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Navy Correctional Custody Units: Perceptions of Navy Leaders and Analysis of Effectiveness

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This report presents an analysis of the Navy's need for Correctional Custody Unit (CCU) facilities. The perceptions of Navy leaders were collected, the program's effectiveness in retraining young offenders was examined, the potential effects of CCU closure on the Navy disciplinary system were investigated, and the costs and benefits of the CCU program were assessed. Data used for these analyses reflected CCU use between May 1991 and May 1993. Navy leaders indicated that the CCU was an effective tool for retraining the young, immature offender. The majority of commanding officers believed that the CCUs should remain open. Other analyses indicated that (1) the program was applied to the population for which it was intended, (2) most sailors retrained at CCU facilities over the past 2 years are still on active duty, and (3) the net value provided to the Navy by successful awardees was substantial. The financial benefits realized from the CCU program seem to be greater than the costs of program maintenance.			
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Foreword

The analysis of Navy Correctional Custody Units (CCU) described in this report was conducted using Navy Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) Studies and Analyses funds. This study is closely related to work being accomplished in the 6.3a project, *Development of the Navy Corrections Retraining Assessment Model* (Project L1772, Program Element 0603707N). Both efforts are sponsored by the Chief of Naval Personnel (PERS-84).

We wish to acknowledge the contribution of Janet Reynolds, who conducted the cost-benefit analyses reported here.

We appreciate the assistance of corrections staff members at the Navy Brig/CCU in Norfolk and Jacksonville, and of the personnel at Naval Health Research Center in accessing extractions of their databases.

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Summary

Background and Problem

The Navy's Correctional Custody Units (CCU) were introduced more than 30 years ago as a means by which minor disciplinary infractions could be handled without stigmatizing offenders with courts-martial. An increasing emphasis on retraining and retaining minor offenders led to continued growth in the CCU population throughout the 1980's. More recently, however, the combined effects of military downsizing and the onset of Desert Storm resulted in a declining CCU population.

Despite the fact that the CCU program has generally been considered an effective one, fiscal reductions and underutilization led to the closure of all of the Pacific Fleet CCUs and all but two of the Atlantic Fleet CCUs. The remaining Atlantic Fleet facilities at Jacksonville, FL, and Norfolk, VA face closure in FY94 and FY95. Before taking that step, however, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center was requested to assess the impact of CCU closures on disciplinary options and outcomes.

Objective

This quick-response study was conducted to determine the Navy's need for CCU facilities by examining the program's effectiveness in retraining young offenders, investigating the potential effects of anticipated Jacksonville and Norfolk CCU closures on the Navy disciplinary system, and assessing the financial costs and benefits of the CCU program.

Approach

A multiple-method approach was used for this investigation. A questionnaire, *Disciplinary Options in the Navy*, was designed to solicit the opinions of commanding officers regarding (1) the effectiveness of CCUs and other disciplinary options and (2) the closure of the remaining CCUs, and their utilization of various disciplinary options. The questionnaire was pilot tested and then distributed to a sample of 704 commanding officers located in the Pacific and Atlantic areas. A total of 392 questionnaires were completed and returned.

CCU records from the Norfolk and Jacksonville facilities were used to learn about the awardee population, the offenses that led to CCU assignment, and awardee performance at the CCU. Several other archival databases were used to evaluate disciplinary history and awardee performance after release from the CCU. The 2-year time period from 31 May 1991 to 31 May 1993 was specified for these analyses. The number of awardees for whom data were available ranged from less than 300 to 680. Approximately 75% of the data represented awardees assigned to the Norfolk CCU.

An analysis was conducted utilizing FY91 cost information to determine the costs and benefits associated with maintaining the CCU facilities. Data were collected for 384 awardees assigned to the Jacksonville and Norfolk CCUs during the FY91 time period. This information was used to compute the CCUs' cost to the Navy and benefit to the Navy, and the cost avoidance realized through the CCU retraining program.

Results

Commanding officers' responses to the questionnaire suggested that the CCU was seen as an effective tool for retraining the young, immature offender. More than 50% of commanding officers indicated that sailors sent to the CCU were better performers and more committed to the organization after retraining than were sailors disciplined by other measures. Three factors were mentioned that contributed to CCU underutilization: (1) the preference for other disciplinary options thought to be more convenient or effective; (2) perceived lack of appropriate candidates; and (3) systemic barriers to utilization such as cost, time, distance, and logistics. The majority believed that the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs should remain open.

Analyses of CCU records and archival databases showed that the CCU program was used for the population for which it was intended: young, first-term sailors with minor disciplinary problems prior to CCU retraining. Further examination of the records revealed that the CCU was successful in retraining these sailors. The majority of sailors retrained at the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCU facilities over the past 2 years remain on active duty and a number of the awardees are filling critical rates for the Navy. Many of the awardees subsequently discharged were separated for additional disciplinary infractions. However, nearly 20% of discharged awardees successfully reached the end of their obligated service.

The cost benefit analysis indicated that the net value provided to the Navy by successful awardees was substantial. These data suggested that the financial benefits realized from the CCU program were greater than the costs of program maintenance.

Discussion and Conclusions

This investigation lead to the following conclusions:

- When used appropriately, CCUs can effectively change behavior.
- CCUs make a unique contribution to the Navy disciplinary system.
- CCUs provide benefits to the Navy that seem to outweigh their costs.
- Systemic barriers to the utilization of CCUs exist in today's environment.

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Introduction

Background

The Navy's Correctional Custody Units (CCUs) were designed to be a means of handling minor infractions of discipline without stigmatizing the offender with a court-martial. According to the *Manual for Administration of Correctional Custody Units*,¹ the goal of the CCU is "to correct the attitudes and motivation of enlisted personnel through a regimen of hard work, intensive counseling, physical training, and motivational and attitudinal training conducted in a strict military environment" (1983, p. I-3).

Originally, the CCUs occupied facilities that were entirely separate from other correctional facilities. However, as new state-of-the-art waterfront brigs were constructed to replace outdated (and often substandard) facilities, each was designed to include a separate wing to house CCU operations. This made it possible to realize operational economies while completely segregating CCU awardees from brig prisoners.

Although CCUs were established 30 years ago, they assumed a more significant role in the Navy's disciplinary system following the release of a 1985 report that prompted major changes in the Navy disciplinary system.² As a result of an increased emphasis on retraining and retaining minor offenders, the CCU awardee population continued to grow throughout the late 1980s, only to decrease again as more personnel deployed with the onset of Desert Storm. The CCU population has continued to decline as the effects of downsizing are felt.

Problem

A great deal of anecdotal evidence is available to show that CCUs are effective in helping to "turn around" young offenders. However, despite such generally positive reports, the program became a casualty of total force downsizing and fiscal reductions, with the result that all units operated by the Pacific Fleet and all but two serving the Atlantic Fleet were closed in FY93. In addition, the remaining CCU facilities operated by Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) at Jacksonville, FL, and Norfolk, VA presently face closure in FY94 and FYY95. Prior to that time, additional information about the impact of CCU closure on disciplinary options and outcomes has been requested.

Objective

To determine if such justification exists, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center was asked to conduct a quick-response study assessing the effects of closing the two remaining CCU facilities. The primary objectives of this effort were to determine the Navy's need for a disciplinary option such as the CCU program, to assess CCU effectiveness in retraining young offenders for productive naval service, and to investigate how the anticipated closures of the Norfolk and Jacksonville facilities will impact the Navy disciplinary system.

¹Department of the Navy. (1981 Sep). *Manual for Administration of Correctional Custody Unit* (OPNAVINST 1640.7). Washington, DC: Author.

²Extensive modifications in the Navy Disciplinary system resulted from recommendations presented in the Navy Disciplinary Study and Facility Master Plan completed in August 1985 and studies performed for the Navy by the American Correctional Association in 1987.

Approach

To make the most of the study's short performance time the following approaches, utilizing multiple data sources, were combined:

- The use of a questionnaire soliciting the perceptions and opinions of commanding officers regarding the effectiveness of CCUs and other disciplinary options and the closure of the remaining CCUs, and their utilization of various disciplinary options.
- The use of CCU records to learn more about the awardee population, the offenses that led to the disciplinary action, and performance while at the CCU.
- The use of archival data to assess performance and disciplinary history of awardees after their release from CCU.
- Consideration of the costs and benefits associated with maintaining CCUs for the retraining of youthful offenders.

Perceptions of Commanding Officers

Fleet Command Questionnaire

A questionnaire was developed to obtain data from commanding officers in the fleet regarding their perceptions of the CCU program. Items included in the questionnaire addressed command utilization of the CCUs compared with other disciplinary options; the perceived effectiveness of each disciplinary option; the factors that have influenced their choice of disciplinary options; and their opinions about the impact of CCU closures. Respondents were asked to base their answers on their experiences over the last 2 years. A variety of item formats was used in the questionnaire, relying heavily on Likert-type scales. The wording of the questionnaire prepared for commanding officers at Pacific locations was slightly different from that prepared for Atlantic locations because there are presently no CCUs in the Pacific area. Both versions of the questionnaire are included as Appendix A of this report. Several commanding officers, who were not part of the sample, reviewed the questionnaire prior to its distribution. Minor modifications to the instrument were made as a result of feedback obtained from the pilot administration.

Sample

A sample of commands was selected for participation from the *Standard Navy Distribution List* (SNDL, 1990). An effort was made to include ship, aviation, and shore commands of more than 200 persons, with approximately equal numbers selected from the Pacific and Atlantic areas.

Procedure

The questionnaire was mailed in August 1993 to the commanding officer of selected commands at addresses taken from the SNDL. In addition to the questionnaire, packages included a postage-paid return envelope and a cover letter that explained the study and provided the names and telephone numbers of the researchers to whom questions should be addressed. Reminder postcards were also mailed approximately 3 weeks after the initial mailing.

