actual violent crime, and a strong presence of drug dealers on the street. Drug dealers continued to be a major concern in the city because of the flagrant and open manner in which they operated and because of the violence associated with their activities.
- Citizen complaints about drug transactions in various neighborhoods were heard constantly, and many people lived in fear. About 28 percent, or 33 of the 117 homicides

committed in Oakland in 1984, were believed to be drug-related. By 1986, the number of homicides had risen to 146.

- Compounding these difficulties were the manpower constraints faced by OPD. Compared to similar-sized cities (250,000 and above), Oakland ranked among the top five in homicides, robberies, and burglaries per officer.

- Despite extensive OPD drug enforcement efforts, drug problems continued. While the tactics clearly had a favorable impact in some neighborhoods, drug dealers resumed their efforts in other sections of the city. Moreover, the sheer volume of complaints and the number of places calling for immediate enforcement action simply overwhelmed SDU-2, the vice control division, and all other units of the department.

Project Goals and Objectives

The chief of police, in the transmittal letter to BJA accompanying the department's application for the grant, stressed that the proposed project would “. . . serve as an excellent model to evaluate citizen participation and various enforcement strategies on street-level drug trafficking.” The project had three specific goals:

1. Reduce street dealing in the area of SDU-3's deployment.

2. Increase citizen interaction and cooperation with the police.
3. Improve the quality of life in those neighborhoods where grant-funded officers were assigned.

The operational goals and objectives were as follows:

- Establish an information campaign to inform citizens about the department's efforts to combat street drug trafficking and to solicit their cooperation and assistance.
- Establish a special unit of officers (SDU-3) to undertake a buy-bust program exclusively in selected concentrated geographical areas of Oakland.
- Develop a drug hotline and door-to-door informational campaign to increase police street-level drug enforcement deployment against drug sellers.

Project Description

The proposed project had two key components: expansion of police-community interaction and establishment of SDU-3.

Expansion of police-community interaction. Under this component, OPD established an information campaign to acquaint the community with the department's efforts to combat street drug trafficking. Specifically, OPD representatives made door-to-door contacts at households in targeted areas to inform citizens that an OPD telephone drug hotline existed and how to use the telephone system, that the police would respond to any complaints received on this line, that citizens could report street drug activity, and that any drug-related complaint to OPD would be treated confidentially and the complainant's anonymity protected.

Establishment of special duty unit #3 (SDU-3). As centerpiece of the proposed project, OPD established a six-officer unit (five police officers and one sergeant) to implement a street-level buy-bust program in defined geographical areas. Specifically, this SDU-3 would respond promptly to citizen calls regarding drug activity in these areas. As noted in its application, ". . . at present complaints are received in a variety of OPD units and on a drug hotline that records calls when officers are not on duty. Response to these complaints is typically delayed because of the urgency of more immediate service demands. Because feedback to the complainants is sporadic and inconsistent, public satisfaction and confidence is diminished and important information about drug activities is lost. A special unit that responds quickly and efficiently to drug-related calls may counteract these negative attitudes."

What was also unique about the Oakland project was that it was based on a specific field experiment design that would permit a Police Foundation evaluation funded by the National Institute of Justice.

As part of the experimental approach, four areas of the city similar in size and demographic characteristics were identified. These neighborhoods were targeted for increased police-citizen interaction and for different operational drug-enforcement strategies. One neighborhood area was identified as a control area, where current police operations were maintained at preexperimental levels. In a second area, the door-to-door informational campaign was added to the conventional preexperimental strategies. In the third area, the concentrated SDU-3 effort was added to the conventional strategies. Finally, in the fourth area, both the door-to-door informational campaign and the concentrated SDU-3 activity were added.

After 6 months of project effort , the areas were rotated and the experiment duplicated for 6 more months.

The experiment officially ended after the initial grant. However, BJA awarded OPD an additional \$150,000 to extend the life of the project beyond the original 15-month commitment. The Police Foundation's involvement was not extended, and its participation in the project ended in June 1989.

BJA funds granted to OPD, with the exception of \$2,500 for printing project material, were allocated almost exclusively for payment of officer overtime expenses. All other project-related costs were borne by OPD.

Project Organization and Management

The drug enforcement unit SDU-3 was assigned to the patrol division's 4th platoon. That platoon, commanded by a police captain, contained all the specialized patrol division units, including the felony suppression unit, foot patrol officers, an existing street drug enforcement unit (SDU-2), the helicopter unit, airport security, animal control unit, evidence technicians, canine units, and police reserves.

Day-to-day project administration and coordination was the responsibility of a sergeant, who was also responsible for direct supervision of SDU-3. The project also had a technical adviser—a lieutenant who commanded the vice division. Because this project was also a field experiment, the individuals listed were also responsible for consulting and coordinating project activities with the Police Foundation evaluation team about implementation of the experimental design.

Another useful project tool, though not funded through this grant, was OPD's beat health unit. This unit, established in 1988, was effective in closing down crackhouses through application of local ordinances related to drug nuisance abatement in cooperation with the

county health department, the city building department, the fire department, and the public utility agencies. This unit supplemented direct enforcement efforts by initiating actions against individuals who let dwellings deteriorate to the point of being unsafe and unfit for human habitation.

Project Activities

Preliminary planning and implementation. During the initial phase of the project, police department staff engaged in the following activities to prepare for field implementation:

- Selecting one sergeant and five officers for SDU-3.
- Selecting the four target areas for drug enforcement.
- Conducting baseline citizen interviews in target areas.
- Developing forms/procedures for recording of baseline and experimental data.
- Developing the citizen information pamphlet and the procedure for distribution.

Some initial delays in conducting these activities were encountered because of manpower and equipment constraints and resulted in the planning phase extending into the second quarter of

the project. OPD recognized early that these delays would necessitate an extension of the grant project by 3 months.

Selection and training of SDU-3 officers. The selection of officers to staff SDU-3 was based on a review of personnel evaluation forms, internal affairs section complaints, sick time usage, and other measures of officer performance. An individual passing this screening was invited to an oral board where the officer's background, interest in the assignment, and performance in hypothetical situations were evaluated. This resulted in a rank-ordered listing from which the five officers to be assigned to SDU-3 were drawn.

Training was provided by the SDU-3 supervising sergeant and by instructors from the narcotics unit of the vice division. Additionally, during the course of the project, SDU-3 officers were provided with training sponsored by DEA, and several undercover officers attended training sponsored by the Los Angeles Police Department.

The first month of officer assignment to SDU-3 was used for both formal and field-based training. As there were only five line police officers assigned to the unit, they operated in two 2-officer teams and one 1-officer team. During the training and startup period, it became apparent that the single officer could not operate safely and efficiently using the tactics chosen for implementation by SDU-3. Consequently, using its own funds, OPD added a sixth officer to the unit, thus permitting the deployment of three 2-officer teams. The same problem would arise when an officer was on vacation. To preclude this problem, money

originally allocated for clerical support was reprogrammed to fill vacation positions on an overtime basis.

Enforcement activities. SDU-3 officially began its enforcement activities in May 1988.

During the first month of implementation, high visibility patrol was the only form of unit activity. Basically, the officers were allowed to patrol the target areas and stop suspicious persons, make arrests, and disrupt any drug dealing they encountered.

Arrests initially made by the unit were not meeting screening standards. Only 47 percent of the arrests were being charged.

The department took these steps to counter its problems: special training in narcotics report preparation was provided SDU-3 team members by an assistant district attorney, and report writing procedures were corrected to conform to the district attorney's standards; closer supervision of unit activities by the team sergeant was also imposed; and alternative buy-bust tactics in addition to high visibility efforts were used.

The Police Foundation's experimental design called for door-to-door distribution of information pamphlets in selected target areas. OPD initially assigned this task to police service technicians, but this activity conflicted with their other duties. A temporary solution was found by assigning a light-duty police officer to all interview and distribution activities.

SDU-3 was deployed to intensify the application of buy-bust techniques in two of the four target areas. Based on drug-hotline or anonymous tips, patrol officer observations, or SDU-3 surveillance, the team sergeant designated the areas for enforcement within the target areas and assigned officers to individual tasks.

Two officers made up the buy team and were dressed in undercover garb. These officers were given marked bills to make buys—mostly crack cocaine, although the unit would go after whatever drugs were offered for sale. During the initial months of the project, these officers drove around in a beat-up vehicle and made buys on street corners, in front of motels, houses, or stores located in residential areas.

The other four officers made up the arrest team. They wore civilian clothing but also carried blue windbreakers that were clearly marked "Oakland Police." These officers drove semimarked police vehicles. They stationed themselves within striking distance, about four to five blocks, from buy locations. The buy and arrest teams were in constant contact via portable radios.

The buy team was responsible for locating the dealers, informing the backup team of its location, and making the buy from the seller. If a deal could not be made, the whole team simply moved to another location.

If a buy transpired, the arrest team was immediately notified and moved in as rapidly as possible to make the arrests. This technique, called "swooping," usually caught the dealers by surprise. If buyers were at the locale, they were arrested along with the dealers. These operations, from start to finish, normally took no more than 5 to 10 minutes and were visible to any citizens in the vicinity. After six to eight arrests, a police wagon was called to take the suspects to jail.

To counteract street dealers' awareness of SDU-3 efforts, the team sergeant rotated in new officers to serve as buyers. Different vehicles were also used by the buy officers, including a city van, a Volkswagen van, a U-Haul truck, a camper, and a taxi. Other tactics, including the use of confidential informants for buys, search warrants, recruitment of informants, and high visibility patrol were employed as appropriate.

Here are brief descriptions of SDU-3's more significant operations during the course of this project:

- A seizure of 2.5 ounces of crack cocaine along with \$7,000 of seized drug moneys caused almost complete elimination of drug street sales in the 3400 block of Chestnut.

- The arrest of a major supplier at 34th and Hollis Streets drastically reduced the availability of street drugs at that location. The arrest stemmed from a hand-to-hand sale of narcotics with the dealer.

■ At 13th and Peralta Streets, a long-term undercover buy operation was conducted, and 35 undercover heroin buys were made from street dealers. Arrest warrants were obtained, and a sweep of the area was made with all suspects arrested. Over 90 percent of those arrested received State prison terms.

■ Surveillance between the 2400 and 3300 blocks of Martin Luther King, Jr. Way led to the arrest of an individual responsible for dropping off ounce weights of crack cocaine to street dealers.

■ At 59th and Stanford Streets, response to a citizen complaint led to disruption of a well-organized heroin operation. The operation was under the control of the Black Guerrilla Family prison gang. Surveillance of the location resulted in a search warrant that, in turn, produced numerous arrests, drug, and weapons seizures.

In 21 months of operation, this unit accounted for 3,057 narcotics and narcotics-related arrests. Charging rates for SDU-3 cases averaged 80 percent, and conviction rates were over 90 percent, according to OPD's final report.

Beat health unit. While not directly part of the project, the creation of the Oakland Police Department's beat health unit was initiated largely because of the problems generated by the crack cocaine epidemic in the city. Officers assigned to the special duty units were arresting persons who resided in crackhouses, which were frequently abandoned, burned out, or

generally substandard. Once released, these individuals would often resume their illegal activities in such dwellings.

In early 1988, one patrol supervisor became interested in the use of ordinances, building and housing code regulations, and the public utility code provisions as a means of resolving the problem of crackhouses in his patrol district. As his knowledge of the use of these codes, regulations, and provisions grew and his efforts to close such dwellings became more successful, this sergeant began to work closely but informally with SDU supervisors. These sergeants would refer specific locations to this beat health sergeant for action. In October 1988, this sergeant was placed in charge of the citywide beat health unit.

Since that time, through early 1990, the beat health unit was involved in 417 crackhouse problems. Of these 417 projects, 182 were completed by January 1990, and 232 were in progress. Another 400 complaints were awaiting action. In each of the 182 locations where abatement action had been completed, there had not been a single instance of a return by drug dealers.

With the success of the beat health project, the SDU-3 developed an approach to street sales enforcement which first focuses on the actual sale of narcotics. Once that phase is complete, SDU-3 coordinates with the beat health unit and city inspectional officers to address housing and health code violations at the seller's residence. Services of utility providers are also

employed when it is suspected that power is being stolen (i.e., in the case of abandoned buildings) or is incorrectly connected.

Summary of Successful Activities

OPD's use of a comprehensive screening process to select only experienced proactive officers for SDU-3 contributed greatly to the productivity of this unit. SDU-3 demonstrated that a concentrated enforcement effort in discrete geographical areas can effect a major impact on street-level drug dealing.

The sequential integration of the enforcement efforts of SDU-3 with that of the abatement efforts of the beat health unit represented an effective strategy for coping with the problem of crackhouses.

SDU-3 provided the department with the capability to rapidly respond to citizen complaints of street-level drug dealing problems.

**Orlando Police Department
Orlando, Florida**

Orlando, Florida, is one of the fastest growing cities in the Nation. Approximately 160,000 people live within the city limits, but each day the population swells to well over 250,000 as people come to Orlando for work and tourism. Orlando is home to many of the top tourist destinations in the world, including Disneyworld, Epcot, Sea World, and Universal Studios. It is estimated that 15 million passengers used Orlando International Airport in 1989.

