U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Ethnic Succession and Network Formation in Organized Crime

FINAL REPORT
Grant Award No. NI-71-076-G

Francis A. J. Ianni, Ph.D.
Suzy Fisher, B.A.
Jeffrey Lewis, J.D.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND SPECIFIC AIMS

Part of the current debate over organized crime is the relationship between ethnicity and criminal syndicates or confederations in America. On the one hand there is the frequent assertion that organized crime is controlled by "a nationwide alliance of at least 24 tightly knit mafia families" and that the Italian syndicate is virtually coterminous with organized crime. On the other hand there are writers, most recently Norval Morris of the University of Chicago Law School and his colleague, a visiting Australian criminologist, Gordon Hawkins who scoff at the evidence and the figures, and while readily admitting the presence of Italian-Americans in crime, are skeptical of the existence of a national crime syndicate or cartel. Lost in the debate is the most salient factor regarding organized crime as a way of life in America; there is a complex but demonstrable relationship between the structure of ethnic communities in urban society and organized crime which can be traced back through the last fifty years and beyond.

A number of social scientists have analyzed the relationships among ethnicity, organized crime and politics in American life. Daniel Bell, for example, describes the transfer from the hands of one wave of European immigrants to another, of the "queer ladder of social mobility"

out of the slums which has organized crime as the first few rungs. The Irish came first and early Irish gangsters started the climb up the ladder. As they came to control the political machinery of the large cities, the Irish won wealth, power and respectability through consequent control of construction, trucking public utilities and the waterfront. The Irish were succeeded in organized crime by the Jews and the names of Arnold Rothstein, Lepke Buchalter and Gurrah Shapiro dominated gambling and labor racketeering for a decade. The Jews quickly moved into the world of business as a more legitimate means of economic and social mobility. The Italians came last and did not get a commanding leg up the ladder until the late thirties. They were just beginning to find politics and business as routes out of crime and the ghetto into wealth and respectability in the fifties when the Kefauver hearings took place.

An analysis of the culture history of the urban ghetto shows clearly that each of these minority groups achieved mobility out of the ethnic ghetto and into the dominant society through the interrelated and interdependent routes of crime and politics. Other avenues out of lower class status such as labor, ethnic business, sports and entertainment, were also available but it can readily be demonstrated that these were related to crime and politics as well.[1] Ethnic crime and ethnic political structures have consistently enjoyed a symbiotic relationship in which a

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[1] See for example, Oscar Handlin, The Newcomers Garden City; Doubleday 1962., and "Organized Crime in Urban Society," a paper presented at the American Historical Association by Mark H. Haller, Temple University.

working alliance had been formed and where advancement in either structure is dependent upon the right connections in the other.[2] It is important to note that the tradition has been one of "up and out" in which the ethnics used organized crime as a first step towards eventual respectability and legitimacy which would have been impossible if the gangster and the politician were not seen as "models" who demonstrated to the masses of lower class co-ethnics, that they could achieve success and power in the greater society. Thus Cloward and Ohlin comment:

> The gangsters and racketeers contributed greatly to the coffers of political parties and were rewarded with immunity from prosecution for their various illegal activities. As the political power of the ethnic or nationality group increased, access to legitimate opportunities became enlarged and assimilation facilitated. Blocked from legitimate access to wealth, the immigrant feels mounting pressures for the use of illegal alternatives.[3]

While all of this has been known to criminologists and other social scientists for some period of time, it has not been systematically researched and has not had any serious effect on social policy or on planning enforcement and other social programs dealing with organized crime. That is to say, we have never stopped to ask the question: Who are the next wave of ethnics who will replace the Italo-Americans--as they replaced the Irish and Jews before them--in organized crime and how will they organize themselves to achieve their goals? We know the answer to the first part

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[2] The best example--or at least the best known--is the success of Tamany Hall in New York City. See Herbert Ashbury, The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of the Underworld, New York; Knopf, 1929.

[3] Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, Glencoe: Free Press, 1960, p. 196.

of the question: Blacks, Puerto Ricans and to a lesser extent Cubans are in fact already pursuing these routes and it does not take very profound insight to observe that Blacks are working their way into higher positions of power in urban politics and that in many cities both Blacks and Puerto Ricans are displacing Italo-Americans in organized crime. The evidence of this displacement is already apparent. In New York City, for example, Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans are now displacing Italo-Americans in the policy or numbers rackets.[4] In some cases, particularly in East Harlem and in Brooklyn this is a peaceful succession as the Italo-American "families" literally lease the rackets on a concession basis. The "family" supplies the money and the protection, the Blacks or Puerto Ricans run the operation. In other cases we know of in Central and West Harlem, however, the transition is not so peaceful and the Italian syndicate members are actually being pushed out. Current estimates are that upward to one-fourth of the control and operation of the policy racket in New York has already changed hands. It is the second part of the question--how do Blacks and Puerto Ricans organize themselves to achieve shared goals in organized crime--that remains unanswered and largely unasked.

Virtually all of the research on organized crime has been conducted by going to the files of government law enforcement agencies and drawing data from this source. Yet the focus of these files is necessarily on criminal intelligence and so they deal largely with criminal activity rather than on the nature of the organization through

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[4] See Francis A. J. Ianni, "The Mafia and the Web of Kinship," The Public Interest. National Affairs, Inc., Number 22, Winter 1971.

which such activities occur. For this reason, most research has failed to ask the kinds of questions about organized crime that leads to an understanding of how and why it exists and persists.

Donald Cressey has also pointed to the importance of doing research in the field rather than in the files to seek both questions and answers:

> The principal handicap here stems from the fact that there are no "hard data" on organized crime. The information in the field of law enforcement officers and investigating agencies, even those whose principal function is the assembling of intelligence information, is by no means oriented to providing assistance to social science theorists. . . Informats are not available for interviews and there is no known way to observe the everyday interactions of organized criminals, with each other, with other criminals, or with non-criminals. These facts pose serious methodological problems for the social scientist who would learn something about norms, values, and rules of organized criminal society.[5]

In 1967 Francesco Cerase of the Institute of Social Research in the University of Rome, Elizabeth Reuss of the Institute for Social Analysis and I decided to do just that, and with a two year grant from the Russell Sage Foundation we began a comparative field study of criminal syndicates in the United States and Italy.[6] Our interest was in looking at them as secret societies rather than merely criminal organizations, and to see if there is a common model--some system of order or code of rules--which describes social controls within all such groups. We saw our task as the formulation of the system of implicit rules shared by the members of Italo-American criminal syndicates by examining how those members apply these rules. The central

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[5] Donald R. Cressey, "Methodological Problems in the Study of Organized Crime as a Social Problem," The Annals; Combating Crime, November, 1967, Vol. 374, p. 109.

[6] See Francis A. J. Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime. New York: Russell Sage, 1972.

question of our research was: What is the code of rules that makes a criminal syndicate a social system and how do its members play the game?

For three years we observed and recorded patterns of behavior and social relationship in an organized crime "family" (we gave them the pseudonym of "Lupollo") in New York and attempted to identify the cultural patterns--both Italian and American--which underlie this ordering of behavior in this "family." The study produced a complete ethnographic account of the organization, authority structure, power and prestige relationships and normative system of one organized crime "family" in New York and some partial data on two other "families" in the same area.[7]

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[7]The results of the study have been reported in the following:

Papers

(1) "Some Suggested Affinities Between Sicilian Mafia and African Secret Societies" African Studies Association, Los Angeles, 1969.
(2) "Comments on Kinship and Organized Crime" Invited paper at Conference on Organized Crime, University of Chicago Law School, 1970.
(3) "A Comparative Study of Secret Criminal Societies in the South of Italy" Invited paper, Annual Meeting of Italian American Historical Association and in Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal.
(4) "The Kinship Base of Sicilian Mafia and Italo-American Criminal Syndicates," Annual Meetings, American Anthropological Association, San Diego, California, Nov., 1971.

Articles

(1) "Mafia and the Web of Kinship," The Public Interest, Winter, 1970.
(2) "The Organization of an Italo-American Crime Family;" University of Florida Law Review, Fall 1971.
(3) "Authority, Power and Prestige in an Organized Crime Family," American Anthropologist.

Books

A Family Business; Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime. New York: Russell Sage Foundation-Basic Books, 1972.

We developed a complete kinship map of the "family" and defined the relationship among the members of the managerial group within the "family" and related this to the social and business organization of the group and how these are related to the Italo-American community and the larger society. What we found was that kinship--both the usual biological and affinal type and the fictive type established by godparenthood--are the most important factors in keeping the "family" together.

In the field study of the Lupollo "family," we focused our primary attention on how the "family" organized itself to achieve the goals shared by members of the group and what forms of social control they used to develop and enforce the rules to maximize these efforts. The next stage in our research program called for two projects. We have a long-range interest in attempting to re-create the history of ethnic succession in organized crime from the Irish to the Jews to the Italians. Our major interest, however, was to look at the ongoing process of ethnic succession in organized crime and to attempt to prepare the same model of how Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime organize themselves to achieve the goals shared by members and what forms of social control they use to develop and enforce the rules to maximize these efforts. It is this project which we are here reporting.

OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH AND RELATIONSHIP TO LONG TERM GOALS

Specifically, our objectives for this project were:

(1) To document and demonstrate the process of ethnic succession in organized crime by tracing the transfer from Italo-American "families" in New York City to new and aspiring organized crime groups among Blacks and Puerto Ricans.

(2) Using techniques of the field anthropologist, to observe, record and analyze the patterns of social relationships which structure behavior in these newly forming groups and which define relationships with (a) the ethnic communities of which they are a part (b) the general society and (c) the Italo-American crime "families" they will displace.

(3) Using the techniques of network analysis, to develop a preliminary model or models of the social organization of Black and Puerto Rican organized crime groups which grows out of an analysis of social action within the organization rather than deduced from its external relations.

(4) Once the model or models were developed, to use them to examine the following questions pertaining to the sub-cultures under study in particular and to ethnic involvement in organized crime in general:

(1) What holds Black and Puerto Rican criminal networks together? If we start with the assumption that in all social relations certain binding obligations and preferential rights are established; is it possible that what explains the force and persistence of social relationships in organized crime groups is that the relationships established are culturally patterned syndromes of binding rights and obligations?

(2) How are Black and Puerto Rican crime networks or groups organized behaviorally? If we accept our theoretical formulation which holds that the code of rules is what specifies order in a social system, can this be demonstrated in the case of and, eventually, other mafia-type organizations? Our earlier research convinced us that the mafioso for example, is not exhibiting deviant behavior but is following a well ordered course of social action with all of the positive support and achievement satisfaction which come from the supportive behavioral structure of values, norms, and roles found in any integrated social system. Further, Mafia as a social system has its own social organization and social order which is legitimated to its membership in folklore and legends as well as in reward systems. Initiation and "socialization" are accomplished in its own learning environment for new members in which they learn traditions, roles, and norms and the reciprocal pattern of rights and obligations which illuminates that system. Finally, all of these characteristics of the social system, and, in particular, the code of rules, grow out of what goes on within that system just as certainly as how it operates in the outside world. Thus, if one would understand and control such organizations, then it would be necessary to understand the pattern of its social system rather than concentrate on interventions in its external relationships.

(3) What is the code of rules for Black and Puerto Rican networks and how do they control behavior? If we follow our basic principle that, "the most fundamental mechanisms of social control are to be found in the normal processes of interaction in an institutionally integrated social

system," is it possible to identify the code of rules which form the basis for the integration and regulates social control within each group and between them?

(4) How do changes in society affect organized crime? Assuming that organized criminal groups are functionally related to the larger society in which they are located, what is the relationship between such groups and the specific cultures in which they are found? There is, for example, some intriguing evidence from our early work that Italo-American crime "families" in the United States (as contrasted to Sicily) may be undergoing the process of bureaucratization. Many of the characteristics of a bureaucracy as described by Eisenstadt[8] and others seem to be emerging in the modern Mafia generation: (1) increasing role differentiation as exhibited by the clear division of members into legitimate and non-legitimate spheres of activity. (2) role assignment on the basis of achievement criteria rather than kinship as evidenced by the beginnings of extending membership to non-Sicilians, and even, in a few cases, to non-Italians, and (3) the growing emphasis on specialization of function. To what extent have or will similar changes take place among Blacks and Puerto Ricans?

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[8] S.N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy, Bureaucratization, and the Debureaucratization," Administrative Science Quarterly, No. 4, 1959.

RESEARCH PROGRAM IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The distinction between our approach and most previous research is critical to assessing the impact of this research. Criminal organization have generally been viewed as a type of formal organization--that is, as a social unit which has been deliberately designed and constructed to achieve a set of specified illicit goals. This approach views criminal organizations as rationally designed and constructed formal organizations with a hierarchy of organizational positions which can be diagrammed and then, perhaps, changed by recasting the organization chart. Our approach, on the other hand, is to view criminal organizations as social groupings contrived by culture and responsive to socio-cultural change and so to study them as social systems. We attempt to learn the rules which structure and motivate behavior by observing how people behave. Imagine, for example, someone who has never played the game of bridge. He could learn by buying a book on how to play; we insist he could learn better by observing people playing bridge and seeing the rules in operation. This emphasis on rules and a code of rules as the behavioral structure of a social system is, we feel, the key to what we are hoping will be a breakthrough in understanding how social systems in organized crime operate. Thus the social system of criminal groups if viewed as a code of rules of expected behaviors with a discernible form, is a model and it is within this context that one begins to develop a systematic understanding of the code and thereby comprehend any workings of the criminal social systems, thus permitting law enforcement agencies in any society to design and implement corrective strategies.

We expect four major contributions to theory in criminology and to social policy and law enforcement to emerge from the objectives of the study:

(1) The direction of recent growth in the theory of criminal behavior has moved from the earlier concentration on the study of the individual offender as a form of deviant behavior to the development by Cloward and others of an emphasis on criminal behavior as a sub-culture in American society. The basic premise of this newer approach is that criminals form a discernable sub-culture with its own norms, roles and statuses in society. Our research so far has convinced us that an important distinction can be made between organized crime and crime in general which pushes theory one step further. It is our hypothesis that highly organized criminal networks are more than sub-cultures and are, in fact, integrated cohesive social systems which have their own structure and are functionally related to the cultural group of which they are a part.

(2) From a social policy point of view, this research should provide data on the social organization of the developing network of organized criminals among Blacks and Puerto Ricans and allow us to develop a model of the internal structure of such crime syndicates.

(3) We look upon this research also as a means to refine and further develop our own particular approach to field work with organized criminal social systems in modern society. This approach which we call "situational analysis" has as its basic tenet the principle that models of social systems must be studied and analyzed in on-going situations rather than as abstractions from reality.

(4) Finally, we expect that this research will, in fact, allow us to develop sufficient data on the structure and function of ethnic succession

in organized crime to permit us to draw generalizations both about the future direction of organized crime as a social system and to make certain predictions about how, when and in what areas Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans will continue to move into organized crime as the Italian-Americans move out.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF BLACKS AND PUERTO RICANS IN ORGANIZED CRIME

In the late 1960's, the American public was introduced to a new figure of speech, and a new criminal force. Newspapers in New York City and Washington, D.C. reported the emergence in ghetto areas of what police officials termed a "Black Mafia." Blacks were said to be organizing to wrest control of the lucrative drugs and numbers rackets from white syndicate criminals. In one news account, it was alleged that heroin users in Washington, D.C. had formed a Black "Murder Incorporated." [1]

On July 30, 1969,Ralph Salerno, a long-time student of organized crime, told the House Select Committee on crime:

> Black militants have indicated that if the economics of vice are to continue, they will seek community control of the activities. There is growing evidence in the major cities of America of the beginning of Black Mafia. [2]

Salerno, who is now a consultant to the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department, said that if mob "raping" of Black slums through gambling and narcotics was to continue "then there would be slightly more justice in the matter if the face of the rapist were Black."[3] Six months later, on February 6, 1970, a

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[1] New York Post, February 6, 1970, p.18.

[2] New York Daily News, July 31, 1969.

[3] Ibid.

"self-proclaimed Black Mafia" was attempting to gain full control of heroin distribution in the Capital through "threats of death to drug peddlers who refuse to kick in a percentage of their sales--typically, 10 per cent," the Washington Post disclosed.[4]

The phrase "Black Mafia" is glamorous and makes good newspaper copy, but it does little to further understanding of the changes that are now taking place in the power alignments of organized crime in the ghetto. There is a growing belief among urban law enforcement specialists that Black men are becoming powerful figures in narcotics and numbers operations in the Black community. At the same time, Puerto Ricans are rising to power in the drugs and numbers rackets located in Spanish-speaking areas. Blacks in Harlem and in the Brooklyn communities of Bedford-Styvestant, Brownsville and Crown Heights are reputedly running numbers banks and controlling large supplies of drugs. Puerto Rican numbers bankers and drug dealers are operating in Harlem, East Harlem, the Bronx and sections of central Brooklyn.

Black and Puerto Rican involvement in organized crime is not a recent phenomenon. As early as 1875, Chicago Negroes were employed as maids in white syndicate-controlled brothels.[5] In the twenties, Italian bootleggers hired Blacks to work in breweries, or as beer runners in

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[4] New York Post, February 6, 1970, p. 18.

[5] St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis, New York: Harcout, Brace & World, 1945, Vol. 1. p. 47.

the Negro districts.[6] Today, numbers of Blacks and Puerto Ricans are out in the streets, pushing drugs and taking numbers for white-controlled narcotics rings and policy operations.

Some Blacks and Puerto Ricans have done well in urban crime. Edward A. Jones, the Black "policy king" of Chicago from the 1920s down to the early 1950s, owned and operated a string of South Side policy wheels. In 1931, Jones' wheels were collecting bets totaling $10,000-$15,000 a day.[7] By 1950 annual profits exceeded $8 million.[8] Police

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[6]While most Blacks in the illegal alcohol trade were employed at the lowest levels of bootlegging enterprises, there were independent Black bootleggers competing with Italian racketeers on Chicago's South Side. The Negro bootleggers of Chicago had both Black and white clients and were among the first Blacks in the nation to compete with whites for control of illegal activities. Harold Gosnell, Negro Politicians, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935, p. 117.

[7]Jones, with his two brothers, controlled 6-7 large policy wheels and at least twelve smaller wheels. He became the biggest policy banker in Chicago by introducing an innovative business practice into the racket--he always paid off winning bettors. St. Louis Post Dispatch, December 20, 1950. (Policy is played in Chicago as it was in New York City before the turn of the century--78 consecutively-numbered, black-and-white balls are placed in a drum and rotated, and a certain number are drawn out. Normally, a winning bettor is one who has chosen three numbers correctly out of the total drawn. A winning number, for example, might be the three figures 4-11-17. Because it is a lottery drawing, policy bankers can easily tamper with the results. Rigging the game is a frequent practice, most often when many players bet very heavily on one number, and the banker doesn't have the money to cover winning bets if that number comes out in the drawing. Today, in New York and most other cities, the numbers are derived from racetrack parimutuel "handles"--the total amounts of money bet to win, place and show on one or more races run at a given track on a given day. Because parimutuel betting is computer-controlled, and because parimutuel results are printed in the daily newspapers, there is little opportunity for fraud. But in Chicago, the lottery drums, called "wheels", are still used. For a concise explanation of parimutuel betting, see Rufus King, Gambling and Organized Crime, Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1969, pp. 60-62. St. Clair Drake explains how policy was played in Chicago in the thirties in Drake, op. cit., Vol. 2, Chapter 17. For further information on the early game of policy in New York City, see James D. McCabe, New York by

estimated that the "Maine-Idaho-Ohio," the largest of Jones' wheels, alone earned $4.5 million for the Black policy banker between July 1949 and June 1950.[9]

John "Mushmouth" Johnson, the leading Black gambler in Chicago at the beginning of this century, operated a saloon and gambling house on the South Side which was "a meeting place for railroad men, waiters, porters and professional gamblers--Chinese, Negro and white."[10] One can estimate his earnings from the large bribes he paid. Gosnell relates in Negro Politicians:

> In politics, "Mushmouth" Johnson was primarily interested in protecting his business. As one of his friends put it, "When a mayoralty campaign came around he would give $10,000 to the Democrats and $10,000 to the Republicans so that no matter who won he'd be protected. The law enforcing officials rarely raided his place, and when they did he was usually tipped off so he could make all the necessary preparations. Although he was fined many thousands of dollars and was indicted once as a gambling-house keeper, Johnson was never in serious difficulties with the law.[11]

Johnson died in 1907, leaving a $250,000 estate.

"Spanish" Raymond Marquez, the most important Puerto Rican numbers banker in New York until his 1969 conviction on federal gambling conspiracy charges, collected $100,000 a day in policy bets.[12] Marquez, who controlled

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Sunlight and Gaslight, Philadelphia: Hubbard Brothers, 1881, pp. 550-552, and Edward Winslow Martin, Secrets of the Great City, Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1868, pp. 512-517.

[8] St. Louis Post Dispatch, December 12, 1950.

[9] Ovid Demaris, Captive City, New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969, p. 45.

[10] Gosnell, op. cit. p. 126. [11] Ibid., p. 127.

[12] New York Amsterdam News, September 20, 1969.

the fifth largest policy bank in New York, allegedly set aside $425,000 a month--7.5 per cent of the profits from his operations--for bribes to corrupt police officials. The total dollar volume of his business in 1969 was $25 million.[13] Marquez owned an estate in Great Neck, Long Island, that has more than once been described in the New York press as "palatial."

Henry Marzette, who was for a time the head of Detroit's largest heroin distribution system, reaped profits of $5 million a year by supplying 100 "dope houses" on Detroit's Black West Side. Last April, at the time of Marzette's death, the Detroit Free Press published an inventory of the possessions the Black drug dealer had accumulated during twenty years in narcotics traffic. Marzette, a former $100-a-week narcotics investigator for the Detroit Police Department, owned:

> three Cadillac Fleetwoods, four houses in Detroit, a plantation and tropical nursery on Grand Bahama Island, several closets full of fur coats and silk suits and trunks full of jewelry and knicknacks with his initials embossed in diamonds or sapphires.[14]

The Internal Revenue Service estimated his worth at several million dollars.[15]

Madame Stephanie St. Clair, the "Policy Queen" of Harlem in the 1920s and early 1930s, became a millionairess collecting 1¢, 5¢ and 10¢ bets in what was then known as the "nickels and dimes game of the poor."[16] By 1930 Madame St. Clair was wealthy enough to resist the efforts of the powerful Jewish mobster Dutch Schultz to seize control of the numbers racket.

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[13] Nicholas Gage, The Mafia is Not an Equal Opportunity Employer, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 124-125.

[14] Detroit Free Press, April 9, 1972. [15] Ibid.

[16] Fred J. Cook, "The Black Mafia Moves into the Numbers Racket," New York Times Magazine, April 4, 1971, p. 27.

Recalling her battle with Schultz, which ended in her retirement after Schultz arranged numerous police raids on her policy banks, Madame St. Clair said, "It cost me a total of 820 days in jail and three quarters of a million dollars"[17] to try to stay in business. Schultz took over the numbers; Madame St. Clair retired rich.

Whether the activities in which Black and Puerto Rican racketeers have accumulated large amounts of money can be called "organized crime" depends on how organized crime is defined. Albini calls it "interaction in the mutual performance of a criminal act."[18] While this broad definition of organized crime would include, say, two narcotics addicts who rob an apartment together, it would not include"Mushmouth" Johnson--an indepedent operator with many subalterns but no partner. On the other hand, the definition might include Madame St. Clair, who joined other Harlem policy bankers of the 1920s in an informal alliance. Spanish Raymond,who operated alone but has been linked with Italian syndicate criminals currently controlling much of New York's numbers racket from a base of operations in East Harlem, might or might not be included.

Thorsten Sellin defines organized crime as "synonymous with economic enterprises organized for the purpose of conducting illegal activities and which, when they operate legitimate ventures, do so by

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[17] Ibid., p. 108.

[18] Joseph L. Albini, The American Mafia, New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1971, p. 35.

illegal methods."[19] Sellin's definition is more useful. By its terms Marzette, Jones, Johnson, St. Clair and Marquez were all involved in organized crime because all operated "economic enterprises." Moreover, their operations all were protected by payoffs to police, which is another widely-accepted criterion for distinguishing organized criminal ventures. On the other hand, only Marzette is known to have used violence--another benchmark of organized crime--to protect his operation. Marzette's "enforcer," James Moody, reputedly killed fifteen men in a 1969-1970 Detroit drug war before Moody was himself executed by Marzette to put a stop to the gang killings.[20]

Blacks and Puerto Ricans have almost always worked for white criminal syndicates. When they have operated independently, their activities have almost always been on a relatively small scale. Raymond Marquez's profits, or Henry Marzette's jewelry collection, when compared to the immense fortunes accumulated by New York's Italian crime "families," seem almost insignificant.

Ellsworth Raymond "Bumpy" Johnson, who was once the most important Black gangster in New York, worked as a middleman for the Italian syndicate. When a Black wanted to buy a franchise to establish a numbers bank, he went

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[19]Thorsten Sellin, "Organized Crime: A Business Enterprise," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Gus Tyler, ed., Vol. 347, (May, 1963), p. 13.

[20]Detroit Free Press, April 10, 1972.

to Bumpy Johnson, who arranged it for a fee. When a Black drug dealer wanted to buy a large quantity of drugs, Johnson arranged the sale.[21]

Bumpy Johnson is a hero and a legend to Harlem Blacks. Recently depicted in the popular Shaft movies, Johnson was suave, well-spoken, and always well-dressed. He was an expert chessplayer and an avid reader. Fellow prisoners at Dannemora, the New York State Penitentiary where Johnson was once incarcerated on a drug charge, called him "The Professor."[22]

Italian racketeers knew Johnson as a "persuader," one who could settle underworld quarrels before disputes erupted into violence, and violence into the publicity they naturally wished to avoid. As such Johnson was assigned a place which for a Black in those days was considered high in the ruling circles of organized crime. When he was not in jail (where he spent twenty-six years of his life), millions of dollars in syndicate funds passed through his hands.

Bumpy Johnson had style. When all the other Blacks who had made it big in the drugs and numbers rackets drove Cadillacs, Johnson drove a Lincoln Continental. He was an important man in Harlem for more than twenty years, from the 1940s through the mid-sixties. But on a scale of important syndicate criminals ranging from one to ten, Johnson would have rated no more than a two.

On December 21, 1967, Johnson sent a letter to Commissioner Carl Madonick of New York City's Department of Real Estate. Under the

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[21]Interview, August 1, 1972.

[22]Gus Tyler, ed. Organized Crime in America, Ann Arbor: The University of Michingan Press, 1962, p. 242.

letterhead "Palmetto Chemical Corp./Exterminators/Disinfectants/Waxes/ Polishes," [23] Johnson wrote:

> Dear Sir:
>
> I am hereby informing you that I possess a criminal record. My reason for sending you this information is that, firstly, upon the one occasion that we met, you not only showed yourself to be a gentleman, but you treated me as such. Secondly, the members of your staff that brought about the meeting know nothing of my past record, but only that my firm tries to give meritorious service to all customers.
>
> We shall be more than glad to continue our work with your department as long as your staff finds our work satisfactory. However, I want you to know with whom you are dealing in order not to cause any embarrassment to yourselves.
>
> Respectfully yours,
> Ellsworth Raymond Johnson[24]

One may wonder whether the most powerful of the Italian criminals would ever have felt the need or urge to write such a letter.

Black and Puerto Rican organized crime, until very recently, was a small-time proposition. Blacks and Puerto Ricans worked for white syndicates, always struggling for advancement, never getting very far beyond the lowest level. Blacks and Puerto Ricans who became well-known in the drugs and numbers rackets were few. When Blacks and Puerto Ricans did make money in organized crime, they were legend. Aspiring Black and Puerto Rican youths, when they saw famous racketeers passing through the neighborhoods with the best cars, fanciest clothes and most attractive girlfriends, looked forward to the day when they themselves could reap the profits of involvement in organized crime. That day has come. The present

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[23] Files, Amsterdam News.

[24] Ibid.

generation of Black and Puerto Rican racketeers is no longer content to work under white domination. While in the past there were always a few Blacks and Puerto Ricans who "bucked the syndicate," today there are many who are doing so.

What distinguishes the current involvement of Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime is that Black and Puerto Rican drug dealers and numbers bankers are today both demanding and receiving a much larger share of the rackets for themselves. Independent operations headed by Blacks and Puerto Ricans are far more common now than they were in the past and where operations are not fully independent, Blacks and Puerto Ricans take a much larger share of profits.

In the numbers: Puerto Ricans are leasing policy wheels from Italian crime "families" on a franchise basis. "Current estimates are that upwards of one-fourth of the control and operation of the policy racket in New York has already changed hands."[25] (From the Italians to the Blacks and Puerto Ricans.)

In narcotics wholesaling: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which has recently "come to realize that Blacks in this country play a major part in the distribution of heroin,"[26] asserts that Black drug dealers "no longer depend solely on the white elements of organized crime

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[25]Francis A. J. Ianni, A Family Business, New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1972, pp. 193-194

[26]Federal Bureau of Narcotics, unpublished report.

for their major source of drugs."[27] Blacks, Cubans and, to a lesser extent, Puerto Ricans are bypassing the white-controlled "New York Connection" and developing their own importing sources in Latin America and Southeast Asia, Bureau investigators believe.[28]

Most of what we presently know about Black and Puerto Rican involvement in organized crime comes from either law enforcement or media sources. Even the law enforcement data are sparse since like the media reports, they tend to focus on specific individuals and say little or nothing about how Blacks and Puerto Ricans have made their way into organized crime (ethnic succession), how much of organized crime they now control, and how they are related to each other and to the community around them. Answers to these questions must await field research but some preliminary answers, at least for a number of small networks of Black and Puerto Rican organized crime groups in the New York City area, will be presented in later chapters. This chapter distills what is presently known about Black and Puerto Rican involvement from the histories of those Blacks and Puerto Ricans who have achieved success at running major illegal operations: policy banks, gambling houses or drug outlets. In order to assess the conclusions we present later on, how Blacks and Puerto Ricans can be expected to operate as they displace whites in organized crime, we look next at what the literature says about: How much cohesion (or lack thereof) has existed among Puerto

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Interview, August 1972.

Ricans and Blacks operating parallel illegal enterprises? What are the strengths of their operations? At what point do these operations break down?

"The numbers racket is Harlem's most flourishing enterprise,"[29] Fred Cook wrote recently in an article discussing proposed legalization of the "policy" business in New York State. Many police officials agree. Policy is the oldest racket in the Black and Spanish-speaking communities of the major cities, and it is one of the first in which Blacks and Puerto Ricans achieved financial success. Black and Puerto Rican numbers operators have won and lost fortunes, and, more than once, they have been driven out of the business by whites. As Blacks and Puerto Ricans move up in the numbers racket today, they are doing nothing more than getting back what other Blacks and Puerto Ricans once had.

"The most insidious evil among Negroes," a Black journalist wrote in 1929,"is policy."[30] In 1868, a chronicler of contemporary New York life avowed, "A Negro must play his policy even if bread is lacking at home."[31]

Policy gambling, a betting operation that emerged as an offshoot of numbers lotteries popular in American cities in the nineteenth century,

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[29]Fred Cook, "The Black Mafia Moves Into the Numbers Racket," op. cit., p. 26.

[30]Edward E. Wilson, "The Responsibility for Crime," Opportunity VII, (March, 1929), p. 95.

[31]Martin, op. cit., p. 517.

has been practiced in Negro communities since the Civil War. It "is and has always been, the gambling game of the poor."[32] It is also, as it has been for years, illegal.[33]

"Policy Sam" Young migrated to Chicago from New Orleans in 1885, bringing with him Chicago's first policy wheel.[34] By 1903, Chicago policy had become a $5 million a year business. Black gamblers ran the game from various locations in Chicago's South Side "vice" district,[35] where the Negro population of the city was concentrated.

