Killed in the Line of Duty

A Study of Selected Felonious Killings of Law Enforcement Officers

Conducted by

Uniform Crime Reports Section
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to America's law enforcement heroes and heroines and to the survivors of those officers who made the ultimate sacrifice in giving their lives in the performance of duty.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Introduction

Each year a number of law enforcement officers lose their lives while safeguarding our society from violence and disorder. Although the numbers of slayings have declined in recent years, each tragic incident brings devastation and outrage to the community whose rights, lives, and property the victims are sworn to protect. Most directly affected, aside from victim families, are those fellow officers who are suddenly made starkly aware of the extremely hazardous nature of their profession and their vulnerability as they go about their everyday duties.

The FBI has been gathering data on officers feloniously killed in the line of duty since 1945 and has expanded the collection of information consistently throughout the ensuing years in an attempt to examine these events as fully as possible. The annual publication, *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted*, presents the extensive data provided by slain officers' employing agencies, including information about the officers and their killers, along with the circumstances that brought them together. The victim officer is addressed with data on age, sex, and race, physical attributes, years of service, etc. Situational descriptions that indicate what particular tasks the officers were performing at the time of their deaths, such as making an arrest, transporting a prisoner, handling a disturbance call, or making a traffic stop, are portrayed. Also addressed are weapons used, the geographic area of the country in which the officer was working, and the type of law enforcement agency with which the victim was associated. Data about the offenders include physical characteristics and criminal history.

Yet, even these detailed data cannot answer what is likely the most important question, "Why?" Speculation ranges from discussions of possible procedural mistakes, to assessments of the adequacy of law enforcement training, to analyses of the personality types of both offenders and officers that are involved in these incidents. Many serious questions arise when considering the possible causes for these events. What were the factors that turned a petty thief or a drunken driver into a killer of law enforcement officers? Why would a person who has been arrested on numerous occasions with no act of violence suddenly use deadly force against an arresting officer? Was some type of behavior either performed or omitted by the victim officer which may have precipitated the violence? Was there anything that the officer could have done to prevent his or her own death?

Need for an Integrative Study

The FBI has long recognized the limitations of its data on officers killed. While they receive wide dissemination throughout the law enforcement community and have provided the basis for the development of training procedures and for many studies on a wide range of law enforcement-related issues, they represent, for the most part, the recitation and enumeration of the events themselves. No indepth analysis of the situation resulting in a law enforcement officer's death or of the combination of events that led to it has been conducted by the FBI prior to this study.

A review of existing academic research revealed that the FBI data are used extensively in studying issues such as those posed above. (See Background Studies, Appendix I, Methodology.) The research, however, has resulted in varied and sometimes conflicting conclusions. The "most dangerous situation" a law enforcement officer can face, for example, has been found by some research to be responding to a robbery call, while others have found it to be responding to a domestic or general disturbance. All of the studies used sources in addition to the FBI data and appear to have been well-documented and thoroughly researched. Missing in all national studies, however, was an integrative approach which examines the police officers, the offenders, and the situations which brought them together. The need for such an integrative approach has been stressed by various researchers, but such study has been hindered by difficulties in collecting adequate data, particularly in relation to the psychology of the offender.

Having conducted law enforcement training throughout the Nation and having repeatedly had the unanswered questions posed, the staff of the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program formulated a plan for a project that would combine and study the felonious killings of officers through an interactive and integrative approach. The study would

address the psychology of the offender, the behavior of the officer, and the circumstances in which the officer lost his or her life. Clearly, such an integrative study could practically and substantially add to the current base of knowledge on officers' slayings. While it would not answer all the "questions" or prevent all future deaths, it would examine the complex situations in a different manner than had been previously accomplished.

The Study Plan

To achieve the integrative objective of the study, the UCR staff devised a plan to select 50 incidents of officer slayings and examine those incidents in their totality. The incidents would be selected using criteria based on the data concerning all officers feloniously killed and would have occurred within a timeframe chosen to assure information concerning the killings was still relevant to current law enforcement practices. For those 50 incidents, all information concerning the incident, victim officer, and offender would be retrieved from institutional records, both law enforcement and correctional; interviews of the victim officers' peers and supervisors, as well as the investigators originally assigned to the homicides and other officers who have knowledge of the events, would be conducted; and the offenders themselves would be interviewed. To accommodate the offender interviews, the incidents selected would be limited to those whose offenders had exhausted all appeal processes. A complete description of the study methodology is set forth in Appendix I.

While the UCR staff focused on the primary issue of addressing "WHY" officers were killed, during the planning phase of the study several other questions were identified on which the study might possibly provide some valuable insight. What, for example, is the likelihood that an excellent officer, physically fit, mentally alert, and following departmental rules and procedures, would still be killed? Does age, gender, race, or physical size have a bearing on the death of an officer? Why are so many of the slain officers from the South? Why, from the perspective of the killer, was a given officer killed?

Study Results

The study was conducted over roughly a 3-year period, during which 51 distinct cases of officers' homicides were examined. These incidents resulted in the deaths of 54 law enforcement officers and involved 50 offenders. Included were two incidents involving the same single offender and three incidents involving the slaying of two officers in each incident.

While the study did not produce all the answers sought, this report presents several important findings regarding the outcome of an indepth examination of the offenders, victims, and events. The study found, for example, that while there is no single absolute offender profile, most killers of law enforcement officers have been diagnosed as having some sort of personality disorder. The behavioral descriptors of victim officers were frequently similar in that they were characterized as generally of good-natured demeanor and more conservative than their fellow officers in the use of physical force. The incidents themselves revealed the killings were often facilitated by some type of procedural miscue (e.g., an improper approach to a vehicle or loss of control of a situation or an individual). In combination, or integratively, these factors combine into a "deadly mix" of an easy-going officer who will use force only as a last resort with an offender of aberrant behavior in an uncontrolled, dangerous situation.

The report presents extensive information on the victims, offenders, and incidents studied. It identifies personality types of offenders, provides guidance in assessing how those of a given type will typically interact with authority figures, and offers styles or approaches in questioning or interrogating them to law enforcement. It points out specific areas where law enforcement training and procedures may be improved. It provides some signals for law enforcement managers that an officer may be more likely than his or her counterparts to become a victim in a potentially deadly situation. It describes the "deadly mix" that results in a killing. Probably most important, however, it does not answer all the questions. In fact, it actually raised as many questions as it answered. It identifies areas that require more extensive study and thorough evaluation at all levels of law enforcement, Federal, state, and local.

Chapter 1

THE OFFENSE AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE OFFENSE

Information regarding the nature of the circumstances surrounding each felonious killing of a law enforcement officer is collected, recorded, and tabulated by the FBI. Yet, the specific factors that contribute to a particular law enforcement officer being placed in a particular situation that leads to his or her slaying remain unclear. This study examined the 51 selected incidents, along with information on all killings of officers, to attempt a better understanding of the nature of these fatal attacks.

Scene Circumstances

The nature of the calls to which officers were responding at the time of their deaths must, of course, be assessed to reach any understanding of the conditions surrounding these incidents. As noted in Figure 1, 40 percent of all officers slain from 1981 to 1990 were involved in arrest or crime-in-progress situations at the time they were killed. Seventeen percent of the victims were slain upon responding to disturbance calls ("man with gun," family quarrel,

| FIGURE 1 | Circumstances at Scene of Incident |

Legend: U.S Total, 1981 - 1990; FBI Study

Data values by category:
- Disturbance calls: 17%, 13%
- Arrest situations/crime-in-progress: 40%, 39%
- Handling, transporting, custody of prisoners: 5%, 11%
- Investigating suspicious persons/circumstances: 14%, 7%
- Traffic pursuits/stops: 13%, 22%
- Other: 11%, 7%

Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1990
FBI Study

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etc.), 14 percent while investigating suspicious persons/ circumstances, 13 percent following traffic pursuits/stops, and 5 percent while involved in handling, transporting, or custody of prisoners. The remaining victims were slain under other circumstances.

Similarly, of the 51 incidents selected for this study, 39 percent involved arrest or crime-in-progress situations; 22 percent traffic pursuits/stops; 13 percent disturbance calls; 11 percent handling/transporting/custody of prisoners; 7 percent investigating suspicious persons/circumstances, and 7 percent other circumstances. Disparities between the distribution for the selected cases and the total experience of officers slain exist because certain types of incidents were excluded from consideration in study cases— ambushes, for example, where there was no possible preventive action the officer could have taken.

Seventy-three percent of the killings analyzed for this study occurred on a street or highway or in a parking lot. Twelve percent occurred in private dwellings, and 10 percent in public buildings. Forty-two percent of all incidents occurred within 5 miles of the offender's residence, 33 percent from 5 to 25 miles of the offender's residence, and 25 percent farther than 25 miles from the offender's residence.

In 8 out of 10 incidents, the initial encounter between the victim officer and the offender (whether questioning or confrontation) occurred in the same location as the assault which claimed the officer's life. In 3 of 4 incidents, the offenders' means of transportation was some sort of motor vehicle. One of 4 offenders was on foot.

In summary, this analysis indicates that the victim officers in this study were most likely to be slain during arrest/crime-in-progress situations; on streets, highways, or in parking lots; and within 5 miles of the offender's residence. The killings generally occurred in the same location at which the officers first encountered the offenders, and the offenders most likely used a vehicle for transportation.

Environment

The time of day and the weather conditions at the time the incidents occurred are also factors contributing to the circumstances under which officers are killed. Figure 2 shows a comparison of these factors for both this study and the 1981-1990 historical FBI data. Of the 51 incidents studied here, about 30 percent occurred during each of three 6-hour time periods of the day (12:01 a.m. - 6 a.m.; 12:01 p.m. - 6 p.m.; and 6:01 p.m. - midnight). The fewest officers were slain during the morning hours of 6:01 a.m. to noon when

FIGURE 2 Law Enforcement Officers Killed by Time of Day

- U.S Total, 1981 - 1990
- FBI Study

	12:01 am - 6 am	6:01 am - noon	12:01 pm - 6 pm	6:01 pm - midnight
U.S Total	23%	13%	26%	38%
FBI Study	30%	15%	28%	28%

only 15 percent of the incidents occurred. As shown in Figure 2, the historical FBI data for 1981 to 1990 closely parallel the incidents selected for study.

The incidents studied here were not examined indepth for the effects of darkness on the likelihood of the officer being killed. Yet, since 6 of 10 fatal incidents occurred during the nighttime hours, visibility during these hours is likely a contributing factor to their outcomes. The information drawn from the incidents studied further shows that 7 of 10 incidents that occurred between 6:01 p.m. and 6 a.m. also involved snow, rain, or fog. While these conditions were not identified as having a role in the incidents, visibility issues may still play a role in procedural safeguards that law enforcement officers may be trained to exercise. These environmental conditions are for the most part uncontrollable, but their potential contribution to the fatal incidents are of importance to law enforcement survival training efforts.

Weapons Used in the Assault

Seventy-two percent of the victim officers in the incidents selected for study were killed as a result of handgun wounds. Other weapons involved in the victimization of these officers include rifles at 13 percent; shotguns at 9 percent; and other weapons at 6 percent. The clear predominance of handguns as the weapon of choice used to victimize officers (confirmed by the fact that 70 percent of all officers slain from 1981 to 1990 were killed by handguns) leads to further delineation of the handgun cartridge types. Figure 3 shows the differential involvement of a variety of handgun cartridge types in the killing of these law enforcement officers. In the selected study incidents, the .38 Special was used in 41 percent of the slayings as compared to the .357 Remington magnum in 15 percent. The 9-millimeter Luger and .32 Smith and Wesson were used in 10 percent each. Although specific cartridge types used in the killings of law enforcement officers have not been included in the FBI historical data, handgun calibers have. The data on all officers killed during the past decade indicate similar weapon use with .38-caliber handguns being used 39 percent of the time, .357 magnums 24 percent of the time, and 9 millimeter weapons 9 percent of the time. Interestingly, 85 percent of the victim officers in the study did not discharge their service weapons. This information about handgun type and use has implications for tactical and training aspects related to reducing the likelihood of law enforcement officer deaths.

Geographical Variations

In particular, a study of the regional variations in the occurrences of these events may suggest some cultural or

FIGURE 3 Handgun Cartridge Types Used to Kill Victim Officers

ACP - Automatic Colt Pistol
Source: FBI Study

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structural factors that may contribute to an understanding of the causes of law enforcement officer deaths. For example, more officer killings occur in the South. Does the explanation of these events lie in variances in regional training or in the nature of law enforcement duties and responsibilities peculiar to that region of the country? In this light, Figure 4 offers some regional comparisons of factors that may be relevant to an understanding of law enforcement officer deaths.

Figure 4 shows that a disproportionate number of law enforcement officers were feloniously killed in the Southern Region of the United States between 1981 and 1990. The Southern States account for 49 percent of all the officers killed during this time period. Because this overrepresentation of the South, on the surface, is somewhat alarming, factors such as the regional distribution of general homicides, the number of law enforcement officers, the total population distribution, and the regional occurrences of accidental killings were examined in an attempt to assess its significance.

The number of homicides from 1981-1990, also reflected in Figure 4, was examined by the four regions of the country. Here again, the South was disproportionately represented. The South reported 43 percent of all murders, while the West reported 21 percent, the Midwest 19 percent, and the

Northeast 17 percent. Given that the overall percentage of homicides is much higher in the South than in other parts of the country, it is plausible that the same geographical area may be expected to produce a proportionately higher percentage of law enforcement deaths.

If a disproportionate number of law enforcement officers are employed in the South, then a larger number of felonious killings of these officers might also be expected. However, the number of officers employed in the South does not greatly exceed the number of those employed in other areas of the country. Figure 4 shows that from 1981-1990 the South employed 33 percent of the total number of law enforcement officers in the Nation, as compared to 19 percent in the West, 23 percent in the Midwest, and 25 percent in the Northeast. Therefore, even though the South accounts for 34 percent of the general population (as discussed below) and may be expected to employ more officers, this factor does not appear to explain adequately the preponderance of law enforcement officer killings in the South.

Another factor considered was total population. A higher concentration of population in the South might suggest an increased chance of a law enforcement officer being killed. In this regard, the 1981-1990 population figures, obtained from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and illustrated in Figure 4, show a large percentage of the population present in the

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FIGURE 4 | Regional Comparisons Relevant to Law Enforcement Deaths 1981 - 1990

Law Enforcement Killings in the U.S. — 12%, 19%, 19%, 49%

Law Enforcement Officers in the U.S. — 23%, 19%, 25%, 33%

Homicides in the U.S. — 17%, 21%, 19%, 43%

U.S. Population — 25%, 20%, 21%, 34%

■ South   ■ Northeast   ⌐ Midwest   ☐ West

South (34 percent compared to at most 25 percent in any other geographical area). Yet, the degree of the Southern Region's population disparity does not appear to explain fully the large disparity in officer deaths that occur in this region.

Finally, a view of accidental deaths of law enforcement officers is also included to provide some context to the scope of felonious officer killings. A review of accidental deaths during the period of 1981-1990 indicates that 719 officers were accidentally killed in the line of duty in the Nation. Once again, the regional distribution of these accidental killings indicates that the South was associated with over 46 percent of the incidents; no other region exceeded 23 percent of such incidents. Clearly, as with felonious killings, the South outdistanced all other regions. Within these accidental losses of life, automobile accidents accounted for the leading cause of death with a total of 302 during the period. It has been found in other professions that it is possible to reduce the number of accidental deaths with proper training. In the past, various construction companies have reduced the number of industrial accidents with training in the use of safety equipment such as glasses and hard hats. Likewise, it is possible to reduce the number of accidental deaths, and perhaps even felonious deaths, in law enforcement with proper training in the use of safety equipment such as seatbelts, vests, and handcuffs. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 of this report.

Overall, this study was unable to explain adequately the preponderance of law enforcement officer deaths in the South. Much speculation continues to exist regarding this phenomenon. However, the difficulties in explaining the cultural and structural aspects of crime and punishment in the southern United States have also been, and continue to be, a focus of much research by academic criminologists. (See for example, Gastil, 1971; Simpson, 1985; Huff-Corzine, 1986; and Borg, 1989.) An understanding of the factors that may contribute to the likelihood of an officer being killed clearly goes beyond simple regional variations. The type of assignment, the circumstances at the scene of the encounter, the weapons used in these incidents, and the environment in which these events occur also play a role in the ultimate death of the law enforcement officer.

Chapter 2

THE OFFENDER

Assumptions are often made concerning the physical, social, and psychological attributes of a person who feloniously kills a law enforcement officer. The mental picture developed in visualizing this "killer" may vary from person to person, but basic similarities in these pictures would no doubt result. The findings of this study, however, suggest that there is no singular profile of an individual who kills a law enforcement officer. Rather, a variety of pictures come about when the actual data are analyzed for physical, social, and psychological characteristics.

Offender Demographics

Table 1 presents the aggregate demographic attributes applicable to offenders in this study. Those included are predominantly male, young (average age 26), white, single, and high school educated. This profile compares favorably with historical FBI data in that the demographics of offenders convicted of killing a law enforcement officer during 1981-1990 show 96 percent were male, 54 percent were white, and the average age was 29 years. Historical offender demographic data concerning education and marital status were not available to construct comparisons.

Intelligence tests were not administered as a part of this study. However, the limited findings regarding the offenders' intelligence are reported in Chapter 3, Psychological Evaluations of the Offenders.

Family History

Information on family history of offenders was obtained through offender interviews. Eighty-two percent of the killers reported that their natural mother was present most of the time during their pre-adult life, while only 6 percent reported that they had never lived with their natural mother. In contrast, only 44 percent of those interviewed stated that their natural father was present most of the time, and 14 percent reported they had never lived with their natural

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Table 1
Offenders: A Demographic Description

Gender:	96% male; 4% female
Average Age:	26 years
Race:	60% white; 40% nonwhite
Average Height:	5 feet 9 inches
Average Weight:	176 pounds
Marital Status:	12% married;
	54% single;
	2% separated;
	32% divorced
Education:	34% no degree;
	60% high school degree;
	4% some college;
	2% college degree

Source: FBI Study

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father. Over half of the offenders reported that the most dominant parental figure in the home was their mother.

Table 2 illustrates further social and economic conditions regarding the background of these offenders. Of particular note is that as many as 58 percent of the offenders considered their pre-adult socioeconomic status to be at least average to comfortable.

