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THE FUTURE OF PRIVATIZING NONESSENTIAL POLICE SERVICES
IN CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

by

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COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS 12
PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING (POST)

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
July 1991

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This Command College Independent Study Project is a FUTURES study of a particular emerging issue in law enforcement. Its purpose is NOT to predict the future, but rather to project a number of possible scenarios for strategic planning consideration.

Defining the future differs from analyzing the past because the future has not yet happened. In this project, useful alternatives have been formulated systematically so that the planner can respond to a range of possible future environments.

Managing the future means influencing the future--creating it, constraining it, adapting to it. A futures study points the way.

The views and conclusions expressed in this Command College project are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

INTRODUCTION

A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM.

PART ONE - DEFINING THE FUTURE

WILL THE PRIVATIZATION OF NONESSENTIAL POLICE SERVICES BENEFIT CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES BY THE YEAR 2001?

PART TWO - STRATEGIC PLANNING

A MODEL FOR A MEDIUM SIZE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IN GENERAL AND THE FRESNO, CALIFORNIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, IN PARTICULAR.

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CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY.

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Executive Summary

PART ONE - DEFINING THE FUTURE

This study examines the feasibility of contracting out specific nonessential police services and how it might benefit California law enforcement in the future. For purposes of this study, the term "nonessential police services" refers to specific non-emergency and low priority services most law enforcement agencies provide to the public. It also refers to specific low priority functions that are routinely performed by sworn and non-sworn police personnel. The specific tasks and services

which were the focus of this study included: (1) parking enforcement; (2) burglary alarm response; (3) completion of minor incident reports; (4) investigation and reporting of non-injury traffic accidents; (5) prisoner transportation; (6) guarding prisoners at hospitals; and (7) the arrest and transportation of shoplifting suspects to detention facilities. These are the types of services and functions that can be contracted out and performed more cost-effectively by the private sector. Contracting out tasks considered "essential," such as the investigation of homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults, was not within the scope of this study.

There are several important reasons police administrators should consider privatization and other alternative methods of service delivery. The literature suggests that the amount of money available to local law enforcement will continue to decline at a time when requests for police services are likely to increase. This problem will become even more acute in the future as the median age of people in California continues to rise and more and more Californians become dependent on law enforcement to provide a full-range of services.

The nominal group technique (NGT) was used to gather and develop relevant data about the topic. Panelists selected five key trends which they felt impact the issue and sub-issues. They included: (1) the amount of government spending for law enforcement; (2) providing police service to an aging population; (3) crime in California; (4) U. S. economic growth; and (5) violent crime in California. Panelists also identified five probable events which included: (1) passage of a proposition providing additional funding for local law enforcement; (2) passage of a proposition mandating police consolidation; (3) a court decision prohibiting the imposition of service charges or special fees; (4) mandatory privatization of nonessential services; and (5) a major stock market crash. Based on the trend and event projections, three scenarios were written describing the potential future of police service delivery. The most desired and attainable scenario was selected for strategic planning.

PART TWO - STRATEGIC PLANNING

The Fresno Police Department was selected as the model upon which analysis was performed, and a strategic plan was developed for implementation. The ideal setting for the development of a strategic plan to contract out nonessential services is in a city, like Fresno, which is experiencing tremendous growth, increasing crime, and insufficient revenues to provide adequate resources for law enforcement.

A modified policy delphi process was also used to select policy alternatives for implementation. They included:

1. Contracting out the Department's telephonic report-taking process.
2. Contracting out nonessential police services which require on-scene investigators.
3. Utilizing police reserve officers to provide specified police services.

Several stakeholders were identified and their assumptions about the proposed policies were analyzed. The study found that two stakeholders in particular, the Fresno Police Officers' Association (FPOA) and Fresno City Employees' Association (FCEA), would be most opposed to contracting out services based upon their assumption that it would threaten the job security of those who they represent. The Fresno City and County Chamber of Commerce, another important stakeholder, would be a staunch supporter of the proposed policies based upon their assumption that it would bolster economic and industrial growth.

PART THREE - TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

In this section, several techniques were presented to enable organizational leaders to mitigate resistance to the strategic plan. A readiness/capability analysis was undertaken to determine the ability and willingness of members of the critical mass for anticipated change. The most alarming low-readiness score is that of the President of the FPOA. He would reject the proposed policies based upon (1) his concern about the job security of those who he represents and (2) his assumption that private sector substitutes would lack the necessary skills to properly deliver police services. He would also be concerned that any lack of professionalism by private sector substitutes would tarnish the community's image of the department, its employees, and the FPOA. A commitment planning process was also completed to measure, evaluate, and achieve the necessary level of support from each individual actor.

This study also suggested that the support of the police chief and city council, two very important members of the critical mass, is absolutely essential if the department is ever to contract out

nonessential services. The chief would have to be convinced the community would continue to receive quality services at a lower total cost. A majority of the members of city council would have to be convinced the strategic plan is more desirable to their constituency.

Considering the scope and complexity of the strategic plan, a project manager would be assigned and given the flexibility to appoint a committee to assist in policy implementation. Several support methods and technologies were selected including: responsibility charting, midpoint goals/scenario writing, and quality circles.

CONCLUSION

This study clearly showed that California law enforcement agencies would benefit from contracting out nonessential police services. The most important benefit would be the reduction of personnel expenditures. Local law enforcement could realize up to a 51 percent salary savings depending upon the types of nonessential services targeted for privatization and the police agency in which these changes are proposed. Another benefit to contracting out nonessential services is that the money saved from doing so could be used more effectively by a police agency to address violent crime, drug-related problems, and other equally important community concerns. Finally, contracting out nonessential services would benefit local law enforcement from the perspective of reducing the problems and the associated costs of recruiting, training, and disciplining in-house employees involved in the performance of nonessential tasks.

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INTRODUCTION

The passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 launched California government into a new era. It truly represented the turning point in the attitude of the general public about the role of government as the provider of all services to meet the needs of the masses. In overwhelmingly supporting this proposition, the message Californians resoundingly delivered was---government is spending my hard-earned dollars on programs that I do not need and that serve someone else, so why should I continue to pay for it. Even today, most Californians still resent the thought that their hard-earned tax dollars are being applied to something they do not personally use or a program they do not support.

For those in state and local government, the impact of Proposition 13 and other tax reform measures has been devastating. Recent trend and event data clearly indicate that the State of California faces billion-dollar deficits in the current and upcoming fiscal years. Moreover, 34 California cities and two counties face dissolution or bankruptcy. In a report issued by the California Counties Foundation, researchers Richard Simpson and Cary Jung concluded after touring 18 distressed counties and reviewing the rest that counties are generally in their worst financial condition since 1982, and perhaps since 1934 (1). The old adage "the writing is on the wall" is very descriptive of what lies ahead. California law enforcement leaders simply are not going to have the traditional sources of revenue they once enjoyed to meet and overcome the challenges of the future.

Until recently, there has been a tendency in local law enforcement to avoid these warning signals. The prevailing attitude has been that, regardless of tax reforms or the fiscal instability of local government, society will forever need services that only the police can provide and will have to pay for it whatever the costs. California law enforcement leaders need only to read about the growth of private security in recent years and look around to understand that people are not as dependent as they once were on the services of local law enforcement. Recent trend and event data also suggest that new technology and private sector competition are beginning to reshape society's thoughts about the role of

local law enforcement. While the growth in the number of private security workers in the nation grew by 33 percent during the past decade, the number of local law enforcement employees increased only 16 percent (2). Tasks once performed solely by law enforcement have most recently been absorbed by private security companies. Examples of these responsibilities include prisoner transportation, special events security, court security, public parks patrol, and burglary alarm response. The point is, California law enforcement leaders must come to grips with the fact that revenues are likely to continue to decline and place an even greater strain on the ability of local law enforcement to deliver services. Moreover, private industry appears to be capable of absorbing services law enforcement may no longer be able to provide. Such being the case, it may benefit local law enforcement to contract out low priority services so that the resources that were once committed to these tasks could be better utilized to address violent crime and other equally important law enforcement concerns.

The intent of this study has been to determine if contracting out specific nonessential police services to private industry will benefit California law enforcement in the future. The term "nonessential police services" refers to specific non-emergency and low priority services most local law enforcement agencies provide to the public. It also refers to specific low priority functions that are routinely performed by sworn and non-sworn personnel. The specific services and functions which were the focus of this study included: (1) parking enforcement; (2) burglary alarm response; (3) completion of minor incident reports; (4) the investigation and reporting of non-injury traffic accidents; (5) prisoner transportation; (6) guarding prisoners at hospitals; and (7) the investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to detention facilities. These are the types of duties that can be contracted out and performed more cost-effectively by the private sector. These are also tasks that are time-consuming and which, all too often, restrict the ability of police agencies with limited resources to effectively address more important concerns. Contracting out functions considered "essential," such as the investigation of criminal homicides, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults and other serious crimes, was not within the scope of this study.

Three sub-issues were identified which served to further refine and focus this study. The first sub-issue addressed the subject of whether or not local law enforcement will be capable of providing nonessential police services in the future. If law enforcement agencies are funded to the degree that they are capable of handling both essential and nonessential services then it may serve little purpose to consider contracting out services.

The types of nonessential services private industry will be providing in the future was the second sub-issue addressed in this study. The interest here was in determining the specific types of nonessential services California law enforcement professionals felt would or would not be performed by private industry in the future. This objective was accomplished through the use of a survey questionnaire and a nominal group exercise.

Finally, determining if contracting out nonessential services will be cost-effective in the future was the third sub-issue addressed in this study. The point is, if contracting out nonessential police services does not result in a substantial cost-savings then it may not benefit law enforcement to pursue it or to allow it to happen in the future.

PART ONE

DEFINING THE FUTURE

AN OVERVIEW

The purpose of this part on futures forecasting is to provide a conceptual "roadmap" for law enforcement administrators to shape, manage, and influence the future as it concerns law enforcement privatization. The research and forecasting techniques presented in this section have identified key trends and events likely to have an impact on this issue. The results of this process will be three futures scenarios based upon trend and event forecasting data. The preferred scenario will be used as a model for the strategic planning process which will be discussed in Part Two.

THE ISSUE

As the costs of public safety services have risen and tax revenues have declined, police administrators have sought other resources to assist them in delivering the best possible service at the lowest total cost. Recently, police administrators have considered contracting with the private sector to provide specific nonessential services which personnel in their agencies are currently performing. For example, many law enforcement agencies are currently contracting with private security firms to provide prisoner transportation services. As costs continue to rise and revenues decline, the interest in contracting out nonessential police services may increase, especially if contract security firms are capable of delivering quality services at a lower cost.

The central issue in this study is: Will the privatization of nonessential police services benefit California law enforcement agencies by the year 2001? In other words, if local law enforcement were to contract out certain types of police services would it benefit the police, the community they serve, and result in a cost savings?

The term "privatization" means contracting out traditional police services to the private sector. The term "nonessential police services" refers to the extraneous types of services law enforcement provides to the public which could be performed by the private sector. These are the types of services the public expect and frequently demand of local law

enforcement. An example of a nonessential service is parking enforcement. The term also refers to the functions police routinely perform which could be conducted by someone other than a police officer or non-sworn police employee. An example of a nonessential function could include the task of guarding a felony prisoner needing medical treatment at a hospital.

At the onset of this study, a panel of police administrators were assembled to generate a list of tasks and services they felt could be contracted out to vendors in the private sector. From a larger list of police services, the panel identified four which they felt could be contracted out. These are services most law enforcement agencies currently perform and frequently provide to the public. They include:

1. Parking enforcement;
2. Burglar alarm response;
3. Completion of incident reports where the victim declines prosecution or is reporting for insurance purposes only;
4. The investigation and reporting of non-injury traffic accidents.

The panel also identified three functions police frequently perform which they felt could be carried out as effectively by a company in private industry. They include:

5. Prisoner transportation;
6. Standing by prisoners needing medical treatment at hospitals;
7. The investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail facilities, as appropriate.

In order to properly focus the study issue, a Futures Wheel was used to help identify critical sub-issues. A Futures Wheel is a research method designed to assist the researcher in narrowing the scope of the study. The Futures Wheel appears as Appendix A.

The following sub-issues were selected for study:

1. Will local law enforcement agencies be capable of providing non-essential services to the public by the year 2001?
2. What types of nonessential police services will private industry be providing to the public by the year 2001?
3. Will contracting out nonessential police services to private industry be cost-effective in the future?

The focus of this study then is quite specific. Will contracting out these four specific nonessential services and three police functions create a future that is beneficial to law enforcement or one that should be avoided?

METHODOLOGY

A review of the related literature as it pertains to the wide spectrum of privatization in public organizations was undertaken as background and as a foundation for this project.

A survey questionnaire was also developed and administered to law enforcement officials in 131 police and sheriff's departments in California. The intent of the questionnaire was to collect current information about law enforcement agencies that have or are considering contracting out services to private industry. The questionnaire was also designed to determine current opinions of these officials about the types of police functions they believe private industry will be performing in the future.

Finally, the nominal group technique (NGT) was used to gather and develop relevant data about the topic of police privatization. Conducting an NGT involves assembling a small panel of subject-matter experts to identify and forecast trends and events likely to have an impact on the issue and sub-issues. This panel also performed a cross-impact analysis to evaluate the impact of events on events, and events on trends. From this data, an exploratory, normative, and hypothetical scenario was developed describing possible future states. The preferred scenario was used as a model for the strategic planning and transition management portions of the study.

REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

This section is a review of the related literature as it pertains to privatization or contracting out of government services. It was undertaken for the purpose of providing the reader with the requisite background for understanding how privatization within government evolved.

Privatization of Local Government Services: A Description

Privatization of traditional government services is a concept that is growing at a remarkable pace in cities and counties throughout the United States. In fact, the total dollar amount of local government contracts to private industry have more than tripled since 1972 (3). Most recent studies suggest this rate of increase will continue through at least the year 2000 and perhaps beyond.

In the broadest sense, privatization is a method in which government enters into an agreement or "contract" with business firms to provide government goods and services to be used by the public (4). Privatization of government goods and services can and ordinarily does result in a cost-savings to government organizations because of the competition among private firms to be awarded the contract (5).

Contracting government services to private industry is not solely a response to the fiscal constraints cities and counties faced in the past decade. Since 1932, San Francisco has contracted out garbage and refuse collection to independent garbage collectors. Today, drivers own their trucks and are responsible for collections within specified neighborhoods throughout the city. In 1975, a study revealed that San Franciscans paid only \$40.00 a year for private garbage collections while New Yorkers living in comparable neighborhoods paid nearly seven times that amount for municipal collection (6).