In New York City, policy was white controlled from the 1860s, when it originated, down to the turn of the century. In those days

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[32]Cook, "The Black Mafia Moves into the Numbers Racket", op.cit., p. 26.

[33]Policy gambling became illegal in New York City in 1901 and in Chicago in 1905. Years earlier, Congress and several state legislatures passed laws to curtail the numbers lotteries policy gambling was first based on. New York and Massachusetts banned numbers lotteries in 1833. Congress prohibited use of the mails for lottery purposes in 1890, and in 1895 banned interstate transport of lottery tickets.

[34]"Wheel", the drum from which lottery numbers are drawn. In current usage, "wheel" more often refers to a policy bank or district collection office, Ianni, op. cit., pp. 93-95.

[35]In 1871, Chicago's downtown Red Light District was burned out in the Chicago Fire. The prostitutes and gamblers who made up Chicago's underworld then moved to the near South Side, in the heart of the Black settlement. There, at the Twenty-Second Street "Levee", in the First Ward, prostitution and gambling flourished openly until 1912, when reformers succeeded in having the Red Light District officially closed. Prostitution and gambling then continued, in the First and Second Wards but less publicly. These South Side wards became known as a segregated Negro "vice" district. Because the area remained a center for gambling and prostitution down to the 1930s, and because Blacks continued to move into the area, and could not move out (Chicago real estate brokers and tenants' associations combined to

policy bets were taken at lottery exchanges, where results of lottery drawings held twice daily in Southern cities were announced. To "policy" meant to wager a sum of money on the lottery numbers coming out of the drawing.[36]

"The Negroes of [New York] City are great policy players,"[37] James McCabe wrote in 1868 in his Secrets of the Great City. "In every district where they live you will find dingy little lottery offices, patronized mostly by them."[38]

By 1881, there were about 400 policy shops in New York. Principal customers of the shops, located throughout the city, were "negroes, sailors and foreigners."[39]

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block housing integration as early as 1910), Chicago Negroes became associated in the minds of white citizens with the vices that existed in the neighborhoods where they lived. Many Blacks patronized gambling joints and houses of prostitution; there were also many Black prostitutes, pimps and gamblers. Among the people who availed themselves of the illegal goods and services the district had to offer, however, the majority were white. Drake, op. cit., p. 47, pp. 55-56, and John Landesco, Organized Crime in Chicago, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1929, pp. 31-38.

[36]McCabe, op. cit., p. 551, and Martin, op. cit., p. 514.

[37]Martin, op. cit., p. 517.

[38]Ibid.

[39]McCabe, op. cit., p. 550-551.

Puerto Ricans living in New York's first Colónia España, situated around Columbia Street and Atlantic Avenue in Brooklyn, developed a policy game from Italian lotteries operating in the area, and played it in the 1920s.

By 1925, Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans controlled the game. Their center of operations was Harlem. The Blacks included Madame Stephanie St. Clair, a migrant from the West Indies, Wilfred Brender, and Casper Holstein, who according to a long time resident of Harlem, provided funds to build Harlem's first Elks' Lodge. There were then about thirty Black policy banks, several of them large enough to collect bets in an area of twenty city blocks and across three or four avenues.

The leading Spanish-speaking policy bankers were Henry Miró, the Puerto Rican "King of the Numbers"; Alex Pompey, a tall, distinguished Cuban from Tampa, Florida; and "Cubano Loco," a Cuban who cut an elegant figure in Harlem; in the summer time often appearing in a custom-tailored white suit and Panama hat. The Panama was imported from Ecuador, where all the best such hats are made.

A former Harlem numbers runner says of the Spanish-speaking policy bankers, "Affluence made them happy to be alive." Coming as stowaways from Puerto Rico on the old Red Star shipping line, many of them spent their youth in poverty. When they came to New York, many of them found employment scraping ships on the city docks. Then they

discovered La Bolita,[40] the Spanish name for the numbers. For those who became numbers operators, good times arrived. "They'd hop into two, three cars, drive down to La Conga, on 51st," the ex-runner, once a Miró employee, recalls. One of the cars was a LaSalle, the property of Henry Miró. The Spanish-speaking policy bankers often met at the Central Grill on Lenox Avenue, sometimes to talk business, more often to drink and chat with the girls.

The Black, Cuban and Puerto Rican policy "kings" and "queens" of Harlem reaped hundreds of thousands of dollars in annual profits, taking the nickel and dime bets that were so readily offered by Harlem residents. Even penny bets were accepted.

Winning numbers were in time no longer derived from the lotteries, but instead from figures printed in the daily newspaper, among them the Federal Reserve Clearinghouse total and the daily total of U.S. domestic and foreign sales of the New York Stock Exchange.

Policy in its present form, the modern-day numbers racket, yields profits in the millions of dollars. Total dollar volume of play

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[40] La Bolita means the numbers game, in Spanish. When Spanish-speaking persons speak of La Bolita, they are usually referring to the New York number (see below, p. 18). There is a policy operation however, in which a two-digit figure, rather than the normal three-digit figure is played; sometimes this game is called La Bolita. Some law enforcement specialists believe La Bolita is a Spanish numbers game that originated in Cuba or Puerto Rico. This is not the case. In the twenties and thirties, when Puerto Ricans and Cubans often travelled between the US. from the islands and back, the New York numbers game was transplanted to Cuba and Puerto Rico, where it acquired the name, La Bolita.

is estimated at anywhere from $500 million to $2 billion annually, in New York City alone.[41] Black New Yorkers call policy the "game of hope," a "way of life," and "a dream." Bets on the winning number have sent Negro children to college and financed small businesses. Lucky hits have given policy bankers their start. Last year, the New York Post called policy "one of the earliest and most successful examples of Black capitalism and the employer of an estimated 100,000 numbers workers."[42] Residents of Harlem agree that it is a major employer and some say that it is the leading economic enterprise in the ghetto. "If it wasn't for the number business in Harlem, the welfare rolls would be much higher," a longtime community resident warns.

The numbers racket is today a highly-organized, hierarchically-structured illegal gambling operation flourishing in the Black and Spanish-speaking communities of New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles and other major cities of the United States. It is also, in its "single-action"[43] variant, a small scale, free-lance operation in which thousands

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[41]For various estimates, see Cook, "The Black Mafia Moves into the Numbers Racket," op. cit., p. 26, Nicholas Pileggi, "The Mafia: Serving Your Community Since 1890," New York magazine, July 24, 1972, p.44 and Anthony Mancini, "Living by the Numbers," New York Post, December 4, 1971, magazine p. 3

[42]Anthony Mancini, "Living by the Numbers," op. cit., magazine p.3

[43]In "single-action" policy playing, bettors pick a single-digit number from 0 to 9. There are three "single-action" numbers per day, the first known at the end of the third race at a given track. Because there are three winning numbers, single-action numbers runners have to be extremely fast on their feet, taking bets and paying off winners three times during the course of the afternoon. White racketeers, more accustomed to the leather

of Blacks and Puerto Ricans are self-employed.

In the organized "whole figure" numbers game a player bets on any three-digit number from 000 to 999. Today winning numbers are usually[44] derived from racetrack betting pools; in New York there are the "New York number," computed from the total parimutuel handles of the third, fifth and seventh races held at a given track, and the "Brooklyn number," the last three digits of the total parimutuel handle for the day.

Bankers finance the game, paying off winning hits and taking care of overhead. Their share of a $1 bet is roughly 65¢; after expenses including payoffs to the police, bankers' profits are about 10¢ on the dollar. The hierarchy beneath each banker consists of controllers, who manage the banks; collectors, who gather betting slips and bring them to central banks or district offices; and runners, who take bets in the streets and pay off winners. The controllers, collectors and runners share approximately 25¢ of every $1 bet, plus ten per cent of any winning hits.[45]

A winning hit pays 540-to-one. Odds against winning are 1,000 to one. Odds were the same back in 1930s, when policy became big business in the Black communities.

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upholstery of their limousines than to wearing out shoe leather, have never bothered with the game. But it is profitable: estimates of the dollar amount of bets handled by single aciton runners range to $1,000 daily. Mancini, op. cit., p. 3 and Cook, "The Black Mafia Moves into the Numbers Racket," op. cit., p. 107, elaborate on the complexities of single-action play.

[44]In Chicago, the three-digit winning numbers still come from lottery drawings.

[45]New York Times, March 1, 1971, p. 1, also interviews, August, 1972.

During the Great Depression of the Thirties, when nearly everybody was poor, Negroes were poorer than nearly everybody else.[46]

A great Black migration to the industrial cities of the North took place at the time of the First World War, when laborers were needed to replace the factory workers who had been called up. Job opportunities for Blacks were numerous. For the first time, skilled blue-collar occupations were opened to Blacks (for example, in the steel mills of Gary, Indiana). Negroes were also hired in large numbers to fill white collar positions.[47]

After the War, when the whites came home, many Negroes lost their jobs. The numbers of Negroes employed as unskilled laborers and as domestics rose to prewar levels.[48] When the Depression came, Negroes working in the Chicago stockyards, as elsewhere, were fired long before white workers. Whites, particularly recent immigrants, replaced Negroes in domestic employment. Welfare became an institution in the Black community.

Malcom X, writing in his Autobiography of his childhood years in East Lansing Michigan, tells of the harsh impact on his family of

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[46]Puerto Ricans were probably poorer. For comparisons of income levels, unemployment and other indicators of relative wealth in the Black and Spanish-speaking communities during the 1950s, see Patricia Cayo Sexton, Spanish Harlem, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, and Elena Padilla, Up From Puerto Rico, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

[47]Drake, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 232.

[48]Ibid.

living on public assistance:

> Then, about in late 1934, I would guess, something began to happen. Some kind of psychological deterioration hit our family circle and began to eat away our pride. Perhaps it was the constant tangible evidence that we were destitute... It seemed that everything to eat in our house was stamped 'Not to Be Sold.' All Welfare food bore this stamp to keep the recipients from selling it. It's a wonder we didn't come to think of Not to Be Sold as a brand name.[49]

Black Americans, like other citizens, sought escape from the grinding poverty that was their lot. Get-rich-quick schemes flourished. Chief among them in the Negro districts of the large cities was the numbers racket. Where little hope of making a decent living existed, the possibility of winning a lucky "hit" offered hope. Where poverty made everyday life a wearing dismal struggle for survival, policy-playing brought a little excitement into the tedious activities of the day. Policy was an escape, and a chance to get rich. It was also a major employer during the Depression, and a community welfare system. When a mother needed milk for the baby, when a family was behind in its rent, when a son was in jail, the policy banker provided emergency, short-term financial aid.

Policy bankers have often been viewed as patrons of charity, as dispensers of largesse to the Negro masses, because they will help out in a pinch. However, to draw the further conclusion that numbers operators, and thus the numbers operation, are beneficial to the Black community, would be to step too far. Malcom X, never one to traffic

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[49] Malcolm X and Alex Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, New York: Grove Press, 1964, (paperbound edition), p. 14.

in illusions, speaks in his Autobiography of the myths of Black respectability present in the ghettoes during the Depression, while at the same time revealing the true place in the ghetto economy of the "Policy Kings." He writes:

> Back when I was growing up, the 'successful' Negroes were such as waiters and bootblacks. To be a janitor at some downtown store was to be highly respected. The real 'elite,' the 'big shots,' the 'voices of the race,' were the waiters at the Lansing Country Club and the shoeshine boys at the State Capitol. The only Negroes who really had any money were the ones in the numbers racket, or who ran the gambling houses, or who in some other way lived parasitically off the poorest ones, who were the masses.[50]

At best, the numbers provided the Black community with a little hope and excitement, while in a small way redistributing the community's wealth in favor of the few. At worst, after the early thirties when white racketeers discovered how profitable policy operations could be, and took by force a large share of the business, the numbers resulted in a serious, if subtle, depletion of the ghetto's limited resources.

Into Harlem, in 1930, came Dutch Schultz. Schultz (nè Arthur Flegenheimer) was at that time the most important Jewish gangster in New York City, and this meant that he was quite an important gangster. Although Italians began to dominate the major organized crime activities of gambling and labor racketeering in the thirties, it was Jews who had controlled these rackets during the twenties, and some Jewish

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[50] Ibid., p. 5.

criminals (for instance, Meyer Lansky, who is still active) remain important in later decades. New York syndicate bosses Arnold Rothstein, Louis "Lepke" Buchalter and Gurrah Shapiro were the major figures of the twenties in gambling and the labor rackets, while Schultz, as holder of the Harlem liquor concession, was still in the second rank of racketeers. But in the 1930s Dutch Schultz made his way to the top.

Harlem in 1930 was a place where money could be made. Poverty was not unknown; but New York Negroes, unlike Black migrants to Chicago and other cities, had some education and some skills. The Harlem Negro came to the city from the West Indies or from one of the cities of the Atlantic seaboard, where he had often acquired some amount of education. When the Depression came he was able to hold onto his job much longer than the Midwestern Negro, who was typically a migrant from the cotton-fields of the Deep South.[51]

Hustling, a mode of earning a living practiced in New York City since Peter Stuyvesant first debarked on Manhattan's shore, offered

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[51] James Weldon Johnson, Black Manhattan, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930.

other possibilities of employment to New York Blacks.[52] Harlem was at that time the entertainment capital of the world. Nightlife was exuberant, the combined heritage of Prohibition and the migration of Black jazz musicians north during the twenties. There were speakeasies, jazz joints, and cabarets in every block. In "tea pads" and "reefer dens," musicians congregated to smoke marijuana and drink sweet wine. In "King Kong joints," Harlem Negroes drank bootleg whiskey and danced to the first jukeboxes in America. Serious gamblers met at clubs and apartments to play poker and Georgia Skin, the popular card games of the day.

In the streets was found an agglomeration of pimps, prostitutes, zootsuiters, gamblers and petty hustlers rarely paralleled in world history. Among them were thousands on thousands of numbers runners, a small army, out in the streets all day long collecting millions of nickles and dimes.

Madame St. Clair and other Black numbers bankers had formed a loose alliance, as had the Spanish-speaking bankers and the Policy Kings of Chicago. There was no need to fight for control of the racket; there was plenty of money to be made in the numbers for all. Holstein, St. Clair,

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[52]Malcolm X, who, before his 1948 prison conversion to the Black Muslim faith, was involved in virtually every racket existing in Harlem--pimping, drug pushing, petty thievery, burglary, pushing stolen goods--in speaking of his decision to earn a living as a hustler, sums up the general situation in New York, as true today as in the thirties and forties, when he lived in Harlem. Malcom X says. "I was going to become one of the most depraved, parasitical hustlers among New York's eight million people--four million of whom work, and the other four million of whom live off them." Malcolm X, op. cit., p. 75. Nicholas Pileggi, "The Mafia: Serving your Community Since 1890," op. cit., p. 39, claims hustling has been raised to an "art form " in New York.

Miró, Pompey collected millions in numbers bets, and shared in peace the profits of what they all considered to be simply a business, a way to earn a living. Then, somehow, Dutch Schultz learned of the profits to be made in policy.

There is a story that a Harlem numbers banker borrowed $8,000 from Schultz and repaid the full amount in two weeks, or borrowed $40,000, repaying the sum in three weeks, to cover a large "hit." Surprised by such rapid repayment of such a large loan, Schultz investigated the banker's source of income. This, some Harlem residents affirm, is how Dutch Schultz found out about the profits of the numbers racket. The story is probably apochryphal. Schultz probably heard about the game's profits at the Cotton Club, or at the Savoy Ballroom, or at any of the other popular Harlem nightspots he was known to frequent. But in any case, once he learned of them, he moved in fast, striking with muscle and attempted murder.[53] The Black and Spanish-speaking bankers, unaccustomed to violence and ill-prepared to fight for control of the racket, were driven out of the game by 1935.

"Dutch Schultz organized the numbers racket," claims Sargent Cook of the Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department. Longtime Harlem residents agree. Paying Tammany Hall for protection, through West Side leader Jimmy Hines,[54] Schultz was able to consolidate the

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[53] Madame St. Clair was at one point forced to hide out in a coal cellar, buried under a pile of coal, until Schultz' racketeers, all set to gun her down, gave up the search and went away. That's one advantage of being a Black racketeer.

[54] Albini, op. cit., p. 209. Hines had many friends in the rackets. Not one to conceal his associations, he shared a room with Frank Costello at Chicago's Drake Hotell during the 1932 Democratic Convention. Ovid Demaris, op. cit., p. 125.

fragmented numbers business, bringing to it his fine organizational skills, and make of it a highly structured operation, far more profitable than it had ever been.

Before Schultz there were no big layoff bankers in the numbers racket. That is, if an unusually large number of bettors won at any given numbers bank on a given day, and the banker was having trouble raising funds to pay off winning bettors, there was no one to whom he could go for a loan. Schultz became a layoff banker, and had Blacks and Puerto Ricans working under him as controllers.

If Black numbers bankers were "Kings," Schultz was absolute monarch of policy. In the Schultz era, "You worked for Schultz or you didn't work at all," says a numbers runner who was employed in Harlem at the time. After Schultz's death, in 1935, control of the numbers racket passed into the hands of Italian racketeers operating in East Harlem. There, until very recently, it remained. The first Italian policy boss was "Trigger Mike" Coppola of the Vito Genovese crime family. When Coppola was implicated in the murder of Joseph R. Scottoriggio, a notorious incident of the late forties, he retired to Florida and left the racket in the hands of his lieutenant, "Fat Tony" Salerno. "Fat Tony" has controlled the numbers as long as I can remember," relates a veteran Harlem police official.

In the Chicago policy game, white takeover did not come until the fifties.

Politics, policy and police corruption went hand-in-hand in Chicago where the numbers game was from its earliest days, Black-controlled.

South Side gambling kind "Mushmouth" Johnson was one of the first reported Black policy bankers.[55] Another early Black banker was Dan Jackson, head of a gambling and vice syndicate operating in Chicago's Black Second Ward.[56]

Chicago policy drawings were held three times a day at "wheels" located in cigar stores, beer joints and other neighborhood meeting places in the South Side Negro "vice" district. The drawings were public and sometimes were witnessed by several hundred persons, among them a large contingent of policy writers who, when they heard the results, ran out to pay their winning customers. Chicago wheels had exotic names; some of the more well-known are the Maine-Idaho-Ohio; the East-West-North-South; the Tia Juana; the Iowa-Winsconsin-Birmingham-Memphis and Royal Palm; the Black-White Streamline; the Calcutta-Green Dragon; and the Old Reliable.[57]

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[55] An Illinois state legislator who sponsored Illinois' 1905 anti-policy act gave as one reason for supporting the legislation that he wished to see Johnson's policy activities curtailed. Gosnell, op.cit., p. 126.

[56] Drake and Cayton speak rather contemptuously of Chicago's Black "demimonde and underworld," alleging Chicago Negroes never got more than the petty 'cuts' from gambling and vice. Drake, op. cit., p. 111. They further claim Chicago's Black community never had a "highly organized gang world... dealing in alcohol, dope, robbery, murder and women." In drawing these conclusions, they neglect the career of Dan Jackson. Jackson, a college graduate, came to Chicago from Pittsburgh in 1892. He opened several undertaking parlors and, at the same time, opened a string of gambling joints--one located in one of his funeral homes. He became "head of a great syndicate controlling vice, bootlegging, cabarets, and such gambling games as craps, poker and policy." In 1927, during the third administration of Republican Mayor William Hale Thompson, Jackson was named Republican Second Ward committeeman. Soon after, Illinois Governor Small appointed Jackson to the Illinois Commerce Commission. Jackson's policy wheel was the TiaJuana, one of the largest wheels in Chicago. Gosnell, op. cit., pp. 130-33.

[57] The game of policy has quite an arcana, aside from exotic names. Since the 19th century, policy-players have consulted "dream books" to determine the numbers they should play for the day. These numerological tomes, which are sold in small shops in the Black community and in Botanicas in Spanish-

By 1930, income from the game had reached $1 million monthly. Every day 350,000 bets were placed.

Before 1930, there existed among Chicago policy operators "unregulated rivalry, fights and bloodshed."[58] This warfare soon ceased, when the major operators allied themselves into a"policy syndicate." Although the syndicate was not a tightly-controlled, hierarchical organization but merely an informal alliance, its formation allowed policy operations to continue without major violence down to the 1950s, when white racketeers took over the game.

William Hale "Big Bill the Builder" Thompson, Republican Mayor of Chicago from 1915-1923, and again from 1927-1931,[59] was closely allied with Chicago's Black policy kings. Kickbacks from the policy bankers to Thompson's political machine were estimated at $1/2 million a year in the early 1930s.[60]

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speaking areas, list a number for every symbol that may appear in a dream. There are, for example, numbers for falling from a building, numbers for falling from a buiilding, numbers for people's names, and numbers for the various forms of copulation. In the Spanish community, Spiritualists sometimes advise on the numbers people should play. There are magic substances, such as Holy Oriental Oil and Lady Luck Room Spray, said to enhance the player's chance of winning, available at shops and Botanicas. Where luck is not enough, an event of the day may help determine the winning number. Among numbers heavily bet in the past are Willie May's batting average and the day of the Pope's visit to Shea Stadium.

[58]Lewis A. H. Caldwell, The Policy King, Chicago: New Vistas Publishing House, 1945, p. II.

[59]A total of three five-year terms.

[60]Drake, op. cit., p. 485.

Although this was only one source of income for the Thompson machine, and by no means the largest,[61] it was an important one. And Thompson had other political reasons for protecting the policy racket.

By 1930 the Black population of Chicago was 180,000--8.7 per cent of the total city population, and the second largest urban concentration of Blacks in the world. Almost all Chicago Blacks were policy players. Almost all Chicago Blacks also were voters, and they turned out in force on Republican primary day. Big Bill Thompson, "the second Abraham Lincoln,"[62] took an interest in the Black Republican vote.

Chicago Negroes were organized politically long before Blacks in other parts of the nation. Commenting on the achievements of Blacks in politics in Chicago in the years 1900-1935, Gosnell avows:

> The Negroes in Chicago have achieved relatively more in politics during this period than have the Negroes in other cities of the United States. They have been more aggressive along political lines than have the Negroes in Detroit, they have been more adventuresome than the Negroes in Cincinnati, and they have been more united than have the Negroes in St. Louis. [63]

"Bathhouse" John Coughlin and Michael "Hinky Dink" Kenna, alderman in Chicago's First Ward during the early years of the century, were among

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[61] Thompson was mayor of Chicago during the heyday of the big time mobsters--the Torrio-Capone syndicate, on the South Side, and the North Side's O'Banion-Moran mob. Gambling, prostitution and bootlegging flourished--all with protection from the Thompson political machine. In 1927, gambling protection kickbacks from Capone, Moran and others were estimated at over $500,000 a month. During the five years of Thompson's third term, there were 227 gangland slayings in the city of Chicago. Landesco, op. cit., pp. 80-81, also Virgil Peterson , The Barbarians in Our Midst, 1952 excerpted in Gus Tyler, ed., Organized Crime in America, op. cit., p. 167.

[62] Gosnell, op. cit.

[63] Ibid., p. 11.

the first to organize Chicago's Black voters.[64] The gambler Bob Motts, who until his death in 1911 ran a saloon, cabaret and gaming house in the Second Ward, was one of the first Negroes to promote Black participation in politics. Gosnell says of Motts:

> He was not only a good "pay off" for the police and the politicians, but he was also active in organizing the Negro voters. He would pay political workers five dollars to register people and to get them out to vote. Even before woman suffrage, wives were also enlisted in the process of "ringing doorbells and seeing faces." In return for his political activities, he demanded jobs for Negroes. Through his efforts some forty women were placed in the Recorder's office. He was also instrumental in securing the election of Edward Green [a Negro] to the state legislature in 1904.[65]

Mayor Thompson began cultivating the Negro vote as early as 1900, when he was a candidate for alderman of the Second Ward. Appearing at political meetings in the Negro district wearing his famous ten-gallon hat, Thompson presented himself as the jovial, genial friend of the Negro, and at the same time as the forthright, upstanding champion of the downtrodden Black race. Cracking jokes and shaking hands, he extrolled the virtues of negritude, while at the same time damning his opponents as

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[64] "Bathhouse John" and "Hinky Dink" were closely allied with saloon-keepers, brothel-keepers and other criminal elements in the First Ward. It is under their political leadership that the First and Second Chicago "River" Wards (they bordered on the Chicago River) became notorious, nationwide, for corrupt election practices.

[65] Gosnell, op. cit., p. 128.

"meddlers" and "Southern crackers."[66] Mayor Thompson, a man who once said "If your opponent calls you a liear, call him a thief," entertained the voters on numerous occasions with improptu speeches laced with illustrations drawn from the prizefighting ring, the cattle range, the saloon, the Bible and everyday experiences of city life. He was widely popular among Blacks.

During his terms of office 1915-1923, Thompson appointed a Negro floor leader of the City Council, three Black Corporation Counsels, and two lower level positions "So many Negroes...that one of his Republican factional opponents called the City Hall 'Uncle Tom's Cabin.'[67] This approach paid off for Thompson. In his first mayoral race, 1915, and in the third, 1927, Black votes meant the difference between victory and defeat.[68]

Thompson seemed to feel that if his supporters wanted to play the numbers, there was no good reason to stop them from doing so. In 1928 Police Commissioner William Russell, just before assuming office, discussed the policy game with Chicago reporters. The Thompson appointee said:

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[66] Ibid., p. 47.

[67] Ibid., p. 55.

[68] Ibid., p. 43.

> Mayor Thompson was elected on the 'open town'[69] platform. I assume the people knew what they wanted when they voted for him. I haven't had any orders from downtown to interfere in the policy racket and until I do get such orders you can bet I'm going to keep my hands off.[70]

Chicago's Black policy bankers and gambling kings performed another service for the Thompson machine above and beyond sharing with Thompson a large part of their profits. When election time rolled around they, like white racketeers, turned their army of underworld employees to the services of the political machine. At election time, what is known in Chicago as the 'Big Fix' occurred:

> When word is passed down from the gangster chiefs, all the beer runners, the proprieters of speakeasies, book-makers, burglars, pimps, fences and their like were whipped into line.[71]

These underworld employees had a threefold job: to register voters, to get them to the polls, and to serve as election judges.

In Chicago, policy was so closely linked with police corruption that in 1938, well after Thompson's terms of office when Black policy

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[69]Thompson's third election, 1927, was run on a "wide open town" platform. That, Thompson explained, meant non-enforcement of prohibition. But gangsters considered the statement a "laisses-faire for vice." Ralph J. Bunche, "The Thompson-Negro Alliance," Opportunity VII, (March 1929), p. 80. Before Thompson's third election, Al Capone centered his gambling, prostitution and bootlegging operations in the outlying town of Cicero, Illinois. After Thompson's bid was successful, Capone moved his gambling rackets back into the City.

[70]Ovid Demaris, op. cit., p. 110.

[71]Gosnell, op. cit., p. 115.

runners went out on strike, police were sent to policy stations to protect numbers players from picket line violence.[72]

Policy was so closely allied with political affairs that in 1931 when Democrat Anton Cermak was elected Mayor and started raiding major policy banks, all the leading policy bankers became Democrats.[73]

Black control of the numbers in Chicago ended in the early fifties, when white crime leaders Sam "Momo" Giancana and Tony Accardo muscled in and took over the racket.[74] Jones' lieutenant Theodore Roe, the "last independent entrepreneur in Chicago's $30 million a year policy racket," was executed in gangland-style in 1952.[75]

After 1935, when control of the Harlem numbers racket passed into the hands of whites in East Harlem, the Black and Puerto Rican policy bankers began to resume independent operations. "Trigger Mike" Coppola had become the leading policy banker in New York. Like Dutch Schultz, Coppola employed Blacks and Puerto Ricans as controllers, to manage the policy banks he operated. Coppola bankrolled these operations and took most of the profits. But, increasingly, Black and Puerto Rican "controllers" ran policy banks on an almost independent basis--paying off winners and collecting a large share of daily receipts. The East Harlem

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[72] Albert Votaw, "Chicago: 'Corrupt and Contented'?", New Republic, August 25, 1952, p. 12.

[73] Demaris, op. cit., p. 171.

[74] Edward A. Jones was kidnapped by the Giancana-Accardo mob in 1946. Held for $100,000 ransom, he was released after his family arranged for payment and then fled to Mexico with his brother George. Ibid., p. 7.

[75] A June 1951 kidnap attempt was unsuccessful. A year later, Roe was shot. Ibid.

syndicate collected a daily protection payment estimated alternately one [76] or ten per cent[77] of the total receipts from these quasi-independent operators.

The Forty Thieves gang emerged in Harlem in the late thirties to compete with East Harlem mobsters for a share of the policy racket. Black racketeers who were members of the Forty Thieves, an extortion ring operating around 140th Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan, started out in the thirties as "single action" policy bankers. By 1939, some members of the Forty Thieves gang had accumulated enough capital to start whole figure policy operations. To start policy banks without paying a large percentage of the profits to Mike Coppola and his group, the Forty Thieves had to resist the Italian mob.

Longtime residents of Harlem assert that bankers among the Forty Thieves were allowed to operate numbers banks without paying off the East Harlem syndicate. The Forty Thieves, all tough, never backed away from a fight. Italian racketeers, according to residents of Harlem, were not eager to do battle for control of the illegal activities they were involved in, and thus allowed the Forty Thieves to set up independent numbers territories in Harlem.

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[76] Gus Tyler, ed. Organized Crime in America, op. cit., p. 272.

[77] Interview, August 1972.

This story may or may not be true. That white racketeers would have been unwilling to engage in a struggle for control of illegal activities seems a specious claim, on the face of it, since supposed Mafiosi have spent a fair amount of their time killing each other off in territorial disputes. But there are reports that, in the late nineteenth century, Italian "Black Hand" extortionists left their intended victims alone when the immigrants who had received the threats announced that they would not pay, and were prepared to put up a fight. And some police officials say that today one of the chief reasons Blacks have been able to advance to the higher levels of gambling and narcotics operations is that now the Blacks are willing to fight for control of the rackets. Just as the Forty Thieves employed "hit men" to protect their operations, so it is said that Black numbers bankers are now hiring their own "enforcers" to assure that the profits from their policy banks will remain in their own hands.

In the fifties a new generation of Blacks moved into policy operations and the newly-emerging drug trade. The new Black gangsters were graduates of the youth gangs which in the late forties began to emerge in the Black communities of New York. Organized as social clubs, for purposes of fighting with other social clubs for control of ghetto "territories," the gangs quickly won the allegiance of a large part of the Black young men and women of New York, who had to join for "survival." Black youths could not move safely through the streets of their communities unless other youths could identify them as Copians, Slicksters, Sabres, Socialistic

Dukes or International Aces.[78] There were "midget" and "cub" gang members, children recruited into the gangs in grammar schools, and the ubiquitous "Debs," the female gang members who on many occasions provoked bloody street battles in response to inferred imputations of their "honor."

When the gang members grew up, some of them entered "respectable" occupations, while others found their way into the various enterprises of organized crime. The Forty Thieves hired a certain number of them as policy runners: and predictably as these ex-gang members began to earn money in the numbers racket, some among them formed the desire to establish themselves as independent bankers. However, this was difficult for them to do, since the Forty Thieves pretty much controlled independent policy operations in West Harlem. Some ex-gang members therefore went into the narcotics trade. Drugs were then becoming a major profit-making enterprise for white criminal syndicates. Young Black gangsters earned money in the policy racket, or in other illegal activities, and then with their profit bought drugs from the white narcotics wholesalers of New York.