The tremendous growth experienced by Orlando has brought not only economic prosperity but also a significant increase in street drug dealing. Individuals displaced from other areas of the country, mostly South Florida, found Orlando easily accessible and a perfect place to expand the highly profitable street drug enterprise.

Orlando was first introduced to crack cocaine during the summer of 1985. A loosely organized group of young males from the Miami area began showing up on the streets of Orlando and dealing this relatively new form of cocaine.

With this group came a serious problem for the police department in the community. Major crimes such as robbery, assaults, and drug-related homicides increased drastically. In 1986, assaults increased by 8 percent while robberies increased by 37 percent. In 1987, drug-related homicides doubled compared to 1985 and 1986. The street drug problem also

worsened because of the influx of illegal aliens, mostly Haitians and Jamaicans, who dealt drugs. Some sections of Orlando developed into drug problem areas.

Driveup drug sales were common, and the number of dealers often outnumbered the law-abiding citizens in some apartment complexes. Citizens in these areas complained that for the first time in their lives they actually were afraid to walk the streets in their neighborhoods. This fear prompted a barrage of citizen complaints to the police department about street drug dealing

During the mid-seventies and early eighties, most drug enforcement efforts in Orlando were focused on interdicting drugs moved by key suppliers and traffickers. Regional multiagency task forces, including those of Orlando's Metropolitan Bureau of Investigation and the DEA, were created to impact major drug networks. Street drug enforcement was deemphasized to allow manpower and resources to be shifted towards bigger targets for prosecution.

Project History

The Orlando Police Department (OPD) created a street drug unit in October 1985 to deal with the problem of crack cocaine. The effectiveness of this unit was severely hampered by a lack of support personnel, equipment, and appropriate budget. In response to this problem, OPD's drug enforcement division applied for a street sales enforcement grant from the BJA.

A \$359,903 discretionary grant was awarded OPD on October 1, 1987, but implementation did not begin until late December 1987. In June 1989, the department was awarded an additional \$150,000 to continue the street sales narcotics enforcement program through September 30, 1990. This brought the total amount of grant funds awarded to the program to \$509,903.

Project Goals and Objectives

The goals of OPD's Street Sales Enforcement Program were as follows:

- Identification of operational targets through analysis and automation of drug intelligence information.
- Response to 100 percent of citizen complaints concerning street drug violations.
- Arrest and prosecution of street drug dealers and the seizure of their drug-related assets.
- Arrest and prosecution of drug addicts and the seizure of drug-related assets.
- Arrest and prosecution of street drug retailers and seizure of drug-related assets.
- Formal training of all officers assigned to OPD's Drug Enforcement Division.

Project Description

Funds from the Street Sales Enforcement Program were expended in three major categories: personnel, equipment, and confidential funds.

Personnel. The grant funded three civilian support positions. The first position was an evidence prosecution coordinator who had the following duties:

- Assisting drug agents with evidence at search warrants and major enforcement operations.
- Entering all arrestees' names in a computer and tracking each case through the criminal justice system to conviction.
- Maintaining the drug hotline and computerizing files on all citizen drug complaints.
- Computerizing and maintenance of grant equipment inventory.

Another position, forfeiture attorney legal adviser, was filled when the workload generated by the heavy volume of arrests increased. This person's duties were processing all forfeitures, reviewing search and arrest warrants, and providing legal research and advice to the drug units.

The third grant-funded position was a secretary who provided clerical support for the drug units. In April 1989, the drug enforcement division doubled in size with the addition of the uniform drug section to work on the grant project. The section consisted of 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, and 10 officers.

Confidential funds. Funds were used to purchase evidence (drugs) during buy-bust operations. A portion of the funds was also used to pay informants small amounts of money for information about drug-related crime.

Equipment. At the time of the grant application in early 1987, OPD's street drug unit had only been in existence a short time. The unit had very little support equipment and no automated files. Because of this, purchase of equipment and automation was a primary goal of the grant program. The following is a partial list of the major equipment purchased with grant funds.

Computer equipment.

Van.

Rental cars.

Cellular phones.

Body microphones.

Camera equipment.

Video equipment.

Surveillance equipment.

Project Activities

The grant funds were used to increase the drug enforcement division's effectiveness in combating street drug crimes by controlling areas of concentrated drug sales and investigating and arresting drug retailers who supplied street dealers with drugs.

Also targeted were drug users who purchased drugs on the street and who often became victims of drug-related crimes from theft to homicide. A goal of the department was to arrest these individuals and to seize all drug-related assets. To accomplish this goal, the department used several different types of enforcement activities, which are outlined in the following sections.

Buy-bust operation. This type of operation was conducted on almost a daily basis and was one of the most frequently used enforcement tactics. Undercover officers drove to areas known for street drug sales or areas where citizens' complaints had been received. The undercover officers' activities were monitored via a body bug by the undercover supervisor and other undercover agents. As the officer approached a location to buy, the uniform drug supervisor set a cordon around the area. As a purchase was made, the undercover officer relayed a description of the suspects, and the uniform units moved in and made the arrest while the undercover officer left the area. This procedure continued throughout the shift, resulting in numerous arrests for the sale and delivery of cocaine.

Video buy operation. In many areas of the city, especially high density housing projects, traditional buy-bust operations resulted in low apprehension rates because of the inability of takedown teams to get close to suspects without being spotted by lookouts and other drug dealers. In some areas, dealers would run and change clothes immediately upon completing a drug transaction. To combat this problem, undercover drug units began videotaping drug buys by using hidden cameras located within the undercover vehicle. After completion of several buys at one location, undercover officers contacted uniform district officers and neighborhood team officers to view the videotapes and identify the suspects.

Uniformed officers would then arrest dealers on a random basis. Using this program, apprehension rates increased to approximately 90 percent. Another advantage of this program was that it also helped to maintain cover for the undercover officer and required many fewer changes in undercover vehicles.

Search warrants. In response to citizen complaints or information about drug sales from residents, drug agents made direct or informant buys and obtained search warrants for the targeted premises. This type of activity was considered somewhat less effective than direct buys because of the problem of proving constructive possession, but was a necessary tool used to combat drug sales from inside individual residences and apartments.

Reverse stings. There appeared to be an unlimited supply of drug dealers in certain areas of the city. No matter how many dealers were arrested from a few specific locations, there were

always others to take their place. When a location like this developed, the only answer was to conduct a reverse sting to arrest drug buyers. Undercover officers posing as drug dealers sold drugs to buyers who were then arrested, and their assets were seized for forfeiture. With proper publicity, through the media, drug addicts became wary about approaching target locations. When no buyers showed up, the dealers went elsewhere. This enforcement program also helped reduce other drug-related crimes in and around the target area.

Substantial assistance program (informants). To arrest major drug traffickers, law enforcement must obtain assistance from lower level drug dealers who have been arrested and are willing to help arrest and prosecute their suppliers in exchange for certain considerations at sentencing. The department, in cooperation with the State Attorney's Offices, used substantial assistance agreements with arrested defendants in accordance with Florida law. Contracts were written requiring defendants to plead guilty to earlier offenses and to assist law enforcement with the arrest of certain major traffickers and the seizure of specific amounts of drugs.

Roadblock operations. Roadblock operations were conducted by the uniform drug section in known high drug areas. The primary purpose of this operation was to systematically stop all vehicles and check drivers' licenses and inspect vehicle equipment. Officers conducting this operation made numerous arrests for drug violations and seized large amounts of contraband and vehicles for forfeiture.

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms task force. OPD's drug unit and the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) agreed to join forces to target armed and violent drug dealers. A Federal ATF agent was assigned to work full-time with the OPD drug unit.

The objective was to form a joint task force to target armed drug dealers and file charges through the Federal courts using new Federal laws that required mandatory sentencing for drug dealers using firearms. In one case, a local drug dealer received 55 years in Federal prison with no chance of parole on drug violations that would have netted him less than 5 years in the State system.

Drug taxation program. The Florida Department of Revenue developed a plan to levy a State sales tax on the street value of drugs seized from drug traffickers. Drug agents worked directly with Department of Revenue officials to tax all defendants charged with trafficking in drugs.

Nuisance Abatement Board. Orlando created a Nuisance Abatement Board to hear complaints alleging that a given place or premise constituted a public nuisance if it had been used on more than two occasions as the site of an unlawful sale or delivery of a controlled substance. If the board found the existence of a public nuisance site, it entered an order prohibiting the conduct, operation, or maintenance of any business or activity that was

conducive to such nuisance. Failure to comply with the board's order was cause for the board to seek from the circuit court a permanent injunction against any nuisance.

City zoning and code enforcement. The police department worked closely with city zoning and code enforcement officials to target buildings that were continually used for drug sales and use. Several abandoned houses were leveled, and other areas were rid of drug dealing by the property owners after being cited for code violations.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

In calendar year 1987, prior to the Street Sales Enforcement Program, 10 drug agents assigned to the street drug unit made 352 drug arrests and 12 trafficking cases, and seized just under 4 kilos of cocaine. In 1988, the same 10 drug agents, with the assistance of grant resources, made 792 drug arrests and 42 trafficking cases against drug retailers, and seized over 8 kilos of cocaine. Federal assistance resulted in a 56 percent increase in drug arrests, a 71 percent increase in trafficking cases, and a 52 percent increase in the amount of cocaine seized. In 1989 the same success was enjoyed with increased arrests and seizure statistics.

Other indicators of success are not as easily measured as arrest and seizure statistics. In 1986, Orlando began to lose control of certain areas of the city because of sales and use of crack cocaine. Violent crime continued to rise, and the sound of gun fire was commonplace.

To ensure officer safety, teams of four to six officers were being dispatched to calls in these areas.

Through Federal grant assistance and commitment of OPD, these drug areas have been reclaimed.

Orlando continues to have a drug problem with no permanent solution in sight, but the police department has been able to gain control of the streets. Drug dealers are not allowed to rule a particular apartment complex or street corner. Each time drug sales begin to build in an area, drug agents and uniform officers saturate the area with the ultimate goal of controlling the streets.

There has also been a change in attitude toward the police department. In years past, drug agents were often the target of rocks and bottles thrown by bystanders at arrest and search warrant scenes. Recently, officers have been greeted by cheers and applause instead of rocks and bottles. An attitude of support and assistance has replaced resentment and hatred.

The Street Sales Enforcement Grant awarded to Orlando came at one of the most critical times in the city's history. The emergence of crack cocaine and the subsequent transformation of neighborhoods from minor problem areas to war zones seemed to hit all at once. Through the cooperative effort of OPD and BJA with the use of Federal funds, Orlando has regained control of the streets and neighborhoods.

**District Attorney of New Orleans
Orleans Parish, New Orleans, Louisiana**

The Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office is responsible for prosecuting all cases arising from violations of Louisiana criminal law in the Parish of Orleans, whose boundaries are the same as those of the city of New Orleans. In 1987, the DA's office was staffed by 181 employees, including 65 attorneys.

The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) has a staff of 1,300 police officers. In 1987, only 15 officers were assigned to the narcotics unit. In 1988, this was increased to 49. Beginning in November 1987, tactical units from each NOPD patrol district were reassigned to the NOPD's special operations division to work street-level drug problems. Originally, this was to be a temporary assignment, but it was continued throughout the grant period. These assignments involved as many as 125 police officers.

Project History

The District Attorney of New Orleans was awarded two BJA grants to create a strike force. The first grant award was for \$418,476 and covered the period from September 30, 1987, to March 1989. The second award was for \$150,000 and covered the period, with extensions, from April 1, 1989, to June 30, 1990. This was the only BJA street sales enforcement grant

that was awarded to a DA's office. All other grants were awarded directly to police departments.

The drug-related problems facing this jurisdiction before the grant award were described by New Orleans officials as follows:

- New Orleans, the largest city in Louisiana, was the focal point of illicit drug activity in this State. Between January 1, 1986, and June 30, 1986, 1,232 defendants were charged with drug violations by the Orleans Parish Grand Jury and the Orleans Parish DA's office. NOPD made 1,500 drug arrests during that same period.

- Fully half of all drug arrests in Louisiana occurred in New Orleans.

- Budgetary constraints severely hampered all efforts to effectively combat drug abuse and trafficking in New Orleans. The collapse of Louisiana's oil-based economy eliminated any possibility of adequate funding for the NOPD's narcotics division and the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, and forced both agencies to operate on shoestring budgets.

- NOPD's Narcotics Division was staffed by an inadequate force of 15 detectives. These officers had access to only three patrol vehicles and had no electronic or technical equipment to assist them on surveillances or undercover operations.

- The DA's office had also been severely handicapped in its efforts to effectively prosecute drug cases. The DA's office's operating budget decreased by 43 percent between 1982 and 1986. Only one assistant district attorney was assigned exclusively to narcotics prosecutions.