CCU Records

Records maintained at Norfolk CCU and Jacksonville CCU were extracted for awardees undergoing retraining at those locations between May 1991 and May 1993, a 2-year period roughly corresponding to that covered by the Fleet Command Questionnaire. Data were not available from CCUs that had been closed.

Data Files

Three data files maintained at Norfolk CCU were thought to be relevant to this study. Only the awardee history files were available from Jacksonville CCU.

Awardee History Files. These files were available at both Norfolk and Jacksonville. They contained demographic information about the awardees, their past performance, and the offense that led to the award.

Awardee Follow-up Files. These files contained responses to follow-up inquiries sent by the CCU staff to each awardee's command at 3, 6, and 12 months after his or her return to the command. The command was asked to indicate (1) whether the awardee remained on active duty or had been separated, and (2) whether the awardee had been recommended, or would be recommended, for reenlistment. Computer files containing follow-up information on Jacksonville awardees were not available. In addition, the Norfolk follow-up file contains data for only 54% of the 475 awardees found in the history file.

Staff Spot Check Files. A third CCU data file contained indicators of an awardee's behavior while at the CCU, based on recorded staff evaluations. Staff members conducted periodic spot checks of awardees' attitudes, appearance, motivation, and interactions with staff and other awardees. These data were also unavailable from the Jacksonville facility.

Procedure

Researchers visited the Norfolk CCU to investigate the availability of data relevant to this study. Procedures for downloading records from the computerized Awardee History files were specified, and subsequently forwarded to Jacksonville to assist them in the data extraction process.

The staff spot check files were not computerized, which meant that the data had to be transcribed from hard copies found in the archived files. Manual data entry was required to complete this process.

The data files obtained from Norfolk were then merged using the individual's social security number as the matching key. Due to erroneous social security information and incomplete records, the number of "matches" was substantially lower than that of any of the individual files.

Archival Database

Awardee records obtained from both the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs were also merged with an historical event-type database maintained by Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) to extract additional demographic data and information regarding an awardee's behavior after CCU

retraining. The NHRC database also provided present enlistment status and, if the individual had been separated from the Navy, the reason for that separation as indicated by both a DOD loss code and a Navy loss code. This database did not include a record of any additional nonjudicial punishments (NJPs) that an individual may have received, but did note if he or she received a court-martial at any time between CCU release and separation from the Navy.

Cost-Benefit Analyses

The cost-benefit analysis utilized FY91 cost information obtained from the Navy Corrections Program (PERS-84) and replacement cost figures obtained from the Recruiting and Retention Programs Division (PERS-23), as well as the CCU records and archival databases discussed earlier. For purposes of these analyses, benefit was conceptualized as the value in services provided by a member following release from the CCU, measured in either time or dollars.

FY91 was selected as the basis for the cost benefit analyses. That is, the figures are based on the operating costs in that year and the success of awardees assigned to the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs during 1991. To determine benefit, the 1991 awardee cohort was tracked through 1 June 1993.

Results

This section is organized in three parts. First, responses to the Fleet Command Questionnaire are reviewed. Second, analyses of CCU records and archival databases are summarized. Third, the results of the cost-benefit analyses are presented.

Analysis of the Fleet Command Questionnaire

The opinions and perceptions reflected in this section were those compiled from responses to the fleet command questionnaire entitled *Disciplinary Options in the Navy*.

Response Rate

Of the 704 questionnaires mailed to commanding officers, a total of 392 were completed and returned for an overall response rate of 55.7%. Seventeen questionnaires could not be delivered and were returned unopened. Fifty-four percent of the respondents were from Atlantic locations and 46% from Pacific locations. Aviation commands were represented by 39% of the respondents, 30% were from ship commands, and 26% from shore commands. Approximately 5% of the respondents did not designate a command type. Respondents had been at their present ranks for an average of 3.4 years and at their present commands for an average of 1.4 years. The average number of military personnel currently under their command was 418. Forty-six percent of the commanding officers said that they had assigned at least one member of their command to a CCU during the past 2 years.

Utilization of Disciplinary Options

One objective of this study was to assess the utilization of CCUs in comparison to that of other disciplinary options. Respondents were asked to indicate the total number of sailors at their

commands who had been administratively separated, sentenced to the brig, sent to the CCU, summary court-martialed, and received other NJPs over the past 2 years. Table 1 shows the percentage of use for each of the disciplinary options for the total population and by fleet. Table 2 presents the percentage of use by command type. As expected, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that more individuals received other NJPs than were disciplined in other ways. This was especially evident for the ship commands.

Table 1

Frequency of Use by Disciplinary Option and Location

	Administrative Separation (%)	Brig (%)	CCU (%)	Summary Court-Martial (%)	Other NJP (%)
Atlantic (<i>n</i> = 16,300)	24.3	5.8	2.1	3.3	64.6
Pacific (<i>n</i> = 18,997)	24.5	4.4	1.4	2.4	67.3
All (<i>n</i> = 35,297)	24.5	5.0	1.7	2.8	66.0

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, NJP = nonjudicial punishment.

Table 2

Frequency of Use by Disciplinary Option and Command Type

	Administrative Separation (%)	Brig (%)	CCU (%)	Summary Court-Martial (%)	Other NJP (%)
Aviation (<i>n</i> = 7,420)	25.2	3.1	2.1	1.7	67.9
Ship (<i>n</i> = 18,579)	19.7	5.2	1.6	3.5	70.0
Shore (<i>n</i> = 7,474)	35.7	6.6	1.6	2.7	53.4

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, NJP = nonjudicial punishment.

Form of NJP. Respondents were asked to identify and rank the three forms of NJPs used most frequently at their commands. Restriction was ranked by the total population as the most frequently employed NJP, followed by forfeiture of pay, reduction in grade and additional duties. Ranking by frequency of use was similar for the aviation and ship commands but differed somewhat for the shore command. The shore command ranked forfeiture of pay as the most frequently used NJP with reduction in grade and additional duties ranked second and third, respectively.

Perceived Effectiveness of Disciplinary Option

Table 3 displays the mean responses of the total sample on an item designed to assess the perceived effectiveness of the CCU, brig, and other NJPs in achieving a number of desirable outcomes. The commanding officers participating in the study were asked to indicate the extent to which they believed that the different forms of discipline lead to the various outcomes.

Table 3

Perceived Efficacy of Discipline Measures (Mean Agreement)

	Not at all (1)	To a small extent (2)	To some extent (3)	To a great extent (4)	To a very great extent (5)	
				CCU	Brig	Other NJP
Reinforces boot camp training principles				4.13	3.01	2.71
Prepares sailor for return to duty				3.90	2.72	3.22
Prepares sailor for return to civilian life				2.40	1.98	2.33
Corrects problem for which sailor was discipline				3.64	2.99	3.47
Improves military discipline				3.97	3.47	3.66
Improves work performance				3.61	2.76	3.41
Deters others from committing similar offenses				3.46	3.97	3.63
Eliminates undesirables from the Navy				2.52	3.39	3.34

Notes. 1. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, NJP = nonjudicial punishment.

2. The "don't know" responses were calculated as missing values.

Overall, the CCU was evaluated as being more effective than brig confinement or other NJPs, except with regard to deterring others from committing similar offenses and eliminating undesirables from the Navy.

Characteristics Influencing Choice of Discipline

Commanding officers were asked, first, to indicate the extent to which personal characteristics of the individual influence his or her decision to send a sailor to the CCU and, second, to provide a description of the typical awardee. A 5-point scale with response options ranging from "not at all" (1) to "to a great extent" (5) was utilized for the first of these analyses. "Don't know" responses were treated as missing values and excluded from the analysis.

Mean values and standard deviations (SD) computed for each characteristic and presented in Table 4 indicate that all six characteristics were somewhat influential in commanding officers' decisions to send an individual to the CCU. The perceived potential of the member was the characteristic ranked highest by respondents from each type of command.

Table 4

Member Characteristics That Influence the CCU Decision

	Mean	SD
Potential	4.34	.94
Maturity	3.84	1.10
Work performance	3.79	.99
Recommendations of senior staff	3.72	1.25
Rank	3.63	1.16
Age	3.14	1.31

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, SD = standard deviation.

Knowledge of the personal attributes that influence the decision to send someone to the CCU does not necessarily provide information about the quality of that attribute. For example, knowing that age affects the decision does not explain whether the person selected is likely to be under 21 or over 30. Therefore, another item allowed commanding officers to describe the individual that they were likely to send to the CCU.

Based on the most frequent responses, the sailor assigned to CCU typically was an emotionally-immature E-2, under 21 years of age, with high potential, but whose work performance was rated low or merely adequate. In addition, it was likely that senior staff members made recommendations that influenced the decision. Table B-1 in Appendix B shows the distribution of responses across six attributes.

Perceived Outcomes of CCU Training

One section of the questionnaire solicited opinions about the outcomes of CCU training compared to outcomes of other disciplinary options. Respondents were asked to use a 6-point scale to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Awardees who successfully complete CCU retraining

are more committed to the organization,
are better received by their units,
are better received by their CO's,
become better performers.

The sample generally agreed (44.5%) that awardees become better performers than individuals who are disciplined in some other manner. Further, they were also inclined to believe that awardees become more committed to the organization after CCU release. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of these responses. The "strongly agree" and "agree" responses have been combined into one category for these analyses, as have the "strongly disagree" and "disagree" responses. A substantial number of people selected the neutral response, indicating that they neither agreed nor disagreed.

