

The Strategy for Community Policing

LEE P. BROWN
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JANUARY, 1991



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NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

**POLICING
NEW YORK CITY
IN THE
1990s**

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
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THE POLICE COMMISSIONER
CITY OF NEW YORK

To the Citizens of New York City:

This report, Policing New York City in the 1990's, sets forth the plan for transforming the New York City Police Department into a modern, neighborhood-based police organization. As such, our Police Department will better serve the residents and business people of our city's many communities. The complete transformation of the Department will take some time to achieve, but the result will be a new style of policing - community policing - carried out by an efficient and cost-effective organization. In our recently-released Resource Allocation and Staffing Report, we indicated how many police officers we need to police the city. This report explains what those police officers will be doing.

Few expenditures are as important to our citizens as those for police service delivery. The New York City Police Department has a great responsibility to use its funds in a way that reflects the priorities of this city. Those priorities - a city more free from fear, with limited crime and disorder - can best be achieved through adoption of community policing as the dominant philosophy for the Department.

This report explains where we have come from, where we are today, and where we expect to be in the future. The process of change has begun. Its completion will require the support of all members of the Police Department, the assistance of other agencies of city government, and the support of businesses and residents of this city.

I extend my heartfelt appreciation to the men and women, both civilian and uniformed, of the New York City Police Department for their contributions to this undertaking. In addition to their usual heavy burden, they spent countless long days, late nights and weekends assembling the information that went into this report. I count on their skill and dedication to guide New York's Finest into the future with community policing.

I would also like to thank the New York City Police Foundation for the generous support that made it possible to produce this document. Their funding enabled us to obtain the assistance of three highly regarded police consultants to work with us in all phases of this work. Thanks go as well to First New York Bank for Business, which so graciously supplemented the Police Foundation's funding by donating back office support and a substantial portion of the time of their Senior Vice President, one of the consultants.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading 'Lee P. Brown'.

Lee P. Brown
Police Commissioner

New York
January 4, 1991

NEW YORK CITY

POLICE DEPARTMENT VALUES

**In partnership with the community
we pledge to:**

- Protect the lives and property of our fellow citizens and impartially enforce the law
- Fight crime both by preventing it and by aggressively pursuing violators of the law
- Maintain a higher standard of integrity than is generally expected of others because so much is expected of us
- Value human life, respect the dignity of each individual and render our services with courtesy and civility

Executive Summary

The beat cop is coming back to New York City. This is what this report is about. It outlines how New York City will be policed during the decade of the 1990's and spells out what steps the Department will take to make community policing the dominant style of policing throughout the neighborhoods of the city. It is a blueprint for change.

After undergoing a thorough assessment, including a historical review, the Department has made an organizational commitment to alter radically its traditional way of policing the city and managing its operations. This new strategy is community policing, which is tough on crime and builds on the Department's rich history of creativity and experimentation.

The future strategy for policing the City of New York aims at making community policing — the work of police officers in the city's precincts at the neighborhood level — the Department's highest priority. With community policing, every neighborhood will have one or more police officers assigned to it and responsible for helping the residents of the community prevent crime, develop a capability for order maintenance and improve the quality of life. In this way, the Department can increase its substantial contribution to controlling crime and improving the quality of life throughout the city. This new orientation assumes the following mission for the Department:

- **The New York City Police Department exists to protect life and property under the law, maintain community order, and reduce crime and fear of crime in the neighborhoods with full respect for human dignity and according to the highest standards of professional skill, integrity and accountability.**

The key components of the transformation to community policing are:

- **A community policing presence will be provided for every neighborhood of the city.**
- **Problem-solving will become the standard way in which members of the Department respond to situations brought to their attention, whether on patrol or in administrative, investigative or support assignments.**
- **The Department will manage its operations in a manner that stimulates employees and is based on commitment to a written set of values that guide its actions.**
- **Policing the city's neighborhoods, uniformed patrol will have the stature, support and rewards necessary to make it as desirable a place for an officer to spend his or her career as any other assignment in the Department.**
- **Police officer creativity will be formally recognized and used in problem solving. Likewise, officers will be held accountable for their actions, within the context of the Department's mission, values, objectives, policies and procedures.**
- **New measures of Departmental performance will be developed to provide meaningful feedback to the Department and provide the community with an assessment of how well the Department is achieving its objectives.**

- **911 work demands will be controlled. An improved system for call classification, referral and processing will be designed and implemented. All police officers assigned to a given neighborhood will assist in responding to calls for service that come from their neighborhood.**
- **The Patrol Allocation Plan, the system used to assign personnel to the various precincts, will be revised to reflect the integration of all precinct personnel into the community policing strategy.**
- **The base from which new employees are recruited will be broadened. People willing to accept the department's commitment to a police organization representative of the community—who view the police job as service to community rather than individual adventure—will be identified and sought out.**
- **The selection process will be modernized. Improved selection tests, enhanced background investigations and revised psychological testing will be developed to recruit with a community policing orientation.**
- **Civilians and uniformed personnel will become equal partners in the transition to community policing.**
- **Department training systems will be enhanced and, in some instances, totally revised. They will teach new skills required for community policing, such as problem-solving, crime prevention and community organization.**
- **Revised performance evaluation mechanisms will be developed to provide officers with meaningful feedback on their performance and assist them in strengthening their effectiveness.**
- **New reward systems will be developed to reinforce community policing values and ensure that recognition is given to those who excel in carrying out the philosophy of community policing.**
- **Integrity Control mechanisms will be thoroughly reviewed to ensure maintenance of the highest level of integrity throughout the Department, while still encouraging and supporting the exercise of discretion by precinct personnel in dealing with the problems on their beats.**

These actions constitute the policing strategy for the 1990's. The report explains where we are, where we are going and what must be done to get us there.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
What This Report Is	1
How the Assessment Was Done	1
How the Report is Organized	4
How the Report Will Be Used	4
THE NEW STRATEGY FOR POLICING NEW YORK	5
THE VALUES OF THE DEPARTMENT	9
Current Values	9
The Values of Community Policing	10
THE CONTEXT FOR POLICING NEW YORK	11
The City	11
Special Constituencies	12
Crime Patterns and Trends	13
OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT	21
The Early History	21
The Past Twenty Years	21
The Nature of the Organization	23
Specialization	23
Servicing the Bureaucracy	25
Resource Allocation	25
Functional Orientation	27
Conformity	27
The State of the Infrastructure	28
Facilities and Equipment	28
Science and Technology	28
Personnel Development	30
THE STRATEGIC PLAN OF ACTION	33
Focusing on the Neighborhoods	34
Providing a Community Policing Presence	35
Matching Assignments with Commitments	36
Institutionalizing Problem-Solving	37
Modernizing the Organizational Structure	38
Adopting a New Management Style	39
Increasing Discretion and Accountability	40
Responding to Citizen Calls for Service	41
Controlling 911 Work Demands	44
Reworking the Patrol Allocation Model	45
Broadening the Base for Recruitment	45
Modernizing the Entry Process	46
Developing Real Reward Systems	47
Training for Problem-Solving	48
Assessing Performance	49
The Department as a Whole	49
Individual Performance	50
Strengthening Integrity Control	52
Managing Disorder in the Community	53
Dealing with the Narcotics Scourge	53
Modernizing the Arrest to Arraignment Process	54
Marketing Community Policing—The Media	55
SUMMARY	56
IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING	57
Key Task Responsibilities	57
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63

INTRODUCTION

What this Report Is

We all make important life choices based on our sense of safety: where to live, where to locate a business, how to spend our leisure time and when to venture into the streets. It is the responsibility of the New York City Police Department to provide for the safety of our citizens and to help them feel safe. Crime patterns are not static. And neither should the Police Department's response be static. We have undertaken this report to provide us with a guide toward implementing community policing as our dominant strategy; to see what works best to serve New York City rather than simply building on existing projects and to ensure that the Department operates efficiently. The residents of New York City are entitled to know where we are, where we are going and how we are going to get there.

To this end, the Police Department started a massive self-assessment in May, 1990. That assessment—a snapshot of where we are today—became the basis for an Executive Staff Retreat in September, 1990. At that retreat, the uniformed and civilian Executive Staff spent three days of intense discussion about how to transform the New York City Police Department from the incident-based policing of today to the problem solving community policing of tomorrow. Community policing is an evolving strategy that alters the fundamental way in which the police fight crime and respond to other problems in the community. It means having officers in neighborhoods working cooperatively with the people to address the problems of crime, drugs, disorder, fear and other elements that have a disruptive influence on the quality of life in the city. At the core of this new strategy of policing is the realization on the part of the police that today's overwhelming and complex problems that afflict our neighborhoods cannot be confronted in a truly meaningful way unless and until the total community—the police, other institutions of government, the private sector and the community at large—mobilize for an all-out collective assault against the many dimensions of these problems. Community policing demands the commitment of resources to the process of achieving quality results rather than continuing to simply respond to and handle a multitude of incidents that so often result in little to no resolution. For New York City it also means getting officers out of their cars and back on the beat.

The outcomes of the assessment and the Executive Staff Retreat, along with an intervening Resource Allocation and Staffing Study released in October, 1990, are presented in this report.

How the Assessment was Done

The purpose of the assessment was to describe current conditions in the Police Department, city government and the community as they relate to:

- **Crime**
- **Drugs**
- **Violence**
- **Quality of life in the City's neighborhoods**
- **Organization of the Department.**

The assessment involved every uniformed and civilian unit in the Department and covered every neighborhood in the city. There were four levels of review:

- **Bureau review**
- **Community profiles**
- **City government review (as it affects the Police Department)**
- **Historical review**

Each bureau review identified the mission of the bureau and its sub-units along with its

organization, staffing, resources and training needs. Work generators and their results were evaluated along with the obstacles that hinder performance. The interface of each unit with other government agencies was also examined.

Each community was assessed as well. We looked at each distinct neighborhood and its customs, the population mix and how it is changing, land use and demographic trends. We examined local crime patterns, calls for service and their causes. We addressed local fears and how the community deals with them. Finally, we reviewed the way in which community leaders had formed partnerships with the police to address the problems of fear and crime.

The review of City Government initiatives and operations focused on identifying areas in which the Department's activities meshed well with those of other government agencies, as well as areas in which improved interaction was desirable. Governance changes, such as the Charter Revision, were reviewed in context of how they affected the functions of the Department.

The Historical Review looked at the 1970-1990 period in order to locate the antecedents of the Department's current programs and policies. Every major initiative of the period was reviewed in context of the central driving events, priorities, solutions, successes and failures; thereby making it possible to trace the evolution of the key initiatives that brought the Department to the present time.

A working group—chaired by the Department's First Deputy Commissioner and made up of the Chief of Department, all five Bureau Chiefs and three outside consultants—reviewed the presentations of all the reporting units. The working group sessions took place once a week and lasted all day. They provided an opportunity for probing the assumptions that guide the way we do police work. The New York City Police Department is so large that many units do not have the opportunity to interact with other units on a regular basis, so the working group sessions also turned into an important forum for sharing information.

The outcome of this assessment is probably the most complete analysis ever done of the Police Department. Based on these reviews, the Working Group identified a series of critical issues that became the basis for the Retreat that took place in September, 1990. These include:

- **What do we need to do to make community policing the style for all police operations?**
- **How can we upgrade the patrol function?**
- **How do we merge motorized patrol into community policing?**
- **What should be the involvement of non-patrol units in community policing?**
- **What information needs does community policing generate?**
- **What kind of technological support does community policing require?**
- **What kind of internal research and development capability do we need to support community policing?**
- **How can we improve two-way communication and get more feedback from throughout the Department?**
- **What new crime strategies are suggested by community policing?**
- **Does the Department need to be so reactive to 911 work demands?**
- **How can we make the self-image, personal appearance and pride of members of the Department consistent with community policing?**
- **How do we slow the attrition among civilians and uniformed employees in order to maintain the levels of staffing and experience needed for community policing?**
- **How can we increase civilian participation in community policing?**

- **How can we improve relations between civilian and uniformed members?**
- **How should the Department be reorganized to put like functions together?**
- **How can we promote community policing within the Department and the City?**

Many of these issues are ongoing and the Department has addressed them before. We have no interest in reinventing the things that have been done well in the past. Therefore, we asked our consultants to produce a historical review of the major initiatives, trends and issues of the past twenty years. This review gave the Assessment a good grounding in the Department's recent history and established the context for why and how it reached its present condition. Among the issues it helped clarify was how the Department came to be so specialized, centralized, diffuse and dependent on uniformed staffing.

- **It became obvious that many specialized functions had arisen in response to a particular crisis. As such, each developed its own constituency, command structure and a life that sometimes exceeded its usefulness.**

These observations—along with the mission statements and staffing patterns identified in the unit reviews—became the foundation of a Resource Allocation and Staffing Study submitted to the Mayor in October, 1990. That study's purpose was to review how personnel are presently being used and delineate the staffing requirements of the future community policing strategy of New York City. The study concluded that:

- **The Department is highly specialized, with many small units and functions designed to deal with particular problems;**
- **Uniformed personnel are used to perform tasks that could be performed by civilians because historically the Department has been unable to fund needed civilian positions;**
- **There is no consistent standard of determining whether a function should be performed by a centralized headquarters unit or decentralized to the borough or precinct level;**
- **Precincts have consistently suffered the most in their staffing needs because the centralized, specialized units tend to draw personnel away from them.**

The task of the Resource Allocation and Staffing Study was to identify the staffing needed to achieve our main goal:

- **The Department's goal is to have every section of the city, every neighborhood and every street, policed by officers working under the community policing philosophy.**

The community policing philosophy reaffirms that crime **prevention**, not merely responding to call for service, is the basic mission of the police. Crime prevention is accomplished by having a visible police presence in neighborhoods and undertaking activities to solve crime producing problems, arrest law violators, maintain order and resolve disputes before they result in violence. In community policing it is understood that police and citizens are partners in the maintenance of safe and peaceful neighborhoods. The police bring into the relationship their constitutional and legal values and their professional knowledge and skill. Citizens bring into the relationship their intimate knowledge of neighborhood conditions, a commitment to civility and good citizenship and their willingness to participate fully in controlling crime and maintaining order in their communities.

To achieve this, we established the following principles to guide our staffing decisions:

- **Police activity will be decentralized to the precinct level unless there is a good reason to deal with problems on a borough or city-wide basis.**
- **The 911 system will be integrated with community policing assignments. In this way, non-emergency calls will be handled by community officers who have a close knowledge of the people, problems and issues of their assigned neighborhoods.**
- **The load on 911 will be reduced by using other ways to respond to non-emergency calls. The police will focus on solving problems rather than just responding to incidents. The public's concerns will receive more attention and emergency situations will get a faster response.**
- **Neighborhood police officers will be encouraged – and trained – to act as advocates for the communities they serve, assisting them to solve their problems.**
- **Police officers will be highly visible and will spend time getting to know neighborhood residents, merchants and young people.**
- **Civilians will perform all the functions that do not require the training or powers of a police officer. Skilled civilians will be hired at all levels and they will become an integral part of the Department.**

All the stages of our assessment process were conducted internally and expeditiously. Had we hired an outside firm, the process would have cost the city hundreds of thousands of dollars. Instead, we made use of the considerable skills of our own members and the guidance of three consultants provided by the New York City Police Foundation. The consultants worked with the Executive Staff in drafting the parameters of the assessment process, Resource Allocation and Staffing Study and retreat. They acted as facilitators during the Working Group presentations and Executive Staff Retreat. Finally, they helped mold the vast arsenal of information we compiled into this comprehensive plan for the future.

How This Report is Organized

This report is organized into six main sections. The first section, "The Strategy for Policing New York," describes where we want to go and how community policing can help New York City deal with its needs. This is followed by a description of the values that will guide our transition to community policing.

The next section assesses where the Department is today in relation to community policing goals. It starts with the context for policing New York City and is followed by an overview of the Department and its development.

The report goes on to assess how the Department is organized and staffed along with the state of its infrastructure. The Department's culture, technology, facilities and equipment, personnel and training are all reviewed in the framework of community policing.

The next section, entitled "The Strategic Plan of Action," focuses on the key challenges that must be addressed in order to make the transition from the present to the future. These challenges form the basis for the action plans that are described toward the end of the report. The last section of the report lays out the specific actions we will undertake to institutionalize community policing as the Department's dominant style.

How this Report Will be Used

"Policing New York City in the 1990's" is the link between our assessment of where we are now and our goals for the future. It describes how we are going to achieve community policing and the tasks that must be accomplished to make it happen. This report is a standard for the future and our commitment to the people of New York City.

THE NEW STRATEGY FOR POLICING NEW YORK CITY

Where We Want To Be in the Future

The Strategy for Community Policing represents a basic change in the values, orientation and commitment of the New York City Police Department over the next few years.

- **The dominant philosophy and strategy for policing the city will be community policing. The Department will return to block-by-block policing throughout the city.**

Every neighborhood in this city will have one or more police officers assigned who know about that neighborhood, its people, their concerns, the crime problem, the make-up of the blocks, the crises of daily living and the support systems available to help people live better.

The police officer or officers assigned to these neighborhoods will be responsible for solving problems, not just walking around or responding to incidents. Precinct supervisors will be responsible for ensuring the success of these officers by providing them with the skill and information needed to help neighborhoods build a capacity to deal with crime, disorder and fear.