In response to these conditions, the District Attorney's office proposed to BJA the implementation of a joint police/prosecutor narcotics strike force project (NSFP). The NSFP was designed to focus directly on street-level drug problems. As described in its application, NSFP was aimed to ". . . immediately impact the unique street-level narcotics problem in our city." The application noted that the proposed project had been presented to all component agencies of the Orleans Parish criminal justice system and was endorsed as a sound and well-reasoned initiative.

Project Goals and Objectives

The overall goal of the New Orleans project was to demonstrate effective police efforts to target street-level narcotics dealers and buyers through effective planning, investigation, and prosecution. Subordinate project process objectives included the following:

- Institution of data collection and analysis.
- Early involvement of prosecution and court functions.

- Training and use of street teams and task forces.
- Implementation of undercover buy programs.
- Development of an asset seizure and forfeiture program.
- Coordination of NSFP with forensic laboratories.

The New Orleans NSFP effort also proposed to accomplish the following measurable objectives by the end of the grant period:

- Increase drug-related arrests by 10 percent.
- Decrease case screening time by 56 percent.
- Obtain a 90 percent conviction rate for project cases.
- Achieve an average time from arrest to trial of 60 days.

Project Description

The DA's Office proposed creation of a strike force that would be directed by an experienced narcotics prosecutor from the DA's Office and staffed by four prosecutors, an investigator, five NOPD police officers, and support staff. As described in its application, the strike force would engage in the following 10 activities during the course of the project:

- Data collection and analysis.

- Early involvement of prosecution and court functions.

- Training and use of uniformed personnel and certification of uniformed officers as trial experts.

- Deployment of street teams to investigate, arrest, and respond to citizen complaints.

- Vigorous enforcement effort to arrest and convict narcotics addicts.

- Organization and deployment of mobile task forces.

- Continuation of undercover buy program.

- Case-related asset seizure and forfeiture of assets.
- Coordination of the project mission with forensic laboratories.
- Continuation and enhancement of the unique working relationship that exists between the DA's Office and the narcotics unit.

Grant funds for personnel services were requested to partially pay for the salaries of prosecutors and support staff and for police overtime. All other personnel costs were borne by the grantee. Other grant funds were used for buy money, computer equipment, leased autos, surveillance equipment, court transcript costs, witness expense, training, extradition costs, travel, and office supplies.

Project Organization and Management

The strike force was directed by an assistant DA and staffed by a chief prosecutor, three narcotics prosecutors, and two attorney/screeners. Support staff included two investigators, clerical personnel, a paralegal, and a part-time statistician. The NSFP director reported directly to the DA.

The original plan called for five attorneys to be assigned to the strike force. However, because of major increases in police drug enforcement activity, it was necessary to add two

attorney/screeners to the strike force. Before the strike force, drug arrests averaged 221 per month in 1987. By 1988, drug arrests rose to an average of 381 per month. By 1989, this figure had increased to 475 per month. Two screeners were hired to screen all drug cases and to pass on to trial attorneys only those cases that met strike force criteria. These screeners also provided backup for the trial attorneys in the event of illness, vacation, or other matters.

Only experienced attorneys were assigned to the strike force. Assignment was voluntary. Before coming to the strike force, all assigned attorneys had already served in at least two other major divisions of the office. All had been assigned to the Trial Division and were trained in trial work and tactics.

The original plan called for five NOPD police officers to be assigned directly to the strike force. However, it was decided that for reasons of street backup and compliance with NOPD policies, that these five officers would remain with NOPD, but would work closely with the strike force.

Project Activities

Enforcement activities. When the strike force was initiated, certain grant funds were used to provide NOPD with equipment to upgrade its narcotics enforcement effort. Specifically, the strike force purchased two automobiles for the narcotics division, eight secure channel

radios, a scrambled broadcast and recording system for installation in an undercover vehicle, and various types of camera equipment. Funds were also provided to send two officers to attend a special training course on the equipment. These officers, in turn, trained the other members of the narcotics division.

Shortly after the grant award, the strike force immediately began working with the NOPD narcotics division on undercover buy operations. The first operation began in September 1987 and resulted in indictments and warrants for 56 drug dealers in April 1988. Since that date, undercover operations have been virtually continuous. For example, in the last 6 months of 1989, four undercover operations were surfaced by roundups, and cases against hundreds of street dealers were filed in court. Many of these transactions were recorded on the tape equipment purchased with grant funds.

Strike force attorneys worked closely with officers engaged in NOPD undercover buy operations, providing general and case-specific legal counsel and guidance throughout the course of these operations. Strike force attorneys advised on setting up undercover operations and coordinating the end of such operations, including the roundup of defendants. For example, in one coordinated operation, the strike force screened and filed charges against 90 defendants within 2 days of the roundup.

As with most jurisdictions, NOPD concentrated narcotics efforts before this grant against drug dealers, and drug users were not a priority. Shortly after grant award, the DA and chief

of police held a joint press conference to announce a new enforcement effort directed against drug users. As shown by arrest statistics presented later, this effort was intense throughout the course of the project. And, as noted in the report of the strike force, presented at the BJA Discretionary Grantee Cluster Conference in San Diego in February 1990: "This office has a policy of charging all defendants who have prior felony convictions as multiple offenders and subjecting them to mandatory enhanced penalties. Because of this policy, many of these users are now serving time."

During the primary period of grant operations, 2,918 individuals were arrested for drug sales offenses and another 4,236 for drug possession offenses. Of these 7,154 arrests, over 88 percent involved felony charges. Arrests on crack and cocaine HCl accounted for close to three-quarters of all arrests.

Within the DA's Office, all narcotics-related reports were brought directly to the strike force screening attorneys rather than following the general flow of police reports to the office. Before accepting receipt of the report, the attorney screener verified that the arrest package was complete. The screeners received all police and lab reports, rap sheets, warrants, etc., and reviewed the case for prosecutive merit. The screeners either accepted, refused, or amended the booking charge.

An indication of the effectiveness of these revised procedures and priorities is that screening times, compared on a month-by-month basis between 1987 and 1988, were cut in half.

During the preproject period, average police and DA screening time was 45 days. Once project efforts were fully in place, screening time averaged about 20 days. During the course of the project, charges were filed on 66 percent of all drug cases screened.

It was originally projected that drug arrests in New Orleans would increase by 10 percent over the baseline period. In the first year of the project, drug arrests increased by over 100 percent compared to the prior year.

At the outset of this project, the strike force projected a 90 percent conviction rate on drug cases accepted. In every month since the strike force began operations, the conviction rate ranged between 91 and 95 percent.

Training. Working with the police department was a primary objective of the strike force. Daily advice was provided to individual officers on search and seizure law, search warrants, appropriate charges, and similar issues.

Strike force attorneys lectured at the police training academy to classes of recruits and to special task forces targeting specific narcotics problems or areas. Strike force attorneys also worked closely with the Louisiana State Police on making drug cases at the State's horse racing tracks. For example, strike force attorneys provided training to the 125 NOPD officers assigned to the special operations division for street-level drug enforcement.

Unit attorneys were also heavily involved in revising NOPD's narcotics related reporting procedures. Seminars were also offered to groups of officers on case preparation and testimony in court.

Training programs attended by strike force staff included the following:

- Prosecuting Drug Cases, Louisiana District Attorneys Association (five attorneys).
- Drug Prosecution Seminar, National District Attorney's Association (four attorneys).
- Technical Surveillance (two police officers).
- BJA Discretionary Grantee Cluster Meetings (project staff).

Strike force attorneys also provided training to a newly formed 12-officer NOPD unit designed to address crime and drug problems in city housing projects.

Ad hoc drug courts. The Criminal District Court of New Orleans established two BJA-funded ad hoc drug sections in September 1988. These sections were set up to handle serious drug cases. Two retired judges were appointed by the State Supreme Court for these special sections, and two strike force trial attorneys were placed in these new sections as prosecutors.

Under the original plan, these sections would handle all strike force cases (i.e., sales/distribution or above), and all pending strike force cases would be transferred from the other court sections to the two new sections.

In July 1989, the system was changed by a decision that all drug felony cases would go to the ad hoc sections. Several hundred such cases were transferred. This immediately clogged the dockets and slowed down case dispositions. It then became necessary to move three of the four strike force attorneys to these sections to handle the workload.

However, by adopting an innovative procedure, the strike force was able to cope with the increased workload. This procedure worked as follows: Once a month in both sections, every defendant with an open case was brought in for a pretrial conference. Extra defense lawyers were provided by the Indigent Defenders Program and through volunteers from the defense bar. This procedure resulted in a large increase in pleas. For example, the number of pleas in a 1- or 2-day effort was as many as 75 and averaged about 50.

Special data analysis project. In the summer of 1989, the DA's office made arrangements with the Loyola University Sociology Department to conduct a detailed study of drug-case processing.

The data were entered into a computer and could produce reports based on a wide variety of criteria. It was felt that the data analysis system would be useful to the criminal justice

system to track offenses, sentences, bonds, and other factors used to identify trends and discrepancies. The results of these data analysis efforts were used to formulate plans and guidelines for drug operations in Orleans Parish.

Forfeiture law. On January 1, 1990, the Louisiana State Legislature enacted a new drug asset forfeiture law. Under the prior law, drugs, records, paraphernalia, and cash could be forfeited if the value of the drugs was over \$500 or if the drugs were intended for distribution. It was very difficult to obtain forfeitures of other property unless certain strict conditions were met. Under the new law, any asset connected with a drug felony can now be seized. At the time of this report, insufficient information was available to judge the impact of this change.

The New Orleans DA's Office and strike force attorneys helped draft this new law as well as several other important changes in State drug laws.

Community activities. Strike force prosecutors also engaged in a variety of community support activities. The DA and strike force staff attended church meetings, community anti-drug rallies, and community question and answer sessions. Staff also provided drug-related information at schools, community centers, and mental health facilities. They also provided direct support to the Mayor's Anti-Drug Task Force and the DA's Commission on Illegal Drugs.

The strike force actively cooperated with the news media by providing background information on narcotics control efforts. Staff regularly appeared on local television discussing the drug problem in New Orleans and criminal justice system efforts to counteract this problem.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

Overall, the project managed by the Office of the New Orleans DA did a commendable job in improving the coordination and effectiveness of drug enforcement and prosecution efforts in this jurisdiction. Some of the more noteworthy accomplishments of this project are briefly summarized below:

- A new police and prosecutor procedure for handling drug arrests was developed that improved case management.

- Drug arrests increased by over 100 percent during the project period.

- Decreases in case screening time of between 40 and 50 percent, compared to the preproject period average of 45 days, were achieved as the result of project efforts.

- As a result of the strike force case screening procedures, defendants were charged with the correct criminal offense. Of the 1,295 defendants convicted by the strike force in 1988-89, only 20 were allowed to plead to a lesser charge.
- NSFP maintained a 90 percent conviction rate at the outset of this project. After the first 2 years of project operations, the actual conviction rate achieved for project cases ranged between 91 and 95 percent.

**San Antonio Police Department
San Antonio, Texas**

San Antonio, located in Bexar County in South Texas, is the hub of four major interstate highways and serves as conduit for goods and imports arriving from Mexico. The ninth largest city in the United States, San Antonio had a population of 935,933 in 1990, an increase of 6 percent over 1987. Its metropolitan area has an estimated population of 2 million.

The San Antonio Police Department (SAPD) had an authorized staff of 1,565 sworn officers and 290 civilian employees in 1990. This represents a decrease of 5 percent in sworn officer staffing and 16 percent in civilian staffing compared to 1986.

Project History

SAPD was awarded an initial grant of \$394,500, which covered the 18-month period from October 1, 1987, through March 31, 1989. The second followon grant of \$150,000, with scheduled extensions, covered the 15-month period from April 1989 through June 30, 1990. In summary, SAPD received a total of \$544,500 in BJA funds over a period of 33 months.

SAPD identified these as indicators of its drug problems:

- Because of the close proximity to the Gulf of Mexico and the international border, San Antonio evolved as a major distribution point for both legal and illegal trade.

- The proximity of large military bases (Kelly AFB, Lackland AFB, Randolph AFB, Fort Sam Houston, and Brooks AFB) and high levels of tourism in South Texas created a large transient population in the area. These factors, when coupled with the intense narcotics interdiction efforts in Florida and Southern Georgia, increased the apparent flow of drugs into the country through the South Texas border.

- Between 1985 and 1986, the percentage increase in the amount and type of drugs seized by the department were as follows: heroin 48 percent, cocaine 300 percent, and methamphetamine 72 percent.

- Drug-related property crime increased by almost 20 percent between 1985 and 1986, and this trend continued in the first quarter of 1987.

- New shipments of drugs arrived daily resulting in relatively uninhibited street sales and usage. Competition between drug dealers resulted in fierce rivalry on the street.

The police department sought funds to institute a concentrated police enforcement effort directed specifically at the apprehension and prosecution of street-level drug sellers and buyers in San Antonio.

