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EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION OF POLICE SERVICES - A CASE STUDY OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

Peter B. Bloch

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PREFACE

The Public Interest Research Project of The Urban Institute conducts studies in a number of fields where the expertise and skills of Institute staff coincide with issues in current litigation or administrative proceedings. This paper on measures of discrimination in police services represents one such effort. Earlier papers in this series are:

- *The Validity and Discriminatory Impact of the Federal Service Entrance Examination*, by Robert Sadacca, assisted by Joan Brackett
- *Inequality in Local Government Services: A Case Study of Neighborhood Roads*, by Andrew J. Boots, III, Grace Dawson, William Silverman and Harry P. Hatry
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Topics for studies by PIRP are suggested by public officials, lawyers, community groups, or Institute staff members. Regardless of the sources of a research issue, all resulting publications represent the objective and policy-oriented approach of The Urban Institute. The findings and conclusions of the studies are made available to judges, administrators, lawyers, and to the general public.

Peter Bloch is manager of the Community Safety Studies project. His research to date includes *Policewomen as Patrol Officers in the District of Columbia Police Department--An Evaluation* and *Evaluation of New York City's Neighborhood Team Policing Program*. He is a member of the Massachusetts Bar and was a teaching fellow at Harvard Law School during 1965-1967.

I should also like to acknowledge the invaluable secretarial support of Montina Pyndell and Judy Greenwald.

William Silverman, Director
Public Interest Research Project

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SUMMARY

This paper examines a variety of measures which may be used to determine whether police services are being distributed equally to two sections of the District of Columbia. The approach developed for this study is believed applicable to most large cities.

Measures that are discussed include input measures, which relate the number of police officers to the demand for their services, and effectiveness measures, which indicate whether police are accomplishing their objectives of controlling crime and providing police services. In the absence of sufficient accurate effectiveness measures, the paper infers police effectiveness from some imperfect indicators of effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The District of Columbia is following acceptable management standards in its method of distributing police services between its relatively affluent area west of Rock Creek Park (District 2) and its relatively poor Anacostia community (Districts 6 and 7):

- *Police inputs are distributed equally;*
- *Property crime rates in the two areas are now almost equal;*
- *Property crime rates have followed more favorable recent trends in Anacostia than west of the Park;*
- *Violent crime, which includes crimes between acquaintances and relatives, is reported to the police more frequently in Anacostia;*
- *Clearance rates--representing the success of the police in identifying and apprehending criminals--are roughly equal west of the Park and in Anacostia;*

- *Citizen satisfaction with police services, as measured by a recent survey, indicates a high level of satisfaction with police services in the city, including Anacostia;*

- *Anacostia appears from a citizen survey to have relatively poorer services, in respect to police response time, than some other sections of the city. The data on this score are only suggestive of a difference, however, and they bear further investigation.*

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING FUTURE RESEARCH

The quality of data about actual crime (as contrasted to data about crime reported to the police) will be improved when the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration conducts its planned citizen victimization survey in the District of Columbia and elsewhere in the nation. The LEAA survey can be used to improve police resource allocation and to increase knowledge about the distribution of crime throughout this city. Because survey data are not available, this study is largely based on the relatively inaccurate reported crime statistics.

INTRODUCTION

Federal courts are facing an increasing number of cases involving allegations of unconstitutional inequality in municipal services. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw *961 F.2d 1171 (Cir. 5, 1972) involving street paving, street lighting, and street sewers, and* Beal v. Lindsay*, 468 F.2d 287 (Cir. 2, 1972), involving public parks, are the most recent major cases.*

Black residents living in the Anacostia section of Washington have filed a similar suit against the government of Washington, D.C., claiming that a variety of municipal services are being allocated unequally and therefore in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights. Burner v. Washington *(CA 242-71). The plaintiffs allege that whites living west of Rock Creek Park (see Table 1) receive superior public services.*

This paper deals only with the Burner *allegations as to the distribution of police services. These allegations are:*

- *The assignment of a disproportionately small percentage of police to Anacostia, considering the size of the area, the high incidence of crime and the general need for police services.*
- *Failure to provide "adequate protection."*
- *Providing police protection and services which are "significantly inferior" to the area west of Rock Creek Park.*

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1. Burner v. Washington, *Complaint pp. 33-35.*

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ANACOSTIA AND "WEST OF THE PARK"

CHARACTERISTIC	AREA			
	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF THE PARK	
	District 6	District 7	Residential Area Only	District 2[a] (Includes Business Area)
Total Population	89,500	126,200	96,700	119,400
Percent Black	96.1	85.1	2.5	3.4
Percent of Families Below Poverty Level[b]	14.5	12.5	2.8	3.0
Median Family Income[c]	$8,400	$8,200	$20,600	$17,900

SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1970, Census Tracts, Final Report PHC (1)-226, Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia, Tables P-1 and P-4.

