


U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice



NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS

Annual Evaluation Report on
Drugs and Crime: 1992

142975

About the National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice, a component of the Office of Justice Programs, is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. NIJ was established to prevent and reduce crime and to improve the criminal justice system. Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 direct the National Institute of Justice to:

- *Sponsor special projects and research and development programs* that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime.
- *Conduct national demonstration projects* that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice.
- *Develop new technologies* to fight crime and improve criminal justice.
- *Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs* and identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated.
- *Recommend actions* that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments as well as private organizations to improve criminal justice.
- *Carry out research on criminal behavior.*
- *Develop new methods of crime prevention* and reduction of crime and delinquency.

The National Institute of Justice has a long history of accomplishments, including the following:

- Basic research on career criminals that led to the development of special police and prosecutor units to deal with repeat offenders.
- Research that confirmed the link between drugs and crime.
- The research and development program that resulted in the creation of police body armor that has meant the difference between life and death to hundreds of police officers.
- Pioneering scientific advances such as the research and development of DNA analysis to positively identify suspects and eliminate the innocent from suspicion.
- The evaluation of innovative justice programs to determine what works, including drug enforcement, community policing, community anti-drug initiatives, prosecution of complex drug cases, drug testing throughout the criminal justice system, and user accountability programs.
- Creation of a corrections information-sharing system that enables State and local officials to exchange more efficient and cost-effective concepts and techniques for planning, financing, and constructing new prisons and jails.
- Operation of the world's largest criminal justice information clearinghouse, a resource used by State and local officials across the Nation and by criminal justice agencies in foreign countries.

The Institute Director, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by the priorities of the Office of Justice Programs, the Department of Justice, and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify their most critical problems. Dedicated to the priorities of Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies, research and development at the National Institute of Justice continues to search for answers to what works and why in the Nation's war on drugs and crime.

SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS

ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON DRUGS AND CRIME: 1992

A Report to the President,
the Attorney General,
and the Congress

U.S. Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice

142975

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June 1993

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Editorial Support

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National Institute of Justice

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20531

June 1993

Honorable William J. Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3766 (c), the National Institute of Justice is required to submit annually to the President, the Attorney General, and the Congress a report on evaluations of innovative programs to reduce crime and drug abuse.

In fulfillment of that mandate, therefore, I have the honor to transmit herewith *Searching for Answers*, the National Institute of Justice's Fourth Annual Evaluation Report on Drugs and Crime for 1992.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michael J. Russell".

Michael J. Russell
Acting Director
National Institute of Justice

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Message from the Office of Justice Programs

Many State and local jurisdictions today face a double-bind: rising public demand to stem crime, violence, and drug abuse and a concurrent rising cost in coping with these problems. This development has placed a heavy responsibility on criminal justice system policymakers and managers to stretch their taxpayer dollars to the limit, and to find new and efficient ways for police, courts, and corrections to use a reasonable share of revenues while ensuring that the return to the taxpayer is also reasonable.

The Office of Justice Programs plays an important role in assisting State and local criminal justice agencies in meeting their public responsibilities. Under a cooperative agreement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance funds innovative programs and, as required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the National Institute of Justice evaluates drug-control projects that BJA funds. The goal is to find

the most effective anti-drug and anti-crime approaches available in the Nation, and to make the results of this effort available to State and local criminal justice agencies.

This fourth edition of *Searching for Answers* reports on the latest findings of this research and evaluation effort. Progress comes slowly in finding approaches that successfully meet the levels and kinds of violence and other crimes that society faces today. But progress is being made, and this report contains findings about approaches that are proving to be useful to State and local criminal justice agencies.

S. S. Ashton, Jr.
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the research, development, and evaluation arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, launched its *Searching for Answers* series in 1990. Since then, NIJ has reported on its evaluations of new approaches in State and local police, courts, and corrections agencies to reduce crime, violence, and illegal drug activity in the United States. These evaluations are conducted under a mandate from Congress in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

NIJ prepares this annual report to be of practical use to law enforcement professionals, prosecutors, judges, probation and parole officials, corrections administrators, victim services providers, and elected officials on the Federal, State, county, and municipal levels. This report, together with NIJ's annual research plan, provides solid information on approaches that are successful and worthy of replication, and on issues that require clarification and perhaps a new direction.

This year's report discusses a number of innovations that are showing promise in reducing crime and drug trafficking at the neighborhood level, which will help residents—aided by public and private agencies—to begin the all-important process of rebuilding those neighborhoods. For example, several of these promising new approaches involve the concept of community policing, in which the police department, from patrol officers to upper management executives, forms partnerships with neighborhoods to reduce crime, close crack houses and other drug markets, and utilize public and private resources to help stabilize neighborhoods. Police and community residents see value in community policing, and more reports on this new approach can be expected in the future.

Evaluation has played an important role in NIJ's work since its establishment 25 years ago. More recently, several forces have combined to raise evaluation to a higher priority at NIJ and in the criminal justice community:

- Congress has increasingly emphasized evaluation in legislation affecting the Institute;
 - Evaluation techniques have become more sophisticated, now employing, for example, computerized analysis of drug activity down to the neighborhood level and highly reliable scientific methods of detecting drug use in suspects and offenders;
 - A new spirit of experimentation and innovation to fight the problems of drugs and crime, which grow increasingly more complex;
- An increase in community involvement to fight crime, violence, and drugs; and
 - A growing need for hard data on what works to support budget decisions and assist policymakers faced with increasing budget constraints.

There is still no substitute for a trained and experienced police officer who knows his or her beat. But evaluations can recommend approaches that will help police officials to determine what equipment the officer should carry, help communications planners match computer databases with the officer's operational needs, alert watch commanders to patterns of drug and crime activity across the jurisdiction from day to day, and guide precinct commanders in planning patrol activities.

Results of Institute evaluations are now made available to the criminal justice community across the Nation. States are also building their capacity to conduct evaluations of crime- and drug-reduction programs, and NIJ is helping them to increase their capability. Much remains to be done, however, before results of evaluation are fully integrated into policymaking at the Federal and State levels and into planning, program development, and field operations at the State and local levels. The Institute also supports efforts to find better ways to ensure that evaluation results reach decisionmakers at all levels in the criminal justice system. Policymakers are seeking information on programs that have been validated through evaluation, and the inclusion of evaluation into the decisionmaking process is a major goal of NIJ.

The Institute presents this report not only in fulfillment of its mandate from Congress, but also as a contribution to its partnership with criminal justice professionals and the research community. The Institute looks forward to continuing to build this partnership by identifying programs that have maximum impact in the fight against drugs and crime.

Michael J. Russell
Acting Director
National Institute of Justice



Crime, violence, and drug abuse continue to rank among the most severe and chronic problems in American society today. In response, all elements of the criminal justice system are fully engaged in the effort to enforce the criminal law, apprehend and prosecute persons suspected of violating the law, and punish those who do.

Increasingly, however, as this report makes clear, many other public and private elements are also joining the efforts against crime and drugs. Sometimes this contribution is direct: police may ask a municipal housing agency to enforce nuisance abatement ordinances to drive drug dealers out of a neighborhood. (Chapter 8) Sometimes it is indirect: in many schools today, peer teaching and peer counseling help young people to develop their own means to resist the temptation to use drugs. (Chapter 6)

In this report, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) examines the subject of drugs and crime, including violent crime, from the perspective of the researcher and evaluator. This report asks, and attempts to answer, such questions as: What are the best methods to protect individuals and communities from drug-related crime? How can criminal justice agencies employ tested approaches that are both effective and affordable? How can offenders be changed in ways that lessen the chances that they will return to crime?

This fourth edition of *Searching for Answers* constitutes one NIJ contribution toward answering the critical questions of interest to the criminal justice system today. This report describes evaluations funded by NIJ to measure the effectiveness of dozens of innovative projects funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs. NIJ and BJA cooperate in conducting these activities in carrying out the provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES AND COMMUNITIES BROADEN APPROACHES

It has become increasingly evident that the criminal justice system alone cannot correct those conditions that seem to breed crime. NIJ evaluations are beginning to open new and broader paths to addressing crime problems through a greater range of public and private agencies and resources.

NIJ evaluations are showing, for example:

- **Police crackdowns:** These intense police efforts drive drug dealers out of a neighborhood as long as the high-profile police presence remains. In some cases, however, within about 12 days after the high-intensity crackdown ends, drug activity returns to the neighborhood. (Chapter 2) Some cities are now experimenting with "crackdowns plus" to continue a lower level of police presence through opening a mini-station, deploying walking patrols, and involving municipal agencies in persuading crack house owners to evict the occupants or risk boarding up of the buildings for violating building codes. (Chapter 3)
- **Community policing:** An NIJ evaluation in Baltimore, Maryland, showed that, when police and community residents work together, crime goes down; areas that receive the most extensive community policing effort show the largest decrease; and community policing improves residents' satisfaction with police. (Chapter 2)

- **Public housing:** NIJ evaluations in several cities show that levels of drug-related crime may differ significantly from one building to another in a public housing development, suggesting that police need to know more about particulars of drug activity at the unit level in public housing. (Chapter 2)
- **Probation:** In San Diego County, California, probationers responded in an NIJ survey that they would select a structured program of drug treatment, education, employment assistance, and counseling if given such an option; the cost and effectiveness of this approach in San Diego need to be investigated. (Chapter 5)
- **Drug Market Analysis:** Adapting NIJ's Drug Market Analysis techniques, Kansas City, Missouri, showed that information-sharing pays off. (Chapter 2) The idea that "everyone knows" where crack houses are located and where drug dealing occurs may not be true in Kansas City, at least. The Data, Research, and Analysis for Geographic Narcotics Enforcement Targets (DRAGNET) program of the Kansas City Police Department recently produced some surprising results, for instance:
 - Of drug-dealing locations reported to the 24-hour police hotline, 95 percent were not known as drug-dealing locations by officers working the beats where those markets were reported.
 - Of locations identified by beat officers as drug-dealing locations, 84 percent were not reported by citizens to the 24-hour hotline.
 - Locations identified by both police and citizens were far more violent and troublesome than those identified by one group alone.
- **Boot camps:** Evaluations are indicating that "graduates" of boot camp who return to the streets need assistance in carrying over the positive habits they learn. Some States are now implementing programs of aftercare to enable offenders to make a structured and supported transition from boot camp to life in the community. (Chapter 10)

These new, broader approaches appear to be generated in part by the increasing awareness of the need for other public and private resources and approaches in preventing crime and helping offenders avoid a relapse into drugs and crime. This last point bears some expansion. One of the most pressing criminal justice issues confronting society today is the behavior of the ex-offender: Will he or she integrate into a family and circle of supportive friends, learn a skill, find a job, and become a law-abiding and contributing member of the community? Or will he or she begin to associate with the criminal element, rely for income on skills in illicit activity, start to commit crime, and soon be pulled back into the criminal justice system for yet another cycle of arrest, prosecution, and punishment?

There is growing recognition that many persons, especially high-risk individuals, entering the criminal justice system present a range of problems and disabilities that should be addressed, if rehabilitation is the goal. An example is learning disabilities: in one juvenile program, one-third of the youths had an emotional or learning disability and the group had on average an eighth grade education. Greater emphasis on prevention and early intervention with a range of community-based services clearly is warranted.

LEARNING HOW PARTNERSHIPS CAN WORK

During the past few years, NIJ has funded a number of grants that focus on the effects of public-private collaborations. One recently completed evaluation of the national demonstration program called Community Responses to Drug Abuse (CRDA) looked at how 10 community-based organizations across 9 cities planned and implemented anti-drug strategies in preventing crime and drug abuse. Others are looking at various forms of community- and problemsolving policing strategies, anti-drug initiatives in small cities and towns, and interventions to deter youths considered at risk of becoming drug abusers or criminals. (Chapter 7)

Most Institute evaluations of programs that involve community-police partnerships have one common finding: police, and the communities they serve, often become supporters of each other and their combined missions once they get to know and trust each other. This may mean overcoming what had been poor relations between them. The studies also show, however, that implementing community organizing programs in drug-plagued, unstable neighborhoods is difficult, but can be accomplished. For example, in a drug-ridden neighborhood in Hayward, California, residents organized a Neighborhood Watch group that successfully drove drug activity from their streets. Residents have continued to take an active role in improving the quality of life in their neighborhood and, through innovative neighborhood-oriented policing, have developed excellent relations with the police department and individual officers. (Chapter 4)

NIJ's evaluation of CRDA has demonstrated how much can be accomplished by local community organizations with limited funding from the Federal Government. Initially, evaluators found that CRDA organizations focused on a broad range of anti-drug programs, many of which were geared toward enforcement and reflected the community's outrage over the persistent presence of drug dealers and drug-related violence in their neighborhoods. Over time, however, some CRDA organizations came to realize that the criminal justice system provided only a limited solution to the drug problem, and thus, turned their attention to education, prevention, and treatment responses and expanded into broader partnerships with other agencies. The transition from an adversarial to a collaborative relationship, especially in the partnerships that emerged between the CRDA community organizations and the local police, was noteworthy. The two parties worked together to plan and implement many anti-drug strategies; in the process, they developed a new level of respect and understanding.

At the same time, police in a Brooklyn, New York, precinct witnessed about a 27 percent drop in the number of civilian complaints against officers during the first 21 months of operation of its community-oriented policing program. To coordinate this problemsolving approach to policing, a Precinct Management Team was established, composed of the precinct commander and representatives of patrols, a special operations unit and the community, plus the City Council Representative and the Community Council President. The team holds regular meetings to identify and address problems, including drug sales, burglaries, stolen and abandoned automobiles, robberies, and prostitution. There has been a 10 percent decline in property felony crime complaints and a 32 percent rise in monthly violent felony crime arrests as a result of this program. (Chapter 3)

The quality of life in a neighborhood is tied directly to fear of crime and drug abuse. Some neighborhoods are so devastated by crime and drugs that they cannot function as communities. The social fabric is so torn that even the barest amenities are scarcely available, and neighbors do not help neighbors. Some communities are experimenting with this formula: police drive drug traffickers out of the neighborhood and keep them out, city agencies close crack houses and clean up trash-filled empty lots and alleys, and public and private agencies intensify delivery of education and health services. Indications of change soon appear. Residents begin to report crime and drug activity to police and to cooperate when police ask for help. (Chapter 4) Even if the crime rate does not change, public perception of security rises, which encourages economic activity and raises the quality of life.

USING NIJ EVALUATION RESULTS

This document provides information useful at three levels:

- **Practitioners:** Criminal justice agency managers can learn about programs that have been tried elsewhere and seem to produce results. Example: San Diego, California, has developed Jurisdictions Unified for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE), a multiagency task force that addresses escalation in gang problems. (Chapter 7)


- **Researchers and evaluators:** Innovation invites evaluation, which in turn leads to refinement of programs and suggests new directions. This report suggests many new avenues for research and innovation, and many opportunities for State and local agencies to conduct their own evaluations. Indeed, NIJ is helping States to develop their own evaluation capabilities. Findings from these evaluations are presented at the annual Evaluation Conference jointly sponsored by NIJ and BJA. (Chapter 11)
- **Policymakers:** Government leaders have closely followed developments in law enforcement and criminal justice in recent years, and have frequently enacted legislation at the Federal and State levels to enable agencies to try new approaches. More ideas are forthcoming in this volume. (Chapter 5)

A Long-Range Effort

In the past year, NIJ has built on the knowledge gained from its work to chart new directions. This broadening view of crime reduction efforts is also reflected in the Institute's long-range plan. NIJ will continue to design and support research, evaluation, demonstration, and training projects to understand, prevent, and control crimes and their harms. Toward this end, *NIJ's Program Plan: 1993* contains six broad goals:

- Reduce violent crimes and their consequences;
- Reduce drug-related crimes;
- Reduce the consequences of crimes for individuals, households, organizations, and communities;
- Develop household, school, business, workplace, and community crime prevention programs;
- Improve the effectiveness of law enforcement, criminal justice, correctional, and service systems' responses to offenses, offending, and victimization; and
- Develop and evaluate information for criminal justice responses to changing and emerging crime patterns and for utilization of new technologies.

Among areas of interest to NIJ in the coming year are: drug enforcement and treatment, gang prevention and sanctions, drug and crime prevention in schools and public housing, health and justice, community policing, and community-based prosecution.



NO
LOITERING
DRINKING
OR
DRUGS

POLICE NOTICE
Persons observed loitering for the purpose of engaging in illegal drug activity are subject to Tampa Police Department Officers questioning and arrest.
City of Tampa Code Section 24.43

WARNING
HIGH DRUG ACTIVITY AREA
Person(s) observed loitering for the purpose of engaging in illegal drug activity are subject to Tampa Police Department Officers questioning and arrest.
City of Tampa Code Section 24.43

Drug abuse and drug-related crimes—especially violent crimes—afflict the lives of countless Americans. Efforts to combat crime and violence and improve the quality of life in neighborhoods scarred by drugs place an enormous burden on the criminal justice system at all levels of government. The Federal Government plays a special role in these efforts, a role that includes assisting State and local governments in finding and emphasizing those methods of combating drugs and crime that are the most efficient and effective.

This is the fourth in a series of reports begun in 1989 that responds to a mandate from Congress to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, to evaluate and report on innovative programs that show promise in the fight to reduce crime and drug activity. The purpose of this report is to advise policymakers within Federal, State, and local governments on findings about new anti-drug approaches that police, courts, and corrections are implementing.

THE FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL PARTNERSHIP

In the Federal system in this country, responsibility for protecting people and property falls largely to the States and their counties, cities, and towns. The legislation mandating this report relies on that Federal system to build a new partnership to fight crime and drugs. This partnership reflects the philosophy that Federal funds, ideas, and information plus State and local initiatives, experience, and resources can be combined in an aggressive fight against drugs and crime.

The Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-570), for example, authorized annual Federal grants to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the five Territories (referred to here as the States) to support anti-drug and -crime efforts. The grants were to be distributed to the States from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which (like NIJ) is a component of the Office of Justice Programs.

Two years later, in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690), Congress expanded this partnership. It increased funding levels, created the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and (in Section 520) assigned to NIJ responsibility for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of programs funded under the Act.

The key to success of the partnership is the ability of State and local governments to act as laboratories for experiments in anti-drug and -crime efforts. BJA provides formula grants for this function to the States, which then pass on funds through subgrants to county and municipal governments that in turn carry out innovative programs. BJA also provides funds through discretionary grants directly to State and local agencies that initiate programs. In either case, BJA and NIJ work together to select promising programs for evaluation under Section 520 according to four criteria:

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- *How Federal, State, and local organizations can coordinate efforts to fight drugs and crime*
- *NIJ and evaluation*
- *Future directions for NIJ evaluations*

- The extent to which the program establishes a new and innovative approach to the control of drugs and crime;
- The cost of the program that will be evaluated and the number of similar programs funded;
- The program's potential for replication in other jurisdictions; and
- The levels of public awareness of and community involvement in the program.

NIJ's selection process, which involves staff members from both NIJ and BJA, draws on a national network of criminal justice researchers established largely through support from Federal research grants. The Institute also convenes focus groups of criminal justice professionals and associations to solicit their input on key issues regarding field operations as well as their views on what the Institute's research and evaluation priorities should be. Participants in these focus groups have included the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National District Attorneys Association, the National Association of Counties, and the American Corrections Association, among others.

NIJ reports the results of its evaluations in *Searching for Answers* and by other means to police executives and officers, prosecutors, judges, probation and parole officials, corrections executives, victim services providers, and elected officials on the Federal, State, county, and local levels.

Evaluation and the National Institute of Justice

NIJ has been evaluating anti-crime efforts since it was established by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-351). NIJ began to award evaluation grants in 1989 to meet the mandate of Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988; since then, it has awarded \$15.5 million for 55 grants. Many of the Nation's leading criminal justice researchers in colleges, universities, nonprofit research organizations, and criminal justice agencies have participated in this program to mobilize knowledge and talent for the anti-crime effort.

Although only in its fourth year, the Section 520 evaluation program has shown significant results. Some new approaches show considerable promise, such as Drug Market Analysis, a computerized information system that enables police commanders to assign patrols to suppress "hotspots" of drug activity and that provides police executives with valuable information to plan longer-range strategies against such activity. Community-based anti-drug programs, many of which entail close partnerships between neighborhood organizations and local police, have also proved quite successful in addressing the drug problem from a broader perspective that comprises education, prevention, and treatment. Another new approach, adopted by corrections officials in many States, is the use of post-release programs to provide services to help ex-offenders retain the valuable lessons they learned in boot camp, to channel them toward work and family, and to help them build the foundations of a stable life.

Scope of This Report

This report focuses on the widening dimensions of crime associated with drugs. It discusses criminal activities that police and prosecutors have lately viewed as drug-related concerns. For example, domestic violence, once thought to be largely outside the realm of police responsibility, is now viewed as a matter that not only demands police intervention but also is likely to involve drugs (the batterer is often under the influence of alcohol or drugs). Schools, too, increasingly call for police involvement in educating students about drugs and violence. Thus, this report covers NIJ evaluations in the areas of domestic violence, school-related crime, gangs, and other areas of crucial concern to policymakers, practitioners, and the public—all of whom have a stake in addressing the complex social issues attending drug-related crime and violence.

Similarly, this report covers all current NIJ evaluation grants awarded under Section 520 of the 1988 Act (and lists all grants currently active that have been awarded since 1989). It also includes some other NIJ evaluations in order to provide a larger and more meaningful context. (A list of all Section 520 grants awarded by NIJ since the program began appears in Appendix A.)

This report does not, however, cover the wide range of other NIJ research, demonstration, and evaluation efforts conducted across the country. These efforts touch on all aspects of public safety and justice—from violence within the family to the roots of criminal behavior, white-collar crime, and education and treatment to control drug abuse. The Institute publishes the results of this work in various publications (a list of which is included in Appendix B of this report).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR NIJ EVALUATIONS

The evaluations discussed in this report point to many promising new avenues of exploration in the search for answers that will help criminal justice agencies control drugs and crime more effectively. NIJ evaluations are intended to ensure that research and demonstration funds are funneled into the best approaches and that information on successful programs is quickly disseminated to the law enforcement and criminal justice community.

NIJ has identified several avenues for evaluation in fiscal year 1993 and will focus particularly on integrating enforcement and control with broader social services and community involvement. Among the areas proposed for study in 1993 are the following:


- **Drug enforcement and treatment:** Meshing law enforcement and social services may extend the impact of crackdowns and help communities forestall the return of drug trafficking in their neighborhoods.
- **Gang prevention and sanctions:** Numerous public and private social service, school, and community-based organizations are becoming involved with gang prevention, even as police attempt to control violent gang activity. Leaders of these organizations, which include public and mental health agencies, job training programs, public housing authorities, and criminal justice agencies, want to know how to design comprehensive approaches to attract young people away from gang activity as well as what sanctions are effective against illegal gangs.
- **Drug and crime prevention in schools:** Police and educators are interested in knowing more the effectiveness of partnership programs that help young people avoid drug and alcohol abuse, delinquency, school disruptions, and other behavior detrimental to the educational process.
- **Drug and crime prevention in public housing:** Public housing authorities and police departments, in conjunction with other municipal agencies, need proven tactics that can stem the crime, violence, drug abuse, and drug trafficking that are overwhelming public housing developments in many parts of the Nation.
- **Community policing:** Evaluations of specific strategies that may be effective, such as aggressive patrolling and order maintenance in particular neighborhoods and ways in which police can resolve citizen conflicts before they escalate to more dangerous situations are planned in 1993. Comprehensive impact evaluations of fully-developed community policing efforts may be undertaken in 1994.
- **Community-based prosecution:** Evaluations of new programs that are placing prosecutors and courts in neighborhoods, where residents can participate more easily in the administration of justice, can help focus attention on individual communities as part of crackdowns on crime and drugs.

In addition, States are conducting their own evaluations of local projects. An NIJ needs assessment has found that States differ in their ability to evaluate programs and use evaluation data. Evaluation staff and resources are often severely limited, affecting interest in and potential uses of State evaluation findings.

NIJ has for the past few years sought to help States upgrade their evaluation capacities to attain the following goals:

- Develop State and local evaluation capacities that can be sustained;
- Help State and local criminal justice agencies conduct process and impact evaluations of their programs;
- Incorporate the findings of national and State evaluations into State-level planning; and
- Improve drug- and violence-control efforts by sharing lessons learned from the evaluation experience.

NIJ is seeking to integrate evaluation findings into the planning of Federal, State, and local drug- and violence-reduction programs; to that end, NIJ will assess how State and local evaluation units can work together in creating those programs.



Enforcement of criminal laws against illegal drug activity has long been a cornerstone of national policy on drugs and crime. Concepts of enforcement have changed in recent years, however, and continue to evolve as police departments try innovative and experimental approaches, combine new and old tactics to confound and apprehend drug offenders, and stretch limited resources to gain the greatest return on money and effort expended. The goals of these efforts are to suppress crime and drive criminals from neighborhoods and to achieve levels of long-term safety and stability that enable local residents to build communities that can successfully resist criminal activity.

Police agencies around the country are experimenting with new enforcement approaches, many of them highly imaginative, and the Institute is evaluating scores of these in numerous locales. An idea is one thing, but an idea that works well may be something quite different, as any experienced police commander knows. Evaluations undertaken by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) are designed to find ideas that not only work but also apply to a variety of jurisdictions.

This chapter reports on Institute efforts to evaluate projects that show promise of helping State and local policymakers and police managers find ways to use their resources most effectively in law enforcement. Information provided in previous annual reports on Drug Market Analysis (DMA), a computerized approach to processing information on local drug activity, has been updated in this report. DMA shows considerable potential for helping police with precinct-level assignment of patrols and other drug-suppression tactics.

Police drug crackdowns, also reported in previous years, continue to evolve as a technique against drug dealers. Intense police activity clearly has significant short-term effects in driving out drug criminals, but evaluators are finding that longer-term followup actions are needed to make the changes stick. A Baltimore, Maryland, project that employed traditional police crackdown techniques, followed by community policing and community-initiated and -implemented programs, has shown promise in terms of reducing drugs and drug-related crimes and in improving citizens' views of the quality of the policing and safety of their neighborhoods.

Finally, this chapter reports on an evaluation of levels of drug-related crime in public housing and police responses to that crime. Crime levels in public housing, and how those levels compare with levels in surrounding areas, have long been the subject of speculation. Reliable data have been notably lacking, however. This evaluation will provide public housing managers, police executives, and public housing residents with such information.

CHANGING POLICE TACTICS AND INFORMATION NEEDS

Drug enforcement tactics changed dramatically when crack cocaine was introduced on the street in about 1985. This new, cheaply priced, and easily concealed product brought drug dealing and drug dealers out into the open, and local police agencies responded. By the early 1990s, drug enforcement in most American cities had shifted from a reliance on

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- ***Drug Market Analysis programs in five cities***
- ***A drug crackdown program in Detroit***
- ***Baltimore County's community-oriented drug enforcement program***
- ***Emerging drug enforcement tactics***
- ***Drugs, crime, and policing in public housing***

Many police departments around the country are watching Drug Market Analysis with interest. The Institute expects that a model DMA program widely applicable in policing will soon emerge.

narcotics units to enforcement by line officers, who had always made more drug arrests than narcotics units—often as a result of routine traffic stops.¹

At the local level, drug arrests increased dramatically in the late 1980s—doubling, for example, in New York City from 1986 to 1988 and rising 70 percent from 1985 to 1987.² Arrests of wholesale dealers of drug-selling organizations were, however, rare during this period, and arrested street-level sellers were rapidly replaced by others.³

The growing demand for drug enforcement raises varied and complicated policy questions, including these:

- How much effort should be invested in drug enforcement?
- Which drugs should receive the most attention?
- How should enforcement efforts be divided among high-level dealers, retailers, and drug users?
- Should enforcement be concentrated in a specific neighborhood or spread through a city?
- What is the role of police and corrections agencies in the prevention and treatment of drug abuse?⁴

Policymakers have remained largely unclear about what to do in their cities and even less clear about what others are doing in theirs.⁵ Institute evaluations that can help inform policy decisions follow.

DRUG MARKET ANALYSIS: TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

Data not typically used in making law enforcement decisions, such as calls for service, arrests, and citizen tips, are now being integrated into automated information systems collectively referred to as the Drug Market Analysis program. Initiated by the Institute 5 years ago, DMA has become useful in tactical assignments and strategic planning alike. Police commanders use DMA to decide how to deploy patrols to combat drug activity, and police executives use DMA to determine which city ordinances to invoke to close crack houses—to note only two examples (see box).

Many police departments around the country are watching Drug Market Analysis with interest. The Institute expects that a model DMA program widely applicable in policing will soon emerge. In short, DMA is a significant addition to the tools available to police today.

Central to DMA are the geographic databases that generate maps of specific drug market locations. This technology was not available prior to initiation of the program in 1989. In that year, five police departments received funding to develop computer systems that would identify and track “hotspots” of drug trafficking and enable them to evaluate the effectiveness of specific anti-drug tactics. The five participating agencies and their affiliated research organizations are Jersey City, New Jersey, Police Department and the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University; Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department and Crime Control Institute; Pittsburgh Police Department and the School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University; the San Diego California Police Department and Police Executive Research Forum (PERF); and Hartford, Connecticut, Police Department and Queues Enforth Development Corporation (QED).

During the first phase, participants have been developing computer-based information systems and strategies for street-level enforcement; they have also been determining how these systems can be used to support their strategies. During the second phase, each site is implementing its street-level strategies and evaluating their effectiveness.

The technologies piloted in the five DMA projects have significant implications for the development and advancement of local drug-enforcement-related and other criminal justice activities in communities. Thus far, the demonstration sites have found that:

- Computer mapping of drug activity indicators is informative in developing and implementing enforcement strategies;
- Computerization and integration of databases allow police to organize and apply previously underused data such as calls for service and arrest data; and
- DMA is helpful in supporting neighborhood-oriented policing (see Chapter 3).

NIJ has undertaken six evaluations of DMA projects. Five relate to the actual demonstration sites, and the sixth involves an umbrella analysis of the technologies and other facets of the entire project as well as recommendations for a model DMA program that could be employed in other local jurisdictions.

Gaining a New Perspective on the Drug Problem in Jersey City

Jersey City's Drug Market Analysis Project (DMAP) uses a location-based computer information system to help police identify drug markets and develop crime prevention and control programs. This computer system links the police department's computer-aided dispatch system and personal computer technology so that data can be represented both visually—on computer-generated geographic maps—and in a report format.

Data on narcotics arrests and activity and interviews with narcotics squad detectives are being integrated by the DMA system. To determine what information the community could provide on drug dealing, a 1-day narcotics "phone-in" and a community survey of 500 Jersey City residents were conducted during the first phase of the project.

The program differs from conventional enforcement strategies in three ways:

- First, it has changed the management style of the experimental narcotics teams by giving responsibility for particular markets to individual officers. The aim is to generate a sense of ownership for each market so that officers can develop specialized knowledge of market patterns, develop close contacts with residents and businesses in their area, and sustain long-term maintenance programs within the market boundaries.
- Second, it classifies the different types of drug markets into categories depending on the situations and physical environments that prevail within market boundaries.
- Third, crackdowns are now developed after intensive surveillance of market areas and advance preparation of arrest warrants for dealers frequenting the market. These crackdowns may involve as many as 45 officers in a single evening or day, or may involve a dozen officers executing arrest warrants in a 1-hour sweep through the area.

Detecting Crack Houses in Kansas City

A valuable lesson for both law enforcement and community policing has been learned in Kansas City: information-sharing pays off. The idea that "everyone knows" where crack houses are located and where drug dealing occurs is not true in Kansas City, Missouri, at least.

The Data, Research, and Analysis for Geographic Narcotics Enforcement Targets (DRAG-NET) program of the Kansas City Police Department produced these surprising results:

- Of drug-dealing locations reported by citizens to the 24-hour police hotline, 95 percent were *not* known as drug-dealing locations by officers working the beats where those markets were reported.

Drug Market Analysis

Drug Market Analysis (DMA) programs integrate police operations, computer technology, and evaluation. Programs are designed to meet the need for large-scale data on drugs and drug-related crime, to help police assess the extent of drug problems, and to determine the effectiveness of intervention efforts. At a minimum, DMA programs are being used to pinpoint hotspots of drug activity, determine how they relate to other trouble areas, and integrate data from police agencies within a metropolitan area.

As basic requirements, the five sites selected to participate in the DMA demonstration program were required to create:

- A computer system that integrates multiple police databases on a real-time basis;
- Computer mapping technology that locates drug markets throughout a city and eventually the surrounding metropolitan area;
- A user-friendly computer system for narcotics detectives and other police officers; and
- Specific drug enforcement strategies that can be implemented and evaluated.

Prior to DMA, police in these cities relied on scattered databases; some departments were still working with handwritten materials. Many of these departments have now computerized and integrated existing records with other data sources, such as property descriptions, tax records, and building codes. Although each demonstration site has incorporated the required elements, all of the sites have their own characteristics and are at different stages in their programs.

One of the more important innovations of Pittsburgh's DMAP is its ability to allow police to retrieve data instantly from citizen calls for service and police offense and arrest reports—both of which are reliable indicators of the relative volume and geographic distribution of drug trafficking activities in the city.

- Of locations identified by beat officers as drug-dealing locations, 84 percent were not reported by citizens to the 24-hour hotline.
- Locations identified by both police and citizens were far more violent and troublesome than those identified by one group alone.

Evaluators concluded that police and citizens can identify drug-dealing locations most accurately by working together.

The effects of police raids were not as encouraging:

- The experiment's 98 raids prevented only an estimated 35 reported crimes—about 1 crime for every 3 raids—and an estimated 85 calls for service, less than 1 call per raid.
- Even these small effects disappeared after 12 days and may have been further reduced by displacement of drug activity to other locations.
- Only 23 of 98 raids produced any arrests, but the effects of the raids were substantially the same regardless of whether arrests were made.
- Citizen calls to the police drug hotline actually went up after the raids, while they went down in control areas; the rise was probably a function of increased willingness to call police.

Evaluators concluded that alternative police methods might be far more cost-effective than raids in reducing neighborhood harm caused by crack houses.

Using Call-for-Service Data in Pittsburgh's DMA System

Pittsburgh's computerized mapping and data retrieval system, P-DMAP, is still under development. Individual components have, however, been implemented by narcotics detectives and police administrators as they become available.

P-DMAP's computer-generated maps and accompanying reports trace drug activities in terms of locations and time of day. The system can be used to produce traditional police "pin" maps displaying the location and volume of drug trafficking activities on street maps; "area" maps that compare activity levels across larger geographic units such as neighborhoods and police patrol sectors; displays of buildings and property outlines; and other information, including public record data on property ownership. P-DMAP data queries also allow law enforcement personnel to investigate police records using nontraditional means such as telephone numbers, first names, and neighborhoods of arrest. The resulting list of individuals allows for further targeting of investigations—through mug-shot checks, surveillance, and undercover buys—in preparation for obtaining arrest warrants.

One of the more important innovations of P-DMAP is its ability to allow police to retrieve data instantly from citizen calls for service and police offense and arrest reports—both of which are reliable indicators of the relative volume and geographic distribution of drug trafficking activities in the city. Although individual calls for service may not provide fully accurate information on the circumstances of individual incidents (because they reflect the unconfirmed perceptions of citizens who call), analyses of the volume of calls and their distribution do provide reasonably accurate indicators of the locations of high and low activity across the city. The maps have been highly effective in quickly identifying the locations and times of high concentrations of drug trafficking activities and thus have been very useful during preparations for raids on drug market locations.