When questioned about the method in which problem solving was accomplished within their home environment, 40 percent related that talking rationally about problems was a usual method used; however, 54 percent reported that verbal abuse and physical violence were common practices in resolving disputes. As shown in Table 2, 44 percent of the offenders stated that they had suffered at least some degree

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of physical abuse by their parents. This physical abuse by parental figures, defined by the offenders as physical beatings, was reported when discussing interaction and problem solving within the home environment. Psychological abuse by parents during pre-adult life was also claimed by 36 percent of the respondents. Psychological abuse by parental figures included neglect, verbal abuse, and cold, distant, uncaring, and indifferent treatment.

Criminal History

Twenty-three offenders, or 46 percent of those studied, reported during the interviews that larceny was the first crime they committed. Twelve years was the average age when the offenders committed their first crime. Figure 5 summarizes the self-reported criminal involvement of the 50 offenders examined in this study. Clearly, this figure illustrates that drug offenses, larceny, burglary, weapons offenses, and robbery predominate the criminal history of the individuals who kill law enforcement officers. These offenses, however, are also predominant incarcerating offenses of individuals who have not killed law enforcement officers (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, 1990). The fact that as many as 48 percent of those interviewed admitted that they had murdered or attempted to murder someone prior to the killing of the officer also should not be overlooked. Further, 18 percent of the offenders stated that they had assaulted an officer or had resisted arrest prior to the incident of killing an officer. Therefore, the preponderance of both murder and assault in the criminal histories of these offenders may have some serious implications for the control of this phenomenon. Only 3 offenders claimed to have no criminal history prior to killing the officer. No record of prior arrests for these 3 offenders could be identified in institutional records.

In addition to their statements, offenders' prior criminal arrest records, as well as those of all persons identified in connection with the slayings of law enforcement officers from 1981 through 1990, were examined. Figure 6 indicates that 47 percent of the study offenders had prior arrests for crimes of violence, while 38 percent of all offenders had similar arrests. There is also a clear presence of prior weapons and drug law violations in both groups.

Weapons Usage

Of the 54 law enforcement officers killed by the offenders interviewed, 72 percent were victims of handgun wounds. Therefore, use and familiarity with handguns appear to be contributing factors to these incidents. In fact, familiarity with handguns during childhood and teenage years was reported by as many as 64 percent of the offenders, and 60 percent of those interviewed stated that they had used a rifle in the past. Figure 7 illustrates the offenders' dependence upon weapons in their everyday behavior. In particular, 74 percent of those interviewed reported that they regularly carried a handgun. This same percentage reported using these weapons during criminal behavior. Interestingly, the average age at which the offenders stated they started carrying a handgun was 18. Twenty percent reported carrying

Table 2
Social and Economic Conditions of Offenders

Social and Economic Conditions	Percent*
Relationships:	
Variable to hostile and aggressive with:	
Dominant female	46%
Dominant male	68%
Physical abuse	44%
Psychological abuse	36%
Harrassment by peers or others outside the home	22%
Environment:	
Instability of family caretaking	62%
Problem solving involved arguing, shouting, or physical violence	54%
Socio-economic status of pre-adult life:	
Advantaged	4%
Comfortable, average	54%
Marginal but self-sufficient	28%
Sub-marginal	14%
Outside factors:	
Criminal history present among significant others	44%
Alcoholism present among significant others	56%
Drug abuse present among significant others	32%

*These totals may exceed 100% due to the observations of multiple social and economic conditions of the offenders.

Source: FBI Study

FIGURE 5 | Self-Reported Criminal Involvement of Offenders

Category	Percent
Murder*	48%
Rape/sex offenses	12%
Robbery	52%
Assault	18%
Burglary	66%
Larceny-theft	70%
Auto theft	8%
Arson	6%
Fraud	16%
Vandalism	20%
Weapons	60%
Drug offenses	72%
Disorderly conduct	30%
Other	6%
No criminal history reported	6%

*Includes attempts; excludes law enforcement officers
Source: FBI Study

FIGURE 6 | Criminal History of Persons Identified in the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers

Category	U.S Total, 1981 - 1990	FBI Study
Murder	6%	8%
Assaulting an Officer or Resisting Arrest	12%	18%
Crime of Violence	38%	47%
Drug Law Violation	24%	39%
Weapons Violation	41%	35%

Legend: ▮ U.S Total, 1981 - 1990   ▮ FBI Study

Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, 1981 - 1990
FBI Study

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
Source: FBI Study

their weapons in a pocket; another 20 percent carried them in the small of their backs; and the remainder carried them in various locations on their person.

The basis for the particular choice of firearm that these offenders used to kill the law enforcement officers is summarized in Figure 8. It should be noted that availability and familiarity with the weapon account for approximately 77 percent of the reported motivations for using these particular weapons.

When in a vehicle, 34 percent of the offenders stated they kept their weapons on their person, while 20 percent kept them beneath the seat, and 12 percent left them on the seat of the vehicle. Fifty-four percent of the offenders reported that they practiced with their weapons at least once a month. Yet, 74 percent of the offenders termed their firearms practice as informal and at various locations. Clearly, the prevalence of handgun usage among these offenders, where offenders carry these weapons, and the placement of weapons within vehicles operated by offenders appear to be important factors in the incidents studied. Law enforcement training may benefit greatly with some attention to these areas.

Involvement in Prior Shooting Incidents

Thirty-six percent of the killers interviewed stated that at some time in their lives, they had been shot at prior to killing

the officer. This issue of prior experience in shooting situations was offered as a general comment by one of the initial offenders interviewed. He stated that, having been shot once, he was determined not to let it occur again and intended to take early action against the officer. This issue was then discussed with all of the remaining offenders who participated in the study. One offender asked how the investigators knew to ask him if he had been shot. He stated that he had never told anyone, not even his attorney, that he had been shot by his brother. He added that he was determined never to be shot again and would shoot first, if need be, to prevent himself from being shot. Finally, another offender, when asked if he had been shot at before, responded with a question of his own, "Do you mean by the police or by just anybody?" This individual had been shot at by both law enforcement officers and by other criminals.

Alcohol/Drug Usage

When drug and/or alcohol use was defined as any activity regarding the buying, selling, or using of these substances, 76 percent of the killers stated that they were engaged in drug or alcohol activity at the time of the killing of the law enforcement officer. Figure 9 illustrates the apparent differential use of drugs and alcohol in the killing of law enforcement officers. This figure further shows that drug use only is more prevalent than alcohol use only (24 percent

*No offenders indicated familiarity with a rifle as a reason for their choice of firearm.
Source: FBI Study

to 12 percent) in these killings. Yet, 41 percent of these offenders were using both at the time of the killing of the officer.

Offenders' Perspectives

The offenders were asked what, in their opinion, the victim officers could have done, if anything, to prevent their deaths. Because of a lack of eyewitnesses or surviving officers, the exact facts surrounding the initial confrontation between the offenders and the officers are quite difficult to verify independently. These data, therefore, should be viewed with great caution and circumspection due to likely offender biases. Forty-seven percent of the killers stated that there was nothing that the victims might have done to prevent their deaths after the initial confrontation with the offender. Additionally, 8 percent of the offenders felt that if the officers had been more "professional," these officers may not have lost their lives. However, none of these offenders was able to articulate what was meant by being "professional." Finally, in 3 cases, the offenders stated that if the victim officers had identified themselves as law enforcement officers, they could have prevented their deaths. None of these 3 victims was in uniform at the time of the killings. The offenders in these incidents claimed that the non-uniformed officers were mistaken for private individuals who were perceived to be threatening their person or property.

Some offenders responded to this phase of the study by indicating that they felt that they had the tactical edge on the officers even before the officers were aware of the imminent threat. In these cases, the killers did not shift the blame to the officers by stating that the officers could have taken an alternate course of action to prevent their deaths.

Fifteen of the 51 incidents (or 29 percent of those selected for study) were cross-racial. In 11 of these cases, the offenders were black and the officers were white. However, race was never offered by any of the offenders as a contributing factor in the deaths. One of the black offenders who stated that race was not an issue in the killing of a white officer explained his position in the following way. Although part of the criminal defense presented by the offender's attorneys, in this particular case, attempted to link race to the killing of the white officer, the black offender himself related that the killing was primarily motivated out of fear of returning to jail. This motivation, combined with the offender's inability to handle conflict, appears to be the more likely influencing factor that led to the officer's death than was the factor of race.

Each offender was also questioned as to whether age, sex, or physical size of the victim had any influence on the decision to assault and kill the officer. Only 4 percent of these offenders stated that age was a contributing factor. Only a single offender advised that the size of the victim was

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| FIGURE 9 | Drug and Alcohol Involvement of Offenders at Time of Incident |

Use - buying, selling, or using of a substance
Source: FBI Study

a contributing factor. Yet, 7 offenders, all males who had killed male officers, stated that they would not have committed the act had the officer been female. The average killer of a law enforcement officer may or may not receive higher status in the prison society for his or her crime, but the one individual interviewed who had killed a female officer found little to boast about within the prison setting. He was even reluctant to talk about the fact that he killed a female.

The next chapter of this study, Psychological Evaluations of the Offenders, discusses the results of the personality assessments made on each offender. As stated earlier, there is no singular profile of an individual who kills a law enforcement officer. However, comparing the results of this study with the findings from historical FBI data on officers killed, certain personal and demographic characteristics have emerged. (See Table 1 on page 9.) Similarly, certain psychological categories emerged and are discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS OF THE OFFENDERS

This chapter outlines the method used to classify the personality types of the individual offenders in the study. After discussing the various difficulties encountered in this process, two major diagnostic categories most encountered in the study, the antisocial personality and the dependent personality, are defined and discussed.

A case study approach is used to explain the different ways in which these various personalities interacted with the law enforcement officers. In particular, the social and psychological backgrounds of these offenders are examined in an attempt not to justify, but to understand, the behavior of these offenders. This analysis further reiterates the fact that caution must always be employed when dealing with any individual — regardless of apparent compliance to the officer's commands.

Classification of Offenders

Classification of the mental status and diagnosis of the personality of each of the offenders in this study were generally accomplished in two ways, namely, by reviewing institutional or court records and by a clinical evaluation of the offenders by a forensic psychologist who participated in 33 of the 50 interviews. In some cases, the actual psychological and neurological test protocols at the institutions were made available to the investigators regarding the institutional classification and diagnosis of the offenders. In other cases, the clinical evaluations, including the diagnoses, were part of the offenders' records and were released to the investigators. Still other case information provided either one or multiple, and sometimes conflicting, diagnoses, without any clinical data to support these diagnoses. In some cases, no clinical judgment was recorded in the offenders' personnel files. In these cases, the diagnosis was determined solely by the forensic psychologist based on information retrieved from the interview process.

Intelligence Testing

In several institutions, the mental and physical records of the offenders were exceptionally well documented. The specific type of instrument used for testing was recorded, the testing instruments were maintained, and a full clinical evaluation by a mental health professional was present. This was not the condition in several other institutions. Difficulties in examining "intelligence testing data" included: no record of the specific intelligence test administered; verbal descriptions of intelligence given rather than numerical data, for example, "the offender tested somewhat average in intelligence"; extreme and conflicting data given for the same offender, for example, the same individual was listed as having Intelligence Quotients of 87 and 113. Because of these discrepancies in both testing and in the recording of the data, no definitive information on the offenders' intelligence is available.

During the interviews of 4 offenders for whom no results of intelligence testing were known, however, the appearance of above-average intelligence was noted by the interviewers. One of the 4 reported that, although no record existed in the prison files, he had previously been given an intelligence test on which he attained a score of 135. This same offender was the current chess champion within the prison and was quite proud that he was self-taught after arrival in prison. Two others had been attending college at the time they killed officers. The fourth began college after incarceration and is reported to be doing well in the course work.

Only these 4 offenders refused to have their interviews audio-taped. All also indicated that they had consistently developed detailed plans of action in the event they were interrupted during criminal activity. Each of the 4 stated that, if circumstances during a criminal act dictated the necessity, they would not hesitate to kill an officer.

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Personality Testing and Diagnosis

It was found that the institutional diagnostic judgments concerning the offenders' personalities were made at various stages in their experience within the criminal justice system. This assessment was most often done during incarceration. Generally, one or more of the following three sources, based on availability, provided information which resulted in the psychological diagnoses: pre-sentence investigation reports, initial and subsequent psychological testing results extracted from classification records, and direct clinical judgments. Although testing or classification may have been completed at some point in the offenders' judicial or correctional history, in some cases the information could not be retrieved or was not available for use in this study. In these cases, a clinical judgment was made by the forensic psychologist concerning the subject's mental state and diagnosis.

Multiple Diagnoses

In those cases where multiple diagnoses were indicated on the institutional records, the first or primary diagnosis was recorded for the offender. For example, one offender received a primary diagnosis as antisocial personality disorder and secondary diagnoses as borderline personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder. In only 3 of the cases in the entire study did a discrepancy exist between the diagnosis found in the institutional records and the diagnosis made by the forensic psychologist. In each of these 3 cases, the diagnosis of "antisocial personality disorder" was a secondary diagnosis in the institutional records but was the primary diagnosis from the clinical interview conducted by the FBI forensic psychologist. After an examination of the offenders' prior criminal, social, and medical history (where available), sufficient data were uncovered to allow the diagnosis of "antisocial personality" as the primary diagnosis.

Psychosocial History

The purpose in using these various clinical and diagnostic instruments was to attempt to construct a psychosocial history of each of the offenders. As such, not only are the results of psychological testing, neurological testing, and intelligence testing appropriate and important to examine in detail, but an examination of how the individual interacted with family members, childhood playmates, schoolmates, teachers, clergy, co-workers, social acquaintances, supervisors, and other authority figures is important as well. The interview protocol provided for most of this information as is illustrated in Appendix I.

Diagnostic Classifications

Of the 50 offenders interviewed in this study, three broad diagnostic categories were found to be present. The diagnostic terminology employed herein is derived from the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third Edition, Revised* (DSM-III-R), of the American Psychiatric Association. Using these diagnostic criteria and terminology, 2 offenders, or 4 percent of the sample, were diagnosed as having an organic personality disorder. They were victims of closed head injuries that occurred in circumstances distinct from the situation in which the law enforcement officers were killed. These diagnoses were made by medical personnel during the time of these offenders' presentence period. Forty-three offenders received various diagnoses within the general category of personality disorders, and 5 offenders were not categorized within any diagnostic category. For 4 of the 43 cases with personality disorders, the only psychological information which was made available to the interviewers revealed that the offenders were diagnosed as having a "personality disorder;" no insight was offered as to the particular type of personality disorder. Since the forensic psychologist was not present for these 4 particular interviews, no further diagnoses were completed for these offenders.

The specific kinds of personality disorders for the 39 remaining offenders within the classification "Personality Disorder" were further delineated. Figure 10 illustrates the presence of narcissistic, borderline, dependent, passive-aggressive, and antisocial personality types.

Because of the high frequency with which the dependent personality and the antisocial personality types appear in this population, discussion about these two groups of offenders follows. Additionally, a full description of all of the personality types encountered in this study is provided in Appendix II.

Dependent Personality Type

This particular personality type has been labeled in a variety of ways including inadequate personality, passive personality, and asthenic personality. There are two particularly salient aspects of this group. The first most salient aspect reflects the definition of the dependent personality as found in the DSM-III-R, specifically, "a pervasive pattern of dependent and submissive behavior beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts" (p. 353). These individuals have a history of poor social interaction. They have been described variously as "weak and ineffective," "passive," "lacking any energy," "compliant to a fault," "nice, but totally inadequate." Characteristically,

FIGURE 10 | Diagnostic Classification of Selected Offender Personality Disorders

Note: Based on total offenders classified with a personality disorder.
Source: FBI Study

these individuals related how poorly they interacted with others from an early age. This inadequate social interaction continued throughout adolescence and into adulthood. These offenders related feelings of helplessness during periods when they were alone and felt "the world coming to an end," as one stated, when a relationship with another person terminated.

Typically, these individuals reported having maintained a relationship well into adulthood with a significant member of the immediate family. Frequently, this person was either the offender's mother or father. Of interest in these relationships is that the offenders felt uncomfortable about having maintained the relationship — and yet did so anyway. In fact, in each of these cases, the offenders felt some animosity toward this "significant other." However, at the same time, they felt, as one stated, "it was important; I didn't know what to do without (her)." Usually these "significant others" had made most, if not all, decisions for the offenders.

The mental status of these offenders reflected typical reactions of dependent personalities: dependency, submissiveness, anxiety, and an overall need to please the interviewers. As expected, these individuals, in their interaction with others, particularly those who represent authority of some kind (law enforcement, FBI, mental health professional), create a situation in which they attempt to meet the

expectations of the authority figures. During interviews, these offenders' low self-esteem becomes most apparent.

The second most salient aspect of dependent personalities is the overcontrolled aspect of their personalities. Each of these 9 individuals was unable to deal with their anger, frustration, and hostility. In 2 cases, the offenders even denied that they had anything to be angry about from their childhood years. In these same 2 cases, the offenders revealed that they were treated "like a slave sometimes," and yet they did not recognize how this affected them emotionally. In examining their early childhood, adolescence, and early adult years, there was an apparent lack of sufficient evidence of passive-aggressive measures in dealing with their feelings of anger and hostility. As a result, passive-aggressive personality disorder was ruled out.

The emotional life of these types of individuals can best be described by an analogy to a giant spring. Imagine a very large, expanded steel coil. This coil, at the time of the individual's birth, begins to be compressed within the person. As he or she experiences situations in which frustration, anger, and hostility are involved, this giant coil compresses more and more. Each time the person is involved in circumstances which cause stress and anxiety, the tension of this emotional coil increases. Concomitantly, a button develops which can trigger that coil to expand — and the person runs

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the risk of an explosive episode. There is little or no way to anticipate exactly what will trigger this button or precisely when this button will be triggered. There does seem to come a point in these individuals' lives when "they have had enough." One of two dynamics seems to occur. In some instances, the pressure that results from years of repressed anger and hostility reaches a level which can no longer be contained or tolerated. When a situation occurs which is perceived by the individuals as hostile, they react excessively and inappropriately, releasing years of anger and frustration. In other cases, some of these dependent personality types perceive that they have finally met someone who treats them well — who, in their minds, treats them with respect and with love. This is a completely new and exciting experience for someone who has never been involved in what is perceived by them to be a positive relationship. When this relationship or this "significant other" is threatened, the individuals react — again, with levels of anger and hostility commensurate to the pressure which has built up over years of repressed anger and frustration.