[a] Includes 23 census tracts completely within District 2 and excludes 5 partially contained tracts, whose total population is 4,679 (18% black). Census tracts fell completely within the other areas.

[b] The Census definition of poverty is adjusted for family size (and location in an urban or rural area). For example, the poverty threshold for a non-farm family of four in 1969 was $3,743.

[c] To derive this median, first select the median income for each tract completely included in the area. This is the median of the median incomes for those tracts.

Input Measures

For the purpose of discussion, the allegations relating to the assignment of a "disproportionately small percentage" of police will be called allegations that "inputs" are being unequally distributed. Unequal distribution of inputs does not necessarily result in poorer service. For example, a small number of police who are highly motivated and well trained may provide better emergency services and better crime protection in one district than a larger number provide in other districts. However, since fully satisfactory measures of quality

of service are difficult to obtain, input measures may be used as one indication of equal treatment.

There are a variety of input measures one may examine. In this paper, we examine the measure suggested by the complaint plus a few other relevant measures.

ASSIGNMENT OF POLICE PROPORTIONATE TO DEMAND FOR SERVICES[2]

The police officer must perform a variety of duties, including responding to telephone calls requesting police services, reporting a crime or reporting an accident. Table 2 shows that police in Anacostia are no busier than are police in District 2, which includes both the residential area west of the Park and a business district.[3] (Since police resources are allocated to a district, it is not feasible to determine what resources are available just in the residential area, and thus many of our comparisons will be between Anacostia and all of District 2. See Table 3, footnote a, p. 5, for a discussion of the relative daytime populations of District 2 and Anacostia.)

When the police are not responding to calls, they perform "preventive patrol" (or other precinct duties). It is also useful, therefore, to see the frequency of crimes per officer, as a rough measure of the amount of crime which might be deterred by preventive patrol. Robbery is a particularly

2. A more traditional analysis of resource allocation would discuss the distribution of dollar expenditures. However, dollar expenditures by police district are not available and a personnel analysis is acceptable because 91 percent of the police budget ($75 million of $83 million), excluding police pensions, is spent on personnel. If pensions are included as personnel expenditures, 93 percent of the budget is personnel. (Telephone conversation, November 28, 1973, with Mr. Michael Trpha of the Office of the Budget of the District of Columbia government.)

3. If there is less than one chance in twenty that two samples could have been drawn by chance from the same population (chi square statistical significance at .05 on a two-tailed test) then the samples are considered different, but for one footnoted exception, otherwise they are considered the same.

TABLE 2: RECENT WORKLOAD STATISTICS

	TIME PERIOD	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF PARK[a]
		District 6	District 7	(District 2)
Service calls per officer	Oct.-Dec. 1972[b]	--- 3.39 ---		4.37
Total police per hundred reported robberies	May 1971 to June 1972[c]	35.6[d]	54.7	57.6
Total police per hundred Index Crimes[e]	May 1971 to June 1972[c]	6.9	7.7	7.2
Number of police actually in the field each day per hundred Index Crimes	May 1971 to June 1972[c]	3.5	3.1	3.4

[a]District 2 includes some nonresidential areas containing office buildings. Police do not keep manpower statistics separately for the residential area west of the Park.

[b]Statistics on service calls were computed from statistics contained in a letter of September 18, 1973, from Thomas R. Nedrich, Assistant Corporation Counsel, D. C., to S. William Livingston, Jr., Esq., of Covington and Burling, counsel to plaintiffs.

[c]These statistics are derived from the annual report of the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia for fiscal year 1972.

[d]The only value on this table which reaches statistical significance (chi quare significant at .05 level,two-tailed test) is police per robbery, comparing District 6 and District 2. There is little reason, however, to allocate police only according to the number of robberies.

[e]Crimes included by the FBI as Index Crimes are murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny ($50 and over in value) and auto theft.

important crime to examine separately because citizen surveys have shown that police statistics on robbery tend to be more accurate reflections of actual crime than other crimes, which are less likely to come to the attention of police. Table 2 also shows that there are as many police per serious crime in Anacostia as west of the Park.

PSEUDO-WORKLOAD MEASURES. In addition to the measures already presented, one might want to allocate police proportionate to the number of people served or to the geographic area to be covered on patrol. The number of people served is a measure of potential demand for police services, as contrasted to the number of police service calls or the crime rate--both of which represent actual problems for the police to handle. The area served has some relationship to the number of police needed because more travel time is required for completing police service calls in a large area than in a small area. However, it takes large distances to make significant time differences. For these reasons, measures of police per capita and police per square mile, presented in Table 3 below, are considered less important than the workload statistics presented in Table 2. In any event, the application of these population and area measures does not indicate that the distribution of services in fiscal year 1972 favored either of the two District of Columbia areas.