La Mirada, California is another city that has relied heavily upon contracting services from the day the city was incorporated in 1960. Nearly every commercial municipal service is contracted to private companies. In 1988, the city had 64 service contracts with other government agencies and

private companies. The city only employs 75 full-time employees to service a population of 40,000 (7).

Forms of Government Privatization

There are essentially three basic forms of government privatization. The sale of government assets, such as government land holdings or surplus equipment, is one form of privatization (8). It is designed to generate revenue and/or spur private sector development. The sale of Conrail in 1987, a federally-owned railroad, is the most recent example of this type of privatization (9).

The second form of privatization is contracting out, whereby government enters into a contractual agreement with a private business to provide goods and services currently being provided by government. This is by far the most widely-used form of privatization at the state and local levels (10). Typically, the types of services cities and counties contract out include refuse collection, solid waste disposal, vehicle towing, and payroll and legal services (11).

Finally, the third form of privatization is the concept of vouchers, a system in which government distributes purchasing power to eligible consumers, who must then use the vouchers to purchase designated goods and services (12). An example of this form of privatization includes rental subsistence programs which provide low-income families with the purchasing power to obtain better housing than they might otherwise be able to afford. The G.I. Bill is another form of voucher which provided veterans with an opportunity they might not otherwise have had to attend the college or a trade school of their choice.

Why Local Governments Contract Services

There are principally two reasons for contracting out government services. The primary reason is to save money. In a recent survey of over 1,000 U. S. cities by Touche Ross (1987), 74 percent of the responding government officials listed cost savings as a major advantage of contracting

services. Eighty percent also indicated that contracting out had reduced the taxpayer's cost of government services by at least 10 percent (13). In California, the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 and other local tax reduction measures have created fiscal hardships for most city and county governments. Most recently, the Boards of Supervisors of California's Butte and Lassen Counties have contemplated bankruptcy to demonstrate just how serious continued demands for service and shrinking revenues have impacted government operations (14). Because of demands and constraints on local government, contracting services has become an acceptable government management technique.

Another reason cited in the literature for contracting services is that it helps solve labor problems. The strength of public employee unions is growing at a rapid pace in the Western region of the United States. For example, membership in the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSME) grew by 380,000 members since 1983, a 66 percent rate of growth (15). Their growth and continued efforts to influence government operations has placed restraints on the ability of government to deliver goods and services. In recent years, public employee unions have begun to challenge what city and county officials consider their exclusive rights to determine the procedures and standards of selection for employment, assignment, transfer, and promotion of employees. They have also demanded and, in some cases, been awarded salary increases and fringe benefits exceeding that which is paid to employees in private industry performing similar jobs. In many cases, government employees, especially those with union ties, create an impediment to local officials forced to provide adequate services at a reasonable cost. There are other advantages to contracting out government service. They include:

- Eliminating or avoiding day-to-day management responsibilities involving the recruitment and retention of employees to perform tasks (16).
- Providing local government officials access to specialized skills and worker expertise often unavailable within the government work force (17).

- Providing greater flexibility to government officials responsible for service delivery without the need to observe government bureaucratic regulations, such as in the hiring and firing of employees (18).

Privatization of Law Enforcement Services: Types and Trends

Among the most important duties of police administrators in the 1990's will be that of providing for public safety at a level that is financially acceptable and appropriate. This will be no easy task considering the increasing fear of crime, continued public demands for police services, and shrinking tax revenues to meet these demands.

Since World War II, crime and fear of crime have become issues of major concern for most Americans. In a study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, researchers discovered that between the years 1948 and 1978, one-fifth of all front-page newspaper stories concerned crime. The study also concluded that, by 1974, crime and law enforcement had emerged as "the most salient issue" in local politics, surpassing race, government reform, economic growth, and municipal corruption (19).

In response to the continued concern about crime, requests for police services have also increased in most communities. In the five years between 1976 and 1981, a study sponsored by the National Institute of Justice found that police calls for service increased an average of 20 percent nationwide (20). Many of these calls concerned incidents of violent crime and property loss. In addition to answering high priority calls, the public also expects the police to provide personalized services. For example, people routinely request and expect police checks on their homes while they are away on vacation, advice on handling of domestic problems, extra patrols in neighborhoods, and the reassurance that the police will promptly investigate complaints of suspicious persons in their neighborhoods.

Despite increased crime and requests for service, resources to meet these demands are not being met. In most major metropolitan cities, the number of police personnel per 1000 population dropped off 10 percent between 1975 and 1985 (21). In St. Louis, Missouri, the actual number of police personnel decreased 11 percent between 1984 and 1988. Several

other major metropolitan police agencies experienced similar personnel decreases including Cleveland, Ohio; Birmingham, Alabama; Wichita, Kansas; Boise, Idaho; and Des Moines, Iowa (22). As one police chief wrote in 1982, "Today, the management associated with declining or stagnating programs appears to be the rule, and not the exception as in the past" (23).

As costs have risen and the resources to meet demands have declined, police administrators have been forced to search for other resources to assist them in providing adequate public safety services at a lower cost. These efforts have taken many forms. In many organizations, police functions once handled solely by sworn police officers are now being assigned to civilian personnel. Some police organizations have recently begun to contract out to the private sector traditional police services such as employment background investigations, prisoner transportation, and parking enforcement. In reviewing the literature, it was discovered that a few police agencies have been very successful in contracting out services. The successes these agencies have had with privatization are discussed in the following sections.

New York Police Department. In 1981, the incidence of shoplifting in U.S. supermarkets alone was estimated at costing store owners in excess of one billion dollars (24). Because of shrinking revenues and increasing demands on police to handle more serious crime problems, shoplifting is viewed as a minor problem and is not a priority for police response. Unfortunately, sending officers to investigate, cite, or physically arrest shoplifters is often an expensive and time-consuming task for most police departments.

In one major department store chain in New York, store security became concerned that local law enforcement did not have adequate resources to protect employees and store merchandise from vandalism, theft, and credit card fraud. Through an arrangement made with the New York Police Department, security personnel now provide surveillance, make arrests, transport suspects to jail facilities, complete record checks, and enter criminal history information (25). Security personnel are not only making their own arrests, but are transporting suspects to jail facilities, all of which helps to relieve the New York Police Department of this minor and time-consuming responsibility.

San Diego Police Department. During the holiday season in San Diego, incidents of shoplifting arrests by store security officers takes its toll on the San Diego Police Department's Patrol Division. In an address to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 1986, San Diego Police Chief William Kolander indicated that time spent by a patrol officer on a single shoplifting arrest could take up to two hours (26). To remedy the problem, members of the security community and San Diego Police Department met and devised a plan to better utilize security personnel to lessen unnecessary out-of-service time by the police to handle shoplifting arrests. Security personnel currently complete all necessary arrest and incident reports while awaiting the officer's arrival. Once the officer is on the scene, he reviews the reports for content and either issues a citation or takes physical custody of the suspect. Since implementing the plan, seldom are officers out-of-service more than 30 minutes handling in-custody shoplifting cases.

The San Diego Department has also developed a plan, utilizing private security personnel, to lessen the number of false burglary alarm calls requiring police response. When an alarm is tripped, either remotely or manually, a security officer is dispatched to the location to investigate. In each case, the police department is notified when the security officer is responding. After he arrives, the status of the call is again relayed to the police. If the alarm is false, the responding police officer is promptly notified and cancelled (27).

Amarillo (Texas) Police Department. In February 1982, the Amarillo Police Department, in corroboration with a major security firm, developed a program granting authorization to security officers to respond and assist the police department with burglar alarm calls. The Amarillo Police Department currently employs 247 sworn and non-sworn personnel who serve a population of 150,000 (28). This program relieved the police department of the time-consuming responsibility of answering an average of eight alarm calls a day. This has resulted in a cost-savings to the department of approximately 3,428 manhours---the equivalent of adding 1 3/4 men per year to the police department (29).

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

A survey questionnaire was developed to obtain current data from California police and sheriff's officials on the subject of privatization. The purpose of the questionnaire was to meet three objectives. The first objective sought to identify law enforcement agencies that have recently contracted nonessential law enforcement services to firms in the private sector. Specifically, police agencies that had contracted out the types of nonessential services described in this project.

The aim of the second objective was to determine the number of law enforcement agencies currently exploring the possibility of contracting nonessential services from the list of agencies surveyed. This objective also sought to determine the types of nonessential services police agencies had considered contracting out.

The third objective sought to determine current opinions of survey respondents regarding the probability of private security providing nonessential police services in the future and the specific types of services they felt might be included. The survey questionnaire is presented in its final form as Appendix B.

It was decided at the onset of the project that 131 (30 percent) of the 411 police and sheriff's departments in California would constitute the survey population. Eliminated from the survey population were state police agencies, campus police departments, and other law enforcement agencies employing peace officers. The simple random sample was the technique chosen to select the 131 agencies targeted for study. Agencies that participated in the survey by returning completed questionnaires appear as Appendix C.

SURVEY FINDINGS

In all, 117 of 131 law enforcement agencies surveyed participated by returning completed questionnaires. This represented an 89 percent return which was exceptionally high considering the average response rate from mailed questionnaires is between 10 and 50 percent (30). The survey results appear as Appendix D.

Respondent Information

The first item of interest was determining the present rank of survey respondents. Of the 117 police officials surveyed, 63 (54 percent) were police chiefs or sheriffs, and 54 (46 percent) held other ranks, ranging from assistant or deputy chief to crime analyst.

In addition to requesting the rank of survey respondents, they were also asked to list the type of police agency for which they are employed. Of those 117 respondents surveyed, 100 (85 percent) indicated they were members of city police departments, while 17 (15 percent) were sheriff's employees.

Objective One

The first consideration of Objective One was to identify law enforcement agencies which had contracted nonessential police services to firms in the private sector. Specifically, the traditional nonessential services most agencies currently provide to their communities. Based on the results appearing in Table 1, a strong majority of those surveyed indicated their police agencies had not entered into an agreement with a business firm, e.g., a contract security firm, to provide nonessential police services. Only a small number of respondents, 31 (27 percent), indicated they had contracted out a service to private industry.

TABLE 1

Police Agencies Contracting Services to the Private Sector

"In the past ten years, have you entered into an agreement with a private firm (e.g., a private security firm) allowing them to provide a nonessential police service(s) in your community?"

Yes	27%
No	73%
Unsure	0%

Total N=117

This objective also sought to identify the types of nonessential services that had been contracted out from those respondents who indicated that they had entered into such an agreement. Of those 31 respondents (27 percent) who said their agencies had contracted out services, 22 (70 percent) indicated they had contracted out prisoner transportation to destinations outside their jurisdiction. Thirteen (32 percent) reported contracting out other services including private security protection for people attending special events, vehicle burglary prevention, and for traffic control at accident and disaster scenes. All thirteen indicated their agencies had contracted these services with private security firms. Finally, three respondents indicated they had entered into an agreement with a contract security firm to have guards standby prisoners needing medical treatment at hospitals. The results appear as Table 2.

TABLE 2

Types of Nonessential Services
Police Contract to the Private Sector

"Please indicate the type(s) of service(s) your agency contracts to private industry."

Parking enforcement	3%
Burglar alarm response	0%
Completion of petty crime reports	0%
Investigation of non-injury accidents	0%
Prisoner transportation	70%
Standing by prisoner(s) at hospitals	10%
Investigation, arrest, transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail	0%
Other	32%

Total N=31

Objective Two

The aim of Objective Two was to determine the number of law enforcement agencies currently exploring the idea of contracting out nonessential services. It also sought to identify the types of services respondents were considering contracting to private industry. Interestingly, only 6 of 117 respondents said they are currently exploring the concept. By far, the majority of respondents, 105 (95 percent), indicated they were not exploring the possibility and one respondent was unsure. Of these six respondents who indicated that they were considering contracting out, two indicated that they were considering contracting out prisoner transportation while the remaining four indicated they were contracting out for other reasons. The results of this question appears as Table 3.

TABLE 3

Types of Services Police Agencies
Are Considering Contracting Out

"...Please describe the services you are considering contracting to private industry."

Prisoner transportation	33%
School crossing guard responsibility	16%
Security patrol	16%
Background investigations for police applicants	16%
Security for special events i.e. parades	16%

Total N=6

Objective Three

Objective Three concerned current attitudes and opinions of police respondents regarding the possibility of private industry, e.g., contract security firms, providing nonessential services in the future. Specifically, the types of services and functions alluded to in this project. Survey results indicated 55 (48 percent) believe business firms will be providing nonessential police services by 2001. These results appear as Table 4.

TABLE 4

Police Opinion of Privatizing
Nonessential Services by 2001

"By the year 2001, do you believe private industry (e.g., a private security firm) will be providing nonessential police services in your community?"

Yes	48%
No	27%
Unsure	25%

Total N=114

It would appear the highest percentage of respondents (48 percent) believe private industry will be providing nonessential police services in 2001. On closer examination, however, 27 percent indicated they did not believe private industry would be providing these services, and 25 percent were unsure. This amounts to 59 police respondents (52 percent) either believing private industry will not assume responsibility for these services or unsure what role, if any, private industry will play in nonessential service delivery.

The 55 police respondents who believe private industry will be providing these services in the future were also asked to specify the types of functions they believe private industry would be performing. The opinions of those survey respondents appear at Table 5.

TABLE 5

Police Opinion of Types of Services
the Private Sector will Perform in 2001

"Please indicate the types of functions you believe private industry will be performing."

Parking enforcement	49%
Burglar alarm response	45%
Completion of petty crime reports	38%
Investigation of non-injury accidents	22%
Prisoner transportation	58%
Standing by prisoner(s) at hospitals	44%
Investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail	22%
Other	40%

Total N=55

Based on these findings, a large number of respondents (49 percent) were of the opinion parking enforcement would be a function private industry would be performing in 2001. Not surprisingly, prisoner transportation was another service respondents felt business firms would be performing in the future. This response is understandable considering that 22 police agencies currently contract out this service. Finally, only about 22 percent of the respondents believe business firms will be investigating non-injury accidents and handling shoplifting suspects without police assistance or involvement.

TREND AND EVENT SELECTION

Ten subject-matter experts were assembled to generate a set of possible future events and trends worth forecasting. The list of panelists appears as Appendix E. As previously discussed, the NGT is a simple, but effective, technique which involves convening a small panel of subject-matter experts to identify and forecast trends and events likely to have an impact on the issue and sub-issues. Prior to the NGT getting underway, the central issue and sub-issues were presented to the panel. To clarify the central issue question, the previously mentioned definitions for the terms "privatization" and "nonessential police services" were provided to the panel.

