

U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of Justice Programs  
*National Institute of Justice*



# NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

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## Searching for Answers

Annual Evaluation Report  
on Drugs and Crime: 1991

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# About the National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of Justice Programs, is the research and development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. NIJ was established to prevent and reduce crime and to improve the criminal justice system. Specific mandates established by Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 direct the National Institute of Justice to:

- *Sponsor special projects and research and development programs* that will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or prevent crime.
- *Conduct national demonstration projects* that employ innovative or promising approaches for improving criminal justice.
- *Develop new technologies* to fight crime and improve criminal justice.
- *Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs* and identify programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated.
- *Recommend actions* that can be taken by Federal, State, and local governments as well as private organizations to improve criminal justice.
- *Carry out research on criminal behavior.*
- *Develop new methods of crime prevention* and reduction of crime and delinquency.

The National Institute of Justice has a long history of accomplishments, including the following:

- Basic research on career criminals that led to development of special police and prosecutor units to deal with repeat offenders.
- Research that confirmed the link between drugs and crime.
- The research and development program that resulted in the creation of police body armor that has meant the difference between life and death to hundreds of police officers.
- Pioneering scientific advances such as the research and development of DNA analysis to positively identify suspects and eliminate the innocent from suspicion.
- The evaluation of innovative justice programs to determine what works, including drug enforcement, community policing, community anti-drug initiatives, prosecution of complex drug cases, drug testing throughout the criminal justice system, and user accountability programs.
- Creation of a corrections information-sharing system that enables State and local officials to exchange more efficient and cost-effective concepts and techniques for planning, financing, and constructing new prisons and jails.
- Operation of the world's largest criminal justice information clearinghouse, a resource used by State and local officials across the Nation and by criminal justice agencies in foreign countries.

The Institute Director is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Director, through the Assistant Attorney General, establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by the priorities of the Department of Justice and the needs of the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of criminal justice professionals to identify their most critical problems. Dedicated to the priorities of Federal, State, and local criminal justice agencies, research and development at the National Institute of Justice continues to search for answers to what works and why in the Nation's war on drugs and crime.



# Searching for Answers

## Annual Evaluation Report on Drugs and Crime: 1991

A Report to the President,  
the Attorney General,  
and the Congress

137775

July 1992

U.S. Department of Justice  
National Institute of Justice

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U.S. Department of Justice

National Institute of Justice

Office of the Director

Washington, D.C. 20531

July 1992

Honorable George Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690), I have the honor to transmit herewith *Searching for Answers*, the National Institute of Justice's Annual Evaluation Report on Drugs and Crime.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "CB DeWitt". The signature is stylized and written in a cursive-like font.

Charles B. DeWitt  
Director  
National Institute of Justice



<b>Foreword by the Assistant Attorney General</b> .....	vii
<b>Message from the Director of the National Institute of Justice</b> .....	ix
<b>Executive Summary</b> .....	xi
<b>Chapter 1</b>	
Introduction .....	1
<b>Chapter 2</b>	
Operation Weed and Seed .....	7
<b>Chapter 3</b>	
Drug Enforcement .....	15
<b>Chapter 4</b>	
Community Policing and the Drug Problem .....	37
<b>Chapter 5</b>	
Drugs, Gangs, and Public Housing .....	51
<b>Chapter 6</b>	
Prosecuting and Adjudicating Drug Offenders .....	65
<b>Chapter 7</b>	
Intermediate Sanctions .....	73
<b>Chapter 8</b>	
Drug Testing and Treatment in the Criminal Justice System .....	83
<b>Chapter 9</b>	
Evaluating Community Initiatives .....	95
<b>Chapter 10</b>	
Evaluating Systemwide Efforts .....	103
<b>Appendix</b>	
Index of Grants .....	111

# Foreword by the Assistant Attorney General

**F**or the past several years, this Nation has devoted unprecedented resources at the Federal, State, and local levels to combat the drug-related and other violent crime that terrorizes law-abiding citizens and turns once-quiet neighborhoods into battle zones. During this same period, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP)—through a cooperative effort between two of its bureaus, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)—has been working to determine the effectiveness of the crime and drug control programs supported with these resources.

OJP has made program evaluations one of its top priorities for funding in Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992, allocating a total of \$13 million during the past 2 years. These evaluations are designed to determine what works and why in the fight against drug-related crime so that successful approaches can be documented and adopted by jurisdictions throughout the country. Evaluations also serve as a guidepost for determining whether public funds are being used wisely, and for eliminating funding for programs that have not proven to be effective. In addition, evaluations assist the OJP and its bureaus in developing research and demonstration programs that, based on evaluation findings, are likely to be effective. Furthermore, evaluations contribute to the development of comprehensive strategies to deal with the complex issues of drug abuse and violent crime.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 directs the National Institute of Justice to evaluate the drug control programs funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Through the research and evaluations described in this report, you will find that NIJ and BJA are making a significant contribution to increasing the knowledge needed by policymakers and practitioners at all levels of government to combat and reduce drug abuse and violent crime in this Nation. This important partnership is helping the OJP to fulfill its mission to improve the administration of justice in America.

With our partners at the Federal, State, and local levels, the OJP, its bureaus, and the Department of Justice will continue working toward achieving the President's goal of a drug- and crime-free America.

Jimmy Gurulé  
Assistant Attorney General  
Office of Justice Programs  
U.S. Department of Justice

# A Message from the Director of the National Institute of Justice

**T**his report represents one of the ways that the National Institute of Justice helps this Nation respond effectively to crime and violence. Criminal justice officials, the Congress, and the public want to know what innovations and improvements will enable police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials, and political leaders to stem the tide of drug trafficking, drug abuse, and violent crime. Through *Searching for Answers*, the Institute explains what is working and shows what else can be done.

This evaluation program carries out the Institute's mission as the Federal Government's principal research and development center for improvements to the criminal justice system. This report to the President, the Attorney General, and the Congress is required by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690).

Our 1992 report delivers on a promise we made a year ago to provide "more definitive results" from the evaluations the Institute initiated soon after the 1988 Act was implemented. In this volume, the Institute describes what criminal justice professionals can put to work—right now.

For example, Institute evaluations show that:

- **Police crackdowns have impact.** Institute evaluators found that short (90-day), intense crackdowns disrupt drug markets and drive users and sellers off the streets, and diminish the availability of drugs. Over the longer haul, however, other techniques for improving neighborhood life must supplant police activity if a real impact on quality of life is to be felt by the citizens in those areas.
- **User accountability programs work.** Properly implemented, programs to hold occasional or recreational drug users accountable for violating the law are effective. These programs can widen the enforcement net to apprehend casual users, punish them with the loss of driving privileges or other sanctions, force the offenders to pay the costs of their own prosecution, and still not overload the criminal justice or corrections systems.
- **Community programs can help reduce both drug-related crime and fear.** Active citizen involvement is spurring many communities to work more closely with police in reporting crime and drug "hot spots" in their neighborhoods. Increasingly, community groups are working on other parts of the solution to the drug crisis—such as drug education, tutoring programs for youth, training for parents, and job training.

These and many more results are explained in detail in this volume of *Searching for Answers*. Not every program that the Institute has evaluated was successful, but it is important in research and evaluation to be candid and accurate about what works and what doesn't work. After all, we may learn as much or more from unsuccessful attempts that should not be repeated. Our Nation needs reliable answers to the drug problem, not wishful thinking.

The Institute is developing reports that will communicate information that criminal justice officials need to repeat success stories and avoid approaches that will not work. The Institute has over the past year established its first permanent Evaluation Division. Our planning and evaluation process will ensure evaluations to answer questions that are raised by policymakers and practitioners in the field. Further details on the new division and the evaluation process are contained in Chapter 1.

We hope that *Searching for Answers* will become a valuable reference for the criminal justice field and a guide to help agencies to implement what works against crime and drugs. *Searching for Answers* reflects the Institute's commitment to finding the answers that now and in the coming years will help this Nation in its struggle against drugs and crime.

Institute evaluations reported here represent our most recent steps in a long-range effort to identify promising anti-drug approaches and to develop innovative answers to the current drug crisis in many communities. Although State, county, and local governments must shoulder most of the burden in fighting drugs and crime, the National Institute of Justice can identify the best efforts, support development of new approaches, and communicate results of this work across the Nation.

Charles B. DeWitt  
Director  
National Institute of Justice  
U.S. Department of Justice





## Executive Summary

■ In the Eastern District precinct headquarters, San Diego police are being briefed just before beginning patrol duty in a neighborhood known for drug activity. On the wall is a large computer-generated city map showing hot spots of drug activity: drug markets, sites of drug arrests, suspected crack houses. A sergeant distributes updated printouts that show hot spots in the neighborhood the officers will patrol, and the officers plan their patrol accordingly. The maps are based on information obtained from arrestees and other sources, much of it gathered within the past 24 hours. The information was gathered through Drug Market Analysis (DMA), which has been developed and improved through National Institute of Justice research and evaluation. DMA is being demonstrated in five police departments in the United States today.

■ Planners in several major metropolitan police departments around the Nation are contemplating setting up drug crackdowns. They can turn to the Institute for information. The Institute has evaluated several crackdowns operated by the New York City Police Department and other departments around the country and has learned what police should consider in planning a crackdown, what expectations they might have, and what pitfalls they should avoid.

■ In the criminal courts of a city, judicial administrators meet with prosecutors to review a long list of new cases. Using information from the Institute's evaluation of expedited drug case management, the group adjusts caseloads for judges and screens cases for appropriate disposition. Institute research has demonstrated that, when properly implemented, the program moves cases forward through the judicial process more quickly than traditional methods, cuts the time to jury trial and thus to conviction or acquittal, and does so at no harm to the judicial system or to the individual defendant's constitutional rights. This program is being demonstrated at three sites in the United States today.

■ A group of citizens concerned about drugs wants to know how to mobilize and work with police to make their neighborhood safer. The Institute's evaluations of creative partnership efforts in a variety of communities explain how to design programs, forge partnerships with police to strengthen enforcement, and work with other city agencies to secure services such as tutoring programs for youngsters, training programs for parents, drug education, and emergency housing.

**F**ederal, State, and local law enforcement and criminal justice officials have increasingly sought guidance from the National Institute of Justice, the principal research and development arm of the U.S. Department of Justice, for answers in developing and implementing programs to fight drugs and crime. The reliance of the law enforcement and criminal justice field on new approaches to stem drug-related crime has risen in the past 3 years, during which the Institute has been carrying out the mandate of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. That Act directed the Institute to evaluate projects funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which administers the Federal block grant program to help States and localities to fight drugs and crime. These BJA-funded projects, which originate with State and local officials, characteristically reflect remarkable invention and innovation. Congress directed the Institute to find out which projects offer

*Police are the Nation's front line in the war against drugs. Providing police departments with the best tools for eradicating drugs and related crime from their jurisdictions is, therefore, of prime importance.*

promise to reduce crime and recidivism, and to publish the results so that other jurisdictions could learn from them. Broadly speaking, the evaluations of some projects show indications of success, while evaluations of other projects warn that project assumptions may have been invalid, that critical elements might have been missing, or that project implementation may have been flawed.

Evaluations are useless to the field unless the results are widely disseminated. The Institute is working to get the results in the hands of the right people. In many cases, project administrators have redirected their programs on the basis of Institute evaluation findings. For example, managers of some boot camps, which offer inmates military-style discipline and activity in lieu of prison incarceration, have begun to add Institute-recommended drug counseling and work skills training to help the inmates as they make the transition back to their community.

## **Evaluation Results Have Impact Across a Broad Front**

From enforcement to adjudication to offender punishment and reclaiming communities, Institute evaluations are now defining techniques that can help—or hinder—this Nation's police, courts, and corrections personnel and citizens in the fight against drug abuse and related crime.

### **Effective Enforcement Tools For Police**

Police are the Nation's front line in the war against drugs. Providing police departments with the best tools for eradicating drugs and related crime from their jurisdictions is, therefore, of prime importance. To date, Institute evaluations have analyzed a wide spectrum of related issues:

- **Crackdowns.** Drug enforcement operations in Detroit, Michigan, have shown that crackdowns can be carried out with existing police department resources, and that these types of operations drive dealers off the street;
- **Computer Analysis.** Institute programs have established a new role for computers in the war on drugs and crime. Although Jersey City, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego, California; and Hartford, Connecticut, are still developing and testing their systems, Drug Market Analysis (DMA) is already proving effective. For instance, Jersey City's DMA system identified 94 distinct drug markets, and then showed that those markets only covered 5.7 percent of the intersections and 3.8 percent of the streets of the city. And, Kansas City's system has shown police both that informants alone do not pick the highest priority targets for drug raids and that information from citizen hotlines serves better as a measure of perceived drug dealing than as an operational enforcement tool.
- **Demand Reduction.** Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona's Demand Reduction Program—called "Do Drugs. Do Time."—showed that user accountability programs can be highly visible, highly praised by the public, and strongly supported by the private sector and the media; slow the length of time to recidivism among those who had contact with the treatment program; and generate significant funds—in the first 2 years, Maricopa County collected \$39,342 in county jail fees and another \$850,411 for the Arizona Drug Enforcement Fund.
- **Drug Forfeiture.** The Federal Government's asset seizure and forfeiture program has been impressive—in 1990, alone, Federal forfeitures totalled \$460 million. An Institute nationwide survey of asset forfeiture programs, however, found that only 37 of the 100 reporting jurisdictions seized any proceeds of illegal activities, even though net forfeitures for 27 jurisdictions with programs amounted to approximately \$11 million. A subsequent Institute evaluation of federally-supported asset seizure programs in Prince George's County, Maryland; Colorado Springs, Colorado; and

Tucson, Arizona; proved that, given adequate seed money, training, and assistance, these programs can more than pay for themselves. With \$105,000 seed money, for instance, Prince George's County and Colorado Springs collected \$224,000 and \$615,000, respectively, in forfeitures during their programs' first year; and with \$125,000, Tucson produced \$825,000.

- **Community-Oriented Policing.** Community-oriented policing evaluations in San Diego, California; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Baltimore, Maryland; Flint, Michigan; Houston, Texas; and Newark, New Jersey, have explored how community-oriented policing strategies can best be implemented, the roles that citizens and community organizations play in combatting neighborhood drug problems, and means for building police-community relationships. San Diego's program showed that patrol officers can implement community-oriented policing successfully with general guidance from supervisors and command-level staff. Survey data from Baltimore indicate that citizens perceived it was more difficult to buy drugs either in an apartment or on the street when crackdowns are followed by community-oriented policing. And notable declines took place in reported crimes of violence in areas of Oakland where police met residents by going door-to-door through the neighborhood.

### **Expediting Court Processing**

Expedited drug case management programs represent one of the more important court reforms since automated docketing. Moreover, the Institute's three-site evaluation of these programs has now shown that they can have remarkable results:

- In Philadelphia's Court of Common Pleas, for instance, the program reduced the average number of days from arraignment to disposition by 26 percent, from 158 to 113 days; increased the number of jail beds available for pretrial detainees by up to 400 a day; resulted in a 42 percent decrease in jury trials and an 18 percent increase in guilty pleas; and reduced the total criminal case inventory throughout the court by approximately 32 percent in the first year.
- In New Brunswick, New Jersey, the program improved processing times and satisfied a long-standing need for a case management system that would provide quick responses to crime, especially drug crimes, and certainty in punishment.
- Where the court lacked an infrastructure capable of supporting the program, the policies and procedures needed for processing cases were not developed and the experience was less than positive. The effort provides a valuable lesson: without a professional court administrator or a management-oriented presiding judge with authority, any serious reform of the caseload management system is unlikely to succeed.

### **Encouraging New Corrections Approaches**

With tougher sentences, a dramatic increase in jail and prison populations has occurred in recent years. The Institute has conducted a number of evaluations of programs intended to increase the chance that inmates will return to their communities as law-abiding citizens.

Among these evaluations are the following:

- An Institute study of shock incarceration in the United States during the period 1989 to 1991 found that the recidivism rate for boot camp graduates' is not any greater than that of similar offenders serving longer sentences in prison. As a followup to the national survey, the Institute is evaluating shock incarceration programs in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Preliminary data from the Louisiana program seem to indicate that after completing their shock incarceration, offenders had fewer arrests, convictions, and revocations for new crimes, although they had more revocations for technical violations than comparison groups of parolees and probationers—a finding that has important implications for parole and probation.

*As the research and development arm of the Department of Justice, the Institute's role in Weed and Seed is to research and evaluate model programs and strategies that support each of the major objectives of the program, including the suppression of neighborhood drugs and crime; police/citizen partnerships that enhance community security; and neighborhood revitalization.*

- An Institute evaluation of Los Angeles County's Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) pilot program, which is a sentencing option for selected defendants who were likely to receive lengthy jail sentences followed by probation, found that:
  - Program graduates improved their education levels. Functioning on average at the sixth grade level on arrival, program graduates improved their overall grade levels by 1 to 2.5 years over the 90-day period. The school awarded 66 general equivalency diplomas and 9 high school diplomas to fiscal year 1991 participants.
  - More than half of the inmates who were unemployed on arrival were employed or in school when completing the RID probation period. Fully 92 percent of all graduates who were employed on a full-time basis exited the program successfully. By comparison, 36 percent of unemployed offenders successfully completed RID.
- To provide a detailed picture of work release, the Institute is evaluating Pioneer Human Services in the State of Washington. According to preliminary study results: nearly 70 percent of those who participate complete the program successfully; a large percentage of offenders participate in the program, but approximately 20 percent of those who apply are not accepted; and of those who are accepted, approximately 12 percent are not placed during their sentences.
- To determine whether adjudicated juveniles who received comprehensive, intensive services fare better than those assigned to traditional programs, the Institute evaluated the Paint Creek Youth Center in Ohio. Findings from that study showed that some program participants were—to a modest degree—less likely to be involved in criminal activities 1 year after release from the program than control group counterparts; and that the daily costs for both intensive and traditional groups were approximately equal.

## Putting Evaluations to Timely Use

The Federal Government's new Weed and Seed initiative is a two-step, coordinated program designed to reduce violent crime, drug trafficking, drug use and related crime, and gang activity from high-crime neighborhoods; and provide a safe environment, free of crime, for law-abiding citizens to live, work, and raise their families. The first step of this program involves the removal of narcotics traffickers and violent criminals from the community. The second calls for an infusion of educational, recreational, and social services and neighborhood reclamation.

As the research and development arm of the Department of Justice, the Institute's role in Weed and Seed is to research and evaluate model programs and strategies that support each of the major objectives of the program, including the suppression of neighborhood drugs and crime; police/citizen partnerships that enhance community security; and neighborhood revitalization. The Institute's work is, therefore, essential to communities that are committed to participating in coordinated efforts to increase public safety and improve the quality of neighborhood life.

Information and findings from a number of Institute research and evaluation projects undertaken before Weed and Seed have important implications for the program.

For instance:

- **Computer Analysis.** In selected Weed and Seed demonstration sites, police are using the Institute's Drug Market Analysis (DMA) program to map drug- and crime-related activities as a basis for developing and evaluating programs.
- **Drug Forecasting.** The Institute's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program is providing current information on drug use among booked arrestees and also tracking trends in particular drug problems.

- **Enforcement Strategies.** Drug enforcement strategies under study in New York City, Detroit, Tulsa, and San Diego are pinpointing promising methods for suppressing neighborhood drug and crime activity—sweeps, crackdowns, reverse-buys, and other law enforcement problem-solving strategies—and should help Weed and Seed program managers decide on enforcement techniques.
- **Community Policing.** Community policing is a key element of Weed and Seed. The Institute is evaluating programs in Houston, Texas; Madison, Wisconsin; and Seattle, Washington, and other areas that are helping to determine the key organizational and implementational issues in effective community policing.
- **Court Processing.** Expedited court processing programs provide guidance on how drug seller and user cases can be most effectively and expeditiously processed to conviction or acquittal.
- **Crime in Public Housing.** Institute evaluations of public housing projects in Chicago, Illinois; Lexington, Kentucky; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; Washington, D.C.; Denver, Colorado; and New Orleans, Louisiana, will provide Weed and Seed program managers with a clear picture of enforcement strategies that work and don't work within this environment.
- **Community Planning and Design.** The Institute's initiative, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), is also addressing issues that have important implications for each of the major components of Weed and Seed.

## New Institute Evaluation Efforts

In an effort to help States and municipalities develop their own evaluation capacity, the Institute has in the past year held a second National Evaluation Conference in Washington, D.C., to bring together Federal, State, and local criminal justice policymakers to discuss findings from evaluations at all levels of government. A third conference will be held in July 1992.

The Institute is launching two new publications, *Program Focus* and *Evaluation Bulletins*, that discuss evaluated programs as well as convey information on successful programs to States and localities. And the Institute is holding workshops to train State-level evaluators in new techniques and to provide technical assistance to States on specific problems they face in their evaluation plans and activities.

In 1992, the Institute will assess the extent and capacity of State evaluation efforts in criminal justice and will develop a compendium of State drug program evaluation findings.

New evaluations in 1992 include:

- **Collaborative Program for High-Risk Youth.** A 4-year program funded by the Ford Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Annie Casey Foundation will seek to provide a safe environment at home and school for young adolescents (aged 11 to 13); the Institute will evaluate the delivery of services and the overall impact on child achievement, drug use, and criminal involvement.
- **Correctional Boot Camps.** As of early 1992, 23 States had adopted these programs for adult and juvenile offenders. Building on previous assessments, the Institute will continue to evaluate these camps, which will lead to professional standards to assist public officials and corrections professionals in developing, operating, improving, and evaluating correctional boot camp programs.
- **Correctional Options.** The doubling of prison and jail populations over the past decade has resulted in higher correctional costs, crowded facilities, and constrained budgets for inmates programs. In response, Congress enacted the Correctional Options Amendments to the Crime Control Act of 1990 to provide financial assistance to State and local governments to develop correctional options. BJA administers the

demonstration program, and the Institute will evaluate it. Projects will be designed to steer youthful offenders away from a career in crime, provide security and discipline for offenders, provide diagnosis and treatment to help offenders in pursuing a law-abiding and productive life after release, reduce recidivism, lower correctional costs, and provide work that promotes offenders' industrial and service skills.

## **Other Institute Responses**

This edition of *Searching for Answers* focuses on Institute evaluations undertaken pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. It does not report on the wide range of research, development, demonstrations, and special projects that the Institute sponsors. The Institute also reports annually on that research to the Congress, the executive branch, State and local officials, and the general public through the:

- *National Institute of Justice Research and Evaluation Plan*, and
- *National Institute of Justice Annual Report*.

Copies of these and other Institute publications are available from the Institute's National Criminal Justice Reference Service (see inside back cover).





**F**or the past 3 years, the National Institute of Justice has evaluated criminal justice programs at the State, county, and local levels to determine which new approaches and techniques were proving to be useful and effective in the nation's fight against drugs and crime.

The Institute undertakes these evaluations pursuant to the provisions of Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which directs the Institute to evaluate drug control programs according to four criteria:

- Whether the program establishes a new and innovative approach to the control of drugs and crime;
- The cost of the program that will be evaluated and the number of similar programs funded;
- Whether the program has a high potential to be replicated in other jurisdictions; and
- Whether there is substantial public awareness of and community involvement in the program.

In order to give a more complete picture of Institute evaluation efforts, this report also presents background and findings of other projects that are providing answers in the effort to prevent and reduce crime and drug abuse.

This chapter describes the role and responsibilities of the Institute in evaluating criminal justice programs, and the Institute's plans for evaluations in the coming fiscal year.

## **Institute Evaluation Program**

The Nation today is committing an unprecedented level of resources across a broad front to combat drugs and crime. The American public understandably and properly expects an accounting for this expenditure of resources and wants results.

The burden of producing those results falls, under the Federal system, on State and local criminal justice agencies. They represent the front lines—a patrol officer in a drug-plagued neighborhood, a night court to process drug-abusing arrestees, special corrections programs to incarcerate offenders, and treatment programs to help offenders to kick the drug habit and rehabilitate themselves to become law-abiding and productive citizens.

State and local criminal justice agencies need support from the Federal Government. First, they need operational support. The Federal Government brings the unique resources of the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes, including the highly complex cases involving interstate and international drug trafficking and its attendant money laundering and allied crimes. Other Federal agencies play critical roles in preventing the entry of drugs into the country, educating the public about the dangers of drug abuse, and treating drug abusers.

## **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .**

- *NIJ's roles and responsibilities in evaluating criminal justice programs*
- *NIJ's plans for evaluations in the coming fiscal year*

*... State and local agencies need to know what new approaches and techniques are producing positive results. Looked at from the other end of the resource pipeline, Congress and other Federal policymakers need to know the impact of Federal grants on drugs and crime.*


Second, States and localities need program support. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) administers the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, which funds a wide variety of innovative and experimental programs through its discretionary grant authority, and it supports States through its block grants for general criminal justice activities. This support helps State and local jurisdictions to respond to the increasingly challenging nature of drug-related crime.

Third, and most important for this report, State and local agencies need to know what new approaches and techniques are producing positive results. Looked at from the other end of the resource pipeline, Congress and other Federal policymakers need to know the impact of Federal grants on drugs and crime.

The Institute plays the critical role of trying to answer the key questions about what approaches and techniques work best and about the effectiveness of Federal support. The Institute also seeks to share lessons learned so that promising approaches can have the widest effect throughout the country.

The Institute has been engaged in evaluation research since it was established under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Congress has long expected the Institute to assume responsibility for evaluation programs funded under that Act. In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress directed the Institute to focus on evaluation of drug-control programs funded by BJA. This broad mandate covers evaluation of both discretionary grants that BJA awards for specific programs and the block grant programs that States administer.

**From Research to Action.**



Since 1989, the Institute has awarded nearly \$12 million in 47 grants to evaluate BJA-funded programs. Institute evaluators have examined police crackdowns, community policing, new court management practices, sanctions aimed at both casual and persistent drug users, promising approaches to monitoring and controlling behavior of convicted offenders, and other programs important to the criminal justice community. In all cases, the Institute has sought objective data on these approaches and their alternatives so that State and local policy could be grounded on reliable information.

## **Institute Builds Evaluation Capacity**

In the past year, the Institute has redoubled its efforts to build both its own evaluation capacity and that of States and municipalities. The Institute created an Evaluation Division to plan and carry out a focused program of evaluation of the impact of activities that have been funded by BJA.

For the second year in a row, the National Institute of Justice held a National Evaluation Conference in Washington, D.C. The 1991 conference brought together more than 400 Federal, State, and local criminal justice policymakers to discuss findings from evaluations at all levels of government. Participants also attended workshops on evaluations topics and new program concepts.

The third National Evaluation Conference, to be held again in July 1992, is only one method by which the Institute makes evaluation findings available on a timely basis to criminal justice practitioners. It is especially desirable to do so now because criminal justice managers are showing an increased receptiveness to integrating evaluation results in their plans and programs. To that end, the Institute is launching new publications focused on evaluations. These include:

- **Program Focus**, which will report on innovative programs and practices that show signs of success in improving criminal justice. Each *Program Focus* describes in detail an actual operating program that has demonstrated success and explains how to establish and manage such a program.
- **Evaluation Bulletins**, which will present the results of Institute evaluation research. These bulletins will communicate the results of individual evaluations to large audiences and provide details on project design and operation. A typical bulletin could include results of several evaluations dealing with the same subject. Bulletins will also discuss evaluation methods that provide rigorous and cost-effective analyses of programs.

These publications complement the Institute's ongoing series, which include *Research in Brief* (reporting on specific criminal justice research projects), *Corrections Construction Bulletins*, *Issues and Practices*, and the *National Institute of Justice Journal* (formerly *NIJ Reports*), a periodical that will serve as the general information dissemination vehicle about Institute activities. The Institute also publishes the *Catalog* of publications available through its National Criminal Justice Reference Service, an international clearinghouse of criminal justice information.

As the Justice Department's principal evaluator of efforts to fight drugs and crime, the Institute is in a unique position to help State and local jurisdictions to build the capacity to conduct their own evaluations. The Institute therefore holds regional workshops on how to evaluate criminal justice programs. The workshops train State-level evaluators in new techniques and provide technical assistance to States on specific problems they face in their evaluation plans and activities.

*For the second year in a row, the National Institute of Justice held a National Evaluation Conference in Washington, D.C. The 1991 conference brought together more than 400 Federal, State, and local criminal justice policymakers to discuss findings from evaluations at all levels of government. Participants also attended workshops on evaluation topics and new program concepts.*

The Institute will initiate three projects in fiscal year 1992 aimed at helping State and local jurisdictions to build their evaluation capacity:

- **National Assessment of State Evaluations.** This national survey will measure the scope and focus of State evaluations of criminal justice programs, the use of findings, and the level of resources available to States.
- **Assessment of State-Level Evaluation Capacity.** Information about the nature and extent of State-level evaluation capacity will be developed in this study.
- **Compendium of State Drug Program Evaluation Findings.** State and local jurisdictions have completed a number of evaluations since 1989, but their combined experience in both evaluation and implementation of findings have not been collected and documented in a way that enables other jurisdictions to share the lessons learned. This project will develop a compendium of State evaluation findings and training materials for Institute publication.

## NIJ Evaluation Initiatives


In addition to the three projects aimed at helping State and local jurisdictions to conduct their own evaluations, the Institute will undertake evaluations in a number of other new areas. Examples include:

- **Collaborative Program for High-Risk Youth.** Evaluation of a comprehensive program for high-risk youth will span 4 years and will assess the delivery of services and overall impact on child achievement, drug use, and criminal involvement. The Institute will jointly develop and support the evaluation of the program, with BJA and New York University's Strategic Intervention for High-Risk Youth project. Funding will be provided by the Ford Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trusts, and the Annie Casey Foundation. The Program will operate in five to seven cities and contain a wide range of interventions targeted at early adolescents (children aged 11 to 13). Key objectives include providing a safe environment at home and school.
- **Correctional Boot Camps.** As of early 1992, 23 States had adopted correctional boot camp programs for adult and young offenders. Institute research has found a wide variation in their operations, activities, time served, number served, release procedures, and aftercare. The characteristics that continue to distinguish boot camps from traditional prisons and jails are the rigorous physical exercise and discipline, as well as housing separate from other inmates.
- **Correctional Options.** In response to the doubling of prison and jail populations over the past decade, which has resulted in higher correctional costs, crowded facilities, and constrained inmate programming budgets, Congress enacted the Correctional Options Amendments to the Crime Control Act of 1990. The new legislation provides financial assistance to State and local units of government to develop correctional options. BJA administers the program and the Institute will evaluate it. The demonstration projects will be designed to:
  - Steer youthful offenders away from a career in crime;
  - Provide security and discipline for the offenders;
  - Provide diagnosis, treatment, and services to assist offenders in pursuing a law-abiding and productive course of conduct after release;
  - Reduce recidivism;
  - Lower correctional costs; and
  - Provide work that promotes development of industrial and service skills by the offender.

- **Operation Weed and Seed.** This new national initiative will link intensive enforcement with efforts to provide social services in high-crime areas. The Institute will provide research and evaluation support as outlined in Chapter 2.

## **NIJ's Comprehensive Reports**

This 1992 edition of *Searching for Answers* describes in detail the evaluation program of the National Institute of Justice, with emphasis on the projects undertaken pursuant to Section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The Institute conducts substantial additional research, however, and publishes several volumes that report the results of this research to the Congress, the executive branch, State and local officials, and the general public. Principal among these are the annual *Research and Evaluation Plan* and the *National Institute of Justice Annual Report*.



**O**peration Weed and Seed is a new national initiative that links law enforcement efforts with social services and public and private resources to revitalize and restore crime- and drug-ridden neighborhoods. The program is a comprehensive and integrated, multi-agency approach to:

- Eliminate violent crime, gang activity, drug trafficking, use, and related crime from targeted high-crime neighborhoods; and
- Provide a safe environment, free of crime, for law-abiding citizens to live, work, and raise their families.

## **Operation Weed and Seed**

Operation Weed and Seed is based on the premise that a partnership of Federal, State, and local governments, community organizations and citizens, and businesses and nonprofit organizations is essential for creating safer urban neighborhoods. Weed and Seed coordinates law enforcement with social services to:

- Involve law enforcement in “weeding out” violent offenders and drug traffickers by coordinating and integrating the efforts of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in targeted high-crime neighborhoods;
- Implement community policing in the targeted sites. Under this policing strategy, law enforcement works closely with residents of a community to develop solutions to the problems of violence and drug-related crime. (See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of this subject.) Community policing will also serve as a “bridge” between the “weeding” (law enforcement) and “seeding” (neighborhood revitalization) components of the program;
- Unite law enforcement, social service agencies, the private sector, and the community in efforts to prevent crime and violence from occurring and restore the quality of life within the community. A broad array of human services—drug and crime prevention programs, drug treatment, educational opportunities, family services, and recreational activities—will be established in the targeted sites to create an environment where crime cannot thrive; and
- Focus Federal, State, local, and private sector resources on revitalizing distressed neighborhoods through economic development and provide economic opportunities for residents. Boys and Girls Clubs of America will be involved in this effort.

Operation Weed and Seed is divided into three basic operational phases: 1) weeding, 2) community policing, and 3) seeding. These program elements are described below.

### **Weeding: Removing Violent Criminals from the Streets**

After arrest and arraignment, many narcotics traffickers and violent criminals are returned to the streets to await prosecution. Once released, these criminals often continue to sell drugs, and they also have the opportunity to terrorize persons who witnessed their crimes

*“The fight against crime is everyone’s business. Families and neighborhoods, schools and churches, drug shelters and business and the media—everyone must join in this fight.”*

*President George Bush*

## **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .**

- *Operation Weed and Seed defined*
- *Trenton, Kansas City, and Omaha programs*
- *New cities for action*
- *NIJ’s roles in advancing weed and seed*

and could testify against them in the courts. Weed and Seed is designed to address this problem by placing the local U.S. Attorney in the role of coordinator for Federal, State, and local law enforcement activities related to the prosecution of certain drug and/or violent offenders in Federal courts, where they will be subject to pretrial detention, a speedy trial, and mandatory minimum sentences. The advantages of this approach are that:

- The offender is immediately removed from the streets, and the public immediately sees that these law enforcement efforts are effective;
- The offender receives swift justice; and
- Once convicted, drug traffickers and violent criminals serve longer sentences—mandated by Federal law—and are prevented from committing further criminal acts while imprisoned.

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### ***Building Partnerships for Weed and Seed Programs***

- *Key State and local agencies;*
  - *Key Federal agencies such as:*
    - Department of Justice,*
    - Department of Housing and Urban Development,*
    - Department of Commerce,*
    - Department of Health and Human Services,*
    - Department of Education,*
    - Small Business Administration,*
    - Department of Labor, and*
    - Department of Agriculture;*
  - *Private sector businesses; and*
  - *Community-based organizations.*
- 

### **Community Policing: The Bridge Between Weeding and Seeding**

Community-oriented policing activities focus on increasing police visibility and developing cooperative relationships between the police and the citizens they serve. Policing techniques such as foot patrols, citizen neighborhood watches, targeted mobile units, and community relations activities increase positive interaction between the police and the community, thereby raising the level of citizen and community involvement in crime prevention activities and other partnership efforts, to help solve drug-related and other problems in neighborhoods. The community-oriented approach can ensure that the reduced levels of drug use, trafficking, and related crime—which result from the “weed” activities—are maintained. It also reduces fear in the community so that economic development and related social services can take root. Thus community policing is an important bridge between “weed” and “seed” components of the program.