Being a community police officer assigned to a specific neighborhood will become one of the premier assignments in the Department. It will become a job in which young police officers will want to stay. Indeed, the Department will move toward selecting as police officers men and women who have a commitment to serving the community, not simply seeking adventure.

Police officers will strive to be assigned to the neighborhoods of this city because that assignment will be one of the most satisfying jobs a police officer can have. The Department will provide rewards to the patrol officer so they will want to remain in neighborhood policing, an assignment that will have status equal to others in the Department.

- **The neighborhood police officer, the Department's greatest asset, will be available to residents throughout the city.**

Every neighborhood in the city will have a police officer to serve as a neighborhood advocate and deal with its needs. Some congested neighborhoods may have more than a single police officer but every neighborhood will have at least one.

This police officer may cover the neighborhood on foot (when the neighborhood area consists of a small number of blocks) or by a scooter or by car (when the neighborhood covers a larger area). But community police officers will not remain in those vehicles; they will walk and talk, learning about the needs of the community, meeting residents and business people, assessing crime conditions, becoming neighborhood advocates and working with residents to resist crime, reduce fear and maintain order.

A majority of personnel assigned to these precincts will assume the responsibilities of neighborhood police officers. Every police officer in the precinct will have community policing responsibilities, and most of them will have a specific neighborhood responsibility. No longer will the precincts have only a small number of officers assigned to community policing activities. The Department will encourage the redrawing of some precinct boundaries where there have been significant neighborhood changes since the boundaries were originally developed in the 1970's. This is important because precinct boundaries should match natural neighborhood boundaries.

The precinct will also have a group of rapid response units consisting of two officers available for **immediate** response to life-threatening 911 **emergency** calls and back-up to other officers when responding to hazardous calls. This will permit officers assigned to specific neighborhoods to remain in their areas for their full tours of duty.

Even police officers assigned to specialized functions, such as emergency service and task forces,

will have community policing responsibilities. The members of these units will have a precinct assignment where they will spend their uncommitted time engaged in problem solving activities under the guidance of the precinct command.

- **The entire police organization will reflect this commitment to community policing.**

The police bureaucracy will be tightened, with a minimum of bureaucratic layers between top management and community police officers. The number of police officers assigned to administrative or technical duties will be greatly reduced, reflecting the movement of large numbers of officers from staff assignments to line operations at the precinct level.

The orientation of the headquarters Executive Staff will change. Members of the Executive Staff will view themselves as corporate executives concerned with one common goal: provision of high quality police service in the neighborhoods of this city. The division of responsibility between members of the Executive Staff will result in a collective effort to build a management capability for direction and oversight of a highly decentralized policing effort in each of the city's neighborhoods. The Department will curtail the tendency for the bureaucracy to focus on its own needs. Instead, the full capabilities of the Department will focus outward, toward life in the city's neighborhoods.

Uniformed personnel will be employed in situations requiring police powers. For tasks not requiring police skills, civilians will be hired. These civilian employees will be treated as an integral part of the Police Department.

People at every level of the organization will focus on problem solving and thinking about how to make a difference in the quality of life in this city. The Department will move from an incident-responding bureaucracy to a creative high-performing organization fielding police who are neighborhood advocates, problem solvers and crime controllers.

The Department will invest a substantial portion of its assets in trying to do its job better. This will result in a strengthened capability for problem solving and crime analysis. The dominant operational philosophy of the Department will be community policing, and the focus of community policing will be neighborhood police officers. These officers will be linked with other government and community agencies, building the capacity of neighborhoods to improve the quality of people's lives.

The New York City Police Department will become an agency that shares with neighborhoods the responsibility for controlling crime and maintaining order. In turn, neighborhoods will share with the police responsibility for what happens in their areas. Only by assigning police officers to be responsible for every block of this city can such a collaborative relationship with neighborhood residents be achieved.

- **The Department's efforts to manage the daily crises of the city will draw upon the strengths of community policing but will not impair its commitment to the city's neighborhoods.**

Crises will always occur in New York City. And the New York City Police Department will always play a major role in ensuring that these crises are resolved with a minimum of disruption. But dealing with daily crises will not be permitted to impair the Department's commitment to community policing or to divert the police officers assigned to the neighborhoods of this city to other duties, except as a last resort. It is essential, therefore, that the recommendations of the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan be funded which will enable the Department to employ sufficient personnel to fully staff the precinct requirements. Committing police officers to carry out their community policing responsibilities on the streets of the neighborhoods requires a consistent police presence, attainable only if the officer is permitted to remain in that assignment on a permanent basis.

This change in orientation means the Department will no longer form a unit to deal with each special condition. Instead, the Department will assign a manager to assume responsibility for the condition and coordinate the work of other existing units for a specified time period. After the initial stages of a crisis have been resolved by existing units, dealing with the underlying problem or issue will be an on-going commitment. Few additional special units will be formed. Many will be eliminated as the move toward decentralization and community policing generalists takes hold.

- **The Department will retain its commitment to rapid response to 911 emergencies when a life is in danger or there is a strong possibility of apprehending the violator. Many non-emergency calls will be handled by neighborhood police officers who will assume responsibility for finding solutions to the underlying causes of the problem.**

The Department will move from an incident-responding orientation to a problem solving orientation. Problem solving focuses police officer attention on the underlying causes of the problems that are reflected in a pattern of citizen requests for assistance. Repeat calls to the same problem will not be treated simply as isolated incidents. This will require substantial education of citizens on how the 911 emergency telephone number should be used, as well as changes in how the Department responds to those calls for service. The 911 telephone number will be used for its original purpose . . . emergencies.

- **The Department's policing strategy will focus on neighborhood problem solving by community police officers rather than simply having police officers rapidly move from call to call.**
- **Members of the Department will develop new skills and competencies to reflect the change in policing strategy.**

New York City police officers will be highly skilled in problem solving techniques. Their training will make them sophisticated in crisis intervention, investigating crimes and disorders and assisting people in trouble. Community police officers will be skilled in community organizing, crime prevention, problem analysis and interpersonal communications. They will have the skills and orientation to assist a neighborhood build its own capacity to resist crime. They will improve the quality of life in the city by knowing how to galvanize neighborhood energies toward solving problems of crime, disorder and fear.

The Department will obtain better quality information about neighborhood crime and who the violators are because police officers will remain in neighborhood sectors, increasing their positive contact with residents and business people.

- **Because community police officers will have a greater ability to share information with detectives, improved criminal apprehension will be an important outcome of the community policing strategy.**

Detectives assigned to the Precinct Squads will become area specialists and crime generalists. They will be given defined areas of the community as their primary responsibility. They will work closely with the community police officer(s); thereby ensuring a constant exchange of information about crime, crime conditions and wanted persons in the neighborhood. The detectives will be an integral part of a neighborhood's crime control and problem solving efforts. As such, their ability to apprehend violators will be enhanced.

- **The role of first line supervisors and managers will change. They will work to ensure the success of the community police officers.**

Sergeants will know how to help the community police officers succeed in their objectives by adding to their responsibilities as supervisors a broader role of facilitating the police officer's problem solving activities. Lieutenants will assume management responsibilities for organizing broader Department and city-wide resources to solve neighborhood problems and ensure that community police officers and sergeants are adequately trained and supported. In short, all ranks above police officer will be responsible for assisting the community police officer to successfully achieve his/her objectives in the neighborhoods throughout the city.

For those who aspire to be commanders in the Department and rise to the level of Captain and above, success in community policing will be an important priority. Those who will have moved up the ladder are those who are most successful in working with neighborhoods.

This is what the New York City Police Department will be like in a few years.

THE VALUES OF THE DEPARTMENT

Our Standards of Excellence

Values are the beliefs held by the Police Department and its personnel. They guide the actions of individual employees and the policy decisions made by management. As such, values provide the Department with a sense of why it exists and what it wants to achieve. For employees, values indicate how they view the world, their constituents and others with whom they have contact. In high performing organizations, values are the driving force behind behavior. People do things not because of the threat of discipline, but because they believe in what they are doing.

In policing, three separate sets of values are particularly important.

Organizational values are the official statement of the Department about how policing will be done and what is important. These values indicate the things the organization takes seriously. Values set forth the organization's view of the community it serves, as well as its approach to dealing with the daily situations it encounters.

Employee values indicate how police officers and civilians view the world in which they work. As with organizational values, employee perceptions of their world indicate what they believe is important and unimportant, and how they treat various people with whom they come in contact.

The **community's values** indicate how residents of the city expect the Police Department to perform. These values set forth the public's expectation for the Police Department. Community values also indicate the type of relationship people believe the Department ought to have with residents of the city's neighborhoods.

The New York City Police Department has always had a set of organizational values. Over time, these values have been refined, but they have rarely been put into written form. With an organization as large as the New York City Police Department, it is difficult to obtain a value consensus. But with the movement of the Department toward community policing, the Department's values must be publicly stated and must generally match the expectations of the community. The values of all employees must, in turn, match the values of the Department if the full potential of community policing is to be achieved.

Current Values of the Department and Community. Much of the strife that arises between police and their constituents comes from conflicting values and expectations. What the community expects from the police and what police expect of themselves are often at odds. The issue is further complicated by the difference between **stated** values and **actual** values.

The community expects the following from its police:

- **Honesty and integrity**
- **Respect**
- **Fairness**
- **Justice**
- **Professionalism**
- **Sensitivity**
- **Obedience to the law**
- **Homage to the dignity of life**
- **Delivery of government's responsibility to the people**
- **Equal treatment under the law**
- **Responsiveness to community needs**
- **Neutral enforcement of law and respect for diverse cultures and lifestyles**
- **Community input in decision-making**

- **Upholding of human rights and civil liberties**
- **Provision of a safe and secure environment**
- **Good selection, training and equipment**

There is nothing in this list with which the Department's current, though often unstated, values disagree. The members of the Department see themselves as part of a long and proud tradition of service. However, in some officers, seeing the worst of human behavior and tragedy on a daily basis has too often divided their world into "us" and "them."

- **One goal of community policing is to align the values of police and their constituents. The cynicism that threatens this alignment will be tempered by problem solving policing.**
- **The problem solving approach of community policing allows officers to regain control of their work and its results. That sense of mastery will reinvigorate the New York City Police Department's long tradition of service.**

The Values of Community Policing. It is important that citizens and members of the Department have no question as to what the values of the Department are, since those values guide most police actions. With the move into community policing, the key values that will guide Police Department actions are:

- **We care about the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods.**
- **We treat every citizen, in every contact we have, with respect, regardless of their ethnic or social background or their cultural, religious or sexual orientation.**
- **We are committed to providing a highly visible presence in all of the city's neighborhoods.**
- **Recognizing the trust the community has placed in us by providing us with police authority, we will be accountable for our actions.**
- **We will maintain the highest level of integrity in all our activities, avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.**
- **Our highest priority is human life. Recognizing that we sometimes must use deadly force, we only do so when absolutely necessary to save a life.**
- **The Department recognizes that its employees are its greatest asset and assumes a responsibility to treat them professionally and support their professional development.**
- **We are committed to pursuing criminal violators until they are apprehended. Following a crime, we accept responsibility for assisting the victim and his or her neighborhood to prevent further criminal occurrences.**

These values will be widely disseminated and will serve as the basis for our decision-making as the Department adopts the community policing philosophy.

THE CONTEXT FOR POLICING NEW YORK CITY

The City

Whether they focus on its good or bad qualities, popular descriptions of New York City are stated in hyperbole that makes the city larger than life. That's because the Big Apple is larger than life. New York City is the cultural and media capital of the world, the financial center of the country and the ultimate melting pot.

New York City is at once a conglomeration of local enclaves and a world center that is greater than the sum of its parts. Its ethnic celebrations and its cosmopolitan happenings generate more public events than in any other city in America. In 1989, for example, Patrol Borough Manhattan North handled more than 936 major events requiring a police presence beyond precinct abilities. Bicycle races, marathons, rodeos, religious processions. Neighborhood festivals for Amsterdam Avenue, Broadway merchants, Columbus Avenue and El Barrio. Parades for Greek and Cuban Independence, Israel, St. Patrick's Day, Martin Luther King Jr. and Pan American Day.

This is not to mention the dignitaries and protestors drawn by the United Nations or the crowds that overrun major sporting events and concerts, such as at Yankee Stadium in the Southwest Bronx, Shea Stadium and the National Tennis Center in Flushing and Madison Square Garden in Midtown. The city's mass events attract more people than in any other city.

- **The essence of New York City is its diversity, density and political complexity— all of which impact directly on the operations of the Police Department.**

New York City packs a population of about 8 million people (the exact number is in dispute) into a mere 319 square miles of land, making it the largest and densest city in the nation. With over 25,000 people per square mile (66,500 in Manhattan) the closest any other U.S. city comes is about 16,000 people per square mile in neighboring Paterson, New Jersey. These numbers do not include undocumented aliens or the more than 40 million (1989) tourists reported by the New York City Convention and Visitors Bureau. Nor do they take account of the commuters who daily pour into the city from a metropolitan area of 18 million people.

New York City's population mix is not a simple one. As of 1985, fully one-quarter of the city's population was foreign born. In recent years, the city has received about one-sixth of the total legal immigrants that come into the U.S. annually. The largest groups among these are Asians, Dominicans and Jamaicans. They come with different languages, cultures and prospects. They join a city that is already very diverse with a population that is 24% African American and 23.3% Hispanic.

The New York City Police Department is organized around 75 precincts, which, for the most part, are somewhat coterminous with the city's neighborhoods. The culture of these neighborhoods defines much of the Police Department's work. It must provide protection during the Greek holidays in Astoria and the Hasidic observances in Boro Park and Williamsburg; the San Gennaro feast in Little Italy and the observances of the Ansaar Allah Muslims in Bushwick; the rallies at the Slave Theater in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the West Indian Day parade on Eastern Parkway; the Gay Pride march in Greenwich Village and the Chinese New Year in Chinatown; the Mid Bronx Desperados Street Fair in Morrisania; and the anti-abortion protests at Staten Island University Hospital. Sometimes cultures clash. Wherever such clashes occur, police are the buffer.

Changes in the city's economic base contribute to intergroup clashes as well as creating pressures of their own. New York City is undergoing a clear shift from a manufacturing/labor intensive economy to a service/capital intensive economy. After a period of rapid growth, some jobs are evaporating or moving to the suburbs. Much of the remaining work requires skills that our labor force must scramble to acquire. More wealth is being concentrated at one end of the scale while more poverty is being concentrated at the other. As the economy roils around, real estate interests clash with tenants' rights and Fifth Avenue retailers butt up against street corner peddlers.

New York City is a diverse city made up of diverse interests that fight hard for scarce police resources. Neighborhoods are organized into community boards, community councils, precinct councils, block associations, neighborhood associations, institutions and various pressure groups that make their interests known. On a city-wide basis, pressures are brought to bear on behalf of broader constituencies.

Because New York City is a politically sophisticated city, these diverse constituencies have created a highly reactive form of public policy. The city's culture dictates that if you have a problem, you solve it by creating a new program. Many of these programs are short term solutions applied in response to public pressure. But once the program is created, it often develops a life of its own. Media focus, in this media capital of the world, magnifies an event and helps to shape public perception. The result is a proliferation of programs and initiatives that ultimately drain the Police Department of much of its street presence.

Special Constituencies

Decentralization is a key element of community policing. The city's recent move toward coterminality has smoothed the way for a systematic response to local problems and special constituencies.

New York City's constituencies are:

- **Ethnic**
- **Racial**
- **Religious**

In addition, they are defined by:

- **Sexual orientation**

Other special groups consist of:

- **Women**
- **Children**
- **The aged**
- **The physically challenged**

Finally, the city is a collage of:

- **Business interests**
- **Media interests**
- **Labor groups**
- **Academic institutions**
- **"Good Government" groups**

Some of these groups are quite vocal. They flex their muscles in the media and they know how to get things done. Other groups are quiet and have limited influence.

To respond to the needs of these constituencies, various specialized units have been created in the Police Department. To name a few: Senior Citizen Escort Service, Movie-TV Unit, Youth Outreach Unit and the Peddler Task Force. Each of these programs—as well as the many others not named—serves an important purpose. However, each has required special staffing that has diverted support from the Department's primary focus.

Centralized programs have their place as a last resort. But they are basically contrary to community policing which seeks to solve problems at the local level. Nevertheless, the variety of demands

from the broad constituencies throughout the city and the emergence of all these specialized programs points to an important guidepost for the future:

- **The changing composition of the city calls for keeping the peace more through intervention and mediation as opposed to simply hard line policing.**

Community policing is a proactive, interactive alternative to traditional policing. It attends to the needs of special constituencies without draining resources from the broader community.

Crime Patterns and Trends

Fear of crime is a major concern of New Yorkers. Citizen anxieties are heightened by what they hear in the news, what their friends tell them, and what they and their families have themselves experienced. But there is nothing to be gained in being paralyzed by fear. Because crime is the focus of such fear, it is important to put the issue of crime in some kind of perspective.

