

TRENDS IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1970-1985, IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE

Results of the
Second United Nations Survey of Crime Trends,
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
and Crime Prevention Strategies



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United Nations Office at Vienna
Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs

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U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

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Explanatory notes

In tables:

A hyphen indicates that the item is not applicable.

An em dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible

Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately listed.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report is the result of a long process that began when the General Assembly, in its resolution 3021 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, expressed concern about the crime problem in many parts of the world, particularly "the threat that crime in its various forms presents to economic, social and cultural development and to the quality of life".

2. In pursuance of that resolution, and on the basis of responses provided by Member States, which were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the situation concerning crime prevention and control in their respective countries, the Secretariat carried out a worldwide survey of crime trends, operations of criminal justice systems and crime prevention strategies for the period 1970-1975. That survey, the first to be conducted, was contained in a report submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session (A.32/199). In its resolutions 32/59 and 32/60 of 8 December 1977, the Assembly noted with satisfaction the report, and requested the Secretary-General to continue to gather and disseminate information concerning crime trends and criminal policies, and to foster the exchange of information relating to crime and to the functioning of the criminal justice systems in Member States.

3. The Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Caracas from 25 August to 5 September 1980, also discussed this matter.* In its resolution 2, the Congress requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts to coordinate the collection of comparable cross-national statistics on crime and justice in Member States. 1/ It also called for further studies aimed at improving systems of crime statistics, and recommended that the United Nations should provide information on world crime trends and criminal justice policies on a regular basis, in close and continuing cooperation with Member States and relevant bodies. The Congress emphasized that this required that the capacity of the United Nations to collect, analyse and disseminate information in the form most useful to Member States be strengthened. To that end, the United Nations should study the possibility of establishing unified statistical plans which would serve as a guide for Member States and as a way of collecting, analysing and disseminating information. 2/

4. The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985, considered a report on the preliminary results of the Second Survey, 3/ and, in its resolution 9, requested the Secretary-General *inter alia* to publish the data collected as output of the analytical research undertaken by the Secretariat. 4/ The survey data are also available on computer diskettes** and have been widely disseminated for incorporation in various databases.

5. To work out in detail the most effective strategy and instruments for implementing the above-mentioned recommendations after the Sixth and the

*Under agenda item 3, "Crime trends and crime prevention strategies", and also partly under agenda item 8, "New perspectives in crime prevention and criminal justice and development: the role of international cooperation".

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Seventh Congresses, the Secretary-General convened several ad hoc meetings of experts.* These meetings sought to generate a more rigorous methodology, including the construction of a new questionnaire for the second and third surveys, with appropriate methods of data analysis.

6. The meetings addressed the following four substantive areas of crime prevention and criminal justice:

- (a) Crime statistics;
- (b) Statistics and other information on the operation of criminal justice systems, especially their personnel structure, including recruitment and training;
- (c) Information on crime prevention strategies;
- (d) The study of crime and criminal justice in the context of socio-economic development.

7. The present report contains a comparative overview of these areas and provides a criminological analysis, taking into account crime-related developments that occurred during the period covered by the Second Survey.

8. From both substantive and operational points of view, this report should, however, be regarded only as an initial attempt to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of the crime-related data obtained. Its publication will be followed by another report containing a review of the results of the Third United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies (1980-1986), which is currently under way. This forthcoming publication will include an additional analysis of the results of the Second Survey in the light of the data obtained from the Third Survey.

9. Many experts took part in the preparation of this report. Noteworthy contributions were made by Karoly Bárd of Etvos Lorand University at Budapest, Trevor Benn of the Home Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Linda Harvey and Kenneth Pease of Manchester University, Hans Jurgen Kerner of the University of Tübingen, Graeme Newman of the State University of New York at Albany, and Patrick Törnudd of the National Research Institute of Legal Policy at Helsinki. Valuable input was also provided by Matti Joutsen, Director of the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and

*See working papers prepared by the Secretariat and reports of the following meetings: Ad hoc Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Second United Nations Survey of World Crime Trends and Crime Prevention Systems, held at Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 5-8 October 1981; United Nations Expert Group Meeting on the Second United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies, held at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, 24-28 October 1983; United Nations Expert Group Meeting on the Formulation of Guidelines for Database Development, held at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, 31 October-4 November 1983; and the Ad hoc Expert Group Meeting on the Third United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies, held at Washington, D.C., 18-20 March 1987.

Control, affiliated with the United Nations, by Satyanshu Mukherjee of the Australian Institute of Criminology, and by the interregional and regional United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice institutes, in particular the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute at Rome, and the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in Tokyo.

I. BACKGROUND AND APPROACH

10. Over the last century various attempts have been made to compare statistics on crime across different countries.* In most respects, however, cross-national analysis of crime data is still an emerging field, especially at the global level.** Recent studies have been restricted mostly to the developed countries of the western hemisphere and to selected crime types, 5/ some to broad categories such as property crime or personal crime (homicide, for instance), 6/ and some to offender categories, for instance, women 7/ or juveniles. 8/ Both the number of countries studied and the methods used vary considerably. Some studies have been limited to a description of changes in the patterns and trends of criminality, while others have looked for correlations between the incidence of crime and various socio-economic factors, such as population density, age structure, gross national product or alcohol consumption. 9/ In summarizing the findings of these studies, there are problems in comparing very different crime categories and the different kinds of data used. There are also considerable difficulties, which have been repeatedly emphasized, 10/ in making international comparisons of crime data.

A. Making comparisons: a note of caution

11. It is important to stress that comparisons between countries, even when they have similar social and economic backgrounds, are hazardous and require the utmost caution. In preparing the reports issued on the findings of the world crime surveys, a number of guidelines have been formulated for making such comparisons. These guidelines may be summarized as follows:

(a) High rates of recorded crime may reflect high "true" rates of crime, but they may also be the result of conscientious and effective recording by crime control authorities. While the statistics published in this report are official accounts of the crime rates of each country, they inform as much about the organizational and bureaucratic mechanisms as they do about the extent of "the crime problem". As noted in the report of the Secretary-General on the

*At the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva from 22 August to 3 September 1955, a recommendation was adopted that comparative, coordinated and interdisciplinary research should be carried out in order to determine such uniformities and differences in casual influences on criminality as will result in progress made toward a true science of criminology and in the development of a highly promising new field of comparative criminology. See First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (United Nations publication, Sales No. 1956.IV.4), annex I, resolution E, sect. II (F), p. 81.

**The history of the early attempts is surveyed in the following articles: Eduardo Vetere and Graeme Newman, "International crime statistics: an overview from a comparative perspective", Abstracts in Criminology and Penology, No. 3 (1977), pp. 251-266; Antoinette D. Viccica, "Toward the first world crime survey", L.E.A. Journal, No. 42 (1977), pp. 7-20, and "World crime trends", International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, vol. 24, No. 3 (1980), pp. 270-277; and Slawomir Redo, "The United Nations crime trends surveys: comparative criminology in the global context", International Annals of Criminology, vol. 24, Nos. 1-2 (1986), pp. 162-179.

First Survey, "... countries keeping the most careful records are likely to be regarded as having the most criminality when, in fact, they may be doing more to detect and record crime than many others" (A/32/199, para. 13);

(b) Comparisons between particular countries should be made only on the basis of a full and complete understanding of the social, economic, and administrative aspects of each country concerned. With such an understanding, valid comparisons can be made;

(c) As noted in the report of the Secretary-General on the First Survey, crime cannot readily be measured against its opposite, which may be called "good behaviour". Unlike health, where such factors as the nutrition of a population can be measured to compare it with the incidence of "disease", there exist no clear measures of the "non-criminal" health of a society. Thus, while crime rates may be high, there is the possibility that "good behaviour" is also frequent;

(d) A significant number of offences, such as so-called victimless crimes and especially corruption, are rarely reported. White-collar crimes are reported only occasionally, with many countries having no simple legal category for such crimes. Thus, the pattern and forms of crimes presented in this report tend to involve what criminologists call "traditional" or "conventional" crimes - those of "common criminals". The injury produced by massive white-collar crimes, as have occurred, for example, in recent "mass disasters" (environmental crimes), may be far greater than that of all recorded homicides. Thus, there is the difficulty that every crime is given equal weight in the total reported crime picture, when in actual fact some crimes - many of them unrecorded - may cause greater injury to society;

(e) There is also the problem of different countries having different definitions of established crime categories. This problem has been addressed by critics of international crime statistics for many years - indeed, since their collection began. The descriptions of systems provided by respondent countries were heavily hedged around with qualifications about national arrangements. Any presentation of data that included all those qualifications could become unreadable or incomprehensible. For that reason, data have been reviewed and presented in a general manner.*

These points highlight the difficulties with which researchers are faced in a comparative analysis of crime trends, and which, to a certain extent, may not exist for other kinds of international social statistics. Well-recognized as they are in criminology, however, these difficulties should not negate the endeavours of the international community to offer, through the United Nations

*The following publications give more detailed information on data from two regions: Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, Criminal Justice Systems in Europe, Publication Series No. 5 (Helsinki, 1985); and "Delineation of crucial issues of criminal justice in Asia", report of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders for the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (A/CONF.121/UNAFEI).

surveys of crime trends, a general classification of crime and an analysis of its reported patterns and dynamics.*

12. The present report is intended to provide a very broad overview of the results obtained from the Second Survey, with particular emphasis on the extent to which the crime problem has worsened or lessened, the particular forms of crime that may have increased in seriousness, the criminal justice response (especially the use of prisons), and the linkages of the crime problem with certain economic, social and cultural factors in member countries. With the experience and findings of the First Survey to draw upon, attention has been given to issues that have evolved over time, focusing on trends and comparative increases rather than comparisons of combined rates.**

B. Countries reporting

13. An indication of the increasing importance of the world crime surveys is given by the number of countries responding, which has exceeded the level established in the First Survey. In that survey, which covered the years 1970-1975, a total of 64 countries returned the questionnaires, 50 of which provided data that could be used statistically. In the present survey, covering the years 1975-1980, a total of 78 returned the questionnaires, between 47 and 63 of which could be used, depending on the particular data analysis involved.***

*It is, however, important to acknowledge that there are some wide variations in actual crime rates even within particular geographic regions and among countries that appear somewhat similar in economic and cultural background. These variations are probably due to definition and reporting variability. See, for instance, F. Balvig, "The snow-white image", Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, vol. 9, 1988.

**Owing to possible sources of error and confusion in the interpretation of raw crime data at the international level, such comparisons have not even been attempted in the report.

***The number of countries varies according to crime type and particular aspects of the criminal justice systems. For a comprehensive listing of crime-related data (1975-1980) and reporting countries, see annex I. The crime trends data sets of the surveys are under continuous revision. At the time of the compilation of this report, a number of returns had not been received from Member States. The above table represents a more recent data set than those used in this report. The statistics may, in some instances, differ from those in the report. The most recent version of the data set is available from the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF TRENDS IN RECORDED CRIME

14. Needless to say, the generalizations that follow are limited by the range of the countries that provided the requested information. However, as an approximate indication of the crime situation for the period 1975-1980, the countries reporting are representative of all major regions of the world.

15. This section deals with crimes recorded by police or other crime reporting agencies. The statistics represent the number of offences, not the number of offenders. Obviously, a single person may commit more than one offence, and conversely, a single offence may be committed by several persons acting in concert. This measure is therefore quite different from that of offenders, an indicator which is examined in the next section.

16. The total or combined rates of crime for various regions or for the entire sample of countries have not been computed. Because of the difficulties of making comparisons, referred to above, emphasis has been given to trends for each country.* Thus direct comparisons of crime rates from one country to another are avoided. Instead, what is meaningful is to determine whether crime has increased or decreased within a particular country and, on this basis, to make useful comparisons.

A. Total recorded crime

17. When examining changes in the total levels of recorded crime,** it must be borne in mind that the coverage of different types of crime in the statistics varies from one country to another.*** In countries where the total crime figures include a large proportion of traffic offences or other minor offences, the trend in the total number usually reflects the trend for such offences. Figure I (annex II) shows that the number of countries that reported increases in total recorded crime is only slightly higher than those which reported decreases. However, an examination of the tables in annex I reveals that some of the changes for individual countries are very great - in both directions. This supports the belief, echoed by much of the criminological literature, that the rates of crime are responsive to policy and measurement changes. If a decline in recorded crime can be counted as a "success", there are enough

*Zero increases or decreases were coded as a decrease. There were, however, very few cases of zero change.

**This was a separate category in the questionnaire, as it was in the First Survey. It is intended to obtain an all-inclusive measure of crime. It is not equivalent to the sum of all crime categories used in the questionnaire, as there are many countries which have crime that goes beyond these categories.

***So does the reporting practice of Member States with regard to the surveys. See further "Second United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies: report prepared by the Secretariat" (A/CONF.121/18), paras. 49-57. One of the substantive outputs of that analysis was the Manual for the Development of Criminal Justice Statistics (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.XVII.16).

success stories to offer possible examples to countries wishing to reduce their crime rates. That would apply especially to countries within the same region.

18. It should be noted that a decline in the recorded crime rate is not necessarily "good", nor is an increase necessarily "bad". It may be that more responsive police forces, increasingly conscientious in recording victim complaints of crime, generate an increase in recorded crime. On the other hand, a decrease in recorded crime may be due to less efficient recording. In either case, sharing experiences across national frontiers could reflect both possibilities, and thus be valuable in itself.

B. Types of crime

19. Rates for all types of reported crime have increased substantially from 1970 to 1980; violent crimes have doubled (see annex II, figure II), and property crimes almost tripled (see annex II, figure III).

20. For every 100 crimes recorded and reported, the average incidence by specific type of crime was as follows:

<u>Types of crime</u>	<u>Percentage of total</u>
Theft	72
Assault	12
Robbery	5
Drug crimes	3
Fraud, including embezzlement	3
Intentional homicide	1
Non-intentional homicide	1
Rape	1
Bribery	1
Kidnapping	<1

21. If other data collected in the survey on the different types of crime are examined, an interesting pattern emerges. While there may not be a "world crime wave" in general, figure II (annex II) shows that certain types of crime were reported to have increased much more than others. For example, drug crimes appear to have increased substantially (over 70 per cent of countries reporting an increase), whereas kidnapping, murder and non-intentional homicide have shown increases in less than half the countries. With the advantage of hindsight, the finding of increased drug criminality does not seem particularly surprising. But had the analysis been reported soon after the end of the period to which the data refers, the same conclusion could not have been regarded as obvious.

22. With reference to bribery and corruption, systems of criminal statistics seem to be more structured towards the reporting of "street" crimes than towards certain other, less visible, types of crimes. This is but a further manifestation of the fact, recognized by the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, in its resolution 7, "that criminal justice systems in most countries are designed primarily for the prevention and control of conventional forms of crime". 11/

23. The finding suggests the need for further research, such as an investigation of those countries with high rates of conventional crime to find out whether such rates are not also a product of increased reporting. However, it is clear that different types of crime fluctuate in different geographical regions; hence a comparison of individual countries within such regions should prove useful in the analysis below.*

C. Regional variations

24. Figures III, IV and V in annex II show the percentage of countries reporting increases or decreases in violent crime (murder, non-intentional homicide, rape, robbery, assault and kidnapping), property crime (theft, bribery and fraud) and drug crimes.**

(a) Violent crime. Figure III shows that, although the number of reporting countries in Eastern Europe was only two, both reported decreases in violent crime, whereas in other regions increases and decreases were reported with roughly equal frequency, with the exception of the Caribbean and North America and Europe. Two thirds of Caribbean countries reported increases in violent crime. Further, all Latin American countries have comparatively high robbery rates;

(b) Property crime. Figure IV displays some remarkable results. As was found in the First United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, the countries of North America and Western Europe show substantial increases in property crime. Eighty per cent of these countries reported increases. During the period 1975-1980 a number of Asian countries were beginning to develop their economies. Thus, it may not be very surprising to find that they reported more increases in property crime compared with other regions, after Europe and North America. Once again, the countries of Eastern Europe reported the fewest increases;

*See, for example, Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, Criminal Justice Systems

**Because of small numbers in some categories, the following country groupings have been adopted:

(a) Africa and Middle East: Cape Verde, Fiji, Kuwait, Madagascar, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Senegal, Seychelles, Zimbabwe;

(b) Asia: Bangladesh, India, Japan, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga;

(c) Caribbean: Barbados, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago;

(d) Eastern Europe: Poland, Yugoslavia;

(e) Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Panama;

(f) Western Europe and North America: Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Israel, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

(c) Drug crime. Figure V paints a rather bleak picture. All regions of the world, with the exception of Eastern Europe, reported increases in drug-related crimes. One hundred per cent of the Caribbean countries reported increases, closely followed by Europe and North America, with 80 per cent reporting increases. An examination of table 6 of annex I, however, also shows some countries with very low drug crime rates, which again suggests that a special study of those countries may be valuable.

III. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS

A. Characteristics of offenders

25. Data can be collected on the characteristics of offenders only when the authorities involved have actually apprehended a suspect. Countries vary widely as to how they detain suspects, interrogate them, and assign to them the status of accused. Hence, the number of countries providing information that can be analysed is smaller than for recorded crime. Recorded crimes simply require that any person should contact the police and report an incident, whereas to assess the characteristics of offenders there must be an alleged offender.

26. Two basic offender characteristics have interested those concerned with the explanation and control of crime for many years: age and sex. Figure IX of annex II shows that for the countries reporting (a small number but from diverse backgrounds),* there is very little difference in the percentage of offenders according to their age distribution between 1975 and 1980. Indeed, this percentage is remarkably stable. Also, with some minor exceptions, the age patterns seem to be roughly the same for both sexes. There is an indication that more males are likely to be apprehended between 20 and 24 years of age, but this is not a substantial difference. The most striking finding is that the major portion of offenders are over 30 years of age, which generally goes against the prevailing research findings that the bulk of crime is committed by youth. At least these data suggest that if the latter is correct, then the term youth as used in this analysis must be interpreted in a very loose sense. There are, however, some startling individual variations among countries in the age distribution of those arrested, which may or may not be related to the general age distribution in society. For example, one country shows that 95 per cent of its offenders are over 30, whereas another reports only 11 per cent (see annex I, tables 20-29).

27. The proportion of male to female offenders is consistent with the criminological finding that the number of recorded male offenders far exceeds that of females. Table III.1 (based on table 17 of annex I) presents the ratio of males to females at each stage of the criminal justice process of apprehension, conviction and imprisonment. For 1975, the overall ratio for all countries combined was 25 males apprehended for every single female, with 23.9 males convicted and 27.2 males imprisoned for each female. In 1980, however, the ratio of males to females was somewhat lower for apprehension and conviction, but the difference narrows considerably at the stage of imprisonment. These changing proportions should be interpreted separately at each stage of the criminal justice process.

*For male offenders, countries reporting were: Austria, Bahamas, Chile, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, India, Japan, Norway, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Suriname, Tonga, United States and Uruguay. For female offenders: Austria, Bahamas, Chile, Germany, Federal Republic of, India, Japan, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Suriname and Uruguay.

Table III.1. Ratio of males to females apprehended, convicted and imprisoned, 1975-1980
(Number of males per female)

Year	Apprehension	Conviction	Imprisonment
1975	25.1	23.9	27.2
1980	15.7	16.5	24.2

28. While the situation is very complex, there is some evidence of system-wide discrimination in favour of females in criminal justice processing, that is, as cases proceed through the system, there is a slightly higher possibility for males to go to prison than females. That finding, however, is in need of further investigation. In addition, other factors may affect the above-mentioned figures, starting with the considerable annual variations in recorded crime rates, as a result of which there may already be significant differences between the female-male offender ratios at the intake stage (see annex I, section B). Another factor operating in the figures for conviction and imprisonment may be the different pace with which male and female offenders are processed through the criminal justice system. It is notable that the variation between countries in the gender ratios is considerable, but not as wide as the variation in the age-gender distribution.

B. Processing of offenders

29. The processing of offenders through the criminal justice system from first apprehension, prosecution and eventual conviction is an extremely complex issue and one of growing interest to many criminologists. Countries vary widely in their procedures, in the flow and filtering of offenders throughout their respective justice systems, and also in the indicators of system efficiency used.* The "clearance rate" (that is, the number of suspected offenders expressed as a percentage of recorded crimes) is sometimes used to indicate how effective the criminal justice system is in "solving" crimes, but it is a very difficult indicator. It may not necessarily reflect success, since if many offenders commit one offence, the clearance rate will be amplified considerably. It can also be affected by the inclusion of petty crimes, such as traffic violations and drug-abuse offences, in the statistics, since such offences are seldom recorded except when offenders are apprehended, leading to artificially high clearance rates. There are many difficulties in collecting and comparing such statistics.

*See, for example, M. L. Luskin and R. C. Luskin, "Why so fast, why so slow?, explaining case processing time", The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 77, No. 1 (1986), pp. 190-215; Slawomir Redo, "United Nations position on drug crimes", UNAFEI Resource Material Series, No. 27 (1984), pp. 75-81; I. Morawitz and W. Stange, "Untersuchungshaft in Oesterreich: Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung" ("Arrest in Austria: results of an empirical study"), Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, No. 5 (1986), pp. 259-270; and J. R. Kubiak, "Internal and external factors influencing the operation of criminal justice systems of socialist European countries", Review of Socialist Law, No. 13 (1987), pp. 5-59.

30. As an example, table 16 of annex I shows that the clearance rates of 1975 (calculated by apprehensions as a percentage of recorded crimes), as compared with 1980, do not vary a great deal within each country. In fact, the overall rate for 1975 was 54.8 per cent, compared with 60.4 per cent in 1980. The variations across countries, however, are startling, though much of these could be due to statistical artifacts of the kind noted above. The clearance rate for Qatar, for example, is 115 per cent (which means that the number of offenders apprehended exceeded the number of recorded crimes), whereas the rate for Honduras is 0.4 per cent, which means that very few offenders were apprehended compared to the number of crimes. The reasons for these variations cannot be established from these data alone, but the variations suggest that further detailed research into the differences in criminal justice processing and decision-making would be of great value in the international exchange of experience and information.

31. Individual countries vary considerably in the filtering of individuals through the criminal justice system. Because the filtering process is a significant indicator of the actual operation of the criminal justice system of each country, it is of great interest to examine individual countries that differ in their processing. Thus, from the sex ratios shown in tables 17 and 18 in annex I, a clear contrast emerges in the way in which offenders are filtered either into or out of the system. While in each country the proportion of male to female offenders differs, in all responding countries male offenders clearly outnumber female offenders.

32. As an example of the filtering process, figure X (annex II) compares the numbers of offenders processed from apprehension to conviction for Qatar and Yugoslavia, using an arbitrary base of 100 apprehensions. The level of prosecution and conviction for Qatar is very high compared with Yugoslavia. Do these differences represent different patterns in criminal justice processing, or cultural and societal differences? More research into such questions would, again, contribute to the value of international exchanges.

33. Similarly, figure XI (annex II) shows a filtering chart that includes the initial (crimes recorded) and final (choice of prison) stages in the criminal process. For example, using the base of 100 reported crimes, a marked contrast can be noticed between Poland and Japan. Poland apprehends considerably more individuals at the early stage, prosecutes many more, convicts more, and imprisons more. Japan, on the other hand, seems to filter many of its possible offenders at the early stage of processing. Whether this is because of alternative ways of dealing with suspected offenders or not, or whether these alternatives reflect genuine differences in the severity of processing, one cannot judge.