### **Seeding: The Neighborhood Revitalization Program**

Neighborhoods, especially in urban areas, deteriorate when narcotics trafficking takes hold. Unless the existing social and economic problems of these communities are addressed in conjunction with the removal of violent criminals, they remain fertile ground for renewed drug trafficking. Operation Weed and Seed provides the framework under which public agencies, community organizations, and citizens can form partnerships to enhance public safety and the overall quality of life within a neighborhood. After “weeding” operations have been completed, new recreational, job and life skills development, mentoring, health services, and educational programs will be established under the seeding phase of the program—for example, the National Boys and Girls Clubs of America will set up clubs in targeted neighborhoods to provide activities for youth. Seeding programs fall into these basic categories: prevention, intervention, and treatment; and neighborhood restoration.

### ***Prevention, Intervention, and Treatment***

One of the basic tenets of Operation Weed and Seed is that crime and drug abuse can be prevented if individual responsibility is fostered among community members, especially school-aged youth. Thus, seeding programs focus on youth services and school programs for high-risk youth as well as recreational activities. Ongoing support services for community members and victims and survivors of violent crime are being stressed.

### ***Neighborhood Restoration***

Under Operation Weed and Seed, neighborhood reclamation and restoration begins with the development of community-law enforcement partnerships to organize and train citizens and resident groups to resist and repel drugs, and to provide an environment where community services can grow. Such programs can help improve living conditions, enhance home security procedures, allow for low-cost physical improvements, and develop long-term efforts to renovate and maintain housing, as well as provide educational,



economic, social, recreational, and other vital opportunities. Again, the key feature of this strategy is the attempt to foster self-worth and individual responsibility among community members. Programs to enhance home ownership through housing rehabilitation and promote new business opportunities are also included in this category.

## Beginning Efforts

Weed and Seed demonstrations began in Kansas City, Missouri; Trenton, New Jersey; and Omaha, Nebraska, with funds from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). These cities were selected on the basis of:

- Incidence of gang-related violence;
- Homicides/aggravated assaults/rape and other incidents of violent crime;
- Drug arrests;
- High school dropout rates;
- High unemployment rates;
- High percentage of population on public assistance; and
- Percentage of population on probation and parole.

These pilot programs are now at different stages of operation—the Trenton program, which already had a number of program elements in operation before it became a demonstration site, is now fully operational; and the Kansas City program is well under way.

### The Trenton Program

The city of Trenton has developed a four-pronged approach to fighting the war on drugs and crime in the four neighborhoods that are currently receiving Weed and Seed funding from BJA. In Trenton:

- **The Violent Offender Removal Program (VORP)** is designed to target, apprehend, and incapacitate violent street gang members and disrupt drug trafficking networks in and around designated "Safe Haven Zones."
- **The Community Policing Program**, which employs police mini-stations to bring officers closer to residents, has been implemented in all four targeted neighborhoods. Citizen Crime Watch groups are also being formed as a part of this program.
- **The Safe Haven Program** is designed to bring together education, community, law enforcement, health, recreation, and other groups to provide alternative activities for high-risk youth and other residents of the community. Three public middle schools in three of the targeted neighborhoods stay open after regular school hours from 3 p.m. to 9 p.m. to house these programs. In addition to programs for high-risk youth, the Safe Haven Program also includes a number of programs for adults. The number of community participants at one Safe Haven location has averaged between 85 and 125 per evening, with as many as 200 on several occasions.
- **The Neighborhood Revitalization Project** is working to fund capital construction and redevelopment projects, and train citizens and resident groups in security procedures and home improvement.

A number of human service agencies have been identified to participate in Trenton's "Seed" effort, including the Delaware Valley United Way, Urban League of Greater Trenton, Boys and Girls Clubs, DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) program, and the Trenton School District, among others. In addition, the mayor of Trenton has held a number of town meetings in the target areas to assess community needs and the types of social services to be made available in the "Safe Haven Program." Project participants have expressed their commitment to the program.

*"Only an approach combining tough law enforcement with the economic and moral revitalization of high-crime areas offers the prospect of a safer America."*

*Attorney General  
William P. Barr*

## The Kansas City Program

Kansas City's Weed and Seed program was funded in August 1991. The program is being organized by the U.S. Attorney and the Kansas City Police Department, with assistance from law enforcement personnel, human services agencies, and community organizations. Kansas City is using the Data, Research and Analysis for Geographic Narcotics Enforcement Targets (DRAGNET) data system—which was developed through NIJ's Drug Market Analysis Program (see Chapter 3 for additional information about this program)—together with the new patrol resources added as a result of Federal funds, to implement its Weed and Seed program. These resources are being used to support activities such as:

- **Door-to-door policing**, which involves brief visits to residences to introduce the city's citizen reporting program and encourage participation; demonstrate the officers' personal involvement in area problems; survey citizens on important local problems; and request information on local drug dealing and persons known to be carrying concealed weapons;
- **Gun tips and busts**, which include a program that encourages citizens to use 911 to report people known to carry concealed weapons and a program for testing hand-held metal detectors to search alleged gun carriers' persons, handbags, or other luggage;
- **Hot spot patrols**, which involve increased patrol presence at specific times and specific street corners, businesses, drug houses, or other locations identified by DRAGNET analyses;
- **Drug house raids**; and
- **Cleanups**, including towing of abandoned automobiles, boarding up of burnt-out houses, and removal of trash from yards of vacant houses or from vacant lots.

Once drug dealers and criminals have been removed from the target area, abandoned property and houses that had been used for drug trafficking but were later forfeited to the city will be converted into affordable housing with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business Administration, the Kansas City Neighborhood Alliance, and the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, a Kansas City neighborhood-based organization.

The centerpiece of Kansas City's seeding strategy is its "Hub House," a one-stop center to provide residents with information on a wide range of programs available to them, including drug treatment and referral, family therapy, education, counseling, child development programs, youth services, housing services, and opportunities available through the Small Business Administration. Job opportunities are being made available through a Corrections Options Program, which was established by the Community Development Corporation of Kansas City to employ first-time substance abuse offenders in the construction field and place them in a learning environment where training and skills can be developed. This program provides a form of community service for these offenders by having them participate in the renovation of confiscated houses and making them part of the effort to restore their community.

### *Evaluating the Program*

The Kansas City Weed and Seed program is being conducted over a 12-month period. NIJ is currently gathering and analyzing data on every phase of program development and implementation. At program completion, improvements in the target area will be measured through the Kansas City's DRAGNET data system and through a variety of data collected by researchers from the University of Maryland Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, including:

- Qualitative observations provided by a staff member who is in the target area full time;
- A sample household survey conducted before and after the project; and

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### *Selecting Target Areas: Kansas City*

*The 80-block, 0.6-square mile area of Kansas City, Missouri, targeted for Weed and Seed has had a high incidence of gun crime, violent crimes committed by repeat offenders, drug houses, and disorder. During the fiscal year that ended September 30, 1991, a total of 223 crimes involving guns were reported. There were 448 violent crimes reported during the first 317 days of 1991 (5 homicides, 12 rapes, 81 robberies, and 350 assaults). Twenty-two driveby shootings were also reported. A total of 142 addresses were the subject of 423 calls to the area's drug line.*

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- A videotape of every block in the area before and after the project, which will provide data on numbers of abandoned cars, burned-out houses, and other physical signs of disorder and decay.

### ***Policy Implications***

If the program succeeds in reducing the number of shootings in the target area, it will have policy implications for other neighborhoods in the country that are experiencing a high incidence of gun crimes. The program also may produce other valuable lessons, for instance:

- Specific problems with door-to-door strategies for soliciting tips about criminal activities;
- Procedural problems in investigating tips about gun carrying; or
- Methods that criminals use to carry guns to avoid detection by the police such as asking friends to carry the weapons or storing them inside a car trunk.

Benefits to Kansas City might also include:

- A reduction in the number of locations at which drug dealing is reported;
- A reduction in the number of calls-for-service in the target area;
- A reduction in the disorder attendant upon open drug marketplaces;
- A reduction in crime or disorder in hot spot locations; and
- An improvement in the physical appearance of the neighborhood—as measured by decreased numbers of abandoned cars and houses.

Community policing efforts would profit from the specific results of such strategies as door-to-door visits and hot spot patrols. Drug enforcement could profit from analysis of the effects of concentrated raids in a single neighborhood on an alternating crackdown-and-backoff schedule of program delivery.

The findings will be of interest to urban police agencies, local and Federal prosecutors, mayors, city managers and council members, neighborhood citizens' groups, and others who are attempting to cope with massive urban drug-related problems.

### **The Omaha Program**

Omaha received initial Weed and Seed funding from BJA in September 1991. Directed by the Community Partnership Steering Committee of Omaha, the program is targeted at the 40th and Bedford area of the city, where illegal drug trafficking, gang activity, and related violence are disrupting school and community life.

Omaha police are working with Federal authorities to aggressively prosecute offenders arrested for drug- and gang-related crimes and to improve services for crime victims. To conduct the community policing component of the program, nine police officers have been allocated to the target neighborhood to work with community leaders and serve as the bridge between neighborhood residents and the six task forces formed on citizen involvement, housing and employment, prevention and education, enforcement and prosecution, corrections, and treatment.

Omaha's seeding strategy focuses on providing alternative activities for high-risk youth, particularly those attracted to gangs. More than a dozen local service agencies and the public schools are participating in this effort to provide recreational activities, establish Boy and Girl Scout troops in the target neighborhood, educational and career counseling, pre-school programs, and other special education programs designed to build children's self esteem, communications skills, and ability to deal constructively and nonviolently with

***Community policing efforts would profit from the specific results of such strategies as door-to-door visits and hot spot patrols. Drug enforcement could profit from analysis of the effects of concentrated raids in a single neighborhood on an alternating crackdown-and-backoff schedule of program delivery.***

day-to-day problems. In addition, a number of public and private organizations are working to rehabilitate housing and attract businesses to the area to provide employment opportunities for neighborhood residents.

### **Evaluating New Sites**

An additional 16 Weed and Seed demonstration sites have been selected. In its current 1992 *Research and Evaluation Plan*, NIJ announced an initial evaluation of how the program is being implemented in the sites. In 1993, NIJ will expand its Weed and Seed evaluation program to include an intensive impact evaluation of three to five of the demonstration sites. The goals of this program will be:

- To understand the costs and value of Operation Weed and Seed in urban settings; and
- To inform policymakers, program developers, and law enforcement agencies about new and promising innovative strategies, and to make Weed and Seed program development recommendations.

NIJ expects that this evaluation will be completed by 1994.

### **NIJ's Other Roles in Advancing Weed and Seed**

As the research and development arm of the Department of Justice, NIJ's role in Weed and Seed is to research and evaluate model programs and strategies that support each of the major objectives of the program, including the suppression of neighborhood drugs and crime; police/citizen partnerships that enhance community security; and neighborhood revitalization. NIJ's work is particularly useful to communities participating in Operation Weed and Seed. In addition, the Institute has reviewed past research for lessons that can be incorporated in the new initiative. A number of other NIJ research and evaluation projects have important implications for operation Weed and Seed. For example:

- **NIJ's Drug Market Analysis (DMA) program** computerizes law enforcement information, particularly location-specific knowledge regarding street-level drug trafficking enforcement and associated crime. Through DMA, police in several cities developed computer mapping capacities that enable them to zero in on neighborhoods with drug trafficking problems, high crime rates, and disorder. The program enables police to collect, share, and analyze pertinent data on a real-time basis and use it to guide strategies and tactics. DMA projects are being conducted in Hartford, Connecticut; Kansas City, Missouri; Jersey City, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and San Diego, California. The cities are using mapping of drug- and crime-related activities as a basis for developing and evaluating Weed and Seed programs in specific neighborhoods. (See Chapter 3 for additional information about the Drug Market Analysis Program.)
- **NIJ's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) Program** provides current information on drug use among booked arrestees that tracks trends in particular drug problems and enforcement needs in 24 participating cities. DUF is now operating in eight cities that are participating in Operation Weed and Seed. (See Chapter 8 for additional information about NIJ's DUF program.)
- **Drug enforcement strategies** are being evaluated in New York City, Detroit, Tulsa, and San Diego. These efforts are examining promising methods for suppressing neighborhood drug and crime activity—sweeps, crackdowns, reverse-buys, and other law enforcement problem-solving strategies. (See Chapter 3 for additional information about this program.)

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### ***New Weed and Seed Demonstration Sites***

- Atlanta, Georgia
  - Boston, Massachusetts
  - Charleston, South Carolina
  - Chicago, Illinois
  - Denver, Colorado
  - Fort Worth, Texas
  - Los Angeles, California
  - Madison, Wisconsin
  - Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
  - Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
  - Richmond, Virginia
  - San Antonio, Texas
  - San Diego, California
  - Seattle, Washington
  - Washington, D.C.
  - Wilmington, Delaware
-

- **Community policing strategies** in Houston, Texas; Madison, Wisconsin; and Seattle, Washington, are being assessed to determine the key organizational and implementational issues in effective community policing activities. (See Chapter 4 for additional information about these strategies.)
- **Innovative neighborhood-oriented community policing program** evaluations in eight urban areas are currently examining the process of implementation as well as the programs' impacts on drug and crime offenses and quality of life in the targeted neighborhoods. (See Chapter 4 for additional information about these programs.)
- **Promising efforts by citizens to reclaim their neighborhoods** and make them safe and secure are being studied, with special attention to strategies to promote and maintain effective forms of citizen involvement. (See Chapter 9 for additional information about this program.)
- **Anti-drug initiatives** in small cities and towns are being assessed to determine how they can be implemented most effectively in those settings. (See Chapter 9 for additional information about this program.)

In addition, NIJ's program, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), addresses issues that have important implications for each of the major components of Weed and Seed. CPTED focuses on the design and effective use of physical environments as a means for preventing and controlling crime and drug abuse. Under this initiative, NIJ is examining policies and procedures that incorporate CPTED principles to determine their value in addressing drugs and crime, and fear. The results will help Weed and Seed cities to take advantage of more effective design and use of buildings, streets, parking areas, and commercial facilities.

# Drug Enforcement

**N**o matter where they live—in urban, suburban, or rural settings—most Americans perceive that drugs and drug-related crimes are affecting their daily lives. Moreover, in many urban neighborhoods, ordinary law-abiding citizens now live in fear that they, or their families, will become the next victims of drug-war cross fire. Today Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are employing a range of new strategies that respond to both the fact and fear of drug-related crime problems.

## Conventional Approaches to Drug Enforcement

Until the mid-1980s, traditional narcotics enforcement focused on drug activity at the mid- and upper-levels of wholesale distribution—to the near exclusion of retail street sales. In local police agencies enforcement was the purview of specialized narcotics units staffed by undercover personnel whose job it was to make “buys” from mid- and upper-level dealers and then effect arrests. Surveillance, informants, and hand-to-hand buys were their most common tools.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the crack cocaine epidemic spurred local police agencies to respond more directly to street-level retail sales.

By the late 1980s, local police agencies had dramatically increased the number of annual drug-related arrests. In New York City, for example, arrests rose by 70 percent from 1985 to 1987 and doubled in the 2 years from 1986 to 1988.<sup>1</sup> Wholesale dealers from drug-selling organizations were, however, rarely arrested during this period, and arrested street-level sellers were rapidly replaced by others.

As the 1990s began it became clear that traditional law enforcement tactics were not effective in either ameliorating drug activity or reducing the concerns and fears of residents in drug-infested neighborhoods. At the same time, increasing pressure to solve drug problems prompted law enforcement agencies at all levels to seek alternative tactics.

Local police agencies responded by beefing up patrol resources. Uniformed patrol officers had always made more drug arrests than narcotics units<sup>2</sup>—often as a result of routine traffic stops.<sup>3</sup> Now, however, law enforcement agencies systematically shifted from a reliance on narcotics units to enforcement by line officers.

Changes in narcotics enforcement have now occurred at every level of law enforcement. At the local level, responses range from increased street enforcement against drug sellers to educational efforts such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE)—a program staffed by police officers and conducted in public school classrooms. State-level agencies have pioneered such new approaches as expanded use of drug courier profiling and consent searches in airports and train stations to increase drug trafficker interdiction. And at the Federal level, electronic investigations of financial institutions, tracking of large cash transactions, use of U.S. Marshals to seize leasehold rights to federally subsidized properties, and links with local and State police efforts have become increasingly sophisticated.

## ***INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...***

- ***Drug Market***  
*Analysis programs in  
Jersey City,  
Pittsburgh, Kansas  
City, San Diego, and  
Hartford*
- ***Detroit's crackdown  
on drug sellers***
- ***New York City's  
tactical narcotics  
teams***
- ***Asset forfeiture  
programs in Prince  
George's County,  
Colorado Springs,  
and Tucson***
- ***Multijurisdictional  
task forces***
- ***Emerging drug  
enforcement tactics***

*The National Institute of Justice expanded its search for what works in drug enforcement in 1989. Since that time, the Institute has developed and assessed a wide range of strategies . . . .*

Although many police departments have broadened their use of old tactics and developed new tactics tailored to their local problems, information on the scope and frequency of these tactics, the ways in which they are applied to drug problems, and their relative effectiveness is scant. Indeed, only a few modest evaluations of alternative local drug law enforcement strategies have been conducted, leaving police officials to rely on intuition and personal experience to guide policy and operational decisionmaking relative to enforcement strategies.

### **Developing and Assessing Enforcement Approaches**

The National Institute of Justice expanded its search for what works in drug enforcement in 1989. Since that time, the Institute has developed and assessed a wide range of strategies, including:

- **Drug Market Analysis**, which employs computer technology to pinpoint drug retailing hotspots, focus police resources on them, and assess the impact of various enforcement strategies;
- **Urban crackdowns**, which concentrate police resources on a particular place, for a period of time—weeks or months usually—to deter or disrupt illicit drug transactions;
- **Asset seizure and forfeiture programs**, which take advantage of recent changes in Federal law to reduce drug trafficking by seizing the material rewards of drug trafficking and diminishing the capacity of drug traffickers to engage in illegal practices;
- **Multijurisdictional task forces**, which are special enforcement units that use law enforcement personnel from a number of different jurisdictions to respond to the drug dealing in a particular area; and
- **Monitoring emerging drug enforcement tactics**, which is documenting the use of a variety of traditional and new drug enforcement tactics across the Nation.

These strategies draw on efforts to experiment with a wide range of technological, strategic resource allocation, legal, and organizational approaches. Studies of these and future efforts will help answer the following basic questions:

- What level of effort is appropriate for drug enforcement?
- Which drugs should receive the most attention?
- How should enforcement efforts be allocated against high-level distributors, retail dealers, and drug users?
- Should enforcement be concentrated in one neighborhood or spread throughout a city?

NIJ projects related to these issues are described below in greater detail.

### **Analyzing Drug Markets**

In 1989, the Institute developed a plan to integrate police operations, computer technology, and evaluation within a single program. Known as Drug Market Analysis (DMA), this program's primary objective is to find out what works to control street-level drug trafficking.

DMA provides location-specific information about street-level drug trafficking enforcement and associated crime. DMA puts up-to-date information about drug markets at the fingertips of police personnel at the moment it is needed. It also provides law enforcement with the ability to collect, share, and analyze pertinent data in real time and can be used to evaluate drug enforcement strategies.

During fall 1989, four sites were selected to begin DMA programs—a fifth site was added in 1990. To participate in the program, police departments at these sites had to develop:

- A computer information system that integrates different databases on a real-time basis;
- Mapping technology that locates drug markets throughout a city and eventually the metropolitan area that surrounds it;
- A user-friendly computer system for use by narcotics detectives and other police officers; and
- Specific drug enforcement strategies that could be implemented and evaluated.

To date, three of the selected sites—Jersey City, New Jersey; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Kansas City, Missouri—have developed workable, usable systems. The two other sites, San Diego, California, and Hartford, Connecticut, are still in the system setup phase, but are expected to have citywide mapping capabilities by mid-1992. Evaluations are being conducted by police agencies in the selected cities working with NIJ-sponsored researchers.

### **Using Microcomputers in Jersey City**

Designers of Jersey City's DMA program set out to develop a systematic, location-based information system that would help police identify drug markets and develop crime prevention and control programs to combat them. Now implemented, the program is available for use by all squad members and is providing significant new information on the scope and nature of Jersey City's drug problem. Most significant of those findings is that drug activity is highly clustered in a relatively small portion of the overall city landscape.

Jersey City's DMA analyzed data from a narcotics phone-in, a location-based community survey, arrest data, police investigation data, narcotics squad interviews, and intelligence information and identified 94 distinct drug markets. It then showed that those markets covered only 5.7 percent of the intersections and 3.8 percent of the streets in the city.

### **Micro Technology Makes a Difference**

A special feature of Jersey City's DMA program is the use of microcomputer technology. At the time of project implementation, the Jersey City Police Department was in the process of installing a new minicomputer. DMA program designers were, therefore, able to coordinate the installation and integration of the two systems. Jersey City's minicomputer now acts a server for the remote Drug Market Analysis Program (DMAP) microcomputer sites. DMAP data are stored directly in the mini system. A simple conversion program is activated whenever data are drawn into the DMAP environment.

DMAP system users can access information on three levels. At the first level searches can be conducted for discrete information either on specific persons or addresses. For example, narcotics officers may query the system for all arrests (and supplemental data) on a particular offender or for all arrests at a particular address. At the second level—with the system in map mode—users can query a particular address or street segment or a range of addresses, using any of the DMAP databases. This level allows users to focus on any level of aggregation from the city to a district to a few square blocks. On the suggestion of narcotics detectives, video images of addresses and the inside of building structures are also being added.

The third and final level of query allows users to access data about drug markets. Through this type of inquiry, users can identify markets both by market number (as assigned by the project) and by basic location—either using addresses or intersections for location identification. The data can then be printed using mapping technology or in a simple list format.

***Jersey City's DMA system identified 94 distinct drug markets . . . then showed that those markets covered only 5.7 percent of the intersections and 3.8 percent of the streets in the city.***



***Tougher police enforcement will be directed against open drug trafficking at targeted housing developments.***

## **Testing DMA Effectiveness in Pittsburgh**

In Pittsburgh the P-DMAP system plots police crime, arrest, and other data, providing police with the ability to retrieve and organize information on calls-for-service, criminal incidents, and arrest data by geographical location. P-DMAP also stores and uses data that were previously maintained in hardcopy form, including surveillance data, citizen silent complaint forms, nuisance bar complaint forms, crime lab reports, and the like.

P-DMAP is designed primarily to meet investigative information needs. Police produce investigative "pin maps"; produce statistical maps through color-shaded statistical areas; and create custom maps. Although still under development, P-DMAP has already generated numerous maps and computer reports for ongoing investigations.

### ***Testing the System***

To evaluate its capabilities, P-DMAP is being tested in two enforcement efforts that rely on the locational features of street-level drug trafficking activities. The first focuses on drug trafficking in and around licensed bars. The second targets drug trafficking in public housing communities. Both rely on interagency cooperation between police and other administrative agencies. In addition, the enforcement strategies include civil enforcement of license and lease provisions, and leveraging criminal justice resources with resources from other administrative agencies.

The system's ability to retrieve data within designated boundaries and around a target area will permit data analysis by location, including data on criminal incidents in the surrounding vicinity as well as those at individual target addresses. That locational data can then be used to identify target areas with serious drug trafficking problems, to monitor the impact of specially targeted tactics, and to assess their effectiveness in reducing or displacing drug trafficking activities.

In the case of bars, city police will work with other regulatory agencies responsible for liquor licensing and health, safety, and building code enforcement as part of a Nuisance Bar Task Force. Specific bars are being targeted for vigorous and coordinated enforcement by police and other regulatory agencies in an effort to reduce significantly illegal activities in the vicinity of a bar. Criminal incidence data on drug trafficking activities, including citizen complaints and crime reports, police incident reports, and arrest data, are being used to develop and support police recommendations to the State licensing agency against annual renewal of liquor licenses and applications for transfers of liquor licenses for problem bars and licensees. Between regular license reviews, the police surveillance and arrest data will also be used to seek a court injunction to close a problem bar under the State's Nuisance Bar provisions.

For the second strategy, a special police task force is being formed to work with the local public housing authority legal department and housing authority police to reduce drug trafficking in public housing. Tougher police enforcement will be directed against open drug trafficking at targeted housing developments. P-DMAP's geographical features will allow police to retrieve data on criminal incidents that either occur on housing authority property or involve public housing residents. That information will be shared with the housing authority legal department to initiate or provide supporting documentation for tenant eviction proceedings on grounds of tenant participation in drug trafficking or participation in other criminal activities.

As a part of this evaluation, P-DMAP will be augmented with an "Early Warning System" that will monitor data on 911 police and emergency medical service calls regarding drug overdoses, and arrest data in order to identify unusual changes in the temporal and locational patterns of these incidents. The system will compare current incidence rates

with recent data on the pattern of similar events to highlight differences in observed trends and deviations. Such differences will be flagged by warning messages and specially coded maps from the system.

### **DRAGNET Shows Results**

Although undercover officers are using buy-bust strategies successfully to close crack houses, a number of questions remain about the use of these strategies. For instance:

- With so many alleged crack houses to investigate and raid, how should police set priorities for enforcement actions?
- How useful is citizen information provided through drug hotlines?
- What happens to drug dealers once they are arrested, and how is it that some seem to be able to resume their business quickly?
- Most important, what is the immediate effect of raiding crack houses on the quality of life in the neighborhood?

The Data, Research, and Analysis for Geographic Narcotics Enforcement Targets (DRAGNET) program is a DMA project, created through collaboration between researchers in the Kansas City Police Department and NIJ, which is designed to answer these questions. DRAGNET has two primary objectives:

- To improve the quality of information available for setting priorities for street-level drug enforcement; and
- To test the effectiveness of both crack house raids and the prosecutions that result from them in improving the quality of life in the vicinity of each crack house.

The DRAGNET information system combines traditional and new data sources. Traditional data sources include calls-for-service, offense reports, and arrest reports. These are combined into one file on the DRAGNET system. New data sources are taken from a 24-hour drug-tip hotline and monthly interviews of expert patrol officers in inner-city patrol divisions (asking them to list all addresses at which they believe drug dealing to take place). These data are also entered into the DRAGNET system with as much detail as possible about each location: type of drugs, known weapons and fortification, and prior enforcement experience. Detailed information about every street block in the city, as well as each address on the block, allows DRAGNET to produce a weekly "shopping list" in priority rank order for every alleged crack house in the city. Using a weighted formula developed by the Kansas City Police Department, computers analyze each crack house in reference to the most recent 30-day history of the block where it is located: how many offense reports of violence, total calls-for-service, drug arrests, and citizen reports of drug dealing were registered for each block.

The central issues are how this information system can be useful for managing street-level enforcement, and whether the enforcement efforts can show measurable results. Preliminary findings suggest that:

- Information from citizen hotlines has greater utility as a measure of perceived drug dealing than as an operational enforcement tool;
- Police agencies pursuing an undercover buy-and-raid strategy against indoor drug dealing should concentrate on informants rather than hotlines as the major source of target selection;
- Informants alone will not identify the highest priority targets; and
- Making full use of recent calls-for-service data will help to guide informants and police to the places where enforcement may do the most good.

*Using a weighted formula developed by the Kansas City Police Department, computers analyze each crack house in reference to the most recent 30-day history of the block where it is located: how many offense reports of violence, total calls-for-service, drug arrests, and citizen reports of drug dealing were registered for each block.*

## San Diego DMA at Work

Upon receiving a citizen complaint of drug dealing at an apartment in his neighborhood, an Eastern District patrol sergeant checked the Drug Information Network database to determine if there was other information in the system or if an investigator was currently working that location. When he checked the address, he learned that a narcotics detective had received a complaint at the same location. The sergeant then directed one of his officers to contact the narcotics detective. By working together, the officers and detective were able to hit the location the same day, making arrests in a coordinated effort.

DRAGNET is currently being used to evaluate two drug enforcement strategies: drug raids and immediate arraignment of defendants (which offers a higher probability of retaining custody of the arrestees until the next stage of prosecution). Controlled experiments are being conducted on these two strategies, using DRAGNET data on calls-for-service to assess the before-after disorder associated with illicit drug activity in the targeted areas. The raid experiment will look at 30-day differences in drug-related calls-for-service, as well as broader categories of calls and offense reports dealing with violence, disorder, and property crime. In addition, the arraignment experiment will also look at the long-term impact of immediate arraignment on arrestees' criminal careers by tracking the frequency and prevalence of arrests for drug dealing and a variety of other offenses for 6 months before and after the arrest.

## Two Innovations from San Diego


The San Diego Police Department's DMA project has involved the creation of two new computer-based systems: the Drug Information Network (DIN) database, which integrates data from narcotics units, patrol officers, the community, and specialized units country-wide; and the Regional Urban Information System (RUIS)—or CRIME as it is commonly called—which employs DIN and other data to plot maps for a number of departmental applications. When fully operational, San Diego's DMA system will be the most advanced and comprehensive in the Nation. In addition to providing specific information on drug dealers and markets, the system is designed to:

- Serve as a safety tool to prevent various undercover units and patrol teams from investigating the same target, or unwittingly entering a site that is being investigated at the same time;
- Foster communications and information sharing between investigators, patrol officers, and various agencies to prevent duplications of police investigations and other activities;
- Assist in case management; and
- Provide a statistical database for narcotics-related information and serve as an information repository to enhance future investigations.

Because of the wide range of information in the system, narcotics detectives can use it to monitor locations and track individuals, while their managers and supervisors use it for case management and statistical information.

Through the Drug Information Network portion of San Diego's DMA program, police personnel can:

- Determine the dominant drugs in an area—e.g., crack, cocaine, heroin, PCP, LSD, other, or unknown.
- Locate a suspect, either by last name, first name, nickname, sex, race, or age.
- Pinpoint an address, using the street number, direction, name, street, building type, and apartment, and/or determine if other drug activities are occurring next door, across the street, or in different apartments within the same complex.
- Locate a suspect by telephone number—a search can be completed on a telephone number field that captures cellular numbers, beeper numbers, and regular telephone numbers.
- Obtain information on a specific element of a case—for example, a search for all cases where shotguns were recovered could be initiated by keying in the word "shotgun."
- Determine the status of an investigation, including how it was initiated—e.g., through a citizen complaint, problem-oriented policing, citizen request form, a city manager



A section of a San Diego Police Department Crime Analysis Unit DMA map showing narcotics arrests for December 1991. (Each ★ indicates a location where a narcotics arrest occurred.)

route slip, beat profile, or a confidential informant; whether it is open, closed, inactive, or informational; and how it was closed, e.g., unfounded, search warrant, buy-bust, knock and talk, parole search, reverse sting, suspects moved, or no activity within the past 90 days.

- Show activities in specific areas—a beat, sergeant's area, or division.
- Document department workload by unit, team, or officer.

CRIME uses crime and arrest data from San Diego's regional system and citizen complaints, problem-oriented policing projects, and narcotics investigation data from DIN to plot maps that depict the city's drug and crime problems. Calls-for-service data will be added in the near future.

A basic CRIME map shows crimes and arrests, by type—for specific areas. It plots arterials or streets, census tract, beat, council district, or division boundaries with or without their numbers, and selected crimes or arrests.

Within a file, crime and arrest data may be grouped by the California Bureau of Crime Statistics codes or by specific violation codes. Searches can be narrowed to look at crimes by occurrence time, point of entry, type of evidence, type of structure, target area, or day of week. DIN data may be retrieved by report date, status of the investigation, drug type, and unit/team.

### ***DMA and San Diego's Problem-Oriented Policing Program***

The San Diego Police Department has made a firm commitment to neighborhood policing through the use of problem-solving. (See Chapter 4 for a description of this program.) To date, 85 percent of San Diego's problem-oriented policing activities have been drug related. The information that DIN and CRIME provide is essential to this program.

For instance, the information that DIN tracks on citizen complaints and drug locations helps pinpoint potential problem-oriented policing projects for officers at the start of and during the project evaluation phase. CRIME provides maps during all phases of the project for scanning through assessment. These maps are used at community presentations and as part of drug abatement packages.

### **COMPASS to Support Drug Enforcement in Hartford**

Hartford, Connecticut, has named its DMA system Cartographic-Oriented Management Program for Abatement of Street Sales (COMPASS). Currently under development, the COMPASS system is being designed to support the police department's neighborhood-oriented strategy to deal with drug problems. This strategy identifies target neighborhoods, concentrates enforcement activities in those neighborhoods to "reclaim" them from drug dealers, and then works with neighborhood residents and other municipal agencies to maintain and enhance the gains made during the reclamation phase. The reclamation phase includes a variety of enforcement tactics: undercover intelligence gathering, high-visibility patrol, reverse stings, buy-busts, surveillance busts, and auto safety checks.

These activities are undertaken by the department's 18-officer Crime Suppression Unit, as well as by vice and narcotics detectives. During the followup maintenance phase a few Crime Suppression Unit officers—typically two—remain in the target area, while the Community Service Officer assigned to each neighborhood organizes community resources to prevent and reduce crime. The Community Service Officer has an office in the neighborhood and serves as a communications link between the residents of a neighborhood and the police department. The officer relies heavily on neighborhood groups to organize meetings, disseminate information to residents, and gather and report information to the police department.

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### **CRIME Map Uses**

*From daily investigations to operations, planning and citizen outreach programs, CRIME is used throughout the San Diego Police Department. It plots maps for:*

- *Patrol officers to display crime trends in their beats and for radius searches around a specific address.*
- *The homicide unit to conduct serial murder investigations.*
- *The sex crimes unit to show crime scenes in court.*
- *Managers to determine trends in their area and to help allocate manpower.*
- *Police officials to illustrate criminal activity changes and corresponding enforcement actions at community meetings.*
- *The narcotics unit to identify city divisions with the highest drug dealing activity, by drug type—sergeants can identify concentrations of activity, or drug markets, within the areas they are assigned and detectives can visualize drug activity in the vicinity of a target location.*
- *Narcotics supervisors to visualize the correlation between search warrant locations, citizen complaints, and patrol information—citizen complaints drive a substantial portion of their caseload.*

*In addition, maps that display land use with narcotics data allow for a quick visual assessment of the market type, and, by showing activity over a long time, illustrate displacement activity as it relates to drug enforcement actions. This ability permits ongoing operations planning and analysis of current strategies.*

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*A number of jurisdictions have supplemented their enforcement activities with an innovative approach that cracks down on drug distribution.*

*Crackdowns involve a concentrated application of police resources within a limited geographic area.*

COMPASS will map six types of events: drug arrests, tipline complaints, drug overdoses, calls-for-service related to guns, loitering, and vice. In addition, it will provide: multilayer maps of the different types of events and a referencing system to facilitate the search for additional detailed information on events at a given location. It will be user-friendly—officers will not need special training to use the system. Hartford's Crime Suppression Unit—the intended primary users of COMPASS—will employ the system to plan and evaluate enforcement operations. The Institute's grantee for the evaluation is the Hartford Police Department.

### ***An Early Result***

Although COMPASS is still in its preliminary testing phase, Hartford Police have already experimented with its neighborhood-oriented reclamation and maintenance strategy in a few neighborhoods. Preliminary results have provided useful information to the department. For example, early results suggest that the reclamation/maintenance strategy appears to be viable only where there are well-developed neighborhood organizations.