TABLE 3: LESS IMPORTANT WORKLOAD STATISTICS
(Calculated from the M.P.D.C. Annual Report for Fiscal 1972)

MEASURE	AREA OF CITY	
	Anacostia	West of Park[a] (District 2)
Daily average police per 10,000 residents	15	18
Daily average police per 10,000 total population	13	10
Daily average police per square mile	19	11

[a]District 2 includes a business district whose peak daytime employment (excluding domestics, theatre and restaurant workers, late daytime and night-time shift workers, commerical employment in apartment buildings, postmen, movers, deliverers, truck and cab drivers and on-site construction workers) was 86,000 in 1965 compared to peak daytime employment in Anacostia of only 26,000. Economic Associates, Daytime Park Employment District of Columbia, 1965, Government of the District of Columbia (Office of Civil Defense), January 1965.

AMOUNT OF SUPERVISION

The amount of supervision, measured by the ratio of officials to total police personnel, is about the same in District 2 and in Anacostia. For every hundred police assigned to District 2, 14.7 are officials, and in the two Anacostia districts, 6 and 7, there are 13.6 and 14.0 officials, respectively. (See Table 4.)

TABLE 4: PERCENT OF TOTAL PERSONNEL IN SUPERVISORY POSITIONS (June 30, 1972)

POSITION	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF THE PARK
	District 6	District 7	(District 2)
Inspector	0.3%	0.3%	0.2%
Captain	1.2	1.1	1.0
Lieutenant	3.7	4.0	3.2
Sergeant	8.3	8.7	10.2
All Official Ranks	13.6	14.0	14.7

NOTE: None of the above differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE AGAINST CRIME

The question of how effective police are against crime is extremely elusive. Another way of putting the question is:

> *What is the effect which each additional police officer has on the amount of crime which actually occurs in the community?*

Were the answer available, one might chart the impact of more police in reducing crime, as shown with the hypothetical data in Figure 1. But this kind of correlation has not yet been demonstrated with any certainty.

Among police officials and researchers who specialize in police and crime matters, there is a debate about whether even large differences in police resources have an effect on the crime rate. Preliminary results from a Police

Foundation study in Kansas City, Missouri, indicate that even a large increase in the amount of police patrol does not affect the crime rate.[4] *On the other hand, a Rand Corporation study of a New York City saturation patrol program indicates that the number of police did have an effect on street crime.*[5]



Figure 1: Hypothetical Example of a Chart Showing the Productivity of Police

Many factors complicate the measurement of police effectiveness. First, many dynamic social factors influence crime rates--from unemployment to fads in behavior as unpredictable as the use of a hoola-hoop. Since some of these factors are measurable, such as the unemployment rate, it might seem possible to estimate the effect of each factor as a baseline from which to measure police performance. Unfortunately, no satisfactory estimate of effects appears to be available.

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4. David Burnham, "A Police Study Challenges Value of Anticrime Patrol," New York Times, November 11, 1973, p. 1.

5. S. James Press, Some Effects of an Increase in Police Manpower in the 20th Precinct of New York City, Rand Institute, 1971. See also Col. Carl V. Goodin, "Crime Reduction: A Community Approach," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1973, p. 20ff.

Second, many other social programs--such as compulsory education or voluntary methadone maintenance programs--may have important effects on crime. Since police services and these other programs operate simultaneously, it is extremely difficult to attribute improvements in crime control to the efforts of one program rather than another.

Until research along these lines progresses to the point where it is determined how much crime the police prevent, we must rely on other measures of effectiveness. These include crime rates generally and for specific crimes, crime trends and clearance rates.

EQUALIZING THE CRIME RATE

It is widely recognized that government has the responsibility to guarantee the safety of its citizens. It may be argued that a measure of government's success in fulfilling this responsibility equally, with respect to all citizens, is:

> Regardless of place of residence, is every citizen equally likely to be victimized by crime?

The biggest problem with this formulation is that social forces may be so large or powerful that it is beyond the power of the government or the police to be the equalizer. However, it is a goal worthy of aspiration and its achievement will be examined in this section of the paper.

It has been alleged in Burner v. Washington that there is a relatively higher incidence of crime in Anacostia (90 percent black and relatively poor) than in the residential area west of Rock Creek Park (98 percent white and relatively affluent). On examination of recent statistics (see Table 5), this allegation appears to need qualification. While Anacostia is more robbery prone, District 2 experiences a higher rate of burglaries and of total serious crime.