When that button is pushed, all the hostility and rage that had been repressed during previous years are expressed. What seems to be occurring in these cases is something of the dynamic expressed in the case of Mary that follows.

Case Narrative of Dependent Personality Type

Mary is a fictitious name for a woman who killed a law enforcement officer when she was 16 years old. Mary was 24 years of age at the time of the interview for this study. The oldest of three siblings, Mary was born into a military family. Although the father was absent during much of her childhood, when present he was the dominant parental figure.

Mary assessed the economic level of her family during her childhood as comfortable. However, the overall stability and coherence of the family environment she described as unstable and disruptive. Mary characterized the quality of the relationship with both her mother and father as uncaring and indifferent. In Mary's words, her mother was always "too busy for me." The nature of problem-solving within the home was described by Mary as including frequent shouting, threats and insults, as well as physical abuse at the hands of the parents.

Mary reported that the relationship with her father was emotionally and sometimes physically abusive. An alcoholic, her father would frequently have Mary "run and fetch beer for him and his friends" on weekends. Her father allegedly would have Mary light cigarettes in her mouth and then pass them on to him and his friends. During these times, Mary was unable to express her unhappiness and her anger at how she was being treated. Since she perceived her relationship with her mother as antagonistic, she felt that she had no one to whom she could turn. In relationships

outside the home, Mary recalled victimization and harassment by her peers. And yet, in relation to these various circumstances, Mary did not express anger as much as disappointment and feelings of rejection to the investigators.

At the age of 8, Mary's parents divorced. After the divorce, Mary moved from her father's residence to her mother's home, then moved again to live with her grandmother. This continual movement extended into Mary's adolescence. Mary stated that she felt no love in any of these three homes. Most dramatic, however, was the lack of any positive feelings during her stay with her father.

Mary denied she experienced any sexual abuse during her childhood and adolescence. She did have a history of running away from home. However, none of these episodes extended for long periods of time, and she always returned home without anyone having to search for her.

Although Mary states that she experienced some difficulty in her academic pursuits, she also claims that she did "average" in school. She reports not having had any friends while in the elementary grades. She dropped out of school before completing the 12th grade but attained a GED within the correctional setting.

By the age of 14 or 15, Mary states that she began to live regularly with her grandmother. Feeling very much isolated within the home and at school, Mary reports having felt alone and alienated. It was during this time of reported depression, at which time Mary was 15 years old, that an individual unexpectedly came into her life. John was a small-time drug dealer who seemed to recognize in Mary a person who would do his bidding without complaint or question. She seemed to recognize in him someone who would take charge of a situation and make the necessary decisions, something which Mary characteristically avoided. The anxiety which was generated by her fear of being alone was calmed by his presence. Although she was apparently mistreated by him, this was not something alien to Mary. She had become accustomed to being treated poorly. Even though she was taken advantage of by John, she perceived the relationship as one in which she had meaning for the first time in her life. Here was someone who, in her mind, saw Mary as important and as an integral part of his life. John became the proverbial "knight in shining armor" for Mary.

The meeting of Mary and John initially took place one afternoon while John was driving down the street in the community where Mary was living. As John drove by, he called out to Mary, and Mary approached his car. They "saw each other off and on" over the next several months. The intensity of this relationship grew and included several excursions where John and Mary would "leave for several days at a time." During the fall of her 15th year, Mary finally left her grandmother's home in order to live with John. John, in

Mary's words, "was the only person who ever showed (her) any affection." He bought her "special things" such as clothing and gave her money to spend.

It was during this period of Mary's life that she began to experiment with and abuse drugs. John taught her to use a handgun and they "had fun shooting at cans" and at other objects for target practice. Mary began to enter quickly into John's world of drugs and other illegal behaviors. The way in which John supported himself and his paramour, 8 years his junior, was to rob other drug dealers.

After John and Mary had lived together for approximately 6 months, John robbed a drug dealer and obtained large amounts of drugs and money. Following the robbery and ingestion of some of the drugs, John went into a convenience store for the expressed purpose of using the telephone to contact a friend. Because of his "peculiar behaviors" in the store, the proprietor of the convenience store called the police. Prior to the arrival of the police, Mary entered the store to determine why John was taking so much time calling his friend.

When Mary went into the store, she found John sitting on the floor in the middle of the store, eating potato chips. As she approached John, the police arrived. Because of John's condition and his inability to respond appropriately to their commands, the police arrested him, charging him with disorderly conduct. Seeing this, Mary's world began to crumble. She perceived that her "knight in shining armor" was in jeopardy and that her own physical and emotional stability was threatened.

At this point, she returned to the car and got a revolver. She approached the officer who was in control of her boyfriend and demanded John's release. When the officer refused to release John and attempted to draw his own weapon, Mary shot and killed him.

Mary was then arrested by backup officers. She was later tried and convicted of the murder of the officer and is currently serving a life sentence.

Consistent with the general description of the dependent personality are the unsolicited comments of the correctional personnel made to the investigators about Mary. During her entire incarceration period, she had the reputation of being "very quiet and cooperative." She was described as a "loner who stayed off by herself most of the time." One of the guards stated that as long as he has known her, "she hasn't been a problem at all. In fact, she's been so easy to manage that she has special living arrangements within the prison."

As with so many of these dependent personality types, most of the individuals who know them are shocked to hear that they have been involved in any criminal behavior. It is even more unbelievable for these acquaintances to accept that the criminal behavior in which the individual was involved was violent in nature.

Antisocial Personality Type

There is great misunderstanding concerning the personality disorder of the antisocial personality type. In the past, this individual has been called by many names: moral imbecile, sociopath, and psychopath. Because the current DSM uses the term antisocial personality, this is the term used throughout this study.

There are, however, some advantages to using some or all of the above terminology in place of "antisocial personality." The connotation of the words moral imbecile, for example, suggests that this individual's level of moral behavior or moral involvement within the community is greatly lacking. Where the "common person's" moral fiber can be compared to a large, thick rope, this moral imbecile's moral fiber would be no larger than a piece of fine surgical thread.

The word "sociopath" stresses a pathological relationship with society. Not only is the sociopath alienated from society, as is also suggested by the term antisocial, the sociopath displays a negative and almost diseased relationship with members of both the general society, as well as with members of the smaller social network of family and acquaintances.

This diseased model is connoted by the term psychopath, suggesting that the psyche of the individual is pathological. This psychopathy is evidenced in his or her lack of conscience, lack of positive regard and feeling for others, and in a sense of entitlement to the possessions of others.

Regardless of the term used, (moral imbecile, sociopath, psychopath, or antisocial personality type), it must be stressed that this individual is not "crazy." Frequently, when any of these descriptors are used, the general response from society is something to the effect, "Well, he must be crazy to do something like that." These individuals are not "crazy" in this sense. What can be said with a great deal of accuracy is that the antisocial personality type is manipulative and cunning—and may feign being "crazy." In other words, these individuals may want others to believe that their behaviors are out of their control—that they acted without any ability to control their behaviors. This allows them to act with impunity and to continue behaving without having to face the consequences of or responsibilities for their actions. They know right from wrong but choose not to conform their behaviors to what is socially acceptable.

The general characteristics which this study uncovered concerning the antisocial personality type are consistent with those found in the literature describing this personality type and can be contrasted to both the dependent personality and other approaches to models of violent behavior as shown in Table 3. Typically, antisocial personality traits

Table 3
A Comparison of the Results of the FBI Study With Various Models of Violent Behavior

FBI STUDY (1992)

Dependent Personality Type
Inadequate
Passive
Overcontrolled
Weak, inadequate response
  to demands of daily life
Passive compliance with
  wishes of others

Antisocial Personality Type
Entitlement
Abnormally aggressive
Lack of feelings for others
Recklessness
Blames others for own
  wrongdoing

MEGAREE (1966)

Overcontrolled Type
Great degree of inhibitions
Rigidly adheres to social
  inhibitions
Conforming
Non-hostile
"Boy/Girl next door" type

Undercontrolled Type
Few, if any, inhibitions
  against violence
Frequently engages in violence

BLACKBURN (1968)

Extreme Assaulters
Murder; manslaughter;
  attempted murder
Overkill
Introverted
Conforming
Overcontrolled
Less hostile than most
Aggression occurs only after
  prolonged or repeated provocation

Moderate Assaulters
Intent to cause serious harm;
  malicious wounding
Extroverted
Less conforming
History of violence

TUPIN, MAHAR,
SMITH (1973)

Sudden Murderers

No history of violence
Introverted
Feelings of inadequacy

Convicted Murderers with a
  History of Violence
High incidence of hyperactivity
History of fighting
History of temper tantrums

EYSENCK (1977)

Introvert
"If I violate the rule,
  I'll be punished."
Quiet
Reserved
Cautious

Extrovert
Need for excitement
  and stimulation
Fun-loving
Thrill-seeking
Aggressive
Unreliable

include a disregard for social obligations and a gross disparity between their behaviors and the socially accepted normative behaviors. A lack of feelings for others is seen especially in their social relationships. These individuals easily enter relationships which they feel they can work to their advantage. They remain in these relationships only as long as they continue to extract personal gain. As soon as the relationship begins to inconvenience them — or no longer affords them the kind of reinforcement they expect — they leave the relationship with no regard for the feelings of the other person. This relationship may have lasted a day, a few days, several weeks, several months, or even several years. As soon as another person becomes the focus of the antisocial personality's attention, he or she drops the former relationship quickly and with callous unconcern.

For these individuals, behaviors are not readily modifiable by experience. In other words, they have difficulty learning from their past mistakes. People who know these individuals over time have commented on their high levels of aggression, irresponsibility, and low tolerance for frustration.

Antisocial personality types also tend to project on others the bad or negative consequences of their own behaviors. In other words, they tend to blame others for their own wrongdoing. These others may happen to be specific individuals, groups of individuals, or society at large. In the case study discussed below, the offender blames the very officer he kills for the officer's own death. In the minds of the antisocial personality types, the negative consequences of and the responsibility for their behavior is always directed outward. Rarely do they accept it as "their" responsibility.

Although complete and totally validated explanations for these behaviors are unavailable within the scientific community, there have been many interesting findings within the experimental areas of neuropsychology and neuropsychiatry. This present study can only offer references which address various explanations for the antisocial personality's behaviors. (See Cleckley, 1976; Eysenck & Gudjonsson, 1989; Hare, 1983; Hare & Connolly, 1987; Mackay, 1986; McCord & McCord, 1964; Modlin, 1983; Quay, 1965; Reid, 1985; Reid, 1986; Wolman, 1987.)

Case Narrative of Antisocial Personality Type

Edward is a fictitious name for the individual who is responsible for the death of a law enforcement officer in the northeastern part of the country. At the time he killed the officer, Edward was 32 years old.

Edward is the oldest of eight siblings, having seven half brothers and sisters. His father left the household when Edward was 6 months of age. Because Edward's mother was very young when she gave birth to Edward, he and his mother continued to live with Edward's grandmother. It was Edward's grandmother who was the dominant person in the household. Over the next several years, Edward's mother worked outside the home as a seamstress.

The grandmother's discipline was reported by Edward as being very inconsistent. There were times when Edward would be praised for having done something and punished the following day for having done the very same thing. The family's socio-economic status was reported to have been marginal. Although Edward claims that he was physically abused during times when he was punished, there was no report of sexual abuse.

During his school years, Edward claims he did "average" in elementary school. His definition of average was A's and B's. This changed dramatically during his junior high school years where his grades dropped to D's and F's. It was during this time that Edward dropped out of school. During his prison term, he completed his GED.

His social encounters were replete with conflict. From police reports, it was determined that Edward had a reputation of being threatening and impulsive. His friends, according to newspaper accounts, characterized him as "dangerous because you didn't know what he would do." Frequently, his response to frustration was aggression.

He had been found guilty of another homicide which took place prior to the law enforcement officer shooting. The individual he killed had been a "friend" of his for almost 20 years. The two had gotten involved in an argument concerning a girlfriend. During the argument, which took place in a car being driven by Edward, Edward shot his long-time friend in the neck. Not certain that he killed him, Edward took his friend's pulse to determine if, indeed, he had died. When Edward was certain that his traveling companion was dead, he proceeded to push his body onto the floorboard of the car in order to conceal his presence. As he "drove around for a while trying to find a place to dump the body," he removed the gold jewelry, rings, and watch from the body since "they weren't no value to a dead man."

According to police and court reports reviewed, Edward's reputation also included his ability to "use" and "con" others into thinking that he intended to include them in his future plans. What actually happened is that once an individual no longer proved to be a means to a desired end Edward would quickly remove himself from the relationship without explanation or even excuse. It became apparent to others that the only person Edward had feelings for was Edward himself.

On the afternoon which ended with the law enforcement officer's death, Edward and two associates had decided to "hold-up a gambling joint." Prepared to face resistance at the illegal gambling establishment, the three were well-armed with handguns and shotguns. Having completed their robbery, they proceeded to drive away from the building. Edward, the front seat passenger in the car, reportedly

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told the driver of the car to proceed without too much speed so that no unnecessary attention would be drawn to them. The driver drove the wrong way down a one-way street, attracting the attention of an officer who was on patrol in his marked vehicle.

After the officer stopped the vehicle, Edward opened the door of his car and walked back to the officer's car. Asking the officer why he stopped their vehicle, the officer responded that Edward was to go back to his car and wait there. During this verbal exchange, Edward noted that the officer was "speaking into his radio" and not paying attention to what Edward was doing. When Edward finally returned to the car in which he was a passenger, he told the individual in the back seat of the car to "get ready...something is going to happen...someone is going to get hurt." He then told the person in the back seat to "get (his) shotgun ready because something is going to be done about this. I'm going to shoot him." When asked by the back-seat passenger if Edward meant that he was going to kill the officer, Edward responded, "You're damn right; I'm going to kill him." Edward quoted himself as further saying, "I'm going to shoot this man because I have a feeling something is going to happen."

Edward reportedly walked back to the officer's car and stood to the side of the seated officer. Edward stated that when he arrived at the side of the car, the officer was "still looking at the radio when he was talking into the microphone. He didn't see me come to the car. He then looked up out of the corner of his eye for a fraction of a second

and saw I had a gun. I shot him once in the chest and went back to the car." Edward then told the driver of the car to drive away because he "just shot the officer." They were able to succeed in their escape.

Law Enforcement Implications

Of what value to law enforcement is knowledge of the personality type of these individuals who have killed law enforcement officers? Certainly, an individual officer would not be expected to administer a personality instrument during a conflict with a citizen in order to determine either personality types or levels of danger. However, there are ways in which the psychological information from this study can be of importance to the law enforcement officer.

A major lesson learned from this study is that there is no single personality type that kills law enforcement officers. Of the individuals interviewed for this study that were identified as having a personality disorder, the antisocial personality type was the most frequently diagnosed disorder (56 percent) within the sample. And, although this is the diagnostic group that many would expect to be involved in crimes of violence, there was also a relatively large number (23 percent) of individuals diagnosed as dependent personality types — far less frequently "expected" by most people to be found committing crimes of violence. The dependent personality type appears too docile and easy-going to engage in violence. As such, officers need to be aware that a calm and agreeable surface may be hiding an emotional volcano. Law enforcement officers will no

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Table 4
Personality Typology of Survey Offenders

Antisocial Personality	Dependent Personality
Sense of entitlement	Overcontrolled
Lack of remorse	Dependent and submissive
Disparity between behavior and socially accepted normative behavior	Inability to deal with anger, frustration, and hostility
Disregard for social obligations	Passive compliance with the wishes of others
Nonconformity to norms	
Alienated from society	Poor social interaction
Lack of feeling for others	Inadequate
Lack of conscience	Weak and ineffective
Blames others for their own wrongdoing	Lacking energy
Projects negative consequences upon others	Passive
Manipulative and "conning"	
Irresponsible	
Affectively cold	

Source: FBI Study

doubt be aware of situations of a similar nature where an individual who had a reputation of being calm and quiet engaged in uncharacteristically violent behavior.

Personality typologies of the antisocial and dependent personalities are provided in Table 4. This typology may be of use to law enforcement officers in recognizing and encountering such personalities. Caution must always be employed when dealing with any individual—regardless of apparent compliance to the officer's orders and commands.

What about those times when officers do have prior knowledge of the personalities of individuals being sought—or could easily attain this information? There are those situations where officers are called to scenes or are engaged in circumstances in which they have prior knowledge of the type of person they will be encountering. These circumstances can include domestic disturbance calls where the officers have repeatedly been called to the same address and have become aware of the personality types of those involved in the domestic disturbance. It can also include arrest warrant situations where, again, information concerning the personalities of those to be arrested are known—or such information can be obtained from other sources.

It can also be very useful to know if individuals being interrogated or questioned as suspects or even witnesses fit one of these personality types. The approach one takes with different personalities — a principle which every law enforcement officer knows from experience — can assist or hinder the interrogation process. In each of these situations listed above, knowing the personality type may well assist in directing the way in which this individual is questioned and treated. Certain approaches may be more effective than others in eliciting information from these individuals. Suggested methods for the management of these individuals by law enforcement personnel during questioning and interrogation are discussed in the next chapter of this study entitled Approaches to Antisocial and Dependent Personality Types During Questioning and Interrogation.

Chapter 4

APPROACHES TO ANTISOCIAL AND DEPENDENT PERSONALITY TYPES DURING QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION

How do you, personally, react to requests or commands made of you? What is your own response to an individual who either quietly requests or forcefully demands your cooperation? The answer to these questions may well depend upon the circumstances of the incident, the individual who is making the request or command, your particular mood at the time of the request or command, among other variables. Generally, however, we tend to respond more or less favorably to one particular style or approach as opposed to other possible styles or approaches. Our reactions in these situations frequently have to do, in part, with our own personality. So it is with others — other people (other personality types) respond to particular styles of questioning or particular styles of requests better than they would to others.

One's personality is made up of a variety of factors. These factors include the individual's perception of external stimuli, the processing of these perceptions, and the interpersonal actions in which one engages. The activities of an individual, then, become habitual and relatively predictable.

The reasons that a person processes external stimuli in idiosyncratic or individualistic ways are the result of a combination of genetic constitution, infant and early childhood experiences, academic exposure, and interpersonal relationships. One generally makes a distinction among the terms personality, personality traits, and personality disorder. Personality consists of deeply ingrained patterns of behavior. Personality includes such aspects as the way in which the individual relates to, perceives, and thinks about the environment and himself or herself. Traits are the particular and prominent aspects of the personality. A disorder of personality is a chronically inflexible and maladaptive pattern of behavior sufficiently severe to cause significant social impairment or subjective distress (DSM-III-R, p. 403).