### **Crackdowns in Detroit**

A number of jurisdictions have supplemented their enforcement activities with an innovative approach that cracks down on drug distribution. Crackdowns involve a concentrated application of police resources within a limited geographic area. Interest in crackdowns stems from four potential benefits:

- First, the sudden increase in enforcement activity is thought to have an impact on the drug distribution patterns in targeted areas;
- Second, crackdowns may also affect drug-related crimes—such as robbery, burglary, and larceny—within the enforcement area;
- Third, the increased police presence may affect the community's perception of neighborhood safety and quality of life; and
- Finally, a crackdown that disperses a drug market and reduces or eliminates associated problems of neighborhood order—such as noise, traffic, and loitering—might promote informal social controls.

Earlier findings of evaluation research on crackdowns were mixed. For example, an assessment of a crackdown in Lynn, Massachusetts, indicated that as the volume of visible drug transactions decreased, it became more difficult to obtain drugs and street crime also decreased; however, a similar strategy in Lawrence, Massachusetts, did not replicate those results.

Operation Pressure Point, which was conducted on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, reduced the amount of street dealing, increased the demand for drug treatment, reduced street crime, and improved neighborhood quality of life, but a similar crackdown in Harlem was largely unsuccessful. The results of an evaluation of Operation Clean Sweep conducted in Washington, D.C. were also mixed.

Operation Clean Sweep was mounted in the context of the rising violence in the drug markets in the Nation's capital, violence that one team of investigators<sup>4</sup> attributed to these four factors:

- **Market Imbalance.** The number of drug suppliers has grown faster than demand, inducing fiercer struggles among sellers for available sites and selling opportunities;
- **Youthfulness of Traffickers.** Sellers have become much younger, and young people are less likely to consider the consequences of their own violence;

- **Police Effects.** Police intensify market imbalance by shutting down the most popular trafficking areas; and
- **Strangers in the Market.** Out-of-town sellers exacerbate violence largely because they are less likely to get caught.

By the late 1980s, drug trafficking had become flagrant in Washington; police had identified close to 100 open-air illegal drug markets in the city in 1988.

In Clean Sweep, conducted during 1987–88, 300 to 400 officers were fielded daily, almost half on a volunteer overtime basis. They arrested 43,000 sellers and buyers during the 2-year period. According to one researcher, who also studied 15 other crackdowns with similar results, Clean Sweep succeeded in creating “initial deterrence” by reducing crime in the area over a period of 3 to 6 months.<sup>5</sup>

## Evaluation Purposes

To shed new light on the value of crackdowns, in 1989, the Institute initiated two evaluation studies of this enforcement approach—one in Detroit, Michigan, and one in Brooklyn, New York. The Detroit crackdown evaluation, which was conducted with the assistance of the School of Criminal Justice of Michigan State University, was designed to determine:

- The degree to which crackdowns may affect drug distribution and crime patterns in a targeted neighborhood;
- Whether the intervention strategy increases dealers’ and users’ perceived risk of apprehension and results in an alteration of normal patterns of selling or consuming drugs;
- Whether the combination of users’ perceptions of increased risk and the additional precautions taken by dealers results in reductions in drug consumption and in the number of street crimes committed by users to secure funds to purchase drugs; and
- The means police used to implement and conduct crackdown activities, including the resources committed to the initiative, how narcotics officers carried out the enforcement technique, and the immediate results in terms of arrests and seizures.

To better understand the impact of these deterrence measures, the evaluation also examined offenders apprehended during the crackdowns to learn:

- Their criminal histories, including both drug and non-drug offenses; and
- Whether—and for what—they were prosecuted and convicted and any sanctions they received.

## Studying Crackdowns

For the purposes of this study, four areas of Detroit were selected as the crackdown targets. These areas were then paired on the basis of similarities in drug offense patterns and socioeconomic and neighborhood characteristics. For the first 6 months of the study two of the target areas—one in the east side of the city and one in the west—were subjected to the crackdowns, while the other two continued to receive normal enforcement activities. At the end of the 6 months, the control and treatment areas were switched. To determine the effectiveness of the crackdowns, five types of data were collected:

- Approximately 750 community households were interviewed by telephone before, at the 6-month mark (when the treatment and control areas were switched), and after the crackdowns;
- In-person interviews with informed community members were conducted at the same stages as the telephone interviews;

- Citizen calls to an anonymous drug hotline were collected to assess the influence of the crackdowns on reported drug activity;
- Police department crime data were collected for the target areas to examine the crackdown's impact on crime patterns; and
- Interviews were conducted with a limited sample of persons convicted of drug offenses.

### **Evaluation Findings**

Even before the first crackdown, evaluators were aware of residents' concerns about drug selling in their neighborhoods. In each of the crackdown target areas, drug selling was more frequently identified as a "big problem" by initial telephone survey respondents than other potential neighborhood problems such as prostitution, abandoned houses, and such. In fact, more than 50 percent of the respondents in two areas and 48 percent and 37 percent of respondents in the other areas stated that drug selling was a big problem.

### **The Ease of Drug Purchases**

Perceptions of drug-related problems within the selected target areas were supported by responses to several other survey questions. For instance, in three of the four target areas, better than 60 percent of those questioned said they knew of a crack house operating within a three-block area of their home during the preceding 6 months, and from 64 percent to 73 percent of the respondents in each target area indicated that it would be "very easy to buy drugs" in the area right around their home.

### ***Crackdown Actions***

There was a significant increase in the level of drug enforcement in the target areas during the initial 6-month crackdown period. In one area, 47 drug enforcement actions—warrant raids, buy-busts, and the like—had been conducted during the 6 months prior to the crackdown. During the crackdown, 101 actions occurred—a figure that represents nearly a 115 percent increase. In the other area, the number of actions increased from a pre-project level of 65 to 99 for the 6-month crackdown period—an increase of 52.3 percent. Both of these increases are particularly notable because they were achieved using existing—and limited—police resources.

### ***Citizen Awareness***

Even with the increased number of enforcement actions, most citizens in the target areas were not aware of the additional police activity. Data from telephone interviews conducted at the end of the first 6-month crackdown period show that only 12 to 14 percent of those interviewed thought that the police were conducting more frequent raids—a percentage that was only slightly higher than in the areas where enforcement levels had not changed. In the area that received the greatest increase in enforcement resources survey respondents who reported that there was a crack house within several blocks of their home fell from 61 percent to 47 percent; however, residents of one of the control areas reported an 11 percent decrease. These numbers indicate that although respondents in the target areas perceived that their neighborhood's drug problems were decreasing, so did the residents of areas not receiving enhanced enforcement.

There may be several explanations for the survey's failure to show the full impact of this project; for instance:

- The relative frequency of the number of raids may not have increased enough for citizens to perceive an increase in enforcement—i.e., although raids doubled in one area, there were still only approximately four raids per week in the 1.5-square-mile target area;

- Many community residents would likely be away from their homes at the times of the raids; and
- Raids might occur at sites not visible to the survey respondent.

For these and other reasons, citizen perceptions may not be very sensitive to variations in enforcement activities or drug activity. Thus, surveys may be appropriate indicators of citizens' perceptions of the drug market, but not of changes in the drug market itself.

### ***The Drug Dealers Crackdown Response***

Informal interviews with narcotics officers revealed the impacts on drug dealers. In the officers' views, drug dealers responded to the crackdowns by taking self-protective measures. Dealers became more reluctant to sell drugs to strangers, often refusing to sell if the prospective buyer—in this case a police informant or undercover officer—was not known or could not name someone known to the seller. In order to minimize losses from police raids, dealers reduced the quantity of drugs on hand, and, as a result, they frequently had no drugs for sale. Some dealers also adapted to the crackdowns by rotating both the days and their selling locations among different houses on a particular block. These measures diminished a dealer's vulnerability to arrest. They also diminished the availability of drugs because it became more difficult for would-be buyers to find willing sellers.

### ***Hotlines and Crime Data***

Analysis of hotline calls and crime data for the 23 police sectors that comprised the target areas showed a decrease in the number of hotline calls—as compared with the control areas—during the initial 6-month crackdown period. Incidences of breaking and entering, larceny, and grand larceny decreased in the crackdown areas, but there was no impact on robbery and a surprising increase in auto theft.

### ***Policy Implications***

The findings from this evaluation are promising. The evaluation has shown, for instance, that:

- Although daily competing demands make it quite difficult to maintain a crackdown of this type and duration within existing resources, it is possible to increase enforcement substantially over a limited time.
- Although increased enforcement may result, extended crackdowns are less likely to be visible to the community than intense, immediate enforcement increases.
- Crackdowns may have some limited impact on narcotics distribution patterns and the behavior of drug dealers.
- Other departments considering adoption of a crackdown strategy within their existing resources would be well-served to implement programs of shorter duration—several months or less—and of greater intensity.

### ***Tactical Narcotics Teams in Brooklyn, New York***

Street-level narcotics enforcement fell out of favor in the 1970s because it was perceived as relatively ineffective in reducing established drug markets. Concern about the negative impact drug markets were having on the quality of life in local areas renewed interest in this drug enforcement approach in the 1980s. With the assistance of the Vera Institute of Justice, NIJ recently evaluated the community-level effects of the New York City Police Department's Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT).

***Dealers became more reluctant to sell drugs to strangers, often refusing to sell if the prospective buyer—in this case a police informant or undercover officer—was not known or could not name someone known to the seller.***



## **Evaluation Purposes**

This project involved the evaluation of short-term (90-day), intensive, street-level narcotics enforcement in Brooklyn, New York. To conduct the program, a mobile force of plainclothes and undercover narcotics officers was assigned to areas where street-level drug trafficking was endemic. The program was designed to assess the extent to which TNT efforts would:

- Reduce disorderly conditions;
- Reduce the street crime that often springs up around drug marketplaces;
- Reduce fear of crime among community residents;
- Increase residents' use of community amenities—streets, parks, and such;
- Improve attitudes toward police;
- Help the community "regain control of the streets"; and
- Affect other crimes in the target area.

This evaluation is a first step in developing information about the nature of the TNT approach in experimental areas and exploring whether the implementation of TNT varies according to the characteristics of the target community. In addition, it provides a vehicle for exploring the perceptions about TNT of various groups in the community—precinct personnel, street-level users and dealers, ordinary residents, community leaders, and TNT staff—and examining the differences in the awareness of the intervention and the assessment of its effectiveness among these groups.

The evaluation focused on two TNT target areas, plus a comparison area designated as a future TNT site. All areas are located in the Brooklyn South patrol borough of New York City. Analysis of official data indicated substantial similarities among the study areas in terms of demographic composition, income levels, and drug and crime conditions. For instance:

- All three areas included active street-level crack markets;
- The three precincts within which the study areas were located were all characterized by a relatively high volume of crimes against persons, which is a marked contrast to other precincts in Brooklyn South; and
- Interviews with community residents pointed to higher levels of fear and dissatisfaction among study area residents, although the differences were relatively small.

During the initiative, TNT employed a rapid buy-and-bust strategy, drawing on Federal, State, and city agencies to provide the additional personnel needed to attack drug locations in target areas.

## **Evaluation Findings**

Evaluation results fall into four general categories: drug market effects; citizen awareness of TNT and attitudes toward the police; perceived effects on quality of life; and fear of crime and use of public amenities.

### ***Market Effects***

During the early days of TNT operations a substantial number of street traffickers were arrested. Arrested traffickers were, however, quickly replaced by new street-level dealers. In addition, street dealers adapted to the intensive enforcement activity during the enforcement period by:

- Moving selling locations indoors;
- Shifting selling hours to times when it was believed that TNT might not be operating;

- Moving out of the selling location after a sale;
- Using lookouts adept at spotting TNT vehicles; and
- Reducing the volume of outdoor sales for the duration of the intervention.

Both the police and the community generally agreed that TNT was most effective in reducing visible street markets in areas that were geographically separated from highly concentrated drug markets and in areas that catered to purchasers from outside the neighborhood. During the initiative, drug trafficking became less visible; however, a reduction in street drug trafficking in the comparison area was also noted. The reduction in the blatant visibility of some street drug markets was clearly not the result of large-scale geographic displacement either within or outside the TNT target area. While there were some small shifts in the location and hours of drug markets, including the intensification of activity in some areas, the primary displacement involved the movement of drug activity off the street to indoor locations in the same geographic areas.

The data also showed that over the course of the enforcement period, the “search time” for an undercover officer to find a dealer and buy drugs increased in both precincts. In addition, the data suggested that the increased difficulty of finding drugs among established users was associated with more erratic consumption patterns—an increase in drug “binges”—rather than a reduction in overall consumption.

Although the period of TNT enforcement was associated with a variety of changes in drug market operations and structure, traffickers, police, and community leaders believed that these market adaptations were temporary and that street-level drug trafficking would resume in full force once TNT was gone. Moreover, field observations suggest that in both precincts, drug trafficking continued to flourish throughout the enforcement period and that a substantial amount of street-level drug trafficking returned to some areas after the departure of TNT. In some areas, the location and intensity of trafficking seemed to change; however, even during the peak of enforcement, knowledgeable purchasers could locate drug sellers with little difficulty.

The evaluation found evidence that TNT enforcement drove dealers indoors. However, the proportion of the unit’s activities against indoor locations (approximately 20 percent of all arrests) remained relatively constant in both precincts. This suggests that crackdowns need to build in flexibility to shift tactics as drug sellers shift their operations.

### ***Awareness of TNT and Attitudes Toward the Police***

Although street-level drug traffickers and consumers quickly learned that TNT was in their neighborhoods, most community residents and community leaders did not. What’s more, most of the residents who knew of TNT’s presence knew little about the nature of the initiative.

Community residents were not concerned about police aggressiveness—e.g., police stopping the wrong people on the street—either before or after TNT. Residents who were critical of the level of policing in their community, including police enforcement of street-level narcotics conditions before TNT, remained so after. Nevertheless, community leaders who were aware of TNT supported the initiative as a symbolic response to their neighborhood’s drug problem, and even those who were skeptical about the long-term impact of the initiative appreciated the commitment of police resources to their community.

### ***Fear of Crime***

One of TNT’s primary goals was to help community residents “regain control of the streets.” Program designers hoped that if TNT reduced street-level drug trafficking and associated disorder, community residents would be less afraid to walk around their neighborhoods and use local parks. However, this expectation seems to have been

***Both the police and the community generally agreed that TNT was most effective in reducing visible street markets in areas that were geographically separated from highly concentrated drug markets and in areas that catered to purchasers from outside the neighborhood.***

***Twenty-seven jurisdictions that reported that they undertook seizure actions netted a total of about \$11 million—ranging from \$680 in the lowest jurisdiction to \$2.3 million in the highest.***

unrealistic given the extent of the effort. Residents reported that they remained afraid to walk in their neighborhoods or enjoy their parks. Residents also reported small improvements in perceived levels of physical deterioration, such as abandoned cars, and social disorder, e.g., loitering or drinking on the streets, at the program's end.

### **Use of Study Findings**

The New York City Police Department intends to use the findings from this research as it balances concerns about precinct staffing levels with community demands for narcotics intervention. Police managers should also learn much from the findings about the value of intensive but short-lived, street-level enforcement in urban settings where crack markets are widespread and where those markets shift periodically between indoor and outdoor locations.

### **Evaluating Asset Forfeiture Programs at Four Demonstration Sites**

Asset seizures and forfeitures are potentially important tools law enforcement can use to disrupt drug trafficking networks and reduce profits from these illegal activities. Yet State and local jurisdictions have made only limited use of these methods—largely because many criminal justice professionals are unfamiliar with this complex civil procedure, but also because of concerns raised regarding protection of innocent asset owners and third-party rights. Not surprisingly, few agencies have engaged in anything more complex than forfeitures of cars and cash.

In 1989, BJA supported a demonstration of asset forfeiture programs in the State's Attorney's Office, Prince George's County, Maryland; Metro Vice and Narcotics Investigations (VNI) task force, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Metropolitan Area Narcotics Trafficking Interdiction Squad (MANTIS) task force, Tucson, Arizona; and the Attorney's General Office in Arizona. During that same year, NIJ, with the assistance of the Jefferson Institute of Justice Studies, initiated an evaluation of those programs.

The purpose of the evaluation was to:

- Examine the status, use, and value of the programs;
- Describe the effectiveness of different types of programs and procedures;
- Identify program elements that are critical to successful implementation of the strategy; and
- Make recommendations for future directions to support asset forfeiture proceedings.

The evaluators identified resources available to State and local jurisdictions in conducting such programs—from Federal and State governments, national organizations, and the private sector—and published them in a *Directory of Resources*. In addition, researchers conducted both a state-of-the-art and needs assessment survey of 100 programs and on-site assessments of each of the four demonstration programs.

### **Evaluation Findings**

From the needs assessment survey to the evaluation of the individual demonstration sites, this study reports two major conclusions: Although the use of asset seizure techniques is limited, monetary results can be significant. For instance, of the 100 jurisdictions surveyed for the needs assessment phase of the evaluation, 63 did not seize the proceeds of illegal activities; 47 percent did not seize real property; and more than 90 percent reported that they did not seize proceeds or real property more than 20 percent of the time. Even with this low level of activity, forfeiture amounts were impressive. In 1990, for example, net

forfeitures for the 27 jurisdictions that reported that they undertook seizure actions amounted to a total of about \$11 million—ranging from \$680 in the lowest jurisdiction to \$2.3 million in the highest.

Analysis of the demonstration sites also proved that, given adequate seed money, training, and assistance, forfeiture programs can more than pay for themselves:

- In Prince George's County, for instance, the State's Attorney's Office, using its \$105,000 in start-up funds, was able to collect \$224,000 in forfeitures in the first year;
- In Colorado Springs, net forfeitures of \$615,000 were achieved with \$105,000 in seed money; and
- The MANTIS program in Tucson produced \$825,000 in net forfeitures with its \$125,000 in seed money.

There are three basic organizational models for asset forfeiture programs: one integrates the asset forfeiture activity within a division or bureau (most frequently narcotics and vice squads in law enforcement agencies); a second organizes the program as a separate unit within law enforcement agencies or prosecutors' offices; and the third places the program within a task force generally involving multiple agencies (police, prosecutors, and sheriffs), and/or multiple jurisdictions (Federal, State, or local). Of these, the task force model appears to be the most effective because it incorporates more functions under a single umbrella organization; however, the other models are feasible if substantial attention is paid to coordination and communications.

Elements critical to successful implementation of asset forfeiture programs include:

- The enabling legislation that defines the scope of seizures, adjudication procedures, and the distribution of proceeds;
- The organization of the courts with respect to civil and criminal proceedings, and, more important, the attitude of the court, prosecutor, and defense counsel with respect to the concept of civil forfeitures;
- The amount of training and attention law enforcement agencies pay to identifying assets that can be seized;
- The use of financial investigations;
- The relationship between the prosecutor, law enforcement, and civil attorneys (if used);
- The policy and procedures for adjudications and negotiated dispositions;
- Property maintenance and inventory control; and
- The administrative and management information support systems.

There is still a great deal to learn about asset seizure and forfeiture. Measuring its impact on drug trafficking networks and the level of drug dealing remains a challenging task. Reliable data on the membership and activities of illicit drug networks are difficult to obtain routinely, and tracing the effects of disruptions to those networks to the level of illicit drugs in the community is particularly difficult. One prospect for assessing the ultimate effects of asset seizure and forfeiture is to mount a massive effort in an area where the drug trafficking networks are relatively well defined by law enforcement intelligence.

### **Three Alternative Sanctions for Drug Offenses**

Most persons arrested for the purchase, manufacture, or distribution of drugs are arraigned, tried, and—if convicted—punished through some combination of fines, incarceration, probation, and/or community service. Increasingly, State and local criminal justice organizations are adding to their options for sanctioning drug offenses through such methods as:

*... given adequate seed money, training, and assistance, forfeiture programs can more than pay for themselves.*

- **Asset Seizure and Forfeiture.** This program strips drug traffickers of the fruits of their crimes and removes resources that their successors would need to continue their activities.
- **Revocation of Motor Vehicle Driver's Licenses.** This program is now mandated in some States even when the vehicle is not directly connected to the drug offense.
- **Application of Land Use Control Ordinances.** This approach is designed to preserve the quality of life in a community, including enforcement of zoning and nuisance abatement ordinances, this enables local officials to close businesses and housing complexes where drug trafficking takes place.

Asset seizure and forfeiture strategies were first directed against drug traffickers during the 1970s. At the time, most of these actions were initiated at the Federal level. When the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act extended and strengthened this powerful weapon, the Federal Government increased its asset seizure and forfeiture efforts—and the results have been impressive. In 1990 alone, Federal forfeitures totalled \$460 million.

Although asset forfeiture is one of the most promising legislative techniques for disrupting drug trafficking networks and reducing the profits from these illegal activities, its potential has barely been tapped by State and local jurisdictions. To encourage use of this technique, the Federal Government has provided support for training and technical assistance, and has distributed much of the funds obtained through Federal forfeitures to participating local law enforcement agencies for their asset forfeiture programs. Where the concept of asset forfeiture has been accepted by State and local law enforcement and prosecution agencies, it has been implemented through a variety of program forms.

Several States also now have statutes that call for the revocation of driving privileges for persons convicted of drug offenses, such as Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Oklahoma; however, individual State laws differ with regard to who is affected (some States apply the law only to younger drivers), the length of license revocation, and type of drug offense (possession versus sale) for which the revocation applies.

Nuisance abatement sanctions differ from other forms of drug enforcement in that they focus on places rather than persons—specifically those places where a large volume of drug transactions take place. The primary objective of nuisance abatement sanctions is to end drug transactions at specific sites.

An NIJ evaluation is examining the impact of the various approaches in several jurisdictions and will provide insights into the value of:

- Asset forfeiture—in terms of its effectiveness in reducing recidivism by both drug users and sellers;
- Driver's license revocations; and
- Nuisance abatement, including obstacles in implementing nuisance abatement procedures, and the sanction's long-term effectiveness in changing the character of a building so that drug offenses are discontinued.

The eight sites selected for evaluation were chosen on the basis of their programs and the expected level of cooperation from key agencies. A list of study sites and the program evaluated in each area is provided in the accompanying chart.

### ***Major Findings***

Although work on this evaluation is still in progress, data collection and analysis has now been completed for the four nuisance abatement sites and the Miami, Florida, asset forfeiture site. Preliminary findings are also available on driver's license revocation in

Middlesex and Hudson Counties in New Jersey. NIJ reports on these evaluations are forthcoming.

**Nuisance abatement in Miami Beach, Florida.** On October 1, 1987, Miami Beach's Ordinance No. 87-2578 established the Miami Beach Nuisance Abatement Board. This five-member board is chaired by a licensed attorney with trial experience and composed of persons who reside or maintain a business establishment in Miami Beach. It hears complaints and evidence regarding drug-related nuisances on premises located in Miami Beach, and has the authority to sue to enjoin any such nuisances, as well as the persons maintaining the premises and the owner or agent of the building or ground on which the nuisance is occurring. The board heard its first case in March 1988. From that time to the end of 1990, the board had conducted hearings on 24 different properties. The following case typifies the activities of the board.

During an 18-month period, the Miami Beach police received 120 call-for-service at the city's Lawn Court Apartments: 30 for suspicious persons, 34 for disturbances, 14 for injured persons, 5 for battery, 3 for burglary, 3 for drunks, 2 for robberies, 1 for shots fired, 1 for narcotics, and 27 for miscellaneous incidents. The police department made 29 arrests at the site, including 19 for drug-related activities. In addition, the police made seven controlled narcotics purchases while preparing their case for the Nuisance Abatement Board.

In July 1989, the board directed ordered the following changes in the operation of the building:

- The hiring of a new resident manager;
- Building renovations (so that the building would attract better quality tenants);
- No new leases for a 90-day period;
- Construction of a security gate around the property;
- The hiring of a security guard for a 90-day period;
- Conversion of an 8-unit "hotel" portion of the building into apartments; and
- Elimination of any narcotics activity.

In January 1991, the building was in the process of being gutted and restored.

By the close of 1991, the status of the 24 properties reviewed by the Nuisance Abatement Board was as follows: five were vacant, four were closed, eight had been restored but were again under investigation, eight had been restored and were operating with no further problems, two were under investigation, and one was in the process of making the operational and facilities changes dictated by the Board.

**Driver's license revocation in New Jersey.** In June 1988, New Jersey amended its Comprehensive Drug Reform Act to strengthen several sanctions for drug offense convictions. The most significant change in the law centered on the loss of driving privileges for 6 months to 2 years for anyone convicted of a drug offense. Suspension is mandatory; however, the courts determine the length of the license suspension. Moreover, driver's license suspension is always in addition to other sanctions imposed by the court. During 1989, 17,554 licenses were suspended under this mandate. The number had increased to 18,164 in 1990 and stood at 8,500 for 1991, by May of that year.

Hudson (Jersey City) and Middlesex Counties were selected as evaluation sites to gauge the effects in both an urban and suburban community. Evaluation data for these sites were collected on 690 adults whose licenses had been suspended between January and March

## Alternative Sanctions Evaluation Sites.

City	Asset Forfeiture	Driver's License Revocation	Nuisance Abatement
Denver, CO			✓
Hudson and Middlesex Counties, NJ		✓	
Miami, FL	✓		
Miami Beach, FL			✓
San Antonio, TX	✓		
Portland, OR			✓
San Diego, CA			✓

## Number of Seizures Per Year in Miami, Florida.

Property Type	1988*	1989	1990	Total
Vehicles	158	239	186	583
Currency	75	98	121	294
Vessels	4	16	6	26
Other (jewelry, tools, etc.)	N/A**	3	3	6
Real Property	N/A**	N/A**	4	4
Total	237	356	320	913

\* May-December only.  
 \*\*Not available or not applicable.

1990—457 from Hudson County and 223 from Middlesex County. The New Jersey Department of Motor Vehicles provided driving histories for these individuals, and the New Jersey State Police provided complete criminal history information.

The most startling finding from the driver history information was that 40.5 percent of the cohort did not have a driver's license at the time of arrest—thus, the license revocation sanction had no impact on these persons. Other findings were as follows:

- Of the 366 licensed drivers whose permits were revoked, 41 (11.2 percent) were rearrested for a drug offense within 6 months—a number that had grown by another 24 (6.6 percent) at the end of 12 months. A total of 75

persons (20.5 percent) had been rearrested within 16 months of revocation.

- The recidivism rate for drivers with no prior arrests was 12 percent, while the recidivism rate for drivers with prior arrests was 23.7 percent.
- Drivers with licenses had a 20.5 percent recidivism rate, while those without licenses had a 31.3 percent rate.
- Middlesex County had a recidivism rate of 13.2 percent, which was significantly lower than the 24.3 percent rate for Hudson County.

From these results evaluators have drawn two conclusions:

- First, the New Jersey law misses a significant portion of convicted persons simply because they are not licensed drivers, thus it is not the broad sanction that the legislature had anticipated; and
- Second, the sanction has the greatest impact on suburban and first-time offenders and may also influence future behavior.

**Asset forfeiture in Miami.** The Miami Police Department, along with most other law enforcement agencies in Florida, became involved in asset seizures in 1982, when the State passed its Contraband Forfeiture Act. The statute defines contraband, including controlled substances, and allows the seizure of any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft used to facilitate the transportation, concealment, possession, or sale of contraband. As originally enacted, the statute also included detailed procedures for seizing and using property; it was later amended to allow for the seizure of real property.

Although the police department started property seizures in 1982, it had no formal organizational entity dedicated to asset seizures until mid-1988. The Forfeiture Detail, which is organizationally located under the Business Management Section of the Administration Division, consists of a sergeant, investigator, crime analyst, and secretary. A police legal advisor also assists the unit in negotiating with owners for the return of their assets.

In Miami, data on 134 cases involving 197 individuals who had had some assets seized between 1987 and 1989 were collected. One of the aims of this study was to determine the rate of recidivism for persons who had their property seized. The data showed that 35 percent of those arrested were rearrested at least once on a drug charge within 18 to 42 months of their original arrest.

## Multijurisdictional Task Forces

As a part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988, Federal discretionary and formula grant funds were made available to State and local agencies that wished to expand drug enforcement efforts. The majority of those funds—about 65 percent—were used to create approximately 700 multijurisdictional cooperative drug control task forces that now operate throughout the country. These organizations have annual operating costs ranging from \$100,000 to more than \$1 million and employ a combination of more than 10,000 full- and part-time people.

Multijurisdictional drug control task forces differ from other task force models in that they cross geographic and political boundaries. In most instances, they comprise five or more State and local enforcement agencies, have significant prosecutorial participation, and work closely with a host of Federal enforcement agencies.

The primary goal of the multijurisdictional task force is the disruption of drug trafficking through the arrest, prosecution, and conviction of drug traffickers, dealers, and users. Other goals may include the confiscation of drugs, seizure of the property and assets of convicted drug offenders, and raising community awareness of drug-related issues.

Although most task force goals are essentially the same, significant differences exist in how individual organizations choose to address their goals. Some task forces deemphasize the drug user and focus on the retail level or penetration into drug distribution networks. Others focus on the drug user because they believe that the threat of public exposure will serve as a deterrent. Most task forces, however, take a multitargeted approach aimed at all levels of drug use and activity, paying extra attention to the more dangerous drugs and more serious drug offenses.

### Evaluating Task Forces

The fact that multijurisdictional task forces have been established and are operating in a number of jurisdictions around the country is well documented. The fact that these organizations have been responsible for a large number of arrests and significant seizures and forfeitures of property is also documented.

The Institute evaluator, the Criminal Justice Statistics Association, has completed an evaluation of multijurisdictional task forces that documented key factors involved in creating and maintaining successful task forces.

### Evaluation Findings

In the six task forces studied:

- Two employed experienced officers;
- Three involved a prosecutor;
- Five maintained a computerized intelligence database;
- Four were established with detailed or very detailed interagency agreements;
- Two were the sole beneficiary of asset forfeiture funds—four shared the proceeds with other departments, and one received significant funds from Federal asset forfeitures; and
- Five handled other (non-drug) offenses.

***Some task forces deemphasize the drug user and focus on the retail level or penetration into drug distribution networks. Others focus on the drug user because they believe that the threat of public exposure will serve as a deterrent.***



*... the crackdowns altered narcotics distribution patterns and the behavior of drug dealers. By changing the patterns of dealers and sellers, the availability of drugs was diminished.*

## Emerging Drug Enforcement Tactics

Each day, thousands of Federal, State, and local agencies are attempting to solve their community drug and drug-related problems with the tools that are available to them. Individual program evaluations are helping decisionmakers choose their tools, but the few in-depth studies that have now been completed are only scratching the surface in terms of innovative enforcement programs. To increase knowledge about innovative enforcement initiatives, the Institute initiated a survey of drug enforcement tactics in 1991 and a review of the literature.

A new NIJ study by the Police Executive Research Forum, "Emerging Drug Enforcement Tactics," beginning in 1992 will provide extensive new information on current drug control efforts—highlighting those that show promise. The assessment will look at:

- What tactics are currently being used?
- How do innovative tactics differ from traditional tactics?
- What are the important elements of an innovative tactic?

### Research Design

The evaluation will be completed in four steps:

- A literature review and discussions with professionals in the field;
- A survey to identify what drug enforcement tactics are used, determine variations or new applications of those tactics, and search for previously unidentified tactics;
- Development of mini-case studies that document and describe innovative tactics in use in up to 50 local and State police agencies across the country; and
- Preparation of a comprehensive report that integrates findings from the literature review with survey results.

The study will produce:

- A framework of drug enforcement tactics as a guide for strategy development;
- A summary of current drug enforcement tactics—focusing on those that are innovative and promising;
- Information that is both relevant for policy, operational, and tactical decisionmaking and implementation guidance and user-friendly for police and practitioners; and
- An identification of trends in enforcement that can be used to influence the Nation's research agenda for drug enforcement.

### Policy Implications

This assessment will provide State and local governments with new information on the relative merits of various drug enforcement techniques. Decisionmakers can use that information to select specific enforcement tactics to address their jurisdiction's drug problems.

In addition, by determining the scope and kind of drug enforcement tactics currently in use and by developing relative indicators of variations in effectiveness, the evaluation will provide useful guidance for further research and information for policymaking at every level of government.

## Drug Enforcement Findings

The findings from these drug enforcement evaluations have mixed results and offer considerations for future law enforcement efforts.

Evaluations of crackdowns in Detroit and New York found that concentrating police resources within a limited geographic area had positive outcomes. In Detroit, for example, the crackdowns altered narcotics distribution patterns and the behavior of drug dealers. By changing the patterns of dealers and sellers, the availability of drugs was diminished. Also, the crackdowns led to a decrease in the number of hotline calls to police and a reduction in breaking and entering, larceny, and grand larceny. In New York City, street drug trafficking became less visible and blatant as a result of the enforcement activities of the TNT.

Police departments in both these cities were effective in implementing their enforcement strategies. In particular, it appears that the optimum duration of a crackdown is about 2 to 3 months. In both cities, however, the impact on the quality of life of residents did not change. This finding underscores that drug enforcement alone cannot eradicate drug trafficking, and broader efforts are necessary.

Asset forfeiture programs and multijurisdictional task forces are also useful in combatting drug trafficking. Asset forfeiture programs can more than pay for themselves if seed money, training, and assistance are available to law enforcement agencies.

Multijurisdictional task forces have been responsible for a large number of arrests, seizures, and forfeitures resulting in a limited disruption of drug trafficking activity.

Overall, these findings provide law enforcement with promising signs. Future Institute projects will focus on ways to build on the potential of these strategies, as well as continue to search for innovative ways to address the challenge of combatting drug trafficking. The Institute will continue to learn what enforcement strategies offer the best prospects for dealing effectively with illicit drug dealing.

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## End Notes

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**I**n drug-infested neighborhoods, residents often know those who use drugs, where they buy, and from whom they buy. Residents may not know names, but they witness drug transactions and see people come and go from crack houses, and they see drug-related violence. Community- and problem-oriented policing strategies tap into this essential source of information by building community-police partnerships. These strategies recognize today's realities:

- The police need assistance from community members to pinpoint locations where drugs are produced and sold, to report criminal activities and identify perpetrators, and to testify in court against individuals they witnessed engaged in criminal acts.
- The community needs police to remove drugs and those who produce, distribute, and sell them from their neighborhoods.

Evidence from National Institute of Justice research in a number of cities— Baltimore, Maryland; Flint, Michigan; Houston, Texas; and Newark, New Jersey—has shown that closer ties between police and the citizens of the community, especially in the form of door-to-door contact and foot patrols, raise citizen satisfaction with police services and quality of life, while lowering the fear of crime. In its ongoing evaluations of community-oriented policing programs, the Institute is now also attempting to answer three basic questions:

- What kinds of roles should citizens and community organizations play in combatting drug problems in their neighborhoods?
- How can police-community relationships best be built?
- How can citizens and community organizations be mobilized to provide maximum support for police drug enforcement strategies?

Current Institute evaluations of programs in San Diego, California; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Baltimore, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama; Oakland, California; Brooklyn, New York; and other communities are intended to shed light on these and other related issues.

## **Problem-Oriented Policing in San Diego and Tulsa**

Police work often calls for immediate reactions to criminal incidents. Research is increasingly showing, however, that this type of "incident-driven" policing does not have a substantial impact on many of the problems that citizens want police to solve. Problem-oriented policing methods are gaining substantial favor as an alternative.