When asked if they agreed that awardees are better received at their commands after release than those disciplined in other ways, the number of neutral responses was even greater. As shown in Figure 2, a substantial number of commanding officers responding to the questionnaire felt that the type of discipline received has little effect on how an individual is regarded by fellow command members or command leadership. Tests of significance did not reveal any differences by fleet or command across each of the four items.

Purpose of the Navy Disciplinary System

The type of discipline imposed is likely to depend not only on the offense committed and the characteristics of the offender, but also upon the commanding officer's notion of what the discipline is intended to accomplish. To investigate what commanding officers see as the appropriate objective(s) of discipline, they were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the goals of changing behavior, serving as a deterrent, punishing individuals, and ridding the Navy of undesirables.




Figure 1. Perceived benefits of CCU compared to other disciplinary options.




Figure 2. Perceived command acceptance of awardees compared to other disciplinary options.

Responses could range from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5) on the scale, with “don’t know” responses treated as missing values. The disciplinary goals with which there was strongest agreement were “to change inappropriate behavior” ($M = 4.66$), and “to serve as a deterrent to others” ($M = 4.37$). There was less endorsement of the goals “to punish individuals” ($M = 3.80$) and “to rid the Navy of undesirables” ($M = 3.58$).

Figure 3 indicates the percentage of the sample who said they agreed or disagreed with each of the disciplinary goals presented. As the figure shows, the majority of the commanding officers participating in this study tended to agree with all four goals. However, close to 20% disagreed that the purpose should be to rid the Navy of undesirables, and about 10% disagreed that punishment is an appropriate goal of the system. Tests of significance across each of the items did not reveal any variation for command or fleet comparisons.




Figure 3. Agreement with disciplinary goals.

Opinions Concerning Closure of CCUs

Although the respondents indicated that they had sent relatively few command members to the CCU over the last 2 years, the majority indicated that they did not agree that the CCUs should be closed. Figure 4 shows the distribution of responses on the 5-point scale, with options ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Only 14% of the total population agreed that the Navy should close its CCUs, although about one third of the respondents neither agreed or disagreed.




Figure 4. Total population agreement with closing remaining CCUs.

Analysis of variance found that significant differences in responses to this question were related to the command type ($F_{(2, 364)} = 6.57, p < .002$). As Figure 5 shows, commanding officers aboard ships were more likely to agree that the remaining CCUs should be closed. Means and SD for this item are shown in Tables B-2 and B-3 in Appendix B.




Figure 5. Agreement with closing CCUs by command type.

Disciplinary Alternatives

Respondents were asked what alternatives to the CCU they would be most likely to employ if the remaining CCUs were closed. As the means in Table 5 illustrate, agreement was strongest for using other forms of NJPs. Means were computed from responses on a scale similar to those described previously. That is, the respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the use of several alternative forms of discipline. Higher mean scores reflect more agreement with that alternative.

Table 5

Alternative Measures if Remaining CCUs are Closed

Disciplinary Alternative	Mean	SD
Use other forms of NJPs	4.39	.80
Deal with minor infractions informally	3.02	1.14
Discharge more offenders	3.02	1.20
Use more severe measures	2.97	1.11
Create another form of discipline	2.28	1.06

Notes. 1. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, SD = standard deviation.
2. Scale ranges from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5).

Perceived Effects of CCU Closures

The closure of CCU facilities in the Navy was rated as marginally limiting disciplinary options ($M = 2.60$, on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 where 5 indicated that closure would limit options to a very great extent).

A slight majority (55%) of these commanding officers felt that the CCU closures would have no effect on the readiness of their commands. However, among those who thought that there would be an effect on readiness, almost all felt that the effect would be negative (44% of the total respondents).

Summary of Open-Ended Comments

At the end of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to list any additional comments or concerns they might have. Over 80% of the respondents took the opportunity to explain why they had or had not used CCUs, to describe the people they thought benefited most from the CCU program, and to amplify their opinions regarding the value of the CCU concept. Examples of these comments are found in Appendix C.

Analysis of CCU Records and Archival Data

Sample Description

The awardee history files maintained at the Jacksonville and Norfolk CCUs were merged to form the core database for this study. Supplementary CCU and archival files were matched against this database. The core database contained records for 680 awardees who were released from the CCUs between 31 May 1991 and 31 May 1993. The supplementary files from which other variables were drawn were less complete and varied from 211 to 624 cases, depending on the specific file. Thus, the number of cases available for each analysis was dependent on the information source.

Type of Command. A description of the combined Norfolk and Jacksonville CCU awardees by aviation, ship, and shore commands is presented in Table 6. This table provides a picture of the sample used for these analyses. Most awardees (57.1%) in this sample were serving at ship commands at the time of their offenses. Almost 20% of the awardees were from aviation commands, closely followed by shore commands. For a number of CCU awardees, the recorded Unit Identification Code (UIC) at time of offense could not be matched with a valid command name, presumably due to entry error or decommissioning. Without exception, each unidentified command had sent only one awardee in the sample to the Norfolk or Jacksonville CCU. Therefore, it is almost certain that no major command was among the unidentified UICs.

Table 6
CCU Awardee Sample Description

Variable	Type of Command									
	Aviation (n = 121)		Ship (n = 354)		Shore (n = 108)		Unknown (n = 37)		Overall (n = 620)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
CCU Location										
Jacksonville	69	57.0	15	4.2	58	53.7	3	8.1	145	23.4
Norfolk	52	43.0	339	95.8	50	46.3	34	91.9	475	76.6
Ages										
18-19 years	17	14.0	89	25.1	14	13.0	13	35.1	133	21.2
20-21 years	27	22.3	179	50.6	21	19.4	15	40.5	242	39.1
22-23 years	7	5.8	47	13.3	7	6.5	5	13.5	66	10.7
24 or more years	1	0.9	24	6.8	8	7.4	1	2.7	34	5.6
Unavailable	69	57.0	15	4.2	58	53.7	3	8.2	145	23.4
Race										
Caucasian	37	30.6	201	56.8	36	33.3	11	29.9	285	46.0
Non-Caucasian	15	12.4	136	38.4	14	13.0	20	54.0	185	29.8
Unavailable	69	57.0	17	4.8	58	53.7	6	16.0	150	24.2
Marital Status										
Single	75	62.0	235	66.4	42	38.9	17	46.0	369	59.5
Married	27	22.3	41	11.6	21	19.4	7	18.9	96	15.5
Divorced or widowed	4	3.3	24	6.8	6	5.6	4	10.8	38	6.1
Unavailable	15	12.4	54	15.3	39	36.1	9	24.3	117	18.9
Paygrade										
E-1	22	18.2	103	29.1	21	19.4	15	40.5	161	26.0
E-2	48	39.7	124	35.0	46	42.6	12	32.4	230	37.1
E-3	51	42.1	126	35.6	40	37.0	10	27.1	227	36.6
E-4	0	-	1	0.3	1	0.9	0	-	2	0.3

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit.

Characteristics of the Typical Awardee. The files maintained by the CCU in Jacksonville did not include age and race information; therefore, the data found in Table 6 for these two variables represent the Norfolk CCU only. However, there is no reason to believe, that there would be a significant difference in either race or age composition between the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs.

Overall, most CCU awardees could be described as single, Caucasian, first-term Navy members between 20 and 21 years old. All awardees in the sample were male, although CCU accommodations were available for females. This sample is not substantially different from the general population of first-term Navy members with regard to age, race, marital status, paygrade, and command assignment.

Utilization of Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs. The majority of awardees in this sample, over 75%, were retrained at the CCU in Norfolk over the 2-year period. The Norfolk CCU has 72 beds, whereas the Jacksonville facility has only 25 beds available for CCU awardees. Given that the Norfolk CCU is a much larger facility, it is not surprising that over 75% of the sample was drawn from that location.

Awardee Outcome Categories

Five outcome categories were initially identified: active duty, end of active obligated service (EAOS), legitimate early discharge, negative discharge, and other outcome. The categories were based on an awardee's duty status as of 31 May 1993. The active duty category consisted of all awardees listed as active duty on that date. For CCU awardees no longer on active duty, outcome category membership was based on the Navy separation codes entered in the NHRC database. Although DOD loss codes were available, they proved to be less accurate than the Navy separation codes.

Successful and Not-Successful Awardee Groups. To ease interpretation of subsequent cost-benefit analyses, the five initial outcome categories were collapsed to form two groups: a successful category of active duty personnel and personnel discharged for legitimate reasons, and a not-successful category of personnel who were discharged for negative, often disciplinary, reasons. Analyses indicated that the number of awardees classified as successful (67.8%) was considerably greater than the number of unsuccessful awardee (32.2%). The section in which analyses of post-CCU behavior are presented provides a more detailed evaluation of awardee success rates.

For this portion of the report, awardees in the successful category were analyzed as two groups, active duty successes and discharged successes. By doing so, any differences between successful awardees who remained on active duty and those who were discharged could be identified. Awardees awaiting appellate hearings were removed from analyses because their success or failure could not be determined prior to the conclusion of the hearings.

Nonactive Duty Outcome Classification Procedure. Table 7 displays the Navy separation codes associated with each of the nonactive duty outcome categories. Three letters constitute the Navy separation codes. The first letter indicates the *means* of separation. For example, a "G" in the first position indicates that the separation was an involuntary discharge, whereas an "M" indicates voluntary release or transfer. The second and third letters indicate the *reason* for separation. For example, "BK" indicates that the member reached the end of his or her active service and "PD" indicates that the member was an alcohol abuser and that rehabilitation efforts failed. For the purposes of this study, only the last two letters of the Navy separation code were used to define the outcome categories.³

³More information regarding Navy separation codes can be found in NAVMILPERSCOMINST 1900.1B, *Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty* (DD Form 214, 1 July 1979). Washington, DC: Author.