Since personality is habitual and predictable in many ways (Soloff, 1987), it is valuable to recognize the personalities with which one is dealing. Knowing how the person will react to situations and particular lines of questioning will place the law enforcement officer at a distinct advantage in dealing with these individuals.

What are some of these styles or approaches that can be used in an interrogation or in a questioning situation? This next section will discuss two different approaches. The first approach is more appropriate to the dependent personality type, and the second approach is more appropriate to use with the antisocial personality type. (For further insight, reference any psychiatric interview text, for example, MacKinnon & Michels, 1971; Othmer & Othmer, 1989; Shea, 1988.)

Developing the Principles

The principles discussed below have been developed from a combination of two unique — but certainly not mutually exclusive — approaches, namely, the mental health view and the law enforcement view. Although these two perspectives may appear at first glance to be contradictory, many similarities exist. In both cases, information is elicited from a person who may or may not be a willing participant -- for a variety of reasons. Also, in both the mental health and law enforcement interviews, the interviewer must continually analyze the dynamics that are occurring between the interviewer and the interviewee. During this process, the interviewer is testing his or her hypotheses about such things as

the motivation of the interviewee; in what direction the interview and the interviewee are moving; how to focus the interview for the purposes of both efficiency and effectiveness; how best to phrase questions, statements, and responses; how the interviewee will react to certain questions, statements, and responses made by the interviewer; and finally, the kind or type of person (diagnostic evaluation) with whom the interviewer is dealing. Both law enforcement and mental health professionals attempt to answer these questions as best they can. The interviewers in this study attempted to use various interview principles and techniques from both the mental health profession and the law enforcement profession in dealing with the offenders.

The interviewing aids that follow need to be applied, of course, to the particular investigation in question. The principles developed and discussed in this chapter may be of some value to other investigators in their interrogations and questionings of suspects and witnesses.

Interrogation of Dependent Personality Types

In dealing with this personality type, the interviewer must begin with the recognition that the dependent personality type will generally take no initiative throughout the interviewing process. The bulk of the work belongs to the interviewer. However, since this individual has a history of following the commands and wishes of others, if the correct approach is used, it will be relatively easy to elicit responses from him or her.

Dealing with the dependent personality type is something of a delicate balance, however. Although these individuals are used to following the commands and wishes of others, they have also developed a resentment to individuals who represent authority. The key issue in eliciting information without causing the dependent personality types to react negatively is to allay their feelings of anxiety.

Under the surface of the apparently calm and docile dependent personality is an ocean of anxiety and fear. The inability to deal with years of feelings concerning their sense of inadequacy and self-deprecation has resulted in inordinate levels of anxiety. By reducing the levels of anxiety they experience during the initial stages of the interview, the dependent personalities will be more open to actually hearing the questions of the interviewer, as well as more able to respond to questions asked.

One of the more effective means of allaying the interviewee's anxiety is for the interviewer to take the initiative for the interview without making excessive demands on the interviewee. In the interviews conducted for this study, this was achieved in two ways.

The first technique used to alleviate the interviewee's fears and anxiety was to state in the opening phase of the interview that the interviewers recognized that talking about these matters sometimes causes initial anxiety and unrest. The interviewees were told that there was no intention to make them feel uncomfortable, but the interviewers did realize that some discomfort would be experienced. They were also told that it was the experience of these interviewers that, at the end of this interview process, most people actually felt better having participated in this study.

Introducing the topic of anxiety into this first phase of the interview process allows the individual consciously to recognize the anxious feelings that are inevitably present. In this way, he or she is able to deal with these feelings. To hear that others have felt this same way, that is, that people other than they have had these anxieties and fears, allows the interviewee to feel that he or she is "like other people" in some ways.

The second technique used to assuage the interviewee's anxiety was to tell the person that the interviewers were not passing judgments on them...or on what took place between them and the law enforcement officer. The interview was being conducted only for the purpose of gathering information in order to determine WHAT occurred, WHY it occurred, and possibly HOW it could have been prevented.

This is accomplished by directly telling the interviewees that the interviewers were not there to judge them and also by taking a detailed socio-psychological history of the individuals. Although the major purpose in conducting the socio-psychological history (the first major section of the interview protocol) is to retrieve vital and necessary information for purposes of diagnosis, it is also a useful "ice-breaking" mechanism for discussion. It allows the interviewees to see that the interviewers are interested in them as persons, as well as sources of information. In mental health settings, this is referred to as developing a therapeutic relationship and rapport.

Once the levels of anxiety are diminished, the interview can proceed into the more involved and complicated material, specifically the material relating directly to the incident in which the death of the law enforcement officer occurred. It is best, even during this time of the interview, to keep the questions as simple as possible.

The caution that must be given is that the dependent personality types will demonstrate during an interview many of the same psychological dynamics that they employ when interacting with others outside this interview setting. The most important factor to remember within the interview setting is that dependent personality types have historically felt the need to please individuals whom they feel have some authority. Consequently, they will sometimes say and do things that they feel "they should do" and that "they should say" rather than what they actually want to do and want to say. Continual verification of what they say and corroboration as to what they claim occurred must be made.

Although the initial phase of the interview may frequently appear to be moving nowhere, once the individual's levels of anxiety and feelings of threat are reduced within the interview setting, the dependent personality type will become compliant and verbal.

It would be an easy error to make during the interview with the dependent personality type to limit the interview to the shortest amount of time possible based solely on the feeling that the interview is "going nowhere." Most reactions to the dependent personality type by interviewers are that this individual is dull and uninteresting. Many individuals would conclude the interview at that point, thinking that the dependent personality type has no information worth retrieving. Although it is not a particularly exciting process to converse with the dependent personality type, it can be a valuable process if the interviewer is patient and requests the information in a very specific and non-threatening manner.

Interrogation of Antisocial Personality Types

As mentioned in the last section, it is sometimes very difficult to engage the dependent personality type in the interview process. He or she is more than reluctant to converse. This situation is rarely encountered with the antisocial personality type (ASP). The major obstacle to interviewing the ASP is his need to attempt to control the entire conversation. (The masculine gender will be used in this subsection not for convenience but because the largest proportion of antisocial personality type is male.)

Clearly, control of the interview must always be securely located with the interviewer. However, in the opening or first phase of the interview, it is not always unwise for the interviewer to consciously and freely relinquish a small amount of control to the interviewee. This may simply involve allowing him to vent his feelings about law enforcement, about the correctional staff, or even about society in general! For the most part, the ASP is "testing the waters" to see if the interviewer is listening and what the effects of what he is saying is having on the interviewer. To either lash out or to show some shock at what is being said will be translated by the ASP to mean that this interviewer is not worth talking to...and the conversation will dramatically end at that point.

It is always a balancing routine with the ASP as to where the locus of control rests within an interview process. However, once the interview has begun and some level of rapport has been established, the interviewer can begin to establish his or her command of the interview process. Perhaps one of the more effective measures with which to create this rapport is to let the ASP know that he is assisting the interviewer. With his help, the interviewer will return from this encounter with information which the interviewer would not have had if it were not for the assistance of the interviewee. This establishes in the mind of the ASP early on in the interview process his "importance." His compliance thereafter is generally more easily received.

This is not the end of the "control" issue. It will continue to surface throughout the process, and the interviewer must be aware that it will continue to become an issue. However, once rapport has been established, to what little extent it is possible with an ASP, confrontation and checks and balances within the interview can be made with less chance of the interview coming to an abrupt end.

Most ASP types speak with great "bravado." Although being subjected to this bravado is annoying, the ASP's need to feel "super masculine" and "super important" can work to the advantage of the interviewer. Also, many of these individuals have histories of criminal behaviors and have been involved in connings and manipulations for many, many years. Questions can be phrased that suggest not only an understanding that the ASP has, in fact, committed certain acts, but also that it is "expected" that he would have been involved in these behaviors. In other words, rather than asking, "Have you ever taken anything that didn't belong to you?", one might ask, "How many times have you taken things that you felt you either needed or wanted to have?" In relation to their involvement in violence, one might ask, "You seem like you can take care of yourself rather well. How many times have you had to put someone in his place?"

The principle to bear in mind with the ASP within the interview process is that more information will be retrieved if one explores what he is saying without appearing to attack what he is saying. The ASP already knows that much of what he does is considered both inappropriate and wrong by the society. However, he does not incorporate what the society judges to be correct or incorrect into his behavior. His judgment as to what is personally appropriate behavior is guided only by what he feels will further his immediate gratification. To argue with him over such a principle would be to no avail.

Since the ASP is rarely in touch with his feelings, it is difficult for him to talk about them with a true understanding of them. If, for the purpose of a particular study such as this, one is interested in "how the ASP was feeling before, during, or after the commission of a crime," one must focus first on his behaviors. His behaviors are an outlet for feelings that he is generally unable to understand or to adequately express verbally. And so, for example, how he "felt" about individuals with whom he may have had some relationship would best be uncovered by examining not what he said he felt about them, but rather by how he actually treated them. What will no doubt become plain to the interviewer is the obvious conflict between how he claims he felt about individuals with whom he was involved in a relationship

and how he actually treated them. One individual whose case was developed at length in Chapter 3, for example, spoke at length about the life-long friendship he had with an individual he killed because of a disagreement. What is most interesting about this occurrence is both the lack of any sense of guilt or remorse for killing his "friend," as well as the apparent justification in his own mind for having killed him. And yet, when asked about the relationship, the ASP claimed to have had strong, positive feelings toward his friend.

Although the interviewer has to work hard to continue to maintain the control of the interview, once the ASP feels that the interviewer is listening and is "understanding," the ASP will continue to talk. Once talking, information will be retrieved not only concerning the incident for which the interview or interrogation is being conducted, but also about other activities in which the ASP was involved.

Chapter 5

THE VICTIM

The law enforcement officers whose killings are examined in this study made the ultimate sacrifice for the communities they served. While upholding our Nation's laws and protecting its citizens, they were feloniously killed. The men and women sworn to safeguard the rights, lives, and property of American citizens wonder every time one of their brother or sister officers is killed in the line of duty, "Why was this officer killed and not me?" Carefully studying the experiences and characteristics of past victims is essential to gaining the understanding needed to perhaps save the lives of fellow officers.

The data supplied to the FBI by each victim officer's law enforcement agency provided the initial background information for this chapter. During the course of the study, the employing law enforcement agencies were contacted, and the victims' supervisors and co-workers were interviewed about the incidents and the victim officers. When provided by the various departments, additional background records were reviewed for the purposes of this study. (See Appendix I.)

Victim Demographics

As previously stated, the 51 incidents studied involved the deaths of 54 officers. Table 5 summarizes the demographic attributes of these 54 victim officers. From this table, it is clear that the victim officers are predominantly male, young (average age 34), white, married, and high school educated. Comparatively, FBI data from 1981-1990 show that 98 percent of all victim officers were male, their average age was 36 years, and 87 percent were white. This demographic description of the victim officers studied is similar to that of the offenders' demographic description involved in these incidents. (See similar offender information in Table 1.) However, there are also obvious differences. The victim

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Table 5
Law Enforcement Officers Killed: A Demographic Description

	1981-1990[1]	FBI Study
Gender:	98% male; 2% female	98% male; 2% female
Average Age:	36 years	34 years
Race:	87% white; 12% black	93% white; 7% black
Average Height:	5 feet 10 inches	5 feet 10 inches
Average Weight:	NA	188 pounds
Marital Status:	NA	81% married; 11% single; 6% separated; 2% divorced
Education:	NA	83% high school; 7% some college; 9% college degree

[1] Source: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (1990 Edition)
NA - not available in the historical FBI data base.

officers studied were on average 8 years older, more educated with higher percentages having completed both high school and college, and more likely to be married (81 percent versus 12 percent) than were the offenders examined. There are, on average, no significant weight or height differences between the victim officers and offenders studied.

Agency Affiliations

The victim officers in this study served a variety of types of law enforcement agencies at the time of their deaths. Figure 11 summarizes the agency affiliations of the victim officers involved in these incidents. Clearly, municipal police, at 46 percent, and officers employed by sheriffs' offices, at 26 percent, were the predominant victims in the incidents studied. This distribution is supported by the historical FBI data (also displayed in Figure 11) that show municipal police comprising 58 percent of all victims and sheriffs' office personnel accounting for 24 percent of law enforcement officer deaths from 1981-1990. Of course, these two types of agencies jointly provide most of the law enforcement service in the Nation.

Across all regional areas of the Nation, these two types of agencies together employed the majority of officers killed

in the line of duty. In the Northeast, however, state police represented 4 percent more officer deaths than sheriffs' office personnel. It should be noted that the functions of law enforcement are diverse throughout the country. In certain areas, sheriffs' responsibilities are limited almost exclusively to civil functions and/or the administration of the county jail facilities. In other areas, sheriffs' responsibilities include full-service law enforcement. Likewise, the responsibilities of state police and highway patrol agencies vary from one jurisdiction to another.

Types of Assignment

The nature of the assignments of the victim officers is shown in Figure 12. Eight of 10 officers in the study were assigned to vehicle patrol at the time of their deaths. Specifically, 70 percent were assigned to single-officer vehicles and 9 percent to two-officer vehicles. Other victims studied served in varying capacities with 9 percent performing detective duties or special assignments and 6 percent serving undercover, temporary, or administrative duties. Another 6 percent were off duty but acting in an official capacity when slain.

FIGURE 11 Professional Affiliations of Victim Officers

Legend: U.S Total, 1981 - 1990 / FBI Study

FIGURE 12 | Types of Assignment at Time of Death

Legend: U.S Total, 1981 - 1990 | FBI Study

This distribution is similar for the historical FBI data, also shown in Figure 12, with 49 percent of the victims on single-officer vehicle patrols and 14 percent assigned to 2-officer vehicle patrols. Data on all officers slain, however, indicates that 23 percent (versus 9 percent in the study) of the victims from 1981-1990 were serving as detectives or on special assignments.

At the time of their deaths, 81 percent of the study victims were in uniform. The study included 2 chiefs of police, 2 sheriffs, 2 special agents, 2 lieutenants, 3 sergeants, 1 corporal, 6 detectives, 7 deputies, 8 troopers, and 21 patrol officers.

Years of Service

The study victims averaged 8 years of law enforcement service. None had less than 1 year of experience. Thirty-one percent had 1 to 5 years of service; 39 percent had 6 to 10 years; and 30 percent were veterans of more than 10 years.

Historical FBI data show that of all officers slain from 1981 through 1990, 5 percent had less than 1 year of service; 28 percent had from 1 to 5 years; 31 percent had 6 to 10 years; and 37 percent over 10 years. The average experience for all officers feloniously killed during the decade was 9 years.

Work Performance

For all officers included in the study, an attempt was made to obtain information on overall work performance. Several agencies, however, did not use a standard work performance evaluation form or procedure for evaluation, and some had very limited, if any, personnel records systems. In spite of these difficulties with data collection, a most surprising finding emerged. Ten victims had received successful or better than successful ratings over several rating periods, but just prior to their deaths received a lower assessment. The specific area the officers were found lacking could not be determined in all cases. When contacted, departments were reluctant to release specific information about the individual officer's personnel record. Some departments would not allow actual review of the victim's personnel file but would comment verbally as to the contents.

In one such case, the reviewing official stated that there were two areas of decline in the officer's last evaluation. The first was that the officer failed to maintain the department's weight guidelines; he was overweight. Secondly, the victim would not use the department-issued protective vest, stating that it was too uncomfortable to wear. It was also learned

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that during this rating period, the victim officer had his service weapon taken during an arrest situation. During this incident, the victim's partner was able to kill the offender who had disarmed the officer.

The night the officer was slain he had returned to the station, removed his vest, and placed it in his locker. He was killed 1 hour later. His killer, earlier in the day, had reported to one of his relatives that he was going "to kill a pig." This is the only case examined in which the killer, herein referred to as Tom, deliberately set out to kill an officer. According to his interview, prior to his contact with the victim, Tom observed a uniformed patrol sergeant near what would eventually become the crime scene. This killer, a heavy drug user, after evaluating the sergeant, decided not to attempt to kill him. Two hours later, the victim officer arrived on the scene, and Tom immediately decided that the slaying of this officer would be an easy task. He assaulted the officer, knocked him to the ground, removed his service weapon, and shot and killed him. Unfortunately, Tom was unable to articulate his reasons for not attempting to kill the sergeant; nor was he able to state why he felt it would be easy to disarm and kill the victim officer. The victim officer's actions conveyed a message to his supervisor which resulted in a decline in his work performance evaluation. Perhaps the same message was communicated to the killer.

This was not the only case observed in which the killer made an evaluation of the eventual victim. These evaluations, conscious or not, may be the sudden spark that sets the killer in motion. This evaluation on the part of the offender is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, Procedural and Training Issues.

Behavioral Descriptors

It should be stressed that the original purpose of this study was not to analyze the personalities of the victim officers. Consequently, no systematic approach to uncover a victim officer behavioral profile was made. It was only after several interviews with victim officers' peers and supervisors that it became apparent that similar behavioral descriptors were commonly used to describe these victim officers. Open-ended questions concerning the type of person the victim officer was were asked of law enforcement officials and line officers who knew the victim officer. These same open-ended questions were asked of the offenders who had some actual interaction with the victim officer prior to his or her killing of the officer. A remarkable similarity among the adjectives and phrases law enforcement sources and a limited number of offenders used to describe the victim officers was observed. A list of behavioral descriptors was formed during the early stages of the study and the number of descriptors continued to grow as the interviews with victim officers' peers, supervisors, and the offenders proceeded.

Table 6
Behavioral Descriptors of Victim Officers

Friendly to everyone
Well-liked by community and department
Tends to use less force than other officers
    felt they would in similar circumstances
Hard working
Tends to perceive self as more public
    relations than law enforcement
        - service oriented
Uses force only as last resort
        - peers claim they would use force at an
            earlier point in similar circumstances
Doesn't follow all the rules, especially in
    regard to:
        - arrest
        - confrontation with prisoners
        - traffic stops
        - does not wait for backup
            (when available)
Feels he/she can "read" others/situations and
    will drop guard as a result
Tends to look for "good" in others
"Laid back " and "easy going"

Source: FBI Study

Each of the 54 victim officers possessed several of these behavioral characteristics. No actual tabulation of each adjective or phrase was recorded concerning the responses of either law enforcement personnel or offenders, as this was not an initial focus of the study. Table 6 summarizes some of the most frequently occurring behavioral descriptors of these victim officers.