Problem-oriented policing is the result of 20 years of research into police operations. Rather than approaching calls for help or service as separate, individual events to be processed by traditional methods, problem-oriented policing is based on three concepts:

- Increase police effectiveness by attacking underlying problems that give rise to incidents that consume patrol and detective time;

## **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...**

- *Problem-oriented policing in San Diego and Tulsa*
- *Baltimore's CODE community-oriented policing program*
- *Drug enforcement in Birmingham and Oakland*
- *A model precinct program in New York City*
- *Innovative neighborhood-oriented policing in urban and rural settings*

## The Problem-Oriented Policing Problem-Solving Process.



- Rely on the expertise and creativity of line officers to study problems carefully and develop innovative solutions; and
- Work closely with the public to make sure that the police are addressing their needs.

The National Institute of Justice tested the effectiveness of this approach in Newport News, Virginia, several years ago. The program involved a four-phased strategy:

- **The Problem-Identification Phase.** Instead of relying on broad, law-related concepts—robbery and burglary, for example—officers are encouraged to group individual related incidents that come to their attention as “problems” and then define those problems in more precise and, therefore, more useful terms. For instance, an incident that typically would be classified simply as a “robbery” might be seen as part of a pattern of prostitution-related robberies in center-city hotels.
- **The Analysis Phase.** Officers working on a well-defined “problem” collect information from a variety of public and private sources—not just from police data. Collected data are then used to illuminate the underlying nature of the problem, suggest its causes, and point to a variety of options for its resolution.
- **The Response Phase.** Officers work with citizens, businesses, and public and private agencies to tailor a program to address the problem. Solutions may go beyond traditional criminal justice system remedies to include other community agencies or organizations.
- **The Assessment Phase.** Officers evaluate the impact of their efforts to see if the targeted problems were actually solved or alleviated.

Building on the research, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in late 1988 funded five urban drug programs with problem-oriented policing components. The Institute selected two of those sites—Tulsa and San Diego—for evaluation, by the Institute for Social Analysis, of problem-oriented policing. Police department managers at both cities intended to instill a community-oriented philosophy throughout their departments, and they viewed problem-oriented policing as an operational style that would put that philosophy into practice.

How effective are problem-solving approaches to drug dealing and other crimes? This evaluation will help answer that question by describing officers’ actions on the street as they use a problem-oriented framework. It will also analyze organizational factors that influence the implementation, shape, and character of problem-oriented approaches to controlling drugs and other crime. Other evaluation questions include:

- What are the characteristics of police problem-solving efforts as applied against drugs, other crimes, and neighborhood problems?
- How do organizational factors—management and supervisory roles and reward structures, for instance—influence the police’s use of problem-solving approaches?
- To what extent has the philosophy of community- and problem-oriented policing been accepted by top management and rank and file?
- What is the nature of the relationship between citizens and police?
- What are the effects of the responses crafted by the officers?

## The Research Program

There are five substantive areas of inquiry in this evaluation:

- Project implementation—which is being examined through focused interviews with key personnel, and review of the files of the Police Executive Research Forum (the evaluator), and police departments.

- Problem-oriented efforts by police officers—which are being measured through department case files, calls-for-service data, and reported crime reports.
- The continuing use of problem-oriented policing as a means for carrying out police work—which is being examined through observations of police activity.
- The nature of current problem-oriented policing activities—which is being documented by interviews with officers and supervisors as they work on cases, through surveys of residents and businesses, calls-for-service, and other measures.
- The attitudes and roles of police personnel—which are being determined through surveys of management and line personnel.

## **Preliminary Findings**

Although the evaluation is still in progress, preliminary findings provide some useful lessons. Results to date are reported below.

### ***Implementation***

Except for in-service and recruit training in problem-oriented policing, the management of each department implemented the program differently.

San Diego implemented problem-oriented policing at the patrol officer level, with minimal direction from supervisors and command-level staff. Officers were encouraged to identify problems on their beats, then craft and implement a response with guidance from supervisors—using department resources. The nature and structure of problem-oriented policing in San Diego was, therefore, largely defined by officers' practices in the field. As one administrator commented, the officers established problem-oriented policing, and management has had to race to keep up with what the officers are accomplishing.

Tulsa launched its program at five public housing complexes in one patrol division, with centralized control by division commanders. Officers in the target areas were assigned different tasks: some walked beats and became involved with citizen groups, others interviewed residents and housing authority managers, and still others performed directed patrols. As the program developed and officers not assigned to the target areas became aware of the new direction, they too began employing problem-oriented policing approaches to some of their routine patrol work.

### ***Ensuring Continuing Use of the Approach***

One of the primary objectives at both sites was to have the problem-oriented approach diffuse through the organizations and become a standard operating procedure for officers on the beat. In San Diego, problem-oriented policing is now an established police program. San Diego problem-oriented policing statistics tell the story: In 1989, 50 problem-oriented policing cases were formally opened by 21 patrol officers; by November 1991, department log sheets listed 474 active problem-oriented policing cases being handled by 378 officers across six patrol divisions.

In Tulsa, however, development had lagged to the point where little or no formal problem-oriented activity was maintained at the patrol level—even though the program seemed promising when first implemented. According to officers, program momentum was lost because of initial skepticism about program management approaches, and the impact of organizational changes.

### ***Use of Problem-Solving Methods***

How closely did officers in San Diego and Tulsa adhere to the four-step process for problem resolution?

- Officers in both departments relied almost exclusively on repeat calls to identify and define problems;
- Problems were most often categorized according to the legal categories used to classify calls-for-service.
- In practice, the scanning and analysis portions of procedures were indistinguishable—the initial scanning used to identify a problem (e.g., repeat calls of disorderly juveniles) generally served as the analysis of the problem's scope.
- Neither department formally assessed the effects that their problem-solving efforts were having on either the target area or the problem being addressed.

### ***Impact***

To date, data is only available on the impact of problem-oriented policing in the five Tulsa housing complexes. These data show that three housing complexes experienced reductions in reported incidents, but that reports of violence remained the same for one. Problems with violent crime increased dramatically at one housing complex—countering the trends in the other target areas. In terms of reports trends, that data also show that the reported incidents of violence in the entire patrol division in which the target areas were located increased, which is an indication that Tulsa's problem-oriented policing efforts were able to offset the general trend.

### ***Policy Implications***

When completed, the evaluation will specify the nature of police problem-solving practices and assess its effectiveness in addressing drug problems, thereby broadening knowledge about the effectiveness of police strategies to combat drug problems. Managers in the two cities can use the findings as feedback on their efforts, and police managers in other cities can use the information to develop and guide their efforts to refine or implement community- and problem-oriented policing in their departments. In addition, line personnel can use the results to evaluate their current problem-solving efforts, and refine future attempts to control drugs, crime, and other problems that contribute to the crime problem and detract from the quality of neighborhood life.

## **Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement in Baltimore County**

Baltimore County's Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement Program (CODE) was designed—through cooperative efforts with the city's vice/narcotics detectives and precinct-level officers—in response to citizen complaints about street-level narcotics distributors. The program was two-phased. In phase I, traditional drug enforcement tactics resulted in large-scale arrests and search warrant raids. In phase II, community-oriented policing methods—such as community surveys, community organization, and cooperative efforts with rental management—were employed to correct conditions thought to contribute to drug problems. During the first phase of the program, seven neighborhoods were targeted for CODE intervention. The Institute selected four of these locations for researchers at the University of Baltimore to evaluate:

- The development of community-oriented tactics and target sites, and the implementation and maintenance strategies;
- Possible impact on community residents, in terms of their perceptions of program effects on drug sales, their fear of crime, and their satisfaction with the police; and
- The impact of CODE on burglaries and robberies.

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### ***San Diego's Combined Strategies for Problem-Oriented Policing***

*There was a greater tendency among San Diego officers than among Tulsa police to use multifaceted strategies in their response to problems. San Diego officers were likely to combine their enforcement tactics with other measures. In cases involving a crack house, for example, San Diego officers increased their field enforcement activities, but also called on child welfare workers (two children lived in the house), the city's animal control office (there was evidence of a neglected dog living on the property), and the city attorney's office to initiate nuisance abatement procedures.*

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## The Evaluation Process

CODE was evaluated through structured interviews with the individuals who initiated CODE projects, observation of implementation meetings and community maintenance activities, and ride-along observations during the implementation of narcotics enforcement tactics—including the large-scale arrest and search warrant raids.

To measure the effects of CODE on citizen perceptions, surveys of adult residents were conducted in each of the four target areas. To prevent information leaks about the upcoming police raid, only a post-raid survey was conducted. For the survey, a sample of approximately 100 households from each target area was selected. Of those interviewed, 277 usable surveys were completed. The surveys were designed to measure citizen perceptions of the ease of drug sales, fears associated with drug crime, victimization, and satisfaction with the police. Respondents were asked to rank their perceptions in these areas before CODE, after CODE, and, where appropriate, what they felt their perceptions would be 3 months from the time of the interview.

To assess the effects of CODE on crime, analysis focused on burglaries and robberies in each of the target areas as compared with the remainder of the precinct as a whole. The Baltimore County Police Department Crime Analysis Section provided data on all reported burglaries (and attempts) and robberies (and attempts) for the target area and surrounding precincts for the 3 months prior to the raids, the month of the raids, and the 3 months following the raids. Changes in these crimes were then compared before and after implementation of CODE.

## Preliminary Findings

Phase I of the evaluation, which focused on program development and implementation—began early in 1990 and was completed in 1991. Phase II—which focuses on the continued development and implementation of CODE, including an examination of how the community-oriented component changed during the second year of implementation, factors that are important in developing similar projects, problems in program implementation, and overall program findings—began in mid-1991 and will be completed in late 1992. Preliminary evaluation findings focus on three topics: the implementation process, citizen perceptions, and effects on burglaries and robberies.

## The Implementation Process

The tactics developed and used during the investigative and enforcement phases of CODE were similar in all target areas and generally reflected the officers' previous training and experience. These tactics can be characterized as traditional in the sense that they reflected regular narcotics enforcement techniques such as surveillance and controlled buys. The ease of deployment of these tactics varied from target to target because stranger-to-stranger transactions were very easy in some areas, but much more difficult in others.

During the community-oriented, or maintenance phases of CODE, the tactics developed and implemented varied from one target area to the other. In one target area, for instance, there was a sustained and comprehensive effort to organize and involve the community in solving problems thought to contribute to drug sales. In another, however, little work was done with the community once the police had completed their residents' survey. The difference in the tactics employed during this phase appeared to be a result of precinct command staff's experience and personal philosophy concerning community policing.

The nature of the communities themselves also contributed to variations in the project's community-oriented policing. For example, the area receiving the least followup and maintenance support had a very transient population. Police placed less emphasis on community organization and problem-solving in that area because they believed it would be more difficult to implement than in communities with more stable populations.

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## Community-Oriented Drug Enforcement

*The idea of implementing a community-oriented approach to drug enforcement received substantial support among all levels of the police department. Police personnel found CODE attractive:*

- *Because of the nature of recurrent drug problems in certain neighborhoods;*
  - *Because it offered the opportunity to try something new and promising; and*
  - *Because it allowed for decentralization of narcotics enforcement, which, in turn, enabled police to tailor enforcement strategies to the specific neighborhoods and permitted vice and narcotics detectives and local level officers to work together as a team.*
-



## Citizen Perceptions of the Ease of Buying Drugs in their Neighborhood.

	In an Apartment	On the Street
3 Months Prior to CODE	66.0%	70.0%
Immediately After CODE	16.6%	14.9%
In The Following 3 Months	19.5%	17.3%

*Preliminary findings from this evaluation indicate that community-oriented drug enforcement can be successfully implemented in medium- to large-sized local police agencies. Baltimore was successful in implementing a decentralized cooperative drug enforcement effort that teamed vice and narcotics detectives and precinct-level officers.*

## Effects of CODE on Citizen Perceptions

As shown in the table on the left, surveys of citizens showed dramatic changes in their perceptions of the ease with which illegal drugs could be purchased within 3 months after CODE as compared with the 3 months prior to CODE.

Statistics on the changes in citizen fears associated with drug sales in their neighborhoods were also significant. More than 62 percent of the respondents reported that before CODE they felt very or somewhat afraid of being alone outside at night. Directly after the project began, and for the next 3 months, fewer than 50 percent of the survey respondents reported being very or somewhat afraid. People were less worried about family members being recruited to use or sell drugs. And, respondents reported that they felt less worried about being bothered or harassed by drug dealers immediately following CODE and during the next 3 months.

Significant improvements in citizen satisfaction with the police were also reported. Overall, respondents rated their general satisfaction with the police and the performance of the police in solving problems in their neighborhoods significantly higher following the implementation of CODE as compared to before. Citizens also perceived that the police performance related to drug enforcement and crime prevention was significantly better after implementation of CODE.

## Effect of CODE on Burglaries and Robberies

There was a substantial difference in the percentage changes in burglaries for the 3 months prior to the CODE raid-month and the 3 months following the raids. In the target areas, burglaries rose by 56.4 percent overall during the period following the raids—the time when community-oriented policing strategies were being implemented. However, in the surrounding precincts burglaries rose by only 4.9 percent.

It is important to note, however, that the actual number of burglaries in each of the target areas was quite small. For example, in one area burglaries rose from only 4 prior to CODE to 11 afterward. Nonetheless, across all four areas the total number of burglaries rose from 39 before CODE to 61 after.

Similarly, robberies rose by 75 percent overall in the CODE target areas, but by only 34.6 percent in the surrounding precincts. This rise was primarily accounted for by a large increase in one of the target areas. The total number of robberies in the target areas is even smaller than those for burglaries. Only 8 robberies were reported across all target areas prior to CODE as compared with 14 after.

Differences in crime levels before and after CODE may simply be the result of random fluctuations, or may indicate that:

- The program has had an impact on crime; or
- Citizens may be reporting crimes to the police more often because during the community-oriented phase of the project, the police asked for residents' assistance in the targeted neighborhoods.

The reasons for the changes—particularly in burglaries—will be explored during the second phase of the evaluation.

## Policy Implications

Preliminary findings from this evaluation indicate that community-oriented drug enforcement can be successfully implemented in medium- to large-sized local police agencies. Baltimore was successful in implementing a decentralized cooperative drug enforcement

effort that teamed vice/narcotics detectives and precinct-level officers. Policymakers considering implementing such an approach should recognize, however, that two major factors appear to influence narcotics enforcement and followup community policing under such a decentralized approach:

- The nature of targeted communities, including racial demographics and population transience, appears very important in determining enforcement tactics and in facilitating or inhibiting community problem-solving by the police.
- The experience and philosophy of local precinct-level command staff regarding community policing appeared to influence the extent and types of programs implemented following traditional enforcement.

Policymakers should also realize that this type of program is likely to have positive effects in terms of community residents' perceptions of the ease of drug sales, fears associated with drug trafficking, and satisfaction with police performance, but that the effects on crime, drug markets, or substance abuse are not yet clear.

## **Birmingham and Oakland Drug Enforcement Teams**

Oakland and Birmingham also recently served as testing grounds for several police models designed to address the problems of street-level drug trafficking. When the police departments in those cities decided to employ community policing, their intent was to use a few specific techniques, not to implement a philosophical change in their departments. Both departments did, however, adopt a policy of directed police-to-citizen contacts because of reported success of this practice in earlier NIJ efforts to reduce fear of crime in Houston, Texas, and Newark, New Jersey.

The purposes of these police-to-citizen contacts were to:

- Inform residents that the department intended to intensify patrols in drug trafficking areas;
- Alert residents to the signs of drug trafficking; and
- Warn residents not to intervene personally if they observed drug dealing.

## **Program Findings**

The following lessons emerged from the Oakland and Birmingham evaluations, conducted for the Institute by the Police Foundation:

### **Oakland**

- Notable declines took place in reported crimes of violence in the beats where police met residents by going door-to-door through the neighborhood—either alone or with the special enforcement unit.
- In the areas where both approaches took place, burglaries increased about 5 percent—which was still less than the citywide increase of about 11 percent.
- In the beats that received the door-to-door component only, violent crimes declined, but the number of burglaries did not appear to be affected.
- The special drug enforcement unit helped reduce violent crimes and burglaries, but not robberies.
- The coordinated work of the special enforcement officers and officers who conducted the citizen interviews produced good results. The presence of extra officers, whether carrying a clipboard, stopping and questioning individuals, or making surprise busts, appeared to have led to a decrease in reported crime.

- Perceptions that drug trafficking was a problem declined. On the beats that received special enforcement only and in the areas that experienced both the special enforcement and the door-to-door interviews, residents perceived that police presence lessened the drug problem. In the areas where the door-to-door interviews took place, residents were more satisfied with the way police handled neighborhood problems. Residents in all three treatment areas said they felt safer than before.

#### **Birmingham**

- Narcotics detectives achieved success in terms of drug arrests, positive media coverage of their activities, and a possible reduction in property crime as well.
- In the neighborhood where a police substation was established, residents reported that they were more satisfied with the way police handled neighborhood problems, worked with residents and victims, and kept order in the neighborhood.
- In the area with the door-to-door interviews, there was a decline in reported homicides, rape, assault, and robbery.
- Residents who participated in the door-to-door interviews thought that police were more responsive to community concerns and that police were spending more time in their neighborhood.
- Residents in the three areas did not change their perceptions of drug trafficking as a problem.

### **A Model Precinct Program in New York City**

When the New York City Police Department (NYPD) committed to citywide implementation of community-oriented policing, it decided to first pilot the approach in a model precinct. The lessons learned from that pilot test will prove valuable not only to the NYPD, but to the others in the policing world. The Institute's evaluation, which is being conducted with the assistance of the Police Foundation, is intended to document those lessons.

#### **Program Now in Progress**

NYPD began to implement its model precinct program in 1991. The Institute's evaluation of the program is scheduled for completion late in 1992.

#### ***Evaluation Purposes***

The Institute's documentation and evaluation of the NYPD model precinct program will begin to provide answers to a number of key questions concerning the implementation of community policing, for instance:

- How should police change their selection criteria to select recruits that are suited to community policing?
- What changes must be made in police training?
- Must police alter their system of evaluating performance to account for the new community-oriented police role?
- Must they change their promotional system as well?
- How should the police alter their systems of supervision to allow officers the discretion to do what is necessary in their communities while remaining responsible to departmental expectations?
- How can police departments make time available for community-oriented policing while still responding to calls?
- What changes does this require in the communications and dispatch systems?
- How should police educate the public about the new style?

## The "Model Precinct" Plan

The 72nd Precinct of Brooklyn was selected as the model, and a project development team was created to design and implement the project. The team determined the following would be needed if the project was to be accomplished:

- A precinct organizational structure that facilitates the transition from traditional to community-oriented policing;
- An operational system that promotes, encourages, and facilitates the practice of community-oriented, problem-solving policing by all members of the precinct;
- Information systems that support community-oriented, problem-solving policing;
- A system to facilitate sharing of the 911 workload between personnel assigned to emergency response units and neighborhood sector beats;
- A comprehensive community policing model developed in conjunction with other department units; and
- A training program for all precinct personnel on community-oriented and problem-solving policing concepts and practices.

## Research Design

The Institute's evaluation will be based on intensive documentation and assessment of the program. Data for the evaluation are being gathered from interviews with officials involved in planning and implementing the program; reviews of planning and operations memoranda, correspondence, personnel rosters, beat books, and other materials pertinent to the program; periodic interviews with police supervisors and officers; observations of planning and operations meetings and police personnel as they perform their daily duties; and collection of data on calls-for-service, cross-sector dispatching, recorded crime, arrests, clearance rates, and other official records.

## Program Organization

To implement the program, an organizational structure was adopted to place precinct personnel into one of three functional units:

- **An Administrative Unit**, which consisted of officers assigned to the staff positions operating under the direct supervision of the precinct commander or operations coordinator;
- **A Public Safety Unit**, which consisted of personnel assigned to motorized emergency response units and other public safety assignments (Officers assigned to this function performed duties in accordance with the authorized duty chart for the three platoons, and were supervised by sergeants assigned to the platoons and the platoon commanders.); and
- **A Neighborhood Sector Patrol**, which consisted of personnel assigned to the Special Operations Unit and supervised by sergeants assigned to the unit under the direction of the special operations lieutenant.

Despite the functional distribution of personnel, the model precinct operates on the presumption that all personnel will engage in the full range of community-oriented, problem-solving policing activities.

The project development team defined 16 neighborhood sectors (beats) to which members of the Special Operations Unit would be assigned. To the extent possible, beat boundaries were made coterminous with the boundaries of the sectors to which emergency units were assigned. Personnel from the unit were then assigned to the various beat areas on the basis of need.

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## Developing Information Systems

*Project staff introduced a number of systems designed to provide precinct personnel with information to help identify community problems and evaluate strategic responses to them. These systems include:*

- **Precinct Hot Sheets**—Daily sheets that contain information about calls-for-service, crime complaints, and warrants.
  - **Calls-for-Service Analysis: "Hot Spot" Identification**—Identification of locations generating large numbers of radio runs so that precinct personnel can be assigned to attempt to identify and resolve the underlying problems causing the calls.
  - **On-line Complaint Preparation**—A system that allows personnel to enter complaint data into the headquarters computer through remote precinct terminals and also provides the ability to download complaint data for crime analysis purposes, including the preparation of computer-generated crime spot maps.
  - **Administrative Support Systems**—Automation of administrative clerical functions such as preparation of the administrative and daily roll calls for the Special Operations Unit.
  - **Support for the Warrant Function**—The automation of many clerical operations associated with the warrant execution function. As warrants are received at the precinct, they are entered into a computerized warrant database used to assist Special Operations Unit officers in serving warrants.
  - **Mapping Calls-for-Service**—Computer software that produces localized maps of locations for calls for police service.
-

## **Share the Calls-for-Service Workload**

Full integration of the activities of the neighborhood sector and emergency response personnel has necessitated that personnel assigned to these functions share the 911 workload. To facilitate this, low-priority calls are assigned to neighborhood sector personnel so that they may respond when time permits. An experimental program is currently under way to determine the feasibility of altering the central dispatch procedures even more significantly.

## **Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing**

Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing (INOP) programs supplement traditional enforcement approaches, such as sweeps, street-level buy-and-busts, and periodic intensive drug enforcement in specific areas, with long-term community-based prevention, education, and treatment referral. It represents a departure from many drug-related policing strategies that emphasize arrest. Although community policing and drug demand reduction had previously been central aspects of police agendas in many jurisdictions, linking the strategies under a single program is a new concept. Combining community policing strategies, focused drug enforcement, interagency cooperation, referral to treatment, and community-based preventive initiatives has resulted in a relatively comprehensive approach to demand reduction. Moreover, by linking neighborhood-oriented policing to the problem of demand reduction, and by mandating the development of police-community partnerships to address neighborhood drug problems, INOP draws on the principles of problem-solving policing—in this case, targeted at a single, specific issue.

## **Eight Urban/Suburban Community Programs**

The eight urban and suburban jurisdictions chosen to receive BJA support under the INOP initiative in November 1990 included Hayward, California; Houston, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky; New York City, New York; Norfolk, Virginia; Portland, Oregon; Prince George's County, Maryland; and Tempe, Arizona. INOP programs have now been designed and are in various stages of implementation at these sites.

These demonstration sites have a number of both common and distinct elements. Common elements include:

- A police enforcement component;
- A focus on neighborhoods, with an emphasis on drug demand reduction; and
- A reliance on partnerships with State and local agencies, and community organizations within the respective jurisdiction.

Differences include:

- Population size—which ranged from fewer than 200,000 residents in Hayward and Tempe to more than 7 million residents in New York City.
- Police force size—which ranged from fewer than 200 sworn officers in Hayward to more than 25,000 in New York City.
- Historical relationships with other neighborhood- or community-oriented policing initiatives—In Tempe, Prince George's County, Louisville, Portland, and Hayward the INOP project is the department's first effort at implementing a neighborhood-oriented style of policing within their jurisdiction. In Norfolk it is a relatively small component of a larger, new citywide neighborhood-oriented policing initiative. And, in New York City and Houston it is a small new effort in police departments that have extensive, established community policing agendas.

- Approach to the drug demand reduction—Emphasis in the Houston and Norfolk program is on drug enforcement, supplemented by secondary drug prevention activities, while emphasis in Hayward, Portland, and New York is on providing a wide array of community-based services, including drug prevention, education, and treatment. (For additional information on community initiatives, see Chapter 9.)

Other significant components of these programs include the use of public service advertising campaigns in Louisville; the use of volunteers from the community in New York City; the establishment of satellite police offices in Prince George's County, Norfolk, Portland, and Tempe; and the study and adoption of new data processing resources in Portland and Louisville.

### ***Significant Program Features***

By the summer of 1991, some INOP demonstration sites were close to being fully operational; others were still in preliminary states of organization and had not yet begun neighborhood-based project operations. Several of the sites had planned or implemented features that distinguished them from the other projects:

- In Norfolk, a unique "top-down" structure of interagency partnerships, which was originally established through Norfolk's Police-Assisted Community Enforcement (PACE) program, the city's initial community-policing program, is designed to guarantee a timely, documented response from all city agencies to requests for services—regardless of their origin;
- In New York City, community volunteers are being relied on to provide service referral to neighborhood residents;
- In Louisville, an extensive advertising campaign is being employed to tell citizens about the program and about drug prevention issues;
- In Houston, the project is emphasizing drug enforcement over and above all other program components;
- In Portland, the project is focused on drug prevention, treatment, and education, supplemented and enhanced by a variety of community services in a narrow target area;
- In Prince George's County, extensive community outreach and organization efforts and a "beat manager" approach are being enhanced by satellite offices that have been located in housing projects in each officer's beat;
- In Tempe, a team approach to beat management, with an entire squad concentrating its efforts on one of the city's 15 beats, is being employed; and
- In Hayward, officials purchased a motor home for use as a mobile meeting place for community groups and to provide a police presence.

### ***Evaluating the Program***

Although the INOP concept is promising, many questions must be addressed before it is more widely adopted. For instance:

- What effect does INOP have on the demand for drugs, on public safety, and on the quality of life both within and across sites?
- Which INOP characteristics contribute most to program effectiveness?
- How should INOP be implemented for maximum benefit?
- How does the INOP approach compare with other law enforcement strategies designed to reduce local drug problems?

*Much attention has focused on community-oriented policing and anti-drug strategies in urban and suburban settings, but similar initiatives in small cities and rural areas have been largely ignored in the past.*

These questions are being addressed through an Institute evaluation, which is being conducted with the assistance of the Vera Institute. The evaluation was begun in 1991 and is scheduled for completion in 1992. Data for the evaluation are being collected through interviews, focus groups, observations, review of project documents and local evaluation products, and analysis of pre-post statistical record data. When completed the assessment will:

- Provide detailed site descriptions and cross-site comparisons of program structure and operations;
- Assess factors that appear to have facilitated or impeded implementation within each site;
- Identify common implementation issues among INOP projects; and
- Provide qualitative information on the expectations for and assessments of the INOP projects held by local project staff, police personnel, municipal officials, and community leaders over the course of the project.

### *Leveraging Institutional Change*

In Louisville, Portland, Prince George's County, and Tempe the project has served as a catalyst for implementation of neighborhood-oriented policing. In Norfolk and Hayward, the INOP project is part of a broader, new citywide initiative. In New York and Houston, INOP represents an expansion of established community- and neighborhood-oriented drug enforcement strategies.

### *Policy Implications*

The results of the implementation and impact analyses will identify those aspects of the various projects that are most effectively implemented and that appear more closely related to impact. This information could, in turn, be used by project managers to adjust program operations, or to change to more promising activities. The lessons learned will help determine how other jurisdictions may adopt similar approaches.

### *INOP in Rural Settings*

Much attention has focused on community-oriented policing and anti-drug strategies in urban and suburban settings, but similar initiatives in small cities and rural areas have been largely ignored in the past. More recently, community and neighborhood policing and anti-drug strategies have been implemented within the confines of small city and rural areas with populations of less than 50,000.

In 1992, the INOP program funded four projects to develop innovative community policing programs that target drug demand reduction at the neighborhood levels in these small cities and rural areas. The Institute, with the assistance of Queues Enforth Development, Inc., is evaluating and documenting those programs. The evaluation is being geared to answer such questions as:

- Do rural police spend less time on calls-for-service, thus leaving more time for problem-solving and community interaction?
- Is there less general anonymity among residents of rural jurisdictions? And if so, is it easier to detect early family and personal situations that are likely to give rise to disruptions of public order?
- Are police in rural jurisdictions more likely to know personally the individuals in public and private agencies whose services may be required for community problem-solving—fixing “broken windows,” or playgrounds, or cleaning a public park, for instance? And if so, is community policing easier to maintain in a rural setting?

- Are police officers in rural jurisdictions more likely to be residents of the communities they serve? And, are they more likely to be aware of and sensitive to community concerns and more likely to be effective implementors of community policing?
- Are rural police departments more reliant on volunteer support? And if so, does this explain the differences in neighborhood-oriented policing practices and impacts in rural and urban settings?

In addition to answering these types of questions, the Institute's rural INOP study has three research goals:

- To describe how the sites implemented their neighborhood-oriented anti-drug programs—giving special attention to program planning, expectations, project roles, resource commitments, target area selection, and transient effects; and
- To assess the costs and benefits of each of the programs, including the impact of the program on safety and quality of life in the target areas and the organizational impact on the police department and other agencies involved in the program.

### ***The Research Process***

At each site, the key data sources for the evaluation will include on-site program observations; focused interviews with key project stakeholders; police data on crimes, arrests, and call-for-service data; area agency computerized or manual "work request" forms that document program-related activities; and pre/post project telephone surveys of community residents. Work on the evaluation began in January 1992 and is slated for completion in late 1993.

### **Conclusion**

Community policing is in the process of moving from the conceptual plans of reform advocates to programs and street-level practices. Most of the Institute's research efforts have focused on describing *what* community policing programs are and how they have been implemented. Assessments of program impact have been limited mostly to before-and-after comparisons rather than more rigorous evaluation designs.


The preliminary results of Institute-supported research should prove useful in future program development designed to apply community policing to the drug problem. One important lesson is simply how challenging it is just to implement changes as profound as those for which community policing calls. For example, problem-oriented policing requires that police go beyond traditional legal labels for identifying problems, and its advocates encourage police to go beyond traditional crime-fighting solutions to those problems. Nonetheless, the experiences of Tulsa and San Diego suggest that law enforcement and crime fighting remain the principal orientation of problem-solving efforts.

Another important lesson is that many citizens and community groups are willing and eager to work with the police, and that workable police-community relationships are possible. But the creation and maintenance of a productive on-going police-community partnership cannot be assumed. Such partnerships are achieved in different ways, depending on local conditions and the nature of the drug problem in the targeted area.

Finally, preliminary analysis of these programs suggests that community policing's greatest impact may be on citizen perceptions of drug crime, fear of such crime, and the assessments of police service. The Baltimore, Oakland, and Birmingham experiences are particularly instructive in this regard. Actually reducing the level of drug dealing and drug-related crime remains a challenge for future program development. Future research supported by the Institute will focus on rigorous impact evaluation of the most promising community policing strategies to reduce drug problems around the Nation.

***One important lesson is simply how challenging it is just to implement changes as profound as those for which community policing calls . . . . Another important lesson is that many citizens and community groups are willing and eager to work with the police, and that workable police-community relationships are possible***





# Drugs, Gangs, and Public Housing

In many urban areas, public housing developments sprawl over vast tracts of land, sometimes housing as many as 10,000 official residents within a single complex. Individual units are often seriously deteriorated—visibly decayed and marred by vandalism, with trash-strewn grounds and broken windows. Residents are poor, particularly vulnerable to exploitation, and usually unable to defend themselves—either against predators or groups looking for revenge, or drug dealers engaged in turf wars or intimidation.

As adult public housing residents grapple with basic survival, some children, lacking adult supervision and suffering from family disorganization, learn to fend for themselves. They are exposed to violence and crime at an early age. They fail in school. They take drugs. They join gangs.

A number of cities are fighting back. To help policymakers respond to drug-related activity in public housing developments, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has embarked on a multifaceted program to evaluate drug control strategies in public housing and to respond to the growing problem of gangs in public housing and other areas. Programs in both these areas are described below.

## Chicago's Operation Clean Sweep

The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is responsible for some 50,000 public housing units, housing 150,000 people—or about 5 percent of the city's population.<sup>1</sup> Drug abuse in these units has been a critical problem for years. By 1988, gangs had virtually taken over many of the high-rises, extorting fees from tenants for use of elevators and entrances.

With the cooperation of the Chicago Police Department, the CHA is systematically regaining control of the more than 1,500 public housing buildings it manages, one by one, through a program that has come to be known as Operation Clean Sweep.

Operation Clean Sweep is a four-phased program:

- Phase I—facilities are secured and common areas are restored;
- Phase II—property management procedures are improved;
- Phase III—social services are improved and means for having residents participate in housing cleanup, safety, and services are developed; and
- Phase IV—capital improvements and resident patrol training programs are established.

## Program Results

With the assistance of the Institute for Law and Justice, NIJ reviewed Operation Clean Sweep and found that it has changed much of the basic operations of the CHA. For instance:

## INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *Chicago's Operation Clean Sweep*
- *Case studies in public housing*
- *Narcotics enforcement in public housing in Denver and New Orleans*
- *How police respond to drugs and gangs*
- *A multiagency approach to drug and gang enforcement*

- The housing authority now focuses its efforts on rent nonpayment cases because its financial losses have been significant. Because many drug-involved tenants also fail to pay rent, the new process applies to drug-related cases as well.
- Rather than use Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations to obtain evictions, CHA employs Illinois' forcible entry and detainer law that allows for court-ordered evictions of tenants who fail to respond to CHA eviction notices within 14 days. From 50 percent to 70 percent of the public housing residents CHA targets for eviction choose not to contest the eviction notice in court; however, those who do can extend their rent-free housing by filing for continuances.
- CHA also has the authority to challenge a tenant's eligibility for public housing. By using this procedure, the CHA can tell a leaseholder with a drug-dealing child to vacate unless the child moves out. CHA believes that many tenants who can no longer effectively control their children are relieved to have this alternative. It is especially important to note that HUD encourages local housing authorities to add "no drugs" language to their leases, and CHA is updating its leases to prohibit drugs "on or near" any premises "under control of the tenant."
- CHA has also begun to use the Federal asset forfeiture laws to seize leases and reclaim apartments. And the Chicago Police Department is actively cooperating by conducting the undercover work and investigation needed to make these cases stand up in court.

## **Studying the Public Housing Problem**

With the enactment of the Public Housing Drug Elimination Act of 1988 (Chapter 2, Title I, P.L. 100-690) specific funds were earmarked for Federal anti-drug efforts by local housing authorities. Public housing is an arena in which government has particular responsibility because as the local Public Housing Authority (PHA), it is the landlord and is responsible for ensuring the health and safety of public housing residents.

The Institute has now funded studies to evaluate drug control strategies in public housing. Studies in Denver, Colorado; New Orleans, Louisiana; Lexington, Kentucky; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; Washington, D.C.; and Chicago, Illinois, are described below.

### **Case Studies of Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing**

An NIJ evaluation, undertaken with the assistance of RAND, is looking at a variety of public housing developments to assess the nature and extent of crime and drug problems in public housing. This Institute evaluation will answer several basic questions:

- What is the extent and character of drug and drug-related crime in public housing complexes?
- How do the extent and character of drug and drug-related crime in public housing complexes differ both within cities and from city to city?
- How do the extent and character of drug-related crime in public housing communities compare with those associated with nearby, demographically similar communities consisting of private rental housing?