During the NGT process, the panel developed a rank-ordered list of trends and events which they felt impact the emerging issue and sub-issues. The rank-ordered list of trends and events appear as Appendixes F and G respectively. The five most valuable trends in order of priority were:

1. The amount of government spending for law enforcement: The amount of funding local, state, and federal governments commit to local law enforcement in the future.
2. Providing police service to an aging population: The ability of law enforcement agencies to provide nonessential services to an aging U.S. population.
3. Crime in California: An increase or decrease in the number crimes committed statewide.
4. U.S. economic growth: An increase or decrease in the growth of the national economy.
5. Violent crime in California: The number of homicides, rapes, robberies, aggravated assaults, and other violent crimes committed statewide.

The panel then identified the following five events which they felt would have an impact on the central issue and sub-issues should they occur:

1. Additional funding for law enforcement: The passage of a state proposition providing revenue to cities and counties to fund additional law enforcement services.
2. Law enforcement consolidation: The passage of a state proposition mandating that city and county law enforcement consolidate and form one police agency per county.
3. A California Supreme Court decision prohibiting local fees: Local government is prohibited from assessing service charges or other fees against government consumers.
4. Mandatory privatization of nonessential police services: State legislation mandates that local law enforcement contract to the private sector those nonessential services which are the focus of this study.
5. A major stock market crash: A one-day 1000 point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average.

TREND FORECASTING

The panel was then asked to do a nominal (will be) and normative (should be) forecast of each of the five trends. The nominal and normative forecasts were then collected from each panelist and recorded on a flip chart. A discussion followed concerning the range of forecasts and some adjustments were made. The panel median forecasts of each trend appear as Table 6.

**TABLE 6
Trend Evaluation**

TABLE 6

Trend #	Trend Statement	Level of the Trend			
		5 years ago	Today	5 years from now	10 years from now
T-1	Amount of government spending for law enforcement	90	100	95 120	78 145
T-2	Providing police service to an aging population	90	100	85 118	78 145
T-3	Crime in California	83	100	135 80	155 75
T-4	U.S. economic growth	93	100	110 120	123 137
T-5	Violent crime in California	85	100	125 60	150 43

** PANEL MEDIANS N=10

*FIVE YEARS
FROM NOW

*TEN YEARS
FROM NOW

"WILL BE"

"WILL BE"

"SHOULD BE"

"SHOULD BE"

Trend One Analysis

The amount of money local, state, and federal governments commit to local law enforcement was the first trend identified. It is critical to the central issue given the fact that (1) local government revenues are shrinking in most communities, and (2) state and local governments have contracted out services for the sole purpose of saving money. The median nominal forecast showed the panel felt the amount of government spending for law enforcement will decrease during the next decade. They predicted it will decrease five percent from its present level of 100 within five years, and by 22 percent within ten years. Five years ago, they felt the trend was only ten percent less than what it is today. Notice the variance between the "will be" and "should be" forecasts. The panel is suggesting that the amount of revenue committed to funding local law enforcement should be much higher than what they project it will actually be by the year 2001. The results of the panel's median projections are displayed graphically in Appendix H.

Trend Two Analysis

The ability of local law enforcement to provide nonessential services, e.g., petty crime investigations, to an aging U.S. population is also crucial to the central issue. The median nominal forecast indicates the panel projected a dramatic decrease in the ability of local law enforcement to provide nonessential services such as the types described in this study. In fact, they predicted it would decrease from its present level by 15 percent in five years and level off through the year 2001. Notice the wide disparity between the "will be" and "should be" forecasts. This suggests the panel believes the ability of local law enforcement to provide services to an aging population will be less than the panel believes it should be ten years from now. These trend levels are displayed graphically in Appendix I.

Trend Three Analysis

The incidence of crime in California was another trend the panel identified as having a significant impact on the central issue. The panel's median forecast projected a continuing trend toward increased crime in California. They predicted it would increase 35 percent from its present level of 100 in five years and by 55 percent by the year 2001. The range of nominal forecast is also significant considering the lowest forecast projected a 20 percent increase within ten years. Not surprisingly, the panel's median forecast suggests crime will increase more dramatically in the next ten years than panelists would have preferred. Median panel projections of this trend are displayed graphically in Appendix J.

Trend Four Analysis

The growth of the national economy was the fourth trend the panel identified. It is rapidly becoming the nation's most critical problem considering the enormous size of the federal deficit, inflationary prices, and

the number of unemployed and homeless people. Interestingly, the panel felt economic growth was only 7 percent less five years ago than what it is today. The panel's median forecast projected an increase in economical growth by ten percent in five years and by 23 percent in the year 2001. Notice the wide disparity between the high and low nominal forecasts suggesting some disagreement by panelists as to the level of economic growth in the future. The panel's forecast suggests the level of economic growth is much lower than they would prefer. These trend levels are displayed graphically in Appendix K.

Trend Five Analysis

The level of violent crime in California will certainly have far-reaching implications in terms of contracting out police services. Comments from members of the panel suggest that if violent crime does increase, the likelihood of contracting out for services will increase. It was the consensus of the panel that violent crime has risen 15 percent from its present level five years ago despite the fact crime has fallen somewhat nationwide (31). They also felt it would increase from its present level by 25 percent within five years, and by 50 percent within ten years. Notice the wide disparity between the "will be" and "should be" forecasts. These projections suggest the panel believes violent crime will actually be higher in ten years than the level the panel would prefer. These trend levels are displayed graphically in Appendix L.

EVENT FORECASTING

Members of the nominal group were also asked to forecast the probability of the events occurring and the impact each event might have on the issue and sub-issues. The scale of probability was explained to the panelists before the exercise was begun. Panelists were instructed to complete the form for each event indicating when they felt the event might occur and its impact on the issue question. The panel median forecasts for each event appears as Table 7.

TABLE 7
Event Evaluation

Event #	Event Statement	Years until probability first exceeds zero	Level of the Trend			
			*PROBABILITY		IMPACT ON THE ISSUE AREA IF THE EVENT OCCURRED	
			5 years from now 0-100%	10 years from now 0-100%	*Positive 0-10 scale	*Negative 0-10 scale
E-1	Additional funding	1	75	100	1	7
E-2	Law enforcement consolidation	5	25	60	5	5
E-3	A California Supreme Court decision prohibiting local fees	1.5	28	45	7	3
E-4	Mandatory privatization of nonessential police services	2	78	88	8	0
E-5	A major stock market crash	3	35	53	5	3

* PANEL MEDIANS N=10

Event One

The panel described the first event as the passage of a state proposition providing cities and counties with additional revenue earmarked specifically for the needs of local law enforcement. The median forecast indicates the panel felt the probability of this event first exceeding zero would be as early as 1992. The probability of it occurring increases sharply as the panel forecast a 75 percent probability of this event occurring by 1996 and a 100 percent probability of it occurring within ten years. If this event occurs as projected, the panel agreed it would have a negative impact on the central

issue. It was the concensus of the panel that any additional funding of law enforcement would increasingly reduce the need for local law enforcement to contract out for nonessential services. In short, the panel viewed privatization as a revenue-driven issue.

Event Two

The passage of a statewide proposition mandating police consolidation was the second event identified by the panel. The panel described this event as the regionalization of all police and sheriff's departments into a metropolitan police agency within each of the 58 counties in the state. In essence, only one police agency would exist in each county. Interestingly, the panel felt the probability of this event first exceeding zero would not occur until 1996. Even then, they projected only a 25 percent probability of this event occurring within five years and a 60 percent probability of it occurring within ten years. Therefore, it has a slightly better chance of happening than not happening within this decade. This event should be viewed as a wildcard. Despite the fact it was forecast as having a low probability of occurring, if it were to occur consolidation would cause some services to be streamlined making available existing employees to perform nonessential services otherwise targeted for privatization.

Event Three

A California Supreme Court decision prohibiting local fees was the third event identified by the panel. The panel agreed that a State Supreme Court decision limiting local government taxation is a probable future event and one which would influence government privatization in the future. The panel believed that such a court decision would target user fees and other special service charges that have recently become so prevalent in local police and sheriff's departments. The median forecast indicates the panel projected only a 28 percent probability of this event occurring within the first five years and a 45 percent probability of it occurring in ten years. This event is also a wildcard. Even though it was forecast as having a low probability of occurring, if city and county governments could not generate revenue to offset expenditures they might be compelled to reduce services or find other

less expensive methods of delivering services. For police and sheriff's administrators, this could result in an uncertain future in which certain types of services are contracted out to the private sector. More importantly, the final decision concerning the types of services contracted out might not rest with police and sheriff's administrators who would have to manage the change.

Event Four

A legislative mandate that law enforcement agencies contract out nonessential services, the types which are the focus of this study, was the fourth event identified by the panel. The median forecast indicates the panel felt the event would emerge as an issue in 1993. By 1996, the panel projected a 78 percent probability of the event occurring and, by the year 2001, they felt it would increase to 88 percent. Interestingly, a majority of the survey respondents also believed law enforcement agencies would soon begin contracting out nonessential services. The fact so many people familiar with this issue believe nonessential police services will be contracted out at some point in the future suggests just how important this issue is to the future of law enforcement in California.

Event Five

A major stock market crash was the fifth and final event identified by the panel. They described it as a one-day 1000 point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average. The median forecast showed the panel projected a 35 percent probability of the event occurring within the first five years and a 53 percent probability of it occurring within ten years. This suggests the probability of a stock market crash has about an equal chance of occurring or not occurring within the next ten years. Interestingly, the panel felt this event, if it were to occur, would have a positive impact on the issue. A major stock market crash might not have an immediate impact on law enforcement but would eventually cause cities and counties to realize a loss in tax revenues. The gradual loss of revenues and increasing expenditures might cause government officials to seek cost-effective methods of police service delivery, including privatization, to offset expenditures.

CROSS-IMPACT ANALYSIS

Trends and events are interrelated and do not exist in a vacuum. If any of the events were to occur at some point in the future, they would impact some or perhaps all of the other events and trends identified in this study. Cross-impact analysis is a technique that allows researchers to measure the effects events would have on all other events and trends if they were to occur in the future. Five of the original panel members made projections about the interrelationships between these events and trends on a cross-impact analysis form. The panel median forecast of these relationships appear as Table 8.

The panel determined that event one, a voter initiative providing additional funding for law enforcement, was the most active of the five events forecasted. The interrelationship between this event and event four, legislation requiring police contract out nonessential services, was rather interesting. If event one were to occur, the panel felt it would increase the probability of legislation forcing police to contract out nonessential services. Members of the panel also believed the additional revenue would be used to target serious crime problems and not the nonessential services most police departments still provide. Finally, several members concluded that the role of providing nonessential police services would shift to private industry at some point in the near future.

A review of the impact of event three on the other events was also rather interesting. Event three is a major court decision prohibiting local government from imposing user fees and other special charges to offset rising costs. If this event were to occur, the panel concluded that a voter initiative mandating funding for law enforcement would be a likely future event. They also felt that event four, legislation requiring police to contract out nonessential services, would also have a greater probability of occurring.

TABLE 8
Cross-impact Evaluation Table*

IMPACTING EVENT	IMPACTED EVENT					IMPACTED TRENDS					ACTOR HITS
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
E-1	-	-50	+10	+10	0	+90	+50	-5	0	-20	7
E-2	+10	-	+65	+40	-10	0	+5	0	+2	0	6
E-3	+50	+20	-	+50	0	-10	-10	+3	0	0	6
E-4	+40	+40	+10	-	0	+5	+20	+40	0	+3	7
E-5	-50	+10	+20	+20	-	-10	0	0	-10	0	6
REACTOR HITS	4	4	4	4	1	4	4	3	2	2	

E=Event
T=Trend

* Panel Medians N = 5

E - 1 Additional funding for law enforcement.

E - 2 Law enforcement consolidation.

E - 3 A California Supreme Court decision prohibiting local fees.

E - 4 Mandatory privatization of nonessential police services.

E - 5 A major stock market crash.

T - 1 The amount of government spending for law enforcement.

T - 2 Providing police service to an aging population.

T - 3 Crime in California.

T - 4 U. S. economic growth.

T - 5 Violent crime in California.

FUTURE SCENARIOS

A scenario is nothing more than a clearly thought out process that translates trends and events and their interrelationships into a written description of possible future states. In this portion of the study, three potential futures scenarios were written to provide the reader with some insight about the future possibilities of police service delivery.

The first scenario is the exploratory or "most likely" future in which no intervening policies and events are introduced to alter the present course of the forecasted trends. The hypothetical or "what if" scenario describes a chaotic and turbulent future in which events occur simultaneously or without warning. Finally, the normative or "desired and attainable" scenario describes the events and trends and their interrelationships which, if they were to occur, might ensure that the preferred future actually occurs.

EXPLORATORY "MOST LIKELY" SCENARIO

"Public Requests for Non-emergency Police Services Denied"

The decade of the 1990's proved to be a very traumatic period for many local law enforcement agencies in California. Increasing reports of crime and public dissatisfaction with local law enforcement seemed to top most national, state, and local news stories. In many communities throughout the state, police organizations were considered, even by their most ardent supporters, as "ineffective, unresponsive, and ill-prepared" to cope with the changing needs of society.

Many of these problems began for law enforcement in 1996. Californians witnessed demographic changes unlike any that had ever been seen. Population growth and ethnic diversity reached new heights. Nearly 39 million people had established residency in California---a 40 percent population increase over 1990 U.S. census estimates. The two ethnic groups posting the greatest population gains were Hispanics and Southeast Asians. In 1998, it was estimated that nearly 21 million Hispanics and Asians, nearly 54 percent of California's population, were living in California.

With these changes came social and economic consequences most of which were shouldered by local law enforcement. The most troubling problem was the increase in violent crime. In 1996, the murder rate in California increased 15 percent from 1991 estimates. Aggravated assault and rape also rose by monumental proportions. Unfortunately, police agencies spend most of their energies investigating violent crimes which left little time to address requests for less important services.

An equally troubling problem in California was the dramatic rise in property crimes. In a major survey of over 30,000 California households, Gallup Poll found that nearly 70 percent of those surveyed reported having been the victim of a residential burglary between 1991 and 1996.

Despite changing demographics and increasing crime, the amount of government spending for law enforcement declined 25 percent during the decade. In the late 1990's, police in communities throughout California complained of being too understaffed and incapable of providing the level of service demanded by the public. In many communities, the police simply did not have the resources to respond to requests for nonessential services. In many large communities, the police simply did not have the resources and began refusing requests to investigate petty crimes or minor traffic collisions.

HYPOTHETICAL "WHAT IF" SCENARIO

"Will the Public Ever Agree to Fund Nonessential Police Services?"

In 1994, local government was on the brink of financial disaster. The costs of public safety were outstripping available general fund revenues. In response to this problem, several municipal and county governments began imposing exorbitant service charges for nearly every nonessential service imaginable. For example, it was not uncommon for accident victims to pay one-hundred dollars for a copy of the traffic collision report or for a home owner to have to pay a sixty dollar fee for the police to cite an illegally parked vehicle authorizing its removal from the owner's property. The intent, of course, was to generate enough revenue to offset the rising costs

of providing public safety services. It was not until late 1995 that this practice of imposing service charges came under close public scrutiny.