Even though killings, rapes and "wildings" are the crimes that dominate the news, the fact is that most crimes are non-violent. Violent crime makes up less than one-quarter of all the crimes that are committed. But routine "quality of life" crimes are important too. They set the tone for our sense of safety in homes, on the streets and in the neighborhoods.

Some New Yorkers have the impression that the city is in the midst of an unprecedented crime wave. In order to assess the truth of that statement, there is a need to understand what crime statistics really mean. There are two ways of measuring crime. The first, Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), is the one the public hears about the most. It is based on the number of crimes reported to or by police. As such, it may not always be an accurate indicator of crime because many crimes are not reported. The UCR is a fairly accurate way to measure year to year changes in homicide, which reached a record in New York City last year, but not as accurate for other crimes.

The second way of measuring crime is through victimization surveys. These have been conducted by the federal government since 1973 to ascertain national crime rates. The National Crime Survey has its shortcomings. But many experts feel it is more accurate than the UCR because it surveys a **random** sample of the population to learn about both reported and unreported crimes. Based on national victimization surveys, only about one-third of all crimes are reported. However, there has been an upward trend in the percent of crimes reported to police between 1973 and today. Based on this upward trend, an increase in the UCR would be expected. Therefore, **part** of the increase in reported crime may be due to people **reporting** more crime.

- **No victimization survey has been conducted in New York City since the federal government did one in 1974. So the only measure of crime available is UCR data.**
- **The UCR reports crime two ways: *number of crimes* reported and *crime rates*. Of these two numbers, the crime rate is the more meaningful to the general public. Numbers of crimes reported are important for police to assess and manage their work load. But they do not tell anything about the chances of becoming a crime victim.**

It is important to put New York City's crime problem in perspective. Comparing the city's crime rate to the 25 largest U.S. cities (See Table 1.):

- **Statistically, New York City is one of the safest big cities in the country. With a crime rate 9697.6 per 100,000 people, it is *thirteenth* among major cities. Seattle, San Antonio, Boston, El Paso, Jacksonville, Columbus, New Orleans, Phoenix, Dallas, Houston, Detroit and Washington D.C. all have higher crime rates than New York City. The highest crime rate in the nation is found in Dallas, whose rate is nearly twice that of New York City's**

- **Only in robberies does New York City have a higher crime rate than other cities in the country. The city's homicide rate is far less than cities such as Washington, DC; Detroit, MI; Richmond, VA and even Inglewood, CA.**

Yet, New York City is perceived as a dangerous place and most of those other cities are not. Part of the reason is that New York City's crimes get a lot of publicity, whereas Columbus's do not. For example, cases such as the Central Park jogger and Zodiac shootings got national attention and created a perception that Central Park was unsafe. But there is a big difference between perception and reality. The fact is: reports of serious crimes committed in Central Park have plummeted in the past ten years. Robberies alone have dipped 73%.

Table 1

**TOTAL CRIME INDEX
RANKING PER 100,000 POPULATION,
Twenty-Five Largest Cities
1989**

RANK	CITY	RATE
1	Dallas	16353.7
2	Seattle	
3	San Antonio	
4	Boston	
5	Detroit	
6	New Orleans	
7	El Paso	
8	Jacksonville	
9	Phoenix	
10	Houston	
11	Columbus	
12	Washington, D.C.	
13	New York City	9697.6
14	San Diego	
15	Los Angeles	
16	Baltimore	
17	San Francisco	
18	Memphis	
19	Milwaukee	
20	Cleveland	
21	Las Vegas	
22	Denver	
23	Philadelphia	
24	Nashville	
25	San Jose	5318.8

When New York City's year-to-year changes in numbers of crime reported since 1970 is compared with those of the nation as a whole, the following results are revealed:

- Almost every year in which the nation's crime index decreased, New York City's index decreased by a greater percentage than the nation as a whole. (See Table 2.)
- For most years in which the nation's crime index increased, New York City's either decreased or increased by a smaller percentage than the nation as a whole. (See Table 2.)
- There were only five years out of the past twenty in which New York City's crime index increased by a greater percentage than that of the nation as a whole. (See Table 2.)
- If the nationwide and New York City series are indexed¹ against 1970, the former shows an 80% increase over the base year, while the city shows a far smaller 23% increase over the base year. (See Figure 1.)

None of this means that there is not a serious crime problem in New York City. There is. The number of reported crimes has increased 23% since 1970. While part of this number may be accounted for by increased reporting of crime, a large part of the increase is due to an actual rise in the incidence of crime.

Among New York City's major crime categories, there are a number that are increasing, while there are others that are decreasing. Among those decreasing are rape and burglary. Among those increasing are homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny and motor vehicle theft. Most of these are crimes induced by drugs, turf wars over control of the drug trade, proliferation of guns, violence triggered by the effects of stimulants on the brain and the desperate acts of addicts trying to support their habits.

Table 2
TOTAL CRIME INDEX
By Year, 1970-1989
New York City vs. Nationwide

Year	Nationwide Crime Index Total	+ / - %	N.Y.C. Crime Index	+ / - %	Nationwide Minus NYC Crime Index	+ / - %
1970	8,098,000	-	578,149	-	7,519,851	-
1971	8,588,200	+6.0	591,929	+2.4	7,996,271	+6.3
1972	8,248,800	-3.9	478,869	-19.1	7,769,931	-2.8
1973	8,718,100	+5.7	475,855	-0.6	8,242,245	+6.0
1974	10,253,400	+17.6	519,825	+9.2	9,733,575	+18.0
1975	11,292,400	+10.1	581,247	+11.8	10,711,153	+10.0
1976	11,349,700	+0.5	658,147	+13.2	10,691,553	-0.1
1977	10,984,500	-3.2	610,062	-7.3	10,374,438	-2.9
1978	11,209,000	+2.0	570,355	-6.5	10,638,645	+2.5
1979	12,249,520	+9.3	621,110	+8.9	11,628,390	+9.3
1980	13,408,300	+9.5	710,153	+14.3	12,698,147	+9.1
1981	13,423,800	+0.1	725,866	+2.2	12,697,934	*
1982	12,974,400	-3.3	688,567	-5.1	12,285,833	-3.2
1983	12,108,600	-6.6	622,877	-9.5	11,485,723	-6.5
1984	11,881,800	-1.9	600,216	-3.6	11,281,584	-1.7
1985	12,431,400	+4.6	601,467	+0.2	11,829,933	+4.8
1986	13,211,900	+6.3	635,199	+5.6	12,576,701	+6.3
1987	13,508,700	+2.2	656,505	+3.4	12,852,195	+2.1
1988	13,923,100	+3.1	718,483	+9.4	13,204,617	+2.7
1989	14,340,800	+3.0	712,419	-0.8	13,628,381	+3.2


* No statistical change

** Estimate using 1989 % change reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, April 8, 1990.

¹The term "Index" is used loosely when referring to Index Crime. The indexing used for this comparison is a true statistical indexing obtained by dividing succeeding annual totals by the respective 1970 total for each series and then multiplying the result by 100.

FIGURE 1

TOTAL CRIME INDEX - % CHANGE
NEW YORK CITY -VS- REST OF NATION
(1970 AS BASE YEAR)



- New York City's biggest drug problem is crack cocaine, which accounts for the majority of drug arrests.
- Street buys show heroin making a comeback.

The frightening increase in homicides is also a spin-off of the drug trade. But it is also a product of technology. Assaults that would have remained assaults are turning into murders because they are being committed with guns.

The rise in crime is not uniform. In fact, overall crime complaints are dropping or remaining the same in about one-third of all precincts. (See Table 3.) This decrease even includes some high crime areas. Even so:

- Selected crimes are increasing in specific neighborhoods. This implies the need for crime-fighting strategies to be tailored to each area. It illustrates the futility of the incident-responding model of police work and speaks for the problem solving approach of community policing.

Victimization rates vary enormously depending on where one lives. A New Yorker's chances of being the target of a violent crime are almost non-existent if he or she lives in Battery Park City. But they increase to 1 in 23 for residents of Central Harlem.

Table 3
CRIME COMPLAINTS
Year Comparison
1985 and 1989

Prec't	1985	1989	% +/- Change	Prec't	1985	1989	% +/- Change	Prec't	1985	1989	% +/- Change
1	21972	23246	5.8	44	24746	28104	13.6	81	13006	16138	24.1
5	18612	13579	-27.0	45	10421	13117	25.9	83	22094	35005	58.4
6	19691	19682	0.0	46	26464	25301	-4.4	84	16695	18244	9.3
7	9715	8622	-11.3	47	14171	19003	34.1	88	12092	13109	8.4
9	22183	21936	-1.1	48	11298	13268	17.4	90	19370	21875	12.9
10	22993	12136	-47.2	49	10898	15286	40.3	94	6757	8996	33.1
13	23986	22063	-8.0	50	10824	14536	34.3	100	7236	5815	-19.6
MTS	82419	61005	-26.0	52	21423	21040	-1.8	101	9233	10614	15.0
17	14862	13109	-11.8	60	16229	15460	-4.7	102	14521	18554	27.8
MTN	53567	32381	-39.6	61	16653	18619	11.8	103	19811	19822	0.1
19	27328	28744	5.2	62	12235	14211	16.2	104	15304	20111	31.4
20	15416	15898	3.1	63	12484	14752	18.4	105	14190	17334	24.6
CPP	4523	3596	-20.5	66	12576	15144	20.4	106	11854	14358	20.3
23	12851	14379	11.9	67	25488	20769	-18.5	107	14683	16451	12.0
24	13421	15806	17.8	68	10703	12223	14.2	108	12969	15322	20.7
25	11942	11453	-4.1	69	8313	11790	41.8	109	18706	22454	20.0
26	7059	11194	58.6	70	30677	24361	-20.6	110	17920	27252	52.1
28	19931	16162	-18.9	71	16353	17839	9.1	111	9617	13259	37.9
30	9641	10814	12.2	72	16954	16515	-2.6	112	10429	13171	26.3
32	15386	17000	10.5	76	6668	8217	23.2	113	18010	23168	28.6
34	22870	25607	12.0	78	15777	12547	-20.5	114	20142	24400	21.1
40	17383	18960	9.1	73	19966	23148	15.9	115	16171	20051	24.0
41	14988	14227	-3.1	75	27615	39568	43.3	120	23716	28080	18.4
42	10317	13760	33.4	77	14432	22319	54.6	122	16598	17966	8.2
43	22312	28801	29.1	79	19849	19858	0.0	123	4356	5858	34.5

Complaint data includes complaint reports, juvenile reports and summonses (for other than traffic infractions and parking offenses)

The New York City Police Department's primary response to crime has been arrests. Arrests have risen steadily over the past ten years, despite a fluctuating uniformed presence in the precincts. (See Table 4.) Arrests are one response to crime, but they are not the only one. Isolated arrests of isolated criminals do not always attack the causes of crime. Crime is also related to the degree to which people are willing to use the streets, the organization of neighborhood residents and a variety of environmental factors (including the ability to observe open space activities and the absence of dark and dirty alleyways) which frequently reduce the opportunity for the commission of crime. Similarly, a number of tactical police responses, such as detectives targeting repeat offenders or responding to crime patterns they have identified, are also important in controlling crime.

Table 4
OVERALL CRIME BY PRECINCTS
Arrest Trend by Year and Precinct Personnel Assignments
1980-1989

Year	Precinct Personnel ¹ Assigned	Precinct ² Arrests	Arrests to Personnel
1980	11,157	104,882	9.4 :1
1981	10,587	101,250	9.5 :1
1982	10,644	101,880	9.6 :1
1983	10,971	106,143	9.7 :1
1984	11,913	115,750	9.7 :1
1985	11,913	118,381	9.9 :1
1986	12,107	134,074	11.1 :1
1987	12,263	142,703	11.6 :1
1988	13,057	155,254	11.9 :1
1989	11,709	159,161	13.6 :1

¹Number of police officers and detectives assigned to precincts (excluding Detective Bureau personnel) as of December of each year.

²Total arrests (felony, misdemeanor/violation) made by precinct personnel (excluding those made by Detective Bureau personnel).

Using the problem solving model, robberies can be seen as crimes of abandoned streets, empty lobbies, hidden stairwells and poorly designed stores. A spate of robberies can sometimes be stymied just by making simple changes in the physical environment: defining an area with planters or benches; creating a cul-de-sac; clearing stacks of garbage that obstruct informal surveillance. These measures take the anonymity out of streets. They create a sense of territoriality that encourages law-abiding people to use public spaces and keep a casual watch on them. These "eyes on the street" help spot intruders and increase their risk of being caught.

Other changes involve organizing people. For example, a citizen patrol that escorts senior citizens and children home during late hours can take the terror out of deserted lobbies and stairwells. Also, a highly organized neighborhood can often identify those who are committing crimes and provide assistance to the police in bringing them to justice.

In the case of store robberies, isolated establishments with layouts that reduce visibility are more vulnerable than others. When a store is robbed, a police officer can respond to the scene, get information and perhaps make an arrest. But that is just a response to the symptom, not the root problem. Addressing the problem may take the form of working with the store owner to remove obstructive displays and signs from the windows. This way, passersby—including police—can have a clear line of vision

into the store. Cash registers can be moved up front so that everything going on around them is open to view. Large signs can announce that clerks have only small amounts of money in the registers and that the rest is kept in lock-boxes to which cashiers have no access. The heights of display cases can be lowered and aisles rearranged, reducing the opportunities for concealment. Just such techniques were used by the largest convenience store chain in the country and its robberies dropped 62%. This occurred during a time when the national robbery rate was going in the other direction.

The point is this: Making an arrest is just the beginning of good police work. Much crime can be averted when police officers work with local residents, businesses and city agencies to identify the root problem and mobilize the resources to solve it.

Crime is not just a random phenomenon. If the cause can be identified, it can be worked on. That is what community policing is about . . . solving problems and preventing crime.

OVERVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT

Where We Have Come From and Where We Are Today

Early History of the Department and How it Developed.

The history of the New York City Police Department is that of the city itself. In his history of the Department, Gerald Astor¹ notes that "history's effect (on the Department) cannot be underestimated, for past performance and tradition influence much of the quality of police work today."

Policing in New York City began with a small "town watch" in 1783. The police, Astor says, then went through a number of stages as the rapidly growing community tried to deal with massive immigration, disease and general lawlessness among the new arrivals. The city problems reflected the need for public order as well as the challenge of developing city services to deal with its increasingly dense population. The official birth of the New York City Police Department took place in 1844 with the passage of the Municipal Police Act. Under a formal organization enacted in 1845, the Department was established with an initial personnel strength of about 800.

During its formative years, the New York City Police Department worked to establish its presence throughout the city. Crowd control was a major challenge of the period. During numerous incidents, command broke down and violence erupted on both sides of the conflicts. Corruption was a problem throughout government, and the police were not immune from its impact.

With the appointment of Theodore Roosevelt as a Police Commissioner in 1895, reform of the Department began. But when Roosevelt moved to Washington, D.C. as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Department lapsed into a political machine, responsive to the special interests of the government. The following fifty years saw periods of violence interspersed with periods of relative calm.

In 1914, under Commissioner Arthur Woods, police hiring standards were dramatically raised and the training programs of the Department broadened. It was the first real move toward professionalism. Under a succession of Commissioners in the first third of the 20th century, the Department augmented its responsibilities with traffic control and emergency services. Police education came into vogue, first at local schools such as the Baruch School of Business and Public Administration and then at the College of Police Science (now the John Jay College of Criminal Justice) which was established in 1965.

In a sense, the New York City Police Department has mirrored the development of professional policing in America. From a disorganized beginning, the earliest focus of the Department was political, responding to the needs of the party in control of government. Later, as public concern mounted about police behavior, the Department moved to modernize itself, initially through education and training and then through the application of technology beginning in the 1960's. By 1970, the Department had grown immensely. While numerous initiatives had been undertaken to professionalize the Department, issues related to rapid growth demanded the most administrative attention. The police strategy remained primarily foot patrol in the neighborhoods of the city. The 911 emergency response system had not been established and the Department had yet to deal with the corruption incidents exposed during the early 1970's. Those two events drastically changed the make-up of the Department and greatly altered the Department's policing strategy.

The Past Twenty Years.

The period 1970 to 1990 was one in which the New York City Police Department emerged in the vanguard of almost everything having to do with "progressive" police management. But despite pioneering programs at almost every level, the dominant style of the organization remained traditionally paramilitary with strong central control over most activities, even though there was substantial decentralization of some efforts.

¹Astor, Gerald. The New York Cops: An Informal History. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971.

During this twenty year period, the New York City Police Department tried to shift the basis of police authority from a paramilitary, authoritarian, and control-based model to one based on social service, professionalism, and human relations skills. The Department upgraded the use of verbal strategies in resolving conflict. Fine programs, such as hostage negotiating teams, came out of that effort. The arrests and summons "numbers game," which had long dominated the Department, was tempered with an emphasis on quality of services rendered. Community members along with rank and file officers were given an enhanced role in making police policy. Recruiting minority and female officers was an important part of that effort. So was careful attention to the psychological health and personal integrity of all officers.

The growing recognition of the unjustified use of deadly force by police, coupled with the wrenching stresses under which police officers work, led to an array of changes in police procedure: restrictions on use of firearms; psychological monitoring for police officers under emotional stress with early warning systems to detect troubled police officers and intervene before they hurt themselves, their families, fellow officers, or the public; ethical training in the consequences of deadly force; and supplementing of guns with non-lethal weapons.