### ***Study Sites***

Public housing communities differ widely. The five cities under study—Lexington, Kentucky; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; and Washington, D.C.—exemplify this diversity. Public housing complexes in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., each have tens of thousands of residents. By contrast, the public housing populations in Lexington and Phoenix are roughly 4,500 each. Phila-

delphia and Washington's housing stock, like that of most major East Coast cities, is relatively old and has a large number of high-rise buildings; the housing developments in the other cities are younger, less deteriorated, and generally low-rise. In Los Angeles and Phoenix, many housing projects are grouped close together, creating "clumps" of projects.

Management of the public housing stock also differs. In all the cities under study except Phoenix, independent housing authorities manage the public housing developments. In Phoenix, however, public housing is under direct control of the mayor's office. In some cities, like Los Angeles, enforcement responsibilities are shared between the city police and a housing authority police department; in others, there are no housing police.

Finally, a variety of drug control initiatives are under way in each of the five sites. Phoenix, for instance, has implemented a walking beat program, in which public housing is intensely patrolled by teams of police officers on foot, while Los Angeles has experimented with a wide variety of social service programs, passive security measures, and police sweeps.

### **Data Sources and Types**

In all five cities, 1986-89 data from police departments and housing authorities were combined with census information to create descriptions of the extent of drug and non-drug crime in public housing projects and surrounding communities. For the purpose of this evaluation, three types of information were obtained from police departments in each of the five cities: arrest data, crime data, and data on calls-for-police service.

### **Major Findings**

Early evaluation results are available for Los Angeles and Phoenix.

All housing projects in Phoenix were analyzed for the study. In Los Angeles, two districts (police "divisions") were studied in depth: Southeast, which includes Watts and Hollenbeck, and East Los Angeles. Each division includes several large housing projects and contains roughly 25 percent of the city's conventional public housing population. The data suggest that:

- Crimes and arrest rates in public housing areas were significantly higher than both the citywide rates and the rates for the communities within the city where public housing is located. Rates were also higher in public housing than in comparison areas in Phoenix and in both Los Angeles divisions. Moreover, because public housing has a higher average population density than surrounding areas, the disparities in the volume of crimes and arrests is even greater than the disparities in rates.
- In Los Angeles, there were significant differences among types of crime, between divisions, and among projects within a particular division. Similar differences among neighboring (and even adjacent) projects were recorded in Phoenix. Such differences were especially dramatic for measures of violent crime. For example, the rate of violent crime in the Southeast division in Los Angeles was more than five times higher than the rate in Hollenbeck during the study period. Similarly, housing projects in Southeast showed rates of arrest for violent crimes more than twice the rate in Southeast comparison areas; in Hollenbeck, public housing had rates only 20 percent higher than comparison areas.

At the same time, the rate of arrests for drug crimes was only 20 percent higher in Southeast than in Hollenbeck. Moreover, the ratios of rates of drug-related arrests in public housing to rates of drug-related arrests in comparison areas were approximately two to one in both Los Angeles divisions.

- Aggregate counts across divisions mask wide differences among projects and comparisons within divisions. Rates of violent crime, arrests for violent crimes, and arrests for drug sales and drug possession in one project are sometimes more than double those in

***... a wide variety of drug control initiatives is under way in each of the five sites. Phoenix, for instance, has implemented a walking beat program, in which public housing is intensely patrolled by teams of police officers on foot, while Los Angeles has experimented with a wide variety of social service programs, passive security measures, and police sweeps.***

another project less than a mile away. Moreover, the projects with especially high or low rates vary with the crime measure being examined; that is, no particular projects are consistently high- or low-crime.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these data:

- First, rates both of drug and non-drug crime are considerably higher in public housing than in other urban areas. The greater density of public housing implies that the volume of crime in public housing is even greater than in surrounding neighborhoods.
- Second, crime in public housing projects is not monolithic. Some projects may have high rates of violent crimes, but low rates of drug crime, or the reverse. Projects may have crime rates that are very different even from projects that are directly adjacent to them. These variations are particularly striking for violent crime rates.
- Finally, the extent to which an individual public housing project may deviate from the norm suggests that, although public housing appears to have disproportionate rates of crime, these rates may be due to factors other than the fact that the housing is public.

### ***Policy Implications***

Evaluation results will be of interest to local housing authorities attempting to develop drug control initiatives under HUD's Public Housing Drug Elimination Program. Methods developed by this study for analyzing drug crime in housing projects and the study's descriptions of public housing in major cities will also provide these evaluations with benchmarks against which to compare their local situations.

The results will help local officials who need to determine the extent to which public housing should receive additional police protection, the replicability of urban drug control initiatives in the public housing context, and the potential for new initiatives.

The evaluation also will be of interest to national drug control policymakers. The extent to which public housing presents especially grave challenges is a central question as they allocate scarce resources among numerous competing needs.

### **Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing: Denver and New Orleans**

In 1989, NIJ began evaluations of narcotics enforcement programs in public housing developments in Denver, Colorado, and New Orleans, Louisiana. Funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), the programs were conducted by special Narcotics Enforcement in Public Housing Units. The Institute, with assistance from the Police Foundation, has now evaluated those programs.

The goals for the Denver and New Orleans programs were threefold:

- Reduce the availability of narcotics in public housing areas;
- Decrease levels of crime and fear; and
- Increase confidence in the police.

As proposed, the Denver program was to include a nonenforcement plan that would "educate citizens in . . . tenant responsibility, crime prevention, and drug identification and suppression." To improve community relations between citizens of public housing and the Denver Police Department regular meetings with project tenants and members of tenant councils were also proposed. To achieve these same effects, the New Orleans narcotics enforcement unit envisioned a modest community outreach effort—in the form of increased police presence in the projects and meetings with members of the Tenant Advisory Councils. Police departments in both cities also planned to enhance their undercover narcotics operations in the developments by assigning special uniformed patrols to those areas.

## Evaluating the Programs

Crime and arrest data, unit activity reports, and survey interviews provided data for evaluating the Denver and New Orleans programs. In Denver, survey interviews were conducted with residents in the two target public housing developments at three points in time, and daily activity reports by the narcotics units, arrest reports, and reports of visible enforcement efforts by residents of the target housing project were reviewed. In New Orleans interviews with a panel of tenant council members at each of the three housing developments in the program were conducted once at the beginning of the project and again a year later. The police department provided data on recorded crimes and arrests for all the housing developments in the city and the surrounding neighborhoods, as well as for the city as a whole.

## The Programs in Action

As implemented, both programs employed traditional—enforcement-oriented—policing methods; however, the addition of special narcotics units focused new energy and resources on a problem that otherwise was not being squarely addressed in the two cities. The programs in both cities received “community input,” principally from calls to special drug hotlines set up for the residents.

## Effects of the Narcotics Enforcement Programs

The primary concern of the police in both cities was the effect of the programs on drug and crime problems, fear of crime and victimization, and residents’ evaluation of police services. Interviews conducted with the residents in the two target housing developments in Denver suggested:

- A decline in the availability and frequency of drug use in both housing developments;
- A decline in personal and property crime; and
- A significant decline in residents’ fear of crime in the development in which a narcotics unit was most active.

To ascertain police activity and the extent of drug and crime problems in New Orleans’ public housing developments, a panel of key individuals was interviewed—both at the beginning of the program and at its end a year later. The results of those interviews suggest:

- There was an improvement in crime, disorder, and drug problems, but assessments of policing worsened in the first housing development;
- There were few changes, but residents’ perceptions of the police improved somewhat in the second development; and
- The perceptions of the police improved, crime problems lessened, and drug-related problems were alleviated somewhat in the third development.

## The Process Evaluation

The evaluation offers some lessons about effective narcotics unit operations, and also raises some issues about enforcement as the sole response to drug and crime problems in public housing:

- **Special units were necessary.** Both programs successfully focused their energies on a problem that otherwise was not being squarely addressed in the two cities.
- **Federal funding was important.** Federal funds made a difference in the effectiveness of the programs in several ways: confidential funds were needed to pay informants and buy drugs; the teams needed vehicles and sophisticated equipment that they could not have purchased otherwise; the money for overtime work enabled police to

## Actions by Narcotics Enforcement Teams (Oct. 1989–Dec. 1990).

	Denver	New Orleans
<b>Felony Arrests*</b>	176	807
<b>Seizures</b>		
<b>Vehicles</b>	6	13
<b>Weapons</b>	35	86
<b>Cash</b>	\$133,000	\$34,000
<b>Drugs (cash value)</b>	—	\$242,000

\*The Denver District Attorney’s office accepted 89.5 percent of the felony arrest cases for prosecution. Data are not yet available for New Orleans.

focus energies in a sustained way while compensating for the inability of the cities to contribute more personnel to program goals; and independent funding helped keep the programs alive in the face of adverse reactions— inside and outside the departments.

- **Personnel policies counted.** Several organizational considerations seemed to have played an important role in determining the effectiveness of each city's narcotics unit. The Denver unit—which consisted of four officers, a sergeant, and a lieutenant—was too small to sustain its activities over time. The department's limit of 25 hours per month overtime pay was quickly used up and officers were forced to use their accrued vacation and sick leave during the evaluation year. The New Orleans unit consisted of nine officers, two sergeants, and a lieutenant, which provided enough flexibility for the team to adjust to the absence of several officers and still sustain operations at the desired level. In addition, New Orleans police officers could work an extra 4 hours each day, every day, which encouraged them to delay their vacations until the program was completed.
- **Narcotics unit–Public Housing Authority cooperation was lacking.** Although both cities envisioned close cooperation between their narcotics units and local public housing authority at program onset, the obstacles to cooperation were multiple and complex. Both housing authorities were affected by internal organizational problems.
- **Corruption is a threat.** Corruption is a serious concern for drug enforcement agencies, for it is difficult to supervise plainclothes operations closely, and successful narcotics detectives encounter ample opportunities to steal cash and drugs from dealers and go into the business themselves. Narcotics unit supervisors dealt with the threat of corruption by trying to recruit good officers. Supervisors monitored the dress and lifestyles of squad members. They searched squad vehicles for contraband. In New Orleans narcotics officers were subjected to occasional urine tests.
- **New policing efforts take time and patience.** Despite their seemingly clear and limited mandate, it took a great deal of time for narcotics unit operations to get off the ground in both cities. Some of the obstacles were bureaucratic. In New Orleans, there was no space or vehicles for the unit, so officers worked out of their own cars for almost 2 months. In both cities, new officers needed a great deal of training, and it took even longer for them to become effective narcotics detectives. Neither city's narcotics unit was able to recruit experienced narcotics detectives who wanted to work in public housing.
- **Community outreach was very difficult to sustain.** Efforts to involve community residents—or the few council members representing them—did not meet expectations in both cities, partially because the enforcement unit made only limited efforts to involve the residents. The officers believed that public housing residents were not interested in halting the drug trade, that many had friends or relatives who were involved in it, that some found ways to profit from the trade, and that many other residents lived in terror of drug dealers.
- **Can enforcement work without system reform?** The effectiveness of the rest of the criminal justice system plays an important role in enhancing or limiting the impact of special drug enforcement efforts. Many States have made significant policy changes in this regard. However, in many jurisdictions prosecutors are overwhelmed with cases, and jails are so full that persons arrested for nonviolent offenses cannot be held until their cases are disposed of.

### *For the Future*

Officers in both cities reported that it was difficult to mobilize community cooperation with the narcotics unit because residents felt special programs had come and gone too many times before. The New Orleans unit was disbanded. In Denver, other units were merged into a new and larger unit, but the scope of this unit now extends far beyond public housing areas. The evaluation underscores the need for sustained and cooperative efforts

if there is to be more than a transitory difference in the crime and drug problems facing public housing. Research on the operation and effectiveness of narcotics units in public housing should be augmented by a closer analysis of local policy processes that undermine the ability of government in carrying out its responsibilities effectively.

## **A Broadening Examination of the Problems of Gangs**

Growth in gang membership, and the corresponding increase in gang-related violence, now threaten the quality of life not only in public housing developments, but in every major U.S. city. Data from a 1989, 45-city survey suggest that 1,439 youth gangs, with a total of 120,636 members, are now established in those cities, and that blacks and Hispanics account for better than 87 percent of total gang membership—far in excess of their representation in the general population; many gangs are now involved in serious crimes; gang members commit violent crimes three times more often than delinquents who do not belong to gangs; juvenile gang members commit nearly 23 percent of index crimes in the surveyed jurisdictions; and some gangs now both sell and use illegal drugs.<sup>2</sup>

The Los Angeles-based CRIPS and Bloods are today's most publicized gangs. According to a recent Drug Enforcement Administration report, CRIPS–Bloods conflicts over drug trafficking have taken the form of urban guerilla warfare, with drive-by shootings, turf battles, and the killing of informers as common results of their conflicts.<sup>3</sup> Other reports suggest that these gangs have also migrated across State lines to other urban centers, and that officials in smaller cities and towns have become wary and fearful of the incursion of gangs into their jurisdictions.<sup>4</sup>

Although young blacks and Hispanics account for the majority of gang memberships, white, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian youths now have established gangs in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles.

Another new trend is that youths are now participating in gangs well into their adult years. In Los Angeles, for instance, the average age of a gang member convicted of homicide is now between 19 and 20 years old; in Chicago, nearly 50 percent of the gang members found guilty of homicides are over the age of 19; and in San Diego, half of all gang members are 19 years of age or older. The fact that youths are staying in gangs is of great concern because, as Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention research has shown, it is the adult gang members who play leadership roles, engage in the worst violence—homicides, aggravated assault, robberies—and encourage drug trafficking activities. A California Department of Justice study also found that adult gang members commit a great many serious crimes after their release from prison, and others report that prison gangs have also become a serious problem—particularly in Illinois, New York, California, and Texas.<sup>5</sup>

Evidence further suggests that youth gang members are particularly susceptible to recruitment into larger criminal organizations engaged in drug trafficking. According to media reports, for instance, Chinese youth gangs—operating in conjunction with the Asian Triads—were responsible for the resurgent heroin trade in New York City.<sup>6</sup>

To better understand gangs and the crimes they commit, in 1991 NIJ funded six projects on topics that range from the criminal behavior of gang members and gang migration to national assessments of the criminal justice response to gang-related crime. These projects include:

- **National Assessment of Law Enforcement Anti-Gang Information Resources.** A nationwide assessment of enforcement initiatives to suppress gangs and gang-related criminal activity.

*Growth in gang membership, and the corresponding increase in gang-related violence, now threaten the quality of life not only in public housing developments, but in every major U.S. city.*



*NIJ is now, with assistance of the Police Executive Research Forum, evaluating police decisionmaking—as it relates to illegal gang activities—within police departments in Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Austin, Texas; and Metro-Dade County, Florida.*

- **The Impact of Gang Migration: Developing Effective Responses.** An assessment of the extent of gang movement from city to city.
- **Street Gangs and Drug Sales.** A study to determine the magnitude of gang involvement in drug sales and violence, to compare the characteristics of gang-involved drug sales with sales that do not involve gangs, and to determine the scope of particular drug gangs. In this study crack sales cases are being contrasted with sales of other drugs, and gangs of different ethnic groups are being contrasted to determine if ethnicity plays a role in drug marketing choices.
- **Criminal Behavior of Gangs.** A study of the criminal behavior of gang members, including gang behavior; motivation to join, remain, or leave gangs; the role of gang life in criminal behavior patterns; and the roles of gangs in the illegal economy.
- **Prosecuting Gang Crime: A National Assessment.** A nationwide assessment of how perpetrators of gang-related crimes are prosecuted, including legislative strategies that may enhance prosecutions, and the identification and exploration of innovative methods for prosecuting gang members for the crimes they commit.
- **Gangs in Correctional Facilities: A National Assessment.** An assessment of the extent of gangs in correctional facilities—including the growth of gangs in State and local prisons, and the means by which gang activity can be controlled—to determine how correctional facilities are managing gang activity; how correctional practices affect prison environments; innovative strategies for controlling gang-related prison activity; and future research needs.

Some preliminary findings from these studies are expected in 1992. Two other NIJ-sponsored evaluation studies of gang-related issues are described below.

### **How Police Respond to Drugs and Gangs**

Every day in major urban centers in this country gangs commit crimes and the police respond. The makeup and character of individual gangs is as varied as the decisionmaking processes law enforcement personnel employ in response to their crimes. Yet, few studies have focused on the decisionmaking process police administrators employ in responding to gang crimes—even though their actions affect the lives and welfare of their communities.

NIJ is now, with assistance of the Police Executive Research Forum, evaluating police decisionmaking—as it relates to illegal gang activities—within police departments in Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Austin, Texas; and Metro-Dade County, Florida. Sites for this evaluation were selected on the basis of the severity of each city's drug and gang problems, regional diversity, ethnic diversity in terms of gang manifestations, and variations in approaches to gang problems. Kansas City and San Diego were specifically chosen because they have received BJA discretionary grants to address gang problems.

In Chicago, the police department employs a specialized gang unit—decentralized into three gang unit commands—to address the city's gang problems. Because of the scope and severity of the city's gang problem, this unit employs a staff of more than 450. Personnel assigned to the unit address gang-related crime only—narcotics enforcement, as in most other cities, is the exclusive province of the department's narcotics unit. The department also staffs a public housing police bureau, which serves most of the city's public housing complexes and has direct responsibility for gang-related problems within those complexes. The Chicago Housing Authority also operates its own police department.

In Kansas City, police did not develop a specialized unit to coordinate anti-gang activity. The agency, however, used a multiyear discretionary grant from BJA to address the problem of a gang that had been heavily engaged in street-level drug trafficking. By focusing on the specific gang and its criminal behavior, the department was able to reduce substantially the impact of the group in their city.

The San Diego Police Department uses a specialized approach to gang problems—a combination of a gang detective unit and an uniformed gang enforcement effort. The department also works closely with the San Diego District Attorney's office to address gang-related problems through a vertical prosecution effort supported by BJA funds. The District Attorney's office maintains a specialized gang prosecution unit—assisted by detectives from the San Diego Police Department—to develop proactive investigations, coordinate with the police department and other law enforcement agencies, and conduct prosecution efforts.

Issues to be addressed in this study include:

- The jurisdiction's economic conditions, political arrangements, race relations, geographic location, demographic characteristics, and other background factors;
- The police department's culture, leadership style, policies, procedures, organizational structure, and staffing and resource allocation;
- The key decisionmakers within the police department, including their tenure and experience, and the relationship between key elected officials in the jurisdiction and the chief of police;
- The degree to which an individual police department's response to drug and gang-related problems is influenced by local politics and community demands;
- The scope of the current gang problem in the jurisdiction, including the number of gangs and gang members; members' ethnicity and age distribution; gang leadership; and gang activities;
- Evidence that gang characteristics have changed over time;
- The nexus between organized gangs and drug activity in the jurisdiction;
- The agency's approach to gang problems, including whether it used a special unit and how it defined gang membership, gang activity, and gang-related activities;
- The specific triggering event, set of events, or other stimulus that created the need for the agency to respond specifically to gang problems, including identification of the decisionmaker and others who exerted control in the decisionmaking process and degree of formality in the process;
- Departmental guidance to patrol officers and supervisors on how to deal with gang-related problems, including the extent to which gang enforcement decisions have been defaulted to street officers, street supervisors, and/or unit commanders;
- Any gang prevention, education, or other proactive approaches included in the department's response; and
- The results of the department's current response to gangs, including the attitudes of department members toward their enforcement efforts, their perceptions of the public's attitudes toward those efforts, and press accounts, local reports, and statistics.

### ***Major Findings***

Some common themes emerged while looking at gang problems across the five sites. For instance:

- **Gang involvement in drug and other types of criminal activity varies significantly, somewhat by ethnicity.** In Metro-Dade, one gang specialized in car theft. Police reported little drug involvement among gang members and speculate that the highly organized nature of drug dealing in South Florida worked to keep gangs out of the business. Conversely, in Chicago, black gangs divide up territory and types of drugs for dealing, and in Chicago, San Diego, and Metro-Dade, police perceived that black gang members were more involved in drug activity than gang members of other ethnicity. In Austin, black gangs were just beginning to become established, but

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Hispanic gangs have been in some neighborhoods for decades. Further, police statistics suggest that although gangs do engage in a great deal of criminal activity—particularly auto theft—they account for a small percentage of the overall crime rate.

- **Each evaluation site had a formal or informal policy for dealing with the media on gang problems.** Generally, it is perceived that reporting the name of the individual gang member or the gang name gave credibility to gangs in a community and provided positive reinforcement to gang membership. Metro-Dade, for example, has a policy not to inform the media of these details. But policy and practice sometimes differ. On one occasion, the gang unit's lieutenant agreed to appear on a national talk show about gangs with the proviso that gang members would not also be on the program. Programming officials agreed, but when the program aired, interviews with gang members were interspersed with law enforcement officials' discussion.
- **At all sites patrol officers' knowledge of drug and gang activity varied, depending on the level of communication between special units and patrol, formal training provided to officers, and the frequency and mechanisms of briefing officers.** Generally, gang and drug enforcement were perceived to be the exclusive purview of the specialized units. In some cases patrol officers would channel information to gang or drug units, often via formal communication forms. Sometimes information would be passed informally, when patrol officers would drop by the gang unit office or converse with a gang investigator.
- **Several departments tracked gang-related police incidents in the jurisdiction through use of a check-off box on the agency's incident reporting form.** However, training of officers in when to check the box was not uniform. Given the uneven experience of patrol officers to recognize evidence of gang membership, it is likely that aggregate department gang-related data are inaccurate.
- **Narcotics personnel and gang personnel worked together only on occasion.** In Chicago, gang personnel are specifically discouraged from pursuing drug cases. In Metro-Dade, gang investigators can pursue a drug case if it involves a gang member and falls below a threshold value for the amount of drugs. In San Diego, gang investigators or commanders routinely notify narcotics personnel when they are pursuing drug cases. A drug investigation is viewed as the easiest way to break into some gangs, such as the CRIPS. Such a strategy does not work for non-drug-involved gangs or gangs where ethnicity or cultural barriers limit the capacity of police to conduct undercover investigations.
- **There was great variation in the relationship of gang- and drug-related problems.** In recognizing this diversity, some police are taking steps to develop tailored responses to the problems. Much effort is being devoted to the collection of intelligence information, particularly in developing manual or automated files that identify gang members through the use of field investigations that are supplemented by photographs, details of known associates, use of special names, school attendance, cars, and the like. Police can devote only limited attention to prevention techniques although most every agency is involved in conducting educational programming, often for school or parent groups. Suppression tactics vary widely, ranging from weapons charges to mob action (in Chicago), but all agencies focus on the criminal activity of the gang member. "It's not against the law to be a gang member," notes one gang specialist. "We have to focus on the criminal activity."

### ***National Field Studies of Gangs and Gang Violence***

One major initiative begun in fiscal year 1991 was the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) National Field Studies of Gangs and Gang Violence. The aim of the field studies was to examine the nature and scope of the gang problem nationally and to identify strategies that have proven successful in preventing, disrupting, and controlling gang activity and related violence and illegal drug trafficking.

To gain national perspective on the problem of gang violence and the various responses in jurisdictions across the Nation, OJP conducted field studies in three cities: Los Angeles, California, in March 1991; Dallas, Texas, in June 1991; and Chicago, Illinois, in October 1991.

### ***Policy Implications***

Institute study findings should enhance dialogue on strategies and tactics that are effective in responding to gang-related problems. The case studies may also stimulate critical discussion on ways that internal communication and organization can be improved to address more effectively complex problems. Effective gang programs must be developed locally, based on local knowledge and data. Such efforts will depend on the characteristics of local gang problems, the organizational structure of various gangs, and the strengths of the community. Appropriate police response will also depend on the organization and capabilities of the police agency and the capacity of other local agencies to collaborate in addressing gang problems. Gang problems are not the sole province of the police. Housing authorities, schools, social service agencies, parks and recreation departments, and a host of other non-law enforcement agencies have a stake in resolving gang problems and have resources that they can apply toward a resolution. In the future, greater attention needs to be paid to developing multiagency responses to gang problems.

### **Multiagency Approach to Drug and Gang Enforcement: JUDGE**

In 1975, according to Police Foundation research, the San Diego Police Department estimated that there were three gangs with fewer than 300 members. The figures increased to 47 gangs and more than 4,000 members in 1991. Violence associated with gangs has also increased significantly. In 1985, there were 6 homicides attributed to gangs in the city, increasing to 12 in 1990. Felony assaults involving gang members rose from 50 to 296 during the same period.

NIJ, with assistance from the San Diego Association of Governments, is evaluating the San Diego County District Attorney's office's multiagency task force—Jurisdictions Unified for Drug Gang Enforcement (JUDGE). The task force consists of police officers, prosecutors, and probation officers who enforce probation conditions for drug- and gang-involved probationers. Its goal is to reduce violence and gang-related crimes by providing real consequences for violations.

JUDGE is unique because it incorporates undercover narcotics task forces and crackdowns, intensive supervision probation, and priority prosecution for high-risk offenders. In addition, it expands the use of multiagency task forces for drug law enforcement to include gang suppression and probation supervision.

Before JUDGE was implemented in 1988, gang and drug enforcement and prosecution efforts focused on new offenses, rather than on enforcing the probation conditions of those already sentenced. JUDGE targets juvenile and adult street gang members on probation for narcotics offenses and others involved in the use, sale, and distribution of narcotics.

JUDGE components that relate to activities of law enforcement, prosecution, and probation include:

- Special enforcement techniques, such as undercover operations and drug testing, that police officers can employ to enforce drug laws and probation conditions for drug-involved gang members;
- Vertical prosecution, which prosecutors employ to ensure that JUDGE cases are handled consistently throughout adjudication, to increase conviction rates, and to ensure that the most severe sentences are imposed when appropriate; and

***Before JUDGE was implemented in 1988, gang and drug enforcement and prosecution efforts focused on new offenses, rather than on enforcing the probation conditions of those already sentenced. JUDGE targets juvenile and adult street gang members on probation for narcotics offenses and others involved in the use, sale, and distribution of narcotics.***

- Coordination between probation officers and other law enforcement personnel in conducting probation searches and apprehending probation violators—in addition to preparing the paperwork for probationers returned to court.

The goals of this evaluation are:

- To determine if the program was implemented as designed and whether program objectives were met;
- To assess the results of enforcement and prosecution efforts in providing consequences for offenders;
- To evaluate the program's impact on offenders' criminal behavior, gang affiliation, and social integration;
- To assess the costs of JUDGE probation as compared with regular probation caseloads; and
- To provide recommendations regarding the implementation of similar programs in other jurisdictions.

### ***Research Design***

Researchers are employing pre-post test methodology to compare probation violations and offense rates for a sample of juvenile probationers targeted by JUDGE and a comparable group of juveniles on probation prior to the JUDGE program. The study samples include two experimental groups with 150 probationers in each group, and one control group with 300 probationers.

Data will be compiled on the juveniles' sociodemographic characteristics, gang affiliation, school attendance, employment, criminal history, offenses that resulted in probation supervision, probation conditions, contacts by probation and JUDGE staff, performance during probation, and new offenses after probation. For the process evaluation, data for experimental cases will be compared with project objectives to measure compliance in terms of program implementation and results, such as probation revocations and convictions. The measures to be compared for the experimental and control groups include:

- Recidivism;
- Need for probation intervention;
- Gang affiliation and social integration; and
- Program costs.

### ***Policy Implications***

When completed, this evaluation will provide policymakers with information on two important questions:

- What is the most cost-effective way to use limited resources to address gang-involved criminal activity?
- What issues should be considered in developing multiagency task forces to address drug, gang, and other criminal justice problems?


The primary audience for this research will be criminal justice administrators, practitioners, and researchers in the areas of law enforcement, prosecution, and corrections. The results may be used to formulate similar programs in other areas, while taking into consideration the lessons learned from the San Diego experience and the evaluation findings. Also, in San Diego and other areas with multiagency task forces, the results will be useful in assessing program components and improving the effectiveness of the response to crime and drugs in the community.

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
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# Prosecuting and Managing Drug Offenders

**A**s a result of stronger law enforcement drives against drug-related crime nationwide, drug cases are flooding the criminal courts. Federal prosecutions for drug offenses rose 250 percent from 1980 to 1989, with 24,278 suspects prosecuted in 1989<sup>1</sup>; convictions for Federal drug offenses increased 213 percent from 1980 to 1990.<sup>2</sup>

The crush of drug-related cases is so severe at the State level that some States are considering establishing special courts that would process drug-related cases exclusively. For example, State courts convicted about 112,000 persons on felony drug trafficking in 1988—about 50 percent more than in 1986. More than a third of all felony convictions in State courts in 1988 were for drug trafficking or possession.<sup>3</sup> Court administrators at all levels of government see a need for more judges, more pretrial service personnel, and more probation and parole officers and other court personnel.

Federal and State officials are responding in two important ways. First, they are moving rapidly to improve case management and the court administrative processes. Courts are experimenting with expedited drug case management and other improved court response efforts. Federal officials are taking the lead in finding ways to prosecute the many complex drug cases.

Second, while working to improve case adjudication, court officials are testing ways to dispose of cases in other than the traditional up-or-down manner of probation or incarceration. Among the alternative approaches are day fines and other structured fines, asset seizures and forfeitures, driver's license revocations, and the application of land use control ordinances to close businesses and housing complexes. Moreover, criminal justice administrators are seeking ways to classify drug offenders for treatment after release from prison in hopes that specialized programs involving treatment for and monitoring of the individuals will help to reduce recidivism. National Institute of Justice (NIJ) research has found that urinalysis can be an effective way to monitor the behavior of drug-using offenders in the community.

NIJ is determining ways in which managers might best implement these new approaches and documenting those ways that are proving most useful and effective. The Institute has gained considerable knowledge about methods for court administration to ensure the swift, efficient, and fair prosecution of drug offenders. The Institute is also working with State and local agencies to develop alternative methods of dealing with drug cases. (See Chapter 7, Intermediate Sanctions, for further discussion of alternative punitive measures.)

This chapter describes evaluations of research on more effective ways to prosecute drug offenders and examines evaluations of innovative ways to process drug offense cases and hold drug users accountable.

## ***INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...***

- ***Expedited management of drug cases***
- ***Prosecuting complex drug cases***
- ***Improving court response to drug cases***
- ***Innovative methods for handling drug-abusing offenders***



## **Expedited Management of Drug Cases**

*Expedited drug case management (EDCM) programs, one of the more important court reforms since automated docketing, differentiates cases according to the expected disposition and the demand on the docket. The goals of EDCM programs are to:*

- *Provide courts with a strategy to relieve congested criminal and civil dockets;*
- *Use existing resources more efficiently and effectively; and*
- *Assist the courts in satisfying the constitutional requirements of a speedy trial.*

*Based on the success of differentiated court management programs, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) launched the EDCM program in July 1989. These programs combined treatment and supervision components of drug cases with the differential case management principles. These principles include:*

- *Early case screening and classification by processing complexity and/or dispositional route;*
- *Assignment of cases to "tracks," based on the screening classification;*
- *Establishment of schedules for each court occurrence; and*
- *Continuous monitoring of each case, with track reassignment, if necessary, to ensure that cases are disposed of in accordance with the track time lines.*

*With the assistance of the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies, the Institute evaluated the programs at the three sites funded: the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania; the Superior Court of Middlesex County (New Brunswick), New Jersey; and Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana. The evaluations focused on EDCM's developmental stages, including planning and implementation.*

## **Findings**

*Of the three sites, Institute evaluators found that Philadelphia's Court of Common Pleas produced the most remarkable results. In Philadelphia, the EDCM program:*

- *Reduced the average number of days from arraignment to disposition by 26 percent, from 158 to 113 days;*
- *Increased the number of jail beds available for pre-trial detainees by up to 400 a day;*
- *Resulted in a 42 percent decrease in jury trials and an 18 percent increase in guilty pleas; and*
- *Reduced the total criminal case inventory throughout the court by approximately 32 percent in the first year.*

*The cooperation of the prosecutor and public defender has been essential to the success of the program, researchers report. This stems from their mutual belief in the underlying fairness of the arraignment judge and their willingness to change office policy and procedures relating to plea negotiation, open files, motions, and such.*

*The New Brunswick EDCM program emphasized the role of the community in controlling drug activity and merged it with the court's case management system. New Brunswick was able to improve processing times and satisfy a long-standing need for a case management system that would provide quick responses to crime, especially drug crimes, and certainty in punishment. By relying on pre-trial or pre-indictment diversion of offenders, the dispositional emphasis was shifted to the appropriate point in the adjudication process—the front end.*

*In Marion County, the experience with EDCM has been less than positive. The program attempted to include both the Municipal and Superior Courts, but these courts have independent jurisdictions*

*and would derive no benefit from working together. Despite planning efforts, track time frames overlapped. Policies and procedures for processing cases within tracks were not developed, primarily because the court lacked an infrastructure capable of supporting the program. The effort provides a valuable lesson; without a professional court administrator or a management-oriented presiding judge with authority, any serious reform of the caseload management system is likely to fail.*

*Based on the study, Institute evaluators reported that these factors produced success:*

- *Strong court administration and leadership;*
- *Emphasis on the front end of the court processing system;*
- *The active commitment of the prosecutor and public defender;*
- *Well-coordinated operations; and*
- *A strong, charismatic leader.*

*Factors that impede success are:*

- *Weak program leadership and unclear goals;*
- *Unrealistic expectations by the participants;*
- *Inadequate administrative support;*
- *Deficiencies in operational procedures; and*
- *Failure to address the need for long-term institutional support.*

*Factors that contribute to failure are:*

- *Lack of an infrastructure to support the program;*
- *Lack of policy direction and control;*
- *Absence of internal court coordination and administration; and*
- *Lack of impetus—resulting in a court overwhelmed by the volume of drug cases.*

## Prosecuting Drug Cases More Effectively

For many years the Institute has worked closely with court administrators at all levels of the judicial system in an effort to find better ways to manage cases. Court administrators conceive new ideas, try them out, and learn from Institute evaluations ways to improve on the concepts. This step-by-step approach led to development of the expedited drug case management program described below.

Institute evaluations are also helping prosecutors faced with the formidable tasks of prosecuting highly complex drug cases. The Institute is also working with court administrators to determine the relative merits of various approaches that their colleagues are using to cope with the pressures of increased drug caseloads.

### Prosecuting Complex Drug Cases

Over the past decade, the Congress has enacted legislation that enables law enforcement and prosecution to strike a direct blow against lucrative drug trafficking, interdict the line of supply, and recoup some of the public money spent by law enforcement agencies.<sup>4</sup> The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statutes, and the laws governing money laundering, firearms, public corruption, civil and criminal forfeitures, conspiracies, and tax evasion offer a powerful basis for the prosecution of drug traffickers. Many States have adopted legislation that mirrors the Federal structure.

At the Federal level, the Government concentrates on such matters as building financial investigative cases against high-level drug traffickers and money-laundering operations. The Federal Government requires special skills and resources to conduct such cases. State and local investigative and prosecutive agencies handle their own kinds of complex cases that also require specialized skills, sophisticated equipment, and additional resources necessary to develop technological or operationally intricate cases.