By the mid 1950s so many young people in Harlem had become heroin addicts that the youth gangs were forced to disband. Addiction became a way of life, and narcotics became one of the most lucrative rackets in the ghetto. Although some police officials dispute this, investigators for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics claim that the narcotics trade is now the biggest moneymaker for organized crime in the Black community.

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[78] Other well-known gangs of the day were the Socialists, Buccaneers, Mutineers, Mysterious Five, Chancellors, Ebony Dukes and Noble Gents.

"Hollywood Harold" Munger was one of the first Blacks to become involved in the narcotics trade. Starting out in the late forties, assisted by lieutenants whose loyalty he considered "unquestionable,"[79] Munger became in the sixties one of the leading herion dealers in New York.

One of Hollywood Harold's first operations was a heroin "mill," where fifteen to twenty "mill girls" diluted the almost pure heroin Harold bought in kilo quantities and bagged it for street sale.[80] When it became dangerous to operate in this way, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics reports, Harold turned to "processed weight" packaging methods--selling heroin in 1/4 or 1/8 kilo quantities to lesser dealers, who would, in smaller mills, cut the heroin with lactose and other chemicals and insert it in glassine envelopes for sale in the streets. Most major drug rings now operate in this way, diluting the product they receive and sharing out quantities of the drug to lesser wholesalers.

Many Blacks, including several of Harold's ex-lieutenents, are now making money in narcotics traffic.[81] But most of the heroin they sell is, like Harold's, obtained through the "New York connection" of the white syndicate. Reports of independent drug importing sources are rare.

Detroit's Henry Marzette, a Black, attempted to bypass syndicate drug sources and set up his own importing source in Southeast Asia. Making contact with drug dealers in Singapore, Marzette was able to arrange for

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[79] Federal Bureau of Narcotics, unpublished report.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

importation of heroin smuggled from Burma and Laos--if he could come up with $500,000 a week, cash in advance.

At a meeting with Detroit's leading drug dealers in 1970 at the lavish 20-grand Motel, Marzette offered them a proposition: he would supply enough heroin for all of Detroit's Black West Side; they would pay him $50,000 apiece a week. By the terms of this proposition Marzette was unable to conclude the deal because he was hospitalized soon afterwards with a kidney disease. Then a gang war broke out among Detroit drug dealers, and the scheme was abandoned.

But today, says the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, some Blacks and Cubans, and, to a lesser extent, Puerto Ricans are setting up their own heroin importing sources. Recent arrests of Blacks and Spanish-speaking persons bringing drugs into the country may bear this conclusion out.

Black America in the sixties entered the era of Black Power. There were riots and uprisings in the ghettoes, and the names of Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael, and Elijah Muhammed became familiar to many Americans. Black power, Black consciousness, and Black militancy became bywords to Black young people, who became instilled with a new sense of racial pride. At the same time, young Puerto Ricans developed a new ethnic pride, joining groups like the Militant Young Lords. White racketeers began to bow out of the ghettoes. Blacks in the numbers and drugs were given more independence than ever, fronting for white syndicate criminals, but actually controlling an increasing share of the profits from policy and gambling operations. Black and Puerto Rican control continues and increases, today.

Chapter III

METHODOLOGY

Our theoretical orientation in field research on organized crime has centered about the assumption that organized criminal groups which persist over time are social systems which have the character and permanence of social institutions. Our usage of the term social institution, however, deviates somewhat from the usual view which we characterize as excessively static and structural. Institutions, in our usage are not fixed, monolithic structures nor are they transmitted across generations as structures. Institutions, for us, are the behavioral patterns, learned or first established by people seeking to maximize their shared values. What becomes institutionalized in this process is not a structure in the usual sense--a box containing action as it were--but a code of rules governing social action as a means of converting human energy and intelligence into a defined pattern of behaviors which are productively efficient in maximizing social gains. That the social goals of the ethnics involved in organized crime are defined as illegal and dysfunctional by the larger society does not negate the fact that to the ethnic criminal, his value reference group is the ethnic community and his own network in crime not the larger society, and so its goals are positively defined.

We have assumed that this theoretical orientation goes somewhat beyond the general position of functionalism in that we see the need for identifying some structure of action rather than the usual organizational structure in order to analyze social action. Thus, while we reject the usual view of structuralists which looks to such positional elements in a social system as "status" or "organization" for structure, we find our structure in the code of rules which illuminates every social system and structures every institution. A social system or an institution is, in short, a code of behavior, a structured set of rules of the game which regularize all social action in terms of probabilities flowing from particular social relationships. Our primary research strategy is to gather data on social relations in organized crime by using the traditional anthropological techniques of participant observation and dealing with field work in precisely the same fashion as we would in any piece of field research. It is important to indicate here that our contacts and the field work in general grow out of natural social settings. Specifically, in this project we used Black and Puerto Rican members of the Fortune Society, a group of ex-offenders, to observe and record patterns of social action and behavior among Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime activities in East and Central Harlem, and Bedford Stuyvesant in New York and in Paterson, New Jersey. Our previous research among Italo-American "families" had given us contact in each of these areas and especially in East Harlem where both Puerto Rican and Black numbers and bolito operations are carried out in conjunction and in some case in direct cooperation wtih the Italo-American "family."

In addition, we used a number of field consultants or informants (in the anthropological rather than police sense) who are indigenous to the population being studied as primary data gatherers. The first step in the research process, then, was the observation of behaviors with systemic recording of observed behavior and fitting these into categories in order to classify the observations in terms of four major questions:

1. Who interacts with whom under what circumstances as part of the network involved in particular activities in organized crime and what is the frequency and intensity of the contact?

2. What is the nature of the relationship in terms of rights and obligations, patterns of association, dominance and submission, and other factors which define the quality and function of the relationship?

3. What are the norms and rules which regulate these relationships and how do they function as mechanisms of social control within the organization?

4. How do members of these organized crime networks describe what the group is and what its functions are?

While our previous experience with Italo-American crime "families" gave us a tested methodology it is important to point out that what we learned there about categories of behavior and patterns of social relationships did not bias what we looked for in this study of syndicates among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. One of the great problems in the study of organized crime to date has been the tendency to attempt to analogize from either the corporate structure of big business in the U.S., or the mafia in

Sicily to describe the structure and function of organized crime "families" among Italo-Americans. While there will be obviously similarities in function between Italo-American crime "families" and syndicates formed or forming among Blacks or Puerto Ricans, it was our premise that the ethnic culture of these two groups will provide a different organizational imperative than that which was true for Italo-Americans or indeed for the Jews or Irish before them.

We planned to generate models of organized crime groups among Blacks and Puerto Ricans using the techniques of network analysis to describe and diagram the structure of the group. In our techniques of network analysis (which is part of our overall approach of situational analysis described earlier) we use three major components for analysis: (1) the social-behavioral field, (2) dyadic contracts, and (3) social relations sets. Essentially this means that through constant analysis of the data, we first describe the total behavioral field involving the group of individuals we are observing in gambling activities for example. Then through constant analysis and comparison of the data, we identify those dyadic contracts--that is those agreements on rights and obligations which exist between occupants of specific roles--which exist between various roles in that social field. In this way we do not describe a structure for organization, which is based only on single dimension status, but rather describe roles in terms of what individual A owes and expects from individual B as a result of the mutuality of their roles. We then proceed to combine these roles into social relations sets or sociograms of how various roles are related to each other. By extending this process, we then describe the network of social relations which form the specific organization. As part of the process

of analysis we also consider such factors as regularity of interaction on closeness of ties, recruitment as one of the mechanisms in network formation, sub-networks such as power alliances within the network and between elements of the network and external forces such as the police or political world, and the nature and amount of interaction implied by the links. Our approach to network analysis comes from the anthropological usage of the technique.

WHAT IS NETWORK ANALYSIS?

It was in 1940 that Radcliffe-Brown talked of social structure as "a complex network of social relations."[1] This rather metaphorical use of the term "network"* introduced it perhaps for the first time into anthropoligical parlance. In the following years other anthropologists made use of network, among them Fortes in The Web of Kinship;[2] but it was not until Barnes in 1954 read a paper which used the notion of network to help elucidate his study of class, kinship and friendship in the Norwegian community of Bremnes[3] that network began to be a significant anthropological term.

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[1]Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., "On Social Structure," J.Roy. Anthrop. Inst., Vol. 70 (1940), pp. 1-12, as quoted in Bott, E., Family and Social Network (London, 1957), p. 59. Hereinafter cited as Bott, 1957.

[2]Fortes, M., The Web of Kinship Among the Tallensi: the second part of an analysis of the social structure of a Trans-Volta tribe, (London, 1949), as mentioned in Barnes, J. A., "Networks and Political Process," in ed. Swartz, Local-level Politics (Chicago, 1968), pp. 107-130, 108. Hereinafter cited as Barnes, 1968.

[3]Barnes, 1968.

*In the brief explanation of network analysis presented here the various meanings and implications of the word "network," as it is used in anthropology, are discussed and compared. The word network appears in quotes only once, when it is introduced, to avoid cluttering the text with quotation marks. This procedure will also be followed for the words association, group, network analysis, set, and community, and for the anthropological terms quasi-group, action-set and classificatory set.

Barnes described his vison of a network as follows:

> Each person is, as it were, in touch with a number of other people, some of whom are directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not...I find it convenient to talk of a social field of this kind as a network. The image I have is of a net of points some of which are joined by lines. The points of the images are people, or sometimes groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other. [4]

Thus we can represent a network by a diagram, a map, in which each person in a social field is represented by a point, and in which lines are drawn between points to indicate when two people are in one way or another interacting with one another. Thus a very simple network might be mapped as follows:



Figure 1

Here, G directly interacts with C, E, and F, but not with A, B, or D. A directly interacts with B, C, D, and E, but not with F or G. Of course network maps may become much more complex than this one, a fact which has prompted Barnes to point out that when the lines crisscross one another often, the "resulting pattern looks slightly like an untidy net and is appropriately called a network."[5]

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[4] Barnes,J. A., "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish," Hum. Relat., Vol.7, No.I, pp. 39-58. Hereinafter cited as Barnes, 1954. Quoted in Bott,1957, p.59.

[5] Barnes, 1968, p.111.

This notion of network soon became quite popular among anthropologists; this popularity has continued up to the present, and it would be fair to say that there has been good reason for it. As Barnes himself has said, "We construct analytical tools not because they look beautiful but because we have a job to do with them."[6] Network has been popular because numerous anthropologists have discovered that "group," "association," and "community," anthropological terms which have been traditionally used to describe relationships among numbers of people, have failed to yield adequate insight into the phenomena that these anthropologists were trying to understand. Bott, for instance, has distinguished network from group by saying that whereas in a group "the component individuals make up a larger social whole with common aims, interdependent roles, and a distinctive sub-culture," in network formation, "only some, not all, of the component individuals have social relationships with one another,"[7] and has shown how network is a more useful concept for dealing with certain aspects of the modern urban family than is either group or community. Of such families she has written:

> Families who moved away from their "home town," where they were brought up, no longer live in a community. Instead, they live in a social network. The social network of a particular family consists of all the people they know. Usually a married couple maintains one or two childhood friendships; an individual member of the family will have one or two neighborhood friends and one or two at work. In addition, the husband and wife keep in touch with their parents and perhaps a few other close relatives.

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6 Barnes, 1968, p. 109.

7 Bott, 1957, p. 58.

> But these various people do not form a community. They do not necessarily all live in the same place, and many of the family's various friends do not even know one another. Unlike a community, a network has no solid body of public opinion. Whereas a family living in a community must conform to group opinion fairly closely a family living in a social network need not.[8]

Likewise, A. Mayer, and others have found the notion of network particularly helpful in analyzing the features of complex, as opposed to simple, societies. From his extensive study of an election in the Indian electoral district of Dewas, Mayer came away with the expectation that "social relations in simpler societies. . .(are more likely) . . . to be those of common group membership than they are in societies where there is a greater scatter of roles;"[9] which led him to make the following suggestion:

> It may well be that, as social anthropologists become more interested in complex societies and as the simpler societies themselves become more complex, an increasing amount of work will be based on ego-centered entities such as action-sets and quasi groups entities the definitions of which arise out of the analysis of social networks (see below) rather than on groups and sub-groups.[10]

And Barnes has gone so far as to suggest that it is the very existence of complex societies which makes it possible for us to talk about social networks:

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[8] Bott, E., "Family, Kinship and Marriage," in ed. Douglas, Man in Society (London and Garden City, 1964), pp. 82-103, pp. 102,103. Hereinafter cited as Bott, 1964.

[9] Mayer, A., "The Significance of Quasi-Groups in the Study of Complex Societies," in ed. Banton, The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies (London, 1966), pp. 97-122, 119. Hereinafter cited as Mayer, 1966.

[10] Mayer, 1966, p.119.

> In the populous urban communities studied by Epstein(1961), A.C. Meyer (1963,1966), P. Mayer (1961), Mitchell (1966), and others, network analysis is made feasible because in every person's social environment there are many strangers with whom he has no significant interaction at all. In small-scale societies this is not so.[11]

Barnes himself has described a variety of quite general uses for network analysis:

> The notion of network has been developed in social anthropology to analyze and describe those social processes involving links across, rather than within, group and category limits. The interpersonal links that arise out of common group membership are as much part of the total social network as are those that link persons in different groups, and an analysis of action in terms of network should reveal, among other things, the boundaries and internal structure of groups. The network concept is indispensable in discussing those situations where, for example, the individual is involved in "interpersonal relations which cut right across the boundaries of village, sub-caste and lineage" (Srinivas and Beteille, 1964, p.166). It is appropriate when enduring groups such as parties and factions have not formed, and where individuals are continually required to make choices about whom they should look to for leadership, help, information, and guidance. It helps to identify who are leaders and who are followers, or to demonstrate that there is no enduring pattern of leadership.[12]

Moreover, according to Barnes network analysis is "concerned with choice in social action," with "the problems of why in a specified context a man chooses one course of action rather than another, why and when and how he selects one contact out of many possible and appeals to one principle rather than to others."[13]

The specific contexts to which network analysis has been applied are both numerous and various. Among these have been "political processes,

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[11] Barnes, 1968, p. 127.

[12] Barnes, 1968, p. 109.

[13] Barnes, 1968, pp. 126-127.

social classes, the relationship of a market to its hinterland, the provision of services and the circulation of goods and information in unstructured social environments, the maintenance of values and norms by gossip, (and) structural differences between tribal, rural, and urban societies."[14]

And as so frequently happens with popular concepts, network and "network analysis" have come to mean a variety of somewhat different things to different people. It is only natural that as an anthropologist employs a more-or-less new concept to the specific social situation which he is endeavoring to elucidate, that he will give that concept those contours which will be of maximal help to his endeavor. This is exactly what happened in the case of network and network analysis. Barnes has accepted part of the blame for whatever lack of clarity resulted, because, as he says, "I wrote as briefly as possible, saying only what was strictly necessary to describe the delimited Norwegian social science I was examining. I did not distinguish between the distinctive features of all networks (in contrast to dyadic relationships, groups, categories and the like), and those features that happened to be present in the Norwegian network I described."[15]

It should not be necessary to describe all the arguments and elaborations that followed Barnes's initial effort, but one good illustration of the reinterpretive process can be found in Bott's work. When Bott

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[14] Barnes, 1968, p. 108.

[15] Barnes, 1968, p. 108.

wrote that families who move away from their home town "no longer live in a community. Instead, they live in a social network,"[16] she was clearly suggesting that mutually exclusive formations, that where communities exist, networks do not, and vice versa; whereas it has always been Barnes's notion that although it may be more useful for anthropologists to think in terms of networks in situations where groups and communities do not exist, nevertheless, "there is always a network in any society, however rich in group and community activity it may be."[17]

A good illustration of the way that the notion of network has been elaborated and expanded upon can be found in A. Mayer's discussion of "quasi-groups."[18] Mayer believed that the concept of quasi-groups could be helpful in the study of complex situations such as his Dewas election, and set out to define quasi-group in terms of Barnes's network terminology. Quasi-groups had already been distinguished from groups and associations by numerous anthropologists, and had been defined by Ginsberg as entities without a "recognizable structure, but whose members have certain interests or modes of behavior in common which may at any time lead them to form themselves into definite groups."[19] Mayer started out by asserting that there are two kinds of quasi-groups,

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16 Bott, 1964, p.102.

17 Barnes, 1968, p.116.

18 Mayer, 1966, pp. 97-122.

19 Ginsberg, M., Sociology (London, 1934), p.40, quoted in Mayer, 1966, p.97.

classificatory and interactive ones. Then he asserted that he was only interested in the latter, and explained that interactive quasi groups differ fundamentally from groups insofar as interactive quasi-groups are ego-centered (they depend on a single individual as a central organizing focus) and insofar as their members' actions are significant only to the extent that they are directed towards the ego or the ego's intermediary: "The membership criteria do not include interaction with other quasi-group members in general."[20] Mayer next explained that the interactions of an interactive quasi-group are to be found in "action-sets"; and here he found his link-up to Barnes's terminology.

For Barnes in his analysis of class distinctions in the Bremnes social network had said that "for every individual A the whole of the network, or at least that part of it of which he is aware, is divided into three areas or sets of points,"[21] one set for those whom he considered to be his equals, and one set for those whom he considered to be below himself. Although Mayer was quick to point out that these were "classificatory sets" rather than action-sets, and although he was quick to admit that Barnes's treatment of the concept of "set" had been ambiguous, nevertheless, he seized upon it. Mayer wrote:

> I would. . . suggest that Barnes conceives of the network as important in so far as it is a basis for sets rather than as a means of describing them, and that the two are distinct.[22]

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20 Mayer, 1966, p.98.

21 Barnes, 1954, p.46, quoted in Mayer, 1966, p.101.

22 Mayer, 1966, p.99.

Mayer took care to draw the distinction between network and set:

> Barnes saw a network as a social field made up of relations between people. These relations were defined by criteria underlying the field. . . The network was 'unbounded'. . .and was without leadership or a coordinating organization. Any person had relations with a number of people, who in turn were linked to further people. . .
>
> The definition of network formed the first step in Barnes's analysis. The second was the identification of sets of people on the basis of linkages provided by the network. The set was different in form from the network. For it was centered on a single person (ego), and consisted of the people classified by him according to a certain criterion.[23]

And he also took care to distinguish between Barnes's classificatory sets and the action-sets in which the interactions of quasi-groups were (according to Mayer) to be found: classificatory sets lack any purposive content, whereas action-sets, as for instance those generated by a candidate in the Dewas election, are filled with it.[24]

Mayer went on to describe the characteristics of Dewas electoral action-sets (wide variety of bases for linkage, links sometimes based on group membership, links forming paths through intermediaries, 'loosedness', impermanence) and finally explained what a quasi-group was in the newly expanded terminology of network analysis;

> When successive action-sets are centered on similar contents of activity, personnel and linkages may also be similar. By 'superimposing' a series of action-sets, therefore, one may discern a number of people who are more often than not members of the action-sets, and others who are involved from time to time. Taken together, these people form a catchment for ego's action-sets based on this type of context. . . I think it may be well to adopt the work quasi-group (here) since this best expresses the sociological implications of this type of collection of people and suggests the qualitative difference between the quasi-group and the group.[25]

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23 Mayer, 1966, p.99.

24 Mayer, 1966, p.99.

25 Mayer, 1966, p.115.

To summarize a network represents all the links, all the interactions, among persons in a social field, without any egocentric bias; a set represents all the links which exist when the field is analyzed according to some criterion emanating from one of the persons in the field. For example, Who does Ego suppose are his peers? Or, who can Ego get to support him in the election?; the former example is of a classificatory set, because it has no purposive content, whereas the latter example is of an action-set, because it possesses purposive content; a quasi-group consists of all those people who in a given context could reasonably be expected to be part of a given Ego's action-set. A quasi-group differs from a network insofar as a quasi-group, like an action-set, necessarily involves links based on an ego's purposive action.

In 1968 Barnes contributed an article in which he attempted to clarify the terms of network analysis.[26] In this article, he corrected Bott's misunderstanding of network and with slight reservations endorsed Mayer's elaborations. In addition, he defined a handful of other terms which he felt to be useful for those attempting to make or understand a network analysis. A few of these terms should be briefly mentioned here. A partial network, as opposed to a total network, is "any extract of the total network based on some criterion applicable throughout the whole network."[27] It cannot be egocentric. The density of a network, or of a portion of a network, is the proportion of the theoretically possible direct

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[26] Barnes, 1968.

[27] Barnes, 1968, p.111.

links chat exist in fact. Low-density networks may be called "close-knit." Comparing the density of different networks, or the density of different portions of the same network, has yielded a good deal of valuable information to anthropologists. It has likewise proven useful to identify clusters within networks, that is, those sets of persons whose links with one another are comparatively dense.

Barne's terminology has basically stood up quite well over the past several years, and it is that terminology, together with Mayer's elaborations, that this paper will endeavor to follow. Of course Black and Puerto Rican crime syndicates as social fields have a fair number of their own very distinct characteristics, quite different from the characteristics of elections in Dewas, Indiana and neighbors in Bremnes, Norway; and since network analysis is by no means yet a finished science, there are naturally--even necessarily--a few points at which the techniques employed in this paper will be innovative.

Once network maps were developed we used them to build a preliminary analytic model of the internal organization of organized crime networks among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. We planned to map as many networks as we could discover and then to relate these network maps to each other to form a generalized network map or maps. A second dimension used to structure the model is the behavioral code of rules which governs relationships among members and both internal and external social

action. These preliminary networks were reviewed and evaluated through conferences with field informants and with organized crime specialists.[28]

In summary, then we used the anthropological technique of participant observation by native informants to document the process of ethnic succession in organized crime and to gather data on how networks are forming or formed among Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime. We also gathered data on how they are individually and collectively organized in terms of social relationships and rules of behavior and to develop from these data a model of the social organization of Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks. Once the model was developed, we used it to analyze the questions described earlier as important to social science and social policy.

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[28] See Appendix A for list of organized crime specialists consulted.

OBSERVATION AND INTERVIEWING

Since the theoretical base of our field methods is viewing the world through the eyes of "native" members of a culture, immediate problems of access and rapport had to be resolved. Since we were studying Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks, we were doubly alien to the group under study. Our resolution was to locate and train native informants (in the anthropological rather than intelligence sense) as primary data gatherers. "Native" in this case meant not only Black and Puerto Rican, the informants had to be familiar with and acceptable to organized crime networks within their own sub-cultures. We were able to locate, through contacts with the Fortune Society, an organization of ex-offenders, we were able to select six Black and two Puerto Rican Field informants all of whom had been associated with criminal networks in New York City. One Black interviewer was resident in Paterson, New Jersey and this afforded us an opportunity to use the Paterson network as a comparative case. Our instructions to the field informants were to gather through observation data on characteristics, behavior and interactions among members of networks with which they were familiar. Since most of the field informants were parolees, it was necessary to obtain releases from their parole officers since involvement in this study would place them in contact with known offenders. This problem was resolved at the state level when we pointed out that the ex-offenders were being asked to function as observers, not participant observers and that the project director would assume responsibility for the parolees.

The field informants were trained for two weeks in observation, recording and reporting techniques in group sessions. During these sessions the field informants carried out actual field work and these data were used to isolate areas where networks could be observed and to develop a basic protocol for use by all field informants in order to insure comparability. (See Appendix B.) All data were tape recorded and transcribed. The active field work consisted of twelve weeks in two time blocks during which the field informants worked full-time. Weekly meetings were held with the field informants during which data gathered in the previous week were reviewed and discussed so that data requirements and sampling could be handled sequentially.

A major problem with data gathering was the obvious need to insure anonymity since we had assured our field informants that our interests were research rather than intelligence oriented. We resolved this by assigning code letter designations to each field informant and instructing him to number sequentially each person he reported as part of a network. Thus, field informant A would identify the first person he described as A-1, the second as A-2 and so on. We then assigned pseudonyms to each of the network members so identified. A data summary sheet was prepared for each member identified and used to indicate which data were reported and which were still to be gathered. (See Appendix B.) These data sheets were also used as coding sheets for content analysis of the tape transcripts.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The problem of how to classify and analyze what is observed in field work is a persistent one that has many dimensions. Two are especially problematic. Should the categorization of behavior take place prior to going into the field or during the field experience itself? The other question has to do with how categories or units of observation are derived. Does the field worker create his own logical categories or does he let them emerge from the people he is studying.

The first question--which asks, essentially, whether categories for observation in field work are derived from theory and then taken into the field with the field worker or whether they arise from the observation sitaution itself--is one which is currently under examination in both sociology and anthropology. At the heart of the issue is how theory should be generated. Under the classical logico-deductive scheme, theory is first developed and then taken into the field and examined through the research process. In an earlier period in the history of sociological research, the "Chicago School" of sociologists emphasized field work in the urban areas of Chicago as the basis for the discovery of knowledge about human society and the social system--letting theory emerge from what one finds in the field. A generation of researchers went out to study the gang, the Gold Coast, the slum and other features of Chicago life and developed

insights into the functioning of society as a result and from those insights developed theory. Today, a number of sociologists are calling for a return to that tradition. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, sociologists who have been working in the medical field, have developed one such paradigm for the relationships of theory and research which they call "grounded theory." They maintain that while generating a theory should always involve a process of research, the development of theory in the logico-deductive paradigm sometimes looks to non-research data sources for ideas which creep into the research. Thus, they say, theory should be developed in (not before) the process of research so that it is "grounded" in the empirical world in which the research is being carried out.[29] We have been using a similar model, which we call "situational analysis," in some of our studies of the social action in education systems. There are, of course, other similar schemes being developed elsewhere which share this new--or at least newly rediscovered--approach in the field of qualitative research.

Anthropologists on the other hand have been dealing with qualitative questions consistently in the history of that science. But even here there is a"new ethnography" developing. Generally known by that term or sometimes called "ethnoscience," it is an attempt to "break the mold of the

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[29] Barney G. Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago, 1967).

categorical outline of culture which most anthropologists now take with them into the field."[30] In both the "new field work" in sociology and the "new ethnography" in anthropology there is a strong emphasis on letting categories of observation emerge in the field work experience. This does, not, however, mean that the sociologist or anthropologist goes into the field "as a camera" and records all that is to be seen. That is of course impossible. One always goes into the field looking for something and using prior knowledge and experience as a guide. In our own scheme of situational analysis which we used in this study, we took "concepts" into the field with us and used them as guidelines for observation but did not pre-plan and pre-build an elaborate conceptual framework into which we forced all of the observations we made. To say this differently, we did not build a series of theoretical and conceptual boxes back at the university and take these into the field and fill them with approprate pieces of action; rather we went out and observed the social action and then built the boxes in the field using conceptual materials which were already a part of our repertoire. There is, of course, no utility in rediscovering concepts which are already known. We already knew, for example, a very utilitarian concept called role-model. We took this concept with us into the field as a category for observation and as the study progressed

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30 Thomas Gladwin and William G. Sturtevant, Introduction to a paper by Charles Frake, Anthropology and Human Behavior, Washington, Anthropological Society of Washington, 1962, pp. 72-73.

we discovered that each of the four generations in the Lupollo "family" had a different role-model and that an adequate understanding of the "family" required more knowledge than we had or theory could provide. The process of "filling in" the knowledge required gathering and classifying more cultural materials to explain the origin and function of these different role-models.

Once we had derived categories into which to fit observations--either from theory and experience or de novo from observation--we continuously tested and refined them. We did this by use of a technique of constant comparison in which we constantly went over observation reports, compared them and looked for plausible categories suggested in the data. Then we would take these embryonic categories and go over them with some of our interviewers in an attempt to see if the categories we developed fit the logic of the group under study as well as our own logical assumptions. This technique grows out of our position on the second issue described earlier: whose categories take precedence in the field, one's own or the peoples' being studied? In our field work we have always followed the injunction that "the native's categorization is the only correct one." Constant rechecking with key informants was necessary because we proposed as one of our most important tasks the search for the right organization of any set of observations to conform with the reality of the world we were studying.

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY IN INTERVIEWING

It is generally assumed that the problem of validity is greater in interviewing than it is in participant-observation because the data are one step removed and one is "observing" through the eyes and perception of other individuals. This was a particular problem for us because we were using informants as observers. In this study validity checks on interview information came from a process in which we measured the internal consistency of interview data and sought verification of information through other sources wherever possible. And, since we were also involved in the process of observation, some of the data could also be checked against our own observations. Even so, the question of the reliability of our informants is an important one in considering the validity of our data.

The question is one which is common to field work studies but is obviously more pronounced where one is observing deviant behavior that actors may want kept secret. Our solution was to establish a standardized system of assessing both the validity of the data which we were recording and the reliability of the individuals who we were gathering the data. Our problem was a dual one: how to assess the reliability of the source of a particular piece of data and how much validity to assign to the information itself. The two questions are, of course, interrelated but actually are separable. An individual informant who has always proved reliable in the past may provide

information which he is passing on from someone else and about which the analyst must make a separate judgment; an informant who is usually unreliable may pass on a piece of information which can be checked against factual data such as ownership records of a business. Because we felt that the questions of informant reliability and data validity had to be looked at separately, we set up a two-dimensional system for assessing data.

Following our earlier assumption that the closer the field worker is to the data the more certain he is of what he is seeing and hearing, where one of us was actually participating in the action being observed, we assigned the highest validity score to those data gathered by observation but where we were not involved as direct participants. We assigned lower validity scores to data gathered by interviewing informants and coded interview materials into one of three categories according to how carefully we were able to check the data. Data which could be checked against standard, available documented sources--arrest records, marriage records, home and business addresses, business ownership and so on--received the highest rating. Where the data could not be checked but was corroborated by more than one informant, either spontaneously or as a result of our checking information from one source against later interviews with other informants, we assigned the second highest score, and where the data came from one source only, we assigned the lowest score.

Since we were constantly comparing data as they were gathered, we also began building up a profile of how reliable our major informants were. Here again we assigned the informants to categories: "always reliable" where information from that source was consistently accurate in terms of factual checks or subsequent interviewing, "usually reliable" where the data usually but not always checked out, "reliability unknown" where we had been unable to check and "unreliable" where later checking indicated that the individual seldom seemed to provide accurate information. The following table indicates the reliability-validity coding scheme which was applied to all data used in analyses for the study.

TABLE

VALIDITY SCORE	RELIABILITY SCORE
A. Data gathered through observation with direct participation.	1. Informant always reliable.
B. Data gathered through observation but not as direct participant.	2. Informant usually reliable.
C. Interview data checked against documentary or other factual source.	3. Reliability of informant unknown.
D. Interview data corroborated by one or more additional informants.	4. Informant unreliable.
E. Interview data from a single informant.	

Once we had assigned both a reliability score and a validity score to interview data we combined the two into an index number and used only those units of data which had a reliability-validity index of D-2 or above for analysis and summary reporting.

Since our interest was in finding and describing the networks and rules by which members organize their universe and behavior, our problem in analyzing the field data was one of formulating both networks and the behavior. Our approach was essentially that of developing a natural history of the areas of behavior in which we were interested; what is generic about the behavior of members of these networks in these areas and how did they explain this regularity. Since we were continuously coding observational and interview data into categories for analysis and constantly comparing the behaviors we sorted into a particular category, we began formulating tentative networks from the very beginning of the research. As new data came in we re-examined networks when we were satisfied that our formulation of a particular network or set of behaviors was sufficient to allow us to make the judgments and perform the acts in the way which members of network would consider appropriate, we added the rule to our code of rules along with any exceptions we noted.