Project Goals and Objectives

The stated goal of the project was to demonstrate, using innovative strategies, effective police efforts to target street-level narcotic dealers and buyers through effective planning, investigation, and prosecution. The underlying purpose of the program was to design a strategy that would enhance and strengthen existing urban drug enforcement. SAPD proposed to accomplish the following specific objectives in support of the overall program goal:

- Reduce drug involvement and availability on San Antonio streets.
- Eliminate visible signs of drug involvement in the community.
- Reduce fear of crime and perception of social disorder in neighborhoods where street sales of illegal drugs are commonplace.

- Educate uniformed officers in both narcotics identification and interdiction strategies.
- Establish a communications link between police and the neighborhoods.
- Include social service agencies in the counseling of families affected by drug addiction.
- Increase the drug awareness of the citizens through public service announcements and other media.
- Inhibit the rate of increase of property crimes.
- Expedite the prosecution of drug offenders through early involvement of prosecutors.
- Improve the public perception of the police department's efforts to eliminate the availability of street drugs.
- Improve interagency cooperation through a forum in which strategies are devised and exchanged.

Project Description

The project consisted of five distinct, but interrelated, elements, described briefly below.

Education. Every officer was provided specific drug-enforcement-related training during roll call training periods. Narcotics officers gave operational instruction, and representatives of social service providers gave instruction on the nature of their rehabilitation and crises intervention services.

Three police officers, assigned to undercover duties during the course of this project, received intensive instruction in narcotics identification, role-playing, psychological counseling, witness identification, and street-survival techniques. Other training was provided by DEA, Bexar County District Attorney's Office, and U.S. Attorney's Office.

Police-community communications. One of the key aims of this project was to increase the flow of information between the police department and members of the community about drug sales locations and drug sellers. SAPD implemented a media campaign to achieve this purpose that involved a combination of radio and television public service announcements, printed material, and other means of communication. Both the mayor and chief of police appeared on the video media to urge support for the project.

Three other elements of this communications program included the following:

- Preparation and distribution of pamphlets printed in both English and Spanish that requested citizens to call the department with information about drug sales and to ask for information about drug abuse treatment.
- Members of the community were encouraged to correspond with the project coordinator to identify potential drug enforcement target areas in their neighborhoods, using a form designed for that purpose.

■ Patrol officers, when responding to calls for service that involved violence in homes and where it was suspected that drug usage was a contributing factor, provided referral information about the appropriate social service agencies to obtain help.

Enforcement. Officers from selected SAPD units (narcotics, special operations, repeat offender program, crime analysis, and foot patrol) were key participants in this program. As designed, the centerpiece of the SAPD project was three undercover buy programs targeted specifically at street drug dealers. Each buy effort was manned by a four-officer team consisting of two experienced narcotics detectives, an undercover officer, and a supervisor. Three separate four-officer teams were used over the 15-month operational period of the project. SAPD projected that 500 hand-to-hand drug buys would be made over the life of the program. These undercover buys would culminate in the issuance of arrest warrants and the coordinated roundup, arrest, and prosecution of the drug sellers.

In addition to the undercover buy program, SAPD used both its foot patrol and special operations units (SOU) to assist in project activities. Specifically, the foot patrol unit (a 75-officer unit) was deployed in teams in inner-city neighborhoods and business districts. Foot patrol units were responsible for recognition and identification of enforcement target areas and were deployed in a highly visible manner so as to be responsive to citizen complaints and to reduce the fear of crime.

SOU (a 17-officer unit) was used for saturation patrolling in selected drug-plagued neighborhoods. In these neighborhoods, SOU's high-visibility tactics (i.e., uniformed

officers, marked vehicles) focused on the enforcement of disorderly conduct laws to reduce loitering and disruptive behavior on corners and sidewalks. SOU also performed road checks to identify drivers without proper licenses or under the influence of alcohol, to detect stolen vehicles, and to apprehend wanted offenders.

Prosecution. An assistant district attorney position was funded to provide direct support to the enforcement component of this project. This and other prosecutorial positions were responsible for case screening and case preparation. They also assisted in the preparation of search warrants and arrest warrants, coordinated asset seizure and forfeiture cases, and assured that citizen rights were protected. These attorneys became an integral part of the enforcement process, accompanying officers on raids and major arrests when possible. The assigned attorney also worked closely with prosecutors in the various courts on project-related drug cases.

Analysis. The department's crime analysis unit, in concert with the research and planning section, coordinated the data processing requirements of the project. This unit analyzed all information collected and prepared monthly progress reports. The unit also assembled information on potential target locations for consideration by the target committee in making assignments for the foot patrol and special operations units.

The personnel component of the SAPD budget for this project was used to pay overtime expenses by project participants. For example, each of the three projected buy operations was

calculated at \$48,000 per operation. The only direct salary expense was for the payment of the district attorney position. Other grant funds were used for confidential expenses, equipment, travel, supplies, contractual services, and training. All other program-related funding was provided by the grantee.

Project Organization and Management

SAPD's street sales project was administered by the vice and narcotics division of the department. The program coordinator was a police lieutenant in the narcotics bureau.

Commanding officers and staff from the patrol division, special operations unit, foot patrol unit, repeat offender program, crime analysis unit, and the research and planning unit of the department were also heavily involved in various phases of the project.

Other program participants included representatives of the Bexar County District Attorney's Office, DEA, U.S. Customs and Immigration, the State Board of Pardons and Parole, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and Bexar County Adult Probation, among others.

The grant also used a target committee made up of three police representatives (including the project coordinator), one State prosecutor, and one representative from a human resource/substance abuse treatment agency. This committee was used to select target neighborhoods for intensive patrol or foot patrol and to continually monitor grant operations.

Project Activities

One of the initial activities undertaken by SAPD was the development and presentation of a 40-hour drug enforcement training program presented to over 50 officers scheduled to participate in the project. The course included a number of segments designed to familiarize officers with drug investigation techniques.

A second activity was the implementation of a drug hotline to permit citizens to provide anonymous tips and complaints to the police about drug dealing in the community.

Grant administrators met with the city's director of human resources to develop a listing of services available for persons with drug abuse problems. Arrangements were also made for the department to assist the city's AIDS education project by using officers as conduits for funneling information to that segment of the community that is considered to be at risk from the AIDS virus. Based on these meetings, SAPD developed and printed 10,000 copies of a pamphlet that listed treatment and intervention services available for drug abusers and also provided information on how to report information on drug-related activities to the police department for enforcement action.

During this period, SAPD narcotics officers also produced a 7-minute video tape that provided an overview of the street sales program. This videotape was shown to all patrol officers at roll calls. Later in the grant year, the project team also produced a 20-minute

videotape for patrol roll call training that covered the proper handling of drug-related evidence from discovery to storage in the police property room.

Throughout the enforcement period of the grant, SAPD targeted street dealers and others associated with street-level drug dealing. Six types of enforcement activities were pursued during this period: narcotics delivery investigations, street sweeps, surveillance, execution of search warrants, investigation of clandestine drug laboratories, and service of arrest warrants. Each of these activities is briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

Narcotics delivery investigations. Three major undercover buy operations occurred during the period of the initial grant. The police department called these narcotics delivery investigations. Under this program element, grant funds were used to fund overtime-paid narcotics teams. Each team consisted of a supervisor, two experienced narcotics agents to serve as mentors and protectors, and an undercover police officer to make buys from street dealers. This arrangement had two benefits: it allowed a close level of supervision and observation during any street buys, and it provided for the careful handling of evidence by the mentors.

The undercover officers were selected from patrol officers fitting a profile of the type (race, sex, ethnicity) that matched the proposed targets of the investigation. For example, a young female officer was selected to infiltrate the drug culture associated with a local high school.

Undercover assignments ranged from 3 to 6 months. Most undercover operatives made from 30 to 50 drug sales (delivery) cases each during their tenure with the program.

The original intent of the project was to use approximately five undercover officers. Instead, a total of 24 officers were trained and guided through the complex process of making narcotics delivery cases. Six different supervisors guided these officers in making the over 1,100 delivery cases attributed to this element of the project. Another 21 narcotics officers served as mentors and protectors of the undercover officers.

Street sweeps. Using uniformed officers assigned to the special operations and foot patrol units, occasional sweeps or high-visibility enforcement efforts were devoted to targeted locations involving drug activities. Neighborhood leaders adjacent to these hot spots generally welcomed the increased police presence in the community as well as the vigorous enforcement activities aimed at street dealers in their locale. The addition of officers from the repeat offender program to these intensive efforts also assisted in the identification of known offenders specializing in property crimes. Representatives of the print and video media were routinely invited to observe these efforts with the result that SAPD relations with the press were improved. Five major sweeps were conducted by SAPD during this project.

Surveillance. Professional quality surveillance equipment was obtained with grant funds to complement SAPD's existing equipment. Video equipment, tracking devices, and sophisticated listening equipment were used extensively in grant-funded narcotics operations.

Execution of search warrants. Narcotics delivery investigations, street sweeps, and surveillances all lay the groundwork for the issuing and executing of search warrants. Information developed through confidential informants and police undercover operatives resulted in the issuance of 104 narcotics search warrants (between January 1988 and December 1989) which were executed by SAPD officers assigned to the project. Frequent use of search warrants to uncover additional evidence proved to be an effective enforcement tool.

Investigation of clandestine drug laboratories. Through the efforts of SAPD officers assigned to the project, seven clandestine drug labs were uncovered and closed down during the grant period. It was discovered that most of the locally manufactured illicit drugs (mainly methamphetamine) were transshipped to other parts of the Nation for consumption.

Arrest warrants. SAPD's practice was to file simultaneously large numbers of cases attributed to the efforts of an undercover operative. In this way, the true identities of the officers responsible for making the cases and informants were protected until the indictments were returned. This allowed officers to continue to be productive throughout the 3- to 6-month period of their undercover assignments. Once the indictments were returned, SAPD used carefully planned roundups of felony offenders for whom arrest warrants had been returned as sealed indictments. As many as 18 three-officer arrest teams, drawn from various SAPD units, the Texas Department of Corrections, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and DEA, were used in these roundups.

Crime laboratory support. SAPD originally intended to use a part of the BJA grant to fund a dedicated attorney position to support program efforts in the Bexar County District Attorney's Office. For a variety of unrelated reasons, this was not possible. However, because of the growing volume of drug cases, the Office of the Medical Examiner (actually the Regional Crime Laboratory) was overwhelmed and suffered increasing delays in drug identifications. The department requested and received BJA approval to reprogram the funds for the attorney to provide needed equipment to the Regional Crime Laboratory. Grant funds were used to purchase a stand-alone mass spectrometer and auto injectors for a gas chromatograph. This equipment was received in late 1988 and did much to speed up SAPD evidence processing.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

Overall, SAPD was successful in implementing a street sales enforcement project. Six of the more successful project activities were as follows:

1. The department clearly demonstrated that a well-designed and well-managed undercover buy program was a useful enforcement tool in addressing street-level drug problems. Specifically, the use of four-officer narcotic teams provided department management with appropriate security and control over undercover police drug enforcement operations.
2. The department was able to implement a comprehensive enforcement program involving undercover buys in concert with street sweeps, high-intensity patrol, execution of search warrants, exposure of clandestine drug laboratories, and service of arrest warrants.
3. The department exceeded by more than 100 percent its proposed target of 500 drug delivery arrests.
4. Seizures for all types of drugs during the course of this project were impressive. With respect to cocaine alone, SAPD seizures increased by more than 300 percent in comparison to the preproject base year.

5. SAPD developed and implemented a 40-hour training program for undercover narcotics officers and their handlers.

6. As a result of the project, over 100 SAPD officers developed expertise in handling street-level drug dealing situations, and the level of cooperation between the narcotics unit and uniformed elements of the department significantly improved.

**Seattle Police Department
Seattle, Washington**

Seattle is located in northern Washington with a population of approximately 500,000. Its metropolitan area is home to almost 1.5 million persons.

The Seattle Police Department (SPD) had a budget of \$61.2 million and was staffed by 1,071 sworn police officers and 492 civilians when the project began in 1987. In 1986, the department responded to 784,778 calls for service. The police department's vice and narcotics sections were staffed by 41 sworn officers and 3 civilians.

Each of the four police precincts had four to seven officers assigned to anticrime teams. These were tactical units that focused on street crime, including street-level narcotics trafficking.

Project History

In September 1987, BJA awarded SPD a \$356,000 Street Sales Enforcement Program grant. The project was scheduled over the 20-month period extending from November 1, 1987, to June 30, 1989. In fact, because of requests for schedule extensions by the grantee, the project operated for 34 months ending August 31, 1990.

In establishing the need for this project, SPD described the following drug-related problems facing its jurisdiction:

- Drug arrests and investigations escalated dramatically in the 4-year period from January 1983 to December 1986. In 1983, SPD conducted 625 investigations and made 684 arrests, and in 1986, 1,659 investigations and 1,527 arrests.

- Seattle's most significant crime increases happened in 1985 when the cocaine rockhouse phenomenon emerged. Crack cocaine spread to a greater percentage of the drug-consuming public as the price dropped and the supply increased. Crackhouses became the new centers for distribution of this drug, and their numbers multiplied throughout the city. Neighborhood crime rates increased in those areas having newly established rockhouses.

