

TRENDS IN ARRESTS INVOLVING INTOXICATION AND ARRESTS FOR OTHER CHARGES, SEATTLE: 1931-1970




Figure 7:1

involving intoxication extends back to 1931. Even during the early 1930's, before the repeal of the Volstead Act, the number of arrests involving intoxication constituted over 40.0 percent of all arrests. In 1931 there were 6,771 such arrests, or 40.5 percent of the total; the corresponding figures for 1932 are 5,633 and 41.8 percent and for 1933, 7,493 and 47.4 percent. Since 1960 the number of arrests for drunkenness has varied from a minimum of 11,463 (51.0 percent) in 1969 to a maximum of 16,348 (63.3 percent) in 1963. The series of rates per 100,000 of population for arrests involving intoxication shows a pattern similar to that portrayed in the upper panel of Figure 7:1. The lowest rates are for 1931 (1,774.8) and 1932 (1,502.5). The highest rates coincide with the period of World War II: 1942 (6,912.6), 1943 (7,369.2), 1944 (7,047.0) and 1945 (7,041.5). Since the peak of 1943 there has been a fairly steady downward trend to 2,111.0 in 1969. In 1970, the rate was 2,232.5, the second lowest rate since 1943. Between 1954 and 1970, the arrest rates varied between 3,053.2 in 1954 and 2,111.0 in 1969. (Table 7:1)

Table 7:1 also presents the number of arrests for drunkenness along with the number of arrests for driving under the influence. The number of arrests for driving under the influence was relatively small before 1948. Between 1931 and 1947, the largest number of arrests for driving under the influence was 337 in 1945, and the smallest number, 10 in 1942. Between 1935 and 1947, with the exception of 1945, the proportion of arrests for driving under the influence in relation to the total number of arrests involving intoxication, was less than 1.0 percent. Since 1948, the proportion of arrests for driving under the influence ranged from 4.8 percent in 1952 to 12.6 percent in 1970. The year 1952 was the only year during the past 22 when the proportion was less than 5.0 percent.

The apparently fortuitous variations in rates for arrests involving intoxication can be explained at least in part by shifts in police policy. Realistically, the majority of those in a state of intoxication, who venture on the street or in public places, escape arrest. From personal observation in certain areas of the city, drunks seem to be ignored by the police unless disorderly. Of course, police policy concerning drunks is subject to change from time to time. The fact that the arrest rate involving intoxication was over three times as great for any year from 1942-1945 as for any year from 1966-1970, seems to be explainable largely by shifts in police policy rather than by an overwhelming increase in inebriety. Public opinion, the attitudes and practices of certain judges, the enactment of new laws by the state legislature or city council, and changes in political administrations

TABLE 7:1
Arrests Involving Intoxication
Seattle: 1931-1970

Year	All Arrests- All Charges	Total Arrests Involving Intoxication		Drunkenness		Driving under the influence		Rate per 100,000 of Pop. (Total Intoxication) [§]
		Number	Percent*	Number	Percent†	Number	Percent†	
1970.	22,282	11,851	53.2	10,361	87.4	1,490	12.6	2,232.5
1969.	22,458	11,463	51.0	10,144	88.5	1,319	11.5	2,111.0
1968.	22,744	12,123	53.3	10,903	89.9	1,220	10.1	2,200.2
1967.	21,745	12,464	57.3	11,367	91.2	1,097	8.8	2,262.1
1966.	20,485	12,508	61.0	11,328	90.6	1,180	9.4	2,282.5
1965.	20,351	12,621	62.0	11,645	92.3	976	7.7	2,312.1
1964.	23,828	15,016	63.0	13,707	91.3	1,309	8.7	2,750.2
1963.	25,838	16,348	63.3	14,851	90.8	1,497	9.2	2,961.6
1962.	25,437	15,266	60.0	13,633	89.3	1,633	10.7	2,745.7
1961.	21,614	12,521	57.9	11,047	88.2	1,474	11.8	2,252.0
1960.	20,153	12,512	62.1	11,198	89.5	1,314	10.5	2,248.3
1959.	21,686	13,322	61.4	12,044	90.4	1,278	9.6	2,374.7
1958.	23,077	14,690	63.6	13,121	89.3	1,569	10.7	2,642.1
1957.	23,536	15,169	64.4	13,543	89.3	1,626	10.7	2,758.0
1956.	22,714	14,715	64.8	13,202	89.7	1,513	10.3	2,766.0
1955.	21,400	14,947	69.8	13,525	90.5	1,422	9.5	2,820.2
1954.	24,227	16,121	66.5	14,591	90.5	1,530	9.5	3,053.2
1953.	26,505	18,410	69.4	17,247	93.7	1,163	6.3	3,827.4
1952.	28,215	19,163	67.9	18,247	95.2	916	4.8	4,193.2
1951.	32,393	21,897	67.6	20,790	94.9	1,107	5.1	4,802.0
1950.	28,995	19,069	65.8	17,941	94.1	1,128	5.9	4,100.9
1949.	30,511	20,106	65.9	18,962	94.3	1,144	5.7	4,393.8
1948.	28,163	17,459	62.0	16,870	96.6	589	3.4	3,840.5
1947.	35,315	23,497	66.5	23,325	99.3	172	0.7	5,436.6
1946.	37,732	24,308	64.4	24,091	99.1	217	0.9	5,375.5
1945.	43,893	30,342	69.1	30,005	98.9	337	1.1	7,041.5
1944.	40,715	28,618	70.3	28,539	99.7	79	0.3	7,047.0
1943.	41,108	30,781	74.9	30,766	99.9	15	0.1	7,369.2
1942.	42,072	27,533	65.4	27,523	99.9	10	0.1	6,912.6
1941.	28,367	17,111	60.3	17,090	99.9	21	0.1	4,471.1
1940.	20,289	11,485	56.6	11,427	99.5	58	0.5	3,116.7
1939.	17,863	9,298	52.0	9,261	99.6	37	0.4	2,583.5
1938.	19,092	9,560	50.1	9,535	99.7	25	0.3	2,649.7
1937.	20,599	9,684	47.0	9,663	99.8	21	0.2	2,680.3
1936.	19,990	9,485	47.4	9,463	99.8	22	0.2	2,617.3
1935.	18,363	8,337	45.4	8,280	99.3	57	0.7	2,288.5
1934.	18,463	9,637	52.2	9,447	98.0	190	2.0	2,609.5
1933.	15,809	7,493	47.4	7,293	97.3	200	2.7	2,017.0
1932.	13,483	5,633	41.8	5,546	98.4	87	1.6	1,502.5
1931.	16,706	6,771	40.5	6,709	99.1	62	0.9	1,774.8

* Percentage of all arrests.

† Percentage of arrests involving intoxication.

§ Rates based on total population.

may exert a significant influence on police policy.⁹

Sex Differences in Arrests Involving Intoxication. Table 7: II and Figure 7:2 portray sex differentials in arrests for drunkenness and for driving under the influence in the city of Seattle for the 26-year period, 1945-1970. Annual rates were computed on the basis of the population 18 years of age and over for males and females, respectively.

The configurations of the two sets of curves for males and females in Figure 7:2 show a remarkable similarity. However, the incidence of male arrests is very much higher. Beginning in 1945 with a rate of 17,294.8 for drunkenness, the trend for males has been generally downward to 5,122.1 in 1969 and 5,185.3 in 1970. The corresponding trend for females was 1,138.6 in 1945 and 298.8 in 1970. On the basis of rates per 100,000 of population 18 years of age and over, arrests for drunkenness in 1945 were over 15 times as great for males as for females. In 1969 the difference was 17.1 to one and in 1970, 14.8 to one.

Numerically, there were 28,149 arrests for drunkenness recorded for males in 1945 in comparison to 9,519 in 1969 and 9,621 in 1970. Among females there were 1,856 arrests for drunkenness in 1945 and 625 in 1969 and 738 in 1970.

Arrests for driving under the influence for both males and females show a relatively sharp rise from 1947 to 1949 followed by a more graduated increase and leveling-out tendency. (Figure 7:2) For the past 17 years the curve for males has generally fluctuated between 600.0 and 800.0 per 100,000 of population, and for females, between 40.0 and 70.0 per 100,000 of population. The highest rate for males occurred in 1957 with a rate of 810.6 and for females, in 1964, with a rate of 68.7. The year 1970 was a close second with 68.6. In actual number of cases of arrests for driving under the influence, there were 1,505 male arrests in 1957, 1,209 in 1969, and 1,346 in 1970. For females, there were 141 arrests in 1964, 110 in 1969 and 144 in 1970.

Drunkenness and Recidivism

One of the most common characteristics of arrestees for drunkenness is the frequency of arrest. Although there may be arrests for other offenses, the

⁹"Drunkenness arrest practices vary from place to place. Some police departments strictly enforce drunkenness statutes, while other departments are known to be more tolerant. In fact, the number of arrests in a city may be related less to the amount of public drunkenness than to police policy." The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

TABLE 7:II
Trends in Arrests Involving Intoxication by Sex, Seattle: 1945-1970

Year	Male						Female					
	Total Intoxication		Drunkenness		Driving under Influ.		Total Intoxication		Drunkenness		Driving under Influ.	
	Number	Rate*	Number	Rate*	Number	Rate*	Number	Rate*	Number	Rate*	Number	Rate*
1970	10,967	5,910.8	9,621	5,185.3	1,346	725.4	882	420.1	738	351.5	144	68.6
1969	10,728	5,772.6	9,519	5,122.1	1,209	650.6	735	351.4	625	298.8	110	52.6
1968	11,292	6,066.3	10,168	5,462.5	1,124	603.8	831	398.9	735	352.8	96	46.1
1967	11,561	6,200.9	10,555	5,661.3	1,006	539.6	903	435.1	812	391.2	91	43.8
1966	11,513	6,165.2	10,426	5,583.1	1,087	582.1	995	481.3	902	436.3	93	45.0
1965	11,619	6,212.0	10,734	5,738.8	885	473.2	1,001	486.0	911	442.3	90	43.7
1964	13,597	7,257.8	12,429	6,634.4	1,168	623.5	1,419	691.7	1,278	622.9	141	68.7
1963	14,999	7,993.4	13,622	7,259.6	1,377	733.8	1,349	660.1	1,229	601.4	120	58.7
1962	14,071	7,486.9	12,559	6,682.4	1,512	804.5	1,195	587.0	1,074	527.6	121	59.4
1961	11,407	6,059.8	10,035	5,330.9	1,372	728.8	1,114	549.4	1,012	499.1	102	50.3
1960	11,418	6,045.3	10,204	5,402.6	1,214	642.8	1,094	540.6	994	491.2	100	49.4
1959	12,193	6,492.5	11,018	5,866.9	1,175	625.7	1,127	563.7	1,026	513.2	101	50.5
1958	13,357	7,153.2	11,907	6,376.7	1,450	776.5	1,333	675.0	1,214	614.7	119	60.3
1957	13,925	7,500.5	12,420	6,689.9	1,505	810.6	1,244	637.8	1,123	575.8	121	62.0
1956	13,428	7,274.9	12,011	6,507.2	1,417	767.7	1,157	600.7	1,061	550.9	96	49.8
1955	12,758	6,952.3	11,433	6,230.2	1,325	722.0	1,156	607.9	1,059	556.9	97	51.0
1954	14,778	8,100.4	13,346	7,315.5	1,432	784.9	1,343	715.4	1,245	663.2	98	52.2
1953	16,717	9,217.5	15,632	8,619.2	1,085	598.3	1,693	913.8	1,615	871.7	78	42.1
1952	17,501	9,707.2	16,653	9,236.8	848	470.4	1,659	907.4	1,594	871.9	65	35.6
1951	20,410	11,388.5	19,365	10,805.4	1,045	583.1	1,487	824.3	1,425	790.0	62	34.4
1950	17,755	9,937.0	16,678	9,334.3	1,077	602.8	1,313	737.3	1,263	709.2	50	28.1
1949	18,723	10,668.9	17,627	10,044.3	1,096	624.5	1,383	790.0	1,335	762.6	48	27.4
1948	16,158	9,377.3	15,595	9,050.6	563	326.7	1,301	756.2	1,275	741.1	26	15.1
1947	21,747	12,858.5	21,582	12,760.9	165	97.6	1,750	1,035.3	1,743	1,031.1	7	4.1
1946	22,662	13,656.5	22,455	13,531.8	207	124.7	1,646	991.4	1,636	985.6	10	6.0
1945	28,469	17,491.4	28,149	17,294.8	320	196.6	1,873	1,149.0	1,856	1,138.6	17	10.4

* Rate per 100,000 of population based on respective male and female populations 18 years of age and over.




Figure 7:2

typical pattern is one of multiple arrests for drunkenness. However, crimes committed by recidivists charged with drunkenness are generally less serious offenses.¹⁰ In the two following sections, an attempt is made to summarize the frequency of arrests by offense for recidivists who were not arrested for drunkenness and for recidivists who were arrested for drunkenness.

Number and Distribution of Arrests of Male Recidivists, Classified by Offense Charged, Based on Two Categories of Arrestees: (1) Those Arrested for Drunkenness and (2) Those Not Arrested for Drunkenness, During Three-Year Period, 1968-1970. Table 7: III shows the total number of arrests for all male recidivists according to offense charged, recorded during the three-year period, 1968-1970. The arrests are differentiated into two groups, one for recidivists who had no arrests for drunkenness, and the other for recidivists who had at least one arrest for drunkenness. Thus, a comparison can be made between the two groups of recidivists according to type and frequency of crimes committed. For example, 80.8 percent of the arrests for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter were charged against recidivists with no arrests for drunkenness. Again, with the exception of vandalism, vagrancy and driving under the influence, the majority of arrests for the various categories in Table 7: III involved recidivists who had not been arrested for drunkenness. These facts lend support to the hypothesis that there are two fairly distinct types of offenders--those that engage in crimes involving alcohol and those involved in nonalcohol-related crimes.

In this connection, another significant observation is that over 90.0 percent of the arrests for violation of drug laws were committed by recidivists with no record for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970. These facts seem to indicate two distinct groups--those that specialize in the use of drugs and those that consume alcohol excessively.

Of the total number of arrests of recidivists who had been arrested for drunkenness (26,996), the overwhelming proportion (22,956) were for drunkenness itself, leaving only 4,040 arrests involving other crimes. Driving under the influence, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, violation of liquor laws and vandalism included 1,802 arrests, or over 40.0 percent, of the 4,040 arrests. The offenses charged against male recidivists without any arrests for drunkenness cover a wider range of crimes. Suspicion is first with 1,295 arrests, other (nonaggravated) assault is

¹⁰"Recidivist" in this study is defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

TABLE 7:III

Number of Arrests of Male Recidivists† Classified by Offense Charged Based on Two Categories of Arrestees: (1) Those Arrested for Drunkenness, and (2) Those not Arrested for Drunkenness During Three-Year Period, 1968-1970, Seattle: 1968-1970*

Offense Charged	Number of Arrests			Percentage		
	Total	Not Arrest. for Drunk.	Arrest. for Drunk.	Total	Not Arrest. for Drunk.	Arrest. for Drunk.
Total	34,455	7,459	26,996	100.0	21.6	78.4
Murder-Nonneg. homicide	26	21	5	100.0	80.8	19.2
Negligent homicide	6	4	2	100.0	66.7	33.3
Forcible rape	16	15	1	100.0	93.8	6.2
Robbery	340	210	130	100.0	61.8	38.2
Aggravated assault	120	93	27	100.0	77.5	22.5
Burglary	406	338	68	100.0	83.2	16.8
Larceny	1,474	852	622	100.0	57.8	42.2
Auto theft	228	199	29	100.0	87.3	12.7
Other assault	1,382	856	526	100.0	61.9	38.1
Arson	19	14	5	100.0	73.7	26.3
Forgery-counterfeiting	295	259	36	100.0	87.8	12.2
Fraud	161	104	57	100.0	64.6	35.4
Embezzlement	14	12	2	100.0	85.7	14.3
Stolen prop: receiving, etc.	292	229	63	100.0	78.4	21.6
Vandalism	209	92	117	100.0	44.0	56.0
Weapons: possession, etc.	384	262	122	100.0	68.2	31.8
Prostitution - comm. vice	78	59	19	100.0	75.6	24.4
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros	174	121	53	100.0	69.5	30.5
Narcotic drug laws	758	683	75	100.0	90.1	9.9
Gambling	31	23	8	100.0	74.2	25.8
Off. against family, child.	3	--	3	100.0	--	100.0
Driving under influence	1,231	529	702	100.0	43.0	57.0
Liquor laws	627	382	245	100.0	60.9	39.1
Drunkenness	22,956	--	22,956	100.0	--	100.0
Disorderly conduct	632	325	307	100.0	51.4	48.6
Vagrancy	612	181	431	100.0	29.6	70.4
All other, ex. traffic	382	301	81	100.0	78.8	21.2
Suspicion	1,599	1,295	304	100.0	81.0	19.0

* Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over - included in this table.

† "Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

second with 856 arrests, larceny third with 852 arrests, violation of drug laws fourth with 683 arrests, and driving under the influence fifth with 529 arrests. As will be seen from Table 7:III, there are twelve other offenses with more than 100 arrests.

Number and Distribution of Arrests of Female Recidivists, Classified by Offense Charged, Based on Two Categories of Arrestees: (1) Those Arrested for Drunkenness and (2) Those Not Arrested for Drunkenness, During Three-Year Period, 1968-1970. It will be observed that Table 7:IV is similar to Table 7:III except that the data pertain to female recidivists. Arrests are separated into two groups of female recidivists for the three-year period, 1968-1970--one group represents those not arrested for drunkenness and the other, those having at least one arrest for drunkenness.

It will be found from Table 7:IV that in comparison to male recidivists female recidivists differentiate more distinctly into two separate types--one primarily involved with arrests for drunkenness and the other primarily involved with other crimes. Also, unlike male recidivists the relative frequency of arrest for drunkenness is far less for female recidivists. Female recidivists recorded 1,243 arrests for drunkenness, or 32.8 percent of the total for female recidivists, while male recidivists recorded 22,956 arrests for drunkenness, or 66.6 percent of the total for male recidivists.

A comparison of offenses further emphasizes the difference between the two groups of recidivists. For female recidivists who had not been arrested for drunkenness, the offenses charged cover a relatively wide range of crimes with prostitution ranking first with 1,030 arrests; larceny is second with 252 arrests and suspicion third with 202 arrests. Six other offenses have more than 50 arrests: disorderly conduct (97), violation of narcotic laws (95), other assault (nonaggravated) (79), all other offenses (71), forgery-counterfeiting (69) and violation of liquor laws (54). The range and frequency of arrests are not nearly as great for the group of female recidivists with at least one arrest for drunkenness. Of the 1,584 arrests for this group, 1,243 arrests were for drunkenness alone. This leaves only 341 arrests distributed among the remaining 27 categories. Prostitution ranks second with 52 arrests, larceny third with 45, and disorderly conduct fourth with 43. The number of arrests for the remaining offenses are all below 40 for each offense.

The difference between the two groups of female recidivists is further indicated when the proportions in each offense category are compared. The proportion

TABLE 7:IV

Number of Arrests of Female Recidivist† Classified by Offense Charged Based on Two Categories of Arrestees: (1) Those Arrested for Drunkenness, and (2) Those not Arrested for Drunkenness During the Three-Year Period, 1968-1970, Seattle: 1968-1970*

Offense Charged	Number of Arrests			Percentage		
	Total	Not Arrest. for Drunk.	Arrest. for Drunk.	Total	Not Arrest. for Drunk.	Arrest. for Drunk.
Total	3,789	2,205	1,584	100.0	58.2	41.8
Murder-Nonneg. homicide . . .	5	3	2	100.0	60.0	40.0
Negligent homicide	--	--	--	--	--	--
Forcible rape	49	40	9	100.0	81.6	18.4
Robbery	10	10	--	100.0	100.0	--
Aggravated assault	6	5	1	100.0	83.3	16.7
Burglary	297	252	45	100.0	84.8	15.2
Larceny	7	5	2	100.0	71.4	28.6
Auto theft	98	79	19	100.0	80.6	19.4
Other assault	--	--	--	--	--	--
Arson	77	69	8	100.0	89.6	10.4
Forgery-counterfeiting	30	23	7	100.0	76.7	23.3
Fraud	4	3	1	100.0	75.0	25.0
Embezzlement	17	16	1	100.0	94.1	5.9
Stolen prop: receiving, etc. . .	24	13	11	100.0	54.2	45.8
Vandalism	54	48	6	100.0	88.9	11.1
Weapons: possession, etc. . . .	1,082	1,030	52	100.0	95.2	4.8
Prostitution-comm. vice	53	40	13	100.0	75.5	24.5
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros. . .	106	95	11	100.0	89.6	10.4
Narcotic drug laws	2	1	1	100.0	50.0	50.0
Gambling	1	--	1	100.0	--	100.0
Off. against family, child. . .	67	33	34	100.0	49.2	50.8
Driving under influence	74	54	20	100.0	73.0	27.0
Liquor laws	1,243	--	1,243	100.0	--	100.0
Drunkenness	140	97	43	100.0	69.3	30.7
Disorderly conduct	23	16	7	100.0	69.6	30.4
Vagrancy	80	71	9	100.0	88.8	11.2
All other, ex. traffic	240	202	38	100.0	84.2	15.8
Suspicion						

* Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over - included in this table.

†"Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

of arrests for recidivists not arrested for drunkenness ranges from 95.2 percent for prostitution to 49.2 percent for driving under the influence. For the majority of crimes, 75.0 percent or more of the arrests were for the group without arrests for drunkenness. It is obvious that female recidivists with no record of drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970, contribute very substantially to the total crime picture, in comparison to recidivists who have been arrested for drunkenness at least once.