In addition, P-DMAP "pin" maps of drug and other criminal activities in the vicinity of target locations have been included as part of probable-cause affidavits for obtaining search warrants and as evidence in liquor license reviews and special hearings for injunctions to close nuisance bars. They have been used to identify new locations of displaced drug

activities and to determine whether an offense occurred within the vicinity of a school. (If a drug trafficking offense occurs within 1,000 feet of a school, a convicted offender is subject to a stiffer sentence; P-DMAP can accurately calculate the distance to the nearest school to within 5 feet.)

Impacts of a reverse-sting operation show the power of P-DMAP as a law enforcement tool. In a reverse sting, police officers replace dealers in a drug market in order to arrest customers who solicit and purchase drugs from undercover officers. In December 1990, Pittsburgh police officers used P-DMAP to select an area where there had been heavy drug trafficking. Undercover detectives first bought drugs and arrested the dealers in the areas and then substituted undercover officers for the dealers. After detectives made a sale, their customers were arrested by waiting police officers. Within 2 hours, 12 arrests had been made. Within a week and for the next 12 months, drug marketing in the area was virtually eliminated. P-DMAP showed, however, that during the same period of time, drug activity in a nearby location increased.

Integrating Drug Data in San Diego

Drug Market Analysis is part of the Regional Urban Information System (RUIS) within which the City and County of San Diego have integrated geographic data from 14 departments—such as engineering and utilities—into a single database. The police department component of RUIS contains specific police data and map boundaries.

Several data sources are plotted by this DMA system. Crime and arrest data are available from the regional crime and arrest system; citizen complaints, problem-oriented policing projects, and narcotics investigation data are downloaded from the city's crime analysis system; and calls-for-service data are transferred from a computer-aided dispatch system.

A basic map includes area and crime or arrest type. Police boundaries are designated by beats, sergeants' areas, or divisions. Other jurisdictions, such as council districts, census tracts, and community planning areas, and a radius around a selected address, may also be mapped.

With this system, patrol officers can request maps that display crime or drug trends in their beats as well as searches around a specific address. The maps are also used extensively for neighborhood and problem-oriented policing projects. In addition, investigative units have developed their own uses for the maps. For example, the homicide unit uses large maps in some of its investigations for serial murders, and the sex crimes unit uses the maps to show crime scenes in court.

DMAP was developed by the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) under contract with the police department. Experts in crime analysis have also been trained to modify the system to allow for expanded data transfer.

Mapping Target Areas in Hartford

The City of Hartford launched its Cartographic-Oriented Management Program for the Abatement of Street Sales (COMPASS) program in 1990. Partially funded by NIJ, COMPASS represented a new approach by the city in its attempts to improve the quality of life in areas hard hit by crime and drugs. With this effort, police would be responsible for reclaiming a target area, first through a Drug Market Analysis using the computer-based mapping tool and then by employing a variety of high-visibility anti-drug tactics over a period of several months to remove dealers from the streets. Once an area was reclaimed, the community, the city, and the police would work together to keep it stable.

A computer-based mapping tool called DMAP was developed for the project. Based on desktop mapping software, DMAP allows users to map different types of police records, including the locations of drug arrests, citizen complaints regarding drug activity (TipLine

How P-DMAP Can Be Used to Locate a Suspect

Police receive a tip from an informant about a suspected drug dealer known only as "Ron" who is selling drugs out of a house on Main Street in the Valley section of Pittsburgh. Police can query P-DMAP for past arrest data on any persons with the first name "Ron" and can then narrow the list by searching further for any persons who reside and/or were previously arrested for drug offenses in that neighborhood. If the informant information includes a telephone number, police can further narrow the search by asking for specific locations and names previously associated with that number. Mug shots can then be used to identify or confirm the identity of the suspect in question. Residence addresses in arrest records or public-record data on property owners may also reveal a specific street address on Main Street that is associated with persons named Ron.

Based on the experiences in the four COMPASS target areas, evaluators found that the mapping of indicators of drug activity appears to be a highly effective and informative exercise.

complaints), drug overdoses and certain crime incidents, and calls for service. With the system, drug arrest data provide a record of where reclamation efforts are targeted. In addition, users need only specify a date range and a list of event types to produce a desired map.

From March 1990 to June 1992, COMPASS was implemented in four target areas in different parts of the city. Officers engaged in intensive drug enforcement activities and high-visibility policing. Foot patrols, vehicle safety checks, reverse stings, and "buy-busts" were among the tactics used.

Based on the experiences in the four COMPASS target areas, evaluators found that the mapping of indicators of drug activity appears to be a highly effective and informative exercise. They also discovered that geography can play a significant role in the effectiveness of reclamation tactics. Well-defined boundaries helped delimit each target area; a limited number of roads in and out of each target area helped police control access; and smaller target areas gave police higher visibility.

Building a Model DMA Program

As the evaluations of each DMA demonstration site near completion, much has surfaced about the effects of drug enforcement activities that are developed and implemented with the assistance of computerized drug market mapping systems. NIJ is preparing to describe the technologies and approaches used by each of the sites for use by additional jurisdictions and has funded a comparative analysis of the individual systems. This analysis entails the following:

- Determining the salient features of DMA systems in the different law enforcement agencies;
- Explaining the use of the technology, including hardware and software and data source integration, at all levels of each law enforcement agency;
- Examining the use of technology to identify hotspots for street-level enforcement, evaluating patterns in drug market activities, and assessing the effectiveness of law enforcement activities; and
- Describing the use of DMA and mapping technologies to support problem-oriented policing and other law enforcement strategies.

This DMA evaluation will result in a series of publications directed at State and local law enforcement agencies. The first analysis will emphasize the technologies of geographical mapping, including the software and hardware systems required. The second analysis will report on potential applications of the geographical mapping and DMA technology in law enforcement agencies, including its use in the identification of hotspots of drug activity and other types of activity; support for drug investigations; development of diverse street-level enforcement tactics for various drug markets; and support for problem-oriented policing. The analysis will also examine the use of automated information for decisionmaking at various organizational levels and potential changes in law enforcement organizations.

Begun in October 1992, this project is expected to continue for 18 months. During the first few months, initial site visits were conducted and information gathered from the study sites. To date, site visits have been conducted in Jersey City, Pittsburgh, and San Diego, and interviews have been conducted with representatives from the Kansas City Police Department and the Crime Control Institute (the research organization). Additional site visits are planned during 1993.

POLICE CRACKDOWNS AGAINST DRUGS

One area of particular emphasis in NIJ research has been police crackdowns in which officers sweep without warning through a drug-infested neighborhood with warrants to close crack houses, arrest drug dealers, and shut off supplies to buyers. Several large metropolitan police departments have conducted crackdowns for several years, and much has been learned about them.

A central theme that emerges from Institute evaluations of crackdowns in New York City, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and other cities is that expectations must become more clear and more realistic. The right outcomes must be anticipated—namely, a sudden disruption of drug activity, a sharp rise in felony arrests, and initial public support.

Crackdowns are expensive and require substantial numbers of officers and other personnel (many of them working long hours on overtime). They involve much preparation in intelligence-gathering and obtaining of warrants, and additional resources to board up crack houses, process arrestees, and conduct other aspects of the mission.

Because of the cost, a police department's capacity to sustain the immediate effects of a crackdown may be limited. One Institute evaluation shows that those immediate effects are dramatic and include a virtual cessation of drug activity in the neighborhood. Within an average of 12 days after the crackdown ceases, however, drug activity begins again.⁶ New people appear to replace the incarcerated drug dealers, and the crack houses open again. The buyers return; calls from residents for police service begin to rise again. Learning of this activity, both residents and police officers become discouraged, believing that the crackdown has been in vain.

Informed in part by Institute evaluations over the past 2 or 3 years, police executives around the United States are now moving to a new understanding of the value of crackdowns. Some police departments, working with other municipal agencies and private interests, are following up crackdowns with activities that are intended to have longer-term effects. For example:

- Police establish a mini-station in the neighborhood with the intention of keeping it open indefinitely;
- Police department lawyers inform owners of crack houses of the activity in their dwellings, ask their cooperation in closing the crack house and nailing planks over its entrances, and ask municipal building authorities to enforce building codes strictly to evict inhabitants where the owner does not cooperate;
- Police begin walking patrols; and
- Police officers conduct research efforts to get to know neighborhood residents, sometimes by going door to door to introduce themselves and ask how they can help.

Early results of evaluations of this "crackdown-plus" approach are encouraging. First (and perhaps most important), citizen cooperation with police begins to rise. The dealers and buyers seek out more hospitable surroundings. Under these conditions, if public and private resources continue to be brought to bear on the neighborhood, some semblance of order returns. Municipal agencies can clean up trash-strewn streets and alleys, repair street signs and fix street lights, and turn empty and abandoned lots into playgrounds. School authorities can provide security to students in and near schools. Private businesses can begin to locate in the area.

Many of the activities that constitute community rebuilding are, of course, beyond the reach or mission of police. Yet the return to law and order and to citizen confidence in the police constitute the foundation for this rebuilding.

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Although Institute evaluations necessarily focus on law enforcement, early indications suggest that this expanded view of crackdowns and enforcement holds considerable promise. Various cities around the country offer anecdotal evidence of what evaluations point to: that crackdowns followed by a sustained police presence at a modest level and supported by many other public and private resources can return even a notoriously drug-infested neighborhood to stability. Neighborhood residents are the first beneficiaries of such a turnaround. With the return of civic pride and involvement, a safe and productive neighborhood becomes not only possible but also likely.

More recent findings from Detroit and Baltimore show further and, in some cases, more promising dimensions of crackdown strategies. Dealers and buyers change their behavior in the face of crackdowns. Police may be able, using existing resources, to increase enforcement intermittently. Long-term maintenance of crackdowns, however, requires additional police resources, and improvements in the quality of life for residents require intensive enforcement efforts. These findings raise an important policy question: What levels of enforcement are required to stabilize drug-ridden neighborhoods?

Detroit's Approach

Can crackdowns be carried out within existing police resource constraints and without the creation of special—and costly—crackdown units? That was a central concern in an NIJ evaluation in Detroit, Michigan.

For the purposes of this study, four areas of the city were demarcated as crackdown targets and paired on the basis of similarities in drug offense patterns and socioeconomic and neighborhood characteristics. Crackdowns were conducted in two of these areas—one on the east side of the city and one on the west—for approximately 6 months, while the other two areas continued to receive the normal level of enforcement attention. At the conclusion of this period, the treatment and control areas were formally switched. In each area the crackdowns were to be implemented by the same personnel—Narcotics Enforcement Units, which primarily attend to indoor sales locations, and Street Narcotics Enforcement Units, which primarily focus on street sales—that were normally responsible for the precincts in which the target areas were located.

When the crackdowns began, retail drug markets were pervasive. The volume of calls to the drug hotline was disproportionately large in the target areas; all but 4 of the 23 police sectors that constitute the target areas were among the “hottest” 10 percent of Detroit’s police sectors. Survey data confirmed that drug dealing was visible to residents and was a source of concern. All the data indicated that drug dealing was not confined to certain parts of these areas but rather was a widespread problem in these neighborhoods. Thus, it would not have been possible to isolate more narrowly defined hotspots as targets for intensive enforcement.

The level of enforcement increased substantially in the target areas during the first 6-month crackdown period:

- In one target area, 101 enforcement actions (e.g., warrant raids, buy-bust arrests, observation-of-sale arrests) were conducted; this represented a 115 percent increase over the level of such enforcement actions during the preceding 6 months.
- In the other area, the number of actions increased from a pre-crackdown level of 65 to 99 for the crackdown period, a 52 percent increase.

Moreover, the increases were especially pronounced during the first 2 to 3 months of the crackdowns, after which the intensity of the crackdowns diminished. Mounting and sustaining the crackdowns was extremely difficult in the face of resource constraints and competing priorities. This became even more clear during the second crackdown period, when hardly any increase in enforcement actions occurred in the control areas.

Narcotics officers assigned to the target areas reported that by the second month of the crackdowns, dealers had become more reluctant to sell drugs to strangers, often refusing to sell if the prospective buyer—in this case a police informant or undercover officer—either was not already known to the seller or could not name someone whom the seller knew. In addition, prospective buyers often found that dealers had no drugs to sell because they reportedly reduced the quantities of drugs on hand to minimize their losses in police raids. Some dealers also adapted by rotating the sites of sales among different houses (usually on the same block) on different days. These measures would appear to reduce dealers' vulnerability to arrest, and indeed, officers reported that it became more difficult for them (and for informants) to make drug purchases on the basis of which search warrants could be obtained. These measures also increased the nonmonetary costs of drugs in terms of time and inconvenience. That these adaptations were made within 2 months suggests that the police could have "backed off" at that point, provided that the crackdown could be resumed when (or before) dealers became aware of the reduction in enforcement activity.⁷

Statistical analyses of a composite index of predatory, drug-related crime (including robbery, breaking and entering, grand larceny, and larceny) reveal decreases in the target areas of 18 percent and 19 percent per month, respectively, during the first crackdown period. The levels of this index also decreased in the control areas, but the decreases were statistically insignificant.

Analyses of survey data indicate that residents were unaware of the increase in enforcement activity and that the crackdowns had no impact on citizens' perceptions of the drug problem in their neighborhoods, their perceptions of disorder, their fear of crime, or their quality of life more generally. Few respondents reported any perceived increase in drug raids at the end of the first crackdown period, and there was no appreciable difference between the treatment and control areas. Although responses from the first set of target areas reveal improvement on some dimensions, including the severity of the drug problem, comparable improvements appear in the control areas.

These results suggest that although an abrupt increase in drug enforcement activity may be detected by drug dealers, most citizens are unlikely to be aware of any such increase. The results further suggest that demonstrable improvements in quality of life may follow only after far more substantial effects on retail drug activity.

Focusing Resources Through Crackdowns

The Detroit evaluation shows that it is possible to implement a drug crackdown using existing resources and that, although it is difficult to maintain a crackdown of this type and duration, police managers can focus drug enforcement resources more strategically than they can using conventional tactics. Crackdowns of shorter duration—approximately 6 to 8 weeks—are almost certainly easier to implement, and even within this abbreviated timeframe, crackdowns can prompt drug dealers to respond in ways that reduce the visibility and ease of drug transactions.

The intensity of a crackdown should thus be commensurate with the size of the drug market(s) in the target area; crackdowns of shorter duration can sometimes be of greater intensity and may have a greater impact on residents' quality of life. In any case, residents should be aware of the crackdown effort once it has begun; without this communication between police and community, the crackdown's effectiveness is diminished.

BALTIMORE COUNTY'S COMMUNITY-ORIENTED DRUG ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (CODE)

A number of police departments have begun experimenting with problem-oriented or community-oriented approaches to combatting highly visible and potentially violent drug markets in their jurisdictions. Such approaches have included tactics that emphasize

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cooperation with community residents to solve problems or eliminate conditions thought to contribute to drug sales. However, these experiments with problem- or community-oriented approaches to drug enforcement have only recently begun to be evaluated.

An NIJ evaluation examined the development and effects of one such approach to drug enforcement implemented by the Baltimore County, Maryland, Police Department. Baltimore County's Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement Program (CODE) was designed to respond directly to citizen complaints about street-level narcotics distributors through cooperative efforts by vice/narcotics detectives and precinct-level officers. Following the use of traditional drug enforcement tactics that culminated in large-scale arrest and search warrant raids, community-oriented tactics—such as community surveys, community organizing, and cooperative efforts with rental management—were employed in the targeted neighborhoods to correct conditions deemed to contribute to drug problems.

The CODE program was evaluated as it evolved in two distinct phases from 1990 through the end of 1991. CODE continued into 1992 as an ongoing and integral part of narcotics enforcement in the police department. The evaluation first focused on the selection of target sites, the development of community-oriented tactics, and implementation and maintenance strategies. Changes in the process of implementation and the development of strategies between 1990 and 1991 were also examined.

In addition, the evaluation examined some of the possible impacts of the CODE program through surveys of residents' perceptions of the program's effects on drug sales in their communities, their fear of crime, and their satisfaction with the police in terms of drug enforcement and crime prevention. Evaluators also examined the quality of arrests made during the program's first phase, focusing on the dispositions and sentences received by those arrested as a direct result of CODE. Impacts on the crimes of burglary and robbery were also examined in this initial phase, and this examination was expanded in the second phase to include crimes of violence and against property in addition to drug crimes. For both stages, the potential impacts of CODE on drug market locations were explored.

Based upon previous research on community policing, evaluators hypothesized that citizens would report that CODE positively affected their perceptions about drug sales, fear of crime, and satisfaction with the police. Because of the intense concentration on street dealers, sanctions would be likely for those arrested. Reported levels of crime were not expected to be influenced by CODE despite anticipated market location displacement effects.

Making CODE Work

The idea of implementing a community-oriented approach to drug enforcement received substantial support among all levels of the Baltimore County Police Department. Decentralization of narcotics enforcement facilitated the tailoring of enforcement strategies to the specific neighborhoods targeted by precinct-level personnel and allowed centralized vice/narcotics detectives and local officers to work together as a team. The precinct officers and centralized vice/narcotics detectives interacted and cooperated extensively, and a sense of program ownership evolved at the precinct level. Organized efforts to develop innovative post-raid tactics were undertaken in regular implementation meetings.

In CODE's second phase, the primary organizational responsibility for CODE shifted from the precincts to centralized vice/narcotics detectives. A CODE team was established and located administratively within a centralized vice/narcotics unit. Centralization appeared to diminish the precinct's sense of ownership and reduce the rapport that had existed; some confusion about the roles and responsibilities of precinct officers under the changed structure emerged in this phase.

The tactics developed and used during the investigative and enforcement phases of the CODE projects were similar across all the target areas and generally reflected officers' previous training, experience, and established enforcement techniques such as surveillance and controlled buys. The ease with which these tactics were deployed varied, however; stranger-to-stranger transactions were very easy in some target areas but much more difficult in others. The investigations culminated in arrests and search warrant raids in each of the targeted neighborhoods.

Following the raids, community-oriented maintenance tactics were to be implemented; however, the actual tactics varied from area to area. At one extreme, sustained and comprehensive efforts organized and involved the community in solving problems thought to contribute to drug sales. At the other extreme, little or no community work followed the raids. The difference in the tactics employed during CODE in 1990 appeared to be partly a function of the precinct command staff's experience and views concerning community policing as well as the level of neighborhood resident transience during this period. During 1991, although community policing initiatives were still emphasized, the focus on innovation, interactions, and collaboration appeared to diminish from the previous year, primarily because of the more centralized, traditional narcotics enforcement and fewer implementation and maintenance meetings to develop creative alternative tactics.

Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement's Effects

One of the purposes of the CODE program during both phases was to employ traditional narcotics tactics in order to respond to citizen complaints about local-level drug trafficking through the making of "good cases." An examination of dispositions of those arrested during phase one found that the department had achieved this goal: the vast majority of those arrested were found guilty, and most received some term of incarceration.

Initially, it appeared that there were disproportionate increases in burglaries and robberies in the CODE areas as compared with their precincts following the program's implementation. However, further examination of the nature of the burglaries revealed no significant change in actual burglaries. The increases in phase one were probably the result of random reporting or seasonal changes, or the result of increased citizen reporting due to the implementation of community surveys that urged increased crime reporting.

In phase two, the expanded analysis found decreases in violent and property crimes as well as drug crimes in the target areas as compared with their precincts. The area receiving the most extensive community policing effort showed the largest decrease.

Surveys of residents in targeted neighborhoods during the first phase revealed significant positive changes in their perceptions of the ease of buying drugs, the influence of drugs on crime, and fears and satisfaction with the police. In phase two, however, there was significant change in these perceptions in only one of the target neighborhoods, where satisfaction with police increased significantly. A possible explanation for the different results over the two phases is that the method of administering the survey changed. Residents reported much higher levels of fear and lower levels of police satisfaction prior to CODE than they did during phase two. These perceptions may have been inflated because police surveyed citizens door to door about their concerns on the day after the raids took place during phase one.

In one target area in phase two, however, satisfaction with the police changed significantly. Because the change was consistent with phase one findings, it can be concluded that satisfaction with the police can be positively influenced by a community drug enforcement strategy such as the one employed in Baltimore County.

Expanded analysis found decreases in violent and property crimes as well as drug crimes in the target areas as compared with their precincts. The areas receiving the most extensive community policing effort showed the largest decrease.

The centralizing of CODE program responsibilities diminished communication and coordination at the precinct and community levels. In that sense, CODE's first phase was more community oriented and consistent with the premises of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing.

The effects of the CODE program on drug market locations appeared to be mixed. There was evidence in some neighborhoods of displacement within the community following CODE, as well as declines in the number of locations. There was also evidence in some areas of displacement to adjoining neighborhoods. Across all of the targeted communities, where displacement did occur, it remained relatively close to one or more major vehicular thoroughfares, which allowed easy entrance and exit from the locations identified by residents as drug markets.

CODE's effects were achieved with a very modest investment in terms of supplemental overtime and funds provided by the county council to the police department.

Keeping Communications Open and the Community Involved

In Baltimore County, the centralizing of CODE program responsibilities diminished communication and coordination at the precinct and community levels. In that sense, CODE's first phase was more community oriented and consistent with the premises of community-oriented and problem-oriented policing. Implementation proved more difficult with the evolution from a decentralized organizational structure emphasizing the involvement of a wide variety of organizations and entities at the local neighborhood level.

Evaluation of the first phase also revealed significant enthusiasm for community policing, which was reinforced by precinct and central command staff. This level of support and reinforcement appears to be a critical element in implementing such a drug enforcement program.

EMERGING DRUG ENFORCEMENT TACTICS

Many police departments have expanded the range of uses of conventional drug enforcement tactics while developing new tactics that are better tailored to their local problems. Yet information on the scope and frequency of these tactics, the ways in which they are applied to drug programs, and their relative effectiveness is scant.⁸

The Institute awarded a grant to the Police Executive Research Forum to conduct an 18-month evaluation of emerging and innovative drug enforcement tactics across the country. The study is examining tactics currently in use in up to 50 State and local police agencies, how these new tactics differ from traditional approaches, and which elements of each tactic hold promise for replication elsewhere. Final results of this study are expected before the close of fiscal year 1993.

By the end of 1992, the project had identified more than 150 new drug enforcement tactics, many of them community based or narrowly focused on specific targets. Examples of these tactics in a variety of communities include the following:

- **Mail-in coupons:** Police place newspaper advertisements that contain a form for readers to fill in with information on suspected or observed drug activity; readers then mail the form in to the department.
- **Taxi connection:** Undercover police officers ride in taxis and ask the driver to connect them with a drug dealer; if the driver sets up or handles a drug transaction, the undercover officer arrests the driver.
- **Hotel managers:** Police train managers of hotels and motels to spot signs of drug activity and to call the police.
- **Package interdiction:** Working with parcel-shipping companies, police in some communities are examining and intercepting packages that may contain drugs.
- **Clone beepers:** Drug dealers, sellers, runners, and buyers who use beepers may learn that police are tuned to their frequency and can, through new electronic capability, identify telephones from which calls are made; arrests may follow.

- **Child abuse and neglect:** Pregnant women who use drugs may be charged with child abuse by police. Parents of juvenile drug offenders may be charged with child neglect.
- **Traffic checkpoints:** Signs put up by a State highway patrol along interstate highways warn of a drug checkpoint a few miles ahead; motorists who drive off at the next exit, however, learn that the checkpoint is actually on the exit.

DRUGS, CRIME, AND POLICING IN PUBLIC HOUSING

Crime and vandalism have long been endemic in public housing,⁹ and the rise in drug abuse in the late 1970s and early 1980s—particularly the crack epidemic that swelled during the mid-1980s—significantly exacerbated the situation. As of 1990, more than 3.5 million people inhabited the 1 million conventional public housing units in the United States that receive Federal assistance.¹⁰

Drug use and drug-related crime are widely thought to be higher in public housing than in the surrounding community, and some think that levels of policing are lower. No reliable data have been available to demonstrate these and related points, however. Little is known about the magnitude of the crime problem in public housing developments, and some research has even suggested that it might not be much worse than in the surrounding city.¹¹

To respond to these needs, several research projects have taken shape. One of these involves an Institute evaluation, undertaken by RAND, that compares drug crime and arrest levels in public housing and surrounding areas from 1986 through 1989 in Los Angeles, California; Phoenix, Arizona; and Washington, D.C. Researchers focused on 29 conventional public housing settings that house almost 35,000 residents—more than 50 percent of the entire public housing population within each of the three cities. The researchers used Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data to calculate their findings. Although study results can be considered definitive for those cities, extrapolations to public housing at large should be made with some caution.

Examining Rates of Crime and Police Activity

Several significant findings emerged from this study, which concluded in January 1993. To begin with, rates of drug and violent crime in public housing are very high relative to other areas. Reported property crime rates, in contrast, are relatively low in public housing. Rates of reports of serious property crime—burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft—do not show the same pattern in public housing as drug and violent crime rates. In Washington and Los Angeles, property crime rates in housing projects are considerably lower than citywide rates; in Phoenix, the property crime rate in public housing exceeds the city rate but is considerably lower than the rate in nearby urban neighborhoods.

Crime rates vary substantially among public housing locales. This study confirms the widespread perception that “problem projects” exist—housing developments with crime problems that are much more severe than in most public housing communities.

Finally, police activity in public housing is roughly proportional to public housing crime. Police make at least as many arrests per serious violent or property crime in public housing as in cities at large. For some crime categories and cities, police are considerably more active in public housing developments than they are citywide. A mixed pattern emerges, however, when arrest rates in public housing areas are compared with arrest rates in nearby urban neighborhoods. The number of arrests per crime in public housing communities is greater than the corresponding figure for comparison areas in Washington and the Hollenbeck areas of Los Angeles, while the opposite is true in Phoenix and Southeast Los Angeles. Thus, although police activity in public housing is roughly proportional to its

Drug and Violent Crime Rates in Three Cities

Drug and violent crime are severe problems in public housing developments. Public housing systems studied in Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., have aggregate rates of drug offenses ranging from 33 to 58 annual drug arrests per 1,000 residents, and aggregate rates of violent offenses ranging from 41 to 67 violent crimes reported per 1,000 residents. Relative to most communities, these are extremely high rates. Moreover, in each city studied, rates of drug offenses are higher in public housing than in the city at large; and in two of the three cities—Los Angeles and Phoenix—the differences are very substantial. Rates of drug offenses in public housing developments are also considerably higher than the rates in nearby urban neighborhoods. Similarly, violent offense rates in public housing are much higher than rates in surrounding cities and nearby areas. In all three study cities, aggregate violent offense rates in public housing are multiples of the corresponding city rates. In Washington and Los Angeles, violent offense rates in public housing developments are also considerably higher than rates in nearby areas, while in Phoenix, the two rates are relatively close. Murder and aggravated assault have especially high rates in public housing communities.

overall crime problem, relative to that of the city, in all three cities studied, the level of police attention received by public housing compared with other urban neighborhoods varies from city to city.

Focusing on Specific Public Housing Developments and Types of Crimes

The foregoing research bears on important questions now being confronted by policymakers in the areas of drug control, law enforcement, and public housing policy. Several findings are of particular note. First, the finding that public housing developments have rates of drug and violent crime that are well above the rates in other areas suggests that it is reasonable to devote a disproportionate share of drug and law enforcement resources to public housing, even independent of government's special obligation to tenants for whom it is the landlord.

Second, the study documents large differences among crime rates in public housing developments even within the same city. Crime control initiatives in public housing—such as those funded under the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program—need to be tightly focused on the problems of particular projects.

Third, although public housing developments do not appear to be underpoliced, police departments can benefit from data describing crime and arrest rates there. For example, the finding that property crime is a smaller problem in public housing than drug or violent crime may be relevant to police tactics or to the allocation of scarce resources to the extent that these decisions differentiate among the three types of crime.

The results of this evaluation should assist planning and management personnel in city police, housing authorities, housing authority police, city departments of social services, public housing resident councils, community groups, mayors' offices, and city councils.

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Clearly, more is needed than crackdowns and other enforcement actions to rid neighborhoods of drugs, crime, and violence permanently. Police departments around the country are testing many new approaches to determine just what constitutes the elements that bring stability and self-policing to a community once ravaged by drug activity.

This chapter reports on how police are working with communities to develop new ways to form partnerships to reduce drugs and crime. Police, for their part, are implementing the evolving concept of "community policing." Community policing comes in many forms but typically includes efforts by officers to get to know their patrol area as a neighborhood, to meet and communicate with residents, and to become part of a larger team of municipal agencies that work together to reduce drugs and crime.

Some neighborhoods that have suffered from years of drug activity, violence, and crime are not finding the road to rehabilitation easy. Some of these neighborhoods lack the community organizations and other elements that hold a community together. Policing alone cannot move these neighborhoods very far toward revitalization. NIJ evaluations show that the actions of many public, nonprofit, and business organizations, plus the commitment of the residents themselves, are needed to drive out crime and drugs permanently.

INCREASING POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITIES

Greater police involvement in neighborhoods may reduce levels of crime and disorder and almost certainly lowers fear of crime and increases citizen satisfaction, according to NIJ research in Baltimore, Maryland; Houston, Texas; and Newark, New Jersey.

During the 1980s, interest in community-oriented policing grew, in part, out of a series of studies on the value of foot patrols.¹ Police can prevent crime and reduce fear of crime, researchers found, by concentrating their efforts on addressing deteriorating neighborhood conditions—the incivilities, disorder, and unpleasant physical conditions that affect the quality of neighborhood life negatively.² From these experiences grew a discussion of community policing, which is properly seen as a philosophy of policing. In current practice, community policing represents a significant change in approach to providing "policing" services, and it is only slowly being tried or adopted by departments.

Community policing has, in the words of one observer, four common elements: "(1) community-based crime prevention; (2) proactive servicing as opposed to emergency response; (3) public participation in the planning and supervision of police operations; and (4) shifting of decisionmaking responsibility to lower rank levels."³ Community policing efforts often attempt to involve neighborhood residents in the identification of local problems and in the development of solutions to those problems.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- ***Problem-oriented policing in San Diego and Tulsa***
- ***Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in eight cities and in rural areas***
- ***A model precinct in New York City***
- ***Police and domestic violence prevention***

Building Police-Community Partnerships

NIJ researchers have already found that both police and residents may encounter considerable initial difficulty in bridging a communication gap that exists between them. Communication at high levels tends to be good; a public housing authority official can meet and work easily with a senior police executive. But a precinct commander or a police officer may face formidable problems in meeting with, for example, members of a tenant's association; these problems range from talking with

non-English-speaking residents to differing assumptions on both sides about the nature of policing. Clearly, a new culture of police-community communications needs to be built.

Another barrier to successful police-community partnerships has to do with approaches to problemsolving. Police traditionally rely on calls for service to alert them to the need for police service, and repeated calls for service come to constitute a "problem." Departments that

are at the forefront of community policing are sending out officers to look for indicators of trouble before calls for service come in, and to invoke the power, authority, and resources of other city agencies to use civil remedies to drive out drug dealers, close drug houses, protect children of drug addicts, and cope with the persistent problem of domestic violence, which is often linked with drug and alcohol abuse.

Community policing is still evolving. The Institute is working to help police expand and enhance these nascent programs. This chapter reports on four Institute evaluations that examine four different dimensions of community policing, each evolving in turn from the previous one:

- Community-oriented policing (COP), in which police endeavor to become acquainted with local residents, gain their trust, and eventually gain their support (often in the form of critical information) for crime- and drug-reduction efforts;
- Problem-oriented policing (POP), in which officers help residents solve problems through referrals to appropriate municipal agencies and other resources;
- Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) programs, which are funded by BJA to enable police departments to focus resources on community policing efforts to reduce drug demand; and
- Model Precinct, in which one city (New York) designated a precinct for an expanded community patrol officer program (CPOP) with BJA funds and included a number of police functions previously performed by specialists.

This chapter also discusses domestic violence, which has emerged as one of the most troublesome and dangerous (to both police and perpetrator) problems that police face today. Domestic violence—spouse assault, elder abuse, sibling violence, and child abuse—is now the single most common form of violence that police encounter, more common than all other forms combined.⁴ Until the past decade or so, domestic violence was considered a private matter to be handled within the family or neighborhood. More recently, family members—particularly women—have begun to turn to the criminal justice system for help. Police now respond to 2 million to 8 million calls annually involving incidents where a victim has been beaten by a spouse, lover, or family member.⁵

PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING IN TWO CITIES

In the late 1980s, NIJ and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) developed a framework for problem-oriented policing (POP)⁶ as a tool for putting into practice a community-oriented policing philosophy. Problemsolving is a mechanism by which principles such as close working relations between police and residents, citizen involvement, and responsiveness to community needs can be applied to the routine work of police on their beats. In 1988, PERF applied these principles in the design of drug control

programs in five urban police departments, with support from BJA. The Institute selected San Diego, California, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, as sites for evaluation and awarded a grant to the Institute for Social Analysis to conduct the evaluations.

This evaluation is developing a detailed description of officers' street-level behavior as they use a problem-oriented framework. The results point to the importance of organizational factors that influence the implementation, shape, and character of problem-oriented approaches to controlling drugs and other crime.

Police Use of Problemsolving Techniques

The two sites approached implementation in opposite ways. San Diego's implementation began at the patrol officer level with minimal direction from supervisors and command-level staff. Officers were encouraged to identify problems on their beats, then craft and implement a response with supervisor guidance and using department resources. After training, officers decided whether and how to use problemsolving in their work. Thus, the nature and structure of the program in San Diego was defined largely by officers' practices in the field.

In contrast, Tulsa began its use of problemsolving at five public housing complexes in one patrol division (Uniform Division North) with centralized control by division commanders. Some officers walked beats and became involved with citizen groups. Others interviewed residents and housing authority managers, while still others performed directed patrols. Management designed and directed the initial activity, showed officers how to become involved, and then sought to stimulate problemsolving throughout the organization with a combination of formal and informal persuasion, including changes in performance evaluation measures and desirable transfers for officers involved in problem-oriented policing. As the program developed and officers became aware that POP was the direction in which the department was evolving, officers other than those in the target areas began employing problemsolving approaches in some of their routine work patrolling their beats.

One difference between the two sites is worth noting. There was a greater tendency among San Diego officers than among Tulsa police to use multi-faceted strategies in their responses to problems. Given a similar problem (e.g., a crack house), the Tulsa program was likely to focus on a single strategy, often an enforcement-oriented approach. In contrast, San Diego officers often used multi-dimensional responses that combined an enforcement activity with other measures. For example, the officers might use a surveillance strategy and also invoke child welfare, zoning, or even animal cruelty ordinances as appropriate. If the crack house owner did not respond, civil nuisance abatement procedures could be initiated.

Strengthening Communications and Strategies

The evaluation of problem-oriented policing strategies implemented in two different settings highlights the need for regular, open communications between police departments and communities—at the street level as well as through administrative channels. Also underscored by preliminary data on the outcomes of BJA-funded projects is the efficacy of coupling traditional law enforcement strategies with approaches that make use of other agencies and civil nuisance abatement procedures: for example, invoking laws designed to protect children or property owners. Perhaps most important are efforts to heighten the capacity of police to take a broadened view of the problems they confront in the communities they patrol, so that they can better establish the boundaries of problems before developing solutions.