■ SPD intelligence analysts reported that California drug dealers and street-gang members increased in the Seattle area in early 1986. Confidential informants indicated that one ounce of cocaine purchased for \$450 in Los Angeles could be resold on Seattle's streets for profits estimated at between \$2,500 and \$3,000.

Seattle's program differed significantly from those of other police agencies in that it proposed to develop a unique intelligence-oriented information system to support street-level drug enforcement rather than fund a special enforcement effort directed at this narcotics problem. SPD termed this effort Project NOVA (narcotics, organized crime, and vice activity).

Project Goals and Objectives

Project NOVA's fundamental premise was that effective police operations against drug dealers must be preceded by a comprehensive planning effort based on high-quality intelligence information contributed by all members of a police agency. Thus, Project NOVA's basic objective was to strengthen existing law enforcement efforts aimed at street-level narcotics dealers and buyers in an urban environment.

With this objective as a foundation, SPD proposed to improve police operations by the following methods:

- Uniting divergent but related police file systems.

- Developing new files to provide greater accountability and managerial control over important subdivisions of the police agency.

- Focusing and combining police resources against criminal violators, thereby avoiding waste and duplication.

In brief, NOVA proposed to develop an advanced automated information system that combined the data resources of the three primary units of SPD (narcotics section, vice section, and criminal information section) that maintained intelligence data concerning drug addicts and related criminal activity.

NOVA's goal was to combine these divergent intelligence systems through the formation and staffing of a new service unit. Automating these existing manual files into a unified automated system was expected to supply a greater amount of raw narcotics-related intelligence data to each officer and investigator of SPD.

The technical subobjectives of the project were set forth as follows:

- Select and hire staff to develop the NOVA system.

- Assess files in the three sections and the processes used to produce current records.
- Purchase, set up, and program a computer network.
- Combine files into the computer system through a hierarchal process—first enter the indices and then extract relevant file data as applicable.
- Develop a standard criminal intelligence report for SPD—revise existing reports if necessary to meet data and entry needs.
- Develop select files to be used in the system: (a) subject-of-interest file, (b) investigative funds management file, (c) seized equipment/asset file, (d) narcotics complaint file, and (e) laboratory file.
- Develop procedural instructions for entering data into the NOVA system.
- Provide training on the NOVA system to department members.

Project Organization and Management

The NOVA project was assigned to SPD's criminal information section (CIS). The project director was a police lieutenant who also served as CIS commander and had 25 years of police experience, including over 16 years of assignments to vice, narcotics, and intelligence units.

The technical leader of the project was a civilian management systems analyst, who was responsible for systems design. He was assisted by a programmer.

One problem cited by the grantee was the difficulty of hiring qualified technical personnel who could also meet the rigid screening criteria of the police department. Any person employed on this project had to have a drug-free history, undergo a polygraph examination, and have extensive character and background examinations.

Several rounds of job postings were conducted to find a programmer for this project. The first round did not produce any candidates who met project requirements. The second round produced two candidates who met project requirements, and one of these individuals was hired during the fourth quarter after the project began. The delays associated with the hiring process set the project nearly a year behind its proposed schedule.

Later in the project, it became necessary to hire a consulting software firm to complete implementation of the project. The civilian members of the project staff were laid off in May 1990 because of lack of additional funding.

Project Activities

This project was completed, but it met its original objectives in only a minimal fashion. This section will describe project design and implementation activities and problems.

The best place to begin this discussion is with a presentation of the conclusions of two separate external evaluations of Project Nova.

In February 1990, Search Group, Inc., BJA's Information Systems Branch technical assistance contractor, prepared an evaluation report on Project NOVA for the BJA program manager. The evaluation concluded that the information system developed by Project NOVA was not likely to accomplish project objectives as designed. In a section of the report titled "Inappropriate or Ineffective Functioning of the Current System," the following deficiencies were identified:

- The system had an incomplete name-searching function that did not search aliases and had no partial match capability.

- The data-entry system was difficult to use and incomplete.
- There was no delete function.
- Numerous "bugs" were present in the system.

The report recommended that NOVA freeze all programming until the system could be fully documented and technically tested. It also recommended a system design and review committee be formed to oversee the project. An internal SPD review committee met to review the Search Group report in March 1990 and decided to fully comply with the report recommendations. In May 1990, due to the problems encountered and depletion of grant funds, the civilian project staff was laid off. In August 1990, a local software consulting firm was hired to review the NOVA problems and to develop a plan for completing the project.

This firm prepared the review report in September 1990. A key conclusion of this report was as follows:

In reviewing the NOVA Project, looking at the demonstration programs, and talking with users, we concluded that the NOVA Project will be a tremendous help to investigators to share narcotics intelligence. However, in running the current version of NOVA, reviewing the source code, and talking with [the former NOVA programmer], it was determined that NOVA was only about 50 percent to 60 percent complete. . . . A main hurdle we ran into when reviewing NOVA was the lack of documentation. There is nothing describing the code written or the overall design and architecture (how stacks are linked, etc.).

Before describing the software consultant's conclusions and recommendations in detail, it is useful to review the basic design of the NOVA system.

NOVA staff concluded early in the project that the drug investigative function was best served by a large, varied data base containing many different facts about crime suspects. Blending the results from the files of SPD's vice section, narcotics section, and criminal information section in a sizable data base required the use of large capacity storage units to process and provide photographic, graphic, and relational data online. The data were to be a combination of dynamic and generally static information: dynamic information would be processed using hard disk storage devices and static information would be processed using CD-ROM technology. Project staff felt that this database should contain nine unique data set information files:

- Criminal associates.
- Criminal associations
- Criminal biographies
- Intelligence documents
- Criminal descriptions

- Real estate descriptions
- Document references
- Telephone activity
- Vehicle activity

Based on this design logic, the Project NOVA staff concluded that the most appropriate Criminal Descriptions equipment configuration needed to meet their needs was the Macintosh microcomputer, associated peripheral equipment, and HyperCard software. A basic requirements document described the equipment needs of the project but was not a detailed systems design document.

This design included the requirement to store and retrieve graphic images, videotapes, and photographs. This was a clearly useful requirement from an investigative viewpoint, but in retrospect, it was also clearly pushing the state-of-the-art equipment and software.

Based on this premise, Project NOVA went on to purchase almost \$125,000 worth of hardware and software. Key hardware items purchased included the following:

- Macintosh II Microcomputer (M5300/B), videocards, color monitors, 80 megabyte hard disks, 6 mb SIMM memory expansion kits (seven complete systems).
- Local area network and ethernet interface cards.
- Four 200 mb optical disk WORM storage units and WORM disk controllers.
- Networked color and laser printers.
- Apple optical character recognition scanners.
- Video visualizer fixed station still video camera.
- Color still videodisk recorders, cameras, video graphics cards, video printers.

Software purchases included packages such as Microsoft Word, dBase Mac data base, HyperCard, MacPaint, Videoworks II, OmniPage OCR software, Hyperscan, HyperKRS and Hyperindexer, and LAN network server software, among others. Basically, the staff decided to adapt existing software packages to their needs rather than writing the software from scratch.

Project Nova staff obtained and installed all of the equipment listed above, including the LAN connecting the three offices. The staff input a considerable quantity of data to the prototype system, and put on a system demonstration at one of the BJA Discretionary Grantee Cluster conferences.

A report on the system produced by a local software consulting firm in 1990 made the following four observations:

- The HyperCard displaying digitized color pictures seemed to lock up after displaying four or five in a row.
- A reporting/printing function needed to be added, and an extensive amount of testing was needed after all problems are debugged.
- In analyzing the current NOVA system, the biggest single issue was that the HyperCard Version of NOVA had no documentation. With all the bugs in the system, that fact alone

makes it impractical [to fix the existing NOVA system] given the time and money constraint. There was no program documentation describing variables, routines, etc., and no system documentation describing data structures, card or stack links, or any overall picture of the system.

■ It is not prudent to try to document and flowchart the hundreds of pages of existing code that are required to give a successful finished product. The logic of the program is suspect because no master plan was used, 2 years of work went into a moderately sized database which is still unfinished, and only 30 minutes of user contact and input was obtained in 2 years. Knowing that there was no clear picture of what was going on during development indicates that the program will not work.

After a review of the NOVA system development efforts and problems and a review of alternatives, the software consultant recommended that SPD use an existing software package developed by the University of Washington Police Department. This program was currently in use by the SPD gang unit and could be revised to include the narcotics section, vice section, and CIS as users. However, the consultant noted that there was no time or money available to include the storage and retrieval of video or graphic images.

After considering this recommendation, SPD agreed to use remaining grant funds to hire the software consulting firm to revise the University of Washington software. This was accomplished, and in November 1990 a working prototype of the software, now written in

the dBase IV language, was delivered, tested, and installed. Since the program is written in dBase IV, it is a multiplatform solution functioning under DOS, MacIntosh, Unix, or Digital VMS systems without modification.

The eventual NOVA system implemented lacks the video capability. However, it provides SPD users with an ability to search with free-form association of names, monikers, aliases, vehicles, organizations, and events.

A detective now has the ability easily to scan related information in a criminal information data base. The system can identify previously unknown individuals through the computer's capability to link them to a known subject's address, vehicle, telephone, etc. The system will search for a specific name, partial name, or search sound-alike names with a soundex capability. These are essential capabilities for conspiracies and criminal network interdiction. Information in the system can be freely linked to form complex relationships which then can be easily retrieved through a powerful, intuitive, menu-driven search process. The results of these searches can be printed in concise, easy-to-understand reports.

SPD officials were convinced that they were finally on the right track with this system, and they requested and received a \$50,000 appropriation from the Seattle City Council to hire a data processing specialist to continue the development of the system in 1991.

Summary of Successful Project Activities

From a technical standpoint, this was an extremely ambitious project that ultimately fell short of meeting its objectives. However, there were several successful accomplishments under the grant:

- BJA grant funds were used to implement a successful narcotics unit administrative management information system, according to NOVA staff.

- While the original objectives of the NOVA project were not achieved during the grant period, SPD was able to make a major adjustment in its plans and to hire a consulting firm that did deliver a workable relational database written in dBase IV that runs on equipment purchased with project funds.

- The final direction of this project was so promising that SPD management, the mayor, and the city council agree to commit to an additional \$50,000 in municipal funds to further develop the project.

Rochester Police Department Rochester, New York

Rochester is in western New York State, near the Great Lakes and the U.S. border with Canada. Its population is approximately 240,000 and covers an area of about 37 square miles; its metropolitan area has just over 1 million persons. An estimated 80,000 additional persons commute to work or to shop in the city each day. The Genesee River runs through the center of the city and empties into Lake Ontario on its northern edge.

When this project began in late 1988, the Rochester Police Department (RPD) had 630 sworn police officers and 126 civilian employees. Its budget was \$31.4 million. Seven patrol section offices are strategically located within the city and make up the RPD Patrol Division, which operates a decentralized approach to policing.

Project History

BJA awarded a \$350,000 grant to RPD in September 1988. The grant period ran from September 1988 through December 1989. In January 1990, BJA awarded a followon grant that extended the period from January 1990 through May 1991. Overall, these grants were conducted over a 32-month period.

In its initial application, RPD cited the following as justification:

- Because of its location and population mix, Rochester had become a key city in the drug traffic network. Major investigations uncovered drug pipelines stretching into Rochester through Canada, the West Indies, Latin America, and other U.S. cities.

- Between 1985 and 1987 arrests for illicit drug sales and manufacturing rose by 135 percent. Arrests for possession of narcotics and illicit drugs increased by almost 100 percent during the same period.

- While numerous gatehouses (rental properties where drugs were sold through a fortified slot and which served as resupply centers for street dealers) and street dealing hot spot locations were known to RPD's uniformed patrol personnel, uniformed officers were restricted from acting against these sites without the overall coordination of the special criminal investigation section (SCIS) narcotics unit. These restrictions existed because of the risk of endangering ongoing SCIS undercover operations and because of the lack of specialized training and experience of the officers to undertake narcotics enforcement effectively. Those drug-related arrests made by uniformed RPD personnel were usually the result of a plain-view situation (or incidental situation) to an arrest for other reasons.

- Rochester was a fluid marketplace for illicit street sales and drug prices were stable. New dealers replaced the old almost immediately after they were arrested, and organized and

violent attempts by street dealers to expand their market share by shooting a competitor were infrequent and ended quickly. However, Jamaican dealers increasingly switched to firebombings with 15 incidents reported.

In short, the RPD application stressed that it was using its limited narcotics control resources as cost effectively as possible by focusing on long-term involvement in complex conspiratorial investigations aimed at dismantling organized narcotics distribution organizations. As a consequence, this policy failed to address legitimate citizen concerns associated with street-level narcotics trafficking. The project focused on developing a more balanced and integrated approach to Rochester's drug problems by developing the means necessary to address the street-level trafficking of narcotics and illicit drugs.