In the 18 months in which we looked at these networks we gathered a substantial quantity of data. As is so frequently true in field studies, selecting those data for eventual analyses and writing up was not an easy task. Confidentiality was, of course, a major problem for us. Our relationship has been such that we did acquire information which could be potentially harmful to them. Since our major interest in the study was social organization, rather than criminal behavior, much of the potentially harmful data was not really pertinent to our interests anyway. Some of it, however, is important to understanding how the

networks function and so we have included information on new areas such as Gypsy cabs and prison life which inform the basic purpose of the study.

Chapter IV

THE FIELD DATA

In this chapter we present the field data on the networks we observed.

What follows is a description of various criminal networks as reported to us by our informants. In most cases, the characters and their relationships are presented here just as our informants presented them to us. In a few cases, however, notably in Network G, dealing with the gypsy cab industry, and in Network H, dealing with prison life, our informants spoke either in hypotheses (for example, "if a guy wants to go drive a gypsy cab, first he gets a stolen car and then. . .") or in generalizations (for example, "in prison, all the Puerto Ricans hang around their court, and all the whites hang around theirs and. . ."). In these cases, we have taken the liberty of constructing characters and situations out of the hypotheses and generalizations. In no case, however, have we provided a character or a situation with details for which there was not ample verification in our informants' testimony. All names are fictitious.

NETWORK A

The Place: a 15 square block area near Grand and Green Avenues in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn.

The Characters:

Harold Robinson is a Black male born in 1933.

Timothy Minton is a Black male born in 1936.

Theodore Stevens is a Black male born in 1934.

John Ellis is a Black male born in 1932.

William Smith is a Black male born in 1935.

Ray Ballantine is a Black male born in 1933.

John Johnson is a Black male born in 1937.

All seven of these men grew up in the area described above. In 1951, when they committed their first significant crime together, all but Ray Ballantine were living at home with relatives. Yet only Harold Robinson lived in a home with a father present. In November of 1951, after a fire in a neighborhood bar, these seven young men vandalized and burglarized the damaged premises. They made off with 85 cases of whiskey from the basement of the bar. This was the start of their joint criminal careers. In the following 15 years, Robinson, Minton, Stevens, Ellis Smith, Ballantine, and Johnson were to come into contact with everyone involved in crime in their neighborhood.

Michael Herlihy is a white male who in 1951 was a police lieutenant in the neighborhood 88th Precinct. He was also at the time the coach of the neighborhood PAL baseball team, of which Robinson, Minton, Stevens, Ellis, Smith, Ballantine and Johnson were all members.

George Gordon is a Black male born in 1924 who lived on Grand Avenue and was a local fence, shylock and numbers operator in 1951.

Winston Phillips is a Black male who in 1951 was bartender at the "Lucky Spot" bar on Grand Avenue.

Cynthia Brown is a Black female born around 1925 who in 1951 lived with George Gordon and worked as a prostitute out of a house on Grand Avenue which was known locally as "the Whorehouse."

Dorothy Franklin Ellis is a Black female who is John Ellis's mother and who in 1951 made her living as a numbers operator.

The Linkages:

Lieutenant Herlihy, when still coach of the PAL team, appointed Timothy Minton to "handle" street gambling in the neighborhood. That is to say, Minton was given exclusive permission to run and to "cut" all crap games played in the area. It was Minton's duty to see that the 88th Precinct received $2 for every hour that craps were played in the neighborhood streets.

George Gordon in 1951 purchased from Robinson, Minton, Stevens, Ellis, Smith, Ballantine and Johnson the 85 cases of whiskey which they had stolen from the fire-damaged bar. He paid the young men $30 per case. The whiskey was eventually sold at the Whorehouse for $1 a shot and $20 a bottle. Gordon befriended Harold Robinson in particular. He made Robinson his number one runner/pick-up man.

Theodore Stevens, William Smith and John Johnson became numbers runners working for Harold Robinson, after Robinson entered George

Gordon's employ.

After the burglary, Winston Phillips began steering some of the "Lucky Spot's" richer and drunker patrons to Timothy Minton's street crap games, for which Phillips was paid $2 per head. On account of the burglary, Minton's reputation as a street craps hustler was enhanced.

Cynthia Brown lived with George Gordon and worked at the Whorehouse where the whiskey that George Gordon bought from the seven youths was sold.

As mentioned, Dorothy Ellis is John Ellis's mother.

NETWORK B

The Place: Paterson, New Jersey

The Characters:

Joseph Hajar is a Syrian male now in his mid-forties. He owns a tavern and is the biggest dealer of narcotics in the area due to his ability to maintain a constant supply of narcotics and to pay protection directly to the police for his pushers. He is also involved in the numbers, as both controller and banker. Joseph Hajar started out in 1941 or 1942 running a gas station where he would change the serial numbers on stolen cars. After a number of unsuccessful business ventures, he became owner of the tavern which is his today. The bar takes in a fair amount of money and also serves as Hajar's front. In the back of the bar is a room with dice and card tables. Upstairs there are a number of rooms which the bar's go-go girls use for prostitution. Hajar's income from the ghetto narcotics trade is unknown, but it can be estimated that he takes in $15,000 a day from his numbers operation. He turns over

a share of his income to a high-ranking member of the Italian crime syndicate in Bergen County. He owns and manages three Golden Glove fighters, and has served a prison sentence.

Albert Montgomery is a Black male who owns a cleaners and runs numbers on the side.

Thomas Jones is a Black male, age 37, who works as a bartender and numbers controller.

Elsie Payne is a Black female whose house is used for money drop-offs by numbers runners.

Horace Jackson is a Black male shopkeeper who also works as a numbers controller.

Willie C. Squires was a Black male who died in his late thirties. For a time he rivalled Joseph Hajar as a local power in organized crime. He was the first Black man ever to do so. He was murdered "gangland style," supposedly because he was involved in tampering with bets on a horse race.

Franklin Squires is a Black male, brother to Willie C. Squires, who since Willie's death has taken over his operations. Franklin Squires enjoys a high station in organized crime. He controls the territory designated "up the hill" in the Paterson area. He has at least 50 to 60 Blacks working for him. Nothing of an organized criminal nature can be done "up the hill" without his approval.

Wendell Jenkins is a Black male in his fifties. He is one of Franklin Squires' top lieutenants. He owns two taverns, three houses, and three stores. He receives a percentage of the total numbers take from Franklin Squires. However, except for the fact that drugs can be bought

at one of the bars, he does not directly involve himself in the narcotics business. For a time Wendell Jenkins did a substantial amount of dealing in stolen goods. He is one of the few Blacks in this locale to have connections with a New York Italian syndicate.

Malcolm Jenkins is a Black male in his sixties, brother to Wendell Jenkins. He owns various properties and has served a prison term.

Roy Jones is a Black male, thirty-three years old, who started out as a numbers writer and is now a controller and banker for Franklin Squires. He does well financially. He is not connected in any way with drugs.

William Howard is a Black male, 28 or 29 years old, who works as a numbers controller, along with Roy Jones, for Franklin Squires.

Calvin Horton is a Black male, 35 years old, who started out first as a trailer driver and then as a numbers writer. He now owns two or three houses and has four people working for him. As far as has been discovered, he is "independent": this means that he does his own banking and that the only people to whom he turns over a percentage of his income are the Italians. His base of operations is a luncheonette owned by a number of West Indians.

The Linkages:

Albert Montgomery works for Joseph Hajar as a runner.

Thomas Jones also works for Joseph Hajar as a controller.

The numbers runners for whom Elsie Payne's house serves as a place for money drop-offs all work for Joseph Hajar. It is not mentioned

whether Elsie Payne interacts directly with Joseph Hajar in any way.

Horace Jackson at one time worked as a controller for Joseph Hajar, but he now works for someone else and is trying to branch out on his own.

Willie C. Squires and Franklin Squires were brothers. When Willie died, Franklin took over Willie's operations. Wendell and Malcolm Jenkins are brothers. Both Wendell and Malcolm work for Franklin Squires as "top lieutenants."

Roy Jones works as a controller and banker for Franklin Squires.

William Howard is a partner of Roy Jones, the two of them working as controllers for Franklin Squires.

NETWORK C

The Place: Central Harlem Section, Manhattan

The Characters:

Reginald Martin is a Black male, age approximately 28, who was born in New York and grew up in Harlem. He is a pimp, a successful one, who has had up to 12 girls working for him at a time. His growing up in Harlem almost naturally encompassed a strong disrespect for government and a burning desire for money. Like many ghetto youths, he admired the lifestyles of the men who owned the big Cadillacs and Lincolns parked on the corner. He was lured into pimping by a woman who was fond of him.

Reginald Martin is a junior high school drop-out and it is possible that his business acumen, as opposed to his natural ability as a pimp,

NETWORK B

PATERSON, NEW JERSEY





is not too great. But he is an intelligent, affable, generous person, who is respectful to old people. He is a good athlete and takes pride in his body. He is also capable of being quite vicious if need be. Reginald Martin built up his "stable" of women by befriending young girls in jail. He would send them money orders and the like, so that when they got out of jail they would naturally come to him for comfort and protection.

His operations are located entirely in Harlem. His women have the reputation of being the cleanest and most consistently "unhooked" of any in Harlem. Moreover, they are for the most part strictly "flatbackers": that is to say, they get all their money by selling sex, as opposed to thieving or shoplifting. Reginald Martin has no business connections outside of Harlem, nor does his business seem to owe anything to anyone other than his women. However, if he went to another large city it is likely that the important pimps in that city would know of his good reputation and would "accept" him: the "hustler's grapevine" is quite powerful. Reginald Martin ranks right at the top of his profession in the eyes of other pimps.

Lucy Greer is now deceased. She was a Black female who worked as a prostitute and who died of an overdose of narcotics. Lucy Greer's mother was an addict and a prostitute and a lesbian. Lucy Greer (as opposed to Reginald Martin) had a juvenile court record and served time in one of New York's houses for wayward children. It is likely that Lucy Greer learned a good deal about criminal activity from her early

incarcerations.

James Mitchell is a Black male, age 31, who has no apparent occupation. He is a high school drop-out who "hustles" for a living. He is a native New Yorker.

Robert Lewis is a Black male who happened to come up with some heroin during a panic on one occasion. He is a low-level pusher.

Thomas Irwin is a Black male, age 45 or so, who owns a tailor shop. His shop was repeatedly burglarized by neighborhood drug addicts, with the result that he felt it incumbent upon himself to hire local thieves to replace his customers' merchandise. These thieves--two men and one woman--did a fine job. Thomas Irwin's involvement with them was the beginning of his participation in criminal activity.

The three thieves were also drug addicts, who on occasion were badly in need of money; so that Irwin not only purchased stolen goods from them but also occasionally served as their loan shark. Eventually Irwin began acquiring stolen clothing in bulk and selling it. He also started up a gambling and after-hours place across the street from his cleaners, and opened another cleaners and a laundromat at another location. When his gambling place began to attract leading Harlem gamblers, Thomas Irwin became nervous because he really didn't want, nor was he prepared for, criminal notoriety. So he opened up three more laundromats to put "more shade" on the illicit part of his activities.

Today Thomas Irwin is rich and prosperous: he is one of the men in Harlem to whom it is possible for someone in need of a few thousand dollars to go and these days he buys strictly "Fifth-Avenue-style" stolen goods.

He is not involved in narcotics at all, nor in the numbers, and he has never been to jail. He is often considered to be a successful man in Harlem.

Phillip Thomas is a Black male who worked as one of Thomas Irwin's original three thieves.

Elizabeth Dukes is a Black female who worked as the third of Thomas Irwin's original three thieves.

Cleveland Dukes is the husband of Elizabeth Dukes. He is one of the few Black thieves who have been successful at stealing large shipments of clothing from the midtown Manhattan area. He is a drug addict. His method of operation is typically to get keys to the locks on truck doors and when no one is looking to enter the truck with mail carts or hand trucks and carry off the merchandise. This seems to be considered fairly "high-class" stealing.

Joseph Allen is a Black male who also works as a thief, and who has a connection with a hardware man who can make master lock keys by number. Joseph Allen's method of operation is something like this: he spots a truck loaded with merchandise that he knows he would like to sell; he examines the lock and goes to his hardware man, who if possible will make him a key; with the key he returns to the truck and carts off as much as he can carry.

Richard Williams is the hardware man who makes keys for Joseph Allen.

The Linkages:

Reginald Martin was Lucy Greer's childhood "prince." It was she who, when she got out of jail, led him into the pimping life. She showered gifts on him, and also her love. And when she went into prostitution she

made him her pimp. It is the informant's view that she in fact made him a good pimp. It is the informant's view that the best pimps are those who are made pimps by prostitutes, rather than vice versa, since when the former happens there is much that the prostitute will likely be able to teach the new pimp about how to treat women. Reginald Martin and Lucy Greer conceived the scheme of sending money orders to the lonely girls who were Lucy Greer's friends when she was incarcerated and who remained in jail after she got out. It was these girls, shunned by their families, who came to Reginald Martin and Lucy Greer when they got out of jail, and who eventually served to make up Martin's "stable."

Reginald Martin's relations with his prostitutes generally can be put at this: his women stick close to him because they believe that he will lead them to wealth. It may be presumed that Reginald Martin has a certain manner which makes him attractive to women, but in addition to that, his unwillingness to involve himself in any activities which might jeopardize his prostitution business and his ability to maintain a reputation as a man who supplies safe, healthy and unhooked women makes him seem to prostitutes a reliable choice, that is, a pimp who will make them prosperous. Martin's women have never testified against him in court, with the result that he has never gone to jail.

James Mitchell, because he grew up in New York and is known by a large number of people in his own neighborhood and elsewhere in the city, was able to purchase a supply of narcotics during a drug panic. He was able to locate fellow-hustlers with whom he'd grown up, set up special meetings through them, and eventually make a purchase, away from the mob of anxious addicts. Growing up in New York and having lifelong friends in New York

results in James Michell having a certain pedigree, a certain reputation in this kind of situation--at least in the eyes of our informant here, who grew up in Detroit.

Robert Lewis is a low-level pusher who during the panic was able to come up with good quality heroin which our informant was able to purchase for his own neighborhood. The man from whom Robert Lewis purchased had maintained a business connection with Lewis during the previous three or four years.

Thomas Irwin's first group of thieves consisted of George Pendleton, Timothy Jones, and Elizabeth Dukes. Because all three were drug addicts, and therefore occasionally in desperate need of cash, Irwin occasionally loaned them money at high interest (for example, for a $50 loan, $12.50 per week for 5 weeks) and this was the beginning of his loansharking business. Pendleton, Jones and Dukes were considered the best "bootsters" in Harlem; and their talents at thievery kept Irwin well-supplied with goods.

When George Pendleton was sent off to jail, Elizabeth Dukes' husband, Cleveland Dukes, began to thieve for Thomas Irwin, and it was at this point that Irwin's business really began to expand. Cleveland Dukes' ability to steal wholesale from trucks in the midtown Manhattan area meant that Irwin could offer for sale a wide variety of merchandise with Saks and Bonwit Teller labels; and Irwin's tailor shop soon developed a local reputation as quite a bargain shop. During the time of Irwin's rapid business expansion, he often went for advice to Cleveland Dukes, who approached criminal matters with greater experience and confidence than Irwin possessed. The two men broke off their business relationship when Dukes was sent off

for a jail term, at which time he welched on an $800 debt owed to Irwin, a debt which had grown out of a $450 loan.

Cleveland Dukes and Joseph Allen met "downtown" somewhere and discovered that they were both involved in the same kind of "hustle." They apparently worked together to some extent, stealing from midtown delivery trucks; and the fact that Allen had contact with a hardware man, Richard Williams, who would make him master keys on demand, apparently helped their joint operations, and the clothing business of Thomas Irwin in turn.

Cleveland Dukes is the man who schooled our informant in the art of stealing from trucks.

Thomas Irwin's success has spurred others in his immediate neighborhood to imitation of his methods and approaches.

CONTINUED

1 OF 3

NETWORK C

HARLEM





Network D

The Place: East Harlem Section, Manhattan

The Characters:

Edward Thomas is a Black male, 35 years old, who graduated from high school and finished one year of college. He owns a fairly large boutique where it is possible for customers to purchase marijuana, pills and cocaine, but not heroin.

James Mallory is a Black male who works in Edward Thomas's boutique and who is responsible for purchasing the drugs that are sold there.

Rodney Williams is a Black male, 22 years old, who has completed two years of college. He runs numbers, because it is an easy way to make money.

The Linkages:

Edward Thomas and James Mallory grew up together, and their relationship in Thomas's boutique is cemented as much by friendship as by financial concerns. Although Thomas finances the boutique, there are ways in which Mallory might be considered the "brains man" of the operation: it is Mallory who must know the quality of the drug merchandise that the boutique handles, since it is he who purchases it. Edward Thomas hires other people to do the selling of the merchandise.

Network E

The Places: all parts of Harlem, the Red Hook and Bay Ridge sections of Brooklyn, the Jamaica section of Queens, and certain unidentified sections of both the Bronx and Brooklyn.

The Characters:

Terrence Elliot is a Black male, 37 years old. He owns three houses, a bar, a restaurant and an ice cream parlor, all of which are located in the same area. He sells heroin and cocaine from his bar, and also through a network of pushers in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Jamaica and East Harlem.

Robert Barrios is a Puerto Rican male, 32 years old, who lives in the Bronx but works in Harlem. He has dealers selling cocaine, marijuana and hashish for him in all parts of Harlem. He has an eighth grade education, acquired in Puerto Rican schools.

Ernest Smith is a Black male, 42-45 years of age, who dropped out of the tenth grade in a small segregated school in Atlanta, Georgia. He is a dealer in cocaine, marijuana and hashish, and his profits from drugs have enabled him to establish a haberdashery and barber shop and to bank a small policy business. Policy bets are placed and paid off at the haberdashery and barber shop.

Steven Finezee is a Black male, approximately 35 years old, who comes from Mobile, Alabama. He dropped out of school in the sixth grade. He owns two houses and a candy store, all of which are located in the same area. One of his houses Finezee rents out, the other he lives in and sells cocaine and heroin from.

Carmine Grazioli is an Italian from the Red Hook and Bay Ridge sections of Brooklyn who sells drugs.

Ricardo Mendoza is a Cuban from Florida who sells drugs.

Lawrence Minley is a Black male, 27 years old, who works as a policeman and who deals in small quantities of heroin, marijuana, cocaine, hashish and barbituates. Minley obtains the drugs he sells either from other policemen or by shaking down pushers.

Jesus Izquierdo is a Puerto Rican male, 32 years old, who owns (in partnership with Jose Rodriquez) a Spanish-American Restaurant and who sells heroin, marijuana, cocaine, hashish and barbituates there.

Jose Rodriquez is a Puerto Rican male, 34 years old, who is Jesus Izquierdo's partner in the restaurant and the sale of drugs.

The Linkages:

Seventeen ex-heroin addicts work directly for Terrence Elliot in the selling of heroin and cocaine. These seventeen ex-addicts in turn have between twenty-two and twenty-eight Black and Puerto Rican ex-addicts selling heroin and cocaine on consignment in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Jamaica and East Harlem.

The sales network of Robert Barrios consists of: several Blacks, male and female, dealing marijuana and hashish in West Harlem; and several teenage Puerto Ricans dealing marijuana, hashish and heroin for him in East Harlem.

In addition to the drug sales made at his haberdashery and barber shop, Ernest Smith has several Black people, male and female, teenagers and adults, selling marijuana, hashish and cocaine for him in West and Central Harlem. Ernest Smith buys his drugs chiefly from Robert Barrios.

Steven Finezee purchases the drugs he sells from Carmine Grazioli and Ricardo Mendoza.

Lawrence Minley obtains the drugs he sells either from other policemen or from pushers (by means of shakedowns); and he sells his drugs to Jesus Izquierdo and Jose Rodriquez.

Network F

The Places: Red Hook and Bay Ridge Sections, Brooklyn; East Harlem Section, New York; Florida; and locations unknown

The Characters:

Luis Santos is a Puerto Rican male. His mother came to New York from Puerto Rico in 1949 and settled on 109th Street between Lexington and Park Avenues. The majority of people who lived on this block came from his mother's hometown in Puerto Rico. Luis Santos was soon enjoying what he describes as the normal growing up of a boy in Harlem: playing hookey, carrying numbers for different runners, and explaining everything to his mother in terms of helping a guy at a grocery store. When his mother found out, she had him committed to Lincoln Hall for truancy. When he emerged, he was sent to a "614" school, and became in the eyes of his neighborhood friends a "big tough guy." When his mother moved to mid-Manhattan on the West Side, to a block on which only two other Puerto Rican families lived, Luis Santos began returning daily to his childhood neighborhood in East Harlem.

He began gangfighting, and "one thing led to another," and he was sent back to Lincoln Hall. In the meantime, local dope pushers began

NETWORK E

BRONX, BROOKLYN,
EAST HARLEM, JAMAICA



N.B. The exact relationships of Terrence Elliot to each of the 17 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships among the 17 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships between each of the 17 and each of the 22-28 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships among the 22-28 ex-addicts are unclear.

N.B. The exact relationships between Robert Barrios and each of the several Blacks and Puerto Ricans selling for him are unclear.

The exact relationships of these Blacks among themselves and of these Puerto Ricans among themselves are unclear.

The exact relationships between Ernest Smith and each of the people working for him, either in drugs or in his other enterprises, are unclear. The exact relationships of these people among themselves are unclear.



observing him and eventually he was given a job as a "dope cutter," which he preferred to carrying numbers because of the greater money involved. Upon his second discharge from Lincoln Hall, in 1957 or 1958, he got together with four of his old streetfighting buddies and formed a partnership: each was to put up money so that they could buy almost a thousand dollars of marijuana. In order to meet his share of the financial burden, Luis Santos committed robberies, burglaries and muggings. The friends finally bought their marijuana, resold it all at a profit within two weeks, and were ready to start again. They sold marijuana for a while and became frustrated over the fact that it seemed impossible for them to dominate the business even in their own neighborhood, because the Italian from whom they purchased drugs was willing to sell them more than a few pounds at a time and unwilling to cut off his other customers. Luis Santos was then jailed for burglary for a few months, and in jail discovered the far greater profits that could be made from dealing in heroin. When he got out, he and his friends each put up $250.00 and went off to four different places all over New York to buy four different "pieces" of heroin, which when put together gave them the kind of tidy stockpile that they would have been unable to obtain from any one dealer.

Thereafter they tried to dominate the heroin trade in their neighborhood. However, obstacles kept coming up: some older women "ratted" on them, so they all got prison terms; Santos wound up addicted to heroin and was sent off to prison on at least two more occasions, involving

statutory rape one time and homicide another; and gangfighting broke out again, this time apparently because of drug rivalries.

Antonio Rivera, Jose Ayala, Juan Rios, and Rafeal Quintero are Puerto Rican males who grew up with Luis Santos.

Robert Mateo is a Puerto Rican male in his late forties to late fifties, who works in the numbers. He is in charge of a "book." His territory is what was Joey Gallo's neighborhood, although there was no apparent connection between Joey Gallo and Mateo himself. It was perhaps the intensive police surveillance of the Gallo gang in Mateo's neighborhood which led Mateo to adopt some rather technologically advanced ways of operating his business: numbers runners record the bets of their players on cassette tape recorders, then play their tapes over the telephone onto another tape recorder located at Mateo's headquarters. Pressure due to police surveillance of the Gallos has also led Mateo to encourage weekly players rather than daily players. His customers are mostly factory workers from his immediate neighborhood along with local restaurant employees, cab drivers and gas station attendants. He hires housewives at $50-$75 a week to handle the telephone calls as they come in from his runners. Robert Mateo appears to operate independently. He is frequently approached by people who live in his neighborhood, who seem to hope or expect that he will be able to help them out in one way or another, loan them money, get their kid out of jail, et cetera; and it would be reasonable to assume, since people persist in approaching him, that he does help out at least occasionally.

Tomas Correa is a Puerto Rican male, 33 or 34 years old, with a junior high school education. Behind a "collision shop" front, he obtains stolen cars and sells them for parts. He has an established reputation with perhaps 50 different collision shops, many in the Pension Heights area of Brooklyn, so that when they need parts for a damaged car they call him, knowing that he can supply them at low prices. When he gets an order for parts, Tomas Correa instructs a group of young thieves to steal the kind of car that will fill the order. He pays the thieves in cash. They steal the car, strip it, obtain the parts that are wanted, and leave the hulk on a street somewhere. Sometimes Correa is able to supply the thieves with master keys. Sometimes he stocks certain parts, without a firm order, in the expectation of a later sale.

Cesar Rosario is a Puerto Rican male, 21-22 years old, who is also in the automotive business. He cannot read or write. His education is at the second grade level. He repairs hot rod engines and he also employs thieves to steal cars for their competitive equipment, such as four speed transmissions and high performance engines. The thieves are usually Puerto Ricans between the ages of 17 and 21. Cesar Rosario relies on two or three of them particularly; only one of his thieves is Black. In most cases the thieves are saving up to buy their own high performance cars.

It is often Rosario's procedure (in particular with Fords, because they do not have their registration numbers stamped on the engine block) to go to a junkyard, buy a wrecked car that is roughly

comparable to the one that is stolen, take the door identification tag off the junk car and put it on the stolen car, and proceed to "remake" the stolen car into the junk car, chiefly by painting it the junk car's color and putting new locks on the doors. Cesar Rosario also sells phony auto insurance cards to young hot-rodders for whom the cost of real insurance would be intolerably high. He also employs two or three young women (themselves in a methadone program) to push pills and dope for him. The girls receive $1.25 on a $5 bag and are instructed to stay away from Rosario's garage at all times.

Eduardo Paredes is a garage owner in Bay Ridge who will promptly repaint a stolen car with red or grey prime for $20.

Clemente Sanchez is a personal friend of Luis Santos. He was brought up in Harlem and to a considerable extent educated himself in prison. He seems to be well-read in psychology, sociology and philosophy, and he understands how to make use of psychology; for example, he is likely to show off his gun collection to business guests. Sanchez sells narcotics, and he seems to go about it in quite a shrewd way: he employs other members of his family because they are safer and more reliable than most people and because, being family, they can thereby "keep the thing to themselves;" and he retains a lawyer, which makes his pushers feel more secure than they would with some other dealer. In a sealed room in his basement is a factory where dope is cut and bagged. Dope is sold from the apartment of one of his employees.

Hector Sanchez is 17 or 18 years old, the younger brother of Clemente. He works for Clemente in Clemente's narcotics operations.

Jorge Sanchez is the older brother of Clemente. He is now in prison. He has for a long time been heavily involved in narcotics. Strangely, he has never been willing to tell his brothers about his best narcotics connection.

Francisca Lopez is a Puerto Rican female, 26 to 28 years old. She is a lesbian. She sells Clemente Sanchez's heroin and occasionally uses heroin herself.

The Linkages:

Luis Santos has had a number of significant links with people that he grew up with in his East Harlem neighborhood. The first time he got out of Lincoln Hall he was looked up to by his peers in the neighborhood as a "big tough guy." Later, he was observed by older criminal elements in the neighborhood who hired him to do odd jobs such as picking up policy slips or cutting dope. Eventually he went into partnership with four of his childhood friends in which each partner put up equal amounts of money to buy supplies of drugs. The partners first bought drugs from a local Italian dealer and then from dealers all over the city (in an effort to accumulate a large stash). The partnerships' downfall seemed to come about when the partners began keeping company with a group of older women, all junkies, who apparently sold them out to the police, perhaps in deference to the wishes of another gang.

Robert Mateo is the employer of a group of neighborhood women, who handle the telephones for his numbers operation. He is also apparently the occasional benefactor of neighborhood people who get in

one kind of trouble or another, for example, a guy who needs money or who needs to get his son out of jail.

Tomas Correa probably has a criminal liaison with approximately 50 bodyshops, most of them located in the Pension Heights area of Brooklyn. They call him when they need parts for a damaged car, and he supplies the parts by stealing a similar car and stripping off the appropriate parts. Moreover Tomas Correa will sometimes take the initiative in offering parts to the bodyshops. Tomas Correa hires young thieves to steal cars for him, and he apparently pays them a flat fee for each car stolen.

Cesar Rosario, like Tomas Correa, hires young thieves to steal cars for him. He pays the going rate of $100-125 per car. He relies on two or three thieves particularly, who are motivated to work for him by the prospect of saving up enough money to buy and keep up their own high performance cars. Cesar Rosario also employs two or three young women as dope pushers. These young women, who as mentioned earlier are in a methadone program, receive about a 25% commission for their work.

It seems likely, from the way that our informant brings up his name, that Educardo Paredes paints cars either for Tomas Correa or Cesar Rosario. But this is not explicitly stated in the text. In any case, it seems that both Correa and Rosario would need fast paint jobs every once in a while.

Clemente Sanchez is the personal friend of Luis Santos.

Hector Sanchez, who is the younger brother of Clemente

Sanchez, works for Clemente in Clemente's narcotics business. Jorge Sanchez, who is Clemente's older brother, apparently worked with Clemente at some point; but now Jorge is in jail. Francisca Lopez sells Clemente Sanchez's heroin from her own house. It pleases Francisca that Clemente Sanchez retains a lawyer--she feels secure because of it--and perhaps it would not be inappropiate to make the lawyer a link in this particular network.

NETWORK F

EAST HARLEM, BROOKLYN





Network G

The Place: chiefly the Harlem Sections, Manhattan

The Characters:

Juan Ruiz is a Puerto Rican male who drives a gypsy cab in New York. The cab he drives is a stolen car; but he is saving money so that he will be able to buy a legitimate car in the not-too-distant future. The two-way radio in his cab Juan rents from the Superfast Cab Company, which supplies him with radio business. Juan also hopes to be able to buy his own radio someday.

Francisco Pizarro is a Puerto Rican male who drives a gypsy cab in New York. He legitimately owns the cab he drives; but like many gypsy drivers, he occasionally purchases parts from known thieves.

Angel Ocasio is a Puerto Rican male who drives a gypsy cab in New York. Like Francisco Pizarro, the cab he drives is legitimately his own.

Raymond Munoz is a Puerto Rican male who drives a gypsy cab part-time in New York. He is a drug addict and a small-scale pusher, who occasionally rents a cab from a regular driver and uses it to sell drugs to other addicts or to transport addicts to places where they can buy drugs.

Victor Hidalgo is a Puerto Rican male who owns the Superfast Cab Company. He has hopes of becoming active in politics, of perhaps one day even running for office; and on election days he has volunteered the services of his cabs to friendly candidates.

Sergeant Richard Ryan is a police officer assigned to the precinct where the Superfast Cab Company has its main offices.

Jose Reyes is a Puerto Rican male who steals cars for a living.

Rafael Pagan is a Puerto Rican male who steals in order to earn money for his heroin habit. He often steals automobile parts.

Jesus Salas is a Puerto Rican male who owns a bodyshop and buys and sells stolen automobiles and automotive parts.

Herminia Rivera is a Puerto Rican female who earns her living as a prostitute.

The Linkages:

Juan Ruiz, Francisco Pizarro and Angel Ocasio are all affiliated with the Superfast Cab Company of which Victor Hidalgo is president. Although they own their own cars, they pay for the privilege of being part of the Superfast network, with its radio business, et cetera.

The three drivers all know one another and are friends. It is common knowledge among them that the car Juan Ruiz drives is stolen and that Angel Ocasio sometimes rents out his cab to the narcotics addict, Raymond Munoz. All three of the men occasionally purchase stolen automotive parts from Jesus Salas, from whom Juan Ruiz also bought his stolen cab. All three of the men have occasionally paid bribes to policemen of the local precincts, just as Victor Hidalgo has occasionally paid bribes to Sergeant Richard Ryan.

When Juan Ruiz finally gets together enough money to purchase his own legitimate car, his status in the eyes of his friends will go up: to be able to buy one's own legitimate car is to "make it" among gypsy drivers.