Number of Times Recidivists Are Arrested for Drunkenness in Relation to the Types and Frequencies of Other Crimes

In this section the relationship between multiple arrests for drunkenness (recidivism) and other offenses will be further analyzed. Particular emphasis is placed on the number of times a recidivist is arrested for drunkenness and the type and frequency of crimes committed. In the first part of this section special attention is given to the arrestee, both male and female, while in the latter part emphasis is placed on arrests. Both series--arrestees and arrests--are related to the frequency of arrests for drunkenness as well as to the other crime categories.

Male Recidivists Cross-Classified by Specified Offenses and by Number of Times Arrested for Drunkenness. Table 7: V cross-classifies 5,190 male recidivists according to the various offense categories indicated on the vertical side of the table (stubs) in relation to the number of times arrested for drunkenness in accordance with the frequencies on the horizontal dimension (captions) of the table. Only male recidivists arrested one or more times for drunkenness are included in this table. If an arrestee were charged only for offenses other than drunkenness, he is not included in this table. Each recidivist is counted one time for each different offense charged; thus, if a recidivist had four arrests for drunkenness and other arrests for robbery, liquor law violation, and vandalism he would be counted once for robbery, once for liquor law violation and once for vandalism each under the column marked "4" for number of arrests for drunkenness.

In order to illustrate the interpretation of this table, it will be observed that of the 5,190 male recidivists with at least one arrest for drunkenness, 1,144 had one drunkenness arrest, 1,576 had two drunkenness arrests, 778 had three drunkenness arrests, and so on. Thirteen males in this group had 50 or more arrests for drunkenness, and 161 recidivists were arrested 20 or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970. Of the five recidivists charged with murder or nonnegligent manslaughter, three were arrested for drunkenness once; one,

TABLE 7:V
Number of Males Arrested for Specified Offenses Classified by Number of Times Male Recidivists* were Arrested for Drunkenness, Seattle: 1968-1970†

Offense Charged	Total Number of Times Arrested	Number of Times Male Recidivists were Arrested for Drunkenness																				
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20 or more	
Murder-Nonneg. homicide	5	3																				
Negligent homicide	2	2																				
Forcible rape	1	1																				
Robbery	106	30	16	11	9	5	3	3	2													
Aggravated assault	27	16	4	3	1																	
Burglary	63	27	12	5	7	2	1	1	3													
Larceny	458	154	75	39	26	22	20	15	12	13	11	6	11	7	2	9	1	2	4	2		
Auto theft	27	14	2	2	1	1	3	1														
Other assault	424	206	78	38	24	16	13	6	9	3	5	3	6	1	1	2						
Arson	5		3	1	1																	
Forgery-counterfeiting	36	23	5	3	3																	
Fraud	46	22	8	3	2	2	1															
Embezzlement	2	2																				
Stolen prop.:receiving, etc.	61	27	3	8	3	3	3	4	1													
Vandalism	110	38	21	16	4	3	6	6	2	3	3	1										
Weapons: possession, etc.	114	38	26	11	7	6	2	3	5	2	2											
Prostitution - comm. vice	15	12																				
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros.	52	28	8	3	1	5	2															
Narcotic drug laws	67	48	9	3	4																	
Gambling	8	6	2																			
Off. against family, child	3	2	1																			
Driving under influence	593	378	95	48	23	13	3	6	6	9	3											
Liquor laws	188	62	25	24	17	12	4	6	6	4	4	3	1	2	3	1	2	2	1	1		
Drunkenness	5,190	1,144	1,576	778	359	277	197	149	111	86	70	55	52	38	25	35	19	18	27	13	161	
Disorderly conduct	284	119	41	30	14	14	13	11	8	2	2	4										
Vagrancy	328	58	34	32	21	26	11	17	12	17	8	6	9	2	4	7	4	1	6	3	50	
All other, ex. traffic	77	31	18	8	3	5	1		2	1	4		1	1	1							
Suspicion	269	141	45	16	11	11	8	5	6	5	3	3	1	1								

* "Recidivist" is defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.
† Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over - included in this table.

7 times, and one 17 times during the three-year period, 1968-1970. Again, 11 of the 106 charged with robbery, two of the 63 charged with burglary, and 27 of the 458 charged with larceny had been arrested 20 or more times for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

Although the pattern is not a strong one, it will be seen that as the number of arrests for drunkenness increases the frequency of recidivists arrested for other offenses tends to decline.

In addition to the slight inverse relationship between the frequency of arrests for drunkenness and arrests for offenses other than drunkenness, there also is a similar pattern between arrests for drunkenness and the number of different offenses. For example, beyond the cutting-point of 8 arrests for drunkenness, there are 19 offenses remaining out of a total of 28 listed in the table. Several of the remaining categories are alcohol-related offenses such as a violation of liquor laws, vagrancy, driving under the influence, and disorderly conduct.

Female Recidivists Cross-Classified by Specified Offenses and by Number of Times Arrested for Drunkenness. As will be observed from Table 7:VI, this section corresponds with the preceding one which is devoted to male recidivists. Table 7:VI cross-classifies female recidivists by specific offense as related to the number of times arrested for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970. Only female recidivists who were arrested at least once for drunkenness are included in this table. There were 427 female recidivists.

This table permits an examination of the arrest record of female recidivists during the three-year period, 1968-1970. It will be seen that as the frequency of arrests for drunkenness increases, the number of female recidivists arrested for other crimes diminishes. The more serious the alcohol problem, the less involvement there is with other types of offenses. Of the 427 female recidivists with at least one arrest for drunkenness, 94 were arrested once for drunkenness, 170 twice, 63 three times, 40 four times, 14 five times and 46 more than five times. The only other offenses that had 20 or more female recidivist arrests of this group with at least one arrest for drunkenness, were: larceny, 30; driving under the influence, 29; disorderly conduct, 37; and suspicion, 31. As the frequency of arrests for drunkenness increases, the number of other offenses becomes negligible. For the entire group with more than five arrests for drunkenness, the only other offenses for which the female recidivists were arrested are: larceny, offenses against the family, violation of liquor laws, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and the catch-all

TABLE 7:VI
Number of Females Arrested for Specified Offenses Classified by Number of Times Female Recidivists* were Arrested for Drunkenness, Seattle: 1968-1970†

Offense Charged	Total Number of Females Arrested	Number of Times Female Recidivists were Arrested for Drunkenness															
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15 or more	
Murder-Nonneg. homicide.	2																
Negligent homicide																	
Forcible rape	5	3	1														
Robbery																	
Aggravated assault																	
Burglary	1		1														
Larceny	30	15	4	2	2	4	1										2
Auto Theft	2	1	1														
Other assault	18	9	5	3													
Arson																	
Forgery-counterfeiting	8	6	1			1											
Fraud	6	5	1														
Embezzlement	1	1															
Stolen prop: receiving, etc.	1		1														
Vandalism	11	5	3		1										1		
Weapons: possession, etc.	6	4	2														
Prostitution - comm. vice	16	11	4														
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros.	11	5	2														
Narcotic drug laws	11	8															1
Gambling	2	2															
Off. against family, child	1							1									
Driving under influence	29	21	7	1													
Liquor laws	12	6	4	1				1									
Drunkenness	427	94	170	63	40	14	9	10	5	5	3	2	1	2	1	2	7
Disorderly conduct	37	18	3	3	2	4		2	2		1						1
Vagrancy	6	3		1													
All other, ex. traffic	9	3	2	1													
Suspicion	31	16	9		1	3											

* "Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

† Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over - included in this table.

categories of "other" and "suspicion." Several of these offense categories are alcohol-related.

Arrests Cross-Classified by Offenses and by Frequency of Arrests for Drunkenness of Male Recidivists. This section, as well as the following one, is concerned primarily with the cross-classification of arrests according to specific offense categories and the frequency of arrest for drunkenness of male recidivists. For example, since the unit of analysis is arrest, a person arrested five times for automobile theft would be represented in Table 7: VII by a five and not by a one. In addition, of course, he would have been arrested one or more times for drunkenness.

The total number of "arrests" in Table 7: VII is 26,996 recorded by 5,190 male "arrestees" (recidivists with at least one arrest for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970). It will be seen that 22,956, or 85.0 percent, of the 26,996 arrests were for drunkenness. In addition, approximately 1,700 arrests were for alcohol-related offenses, such as driving under the influence, violation of liquor laws, disorderly conduct and vagrancy.

The majority of offenses other than drunkenness were committed by those with four or less arrests for drunkenness. Apart from alcohol-related offenses, robbery, larceny, possession of concealed weapons, other assault and vandalism cover a relatively wide range of frequency of arrests for drunkenness, but there is a tendency for arrests for nondrunkenness offenses to diminish as the number of arrests for drunkenness increases.

Arrests Cross-Classified by Offenses and by Frequency of Arrests for Drunkenness of Female Recidivists. Like the preceding section, the primary unit of analysis is "arrest," not "arrestee." Table 7: VIII presents the number of arrests according to 28 offense categories in relation to the number of times female recidivists were arrested for drunkenness.

Table 7: VIII shows that female recidivists who were arrested two or more times, of which at least one was for drunkenness, during the three-year period, 1968-1970, had a total of 1,584 arrests. There were 427 female recidivists that conformed to the multiple-arrest and drunkenness-arrest criteria. A further examination of Table 7: VIII reveals that 1,243, or 78.5 percent, of the 1,584 arrests were for drunkenness. In addition, there were approximately 100 arrests for alcohol-related offenses. Besides drunkenness and other alcohol-related crimes, the only sizable numbers of arrests were for larceny and prostitution. Furthermore, it will be noted that there is a tendency for frequency of arrests

TABLE 7:VII

Number of Arrests for Specified Offenses Classified by Number of Times Male Recidivists* were Arrested for Drunkenness, Seattle: 1968-1970†

Offense Charged	Total Arrests for Specified Offenses	Number of Times Male Recidivists were Arrested for Drunkenness																			
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20 or over
Total	26,996	2,855	3,797	2,683	1,665	1,560	1,301	1,152	980	854	771	652	685	516	370	560	320	318	518	258	5,181
Murder-Nonneg. homicide	5	3	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Negligent homicide	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Forcible rape	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Robbery	130	32	16	13	12	6	3	4	2	--	6	12	4	1	--	1	1	2	--	--	15
Aggravated assault	27	16	4	3	1	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Burglary	68	29	12	7	7	2	1	1	3	--	2	--	--	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	2
Larceny	622	193	93	43	41	29	30	20	20	24	16	10	25	7	3	10	2	2	6	2	46
Auto theft	29	16	2	2	1	1	3	1	--	--	--	--	1	--	1	--	--	--	1	--	--
Other assault	526	252	104	42	30	17	18	10	10	4	9	4	6	1	1	3	--	2	1	--	12
Arson	5	--	3	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Forgery-counterfeiting	36	23	5	3	3	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Fraud	57	25	8	10	2	2	1	--	1	--	2	3	--	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	1
Embezzlement	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Stolen prop: receiving, etc.	63	27	3	8	4	3	3	4	1	--	2	1	--	2	--	--	--	--	1	--	4
Vandalism	117	42	22	17	4	4	6	6	2	3	3	--	1	--	1	1	--	1	--	--	4
Weapons: possession, etc.	122	40	26	11	8	8	2	3	5	2	2	--	2	1	1	3	1	--	3	--	4
Prostitution-comm. vice	19	15	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros.	53	29	8	3	1	5	2	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	3
Narcotic drug laws	75	52	9	3	8	--	--	1	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Gambling	8	6	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Off. against family, child	3	2	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Driving under influence	702	436	117	57	27	15	4	12	7	10	5	--	2	1	2	2	--	--	1	3	1
Liquor laws	245	90	43	24	20	15	6	6	6	4	4	3	4	1	3	3	1	2	2	1	7
Drunkenness	22,956	1,144	3,152	2,334	1,436	1,385	1,182	1,043	888	774	700	605	624	494	350	525	304	306	486	247	4,977
Disorderly conduct	307	124	44	32	17	14	15	14	10	2	2	4	--	1	2	1	2	--	4	1	18
Vagrancy	431	59	51	39	27	37	16	18	14	25	10	7	13	2	5	9	9	1	6	4	79
All other, ex. traffic	81	34	18	9	3	5	1	--	2	1	4	--	1	1	--	1	--	1	--	--	--
Suspicion	304	162	53	19	12	11	8	6	6	5	3	3	1	1	--	--	--	6	--	--	8

* "Recidivist" is defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.
 † Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over -- included in this table.

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TABLE 7:VIII

Number of Arrests for Specified Offenses Classified by Number of Times Female Recidivists* were Arrested for Drunkenness, Seattle: 1968-1970†

Offense Charged	Total Arrests for Specified Offenses	Number of Times Female Recidivists were Arrested for Drunkenness														
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15 or more
Total	1,584	288	405	202	167	101	54	15	43	48	32	22	25	13	32	137
Murder-Nonneg. homicide	2	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	43	48	32	22	25	13	32	137
Negligent homicide	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Forcible rape	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Robbery	9	7	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Aggravated assault	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Burglary	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Larceny	45	23	5	2	2	5	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Auto Theft	2	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Other assault	19	9	5	3	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	5
Arson	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Forgery-counterfeiting	8	6	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Fraud	7	6	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Embezzlement	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Stolen prop: receiving, etc.	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Vandalism	11	5	3	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Weapons: possession, etc.	6	4	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Prostitution - comm. vice	52	35	15	--	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	1
Sex off., ex. f. rape, pros.	13	6	2	--	--	5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Narcotic drug laws	11	8	--	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Gambling	1	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Off. against family, child	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1
Driving under influence	34	25	8	1	--	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Liquor laws	20	12	4	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Drunkenness	1,243	94	340	189	160	70	54	7	40	45	30	22	24	13	28	127
Disorderly conduct	43	19	4	3	2	6	--	--	2	2	2	--	--	--	--	--
Vagrancy	7	3	--	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
All other, ex. traffic	9	3	2	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	1
Suspicion	38	19	9	--	1	7	--	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	--	2

* "Recidivist" is defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.
 † Only "adult" arrestees - those 18 years of age and over - included in this table.

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for nonalcohol-related offenses to decrease as the frequency of arrests for drunkenness increases.

Special Analysis of Two Selected Groups of Male Recidivists With
Relatively Large Number of Arrests for Drunkenness

In order to obtain more detailed insight into the personal characteristics and arrest histories of recidivists with frequent arrests for drunkenness, two groups were selected for special study. The first group is composed of 101 male recidivists who were arrested 25 or more times for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970. The second group is a subgroup of 10 of the 101 male recidivists who were arrested 55 or more times during the same three-year period. Essentially, different types of data were collected for each of the groups. In the larger group, emphasis is placed on personal characteristics, while in the second group, arrest histories are given primary consideration.

Summary of Personal Characteristics of 101 Recidivists
Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness
During the Three-Year Period, 1968-1970

Age Distribution of Male Recidivists Who Were Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness During the Three-Year Period, 1968-1970. It will be observed from Table 7: IX that the overwhelming proportion--77.2 percent--of this group of 101 recidivists are 40 years of age and over. Almost 12.0 percent (11.9 percent) are 60 years of age and over. The mean age is 47.0 years and the median age is 47.2 years.

There is a noticeable disparity between the ages of all males arrested for drunkenness and this special group of recidivists. For the entire group of male arrestees for drunkenness both the mean and median age is 43.7 years. In comparison, for this special group of recidivists, the mean age is 47.0 and the median age, 47.2 years.

TABLE 7:IX
Age Distribution of Male Recidivists*
Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness
Seattle: 1968-1970

Age	Recidivists	
	Number	Percent
Total . . .	101	100.0
20 - 24 . . .	3	3.0
25 - 29 . . .	5	5.0
30 - 34 . . .	6	5.9
35 - 39 . . .	9	8.9
40 - 44 . . .	20	19.8
45 - 49 . . .	17	16.8
50 - 54 . . .	15	14.8
55 - 59 . . .	14	13.9
60 - 64 . . .	10	9.9
65 - 69 . . .	2	2.0
Average Age . . .	Mean 47.0	Median 47.2

*"Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

Number of Different Offenses of Male Recidivists Who Were Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness. Table 7: X presents the number of different offenses with which this special group of 101 recidivists was charged. In 45, or 44.6 percent, of the cases, the only charge was drunkenness. Most of the other charges were for alcohol-related offenses such as violation of liquor laws, driving under the influence, vagrancy and disorderly conduct. Only approximately 10.0 percent were arrested for four or more offenses.

TABLE 7:X
Number of Different Offenses of Male Recidivists*
Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness,
Seattle: 1968-1970

Number of Offenses	Recidivists	
	Number	Percent
Total . . .	101	100.0
1+ . . .	45	44.6
2 . . .	34	33.7
3 . . .	12	11.9
4 . . .	5	5.0
5 . . .	3	3.0
6 . . .	1	1.0
7 . . .	1	1.0

*"Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

+ Drunkenness only.

Racial Distribution of Male Recidivists Who Were Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness. Table 7:XI clearly shows that among the 101 male recidivists for drunkenness Indians, Negroes and Mexicans are disproportionately represented on the basis of population in the city of Seattle. Almost one-third (32.7 percent) of the group are Indians. Negroes comprise 17.8 percent and Mexicans 5.9 percent. There was 1 Filipino, no Chinese or Japanese and 2 "all other." There were 41, or 40.6 percent, who were Caucasians.

TABLE 7:XI
Racial Distribution of Male Recidivists*
Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness,
Seattle: 1968-1970

Race	Recidivists	
	Number	Percent
Total . . .	101	100.0
White	41	40.6
Indian	33	32.7
Negro	18	17.8
Mexican	6	5.9
Filipino	1	1.0
Japanese	--	--
Chinese	--	--
All Other . . .	2	2.0

*"Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970

Personal History and Police Record of Recidivists Arrested 55 or More Times for Drunkenness During the Three-Year Period, 1968-1970. The second special subgroup of recidivists consists of 10 persons who were arrested for drunkenness 55 or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970. All were male, 4 Negro, 3 white and 3 Indian.

Their arrest histories were compiled from records of the Seattle Police Department. For two cases, records extend back to 1949, while the remaining eight range from 1952 to 1963. Of course, it is not assumed that the data derived from the files of the Seattle Police Department represent the complete police record of these recidivists. It is possible that their activities extended to other localities before or during the period when they first came into contact with the Seattle Police.

Since the size of this special subgroup is so small, no direct comparisons can be made with the larger group of recidivists. However, certain characteristics

of the group may be noted. (Table 7:XII) As will be observed, the nonwhites are overrepresented compared to their proportions in the general population. All ten men finished at least grade school and six finished high school. It should be remembered that the personal data concerning this subgroup is largely self-reported, and there is no practicable way of corroborating it. About half of the group is married and about half, single. All men reported occupations in the "blue collar" category. In view of their arrest rate for drunkenness it can be seriously questioned if any of them have had any consistent employment record. Although 8 of these recidivists are now over 35, the age at time of first arrest was considerably under 35 for most of them. At time of first arrest by the Seattle Police, five were under 30 years of age, four were between 32 and 37, and only one over forty. (Table 7:XII)

TABLE 7:XII

Personal Characteristics* of Recidivists Arrested in
Seattle for Drunkenness 55 or More Times During
Three-Year Period, 1968-1970

Case No.	Race	Marital Status	Education Years	First Arrest		Arrests Through 1970		
				Year	Age	Total	Drunk	Other
1.	I	S	†	1963	20	81	78	3
2.	N	M	10	1957	33	124	124	--
3.	N	M	8	1953	47	126	116	10
4.	W	M	12	1957	37	130	125	5
5.	N	S	12	1955	33	133	123	9
6.	W	W	12	1949	32	147	140	7
7.	I	S	†	1962	25	148	147	1
8.	I	M	12	1957	24	159	156	3
9.	N	S	12	1949	26	164	145	19
10.	W	S	12	1952	23	198	191	7

*All of the cases are male and all are included in blue-collar occupations.

†No data available.

Although only ten persons are involved, they account for over 1,400 arrests, most of them for drunkenness spanning many years (for some, a 21-year period). The number of arrests by the Seattle Police ranged from 81 for Case No. 1 to 198 for Case No. 10. Nine of the ten cases were arrested 124 times or more. They do not appear to have benefited from their numerous contacts with the criminal justice system. It will be noted from Table 7:XIII that most of the arrests are for drunkenness with only very few arrests for other offenses. Most of the other

offenses are related to drunkenness such as liquor law violations, disorderly conduct and vagrancy. Six have been arrested at least once for larceny, with the group as a whole recording 19 arrests for this offense. Instead of viewing these arrests as part of a criminal career, probably they can best be seen as attempts to obtain money to satisfy their drinking habit. As other studies have shown, criminal careers and long histories involving arrests for alcoholism seldom are found together.

TABLE 7:XIII

Arrests other than for Drunkenness of Subgroup of Recidivists
who were Arrested 55 or More Times for Drunkenness in Seattle
During Three-Year Period, 1968-1970

Case Number	Offense	Number
Total . . .	Larceny (19), Vagrancy (18), Dis. Conduct (6), Liquor Law (5), Driving Under Influence (3), Drugs (2), Suspicion (2), Safe Keeping (2), Stolen Property (1), Weapons (1), Other Assault (1), Other (2)	62
1	Liquor Law (3)	3
2	None	--
3	Larceny (3), Stolen Property (1), Weapons (1), Driving Under Influence (2), Dis. Conduct (1), Vagrancy (1)	9
4	Larceny (3), Drugs (1), Dis. Conduct (1)	5
5	Larceny (1), Liquor Law (1), Vagrancy (7)	9
6	Dis. Conduct (1), Vagrancy (5), Other (1)	7
7	Suspicion (1)	1
8	Larceny (2), Other Assault (1)	3
9	Larceny (9), Drugs (1), Dis. Conduct (2), Vagrancy (5), Safe Keeping (2)	19
10	Larceny (1), Driving Under Influence (1), Liquor Law (1), Dis. Conduct (1), Suspicion (1), Other (1)	6

Table 7:XIV summarizes the arrest histories of this special subgroup of recidivists. For most of the men their arrest history began with relatively few annual arrests for drunkenness followed by an increase in number. The largest annual number of arrests was 33 in 1970 for Case No. 7. Also, it should be noted he was arrested 31 times the year before. Case No. 2 was arrested 32 times in 1970. Twenty or more arrests per year are not uncommon. Since 1967, it appears

that many of these recidivists have been arrested for drunkenness at a much greater rate. This may reflect changes either in police personnel or departmental policy. It may be that with increased professionalization, old informal ways of handling those charged with drunkenness have been replaced by more formal methods of arrest and jail. The last two years, 1969 and 1970, show the greatest rate of increase as well as largest number of arrests per year for drunkenness for this group of recidivists. Of course, it also must be recognized that this group is a highly selected one based on the frequency of arrest during the past three years.