C. Use of imprisonment

34. In most countries that have abolished the death penalty, the most severe sanction that can be imposed upon an offender is incarceration. Changes in the use of incarceration over time are therefore of central importance in contemporary criminal justice science. Nationally, available statistics of imprisonment are the most accessible data, but even they may be only an approximate indicator of the severity of the punishment response, for several reasons. Prisons are not the only places where people may be sent by the courts, before or instead of conviction. There may be other forms of incarceration that are not always included in the statistics of imprisonment. Young people may have their liberty restricted in the name of their welfare

in institutions that are not prisons. People who are not prosecuted, on the understanding that they become voluntary patients in psychiatric hospitals, are not counted as imprisoned; offenders who are detained in psychiatric hospitals by order of the courts may be counted as having received a custodial sentence, but not as part of the prison population. The range of techniques of restricting people's liberty by means other than imprisonment clearly influences the scope and meaning of statistics on imprisonment.

35. The looseness of the link between imprisonment and the restriction of liberty means that even if the number of people in institutions designated as prisons goes down, the total number of people deprived of their liberty may none the less be going up. That could be true in the narrow sense set out above. It could also be true in a wider sense, namely that, depending on the physical arrangements in a certain place, the number of things any person can do, and the other places where he or she can go, may be higher or lower; prison is near one end of a continuum ranging from total restriction to total liberty.

36. Having recognized these limitations, this section nevertheless focuses on imprisonment in its narrowest sense. This does not mean that problems of scope do not arise. The absolute number of people sent to prison (receptions) or in prison (population) are the important statistics for a number of practical purposes. However, if the numbers are to be expressed so as to discover changes in practice, it is necessary to express prison use statistics in relation to some other variables. Should the general population be used as that variable, or convictions for serious offences? If the former, no allowance is made for changes in criminal activity of the population as a whole; if the latter, no account is taken of changes in police clearance rates or prosecution policy. There is thus no correct technique for the standardization of prison statistics. Rather, there is a range of possible techniques, each with particular advantages and disadvantages.

37. A major choice to be made when examining statistics of imprisonment is between statistics on prison receptions (committals) and statistics on prison populations. These two kinds of statistics differ considerably and generate significantly different conclusions when used in research and analysis. A different impression of the use of imprisonment is created by focusing on one rather than the other type of statistic. It is necessary to emphasize the distinction because these differences cannot always be recognized.

38. The basic relationship between the number of prisoners received to serve a sentence and the sentenced prison population is that the prison population equals receptions multiplied by average time served. Such arithmetic shows why statistics on receptions and population can be so different for the same system. The prison population contains a higher proportion of long-sentence prisoners rather than forms a cohort of receptions. That is of fundamental importance in the understanding of prison statistics, and indeed statistics from other types of institution.*

*European countries vary in number of prison receptions, and also in average sentence length. Many of the possible combinations occur, as attested by the biannual Prison Information Bulletin of the Council of Europe. For example, in recent years, although the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany have had similar rates of reception, they have contrasting prison

39. The Second Crime Survey requested only figures on prison population. With the data at hand, it is possible to look only at the prison population resulting from the combined effects of receptions and sentence length, and not to disentangle the relationship between the reception rate and sentence length.*

40. Table 30 of annex I shows the returns on the proportion of the population detained. The most striking aspect of the table is the range of figures within a region. Detained populations of countries within a region may vary by a factor of eight or nine. That finding represents very great differences in the degree to which countries have recourse to custodial options. As was the case for crime, several countries in the surveyed regions have shown a reduction in detained population over the period covered by the Second Survey, and

(continued) populations, with the German rate being about three times as high as the Netherlands rate. Spain and Denmark have similar sizes of prison population, but their rates of reception are very different. See Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, Criminal Justice Systems ...; J. Jasinski, "The punitiveness of criminal justice systems", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, No. 1 (1976), pp. 43-51; K. F. Schumann, "Comparative research on legal sanctions: problems and purposes", International Journal of the Sociology of Law, No. 11 (1983), pp. 267-276; and H. J. Kerner, "Criminal justice policies in relation to process of imprisonment, other penal sanctions and alternative measures", report submitted on behalf of the International Society for Criminology to the International Symposium, organized by non-governmental organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council, and held at Milan from 29 November to 1 December 1987, in preparation of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.

*A different approach to comparisons of prison use concerns the notion of prevalence. Countries differ in the proportion of their citizens who can expect, at current rates of imprisonment, to be sentenced to imprisonment at some time in their lives. It is a measure of the penetration of the experience of imprisonment through the general population. The issue has been addressed in the following studies: P. Langan and L. A. Greenfield, The Prevalence of Imprisonment (Washington, D.C., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986); and L. Harvey and K. Pease, "The lifetime prevalence of custodial sentences", British Journal of Criminology, vol. 27 (1987). The studies suggest very great gender differences, with around 6 per cent of males being expected to suffer a sentence of imprisonment at some time in their lives, contrasted with less than one half of 1 per cent of women. In the United States there are equally large racial differences, which do not appear to be a function of discrimination within the criminal justice process from apprehension on (see P. Langan, "Racism on trial", Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 76 (1985), pp. 666-683). In the absence of corresponding data from Eastern European countries, it will be noted only that according to a Hungarian study of conviction rates among males, 40-49 per cent of males in Hungary will be sentenced at some point during their lives (see Andras Szabo, "A Bunozes Kihivasa es a Kriminologia Valaszai" (The challenge of crime and the responses of criminology), Tarsadalomkutatas, vol. 3 (1988), pp. 5-31). The statistics on prevalence are just one set within the general area of research on criminal careers (see A. Blumstein and others, eds., Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals" (Washington, D.C., National Academy Press, 1986).

all these reductions represent a trend over the period, rather than simply a contrast of the two end-years. However, some of the movements in either direction are dramatic: for example, the upward changes in France and Qatar and the downward changes in Finland and Bangladesh.*

41. An alternative way of expressing prison population statistics is in relation to the number of crimes, rather than to the number of people. The data are presented in this way in table 31 of annex I. A comparison of tables 30 and 31 shows that courts in some countries apply imprisonment infrequently both in relation to the population and in relation to recorded crime (for example, the Netherlands); some countries are high in relation to both population and recorded crime (for instance, Belize); and others are high in relation to one variable and low in relation to the other (examples include Ireland and Spain). The existence, in the data, of all possible patterns suggests that some countries have prison populations "in line" with their levels of crime, and may thus feel themselves constrained by the crime situation to have a high level of custody, or feel able, by dint of a low level of crime, to have a low use of custody. Others have prison populations not directly related to the numbers of recorded crimes, possibly because the variable of seriousness is hidden. Those countries with prison populations not so obviously related to the number of recorded crimes may have crimes of a level of seriousness that accounts for the difference.**

42. A clearer picture of both the relation between these two measures of prison rate (that is, one using the recorded crimes as the base, and the other using the general population as the base) and regional variations can be seen in figures XII and XIII (annex II). In figure XII, it can be seen that countries of Europe and North America report much higher increases in prison rates based on population than other countries generally. However, when using crimes as the base, European countries report fewer increases in the prison rate. In other words, if the assumption were made that there ought to be a relation between prison population and the amount of crime, a conclusion might be that the prison rates of European and North American countries have not kept pace with their rising crime rates, or that there is a deliberate trend towards deinstitutionalization.

*Reductions or increases in prison population during the survey period might have been influenced by various factors, some of which are rather theoretical in nature.

**A recent and detailed comparison of four countries, providing a model of the comparisons that are possible and the limitations on them, is provided by J. P. Lynch, Imprisonment in Four Countries (Washington, D.C., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986). His conclusion, simplified, is that major national differences in prison use are largely due to differences in the seriousness of offences. In W. Young, "Influences upon the use of imprisonment", The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, vol. 25 (1986), pp. 125-136, the most detailed review of theories of differences in national prison use is presented. See also G. Kaiser, Strafvollzug im europäischen Vergleich (Imprisonment in Europe: a Comparative Study), (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983); D. Biles, ed., Current International Trends in Corrections (Sydney, Federation Press, 1988); and M. J. Lynch, "The extraction of surplus value, crime and punishment: preliminary examination", Contemporary Crises, vol. 12 (1988), pp. 329-344.

43. A classification based on the world system approach* is reflected in figure XIII (annex II), which shows core countries having much higher prison rates using population as the base. The semi-periphery group appears to have "overcompensated" (as compared with other countries) for the increases in crime.

44. Those findings could imply that the levels of use of imprisonment by individual countries are not powerful factors in affecting the levels of crime, but that again is a hypothesis worth detailed future study. If high levels of imprisonment did reduce crime significantly, in the present analysis countries with high levels of crime per 100,000 inhabitants would be those with low levels of imprisonment per 100,000 inhabitants, but a comparison of tables 30, 31 and 32 (annex I) shows that this is not the case. There are other countries characterized by high rates of custody per crime and low rates of custody per person, or vice versa. This suggests that penal policy may result in prison populations either higher or lower than might be predicted from the crime rate.**

45. Differences in prison use, according to whether the prisoner is under trial or already sentenced, can be seen from table 32 (annex I), which shows the proportion of adults imprisoned who are under sentence, for both 1975 and 1980. For 17 countries, the rate was higher in 1980, and for 15, lower. Noticeable fluctuations took place over that six-year period in all the countries concerned.

46. The proportion of prisoners who are detained while under trial has been a matter of continuing interest to penologists. The pattern was the same in 1975 and 1980. In this context, figure XIV (annex II) suggests marked regional differences, with Latin American countries reporting much higher numbers of prisoners detained prior to sentence. There were no great differences between 1975 and 1980, which suggests that the figures provided were recorded according to consistent criteria.

47. Table 33 of annex I shows statistics for juveniles comparable with those of table 32. It can be seen that the proportion of detained juveniles who were not sentenced was on the whole even higher than the proportion of adults. The number of countries shown as having a higher proportion of unsentenced juveniles in custody in 1980 when compared with 1975 was 10. The number of countries with a lower proportion was nine. The regional variations shown in figure XV (annex II) once again demonstrate the high numbers of individuals held without sentence in Latin America.

*For a discussion, see paras. 174-177 below.

**In his 1986 review of influences upon the use of imprisonment, W. Young, argued that neither simple deterministic theories nor policy choice theories of prison use are supported by the data, and that detailed cross-cultural work is necessary to clarify the dynamics of national prison use. It may also be the case that, since imprisonment is used only for a very small minority of all offenders, changes in the volume of crime would be primarily expected to have an impact on the use of fines and other non-institutional measures.

48. If the composition of the detained population is examined in a slightly different way, the number of detained juveniles can be expressed as a proportion of all those detained. The data are presented in table 34 of annex I. It can be seen that in some countries the proportion of prisoners who are juveniles (in terms of the national legislation on age boundaries) varies greatly between countries. The proportion of juveniles in prison increased in six countries between 1975 and 1980 and decreased in 10. Some of these variations may be explained in terms of differences in population age distribution, but population breakdowns more closely aligned with the breakdowns by age of the prison population would be needed to research this question in detail.

49. The regional variations are shown in figures XV and XVI (annex II). Latin America, Europe and North America recorded higher proportions of juveniles in prison. There were no substantial differences from 1975 to 1980.

50. It was noted earlier that the proportion of the detained population that was unsentenced varied widely. For only a few countries do data exist which make it possible to determine the average period of such detention in days.* These data are presented in table 35 of annex I. Even here, there are wide differences in evidence. The use of an arithmetic average without any data about the distribution of the time periods is likely to produce only a very partial account of the process. A long average pretrial period may result from a general and lengthy period of presentence custody, or from an excessively long period of presentence incarceration for a minority of the group. Paradoxically, a short average might result from long remands, being so long that they cannot contribute to the calculation of an average, since they have not ended.

51. Average sentence length is an important factor in criminal justice planning. More precisely, the actual time served in prison, which may be shorter because of parole or remission, is the crucial factor. It is possible to calculate any prison statistics (population, receptions and average time served) from the other two, that is, on the basis of data on parole and remission. Prison population data and some information on average time served have been collected, but the classification of sentence length is too crude to allow meaningful calculations of receptions. In any event, the sentence length includes people already in prison, data which distort the picture by exaggerating the frequency of long sentences. With this cautionary note, the distribution of sentence length by country for 1975 and 1980 is given in tables 36 and 37 of annex I, respectively.

52. The data for 1975 and 1980 have both been included because patterns for individual years may be distorted by actions such as amnesties given to prisoners in a particular sentence range. The large measure of correspondence between the patterns in the two years is reassuring on this account. Sentencing practices which diverge as much as these do are likely to produce

*There exist, however, more comprehensive regional studies on this subject. See, for example, Elias Carranza and others, El Preso sin Condena en América Latina y el Caribe. Estudio Comparativo Estadístico y Legal de Treinta Países y Propuestas para Reducir el Fenómeno (San José, Costa Rica, United Nations Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1983).

great differences in prison populations. The relative patterns of sentence length, for instance, in Scotland and England and Wales, show that even where substantive criminal law is similar, and where there are no dramatic cultural differences, there are considerable differences in patterns of incarceration by length of time served.

53. The advocacy of the use of alternatives to imprisonment has been part of the United Nations programme in crime prevention and criminal justice for a considerable time, as demonstrated by the programme of the quinquennial Congresses. Some countries have declared their support for the minimum use of custodial sentences as a policy objective. An obvious way to pursue such a goal is to increase the range and use of non-custodial sentences. The use of such sentences to divert from custody relies upon a particular model of the sentencing process, one in which the number of people appearing for sentence is multiplied by the options available, with the result that fewer custodial sentences are given.

54. In an alternative model, the availability of new non-custodial sentences modifies decision-making throughout the criminal justice process, so that the proportion of cases informally processed decreases, and these cases are instead brought to court, where they swell the number of non-custodial sentences. Therefore, the number of custodial sentences does not decline. It is fair to say that the bulk of research studies of the issue show that there is some support for both models.

55. Table 38 of annex I compares the relative use of custodial sentences with the availability of non-custodial sentences. It shows that the number of non-custodial options available does not vary in any consistent way the prison population per 100,000 persons.

56. Two alternative explanations may be offered. One is that the provision of a range of non-custodial options does not reduce the use of custody relative to what its use would be if the alternative were not available. This explanation, while tenable, is not consistent with the available empirical research. The second alternative is that the introduction of non-custodial options does reduce the number of custodial sentences passed, but not to such an extent as to overturn existing national differentials in prison use. That is to say, a Government chooses to introduce or expand non-custodial sentences because it has a high prison population. Some people are diverted from short custodial sentences to the new non-custodial sentence. The effect this has upon the prison population is minimal for the following two reasons:*

(a) Those given short sentences ipso facto contribute little to the size of the prison population (as noted earlier in the discussion on the distinction between population and reception statistics);

(b) A portion of those receiving non-custodial sentences are likely to commit a further offence for which a custodial sentence may be imposed, thus reducing the diversionary effect of the earlier non-custodial sanction.

*For a review of the evidence in one country, see A. E. Bottoms, "Limiting prison use: experience in England and Wales", The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, vol. 26 (1987), pp. 177-202. See also N. Bishop, Non-custodial Alternatives in Europe, Publication Series, No. 14 (Helsinki, Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the United Nations, 1988).

57. The distinction between separate data for reception and population becomes especially relevant in establishing whether those administrations which respond to a high prison population by increasing non-custodial options tend to have a higher prison population because of long average sentences, not because of a high number of receptions into prison. In any event, table 38 of annex I shows that policies aimed at reducing prison populations through the introduction of non-custodial sentences require, at the very least, good data bases for their evaluation, and may not be as successful in arithmetical terms as may seem likely from superficial calculations.

58. Furthermore, certain legal provisions may unintentionally deter the use of non-custodial options. For example, the procedural requirements for the imposition of certain non-custodial sanctions may bar their imposition in simplified proceedings. Also, the greater use of non-custodial sanctions may widen the statutory discretionary powers of certain authorities. This may conflict with other policy goals, such as ensuring due process. In addition, the introduction of non-custodial sanctions through legislative action requires analysis of the proper place of the sanction in the normative scale of punishments.

59. Finally, a key factor in the "success" of any non-custodial sanction is the extent to which the policy makers, courts, other practitioners and agencies and the community are informed of its costs and benefits. Their effectiveness (and, indeed, the effectiveness of sanctions in general) has long been a popular subject of research. Regrettably, it has yielded relatively meagre results. The problems encountered in such research, and in evaluative research in general, are great. Nevertheless, further research is needed in order to promote non-custodial sanctions.

D. Criminal justice resources

60. The very large differences in what might be called the output variables of criminal justice (recorded crime, people in prison etc.) have been noted at some length. Input variables, such as the number of police officers per head of population, are becoming a major concern in criminal justice planning. Many variables can influence the number of police appointed in a society, such as the degree of urbanization and the specification of the duties of the police in relation to tasks such as traffic control and public service. The data may also be subject to differences in the classification of a person as a police officer. Areas of difficulty include the following:

- (a) The use of part-time or reserve police officers;
- (b) The inclusion or exclusion of those who police special facilities, such as frontier posts, transport systems or nuclear facilities;
- (c) The degree of overlap of function between the police and the army and the division of police forces according to the Ministry that oversees their work;
- (d) Recourse to private security policing.

61. With those reservations, it can be said that a comparison of 1975 and 1980 shows that police strength has gone up in 18 countries and down in 11. The relationship of police strength to the number of recorded crimes is relevant to the question whether recruiting more police officers increases the

apparent crime rate by augmenting the proportion of total crimes committed and recorded. Statistical analysis reveals a positive relationship between levels of police personnel and the level of assaults for both 1975 and 1980.* The general level of association with other individual crime types is insignificant and often negative. This may be because there really is no relationship between the level of policing and the level of crime, or it could be that there are relationships but that the data are not adequate to expose them. The positive relationship between assault and police personnel may justify further research, since opinion surveys show that people most fear crimes against the person and think there should be more police to guard against such crimes. Other studies have suggested that in countries with a high overall level of violence (political violence and unrest in addition to traditional violent crime), there are likely to be more police personnel. 12/

62. A comparison of data for criminal justice personnel between the First and Second Surveys was made.** An important finding in the First Survey was that, while developing countries had a somewhat higher rate of police officers per 100,000 head of population than did developed countries, there was no correlation between gross domestic product per capita and the level of police personnel. However, it was observed in the First Survey that the proportion of criminal justice personnel represented by police was significantly higher for developing countries, and that developing countries also had fewer judges. That difference is more apparent in the Second Survey, as reflected in figure XVII (annex II). These graphs show that police comprise 94 per cent of the criminal justice personnel in developing countries, against 77 per cent in developed countries, and that there are proportionally fewer judges and prison officers in developing countries.***

63. Perhaps the most striking finding concerns the comparative rate of increase in the number of police. It may be seen in figure XVIII (annex II) that the police rate has increased from 394 per 100,000 in developing countries in 1970 to a remarkable 913 in 1980. The amount of increase for developed countries was only from 302 to 413.

64. In the report on the First Survey it was suggested that one reason for this difference in allocation of resources to police personnel could be that developing countries had less qualified or highly trained personnel available to become judges. However, since no more education is required for prison officers than for the police, that hypothesis may need reassessment. An alternative explanation may be that the developing countries have increased

* $r = 0.87$ in 1975 and $r = 0.84$ in 1980, significant at 0.01 level.

**Although data on annual rates of employment of criminal justice personnel were collected for the Second Survey, in the First Survey such data were collected only for the year most recently available. The year reported was predominantly 1974. In order to make a comparison between the First and Second Surveys, the year most recently available in the Second Survey (1979 or 1980) was compared with that of the First. Budgetary expenditure data were not collected in the First Survey.

***It should be noted, however, that data were only available from three developing countries, so that the validity of this analysis is dependent on their being representative.

their police forces in response to the higher levels of violent crime, although statistical analysis did not produce any significant relationships between violent crime rates and police rates.* A significant relationship was found between the rate of increase in gross domestic product per capita and the increase in police forces from the First to the Second Survey.** The relationship between budgetary factors and levels of policing is apparently another potentially valuable topic for research. A limitation on such analyses may be a lack of deflators to offset inflation rates, and, more generally, the difficulties accompanying conversion rates.

65. The resources spent on the police and other criminal justice agencies, as a percentage of all criminal justice spending, are presented comparatively in table III.2, whenever they could be calculated. They constitute the bulk of criminal justice spending (taken as combined spending on police, prosecution, court and prison services in all countries).

Table III.2 Allocation of resources as a percentage of total a/
criminal justice spending in selected countries b/

Country	1975				1980			
	Police	Prose- cution	Courts	Prisons	Police	Prose- cution	Courts	Prisons
Barbados	73	16	6	5	77	6	7	10
Canada	65	2	10	22
Cyprus	90	2	5	4	89	2	6	4
Finland	71	1	5	23
Israel	78	1	7	14	75	2	7	17
Norway	72	0	12	15	71	1	5	23
Sweden	65	0	15	16	64	0	17	17
United Kingdom	60	1	2	37	69	1	3	27
United States	58	7	12	23	54	9	13	24

a/ Police, prosecution, courts and prisons.

b/ The relationship between police strength and criminal justice personnel over time is a close one (average $R = 0.70$), with both variables increasing.

*Pearson's "r" was computed using crime rates as independent variables and criminal justice personnel as dependent variables. The police rate was not related to the crime rates. However, it was necessary to conduct this analysis using the total sample, since the "n" was too small to conduct it for the developing countries separately. Some strong relationships were found for judges and crime rates (their level was significantly related with all types of crime, except homicide). The same results were found in the relationship between levels of prison officers, and these relationships were strongly significant statistically.

**This correlation was significant at the 0.06 level ($r = 0.44$).

66. The resources spent on prosecution make up only a very small proportion of criminal justice expenditure.* The resources spent on court services, as a percentage of all criminal justice expenditure, represent, on average, around 10 per cent of the total criminal justice expenditure.** Finally, the resources spent on prisons, as a percentage of all criminal justice spending, represent, on average, around 20 per cent of the total expenditure.***

*The relationship between total number of prosecutors and prosecution spending over time is a close one (average $R = 0.63$), with both increasing.

**The relationship between total number of professional judges and court spending over time is a close one (average $R = 0.63$), with both increasing.

***The relationship between total prison staff and prison spending over time is a close one (average $R = 0.71$), with both increasing.

IV. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES: RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND FUNCTIONS OF STAFF

A. Police

67. The police are seen as a multi-purpose social service in most countries, but to differing extents: the amount of police time devoted to investigative work was reported to be as low as 6 per cent and as high as 80 per cent. The average proportion of time thus spent for that type of police work in developing countries was nearly 40 per cent and in developed countries 18 per cent. It was not possible to provide a quantitative estimate of other components of police working time from the data available; but special functions, varying from the protection of hotels and tourists to the assumption of leading roles in local campaigns against alcohol abuse, were specifically mentioned.

68. As regards policing, interesting differences emerged between (the majority of) developed and developing countries; in developing countries, the problems encountered by the police seemed to be primarily internal. The shortage of resources, both of skilled personnel and technologically advanced equipment, was stressed. In developed countries, the emphasis was much more on external problems, particularly new forms of criminality that in many cases seemed to accompany technological development, such as improved communications and rapid means of achieving the illegal transfer of funds. In 8 of the 13 developed countries that responded to the question on the carrying of firearms while on duty, it was the standard practice to carry arms, whereas in only 6 of the 15 developing countries providing this information were arms routinely carried. Further research would be needed to establish whether a particular practice occurs as a reaction to a particular crime situation, or whether it is a tradition of policing.