On March 29, 1996, the California Supreme Court, in its Mendoza v. City of Aurora decision, struck down the practice of imposing service charges for nonessential services. In the opinion of the court, service charges were discriminately singling-out the poor---that segment of society needing the service most, but the people least capable of affording the fee. Many cities and counties were devastated by the decision and others filed bankruptcy.

In an effort to avoid the financial collapse of municipal and county government, a sufficient number of signatures were gathered to place a law enforcement funding initiative on the November 1996 ballot. But there was a drawback. Its passage mandated that if law enforcement was to receive funding, all police and sheriff's departments within the county would have to consolidate. In effect, only one metropolitan police agency would exist in each of the 58 counties and thus be eligible for funding. In November 1996, the proposition received overwhelming support and was enacted.

Because of the police consolidation requirement, the initiative was not too well-received in local government. Only those municipal and county governments that had declared bankruptcy actually consolidated police services to take advantage of the additional funding. Law enforcement consolidation was most prevalent in rural counties but was practically nonexistent in counties where several thousand people were served by separate police organizations. The police were not alone in expressing concerns about police consolidation. Community leaders were also critical of the consolidation requirement fearing those responsible for providing public safety would be non-responsive to local community needs.

By the year 2001, police agencies throughout the state were only capable of providing requests for emergency services. Many police executives had abandoned any provision of providing nonessential services in the communities they served.

NORMATIVE "DESIRES AND ATTAINABLE" SCENARIO

"The Older Americans Organization Applaud Police Service Delivery Levels"

In 1993, major social and economic challenges were seriously threatening the quality of life in California. Among the most serious were violent crime, declining economic growth, and the general lack of revenue to fund local law enforcement. Despite the impact violent crime was having on local police, Californians insisted their hard-spent tax dollars would provide the types of nonessential services they had come to expect.

In response to these problems, the Governor of the State of California established the California Commission on Public Safety and Law Enforcement Effectiveness. The Commission was comprised of top executives from major industries, academic leaders, law enforcement administrators, and other distinguished Californians. The purpose of the Commission was to recommend methods to improve and strengthen local law enforcement. In 1994, the Commission published its findings and recommended that local law enforcement agencies contract out certain types of nonessential services currently being performed by police employees. It was the consensus of the Commission that many non-vital services, ranging from parking enforcement to petty crime investigations, could be performed more cost-effectively by private security. The Commission's report was not well-received until 1995 when Proposition 298, the law enforcement funding initiative, failed miserably in the November 1994 general election.

In 1995, many police chief executives began contracting out nonessential services and found that the costs of contracting were less expensive than hiring police personnel to perform them. In many cases, the money saved by contracting out provided chief executives with the option of hiring additional sworn peace officers to address the increasing threat of violent crime. In fact, many police administrators credited privatization with reducing violent crime in that the money saved by contracting out allowed these administrators to hire additional sworn personnel.

Police executives are not the only people who appear satisfied with the concept. In a major survey conducted by Gallup Poll in 2001, 75 percent of those age 65 and older indicated they felt private security firms, as an extension of their local police, provide nonessential services more effectively than police personnel had in the past. Moreover, they felt more secure about their personal safety knowing a greater number of police officers are available to address, and in some cases prevent, violent crime and other serious problems in their neighborhoods.

Finally, many chief executives credit privatization with decreases in serious Part I offenses. Since 1996, several Part I offenses, including homicide, robbery and auto theft, have decreased a record 57 percent in California.

PART TWO

STRATEGIC PLANNING

AN OVERVIEW

The intent of Part Two is to develop a strategic plan that could be used by any local law enforcement agency considering contracting out services to a firm in private industry. This plan will provide a situational analysis of the environment, evaluate strengths and weaknesses of the target police agency, identify stakeholders, recognize and define policy considerations, and guide the implementation process. At the conclusion of Part Two, a strategic plan capable of taking law enforcement agencies from the present to the desired future will be available to police administrators interested in contracting services.

The scenario that was selected for strategic planning is the normative or "desired and attainable" future. It is a future that can be beneficial to law enforcement agencies especially if personnel costs continue to rise, demands for police service increase, and the revenue available cannot adequately absorb these costs.

SELECTED METHODS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING

Several methods and techniques were used to achieve the objectives of this section:

1. Two mission statements were developed for the model law enforcement agency. A "macro" statement which describes the general mission of the organization and a "micro" statement which sets forth methods to achieve privatization.
2. A description is provided of the model agency in which strategic planning takes place.
3. A situational analysis was undertaken to identify environmental opportunities and threats to the model organization. An examination was also made of the organization's strengths and weaknesses.

4. A capability analysis was performed to assess the skills, resources, management, and organizational climate of the model organization.
5. A Modified Policy Delphi was conducted to evaluate and select the most desirable policies for implementation.
6. The Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (SAST) was used to identify and evaluate important stakeholders and their assumptions relative to the proposed policies.
7. Negotiation strategies were developed and tactics deployed to assist in implementing selected policies.

THE MODEL ORGANIZATION

The Fresno Police Department was selected as a model upon which analysis was performed and strategic plans developed for implementation. Fresno's continued growth, increasing crime, and its long-term city budget imbalance make it the ideal setting for strategic planning.

Fresno is near the geographical center of California, 185 miles southeast of San Francisco. It is the seat of Fresno County and the main marketing, distribution, and financial center of the San Joaquin Valley. At present, 350,400 people reside within the city limits.

Fresno is often referred to as the raisin-growing capital of the world. About 80 percent of the nation's raisins are produced in Fresno County. The city is largely residential and most of its business relates to agriculture.

At present, there are 672 personnel employed at the Fresno Police Department, of which 432 are sworn police officers. The incidence of crime and demands for service has taken its toll on the Department. Calls for service have increased 36.2 percent in the last five years and the number of officers has risen only 13.8 percent. The average ratio of sworn officers per 100,000 population in most U.S. cities is 1.6. In Fresno, the ratio is only 1.3.

For the past five years, the city has also struggled to offset budget imbalances. Increasing demands for service, rising costs, and declining

revenues have all contributed to the city's fiscal woes. The city anticipates an 11.5 million dollar budget deficit for fiscal year 1991 of which 5.2 million will have to be absorbed by the police department. This will result in a 12 percent reduction in the amount of money budgeted for police services.

MISSION STATEMENT

The Macro-Mission

The men and women of the Fresno Police Department are dedicated to providing ethical and professional police services and to developing the organization to meet future needs. Our commitment is to safeguard lives and property, preserve Constitutional rights, proactively reduce crime, and to serve the people of Fresno by providing law enforcement in the most cost-effective manner.

The Micro-Mission

Members of the Fresno Police Department are dedicated to providing quality law enforcement services which meet the needs of the community at a reasonable cost. To achieve this objective, the men and women of the Department who serve the community will develop strategic plans to:

1. Reduce the incidence of violent crime in the City of Fresno through proactive law enforcement.
2. Provide quality nonessential services at the lowest costs to the taxpayer.
3. Reduce the costs of providing nonessential services so the cost savings can be applied to upholding public safety.

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

Situational analysis is a term used to evaluate the ability of an organization to successfully manage change. In this case, the ability of the Fresno Police Department to contract out nonessential police services. This analysis was accomplished using the WOTS-UP methodology. WOTS-UP accesses Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats, and Strengths that Underlie Planning involved in policy implementation. Opportunities and threats concern environmental issues including previously identified trends and events which influence the ability of the model organization to execute strategic planning. Strengths and weaknesses are internal factors which represent the capability of the model organization to accomplish issue-specific objectives.

Six members of the Fresno Police Department were assembled to perform the WOTS-UP Analysis. They were selected on the basis of their ability to interpret environmental opportunities and threats as well as to identify organizational strengths and weaknesses. These six members also represented a "diagonal slice" of the organization in that they held different ranks and represented the various divisions, bureaus, and sections within the Department. Their assessment of opportunities, threats, strengths, and weaknesses are described as follows:

Environmental Opportunities

1. The city faces a severe and ongoing budget imbalance. Support for privatization may exist if business firms can demonstrate that they are capable of delivering quality law enforcement services at competitive prices.
2. The central valley is experiencing tremendous population growth and an expanding labor pool.
3. Federal, state, and local governments currently contract out some governmental services to firms in the private sector.

4. The unprecedented growth of private security in the U.S. The number of protective service workers has increased 33 percent since 1980 (32).
5. Support from the Chamber of Commerce and business community for privatization of government services. They will support it because they believe privatization will boost local economic growth.
6. Continued public dissatisfaction with the ability of law enforcement to deliver nonessential police services.
7. Government bureaucracy creates impediments which limit their ability to hire prospective employees as expeditiously as many firms in private industry.
8. Proposed tax increases for law enforcement services will boost public interest in seeking avenues to deliver police services at a lower total cost.

Environmental Threats

1. A decreasing public demand for nonessential police services.
2. Private industry exists to achieve a profit and may not provide police services in a manner which is in the best interest of the community.
3. A lack of trained and qualified security personnel to absorb the nonessential police service needs of the community.
4. The discovery of new technology which reduces the need for human resources to deliver nonessential services.
5. Opposition to contracting out nonessential services by influential state and local labor groups.
6. Public insistence that police services be provided by sworn or civilian police employees.

7. Most police employees earn a higher salary than those employed for private security firms. Any reduction in salary differential might threaten police service privatization if the sole purpose in doing so is to save money.

Organizational Strengths

1. The Department is a full-service police agency which provides a wide-range of services to the community.
2. The Department does attract exceptionally qualified sworn and non-sworn police personnel.
3. Salary and benefits for sworn personnel are comparable to other major cities where the cost of living is higher. Sworn employee turnover is practically non-existent.
4. Salaries and benefits for civilian personnel who perform nonessential services are well above the level that would be paid to employees in similar services in private industry.
5. The Department purchases state-of-the-art equipment and technology.
6. Executive, mid-management, and supervisory ranks possess the necessary skills to develop strategic plans in support of the mission.
7. The Department is well-respected and enjoys strong community support for law enforcement programs.
8. The Department currently contracts with retired police officers to perform background investigations of prospective police employees.

Organizational Weaknesses

1. The city is facing an ongoing budget imbalance making money unavailable for increasing service demands.
2. Nonessential police service delivery is suffering due to the increasing level of higher priority requests.
3. Executive staff is conservative and resistant to change.
4. There are too many management levels within the organization contributing to poor communication and delays in policy implementation.
5. Lack of adequate office space at police headquarters has led to decentralization of personnel and poor communications.
6. There are not enough police employees available to address current and anticipated policing demands.
7. The Department is currently at a standstill as a large number of executive staff have announced plans to retire.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the organization's strengths and weaknesses, the same six panelists also conducted a capability analysis. A capability analysis is an unbiased assessment and documentation of an organization's strategic strengths and weakness (33). The results of this analysis appear as Table 9.

TABLE 9

Capability Analysis

Each item was evaluated on the basis of the following criteria:

- I Superior. Better than anyone else. Beyond present need.
- II Better than average. Suitable performance. No problems.
- III Average. Acceptable. Equal to competition. Not good, not bad.
- IV Problems here. Not as good as it should be. Deteriorating. Must be improved.
- V Real cause for concern. Situation bad. Crisis. Must take action.

Category:	I	II	III	IV	V
Manpower				X	
Technology		X			
Equipment		X			
Facility				X	
Money					X
Calls for Service				X	
Supplies			X		
Management Skills		X			
P. O. Skills		X			
Supervisory Skills		X			
Training		X			
Image			X		
Council Support			X		
City Mgr Support			X		
Specialties		X			
Mgt. Flexibility			X		
Sworn/non-sworn Ratio			X		
Pay Scale	X				
Benefits		X			
Turnover		X			
Community Support		X			
Complaints Rec'd			X		
Enforcement Index				X	
Traffic Index			X		
Sick Leave Rates			X		
Morale				X	

The panel also conducted a "readiness for change analysis," which is designed to determine (1) the skills and ability of top managers to actively seek change; (2) the culture and norms of the organization and willingness of its members to support change; and (3) the competency of the organization in terms of personnel and resources to bring about change. Results of this analysis appear as Appendix M.

Regarding this change analysis, results indicate the panel believes top managers have the ability and skill to bring about change. They are perceived as being intelligent, knowledgeable, and flexible enough to develop a system that would allow private industry to perform nonessential services. Unfortunately, a few top managers are not viewed as risk-takers nor are they receptive to innovation that created change. This could be a problem especially if this concept had to be acted upon immediately. With management transition about to occur, there is a likelihood those assuming new leadership roles will be receptive to change.

The Department's general organization competence is also adequate. Middle management and line personnel are viewed as desiring change despite resistance from top management. The structure of the organization, principally the number of management layers, was considered by the panel as a major stumbling block to effective change.

STRATEGIC ASSUMPTION SURFACING TECHNIQUE

Strategic Assumption Surfacing Technique (SAST) is another method of analysis which helps those involved in strategic planning identify opportunities and impediments to successful policy implementation. The purpose of SAST is to identify "stakeholders" or individuals who have a vested interest in the strategic plan being proposed. More specifically, stakeholders are individuals and groups or organizations who:

1. Impact what you do;
2. Are impacted by what you do; or
3. Care about what you do (34).

Another purpose of SAST is to identify "snaildarters." A snaildarter is a seemingly insignificant player who has the ability to drastically impact the organization's policy or action (35).

The principal intent of SAST is to make the point that the police department does not exist in a vacuum, that its policies have implications outside the department, and that those outside the organization can influence policy choices and implementation.

Stakeholders

In developing a strategic plan to contract out nonessential police services, it is important to identify those who will endorse the concept and those who will not, based upon their assumptions of the proposed strategy. The most significant stakeholders are:

1. Fresno Police Officers Association (FPOA)
2. Fresno City Employees Association (FCEA)
3. City Attorney
4. Insurance Industry
5. Chief of Police
6. Chamber of Commerce
7. Local Community
8. Police Follow-up Investigators
9. City Council
10. Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)
11. Department of Motor Vehicles (Snaildarter)
12. El Centro La Familia (Snaildarter)

Stakeholder Assumptions

1. FPOA
 - Will oppose any program which transfers traditional law enforcement responsibilities to the private sector;
 - Will oppose any program which reduces the size or number of sworn police officer positions.

2. FCEA

- Would oppose a program which would cause a reduction in the number of city employees they represent;
- May question the integrity and reliability of the service contract provider including the qualifications of private sector employees performing tasks.

3. City Attorney

- Would want to be assured the contract service provider was licensed and bonded to reduce city liability;
- Will insist that those performing nonessential police services meet all legal and statutory requirements, i.e., PC 832 training.