TABLE 7:XIV

Arrest History of Those Arrested for Drunkenness 55 or More Times During the Three-Year Period, 1968-1970, Seattle: 1949-1970

Year	Number of Yearly Arrests by Case									
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10
Total	81	124	126	130	133	147	148	159	164	198
1970	22	32	23	26	23	28	33	23	31	24
1969	20	23	22	18	22	18	31	25	20	14
1968	18	15	11	16	10	15	18	10	12	18
1967	18	9	11	12	12	7	13	11	13	12
1966	--	9	10	6	9	6	9	11	6	12
1965	--	8	10	11	14	11	14	18	14	16
1964	--	6	4	5	4	9	8	4	4	9
1963	3	5	8	10	7	6	8	14	7	13
1962	--	--	1	15	3	7	14	9	4	12
1961	--	--	--	2	4	3	--	10	5	5
1960	--	--	--	6	2	3	--	6	7	11
1959	--	3	1	--	4	2	--	7	7	10
1958	--	7	5	1	4	4	--	7	3	13
1957	--	6	4	2	4	3	--	4	1	--
1956	--	1	5	--	4	3	--	--	3	1
1955	--	--	2	--	7	8	--	--	3	7
1954	--	--	8	--	--	--	--	--	5	3
1953	--	--	1	--	--	5	--	--	4	5
1952	--	--	--	--	--	7	--	--	4	13
1951	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6	--
1950	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	4	--
1949	--	--	--	--	--	2	--	--	1	--

The Chronic Alcoholic Offender and the Deviancy Reinforcement Cycle for Public Intoxication

In the Task Force Report: Drunkenness of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (pp. 7-11), David J. Pittman presents an excellent discussion of the characteristics of chronic alcoholic offenders, in which middle-class and upper-class problem drinkers are differentiated from lower-class chronic-drunkenness offenders. The deviancy reinforcement cycle is described in some detail, showing how certain factors in the form of social policies, community sanctions and attitudes toward the lower-class public drunkenness offender actually aggravate and reinforce his drinking problem.

Chronic drunkenness offenders are generally excessive drinkers who may or may not be alcoholics, but whose drinking has involved them in difficulties with the police, the courts, and penal institutions. They are a group for whom the penal sanctions of society have failed and to whom existing community resources have not been applied. Although some of these men (very seldom women) are confirmed alcoholics, others are miscreants whose present use of alcohol is preliminary to alcoholism, and others are nonaddicted excessive drinkers who will never become alcoholics.

As yet no studies exist which clearly differentiate an alcoholic from a nonalcoholic in the chronic drunkenness offender group. The most widely accepted definition of alcoholism is one developed by the World Health Organization which states:

Alcoholics are those excessive drinkers whose dependence upon alcohol has attained such a degree that it shows a noticeable mental disturbance or an interference with their bodily and mental health, their inter-personal relations, and their smooth social and economic functioning; or who show the prodromal signs of such development.

From this definition it is obvious that a history of arrests for public intoxication is indicative of a drinking problem. Repeated arrests for public intoxication are certainly a symptom of the disease of alcoholism. However, as a result of the paucity of scientific research and lack of funds at the Federal, State, and local governmental levels for research and treatment studies on alcoholism, there are few clear cut answers about this disease.

Two Federal appellate courts have recently held that a person cannot be convicted for behavior which is a manifestation of a disease. It has been urged upon the courts that such individuals lack mens rea or criminal intent, and that . . . any disease which deprives the individual of capacity to control his conduct will excuse conduct which would otherwise be condemned. It should be recognized that the two recent decisions deal only with the chronic alcoholic and one manifestation of his disease--public intoxication. They are aimed at helping only the chronic alcoholic, and not helping all drunkenness offenders. In short, the mens rea approach deals with

one aspect of the chronic drunkenness offender problem. But society should be equally concerned with the individual who goes on a binge from time to time, and the drunkard whose intoxication appears to result from indolence, both of whom, through repeated arrests and incarcerations, are caught up in a deviancy reinforcement cycle or, in effect, a revolving door; this revolving door may actually contribute to an excessive drinker's becoming an alcoholic and also encourage the public inebriate to act out secondary deviances.

On the whole, Americans have a relatively tolerant orientation toward nonexcessive drinking of alcoholic beverages. On many occasions, however, it is socially permissible to drink to excess. These occasions are usually private or semiprivate, and range from fraternity "beer blasts" and debutante "coming-out parties" to office parties and conventions. However, when a person's drinking starts to interfere with his work or family life, certain negative sanctions are invoked by his friends. His wife may be ashamed to invite guests home, and, correspondingly, friends may be embarrassed to visit. . . . Although the public labels these deviant middle class drinkers negatively, they do not invoke the same harsh sanctions against them as with lower class alcoholics.

On the other hand, the same public often considers lower class alcoholics and excessive drinkers as worthless derelicts and vagrants. It is highly undesirable to have men sleeping in alleys and doorways. But the present solution--using the criminal system--fails to correct the problem and is unjust. And the public's negative stereotype of the public intoxication offender is largely a result of this archaic and punitive policy. . . .

It is hypothesized here that "social policies directed against a particular deviancy affect some differently than others, resulting in a corresponding effect on the larger public." The very nature of the administration of public intoxication laws excludes most middle and upper class alcoholics and excessive drinkers who typically drink in private or semiprivate surroundings. Public drunkenness laws discriminate against the lower class. . . . The jailed intoxication offender represents social problems which encompass both social and class relations in the United States.

Looking at Figure 7:3, the "Deviancy Reinforcement Cycle for Public Intoxication," we can see the ramifications of the last statement. Excessive drinking and alcoholism are considered in a moralistic and negative manner by the larger population. When the deviant behavior of excessive drinking is acted out in public "B", the larger community's sanctions become greater, especially since these individuals are much more likely to be found in the lower socio-economic class.

Indeed, there seems to be a commonly accepted notion among therapists dealing with problem drinkers and alcoholics that there are two large sub-types. First, there is the person who has a disease and must be helped (middle and upper class alcoholics and problem drinkers). Secondly, there is the drunk or skid-rowite, who is hopeless and whom few professionals care to treat. Duff Gillespie evaluated 22 followup studies of treated alcoholics. It was found that the typical population in these public treatment facilities excluded lower-lower class whites and, especially, Negroes. The public drunkenness offender often does not expect to find tolerance even among professionals who are reputed to be among the more tolerant groups.




Figure 7:3

The lower class public drunkenness offenders are drawn from those who have difficulty in interpersonal relationships, are poorly educated, are frequently from an ethnic or racial minority and are typically dependent on institutionalized living arrangements (such as those found in the Armed Forces, the Merchant Marine, and the Salvation Army and kindred shelters). In short, they are at a disadvantage in competing with other persons for a productive role in our society.

After repeated arrests and incarcerations, the negative effects of the above sociological variables are reinforced ("D" and "E" on Figure 7:3). The constantly incarcerated individual finds it nearly impossible to maintain a meaningful marital and familial relationship; his ability to find employment is seriously jeopardized by his arrest record coupled with his poor education. By constantly being officially labeled by the police, the courts and correctional institutions as a public drunk, he begins to see himself as a public drunk; the jail becomes little more than a shelter to regain his physical strength. Because the public intoxication offender is usually unable to support himself, he frequently turns to petty thievery. This is especially true if he is an alcoholic. The alcoholic will go to great lengths to maintain his supply of alcohol, and frequently he spends most of his nondrinking hours finding ways to obtain money for alcohol. As a result, the alcoholic public intoxication offender frequently presents a health problem, not only from diseases associated with an excessive intake of alcohol, but also from his indifference to caring for himself physically.

Social policy has its greatest negative effect on excessive drinkers who are not alcoholics. An excessive drinker who confines his drinking to weekend bouts (a pattern not uncommon in the middle classes), but who does not drink secretively, may find himself frequently arrested and perhaps incarcerated. If this happens often enough, he may be conditioned by the enforcement, the judicial, and the correctional processes in such a way as to contribute to his drinking problem. Where before he confined his drinking to weekends and managed to hold a job and be a breadwinner, he now finds these roles increasingly difficult and harder to maintain, and crises arrive which encourage his drinking. Instead of arresting his excessive drinking, the social policies have modified (relationships between "E"--"A", and "D"--"A", Figure 7:3) his deviant behavior and contributed to the development of a more serious deviancy--alcoholism. Thus, the public intoxication offender confronts the society with a serious social problem which involves the total community as well as the criminal justice system.

Ecology of Drunkenness

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an analysis of various aspects of the spatial distribution of arrestees for drunkenness and for driving under the influence. Primary referents are place of arrest and place of residence of arrestees, differentiated according to sex. In addition, a few series of data are classified by race.

Place of Arrest of Those Charged With Drunkenness. Figures 7:4 and 7:5 present place of arrest of males and females, respectively, who were charged with

drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970. Again, it should be emphasized that the data on these maps indicate arrestees, not arrests. Because of multiple arrests, the actual volume of arrests during the three-year period, 1968-1970, is not revealed by this map.

Tract M1, the Central Business District shows the heaviest concentration of arrests, both for males and for females charged with drunkenness. During the three-year period, 1968-1970, there were 2,784 males and 270 females arrested in Tract M1. Many of these arrestees were arrested two or more times during the period. In attempting to explain the large number of arrests for drunkenness in the Central Business District, the following questions might be raised: Can the high incidence of arrests be accounted for by the large number of drunkards who frequent the area? Or, are the police less tolerant of public drunkenness in the main shopping, banking, professional service and amusement center of the city than in areas such as Skid Road? Skid Road, Tract O1, ranks second in number of persons arrested, 1,638 males and 91 females. For males, Tract M2 ranks third with 583, Tract L5 ranks fourth with 549 and Tract O2, fifth with 520. For females, Tract M2 is second with 74, Tract L5, third with 56, and Tract O2, fourth with 43. In general, the overwhelming proportion of arrests for drunkenness are made in the Central Business District and contiguous areas. The number of males arrested in the 13 census tracts comprising the inset on Figure 7:4 totalled 7,229, or 76.0 percent, of the 9,508 male arrestees charged with drunkenness. For female arrestees (Figure 7:5) the total for the city is 1,058 of which 691, or 65.3 percent, are included in the 13 tracts in the inset. Outside the central area as defined by the insets in Figures 7:4 and 7:5, there are five other tracts with noticeably large clusterings of male arrestees (ranging from 72 to 134) and four other tracts for female arrestees (ranging from 12 to 23). For both male and female arrestees, two of the tracts are contiguous to the central area (Tracts K1 and K4); one is in the southern part of the city known as Georgetown (Tract R1A) and one is in the northwestern part of the city, the main business section of Ballard (Tract A5). The fifth tract for male arrestees located outside the central area is the University District (Tract D6).

One of the distinctive characteristics of arrestees for drunkenness is the large number of Indians arrested in the central part of the city. The incidence of drunkenness among Indians is out of all proportion to the number represented in the population. This fact is also true for Negroes but to a much less degree. Mexicans also show a high rate of drunkenness in the city of Seattle, but it is not




Figure 7:4




Figure 7:5

possible to make accurate comparisons because of unsatisfactory population data. For example, 69 male arrestees for drunkenness in Tract M1 and 56 in Tract O1 were Mexican. Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese rank lower in drunkenness than any of the other ethnic groups, including whites. Among the 2,784 male arrestees in Tract M1, 66.2 percent were white, 21.3 percent Indian, 7.8 percent Negro, and 4.7 percent all other. The corresponding figures for Tract O1 are: white, 59.7 percent; Indian, 21.1 percent; Negro, 14.7 percent; and all other, 4.6 percent. Among female arrestees, the proportion of Indians is considerably higher and the proportion of Negroes, lower. In Tract M1 the percentage of white females was 48.1, Indian females 44.4, Negro females 4.1 and all other 3.4. For Tract O1, 26.4 percent were white; 62.6 percent, Indian; 8.8 percent, Negro; and 2.2 percent, all other.

Relationship Between Home Address of Arrestees and Place of Arrest.

In the previous section it was indicated that the highest arrest rate for drunkenness occurred in the Central Business District. However, we find that only a relatively small proportion of these arrestees actually reside in this part of the city. In other words, particularly with respect to the Central Business District, place of occurrence of many social phenomena and place of residence may be very different. This is true not only for drunkenness, but also for many other offenses.¹¹ It will be recalled that 2,784 males and 270 females were arrested for drunkenness in Tract M1 during the three-year period, 1968-1970. However, only 355, or 12.8 percent, of the male arrestees and 33, or 12.2 percent, of the female arrestees resided in this tract. The overwhelming proportion of arrestees came from other areas of the city (1,838), from other parts of the state of Washington (266), and from other states and Canada (62). In addition, residence was unknown in a substantial number of cases (500). An examination of Figure 7:6 reveals that 871 males arrested in the Central Business District (Tract M1) resided in Skid Road (Tract O1). This figure of 871 arrestees from Tract O1 was noticeably in excess of the number of arrestees--35--that actually resided in Tract M1. In the 12 tracts (exclusive of Tract M1) in the inset on Figures 7:4 and 7:5 there was a total of 1,342 persons arrested for drunkenness in Tract M1. The remaining tracts of the city showed 496, or 27.0 percent, of the total for the entire city who were

¹¹ Over forty years ago, the senior author discussed this point in some detail with respect to suicidal behavior. Calvin F. Schmid, Suicides in Seattle, 1914 to 1925, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1928, pp. 4-23.




Figure 7:6

arrested in Tract M1. There were 14 tracts in the city in which none of the residents were arrested for drunkenness in Tract M1.

In a sense, Figure 7:7 portrays a type of pattern opposite to that in Figure 7:6. Figure 7:6 focusses on residents from various parts of the city who were arrested for drunkenness in Tract M1; whereas, Figure 7:7 indicates the tract where residents of Tract M1 were arrested for drunkenness. Most of the arrestees who were residents (male residents only) of Tract M1 were arrested in Tract M1, but a substantial number were arrested in 35 other tracts throughout the city. The largest number was 102 in Tract O1, followed in rank-order by Tract M2 (23), Tract L5 (22), Tract O2 (15), L2 (9), and M5 (8). In summary, of the 593 male residents of Tract M1 arrested for drunkenness 355, or 59.9 percent, were arrested in Tract M1, while the remaining 238 were arrested in 35 other tracts in various parts of the city.

Figures 7:8 and 7:9 are counterparts of Figures 7:6 and 7:7. Figure 7:8 depicts the home address of arrestees charged with drunkenness who were arrested in Skid Road (Tract O1) and Figure 7:9 shows the place of arrest of arrestees (males only) charged with drunkenness residing in Skid Road (Tract O1). It will be recalled that Figures 7:6 and 7:7, respectively, present comparable data for the Central Business District (Tract M1).

Unlike the Central Business District (Tract M1), the arrestees for drunkenness in Skid Road are predominantly from that area (compare Figures 7:6 and 7:8). It will be seen from Figure 7:8 that 852 males and 14 females arrested in Skid Road (Tract O1) are residents of that area; 456, or 34.5 percent, of the arrestees are residents of other parts of the city. In addition there were 133 nonresidents of Seattle and 269 whose residence was unknown. By contrast, it will be recalled that 1,838, or 82.6 percent, of the persons arrested in Tract M1 were residents of other parts of the city. Of the 456 arrestees in Skid Road from other parts of the city, exactly one-half (228) resided in four neighboring tracts--M1, O2, L5 and M5. The remaining 228 arrestees resided in approximately 65 other tracts scattered throughout the city.

Although most of those arrested in Skid Road for drunkenness are residents of Skid Road, we find that in addition large numbers of Skid Road residents are arrested in other parts of the city. This is particularly true of the Central Business District (Tract M1). It will be seen from Figure 7:9 that actually more residents (males only) of Skid Road were arrested in the Central Business District (871) than in Skid Road (852). Also, a sizable proportion of the arrestees in the




Figure 7:7




Figure 7:8




Figure 7:9

following tracts are from Skid Road: O2 (181 arrestees), L5 (168), M2 (57), O3 (56), L3 (51), and M5 (38).

Although these facts give emphasis to the problem drinkers from Skid Road, they do not present the complete picture. These facts relate to arrestees as single cases of arrest during the three-year period, 1968-1970. From previous sections in this chapter, it was clearly demonstrated that arrestees for drunkenness have a high rate of recidivism. This is especially true of habitues of Skid Road. In further corroboration of this observation are data presented in Table 7: XV which show that 75 of the 101 male recidivists who were arrested 25 or more times for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970, resided in Skid Road (Tract O1). In addition there were 7 in Tract O2, 4 in M1, and 1 in M5--all contiguous to Tract O1. Certain limited portions of these tracts are actually part of Skid Road.¹²

TABLE 7: XV

"Home Address" by Census Tract of 101 Male Recidivists*
Arrested 25 or More Times for Drunkenness, Seattle: 1968-1970

Census Tract Designation			Recidivists	
Police Department	Pre-1970	1970	Number†	Percent†
003	A3	33	1	1.0
071	G2	60	1	1.0
113	K4	86	1	1.0
124	L5	80	2	2.0
130	M1	81	4	4.0
131	M2	82	1	1.0
133	M4	84	1	1.0
134	M5	85	1	1.0
150	O1	92	75	74.3
151	O2	91	7	6.9
160	P1	90	2	2.0
180	R1A	109	1	1.0
Unknown	--	--	4	4.0

*"Recidivist" defined as a person arrested two or more times during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

† Total number of cases, 101 and total percentage, 100.0. There were 4 cases, or 4.0 percent, whose home addresses were not indicated.

¹² Census tract boundaries, of course, do not conform exactly to "natural areas," however they might be defined.

In addition to the Skid Road recidivists with 25 or more arrests, there were hundreds more with five, ten, fifteen or twenty arrests. Skid Road residents accounted for many thousands of the 31,408 arrests for drunkenness during the three-year period, 1968-1970.

Contrary to popular conception, the chronic drunkenness offenders from Skid Road do not represent a single, homogeneous type. They do have one characteristic in common--they are all problem drinkers, but not necessarily alcoholics. To be sure, alcoholics are problem drinkers, but not all problem drinkers are alcoholics. Jackson and Connor have attempted to differentiate segments of the Skid Road population into several types.¹³

First, they dichotomize the Skid Road population into nonalcoholics and alcoholics. The nonalcoholics in turn are classified as permanent residents--older men for the most part--and transients. Characteristically, both groups are heavy drinkers.

Typologically, alcoholics are represented by six different categories: (a) The older alcoholics, who tend to live in one place over a long period of time and who stick together or are isolates. Frequently these men have pensions. (b) The "bums," men who do not adhere to Skid Road group standards. They are avoided by other alcoholics and by each other as much as possible. (c) The "characters," men who behave erratically or in a bizarre fashion. These men, too, are avoided and avoid each other, as they are likely to be picked up by the police. (d) The "winos," individuals who habitually drink wine and also have a run-down appearance, a fetid smell, "wine" sores, and a tendency to unpredictable behavior. (e) The "rubby-dubs," who habitually drink nonbeverage alcohol. These are few in number and tend to be social isolates. (f) The "lushes," the prestige group of alcoholics on Skid Road. They maintain social distance from the other groups, although the line between them is often difficult to specify with precision. They tend to be in better physical and mental health than "winos" and "characters," while their adherence to the mores of Skid Road society differentiate them from the "bums."

In order to study the relationship between home address of arrestees and place of arrest for drunkenness in an outlying business district, special tabulations were prepared for the main commercial section of Ballard (Tract A5). These data are summarized in Figure 7:10. During the three-year period, 1968-1970, 148

¹³ Joan K. Jackson and Ralph Connor, "The Skid Road Alcoholic," Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol, Vol. 14 (September 1953), pp. 468-486.




Figure 7:10

persons--126 males and 22 females--were arrested for drunkenness in Tract A5. Residents of Seattle numbered 113, nonresidents 21, and persons whose residence was unknown, 14.

Where did the 113 residents of Seattle live? The largest number--34 males and 8 females--resided in Tract A5. Contiguous tracts included 21 additional arrestees--A3 (9), A4 (6), B4 (3) and B3 (3); and two other tracts in close proximity added 8 more--A1 (5) and A2 (3). Strangely enough six Skid Road (O1) residents and three from the Central Business District (M1) were arrested in Ballard for drunkenness. There were four cases from Tract B6. Except in three instances the remaining 26 arrestees, numbering either one or two per census tract, resided in 23 tracts located north of Yesler Way.

Residential Distribution of Arrestees Charged With Drunkenness or With Driving Under the Influence: Rates per 100,000 of Population

This section is devoted to an analysis of the spatial distribution of arrestees charged with drunkenness and with driving under the influence. The data pertain only to arrestees who are residents of Seattle, and the cases have been allocated to the reported home addresses of arrestees. Rates have been computed for each sex on the basis of the population 18 years of age and over.

Residential Distribution of Male Arrestees Charged With Drunkenness.