69. Of the questionnaires returned, 40 countries gave information about the recruitment criteria of the police forces. All except one of the countries replying to the question on recruitment criteria for the police reported a minimum age requirement. Two countries had a minimum age of 16, while the most common minimum age was 18, and in a few countries it was as high as 21. In two countries the minimum age depended on the grade and in one on sex. Thirty of the countries responding to the question also had a maximum age for people recruited to be police officers varying between 22 and 40, but in most cases it was between 25 and 30. In some countries the maximum age varied depending on the grade of the post, type of duty, or sex, with a lower maximum for women, and higher for ex-servicemen.

70. All except five countries reported some sort of fitness requirements. Many required a minimum height for applicants, which usually was different for men and women. Three countries also had a minimum weight. Other requirements for recruitment included an exam in 19 countries, with a medical-physical test in 11, and a psychological test in five. Two countries required an IQ test. Further reported criteria included citizenship, single marital status, no criminal convictions, military service completed, good vision, "no glasses, no colour-blindness, driving-licence, and ability to swim", and "loyalty to State and socialist system".

71. Educational requirements varied widely. Three countries required only primary or grade school. Several specified 8 or 10 years of school; the most common requirement was the completion of secondary or high school. In many

countries educational requirements varied with the grade. For example, in one country the second level of primary school was sufficient for middle-grade officers, while university education was required for higher-grade officers. Another country required elementary education for ordinary police, middle school for sergeants, and secondary school for higher officers. In one country only an elementary education was required for constables, while a superintendent needed to have a law degree.

72. Forty countries also responded to the questions concerning the training of police forces, the basic syllabus including law, the use of firearms, social service, responsibilities of civil servants, and management, and left room for each country to include other topics or specify which of the topics were not included.

73. Other common topics included were physical training or drill (in 10 countries), criminal investigation (nine countries), first aid and life saving (eight), self-defence and traffic control (five each), police-community relations (four), criminology, typewriting, crowd control, language, ethics, family crises (three each), police administration, court presentation and procedures, patrolling, and police regulations (two each). Other topics mentioned were criminal psychology, human rights, minorities and race relations, constitutional safeguards, alcohol and drugs, rape investigation, anti-riot operations, civil defence, surveillance, peace preservation, police affairs, intelligence, tourism, statistics, scientific police work, telecommunications, the role of the military, fire service, practical exercises, good manners and courtesy, leadership, discipline, humanistic culture, civic institutions, general culture, politics, sociology, social sciences, mathematics, geometry and natural sciences.

74. The initial training period varied anywhere from a minimum of "12 to 33 weeks", in one country, to a maximum of "three years for senior officers", in another (for junior officers the required training in the same country, however, was only two years, and for rank and file, eight months).

75. Thirty-four countries responded in regard to the duties of the police forces. The amount of time spent by police on criminal investigation varied from 0 to 75 per cent, with half of the responses between 10 and 35 per cent. Many of the countries which stated that their police forces spent a small percentage of their time on criminal investigation had an organizationally separate unit of investigative police. That was also true for a number of countries that did not specify a percentage breakdown of police time. There was no difference, however, in the amount of time spent on criminal investigation by police as a result of whether or not the prosecutor investigated or assisted with the investigation. One country gave separate statistics for the police at the federal and local levels, with the federal police spending 90 per cent of their time on criminal investigation and the local one, 40 per cent. Another country gave a separate figure for cities, where the police spent 9 per cent more time on criminal investigation than for the country as a whole.

76. In addition to investigation, the duties of the police forces most frequently listed were traffic control, administration or office duty, patrolling, training and crime prevention. Other duties included airport security, frontier control, national security, coastguard operations, protection of property and persons, guarding public buildings, VIP security, escorting payroll, security of ports and railways, and crime prevention by monitoring movement into

and out of the country. Other functions included public order duties, such as the defence of public order, public safety, maintenance of law and order, crowd control and anti-riot operations; control duties, such as compliance with law and regulations, building control, trade inspection and market inspection; and border duties such as those relating to immigration, passports, customs and tariffs.

B. Prosecutors

77. The questions about prosecutors were answered at least in part by 58 countries. Fifty-six countries gave some information about the role of the prosecutor, 54 about the selection and 39 about training.

78. In 11 of the countries that referred to the question of prosecutorial involvement in investigation, the prosecutor's office had a formal responsibility to be involved in, supervise or conduct an investigation supplementary to that of the police. In the remainder no such formal role was reported. One country reported a distinction between urban and rural roles: in rural areas, the police and prosecutors to some extent exchanged, or shared, roles. In large cities, that did not occur.

79. The selection criteria for prosecutors varied greatly from country to country, but even more depending on whether the prosecutors were police prosecutors or other. Of the 54 countries responding, 31 required a law degree for all prosecutors. Six countries did not require a law degree for any prosecutors, and in 13 countries the requirement for this degree depended on whether or not police prosecutors were concerned. Five countries did not specify whether a law degree was required for prosecutors.

80. For police prosecutors, that is, prosecutors recruited from the police, responses given on eligibility requirements included the experience of criminal investigation; an objective, impartial sense of justice; knowledge of criminal law, evidence, and procedure; and command of language. A minimum length of service in the police force (up to 10 years in one country) might be stipulated. Courses or examinations on law or procedure were required in some countries. Among the highest educational requirements were those of one country that required police prosecutors to have university degrees and another in which only district police chiefs with law degrees could act as prosecutors. In contrast, in one country all senior police officers were public prosecutors.

81. The majority of countries required that prosecutors have law degrees. Three countries did not mention any additional requirements. In other countries, further requirements included bar and other examinations, courses, experience and interviews, either alone or in combination. The length of experience required varied widely, often depending on the level of the post applied for; it could be as long as 15 years. Specific prosecution courses included five-year courses and written and oral examinations; a two-year course and a dissertation followed by a final examination at the College of Magistrates; a two-year course as law apprentice; and participation in a national prosecutors' seminar. Citizenship of the country concerned and good character were specifically mentioned by some countries. Some mentioned age limits, with minima of 24 or 25 and maxima of 35 or 45, no criminal record and language skills.

82. Besides police officers and holders of law degrees, others eligible to become prosecutors included civil service employees; civil service recruits

who had passed the relevant examination of the Law Society of the country; and persons who had passed the Court Organization examination. Several countries cited rural-urban differences; for example, a minimum of a bachelor's degree in law or social science was required in cities, while in rural areas the ability to read and write and some knowledge of the law was sufficient. Exceptionally, it was reported that "in some remote regions police act as prosecutors", while in far-away provinces non-legally-trained personnel were employed to prosecute minor offences.

83. On the training of prosecutors it was sometimes difficult to differentiate whether the information given referred to initial training or continuing training. The responses describing initial training included the following: "initial course conducted by the Crown Office"; "theory and practical courses"; "attend Judges School"; for police prosecutors, training at the academy; three-day sergeant's management course and two-week prosecutor's course; six-week prosecuting officers course; eight- to nine-week theoretical course; four-month training course with training in physical and mental endurance as well as law; and 10 months of criminology and criminal justice followed by 10 months of supervised practice assisting senior prosecutors, then a six-month period of supervised practice, and additional compulsory courses during the first five years. In one country, training varied with the jurisdiction and required a two-week trial advocacy course and a nine-week introductory course; in another, training was not organized; and in yet another, it was still in the planning stage.

84. The majority of countries gave descriptions of their continuing training programmes, though six responded that they had none. In addition to training, the programmes described various research opportunities provided for prosecutors. For example, in one country there were two different courses for prosecutors: the purpose of the 20-day general training course for public prosecutors with about three years of service after appointment was to "give them advanced cultural education and, at the same time, to provide them with the primary techniques as well as the knowledge relevant to the prosecutorial work ranging from investigation process to institution of prosecution"; and the primary training course given to all assistant prosecutors immediately after their appointment was "designed to provide them with the primary techniques as well as the knowledge necessary for the performance of their duties as assistant prosecutors". This was achieved through "appropriate lectures and workshops given by practitioners, experienced scholars and instructors, as well as the field visits to, and technical training at, district public prosecutors' offices".

85. Concerning the duties of prosecutors, in those countries where prosecutors investigate criminal cases, the responding countries were asked to specify approximately what proportion of prosecutors' time is allocated to investigation as distinct from court work. In 30 countries prosecutors made no investigations, while in 13 they both investigated and prosecuted. When specified, the amount of time spent on investigation varied from 10 per cent to a maximum of 70.4 per cent in the capital of one country. Comments referring to investigation and the role of prosecutors in investigation included the following: "may control through advisory role"; "coordinate, control and supervise investigations of the criminal police"; "has control of investigation proceedings, police are under him"; "supervise investigation undertaken by militia"; "can instigate investigation"; "may suggest to investigating judge"; "magistrates investigate"; "investigation responsibility of police"; "judicial police investigates"; "magistrates investigate up to one year, then

to the investigating judge"; and "investigation instigated by judges, prosecutors or private citizens, in most cases done only by police". In one country the prosecutor conducted the preliminary inquiry for crimes punishable with less than three years imprisonment, but the police could also conduct summary proceedings; while if the crime was punishable with more than three years imprisonment, the case would be brought before a court of inquiry that would conduct an investigation.

1. Opportunity versus legality principle

86. The "legality principle" (every case where there is sufficient evidence to prosecute is prosecuted) applied in 15 responding countries in all cases, the "opportunity principle" (cases prosecuted at the prosecutor's discretion) in eight countries. Thirteen countries used the legality principle as the guiding rule in most cases. However, they made a number of important exceptions, including: juvenile offences; petty offences and complainant offences; cases such as adultery, where prosecution is instituted at the request of the aggrieved party; "private" offences which are prosecuted at the request of the victim; simple offences where an amicable settlement is possible; cases of rape, thefts from close relatives, insults and slander, which are prosecuted at the discretion of the victim; and "a small number of other cases where the opportunity principle is applied". In one country the legality principle was used at the local and state levels, while at the federal level the seriousness of the case, impact on justice, resources available, sufficiency of evidence, and availability of alternative prosecution were taken into consideration. In another country, circumstantial factors such as age, culpability and seriousness of the offence had to be evaluated. Still another country noted the importance of taking the public interest into account.

C. Judiciary

1. Full-time judges

87. Forty-three countries answered the questions about judges. All except two described the criteria needed to qualify for the professional judiciary as judges or magistrates. In only one was a law degree not required, and in that case a final diploma from the National School of Administration or four years' experience as a clerk of a court was acceptable.

88. In addition to a law degree, various other criteria were mentioned. These most frequently included a number of years of experience; when a range was given, the exact number of years depended on the level of the appointment.*

89. A few countries mentioned just examinations, competitive, written and oral, except in some cases where the applicant has seven or more years'

*Reported experience ranged from 1 to 15 years, for instance: three years at the bar for a magistrate; three years for a magistrate and 15 years for judges (three years as barrister-at-law); five to seven years for advocates of the High Court; for the Supreme Court five years as a judge or 10 years as a lawyer; six or seven years for magistrates and 10 years for judges; 10 years for federal judges; 10 years except for the High Court, for which 12 years are needed; usually some experience, with variations among cantons.

experience. Other countries required experience and examinations: oral and written examinations and two years as a clerk of the court; two years' experience as barrister-at-law and a competitive examination; 10 years' experience and an entrance examination; and prior to appointment to the Supreme Court, 10 years' practice and a competitive examination. Several countries required training, in addition to a variety of other requirements, though sometimes there seemed to be little difference between the "training" and experience.*

90. Additional comments on eligibility in various countries were that the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court must have graduated with a first-class degree; that juvenile judges must pass a psychological test or have attended a special course; that magistrates might be non-lawyers; and that all promotions were from within the judiciary. One country reported that the required law degree must be from a university of the country concerned. Three countries mentioned that the requirements for judges and magistrates were the same as those for prosecutors. Other requirements were membership in the bar association of the country and citizenship; various age limits (minimum ages from 25 to 40); actual residence in the community; no conviction for any offence; and completed military service. Subjective requirements were "adequate character", "appropriate attitude and character", "good moral character" and "active revolutionary integration".

91. Some countries reported that members of the judiciary were appointed by the President; and that appellate judges could be appointed by the legislature or by the executive in certain circumstances. In one country the judiciary are elected by a popular assembly.

92. Thirty-three countries answered the questions about continuing training for the judiciary. Three countries reported that they had no continuing training, one that it had none yet, and another that such training was not organized. In those countries that had training, a variety of courses were mentioned.**

*One year of training in a judicial office, then competitive written examinations, followed by oral examinations; competitive examinations and training at the National Institute of Law; two years of apprenticeship and an examination; two and a half years as law clerk, one year as a trainee legal assistant, and four to six years of assistant judgeship; two and a half years of preparatory service in the judiciary, and in order to become a judge for life, three years of experience; three years of practical training plus three years of experience to become minor criminal courts magistrate or seven years of experience to become senior criminal courts magistrate, or for labour courts or civil courts; after passing national bar examination, two years of training, final examination, and 10 years of experience as assistant judge before being appointed full judge; initial training seminar, five years of experience for municipal judges, 10 years of experience for regional trial and appellate courts; competition for admission to College of Magistrates, two-year course plus dissertation, final examination, and apprenticeship.

**For instance, five-day residential courses for circuit judges and recorders, and one-day sentencing course; during the period from 1975 to 1980, 75 per cent of professional judges and magistrates attended one- to three-day courses; three one-week courses are offered; continuing education courses; theoretical and practical courses having a duration of six months to one year are offered.

93. Several countries mentioned the possibility of going abroad to study. Training in various countries included on-the-job training.*

94. Other responses on the kinds of continuing training offered for judges were: seminars and conferences; periodic seminars and meetings; seminars by the Law Association of the country; seminars and courses offered by national and provincial associations of judges; conferences and seminars for judges, regular meetings of all district judges convened by the President of the District Court, meetings of all judges called by the Chief Justice; Commonwealth conferences for judges; annual seminars and symposia on specific issues; seminars to discuss new developments in law; one- to three-day seminars on sentencing, legal procedure, torts and tax crime.**

95. Several countries also mentioned course requirements, for example: judges must attend courses in sentencing; juvenile court panel members must attend a course of training within one year of appointment and an introductory course within the first two years of service. Other responses concerning training that referred to initial rather than continuing training involved training only before entry.***

96. Finally, and to sum up, the main factor on which a significant distinction between countries with respect to the judiciary emerged was a difference with regard to recruitment criteria and subsequent career structure. In one group of countries, membership in the judiciary was a career in itself. The judges were recruited during their legal training or shortly thereafter, and after undergoing various types of in-service training and passing examinations, commenced their judicial career at a relatively young age. With the

*One country reported, for example, "both practical and theoretical training, mostly optional, but there is a growing regard for training"; 48 training sessions a year attended by approximately 40 judges and prosecutors; systematic training consisting of guided self-training, courses and conferences, post-graduate studies and seminars to acquire scientific degrees; and "summary court judges are given intensive training from time to time".

**Other comments regarding continuing training were: magistrates are awarded scholarships by national Government for training; the central training division of the Government may recruit magistrates to attend training courses; the executive and judiciary are both concerned with the training of justices; in-service training; an independent foundation is primarily concerned with the training of the judiciary; the Legal Training and Research Institute of the Supreme Court is in charge of training for judges; training at the Development Academy of the country; in addition to training provided by local, state and federal jurisdictions, the National Judicial College provides pre- and in-service training; the Institute for Court Management provides training in court administration, various universities provide pre- and in-service training.

***For instance, assistant judges are given one week of basic training and five years of on-the-job training; during time spent as legal assistant, three years of training including courses and visits to other countries for comparative study; beginning judges observe court proceedings initially; and a one-year training programme, with theory and practice, conducted by the Office of Judicial Affairs.

passage of time, additional experience and further testing, they were promoted to more senior courts. In another group of countries, the judiciary were appointed only from among experienced practising lawyers, who had already established their standing within their profession. Therefore, the age level of recruitment was much higher, there was much less emphasis on training or formal examination, and there was a much less clear-cut and formal promotion structure.

97. The method of appointment and selection varied considerably across countries. In some countries, the Head of State made a personal appointment, at least to the senior posts. In other countries, the cabinet was the formal appointing body. The existing judiciary might have a formal or informal role in making recommendations in this respect. The Minister of Justice or Chief Justice might also have the formal responsibility for making appointments, usually assisted by a specific recommendatory body including members of the judiciary. In three of the countries that replied, judges were elected by a representative body of the people; several more countries indicated that a similar selection procedure prevailed with respect to the lay judiciary, which will now be further considered.

2. Part-time magistrates

98. Twenty-one countries answered the questions about the recruitment and selection of lay judges and magistrates for the non-professional judiciary. Three countries had none. Those countries that did have a non-professional judiciary reported a variety of selection procedures.*

99. A few countries mentioned requirements for lay judges. For example, members of the judiciary and criminal justice system were not eligible; lay judges could serve only in specific chambers of trial court; and they must work with professional judges. Lay magistrates should pass courses on the following subjects: evidence, procedure (civil and criminal), and principles of national law and language, as well as local law and language. Lay judges in juvenile courts must be at least 30 years old, have a child, or have cared for a child or worked for a children's service for two years.**

*These included selection of magistrates by the governor or of lay judges and magistrates by national councils. Lay judges were also appointed by royal decree for a period of three months; juvenile court had two lay judges (one must be a woman) appointed by the chancellor; justices of the peace were appointed by professional judges; justices of the peace were appointed after nomination by a member of parliament or elected by popular assembly; and lay judges in district courts were elected by municipal assemblies and in courts of appeal by country assemblies.

**Other requirements were a minimum age of 40, age between 25 and 70, citizenship (in two countries), high moral standards, good moral character and adequate education (for the justice of the peace), and actual residence in the commune. One country gave details on the education of their lay judiciary: in the Superior Court 21 out of 74 had a university or technical education, and 27 a secondary education. In the other courts, out of 4,243, 13 had less than a sixth-grade education, 973 had a sixth-grade education, 1,860 a secondary education, 782 a pre-university education, and the rest attended a university or technical institution.

D. Correctional personnel

1. Recruitment

100. The replies on prison systems, primarily as regards the training of staff, suggested that the staffing of prisons was seen more in terms of a two-level operation, in contrast to the multi-level staffing of the police. It was, however, possible to see that in many countries the entrance criteria for custodial staff were identical, or very close to those of basic-grade police officers. There seemed to be a distinction in most of the countries between custodial and management staff, which required either direct entry to the management level or an extensive training period to make the transition. Five countries specified that physical criteria applied in the case of management staff, as they did generally for custodial staff. In at least one country, such criteria were stated to be the result of a policy that all management staff had to undertake custodial duties on first recruitment.

101. Fifty-three countries responded to the questions regarding the recruitment criteria for custodial prison staff. With regard to age requirements, 34 countries accepted eligible candidates within certain age brackets, 12 had only a minimum age and two had only a maximum. The most common minimum ages were 21 (in 15 countries) and 18 (in 14 countries); other minimum ages ranged from 18 to 25. The most frequent responses for maximum age were 35 (in 13 countries) and 30 (in five countries); other maximum ages ranged from 21 to 50. One country, which generally had a maximum age of 30, allowed former service personnel up to the age of 35; two countries had different age ranges for men and women, and in two the age depended on the grades.

102. Other criteria for custodial prison staff included an examination (in 33 countries), a fitness requirement (in 31 countries), an interview (in 18), a medical test (in 11), a psychological test and good vision (in seven), a physical test (in three), a personality test and an IQ test (in two each), and an academic and a language requirement (in one). Twenty-six countries also had a minimum height; in 10 of these there were different requirements for men and women. Three countries had minimum weight requirements; two of these differentiated between men and women.

103. Minimum education requirements varied from completion of primary school to a number of years of secondary school, to university education for management in certain countries. A number of countries mentioned different educational requirements depending on the position.* There were also a variety of

*For wardens at least a seventh-grade education or its equivalent, and for prison staff three years of secondary school; guards must have two or more years of high school, while management must be university graduates; guards must have a rudimentary professional school education; ordinary level for custodial staff and secondary level for management; basic education for subordinate staff, full secondary education for senior staff, and certificate of business studies for management; a degree (Bachillerato Superior) from the Prison Studies School (for management that included courses in administration and accounting); prison school for custodial staff and university education for management; at least an elementary education, and for management a degree in law or a secondary education; lowest-ranking staff must have graduated from

other requirements, the most common being good character (in six countries) and no criminal record (in five). Five countries mentioned citizenship, and four completion of military service.*

104. Forty-five reported that the basic training syllabus included management, minimum health standards, social sciences, reference to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, use of firearms, physical security and control, and responsibilities of civil servants. In one country, the Standard Minimum Rules were soon to be incorporated into the training syllabus.

105. In the area of safety and control, subjects mentioned were self-defence and first aid, fire prevention, fire-fighting, judo, kendo, dog handling, use of chemical agents, use of gas, surveillance, internal guard duty, maintenance of order, prison rules, regulations and laws, disciplinary procedure, military discipline, emergency training, and riot drill and control.

106. Academic subjects included in the various training syllabuses were criminology, criminal law, penal science (penology), criminal procedure, the legal system of the country, general principles of law, and correction law. Other topics included counselling and guidance, rehabilitative modalities, knowledge of prisoner treatment, psychiatry, psychology, and group psychology.

107. General administrative topics included accounting services, finance, and prison administration. For better communication among staff and between staff and inmates, also mentioned were verbal and written expression, "How to be a peace officer", etiquette, courtesy, personnel relations, and human relations. Other assorted topics included "study tours", general knowledge, civics, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, fingerprinting, conducting searches, court procedure, grievance procedure, indoor custody, probation, and protection of dignitaries. In one country there was "no training of any kind".

(continued) a junior high school or the equivalent, while lowest-ranking officers must have a university degree; intermediate and secondary education for management, as well as military training; middle grade must have completed intermediate school or the second level of primary school or vocational training, the higher middle grade must be qualified for the university or a technical school, and the high grade of administrative service must have passed the second examination of university studies; and finally, for management a Bachelor of Arts in law and training at the National School of Prison Administration were required.

*Other comments were: "custodial staff are uniformed police"; "selected by Public Service Commission"; and "committee of prisons political appointment". Concerning promotion to and recruitment of management, the responses given were: management promoted (in nine countries); promotion and direct recruitment of management (in three); 75 per cent of management promoted and 25 per cent recruited; management promoted or direct recruitment of those with a Masters of Science in Criminology; promotion by examination; administration recruited by direct professional examination; and management appointed.

108. The period of initial training for custodial prison staff varied in length from two weeks to several years.* Concerning continuing training, the survey specifically asked about the minimum amount of in-service training required within a five-year period.** In one country, the initial training period of two weeks for all staff was followed by three additional months of training for middle school graduates, or five months for those with rudimentary professional training. Supplementary specialist training of one month was also available, as well as a specialist middle school which could be attended while continuing work, and four hours monthly in-service training during 10 months of the year.

109. Five countries had no requirements for continuing training, and one said that it had no in-service training. Further comments were that training centres were all over the country concerned, that training was done abroad as well, and that the Correctional Association of the country had developed training standards.

E. Non-custodial personnel

110. Fifty countries responded to the questions on the recruitment criteria for non-custodial staff. For age requirements, 16 countries gave a range, 11 countries a minimum age only, and three a maximum age only. Four countries said that they had no age requirements; two said that it depended on the role; and one said that individual prisons decided the criteria. Thirteen countries

*The responses given by various countries were two weeks; an average minimum of four weeks though it varies; one month; one to three months; one month plus three months probation; courses spread over several weeks; five weeks; six weeks (in three countries); seven weeks in-service; eight weeks; two months; two months or 45 days; nine weeks residential training; 12 weeks (in two countries); two to three months plus four weeks residential training; three months (in five countries); two weeks plus 12 weeks within first 24 months; 16 weeks; eight weeks at l'Ecole nationale d'administration pénitencière plus two months of practical experience; four months; four months at Police Training School; 20 weeks; 108 days; five months; six months (in three countries); six to nine months; 20 days of orientation plus eight months of training; nine months (in two countries); 9 to 12 months; average of one to two years though it varies; one year, plus one year of probation; two years; three years and senior staff are trained at National Penitentiary College for three years (while subordinate staff attend the College for Subordinate Staff for six months if they are women or nine months if they are men).