Complex drug prosecutions are unlike the majority of the drug cases clogging the criminal justice system—the high-volume cases of possession or street-level distribution. Complex cases are characterized by activities that deal with large amounts of drugs or money and involve one or more persons or business associations operating through networks that are difficult to trace or have multiple connections to legitimate business. These cases present special problems for law enforcement and prosecution because the investigations may be expensive, involve many personnel and experts over long periods of time, and require funds and equipment not usually included in operating budgets. The nature and emphasis of prosecution are affected as well. The capacity to deal with informants, using both civil and criminal remedies, and to employ techniques such as net worth analysis is not typically found in a prosecutor's office.<sup>5</sup>

Despite these difficulties, States such as Arizona and Florida have successfully investigated and prosecuted complex drug cases. Favorable State legislation, extensive coordination with Federal agencies, and smooth operating processes make these agencies some of the most professionally managed in the country. Furthermore, multijurisdictional task forces—bringing expertise in money laundering, asset forfeiture, and access to new technological developments such as automated crime laboratory and identification systems—have helped prosecutors respond to complex drug crimes at the local level.

Current State and local efforts to prosecute complex drug cases show little uniformity, largely because of different program goals and the tremendous diversity that exists among State and local jurisdictions. Actually, apart from single case studies and special-focus evaluations, such as the asset forfeiture studies, little is known about the approaches prosecutors have taken regarding complex drug cases.

***Research thus far has tended to focus on particular techniques or on a few courts. The Institute has begun an assessment that operates from a broader perspective than that of earlier research. Rather than examine one technique or a small number of courts, this evaluation will examine a full range of techniques in a large number of courts.***

Without such knowledge, a prosecutor may find it difficult to decide whether to pursue a case or transfer it to the U.S. Attorney, or to distinguish between options and select the most applicable. This lack may also lead to exorbitant costs or drain scarce personnel and financial resources.

The situation has prompted the Institute to design an evaluation that will:

- Describe prosecutorial programs and strategies for complex drug cases that are being or can be used by State and local prosecutors;
- Synthesize the information for use by other prosecutors operating in this field to encourage wider use of a variety of promising strategies; and
- Increase prosecutors' understanding of the impact of drug cases on other activities.

For every State or local prosecutor who has the capability of supporting this type of prosecution, the goal of disrupting drug networks is strengthened. The research should begin to answer questions such as:

- At what point does the prosecution of complex drug cases exceed the capacity of State and local prosecutors and require Federal prosecution?
- What criteria will aid State and local prosecutors in making this determination?

### ***Policy Implications***

The assessment should identify the needs of State and local prosecutors in addressing these special cases, and help them bring complex drug cases to a successful conclusion more effectively and efficiently.

This assessment, undertaken for the Institute by the Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies, will produce:

- A directory of prosecutorial programs and a computerized database;
- A description of the most promising programs and of the significant factors affecting program success and the essential ingredients for transfer of information to other prosecutors' offices; and
- Strategies for communicating information through publications, workshops, technical assistance, and the like.

### ***Improving Court Response to Drug Cases***

Court workloads have increased steadily in recent years because of the increase in drug arrests and prosecutions. The rise has contributed to increased backlogs, a shift in resources from civil to criminal matters, and jail and prison crowding.

At the same time, and despite strained resources, many courts have experimented with new approaches to using resources more effectively, as this chapter shows. Experiments such as the disposition of felony drug cases in limited-jurisdiction courts have enabled the courts to meet the challenge of the drug caseloads while ensuring due process.

Research thus far has tended to focus on particular techniques or on a few courts. The Institute has begun an assessment that operates from a broader perspective than that of earlier research. Rather than examine one technique or a small number of courts, this evaluation will examine a full range of techniques in a large number of courts. It will synthesize the current status of knowledge about drug cases and the courts, identify where knowledge is lacking or incomplete, and establish an agenda for future efforts.

Institute evaluators from the National Center for State Courts will seek to answer the following questions:

- How have courts responded to the pressure of drug cases? To what extent have they followed models developed at the national level or have they developed their own models?
- How have the courts defined the problem—increased volume? Speed of case processing? A change in the kind of cases? A need for sentencing alternatives?
- What part of the process has experienced the greatest impact: pre-trial, trial, post-trial, or sentencing?
- To what extent are courts being pressured from other components of the adjudicatory process (i.e., prosecutors, defense counsel, and corrections officials)?
- What type and amount of additional resources have been required to address the problem—more judges, administrators, equipment, or facilities?
- What have been the objectives of the programs—accelerated case processing? Reduced backlog? Sentencing alternatives? Reduced jail crowding? Increased efficiency? Enhanced ancillary services (e.g., testing and treatment)?
- How successful have various programs been in meeting objectives?

### ***Policy Implications***

Information on all these issues will assist policymakers within and outside the judiciary system who must establish the broad objectives for such programs, decide on the resources that will be made available, and monitor implementation. To meet the needs of policymakers, the findings will review as many alternative approaches as possible, along with the relative advantages and disadvantages. The results will also aid practitioners who translate program concepts into day-to-day operations and need details on how other courts have implemented and operated effective programs.

Researchers will look to this evaluation as a guide toward future efforts. The results of the study will provide details on implementation and management.

## **Drug Offender Disposition**

While some Institute evaluators are working to improve court administration, others are assessing different ways of handling offenders. Drug-using criminals present a wide variety of problems to sentencing judges who want to impose punishment that is meaningful and will serve as a deterrent to the defendant, and simultaneously makes best use of available jail, prison, parole, and probation resources.

The Institute has undertaken a number of evaluations aimed at improving approaches to drug offender disposition. Three of them—structured fines, focused offender disposition, and alternative sanctions—are discussed below.

### **Structured Fines: An Impact Evaluation**

Criminal fines are capturing interest as policymakers seek a greater variety of community-based sentencing options. Ultimately, a full spectrum of intermediate sanctions—including fines, intensive probation, electronic monitoring, and community service—can be implemented, allowing judges to better match the seriousness of the offender's crime with the severity of sanctions. It is within this context that the Institute is closely examining fines and other monetary sanctions. Can fines—appropriately imposed, monitored, and enforced—develop into a credible intermediate sanction?

Criminal fines are widely used but primarily in conjunction with other sanctions (e.g., probation) or as stand-alone sentences for less serious crimes (e.g., traffic offenses). Western European countries, on the other hand, have successfully used fines as sole sanctions for many serious criminal cases, and in several countries fines serve as a major

***Structured fines may serve as an intermediate sanction that can be handled administratively, leaving probation officers free to invest more time and resources to supervise high-risk offenders. Structured fines may also generate substantial revenues for courts.***

alternative to imprisonment. Hesitancy to use fines more broadly in the United States appears to result from judicial concerns about ensuring public safety (if fine sentences were used to divert persons from incarceration), poor fine enforcement, and unduly penalizing the poor. The European day fine, which is based on the offender's daily income, enables the court to link the fine to the offender's ability to pay and the seriousness of the offense.

Institute researchers developed a pilot project to use day fines for low-level offenses handled in Staten Island, New York, courts. The project succeeded along a number of dimensions, including generating substantial revenues for the court. As the researchers disseminated the results, other jurisdictions became interested in the day fine concept. Institute researchers from the Vera Institute of Justice in 1990 assisted Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, in developing a day fine project as an alternative to probation.

### ***Research Questions***

Building on earlier research, especially the Staten Island experiment, the Institute has now launched an evaluation that will gauge effects of the frequency or amount of financial sanctions imposed on different offenders, how imposed sanctions are monitored and enforced, and their effectiveness relative to other sentences. The Institute is assessing the Structured Fines Demonstration Project, funded by BJA, in four jurisdictions: Phoenix, Arizona; Des Moines, Iowa; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and an Oregon jurisdiction to be selected. For this assessment, Institute evaluators from RAND will answer these questions:

- What are the goals and objectives of the day fine programs?
- How many eligible offenders received the day fine specified in the program's design?
- What revenues were generated from the day fine programs? How do these compare with those generated from routine fine practices?
- How replicable is the day fine program? What are the key ingredients for successful program implementation?
- How much did the programs cost? How did costs compare with revenues collected?
- What evidence suggests that the imposition of day fines is associated with an increase (or decrease) in recidivism?

### ***Policy Implications***

Structured fines may serve as an intermediate sanction that can be handled administratively, leaving probation officers free to invest more time and resources to supervise high-risk offenders. Structured fines may also generate substantial revenues for courts.

The evaluation will provide a comprehensive assessment of the implementation, costs, and impacts (both on the offender and the system) of implementing day fine programs across the country. The results will be of immediate interest to jurisdictions considering implementing day fine or other monetary penalty programs.

### ***Focused Offender Disposition***

A critical step in controlling drug abuse involves the behavior of offenders after they are released from incarceration. Offenders with a history of illegal drug use are of particular concern, for a return to drug use correlates with a return to crime. Institute research has established that urinalysis is effective in monitoring offenders' drug use after incarceration, and studies are examining how best to employ it as a monitoring technique. The goal is to reduce the likelihood of recidivism and to reserve the most intensive and expensive treatments for those offenders who need them most.

Under a BJA grant, the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors (NASADAD) established the Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition Program. NIJ's evaluation, conducted by the School of Justice Studies at Arizona State University, is examining:

- How does urinalysis monitoring alone compare with urinalysis monitoring combined with standard treatment?
- How effective are needs assessment instruments in determining the level of treatment or supervision that offenders require after prison?

NASADAD established programs in Birmingham, Alabama; Chicago, Illinois; and Phoenix, Arizona. Offenders entering probation with a history of recent drug use were divided into two groups. One group (the control group) was assigned to random urinalysis monitoring, regardless of individual needs. The other group was assigned to one intervention option: urinalysis only, outpatient care with urinalysis, short-term residential care, or long-term residential care. Probation authorities at some sites used the Offender Profile Index (OPI) to determine individual offender's needs and local methods of assessment at other sites.

### ***Preliminary Findings***

Preliminary analysis of 908 cases in Birmingham and 907 in Phoenix showed substantial differences in how authorities assessed offenders' needs:

- In Phoenix, 79 percent of OPI-assessed cases and 60 percent of local-assessed cases prescribed urinalysis only; and
- Of the OPI-assessed cases, 42 percent of the Birmingham and 21 percent of the Phoenix offenders needed some form of outpatient or residential treatment.

These findings reflect differences in the offender profiles within the two cities. Compared with offenders in Phoenix, those in Birmingham were more likely to be minority males who had been convicted of a property offense rather than a drug-related crime, to have at least one prior arrest, and to be using cocaine rather than marijuana, thus requiring a stricter regimen. Offenders assessed by the OPI did not differ significantly from those assessed through local screening techniques on factors such as gender, ethnicity, age, education, prior arrest record, current offense, and drug use. No differences appeared between members of the treatment and control groups on the demographic and criminal history factors or on such indicators as stakes in conformity or drug use severity.

### ***Policy Implications***

Planners and managers seeking alternative techniques for coping with the growing numbers of offenders with a history of drug use should find this evaluation useful. The conclusions should serve as a practical guide to developing assessment instruments and point out the value of urinalysis monitoring for drug-using offenders.

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## **Endnotes**

1. Bureau of Justice Statistics, October 1991. *Federal Criminal Case Processing, 1980-89*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, p. 2.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
3. Bureau of Justice Statistics, July 1991. *National Update*, vol.1, no. 1. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, p. 6.
4. Jacoby, Joan, December 1992. "Prosecuting Complex Drug Cases: A Program Assessment," report to the National Institute of Justice on Grant No. 91-DD-CX-K046. Washington, D.C., Jefferson Institute of Justice.
5. *Ibid.*



# Intermediate Sanctions

**F**or the past century, the American penal system has sought ways to deal effectively with the widening diversity among convicted offenders. Prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials have long believed that the basic choices—incarceration or probation and parole—provide too few tools to mete out justice, defend the community, and offer offenders opportunities to correct their behavior. The rapid increase in drug trafficking, drug-related crime, and violence-prone offenders adds to the complexity. Some middle ground that enables sentencing judges and correctional administrators to fashion the sanction to fit the criminal is needed. The public has been equally vocal about its concerns. The public worries about keeping another offender in the community, thus risking additional crime, and conversely worries about the cost of financing another prison cell to house that offender.

The National Drug Control Strategy addressed this subject as follows: "All those engaged in illegal drug use must be held accountable for their behavior, yet not all convicted drug offenders need to be incarcerated. Intermediate punishments, which expand the range of options between incarceration and unsupervised release, can provide innovative ways to ensure swift and certain punishment."<sup>1</sup>

Virtually all jurisdictions now face significant and rising pressures on prison facilities. By mid-1991, the Nation's prisons held a record high of 804,524 inmates, up 6.5 percent over 1990.<sup>2</sup> For every inmate, about three others were under some form of community supervision, mostly on probation. More than 4.3 million adults in the United States are currently under correctional supervision, about 60 percent of them under probation supervision in the community.<sup>3</sup> Not only has the size of the probationer population risen, but also a greater proportion appears to consist of serious offenders, particularly with respect to drug involvement. Offenders convicted of drug charges constituted 35 percent of the felony probationer population in 32 urban/suburban counties in 1986; 2 years later, that number had grown to 42 percent.<sup>4</sup>

These factors—risk to the community, sentencing fairness, drug dependency, and rising prison and jail populations—have given impetus to the demand for punishment that is more severe and restrictive than traditional probation. Intermediate sanctions today include intensive supervision, house arrest with electronic monitoring, and shock incarceration.

Intermediate punishments are intended to supplement traditional options of prison and probation. As the table on the following page shows, intermediate punishment programs, although growing in number, currently supervise fewer than 2 percent of all correctional populations. Rather than substitute for prison or probation, they fill the gap between those options by adding restrictions to offender movement, often requiring drug testing and treatment and offering the potential of greater community safety.

Proper disposition of the drug-using criminal, with a goal of protecting society and encouraging return to a responsible, crime-free life, has become a central question in the use of intermediate sanctions. Based on the research to date, some criminal justice experts

## **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .**

- *An assessment of intermediate punishments*
- *Intensive supervision programs in California and Minnesota*
- *House arrest and electronic monitoring in Marion County, Indiana*
- *Shock incarceration and aftercare*



now view aftercare—the provision of followup testing, treatment, and monitoring services after the offender leaves intensive supervision—as a critical element in ensuring that the ex-offender becomes a productive citizen and does not revert to a life of crime.

## Assessing Intermediate Punishments

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has responded to the needs of prosecutors, judges, other criminal justice professionals, and the public by sponsoring research and evaluation projects that are examining the effects of intermediate sanctions on criminal behavior and exploring the types of offenders and supervision conditions most appropriate for such programs.

Institute interest has focused on three areas:

- **Intensive Supervision Programs.** A form of community release that emphasizes close monitoring of convicted offenders in the community, many of whom have served a sentence in prison or jail.
- **House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring.** A procedure for monitoring the whereabouts of offenders while they are confined to their homes. Programs also use drug testing to screen for drug use by offenders.
- **Shock Incarceration and Aftercare.** The use of boot camp discipline to instill self-respect and new habits in younger inmates, and to provide them with job training, drug treatment, and aftercare services to improve their chances of returning to responsible lives in the community.

Descriptions of Institute evaluations in these areas follow.

## Intensive Supervision Programs

Intensive supervision programs (ISPs) emphasize stricter and more frequent monitoring and, often, expanded services for the offender. These programs can include convicted offenders who are sentenced to probation instead of prison or jail, and offenders who are released on parole after serving their sentence in prison or jail. Institute research has shown that, between 1980 and 1990, every State in the Nation implemented some form of ISP.

ISPs allow offenders to remain in the community under strict surveillance, but usually require them to pay victim restitution, hold a job, submit to random urine drug and alcohol testing, and pay part of the cost of their supervision.

Responding to needs of State and local jurisdictions, the Institute began to evaluate the first ISPs in the mid-1980s and continues to study a variety of programs around the Nation. Findings from the research indicated that ISPs may have considerable utility in punishing and controlling less serious offenders who have been escaping punishment altogether. The evidence to date raises questions about using ISPs to deal with serious and violent offenders, who need to be incarcerated to protect the public.

Probation was not intended or structured to handle heavily drug-dependent or violent offenders, yet caseloads of 150 to 200 are common—many involving drug users. Given such caseloads, routine “supervision” sometimes amounts to little more than the probationer mailing a card to the probation officer once a month.

A growing number of jurisdictions are trying to provide rigorous supervision of these higher-risk probationers in the community, with the aim of lessening the risk to public safety, which such offenders pose. Some jurisdictions also hope that such programs may reduce long-term imprisonment and thus help keep costs in line with budgets.

The Institute has focused evaluation resources on these programs to answer, among others, these questions:

## Intermediate Punishment Populations: 1990.

Punishment	Population
Intensive Supervision	72,509
Electronic Monitors	7,868
Shock Incarceration	5,268
All Corrections Populations	4,378,204

**Source:** Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice.

- To what extent do ISPs provide more effective punishment and control as an adjunct to prison or jail or, where appropriate, in lieu of long-term incarceration?
- How effectively do ISPs supervise offenders and control crime?

Recent Institute evaluations, with the assistance of RAND, constitute the most rigorous assessments of ISPs conducted to date and begin to provide answers to these questions.

### **Results from Three California Counties**

Between 1980 and 1985, 40 States implemented ISPs and the published results seemed encouraging.<sup>5</sup> Recidivism rates were low and most new arrests were for technical violations. But questions remained because the programs were untested, and judges were hesitant in sentencing offenders to them. Most programs did not assign offenders to ISPs randomly, but rather limited participation to property offenders with minor criminal records.

In 1986, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded an ISP demonstration project in 14 sites in nine participating States. The Institute selected three sites in California (Contra Costa, Los Angeles, and Ventura) for an initial evaluation involving random assignment of offenders. All three were probation-enhancement rather than prison-diversion programs. In all three, offenders were assigned in small caseloads and were required to participate in work, submit to random drug and alcohol testing, and perform community service.

The three programs were viewed as an alternative form of supervision for high-risk probationers and, in general, the approach did not succeed in these areas: recidivism rates were unaffected; participation in employment, education, and treatment programs was low; and high violation and incarceration costs drove up estimated program and court costs.<sup>6</sup>

Institute evaluators concluded that the failure rates occurred because offenders in the ISP were those sentenced for more serious crimes and were at higher risk of recidivism than those who participated in most of the previously evaluated ISPs. For example, only one-third of those in an earlier Georgia ISP, which was a prison-diversion program, were judged high-risk, while most of those in the California probation-enhancement effort fell into that category.

The BJA experiment continued from 1986 through 1990 and involved more than 2,000 offenders. The 14 sites tested 2 kinds of ISP: prison diversion (to keep sentenced offenders in community-based supervision rather than prison) and enhanced probation and parole (to increase surveillance of and services for high-risk offenders already on probation or parole).

A review of results from the 14 programs also failed to find positive outcomes. According to the evaluators, ISPs did not seem to control crime better than routine supervision, were not less costly, and had little effect on relieving pressures on prison populations. As with the three California sites, Institute evaluators concluded that the admission of a majority of serious, high-risk offenders into the program defeated the purposes of the ISPs.

Based on these findings and other research, NIJ began evaluation of more advanced ISP approaches, including the one in Minnesota described below.

### **Minnesota Intensive Supervision Program**

One of few intensive supervised release programs within a sentencing guideline system is being implemented in Minnesota. This initiative offers the Institute a useful opportunity to evaluate such a program, which also has been structured specifically to focus on using ISP in lieu of incarceration.

Minnesota enacted legislation to specify eligibility criteria for both prison-diversion and intensive supervised release programs. Corrections officials identify *low-risk* incoming inmates who fall within certain categories of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for

***Minnesota's program provides maximum community surveillance and supervision that include a lengthy period of home detention and close contact with specially trained agents who have small caseloads. At the core of the program are mandatory work and/or training in job skills.***

possible prison diversion. With the concurrence of the sentencing judge, these inmates are returned to their communities on condition that they fully participate in the program. Some high-risk offenders who need residential care upon release from prison are also identified for the program.

Minnesota's program provides maximum community surveillance and supervision that include a lengthy period of home detention and close contact with specially trained agents who have small caseloads. At the core of the program are mandatory work and/or training in job skills.

The Institute evaluation of the Minnesota program is designed to assess program costs and effects by answering these questions:

- How many offenders were diverted, and what were their characteristics and backgrounds?
- How many offenders declined the option, and what factors influenced their decision to serve full terms of imprisonment?
- How fully were each of the planned components actually delivered, and what were the levels of service and surveillance?
- How many offenders were tested for drug and alcohol use, what were the results, and what action was taken when tests showed substance use?
- How did offenders behave in the program, how many were arrested again and for what crimes, and what offender characteristics and/or program methods seem to relate to success or failure?
- How many offenders maintained employment, paid victim restitution, and participated in drug-dependency treatment, and what relationship exists between these activities (particularly drug treatment) and recidivism?
- How did costs compare with prison incarceration during the 2-year period?

This Institute evaluation represents the first experimental evaluation of a prison-diversion ISP. Results, expected in early 1993, should be of value especially to State legislators and corrections policymakers. The evaluation should determine whether the stated objectives were achieved and at what cost. This evaluation should also yield important information on how this and other intermediate sanctions can be incorporated into sentencing guidelines.

## **House Arrest and Electronic Monitoring**

House arrest and electronic monitoring were among the first topics that the Institute studied in the field of intermediate punishments. House arrest, which enables the offender to work or carry out necessary errands, has a long history as a criminal penalty and has been made newly popular with correctional authorities with the advent of electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring is thought to make house arrest practical and affordable.

Electronic monitors can be active or passive. An active monitor includes a transmitter attached to the offender's wrist or ankle, which transmits signals during the specified hours that the offender is required to be at home. The signals are relayed by telephone to the supervising office. A passive monitor uses a computer program to call the offender randomly during the hours of home confinement; the offender inserts his or her wristlet or anklet in a verifier to confirm his or her presence at home.

Electronic monitoring and house arrest have come into widespread use in recent years. An Institute-sponsored study of nationwide trends in 1989 showed that in fewer than 6 years since the first monitoring devices became available, 37 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico were using the system. Most jurisdictions tested some offenders for drug use, and many routinely tested all.

The Institute places a high priority on evaluating community-based programs that emphasize punishment and offender control, and thus evaluate the Florida Community Control Program (FCCP), a State-operated program that has handled more than 60,000 offenders since 1983. The program, the Nation's largest intensive-supervision prison-diversion program, uses very small caseloads—between 20 and 25 per supervising officer—and places many offenders under house arrest when they are not involved in an approved activity. In 1987, the program also placed some offenders on electronic monitoring and began screening for drug and alcohol use.

The Institute evaluation, conducted by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, found that the Florida program was effective with the population it was intended to serve:

- Of all offenders diverted from prison, 54 percent were diverted through FCCP.
- Of all offenders diverted from jail, 32 percent were diverted through FCCP.
- Offenders who spend an average of 9 months in prison have a higher new conviction rate (24.3 percent) during an 18-month followup period than their counterparts in the community control program (21.7 percent).
- Costs per day compared favorably with other dispositions: prison—\$39.05, jail—\$19.52, FCCP—\$6.49, and regular probation—\$2.19.

### **Marion County, Indiana**

The home detention program in Marion County (Indianapolis), Indiana, which includes electronic surveillance of nonviolent felons as well as drug testing, was the subject of another Institute evaluation. The program enforced home detention in some cases through such intensified probationary supervision methods as frequent home visits and telephone calls, which enabled evaluators to compare such "manual" confinement with the newer electronic systems.

Institute evaluators from Indiana University found no difference between the two ways of monitoring in terms of in- or post-program recidivism, but stressed that the two systems require different skills and organization. When properly installed and maintained and when program staff are experienced with it, evaluators found electronic monitoring equipment provided more information on the whereabouts of offenders.

Drug testing was also conducted on the monitored offenders. A disproportionate number of monitored offenders—65 percent—had been convicted of the felony of driving while intoxicated; 39 of 99 offenders were given urine tests on suspicion of using a forbidden substance and 29 tested positive—5 for cocaine and (with some overlap) 25 for marijuana derivatives, and only 1 for alcohol.

Rearrest rates were low. While in the detention program, only five offenders were arrested once and two were arrested twice on a variety of charges; none was arrested for an alcohol-related offense.

### **Shock Incarceration and Aftercare**

Shock incarceration programs are one of the fastest growing forms of correctional intervention. As of early 1991, 34 programs for adults operated in 23 States, and cities and counties ran additional programs for adults and juveniles. Although not originally designed for drug offenders, these programs have received considerable attention as an option for disposing of young nonviolent drug offender cases. In short, a shock incarceration program can be described as one that includes intensive training and is an incarceration-based alternative to a traditional prison sentence. These programs generally consist of:

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- A boot camp atmosphere, with strict rules and discipline;
- Required military drills and physical training;
- Offenders separated from other inmates; and
- Voluntary participation—prisoners choose to enter the program or serve their full sentence in prison.

More recently, some programs have abandoned the military-style training although they remain highly structured. Alternatives to the military model, such as Michigan's Nokomis program, reported on below, still attempt to instill discipline and responsibility; these alternatives include wilderness experience, job corps, and industrial components.

One area highlighted by research and experience to date is the role of rehabilitative efforts during and after shock incarceration, especially for drug offenders. Because little is known of the effect of these "bridge" services, such as drug therapy and vocational education, the Institute is developing information on this for the criminal justice field.

Questions posed for evaluation of shock incarceration, especially regarding young adult drug offenders, include:

- How effective is shock incarceration in reducing recidivism and controlling such offenders?
- How important are "bridge" services and therapies in the post-incarcerative period?

Because a large percentage of entrants are drug abusers, corrections officials want to know whether and how to incorporate drug treatment into the in-prison phase, and whether and how aftercare can be provided to reduce drug use successfully.

Research indicates that most boot camps provide drug education and treatment; some require all participants to attend drug treatment, while others provide drug education but expect the community to provide drug treatment after release of the inmate. Law enforcement officials want to know the effectiveness of these and other approaches after offenders are back in the community.

Because boot camps incarcerate offenders for relatively short periods of time, research suggests they may not be able to prepare the individual fully for readjustment to the community. Post-release aftercare may, therefore, be an essential ingredient of successful programs. Aftercare generally includes frequent contacts between the offender and the supervising officer, employment assistance or training, and other services, particularly drug treatment or surveillance directed at enabling the offender to lead a noncriminal life.

### **Institute Evaluations**

The Institute has supported several evaluations of shock incarceration in recent years, including a national study, a more in-depth multisite study, and examination of particular programs.

#### ***National Study of Shock Incarceration***

Working with researchers from Louisiana State University, the Institute conducted a national study of shock incarceration in the United States during the period 1989 to 1991. Findings showed that, as of late 1991, boot camp graduates' recidivism after release compares with that of similar offenders serving sentences in prison. Studies by the corrections departments in New York and Georgia—two States with very different emphasis on rehabilitation—concluded that boot camp releasees do "no worse" than much higher risk and more serious offenders who had served longer sentences in prison. In both States, 20 percent to 30 percent of boot camp graduates and comparison groups returned to prison within the first year of community supervision. However costs were lower because time served is less.

Based on these results, New York has identified the transition to community life as crucial and has improved services and supervision in the community following release from boot camp. Georgia has proposed increasing the rehabilitation or educational component of its boot camp programs.

Research has confirmed that many offenders in boot camps have drug problems. Officials in Mississippi, for example, found that up to 95 percent of their participants were drug users. At least four States in the evaluation reported that their programs were specifically designed for nonviolent, drug-involved offenders.

In response to offenders' needs, all boot camp prisons reported having incorporated drug treatment and education into their program. In nine States, drug treatment is a legal requirement. Strategies for drug treatment and education vary widely, as might be expected. Some focus solely on drug education—a total of seven in the NIJ survey conducted as part of the evaluation. Others emphasize treatment (three programs), and 13 combined the two. Most respondents rated drug education more important than treatment.

In virtually all programs, inmates receive at least several hours of drug treatment per week. The availability of individual or group psychotherapy, drug counseling, and relapse-prevention training was far more limited.

### **Multisite Study of Shock Incarceration**

Following up on the national survey, the Institute is supporting evaluations, by researchers from the University of Maryland, of shock incarceration programs at sites in eight States: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas. Final results are expected in 1993.

### ***Preliminary Findings***

In Louisiana, evaluators found that, after completing their shock incarceration, offenders had fewer arrests, convictions, and revocations for new crimes, although they had more revocations for technical violations than comparison groups of parolees and probationers. This finding is important in terms of its implications for parole and probation. If one of the goals of the shock programs is to produce lower return rates to prison, it may be beneficial to develop intermediate punishments for those who are found to have violated conditions rather than committed new crimes.

### **A County-Operated Boot Camp for Drug Offenders**

Another Institute effort is evaluating Los Angeles County's Regimented Inmate Diversion (RID) pilot program, which is a sentencing option for selected defendants who were likely to receive lengthy jail sentences followed by probation. Young adult male offenders are confined in a residential military-style boot camp for 90 days, followed by 90 days of intensive aftercare supervision in the community. RID includes mandatory education, drug treatment, and counseling.

NIJ decided to evaluate the program because RID represents the most ambitious effort to date to test the efficacy of a county-operated boot camp for drug offenders. The program also is unique in that it is funded primarily by money and assets seized from drug offenders convicted in Los Angeles County. Program goals are to:

- Improve inmate control by establishing and enforcing strict rules of conduct;
- Reduce recidivism;
- Reduce costs through avoidance of long-term incarceration; and
- Reduce jail crowding.

***Research has demonstrated that drug treatment and aftercare components in boot camps may be crucial for effectiveness. In fiscal year 1991, NIJ awarded funds, to Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, to seek out innovative and effective programs of boot camp drug treatment and aftercare services at three levels: system, institutional, and individual.***

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency is conducting the evaluation for the Institute.

### ***Findings to Date***

The evaluation project began in fall 1990 and will be completed in July 1992. The first platoon of inmates graduated in December 1990, and platoons have graduated every 2 weeks since then.

The program targets serious, high-risk offenders. About one-third have committed crimes against persons, and 23 percent were arrested for drug offenses. Almost half reported regular use of cocaine or crack, and just under 10 percent used heroin prior to arrest.

Among findings to date are these:

- Both the boot camp and intensive supervision components demonstrated high success rates in terms of successful completions. More than 85 percent of inmates admitted in fiscal year 1991 successfully completed the boot camp portion of RID, and almost 75 percent completed the intensive supervision phase. The overall successful completion rate for the RID program was 64 percent.
- RID graduates also demonstrated impressive results in terms of improving their education levels. Functioning on average at the sixth grade level on arrival, RID graduates improved their overall grade levels from 1 to 2.5 years over the 90-day period. The school awarded 66 general equivalency diplomas and nine high school diplomas to fiscal year 1991 participants.
- Inmates also responded positively to the opportunity to learn workplace skills. More than half of the inmates who were unemployed on arrival were employed or in school when exiting the probation period of RID. Fully 92 percent of all graduates who were employed on a full-time basis exited the program successfully. By comparison, 36 percent of unemployed offenders successfully completed RID.

In the aftercare phase, supervised offenders are contacted two to three times a week. Successful participants have an average of 30 contacts with probation staff during their supervision, and approximately 40 percent of those contacts involve face-to-face meetings with probation officers.

Evaluators found that many offenders in the target population shun the program because they can spend less time in jail if sentenced, given reductions of sentences for good behavior. For many, the attraction of 90 days of strenuous physical activity, followed by 90 days of strict community supervision, is not great. Program administrators are seeking ways to increase intakes into the program, particularly offenders likely to spend long periods of time in jail or prison.

### **Boot Camp Drug Treatment and Aftercare Interventions**

Research has demonstrated that drug treatment and aftercare components in boot camps may be crucial for effectiveness. In fiscal year 1991, NIJ awarded funds, to Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, to seek out innovative and effective programs of boot camp drug treatment and aftercare services at three levels: system, institutional, and individual.

This study will survey all State departments of corrections and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and three boot camps that exhibit potentially strong treatment and/or aftercare components will be asked to participate more fully in the study. Results are expected by late 1993. By documenting the most promising strategies for effective treatment of boot camp inmates, NIJ will continue to help corrections officials in refining their programs.

## Juvenile Offenders: Michigan's Nokomis Challenge Program

Previous evaluations suggest that chronic or serious delinquents, who suffer from a variety of social and family problems, can be rehabilitated by programs carried out in community settings. The Institute is testing the value of intensive community supervision for chronic juvenile offenders, such as substituting intensive community supervision and aftercare for a few of the final months of year-long residential placements. Although results are not definitive, administrators in Michigan have been encouraged by their Nokomis Challenge Program.

The Nokomis Challenge Program was designed as an alternative program for juvenile offenders who are serving terms of approximately 12 months in Michigan's training schools. The goal is to prevent relapse into drug use or crime. A 3-month residential stay emphasizes life skills, addresses substance abuse problems, and includes an "outward bound" component. Providing needed services and child advocacy by private community agencies, a 9-month community phase intensively supervises and tracks youths.

The Institute's evaluation of the Nokomis Challenge Program, conducted by RAND, is measuring its impact on substance use, continued delinquency, public safety, and correctional costs. The goal of the evaluation is to determine the program's effectiveness in:

- Teaching juvenile offenders the skills they need to change their behavior, thereby reducing their level of criminal activity and drug use and thus recidivism; and
- Suppressing and detecting criminal activity and drug use while the youths in the experimental group are under intensive supervision in the community and the control youths are still in residential placement.

The evaluation seeks to find out if one type of offender is better suited to this type of program than another, and, if so, what are the characteristics of the offenders who are better suited. It will also measure impacts of the family treatment component, offered by the community providers, on family functioning and on other family members.

Evaluation results will be useful to juvenile corrections' policymakers and practitioners because of data comparing the cost-effectiveness of an integrated short-term residential program (which has intensive community supervision) with a traditional long-term residential program. Also, the study will report on the public safety risks of supervising juveniles within the community and on the kinds of juveniles who do best in this type of treatment.