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INNOVATIVE NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED POLICING IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN SETTINGS

Although both community policing and reducing the demand for drugs have been central elements of emerging police agendas in many jurisdictions, the linking of these features represents a new and promising direction. In 1990, eight urban and suburban jurisdictions began pursuing, under the Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) program, the objectives of fostering both community policing initiatives and drug demand reduction efforts at the neighborhood level.

In June 1991, the Institute awarded funds to the Vera Institute of Justice to evaluate the program so as to learn how best to structure the various components, particularly in areas with widespread drug use and trafficking. Eight jurisdictions received BJA funds: Hayward, California; Houston, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; New York, New York; Norfolk, Virginia; Portland, Oregon; Prince George's County, Maryland; and Tempe, Arizona. All sites have in common a police enforcement component, street-level buy-and-busts, sweeps, a focus on neighborhoods, and an emphasis on drug demand reduction (including prevention and treatment). In addition, all eight sites have attempted to implement a broad array of partnerships with various State and local agencies and community organizations within their respective jurisdictions.

Features of Successful INOP Programs

The evaluation findings, although preliminary, reveal examples of successfully implemented components of problem-oriented approaches. They also raise key issues that future research should address in developing a model program that can be widely adopted.

Community Organizing. Because the programs were located in drug-plagued, unstable neighborhoods, community organizing proved difficult. The tasks of community organizing and outreach fell to police, who lacked training in this type of work. Despite these obstacles, INOP sites made some progress.

For example, Prince George's County took an active approach to community organizing. Each officer met with a group of five to eight local leaders (businessmen, teachers, community association leaders, etc.) once a month to brainstorm about community conditions and collaborate on problemsolving strategies. This approach appeared to be useful in addressing problems.

Probably the best example of community organizing was in Hayward, which had an extensive network of Neighborhood Watch groups with a core of active community leaders. In one neighborhood, a few homeowners pulled together a Neighborhood Watch group that successfully drove drug activity off their street. These residents continued to take an active role in improving the quality of life in their neighborhood and, through INOP, developed an excellent relationship with the police department and individual officers.

Substations and Satellite Offices. A feature common to most of the INOP projects was the use of substations or satellite offices. Examples include the following:

- In Prince George's County, satellite offices were located in apartments donated by the management of private apartment complexes in each beat. Officers held regular office hours (which were posted on the door of the office), and residents could leave messages on an answering machine at other times.
- The cornerstone of the New York project was the Neighborhood Resource Center—a large motor home purchased with project funds. In each of the project's three sites, these centers were parked near a school to deter drug activity in the area. Volunteers

provided information and referral to programs; needed health services, such as blood pressure screening, were sometimes provided in the van. Although the volunteers did not take police reports, the community patrol officer patrolled its perimeter.

- The Tempe project used BJA funds to purchase a trailer, which was parked in the middle of a large public square near a community center. Police officers used the trailer as an office. The trailer contained literature about available social services and was staffed from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. by a secretary who took some types of crime complaints and summoned an officer if necessary. Residents may have perceived that the trailer offered no benefits in addition to those they could obtain by phone. Moreover, because the trailer was located in a high-crime area, residents were reluctant to be seen working directly with the police.

Interagency Collaboration. The best example of interagency collaboration was Norfolk's PACE program. The Mayor ordered every city agency, including the Norfolk Police Department, to send a representative to monthly meetings of a support committee to discuss problems and suggest strategies. Through this extensive network of agencies, when confronted with a problem that requires intervention from another city agency, beat officers can call on the appropriate agency and generally get a quick response. The key to success appears to be the institutionalized support of the city government for this effort.

Problemsolving. The Prince George's County program had the most well developed problemsolving. Each beat officer developed a Beat Condition Report to identify the most pressing crime and quality-of-life problems in the beat. The goal was to solve the problem and close out the report. The Prince George's County project also used petitions of injunction and nuisance abatement statutes to close down some crack houses.

Effects on Drug Demand and Related Crime

One sector of Prince George's County (where the INOP program was operating for more than a year) experienced a drop in drug-related calls for service and in violent crime during the project period. According to a June 1991 police department report, "the statistics show a 40 percent reduction in drug related calls since its inception in the Seat Pleasant District. And, in the same area, a 15.3 percent reduction in violent crime in the first quarter of 1992." Although the County Executive viewed these statistics as demonstrating that the program was a "true success," others in the county were less certain that these changes could be attributed solely to the project, and some believed that criminal activity was simply displaced to other locales.

In another example, the Iris Court project in Portland experienced, according to police and some residents, a reduction in drug activity and gang-related incidents. These effects were attributed to the enforcement efforts of the police department in the early phases of the program, to making the street a cul-de-sac, and to the use of trespass laws against drug dealers. Other residents, however, complained that drug traffic still flourished at night and felt that greater police protection was needed.

Street-level drug dealing was reduced in one of the target areas of Tempe. This effect was attributed to the police enforcement effort at the start of the project, which resulted in the arrest of 18 local user-dealers (a substantial proportion of known drug traffickers in the small target area). This effort was conducted in May 1991, and its effects remained at the time of the final research site visit in July 1992.

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NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED POLICING IN RURAL SETTINGS

How useful is community policing in rural settings where police must deal with domestic violence, burglaries, thefts, and other crimes in geographically dispersed and sparsely populated communities? In 1992, BJA funded a four-site demonstration—Caldwell, Idaho; Fort Pierce, Florida; Newton County, Indiana; and Richmond, Maine—of a rural INOP program. The four sites ranged in population from 3,000 in Richmond to 40,000 in Fort Pierce; in size from 8.6 square miles in Caldwell to 600 square miles in Fort Pierce; and in number of sworn officers from 5 full-time and 3 part-time in Richmond to 106 in Fort Pierce.

NIJ's evaluation, conducted by Queues Enforth Development, is addressing several questions. First, what forms of innovative neighborhood-oriented policing are being implemented in rural jurisdictions? Second, how effective are such programs, and what factors—especially rural characteristics—contribute to or detract from their success? Finally, how do rural INOP programs fit into the broader context of other community policing programs?

The evaluation will examine several issues that are likely to affect programs in rural areas. For example, a rural population that is small or cohesive could be expected to enhance the impact of neighborhood-oriented policing. Conversely, if a small police department lacks experience in police experimentation as well as data and computer capabilities, it might have difficulty developing an effective INOP.

Other hypotheses to be examined might include the following:

- The percentage of available time spent by a rural patrol officer on calls for service is significantly lower than that of his or her urban counterparts. If so, there should be more police time available for problemsolving and community interaction.
- General anonymity is significantly reduced in rural jurisdictions. If so, this could improve the early detection of potentially violent family situations, as the police are likely to be more familiar with the residents in their assigned neighborhoods.
- In rural jurisdictions, police are more likely to be residents of the communities they serve. If so, this could enhance police sensitivity to community concerns and facilitate their intervention.
- Police in rural jurisdictions are more likely to know personally professional service providers in both public and private agencies. If so, they may be more able to bring outside resources to bear on community problems.
- Rural police departments rely to a greater extent than their urban counterparts on volunteer support. If so, this could explain some of the differences between rural and urban programs.

Unlike the urban INOP evaluation, which commenced after the programs had begun, the rural evaluation has been concurrent with the programs, giving evaluators an opportunity to observe virtually the entire program implementation process. As a result, it is expected that evaluators will be able to assess not only the program planning process but also the initial expectations of the participants and stakeholders, the roles of all involved parties, their resource commitments and the extent to which they have been fulfilled, and selected program target areas. Measuring the effects of the program on neighborhood safety and the quality of life may prove to be more difficult. None of the sites has the capacities or resources to conduct the experimental or quasi-experimental research that would be necessary to make such measures feasible.

Through data and program monitoring, site observation, and a series of community surveys, it should be feasible to detect the presence or absence of critical neighborhood problems and to assess residents' awareness of the program, neighborhood cohesion, and the feelings of stakeholders toward their neighborhoods and their concerns about both crime and drugs.

During 1993, as program plans at the sites evolve, evaluators will make site visits, interview program participants, and conduct community surveys. Evaluators will then communicate their findings to the sites to aid in continued development of program designs and the sites' own internal evaluations.

TESTING A COMMUNITY PATROL OFFICER PROGRAM IN NEW YORK CITY

Community-oriented policing will soon be implemented citywide by the New York City Police Department. As a prelude to program launch, in April 1991, a model site was established in the 72nd precinct in Brooklyn. The 72nd precinct was chosen as the "model precinct" because it was the original site of a community patrol officer program (CPOP).

The lessons learned from the model precinct have implications both for community-oriented policing implementation in other New York City precincts and for police decisionmaking nationwide. In May 1991, NIJ awarded a grant to the Police Foundation to ensure that these lessons are adequately documented, assessed, and disseminated.

Within the model precinct, establishing community-oriented policing has meant an overall increase in precinct personnel, substantial staff reorganization, an increase in the number of officers assigned to CPOP, and expansion of the roles of these officers to include functions previously performed by specialists. To facilitate program operations and provide officers with the time needed to identify and solve community problems, program designers determined that community policing officers should spend no more than 60 percent of their shift in radio patrol units; 911 calls needed to be better prioritized; and workloads would have to be shared between personnel assigned to radio patrol units and the precinct's special operations unit. In addition, the precinct was to receive a new operational system that would promote, encourage, and facilitate community-oriented, problemsolving policing; new information systems to assist in implementation of the approach; and assistance from other department units, including detectives.

Organizational Structure

Under the new model precinct organizational structure, the original CPOP sergeant, who had considerable experience with the previous program, remained in place. Initially, the number of sworn personnel assigned to the precinct rose by nearly 26 percent (from 162 to 204); however, by the end of 1992, personnel had declined to 186 (because of retirements, transfers, and promotions). In addition, the number of detectives working in the precinct, although not officially reporting to the command, increased from 13 to 21.

Prior to the program, 91 officers were assigned to patrol, 13 to CPOP, 6 to an anti-crime unit, 5 to a street narcotics enforcement unit, 16 to various specialist positions, and the remaining 31 to other duties. With the model precinct program, 113 officers were assigned to patrols, 61 officers were assigned to a newly created special operations unit, the number of specialist positions was reduced to 7, and the remaining 23 precinct personnel were assigned to other assignments.

The primary responsibility of personnel assigned to the special operations unit was to patrol neighborhood beats, primarily on foot or in scooters, where they performed a full range of community policing and problemsolving activities. For the most part, these

To facilitate program operations and provide officers with the time needed to identify and solve community problems, program designers determined that community policing officers should spend no more than 60 percent of their shift in radio patrol units; 911 calls needed to be better prioritized; and workloads would have to be shared between personnel assigned to radio patrol units and the precinct's special operations unit.

To coordinate problemsolving across the entire precinct, a Precinct Management Team was created; it consisted of the precinct commander and representatives of patrols, the special operations unit, two persons from the community, the City Council Representative, and the Community Council President.

officers did not respond to immediate calls for service, although some low-priority calls were given to these officers for a delayed response. Officers in this unit also performed functions of the former anti-crime unit and the former street narcotics unit as well as specialized functions such as fingerprinting.

To coordinate problemsolving across the entire precinct, a Precinct Management Team was created; it consisted of the precinct commander and representatives of patrols, the special operations unit, two persons from the community, the City Council Representative, and the Community Council President. At meetings of this group, attendees reviewed and assessed problemsolving efforts. Through this system, special operations officers have identified and addressed a wide variety of problems, including drug sales, burglaries, stolen and abandoned automobiles, robberies, and prostitution.

Officer Reactions to the Program

Officers in the precinct have had a variety of reactions to the program. Some have appreciated the flexible hours, weekends off, and additional days off. Others have valued the opportunity for more independence; the ability to work more closely with the community to identify and attempt to solve problems (and the more positive interactions that resulted); and release from the 911 calls-for-service queue.

Several aspects of the special operations unit were less attractive: the requirement that emergency calls cannot be addressed without a partner; the physical discomfort of walking a beat; the perceived boredom of the assignment; and the necessity of dealing with the community on a sustained basis.

Finally, although the problem has in large part been ameliorated over time, conflicts have arisen between officers assigned to the special operations unit and those assigned to regular patrols. Patrol officers have expressed sentiments that special operations officers do not do "real" police work, should be responding to more calls for service, and spend too much time "drinking coffee" with the public. Special operations unit officers have commented that patrol officers do not understand the importance of working with the community and do not appreciate the significance of their problemsolving efforts.

Program Outcomes

By the end of 1992, the following effects of the model precinct program were documented:

- The utilization rate for radio patrol units fell to below 40 percent early in the program but had risen to almost 60 percent by the close of 1992. Although there was a slight decline in the utilization rate for the remainder of the Brooklyn South command, it was much less noticeable. No change in response times was discerned in either the model precinct or the remainder of the Brooklyn South command.
- The average number of violent felony crime complaints rose by nearly 9 percent (from 121.9 per month in the 27 months before April 1991 to 132.5 per month during the first 21 months of program operation). In the remainder of the Brooklyn South command, violent crime felony complaints rose by 3.4 percent during this period.
- The average number of property felony crime complaints declined by nearly 10 percent (from 304.2 per month before the model precinct program to 274.4 per month in the 21 months after program implementation).
- Arrests for violent felony crimes increased by almost 32 percent in the model precinct, while such arrests declined slightly (by less than 1 percent) in the remainder of Brooklyn South. Monthly arrests for property crimes declined by about 7 percent in the model precinct and nearly 11 percent in the rest of Brooklyn South.
- Clearance rates in the model precinct rose slightly for all felony crimes except burglary and motor vehicle theft. For the remainder of Brooklyn South, clearance rates declined for all felony crimes except rate and assault.

- The number of civilians filing complaints against officers in the model precinct declined by about 27 percent during the first 21 months of program operation—despite the fact that the number of personnel had been increased dramatically. In the remainder of Brooklyn South, the number of civilians filing complaints increased by more than 10 percent per month.

POLICE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, research suggested that prompt police arrest of the perpetrator was an effective deterrent to further domestic violence. More recent research has significantly refined and modified that finding, however. The Institute is currently funding research on the effects of arrests and other police responses as a followup to the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment—one of the earliest efforts to test traditional viewpoints on appropriate police responses to domestic violence.

In 1984, Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, which provides in part for the development of regionally based training and technical assistance to enhance the responses of law enforcement personnel to victims of domestic violence. Since 1986, the Justice Department's Office for Victims of Crime has funded 22 family violence training and technical assistance projects, each with variations in strategies, materials, and administration. This chapter also reports on evaluations of these projects.

Spouse Assault Replication Project

In what has become a well-known experiment in the field, the Institute provided funds to the Minneapolis Police Department to explore options for police responses to domestic assault calls. In the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, conducted in the late 1970s, police systematically varied the use of three approaches when responding to misdemeanor domestic assault calls: advise, separate, or arrest. Three long-standing viewpoints were tested in the experiment:

- The traditional law enforcement view that police should do as little as possible because courts will not punish offenders and family problems are in any case unsolvable by outside intervention;
- The clinical psychologists' view that police should actively mediate or arbitrate disputes underlying the violence and restore peace but not make arrests; and
- An approach favored by many women's advocacy groups holds that police should treat violence as a criminal offense and arrest the perpetrator.

Researchers found that arrest was the most effective tactic in reducing and deterring future domestic violence in a household. Counseling the parties or sending assailants away were considerably less effective tactics.⁷

These findings coincided with rising demands by women's rights and advocacy groups for increased police sensitivity to domestic assault. The combined effect on police practices was dramatic. Many departments changed their policies to require arrest in domestic violence situations.

It became clear that further testing of police responses to spouse assault was needed on as broad and varied a front as possible. The Institute accepted proposals to test the effect of arrests and other police responses in Atlanta, Georgia; Charlotte, North Carolina; Colorado Springs, Colorado; Metro-Dade County, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; and Omaha, Nebraska. In addition, a team of researchers was selected to perform a cross-site analysis of all the replication sites. The results will suggest which police responses work and why in different locales and situations, along with what else can be done to enable police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, political leaders, and victims to end this cycle of violence.

The number of civilians filing complaints against officers in the model precinct declined by about 27 percent during the first 21 months of program operation—despite the fact that the number of personnel had been increased dramatically. In the remainder of Brooklyn South, the number of civilians filing complaints increased by more than 10 percent per month.

State Approaches to Domestic Violence

Over the past decade, as a result of growing awareness of and knowledge about family violence, State statutes pertaining to domestic violence have changed frequently and dramatically. Although considerable variation in the law exists within and across States, many jurisdictions have made domestic violence a separate offense, strengthened penalties for offenders, expanded the range of relationships covered to include nonspouses, expanded access to and remedies under civil protection orders, and criminalized their violation.⁸ The statutory changes have been accompanied by more aggressive law enforcement and a move away from on-site mediation by officers responding to disputes. Court judgments holding law enforcement agencies liable in domestic violence cases have increased pressure on law enforcement agencies to adapt to growing legal and social intolerance of spousal assault.⁹

The Family Violence Prevention and Services Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-457) was enacted to assist States in:

- Developing and maintaining programs for the prevention of family violence;
- Developing and maintaining programs for the provision of immediate shelter and assistance to victims and their dependents; and
- Providing training and technical assistance for personnel who provide services for victims of family violence.

Training and Technical Assistance

For many victims of domestic violence, law enforcement officers often are the first point of contact with an official source of help. The Act provides for regionally based training and technical assistance for local and State law enforcement personnel to develop, demonstrate, and disseminate information on improved responses to family violence incidents. Since 1986, the Office for Victims of Crime has funded 22 Family Violence Training and Technical Assistance Projects with funds provided by the Department of Health and Human Services. The goals of these projects are to:

- Assess existing curriculum materials, policies, practices, and protocols used by law enforcement personnel to respond to victims of domestic violence;
- Develop model procedures, protocols, policies, and practices to enhance law enforcement responses to victims of domestic violence;
- Develop training and technical assistance materials to instruct law enforcement officers on ways to improve their responses to the needs of domestic violence victims; and
- Disseminate the products of the program to the law enforcement community.¹⁰

The Office for Victims of Crime awarded grants to State police training academies, local law enforcement agencies, victim advocacy organizations, and departments of social services. Working within the prescribed framework of the project but taking into account the specific needs and resources of their States and localities, grantees exhibited considerable variation with regard to strategies, materials, and program administration. The work has included training of trainers, managers and policymakers, officers, and victim advocate-officer pairs. It has been provided at central locations with a general, statewide curriculum and in localities with a curriculum and faculty tailored to the community. Training content and materials have also varied widely and have included videotapes, presentations by victims and abusers, and details on laws specific to the State or municipality.

NIJ has awarded a grant to The Urban Institute to evaluate how well these projects have achieved their goals. Specifically, the evaluation is designed to assist States and localities in designing and implementing police training in how to respond to family violence as well as to assess the effects of the projects in meeting the needs of victims. The study is scheduled for completion in 1994.

Linking Law Enforcement With Other Interventions

From a policy standpoint, this evaluation will examine how training and information provided to police officers can be used most effectively to (1) change the policies and practices of law enforcement and community agencies, and (2) help victims exercise their rights and avail themselves of services. Like other efforts to link law enforcement with social service interventions, the police officer training component of the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act envisions law enforcement officers as participants working with other agencies, victims, and community groups (e.g., shelters, advocacy organizations) in a coordinated response to a crime problem. As advocated by proponents of problem-oriented policing,¹¹ the training emphasizes a professional approach based on a better understanding of the underlying causes of criminal behavior and of alternative resources available for intervention to prevent crime and assist victims.

This evaluation will consider the impact of specific materials and training activities on the knowledge and behavior of participants and will provide guidance for law enforcement agencies in training design and delivery. It will also emphasize the factors associated with changing law enforcement practices and establishing interagency coordination. The evaluation will thus include consideration of the role of management practices (leadership, philosophy, staffing, and resources) as well as training, technical assistance, and dissemination of materials. The findings are expected to enhance the capacity of law enforcement agencies to transfer training successfully into practice.

NOTES


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How Communities Can Help Police

Alarmed and angry about drugs and crime in their areas, many communities across America are determined to maintain or take back control of their neighborhoods. Neighborhood community groups are organizing meetings, rallies, patrols, and other forums to enlist residents in efforts to stop drug abuse, drug trafficking, and crime. Many of these activities are stimulated and guided by churches and other community-based organizations, which are also establishing links to police and school departments, government and nonprofit social service agencies, business groups, and policymaking bodies such as city and county councils and State legislatures.

Some neighborhoods that have suffered from years of drug activity, violence, and crime are not finding the road to rehabilitation easy. Some of these neighborhoods lack the community organizations and other elements that hold a community together. Policing alone cannot move these communities very far toward revitalization. Evaluations conducted by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) show that the actions of many public, nonprofit, and business organizations, plus the commitment of the residents themselves, are needed to drive out crime and drugs on a permanent basis. Communities active in combating drugs and crime range across a spectrum of income levels and demographic diversity. Not all communities, however, seem able to generate the degree and duration of effort needed to make a difference. Generally, communities with a strong economic base of middle-income families are better able to marshal the people, organizations, and money needed to support a sustained citizen anti-crime initiative. Economically depressed communities, which often are less cohesive than their middle-income counterparts, tend to experience greater difficulty in launching and sustaining such an initiative. Residents are more fearful and local businesses and community organizations are fewer in number and weaker than in middle-income communities.

What avenues lie open to communities in meeting these challenges? This chapter describes the involvement of the Institute in evaluating community-based and community-initiated efforts to combat drug-related crime and violence. The purpose of these evaluations is to determine which strategies best enable communities to involve citizens for the long term. The evaluations described here showcase the kinds of actions communities can take to respond to drugs and crime, promising anti-drug initiatives being employed in small cities and towns, strategies for intervening in the lives of at-risk youths, and the effects of a Federal anti-crime initiative underway in 20 cities.

What these various initiatives highlight is a growing emphasis on addressing drug and crime problems through partnerships and collaborations—not just between police and residents but also within concerned sectors of each community: local organizations and clubs, businesses, churches, social service organizations, and youth groups. Each of these parties has resources and leadership to deploy; however, information-sharing and communications among them are often lacking or need to be enhanced. As more evaluations of community-based anti-drug and -crime efforts are undertaken, the Institute hopes to refine an understanding of ways in which planning and service providers in criminal justice, social services, and community organizations can integrate their activities.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- ***Community responses to drug abuse***
- ***Anti-drug initiatives in small cities and towns***
- ***Two interventions to assist youth at risk***
- ***An urban anti-drug and anti-crime initiative***

WHEN COMMUNITIES TAKE ACTION

In 1988, the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) and the National Training and Information Center (NTIC), in cooperation with local community organizations, developed a national demonstration program called Community Responses to Drug Abuse (CRDA). The program involved 10 community-based organizations across 9 cities.

Unlike most government-funded programs, which involve a "trickle-down" approach to program funding and development, this program represented a "bubble-up" approach.¹ The 10 organizations approached the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which sponsored the CRDA demonstration; thus, they were not selected by the government for funding but rather were self-selected. The approach taken by these community organizations was supported by previous research in community crime prevention.²

Over a 3-year period beginning in May 1989, the 10 organizations planned and implemented a variety of anti-drug programs in Council Bluffs, Iowa; Des Moines, Iowa; Hartford, Connecticut; Houston, Texas; Logan Square, Chicago, Illinois; Northwest Bronx, New York City, New York; Oakland, California; South Austin, Chicago, Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; and Waterloo, Iowa. Nearly all of these target communities are inner-city areas with significant levels of poverty and severe problems of gang violence, drug marketing, and other criminal activity.

In 1989, the Institute awarded a grant to the University of Illinois at Chicago to conduct a process evaluation of the CRDA program. The objectives of this evaluation were to document the activities involved in the planning and implementation of anti-drug strategies by the participating organizations, to describe the program strategies that emerged, and to determine the extent to which program goals were achieved.

Community-Based Planning and Implementation Methods

The CRDA organizations used a variety of methods for planning and implementing their anti-drug programs and strategies. One requirement of the CRDA grant was that each organization establish a task force composed of concerned residents and relevant city agencies, whose function would be to assist in the development of a communitywide drug-abuse prevention program. The task forces differed across the sites in terms of their membership, structure, and program functions. Several organizations formed (or attempted to form) task forces of local youth and churches in addition to the primary CRDA task force. Concerned about the exposure of youth to both drug use and drug selling, these organizations sought to involve adolescents in planning and implementing strategies that might reduce youth involvement in drugs and alcohol. The attempt to mobilize churches occurred because of difficulties in using traditional tactics for organizing residents, the need for additional resources, and/or the power and legitimacy of churches in some communities, among other reasons.

In addition to the task forces, CRDA organizations worked with various agencies and organizations to further the goals and objectives of the CRDA program. In some cases partnerships were developed; for example, depending on the approach taken, closing crack houses often required the participation of community residents, the police, various city inspection services, and the courts.

Each of the 10 organizations worked cooperatively with local police departments on at least some of their program strategies. Many programs started with a strong focus on increased enforcement. They encouraged citizens to report drug activities to the police and obtained commitments from the police with regard to increased patrol visibility and follow-through on citizen information, closure of drug houses, and increased cooperation with citizen patrols or Neighborhood Watch programs. The CRDA organizations also obtained

police assistance with such nonenforcement anti-drug strategies as the maintenance of youth programs and installation of drug-free school zone signs. Police personnel also served as task force members in some cases.

The most salient police role in the CRDA program, however was that of enforcement. Primary enforcement-related strategies included the use of "hotspot cards" (cards with a police phone number for individuals to call with anonymous reports of drug activity), the closing of drug houses, establishment of drug-free school zones, and support for surveillance programs such as citizen patrols and Neighborhood Watch. For community organizations, cooperative work with the police can and often does represent a significant change from earlier, more adversarial relations. As one group noted, "Trust is the major accomplishment. We never had it before."

Although many of the CRDA organizations experienced improved relations with their police departments, a few continued to report problems in developing cooperative relationships. One facet of implementation became clear: Although community organizations with established track records in communities (such as the CRDA sites) have a better-than-average chance of implementing sustained anti-drug programs, the CRDA demonstration underscores the importance of technical assistance³—that is, assistance in drafting plans, monitoring programs, preparing budgets, conducting training, and general problemsolving and troubleshooting. Without the dissemination of information across the sites, local planning and implementation efforts would have been significantly slowed.

Anti-Drug Strategies of CRDA Organizations

A wide range of anti-drug strategies were followed by the CRDA organizations during the course of this demonstration program. These included community awareness and surveillance and reporting strategies as well as the closing of drug houses, strengthening of prosecution or sentencing, legislative initiatives, support for youth activities, and treatment services.

Promoting Community Awareness. The 10 CRDA organizations used a mix of marches, rallies, conferences, and community meetings to increase residents' awareness of local drug problems and of the anti-drug activities sponsored by the CRDA organization. These awareness-building tools also improved both city agencies' and drug dealers' awareness of residents' commitment to ridding their communities of drug problems; motivated and enabled residents to participate in anti-drug efforts that were less threatening because of the number of people involved; and highlighted specific problems or concerns of the neighborhood and helped publicize them to the broader community.

Surveillance and Reporting Strategies. Several CRDA organizations enhanced already-established crime prevention programs. For example, the hotspot card strategy was used to record suspicious persons, locations, and vehicles associated with repeated drug activity. This approach provided citizens with anonymity, thereby increasing their participation in anti-drug programs. Also in use were Neighborhood Watch programs—as a basic community crime prevention strategy, an organizing tool, a precursor for more formal neighborhood associations, and a mechanism for building stronger relationships with police departments.

Closing Drug Houses. In many communities, increased enforcement by local police departments has not proved effective because drug dealers are usually released in a matter of hours, or drug organizations quickly replace their look-outs, runners, or dealers after an arrest. With the overburdening of the criminal justice system with drug cases, moreover, dealers can continue drug operations for months before going to trial.

Although the closing of drug houses is not a solution to the drug problem or a strategy without problems, it can and does empower local communities in their fight against drugs and crime. The preventive value of this process should not be underestimated. Most drug-house landlords remedied the drug problem after receiving formal notification through nuisance abatement and other legal procedures, thereby eliminating the need for a lengthy hearing and closure.

To address this problem, several CRDA organizations pursued a multiagency approach, focusing on physical residences rather than on individual drug offenders. With this approach, the citizenry still played a role in reporting hotspots; however, the city responded with many agency services, which increased the likelihood of action being taken not only against the dealer but also against the landlord of the drug house. These CRDA organizations made creative use of nuisance abatement laws, the police department, other regulatory agencies, concerned landlords, judges, banks, and community pressure to close drug houses.

Although the closing of drug houses is not a solution to the drug problem or a strategy without problems, it can and does empower local communities in their fight against drugs and crime. The preventive value of this process should not be underestimated. Most drug-house landlords remedied the drug problem after receiving formal notification through nuisance abatement and other legal procedures, thereby eliminating the need for a lengthy hearing and closure.

Strengthening Prosecution or Sentencing. Concerned about the performance of prosecutors and judges, several community groups pursued various avenues to strengthen the prosecution and sentencing of drug offenders. Community groups using some type of court monitoring program generally developed three different approaches, each carried out by volunteers: (1) having a physical presence at court sentencing; (2) following court dockets and disposition; and (3) encouraging vigorous action by drug prosecutors. Volunteers were recruited through block clubs, churches, senior programs, and other social outlets.

For example, the presence of concerned citizens in the courtroom was meant to influence judges to apply the law fully and give appropriate sentences for drug dealers. The volunteers were motivated by the belief that the criminal statutes were created to protect the public and that all "links" in the criminal justice chain needed to be connected.

The court monitoring program certainly had a short-term benefit for the communities involved. It motivated residents to participate in the court system and understand courtroom procedures. As such, the program empowered community residents to take a stand against something they felt was wrong. In the final analysis, the monitoring strategy was meant to hold judges accountable to the public. Whether this type of program had any impact on the severity of punishment in targeted drug cases could not be determined.

Legislative Initiatives. Some CRDA community groups have lobbied for new or revised laws (such as criminal nuisance, city zoning, or State criminal codes) to strengthen the hand of law enforcement and to mobilize local residents on the drug issue. Among them are the following:

- **Nuisance Abatement Laws.** These laws are designed to prosecute building owners who knowingly permit illegal activities, including the sale of drugs, on their property.
- **Asset Forfeiture.** A relatively new procedure in criminal cases, asset forfeiture has been used extensively in recent years in cases involving the trafficking, manufacturing, and cultivation of drugs as well as in racketeering and contraband cases. Some CRDA organizations have sought a share of the proceeds to expand their anti-drug activities.
- **Beeper Ordinances.** Ordinances prohibiting students from carrying beepers in school have been used in the drug war.
- **Drug Paraphernalia.** Statutes directed at drug paraphernalia prohibit the sale of all equipment and products that are marketed for the sale, manufacture, or use of controlled substances (e.g., pipes, miniature cocaine spoons, vials, mirrors, decorative razors).

- **Drug-Free School Zones.** The use of laws on drug-free school zones (areas around schools where increased penalties could be applied for gang or drug activity) was an important component of the CRDA demonstration program. Congress passed a Federal drug-free school zone law as part of the Omnibus Anti-Substance Abuse Act of 1988; it doubled the penalty for selling drugs or for being involved in gang activity "within 1,000 feet of a school or areas where children congregate." Unfortunately, not all of these zones have been effectively enforced;⁴ as a result, in part, individual States have established their own legislation.
- **Billboard Campaign.** Community-based anti-drug initiatives have led to a deeper understanding of the public health consequences of drugs and other disease-promoting consumer products. Campaigns to remove billboards advertising alcohol and tobacco products from areas where children congregate have emerged as a national issue.
- **Federal Days.** To enhance drug enforcement efforts, CRDA organizations have successfully used "Federal Days"—that is, prearranged days on which the coordinated efforts of community residents, local police, and Federal law enforcement officials lead to the arrest and prosecution of drug suspects under Federal (rather than State) law. Law enforcement officials target drug users as well as dealers by saturating the target area and charging offenders with as many criminal and/or civil violations as possible.

Supporting Youth Activities. Several CRDA community groups were active in promoting drug abuse prevention activities that focused on youth. Designed to provide alternatives to drug use and to encourage and enhance the skills necessary to succeed in school or to secure employment, these initiatives included the following:

- **Recreation and Social Activities.** CRDA organizations supported programs sponsored by youth centers that consisted not only of recreational opportunities but some type of training and tutoring. For instance, one site offered hands-on experience in running a small food business; another offered classes on AIDS leadership development (among other topics).
- **Tutoring Programs.** CRDA organizations in some cities offered tutoring programs for youths and adults. In Houston, law enforcement officers were recruited to serve as adult role models for young males growing up in single-parent families.
- **Employment and Training Programs.** A few CRDA organizations addressed the issues of employment or job training. Oakland's CRDA organization persuaded United Airlines to participate in an airline mechanics training program at one of its maintenance facilities.

Treatment Services. Although treatment was not a high priority for CRDA programs during the first year, interest grew as the complexity of the drug problem became more apparent. The CRDA group in Hartford, for example, worked with local agencies to raise funds for the development of drug rehabilitation centers. In Chicago, one group recommended that treatment services for poor residents be expanded, and another developed a plan to link prevention and treatment services through the community schools.

The Value of Partnerships in Fighting Drug Abuse

The evaluation of the CRDA programs demonstrates how much can be accomplished by local community organizations with limited funding from the Federal Government. Although the funding did not significantly change the methods and programs that the 10 community groups were planning at the time of the grant award, these funds did allow them to pursue their anti-drug agenda with greater intensity, focus, and persistence. Furthermore, in many cases the Federal funds and the groups' association with the U.S. Department of Justice were instrumental in strengthening their organizational legitimacy in the eyes of other city, State, and national agencies.

Although treatment was not a high priority for CRDA programs during the first year, interest grew as the complexity of the drug problem became more apparent.

By the conclusion of the CRDA program, all participating community organizations had developed extensive working partnerships in addition to those maintained through their interagency task forces.

The planning process was not entirely problem-free. The concept of an interagency task force was initially rejected by several CRDA organizations, but the importance of partnerships became more apparent to them over time. When a community organization already performs the functions of a task force or already participates in a multiagency task force, however, the creation of a new task force may be unnecessary (and potentially wasteful); some flexibility with regard to requiring the creation of a task force may be appropriate.

Forming and Supporting Partnerships. The CRDA organizations worked extremely hard on a broad range of anti-drug programs, many of which were geared toward enforcement and reflected the community's outrage over the persistent presence of drug dealers and drug-related violence in their neighborhoods. Over time, however, some CRDA organizations came to realize that the criminal justice system provided only a limited solution to the drug problem. They turned their attention to education, prevention, and treatment responses and expanded into broader partnerships with other agencies. By the conclusion of the CRDA program, all participating community organizations had developed extensive working partnerships in addition to those maintained through their interagency task forces.

In the 1990s, new partnerships and coalitions increasingly characterize neighborhood and citywide efforts to prevent drugs and crime. The transition from an adversarial to a collaborative relationship, especially in the partnerships that emerged between the CRDA community organizations and the local police, was common and noteworthy. The two parties worked together to plan and implement many anti-drug strategies; in the process, they developed a new level of respect and understanding.