**Responses were: up to five weeks; one week; one week for men; two weeks; two weeks plus three days; four weeks; 45 days; average of two months; 13 weeks; three months; and 19 weeks. Other responses on continuing training were: two hours a month (but not required); five days a year; two-week refresher courses; 21-day refresher courses; 5 per cent of working time spent in training; three to six months of training each year; one to three months of promotion and refresher courses; induction training development courses after one to four years; after two years, a two-week development course; continuous training; seven-year career development programme, only for promotion to the grade of chief.

did not answer the question. The most common minimum age, stated by 16 countries, was 18.* Other requirements were fitness (in 22 countries), an examination (in 18), an interview (in 11), a required height (in five countries, one differentiating between males and females), a required weight (in one country with separate requirements for males and females), and psychological, clerical, medical, physical, personality and IQ tests, all in one country each.

111. Other requirements were good character (in two countries), a clear record, three references, citizenship, completed military service, and, for support staff, ability to type. In one country, prison staff were recruited from the ordinary police, in another, they were recruited by the Police Training School, and in a third the positions were advertised.

112. Educational requirements for non-custodial personnel were very diversified. In some countries only advanced elementary education was required, in others, completed and certified primary education. In still other countries, secondary education was required.** The length of the initial training period for non-custodial staff varied from a minimum of one week in two countries to a maximum of three years for nurses in one country (in the same country vocational instructors had two weeks of training and welfare officers three months).*** Two countries responded that they had no training, and one each

*Five countries had a minimum age of 21, two of 19, and one each of 15, 16, 17 and 20. In one country the minimum age for females was 18, while for males it was only 16. The most frequently occurring maximum age, in eight countries, was 35. Five countries had a maximum age of 40, while the other responses were 25, 26, 32, 34, 35 to 40, and 45. Comments on the age requirement were that the limit does not apply to leading posts, and that the range given does not apply for specialists.

**More specific requirements were: 10 years of education (in two countries); junior-high-school education for clerks, certificate of secondary education for management; secondary or vocational school education; lower secondary education for clerks, higher secondary education for senior clerks; school grade 14 in most areas; local higher leaving certificate; general certificate of education; two subjects passed for clerical assistants, five subjects for clerical officers; senior high school or equivalent, depending on role; completion of secondary studies (in three countries); secondary school or university level, according to job; ordinary degree for administrative section, university degree for higher grades; university education, according to function; completed secondary education for executive functions, university education for management; certificate of primary education, diplomas for technical officers, school leaving certificate for division heads, university degree for management; certificate in social work; studies in social services and psychology; university degree in social work; and five years and approved certificate for technical staff, regular medical personnel and ministers with recognized licence for specialists.

***The most frequently mentioned period was three months (in four countries). Two countries said they had two years of probation. Other responses given were: two weeks of training; two-week orientation course; one-month training for various specialists such as psychologists; six weeks of training;

continued

that they had no set training, that training was in-service according to the job, and that they had orientation courses.

113. Responses to the questions on in-service training included 5 per cent of time spent in training, one week in-service for each officer, a one-week refresher course after three months, two weeks in five years, two periods of in-service training every five years, a 15- to 30-day refresher course in five years, two periods of training averaging two months, 13 in-service training courses, and three to six months of training a year. Further comments were that when there were professional courses, staff were released with pay to further their education; that there were specialist and improvement courses; that there were study days; and that the majority of staff were interested in continuing their education.

F. Volunteers

114. In contrast to the cautious attitude towards non-official agencies entrusted with the adjudication of criminal cases, a large number of countries were making use of volunteers to assist in correctional work, indicated as the main form of community participation in the criminal justice system. Volunteers were involved in correctional activities in almost all countries, with only a very few countries explicitly reporting that volunteers were not at all involved in correctional work. Also, certain countries not currently employing volunteers in correctional work had plans to make use of community assistance in the future. Countries were asked to indicate the prevailing types of volunteer participation in institutional and non-institutional correctional work. From the replies, it was clear that volunteers participated both in institutional and non-institutional correctional work, and that non-institutional activities consisted mainly in the provision of guidance and assistance to offenders on probation or parole.

115. There were no clear regional differences. The types of activity reported as being carried out by the volunteers included: visits to prisoners; talks with prisoners to provide comfort and support; support for alcoholics and drug addicts; participation in organizing cultural and educational activities (including vocational training); counselling on the legal rights of prisoners; assistance in finding jobs and housing after release; religious guidance; assistance to the prisoner's family; investigation of the petitions of inmates to the prison administration; and after-care services.

116. In certain cases, volunteer organizations, in addition to providing support for inmates and released offenders, lent assistance to the official

(continued) nine-week introduction; two months at Prison Studies School; orientation course and two-month trial period; 12 weeks of training for trades staff, four-week induction for treatment staff; 12-week orientation plus placement for four weeks; three months; three months for educators, six months for management; three months for clerk, six months for senior clerk, as well as on-the-job training depending on the role, for example, three-week residential training for administration; four months; six months; six months on-the-job training; nine months; 9 to 12 months; training for one year at the National Police Training School plus one year of probation; and two years of training for assistant governors and education officers, with no training for other non-custodial staff.

agencies of the criminal justice system. The titles of the bodies, for example, the Social Penitentiary Council or the Industrial School Visiting Committee, might differ, but their functions were similar. They might play a consulting role in meeting with the prison administrative staff, or make recommendations to competent agencies as to employment, education and recreation possibilities for inmates. Volunteers were also reported as assisting the courts in passing appropriate sentences.

117. Most correctional activities carried out by community volunteers took place within some kind of larger organization. In contrast, the work of volunteer probation officers took place primarily on an individual basis. Besides volunteer agencies set up specifically to pursue correctional activities, a number of charitable and religious organizations and other self-help groups, such as Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous, provided help for inmates, released offenders and their families.

V. CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES

118. An overview of crime prevention strategies is presented in this section. Unlike the quantitative information, the narrative information provided on crime prevention strategies shows that, in spite of their rather specific formulation, the questions have not always been interpreted in the same way. In addition, diverse organizational settings and a variety of approaches to crime prevention particularly influenced the replies, which thus required selection and evaluation.

119. Of the questionnaires returned at the time of the review, 32 contained information on crime prevention strategies; the remaining countries did not respond to these questions. This seems to indicate that in many countries systematic collection of data on crime prevention is not yet standard practice, or that there may be no agency responsible for a general monitoring of crime prevention and control policies. It may also be surmised that, in some cases, the agency completing the statistical section of the questionnaire was not responsible for collecting information on crime prevention issues and so returned the whole questionnaire without contacting the other agencies concerned.

120. Although the questionnaire did not use the phrases "indirect" and "direct" strategies, the formulation and arrangement of the items indicate such a distinction. Indirect preventive strategies, such as providing job opportunities or upgrading communities through subsidies, have as their primary aim the improvement of the quality of life in general. The question whether they did or did not have some crime prevention effect for previous and potential offenders or the community could be secondary. In other words, these activities could be perceived by administrators as having a potential effect on the prevention of criminality, because of the belief that they would have an influence on the "causes" of crime*.

121. Publicity campaigns and attempts to reduce opportunities for crime by identifying and changing environmental circumstances that facilitate criminal activity seemed to be the most favoured direct strategy. When such strategies were reported, the issue of the roots of crime was not raised, as if to say that crime was to be considered an inevitable part of social life, but one that should be kept at a tolerable level. The replies suggested also that, overall, such direct strategies were more frequently noticed than indirect ones. This pattern of replies may be interpreted as showing that the respondents were more aware of the relevance of situational crime prevention, but also that partly because of the absence of an unequivocal identification of the "causes" of crime, there was no clear agreement on the appropriate way to react to crime.

*Some preventive activities, however, may have the characteristics of both types of strategy, so that it is not easy to classify them. For instance, providing opportunities for constructive leisure-time activities might also reduce crimes committed out of boredom or those crimes perceived as "fun" by young people. Such strategies are, therefore, both direct and indirect. See also M. Findlay and U. Zvekic, eds., Analysing (In)formal Mechanisms of Crime Control, a Cross-cultural Perspective (Rome, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1988).

122. Such direct strategies might also facilitate the more specific mobilization of community resources against crime, whereas the indirect measures, by virtue of their broader scope, traditionally fall within the competence of national bodies. With direct measures, responsibility could be allocated to a centre coordinating crime prevention activities; with indirect strategies, responsibility was divided between legislative, law enforcement, education and social welfare agencies, making a coordinated, centrally controlled approach to crime prevention difficult.

A. Indirect strategies

1. Improving the quality of life

123. With respect to indirect crime prevention strategies, 25 countries reported that they included measures for improving the quality of life. Measures providing for adequate housing, food, education, employment, pensions and social security, and aimed at guaranteeing decent living conditions for the whole population, were reported from most countries. It was added, however, that crime prevention was not the primary consideration underlying those measures. Some countries may have omitted to report such indirect measures because they were not the responsibility of the crime prevention agency that completed the questionnaire.

124. Some countries interpreted "improving the quality of life" to mean measures aimed at potentially delinquent youths; others, as a question of improving the conditions of imprisonment. Countries facing the problem of ensuring basic conditions for human existence interpreted improving the quality of life as the liquidation of slums, or ensuring a permanent food supply for the population.

2. Providing proper education

125. Another indirect strategy for crime prevention consisted of measures to ensure the correct upbringing and education of children. One strategy referred to by some countries was the placement of children at risk under the care of local social welfare authorities. "Fostering" was also viewed as an appropriate means of care for children whose development seemed to be at risk, or who had already been in trouble. That was reported by 23 countries, although it was difficult to test the extent to which crime prevention considerations figured in the fostering process.

3. Providing constructive leisure-time activities

126. The majority of the countries reported efforts to provide constructive leisure-time activities for young people as a strategy of crime prevention; this widespread strategy was the third most frequently cited. However, some countries expressed doubts about the need to target groups of delinquent and pre-delinquent juveniles, again pointing to the stigmatizing and damaging psychological effects of such labelling.

127. Ten countries noted the existence of leisure-time programmes specifically aimed at juvenile offenders as well as at ex-offenders. In some countries, juvenile offenders could be compelled by the courts to participate in such programmes as part of court-ordered supervision. Many of those countries reported police involvement in providing and leading leisure-time activities. The specific cultural nature of approaches to crime prevention was frequently reflected in responses to this question.

4. Providing job opportunities

128. Criminal justice personnel seem to be sensitive to the problem of the relationship between unemployment and crime; certainly, measures for improving opportunities for work figured significantly in the reports of crime prevention measures. In many countries, programmes for improving job opportunities were combined with training and education. Those programmes focused on unemployed young people and on disadvantaged youth.

129. Most programmes were not primarily designed to assist ex-convicts or endangered young people, although the majority of those programmes were made available to them. Difficulties arose if job or training programmes involved private employers who did not want them extended or applied to released prisoners. However, ex-offenders sometimes seemed to be in a better position to take advantage of job opportunities than the average unemployed person, since, besides having access to ordinary programmes, ex-prisoners were assisted by specific projects. Almost one third of the countries replying reported special programmes for ex-offenders. The programmes were run partly by the prison administration and partly by associations supporting released offenders. In one country, the prison administration sometimes maintained work camps for released offenders. Only a few countries referred to the possibility of work in prison under the auspices of well-developed prison-employment systems.

130. The differences in the replies to the question on employment could perhaps be attributed to differences in unemployment rates in various countries, although the priorities of social policy makers may have an impact as well. Vocational training was closely linked to job opportunities. A number of countries reported programmes of work-training to ensure maximum job opportunities for convicted offenders.

131. There were wide variations in the interpretation of "vocational training" and "job opportunities". Significant regional differences could be observed. Almost one third of the countries replying reported that vocational training was being used to support the disadvantaged and unemployed, with no direct consideration of crime prevention. A further third interpreted vocational training as training provided for the prison population, for offenders on probation or for ex-prisoners. Some countries expressly stated that vocational training was a part of the formal educational process. With regard to the question of whether specialists were involved in decisions on the creation of job opportunities, different countries referred to different bodies as "specialists". The police, prisoners' aid societies and "committees fighting crime" were cited as expert bodies.

5. Upgrading communities

132. The issue of improved housing has already been mentioned, since a number of countries regarded measures for upgrading communities as part of arrangements for improving the quality of life. Two trends were clear from an analysis of comments concerning this item. In most poorer countries, the upgrading of communities was equivalent to increasing the quantity of housing, aimed at ensuring decent living conditions, without direct consideration of crime prevention. In comparison, some industrialized countries paid more attention to crime prevention. In the attempt to diminish the criminogenic effects of the environment, the need for better control, repairs and community involvement in housing projects were mentioned.

6. Welfare and financial assistance

133. A fairly high proportion of the countries that replied noted that welfare and financial assistance in one way or another was used. The absence of any comment presumably did not mean an absence of welfare and financial assistance, but perhaps only implied that direct crime prevention was not a primary consideration in the provision of various forms of assistance. Welfare and financial assistance was most commonly understood as a general welfare service provided on a needs basis without consideration of crime prevention.

134. Only a minority of countries provided a detailed account of services provided to the families of offenders or to released prisoners. A few specified that assistance (apparently financial support) was provided to the families of inmates. In one country, a certain part of the salary earned by the inmate in prison was used for family support. Possibly many countries offering job opportunities in prison may follow this example, but the question deserves further investigation. Another country reported the use of a "resocialization fund"; the task was to negotiate with creditors and so relieve offenders of part of their debts. The fund also repaid the creditor the unpaid balance of the debt, thus actually granting the offender a loan.

B. Direct strategies

1. Crisis intervention

135. The majority of countries reported crisis intervention as a strategy of crime prevention. Most countries interpreted crisis intervention as special care for adolescents, as had been indicated by the questionnaire, but some countries reported that it was considered as a general social welfare service, accessible to all age groups. The services provided in crisis intervention covered a wide scope, ranging from simple advice over the telephone to accommodation and medical care, detoxification in case of drug abuse, and possible psychotherapeutic treatment. The population of countries reporting only limited crisis intervention services, however, might well enjoy additional services, in case of need, from other institutions such as the social security or the insurance system. Industrialized countries paid particular attention to that strategy. In addition to the existence of financial resources, the disappearance of the primary agents of social control may well be one reason for the growing importance of crisis intervention as a crime prevention strategy.

2. Reduction of opportunity

136. As mentioned earlier, three quarters of the countries replying to the crime prevention part of the questionnaire seemed to attribute great significance to the use of architectural techniques in reducing opportunities for committing crimes. There were no apparent regional differences in the frequency of the use of architectural techniques, but the actual extent to which this strategy is used may vary to a significant degree. Responses accompanied by comments indicated considerable differences between countries. In some countries the use of architectural techniques for crime prevention was restricted to lighting; in others, techniques were used only in a limited context, primarily for government buildings, banks and some industrial plants.

137. A well-developed, organized and permanent system of advisory activities seemed to operate successfully in some countries where the concept of "defensible space" was an integral part of housing and industrial plant design and an important aspect of crime prevention. Guidelines have been prepared for architects and designers on dwelling security, and funds have been granted for improving the physical security of existing structures by the fencing of industrial grounds and the use of controlled entry systems. However, as a counter-example to the trend towards greater physical security, one developed country reported that its architects gave low priority to security in general, and that security was often considered only after the building had been completed.

138. The use of architectural techniques was considered primarily in the sense of the provision of better physical obstructions against theft. However, there were different interpretations of the meaning of providing physical obstructions to crime. Some countries referred to intensified police patrols and more frequent police raids when replying to the question. Others noted that provisions for better physical obstructions to crime concerned banks, businesses and industries only, while some countries explicitly added that such a strategy also included houses and shops.

139. Compared with other types of strategies aimed at reducing opportunity, campaigns for placing individual identifying marks on valuable items seemed to be less widespread. Only half of the respondents referred to their use, the majority of references coming from industrialized countries.

140. Despite efforts to make use of new technology for crime prevention in a number of countries, the traditional method of preventive policing for opportunity reduction was still of primary importance. Nearly all countries gave a positive reply to that question, and there was not a single definitive rejection of preventive policing for opportunity reduction (only four did not comment). The replies from several industrialized countries indicated that a number of them seemed to be returning to more traditional modes of patrolling, such as foot and bicycle patrols instead of car patrol. This trend may have its roots in the recognition of the importance of police visibility and in the realization that traditional forms of patrolling may promote favourable relations with the community. The implication may be that "overmechanizing" police patrolling, rather than preserving traditional forms of police relations with the wider community, could be a counter-productive strategy.

3. Patrolling

141. A considerable number of countries mentioned patrolling involving citizens. Various forms of community patrolling had developed, such as patrolling in "neighbourhood watch" schemes, where the primary task of citizens was to assist the police. The use of private guards as a substitute for police surveillance was mentioned in only one report.

142. A special form of patrolling involved the supervision of public transport. A number of countries noted increased supervision of aircraft and airports to prevent terrorism, and in these countries no specific measures were mentioned to prevent crime on railways, underground railways and buses, or in transport stations. Intensive ordinary police patrolling might already exist, for example, at railway stations considered to be trouble spots in some countries, where railway station guards were trained by the police to supervise public transport. Those full-time and part-time police officers were reported as working with considerable efficiency.

4. Publicity campaigns

143. Almost all the countries replying made use of publicity campaigns in one way or another, mostly through the mass media, although community meetings, mainly at schools and also on a religious basis, seemed to be preferred by some countries. The following types of publicity campaign could be distinguished by their different functions: information on crime prevention measures; information on police work: explaining the role of the police and providing information on criminal activity; and information on legal provisions to ensure that citizens are aware of and abide by the law.

144. A specific form of publicity campaign consisted of competitions between residential areas in promoting order and security. That method was reported by only a few countries, with quite different social and political systems. In one country, national awards were being made to jurisdictions for their success in crime prevention efforts; in addition, some insurance companies offered discounts in some locations if certain crime prevention steps had been taken. Other countries reported specialized initiatives, such as quizzes and competitions on crime prevention, held mainly at schools and organized by crime prevention panels.

5. Visits to prisons

145. The strategy of deterrent visits to prisons was generally not favoured by the requesting countries, although, there was a wide range of opinion. Most of the few countries that replied positively reported that such visits served aims other than deterrence, for instance, that visits to prisoners by family members might have a deterrent effect on the prisoners themselves. Visits to prisons might be organized for the better understanding of correctional activity, with the deterrent effect of such visits mentioned only as a side-effect. Indeed, visits to prisons solely for a deterrent effect were not allowed by law in one country. In others, such visits were thought to have a resounding effect on future criminal activity. Deterrent visits were seen also as running counter to organizational interests and to the self-image of the correctional staff, as well as interfering with the inmate's right to privacy and dignity.

C. Community participation in crime prevention

1. General observations

146. Citizen involvement in crime prevention is a fairly new area of interest for criminal justice practitioners and criminologists. Citizen participation is already well-established in many countries in various areas of the administration of justice. However, since protection against crime is of vital interest, members of the community might be mobilized to participate in crime prevention programmes. Crime prevention activities can be less formal; they are less thoroughly regulated by legal provisions (as compared, for example, with criminal procedure or correctional activities), and legislative changes might not be required to introduce programmes with deeper community involvement.

147. However, community involvement sometimes disturb the balance between the two main police functions, namely, preventing and reacting to criminal activity. Replies to the Survey indicated that reactive police policies seemed to

take precedence over preventive activity. That might be attributed to organizational factors, especially the fact that police performance was traditionally measured by the quality of reactive policies. Some countries, particularly those that had met with some problems in involving the public in the administration of justice, seemed to be cautious in their use of community participation in crime prevention. One alternative was to bring the police closer to the public, thus gaining community assistance for crime prevention activities that were extensions of official police duties. Another method was to set up mixed bodies in which police officers and representatives of the community acted together. Finally, most countries reported measures to ensure that community prevention was under the control and supervision of official crime prevention and control agencies.

148. In respect of indirect strategies of crime prevention, the important role played by members of the community acting as foster parents for children at risk was reported by several countries. Some countries reported that fostering was not a State-run, but a private-agency programme. In other countries, programmes providing welfare and financial assistance, as well as crisis intervention, fell within the competence of official agencies. The participation of the community in discussing drafts of important laws and decrees was mentioned by one country. If such policies existed elsewhere, as they well might, they were not clearly reported in other responses to the Survey. In view of the primary emphasis placed upon criminal law, that area of public participation might be further considered. The community was reported as actively involved in a number of criminal justice activities in different countries. One country reported the participation of lay judges in criminal proceedings, and of voluntary organizations in official proceedings concerning the reform of probation, parole and after-care arrangements. In many countries, community participation took the form of informal dispute settlement, mediation and reconciliation, and increasing attention to victim assistance.

2. Citizens' crime prevention associations

149. The composition and function of the various forms of citizens' organizations differed to a considerable extent across countries, but may be classified as follows:

(a) One group of countries had bodies that clearly had a preventive function. Those were the crime prevention committees, councils or panels. The primary function of those associations was to maintain contact with the police, to organize campaigns for crime prevention and to advise officials on crime prevention strategies;

(b) Another group of countries had informal associations with the primary function of dispute settlement. Those bodies, known by various names, such as village councils or settlement clinics, and held under the guidance of older persons, worked for solutions that should be acceptable to the community as a whole;

(c) The primary function of citizens' organizations in the third group of countries was patrolling. Those organizations could be seen as a kind of community police; their activity was being supervised by official agencies, mainly by the police, and volunteers frequently went on patrol with members of the police force. Their primary function was thus to assist the operation of the police and incidentally to promote good relations between the police and the public.

150. Crime prevention activities were also being carried out by bodies set up mainly for other purposes. Certain social and religious institutions in one country, and women's and youth organizations in another, were involved in crime prevention activities in addition to other projects. The activities of those groups, which, first of all, provided certain social, educational and cultural services, were also significant in correctional work.

151. Other groups or citizens' associations had been formed for the settling of disputes. In most countries they were seen as an alternative to, not a substitute for, the formal courts. The wording of the reports of different countries suggested that there were considerable differences in the organization and operation of community courts. However, most countries reported that community courts handled only cases of minor significance. One country reported the existence of courts of reconciliation, which endeavoured to reach informal settlements of criminal cases in which prosecution was initiated by a private plaintiff. If the case could not be settled in an informal way, the private plaintiff could bring charges before a regular court. In another country, social courts functioning in residential quarters and in big industrial institutions handled disputes of inhabitants or employees, but only on request and only for minor offences. Informal ways of handling criminal cases had been developed and implemented primarily for young offenders. Minor offences were being adjudicated by informal dispute resolution bodies designed mainly to handle civil cases. The popularity of mediation programmes might also stem from the increasing attention paid to victims' needs: informal dispute settlement (for example, placing an obligation on the offender to repair damaged goods, pay damages or compensate the victim in some manner) might be more in the victim's interest than the application of a penal sanction against the offender.