TABLE 5: REPORTED CRIME RATES
(Fiscal 1972)

MEASURE	AREA OF CITY			
	ANACOSTIA			WEST OF THE PARK
	District 6		District 7	(District 2)
Reported Robbery Rate (per 1,000 residents)	---	7.42	---	6.76
Reported Burglary Rate (per 1,000 residents)	---	16.30	---	20.64
Reported Index Crime Rate (per 1,000 residents)	---	44.65	---	53.82

NOTE: Each of these differences is statistically significant at the .05 level, using a chi square test on the number of crimes and using as expected values the number of crimes which would have occurred had they been distributed proportional to residential population.

On closer examination, using a sample of small areas within District 2 for the months of August and September of 1973 (see Table 6), one finds that the reported risk of serious crime (i.e., a crime in the FBI crime index) to a person living in the residential area west of the Park (excluding the business district) is about the same as to a person living in Anacostia. That is, the full year data should be interpreted with care. Crime per capita may be higher in District 2 as a whole but not in the residential area considered separately. (In the two month study, there were 59 index crimes per thousand residents west of the Park compared to 55 in Anacostia.) Street robberies (not separately reported in the full year data) were more than twice as likely to occur in Anacostia as in the residential area west of the Park (excluding the downtown business district).

PROBLEMS WITH CRIME REPORTING. The reported crime statistics, which are the best available in the District of Columbia and in most other jurisdictions, have a serious flaw. They include only those crimes which citizens have

brought to the attention of the police and which the police have determined to constitute a crime. Thus, an area of the city might have a reported crime rate equal to another area but--if the proportion of crime reported to the police is different--the actual crime rates of the two areas may be different.

TABLE 6: CURRENT CRIME RATES
(August-September 1973)
From Reports Regularly Compiled by the M.P.D.C.

	ANACOSTIA (District 6)	ANACOSTIA (District 7)	All District 2	Residential Area West of Park [a]
Approximate Resident Population	--	215,700	102,945	96,700
Number of Crimes:				
All Index Crimes	833	1,159	1,604	959
Residential Burglary	141	283	239	185
Street Robbery	121	152	57	56
Other Robbery	28	57	36	34
Crime Rates Per Year (Per 1,000 Residents)				
All Index Crimes	--	55	93	59
Residential Burglary	--	12	14	11
Street Robbery	--	8	3	3
Other Robbery	--	2	2	2

[a] Small area or "Carney Block" statistics for west of the Park include two blocks which include some territory that is not west of the Park. Fifty percent of the crime in two split blocks (and all the crime from 73 unsplit blocks) has been allocated to District 2.

The best known method of correcting this possibility for error is the victimization survey, in which interviewers ask a random sample of people about their experiences with crime during a recent time period (say six months or a

year). These people also are asked whether the incidents were reported to the police, and these answers may be used to estimate a non-reporting rate--for a particular crime, for a city, or for an area of a city. These interviews are expensive, costing approximately $40 per interview in the District of Columbia. However, the United States Law Enforcement Assistance Administration is planning a survey which may shed important light on crime reporting practices in the District of Columbia. Survey results should be available within two years.

According to the President's Crime Commission, the percentage of unreported robberies is lower than for most other index crimes, with about two-thirds of robberies (compared to 30 percent of burglaries and 45 percent of larcenies) reported to the police. The relatively high incidence of robbery in Anacostia raises a question about whether actual crime rates in Anacostia for other serious crimes are greater than is indicated by the unreported crime statistics.[6]

In short, the police are basing their manpower allocation decisions on, and are measuring their crime-control effectiveness with, reported crime statistics. While these statistics are the best available to them, the reported crime figures may be biased because of less crime reporting in Anacostia. The only way for the police to become more confident in their effectiveness measures and allocation plans is for a victimization survey to be used to check the accuracy of the reported crime data.

VIOLENT CRIME. If, instead of focusing on the entire crime picture, one focuses on offenses which involve violence, one finds corroboration for the common belief that Anacostia is a more dangerous section of the city. Table 7 shows that for each of the four violent crime categories, there is

6. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office) 1967, pp. 20-21.

more crime in Anacostia and that the differences are all statistically significant at the .05 level. These crimes are: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault and robbery.

Table 7 also shows that these crimes represent a larger percentage of total serious crime (FBI Index Crimes) in Anacostia than in District 2.

These data on violent crimes are reflected in police practices concerning the assignment of officers to patrol either in one-officer cars or two-officer cars. In areas which the police perceive as being relatively safe for patrol officers, one-officer cars are assigned. In areas considered more dangerous, two officers are assigned to the same car to provide one another backup in an emergency. In District 2, as of June 1972, 92.6 percent of the officers (daily average of 75 of 81) were assigned to one-man scout cars. In District 6 only 9.6 percent of the officers were in one-man scout cars (8 of 83) and in District 7 only 7.2 percent (6 of 83) of the officers were in one-man cars. This represents the police department's perception of the relative danger of these neighborhoods.