Likewise, Victor Hidalgo struggles for legitimacy by supporting local political candidates. The gypsy cab industry, as opposed to the yellow cab industry, operates in a no man's land between de facto and de jure acceptance; gypsy cabs are not licensed to cruise the streets of the city for fares, yet it is common knowledge that in many sections of New York they do so, and that if they did not do so, these sections would have no taxi service at all. Victor Hidalgo would like to consolidate the position of his business through the acquisition of political power. He would also like to gain personal respectability, and in his eyes politics is a pathway to this.

Herminia Rivera does not conduct any business directly through the Superfast Cab Company, but she frequently uses Superfast cabs to get around the city. As a prostitute, she prefers gypsy cabs to yellow cabs, because she considers gypsy cabs "one of us."

Jesus Salas buys stolen automobiles and automotive parts from Jose Reyes and Rafael Pagan.

Network H

The Place: A New York State Penetentiary

The Characters:

Luis Santiago is a Puerto Rican male who is looked up to by other Puerto Ricans in the prison, by virtue of the fact that he is in jail for having attempted an extremely daring and clever robbery and by virtue of the fact that he has more "connections" in prison--for laundry, milk, pornography, cigarettes--than any other Puerto Rican. He is able to deal with situations calmly, intelligently and even passively when necessary. He is physically strong, and willing to fight when the

occasion arises. The other Puerto Ricans in prison are considered to be his followers, and meet with him in "courts," which are nothing more than customary meeting places equipped with tables and food lockers.

Pascual Colon and Angel Parrilla are two of the many Puerto Ricans in the penetentiary. Juan Rocque, a heroin addict, is another.

Albert Dowd is a white male who is fond of recounting his safecracking experiences. He will pass on his skills to anyone who will listen.

Stanley Mierkowicz is a white male who a few years ago was a leader among the whites in prison.

Trenton Williams is a Black male who a few years ago was a leader among the Blacks in prison.

Jorge Marrero is a Puerto Rican male who a few years ago was a leader among the Puerto Ricans in prison.

The Linkages:

The most pervasive principle of prison social life is racial segregation. The whites, Blacks and Puerto Ricans each band together into their own groups, and whatever social life goes on in prison, talking, playing games and the like, goes on largely within these groups. Prison administrators encourage the segregation of the prisoners into racial groups by giving the white prisoners all the best jobs, thereby elevating them in prestige and material advantage above the Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Blacks and Puerto Ricans are perhaps less segregated from each other in prison life than they both are from the whites; but even between Blacks and Puerto Ricans, segregation is pervasive.

Thus for Luis Santiago, Pascual Colon, Angel Parrilla and Juan Rocque, most social interaction occurs with other Puerto Ricans. Luis Santiago provides his followers with leadership, advice, and the material advantages that arise out of his many successful "hustles," and his followers in turn provide Luis Santiago with protection. Angel Parrilla and Pascual Colon are friends with each other, and both of them have other friends among the prison's Puerto Ricans. It should be observed that when Angel Parrilla gets out of prison, he will be able to go into Pascual Colon's neighborhood, with or without Pascual Colon, and upon establishing that he is a prison friend of Pascual Colon, he will be admitted to conversations among criminals which he would otherwise be denied access to. Thus, prison life can provide a man with street-level "credentials:" testimony that he is not a cop, and perhaps that he has valuable criminal skills.

Although prison segregation is pervasive, it is not altogether total and complete. Drug addicts, for instance, are despised in all the courts. Because of the low status they all share, together with the basic needs that they shared even before coming to prison, which often enough led a Puerto Rican addict to come into a Black or a white neighborhood during a drug shortage, or vice versa, they tend to mix in prison somewhat regardless of race. Thus, although Juan Rocque spends most of his time around the Puerto Rican court, it is often he who is chosen as a courier when business transactions are carried on between the Puerto Rican court and one of the other courts. Moreover segregation also breaks down somewhat when it comes to telling "war stories" and passing on criminal skills. Thus Albert Dowd, who is white, will tell

anyone who cares to listen, regardless of race, how to crack a safe. And prison uprisings can be the most devastating destroyers of segregation: during the rebellion of a few years ago, Stanley Mierkowicz, a white leader, Trenton Williams, a Black leader, and Jorge Morrero, a Puerto Rican leader, all worked hand in hand, and there was a spirit of complete unity among all the prisoners in the penetentiary. It seems likely that some prison administrators believe segregation to be an effective way of keeping prisoners in line: after the rebellion, nearly the whole prison population was reassigned to other prisons; when fresh batches of prisoners were brought in, they didn't know one another, and therefore fell more or less naturally into the segregated patterns that were expected of them.

CHAPTER V

RULES OF CONDUCT IN THE NETWORK

So far, we have described the structure of the networks we observed and the generalized social action which takes place within them. Now we turn to control mechanisms--a term we use to mean the code of rules which not only shapes the behavior of network members but which also distinguishes the "good" or successful member from the less successful one. In the sense we use it here, control within social systems begins with values which establish preferential guides to action. Ultimately, it comes to take the form of specific rules which attempt to apply those values to everyday life situations. Thus while values direct behavior, it is the rule which states which actions will be approved and which forbidden. Rules also carry with them sets of sanctions to be applied when they are broken. Usually, rules do not stand alone but are grouped into codes which cover specified classes of behavior; individual rules and codes both usually state the situation or situations to which they are applicable.

In the following pages, we describe the code of conduct we extrapolated from the networks the manner in which it is enforced, and make some comments on the way in which new members are recruited into adherence to that code. Before doing so however, it may be worthwhile to look at the descriptions which other investigators have given of the

code of rules they found applicable in organized crime. Like the pattern of organization and roles we discussed earlier, rules of conduct have usually derived by analogy--that is, rather than looking directly at the behavior of criminal syndicate members and extrapolating a code from their words and actions, investigators have tried to apply to syndicates codes drawn from observations of other groups.

The Mafia Code

One favorite source of analogies for rules of conduct in American criminal syndicates is the "code of the Mafia." The report of the Task Force on organized crime, for example, points out that since "there is great similarity between the structure of the Italian-Sicilian Mafia and the structure of the American confederation of criminals, it should not be surprising to find great similarity in the values, norms, and other behavior patterns of the two organizations."[1] Continuing with this reasoning, the report then goes on to present two summaries of the Mafia code; one statement was made in 1892, the other in 1900.

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[1]The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report-Organized Crime; Annotations and Consultant's Papers, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 47.

1. Reciprocal aid in case of any need whatever. 2. Absolute obedience to the chief. 3. An offense received by one of the members to be considered an offense against all and avenged at any cost. 4. No appeal to the state's authorities for justice. 5. No revelation of the names of members or any secrets of the association.

1. To help one another and avenge every injury of a fellow member. 2. To work with all means for the defense and freeing of any fellow member who has fallen into the hands of the judiciary. 3. To divide the proceeds of thievery, robbery and extortion with certain consideration for the needy as determined by the capo. 4. To keep the oath and maintain secrecy on pain of death within twenty-four hours.[2]

Noting that the two statements of the Mafia code are quite similar and allowing for the fact that the code is nowhere written except in such summaries, the report then describes the Mafia code as quite similar to the tenets of American organized criminals--loyalty, honor, secrecy, honesty and consent to be governed, which may mean "consent to be executed." As the report freely admits, the Mafia code is also quite similar to any secret organization such as Mau Mau or the Irish Republican Army and even to

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[2] Op. cit., p. 47. The first summary was taken from Ed. Reid, Mafia, New York: New American Library, 1964, p. 31 and the second taken from Cutrera, La Mafia edi Mafiosi, Palermo, 1900.

public organizations opposed to the existing authority in power and seeking to overthrow it.

Unless the premise of direct descent of Italo-American criminal syndicates from the Mafia is accepted, there seems to be no more reason for attributing these reported similarities in behavioral code to the Mafia than to the general behavioral needs of all secret organizations opposed to existing power. The antiquity of the reports used to reconstruct the Mafia code also reduces the utility of the analogy. Again, unless it is assumed that the early immigrants to the United States brought the code from Sicily and, like Elizabethan English in the Ozarks it remains largely unaffected by American culture, then it would seem more sensible to compare the current codes of behavior in Sicilian Mafia and Italo-American crime syndicates.[3]

The Code of American Prisoners

The Task Force Report, and more recently both Donald Cressey and Ralph Salerno also find striking similarities between the behavioral code or organized crime syndicates and prisoners in American penal institutions.[4] This latter code is best described in a paper published by the Social Science Research Council based on the work of the Conference Group on Correctional Organization (1956-57). This report sees the prisoners' code structured into five major areas of concern:

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[3]Cf. Francis A.J. Ianni, "Time and Place as Variables in Acculturation Research," American Anthropologist, Vol. 60, No. 1, February 1958, pp. 39-45.

[4]Donald Cressey, Theft of the Nation, New York: Harper and Row, 1969; Ralph Salerno and J.S. Tomkins, The Crime Confederation, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969.

1. There are those maxims that caution: Don't interfere with inmate interests . . . never rat on a con . . . don't be nosey . . . don't have a loose lip . . . keep off a man's back . . . don't put a guy on the spot . . . . be loyal to your class--the cons.

2. There are explicit injunctions to refrain from quarrels or arguments with fellow prisoners: don't loose your head . . . play it cool and do your own time.

3. Prisoners assert that inmates should not take advantage of one another by means of force, fraud or chicanery: don't exploit inmates . . . don't break your word . . . don't steal from the cons . . . don't sell favors . . . don't be a racketeer . . . don't welsh on debts . . . be right.

4. There are rules that have as their central theme the maintenance of self: don't weaken . . . don't whine . . . don't cop out . . . don't suck around . . . be tough . . . be a man.

5. Prisoners express a variety of maxims that forbid according prestige or respect to the costodians or the world for which they stand; don't be a sucker . . . be sharp. [5]

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[5] Sykes and Messinger, "The Inmate Social System," in Theoretical Studies in Social Organization of the Prison, Social Science Research Council, Pamphlet 15, 1960.

Both Salerno and Cressey also describe the prisoners' code as similar to that in organized crime but recognize the similarity of the prisoners' code to that of other underground organizations and see the similarity as growing out of similar needs to control behavior. They also see this code like the Mafia code as being an unwritten set of agreements which prisoners adhere to but which have no formal sanction by prison authorities. Finally, this code, like the Mafia code, draws together those maxims of behavior which members see as ideal and enforcement comes from general agreement to abide by the code.

The Code of Organized Crime "Families"

While each of the major sources admits the absence of any codified set of rules which structure behavior in organized crime "families," all present descriptive lists drawn either from analogies with the codes we have just described or abstracting them from the experience of the writers in observing organized criminals. Cressey uses the "thieves' code" as essentially the conduct code for organized crime families:

> 1. Be loyal to members of the organization. Do not interfere with each other's interests. Do not be an informer. This directive, with its correlated admonitions, is basic to the internal operations of the confederation.
> 2. Be rational. Be a member of the team. Don't engage in battle if you can't win. What is demanded here is the corporate rationality necessary to conducting illicit businesses in a quiet, safe, profitable manner. The directive extends to personal life.

3. Be a man of honor. Respect womanhood and your elders. Don't rock the boat. This emphasis on "honor" and "respect" helps determine who obeys whom, who attends what funerals and weddings, who opens the door for whom, who takes a tone of deference in a telephone conversation, who rises when another walks into a room.

4. Be a stand-up guy. Keep your eyes and ears open and your mouth shut. Don't sell out. A family member, like a prisoner, must be able to withstand frustrating and threatening situations without complaining or resorting to subservience. The "stand-up guy" shows courage and "heart." He does not whine or complain in the face of adversity, including punishment, because "If you can't pay, don't play."

5. Have class. Be independent. Know your way around the world. Two basic ideas are involved here, and both of them prohibit the according of prestige to law-enforcement officials or other respectable citizens. One is expressed in the saying, "To be straight is to be a victim." A man who is committed to regular work and submission to duly-constituted authority is a sucker. When one "family" member intends to insult and cast aspersion on the competence of another, he is likely to say, "Why don't you go out and get a job."

Ralph Salerno derives his list from his experience in studying organized crime during a career with the New York Police Department.

1. Secrecy. Most members reveal as little as possible to the police, but the silence of the "Costa Nostra" segment of organized crime has been so complete that until the famous Apalachin meeting in November 1967, many law-enforcement officials doubted its very existence.
2. The organization before the individual. As in the case of secrecy, this rule is one that many in the outside world subscribe to. In military service the individual is expected to put the good of the organization ahead of his own, even if his life depends on it. Our gallery of national heroes is made up of people who made such a choice; the heroes of organized crime are those who went to the death house with their mouths shut.
3. Other members' families are sacred. In most social groups it would be considered unnecessary to specifically prohibit members from making seductive approaches to their associates' wives and daughters. But "Costa Nostra" as an organization of Italian-Americans and as Luigi Barzini has observed, all Italian males, married and unmarried, are in a constant state of courtship. The rule helps protect the organization from vendettas over such "matters of honor." It makes it possible for a member to be inattentive to the female relatives of another member without this

lack of interest being considered unmanly. This sense of chivalry does not, of course, extend to the families of strangers. They can, and often are, taken advantage of.

4. Reveal nothing to your wife. There are three reasons for this rule. In the first place, a member might become estranged from his wife and since "Hell hath no fury. . ."--it is important that she not know anything that she could use to hurt him. Keeping wives in the dark about illegal activities diverts law enforcement attention from them and the rest of one's family. The overall policy that business is not discussed with one's wife is part of a general desire to dissociate the home and family from criminal activities.

5. No kidnapping. The rule against kidnapping for ransom is probably a holdover from Sicily where this form of coercion and extortion was widespread.

6. You don't strike another member. This is another rule designed to avoid internal vendettas that could easily arise if an argument were allowed to turn physical. The restraint of often fiery temperaments that it demands is a graphic demonstration of the authority that the code carries.

7. Orders cannot be disobeyed. While self-explanatory, this rule is much broader than similar injunctions found in military or religious organizations. Orders must not only be obeyed, they must be properly carried out. Going

through the motions, or hewing to the letter of one's in structions is not enough. This is true even though orders are not detailed or explicit.

8. Promotions and Demotions. Members are promoted in rank-soldier to Capo to underboss etc.-to fill vacancies created by death, illness,and retirement. The rank of a member who is in prison, however, is kept by him, though his job may be performed by a substitute until he is paroled. At the same time, all members of the same rank are not necessarily equal. A highly successful soldier, for example, may operate a number of different businesses or rackets and have many people working for him. His economic power and influence will tend to make him more important than his technical rank would indicate.

9. Transfers. The majority of members spend their lives within the same family or group. The rules and traditions encourage this loyalty. Under special circumstances, though, there can be a transfer to a family in another jurisdiction.

10. All arguments to higher authority. Most of the disputes that are important enough to go to higher authority involve business practices, sales territories, new operations and the like.

11. Always be a stand-up guy. A "stand-up guy" is by definition, a man who lives by the rules and, if necessary, will die for them. He keeps his mouth shut

> to the police, he puts the organization ahead of himself, he respects the families of others. He is a man of honor who can be relied on. In the parlance of those in the Confederation he "has character," he is true to the code. In other words, the injunction, be a stand-up guy epitomizes what the code says a real man should be.
>
> 12. Justice. The law is the basis for the administration of justice, which is handled within each family. The authority for judgements comes down from the boss in the same way that it might from the village chief of a primitive tribe. The boss, however, does not personally preside except in very serious cases.[6]

Both Cressey and Salerno describe the current code of organized crime "families" as derivative from the "code of the Mafia" but tempered by American culture. Salerno describes the roles as of American invention but based heavily on the attitudes and world view that Southern Italian and Sicilian peasants brought with them to this country. Again, it is important to point out that as was true when we looked at organization and rules, the use of analogies is not a satisfactory means of finding rules of conduct. The most obvious reasons have to do with the differences between the milieu in which the analogue codes developed and that of Italo-American crime "families." More fundamentally, however, the problem here is that the assumption that there is "a code" which covers all criminal syndicates must

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[6] Salerno and Tompkins, 1969, pp. 111-128.

be derived from the previous assumption that there is a national organization form as in all codes of rules, there must be some shared set of values from which to derive rules.

In our own recent study of an Italian-American organized crime family, we derived rules from observed behavior rather than by analogy. In that study, we observed behavior within the Lupollo "family" with which we had contact and our data were limited to what we were able to see and hear. Our method was to observe and record behavior and then to seek regularities which have enough frequency to suggest that the behavior results from the pressures of the shared social system rather than from idiosyncratic behavior. We also asked "family" members and others about rules, usually by asking why some member of the "family" behaved in a particular way. Thus, our reconstruction of rules of conduct came both from our own observations and from the explanations of observed behavior of what we saw by the people living under those rules.

In analyzing the data--both observational and interview--we found that rules of conduct should be examined in two major classes. Returning to our earlier analogy with the game of bridge: in bridge, or any other game, there are two sets of rules--the game, or ground rules which structure the game, and the informal rules for playing the game intelligently. In observing how the members of the Lupollo "family" play their game, we found that, just as in bridge, there are two sets of rules--formal and informal. Edward Leach, an anthropologist who has applied the Theory of Games to kinship analysis has suggested the importance of these informal game strategy rules, "In all viable

systems there must be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to manipulate the system to his own advantage."[7] So it was in the Lupollo "family" with rules of conduct; there are those basic rules which structure the framework and those which define who plays the game well and who plays it poorly. We found three basic rules which are ground rules for behavior in the Lupollo "family": (1) primary loyalty is vested in the "family" rather than in individual lineages or families, (2) each member of the "family" must act like a man and do nothing which brings disgrace on the "family," and (3) "family" business is provileged matter and must not be reported or discussed outside the group. These three rules were the basics for maintaining membership within the group but there are a number of informal rules under each which explain why some members are more successful at the game than others.

In the present study we again attempted to extract rules from regularities in behavior. That is to say we attempted to observe behavior in the various networks and then to construct a normative code of rules which seemed to emerge from those behaviors most valued in the various groups. In general, we found some congruence between the rules generally described for organized crime and those which seemed to inform our networks. There were, however, some important differences. Considering our own earlier work in extracting the code of rules which apparently serves as behavioral guides for the Lupollo "family," it is interesting that these rules do not seem to operate with the same degree of fairness

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[7] E.R. Leach, "Notes on Some Unconsidered Aspects of Double Descent Systems," Man, Vol. 62, No. 214, p. 133 (Leach's italics).

within the Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks we observed. The primary rules of the Lupollo family--primary loyalty is vested in the "family" rather than in individual lineages or families does not appear as a definative rule in the networks we studied. There is some concept of loyalty that it is not loyalty to an organization or indeed even to a group but rather the loyalty which grows out of mutual dependence of individuals of the network. In addition, as can be observed in networks A and B (2) and E (1) loyalty is often vested in a sub-network of the larger network. Thus the organizational cohesion of the Italian-American "family" in organized crime does not seem to be present as a behavioral guide in the Black and Puerto Rican networks we studied. The second major injunction among the Lupollos--each member of the "family" must act like a man and do nothing which brings disgrace on the "family"--also differs in the Black and Puerto Rican networks we studied from that which we have found earlier among the Lupollos. The concept of acting like a man--that is to present an image of strength and endurance as well as self-reliance--is present in each of the networks we studied. It differs from what we found among the Lupollos, however, in that it is highly individual and the concept of bringing disgrace to a larger organization seems to be absent among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans we studied. Thus among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans it appeared that each individual is individually responsible for presenting the image of "being a man" and does not receive any support in this venture from some larger group such as was true among the Lupollos. The Third basic rule among the Lupollos--"family" business is privileged matter and must not be reported or discussed

outside the group--is found among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans in our networks as well. Here again the strength of the rule among the Lupollos eminates from the loyalty to the family while among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans it appears that it is less social and more individual in its imperative. That is to say, among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans we studied the function of secrecy is far less ritualistic than seems to be true among the Lupollos and seems to be more a matter of individual protection.

The Rules which govern the various Black and Puerto Rican networks we studied differ according to the type of network. In prison and in the youthful partnerships, rules seem more likely to speak to intimate personal characteristics:

1: Don't be a coward. This rule, which is found in both the prison court and in the youthful networks, enjoins the individual to be a man but has a more physical connotation than we found to be true among the Italian-Americans. Essentially, it indicates that the individual is always willing to fight for his own rights and safety and to a lesser extent for those of his collegues in the network.

2: Don't be disloyal. Here again the injunction is less positive in terms of its relationship to the group than we found among the Lupollos. What is called for here is a feeling of membership in a group and a basic loyalty rather than the intensely socialized family membership code among the Italian-Americans. Loyalty in this context means acceptance of membership in a group with the consequent requirement that outsiders be rejected.

3: Don't be a creep. Here, the rule calls for a normalizing of behavioral relationships among members in the network. What this rule does is to exclude from membership aberrent individuals--those who are somewhat deficient or who cannot for some other reason enjoy full membership--and consequently establishes rules of behavior.

All of these rules are usually expressed in terms of punitive or critical actions toward any behavior which violates them. In effect what we found was that these are expected norms of behavior which are socialized into individual network members as a result of their membership in the network. In prison perhaps more than in the youthful partnerships (and for obvious reasons) shrudness and the capacity to keep calm seem to be required. Thus in the prison network we found greater emphasis upon a fourth rule which is best explained as "be smart" which enjoins the individual to learn to acquiesce to some regulations which cannot be ignored but to determine ways to beat the system as well. We found that the code of rules which emerged from our observations among Black and Puerto Rican networks of the prison and youthful gang type did bear some resemblance to what we have earlier called the code of American prisoners. Prisoner rules such as "don't whine . . . don't cop out . . . be tough . . . play it cool and do your own time . . . and belong to a class--the cards--are accepted behaviorally in both of these networks. In the case of the prison court for obvious reasons that in the case of the youthful gangs the reasons seem less obvious. One possibility which we discussed with our informants and which received some acceptance from them is that in the youthful gang the importance of mutual dependence

and mutual protection are not nearly so great as they are in prison more over among youthful gang members who band together largely as a result of their common problems and common needs.

In the small businesses of the individual entrepreneurs in those networks where this pattern of organization seems most common, rules speak more to the impersonal requirements of commerce than to the personal qualities we have described in the prison and youthful gang networks. In these business related networks we found three major rules:

1: Don't tell the police. This rule actually stretches beyond the injunction not to tell the police; it also includes the caution against telling anyone who is likely to tell the police either through malice or weakness. While the rule is strongest within the networks themselves we found that it reaches out beyond the networks into the community and that (just as we found among the Italo-Americans) there is a great reluctance on the part of the community to inform on organized crime activities. To some extent this is certainly the result of fear but we feel certain that it also results from an antagonizing towards the criminal justice system and the feeling of greater unity and identification on the part of the community members with their co-ethnics in the networks than with the police or other segments of the criminal justice system.

2: Don't cheat your partner or other people in the network. This rule establishes the necessary confidence within the network that individuals will be a tool to each other with some degree of certainty. The rule places a highly "moral" standard on interpersonal

behavior within the network but does not carry outside that group. Thus an individual is expected not to cheat with money inside the network but is not enjoined against doing it externally.

3: Don't be incompetent at whatever you are supposed to be doing. This rule sets standards of excellence within the network and again it establishes confidence among its members. What this rule suggests is that an individual--be a thief, a numbers runner, a prostitute, a pimp, a locksmith, a dealer of stolen goods, a narcotics pusher, or a hijacker--should do his job well.

These rules are, as we have said earlier, far less related to personal characteristics than they are to relationships. This results we believe, from the fact that in these entrepreneur networks the relationships are more situational or episodic than is true in the prison court or in the youthful gangs. Thus individuals come together in these entrepreneur models largely for mutual profit and their dependence upon each other is related entirely to that kind of profit. In the prison court or youthful gang model, however, personal relationships are involved as well. While the rules which govern the prison court and youthful gang type of network as contrasted to the entrepreneur type of network do differ, it is interesting that these two different sets of rules do seem to interact. Thus the more highly personalized rules take place within networks which might be considered training and testing grounds for the more profitable but also more demanding networks of organized crime. Networks A (a youthful gang) and H (a prison court) may be to action-sets B-2 and E-1 (highly sophisticated entrepreneur action-sets) for instance, as boot camp is to the marines. That is to say the youthful gang and the

prison court may both serve as preliminary training grounds in which an individual establishes his "rep" and learns the first rules of membership in a more sophisticated network. It is in these early training experiences that he can be observed and where his reliability can be tested. Thus recruitment of Blacks and Puerto Ricans into sophisticated organized crime networks usually seems to come as a result of prior experience either in a youthful gang or in prison where they are identified as promising individuals. Unfortunately our data about the same process among Cubans is quite sparse and we can not make similar observations there. Among Blacks and Puerto Ricans,however, we feel confident enough of this pattern to codify this inner connectedness by adding a fifth rule, a flexible but nonetheless, subtly applied one, to be used as a general guide for the entrepreneur type of network which we described earlier: (4) In order to join the "organization" one must have passed through some kind of accredited criminal training course in which it can be assumed that the personal qualities valued in organized crime were duly tested.

We also found that among youthful criminal partnerships, lines of authority seem, in general, to be poorly drawn-- there is little sense at who is obliged to follow whose orders except in particular circumstances. This may of course be only true in the networks we happened to identify and consequently studied. Nonetheless it was so in each of the networks we looked at. On the other hand, in prison and in the small criminal businesses, certain lines of authority seem to be clearly drawn. In prison, one man in each court is the leader, by precident of personal qualities in criminal

expertise, and all of the others of the court are his followers. In the small businesses whoever pays the salaries gives the orders.

In all cases that we have observed, few clear lines of authority seem to be drawn beyond those stemming from the boss to each of his employees or the leader to his followers. There seems to be little complex layering of authority. Perhaps it exists in action-sets E (1) and E (2) or in M and reported parts of B (1) and B (2) but we lack substantial information about it. This match, however, can be observed with confidence: "It is not atypical in legitimate small businesses, especially when they are still quite small, for the boss to be the only man with any authority, and for all the underlings to identify with and and be obedient to him alone. Successful delegations of authority seem to require a degree of organizational stability which the majority of small businesses, including the majority of the small criminal networks we have studied, lack.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSES OF THE FIELD DATA

Analyses of these field data were carried out continuously as the field workers made reports. These analyses, which form the basis for the conclusions and recommendations growing out of this report, were done under three categories: (1) preliminary analyses and commentary on the networks and refinement into action-sets,[1] (2) typology of networks by (a) type of network (b) type of linkages and (3) inferences from the field data in terms of (a) the bases of network formation (b) structure of networks (c) relationship of networks to Black and Puerto Rican communities (d) relationship of the networks to American society (e) characteristics of ethnic succession.

Preliminary Analyses and Commentary

During the period of the field study, constant comparison techniques allowed for continuous analyses of the data. The six basic networks (A,B,C,D,E, and F) were subdivided into their component action-sets and analyses of data were related to these sub-units. The following commentaries are summaries of analytic commentary on each of the action-sets and on the "gypsy" cab and prison networks made throughout the research by the principal investigator and associated analysts.

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[1]It may be helpful to the reader to refer again to the definitions of network, action-set and associated terms we presented earlier in Chapter III, p. 14 of manuscript.

The Network Maps

Code

- - - - - probable link (implied in text but not explicitly stated)

_____ ordinary link

XXXXXXXXXX especially strong link, relative to the other links in the network at hand

Fortunately, there were not any implied links of especially strong character. Presumably they would be designated by ==========

THE NETWORKS BY LOCATION

Harlem Section, Manhattan	Brooklyn (all Sections)	Bronx
C (1)	A	E (1)
C (2)	E (1)	E (4)
E (1)	E (3)	
E (2)	E (4)	
G	F (2)	
	F (3)	

East Harlem Section, Manhattan	Jamaica Section, Queens	Paterson, N. J.
D	E (1)	B (1)
F (1)		B (2)
		B (3)

Florida	New York State Penetentiary	Location Unknown
E (3)	E (1)	E (3)

NETWORK A

Bedford Stuyvesant Section, Brooklyn

Network A basically tells the story of a gang of neighborhood boys who as they grew up became involved in crime in their neighborhood. The gang, as a web of friendship, preceded any criminal involvement. The gang's first big criminal action--vandalizing and burglarizing the burnt-out bar--was carried out strictly on a partnership basis, with apparently equal sharing of responsibilities and profits. This equal sharing seems to reflect the fact that the gang was initially formed on the basis of friendship. In time, as the members of the gang became further exposed to criminal opportunities, and as older, established neighborhood criminals had a chance to see which of the boys had the greatest criminal potential, the simple partnership began to break down, so that eventually Stevens, Smith and Johnson became numbers runners for Robinson, after Robinson was picked for a higher position by the older criminal Gordon.

An interesting sidelight in the story of Network A is the role of the police. It would appear that Lieutenant Herlihy, the PAL coach, was an original "corrupter" of the boys, since it was he who permitted Minton to run and cut crap games in the Precinct in exchange for pay-offs. Probably the boys would have found their way into crime regardless of police complicity. But the complicity underscores a very significant aspect of this network: there was not a single force in the neighborhood where these boys grew up which presented a vigorous deterrent--a serious threat, a danger, a fright, or compelling alternative set of values--to any of their activities. One

can imagine that in a few cases there were lectures from family, teachers, or perhaps ministers; but these would naturally count for little to boys who could weigh against them the norms held jointly by their gang-peers and by the older people out in the neighborhood's only place of hope and excitement, the street.

NETWORK A

BEDFORD STUYVESANT SECTION, BROOKLYN



NETWORK B (1)

Paterson, New Jersey

Network B (1) basically tells the story of a self-made white immigrant businessman who throughout his career has realized that his success would depend on being willing to mix illegal business dealings with legal ones. Joseph Hajar's career is interesting insofar as he has been involved in a wide variety of criminal ventures--stolen cars, gambling, prostitution, the numbers, narcotics; and also insofar as he is a white man who is not a leading Italian distributor yet who is still prominent in a ghetto narcotics trade.

One might guess that the people who work for Hajar, at least in the numbers and gambling end of his enterprise, (which is all that our network map shows) bear much the same relationship to him, and to each other, as would employees in a variety of "legitimate" enterprises, say an ordinary tavern. Presumably employees wouldn't talk freely to strangers about the illegal aspects of their job, but at the same time, presumably, most of their friends would know full well what was going on. The fact that Hajar's pay-offs to the police are notoriously successful lends a stability to his business activities, which has as much permanence and probably as much local acceptance as more "legitimate" ones.

NETWORK B (1)

PATERSON, NEW JERSEY



NETWORK B (2)

Paterson, New Jersey

Network B (2) describes a fledgling dynasty. William C. Squires built up a powerful organization, and when he died, Franklin Squires took it over. Thus, we are presented with some evidence that even if kinship among Blacks is not an overwhelmingly important tie in the formation of criminal organizations (as it is among Italians) nevertheless, it is at least possible for kinship to serve as an important determinant of a Black organization's development. Moreover Wendell and Malcolm Jenkins, also consanguineal brothers, are both successful men who work with the Squires organization, and their common tie, together with their common success, suggests further that kinship plays at least some role in determining who will have access to Black criminal activities of an organized nature.

It is unfortunate that we do not have more data on the "50 or 60" Blacks who work for Franklin Squires, since such data would undoubtedly yield many insights into how a Black organization works when it gets quite large. Further research might uncover important information on hierarchical organization but at this point we have reliable data in detail about only a small circle of participants.

Network B (2), when considered in conjunction with Network B (1), with which it has been at times in competition, is a striking example of an organization run by Blacks trying to push organizations run by whites out of ghetto areas.