D. Other types of crime prevention strategies

1. Crime prevention through penal legislation

152. Thirty countries answered this question, but others mentioned legal reform elsewhere in their replies. The most frequent approach to crime prevention was penal legislation. The following observations may be made:

(a) A great number of countries attached the highest importance to new and comprehensive penal legislation in both substantive and procedural law without specifying the direction of the change, that is, towards penalization or depenalization. However, certain "due process" considerations were usually involved so far as procedural law was concerned;

(b) Only a small proportion of the countries reported legislation of a more or less prophylactic nature, such as laws on "anti-alcohol" education;

(c) A number of countries from all regions reported that the deterrent effect through both criminalization of behaviour and more severe penal sanctions for various types of existing crimes was expected to be considerable.

153. Most countries seemed to combat serious forms of crime (such as crimes of violence or drug crimes) and so-called dangerous offenders through more severe legislation. Incapacitation, as well as the general deterrent of strict penal measures, was said to reduce criminal behaviour. In many countries, specific legislative acts established stricter parole conditions for

persons classified as recidivists or dangerous offenders, and raised the upper limits of imprisonment for certain crimes (such as drug-related crimes).

154. The Survey revealed a clear tendency among reporting countries to seek measures for decreasing the harmful effects of the formal processes of criminal justice. This trend included new measures for diversion, reconciliation, decriminalization and depenalization, as well as the shortening of prison terms. Efforts to avoid formal procedures and the search for community-oriented methods of dispute settlement were reported equally by industrialized and developing countries.

155. Measures to avoid the harmful effects of imprisonment and other negative aspects of formal criminal justice processes were reported by several countries. For instance, juveniles could be ordered to do specific work as a substitute for the deprivation of liberty; the criminal law made it possible to order community service as a sanction. With regard to diversion and mediation, one country reported an interesting experiment in which full-time police officers, specifically trained for dealing with juveniles, acted as mediators between juvenile groups. These officers were permitted to intervene in high-risk situations before formal police action was initiated. The experiment was interesting because it demonstrated that official organs could be entrusted with less formal methods of conflict resolution. It also indicated an effort to "legalize" this informal way of dealing with conflicts, which, in several countries, existed as a process almost on the borderline of illegality.

156. Several countries stressed that the treatment of offenders and correctional work were a part of crime prevention. In some countries, a growing scepticism regarding the rehabilitative or treatment ideology had led to their considering the abolition both of specific "treatment" institutions and of sentences of imprisonment of indeterminate duration.

2. Assistance to victims

157. A growing emphasis was being placed on assistance to victims. The programmes referred to included victim compensation, help in overcoming the trauma of being a victim, and sympathetic treatment for victims by criminal justice authorities. Those measures were frequently viewed as part of the crime prevention programme, even though victim assistance programmes seemed to fall outside the scope of prevention. In the long run, however, projects to help victims were thought to contribute to the success of crime prevention, especially by persuading former victims to provide assistance to agencies responsible for crime prevention and control. Apparently, victim assistance programmes were encouraged and sponsored not out of humanitarian considerations alone, but also in order to gain the support of the community in combating and preventing crime. Finally, increased interest in victim assistance and official and public involvement in crime prevention seem to have been stimulated in some countries by the continuing high rate of recidivism and by limitations on the provisions that could be made by general social security systems.

3. Other strategies

158. Secondary to the emphasis on penal legislation, the replies to this question were the most informative in respect of possible developments in the methodology of international research and exchange of information. Excluding

legal reforms, 20 different measures were cited. Most of these had been reported under other headings by other countries, and have been mentioned in the relevant section of this report. A few countries mentioned religious and educational campaigns, which seem to be closer to the "indirect" category described above. Examples of direct measures included: greater coordination with private security firms; the spread of information on technical advances in mechanical crime prevention (target hardening); road safety campaigns, which affect the behaviour of criminals; surveillance of known criminals; and specific attention to particular kinds of crime, such as economic crimes, especially fraud and thefts from the national cultural heritage. The results of this section, however, emphasize the difficulties inherent in the international exchange of opinion and experience, as the same terms may be interpreted differently by different countries.

E. Criminal justice planning

159. Countries were asked for information concerning criminal justice planning during the period between 1975 and 1980. From the replies to this question, it again emerged that there was a problem with the terminology, in this case, the interpretation of "planning". Most countries referred to crime prevention measures already mentioned in other parts of the Second Survey, and pointed out that this was a part of the planning process. The aspect most mentioned concerned the relationship between central and local government, and between government and the community. Only one country gave an account of a separate planning activity with exact goals and figures: in the Survey period, that country planned for a reduction in certain crimes and in court case-loads; however, no information was provided on the implementation of the plan itself.

F. Evaluation of crime prevention strategies

160. In replies to the question regarding the evaluation of crime prevention strategies, most countries referred to traditional crime statistics, such as the number of crimes, recidivism rates, arrest rates and the number of prisoners, as the basis for evaluation. Thus, the need for orthodox criminal justice data of high validity and reliability was again emphasized. Other methods were also noted: for instance, in one country police led leisure-time activities, and the number of housing units participating in "neighbourhood watch" schemes were considered direct indicators of certain crime prevention measures. The number of members of clubs and the number of housing units were compared with changes in recorded crime.

161. According to a report by one country, certain crime prevention strategies were evaluated by a study of citizen confidence in the criminal justice system. However, the exact method of measuring such confidence was not mentioned in the report. Victimization surveys might be used to reveal whether crime prevention strategies actually enhanced the readiness of citizens to report crimes, in that the perception of citizens could serve as the basis for the evaluation of crime prevention measures. Fear of crime is an important measure of the quality of life, while the perception of the risk of victimization might be almost as important as the actual crime itself.

162. If the evaluation of crime prevention strategies through traditional crime statistics remains dominant, despite the deficiencies in the official crime statistics, development of the validity and reliability of crime statistics becomes ever more pressing. The impact of a given crime prevention

measure can be evaluated with any degree of confidence only from reliable data bases. This should permit the identification of individual factors, which may affect the results and analysis of any evaluation, including the displacement of criminal behaviour, which is difficult to measure.

163. Countries were asked for their views on the main obstacles to implementing and evaluating various crime prevention strategies. Most countries described either problems of implementing crime prevention strategies or difficulties in evaluation, but few gave details on both. Therefore, it was not always possible to determine whether a given problem hampered the implementation of a crime prevention strategy or only rendered its evaluation more difficult.

164. Most countries saw the shortage of financial resources and organizational shortcomings as the main problems involved in implementing and evaluating crime prevention programmes. Lack of coordination, particularly between governmental and non-governmental agencies, was perceived as a major problem. The lack of modern technology and skilled personnel for the implementation and evaluation of crime prevention programmes was perceived as a more serious obstacle in less wealthy countries, whereas in the wealthier countries everyday administrative pressure on officials was mentioned several times. It was primarily the latter countries that also noted that the apathy of citizens hampered the operation of crime prevention programmes. Official attempts to prevent crime frequently turned out to be ineffective, since the public refused to participate in the various programmes.

165. One industrialized country raised the important question whether crime prevention strategies could be evaluated at all. According to that reply, crime prevention was hampered by the fact that reactive police policies took precedence over preventive police policies. That was, presumably, a problem that many countries might face in the implementation and evaluation of crime prevention programmes. Several countries raised the question of the extent to which ethical considerations limited the implementation and evaluation of crime prevention strategies.

VI. DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME

A. Socio-economic changes

166. Socio-economic changes occur in a network of cause and effect where no simple linear sequence of events can be postulated. The latest decades have witnessed rates of social change, especially demographic, unprecedented in human history. During the period 1975-1980, almost 75 million more people were added to the global population each year. According to recent estimates, the rate of increase is still growing annually: 76 million for the 12 months ending in June 1981, 78 million for the succeeding 12 months, and an expected further increase to 89 million annually between 1995 and 2000. 13/

167. Population growth occurs at different rates in different regions. During the second half of the 1970s, the annual rate of population growth in Africa, at 3 per cent, was the highest in the world. Other regions experienced a declining rate of natural increase due to falling fertility ratios. In South Asia and Latin America, the annual rate of population growth in the late 1970s was 2.3 per cent and 2.4 per cent, respectively. In East Asia, it was 1.4 per cent, as compared with 2.2 per cent a decade earlier.

168. As a consequence of the urban concentration of economic activities, which is itself generally recognized to be a precondition for economic development, countries of developing regions have experienced a rapid growth of urban populations. This urban growth is expected to increase even faster than the overall rate of population growth. In 1975 almost 38 per cent, and in 1980 approximately 40 per cent, of the world's population lived in urban areas; two decades earlier, urbanization affected only 34 per cent of the population. Such global figures, however, disguise disparate situations in different countries and regions. On the whole, developed countries are highly urbanized with over 7 out of every 10 inhabitants residing in urban areas. However, less than one third of the population in less developed countries was living in urban areas in 1980. The process of urbanization is projected to continue throughout the years 2000 to 2025. By the year 2000, projections suggest that probably over half the world's population will be living in urban areas. While urban populations are projected to reach 79 per cent of the total world population by the year 2000, and 85 per cent by 2025 in the more developed regions, there is increasing evidence that urbanization is stabilizing in some of the more developed countries.

169. The fact that population growth is accompanied by an even faster rate of urbanization in all but the most developed countries is particularly significant for criminal justice; demands on the criminal justice system seem, in most countries, to be disproportionately higher in urban situations. This is, to some extent, a result of different responses to criminal events, including different recording practices in urban and rural areas. But the anonymity of a city seems to encourage people to resort to formal, rather than informal, styles of response to crime. Increasing urbanization may, in itself, create an increased demand for the services of all criminal justice agencies and thus a need for greater resources to respond to that demand. Criminal justice systems will require comprehensive management, which includes informed planning and subsystem coordination. In short, it is clear that increasing urbanization could create new demands on, and operating conditions for, the agencies of criminal justice, even if there were no change in the "real" rate of criminal behaviour.

170. In the years to come, different regions of the world will be characterized by different age structures: the regions with the youngest population in 2025 will be Africa and Latin America, with medians of 21.8 and 29.8 years, respectively. Population distribution and redistribution affect the development process and therefore development strategies. For example, changes in the age composition of the labour force influence the rate of economic growth, industrialization and technological progress. Economic factors are influenced by population structure, just as the dynamics of population growth are themselves affected by economic change. At present, it is difficult to predict precisely the effect such processes will have on the operations of criminal justice. However, experience so far suggests that factors such as the rate of unemployment and the size of the labour force directly affect the agencies of the criminal justice system, both through the competition for jobs and, consequently, the lack of employment opportunities for prisoners and ex-prisoners, and perhaps through the high levels of reported crime.

171. Urbanization, unemployment and poverty are traditionally considered to influence crime rates. In 1980, almost 800 million people in developing countries were estimated to have an annual income per capita of less than \$150 (in 1975 United States dollars), and their number is projected to increase by 30 per cent by the year 2000. The pattern of world incomes, as well as changes in the gross domestic product of individual countries, will influence the extent to which poverty is responsible for an increase in crime, both overall and as regards specific types of crime. However, as noted repeatedly, it cannot be said that poverty leads to crime, or vice versa, that affluence is insurance against crime: indeed, some of the most affluent countries with the highest mean incomes are most severely beset by crime. It is not poverty per se but poverty in the midst of plenty, creating relative rather than absolute deprivation, that may be most criminogenic, though situations of acute want, under any circumstances, might encourage the resort to illegal survival means. There seems to be a clear relationship between migration, usually induced by poverty or unemployment, and crime. Any social measures that reduce forced or large-scale migration will probably reduce crime and thus the demands on the criminal justice system, whereas increases in migration could produce parallel increases in the demands made upon the system.

B. Dependency and crime

172. The regional variations in the increases and decreases in crime suggest that there may be a relationship between certain country categories - regardless of geographic location - and the amount of increased crime that they report. From the findings of the First United Nations Survey of Crime Trends, for example, the conclusion emerged that those countries that are most economically developed have, generally, much higher property crime rates.

173. Progress has been made since the First Survey in the understanding of the term "development". Recent work on the concepts of development, modernization and dependency have forced a revision of the traditional view of development, which, however, is still pertinent in political terms. 14/ From a research viewpoint it appears no longer valid to think of development as representing a unidirectional movement of a country to the desirable end-point of "modernization".

174. In the latter perspective, countries have been grouped in this report not on the basis of the "developing" or "developed" dichotomy, but rather on the basis of their estimated position in the world system. Events in the

United States of America, such as the stock market crash of October 1987, have clearly demonstrated what many economists have known for some time: that all economies of the world are interrelated. World system theory ^{15/} estimates the position of countries as either at the core of the world socio-economic system, or at the periphery, or semi-periphery, in contrast to the older classifications of development which assumed that every country should aspire to become "developed", and that there was only one direction of movement, which was "up" to development.

175. World system theory takes into account the fact that countries may move back and forth between the core of the world system, through the middle range to the periphery and back again. Classification into these categories is also made, initially, not on pure economic development factors (though these are important), but also on relationships among countries.* Thus, the amount and patterning of trade among countries, treaties and relations between them are taken into account in the classification of each country. From one perspective this can be seen as a more dynamic way of classifying countries. It does not make the value judgement of a unidirectional movement to the status of "developed".

176. Most important, the classification system focuses attention on the "dependency" of countries - that is, those countries that are dependent on core countries for their welfare, economy and perhaps even survival. In some instances, ties with core countries have been broken, in order to eliminate the dependency of the peripheral country. That is, countries on the periphery have attempted to assert their "independence". Whether or not one can claim that these countries have been successful in their attempt to establish independence, it is apparent that the ideas of development and modernization are multifaceted and probably should not be defined strictly in economic terms. On the other hand, it is also apparent that economic welfare is extremely important for independent national survival. No country, no matter how small or large, can remain insulated from the world system.** Countries reporting increases or decreases in three types of crime categories can be listed according to their grouping as either "core", "semi-periphery" or

*The original classification scheme was developed in David Snyder and Edward Kick, "Structural positions in the world system and economic growth, 1955-1970: a multiple network analysis of transnational interactions", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 84, No. 5 (1979), pp. 1096-1126.

**For the recent work on this topic, see W. C. Peacock, G. A. Hoover and C. D. Killian, "Divergence and convergence in international development", American Sociological Review, vol. 53 No. 6 (1988), and Y. W. Bradshaw, "Reassessing economic dependency and uneven development", American Sociological Review, vol. 53, No. 5 (1988).

"periphery".* A clear pattern seems to be that the core countries report proportionately more increases in all types of crime, but especially drug and property crimes, compared with either the semi-peripheral or peripheral countries. What is not known is the extent to which these differences arise from the relatively low proportion of crimes committed which are reported and recorded in semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. While the special problems of semi-peripheral countries are not fully understood, it is apparent that the patterning of their crime increases is similar to that of the peripheral countries. While semi-peripheral countries do not report increases in drug crimes as high as peripheral countries, their reporting of increases in property crimes is somewhat higher.

177. It is also of major interest that a low rate of increase of violent crime was reported by peripheral countries. That trend was observed in the First United Nations Crime Survey where it was found that, overall, developing countries had higher violent crime rates than developed countries, but that the gap between the two was decreasing. That trend appears to have continued during the period covered by the Second Survey.

178. To provide some continuity with the First Survey, the data for all those countries that reported data in both the First and Second Surveys have been assembled to permit the examination of trends in crime over an 11-year period from 1970 to 1980. However, because some countries reported in one survey and not in the other, the actual number of countries reporting in both is quite low. The results of both surveys are reasonably consistent for these countries, with some exceptions.** The major exception was that of homicide,

*The list of countries reporting increases or decreases in violent crime and property and drug crimes, according to their grouping in dependency theory, is as follows: core - Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland), United States; semi-periphery - Argentina, Bahamas, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Kuwait, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, United Arab Emirates, Yugoslavia, Venezuela; periphery - Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Uruguay, Zimbabwe.

**A check on the statistical relationship between the two surveys was conducted. A correlational analysis (Pearson's r) between each year for each of the reported crimes of homicide, assault, robbery, theft and fraud was calculated. All years of each survey were highly correlated with each other for all crimes except homicide. In fact the correlations were all in the order of 0.8 and above. Therefore, although as will be seen in subsequent analysis of results, there has been some reporting error (there is generally a "jump" between the transition years of 1975 and 1976), the trends within each of the survey periods tend to be consistent, with a few exceptions.

for which there are particular reasons,* most especially, that it is such a statistically rare event. Therefore, the two crime types for which the most countries provided data in both surveys, and which are statistically more common, assault and theft, are considered here. Figures VII and VIII of annex II display the 10-year trends for developing and developed countries. That classification has been retained in order to provide comparison with the classification used in the First Survey report.

179. Figure VII shows that developing countries displayed a generally higher rate of assaults than developed countries, and that remained so during both the First and Second Survey periods. There was a drastic increase at the point of intersection of the two surveys (1975) for developing countries, probably reflecting a statistical artefact.** It may be noted that, in relation to the previous findings concerning the number of countries reporting increases, it would seem from the general trend of the chart in figure VII that the gap in assaultive crime between developing and developed countries was diminishing considerably.

180. Figure VIII for reported thefts is similarly liable to show the effect of statistical artefacts. However, the Second Survey has clearly confirmed the findings of the First Survey that property offences, as measured by theft, are crimes most typical of developed countries. Furthermore, there appears to be little doubt that the gap between developed and developing countries has remained a wide one. The common-sense explanation that more is stolen in developed as compared with developing countries because there are many more goods, perhaps in absolute terms as well as per capita, was not challenged by the survey data.

181. In conclusion, taking into account reporting error, there was a general similarity in reported crimes between the First and the Second Crime Trends Surveys.

182. The First Survey found that a number of social indicators (proportion of workforce in agriculture, infant mortality rate, school attendance ratio, gross domestic product per capita, proportion of illiteracy) were highly related to the mean rate of property crime for the period 1970-1975. These findings were based on a sample of 36 countries. In the Second Survey, data on many more social indicators were obtained from World Bank sources. However, because of missing data the number of countries that could be included in the statistical analysis of socio-economic factors and crime was very small. The findings presented are very tentative and have limited application.

*The reason for the poor correlation between the First and Second surveys for homicide may be that it is a statistically rare crime which is defined very specifically in different jurisdictions, with the result that it may be classified quite differently (as manslaughter instead of murder, for example) from country to country. Therefore, although there may be a relatively high reporting rate for homicide compared with most crimes, its classification is probably open to more variability.

**The countries for which data were included for analysis in that year may be quite different from the countries which reported in that year on the above item within the Second Survey, especially in the case of countries from developing regions.

183. With the exception of non-intentional homicide, the overall crime rate rose somewhat over that of the period 1975-1980. During this same period, the average population density rose significantly, as did the gross domestic product and the average number of television receivers per household. At the same time, the percentage of total income received by the lowest 20 per cent of households decreased.

184. While a number of other relationships were found concerning the type of crime and the social indicators, the most interesting and consistent finding concerned the rate of assaultive crime. As noted earlier, the rate of assaults increased parallel to increases in the rate of police personnel. In addition, the rate of health spending decreased. The overall crime rate was also related to the percentage of income earned by the lowest 20 per cent of households: as the income of this group increased, so the overall crime rate decreased. While this is a very tentative finding, it does fit with the large body of criminological literature which argues for a close relationship between poverty and those offenders who are apprehended and convicted, reflecting perhaps also some bias of all systems against the disadvantaged.

185. The above findings refer to changes in average annual crime rates for all countries. An alternative method was adopted to examine the relationships between the rates of change of the different variables.* The results obtained were necessarily tentative and experimental. Among the findings were the following: increasing levels of police personnel were associated with a decrease in robbery rates; and rises in participation in the labour force were associated with increases in the overall crime rate.

186. In general, the analysis of the Second Survey data demonstrated that as development increases (as measured by gross domestic product per capita), so does property crime. This could be seen in figure VI, but also in figure XX (annex II), which reflects a more detailed approach to development than figure VI. The relationship between development and the two broad crime types has been supported by a number of analyses using the United Nations survey data and a variety of measures of "development" (such as proportion of population engaged in agriculture, level of education and illiteracy rate). 16/

187. Figure XX further shows that the rate of theft for developed countries is several times higher than that of developing countries, with the gap continuing to widen.** However, for assault (figure XIX), developing countries show a much higher rate, which may be increasing more rapidly than in developed countries.

*This method uses regression coefficients as dependent or independent variables respectively, and is sometimes called a "meta-analysis".

**The developing countries include: Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Saint Lucia, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Togo, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe. The developed

188. It should be noted that this analysis was extended also to the least developed countries, although unfortunately, even using new techniques, it was possible to obtain data for only a small number of such countries. These countries were selected from the list compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in its 1987 report on the condition of least developed countries. 17/ The hypothesis was that if the findings within countries were such that least developed countries were the truly disadvantaged economically, then one might also find this pattern reflected in international crime statistics on an international scale. Figures XIX and XX do not bear out this hypothesis. It may be seen that the violent crime rate for the least developed countries is similar to that of developed countries, and the property crime rate for the least developed countries is considerably less than that of developed countries, though slightly higher than that of developing countries as a whole.

189. This apparent anomaly may camouflage other processes at work, in particular the impact of crime on the countries concerned, which requires an additional analysis of the cost of crime.

C. The cost of crime

190. The above-mentioned relationship between crimes of violence or against property, on the one hand, and development, on the other, may be somewhat misleading, or at least needs to be interpreted against the complex background of the concept of development. For example, it is doubtful whether the very high property crime rate in Sweden has the same impact on Swedish society as such a rate would have on the typical developing country, since Sweden has a much higher level of social and economic support for its citizens. Developed countries, while they appear to have, in general, very high property crime rates, may actually feel such crimes less, simply because there is much more economic affluence within the context of which the crimes are experienced.

191. For example, if a brick is dropped in a small puddle of water, the impact will be considerable. However, if several bricks are dropped into a large pond, the impact will barely be measurable. This may be a more accurate way of interpreting trends in the relationship between development and crimes of violence or against property.

192. Figures XXI and XXII show a "cost index" of crime rates. This index has been calculated by expressing the crime rate per 100,000 persons as a percentage of gross domestic product per capita. This makes it possible to take into account the size of the "pond" (the country's economic output) compared with the "brick" (the particular crime rate). Figures XXI and XXII show the results of this analysis.

193. It can be seen immediately that the impact of both types of crime - assault and theft - are felt much more by developing than by developed countries. Furthermore, the apparent difference between developed and developing countries in terms of property crime has disappeared. The impact

(continued) countries include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States and United Kingdom. The least developed countries include: Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal.

of property crime is greater on developing than on developed countries, even though the latter have property crime rates many times higher than those of the former.

194. An interesting observation may now be drawn from these findings. Instead of the usual conclusion that the "price of development is an increased crime rate", it might be more accurate to conclude that as development increases, the impact of crime may be less, even though the rates themselves increase. Such a conclusion, however, which is made for aggregate data, should not be applied to one particular country. While the observations may hold for a group of countries, they may not hold in any specific case.

195. Figures XXI and XXII raise other important considerations. While the cost index declined considerably over the 10-year period, particularly for developing countries, the situation of the least developed countries was more serious. The explanation for this finding probably lies in the intensification of social problems in least developed countries.

196. From a review of data on the truly disadvantaged and homeless in developed countries, it appears that increases in crime rates have mainly affected the lower strata of the societies concerned. The expected "price" that developing countries may have to pay for increases in economic development is, therefore, a shift in the growth in crime more and more to the lower strata of their societies. This is cause for considerable alarm, because it suggests that as development continues, the lower strata become increasingly cut off from the broader society. It is this "class" that absorbs the major impact of the increase in crime. In other words, as development continues, a clearly identifiable underclass emerges. In some countries this underclass has existed for centuries, in others for a shorter period. But in those where the underclass has existed for centuries, the hope has been that development would help it to achieve more economic independence. The data would suggest that the reverse is the case. There is little doubt that the relationship between poverty and crime will continue to deepen, with more and more crime focused on the underclass, while the impact of crime felt by the wider society remains less severe.