Project Goals and Objectives

The focus of the RPD grant, as required by BJA, was on street-level drug enforcement. It proposed the development the highway interdiction team (HIT) program. The overall goal of HIT was to attempt to modify street-sales behavior by creating a high-risk environment that would deter the casual buyer from approaching the seller or by making dealers more cautious about how they picked their customers. The aim of this strategy was to drive drug sales business from the streets into nearby gatehouse apartments houses, thereby increasing the cost of street sales and decreasing a visible neighborhood menace. Enforcement would then

shift to execution of search warrants, issuance of housing code violations, and closure of a property under the city's nuisance law.

In support of this goal, the HIT program had the following 11 objectives:

1. Ensure early identification, apprehension, and arrest of HIT target offenders.
2. Ensure trial-worthiness of the case against the target offenders through the application of law enforcement case enhancement techniques.
3. Execute a system of smooth and prompt case transfer between the law enforcement component of the HIT program and prosecutors who receive HIT case referrals.
4. Ensure proper and accurate initial charging by law enforcement.
5. Effect conviction of the targeted offender for the maximum sentence feasible without plea bargaining, except in extraordinary cases.
6. Ensure prompt testing of controlled substances seized by the law enforcement component of the HIT program and validated by public safety laboratory specialists who analyze, interpret, and report test results.

7. Execute a system of fair and certain real property closure action between the law enforcement component of the HIT program and municipal attorneys who receive complaints about nuisance drug premises.

8. Effect maximum interchange of intelligence information about HIT operations and target offenders between the law enforcement component of the HIT program and special mobile drug task forces that focus on county and Jamaican drug trafficking.

9. Execute a system of formal and informal dialog between the HIT program supervisor, patrol section crime prevention officer, and police-citizen interaction committees that vocalize feedback about enforcement efforts.

10. Execute a system for proper and reasonable disbursement and accounting of buy funds allocated to HIT program officers and monitored by the SCIS.

11. Ensure post-arrest prosecution of drug buyers and sellers on those nondrug charges (such as traffic charges, disorderly conduct, loitering, etc.) related to drug activity in target city locations.

The application specifically noted that flexibility was the key to success in undertaking this type of program. The cycle of direct interdiction and efforts aimed at gatehouse premises

were to be considered concurrent approaches. Use of each strategy would depend on a variety of circumstances for a given area of the city at specific times.

Project Description

The key element of the project was the formation of the HIT team, which was composed of a core group of four experienced narcotics enforcement investigators and one supervising sergeant. This core team was supplemented by six uniformed patrol officers who were assigned to the HIT program. The uniformed officers were drawn from the patrol division for rotating 30-day assignments to the HIT program. Officer assignment to HIT was funded by a combination of regular police budget and grant funding. Direct salaries were paid by the city for regular hours worked. Grant funds were used for overtime expenses that extended beyond regular work hours and for compensation to patrol officers working outside of their regularly assigned work hours. Teams of three to four officers each (consisting of one SCIS narcotics unit investigator/officer serving as team leader, and two to three uniformed officers) worked the street sales target sites. Overall supervision was provided by the SCIS sergeant with umbrella support provided by the SCIS commanding officer.

These HIT units had three primary responsibilities:

- Conduct intensive antidrug surveillance in three target area sections: Clinton, Goodman, and Genesee.

- Suppress flagrant street corner trafficking by using these methods: buy-bust, stop-and-frisk tactics, and overt legally permissible enforcement tactics that maintained a visible neighborhood presence against trafficking (RPD planned to use citations issued for such violations as traffic charges, noise ordinances, or disorderly conduct).

- Identify premises housing drug traffic and initiate search warrants, raids, and resulting arrests in each of the target areas above.

The specific underlying logic to RPD's formation of a mixed team consisting of narcotics specialists and patrol generalists for 30-day assignments was as follows:

- Uniformed officers would have an opportunity to act upon field intelligence they may have submitted on field information forms (FIF) to SCIS.

- Uniformed officers became better evaluators of information and could be expected to submit better FIF's upon completion of their rotation into SCIS.

- SCIS management had an opportunity to evaluate which uniformed officers perform the best work for subsequent permanent reassignment or perhaps promotion into SCIS as a narcotic unit investigator. Similarly, uniformed officers could see whether they wanted to pursue a future transfer to SCIS.

In addition to HIT, RPD also proposed to initiate a number of supporting program elements: case enhancement and prosecution support, narcotics investigative coordinator, nuisance abatement, drug testing support by the Monroe County Public Safety Crime Laboratory, community involvement, asset seizure and forfeiture, project information system, and special equipment and training.

Project Organization and Management

The HIT program was managed and administered by the SCIS narcotics unit. The SCIS reported directly to the chief of police and included both the narcotics unit and the intelligence unit. Oversight management of the grant was a direct responsibility of a police captain, the commander of the SCIS. This individual was responsible for the development of assignment priorities for the street sales drug enforcement team.

A sergeant from the narcotics unit served as day-to-day project director and as supervisor of the HIT unit. The sergeant was responsible for HIT program personnel selection and administration, liaison with patrol units and assistant district attorneys, target selection and overall strategy development, and supervision of team leaders and team activities.

Each of the four experienced narcotics unit officers assigned to the HIT served as investigators and team leaders and were responsible for onsite supervision of team activities, surveillance, suspect identification, assignment of team members to tasks, and collection of

evidence. Team leaders also participated in or directed suppression activities and prepared reports for review by the HIT sergeant and SCIS captain.

Officers assigned to the teams were responsible for surveillance, infiltration, collection of evidence and suspect identification, and conduct of suppression activities, including raids, arrests, and related activities.

This project management and organizational structure prevailed from September 1988 through October 1990 when a revised project management structure was put in place.

Project Activities

Selection and training of HIT personnel. As part of this project, the department provided 16 hours of drug interdiction training to over 300 uniformed officers in the patrol division. Over 15 training sessions were presented by members of the narcotics unit. This was a general introductory course addressing basic issues of narcotics identification, street sales methods, and legal issues related to drug investigations and enforcement. Thus, any officers selected for the HIT team had already received basic instruction in the drug enforcement area. While this training was primarily intended for nonsupervisory personnel, command officers also attended this training. Since one of the key elements of this program was the mandatory assignment of one officer per month to the HIT program, this training would help

to break down some of the barriers that existed between patrol officers and the narcotics unit and would convince command personnel to buy into the program concept.

Initial selection of officers for assignment to HIT was left up to patrol section commanders.

Once assigned to HIT, officers received additional on-the-job training that dealt with the following areas:

- Use of narcotics identification field test kits.

- Preparation of case depositions and related material.

- Conduct of raids, surveillance, and mechanics of making drug buys.

- Use of narcotics enforcement equipment (such as body wires for monitoring drug transactions and use of support radio systems).

Once HIT was fully underway, many of the agencies in Monroe County also requested training for their officers through brief working assignments to the program. During the first project year alone, 75 police officers from RPD and other agencies were trained and worked for 30 or more days at a time in the HIT unit.

Enforcement activities.

From October 1989 through February 1989, HIT officers worked a Monday through Friday, 6 p.m. to 2 a.m. schedule. However, it was a condition of assignment to HIT that duty hours were flexible and would be adjusted to the nature of the problem being addressed.

By March 1989, the basic schedule was changed to a Tuesday through Saturday. This occurred because of a drug hotline that was introduced in February 1989 and that required rapid response to immediate drug-related problems. On the drug hotline alone, over 5,300 calls were received between March and December 1989, an average of about 20 such calls per day.

Since flagrant street sales were the project's main reason for the HIT program, it was in this area that primary enforcement effort was focused. With the primary sales locations and many of the dealers already known, enforcement was applied using two methods.

The first was target area surveillance, where drug transactions could be witnessed by one group of HIT members. A second HIT unit would then stop the customers outside the target area. In those instances where these customers would cooperate, by admitting (in a deposition) to purchasing drugs, confirmation would be relayed to a third HIT unit who would ride in and pick out the dealers. If there were multiple dealers in an area, the arrest

The second method, when the situation permitted it, involved use of an undercover officer to make buys. The HIT configuration in this instance would be somewhat different, and the resulting charges would be for sale and possession. Search warrant procedures were fairly standard and were sometimes substituted with buy-busts where a location would be rushed after an undercover would make a buy. These rushes were called jumpouts.

The HIT unit also focused efforts on public transportation facilities in an effort to intercept drug mules bringing in out-of-town supplies for street dealers or networks. This was an occasional productive use of HIT resources when Rochester's harsh winters closed down street sale enforcement opportunities.

The HIT unit developed a variety of techniques to increase its productivity in the field. In street sales arrest situations, the majority of paperwork was completed on the scene. All necessary report forms were carried in officers' vehicles. When an arrest was made, the suspect was processed at the scene, and a uniform patrol vehicle was called to transport the suspect(s) to the booking office. While the processing was being completed, the undercover officers would scout new target areas for sales activity.

Summary of Successful Activities

One relatively immediate impact of the HIT program was an increase in drug-related arrests by members of the uniformed patrol force. One of the aims of this program was to cycle as many patrol officers as possible through the HIT program (based on the 30-day assignment of patrol personnel to this unit). In addition to the increased narcotic enforcement effort by the HIT team itself, this strategy was having the desired results. Five months into the first project year, RPD statistics recorded an 800 percent increase in narcotics arrests by patrol officers compared to the prior year. HIT reports attributed this increase to the return of officers cycled through HIT to their regular patrol assignments and to more aggressive work by other patrol officers with respect to drug arrests.

There was fairly extensive media coverage of the HIT program during the initial grant year. HIT reports indicated that community response to the program was, for the most part, highly positive. One report stated that "In most neighborhoods where we operated on a regular schedule, citizens would actually voice their support by cheering and applauding when we jumped out on a group of dealers or when we led suspects out of a search warrant location." After the drug hotline was established, people would call and ask for HIT officers to respond to their neighborhoods.

During the first HIT grant period, HIT accounted for 907 arrests and seized 22 pounds of cocaine, 16 pounds of marijuana, 13 ounces of heroin, \$177,426 in cash, 40 weapons, and 8 vehicles. During this same period, the entire narcotics unit made 291 arrests.

In June of 1989, HIT was presented with an award for its accomplishments from the mayor of Rochester. Despite these successes, HIT reports pointed out that the drug problem facing the city had, if anything, gotten worse. They noted that a major factor that affected their drug problem was a sizable Jamaican population that led to the incursion of the Jamaican posses into the area. Approximately 50 percent of Rochester's reported homicides in 1989 were drug related (14 out of 30).

By the end of the first grant period, HIT was no longer viewed as an experiment, but was now widely accepted by all elements of RPD as a valid and effective program. Based on HIT's accomplishments, a second HIT unit was formed. This second, smaller unit was made up solely of personnel from the RPD narcotics unit.

The program continued to evolve along much the same lines during the second grant period and stressed street sales enforcement in specific areas of the community. For at least the first 9 months of the grant period (January-September 1990), the program continued as described in an RPD report:

Our plan of action was simple. We would move into a target area, identified through the telephone drug hotline or from the patrol section complaints. The HIT teams would work an area until it was no longer productive and then move on to another section/problem area and so on. Our tactics were to do jump outs

on street sales locations, search warrants, bum and rush (police buys) on gatehouses, and conventional hand-to-hand police buys whenever possible.

The drug hotline generated well over 5,000 complaints and leads for HIT followup. In addition, the Nuisance Abatement Law was being used to induce landlord compliance in closing down drug premises. The HIT program helped RPD to identify over 500 premises and locations where drugs were being sold. This enabled RPD and HIT to deploy their enforcement resources efficiently against such target.

Project-Related Problems and Solutions

A major problem surfaced In October 1990 that had dire implications for both RPD and the HIT program itself. The nature and severity of this problem were described succinctly by the department in a final report on this project.

The chief of police was arrested for the misuse of several hundred thousand dollars in official funds (no Federal grant funds were involved), most of which had been allocated for use by SCIS. As a result of the investigation into the chief's actions, the captain in charge of SCIS was suspended and replaced by a new one.

Further allegations arose that led to the suspension of five permanent members of the HIT team for alleged civil rights violations and the theft of property and/or money from drug

defendants and/or dealers. These allegations are currently being investigated by a team of Federal and RPD investigators. Evidence is being presented to a Federal grand jury.

As a result of these events, all HIT operations were suspended in October 1991. This suspension remained in effect until new supervisors and staff were transferred into the SCIS and the HIT program. Once the investigations were complete, and based on the wholesale changes made in RPD, BJA authorized completion of the project.

During the remaining 7 months of the project, the new RPD management team decided to disband the HIT unit and to allocate \$10,000 in HIT grant funds to each of the six patrol division sections and to the tactical unit to continue the project.

This money was used to provide additional overtime funds for foot patrol within the various patrol sections and tactical unit. These foot patrols were designed to establish a high profile uniform presence in areas known to be frequented by street-level drug sellers.

Initially, officers assigned to these foot patrols were instructed to use their visibility as a deterrent. As time went on, they were instructed to become more aggressive and still maintain a highly visible uniformed presence in these target areas. All such activities were carried out, only in uniform and marked police vehicles. Officers were further instructed to address only outside drug activity. They were not permitted to become involved in search

warrants, buys, or police buys. During the last two quarters of the grant, 175 officers participated in these high visibility patrols.