Table 7

**Outcome Categories and Associated Navy Separation Codes
for Nonactive Duty Awardees**

Outcome	<i>n</i>	% of Total
End of Service	44	17.5
BK: end of active service	29	65.9
BM: end of active service within 3 months	14	31.8
DM: early separation	1	2.3
Legitimate Discharge	15	5.9
CC: general demobilization	5	33.3
DH: dependency	1	6.7
FF: secretary plenary authority	1	6.7
FL: disability with severance pay	2	13.3
FM: disability without severance pay	1	6.7
FT: obesity	2	13.3
FV: physical condition interfering with performance	1	6.7
GA: entry level separation	1	6.7
925: death	1	6.7
Negative Discharge	181	71.8
FS: good of service, in lieu of court-martial	5	2.7
FX: personality disorder	3	1.7
HJ: unsatisfactory performance	2	1.1
KA: frequent involvement with authorities	93	51.4
KB: conviction in civil court	2	1.1
KK: drug abuse	11	6.1
KN: misconduct, minor offense	6	3.3
KQ: misconduct, serious offense	54	29.8
PD: alcohol abuse, rehabilitation failure	5	2.8
Other	12	4.8
980: awaiting appellate hearing	11	91.7
Unavailable	1	8.3

The majority of CCU awardees no longer on active duty were discharged for negative, unacceptable reasons ($n = 181$, 71.8%). Within this category, discharges were most often due to frequent involvement with civil or military authorities and misconduct related to a serious offense. Nearly 6% of the CCU awardees received early discharges for what are considered legitimate reasons, reasons not related to disciplinary or performance problems. Among the most common, legitimate reasons for this sample were: general demobilization, disability with severance pay, and obesity, although there were a wide variety of other legitimate reasons for early discharge. Almost 18% of the nonactive duty CCU awardees successfully reached their EAOS or were discharged within 3 months of their EAOS. Loss codes in this category included Navy members released to the Naval Reserves as well as members who had fully completed their military obligations. Twelve members were awaiting appellate hearings, presumably for disciplinary infractions.

Awardee Disciplinary and Service History

The CCU program was intended to be used for first-term Navy members who experienced minor disciplinary problems before CCU retraining. The following data show the disciplinary and service histories for awardees in the sample.

Awardee Behavior Prior to Retraining. The disciplinary history of CCU awardees by outcome is shown in Table 8. These data were available for the Norfolk CCU only. Contrary to what might be expected, there was no difference between the number of past offenses committed by awardees who were successful and those who were not successful. Less than one half of both successful active duty and not-successful awardees had one or more prior offenses on their records. Surprisingly, nearly 55% of awardees who were discharged for legitimate reasons committed one or more offenses prior to CCU training. Due to the relatively small number of successfully discharged awardees, however, conclusions regarding this group are tentative. Fewer than 16% of awardees in all three outcome groups had committed two or more offenses before CCU retraining. This finding is consistent with the CCU program's intended population. There were no differences among the outcome categories with regard to drug use history. Less than 1% of awardees in the Norfolk sample had histories of civilian or military drug use. Two of these awardees remained on active duty and two were discharged for negative reasons.

Table 8

Disciplinary History by Outcome

Variable	Outcome Category					
	Successful Active Duty (n = 273)		Successful Discharge (n = 43)		Not-Successful (n = 150)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Number of past offenses						
none	150	54.9	20	46.5	82	54.7
one	71	26.0	17	39.5	38	25.3
two	41	15.0	3	7.0	24	16.0
three	7	2.6	3	7.0	6	4.0
four or more	4	1.5	0	-	0	-
History of military drug use						
no	272	99.6	43	100.0	149	99.3
yes	1	0.4	0	-	1	0.7
History of civilian drug use						
no	272	99.6	43	100.0	149	99.3
yes	1	0.4	0	-	1	0.7

Months of Service Before CCU Retraining. As shown in Table 9, most awardees in the sample performed less than 24 months of honorable service prior to CCU assignment. Not surprisingly, however, a substantial percentage of awardees who were discharged at their EAOS had performed 25 to 36 months of honorable service before CCU retraining.

Table 9

Months of Service Before CCU Retraining by Outcome for Norfolk Awardees

Months of Service	Outcome Category					
	Successful Active Duty (n = 273)		Successful Discharge (n = 43)		Not-Successful (n = 150)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
0-12	65	23.8	10	23.2	45	30.0
13-24	135	49.5	16	37.2	71	47.3
25-36	57	20.9	14	32.6	28	18.7
37-48	12	4.4	2	4.7	4	2.7
49 or more	4	1.4	1	2.3	2	1.3

Awardee Violations

Table 10 shows the articles of offense and offense severity for CCU awardees in the combined Norfolk and Jacksonville samples. Multiple offense codes were recorded in the databases for many awardees, but an individual's most serious violation was used for this analysis. When numerous violations were of equal severity, the offense appearing first in the awardee's file was used. Seriousness, or severity, was determined using the procedure outlined below.

Offense Leading to CCU Award. Offense codes typically consist of a three number offense category code followed by a letter or number combination indicating the specific type of offense within the category. For example, "111" indicates the general category drunk driving. The letter "A" following the three number code indicates drunk driving involving a personal injury, and the letter "B" indicates other cases of drunk driving. Oftentimes, a three number offense code was entered without a specific code. Therefore, the offense descriptions found in Table 10 reflect the three number general offense categories only.

By far, the most frequent (61.1%) violation of CCU awardees was absence without leave. Failure to obey an order was the second most frequent violation across successful active duty, successful discharge, and not-successful outcome categories. Compared to active duty and awardees discharged for legitimate reasons, individuals who were not successful had a higher incidence of absence without leave and a lower incidence of failure to obey an order.

Offense Severity Rating Procedure. Offense severity levels were determined using the severity ratings found in the Corrections Management Information System (CORMIS). Seven levels of severity are specified in CORMIS based on the amount of violence involved. The levels range from "not violent" (1) to "very violent" (7). Within CORMIS, severity ratings are assigned to specific offenses rather than general offense categories. That is, a drunk driving offense with personal injury has a severity rating of "2," whereas other cases of drunk driving have severity ratings of "1." The lack of specific offense codes in the awardee history files made it necessary to collapse offenses into three severity rating groups: levels 1 and 2, levels 3 and 4, and level 5. No one in the sample committed an offense with a severity rating above "5."

Table 10

Articles of Offense and Offense Severity by Outcome

Offense Article and Severity	Outcome Category					
	Successful Active Duty (n = 368)		Successful Discharge (n = 59)		Not-Successful (n = 181)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Severity Levels 1 and 2	332	90.2	49	83.0	164	90.6
Absence without leave	225		33		129	
Breach of peace	1		0		0	
Disrespect toward superior	4		0		0	
Drunk driving	2		1		1	
Drunk on duty	0		0		2	
Failure to obey an order	62		9		19	
Insubordination	21		3		7	
Intent to deceive	0		0		1	
Larceny	10		3		2	
Larceny: military property	1		0		0	
Misbehavior	6		0		1	
Provoking speech or gesture	0		0		2	
Severity Levels 3 and 4	27	7.3	9	15.3	15	8.3
Arson	1		0		0	
Assault	10		1		2	
False official statement	1		0		3	
Forgery	2		1		1	
General article	11		5		7	
Sell or damage military property	1		1		0	
Sell or damage nonmilitary property	1		1		1	
Use of drugs	0		0		1	
Severity Level 5	9	2.5	1	1.7	2	1.1
Assault or disobey an officer	3		0		2	
Desertion	4		0		0	
Threat through communication	2		1		0	

Over 85% of the violations committed by CCU awardees were in the least severe category of offenses. The greatest percentage of level 3 and level 4 offenses within an outcome category were committed by the successful awardees who were discharged for legitimate reasons. Across outcome categories, however, the greatest number of relatively serious offenses, level 5, were committed by awardees currently on active duty. These findings are largely due to the greater number of awardees in the successful active duty category.

Behavior During CCU Retraining

The spot check records maintained by the CCU staff at Norfolk provided an easily quantifiable measure of an awardee's behavior during CCU retraining. A spot check was labeled positive by CCU staff if an awardee behaved in a way that was consistent with retraining goals (e.g., proper military bearing). When an awardee behaved inappropriately (e.g., insubordinate attitude), a negative spot check was recorded. The total number of negative spot checks and the total number of positive spot checks recorded in an awardee's file were used for this analysis.

As shown in Table 11, fewer positive spot checks than negative spot checks were recorded for awardees in all outcome categories. Over 40% of awardees in the successful and not-successful discharge categories received five or more negative spot checks, compared to less than 30% of the successful active duty awardees.

Table 11

Positive and Negative Spot Checks by Outcome for Norfolk Awardees

Number of Checks	Outcome Category					
	Successful Active Duty (n = 180)		Successful Discharge (n = 18)		Not-Successful (n = 71)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Positive Spot Checks						
0	157	87.2	18	100.0	69	97.2
1-2	20	11.1	0	-	2	2.8
3 or more	3	1.7	0	-	0	-
Negative Spot Checks						
0	19	10.6	1	5.6	4	5.6
1-2	61	33.8	2	11.1	18	25.4
3-4	48	26.7	7	38.9	20	28.2
5-6	32	17.8	4	22.2	14	19.7
7 or more	20	11.1	4	22.2	15	21.1

Post-CCU Behavior

The behavior of awardees after CCU release is one indication of the retraining program's effectiveness. The months of service a member provided to the Navy after release from the CCU and the quality of that service (indicated by promotions, demotions, number of unauthorized absences and desertions) are germane to this evaluation of the CCU program.