Figure 7:11 presents mean rates by census tracts for male arrestees charged with drunkenness for the three-year period, 1968-1970. Again, it should be pointed out that the unit of analysis is the arrestee, a large proportion of whom have been arrested many times during the 1968-1970 period. The rates per 100,000 of male population 18 years of age and over vary from 61.8 in Tract D11 (western portion of View Ridge) to 104,030.2 in Tract O1 (Skid Road). The anomalous rate of 104,030.2 for Tract O1 is to a considerable extent indicative of the high degree of population turnover in that area. Similarly, population mobility is partially accountable for the relatively high crime rates in the Central Business District and contiguous areas.¹⁴

¹⁴The significance of population mobility as a factor in the comparability of rates is explained more fully in the following statement. "In making comparisons of vital and social rates between various districts in urban communities, the relative stability of the population is either disregarded or only referred to incidentally, so that the unwary reader naturally infers, if at all, that it is a negligible factor in the comparability of the data. This, of course, is a false assumption and may lead




Figure 7:11

Tract M1 (Central Business District) ranks second highest with 13,060.7 followed by Tract L5 (8,434.3), Tract O2 (7,996.1) and Tract M2 (6,079.7). It will be observed that only three of the 24 tracts comprising the central sector of the city from Elliott Bay to Lake Washington have rates less than 1,000 per 100,000 of population. There is one tract north of the central sector--Tract A5, comprising the main business district of Ballard--that has a rate of more than 1,000 (1,496.8), and four tracts south of the central sector that are included in this category. These tracts are located in or in close proximity to industrial areas--Georgetown, Harbor Island, Youngstown, Delridge and High Point. There are 19 tracts with rates under 200.0 per 100,000 of population. Most of these tracts represent relatively new and substantial residential areas. It will be recalled from Chapters 4 and 5 that the residential distribution of male arrestees charged with drunkenness is similar to the spatial patterning of most index crimes.

Residential Distribution of Female Arrestees Charged With Drunkenness.

Although there are considerably fewer female than male arrestees charged with drunkenness, nevertheless the basic residential distributions manifest marked similarities (Figure 7:12). Like male arrestees, the highest rate for female arrestees is Tract O1 (Skid Road) with a rate of 10,333.3 and Tract M1 (Central Business District) is second highest with 7,024.3. Tract O2 (Chinatown-Jackson Street) ranks third with 2,071.6; Tract L5 (Pike Street Market-Belltown) ranks fourth with 1,963.5; L3 is fifth with a rate of 1,147.1; and M2 is sixth with a rate of 1,006.0.

Outside of the central segment of the city there are only two tracts with rates in excess of 300.0--Tract S1B with 374.8 (High Point) and Tract R1A with 341.4 (Georgetown). There are 13 tracts with no cases at all. Most of these tracts are located in the northeastern section of the city. In general, there is a clear negative correlation between the residential distribution of arrestees for drunkenness and socioeconomic status.

to erroneous conclusions and implications. . . . The endless shuttling of people in and out of this district would mean that in a very short interval of time the complexion of the population would have changed many times. In other words, the population enumeration as of January 1, 1920, by the United States Bureau of the Census is not nearly so representative for this section of the city as it is for the less mobile districts. Hence, in computing rates for various territorial units on a population base taken as of a given instant, the relative turnover within the period under consideration would affect the comparability of the data."--Calvin F. Schmid, Suicides in Seattle, 1914 to 1925, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1928, pp. 7-9.




Figure 7:12

Residential Distribution of Male Arrestees Charged With Driving Under the Influence. Figure 7:13 presents resident male arrestees classified by race who were charged with driving under the influence in the city of Seattle during the three-year period, 1968-1970. During this period there were 2,249. In addition to the 2,249 residents there were 702 nonresidents and 126 whose residence was unknown who were charged with driving under the influence. Figure 7:14 indicates that mean rates per 100,000 of population 18 years of age and over of male arrestees charged with driving under the influence vary from 54.9 in Tract D6 (mainly University Business District) to 1,276.1 in Tract K5 (part of a predominantly Negro community in the central sector). Tract O1 (Skid Road) ranks second highest with 1,049.5; and Tract J1 (part of Negro community in central sector) ranks third with 1,009.2. With comparatively few exceptions, tracts with relatively high rates--600.0 and over--are located in or contiguous to the central sector of the city. Tracts with comparatively high rates outside the central sector of the city are found in or close to industrial areas. All of these tracts rank relatively low in socioeconomic status as measured by median income and median rent, and by occupational and educational status. Tracts A5 (Ballard) and B5 (Ballard-Fremont), located in the northern section of the city, Tracts S1B, O4B, R1B, R1A and R4A in Delridge-Youngstown, High Point, South Park, Georgetown and Rainier Vista areas, located in the southern sector of the city, all have rates of 600.0 and over. The largest clustering of low rates is to be found in residential areas in northeast Seattle.

Residential Distribution of Female Arrestees Charged With Driving Under the Influence. Figures 7:15 and 7:16 show that the residential distribution of female arrestees charged with driving under the influence does not conform to a clear and consistent pattern such as indicated by the other series discussed in this section. However, there is some similarity between the patterns of female arrestees for driving under the influence and male arrestees charged with drunkenness. The highest rate (333.3) in Figure 7:16 is found in Tract O1 (Skid Road), but there are no cases at all in Tract M1 (Central Business District).

In tracts with relatively large proportions of adult females, rates for driving under the influence are not high. Automobile ownership or accessibility to the use of automobiles as well as ability to drive automobiles, no doubt operates more restrictively on females, thus accounting in part for the total rate as well as for differentials from one part of the city to another for driving under the influence.

Perhaps the relationship of the residential distribution of arrestees charged with drunkenness and with driving under the influence can be summarized




Figure 7:13




Figure 7:14




Figure 7:15




Figure 7:16

best by a series of intercorrelations. The two distributions with the highest correlation are males and females charged with drunkenness, $r = .89$. The second largest coefficient of correlation ($r = .62$) is between males charged with drunkenness and females charged with driving under the influence. The relationship between females charged with drunkenness and females charged with driving under the influence is indicated by a coefficient of correlation of $.49$. A coefficient of $.41$ describes the relationship between males charged with driving under the influence and females charged with driving under the influence. There is only a comparative slight correspondence in the residential distribution of males charged with drunkenness and males charged with driving under the influence, $r = .30$. The smallest coefficient of correlation in this series is $.28$, between male arrestees charged with driving under the influence and female arrestees charged with drunkenness.

CHAPTER 8

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CRIME: THREE MAJOR CITIES OF WASHINGTON AND OTHER LARGE PACIFIC COAST CITIES¹

It is a common observation that social phenomena vary from one city to another, whether it be automobile accidents, death from nephritis, personal income, ethnic background, educational attainment, suicidal behavior or crime.² However, in studying crime differentials, even for large cities, one is faced with the problem of comparability and reliability of data. In spite of the carefully formulated instructions developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for reporting crime statistics, each police department is autonomous with its own special personnel and procedures and techniques of operation.³ In order to minimize possible inherent inadequacies and limitations of the data, the cities chosen for comparison have been carefully selected, especially with respect to number, size and location. Furthermore, in view of the potential deficiencies of the data, only more general comparisons and analyses are presented.

The present comparative survey has been limited to the 14 Pacific Coast cities with populations of 150,000 and over in 1970: Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma in Washington; Portland in Oregon; and Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, San Jose, Oakland, Long Beach, Sacramento, Anaheim, Fresno and Santa Ana in California. Two series of rates have been computed for the seven index crimes,

¹The basic data for this chapter were derived from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.

²Appendix B of this report represents a detailed analysis of suicide differentials and components for all of the 130 American cities of 100,000 population and over in 1960.

³Ronald H. Beattie discusses this particular point in detail in the following critique of criminal statistics: "Criminal Statistics in the United States--1960," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 51 (1960), pp. 49-65.

in addition to the total for all crimes and subtotals for violent crimes and for crimes against property. One series covers the three-year period, 1968-1970; and the other, the three-year period, 1959-1961.⁴

Violent Crimes

Murder and Nonnegligent Manslaughter. Figure 8:1 portrays differentials in murder and nonnegligent manslaughter in terms of mean rates per 100,000 of total population for the three-year period, 1968-1970, for the 14 Pacific Coast cities. Anaheim ranks lowest with 2.0 and Oakland highest with 19.3 per 100,000 of population. Oakland's rate is over nine times that of Anaheim. With respect to reliability of data, there is no substantial reason why very considerable confidence cannot be placed in the series on murder and nonnegligent manslaughter. The great disparity in the incidence of this crime for cities within the same state, and for that matter among the large cities on the Pacific Coast, is indeed impressive. For the cities in the state of Washington, Seattle's rate of 9.1 is approximately three times that of Spokane's 3.1 and Tacoma's rate of 6.0 is twice that of Spokane. Another significant observation is the relatively low incidence of murder and non-negligent homicide ten years earlier. All of the 14 cities except Anaheim had lower rates in 1959-1961. In Anaheim the rate for 1959-1961 was 3.5 in comparison to 2.0 in 1968-1970. Oakland's rate for 1959-1961 was only 5.3 which was fourth highest at that time. The city with the highest rate was Sacramento with 6.4. For 1959-1961 Seattle reported a rate of only 4.1, Spokane 2.0 and Tacoma 6.4. For the recent three-year period, 1968-1970, San Francisco ranked second with 15.2 per 100,000 of population, whereas in 1959-1961 San Francisco ranked fifth with a rate of 4.9. The rank-order coefficient of correlation for the rankings of the two series of data for the 14 cities is $\rho = .700$.

Forcible Rape. In comparison with other large Pacific Coast cities, Spokane ranks at the bottom in forcible rape with a mean rate of 13.1 for the three-year period, 1968-1970, while Seattle with a rate of 37.6 and Tacoma with a rate of 30.8 rank fifth and sixth, respectively. (Figure 8:2) Los Angeles (69.2), San Francisco (64.8), Oakland (51.2) and Long Beach (43.5) rank above Seattle

⁴It will be observed that the earlier series was centered on the census year, 1960. However, because of the time schedule for the completion of the present report, this could not be done for the later series. The 1970 data were not available until August, 1971, and presumably the 1971 data will not be available until about August, 1972.




Figure 8:1




Figure 8:2

and Tacoma. There are three cities that reported rates under 20.0--San Diego (18.2), Anaheim (17.6) and Spokane (13.1).

For the earlier series of data covering the three-year period, 1959-1961, Los Angeles again held top position with a rate of 44.3, but Long Beach rather than San Francisco was in second place with 27.3 and Oakland was third with 16.7. Tacoma (12.6) ranked sixth, Seattle (11.8) seventh and Spokane (5.0) fourteenth. The rank-order relationship between the 1959-1961 and 1968-1970 series for forcible rape was $\rho = .856$ --the highest of any of the ten series.

Robbery. Among the seven index crimes, none of the three cities of the state of Washington holds either first or second place. However, Seattle holds third place for robbery and for burglary. San Francisco (870.7) and Oakland (721.1) rank above Seattle (429.5) in robbery. (These cities also rank above Seattle in burglary.) Los Angeles (425.3) ranks fourth, Portland (352.7), fifth and Long Beach (287.8), sixth. Tacoma (165.6) is in ninth place and Spokane (90.9) is in thirteenth place. (Figure 8:3)

For the earlier three-year period, 1959-1961, Seattle was in eighth place with 66.0, Tacoma was in eleventh place with 44.2 and Spokane was in fourteenth place with 29.7. Los Angeles was in first place with 217.4, San Francisco second with 199.1, Sacramento third with 175.0 and Long Beach fourth with 150.3. In comparison with the incidence of crime for the 1968-1970 period, a rate of 217.4 would have been lower than seventh place. The lowest rate for the earlier series was 29.7 (Spokane) and the corresponding rate for the later series was 89.1 (San Jose). Again, these facts as well as many others in the two series reflect the unprecedented increase in crime during the decade of the 1960's.

A comparison of rank-order of the 14 cities for robbery in 1959-1961 and 1968-1970 is indicated by a ρ of .769.

Aggravated Assault. It will be observed from Figure 8:4 that rates for aggravated assault vary from a minimum of 60.0 for Spokane to a maximum of 513.7 for Los Angeles. San Francisco with 404.4 is second, Oakland (287.4) is third, Tacoma (229.0) fourth, Portland (201.7) fifth and Seattle (178.2) sixth.

Rates for aggravated assault for the earlier period, 1959-1961, varied from a minimum of 16.9 (Tacoma) to a maximum of 298.8 (Los Angeles). For both periods, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland held the same three top rankings, but as indicated, Tacoma shifted from last place in 1959-1961 to fourth place in 1968-1970. Spokane ranked thirteenth (18.9) in 1959-1961 and fourteenth (60.0) in 1968-1970. The coefficient of correlation between the rankings for the




Figure 8:3




Figure 8:4

two periods shows more shifting for aggravated assault than for any of the other crime categories except burglary. The ρ 's for both aggravated assault and burglary are .508.

Crimes Against Property

Burglary. In comparison with the other large Pacific Coast cities, the burglary rate in Seattle is relatively high. (Figure 8:5) Oakland reported the highest rate (3,774.5), San Francisco second highest (2,570.5) and Seattle third highest (2,481.8). Fresno (2,382.5) is fourth, Los Angeles (2,321.5) fifth and Portland (2,072.8) sixth. Tacoma (1,483.1) ranks eleventh and Spokane (1,272.2) thirteenth.

For the earlier series, 1959-1961, Los Angeles was in first place with 1,357.7. A rate of 1,357.7 in 1968-1970 would rank below twelfth place. Incidentally, San Jose with a rate of 1,392.4 in 1968-1970 ranked in twelfth place. For the 1959-1961 period the lowest rate--367.8--was recorded for the city of Spokane. For the more recent series, 1968-1970, San Diego (767.7) was the only city that showed a burglary rate of less than 1,000.0, whereas for the earlier series, 1959-1961, only one city, Los Angeles (1,357.7), reported a rate of more than 1,000.0. The rank-order relationship for the two series is $\rho = .508$.

Larceny \$50 and Over. The mean rates for larceny \$50 and over for the 14 Pacific Coast cities range from a minimum of 493.7 for San Jose to a maximum of 1,853.9 for Portland. (Figure 8:6) The second highest rate is 1,804.2 for Oakland; third highest, 1,745.9 for Fresno; and fourth highest, 1,726.9 for Seattle. Tacoma ranks eleventh with 1,131.2 and Spokane, twelfth with 968.8.

The earlier series of rates for larceny, covering the 1959-1961 period, varied from 236.5 for Santa Ana to 827.4 for Los Angeles. In other words, 13 cities had rates less than 827.4; however, in comparison with the later series, 1968-1970, only two cities Santa Ana (556.4) and San Jose (493.7) had rates lower than 827.4.

Portland's 1968-1970 rank of first place for larceny is unusual since its rankings for the six other index crimes are considerably lower--fifth for aggravated assault and robbery; sixth for burglary; seventh for forcible rape; and eighth for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and for automobile theft.

The correlation of rankings of the 14 cities for the two series of larceny is indicated by a ρ of .622.




Figure 8:5




Figure 8:6

Automobile Theft. Figure 8:7 clearly portrays the pronounced variation in rates for automobile theft among the 14 Pacific Coast cities. For example, the rate in San Francisco (2,155.2) is over five times as high as it is in Spokane (392.5). Seattle, with a rate of 889.1 is in fifth place, and Tacoma with a rate of 581.4 is in tenth place. Oakland with 1,450.3 ranks next highest to San Francisco, followed in rank-order by Los Angeles (1,159.7) and Fresno (1,095.4).

For the three-year period, 1959-1961, San Francisco also ranked in first place with a rate of 684.4, but Sacramento (617.6) ranked second, Los Angeles (570.3) third, Long Beach (546.9) fourth and Fresno (507.5) fifth. Seattle (394.3) ranked seventh, Tacoma (204.8) thirteenth and Spokane (168.9) fourteenth. The relationship in the rankings for the 1959-1961 and 1968-1970 series is indicated by a ρ of .741.


Violent Crimes Combined, Crimes Against Property Combined, and All Index Crimes Combined

Violent Crimes. It will be recalled that the category "violent crimes" represents a subtotal of four index crimes comprising murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Comparative data for this category are presented in Figure 8:8. The rates vary from 167.1 for Spokane to 1,355.2 for San Francisco--a differential ratio of over 8:1. Oakland ranks second with 1,078.9, Los Angeles third with 1,021.5, Seattle fourth with 654.4 and Portland fifth with 592.5. Tacoma ranks seventh with a mean rate of 431.5.

For the earlier series of data--1959-1961--the lowest rate is 55.6 for Spokane and the highest rate is 566.6 for Los Angeles--a differential ratio of 10:1. San Francisco (392.7) ranked second, Oakland (284.8) third, Long Beach (283.5) fourth and Sacramento (253.4) fifth. Seattle (122.2) ranked ninth, Tacoma (76.6) twelfth and Spokane (55.6) fourteenth. The comparative rankings for the two series is indicated by a ρ of .798.


Crimes Against Property. Crimes against property represents another subtotal consisting of burglary, larceny over \$50 and automobile theft. Comparative statistics for this category are portrayed in Figure 8:9. The mean rates for this series range from 2,546.6 for San Jose to 7,029.9 for Oakland. San Francisco (6,004.7) is second, Fresno (5,223.8) third and Seattle (5,097.8) fourth. Tacoma (3,195.7) is in tenth place and Spokane (2,633.6) is in twelfth place.

Comparable data for the three-year period, 1959-1961, vary from 782.6 for Spokane to 2,755.4 for Los Angeles. Sacramento (2,276.3) ranks second,



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Figure 8:7



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Figure 8:8




Figure 8:9

Long Beach (2,178.7) third, Fresno (1,964.0) fourth and San Francisco (1,866.5) fifth. Seattle (1,622.1) is in eighth place, Tacoma (1,042.7) is in thirteenth place and Spokane (782.6) is in fourteenth place. A comparison of the earlier (1959-1961) and later (1968-1970) series is summarized by a ρ of .582.

All Index Crimes Combined. Figure 8:10 presents graphically a comparison of rates for all of the seven index crimes combined for the three-year period, 1968-1970. Oakland with a mean rate of 8,107.9 is in first place followed in rank-order by San Francisco (7,359.9), Los Angeles (6,024.6), Seattle (4,752.2) and Fresno (5,555.6). Tacoma (3,627.2) is in tenth place and Spokane (2,800.7) is in thirteenth place. San Jose shows the lowest rate with 2,790.2.

For the earlier series, 1959-1961, Los Angeles (3,322.0) was in first place and Spokane (838.3) was in fourteenth place. Sacramento (2,529.7) was second, Long Beach (2,462.2) third, San Francisco (2,259.2) fourth and Fresno (2,137.0) fifth. Oakland (1,843.7) which ranked first for the recent period 1968-1970, was in sixth place for 1959-1961. For the earlier period Seattle ranked eighth and Tacoma thirteenth, respectively. The relationship between the rankings for the two series is fairly substantial, with a ρ of .758.

Summary and Conclusions. Perhaps the ten series of comparative crime data for the 14 large Pacific Coast cities can be summarized best by a tabulation of rankings for both the earlier and later periods. (Table 8:1) Oakland indicates the highest mean ranking (2.0) for the seven index crimes for the three-year period, 1968-1970; San Francisco (2.7) is second; Los Angeles (3.1) third; Seattle (4.4) fourth and Portland (5.7) fifth. Spokane with 13.0 has the lowest mean ranking and, of course, is in fourteenth place while Tacoma with a mean ranking of 8.7 is in ninth place. As might be expected, the rank-order based on mean rankings is very similar to the rankings for the series of rates for all index crimes combined. The rank-order for the top four cities--Oakland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle--is identical; but for the remaining cities there are several discrepancies. It would be unwarranted to assume that one of these measures is necessarily superior to the other.

Perhaps among the most significant facts in Table 8:1 are the differences as well as similarities in ranking between the later and earlier series. For the 1959-1961 series, Los Angeles is in first place with a mean ranking of 1.5, followed by Sacramento (3.3), San Francisco (4.3), Long Beach (4.4), Oakland (5.9) and Fresno (6.3). Seattle and Anaheim, with mean rankings of 8.0, are tied for seventh place. It will be observed that Oakland moved from fifth place in 1959-1961




Figure 8:10

TABLE 8:1
Comparison of Rankings of Rates for Two Series of Index Crimes for 14 Pacific Coast Cities with Populations of 150,000 and over in 1970: 1968-1970 and 1959-1961

City	Mean Rank Seven Crimes		Violent Crimes							
			Murder Nonneg Man		Forcible Rape		Robbery		Aggravated Assault	
	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961
Oakland	2.0	5.9	1	4	3	3	2	5	3	3
San Francisco	2.7	4.3	2	5	2	4	1	2	2	2
Los Angeles	3.1	1.5	3	2.5	1	1	4	1	1	1
Seattle	4.4	8.0	5	6	5	7	3	8	6	12
Portland	5.7	8.1	8	8	7.5	10	5	7	5	9
Fresno	6.4	6.3	4	2.5	11	11.5	8	6	12	8
Long Beach	6.9	4.4	6	11	4	2	6	4	7	4
Sacramento	7.7	3.3	7	1	10	5	7	3	8	6
Tacoma	8.7	10.8	9	9.5	6	6	9	11	4	14
Santa Ana	10.3	9.1	11	12	9	8	10	12	9	5
Anaheim	10.9	8.0	14	7	13	13	11	13	13	10
San Diego	10.9	9.1	10	9.5	12	9	12	9	11	7
San Jose	11.3	10.6	13	14	7.5	11.5	14	10	10	11
Spokane	13.0	13.6	12	13	14	14	13	14	14	13

City	Property Crimes						Total and Subtotals					
	Burglary		Larceny \$50 over		Auto Theft		Grand Total		Violent Crimes		Property Crimes	
	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961	1968 1970	1959 1961
Oakland	1	7	2	9	2	10	1	6	2	3	1	9
San Francisco	2	4	9	12	1	1	2	4	1	2	2	5
Los Angeles	5	1	5	1	3	3	3	1	3	1	5	1
Seattle	3	8	4	8	5	7	4	8	4	9	4	8
Portland	6	10	1	5	8	8	6	7	5	7	6	6
Fresno	4	9	3	2	4	5	5	5	9	6	3	4
Long Beach	8	2	10	4	7	4	8	3	6	4	8	3
Sacramento	10	3	7	3	6	2	7	2	8	5	7	2
Tacoma	11	12	11	10	10	13	10	13	7	12	10	13
Santa Ana	9	6	13	14	12	11	11	11	10	8	11	11
Anaheim	7	5	6	6	13	12	9	9	13	11	9	7
San Diego	14	13	8	7	11	9	12	12	11	10	13	12
San Jose	12	11	14	11	9	6	14	10	12	13	14	10
Spokane	13	14	12	13	14	14	13	14	14	14	12	14

to first place in 1968-1970; Sacramento dropped from second place in 1959-1961 to eighth place in 1968-1970; San Francisco shifted only slightly from third to second place; Los Angeles declined from first to third place; Seattle moved from seventh place in 1959-1961 to fourth place in 1968-1970. Fresno occupied sixth place for both series. Spokane was in last place for both series. Similarly, San Jose, Santa Ana and San Diego ranked relatively low in both series. Tacoma shifted from thirteenth place for 1959-1961 to ninth place for 1968-1970.