On the other hand, with the exception of robbery, these crimes of violence are relatively difficult for the police to prevent. First, they are much rarer occurrences than are burglaries and larcenies; and this infrequence of occurrence makes them especially difficult to prevent. Second, the President's Crime Commission found that only one murder in five was committed by a person who was not acquainted with the victim. (Thirty-one percent of murders were committed by a member of the victim's family.) Rapes were somewhat more likely to be committed by someone unknown to the victim, with 36 percent being committed by complete strangers and seven percent by people known only by sight. Assault victims were acquainted with all but 19 percent of their assailants.[7]

7. Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact--An Assessment, Task Force on Assessment, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967), p. 81.

TABLE 7: SERIOUS CRIMES INVOLVING VIOLENCE (Fiscal Year 1972)

MEASURE	AREA		
	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF THE PARK
	District 6	District 7	(District 2)
Number of Offenses			
Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	20	40	6
Forcible Rape	79	90	35
Aggravated Assault	404	450	161
Robbery	910	691	696
Total	1,413	1,271	898
Rate per 10,000 Residents			
Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter	--- 2.8	---	0.6
Forcible Rape	--- 7.8	---	3.4
Aggravated Assault	--- 39.6	---	15.6
Robbery	--- 74.2	---	67.6
Total	--- 124.4	---	87.2
Percent of Total Index Crime Represented by these Four Offenses	30.0	25.8	16.2

SOURCE: M.P.D.C., Annual Report, 1972.

NOTE: Each of these four crimes occurs less frequently in District 2 than in Anacostia (chi square significant at .05 level). The chi square test on number of crimes used, as the "expected value" for each area, the number of crimes which would have occurred had they been in proportion to population.

It is the nature of crimes of violence against acquaintances that they often arise out of the passion of a moment. This makes them especially difficult for the police to prevent. Furthermore, while cases of serious family trouble with a known potential for repetition often come to the attention of the police, techniques have not yet been developed for the police to treat those cases in ways known to reduce the potential for future violence.

Consequently, it may continue to be a goal for the police to reduce crimes of this sort in Anacostia, but the disproportionate occurrence of these crimes in Anacostia may not be remediable by any reallocation of police resources.

In fact, the increase in police resources to combat these crimes of violence might be a disservice to Anacostia. Any dramatic increase in police presence would run the risk of being a source of resentment or the cause of more police-citizen conflict in the Anacostia community.

The principal way in which police might seek increased safety in Anacostia is by developing expanded robbery prevention programs. While there is no magical solution to this problem, it is the kind of crime problem for which the police can attempt to find solutions.

CRIME TRENDS. Another way of examining police effectiveness in recent years is to use crime trends. Table 8 summarizes what is known about trends in reported crime in the two sections of Washington from 1970 to 1972 and from 1967 to 1972. We find that from 1967 to 1972, reported robbery, reported burglary and reported total index crime have been growing somewhat more slowly in Anacostia than in the residential area west of the Park (but burglary and total index crime have grown somewhat more rapidly in Anacostia than for District 2 as a whole, including the business district).

Table 8 also shows that for the 1970 to 1972 period, burglary and total index crime have declined somewhat more rapidly in Anacostia than in District 2 but robbery has grown much more rapidly.

CLEARANCE RATES. Another measure of police productivity is the number of "clearances" per reported crime. That is, every reported crime represents potential clearance. If an individual is arrested for that crime (regardless of whether the individual is convicted), the offense is listed as cleared by arrest. The arrest of one individual may cause many clearances, providing

TABLE 8: CRIME TRENDS

(From M.P.D.C. Annual Reports Unless Otherwise Indicated)

	ANACOSTIA	WEST OF THE PARK Residential Area	WEST OF THE PARK (District 2)
Crime Rate (per 1,000) in 1967			
Robbery	5	2	5
Burglary	11	8	19
Total Index	28	16	41
Crime Rate (per 1,000) in 1970			
Robbery	11	-	7
Burglary	28	-	23
Total Index	68	-	65
Crime Rate (per 1,000) in 1972			
Robbery	8	5[a]	8
Burglary	17	15[a]	23
Total Index	45	34[a]	54
Change in Crime 1967-1972			
Robbery	+60	-	+60
Burglary	-55	+88	+21
Total Index	+61	+113	+42
Change in Crime 1970-1972			
Robbery	+60	-	+14
Burglary	-39	-	0
Total Index	-34	-	-17

[a] In July and August 1973, Carney Blocks west of the Park had 59.79 percent of total reported crime in District 2. This percentage is used to derive crime rates for 1972 for the 96,706 people who are residents of this area.

that the police believe that the individual has committed many reported crimes. In addition to clearances by arrest, there may also be "exceptional" clearances. The principal exceptional clearances are when the police find that the individual who has committed a crime has either fled the jurisdiction or is already in prison, or if the police identify the perpetrator but a necessary witness refuses to cooperate.