Months of Service After CCU Retraining. The months of honorable service after retraining is shown in Table 12. The greatest number of awardees serving 16 months or more was found in the successful active duty category. Nearly 75% of successful discharged awardees gave over 6 months of service to the Navy before discharge. Over 50% of awardees in the not-successful group served 6 months or less before discharge.

Table 12

Months of Service After CCU Retraining by Outcome

Months of Service	Outcome Category					
	Successful Active Duty (n = 273)		Successful Discharge (n = 43)		Not-Successful (n = 150)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
0-3	22	8.0	5	11.6	31	20.6
4-6	31	11.4	7	16.3	50	33.3
7-9	51	18.7	9	20.9	30	20.0
10-12	32	11.7	8	18.6	16	10.7
13-15	26	9.5	7	16.3	13	8.7
16 or more	111	40.7	7	16.3	10	6.7

Awardees who were not successful tended to fail within the first 6 months after release from the CCU program. This finding is of particular importance when examining the validity of the successful active duty awardee category. Although classified as successful, analyses indicated that 50% of awardees who completed CCU retraining less than 6 months prior to data collection may fail. Fewer than 20% of the successful active duty awardees were new releases (i.e., less than 6 months prior to data collection); therefore, the number of awardees in the successful active duty category was *not* inflated by recently released awardees who might fail.

Command Follow-Up Letters. Responses to the follow-up letters sent by CCU staff to an awardee's command were available for approximately 53% of the 475 awardees retrained at the Norfolk facility. The letters are used to track an awardee's success at 3, 6, and 12 months after release from the CCU. Commands are asked to indicate the awardee's current duty status and the command's recommendation regarding reenlistment. At the time of this investigation, the facility had received command responses to about 58% of the 3-month follow-up letters. From the commands that responded, 120 awardees were still on active duty, while only 28 awardees were discharged. Just under 50% of the active duty awardees would not be recommended for reenlistment. None of the awardees who were discharged would have been recommended for reenlistment. This pattern was repeated at 6 months and at 12 months after CCU release. Approximately one half of the 66 awardees who remained on active duty at 6 months and nearly all of the 37 who were discharged would not have been recommended for reenlistment. At 12 months, 14 of the 33 awardees on active duty and 43 of the 47 discharged awardees would not have been recommended.

Nonactive Duty Awardees' Career Activities. Several pieces of information were recorded for awardees in the successful and not-successful discharge categories, but were not available for awardees who remained on active duty. Taken together, the data provide a sketch of each awardee's Navy career. Included were total months served, number of promotions and demotions throughout career, highest paygrade earned, and number of unauthorized absences and desertions over the course of the awardee's enlistment. These data are found in Table 13.

Table 13

Career Activities for Nonactive Duty Awardees

Activity	Nonactive Duty Outcome Category			
	Successful Discharge (n = 59)		Not-Successful (n = 181)	
	n	%	n	%
Months served during career				
0-12	0	-	5	2.8
13-24	14	23.7	79	43.6
25-36	18	30.5	63	34.8
37-48	25	42.4	26	14.4
49 or more	2	3.4	8	4.4
Number of promotions				
none	31	52.5	108	59.7
one	10	16.9	44	24.3
two	11	18.6	28	15.4
three	4	6.8	1	0.6
four or more	3	5.1	0	-
Highest paygrade earned				
E-1	2	3.4	16	8.8
E-2	15	25.4	81	44.8
E-3	34	57.6	60	33.1
E-4 or higher	8	13.6	24	13.3
Number of demotions				
none	46	78.0	130	71.8
one	9	15.2	43	23.8
two or more	4	6.8	8	4.4
Number of unauthorized absences				
none	53	89.8	153	84.5
one	3	5.1	18	9.9
two or more	3	5.1	10	5.6
Number of desertions				
none	57	96.6	171	94.5
one	2	3.4	10	5.5

Rate Criticality and Outcome

The likelihood of individuals being administratively separated may depend not only on their behavior, but on how critical their jobs are to the commands they serve. That is, individuals in undermanned, or critical, rates might be more likely to remain on active duty and less likely to be discharged for disciplinary reasons than those in overmanned, or noncritical, rates. To investigate

this possibility, a rate criticality code was assigned to each awardee, and the percentages of successful active duty, successful discharged, and not-successful personnel in the critical and noncritical rates were compared. Rate criticality was determined using the Career Reenlistment Objectives (CREO) classification list produced in August 1993. For the purposes of this study, a critical rate was defined as any job rate listed as undermanned in the August 1993 CREO. All manned and overmanned rates were classified as noncritical.

As shown in Table 14, close to 80% of the awardees filling critical rates are currently on active duty, whereas less than 60% of awardees in noncritical rates remain on active duty. In addition, the percentage of awardees in overmanned positions who were discharged for negative reasons (31.3%) was over two times the percentage of awardees in undermanned positions who were discharged for negative reasons (14.5%). Conclusions regarding the relationship between rate criticality and outcome are limited by the small number of awardees in critical rates. Nevertheless, there is some indication that awardees filling critical rates are less likely to be discharged for disciplinary reasons than those in overmanned positions.

Table 14

Rate Criticality by Outcome

Outcome Category	Critical Rate (n = 55)		Noncritical Rate (n = 553)	
	n	%	n	%
Successful Active Duty (n = 368)	43	78.2	325	58.8
Successful Discharge (n = 59)	4	7.3	55	9.9
Not-Successful (n = 181)	8	14.5	173	31.3

Cost-Benefit Analyses

The results presented in this section are based on FY91 costs, and the population of awardees who were retrained at Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs during that period. Using data from the Awardee History database, the length of stay was computed for each individual and averaged for the entire population. The average length of stay across all awardees was 27.87 days.

Cost Computations

To compute the costs associated with retraining a Navy member at a CCU, the two additional pieces of information required were the average cost per day and the average daily population. Because both Norfolk and Jacksonville were operated as a joint waterfront brig and CCU, available cost figures did not discriminate between costs for awardees and costs for prisoners. Accordingly, it was necessary to proceed under the assumption that the costs were equal for brig prisoners and CCU awardees. This results in a conservative estimate of CCU costs: FY91 data show that the average daily cost for prisoners in stand-alone brig facilities was actually higher than the average daily cost for awardees at stand-alone CCU facilities. Therefore, the following computation can be used to arrive at the average daily cost per person for either brig prisoners or CCU awardees:

$$\text{Average daily cost per person} = \text{Yearly cost} / \text{Average population} / 365 \text{ days.}$$

To arrive at the average cost for retraining an awardee in a CCU, the average daily cost per person was multiplied by the average length of stay for CCU awardees (27.87 days). Also included is the cost associated with the loss of productivity while the awardee undergoes retraining. This is computed as the basic pay rate for 28 days for the typical E-2 awardee, or \$859.00. Results of these computations for the two facilities are shown in Table 15.

Table 15
Computation of CCU Costs at Norfolk and Jacksonville Facilities

Facility	Total Yearly Costs ^a	Average Brig/ CCU Population	Average Cost per Awardee
Norfolk	\$1,414,183	46	\$2,347
Jacksonville	6,071,298	138	3,359
Total	7,485,481	184	3,106

Note. CCU = Correction Custody Unit.

^aTotal costs include cost of operations plus personnel costs for civilian, officer, and enlisted staff and awardee basic pay.

Value Computations

The benefit to the Navy gained by sending a member through the CCU retraining program was determined by the value of services provided by those awardees following their release from the CCU. Value is customarily measured in either time or dollars. The computation of value received was based on the actual awardee population at Norfolk and Jacksonville during FY91. The data source for specifying that population was the Awardee History File obtained from each facility. The total file used for analysis included 384 awardees.

Awardees released in FY91 were next classified as either successful or not successful on the basis of (1) duty status and (2) separation reason. For those no longer on active duty, the DOD loss codes were used to determine and classify the reason for separation. The success category included all individuals still in the Navy as of 1 June 1993, plus those who had received a discharge because they had reached the end of their obligated service or for some other legitimate reason (e.g., a medical problem). The not-successful category included those individuals with loss codes indicating that they were separated for negative reasons. Classified in this manner, approximately 53% of the population was considered successful.

One way to assess the value received is to look at the services provided by awardees after their release from the CCU. Before that could be done, it was necessary to compute the average length of service (in days) following release from the CCU for both the successful and not-successful groups. Thirteen individuals who were awaiting an appellate hearing were excluded from this analysis because they could not be classified as either successful or unsuccessful at this time. Table 16 shows the average length of time individuals in both categories were in the Navy from enlistment through release from the CCU, and also indicates the average length of time between release from the CCU and discharge or 1 June 1993, whichever came first. As the table shows, awardees classified as successful contributed more than twice as many days of service following release than did those in the not-successfulness category.

Table 16

Average Length of Service

	Number of Cases	Average Number of Days Between Enlistment and CCU Release	Average Number of Days Following CCU Release
Total successful	204	639	650
Active duty	132	553	768
EAOS/ legitimate	72	797	433
Total not-successful	167	521	290

Note. CCU = Correction Custody Unit, EAOS = end of active obligated service.

The days of service following release from the CCU can be used to assess value to the Navy in two ways. Both methods utilize data from successful individuals only, because the unsuccessful group's remaining services are assumed to be of lesser value. Using the first method, the number of days of service after release is compared to the number of days in the CCU:

$$650 \text{ mean days service} / 27.87 \text{ days} = 23.3 \text{ days payback for each CCU day for those in the successful category.}$$

Alternatively, value can be conceptualized as the total number of post-CCU service days contributed by successful members, with cost derived from the total number of days spent in the CCU by all 1991 awardees (including 13 not classified) in the two CCUs:

Value	= 650 service days x 204 successful members	= 132,600 days
Cost	= 28 days x 384 total members	= - 10,752 days
Net Value		= 121,848 days

Cost and Benefit Computations

It is customary to see cost-benefit analyses presented using dollar figures rather than service time. Economists frequently represent the value of an employee by the salary paid to that individual. The rationale is that the more valuable an individual is to an organization, the more he or she will be paid. Although one may argue with this assumption, salary nevertheless can provide a useful indicator of value received. Services contributed to the Navy by successful awardees can be translated to a dollar figure based on the average paygrade they achieved following their release from the CCU.