With regard to the respective rankings of the three Washington cities, Seattle's highest rank for the 1968-1970 series was third for both robbery and burglary; Seattle ranked fourth for larceny over \$50, fifth for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape and automobile theft, and sixth for aggravated assault. Spokane ranked twelfth for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and larceny over \$50, thirteenth for forcible rape, robbery and burglary, and fourteenth for aggravated assault and automobile theft. Tacoma's highest ranking was fourth for aggravated assault. Tacoma ranked sixth for forcible rape; ninth for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and robbery; tenth for automobile theft and eleventh for burglary and larceny over \$50.

CHAPTER 9

A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A CRIME INFORMATION AND RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ¹

Washington occupies the unenviable position of being one of the most backward states in the Union with respect to the availability of systematic and reliable crime data. In fact, according to a recent survey, Washington is one of only two states without a central records and identification system.² Neither does Washington have a centralized program for compiling crime statistics. Most states have such programs or are in the process of establishing them.

The Need for a State Crime Information and Research Center

Crime is a state matter and each state has either constitutionally or by statute defined crime within its boundaries. Each state has also defined the degree of, and the penalties for, violation together with the agencies and processes to be followed in the administration of criminal justice.

¹This presentation is designed to reflect the experience of many states, Federal governmental agencies, crime commissions and criminological, statistical and legal specialists. It is basically an integrated compilation of excerpts and resumés derived from various published and unpublished reports. Entire paragraphs and sections have been extracted verbatim from these sources. Two of the major sources of material included in this discussion are American Bar Association, Uniform Criminal Statistics Act (1946) and the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Crime and Its Impact--An Assessment (1967), pp. 123-137 and pp. 178-206. Other sources are cited in specific footnotes.

²Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice, "Survey of State Criminal Justice Information Systems" (Washington, D. C., September 25, 1970). The other state besides Washington that does not have a central records and identification system is Nevada.

It should be noted, however, that the Forty-second Legislature during the second extraordinary session in January-February, 1972, re-created a Bureau of Criminal Identification under the auspices of the State Patrol. This statute (Senate Bill 146) was signed by the Governor on February 25, 1972.

If a state establishes a statistical reporting system which reveals all aspects of the crime situation and gives sufficient leadership to collecting and processing such data, it will go a long way in carrying out its responsibilities to its citizens. Good management, good government--in short, an effective system of criminal justice is impossible without an adequate crime information program.³

A rational and efficient approach to the crime problem purely from an administrative point of view requires careful planning and guidance based on adequate and reliable data concerning crime and criminals as well as the performance of all the agencies and institutions involved in law enforcement, judicial procedure and treatment of criminals.

For example, with respect to law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to possess reliable information concerning the number, types, distribution, trends and other facts pertaining to the occurrence of criminal offenses as well as the number of arrests and the characteristics of arrestees. It also is essential to measure the effectiveness of the judicial system, the official actions of prosecutors and judges and the significance of various kinds of treatment programs including the consequences of sentences which are imposed. The efficient administration of custodial, reformatory and penal institutions, as well as the evaluation of different institutional programs, and probation and parole practices, are impossible without comprehensive and meaningful information concerning the basic elements and processes of the criminal justice system.

It indeed is paradoxical that we seem so dependent on trial-and-error techniques, hunches, emotionalism and tradition in dealing with crime and criminals. Certainly, the many billions of dollars which are expended annually in attempting to control crime in the United States could be directed more effectively and economically if sufficient effort were made to collect and properly utilize basic crime data in planning and decision-making processes.

In addition to the administrative value of an efficient crime information system, its importance in basic research cannot be overemphasized. There is a growing realization that crime and other serious problems that constantly press for solution cannot be dealt with effectively without a wider and deeper understanding of the forces and conditions producing them, and that this understanding can be attained only by thorough and scientific study.

³Quoted from James A. McCafferty, "Court Statistics: The Need for Them." Paper presented at Search Workshop, sponsored by Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Phoenix, Arizona, October 29, 1970.

In 1967, the National Crime Commission found that the criminal justice system's greatest need was the "need to know." That statement is no less true today as the nation enters the decade of the 1970's. Only with the help of research and development can the nation fully and meaningfully explore the vast unknowns of crime, crime reduction, crime prevention and the host of other problems plaguing the criminal justice system. The great advances in many parts of our national life--health, defense, space--are due in large measure to research. Similar progress through research is possible in the criminal justice field.⁴

In recent years, as the result of rapid and unprecedented proliferation of electronic computer technology, many administrative systems and methodological models and techniques have been developed. With certain modifications and adaptations several of these systems and techniques have been applied largely on an experimental basis to problems in the area of criminal justice.

One of the most promising and better-known innovations of this kind is Project SEARCH, an acronym for System for Electronic Analysis and Retrieval of Criminal Histories.⁵ The main goals of Project SEARCH are twofold: First, evaluate the technical feasibility and operational utility of a cooperative interstate transference of criminal history data. This particular objective is concerned with a more efficient control of crime through access to the criminal histories of known offenders. Eventually, it is projected that the interchange of information of this kind will be on a national scale. The need for such a system has long been recognized, and it must be computer-assisted to achieve the needed responsiveness. At the present time several states are involved in the initial prototypical development of this phase of SEARCH. After adequate experimentation and evaluation, recommendations will be made regarding the feasibility of an on-going, fully operational, nationwide system.

The second major objective of SEARCH is the development of a statistical system that would be sufficient to support decision-making in at least four general areas--planning and budgeting, monitoring, evaluation and general research. The proposal represents a computerized system based on the accounting of individual

⁴Quoted from National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, The Need to Know, pp. 1-3.

⁵Project Search, Standardized Data Elements for Criminal History Files, Technical Report No. 1, Sacramento, January, 1970; Project Search, Security and Privacy Considerations in Criminal History Information Systems, Technical Report No. 2, Sacramento, July, 1970.

offenders proceeding through the criminal justice system. The basic concept is referred to as "offender-based transaction statistics" which focusses on the individual person and tracks the processing of the individual from point of entry in the criminal justice system to point of exit. The offender-based transaction approach to criminal justice statistics accounts for and describes each encounter between individuals and the agencies in the system. This approach is a step toward a criminal justice statistics system, not a police system, nor a judicial system, nor a correctional system. The individual felony defendant is the unit of count. Such a system requires a comprehensive and detailed file on each "processed-defendant." The criminal history file would represent one aspect of the statistical activity of the state center of crime information and research.⁶

Obviously, Project SEARCH, or any other computerized system, is dependent on the existence of adequate and reliable data concerning crime and criminals as well as on the effective performance of all the agencies of criminal justice. Unless there are adequate and reliable data, the most elaborate, sophisticated and efficient administrative systems and analytical models and research methodologies are irrelevant and useless.

Objectives and Functions of a Crime Information and Research Center

Briefly, the objectives and functions of a Crime Information and Research Center may be summarized as follows:

1. It will serve as a potent educational force by informing the public and responsible governmental officials concerning the nature of the crime problem, its magnitude, its trend over time as well as other significant facts.
2. Measure the effects of prevention and deterrence programs, ranging from community action to police patrol.
3. Find out who commits crimes, by age, sex, family status, income, ethnic and residential background and other social attributes, in order to find the proper focus of crime prevention programs.

⁶Excerpted from Project Search, Statistical Steering Committee, Implementing Statewide Criminal Justice Statistics Systems--The Model and Implementation Environment, Technical Report No. 4 (Draft, January, 1972).

4. Measure the work load and effectiveness of the police, the courts, and the other agencies of the criminal justice system, both individually and as an integrated system.
5. Analyze the factors contributing to success and failure of probation, parole and other correctional alternatives for various kinds of offenders.
6. Provide criminal justice agencies with comparative norms of performance.
7. Furnish baseline data for research, as well as provide answers through research to many problems concerning crime and criminals.
8. Compute the costs of crime in terms of economic injury inflicted upon communities and individuals, as well as assess the direct public expenditures by criminal justice agencies.
9. Project expected crime rates and their consequences into the future for more enlightened government planning.
10. Assess the societal and other causes of crime and develop theories of criminal behavior.
11. Provide indispensable data for constantly developing computerized systems in the administration of criminal justice agencies and in the direct control of crime.⁷

A Crime Information and Research Center Statutory Essentials with Supplementary Comments and Explanations

Obviously, a crime information and research center for the state of Washington can be created only by legislative action. Fortunately, much can be learned from the experience of other states.

In addition, the Uniform Criminal Statistics Act, prepared by the National Conferences of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, represents a very substantial contribution in the formulation of specifications and standards for crime information centers. As long ago as 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (the Wickersham Commission) urgently recommended that each state should enact "a uniform state law" governing the gathering of crime statistics.

⁷The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Crime and Its Impact--An Assessment (1967), pp. 123-124.

The Wickersham Commission was concerned with the establishment of an adequate nationwide system of crime information, which was contingent on the creation of effective statewide systems. History graphically shows that comparatively little was done to implement the recommendations of the Wickersham Commission. In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice stated that: "In short the United States is today, in the era of the high speed computer, trying to keep track of crime and criminals with a system that was less than adequate in the days of the horse and buggy."

The following proposed statute, as well as the accompanying commentary, has been taken with certain modifications and abridgements from the 1946 Uniform Criminal Statistics Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association. We believe that the facts and principles embodied in these proposals can be used, perhaps with certain revisions and additions, as a sound and practicable basis in the preparation of a bill for legislative action. Hopefully, in spite of the extraordinary fiscal and other problems faced by the Legislature, there will be sufficient support to establish a crime information and research center. If the 1973 Legislature fails to act positively on this issue, it will be only a matter of time before such action is taken. The state of Washington simply cannot afford for very much longer not to establish a center of this kind.

SESSION LAWS, 1973⁸

CHAPTER

An Act relating to state government;
creating a state Crime Information and Research Center; prescribing
powers, duties and responsibilities of certain officers and individuals

- 1 Section 1. Crime Information and Research Center
- 2 A Crime Information and Research Center
- 3 (called the center) is established [in the office
- 4 of the attorney general] [as an independent agency]

⁸For an excellent summary of the activities, responsibilities and legal and organizational framework of the crime information and research centers of the states of California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota and New Jersey, see: Project Search, Statistical Steering Committee, Technical Report No. 4, op. cit.

Comment to Section 1.

The object of the Crime Information and Research Center is to act as a central agency which collects, analyzes and publishes statistical and other information drawn from reports supplied by all local and state officials or agencies concerned in any way with crime and criminals.

Strictly speaking, no state of the union possesses, at the present time, an independent Center or Bureau of Crime Information; that is, an agency which is solely devoted to this task and not attached to any specific state department. Most of the present information centers are administered as divisions of some state department set up to serve some other main function.

There are those who believe that a Crime Information Center should be an independent agency, devoting its entire effort in compiling crime information and in conducting research. The drawback in attaching a crime information and research center to some other agency is the possibility that it may be regarded as a stepchild which will suffer from lack of funds. Another drawback is the sensitivity and rivalry of in-line agencies which could hamper the work of the center if it happens to be subsidiary to one of them. Again, identification with a larger agency may lead to overemphasis on one type of information to the neglect of others. Perhaps an independent center would be in a better position to maintain an even balance. In any case, every effort must be made to avoid statistical and research work from becoming a side issue lacking competent supervision, adequate staff and sufficient funds for conducting an effective and vital operation.

- 1 Section 2. Director, Method of Appointment, etc.
- 2 The Governor [by and with the consent of the senate] [The Attorney
- 3 General] shall appoint the director of the center. He shall have statistical
- 4 training and experience and possess a knowledge of criminal law enforcement
- 5 and administration and of penal and correctional institutions and methods.
- 6 He shall devote all his time to the duties of his office. He shall be furnished
- 7 with the necessary facilities and equipment and shall appoint research, statis-
- 8 tical, clerical and other assistants necessary for the work of the center. All
- 9 expenses of the center shall be paid out of the appropriation made for its
- 10 work. All center personnel, including the director, shall be selected and
- 11 shall serve in accordance with the established merit system standards and
- 12 regulations.

Comment to Section 2.

It is hardly worthwhile to establish a center of crime information and research, unless provisions are made for placing at its head and on its staff persons who have the training and knowledge needed for its proper operation. It may be impossible to write detailed specifications of this kind into statute.

The director must be an outstanding administrator and statistician with training in the social sciences, a sound knowledge of criminology and penology, and several years of successful experience. Salaries must be adequate to insure the appointment of persons with required qualifications. In terms of present salary levels, a properly qualified director could demand a minimum salary of \$25,000 per annum. He should be assured of reasonable tenure, and would be subject to removal (except for moral turpitude) only for failure to fulfill his professional and technical responsibilities.

1 Section 3. Duties of Director.

2 The director shall:

3 (1) Collect data, necessary for the work of the center, from all
4 persons and agencies mentioned in section 4.5 (2) Prepare and distribute, to all such persons and agencies, forms
6 to be used in reporting data to the center. The forms shall provide for items
7 of information needed by federal bureaus or departments engaged in the devel-
8 opment of national criminal statistics.9 (3) Prescribe the form and content of records to be kept by such
10 persons and agencies to insure the correct reporting of data to the center.11 (4) Instruct such persons and agencies in the installation, mainte-
12 nance and use of such records and in the manner of reporting to the center.

13 (5) Tabulate, analyze and interpret the data collected.

14 (6) Supply data, at their request, to federal bureaus or departments
15 engaged in collecting national criminal statistics.16 (7) Annually present to the governor, on or before July 1, a printed
17 report containing the criminal statistics of the preceding calendar year; and
18 present at such other times as the director may deem wise or the governor
19 may request reports on special aspects of criminal statistics and other data.
20 A sufficient number of copies of all reports shall be printed for distribution
21 to all public officials in the state dealing with crimes or criminals and for
22 general distribution in the interest of public enlightenment.Comment to Section 3. Sub-Section (1)

Should the nature of the data to be collected by the center be left entirely to the discretion of the director or should the statute itemize such information? Existing statutes provide no uniform answer to this question.

There are good arguments for and against explicit directions to the center as to what items of data it would collect as well as what other functions it should perform. As for pro-arguments, the center is given a clear mandate and definite responsibilities and presumably there will be no serious omissions or holes in the type of data necessary for understanding and administering a system of criminal justice. Contra-arguments indicate that the center would be placed in a strait-jacket; compiling data and conducting research is a professional type of work and a good director should be free to develop his program in the best manner possible.

Comment to Sub-Section (2)

The provision which has reference to the federal bureaus is merely to make certain that the center collects items needed by the F. B. I., the Children's Bureau, etc., as an essential part in the development of nationwide, uniform and comparable statistics.

Comment to Sub-Section (3)

In order to insure proper standards and comparability, it is necessary to give to the director power to prescribe such standards for records which reporting agencies need to maintain in order to enable them to make the required reports to the center.

Comment to Sub-Section (4)

Correlated with the power of prescribing record systems is the power to give instructions to record clerks, etc., and how to install, maintain and utilize such systems insofar as they relate to the duty of reporting information to the center. This includes, in part, the preparation of instruction sheets to accompany the forms provided for in sub-section (2). Federal bureaus or departments collecting national statistics must, in the future, be able to rely upon state centers to supply the information.

Comment to Sub-Section (7)

The choice of the calendar year is desirable, since it affords the most logical basis for uniformity and comparability. All existing federal and state systems conform to the calendar year.

1 Section 4. Report to Center; Duties of Persons and Agencies.

2 Every constable, city marshal, chief of police; railroad, steamship,
3 park police; sheriff, coroner, medical examiner, jail keeper, justice, magis-
4 trate; judge, district attorney, court clerk; probation officer, parole officer,
5 warden or superintendent of a prison, reformatory, correctional school, men-
6 tal hospital or custodial school; school attendance officer, school security
7 officer, attorney general, department of motor vehicles, department of wel-
8 fare, state police, department of highways, state fire marshal, bureau of
9 vital statistics, liquor control board, and every other person or agency, pub-
10 lic or private, dealing with crimes or criminals or with delinquency or delin-
11 quents, when requested by the director, shall:

12 (1) Install and maintain records needed for reporting data required
13 by the center.

14 (2) Report to the center as and when the director prescribes, all
15 data demanded by him (except that such reports concerning a juvenile delin-
16 quent shall not reveal his or his parents' identity).

17 (3) Give the director or his accredited agent access to records for
18 purpose of inspection.

Comment to Section 4.

Every effort should be made to include by title every public official who has anything to do with criminals or delinquents in the state. Such specifications will be of help to the director of the center and will make every public official mentioned aware of his responsibility. In practice, only the heads of the different offices, etc., will be requested to supply information. The formula suggested in the statute makes the duty operative only when the Director of the center makes a request.

1 Section 5. Annual Report.

2 (1) The annual report of the director shall contain statistics showing
3 (a) the number and the types of offenses known to the public authorities; (b)
4 the personal and social characteristics of criminals and delinquents; and

5 (c) the administrative action taken by law enforcement, judicial, penal and
6 correctional agencies in dealing with criminals and delinquents.

7 (2) The director shall so interpret such statistics and so present
8 the information that it may be of value in guiding the legislature and those
9 in charge of the apprehension, prosecution and treatment of criminals and
10 delinquents, or those concerned with the prevention of crime and delinquency.
11 The report shall include statistics that are comparable with national criminal
12 statistics published by federal agencies heretofore mentioned.

Comment to Section 5.

Nearly all criminal statistics published today in the various states suffer from a lack of interpretation. The enormous amount of tabulated material, in such reports on crime statistics, is presented without explanation, to the great consternation of all consumers of statistics. Existing statutes pay no attention to this problem. It has therefore seemed desirable to introduce, in the second part of the section, a directive which compels the center to give an interpretation of all statistics included in the annual report. Furthermore, this requirement emphasizes the importance of the research and administrative functions of the center.

1 Section 6. Penalties.

2 If any public official required to report to the center neglects or
3 refuses to comply with the requests of the director for such report, or with
4 his rules governing record systems and their maintenance, the director
5 shall give written notice thereof to the officer charged with the issuance of
6 a warrant for the payment of the salary of such official. Upon the receipt
7 of this notice, such officer shall not issue a warrant for the payment of the
8 salary accruing to the official until notified by the director that the salary
9 has been released by the performance of the required duty. Any official
10 who makes, or causes to be made, a fraudulent return of information to
11 the center is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Comment to Section 6

Many of the statutes specify fines and a few even jail sentences or removal from office for failure to report to the center. A statute which requires the institution of civil actions or criminal prosecution of neglectful officials, when duties are of the type covered by this statute, would probably be unenforceable. Giving

to the director of the center the power merely to hold up the payment of salary should be a much more effective means of securing compliance.

Other minor sections such as interpretation, title, repeal of acts inconsistent with the present one and time of taking effect may be added to this statute.

A Brief Description of an Existing
Crime Information and Research Center

An example of the organizational structure and basic program of one of the older, better-known and more efficient centers for crime statistics--State of California Bureau of Criminal Statistics--is portrayed in the accompanying chart. (Figure 9:1) The center (bureau), with a director in charge, is located in the Division of Law Enforcement in the State Department of Justice under the Attorney General. The present director (chief), Mr. Ronald H. Beattie, a statistician of wide reputation has guided the activities and development of the center (bureau) for many years. It will be observed that there are three major divisions in the center (bureau) with a total of approximately 67 staff-members. The accompanying tabular form indicates the specific programs under each of the three major divisions along with the type of reporting system and coverage of each program. The bureau was created by statute in 1955 after operating under executive order since 1946. Previous to that, some limited statistical functions had been carried out by the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. In addition to the 67 staff members in the bureau, there are several persons involved in the statistical programs of the Department of Correction, Youth Authority, and Judicial Council. Also, the Bureau of Criminal Identification, while it is not involved in statistical analysis maintains two related functions. This bureau, which is located in the same division of the Justice Department as the Bureau of Criminal Statistics, is responsible for processing crime reports, fingerprints, and building criminal histories.

Of course, the size of the staff required for the Washington State Crime Information and Research Center probably would be considerably smaller. However, the difference in size between the Washington and California crime information centers cannot be gauged merely on the basis of the total populations of the respective states. In determining size and composition of staff, such factors as the following should be considered: relative work load based on the number of programs; type, amount and quality of data received; the number and efficiency of reporting agencies; the variety and volume of services demanded of the center; and the extent and quality of the research program.