NETWORK B (2)

PATERSON, NEW JERSEY



NETWORK B (3)

Paterson, New Jersey

Network B(3) suggests little of interest except that even a small-time independent Black numbers operator may find it necessary to turn over a percentage of his take to an Italian syndicate. Perhaps the location of this network, in Paterson, N. J., has something to do with this.

NETWORK B (3)

PATERSON, NEW JERSEY



NETWORK C (1)

Central Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network C (1) is the only one we discovered which is mainly concerned with prostitution. It suggests that prostitution, at least the local trade in Harlem, as opposed to interstate traffic or the trade that caters to the white corporate world, is a relatively small-time operation. The amounts of money involved are much smaller than the amounts in the numbers and narcotics, and the number of people involved in any one operation seems quite small. Every pimp--and the pimp is the leader--seems to be his own independent operator. Yet Martin, our pimp here, owes his success largely to the concern and affection and basic education that the deceased protitute, Lucy Greer, lavished on him.

This network, in keeping with the fact that it largely involves women and the use of their bodies, seems to depend for its success or failure more on the personal feelings its members harbor for one another than do networks involving the numbers or narcotics. This is evidenced by favors, love, security, or conversely, fear, hatred or physical abuse. Thus, Lucy Greer's love for Reginald Martin; thus, the aid given to lonely prison girls by Greer and Martin.

NETWORK C (1)

CENTRAL HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



NETWORK C (2)

Central Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network C (2) tells the story of a small but legitimate Black businessman who almost inadvertently discovered the profits that could accrue to him from dealing with contraband. As a result, he went on to develop a complex of criminal operations: the sale of stolen clothing, loansharking, gambling and after-hours bar. None of Thomas Irwin's criminal activities are likely to offend even the most high-minded of the residents of his Harlem neighborhood. In fact, each and every one of Irwin's activities seems to provide a valued public service, and Irwin is respected and emulated in his neighborhood. He has nothing to do with narcotics; violence never seems to come even close to touching him or his business. So tentative and uncertain is Irwin's committment to illicit activity that he has frequently been concerned with the problem of gaining too much criminal notoriety. By way of contrast, the thieves who supply Irwin with clothing are not nearly so ingenuous about the criminality of their lives as Thomas Irwin (with the support of his neighbors) seems to be. This is perhaps because they live so much closer to fear and danger and threat, and because in their criminal activities so much more depends on alertness and skill.

A number of very interesting points can be derived from Network C (2):

(1) a good many criminal activities among Blacks can, with community support, be run along lines very similar to those of legitimate small businesses;

(2) if he is involved in socially acceptable and uncompetitive activities, a successful leader of a Black criminal network need not be frightening, vicious, bold or even strong (provided he has luck and a bankroll);

(3) a successful Black criminal may be respected and emulated by his neighbors, even if he is not flashy, provided he isn't involved in something messy such as narcotics;

(4) once a Black man slips into one area of criminal activity, he can (with luck and a bankroll) expand quickly into related areas.

NETWORK C (2)

CENTRAL HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



NETWORK D

East Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network D reveals another instance in which a small legitimate Black business co-exists very nicely with a small criminal Black business; and another instance in which a childhood friendship blossomed into a criminal partnership. It also presents an interesting picture of a pattern in which (a) a number of fairly well-educated Black men, (b) boutiques and (c) cocaine are intrinsically related--perhaps in a quasi-hip lifestyle which largely excludes heroin.

NETWORK D

EAST HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



NETWORK E (1)

Harlem Section, Manhattan
Brooklyn
Bronx
Jamaica Section, Queens

Network E (1) tells the story of a Black man who has managed to build quite a large narcotics network underneath himself: 17 people at one level and 22-28 at another, operating in four boroughs.

Unfortunately, our informant here has not given us the information that would be of the greatest value to us, viz., how the 17 people at one level and the 22-28 at another are organized, and how the two levels relate to one another and to the head of the network, Terrence Elliot.

Network E (1) suggests that the narcotics dealer, just as much as any other criminal type, maintains "shade" for his activities in legitimate business: Elliot owns three houses, a bar, a restaurant and an ice cream parlor.

NETWORK E (1)

HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN
BRONX
BROOKLYN
JAMAICA SECTION, QUEENS



N.B. The exact relationships of Terrence Elliot to each of the 17 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships among the 17 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships between each of the 17 and each of the 22-28 ex-addicts are unclear.

The exact relationships among the 22-28 ex-addicts are unclear.

NETWORK E (2)

Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network E (2), like Network E (1), would be more helpful if it described in greater detail the relationships between the leading dealers and the pushers who work for them. But the rudimentary story it does tell of a Black man, with pushers under him, who buys his drugs from a Puerto Rican, is interesting indeed. Such intermingling is rare in the networks we observed.

It is also worth noting that the Black man, Ernest Smith, works in the numbers as well as in narcotics. Like many other Black criminals in these networks, he runs a couple of small businesses--a haberdashery and a barber shop--which lend a cover of legitimacy to his operations.

NETWORK E (2)

HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



N.B. The exact relationships between Robert Barrios and each of the several Blacks and Puerto Ricans selling for him are unclear.

The exact relationships of these Blacks among themselves and of these Puerto Ricans among themselves are unclear.

The exact relationships between Ernest Smith and each of the people working for him, either in drugs or in his other enterprises, are unclear. The exact relationships of these people among themselves are unclear.

NETWORK E (3)

Red Hook Section, Brooklyn
Bay Ridge Section, Brooklyn
Florida
and an Unknown location

Network E (3) is almost too rudimentary to be worth anything at all. But it does show how a Black narcotics dealer can establish a bulk connection not only with an Italian in New York, but also with a Cuban in Florida. His use of the Florida Cuban perhaps suggests a new direction in the narcotics trade.

NETWORK E (3)

RED HOOK AND BAY RIDGE SECTIONS, BROOKLYN
FLORIDA,
AND AN UNKNOWN LOCATION



NETWORK E (4)

Bronx - Brooklyn

Network E (4) centers about a Black policeman who uses his official position to operate a small heroin dealership. The fact that other policemen in Minley's precinct are apparently also involved in dealing, and the fact that Minley and other policemen are willing to blatantly shake-down addicts in search of narcotics, suggest the kind of moral indifference at best and raw greed at worst which the narcotics business evokes at many, many levels of the ghetto community. This is the same pattern as that of Lieutenant Herlihy in Network A. One interesting sidelight here is the fact that Minley deals his drugs to two Puerto Ricans--thus the situation of Barrios and Smith in Network E (2) is reversed.

NETWORK E (4)

BRONX - BROOKLYN



NETWORK F (1)

East Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network F (1) tells at least two different stories, connected only by the presence of the Puerto Rican, Luis Santos, in both of them.

The first is of a gang of childhood friends coming together, much as the friends in Network A except on a more sophisticated level in this case, to try to crack the drug market in their neighborhood. It is revealing as to the difficulties involved for any Puerto Rican or group of Puerto Ricans (and perhaps for any Black or group of Blacks as well) hoping to gain preeminence in the narcotics business even in one neighborhood. An Italian controlled the local supplies and refused either to sell a large stash to any one party or to decline to sell supplies to other parties. In order to break this stranglehold, the partners went to all parts of the city, picking up small amounts here and there, but then, when they got their stash together, they had the attacks and machinations of another gang to deal with. Here is one of the first times that violence is actually cited by any of our informants. It is possible that, in general, men who attempt to enter the drug trade are willing to engage in more blatantly anti-social ways than men who confine themselves to the numbers or to dealing in stolen goods. Luis Santos robbed, mugged and burgled in order to put together his share of the initial partnership bankroll. And in the struggle for control of the neighborhood drug trade there were shootings and beatings.

An interesting comparison might be drawn between the narcotics

efforts of Luis Santos and his childhood friends, operating in partnership and presumably on the old gang-like ties of friendship and comaraderie, and the far more successful narcotics efforts of Santos's friend, Clemente Sanchez. It seems somehow not unexpected that the downfall of the old gang of childhood friends should have come at the hands of a group of older women they fell in with. Carelessness and foolishness, along with daring, seem appropriate to such a gang. By comparison, Clemente Sanchez is cool, clever and deliberate, an able psychologist who more often gently threatens violence than resorts to it. His narcotics operation, far from being a loose and informal partnership, is run very much like any successful ongoing business of an individual entrepeneur. He employs relatives to the extent he can, because they are safer and more reliable and because, being family, they can thereby "keep the thing to themselves" (like any good small businessman, he retains a lawyer to make sure that things keep running smoothly). Of particular interest is the fact that the parents of many of the childhood friends who make up this network came from the same town in Puerto Rico.

NETWORK F (1)

EAST HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



NETWORK F (2)

Red Hook Section, Brooklyn

Network F (2) is interesting primarily insofar as it reveals how numbers operators, like legitimate businessmen all over the country, are eager to turn to electronic gadgetry to aid their operations. Here, cassette tape recorders are used to take bets. The use of neighborhood women as telephone operators in this operation is one more bit of evidence of the universal acceptance of the numbers game as a legitimate community enterprise.

NETWORK F (2)

RED HOOK SECTION, BROOKLYN



NETWORK F (3)

Bay Ridge Section, Brooklyn

Like Network F (1), Network F (3) really tells two stories. Here the connecting link is no more than a probable one, the car painter, Paredes. Yet if he is a true link, he is a very interesting one. He represents a phenomenon that we have met with elsewhere in our networks, notably in the locksmith, Richard Williams, in Network C (2): the small professional craftsman who sells his skills on a regular basis to people he knows to be criminals. Such craftsmen, who are hired as independent contractors, just as anybody might hire a locksmith or a painter to do a job, provide expertise without which many criminals would find it much harder to operate effectively. These craftsmen seem ordinarily to have only one link to each criminal network, namely, the one man who knows them and hires them. It is at least possible that within criminal networks it is a source of power to possess the right contact with a craftsman. Thus, a car thief might feel dependent on the person in his ring who knows where to get a stolen car painted in twenty minutes.

Thomas Correa and Cesar Rosario each deal in stolen cars. They have rather different methods of operation, but the basic similarities--small entrepeneur operating an automotive shop, paying young thieves for each stolen car--perhaps outweigh these. The most interesting sidelight of these two operations is the fact that up to 50 supposedly "legitimate" body shops in one area of Brooklyn order parts from Correa which they almost surely

must know to be stolen. Rosario supplements his used car business with a small narcotics business, which he keeps strictly separate from his cars.

NETWORK F (3)

BAY RIDGE SECTION, BROOKLYN



NETWORK G

Throughout New York
Chiefly in Harlem Section, Manhattan

Network G tells the story of the gypsy cab industry, a story of men who, starting out virtually with nothing, indulge repeatedly in illegal activities--theft, fraud, purchase of stolen goods, et cetera--until at last they obtain, through wealth and the power it brings, what they consider to be an adequate place in legitimate bourgeois society. The story here seems to replicate in miniature the story that has often been told of organized crime generally.

In the case of Hidalgo, owner of the Superfast company, ambitions are set higher than for the men who drive. Hidalgo wants to be a leader of the community, and using his company--itself built out of a mountain of small and large quasi-legal and illegal transactions--as a base, he is doing his best to gain political influence. For the men who work for Hidalgo-Ruiz--Pizarro and Ocasio among them--it is in most cases enough (at least during the first years) to be able to unload the stolen cars they started out with and buy their own brand new ones.

This network as a whole is instructive because not only are all its members tending towards legitimacy, but so too is the industry which the network represents. The "gypsies" feel that they are performing a needed public service, and because the people they serve seem gradually to be obtaining enough power so as at least to get some of their simplest and most easily satisfied needs recognized, the future of the business looks bright. The status of the gypsy cabs in an interesting case of an activity in transition from illegality, to what now appears to be quasi-legality (their right

to pick fares off the street is accepted de facto but not de jure, and only in certain parts of town), to what in all likelihood will eventually be full legality. It is interesting to note that in the latter eventuality, many people who now profit from the industry--ex-cons, addicts, etc.--may lose out.

NETWORK G

CHIEFLY IN HARLEM SECTION, MANHATTAN



Network H

A New York State Penitentiary

Network H is about life in prison. It sets a sharp contrast to nearly all the criminal networks that have been described outside of prison. In prison, presumably because of the close quarters and the constant presence of authority and the nature of captivity itself, the rules that govern relationships among men delve more deeply into their personal lives. In most of the criminal networks we have described, it would be fair to say that the chief rules governing relationships are (a) don't tell the police, nor anyone who likely would tell the police; and (b) don't cheat your business associate out of money. Of course it is also true that a person who fails to act firmly in any instance will probably soon be bereft of whatever criminal fortune and influence he had; but this is almost as true in the legitimate business world. The only real difference would seem to be that in the legitimate business world the means of recourse tend to be less violent than in the criminal world. By contrast, however, in prison it is an offense to be a "creep," or to "punk out" of any fight whatever.

What prison relationships most resemble in the "outside" criminal world seem to be the relationships that one may suppose prevail among the two youth gang partnerships found in our networks, in Network A and in Network F (1). In those partnerships, where business relationships among the parties are less well-defined then in situations where one man has most of the money or supplies and is the boss, it can be expected that, as in prison, reliance on personal qualities such as willingness to fight, to be

generous, to be friendly, is very high. This is especially interesting since what stands out with greatest clarity in the networks we observed is the fact that the two chief proving and training grounds for organized criminal activity are the neighborhood and the prison. Perhaps it is necessary for a would-be criminal to go through, at least once, a social situation where his personal qualities are severely tested and observed by his peers. Once having successfully gone through that testing situation, he can become party to criminal networks which can become actionsets-- sharing common values-- where those personal qualities are assumed as requisites of membership. Thus, since these basic qualities have already been proven to exist in the individual, he can be accepted as a member of the network and patterns of interdependent relationships can be established. This is, of course not restricted to networks in crime but is a common phenomenon in all networks where a common set of values and mutual interdependence are important. Thus, the tradition of "the old school tie" in which an Etonian Prime Minister picks another Etonian to serve in his government because he knows that he can expect and rely on certain values and patterns and standards of conduct from an earlier experience which both shared. It is this expectation of behavior which serves as the basis of mutual dependence and reliance in all groups which seek a common end whether it is in the day to day workings of a governmental or business enterprise or in a criminal network.

NETWORK H

A NEW YORK STATE PENETENTIARY



THE PRISON AT THE TIME OF THE UPRISING A FEW YEARS AGO



Typology of Action-sets and Linkages

Among the networks described in our research, three basic types of action-sets seem to emerge with sufficient clarity that we could recognize their presence in the various networks we identified. They also seem to represent basic patterns of recruitment and structure. The first of these, the prison court, is not really a criminal network in the sense that we have used this term in our organized crime research. Although its members are convicted criminals, their participation in the network comes at a time when they are largely unable to commit the types of crimes which we have classified as organized. The chief purposes of the prison court do not include the commission of crime but there is impressive evidence in our data that it is in these courts that base recruitment and basic relationships which serve to structure organized crime networks in the post-release period are first formed. The prison court is characterized by (1) a single strong leader and many followers, (2) by strict racial segregation, and (3) by extreme sensitivity to the closed environment of prison life. It is within this court that the exchange of favors, what we have called elsewhere the mutuality of rights and obligations, seems to become well established. The possession, or lack there of, of material advantages is an important factor in the adjustment of relations within the prison court. Thus, the individual who is able to provide goods or services is able to achieve a hierarchical position within the group. The relationships thus established become binding in the sense that there are expectations built up on both sides of each interpersonal relationship. As a further result the members of the prison court form a bounded network

within which norms and rules are established which govern life in the court. These rules are directed towards a very personal and subjective set of criteria:

1. Whether a guy will always be willing to fight. This criterion is a paramount factor in determining membership in the prison court and in establishing relative position among its members.

2. Whether a guy is "smart" in terms of prison life. This criterion establishes a sense of unity among the members of the network in that the membership sets its standards for behavior in prison in terms of the individual's ability to adjust to the system either in terms of acquiescence to some regulations or by determining ways to "beat the system."

3. Whether a guy is a "creep." This criterion establishes the isolation of the aberrant, deviant or simply different individual in the system who does not become a member of the network because he can not identify with the various criteria whether they are racially or behaviorally determined.

The second type of action-set, the partnership of old neighborhood friends, is related to the prison court in so far as many of the norms governing the conduct of the partners speak to the same kinds of personal characteristics that the rules of the prison court address. In fact as one looks over the behavior described in the various action-sets we found in our research it is not at all surprising that criminal partnerships based on old prison friendships have many of the same norms as the partnership of old neighborhood friends. What is different about the two types of

action-sets, however, is that at least so far as our informants reported, the prison partnership seems to be rare. This may result from the fact that ex-convicts are typically more experienced than the neighborhood friends we have identified with our networks and thus may be wary of the uncertainties and vagueness of partnerships. It is the partnership of old neighborhood friends which is most characterized by the sharing of risks and profits, by unclear lines of authority, by expressed concern over many aspects of the personalities of the members, and by the youthfulness of the partnership's members. The four partnerships which we saw in network A and in network F(1) are illustrative of each of these points. It is interesting, however, that these are youthful partnerships and we would suggest that few probably last beyond the mid-twenties of the participants' lives. For one thing, the men involved--no doubt like men everywhere--grow apart from one another as they grow older and so begin to feel uncomfortable in the intimate confines of the partnership. For another thing, this kind of partnership has its perils--the youthful enthusiasm which led to its formation and which created many of its norms can result in costly mistakes, errors in judgement and significant problems such as those which befall the gang in network F(1).

The third type of action-set revealed in the data seems to be by far the most prevalent one and also apparently the most adaptive one among Blacks and Puerto Ricans today. It is the action-set of the small business man, the individual entrepreneur, whose illegal activities are carried out through a quasi-group of individuals related to him in that activity. In many respects, these crime networks are similar or identical

to the kind of network that would coalesce an individual Black or Puerto Rican who establishes his own small legitimate business. The pattern of this type of action-set is quite familiar throughout our research and is found in networks B(1), B(2), B(3), C(1), C(2), D, F(1), F(2), F(3) and G. Its characteristics seem always the same. One man is basically in charge of the activity by virtue of the fact that he pays the salaries or commissions of the other men. There is some degree of hierarchical arrangement among the employees in that most employees seem to have some direct contact with the boss, but they identify with him more than they do with other members of the network except in those specific cases where we have seen direct partnerships or long standing relationships among the employee-members. The boss or center of the action-set is in most cases the only one in the set who has accumulated any risk capital. In fact if an employee does accumulate risk capital he is likely to try to go off and set up some enterprise of his own. Again it seems that the salaried or commissioned employees, even when they are out on the street, are likely to view their activities as little different from "a job." Similarly, the boss, if the business of the network is successful, is likely to have many of the traits of any good small business man--economy, prudence, firmness, a sensitivity to when he is being cheated or lied to and status as a business man in his neighborhood. It is this relationship between the illegal business set and the community which is most significant as we review the data in the various networks. There are probably no more secrets or confidences within the group of employees in these networks than there would be within any comparable group of employees in the

legitimate small business. What is different is that despite the illegal nature of the activities the co-ethnics and neighborhood associates of these networks view them as legitimate even though illegal.

The two formal rules of conduct that seem to obtain in each of these entrepreneurship models we have seen are those which we mentioned in the description of network H: (a) don't tell the police, or anyone who likely would tell the police about the activities or nature of the enterprise, (b) don't cheat your business associates out of money or create difficulty by disrupting the activities of the network. Beyond this, the chief quality that seems to be called for is competence although presumably in some activities--car theft for example--the kinds of competences required are more exotic than others, such as in numbers runners.

The networks we have described are ones which could not be characterized as "big" operations, ones with many layers of authority and countless functionaries most of whom are not even aware of the others existance. We do however, have some data on hierarchical placement within the action-sets we identified and the larger networks of which they are a part. Network E(1), for example has two levels of personnel under the narcotics dealer, Terrence Elliot. The same seems to be true in network E(2) but we have fewer details about how this level works. The action-sets described in B (1) and B(2) are also much larger than the others but here again our data do not provide a sufficient basis for analysis. It would be reasonable to assume that in the numbers activities described there would be the traditional carefully articulated runner-collector-controller-banker hierarchy that has been described elsewhere. But the extent and possible

interrelationships between collector and banker or between runner and controller is unclear in our data. The reasons for this are because of the preliminary and exploratory nature of our research. None of our informants supplied us with networks which showed the full range of illicit activity required to maintain a criminal operation. On the other hand, we are told throughout the various networks about those people who by virtue of superior power and position may often be able to make or break a criminal operation. Among those there are the wholesale drug suppliers, high level lay-off bankers, and police officials. As we follow the networks "upward" through the payers of individual entrepreneurs each with his own little entourage of employees, however, it becomes obvious that in at least three of the networks we have described they come finally to an Italian-American organized crime "family," with its net of complex kinship relations. Most of the individual entrepreneurs do seem to exhibit this relationship in the process of ethnic succession as power and profit passes inexorably but slowly from the hands of Italian-Americans to Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Cubans. Most of the individual entrepreneurs, however, seem to be connected to one another either through joint ventures or through straight one shot deals for sales or services.

Linkages

Within these networks there are several types of linkages which are well enough established that it becomes possible to classify them as distinctive patterns of relationships which create action-sets within Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks. In our analyses we were looking

for ways of interacting or relationships which bring individuals to the point of establishing a criminal relationship and thus give form to the purposive action which establishes the action-set within a network. There appeared to be six of these "causal" types of relationships in our networks.

The first of these is childhood friendship. It is quite common through all our networks and very interestingly it was this type of relationship which led to both the definitive criminal partnerships we found in the networks. As we pointed out earlier it is perhaps more effective in establishing the more youthful "less sophisticated" kinds of criminal ventures such as stealing cars and a minor hijacking than in establishing the carefully calculated ventures such as numbers and narcotics. It is important as a linkage however, both because it seems so widespread in the networks we have described among Blacks and Puerto Ricans and because it is also commonly found among Italian-Americans involved in organized crime. The importance of this linkage and its presence in both Italian-American and Black and Puerto Rican networks results from the ethnic character of organized crime networks. This does not, of course, result from any innate criminality in any of the ethnic groups but rather because of the peculiar relationship between ethnicity and organized crime. The ghetto both insulates and isolates the organized crime network from the outside world, and the supportive base of co-ethnicity with its antagonism towards the police authorities is critical to its formation. Again, youth gangs are commonly found in ghetto areas both as a result of social factors such as overcrowded

housing which makes the street the one suitable area for congregation and peer relationship and the deprivation which leads to youthful involvement in crime.

The second causal type is prison acquaintanceship. It can provide very strong and durable links among men who have already been involved in crime and who in the prison atmosphere come to feel themselves segregated from society and find natural linkages among themselves. Once such links are developed in prison the chances of their leading to later joint criminal activity and forming the basis for organized crime networks seems to be quite high. Moreover, a multiplier effect is at work here since sometimes being a friend of a friend is enough to establish a link among ex-convicts. It is important to note that this type of linkage is found very commonly among the Blacks and Puerto Ricans in the networks which we have described but seems to be absent to any sizable degree among Italian-Americans. The linkages among Italian-Americans are formed early enough so that apprehension and consequent incarceration seems to be less common among Italians than among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Also, the strength of kinship and family among Italian-Americans is not found among Blacks and is less pronounced among Puerto Ricans.

A third type of linkage develops when an experienced criminal in the neighborhood sees that a young boy or gang of young boys possess talent and induces them into some kind of criminal venture. This seems to have happened at least twice in our networks (A and F(1)) and presumably it is a common occurence in high crime neighborhoods. Here again, the linkage is one which is found both in Italian-American organized crime

networks and among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. It is one of the frequent recruitment devices for new blood into networks.

A fourth type of linkage is the infrequent but potent causal type of relationship which seems to exist between individuals in Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks and their wives or lovers. Black and Puerto Rican members of organized crime networks do not seem adverse to involving their lovers in whatever criminal activity they themselves are involved in. Here, there is a distinctive difference between the emerging Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks and those found traditionally among Italian-Americans. Once again it may represent the strength of family and kinship among Italian-Americans but it may also be a result of the less highly organized and consequently less stringent relationships among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. It is interesting to note that in our field experience we have found that Cubans are much more highly organized than is true of Puerto Ricans and Blacks. The usual reason given for this by the informants was that the Cubans were highly organized in Cuba before coming to the United States. Here again we do not have sufficient data to comment on the relationship between Cubans involved in organized crime networks and their wives or lovers.

Although it happens not nearly so often as we found among the Italian-Americans, nevertheless, kinship ties will sometimes foster a criminal linkage among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Our experience indicates that there is some greater reliance upon kinship among Puerto Ricans than among Blacks but here our evidence is spotty and we do not have sufficient data upon which to make a reliable judgment. In fact, there is even some

evidence that because of the prevalence of common law marriage and multiple relationships in the networks that we studied that the Puerto Rican family show no greater stability than is true among Blacks. One interesting point which did emerge in this research is that all the kinship ties in our networks were between brothers; none were between a father and a son. This, however, could be a function of the limited size of our sample but it could also be a function of the relatively short period of time in which organized crime networks such as those we have described have been in existence in Black and Puerto Rican societies.

The sixth and most common causal type of linkage in our networks is the meeting of two men, either through intermediaries or casually, who happen to be in complementary business positions (such as buyer-seller) and consequently form a linkage for common profit. These kinds of relationships, premised on business, lead to a great deal of criminal activity. Characteristically some of the activities are legitimate and some are illegal. But as can be seen in most of the networks we have described, gradually the activity tends to move from one form of organized crime activity to another. In some cases these are episodic as when a particularly good opportunity arises and two or more individuals along with their associated networks will join together briefly for a common venture. In other cases the relationship grows over a period of time as expertise and special skills are required for the continuation of certain types of activities. In either case, what is important is that individuals involved in the lesser regions of organized crime do seem to have a common set of relationships which allows them to come into contact with one another.

In addition to these causal types of linkages in the networks, we have also isolated nine of what might be called substantive "criminal relationships" which we define as functional linkages which are based upon a common core of activity. The most common by far, just as it is in the legitimate business world, is the employer-employee relationship. The employer hires the employee at wages or a salary to do certain things that the employer requires of him. In nearly everyone of our networks we find many such relationships.

A second type of substantive "criminal relationship" is provided in the partnership and joint venture type of linkage in criminal networks. The partners share equally in the risks, responsibilities and profits. This relationship differs from the employer-employee relationship in that the two individuals involved are in association without a dominant-submissive relationship. In some cases, however, one partner does seem to have greater authority and perhaps more influence than the other.

A third type of relationship is that which occurs between the buyer and seller of goods. This type of relationship is, of course, very important in the narcotics and stolen car trades. However, we have found in most of our networks that this type of relationship does exist in a variety of areas. In some cases, it is a well established pattern such as those where illegal required goods are sold either through a middle man or directly as part of the network. In others it tends to be episodic.

Related to the buyer and seller of goods relationship is the buyer and seller of services relationship. In all networks this involves chiefly a specialized criminal skill such as locksmithing. Other skills such as

prostitution or numbers running require far less immediate skill but serve as recruitment points into the network. We distinguish between the buyer and seller of goods relationship and the buyer and seller of services relationship because the relationships are quite different. In the case of the buyer and seller of goods, this very often is the result of the availability of certain goods. In the case of the buyer and seller of services relationship, however, there is usually an established pattern so that the same locksmith, for example, is used repeatedly.

The fifth type of linkage is the complex one that exists between a leader of an informal gang and his followers. The one significant example of this in our networks is in prison life although it does appear in most of our networks in some form. Except for the case of prison, however, and except for the youth networks which we have described, this relationship seems to be too informal to maintain a stable operation. Here again our data are too thin on hierarchical placement, dominance, submission and other organizational features to allow us to do more than speculate that these relationships represent first stages in the formalization of organized crime networks.

A sixth type of linkage is that which exists among and between fellow employees, or among and between followers in a gang. Although this type of relationship seldom brings a criminal venture into existence, it is often on this type of relationship that the success of a venture rests. Poor coordination of effort and poor morale seem each to have doomed many of the efforts described in our networks. In a traditional business relationship this would be described as morale, espirit de corps, or morality within the company.

The last three types of relationships are somewhat less ordinary than the foregoing but they do emerge rather frequently in our networks and seem important to a number of the criminal operations which are described. The first of these is that which obtains between a granter and a grantee of a privilege, as when, in network B(2) a man dies and a brother inherits his business. In effect this relationship defines property and territorial rights in much the same way that it seems to exist in Italian-American organized crime circles. The eighth type of relationship which seems to be present in our networks is that which is engendered by bribes and favors; that between the debtor and the recipient of the bribe or favor. Here the basis of the relationship is the exchange of goods and services based upon mutual needs and the assumption that the exchange is in some fashion mutually beneficial. Here again this is not an uncommon activity even outside of organized crime but the relationship is an important one for keeping the networks in operation.

The ninth substantive relationship is one which we did not find very frequently in our networks but did occur in some cases. This is the relationship engendered by a simple, direct assault as between the Policeman Minley and the addicts he shakes down. We have very little data on the use of violence and assault as techniques in organized crime and, in fact, our informants reported repeatedly that violence does occur but is not an important factor since it is the certainty of relationships and the mutual profit among members of the network which keeps it in operation. It is important, however, to remember that criminal business is not always tidy and consequently some violence certainly does occur. There are, of

course, examples of violence throughout the networks which we describe. Our point here is that we cannot indicate how important violence is and to what extent it is a major factor in keeping the networks alive.

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Chapter VII

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

When we undertook this study of ethnic succession and network formation in organized crime, our specific objectives were:

1. To document and demonstrate the process of ethnic succession in organized crime by tracing the transfer from Italo-American "families" in New York City to new and aspiring organized crime groups among Blacks and Puerto Ricans.

2. Using techniques of the field anthropologists, to observe, record and analyze the patterns of social relationships which structure behavior in these newly forming groups and which define relationships with (a) the ethnic communities of which they are a part; (b) the general society and (c) the Italo-American crime "families" they will displace.

3. Using the techniques of network analysis, to develop a preliminary model or models of the social organization of Black and Puerto Rican organized crime groups which grows out of an analysis of social action within the organization rather than being deduced from its external relations.

4. Once the model or models were developed, to use them to examine a number of questions pertaining to the sub-cultures under study in particular and to ethnic involvement in organized crime in general.

The specific questions which we planned to examine were:

1. What is the organizing principle in the establishment of Black and Puerto Rican criminal networks and what indications are there that the process of ethnic succession is operative here?

2. How are Black and Puerto Rican crime syndicates or groups organized behaviorally?

3. What are the codes of rules operative in Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks and how do they control behavior?

4. How do changes in communities and in society affect such criminal systems?

In the chapter which follows we have applied these questions to the network and action-set models which we identified and the behavior which we observed in them. We present our conclusions based upon these data. In addition we also comment on what we think are important implications of this study for the criminal justice system.

I. What is the organizing principle in the establishment of Black and Puerto Rican criminal networks and what indications are there that the process of ethnic succession is operative here?

Throughout the various networks which we identified and studied the process of ethnic succession seems to have been documented. In the Brooklyn, East Harlem and Bronx action-sets and networks we studied there is clear evidence of connections between the emerging Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks and Italo-American organized crime families.