To further address street-level drug problems, RPD requested and received the assistance of the New York State Police community narcotics enforcement team (C-NET). C-NET provided undercover troopers to curtail street-level narcotics trafficking, using primarily buy-bust methods. RPD provided confidential funds, technical equipment, and surveillance and backup officers. Two of these C-NET/RPD operations in Rochester proved so successful (22 sales and possession arrests and the execution of 9 search warrants in the first, and 20 sales and possession arrests and the execution of 3 search warrants in the second) that it was decided to continue joint operations on an ongoing basis.

During the 17-month period from January 1, 1990, through May 31, 1991, RPD's HIT grant reported the following accomplishments: 770 arrests; and seizure of 32 pounds of cocaine, 22 pounds of marijuana, 8 ounces of heroin, \$197,007 in cash, 86 weapons, and 8 vehicles.

Chapter 4. Aggregate Data Summary

Introduction

In keeping with the responsibilities of the Narcotics Control Technical Assistance Program (NCTAP) for coordination between program sites, data collection began in mid-1988 and continued through the end of the grant periods for each site. This chapter summarizes some of the data collected through June 1991.

Data Collection

Each site was asked to complete a quarterly data collection form (exhibit 4-1) and submit it along with the quarterly report that BJA requires. Without exception, each site cooperated fully.

NCTAP staff entered the data into a data base for which seven elements were extracted for this report:

- Overtime funds spent.
- Confidential funds spent.
- Search warrants executed.

- Number of arrests (felony and misdemeanor).
- Assets seized (value).
- Assets forfeited (value).
- Drugs seized.

Not all sites were able to provide data in all categories. However, enough information was gathered to give an indication of the level of activity. Because of the unique composition and funding of the Washington, D.C., Metro Area Task Force, data from this project are not included in this report.

Findings

Exhibit 4-2 shows the totals in each data category for all sites as of the end of June 1991.

Exhibit 4-2. Total data category for all sites

Overtime funds spent	\$2,757,265
Confidential funds spent	\$1,154,495
Search warrants executed	4,259
Number of arrests	
Felony	35,174
Misdemeanor	<u>4,830</u>
Total	40,004
Assets seized	\$8,913,629
Assets forfeited	\$1,117,455
Drugs seized	
Cocaine	1,454 kg
Crack	73 kg
Marijuana	1,796 kg
Heroin	19 kg
Methamphetamine	<u>11 kg</u>
Total	3,353 kg

Program sites made 40,004 arrests, with felony arrests accounting for about 88 percent (35,174) of total arrests and misdemeanors accounting for about 12 percent (4,830) (exhibit 4-3). Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement sites reported 19,510, or about 55 percent of all felony arrests. Street Sales Enforcement projects reported 15,664 felony arrests, or 45 percent of the total. Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program sites reported about 48 percent (2,303) of all misdemeanor arrests, while street sales sites accounted for approximately 52 percent (2,527) (exhibit 4-4).

Exhibit 4-3

Crack projects and street sales projects

Total arrests

Exhibit 4-4

Crack projects and street sales projects

Arrests by program

The total value of assets seized was \$8,913,629, and the sum of overtime and confidential funds spent by all projects through June 1991 was \$3,911,760 (exhibit 4-5). Together, confidential funds and overtime expenses accounted for about 65 percent of grantee budgets. Program income generated from seizures offset program expenditures (overtime and confidential funds) by a significant margin.

Asset seizures and expenditures are broken down by type of project in exhibit 4-6. The difference in seizures between the two programs may be due to different types of enforcement. One of the goals for the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program sites was to address high-level crack dealers, who included individuals and organizations with substantial assets. Street Sales Enforcement Programs, on the other hand, concentrated on low-level street sellers and users who typically had few, if any, assets available for seizure.

Exhibit 4-5

Crack projects and street sales project

Value of seized assets and project expenditures *

Exhibit 4-6

Crack projects and street sales projects

Value of seized assets and project expenditures

The total value of assets forfeited through June 1991 was \$1,117,455, or about 12.5 percent of the total seized. All sites reported that legal forfeitures typically lagged well behind the seizures.

With regard to the total drugs seized by all projects, cocaine accounted for about 43 percent, marijuana about 54 percent, and crack seizures accounted for another 2 percent (exhibit 4-7). The remaining 1 percent of seizures included heroin and methamphetamine.

Exhibit 4-7

Crack projects and street sales projects

Total drugs seized

Drug seizures are categorized by program type (exhibit 4-8). The breakdown for each group shows cocaine seizures accounting for about 43 percent of the total for crack task force sites

and 54 percent for street sales sites. Marijuana seizures for street sales sites accounted for 35 percent of their total, while 55 percent of the crack project seizures were marijuana.

Exhibit 4-8

Crack projects and street sales projects

Drugs seized by program

Crack projects

Street sales project

The total estimated street value of cocaine, crack, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine seized by the projects was \$165,129,000. Cocaine accounted for about 88 percent and marijuana only 6 percent of this total (exhibit 4-9). DEA street-level drug cost estimates were used for these calculations.

Exhibit 4-9

Crack projects and street sales projects

Estimated street value of drugs seized

- Cocaine - based on average of \$100/gram
- Heroin - based on average of \$100/gram
- Methamphetamine - based on average of \$100/gram
- Crack - based on average of \$100/gram
- Marijuana - based on average of \$150/ounce

Summary

The information in this report indicates a high level of grantee work activity in these projects. Sites made over 40,000 arrests, and the majority of these were felonies. In addition, nearly \$9 million in drug traffickers' assets were seized. As seized assets were forfeited and awarded to program sites, the proceeds were used to fund many projects after grant funding expired.

Some of the most significant data were drug seizures. The BJA program sites removed 3,353 kilograms (nearly 7,400 pounds) of drugs from their communities. The street value of these drugs was over \$165 million.

Chapter 5. Conclusions and Policy Issues

Introduction

This report assesses site activities performed by grantee agencies involved in the Bureau of Justice Assistance Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and Street Sales Enforcement Program. It is not intended to be an evaluation. While some of the information contained in the report reflects the process and implementation strategies of the sites, no impact evaluation was conducted. There has been no attempt to measure reductions in drug crime or use, or improvement in the quality of life in affected communities.

It is not BJA's role to conduct such evaluations. This role is fulfilled by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). As part of its evaluation function, NIJ funded indepth evaluations of the Birmingham and Oakland Street Sales Enforcement Program sites. These evaluation reports are available from BJA.

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this report, BJA's objective in funding the Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and the Street Sales Enforcement Program was to provide a setting for local law enforcement agencies to implement innovative techniques to combat drug trafficking.

This chapter provides a discussion of enforcement strategies that were implemented successfully from a process standpoint. It also points out issues for other law enforcement agencies to consider when implementing similar programs.

Issues and Policy Implications

The preceding chapters pointed out the success of BJA program sites in seizing drugs and assets from drug traffickers. Although these are significant achievements, there are long-term benefits from the programs that will have a lasting impact on how other communities combat the drug problem.

This section discusses the most important policy issues addressed and lessons learned by program sites. It also provides specific examples of successful applications of drug investigation techniques by program sites. Law enforcement agencies at all levels should be aware of and be able to successfully apply these lessons to enhance their drug enforcement efforts.

Coordination

Coordination of effort is one of the most important keys to successful drug enforcement programs. Inside the agency, there must be coordination among patrol, specialized drug enforcement units, gang units, intelligence units, and others. Effective coordination results

from clear communication among these units as to which individuals, premises, and other geographic locations are being investigated. Examples of effective communication strategies used by program sites were weekly meetings of unit supervisors; circulation of hard copy lists of drug suspects, arrestees, and premises targeted for search warrants; and dissemination of intelligence drawn from sources inside and outside the department.

The Los Angeles Police Department used its automated Narcotics Information Network (NIN) for storing, analyzing, and disseminating drug-related intelligence generated by the grant-funded crack task force. The department developed strict guidelines regarding dissemination of this information.

Coordination with outside agencies is also a key factor in successful drug enforcement. This includes working closely with other law enforcement agencies in the region, the prosecutor, and probation and parole agencies. It is important for officers to know who in the drug enforcement target area is on probation or parole. Depending on the conditions, just being present in a drug area, or associating with gang members, may be a violation of probation.

Working with other agencies in a multijurisdictional approach to drug enforcement allows agencies to share expertise and staffing resources. For example, many program sites used task forces to supply extra personnel for surveillances and search warrant execution. In addition, task forces helped agencies to share "new faces" for undercover work.

An example of the multijurisdictional approach by program sites is the Northern Virginia crack task force. This task force, which is still in operation, is currently directed by DEA and coordinated by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. While it is staffed primarily with State and local law enforcement officers, the officers are deputized as Federal law enforcement officers. This gives them jurisdiction in the tristate Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. The major benefit to this type of task force is the ability of task force members to charge and prosecute drug violations under Federal law, which often provides stiff prison sentences with no parole for certain drug violations. The average sentence has been 10 years for defendants prosecuted as a result of Northern Virginia crack task force arrests.

Program sites found that early coordination with the local prosecutor's office was effective in enhancing drug investigations. As a result of the BJA projects, many prosecutors in these sites became specialists in drug investigation and prosecution. These specialists provided expertise in preparing search warrants, interrogating suspects, and case screening. In addition, they were able to help agencies recruit confidential informants by seeking plea agreements for criminal charges.

Perhaps one of the most important aspects of coordination with the prosecutor is the vertical prosecution concept. This involves assigning a single prosecutor to a drug case. The prosecutor handles the case from screening and filing all the way through adjudication and sentencing. By applying special expertise in drug prosecution, and by being involved in the

entire case process, the prosecutor is more effective in seeking enhanced sentencing for drug violators.

The Orleans Parish District Attorney's street sales project demonstrated how vertical prosecution can enhance and improve drug prosecution at the local level. The District Attorney's Office in Orleans Parish, which includes the city of New Orleans, formed a strike force consisting of seven attorneys working with designated police officers from the New Orleans Police Department. Strike force attorneys worked closely with officers engaged in drug investigations, providing advice and counsel at all stages of the investigation.

All drug-related arrests that could result in long-term prison sentences and cases involving career criminals were tried by strike force attorneys. The attorneys also screened all drug cases to ensure arrests were proper and criminal charges were accurate. As a result, the conviction rate for drug-related cases was nearly 95 percent. Only 20 percent of all defendants charged were allowed to plead to a lesser crime.

Early involvement of probation and parole agencies is an often overlooked facet of coordination that was used effectively by program sites. Police agencies found that it was important to collect timely information on parolees with prior drug arrest records in the community. In addition, police in several sites, including Los Angeles and Long Beach, were able to accompany probation officers on scheduled home visits to probationers with drug arrest records. Probation officers and police conducted home searches that were allowed as part of the conditions of probation or parole.

In recognizing the importance of coordination, BJA placed special emphasis on early involvement of the prosecutor and the courts in addition to coordination with the forensic laboratory and jail by program sites. This coordination reduced overloading of local criminal justice systems with drug arrests by grantee law enforcement agencies. This was especially important in sites such as San Antonio, where months of investigation were followed by large-scale arrests.

BJA also emphasized coordination by requiring Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program sites to adopt the task force approach drug investigations. For example, the Denver crack task force included the Aurora Police Department, DEA, and the District Attorney for the Second District for Colorado's Second Judicial Circuit. Coordination with Federal law enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorneys' Offices allowed program sites to use Federal statutes such as RICO and CCE to target drug trafficking organizations.

Supervision and Management

As with all other law enforcement activities, effective supervision and management are essential to successful drug investigations and enforcement efforts. A number of sound techniques related to managing drug investigations were developed by BJA program sites and are discussed in this section.

Managing confidential funds. BJA program sites developed reliable policies and procedures to manage critical activities such as handling confidential funds and managing informants. A significant amount of BJA funding to program sites was allocated for purchasing evidence and information, and nearly all program sites set up accounts for this purpose.

Prior to award of the BJA grants, some of the program sites had very limited confidential funds and only rudimentary systems for oversight. BJA required all grantees to set up detailed guidelines for handling confidential funds. As a result, the financial management systems developed by program sites have become models for other law enforcement agencies.

These systems incorporate three principal components: controls and procedures, periodic reports, and routine audits. Controls and procedures govern the day-to-day mechanics of how a confidential fund or flash roll operates and are designed to ensure that:

- Authority, responsibility, and accountability for the fund's administration and authorized use are fixed.
- Financial integrity of the fund is maintained and verifiable through a well-documented chain of custody.
- Adequate documentation exists to serve as the basis for subsequent reports and audits.

Periodic reports are derived from the documentation associated with the controls and procedures described above. These reports provide such information as:

- Condition or status of the fund on a given date.
- Summary of the fund's operation over a given period of time.
- Accounting of fund expenditures by case number and transaction type.

Audits, whether conducted by police executives or an outside agency, constitute the final component of the management system. Audits are used to determine if funds are accounted for properly and may also assess whether the fund is being managed effectively.