197. This hypothesis is supported on the global level by data which, although collected from only a small number of countries, provide impressive confirmation of the trend. Figures XXI and XXII show that whereas the cost of both property crime and violent crime declined significantly over the past decade for developing countries as a whole, this was not the case for the least developed countries. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the reverse process is emerging: that the cost of crime is increasing for the least developed countries as regards both property crime and violent crime. This is highly significant in the context of data presented in figures XIX and XX, which appear to show that the least developed countries suffer less from the crime problem. But when the circumstances in which crime occurs are taken into account, it could be argued that the impact of crime is potentially far greater for the least developed countries.

198. In conclusion, while the "price" of development may increase with regard to various types of crime, particularly property crime, development also brings with it a decrease in violent crime. More significantly, because of the increased quality of life, particularly economic well-being, the costs of crime are outweighed by other benefits of development. The exception is that the ultimate costs are borne by the underclass in each society, those who are least able to bear it.

VII. FACING THE FUTURE: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

199. One use of a database such as that created by the Second Survey is to form the basis from which certain projections can be generated. Three examples are given, but the same process would be feasible for any of the data sets.

200. It should be emphasized that the following are not forecasts of what the number of crimes will be in the year 2000, because the time base of six years (1975-1980) is so short that sudden fluctuations may distort the projection. More importantly, there are bound to be significant changes in the legal and social policies as well as the demographic make-up of countries, all of which will affect the final numbers in each category, perhaps quite dramatically. However, they do show a considerable increase in the demands made upon the national economy by the criminal justice system. In the Nordic countries, for instance, which all provided detailed data on this question, the non-deflated amount of money allocated to the different criminal justice agencies increased by approximately 80 per cent over the six-year period.

201. The percentage of gross national product spent in European countries on the administration of justice during the period of the Survey most probably did not exceed 2 to 3 per cent, but the trends indicate that that figure will rise, and perhaps more than double, by the end of the century.

202. An example of this may be provided using a simple least-square regression to compute a trend line for the years 1975 to 1980, and projecting that to the year 2000 for all countries returning complete data. The projected values for the year 2000 of three main indicators were as follows:

(a) For every 100 recorded crimes in 1975, there would be 160 in the year 2000 (see annex II, figure XXIII);

(b) For every 100 police officers in 1975, there would be over 170 in the year 2000 (see annex II, figure XXIV);

(c) For every 100 adults in prison in 1975, there would be over 200 in the year 2000 (see annex II, figure XXV).

203. These projections are consistent across most of the countries reporting, and thus seem to show a genuine increase in the categories considered. The two categories with the most immediate budgetary implications, the number of police officers and the number of people imprisoned, are those for which the rates are increasing most rapidly.*

*It was possible that the figures were dominated by the statistics provided by the United States. The large population of that country, and the efficiency and openness of its crime reporting system, coupled with the scale of the officially recorded crime problem over many years, resulted in the figures submitted by the United States being by far the largest of those of countries providing data. Therefore, the calculations were done first with the United States figures excluded. The slope of the graphs was almost identical for both calculations for all three variables, which suggests that, whatever the trends in the United States, they are similar to those in most other countries that provided adequate data.

204. In general, the cost of crime and of society's response to it is escalating, and therefore the amount of national resources that have to be diverted from other pressing needs will also increase. One side-effect, arising from the intrinsic nature of criminal justice operations, an increase in police numbers in response to an increase in recorded crime, will result in more arrests. That will lead to more people being processed, and will entail either delays in justice or a parallel increase in court facilities and prison and non-custodial facilities. That, in turn, creates a new level of criminality and criminal justice activity, with any further increase in recorded crime triggering a new upward cycle. The level of recorded crime seems to be significantly influenced by the number of police officers available to record it; thus increases in the number of police can easily be self-reinforcing.

205. The data submitted by Member States in response to the Second Survey provide an example of the way in which the workloads of criminal justice agencies and the resources devoted to them are increasing. The following two examples at the national level illustrate this point:

(a) The first is that of a developed country in which patterns in crime and criminal justice statistics are typical of many other developed countries, and which is itself culturally homogeneous and socially stable. From the beginning of 1975 to the end of 1980, there was a population increase of approximately 1 per cent, but an increase in recorded crime of over 20 per cent, in detained males of nearly 20 per cent, and in police personnel of around 10 per cent. If these rates of increase for the six-year period 1975-1980 were to continue unchanged until the year 2000, without taking into account other demographic changes, by that time there would be some 1,400,000 recorded crimes (compared with 762,000 in 1975), 7,500 males in prison or detention (compared with 4,000 in 1975), and almost 28,000 police personnel (compared with just over 18,000 in 1975) in that country. The implications in terms of the projected cost to the national economy alone are disturbing, and the different level of national resources that will be required will not be so because of any sudden leap in any category, but because of a small, steady incremental increase. It is possible, however, that the rate of crime increase will slow down naturally so that these predicted levels are never reached. But either some such intrinsic change in trends must occur, or an explicit strategy must be devised to deal with the problem;

(b) The second example is that of a developing country in which the population increased by almost 20 per cent during the six-year survey period. Because recorded crime rates fluctuate so much between different developing countries, no one country is typical of developing countries in general. Between 1975 and 1980, the country in question showed an increase in recorded crime of about 46 per cent, an increase in detained males of about 10 per cent, and an increase in police personnel of about 36 per cent. If these rates of increase were to continue unchanged until the year 2000, by that time there would be some 29,000 recorded crimes (compared with 9,000 in 1975), 14,000 males in prison or detention (compared with 8,500 for 1975), and 13,500 police personnel (compared with just over 4,500 in 1976) in that country. The implications discussed in the preceding paragraph apply just as strongly in this, quite different, context;

(c) For an example at the regional level, the most complete data are available for Western Europe. Those data suggest that, on the basis of conservative estimates, recorded crimes could rise by over 25 per cent if the

1975-1980 trends were to continue up to the year 2000. More importantly, the total number of persons detained, that is, incarcerated in some way, could increase to nearly 500,000. The increase between 1975 and 1980 was from 170,000 to about 230,000. This alone implies that a great number of prisons might have to be built, not simply as replacements for, but in addition to, the existing facilities.

206. At the global level, the total number of crimes recorded in the 50 countries that provided complete data for the years 1975-1980 rose by almost 20 per cent. If this rate of increase were to continue, the crime rate might almost double by the end of the century, and in those 50 countries, over 60 million recorded crimes might be expected. While the number of persons detained does not show quite the same increase, that is, 16 per cent, the number detained in the 46 countries providing data will rise from under 1 million to over 1.5 million, according to conservative estimates. These figures could be further increased by virtue of:

(a) The fact that the number of police personnel continues to rise (1.5 million in 25 countries in 1975 and 1.75 million in the same countries in 1980), a trend which could lead to 2.5 million police personnel by the year 2000;

(b) The fact that the number of police personnel, as a ratio of the total working population, rose by nearly 14 per cent for the survey period, even at a time when unemployment in most sectors was increasing, as was the size of the working population;

(c) Speculative evidence to the effect that, in general, a slightly higher proportion of those apprehended in 1980, in comparison with 1975, were finally imprisoned in some way.

207. All this adds up to a picture of more recorded crime, more police to feed cases into the formal criminal justice system, a tendency to use imprisonment more extensively, and a massive increase in the need for court and prison facilities.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

208. The primary purposes of the Second Survey were stated to be as follows: first, to serve as an instrument for strengthening cooperation among Member States to improve the review and analysis of crime-related data; and secondly, to determine which data are generally available in national databases. The hope was expressed that each country would benefit from the global survey through an analysis of its own crime-related statistics from an international perspective.

209. The purpose of such a comparison, as of the systematic collection of social data of any kind, is to use it to identify trends and to chart the achievement of, or the failure to achieve, particular policy goals. The advantage of international comparisons is that they may facilitate the identification of trends or circumstances in other countries which may be compared with those in the observer's own country, and thus be used to inform policy. They thereby invite speculation and encourage consideration of the limits of the possible. Whether observed trends result from, or occur in spite of, certain policies is interesting but not crucial for this purpose.

210. The disadvantages of international comparisons include the very considerable variation in recording practices between countries, and the changes in counting or recording practices within countries, which can generate spurious trends. The latter are often only barely detectable to domestic observers, let alone an outsider policy maker of different background.

211. The combination of strengths and weaknesses of international comparisons should not be considered in isolation. Perhaps this report can be compared with a crude thesaurus of criminal justice. Those who consult a thesaurus know what they want to say, and the thesaurus provides a range of possibilities for further exploration or consideration. Scrutiny of this report may give some indication of recent experiences related to crime trends and criminal policies. For that reason, the report provides a large amount of descriptive material, reflecting the range of policy preoccupations of those to whom it may be of some service.

212. Patterns of relationships between criminal justice variables and those between recorded crime frequencies and social variables have been considered in this report. It should be recognized that these variables and their relationships can be (and have been) explored more systematically over time in individual countries, and that the data presented here do not allow definite conclusions of any kind. They were included merely to demonstrate some ways of thinking quantitatively about criminal justice as a whole, about its relationship to social policy, and as evidence that further research, based on wider and more complete databases, will be of practical benefit to the criminal justice community.

213. The difficulties of interpreting data on recorded crime within a State are well-known. In cross-cultural comparisons these difficulties are compounded by national differences in social structure and organization, opportunities to commit crime, and crime recording and reporting practices. Interpreting quantitative data on crime prevention is still more difficult, even within one particular culture, because a statement that crime of some sort has been prevented is a statement that something has not happened. Demonstrating that it would have happened had it not been for the crime

prevention measures under scrutiny requires comparisons that are far too complex, and too specifically focused, to be possible in a survey of this scope.

214. The primary lesson which emerges from this survey lies perhaps in its reflection of the ways in which countries differ. The reasons may not be self-evident but could be worth pursuing. For instance, the number of reported crimes of violence may be attributable to any combination of the following:

(a) Differences in citizen tolerance of rough physical contact: if people in one national group regard such contact as part of everyday life while people in another regard it as unacceptable, more crimes of violence will be reported in the second than in the first;

(b) Differences in reporting violence to the police: in the countryside, reporting instances of violence may be more difficult than in cities with more comprehensive police administration services (staff and precincts);

(c) Differences in police responsiveness to citizen complaint: if the police accept and record offences of violence as serious, then they will obviously feature more in the recorded statistics than if this were not the case. Legal rules and statistical practices in recording would also weigh heavily;

(d) Differences in the true crime commission rate, which itself may reflect changes in the opportunity to commit crime, or changes in social structure or circumstances with a more indirect impact on crime commission. Differences in the criminal justice response to known crimes of violence is a product of all the prior variables and of others, such as the crime control resources, their cost, and national or sectional confidence in the capacity of the criminal justice system, to name but a few.

215. There are also other lessons which can be drawn from the analysis of the data. First, the information provided by countries replying to the questionnaire made possible the creation of a United Nations data bank of crime-related data. Although there are still, at this stage, many gaps and shortcomings, the data bank can become increasingly helpful in conducting a number of specific research studies, and in making action-oriented recommendations.

216. Secondly, available crime-related data highlight the need to improve data collection, even in countries that seemed to be more advanced in that field. Progress in the availability of statistics at the international level depends largely upon improvements at the national level. More importantly, timely, reliable and relevant statistics and indicators on various aspects of crime and the criminal justice system are essential for sound policy-making and programme management at the national level. These improvements can be fostered through international collaboration, including the exchange of experience and technical cooperation, within the framework of the United Nations system. Although the first major steps have now been taken, there is still much to be done. National statistical capabilities and systems of criminal justice statistics need to be strengthened, users and producers of such statistics within countries need to collaborate more closely, and the national and international use of statistics and indicators in this field needs to be strengthened. From the point of view of quality and coverage,

databases on socio-economic aspects of development have matured over a long period of time; they now constitute a stable and essential component of the international exchange of information, and a basis for substantive policy development in many social and economic fields at the global, regional and national levels. With the proper attention and support, a similar evolution in the production of relevant information on crime and criminal justice may be anticipated.

217. Thirdly, and more specifically, the data from this survey suggest that:

(a) The incidence of recorded crime has mostly continued to increase during the period 1975-1980;

(b) If this increase continues, the implications for many countries could be very disturbing. Concerted action within and among nations therefore seems to be an even more urgent need;

(c) Continuous efforts should be made to create comprehensive, extended, and, wherever they exist, improved systems of crime-related statistics. Such systems should be able to serve a variety of purposes, in combination with data from other social and economic fields, to ensure informed decision-making in crime prevention and the administration of justice, achieving the dispensation of justice in a fair, impartial and efficient manner;

(d) Continuous attention should be paid to the operations of the criminal justice system, particularly the legal structure and functional arrangements of each of its subsystems, to ensure its overall effectiveness and the proper recruitment and training of criminal justice personnel;

(e) Changes in the dynamics of both criminality and criminal justice processes pose a problem for those concerned with the administration of justice: that of how to respond to the pressures these changes create, while ensuring the fair, humane and speedy delivery of justice. The extent to which this problem is resolved satisfactorily has both practical and moral implications for the peaceful development of societies. For instance, the number of law violations that may occur in any modern society may exceed the number that can be dealt with by the criminal justice system alone. Decisions have to be made about how much formal control to exercise and how to allocate resources in response to various types of violations, consistent with the tolerance levels of the population.

218. In view of the importance of the collection, analysis and dissemination of crime-related data, new ways and means of enhancing this aspect of the work carried out by the United Nations should be explored. The utilization of the crime-related database, including long-term research on the further development and publication of the results of the survey, the preparation of technical manuals, the need to systematize criminal justice statistics, and various forms of technical cooperation and assistance to developing countries require far more resources than those traditionally allocated to this important component of the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice programme.

219. With regard to the organizational problems stemming from the Second Survey, it is clear that many countries find it difficult to provide the minimum sets of data required for monitoring the overall criminal justice

process. Most countries cannot easily provide complete sets of data, and some cannot provide even the most basic statistics. Training courses, special funding for criminal statistics projects and a more focused and active exchange of interregional and cross-regional experiences are therefore central to an effective operational strategy for the improved collection and analysis of data, both nationally and internationally.

220. In summary, the Survey offers a worldwide inventory of crime trends and criminal justice statistics. Since the quality of much of the data is not necessarily perfect, and since more complex statistical procedures would involve a burden that could not be sustained, the ability to collect reliable data from the source is crucial.

221. Comparative work can encompass a range of alternatives, from studies covering all the countries of the world, to studies in which detailed comparisons are made between pairs of countries. Perhaps it is true that the broader the range of countries covered, the less specific and detailed may be the lessons learned. The justification for the more general approach is that it may highlight particular comparisons which could prove fruitful. There is nowhere available a broad set of criminal justice data, officially provided by Governments, collected and analysed worldwide. No doubt more work is required on both the collection and the analysis of data in order to improve their quantity and quality. But this is a continuous, incremental process in which the support and full involvement of Governments, experts and scientific institutions are always required. On those grounds, this publication is presented to the international community.

Notes

1/ Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.IV.4), part one, chap. I, sect. B, p. 6.

2/ Ibid., sect. C, p. 25, para. 6.

3/ "Second United Nations survey of crime trends, operations of criminal justice systems and crime prevention strategies: report prepared by the Secretariat" (A/CONF.121/18 and Corr.1).

4/ Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IV.1), part one, chap. I, sect. E, p. 76.

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Annex I

TABLES

A. Recorded crime

Table 1. Total recorded crime per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	1 229	806	-
Bangladesh	185	148	-
Barbados	2 872	2 786	-
Belize	5 525	4 981	-
Canada	9 383	11 172	-
Cape Verde	863	447	-
Chile	1 771	3 356	+
Colombia	829	877	+
Cyprus	389	397	+
Denmark	5 741	7 966	+
Fiji	2 890	1 980	-
Finland	8 032	6 831	-
France	3 629	4 884	+
India	486	472	-
Ireland	1 509	2 140	+
Israel	5 217	6 369	+
Italy	3 394	3 418	+
Japan	1 107	1 163	+
Kuwait	749	608	-
Madagascar	863	666	-
Nepal	29	38	+
New Zealand	7 569	11 020	+
Netherlands	3 245	4 894	+
Norway	2 457	2 970	+
Pakistan	219	189	-
Philippines	184	122	-
Pland	1 001	944	-
Portugal	866	477	-
Qatar	853	928	+
Republic of Korea	1 688	2 098	+
Saint Lucia	..	5 066	
Senegal	189	232	+
Seychelles	23 344	29 917	+
Singapore	820	1 233	+
Spain	509	1 092	+
Sri Lanka	581	418	-
Sweden	9 221	11 217	+
Thailand	894	470	-
Tonga	7 629	5 511	-
Trinidad and Tobago	1 812	1 712	-
United Arab Emirates	..	1 598	
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	4 303	5 128	+
Northern Ireland	2 456	3 777	+
Scotland	4 484	7 107	+
United States	5 212	5 840	+
Yugoslavia	1 463	1 040	-

Table 2. Changes in recorded crimes between 1975 and 1980 a/

Country	Intentional homicide	Non- intentional homicide	Assault	Drugs	Rape
Argentina	-7.24
Bangladesh	-1.19	-0.01	1.88	0.00	0.03
Barbados	2.61	-4.51	24.11	77.54	4.42
Belize	-17.83	..	30.09	210.76	-0.83
Canada	-0.73	0.13	37.04	63.50	1.48
Chile	8.01	..	180.52	16.56	13.35
Colombia	1.58	8.81	33.28	-10.37	2.40
Denmark	2.97	0.00	40.15	15.99	..
Fiji	-1.02	..	18.02	-1.15	-16.26
Finland	-1.12	..	-19.96	-715.52	-1.65
France	..	1.07	1.27	13.73	0.49
India	0.38	0.18
Ireland	-0.10	-1.30	24.28	18.89	0.17
Israel	0.22	-0.97	-38.70	46.44	-3.55
Italy	0.58	-0.32	-0.21	7.86	-0.03
Japan	-0.44	-0.03	-14.67	0.62	-1.08
Kuwait	0.50	1.09	-62.48	3.35	-8.34
Madagascar	0.83	-45.26	1.75	-0.08	-9.54
Nepal	0.33	0.73	-0.01
Netherlands	3.32	..	24.77	17.22	..
New Zealand	-0.52	0.05	90.64	182.38	-0.59
Norway	0.18	-0.41	12.24	18.81	0.18
Pakistan	-0.94	0.00	-0.09	-14.45	0.42
Panama	-4.80	..	-4.37	1.15	-2.65
Philippines	7.66	9.10	22.43	..	0.94
Poland	-0.24	-0.07	-0.64	1.46	-1.35
Qatar	0.86	-0.18	-196.02	0.48	-1.35
Republic of Korea	0.13	..	-2.33	1.31	5.36
Senegal	0.44	..	19.26	3.66	-0.01
Seychelles	-2.08	..	-3 697.22	-5.56	102.78
Singapore	0.36	1.89	5.79	-14.98	0.21
Spain	-0.39	0.64	7.63	11.06	..
Sri Lanka	-1.10	..	-7.53	..	-0.12
Sweden	1.17	-2.62	35.52	480.57	1.31
Thailand	-2.22	0.32	-6.82	7.93	..
Tonga	5.08	..	-468.42	..	-5.64
Trinidad and Tobago	-1.24	..	33.60	83.81	0.15
United Arab Emirates	-1.58
United Kingdom					
England and Wales	-0.50	-0.93	53.35	..	0.37
Northern Ireland	-9.93	-0.26	-0.13	5.14	0.71
Scotland	2.94	0.18	19.26	11.89	0.43
United States	0.63	..	63.26	-44.34	10.08
Yugoslavia	-2.44	-0.06	-67.84	-0.07	-2.30

a/ Tabulated figures represent the annual change in rate of individual crime types.

Table 3. Intentional homicide rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	12.09	4.86	-
Bangladesh	3.34	2.15	-
Barbados	3.69	6.30	+
Belize	47.83	30.00	-
Canada	2.79	2.06	-
Cape Verde	..	5.07 a/	
Chile	5.68	13.69	+
Colombia	0.82	2.40	+
Cyprus	..	1.91	
Denmark	1.66	4.63	+
Fiji	2.60	1.59	-
Finland	9.84	8.72	-
India	2.84	3.21	+
Ireland	0.72	0.62	-
Israel	5.33	5.54	+
Italy	2.94	3.52	+
Japan	1.88	1.44	-
Kuwait	2.48	2.99	+
Madagascar	6.81	6.81	=
Nepal	1.62	1.96	+
Netherlands	7.24	10.56	+
New Zealand	0.65	1.17	+
Norway	0.60	0.78	+
Pakistan	6.15	5.22	-
Panama	14.36	9.56	-
Philippines	2.63	10.29	+
Poland	2.03	1.79	-
Portugal	..	3.68	
Qatar	1.17	2.03	+
Republic of Korea	1.34	1.46	+
Saint Lucia	..	3.33	
Senegal	1.93	2.37	+
Seychelles	18.75	16.67	-
Singapore	2.21	2.57	+
Spain	0.47	0.08	-
Sri Lanka	7.12	6.03	-
Sweden	3.59	4.76	+
Thailand	27.44	25.22	-
Tonga	10.71	15.79	+
Trinidad and Tobago	5.55	4.31	-
United Arab Emirates	5.15	3.57	-
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	2.07	1.58	-
Northern Ireland	15.83	5.90	-
Scotland	3.65	6.59	+
United States	9.49	10.12	+
Yugoslavia	8.48	6.04	-
Zimbabwe	..	5.16	

a/ 1979 data.

Table 4. Non-intentional homicide rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	0.29	0.28	-
Barbados	4.51	0.00	-
Canada	0.28	0.40	+
Cape Verde	..	7.09 ^{a/}	
Colombia	24.41	33.20	+
Denmark	0.10	0.10	=
Fiji	2.56 ^{b/}	0.79	-
Finland	..	2.92	
France	2.80	3.87	+
Ireland	1.72	0.41	-
Israel	1.33	0.36	-
Italy	9.76	9.44	-
Japan	0.22	0.19	-
Kuwait	4.67	5.76	+
Madagascar	86.08	40.82	-
Nepal	1.78	2.50	+
New Zealand	0.49	0.54	+
Norway	0.87	0.46	-
Pakistan	0.03	0.03	=
Panama	..	3.58	
Philippines	7.49	16.60	+
Poland	0.82	0.76	-
Portugal	..	1.90	
Qatar	0.58	0.41	-
Singapore	0.93	2.82	+
Spain	0.36	1.00	+
Sri Lanka	..	4.12	
Sweden	7.76	5.15	-
Thailand	0.09	0.40	+
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	1.41	0.48	-
Northern Ireland	0.59	0.34	-
Scotland	0.48	0.66	+
United States	3.98	..	
Yugoslavia	0.41	0.34	-

^{a/} 1979 data.

^{b/} 1976 data.