Some have suggested that only positive and noncritical statements would be made concerning a fallen officer by other officers. As these behavioral descriptors are examined, however, two points should be recognized. First, it is obvious that not all of the descriptors are favorable. A statement that an officer uses force only as a last resort — even where most other officers would have used force earlier — suggests that the officer "should have" used more force and used it earlier in order to protect both himself or herself, as well as other officers and/or civilians. "Not following all the procedures" is another descriptor used. This, too, could result in possible injury to oneself or others. If, for example, a prisoner is not handcuffed correctly, considering the offender's comfort more than the officer's safety, the handcuffs might be used as a weapon against the officer and his or her partner. A second point to consider is that

even some offenders, those who had timely contact with the officers prior to the killings, used these same behavioral descriptors when talking about the victim officers.

The most salient characteristics in relation to incidents of this nature appear to be those descriptors which characterize the officer as good-natured and conservative in his or her use of authority. Law enforcement officers continually face the challenge of assessing the appropriate degree of authority to be asserted in maintaining control of any potentially dangerous encounter. The relationship between the victim officer who possesses these characteristics and the offender is discussed at length in Chapter 6.

Offenders' Perspectives

There are many questions concerning the victim officers that have not been examined in this study. Unfortunately, the nature of a study that examines law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty is limited in that the perspectives of the victim officers cannot be directly assessed. Instead, the perspectives of the offenders regarding the police officers' demeanor at the time of the confrontation must be considered. In this light, 57 percent of the offenders questioned in this study characterized the victim officers as unprepared or surprised during the confrontation. Thirty-nine percent characterized the demeanor of the victim officer as menacing or loud. However, the impact of these behavioral styles on the likelihood of law enforcement officer killings remains unclear.

Chapter 6

PROCEDURAL AND TRAINING ISSUES

Much has been learned from past and recent studies that have analyzed specific aspects of situations in which law enforcement officers were killed. These works include studies that variously reviewed law enforcement procedures, offender characteristics, and high-danger/high-risk circumstances. However, additional information and important lessons can be gleaned from a more integrative approach to studying law enforcement deaths. The integration of all these aspects into a holistic view provides some crucial insights that hopefully will reduce the likelihood of an officer being feloniously killed in the line of duty. This study, in an attempt to integrate the specific aspects of each case with the general characteristics of both the offenders and the victims, identified several specific areas where law enforcement procedures and/or training (or a lack of procedures and training) may have played a role in the eventual outcome of the incident. These areas were then compared to generally accepted law enforcement training and procedures.

Two initial points need to be made in order to give the reader a better understanding of both the intent and approach of this study. First, hindsight judgments concerning the procedural aspects of these incidents were made with considerable reluctance. This reluctance was offset, however, by one of the study's chief aims, to examine and analyze these situations in the hope that the lives of law enforcement officers and citizens alike may be saved in the future. Second, the case narratives that are delineated in this chapter often contain multiple aspects. Therefore, the same example may be used to illustrate two different, yet related, aspects of the event. For example, an improper approach to an offender or vehicle may place an officer at a tactical disadvantage that increases the likelihood of the officer losing control of both the offender and the encounter.

This study developed five general areas of concern in connection with law enforcement training and procedures:

1. Procedural Errors. There were cases in which the victim officer did not follow accepted law enforcement procedures. Such examples include: failing to call for backup support when such backup was available and appropriate given the circumstances; acting alone prior to the arrival of backup support; failure to search a suspect fully and completely; improper or no use of handcuffs; positioning the police vehicle in front of a target vehicle during a traffic stop.

2. Correct Procedures. In some cases, the victim officers apparently followed all the acceptable procedures and yet were killed. For example, in one case the officer simply asked an individual to move a car which was improperly parked. Without giving the officer any indication that he was armed, the occupant of the car shot and killed the officer.

3. Absence of Procedures. Certain situations arose for which the law enforcement agency had no formalized or accepted procedures to handle the circumstances. It is recognized that procedures cannot be formalized to cover every situation that an officer may encounter; however, there are some eventualities, given the nature of the profession, for which plans should be made and then formalized in training. For example, how is an officer to respond to a situation in which he or she is faced with a drawn weapon? Another example is illustrated by the lack of stated policies by some departments indicating whether the officer is to allow the occupants of a vehicle in a traffic stop situation to exit the car or whether the officer should command the occupants to remain in the car until the officer instructs them further. There is considerable variation in the philosophies for managing these circumstances, but these differences should not preclude officers' exposure to training on these situations.

4. Conflicting Procedures. Procedures in which the officer was trained were sometimes in conflict with his or her personal safety. In some jurisdictions, the written policy of

the department for traffic stops allows the officer to place the driver of the target vehicle in the front seat of the officer's vehicle for additional police action. This procedure has the possible effect of placing the officer at a disadvantage when, for example, the radioed results of a National Crime Information Center (NCIC) search reveal an existing arrest warrant, and the situation thus turns into an arrest event. Even in departments that transmit coded voiced NCIC responses indicating existing warrants for the offender, the officer is at a disadvantage now that he or she must remove the potential prisoner from the front seat of the patrol vehicle. Another example involving training procedures that may be in conflict with an officer's safety is in the jurisdictions where written departmental policies and procedures preclude an officer from drawing his or her service weapon unless drawn on first. Such a policy has the potential of always placing the officer at a tactical disadvantage.

5. Training. As stated previously, it is recognized that law enforcement agencies cannot plan, and subsequently establish, procedures and training for every conceivable eventuality or situation with which their officers will be confronted. The agencies can, however, continually strive to stay abreast of new methods, literature, studies, procedures, practices, concepts, court decisions, and equipment, and develop procedures and training to keep their members informed and updated in the latest law enforcement methods. They can do critical post-incident evaluations with a view toward not criticizing or condemning but updating and improving safety procedures. They can make the commitment, in attitude, personnel, and other resources, to give their officers every possible advantage by providing relevant and timely training in all areas. This training not only benefits the department and its officers, but the communities they serve. A department well educated in law enforcement techniques and general safety procedures can better respond to the various needs and emergency situations of the citizens it serves. Examples of such training include, but are not limited to, dealing with the physically impaired, dealing with mentally disordered members of society, and dealing with individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds. Knowing the special needs and characteristic reactions of members of various groups asssists the law enforcement officer in understanding the individuals from these various groups so that their needs are met and misunderstandings are kept to a minimum. It is, of course, possible that miscommunication and misunderstanding in dealing with these or similar situations can lead to physical altercations. Law enforcement training can minimize the chance that these situations will lead to such disputes.

Detailed analysis of these broad areas resulted in the determination that the concerns raised by the study of these incidents could be separated into two major categories: approaches to vehicles and suspects and lack of control of persons and situations. These two major categories have been subdivided in this chapter to discuss related implications. In the Approach to Vehicles and Suspects section are topics that include identification as law enforcement officers when not in uniform, off-duty performance of duty, facing a drawn gun, and traffic stops. The section concerning Control of Persons and/or Situations will discuss weapon retention, use of protective body armor, searches, handcuffing, first aid, professional demeanor, team concept, night training, and supervision for increased safety.

In this limited study, 41 percent of the victim officers made improper approaches to suspects or vehicles; and 65 percent were unable properly to control persons or situations. Included in the percentages are 4 cases where officers apparently both made an improper approach to the persons or vehicles involved and failed to control the individuals or situations. Only 2 victim officers made no apparent procedural error.

None of the information herein has been ranked in order of importance in preventing the felonious death of a law enforcement officer. However, the following case narrative information included may provide a foundation of knowledge that can be used to assist individual law enforcement agencies in addressing their survival training needs. As previously stated, many issues are addressed here without conclusions or resolutions. Just as laws and regulations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so do individual training needs.

Approach to Vehicles and Suspects

Improper approach to vehicles or suspects is of particular importance since the dynamics of the encounter are initially defined at this stage of the incident. As stated in Chapter 1, in 8 of 10 incidents studied, officers were slain where they initially encountered their assailants. Additionally, the aspects of the physical, social, and psychological approach to these incidents usually dictate the degree of control that both the offender and the law enforcement officer maintain throughout the duration of the encounter.

Aspects related to the approach to vehicles and suspects that this study has been able to examine include: the approach to known/suspected felons, encountering several persons in a situation when only one is suspected of any criminal misconduct, proper identification as law enforcement officers, encountering drawn weapons, and the importance of approach in general traffic stops. Each of these is explored using extensive case narratives from the incidents studied.

Approaching Known/Suspected Felons

What training is given an officer concerning an approach to a known or suspected felon? In one case examined, the victim officer advised the radio dispatcher that he had a suspect in sight who resembled an armed robber of a local convenience store and requested a backup officer to respond. Prior to the arrival of the second officer, the victim approached the suspected armed robber. In the interview, the killer stated the victim did not take control of him; the offender ignored the officer's command to raise his hands, and finally turned and shot the officer. The victim had never taken his service weapon from its holster.

In a second case, the victim officer was sent to a secluded area in an attempt to locate several burglary suspects. When the officer located and observed two suspects carrying rifles as they walked away, he approached them and asked for their weapons. When they refused to lay down their weapons, the officer turned his back on them, returned to his patrol vehicle, and called for assistance. Upon returning to the suspects, the victim was shot and killed. The victim's weapon was still in its holster.

In both of these cases, the officers had prior knowledge that the suspects they were approaching resembled, and in all probability were, the alleged armed felons. Why were their guns still in their holsters? Clearly, these study results suggest that training procedures focusing upon the approach to suspected armed felons may reduce the likelihood of law enforcement officer deaths.

Approach to Several Persons When Only One is Suspected of Criminal Activity

This research revealed that 14 of the killers were in the company of one of more individuals at the time the officer was killed. Eleven of these killers were not the target of the officer's initial approach. What can be learned by law enforcement officers in situations such as these? The case of Mary, discussed earlier in Chapter 3, best portrays a situation where the victim officer is killed as a result of the approach of several persons when only one is suspected of wrongdoing. John was the focus of the victim's approach. Mary had not committed any crime and apparently posed no perceived threat to the officer. In the officer's attempt to remove John from a store, Mary was completely ignored. She returned to their car, retrieved a gun, and shot and killed the officer.

In another example, the victim officer executed a traffic stop in which there were three individuals in the vehicle. The victim wanted to cite the driver for a traffic violation, disregarding the two passengers. One of the passengers exited the vehicle, approached the patrol car in which the officer was seated, and shot and killed the officer.

In some of these cases, it appears that the officer was a victim of "tunnel vision," that is, the focus of his or her approach was on one person, and the other people in the group were neglected or ignored, resulting in the officer's demise.

Identification When Not in Uniform

In every study case where the victim officer was not in uniform, the offenders claimed that they did not know the victim was a law enforcement officer. In the cases involving the sale or distribution of drugs, the killers' defense at the time of the trial was that they were afraid that they were being robbed by another drug dealer. This defense can be seen time after time in criminal trials attempting to justify a defendant's actions when officers are not in uniform. One of the killers said, "It's not acceptable to yell, 'Police, freeze!' or 'Police, hands up!' because when someone is yelling at me and pointing a weapon, the only thing I hear them saying is 'Give me your money. Give me your drugs.'" Although this may be seen as a justification on the part of the offender for killing the officer, and even though one may doubt the veracity of this statement, a lesson could be extracted from these comments. Specifically, that law enforcement give consideration to a two-sense identification, both a visual display and a verbal command (i.e., a raid jacket and a verbal command). How an officer presents himself or herself when not in uniform could mean the difference between life and death. In one of the cases examined, the victim officer was in the company of two other officers. They were dressed in plaid shirts and blue jeans. They were approaching a marijuana field under cultivation when observed by the eventual killer. The killer, unknown to the police, had been involved in a gun fight the day before with a rival drug dealer. The offender allegedly thought these officers were men hired by a rival drug dealer to settle accounts. He claimed that there were no visual means by which to identify the officers as members of any law enforcement agency. The victim's department now issues clearly marked raid jackets to be used by officers not in uniform.

While not clearly identified as law enforcement, officers have also been killed accidentally by fellow officers. This misidentification has occurred most frequently during interventions in armed robberies or arrest situations. A clear benefit of the raid jacket or other obvious law enforcement symbol is the elimination of the possibility of misidentification of an officer as a suspect. When multiple-agency operations are being performed, clear identification of the officers involved is essential.

Off-Duty Performance

How are officers trained to act when they come upon a crime scene when off duty? In one of the cases examined, an officer was present when several people attempted to rob a restaurant/bar. The victim in this case was not aware that there were three offenders involved in the robbery. The officer jumped up from his table, and while attempting to

draw his gun, announced that he was a police officer. He commanded two of the offenders to drop their weapons. He was shot and killed by a third robber he didn't recognize as such. Would it have been wrong for this officer to act as a witness in this case? Might it have been more prudent to take note of the description of the robbers and only act when the robbers started to flee the scene? Wasn't the situation exacerbated and innocent lives placed in jeopardy unnecessarily by the officer taking aggressive action in a crowded bar? Some departments provide little training and direction in this matter, and yet others spend hours instructing their officers in off-duty procedures.

Facing a Drawn Gun

One example of this dilemma is illustrated by the question of an offender at the conclusion of the interview. This offender questioned "Why do police officers have to act so macho?" When pressed further, he responded, "Why do law enforcement officers try to out draw a trigger squeeze?" "Trigger squeeze" refers to facing a drawn gun and estimating the time and pressure required to discharge the weapon. Some agencies addressed this issue by suggesting that the officer should seek some kind of cover. Another school of thought proposes that closing distance in an attempt to disarm the individual is the proper procedure.

Consider the following hypothetical scenario. The officer is in the middle of a large open area in which there is no cover. It is the officer versus a criminal. The criminal has a single-shot shotgun, and all that he has to do is to squeeze the trigger. The officer's gun is holstered, and cover is a long way off. As the officer starts to move, the criminal says, "One step and I squeeze the trigger." What is taught to officers should they be faced with a situation where the criminal has a gun drawn and pointed, and the officer's gun is still holstered? Given this scenario, if one has been taught to close the distance an: disarm, and the criminal says, "One more step and I shoot," what other options are available to the officer? When this situation is mentioned to law enforcement groups, their comments regularly warn, "Don't give up your gun." The analysis of the case narratives of this present study suggests that an important aspect to surviving a situation such as described above is to think...think of all possible options.

Eighty percent of the killers in this study have stated during the interviews that they were "instinctive shooters." This characterization of "instinctive shooters" indicates that the offenders do not consciously prepare to fire their weapons but rather simply draw, point, and discharge the weapon. When the victim officer stands in front of a criminal with a drawn gun pointed at him or her, clearly any attempt to out draw the trigger squeeze by bending knees and attempting to remove the gun from its holster seriously reduces the officer's chance of survival.

The offender who first discussed this issue pointed out that prior to the incident in which he killed a police officer, he had confronted two officers with his gun drawn and their guns holstered. He gave them a command to lie on the floor. They followed his command after which he ran from the business establishment and escaped. Law enforcement records substantiate this encounter. Later that night, the offender confronted another officer at the scene of a traffic stop. If the offender can be believed (the only substantiated facts in this case are that the victim officer was shot and killed on a roadside, and the handgun used to kill the officer was later recovered in the possession of the offender), he drew his gun on the officer and again told the officer to lie on the ground allowing the offender to escape. The offender then stated that the officer attempted to draw his weapon from the holster. The offender shot and killed the officer. The offender again escaped and was a fugitive for several weeks before being captured. Should the officer have acted differently? The answer to this question remains unknown. The fact remains, however, that the victim officer had never received any training in what to do when facing a drawn gun.

Traffic Stops

The first case examined here is that of a 46-year-old male who killed a 27-year-old law enforcement officer with 4 years' law enforcement experience. The offender reported he had never been involved in a criminal act. It was substantiated that he possessed no criminal record either as a juvenile or an adult. He lived alone, had no friends, and worked menial jobs. People who knew him described him as different, strange, and a harmless eccentric. About 6 weeks prior to the killing, this individual was stopped for a traffic infraction. That stop resulted in his vehicle and equipment inside it being impounded and his driver's license suspended. The individual depleted his savings when he paid the fines to recover his small truck and equipment from the impound lot. This was his first adult contact with law enforcement, and he claims that it left him very bitter toward law enforcement.

The victim officer involved in this incident had prior knowledge that the offender's driver's license was suspended. On the day of the killing, the officer observed the offender driving his small truck in a manner that almost caused an accident. He wasn't speeding; he made an illegal U-turn and the officer stopped him. The officer exited his patrol vehicle and approached the truck. He then had the offender accompany him back to the patrol car and sit in the front seat with him. The officer contacted the radio dispatcher and requested a check for the driver's license and a name check through the state segment of the NCIC system. One is prone to ask, "Why?" Why go through the exercise of asking the radio dispatcher information that is already known? Secondly, why do it in the presence of an

offender? Information was received from the dispatcher that the driver still had his driver's permit suspended — again, a fact that the officer already knew. The officer called for a tow truck to impound the vehicle and told the offender to exit the police vehicle. The officer then started to walk around the cruiser, apparently intending to search the offender and place him in the rear transport portion of the patrol vehicle. Instead, the offender was able to walk to the back of his truck, reach into the bed, and remove a single-action revolver. When the officer exited from the patrol car, he had a nightstick in his hands. Seeing the offender remove something from the truck, perhaps observing the revolver, the officer immediately retreated to the rear of the patrol car. The offender said that he observed the officer with a weapon in his hand and was afraid that he was going to be shot. He fired three shots at the officer. One round went through the emergency light bar and two went through the windshield and exited the back window. One of these rounds struck the officer in the head. The killer firmly asserts that he believes that the officer was firing at him. However, all forensic evidence indicates that the only three rounds fired during this fatal confrontation were fired by the offender. The crime scene photographs clearly indicate that the officer died with the baton in his hand, not his service weapon.

This offender is a classic dependent personality type. Consistent with the dependent personality as described in Chapter 3, this offender had no prior criminal involvement. Pushed, as he saw it, to the maximum limit and having had the opportunity to lash out in a sudden explosion of anger, he killed the victim officer. What might the officer have done differently in this situation? Allowing the offender to come back and sit in the front seat of his car meant the officer had to remove the offender when the decision to arrest was made. In this case, the officer already knew all the information that a radio name check of the offender was going to reveal. In the killer's view, it enabled him to retreat to his motor vehicle and retrieve the weapon. After reviewing all the situations and circumstances where officers were killed in traffic stops, it seems that the officer is at a greater risk when bringing the suspect to the cruiser when not under arrest than he or she is when approaching and retreating from the stopped vehicle. These results clearly suggest that the officer should have the driver and all others in the vehicle remain inside until the decision is made to either arrest, cite, or issue a warning.