Clearance rates are used by police to indicate, roughly, the chance that a person who commits a reported crime will be apprehended or--at least--identified. This is seen as part of their responsibility of apprehending criminals and is considered a way of deterring crime through the risk of punishment.

In the District of Columbia, published statistics indicate the number of reported crimes and the number of clearances for each police district. In addition, some clearances are attributed to centralized units and are not credited to any district. One thousand, one hundred forty-seven of the total clearances in 1972, or 12.4 percent of all clearances, were attributed to centralized units.

Table 9 shows that the clearance rate in 1972 for District 2 was slightly lower than in either of Anacostia's districts for total index crime, but it was similar to Anacostia for robberies and burglaries.

TABLE 9: CLEARANCE RATES IN FISCAL 1972

TYPE OF CRIME	AREA		
	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF THE PARK
	District 6	District 7	(District 2)
Robbery	16.3%	17.1%	15.5%
Burglary	13.2%	11.5%	13.8%
Total Index Crime	19.2%	16.5%	12.7%

SOURCE: M.P.D.C., Annual Report, 1972

Citizen Views About Police Service

In addition to statistical measures of police effectiveness, it is important to ask whether the police are providing a service that is acceptable to the consumers who are, of course, the public. The best way to determine consumer acceptability is to conduct a general citizen survey. Such a survey would be relevant to Burner v. Washington since the plaintiffs have alleged "inadequate" police protection.

While the author does not know of any survey with which to compare police service in Anacostia to the area west of the Park, The Urban Institute recently conducted a study in which it obtained some citizen satisfaction measures in Districts 1 (Southwest and Central Business), 5 (Upper Northeast), 6 (Northern Anacostia) and 7 (Southern Anacostia). The survey was conducted as part of an evaluation of policewomen as patrol officers in the District of Columbia. The survey was conducted by telephone in three different waves, in April, August and October of 1972. The sample was stratified by age, race, and sex of respondent, with a total of 421 interviews.[8]

This section of the study discusses findings derived from that community survey and their relevance to the question of equal distribution of police services. Since the data from the community survey relate to District 1 rather than to District 2, inferences must be drawn somewhat indirectly. However, District 1 is comparable to District 2: it is also perceived by the police as relatively less dangerous than Anacostia. As evidence of this, in fiscal 1972, 87 percent of the daily average of personnel in District 2 were assigned to one-officer scout cars. This is comparable to seven percent in District 7--in Anacostia. Inferences must be drawn with care, however, because

8. The survey was part of Policewomen on Patrol, by Peter B. Bloch, Deborah Anderson and Pamela Gervais of The Urban Institute; published by the Police Foundation (1973). A further description of the community survey may be found in D. C. Policewomen Evaluation, Volume II, Methodology and Tables, published by The Urban Institute (1973).

District 1 is not comparable to District 2 in its socioeconomic characteristics. District 1 is 75 percent black (similar to Anacostia), has 25 percent of its families living under the poverty level (double the poverty rate in Anacostia) and has a median family income of $7,300 (lower than Anacostia).

OPINIONS ABOUT SAFETY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

One of the major purposes for providing police service is to create a sense of security--to reduce the fear which people feel about their neighborhood. In The Urban Institute's survey two questions were asked about safety in the neighborhood, and the answers to these questions may be interpreted as a measure of citizen fear as well as their subjective opinion of the risk from crime. Table 10, which presents the responses to these questions, shows that citizens in different precincts had remarkably similar opinions about how dangerous their own neighborhood would be for a twenty-year-old man or for a middle-aged woman. (There was general agreement, however, that walking home alone after dark was more dangerous for the woman.)

TABLE 10: OPINIONS ABOUT SAFETY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Q1. How safe would you say it is in your neighborhood for a twenty-year-old man to walk home alone after dark?

Q2. How safe would you say it is in your neighborhood for a middle-aged woman to walk home alone after dark?

Question	Police District	Area	Number[a] Answering	RESPONSES: Very Dangerous	Fairly Dangerous	Fairly Safe	Safe	Weighted Mean[b]	Number Don't Know
Safety for young man (Q1)	1	S.W. and Downtown	99	13%	21%	56%	9%	2.6	0
	5	N.E.	141	13	31	42	13	2.5	6
	6	North Anacostia	80	11	24	53	12	2.7	6
	7	South Anacostia	102	14	30	45	10	2.5	3
Safety for woman (Q2)	1	S.W. and Downtown	97	34	26	36	4	2.1	2
	5	N.E.	138	34	29	30	8	2.1	4
	6	North Anacostia	75	32	28	31	9	2.2	4
	7	South Anacostia	102	30	36	25	8	2.1	0

NOTE: None of the differences among police districts on this table are statistically significant.