In Central Harlem this was less obvious but perhaps if we had been able to follow these networks up to higher echelons some contact might have been established. Most significantly, in Paterson, New Jersey where we identified three action-sets in network, B two of these networks have direct contacts with a New York City Italo-American organized crime family and the third network had contact with the Bergen County Italo-American organized crime syndicate. It is also of interest that the two emerging Black action-sets in Paterson are slowly but inexorably pushing the long established group headed by George Hajar, who is white, out of competition. Despite the fact that Hajar's action-set contains primarily Blacks, its white domination and the fact that it is associated with the Italo-American group in Bergen County seem to account at least in part for its decline. Not only is ethnic succession obvious in these instances but throughout our interview data reference to Black and Puerto Rican displacement of Italo-Americans is common. One interview with a Puerto Rican in East Harlem is illustrative:

> When I was nine years old, I was selling dope in East Harlem. I didn't have trouble making connections because my father had done time and had worked for the Italians who run the neighborhood. For a long time up until I went to prison everything was controlled by the Italians. The Blacks and Puerto Ricans did have some action in numbers and in dope but in every case that I knew of there was some Italian who was getting paid off by them. The police were controlled by the Italians too and if you did try to start anything on your own the Italians wouldn't bother to kill you or even to hurt you they would just turn you into the police and the police would take care of you. That's how I got into trouble and that's how I finally ended up in jail. When I came out a couple of years ago things were really different. I know for certain just like everybody else does that a certain guy is a big man in Harlem. Now everybody says he's always been around but since the Italians have been moving out he's been

> getting bigger and bigger. Ever since I was old enough to know something was going on this guy has been sort of respected in the community and even when the Italians were in control he didn't do too badly. Like some Italians, he would go to Florida and spend $10,000 in two weeks and come back to the neighborhood where he didn't live with any big spending. But everybody knew he was a big man and that he would spend $10,000 when he was in Florida. He was always in the neighborhood and he was always there and had given to a lot of things. Now from what I have been able to see, as you go up to these guys who are buffers between you and the next guy they are Black or Puerto Ricans. They're Black if you've been with Black guys and Puerto Rican if you're not. In the whole group as you go up it's hard to understand. Lots of time you know someone is a big guy but the thing about it is you don't approach him. Well, how can you? On what grounds, what do you know about him to say something that's kinda personal to him about what he's doing. You can't just walk up to someone and ask about something that don't concern you. But there are ways of knowing who's the big guy, who will get his Cadillac confiscated with lots of dope in it and it's an assumed name and he'll say it's not mine. You know what I mean? That's flamboyant. And that's the way the Italians used to be in our neighborhood and now it's Blacks and Puerto Ricans. And you see the cops playing up to these guys too. It used to be that Italians could do pretty much what they wanted and they never had any trouble with the cops. Now it's the guys who've got the money who have the power to control the police and they're Puerto Rican and Black.

In another interview, also in East Harlem but in this case involving a Black respondent as well as a Puerto Rican, the connection between Italo-American syndicates and emerging Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks is even more clearly revealed:

> The most important thing is to be part of the neighborhood because the people in the community don't trust you if you're not. Anything you try is not going to work because if the people don't know you're capable and if they don't know you're trustworthy, who in that area will help you? And even in the neighborhood sometimes the people in the community don't have complete control. Somebody might want to get himself set up in business but he's got to have the right connections. And even if he does set himself up selling dope and has the right connections he's got to have people working for him who are natives in that neighborhood. And they would also

> have to take care of the business directly in that neighborhood of this man. The only reason that there's any movement like this now is that the Italians have set up with different people in different neighborhoods and very often they don't come into the neighborhoods themselves any more at all. Some places I know how they did try to come back in and they got crossed out of the initial investment and in other cases they got it back and just conceded those areas to certain peoples.

While ethnic succession in organized crime is evident in the movement from Italo-Americans to Blacks, Puerto Ricans and to a lesser extent Cubans, there are observable differences between Italo-American domination and the newly emerging Black and Puerto Rican control. The most obvious difference is that the Italo-American control seems to have been far more organized both hierarchically and in terms of social control than we were able to observe among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. To some extent this may be the result of the limited and preliminary nature of our research. Since we were working with informants who necessarily were not high in the hierarchy of Black and Puerto Rican organized crime it may well be that the networks and action-sets we identified were very low level. Again there may be higher levels of organization which were elaborated and highly organized but our data do not indicate this. On the other hand we frequently heard reference to the organizational characteristics of Italo-Americans and the lack of such organization among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. In one interview, for example, a Black commented on the differences between the Black networks and Italo-American syndicates:

> The Italians really stuck together when they were running things in our neighborhood. You would always see them together each one seeming to know what he was supposed to

> do and who was supposed to do it for and if there was any trouble. The Italians managed to do thing without too many shoot-outs. They were organized in that the danger of anybody giving them trouble wasn't very strong. The number of banks, the number of parlors that were held up was very very small. And the reason is that there is always the certainty that these guys would hang together and that suggested that you are going to get yours if you tried anything with them. You might have picked up thirty-five thousand dollars by holding up some controller. It isn't going to get you anywhere because it's not worth it because your life won't be that long. If your life is worth $35,000, then do it. Now has it got to that point of organization today? No and things are a lot worse. You can get killed for a lot less money. Contracts are a lot less than they used to be. Not only is the contract less, you life is worth a lot less. Due to the fact the people are controlling large sums of money and anything that threatens it sort of calls that people get snuffed out. If a guy all of a sudden starts handling $16,00 a day and he's not used to it then he gets pretty nervous. Things aren't just that well controlled because there are all kinds of rivals out trying to get your money. Even some of the numbers runners that I used to know aren't going to houses any more because they get mugged by junkies, but things are starting to change. Now if a guy comes around and beats you he can be the toughest guy in three blocks but there ain't nobody who's going to feel very much afraid of him anymore. Because by this time there's some guys around who don't want that kind of stuff going on and they've been watching all these things, and they start to take over the tough guy. Once you have a reputation you don't even have to worry about these guys anymore, you have to keep them, you have to maintain that reputation up to a certain level but once you've got it you don't have to worry anymore. Because when you're big enough nobody is going to challenge you. You've got that reputation for the rest of you life. I know a lot of Black guys and Puerto Rican guys and some Cuban guys also who have that reputation and things are beginning to quiet down.

A second reason for the difference between the high degree of control in Italian-American organized crime "families" and the lesser degrees of control noted among Blacks and Puerto Ricans is the relative newness of such organization among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Although

Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime goes back half a century, they have only recently begun to move towards control of organized crime in ghetto areas, and as far as we have been able to determine are still not mobile outside those ghettos. This also suggests that intra-city connections among Blacks are minimal. But again we have no direct evidence on this subject, and can neither confirm nor deny that intra-city linkages exist. What information we do have tells us the relationship between the Black or Puerto Rican organized crime network and the local neighborhood is a strong one, similar to the relationship existing in Italian-American communities during the period 1922-1930, when the Italins were wresting control from Jewish gangsters.

Cubans appear to be much more highly organized than Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime. Although our information about Cubans is sparse, the degree of organization we noted in the area was striking. In September 1972, for example, Cubans ran the gambling concessions at the San Gennaro festival, New York's annual Italian street fair. Until 1972, of course, Italians operated the gambling wheels. Cubans running gambling operations in Little Italy was unheard of in the past.

The reason for the greater organization among Cubans and probably the reason for their closer relationships with Italian-American organizations is that prior to their departure from Cuba, they were highly organized there in prostitution and in gambling. It is also important to remember that there were strong contacts between Italian-American syndicates and the Cuban organized crime scene.

The third and we feel most important reason for the higher degree of organization among Italian-Americans and the seeming lack of a highly

elaborate organizational structure among Blacks and Puerto Ricans is probably cultural. The Italian-Americans were able to organize into very tightly structured "families" or clans because they had the cultural model of the strong, all-encompassing family with real and fictive kinship bonds. Kinship holds these Italo-American families together and the bond is a strong and enduring one. In addition, the Italo-Americans were able to adapt a cultural model which they brought with them to the United States to assure their organization in crime. The south of Italy had a number of secret criminal societies--the Camora of Naples, Societa Omorata in Calabria and the Mafia of Sicily--to serve as both organizational and behavioral guides. Here again, it is important to point out that we are not suggesting that Mafia emigrated as an organization and set up a branch office in the United States, but rather that the cultural model tied in with the strength of kinship ties was sufficient to give a high degree of organization to Italian-American involvement. Finally, the onset of Prohibition provided the necessary impetus for both power and profit which allowed the Italian-Americans to move organized crime out beyond the ghetto boundaries into the mainstream of American society. None of this, however, is true among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. That is to say, none of these factors which lead to a high degree of centralization and organization seem currently to be true among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. There is some evidence, admittedly still highly tentative, that there are two developments which might lead to a high degree of organization. One is the emerging importance of narcotics as a basis for organization. There seems little doubt, in New York City at least, that gambling in all forms will seen be legalized. That is, once the policy

game becomes completely legal a very important source of organized crime funds and payoffs to the police will disappear. Narcotics, which holds the same relationship to the community, as was true of alcohol during Prohibition, could supply an important source for both profit and corruption. Certainly drugs are not as much in popular demand as alcohol was during Prohibition. The pattern of relationships, however, seems to be very much the same. Thus, it may be that drug traffic, particularly if it comes under greater control by Blacks and Puerto Ricans, could offer one source of organizing power for crime in these groups. There is some evidence in our data that Cubans may be moving toward greater control in narcotics with their own importation system. One of our informants reported:

> There are some Cubans that hang out in Spanish Harlem, they don't use Italian families for drug outlets but they have employed the Latin American people coming from different countries who sometimes bring dope into the country for their own personal gains. It is not a set contract that Italian familes run with them. In other words they might come over here and visit and find out that the cocaine from Peru is worth 5 times as much over there so they may return to bring it back. For instance like when they go for vacations and they try to sneak all the dope and sell it to people like my partners. They set about establishing a new system which is almost undetectable. There is no set pattern or time the dope comes in. You can't trace it. The way it was explained to me they started to patronize different foreign Latin American restaurants, and clubs and things. They met different bartenders and prostitutes and having visited them they spend pretty large amount of money everytime they visited. These people readily accepted them afterwards, the bartenders, prostitutes, waiters, etc. They turn around and they pass the word on and they say, 'You know someone this woman who just got back and she got so many ounces of cocaine and heroin' and they would turn around and pay the woman whatever amount she would ask for or try and meet her cost and turn around and submit the thing to the factory and cut it and make a killing. Now it got to the point that the individual has a different area where he's not in Harlem but in Queens--by Queens Boulevard where there is a lot of concentration of foreign speaking Latin Americans and Western Avenue

> and the Bronx they have established a system which is in operation since 1961. And they have never been arrested or even under watch because they do not have a tiny outlet or designated area when the dope comes. The waiters or what have you get in touch with him whoever gets that area gets a tip for telling him and setting up the arrangements to talk about business. So this way does not have a certain time or place or plane flight what have you or someone's bringing something over because if he don't know he don't know who he's gonna sell it to. This became a set pattern waiters get tips for doing this, recommending who has stuff and setting up the arrangement and prostitutes get paid for helping.

If this system grows, however, it will provide only the source for power and profit and still would not provide an organizing motif among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. What could provide that cement, however, is militancy. Previous ethnic groups involved with organized crime--the Irish, the Jews and the Italians were desperately trying to become white Americans. Now,however, the Blacks are beginning to come into importance in organized crime at a time when being Black, being a brother or a sister, serves to create a family type structure based upon militancy. Even the terminology--brother, sister, mother--expresses a sense of rights and responsibilities to the "family of Blacks." This militancy, then, might be strong enough to provide the necessary cement. It is important to point out here that we are not suggesting that Black militants can be equated with organized criminals or that the rightful striving for equality and justice for Blacks is in any way connected with organized crime. Rather we are suggesting that the mantle of Black militancy might well be put on by some organized crime groups. More important, Blacks and Puerto Ricans involved in organized crime may rightfully feel themselves bound together by the oppressiveness of the system which rejects their attempts

at social and political mobility and that during this period when much of Black power is negative power--that is given out of fear--that banding together to beat the system by any means may serve as a powerful incentive and an organizer.

2. How are Black and Puerto Rican crime syndicates or groups organized behaviorally?

When we analyzed the data which we have gathered through observation of behavior in the organized crime networks among Blacks and Puerto Ricans, several important features of the behavioral organization of these networks also emerged. We found three major types of behavioral organization into which we could place our networks or the action-sets within those networks. The first of these was the youthful gang or criminal partnership. In these associational action-sets, Black or Puerto Rican youngsters growing up in the same neighborhood were involved in criminal activities and then through the process of recruitment became involved in organized crime as a group. The friendships and ties among these youngsters were such that they continued into adulthood. It is important to point out, however, that such youthful gangs should not be included under organized crime networks initially because although they might occasionally participate in organized criminal activities, they are not organized entirely for participation in such activities. Rather their importance is as a beginning step and as a source of recruitment into organized crime.

The second major type of behavioral organization which we found was the prison court, where individuals within prison band together along very strict racial lines. In addition to racial segregation these prison courts are characterized

by strong leadership and a sensitivity to being together under a coercive and authoritarian system which bands the individuals together. It is a major finding of this study that these prison courts are far more important in the formation of networks and action-sets in organized crime among Blacks and Puerto Ricans than they ever were among Italo-Americans. One of our interviews in Central Harlem points both to the difference between Italo-Americans on the one hand and Blacks and Puerto Ricans on the other and the the importance of prison as a molding force among Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime.

> What I learned when I went to prison was that there were more Blacks and Puerto Ricans than anything else there and I didn't see many Italians. What I did see were not big racket guys. Anybody among the Italian-Americans who was identified as a big racket guy always got special privileges and kept pretty much to himself. The word inside was that their families were being taken care of and that they could be sprung at any time if they wanted to. I also learned that they went to jail very little and that there weren't enough of them there to band together. Then, with the Blacks and Puerto Ricans, it is very different. The Puerto Ricans stepped together and the Blacks stepped together. When you went back from the court into your cells you went back with guys you could depend on and there was always somebody who would watch your back. When I got out of prison these were the guys that I knew and the ones that were from my neighborhood were closer to me. I knew these guys. I could trust them and they could trust me. I knew what they could do and they knew what I could do. We were the ones who always worked with each other. If I found something good I would cut them in on it because I knew they would do the same thing for me. When I got back to my neighborhood not all the guys I knew in the prison court were there, of course, but some of the guys in my neighborhood knew the guys in prison and I knew that I could depend upon them because their friends in prison had been friends of mine, too.

There are a number of reasons why the prison is so important in network organization among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Among Blacks, the sociology of the Black family points dramatically to a relatively un-

stable family. While there is still some debate as to how unstable it is and how important this lack of stability is for developing personalities within the Black family, there is little question that the absence of the male figure, the strong will of the mother who is usually out working and not at home, and the lack of a long tradition of family loyalty are characteristic of Black families. This lack of a strong sense of family loyalty, and the consequent absence of a sense of rights and responsibilities to something which is larger than the individual is certainly not as strong in Blacks as it was and is among Italo-Americans. Thus, the childhood gang or the prison court may well represent the first strong associational tie for the Black youngster as he matures and may form the basis for his loyalties to other individuals.

Catholicism and the Latin ancestry of Puerto Ricans would suggest that among them, the family is a strong unit, and we did find kinship more important among them than it was among Blacks. But, at least among those individuals we studied in our networks, families are not that stable and strong because of the importance of common law relationships and especially because of the rapid and frequent movement of the members of the family back and forth between Puerto Rico and the United States. In any event we feel that the primary importance of prison in the formation of Black and Puerto Rican networks is warranted by observation in each of the networks we have studied. In almost every case friendships were formed either in childhood gangs and subsequently validated in common prison experience (as in Network F, for example) or individuals made contact with each other for the firat time when they were in prison. In the prison court as was true in the child-

association, the relationships which are formed tend to be highly personalized and consequently tend to be very lasting. They have the character of partnerships since they do depend on mutual trust and responsibility as well as compatibility of the individuals.

The third type of behavioral organization which we observed in the action-sets and networks we studied was what we have called the criminal entrepreneurship model. In this type of organization individuals come together into an action-set or focused network because of common interests in profit and because their skills and abilities are mutually supportive. That is to say that in this type of activity what seems to occur is that a group of individuals who know each other because of their presence in the Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks will band together for a particular set of activities either on a permanent or temporary basis. This pattern of organization seems to be by far the most prevalent one and in fact, the only true organized crime type of network that we have identified. The other two basic types, the childhood gang of friends and the prison court, seem to serve more as recruiting grounds for these types of networks. The entrepreneur model of the small illegal businessman with his employees and associates marks the current stage of development among Blacks and Puerto Ricans in organized crime. Here again, we add the caution that our study is a preliminary one and it may well be that there are much more elaborate organizational structures.

This lack of organizational development in Black and Puerto Rican criminal structures coincides with both the newness of Blacks and Puerto Ricans in control positions in organized crime and the consequent lack of

a long period of development, and, with the nature of the types of criminal activities which we discovered in these networks. Just as this newness has hindered any large-scale development it has also tended to keep the networks and action-sets we observed fairly generalized rather than specialized in specific types of criminal activities. Throughout the networks there is a diversity of criminal activity involved both in the networks and in the action-sets which make them up. The combinations seem to be fairly stylized: prostitution and drugs, liquor, theft, and petty gambling, numbers and narcotics are typical patterns. The gypsy cab network we described also is used for drug transactions and in the numbers racket. In one network we found numbers, narcotics and prostitution operating through the same mechanism: the sale of cocaine, hashish, pot and numbers coincident with business establishments, the picking up of numbers slips and the cutting of dope done by individuals in the same network; and finally violence, found in numerous networks here.

But, since the beginning networks among Blacks and Puerto Ricans are still relatively small operations, they cannot specialize. It might, of course, also be argued that it is the lack of specialization which keeps them relatively small. There are, of course, always possibilities of enlargement and some of the activities which we observed were seemingly on their way to becoming large. What seems to be necessary for the beginning networks to become elaborated into the larger types of activities, now present among

Italian-Americans, is (a) greater control over sectors of organized crime and (b) better access to political power and the ability to corrupt it. In Network G, which describes the gypsy cab operation, the interface among various types of organized crime activity and the importance of corruption emerge with considerable clarity in some of the interviews:

> Most of the kids who steal cars for "gypsys" are 17 to 21 years old. Majority of them are Puerto Ricans. One is Black and usually hangs out with Puerto Ricans and almost speaks fluent Spanish. What keeps these youngsters together is the fact that they all are saving money by these activities to buy their own car and they can't wait to be getting these stuff together there. They are very talkative and friendly individuals. I don't seem to find no hesitancy about discussing business and they are open about it and they are not very suspicious of people. I find that a lot of the older Puerto Rican people within different communities know of them and they tend to use them also in getting them cars like if you crashed during the weekend and you don't want your insurance to go up, you'll turn around and they call it heating up a car by sending these kids out. There is one garage in Bay Ridge and he charges $20 to put red or gray prime on a stolen car just to change the color and you'd have to supply the paint and for the prime alone you have to pay $20 and he'll paint the car. He'll put red primer or gray primer on the car for you for $20.
>
> A lot of the gypsy cabs are gotten in this way. They only have the $175-200 insurance fee just to secure the 0 plate or Z plate. From there on, of course they have just that amount to get them started, and the police, the base and insurance company tend to work with them. They pay approximately $100 insurance to start off. The company which allows them to do this will rent them out a radio, a two-way radio, until they are on their feet and be able to buy a second hand radio and then they'll go into business and from there they'll shoot on up. They'll work their way 'til they eventually little by little save enough to buy their own legitimized car, a legal car, and not work under the fear of the door tag being placed.

I have known approximately from 15-20 drivers throughout 3 different companies that I have been hanging out with and a lot of them are ex-cons, some are still on parole, others are not and they make a pretty well good living out of it. By the way, they are competing with the legitimized taxi in the city, yellow cabs. Their going rates are not 50 or 60¢ as the meter clicks on them and in a way they are more closely knitted. The older ones are closely knitted because they all know how practically each one began and each one protects each other pretty similar to the way utilized in prison. I know that everybody else knows that I am driving a stolen car but it is registered and the registration is on it. This is the whole system there. They have a tendency to glorify a man who can dump the two stolen cars he has been utilizing and purchase his own legally from a dealer, a registered dealer, legitimized registered dealer and go on his own. He finally made it and they tend to pretty well stick together. Once you've classified that there has been a rap, you usually more or less are anti-social for anyone and no one will want to associate with you. So again there are some reports that are similar to prison. The majority are still with the old Puerto Rican ways but they are very sharp and very money hungry. They tend to help one another out more freely. The radios and equipment that they purchase other from the base are usually stolen from another company by junkies who do sell these radios, it's a prosperous business, by the way, so I've been told. Someone has informed me that the summer months are usually slow in this trade. They normally make $15-20 each day and winter months they can practically make up to $100 a day. They run pretty constantly. Another interesting fact is that the companies these Puerto Rican gypsy cabs or Spanish speaking gypsy cab companies literally use the channels because they are open channels which anyone can use. There is one particular company that has been able to purchase a license and has been assigned a frequency so this is a growing business also and it is a growing step where eventually all the owners of these companies shoot from. They are very business concerned and they seem to adopt themselves to this business very fast and they are in the midst of economic development in this field and I believe that the Black gypsy cab corporations do not compete with them on that economic basis but they do have a very friendly outlook towards one another and they are very closely knitted. Outside of a few personal dislikes on the general and as a whole they do band together and they are starting to work closely knitted

> and there is a very well situated thing there with them. Here again this industry has opened up a creative market for tires, batteries for the junkies who go out and steal and sell it to them. They are willing to buy practically anything because they will save money purchasing stolen goods from the junkies who steal like tires, batteries and things I have outlined. This is utilized to maintain their cars and what have you. This field is introduced into my analysis now so here again you are opening up a new crime, an entirely new field hasn't been touched on too frequently. There has been a report of a case where the police department know more or less different companies within their district areas which they actually know the cars that these drivers are driving by heart and they are pretty well informed of these through their stool pigeons system. But on the whole they do tend to accept bribes and take money from, for instance, the owner of the car base or the gypsy cab company. Somehow, especially the Blacks have realized that the banding together is a secret thing between Blacks and Puerto Ricans or Spanish speaking drivers and owners. They have taken advantage of it. Now that ex-convicts, once they meet parole, can vote they are utilizing this as a means of voting on. So they are going to be pretty well situated and I believe they won't be removed from that business although the legitimized taxi industry is trying to liquidate them out of their market. The police played an important role in this because throughout each and every company I have gone to they literally take bribes and after they take the bribe they subject them to harassment because of the sergeant or the precinct captain's orders and the funny part about it is that the driver and the police or the police officer after he comes off shift duty usually comes back and says 'Look, I had to do it because my sergeant this, my sergeant that, and that's the whole thing.' The detectives also collect money from them and I believe the same thing with crime. The community are aware of this.

In addition to this typology of networks, we also developed a typology of linkages within the network. We found six types of relationships which form strong personal links within the networks and which define the action-sets we identified:

1. childhood friendship

2. prison acquaintance

3. the recruitment of younger men in the neighborhood by an experienced criminal

4. the use of women--particularly lovers--in criminal activities is a relationship we found only among Blacks and Puerto Ricans and which seems to be missing among Italian-Americans and Cubans

5. kinship, but primarily brother-brother and very little (if any) father-son

6. the meeting of two men either firsthand or through intermediaries who establish a relationship for mutual profit in organized crime.

These linkages are important in that they define the establishment of organized crime behavior. Most important, however, is that they serve as the sources of recruitment into organized crime in Black and Puerto Rican circles. An example, from one of our observed networks in East Harlem points out the importance of these linkages:

> You gotta have eyes to move up. In other words this has to be your goal and you have to make it known that you intend to make something of yourself and get other people to accept it. First of all you've got to have a knowledge of what you're gonna do and what you're able to do. You have to go and enlist the aid of somebody who's known to other people or you never get anywhere. Nobody gets somewhere without somebody and the people who help him either have to do it in a way that gives him some power or show that they are interested in him or look the other way, such as the police authorities. He has to grease them or have a contact who is able to grease them or he's got no chance. You've got to be flexible in all things except in your main concern and that's got to be making money, more money and getting more power. The power is going to come in several ways. One power is protection. You've got to have the power to pay off the police or you're dead. Another thing is somebody will sooner or later challenge your authority. First of all you have to have a reputation dating to the first time you ever entered into whatever you are doing. You probably got into it in a number of ways. You might have just been a kid and you

might have just been lucky and have been noticed by the other bigger guys in the neighborhood. This is not always going to work though because you've got to do some things yourself. Somebody will come along sooner or later and will challenge that authority and unless you're strong enough or connected well enough you won't be able to maintain your position, even through force. You've got to be forceful and be willing to do things like putting your life out on the line because somebody just took $10,000.00 from you. You also have to always be thinking about your business and what you're going to do with it. What happens to it depends on who comes along. Everything works on the basis that you are liked, either because you have qualities that are likeable or because you have qualities that are recognized, such as being a nice guy but still being a regular guy. Somebody that is good to be with or a bright kid. These things lead to your being discovered. These are the things that oldtimers look for. It is a tradition. We don't want nobody who is on drugs half the time taking on our business when we decide to retire and go to Florida. We don't want somebody who will let somebody from another territory come in and take over. What we want is somebody we know and like and can talk to somebody to manipulate but somebody we can talk to I can get you to do what I want to so that you are learning the business at the same time. If you are not a doer, whatever you are that is what you are going to be. Once they learn that you can do something, then they are willing to experiment on other things, bigger and better things because you have proved yourself. But if all you do is bring in a 100 dollars a day in the numbers they are not going to approach you with any kind of proposition like running this gambling joint that nets like 3,000 dollars a day. Once you have developed a reputation in a particular group of people you can't take that reputation and go out to some other area unless you have "your man" in that other area. Most of it stays right in the neighborhood and once you move out of that neighborhood then you've got to have contacts or you are dead.

Still another interview relates the importance of friendships and mutual trust and responsibility in the establishments of networks:

You don't have to be a college professor to figure out that when a man gets himself into the business of narcotics, naturally he is going to put people around him he knows personally, people he deems trustful, the people who he

deems in his heart as loyal, the kind of people who have the necessary sense to keep the business going and not working against the business but working for it. Therefore if organized crime is what this is, and by the way people in the ghetto do not call it organization but "being down together," then such a thing does exist in the narcotics traffic. It exists because the business runs much more smoothly when people who have something in common or people who have known each other for a long time, people who feel that they can trust each other working together towards an objective and that objective being money. Then such a thing as organization does exist in the narcotic traffic. In my travels over the last twenty years of hustling in the streets between Detroit and New York I find that in order for people to put the right kind of opportunities your way and in the streets there must be a mutual respect to people who are in those positions that can put you on a spot that will bring you great profits must have a certain kind of respect for your ability as a person or as a hustler or whatever. Without this certain kind of respect for you then there is a big chance that you will never be a success in the hustling life, which is the reason why drug addicts are never really successful. They only experience marginal success. Some drug addicts are better hustlers than others. Some are much more respected than others. However, before a man can become successful in whatever field he is in in this town he has a far better chance if he has not used narcotics himself. Naturally in a business of this kind where large amounts of money are being trusted into other people's hands sometimes there is trouble. Sometimes there have to be enforcers or what we call butches, guys who straighten out these things with a little bit of muscle, who make sure that a guy has paid the money that he owes. But except of this I would say that there is not a great deal of difference in the drug business from any other business there must be people who can be trusted people who remain loyal people who will only talk about what they have been told to talk about, people who are on time, people who are dependable otherwise, people who must feel that they are a necessary link in a chain for the organization to reach its objective. So it is in the narcotic traffic it is clear that we have to have the same kind of organization to run our business.

In addition to these types of linkages we also discovered nine

criminal or substantive relationships which exist within the networks:

1. employer - employee

2. the partnership which we found most common in prison courts and in childhood gangs where a close relationship exists between two individuals to the extent that the other person is always known as "my man"

3. buyer and seller of goods

4. buyer and seller of services

5. the leader follower relationship which was found in the prison and youthful gangs but seemed to be almost absent in the entrepreneurial models.

6. the employee relationship which seldom seems to bring networks into existence but is the basis of its success. Here mutual trust seems to be quite important.

7. the granter and grantee of privilege relationships where favors are passed from one individual to another.

8. the bribery and corruption relationships, where favors are the donor and receipient in terms of favors.

9. violence which seems to be quite an important way of obtaining services within these networks.

The operations of these various types of linkages are well described in one set of interviews which were conducted in Central Harlem which illustrate several of them in one network:

> Therefore with the exception of the fact that the drug business is illegal as far as the law is concerned, I would say that there is not a great deal of difference in the drug business from any other business because in the drug business there must be people who can be trusted, people who will remain loyal, people who will talk about what they have been told to talk about, people who are punctual, people who are dependable otherwise people who must feel that they are a necessary link in the chain for the organization or for the mob to reach its objective. So in the narcotic traffic, it is clear that we do not have the kind of organization to run the business per se. To give you an example of what I mean when I

say being properly connected, I shall move to the 1965 drug panic and this too is in the summer of 1965. This happens to be a personal experience whereby I was able to phone a particular individual, who is now deceased, in his home and go there to his home and purchase narcotics where no one else in the streets at the time or in my particular neighborhood was able to buy dope. Therefore I was able to remain in Harlem and not have to go outside of Harlem to obtain my money to purchase narcotics but I was able to take advantage of the fact that I personally knew where this man lived and I was able personally go to his house. It was somewhat of a privilege as a result of the mutual respect that we had for each other. In some cases there were people whom he had grown up with and people whom he had known all throughout his life as a result of being a native New Yorker, people whom he did not allow to come to his house. As a result of my knowing this man and the mutual respect we have for each other, I was granted this privilege and I in turn was able to keep my habit to an extent as well as to do favors for the other drug addicts in my neighborhood who were unable to buy their stuff. It happens that this particular man's connection he was no big time dope pusher but it just happened that the particular people this boy was connected with, and we shall call him C-4, happened to come up with some narcotics at the key time with dope and it happened to be good dope during the panic, or for the most part when no one else had any drugs and for the most part no one else who had drugs had good drugs. C-4's connection was able to come up with drugs and the man he had been doing doing business with 2, 3, or 4 years was able to come up with narcotics and gave it all to him to sell. This in turn enabled me to go to C-4 and to purchase narcotics for the people in my neighborhood who were unable to purchase drugs for themselves. Again I stress the point of making the right kind of friends, making the right kind of respect, carrying yourself in such a way that people will bestow a respect upon you as far as giving you their home addresses and their home phone numbers. Because it is a thing in New York, and it is a very definite thing that people in the streets just do not take you to their homes. This is a rule in New York and most people stick to it. Only on rare occasions or only after a man is very sure that he knows you very well, especially if he is involved in an illegal activity such as narcotics, will he bring you to his home, introduce you to his family and expose himself as far as you are concerned and if you should ever run

afoul with the law and puts himself in a position that you in turn can bring the police to his home. These things are just not done in New York. Maybe other cities but not New York City. People who are in the hustling life in N. Y. city are just not hospitable in that light. In our discussion last Wednesday I think it was mentioned or the question was posed as to how the price of a bag of narcotics is determined. For the most part I would say supply and demand is the determining factor. Sometimes during the drug panic a bag which would cost $5 in Harlem was raised to $6 or for that matter those people who were not able to but narcotics readily, people who do not know the people well enough to buy when they wanted to buy it, they had the money to pay as high as $10 to $12 a bag. In some cases, I have seen a bag purchased for as high as $20 on the East side of New York. But for the most part the price of the bag is determined by the supply as well as the demand. Naturally, during the panic there is a short supply of narcotics. Those people who have it try to get the most money for it or if not those people who act as go between are responsible for raising the price so that they in turn can make as much money as those people to whom the narcotics belong to. On the other hand, during normal times when there is a lot of dope which is not necessarily good dope this for the most part would come down. As the case when the panic did finally subside. In those places where the price of a bag had been raised, for the most part the price of the bag came down, a short time after the panic was officially over. By this I mean you could practically go to any corner you know to be a drug corner and purchase narcotics. As far as connections are concerned in the narcotic field, I think that in most instances, a man that deems himself a street pusher is able to go to one person, that is the person who gives him bulk narcotics. As far as the street pusher being able to go past this man to someone higher or past this man to the people who he would buy drugs from is very very unlikely. It is only after a great length of time that the street pusher becomes so adept in pushing drugs on the street that someone on a higher level recognizes his abilities and thinks in terms of dealing with him directly which in turn would knock out the middle man who is more or less not doing anything but receiving percentages on the narcotics that he in turn is giving to the street pushers directly. Therefore it is a thing of being higher echelon or middle echelon or a lower realm or the actual man who does the hand to hand combat that is the man who does the pushing in the

> street. Until the man raises himself to that particular caliber of the middle man or until he comes to the sum of money to do business directly with the man on the high echelon there is no chance that he will ever meet the key connection. It is a long line of connections that you never really know how close you have gotten to the tope. The only yardstick for a man to know how close he has gotten to the top as far as narcotic traffic is concerned is determined by the amount of narcotic that he is able to buy if he is able to come up with the money. In many instances when a man starts to thinking in terms of kilos it takes a little more for him to just have the money. He may have the money but still not know the people. He is still at a loss. It is only at rare occasions when the Federal agents are able to step in and purchase narcotics directly. It is only on these rare occasions when someone has become greedy that the police do step in and purchase narcotics directly. However I think there is a little bit more to the investigation that they conduct than meets the eye. Therefore I think it is easy to conclude that this network is a very difficult network for someone who is a stranger and for someone who has no hustler's background, no jail background.