Table 5. Assaults per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	2.76	4.64	+
Barbados	696.47	720.58	+
Belize	381.16	411.25	+
Canada	438.94	475.98	+
Chile	114.14	294.66	+
Colombia	163.48	196.76	+
Cyprus	10.93 a/	8.90	-
Denmark	66.44	106.60	+
Fiji	309.03	327.05	+
Finland	499.16	479.20	-
France	59.95	61.21	+
Ireland	34.91	59.19	+
Israel	365.90	327.20	-
Italy	57.40	57.19	-
Japan	50.29	35.62	-
Kuwait	178.13	115.65	-
Madagascar	99.81	101.56	+
Netherlands	69.53	94.30	+
New Zealand	333.31	423.95	+
Norway	93.03	105.27	+
Pakistan	16.14	16.05	-
Panama	30.90	26.53	-
Philippines	10.91	33.34	+
Poland	13.45	12.80	-
Portugal	..	15.56	
Qatar	235.44	39.42	-
Republic of Korea	27.42	25.09	-
Saint Lucia	..	425.83	
Senegal	14.92	34.18	+
Seychelles	3 925.00	227.78	-
Singapore	14.54	20.34	+
Spain	27.58	35.21	+
Sri Lanka	73.01	65.48	-
Sweden	262.54	298.07	+
Thailand	27.41	20.59	-
Tonga	1 350.00	881.58	-
Trinidad and Tobago	143.02	176.62	+
United Arab Emirates	..	7.96	
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	141.14	194.49	+
Northern Ireland	0.46	0.34	-
Scotland	58.05	77.31	+
United States	224.43	287.69	+
Yugoslavia	143.77	75.93	-
Zimbabwe	177.16	199.27 b/	+

a/ 1976 data.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 6. Drug crimes per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	0.01	0.01	=
Barbados	9.43	86.97	+
Belize	121.74	332.50	+
Canada	244.39	307.89	+
Chile	9.14	25.70	+
Colombia	30.99	20.63	-
Cyprus	..	3.50	
Denmark	77.63	93.62	+
Fiji	2.26	1.11	-
Finland	748.29	32.77	-
France	6.64	20.37	+
Ireland	9.08	27.96	+
Israel	47.79	94.22	+
Italy	6.00	13.86	+
Japan	1.04	1.66	+
Kuwait	5.46	8.82	+
Madagascar	6.38	6.30	-
Nepal	..	0.48	
Netherlands	20.17	37.39	+
New Zealand	93.72	276.10	+
Norway	31.27	50.08	+
Pakistan	26.50	12.05	-
Panama	75.98	77.13	+
Philippines	..	2.60	
Poland	0.82	2.28	+
Portugal	..	8.96	
Qatar	6.43	6.91	+
Republic of Korea	1.46	2.76	+
Saint Lucia	..	257.50	
Senegal	2.26	5.92	+
Seychelles	100.00	94.44	-
Singapore	80.04	65.07	-
Spain	3.73	14.80	+
Sri Lanka	..	42.36	
Sweden	268.72	749.29	+
Thailand	44.80	52.72	+
Tonga	..	5.56 a/	
Trinidad and Tobago	100.68	184.49	+
United Arab Emirates	..	16.53	
United Kingdom			
Northern Ireland	2.44	7.58	+
Scotland	16.01	27.89	+
United States	278.46	234.13	-
Yugoslavia	1.13	1.06	-
Zimbabwe	59.16	66.43 a/	+

a/ 1979 data.

Table 7. Rape rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	0.23	0.25	+
Barbados	17.23	21.65	+
Belize	33.33	32.50	-
Canada	8.13	9.61	+
Chile	20.56	33.91	+
Colombia	6.41	8.81	+
Cyprus	0.49 a/	0.32	-
Denmark	..	6.28	
Fiji	23.09	6.83	-
Finland	14.25	12.59	-
France	3.01	3.51	+
India	0.55	0.73	+
Ireland	1.19	1.35	+
Israel	11.46	7.92	-
Italy	3.31	3.28	-
Japan	3.32	2.24	-
Kuwait	26.92	18.58	-
Madagascar	11.64	2.10	-
Nepal	0.52	0.50	-
Netherlands	..	29.24	
New Zealand	8.36	7.76	-
Norway	2.97	3.15	+
Pakistan	0.75	1.18	+
Panama	12.87	10.22	-
Philippines	1.52	2.46	+
Poland	5.75	4.40	-
Portugal	..	1.23	
Qatar	1.75	0.41	-
Republic of Korea	9.43	14.79	+
Saint Lucia	..	21.67	
Senegal	2.39	2.38	-
Seychelles	125.00	227.78	+
Singapore	2.61	2.82	+
Spain	..	2.55	
Sri Lanka	1.66	1.55	-
Sweden	9.39	10.69	+
Thailand	5.27 a/	5.49	+
Tonga	21.43	15.79	-
Trinidad and Tobago	11.37	11.52	+
United Arab Emirates	..	5.82	
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	2.13	2.49	+
Northern Ireland	2.51	3.22	+
Scotland	5.54	5.96	+
United States	25.97	36.06	+
Yugoslavia	10.80	8.50	-
Zimbabwe	9.55	11.61 b/	+

a/ 1976 data.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 8. Kidnapping rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	0.26	0.02	-
Bangladesh	1.23	1.16	-
Barbados	0.00	0.00	=
Colombia	0.31	0.17	-
Cyprus	..	0.00	
Denmark	..	0.45	
France	0.02	0.01	-
India	1.80	1.97	+
Ireland	0.28	0.71	+
Israel	1.59	2.50	+
Italy	0.11	0.07	-
Japan	0.16	0.12	-
New Zealand	1.07	2.62	+
Pakistan	4.08	5.35	+
Portugal	..	0.08	
Qatar	3.51	2.03	-
Republic of Korea	0.82	1.03	+
Singapore	1.37	0.46	-
Spain	..	0.05	
Sri Lanka	3.01	2.11	-
Thailand	0.38	0.15	-
United Arab Emirates	..	3.27	
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	..	0.15	
Northern Ireland	..	0.87	
Scotland	0.23	0.62	+
United States	0.27	0.05	-

Table 9. Robbery rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	178.62	103.68	-
Bangladesh	7.99	2.61	-
Barbados	13.13	66.51	+
Belize	63.77	55.00	-
Canada	93.72	102.00	+
Chile	182.49	400.09	+
Colombia	150.16	196.88	+
Cyprus	1.47 a/	1.43	-
Denmark	15.55	28.51	+
Fiji	46.01	20.32	-
Finland	74.77	64.14	-
France	6.68	9.00	+
India	3.50	3.41	-
Ireland	21.96	39.22	+
Israel	8.63	15.34	+
Italy	5.98	7.66	+
Japan	2.06	1.89	-
Kuwait	6.36	2.84	-
Madagascar	8.25	11.29	+
Nepal	2.70	2.71	+
Netherlands	..	29.84	
Norway	8.04	8.33	+
New Zealand	11.18	16.69	+
Pakistan	0.79	0.69	-
Panama	44.91	44.42	-
Philippines	13.59	28.61	+
Poland	0.85	0.68	-
Portugal	..	16.58	
Qatar	1.17	1.22	+
Republic of Korea	6.17	8.87	+
Saint Lucia	..	32.50	
Senegal	11.99	30.29	+
Seychelles	12.50	77.78	+
Singapore	57.41	51.15	-
Spain	11.38	73.26	+
Sri Lanka	37.06	33.40	-
Sweden	28.51	41.41	+
Thailand	18.13	18.10	-
Tonga	3.57	7.89	+
Trinidad and Tobago	37.63	71.17	+
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	23.12	30.53	+
Northern Ireland	129.42	..	
Scotland	66.58	72.57	+
United States	215.29	241.07	+
Yugoslavia	7.07	4.52	-
Zimbabwe	41.04	93.59 b/	+

a/ 1976 data.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 10. Theft rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	363.90	248.31	-
Bangladesh	48.68	27.92	-
Barbados	1 374.49	1 568.28	+
Belize	2 600.00	2 022.50	-
Canada	2 983.78	3 560.45	+
Cape Verde	..	131.05 a/	
Chile	288.82	400.77	+
Colombia	167.81	142.34	-
Cyprus	210.51 b/	251.52	+
Denmark	3 519.39	4 416.32	+
Fiji	1 296.18	769.99	-
Finland	3 716.87	3 471.35	-
France	2 320.84	2 988.11	+
India	99.34	86.76	-
Ireland	873.79	1 161.83	+
Israel	3 133.11	3 906.05	+
Italy	402.01	303.01	-
Japan	930.69	998.80	+
Kuwait	286.13	207.40	-
Madagascar	171.62	121.80	-
Nepal	11.78	11.31	-
Netherlands	2 398.31	3 366.19	+
Norway	1 980.58	2 415.88	+
New Zealand	2 398.59	3 218.41	+
Pakistan	51.41	43.67	-
Panama	174.91	180.07	+
Philippines	39.95	48.30	+
Poland	529.63	511.76	-
Portugal	..	234.68	
Qatar	249.46	111.35	-
Republic of Korea	153.62	165.40	+
Saint Lucia	..	2 388.33	
Senegal	74.91	67.73	-
Seychelles	8 043.75	6 688.89	-
Singapore	511.31	774.24	+
Spain	382.57	840.15	+
Sri Lanka	408.66	212.33	-
Sweden	5 680.71	6 212.30	+
Thailand	81.35	70.22	-
Tonga	4 317.86	2 971.05	-
Trinidad and Tobago	1 347.76	1 204.81	-
United Arab Emirates	350.11 b/	318.70	-
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	3 551.04	4 156.41	+
Northern Ireland	1 740.83	1 920.39	+
Scotland	4 165.59	5 020.70	+
United States	4 736.86	5 265.09	+
Yugoslavia	496.29	392.01	-
Zimbabwe	803.72	730.60 a/	-

a/ 1979 data.

b/ 1976 data.

Table 11. Fraud rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	50.96	48.72	-
Bangladesh	1.86	2.34	+
Barbados	158.74	47.23	-
Belize	91.30	93.75	+
Canada	378.51	424.32	+
Chile	120.88	235.73	+
Colombia	78.86	85.18	+
Cyprus	29.51 a/	17.16	-
Denmark	414.85	458.61	+
Fiji	31.77	40.33	+
Finland	394.22	429.34	+
France	5.24	9.04	+
India	2.87	2.43	-
Ireland	42.11	148.04	+
Israel	185.90	307.99	+
Italy	35.81	39.66	+
Japan	52.48	53.77	+
Kuwait	15.80	10.64	-
Madagascar	37.17	29.80	-
Netherlands	42.97	54.96	+
Norway	118.66	97.50	-
New Zealand	380.61	601.25	+
Pakistan	0.40	0.45	+
Panama	15.22	11.65	-
Poland	17.74	20.07	+
Portugal	..	21.93	
Quatar	12.27	7.72	-
Republic of Korea	105.39	182.29	+
Saint Lucia	..	60.00	
Senegal	1.17	13.75	+
Seychelles	25.00	105.56	+
Singapore	36.06	60.88	+
Spain	..	19.18	
Sri Lanka	13.24	18.93	+
Sweden	580.27	1 168.45	+
Thailand	..	11.97	
Tonga	103.57	68.42	-
Trinidad and Tobago	60.00	26.88	-
United Arab Emirates	75.69 a/	26.33	-
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	218.93	194.49	-
Northern Ireland	60.88	78.94	+
Scotland	182.91	326.00	+
United States	84.96	118.45	+
Yugoslavia	31.14	18.49	-

a/ 1976 data.

Table 12. Bribery rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	0.07	0.05 a/	-
Barbados	---	---	=
Chile	2.01	5.65	+
Colombia	0.34	0.58	+
Cyprus	0.81 b/	1.27	+
Fiji	0.87	1.91	+
Israel	5.56	4.13	-
Italy	0.66	0.99	+
Japan	0.95	0.69	-
Kuwait	0.79	1.02	+
Madagascar	..	1.26	..
Netherlands	0.54
New Zealand	0.36	1.70	+
Panama	0.92
Poland	14.51	10.12	-
Portugal	..	0.21	..
Qatar	1.75	1.22	-
Republic of Korea	2.61	1.05	-
Sri Lanka	21.17	11.82	-
Sweden	7.56	4.17	-
Trinidad and Tobago	0.28	0.09	-
United Kingdom			
Scotland	0.04	0.35	+
United States	0.14	0.13	-
Yugoslavia	1.96	1.52	-

a/ 1979 data.

b/ 1976 data.

Table 13. Other serious crimes rate per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Bangladesh	0.02	0.01	-
Barbados	12.72	3.54	-
Belize	1 011.59	785.00	-
Canada	55.34	66.14	+
Chile	..	23.24	..
Colombia	18.49	19.99	+
Cyprus	39.79 a/	50.84	+
Fiji	3.13	8.73	+
Finland	721.43	773.16	+
Ireland	490.64	692.27	+
Israel	355.34	415.62	+
Japan	12.03	28.60	+
Netherlands	183.57	490.71	+
New Zealand	18.98	27.01	+
Panama	135.20	98.39	-
Philippines	108.01	135.66	+
Poland	15.91	8.50	-
Portugal	..	0.80	..
Qatar	3.51	10.16	+
Singapore	2.92	4.31	+
Spain	8.50	12.32	+
Sri Lanka	1.75	0.70	-
Sweden	264.69	261.97	-
Trinidad and Tobago	36.61	21.73	-
United Arab Emirates	16.50 a/	16.23	-
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	46.37	40.45	-
Northern Ireland	349.80	628.57	+
Scotland	663.51	1 103.10	+
Zimbabwe	58.50	87.96 b/	+

a/ 1976 data.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 14. Intercorrelations among crime types per 100,000 head of population in 1975

Item	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1)	-	-0.33	0.33	-0.17	0.55	-0.16	-0.25	0.63	0.07	0.57	0.63
(2)		-	-0.06	-0.01	0.04	-0.28	0.89 a/	-0.48	-0.25	-0.23	-0.27
(3)			-	0.16	0.89 a/	-0.09	-0.32	-0.05	0.30	0.09	-0.31
(4)				-	0.20	0.04	-0.01	0.33	0.87 a/	0.15	-0.03
(5)					-	-0.40	-0.11	0.24	0.43	0.09	-0.01
(6)						-	-0.38	-0.23	-0.23	-0.22	-0.10
(7)							-	-0.14	-0.15	-0.33	0.13
(8)								-	0.61	0.21	0.87 a/
(9)									-	-0.05	0.19
(10)										-	0.02
(11)											-

a/ Significant at 0.01 level.

Key: (1) Intentional homicide (7) Robbery
 (2) Non-intentional homicide (8) Theft
 (3) Assault (9) Fraud
 (4) Drug crimes (10) Bribery and corruption
 (5) Rape (11) Other serious crimes
 (6) Kidnapping

Table 15. Intercorrelations among crime types per 100,000 head of population in 1980

Item	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(1)	-	-0.41	0.28	-0.13	0.36	-0.12	-0.19	0.60	0.03	0.03	0.66
(2)		-	-0.12	-0.24	0.05	-0.36	0.91 a/	-0.45	-0.23	-0.21	-0.21
(3)			-	0.57	0.92 a/	0.00	0.08	0.12	0.19	0.01	-0.12
(4)				-	0.28	0.59	-0.23	0.39	0.83 a/	0.31	-0.03
(5)					-	-0.34	0.33	0.08	-0.02	-0.22	-0.13
(6)						-	-0.53	0.33	0.61	0.78	-0.01
(7)							-	-0.22	-0.19	-0.39	0.03
(8)								-	0.74	0.41	0.81 a/
(9)									-	0.41	0.33
(10)										-	0.06
(11)											-

a/ Significant at 0.01 level.

Key: (1) Intentional homicide (7) Robbery
 (2) Non-intentional homicide (8) Theft
 (3) Assault (9) Fraud
 (4) Drug crimes (10) Bribery and corruption
 (5) Rape (11) Other serious crimes
 (6) Kidnapping

B. Apprehensions, prosecutions and convictions

Table 16. Apprehensions as a percentage of recorded crime

Country	1975	1980
Argentina	59	58
Austria	45	42
Bahamas	33	27
Bangladesh	70	57
Canada	34	..
Chile	32	28
Czechoslovakia	73	41
Finland	..	6
France	..	18
Honduras	0.4	0.3
Japan	30	29
Netherlands	32	29
Norway	13	11
New Zealand	..	41
Philippines	11	..
Poland	80	78
Qatar	115	161
Sweden	13	11
Suriname	16	19
United Kingdom		
Scotland	10	7
United States	71	73
Yugoslavia	74	74

Table 17. Ratio of males per 100,000 head of male population to females per 100,000 head of female population apprehended, convicted and imprisoned in 1975

Country	Apprehended	Convicted	Imprisoned
Argentina	7.91	..	18.33
Bangladesh	183.76
Barbados	..	9.65	..
Belgium	18.15	..	23.18
Canada	8.23
Chile	7.35	10.19	5.86
Colombia	10.67
Denmark	..	8.93	..
France	37.47
India	45.28
Indonesia	38.96
Ireland	..	6.43	38.57
Israel	..	64.30	..
Italy	29.91
Japan	5.09
Kuwait	..	14.56	6.09
Madagascar	58.11	124.64	43.17
Netherlands	9.64	..	54.59
Norway	9.37
New Zealand	..	7.02	..
Philippines	13.79
Poland	8.77	..	22.17
Portugal	..	6.54	..
Qatar	35.18	33.46	26.53
Republic of Korea	7.02	33.06	..
Spain	24.28
Sweden	8.75	7.84	..
Thailand	..	3.91	..
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	..	5.11	33.31
United States	5.62	..	6.31
Yugoslavia	9.66

Table 18. Ratio of males per 100,000 head of male population to females per 100,000 head of female population apprehended, convicted and imprisoned in 1980

Country	Apprehended	Convicted	Imprisoned
Argentina	7.84	..	23.94
Bangladesh	68.23
Barbados	..	12.65	..
Belgium	16.06	..	24.88
Chile	7.23	12.36	6.09
Colombia	10.83
Cyprus	..	11.02	..
Denmark	6.30
France	4.95	..	3.23
India	37.46
Indonesia	41.35
Ireland	..	6.87	47.80
Italy	..	6.63	19.77
Japan	4.43	14.30	..
Kuwait	..	7.86	10.93
Mauritius	46.60	122.60	33.07
Netherlands	9.45	13.21	29.14
Norway	10.39
New Zealand	5.08	5.97	..
Philippines	27.78
Poland	9.30	..	23.15
Portugal	..	6.53	31.64
Qatar	13.02	10.77	8.99
Republic of Korea	7.25	17.65	..
Spain	31.59
Sweden	7.70	6.80	..
Thailand	..	3.48	..
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	..	5.10	28.20
United States	5.62
Yugoslavia	9.56

Table 19. Number of cases where sex ratios increase or decrease as the offender passes through the criminal justice system

Year	Further into system	
	Greater sex ratio	No greater sex ratio
1975	10	10
1980	14	10

Table 20. Age distribution of males apprehended in 1975
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Austria	3	13	30	36	19
Bahamas	6	38	31	15	11
Chile	7	12	20	17	44
Germany, Federal Republic of	6	27	14	13	40
Greece	0	3	7	25	66
India	1	1	3	1	95
Japan	14	19	15	14	38
Norway	12	44	14	11	19
Poland	11	16	17	21	35
Qatar	4	18	41	32	6
Sweden	8	26	19	14	34
Suriname	7	13	26	37	18
Tonga	3	20	49	15	14
United States	10	29	20	12	30
Uruguay	6	12	20	15	47

Table 21. Age distribution of males apprehended in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Austria	3	14	29	35	21
Bahamas	6	33	29	19	13
Chile	7	13	20	16	45
Germany, Federal Republic of	6	30	14	12	38
Greece	0	3	7	26	64
India	1	1	3	1	95
Japan	21	22	12	9	37
Norway	9	46	16	11	18
Panama	15	21	33	19	13
Poland	9	15	16	21	39
Qatar	1	3	51	35	11
Suriname	4	11	22	41	23
Tonga	3	19	46	14	18
United States	6	27	24	15	29
Uruguay	4	10	22	17	47

Table 22. Age distribution of females apprehended in 1975
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Austria	1	10	22	35	33
Bahamas	3	21	25	30	21
Chile	13	20	24	14	30
Germany, Federal Republic of	6	21	11	11	51
India	26	19	41	13	2
Japan	2	4	2	2	90
Norway	6	47	9	8	30
Philippines	2	17	18	15	49
Poland	11	15	15	39	19
Sweden	11	25	16	11	36
Suriname	17	13	13	13	44
Uruguay	9	16	20	15	40

Table 23. Age distribution of females apprehended in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Austria	2	11	21	33	33
Bahamas	7	24	21	26	22
Chile	11	17	22	16	34
Germany, Federal Republic of	6	23	11	10	50
India	24	19	49	7	1
Japan	19	24	6	7	44
Norway	5	46	18	10	21
Philippines	1	14	15	16	54
Poland	9	13	17	41	20
Suriname	0	10	22	54	15
Uruguay	8	31	23	17	21

Table 24. Age distribution of males prosecuted in 1975
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	6	38	31	15	10
Norway	8	42	22	11	18
Poland	13	16	16	16	41
Qatar	4	18	39	33	6
United Kingdom					
Scotland	4	43	18	11	25
Uruguay	2	10	23	17	49
Yugoslavia	2	3	24	13	58

Table 25. Age distribution of males prosecuted in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	6	33	29	19	13
Cyprus	10	19	20	13	38
Norway	6	40	26	12	16
Poland	11	14	14	19	42
Qatar	1	3	43	41	12
United Kingdom					
Scotland	1	44	20	10	25
Uruguay	4	10	25	19	42
Yugoslavia	2	4	25	18	51

Table 26. Age distribution of females prosecuted in 1975
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	3	21	25	30	21
Norway	8	44	22	11	16
Poland	6	11	15	15	55
United Kingdom					
Scotland	2	27	16	12	45
Uruguay	5	18	27	13	37

Table 27. Age distribution of females prosecuted in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	8	24	21	26	22
Cyprus	0	4	15	22	59
Norway	6	41	24	12	18
Poland	5	9	13	16	57
United Kingdom					
Scotland	1	28	18	12	41
Uruguay	8	15	24	15	39

Table 28. Age distribution of males convicted in 1975
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	6	30	24	21	19
Equador	1	4	23	24	49
Germany, Federal					
Republic of	9	13	17	15	46
Greece	1	8	11	15	65
Israel	0	19	33	20	28
Qatar	4	18	38	33	8
United Kingdom					
Scotland	4	43	18	11	25

Table 29. Age distribution of males convicted in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Age				
	<15	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
Bahamas	10	29	23	21	18
Cyprus	11	20	20	13	36
Equador	0	2	23	27	48
Germany, Federal					
Republic of	12	14	16	14	44
Greece	1	8	9	13	70
Italy	3	10	14	16	57
Japan	0	2	20	18	60
Netherlands	2	8	34	17	40
Qatar	1	3	44	48	4
United Kingdom					
Scotland	1	44	20	11	25

C. Prison population

Table 30. Detained population per 100,000 head of population

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	78	84	+
Bangladesh	51	28	-
Belgium	69	59	-
Belize	1 199	1 059	-
Chile	19	16	-
Finland	211	168	-
France	49	85	+
India	..	21	
Indonesia	21	25	+
Ireland	33	36	+
Israel	..	878 a/	
Italy	53	54	+
Jamaica	..	174 b/	
Kuwait	26	25	-
Madagascar	176	260	+
Mauritius	233	195	-
Netherlands	23	27	+
Pakistan	..	36 c/	
Philippines	..	32	
Poland	271	267	-
Portugal	..	59	
Qatar	934	1 257	+
Saint Lucia	..	847	
Seychelles	2 450	1 739	-
Singapore	63	42 c/	-
Spain	24	49	+
Sri Lanka	81	74	-
United Kingdom			
England and Wales	81	86	+
Northern Ireland	..	171	
United States	177	..	

a/ Figure somewhat distorted by the use of figures for receptions, not population, for adjudicated juveniles.

b/ Figure refers to police custody.

c/ 1979 data.