Another case involves a male offender who was 23 years old at the time of the killing of the officer. The victim was 31 years old w years of law enforcement experience. This offender, herein referred to as Jim, is somewhat unique in the fact that his first criminal action involved armed robbery. At 16 years old, Jim began his criminal behavior by robbing convenience stores. After leaving his parents' home, he traveled throughout the southeastern states robbing many stores, incurring several contacts with law enforcement. He was finally arrested for robbery and sentenced to prison.

After a short period of incarceration, Jim, with three other inmates, escaped from the institution. The four traveled for a distance of about 800 miles passing through approximately nine different states before they separated. Jim and one of the other inmates then stole a car and drove across the country, robbing small stores along the way. Eventually, they arrived on the West Coast. During an unsuccessful robbery attempt at a lodging establishment, the other inmate was shot and paralyzed.

Jim then drove to a small community in another state and remained there in possession of the stolen car for several months. He stated he became bored with this existence, was low on funds, and decided to engage in another robbery. He eventually robbed a bank and fled the scene. After driving about 150 miles to another city, he checked into a motel and ingested some drugs. He looked out of the hotel window and observed a police car parked in the driveway. He stated that he thought that the officer may have observed his car and was watching it. An hour or so later, after observing that the officer had gone, he left the motel, got in his car, and drove out onto the street. He had unknowingly committed a no-left turn violation, failing to see a sign which indicated a short stretch of one-way street. Immediately, Jim observed a red light and heard a siren. The eventual victim officer, who had been in his patrol car at the top of the hill, was attempting now to stop him. Jim didn't stop immediately. He drove approximately a city block to an eating establishment and pulled into the parking lot.

Crime scene photographs indicate that there was no room for the officer to park directly behind Jim's vehicle. There was an open space to the right of the offender's vehicle, and the victim officer parked his marked car in this space. The victim officer exited his patrol vehicle and was now standing between the two vehicles. As he approached Jim from the passenger side of Jim's vehicle, Jim removed a weapon and reached over and stuck it out the passenger window. Jim then stated that he told the officer to halt. The officer, seeing the weapon, turned to seek cover. Jim fired three rounds, one of which struck the officer in the back and killed him.

Jim believed that the officer was stopping him because he was a bank robber driving a stolen vehicle. Further investigation showed instead that this was one of the victim officer's usual places to sit and easily cite drivers for one-way street and/or no-left turn violations. Jim, who was right-handed, was of the belief that the victim officer, by approaching on the right side of the car, gave him an advantage which allowed him to stick the gun out of the window

and fire the fatal shot. When questioned indepth, he stated that if the officer had stopped behind him and approached on the driver's side he would not have been able to maneuver the weapon as easily.

What might this officer have done differently? It is clear that vehicle placement played a role in this incident. However, the death of this particular officer may still have occurred regardless of the method of approach. In this case, the officer was not just approaching a motorist who had ignored a traffic sign, but, in fact, a dangerous escaped felon who had robbed a bank and was under the influence of drugs.

From 1981 through 1990, 96 officers were slain while making traffic stops. Procedures have been developed and are found in every law enforcement training curriculum on vehicle stops. It is apparent that several officers in this study did not follow the established and acceptable police procedures when making a traffic stop, and this failure was found to be an important contributing factor in their deaths.

Control of Persons and/or Situations

Improper control of situations or suspects is of particular importance to law enforcement officers since the officer represents a symbol of societal or normative control to any offender. The degree of control over the situation that is maintained by the law enforcement officer will affect the behavior of all parties in the encounter. The aspects of the physical, social, and psychological control of these incidents often dictate their eventual outcome. Law enforcement training initiatives regarding survival techniques also must focus on these control issues. Specific attention is given to the areas of control that this study was able to identify. These include: weapon retention, use of body armor, proper searches, handcuffing practices, first aid experience, and professional demeanor. Although these areas may only indirectly relate to control of offenders, they are discussed because of the contribution that these issues may offer law enforcement officers in controlling the likelihood of their survival in these incidents.

Weapon Retention

Of the 762 law enforcement officers killed from 1981 through 1990, 110, or 14 percent, were killed with their own weapons. How much time is provided for teaching officers weapon retention techniques? In this study, 11 victim officers, or 20 percent of those included, were killed with their own weapons. One was killed with a shotgun that was taken from his vehicle. One weapon was taken from the officer's hand, and 4 officers' weapons were removed from their holsters. Two of these officers were first assaulted, then their weapons were removed from their holsters. One was approached from behind, and the weapon was pulled from the holster. One victim who was right-handed wore his

right-handed holster on his left side in a cross-draw manner. This action placed the revolver grip to the front, and the killer stated that it was very easy to remove the weapon.

Pierce Brooks, the author of the police survival work, *Officer Down Code 3*, states that officers should keep in mind that when a person attempts to take the officer's weapon their intention is not to simply sell it to a pawn shop. There is only one thing in the mind of the offender: bodily harm to the officer who lost his weapon (Brooks, 1989, Presentation to the Alaskan Peace Officers Conference, Fairbanks, Alaska).

In one case, there was evidence showing that the killer who took the weapon from the officer's hand had practiced such a maneuver numerous times. He said it was very simple; he "grabbed and twisted that weapon." The officer was still pointing his finger at him after the weapon had been taken. This same offender provided another interesting observation. He had a rather lengthy criminal record, and allegedly, he was quite proud of the fact that he never used a weapon in his crimes. He pointed out that, in this present case, the victim officer provided the killer with the weapon used to kill him. He also stated that he knew that the officer would not use the weapon even though the officer had it pointed at him. The killer stated that he knew that the officer would not use his weapon by the way the officer looked at him and how he held his gun. What the offender did not know was that this officer had used his weapon to kill a burglary suspect about a year prior to the incident. The killing was ruled justifiable use of a service weapon, and the officer was cleared of any wrongdoing. The officer had also received post-shooting trauma counseling. Even after this counseling, the officer expressed deep feelings of regret for having taken a human life. A recent FBI study entitled *Critical Incidents (1991)* indicates that this phenomenon is not uncommon. Several members of his department, when questioned about this incident, indicated that they believed that this officer would never use his weapon again. Yet, no tests were administered to measure the officer's potential to use his weapon. This case, although possibly an isolated one, suggests that if testing was included in the counseling process to evaluate an officer's ability to use a weapon in another confrontational situation the likelihood of a fatal scenario could be reduced.

In another case, the victim officer, killed with the shotgun taken from his vehicle, had responded to the scene at which an individual was apparently "high" on drugs. He called for a backup but confronted the individual before the backup arrived. A physical confrontation ensued in which the officer was unable to control the offender, and the offender made his way to the officer's car. The victim officer was transmitting on his portable radio that the offender was breaking into the car and that the offender now had the

officer's shotgun. What is interesting to note in this case is that the killer stated that the officer had ample time to keep him from getting into the car and removing the shotgun. The killer claimed that it was not his intention to kill the officer with the shotgun but that the shotgun accidentally discharged with one pellet striking the officer in the head. However, he stated that if the roles were reversed and he had been the officer, he would have prevented the individual from reaching into the car and getting the shotgun even if it meant shooting him. In this case, the victim officer could not, for some reason, use his service revolver to prohibit the offender from reaching in, taking the shotgun, and eventually shooting and killing him.

Use of Protective Body Armor

Only 8 of the 54 victims, or about 15 percent, in the study were wearing body armor (vests) when they were killed. Seven were shot above the vests. The remaining officer was killed when a round from a high-powered rifle penetrated the vest. The vest was not designed to stop such a round.

Interestingly, two of the killers, both robbers, had and regularly used vests. Mentioned in Appendix I of this study, another individual declined to be interviewed when he found out how long the session might last. That individual, also an armed robber, used a protective vest. He stated he was a professional robber and used the best equipment available.

Since the development of soft body armor designed to be concealable under clothing, hundreds of officers' lives have been saved by its use. Various manufacturers have formed "SAVED" clubs. Yet, present statistics still indicate a low percentage of slain officers wearing vests. Between 1981 and 1990, 22 percent of the officers killed were wearing body armor at the time of their deaths. Preliminary 1991 data indicate that of the 71 law enforcement officers that were feloniously killed during this time period just 34 percent were wearing body armor. While statistically there is an increase in the use of protective body armor, the fact remains that many more officers could be saved by simply wearing their vests.

Both historical FBI data from 1981-1990 and information gained from this study indicate about 1 of 3 law enforcement officers killed sustained fatal wounds to the front of the head. Yet, these same data indicate that 44 percent sustained fatal wounds to the front upper torso that may have been preventable by the use of appropriate body armor. This evidence suggests that all uniformed officers would be able to reduce the likelihood of fatal injury if they wore body armor. It is recognized that officers conducting an assignment while wearing civilian attire must make a case-by-case decision whether to wear body armor. However, training programs should encourage the wearing of body armor when circumstances dictate that it is appropriate.

Thorough Searches

Of the 50 offenders interviewed in this study, only 4, or 8 percent, indicated that routine law enforcement searches were conducted thoroughly. Searches in situations such as those studied here generally are more extensive than simple pat downs and involve full custody arrest searches of suspects, as well as prisoners who are being transported to and from court. Nonetheless, according to 70 percent of the offenders interviewed, the major area that male officers fail to search properly is the groin area of male prisoners. The offenders noted that this is a favorite place to transport weapons and contraband. In fact, one of the killers related he had taken 150 "hits" of acid to jail with him taped under his genitals. His method to overcome an officer's potentially effective search was to tell jokes about gays or to make statements about the officer's sexual orientation whenever the officer's hands would get too close to the evidence that was concealed in his groin area. Emphasis of this point can be found in the comments of another subject who stated, "If police keep failing to search the groin area, we will keep transporting our weapons and our contraband in this safe place."

Another area reportedly overlooked during a search is underneath the seat of the offender's vehicle. Twenty percent of the killers interviewed reported that when in a vehicle, their weapons were under the seat. When someone is observed retrieving something from underneath the seat, it is unlikely that they are simply attempting to retrieve their driver's license. Clearly, these results suggest that law enforcement training efforts focusing on effective search procedures may reduce the opportunities for offenders to secure both weapons and contraband.

Handcuff Use

The killers, who were familiar with law enforcement procedures, stated that the first thing they are going to do is complain to the transporting officer that the handcuffs are too tight and are cutting off the circulation in their hands. They have also said that if the officer cuffs the wrists with palms together in front, the offender has been given an added weapon. One of the killers stated that while being transported to court, he had a makeshift handcuff key concealed beneath his lip. The victim officer in this case had been previously warned that this criminal should be considered dangerous, an escape risk, and that all restraints should be used. The offender had promised the officer that he would "behave" and would "be good" if the officer handcuffed him in front. The officer not only handcuffed him in front but allowed the killer to ride in the front seat with him where he "would be more comfortable." This is the same killer, as mentioned earlier, who had practiced disarming techniques while confined in jail. Given the opportunity, the

killer, while handcuffed, lunged over and disarmed, shot, and killed the victim officer. This case will be discussed at length in one of the subsections of this chapter entitled Professional Demeanor.

First-Aid

Comments by law enforcement managers and trainers have helped to develop a description of today's recruit as one who has little, if any, first-hand experience in violent confrontation. Most recruits have neither military training nor have they been exposed to a situation where an individual has been intentionally wounded. What type of training do new officers receive relative to first-aid for gunshot wounds? How able are they to react if faced with the situation where they or their partner is shot? Knowledge of first-aid in emergency situations clearly provides a measure of control in both decisionmaking and behavior that law enforcement officers may find useful in reducing the likelihood of fatal injuries to themselves and other officers. What follows are some examples of first-aid planning and training provided by the killers.

The first case for discussion was that of a burglar who was trained in the military as a paramedic. This burglar carried a first-aid kit on his burglary jobs. On the night he killed a law enforcement officer, this burglar was shot in the shoulder by the victim officer. After receiving this wound, he was able to kill both the officer and the officer's canine. Using a first-aid kit, the offender was able to treat his wound and flee from the scene. Case records support this killer's statements.

The second case involves an offender who exchanged gunfire with a police officer at the scene of a traffic stop. The assailant received one gunshot wound to the groin that exited through the hip and another to the ankle. He was able to shoot and kill the officer and to succeed in his escape. He disposed of the murder weapon and stopped at a market, buying fresh fruit in order to replace the potassium he had lost as a result of the bleeding. The offender bought first-aid supplies and returned to his rooming house where he remained until arrested the following day.

Both of the above offenders received severe wounds, and yet they were able to overcome their pain and escape. They had sufficient knowledge of first-aid to know that the wounds they received, although serious, were not life-threatening at that time. They were able to treat themselves and to escape the scene. Clearly, these results suggest that law enforcement officers should be able to render immediate first-aid to themselves, as well as to their partners.

To illustrate further the need for first-aid planning, the following case is offered. This case involved several officers who approached a field of marijuana plants. Gunshots were exchanged, and one of the officers was shot and wounded. After rendering emergency first-aid, the surviving officers

called for a medical helicopter to respond. Departmental records indicate that there was confusion as to the exact location of the officers when the initial call for assistance was made. The nearest in-service medical helicopter was based 45 flight-minutes away. The victim officer subsequently bled to death before the arrival of the medical helicopter. The killer in this case attempted to focus the defense at his trial away from the fact that he shot the victim officer to the issue of timely medical treatment after the shooting. The officer could have been driven to the local hospital which was only 25 minutes away by car. This is a key issue in planning tactical maneuvers. Law enforcement officers, in almost all situations, need to be aware of the nearest medical facility and the quickest route and method of transportation in the event that the need arises. This case clearly illustrates that planning for medical contingencies is of great importance to law enforcement operations.

Professional Demeanor

Law enforcement officers have been trained to read the body language of persons they come in contact with while on the job. Officers are constantly evaluating suspects and complaints and react to their evaluations. Samuel G. Chapman states in his book, *Cops, Killers and Staying Alive* (1986), "Modern police training must include a significant module to help officers read suspect's body language, as well as control their own" (p. 67). Officers should be aware of the body language and of other signals that they are transmitting to the public. In a case discussed under "Work Performance" in Chapter 5, the offender confronted officers at two different times of the day. In each confrontation, the killer evaluated the officers. He chose not to assault one officer, but chose to assault, and in fact, kill the other.

A second case involves an 18-year-old male, Michael, who had no previous contact with law enforcement prior to the fatal incident. This case occurred on the West Coast. On the evening of the fatal contact, Michael had robbed a convenience store. He had been a National Honor Society student and had won a partial academic scholarship to college. He stated he had gotten bored with the "good life" and wanted to become an "urban guerilla." To be an "urban guerilla," he purchased a handgun and a bullet-proof vest. In fact, this was the second convenience store Michael had robbed in a 3-day period. Michael said that he felt dirty and ashamed that he had robbed a working individual in the first store and wanted to try and see if, in fact, he was cut out to be an "urban guerilla."

The victim officer, aged 30 with 5 years of law enforcement experience, was alone in his patrol vehicle when he received a bulletin regarding an armed robbery of a store. He circled the area of the robbery looking for the suspect and observed a male walking down the street who fit the broadcast description of the suspect. The victim officer contacted the

radio dispatcher and advised that he had observed a suspect who clearly fit the description of the robber and also requested a backup be dispatched to his location. Prior to the arrival of the backup officer, the victim approached the offender and was shot and killed. Michael had on a bulletproof vest, but the officer did not. What might the officer have done differently in this case? A review of all facts clearly demonstrates that the officer could have waited for assistance. The officer's weapon certainly should have been drawn and ready when approaching a suspected armed felon. The officer also failed to watch the felon's hands, allowing the offender to draw the gun while turned away from him.

Michael stated that he had evaluated the officer's behavior prior to taking aggressive action. He stated, "The officer was not authoritarian and did not take control of me. He was a willing participant in his death."

The officer certainly had not intentionally transmitted negative signals to the killer. The offender saw that by acting alone with his gun in the holster the officer was vulnerable to sudden attack. The killer evaluated both the officer and the situation before acting. When questioned as to what the officer might have done to prevent his death, Michael advised that he would have reacted differently had either the officer had a partner or if the officer had his weapon drawn.

Officer demeanor has been addressed by authors writing about law enforcement safety. According to Chapman (1986), "Carelessness is often defined as human error. Though human error occurs in all occupations, with varying degrees of severity in the results, in few callings does it have the potential consequences it has in police work. A glitch in safety, an overlooked precaution, or a departure from proven patrol procedures can cost an officer['s] life."

The transmission of body language or signals has been read by some of the offenders in this study. It is clearly an oversimplification to say one error or mistake caused the victim's death. Some of the killers in the study have evaluated a series of the officer's actions or inactions before considering an attempt to assault the officer. A different projection of self-image by the officer may have changed the outcome of a number of cases in this study.

The next case, referenced in the "Handcuffing" section of this chapter, highlights previously related victim behavioral descriptors and shows the interaction with the antisocial personality and how the killer evaluated the victim officer's behavior. In this case, the victim deputy was 28 years old with 6 years of law enforcement experience with a sheriff's office. He was assigned to a one-person patrol vehicle. When the killer, Mark, a 26-year-old, was questioned about his criminal activity, he admitted to having committed 40 burglaries, 6 armed robberies, over 200 motor vehicle thefts, and in excess of 2,000 drug violations. He stated that he

committed his first crime, a larceny, at age 8 and that he had not been caught. Prior to the killing of the deputy, he advised that he had never tried to kill anyone. His extensive criminal record indicated his first arrest was at age 18 for attempted burglary. He later was arrested 6 more times for auto theft, drug possession, violation of parole, escape, and armed robbery. It was noted that the armed robbery was the last arrest before the murder of the deputy.

On the day of the murder, the victim was assigned to transport the offender from jail to court for a hearing. After the hearing, they were to return to jail. When the deputy received the assignment, he was reminded that the offender was an armed robber, very dangerous, and that he should use all possible restraints. Mark knew he was to be transported to court and had planned to escape if possible. He had a homemade handcuff key concealed behind his lip. It was also found that he had practiced a disarming technique with his cellmate during the previous 2 weeks.