Unlike some earlier police reforms, the last twenty years saw an attempt to expose police to a consistent set of expectations from day of recruitment to day of retirement. The underlying principle: to coordinate all key parts of the police socialization process—recruitment, entry level tests, training, performance evaluation, promotions, rewards, management style, psychological services—and bring them into harmony with the progressive goals of the Police Department.

The New York City Police Department's approach to organizational change won considerable national attention in law enforcement circles. In 1975, for example, the Department's Full Service Neighborhood Team Policing Model was designated by the Federal government as a National Training and Demonstration Project. The New York City Police Department also participated in numerous groundbreaking projects, such as Women in Policing and Peer Review Panels. It was the heyday of police research and the Department was right there in the forefront. But all through the 1970's, the police world struggled through an ongoing feud.

On one side were the progressives at the Police Foundation and Police Executive Research Forum. On the other were the traditionalists who came from a mold in which policemen were tough cops and not "social workers," the term applied to any police activity other than arresting violators. The progressives, by contrast, emphasized putting women on patrol, getting police officers into the community, and promoting the service and order maintenance roles of the police.

In the mid-1980's, crime became more violent—even while overall rates declined—due to the proliferation of advanced firearms and an eruption of organized groups vying for control of drug distribution networks. Law enforcement, order maintenance and social service continued to define police work. But the focus remained on traditional crime fighting.

Today, police are still fighting the same philosophical battle over what kind of institution law enforcement should be. However, a new generation is swinging the pendulum toward new thinking in policing. Alternating hiring freezes, hiring frenzies and layoffs have allowed older police to age and retire. Veterans are being replaced with newcomers, gradually tipping the age distribution of police to the younger end of the scale. The draft is gone. So today's recruits do not come in with a military background. Instead, some are products of a rock music and drug culture era. Younger, better educated, more liberal, more tolerant—and lacking military discipline—they face the future with a vastly different mindset than the police of the past.

Even the technical aspects of the job are changing. Electronic surveillance, management information systems, blood spectrography, voice prints, and DNA typing are becoming the tools of the trade. TASERS, mace, tranquilizer bullets, and restraining nets are reducing the use of deadly force. The nature of policing is inevitably changing, becoming at once more humane, more exact and sometimes more impersonal.

In the old days, informants, friendly shopkeepers, and cooperative neighbors provided the beat cop with the tips he needed to control his territory. Policing was a personal business having less to do with crime busting than with maintaining order. The police officer did everything from helping immigrants find a good place to live to delivering coal and food to the poor to greasing the local political machine.

Corruption scandals and the patrol car changed things. Today's police drive by in an air-conditioned cruiser outfitted with a public address system. Theoretically, they could go through an entire shift without ever getting out from behind the wheel. But that makes for ineffective policing. So the Police Department has made forays into an earlier time with programs such as Park, Walk and Talk; Operation Contact, Neighborhood Team Policing, and the Community Police Officer Program.

The idea is, if police work with the people, the people will work with them. Satisfied clients will keep them posted on local conditions and indigenous "bad guys." The New York City Police Department has recognized that the personal approach is the best one for crime that occurs at the **neighborhood** level. The Department has recognized that creating a partnership with the public to fight fear and crime must be its priority for the 1990's. Police will work with the community in creating a sense of safety, while elected officials and others work on the social agenda that might reduce the underlying causes of crime.

Despite changing priorities and uncertain resource allocations, the New York City Police Department has gone through a clear evolution in the past twenty years. That evolution is captured in the word "professionalism." In standard parlance, the term "professional" connotes ongoing education, discretion in decision-making, peer review of work and acting for the benefit of one's clients.

In some ways, the New York City Police Department has achieved true professionalism. The upgrading of the education and skill level of its personnel has been evident. Community-type policing, in which the New York City Police Department has consistently excelled, is a model of client-oriented work. Problem solving, with the input of local residents, is the essence of professional policing. The sophisticated systems and humane procedures that have been put in place are a model of smart thinking. The pervasive and consistent application of integrity controls are a hallmark of professionalism.

At the same time, other aspects of professionalization, such as input into decision-making and peer review were abandoned. The reward systems, such as the Extra Compensation Program, that were intended to encourage risk-taking and innovative thinking seem to have backfired. The paramilitary organizational structure, which tends to stifle independent thought, remains firmly in place.

In sum, the past twenty years have been a period of extraordinary change and experimentation. Despite a massive bureaucracy, deeply entrenched traditions, repeated fiscal crises and shattering scandals, the Department has emerged as resilient and forward-looking. As it enters into the 1990's, it is clear that the New York City Police Department will continue to hold its place in the forefront of progressive policing. But in order to do so, it must avoid the pitfalls of past efforts:

- **Isolated, ad hoc programs**
- **Conflicts among concurrent programs**
- **Lack of continuity**
- **Over-reaction to special constituent demands.**

The Nature of the Organization

Through the years, the New York City Police Department has sought to achieve dual goals: highly technical specialist capabilities and a decentralized police presence in the city's neighborhoods.

Specialization

- **The Department is highly specialized, with numerous small and medium-sized organizational units assigned to deal with special-interest problems.**

The New York City Police Department is an organization in which special units or groups of police officers have been formed to assume full responsibility for a problem, or perform a function to provide a response (and indication of a public commitment) to a developing crisis. A relatively small percentage of total personnel are assigned to foot patrol in the city's neighborhoods. The largest number of patrol officers staff 911 response units; other officers are assigned to special programs operating at the precinct level and the centralized borough or city level.

The Department has been quite effective in developing competent specialties in response to crises or problems. The net result of these assignments, however, has been a declining percentage of officers actually assigned to beat patrol. While the Department has often indicated that it places a high value on the activities of patrol officers, many officers feel that patrol is the least desirable assignment because they are in uniform, subjected to numerous civilian complaints and frequently must deal with unpleasant conditions. Thus, many officers seek to move out of precinct uniformed duty into one of the myriad specialist units throughout the Department.

- **The specialist nature of the organization is maintained in response to two pressures: 1) the desire of officers to find a job location that will satisfy their individual interests, and 2) the tendency of the Department to respond to crises through implementation of new initiatives that add new units.**

It is an important part of the police culture that many officers feel the need to find their own "niches," positions to which they can get assigned and remain for the better part of their careers. The benefits of these assignments are usually not monetary. They relate to shift schedules, linkage to higher-level commanders who will protect their career and removal from what is seen as low status patrol work.

Special units have also been formed to indicate that the Department takes seriously a developing problem, such as Street Narcotics Enforcement Units (SNEU). If these special units did not continue indefinitely, they might represent a meaningful response to the problems that capture the attention of the city's residents and media. But that has rarely been the case. The organization is so large that regular assessments of whether a unit or specialized effort ought to continue are difficult. Therefore, regardless of how well-intentioned the initial effort might be, specialization ultimately draws resources away from the city's neighborhoods. Particular interest groups may be well served, but other needs of the neighborhoods often go unmet.

- **Each of these specialist units develops its own constituency and forms a bureaucratic structure to serve itself. Some staffing serves the unit, rather than the function performed.**

Every specialized unit in the New York City Police Department can easily justify its existence, and does so whenever additional personnel are required. The task is made easier because the units develop internal and external constituencies that are well satisfied with the efforts made in servicing special-interest needs. There is nothing wrong in meeting these needs. But the continual growth of individual bureaucracies, when police resources at the neighborhood level are scarce, raises questions as to whether extensive specialization is desirable.

- **The community-based efforts of the past have been undertaken as specialist functions of units within the existing structure.**

The Community Patrol Officer Program (CPOP), for example, was established as a community-based policing initiative drawing upon the best police thinking about problem solving and community organization. Officers were assigned to problem-solve in selected areas of each precinct. These assignments, however, were ancillary to the basic function of precinct operations: staffing radio cars to respond to

citizen calls for service. Because these calls have increased from year to year, the time available for officers to do other things has been limited. The high commitment of time leaves radio motor patrols (RMPs) few opportunities to attend to neighborhood stability.

Over the years, a wide range of special initiatives has been undertaken at the precinct level. In each instance, as with the CPOP initiative, a specialist group of officers has been established to focus attention on the problem, or implement the new strategy. When the Department decided to implement its strengthened precinct narcotics enforcement effort, it did so with officers separate from regular assignments. The result of this approach to problem solving has been fragmentation. Internal and external constituencies for each program initiative have made it difficult, if not impossible, for precinct commanders to exercise discretion in allocating resources from one program initiative to another.

Over time, employees become comfortable with their arrangements, so specialization has historically had powerful supporting interests within and without the Department.

Servicing the Bureaucracy. The nature of any large organization is such that specialized units develop their own infrastructure. The New York City Police Department is no different. Commanders have Executive Officers. Units have administrative officers. Shifts have commanders and supervisors. Even though many of these employees are focused on overseeing field performance, such assignments tend to draw some resources from the basic focus of police service: neighborhood policing. The challenge for the Department is to ensure that the absolute minimum number of its uniformed personnel are used in staff positions.

Resource Allocation

- **The largest constituency in the city—the residents and small business people of the city's neighborhoods—has the least influence. There is no special interest group representing their need for police service.**

In a highly specialized structure, special constituencies focus attention on special needs. The neighborhoods are left to compete for the limited resources available for 911 call response and the few CPOP officers. The continuing increase in 911 service demand has deprived neighborhoods of access to more stable, neighborhood-based police service, such as those provided by CPOP officers.

Confronted with pressure to increase the assignment of officers to various precincts, the Department moved some years ago to design a resource allocation formula that would ensure equitable distribution of personnel resources. That plan, the Patrol Allocation Plan, has been the basis of these allocations and has generally defined and limited competition for police resources. This practice maximizes the impact of 911 service demand, while it lessens the impact of ongoing neighborhood problems that are hard to quantify. The specialization of the Department into small units, each competing for more resources to meet an ever-expanding demand, totally consumes decisions on resource allocation. If the Department decides to make a major resource shift, the special constituencies served will loudly complain that they are being denied due service. To deal with these issues, the Department has used a resource allocation formula based on percentages. Units are assigned a percentage of total police personnel strength and the number goes up or down with that of the Department as a whole. The formula does not include analysis of these other units' needs. Until the recently completed Resource Allocation and Staffing Study, rarely has the Department thought through whether some basic units ought to exist at all.

- **The key organizational priority is maintaining consistency and equality of resources among competing neighborhoods. As a result, the organization judges service demand by statistical measures rather than careful problem analysis.**

In December, 1989, only 11,645 officers or less than 50 percent of the Department's resources were assigned to precinct operations. Of that allocation, 8,140 officers were assigned to 911 response,

with the remainder assigned to a variety of other functions, including CPOP (Table 5). The assignment of personnel to other units has often been on an "equal" basis, ensuring that every precinct adopting a special initiative does so with a common level of staffing.

There is somewhat more discretion in precinct staffing levels than is visible from a review of the patrol allocation plan. The model permits assignment of additional resources for "conditions" requiring special attention. The challenge for the Department is to revise the model to incorporate community policing requirements. That means providing a uniformed police officer with "ownership" of each block, neighborhood, and area of the city. That will require a far different model than is currently in use.

Table 5
New York City Police Department
SELECTED OPERATIONAL INDICATORS
1970-1989

Year	Radio Runs	Total Crime (1)	Total NYPD Arrests (2)	Total Uniform Staff	Prec't Uniform Staff (3)
1970	2,961,538	887,598	232,594	31,700	a
1971	2,724,340	897,575	215,041	30,853	a
1972	2,599,097	788,328	198,185	29,532	a
1973	2,456,510	799,674	187,181	30,527	a
1974	2,474,162	866,738	217,690	30,881	16,674
1975	2,666,198	935,960	202,268	26,698	15,935
1976	2,633,931	985,179	176,756	25,321	14,795
1977	2,592,387	889,879	177,969	24,511	13,046
1978	2,539,905	838,398	164,000	23,955	12,149
1979	2,694,983	879,962	159,661	22,936	11,376
1980	2,816,484	944,448	143,777	22,085	10,978
1981	2,763,554	953,547	146,416	21,790	10,041
1982	2,927,846	921,973	159,056	22,165	10,522
1983	3,012,890	871,649	165,224	22,926	9,971
1984	3,204,881	878,544	183,442	24,643	10,895
1985	3,401,449	903,792	190,550	25,695	12,674
1986	3,633,621	1,003,765	211,013	26,793	12,813
1987	3,680,448	1,063,095	227,341	27,393	11,779
1988	3,898,663	1,182,972	241,945	26,546	12,902
1989	4,010,268	1,154,104	242,549	25,817	11,645

NOTES

a Data not available

- 1 Total crime includes all reported Felonies, Misdemeanors and Violations and does not include youth reports and summons activity.
- 2 Total Arrests includes all Felony, Misdemeanor and Violation arrests made by NYPD personnel and excludes arrests made for other agencies, youth reports and summons activity.
- 3 Total number of police officers and detective specialists actually assigned to precincts.

- **The traditional response of the Department to demands for additional neighborhood police resources has been twofold; calls to hire more police and transfer to "street duty" officers from other assignments.**

There have always been periodic calls for increases in street strength of police personnel. Responding to those calls, the Department has commonly reassigned some personnel from specialized units, or called for the hiring of additional police to beef up "street strength."

The recent Resource Allocation and Staffing Study bases staffing levels on institutionalizing the community policing concept city-wide. The Department will integrate the total precinct into a single community policing structure and the energies of all officers will focus on meeting neighborhood needs. Specialization will be limited, every neighborhood will have its "own" officer(s) and the focus of attention will be to reduce crime, maintain order and solve problems in the neighborhood.

Functional Orientation

- **The members of the Department's Executive Staff tend to focus only on their own organizational area of responsibility, rather than broader issues related to providing police service to the city's neighborhoods.**

The Executive Staff of the Department is structured along functional lines, with responsibility for functions divided among civilian Deputy Commissioners and uniformed Bureau Chiefs. The individual areas of responsibility are common to large city police agencies and reflect the general priorities of the Department. Deputy Commissioners focus on fiscal, community affairs, public information, legal and disciplinary matters while uniformed chiefs focus on patrol, investigations, narcotics, personnel, and internal inspections.

The functional division of responsibility has hampered the development of a corporate mindset that focuses on common objectives or concerns. Indeed, there have been only limited "corporate" activities among the Executive Staff. Regularly scheduled meetings of the entire Executive Staff with the Police Commissioner have been rare until recently and members of the Executive Staff tend to concern themselves mostly with their own areas of responsibility. This orientation results in individual commanders having only limited knowledge about overall Department priorities. As a result, the linkages between functional units are weaker than they should be.

Most of the communication between functional commanders has been informal. This pattern of management supports a Department culture that responds to problems and issues with programmatic initiatives rather than careful problem analysis and coordinated action. Instructions for action are sent down from the highest levels of the organization. Among mid-level managers there is a feeling that little information filters up, sometimes resulting in decisions being made by commanders who do not have access to all the information they might need.

Conformity

- **The organizational culture reflects a belief that conformance to existing norms is the key to success. In an environment requiring problem solving, this severely limits the range of options commanders will consider.**

As is common in large bureaucracies, the Department has generally not encouraged innovation and individualism. The driving ethic is conformity to organizational standards. Control has been exercised through clearly defined limits on behavior. Employees learn not to make waves. While creativity and technical competence are highly regarded within the Department, there are implicit limits on how far an employee can go in the pursuit of problem solving.

It is common, and quite normal, for subordinates to consider the impact their actions will have on their supervisor's attitudes toward them. Absent encouragement of individual creativity, this conservative orientation somewhat limits any individual type of risk-taking and defeats initiative.

While initiative is not always rewarded, there is a substantial amount of mentoring within the Department, with key assistants being moved along a faster track than those who have not been able to move into these assignments. The mentoring standard is conformity to organizational norms, not necessarily creativity.

The State of the Infrastructure

Facilities and Equipment. The Department operates 142 facilities throughout the city. These range from the Police Headquarters building to garages and storage facilities to the 75 precinct houses. Many of these buildings are old and need replacement or total renovation. But only a small number of them are scheduled for such during the next few years under the city's capital budget. The Department only has funds for emergency maintenance, with little opportunity or funding for preventive maintenance of facilities.

The Department has started planning for a new Police Academy, which will address pressing space needs for training programs. However, the new facility will not be available for upcoming recruit classes. The city's fiscal problems make it hard to predict when construction will begin.

Unlike many other city buildings, police facilities are used 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Scores of arrested persons, suspects, complainants and people with problems congregate in the public areas at all hours of the day and night. In the less public areas, police officers pass through at the start and end of each shift. Continuous usage produces extensive wear and tear, which raises maintenance costs and shortens the life of the facility. Since there are few plans for regular replacement of facilities, police employees often have to work in crowded, dark and depressing spaces.

The Department's facility problems will get worse in the coming years as more people are added to the Department, and as it shifts to a more decentralized structure. For example, the projected addition of several hundred detectives to precinct detective squads requires more space to house them.