4. Insurance Industry

- Would support privatization only if they were convinced the company providing the service was honest and reliable;
- Would support privatization only if they were satisfied they would have access to the types of police reports they currently receive.

5. Chief of Police

- Would be concerned about the quality and reliability of contract service delivery;
- Would not support privatization unless well-defined operating standards were established for the company(ies) providing services;
- Would not support it unless he/she had the ability to terminate the contract if he/she felt the services being rendered were less than satisfactory.

6. Chamber of Commerce

- Will support government programs which bolster local economic and industrial growth;
- Is a strong advocate of government programs that are cost-effective and reduce tax liabilities.

7. Local Residents

- Would oppose any form of government privatization that results in a general tax increase or inferior services;
- Will demand professionalism, reliability, and integrity from private service providers.

8. Police Follow-up Investigators

- Will not support programs which reduce their ability to receive incident reports in a timely fashion;
- Will insist private sector providers conduct quality investigations and prepare accurate and complete incident reports.

9. City Council

- Has a strong interest in programs which provide quality services at the lowest possible cost;
- Very sensitive to the views and needs of special interest groups such as labor organizations and city merchants.

10. POST

- May require that employees of private sector police providers meet minimum job standards;
- May impose minimum training standards for private sector employees providing services or performing police functions.

11. Department of Motor Vehicles (snaildarter)

- Will want to be assured they continue to receive information regarding traffic accidents;
- Will want to be assured the information they receive about traffic-related accidents is accurate and complete.

12. El Centro La Familia (snaildarter)

- Would oppose any policy or practice which either targets the Hispanic community or prevents them from receiving equal treatment;
- May demand the city establish a review procedure to entertain complaints about service delivery practices by private sector providers.


MAPPING OF STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS

A SAST Map, such as the one depicted as Figure 1, is a visual tool which illustrates the importance of each stakeholder's assumptions and the degree of certainty the assumptions are correct. The SAST Map clearly demonstrates that the six panelists felt they were certain about the assumptions of several stakeholders. Moreover, they felt the assumptions are very important to the organization and to the central issue. For example, they seemed certain that the assumption the city council has about providing low-cost quality services was highly important to the central issue. They also felt certain the assumption the police chief has about the quality and reliability of contract service delivery is also highly important to the issue. These conclusions came as no surprise.

Finally, the panel was somewhat uncertain about the assumptions DMV would have about contracting out police services. They also agreed the assumptions of this stakeholder would not be important to the issue.

Figure 1

SAST MAP



- 1. FPOA
- 2. FCEA
- 3. City Attorney
- 4. Insurance Industry
- 5. Chief of Police
- 6. Chamber of Commerce

- 7. Local Residents
- 8. Police Follow-up investigators
- 9. City Council
- 10. POST
- 11. DMV (SD)
- 12. El Centro La Familia (SD)

N=6

MODIFIED POLICY DELPHI

The purpose of a modified policy delphi is to ensure that a variety of alternative strategies are identified and examined relative to the central issue. The same six panelists participated in this exercise. Panelists were asked to generate, evaluate, and select policy alternatives that would assist the Department in delivering quality nonessential services in a manner that was more cost-effective. Six policy alternatives were generated and rated for their desirability and feasibility to the success of the mission. The three strategies receiving the highest ratings were selected for further discussion and analysis.

Policy One: Contracting out the telephonic report-taking process.

In 1988, the Fresno Police Department established a Telephonic Report-Taking Unit. The purpose of the unit is to handle, by telephone, the investigation and completion of incident reports where suspects are unknown, the victim declines prosecution, or is reporting for insurance purposes only. At the present, these tasks are performed by Community Service Officers (CSO) at an hourly cost to the Department of \$16.72 per employee. CSO's assigned to this unit handle missing person reports, auto thefts, vandalisms, late reported traffic accidents, and other incidental requests for police reports. On an average, the unit completes 12,000 reports per year or 13 percent of the total number of reports the police department handles each year. Tasks performed by this unit relieves sworn officers of this responsibility so they can handle higher priority requests of service. At present, the Telephonic Report-Taking Unit is manned by five CSO's and a supervisor.

Under this proposed policy, the police department would contract out these tasks to a firm in private industry. The firm awarded the contract would be responsible for hiring employees to perform these tasks at a lower overall cost to the city. As a condition of the contract, individuals hired to perform these duties would receive the same level of basic training currently provided to all CSO's at the time of employment. The firm would also be required to hire a retired Fresno Police Officer to supervise the five

employees performing this function. Finally, a stipulation would be included in the contract allowing the police department the authority to revoke the contract with or without cause.

Advantages:

- It would result in a salary cost-savings.
- It would reduce overhead or administrative costs.
- It would reduce internal personnel-related problems. The contract service provider would assume responsibility for recruiting and retaining qualified employees. They would also be responsible for handling disciplinary matters which are oftentimes complex and time-consuming tasks for managers.
- Money saved from contracting out could be applied to the purchase of new technology and/or additional sworn police personnel.

Disadvantages:

- The business firm could experience high employee turn-over. This could result in higher costs for the service provider which could be passed along to the city.
- It might result in a reduction in the number and quality of police reports.
- The Department could lose some of its control over the manner in which incidental crimes are reported.
- It could result in an inferior product, i.e., poorly written police reports.

To determine just how cost-effective it would be to contract out the types of services proposed in this plan, an analysis was completed comparing the differences in costs between a CSO and an equally qualified private sector employee. Estimates are based upon what it would cost a local

private security firm to provide the types of nonessential services which are the focus of this policy (36). The results of this analysis appear as Table 10. Based upon these projections, adoption of this policy would result in a 32 percent cost savings.

TABLE 10

A Cost Comparison of Police and Private Sector
Employees Performing Telephonic Report Writing Tasks

	CSO	*Private Sector Employee
Hourly Base Rate:	\$10.75	\$6.75
FICA:	-----	.52
Fed'l Unemp Ins:	-----	.05
State Unemp Ins:	.01	.12
Basic Training:	-----	.01
Worker's Comp:	.16	.98
Liability Ins:	-----	.18
Uniform Allowance:	.03	.09
Health Benefits:	1.71	.75
Pension:	2.39	-----
Leaves of Absence:	1.64	-----
Misc: Jury Duty:	.03	-----
Employee Costs:	\$16.72	\$9.45
Overhead:	Included in Salary	1.27
Profit:	-----	.80
Total Cost:	\$16.72	\$11.52
		(-32%)

* Source: California Industrial Services
Fresno, California

Policy Two: Contracting out nonessential police services which require on-scene investigators.

At present, the Department assigns twenty-four CSO's who handle low-priority calls which require on-scene investigators. Field CSO's are civilian employees who are assigned a vehicle to respond and handle these duties. The common types of calls field CSO's handle include: the recovery of stolen vehicles; parking enforcement, including the marking and towing of abandoned vehicles; the investigation of residential and vehicle burglaries which may involve collecting physical evidence; and the investigation and reporting of non-injury accidents.

The plan calls for the Department to contract out the types of duties currently performed by field CSO's. The business firm awarded the contract would be responsible for the recruitment, selection, and placement of qualified people to perform these duties at a lower overall cost to the city. The private sector employee would be employed by the contract firm but would wear the CSO uniform. The contract firm would provide all necessary equipment, including vehicles.

As a condition of the contract, individuals hired to perform these services would receive the same level of training currently provided to all CSO's at the time of employment. CSO's currently undergo a six-week training course in a variety of police-related subjects. Private sector employees would be paid at a lower hourly wage and would also be ineligible for many of the fringe benefits CSO's receive including paid health benefits and a pension plan.

Advantages:

- It would result in a salary savings.
- It would reduce internal personnel-related problems involved in hiring and firing employees.

- The cost-savings would provide the Department with the flexibility of hiring additional police officers and/or purchasing new equipment.

Disadvantages:

- Use of non-police personnel to handle these services may not be acceptable to the tax-paying public.
- It could result in poor service delivery. Lower paid private sector employees may not be as proficient nor work as conscientiously as CSO's.
- Conflicts would arise between police and private sector employees regarding the manner in which cases are handled or assignments are completed.

An analysis was also undertaken comparing the differences between the costs of a field CSO and equally qualified private sector employee. Again, data regarding the projected costs of private sector employees performing field CSO duties was made available by a private security agency. The results of this comparison appear as Table 11. The hourly base salary that would be paid to private sector employees performing these duties is much higher than an employee handling telephonic reports. This is because the security professional providing data felt the job responsibilities of employees handling on-scene investigations would require a higher level of proficiency. Based upon this data, adoption of this policy would only result in a six percent cost savings.

TABLE 11

A Cost Comparison of Police
and Private Sector Employees Performing Field CSO Duties

	Field CSO	*Private Sector Employee
Hourly Base Rate:	\$11.85	\$10.50
FICA:	-----	.80
Fed'l Unemp Ins:	-----	.08
State Unemp Ins:	.01	.19
Basic Training	-----	.01
Worker's Comp:	.18	1.52
Liability Ins:	-----	.27
Uniform Allowance:	.03	.13
Equipment:	-----	.21
Health Benefits:	1.97	.75
Pension:	2.63	-----
Leaves of Absence:	1.93	-----
Misc: Jury Duty	.03	-----
 Employee Costs:	 \$18.63	 \$14.46
Overhead:	Included in Salary	1.95
Profit:	-----	1.23
 Total Cost:	 \$18.63	 \$17.64
		(-6%)

* Source: California Industrial Services
Fresno, California

Policy Three: Utilizing police reserve
officers to perform police services.

Under this plan, police officers would no longer perform specified nonessential services. Instead, these services would be provided by Level I reserve officers employed by private industry. The contract service provider

would seek to employ recent police academy graduates or retired police officers desiring full or part-time employment.

The specific duties and services reserve officers would perform include:

- Responding to burglary alarm calls.
- Prisoner transportation.
- Guarding prisoners at hospitals.
- Handling in-custody shoplifting offenders.

The business firm awarded the contract would be responsible for recruiting and training an adequate number of Level I reserve officers to perform these functions. Reserve officers employed by the firm would wear a Fresno Police uniform and would be issued a reserve officer badge. The contract firm would also provide all necessary equipment including vehicles. As a condition of the contract, reserve officers would be temporary employees ineligible for membership in the FPOA.

Advantages:

- It would result in a salary savings. Reserve officers could be paid substantially less than the amount currently paid to police officers performing these tasks.
- Police management would not have to observe labor-management agreements in any decision made regarding wages, hours, and conditions of employment for reserve officers.
- The police department would not have to commit resources to the management of a reserve officer program.

Disadvantages:

- Reserve officers are granted authority as peace officers only when employed by a law enforcement agency. State legislation would have to be adopted allowing private sector providers to hire employees capable of exercising peace officer powers as Level 1 reserves.

- The city would assume liability for the actions or inactions of reserve officers even though they are employed by a private firm.

An analysis was also completed which compared distinctions between the cost of full-time salaried police officers and equally qualified reserve officers. The results of this analysis appear as Table 12. If this policy were adopted, it would result in a 51 percent cost savings.

TABLE 12

A Cost Comparison of
Police Officers and Level I Reserve Officers

	Police Officers	Reserve Officers
Hourly Base Rate:	\$21.34	\$14.00
FICA:	-----	1.07
Fed'l Unemp Ins:	-----	.11
State Unemp Ins:	.03	.36
Worker's Comp:	3.76	1.72
Liability Ins:	-----	.35
Uniform Allowance:	.13	.13
Equipment:	-----	.21
Health Benefits:	2.11	.75
Pension:	12.91	-----
Leaves of Absence:	3.58	-----
Misc: Jury Duty:	.06	-----
Employee Costs:	\$43.92	\$18.70
Overhead:	Included in Salary	2.73
Total Cost:	\$43.92	\$21.43
		(-51%)

STAKEHOLDER POSITIONS ON POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Prior to selecting an acceptable strategy and developing an implementation plan, it is important to determine the positions of principal stakeholders relative to the three proposed policies. Table 13 presents results of this analysis.

TABLE 13

Stakeholders Positions

Policy	Stakeholders											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Contracting out the telephonic report-taking process	O	O	I	O	S	S	I	O	S	S	C	C
2. Contracting out nonessential police services requiring on-scene investigators	O	O	I	O	C	S	S	O	S	S	C	C
3. Utilizing reserve officers to perform nonessential services	O	O	C	S	C	S	S	S	S	S	I	C

- | | |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. FPOA 2. FCEA 3. City Attorney 4. Insurance Industry 5. Police Chief 6. Chamber of Commerce | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Local Community 8. Police Follow-up Investigators 9. City Council 10. POST 11. DMV (SD) 12. El Centro La Familia (SD) |
|--|---|

S= Support O= Oppose C=Change I=Indifferent

The strongest advocates of these policies include the chamber of commerce and city council. The chamber of commerce will support them because they could reduce tax liabilities and boost local economic growth. Since city government is currently facing a budget deficit, city council would also support these policies as they appear cost-effective. The strongest opposition would come from labor groups, principally the FPOA and the FCEA, who would feel threatened by these programs. They would argue that the adoption of privatization for purposes of salary savings would result in high employee turnover by private sector employees performing these tasks. They would also argue the public would receive an inferior level of service as a result of hiring lesser paid employees. All three policies were carried forward to operational planning.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Creating a system for contracting out the delivery of nonessential police services would require a twelve-month start-up period. This would allow those responsible for strategic planning time to (1) adopt a resolution; (2) retain a business firm capable of delivering these services; and (3) ensure those individuals performing job tasks were qualified and had received adequate training. The overall implementation strategy would consist of the following action plans and resource requirements.

Action Plans

1. City council establishes a resolution directing the police chief to contract out nonessential services.
2. The police chief appoints a member of his staff to serve as "contract manager."
 - It will be the contract manager's responsibility to administer the program.
 - This person should be a respected staff officer holding the rank of captain.

- Once the contract is in place, this person monitors the contractor's performance to ensure the community receives quality service.
3. The contract manager forms a committee of police department representatives to begin the search for a contract service provider.
 4. The committee determines the number of private firms willing and capable of delivering police services.
 5. The committee examines the legal parameters of contracting out nonessential services.
 6. The contract manager establishes a "job standards" sub-committee responsible for ensuring the contract firm employs a formal process for the selection of employees. The selection process would include:
 - A written test of mental ability or aptitude.
 - An oral interview.
 - A physical examination.
 - A psychological examination.
 - An in-depth background investigation.
 - A requirement employees be 21 years of age, possess a high school diploma or G.E.D. Certificate, and a valid driver's license.
 7. The job standards sub-committee would also be responsible for ensuring that the contract firm established minimum training requirements for its employees. These requirements would include:
 - Successful completion of a six-week training course for employees performing the task of telephonic report-taking or the duties currently performed by field CSO's.
 - Successful completion of the POST Basic training course for employees who have been selected to perform the tasks of police reserve officer.