Mark reported that when he and the victim were leaving the jail, the victim stated that if the prisoner "would be good," he would handcuff him in front and allow him to ride in the front seat because it would be uncomfortable for someone as tall as the offender to remain in the rear security cage. Mark assured the victim that he would comply. The killer related that, during the drive to court, the victim had constant conversation with him and related his personal problems to the offender. He had no opportunity to escape during the trip to court.

After the court hearing, the killer was again handcuffed in front and placed in the front passenger seat. Near the completion of the trip back to jail, the deputy observed two women walking on the side of a road away from an apparently disabled vehicle. He stopped the patrol vehicle, rolled down the window, and asked if they needed assistance. They asked for a ride to town. The victim said that he would give them a ride and leaned around to his left to unlock the left rear door. The deputy was right-handed, and his service weapon was worn on the right hip. His turning movement had now placed his weapon within easy reach of Mark, who removed the weapon from its holster and a violent scuffle ensued. Mark discharged the gun twice; the first round, he claimed, was a "warning shot." He had placed his foot against the victim's throat to restrain him. The second shot passed through Mark's foot and into the victim's chest killing him instantly. He was arrested shortly thereafter as the incident occurred within 100 yards of a state police post where the occupants heard the gunfire and were on the way to the car shortly after the first round was discharged.

Did the officer's concern for an armed robber's comfort lead to his death? Mark obviously had a lack of feeling for the victim. In interview, he stated the officer should have placed him in the secure area of the back seat and should

not have been so conversant. According to Mark, the victim officer failed to do his job and gave him the opportunity to escape. This case also highlights the necessity of the proper use of handcuffs, procedures for transporting prisoners, and the necessity to maintain control of people and situations in encounters with known felons.

Team Concept

Will two officers, in a life threatening situation, suddenly perform as a team? Throughout this study, many officers privately discussed with the investigators their experiences in threatening situations. Many stated that they found themselves reverting to their training; they did what they were trained to do. Assuming that is valid, it would seem that training officers to function as a team would be an important function of the law enforcement academy. Given that in many jurisdictions there is no backup available for officers, the following remarks and questions are directed to those agencies that assign two-person patrols or have sufficient personnel to provide backup officers. For example, is the placement of the law enforcement officer's vehicle at the scene of a service call or radio assignment (for example, robbery complaint, burglary complaint, domestic disturbance complaint) left to his or her discretion at the scene or is this position of the vehicle determined by a training plan? When the officers arrive, who searches the suspect; who places handcuffs on the suspect; and where does the cover officer stand? These and issues requiring two or more officers to work as a team require repeated practice in training.

Professional conferences and workshops throughout the Nation often have devoted time to discussions of the causes and correlates of law enforcement officer deaths. In many of these meetings, the discussion has focused upon the victim officers' ability to defend themselves. In this context, a frequently asked question has been, "How many victim officers returned gunfire?" Another question often considered is, "Why don't more officers use their service weapons during assaults?" Forty-six of the victims in this study, or 85 percent, did not fire their service weapons. In 12 cases, or 24 percent, the victim either had a partner or backup on the scene, and only in one such case was gunfire returned. Wishing to avoid opening old wounds, this study did not include interviews of surviving officers. Present firearms training practices, however, were reviewed. What was found was that most departments continue to train using traditional target practice. The usual commands were found to be given followed by the traditional warning to shoot only at one's own target. No team-concept shooting was incorporated into the training. One department stated this concept is sometimes taught if time permits. Questioned further, it

was determined that such training rarely happened because of time constraints.

Many agencies train their officers to work as independent, one-officer units. Situations which require team thought and team action are often overlooked in basic, and even some advanced, training. There is a general assumption that when two persons are dispatched to a scene that they will function as a team. Other service-oriented agencies practice to function both as individuals and team members. This is obvious in such fields as the fire service and the military where the specific demands of particular calls will require either an individual response, a team response, or a combination of both. The outcome and success of these efforts are frequently a reflection of the training that these personnel have received. Some agencies offer this specialized team training in such areas as special weapons and assault teams, hostage rescue teams, and civil disturbance units, but they overlook this team training for the remainder of the force. Clearly, in life and death situations, law enforcement officers may reduce the likelihood of fatal injury if proper training, whether individual or team training, has been completed.

Night Training

As reported, FBI data indicate that between 1981 and 1990 felonious killings of officers predominately occurred at night: 38 percent occurring between 6 p.m. and midnight and 23 percent occurring between midnight and 6 a.m. Fifty-seven percent of the cases in this study occurred between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. Traditional law enforcement training has been found to limit night training for various reasons. Many departments presently conduct some type of reduced light training for pistol or revolver and motor vehicle driving. The vast majority of departments overlook other elements of normal work functions for inclusion in these exercises. During darkness the patrol officer making a traffic stop is at a greater disadvantage both approaching a stopped vehicle and returning to his or her patrol vehicle. During darkness, even the response to call for service presents additional areas of concerns for the patrol officer. Will the officer be highlighted by streetlighting when approaching a door? Again, when an exterior door is opened, the responding officer is silhouetted. What are the consequences of turning on their flashlights? Does the officer become a ready-made target, or does the light from the flashlight offer the officer a better view of the situation? How many departments and training academies have developed a lesson plan for search procedures during reduced or low visibility? Are areas overlooked on both persons and vehicles that would be covered in daylight? How many police officers could handcuff their prisoner without some

sort of lighting assistance? Consideration should be given to providing all training normally offered during daylight at night as well. Law enforcement officers have functioned at night since departments were formed. They have always found ways to accomplish their jobs. Perhaps additional night training could assist in reducing the number of officers killed during this time period.

Supervision for Increased Safety

While not directly a focus of this study, the question of first-line supervision and officer safety was raised by various members of the law enforcement community who were interviewed during this study. The most often asked question was "Is present law enforcement first-line supervision developed to increase safety procedures of the patrol officer?" Most officers and first-line supervisors answered in the negative for various reasons. If not presently in place, supervision for safety's sake should become a priority in every department.

How often does the supervisor check the patrol vehicle for exterior damage while the brakes are overlooked? Service-issued weapons are checked for defects but are certain important qualities regarding the operator (officer) overlooked? How many procedural errors or equipment violations are overlooked and thus allowed to continue? How many warning signs of subordinate officers' personal problems were presented to the supervisors, but the supervisors were unable to recognize the signals? How many bad habits went uncorrected? How many supervisors are ill-prepared to function as safety supervisors?

The cases presented in this chapter have dramatically illustrated the need to avoid a lax mental attitude when performing law enforcement duties. Rarely was a single element the cause of these law enforcement fatalities. The holistic approach of positive departmental safety procedures, related and timely training, and first-line safety supervision can and will save lives.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

A situation that results in the death of a law enforcement officer is indeed a complex one. It deals with two or more individuals, their life experiences and perceptions, as well as with situational circumstances that brought them together and ultimately led to the death of the officer. This study was conducted, not to justify the behavior of the offender in any way, but in an attempt to understand and explain why an offender attempted and succeeded in feloniously killing a law enforcement officer. Nor should the focus be placed on an alleged or actual mistake made by a law enforcement officer. Using an integrative approach that draws upon the psychology of the offender, the behavior of the law enforcement officer, and the circumstances in which the officer lost his or her life, several important factors in these incidents were identified.

Offenders

In regard to the offenders in these incidents, the findings of this study suggest that there is no singular profile of an individual who kills a law enforcement officer. Demographic attributes of the victim officer such as age, race, and physical size were also found to have little impact on the decision of these offenders to kill a law enforcement officer. However, 14 percent of the offenders stated they may have acted differently had the officers been female. The overall social background of these offenders, however, generally reflected average socioeconomic status but considerable verbal and physical abuse during childhood.

Of more significance may be the prior involvement of these offenders in criminal behavior. Drugs or weapons offenses, larceny, burglary, or robbery were found to be prevalent in the self-reported criminal histories of these killers of law enforcement officers. In fact, a large number of the offenders also admitted they had murdered or attempted to murder someone prior to the killing of the officer. Slightly over one-third of the killers interviewed

stated that at some time in their lives, they had been shot at prior to killing the officer. Many offenders also indicated drug and alcohol involvement that may have played some role in the killing. Clear evidence of both familiarity and use of handguns in the everyday life of these offenders was also prevalent. A clear majority of the offenders indicated that this availability and familiarity motivated them to choose a particular weapon. Yet almost half of the killers stated that there was nothing that the victims might have done to have prevented their deaths after the initial confrontations.

A majority of the offenders examined in this study were identified as having some personality disorder. The antisocial personality type and the dependent personality type were the most frequently diagnosed personality disorders. Typically, antisocial personality characteristics include a disregard for social obligations and a gross disparity between their behaviors and the socially accepted normative behaviors; a lack of remorse for the wrongs they have committed; and a sense of entitlement wherein their desire to possess something is processed by them as a right to take it. The dependent personality type includes such characteristics as a sense of inadequacy, passive compliance to others' wishes, and an inadequate response to the demands of everyday life. The case narrative of Edward is a classic description of the antisocial personality type. The case of Mary is typical of the dependent personality type. (See Chapters 3 and 6.) The antisocial personality type is the diagnostic group that is expected to be involved in crimes of violence, while the dependent personality type is usually far less frequently expected to commit these violent offenses.

Identifying these personality characteristics may be of use to the law enforcement community in recognizing the typical or characteristic ways these individuals might interact with others. However, caution must always be employed when dealing with any individual — regardless of apparent compliance to an officer's orders and commands. It can also

be very useful to know if individuals being interrogated or questioned as suspects or even as witnesses fit these personality types. The particular personality and the various ways in which these personalities might react to specific approaches to questions can be factored into the interrogation style for each of these personality types. (See Chapter 4.)

Victims

The demographic description of victim officers studied is apparently very similar to that of the offenders involved in these incidents, except for marital status and education. There were, on average, no significant weight or height differences between the victim officers and offenders studied. Another victim characteristic examined in this study that may have an influence on the killing of law enforcement officers is work performance. Some evidence from this study indicates that an officer's receiving a decrease in performance ratings may be one of several early signs of the potential for a law enforcement killing. However, the specific areas of performance for which an officer may be found lacking and the extent to which the finding can be generalized are unknown.

The general behavioral descriptions of law enforcement officers were also examined. The most salient behavioral descriptors characterizing these officers appear to be their good-natured demeanor and conservative use of physical force as compared to other law enforcement officers in similar circumstances. Law enforcement officers continually face the challenge of assessing the appropriate degree of authority to be asserted in maintaining control of any potentially dangerous or explosive encounter. Yet, a miscue in assessing the need for control in particular situations can have grave consequences for the law enforcement officer.

Situations

Overall, this study was not able to explain adequately the preponderance of law enforcement officer deaths in the South. Yet, the type of assignment, the circumstances at the scene of the encounter, the weapons used in these incidents, and the environment in which these events occur were found to play a role.

This study, in integrating the specific nature of each case with the general characteristics of both the offenders and the victims, also identified several specific areas where law enforcement training and procedures may have had a role in the eventual outcome of the incident. From this holistic approach, some crucial insights that may reduce the likelihood of an officer being killed in the line of duty were identified. Among these, improper approaches and lack of control of both situations and individuals by law enforcement officers were found to be likely contributors to law enforcement officer killings. The aspects related to the approach to vehicles and/or suspects examined included: the approach to known felons, encountering several persons in a situation, proper identification as law enforcement officers, encountering drawn weapons, and the importance of approach in general traffic stops. Similarly, the aspects relevant to control issues that this study found to be important factors in law enforcement killings included: weapon retention, use of body armor, proper searches, handcuffing practices, first-aid experience, and professional demeanor.

Overall, it is clearly an oversimplification to say one error or mistake caused a law enforcement officer's death. Some of the killers in the study appear to have evaluated a series of actions or inactions of the officer before considering an assault on the officer. The details of the case of Michael, discussed at length in reference to procedural and training issues, highlight the interaction of the victim officer's behavioral descriptors, the antisocial personality, and how the killer evaluates the victim officer's behaviors. This case, along with the variety of other factors that have been outlined here, is offered to the law enforcement community to provide a foundation of information to assist individual law enforcement agencies in addressing their own survival training needs.

Given the extraordinary pressure of decisionmaking in law enforcement, combined with a mix of deadly factors such as disordered personalities of the offenders, misperception of imminent threats, and possible procedural miscues that are characteristic of these incidents, it is clear that further research on all aspects of law enforcement safety is needed.

The Uniform Crime Reports Section of the FBI has sought and recently received funding for an additional study to examine cases in which law enforcement officers survived serious assaults that may shed light on many of these and other important questions and issues.

Appendix I

METHODOLOGY

Since 1930, The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Section has administered the Uniform Crime Reporting Program for law enforcement. In that year, Congress passed a law that authorized the collection of crime statistics for the country. The United States Attorney General subsequently delegated that authority to the FBI, and the UCR Program was transferred from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the developer of the system. In 1945, UCR began collecting information on the number of law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty and published those figures in the annual publication, *Crime in the United States*. The information was expanded throughout the ensuing years until the 1970s when a separate publication on officers killed in the line of duty was created. Subsequently, additional statistics were added relative to assaults on law enforcement officers.

Background Studies

The FBI publication, *Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted*, receives wide dissemination throughout the law enforcement community and has become a standard for many training purposes (for example, O'Neill, 1979). It is the foremost data source for academic research including such important works which offer characteristics of officers killed (Little, 1984); attitudes, problems, and experiences of law enforcement officers in relation to officers killed in the line of duty (Bartlett, 1988); violence perpetrated against police (Uchida & Brooks, 1988); analyses of rates of officers killed, incident trends, and the statistical relationship between law enforcement deaths and national crime rates, (Vaughn & Kappeler, 1986); as well as analyses of drug-related situations in which officers have been killed (Sherman, De Riso, Gaines, Rogan, & Cohn, 1989). The publication, however, does not go beyond the recitation and enumeration of these events. No indepth analysis of the situations resulting in a law enforcement officer's death or injury or of the combination of events that led to either is conducted.

Nonetheless, the information found in the publications is the basis for many studies on a wide range of law enforcement-related issues. What, for example, is the "most dangerous" situation in which a police officer might be found? Varied and sometimes conflicting conclusions have been reached. Some research indicates that the most dangerous situation in which a law enforcement officer can be involved is a call for a robbery. (See Boylen & Little, 1990; Garner & Clemmer, 1986.) Others have found that domestic and general disturbances were among the most dangerous situations to police officers in terms of both injury and noninjury assaults (for example, Margarita, 1980; Uchida & Brooks, 1988). All of these studies used sources in addition to the FBI and appear to have been well documented and thoroughly researched. Yet, the contradictory results of these studies leave the question still unanswered. Perhaps a major part of the answer to this question lies in the approach which many researchers have taken in the past. Specifically, by examining only limited aspects of the circumstances in which a law enforcement officer was killed, rather than employing an integrative examination of the police officer, the offender, and the situation which brought them together, some valuable information may not have been available for analysis.

For further illustration, a study of only the behavior of the police officer — what was done or not done — in a particular situation that resulted in his or her death does not take into consideration either the motivation of the offender or the particular circumstances of the situation that brought the two individuals together in a dangerous, hostile environment. Kostantin's (1984) insightful work showed that officers are sometimes killed when they approach crimes in progress without having had the opportunity to consider a plan of action.

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Researchers have noted the importance of an integrative approach in order to examine more fully and completely felonious deaths of law enforcement officers (Chapman, 1986; Lester, 1986). The need to look at law enforcement encounters with violent citizens from an integrative approach has also been stressed in the writings of Scharf & Binder (1983) who examined law enforcement's use of deadly force. Their work, *The Badge and the Bullet*, suggests that social forces and psychological aspects of the individuals involved, as well as management issues, must be reviewed when examining situations wherein deadly force is used. Other works include the need to understand violence-prone individuals and the problems with which they deal (Stratton, Snibbe, & Bayless, 1985), the circumstantial elements in which officers use their weapons (Horvath, 1987), and even the administrative implications of the use of service weapons when examining the use of deadly force (Fyfe, 1979).

Studies conducted in the mental health field examining convicted killers tend to focus on the "mentally disordered offender" and the "psychopath." Yet, these same types of individuals are encountered and managed by both mental health practitioners and law enforcement officers routinely without experiencing violence or attempted violent behavior. Has some aspect been overlooked in examining the offenders who have killed police officers? Is the difference to be found in the interaction of a specific offender with a particular officer under a special set of circumstances?

Within recent years, psychological research concerning criminal behavior has focused on cognitive aspects (Bartol, 1991). More attention is currently being placed on the offender's thoughts, perceptions, belief structures, memories of events, and the mechanisms that form and operate to result in the individual's view of the world. As Bartol (1991) points out, "the new challenge of psychological criminology is the systematic integration and organization of the complex interaction of cognitive, motivational, and affective processes" (p. xi). There are many levels of events that contribute to the explanation of behavior. These levels include such events, or elements, as the individual's family, education, peer relationships, and employment, among others. This interplay of factors is the focus of one aspect of this study, the examination of the offender. This analysis is conducted, not to justify the behavior of the offender, but in an attempt to understand and explain why an offender killed a law enforcement officer.

Nationally, little has been done to combine and study collectively all three of these areas (the psychology of the offender, the behavior of the law enforcement officer, and the circumstances in which the officer lost his or her life) in an interactive and integrative approach. This integrative research approach, however, is often hindered by difficulties in collecting adequate data. (See Boylen & Little, 1990.) In studies of the nature conducted here, adequate data assessing the actual perceptions and perspectives of the offender—a major component in this potentially "deadly mix" where law enforcement officers are seriously assaulted or even killed—are often lacking.

Specific research on offenders who have feloniously killed law enforcement officers has not yet clearly delineated the motivational components that may have contributed to the death of the officer. Much of the research that has been completed which addresses the offender gives general descriptions of the offender as found in the FBI publications, rather than examining, through personal interview, the reasons for the assault (Boylen & Little, 1990). The research literature concerning offenders within the general population who have committed criminal homicides and serious assaults are also relevant. Two major areas regarding criminal homicide and serious assaults are addressed in this literature. They include: the sociological correlates of homicide and assaults and the psychological factors in violent crime. These aspects will be discussed here.