Figure 9:1

Programs, Types of Reporting Systems and Coverage
California Bureau of Criminal Statistics

Program	Type Reporting System	Coverage
<u>Law Enforcement</u>		
Crime and arrests	- Summary	Statewide
Jails	- Individual line item	40 Counties
Individual felony arrests	- Individual card	34 Police agencies
<u>Courts and Probation</u>		
Superior Court Prosecutions	- Individual card	Statewide
Adult Probation	- Summary & Individual card	Statewide
Juvenile Probation	- Summary & Individual card	Statewide
Juvenile Detention		
--Halls	- Summary	Statewide
--Camps	- Individual	Statewide
<u>Criminal Careers</u>		
Drug Arrests & Dispositions	- Individual	Statewide
Career Cohorts	- Individual	Statewide

APPENDIX A

BOMBINGS IN THE CITY OF SEATTLE

Since 1968 a relatively unprecedented pattern of terroristic violence in the form of bombing has spread across the nation. If the increase in bombings continues unabated, the consequences could be more serious and devastating than the street rioting that rocked the country a few years ago. Seattle has not been immune to this form of terrorism. In fact, in the entire nation during 1969 and 1970, Seattle was the focal point of a bombing epidemic. Among all the cities in the country, on the basis of population size, Seattle ranked first in the prevalence of bombings, and in terms of actual number of bombings Seattle ranked in third place behind New York and Chicago. Since 1970, the number of bombings in Seattle has diminished very considerably.

However, for the country as a whole, the number of bombings has continued to increase. According to a news release of the International Association of Chiefs of Police dated January 6, 1972:

The year just ended was the worst in history for bombing incidents. . . .

In 2,054 incidents involving 2,563 explosive and incendiary devices, 207 people were injured and 18 were killed in the highest number of bombings ever recorded during one 12-month period.

What do the most recent facts concerning bombings indicate, especially with regard to geographic distribution, casualties, property damage, targets and motive or intent? In a countrywide survey covering the period, July 1970 through June 1971, 1,858 bombing incidents involving 2,352 devices were recorded by the National Bomb Data Center.¹

¹Jane P. Morton and Gary S. Persinger, Bombing in the United States, July 1970 - June 1971, Gaithersburg, Maryland: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1971, *passim*. Most of the following summary is based on direct quotations from this report.

Of the 1,858 incidents, 1,550 (83.4 percent) were reported to have at least one functioning device, while in 308 (16.6 percent) incidents the device or devices did not function. Incendiary incidents totalled 995 (53.6 percent), outnumbering explosive incidents, which totalled 863 (46.4 percent).

California dominated all other states in terms of bombing incidents with 391--325 functioning and 66 nonfunctioning incidents. This total represents 21.0 percent, or over one-fifth of all reported bombing incidents from July, 1970 through June, 1971. Second in total incidents was New York with 182, followed by Ohio with 172, Georgia with 101, Florida with 99, Illinois with 85, New Jersey with 76 and Michigan with 71. The state of Washington with 12 incidents during this period ranked thirtieth among the 50 states, Washington, D. C. and Puerto Rico. On the basis of population, however, Washington, D. C. ranked first with a rate of 27.8 per million, followed in rank-order by New Mexico (22.6), Georgia (22.0), California (19.6), Ohio (16.1), Florida (14.6) and Nevada (14.3). Washington and Iowa, both with a rate of 3.5, ranked 37.5 among the 50 states, Washington, D. C. and Puerto Rico. North Dakota, South Dakota, Arkansas and New Hampshire reported no bombings during this period.

Among the nine geographical regions of the United States, the Pacific region--Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington--ranked first in total incidents with 426 (22.9 percent), followed by the East North Central Region--Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin--with 386 (20.8 percent). The number of bombing incidents per million of population also places the Pacific Region at the top with 16.1, but the South Atlantic Region--Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Florida--is in second place with 11.4; the Mountain Region--Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and Nevada--is in third place with 9.8. The East North Central Region, which ranked second in actual number of cases, is in fourth place on the basis of population with 9.6 per million. The incidence of bombing is higher in large cities than in smaller cities and in unincorporated areas. Cities with populations ranging between 100,000 and 250,000 exhibited the highest rate with 23.4 per million and cities of 250,000 or more in population were second with 14.2. The rate for unincorporated areas was .5.

For the reporting period--July, 1970 through June, 1971--a total of 195 bombing casualties was recorded. The greatest number of casualties, 130 injuries and 10 deaths, was suffered by individuals who were neither public safety officials nor criminal bombers. Twenty-six injuries and six deaths were reported for

bombing suspects, while police personnel sustained twenty-two injuries and one fatality.

Although the Pacific Region ranked first in the number of bombing incidents, it ranked fourth in casualties--20 injuries and 5 deaths. The East North Central Region ranked first in casualties (50) followed by West North Central Region (40) and Middle Atlantic Region (37).

Of the 1,550 incidents involving detonating or igniting bombs, 750 reported a total of \$15,555,695 in property damage.

As a general rule, very few of the 1,858 reported incidents were preceded by any form of a warning. Only 57 incidents (3.1 percent) were preceded by a warning. Specifically, 41 of these were telephone warnings by males, 9 were telephone warnings by females, 2 were in the form of a notice to news media and 5 were contained in messages left or delivered to the scene.

The most frequent targets of bombing attacks were commercial or manufacturing facilities which were struck 705 times. Residential properties ranked second with 407; educational facilities, third with 297; vehicles, fourth with 167; recreational facilities, fifth with 140; and nonpolice governmental facilities, sixth with 133. Other target groups, such as police facilities, transportation facilities, military facilities, utilities, judicial facilities and miscellaneous and unknown, collectively accounted for 503 devices.

A complete and detailed breakdown of the 1,858 incidents and 2,352 devices by motive or intent is not possible, simply because the motive or intent could not be determined in many cases. As a result, 764 incidents and 925 devices have been placed in the unknown category. Of the classifiable motives, 338 devices and 263 incidents indicated racial protests. In addition, there were 205 incidents of juvenile vandalism; 118 incidents of political protest; 101, revenge; 80, other protest; 70, public safety harassment; 51, anti-war protest; 41, labor disputes; and 165, all other.

The sudden and unexpected pattern of bombing in Seattle in recent years is graphically revealed by the following statistics: In 1968 there were only 4 minor explosions representing \$8.00 in damages. In 1969, there were 32 explosions, 17 major and 15 minor, representing \$339,130 in damages; in addition, there were 129 bomb threats. In 1970, 41 explosions occurred, 23 major and 18 minor, resulting in \$101,132 in damages; there were 447 bomb threats. In 1971, there were 11 explosions, 2 major and 9 minor, causing \$7,100 in damage; there were 286 bomb threats. The statistical record of incendiary bombs during the past four years is as follows: 1968, 56; 1969, 42; 1970, 21; and 1971, 11.

The following excerpts from the testimony of Mayor Wesley Uhlman of Seattle and Major (now Assistant Chief) Neil W. Moloney of the Seattle Police Department before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate on July 29, 1970 contain a significant and reliable account of bombing in Seattle about the time the problem had reached its peak.²

* * *

TESTIMONY OF WESLEY UHLMAN

Mr. UHLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am pleased to have been asked to testify on the subject of bombings in the city of Seattle. Bombings have become an increasingly disturbing fact of life in our city. The public fear created by these bombings has become even more disturbing.

Apparently, Seattle has the dubious distinction of being No. 1 in the Nation in bombings per capita and No. 3, behind only New York and Chicago, in total number of bombings. Frankly, this honor we would be happy to relinquish.

All major cities look to this committee to assist us in solutions to this increasing menace. Law enforcement officials, citizens, judges and, to be sure, mayors, badly need your early and decisive action. We face one of the most serious national problems in many years of law enforcement, as we see the bomber strike at everything from a police precinct station to a university building.

It has been easy for Seattle citizens to distinguish between "dissent" and "terrorism"--at least when it comes to the use of explosives to express this "dissent." During the past 18-month period, from January of 1969 to June 30 of this year, there have been 31 bombing incidents resulting in property damage in excess of \$400,000. There have been 35 additional explosions which resulted in little or no damage.³ Since January of 1968, we have experienced a total of 115 bombing incidents.

Of the major incidents, over one-half occurred on the premises of public buildings, such as churches, schools, university buildings, post offices, and related public service institutions.

An equally frightening feature of bombings in our city is the number of bomb threats. During this same 18-month period, there were 347 bomb threats, delivered in almost every case by telephone. About 73 percent of these threats were made to retail business establishments, 14 percent to schools and 13 percent to residential dwellings.

I cannot state too strongly that I consider the bomb threats to be just as dangerous to the life of a great city as an actual bombing. Such threats are the catalyst to a vicious cycle of fear and distrust. A bomb threat generates fear of a danger which often becomes more pernicious than any real possibility of bomb damage. A bomb threat creates suspicion where there was none; it creates racial tension

²Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate--Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, Part 24, pp. 5523-5550.

³Since certain of the statistics relating to bombings are estimates, it is possible that minor discrepancies will be observed.

where there was none; it creates a pervasive fear throughout the city, and that fear creates an abrasive and ugly life style within the city.

Our city has been forced to make a major commitment of law enforcement resources in an attempt to control bombing activities. Since I took office 8 months ago, we formed a special arson squad in the fire department and a special bomb squad in the police department. We have assigned six patrolmen and two sergeants specifically to respond to bombing incidents. We have made specific efforts to improve our bombing incident information-gathering capability--even to the extent of developing an informational reward system. Special attention has been given to training all personnel in identification and handling of various bombing devices; and our police department is desperately looking for additional funds which would finance more effective training and essential equipment purchases.

Major Moloney will be going into that in some detail.

Our police force has made seven arrests in connection with bombings. Two suspects were killed in connection with bombing incidents. One was killed when a bomb exploded in his hands. The other was fatally wounded by a police officer as he was fleeing from the bombing scene.

Several of the arrested suspects were known to be associated with violence-prone organizations, such as the Seattle Liberation Front, Students for a Democratic Society, and the Black Panthers. These organizations have repeatedly advocated bombing activity and may possibly be a source of bombing materials. However, there is no substantial evidence that the bombings or threats were a part of an overall program by any of these groups. Our best information indicates that the bombings are most probably being perpetrated by individuals acting on their own initiative, in connection with a small group joined together for a single criminal act. It would appear that any analogy to systematic, organized crime, Mafia style, is not supported by available facts.

The site of most bombings in our city has been in the central area, which has a predominance of minority groups. The University of Washington district and adjacent business and residential areas are the second district of significant incidents. Most bombs, about 80 percent, are simple dynamite with multiple fuses attached to three to five dynamite sticks. Two efforts have been more ambitious, one was an explosion at the University of Washington in June 1969, in which approximately 100 pounds of dynamite was used, severely damaging the administration building.

I believe the time has come to treat the rash of bombings and bomb threats across the country as a major national problem.

It is not sufficient to measure the destruction of a bomb by property loss alone, for the damage to society by the fear burned into the minds of people when a bomb explodes far exceeds mere loss of property. . . .

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. N. W. MOLONEY

Major MOLONEY. Bombs, explosive devices, and even threats of bombings, have become matters of increasing concern to the Seattle Police Department. Since January 1969, incidents reported to the Seattle police involving bombings, bomb threats, and found explosive devices have mounted steadily. In 1969 there were 36 bombings, 128 recorded threats, and 15 incidents where explosive devices were recovered. In just the first 6 months of 1970 there have been 30 bombings in Seattle, 219 recorded bomb threats, and 29 incidents of found explosives.

Not all of the bombings have resulted in serious damage or injury, for example, deliberate and serious efforts were made to bomb a municipally owned swimming pool under construction in the predominantly Negro central area of Seattle in

November 1969, and again in January 1970. In both instances only superficial damage was done to the pool's foundation.

Several deliberately set explosions in the past year in Seattle have caused considerable damage; an explosion at the University of Washington in June of 1969, in which an estimated 100 pounds of dynamite was used, caused at least \$300,000 damage; \$15,000 damage was done to an apartment under construction on December 1, 1969. It is almost impossible to assess the actual value (in terms of wages and lost production) due to these bombings or of the time expended in evacuating the many businesses and numerous schools which received bomb threats. In 1969 approximately 3,000 persons had to be evacuated until threatened premises could be searched or explosive devices removed. During the first 6 months of 1970 approximately 1,200 persons were similarly inconvenienced.

Prior to 1969, bombs and related explosions were a relatively infrequent occurrence in Seattle. During the 5-year period from 1955 to 1960 only two dozen cases were reported to the Seattle Police Department. Of those, a series of four in less than 3 years was related to a business rivalry between a local association of coin machine operators (pinball and music machines) and certain individuals who wished to wrest from the association more machine locations. Even a city mayoralty candidate's car was damaged by one of these bombs. However, all of these bombings had certain characteristics in common; the explosive used was dynamite, the explosion resulted from a lighted fuse, rather than from a mechanical detonating device, there appeared to have been care exercised in order that no lives be lost or endangered, comparatively small amounts of explosives were used, the bombs were hurriedly placed and no attempt was made to cause extensive damage or great monetary loss. Many investigative hours were expended in the investigation of these occurrences, but there was insufficient evidence on which to base a criminal prosecution.

It cannot be denied that a number of local bombings and related incidents have been politically motivated. It is known that several of the persons responsible are, or have been, active participants in radical groups such as the Black Panthers, the Students for a Democratic Society, and the Seattle Liberation Front.

Building contractors engaged in federally funded projects have been prominent in the suspicions raised by the bombing activities involving construction sites. An injunction was in effect for a period of time early in 1970 enjoining the contractors from engaging in any violence or disrupting in any way the federally funded model cities program. "Minuteman" literature was left at the scene of a pipe bomb explosion at the Seattle Civic Center in February of 1969. A homemade black powder bomb complete with a timing device was detonated in May of 1969, just outside a building housing a military display at the Seattle Civic Center; damage (mostly glass breakage) was limited to about \$600.

It is unknown what motivated the persons responsible for the bombing at the University of Washington Administration Building on June 29, 1969; the suspects have not as yet been identified. However, the university, like many others around the country, has been a target of very active antiwar activity because of the ROTC program and recruiting on campus by corporations with defense contracts.

A Seattle City Light substation was damaged by a dynamite explosion on November 12, 1969. That same night a five-stick dynamite bomb, which did not explode was found just outside a telephone company building, six blocks from the City Light station.

On November 19, 1969, three dynamite explosions in a half-hour period occurred during the night in Seattle's predominantly Negro central area. Approximately \$3,000 damage occurred in a building housing the Central Branch of Seattle Community College; earlier there had been demonstrations led by the Black Student Union (BSU), protesting policies of the community college. A Safeway store

was damaged appreciably and two employees were injured slightly; Safeway Stores, Inc. had refused to contribute money and food to the Black Panthers. A municipally owned swimming pool under construction was damaged slightly, local building contractors had criticized the project because an insufficient number of Negroes were being employed on the construction.

In December 1969, considerable damage from a dynamite bomb occurred to an apartment, intended for low-income persons, which was under construction in the predominantly Negro central area of Seattle. Also in December 1969, an office housing a division of the model cities program was severely damaged by a dynamite explosion.

In January 1970, a young activist couple, Silas and Judith Bissell, both known SDS members, were apprehended placing a bomb under the steps of an Air Force ROTC building at the University of Washington. This couple later forfeited \$25,000 bail each on charges of endangering life and property with explosives. Bench warrants are now outstanding for both. On March 3, 1970, four young men, two of them SDS members, the other two SDS sympathizers, were arrested after setting a dynamite bomb which damaged a U.S. Post Office branch building and vehicle. These same persons had been active in local political demonstrations with the SDS and Seattle Liberation Front. Some of these people were involved in the 1968 riots in Chicago at the Democratic Convention.

On January 19, 1970, a dynamite bomb exploded at the Liberal Arts Building on the Seattle University campus. The damage amounted to \$2,200. Witnesses observed three Negro males running from the scene. This private Catholic University has been the object of disturbances lead by the Black Student Union.

On January 28, 1970, a synagogue, the Temple DeHirsh, sustained \$3,000 damage as a result of a dynamite bomb placed at the front doors.

On March 20, 1970, a pipe bomb filled with marbles was exploded at the Helen Bush School which is a private girls' school located on the edge of the central area. No threats had been made prior to the explosion and no reason for the bombing has ever come to light.

The University of Washington was the victim of another explosion on February 20, 1970; two dynamite bombs, only one of which exploded, were placed at a construction site of the new School of Architecture building; fortunately, there was little damage. Three days prior to this, a citizen found an unexploded gasoline bomb under a corner of the Armory on the University of Washington campus and the following month two homemade dynamite bombs loaded with 1 inch nails did considerable damage to some parked vehicles belonging to the University Security Police.

The homes of two State legislators, both white and both living in the predominantly Negro central area of Seattle, were damaged by separate dynamite bomb explosions during the spring of 1970. Approximately \$1,000 damage was caused to the home of a State senator who has since moved to another area of the city but plans to run for election in his new district. On April 19, 1970, a dynamite bomb placed at the front door of a State representative's home did considerable damage. He does not plan to resume his political career as a result of this act.

Following these two bombings police personnel were assigned to guard the homes of other political leaders, both State and local, over a period of several weeks.

On the same night of the bombing of the State representative's home, three other serious bombings, all believed to have been caused by dynamite, occurred in Seattle's predominantly Negro central district in a period of 15 minutes. Approximately \$2,000 damage was inflicted on the Japanese Presbyterian Church; \$4,000 damage was inflicted on a real estate office owned by a white businessman handling property primarily in the Negro residential area of the city; and about \$2,000 damage was done to a white-owned drive-in restaurant under construction.

The telephone company again suffered about \$2,000 damages when another of its buildings was damaged by a dynamite explosion in June of this year. An attempt was made to damage another telephone company building during the same month by means of an incendiary device. The month before two public telephone booths were completely destroyed in south Seattle by dynamite bombs detonated 12 minutes apart.

Two cases in particular have been of special significance to the Seattle Police Department in the first half of 1970. The first of these involved the bombing of Fuson's Department Store on January 13, 1970. The store had been owned and operated by the same white business family, at the same location in the predominantly Negro central district of Seattle for 50 years. On January 8, 1970, Fuson shot and killed a 19-year-old Negro male while this person was attempting to commit a robbery. The deceased's accomplice was wounded and later charged and convicted of attempted robbery. Mr. Fuson received telephone threats following the incident and police units were detailed to keep a surveillance on his store. The surveillance was discontinued after a few days, and on January 13, the store was bombed during the night. Damage to the store and to neighboring establishments was estimated at approximately \$17,000. Police protection of Mr. and Mrs. Fuson, their store and home, was continued until the end of February. 2,000 man-hours were expended in this effort. On May 18, 1970, Mr. and Mrs. Fuson filed suit against the city of Seattle, charging that insufficient effort was made to protect their property. Later, the Seattle Police Department was advised that Mr. Fuson was moving his remaining stock and business out of the city of Seattle.

Seattle police received information in early May that another bomb would be detonated at the Hardcastle Realty. This same white-owned realty had been bombed on April 19, 1970. Officers were watching the premises when a young Negro male was seen to approach the building; the man set an object down at the front door and the officers could see the reflection of a flame as he attempted to light the fuse. He was ordered by the officers to stop, but ran from the scene. One of the officers ordered him to stop again and when he refused, the suspect was killed. He succeeded in lighting the fuse, but the bomb did not detonate. The device was found to consist of three sticks of dynamite, taped together with a fuse and blasting cap.

Further investigation of this case identified the deceased as Larry Eugene Ward, age 22, a discharged serviceman who had served in Vietnam, but who had also been arrested for burglary in Tacoma, Wash., on March 19, 1970. He had admitted his complicity in this crime and on May 11, just 4 days before his death, he was convicted of burglary and sentenced to 3 years in prison, deferred on condition he not engage in further criminal activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand he was out on probation? He had pled guilty to burglary?

Major MOLONEY. He pled guilty to burglary and received a deferred sentence.

* * *

Mr. UHLMAN. At the risk of not sounding, and I hope I am not being demagogic, this is certainly one difficulty we have had in terms of dealing with these problems by the courts. We apprehended a young man with dynamite in the trunk of his car. He publicly stated his mission in life was to blow up the military recruiting station inside our city limits. This is what he stated his life purpose to be. He was convicted of possessing this dynamite, having been found in the trunk of his car and was given 6 months deferred sentence. He is on the streets again.

* * *

Major MOLONEY. Continuing the reference to this particular case, Mr. Chairman, the feelings among the younger, more militant black citizens have run very high since the Ward shooting, and large numbers of them filled all available space at the coroner's inquest which followed. The coroner's jury, with a split decision of three to two, found that the would-be bomber died by criminal means. Considerable criticism has been leveled at the King County prosecutor because no criminal charges were filed against the officer who shot Ward.

On July 3, 1970, a dynamite bomb accounted for more than \$3,000 damage to the University Federal Savings and Loan Building in Seattle. Information received by the Seattle Police Department indicated that this was in retaliation for the shooting of Ward. This case is still under investigation.

Incidentally, since this statement was prepared, we have been supplied with a clipping from the Berkeley Barb, an underground newspaper in Berkeley, that a group of the Seattle Liberation Front in Seattle are taking credit for this last particular bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. A little later, not now, I want you to tell us what this Seattle Liberation Front is.

Go ahead.

Major MOLONEY. It is difficult to categorize the various bombings which have occurred in Seattle during the past year and one-half. Suspicions based both upon information from confidential informants and logic direct attention to certain conclusions but it is difficult to prove these suspicions. The attacks have seemed indiscriminate in some respects, yet certain types of establishments have emerged as more likely victims: businesses which have refused the extortion attempts of the Black Panthers; schools such as the University of Washington which has an extensive ROTC program; and construction firms engaged in Federal contracts which do not employ Negroes--have all been targets.

Banks, as visible signs of "the establishment" have sustained considerable damage as a result of everything from rocks to dynamite. Public buildings seem particularly vulnerable, and, as a result of possible threat earlier this year, security measures had to be taken at the public safety building housing the Seattle Police Department. During civil disturbances these security forces have been increased considerably.

Certain laws are in effect in the State of Washington regarding explosives: possession of an explosive device with intent to use it for an unlawful purpose, endangering life and property by explosives, and damaging buildings or vehicles by explosives are all felony offenses, the maximum penalties for these offenses vary. Keeping or transporting explosives in a manner prohibited by law is a gross misdemeanor. Since early this year there has been stricter control regarding the purchase of explosives; licensed dealers are now required to keep careful records of amounts sold and to whom.