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## Endnotes

1. Office of National Drug Control Strategy, January 1992. *National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drug Use*. Washington, D.C., Office of National Drug Control Strategy, p. 173.
2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, January 1992. *National Update*, vol. 1, no. 3. Washington, D.C., p. 3.
3. Bureau of Justice Statistics, November 1991. *Probation and Parole 1990*. Washington, D.C., p. 4.
4. Cunniff, Mark A. and Mary K. Shilton, March 1991. *Variations on Felony Probation Persons Under Supervision in 32 Urban and Suburban Counties*. Washington, D.C., Bureau of Justice Statistics.
5. Pertersilia, Joan and Susan Turner, December 1990. *Intensive Supervision of High-Risk Probationers: Findings from Three California Experiments*. Santa Monica, California, RAND.
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WHITE - Case Report CANA \* PINK Extension GOLDENROD

RELEASE PRINT  
USE BALLPOINT PEN

ARREST/BOOKING RECORD

JAIL BOOKING # 90417

INDICATE REFUSED AN APP WITH INFORMATION

LAST NAME FIRST MIDDLE  
**FURLISS DONALD**

VP ALLEGED TATTOOS (LIST ADDITIONAL FROM READING SECTION)  
**TATTOO - RIGHT ARM**

HOME A.D. #  
**7022 43RD AVENUE**

HOME PHONE NO. STATE  
**941-2611 A00487060**

W M 5-9 160 BR BR 40 9/2/50 PLACE OF BIRTH  
**OHIO**

CITIZENSHIP OCCUPATION  
**U.S. 198-34-1460 PLUMBER**

NEAREST RELATIVE NAME RELATIONSHIP ADDRESS  
**SELF NONE**

RELATIONSHIP ADDRESS  
**MOTEL 2002 16TH STREET**

COMPLAINTS (EVIDENCE OF ILLNESS/INJURY) YES  TREATED  REFUSED  NO  NOT TREATED

ARRESTING AGENCY (AGENCY ARREST NO. ARREST DATE) ARREST NUMBER  
**00723 40251549/9/90 2115 09-129788**

ARREST LOCATION ARRESTING CITIZEN NAME  
**1920 E. ADAMS**

DRIVER LICENSE STATUS INFO CHECK PROVIDED BY  
**620 W. WASH**

EVIDENCE IMPOUNDED WHERE YES  NO  PERSONAL PROPERTY IMPOUNDED WHERE YES  NO   
**620 W. WASH**

1-NO CHARGE 2-NO CHARGE

MISC:

**TASK**

**USER h**  
**PUSS P**

SALE  SALE  OTHER

ISSUED DATE INITIAL APPEAR. PRELIMINARY RELEASE INFO JUDICIAL JURISDICTION  
**3-3408A-1 SF 9/8/90 E. PHX. J.**

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# 8 Drug Testing and Treatment in the Criminal Justice System

**A**s the President's 1992 *National Drug Control Strategy* points out, American society is waging a two-front war against drugs: one against casual drug use and another against hard-core drug use. Casual drug users constitute a significant portion of the drug market and a source of revenue for drug traffickers and dealers. Hard-core drug users are estimated to constitute 25 percent of drug users and to consume 75 percent of all illegal drugs consumed in the United States. "These heavy users are at the heart of the drug problem," the Strategy states: "open-air drug markets, crack houses, drug-exposed infants, abused and neglected children, gang violence, decaying neighborhoods, and drive-by shootings."<sup>1</sup>

Important tools for the criminal justice system in this two-front war are drug testing and treatment, tools that can be used in conjunction with incarceration or other appropriate punishment. National Institute of Justice research has shown that integrating treatment with sanctions can help offenders to make the transition to drug-free status, particularly where the offender is kept in treatment and is monitored through periodic testing.

This chapter begins by describing Institute research on programs for the least criminal class of drug users, the casual or recreational user. "Casual drug use is still too high," the President said in transmitting the 1992 *Strategy* to the Congress, and he called for continuing to stress efforts to reduce it. This chapter then reports on a program that helps juvenile offenders to move to a drug-free life, and it concludes its first part with a description of evaluation of drug testing throughout the criminal justice system.

The second part of this chapter discusses drug testing and treatment in the corrections system: in local jails, in work release, and in therapeutic communities in a State prison system.

## Casual User Accountability

A high priority of the National Drug Control Strategy continues to be the reduction of all illegal drug use—experimental, casual, regular, and addictive. Because the majority of the drug-involved population consists of nonaddictive users, casual or recreational users contribute significantly to the violence and crime associated with local drug markets. The strategy calls for demand reduction efforts to hold drug users legally accountable for their unlawful behavior—a policy of "zero tolerance."

Law enforcement has responded vigorously to the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the national strategy, resulting in a broad pattern of activities aimed directly at the first offenders and recreational or occasional drug user. Tools include suspension of driver's license, notification of employer, identification in local newspapers, overnight or weekend detention, and forfeiture of cars driven during purchase or use of drugs. Accountability efforts directed at juveniles include notification of parents, suspension from school, community service on weekends, and suspension or delay in application for a driver's license.

## INSIDE THIS CHAPTER . . .

- *A Maricopa County, Arizona, program to hold casual drug users accountable*
- *Probation and drug treatment for juveniles*
- *Drug testing throughout the criminal justice system*
- *Drug treatment in local jails*
- *Work-release programs*
- *Therapeutic communities in Georgia prisons*

***What did change was the use of diversion to treatment as an option either to turning down a case or filing charges; the increase in such use "widened the net" by bringing into treatment persons who would otherwise not have been retained in the criminal justice system.***

Many States have enacted stiff laws against casual drug users. Indiana, for example, imposes court fees of up to \$400 on convicted offenders, and earmarks the funds to support undercover police units and drug prosecutors. Persons convicted of any drug offense in New Jersey automatically lose their driving privileges for 6 months to 2 years. Persons driving under the influence of drugs in Rhode Island must pay a \$400 fine, which is applied to support their treatment. And in Florida, persons driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs face suspension of their licenses, and all driver's license applicants must complete a drug education course.

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act's strategy to reduce demand included these provisions aimed at users:

- Persons possessing even small amounts of illegal drugs could be fined up to \$5,000 and may be subject to imprisonment;
- Tenants in federally supported housing could be evicted for using drugs;
- Federal contractors are required to make a good-faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace, or risk suspension or termination of the contract or debarment;
- Applicants for a driver's license in a four-State pilot program are to be tested for illegal drug use, and those who test positive could be denied driving privileges for at least 1 year; and
- Federal benefits—including student loans, Federal contracts, and federally issued licenses—can be denied to persons convicted of drug possession and trafficking.

### **Maricopa County, Arizona**

The Institute is evaluating the Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona, Demand Reduction Program, called "Do Drugs. Do Time." The program is based on a strategy that is coordinated among 28 agencies and includes a public education campaign, special law enforcement operations targeted at arresting drug consumers, and a commitment to prosecute all arrestees who not qualify for, accept, or complete an adult prosecution-diversion program.

Only first-time offenders qualify for the diversion program, which consists of fines, urine testing, and drug treatment, with the participant bearing the costs. Those who successfully complete the program have their charges dropped.

### ***Findings***

Institute evaluators from Arizona State University measured program performance in several ways, and found that, among other things, the program:

- Received high visibility and positive publicity and a strong commitment from the private sector and the media;
- Processed a large volume of offenders, reaching more than 10,000 in the first 2 years; and
- Generated significant funds in the first 2 years, both in county jail fees (\$39,342) and the Arizona Drug Enforcement Fund (\$850,411).

Evaluators found no change in the level of enforcement or resolution of cases or in the number of cases submitted or the percentage of cases formally booked at the county jail, and no indication of increased enforcement by the county attorney's office.

What did change was the use of diversion to treatment as an option either to turning down a case or filing charges; the increase in such use "widened the net" by bringing into treatment persons who would otherwise not have been retained in the criminal justice system.

The Demand Reduction Program did succeed in achieving the following:

- Met its objective of net widening by retaining within the criminal justice system cases that would previously have been turned down;
- Expanded use of diversion to treatment, largely with pre-file cases;
- Slowed the length of time to recidivism among those who had contact with the treatment program;
- Generated funds from fees paid by persons who accepted the treatment option; and
- Established a very high profile for itself and its "Do Drugs. Do Time." campaign, which could be viewed as a public education and deterrence program.

## Working with Juveniles

Without effective intervention, many of today's juvenile felons will become tomorrow's career criminals. Programs designed to deter juveniles from continued criminal behavior may, therefore, have a significant pay-off for society. To determine whether adjudicated juveniles who receive comprehensive, intensive services fare better than those assigned to traditional programs, the Institute and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention undertook an evaluation of the Paint Creek Youth Center (PCYC) in Ohio. The evaluation of this small, experimental program for juveniles convicted of felony offenses was conducted with assistance from RAND.

The Paint Creek Center delivers a comprehensive and highly structured array of intervention services and activities to a group of 30 to 35 convicted juvenile felons each year. Each juvenile spends approximately 12 months in the program. In addition to its small size, some of the features that distinguish this program from traditional programs include:

- A structured system by which the inmates are held responsible for each other's behavior;
- A highly formal approach to assessing and tracking behavioral problems and strengths;
- Incentives for positive behavior;
- The absence of locked doors and other means of physical restraint;
- Daily group therapy sessions;
- A regular school curriculum;
- Substance abuse education;
- Family group therapy;
- Work experience for senior inmates; and
- Intensive aftercare and community reintegration.

The evaluation of Paint Creek was based on an experimental design under which eligible youths were assigned at random to Paint Creek or to regular training schools. Members of both experimental and control groups were randomly assigned. Data collected for comparisons between the experimental and control programs included:

- Records of participation in program activities and the rates at which the juvenile offenders completed each phase of the program;
- Interviews with staff regarding program management and operations and their views about the juvenile offenders; and
- Interviews with the juvenile offenders about their experiences in the program and their views about the staff.

These data enabled the NIJ evaluation to describe and document the content of the experimental program and the way in which it differs from the control program.

### **Initial Findings**

This evaluation, which was completed January 1992, yielded the following information:

- The program was implemented in a manner consistent with the way it was designed and was well managed;
- Some PCYC program participants were—to a modest degree—less likely to be involved in criminal activities 1 year after release from the program than their control group counterparts, according to official records. Self-reports showed slightly higher problem behavior;
- There were clear differences between how staff and youths in the experimental and control programs perceived their respective programs; and
- The daily costs for both groups were approximately equal.

Although youth in the experimental program showed improvements in behavior during the residential phase of the program, this improvement did not hold up when they returned to the community. The study concluded that this was not attributable to the intensity or comprehensiveness of the experimental program. In fact, the evaluators found that the experimental program appeared to do everything reasonably possible to assist the youth in changing their behavior. Researchers speculate that either:

- The benefits of the experimental program may not show up until after the first year following release; or
- The antisocial behavior patterns of delinquent youths are so ingrained or reinforced by the social environment, that more than a 1-year effort would be needed to have a greater effect on their willingness and ability to change.

Studies of larger samples of youth—committed to contrasting programs and followed up for longer periods of time—will be required if these issues are to be resolved.

### **Probation and Drug Treatment**

Substance abusers who undergo treatment reduce and sometimes overcome their drug use, thereby reducing the cost of drug-related criminal activity on society. Public safety may be well served by incorporating mandatory drug treatment into intensive supervision for high-risk probationers.<sup>2</sup>

The Institute has undertaken an evaluation of one such effort, A Substance Abuse Program for Probationers (ASAPP), in San Diego County, California. Offenders assigned to ASAPP must participate in intensive drug treatment while they are on probation. The Institute's evaluation of ASAPP, which is being conducted by the San Diego Association of Governments, will assess its effectiveness and document the effects of each element: the compulsory nature of the program, graduated sanctions—urine testing and electronic monitoring—within the drug treatment program, employment assistance, and program fees. When completed in the fall of 1993, the evaluation will provide a profile of the "successful" probationer for potential use in identifying offenders for whom programs of this nature are effective.

### **Policy Relevance**

The primary focus of this project is rehabilitation under strict conditions of performance. An assessment of the extent to which probation for high-risk offenders meets the perceived public demand for punishment and retribution will also be included in the study.

By addressing the question of "what works with high-risk, drug-involved offenders," this study will provide valuable information to justice administrators faced with crowded jails and limited resources.

## Drug Testing Throughout the Criminal Justice System

The criminal justice system provides a controlled environment for drug treatment. That environment may enable many offenders—at least temporarily, and perhaps more permanently—to recover from the use of illegal drugs and change their criminal lifestyles. Drug testing is key to drug treatment within the criminal justice system because it provides the objective information that officials need to both place offenders in appropriate treatment programs and monitor their compliance with those programs. The potential of drug tests for providing information on newly evolving drug problems as well as information on the effectiveness of existing drug treatment programs deserves continuing research and evaluation.

A number of systemwide drug-testing programs are currently in effect at the State and local level. The Institute has commissioned the Urban Institute and BOTEC Analysis Corporation to evaluate one such systemwide drug-testing program, in Multnomah County, Oregon, to determine the effects of such a program and to suggest procedures for implementing new programs. Slated for completion in late 1993, this evaluation will:

- Determine whether the drug-testing programs help offenders to achieve drug-free status;
- Evaluate the extent to which individual programs were successfully implemented;
- Identify barriers and creative solutions that developed during program implementation; and
- Assess whether program costs are offset by benefits to individual offenders and to the criminal justice system.

### Policy Relevance

This evaluation will be valuable to local criminal justice administrators who are considering implementing systemwide drug testing programs. It will provide information on program models, implementation issues, interagency coordination issues, data management, reporting and evaluation requirements, and expected results, including costs and benefits. In addition, the evaluation will yield analysis of the program's effect on drug-using criminals and on selected aspects of the criminal justice system. It will also describe how each program's implementation succeeded or failed.

### Pressures on Corrections

The corrections system in the United States, the end receiver of drug-involved and other offenders convicted of crime, seeks simultaneously to remove dangerous criminals from the streets, to punish offenders, to help addicts to break their drug habits, and to help those offenders who seek to reform their lives and return to society as law-abiding citizens. In the long run, the corrections system contributes to public safety by preventing the recurrence of crime by convicted offenders and deterring others from criminal activity.

For the past 20 years, prison populations have risen steadily and dramatically. The number of sentenced prisoners in Federal and State prison systems totalled roughly 198,000 in 1971, and had increased to 344,000 by 1981.<sup>3</sup> The rate of growth then accelerated even more between 1981 and mid-1991, when inmate population levels reached more than 804,000.<sup>4</sup>

*The criminal justice system provides a controlled environment for drug treatment. That environment may enable many offenders—at least temporarily, and perhaps more permanently—to recover from the use of illegal drugs and change their criminal lifestyles.*

***Prison and other corrections officials need to determine how best to identify those offenders who are likely subjects for drug rehabilitation, and how to bring about rehabilitation.***

Simultaneous growth of probation populations during that period attracted less attention, except among criminal justice professionals. Probation populations rose from 1.1 million in 1979<sup>5</sup> to 2.7 million in 1990, an increase of 146 percent.<sup>6</sup>

Drugs play a role in much of the criminal activity in the Nation today. National Institute of Justice research has for some years documented consistently high rates of drug use among booked arrestees (see Chapters 3 and 6, in particular, for details). Between 1979 and 1990, drug arrests rose 95 percent, significantly more than any other category of crime and accounted for 1.1 million arrests in 1990.<sup>7</sup> Studies show that illegal drug use frequently intensifies and prolongs criminal careers, and that substance abusers sent to prison are three times more likely to return than are nonsubstance abusers.<sup>8</sup>

These developments have placed significant strain on the corrections system, leading to sharply rising corrections budgets (the fastest growing component of many State budgets) and the use of many prison facilities at or beyond designed capacity. Corrections administrators are exploring a wide range of new approaches to coping with the rising influx of new cases, including intermediate sanctions (see Chapter 7).

One area of particular concern to corrections administrators is the role of drugs. Prison and other corrections officials need to determine how best to identify those offenders who are likely subjects for drug rehabilitation, and how to bring about rehabilitation.

The Institute is responding to this call from the corrections field and is evaluating programs that show potential to accommodate rising prison populations without compromising public safety, and that offer the likelihood of reducing recidivism among offenders who have served their punishment.

Offenders who participate in drug treatment have lower rates of recidivism. The task now is to give policymakers information on the specific types of interventions that lead to successful outcomes for drug-abusing offenders.

Current and recently completed National Institute of Justice corrections and treatment evaluations are designed to put accurate information on these types of programs into the hands of those responsible for their design and operation.

### **Treatment in Local Jails**

Evidence that, given the right conditions, correctional drug treatment programs can reduce recidivism and drug use is based largely on studies of prison-based programs. In many of these, however, prisoners participate for 1 year or longer. Little information is available about the effect of short-term drug treatment programs in local correctional settings, such as jails and detention systems. Moreover, it is unclear how extensively in-custody drug treatment is available in local corrections. In 1987, an American Jail Association study of local jails found that only 7 percent of local facilities had "comprehensive" drug treatment programs. Although 28 percent had some substance abuse programming, most offered limited services only, and only 8 percent had "transition planning" that linked participants to post-custody programs.<sup>9</sup>

A Department of Justice survey of drugs and jail inmates in 1989 showed that inmates who had used drugs with any regularity were more likely than those with less involvement in drug use to have participated in a drug treatment program. As shown in the adjacent table, about 24 percent of all jail inmates reported that they had taken part in a drug treatment program. Overall, jails provided drug abuse treatment to about 5 percent of jail inmates.

Little descriptive or impact information from research is available on the effectiveness of drug treatment in local jails, and even less is available on the links between in-custody programs and aftercare or post-release community programs. Aftercare is frequently recommended, but few descriptions of such programs or of their effect on offenders exist.

## Drug Treatment of Jail Inmates—By Past Use of Any Drug or a Major Drug, 1989.

	Percent of All Jail Inmates	Percent of Unconvicted Jail Inmates Who Used		Percent of Convicted Jail Inmates Who Used		
		Any Drug Regularly	A Major Drug Regularly	Any Drug Regularly	A Major Drug Regularly	A Major Drug Daily in the Month Before the Offense
Ever Participated in Drug Abuse Treatment Program	24.0	35.2	42.5	39.3	45.7	47.8
Number of Times*						
1	14.7	21.0	24.4	23.5	25.9	27.1
2	4.6	7.0	8.6	7.8	9.2	7.6
3-5	3.5	6.0	7.9	5.7	7.5	9.2
6 or more	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.9	2.8	3.6
In a Program in the Month Before Current Admission	4.9	7.3	9.2	8.4	9.8	9.7
Most Recent Treatment Was While Incarcerated	7.0	9.6	11.7	12.5	14.7	18.2
Currently in Treatment	5.0	5.4	6.5	10.0	12.2	14.8
Number of Inmates	395,554	102,501	65,857	126,940	81,920	37,769

Note: Major drug includes heroin, crack, cocaine, PCP, LSD, and methadone. Any drug includes the major drugs, marijuana or hashish, amphetamines, barbiturates, and methaqualone.

\* Excludes 1,956 inmates who did not report the number of times in treatment.

To fill the gap and provide thorough descriptions of jail treatment programs, last year the Institute supported an evaluation that details who participates, what services are provided, how much the programs cost, and the effect of these programs on drug use and crime. The study is being conducted for the Institute by the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. It will track post-incarceration results at six program sites, which are diverse in size, offender profiles, the content of their in-custody program, and the aftercare services they provide.

Case profile information and post-custody tracking data on arrests and drug usage (and, to the degree possible, aftercare program participation) will be obtained for matched samples of 1,300 treatment participants and 1,130 other eligible inmates unable to participate because of space limitations. The study will track both groups of offenders for a 12-month period to determine the effect of jail treatment programs on arrest rates and drug use.

This evaluation, which is just under way, will explore the applicability, feasibility, and cost-effectiveness of jail-based drug treatment programs to answer such questions as:

- Do shorter lengths of stay significantly minimize the effectiveness of jail-based programs compared with prison or probation programs?
- Do strong aftercare programs overcome the treatment limitations imposed by briefer custody periods?



***The premise of work release is that offenders who are provided with transitional services, such as employment opportunities and job training, achieve higher rates of employment, experience lower recidivism rates, and adjust to society better when they return to the community.***

## **Policy Implications**

When completed in late 1993, the study will help local jail administrators design and implement model jail drug treatment programs by providing detailed information on screening and diagnostic methods, types of interventions offered, staffing levels, facility requirements, and program costs. Study findings will be integrated with assessments of other local treatment programs to draw conclusions about the characteristics of successful programs and to recommend future research and program development.

## **Work Release**

Work-release programs permit offenders near the end of their prison sentences to live in residential facilities in the community, participate in work and training programs during the day, in many cases attend mandatory drug and alcohol counseling, and return to supervised custody at night. The premise of work release is that offenders who are provided with transitional services, such as employment opportunities and job training, achieve higher rates of employment, experience lower recidivism rates, and adjust to society better when they return to the community. Dating back some 3 decades, work-release programs move low-risk offenders out of incarceration and into the community on a path designed to integrate them with the community as law-abiding citizens.

Although every State has passed legislation that specifically authorizes work release for prisoners sentenced to State institutions upon conviction of a felony, there has been little research on the effectiveness of these programs. Of the few existing empirical studies, most suffer from methodological problems—thus, their findings are mixed and inconclusive. However, some evaluations show that work-release programs have benefits. For example, one well-designed study found that 3 years after they were released from prison, those who participated in work release had lower unemployment rates and higher wages than those who did not. Further, although the overall rearrest rates did not differ between the two groups, work releasees tended to be rearrested for less serious offenses, and were less likely to be returned to a prison for a felony.<sup>10</sup>

Although research shows a reduction in recidivism for offenders who participated in work-release programs, it does not determine:

- Which programs work best with specific types of offenders;
- The cost-benefit ratio of incarceration versus work-release placements and supervision; and
- How the benefits to the community compare with the risks.

Work release makes a great deal of common sense, but criminal justice policymakers need more reliable information than has heretofore been available. Interest in these programs is mixed with concern for public safety. In an effort to provide the criminal justice community with a more comprehensive picture of work release, the Institute has undertaken an evaluation of work release in the State of Washington, a national leader in work-release programs. Researchers from RAND are conducting the evaluation for the Institute.

The study has three phases, which begin with a look at the statewide picture and end with a look at Pioneer Human Services programs in Seattle, the oldest work-release program in the State. The three phases are:

- **Work Release Statewide.** Data on all prisoners discharged from the Washington Department of Corrections (about 2,400 individuals) will be analyzed to show who participates in work release, what services they receive, and how many successfully complete their program.

- **Effect on Post-Release Behavior.** About 400 male offenders found eligible for Seattle-area work release will be randomly assigned either to work release or to complete their full term in prison. Personal interviews and official records will be used to assess the differences in services received and the ultimate effect of participating in work release.
- **Effectiveness of Pioneer Industries.** About 300 male offenders on work release at three Seattle-area residential facilities operated by Pioneer Human Services will be randomly assigned to participate in either the Pioneer Industries program or be required to find employment in the general community. Personal interviews and official records will be used to assess the effect of participating in a comprehensive work, training, and education program run by the work-release provider.

The evaluation should provide the most thorough and credible assessment to date of the implementation and impacts of prison work release. Further details of this evaluation follow.

### **Work Release in the State of Washington**

Washington has used work release since 1970, when Pioneer Cooperative, a private nonprofit corporation, contracted to open the first community-based program in the State. Pioneer Cooperative is now called Pioneer Human Services (PHS). Today, some 15 residential work-release facilities throughout the State house more than 350 offenders on any given day.

The State Department of Corrections estimates that about one-third of the approximately 2,200 offenders discharged in 1989 by the Department were discharged successfully through work release. This is not, however, the total number who participated in work release prior to discharge: the Department estimates that about 40 percent of all released prisoners participate in some type of work release, but some fail to abide by program conditions and are returned to prison and eventually discharged directly into the community.

Those entering the work-release program typically pass through a short term in secure housing, then begin to assess community resources under direct supervision of Department staff, then enter a work-release program, then begin full-time employment, and eventually earn full privileges, including home furloughs.

#### ***Pioneer Human Services***

Pioneer Human Services has served several thousand work releasees since it started more than 30 years ago, and is widely known and well regarded both in the State and nationally. PHS operates three residential work-release facilities for males and one for females in the Seattle area with a combined capacity of about 200 offenders. While in the facilities, offenders are required to pay part of the cost of their program, pay taxes, and save money. They are also encouraged (and sometimes required) to participate in alcohol and drug counseling, and to submit to urinalysis testing for drugs.

A unique aspect of PHS is that it not only makes use of community resources for counseling, jobs, and training, but also operates its own programs. Offenders can participate in Pioneer Industries—which offer work and training—or they can find employment in the general community. Those who are “hired” by the Industries program learn metal fabrication and machinist technology in the Industries’ own 4,200-square-foot plant, where at any time about 200 offenders are engaged as employees in metal-related work.

The 18-month Industries program requires every participant to be subject to random urinalysis and to pass a prescreening urinalysis test when hired for Industries work. While in Industries work, offenders are paid and after 6 months receive full benefits, including medical, dental, vacation, sick leave, and life insurance.

***Preliminary results of this study show that nearly 70 percent of those participating completed the program successfully. The data also indicate that a large percentage of offenders participate in the work-release program, but that approximately 20 percent of the offenders who apply are not accepted, and that of those who are accepted, approximately 12 percent are not placed during their sentences.***

### ***Preliminary Findings***

Preliminary results of this study show that nearly 70 percent of those participating completed the program successfully. The data also indicate that a large percentage of offenders participate in the work-release program, but that approximately 20 percent of the offenders who apply are not accepted, and that of those who are accepted, approximately 12 percent are not placed during their sentences. Researchers are currently investigating why offenders who enter work release stay in it.

### ***Policy Implications***

The Institute evaluation seeks ultimately to determine what benefits work release has for society: Does it convincingly teach offenders skills and work habits that will enable them to pay their own room and board, support their families, and pay restitution to victims—all while remaining free of drugs and not committing crime? The Washington evaluation should provide solid answers, partly because it employs random assignment rather than selecting participants only from the low-risk population. The research will also evaluate the unique form of work release conducted by PHS.

The results will provide much-needed information on how work release can be best implemented, what public safety risks it entails, and what offender and program characteristics are associated with success. The results will help policymakers and planners devise sound policies that attempt to reduce corrections costs and offender recidivism without compromising public safety.

## **Therapeutic Communities in the Georgia Prison System**

NIJ is also evaluating drug treatment within prison. The State of Georgia has established a Prison Setting Therapeutic Communities (PSTC) program for substance-abusing offenders. Its goal is to intervene in the cycle of drug abuse, arrest, conviction, incarceration, and release back to society and reduce the return-to-prison rates for substance abusers. Drug-abusing inmates who are nearing the end of their prison sentences are placed in dormitory-style communities—on prison grounds, but separated from the general prison population—where they participate in counseling, therapy, socialization, and educational activities.

The Institute's evaluation of the program is being conducted over a 3-year period by the Evaluation and Statistics Section of the Georgia Department of Corrections.

The fact that the program is still in its pilot stage, with components being added and refined on a continual basis, is being considered in this assessment. For this study, therapeutic communities in both a men's and women's prison are being assessed in terms of the implementation of the program, how well its goals are achieved, and its potential for effectively managing substance-abusing offenders. Research is also intended to determine:

- How the increasing number of drug admissions to prisons can be managed effectively;
- If treatment provided within the prison setting will work for drug addicts; and
- If PSTC reduces the recidivism rate for drug-abusing offenders.

### **Preliminary Findings**

Although the evaluation will not be completed until mid-1992, preliminary findings indicate that in both the men's and women's prison:

- The therapeutic community is now established, and participants are working together as a community.

- Group therapy is well established.
- Additional staff training is needed to "fine tune" the program.

## Policy Implications

The State of Georgia is already using preliminary evaluation findings as a guide for addressing major issues in the program. Once completed, the evaluation may well influence both whether the program is replicated at other sites in Georgia and program elements that should be modified or emphasized in future programs.

Evaluation findings will also add to the pool of information and resources on therapeutic communities. Because the findings will cover all aspects of the development and implementation of a prison-based therapeutic community—including problems that arose and how they were resolved—they will help other agencies avoid pitfalls in establishing similar programs.

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## Endnotes

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**T**he increasing incidence of illicit drug use in many inner-city neighborhoods has had a profound effect on the quality of life of people living there. Illicit drug activity is often associated with increases in neighborhood crime, as hard-core drug addicts resort to robbery, theft, and prostitution to support their habits.

Recent polls indicate that drug use, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime are major concerns of citizens throughout the United States. In response to these problems, citizens, community-based organizations, and local police and sheriffs' departments have become more actively involved in anti-drug programs and initiatives.

Citizens have become more active in dealing with the problems of drugs and crime because they recognize that police departments cannot be expected to solve these problems alone; citizen involvement is also needed. In addition, evaluations have demonstrated that community programs based on the active participation of citizens can help to reduce both drug-related crime and the level of fear.

The question is: what works and why? What strategies are best suited to which kind of communities? How can community groups maximize the effectiveness of individual citizens and civic organizations that choose to take a stand against the criminal use of drugs and the violence associated with it, and thus improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods?

To answer these and other questions, the National Institute of Justice is supporting five evaluation studies. These studies are designed to:

- Test the feasibility of community-based initiatives;
- Gather practical information on how community groups have planned and implemented their programs;
- Find out what types of partnerships these groups have developed with other organizations; and
- Learn what type of technical assistance has been helpful in reducing drug-related crime in specific neighborhoods.

This information will be used to mobilize further citizen involvement in preventing and controlling drug abuse and related crimes. These studies will produce practical information that can be useful to other communities that want to design effective approaches to freeing their neighborhoods of illicit drugs and reducing drug-related crime.

## The Role of Community Groups

As citizens across the Nation have become increasingly angry about the incidence of drug abuse and drug-related crime in their neighborhoods, community organizations have begun to fight back by enlisting local residents in a grass-roots movement to rid their communities of illicit drugs. Rather than relying exclusively on the government to reduce the supply

### **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...**

- ***Communities in action***
- ***Wilmington's comprehensive approach to drugs and crime***
- ***Anti-drug programs in small cities and towns***
- ***Drug abuse resistance education***

of drugs, these groups have developed programs that rely on citizens to help reduce the demand for drugs. Involving themselves in the "drug war" on the front lines of inner-city streets is a daring undertaking for community groups because the illicit drug market is associated with high levels of violence and because drug dealers have been known to retaliate against those who interfere with their operations—and their profits. Nevertheless, community groups in cities throughout the United States have accepted this challenge and are working diligently to regain control of their neighborhoods.

### **Communities in Action**

In 1992, the Institute will complete a two-phase evaluation of the Community Responses to Drug Abuse (CRDA) National Demonstration Program. This demonstration program was funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to create and test "effective communitywide strategies that local groups can implement to reduce drug abuse and fear and to improve the quality of life" in 10 community organizations in nine cities. The two-stage evaluation program is being conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago. Phase I was completed in September 1990 and Phase II will be completed in 1992.

### ***Expanding Knowledge in the Field***

In contrast to the growing knowledge regarding the effects of criminal justice and government-based anti-drug programs, very little is known about the processes and outcomes associated with community-based programs. The Institute's evaluation study will fill this information gap by:

- Documenting the activities involved in planning and implementing anti-drug strategies;
- Describing the program components that emerged;
- Determining the extent to which the program achieved its goals;
- Describing the severity of specific drug-related problems such as those in the target area and making these data available to local community groups for planning purposes; and
- Assessing whether or not the technical assistance provided to each of these 10 programs was adequate.

This evaluation will provide practical information that can be used to benefit other communities that find themselves confronting in serious drug problems.

### ***Basic Strategies for Fighting Crime and Drugs***

Although Phase II of this evaluation has not yet been completed, data from Phase I and preliminary results from Phase II indicate that the 10 communities participating in this program have become active partners in defending their neighborhoods against drugs and drug-related crime. To this end, they adopted a variety of anti-drug strategies and programs:

- Forging partnerships with the police, other city agencies, and social service providers;
- Conducting needs assessment surveys and other research activities;
- Organizing the community to encourage participation in various program activities;
- Mobilizing churches to move beyond their traditional roles and to take an active part in dealing with the drug problem;
- Using the media to serve the needs of the community in general and the anti-drug programs in particular; and
- Receiving technical assistance from the National Crime Prevention Council and the National Training and Information Center.

This evaluation project demonstrates how very limited Federal funds allowed local community organizations to pursue their anti-drug agenda with greater intensity, focus, and persistence. Furthermore, in many cases, the Federal funds and the groups' association with the U.S. Department of Justice was instrumental in strengthening their organizational legitimacy in the eyes of other city, State, and national agencies. This, in turn, helped them to secure additional funds from other community sources to continue their efforts to reduce street-level drug activity.

### ***Finding New Strategies***

During the course of the CRDA demonstration program, participating groups changed their focus and orientation as they gained experience. For example, the CRDA organizations learned that the enforcement programs, which were the backbone of their initial efforts, would not be sufficient to solve the drug problem, especially in light of the overcrowding in the criminal justice system. In the second year and beyond, these organizations gave more attention to treatment and prevention initiatives. They began to view drug addicts as persons needing treatment as well as lawbreakers deserving punishment for their crimes. As they began to recognize the complexity of the drug problem, some organizations expanded into broader partnerships with other agencies, even though many had rejected the concept of interagency task forces and other similar partnerships at the outset of the project.

This evaluation provides valuable information on creating partnerships, how community leadership emerges, changes in police-community relations, the role of the church, the value of technical assistance, and other areas critical to the success of community-based anti-drug initiatives. Other communities can use this information in developing or strengthening their own efforts to rid their neighborhoods of drugs.

## **The Experience of a Representative Community**

The growing subculture surrounding the sale and use of crack cocaine offers many youths in inner-city neighborhoods an opportunity to earn more by selling drugs than they can earn through legitimate employment. Low-income, predominantly black neighborhoods are often disproportionately affected by the illicit drug trade. Economic hardship, related to the lack of marketable job skills and the perception that legitimate employment is not obtainable, and limited knowledge of how to take advantage of the employment opportunities that do exist have caused some to view drug dealing as an acceptable means of generating income.

These neighborhoods are often plagued by other problems as well. Indifference toward the educational system is common, as are welfare dependency, broken or disturbed families, poor housing, and parental deviance or criminality. Low self-esteem is another factor many believe to contribute to illicit drug use, crime, and the other social problems common in these neighborhoods.

### **A Comprehensive Approach to Drugs and Crime**

The Eastside Community in Wilmington, Delaware, is representative. A predominantly black community, Eastside has been significantly affected by drug trafficking and associated problems. Concerned residents established the Eastside Substance Abuse Awareness Program, which takes into account the social, economic, and cultural factors contributing to the problems, in addition to the issues related to law enforcement and community empowerment. This program aims to reduce drug-related activity in the neighborhood by combining the resources of criminal justice agencies, existing community service providers, the education system, churches, and businesses.

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### **CRDA Programs and the Community**

- **Community Awareness:** CRDA programs worked to enhance community awareness of the problem and the need for citizens to become involved in the war against drug dealers.
  - **Identification and Reporting of Drug Hot Spots:** Programs were created to assist local residents in reporting drug transactions. Hot Spot cards were distributed to record suspicious persons, locations, and vehicles associated with repeated drug activity.
-



***The premise behind the Eastside Community's approach is that open, illicit drug activity tends to occur in communities that have failed to establish standards for acceptable behavior. Such communities also tend to lack such formal and informal social controls as effective social services and community organizations. As a result, they are prey to individuals who view them as an ideal environment for selling drugs.***

The Institute has selected this project for intensive evaluation because it is an example of comparable efforts in other U.S. cities. This evaluation, which will be completed in spring 1993, is being conducted by the Delaware Statistical Analysis Center. It examines the effect of the three program components employed by the Eastside program to reduce drug-related activity in the community. To date the evaluation indicates this program has been successful in implementing all three components:

- Enhanced law enforcement efforts with emphasis on the use of community policing. In addition to assigning four experienced police officers to patrol the neighborhood on foot with the specific purpose of locating and identifying the areas where drug activity is most intense, representatives of the police department meet regularly with area residents to address their concerns about law enforcement efforts.
- Improved community organizations, including the establishment of a neighborhood advisory board, a block captain network, and neighborhood watch groups. The Eastside Advisory Council holds regular community meetings, organizes highly publicized anti-drug marches and rallies, recruits block captains, and works closely with the police and other community organizations in identifying and resolving problems.
- Increased numbers and types of social, educational, and rehabilitative services available to neighborhood residents. This includes establishing tutoring programs for neighborhood youth and training programs for parents, as well as substance abuse education, counseling, and treatment services.

The premise behind the Eastside Community's approach is that open, illicit drug activity tends to occur in communities that have failed to establish standards for acceptable behavior. Such communities also tend to lack such formal and informal social controls as effective social services and community organizations. As a result, they are prey to individuals who view them as an ideal environment for selling drugs.