Strengthening Community-Based Anti-Drug Programs. For CRDA community organizers, the closing of drug houses was a visible success and helped empower the community. Evaluators suggested, however, that this strategy may have some disadvantages. Tenants not directly involved in drug dealing may be displaced; drug dealers may reoccupy closed drug houses and continue their illegal drug operations. Keeping drug houses closed generally requires continued action by the organization and residents. Finally, closing drug houses can contribute to neighborhood blight, and demolishing closed houses reduces the amount of affordable housing in the community. The long-term viability of this strategy may thus depend on the extent to which all these issues are addressed.

The effectiveness of creating drug-free school zones—another extremely popular anti-drug strategy employed by CRDA organizations—also remains uncertain. The posting of zone signs clearly provided immediate benefits from a community-organizing perspective; less clear are benefits in terms of the safety of the school environment. If signs alone are sufficient for deterrence, then this approach may be effective. But if enforcement is needed, communities may be disappointed in the long run. To enforce the zones, some CRDA organizations found it necessary to put pressure on both the police and prosecutors.

Finally, the role of the church in CRDA organizations' anti-drug initiatives is noteworthy. As more inner-city churches take on a social action role, they become increasingly important agents of social change. Although CRDA community organizers found that working through churches usually increased their legitimacy, some found it difficult to enlist the support of churches. Problems identified included the churches' reluctance to identify drug problems as within their scope of responsibility, their tendency to focus activities only on their own members, and some ministers' cautious response to interracial, interfaith groups. In general, however, churches provide a relatively untapped source of influence in inner-city neighborhoods, and the CRDA program has demonstrated how that potential can be tapped in addressing the drug problem.

ANTI-DRUG INITIATIVES IN SMALL CITIES AND TOWNS

Although information on the relationship between drugs and crime and the effectiveness of various anti-drug strategies in large urban areas has been expanding, few investigations have been conducted on the nature and extent of drug problems or anti-drug initiatives in smaller cities and towns. To reduce this information gap, the Institute is evaluating anti-drug initiatives in small cities and towns under the direction of researchers from the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections of Southern Illinois University. This evaluation is focusing on the following:

- The characteristics of drug problems as perceived by local law enforcement officials and key community leaders;
- Anti-drug initiatives that have been developed to address these problems and their operating characteristics; and
- Successful program models and guidelines for their implementation.

Data for this evaluation are being collected from approximately 200 municipalities that have been divided into three groups: those with populations between 5,000 and 50,000; those with populations of less than 5,000; and small cities and towns that contain unusually high proportions of young adults because of the presence of large institutions such as military bases or universities. To obtain data from each municipality, a local law enforcement official, an official of local government, an official from the local school system, and a recognized community leader identified through nominations from the other three individuals and active in local anti-drug efforts (but not employed by the local police, government, or school system) are being asked about the nature and extent of local drug problems and the characteristics of any local anti-drug initiatives. On the basis of those data, 50 sites are being selected for additional research on the operations and impacts of their programs. Six to eight of the most promising anti-drug initiatives will then be the subject of site visits, further interviews, and reviews of program records to aid in developing case studies of program implementation, management, and operations.

INTERVENING TO ASSIST YOUTH AT RISK

Recent research shows that successful intervention programs identify at-risk youth early and intervene early. Research also indicates that both environmental and individual factors play roles in determining whether youths are at risk of becoming involved with drugs and crime.⁵ Environmental factors include low socioeconomic status; crowded, crime-ridden, transient neighborhoods; lack of neighborhood cohesiveness; norms favorable to drug use; and drug availability. Individual risk factors can include a family history of alcoholism; poor and inconsistent parenting; academic failure; association with drug using peers; early rebelliousness; and experimentation with drugs.

Strategic Intervention for High-Risk Youth

Funded for more than 4 years by a public-private partnership that includes NIJ, BJA, and the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention, the Strategic Intervention for High-Risk Youth (SIHRY) strategy conforms to the characteristics of successful intervention programs. Such programs provide long-term, consistent intervention; individualized attention, including intensive counseling; and comprehensive services through on-site provision of case management support. They also emphasize skills enhancement, life options, and vocational orientation; develop and use multiple channels of influence (e.g., media, churches, parents/families, and neighborhood prevention campaigns); and provide a safe and stable physical environment.⁶

Under the SIHRY program, service delivery is coordinated among criminal justice agencies, schools, social service agencies, and community-based organizations. Each SIHRY program is designed to meet local needs; as a result, the kinds of services provided vary among sites. All SIHRY programs must, however, include the following:

- **Direct Participation of Police Officers.** Programs sometimes involve the stationing of police in schools and neighborhoods to ensure order and maintain and enhance relationships with community groups, and stepped-up supervision and sanctioning of drug offenders to reduce their influence in the neighborhood.
- **Criminal/Juvenile Justice Intervention.** Case managers work with juvenile court personnel to provide community service opportunities and enhanced supervision of youth in the justice system.
- **Case Management.** Caseworkers develop a service plan for all members of a household and follow up on referrals to social services. Intensive efforts, usually lasting for 3 to 4 months, are followed by ongoing case management during the period in which participants are in the program.
- **Family Services.** Intensive family counseling (both individual and group), parenting and stress management/coping skills training, identification and treatment of substance abuse, and health care are provided. Services may also include referrals to education and training programs, job search skills and employment services, and income and social support services.
- **Education Services.** Tutoring and homework assistance is provided to all participants. Also provided are educational testing and remedial courses or other specialized coursework (or referrals to these) aimed at reducing academic failure, as needed.
- **After-School and Summer Activities.** All youths participate in recreational programs, life-skill/leadership development activities, and training or education.
- **Mentoring.** Each program has arrangements with local organizations to provide mentors for youth in need of a caring relationship with an adult.
- **Incentives.** Gifts and special events are used as incentives to build morale and attachment to the prosocial goals of the program. Stipends are also provided for community service during summer programs.

The SIHRY strategy has now been implemented in six demonstration sites. Sites in Austin, Texas; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Memphis, Tennessee; and Seattle, Washington, are now being evaluated. (Demonstration sites in Newark, New Jersey, and Savannah, Georgia, are not being evaluated.) Subjects for this evaluation are some 400 boys and girls from 11 to 13 who live in the target neighborhoods and meet school, family, or personal risk criteria.

The Institute's evaluation will assess whether SIHRY's intensive case management, family services, mentoring, and incentives have had any effects on the target neighborhoods. The aim is to determine whether the programs have resulted in improvements in residents' satisfaction with the safety, appearance, and quality of life in their neighborhoods; increased family cohesion and improved parental control; reduced fights, vandalism, disciplinary problems at school, gang activity, and reports of juvenile crimes; improved school performance, attachment, and attendance; and improved self-esteem and attitudes toward risk-taking.

By integrating Federal, State, and local efforts to eliminate violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime from targeted neighborhoods and to provide comprehensive social and educational services, the SIHRY model exemplifies the goals of the Weed and Seed Program, a Federal anti-crime effort in urban areas.

This program's evaluation will demonstrate the feasibility of integrating the provision of services by criminal justice and social service agencies and community-based organizations. By focusing on community-specific needs and resources, the program will also test a model of local initiative in planning program content and providing leadership in addressing community needs. Although these ideas have been widely discussed, this evaluation will be the first systematic attempt to assess their impact under controlled conditions.

Providing Youth With an Alternative to Street Life

A second at-risk youth intervention program currently being evaluated by the National Institute of Justice involves Boys and Girls Clubs. In 1993, BJA funded Boys and Girls Clubs of America to enhance, provide technical assistance for, and (in some cases) establish new clubs in 15 public housing developments. At 10 of the sites—Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Fort Worth, Texas; Greensboro, North Carolina; Hammond, Indiana; Harbor City, California; Las Vegas, Nevada; Little Rock, Arkansas; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Wilmington, Delaware—the main object is to supplement existing programs with comprehensive mentoring and health services for parents and families. In the remaining five sites—Charleston, South Carolina; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; San Antonio, Texas; and Trenton, New Jersey—the goal is to establish new clubs that incorporate mentoring and health services.

With more than 1,200 local clubs operating in every major U.S. metropolitan area, Boys and Girls Clubs have proved to be effective in helping disadvantaged youth. Clubs typically provide recreational activities, tutorial programs, field trips, crafts programs, mentoring, and other programs designed to offer positive direction to youths. Many are located adjacent to or within public housing developments and thus provide a major alternative to street life.⁷

Now in its initial phase, the Institute's evaluation of this program will:

- Determine levels of program implementation;
- Collect data to assess program activities and whether stated objectives are being achieved;
- Compare findings across sites;
- Determine what kinds of programs work in particular environments; and
- Identify program development potentials.

Once completed, this project will provide details on implementation issues, strengths of the programs, and areas that need improvements.

AN URBAN ANTI-DRUG AND ANTI-CRIME INITIATIVE

The Weed and Seed Program developed by the U.S. Department of Justice and other Federal agencies brings to bear on drug and crime problems some of the most promising law enforcement and neighborhood revitalization strategies developed during the past two decades. Weed and Seed operates as a three-step program. During step one, police and prosecutors (under the direction of a multiagency task force) aim to "weed" neighborhoods of serious offenders and drug traffickers through arrest and rigorous prosecution. In step two, community policing strategies serve as a bridge between the efforts of the law enforcement task forces and efforts aimed at neighborhood revitalization, or "seeding." Seeding activities are designed for crime and drug prevention and treatment and are intended to build community empowerment, develop jobs, improve housing, and spur economic development. Seeding is directed by a coalition of government agencies, private organizations, and the community.

Weed and Seed Demonstration Cities

Atlanta, Georgia
Chelsea, Massachusetts
Charleston, South Carolina
Chicago, Illinois
Denver, Colorado
Fort Worth, Texas
Kansas City, Missouri
Los Angeles, California
Madison, Wisconsin
Omaha, Nebraska
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Richmond, Virginia
San Antonio, Texas
San Diego, California
Santa Ana, California
Seattle, Washington
Trenton, New Jersey
Washington, D.C.
Wilmington, Delaware

By the close of fiscal year 1992, the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys had funded Weed and Seed demonstrations in 20 cities: Atlanta, Georgia; Chelsea, Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Denver, Colorado; Fort Worth, Texas; Kansas City, Missouri; Los Angeles, California; Madison, Wisconsin; Omaha, Nebraska; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Richmond, Virginia; San Antonio, Texas; San Diego, California; Santa Ana, California; Seattle, Washington; Trenton, New Jersey; Washington, D.C.; and Wilmington, Delaware.

Supported through a grant from NIJ, the Institute for Social Analysis, the Police Foundation, and American Prosecutors Research Institute are now collaborating on a national evaluation of 19 of these Weed and Seed demonstrations. The 18-month process evaluation will document the implementation, costs, and value of all demonstration projects. Through routine data reporting systems, interviews with program staff and task force members, document reviews, and surveys of prosecutors, task force members, and community leaders, the following program elements will be examined and compared:

- Community characteristics (size, ethnicity, crime and drug problems, etc.);
- Program characteristics;
- Task force characteristics and functioning;
- Law enforcement and community policing strategies and immediate outcomes;
- Prosecution strategies and immediate outcomes; and
- Seeding activities.

The Weed and Seed initiative aims to combine a number of program strategies and approaches that are showing promise as a means for stemming the tide of violent crime and neighborhood deterioration associated with drug trafficking. The premise of this initiative is that these efforts will be more successful if they are part of an integrated plan coordinated by a group of officials and citizens in a position to make decisions about and allocate resources to the problem. The results of this evaluation could have a substantial effect on the planning of future coordinated efforts.

NIJ will give consideration to a full impact evaluation of the Weed and Seed Program as findings from the process evaluation become available, given sufficient funding.

Weed and Seed Prosecutors' Information System

Local prosecutors are in a position to apply the most stringent charges to keep drug and violent offenders out of the community while actively working with community groups to help ensure that revitalization efforts are successful. Moreover, much of the criminal justice process data that provide measurement indicators of Weed and Seed outcomes are centralized in local prosecutors' offices—particularly data on what happens to cases as they move through the system from arrest to final disposition.

The primary goal of this evaluation is to provide an accurate measurement of prosecution-related activities and impacts of Weed and Seed programs on local prosecutors' offices in each of the 20 Weed and Seed sites. This measurement will be obtained through the development and implementation of a computerized database that tracks Weed and Seed case progress. The evaluation will address the following general questions:

- How have Weed and Seed enforcement activities affected the local prosecutor's office, local law enforcement, and the courts?
- What types of prosecution activities are being conducted in conjunction with the Weed and Seed program?
- What is the local prosecutor's involvement level in Weed and Seed enforcement activities?

More specifically, the collection and analysis of data on these issues will allow evaluators to learn:

- The types and numbers of drug and firearms offenses/offenders generated through Weed and Seed enforcement efforts;
- Activities required to prosecute Weed and Seed offenses; the number and value of Weed and Seed-related asset forfeitures pursued by local prosecutors' offices; and offender detention actions being pursued by local prosecutors in Weed and Seed cases;
- The characteristics of Weed and Seed offenders (e.g., criminal histories, if any; typical crimes engaged in);
- The role of nonfelony prosecution responses in Weed and Seed areas, who is handling the cases, and the characteristics of the cases;
- The types and numbers of Weed and Seed offenses in which local prosecutors are cross-designated by U.S. Attorneys' offices to pursue Federal prosecutions, and the types and numbers of Weed and Seed cases referred to the U.S. Attorney for Federal action (e.g., prosecution, asset forfeiture, etc.); and
- The effects of Seeding programs on the volume and characteristics of drug and violent crime cases prosecuted by local prosecutors.

Data collected and analyzed for this evaluation will focus explicitly on local prosecution activities within the Weed and Seed program. In addition to prosecution of offenders under local and State statutes, data collection activities will focus on cases in which local prosecutors are cross-designated by the U.S. Attorney to pursue Federal prosecutions, as well as cases that are referred by the local prosecutor to the U.S. Attorney for Federal actions.

The program evaluator, the American Prosecutors Research Institute, has completed a preliminary needs assessment and manual data collection form. Once a computerized format has been completed and pretested, it will be made available to all Weed and Seed prosecution representatives.

Because the number of sites selected for participation in the initial Weed and Seed funding is limited, analysis and interpretation of prosecution data are of great importance. Results and conclusions derived from the data will influence possible program expansion and format revisions. The experiences of prosecution officials involved in Weed and Seed endeavors will be an important barometer of program impact and achievement.

Prosecution data collected within this system will:

- Provide preliminary benchmarks of program activities;
- Help prosecution officials assess the link between proposed strategies and eventual outcomes; and
- Permit comparisons with pre-implementation enforcement and prosecution efforts.

Collection and analysis of prosecution data will also provide critical feedback to Federal funding agencies and local Weed and Seed participant agencies. Evaluation feedback can be used to monitor implementation, assess preliminary impact, and guide formation of future prosecution strategies.

Collection, analysis, and interpretation of prosecution data will serve several purposes. Implementation of enforcement and prosecution strategies can be monitored; local, State, and Federal officials can measure changes in adjudication processes resulting from Weed and Seed activities; and local prosecutors (and other Weed and Seed officials) can use data as a feedback mechanism to refine future Weed and Seed policies and practices. Prosecu-

tors from other jurisdictions anticipating participation in future Weed and Seed activities can examine data analysis results and substantive interpretations to gain insight into the effects of Weed and Seed prosecution efforts. They may also use the experiences of other prosecutors to anticipate implementation obstacles and gauge future resource requirements.

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The common perception that illegal drug use frequently initiates, intensifies, and prolongs criminal careers is confirmed by research.¹ Many drug users commit crime, often to obtain money to buy drugs, and are arrested, prosecuted, and—if found guilty—sentenced to punishment. Then they repeat the cycle again and again.

Violence, drugs, and crime constitute a serious national problem, but not a problem that the criminal justice system alone can successfully address. The growth of violence and substance abuse is a health problem as much as a criminal problem.² Increasingly, criminal justice agencies are finding it useful to work collaboratively with public and private health care and medical agencies, and with other community organizations to reduce violence, drug abuse, and crime.

One of the central strengths of the criminal justice system is that it can coerce offenders—whether in custody or under probation or parole supervision—into abstaining from using drugs. The system can require offenders to remain drug-free as a condition of release, and it can employ drug testing to monitor offenders after release to ensure that they meet the conditions.

It is encouraging to report that coercion works, at least for some offenders. Research has shown that when a given number of offenders are required to abstain from drugs, are exposed to intensive drug-abuse education, receive appropriate treatment and counseling, and are monitored, a significant percentage of them will remain drug-free. Perhaps more important for both offenders and society, this significant percentage of offenders will remain crime-free.³

Existing evidence does not show that sanctions (fine, probation, parole, or length of time served) reduce criminality more effectively than drug treatment among cocaine-heroin abusers. Indeed, residential drug treatment programs have sizable proportions (frequently more than half) of cocaine-heroin abuser clients who are on probation or parole or under related legal pressure and whose criminality is near zero while in the program. (This near-zero criminality is documented for therapeutic communities in several cities.) A New York study found that about a third of residential treatment clients had extensive criminal histories and were referred by the criminal justice system. These offenders tended to stay in the treatment program longer and have as good or better outcomes than clients with similar pretreatment criminal and drug histories who were not referred by the criminal justice system.⁴

This chapter reports on National Institute of Justice (NIJ) evaluations of four criminal justice programs, ranging from one that applies drug testing across the full spectrum of the criminal justice system in a county of Oregon, to others that implement substance abuse programs for probationers in San Diego and for offenders in local jails. One project involves the widely publicized Miami Drug Court, which handles drug offenders in Dade County, Florida.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- *Systemwide drug testing in Multnomah County, Oregon*
- *Dade County, Florida, Drug Court*
- *A substance abuse program for probationers*
- *Drug offender treatment in local jails*

SYSTEMWIDE DRUG TESTING IN MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON

Drug testing programs can be found at the State and local level at every point in the criminal justice process. They are used to screen for recent use of illegal drugs, identify chronic drug users, identify those with treatment needs, monitor compliance with conditions of release, and estimate drug-use trends in criminal populations.

Testing offenders has become an important means of strengthening the criminal justice system's ability to reduce drug use. In fact, the Office of National Drug Control Policy has recommended that State criminal justice programs implement comprehensive drug testing programs from arrest through post-conviction supervision. Information about an arrestee's drug status has a number of uses. At the time of arrest, for example, it improves the ability of the criminal justice system to assess the risk of pretrial misconduct (rearrest or failure to appear), and this information can be a factor in making decisions about release and setting release conditions. Drug testing of arrestees, pretrial releasees, probationers, inmates, and parolees can also be used to place them in appropriate drug treatment programs, ensure their compliance with these programs, and sanction failure to comply.

Evidence of the links between drugs and crime and the promising results of early evaluations of drug testing programs have provided the impetus to develop systemwide drug testing programs. Since 1984, for example, Washington, D.C., has conducted urinalyses of arrestees and defendants awaiting trial, and an NIJ evaluation found that those who continued to be screened for drug use had lower rates of failure-to-appear and rearrest.⁵ Smaller experimental programs to test at all stages in the system—arrest, prison or jail (for contraband drugs), probation, parole, community corrections, work release, and so on—have been implemented in other jurisdictions.⁶

In 1991, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded a systemwide drug testing program in Multnomah County, Oregon. NIJ awarded a grant to BOTEK Analysis Corporation and The Urban Institute to evaluate and compare the impact of systemwide drug testing and suggest procedures for effectively implementing other such programs. The Institute evaluation focuses strongly on Multnomah County's systemwide Drug Testing and Evaluation (DTE) program.

The two-part evaluation project involves, first, an examination of how well the DTE program is working, what difficulties the county has experienced during implementation of the program, and how the county has resolved those problems. In the second part (in 1993), Institute evaluators are assessing the impact of the program to determine its effectiveness in monitoring persons released before trial and persons on probation and parole. This phase is comparing one group of individuals who are tested with another group not tested to measure appearance at scheduled hearings and criminal activity while case dispositions are pending. Researchers will also evaluate post-adjudication outcomes to determine whether drug testing by probation officers encourages compliance with orders of release and controls recidivism.

Putting "Teeth" in Drug Testing

Two results of this project stand out. The first is the need for resources for appropriate drug treatment and sanctions for drug use or other violations, or parole or probation. Without the capacity to sanction failures to appear for testing and positive drug tests, drug testing is a "paper tiger"; clients quickly become aware of this and ignore the program. And without drug treatment capacity, clients can at best be coerced into temporary patterns of drug abstinence. The possibilities for permanent rehabilitation, which DTE provides, cannot be realized. This first finding further confirms the consensus among researchers studying drug testing programs: namely, that sanctions are necessary for these programs to be effective.

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Second, in the absence of explicit administrative procedures, probation and parole officers can operate drug testing programs according to a philosophy different from that defined in the original program model. This does not necessarily have a negative impact on the program's ultimate goals. In Multnomah County, probation and parole officers use the DTE program for short- rather than long-term control of clients. This is advantageous for the officers and may actually support the goals of the DTE program. This finding is specific to the Multnomah County program but should serve to make program planners aware that various criminal justice practitioners may informally alter specific aspects of program implementation unless formal safeguards against such actions are in place.

DADE COUNTY DRUG COURT

America's courts are becoming increasingly clogged with drug-related cases, and many jails and prisons are overflowing with drug offenders. There were more than 2 million arrests for drug offenses in 1991—a 56 percent increase since 1982. Two-thirds of those arrests were for illegal possession of drugs; one-third were for manufacturing or selling drugs.⁷ Dade County, Florida, is no exception: Police arrested 9,409 individuals in 1991 for drug offenses, including 6,923 arrests for illegal possession of drugs.⁸

What makes Dade County different is its Diversion and Treatment Program, which channels almost all defendants arrested on felony drug possession charges into an innovative court-operated rehabilitation program as an alternative to prosecution. The program provides a year or more of treatment and case management services that include counseling, acupuncture treatment (to relieve symptoms of withdrawal), fellowship meetings, education courses, and vocational services along with strict monitoring through periodic urine testing and court appearances. Defendants who succeed in the program have their criminal cases dismissed.

The program seeks to accomplish what business as usual has failed to achieve: namely, to provide defendants with the treatment and support services that can shut the revolving door that brings the majority of drug offenders back to court. Additional funds and personnel are needed to provide the required long-term services. Dade County's experience indicates that needed resources can be assembled into a total package, from initial detoxification through eventual job placement.

Using a Court to Manage Drug Treatment

The program's centerpiece is its Drug Court, which is a court-based program for felony drug defendants entering Circuit Court in Florida's Eleventh Judicial Circuit. It was set up in the summer of 1989 by order of the Administrative Judge of the Florida Supreme Court. The Drug Court places defendants in its tailor-made treatment program, the Diversion and Treatment Program, monitors their progress, and decides whether they have recovered sufficiently to have their case dismissed. The result is a treatment program managed by a court judge.

Not every arrestee charged with a drug offense can participate. To qualify, the arrestee must be charged with drug possession, or in a minority of cases felony drug purchase offenses, and the State's Attorney must agree to diversion. Arrestees who have a history of violent crime, are arrested for drug trafficking, or have more than two previous felony convictions that are not for drug offenses are ineligible. Participants do not have to be current drug users—in fact, many arrestees maintain that they are not "addicts."

The Drug Court handles a large volume of cases—an average of 80 a day—as both new arrestees and defendants in the program appear at the same time. Arrestees and program participants find that they cannot manipulate the court system through "forum shopping" (i.e., attempting to locate the most lenient venues) in the way they anticipate or have done

What makes Dade County different is its Diversion and Treatment Program, which channels almost all defendants arrested on drug possession charges into an innovative court-operated rehabilitation program as an alternative to prosecution.

Dade County Drug Court: Keeping Offenders Drug-Free

The Dade County Drug Court's rehabilitation program has three distinct phases—detoxification, stabilization, and after-care—with testing and monitoring during all three phases. Counselors and the court exercise discretion in individualizing the program to meet the needs of each "client."

The primary goal of phase one is detoxification. It lasts 12 to 14 days but frequently continues longer if a client has trouble getting off drugs. The client's primary counselor, a State-certified addictions professional, makes sure that the client appears every day to leave a urine specimen and carefully tracks the test results. Clients are offered daily acupuncture to assist in the process of detoxification.

Clients are ready to move into phase two when the judge believes they have shown enough progress to function successfully in a less structured treatment environ-

ment. Clients in phase two concentrate on maintaining abstinence by attending individual and group counseling sessions and attending local fellowship meetings. Each primary counselor provides any one-on-one substance abuse counseling that a client may need; for group therapy, the client is referred to ongoing groups in the treatment clinic. Fellowship meetings are also held at the clinic during the evenings as well as in many locations in the community. Clients often continue to attend acupuncture sessions once or twice a week during phase two to help them stay off drugs. Phase two is scheduled to last 14 to 16 weeks, but clients can exit in 2 months or remain more than a year depending on their progress. The judge may return clients to phase one if they have difficulty staying off drugs.

Once accepted into phase three, clients change treatment sites from the main or satellite treatment clinic to one of two

campuses of Miami-Dade Community College. Here, they are assigned a new counselor and shift their focus from stabilizing their abstinent lifestyle to preparing themselves academically and occupationally for the future. Clients still return to court once or twice a month and still provide urine specimens during phase three, but the emphasis shifts to encouraging them to act without the help of treatment staff. Although many clients attend fellowship meetings at this stage of their recovery, formal drug abuse counseling in phase three is offered only when the client starts to experience difficulty staying off drugs. Phase three is slated to last 36 weeks, rounding out the anticipated year of program participation. Some clients cycle back and forth between the final phase and phase two; others remain in phase three well beyond the expected 8 or 9 months.

Advocates of the Drug Court believe that crime will decline if offenders can emerge from the criminal justice system drug-free, employed, and off the streets.

in the past. In contrast to most courtrooms, where different personnel may preside and prosecute at every encounter and defendants can try to get a better deal out of each new adversary, personnel in the Drug Court remain the same. Eventually, defendants come to realize that the Drug Court's goal is to help them to get off and stay off drugs.

Advocates of the Drug Court believe that crime will decline if offenders can emerge from the criminal justice system drug-free, employed, and off the streets. (A mid-1980s study of 573 substance abusers in Miami found that in a 1-year period, they committed 6,000 robberies and assaults, 6,700 burglaries, 900 auto thefts, 25,000 acts of shoplifting, and 46,000 other larcenies or frauds.⁹) Other research shows that offenders referred to treatment by the courts have a powerful incentive to remain in treatment in order to avoid being jailed again¹⁰ and suggests that the longer an addict remains in treatment, the better his or her chances are for long-term recovery.¹¹ Miami's Diversion and Treatment Program makes use of legal coercion to motivate defendants to accept treatment, and a substantial number of diverted defendants remain in treatment for a considerable length of time.

Because of the unique nature of the Drug Court, the Institute awarded funds in 1991 (in conjunction with the State Justice Institute) for the Crime and Justice Research Institute to assess the impact of the program. Researchers studied the participation of Drug Court defendants in the treatment process and compared their case outcomes and criminal reinvolvement over an 18-month observation period with the outcomes for contemporaneous samples of felony defendants as well as samples of felony defendants entering Circuit Court during a period (in 1987) prior to establishment of the Drug Court. Thus, the research compared outcomes of Drug Court defendants with outcomes of non-Drug Court defendants over the 18 months and with defendants whose cases were adjudicated before the Drug Court began operation. The preliminary findings from the research are reported below.

Drug Court and Public Safety Considerations

Comparing Drug Court defendants with other felony drug defendants not assigned to Drug Court, researchers found the following:

- The two groups of drug defendants differed sharply in the subsequent histories of (re)arrests produced over the 18-month observation period: 32 percent of Drug Court defendants were rearrested at least once; 50 percent of the other felony drug defendants not eligible for Drug Court were rearrested at least once.
- Drug Court defendants who were rearrested during the observation period stayed arrest-free roughly three times as long as other felony drug defendants during the 18-month observation period. Drug Court rearrestees averaged about 8 months (235 days) arrest-free, compared with an average of less than 3 months (79 days) for other felony drug rearrestees.
- Substantially greater numbers of Drug Court defendants (54 percent) generated warrants (largely from the Drug Court itself) than other drug defendants (10 percent).

Comparing Drug Court defendants with nondrug felony defendants showed the following:

- Proportionately fewer drug Court defendants (32 percent) than nondrug felony defendants (39 percent) were rearrested for new offenses during the 18-month observation period.
- Drug Court defendants who were rearrested remained arrest-free for roughly twice as long (with a median of 235 days or nearly 8 months) as nondrug felony defendants who were rearrested (with a median of 115 days or less than 4 months).

Comparing Drug Court Defendants with similar drug and nondrug defendants from a period prior to implementation of Drug Court, researchers found the following:

- The 1990 Drug Court defendants were also rearrested much less frequently during their 18-month observation period than either of the 1987 felony samples (drug defendants, 53 percent; nondrug defendants, 51 percent). Drug Court defendants also recorded proportionately fewer rearrests for serious crimes against the person and for drug crimes than the 1987 defendants.
- When Drug Court defendants were rearrested, the average period of time to the first rearrest (235 days) was three to four times longer than the average time to rearrest shown by 1987 drug defendants (81 days), and nondrug defendants (52 days). Finally, because of the greater opportunity afforded by numerous scheduled appearances in Drug Court, Drug Court defendants recorded dramatically higher failure-to-appear rates.

Recent Developments in Court Involvement in Drug Treatment

Two significant developments are flowing from the innovations made in the Dade County Drug Court. First, the Drug Court is seeking to expand its original pre-adjudicatory focus to incorporate other categories of felony defendants. This may also include focusing on the more challenging population of drug-involved, sentenced offenders. This larger realm is not as limited in its eligibility requirements and, because of the sentenced status of participants, is also one over which the court can exercise greater control. This strategy, expected to be watched with interest by many jurisdictions nationally, has clear potential for easing crowding in local correctional facilities where sentenced inmates are increasingly occupying limited space.

Second, the Dade County Drug Court appears to have spearheaded a growing mini-movement in American courts that involves the judiciary centrally in a treatment-oriented approach to coping with the drug caseload. Although Dade County routinely receives

The Dade County Drug Court appears to have spearheaded a growing mini-movement in American courts that involves the judiciary centrally in a treatment-oriented approach to coping with the drug caseload.

visitors from American and foreign court systems, estimates of replications vary widely—as many as 20 drug court programs may have emulated the Dade County model. These do not include courts that have borrowed elements of the Dade County approach without trying to replicate its entire approach. In Florida alone, for example, the Florida Supreme Court, assisted by the State Justice Institute, is implementing drug courts in two rural counties and another in Broward County. Drug courts are operating in Dayton, Ohio; Oakland, California; and Portland, Oregon. A court making use of residential drug treatment is operating in Brooklyn, New York; implementation efforts are underway in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Los Angeles, California; and Superior Court in the District of Columbia has received a Federal grant to implement a variation of the Dade County Drug Court.

A SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM FOR PROBATIONERS

As prison population levels doubled in the past decade without a commensurate rise in capacity, probation has become the sentence of choice to alleviate severe prison and jail crowding nationwide. The probation population has doubled in the past 10 years with no significant increases in resources. Almost two-thirds of all convicted offenders are placed on probation, yet probation receives less than one-third of the correctional resources.¹² Probation caseloads also include many more serious offenders than in the past. One study found that the majority of felons placed on probation in California constitute a serious threat to the public, as 65 percent of those studied were rearrested and 34 percent were sentenced to jail or prison for new crimes.¹³

Within this context, intensive, surveillance-oriented, community corrections programs have emerged as an intermediate sanction between regular probation and incarceration. Among the primary goals of intensive probation cited by proponents are the reduction of prison crowding by diverting less serious offenders from incarceration, avoidance of the high costs of building and sustaining prisons, rehabilitation of the offender, and the promoting of public safety by ensuring surveillance of offenders supervised in the community who are at high risk of continued criminal activity.¹⁴ Some intensive probation programs incorporate drug treatment and employment assistance, while others focus solely on surveillance and enforcement.

Incorporating mandatory drug treatment into intensive supervision for high-risk probationers offers the promise of reducing drug use and the crime that accompanies it.¹⁵ Costs are a primary consideration. To maximize limited resources, decisionmakers need to know what types of interventions lead to successful outcomes for drug-abusing offenders. A corollary is knowing the characteristics of probationers who remain drug-free after intervention.

Probationers in Recovery, an intensive probation program in San Diego County, California, requires offenders to participate in drug treatment. Program probation caseloads are limited, enabling probation officers to provide increased contacts with clients and more frequent drug testing. Probation and drug treatment staff work cooperatively to enforce probation conditions and participation in the treatment program. Graduated sanctions, including increased drug-use monitoring, curfew, and return to custody, are also used to increase accountability.

Under a grant from the Institute, the San Diego Association of Governments' Criminal Justice Research Division is conducting research to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. The research compares program activities and outcomes among matched groups of high-risk probationers receiving different services and levels of supervision.

Assessing Probationers' Responses to Drug Treatment

At intake, 80 percent of probationers stated that their probation term would help them, and 75 percent said after 8 months that they were helped. Initially, only about one-third of the probationers believed that it would be difficult to comply with probation terms; after their experience in the program, however, 52 percent indicated that it was actually difficult to comply. Despite the fact that they had received an orientation to the program at the time of the intake interview, the probationers may not have realized all the program requirements. The proportion of probationers who would choose the program if given the option increased over the 8-month period, from 29 percent at intake to 44 percent at the followup interview.

During the intake and followup interviews, probationers indicated their need for specific types of services similar to those provided. At intake, almost half admitted to needing drug treatment; eight of 10 indicated a need for additional education, and over half expressed a need for employment assistance and counseling.

Although this program does address some of the needs identified by probationers, its role is limited. Not surprisingly, no significant change occurred in the need for the same services expressed by probationers who had participated in the program for up to 8 months. There was a slight increase (from 10 percent to 17 percent) in the proportion citing a need for alcohol treatment, and the percentage in need of employment assistance dropped from 57 percent to 44 percent.

The continuing need for services reflects the complex nature of the problems faced by drug-abusing offenders when released to the community. Those problems are typically related to remaining clean and sober and to supporting themselves through legal employment. Such problems may not be solved through short-term solutions or narrow programs that focus only on drug treatment and not on helping offenders find work and make other changes needed to support a crime-free life. Those who stay with the program receive relapse-prevention services to assist them in making the transition from treatment to the community; they are generally still on probation.

Probationers' Opinions on Probation and Drug Treatment

Probationers surveyed in the Probationers in Recovery program in San Diego County, California, were asked if they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements regarding probation and drug treatment. Among those who agreed or strongly agreed with the statements, only a small percentage (17 percent) felt that there was nothing helpful about probation in both the intake and followup interviews; about half were not happy about being on probation (64 percent at intake and 50 percent at the time of the followup interview). There was an increase in the proportion of those who said they would not get into trouble again (from 64 percent to 71 percent) and those who felt they would or did learn about themselves

on probation (from 78 percent to 92 percent). These responses indicate that probation may have had a positive impact on some probationers.