- Employees performing as reserves would be required to successfully pass a six-week field training program administered by the Fresno Police Department.
8. The contract manager appoints a second sub-committee responsible for handling invitations for bids from private firms. Their specific responsibilities would include:
- Identifying the bid process to include maintaining a calendar for submission of offers.
 - Handling and receiving bids from potential contractors.
 - Making site visits to potential contractors.
 - Ensuring the private firms chosen has sufficient liability insurance and is bonded.
 - Establishing a system for evaluating the performance of the firm selected.
 - Ensuring the contractor establishes an internal procedure for investigating citizen complaints.

Resources required

1. Budget \$200,000 for project start-up costs. This money would be used to pay the salaries of the contract manager and the two office assistants.
2. The support and commitment of the city manager to allow committee members time away from their assigned responsibilities to serve on their respective committees.

NEGOTIATING ACCEPTANCE OF THE STRATEGY

It would be unrealistic for organizational leaders to believe they could implement a major policy change without negotiating key points of the strategy. Such would hold true if the Fresno Police Department were to attempt to contract out nonessential services. Considering this fact, five key components have been identified which are absolutely critical to the

success of the strategy and several which are not so critical. Those considered critical and non-negotiable include:

1. A city council resolution.
2. The ability to select the service provider.
3. Job standards and requirements.
4. Job training requirements.
5. Liability insurance.

There are three components that are important but not mandatory to project success. They are:

1. The number of representatives serving on the project committee. It would be desirable but not critical that the committee be comprised of twenty members including several from other departments within city government.
2. A citizen's complaint process. It would be important but not mandatory that police require the service provider to develop a system to investigate complaints against their employees.

NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

The very success of strategic planning is dependent upon how well those responsible negotiate acceptance of the proposed policies. Many of the strategies and tactics discussed in this section were taken from Gerald Nierenberg's The Art of Negotiating and Abraham Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs."

Policy One: Contracting out the telephonic report-taking process.

Three stakeholders were identified as key components to the success of this recommended strategy. The three include the FCEA, the insurance industry, and the city council.

At present, the FCEA represents 720 city employees including the six CSO's who serve in the Telephonic Report-Taking Unit. It can be assumed the FCEA will oppose any attempt by the city to contract out this service to private industry. Their greatest fear will be that the city may decide to contract out other services. This might especially hold true if the city discovers that private industry can reliability deliver quality services at a lower cost.

In negotiating acceptance of this plan with the FCEA, the best approach would be to combine what Gerald Nierenberg refers to as Participation and Fait Accompli. Participation is a negotiation strategy in which the negotiator strives to enlist the aid of other parties in his behalf, to act directly or indirectly in winning acceptance of the strategy (37). Before seeking city council approval of the proposed policy, the negotiator should approach the Fresno County Taxpayers Association, Chamber of Commerce, Private Industry Council, and other influential organizations and suggest they lend support to the proposed strategy. Finally, the negotiator should invoke Fait Accompli. The technique demands that you act, achieve your goal against the opposition, then wait and see what, if anything, the opposition will do about it (38). In applying this strategy, those serving on the sub-committee handling the bid process would begin preparations to contract out services. Opposition or argument by the FCEA would be useless once city council adopted the resolution and plans were underway to find a reputable contract firm.

The insurance industry would be another powerful and influential stakeholder in this proposed policy. From a negotiations standpoint, they would probably be more receptive to a proposal to contract out police services than they would any decision by city council to eliminate services. Police reports serve a myriad of purposes for the insurance industry. Chief among them is to discourage policy holders from filing false claims and to obtain an accurate and impartial account of the circumstances surrounding

the insurer's claim. The insurance industry would probably support this proposal if the company providing the service was reputable and the reporting was accurate and impartial. On the other hand, they would likely oppose it if they were not afforded access to the types of reports they currently and legally receive from the police department.

The negotiation technique recommended in winning the insurance industry's acceptance of this proposal is Feinting. Feinting involves an apparent move in one direction to divert attention from the desired and achievable goal (39). The objective of negotiation would be to achieve acceptance of the proposal to contract out the telephonic report-taking process by proposing to eliminate the types of nonessential services considered important to insurance companies. The aim of this strategy is to win the insurance industry's acceptance of the proposal in lieu of eliminating services.

A city council majority would have to lend their stamp of approval to this plan if it is to be consummated. City council members would support the resolution only if they were convinced it met with the approval of their constituency. They will especially want to be assured the contract service provider delivers police services in a manner which reflects quality and reliability. Finally, city council will probably only want to enter into a one-year contract as a trial period to ensure the community received the best service at a lower cost.

In terms of winning city council support for this proposal, the recommended negotiation technique is Participation. Again, the intent of this technique is to enjoin the assistance of others to act on your behalf in support of a plan or objective. Before seeking city council approval of the proposed strategy, the negotiator should enlist the support of the Fresno County Taxpayers Association, Chamber of Commerce, professional organizations such as the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), and influential community leaders who are interested in the proposal and would lobby for council support.

**Policy Two: Contracting out services
requiring on-scene investigators.**

Three stakeholders were determined to be vital to the success of this recommended strategy. They include the FCEA, FPOA, and insurance industry. The views of the FCEA and insurance industry as regards this policy is unlikely to be any different than their opinions of Policy One. Most likely, the FCEA would be the group most opposed. The same strategies used against the FCEA and insurance industry to negotiate acceptance of Policy One could also be used here to win the acceptance of this strategy.

This policy proposes that the city contract out the types of nonessential services performed by CSO's assigned to the field. Even though it would not directly affect those members represented by the FPOA, they would likely be opposed to such a strategy. Chief among their concerns would be the fear that the city might eventually consider options to full-time salaried police officers. The FPOA would also be concerned about the degree of cooperation that would exist between the department and the contract service provider. For example, the FPOA may demand that field supervisors be given the authority to direct the private sector employees, even though they would technically be working for the contract service firm.

In dealing with the FPOA, it is important to understand that they are operating from a strong safety and security need. The negotiator seeking to gain FPOA support must make every effort to accommodate the reasonable fears they have about privatization. During the early planning stages, FPOA representatives should be consulted and, whenever possible, brought into the planning process. Such a practice might serve to lessen their fears about privatization and the impact, if any, it might have on those they represent. Their suggestions might serve to enhance the overall effectiveness of the strategic plan.

**Policy Three: Utilizing reserve officers
to perform nonessential services.**

This policy would receive the greatest level of support from stakeholders. Those who would be staunch supporters include the insurance industry, Chamber of Commerce, city council, and the local community. It is

easy to understand the reasons this plan would receive such overwhelming support. Most importantly, it would result in a substantial cost-savings. The specific tasks reserve officers perform, i.e., prisoner transportation, are not difficult tasks nor the types of functions which would require a higher paid police officer to handle. Only the FCEA and FPOA would be opposed to this policy for those reasons previously mentioned. Despite this opposition, stakeholder support for this plan far outweighs the concerns or dissatisfaction labor groups may express.

It is interesting to note the positions the police chief and city attorney would be expected to take on this issue. Both stakeholders would support the plan only if adjustments were made. The chief, who serves at the pleasure of the city manager, would be expected to approach this issue from the perspective of a safety and security need. Since a private contractor would be responsible for the management of the program, it is understandable the chief would want the authority to terminate the contract if the service provider was found to be unsuitable. Since the chief is critical to the success of this plan, it would be wise for the negotiator to make every attempt to ensure the chief is satisfied that he has the recourse to terminate the program should the need arise.

The city attorney serves to provide legal advice to city council and other city officials. As such, the city attorney would approach this proposed policy from the perspective of a need to know and understand the legal ramifications of contracting out police services. Chief among his/her concerns is the fact the city would not be resolving itself of liability for the actions of private sector employees performing police related tasks. To reduce the degree of liability the city might incur, the city attorney would probably suggest the contract service provider be licensed and bonded. Since this suggestion is not at all unreasonable, those negotiating the acceptance of this plan should make this concession which would be in the best interest of the city.

PART THREE

TRANSITION MANAGEMENT

AN OVERVIEW

The purpose of this section on transition management is to present techniques that will enable organizational leaders to mitigate resistance to the strategic plan for contracting out nonessential police services. The process is designed to ensure the organization experiences smooth transition from the present to the desired future state. At the conclusion of this part on transition management, administrators interested in contracting out services will have a clearer understanding of the basic concepts and techniques that enable successful change to occur.

SELECTED METHODS FOR MANAGING CHANGE

The following methods and techniques were selected to help achieve the successful transition of the strategic plan:

1. The identification of those individuals or groups described as the critical mass whose support is necessary for change to take place.
2. A readiness and capability analysis was done to determine the ability and willingness of individual actors in the critical mass for anticipated change.
3. A commitment-planning process was completed to measure and evaluate the minimum level of commitment necessary from each actor in the critical mass.
4. The design of a management structure was developed to ensure successful implementation of strategic planning.
5. Support methods and technologies were developed to assist organization leaders in maintain stability within the department while tackling the new challenges and requirements of change.

CRITICAL MASS IDENTIFICATION

To ensure successful transition from the present to the desired future requires the commitment of key individuals referred to as the "critical mass". The critical mass is the smallest number of individuals or groups whose support is necessary for successful change to take place and whose opposition will likely lead to failure (40). Ordinarily, the critical mass is comprised of key stakeholders but can include others who do not have a specific interest in the outcome of the proposed change. If organizational leaders hope to implement the strategic plan, it is important that they identify the critical mass and formulate strategies to influence the necessary commitment. The following individuals and groups make-up the critical mass:

1. The President of the Fresno Police Officers Association (FPOA).
2. The President of the Fresno City Employees Association (FCEA).
3. The President of the Independent Insurance Agents Association of Fresno.
4. The Chief of Police.
5. City Council.

READINESS/CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

An important step in transition management is to measure the readiness and capability of the critical mass for anticipated change. "Readiness" for change has to do with the willingness, motives, and aims of each critical mass member concerning the proposed strategy. "Capability" involves the power, influence, and authority of the individual or group member to allocate resources, and the information and skills they possess to carry out the necessary tasks (41). Because each individual is at a different level of readiness and capability, organization leaders must determine the actions necessary to change or influence positions held by these members. Table 14 presents the results of each individual or group in terms of their readiness and capability to accept the proposed policies.

Table 14

Readiness/Capability Analysis

Actors in the Critical Mass	Readiness			Capability		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
FPOA President			X	X		
FCEA President			X		X	
President of the Local Insurance Association		X		X		
Police Chief		X			X	
City Council	X			X		

The results of the "readiness/capability analysis" indicate that some adjustments are necessary to increase the commitment of a few key individuals.

The two most alarming low-readiness scores are that of the president of the FPOA and his counterpart in the FCEA. The FPOA president, a sworn member of the police department, would reject all three proposed strategies on the basis of his assumptions that private sector substitutes would lack the necessary skills to properly deliver police services. Most importantly, he would be concerned that any lack of professionalism by private sector substitutes would tarnish the public's image of the department, its employees, and the FPOA.

The president of the FCEA would be opposed to Policy One and Two which recommend the city contract out the types of services provided by CSO's. He/she would argue that these strategies would displace 29 CSO's and might result in an inferior product, i.e., poorly written police reports.

It is doubtful that either one of these labor leaders would entertain a

high willingness to accept any of the three recommended policies. Their readiness for change might be influenced, however, if they were reassured that contracting out services would not result in the displacement of existing personnel. It would be in the best interest of organizational leaders to strike an agreement with the contract firm allowing displaced city employees the option of employment with the firm chosen to provide these services. Such an arrangement might encourage these leaders to be more amenable to the proposals. On the capability measure, each actor in the critical mass possesses adequate authority and resources to implement the proposed strategies.

COMMITMENT PLANNING

Commitment planning is a strategy designed to secure the support of members of the critical mass who are vital to the change effort (42). Understanding the degree of commitment of each key individual or group is an important part of strategic planning. One technique that has been developed to assess the commitment of members is called "commitment charting." This technique provides organizational leaders with a method of rating the commitment of all key players so that strategies can be developed to ensure project success.

Table 15 depicts the current and desired state of commitment for each member of the critical mass. Organizational leaders are then able to focus their energies on those who are not dedicated to the level of change deemed necessary. If successful transition is to occur, no member of the critical mass can remain in the "block change" category.

Table 15

Commitment Chart

Players in the Critical Mass	block change	let it happen	help it happen	make it happen
FPOA President	X----->	0		
FCEA President	X----->	0		
President of the Local Insurance Assn		X----->	0	
Police Chief		X----->		0
City Council			X----->	0

X=present degree 0=minimum commitment

Strategies to Enlist Commitment

Human resistance to change is a natural phenomenon and it should be expected during the change process. In fact, there can be no real change without some form of resistance. Several intervention strategies can be employed, besides power and persuasion, to overcome resistance and create conditions of commitment. These include: problem finding, educational intervention, resistance management, role modeling, changed reward systems, and "forced" collaboration (42). In the remainder of this section, intervention strategies designed to achieve the commitment of each actor in the critical mass are presented and discussed.

President of the FPOA. The support of the FPOA president is essential if transition is to occur. He is a strong actor in the critical mass. It can be assumed that he will seek to "block change." Chief among his concerns would be the thought that the city might, at some point in the future, propose to contract out additional police services or use this issue of privatization as leverage during contract negotiations.

If organizational leaders hope to bring about change, they will have to persuade the FPOA president to "let it happen." The suggested strategy for achieving his commitment is "problem finding." In executing this strategy, organizational leaders would meet with him as many times as necessary to identify and clarify all aspects of the proposed change. Through information exchange, he would have a better understanding of the concept and the impact it will have on those whom he represents. It would be especially important for organizational leaders to stress the fact that nearly all the responsibilities that would be performed by private sector substitutes are tasks which sworn personnel consider undesirable. The FPOA president might be willing to "let it happen" if he was thoroughly convinced the plan would in some way benefit those whom he represents.

President of the FCEA. If transition is to occur, the president of the FCEA must also be committed to allowing it to happen. At the present, he is perceived as nonsupportive and would elect to "block change." Perhaps the most important reason is that it might result in the dismissal of 29 CSO's whom he represents. In order for the FCEA president to commit to the strategic plan, he must be convinced the 29 affected CSO's will be afforded the option of employment with the contract firm or to be transferred to another comparably paid position within city government. "Problem finding" would be the most effective mechanism to minimize FCEA resistance and to persuade the president to "let it happen." It would be through this process of meetings and discussions that the FCEA president can be reassured every effort will be taken to prevent city employees from being dismissed and unemployed.