The findings reported within the criminological literature generally deal with the offenders' race, gender, age, socioeconomic class, victim-offender relationship, and weapons used. These studies consistently have found that most homicides are intraracial in nature with a preponderance of black offenders (Voss & Hepburn, 1986; Zimring, Mukhergee, & Van Winkle, 1983; Hewitt, 1988; FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, 1990; Bartol, 1991). Other Uniform Crime Reports statistics, as well as regional studies, show that there is a very high ratio of males to females in relation to homicides (FBI, U. S. Department of Justice, 1990; Zahn & Rickle, 1986). In terms of the age of the offenders arrested for homicides, again, Uniform Crime Reports statistics (FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, 1990) and other studies (for example, Riedel, Zahn, & Mock, 1985) consistently point to the general age range of offenders to be from 20 to 29. Studies regarding social class and crime continue to be controversial (Tittle & Villemez, 1977; Tittle, 1983; Brathwaite, 1981; Elliott, Ageton, & Huizinga, 1980). However, many researchers agree that violence appears to be highly correlated with lower-class social status (for example, Smith & Bennett, 1985; Blau & Blau, 1982). Victim-offender relationship frequently depends upon the circumstances of the crimes involved (FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, 1990; Block, 1977; Riedel, Zahn, & Mock, 1985). The general trend, however, seems to be that more individuals are being killed by strangers (Bartol, 1991). Additionally, the FBI publication, *Crime in the United States*, indicates that most homicides are committed with firearms, while the second

weapon most frequently used is a cutting instrument (FBI, U.S. Department of Justice, 1990).

Psychological theory has tried to answer the question "Who is the violent offender?" To date, this question remains unanswered. Theories of human aggression involve either the extreme positions suggesting that behavior is the result of purely internal mechanisms or controlled by external stimuli—or some combination of these factors (Toch, 1969; Zillman, 1979, 1983; Megargee, 1966; Bandura, 1983; Bartol, 1991). Clearly, the answer to the "why" of human aggression in general has not yet been reached. Nor is there a satisfactory explanation as to why individuals kill law enforcement officers. Some instances where law enforcement officers have been killed may appear to be more the result of the external factors "motivating" the offender's action. For example, the offender with multiple felony warrants who is about to be arrested for yet another felony may be "motivated" by this factor to commit this violent criminal act. This can be viewed in contrast to the psychologically disturbed offender (psychotic paranoid schizophrenic) who does not perceive a law enforcement officer approaching to render assistance, but rather sees the law enforcement officer as a large, threatening monster. The results of this study, as are illustrated in Table 3 of Chapter 3, can be compared to populations such as the mentally disordered offenders (Weiss, Lamberti, Blackman, 1960; Megargee, 1982; Henderson, 1983; Lee, Zimbardo, Bertholf, 1977); over- and under-controlled type offenders (Megargee, 1966); extreme and moderate assaulters (Blackburn, 1968); sudden murderers and convicted murderers with a history of violence (Tupin, Mahar, Smith, 1973); and the introvert and extrovert (Eysenck, 1977).

Clearly, an integrative approach to the deaths of law enforcement officers can practically and substantially add to the current literature in the fields of criminology, psychology, sociology, and criminal justice. In particular, the intent of this study was to examine and analyze several critical areas and circumstances in which law enforcement officers were feloniously killed. This study, again, recognizes that a situation that results in the death of a law enforcement officer is a complex one. It deals with two or more individuals, their life experiences and their perceptions, as well as circumstances that are sometimes difficult to recapture in minute detail. Consequently, this study neither offers every possible way to examine the felonious deaths nor does it offer "the answer" which will ultimately prevent every law enforcement death in the future. These would be impossible tasks for any study. However, given the legal and ethical constraints under which this study was conducted, the project does offer to law enforcement an important and timely analysis of some critical issues that have surfaced during the investigation and examination of 54 law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty.

The Study

Fifty-one incidents resulting in the line-of-duty deaths of 54 law enforcement officers and involving 50 offenders comprised this study. The timeframe targeted for the study included the years between 1975 and 1985. This time window was chosen for two reasons. First, due to various legal implications and to increase the likelihood of offenders providing truthful and candid information, no individual was interviewed while his or her case remained in appeal. Secondly, this targeted timeframe was also selected in an attempt to maintain the relevance of police training or operating procedures to current practice. That is, one major section of this study focuses upon the law enforcement procedures which may or may not have contributed to the victim officer's death. Given the evolution of law enforcement procedures, it was not meaningful to review outmoded procedures. An attempt was also made to maintain the integrity of the results of this study by selecting cases in such a way as to reflect the national demographics of felonious killings of law enforcement officers. Three areas were considered in making these case selections: the region of the country in which the killing took place, the circumstances surrounding the officer's death, and the type of agency in which the victim officer worked at the time of his or her death. The percentages of cases selected in each of these areas reflect national demographics as much as possible. For example, of those law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty from 1981-1990, 49 percent were from departments located in the Southern portion of the United States. The Northeast recorded 12 percent; while the West and Midwest each accounted for 19 percent. This distribution compares favorably with the cases selected in this study, with 51 percent of the incidents occurring in the South, 22 percent in the Northeast, 16 percent in the West, and the remaining 12 percent in the Midwest.

There were, nonetheless, a variety of constraints under which this study was conducted. Several factors led to a lack of randomly selected cases which were chosen for examination. For example, as mentioned above, the target cases which identified the potential subjects for this study fell primarily between the timeframe of 1975 to 1985. This constraint, of course, disqualified a substantial number of other individuals who killed police officers. However, six cases were included in the sample that fell outside the targeted time frame. These cases were, nonetheless, included in the sample because all the other criteria for inclusion were met, and the offenders were housed in correctional institutions where another prisoner was to be interviewed.

Additionally, only the inmates who volunteered to engage in this study were interviewed. No promises or special considerations were offered by either the FBI or prison administrators in exchange for an offender's participation. Out of 56 inmates contacted, six refused to be interviewed. One of the six who refused demanded a color television as compensation for participation in the study, and another stated that the interview would take too long. The remaining four were sentenced to death and expressed hope in a last-minute constitutional appeal to spare their lives. They believed that participation in the study might have had a negative impact on their case. Finally, the cases selected for examination in this study did not involve offenders who were fugitives at the time of this study, those justifiably killed on the scene of the encounter, those who committed suicide, those acquitted or otherwise dismissed, or those committed to mental institutions. The inmates were housed in 34 prisons: 32 state and 2 Federal institutions. The interviews were conducted in 18 states and the District of Columbia.

Data Collection

Once law enforcement killing incidents were selected as outlined above, each victim officer's department was notified and personal contact with the agency's command and departmental officials was made. From this contact, interviews with each victim officer's peers and supervisors were conducted. A review of all relevant departmental case documents relating to the incident and the victim officer was also conducted. Where available, the officer originally assigned to investigate the homicide of the victim officer, as well as any other detective who had some knowledge of the event, was interviewed. In five cases, a reenactment of the events that led to the death of the officer was conducted. Any information the law enforcement agency had concerning the offender was also collected and analyzed.

A review of all available correctional documents relating to each offender's case was conducted. This review included such items as the presentence investigation, criminal history, prison classification and diagnostic reports, and current prison files. Prison guards were also interviewed concerning their evaluation of the offender's conduct within the correctional setting.

Offender Interview

A pivotal portion of the study was the interview of the offender. In order to incorporate the various aspects of this study into a coherent research instrument, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Section sought the expertise of the FBI's Behavioral Science Services Unit and the Firearms Training Unit. These professionals were consulted in the developmental stages of a protocol, the basic interview instrument. Additional consultation was made with both the

Behavioral Sciences Sevices Unit and members of the law enforcement community throughout the Nation during the interview process as well as during the analysis of the results. The final form of the interview protocol was adapted from a similar instrument developed by the Behavioral Science Sevices Unit for their interviews of serial murderers and sex offenders. In drafting this study protocol, questions from the original protocol which were not appropriate or inapplicable to this study were deleted, replicate questions were placed in the protocol to measure the reliability and validity of the responses, and specific questions dealing with areas directly relevant to the offender, the victim officer, and the events that led to the killing of the law enforcement officer were added. A forensic psychologist was also contracted to assist in developing interview techniques, reviewing evaluations previously made, identifying basic personality traits, and advising what psychological data might be available from the interview process. After this initial protocol was developed, three individuals convicted of killing a law enforcement officer were interviewed. These first three interviews provided a field test of the protocol. After the test interviews, modifications were made in the protocol. When actual study interviews were conducted, at least two UCR investigators were present. One conducted the interview and the other completed the protocol, requesting further information or clarifications as he or she deemed appropriate. This procedure allowed the primary investigator to concentrate all of his or her attention on developing rapport with the offender and eliciting the necessary information without the distraction of completing the protocol. The interviews ranged in time from 2 to 8 hours, with the average length approximately 5 hours. The length of the interviews varied for reasons such as the offenders' criminal history and criminal involvement or the lack thereof, their use and exposure to weapons, and their social history.

All offender interviews began with an explanation as to the purpose of the interview. After the explanation was given and any questions the offender may have had were answered, the offender signed a release stating that he or she understood the purpose and anonymity of the interview and was cooperating without any promises being made by the FBI. Most interviews were audiotaped. In cases where the offender allowed taping, a release was signed and witnessed by a third individual. In some cases, where the offender had some special information concerning either criminal history or police tactical operations specifically related to the incident where an officer was killed, he or she was asked to allow a video tape to be made of those portions of the interview. This request to be videotaped was made only after the official interview had been completed so as not to detract from the quality of information provided. A total of seven videotapes was produced as a result of this study and have

been used in various law enforcement training seminars throughout the country dealing with officer safety.

Protocol Nature, Content, and Construction

The protocol was composed of seven sections completed with material obtained from the interview session. They include:

1. **Background information concerning the offender—** Questions concerning the offender's physical, ethnic, occupational, and educational background are included.

2. **Family structure and home environment—** Questions concerning the offender's immediate family, his or her relationship within that immediate family, the stability of the family, religious expression, and occupations within the family are addressed. The questions are designed to assess whether any physical or psychological abuse took place within the family, as well as to uncover any evidence of alcohol/drug abuse, psychiatric disturbances, or criminal history within the immediate family.

3. **Attitudes toward authority—** The offender's relationships with authority figures are assessed, including parents/guardians, teachers, supervisors, clergy, law enforcement officers, and adults in general.

4. **Criminal history—** The offender's criminal history begins with the first crime that he or she can recall having committed and whether he or she was caught. The questions are structured to determine whether the offender was aware of the consequences of his or her criminal behavior. The questions include the type of weapon used in criminal activity and whether the offender ever attempted to kill a police officer in the past. Also asked is whether the offender had considered any specific course of action if interrupted or confronted by police during the commission of a crime.

5. **Weapons training and use—** A history of the offender's knowledge of and involvement with a variety of weapons was taken. Whether the offender has trained with weapons is assessed, as well as the circumstances under which the offender carried weapons. Questions regarding the place where the offender would carry the weapon on his or her person, store the weapon at home, or transport the weapon in a vehicle are included.

6. **Characteristics of scene and encounter—** The area of the country, month, day, time, description of the location, weather conditions, distance of assault, offender's means of transportation, and description of offender's vehicle are examined.

7. **Self-reported offense data—** An attempt is made in this section to assess several aspects of the incident from the perspective of the offender. The psychological and emotional states of the offender prior to, during, and following the incident; alcohol/drug use at the time of the incident; role of any codefendants; nature of conversation with officer prior to killing; description of offender's subsequent arrest by law enforcement; intention of offender at time of the killing; influence of victim officer's age, sex, race, size, and behaviors on his or her death are included. An attempt is made to determine if, in the estimation of the offender, the victim officer could have done something differently to have prevented the death. Finally, several questions address the searches that were made of the offender both in regard to this incident as well as to other contacts with law enforcement officers.

At the end of the interview, a final question was asked: "Is there anything you can think of which was not asked in this interview which you feel is important to relate to us?" This question was included to provide the offender an opportunity to offer some information that the protocol and associated interview did not extract.

All of the victim, situational, and offender background data were collected prior to conducting offender interviews at the correctional institutions where the offenders were incarcerated. This data collection process was conducted in this fashion to increase the quality and accuracy of facts that could be extracted from the offender interviews.

Appendix II

DESCRIPTION OF PERSONALITY TYPES*

Antisocial Personality Disorder

A. Current age at least 18

B. Evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15, as indicated by a history of three or more of the following:
1. was often truant
2. ran away from home overnight at least twice while living in parental or parental surrogate home (or once without returning)
3. often initiated physical fights
4. used a weapon in more than one fight
5. forced someone into sexual activity with him or her
6. was physically cruel to animals
7. was physically cruel to other people
8. deliberately destroyed others' property (other than by fire-setting)
9. deliberately engaged in fire-setting
10. often lied (other than to avoid physical or sexual abuse)
11. has stolen without confrontation of a victim on more than one occasion (including forgery)
12. has stolen with confrontation of a victim (e.g., mugging, purse-snatching, extortion, armed robbery)

C. A pattern of irresponsible and anti-social behavior since the age of 15, as indicated by at least four of the following:
1. is unable to sustain consistent work behavior, as indicated by any of the following (including similar behavior in academic settings if the person is a student):

a. significant unemployment for six months or more within five years when expected to work and work was available
b. repeated absences from work unexplained by illness in self or family
c. abandonment of several jobs without realistic plans for others
2. fails to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, as indicated by repeatedly performing antisocial acts that are grounds for arrest (whether arrested or not), e.g., destroying property, harassing others, stealing, pursuing an illegal occupation
3. is irritable and aggressive, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults (not required by one's job or to defend someone or oneself), including spouse- or child-beating
4. repeatedly fails to honor financial obligation, as indicated by defaulting on debts or failing to provide child support or support for other dependents on a regular basis
5. fails to plan ahead, or is impulsive, as indicated by one or both of the following:
a. traveling from place to place without a prearranged job or clear goal for the period of travel or clear idea about when the travel will terminate
b. lack of a fixed address for a month or more
6. has no regard for the truth, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or "conning"

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*   Taken from American Psychiatric Association. (1987). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (3rd ed. rev.). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association.

others for personal profit or pleasure

7. is reckless regarding his or her own or others' personal safety, as indicated by driving while intoxicated, or recurrent speeding

8. if a parent or guardian, lacks ability to function as a responsible parent, as indicated by one or more of the following:

    a. malnutrition of child

    b. child's illness resulting from lack of minimal hygiene

    c. failure to obtain medical care for a seriously ill child

    d. child's dependence on neighbors or nonresident relatives for food or shelter

    e. failure to arrange for a caretaker for young child when parent is away from home

    f. repeated squandering, on personal items, of money required for household necessities

9. has never sustained a totally monogamous relationship for more than one year

10. lacks remorse (feels justified in having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another)

D. Occurrence of antisocial behavior not exclusively during the course of Schizophrenia or Manic Episodes.

Borderline Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of instability of mood, interpersonal relationships, and self-image, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following:

1. a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by alternating between extremes of overidealization and devaluation

2. impulsiveness in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging, e.g., spending, sex, substance use, shoplifting, reckless driving, and binge eating (Do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in 5.)

3. affective instability: marked shifts from baseline mood to depression, irritability, or anxiety, usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days

4. inappropriate, intense anger or lack of control of anger, e.g., frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights

5. recurrent suicidal threats, gestures, or behavior, or self-mutilating behavior

6. marked and persistent identity disturbance manifested by uncertainty about at least two of the following: self-image, sexual orientation, long-term goals or career choice, type of friends desired, preferred values

7. chronic feelings of emptiness or boredom

8. frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment (Do not include suicidal or self-mutilating behavior covered in 5.)

Dependent Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of dependent and submissive behavior, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following:

1. is unable to make everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice or reassurance from others

2. allows others to make most of his or her important decisions, e.g., where to live, what job to take

3. agrees with people even when he or she believes they are wrong, because of fear of being rejected

4. has difficulty initiating projects or doing things on his or her own

5. volunteers to do things that are unpleasant or demeaning in order to get other people to like him or her

6. feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone, or goes to great length to avoid being alone

7. feels devastated or helpless when close relationships end

8. is frequently preoccupied with fears of being abandoned

9. is easily hurt by criticism or disapproval

Narcissistic Personality Disorder

A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), lack of empathy, and hypersensitivity to the evaluation of others, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following:

1. reacts to criticism with feelings of rage, shame, or humiliation (even if not expressed)

2. is interpersonally exploitative; takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

3. has a grandiose sense of self-importance, e.g., exaggerates achievements and talents, expects to be noticed as "special!" without appropriate achievement

4. believes that his or her problems are unique and can be understood only by other special people

5. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love

6. has a sense of entitlement: unreasonable expectation of especially favorable treatment, e.g., assumes that he or she does not have to wait in line when others must do so

7. requires constant attention and admiration, e.g., keeps fishing for compliments

8. lack of empathy: inability to recognize and experience how others feel, e.g., annoyance and surprise when a friend who is seriously ill cancels a date

9. is preoccupied with feelings of envy

Passive-Aggressive Disorder

A pervasive pattern of passive resistance to demands for adequate social and occupational performance, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by at least five of the following:

1. procrastinates, i.e., puts off things that need to be done so that deadlines are not met

2. becomes sulky, irritable, or argumentative when asked to do something he or she does not want to do

3. seems to work deliberately slowly or to do a bad job on tasks that he or she really does not want to do

4. protests, without justification, that others make unreasonable demands on him or her

5. avoids obligations by claiming to have "forgotten"

6. believes that he or she is doing a much better job than others think he or she is doing

7. resents useful suggestions from others concerning how he or she could be more productive

8. obstructs the efforts of others by failing to do his or her share of the work

9. unreasonably criticizes or scorns people in positions of authority

Organic Personality Syndrome

A. A persistent personality disturbance, either lifelong or representing a change or accentuation of a previously characteristic trait, involving at least one of the following:

1. affective instability, e.g., marked shifts from normal mood to depression, irritability, or anxiety

2. recurrent outbursts of aggression or rage that are grossly out of proportion to any precipitating psychosocial stressors

3. markedly impaired social judgments, e.g., sexual indiscretions

4. marked apathy and indifference

5. suspicious or paranoid ideation

B. There is evidence from the history, physical examination, or laboratory tests of a specific organic factor (or factors) judged to be etiologically related to the disturbance.

C. This diagnosis is not given to a child or adolescent if the clinical picture is limited to the features that characterize attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.

D. Not occurring exclusively during the course of delirium, and does not meet the criteria for dementia.

Specific explosive type if outbursts of aggression or rage are the predominant feature.

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