However, it is felt that much of the dynamite illegally used in Seattle has been obtained by criminal means, usually stolen from construction sites outside the city. Such dynamite has often been stored improperly or inadequately protected from such thefts. We recommend that the burden of responsibility be placed upon the legal owners of explosives to store them in the most secure manner possible and that certain minimum standards be set by law for such storage.

Of special concern to law enforcement is the delay in the "speedy trial process" which allows a subject to post bond and remain at large over a period of several months or to continually receive postponements in the trial date. The Seattle Police Department has expended several thousand dollars recently to provide protection for witnesses of bombings, because of threats made upon their lives. . . .

APPENDIX B

DIFFERENTIALS AND COMPONENTS OF URBAN SUICIDE¹

Suicidal behavior is of interest and significance in a study of this kind for at least two basic reasons. First, attempted suicide in the state of Washington is defined by statute as a crime.² On the other hand, completed suicide by the very nature and finality of the act, obviously could not be considered a crime. However, behavioristically, attempted and completed suicide have many common characteristics.³

A second reason is that suicide and crime as well as many other social problems such as alcoholism, divorce, drug addiction, mental disorders and juvenile delinquency involve similar factors and processes.⁴ Accordingly, we believe that the results of the study of suicide presented in this appendix shed more light on differential social characteristics of the large American city, particularly the more important components of social disorganization and deviant behavior, than could be derived from an analysis of available crime data. Unfortunately, crime data are not sufficiently comparable and reliable to warrant the type of intensive analysis utilized in this appendix. It will be recalled from Chapter 8, that because of limitations and inadequacies of the data considerable caution was followed in

¹Written in collaboration with Kazuo Kusano, Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Calgary, and doctoral candidate in sociology, University of Washington.

²See RCW 9.80.020. Aiding, abetting or counseling suicide are also felonies. See RCW 9.80.030, 9.80.040 and 9.80.050.

³See, for example, Calvin F. Schmid and Maurice Donald Van Arsdol, "Completed and Attempted Suicides: A Comparative Analysis," American Sociological Review, Vol. 20 (June 1955), pp. 273-283.

⁴Marshall B. Clinard, Anomie and Deviant Behavior: A Discussion and Critique, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1964, passim.

developing the analysis and discussion of comparative crime rates for the 14 large Pacific Coast cities.

The fact that Seattle ranks close to the top among large American cities in the incidence of suicide also gives emphasis to the importance and relevance of the problem to the present study. During the 50-year period, 1909-1911 to 1959-1961, Seattle averaged third highest in suicide among 93 American cities. Only San Francisco and Sacramento ranked higher.

In the analysis of differentials and components of urban suicide, it has been possible to compile complete, comparable and reliable data for all 130 cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 1960. In addition, a continuous record of suicide covering a 50-year period was obtained for 93 of these cities.

Over 40 years ago, in a brief exposition of suicide differentials among large American cities, the senior author of this monograph concluded that "in the light of the data presented herein, and with due regard to their deficiencies, it is fair to conclude that mobility of population appears to be one of the outstanding determinative factors in the varying suicide rates among the large American cities."⁵

It is the purpose of the present study to pursue in more detail urban suicide differentials, patterns, trends and components, including a reassessment of the original hypothesis of population mobility.

Cities Included in Study

In studying a problem of this kind, the first step, of course, is to consider the incidence of suicide in a sample of large cities, including a careful analysis of differentials, patterns, and components, especially over a period of time.

To begin with, all American cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 1960 were selected as the primary sample. Mean suicide rates per 100,000 of total population were computed for each triennial period, centered in decennial census years, beginning with 1959-1961 and extending back to 1909-1911. Inevitably, because of lack of data, there are gaps in the historical records of several cities.

In the primary sample, based on all cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 1960, 130 cities were included. In 1949-1951, there also were 130 cities; in 1939-1941, there were 129; in 1929-1931, 124; in 1919-1921, 113; and in 1909-1911, 98. A few cities that had populations of 100,000 or more in 1960 were

⁵Calvin F. Schmid, Suicides in Seattle, 1914 to 1925: An Ecological and Behavioristic Study, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1929, p. 56.

virtually nonexistent in 1910, and even later. Furthermore, although every effort was made to obtain suicide data from state and local registrars for earlier years, there were many instances where data were not available. It will be observed that complete records covering the entire fifty years have been compiled for 93 cities.

In a longitudinal study in which the politically defined city is used as the basic unit of analysis, serious questions arise concerning the comparability of the units not only with respect to a given point in time but, more especially, over a period of time. It is obvious that for any given point in time, the cities in our sample vary markedly in population size, territorial size and in many other characteristics. Furthermore, when comparisons are made over a period of half a century, differences become more pronounced and complicated. Even if it were considered more desirable to use some unit of analysis defined in terms of "natural area" rather than "political area" it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to do so because of the paucity of data, as well as the fact that reporting systems for vital statistics and other data are organized on the basis of clearly defined administrative areas as determined by political and governmental structure. The various cities as they have been selected for this study do possess specific, traditional, well-known and meaningful identities.

Furthermore, in this connection it is pertinent to point out that in a parallel examination of political-city, urbanized-area and SMSA data centered around 1960, Hadden and Borgatta concluded "that generalizations about urban phenomena should be relatively constant independently of the type of data used."⁶

Variation of Suicide: A Preliminary Summary

For the three-year period, 1959-1961, Table B:I shows that the incidence of suicide ranges from 6.6 per 100,000 of total population for Knoxville and Providence, to 28.1 for San Francisco. The median rate is 10.4 and the mean rate, 11.3. There are 52 cities, or 40.0 percent, with rates under 10.0 per 100,000 of population, one with a rate of over 25.0, two with rates between 20.0 and 24.9, and 14, or 10.8 percent, with rates between 15.0 and 19.9. The ten highest ranking cities for the 1959-1961 period are San Francisco (28.1), Sacramento (21.9), Miami (20.2), Oakland (19.8), Pasadena (19.8), St. Petersburg (19.8), Seattle (19.7), Glendale (19.5), Los Angeles (19.2) and Long Beach (18.7).

⁶ Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, American Cities, Their Social Characteristics, Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1964.

TABLE B:I
Suicide Rates per 100,000 of Total Population[#]
American Cities with Populations of 100,000 or More in 1960: 1909-11 to 1959-61

City	1960 Population Rank	1959-1961		1949-1951		1939-1941		1929-1931		1919-1921		1909-1911	
		Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank
Akron, Ohio	45	9.4	86	10.3	82	14.7	67	14.9	89	11.8	74	19.8	44
Albany, N. Y.	93	7.2	121	10.9	72	13.0	87	14.9	89	14.7	43	18.0	51
Albuquerque, N. Mex.	60	15.7	15	9.3*	96	14.1	73	26.3	13	†	†	†	†
Allentown, Pa.	116	12.9	30	12.5	46	17.9	32	19.1	51	12.7	63	10.9	85
Amarillo, Tex.	88	8.0	110	15.3	24	11.0	108	†	†	†	†	†	†
Anaheim, Calif.	123	10.9	56	10.3*	82	3.0	129	12.1	113	†	†	†	†
Atlanta, Ga.	24	11.4	44	11.2	65	13.9	46	18.5	58	13.1	58	14.8	70
Austin, Tex.	67	12.2	37	7.0	118	9.1	121	†	†	†	†	†	†
Baltimore, Md.	6	10.5	63	11.8	56	13.8	49	19.2	49	13.4	53	17.0	61
Baton Rouge, La.	80	9.2	92	6.6	121	15.4	57	8.7	123	12.2	69	†	†
Beaumont, Tex.	102	10.4	66	7.4	115	13.5	83	13.9	103	10.7	85	†	†
Berkeley, Calif.	114	13.9	14	17.6	16	21.0	26	21.9	30	13.5	36	14.8	70
Birmingham, Ala.	36	9.9	79	7.0	118	13.7	81	17.1	72	8.8	100	13.8	77
Boston, Mass.	13	7.4	118	11.9	53	11.7	99	14.6	94	13.6	52	17.6	56
Bridgeport, Conn.	79	10.0	77	11.3	63	17.7	33	16.4	75	14.4	43	26.8	19
Buffalo, N. Y.	26	7.3	119	9.0	100	11.1	105	14.0	102	10.4	89	12.8	81
Cambridge, Mass.	119	8.7	99	7.2	117	15.9	46	12.3	112	8.5	104	7.6	92
Camden, N. J.	103	9.7	83	11.0	70	10.5	114	21.3	34	11.5	75	15.9	66
Canton, Ohio	109	13.5	26	9.8*	89	12.9	89	19.1	51	13.9	75	13.9	75
Charlotte, N. C.	59	8.4	104	7.0	118	8.6	122	12.5	109	5.0	112	13.2*	79
Chattanooga, Tenn.	92	11.0	53	6.1	125	13.3	85	13.1	108	17.3	26	†	†
Chicago, Ill.	2	9.3	89	10.9	72	13.8	78	17.4	67	15.3	38	21.2	30
Cincinnati, Ohio	21	11.0	53	13.5	33	16.2	44	23.9	21	16.0	33	18.6	48
Cleveland, Ohio	8	10.9	56	10.9	72	17.2	36	20.7	40	13.7	51	20.3	37
Columbus, Ga.	104	12.3	36	14.2	29	13.8	78	17.0	73	†	†	†	†
Columbus, Ohio	28	10.4	66	11.1	68	17.1	37	19.0	53	10.0	93	23.7	26
Corpus Christi, Tex.	74	7.6	116	12.0	52	18.6	28	†	†	†	†	†	†
Dallas, Tex.	14	9.2	92	7.8	112	16.8	38	18.8	54	16.8	31	†	†
Dayton, Ohio	49	7.2	121	13.9	30	16.6	41	16.4	75	12.2	69	23.2	21
Dearborn, Mich.	110	10.0	75	13.2*	36	7.9	125	11.9*	114	†	†	†	†
Denver, Colo.	23	17.7	11	20.0	9	26.6	6	24.1	20	20.4	14	34.8	5
Des Moines, Iowa	55	9.2	92	13.1	37	10.8	110	20.6	41	†	†	†	†
Detroit, Mich.	5	11.3	46	4.1	95	11.3	103	17.3	69	10.5	87	20.8	32
Duluth, Minn.	122	13.4	27	14.7	25	26.4	7	21.0	26	17.9	22	17.0	61
Elizabeth, N. J.	120	7.1	125	9.7	97	9.7	117	16.0	73	8.7	102	20.4	36
El Paso, Tex.	46	10.5	63	6.1	125	14.8	64	23.1	25	27.1	4	†	†
Erie, Pa.	87	8.4	104	9.2*	97	12.0	95	13.3	48	11.1	83	17.0	61
Evansville, Ind.	86	8.7	99	11.9	53	16.8	38	17.9	65	11.3	79	20.1	41
Flint, Mich.	62	12.0	39	11.4	60	14.5	70	13.2	107	7.3	107	†	†
Fort Wayne, Ind.	78	8.6	101	9.2	97	14.1	73	24.6	18	11.2	89	20.3	37
Fort Worth, Tex.	34	11.2	48	10.2	85	15.0	62	22.2	20	†	†	†	†
Fresno, Calif.	90	12.2	37	14.6	27	26.4	7	22.8	26	20.7	13	22.8	28
Gary, Ind.	70	11.0	53	12.9	40	13.7	81	15.3	85	13.2	55	38.7*	3
Glendale, Calif.	101	19.5	8	18.8	13	20.2	24	14.4	98	14.8*	41	†	†
Grand Rapids, Mich.	71	10.3	68	8.9	103	12.8	90	15.0	88	13.1	58	16.6	64

[#] Before 1937 cases allocated according to place of occurrence, after that date, according to residence.

TABLE B:1
Suicide Rates per 100,000 of Total Population[#]
American Cities with Populations of 100,000 or More in 1960: 1909-11 to 1959-61 (Continued)

City	1960 Population Rank	1959-1961		1949-1951		1939-1941		1929-1931		1919-1921		1909-1911	
		Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank
Greensboro, N. C.	99	9.8	81	5.8	128	9.6	118	18.7	55	1.7	113	6.3*	93
Hammond, Ind.	112	8.1	108	11.0	70	10.4	116	15.5	84	14.8	41	27.1	17
Hartford, Conn.	77	9.7	83	11.6	57	13.8	78	14.4	98	17.4	24	24.3	22
Honolulu, Hawaii	43	8.5	103	10.7*	79	15.6	54	23.3	23	24.6*	6	†	...
Houston, Tex.	7	9.8	81	12.9	40	15.1	61	21.0	36	14.7	43	†	...
Indianapolis, Ind.	26	13.2	29	14.4	28	17.5	34	21.9	30	15.5	36	28.5	13
Jackson, Miss.	84	8.8	96	9.5	94	8.0	124	11.7	116	24.8	5	†	...
Jacksonville, Fla.	61	9.4	86	12.4	48	15.4	57	18.5	58	13.1	58	17.3	59
Jersey City, N. J.	47	8.0	110	8.0	110	11.1	105	11.0	120	9.8	95	19.7	46
Kansas City, Kans.	98	11.2	48	10.8	76	14.8	64	14.8	91	14.2	47	17.8	55
Kansas City, Mo.	27	13.3	28	11.4	60	16.4	43	22.4	28	20.4	14	30.2	12
Knoxville, Tenn.	111	6.6	129	10.2	85	7.8	126	14.8	91	9.0	99	17.4	58
Lansing, Mich.	118	10.5	63	11.6	57	9.3	119	18.3	61	10.5	87	13.9	75
Lincoln, Nebr.	95	12.4	34	6.6*	121	11.8	97	12.7	110	9.7	97	15.2	67
Little Rock, Ark.	117	12.4	34	13.7*	31	14.8	64	20.8	39	†	...	†	...
Long Beach, Calif.	35	18.7	10	20.5	8	22.3	16	20.4	42	24.6	6	28.1*	15
Los Angeles, Calif.	3	19.2	9	19.5	11	27.3	4	25.1	16	24.3	10	31.8	10
Louisville, Ky.	31	11.8	40	11.4	60	14.6	69	18.3	61	15.9	34	17.9	53
Lubbock, Tex.	94	7.8	114	7.4	115	15.7	51	†	...	†	...	†	...
Madison, Wis.	96	11.6	41	12.5	46	17.3	35	29.9	8	7.0	109	20.9	31
Memphis, Tenn.	22	8.1	108	5.8	128	8.1	123	18.3	61	12.1	71	23.9	25
Miami, Fla.	44	20.2	3	15.6	23	18.8	27	21.7	32	18.6*	19	†	...
Milwaukee, Wis.	11	10.2	70	10.7	79	16.6	41	20.1	45	15.0	40	20.7	33
Minneapolis, Minn.	25	12.8	31	11.3	63	16.8	38	24.8	17	17.2	28	19.9	42
Mobile, Ala.	58	6.7	127	5.9	127	9.3	119	15.2	86	8.8	100	12.9	80
Montgomery, Ala.	89	11.4	44	7.8	112	10.7	111	12.6	111	9.2	98	8.7	89
Nashville, Tenn.	73	11.1	51	11.1	68	14.1	73	21.2	35	10.1	92	14.5	72
New Bedford, Mass.	123	7.2	121	11.9	53	13.0	87	18.1	64	10.7	85	11.4	84
New Haven, Conn.	81	8.6	101	11.2	65	18.9	26	16.0	78	14.4	45	18.2	50
New Orleans, La.	15	6.7	127	6.5	124	11.4	101	16.0	78	12.5	65	17.1	60
New York, N. Y.	1	9.4	86	10.3	82	15.7	51	20.1	45	13.2	55	17.6	56
Newark, N. J.	30	10.2	70	12.1	50	14.1	73	20.3	43	14.2	47	20.2	39
Newport News, Va.	108	7.3	119	13.4	34	6.3	127	8.7	123	10.3	90	†	...
Niagara Falls, N. Y.	126	7.8	114	7.7	114	13.2	86	16.6	122	7.2	108	32.8	7
Norfolk, Va.	41	10.3	68	11.2	65	15.7	51	16.2	77	11.5	75	19.8	44
Oakland, Calif.	33	19.8	4	16.4	19	23.7	15	26.9	12	23.7	11	32.6	8
Oklahoma City, Okla.	37	10.8	59	9.2	97	11.7	99	15.6	82	19.7*	17	†	...
Omaha, Nebr.	42	9.3	89	12.7*	42	22.3	16	31.2	6	20.4	14	31.4	11
Pasadena, Calif.	105	19.8	4	16.3	20	24.0	14	21.5	33	12.5	65	7.7	91
Paterson, N. J.	85	10.0	77	15.8	22	15.8	49	23.3	23	13.2	55	20.2	39
Peoria, Ill.	123	16.2	13	12.2	49	15.5	56	20.3	43	17.1	29	†	...
Philadelphia, Pa.	4	10.1	75	8.4	106	13.9	77	17.2	71	12.5	65	17.9	53
Phoenix, Ariz.	29	11.6	41	19.7	10	27.0	5	38.1	4	†	...	†	...
Pittsburgh, Pa.	16	10.8	59	10.8	76	11.0	108	14.5	96	11.2	80	20.5	35
Portland, Ore.	32	14.3	20	19.3	12	24.4	11	31.0	7	18.2	21	26.9	18

Before 1937 cases allocated according to place of occurrence. after that date, according to residence.

PART II

1 OF 2

CONTINUED

TABLE B:1
Suicide Rates per 100,000 of Total Population[#]
American Cities with Populations of 100,000 or More in 1960: 1909-11 to 1959-61 (Continued)

City	1960 Population Rank	1959-1961		1949-1951		1939-1941		1929-1931		1919-1921		1909-1911	
		Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank	Rate	Rank
Portsmouth, Va.	106	9.9	79	8.3	107	12.5	93	13.9	103	9.8	95	†	...
Providence, R.I.	56	6.6	129	9.6*	92	10.6	113	13.3	106	11.2	80	16.2	65
Richmond, Va.	52	13.8	25	12.7	42	15.9	46	19.7	47	8.7	102	12.0	83
Rochester, N.Y.	38	11.2	48	12.1	50	18.6	28	18.5	58	12.1	71	20.6	34
Rockford, Ill.	96	14.2	21	13.3	35	20.5	21	14.8	91	15.7	35	†	...
Sacramento, Calif.	63	21.9	2	21.6	6	31.5	2	43.7	2	27.3	3	39.5	2
St. Louis, Mo.	10	12.6	33	10.9	72	14.5	73	14.5	70	24.5	19	18.7	9
St. Paul, Minn.	40	8.2	107	8.0	110	10.5	114	14.6	94	13.1	58	14.1	73
St. Petersburg, Fla.	69	19.8	4	21.7	5	24.7	10	17.3	69	†	...	†	...
Salt Lake City, Utah	65	11.1	51	10.2*	85	16.2	44	15.2	86	13.0	62	27.3	16
San Antonio, Tex.	17	9.2	92	9.8	89	14.4	72	18.6	57	13.4	53	22.4	29
San Diego, Calif.	18	14.1	22	17.6	16	22.3	16	44.6	1	38.1	1	38.7	3
San Francisco, Calif.	12	28.1	1	24.7	1	32.3	1	38.9	3	33.0	2	45.6	1
San Jose, Calif.	57	14.5	19	17.1	18	21.4	19	16.8	74	24.4	9	24.2	23
Santa Ana, Calif.	130	14.6	18	23.1*	2	19.8	25	20.9	38	15.1	39	†	...
Savannah, Ga.	82	7.6	116	13.1	37	15.6	54	19.2	49	10.0	93	13.8	77
Scranton, Pa.	113	9.3	89	8.2	109	10.7	111	10.9	121	8.5	104	10.0	86
Seattle, Wash.	19	19.7	7	23.1	2	31.4	3	33.9	5	22.0	12	34.0	6
Shreveport, La.	76	10.6	62	6.6	121	14.9	63	18.7	55	11.4	78	†	...
South Bend, Ind.	91	10.8	59	16.1	21	20.4	22	28.2	10	14.1	50	19.9	42
Spokane, Wash.	68	15.2	17	17.9	15	24.3	13	27.7	11	24.6	6	23.6	27
Springfield, Mass.	72	11.5	43	9.0	100	11.1	105	15.6	82	12.3	68	18.0	51
Syracuse, N.Y.	53	8.8	96	10.7	79	13.4	84	14.5	97	12.0	73	19.2	47
Tacoma, Wash.	83	16.9	12	22.5	4	24.4	11	29.0	9	18.6	19	28.3	14
Tampa, Fla.	48	15.3	16	18.2	14	18.4	30	25.4	15	17.4	24	†	...
Toledo, Ohio	39	12.8	31	14.7	25	18.1	31	17.6	66	17.8	23	24.1	24
Topeka, Kan.	100	10.9	56	12.7	42	14.7	67	13.5	105	17.3	26	†	...
Torrance, Calif.	128	10.2	70	9.0*	100	†	...	†	...	†	...	†	...
Trenton, N.J.	107	8.8	96	11.5	59	11.2	104	22.7	27	16.2	32	14.1	73
Tucson, Ariz.	54	13.9	23	20.9*	7	25.2	9	25.6	14	†	...	†	...
Tulsa, Okla.	50	10.2	70	10.0	88	15.2	60	14.4	98	†	...	†	...
Utica, N.Y.	129	11.3	46	10.8	76	12.6	91	11.5	118	8.5	104	12.5	82
Washington, D.C.	9	10.2	70	12.6	45	20.3	23	23.6	22	14.2	47	26.5	20
Waterbury, Conn.	121	6.8	126	9.6	92	11.8	97	14.4	90	12.7	63	18.7	48
Wichita, Kans.	51	13.9	23	13.7	31	15.4	57	15.9	81	17.1	29	15.2	67
Wichita Falls, Tex.	127	7.2	121	4.4	130	12.6	91	†	...	†	...	†	...
Winston-Salem, N.C.	115	8.4	104	8.7	104	5.8	128	11.1	119	5.5	111	†	...
Worchester, Mass.	66	9.6	85	8.2	108	11.4	101	11.6	117	11.1	83	9.4	88
Yonkers, N.Y.	64	7.9	113	8.5	105	11.9	96	11.9	114	6.3	110	10.0	86
Youngstown, Ohio	75	8.0	110	9.7	91	12.5	93	17.4	67	10.3	90	15.2	67

[#] Before 1937 cases allocated according to place of occurrence, after that date, according to residence. * Based on two-year period. † Data not available.