The total dollar value of all successful awardees released from Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs was compared to the total dollar cost of operating those CCUs during FY91. Even though a number of the awardees in the sample had achieved a higher paygrade by 1 June 1993, the computations were based on a paygrade of E-2 because this yielded the most conservative estimate. As Figure 6 indicates, the net value to the Navy provided by successful awardees was substantial.

E-2 annual salary	=	\$ 14,480			
Average length of post-release service	x	1.8 years			
		<hr/>			
Value received per awardee	=	\$ 26,064			
Number of successful awardees	x	204			
		<hr/>			
Total value of services received	=	\$5,317,056			
Less cost of CCUs FY91	-	\$1,711,435 ^a			
		<hr/>			
Net value of services	=	\$3,605,621			
<hr/>					
^a The FY91 cost of the Norfolk and Jacksonville CCUs was computed as follows:					
	<u>Total Costs</u>	<u>Total Beds</u>	<u>CCU Beds</u>		
Jacksonville	\$1,374,669	/ 75	x 25	=	458,223
Norfolk	5,952,756	/ 342	x 72	=	1,253,212
					<hr/>
					\$1,711,435

Figure 6. Computation of value based on pay.

Cost Avoidance Analysis

Given the available data it is difficult to estimate the personnel replacement costs that the Navy avoided by sending members through the CCU retraining program. One can only speculate about the number of successes that would have been produced by other nonjudicial punishment alternatives, the number of administrative discharges that could have been avoided if the member had been assigned to a CCU, or the number of successful awardees that might have been discharged early if the CCU had not been available. If one assumes that other nonjudicial punishments would have been equally successful, then personnel replacement costs are not of primary interest. Rather, a comparison of the cost of the NJP with the cost of CCU retraining is the critical analysis.

Unfortunately, the nature of nonjudicial punishment and limited data make accurate cost assessment of NJPs nearly impossible. However, if one assumes that all or some of the individuals sent to the CCU might have otherwise been court-martialed and/or administratively discharged, then the cost to replace personnel becomes another measure of dollar value gained. Therefore, two cost avoidance analyses were conducted. For the first analysis, it was assumed that all individuals sent to the CCU would have otherwise been discharged. In the second analysis, it was assumed that only a portion of the CCU awardees would have otherwise been discharged. The second analysis was based on questionnaire findings which indicated that NJPs accounted for 66% of the disciplinary actions taken by commands, whereas 27.3% of disciplinary actions were administrative separations and courts-martial. Many of the disciplinary actions may have been taken against sailors who would not have been eligible for CCU retraining; thus, this second analysis is a most conservative estimate of cost avoidance.

The average length of service prior to entering the CCU was 18.3 months for awardees in the FY91 sample. Presumably, members would have been discharged at approximately the time they entered the CCU, and the average replacement cost in time would also be 18.3 months. Economic data provided by the Recruiting and Retention Programs Division (PERS-23) indicates that the replacement cost for a person discharged at 18.3 months is \$27,419. This figure takes into consideration costs of recruiting, pay and benefits. Subtracting the average cost of retraining an awardee in the CCU, a net replacement cost avoidance of \$24,313 is realized (\$27,419 - \$3,106). Assuming that all successful awardees would have been discharged, a significant overall cost avoidance of \$4,959,852 is realized (204 successful awardees x \$24,313). Multiplying the replacement cost avoidance by the more conservative estimate of 56 awardees (204 successful awardees x 27.3% administrative separations and courts-martial) yields an overall cost avoidance of \$1,361,528. Provided the current success rate is maintained, the cost of CCU retraining is significantly less than the cost of replacement.

Data Quality

Our overall response rate of 55.7% was somewhat better than average for a mailed questionnaire, and there is reason to believe that the responses received represent the opinions of the targeted population. It was encouraging that responses to our questionnaire did not tend to cluster at one end of the scales, which indicates that they reflect a wide range of opinions. In addition, response rates for Pacific and Atlantic locations did not differ significantly, suggesting that both groups were fairly represented in the sample.

Missing data, erroneous information, and data entry inconsistencies are commonly encountered when archival databases maintained by noninteracting facilities are used for investigation and analysis. This is particularly true of databases maintained for administrative, rather than research, purposes. While it is not unusual that we encountered such problems, it is unfortunate. As a result, substantially fewer cases were available, which reduced the power of the analyses. In addition, a significant amount of time was required to resolve inconsistencies between data sources (e.g., discrepancies between DOD loss codes and Navy separation codes, erroneous start and release dates). Finally, incomplete information made it necessary to aggregate specific categories into more general and less informative groups (e.g., article severity ratings, offense codes).

Discussion

Given the reality of today's economic and political climate, the Department of the Navy sometimes finds it necessary to scale back or eliminate programs that conventional wisdom tells us were of known benefit to the organization or its members. One such program is the disciplinary option offered by CCUs. There is little doubt that recent underutilization of these facilities, which in turn reduced their economic viability, contributed to the decision to close many of the CCUs. A proposal to close the remaining units operated by CINCLANTFLT, and the need to obtain data while they were still in operation, provided the impetus for this study. It was designed to investigate the conditions under which a commanding officer would take advantage of the option offered by the CCU, to solicit the opinions of commanding officers regarding the discontinuance of that option, to determine for whom and under what conditions the CCUs are most effective in changing behavior, and to assess the benefits and costs associated with maintaining CCU facilities.

One of the most troublesome aspects of assessing CCU effectiveness is specifying criteria of success upon which policy makers can agree. Before the Navy's need to downsize, success was customarily conceptualized as returning a member to active duty. Although we have used time in service after release from the CCU as one of the success criteria in this analysis, we acknowledge that many people no longer agree that returning individuals who have had disciplinary problems to active duty is a desirable objective. If retention is not a viable criterion of success, then the analysis of cost avoidance measured by replacement costs becomes less important. Therefore, other criteria were also addressed in the analyses. These included the congruence between the program's intended and actual populations, the satisfaction of users, and the effectiveness of retraining.

Overall, we found that the CCUs were being appropriately used for the population for which they were intended. According to the *Manual for the Administration of Correctional Custody Units*, the CCU was "... designed to have the greatest positive impact on the young, immature, first-term sailor who has not yet fully developed self-discipline, a sense of responsibility, and an understanding of the Navy's fundamental standards of acceptable behavior" (1983, p. I-3). Our analyses of CCU records showed that the CCU program did, in fact, reach this targeted population of sailors. For example, Norfolk and Jacksonville data showed that the majority of CCU awardees were E-1s and E-2s with less than 2 years of service prior to retraining. Furthermore, when asked to describe the typical awardee, commanding officers indicated that the sailors they assigned to the CCU tended to be relatively young and immature, and low performers who possessed the potential for improvement.

Although the actual and intended populations were generally congruent, one area of discrepancy was noted. A number of awardees who reached their EAOS served in the Navy less than 6 months after their release from the CCU program, even though the *Manual for the Administration of Correctional Custody Unit* states that members within 7 months of EAOS should not be assigned to the CCU "... unless the commanding officer feels the need to award correctional custody for strictly disciplinary purposes. . ." (p. III-1). Data were not available to indicate why commanding officers used the CCU program for members that would be discharged in less than 6 months, but it can be assumed that the objective in those instances was discipline rather than retraining.

Satisfaction of the users (in this case, Navy commanding officers) was best illustrated by results from the fleet command questionnaire. For example, satisfaction with the program was reflected by the fact that more than 50% of the respondents disagreed with the decision to close the CCUs. In addition, the experiences related in the comment section of the questionnaire indicated that a majority of the users have been satisfied with CCU results. Equally important, nearly 50% of commanding officers indicated that sailors sent to the CCU were better performers and more committed to the organization after retraining than were sailors disciplined by other measures. Finally, the CCU was judged somewhat more effective than other means of discipline in correcting behavioral problems and in improving military discipline. The fact that positive opinions usually accounted for about 50% of responses across all items should not be interpreted as indicating that one half of the respondents held negative opinions. In general, neutral responses tended to be more frequent than negative responses.

The effectiveness of retraining was best illustrated by looking at the number of members still on active duty. For critical rates in particular, the number of awardees who remained on active duty was substantially greater than those who received negative discharges. These members were once disciplinary problems yet they went on to perform critical jobs for the Navy. Thus, we can conclude that the CCU program was a factor in their success.

Despite generally positive findings, the CCU program remains underutilized. Among the reasons most frequently given for *not* using CCUs were the cost involved in transporting a member, the manpower shortage created when a member is gone for a month, the required command visits, and the paperwork ("hassles") involved. A number of respondents stated that such inconveniences made the CCU "not worth the effort." Even if a commanding officer believes that retraining is an important part of discipline, the command costs associated with sending a member to the CCU may represent a significant financial sacrifice for some commands. Recent budget cuts make this issue even more critical.

Conclusions

While the research purview does not extend to policy decisions, our task is to provide policy makers with an objective and comprehensive analysis of the information. Using a variety of data sources, this investigation yielded findings that allow us to conclude:

- When used appropriately, CCUs can effectively change behavior.
- CCUs make a unique contribution to the Navy disciplinary system.
- CCUs provide benefits to the Navy that seem to outweigh their costs.
- Systemic barriers to the utilization of CCUs exist in today's environment.