In addition to numerous buildings, the Department maintains an inventory of equipment: automobiles, special firearms, radios and other communications equipment and heavy rescue tools. They are stored throughout the city at 142 sites.

Much of this equipment is in use 24 hours each day. The Department's marked automobile fleet has no spare vehicles, so when repairs are needed, no replacement is available. The patrol function is extremely hard on cars; therefore their useful life is limited to a few years.

The last several years have seen a big jump in the need (and desire) for personal computers. The Department has purchased a substantial amount of hardware, but because of the immense need and size of the Department, the availability of personal computers is far less than the need which cannot be satisfied with existing budgetary resources.

Science and Technology. While the New York City Police Department has been on the cutting edge of a number of important new operational methods, the application of science and technology to automation of some management processes has often lagged behind the need.

In the area of communications, the first generation computer-aided dispatching system was implemented in the 1970's, some years after the technology had gained wide acceptance in most large police agencies. Through revisions in this technology, the Department currently has a reasonably sophisticated centralized communications capability. While some advances have been made in communications capabilities since that time, police communications technology has advanced far beyond the current use by the Department.

The use of mobile digital terminals in police vehicles as a link between police communications and individual Radio Patrols (RMPs) has advanced at a slow pace, with only 444 units having that communications capability as of this year. Completion of the installation will significantly increase availability of information to patrol units.

The Department adopted a computerized information system in the early 1980's, and the initial on-line booking system was also implemented during that period. The application of technology to arrest processing has been fairly recent, with experimental commitments to video interviewing of arresting officers by district attorneys not taking place until the late 1980's.

In the application of science to crime detection, the Department has maintained a capable and modern laboratory for some years. Yet the application of modern fingerprint identification technology was not adopted until recently.

Some technology has focused on police use of force. The search for a non-lethal weapon ultimately resulted in the adoption of several of these devices during the early 1980's. Such devices are now available throughout the city for use when emotionally disturbed people must be subdued. The Department carefully reviews new technology before adopting it. This reflects caution in accepting new technology at face value as well as underlying concern with the cost of training.

There are a number of reasons why the application of technology in the New York City Police Department has sometimes lagged behind developments in the field.

- **The Department, because of city budget restrictions and high initial cost, has tended to view use of personnel as more expedient than application of technology to perform certain administrative functions.**

Because the Department is so vast, it has been easy to have civilian and uniformed personnel perform some operations that could be computerized. For example, the Alarm Abuser Program is manually processed, making it difficult to accomplish its goal of tracking repeat abusers. Application of technology to the police function also requires the Department to retrain large numbers of personnel, a difficult task when there is insufficient time to provide the skill development and in-service training required for basic policing operations.

- **Personnel staffing levels have often taken precedence over funding for science and technology in the Department.**

Adding personnel—especially switching civilians for uniformed officers—has been far easier than obtaining budgetary approval for purchase of new technology. The Department has applied significant technology over the years, but only after drawn-out procurement processes. To purchase a major piece of new technology requires bureaucratic processing far more difficult than simply replacing police officers with new civilians. In this process of uniformed to civilian transition, the Department has sometimes replaced the existing uniformed officer with a civilian, without careful analysis of the functions being performed and without regard for whether the functions could be better performed by investment in technology. The same has been true when police officers have been assigned to civilian positions because of civilian staffing reductions.

- **The cost for implementing science and technology in the Department is immense, given the scale of application required.**

The application of technology to the functions of the Department is not an easy task. The size of the applications required by the New York City Police Department's structure, geographical responsibility and work demands make the systems to be designed among the largest **police** uses of technology in the country. But the systems required are no larger than those in use in major American corporations with highly decentralized structures. The difference between the New York City Police Department's use of technology and that of industry is one of priority. In industry, where functional cost is the driving factor, management is willing to make significant investment in technology when it will bring a real return in terms of costs and performance over the longer term. In the New York City Police Department, because of budgetary constraints, there has been only a limited capability for the Department to apply technology adequately to improve police operations. The utilization of asset forfeiture funds from drug seizure cases may provide the Department with an expanded opportunity to move forward with technological improvements.

The result of this technological "lag" has been:

- **A relatively small number of Department vehicles equipped with mobile data terminals, when many other large police agencies across the country have almost completely equipped their patrol units with such equipment.**

- **A scarcity of personal computers, so that individual work stations of administrative employees often are manual rather than computerized.**
- **A 911 communications system that is antiquated, without adequate centralized back-up capabilities.**

The technological lag in the Department reflects the lack of a central technological coordinator, a person empowered to continually assess how technology can improve effectiveness, while ensuring that technology is not developed for technology's sake. As has been the practice in industry, the Department must consider ways that technology can produce results at less cost than manually carrying out a function. The Department has generally lacked that capability.

Personnel Development. For community policing to become the dominant philosophy of the New York City Police Department, it must be reinforced in every part of the organization. The personnel and training function controls many of the levers that mold the Department's culture. Because it manages its members' careers from recruitment to retirement, this function is one of the most important to address, especially in light of the large number of new personnel who need to be recruited, processed and prepared to meet the newly proposed staffing levels. The Department's personnel systems need overhauling in order to achieve community policing.

One of the cornerstones of community policing is large scale **civilianization**. Not only does civilianization free up officers to return to the streets, but it provides important technical and analytic expertise needed to support problem solving.

At present:

- **There is a chasm of opportunity and recognition between civilian and uniformed members.**
- **The Department has difficulty retaining skilled civilians—such as computer programmers and psychologists—because of better pay in the private sector.**
- **Excessive specialization in civilian job titles reduces flexibility.**
- **The absence of an adequate career path for civilians deprives management of a powerful tool for motivating workers.**
- **Classification of civilian job titles is based on incomplete information and geared toward choosing the lowest possible title to fill the job.**
- **Inadequate resources are devoted to entry level and in-service training for civilians.**

The Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan for the Department requires the **hiring** of 6,479 new officers and 2,961 civilians, in addition to attrition replacement needs. These additions are needed both to increase street presence and fully meet the service demands placed on the Department.

- **The processing cost of hiring each candidate appointed to the Department is \$4,550.18.**
- **The Department is encumbered with counter-productive and time-consuming selection procedures.**
- **The Department suffers from a disorderly hiring schedule.**
- **The slow and disorderly pace of hiring costs the city about \$1,350 more per appointed candidate than it would if system inefficiencies were corrected.**

- Applicant processing personnel must maintain a continuous state of readiness to hire large numbers on short notice. Candidates are constantly brought into the process to insure a sufficient pool for hire. Yet, once in that pool, they languish for months and even years. Because of the unpredictability of hiring, applicant processing is forced to operate in a crisis mode with constantly shifting priorities.
- The Department is in the process of validating its screening procedures to maximize fairness to members of minority groups.
- Backlogs in processing applications for disability retirements leaves members of the Department on extended restricted duty and costs unnecessary dollars in full pay. While they do perform useful service the practice is expensive to the Department.

Once recruits are hired, their first exposure to the Department is the **Police Academy**. It is here that the values of community policing will first be articulated. It is also here that they will learn the problem solving techniques that will guide their work on the street. As they continue in their careers, officers return to the Academy to upgrade their skills and further apply them to community policing. As of now:

- Recruit training lasts 115 days.
- It costs \$5,557 to train each recruit, exclusive of salary.
- Training is excellent but not all training programs are coordinated by the Police Academy.
- The Police Academy is fully staffed with uniformed personnel, many of whom welcome the assignment's steady hours. With the advent of city-wide steady tours, assignment to the Police Academy may lose its attraction.
- No career path points are given for serving on the Police Academy instructional staff.
- The above two problems will be addressed through partial civilianization of the instructional staff.
- Hiring schedules are sporadic, making it difficult to plan for staffing at the Police Academy.
- Space in the Academy building is inadequate to handle the massive training needs and overlapping recruit classes that will be created by an intense hiring schedule.
- Remedial education has become an important training function. While maintaining standards, the implementation of academic counseling and probation, tutoring and an academic holdover program has reduced the Academy dropout rate from more than 20% in the 1970's to 7.34% in 1989.

Once recruits successfully complete the entry level classroom cycle, as of October 1990, they are assigned to **field training** in a CPOP unit. This field training reinforces the values and methods of community policing. Once officers are trained and on their own, they must be exposed to a **consistent** set of **expectations** for the length of their careers. Community policing must be reinforced through **career paths**, **performance evaluation** criteria and **rewards** for innovation and intelligent risk-taking. The current organization needs a great deal of adjusting to achieve this kind of consistency.

- **Rewarding career paths are heavily biased toward the investigative functions.**
- **Some members perceive the command structure to be punitive, so they concentrate on covering themselves rather than contributing.**
- **Personnel records are not all centralized and need to be consolidated for proper monitoring of employees.**
- **The performance evaluation system has lost its credibility and is being revised to reflect the community policing philosophy.**
- **For the past three years, the Personnel Bureau's efforts have been focused on implementing the recommendations of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on Police Management and Personnel Practices (Zuccotti Committee).**

Since a police department's main resource is its employees, appropriate attention to improving its personnel system is critical to community policing.

THE STRATEGIC PLAN OF ACTION

How We Are Going To Get To Where We Want To Be

The primary task facing the Department over the coming years is to fully implement community policing as the basic strategy for policing the city. The community policing orientation assumes the following mission for the Department:

The New York City Police Department exists to protect life and property under the law, maintain community order, and reduce crime and fear of crime in the neighborhoods with full respect for human dignity and according to the highest standards of professional skill, integrity and accountability.

To fully adopt the community policing strategy, specific steps must be taken. They are:

- **A community policing presence will be provided for every neighborhood of the city.**
- **Problem solving, rather than incident responding, will become the standard way in which members of the Department respond to situations brought to their attention, whether on patrol or in administrative, investigative or support assignments.**
- **A new management style will be adopted that encourages all employees to focus their efforts on solving problems and is based on commitment to a set of values that guide their actions.**
- **Policing the city's neighborhoods, patrol services will have the stature, support and rewards necessary to make it as desirable a place for an officer to spend his or her career as any other assignment in the Department.**
- **Police officer creativity will be formally recognized and used in problem solving. Likewise, officers will be held accountable for their actions within the context of the Department's mission, values and objectives.**
- **New measures of Departmental performance will be developed to provide meaningful feedback to the Department and provide the community with an assessment of how well the Department is achieving its objectives.**
- **911 work demands will be controlled. An improved system for call classification, referral and processing will be designed and implemented. All police officers assigned to a given neighborhood will assist in responding to calls for service that come from their neighborhood.**
- **The Patrol Allocation Plan, the system used to assign personnel to the various precincts, will be revised to reflect the integration of all precinct personnel into the community policing strategy.**
- **The base from which new employees are recruited will be broadened. People willing to accept the Department's commitment to a representative police organization — who view the police job as service rather than adventure — will be identified and sought out.**
- **The selection process will be modernized. New selection tests, enhanced background investigations, and revised psychological testing will be developed to recruit with a community policing orientation.**

- **Civilians and uniformed personnel will become equal partners in the transition to community policing.**
- **Department training systems will be enhanced and, in some instances, totally revised. They will teach new skills required for community policing, such as problem solving and community organization. Officers will have better knowledge about how to intervene with, and refer problems to, other city agencies.**
- **Revised performance evaluation mechanisms will be developed to provide officers with meaningful feedback on their performance and assist them in strengthening their effectiveness.**
- **New reward systems will be developed to reinforce community policing values and ensure that recognition is given to those who excel in carrying out the philosophy of community policing.**
- **Integrity control efforts will be thoroughly reviewed to 1) maintain the highest level of integrity, and 2) enable precinct personnel to effectively deal with the problems on their beats.**

Will more police on the streets result in more arrests? Maybe. But the focus of community police officers is building neighborhood capacities to reduce crime and disorder, establish community values against crime and drugs, provide youth supervision, and improve upon on-going conditions that breed crime and drug dealing. Thus, the emphasis of community police officers is the same as CPOP officers. They will be responding to neighborhood concerns and preventing crime, not merely responding to incidents after the fact. Over time, as neighborhood capacities are built up, fewer arrests should be necessary.

The specifics on these initiatives are described in the sections that follow.

Focusing on the Neighborhoods

For the move to community policing to be successful, the Department must shift from a centralized focus to one that is truly neighborhood centered. Since this represents a major transformation of the organization, the change must be carefully planned and carried out.

To provide a neighborhood focus, a number of important issues will have to be addressed:

- **The functional orientation of the Executive Staff will have to be re-directed to a corporate concern for community policing. A large part of the Executive Staff's time, regardless of specific assignment, will be spent focusing on the quality of policing in the city's neighborhoods.**
- **The Department will have to address a number of important "power" issues, providing a means to ensure that the competition for resources is orderly and within bounds.**
- **New oversight and control mechanisms must be established, far different from those existing today.**
- **The current sophistication of Borough and precinct commanders about community interaction will have to become the standard for the entire Department.**
- **The boundaries of sectors and assignment areas within precincts should have a direct relationship to neighborhood boundaries. Streets should not be used as beat boundaries if they are not a natural neighborhood divider.**

The work that led to coterminality of precincts and governmental and neighborhood unit

boundaries was done some years ago. Since that time, there have been substantial changes in neighborhood patterns throughout the city. While the Department cannot unilaterally make a change in the current boundaries, it is important that a review of the boundaries be initiated by the city in the interest of supporting the community policing initiatives.

Providing a Community Police Presence in Every Neighborhood. The Department currently patrols every neighborhood of the city, not with community police officers, but RMP (Radio Motor Patrol) units. The key element of the Department's community policing strategy is redeploying resources to ensure that every police officer is a **community** police officer and that every neighborhood has one or more identifiable police officers who take responsibility for that area. Achieving this objective requires substantial additions to the Department's staffing, as detailed under the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan recently submitted to the Mayor. These additions in personnel will permit the Department to reduce the time of personnel committed to 911 call response to 60%, and provide additional officers for assignment to community policing sectors.

Community policing will change the way precincts are organized. The current practice of dividing personnel into distinct operational groups—CPOP, RMP units, conditions units and tactical units—will be largely reduced or eliminated and the current CPOP assignment broadened to cover the entire precinct. While each of the current functions performed in a precinct will still be done, the proportionate distribution of personnel to those assignments will be altered.

The time frame for the total implementation of community policing is tied to the time frame for staffing the Department at the level outlined in the Resource Allocation and Staffing Study. The Department has, however, already made a commitment to make community policing its dominant style for delivering its services throughout the city. Therefore, the implementation process will begin immediately. Two major initiatives will be undertaken simultaneously. First, one precinct will be selected to fully implement community policing by incorporating all aspects of the concept into its precinct activities. This model precinct will be staffed at the level recommended in the Resource Allocation and Staffing Study. By staffing the model precinct at its ultimate level, the Department will be able to test all aspects of community policing under real life conditions. Second, the other 74 precincts will implement those elements of community policing that are appropriate with their existing resources. Since community policing represents both an operational and management philosophy, certain aspects can be implemented regardless of staffing levels.

Community policing in the neighborhoods, and the model to be tested in one precinct, will be implemented as follows:

- **The Department will conduct a neighborhood analysis to determine the number of discrete neighborhood areas that exist in each precinct. A neighborhood area will be defined as an area in which people have shared values or a common focus on a community institution, shopping center or other neighborhood "draw."**
- **Neighborhood patrol sectors will be established by combining individual neighborhood areas into common groupings. Each sector will be of such a size that it can be covered on patrol by a single officer either on foot, scooter or in a marked police vehicle.**
- **Enough personnel will be assigned to each precinct to assure that every neighborhood sector will have at least one officer responsible during all hours of the day and night.**
- **Some smaller neighborhood areas within patrol sectors will have additional police officers assigned two or three shifts per day, depending on the nature of the activities or problems in that neighborhood.**

- **A number of police officers will be assigned to rapid response units, each covering three or four neighborhood sectors. These units will have responsibility for rapid response to life-threatening 911 emergencies, and back-up assistance to neighborhood sector officers when dealing with other calls.**
- **Police officers assigned to specialist functions, such as Emergency Service or Task Forces in the Boroughs, will be linked to a specific precinct where they will spend their uncommitted time engaged in community policing activities under the guidance of the precinct command.**

Matching Assignments with Commitments. The New York City Police Department's recently completed Resource Allocation and Staffing Study reviewed every unit and considered ways in which uniformed police presence could be maximized in neighborhood assignments. The study sets forth a detailed picture for that point in time when an additional 6,479 police officers and 2,961 civilians have been hired, trained and many assigned to neighborhood police duties.