Next, probationers were asked for their opinions regarding drug treatment. At intake, about one-third believed that the drug program was a game they would play to complete probation. This percentage dropped to 6 percent 8 months later, suggesting that probationers had taken the drug treatment program more seriously. Changes in opinions were minimal for the other questions asked. At intake, 81 percent felt that the drug program would be helpful, while 75 percent stated that it

actually was helpful 8 months later. Roughly the same percentages (84 percent versus 83 percent) indicated that the drug program staff set a good example for probationers. These high responses may be related to the fact that treatment staff admit to having had drug or alcohol-related problems and state that they are now sober and working to help others. Treatment staff felt that a desire among probationers to become drug treatment counselors might indicate an investment in the recovery process; however, the proportion stating that they wanted to be a drug program staff member did not increase significantly over time (36 percent at intake and 42 percent 8 months later).

The Future of Drug Offenders on Probation

Preliminary findings from the intake and followup interviews show that this program's elements address needs identified by drug-abusing probationers, including drug treatment, education, employment assistance, and counseling. Some of the probationers also indicated that the program has provided needed structure and support and that they would choose to be part of the program if given the option. Finding solutions to the problems faced by drug-abusing offenders may, however, require a more long-term intervention than is reflected in the followup interviews (conducted 8 months after release to the community). Moreover, factors beyond the control of the program, such as the economy, may make it more difficult for these probationers to achieve all the goals established for them by the program.

The final report of this study will include a more detailed analysis of probationer interview data and an impact assessment that measures technical violations, repeat offenses, and drug use over a 14-month period. Characteristics of probationers who succeed on probation will also be analyzed. This information is critical to decisionmakers who must maximize resources while simultaneously providing for offender accountability and public safety.

DRUG OFFENDER TREATMENT IN LOCAL JAILS

Drug abuse is a major factor in recent increases in jail and prison populations.¹⁶ The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)¹⁷ reported that in 1989, nearly 1 of every 4 jail inmates was in jail for a drug offense, compared with 1 of 10 in 1983. According to a recent BJS survey,¹⁸ 21.3 percent of the prison population (i.e., sentenced offenders) were serving time for drug-related offenses in 1991, up from 8.6 percent in 1986. NIJ's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) data have consistently shown high rates of drug use among booked arrestees. In 1991, more than half of the arrestees in 20 participating cities tested positive for illegal substances.¹⁹

In light of this increase, there is a growing interest in treatment programs for offenders in custody. Most available information is on therapeutic community models implemented in prisons,²⁰ many of which permit prisoner participation for a year or more. Much less information is available about the impact of drug treatment programs in local corrections settings, in which lengths of stay are typically much shorter.

Also, few descriptions of jail treatment programs detail who participates, what services are provided, and how much these programs cost. Few evaluations have been conducted of the impact of drug treatment in local jails, and little is known about the nature and impact of post-incarceration aftercare services.

The purpose of this multisite evaluation project, undertaken by the National Council of Crime and Delinquency under an Institute grant, is to provide detailed and systematic descriptions of participants and program components for a sample of five drug treatment programs in local jails. The goal is to provide recommendations regarding the status and efficacy of drug treatment in jails. The locations and treatment program participant sample sizes for the five sites are as follows: Westchester County, New York (100); New York City (250); Santa Clara County, California (100); Contra Costa County, California (200); and Los Angeles County, California (100).

Profiling Offenders in Jail-Based Drug Treatment Programs

The average age of offenders in the jail programs studied was 32 years. More than half of the offenders represented in these treatment programs were white (57 percent); 18 percent were Hispanic, about one-third were African-American, and only 3 percent were Asian or Pacific Islander. Five percent reported being of mixed or other racial/ethnic backgrounds.

Almost half had never been married; 20 percent reported being married; and 37 percent were separated or divorced. Almost 40 percent reported renting before their arrest, with another one-third living with a relative; 15 percent were homeless. Half reported prior drug treatment, primarily in the form of self-help groups.

Reported drug use varied by site. The use of alcohol was reported by less than half of the sample in New York City and more than 80 percent in Santa Clara County. The use of heroin was reported by slightly more than 40 percent in Westchester County and only 18.5 percent in Contra Costa County. The self-reported use of cocaine (including crack) ranged from 42 percent in the Contra Costa program to 85 percent in Westchester County.

Slightly more than half of the participants had been arrested for a drug offense, and almost one-quarter had been arrested for a property offense. In the all-female program, 21 percent had been arrested for prostitution, and 41 percent reported a history of physical abuse. In contrast, about one-quarter of the participants in programs serving both males and females reported a history of physical abuse. The programs varied in terms of the percentage of the population with histories of mental illness, from 1 percent to more than 17 percent.

In 1993, researchers are reviewing arrest records for the first treatment program participants and analyzing data on recidivism as well as program completion. Analysis of treatment and control groups should produce useful findings by the completion of the study in 1994. The results will provide researchers and treatment professionals with information about important treatment and individual variables that may affect treatment success for short-term programs offered in jails. The study will also point to gaps in information as an impetus for more detailed recordkeeping. Improvements in documentation will be helpful for future evaluations of programs that move beyond and add to the purely sanctioning approaches to preparing drug offenders for their return to society.

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Violence has invaded the schoolyard and the school itself in the United States. Reports of violence in or near schools appear regularly in the news. Schools and their immediate surroundings are the locale of general disruptions and disorder among students, attacks (intentional or random) on students by outsiders, and attacks on students or teachers by other students. In many instances, drugs play a role in school-related violence. Young people may also be the victims of parental abuse at home or of general crime in the neighborhood.

The school crime supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey estimated that 9 percent of students from ages 12 to 19 were crime victims in or around their schools over a 6-month period.¹ Two percent of those students reported being victims of violent crime (mostly simple assaults), and 7 percent reported at least one property crime. According to the National Education Goals Report for 1992, substantial numbers of 8th, 10th, and 12th graders are victims of violent acts, theft, and vandalism at school.² In 1991, for example, 16 percent of 12th graders surveyed by the University of Michigan reported being threatened with a weapon. Seven percent reported an injury by a weapon.³

A variety of prevention programs to address the problems of safety, violence, and drugs in schools have emerged across the country. In Texas and some other States, for example, classroom management and discipline programs are aimed at the prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, delinquency, school disruptions, and other behaviors detrimental to the educational process. In Seattle, Washington, the police department and school district are planning to teach students how to resolve problems in nonviolent ways. In other cities and States, programs are aimed at training teachers, administrators, guidance counselors, and other school personnel in violence education and prevention.

Among the many dimensions of the interactions of violence and youth, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has focused on three: reducing violence in schools, educational efforts to reduce drug use through Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), and curricula that teach middle-school students how to cope with aggressive behavior. Reports on evaluations in these areas are presented in this chapter.

These evaluations indicate several promising strategies for education on and prevention of violence. They also suggest that because school administrators are routinely short of time and funds to deal with the problem of violence in schools, programs must leverage available resources through the creation of solid information-sharing mechanisms and better teamwork with law enforcement and social service organizations so that all concerned parties' resources are brought to bear on this problem.

CREATING ISLANDS OF SAFETY IN SCHOOLS

Norfolk, Virginia, a city of 300,000, experienced 86 homicides in 1991. Gang activity is sufficiently strong to justify concern by school administrators, who cooperate with the police department, social service agencies, and other organizations in school safety efforts.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *A School Management and Resource Team program in Norfolk, Virginia*
- *Effects of police-school cooperation in Drug Abuse Resistance Education programs (DARE)*
- *Preventing violence in New York City middle schools*

Those efforts have shown some success; in 1991, for example, Norview High received the U.S. Department of Education's Drug-Free School Recognition Award after having received its Award for Excellence for academic achievement in 1989.

Norfolk schools serve about 37,000 students in 5 high, 8 middle, and 37 elementary schools. The district also operates programs in preschool, alternative education, and adult education. Principals, teachers, staff, and school boards have considerable responsibility for policy and operations.

In the late 1980s, school administrators in Norfolk knew that disorders were not uncommon. (A national survey by the National Center for Education Statistics found that 70 percent of teachers reported that disruptive behavior and misbehavior interfered with their teaching to some extent.⁴) Research data showed that in one Norfolk middle school with 1,300 students and 75 teachers, for example, the level of disciplinary infractions approached 200 per month.⁵ Administrators decided that the time had come for action.

The Norfolk schools enlisted the aid of the Institute and the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) to engage the problem. The result was a program to apply a process of monitoring and taking action on legal and disciplinary infractions. This approach used the School Management and Resource Team (SMART) program model, the basic elements of which include (1) a framework for codifying legal violations and disciplinary infractions that can be tailored to local conditions, and (2) an information system for collecting and generating statistical incident data and reports on individual violations.

Broadly based SMART teams were formed and coordinators identified at both the school and the district level. An interagency team was formed to link services and activities. These teams discussed problems and developed solutions.

Of the city's 50 schools, 24 are now involved in the SMART process; 8 served as pilot test sites in 1990 and 1991, and 16 joined during 1991 and 1992. The remaining 26 schools will be tied into SMART when computer capability is attained.

The Institute awarded a grant to evaluate SMART in Norfolk to the Center for Research and Evaluation in Social Policy of the Graduate School of Education and the Department of Statistics at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

SMART in Operation

The main channel of information in the SMART process is a computer link between schools and the district. The schools supply information in 11 categories, including students referred to the principal for disciplinary action, teachers making referrals, suspensions, and reports of incidents by school zone, time of day, and other characteristics. The district computer cross-checks data to reduce the error factor and generates monthly reports.

Each SMART school has a team whose coordinator conducts monthly meetings of teachers and administrators to discuss the reports, and supports staff and students. The teams spot problems and develop plans and methods to resolve them. Some teams include parents and students, and some schools even have student SMART teams that work on problems brought to their attention by the school SMART team.

SMART teams can recommend sanctions against students, but final decisions on and imposition of sanctions remain the task of the principal. (Sanctions range from administrative detention for running or yelling in the halls to out-of-school suspension or more serious punishment.) SMART teams have also proposed conflict-resolution training for

students. One school used a student court system for adjudicating quarrels between students, such as complaints of harassment. Another produced films with student actors to teach students appropriate ways to deal with conflict.

Effects on Rates of Disorder

Determining whether SMART-initiated sanctions have had an effect on the frequency of disorder has not been easy for Norfolk administrators. The system has made an effort to do so, in part as a response to encouragement from the Institute to undertake more formal assessments of program effectiveness. Enthusiasm continues to run high for this approach in Norfolk.

Schools are complex environments, and separating out the effects of SMART from other influences is challenging; disorder among adolescents has many faces and many causes. Still, certain effects have been noted in Norfolk schools that can reasonably be attributed to SMART:

- In November 1990, School A identified insubordination, fighting, and tardiness as salient problems. The SMART team's action plans engaged all teachers in developing lessons and strategies for in-class management of the problem. Students were involved through awards and student clubs and the creation of visual reminders—buttons, T-shirts, and posters—that stress mutual respect among teachers and students. The school's year-end summary (June 1991) reported that the number of incidents of insubordination dropped from 27 in October to 7 in April. Fighting declined from 10 incidents to 2; tardiness declined from 32 incidents to 17.
- At School B, rates of insubordination in September and October (1990) were elevated. Following a program to control the problem, the rates dropped by December. In that month, rates of fighting were high enough to warrant action in "hotspots" (e.g., the boys' restroom) so as to make clear to students the benefits of not fighting and the costs of doing so (communicated through both teachers and the administration).
- School C took a variety of actions to control and reduce the infractions it had targeted. Those actions included an increased use of counselors prior to taking more serious disciplinary action, small group seminars on students with high referral rates, employing "attendance contracts" with students who had chronic attendance problems, an "Adopt a Student" program, and other approaches. The school registered a decline in the incidence of a variety of infractions from the year of its pilot phase to the present.

Making SMART Work

Norfolk initially considered the SMART process because of inconsistencies and imbalances in existing disciplinary policy. Initial skepticism and reluctance about SMART centered on teachers' concerns about using data to make personnel decisions as well as more general concerns about whether the system would work.

SMART data are used in at least two ways. First, monthly reports on individual students and teachers are used by principals to develop plans for assisting or managing at the individual student level. Second, monthly statistical data concerning schoolwide incidents are used to identify problems, to justify action plans, and sometimes to estimate the effects of actions taken.

On balance, Norfolk school administrators strongly favor the process. Reservations concern logistical difficulties that appear manageable and that administrators are trying to solve. Limits on local schools' access to personal computers restrict the process. Nonetheless, the district and schools have moved beyond the original SMART approach in a variety of ways, including development of mini-grants for innovative projects to reduce disorder and improve school climate, incremental improvements in quality control, a system for eliciting and summarizing successful teacher strategies, and others.

Certain effects have been noted in Norfolk schools that can reasonably be attributed to SMART . . . the incidence of insubordination dropped . . . fighting declined . . . tardiness declined.

NIJ is currently supporting efforts to disseminate information on the SMART process to other jurisdictions around the country. Activities have included a dissemination conference, hands-on work with individual school districts, and distribution of manuals and brochures on the SMART system.

POLICE-SCHOOL COOPERATION IN DRUG ABUSE RESISTANCE EDUCATION

Despite the proliferation of school-based drug education and prevention programs over the past two decades, a comprehensive understanding of the efficacy of these programs is only beginning to emerge.⁶ Many school-based programs implemented in the 1970s focused primarily on disseminating information about drugs and the health consequences of drug use. There was little evidence that these programs influenced adolescent drug use behaviors. Most evaluated programs were found to have a greater influence on knowledge about and attitudes toward drugs than on actual drug use behaviors.

Fortunately, programs that focus primarily on helping children and young people recognize and respond appropriately to pressures to use drugs have demonstrated positive effects for preventing drug use.⁷ These programs, adopting what has been termed a "psychosocial" approach, were initially developed for the prevention of cigarette smoking⁸ and have since been adapted for other drugs as well as tobacco. These approaches emphasize developing social skills and often include peer teaching and peer counseling components.⁹

The emergence of these new, apparently efficacious psychosocial strategies represents a significant advance in school-based drug prevention. Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), one of these new approaches, also includes information and other more traditional components. The delivery of the curricula by trained, uniformed police officers is the major distinguishing feature of DARE. Most DARE activities are directed toward youth in the last grade of elementary school, which is thought to be the age at which youth are most receptive to an anti-drug message and at which they are generally recognized to start experimenting with drugs. Other DARE curricula are administered in kindergarten through fourth grade and in both middle and high schools. Moreover, a newly developed DARE curriculum targeted toward parents is being tested.

Few formal evaluations of DARE programs have been conducted to date, most of them in the form of unpublished reports or manuscripts. The results of these evaluations have been mixed. Most studies that assessed changes in knowledge, attitudes, or skills (albeit primarily short term) did observe significant positive effects of DARE for these outcomes. Studies that evaluated effects on drug use behavior have shown either no significant effects or significant effects only for a small number of substances.¹⁰

With the latest amendments to the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, the pre-eminence of DARE among school-based drug prevention programs is clearly established. The U.S. Department of Education now joins the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in providing financial support for DARE at local and regional levels respectively. DARE's popularity, as demonstrated by the extraordinary rate of its adoption and by abundant anecdotal reports of its success, is evident.

Evaluating DARE: Preliminary Findings

Under an Institute grant, the Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis of the Research Triangle Institute undertook an evaluation of DARE in 1991. Its evaluation plan included both implementation and impact. For the implementation assessment, researchers collected original data from four sources: (1) interviews with Regional Training Center Coordinators, (2) a mail survey of State DARE coordinators, (3) a mail survey of a

stratified random sample of school district drug prevention coordinators, and (4) site visits to two matched pairs of schools in two States (one district in each pair had DARE and one did not). The first pair comprised inner-city districts in large cities with large minority populations and substantial drug problems; the second was in a rural area. These case studies will thus compare DARE and non-DARE drug education programs and help determine the level of responsiveness of programs to the needs of special populations. For the outcome assessment, researchers conducted a review and assessment of published and unpublished DARE evaluations conducted to date.

Results of the preliminary analysis of the school-district drug education and prevention coordinators' survey include:

- About 39 percent of the coordinators reported that it is easy to get drugs in their school districts, and about 40 percent reported gang-related activity in the districts' schools. One respondent stated that alcohol is the drug of choice, and its levels of use are high. Although the national focus on so-called hard drugs seems to have had an impact, the same cannot be said of alcohol.
- Only about 5 percent of the school districts surveyed did not have any kind of drug education or prevention programming in place during the 1991-1992 school year.
- The top three published curricula used in the 1991-1992 school year were *DARE*, *QUEST*, and *Here's Looking At You*. DARE is currently implemented in some capacity in about 50 percent of the school districts in the United States.
- Of those school districts with DARE programs, 43 percent plan to increase their use of DARE in the next 5 years. Of those school districts without DARE, 21 percent plan to use DARE in the future.
- The largest barriers to implementation of DARE are lack of funding, lack of officers, and scheduling difficulties. One respondent reported that the cost burden of DARE, when it lies solely on the school and the police department, is quite heavy. Another respondent stated that the biggest problems concerned scheduling and finding time to teach everything required in the school; very little time was available to work with DARE officers to plan a team effort.

Recommending Future Directions for DARE

Knowledge of what school-based drug prevention programs are being implemented and delivered across the United States, and in what combinations, is scant. Little is known about how extensively DARE is administered nationwide and how it is integrated into a general drug prevention curriculum. Recommendations for the future must be based more on various prevention efforts and their mix in various school districts across the country.

The results of this study can benefit the DARE organization in its planning for current and future implementation needs for DARE nationwide. Moreover, the data will serve as a catalyst for research on future directions for these programs, especially ways in which two different Federal agencies—the Departments of Education and Justice, the two major sponsors of drug prevention programs in the Nation's schools—can work together.

PREVENTING VIOLENCE IN MIDDLE SCHOOLS

It is a challenge to teach youth that violence is destructive, ineffective, and inappropriate when they are bombarded with models of extreme violence in their daily lives. For example, 72 percent of a sample of adolescents in an inner-city neighborhood knew someone who had been shot, and 24 percent had witnessed a murder.¹¹ In addition, statistics on child abuse, exposure to parental violence, crime in schools and general crime against adolescents suggest that many youth will themselves be victims of violence either inside or outside the home.¹²

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The effects of such exposure to and experiences with violence have been measured primarily in the context of domestic violence. Research on abused children and children of battered women indicates that these groups are at heightened risk for becoming victims and/or perpetrators of violence.¹³ Although there has been little examination of the effects of personally experiencing or directly witnessing nonfamily violence, social learning theory¹⁴ would suggest a similar effect.

Violence prevention efforts have often been directed at teaching youths alternative conflict-resolution skills through curricula and dispute-mediation programs. Although some of these programs have been demonstrated to be effective,¹⁵ they address only part of the problem of youth violence. Much violence to which young people are exposed may not directly involve their own peer or other conflicts. Thus, a prevention program directed only at conflict resolution will not adequately address the many violence- and victimization-related needs that students bring to school. Such a limited program will not mitigate the effects of youths' experiences with violence, including their risk of being offenders or victims of fighting, bullying, robbery, and/or acquaintance or date rape. Moreover, programs focusing only on peer conflict and fighting may address symptoms of the wider issues of violence in students' lives without getting at the causes.

Evaluating a Broad-Based Violence Prevention Program

NIJ is evaluating the impact of a school-based, multifaceted violence-prevention program that seeks to address some of the causes of students' attitudes and behaviors with respect to violence. The program includes not only conflict-resolution training and peer mediation but also a broad-based violence and victimization curriculum; counseling for victims and witnesses of violence; and a general schoolwide, multimedia anti-violence campaign. The impact of the program on students' knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, as well as on indicators of school violence and victimization, will be compared with that of a more limited conflict-resolution program currently in use in middle schools. This evaluation is being undertaken on an Institute grant by the Metropolitan Assistance (Victim Services/Travelers' Aid) Corporation and involves four middle schools in New York City.

The conflict-resolution model is the most widely endorsed and implemented model in middle schools, but no tests have been conducted of the assumption that this model is the most effective in terms of changing students' attitudes and behaviors and reducing violence. A finding that expanded conflict-resolution programs significantly increase program impact without a dramatic increase in cost could have a major effect on the decisions of educators and others currently implementing conflict-resolution programs with early adolescents.

The results also may be useful for mental health professionals interested in strategies for mitigating the effects of exposure to violence on youths, criminal justice agencies seeking education-oriented program models for juvenile offenders, and victim service and other social service agencies that work with children and adolescents victimized by and/or exposed to violence inside or outside the home.

Although the models being tested here are designed for school settings, if proven effective they could be modified for implementation in residential settings (e.g., group homes), outpatient mental health clinics, community centers, and other group settings serving children and adolescents.

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Youth gangs were a widely recognized, serious problem in major U.S. cities during the 1950s. Three decades later, they continue to be a serious problem. Today, however, gangs are more numerous, more prevalent, and more violent than any other time in the Nation's history.¹

Gangs are a rising threat to the peace and security of neighborhoods in more and more cities and towns across the United States. Adult gang leaders are recruiting young people, including many in their teens and even pre-teens, and are employing coercion, intimidation, and violence as tactics to achieve their ends. In the past decade in particular, gang membership and activities, gang-related homicides, and gang-related drug trafficking has increased and spread to cities in all 50 States.² From 1985 to 1989, gang homicides per capita rose 10 percent.³ Law enforcement officials are increasingly concerned that gangs are spreading from the largest metropolitan areas to medium-sized and smaller cities, although the extent of this movement cannot be determined precisely without national trend data.

These trends are, however, linked.⁴ Gangs are clearly a major source of other problems, exacerbating existing levels of delinquency, crime, and drug abuse.⁵ Gang members participate in a host of crimes ranging from petty theft to premeditated murder. Some gangs are predominantly drug-trafficking organizations. Gangs, however, play a variety of other roles in drug abuse and predatory crime.⁶

There is substantial evidence that young men involved in gangs are likely to be more violent than offenders of the same age acting alone or with others outside a gang context,⁷ although the cause of this increase is unclear.⁸ Some studies suggest that at least among East Los Angeles Hispanic gangs, violence stems from inter-gang rivalries that have little to do with drug dealing.⁹ A study comparing gang youth in Los Angeles and San Diego, California, and Chicago, Illinois, found that gang members participated in violent crimes and were involved in the use and sale of drugs. For the most part, however, violence by gang members was not related to drug activity.¹⁰ Among the reasons offered for the increases in gang violence are changing police reporting practices, increasing use of more lethal weapons, and changing gang conflict strategies. The growing number of gangs and the aging of the gang membership also contribute to increased gang violence (older gang members are disproportionately involved in homicides).¹¹

CHANGING PATTERNS IN GANG MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITY

An estimated 3,876 gangs were identified in a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) survey of law enforcement officials in the Nation's 79 largest cities in 1991; these gangs had 202,981 members and accounted for 36,265 gang incidents that year. A 1989 survey of officials in 45 cities identified 1,439 youth gangs with 120,636 members.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *Police responses to drugs and gangs in Austin, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Metro-Dade County, Florida; and San Diego, California*
- *San Diego's multiagency task force effort to address gang problems*
- *Programs for prevention and early intervention in gang involvement in Boston, Massachusetts; and Los Angeles and San Francisco, California*

Gangs are clearly a major source of other problems, exacerbating existing levels of delinquency, crime, and drug abuse.

Both surveys found that 87 percent of gang members were either Hispanic or African-American, far in excess of their representation in the general population. Although these ethnic groups also appear to dominate in criminal gangs, gang involvement cuts across ethnic and cultural lines. Gangs of white, Cambodian, Chinese, Laotian, and Vietnamese youths have emerged, particularly in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles. In addition, the 1991 NIJ survey showed that a growing number of females are now involved in gangs as members, not simply "associates."

There is general agreement among law enforcement officials and researchers that gang members are involved in the sale and use of illegal drugs. Evidence also suggests that larger criminal organizations find gang youths a fertile source of recruits for involvement in drug trafficking.

The combination of violence and drug activity makes gangs a research and evaluation priority of the Institute, which has for years conducted research on gang-related problems. In 1990, NIJ began a comprehensive gangs initiative to develop a research agenda, produce reliable data, evaluate promising anti-gang approaches, and develop methods for providing technical assistance to State and local agencies combatting gangs and gang-related activities. Under this initiative, the Institute is funding studies on several aspects of gangs and gang-related activity, including projects that:

- Assess the magnitude of gang involvement in drug sales;
- Examine local law enforcement anti-gang information resources nationally;
- Examine how gangs move from city to city and how police, community members, and policymakers can better understand the nature and impact of this migration in their communities;
- Examine the criminal behavior of gang members and their motivations to join, remain in, or abandon a gang;
- Assess the prosecution of gang-related crime, including legislative measures and innovative prosecutorial strategies at the national level; and
- Assess the growth of gangs in State and local correctional facilities (corrections has only recently been recognized as a part of the criminal justice system that needs technical assistance and funds to address gang problems in prisons).

This chapter reports on Institute evaluations of how police make decisions concerning drug- and gang-related enforcements, a multiagency approach to drug and gang enforcement in San Diego, California, and programs designed for at-risk youth. These evaluations underscore the need for approaches to gang activity that draw on the resources not only of police departments but also of concerned local agencies. In addition to addressing the issue of how to use scarce resources cost-effectively to tackle gang-involved criminal activity, these evaluations also address ways of preventing gang recruitment and helping young people identify positive alternatives to gang membership.

POLICE RESPONSES TO DRUGS AND GANGS

Data on police anti-gang and drug efforts are difficult to gather because they are virtually inseparable from each other and from the larger context of anti-crime activity. Agency responses also tend to change quickly because drug and gang problems are so volatile.

Conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), this evaluation was designed to identify events that stimulated a police response to gang and/or drug problems; describe the decisionmaking process and the responses of the agency; and describe the outcome of the department's response. The evaluation used case study methods to study decisionmaking within police departments in Austin, Texas; Chicago, Illinois; Kansas City, Missouri; Metro-Dade County, Florida; and San Diego, California. Sites were selected on

the basis of severity of drug and gang problems, regional diversity, ethnic diversity in terms of gang manifestations, and variations in their approach to gang problems. Two sites—Kansas City and San Diego—were specifically chosen because they had received Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) discretionary grants to address gang problems. Case study methodology was employed because it allows for investigation of a contemporary problem in its real-life context.

Addressing Gang Problems in Diverse Settings

Evaluators found wide variation in gang problems and in the range of police responses to those problems, both from city to city and within individual cities. In Chicago, for instance, the police addressed gang problems through a specialized gang unit decentralized into three gang unit commands. Because of the scope of Chicago's gang problem and the agency's response (more than 450 police personnel served on the gang unit), evaluators focused on the department's response to gangs in public housing developments—specifically Robert Taylor Homes, housing units troubled by serious gang- and drug-related problems. The gang unit addressed only gang-related crime; narcotics enforcement was the exclusive province of the department's narcotics unit. On occasion, some limited collaboration occurred between narcotics and gang personnel, usually in the form of passing along relevant information. (Several other units also have direct responsibility for gang-related problems in public housing. In addition, the department staffs a public housing police bureau that services most of the city's public housing complexes, and the Chicago Housing Authority operates its own police department.)

In Kansas City, the evaluation focused on how the department eradicated Jamaican posses that were heavily engaged in street-level drug activity. The department's narcotics unit coordinated anti-gang activity.

The San Diego Police Department used both a gang detective unit and a uniformed gang enforcement effort and worked closely with the San Diego District Attorney's Office, which maintained a specialized Gang Prosecution Unit to develop investigations. The department made use of information supplied by law enforcement personnel and prosecutors to target potential gang activity (especially drug sales) before crimes actually occurred. This unit coordinated its efforts with the department and other law enforcement agencies and conducted prosecution efforts.

Austin police employed a mixture of vigorous law enforcement and service delivery to sanction harmful criminal behavior while offering alternatives to youths who had not yet joined gangs or would like to get out of them. Anti-gang efforts were centered in the Repeat Offender Unit, which included an intelligence section and street crime, gang liaison, and crime analysis units. Intelligence was shared among these groups of officers as well as patrol officers, prosecutors, probation and parole, juvenile officers, the sheriff's department, and other law enforcement agencies through formal weekly meetings. Police officials also sat on gang planning groups with other city officials.

The Metro-Dade Police Department maintained a centralized gang unit of eight detectives supplemented by gang investigators in the patrol districts. Supplemental personnel ranged from part-time officers to two personnel per patrol district, depending on the severity of gang problems in that district. The agency operated a centralized database of information about gang membership, associates, gang affiliation, and other data and served the county agency and all municipal jurisdictions within the county.

The Multi-Agency Gang Task Force shared information through formal meetings among agencies and informal relationships with personnel helping to identify and track gang offenders. In addition, Metro-Dade coordinated the deployment of the Gang Task Force to handle potentially problematic youth functions. On those occasions, knowledgeable personnel from all involved agencies worked together to prevent destructive gang activities.

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Findings on Gang Problems

Some common themes emerged when gang problems were evaluated across the five sites:

- Gang involvement in drug activity and other types of criminal activity varied significantly, somewhat by ethnicity. For example, in Metro-Dade, one gang specialized in car theft; in Chicago, African-American gangs divided up territory and types of drugs for dealing; in Chicago, San Diego, and Metro-Dade, police perceived that African-American gang members were more involved in drug activity than gang members of other ethnicities; in Austin, African-American gangs were just becoming established but Hispanic gangs had been in some neighborhoods for decades. Police statistics suggest that although gangs do engage in a great deal of criminal activity—particularly auto theft—they accounted for a small percentage of the overall crime rate.
- Patrol officers' knowledge of drug and gang activity varied in all departments, depending on the level of communication between special units and patrol officers, the formal training provided to officers, and the frequency of and mechanisms for briefing officers. Gang and drug enforcement were considered the exclusive purview of the specialized units in most cities. In some cases, patrol officers channelled information to gang or drug units through official communications; in other cases, information was passed informally—when patrol officers dropped by the gang unit office or conversed with a gang investigator, for instance.
- Several of the departments tracked gang-related police incidents through the use of a check-off box on the agency's incident reporting form. Because many patrol officers were not trained to fill out the forms routinely with gang-related information, however, the data obtained were unreliable.
- Narcotics personnel and gang personnel rarely worked together. In Chicago, gang personnel were discouraged from pursuing drug cases; in Metro-Dade, gang investigators could pursue a drug case only if it involved a gang member and if the value of drugs involved was below a set amount; and in San Diego, gang investigators or commanders routinely notified narcotics personnel when they were pursuing a drug-related case because a drug investigation was viewed as the easiest way to break into some gangs, such as the Crips.
- Because the relationship between gang and drug-related problems varied, some police took steps to develop tailored responses to the problems. Police departments also made substantial efforts to build intelligence information, particularly manual or automated files that identified gang members and included photographs, details on known associates, monikers, school attendance and automobile records, and the like. Limited attention was paid to prevention techniques, although nearly every agency operated an educational program, often for school or parent groups. Suppression tactics varied widely, ranging from weapons charges to organized crime statutes (in Chicago); however, all agencies focused on criminal activities of individual gang members.
- Every department had formal or informal policies for dealing with the media on gang problems. Most believed that reporting the name of a gang member gave credibility to gangs in their community and provided positive reinforcement to gang members. In Metro-Dade, for example, policy dictated that the media not be given those details.

The Need for Local Solutions

Gang problems are not the sole province of the police. Housing authorities, schools, social service agencies, parks and recreation departments, and a host of other non-law-enforcement agencies have a stake in resolving gang problems and have resources that they can deploy. This evaluation shows that greater attention needs to be paid to developing multiagency responses to gang problems.

Because of the range and scope of gang problems, general statements about the nature of gangs and anti-gang strategies are of limited use. Effective programs must be developed locally, based on local knowledge and data. Such programming will depend on the characteristics of local gang problems, the organizational structure of various gangs, and the strengths of the community. Appropriate police responses will also depend on the organization and capabilities of the police agency and the capacity of other local agencies to collaborate in addressing gang problems.

JURISDICTIONS UNIFIED FOR DRUG GANG ENFORCEMENT (JUDGE)

Police report that in the 1980s, a dramatic change occurred in urban street gang activity in Southern California, particularly San Diego County. The swift rise in cocaine trafficking during this time was directly associated with street gangs entering the market. The result has been an increase in gang activity and violent crime associated with gangs. The term "gang territory" has thus been expanded to include not only geographic but economic and criminal enterprise turfs as well.

A study conducted by the San Diego Association of Governments estimated that in 1987, there were more than 3,000 active gang members in the county. Data compiled by the San Diego Police Department in 1990 indicate that gang membership had more than doubled (to about 8,000 members) since that time. Gang-related crime statistics for the City of San Diego reflect the increase in violence over the past 5 years. Although homicides decreased somewhat, from 28 in 1988 to 10 in 1992, attempted murders rose from 3 to 20, and assaults with a deadly weapon increased by 68 percent—from 193 to 325.¹³

The Jurisdictions Unified for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE) program is San Diego's multiagency task force effort to address the escalation in gang problems. It is administered by the San Diego County District Attorney's office and consists of police officers, prosecutors, and probation officers who enforce probation conditions for drug and gang-involved probationers. JUDGE targets juvenile and adult street gang members on probation for narcotics offenses and others involved in the use, sale, and distribution of narcotics. Its goal is to reduce violence and related crimes by ensuring that offenders suffer real consequences for their illegal activities. The program has three components related to activities of law enforcement, prosecution, and probation:

- Through special enforcement techniques such as undercover operations and drug testing, police officers enforce drug laws and probation conditions for drug-involved gang members.
- Prosecutors use vertical prosecution to ensure that JUDGE cases are handled consistently by one prosecutor throughout adjudication, to increase conviction rates, and to ensure that the most severe sentence is imposed when appropriate.
- Probation officers coordinate with law enforcement in conducting probation searches and apprehending probation violators in addition to preparing the paperwork for probationers returned to court.

JUDGE is unique because it incorporates a number of innovative approaches to drug enforcement—including undercover narcotics task forces and crackdowns, intensive supervision of probation, and priority prosecution for high-risk offenders—and because it also expands the use of multiagency task forces for drug law enforcement to include gang suppression and probation supervision. Before 1988, when JUDGE was implemented, gang and drug enforcement and prosecution efforts focused on new offenses rather than the enforcement of probation conditions of those already sentenced.

Housing authorities, schools, social service agencies, parks and recreation departments, and a host of other non-law enforcement agencies have a stake in resolving gang problems and have resources that they can deploy.

JUDGE is funded by BJA through the State of California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. The Institute's evaluation of the program is being conducted by the San Diego Association of Governments. NIJ's objectives in evaluating JUDGE are to:

- Determine if the program was implemented as designed and if program objectives were met;
- Assess the results of the program's enforcement and prosecution efforts in providing consequences for offenders;
- Evaluate program impacts on offender criminal behavior, gang affiliation, and social integration;
- Assess the costs of JUDGE probation as compared with the costs of regular probation caseloads; and
- Make recommendations regarding the implementation of similar programs in other jurisdictions.

Research Design

The JUDGE evaluation is being conducted primarily through the use of pre/post-test comparisons of probation violations and offense rates for a sample of juvenile probationers targeted by JUDGE and a comparable group of juveniles on probation prior to the JUDGE program. For the evaluation, 290 probationers divided into two experimental groups and another 176 probationers in a single control group are being tracked over a 3-year period while they are in the JUDGE program or on regular probation, through adjudication of new charges or probation violations, and after release to lower levels of probation supervision.