The civilian correctional community based its increasingly popular "boot camps" on the pioneering programs in the military services. It is ironic that the Navy may be forced to abandon its CCU program which served as a prototype for that innovative approach.

Appendix A

**Fleet Command Questionnaire:
Disciplinary Options in the Navy**

FLEET COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRE: DISCIPLINARY OPTIONS IN THE NAVY

Navy Personnel Research and Development Center
San Diego, CA 92152-7250

August 9, 1993

Dear Sir/Madam:


The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center is conducting an assessment of Correctional Custody Units (CCUs) in the Navy. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of recent CCU closures on Navy corrections and to compare the effectiveness and cost of CCUs with other disciplinary options. The enclosed questionnaire is a major component of our study.


We are asking fleet commands in both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets to provide us with information about CCU use and disciplinary decision-making. **YOUR INPUT IS NEEDED EVEN THOUGH CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY UNITS ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE IN THE PACIFIC FLEET.**


Please complete the questionnaire as soon as possible and return it in the envelope provided. If you have any questions or comments, contact Dr. Joyce Shettel Dutcher (DSN: 553-7966), Dr. Dale Glaser (DSN: 553-7940), or Ms. Amy Rudolph (DSN: 553-7949).

Thank you for your time and effort.

Sincerely,


Joyce Shettel Dutcher, Ph.D.


Dale Glaser, Ph.D.


Amy Rudolph

FLEET COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRE: DISCIPLINARY OPTIONS IN THE NAVY

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San Diego, CA 92152-7250

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
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
We are asking fleet commands in both the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets to provide us with information about CCU use and disciplinary decision-making. **YOUR INPUT IS NEEDED EVEN IF YOU HAVE NEVER USED A CCU FACILITY.**


Please complete the questionnaire as soon as possible and return it in the envelope provided. If you have any questions or comments, contact Dr. Joyce Shettel Dutcher (DSN: 553-7966), Dr. Dale Glaser (DSN: 553-7940), or Ms. Amy Rudolph (DSN: 553-7949).

Thank you for your time and effort.

Sincerely,


Joyce Shettel Dutcher, Ph.D.


Dale Glaser, Ph.D.


Amy Rudolph

FLEET COMMAND QUESTIONNAIRE: DISCIPLINARY OPTIONS IN THE NAVY

As a Commanding Officer in the Atlantic Fleet, you have a variety of disciplinary options from which to choose. We are investigating the impact of recent CCU closures on your choices. We are interested in the types of disciplines you have used in the past and the factors that influenced your decisions.

Please read each question carefully, but do not spend a great deal of time on any one item. Your initial reaction to a question is usually best.

Because we realize the value of your time, the questionnaire is as short as possible. If, however, we have overlooked an important factor or area, please mention it in your comments on the last page.

The responses to this questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential.

Thank you very much for your participation.

Privacy Act Statement

Public Law 93-579 called the Privacy Act of 1974 requires that you be informed of the purposes and uses to be made of the information collected. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of recent CCU closures on Navy Corrections, and to compare the effectiveness and cost of CCUs with other disciplinary options. Providing information in the questionnaire is voluntary. Failure to respond to any particular question will not result in a penalty to the respondent.

Organizational Systems Department (Code 161)
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center
San Diego, CA 92152-7250

SECTION I

1. Please list the duty stations you have had over the last two years, including your present command.

Command	Dates of Service	Type of Command (aviation, training, etc.)	Number of Military Personnel
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

2. I have been at my present rank for _____ years.

Responses to questions 3-5 should be based on disciplinary measures that have been used at your command **WITHIN THE PAST TWO YEARS**. Consult command records or other sources if you have not been at this specific command for the full two years.

3. Please indicate the approximate number of sailors at your command who have received each type of discipline within the past two years.

- _____ Administrative Separation
- _____ Brig
- _____ CCU
- _____ Summary Court Martial for disciplinary reasons
- _____ Other NIPs

4. Please indicate the approximate number of sailors who have been returned to duty after serving time in the Brig. _____

5. Please indicate the approximate number of sailors who have been returned to duty after completing the CCU program. _____

SECTION II

1. In your opinion, to what extent does each type of discipline (CCU, Brig, and other NJP) accomplish the following results?

	To A Very Great Extent	To A Great Extent	To Some Extent	To A Small Extent	Not At All	Don't Know
Reinforces boot camp training principles						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Prepares sailor for return to duty						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Prepares sailor for return to civilian life						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Corrects problem for which sailor was disciplined						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6

(CONTINUED)

In your opinion, to what extent does each type of discipline (CCU, Brig, and other NJP) accomplish the following results?

	To A Very Great Extent	To A Great Extent	To Some Extent	To A Small Extent	Not At All	Don't Know
Improves military discipline						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Improves work performance						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Deters others from committing similar offenses						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6
Eliminates undesirables from the Navy						
CCU	1	2	3	4	5	6
Brig	1	2	3	4	5	6
Other NJP	1	2	3	4	5	6

2. Please identify the three forms of NJPs you use the most and rank them (assign 1 to the form you use MOST frequently, and so on).

- _____ Restriction
- _____ Arrest in quarters
- _____ CCU
- _____ Bread and water
- _____ Additional duties
- _____ Reduction in grade
- _____ Forfeiture of pay
- _____ Admonition or reprimand

When answering questions 3-6, please assume that each disciplinary option (CCU, Brig, other NJP, and Administrative Separation) is readily available to you.

3. Please check the discipline you would use for an UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE when the sailor is a *first-time offender*.

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

4. Please check the discipline you would use for UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES when:

Deployment is pending

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is ashore

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is afloat

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is assigned to critical duty

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is assigned to noncritical duty

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

5. Please check the discipline you would use for a UCMJ VIOLATION other than unauthorized absence when the sailor is a *first-time offender*.

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

6. Please check the discipline you would use for UCMJ VIOLATIONS other than unauthorized absence when:

Deployment is pending

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is ashore

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is afloat

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is assigned to critical duty

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

Sailor is assigned to noncritical duty

_____ CCU _____ Brig _____ Other NJP _____ Admin Sep

SECTION III

1. Please indicate the extent to which each personal factor WOULD AFFECT or HAS AFFECTED your decision to send an awardee to the CCU.

	To A Very Great Extent	To A Great Extent	To Some Extent	To A Small Extent	Not At All	Don't Know
Age	1	2	3	4	5	6
Rank	1	2	3	4	5	6
Maturity	1	2	3	4	5	6
Work Performance	1	2	3	4	5	6
Potential	1	2	3	4	5	6
Recommendations of Senior Staff	1	2	3	4	5	6

2. For each of the factors listed below, please circle the word which best describes the person you WOULD SEND or HAVE SENT to the CCU. Consider only these personal factors and not the offense.

Age:	under 21	22-25	26-29	30 and over	
Rank:	E1	E2	E3		
Maturity:	Immature	Somewhat Immature	Average	Somewhat Mature	Mature
Work Performance:	Low	Somewhat Low	Adequate	Somewhat High	High
Potential:	Low	Somewhat Low	Average	Somewhat High	High
Recommendations of Senior Staff:	Negative	Somewhat Negative	Neutral	Somewhat Positive	Positive

SECTION IV

COMPLETE THIS SECTION IF YOU HAVE USED A CCU WITHIN THE PAST TWO YEARS. IF NOT, GO ON TO SECTION V.

Please indicate your agreement with the following statements.

Awardees who successfully complete CCU retraining:

1. are more committed to the organization than those who are disciplined by other measures.
2. are better received by their units than those who are disciplined by other measures.
3. are better received by their C.O. s than those who are disciplined by other measures.
4. become better performers than those who are disciplined by other measures.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
1. are more committed to the organization than those who are disciplined by other measures.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. are better received by their units than those who are disciplined by other measures.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. are better received by their C.O. s than those who are disciplined by other measures.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. become better performers than those who are disciplined by other measures.	1	2	3	4	5	6

SECTION V

Please indicate your agreement with the following statements.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Don't Know
1. The major purpose of the total Navy disciplinary system should be to:						
change inappropriate behavior.	1	2	3	4	5	6
serve as a deterrent to others.	1	2	3	4	5	6
punish individuals.	1	2	3	4	5	6
rid the Navy of undesirables.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. The most appropriate program for individuals placed in the CCU is:						
work program.	1	2	3	4	5	6
skills training.	1	2	3	4	5	6
education.	1	2	3	4	5	6
behavioral treatment program.	1	2	3	4	5	6
military discipline program.	1	2	3	4	5	6
punishment.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. If the remaining CCUs are closed, I will probably:						
use more severe measures (e.g., brig).	1	2	3	4	5	6
use other forms of NJPs.	1	2	3	4	5	6
deal with minor infractions informally.	1	2	3	4	5	6
create another form of discipline.	1	2	3	4	5	6
discharge more offenders.	1	2	3	4	5	6

SECTION VI

1. Please check the extent to which the closure of CCU facilities in the Navy limits your disciplinary options.

To A Very Great Extent
 To A Great Extent
 To Some Extent
 To A Small Extent
 Not At All
 Don't Know

2. The effect of CCU closure on unit personnel readiness will be:

Negative
 Somewhat Negative
 No Effect
 Somewhat Positive
 Positive
 Don't Know

3. The remaining CCUs should be closed.

Strongly Disagree
 Disagree
 Neutral
 Agree
 Strongly Agree

4. If you have used CCUs in the past, please tell us your main reasons for doing so. If you have NOT used CCUs, why not? YOUR COMMENTS ARE CRITICAL TO OUR INVESTIGATION.

Thank you again for your time.