President of the Local Insurance Association. According to one local authority, the President of the Independent Insurance Agents Association of Fresno is one of the strongest and most influential voices of the local insurance industry. This person, who represents the interests of local independent insurance agents, is perceived as being in the "let it happen" category. If organizational leaders hope to implement the strategic plan, the president of this association must adopt a "help it happen" philosophy. To achieve his commitment, organizational leaders should adopt the intervention strategy referred to as "resistance management." The object of this strategy is to convince the key individual that their level of dissatisfaction with present conditions outweighs the costs or inconveniences of change (44).

An interesting development just occurred which would probably influence this person to lend his support to privatization. On March 6, 1991, the city announced that police personnel would no longer investigate non-injury traffic accidents. This action was recommended by the police department and approved by city council in response to the city's current budget problems. Given this recent development and the likelihood the police may decide to discontinue other services, the president of this organization would probably be interested in supporting a plan to contract out services. From his perspective, it might be advantageous for the insurance industry to encourage the city to contract out the types of nonessential services that are important to the industry if it meant the city planned to discontinue these services altogether.

Police Chief. The support of the police chief is absolutely essential if the organization is ever to contract out nonessential services. At the present, it can be assumed the chief will allow it to happen but would not promote it unless (1) he was convinced the community would continue to receive quality services at a lower total cost; and (2) he had the authority to sever the contractual agreement with the service provider if the situation warranted such action. Before any change will occur, the chief must be persuaded to "make it happen." The suggested strategy for obtaining his commitment is "resistance management." The chief must be convinced that increasing service demands coupled with the city's inability to hire enough

personnel to absorb these demands will only lead to a high-level of public dissatisfaction with the police. A reasonable option is to convince the chief that it may be possible to provide quality nonessential services through privatization at a much lower cost.

City Council. This group is also critical to successful project implementation. They must vote as a majority to adopt a resolution allowing the chief to contract with a private firm capable of providing nonessential police services. Their present position on the issue is to "let it happen." They too must be persuaded to "make it happen" or change will not occur. To achieve the level of commitment necessary, use of "resistance management" is again the preferred strategy. City council is committed to enhancing the quality of life in Fresno through law enforcement efforts. As a group, they are particularly concerned about the problem of crime and its impact on the community. They also understand that current funding levels will not sufficiently impact this problem. Organizational leaders must convince city council that (1) current attempts by the police to address continuing service demands and reduce crime have been unsuccessful and have met with public dissatisfaction; (2) the proposed strategic plan is more desirable to their constituency; and (3) the change will not cause disruption nor jeopardize their political ambitions. Finally, city council must be convinced these factors clearly outweigh the cost of change. Only then will individual council members opt to "make it happen."

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The Fresno Police Department is a very stable organization with deep-rooted values, traditions, and norms. For several decades, it has been led by chiefs who have upheld these values in an effort to maintain harmony and stability within the organization. Moreover, these traditions have been supported by an active police association membership. Any hint of change is ordinarily met with resistance. Moving the Department from the present to the planned future will, therefore, be a very demanding and trying experience for transition managers.

Another reason for resistance, aside from tradition, is the fact stable organizations find it most difficult to accept change (45). If the Department

is perceived as performing satisfactorily, individuals inside and outside the organization resist as they see little need for change.

Considering these facts, utilizing regular structures of the organization (or the hierarchy) to manage change is not recommended. Assigning a "contract manager" (or project manager) to direct the implementation of the strategic plan is most appropriate and will ensure a smooth transition.

The person chosen as the contract manager must also have the respect of the Department and the members of the critical mass who wish to block change. He/she should also possess strong leadership and interpersonal skills. Finally, this person should hold the position of captain which further demonstrates the significance of the strategic plan.

The function of the contract manager would be to act on behalf of the chief to ensure a smooth transition. The chief must delegate to the contract manager the authority and responsibility to make change happen within the Department and to coordinate activities with outside organizations as necessary. The successful implementation of the strategic plan would be the contract manager's only assignment.

Considering the scope of this project, the contract manager should be given the flexibility to appoint a committee to assist him/her in policy implementation. The formation of the committee, to include the selection and appointment of representative members, will be the sole responsibility of the contract manager. The committee should, however, represent a diagonal slice of the police department. This structure allows input from the various levels, cultures, and functions within the organization which encourages greater commitment from all members at all levels of the organization. Leaders of labor organizations and representatives from the insurance industry should also be invited to serve.

SUPPORT METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES

One of the difficulties of managing change is the task of maintaining stability within the organization so it can continue to do whatever is expected of it while transition managers tackle the new challenges and requirements of change. This demands that executive management develop specific methods to ensure change occurs as scheduled, organizational stability remains constant, and employee anxiety and uncertainty are kept at

a minimum.

Until now, only the broad issues and general approaches of transition management have been discussed. The strategic plan would not be complete without a description of the technologies and methods that will support implementation and assist in managing anxiety and uncertainty during change.

Responsibility Charting

Responsibility charting (RASI) is a useful technique to clarify the action steps, in chronological order, necessary to help move the organization from the present to the future state. For each action step, individuals or groups identified as actors, critical to successful transition, are assigned one of several behaviors. They include:

- R = Has responsibility for a particular action, but not necessary authority;
- A = Must approve and has the power to veto the action;
- S = Must support but has to provide resources for the action, does not have to agree;
- I = Must be informed or consulted before action but cannot veto;
- = Not applicable to particular action.

Responsibility charting helps to clarify the roles and responsibilities of major actors whose interrelationship is affected by change. It also tends to reduce the adverse emotional reactions associated with change.

Developing a strategic plan to contract out nonessential services requires that the various tasks be assigned to key actors charged with ensuring successful transition. Considering the number of actors and tasks involved in this plan, responsibility charting would prove to be a very useful technique enabling transition managers to monitor the various tasks to be performed. It would also serve as a ready reference for determining who is responsible for a task and those who must be informed or approve of the action. Table 16 illustrates the practical application of this process. It describes the major actors involved and the tasks that must be performed.

Table 16

Responsibility Charting
Contracting Out Nonessential Services

Decision/Task	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Develop Budget	S	R	S	-	-	-	-	-	A	S
Draft Resolution	I	R	S	S	S	-	-	S	A	S
Adopt Resolution	A	R	-	-	-	I	I	I	A	I
Appoint Contract Mgr	-	-	-	-	-	I	I	I	R	I
Appoint Committee	-	R	-	-	-	I	I	I	S	I
Appoint Sub-Committee	-	R	-	-	-	I	I	I	S	I
Handle Bid Process	I	A	S	I	R	-	-	I	I	-
Select Private Firm	A	R	S	A	R	I	I	I	A	I
Ensure Employees Meet Job Standards	I	A	S	R	A	I	I	I	I	I
Handle Public Awareness Campaign	-	R	S	S	S	I	I	-	A	I

- 1 - City Council
 2 - Contract Manager
 3 - Project Committee
 4 - Job Standards Sub-Committee
 5 - Bid Process Sub-Committee
 6 - FPOA
 7 - FCEA
 8 - City Attorney
 9 - Chief of Police
 10 - City Manager

R = Responsibility
 A = Approval Required
 S = Support Given
 I = Inform
 - = Nonapplicable

Communicating A Vision

Truly successful leaders are those who have the ability to envision the future. That is, they are capable of understanding the organization they lead, the complex environment in which it must function, and the interaction of the two as a single entity. Most importantly, they share this vision with others so they too may participate in its realization. If transition managers ever hope to contract out nonessential police services, the chief, contract manager, and the committee must communicate this vision so others have an idea of where the organization is going and the reasons why. Only when the vision is clearly communicated will others understand and help contribute to its accomplishment.

Establishing Midpoint Goals and Scenario Writing

Communicating a vision of the future or desired state is extremely important to the success of organizational transition. It may also serve to motivate and create excitement within the organization. If, however, transition managers wish to ensure all tasks are accomplished in a timely manner, it is necessary to specify a "midpoint goal." A midpoint goal is the conditions of change expected or tasks that should be completed midway between the present and desired future state. To ensure those in the organization understand what the strategic plan will resemble at midpoint, the contract manager must write a scenario describing the midpoint in terms of goals and tasks accomplished. This should be one of the contract manager's first responsibilities.

Considering the number of actors involved and tasks to be accomplished, developing midpoint goals and scenario writing will be particularly helpful to those charged with the responsibility of ensuring successful transition.

Program Evaluation and Feedback

Consistent with the need to establish midpoint goals is the need to determine how effectively each policy of the strategic plan is achieving its stated objectives. Questions such as these should be asked and answered: just how consistently are private sector substitutes writing quality police reports? What has been the community's reaction to private sector substitutes? To what measurable degree has the privatization of prisoner transportation resulted in a reduction of personnel and administrative costs for the Department? Have there been any hidden costs in developing strategic plans or administering the program? To adequately evaluate the effectiveness of each policy, the contract manager would be responsible for developing measurable program goals and objectives. This person would also be required to prepare an annual report specifically addressing how effectively each stated goal and objective was met.

Finally, a system for generating feedback should also be established and should operate throughout the life of the program. The contract manager and his staff should periodically solicit feedback from each other, members of the Department, the various stakeholders, the service contract provider, and from others either involved or interested in the program. Feedback of this nature helps to ensure that the program is on track.

Quality Circles

Instituting change will create all sorts of unique and unforeseen problems for management and employees within the Fresno Police Department. Among the more prevalent will be (1) a high-level of uncertainty about the future security of specialized job assignments; (2) suspicions about management's motives for change; and (3) the emotional stress and intergroup conflict created by the uncertainty of new roles, policies, and expectations. The fact that today's police officers have work-life expectations that go well beyond efforts to improve pay and benefits serves to make change even more difficult. Recent employee opinion surveys reveal that younger officers want more participation in the decisions affecting their work than their predecessors ever did. If transition managers

hope to create a climate for successful transition, they must remedy the anxieties employees experience during change and satisfy their desires to participate in the process. The best suited management technique to accomplish this task is the "quality circle."

A quality circle is a group of employees who meet to identify and solve problems within their work environment. Establishing quality circles during transition will enhance communication and ease a good deal of uncertainty about roles and expectations. Moreover, it may serve to satisfy the needs of young officers who want more participation in the decision-making process. Finally, the concept of forming quality circles should be extended beyond the confines of the Department. People who are employed in other city departments and other agencies considered critical to successful transition should be invited to participate in this process. This would create better working relations and help ensure the lines of communication remain open.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this study has been to determine if the privatization of nonessential police services will benefit California law enforcement agencies in the future. In other words, would it be beneficial from the perspective of providing the police with a mechanism for ensuring the public receives the best possible service at the lowest possible cost. The list of tasks and services which were the target of this study included: (1) parking enforcement; (2) burglar alarm response; (3) completion of minor incident reports where the victim declines prosecution or is reporting for insurance purposes only; (4) the investigation of non-injury traffic accidents; (5) prisoner transportation; (6) guarding prisoners at hospitals; and (7) the investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail facilities.

This study clearly showed that California law enforcement agencies would benefit from contracting out nonessential police services. The most important benefit would be the reduction of personnel expenditures. Local law enforcement could realize up to a 51 percent salary savings depending upon the types of nonessential services targeted for privatization and the agency in which these changes are proposed. Another benefit to contracting out nonessential services is that the money saved from doing so could be used more effectively by a police agency to address violent crime, drug-related problems, and other equally important community concerns. Finally, contracting out nonessential services would benefit local law enforcement from the perspective of reducing the problems and the associated costs of recruiting, training, and disciplining in-house employees involved in the performance of nonessential tasks.

Several sub-issues were also selected for study which helped focus the study issue. The first sub-issue sought to determine if local law enforcement will be capable of providing nonessential police services by the year 2001. This study strongly suggests that local law enforcement will in fact be unable to do so. An NGT panel, which was established to examine this sub-issue, identified several trends and made projections about these trends which support this conclusion. The panel felt that the amount of money

local, state, and federal governments commit to local law enforcement in the future is likely to decline at a time when an aging population will need and insist upon parking enforcement, police response to non-injury accidents, the completion of minor crime reports, and other so-called nonessential police services. They also felt that violent crime will significantly increase in California by the year 2001 placing an even greater burden on law enforcement to deliver nonessential police services. Even executives in local law enforcement believe their agencies will not be capable of delivering the level of service in the future that they provide today. Of the 117 police executives surveyed as part of this study, 62 (53 percent) believe their agencies will be unable to deliver the same level of service in ten years that they currently provide. To make matters worse, 45 police executives believe they will have to begin eliminating services unless a solution is found which results in additional funding for local law enforcement. Clearly, leaders in local law enforcement will be hard-pressed to deliver nonessential police services by the year 2001.

The second sub-issue sought to determine the types of nonessential police services private industry will be providing to the public by the year 2001. The findings strongly suggest that private industry will be providing at least some of the nonessential services which were the focus of this study. In fact, a number of police agencies have already begun contracting out functions which were once the sole responsibility of law enforcement. Based upon the survey results, the types of services most likely to be targeted for privatization include prisoner transportation, parking enforcement, burglary alarm response, and the task of guarding prisoners undergoing treatment at hospitals.

The third sub-issue sought to determine if contracting out nonessential police services to private industry would be cost-effective in the future. From the standpoint of managing the fiscal affairs of a police department, it would clearly be cost-effective to do so. Of the 31 police executives surveyed as part of this study, nearly half (47%) sought to contract out specific nonessential services because private industry could provide the service more cost-effectively. The specific nonessential services that were contracted out included: prisoner transport, security during special events, security for city parking lots, and billing for parking fines and false burglar alarms. Moreover, this study clearly showed that local law enforcement

could realize up to a 51 percent reduction in salary costs depending upon the types of services and functions targeted for privatization and the agency in which privatization is being proposed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Because of the limited scope of this study, it was not possible to explore every facet of police privatization. To provide additional insight into this topic, further research is recommended in these areas:

1. A similar study could be undertaken to examine the feasibility of contracting out police support functions such as jail management, property and evidence control, and research and planning functions.
2. A similar study could be made of the attitudes and opinions of the general public about the privatization of nonessential police services.
3. An indepth examination could be made of the selection standards for private sector employees who would be performing police services.
4. A similar study could be undertaken to identify specific training requirements for private sector employees performing police services.
5. A similar study could be undertaken of the social implications of transferring police services to the private sector.
6. A similar study could also be undertaken of local law enforcement agencies that have rescinded agreements for the delivery of services by private contractors and their reasons for having done so.