Data are being collected on the juveniles' sociodemographic characteristics, gang affiliation, school attendance and employment, criminal history, offenses that resulted in probation supervision, probation conditions, contacts by probation and JUDGE staff, performance during probation, and new offenses after probation. The measures to be compared for the experimental and control groups include the following:

- Recidivism;
- Need for probation intervention;
- Gang affiliation and social integration; and
- Program costs.

Sources of data are arrest reports, probation case files, court files, and criminal history records. In addition to the collection of data on specific cases, interviews will be conducted with JUDGE staff and criminal justice personnel in agencies that interact with JUDGE. The interviews will provide information on the organizational structure and administrative procedures of the JUDGE program, operational activities, and issues critical to the successful operation of the task force, such as coordination among agencies, training, availability of resources, and staff morale.

Preliminary Findings

The data collection phase of this evaluation, including data from case files for the experimental and control groups and interviews with program staff and other criminal justice personnel, is currently being completed. As part of this process, program statistics have been compiled on JUDGE prosecutions during the study period from 1988 to 1990. The data address three of the primary program objectives related to vertical prosecution, plea bargaining, and conviction rates.

Vertical prosecution is used to ensure a consistent response to cases and to minimize plea bargaining. The data show that 87 percent of the 852 juvenile cases targeted by JUDGE were prosecuted vertically, with 35 percent handled by a single JUDGE prosecutor and 52

percent by JUDGE unit prosecutors. A measure of the extent to which plea bargaining is used is the proportion of cases in which defendants actually plead guilty to the highest charge. For JUDGE, pleas to the highest charge represented almost two-thirds (65 percent) of the cases. About one-quarter of the cases were tried in juvenile or adult court (23 percent), and 7 percent of the cases were adjudicated through a plea bargain. The overall conviction rate for the juveniles prosecuted by JUDGE was 95 percent, including both probation violations and new offenses. These preliminary data suggest that program implementation during the evaluation period was consistent with the program objectives.

Results from JUDGE will provide information related to two critical questions facing criminal justice administrators today:

- What is the most cost-effective way to utilize limited resources to address gang-involved criminal activity?
- What issues should be considered in developing multiagency task forces to address drug, gang, and other criminal justice problems?

Evaluation results may be used to formulate similar programs in other areas. In San Diego and other areas with multiagency task forces, the results will be helpful in assessing program components and strengthening law enforcement responses to crime and drugs.

PREVENTING AND INTERVENING IN GANG ACTIVITY

Most gang prevention and early intervention efforts for gang and at-risk youth have focused on at-risk youth and the larger social/economic environment. The current literature enumerates many youth gang prevention, early intervention, diversion, interdiction, suppression, and related activities;¹⁴ however, there is no complete picture of the underlying intervention strategies or their possible relationships. If the violence associated with youth involvement in gangs is to be reduced, effective practices for deterring gang membership must be identified.

This evaluation will identify specific types of programs that are effective for prevention and early intervention in gang involvement. The evaluation, which is being conducted by COSMOS Corporation, is looking at six intervention programs that have decreased delinquent behavior and gang membership and increased school attendance. The evaluation is also considering positive social and behavioral indicators, such as improved self-esteem and sense of responsibility and improved decisionmaking skills. The research emphasizes the role of family, schools, peers, social service agencies, and community groups in preventing high-risk youth from engaging in criminal behavior associated with gangs.

Researchers will evaluate two general types of intervention. The first involves gang prevention and includes alternative activities for young people who are at risk of joining gangs, prevention of gang recruitment and outreach efforts, and citizen and parent involvement in addressing gang problems. The second type centers on early intervention and is aimed at reducing undesirable gang activities. This type includes diversionary programs for "wannabes" and peripheral gang members, campaigns to reduce gang violence, employment and training opportunities for gang members, mobile street intervention units, and crisis intervention networks.

The evaluation covers six programs in three cities:

- Boston, Massachusetts (Boston Community Centers):
 - Winner's Circle Program (prevention): co-sponsored with Boston Public Schools; offers middle-school students instruction, support, counseling, and supervised recreation; and

- Streetworker Initiative (intervention): helps young people and their families gain access to a wide variety of health and social services, educational and recreational activities, and intervention for substance and alcohol abuse as well as food and shelter.
- Los Angeles, California (Probation Department of Los Angeles County, Long Beach):
 - Gang Alternative Prevention Program (prevention): offers a variety of services to young people and their parents who accept participation voluntarily; and
 - Gang Alternative Prevention Program (intervention): offers services to juveniles who participate after a formal finding of delinquency and a resulting probation sentence in juvenile court.
- San Francisco, California (Mayor's Gang Prevention Project):
 - Education Curriculum (prevention): a curriculum taught in middle and summer schools; and
 - Youth Development Workers (intervention): enables youth development workers, some of them former gang members, to work with young people to improve their quality of life.

Data sources for measuring the effectiveness of each of the interventions include case, arrest, and school records; curricula or other program products; and other documentation, ranging from annual reports or minutes of major staff or director meetings to police reports and official statistics on types of delinquent acts. Other data sources are information on events sponsored by local community organizations; newspaper articles; area youth employment records; sales policy statements of local bars and liquor stores; and local and State alcohol and drug abuse laws and ordinances.

During the 18-month period in which interventions will be monitored, the underlying logic of the interventions will be identified, data will be collected, and a structure will be developed for replication of successful gang membership prevention and early intervention programs. The evaluation is scheduled for completion in 1994.

The COSMOS evaluation will help identify the effectiveness of specific gang interventions. These findings will be of particular interest to policymakers and Federal program planners and managers in helping to determine Federal program requirements and guidelines for demonstration programs and grantees. The study findings will also guide criminal justice and social service agencies in understanding what types of programs work and the types of data that can be tracked to determine the effectiveness of their activities.


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Justice in America is dispensed daily in thousands of hearings and trials in hundreds of courtrooms across the country. With large numbers of drug-related cases now filling court dockets in State and municipal judicial systems, prosecutors have sought new methods of ensuring that they allocate the proper kinds and appropriate levels of effort to prosecution of drug cases.

The vast majority of drug cases involve a single defendant charged with a single offense or, at most, a few offenses: possession of drugs with intent to sell, selling illegal drugs, and similar crimes. These are the high-volume cases in the courts today, and prosecutors face problems of scale rather than complexity. In many of these cases, the central legal issue turns on the correctness of police action in arresting the defendant and obtaining evidence of guilt.

But drug activities today also present prosecutors with a different and much higher echelon of cases. These cases involve crime by a "corporation" that may be a legal entity or an illegal syndicate. In either event, these cases typically involve many defendants (apart from the entity itself, such as a bank) who may be charged with scores of criminal offenses. The members of this criminal network may be charged with varying degrees of culpability.

Governments at all levels in the United States are cooperating in investigating and prosecuting these complex drug cases because of the great harm that criminal drug enterprises do to society. Effective and efficient prosecution requires careful allocation of resources, training in special areas of criminal activity, and preparation of prosecutors to handle such cases.

This chapter reports on two evaluations, one examining complex drug case prosecution procedures and one examining the court response to drug cases more generally.

PROSECUTING COMPLEX DRUG CASES

Illegal drug trafficking, manufacturing, and money laundering cost the American public enormous sums in investigations, prosecutions, and corrections. Moreover, while these costs are being incurred, drug suppliers, distributors, and dealers are reaping huge profits from their illegal activities. Over the past decade, Congress enacted several pieces of new legislation to better enable law enforcement and prosecution to strike a direct blow against the lucrative illegal drug trade, to recoup some of the funds spent on law enforcement, and to interdict the line of supply. The Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, the drug "kingpin" Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute, and laws governing money laundering, firearms, and public corruption, among others, are employed to prosecute complex drug cases. Both criminal and civil forfeitures are used to remove any ill-gotten gains. The Bank Secrecy Act includes provisions that require the reporting of financial transactions, including dollar amounts over \$10,000, to allow investigative agencies to trace the money flow and file charges for evasion of income tax.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- *How different jurisdictions handle complex drug cases*
- *Court responses to drug cases*

Current prosecutorial efforts to deal with complex drug cases entail diverse responses established predominantly at the Federal level and in a few advanced State and local jurisdictions. This diversity reflects differing legislation, case law, judicial interpretation, court practices, police and prosecutorial policy, and ultimately the availability of trained staff and resources.

Thus far, the Federal Government has taken the lead in targeting major drug operations and building financially oriented cases against drug-trafficking and money-laundering operations. State and local jurisdictions may have difficulty following the Federal Government's lead when attempting to implement programs that target complex drug cases. There are numerous reasons for this; some relate to the environment within which these programs must operate, others to the inherent complexity of the programs themselves. Many cases require unfamiliar activities and procedures, such as the following:

- Use of civil procedures with their different standards of proof and evidence;
- Financial investigations that trace hidden assets; special investigative evidence, including net worth analysis and link analysis (a technique for associating individuals, corporations, and events); and
- Means and techniques for managing and disposing of assets.

Nevertheless, some States (such as Arizona, Florida, and New York) have developed the capacity to investigate and prosecute complex drug cases successfully. Multijurisdictional task forces have been created to join law enforcement and prosecutors on all governmental levels to direct the knowledge and resources needed for these cases. Special units have been created to concentrate on money-laundering cases. In the Arizona Attorney General's Office, for example, a sophisticated approach and strategy for detecting money-laundering activities was developed.¹ Advanced technologies have also been used to help investigations, including expert systems and intelligence-gathering systems to identify suspects; new automated crime lab and identification systems,² including fingerprints, DNA tests, and image processing to strengthen evidence;³ and the establishment of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), an expert system used by the Treasury Department to detect money-laundering activities.

Current prosecutorial efforts to deal with complex drug cases entail diverse responses established predominantly at the Federal level and in a few advanced State and local jurisdictions. This diversity reflects differing legislation, case law, judicial interpretation, court practices, police and prosecutorial policy, and ultimately the availability of trained staff and resources.

If jurisdictions are interested in prosecuting complex drug cases, they have access to a few sources for documented manuals or guidelines, some word-of-mouth expertise, and a variety of information about various parts of this activity. What is missing is a synthesis of information about other jurisdictions, insight into local operations and experiences, and an assessment of the factors and issues involved in these prosecutions. Recognizing this deficiency, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded an evaluation by the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies to identify, assess, and describe existing drug prosecution practices that target complex cases. The goals of this evaluation were to:

- Describe the nature of investigative and prosecutorial practices and strategies used in complex drug cases and how they affect State and local prosecutors;
- Examine the role of the local prosecutor involved in these types of cases;
- Inform policymakers, program developers, prosecutors' offices, and police departments about the issues and factors associated with the prosecution of complex drug cases; and
- Make recommendations for future research and programs in this area.

The evaluation included literature reviews, expert consultant workshops, and telephone and mail surveys. The survey covered all State Attorneys' General offices, all jurisdictions with populations of more than 500,000, and a sample of smaller jurisdictions, including the two largest prosecutors' offices in each State. Findings from this evaluation fall into three categories: the gap between Federal and local prosecutions; special demands that complex drug cases place on local prosecutors' resources; and funding.

Federal Versus Local Prosecutions

Complex drug cases pose vastly different and more substantial case processing requirements than routine prosecutions. As a result, State and local prosecutors are faced with three choices: to refer cases to the U.S. Attorney's office for Federal prosecution; to accept them for State prosecution; or to decline them. Each choice presents a separate set of problems and issues.

Because State and local crimes have been increasingly federalized, the problems associated with concurrent jurisdiction are obvious. In the eyes of many State and local prosecutors, the most expedient method for prosecuting complex drug cases is by U.S. Attorneys in U.S. District Courts. Federal law enforcement agencies are often better equipped and trained to support complex investigations than State agencies. Sometimes Federal legislation is less restrictive or provides for higher sentences. Additionally, referring potential forfeiture cases to the Federal Government often proves to be not only easier but also less costly to local agencies.

Yet what looks optimal on the surface is supported by a foundation that is often shaky. Sometimes Federal referrals may not be accepted. U.S. Attorneys, like State and local prosecutors, have the authority and discretion to set policy with regard to accepting cases for prosecution. The implications of this are important for three reasons: (1) the criteria established by the U.S. Attorney may not be met by the case referred from State and local sources; (2) the criteria reflect goals that may be at variance with State and local interests; and (3) the criteria may change to reflect shifts in Federal priorities, not local priorities and needs.

If Federal prosecution is declined, two options remain: to decline the case or to accept it. Declining prosecution is a difficult stance to justify because it appears to call into question the commitment to the tenet of equal justice under the law. It also means that a local drug-trafficking problem cannot be attacked and thereby increases the public's disrespect for the law. This decision requires careful consideration and open disclosure of its rationale.

Special Demands on Local Prosecutorial Resources

When prosecutors opt for State and local prosecutions, they assume a number of responsibilities not routinely encountered. These include long-term commitments of time and personnel with no early return on the investment; a substantial workload for only a few cases; and witness/informant security and protection problems. They also enter a new world of police/prosecutor communication and coordination that demands careful strategic planning of investigations, a respect for the roles each plays in the various stages of the case, and anticipatory prosecution. Finally, there are litigation requirements to be considered. Advanced attorney training and experience are needed; the nature of the evidence is complex, often calling for specialized skills; and the case (usually involving multiple defendants) may be tried in a number of forums, Federal and State. Adding to the requirements that these cases impose on the prosecutor is the fact that courts—both Federal and State—may resist docketing these cases, knowing that trials, if they occur, will be long, complex, and costly.

Given these circumstances, one could question whether local prosecutors should even assume responsibility for these cases and their prosecution. This question was presented to the prosecutors who participated in the national survey. With unanimity, they responded that local prosecutors should prosecute these cases. They cited the simple fact that it was their duty to prosecute all crimes equally; that as political leaders, they are likely to be better informed about their communities and any emerging drug-trafficking networks; and that they have a responsibility not to let cases fall through the Federal-State prosecution gap.

Complex drug cases pose vastly different and more substantial case processing requirements than routine prosecutions. As a result, State and local prosecutors are faced with three choices: to refer cases to the U.S. Attorney's office for Federal prosecution; to accept them for State prosecution; or to decline them.

Funding Sources for Investigations

Funding for investigations, special equipment and operations, and specialized skills and experience may be difficult to come by, especially in light of current budgetary restrictions. Investigators and prosecutors who are involved in complex drug cases have become resourceful in finding support for their activities. Asset forfeiture funds are one source. The availability of asset forfeiture funds is erratic, however, depending on State legislation and whether prosecutors are included in the sharing agreement. Federal funds are also restrictive; they are dedicated for law enforcement purposes, with limited allocation to the rest of the criminal justice system.

Many investigators and prosecutors look to the Federal Government for block grant funds such as those available from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), as well as funds for experts, laboratories, equipment, and training. The military (especially the National Guard) often is a source for personnel to support investigations and equipment for surveillance and observation. Local governments and businesses are also potential donors of space and equipment. There is a clear need for a coordinated mechanism to help local prosecutors obtain funds and resources for complex investigations and prosecutions.

COURT RESPONSES TO DRUG CASES

Drug cases now dominate the judicial workloads in most State courts. There has been ample documentation of the scale of the demand on the courts,⁴ yet there is little literature on how courts are responding to these workloads. Court reports of increases in drug caseloads from 45 percent to 70 percent between 1985 and 1989 are common. A recent study reports that in California, drug cases accounted for 42 percent of dispositions in Superior Court in 1989, up from 17 percent in 1980; Detroit experienced an increase in drug arrests of 157 percent between 1985 and 1988; and in Newark, New Jersey, the proportion of drug arrests increased by 70 percent over the 6 years prior to 1989—and as of 1987, drug sale or possession cases constituted 42 percent of the court caseload.⁵

These figures have been repeated throughout the country. An American Judicature Society symposium discussed the "drugging of the courts"⁶—a theme repeated in other meetings of court officials. For example, a report from a symposium organized for State judicial representatives from the nine most populous States began with this statement:⁷

Conferees report the situation is desperate. The overload causes backlog; backlog feeds delay; and delay (along with the lack of jail and prison space) imperils rights to timely consideration, undermines deterrence, and breeds contempt for the law.

The Need for New Case-Flow Management Practices

One response to this problem has been to call for additional resources. Simply increasing resources, however, has not adequately addressed the problem. Research on delay in the courts has made clear that resources are a weak explanation for delay and backlog in the courts.⁸ As one set of observers has stated, "courts will have to deal with the rising volume, and will increasingly be expected to use modern management techniques to handle the caseload pressures."⁹ The principles underlying those techniques are well established and include early judicial intervention in case flow, time limits on events, judicial enforcement of deadlines, and information systems to monitor case movement.¹⁰

The volume of drug cases has prompted some courts to experiment with new approaches to case-flow management. With funding from BJA, judicial officials have tested the use of differential case management;¹¹ close coordination between courts and other criminal justice components in the Comprehensive Adjudication of Drug Arrestees (CADA) program; the use of limited jurisdiction courts to make early disposition of felony drug

cases;¹² and specialized courts and/or proceedings for drug cases.¹³ Courts have also experimented with similar techniques on their own initiative (for example, a specialized court proceeding for drug cases in New York City and Miami, Florida).

How Courts Are Addressing the Drug Crisis

Court responses to drug cases have thus increasingly gone beyond the simple objective of managing resources more effectively to adopting, in many instances, a proactive involvement in developing local programs and policies that will enhance the effectiveness of the adjudicatory process. The documentation of these efforts, however, has only begun.

NIJ's assessment of how courts are handling the drug crisis, an evaluation conducted for NIJ by the National Center for State Courts, addresses the following questions:

- How have courts responded to the pressure of drug cases? To what extent have they followed existing models or developed their own models?
- How have the courts defined problems such as increased volume, a change in the kind of cases, the need for sentencing alternatives, and case processing speed?
- What part of the process has felt the greatest impact—pretrial, trial, post-trial, or sentencing?
- Have court responses come as a result of pressure from other parts of the adjudicatory process—that is, police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and corrections officials?
- What kind and quantity of additional resources have been required to address the problem: judges, administrators, specialized staff, equipment, facilities?
- What have been the objectives of the programs: accelerated case processing, reduced backlog, sentencing alternatives, less jail overcrowding, increased efficiency, or enhanced ancillary services such as drug testing or treatment of addiction?
- Have programs met objectives?
- Who has supported the programs: judges, court administrators, local government, State judicial officials, law enforcement, prosecutors, defense counsel, corrections officials, local government, State government, the bar?
- What have been the critical components of each program: skills, staff, information system, procedures, leadership, extra-court relationships, financial resources?

The research is being carried out in three parts. A major effort is being made to identify the full range of programs developed by courts to deal with drug cases; information is being collected from the courts on the organization and operation of their programs; and the strengths and weaknesses of each type of program are being analyzed.

Approximately 300 court programs that address drug caseloads or the drug-involved offender, including court-based Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) programs, have now been identified. Programs must meet one or more of the following criteria:

- They have been initiated or developed by a court.
- They are operated within the administrative structure of the court system (i.e., included in court budget or under court supervision).
- They receive court referrals and provide the court with information about the drug-involved offender (assessment, monitoring, and progress reports).
- Their staff operate in the court (or jail) environment.

The types of programs identified thus far entail special case-management procedures or court jurisdiction (such as expedited tracks and special drug courts); assessment/diversion to treatment/monitoring within the justice system; assessment/referral to treatment outside the justice system; and education.

This evaluation is intended to affect the way in which judicial policymakers and practitioners develop new programs and adjust existing programs to respond effectively to the drug crisis in the courts. It will also provide guidance to the research community on where future efforts can be most effective and on how the quality of evidence can affect the outcome of cases. Using as a foundation recent evaluations that focus on efficient resource utilization and case-flow management, this evaluation will broaden the perspective to pretrial offender programs, diversion programs, and intermediate sanctions for post-convictions.

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Innovative sanctions to alter drug use have grown in numbers, ingenuity, and popularity with policymakers and practitioners in many jurisdictions. They attempt to reserve the most expensive sanction—incarceration—for the most serious offenses and to employ other types of punishments that hold drug users and traffickers accountable. Innovations include sanctions such as prohibiting persons from entering places where drug transactions occur, suspensions of driving privileges, structured fines and day fines, treatment in lieu of punishment, and other sanctions aimed at disposing of high volumes of drug cases at acceptable costs. States and localities know that they must find methods to handle high-volume drug cases inexpensively or they will not be able to afford to prosecute such cases.

As innovative sanctions become more fully developed, judges would have a broader array of sentencing options and, ultimately, more of those individuals now sentenced to prison and jail might be sentenced to the community. Such a “graduated-sanctioning” system would save money, allow some individuals to avoid the criminalizing effects of incarceration, and reserve scarce prison and jail space for the more serious offenders. This approach would provide a sentencing option that is more punitive than probation. Moreover, many individuals now supervised by probation officers with excess caseloads could be handled administratively, leaving probation officers more time to supervise high-risk offenders.

This chapter focuses on the role that courts play in fashioning sanctions to fit the offense and help (or convince) the offender to change. Sanctions described include nuisance abatement enforcements, structured fines, and focused offender dispositions. This chapter complements Chapter 10, which examines the role of the corrections system in carrying out innovative sanctions.

NUISANCE ABATEMENT ENFORCEMENTS

Where traditional drug enforcement activities generally focus on buyers and sellers of illegal substances, drug-related nuisance abatement enforcements focus on the places where large volumes of those substances are sold. The primary objective of such enforcements is to stop drug transactions at particular locations.

The legal basis for nuisance abatement enforcements is closely related to the law of zoning. Zoning cases dating back to the first three decades of this century frequently rely on older nuisance cases to support the government’s power to regulate land use for the benefit of the broader community. Thus, nuisance abatement and zoning enforcement respond to neighborhood concerns in much the same ways.

For these reasons, nuisance abatement programs involve more than a police response. Police play a primary role in identifying problems, but several other city code enforcement agencies may become involved in their resolution. A house that has become a nuisance is also likely to be in violation of fire, health, sanitation, and zoning codes. Commercial properties are likely to be in violation of their business licenses. And when litigation is

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *Nuisance abatement programs in Miami Beach, Florida; San Diego, California; Portland, Oregon; and Denver, Colorado*
- *Driver’s license suspensions in New Jersey*
- *Structured fine programs in Phoenix, Arizona; Des Moines, Iowa; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Marion, Malheur, Josephine, and Coos Counties in Oregon*
- *Focused offender disposition programs in Birmingham, Alabama, and Phoenix, Arizona*

necessary to gain code compliance, it is civil litigation, ordinarily brought by a city attorney representing the city, rather than criminal prosecution by a State prosecutor.

Although the sanction can be stringent and costly, nuisance abatement is not the same as forfeiture. It does not deprive an owner of title to realty, although some personal property can be taken under most nuisance statutes; and it does not pertain to fruits or instrumentalities of crime. Rather, it pertains to use of property. The point of code enforcement and civil abatement actions is not to punish property owners but to ensure that they comply with the laws.

In nuisance abatement cases, property owners need not be personally involved in criminal activity. Their obligation is to see that their property is used in accordance with the law, whether or not they work or reside on it. Thus, as part of nuisance abatement proceedings, the court or other government entities may require that property owners evict tenants who have created nuisances or provide whatever security is necessary to exclude persons who are violating the law.

Conducted by the Institute for Law and Justice, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) evaluation of nuisance abatement as a drug enforcement technique examined programs in Miami Beach, Florida; San Diego, California; Portland, Oregon; and Denver, Colorado. These sites were chosen because each had a nuisance abatement program that had been in operation for at least 2 years. All of the sites studied confronted similar problems and relied on similar legal and evidentiary bases; however, distinct differences in each have policy implications for other jurisdictions considering nuisance abatement programs. To establish their nuisance abatement programs:

- Miami Beach, acting under a Florida statute, created a Nuisance Abatement Board for the sole purpose of handling drug abatement cases. From the perspective of code enforcement officials, the nuisance board enables a municipality to prosecute nuisances quickly, without waiting to be heard by congested courts whose heavy criminal dockets make it difficult to receive prompt hearings on minor civil matters.
- San Diego established a city task force to bring all city code enforcement power to bear on difficult properties.
- Portland developed a landlord training program that has now reached thousands of property owners. Portland also adopted a Specified Crime Property Ordinance in 1987, which provides a carefully designed procedure for taking advantage of traditional nuisance concepts.
- Denver, operating under a Colorado statutory structure that merged nuisance abatement with asset forfeiture principles, created a sweeping concept of nuisance abatement.

During this evaluation, researchers reviewed and/or followed up on 23 nuisance abatement actions in Miami Beach, 50 in Denver, 15 in San Diego, and 20 in Portland. Before nuisance abatement enforcements, the signs of disorder at each of the sites studied were plentiful, including:

- Sales of crack or other drugs from a property;
- Heavy automobile and pedestrian traffic to the property at all times of day and night;
- Congregations of apparent drug abusers at and near the property;
- Frequent calls for police service on serious matters;
- Frequent arrests at the problem property;
- Debris and poor maintenance of the property; and
- Complaints by law-abiding neighbors about the property and people frequenting it.

Nuisance Abatement Process

In all jurisdictions the initial selection of properties targeted for nuisance abatement enforcements is made by police, generally the narcotics division. In Miami Beach, the initiation and prosecution of nuisance cases began and stayed within the police department. The narcotics unit prepared a case for review by the police legal advisor—an Assistant City Attorney who worked full-time for and in the police department. When that attorney decided that a case was ready for prosecution, it was brought before the Nuisance Abatement Board.

In San Diego and Portland, the initial work, including sending warning letters to owners of problem properties, was done by the police. The City Attorney's Office was advised of police actions but did not become involved until the case was referred for action. At that point, the City Attorney contacted the landowner to attempt a negotiated settlement. The City Attorney was responsible for prosecuting cases that could not be settled.

In Denver, the District Attorney played no role until the police department had completed its case. At that time he or she took over to prosecute for forfeiture of property or abatement of nuisances under the public nuisance statute.

Types of Properties Abated

Both commercial (business and residential) and private properties are possible targets of nuisance abatement enforcements. Businesses include bars, restaurants, grocery stores, convenience stores, and laundromats—any kind of business where people tend to congregate. Commercial residential properties include hotels, motels, rooming houses, apartment buildings, apartment developments, trailer parks, and the like. Private residential properties include single-family houses, trailers, and individual apartments.

From an enforcement perspective, the type of owner is more important than the type of property. In the jurisdictions evaluated, if the owner of a property, be it commercial or residential, was on site and involved in the drug activity that led to abatement, prosecutors and courts had few qualms about invoking the most severe sanctions. Slumlords also received little sympathy from enforcement officials because they were perceived as tolerating illegal activities on their properties as a part of their general disregard for community values and codes.

Other types of owners presented different and more difficult issues. The most problematic were persons who lived at a property being used for drug activity but were unable to exert any control. For example:

- **Elderly people whose houses had been taken over by children or grandchildren and turned into crack houses.** In those cases, prosecutors wished to deal with the nuisance without inflicting unnecessary harm on the elderly owners. Solutions were not easy. One solution was to frame an order that barred certain individuals from the property, making them liable to arrest as trespassers. That approach did not result in a cleanup of the property or a change in its reputation, however.
- **Owners who did not understand how to manage a property and did not have the resources for restoration and maintenance after damage by tenants.** In this case the owner remained responsible but was not able to discharge that responsibility.
- **Heirs to property who knew little about it or had little interest in it.** These owners may not have had the information, experience, or resources to cope with tenant-created problems.
- **Banks and others who held a security interest in a property.** In this case, the asset against which a loan was made might be depreciating, but the bank or other investor could not take possession and might not be interested in or capable of directly managing the property.

Initial selection of properties targeted for nuisance abatement enforcements is made by police, generally the narcotics division.

Findings in Miami Beach

From its establishment in 1987 through the end of 1990, the Miami Beach Nuisance Abatement Board conducted hearings on 23 different properties. All of the hearings involved commercial properties—restaurants, bars, clubs, hotels, apartment buildings, rooming houses, grocery stores, laundromats, and check-cashing services. (In Miami Beach, no commercial enterprise can operate without an occupancy permit issued by code enforcement, and permits are not issued unless all conditions imposed by the Nuisance Abatement Board have been satisfied.) Of the 23 sites that came before the board, 5 were closed, 5 were vacant, 1 was still under investigation, and 12 had been reopened or restored; 5 of these were again under investigation for narcotics trafficking.

Because of this board, the police legal advisor is able to bring defendants up for a hearing within a few days after a case has been prepared. Proceedings are informal, making case preparation far simpler than in the other jurisdictions studied, and the board is often ready to render its decision at the end of the first hearing. In addition, the solutions proposed by the board are tailored by persons with experience in real estate management. Because the board has continuing jurisdiction, owners can be given the opportunity to remedy problems and come back before the board with evidence that problems have been corrected. During the board's first 3 years of operation, no suits were filed to challenge a final board decision.

Findings in San Diego

The San Diego abatement unit, composed of representatives from the City Attorney's Office and the police, fire, building inspection, zoning, and county health departments, was formed in May 1989 to target properties with narcotics- or vice-related violations for nuisance abatement enforcements. The unit, now known as the Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), has a full-time staff of one Deputy City Attorney, a legal assistant and legal secretary in the City Attorney's Code Enforcement Unit, a police detective, and a building inspector. DART is jointly managed by a police sergeant and Supervising Deputy City Attorney.

DART nuisance abatement procedures were undertaken in five steps: preliminary investigation and evaluation; notification to the owner by letter or in the field; a City Attorney's Office hearing; monitoring the property; and referral or closing of the case.

DART is the most formalized multiagency approach to nuisance abatement enforcements of the four jurisdictions studied. Houses and businesses that constitute drug nuisances are almost certainly in violation of several other State and city codes. The DART approach lays the foundation for coordinated full-code enforcement against a property.

Findings in Portland

Portland's Specified Crime Property Ordinance (Chapter 14.80 of the City Code) has given police and the City Attorney an effective tool for dealing with crack houses. Crimes specified in the ordinances include the unauthorized delivery or manufacture of a controlled substance, gambling, and prostitution. A "specified crime property" is defined as any kind of structure, building, or unit of a building where a specified crime takes place. The ordinance provides that any structure used as a specified crime property is subject to closure for up to 1 year and that any person who uses, maintains, or allows a structure under his or her ownership to be used or maintained as a specified crime property is subject to civil penalties of up to \$500 per day.

The ordinance empowers the chief of police to initiate procedures that can culminate in closing a property. In the 3 years since adoption of the ordinance, the Portland Police Bureau has developed several ways of tracking properties on which action may be necessary. When a complaint is received, the Drugs and Vice Division assigns it a complaint

number and enters the address into its specified crime property database. Entries are printed out each month by address to see which addresses are receiving the most complaints. An address is investigated after there have been five complaints. A 3-month analysis printed in March 1991 shows that 47 properties had received sufficient complaints for investigation during that period.

Of the four programs studied, Portland's landlord training program represented the most significant step toward nuisance *prevention*. The 5-hour training program was developed by a Portland citizen through grants from BJA and the assistance of the Community Policing Division of the Portland Police Bureau. It addresses the question of legal action that landlords can take to protect themselves against drug-dealing tenants by teaching landlords how, for example, to prepare properties for rental; manage property on an ongoing basis; spot the warning signs of drug activity and clandestine labs; evict tenants; obtain police assistance; screen Section 8 applicants; and ensure that applicable lease provisions are spelled out.

Nineteen sessions of the training program were conducted between 1989 and the fall of 1990. A total of 2,208 property managers, including many with only one or two properties to rent, participated. Nearly 66 percent of the participants managed fewer than 10 rental units. The attendance figures for managers of properties with few rental units is important because these properties are more vulnerable to drug dealing. Their managers generally are less experienced, have limited management resources, and can benefit significantly from what they learn during the training sessions.

In an evaluation conducted 6 months after the pilot program, 92 percent said that they had made some changes in their operating methods. Specifically, managers reported that they:

- Made more frequent and careful inspections of their properties (77 percent);
- Changed their applicant screening process (74 percent);
- Made a visual inspection of their property and made improvements where necessary (e.g., trimmed shrubbery, increased outdoor lighting) (70 percent);
- Developed or revised their written criteria for applicants (62 percent);
- Purchased updated forms to match current landlord-tenant laws (57 percent);
- Exchanged telephone numbers with neighbors (46 percent); and
- Worked on apartment watches (12 percent).

In all of the jurisdictions studied, some landlords were unsure of their rights and duties. Portland's landlord training program has addressed their uncertainties and given property managers means for solving the problem of drugs transactions in their units without city intervention.

Findings in Denver

Denver takes a view of nuisance abatements against realty that is substantially different from that taken in San Diego, Miami Beach, and Portland. Under the Colorado nuisance statute, title to real property can be transferred to the State under the type of circumstances encountered in many crack house cases. Thus, the city has been reluctant to use nuisance abatement against single-family residents. In the few cases where the State has gained title to houses, the city has found it difficult to sell them because its real estate market has been weak in recent years, and seized properties are particularly difficult to sell because they are generally in a highly offensive condition. Nuisance abatement has been a very effective tool against commercial properties, however, because these properties are more saleable.

The degree of difficulty in a given nuisance case depends on the willingness and ability of owners to take full responsibility for management of their property.

Key Features of Evaluated Nuisance Abatement Programs

Each of the nuisance abatement programs studied has features that other jurisdictions will find advantageous in developing a program of their own. Highlights of program findings are as follows:

- Citizen complaints play a major role in getting police to act on a specific site. Because community involvement is a major component of community policing, nuisance abatement is an excellent opportunity for police departments to demonstrate that community involvement makes a difference.
- The degree of difficulty in a given nuisance case depends on the willingness and ability of owners to take full responsibility for management of their property.
- Other than in Miami Beach, jurisdictions must cope with the delays inherent in civil litigation. If a landowner refuses to cooperate and forces the city to use its full legal authority in Denver, Portland, or San Diego, cases are placed on the civil docket, where they may or may not receive expedited treatment.
- As the Portland landlord training program demonstrates, there are nonpolice solutions to community problems.
- Nuisance abatement enforcements may attack problems in an individual property but do not address neighborhood problems as a whole. Invoking the law's strongest provisions and closing a house, apartment building, or business may exacerbate rather than alleviate a neighborhood problem—boarded buildings may attract rather than exclude offenders.
- A site that has been cleaned up can again become a site of drug dealing, prostitution, or other forms of crime if a broader strategy for neighborhood and community rehabilitation is not undertaken.

SUSPENDING DRIVING PRIVILEGES

The Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1991 ((Public Law 101-516, Section 333) for the U.S. Department of Transportation mandates that certain Federal highway funds be withheld from States that do not have legislation that revokes or suspends an individual's driver's license upon conviction for a violation of the Controlled Substances Act (Public Law 91-513) or any drug offense. Applicable drug offenses for license suspension include the possession, sale, cultivation, or manufacture of narcotics, or the attempt or conspiracy to possess, sell, cultivate, or manufacture narcotics. Although operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of a controlled substance is contained in the applicable list of offenses, the regulations do not *require* vehicle involvement for license suspension. All drug offenses are included. Although States have until October 1, 1993, to consider and enact legislation, at least 15 States have done so already, including Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. The statutes differ in regard to whose licenses can be suspended (juvenile versus adult), lengths of suspensions, conditions of reinstatement, and requirements of vehicle involvement in the offense.