Appendix B
Supplemental Tables

Table B-1

Commanding Officer's Descriptions of the Typical Awardee

Age (%)				
Under 21	22 to 25	26 to 29	30 and over	
83.3	15.2	0.9	0.6	
Rank (%)				
E-1		E-2	E-3	
25.1		44.0	30.8	
Maturity (%)				
Immature	Somewhat Immature	Average	Somewhat Mature	Mature
41.5	43.7	11.1	2.8	0.8
Work Performance (%)				
Low	Somewhat low	Adequate	Somewhat High	High
26.2	32.6	27.9	11.7	1.7
Potential (%)				
Low	Somewhat Low	Average	Somewhat High	High
8.2	8.5	28.0	39.8	15.5
Recommendation of Senior Staff (%)				
Negative	Somewhat Negative	Neutral	Somewhat Positive	Positive
13.1	12.3	23.2	36.0	15.4

Table B-2

Remaining CCUs Should be Closed

	Mean	SD
Atlantic	2.39	1.02
Pacific	2.55	1.14
All	2.46	1.08

Notes. 1. CCUs = Correctional Custody Unit, SD = standard deviation.
 2. Scale anchors are "strongly disagree" (1), "disagree" (2), "neutral" (3), "agree" (4), "strongly agree" (5).

Table B-3

**Remaining CCUs Should be Closed:
 Responses by Command Type**

	Mean	SD
Aviation	2.33	1.01
Ship	2.76	1.13
Shore	2.35	1.01

Notes. 1. CCUs = Correctional Custody Unit, SD = standard deviation.
 2. Scale anchors are "strongly disagree" (1), "disagree" (2), "neutral" (3), "agree" (4), "strongly agree" (5).

Appendix C
Questionnaire Comments

Questionnaire Comments

The final item on the fleet command questionnaire concerning disciplinary options was: open-ended item inviting respondents to explain the reasons why they had or had not utilized the CCU option over the past 2 years. Eighty-two percent of the questionnaires received included comments. This appendix contains a sample of the comments received, selected to illustrate the range of opinions expressed by questionnaire respondents.

Commanding officers who had used CCU in the past 2 years tended to comment about (1) the characteristics of the person they send there, (2) reasons why CCU was awarded, and (3) unique benefits/capabilities of the CCU. Examples of these types of comments are shown in Table C-1.

Table C-2 reproduces some of the comments related to reasons for not using CCUs, most of which were received from commanding officers who did not send anyone to the CCU in the past 2 years. There were three predominant themes represented in their comments: (1) the preference for other disciplinary options, (2) perception of no appropriate CCU candidates in their commands, and (3) systemic barriers to utilization.

A number of the comments received referred specifically to the issue of downsizing and retention. As shown in Table C-3, people who raised this issue generally felt that the CCUs were no longer necessary under present conditions.

Table C-4 contains comments related to positive and negative experiences involved with past utilization of the CCU option.

Finally, Table C-5 includes examples of recommendations to close the CCUs, and Table C-6 offers examples of recommendations to retain the CCU option.

*

Table C-1

Comments From CCU Users

Who They Selected for CCU

I have used the CCU for the young, immature sailor who generally performs at a high level and has strong potential; for this type of sailor CCU is very beneficial.

We have used CCU to help young and immature individuals to adapt to the military environment. We also used it one time as a method of increasing the perceived severity of punishment but this was not successful.

The CCU is a valuable tool for junior sailors displaying lack of maturity, personal responsibility, and a need for continued military indoctrination.

Why They Used the CCU Option

While awarded as punishment, it is most representative of extension of Basic Training and has been utilized as such to instill pride, professionalism, and an improved work ethic . . .

To improve individuals' performance on the job.

The main reason for sending someone to CCU is to expose them to a stricter environment. This environment is somewhat close to what life in the brig would be like. Once they get a taste of CCU, knowing the brig is only worse, they realize that they don't want to make the same mistake twice.

Unique Benefits/Capabilities of CCU

It provides a close supervision, military indoctrination environment that is not available on board a small ship . . . providing this on board would be resented as an undue burden on regular chain-of-command.

. . . behavior modification combined with discipline seems to be the key.

CCU is an excellent tool to help refocus an otherwise good sailor gone astray.

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit.

Table C-2

Comments From Commanding Officers Who had not Used CCU

Preference for Other Disciplinary Options

As an alternative, this command has turned to increased command counseling in addition to other NJP options to prevent disciplinary problems.

I handle most violation of UCMJ at captain's mast . . . with downsizing of the Navy, if a repeat offender, administrative separation is my choice.

There are so many other options, particularly those that keep the service member within the command and of use.

I have enough flexibility within the current guidelines for NJP and the legal system to maintain discipline. The principles taught at CCU are best taught shipboard on a daily basis . . . I would rather the Navy invest the time and manpower on a petty officer academy to teach middle level leadership skills on a basic level.

No Appropriate Candidates

I don't feel I've had cases requiring CCU and don't have a good enough feel for what CCU accomplishes.

Normally I don't have that many cases of offenders that have that specific type of problem that I would use CCU. . . it is either NJP or ADSEP.

Severity of offenses committed did not warrant such measures nor were the offenders in need of such disciplinary action.

Systemic Barriers to Utilization

We have not used CCU because: (1) nearest CCU is over 150 miles away, (2) seldom encounter individuals who would benefit from CCU . . .

CCUs are too limited in who they will take. Additionally, time required is not compatible with shipboard requirements.

. . . not used because of the costs involved to send members to nearest CCU—200+ miles which takes critical TAD funding away from readiness training efforts and fleet commander demand . . .

We have never used CCU because of the distance from the command and the time, money and logistics involved. Since we are understaffed, it is simply easier to deal with disciplinary problems through NJP.

There is not a CCU close. If there were a CCU close, I would use it.

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, NJP = nonjudicial punishment, UCMJ = Uniform Code of Military Justice, ADSEP = administrative separation, TAD = temporary additional duty.

Table C-3

Comments Related to Navy Downsizing

The CCU concept was terrific when the Navy was a 'growth industry' and retention was a major consideration. I used the CCU for those young immature sailors who needed help in growing up, particularly those who showed potential. Current downsizing climate suggests that we no longer need to play a social rehabilitation role. We have neither the resources or time to correct the deficiencies of those who don't or can't conform. It's a simple case of supply and demand. We can be much more selective in keeping young sailors without having to expend resources on correcting those who are not willing to conform . . .

With a shrinking military we can't afford to waste funds on less desirables. We're even booting out average workers! Let's just get rid of undesirables without benefits!

[The CCU] lets us retrain or reinforce discipline . . . but in this period of downsizing, I consider it more efficient to fire (ADSEP) unsatisfactory performers than to expend time and money to provide extra training . . .

Downsizing the Navy enables me as a CO to discharge with NMPC approval violates of the UCMJ with one violation. Get rid of people who don't conform.

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, CO = Commanding Officer, ADSEP = administrative separation, NMPC = Navy Military Personnel Command, UCMJ = Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Table C-4

Positive and Negative Comments Associated With Utilization of the CCU

Positive Experiences

As an XO, my success rate with CCUs was over 80%.

We have sent one individual to CCU - he is an intelligent 20-year old whom we had initially recommended to the Naval Academy, but he became a discipline problem. Since returning from CCU [he] has been a standout performer displaying outstanding military bearing and has become a real peer leader.

The sailor we sent to CCU was at the very end of his naval career if he did not turn around . . . 30 days CCU turned him around! My thanks to CCU for a job well done as we now have a truly good sailor for a shipmate!

My experience with the CCU process is excellent.

CCUs have proven effective for a majority of the awardees. These men have made a 180 degree turn around.

No other option fills the void.

Negative Experiences

For afloat commands, CCU is a vacation compared to normal shipboard . . . personally have had mixed results with CCUs.

Had mixed success with several failures and several improvements. CCU has worked about 50/50. Usually about half of offenders come back and stay clean. Half get in trouble again and get booted out.

I do not use CCUs because I don't feel they are effective. I have found it to be less demanding than shipboard duties.

I have not been pleased with the results. Initially the sailors have returned with a squared away attitude, but shortly return to their old ways.

All personnel who have been placed in CCU in the last 2 years (6) have been administratively separated under other conditions.

I have never had a sailor successfully complete CCU *and* successfully complete his enlistment

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit, XO = executive officer.

Table C-5

Examples of Recommendations to Close CCUs

If we can't turn young sailors around on board ship with positive leadership, we won't be able to do it at a CCU.

CCUs should be closed. They are too expensive both in money and billets, and the return is not worth it.

Not needed.

Not a viable option anymore. Recommend—close them all.

Closing CCUs is one of the best things that has happened. Don't waste your time trying to retrain a bad apple . . .

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit.

Table C-6

Examples of Recommendations to Retain CCUs

CCUs are an excellent tool for commanders who deem it necessary for young troopers who have not yet adjusted to military life. REOPEN NOW.

. . . CCU should be maintained as a viable option to demonstrate greater severity of action.

CCU should be expanded in use, not diminished.

I toured the 32nd Street Naval Station San Diego CCU and was very impressed. Before the tour, I didn't know a lot about the CCU program. This particular CCU was in the process of being closed so I didn't have the option to use it. CCU would be a great disciplinary option for my younger less mature sailors. I recommend reopening the San Diego CCU.

When our regional unit closed, we lost a critical asset.

As commanding officer of a deploying command, CCU has proven a valuable asset for use in assignment of discipline for my enlisted men. This command strongly approves and desires the use of CCUs.

It [CCU] will never be a first choice of COs for disciplinary action as courts martial will not, but that does not diminish the value of the program.

Note. CCU = Correctional Custody Unit.

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