In the meantime, the Department will move toward this longer term objective in a way that speeds the transformation to community policing. Under the proposals in the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan:

- **Precinct uniformed personnel will increase from 13,138 to 20,269, an increase of 54%.**
- **Precinct detective squad staffing will increase by 67% as sufficient personnel are assigned to meet projected case loads.**
- **CPOP personnel will increase from 786 to 4,895, an increase of 523%.**
- **"On Patrol" strength will increase from 6,640 to 10,238, an increase of 54%.**
- **Enforcement strength will increase from 9,376 to 14,143, an increase of 50%.**
- **Utilization rates for RMP units (the time committed to answering calls for service) will not exceed 60% of their available time.**
- **Dispatch times for crimes in progress will not exceed 1.5 minutes.**

These commitments will be achieved when the Department is staffed at the recommended level. The Department is committed to instituting community policing as its dominant philosophy in all areas of operation. In moving to community policing, the Department will resist the tendency to expand specialization and will focus on other solutions:

- **Civilians hired will be capable of doing the job now being done by the police officers whom they will replace.**
- **The quality of case investigations will be improved with more sophisticated case screening methods, which allow detectives to focus continuing investigations on cases having "solvability factors" or leads. Those cases without such leads can best be solved through pattern analysis and future crime interception tactics undertaken by field patrol officers.**
- **A new model for precinct patrol operations will be developed and tested. The new model will integrate all activities of the precinct under the community policing philosophy.**
- **Eventually, almost all officers assigned to precincts will be engaged in community policing duties. Most of these officers will be assigned to neighborhood policing sectors.**

When all these changes have taken place, the Department's commitment to community policing will be far higher than the statistics on the previous page indicate. Given full staffing under the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan and the integration of precinct personnel into a unified community policing structure, allocation of personnel to patrol functions will be substantially increased to:

Community Policing Officers:	17,400¹
Supervisors/Detectives:	3,991²

A majority of the Department's personnel will be engaged in community policing activities—provision of direct service to people in the neighborhoods. The organization will be administratively lean and every neighborhood in the city will feel the community police presence.

Over the longer term, the Department will have to address a broader issue related to civilianization of key functions. It has been assumed that civilians replace police officers at a ratio of one civilian to each officer replaced. This standard has been in effect since the Department began its efforts to civilianize about twenty years ago.

The ratio holds up for some positions, but not for others. In jobs where police officers have been performing clerical tasks, it may take more than a single civilian to replace that officer, since the police officer, having lengthy experience in the position, may now be better skilled and trained than the average entry-level civilian.

The reverse is true for other positions. In highly technical positions, where police officers have assumed responsibility for which they have no formal training, and yet for which special skills are necessary, a single qualified civilian may be able to perform more work than a single police officer. Thus, it is important for the Department to move toward matching civilianization needs with position requirements.

Institutionalizing Problem solving. Another major element of community policing is the institutionalization of problem solving in all aspects of the police function. Rather than treating each event simply as an incident to which the police must respond, or which an employee must handle, the problem solving orientation will focus on past histories of incidents and their projected futures should no action be taken. Given this information, gathered through the problem analysis process, the employee will then act to intervene in the pattern of events and resolve the problem. Such a diagnostic approach to police service delivery—careful analysis of event histories and consideration of actions which will break patterns of event recurrences—explains why CPOP officers have been successful in their neighborhoods and why the Department expects community policing throughout the city to dramatically improve the ability to deal with neighborhood crime and disorder, as well as reduce calls for service to the Department.

The specific steps to be taken in implementing this approach to problem solving are:

- **The CPOP problem-analysis model—setting forth guidelines for problem analysis and selection of appropriate problem solving actions—will be revised and issued to all members of the Department.**
- **A new reporting mechanism will be devised for officers to report on their analyses and the actions they have undertaken.**

¹This figure represents the number of police officers assigned to community policing activities in precincts under the recommendations of the Resource Allocation and Staffing Study and includes Borough Task Force personnel and special unit personnel (such as the Emergency Service Unit) who will engage in community policing activities when they are not responding to a situation for which they have particular unit responsibility.

²Includes precinct supervisors and detectives assigned to Precinct Detective Squads.

- **Sergeants will be re-trained in problem solving facilitation so they can assist community officers in their problem solving activities.**
- **The Detective Bureau will prepare six month analyses of selected crimes, such as homicide, rape, robbery, auto theft, and aggravated assault. These analyses will include a review of past efforts and a proposed strategy for addressing the problem.**
- **The Organized Crime Control Bureau will prepare a six month analysis on the narcotics problem in the city, reviewing past successes and failures and proposing a six-month tactical plan for the Department to address the problem.**
- **The Department will also analyze repeat calls for service to determine the addresses or locations where multiple calls originate. This information will go to community police officers who will be expected to develop a plan to address the underlying problem. They will execute the plan by working with residents and business people in the neighborhood, as well as with the Legal Bureau and other city agencies to close down nuisances, get trash picked up, evict squatters and other actions.**

Modernizing the Organizational Structure

Specialization, centralization and large bureaucratic support staffs have created an organizational structure with a substantial amount of "overhead" — personnel assigned to tasks that have little direct impact on policing the city's neighborhoods. During the 1990's, the organization will become a model of high performance:

- **Any duplicative command and supervisory assignments — between police officer and Commissioner — will be reduced. Each manager or supervisor will have a clearly defined area of personal responsibility, not just as an assistant to the commander to whom he or she reports.**
- **Members of the Executive Staff will assume broad new Department-wide "corporate" responsibilities beyond the singular functional areas they now manage.**
- **The Executive Staff will continually seek feedback from lower levels about the impact of policies.**
- **Unit staffing levels will be continually reviewed. Once every two years, every unit will be assessed from a "zero-based" perspective, seeking to determine whether the unit should continue as a specialty or the function should be absorbed by field units.**
- **Most new units created to carry out a specialized function will have a designated term of existence, unless they reflect a major re-direction of how the Department is organized. At the end of that term, the function will be performed by field units.**
- **Most headquarters specialist functions will focus on coordinating a Department activity, rather than assuming full responsibility for performing that function.**

The limited resources available to the Department mandate a limitation on building a larger centralized management bureaucracy. The challenge will be to ensure that the organization becomes tighter and more effective, with a majority of new resources going into delivering police service in the neighborhoods.

Adopting a New Management Style. Community policing means beat officers will do more than simply patrol the streets. They are expected to come up with creative solutions to local problems. To do so, they must become actively involved in the affairs of the community. And they must be given authority to make decisions. In short, they are encouraged to use their best judgment. This reflects the faith that police leaders place in their officers' ability to make sound decisions and perform their duties in a professional, productive and efficient manner. This ideal can only be achieved if the inside of the organization is consistent with its outside.

Community policing requires a shift away from the authoritarian, paramilitary management model that has long dominated policing. That style is characterized by hierarchical decision-making, one-way downward communication, parochial command level perspective, vertical organization, absence of feedback and rigid policies. The management style to be implemented is a collaborative one in which employees will be encouraged to use their problem solving skills.

- **First line supervisors will facilitate problem solving by training, coaching, coordinating and evaluating the members of the Department under them.**
- **Problems will be identified at the lowest level.**
- **Management will support the process by mobilizing the resources needed to solve problems.**
- **Management will be flexible and allow subordinates to take reasonable risks in their efforts to resolve problems.**

The new management style requires a form of organization that is both vertical and horizontal. The hierarchical chain of command will be preserved for responding to situations that demand unquestioned adherence to orders. But the Department's day-to-day work will take place in a horizontal framework. This will require substantial training so supervisors and managers will know when to be firm and when to be collaborative.

- **Department members will develop a corporate mindset, viewing the organization as a whole, rather than from the limited perspective of their own command.**
- **The executive staff will expand its collaboration across bureau lines.**
- **The Department will foster joint programs across bureaus and commands.**
- **Inter-bureau consultation will be developed through regular meetings and mutual goal-setting.**
- **Conflicting units will work out their differences through negotiation rather than "orders" from above, whenever possible.**
- **Networking for problem solving will be a part of every job description.**
- **Civilians and uniformed members will collaborate in problem solving.**

This kind of management can succeed only if there is a free flow of information upward and downward. The flow has traditionally been blocked by a strict chain of command and a fear of sanctions. Therefore, the Department must find ways to open the lines of communications across ranks and between civilians and uniformed personnel.

- **Executive Staff will expand its regular visits to the field for informal meetings with their rank and file.**
- **Regular problem solving sessions with formal agenda will be scheduled. Participants will be selected on the basis of knowledge and skill rather than rank.**

- **These sessions will be followed up with feedback on outcomes.**
- **Suggestions from the field will be solicited and receive a response after submission.**
- **Written briefings and videos on Department policies, rumors and issues will be distributed to all members on a monthly basis.**

To increase the collaborative discussion of important police issues, the Department will form a number of Policy Committees. These will consist of both uniformed and civilian personnel. Initially, Policy Committees will be formed in seven areas critical to the Department's future success:

- **Community Policing Implementation:** a committee to oversee the implementation of the neighborhood policing process in the precincts, chaired by the Chief of Patrol.
- **Crime Control Strategy:** a committee to develop semi-annual strategic plans for addressing robbery and interpersonal violence, chaired by the Chief of Detectives.
- **Drug Control Strategy:** a committee to continue the development of six month plans for dealing with narcotics in the city, chaired by the Chief of Organized Crime Control Bureau.
- **Community Crime Prevention:** a committee to monitor the level of community violence and develop initiatives to improve the quality of life and reduce neighborhood violence potential, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs.
- **Discipline:** a committee to oversee the effectiveness of corruption controls and develop appropriate disciplinary methods without reinforcing a perception of punitiveness in the organization, chaired by the Chief of Inspectional Services.
- **Information and Technology:** a committee charged with upgrading and coordinating the New York City Police Department's technological capabilities and information systems, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner for Management and Budget.
- **Patrol Enhancement:** a committee to develop a career patrol officer program which will enable officers to spend their entire careers in patrol and receive the prestige and rewards now offered in various other specialized units, chaired by the First Deputy Commissioner.

Involvement of both uniformed and civilian members of the Department in regular policy discussions is an important means to ensure that decisions are based upon the broadest possible input.

All this adds up to an organization that trusts, encourages and supports its members. The flip side of that trust is that everyone in the Department is held accountable for what they do.

Increasing Discretion and Accountability. Professionalism is central to community policing. Discretion, peer review, client advocacy and accountability are four traits that distinguish professions from occupations. Therefore, action plans for community policing must address these areas.

Peer review goes hand in hand with accountability. Peer pressure is the most effective social control device there is. Therefore, line officers and civilians need to be given a role in monitoring their behavior at their own level. Peers will have input in evaluating their unit's and the Department's performance. Annual internal opinion polls will be conducted to gauge the attitudes of the New York City Police Department personnel toward each other and the organization.

There are precedents for this in the Department. In the 1970's, action review panels and safety review panels were formed in model precincts. The panels were staffed exclusively by line officers. Their purpose was to retrain fellow officers who misused their discretion or had an excess of auto accidents. The peer review panels were an innovative way to empower patrol officers. However, the union found that police officers on these panels were working in a supervisory capacity without attendant title and pay. Therefore, the panels had to be discontinued.

- **The Department will work closely with the line unions to explore ways to revive peer participation in training and decision-making as forms of job enrichment.**
- **Peer input will be built into in-service training. Rather than one-way briefings by superior officers, seminar style sessions will be added in which all participants exchange ideas.**

Client advocacy is the other side of professionalism. Unlike other workers, professionals are trained to act on behalf of their clients rather than themselves. In policing, the client is the community. The question is: who is the community?

When many people talk about community, they are really talking about a level of organization. Most attempts to solicit citizen participation consist of non-controversial advisory panels or community councils made up of "responsible" citizens who have a stake in the community. "Responsible" often means affiliation with some formal community organization. However, social research shows that those affiliated with formal organizations tend to be the more affluent, educated or activist members of their community. The most hostile, isolated or alienated are often the ones most affected by police policies. In sum, a whole range of random, unaffiliated members of the community remain under represented.

- **Community policing will reach out to unaffiliated community members through problem solving. As each problem is identified, officers will tap the people who naturally have some connection with its cause or solution.**

Problem solving requires officers to act as community advocates for law-abiding citizens. An advocate acts as an intermediary between the government bureaucracy and the public. It is the advocate's job to intervene if the rights of the client have been denied or ignored. Police in an advocacy role use their knowledge of law and agency procedures to secure better services for their clients. As the front line of contact between citizens and government agencies, the community police officer is in an ideal position to communicate upwards the concerns of those who live or work on his or her beat. At the same time, the officers can communicate downward the constraints of government agencies.

This speaks of enormous discretion. But, all the while, the community police officer remains accountable to the community in four ways:

- **Keeping the community informed**
- **Soliciting feedback on policies**
- **Giving feedback on responses to community inputs**
- **Sharing responsibility for crime control and problem solving with citizens**

Responding to Citizen Calls for Service

The 911 system was originally established as a universal emergency phone number. Response to 911 calls for service has increasingly become the force that drives the operations of the New York City Police Department. While it continues to be used as an emergency telephone number, it is also used as the primary means to communicate with the Department on a wide variety of other matters.

The Department has adopted a policy over the years of trying to respond to each 911 call as fast

as possible. To provide the capability for that response, the precincts have been structured to provide a designated group of officers having sole responsibility for 911 responses. These Radio Motor Patrols (RMPs) responded to over four million calls for service in the calendar years 1989 and 1990, and are projected to continue at that rate for 1991. Figure 2 shows the increasing number of 911 calls received by the Department over the last several years.

RMP's have the primary responsibility to respond to 911 calls for service. However, other units in the precinct respond if they are available and near the reported incident—especially when a crime in progress is reported. CPOP officers often respond to calls in their beats to assist the RMP, provided that they have heard the call over the radio. At the present time, the Department does not normally dispatch non-RMP units to calls, even if the special unit (such as a CPOP officer) is assigned to a beat covering the address from which the call has been received.

RMP units are currently estimated to have a 24-hour call response commitment rate of over 90%. In 1989 it was 87.5%. National research indicates people use 911 in proportion to a police agency's ability or willingness to respond¹. Therefore, assigning more officers to this function may result in even more calls being received unless a comprehensive call referral initiative is adopted by the Department.

Not all 911 requests relate to matters that are a police responsibility. Indeed, only 50% of the telephone calls received by the Department actually result in dispatch of a police unit to the scene. A number of calls are diverted to telephone report takers; others are referred to other agencies which have responsibility for dealing with the problem at hand. And some of the calls are handled over the telephone, with the caller receiving assistance or information from the complaint clerk.

There can be no question that the demand for 911 response is far greater than the Department's capabilities. On a Friday or Saturday night, there are often long delays in responding to 911 calls because of the large backlog awaiting dispatch. In trying to meet the service demand during these busy periods, RMP units are often sent away from their assigned area to adjoining areas to cover for busy units, or to provide backup in dangerous situations. This results in large numbers of police units traversing the precinct, racing from call to call, having little time to engage in constructive crime control or problem solving in the neighborhoods to which they are assigned.

During peak 911 response hours, citizens often "upgrade" their request for service so that a quicker police response will occur. Thus, a person who hears a neighborhood dispute next door to their home might call 911 and falsely report a dispute with shots fired, assuming that the police will respond to a report of shots fired more quickly than to a noise complaint.

In the Department, 911 calls are generally treated as individual incidents. While officers assigned to RMP units in the precincts have some sense of which addresses generate the most calls, the Department has limited ability to focus on such patterns. Important research in a number of cities has shown that at least 50% of the 911 calls a police agency receives are to addresses to which the police respond over 10 times a year and that 5% of the addresses in the city generate almost 50% of the 911 call demand. This appears to be true in New York City as well.


Given this pattern of 911 calls for service, the Department will do a number of things:

- **De-market 911, so that only people with true emergencies actually use 911 as the means to request police assistance;**
- **Integrate the responsibilities of RMP's and other units in the precincts into the call response system;**
- **Make the response to most citizen calls the responsibility of officers assigned to specific neighborhoods.**

¹McEwen, J.T., E.F. Connors, and M. Cohn, Evaluation of the Differential Response Field Test. Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1984.

FIGURE 2

RADIO RUNS



- **Ensure that non-emergency calls are handled by neighborhood officers in a timely manner when a citizen calls his or her local precinct.**

Controlling 911 Work Demands. 911 work demands—the dispatch of calls for service to patrol units—must become a carefully managed process that leaves beat officers with time to concentrate on neighborhood problem solving.

The de-marketing of 911 calls for service is one way in which the Department can begin to reduce the call load that comes into the Communications Center. A de-marketing campaign would focus on convincing citizens to use 911 only when there is a true emergency; when the police presence is important to save a life, reduce injury or apprehend a criminal. All other calls for assistance would be handled through another telephone number to the local precinct.

An important part of de-marketing 911 is to convince citizens that, while some responses might be delayed, selectivity of response in non-emergencies brings about better service once the police do arrive. The responding officer would be someone knowledgeable about the neighborhood, with the skills and commitment to resolve problems rather than hurriedly dealing with symptoms. With community policing, this approach to calls for service is far more productive for both citizens and officers.

This raises a question: Should a special group of officers at the precinct assume responsibility for most 911 responses? Up until now, the answer has been yes. In reviewing this practice during the assessment of the Department, it became clear that this approach, while efficient, was **ineffective**, since a majority of calls are repeat neighborhood incidents. It makes more sense for neighborhood police officers to handle repeat calls. The challenge for the Department is to achieve that involvement, while still being able to manage the immense number of calls received.

One answer is to restrict 911 to emergencies. Other calls can be assigned alternative responses. With full staffing, as the Department moves to increase the number of community police officers assigned to each precinct, there will be many more officers available to handle non-emergency requests for service.

This change is one of the most important links between 911 call response and community policing. Another is to strengthen the Department's analytical capability so that information about repeat calls can be used by community police officers to solve ongoing problems.