Driver's License Suspensions in New Jersey

In 1987, New Jersey escalated its war on drugs by passing the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (CDRA) statute, establishing a Statewide Task Force, and distributing the *Attorney General's Statewide Action Plan for Narcotics Enforcement*, which details a broad attack on drug problems in the State. CDRA completely revamped State laws regarding narcotics, calling for the mandatory loss of a driver's license for a minimum of 6 months upon conviction of any drug offense—misdemeanor or felony.

With the deadline approaching for States to enact driver's license suspension laws, NIJ provided a grant to the Institute for Law and Justice to evaluate experiences with New Jersey's law. Hudson and Middlesex counties were selected as study sites for this evaluation because of differences in their demographic characteristics. Hudson County, which is bounded by New York City and Newark, is a heavily urban area of 46 square miles and a population of 553,099. Middlesex County, located just south of Newark, is a more suburban area of 316 square miles and a population of 671,780. Jersey City is the county seat of Hudson County; New Brunswick is the county seat of Middlesex County.

Evaluation data were collected in three steps. In the first step, court records on 690 offenders who had been convicted and received license suspensions were collected during the first 3 months of 1990. Offender characteristics, such as sex, race, date of birth, driver's license number (when available), and State criminal identification, were obtained from these records. Drug charges generally were for possession or distribution of cocaine (usually crack cocaine), marijuana, and heroin. Sentences included combinations of prison, jail, probation, and fines.

During the second step, driver histories were requested from the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). These histories show the date of issue of the license and all moving violations of the driver in the State. The DMV was also able to provide information on drug convictions of persons who had no license at the time of conviction.

As a final step, data on criminal histories were obtained from the New Jersey State Police. A cutoff date of April 30, 1991, for criminal histories was used to ensure that data on recidivism for up to 16 months could be produced.

The most common first charges, 63 percent, were for sale or possession of cocaine. Charges involving marijuana were 14.8 percent of first charges, followed closely by heroin charges at 14.4 percent. Nearly half of the offenders had second charges, with cocaine charges accounting for 17.2 percent. An analysis of all charges showed that for 498 cases (type of drug involved was not determined in 2 cases), 327 involved cocaine, 84 involved heroin, 101 involved marijuana, and 20 involved other drugs (opium, other hallucinogens, etc.).

Most sentences for the 500 offenders involved combinations of probation and jail:

- 281 received probation only;
- 106 received jail only;
- 88 received probation and jail; and
- 25 received neither probation nor jail.

The average probation sentence was 29.6 months, and the average jail sentence was 82.9 days. All offenders also received fines. During the followup period, 131 of the 500 offenders had at least one rearrest for a drug offense. The data showed the following:

- 33.8 percent of nonwhite and 20 percent of white offenders were rearrested for drug-related activities.
- Recidivism for Hudson County was higher than for Middlesex County (29.3 percent versus 24.7 percent).
- Males had higher recidivism rates than females (28.3 percent compared with 2.46 percent).
- Nonrecidivists were on average 1 year older than recidivists and had about one fewer prior drug offense.
- The prior drug arrest rate was 0.45 per year for nonrecidivists and 0.60 per year for recidivists.

A key negative finding is that 41 percent of the offenders in the study sample were unlicensed at the time of conviction. Although the percentage of unlicensed offenders may differ in other jurisdictions, it is clear that this sanction will not apply to all offenders.

- Recidivism was 40 percent for offenders who did not receive either probation or jail sentences; the rate was 36.8 percent for those who received jail sentences only, 26.1 percent for offenders with both probation and jail sentences, and 23.8 percent for offenders receiving only probation sentences (all offenders received fines and had license suspensions).
- Approximately 30 offenders had additional drug arrests between the arrest tracked for the evaluation and the time of conviction. These offenders were not classified as recidivists for purposes of this study because the license suspension had not yet been imposed.

New Jersey's Results

The New Jersey experience offers several lessons with regard to suspensions of driving privileges and other sanctions. A key negative finding is that 41 percent of the offenders in the study sample were unlicensed at the time of conviction. Although the percentage of unlicensed offenders may differ in other jurisdictions, it is clear that this sanction will not apply equally to all offenders. Other findings reported by evaluators are as follows:

- The suspension of driver's licenses has specific deterrent value in New Jersey; however, the degree of effectiveness varies in relation to the offender and the imposition of other sanctions. Of the 500 offenders studied, 27.8 had at least one rearrest for a drug offense within the followup period. Of licensed offenders, 24.1 percent were recidivistic; of unlicensed offenders, 33.2 percent were recidivistic.
- At the time of sentencing, judges must be aware of whether the offender has a driver's license. If he or she is unlicensed, judges might consider imposing different sanctions to achieve the objective of equity under law. In New Jersey, judges do not usually determine whether the offender has a license because the suspension of driving privileges is mandatory. Even under these circumstances, however, it may still be advisable to make the determination and adjust sanctions accordingly.
- Most suspensions of the sample studied were for a minimum 6-month period. Researchers concluded that there was no apparent additional deterrent effect in extending the length of suspension beyond that period.
- Suspensions can be imposed without incurring the costs associated with sanctions such as jail and probation. The costs of suspensions are primarily those associated with notifications to the Division of Motor Vehicles and the subsequent entry of information into the computer system.
- The effectiveness of suspensions is limited by the following: very few States have legal authority to revoke the license of an individual from another State; some drivers have no valid license to revoke; and the sanctions for driving with a revoked license are weak in some States.
- Suspensions have a potentially negative impact on persons who depend absolutely on a vehicle for work—truck drivers and delivery personnel, for instance. Judges interviewed for the study suggested that these drivers may risk driving by necessity; however, they may stop using drugs because of the fear of increased sanctions if caught.
- Of the other sanctions imposed under the CDRA statute—jail, probation, and fines—both probation and short jail sentences (1 month or less) resulted in lower rates of recidivism. Many defendants were unable to pay the fines and fees dictated by the CDRA statute; thus, the fines served little purpose. Judges noted that payment of fines was virtually impossible for indigent defendants. Furthermore, because the law does not permit waiver of remittal of fines, offenders have their probation extended for another 5 years if fines are not paid. A second probation extension is stipulated if the fine continues to be unpaid after the first extension.

STRUCTURED FINES

Because of the serious overcrowding of jails and prisons and the continuing growth in probation caseloads, criminal fines are capturing interest as community-based sentencing options. Ultimately, it is hoped that a full spectrum of "intermediate sanctions"—including fines, intensive probation, electronic monitoring, and community service—can be implemented so that judges can better match the seriousness of offenses with the severity of sanctions.

Criminal fines are not new to U.S. sentencing and, in fact, are widely used; however, they are used primarily in conjunction with other sanctions (e.g., probation) or as standalone sentences for less serious crimes (e.g., traffic offenses).³ Western European countries, in contrast, have successfully used fines as sole sanctions for many nontrivial criminal cases, and in several countries, fines serve as a major alternative to imprisonment.⁴ Hesitation to use fines more broadly in the United States appears to result from judicial concerns about public risk—for instance, the diversion of serious offenders from incarceration, poor fine enforcement, and undue penalizing of the poor.⁵ The European "day-fine" concept addresses these concerns. With the day-fine approach, the imposition and amount of a fine can be made commensurate with the offender's ability to pay and the seriousness of the offense.

Despite the recent attention paid to fines, relatively little research is currently available to guide policymakers.⁶ Reliable data do not exist on the frequency or amount of financial sanctions imposed on different offenders, on how imposed sanctions are monitored and enforced, or on their effectiveness relative to other sentences. As with other intermediate sanctions, debates center on whether fines are most appropriately applied as enhancements or as alternatives to probation, jail, or prison. Without more information, it is difficult to assess how court systems might best implement a more expanded and structured day-fine system, what the most appropriate target group might be, or the potential costs and benefits that greater reliance on fines might offer.

Staten Island Day-Fine Project

The first day-fine experiment in American courts was an Institute project that utilized day fines for low-level offenses handled in Richmond County (Staten Island), New York, courts. The project, planned and implemented between 1987 and 1989, proved feasible and successful; it generated substantial revenues for the court. The Staten Island project showed that:

- The day-fine concept could be implemented in a typical American limited-jurisdiction court;
- Day fines could substitute for fixed fines;
- Fine amounts were higher for affluent offenders under the day-fine system;
- Overall revenues increased; and
- High rates of collection could be sustained (and possibly improved) despite the higher average day-fine amounts.

Structured-Fines Demonstration Project

As results from the project became known, a number of other jurisdictions became interested in the day-fine concept. Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, soon received assistance to develop a day-fine project that would serve as an alternative to probation; more recently, the 1990 Minnesota State legislature directed the Sentencing Commission to integrate fines into its statewide sentencing guidelines system.

Criminal fines are not new to U.S. sentencing, and, in fact, are widely used; however, they are used primarily in conjunction with other sanctions. . . or as standalone sentences for less serious crimes.

A nationwide Structured-Fines Demonstration Project funded by BJA is designed to enhance the application and enforcement of structured fines ("day fines") as sanctions for drug offenders and other misdemeanants and felons.⁷ Four jurisdictions have been chosen to participate: Phoenix, Arizona; Des Moines, Iowa; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Marion, Malheur, Josephine, and Coos Counties in Oregon.

NIJ's evaluation of the program is examining the design, implementation, and impacts of those programs. It will address these questions:

- What are the goals, objectives, and characteristics of the day-fine programs; in other words, what fine schedules were imposed, on which offenders, and for which offenses?
- How does the day-fine program differ from routine procedures used for implementing, monitoring, and enforcing fines in each jurisdiction?
- What administrative and statutory changes as well as special training were required for judges, probation, and court personnel to implement the program?
- Was the day-fine program implemented as planned, and how does it differ from routine fining practices at each site in terms of imposition, collection, and enforcement?
- How many eligible offenders actually received the day fine specified in the program's design? How did the range of sentences imposed before and after the implementation of the day-fine system change? Specifically, is there evidence that the sentences of less serious offenders were enhanced (i.e., net widening) or that more serious offenders were incarcerated less often (i.e., diversion)?
- What revenues were generated from the day-fine programs, and how do these compare with those generated from routine fining practices?
- How replicable do those involved in administering the day-fine program believe it to be? What do they believe the key ingredients are for successful program implementation? How much did the program cost to implement in terms of personnel and training? How did that cost weigh against revenues collected?
- Is there evidence that the imposition of day fines is associated with an increase or decrease in recidivism?

The day-fine project became operational in Phoenix in April 1991, in Des Moines in January 1992, and in Marion County and Bridgeport in May 1992. The evaluation is still in the data collection phase; however, the four jurisdictions' projects are described below.

Central to each jurisdiction's program are two key day-fine concepts: (1) the establishment of benchmarks that specify a number (or range) of penalty units for crimes of different severity, and (2) procedures for calculating an offender's daily income. To determine the day-fine amount, daily income is multiplied by the number of penalty units. Contracts are worked out with offenders to specify payment schedules and amounts to be paid, and sanctions are imposed for delinquent accounts. Each of the four jurisdictions has, however, adapted the day-fine concept to meet local needs and interests.

Maricopa County, Arizona

The day-fine program (FARE Supervision) in Maricopa County is administered through probation and targets offenders who have been convicted in Superior Court of a felony and have historically received standard probation supervision. These offenders need no formal supervision; are not chronic offenders or violent; do not require treatment, training, or education; and do not owe excessive restitution. FARE Supervision probation serves as a newly created intermediate sanction between routine probation and summary (unsupervised) probation.

Offenders are eligible for FARE if they are convicted of a probation-eligible offense in Superior Court. Offenders are nominated for FARE by probation officers during the presentence investigation process. For eligible offenders, the officer calculates daily income based on information provided by the offender and fills out a day-fine worksheet that specifies the unit value, the number of penalty units, and the resulting fine amount. Final determination to impose a structured fine is made by the judge at sentencing.

FARE Supervision is provided by a special FARE probation officer whose primary goal is to collect the financial assessment in as short a period as possible. Modifications can be made to the original assessment amount and payment schedule if the offender is unable to pay through a good-faith effort. Willful nonpayment can result in a term in county jail.

In contrast to FARE, in which day fines became an explicit intermediate sanction, the programs in the other three sites focus on replacing currently used tariffs, or flat fees, with day fines in addition to using fines as replacements for other sanctions.

Polk County, Iowa

The Polk County program is administered by the County Attorney's Office. Offenders charged with serious and aggravated misdemeanors (lowest-level misdemeanors are not eligible) are currently targeted by the program, although ultimately felony cases are expected to be included. Determination is based mainly on offense type, but offenders with serious prior records and high need for probation services may be excluded. Eligible offenses are assigned specific penalty units.

Initial screening is performed by Assistant County Attorneys who determine whether a case is fine-eligible. Financial calculations are prepared by day-fine staff; the resulting fine amount is determined and provided to the Assistant County Attorneys. The calculated fine amount is then used in plea negotiations, when the prosecutor recommends the computed fine to the judge. A final determination on the imposition of the day fine is made by the judge. A day-fine officer oversees the project with the assistance of project aides responsible for monitoring and enforcing the payments.

Bridgeport, Connecticut

The goals of the Bridgeport program are to make fines more equitable and to increase the use of fines for offenses currently fined as well as those offenses not previously fined. Offenses ranging from felonies to misdemeanors are eligible for day fines. Cases can be referred from any stage in court processing—arraignment, plea, pretrial, and so on.

Unlike Maricopa and Polk County, the Bridgeport day-fine program sets out broad ranges of penalty units for offenses. The exact number of fine units for a case is generally negotiated in plea-bargaining sessions. Financial information is then reviewed by the project day-fine officer, who verifies the offender's income. The day-fine officer calculates the fine and recommends it to the court. Final approval to impose a day fine is made by the judge.

Offenders either pay in full at the time of conviction or work with the day-fine officer to prepare an installment plan that is acceptable to the court. As at the other sites, the day-fine officer is responsible for monitoring and enforcing payment. Offenders who default are rearrested and brought back before the court.

Coos, Josephine, Malheur, and Marion Counties, Oregon

The day-fine programs in Coos, Josephine, and Malheur counties target both so-called presumptive probation felonies (i.e., those for which probation is a presumed sanction) and misdemeanors. Marion County, which is the largest county, targets misdemeanor offenses only. Penalty units are assigned in 15 to 30 unit ranges for classes of offenses; a presumptive penalty unit is in the center of each range.

Targeted to an appropriate group, structured fines may serve as an intermediate sanction that can be handled administratively, leaving probation officers free to invest more time and resources in the supervision of high-risk offenders. Structured fines may also generate substantial revenues for courts.

To date, most of the cases given day fines have been in Marion County, where cases are eligible for a day fine after a plea of guilty or no contest in lower court. Before the plea, a unit value worksheet is completed based on information generally provided through the affidavit of indigency. This worksheet is provided to the judge along with a verbal recommendation by the District Attorney as to the number of penalty units for the offense. The judge retains final responsibility for determining the number of penalty units for the offense and the final day-fine amount.

After sentencing, the offender meets with the day-fine officer to complete a contract specifying payment amounts and dates. The officer is responsible for monitoring, enforcing, and making any revisions to the contract. Delinquent offenders are warned through telephone calls and letters; a warrant for arrest is issued for nonpayment.

The evaluation information will provide a comprehensive assessment of the implementation, costs, and impacts (on both the offender and the system) of implementing day-fine programs across the county.

FOCUSED OFFENDER DISPOSITION PROGRAM

The Focused Offender Disposition Program was designed to answer two questions regarding probationers with a history of recent drug use:

- In deterring subsequent drug use, is urinalysis monitoring alone as successful as urinalysis monitoring combined with a standard treatment?
- How useful are standard, nationally used needs assessment instruments in determining the level of treatment and/or supervision required by probationers who recently used drugs?

To address these issues, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors, funded by BJA, established the Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition program in Birmingham, Alabama, and Phoenix, Arizona, in December 1988. By August 1990, nearly 900 clients had been assessed and accepted into the Focused Offender Disposition program in each city. A similar program began in Chicago, Illinois, in October 1990 and ran through March 1992. During the operation of that program, 802 probationers were assessed for treatment.

The Focused Offender Disposition program design called for probationers with a history of recent drug use to be assessed with one of two different treatment instruments. Half of all clients were assessed with the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors' Offender Profile Index, and half were assessed with the local instrument then in use at the local site.

Researchers measured the performance of offenders assigned to four categories: urinalysis only; outpatient care with urinalysis; short-term residential care with urinalysis; and long-term residential care with urinalysis.

An offender's success in completing the program was judged by whether the offender kept appointments with program staff; urine was provided for testing as scheduled; tested urine was "clean"; the offender was referred again to a higher level of supervision or treatment; and other defined program requirements were met. An offender was considered to have failed the program if a petition to revoke probation was filed, regardless of whether the violation was criminal or technical, or if probation was revoked.

Findings are now available for Birmingham and Phoenix. (Because of the delay in startup of the Chicago program, findings from this site are not yet available.) The evaluation first addressed this question: Is urinalysis monitoring as effective as treatment? The results

suggest that it may be, at least for the chosen types of offenders and treatments. If the assessment of needs is accurate and if the treatment is implemented faithfully, then the evaluation results indicate that persons who received treatment performed no better on probation than persons who received only urinalysis monitoring.

Although researchers observed that the treatment program fell short of its desired results, they were limited by the fact that they did not know the extent to which the treatment was fully implemented and consistently delivered. Researchers could say, however, that urinalysis monitoring was as effective as the "treatment program" in operation at the time in Birmingham and Phoenix. If these are typical programs for assessing and treating drug-using probationers in those communities, then urinalysis monitoring appears to work as well as what is being done in the name of treatment.

Another question involved the quality of the needs assessment instruments. Several tests raised questions about the predictive accuracy of both the Offender Profile Index and the local instruments in use in Phoenix and Birmingham. Researchers concluded that the type of instrument used to make the needs assessment was unrelated to the probationer's success on probation.

NOTES

1. Hillsman, S.T., 1990. "Fines and Day Fines," in M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, vol. 12. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Hillsman, Sally T., and Judith A. Greene, 1988. "Tailoring Criminal Fines to the Financial Means of the Offender," *Judicature* 72(1); Lewis, Donald E., 1988. "A Linear Model of Fine Enforcement with Application to England and Wales," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 4(1); and Gillespie, Robert W., 1988. "Collecting and Enforcing Criminal Fines: A Review of Court Processes, Practices, and Problems," *Justice System Journal* 13(1).
3. Hillsman, Sally T., and Barry Mahoney, 1988. "Collecting and Enforcing Criminal Fines: A Review of Court Processes, Practices, and Problems," *Justice System Journal* 13(1); and Cole, George F., Barry Mahoney, Marlene Thornton, and Roger A. Hanson, 1987. *The Practices and Attitudes of Trial Court Judges Regarding Fines as a Criminal Sanction*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.
4. Recent research reviews of fines and financial penalties can be found in Hillsman, Sally T., 1990 (see note 1 above).



The corrections system in America finds itself today under severe stress and facing some of the most daunting challenges in its history. At the same time, American corrections has seldom experienced a period of greater innovation and creativity.

The two—stress and experimentation—flow from essentially the same stimulus, which is the sharp rise in inflow of sentenced offenders, most of them for drug-related crimes. The rise in combined Federal and State prison populations continued in 1992, up 7.2 percent over the previous year to a new historical high of 883,593, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics.¹ Federal prison populations grew at a rate of 12.1 percent, to 80,259, while State prison populations grew by 6.8 percent, to 803,334. County and local jails accounted for another 426,479 incarcerated prisoners at midyear 1991, up 5.2 percent over 1990.²

These incarceration rates attest to the effectiveness and efficiency of the police, prosecution, and adjudicatory elements of the criminal justice system, especially in enforcing anti-drug laws. Many courts around the country are showing considerable ingenuity in screening drug offenders, as described in Chapter 8. For those who are not diverted into some alternative program, the corrections system is their final destination.

The challenge for corrections is to determine how to cope with the influx of drug-using offenders. Imprisonment guarantees punishment and accountability, but it is costly and may not rehabilitate prisoners or prepare them to integrate into the community. Thus, corrections policymakers are looking intensely at other options that offer a range of choices that lie between prison and probation or a more constructive environment than traditional incarceration.

This chapter reports on National Institute of Justice (NIJ) evaluations of boot camps, intensive supervision programs in lieu of incarceration, and work release following prison. It also reports on evaluations of the legislatively mandated correctional options projects funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA).

BOOT CAMPS

Boot camp prisons require offenders to serve a short term in prison or jail in a quasi-military program similar to military basic training. The first adult boot camp opened in Georgia in 1983. Currently 28 States, 10 local jurisdictions, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have boot camps, also frequently called shock incarceration programs. Another 8 programs have been designed for juveniles.³

Most State programs are aimed at young offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes who are serving their first prison terms. Offenders are required to serve between 90 and 180 days in a boot camp.

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *Boot camps*
- *Intensive community supervision in Minnesota*
- *Work release in the State of Washington*
- *Correctional options in New Hampshire, Maryland, Florida, and Alameda County, California*

Boot camps began with the expectation that they could, by themselves, help inmates develop sufficient self-discipline to enable them to return to their communities free of drugs and criminal behavior. Evaluations, including those by NIJ, indicated that some measures of success—including recidivism—differed little for graduates of boot camp from those for offenders who served their sentences in traditional prisons. Corrections officials have begun, therefore, to develop programs of aftercare to enable offenders to make a structured and supported transition from boot camp to life in the community.

The number of States with boot camps and the capacity of these programs have continued to increase during the 1990s. New York still has the largest capacity with 1,500 beds, but the programs in Georgia (800 beds), Oklahoma (400 beds), Michigan (600 beds), Texas (400 beds), and Maryland (440 beds) continue to grow.⁴

Overall, boot camps hold a relatively small number of inmates relative to the entire prison population. In 1992, States had dedicated somewhat more than 7,000 beds to boot camp prisons. Because offenders spend, on average, 107 days in the program, more than 23,000 offenders could potentially complete the programs in a 1-year period. Offenders who succeed in the program are released to community supervision. In some States, however, a fairly large percentage of the inmates are dismissed; they must serve these sentences in traditional prisons or return to the court for resentencing.⁵

Boot camps began with the expectation that they could, by themselves, help inmates develop sufficient self-discipline to enable them to return to their communities free of drugs and criminal behavior. Evaluations, including those by NIJ, indicated that some measures of success—including recidivism—differed little for graduates of boot camp from those for offenders who served their sentences in traditional prisons. Corrections officials have begun, therefore, to develop programs of aftercare to enable offenders to make a structured and supported transition from boot camp to life in the community.

This section reports on NIJ evaluations of boot camp programs for adult offenders at several sites across the country, on a county-operated jail program for young inmates, on drug treatment and aftercare for boot camp “graduates,” and on the development of national standards for boot camps.

Multi-Site Study of Shock Incarceration

Prior research examining the effectiveness of shock incarceration programs has been limited to specific locations. Given the large differences among programs, the Institute considered it important to compare several programs to determine which successfully met their program goals and what components contributed to success or failure.

NIJ selected eight State programs for participation in a multi-site study of shock incarceration. Those programs are in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas.

Preliminary Findings

The study showed that the programs provide a combination of disciplinary and rehabilitative elements that are aimed at (in many programs) both deterrence and rehabilitation. The basic program contains the more rigorous elements, including hard work, physical training, and military drill and ceremony. These elements may promote physical health, a drug-free environment, structured routine, and a sense of accomplishment.⁶

Rehabilitative programming has received increasing emphasis over the years in shock incarceration programs. Although earlier programs did not appear to incorporate much rehabilitation, many of the recently implemented programs devote a substantial amount of time to such programming. Indeed, the goal most frequently selected as “very important” in the 1992 Multi-Site Survey was rehabilitation. If the view of core shock incarceration as primarily a catalyst for change is ultimately adopted for these programs, rehabilitation becomes of great importance because the study suggests that other benefits of the program are as yet minimal. Boot camp offenders, for example, appear to have recidivism rates similar to those of offenders who served time in prison.

In many States, shock programs appear to target high-risk offenders. In some States, however, particularly those where the judge sentences directly to the program (such as Georgia and Texas), offenders may have otherwise received a probation sentence and

therefore may not be considered high risk. Thus, the extent to which programs target high-risk offenders probably varies somewhat among States.⁷

By and large, shock programs also attempt to address factors related to criminality. Seven States incorporate substance abuse education/treatment; six States provide job preparedness training; six States include academic education; and four States teach problemsolving or decisionmaking skills. Three States (Illinois, Louisiana, and New York) also provide intensive supervision upon release that extends treatment/education in the community and sometimes provides job training and employment opportunities. The length as well as the voluntary nature of the program may also influence its effectiveness in addressing factors that appear to affect development or return to criminal behavior.⁸

The findings of research and evaluation studies on boot camps conducted to date indicate that the evidence regarding the utility of boot camps as effective alternative sanctions within State systems is as yet inconclusive. Greater emphasis on aftercare clearly seems warranted, as does a more realistic expectation of what constitutes "success" for offenders placed in boot camps.

Boot camps also appear to reduce crowding. Generally, this is accomplished because inmates serve less time in camps than they would if they had served their sentences in traditional facilities. The key factor is whether boot camp offenders would have been sent to prison if the program did not exist. More research is needed to determine long-term effects on crowding.⁹

It is still too early to tell whether boot camps will reduce overall cost of corrections. Boot camps appear to be less costly than traditional forms of incarceration not because of lower daily costs but because offenders serve shorter periods of time than they would in traditional prison.¹⁰

Development of discipline and improved work habits are other important byproducts of these innovations. Some—perhaps many—people who have committed a crime but have not yet begun a criminal career may have little experience with a healthy work ethic. They have never lived structured lives. Innovative programs are beginning to show that it is possible to make people get up early in the morning and be active all day, and that a significant portion of these people will eventually come to understand the value of the work ethic and perhaps adopt it permanently. Inculcating the offender with a healthy work ethic may be more important, initially, than teaching that person a marketable skill. The aimless offender who becomes a motivated worker will acquire skills and find a job more readily than an offender who simply learns a new skill by rote but retains old habits and attitudes.

In a comprehensive review of the status of boot camps, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) recently reported that boot camps appeared to reduce short-term prison costs, but their long-term impact was uncertain.¹¹ The GAO relied on NIJ evaluations and on information received directly from States.

State corrections officials, the report noted, believe that these programs provide "a viable alternative to traditional forms of incarceration and have done much to instill discipline, improve self-esteem, and provide education for all participants and treatment to drug offenders."

Drug Treatment and Aftercare

Although substance abuse programs are central themes in correctional programming, they are perhaps even more important in boot camps because a large percentage of drug abusers enter these programs. Some programs specifically target younger drug-abusing populations and have found that a higher percentage of program participants report drug abuse than do comparable prison populations.

These preliminary findings lend support to the notion that correctional shock incarceration/boot camps are not only a growing alternative sanction but also a potentially important component in the correctional treatment response to substance abuse.

Little systematic information is available regarding substance abuse programs in the continuum of correctional services provided for boot camp participants, and whether existing programs are clinically relevant and theoretically informed. This is a crucial question warranting examination because correctional treatment programs are most likely to result in desired outcomes if specific interventions are based on valid treatment modalities appropriate to the target populations. To evaluate substance abuse treatment in correctional boot camps and accompanying offender aftercare programs in the United States, the Institute awarded a grant to the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Correction at Southern Illinois University.

Preliminary Findings

Preliminary findings support the notion that a large proportion of boot camp participants have substance abuse histories. More than half of the programs reporting to date indicate that 80 percent or more of their participants have such histories. Not surprisingly, therefore, "reducing drug use by offenders" is a major objective of most correctional boot camp programs. Approximately 58 percent of those responding to date indicated that this was their most important objective, while another 26 percent of the programs identified it as their second most important objective. Similarly, 58 percent of those reporting stated that "drug treatment" was a primary element in their programs, while only 16 percent indicated that it was not a program element in their regimes. About three-quarters (74 percent) of the programs responding to date provide some type of substance abuse education program.

These preliminary findings lend support to the notion that correctional shock incarceration/boot camps are not only a growing alternative sanction but also a potentially important component in the correctional treatment response to substance abuse. As this project proceeds, it is hoped that effective drug treatment strategies in boot camp environments can be identified and compiled into usable recommendations for policymakers and administrators.

Boot Camps for Juveniles

Like their adult counterparts, boot camps for juveniles involve a period of "military"-style discipline, strenuous physical activity, and close supervision. They may call for the juvenile and youthful participants to receive extensive assessments, remedial or special education services, substance abuse counseling or treatment, life skills training, job skills and job readiness training, and other services to prepare them for a healthy and constructive life. The delivery of these services begins while the juveniles and youth are confined to the boot camps and continues during a period of intensive supervision after they leave the camps. These programs may also require participation in a period of "aftercare." During this period, the programs focus on reintegrating the youth into their communities, on having participants complete their education and find employment, and, if appropriate, on having them rejoin their families. The youth may be under supervision during this period, but the intensity of the supervision tapers off.

An NIJ evaluation conducted by the American Institute for Research is examining six boot camp demonstration programs for juvenile (ages 14 to 17) and youthful (ages 17 to 25) offenders. The program developers were sensitive to the tradition and policy that a greater focus be placed on rehabilitation and supportive services than is typically provided in adult incarceration programs. As a consequence, the demonstration programs have extensive aftercare services extending over as much as 24 months after offenders leave the boot camp. These services are seen as essential, and in the long run, the reduced recidivism and need for support services in later life will represent savings far greater than the costs of the services.

This evaluation covers three boot camp programs for juvenile offenders funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and located in Cleveland, Mobile, and Denver; and three BJA-funded boot camp programs for youthful offenders (about ages 18 to 25) located in Cook County, Illinois; St. Louis, Missouri; and La Grange, Kentucky.

The three juvenile boot camps began serving youth in April 1992. The implementation evaluation of these programs determined that these programs can support a rigorous impact assessment. All three sites have developed cohesive programs combining military-like structure and discipline with a variety of treatment services. They have instituted random assignment procedures, and they can serve sufficient numbers of youth. Work is currently underway to assess whether evaluation procedures developed for the juvenile programs can be adapted for the youthful offenders' boot camps.

The process evaluation will provide administrators who are considering initiating a boot camp program with information on the characteristics of the program that appear to be associated with success. For example, the results should answer such questions as:

- What type of staff to hire? For example, should the "drill instructors" be persons with a military background who are then trained in corrections, or vice versa?
- What is the proper balance of intense military discipline and physical training with educational activities, life skills training, drug abuse counseling, and other rehabilitation activities?
- How military-like should the intense phase of the boot camp be—very military-like with a confrontational "in-your-face" emphasis, or a less structured, less rigid style emphasizing emotional support?
- What program strategies are associated with lower dropout rates once the boot camp participants reach the aftercare stage and begin reentry into the community?
- What mix of community, correctional, and judicial agency participation is needed to maintain program operations and to be accepted as a viable alternative?
- What types of physical plant, equipment, and facilities and what level of capital investment are necessary for a successful boot camp experience?
- What types and level of basic skills, job readiness and life skills training, substance abuse counseling and treatment, and other support services are required for the aftercare phase of the program to be effective?

Boot Camp Programs in Jails

Most studies of boot camps focus on State-operated programs. Little is known about boot camp programs in jails. NIJ is tracking developments in this area. In a national survey conducted for NIJ in the spring of 1992 by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD), more than 2,200 questionnaires were mailed to sheriffs, jail administrators, and State-operated probation agencies throughout the United States to determine if they were currently operating a jail boot camp, were planning to start one, or were interested in initiating a jail boot camp program in the near future. Eleven jurisdictions responded that they were operating jail boot camps, while another 13 jurisdictions reported they were planning to open boot camps in 1992 or 1993. An additional 130 administrators stated they had no immediate plans to open a boot camp but maintained interest in opening one in the near future. By the end of 1993, as many as 25 county-level programs may be operating across the country.

One such program was operated in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) program but subsequently discontinued because of budgetary problems. With NIJ funds, NCCD evaluated RID; the research began in the fall of 1990 and was

Before embarking on a new program, administrators must first know what types of offender are admitted to jail and how long they stay. The program needs to pretest selection criteria and the screening process to verify that enough offenders are available to fill the program and that the boot camp will help and not worsen the jail's crowding situation.

completed in February 1993. The evaluation was designed to determine whether a county-operated boot camp program for male inmates would be feasible and cost-effective, based on the Los Angeles experience.

Los Angeles Sheriff's Boot Camp Program

In September 1990, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, in cooperation with the county probation authorities, initiated the Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) pilot program. This program was intended to function as a viable sentencing option for selected defendants who were likely to receive lengthy jail sentences (180 days or longer) or short prison terms to be followed by formal probation or parole supervision.

Funded primarily by money and sale of assets seized from convicted drug dealers, the major goals of the program were to reduce jail crowding; reduce costs through the avoidance of long-term incarceration; and reduce recidivism. An important secondary goal was to improve inmate control by establishing and enforcing strict rules of conduct.

While in operation, the program exposed young adult male offenders to a residential military-style boot camp for 90 days, followed by a 90-day period of intensive aftercare supervision in the community. Unlike many boot camp programs, RID had a strong program orientation that included mandatory participation in formal education classes, drug treatment, and counseling sessions. Participants were primarily young minority males, poorly educated, with fairly substantial prior criminal and drug involvements for their age group.

Lessons Learned

Evaluators found that RID participants actually spent more time in jail than did control-group inmates, when time spent in pretrial confinement was added to their boot camp stay. Thus, the costs of keeping them in jail exceeded the costs of keeping non-RID inmates.

Several important lessons can be learned from RID. Each is briefly discussed below.

Establish Realistic Goals. A jail boot camp must address several key issues of importance to the jail administrator.

- **Overcrowding.** The program should target inmates who are spending 90 days or more in custody, including probation violators and parole violators prior to their transfer to State prison or release to probation or parole supervision.
- **Rehabilitation.** A boot camp program can help initiate the rehabilitation process and research findings from the Los Angeles RID program show that a boot camp can significantly improve basic reading and math skills. These gains do not easily translate into reductions in crime rates, however.
- **Improving Jail Operations and Public Relations.** A jail boot camp can improve the overall operations of a jail and its standing in the community by helping to create an efficient inmate workforce and a safe housing environment. Staff training is enhanced as officers learn to deal with inmates in a very direct but supportive manner and community relations can be dramatically improved through community works projects.

Carefully Pretest Selection Criteria Prior to Implementation. Before embarking on a new program, administrators must first know what types of offender are admitted to jail and how long they stay. The program needs to pretest selection criteria and the screening process to verify that enough offenders are available to fill the program and that the boot camp will help and not worsen the jail's crowding situation.

Limit Program Length of Stay. Unless potential boot camp participants will spend, on average, 180 days or more in custody, jail boot camps should limit their period of program participation to no more than 120 days.

Establish a Strong Aftercare Component. There must be a continuation of intense supervision and services after release from the program, and some situations will require a transition halfway house, residential drug treatment, and/or intensive supervision for 6 to 12 months after release.

Evaluate Program Operations and Effectiveness. Jurisdictions need to assess the type of offenders it accepts, the types of service it delivers, and whether it maintains an acceptable program completion rate and effectively works within budget. Impact evaluations should determine the program's effectiveness in reducing recidivism.

NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR BOOT CAMPS

Administrators of most prisons and jails in the United States adhere to the national standards for these institutions promulgated by the American Correctional Association (ACA). No such standards exist for boot camps, however.

In the 1970s, ACA worked closely with the U.S. Department of Justice and 50 State correctional representatives to develop national standards for adult correctional institutions, adult local detention facilities, juvenile training schools, and juvenile detention facilities. These standards have become the national benchmark for the operation of both adult and juvenile facilities. The use of national standards provides a management tool for the operation of a professional correctional organization, minimizes the risk of successful litigation against the agency, improves staff morale, provides clear direction and consistency, and facilitates recordkeeping and objective program evaluation. National standards provide a systematic methodology for comprehensive management of a correctional program in all aspects of its operations. National standards for adult and juvenile boot camps will assist public officials and corrections professionals in developing, operating, and evaluating sound correctional boot camp programs. These standards for adult and juvenile boot camps are expected to be used by the correctional administrators, planners, architects, designers, and practitioners in the construction and operation of camps. The Institute has awarded a grant to ACA to develop these standards.

ACA will develop a set of standards for both adult and juvenile boot camps that correctional practitioners can apply consistently to ensure effective and efficient program operations. ACA will work closely with the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) and BJA to design the delivery of training and technical assistance for State and local jurisdictions wishing to implement or improve boot camp programs.

INTENSIVE COMMUNITY SUPERVISION IN MINNESOTA

Over the past several years NIJ has evaluated a number of options for intermediate punishment. One program of particular interest was begun in Minnesota, and NIJ is evaluating it at this time.

In 1990 the Minnesota legislature enacted a bill to implement an intensive community supervision (ICS) program, specifying the eligibility criteria for both a prison diversion and intensive supervised release (ISR) program and the components of the required programs. The Minnesota ICS program represents the Nation's first true prison-diversion intensive supervision program and also one of the first intensive supervised release

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programs within a sentencing guidelines system. Minnesota's ICS and ISR programs provide maximum community surveillance and supervision in a four-phase process that includes a lengthy period of home detention and close contact with specially trained agents with small caseloads. At the core of the programs is mandatory work and/or training program participation. The programs are being funded jointly by the Minnesota Office of Drug Policy and BJA. The Institute awarded a grant to RAND to evaluate this program.

Random Assignment

The referral of offenders from the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) to RAND for random assignment ran from October 1990 to June 1992. Eligible inmates were screened by caseworkers at selected prisons in Minnesota. The cases were then reviewed by the ICS staff; if they meet all criteria (judge approval, inmate approval, legislative and DOC criteria), they were referred to the DOC for the study.

As of June 30, 1992, 432 offenders had been referred to the ICS and ISR programs. Of these, 125 were inmates who had just entered prison for a sentence of 27 months or less, and 190 were inmates about to leave prison on supervised release. The final sample for the RAND evaluation consists of 123 prison diversion cases eligible for ICS, 46 in the control group and 77 in the experimental group, and 185 cases for the ISR study, 87 in the control group and 98 in the experimental group.

Interviews With Offenders

In the summer of 1992, researchers conducted interviews with a sample of 48 inmates randomly selected from offenders eligible for ICS (according to statutory criteria) incarcerated at Stillwater or St. Cloud. These interviews were designed to measure offenders' perceptions of the severity of sanctions and their perception of the difficulty of complying with various conditions of probation. Preliminary analyses of the data collected in these interviews suggest that inmates do perceive intensive supervision as an intermediate sanction between probation and prison. In comparison to severity ratings for probation and prison, there was less consensus among the inmates on the magnitude of severity of intensive supervision. Although 20 percent of the offenders interviewed had chosen not to participate in ICS, their responses on the magnitude scaling items did not differ significantly from those inmates who were eligible but had been denied the opportunity. The inmates interviewed also felt that compliance with most of the conditions of ICS would be relatively easy.

Policy Relevance

This research, still in progress, represents the first experimental evaluation of a prison-diversion intensive supervision program. The results of the evaluation should be useful nationwide, particularly to State legislatures and corrections policymakers. The experiment will indicate whether the stated ICS objectives were achieved and at what cost. It is also important to discover how ICS and other intermediate sanctions can be incorporated into a sentencing guidelines structure.

Local and State policymakers are grappling with how best to meet a public mandate that requires punishment while at the same time not bankrupting their budgets. To assist in this policy process, researchers need to begin empirically documenting what the effects of various sanctions are—specifically in terms of costs, recidivism, and public safety. Once these estimates are derived, policymakers can engage in more constructive debates concerning whether the dollars expended are sufficient, given the expected benefits. NIJ envisions this research as a first step toward providing credible estimates for such policy decisions. Supplementing the analysis with personal interview data should also enhance an understanding of the impacts of sanctions on offenders and the practitioners who must implement them.

WORK RELEASE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

This project is designed to provide a comprehensive evaluation of prison work release in the State of Washington. The evaluation covers a statewide review of participants in work release, what services they receive, and how many successfully complete the program. The research examines the impact of work release on offender recidivism and reintegration by comparing offenders placed in Seattle work release facilities with those who complete their terms in prison. A case study of the Pioneer Industries work program, a work release placement utilized by Seattle-area work release participants, describes the Pioneer Industries program and the work release experiences of approximately 30 work releasees hired by Pioneer Industries and a matched sample of work releasees with other community employment.

The Institute awarded a grant to RAND to conduct the evaluation. The completed research will provide a thorough assessment of the implementation and impacts of prison work release. The project is currently ongoing with an expected end date of January 31, 1994.

Almost half of the 2,452 male offenders applied for work release. Not all offenders are accepted into work release: of those who apply, approximately 80 percent are accepted. Eventually, about 40 percent of offenders are placed in work release facilities at some point during their sentence. Not all, however, exit their prison sentence from a work release facility. Approximately 30 percent of offenders placed in work release facilities are returned to the institution and are ultimately released to the community directly from the prison environment. Overall, then, 27.5 percent of the inmates returning to the community in 1990 did so from a work release facility.

Analysis revealed an average of approximately 7 months for an application packet to be submitted. Once the application packets were submitted, just over 1 month elapsed before a decision was made to accept the inmate into work release. An additional 56 days then elapsed before the inmate actually entered his work release facility. The average length of time an offender spent in work release (including offenders who were both unsuccessful and successful on work release) was 103 days. For offenders who were unsuccessful (i.e., returned to prison and released directly into the community), the average length of time in work release was 55 days, compared to 124 days for successful offenders (those released into the community from work release.)

Predictors of successful completion of work release included whether or not the offender was older, had no prior record of felony sentences, and was serving time for a nonproperty current offense.

The completed evaluation will provide much-needed information on how work release can best be implemented, what public safety risks such programs entail, and what offender and program characteristics are associated with success.

Specifically, the results will be useful to policymakers seeking to reduce the length of stay in prison and thus contain costs. The extent to which community programs such as work release reduce offender recidivism and ease reintegration into society are critical to our understanding of how best to supervise high-risk offenders in the community.

CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 required the Bureau of Justice Assistance to fund a wide range of optional dispositions of drug-related offenders, including release under intensive community supervision, other forms of ensuring accountability (house arrest, electronic

monitoring, etc.), boot camp prisons, and work release after incarceration. The legislation also mandated the National Institute of Justice to evaluate these optional approaches, as discussed in this chapter.

In 1992, BJA awarded grants to four jurisdictions to develop and implement innovative and cost-effective programs that could serve as alternatives to traditional forms of incarceration without jeopardizing public safety. The four jurisdictions were New Hampshire Department of Corrections, Maryland Department of Corrections, Florida Department of Corrections, and Alameda County, California, Adult Probation Department. Collectively, these sites will provide a diverse array of drug treatment, vocational training, educational services, health care, and intensified forms of community supervision to offenders who otherwise would have been incarcerated.

To determine the effectiveness of these pilot projects, in 1992 the Institute awarded funds to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency to conduct a process and impact evaluation of each site's activities. The process evaluation will document the number and types of offenders screened and accepted by the programs, the range of services and activities provided, program completion rates, and the costs of these various services.

The impact evaluation will be based on experimental and quasi-experimental designs established at each site that will permit a rigorous testing of what would have happened to offenders admitted to the Correctional Options programs, had they not been funded. Specifically, experimental and control cases will be tracked to answer the following questions:

- To what extent did the Correctional Options programs divert offenders from incarceration or reduce their length of stay?
- To what extent did the Correctional Options programs affect the likelihood of recidivism?
- Which interventions were most effective with which offenders?
- To what extent did the programs affect public safety?
- To what extent did the programs represent a less costly form of correctional intervention?

The initial results from this research are expected to be available in late 1994.

NOTES

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Except for the relatively small sector of Federal crimes, responsibility for controlling crime, trying defendants, and punishing offenders lies with State and local governments. Federal, State, and local law enforcement officials have long cooperated on individual cases, but until 1968, State and local governments received no major assistance from the Federal Government for their own anti-crime efforts.

When Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, a new era of Federal-State-local partnership began. With Federal dollars awarded mostly in block grants, State and local law enforcement and criminal justice systems were modernized—communications networks made police operations more efficient, courts adopted computerized management systems, and corrections practices and facilities were improved, to name only a few areas of change.

Congress turned to the same grant-in-aid mechanism to help State and local jurisdictions carry out the fight against drugs and crime. Congress acted through two important laws, the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-570) and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690). The 1986 Act established criminal justice, treatment, prevention, and housing programs to provide State and local jurisdictions with Federal grants-in-aid to combat drug abuse and drug-related crime. The 1988 legislation expanded the 1986 provisions. New programs were established, and the overall level of Federal funding was increased.

The primary vehicle for distributing funds for grants-in-aid programs is the formula grant. Under this approach, Federal funds are distributed to States on a combined basis of entitlement and population; population is by far the most significant of the two factors. States then redistribute their funds through a process of subgrants to State and local agencies. States are given wide discretion to fund whatever programs they believe will be most beneficial. However, supported programs must be consistent with the congressional priorities stated in the legislation and with State-specific objectives that are formally documented in a statewide strategic plan.

The formula approach is supplemented by categorical funding in which Federal agencies award funds directly to agencies implementing State and local initiatives. In the criminal justice area, for instance, a separate discretionary grant program is established and authorized by the legislation.

One of the provisions of the 1988 Act gave the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) responsibility for developing an evaluation program that focuses on the impact and effectiveness of anti-drug activities generated by and through federally allocated funds. This resulted in a partnership between NIJ and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Working together, NIJ and BJA developed a statement of evaluation priorities and agreed on a level of financial support for evaluation studies.

During the first operational year of the agreement (fiscal year 1989), NIJ and BJA agreed that a general assessment of the Act and its implementation was needed. The assessment was to cover the legislation, its implementation at the Federal level, Federal-State interac-

INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...

- *State monitoring of drug control formula grants*
- *Assessment of the impact of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988*

The 1992 publication entitled Guidelines for State Monitoring Under the Drug Control Formula Grant Program . . . does not provide States with an implementation-ready monitoring plan but rather discusses the concepts, issues, and choices involved in designing a system for monitoring subgrant awards.

tion, and State management of the formula grant process. A staged series of projects was agreed on. The first project would be an examination of State responses to the Act's strategic planning mandate. The second would assess the ways in which States manage and monitor the subgrants they award. The third would be an overall evaluation of the Act and its effects. These three projects, though conceptually and substantively related, would be conducted on a standalone basis, with no one of them required simply because an earlier one was completed.

The first two studies have now been completed. The first, which found that States generally met Federal requirements to prepare an annual strategy for drug and violent crime control, was reported in *Searching for Answers: 1991*.¹ The review of guidelines that emerged from the examination of State monitoring of subgrants was completed in 1991 and is provided below. NIJ funded the third study in fiscal year 1991. Early findings from that study are also included in this chapter.

STATE MONITORING OF DRUG CONTROL FORMULA GRANTS

Congress established the Drug Control and System Improvement Formula Grant Program in 1986 to provide Federal aid for State and local drug control programs. The program was expanded in 1988 through additional legislation, and appropriations have increased steadily since that time.

Through this program, 55 agencies at the State level² of government receive formula grants. To receive those funds, each State must create and submit to BJA its strategy for combatting crime related to drug trafficking and abuse. Once a State strategy is approved by BJA, allocated funds are distributed to the State, which in turn distributes subgrant awards to the State and local agencies selected to carrying out the projects detailed in the strategy. States are then required to monitor and report on subgrantee activities.

In 1991, NIJ conducted a national assessment of State strategic planning activities. As a followup to that study, NIJ awarded a grant to RAND to study the procedures and practices that States have used to monitor subgrant awards. That study resulted in the 1992 publication entitled *Guidelines for State Monitoring Under the Drug Control Formula Grant Program*. The publication is intended to (1) help State and local officials develop and use effective methods for identifying and implementing the steps in designing a monitoring system and assessing the most important issues to which the system must respond, and (2) provide examples of alternative monitoring practices. It does not provide States with an implementation-ready monitoring plan but rather discusses the important concepts, issues, and choices involved in designing a system for monitoring subgrant awards.

The *Guidelines* were based on a review of current Federal requirements, experiences in monitoring other Federal programs, and interviews with Federal and State officials, including an intensive study of monitoring programs in California, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and Virginia. (BJA recommended the States chosen for study because of the wide range of approaches to monitoring they represent.)

The Basis for the *Guidelines*

Monitoring is intended to improve program activity and thereby influence funding, planning, distribution of funds, grants management, subgrant staff, and street activities. The following findings were used by evaluators in preparing the *Guidelines* publication.

Goals and Uses of Monitoring

Because of the decentralized nature of formula grants, monitoring can have an impact only if the following goals are met:

- Subgrant activities are documented—this ensures that subgrantees meet their commitments and adhere to program guidelines.
- Relevant information on subgrant performance is obtained—this is the only means for improving State activities, including grants management, strategic planning, and evaluation.
- BJA information about the use of formula grants is enhanced—in addition to its own monitoring, BJA reviews State monitoring to improve program management and meet its obligation to report to Congress on program activities.

Creating an Effective Monitoring System

Between 1987 and 1992, BJA's primary sources for monitoring data were reports submitted for each project annually and at the conclusion of subgrant activities. Although these annual reports constituted technical compliance with Federal monitoring requirements, they were difficult to analyze on a national basis because information reported varied by State both in content and quantity. In 1992, BJA began a process to revise annual reporting requirements. These new reporting requirements will be in place in 1993. BJA also strongly supports States' efforts to design and implement more comprehensive monitoring systems that meet individual State needs.

There are three steps to creating an effective monitoring system:

- **Step One—Planning for a Monitoring System.** Considerable planning must precede implementation. Planning takes time and effort, however, and insufficient planning generally results in unsatisfactory monitoring performance. During the planning process, information needs must be defined systematically to relate to monitoring goals. Planning should include a specific statement of objectives; identification and consultations with persons who will use the monitoring data; creation of a list of the specific types of data that will be gathered; and the ways in which those data will be used.
- **Step Two—Developing Systems for Data Reporting.** States can obtain monitoring data through various techniques and tools, including written forms that subgrantees must complete and submit on a prescribed schedule; site visits by State personnel to subgrant locations; and cluster meetings and workshops, sponsored by the State, with groups of subgrantees as participants. Before making use of any of these mechanisms, however, States must determine the types of data to be collected, draft data-collection tools, and determine how the information from each mechanism will be combined to form a complete picture.

As part of this process, States must strive to present the collection of monitoring data as a cooperative venture between the State and subgrantees. (Subgrantees are generally receptive to this type of approach if States have identified any subgrantee needs that can be met through the monitoring requirements and incorporated them into monitoring procedures.) Monitoring data can be improved, and subgrantee resistance to monitoring can be forestalled, if monitoring requirements are spelled out in advance. The best time to do so is during the subgrant application and award process.
- **Step Three—Ensuring That Monitoring Information Is Used.** Those who design monitoring systems must also take an active role in ensuring that the data collected are used. Data must be presented in a variety of forms, each of which targets the specific needs of individual users. State officials responsible for troubleshooting, for example, need different types of information than officials involved in planning, or public officials and State legislators. In addition, monitoring systems must also provide those who use the information with a means for commenting on its utility and suggesting changes. This feedback mechanism may lead to revisions in monitoring objectives and procedures.

States must strive to present the collection of monitoring data as a cooperative venture between the State and subgrantees.

Audiences for Guidelines

State-level officials responsible for designing and/or implementing a monitoring system for the formula grant program are the primary beneficiaries of the *Guidelines*. Officials implementing State and local projects that receive formula funds (who are the source of monitoring information) and Federal and State practitioners involved in various aspects of program management (who are its consumers) may also find the publication useful. The *Guidelines* should also be of interest to Federal, State, and local policymakers assessing the impact of Federal assistance on State and local criminal justice systems.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988

Because the initiatives supported under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 cover the spectrum of criminal justice activities and are widely distributed geographically, an evaluation of all programs would be cost-prohibitive. Moreover, myriad other influences on drug abuse and drug-related crime—some of which are governmental in origin, some societal, and some personal—may have impacts that are as powerful as the projects that State and local agencies design and implement under the formula and discretionary grant programs.

Under an NIJ grant, evaluators at RAND are examining the Act's impact in the ways described below.

Phase One: Distribution of Anti-Drug Abuse Funds

During phase one, evaluators have been focusing on the distribution of anti-drug abuse grants to States and localities, using BJA data on recipients of formula and discretionary criminal justice assistance grants to create a nationwide picture of the types of projects supported with Anti-Drug Abuse Act funds, funding recipients, and compliance with the provisions of the Act. Data are being collected on distributions made during the first 5 years of the program (fiscal years 1987 through 1991). The goals of this phase are (1) to develop basic information on program activities that can inform and guide research for phases two and three, and (2) to address aspects of the funding process that have been subjects of concern and debate over the life of the program. Phase one is scheduled for completion in mid-1993.

Phase one data stem from BJA's Individual Project Report data, which are in turn based on the individual project reports that States file for each subgrant they award. Because the analysis below is based on State reports filed with BJA before July 1, 1992, results are subject to change as more reports are received.

Data analyzed to date, however, show that State funding decisions are constrained by law, regulation, competing needs, and politics. States are guided in their awards by Federal requirements, by the structure of their criminal justice systems, and by the nature of their drug problems. In some States, where local planning agencies further redistribute funds received from the State, local policymakers are also guided by local needs, the State strategy, and additional requirements imposed by the individual States. Thus, each funding agency makes its allocations in response to a particular set of factors, which makes it difficult to categorize individual programs by purposes in a way that is both precise and applicable to all programs.

Because the 1988 Act replaced the 1986 list of 7 purpose areas with a new set of 21 areas, a consistent categorization across years is impossible. The data show, however, that States have in the aggregate emphasized the funding of law enforcement programs. During the first 2 years of the program, 65 percent of all nonadministrative funds were devoted to

programs focusing on the apprehension of offenders. In the 3 grant years beginning with fiscal year 1989, approximately 60 percent of nonadministrative funds were used for projects whose primary focus was law enforcement and/or prosecution.⁴ In addition to far outpacing funding in other areas, the amount of formula funds allocated to police and prosecution—especially in fiscal years 1987 and 1988—is also disproportionate to the 50 percent share that these functions consume of total State and local criminal justice budgets.⁵

Multijurisdictional task forces have been the preeminent focus of Anti-Drug Abuse Act dollars. In some States, this single-purpose area dominates the program. Since fiscal year 1989, for example, 12 States have spent an annual average of at least 60 percent of their nonadministrative awards on multijurisdictional task forces alone.⁶ Furthermore, these two figures suggest that the priority assigned to law enforcement and prosecution has not changed greatly over time.

In contrast to law enforcement and prosecution programs, many of the 1988 Act's less traditional purpose areas—such as property crime enforcement, prison industry, and public housing—have received only negligible funding. However, two nontraditional criminal justice programs are an important exception to this rule: drug treatment and drug prevention.

The Act authorized use of grants in providing drug treatment to offender populations and prevention programs staffed by law enforcement personnel. Moreover, the Act required that BJA promote and support the coordination of criminal justice, drug treatment, and drug prevention programs. This provision has been translated into a requirement that State criminal justice strategies address the issue of coordination among criminal justice, treatment, and prevention efforts.

Even prior to the Act's passage, in fiscal years 1987 and 1988, 7 percent of States' nonadministrative funds were used to identify and meet the needs of drug-dependent offenders. From fiscal years 1989 to 1991, 10 percent of nonadministrative funds were devoted to prevention and treatment. There has been a gradual increase in the share of funds devoted to these two areas in each year of the program. This is an especially striking aspect of States' strategic decisions. It appears that many States have contributed to a growing consensus that the traditional arsenal of crime control techniques must be supplemented to achieve better results regarding drugs and crime.

Phase Two: Framework of the Act

Phase two of this evaluation will focus on the framework that underlies the Anti-Drug Abuse Act—its organizational and funding structures—using legislation, congressional hearings, legislative history, and interviews as a database. This framework will then be compared with other funding approaches, through an analysis of earlier criminal justice assistance programs and a cross-sectional comparison of current programs to Federal grant programs in other areas, to determine the extent to which organizational elements of other programs might be effectively incorporated into the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Phase two is scheduled for completion in mid-1993.

Phase Three: The Act's Effects on Criminal Justice and Drug Control Activities

What is the extent to which Federal, State, and local efforts under the program have resulted in actual changes in State and local criminal justice and drug control activities? In phase three, evaluators will focus on this question through a literature review, an analysis of Federal activities, and site visits in 5 to 10 States, each of which will include research at State government sites and in one or more local jurisdictions. The primary purpose of the site visits will be to determine how Federal funds are distributed to and by local jurisdictions as a function of the State's organizational structure; compare Federal/non-Federal

There has been a gradual increase in the share of funds devoted to these two areas [prevention and treatment] in each year of the program. This is an especially striking aspect of States' strategic decisions. It appears that many States have contributed to a growing consensus that the traditional arsenal of crime control techniques must be supplemented to achieve better results regarding drugs and crime.

projects at the local level; and understand how State and local officials measure and assess the programmatic impact of Federal funding. Phase three is scheduled for completion by the close of 1993.

The Impacts of Federal Grants on Drug and Crime Problems

This assessment will expand knowledge about Federal grants for criminal justice, intergovernmental relations, federalism, and government planning for social problems. Assessment findings and recommendations will be of interest to all Federal officials involved in the administration of the program, including Congress, which will soon consider reauthorization of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Data on the impact of the program on drug and crime problems will also be of interest to policymakers within the Department of Justice, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and the various State and local drug control policy offices.

In addition, the assessment will provide data useful to Federal, State, and local officials involved in hands-on administration of the program. The financial information developed in phase one will give State and Federal grant managers a better picture of the ways in which grant funds are used. Site-specific data developed during phase three will have implications for strategic planning and program management both in the sites examined and in other areas with similar problems. And because the assessment will also discuss relationships between the Anti-Drug Abuse Act grant programs and other drug control and criminal justice efforts, it will also be of interest to officials working in these areas.

NOTES


1. National Institute of Justice, 1992. *Searching for Answers: 1991*. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. p. 103.
2. Unless noted otherwise, the term "State" refers to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
3. The 1988 purpose areas are sometimes general and overlapping and the data suffer from problems of accuracy and completeness that apply to the Individual Project Report database.
4. It is impossible to categorize grants assigned to one of the 21 purpose areas authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 in terms of the original seven purpose areas authorized by the 1986 Act. For example, post-1988 grants for law enforcement and prosecution cannot be disaggregated, because areas 2 (multijurisdictional task forces), 6 (white-collar crime and corruption), and 9 (financial investigations) embrace both activities. At the same time, it seems clear that the program retains a strong law enforcement focus. In particular, most multijurisdictional task forces—by far the most popular purpose area—are heavily oriented to policing.
5. 1990 figures. See U.S. Department of Justice. *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1991*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. p. 2.
6. It is also likely that significant funding was provided to multijurisdictional task forces before they were assigned a unique purpose area.

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- ***Appendix A: NIJ
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Staff***
- ***Appendix C: Index
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- ***Appendix D: List of
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**National Institute of Justice
Drug Control Evaluations (by
fiscal year).**

Fiscal Year	Amount Awarded
1989	\$3.4 million
1990	\$3.7 million
1991	\$4.8 million
1992	\$4.2 million
Total	\$16.1 million*

*This total includes \$1 million in Bureau of Justice Assistance funds.

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) wishes to thank the evaluation project directors and staff members who provided information for this report. The following lists include all NIJ grants made in fiscal years 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992 under Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, as well as other NIJ evaluations reported in this document. These lists show the full title of each grant, the NIJ grant number, the name and location of the evaluating organization, and the amount of the grant.

Fiscal Year 1989 Grants

Grant Title: Evaluation of Community Responses to Drug Abuse Demonstration
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0026
Evaluator: University of Illinois at Chicago
 Chicago, Illinois
Grant Amount: \$249,509

Grant Title: Eastside Wilmington Anti-Drug Abuse Program Evaluation
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0047
Evaluator: State of Delaware, Statistical Analysis Center
 Dover, Delaware
Grant Amount: \$50,092

Grant Title: Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0050
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
 Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$193,140

Grant Title: Drugs and Public Housing: Toward the Development of an Effective Police Response in Denver and New Orleans
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0054
Evaluator: The Police Foundation
 Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$499,893

Grant Title: The Impact of Narcotics Crackdowns: Intermittent Enforcement and Residual Deterrence
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0049 and Supplement
Evaluator: Michigan State University
 East Lansing, Michigan
Grant Amount: \$254,281 and \$99,992

Grant Title: The Community Effects of Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0056
Evaluator: Vera Institute of Justice
 New York, New York
Grant Amount: \$450,000

Grant Title: An Implementation Study of Cooperative Law Enforcement Narcotics Control Task Forces
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0048
Evaluator: Criminal Justice Statistics Association
 Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$104,758

Grant Title: To Evaluate Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Programs
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0037
Evaluator: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies
 Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$252,144

Grant Title: Alternative Sanctions for Drug Offenses
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0058
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice, Inc.
 Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$197,298

Grant Title: User Accountability in Maricopa County
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0055
Evaluator: Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.
 Phoenix, Arizona
Grant Amount: \$214,694

Grant Title: Evaluation of the Program for the Expedited Management of Drug Cases
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0057
Evaluator: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies
 Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$288,210

Grant Title: Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition Program
Grant No.: 89-DD-CX-0056
Evaluator: Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.
 Phoenix, Arizona
Grant Amount: \$198,782

Grant Title: National Study of Shock Incarceration Programs
Grant No.: 88-DD-CX-0026 (Supplement to a FY 1988 award)
Evaluator: Louisiana State University
 Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Grant Amount: \$44,221

Grant Title: Evaluating State Planning Strategies Developed for the Drug Abuse Improvement Formula Grant Program
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0043
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$154,600

Fiscal Year 1990 Grants

Grant Title: Evaluating State Planning Strategies Developed for the Drug Abuse Improvement Formula Grant Program
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0003
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$111,621 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Multisite Study of Shock Incarceration
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0061
Evaluator: University of Maryland, Institute of Criminal Justice & Criminology
College Park, Maryland
Grant Amount: \$284,028 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition Program
Grant No.: 90-IJ-CX-0064
Evaluator: Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.
Phoenix, Arizona
Grant Amount: \$91,726 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Impact Evaluation of the Community Responses to Drug Abuse
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0015
Evaluator: University of Illinois at Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
Grant Amount: \$294,709 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Eastside Wilmington Anti-Drug Abuse Program Evaluation
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0059
Evaluator: State of Delaware, Statistical Analysis Center
Dover, Delaware
Grant Amount: \$105,950 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Police Response to Drugs and Gangs: Case Studies in Police Decisionmaking
Grant No.: 90-IJ-CX-K008
Evaluator: Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$249,852

Grant Title: An Evaluation of Drug Enforcement Techniques Implemented Within a Problem-Oriented Policing Framework in Two Cities

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0058

Evaluator: Institute for Social Analysis
Washington, D.C.

Grant Amount: \$394,064

Grant Title: San Diego Drug Market Analysis and Street-Level Enforcement Evaluation

Grant No.: 90-IJ-CX-K006 (Initial and supplemental grants in FY 1990)

Evaluator: San Diego Police Department
San Diego, California

Grant Amount: \$449,967

Grant Title: Assessing the Impact of a County-Operated Boot Camp for Drug Offenders

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0055

Evaluator: National Council on Crime and Delinquency
San Francisco, California

Grant Amount: \$197,482

Grant Title: An Experimental Evaluation of Michigan's Nokomis Challenge Program

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0053

Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Grant Amount: \$264,035

Grant Title: Minnesota's Intensive Community Supervision (ICS) Program: Effects on Offender Reintegration, Public Safety, and System Costs

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0062

Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Grant Amount: \$295,456

Grant Title: Assessment of A Substance Abuse Program for Probationers (ASAPP)

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0057

Evaluator: San Diego Association of Governments
San Diego, California

Grant Amount: \$169,358

Grant Title: Work Release in the State of Washington: Assessing Implementation and Impact of Offender Reintegration

Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0056

Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Grant Amount: \$385,106

Grant Title: Georgia Prison Therapeutic Community Drug Treatment
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0060
Evaluator: Georgia Department of Corrections
Atlanta, Georgia
Grant Amount: \$152,282

Grant Title: Evaluation Dissemination
Grant No.: 90-C-005
Evaluator: Aspen Systems Corporation
Rockville, Maryland
Grant Amount: \$130,000

Grant Title: National Cluster Conference on Evaluating Drug Control and System Improvement Projects
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0002
Evaluator: Criminal Justice Statistics Association
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$138,038

Fiscal Year 1991 Grants

Grant Title: The Community Effects of Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement: A Study of the New York City Police Department
Grant No.: 89-IJ-CX-0056
Evaluator: Vera Institute of Justice
New York, New York
Grant Amount: \$150,000 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Evaluation of Baltimore County Police Department's Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement Program
Grant No.: 90-IJ-R-021
Evaluator: University of Baltimore
Baltimore, Maryland
Grant Amount: \$72,226

Grant Title: The Implementation and Impact of Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing Projects: A National Evaluation of a BJA Program
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-0012
Evaluator: Vera Institute of Justice
New York, New York
Grant Amount: \$399,920

Grant Title: Structured Fines: An Impact Evaluation
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-0037
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$299,942

Grant Title: Emerging Drug Enforcement Tactics: A Program Assessment
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-0045
Evaluator: Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$99,749

Grant Title: A Multi-Agency Approach to Drug and Gang Enforcement
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-0046
Evaluator: San Diego Association of Governments
San Diego, California
Grant Amount: \$177,294

Grant Title: Improving the Court Response to Drug Cases: A Program Assessment
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-0048
Evaluator: National Center for State Courts
Williamsburg, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$150,806

Grant Title: The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988: A Program Assessment
Grant No.: 91-IJ-CX-K024
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$499,990

Grant Title: Prosecuting Complex Drug Cases: A Program Assessment
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K046
Evaluator: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$144,348

Grant Title: Community Policing Analysis Directed to Rural Evaluations
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K048
Evaluator: Queues Enforth Development
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Grant Amount: \$400,000

Grant Title: Anti-Drug Initiatives in Small Cities and Towns: A Program Assessment
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K049
Evaluator: Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Illinois
Grant Amount: \$147,492

Grant Title: Evaluation of Drug Offender Treatment in Local Corrections
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K052
Evaluator: National Council on Crime and Delinquency
San Francisco, California
Grant Amount: \$346,020

Grant Title: Past and Future Directions of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Program
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K053
Evaluator: Research Triangle Institute
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina
Grant Amount: \$300,000

Grant Title: Boot Camp, Drug Treatment and Aftercare: An Evaluation Review
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K055
Evaluator: Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, Illinois
Grant Amount: \$49,820

Grant Title: Weed and Seed in Kansas City: Evaluation Design for a Multi-Agency Crackdown on Drugs
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K056
Evaluator: University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland
Grant Amount: \$197,640

Grant Title: Drug Testing Throughout the Criminal Justice System: An Intensive Impact Evaluation
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K057
Evaluator: BOTEK Analysis Corporation
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Grant Amount: \$199,997

Grant Title: Evaluating the New York City Police Department's Model Precinct Program
Grant No.: 91-IJ-CX-K001
Evaluator: Police Foundation
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$125,202

Grant Title: National Evaluation Conference
Grant No.: 91-DD-CX-K013
Evaluator: Criminal Justice Statistics Association
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$272,980

Grant Title: National Conference on Evaluating Drug Control Initiatives—1992
Grant No.: 91-C-005
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice Inc.
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$325,000

Grant Title: Regional Workshops on How to Evaluate Criminal Justice Projects
Grant No.: 91-C-005 (Mod 003)
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice Inc.
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$155,000

Fiscal Year 1992 Grants

Grant Title: Assessing the Impact of Community Policing on the Criminal Justice System
Grant No.: 92-IJ-CX-K033
Evaluator: Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$275,000

Grant Title: Boys and Girls Clubs in Public Housing
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K038
Evaluator: University of Wisconsin
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Grant Amount: \$199,998

Grant Title: Drug Market Analysis: An Enforcement Model
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K031
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice Inc.
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$200,000

Grant Title: Evaluation of Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K043
Evaluator: American Institutes for Research
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$649,710

Grant Title: Evaluation of the Family Violence Prevention and Service Act
Grant No.: 92-IJ-CX-K009
Evaluator: Urban Institute
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$208,825

Grant Title: Evaluation of Minnesota's Intensive Community Supervision (ICS)
Grant No.: 90-DD-CX-0062
Evaluator: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California
Grant Amount: \$126,000 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: Evaluation of Violence Prevention Programs in Middle Schools
Grant No.: 92-IJ-CX-K030
Evaluator: Victim Services Agency
New York, New York
Grant Amount: \$215,378

Grant Title: Longitudinal Impact Evaluation of the Strategic Intervention for High-Risk Youth
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-0031
Evaluator: Urban Institute
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$581,952

Grant Title: National Evaluation of the Weed and Seed Program
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K044
Evaluator: Institute for Social Analysis
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$549,458

Grant Title: Gangs as Targets of Intervention
Grant No.: 92-IJ-CX-K022
Evaluator: Cosmos Corporation
Washington, D.C.
Grant Amount: \$249,943

Grant Title: Proposal to Develop National Standards for Adult and Juvenile Corrections
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K039
Evaluator: American Correctional Association
Laurel, Maryland
Grant Amount: \$249,931

Grant Title: Weed and Seed Prosecutors Information System
Grant No.: 92-IJ-CX-K023
Evaluator: American Prosecutors Research Institute
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$98,231

Grant Title: Evaluation of Correctional Options Demonstration Program
Grant No.: 92-DD-CX-K037
Evaluator: National Council on Crime and Delinquency
San Francisco, California
Grant Amount: \$399,904

Grant Title: Building State Evaluation Capacity: Professional Conference Series
Grant No.: 91-C-005
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice Inc.
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$100,122 (Supplemental)

Grant Title: National Conference on Evaluating Drug Control Initiatives —
1993
Grant No.: 91-C-005
Evaluator: Institute for Law and Justice Inc.
Alexandria, Virginia
Grant Amount: \$200,333 (Supplemental)

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Florida Community Control Program (Evaluation Bulletin)

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Searching for Answers: Annual Evaluation Report on Drugs and Crime: 1991

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