A model policy for managing confidential funds was developed by the Narcotics Control Technical Assistance Program (NCTAP) using the best policies of many BJA program sites. The model has been published as a monograph entitled *Managing Confidential Funds* and has been distributed by BJA for use by all discretionary and formula grantees.

Managing confidential informants. Due to the nature of drug enforcement, use of confidential informants is a necessary practice among law enforcement agencies. BJA recognized this and required grantees to develop strict controls and guidelines for managing

informants. As a result, program sites developed procedures that are models for the rest of the law enforcement community.

These procedures cover a broad range of informant-related issues, including:

- Motivating informants.
- Pitfalls for agencies, supervisors, and investigators.
- Responsibilities of agencies and informants.
- Proper written directives.
- Recruiting and contracting with informants.
- Controlling informant activities.
- Maintaining and terminating informants.
- Legal constraints of using informants.

The experiences of the program sites resulted in a monograph published by BJA entitled, *Managing Confidential Informants*. The monograph contains indepth guidelines to help other law enforcement agencies develop model policies and procedures.

Selection and training. Many BJA program sites created special units to conduct street-level drug enforcement. In addition, the sites developed and conducted intensive programs for training specialized and patrol personnel in drug enforcement techniques.

For example, the Oakland Police Department used a comprehensive screening process to select only experienced, proactive officers for their new grant-funded street level drug trafficking unit. As a result, the 6 officers assigned to this unit accounted for over 3,000 drug-related arrests in 21 months.

The Minneapolis Police Department developed a 5-day training course for patrol officers on case development, informant management, drug recognition, warrant execution, and evidence. Due to this training, the department now has a cadre of over 200 patrol officers trained in drug enforcement. Many other promising examples of personnel selection and training in drug operations can be found among program sites.

Management commitment. One of the best predictors of grant project success is the commitment of the agency's chief executive to the project. If the chief is committed, and

demonstrates this in communications and action, this level of commitment filters down through the organization to the project director and line officers.

The chief's commitment to the project is often reflected in maintaining continuity in the project management and staffing. Some of the most successful projects were managed by the same supervisors and operated with the same personnel for the entire grant period. Projects that experienced turnover in key managers and personnel often failed to meet some objectives in a timely and efficient manner.

Another indication of management's commitment to these grant projects is that the projects continue after the grant funds expire. In a number of cases, these crack or street sales projects are still in operation. In some cases, management has absorbed the projects into the budget. In others, the projects continue to operate on income derived from seized assets from drug traffickers.

Grant Resources

BJA funding to project sites provided a number of resources that were otherwise unavailable for drug enforcement activities. These resources fell into four general categories: overtime, personnel, equipment, and confidential funds. This section gives examples of each.

Overtime. Most grantee police agencies could not afford to add permanent positions, whether specialized or patrol, to address drug problems in their community. However, they were able to use grant funds to pay personnel to work overtime hours.

An excellent example of effective use of officers working grant-funded overtime was the Houston Police Department's hot spot detail. This involved a squad of seven uniformed officers who worked around the clock, targeting three specific locations in a drug infested area of Houston, Texas. In addition to using traditional enforcement tactics, the hot spot detail focused on crack-cocaine buyers as well as traffickers.

The detail also enlisted the aid of other city agencies, such as the Health Department, Fire Department, City Marshal, and the Power Department, to enforce health and zoning violations. Building owners and managers of suspected crack houses were issued citations for such violations as blocked emergency exits, no fire extinguishers, no health permit, and other similar violations.

The hot spot detail arrested 1,234 suspects in its first month of operation. It can serve as a model for other law enforcement agencies who wish to make the most effective use of overtime by combining traditional and nontraditional drug enforcement techniques to produce results.

The Minneapolis Police Department used grant funds to pay overtime for a specially trained group of 27 patrol officers and 9 sergeants who concentrated on using informants to make controlled drug purchases from street drug dealers. The training concentrated on target identification techniques and managing informants.

During the first 6 months of operation, drug arrests by patrol officers increased 68 percent. In addition, patrol officers generated so many investigations that the total number of arrest and search warrants increased 288 percent in a year.

Specialized personnel. Program sites used grant funds to employ specialists with skills targeted to the support of drug enforcement activities. Many of the people in these positions were civilians who were used to enhance drug investigations.

The San Diego Police Department employed civilian investigative aides to support the department's crack abatement teams. The investigative aides performed computer analyses of drug trafficking complaints and determined whether they should be assigned for followup investigation by crack abatement team investigators. This allowed the teams to concentrate their efforts where they were most needed on the most serious violators.

The Orlando Police Department used grant funds to employ several civilian support personnel to support their drug enforcement activities. An evidence prosecution coordinator performed the following functions:

- Assisting investigators with evidence at search warrant and major enforcement scenes.
- Computerized case tracking of all arrestees from arrest through conviction.
- Maintaining a computerized file on drug hotline complaints.
- Maintaining a computerized inventory of grant-purchased equipment.

Orlando also found it necessary to employ a forfeiture attorney/legal adviser when its project began generating large numbers of investigations and arrests. The attorney processed all asset forfeitures, reviewed search and arrest warrants, and provided legal advice to the police department.

The Birmingham Police Department used some of its funds to reimburse the State crime lab for hiring a new chemist to process the department's drug cases.

Equipment. Drug investigations of sophisticated drug traffickers often require the use of highly specialized equipment. Examples of the most commonly purchased special equipment by BJA program sites include the following:

- Surveillance vans.
- Body transmitters.
- Radio system scramblers.
- Night vision binoculars and video cameras.
- Specialized entry tools.
- Drug detection kits.

In addition, agencies often showed creativeness in developing their own specialized equipment. The Birmingham Police Department placed a miniature video camera and microphone in a "boom box" that was placed on the ground to record outdoor drug sales by undercover officers. The department also inserted a miniature ("fisheye") camera lens into a tissue box mounted on the undercover car's dashboard for recording drug sales.

The Nassau County, New York, Police Department modified a delivery truck by placing a secret observation compartment inside a stack of building supplies in the cargo area of the truck. An investigator secreted himself inside the compartment and used a video camera to record drug transactions involving undercover officers who were driving the truck.

Among the most important equipment enhancements through Federal funds were microcomputers and software systems. Several of these projects (Seattle, Denver, Birmingham) used grant funds to purchase affordable microcomputers and to design

management information systems to capture and retrieve information on drug traffickers, crack houses, seized assets, and more.

Confidential funds. When these projects started, few of the agencies had adequate funds to pay confidential informants for information or services, or to purchase narcotics. Grant funds were often used for this crucial aspect of narcotics investigations. In fact, a review of the grants shows that, on average, about 25 percent of all grant funds were used as confidential funds.

As the projects made more narcotics arrests and seized more assets from drug dealers, seizure proceeds were used for confidential funds.

Community support. In the authors' surveys and interviews with narcotics officers and police managers in these projects, the police constantly highlighted the importance of community support to successful drug enforcement efforts.

One of the best examples of working with the community to obtain support for narcotics enforcement was the approach by the Miami Police Department. The police-community relations unit of the police department worked in conjunction with the narcotics street sales enforcement officers to go door-to-door after major reverse sting operations to talk with citizens about the drug problems. This communication helped the citizens feel that the police were not abandoning the neighborhood because the sweep operation was over.

Another effort to gain community support was the use of "hotlines" for citizens to call in about neighborhood drug problems. Many of the projects responded immediately to citizen complaints of street drug trafficking with surveillance and tactical operations (undercover buys, observation arrests, etc.). The police felt that such an immediate response to citizens' complaints helped demonstrate police concern and responsiveness, which would in turn foster community support.

Enforcement Techniques

A number of specialized drug enforcement techniques were developed and tested by BJA program sites. The Houston Police Department's hot spot detail and the Minneapolis Police Department's specialized patrol activities have already been discussed in this chapter. In addition, a number of other techniques were developed and should serve as examples for other agencies.

The Miami Police Department employed the use of "reverse stings" and "buy-busts" to arrest large numbers of drug purchasers and traffickers. Briefly defined, reverse stings are situations where police officers pose as drug dealers and arrest drug buyers. Buy-busts are situations where undercover police officers buy drugs and then arrest the drug seller.

The police department's street narcotics unit combined the use of these two techniques in targeted neighborhoods to curtail open air drug markets. Specific locations were identified

through community complaints, intelligence, or computer analysis. The target areas were often placed under surveillance and videotaped for analysis of street drug trafficking patterns.

The operations began with a sweep of the target area by undercover officers executing buy-busts and clearing the neighborhood of drug dealers. Other undercover officers then moved in to pose as drug dealers. Drug purchasers accustomed to frequenting the area would either drive or walk up to make their buys and undercover officers would make the sale (reverse sting). The purchasers would then be arrested by teams of assisting officers. These operations were heavily covered by the news media. The police department hoped such wide coverage would serve as a deterrent to casual drug buyers.

These enforcement efforts not only generated large numbers of arrests (1,725 arrests in 18 operations), but also resulted in strong community support. Community leaders expressed continued commitment to the police department in keeping drug purchasers and dealers out of their neighborhoods.

The Birmingham Police Department found its undercover officers were quickly becoming known to drug dealers, so it developed a unique method for conducting buy-busts using very few officers. The department videotaped drug transactions conducted by undercover officers, enabling them to conduct numerous transactions without revealing themselves to the suspects. The tapes were then used to identify suspects and obtain arrest warrants.

The operation, entitled *Caine Break*, targeted both dealers and sellers. Two undercover officers driving a vehicle equipped with a covert video camera cruised target areas making drug deals. Each transaction was recorded and tapes were later shown to patrol officers, who were able to identify most of the suspects. Arrests were all made using sweeps of target areas over a 4-week period at the end of the operation.

Caine Break resulted in the arrest of over 140 suspects on multiple charges and the seizure of 32 cars. At least 19 articles appeared in local newspapers over the period when the arrests were being made.

The San Diego Police Department used nuisance abatement laws in neighborhoods where traditional drug enforcement had been unsuccessful. This process employed civil litigation rather than criminal procedures and focused on businesses and dwelling places where drug trafficking was suspected to occur.

One member of the department's grant-funded crack abatement team was assigned to a citywide abatement task force. The purpose of the task force was to select targets for applying California's Drug Abatement Act, which was designed to combat drug trafficking through civil sanctions such as property seizure, fines of up to \$25,000, and closing of buildings.

Since voluntary compliance was the goal, property owners were given a list of suggestions to alleviate problems identified by the task force. These suggestions included such things as erecting a fence in a given location, installing light fixtures and keeping them lit during certain hours, keeping suspects off the property, and making structural repairs. Property owners complied in over 95 percent of the cases.

Many other program sites developed and tested innovative ways to combat the drug problem. Many of these techniques are transferable to other communities in one form or another. BJA has published a monograph that draws on the lessons learned by grantees and other agencies. The monograph, entitled *Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement*, provides detailed methodologies for developing and applying a number of these programs.

Summary

The BJA Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and Street Sales Enforcement Program provided an opportunity for agencies to develop, test, and apply innovative drug enforcement techniques. Over the course of 4 years, beginning in 1987, BJA provided over \$9 million to 18 sites across the country. This assistance from BJA came at a critical time in the enforcement effort against drugs. Communities were being overwhelmed with drugs, and local law enforcement agencies were struggling to deal with the problem.

As a result of these discretionary grants, project sites developed a vast array of strategies for attacking the drug problem at the local level. Techniques such as buy-busts, reverse stings, crackhouse raids, directed patrol, and use of checkpoints were tested against street-level drug trafficking. Project sites developed numerous other strategies that can be applied at all levels of drug trafficking: task forces, undercover operations, audio and video surveillance, informant buys, and more.

In addition, agencies began effectively using strategic, operational, and tactical planning to develop overall anti-drug strategies. Coordination with other agencies has become common, and sophisticated intelligence gathering is viewed as an integral part of drug investigations. One of the most important lessons learned by project sites was that the entire community and all public agencies must be involved in the enforcement effort against street-level narcotics trafficking. Many project grantees worked closely with other local agencies, public housing authorities, and neighborhood organizations to help revitalize communities that were overrun by drug trafficking.

These and other lessons are still being applied by thousands of agencies to combat street narcotics and will continue to be useful tools for American law enforcement as a result of BJA's Crack-Focused Substance Enforcement Program and Street Sales Enforcement Program.

Sources for Further Information:

The following documents can be obtained by calling the BJA Clearinghouse at 1-800-688-4252:

Entrapment Defense in Narcotics Cases: Guidelines for Law Enforcement (monograph). 1990. 22 pages. NCJ 127233. Free.

Managing Confidential Funds (monograph). 1989. 63 pages. NCJ 117889. Order on interlibrary loan or free microfiche.

Multi-Jurisdictional Task Forces and "Sting" Operations. Topical Search, 30 citations. TS060000. \$5.

Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement (monograph). 1990. 64 pages. NCJ 123726. \$19.

Contact the Institute for Law and Justice at 1-703-684-5300 to request the following document:

Managing Confidential Informants (monograph). 1991. 53 pages.