Community policing views each 911 and non-911 request as a possible indicator of a neighborhood problem that demands intervention. This approach requires alteration of the call intake process, a new call classification scheme and an expanded computer-aided dispatching system. All these changes will enable neighborhood police officers to customize call priorities to the neighborhoods they serve.

No longer will each call be treated as "first in, first out" for assignment to a RMP unit. High priority calls—those incidents in which a life is in danger or a crime is in progress—will continue to receive immediate police response. However, if another agency is better equipped to respond, the call will be referred out. If the call simply requires a police report about a past incident, that report will be taken over the telephone. 911 will be de-marketed so that it becomes solely the access for **emergency** response.

Most important, the community police officers assigned to neighborhood beats will assume responsibility for dealing with non-emergency service needs. For these officers to respond, the Department will have to delay some calls until the beat officer is available. But that is better than having officers run from address to address chasing calls for service. The Department wants the officers to be able to make a **difference** at the scene of a situation.

Achieving this change will require a big shift in how the Department processes 911 calls. To that end, the following actions will be taken:

- **A new community policing 911 response policy will be developed.**
- **A marketing campaign will be developed to inform the public that 911 is only an emergency number. Alternate numbers will be provided for calls that are not emergencies.**

- **The call classification scheme used by the Communications Division will be reviewed. It will incorporate call prioritization consistent with community policing and research conducted by the National Institute of Justice indicating there are a number of effective ways to respond to citizen requests for service.**
- **New options for response to citizen complaints will be identified. Arrangements will be made to employ these options when an appropriate call is received.**
- **The Department will prepare a monthly summary for each precinct of those locations to which the police have received repeat calls for service. These locations will be referred to neighborhood police officers for their attention.**
- **Community police officers will report on what action they have taken at these repeat call locations and what additional action is necessary to resolve the problem.**
- **The Department will develop the capability to alter call prioritization on a sector by sector basis so neighborhood police officers can give certain problems a higher priority based on local concern.**

Through these initiatives, the Department expects the Communications Division workload to decrease over the next five years. But the number of dispatches for emergencies will stay at current levels. Community police officers will respond to a far greater number of calls than at present, but there will be thousands more officers in that assignment to handle those calls.

Reworking the Patrol Allocation Plan. The current system for allocating patrol resources will be altered to reflect the integrated model of community policing. While the factors currently in use may remain the same, the allocations among precincts will vary somewhat from current levels, since the number of community policing beats to be established will reflect the composition, density and problem epidemiology for the area. The key elements in the revised model will include:

- **The number of definable neighborhood or policing "areas" within the precinct**
- **The number of calls for service requiring a police response**
- **The degree to which neighborhoods have organized their own crime prevention programs**
- **The population density of the neighborhood areas**
- **The occurrence of serious crime in the neighborhoods**

Broadening the Base for Recruitment

Finding officers to fit into the future policing style of the Department calls for a change in our recruitment methods and criteria. The Department will be searching for candidates who are:

- **Service and people-oriented**
- **Analytical**
- **Educated**
- **Self-motivated**

That is a tall order—especially given the changes in our labor pool. The Bureau of Labor Statistics tells us to expect an increase in older workers by the year 2000. The median worker age will rise to 35 and 85% of new workers will be women and members of minority groups. These demographics have serious implications for the Department's recruitment efforts.

They mean that the Department must intensify its civilian and uniformed outreach efforts to:

- **Members of minority groups**
- **Women**
- **Older workers and retirees**
- **College students**
- **Handicapped workers**

In the Resource Allocation and Staffing Study, the Department recommended that police officers, once hired, be residents of New York City. However, the Department will not limit its recruiting to the city. The Department also has proposed raising the maximum age for hiring to 35, which should greatly broaden the recruiting base.

- **In addition to crossing geographical boundaries, the Department will reach across occupational boundaries to the financial services industry—and any other industry that is experiencing mass lay-offs. Colleges and universities with large minority populations and the military are other natural targets for the recruitment efforts.**

The New York City Police Department already has an extensive recruitment infrastructure in place. In addition to the methods it has been using, special emphasis will be placed on:

- **College career days**
- **Incentives to members of the Department for candidate referrals**
- **Outreach through community organizations**
- **Contacts with outplacement counselors and human resources administrators in other industries**
- **Tutorial services for candidates needing remedial education**
- **Media campaigns**

Modernizing the Entry Process

Recruitment is the first screening that police candidates undergo. If that process is to mean anything, entry level screening must reflect the same values as recruitment targeting. That means updating the entry process.

The current recruit selection process screens out applicants and those who remain are hired by the Department. The Department does not identify the qualities it is looking for in its officers and seek to identify candidates according to those criteria. The new process must identify those applicants predisposed to embracing a community service approach to policing.

At present, civil service tests are geared toward avoiding discrimination challenges. The Department, of course, fully supports unbiased testing. But what is left after all the litigation does not tell much about a candidate's qualifications for police work. Many of the candidates who survive the test find other employment during the long period between filing and hiring. To address these issues the Department will:

- **Work with the Department of Personnel to reduce this costly lag.**
- **Step up efforts to retain minority candidates.**
- **Work with the Department of Personnel to enact exam points for candidates who are proficient in a foreign language and who have completed their college education.**

It will be difficult to alter the civil service tests themselves. But there is some leeway in modernizing later steps of the entry process.

- **Background investigations will be expanded to include a history of community involvement—either through previous employment or volunteer work.**
- **Psychological screening will be revalidated to test for traits that are desirable in community police officers. These include: reasoning ability, violence aversion, flexibility and frustration tolerance. While the screening results cannot be used for candidate exclusion, the information obtained is important as a part of total candidate profiling useful in future recruiting and training program design.**
- **Psychological tests will be re-examined for bias in order to close the gap between minority and majority pass rates.**

Developing Real Reward Systems

Interviews with officers have shown that some members of the New York City Police Department perceive the Department as being punitive rather than supportive. They are reluctant to risk disapproval from their superiors or isolation from their peers. For these members, "Don't Make Waves" is a prevailing attitude and the Department pays a heavy price in lost creativity.

- **The Department is committed to changing the organizational environment into a supportive one that rewards members for creative problem solving.**

Where the Department has discretion in appointment, everyone who earns a promotion, in addition to possessing other competencies, will do so because of excellence in community policing.

- **The Personnel Bureau will incorporate community policing criteria into the revised performance evaluation system.**
- **When the numbers are manageable, promotion candidates will go through a professional assessment center, in addition to the written tests.**
- **Members of the Department will earn promotion points for community service awards, continuing their education and expanding their skills.**

Most police officers are never promoted. For those who remain in patrol, some become cynical. Yet, everyone recognizes that patrol is the backbone of the Police Department. The reward system must make patrol a desirable assignment.

Department recognition and other awards are now given mostly for good arrests and special valor. The present reward system is in some ways inconsistent with the service values of community policing. The Department Medal of Honor, Police Combat Cross, Medal for Merit, Honorable Mention, Exceptional Merit and Commendation are all geared to reward bravery in the face of danger. For example, at last year's Medal Day ceremony, 40 Medals for Valor were presented to members of the Department displaying extraordinary heroism while engaged in personal combat with an armed adversary under circumstances of imminent personal danger. While these are important, they omit the service that makes up the bulk of police work. Only three official New York City Police Department awards recognize excellence in problem solving and service.

- **Department awards, such as breast bars, will be expanded to include community service and excellence in problem solving.**

Training for Problem solving

Community policing will require police officers to obtain new knowledge and develop new skills. The skills necessary, to provide the officers with an ability to problem-solve, are the following:

- **Crime analysis**
- **Situation analysis**
- **Communication**
- **Community organization**
- **Crisis intervention**
- **Crime prevention**

Police officers will be required to analyze what occurs in their beat area, at crime scenes and at calls for service to which they respond. This analysis is much like the diagnosis undertaken by physicians. It requires the officer to determine the underlying causes of a situation, its past history and the symptoms currently being displayed.

Police officers will have to become particularly sophisticated at crime analysis and providing crime prevention advice, since the officers' most important responsibility will be assisting neighborhood residents and business people in dealing with crime.

Communication skills are important to the community policing strategy and must be developed by all officers. Since the interaction between officers and residents of their beats will dramatically increase, the ability to communicate will be particularly important. Communications skills include listening and projecting a sense that the officer understands and cares about residents' concerns. These skills will also be important to officers as they develop information about who is committing crime in the neighborhood.

When crime patterns or other problems are identified, the community police officer must be able to organize residents to participate in solving the crime, adopting crime prevention measures or managing the underlying problem. This requires community organization skills, including how to convene neighborhood meetings, focus group attention on key issues, collaboratively develop solutions and obtain commitments from residents to support agreed upon actions.

Crisis intervention skills provide the police officer with the ability to intervene in a developing crisis and de-escalate the potential for violence—without stifling people's ability to express their views. In crises, the actions of responding police officers often determine whether the situation is resolved or escalates to a point where additional police and city resources are needed.

Training programs are offered throughout the Department. The Department will improve the coordination and management of the training effort by hiring a civilian Director of Training. This individual will have a broad background in training and adult education and will oversee all the Department's training efforts.

Under the leadership of the Director of Training, the Police Academy will focus on several key issues:

- **Providing recruit training sequences that introduce new police recruits to the community policing style and reinforce it throughout the curriculum**
- **Expanding the community orientation field trips to neighborhoods throughout the city during recruit training**
- **Developing new skill training sequences that focus on community organization, crime prevention, situational analysis, communication and crisis intervention**
- **Incorporating the current in-service orientation for CPOP officers into the regular in-service curriculum for all police officers**

- **Developing training modules for sergeants and lieutenants that focus on facilitation skills, the problem solving process and corruption prevention**
- **Creating advanced management training modules on collaborative skills, motivating subordinates, resource maximization and strategic planning**

The community policing style is affected by all aspects of police procedure and requires a thorough review of the current training curricula. The State of New York mandates a minimum number of training hours in numerous subjects for recruit and in-service training. Because the Department exceeds these requirements in most areas, it has the flexibility to make the necessary changes in the existing curriculum.

The Police Academy will develop the new curriculum sequences in community organization, crime prevention, situational analysis, communication and crisis intervention. They will use the assistance of community organizations that have clear expertise in these areas. These new sequences will be introduced as pilot efforts within the next six months. After testing, they will be adopted for all recruits and in-service training.

Some of these training initiatives will be hard to achieve because of the size of the classes now being conducted. Although recruit classes will be reduced in size to 35, there are often thousands of new recruits being trained at one time. Given the size of the total group, the new curriculum will require a thorough analysis of existing training strategies. That review will be undertaken in the next few months.

Assessing Performance

The Department as a Whole. New Yorkers have a right to know how their Police Department is carrying out its mission.

There are no simple measures of police performance. As has been stated in previous sections of this report, the New York City Police Department is a massive bureaucracy serving a variety of constituencies. These constituencies judge the Department in varying ways. With the movement of the Department toward community policing, new measures of performance will be developed and widely disseminated.

In the past, police success has often been measured by statistics focusing on crime and response to 911 calls. The 911 call response is easier to measure than crime. With 911, the desired outcome has been the speed of response. If the Department could maintain a rapid response to emergencies and arrive at the scene of all other calls quickly, it could be considered successful. But because of the large number of calls received, the Department has a hard time meeting standards for rapid response with the number of officers available.

Judging the response to crime has always been more difficult. It has been common for the city to be ranked according to the **crime rate**, in some instances, and by the **actual number of crimes** in others. Yet, often these rankings have less to do with police initiatives than with the state of the city.

Quality of police service is absent from most of the evaluative measures that are now used. Rapid response to 911 calls for service will have little impact if the type of service provided by the responding police officer is insensitive or ineffective.

Citizen fear of crime is also an important evaluative criterion. Fear often has little relationship to actual victimization rates. In New York City, where fear of crime is often higher than the crime rate, the quality of the police response to neighborhood problems has a major impact on citizen fear levels. The capacity to solve problems is ultimately more important to public confidence in the police than how the police handle an individual criminal occurrence.

As the Department moves toward community policing, a broader, more thoughtful set of measures will be developed and regularly reported. There are a number of important commitments that go along with the implementation of community policing as a management philosophy. They are:

- **Accountability to the community, requiring some type of reporting on citizen fear, disorder levels in the neighborhoods and crime solution**

- **A focus of evaluation on *outcomes* from police actions, not just the *numbers* of actions taken**
- **Measurement of the effectiveness of the police organization**
- **Measurement of police impact when handling large demonstrations or crises common to life in New York City**

Accountability to the community means that the Department must set forth a specific set of performance measures and then commit itself to report on outcomes, whether favorable or not. The most important measures are those that relate to police activities in the neighborhoods of the city: citizen fear levels, instances of disorder and crimes solved.

Rather than simply measuring the number of 911 calls to which the Department responds, or the time frame of that response, the measures developed will reflect a commitment to rapid response in only true emergencies—when a life is in danger, a person is injured or a crime is in progress. Other calls for service will be measured by outcomes. That is, whether the problem to which the police responded is resolved by their actions.

Above all, the Department will ensure that the majority of uniformed members are engaged in direct neighborhood service. That means regular reports on staffing levels, as is now done with the “On Patrol Strength” report. After all, staffing patterns are the ultimate measure of this organization’s commitment to direct service delivery in the neighborhoods of the city.

Individual Performance. Community policing changes the roles of all personnel. With that change comes the need for a revised performance evaluation system. Performance quality will be based on the ability to solve problems and involve the community in addressing the problems that have a negative impact on the quality of life.

- **Performance evaluation will shift from the existing focus on numbers—counting arrests, summonses, and calls handled—to *results*.**

Results often means absence of incidents such as criminal offenses, traffic accidents and repeat calls for service. They are measured in relation to joint goals set with each member’s core constituencies.

- **Performance assessment will begin with identifying the core constituencies for each assignment.**
- **The needs of each constituency will be analyzed.**
- **This needs analysis will be the foundation for a problem solving action plan.**
- **Problem solving will include an inventory of the resources available and needed to deliver services.**
- **The ability to mobilize resources to achieve results will be a part of each performance review for every individual and unit in the Department.**

A new task and standards-based performance evaluation system will be developed. It will include both qualitative and quantitative measures. Among the qualitative measures will be:

- **Community surveys**
- **Feedback from community meetings**
- **Peer reviews**
- **Contacts within the Department**

- **Complaint and commendation letters**
- **Visible changes in the work environment**
- **Fear reduction**

Quantitative measures will include:

- **Reduction in *patterns* of crime in target areas**
- **Crime reduction as the result of specific interventions**
- **Arrests as part of a broader problem solving strategy**

The rating dimensions for the new system will measure ability to:

- **Be sensitive to people, situations and issues**
- **Be responsive to neighborhood issues and concerns**
- **Identify problems based on analysis of past occurrences**
- **Solve problems**
- **Collaborate and consult with**
 - **Other Department units and colleagues**
 - **Community members**
 - **Other government and private agencies**
- **Lead**
 - **Motivate**
 - **Organize**
 - **Persuade**
- **Network**
- **Identify resources**
- **Plan**
- **Prioritize**
- **Gather, analyze, organize, evaluate and use information**
- **Use discretion wisely**
- **Maintain an appearance appropriate to one's assignment**
- **Reach stated goals and achieve results**

Even when performance criteria have been well defined, the New York City Police Department's evaluation systems have suffered from two problems:

- **Raters are reluctant to call the hard shots. They simply rate performance down the safe middle.**
- **Ratings have no real consequences for career development.**

In order to avoid these pitfalls, the Department will review the ratings made by each level of ranking officers:

- **Rate the rater**
- **Perform a historical analysis of the rater's ratings**

- **Compare the ratings to a model**

In order to make performance evaluations a real part of career development, the reviews will be used for:

- **Identifying training needs**
- **Retraining**
- **Promotions, as appropriate**
- **Determination of career paths**
- **Policy reviews**

Strengthening Integrity Control

Few issues have been as important to the Department as the maintenance of integrity. When breaches of integrity occur, they are dealt with rapidly. From the early 1970's, when systemic police corruption was exposed by the Knapp Commission, the Department has implemented a number of important control mechanisms. The key initiatives are still in place and appear to be working well. These initiatives include:

- **The Inspectional Services Bureau, which centralizes management over corruption control monitoring**
- **The Field Associates Program, in which police officers are enlisted to watch for signs of corruption**
- **The Field Internal Affairs Unit (FIAU), now a part of most commands, providing for decentralized investigation of complaints of corruption**
- **The Integrity Control Officer (usually a lieutenant) assigned to each precinct, who focuses on identifying areas in which control may need strengthening**

Given these initiatives, the key mechanism for maintaining integrity is control—limiting police officer discretion in a number of ways and providing substantial oversight by checking on what officers are doing. In each Borough, for example, Captains or higher ranks are assigned to monitor field activities at all hours of the day. In precincts, the Executive Officer usually works different hours from the Commanding Officer to provide a supervisory presence during busy duty hours. These layers of oversight, and others, are all aimed at ensuring an appropriate level of supervisory presence.

From interviews with patrol officers, it is clear that there is a strong perception that the Department, in order to maintain control, has defined field situations in absolute terms, as either right or wrong. This encourages officers to stay away from situations in which there is an **appearance** of compromise.