The additional police manpower is intended to increase the level of formal social control, and the improvements in community organization will help to reestablish informal controls. When the enhanced policing efforts are discontinued, it is expected that the community will be sufficiently organized to assist the police in their efforts at controlling illicit drug activity.

### **The Effects of Community Policing**

Initial evaluation efforts are focusing on the law enforcement aspects of the program and will answer the following questions:

- What was the effect of the enhanced law enforcement efforts on the number of drug-related 911 calls and arrests?
- Is there evidence that the enhanced law enforcement efforts resulted in the displacement of drug activity?
- What effect (if any) will the withdrawal of the additional officers have on the number of Eastside drug-related arrests and 911 calls?

Two measures are being used to assess the policing component: the number of drug-related arrests made in the Eastside Community and the number of drug-related 911 calls. Preliminary findings indicate that the increased police presence has had a substantial effect:

- The number of drug-related calls to 911 increased significantly after community policing was implemented in 1989—from 260 in 1988, before the community policing effort began, to 464 after community policing was implemented in 1989. In 1990, the number of drug-related calls received by the police increased slightly to 489.

- The number of drug-related arrests increased. The combination of additional police manpower and improved information increased the number of drug-related arrests in the Eastside Community by more than 46 percent, from 155 arrests in 1988 to 226 arrests in 1989. In 1990, the number of arrests decreased to 177. This 22 percent reduction in drug-related arrests was, however, in part a result of the police department's decision to focus more effort on community involvement and less on making arrests. It is likely that increased responsiveness by police and the resulting increases in drug-related arrests during the initial phase of the program are a major factor in the increased willingness of area residents to report drug activity.
- Although there is little indication that the level of drug activity in the Eastside neighborhood as a whole is declining, it appears that it is stabilizing, for while drug-related 911 calls in this neighborhood remained roughly the same in 1989 and 1990, police departments in other neighborhoods with similar drug-related problems recorded substantial increases during the same period.

### Addressing the Problems of Drug-Affected Neighborhoods

Evaluation efforts currently under way are focusing on the social service and community organization aspects of the program. Issues to be addressed include changes in the number and types of programs and services that become available and changes in the levels at which available services are utilized by Eastside residents. Although final results are not yet available, preliminary evidence suggests that social services are being brought to bear more directly on the needs of community residents most affected by the drug trade. One particularly encouraging development is the effectiveness of the Eastside Development Council in providing area residents with a number of services that did not exist prior to implementation of the Eastside program, including:

- Nontraditional, culturally sensitive substance abuse treatment and counseling;
- Residential substance abuse treatment facilities;
- After-school tutoring programs;
- Community-based counseling and referral services; and
- Parent training workshops.

The advisory council has also been successful in establishing an array of additional services, including job training, adult education, drug education, and emergency housing. Preliminary data indicate that the number of Eastside residents who are taking advantage of these programs is increasing. As more data are available, researchers will assess the effect of expanded services on the community's drug problem.

### Anti-Drug Programs in Small Cities and Towns

Although it is widely recognized that drug abuse is an alarming problem in the Nation's larger cities and urban areas, little attention has been paid to the substance abuse problem existing in small cities and towns.

To provide a comprehensive response to the drug problems in this country, the Institute has sponsored a study of drug abuse prevention and control in small cities and towns that are not contiguous to urban areas and have populations of less than 50,000. The study is designed to collect information from a national sample of small cities and towns, describing the nature and extent of their drug problems and the steps they are taking to deal with these problems. This study, which is being conducted by Southern Illinois University's Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections, will be completed in mid-1993.

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***The major feature that distinguishes DARE from other school-based prevention programs is that the curriculum is well defined and is delivered by trained, uniformed police officers. Most DARE activities are directed toward youth in the last grade of elementary school, which is thought to be the age at which youth are most receptive to an anti-drug message, although some DARE curricula are administered in all other grades as well.***

The evaluation will answer four questions:

- How do law enforcement officials and key community leaders in small cities and towns describe their local drug problem?
- What kinds of anti-drug initiatives have been developed in small cities and towns?
- What are the characteristics of the programs that have been developed?
- Which program models appear to be successful, and what are the guidelines for their implementation?

### ***Policy Implications***

In addition to filling the gaps in our knowledge about—and responses to—the drug problem in the Nation's small cities and towns, the evaluation's findings will assist community leaders in these municipalities. The findings will provide community leaders in these municipalities with detailed program models that have proved promising in jurisdictions similar to their own. Because these models will have been identified through a systematic study of small towns and cities throughout the United States, they will represent the best current thinking about how to deal with drug problems that are unique to these municipalities.

### **Drug Abuse Resistance Education**

Despite encouraging findings that overall drug use among adolescents and youths is declining, the impact of drug abuse among specific populations, particularly minority youths residing in urban, inner-city neighborhoods, remains a serious concern. To inform children and youths about the dangers of drug use, many communities have initiated prevention programs in cooperation with law enforcement agencies. Despite the tremendous proliferation of school-based drug education programs in the past 2 decades, a comprehensive understanding of the efficacy of these programs is only beginning to emerge.

The Institute is evaluating BJA-funded drug-resistance education programs, using the cooperative police-school Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program—which is conducted in elementary and junior high schools and is the largest of these types of programs—as a focal point. This study, which is being conducted by the Research Triangle Institute's Center for Social Research and Policy Analysis, is just under way and will be completed in mid-1993.

The major feature that distinguishes DARE from other school-based prevention programs is that the curriculum is well defined and is delivered by trained, uniformed police officers. Most DARE activities are directed toward youth in the last grade of elementary school, which is thought to be the age at which youth are most receptive to an anti-drug message, although some DARE curricula are administered in all other grades as well. Moreover, a newly developed BJA-funded DARE curriculum for parents is currently being tested.

This study comes at a critical juncture for both the Institute and for DARE. With the latest modifications to the Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (DFSCA), DARE, which has been largely a grass-roots movement, has become institutionalized at the Federal level: the U.S. Department of Education now joins the Bureau of Justice Assistance in providing financial support for DARE at the local and regional levels. DARE is a popular program, as demonstrated by its widespread use. However, a number of fundamental questions have yet to be either addressed or answered:

- What do we know about the efficacy of drug resistance education in preventing drug use?
- What do we know about the effects of drug resistance education, relative to those of other school-based drug prevention programs?

- Are the effects of drug resistance education sufficient to warrant the institutional support these programs now receive?

This study will make a substantial contribution to answering these questions. Specifically, the primary goals of this study are to:

- Assess the effectiveness of the organizational structure and operation of representative DARE programs nationwide;
- Review and assess those factors that contribute to the effective implementation and outcome of DARE programs nationwide;
- Determine how school-based drug prevention programs (including DARE) may be tailored to meet the needs of specific populations; and
- Recommend new structures and operations to improve and expand DARE and other existing drug prevention education programs.

### ***Policy Implications***

The steady and widespread increase in school-based drug prevention programs throughout the Nation has been based on the assumption that such programs are effective.

Nevertheless, more knowledge of what types of school-based drug prevention programs are being implemented and delivered across the United States is needed. We need to know how extensively Project DARE is administered nationwide and how it is integrated into a general school-based drug prevention curriculum. This information will help to define where DARE fits within the constellation of school-based drug prevention programs and to make recommendations concerning the future of DARE and other programs.



**T**he Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which was the Federal Government's first effort to assist State and local governments in fighting crime, and subsequent legislation authorized States to use Federal funds to reduce drug-related crime, but the 1986 and 1988 acts expanded earlier efforts and increased aid specifically for drug control.

## The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988

In the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-570), Congress authorized annual grants to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the five Territories (herein referred to generically as the States). The grants were both formula and discretionary, the latter being awarded at the discretion of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA).

In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690), Congress significantly modified that program: it increased appropriations, created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and assigned to the National Institute of Justice (in section 6091) responsibility for evaluating the efficiency and effectiveness of programs funded under the act.

The centerpiece of the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance program, established by the 1988 Act, is the Drug Control and Systems Improvement formula grant program. Each State receives a "base" amount (e.g., \$1 million in fiscal year 1990) and an additional amount determined by population. BJA establishes each State's annual allocation based on this formula. Total grants vary widely; in fiscal year 1990, California, the most populous State, received \$39.7 million, while Wyoming, the least populous of the 50 States, received \$1.6 million. The table on the following page shows total State and local formula assistance grants under the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts from 1987 to 1992.

The legislation also authorizes BJA to administer a discretionary grant program under which it awards funds directly to both States and localities in the same 21 substantive areas that apply to the formula grant program. In fiscal year 1991, BJA awarded \$50 million in nine competitive and five noncompetitive areas, including intermediate sanctions, gang-related projects, multijurisdictional task forces, community policing, information systems, and drug testing.

Finally, in addition to conducting its own evaluations under the 1988 act, the Institute encourages States to evaluate formula grant projects and to disseminate information about successful projects. In addition, in 1990, the Institute and BJA co-sponsored the first National Evaluation Conference, at which researchers, practitioners, and State administrators discussed evaluation methods and work-in-progress relating to evaluations of drug crime control projects. The second National Evaluation Conference was held in July 1991, and the third is scheduled for July 1992.

### **INSIDE THIS CHAPTER...**

- *Evaluations of State planning strategies*
- *Guidelines for State monitoring*
- *A look at the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988*

## State and Local Assistance Grants Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts (in millions of dollars).

Federal Fiscal Year	BJA Formula	BJA Discretionary	ADMS <sup>1</sup> Formula	Drug-Free Schools Formula
1987	\$178	\$46	\$209	\$161
1988	56	14	200	191
1989	119	31	280	287
1990	393	50	477	461
1991 <sup>2</sup>	423	50	512	498
1992 <sup>3</sup>	405	50	512	498

<sup>1</sup> These figures are for the drug portion of Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Services only (excluding both alcohol and mental health). Sources for figures through 1990: Office of National Drug Control Policy, Federal Drug Grants to States, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Source of these estimates: Bureau of Justice Assistance; Office of National Drug Control Policy, Federal Drug Grants to States, p. 5; and Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy 3: Budget Summary.

<sup>3</sup> 1992 Budget Request. Source: 1992 Budget Request of the President; Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Control Strategy 3: Budget Summary.

## Evaluating State Planning Strategies

States have wide discretion in allocating their formula grants; States must, however, prepare an annual strategy for drug and violent crime control and can fund only those types of projects that the legislation specifies.

In preparing its strategic plan, a State must respond to a Program Guidance document that BJA releases annually after receiving its appropriations. BJA must approve a State's strategy before it will release funds to that State. Only then can the State begin the process of awarding subgrants. The Institute has evaluated how States produce their strategies. Because Congress added the strategy requirement in fiscal year 1987, this evaluation is the first comprehensive

analysis of these documents. Information from the evaluation has enabled Federal and State officials to improve management and gauge the effectiveness of strategic planning.

The evaluation had four broad objectives:

- To describe State strategic planning processes;
- To evaluate the content of the strategies;
- To report on State reactions and responses to the program; and
- To recommend ways to improve the strategic planning function.

Institute evaluators reviewed all fiscal year 1989 strategies and all but one fiscal year 1990 strategy. Site visits were made to California, Georgia, New Jersey, Montana, and Texas. At each site, evaluators interviewed State-level personnel involved in planning for the control of drug crime. Where appropriate, meetings were also held with treatment and prevention officials, officials involved in other drug-planning and coordination activities, and State policymakers.

All State participants in the formula grant program were surveyed by mail. The response rate was high, with all but one of the 56 formula grant recipients returning the instrument.

### Improving State Planning

As one of the first evaluations funded under NIJ's drug control evaluations, the data collection and research were conducted by RAND between December 1989 and August 1990. Preliminary findings were received in August 1990, and BJA immediately began working with the State planning agencies to establish improvements in the State strategic planning process.

In September 1990, BJA convened the first national meeting of the States on "Developing Strategies and Evaluating Performance," which was held in New Orleans during December 1990. This became an annual activity to form a Federal-State partnership focused on improving strategic planning at all levels when the second national meeting on "Violent Crime and Drug Control Initiatives" was convened in San Francisco in November 1991.

The NIJ evaluation findings also led to a redirection of the Consortium of States project, from a collection of 28 States developing data-collection methods and evaluation approaches to a "national" consortium that encompasses all States and Territories in its activities. In addition, and as a direct result of the evaluation, BJA began two major discretionary program initiatives in fiscal year 1991:

- **The Working Group of State Drug Control Executives** (Harvard University), which is a group of senior State officials who convene to integrate program assessments and evaluations into statewide drug control planning.
- **The State and Local Training and Technical Assistance Program**, which assists State and local jurisdictions in developing and implementing comprehensive systemwide strategies for preventing and combating drug-related and violent crime, and improving the function of State and local criminal justice systems.

Additionally, BJA's State and Local Assistance Division is working with States that have deficient information system capabilities and that also have unexpended funds remaining near the end date of a fiscal year award. Plans are developed to use the funds to upgrade the States' Grants Management Information System (GMIS), and BJA approved an extension of the award period for those purposes. Fourteen States have taken advantage of this enhancement of the formula grant program and are now fully meeting their monitoring and data-collection requirements.

Finally, BJA established a task force to prepare an action plan that addresses all the recommendations.

## Major Findings

As noted above, the findings of the study are being used to review programs and procedures. Study findings and recommendations are summarized here.

**Strategic Planning.** In general, States met Federal requirements. This finding confirms the judgment of BJA, which has approved all State strategies since the program began. All States:

- Produce a drug crime control plan of some kind;
- Conduct needs assessments that attempt, at the least, to quantify the drug problem;
- Designate priorities that provide a strategic focus for spending formula grant program funds; and
- Supply some of the information that BJA requires as a condition for strategy approval.

A large majority of States view strategic planning as crucial to their drug-control efforts. States emphasize that such planning forces them to consider goals, benchmarks, priorities, and the needs of various constituencies.

Moreover, there appears to be a growing trend toward State strategic planning for drug control independent of the formula grant program, another indication of the importance that States attach to the planning function.

**Comprehensiveness.** Both the legislation and BJA guidelines clearly require that State strategies be "comprehensive." The strategies must discuss all parts of the criminal justice system; analyze the needs and interdependencies of drug treatment, prevention, education, and criminal justice; and integrate the needs of various jurisdictions and geographic regions.

At the time of the study, few strategies fully met these objectives. Most States focused on activities and expenditures of the formula grant program, although these funds and projects generally constitute a small part of States' drug-control efforts. Many strategies did not



consider the entire criminal justice system, and typically minimized education and treatment. Few displayed a consistent, strategic approach, and fewer still related the strategy to the actual distribution of scarce resources.

These findings are not surprising. Responsibility for producing the State strategy normally rests with criminal justice planners who have no gubernatorial or legislative mandate to integrate the activities of criminal justice treatment and prevention agencies. Moreover, nearly all planners lack even basic information about local drug-control activities. Thus, the planners lacked authority and information to broaden plans beyond their own areas of expertise and influence.

States were also uncertain about whether congressional limits on formula funds—for example, the limitation of expenses to particular purposes—applied to the strategy as a whole. Finally, some planners opposed incorporating noncriminal justice activities into the strategy.

**Federal Mandates.** The statute requires that States consult with criminal justice practitioners, treatment and education personnel, local elected officials, State legislators, and the public during strategy development. Technically, most States met this consultation requirement, but the central force in shaping the strategies appeared to be criminal justice practitioners. At the time of the study, elected local officials were rarely involved systematically; treatment and prevention officials provided relatively marginal input; and the impact of public and legislative review was usually limited.

Some States met certain other requirements—including coordination of drug-control efforts, designation of regional areas of greatest need, and coordination of efforts with the National Drug Control Strategy—with pro forma declarations. Still other requirements, especially regarding data collection, were incomplete despite strenuous efforts, because of limited resources and organizational obstacles.

**Trends in Drug-Control Planning.** Many States are centralizing drug-control planning at increasingly high levels of State government, and are incorporating not only criminal justice but also drug treatment and prevention. States adopting this model are likely to produce increasingly comprehensive plans. Conversely, 13 States have decentralized drug-control planning by distributing formula funds to localities upon the submission of local drug-control strategies. Evaluators conclude that this approach impedes the creation of comprehensive plans at the State level.

**Planning and Funding Decisions.** State funding intentions showed striking similarities. In particular, many States chose the multijurisdictional task force as the crucial element of their spending plans.

This finding confirms the widespread perception that States use the bulk of formula funds for law enforcement. Yet, States also showed relatively strong commitment to the correctional system and career criminal investigations. Areas that received the least attention—family violence and public housing—were generally programs for which other Federal funds were available.

**State and Federal Perceptions.** Several congressional limitations on State use of formula funds—especially provisions requiring local matching contributions and limiting the duration of funded projects—met with serious State objections. Federal and State governments view the purpose of the formula grant program differently. Federal officials see the program as a way to provide States with “seed money” to create innovative and ultimately self-sustaining programs, and as a stimulant for the infusion of non-Federal funds. Most States view formula funds as a way to provide drug-control services that would not otherwise be provided.

## Policy Implications

This study's findings are useful to:

- Federal, State, and local policymakers who are concerned with grants-in-aid to control drug-related crime;
- State professionals involved with day-to-day program management, who want an overview of program activities and information on other States' approaches to such activities; and
- Congress and BJA, which have a basis for improving several aspects of the strategy requirement and the program as a whole.

The final report contains four primary recommendations for action at the Federal level:

**Maintain the Program's Strategy Requirement.** Although the impact assessments have not been completed, the general State approval of program administration suggests that wholesale reforms are not needed at this time. In particular, the State strategy requirement gets high marks. The requirement has clearly led to a dramatic increase in the quantity, range, and sophistication of State drug-control planning efforts; and States report that planning has contributed to their drug-control activities.

**Clarify the Goals of the Strategy Requirement.** Evaluators recommend that the purpose of the State strategies be clarified. Are strategies to be plans for expending Federal criminal justice funds on criminal justice functions, with little or no involvement of other drug-control activities in the health and education arenas? Or, are they to be comprehensive drug-control plans, in which Federal crime aid is but one element?

At the time of the study, strategies fell short of comprehensiveness but expended significant energies and resources in the attempt to achieve it. If comprehensiveness is retained as an objective, strategy requirements could be modified to encourage States to move in this direction. Options for such changes include: increasing coordination obligations for treatment and prevention grantees as well as for criminal justice practitioners; requiring States to submit comprehensive budgets; encouraging planning at higher levels of State government; and reducing the frequency of strategy submissions.

**Modify Certain Regulations That Govern Strategic Planning.** Federal requirements for consultation with localities should be strengthened. States should supplement consultations with police chiefs, prosecutors, and other justice professionals with the input of mayors, local legislators, and others. States should also consult with local jurisdictions, of a certain size, relatively early in strategy development.

Current data-collection requirements fail to meet the needs of either the States or the Federal Government. BJA should review the costs and benefits of requiring States to use standardized data forms, and it should assess whether to reduce the number of required data elements.

If Federal fiscal requirements are retained, Congress and BJA should state more clearly that the formula grant program provides seed money and does not supplement State revenue. They should also explain the specific role of fiscal limitations in advancing this purpose. This is particularly desirable given the eventuality that program funds may be reduced sooner or later, as has occurred in the past.

**BJA Should Improve Its Information Management and Reporting Capabilities.** Based on the evaluation results, BJA took steps to improve the maintenance, accuracy, documentation, and usability of its databases on State awards to local projects and on the progress of those projects. Finally, BJA improved its reporting on project activities to the Congress, to other Federal agencies, and to the States.

## Guidelines for State Monitoring

As a counterpart to the evaluation of the State strategy requirements, the Institute supported a RAND study of procedures and practices that States have created to monitor subgrant awards. This study produced guidelines that States could use to develop, implement, and improve their monitoring systems. The guidelines will help States to:

- Design a monitoring system;
- Assess the most important issues to which a monitoring system must respond; and
- Provide examples of alternative monitoring practices.

Research for this project began in early 1990 and concluded in late 1991. In undertaking this study, the Institute's evaluators reviewed the 1988 act and previous efforts to develop Federal monitoring handbooks. The evaluators then made an intensive examination of monitoring in six States: California, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, and Virginia. These States had, in the opinion of BJA, relatively well-developed monitoring systems that would be of interest to other States; the list also reflected both geographic diversity and a range of monitoring approaches. States volunteered to participate.

Although formal fieldwork was confined to these six States, evaluation personnel discussed monitoring with professionals in other States. These discussions were held primarily during BJA cluster conferences in late 1990 and at the 1991 National Evaluation Conference, where personnel from many States were gathered. These informal discussions were useful in learning about other State approaches to monitoring, such as Florida's introduction of automated data reporting, and in assessing State needs for assistance with monitoring and the types of guidance that they would find most useful.

### Goals of Monitoring

Because the formula grant program is decentralized, monitoring is useful only if it meets three goals:

- To ensure that subgrantees meet their commitments and adhere to program guidelines;
- To improve State activities, including grants management, strategic planning, and evaluation, by providing relevant information on subgrant performance; and
- To inform BJA about the use of formula funds so that it can manage the program more effectively and meet its reporting obligations to Congress.

### *Elements of Monitoring System Design*

States should design a monitoring system that precisely meets the information needs of the government. The monitoring system should be a cooperative venture between the State and subgrantees. Subgrantees are likely to be receptive if the monitoring system produces information they can use. Finally, the monitoring system design should make the information easy to use.

### Policy Implications

This research provides valuable guidance to State-level officials who are responsible for designing or implementing a monitoring system for the formula grant program. It informs officials about program management approaches that have been tried successfully by their peers, and it offers solutions to persistent problems. The study indicated that the formula grant program is now run more professionally and efficiently than it was under previous legislation.

## **The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988**

The Congress and the executive branch want to know to what extent the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program has enabled States and localities to reduce and control illegal drug activity. Therefore, NIJ in 1991 launched a new RAND study of the significant policy questions that have arisen around the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The study assesses whether the act has stimulated State and local efforts that would not have otherwise taken place.

The study, by researchers from RAND, will address these policy questions:

- Did Federal funding stimulate innovative and improved local programs?
- Did the act's planning requirements produce more rational, comprehensive, and coordinated State programs?
- Did Federal agencies provide the leadership and assistance envisioned?
- Would other legislation be more effective in promoting anti-drug efforts?

The study will analyze three major topics:

- Concepts underlying the Anti-Drug Abuse Act;
- Evolution of State strategic planning and its impact on allocation of resources; and
- Influence of Federal activities—training, technical assistance, research, evaluation, discretionary grants, and formula funding—on State and local criminal justice innovation.

### **The Legislative Model**

An important aspect of this study is its examination of alternative legislative models of domestic policy. Overall, it assesses the efficacy of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts as forces for change. Among the questions discussed are the following:

- Does the enabling legislation for other existing Federal grant programs offer better approaches to national policy?
- Are there too many or too few funding "strings" attached to Federal dollars?
- Can other legislative approaches accelerate the pace of adoption of effective programs?

### **State Strategic Planning**

This evaluation, funded in 1991, builds upon previous work on State strategic planning reported in this chapter by focusing on three additional major research questions:

- How has State strategic planning for crime and drug control evolved?
- What is the relationship between the strategies and States' actual funding decisions?
- To what extent have State strategies shaped the scope and substance of drug- and crime-control activities by local and State agencies?

The analysis will examine changes over time in States' strategic priorities; in the roles played by criminal justice practitioners, local officials, other State drug-control agencies, legislators, and members of the public in the planning process; and in the coordination of State planning with education, treatment, and activities at the Federal level.

### **Federal Activities and Local Criminal Justice Innovations**

The evaluation traces the influence of Federal evaluation, training, and technical assistance and discretionary and formula grant funds on State and local program development. Both formula and discretionary funds are meant to stimulate innovation: to provide seed money

for programs that will eventually be sustained by State and local dollars, and to test new approaches that States and local agencies cannot do on their own.

Such use of Federal funds requires a Federal system to provide technical assistance, evaluation capability, and dissemination of information about projects. The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts explicitly assign these functions to the Institute and BJA.

The evaluation will examine whether funding and support mechanisms established by the act succeed in promoting change. Has the act led to local innovation, or has it not?

### **Synthesis and Recommendations**

Recommendations will be presented for both legislative and executive action at the Federal, State, and local levels. The report will also explore alternative approaches to improving the grant system.

### **Policy Implications**

The results of this research will be important to Federal, State, and local personnel involved in Anti-Drug Abuse Act programs. The findings will help State and local personnel to improve their interaction with Federal officials, and it will allow them to incorporate promising approaches, taken by other States and localities, into their own efforts. Finally, the study will assess several issues—e.g., what constitutes “successful” Federal assistance and the pros and cons of various approaches to providing such assistance—that are crucial to the design of such programs in the future.

# Appendix Index of Grants

The National Institute of Justice wishes to thank the project directors and staff members of the evaluations who provided information for this report. Following are lists of all NIJ grants made in fiscal years 1989, 1990, and 1991 under section 520 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, and summaries of the amounts awarded each year. These lists show the full title of each grant, the NIJ grant number, the name and location of the evaluating organization, and the amount of the grant. Please note that supplemental grants are reported with the appropriate initial grants from the previous fiscal years.

## National Institute of Justice Drug Control Evaluations (by fiscal year).

Fiscal Year	Amount Awarded
1989	\$3.2 million
1990	\$3.8 million
1991	\$4.8 million

### Fiscal Year 1989 Grants

**Grant Title:** Evaluation of Community Responses to Drug Abuse Demonstration  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0026  
**Evaluator:** University of Illinois at Chicago,  
Chicago, Illinois  
**Grant Amount:** \$249,509

#### *Supplemental 1990 Grant*

**Grant Title:** Impact Evaluation of the Community Responses to Drug Abuse  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0015  
**Evaluator:** University of Illinois at Chicago,  
Chicago, Illinois  
**Grant Amount:** \$294,709

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**Grant Title:** Eastside Wilmington Anti-Drug Abuse Program Evaluation  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0047  
**Evaluator:** State of Delaware, Statistical Analysis Center,  
Dover, Delaware  
**Grant Amount:** \$50,092

#### *Supplemental 1990 Grant*

**Grant Title:** Eastside Wilmington Anti-Drug Abuse Program Evaluation  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0059  
**Evaluator:** State of Delaware, Statistical Analysis Center,  
Dover, Delaware  
**Grant Amount:** \$105,950

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**Grant Title:** Apprehension, Prosecution and Adjudication  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0050  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$193,140

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**Grant Title:** Drugs and Public Housing: Toward the Development of an Effective Police Response in Denver and New Orleans  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0054  
**Evaluator:** The Police Foundation,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$499,893

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**Grant Title:** The Impact of Narcotics Crackdowns: Intermittent Enforcement and Residual Deterrence  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0049 and Supplement  
**Evaluator:** Michigan State University,  
East Lansing, Michigan  
**Grant Amount:** \$254,281 and \$99,992

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**Grant Title:** The Community Effects of Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0056  
**Evaluator:** Vera Institute of Justice,  
New York, New York  
**Grant Amount:** \$450,000

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*Supplemental 1991 Grant*

**Grant Title:** The Community Effects of Street-Level Narcotics Enforcement: A Study of the New York City Police Department  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0056  
**Evaluator:** Vera Institute of Justice,  
New York, New York  
**Grant Amount:** \$150,000

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**Grant Title:** An Implementation Study of Cooperative Law Enforcement Narcotics Control Task Forces  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0048  
**Evaluator:** Criminal Justice Statistics Association,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$104,758

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**Grant Title:** To Evaluate Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Programs  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0037  
**Evaluator:** Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$252,144

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**Grant Title:** Alternative Sanctions for Drug Offenses  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0058  
**Evaluator:** Institute for Law & Justice, Inc.,  
Alexandria, Virginia  
**Grant Amount:** \$197,298

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**Grant Title:** User Accountability in Maricopa County  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0055  
**Evaluator:** Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.,  
Phoenix, Arizona  
**Grant Amount:** \$214,694

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**Grant Title:** Evaluation of the Program for the Expedited Management of Drug  
Cases  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0057  
**Evaluator:** Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$288,210

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**Grant Title:** Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition Program  
**Grant No.:** 89-DD-CX-0056  
**Evaluator:** Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.,  
Phoenix, Arizona  
**Grant Amount:** \$198,782

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*Supplemental 1990 Grant*

**Grant Title:** Drug Testing Technology/Focused Offender Disposition Program  
**Grant No.:** 90-IJ-CX-0064  
**Evaluator:** Arizona Institute for Criminal Justice, Inc.,  
Phoenix, Arizona  
**Grant Amount:** \$91,726

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**Grant Title:** National Study of Shock Incarceration Programs  
**Grant No.:** 88-DD-CX-0026 (Supplement to a FY 1988 award)  
**Evaluator:** Louisiana State University,  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana  
**Grant Amount:** \$44,221

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*Supplemental 1990 Grant*

**Grant Title:** Multisite Study of Shock Incarceration  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0061  
**Evaluator:** University of Maryland, Institute of Criminal Justice & Criminology,  
College Park, Maryland  
**Grant Amount:** \$284,028

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**Grant Title:** Evaluating State Planning Strategies Developed for the Drug Abuse Improvement Formula Grant Program  
**Grant No.:** 89-IJ-CX-0043  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$154,600

*Supplemental 1990 Grant*

**Grant Title:** Evaluating State Planning Strategies Developed for the Drug Abuse Improvement Formula Grant Program  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0003  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$111,621

**Fiscal Year 1990 Grants**

**Grant Title:** Police Response to Drugs and Gangs: Case Studies in Police Decisionmaking  
**Grant No.:** 90-IJ-CX-K008  
**Evaluator:** Police Executive Research Forum,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$249,852

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**Grant Title:** An Evaluation of Drug Enforcement Techniques Implemented Within a Problem-Oriented Policing Framework in Two Cities  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0058  
**Evaluator:** Institute for Social Analysis,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$394,064

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**Grant Title:** San Diego Drug Market Analysis and Street-Level Enforcement Evaluation  
**Grant No.:** 90-IJ-CX-K006 (Initial and supplemental grants in FY 1990)  
**Evaluator:** San Diego Police Department,  
San Diego, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$449,967

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**Grant Title:** Assessing the Impact of a County-Operated Boot Camp for Drug Offenders  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0055  
**Evaluator:** National Council on Crime and Delinquency,  
San Francisco, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$197,482

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**Grant Title:** An Experimental Evaluation of Michigan's Nokomis Challenge Program  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0053  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$264,035

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**Grant Title:** Minnesota's Intensive Community Supervision (ICS) Program: Effects on Offender Reintegration, Public Safety, and System Costs  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0062  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$295,456

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**Grant Title:** Assessment of A Substance Abuse Program for Probationers (ASAPP)  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0057  
**Evaluator:** San Diego Association of Governments,  
San Diego, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$169,358

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**Grant Title:** Work Release in the State of Washington: Assessing Implementation and Impact of Offender Reintegration  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0056  
**Evaluator:** The RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$385,106

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**Grant Title:** Georgia Prison Therapeutic Community Drug Treatment  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0060  
**Evaluator:** Georgia Department of Corrections,  
Atlanta, Georgia  
**Grant Amount:** \$152,282

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**Grant Title:** Evaluation Dissemination  
**Grant No.:** 90-C-005 (mode 3)  
**Evaluator:** Aspen Systems Corporation,  
Rockville, Maryland  
**Grant Amount:** \$130,000

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**Grant Title:** National Cluster Conference on Evaluating Drug Control and System Improvement Projects  
**Grant No.:** 90-DD-CX-0002  
**Evaluator:** Criminal Justice Statistics Association,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$138,038

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**Grant Title:** Evaluation of Baltimore County Police Department's Community Oriented Drug Enforcement Program  
**Grant No.:** 90-IJ-R-021  
**Evaluator:** University of Baltimore,  
Baltimore, Maryland  
**Grant Amount:** \$72,226

### **Fiscal Year 1991 Grants**

**Grant Title:** The Implementation and Impact of Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented Policing Projects: A National Evaluation of a BJA Program  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-0012  
**Evaluator:** Vera Institute of Justice,  
New York, New York  
**Grant Amount:** \$399,920

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**Grant Title:** Structured Fines: An Impact Evaluation  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-0037  
**Evaluator:** RAND Corporation  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$299,942

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**Grant Title:** Emerging Drug Enforcement Tactics: A Program Assessment  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-0045  
**Evaluator:** Police Executive Research Forum,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$99,749

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**Grant Title:** A Multi-Agency Approach to Drug and Gang Enforcement  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-0046  
**Evaluator:** San Diego Association of Governments,  
San Diego, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$177,294

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**Grant Title:** Improving the Court Response to Drug Cases: A Program Assessment  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-0048  
**Evaluator:** National Center for State Courts,  
Williamsburg, Virginia  
**Grant Amount:** \$150,806

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**Grant Title:** The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988: A Program Assessment  
**Grant No.:** 91-IJ-CX-K024  
**Evaluator:** RAND Corporation,  
Santa Monica, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$499,990

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**Grant Title:** Prosecuting Complex Drug Cases: A Program Assessment  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K046  
**Evaluator:** Jefferson Institute for Justice Studies,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$144,348

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**Grant Title:** Community Policing Analysis Directed to Rural Evaluations  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K048  
**Evaluator:** Queues Enforth Development,  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
**Grant Amount:** \$400,000

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**Grant Title:** Anti-Drug Initiatives in Small Cities and Towns: A Program  
Assessment  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K049  
**Evaluator:** Southern Illinois University,  
Carbondale, Illinois  
**Grant Amount:** \$147,492

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**Grant Title:** Evaluation of Drug Offender Treatment in Local Corrections  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K052  
**Evaluator:** National Council on Crime and Delinquency,  
San Francisco, California  
**Grant Amount:** \$346,020

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**Grant Title:** Past and Future Directions of the Drug Abuse Resistance Education  
(DARE) Program  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K053  
**Evaluator:** Research Triangle Institute,  
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina  
**Grant Amount:** \$300,000

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**Grant Title:** Boot Camp, Drug Treatment and Aftercare: An Evaluation Review  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K055  
**Evaluator:** Southern Illinois University,  
Carbondale, Illinois  
**Grant Amount:** \$49,820

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**Grant Title:** Weed and Seed in Kansas City: Evaluation Design for a Multi-Agency Crackdown on Drugs  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K056  
**Evaluator:** University of Maryland,  
College Park, Maryland  
**Grant Amount:** \$197,640

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**Grant Title:** Drug Testing Throughout the Criminal Justice System: An Intensive Impact Evaluation  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K057  
**Evaluator:** BOTEK Analysis Corporation,  
Cambridge, Massachusetts  
**Grant Amount:** \$199,997

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**Grant Title:** Evaluating the New York City Police Department's Model Precinct Program  
**Grant No.:** 91-IJ-CX-K001  
**Evaluator:** Police Foundation,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$125,202

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**Grant Title:** National Evaluation Conference  
**Grant No.:** 91-DD-CX-K013  
**Evaluator:** Criminal Justice Statistics Association,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$272,980

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**Grant Title:** National Conference on Evaluating Drug Control Initiatives—1992  
**Grant No.:** 91-C-005 (Mod 003)  
**Evaluator:** Institute for Law & Justice Inc.,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$325,000

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**Grant Title:** Regional Workshops on How to Evaluate Criminal Justice Projects  
**Grant No.:** 91-C-005 (Mod 003)  
**Evaluator:** Institute for Law & Justice Inc.,  
Washington, D.C.  
**Grant Amount:** \$155,000

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