[a] "Don't Knows" were not counted in this total.

[b] To calculate a weighted mean, the values 1 to 4 were assigned to responses, beginning with "Very Dangerous" (equals 1) and continuing to "Very Safe" (equals 4).

OPINIONS ABOUT POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

Two questions on The Urban Institute survey dealt with aspects of police effectiveness. Table 11 cites the questions and shows the answers. It can be inferred from the table that residents of Districts 1 and 5 and residents of Districts 6 and 7 had similar opinions about the effectiveness of police in keeping their neighborhoods safe (chi square not significant at .05 level). Residents also responded with about the same frequency that police would handle a situation very poorly or poorly. Where residents differed was in the likelihood that they would expect police to do a "very good" job (chi square significant at .025 level, testing the probability of a very good response). Residents of Anacostia were less likely to expect the police to do a very good job.

TABLE 11: OPINIONS ABOUT POLICE EFFECTIVENESS

Q3. How good a job do you feel the police are doing in helping to keep your neighborhood safe?

Q5. After the police [come to your house because you call them for assistance] how good a job do you think they'd do in handling your situation?

				RESPONSES						
Question	Police District	Area	Number Answering	Very Poor	Poor	Average	Good	Very Good	Weighted Mean[a]	Number Don't Know
Neighborhood Safety (Q3)	1	S.W. and Downtown	96	3%	6%	36%	26%	28%	3.7	1
	5	Northeast	137	6	9	37	26	24	3.6	4
	6	North Anacostia	80	8	8	45	28	13	3.4	0
	7	South Anacostia	100	4	13	47	18	18	3.3	2
Handling a Situation (Q5)	1	S.W. and Downtown	89	4	7	34	27	28	3.7	9
	5	Northeast	124	2	10	34	20	34	3.7	17
	6	North Anacostia	74	4	7	50	19	20	3.4	6
	7	South Anacostia	96	3	7	46	25	19	3.5	6

NOTE: None of the differences among districts on this table is statistically significant.

[a] To calculate a weighted mean, the values 1 to 5 were assigned to responses, beginning with "Very Poor" (equals 1) and continuing to "Very Good" (equals 5).

Question 6, reported in Table 12, shows no difference between residents of different districts in opinions about how respectfully police treat people who live in their neighborhood. In general, citizens showed high regard for the quality of police service on all the questions in the survey.

POLICE RESPONSE TIME

The amount of time which police take to respond to a call may be important. This is especially the case if someone is in need of emergency assistance. It also may be crucial for apprehending a criminal at the scene when a crime is in progress.

Unfortunately, the measurement of police response time is far from a science. Officers' reports of their own response time are notoriously unreliable, and urban police departments apparently do not believe this information is vital enough to require their officers to use precious radio air time to report their arrival at the location to which they have been sent.

The best available measure of response time is subject to the error of human memory and perception--time seems to stretch when one is waiting for help. It consists of asking citizens how long police have taken to respond to their calls. Preferably, one should call citizens to whom police have recently responded. However, not having designed a response-time study, The Urban Institute nevertheless did ask District of Columbia residents, in a general telephone survey, about their opinions concerning police response time. That question, reported in Table 13, shows a tendency for Anacostia residents to believe that police respond more slowly than do residents of District 1. The responses for Districts 1 and 6 are different, with a mean expectation of 9.9 minutes in District 1 and a mean expectation of 14.4 minutes in District 6.

TABLE 12: OPINIONS ABOUT POLICE RESPECTFULNESS

Q6. How well would you say the officers treat the people who live in this neighborhood?

Police District	Area	Number Answering	RESPONSES							Weighted Mean[a]	Don't Know
			Very Disrespectfully	Somewhat Disrespectfully	Neither Disrespectfully nor Respectfully	Somewhat Respectfully	Respectfully	Very Respectfully			
1	S.W. and Downtown	95	1%	1%	18%	25%	55%	25%		4.0	4
5	Northeast	120	2	7	16	26	50	26		3.9	15
6	North Anacostia	78	3	6	18	18	55	18		3.8	6
7	South Anacostia	97	4	7	10	21	58	21		3.9	5

NOTE: Differences between police districts on this table are not statistically significant.

[a]To calculate a weighted mean, the values 1 to 5 were assigned to the responses, beginning with "Very Disrespectfully" (equals 1) and continuing to "Very Respectfully" (equals 5).