This orientation creates an atmosphere of mistrust. In an organization searching for the highest level of integrity, and in which opportunities for breaches abound, that stance can be understood. But this approach to corruption control carries substantial costs, one of which is an unwillingness among officers to initiate creative solutions to problems.

The Department's emphasis on values and its organizational commitment to integrity is a critical element in the defense against corruption. Widespread dissemination of the Department's values and increasing commitment by management and supervisors to act on these values will provide a basis for dealing with corruption hazards. So will the culture of integrity, which has grown strong since new anti-corruption initiatives were put in place during the early 1970's. But the Department will also maintain its current corruption resistance and control initiatives which have been quite successful.

Community police officers assigned to neighborhood beats must assume responsibility for knowing

where illegal activities, including corruption, exist on their beats. Just as precinct commanders are now held accountable, so will beat officers be held accountable. This will require regular reporting on the "state of the beat" by each officer assigned there.

The new reporting systems must be simple enough not to become burdensome, yet adequate to provide information for making sound decisions and flagging potential corruption problems.

Police officers or civilians who engage in corrupt acts will not be permitted to remain in the Department. If they violate the trust placed in them, they will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

Managing Disorder in the Community

One of the most important roles assumed by the New York City Police Department is management of disorder. The range of events requiring the Department to provide oversight is enormous, from formal demonstrations to spontaneous outbreaks of violence to youth rampaging through a neighborhood. The density of New York City creates fertile ground for disorder, and the basic fabric of community order is often quite fragile. The Department has developed great sophistication in dealing with actual or potential acts of violence. The best managed situations occur when there is advance notice of impending disorder, permitting the Department's tacticians to fully prepare a coordinated police response. When large-scale acts of violence occur, the Department generally has done well. But occasional breakdowns—such as that in Tompkins Square Park in August, 1988—led to a re-evaluation of plans and procedures for such incidents.

Management of disorder is no easy task. The general tactic has been to saturate the event with a variety of units drawn from throughout the city. Given the large number of events scheduled each week, coupled with numerous spontaneous happenings, the Department finds itself moving personnel around the city daily, responding to each event as it occurs.

With the shift of Department resources toward a community policing orientation, there will be somewhat fewer officers available for redeployment. Because the Department has so few resources to meet its commitment of a community police officer in every neighborhood, it will have to develop alternate strategies to maximize its community policing presence as well as maintain the capability to respond to actual or potential disorder without seriously weakening the community policing presence in the neighborhoods. While some redeployment will be necessary, the challenge is to limit the impact on the commitment to community policing.

- **Each of the specialized units (such as Emergency Services) now assigned to borough commands will have a precinct of assignment in which they will spend their uncommitted time engaged in community policing under the guidance of the precinct command.**
- **The Task Force units assigned to the boroughs will be increased under the new staffing plan so a flexible response capability is maintained. These officers will engage in community policing activities in assigned precincts when not assigned to policing a major event or responding to an assignment.**

Few actions require as much sensitivity and skill as does intervention in the potentially violent conflicts the Department confronts on a daily basis. The Department has a responsibility to make sure these situations are handled with the highest degree of professionalism, even when the officers at the scene are the object of abuse. Given the number of bias incidents to which the Department must respond, great sensitivity will be required to ensure that the police do not become the object of a dispute between parties.

Dealing with the Narcotics Scourge

Few issues are as important to the quality of life in New York City as rampant drug sales and

usage. The rapid rise in certain crimes, such as robbery, can be directly tied to people seeking quick money to pay for drugs. But the real impact of the problem goes far deeper, threatening the entire fabric of the community.

One need only see the drug ravaged babies living in squalor, the destruction of middle class lifestyles caused by addiction, or the fear generated by street level narcotics dealing to fully understand the impact of this epidemic. While recent government studies report that drug usage is declining among the total population, that trend must not be confused with the unchecked deterioration of many of the city's neighborhoods.

The police assume major responsibility for controlling some aspects of the drug trade. But their efforts are severely limited by a number of factors: overcrowded jails, a shortage of drug treatment facilities, inadequate education, the economic slowdown and other factors.

The New York City Police Department has developed a comprehensive series of drug enforcement initiatives over the last several years. The Department's Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) has committed large numbers of personnel to coordinating these efforts. Recently the OCCB completed a comprehensive Narcotics Enforcement Plan to guide actions over the coming year.

Yet, the problem of drugs continues to increase in the neighborhoods. While many of the strategies have been creative and highly effective, the breadth of the problem is too large to be impacted by local police alone. The challenge for the Department is to provide leadership in continuing the refinement of a comprehensive drug enforcement strategy which, combined with state and Federal efforts, will help reduce drug trafficking in the streets of the city.

As a result of the corruption investigations of the early 1970's, there is a perception that the Department has limited the involvement of precinct patrol personnel in the fight against drugs. This perception exists even though over 50% of the drug arrests are made by uniformed police officers. With community policing, the neighborhood police officer will become the key actor in dealing with a wide variety of important neighborhood problems. In many neighborhoods, the number one problem is street-level drug enforcement. Therefore, the Department will clarify and publicize the role of neighborhood officers in resisting drug trafficking and building internal neighborhood controls. The threat of corruption will not be taken lightly. Strategies coupling aggressive patrol action against street-level drug dealing with adequate oversight of officer activities—in a manner that will not stifle initiative—will be devised. Examples of such options include:

- **Beat officers will produce a street-level drug status report every two months, indicating where street-level dealing is concentrated and where they have made on-sight arrests.**
- **There will be increased coordination between narcotics units and neighborhood beat officers.**
- **Beat officers will be responsible for organizing citizens against drugs and in support of Department enforcement efforts.**
- **On blocks where citizens have indicated a strong willingness to be "drug free," the Department will focus additional attention.**

Modernizing the Arrest to Arraignment Process

The arrest through arraignment process used in this city is far more complex than in most other places. To bring an arrested person to arraignment, officers must spend hours of regular time and overtime waiting in the complaint room at the District Attorney's Office for an assistant to review the case and begin arraignment.

Resolution of this problem will only result from a collaborative effort by the Department and the District Attorney's Offices of the five counties. But the Department is expanding interim measures to reduce overtime. These initiatives will also get arresting officers back on the streets where they are

needed for service delivery. Such initiatives include the following:

- **The Court Affidavit Preparation System (CAPS), a collaborative program developed jointly by the Department and the Queens District Attorney's Office. Trained police personnel in each precinct interview the arresting officers and prepare computerized criminal complaints for review by the District Attorney's Office.**
- **The Video Teleconferencing System—developed by the New York City Police Department along with the Manhattan and Brooklyn District Attorneys' Offices—was set up to provide for a teleconference between arresting officers and the District Attorney's Office without officers having to travel from their assigned area.**
- **The Computerized Arrest Tracking and Management System—developed by the New York City Police Department—gives the Department immediate access to the status of a defendant, his case status, as well as current prisoner location information. Inquiries can be made concerning the reason for delays in processing defendants and detailed data are available for immediate assessment of whether prisoners are paper ready for arraignment**
- **Introduction of FAX 4 Fingerprint Transmission Equipment. In conjunction with the State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the Department is using technology that results in dramatically fewer fingerprint submission rejections due to poor quality, thereby decreasing the need for repeat transmissions to Albany and speeding up the arraignment process.**
- **Conversion of Manhattan Central Booking to an all-male facility—a change that simultaneously implemented a new policy of lodging females directly in Department of Correction facilities in court or in the Midtown South Precinct. This action expedited the arrest to arraignment process by increasing the holding capacity for males to 200 at Manhattan Central Booking, a location immediately adjacent to court, while also achieving more efficient custodial procedures for females.**
- **Increased use of Desk Appearance Tickets by the Department resulting from increased scrutiny of on-line misdemeanor arrests. Officers have the discretion to issue Desk Appearance Tickets (DATs) whenever the statute and Patrol Guide allow. The increased use of DATs means fewer custodial arrests are processed for arraignment.**

Eventually, however, the Department will have to implement a city-wide system to reduce the need for any police officer to travel to the District Attorney's Office, except in special cases.

Marketing Community Policing—The Media

As noted earlier in this report, the media influence the agenda for the city—and, indirectly, for the Police Department. It is vitally important that the Department works with them to further the public's understanding of community policing.

The Department's media relations have tended to be reactive, diminishing its ability to manage the dissemination of information. The result has often been an incomplete picture of the city's crime trends and the Department's responses to them. The Department will take a more proactive approach.

- **The Deputy Commissioner for Public Information will develop background information on community policing to assist the media in communicating its implementation to the public**

- **Specific media will be targeted for the stories of greatest relevance to their audiences**
- **The media will be invited "behind the scenes" to gain a fuller view of the Department's operations**
- **The Department will provide the media with plenty of "true-to-lives" of community policing at work.**
- **The Department will cooperate with the media in filling their data needs.**

The Department views the media as its partners in crime prevention and control. A more balanced mix of stories will help minimize inaccurate public perceptions and keep crime in perspective.

SUMMARY

Implementation of community policing goes through two stages as it evolves from a series of discrete programs to a dominant philosophy.

The New York City Police Department has long been aware of the limitations of traditional policing. For twenty years, it has developed pioneering community programs. However, these typically emerged in response to a particular problem and involved only a small part of the Department. Many were considered experimental and time-limited.

- **The ultimate demise of many of these programs shows how hard it is to do community policing in an organization whose administrative and management style was designed for traditional policing.**

The New York City Police Department is now leaving the program stage and moving into fully integrating community policing into its infrastructure. Each action plan described in this report will be returned to the Executive Staff and converted into an implementation plan. The implementation plan contained on the following pages identifies key tasks and responsible parties. This is an ongoing process by which policing in New York City will change.

We invite the people of the city to join the community policing partnership. All our lives will be better for it.

Implementing Community Policing

*Key Task Responsibilities

1. Conduct neighborhood analyses to determine the number of discrete neighborhood areas for use in identifying patrol sectors; develop new patrol sectors based upon neighborhood boundaries.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Secondary Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
2. Identify the procedure to be used in initiating review of the 1970 coterminality as it impacts precinct boundaries matching current neighborhood boundaries.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner Legal Matters
Secondary Responsibility: Special Assistant to the Commissioner
Chief of Patrol
3. Develop and test model for precinct patrol structure in a single precinct; fully staff the precinct (reflecting recommendations in the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan); fully integrate 911 response units, specialized task forces and other specialized units with the community policing initiative.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Secondary Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
4. Require each of the remaining 74 Precinct Commanders to implement community policing strategies commensurate with existing resources.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Secondary Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Chief of Personnel
5. Match civilianization needs with position requirements throughout the Department; determine the exact number of civilians needed when positions are civilianized.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
6. Revise and reissue CPOP problem-analysis model for use by all entire precinct personnel.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
7. Devise new reporting mechanism for officers to report on problem analyses and actions proposed and actions taken.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Secondary Responsibility: Patrol Services Bureau
8. Retrain sergeants in facilitation of patrol officer problem solving.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner—Training
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Chief of Personnel

9. From the "corporate perspective," undertake semi-annual analyses of selected crimes, detailing specific crime prevention in interdiction strategies based upon the nature of the crime problem being addressed. Develop action plans for Detective, Organized Crime Control and Patrol Bureaus to implement these strategies.

Responsibility: Chief of Detectives
Secondary Responsibility: Chief, Organized Crime Control Bureau
Chief of Patrol
Office of Management Analysis and Planning

10. From the "corporate perspective," undertake semi-annual analysis of narcotics problem, developing specific narcotics interdiction strategies for implementation by all Bureaus.

Responsibility: Chief of Organized Crime Control
Chief of Patrol
Chief of Detectives
Office of Management Analysis and Planning

11. Develop a capability to analyze repeat calls for service and provide patrol units with a monthly report on addresses of key call generators; develop a monthly management summary of repeat calls by location.

Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Secondary Responsibility: Management Information Systems Division
Chief of Patrol

12. Ensure there are no duplicative command and supervisory assignments, and that each command officer and supervisor is assigned to an area of responsibility having clear objectives and specific accountabilities.

Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Personnel

13. Develop a strategy for the Executive Staff to serve as a "corporate board"; and for all commanders above the rank of Captain to assume community policing responsibilities.

Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Department

14. Review unit staffing levels to maximize community policing assignments.

Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Personnel

15. Develop plan for precinct officers to become more involved in crime prevention and interdiction efforts in their assigned sectors, especially in the areas of drug enforcement and violent crime reduction; create reporting mechanism for precinct sector officers.

Responsibility: Chief of Department
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Chief of Personnel
Chief of Organized Crime Control
Chief of Inspectional Services

16. Initiate a committee on Community Policing Implementation.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
17. Work with labor unions to find ways to revive peer participation in training and decision-making; build peer input into in-service training.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
18. Educate the public to use 911 for emergencies only.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Public Information
Secondary Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Management and Budget
Deputy Commissioner, Community Affairs
Chief of Personnel
19. Implement civilianization or unit abolition recommendations contained in the Resource Allocation and Staffing Plan.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
20. Rework Patrol Allocation Plan to reflect the integrated model of community policing and the community policing precinct structure.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
21. Initiate recruitment enhancements: reduce lag between filing and test results; increase efforts to retain minority candidates.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
22. Expand background investigations and revalidate psychological screening.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
23. Encourage city Department of Personnel to use community policing criteria and establish professional assessment centers for promotion.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
24. Expand Department awards to include community service and excellence in problem solving.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
25. Develop Department-wide training plan including Police Academy training of recruits for work in community policing and training officers in facilitation skills and problem-solving.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner—Training
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
26. Develop new tasks and standards-based performance evaluation system.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel

27. Create precinct assignments for specialized units, so they will have a community policing responsibility during their uncommitted time.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Detectives
28. Collaborate with District Attorney's offices of the five counties to reduce overtime and time spent off patrol by arresting officers.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner Legal Matters
29. Work with media to increase their understanding of community policing.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner Public Information
30. Develop strategy for increasing community participation in community policing initiatives.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
31. Initiate Committee on Crime Control Strategy.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
Secondary Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Management and Budget
Deputy Commissioner for Community Affairs
Chief of Patrol
Chief of Detectives
Chief of Organized Crime Control
Chief of Inspectional Services
32. Initiate Committee on Drug Control Strategy.
Responsibility: Chief of Organized Crime Control
33. Initiate Committee on Community Crime Prevention.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Community Affairs
34. Initiate Committee on discipline to address the disciplinary process within the Department.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Trials
35. Initiate Committee on Information and Technology.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Management and Budget
36. Initiate Committee on Corruption Prevention and Control.
Responsibility: Chief of Inspectional Services
37. Initiate Committee on Patrol Enhancement.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
38. Develop a Department-wide space plan.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Management and Budget
39. Survey the District Service Cabinets of the 59 Community Boards to determine a methodology of interacting effectively with them in responding to community service delivery problems.
Responsibility: Special Assistant to the Police Commissioner
40. Design and implement enhancement of the Communications Center, including a new 911 communication system.
Responsibility: Director of Communications

41. Develop new computer-aided dispatch system (CADS).
Responsibility: Director of Communications
42. Review call classification scheme and develop capability to alter call prioritization.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
Secondary Responsibility: Management Information Services Division
Chief of Patrol
43. Conduct a survey and analysis of successful CPOP officers to identify factors that can be used in recruitment efforts.
Responsibility: Chief of Personnel
44. Develop an internal and external marketing plan to get the community policing message out in an effective manner.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Public Information
45. Develop a process to evaluate agency performance.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
46. Develop means to assure that the Department's values are incorporated in all aspects of operations, training and marketing.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Trials
47. Develop a plan to solicit and apply external resources in support of community policing.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Community Affairs
48. Prepare analysis of differential police response with recommendations for action.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
49. Review conduct of preliminary investigations, exploring whether officers take these investigations as far as they can, especially given the planned changes in 911.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol
Secondary Responsibility: Chief of Detectives
50. Develop a plan for the role of Precinct Community Councils under community policing.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Community Affairs
51. Analyze and make recommendations on the role of investigations under community policing.
Responsibility: Chief of Detectives
52. Examine the role of civil remedies in community policing using the results of the 52nd Precinct Project.
Responsibility: Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters
53. Conduct a paperwork review in the context of community policing, including forms control and implementation of the paperless arrest concept.
Responsibility: Chief of Inspectional Services
Secondary Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning
54. Identify the issues to be resolved in developing a precinct-wide problem solving model.
Responsibility: Office of Management Analysis and Planning

- 55. Initiate a Task Force to assess the effectiveness of the Department.
Responsibility: First Deputy Commissioner
- 56. Develop crime analysis under Community Policing.
Responsibility: Chief of Patrol

* Tasks 32 thru 56 were added in the February Executive Session and by later directives of the Police Commissioner.

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The sources listed below represent a **partial** listing of material used for this report. Time and space constraints precluded listing all the Department orders and internal Bureau assessments on which this report drew.

The sources listed below are arranged chronologically within each theme.

Key

"CI" refers to Chief Inspector

"IO" refers to Interim Order

"OO" refers to Operating Order

"TOP" refers to Temporary Operating Procedure

"LEAA" refers to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

"OMAP" refers to Office of Management Analysis and Planning

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