In summary then, we found that organized crime networks among Blacks and Puerto Ricans are behaviorally organized into three organizational models: 1. childhood partnerships 2. the prison court and 3. the entrepreneurial model. Each of these is intimately associated with the neighborhood or community within which it is found and in each case the relationships extends beyond the network into the community. Among Blacks we found that the absence of a strong family system tended to negate the use of this network-to-community organizational principal. Kinship, however, seems to be more important among Puerto Ricans and thus serves some unifying function there. Finally, the prison seems to be an extremely important source of recruitment as is the neighborhood for involvement in organized crime activity.

3. What is the code of rules operative, operative in Black and Puerto Rican organized crime networks and how do they control behavior?

After analyzing the behavior we observed in the various networks and action-sets which we have described, we established two distinct sets of rules which are operative in these networks. One set of rules is that set which seems to be operative in prison and in the youthful partnerships or youth gangs which we have described and which seems to speak to the intimate personal characteristics necessary for survival in the networks:

1. Don't be a coward. This rule, which is found in both the prison court and in the youthful networks, enjoins the individual to be a man but has a more physical connotation than we found to be true among the Italian-Americans. Essentially, it indicates that the individual is always willing to fight for his own rights and safety and to a lesser extent for those of his colleagues in the network.

2. Don't be disloyal. Here again the injunction is less positive in terms of its relationship to the group than we found among the Lupollos. What is called for here is a feeling of membership in a group and a basic loyalty rather than the intensely socialized family membership code among the Italian-Americans. Loyalty in this context means acceptance of membership in a group with the consequent rejection of the outsiders.

3. Don't be a creep. Here, the rule calls for a normalizing of behavioral relationships among members in the network. What

this rule does is to exclude from membership abberant individuals--those who are somewhat deficient or who cannot for some other reason enjoy full membership--and consequently establishes rules of behavior.

We found a different code of rules which operates as a behavioral guide in the entrepreneurial networks described earlier:

1. Don't tell the police. This rule actually stretches beyond the injunction not to tell the police. It also includes the caution against telling anyone who is likely to tell the police either through malice or weakness. While the rule is strongest within the networks themselves, we found that it reaches out beyond the networks into the community and that just as we found among the Italian-Americans, community people are very reluctant to discuss these activities. This is certainly the result of fear, but we feel certain that it also results from an antagonism towards the criminal justice system and the feeling of greater unity and identification on the part of the community members with their coethnics in the networks than with the police or other segments of the criminal justice system.

2. Don't cheat your partner or other people in the network. Individuals within any network must cooperate in a relationship of mutual trust. This rule lays the groundwork for cooperation with some degree of certainty. The rule places a highly "moral" standard on correct interpersonal behavior within the network but does not carry outside the group. Thus an individual is expected not to

cheat with money inside the network but is enjoined against doing it externally.

3. Don't be incompetent at whatever you are supposed to be doing. This rule sets standards of excellence. Within the network it agains builds confidence among its members. What this rule suggests is that an individual--be a theif, a numbers runner, a prostitute, a pimp, a locksmith, a dealer of stolen goods, a narcotics pusher, or a hijacker--should do his job well.

There are two interesting and important conclusions to be drawn from both these sets of rules and from the fact that there are indeed two distinct sets. The first conclusion has to do with the general nature of organized crime. Note that in both sets of rules, there are injunctions against disclosing information. Secrecy is of course a part of all business and certainly is part of most crime. In organized crime, however, the community within which the networks exists protects the secrecy of the operations and consequently becomes a part of the organization--a part which is very important in terms of both the development and persistence of organized crime activity. Quite simply, in the absence of such open public support for individuals involved in organized crime, they could not survive. Thus, changing the values of communities which support organized crime--either because of their antagonism towards the criminal justice system or because of the support of their co-ethnics in organized crime--is essential.

A second conclusion we draw from this body of rules and from its operation is that organized crime is indeed a social system and that it has all of the elements--a pattern of relationships with established rights and

responsibilities, a normative pattern of rules of behavior, and a shared set of values and ends--which mark any other social system. This social system is of more than academic interest. It suggests that in order to combat organized crime, it is necessary to develop strategies aimed at changing the rules of both that social system and the larger social system of which it is a part. That is to say, organized crime as a social system if functionally a part of the larger social system of American society and any attempt at change or remediation must inolve changing the value system of both the social system itself and the larger society of which it is a part.

4. How do changes in communities and in society affect organized crime social systems?

Social and technological developments in American society have brought about significant change in that society. Within the social system of organized crime, however, the latter change does not seem to be great. There are, as we have pointed out earlier, striking similarities between the patterns of recruitment and operation in organized crime found among the Italian-Americans and now beginning to develop among Blacks and Puerto Ricans. Nowhere is this as obvious as in the relationship between the various networks and action-sets we observed and the communities in which they are found and the general society in which these communities operate.

Patronage, acceptance and admiration define the attitudes of many of the Blacks and Puerto Ricans we spoke with towards Black and Puerto Rican organized criminals.

But community attitudes change sharply when the drug problem is discussed. The narcotics trafficker is universally detested in the ghetto. And yet, the local pusher, even though he is Black or Puerto Rican (perhaps because he is Black or Puerto Rican) is not held responsible for the problem of drug addiction. The community's attitude toward the drug pusher is ambiguous. On the one hand, he is a visible symbol of the narcotics traffic and as such becomes an easy target for verbal, sometimes physical abuse. The pusher comes to represent the narcotics problem and the shame and fear community residents feel about drugs. People living in the community, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the drug problem and not knowing how to deal with it, identify the problem with the pusher.

At the same time, community residents assign the responsibility for widespread drug addiction to forces operating on the community from the outside. A conspiracy theory of drugs is widely held in the Black and Puerto Rican communities. According to community residents, heroin addiction is the result of an establishment plot to kill off Black and Puerto Rican youth by introducing drugs into the ghettoes. In the theory, the police are seen as the establishment's most often used mechanism for importing drugs into the community. The catchword to describe this alleged conspiracy is genocide.

The role of Italian-American criminal syndicates in narcotics importing and sale is also widely accepted in the ghetto. Community people believe it is Italian-Americans, not Blacks and Puerto Ricans, who profit most from the drug trade. Again, this belief mitigates the community's attitude toward the pusher.

As one observes the neighborhoods in the ghetto it is obvious that a fair number of the brightest young men in Black and Puerto Rican communities do go into organized crime, and that a number of the wealthiest and best known men in these communities are actively involved in organized crime. Community respect for Black and Puerto Rican organized criminals is high, extending even tho those involved in narcotics operation, just because of their success.

Why are Blacks and Puerto Ricans sympathetic to, and even envious of the Blacks and Puerto Ricans who have achieve success in organized crime? First of all, organized crime is in many ways merely one end of the American business and industrial structure and, as such, is viewed more as a business venture than as a moral evil. Although organized crime is an illicit enterprise, it follows many of the same rules as the American business system. Ghetto dwellers view organized crime from the same perspective many Americans adopt when they regard the American system of business enterprise. That is, they envy it and criticize it at the same time. The line between sharp business practice and theft is thin and can scarcely be distinguished by many Americans.

Poverty and powerlessness provide the moral climate that leads to acceptance of organized criminal activities. Like most Americans living in our consumer society, ghetto dwellers are hungry for money and for the goods and services it can procure. Ghetto dwellers are cut off from many legitimate ways of obtaining financial security. At the same time, they have fewer ways than white Americans to achieve the psychological security that can reduce incidence of crime. When a man is financially secure,

happy and secure in his work, has a stable family life and lives in a stable community, he has little reason to consider criminal activity as a vocational possibility. But Blacks and Puerto Ricans like other ethnics before them see organized crime as one of the few routes to success, to financial and thus psychological security, that is open to them. Poverty and powerlessness aids both in community acceptance of organized crime and in recruitment into its networks.

Conditions of poverty also nurture community desires for the services organized criminal operations provide. Escapism accounts for both widespread drug use and numbers gambling. Again, the resentment poverty and powerlessness brings in the subordinated population makes drugs and gambling attractive as mechanisms of rebellion. Organized crime is esteemed for the very reason that society outlaws it.

Finally, Blacks and Puerto Ricans consider the numbers game to be a harmless activity which is functionally a part of the community. Comparing the numbers racket to bingo, the lottery and to New York's Off-track Betting, they can see no reason why the numbers should not be legalized. But, because Blacks and Puerto Ricans are poor, and lack power, they are unable to push for decriminalization of policy. The alternatives New York City has attempted to provide--the lottery and Offtrack Betting--have failed completely to recreate the important aspects of the game, particularly its community and cultural focus. Blacks and Puerto Ricans continue to play the numbers, which is, not only a part of ghetto life but, has been described as the leading economic enterprise in the Black ghetto. Community people are proud of the numbers. It is policy operations, not

governmental economic proposals, that are viewed as an exemplar of Black capitalism.

It is important to note in the context of ethnic succession that none of these characteristics of organized crime are culture bound: the structures of poverty and powerlessness, rather than the structures of the Black and Puerto Rican cultures seem most responsible. It is, of course, probably that certain subcultures are more prone to certain kinds of specific behavior as a result of the normative structure of those cultures. As we observed among the Italian-Americans, for example, the cultural model provided by Mafia and other secret criminal organizations in the South of Italy led to a high degree of organizational development in the criminal syndicates operating in the United States. Certainly if there is a movement towards higher organization within Black and Puerto Rican networks, this movement will respond to the culture imperatives of those groups. This, however, is very different from a cultural propensity towards organized crime. Organized crime, involves a calculated pattern of offense to one or more of a culture's norms. Its presence is perhaps predictable whenever one culture in a dominating way holds such norms over the head of a lively and energetic dominated subculture. In such a situation, organized crime will probably persist until an adequate degree of assimilation and accommodation takes place. In effect we are suggesting that organized crime results from a conflict of cultures and we are further hypothesizing that organized crime as we know it in the United States requires an underclass of minority status ethnics in order to be operative.

There seems to be little question that assimilation and accommodation

with the larger American societies are the chief aims of Black and Puerto Rican organized criminals. This is not to suggest that they are not criminals and that they are not involved in illegal activities but rather that as was true of the Italians the Jews and the Irish before them, the greater motivation is to achieve social, occupational and residential mobility. Even while they themselves might never articulate such aims, even when their goals are limited by the scope of their own neighborhood, nevertheless they still exhibit single-minded striving for the material wealth and social security which motivates others in society as well. If Luis Santos or Kevin Horton of Franklin Squires cannot themselves quite imagine movement towards respectability and security then certainly they want this for their children and their children's children.

While all of this is fairly well known or at least perceived in Black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods, it would not be unfair to say that, aside from the occasional newspaper headlines and campaign pledges, there is little public knowledge that it is going on. To judge from its actions, the greater society seems to consider Black and Puerto Rican organized crime as one of the small prices it must pay for the continuance of the many psychological and economic comforts that accrue from the existence of an ethnic underclass. Indeed, when measured against the cost of eliminating such crime, the costs are small. The most visible cost--from the thefts and muggings of narcotic addicts--touch only a few people in the large urban areas. In many respects there is also a continuation of that traditional attitude of the criminal justice system: so long as ghetto dwellers keep their crimes within the ghetto and do not spill outside, leave them to themselves. It is when the muggings and the robberies have

reached the non-ghetto areas that there is a strong outcry. This attitude, which has traditionally been part of our law enforcement value system, allows organized crime to thrive within the ghetto. Once the organized crime networks find profitable sources of revenue outside the ghetto then the growing economic political and social impact of organized crime becomes a matter of public interest and social policy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

There are, we believe, a number of important implications of this study for the criminal justice system which appear throughout the report. Generally, we would classify them into two broad categories. One of these grows out of the research methods we have used. This is our second major study of organized crime using anthropological field work techniques to research organized crime in the community where it operates. As a result of this experience we are convinced that looking at organized crime as a social system is an important and promising approach to studying, understanding and eventually controlling organized crime in America. There is also a beginning appreciation in the criminal justice system that interdiction and apprehension of individual organized crime figures is a necessary but insufficient method of organized crime control. Yet both research and intelligence on organized crime remain unchanged and there also remains an overemphasis on the guillotine approach; if we knock off the head, the rest of the organization will fall apart. Law enforcement agencies have committed a major portion of their organized crime efforts in this direction with little obvious pay-off, a fact that is not lost on the public in general and the ghetto dweller in particular. There is now abundant evidence that organizational intelligence and analysis (rather than individual case development) could dramatically improve the ability of the criminal justice system to identify the social, cultural, political and economic factors which allow organized crime to develop and prosper and that there exists within the behavioral sciences and meta-

sciences such as systems analysis.both the methodology and manpower to develop such an approach. We are not here suggesting that surveillance, apprehension and incarceration of individual organized crime figures is not an important function of the criminal justice system but rather that even this task could be made immeasurably easier and more successful if we understood that organized crime is a feature of the social, economic and political structure of American society and that it can only be understood in those contexts. Once such an understanding is achieved, policies and practices for combating organized crime can be developed to attack the social problems which encourage the formation of organized crime groups. Just as important, strategies for destroying the organizational imperatives which are the cement which binds such groups internally, to each other, to the community in which they develop and to American society can be devised. It is, of course, necessary to do a great deal more research and development before we can even begin to develop the policies, practices and strategies we have described. Moreover, there must develop within the criminal justice system an appreciation for and a competence to utilize this approach to both the understanding and control of organized crime. This will require changes and adaptations at all levels of organized crime control planning and operations from specialized training of personnel to reorganization of intelligence gathering, storage and retrieval, and analysis systems within local, state and federal agencies. The fiscal and effort costs, however, will result in significant long-term gains.

Most of what we have said so far is equally applicable to street crime as well as the more organized criminal activities we have described in this report. Organized crime, however, both because it is group activity and because it persists as a system, presents some particular problems. A major problem is that it is essentially an urban phenomenon a fact which must be viewed in the perspective of American social trends for, by 1980, nine out of ten Americans will live in cities and after years of ominous previews, the problems of organized crime in the city will have become a distinctive pattern of every American's life. Despite many attempts, no cure has emerged for this problem which now seems to be becoming rapidly endemic.

Thus, most attempts at comprehensive crime control fail because they attack new problems with old solutions. Our problems are urban, but our education, values and behavior are essentially agrarian. At best we struggle to adapt a rural tradition to apparent urban needs. The city dweller is a distinct breed and, since the modern city is a distinct environment, new values shared by inhabitants must be discovered and examined. Only then can we develop programs which will be responsive to urban needs and begin an effective fight against urban ills. Our vision of the problem must be revised. This idea is obvious throughout our research and we propose a new approach to the control of organized crime and its relationship to the community.

First look at "organized crime" as it is presently defined. Criminologists use the term to distinguish professional from amateur in certain crimes. Organized crime is professional and structured by a cooperative

association of criminals. Sutherland and Cressey's classic text Principles of Criminology defines organized crime as follows:

> . . . (an) association of a small group of criminals for the execution of a certain type of crime, together with the development of plans by which detection may be avoided, the development of a fund of money and connections by means of which immunity or relative immunity may be secured in case of detection.[1]

Thus, any gang or group of criminals organized formally or informally to burgle, shoplift, steal automobiles or pick pockets is part of organized crime.

Governmental commissions and agencies, however, have tended to use a different definition which focuses upon the idea of a general conspiracy. The President's Commssion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice defines organized crime as

> . . . a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their working government. Involves thousands of criminals working within structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are conspiracies, carried out over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits.[2]

Any illicit activity intended to gain control or amass profits fits the definition. Thus a variety of activities are equally defined--drug peddling and gambling, extortion and loan sharking. And thus the

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[1] Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology, New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1955, p. 229

[2] The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Washington Government Printing Office , 1967, p. 187.

definition fails, for careful analysis of modern urban living shows drug peddling condemned by the same community in which gambling and loan sharking are condoned. Law enforcement officials and organized crime specialists link vices and crimes because they are manipulated by the same individuals. But the public, particularly those who patronize organized crime, make no such link. People who play the numbers condemn narcotic traffic; they consider gambling a minor vice providing entertainment and hope while hurting no one save the tax collector. Nowhere is this attitude more obvious than in urban ghettos.

Our data have exposed relationships between ethnicity and organized crime. They indicate with some clarity that every major ethnic group--the Irish, Jews, Italians and, most recently, the Blacks and Puerto Ricans--have faced the same basic dilemma: <u>How do you escape poverty through socially approved routes when such routes are often foreign to the ghetto life</u>? Crime resolves the dilemma because it provides a quick if perilous route out. Social history documents Irish, Jews and Italians following each other on this path. This research report presents evidence that the next group up will be the Blacks and Puerto Ricans as they displace Italians. Thomas Pettigrew, in an article entitled "Negro American Crime" has said, ". . . as with other minority groups who find discriminatory barriers blocking their path toward the mainstream of success-oriented American, many Negroes turn to crime. Crime may thus be utilized as a means of escape, ego-enhancement,

expression of aggression, and upward mobility."[3]

Ethnic consciousness and ethnic solidarity are enhanced by organized crime since it puts the ethnic group against the establishment and reinforces the contra-culture. The successful organized criminal becomes a cultural hero equal to the successful politician and in many cases closely associated with him. Moreover, the shared ethnicity serves as the basis for the protection of the organized criminal and for the reluctance of his co-ethnics to inform. Like Chairman Mao's classic guerilla, the successful organized criminal requires a supportive sea of co-ethnics in order to survive. Thus the low level of social disapproval placed upon the major organized crime activity in the ghetto--gambling as contrasted to drugs--are not only reflected in the attitudes of the ghetto dwellers but the organized criminal receives a certain degree of acclaim from his co-ethnics. He provides a service demanded by his clients, one which cannot be found elsewhere and one which is further enhanced because he is becoming successful in spite of the social barriers.

In effect, if we view organized crime as a cultural phenomenon we must take one step beyond current theory in criminology which proceeded from earlier attention to individual deviant acts to the more recent focus on subcultures. Organized crime is not a subculture in American society, it is a functional part of the whole society and must be viewed as part of that social system. It is a form of illicit enterprise and differs from

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[3]Thomas Pettigrew, "Negro American Crime" in A Profile of the Negro American, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964, p. 156.

business activity sanctioned by the establishment in degree rather than in kind. This message is not lost on ghetto dwellers and should not be lost on us.

A Community Action Approach to Combatting Organized Crime

The second, and we think major implication of this study for the criminal justice system compliments this approach of fighting organized crime as an organizational entity which is symbiotically as well as parasitically associated with American society. If we are to control and hopefully eradicate organized crime, there must be a reconnection between the community and the criminal justice system and some attempt must be made to influence and refocus our social attitudes toward prevention of organized crime. Human society is dependent on a measure of concensus among its members--concensus about goals to be sought and the means of attaining them. Throughout our continuing research on organized crime, all of the evidence leads us to a basic conviction that America's best hope for controlling organized crime is to increase consensus at the national and local levels, in the criminal justice system and in the community and among all citizens that organized crime in any form is unacceptable because of its costs to society and to the individual. Consensus emerges through communication; it rests upon shared values and commonly accepted rules for behavior, but most fundamentally, it grows out of the sense of community that develops when numbers of people and groups work together in common cause. Consensus on combatting organized crime, however, has been impossible to achieve because of changing

characteristics of communities and a sense of alienation between ethnic communities and the criminal justice system.

The term community has always denoted territoriality. It was a place. The community was where one lived and worked, where children were educated and where one went to church. Now, population increase and the new mobility often separate living from work and, especially in the megalopolis, community has come to connote a shared sense of common interest--which may or may not coincide with where one lives. Community then, has both a geographical and an issue dimension and while each neighborhood has its own concerns with crime within its boundaries, it shares an interest in the issue with other neighborhoods in the city and, indeed, throughout the nation. In developing a community-based program to combat organized crime, both the territorial and the interest dimensions must be considered and every significant setting--whether neighborhood, village, suburb, city, metropolitan region, state or the nation--in which citizen action can be mobilized must serve as a locus of action.

Like community, the criminal justice system is made up of several elements--the police, the courts, and the correction system--and, again like the community, these operate at the local, state and federal level. Americans are accustomed to think of communities as operating through two channels: (1) governmental or official, and (2) the private sector. We tend to think of the community as part of the "private" sector and the criminal justice system as wholly within the official sector. Traditionally, we have delegated the responsibility for crime, its consequences and its reduction to the "official" sector of government and very specifically to the criminal justice system, and certainly it must continue to play a

vital role in prevention as well as apprehension and rehabilitation. The criminal justice system at all levels, however, is partner to the community and at each of its levels of jurisdiction it is critical that the two work together for the common goal of crime prevention and reduction. Government and community are concepts in kind and where they are not joined, organized crime has its best environment.[4] Thus, it is impossible to assign the locus of organized crime prevention exclusively to the offical or private sector and crime and its reduction can not be meaningfully addressed without wide public awareness and acceptance of this responsibility and the acknowledgement that it cannot be delegated or abdicated to government.

While the community and the criminal justice system are similar they are separate and distinct networks within the broader system of society. Since they are sub-systems within the same society, they share many values, attitudes and codes of rules for behavior, but they have differences as well. The various levels and jurisdictions of the criminal justice system are designed to enforce and protect the laws which have been established to regulate behavior in society. Ideally, these laws should also be coincident with the community values. Such, however, is not always the case, and nowhere is this more obvious than in community attitudes toward organized crime. We are a society made up of a number of sub-cultures which hold differential values and attitudes toward proper behavior. These differences are sometimes significant and they

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[4]Cf. Francis A. J. Ianni, op cit., 1972, Chapter II.

mold the behavior of the individuals who make up the sub-cultures. This cultural pluralism produces many benefits for our society but it also makes the task of law enactment and enforcement a complex one. Where group attitudes and enacted law coincide, the disparity between the criminal justice system and the community is minimal; where they do not, the tension between the two is mutually dysfuntional. In both instances, however, the role of community crime prevention (as contrasted to current techniques) is to mediate between the developing attitudes of the community and the responsiveness of the criminal justice system. In modern American, it is increasingly obvious that there are problems in the present relationship between the criminal justice system and a number of sub-cultures and that some measure of the recent social unrest and disenchantment with the "system" may be indicative of a growing awareness and concern for these problems on the part of a large segment of the public. It is at this point of intervention that a well planned, carefully developed and mutually interactive strategy of change can be developed to reconnect the two networks. Thus, a community-based program for organized crime prevention may best be defined as a process by which we re-assert the premise that the principal and direct responsibility for crime prevention rests with the total community, including private as well as official sectors, and that government and society must be joined in this effort. This joint effort can and should be addressed at all levels of society and can take many forms from providing viable alternatives to the criminal behavior we have described in our networks through the elimination of corrupt practices in both the private and official sectors, down to the level of

physically reducing the opportunities to commit crime. The task is a monumental one but it can be accomplished if we establish a national ethic with respect to organized crime, if the total community is involved in providing the models for public trust and ethical concern and if we develop a common set of plans and a coordinate strategy for change.

Intervention in Social Processes as a Mechanism for Change

There are two basic approaches for introducing change into a system: replacement and adaptation methods. The replacement method is one in which attempts are made to replace inefficient or outmoded techniques with new, more efficient ones. The great technological advances which have resulted from scientific and engineering discoveries have revolutionized much of what we do in agriculture, industry and medicine. The second technique, adaptation, is more gradual and involves the redefinition or modification of existing practices. Certainly there are technological advances which can replace outmoded ones in crime reduction and prevention but generally, it should be assumed that the major changes needed to produce an adequate and effective program to combat organized crime require changes in attitude and behavior on the part of both the community and the criminal justice system. If relatively permanent (structural) changes are to be brought about, public perspectives on organized crime must be mobilized to (1) introduce appropriate change in attitudes as well as behavior and (2) maintain support for the changes once they are introduced. The changes in attitudes we have described are essential but they will not be sustained unless the new

ideas or techniques are incorporated in new social groups or become items on the agendas of established organizations.

In order to achieve both the necessary climate and to insure the institutionalization of changes in attitudes and behaviors in combating organized crime, two difficulties which have characterized previous attempts must be overcome. Past and present attempts to bring about structural, enduring changes in the relationship between the community and crime in general have been uncoordinated, hence scattered. In both the private and public sectors, individuals and organizations have developed programs of crime prevention using a variety of ideas and techniques. Some have been successful at the local level and some have even achieved a degree of national notice but generally their effects have been non-cumulative and hence ineffectual.

A second difficulty has been the tendency to develop programs which attempt to have a direct impact on the individual. Such programs fail because they do not build opportunities for change in the groups, structures and systems which influence and support the behavior of the individuals who are members. Thus, the individual may in fact be motivated to change his behavior but he is unable to find the necessary reinforcement and support. The cycle of recidivism which has troubled the courts, the correction system and society are testimony to the need for individuals to find some means of joining with others if attitudes and behaviors are to undergo structural change.

Thus, since gambling, loan sharking, prostitution and drug peddling are integral parts of ghetto life, associated social

problems must also be part of that life. All of our research evidence to date supports this position since we have been dramatically unsuccessful in stopping these activities by external intervention. The reason is obvious. While gambling, loan sharking, prostitution and drug peddling are all defined as criminal activities by authorities, people in the ghetto make a finer distinction. Not only are gambling and loan sharking relatively immune from public censure, they are valued positively because they provide services which cannot be obtained elsewhere and are considered a legitimate and even necessary part of social and economic life. This distinction added to the ghetto dweller's antagonism toward police has contributed to the failure of enforcement. Most educational programs fail also because they are presented by law enforcement authorities or educational institutions, neither of which are much trusted in the ghetto. Finally, as mentioned earlier, organized crime figures are folk heroes because they provide services while they seem to take on the establishment. This view, however, results from the failure of the ghetto resident to see organized crime as corrupting and few would believe there is any connection between gambling and drug pushing.

The dilemma persists: how do you develop an awareness in a population which is antagonistic towards those who possess the information and expertise to produce that awareness. A further problem is that organized crime, unlike other social problems has its own systematic organization and activity. Not only is the problem more difficult to see, it is also more difficult to solve.

The solution, we feel, is in community-based programs to prevent

organized crime from developing and to halt its spread once it is established. If organized crime is a sub-cultural phenomenon then it is important that those people who understand that sub-culture form the basis of remediation programs. Thus, self-studies by ethnic communities of the social and individual cost of organized crime in their neighborhood is an important first step. The involvement of community members in the development of organized crime prevention and control programming is the next but still untaken step. This must be more than token "checking with the community," however, and should involve a realistic appraisal of the use of community residents in program planning and evaluation operations. Finally, but most fundementally, the reconnection of the community and the criminal justice system is critical if there is to be any hope of controlling organized crime. Organized crime could not survive without corruption in government and industry nor can it thrive without community support. The one hope we see to control it is in joining those positive forces in each of these sectors in common cause.

APPENDIX A

Consultants Interviewed or Involved in Data Analyses

Donald Cressey, Criminologist, University of California at Santa Barbara

Anthony Giacobbe, Assistant District Attorney, Richmond County, New York

Arthur C. Grubert, Chief of Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department

Everett Harvey, Journalist, organized crime reporter for the Staten Island Advance

Wilbert Kirby, Member, Board of Corrections, City of New York

William McCarthy, Deputy Commissioner, Organized Crime Control, New York City Police Department

John McDowell, Assistant United States Attorney, Strike Force on Organized Crime, St. Louis, Missouri

Jeremiah McKenna, Associate Counsel, Joint Legislative Committee on Crime, State of New York

William Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney, Strike Force on Organized Crime for Brooklyn and Staten Island

Ralph Salerno, Consultant, Off-Track Betting Corporation

William Smith, First Deputy Police Commissioner, New York City Police Department

Captain John Sullivan, in charge of detective division, Staten Island, New York City

William Vanden Heuvel, Chairman, Board of Corrections, City of New York

Benjamin Ward, Deputy Commissioner, Community Affairs, New York Police Department

APPENDIX B

Protocol for Data Gatherers

1. Bio Data

   Birth
   Kinship
   Education
   Marriage
   Military Service
   Aliases
   Putative Kinship
   Relatives in New York
   Relatives Elsewhere

2. Residence and Mobility

   Place of Origin
   Childhood Residence
   Mobility Pattern

3. Occupational Data

   Complete History
   Partial History

4. Business Activities

   Network Businesses
   Network Related Businesses
   "Other Network"
      Related Businesses
   Independent Businesses

5. Social Pattern Data

   Memberships
   Friendship Patterns
   Social Activities
   Hobbies
   Athletics
   Non-Network Contacts

6. Travel

   Some Data
   Partial Data
   Complete Data

7. Politics

   Political Affiliations
   Political Contacts
   Political Activities
   Attitudinal Data

8. Community Activities

   Some Data
   Partial Data
   Complete Data

9. Illegal Activites

   a. Loan Sharking
   b. Gambling
   c. Narcotics
   d. Extortion (Cressey definition)
   e. Protection
   f. Prostitution
   g. Other

10. Social Control Data

    a. Authority Status
    b. Positional Data
       (social control network)
    c. Behavior Samples
    d. Attitudinal Data
    e. Situational Data

11. Behavior Code

    a. Network Behavior
    b. Network-Other Network Behavior
    c. Personal Code
    d. Biological Lineage or Family Behavior
    e. Social Norm-Attitude Data

12. Entry-Exit Data

    a. Into Network (Action-set)
    b. Into Legal Business
    c. Into Illegal Activities
    d. Out of Network
    e. Out of Legal Business

APPENDIX B

Coding and Categorizing System

Bio Data	Residence & Mobility	Occupational Data	Business Activities	Social Pattern Data	Travel	Politics
B, K, E, M, M.S., A, P.K., R.I., A.R.	P.O., C.R., M.P.	C.H., P.H.	F.B., F.R.B., O.F.B., I.B.	M, F.P., S.A., H, A, N.F.C.	S.D., P.D., C.D.	P.A., P.C., P.Ac., A.D.

APPENDIX B

Coding and Categorizing System

Community Activities	Illegal Activities	Social Control Data	Behavior Code	Entry-Exit Data	Life-Style Data
S.D., P.D., C.D.	L.S., G, N, E, O	A.S., P.D., B.S., A.D., S.D.	F.B., F.O.F.B., P.C., B.F.B., S.N.A.D.	I.F., I.L.B., I.I.A., O.F., S.N.A.D.	S.D., P.D., P.M.

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