The corresponding lowest ranking cities are Knoxville (6.6), Providence (6.6), Mobile (6.7), Waterbury (6.8), Elizabeth (7.1), Dayton (7.2), New Bedford (7.2), Wichita Falls (7.2), Buffalo (7.3) and Newport News (7.3).

Ranking of 93 Cities in Suicide Over Fifty-Year Period

In order to determine the relative consistency of the incidence of suicide among large American cities over a period of time, the 93 cities for which there are complete records from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961 were arranged in rank-order. It will be observed from Table B: II that for the six triennial periods during this fifty-year span, San Francisco appears at the top of the 93 cities with a mean rank of 1.5. Four times San Francisco was in first place, one time in second place and one time in third place. Sacramento ranks second with a mean rank of 2.5, and Seattle is in third place with 4.8. With one exception--Denver, which ranks in sixth place--the top 13 are located on the Pacific Coast. Several of the high ranking cities manifest noticeable variations from one period to another. For example, San Diego, which is in fourth place with a mean rank of 7.0, ranked tenth or lower from 1939-1941 to 1959-1961, but was in first place both in 1929-1931 and in 1919-1921, and third place in 1909-1911. Long Beach has fluctuated from fifth place in 1949-1951 to thirtieth in 1929-1931; Spokane from fourth place in 1919-1921 to twenty-seventh place in 1909-1911; and Fresno from sixth place in 1939-1941 to twenty-eighth place in 1909-1911 and twenty-sixth place in 1959-1961.

At the other end of the continuum, cities with relatively low suicide rates show a similar but much less pronounced consistency as do those with high rates. Charlotte (84.3) shows the lowest mean rank; Mobile (83.2), second lowest; Yonkers (82.0), third lowest; Scranton (81.2), fourth lowest; and Buffalo (78.3), fifth lowest. Table B: II presents the position of the 20 lowest and 20 highest ranking cities in the frequency of suicide for the 93 cities with complete records for the fifty-year period, 1909-1911 to 1959-1961.

Frequency Distributions of Suicide

Figure B:1 summarizes by means of frequency polygons, averages and measures of dispersion, the distribution of each of the six series of suicide rates from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961. It is obvious from Figure B:1 that over a period of time, the distribution profiles of urban suicide manifest some similarity, but are far from being identical. For example, the 1959-1961 series shows the smallest dispersion with a range in rates from 6.6 to 28.1, a standard deviation of 2.7, and

TABLE B: II
Cities with the 20 Highest and the 20 Lowest Mean Ranks of Suicide
Among 93 Cities for the 6 Triennial Periods: 1909-1911 to 1959-1961*

City	Mean Rank	1959-61	1949-51	1939-41	1929-31	1919-21	1909-11
<u>Highest</u>							
San Francisco . . .	1.5	1	1	1	3	2	1
Sacramento	2.5	2	4	2	2	3	2
Seattle	4.8	5	2	3	4	9	6
San Diego	7.0	14	10	13	1	1	3
Los Angeles	7.7	6	7	4	12	7	10
Denver	8.5	8	6	5	16	11	5
Oakland	9.2	3	13	12	11	8	8
Tacoma	9.5	9	3	8	8	15	14
Portland	11.5	13	8	8	6	16	18
Spokane	11.8	11	9	10	10	4	27
Long Beach	12.3	7	5	13	30	4	15
Fresno	18.2	26	19	6	20	10	28
San Jose	21.0	12	12	16	57	6	23
Omaha	21.7	63	27	13	5	11	11
Duluth	24.5	18	17	6	28	17	61
Berkeley	25.8	10	10	17	23	25	70
South Bend	27.0	42	15	18	9	36	42
St. Louis	27.5	24	54	49	15	14	9
Pasadena	32.5	3	14	11	25	51	91
Madison	35.5	29	30	26	7	90	31
<u>Lowest</u>							
Memphis	64.5	76	92	92	46	56	25
Waterbury	67.5	89	70	70	79	49	48
Birmingham	69.0	55	87	58	56	81	77
Lincoln	69.0	25	89	70	85	78	67
Utica	69.0	33	58	66	90	85	82
Niagara Falls	69.3	81	85	61	93	89	7
New Orleans	70.8	90	90	73	61	51	60
St. Paul	72.2	75	82	84	75	44	73
Montgomery	75.0	31	84	81	86	79	89
Jersey City	75.2	78	82	77	91	77	46
Cambridge	75.8	69	86	36	87	85	92
Providence	76.0	92	70	83	82	64	65
Worcester	76.0	59	80	73	89	67	88
Knoxville	76.8	92	65	93	73	80	58
Greensboro	77.2	56	92	88	41	93	93
Buffalo	78.3	84	75	77	81	72	81
Scranton	81.2	63	80	81	92	85	86
Yonkers	82.0	80	78	69	88	91	86
Mobile	83.2	90	91	89	68	81	80
Charlotte	84.3	73	87	91	84	92	79

*Based on 93 cities for which records are complete from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961.

DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDE RATES: 1909-11 TO 1959-61




Figure B:1

a coefficient of variation of 32.7 percent. In 1919-1921, the range was 1.7 to 38.1, the standard deviation was 5.6, and the coefficient of variation, 39.6 percent. The mean and median rates, respectively, for 1959-1961 were 11.3 and 10.4, as compared to 20.2 and 19.4 in 1909-1911. The corresponding measures for the depression period of 1929-1931 were also high with a mean of 19.1 and a median of 18.3.

Suicide by Geographic Division

Table B: III and Figure B:2 portray trends and patterns of urban suicide in a geographical context. Unweighted means of suicide rates for each of the six


TABLE B:III
Distribution of Suicide Rates
Cities with Populations of 100,000 or More in 1960
by Geographic Division: 1909-11 to 1959-61

Division	1959-61		1949-51		1939-41	
	N	\bar{X} *	N	\bar{X} *	N	\bar{X} *
Total . . .	130	11.3	130	12.0	129	15.6
New England . . .	10	8.6	10	10.2	10	13.6
Middle Atlantic . .	19	9.3	19	10.6	19	13.0
East North Central.	24	10.8	24	11.8	24	14.9
West North Central.	11	11.6	11	11.4	11	15.8
South Atlantic . .	16	11.5	16	12.4	16	14.6
East South Central.	9	9.5	9	8.6	9	11.1
West South Central.	17	9.6	17	9.0	17	14.1
Mountain	5	14.0	5	16.0	5	21.8
Pacific†	19	16.5	19	17.9	18	23.1

Division	1929-31		1919-21		1909-11	
	N	\bar{X} *	N	\bar{X} *	N	\bar{X} *
Total . . .	124	19.1	113	14.4	93	20.2
New England . . .	10	14.7	10	12.6	10	16.8
Middle Atlantic . .	19	16.4	19	11.3	19	17.4
East North Central.	24	18.8	23	12.8	21	20.9
West North Central.	11	19.6	10	16.6	9	21.4
South Atlantic . .	16	17.6	14	10.9	9	15.6
East South Central.	9	15.8	9	12.9	7	15.6
West South Central.	12	17.6	9	15.4	2	19.8
Mountain	5	25.9	2	16.7	2	31.0
Pacific†	18	26.4	17	22.5	14	28.5

*Unweighted Mean. †Includes Alaska and Hawaii.

URBAN SUICIDE BY GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS: 1909-11 TO 1959-61*



*93 CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OF 100,000 OR MORE

Figure B:2

triennial periods, 1909-1911 to 1959-1961, were computed for cities located in each of the nine Geographic Divisions as defined by the United States Bureau of the Census. The differences between the averages for all cities and the averages for cities in each of the Geographic Divisions were used as indices of rank, as well as for trends over time. For example, large cities in the New England Geographic Division rank consistently below the national average in suicide, while cities in the Pacific Geographic Division invariably rank above the national average in suicide. A further examination of Figure B:2 shows that in addition to the New England Geographic Division, the Middle Atlantic and East South Central Divisions ranked uniformly below the national average, and with only one exception each, East North Central and West South Central show rates lower than the average for the entire country. Like the Pacific Division, the frequency of urban suicide in the Mountain Division is conspicuously higher than the national average.

Intercorrelation of Suicide for Six Triennial Series

In a further effort to measure trends and patterns of urban suicide over a period of time, 15 intercorrelations were derived for the six triennial series of rates from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961. Figure B:3 and Table B:IV present in detail the results of this analysis. Again, a pronounced consistency runs through the patterns of urban suicide over a long period of time. All of the coefficients are positive. The lowest coefficient of correlation is between the 1959-1961 and 1909-1911 series, $r = .510$. The highest is between the 1949-1951 and 1939-1941 series, $r = .769$. Generally, of course, the shorter the period between any two series,


TABLE B:IV

Intercorrelations of Suicide Rates

Cities with Populations of 100,000 or More in 1960: 1909-11 to 1959-61

Triennial Period	1959-61	1949-51	1939-41	1929-31	1919-21	1909-11
1959-61 . . .	--	.724	.728	.559	.592	.510
1949-51 . . .		--	.769	.631	.593	.609
1939-41 . . .			--	.719	.652	.595
1929-31 . . .				--	.660	.615
1919-21 . . .					--	.730
1909-11 . . .						--

INTERCORRELATION OF SUICIDE RATES: 1909-11 TO 1959-61



EXPLANATORY NOTE: FOR 1949-51, 1 CASE (WICHITA) AND FOR 1919-21, 1 CASE (GREENSBORO) UNDER 5.0, FOR 1929-31, 2 CASES (SACRAMENTO AND SAN DIEGO) AND FOR 1909-11, 1 CASE (SAN FRANCISCO) OVER 40.0.

Figure B:3

the higher the coefficients of correlation, and obviously, the longer the period, the lower the coefficients of correlation. There are a few exceptions to this rule, such as the relatively high correlation ($r = .728$) for the 1959-1961 and 1939-1941 series.

Suicide and Population Mobility

In an attempt to determine with some degree of specificity the various factors associated with the incidence of urban suicide, 30 variables reflecting social, economic, educational and demographic conditions were selected for analysis. A complete list of these variables is included in Table B: V.

Two forms of multivariate analysis were applied, namely regression analysis and factor analysis. Stepwise regression, in which a sequence of multiple regression equations are derived in a stepwise manner seemed particularly appropriate, since it is possible to gauge the incremental importance of each independent variable by its influence on R as well as on R^2 . At each step, one variable is added to the regression, the added variable being the one which makes the greatest reduction in the error sum of squares.⁷ Table B: V presents the more salient results of the regression analysis. It will be observed that a mobility index--number of hotels, motels and tourist courts per 100,000 of population--stands out with considerable prominence. Another mobility index--proportion of residents living in same house in 1960 as in 1955--and a relatively less direct index of mobility--population change between 1950 and 1960--are included in the top five independent variables. "Overcrowding"--units with 1.01 or more persons per room--and median age of population are the other two variables among the first five. For suicide and the first five variables, $R = .727$ and $R^2 = .528$. When the remaining 23 variables are added, $R = .826$ and $R^2 = .682$.

The same series of variables, including suicide, were factor analyzed by the principal axes method. Factor analysis possesses two special advantages. The first is parsimony: It can reduce a large number of interrelated variables to a relatively small number of independent factors. The second advantage is in providing a means for discovering underlying unities. The first seven factors extracted were

⁷W. J. Dixon (ed.), BMD, Biomedical Computer Programs, Los Angeles: University of California Health Services Computing Facility, School of Medicine, 1964; R. I. Jennrich and P. F. Sampson, "Application of Stepwise Regression to Non-linear Estimation," Technometrics, Vol. 10 (February 1968), pp. 63-72; R. A. Gordon, "Issues in the Ecological Study of Delinquency," American Sociological Review, Vol. 32 (December 1967), pp. 927-944; R. A. Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 73 (March 1968), pp. 592-616.

retained and rotated orthogonally to simple structure. Also, the factor loadings were normalized.

TABLE B:V

Multiple Correlation Coefficients between Suicide and 30 other Variables
Derived According to Stepwise Multiple Regression Techniques
130 Cities: 1959-61

Independent Variables *	Var. No.	R	R ²	Increment R ²
Hotels, Motels, per 100,000	15	.536	.288	.288
Units, 1.01 or more persons per room	5	.638	.407	.119
Residence, same 1960 as 1955	13	.666	.443	.036
Median Age	11	.714	.509	.066
Population Change, 1950-60	12	.727	.528	.019
Median Income	16	.744	.554	.026
Housing Units, One-Unit Structure	28	.761	.579	.025
Vacant Units for Rent	27	.782	.612	.033
Population Density	1	.790	.624	.012
Median Monthly Rent	18	.797	.635	.011
Home Equipment Index	30	.802	.644	.009
Unemployed in Labor Force	3	.807	.651	.007
Employed in Education	22	.811	.658	.007
Employed, Mfg. Durable Goods	24	.813	.661	.003
Nonwhite Population	7	.815	.664	.003
Foreign-Born Population	8	.816	.666	.002
Living in Group Quarters	21	.817	.668	.002
Migrants, Different County	14	.819	.671	.003
College Graduates	23	.820	.673	.002
Native-Born, Foreign or Mixed Parentage	9	.822	.675	.002
65 Years and Over	6	.823	.677	.002
Employed, Mfg. Non-Durable Goods	25	.824	.679	.002
Males, 18 and Over	10	.824	.679	.000
Age of City	29	.824	.680	.001
Median Grade Completed	20	.825	.680	.000
Less than 5 Years of School	4	.825	.681	.001
White Collar Occupation	19	.826	.681	.000
Family Income, Under \$3,000	2	.826	.682	.001

* Variables 17 (Median Value, Owner-Occupied Units) and 26 (Employed, Wholesale and Retail Trade) not included because F-level or tolerance insufficient for further computation.

Suicide appears in two of the factors, namely, Factor III and Factor V. The significance of suicide in Factor III is sharp and explicit, but in Factor V, it lacks clarity and prominence. Rather, age manifests itself as an important dimension in Factor V. The particular configurations of Factors III and V as well as those for five other factors are presented in Table B: VI.

TABLE B:VI

Summary Description of Factors Showing Positive and Negative Loading*
Suicide and 30 Other Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables, 130 Cities: 1959-61

Variable	Var. No.	Factor Loading		Variable	Var. No.	Factor Loading	
		Positive	Negative			Positive	Negative
Factor I							
Vacant Units for Rent	27	.960		Median Grade Completed	20	.407	
Housing Units, One-Unit Structure	28		.921	White Collar Occupations	19	.382	
Population Density	1	.894		Factor IV			
Index, Home Equipment	30		.856	College Graduates	23		.963
Age of City	29	.719		Employed in Education	22		.914
Foreign-Born	8	.689		White Collar Occupations	19		.840
Employed, Wholesale and Retail Trade	26		.641	Unemployed in Labor Force	3	.758	
Median Value, Owner-Occupied Units	17	.583		Median Grade Completed	20		.722
Native-Born, Foreign or Mixed Parentage	9	.517		Employed, Mfg. Durable Goods	24	.653	
Median Age	11	.427		Living in Group Quarters	21		.461
Median Grade Completed	20		.371	Migrants, Different County	14		.452
Population Increase, 1950-1960	12		.365	Residence, Same in 1960 as 1955	13	.371	
Migrants, Different County	14		.357	Median Value, Owner-Occupied Units	17		.321
Nonwhite Population	7	.356		Less than 5 Years of School	4	.317	
Unemployed in Labor Force	3	.302		Factor V			
Factor II							
Median Income	16	.966		65 Years and Over	6	.914	
Family Income, Under \$3,000	2		.955	Median Age	11	.820	
Median Monthly Rent	18	.925		Units, 1.01 or More Persons per Room	5		.797
Less than 5 Years of School	4		.717	Population Increase, 1950-1960	12		.627
Employed, Mfg. Durable Goods	24	.677		Suicide Rate	31	.514	
Median Value, Owner-Occupied Units	17	.647		Residence, Same in 1960 as 1955	13	.488	
Units, 1.01 or More Persons per Room	5		.508	Less than 5 Years of School	4		.465
Employed, Wholesale and Retail Trade	26		.498	Males, 18 and Over	10		.457
Nonwhite Population	7		.426	Age of City	29	.445	
Median Grade Completed	20	.417		Nonwhite Population	7		.361
Native-Born, Foreign or Mixed Parentage	9	.392		Migrants, Different County	14		.359
Index, Home Equipment	30	.374		Factor VI			
Males, 18 and Over	10	.370		Living in Group Quarters	21		.841
Population Increase, 1950-1960	12	.324		Males, 18 and Over	10		.730
Factor III							
Hotels, Motels, Etc. per 100,000	15	.917		Employed, Mfg. Nondurable Goods	25	.378	
Suicide Rate	31	.820		Employed in Education	22		.368
Employed, Mfg. Nondurable Goods	25		.718	Migrants, Different County	14		.332
Residence, Same in 1960 as 1955	13		.704	Factor VII			
Migrants, Different County	14	.655		Nonwhite Population	7		.738
Population Increase, 1950-1960	12	.588		Native-Born, Foreign or Mixed Parentage	9	.702	
Employed, Wholesale and Retail Trade	26	.539		Foreign-Born	8	.623	
Age of City	29		.452	Unemployed in Labor Force	3	.492	
				Employed, Mfg. Nondurable Goods	25	.402	

* Only Factor Loadings of .300 or higher are included in this tabulation.

The mobility component, represented by three indices, variables 15, 13 and 14 and a less direct index of mobility expressed as population change by variable 12, are notably significant in Factor III. Two industrial indices--percentage of employment in manufacturing producing nondurable goods such as food and

beverages, textile-mill products, rubber goods, apparel, leather and printing-- and employment in wholesale and retail trade also are significant. Age of city-- measured from the first decade that a city reached a population of 50,000--and socioeconomic status as reflected by median grade completed and by white collar occupations comprise the three remaining variables in Factor III.

The fact that a mobility index--residence same in 1960 as in 1955--indicates a significant positive loading (.488) in Factor V may seem contradictory, but actually the primary connotation of Factor V is age. Suicide and, particularly, mobility are of subsidiary significance. In Factor V the variable, 65 years of age and over, ranks highest with a loading of .914, and median age ranks second highest with a positive loading of .820. Accordingly, in interpreting the loadings in Factor V emphasis should be placed primarily on age and, secondarily, on the relationship of age to suicide.

Both the multiple regression and factor analyses clearly indicate that the incidence of suicide in the large American city is associated with population mobility. In addition, of course, but much less definitive and significant, are other components such as (1) age composition of population, (2) socioeconomic status of population, (3) race, (4) overcrowding, (5) age of city and (6) industrial characteristics of city.

Mobility of Population and Suicide A Brief Interpretation

Although there is a demonstrable association between urban suicide and population mobility, any attempt to present a reasonably complete and precise explication of the mechanism involved would be indeed a difficult and complicated task. The moving about of people has a profound impact on individual behavior, interpersonal relationships and on community structure. Mobility implies bewildering change, the making and breaking of social ties. Mobility vastly increases social contacts, mental stimulation and new experiences while at the same time it tends to break down traditional relationships and emancipates the individual from the requirements and restraints of custom and social norms. The avoidance of social responsibilities and involvements, as well as isolation, detachment, anomie and alienation may be frequent concomitants. The standards and forces of community control and restraint may tend to weaken and disintegrate. There is a lack of identity with others and a lack of group integration, consistency, stability and cohesion. In a milieu of this kind the individual may become detached from his social moorings, and as a consequence become demoralized and may commit suicide.

It is important to recognize that mobility varies with sex, age, marital status, occupation and other characteristics. Young adults, especially single males, are the most mobile of any group. Occupationally, farm laborers and other seasonal workers show the highest rate of mobility. A large proportion of migratory workers are older adult males among whom the incidence of suicide is extraordinarily high. Most are "homeless, voteless and womanless." Mobility is a striking characteristic of present-day American society, and for millions of people it is a way of life. Geographically, the West is the most mobile of all regions.


Certainly, the relatively high incidence of suicide in all of the Pacific Coast cities can be accounted for, at least in part, by highly mobile populations, including large numbers of agricultural and other seasonal workers. It is in the anonymous, impersonal milieus of the central business districts and skid roads of San Francisco, Seattle and other Pacific Coast cities, where large numbers of drifters, migratory workers, tourists, nomads and deviants gravitate, that the frequency of suicide reaches its peak.

Summary and Conclusions

In order to analyze differentials, trends and components of urban suicide in the United States, data were compiled for all cities with populations of 100,000 or more in 1960 for six triennial periods, covering a fifty-year period from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961.

In an effort to determine the relative consistency and constancy of urban patterns of suicide during a span of five decades, the following analyses were made: (1) ranking of cities according to the frequency of suicide for each of the six triennial periods from 1909-1911 to 1959-1961; (2) compilation and analysis of frequency distributions of suicide for all of the larger cities; (3) analysis of trends and patterns of suicide for all of the larger cities according to their location by Geographic Division, and (4) computation of intercorrelations among each series of urban suicide rates.

As a basis for testing the relationship between suicide and mobility of population as well as other factors, suicide rates and 30 other social, economic, educational and demographic variables were analyzed by means of multiple regression and factor analysis techniques. The results of these analyses clearly indicated an association between suicide and population mobility. In addition, there are other less significant factors which require further exploration.



END