TABLE 13: OPINIONS ABOUT POLICE RESPONSE TIME

Q4. If something should happen where you had to call the police, about how many minutes would they take to arrive?

Police District	Area	Number Answering	RESPONSES 1-5 Minutes	6-10 Minutes	11-20 Minutes	20-30 Minutes	More Than 30 Minutes	Weighted Mean[a]	Don't Know
1	S.W. and Downtown	92	47%	20%	23%	7%	4%	9.9	7
5	Northeast	125	40	19	25	10	6	11.5	16
6	North Anacostia	72	26	22	29	13	10	14.4	8
7	South Anacostia	87	31	23	22	14	10	13.8	15

NOTE: Residents of Districts 1 and 6 are significantly different at the .05 level, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. District 6 residents believe police respond more slowly than do District 1 residents.

[a] To calculate a weighted mean, the number of responses was multiplied by its interval midpoint and the sum of these products was divided by the total number of responses.

News of these citizen beliefs that responses are slower in Anacostia should not be puzzling to the police department. Police statistics show slightly more service calls per car in Anacostia than in District 2 (see Table 14).[9] Furthermore, it is likely that officers back one another up more frequently in Districts 6 and 7 because of the greater frequency of violent crime and because of their belief that the area is more dangerous. This keeps more cars busy at any time and makes a response to additional calls more difficult.

TABLE 14: NUMBER OF POLICE UNITS PER SERVICE CALL

MEASURE	AREA OF CITY: Anacostia	District 2
Daily Average of Number of Cars (1 or 2 officers)[a]	90	78
Number of Radio Calls (October to December 1972)[b]	2,438	1,833
Number of Calls Per Car (October to December 1972)	27.1	23.5

[a] From the Metropolitan Police of the District of Columbia Annual Report, June 1972. The number of two-officer cars is half the number of officers assigned.

[b] Letter from Thomas R. Nedrick, Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C., to S. William Livingston, Jr., Esq., of Covington and Burling, attorneys for plaintiffs in Burner v. Washington.

There is little indication that the police are less motivated to respond quickly in Districts 6 and 7. One measure of morale often used by police departments is the amount of sick leave taken per officer assigned to a

9. There are no data available about the number of service calls in District 1, which shows a similar pattern to District 2 in that it has many one-officer scout cars, Hence, we must rely on District 2 as a comparison.

district. On this measure, Districts 6 and 7 appear to have more highly motivated officers than does District 2 (see Table 15).

TABLE 15: SICK LEAVE PER OFFICER

MEASURE	AREA OF CITY		
	ANACOSTIA		WEST OF THE PARK
	District 6	District 7	(District 2)
Average sick days per officer in Fiscal Year 1972	7.35	6.95	8.00

Other Police Resources

This paper has not assessed the allocation of centralized personnel to tasks related to crime in the police districts with which we have been concerned. These resources include Central Investigations Division (Detective), Tactical Division, Youth Division and Special Operations Division. Table 16 shows the size of these units in relation to the number of officers assigned to the police districts being compared in this study.

TABLE 16: NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN CENTRALIZED POLICE UNITS
(From M.P.D.C. Annual Report of 1972)

Police Unit	Number of Officers	ALLOCATION OF OFFICERS	
		ANACOSTIA (Districts 6 and 7)	WEST OF THE PARK (District 2)
Central Investigations Division (Detectives)	210	?	?
Special Operations Division	498	?	?
Tactical Division	198	?	?
Youth Division	44	?	?
Patrol Division	2,913	659	392

These centralized units are equal in size to 33 percent of the Patrol Division. Unfortunately, the Department does not keep any statistics which permit allocating their work to the different patrol districts. Consequently, it would be necessary to collect data sampling the work of these divisions in order to allocate their work.

The author attempted to get access to the assignment records of the robbery squad in order to do a study to determine whether officers with District 2 cases to process had a lighter workload (overall) than officers with Anacostia cases. The police department furnished statistics which tend to refute the possibility of disproportionate workloads (see Table 17), but further study of the records would be useful because each squad has a workload consisting only in part of cases from particular districts. The department's statistics do not separate out the portion of a squad's workload which comes from its responsibility to cover designated categories of commerical robberies (e.g., hotel robberies). Furthermore, it may be possible that certain categories of commercial robberies represent a larger real workload than do other categories.

TABLE 17: ROBBERY CASES PER INVESTIGATOR IN ROBBERY SQUADS

Squad	Police Districts Covered	Cases Per Investigator Per Month
1	1 + 2	9
2	6 + 7	8
3	3	9.5
4	5	9
5	4	9

NOTE: Squads also are responsible for specific categories of commercial robberies (e.g., hotel robberies), regardless of the place where they occur. This data is from a letter to the author from Chief Jerry V. Wilson, dated December 12, 1973.