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
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APPENDIXES



APPENDIX A
FUTURES WHEEL

- Prisoner transport
- Standing by prisoner(s) needing medical treatment at hospitals
- Investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail facilities
- Other: _____

5. If you have contracted with a private firm to provide a nonessential service, was it because they could provide the service cost-effectively?
 Yes No Unsure

6. How would you rate the quality of service the private firm provides to your community?
 Excellent Good Fair Poor

7. Are you currently exploring the possibility of entering into an agreement with a private firm to provide a nonessential police service?
 Yes No: go to question 10 Unsure

8. If so, please describe the service(s) you are considering contracting to private industry: _____

9. Are you considering contracting services because it is more cost-effective to do so?
 Yes No Unsure

10. By the year 2001, do you believe your agency will be capable of delivering the level of police service it provides today?
 Yes: go to question 13 No Unsure

11. If not, do you believe your agency will eliminate services?
 Yes No: go to question 13 Unsure

12. If so, what types of service(s) will your agency eliminate?

13. By the year 2001, do you believe members of your community will expect more from your agency in terms of police services than they do today?
 Yes No Unsure

14. If so, what additional type(s) of service(s) do you believe the public will expect? _____

APPENDIX C

Police Agencies Returning Completed Questionnaires

1. Alameda County S. O.
2. Alhambra P. D.
3. Anaheim P. D.
4. Arcadia P. D.
5. Arcata P. D.
6. Bakersfield P. D.
7. Banning P. D.
8. Berkeley P. D.
9. Brea P. D.
10. Brentwood P. D.
11. Burbank P. D.
12. Burlingame P. D.
13. Butte County S. O.
14. Campbell P. D.
15. Carlsbad P. D.
16. Claremont P. D.
17. Compton P. D.
18. Concord P. D.
19. Contra Costa County S. O.
20. Costa Mesa P. D.
21. Culver City P. D.
22. Cypress P. D.
23. Davis P. D.
24. Dixon P. D.
25. East Palo Alto P. D.
26. El Cajon P. D.
27. El Segundo P. D.
28. Escalon P. D.
29. Escondido P. D.
30. Fortuna P. D.
31. Foster City P. D.
32. Fountain Valley P. D.
33. Fremont P. D.
34. Fresno County S. O.
35. Fullerton P. D.
36. Gilroy P. D.
37. Glendale P. D.
38. Gonzales P. D.
39. Half Moon Bay P. D.
40. Hawthorne P. D.
41. Hermosa Beach P. D.
42. Huntington Beach P. D.
43. Huntington Park P. D.
44. Imperial County S. O.
45. Inglewood P. D.
46. Irvine P. D.
47. Kerman P. D.
48. Kern County S. O.
49. La Habra P. D.
50. La Mesa P. D.
51. Lindsay P. D.
52. Livermore P. D.
53. Long Beach P. D.
54. Los Angeles County S. O.
55. Madera P. D.
56. Marin County S. O.
57. Marysville P. D.
58. Milipitas P. D.
59. Modesto P. D.
60. Mono County S. O.

APPENDIX C (continued)

61. Montclair P. D.
62. Monterey County S. O.
63. Monterey P. D.
64. Moraga P. D.
65. Morgan Hill P. D.
66. Mountain View P. D.
67. Napa County S. O.
68. Newark P. D.
69. Novato P. D.
70. Oakland P. D.
71. Ontario P. D.
72. Palo Alto P. D.
73. Patterson P. D.
74. Perris P. D.
75. Piedmont P. D.
76. Pismo Beach P. D.
77. Pleasanton P. D.
78. Porterville P. D.
79. Plumas County S. O.
80. Redondo Beach P. D.
81. Redwood City P. D.
82. Richmond P. D.
83. Riverside P. D.
84. Sacramento P. D.
85. Salinas P. D.
86. San Bruno P. D.
87. San Clemente P. D.
88. San Fernando P. D.
89. San Gabriel P. D.
90. San Jose P. D.
91. San Luis Obispo P. D.
92. San Mateo P. D.
93. Santa Ana P. D.
94. Santa Barbara County S. O.
95. Santa Barbara P. D.
96. Santa Clara County S. O.
97. Santa Cruz County S. O.
98. Santa Cruz P. S.
99. Santa Monica P. D.
100. Santa Paula P. D.
101. Sierra Madre P. D.
102. Simi Valley P. D.
103. South Lake Tahoe P. D.
104. South San Francisco P. D.
105. Stockton P. D.
106. Tiburon P. D.
107. Torrance P. D.
108. Tuolumne County S. O.
109. Tustin P. D.
110. Ukiah P. D.
111. Upland P. D.
112. Vallejo P. D.
113. Ventura County S. O.
114. Ventura P. D.
115. Walnut Creek P. D.
116. Watsonville P. D.
117. Willits P. D.

APPENDIX D

Survey Results on the Future of Contracting Nonessential Police Services to Private Industry

1. Please indicate your present rank: N=117

Chief/Sheriff	54%
Lieutenant	19%
Captain	15%
Assistant/Deputy Chief	8%
Commander	2%
Other (Division Manager, Crime Analysis)	1%
Officer/Deputy	0%

2. Please list the type of police agency for which you are employed: N=117

City	85%
County	15%

3. In the past ten years, have you entered into an agreement with a private firm (e.g. a private security firm) allowing them to provide a nonessential police service(s) in your community? N=117

No	73%
Yes	27%
Unsure	0%

4. If so, please describe the type(s) of service(s) your agency contracts to private industry: (You may mark more than one box.) N=31

Prisoner transport	70%
Other: (security during special events, security for city parking lots, billing for parking fines/false alarms)	32%
Standing by prisoners needing medical treatment at hospitals	10%
Parking enforcement	3%

5. If you have contracted with a private firm to provide a nonessential service, was it because they could provide the service more cost-effectively? N=31

Yes	47%
No	3%
Unsure	0%

6. How would you rate the quality of service the private firm provides to your community? N=29

Good	62%
Excellent	34%
Fair	4%
Poor	0%

7. Are you currently exploring the possibility of entering into an agreement with a private firm to provide a nonessential police service? N=111

No	95%
Yes	5%
Unsure	0%

8. If so, please describe the service(s) you are considering contracting to private industry: N=6

Prisoner transportation	33%
School crossing guards	16%
Background investigations	16%
Security for special events	16%

9. Are you considering contracting services because it is more cost-effective to do so? N=9

Yes	89%
No	11%
Unsure	0%

10. By the year 2001, do you believe your agency will be capable of delivering the level of police service it provides today? N=117

No	53%
Yes	40%
Unsure	7%

11. If not, do you believe your agency will eliminate services? N=64

Yes	70%
No	25%
Unsure	5%

12. If so, what type of service(s) will your agency eliminate? N=66

Nonessential services (i.e. non-injury traffic accidents)	35%
Calls requiring on-scene investigations	18%
Misdemeanor crimes	12%
Burglar alarms	8%

13. By the year 2001, do you believe members of your community will expect more from your agency in terms of police services than they do today? N=114

No	43%
Yes	36%
Unsure	21%

14. If so, what additional type(s) of service(s) do you believe the public will expect? N=55

Crime Prevention	16%
Additional social duties	16%
More visibility in the field	15%
Better response times	13%
Enforcement of environmental protection laws	11%
Increased Patrol	7%

15. By the year 2001, do you believe members of your community will accept less from your agency in terms of police services than they do today? N=115

No	55%
Yes	33%
Unsure	12%

16. If so, describe the service(s) you believe your community will find acceptable to eliminate: N=42

Non-injury traffic accidents	38%
Burglary alarm response	14%
Vacation checks	7%
Petty theft/shoplifting reports	7%
Animal control	7%

17. By the year 2001, do you believe private industry (e.g. a private security firm) will be providing nonessential police services in your community? N=114

Yes	48%
No	27%
Unsure	25%

18. If so, please indicate the types of functions you believe private industry will be performing: (You may mark more than one box.) N=55

Prisoner transportation	58%
Parking enforcement	49%
Burglar alarm response	45%
Standing by prisoner(s) needing treatment at hospitals	44%
Other: (private home patrol/security, security for special events, management of correctional facilities, background investigations)	40%
Completion of petty crime reports	38%
Handling traffic accidents	22%
Investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects	22%

19. By the year 2001, do you believe private industry will be capable of providing nonessential police services in you community? N=112

Yes	61%
Unsure	21%
No	18%

20. If so, please indicate the type(s) of service(s) they will be capable of providing: (You may mark more than one box.) N=112

Parking enforcement	79%
Prisoner transportation	72%
Completion of petty theft reports for insurance purposes	57%
Standing by prisoner(s) needing treatment at hospitals	57%
Burglar alarm response	56%
Investigation/reporting of non-injury traffic accidents	47%
Investigation, arrest, and transportation of shoplifting suspects to jail facilities	40%
Other: (background investigations, animal control, fixed post security/patrol, dispatching)	40%

APPENDIX E

Nominal Group Panel

January 16, 1991

1. Director of the Fresno City and County Chamber of Commerce and member of the Fresno County Taxpayers Association.
2. Deputy Chief, Fresno Police Department
3. Fleet Management Supervisor, City of Fresno
4. President of the Fresno Police Officers' Association
5. Assistant Finance Director, City of Fresno
6. Business Manager, Fresno County Sheriff's Office
7. Director of a local burglar and fire alarm company
8. President of a local private security firm
9. Police Lieutenant, Area Commander
10. Police Lieutenant, Area Commander

APPENDIX F

Trend Statements

1. The amount of government spending for law enforcement: The amount of funding local, state, and federal governments commit to local law enforcement in the future.
2. Providing police service to an aging population: The ability of local law enforcement to provide nonessential services to aging U.S. population.
3. Crime in California: The incidence of all types of crimes committed nationwide.
4. U. S. Economic Growth: An increase or decrease in the growth of the national economy.
5. Violent Crime in California: The incidence of violent crime committed state-wide.
6. Police Response to Calls for Service: The ability of local police to respond to public calls for service.
7. The Availability of City and County Law Enforcement Services: The degree to which law enforcement agencies will or will not be able to provide a full-range of services in the future.
8. The Law Enforcement Applicant Pool: The number of qualified people interested in a law enforcement career in the future.
9. Available Local Government Revenue: The ability of local government to generate revenue in the future.
10. Population in California: The degree of increase or decrease in the size of California's population in the future.
11. Alternative Fuel Usage: The degree to which Americans use alternative fuels for motor vehicles in the future.

12. Political Elections by District: The increased or decreased public interest in mandating that only those who live in the district elect politicians to represent their concerns.
13. Police Salaries and Benefits: The degree to which sworn peace officers receive wage and benefit enhancements.
14. Advanced Technology and the Need for Police: The extent to which the future development of high technology reduces the need for police to respond to request for service.
15. Public-Private Sector Partnerships: The future number of local government and private sector partnerships.
16. Specialized Equipment Availability: The future availability of specialized equipment to assist the police.
17. Public Desire for Expedient Police Service: The degree to which the public insists that police deliver services "fast food" style.
18. The Professionalism of Private Security: The level of private security professionalization in the future in terms of knowledge and expertise.
19. Level of Prison and Jail Funding: The amount of federal, state, and local government revenues committed to constructing and maintain jails and prisons in the U.S.

APPENDIX G


Event Statements

1. Additional funding for law enforcement: The passage of a state proposition providing revenue to cities and counties to fund additional law enforcement services.
2. Law enforcement consolidation: The passage of a state proposition mandating that city and county consolidate law enforcement form one police agency per county.
3. A California Supreme Court decision prohibiting local fees: Local government is prohibited from assessing service charges or other fees against government consumers.
4. Mandatory privatization of nonessential police services: State legislation mandates that local enforcement contract to the private sector those nonessential services which are the focus of this study.
5. A major stock market crash: A one-day 1000 point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average.
6. Gun control laws declared unconstitutional: The U.S. Supreme Court rules that gun control laws violate the Constitutional right to bear arms.
7. Congress reforms the Nationalization and Immigration Act: Legislation is enacted allowing farmers and agricultural growers to hire immigrant farm laborers.
8. A female is elected Governor: For the first time in California history, a woman is elected governor.
9. Abuse of dangerous drugs is declared non-criminal conduct: Federal and State legislation redefines drug abuse as an emotional and physical disability.
10. A legislative mandate for car pooling: The California legislature requires that residents commuting to and from work must carpool with another person.

11. Elimination of Jail Construction Funds: A proposition is passed in California prohibiting state funding for the construction of new jails and prisons.
12. A Democrat is elected Governor: A liberal right-wing state senator is elected Governor in California.
13. A major race riot: A major race riot occurs in the Bay Area leaving hundreds dead and thousands injured.
14. Legislation mandates the police enforce environmental laws: Legislation is enacted in California requiring local law enforcement to investigate and seek complaints against environmental polluters.
15. Mandated police response times to emergency calls: The passage of a California proposition establishes maximum police response times to 9-1-1 calls and fixes penalties for those police agencies failing to meet required standards.
16. Elimination of state-mandated social service programs: The California Supreme Court rules that state officials are prohibited from requiring local governments to provide social programs unless adequate funding is provided.

APPENDIX H

TREND ONE: THE AMOUNT OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT




WILL BE	90	100	95 (50-150)	95 (65-200)
SHOULD BE		100	120 (100-400)	150 (110-500)

Panel Median Forecasts
N=10

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT HIGH/LOW FORECAST OF PANEL.

APPENDIX I

TREND TWO: PROVIDING POLICE SERVICE TO AN AGING POPULATION.




WILL BE	90	100	75 (55-100)	75 (45-90)
SHOULD BE		100	118 (95-150)	145 (92-400)

Panel Median Forecasts
N=10

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT HIGH/LOW FORECAST OF PANEL.

APPENDIX J

TREND THREE: CRIME IN CALIFORNIA




WILL BE	90	100	135 (100-200)	155 (120-400)
SHOULD BE		100	80 (25-150)	75 (10-200)

Panel Median Forecasts
N=10

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT HIGH/LOW FORECAST OF PANEL.

APPENDIX K

TREND FOUR: U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH




WILL BE	90	100	110 (55-200)	123(85-350)
SHOULD BE		100	120 (70-230)	137 (80-375)

Panel Median Forecasts
N=10

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT HIGH/LOW FORECAST OF PANEL.

APPENDIX L

TREND FIVE: VIOLENT CRIME IN CALIFORNIA



WILL BE	85	100	125 (50-150)	150 (150-500)
SHOULD BE		100	60 (100-400)	43 (25-75)

Panel Median Forecasts
N=10

NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REPRESENT HIGH/LOW FORECAST OF PANEL.

APPENDIX M

Capability/Readiness for Change - Analysis

Each item was evaluated for the type of activity it encouraged.

I	Custodial	Rejects Change
II	Production	Adapts to Minor Changes
III	Marketing	Seeks Familiar Change
IV	Strategic	Seeks Related Change
V	Flexible	Seeks Novel Change

Category	I	II	III	IV	V
TOP MANAGERS:					
Mentality/Personality		X			
Skills/Talents		X			
Knowledge/Education			X		
ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:					
Culture/Norms		X			
Rewards/Incentives			X		
Power Structure	X				
ORGANIZATIONAL COMPETENCE:					
Structure	X				
Resources			X		
Middle Management				X	
Line Personnel				X	