Table 31. Detained population per 100,000 crimes

Country	1975	1980	Change
Argentina	6 343	10 429	+
Bahamas	18 049	31 663	+
Bangladesh	27 641	18 850	-
Belize	21 695	21 255	-
Chile	1 079	468	-
Costa Rica	..	7 827	
Finland	2 628	2 454	-
France	1 361	1 738	+
Germany, Federal Republic of	1 768	1 521	-
Greece	1 549	1 061	-
India	..	4 374	
Ireland	2 213	1 683	-
Israel	..	13 791	
Italy	1 548	1 565	
Kuwait	3 435	4 122	+
Madagascar	20 410	38 992	+
Morocco	..	17 670	
Netherlands	712	557	-
Pakistan	..	21 415 a/	
Philippines	..	28 119 a/	
Poland	27 061	28 318	+
Portugal	..	12 305	
Qatar	109 521	135 377	+
Saint Lucia	..	16 713	
Seychelles	10 495	5 812	-
Singapore	7 621	4 059 a/	-
Spain	4 660	4 464	-
Sri Lanka	13 882	17 718	+
United Kingdom England and Wales Northern Ireland	1 891 ..	1 671 4 528	-
Uruguay	39 237	31 801	-
United States	3 389	..	

a/ 1979 data.

Table 32. Proportion of adult prison population under sentence a/

Country	1975	1980
Argentina	34	52
Bahamas	40	15
Bangladesh	12	23
Barbados	77	83
Belgium	48	42
Belize	91	126
Canada	87	84
Colombia	..	26
Costa Rica	..	46
Denmark	75	69
Finland	86	90
France	49	66
Germany, Federal Republic of	68	74
Greece	81	79
India	..	41
Indonesia	59	63
Israel	..	12
Italy	41	31
Jamaica	71	63
Japan	83	82
Madagascar	44	43
Mauritius	81	74
Morocco	46	46
Netherlands	60	64
Norway	72	76
New Zealand	..	94
Pakistan	..	42 ^{b/}
Peru	33	25
Poland	85	86
Portugal	43	63
Saint Lucia	..	35
Senegal	..	27
Seychelles	79	66
South Africa	82	85
Spain	49	44
Sri Lanka	51	43
Thailand	81	86
Tonga	88	95
Trinidad and Tobago	47	32
Uganda	58	..
United Kingdom		
England and Wales	86	86
Northern Ireland	..	85
Scotland	86	87
United States	84	..
Uruguay	14	15
Venezuela	27	..

a/ As distinct from detention before and during trial.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 33. Proportion of juvenile prison population under sentence a/

Country	1975	1980
Argentina	13	29
Bahamas	41	19
Belgium	3	6
Chile	4	5
Finland	76	73
France	17	21
Germany, Federal Republic of	56	63
Greece	69	72
India	..	24
Israel	..	18
Italy	2	5
Mauritius	41	50
Morocco	30	22
Netherlands	66	28
Pakistan	..	61 <u>b/</u>
Poland	75	71
Portugal	..	57
Qatar	100	85
Saint Lucia	82	70
Seychelles	71	49
Spain	17	28
United Kingdom		
England and Wales	81	83
Uruguay	51	41

a/ As distinct from detention before and during trial.

b/ 1979 data.

Table 34. Proportion of juveniles in detained population

Country	1975	1980
Argentina	19	12
Bahamas	3	2
Bangladesh	6	14
Belgium	1	1
Belize	1	1
Chile	42	47
Costa Rica	..	6
Finland	11	8
France	3	2
Germany, Federal Republic of	15	12
Greece	7	5
India	..	1
Indonesia	1	3
Ireland	29	32
Israel	..	13
Italy	3	3
Jamaica	..	5
Kuwait	9	12
Madagascar	---	---
Mauritius	7	6
Morocco	---	---
Netherlands	3	3
Pakistan	..	2 a/
Philippines	..	5
Poland	16	11
Portugal	..	12
Qatar	22	5
Saint Lucia	..	2
Seychelles	19	13
Singapore	1	--- a/
Spain	15	20
Sri Lanka	4	2
Uganda	1	..
United Kingdom		
England and Wales	30	30
Northern Ireland	..	6
United States	2	..
Uruguay	10	10

a/ 1979 data.

Table 35. Average time spent from time of detention to final disposition (Days)

Country	1975	1980
Barbados	23	168
Belize	170	222
Cyprus	11	12
Czechoslovakia	68	70
Jamaica	1 384	1 409
Mauritius	92	97
Norway	62	..
Saint Lucia	..	18
Seychelles	14	34
Switzerland	..	47
United Kingdom		
England and Wales	29	32
Northern Ireland	..	227
Uruguay	115	123
United States	89	63
Zimbabwe	90	90

Table 36. Prison population by sentence length in 1975 (Percentage)

Country	Sentence length				
	<6 months	6-11 months	1-5 years	>5 years	Life
Bahamas	39	29	26	6	—
Bahrain	78	15	6	—	—
Belgium	21	16	48	11	4
Cyprus	64	17	17	2	—
Denmark	35	20	40	5	1
France	22	15	37	25	1
Germany, Federal					
Republic of	21	30	40	7	3
Greece	9	9	26	49	8
Israel	57	14	27	1	—
Italy	6	9	39	40	5
Japan	5	17	62	15	2
Madagascar	2	19	33	44	2
Morocco	26	26	23	24	1
New Zealand	49	33	17	1	—
Poland	4	11	67	17	1
Singapore	18	12	31	37	2
Sweden	76	14	10	—	—
Switzerland	84	5	10	2	— a/
Suriname	4	8	56	30	2
United Kingdom					
England and Wales	8	12	68	7	4
Scotland	35	23	14	21	8
Uruguay	80	16	4	—	—

a/ 1976 data.

Table 37. Prison population by sentence length in 1980
(Percentage)

Country	Sentence length				
	<6 months	6-11 months	1-5 years	>5 years	Life
Bahrain	71	10	17	2	—
Belgium	17	12	50	17	3
Chile	51	11	6	—	31
Cyprus	68	16	16	1	—
France	21	16	35	27	2
Germany, Federal					
Republic of	17	28	43	9	2
Greece	6	10	26	51	7
Israel	59	16	23	1	1
Italy	11	10	33	43	3
Japan	4	17	64	13	2
Madagascar	2	14	31	52	1
Mauritius	87	8	3	2	—
Morocco	24	23	20	31	2
New Zealand	47	35	18	1	—
Poland	4	11	69	15	1
Saint Lucia	59	29	11	1	—
Singapore	15	10	24	50	2
Sweden	74	15	11	—	—
Switzerland	86	4	8	2	— a/
Suriname	30	24	25	19	1
United Kingdom					
England and Wales	8	15	62	9	6
Northern Ireland	3	4	27	49	17
Scotland	32	19	17	22	10
Uruguay	76	16	5	3	—

a/ 1979 data.

Table 38. Prison population and non-custodial alternatives

Country	Total prison population in 1980 per 100,000 head of population	Total number of non-custodial alternatives
Argentina	84	1
Bangladesh	28	—
Belgium	59	—
Chile	16	4
Finland	168	3
France	85	3
India	21	1
Ireland	36	1
Italy	53	1
Kuwait	25	—
Madagascar	260	1
Mauritius	195	2
Netherlands	27	2
Pakistan	36 a/	—
Philippines	32	2
Poland	267	4
Portugal	59	2
Singapore	42 a/	1
Spain	49	—
Sri Lanka	74	—
United Kingdom		
England and Wales	49	—
Northern Ireland	171	6

a/ 1979 data.

D. Statistical compilation*

Table 39. Crimes recorded, persons apprehended, police personnel and prison population, 1975 and 1980

Country or area	Year	Crime recorded b/			Intentional homicides		Persons apprehended				Police personnel		Adult prison population	
		Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Percentage of crimes in largest city	Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Male		Female		Number	Females (per- centage)	Male	Female
							Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Number	Per 100,000 head of population				
Argentina	1975	320 216	1 229	12.7	3 150	12.1	166 592	1 281	21 120	162	15 675	828
	1980	227 578	806	10.8	1 371	4.9	116 152	827	14 978	106	20 027	872
Australia	1975	397	2.9	42 599	623	27 155
	1980	455	3.1	51 404	701	31 645	..	9 427	325
Austria	1975	247 137	3 286	33.1	200	2.7	95 304	2 690	16 847	424	26 655	0
	1980	304 666	4 059	31.6	164	2.2	107 840	3 037	20 501	518	27 159	0
Bahamas	1975	11 009	5	76.0	34	0.0	3 160	3	468	457	1 164	6	1 654	269
	1980	12 150	6	76.8	60	0.0	2 869	3	387	366	1 285	9	3 141	648
Bahrain	1980	6 396	1 843	22.2	4	1.2	3 947	1 954
Bangladesh	1975	141 687	185	..	2 558	3.3	98 999	250	505	1	58 997	0	35 942	1 049
	1980	130 416	148	7.5	1 893	2.1	72 716	160	1 001	2	67 839	0	18 663	2 515
Barbados	1975	7 001	2 851	..	9	3.7	226	4
	1980	7 079	2 842	..	16	6.4	248	12
Belgium	1975	8 500	177	488	10	6 398	283
	1980	164 d/	..	8 193	170	529	11	5 525	225
Belize	1975	3 812	..	52.8	33	..	1 846	662	6	803	18
	1980	3 985	..	61.6	24	..	2 523	502	6	842	0
Canada	1975	2 132 507	9 383	9.1	634	2.8	641 819	5 665	78 508	689	62 125	12
	1980	2 692 159	11 176	8.5	496	2.1	66 687	15
Cape Verde	1975	2 410	851
	1980	1 347	455
Chile	1975	180 591	1 747	22.6	579	5.6	54 504	1 064	7 549	145	1 012	129
	1980	372 703	3 349	37.8	1 520	13.7	54 438	988	7 673	137	867	59
Colombia	1975	192 136	829	22.6	189	0.8	84 826	732	7 943	69	54 958
	1980	226 184	877	17.6	618	2.4	81 711	632	7 513	58	44 206	..	31 084	1 465
Costa Rica	1980	31 952	1 402	51.5	134	5.9	2 288	73
Cyprus	1975	3 636	8
	1980	2 498	397	34.9	12	1.9	3 602	7
Czechoslovakia	1975	151 077	1 021	6.7	121	0.8	186 508	2 586	25 503	336
	1980	127 153	830	6.3	112	0.7	146 496	1 963	20 559	262
Denmark	1975	290 462	5 740	18.8	84	1.7	11 051	..	3 278	104
	1980	408 177	7 967	19.4	237	4.6	38 549	1 524	6 265	241	11 312	..	3 199	138
Fiji	1975	16 644	2 890	..	15	2.6
	1980	12 472	1 982	..	10	1.6
Finland	1975	211 399	4 487	28.1	259	5.5	10 857	..	4 834	98
	1980	199 060	4 165	19.5	254	5.3	127 990	5 539	15 970	647	11 101	..	4 372	117
France	1975	1 913 000	3 629	24 634	679
	1980	2 627 000	4 891	10.7	685 g/	..	567 332	2 156	119 022	434	33 819	11 079

continued

*Based on data submitted to the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders.

Table 39 (continued)

Country or area	Year	Crime recorded b/			Intentional homicides	Persons apprehended				Police personnel		Adult prison population		
		Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Percentage of crimes in largest city		Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Male		Female	Number	Females (percentage)	Male	Female
								Number	Per 100,000 head of population					
Germany, Federal Republic of	1975	3 815 774	6 171	2.2	2 733	4.4	1 149 822	3 894	274 146	849	48 943	2 015
	1980	2 919 390	4 742	3.0	2 957	4.8	917 718	3 120	195 278	607	42 821	1 295
Greece	1975	184 865	2 043	39.1	93	1.0	193 705	4 371	14 558	315	34 519	0	2 564	108
	1980	295 353	3 063	38.2	117	1.2	309 487	6 538	21 522	438	35 595	3	2 845	135
Honduras	1975	9 755	315	39.8	157	5.1	11 352	732	752	49
	1980	9 646	261	56.2	162	4.4	11 333	612	1 423	77
Hong Kong	1986	81 411	71	..	30 711	..	4 673	..	25 762	8	6 220	295
India	1975	3 007 993	485	14.6	17 563	2.8	1 396 343	434	28 743	10	602 800
	1980	3 255 062	473	13.2	22 149	3.2	1 906 821	535	47 433	14	637 102
Indonesia	1975	28 022	729
	1980	34 860	875
Ireland	1975	48 387	1 509	44.6	23	0.7	8 215	0	742	20
	1980	72 782	2 140	57.4	21	0.6	9 882	1	808	21
Israel	1975	180 247	5 217	..	184	5.3
	1980	247 000	6 369	..	215	5.5
Italy	1975	1 894 620	3 394	13.7	1 639	2.9	27 357	980
	1980	1 919 651	3 364	10.8	1 977	3.5	74 481	1	27 826	1 471
Jamaica	1975	93	0
	1980	14	0
Japan	1975	1 234 307	1 107	16.9	2 098	1.9	302 685	552	61 432	108	44 913	1 081
	1980	1 357 461	1 162	17.0	1 684	1.4	317 888	553	74 225	125	49 051	1 655
Jordan	1975	8 339	321	35.0	40	1.5
	1980	22 396	766	33.9	59	2.0
Kuwait	1975	7 540	749	38.2	25	2.5	204	31
	1980	8 346	607	26.6	41	3.0	281	22
Madagascar	1975	65 595	863	40.8	518	6.8
	1980	58 001	666	28.6	593	6.8
Mauritius	1975	453	106	8	2	1 851	29
	1980	13 f/	..	544	115	12	2	1 712	38
Morocco	1975	16 588	883
	1980	117 819	608	..	418	2.2	19 731	1 501
Nepal	1975	3 731	29	6.6	211	1.6	14 000	0
	1980	5 541	38	11.3	287	2.0	18 800
Netherlands	1975	447 668	3 245	13.7	998	7.2	129 454	1 889	13 595	196	3 042	58
	1980	695 993	4 919	13.7	1 501	10.6	182 837	2 604	19 592	275	3 617	127
New Zealand	1975	233 644	7 569	30.1	20	0.6	4 609	..	2 612	111
	1980	349 193	11 020	30.1	37	1.2	118 852	7 539	23 286	1 462	5 617	..	2 685	115
Norway	1975	98 478	2 457	32.1	24	0.6	11 249	565	1 217	60	4 865	..	1 879	34
	1980	121 565	2 975	29.9	32	0.8	12 376	611	1 209	59	5 491	..	1 694	56

continued

Table 39 (continued)

Country or area	Year	Crime recorded b/		Intentional homicides	Persons apprehended				Police personnel		Adult prison population	
		Number	Percentage of crimes in largest city		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female		
											Per 100,000 head of population	Per 100,000 head of population
Pakistan	1975	164 419	220	2.8	4 625	6.2
	1980	164 586	191	2.4	4 548	5.3	213 372	478	113 841	0
Panama	1975	251	14.4
	1980	187	9.6	1 489	156
Peru	1975	11 870
	1980	296
Philippines	1975	78 374	184	69.6	1 120	2.6	7 702	36	549	3	47 456	..
	1980	4 971	10.3	5 492	23	194	1	54 358	..
Poland	1975	340 423	1 001	..	690	2.0	242 565	1 465	29 187	167	..	73 647
	1980	337 935	950	9.8	641	1.8	236 547	1 365	26 680	146	..	81 359
Portugal	1975	81 622	866	67.5	2 525
	1980	46 494	470	58.5	358	3.6	1 338	4 869
Qatar	1975	1 460	853	48.7	2	1.2	1 651	1 437	23	41	2 562	0
	1980	2 284	1 017	32.4	5	2.2	3 548	2 483	132	162	6 186	0
Republic of Korea	1975	799 824	2 267	..	558	1.6	768 000	4 321	104 422	597
	1980	595 398	1 562	..	472	1.2	529 086	2 747	74 234	394
Saint Lucia	1980	6 079	5	59.6	4	0.0	980
Senegal	1975	9 026	189	49.0	92	1.9	8 685	368
	1980	13 219	233	49.1	135	2.4	7 361	262	6 168	0
Seychelles	1975	3
	1980	5 385	9	..	3	0.0	537	..
Singapore	1975	18 553	820	..	50	2.2	5 816	503	1 382
	1980	29 781	1 233	..	62	2.6	10 118	821	966
South Africa	1975	973 005	3 816	9.3	7 663	30.0	3 460	48
	1980	1 111 484	3 885	9.2	7 306	25.5	4 364	55
Spain	1975	181 140	509	15.7	167	0.5	66 265	382
	1980	408 940	1 093	20.9	31	0.1	111 426	606
Sri Lanka	1975	78 993	581	12.2	969	7.1
	1980	61 882	418	9.4	893	6.0	44 213	585
Suriname	1975	8 094	2 221	..	4	1.1	1 279	700	23	13
	1980	5 481	1 544	..	10	2.8	973	554	41	23
Sweden	1975	755 405	9 221	14.4	294	3.6	88 041	2 161	10 169	247	18 234	..
	1980	928 277	11 170	15.4	394	4.7	89 867	2 182	11 825	282	20 215	..
Switzerland	1975	26 151	408
	1980	37 796	597	15 526	..
Syrian Arab Republic	1975	33 649	452	23.7	381	5.1
	1980	34 785	395	40.3	401	4.6
Thailand	1975	370 068	894	40.7	11 357	27.4	329 487	1 585	97 783	..
	1980	218 534	470	34.0	11 715	25.2	180 878	775	124 266	..

continued

Table 39 (continued)

Country or area	Year	Crime recorded b/			Intentional homicides		Persons apprehended				Police personnel		Adult prison population	
		Number ^c	Per 100,000 head of population	Percentage of crimes in largest city	Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Male		Female		Number	Females (percentage)	Male	Female
							Number	Per 100,000 head of population	Number	Per 100,000 head of population				
Tonga	1975	2 136	2	44.6	3	0.0	488	277	11	204	0
	1980	2 094	2	43.5	6	0.0	779	300	15	128	0
Trinidad and Tobago	1975	19 599	1 943	28.2	60	5.9	4 838	938	3 645	3	2 509	102
	1980	18 279	1 669	28.0	46	4.2	5 215	954	4 223	4	2 223	164
Uganda	1975	9 981	99
United Arab Emirates	1975	26	5.2
	1980	15 656	1 598	45.5	35	3.6	17 183	2 538
United Kingdom ^{a/}	1975	2 105 631	3 758	21.7	1 014	1.8	45 300	..	27 199	784
	1980	2 520 628	4 506	22.2	775	1.4	46 168	..	28 563	1 030
United States	1975	11 256 566 ^{c/}	5 212	5.2	20 505	9.5	6 751 545	6 408	1 262 000	1 141	504 000	..	377 839	16 639
	1980	13 295 400 ^{c/}	5 838	5.3	23 044	10.1	8 170 247	7 369	1 532 934	1 312	559 916	..	489 602	22 535
Uruguay	1975	5 737	203	32.7	33	1.2	9 363	668	1 040	73	1 851	166
	1980	6 635	228	47.9	98	3.4	7 853	547	1 457	99	1 768	142
Venezuela	1975	103 431	817	43.0	895	7.1	15 341	410
	1980	128 516	855	39.1	1 881	12.5	11 766	365
Yugoslavia	1975	312 424	1 463	..	1 811	8.5	209 707	1 996	22 401	207
	1980	232 301	1 042	..	1 349	6.0	154 101	1 401	16 581	147
Zambia	1975	120 058	2 480	..	349	7.2	10 577
	1980	153 343	2 715	..	583	10.3
Zimbabwe	1975	224 074	3 603	..	263	4.2

a/ England and Wales only.

b/ Attempts to commit are included in the total of crimes recorded but excluded wherever possible here.

c/ Does not include attempted homicides, non-intentional homicides, non-forcible rape, drug crimes, kidnapping or fraud.

d/ 1984.


e/ 1983.

f/ 1982.

Annex II


FIGURES

Figure I. Increase and decrease in total recorded crime rate, 1975-1980



Note: Based on 36 replies


Figure II. Percentage of countries reporting Increases or decreases by crime type, 1975-1980



Note: Based on 36 replies


 Increase  Decrease

Figure III. Percentage of countries reporting increases or decreases in violent crime by region, 1975-1980




Note: Based on 60 replies: Africa - 11; Asia - 13;
Eastern Europe - 2; Latin America - 8; Caribbean - 4;
Western Europe and North America - 22.

Figure IV. Percentage of countries reporting increases or decreases in property crime by region, 1975-1980



Note: Based on 60 replies: Africa - 11; Asia - 13;
Eastern Europe - 2; Latin America - 8; Caribbean - 4;
Western Europe and North America - 22.

**Figure V. Percentage of countries reporting increases or decreases
in drug crimes by region, 1975-1980**



**Figure VI. Percentage of countries reporting
Increases in violent crimes, property crimes and drug crimes, 1975-1980**






Figure VII. Recorded assaults per 100,000 head of population, 1970-1980



Note: 1970-1975: developing countries - 23; developed countries - 23. 1976-1980: developing countries - 7; developed countries - 22.

Figure VIII. Recorded thefts per 100,000 head of population, 1970-1980



Note: 1970-1975: developing countries - 24; developed countries - 25. 1976-1980: developing countries - 7; developed countries - 22.

Figure IX. Age distribution of offenders by sex, 1975-1980




Figure X. Filtering from apprehension to conviction: two examples




Figure XI. Filtering from crime to prison:
two examples





Figure XII. Countries reporting increases in
prison rate by population base and crime base,
1975-1980



Note: Europe - 8;

all other countries - 10

Figure XIII. Countries reporting increases in prison rate by population base and crime base using the world system classification, 1975-1980






Figure XIV. Proportion of adult prison population under sentence by region, 1975-1980




Note: Based on 60 replies: Africa - 11; Asia - 13;
 Eastern Europe - 2; Latin America - 8; Caribbean - 4;
 Western Europe and North America - 22.

Figure XV. Proportion of juvenile prison population under sentence by region, 1975-1980



Note: Based on 60 replies: Africa - 11; Asia - 13;
 Eastern Europe - 2; Latin America - 8; Caribbean - 4;
 Western Europe and North America - 22.

Figure XVI. Proportion of juveniles in detained population by region, 1975-1980



Note: Based on 60 replies: Africa - 11; Asia - 13;
 Eastern Europe - 2; Latin America - 8; Caribbean - 4;
 Western Europe and North America - 22.

Figure XVII. Proportions of police, judges and prison officers, 1980






Figure XVIII. Police and prison officers in developing and developed countries per 100,000 population, 1970 and 1980




Note: Based on 21 replies: developed countries - 18; developing countries - 3.

Figure XIX. Assaults per 100,000 head of population, 1970-1980




Note: Based on 67 replies; least developed countries - 3; developed countries - 22; developing countries - 42.

Figure XX. Thefts per 100,000 head of population, 1970-1980




Note: Based on 73 replies; least developed countries - 4; developed countries - 23; developing countries - 46.

Figure XXI. Cost Index for assault, 1970-1980



Note: Based on 64 replies:
least developed countries - 2; developed
countries - 20; developing countries - 42.

Figure XXII. Cost Index for theft, 1970-1980



Note: Based on 60 replies: least developed countries - 2;
developed countries - 20; developing
countries - 46.

Figure XXIII. Projected number of recorded crimes, 1975-2000




Figure XXIV. Projected number of police personnel, 1975-2000




Figure XXV. Projected number of detained adults, 1975-2000

